[House Report 110-282]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
110th Congress
1st Session HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Report
110-282
_______________________________________________________________________
ENSURING MILITARY READINESS THROUGH STABILITY AND PREDICTABILITY
DEPLOYMENT POLICY ACT OF 2007
__________
R E P O R T
of the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
on
H.R. 3159
together with
DISSENTING VIEWS
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
July 31, 2007.--Ordered to be printed.
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Tenth Congress
IKE SKELTON, Missouri
JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina DUNCAN HUNTER, California
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas JIM SAXTON, New Jersey
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii TERRY EVERETT, Alabama
SILVESTRE REYES, Texas ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
VIC SNYDER, Arkansas HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON,
ADAM SMITH, Washington California
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina
ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
RICK LARSEN, Washington JEFF MILLER, Florida
JIM COOPER, Tennessee JOE WILSON, South Carolina
JIM MARSHALL, Georgia FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam TOM COLE, Oklahoma
MARK UDALL, Colorado ROB BISHOP, Utah
DAN BOREN, Oklahoma MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio
BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana JOHN KLINE, Minnesota
NANCY BOYDA, Kansas CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan
PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania PHIL GINGREY, Georgia
HANK JOHNSON, Georgia MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa THELMA DRAKE, Virginia
KIRSTEN GILLIBRAND, New York CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida
KATHY CASTOR, Florida
Erin C. Conaton, Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Purpose and Background........................................... 3
Legislative History.............................................. 3
Hearings......................................................... 3
Section-by-Section Analysis...................................... 4
Section 1--Short Title....................................... 4
Section 2--Minimum Periods of Rest and Recuperation for Units
of the Armed Forces........................................ 4
Committee Position............................................... 4
Congressional Budget Office Estimate............................. 4
Committee Cost Estimate.......................................... 5
Oversight Findings............................................... 6
Statement of Performance Goals and Objectives.................... 6
Constitutional Authority Statement............................... 6
Earmarks......................................................... 6
Statement of Federal Mandates.................................... 6
Record Votes..................................................... 6
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported............ 11
Dissenting Views:
Dissenting views of Duncan Hunter, Jim Saxton, John M.
McHugh, Howard P. ``Buck'' McKeon, J. Randy Forbes, Joe
Wilson, Rob Bishop, Jim Marshall, John Kline, Candice S.
Miller, Phil Gingrey, Trent Franks, Bill Shuster, Thelma
Drake, and K. Michael Conaway.............................. 12
Dissenting views of W. Todd Akin, Joe Wilson, Tom Cole, and
Trent Franks............................................... 15
110th Congress Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
1st Session 110-282
======================================================================
ENSURING MILITARY READINESS THROUGH STABILITY AND PREDICTABILITY
DEPLOYMENT POLICY ACT OF 2007
_______
July 31, 2007.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Skelton, from the Committee on Armed Services, submitted the
following
R E P O R T
together with
DISSENTING VIEWS
[To accompany H.R. 3159]
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
The Committee on Armed Services, to whom was referred the
bill (H.R. 3159) to mandate minimum periods of rest and
recuperation for units and members of the regular and reserve
components of the Armed Forces between deployments for
Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom, having
considered the same, report favorably thereon with an amendment
and recommend that the bill as amended do pass.
The amendment is as follows:
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the
following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Ensuring Military Readiness Through
Stability and Predictability Deployment Policy Act of 2007''.
SEC. 2. MINIMUM PERIODS OF REST AND RECUPERATION FOR UNITS OF THE ARMED
FORCES BETWEEN DEPLOYMENTS.
(a) Regular Components.--
(1) In general.--No unit of the Armed Forces specified in
paragraph (3) may be deployed in support of Operation Iraqi
Freedom unless the period between the most recent previous
deployment of the unit and a subsequent deployment of the unit
is equal to or longer than the period of such most recent
previous deployment.
