[House Report 110-131]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



110th Congress                                                   Report
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 1st Session                                                    110-131

======================================================================



 
          INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008

                                _______
                                

  May 7, 2007.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

    Mr. Reyes, from the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 
                        submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                     MINORITY AND ADDITIONAL VIEWS

                        [To accompany H.R. 2082]

      [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

  The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, to whom was 
referred the bill (H.R. 2082) to authorize appropriations for 
fiscal year 2008 for intelligence and intelligence-related 
activities of the United States Government, the Community 
Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency 
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, 
having considered the same, report favorably thereon with an 
amendment and recommend that the bill as amended do pass.
  The amendment is as follows:
  Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the 
following:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

  (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008''.
  (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents of this Act is as 
follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Intelligence Community Management Account.
Sec. 105. Incorporation of reporting requirements.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 202. Technical amendment to mandatory retirement provision.

 TITLE III--INTELLIGENCE AND GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROVISIONS

Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by 
law.
Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 303. Clarification of definition of intelligence community under 
the National Security Act of 1947.
Sec. 304. Extension to the intelligence community of authority to 
delete information about receipt and disposition of foreign gifts.
Sec. 305. Modification of requirements for reprogramming of funds for 
intelligence activities.
Sec. 306. Delegation of authority for travel on common carriers for 
intelligence collection personnel.
Sec. 307. Report on proposed pay for performance intelligence community 
personnel management system.
Sec. 308. Plan to increase diversity in the intelligence community.

  TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

      Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence

Sec. 401. Clarification of limitation on co-location of the Office of 
the Director of National Intelligence.
Sec. 402. Membership of the Director of National Intelligence on the 
Transportation Security Oversight Board.
Sec. 403. Additional duties of the Director of Science and Technology 
of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
Sec. 404. Leadership and location of certain offices and officials.
Sec. 405. Eligibility for incentive awards of personnel assigned to the 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
Sec. 406. Multi-level security clearances.
Sec. 407. National intelligence estimate on global climate change.
Sec. 408. Plan to implement recommendations of the data center 
efficiency reports.
Sec. 409. Comprehensive inventory of special access programs.
Sec. 410. Quarterly intelligence reports to Congress on Iran and North 
Korea.
Sec. 411. Accountability in intelligence contracting.
Sec. 412. Annual report on foreign language proficiency in the 
intelligence community.
Sec. 413. Intelligence community reports on foreign language 
proficiency.

                Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency

Sec. 421. Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 422. General authorities of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 423. Review of covert action programs by Inspector General of the 
Central Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 424. Report on audited financial statements progress.

                       Subtitle C--Other Elements

Sec. 431. Clarifying amendments relating to Section 105 of the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004.
Sec. 432. Repeal of certain authorities relating to the Office of the 
National Counterintelligence Executive.
Sec. 433. Clarification of inclusion of Coast Guard and Drug 
Enforcement Administration elements in the intelligence community.

                         TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS

                Subtitle A--General Intelligence Matters

Sec. 501. Aerial reconnaissance platforms.
Sec. 502. Extension of National Commission for Review of Research and 
Development Programs of the United States Intelligence Community.

                    Subtitle B--Technical Amendments

Sec. 511. Technical amendments relating to the multiyear National 
Intelligence Program.
Sec. 512. Technical clarification of certain references to Joint 
Military Intelligence Program and Tactical Intelligence and Related 
Activities.
Sec. 513. Technical amendments to the National Security Act of 1947.
Sec. 514. Technical amendments to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004.
Sec. 515. Technical amendments to the Executive Schedule.
Sec. 516. Technical amendments relating to titles of Central 
Intelligence Agency positions.
Sec. 517. Technical amendments relating to redesignation of the 
National Imagery and Mapping Agency as the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

  In this Act:
          (1) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term 
        ``congressional intelligence committees'' means--
                  (A) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of 
                the House of Representatives; and
                  (B) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
                Senate.
          (2) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence 
        community'' has the meaning given the term in section 3(4) of 
        the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

  Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2008 
for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities 
of the following elements of the United States Government:
          (1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
          (2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
          (3) The Department of Defense.
          (4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
          (5) The National Security Agency.
          (6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, 
        and the Department of the Air Force.
          (7) The Coast Guard.
          (8) The Department of State.
          (9) The Department of the Treasury.
          (10) The Department of Energy.
          (11) The Department of Justice.
          (12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
          (13) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
          (14) The National Reconnaissance Office.
          (15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
          (16) The Department of Homeland Security.

SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.

  (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The amounts 
authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and the authorized 
personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2008, for the conduct of the 
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the elements listed 
in such section, are those specified in the classified Schedule of 
Authorizations prepared to accompany the bill H.R. 2082 of the One 
Hundred Tenth Congress.
  (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.--The 
Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the Committees on 
Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and to the 
President. The President shall provide for suitable distribution of the 
Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the 
executive branch.

SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.

  (a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the Director of 
the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of National 
Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess 
of the number authorized for fiscal year 2008 under section 102 when 
the Director of National Intelligence determines that such action is 
necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions, 
except that the number of personnel employed in excess of the number 
authorized under such section may not, for any element of the 
intelligence community, exceed 2 percent of the number of civilian 
personnel authorized under such section for such element.
  (b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of National 
Intelligence shall promptly notify the congressional intelligence 
committees whenever the Director exercises the authority granted by 
this section.

SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

  (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the 
Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2008 the sum of 
$737,876,000. Within such amount, funds identified in the classified 
Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for advanced 
research and development shall remain available until September 30, 
2009.
  (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the 
Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National 
Intelligence are authorized 1035 full-time personnel as of September 
30, 2008. Personnel serving in such elements may be permanent employees 
of the Intelligence Community Management Account or personnel detailed 
from other elements of the United States Government.
  (c) Classified Authorizations.--
          (1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to amounts 
        authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community 
        Management Account by subsection (a), there are also authorized 
        to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management 
        Account for fiscal year 2008 such additional amounts as are 
        specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred 
        to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts for advanced 
        research and development shall remain available until September 
        30, 2009.
          (2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the personnel 
        authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Intelligence 
        Community Management Account as of September 30, 2008, there 
        are also authorized such additional personnel for such elements 
        as of that date as are specified in the classified Schedule of 
        Authorizations.
  (d) Reimbursement.--Except as provided in section 113 of the National 
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h), during fiscal year 2008 any 
officer or employee of the United States or a member of the Armed 
Forces who is detailed to the staff of the Intelligence Community 
Management Account from another element of the United States Government 
shall be detailed on a reimbursable basis, except that any such 
officer, employee, or member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis 
for a period of less than one year for the performance of temporary 
functions as required by the Director of National Intelligence.
  (e) National Drug Intelligence Center.--
          (1) In general.--Of the amount authorized to be appropriated 
        in subsection (a), $39,000,000 shall be available for the 
        National Drug Intelligence Center. Within such amount, funds 
        provided for research, development, testing, and evaluation 
        purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2009, and 
        funds provided for procurement purposes shall remain available 
        until September 30, 2010.
          (2) Transfer of funds.--The Director of National Intelligence 
        shall transfer to the Attorney General funds available for the 
        National Drug Intelligence Center under paragraph (1). The 
        Attorney General shall utilize funds so transferred for the 
        activities of the National Drug Intelligence Center.
          (3) Limitation.--Amounts available for the National Drug 
        Intelligence Center may not be used for purposes of exercising 
        police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers or internal 
        security functions.
          (4) Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
        the Attorney General shall retain full authority over the 
        operations of the National Drug Intelligence Center.

SEC. 105. INCORPORATION OF REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

  Each requirement to submit a report to the congressional intelligence 
committees that is included in the joint explanatory statement to 
accompany the conference report on the bill H.R. 2082 of the One 
Hundred Tenth Congress, or in the classified annex to this Act, is 
hereby incorporated into this Act, and is hereby made a requirement in 
law.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

  There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence 
Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 2008 the sum of 
$262,500,000.

SEC. 202. TECHNICAL AMENDMENT TO MANDATORY RETIREMENT PROVISION.

  Section 235(b)(1)(A) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement 
Act (50 U.S.C. 2055(b)(1)(A)) is amended to read as follows:
                  ``(A) upon reaching age 65, in the case of a 
                participant in the system serving in a position with a 
                Senior Intelligence Service rank of level 4 or 
                above;''.

 TITLE III--INTELLIGENCE AND GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROVISIONS

SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY 
                    LAW.

  Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, 
and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such 
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in 
such compensation or benefits authorized by law.

SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

  The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed 
to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity 
which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of 
the United States.

SEC. 303. CLARIFICATION OF DEFINITION OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY UNDER 
                    THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947.

  Subparagraph (L) of section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 
(50 U.S.C. 401a(4)) is amended by striking ``other'' the second place 
it appears.

SEC. 304. EXTENSION TO THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY OF AUTHORITY TO 
                    DELETE INFORMATION ABOUT RECEIPT AND DISPOSITION OF 
                    FOREIGN GIFTS.

  Section 7342(f)(4) of title 5, United States Code, is amended to read 
as follows:
  ``(4) In transmitting such listings for an element of the 
intelligence community (as such term is defined in section 3(4) of the 
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4))), the head of such 
element of the intelligence community may delete the information 
described in subparagraphs (A) and (C) of paragraphs (2) and (3) if the 
head of such element of the intelligence community certifies in writing 
to the Secretary of State that the publication of such information 
could adversely affect United States intelligence sources or 
methods.''.