(2) Sense of congress on optimal minimum period between
deployments.--It is the sense of Congress that the optimal
minimum period between the most recent previous deployment of a
unit of the Armed Forces specified in paragraph (3) and a
subsequent deployment of the unit in support of Operation Iraqi
Freedom should be equal to or longer than twice the period of
such most recent previous deployment.
(3) Covered units.--Subject to subsection (c), the units of
the Armed Forces specified in this paragraph are as follows:
(A) Units of the regular Army and members assigned to
those units.
(B) Units of the regular Marine Corps and members
assigned to those units.
(C) Units of the regular Navy and members assigned to
those units.
(D) Units of the regular Air Force and members
assigned to those units.
(b) Reserve Components.--
(1) In general.--No unit of the Armed Forces specified in
paragraph (3) may be deployed in support of Operation Iraqi
Freedom unless the period between the most recent previous
deployment of the unit and a subsequent deployment of the unit
is at least three times longer than the period of such most
recent previous deployment.
(2) Sense of congress on mobilization and optimal minimum
period between deployments.--It is the sense of Congress that
the units of the reserve components of the Armed Forces should
not be mobilized continuously for more than one year, and the
optimal minimum period between the previous deployment of a
unit of the Armed Forces specified in paragraph (3) and a
subsequent deployment of the unit in support of Operation Iraqi
Freedom should be five years.
(3) Covered units.--The units of the Armed Forces specified
in this paragraph are as follows:
(A) Units of the Army Reserve and members assigned to
those units.
(B) Units of the Army National Guard and members
assigned to those units.
(C) Units of the Marine Corps Reserve and members
assigned to those units.
(D) Units of the Navy Reserve and members assigned to
those units.
(E) Units of the Air Force Reserve and members
assigned to those units.
(F) Units of the Air National Guard and members
assigned to those units.
(c) Exemptions.--The limitations in subsections (a) and (b) do not
apply--
(1) to special operations forces as identified pursuant to
section 167(i) of title 10, United States Code; and
(2) to units of the Armed Forces needed, as determined by the
Secretary of Defense, to assist in the redeployment of members
of the Armed Forces from Iraq to another operational
requirement or back to their home stations.
(d) Waiver by the President.--The President may waive the limitation
in subsection (a) or (b) with respect to the deployment of a unit of
the Armed Forces to meet a threat to the national security interests of
the United States if the President certifies to Congress within 30 days
that the deployment of the unit is necessary for such purposes.
(e) Waiver by Military Chief of Staff or Commandant for Voluntary
Mobilizations.--
(1) Army.--With respect to the deployment of a member of the
Army who has voluntarily requested mobilization, the limitation
in subsection (a) or (b) may be waived by the Chief of Staff of
the Army.
(2) Navy.--With respect to the deployment of a member of the
Navy who has voluntarily requested mobilization, the limitation
in subsection (a) or (b) may be waived by the Chief of Naval
Operations.
(3) Marine corps.--With respect to the deployment of a member
of the Marine Corps who has voluntarily requested mobilization,
the limitation in subsection (a) or (b) may be waived by the
Commandant of the Marine Corps.
(4) Air force.--With respect to the deployment of a member of
the Air Force who has voluntarily requested mobilization, the
limitation in subsection (a) or (b) may be waived by the Chief
of Staff of the Air Force.
(f) Definitions.--In this Act:
(1) Deployment.--The term ``deployment'' or ``deployed''
means the relocation of forces and materiel to desired areas of
operations and encompasses all activities from origin or home
station through destination, including staging, holding, and
movement in and through the United States and all theaters of
operation.
(2) Unit.--The term ``unit'' means a unit that is deployable
and is commanded by a commissioned officer of the Army, Navy,
Air Force, or Marine Corps serving in the grade of major or, in
the case of the Navy, lieutenant commander, or a higher grade.
(g) Effective Date.--This Act shall take effect on the date of the
enactment of this Act.
PURPOSE AND BACKGROUND
The purpose of H.R. 3159, Ensuring Military Readiness
Through Stability and Predictability Deployment Policy Act of
2007, is to establish a statutory requirement that ensures
regular (active) component units and members assigned to those
units are provided a minimum period of rest and recuperation
that is equal to or longer than the period of the most recent
deployment, and a minimum period of rest and recuperation that
is at least three times longer than the period of deployment
for reserve (National Guard and Reserves) component units and
members assigned to those units.