SEC. 305. MODIFICATION OF REQUIREMENTS FOR REPROGRAMMING OF FUNDS FOR 
                    INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

  Section 504(a)(3)(B) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
414(a)(3)(B)) is amended to read as follows:
                  ``(B) the activity to be funded supports an emergent 
                need, improves program effectiveness, or increases 
                efficiency; and''.

SEC. 306. DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY FOR TRAVEL ON COMMON CARRIERS FOR 
                    INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PERSONNEL.

  (a) Delegation of Authority.--Section 116(b) of the National Security 
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404k(b)) is amended--
          (1) by inserting ``(1)'' before ``The Director'';
          (2) in paragraph (1), by striking ``may only delegate'' and 
        all that follows and inserting ``may delegate the authority in 
        subsection (a) to the head of any other element of the 
        intelligence community.''; and
          (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
  ``(2) The head of an element of the intelligence community to whom 
the authority in subsection (a) is delegated pursuant to paragraph (1) 
may further delegate such authority to such senior officials of such 
element as are specified in guidelines prescribed by the Director of 
National Intelligence for purposes of this paragraph.''.
  (b) Submission of Guidelines to Congress.--Not later than six months 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
Intelligence shall prescribe and submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees the guidelines referred to in paragraph (2) of 
section 116(b) of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by 
subsection (a).

SEC. 307. REPORT ON PROPOSED PAY FOR PERFORMANCE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 
                    PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM.

  (a) Prohibition on Pay for Performance Until Report.--The Director of 
National Intelligence and the head of each element of the intelligence 
community may not implement a plan that provides compensation to 
personnel of an element of the intelligence community based on 
performance until the date that is 45 days after the date on which the 
Director of National Intelligence submits a report under subsection 
(b).
  (b) Report.--The Director of National Intelligence shall submit to 
the congressional intelligence committees a report on performance-based 
compensation for the intelligence community, including--
          (1) an implementation time line, by phase and by element of 
        the intelligence community, which includes target dates for 
        completion of--
                  (A) the development of performance appraisal plans;
                  (B) establishment of oversight and appeal mechanisms;
                  (C) deployment of information technology systems;
                  (D) management training;
                  (E) employee training;
                  (F) compensation transition; and
                  (G) full operational capacity;
          (2) an estimated budget, by phase of implementation and 
        element of the intelligence community, for the implementation 
        of the performance-based compensation system;
          (3) an evaluation plan to monitor the implementation of the 
        performance-based compensation system and to improve and modify 
        such system;
          (4) written standards for measuring the performance of 
        employees;
          (5) a description of the performance-based compensation 
        system, including budget oversight mechanisms to ensure 
        sufficient funds to pay employees for bonuses;
          (6) a description of internal and external accountability 
        mechanisms to ensure the fair treatment of employees;
          (7) a plan for initial and ongoing training for senior 
        executives, managers, and employees;
          (8) a description of the role of any advisory committee or 
        other mechanism designed to gather the input of employees 
        relating to the creation and implementation of the system; and
          (9) an assessment of the impact of the performance-based 
        compensation system on women, minorities, persons with 
        disabilities, and veterans.

SEC. 308. PLAN TO INCREASE DIVERSITY IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

  (a) Strategic Plan Required.--The Director of National Intelligence 
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a plan to 
increase diversity across the intelligence community. Such plan shall 
include--
          (1) a description of the long term and short term goals for 
        the intelligence community;
          (2) a description of how the plan will be implemented by each 
        element of the intelligence community, taking into account the 
        unique nature of individual elements of the intelligence 
        community;
          (3) training and education programs for senior officials and 
        managers; and
          (4) performance metrics.
  (b) Restriction on Community Management Funds Until Submission of 
Plan.--The Director of National Intelligence may only obligate or 
expend 80 percent of the funds appropriated to the Intelligence 
Community Management Account pursuant to section 104(a) until the date 
on which the report required under subsection (a) is submitted.

  TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

      Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence

SEC. 401. CLARIFICATION OF LIMITATION ON CO-LOCATION OF THE OFFICE OF 
                    THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.

  Section 103(e) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-
3(e)) is amended--
          (1) in the heading, by striking ``With'' and inserting ``of 
        Headquarters With Headquarters of'' ;
          (2) by inserting ``the headquarters of'' before ``the 
        Office''; and
          (3) by inserting ``the headquarters of'' before ``any other 
        element''.

SEC. 402. MEMBERSHIP OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ON THE 
                    TRANSPORTATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT BOARD.

  Subparagraph (F) of section 115(b)(1) of title 49, United States 
Code, is amended to read as follows:
                  ``(F) The Director of National Intelligence, or the 
                Director's designee.''.

SEC. 403. ADDITIONAL DUTIES OF THE DIRECTOR OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 
                    OF THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL 
                    INTELLIGENCE.