The bill also includes a sense of Congress that the ratio
between the length of deployments and dwell time, the interval
between deployments, for regular components should be one year
deployed to two years at home station (a ratio of 1:2), and the
goal for the reserve components should be one year deployed to
five years at home station (a ratio of 1:5).
The Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, recently announced
a change to deployment policy on May 9, 2007, which would
extend the current policy for all active Army units from a 1:1
ratio (one year deployed and one year at home station) to a
policy of 15 months deployed and 12 months back at home
station. This policy change has raised serious concerns about
sustainability, and whether such a reduced period at home
station allows sufficient time for units and individuals to
adequately train, equip, and re-constitute for the next
deployment. The services are currently at a 1:1 ratio for
regular components and a 1:3 ratio for reserve components and
are not able to meet the Department of Defense goal of a 1:2
ratio for regular components and a 1:5 ratio for reserve
components given the current operational requirements.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
H.R. 3159 was introduced on July 24, 2007, and referred to
the Committee on Armed Services.
On July 27, 2007, the Committee on Armed Services held a
mark-up session to consider H.R. 3159, as introduced. The
committee agreed by unanimous consent to consider Chairman
Skelton's amendment in the nature of a substitute as the base
text. The committee, a quorum being present, ordered reported
H.R. 3159, as amended, to the House with a favorable
recommendation by a record vote of 32-25, with 2 voting
present.
HEARINGS
Committee consideration of the matter contained in H.R.
3159, Ensuring Military Readiness Through Stability and
Predictability Deployment Policy Act of 2007, was informed by
two full committee hearings. The full committee conducted a
hearing on January 23, 2007, ``Implications of Iraq Policy on
Total Force Readiness;'' and conducted a hearing on July 27,
2007, ``Hearing on H.R. 3159 and H.R. 3087.'' These hearings
dealt with rotational policy and the strain on the armed
forces, which has resulted from ongoing military operations.
SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS
The following is a section-by-section analysis of those
sections of H.R. 3159, as amended by the Committee on Armed
Services.
Section 1--Short title
This section would establish the short title of the bill as
the ``Ensuring Military Readiness Through Stability and
Predictability Deployment Policy Act of 2007.''
Section 2--Minimum periods of rest and recuperation for units of the
Armed Forces
This section would prohibit the deployment to Operation
Iraqi Freedom (OIF) of an active component unit or personnel
assigned to such unit unless the period of deployment between
the previous and proposed deployment was equal to or longer
than the period of the most recent previous deployment. Reserve
component units and personnel assigned to those units could not
be deployed to OIF unless the period of deployment between the
previous and proposed deployment was equal to or longer than
three times the period of the most recent previous deployment.
Additionally, this section would express the sense of
Congress that the active components deploying to OIF should
achieve an optimal deployment to dwell time ratio that is equal
to or longer than twice the deployment period, and reserve
components deploying to OIF should achieve an optimal
deployment of no more than one year and an optimal dwell time
of five years.
The section also would provide the President the ability to
waive the dwell times, if the President certifies to Congress
within 30 days after the waiver that the deployment of a unit
is necessary to meet a threat to the national security
interests of the United States. This section also would provide
the Chiefs of Staff of the services the ability to waive the
dwell times for voluntary mobilizations.
This section would also define ``unit,'' ``deployment,''
and ``deployed.'' This section would be effective upon date of
enactment.
COMMITTEE POSITION
On July 27, 2007, the Committee on Armed Services, a quorum
being present, ordered reported H.R. 3159, as amended, to the
House with a favorable recommendation by a record vote of 32-
25, with 2 voting present.
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE ESTIMATE
In compliance with clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules
of the House of Representatives, the cost estimate prepared by
the Congressional Budget Office and submitted pursuant to
section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 is as
follows:
July 31, 2007.
Hon. Ike Skelton,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 3159, the Ensuring
Military Readiness Through Stability and Predictability
Deployment Policy Act of 2007.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Matthew
Schmit.
Sincerely,
Peter R. Orszag,
Director.
Congressional Budget Office cost estimate
H.R. 3159 would require that military units receive minimum
periods of rest and recuperation between deployments in support
of Operation Iraqi Freedom. For active-duty units, the required
period of rest and recuperation would be at least as long as
their most recent deployment, and for Reserve and National
Guard units the required period would be at least three times
as long as their most recent deployment. Those requirements
could be waived if the President certifies to the Congress that
the deployments are in the interest of national security or if
the deployments are voluntary.
Currently, many units already receive sufficient time
between deployments to meet the minimum requirements specified
by this bill. However, some units, such as military
intelligence and aviation units, have been deploying more
frequently because they possess certain skills that are in high
demand in the Iraq theater of operations.
In any cases where the President chose to exercise the
waiver authority provided by this bill, H.R. 3159 would have no
significant budgetary effect, because the deployment of those
high-demand units would continue in the same manner as under
current law. However, in those cases where the President chose
not to exercise the waiver authority, there could be
significant costs or savings depending on which actions the
President undertook to comply with the requirements of this
bill.
To meet the bill's requirement for time between deployments
to the Iraq theater, the President could decide to reorganize
and retrain existing forces so that more personnel with high-
demand skills are available for overseas deployments, which
would result in additional costs to the Department of Defense.
Alternatively, the President could decide to comply with the
requirement by reducing the number of personnel deployed to
Iraq, which would result in budgetary savings. In both cases,
the costs or savings could be in the billions of dollars,
although CBO does not have enough information at this time to
estimate what those budgetary effects might be. Enacting the
bill would not affect direct spending or receipts.
H.R. 3159 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector
mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and
would impose no costs on state, local, or tribal governments.
The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Matthew Schmit.
This estimate was approved by Peter H. Fontaine, Deputy
Assistant Director for Budget Analysis.
COMMITTEE COST ESTIMATE
Pursuant to clause 3(d) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the committee concurs with CBO that
there is not enough information at this time to estimate the
budgetary effects of this bill, and thus it is not possible to
determine the bill's costs or savings. The committee also
concurs with CBO that enactment of the bill would not affect
direct spending or receipts.
OVERSIGHT FINDINGS
With respect to clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, the committee reports that the
findings and recommendations of the committee, based on
oversight activities pursuant to clause 2(b)(1) of rule X, are
incorporated in the descriptive portions of this report.
With respect to clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, this legislation does not include
any new spending or credit authority, nor does it provide for
any increase or decrease in tax revenues or expenditures.
With respect to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, the bill does not authorize
specific program funding.
STATEMENT OF PERFORMANCE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES
In compliance with clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII of the Rules
of the House of Representatives, the goals and objectives of
H.R. 3159, Ensuring Military Readiness Through Stability and
Predictability Deployment Policy Act of 2007, are to set
minimum periods of rest and recuperation for active and reserve
component units deployed to Operation Iraqi Freedom. For
active-duty forces, the bill calls for time between deployments
equal to or exceeding the length of the most recent previous
deployment. For National Guard and Reserve units and members,
the bill calls for time between deployments at least three
times longer than the length of the most recent previous
deployment.
CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY STATEMENT
Pursuant to clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the committee finds the authority for
this legislation in Article I, section 8 of the United States
Constitution.
EARMARKS
Pursuant to clause 9 of rule XXI, H.R. 3159, Ensuring
Military Readiness Through Stability and Predictability
Deployment Policy Act of 2007, contains no congressional
earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits as
defined in clause 9(d), 9(e), or 9(f) of rule XXI.
STATEMENT OF FEDERAL MANDATES
Pursuant to section 423 of Public Law 104-4, this
legislation contains no federal mandates with respect to state,
local, and tribal governments, nor with respect to the private
sector. Similarly, the bill provides no unfunded federal
intergovernmental mandates.