  (a) Coordination and Prioritization of Research Conducted by Elements 
of Intelligence Community.--Subsection (d) of section 103E of the 
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3e) is amended--
          (1) in paragraph (3)(A), by inserting ``and prioritize'' 
        after ``coordinate''; and
          (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
  ``(4) In carrying out paragraph (3)(A), the Committee shall identify 
basic, advanced, and applied research programs to be executed by 
elements of the intelligence community.''.
  (b) Development of Technology Goals.--Such section is further 
amended--
          (1) in subsection (c)--
                  (A) in paragraph (4), by striking ``and'' at the end;
                  (B) by redesignating paragraph (5) as paragraph (6); 
                and
                  (C) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following 
                new paragraph:
          ``(5) assist the Director in establishing goals for the 
        elements of the intelligence community to meet the technology 
        needs of the intelligence community; and''; and
          (2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
  ``(e) Goals for Technology Needs of Intelligence Community.--In 
carrying out subsection (c)(5), the Director of Science and Technology 
shall--
          ``(1) systematically identify and assess the most significant 
        intelligence challenges that require technical solutions;
          ``(2) examine options to enhance the responsiveness of 
        research programs; and
          ``(3) ensure that programs are designed to meet the technical 
        requirements of the intelligence community.''.
  (c) Report.--(1) Not later than June 30, 2008, the Director of 
National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report containing a 
strategy for the development and use of technology in the intelligence 
community through 2018.
  (2) The report shall include--
          (A) an assessment of the highest priority intelligence gaps 
        across the intelligence community that may be resolved by the 
        use of technology;
          (B) goals for basic, advanced, and applied research and 
        development and a strategy to achieve such goals;
          (C) an explanation of how each advanced research and 
        development project funded under the National Intelligence 
        Program addresses an identified intelligence gap;
          (D) a list of all current and projected research and 
        development projects by research type (basic, advanced, or 
        applied) with estimated funding levels, estimated initiation 
        dates, and estimated completion dates; and
          (E) a plan to transition technology from research and 
        development projects into National Intelligence Program 
        acquisition programs.
  (3) The report may be submitted in classified form.

SEC. 404. LEADERSHIP AND LOCATION OF CERTAIN OFFICES AND OFFICIALS.

  (a) National Counter Proliferation Center.--Section 119A(a) of the 
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404o-1(a)) is amended--
          (1) by striking ``Establishment.--Not later than 18 months 
        after the date of the enactment of the National Security 
        Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, the'' and inserting ``(1) 
        Establishment.--The''; and
          (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:
  ``(2) Director.--The head of the National Counter Proliferation 
Center shall be the Director of the National Counter Proliferation 
Center, who shall be appointed by the Director of National 
Intelligence.
  ``(3) Location.--The National Counter Proliferation Center shall be 
located within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.''.
  (b) Officers.--Section 103(c) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)) is 
amended--
          (1) by redesignating paragraph (9) as paragraph (13); and
          (2) by inserting after paragraph (8) the following new 
        paragraphs:
          ``(9) The Chief Information Officer of the intelligence 
        community.
          ``(10) The Inspector General of the intelligence community.
          ``(11) The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center.
          ``(12) The Director of the National Counter Proliferation 
        Center.''.

SEC. 405. ELIGIBILITY FOR INCENTIVE AWARDS OF PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO THE 
                    OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.

  (a) In General.--Subsection (a) of section 402 of the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1984 (50 U.S.C. 403e-1) is amended to 
read as follows:
  ``(a) Authority for Payment of Awards.--(1) The Director of National 
Intelligence may exercise the authority granted in section 4503 of 
title 5, United States Code, with respect to Federal employees and 
members of the Armed Forces detailed or assigned to the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence in the same manner as such authority 
may be exercised with respect to personnel of the Office.
  ``(2) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency may exercise 
the authority granted in section 4503 of title 5, United States Code, 
with respect to Federal employees and members of the Armed Forces 
detailed or assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency in the same 
manner as such authority may be exercised with respect to personnel of 
the Agency.''.
  (b) Repeal of Obsolete Authority.--Such section is further amended--
          (1) by striking subsection (c); and
          (2) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (c).
  (c) Conforming Amendments.--Such section is further amended--
          (1) in subsection (b), by striking ``to the Central 
        Intelligence Agency or to the Intelligence Community Staff'' 
        and inserting ``to the Office of the Director of National 
        Intelligence or to the Central Intelligence Agency''; and
          (2) in subsection (c), as redesignated by subsection (b)(2) 
        of this section, by striking ``Director of Central 
        Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of National 
        Intelligence or Director of the Central Intelligence Agency''.
  (d) Technical and Stylistic Amendments.--That section is further 
amended--
          (1) in subsection (b)--
                  (A) by inserting ``Personnel Eligible for Awards.--'' 
                after ``(b)'';
                  (B) by striking ``subsection (a) of this section'' 
                and inserting ``subsection (a)''; and
                  (C) by striking ``a date five years before the date 
                of enactment of this section'' and inserting ``December 
                9, 1978''; and
          (2) in subsection (c), as so redesignated, by inserting 
        ``Payment and Acceptance of Awards.--'' after ``(c)''.