RECORD VOTES
In accordance with clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, record votes were taken with
respect to the committee's consideration of H.R. 3159. The
record votes are attached to this report.
The committee, a quorum being present, ordered reported
H.R. 3159, as amended, to the House with a favorable
recommendation by a record vote of 32-25, with 2 voting
present.
CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED
Clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of
Representatives requires an elaboration or description of how
the reported bill proposes to repeal or amend a statute or part
thereof. There were no changes in existing law made by H.R.
3159, as reported.
DISSENTING VIEWS
We believe that achieving the DOD deployment-to-dwell-time
goals for both active and reserve component units and personnel
is an important readiness objective that Congress should pursue
aggressively. The goal for the regular/active components is one
year deployed to two years at home station (1:2); and the goal
for the National Guard and other reserve components is one year
mobilized to five years demobilized (1:5). Congress can most
effectively assist in achieving those goals by committing the
resources necessary to substantially increase force structure
and manpower and to reset and modernize the military services.
Furthermore, if Congress is serious about improving unit
readiness and the service members' quality of life by the use
of deployment and dwell time measures, Congress ought to ensure
that they are achieved across the force, not just imposed on
those forces and people deploying to Iraq. We were disappointed
that the House Armed Services Committee, in a largely party-
line vote, defeated a proposal to reaffirm the achievement of
force-wide dwell-time goals and to have the Department of
Defense provide Congress with its plan to achieve those goals.
We have grave concerns about H.R. 3159 as amended--the bill
the committee approved in a largely party-line vote. We will
continue to oppose it for a number of reasons.
The bill would prohibit the deployment of active and
reserve component units that did not meet certain minimum
stand-down or ``dwell time'' requirements between deployments.
Such prohibitions intrude heavily and inappropriately into the
constitutional duties of the President as Commander in Chief.
Beyond that, the dwell time requirements appear to be not
so much efforts to improve the readiness of units and quality
of life of members in the Armed Forces, but rather to force a
withdrawal and reduction of U.S. forces committed to Operation
Iraqi Freedom. This is so because H.R. 3159 as amended levies
deployment prohibitions only on forces destined for Iraq that
did not meet certain dwell time minimums but would allow those
very same forces, regardless of dwell time, to be committed to
combat in Afghanistan or anywhere else in the world they are
needed. For the most highly deployed units, like the Army's
10th Mountain Division, the Iraq-only limitation raises the
false expectation among service members and their families that
there will be a reduction in deployment tempo--but does nothing
to reduce the likelihood of deployments to Afghanistan or other
operational hot-spots.
Moreover, we are concerned that by statutorily reducing the
pool of forces available for deployment in the midst of a war--
essentially putting brigades and battalions on the shelf, so to
speak--H.R. 3159 as amended would make substantial reductions
in the forces available to meet combatant commander
requirements. For example, the Marine Corps told the committee
that the deployment prohibitions would prevent the deployment
in fiscal year 2008 of eight Marine Corps battalion/squadron
sized combat-support and combat service support units that are
essential to the support of the Marine Corps' basic war
fighting unit--the Marine-Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF); one
Marine infantry battalion landing team; and one Marine
reinforced helicopter squadron.
H.R. 3159 as amended, which mandates that both units and
individuals assigned to them meet minimum dwell times between
deployments, would significantly hamper the ability of the Army
and Marine Corps, especially, to meet the combatant commanders'
requirements. For example, because 55,800 Marines (32 percent
of the active duty strength of the Marine Corps) already have
at least one deployment, they would not be available for
assignment to units deploying to Iraq. In the case of an Army
unit, say for example a brigade combat team, that has less than
a 1:1 deployment-to-dwell-time ratio, but nearly all its 3,500
assigned personnel meet or exceed the mandated dwell time
standard, the brigade could not deploy because of the mandated
dwell time limit established for units.
In claiming to improve the readiness and quality of life
for certain portions of the Armed Forces, H.R. 3159 as amended
ignores the likelihood that its mandates actually would degrade
readiness, extend some unit deployments, create further stress
and increase the risk to the force. In response to committee
questions about the impact of mandated dwell time and
deployment restrictions, the Marine Corps, for example,
outlined negative impacts created by such mandates:
In order to support OIF requirements during FY08 and
comply with the minimum period between deployments
proposed [by provisions like the Sen. Webb amendment
and H.R. 3159 as amended--a 1:1 ratio] the Marine Corps
would have to adjust force generation plans. . . .
These plan adjustments could include extending unit
deployments, creating provisional units and forcing
units to execute missions as in-lieu-of forces. Each of
these adjustments, among others, incurs higher risk
than that associated with deploying the unit at [a
deployment to dwell time ratio of] 7:6 and will create
additional force generation challenges for a greater
number of units in order to support subsequent OIF
rotations.
The supporters of H.R. 3159 as amended quickly dismissed
those concerns, citing the ability of the President to waive
any limitations imposed by the bill if he could certify to
Congress that a deployment was necessary to meet a threat to
the national security interests of the United States. Their
argument was that such a waiver would be easy to obtain, if not
automatic, and would therefore not interfere with the orderly
planning and deployment of units and individuals to Iraq.
We think that argument is disingenuous at best. Supporters
of H.R. 3159 cannot have it both ways. Either the legislation
does nothing significant or it significantly limits deployment
decisions. If the former, it is a sham. If the latter, it has
all the deficits previously illustrated.
Congress puts Presidential waiver requirements into
legislation with the expectation that waivers will be used
sparingly and will serve as a barrier to Executive Branch
action. The military services understand this and normally
would draw up plans and operations without the expectation of
obtaining a Presidential waiver. Not surprisingly, supporters
of H.R. 3159 as amended defeated Rep. Marshall's amendment to
make obtaining a Presidential waiver easier.
For these reasons, we will continue to oppose H.R. 3159 as
amended and urge all our colleagues to do so.
Duncan Hunter.
Jim Saxton.
John M. McHugh.
Howard P. ``Buck'' McKeon.
J. Randy Forbes.
Joe Wilson.
Rob Bishop.
Jim Marshall.
John Kline.
Candice S. Miller.
Phil Gingrey.
Trent Franks.
Bill Shuster.
Thelma Drake.
K. Michael Conaway.
DISSENTING VIEWS
Our men and women in uniform are the best in the world and
they deserve all the support and encouragement that we can
possibly give them. Our troops on the ground in Iraq,
Afghanistan and other countless places around the world, are
making us proud by their daily sacrifice and constant efforts
to protect our great nation.
Unfortunately, the Democrats have decided to make the rest
and recuperation of our troops into another tactic in their
misguided attempt to precipitously end the war in Iraq. H.R.
3159, which we voted against in committee, is simply another
empty partisan attack on the war in Iraq. It shows once again
that the Democrats don't actually have a strategy in Iraq, but
rather simply want to give up and pull out as fast as possible.
This bill focuses its dwell time requirements solely on
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) while ignoring the fact that our
ongoing fight against terrorism is requiring our men and women
in uniform to put in long deployments, in harm's way, in many
places other than just Iraq. Rather than reaffirm the goals for
dwell time laid out by Defense Secretary Gates for the whole
military and all missions, this bill mandates dwell times for
OIF in a backhanded effort to force us to withdraw from Iraq.
The goal of this bill is obviously to force our commanders
on the ground to retreat out of Iraq, because they would not
have enough troops to maintain the current op-tempo.
Unfortunately, if this bill were to become law, it would hurt
the troops currently deployed more than anyone else--by
extending their tours until troops in the U.S. had met these
newly imposed regulations on dwell time. The DOD does have
goals for dwell time for all units, as reinforced by Ms.
Drake's substitute amendment, but in times of war, the
Commander-in-Chief must be able to use the military as is
necessary.
Having opposed this bill in committee, we will also oppose
this bill on the floor of the House, as it does nothing but
harm to our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines.
W. Todd Akin.
Joe Wilson.
Tom Cole.
Trent Franks.