SEC. 406. MULTI-LEVEL SECURITY CLEARANCES.

  (a) In General.--Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 
(50 U.S.C. 403-1) is amended by adding at the end the following new 
subsection:
  ``(s) Multi-Level Security Clearances.--The Director of National 
Intelligence shall establish a multi-level security clearance system 
for the intelligence community to enable the intelligence community to 
more efficiently make use of persons proficient in foreign languages or 
with cultural, linguistic, or other subject matter expertise that is 
critical to national security.''.
  (b) Establishment Date.--The Director of National Intelligence shall 
establish a multi-level security clearance system under section 102A(s) 
of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a), not 
later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 407. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE.

  (a) National Intelligence Estimate.--Not later than 270 days after 
the date of enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
Intelligence shall submit to Congress a national intelligence estimate 
on the anticipated geopolitical effects of global climate change and 
the implications of such effects on the national security of the United 
States.
  (b) Content.--In preparing the national intelligence estimate 
required by this section, the Director of National Intelligence shall--
          (1) assess the political, social, agricultural, and economic 
        risks during the 30-year period beginning on the date of 
        enactment of this Act posed by global climate change for 
        countries or regions that are--
                  (A) of strategic national security importance to the 
                United States and at risk of significant impact due to 
                global climate change; or
                  (B) at significant risk of large-scale humanitarian 
                suffering with cross-border implications as predicted 
                on the basis of the assessments;
          (2) assess the capabilities of the countries or regions 
        described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (1) to 
        respond to adverse national security impacts caused by global 
        climate change;
          (3) assess the strategic challenges and opportunities posed 
        to the United States by the risks described in paragraph (1); 
        and
          (4) assess the impact of global climate change on the 
        activities of the United States intelligence community 
        throughout the world.
  (c) Coordination.--In preparing the national intelligence estimate 
under this section, the Director of National Intelligence shall consult 
with representatives of the scientific community, and, as appropriate, 
multilateral institutions and allies of the United States that have 
conducted significant research on global climate change.
  (d) Form.--The national intelligence estimate required by this 
section (including key judgments) shall be submitted in unclassified 
form, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 408. PLAN TO IMPLEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE DATA CENTER 
                    EFFICIENCY REPORTS.

  (a) Plan.--The Director of National Intelligence shall develop a plan 
to implement the recommendations of the report submitted to Congress 
under section 1 of the Act entitled ``An Act to study and promote the 
use of energy efficient computer servers in the United States'' (Public 
Law 109-431; 120 Stat. 2920) across the intelligence community.
  (b) Report.--
          (1) In general.--Not later then February 1, 2008, the 
        Director of National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a 
        report containing the plan developed under subsection (a).
          (2) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted 
        in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

SEC. 409. COMPREHENSIVE INVENTORY OF SPECIAL ACCESS PROGRAMS.

  Not later than January 15, 2008, the Director of National 
Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees 
a classified report providing a comprehensive inventory of all special 
access programs under the National Intelligence Program (as defined in 
section 3(6) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(6))).

SEC. 410. QUARTERLY INTELLIGENCE REPORTS TO CONGRESS ON IRAN AND NORTH 
                    KOREA.

  (a) In General.--
          (1) Report.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
        U.S.C. 413 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the 
        following new section:
  ``quarterly intelligence reports to congress on iran and north korea
  ``Sec. 508.  (a) Report.--
          ``(1) In general.--On a quarterly basis, the Director of 
        National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional 
        intelligence committees a report on the current intentions and 
        capabilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Democratic 
        People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) with regard to the 
        nuclear programs of Iran and North Korea, respectively, 
        including--
                  ``(A) an assessment of nuclear weapons programs;
                  ``(B) an evaluation, consistent with existing 
                reporting standards and practices, of the sources upon 
                which the intelligence is based, including the number 
                of sources and the reliability of each source;
                  ``(C) a summary of any new intelligence gathered or 
                developed since the previous report, including 
                intelligence collected from both open and clandestine 
                sources; and
                  ``(D) a discussion of any dissents, caveats, gaps in 
                knowledge, or other information that would reduce 
                confidence in the overall assessment.
          ``(2) Form.--Each report submitted under paragraph (1) may be 
        submitted in classified form.
  ``(b) Access to Report.--Each report submitted under subsection 
(a)(1) shall be made available to all members of the congressional 
intelligence committees and to all staff of the congressional 
intelligence committees with appropriate security clearance. Other 
members of the Senate or the House of Representatives may review the 
reports in accordance with security procedures established by each of 
the congressional intelligence committees.''.
          (2) Conforming amendment.--The table of contents in the first 
        section of such Act is amended by inserting after the item 
        relating to section 507 the following new item:

``Sec. 508. Quarterly intelligence reports to Congress on Iran and 
North Korea.''.

  (b) Effective Date.--The first report required to be submitted under 
section 508(a)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by 
subsection (a)(1), shall be submitted not later than 30 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 411. ACCOUNTABILITY IN INTELLIGENCE CONTRACTING.

  (a) Oversight Report on IC Contractors.--
          (1) Report.--
                  (A) In general.--Title V of the National Security Act 
                of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.) is further amended by 
                adding at the end the following new section:
             ``report on intelligence community contractors
  ``Sec. 509.  Not later each year than the date provided in section 
507, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees a report on contractors funded 
under the National Intelligence Program. Such report shall include--
          ``(1) a list of all contractors that--
                  ``(A) have been the subject of an investigation 
                completed by the Inspector General of any element of 
                the intelligence community during the preceding fiscal 
                year,
                  ``(B) are the subject of an investigation by such an 
                Inspector General during the current fiscal year, or
                  ``(C) will be the subject of an investigation that 
                may affect the ability of the contractor to deliver 
                contracted services to the intelligence community by 
                such an Inspector General during the current fiscal 
                year,
        either as a corporate entity or an individual employee, for 
        financial waste, fraud, abuse of government resources, failure 
        to perform a contract, or criminal violations; and
          ``(2) the number of contractors performing services for each 
        element of the intelligence community.''.
                  (B) Report date.--Section 507(a)(1) of such Act (50 
                U.S.C. 415b(a)(1)) is amended by--
                          (i) redesignating subparagraph (N) as 
                        subparagraph (J);
                          (ii) adding at the end the following new 
                        subparagraph:
          ``(K) The annual report on intelligence community contractors 
        required by section 509.''.
          (2) Conforming amendment.--The table of contents in the first 
        section of such Act is further amended by inserting after the 
        item relating to section 508, as added by section 410, the 
        following new item:

``Sec. 509. Report on intelligence community contractors''.

  (b) Report on Regulations and Accountability Mechanisms Governing 
Intelligence Community Contractors.--
          (1) Report requirement.--Not later than February 1, 2008, the 
        Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the 
        congressional intelligence committees a report on 
        accountability mechanisms that govern the ongoing performance 
        of contractors for personal services contracts under the 
        National Intelligence Program.
          (2) Matters covered.--The report submitted under paragraph 
        (1) shall include--
                  (A) a list of statutes and regulations that govern 
                the ongoing performance of contractors for services 
                contracts entered into by each element of the 
                intelligence community;
                  (B) an analysis of accountability mechanisms within 
                services contracts awarded for intelligence activities 
                by each element of the intelligence community during 
                fiscal years 2006 and 2007;
                  (C) an analysis of procedures in use in the 
                intelligence community for conducting oversight of 
                contractors to ensure identification and prosecution of 
                criminal violations, financial waste, fraud, or other 
                abuses committed by contractors or contract personnel; 
                and
                  (D) an identification of best practices of 
                accountability mechanisms within services contracts.
          (3) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted 
        in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.
  (c) Impact of Contractors on the Intelligence Community Workforce.--
          (1) Report requirement.--Not later than March 1, 2008, the 
        Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the 
        congressional intelligence committees a report on the impact of 
        contractors on the intelligence community workforce under the 
        National Intelligence Program.
          (2) Matters covered.--The report submitted under paragraph 
        (1) shall include--
                  (A) an identification of contracts where the 
                contractor is providing a substantially similar 
                functions to a government employee;
                  (B) a comparison of the compensation of contract 
                employees and government employees performing 
                substantially similar functions;
                  (C) an analysis of the attrition of government 
                personnel for contractor positions that provide 
                substantially similar functions; and
                  (D) an estimate of the value of the infrastructure 
                provided to contract employees for government furnished 
                equipment, facilities, or other support, by agency and 
                expenditure center.

SEC. 412. ANNUAL REPORT ON FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY IN THE 
                    INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

  (a) Report.--
          (1) In general.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 
        (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.) is further amended by adding at the end 
        the following new section:
 ``report on foreign language proficiency in the intelligence community
  ``Sec. 510.  Not later each year than the date provided in section 
507, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees a report on the foreign language 
proficiency of each element of the intelligence community, including--
          ``(1) the number of positions authorized for such element 
        that require foreign language proficiency and the level of 
        proficiency required;
          ``(2) the number of positions authorized for such element 
        that require foreign language proficiency that are filled by--
                  ``(A) military personnel; and
                  ``(B) civilian personnel;
          ``(3) the number of applicants for positions in such element 
        in the previous fiscal year that indicated foreign language 
        proficiency, including the foreign language indicated and the 
        proficiency level;
          ``(4) the number of persons hired by such element with 
        foreign language proficiency, including the foreign language 
        and proficiency level;
          ``(5) the number of personnel of such element currently 
        attending foreign language training, including the provider of 
        such training;
          ``(6) a description of such element's efforts to recruit, 
        hire, train, and retain personnel that are proficient in a 
        foreign language; and
          ``(7) an assessment of methods and models for basic, 
        advanced, and intensive foreign language training.''.
          (2) Report date.--Section 507(a)(1) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 
        415b(a)(1)) is further amended by adding at the end the 
        following new subparagraph:
          ``(L) The annual report on foreign language proficiency in 
        the intelligence community required by section 510.''.
  (b) Conforming Amendment.--The table of contents in the first section 
of such Act is further amended by inserting after the item relating to 
section 509, as added by section 411, the following new item:

``Sec. 510. Report on foreign language proficiency in the intelligence 
community.''.

SEC. 413. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY REPORTS ON FOREIGN LANGUAGE 
                    PROFICIENCY.

  (a) Annual Reports.--
          (1) In general.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 
        (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the 
        following new section:
            ``annual reports on foreign language proficiency
  ``Sec. 120.  (a) In General.--The head of each element of the 
intelligence community shall annually submit to the Director of 
National Intelligence a report on the foreign language proficiency of 
the personnel of such element.
  ``(b) Contents.--
          ``(1) In general.--Each report submitted under subsection (a) 
        shall include, for each foreign language and, where 
        appropriate, dialect of a foreign language--
                  ``(A) the number of positions of such element that 
                require proficiency in the foreign language or dialect;
                  ``(B) the number of personnel of such element that 
                are serving in a position that--
                          ``(i) requires proficiency in the foreign 
                        language or dialect to perform the primary duty 
                        of the position; and
                          ``(ii) does not require proficiency in the 
                        foreign language or dialect to perform the 
                        primary duty of the position;
                  ``(C) the number of personnel that are proficient in 
                the foreign language or dialect that--
                          ``(i) are authorized for the element of the 
                        intelligence community for which the report is 
                        submitted; and
                          ``(ii) the head of such element considers 
                        necessary for such element for each of the five 
                        years following the date of the submission of 
                        the report;
                  ``(D) the number of personnel of such element rated 
                at each level of proficiency of the Interagency 
                Language Roundtable;
                  ``(E) whether the number of personnel at each level 
                of proficiency of the Interagency Language Roundtable 
                meets the requirements of such element;
                  ``(F) the number of personnel serving or hired to 
                serve as linguists for such element that are not 
                qualified as linguists under the standards of the 
                Interagency Language Roundtable;
                  ``(G) the number of personnel hired to serve as 
                linguists for such element during the preceding 
                calendar year;
                  ``(H) the number of personnel serving as linguists 
                that discontinued serving such element during the 
                preceding calendar year;
                  ``(I) the percentage of work requiring linguistic 
                skills that is fulfilled by an ally of the United 
                States;
                  ``(J) the percentage of work requiring linguistic 
                skills that is fulfilled by contractors; and
                  ``(K) the percentage of work requiring linguistic 
                skills that is fulfilled by members of the Armed 
                Forces.
          ``(2) Military personnel.--Except as provided in paragraph 
        (1)(K), a report submitted under subsection (a) shall not 
        include personnel that are members of the Armed Forces on 
        active duty assigned to the element for which the report is 
        submitted.
  ``(c) DNI Report to Congress.--The Director of National Intelligence 
shall annually submit to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of 
the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence 
and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of 
the Senate a report containing--
          ``(1) each report submitted to the Director of National 
        Intelligence for a year under subsection (a);
          ``(2) an assessment of the foreign language capacity and 
        capabilities of the intelligence community as a whole; and
          ``(3) recommendations for eliminating required reports 
        relating to foreign-language proficiency that the Director of 
        National Intelligence considers outdated or no longer 
        relevant.''.
          (2) Table of contents.--Such Act is further amended in the 
        table of contents in the first section by inserting after the 
        item relating to section 119B the following new item:

``Sec. 120. Annual reports on foreign language proficiency.''.

  (b) Effective Date.--
          (1) Report by heads of elements of the intelligence 
        community.--The first report required to be submitted by the 
        head of each element of the intelligence community under 
        section 120(a) of the National Security Act of 1947, as added 
        by subsection (a)(1), shall be submitted not later than 180 
        days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
          (2) Report by dni.--The first report required to be submitted 
        by the Director of National Intelligence under section 120(c) 
        of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection 
        (a)(1), shall be submitted not later than 240 days after the 
        date of the enactment of this Act.

                Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency

SEC. 421. DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

  (a) Establishment and Duties of the Position of Deputy Director of 
Central Intelligence Agency.--(1) Title I of the National Security Act 
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 
104A the following new section:
          ``deputy director of the central intelligence agency
  ``Sec. 104B.  (a) Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency.--There is a Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency 
who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and 
consent of the Senate.
  ``(b) Duties.--The Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency 
shall--
          ``(1) assist the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency 
        in carrying out the duties and responsibilities of the 
        Director; and
          ``(2) act for, and exercise the powers of, the Director of 
        the Central Intelligence Agency during the absence or 
        disability of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, 
        or during a vacancy in the position of Director of the Central 
        Intelligence Agency.''.
  (2) Conforming Amendment.--The table of contents in the first section 
of such Act is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 
104A the following new item:

``Sec. 104B. Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.''.

  (b) Executive Schedule Level III.--Section 5314 of title 5, United 
States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to the Deputy 
Directors of Central Intelligence and inserting the following new item:
          ``Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.''.

SEC. 422. GENERAL AUTHORITIES OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

  Section 5(a)(1) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 
U.S.C. 403f(a)(1)) is amended by striking ``any of the functions or 
activities authorized under paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 102(a), 
subsections (c)(7) and (d) of section 103, subsections (a) and (g) of 
section 104, and section 303 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
U.S.C. 403(a)(2), (3), 403-3(c)(7), (d), 403-4(a), (g), and 405),'' and 
inserting ``any functions or activities authorized by law to be 
conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency''.

SEC. 423. REVIEW OF COVERT ACTION PROGRAMS BY INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE 
                    CIA.

  (a) In General.--Section 503 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
U.S.C. 413b) is amended by--
          (1) redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (g) and 
        transferring such subsection to the end;
          (2) by inserting after subsection (d) the following new 
        subsection:
  ``(e) Inspector General Audits of Covert Actions.--
          ``(1) In general.--Subject to paragraph (2), the Inspector 
        General of the Central Intelligence Agency shall conduct an 
        audit of each covert action at least every three years.
          ``(2) Terminated, suspended programs.--The Inspector General 
        of the Central Intelligence Agency is not required to conduct 
        an audit under paragraph (1) of a covert action that has been 
        terminated or suspended if such covert action was terminated or 
        suspend prior to the last audit of such covert action conducted 
        by the Inspector General and has not been restarted after the 
        date on which such audit was completed.
          ``(3) Report.--Not later than 60 days after the completion of 
        an audit conducted pursuant to paragraph (1), the Inspector 
        General of the Central Intelligence Agency shall submit to the 
        congressional intelligence committees a report containing the 
        results of such audit.''.
  (b) Conforming Amendments.--Title V of the National Security Act of 
1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.) is amended--
          (1) in section 501(f) (50 U.S.C. 413(f)), by striking 
        ``503(e)'' and inserting ``503(g)'';
          (2) in section 502(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 413b(a)(1)), by striking 
        ``503(e)'' and inserting ``503(g)''; and
          (3) in section 504(c) (50 U.S.C. 414(c)), by striking 
        ``503(e)'' and inserting ``503(g)''.

SEC. 424. REPORT ON AUDITED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS PROGRESS.

  Section 114A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404i-1) 
is amended by striking ``the Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency,''.

                       Subtitle C--Other Elements

SEC. 431. CLARIFYING AMENDMENTS RELATING TO SECTION 105 OF THE 
                    INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 
                    2004.

  Section 105(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2004 (Public Law 108-177; 117 Stat. 2603; 31 U.S.C. 311 note) is 
amended--
          (1) by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and 
        inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''; and
          (2) by inserting ``or in section 313 of such title,'' after 
        ``subsection (a)),''.

SEC. 432. REPEAL OF CERTAIN AUTHORITIES RELATING TO THE OFFICE OF THE 
                    NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE.

  (a) Repeal of Certain Authorities.--Section 904 of the 
Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (title IX of Public Law 
107-306; 50 U.S.C. 402c) is amended--
          (1) by striking subsections (d), (h), (i), and (j);
          (2) in subsection (g), by striking paragraphs (3) and (4); 
        and
          (3) by redesignating subsections (e), (f), (g), (k), (l), and 
        (m) as subsections (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), and (i), 
        respectively.
  (b) Conforming Amendments.--That section is further amended--
          (1) in subsection (d), as redesignated by subsection (a)(2) 
        of this section, by striking ``subsection (f)'' each place it 
        appears in paragraphs (1) and (2) and inserting ``subsection 
        (e)''; and
          (2) in subsection (e)(2), as so redesignated, by striking 
        ``subsection (e)(2)'' and inserting ``subsection (d)(2)''.

SEC. 433. CLARIFICATION OF INCLUSION OF COAST GUARD AND DRUG 
                    ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION ELEMENTS IN THE 
                    INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

  Section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)) 
is amended--
          (1) in subparagraph (H)--
                  (A) by inserting ``the Coast Guard,'' after ``the 
                Marine Corps,''; and
                  (B) by inserting ``the Drug Enforcement 
                Administration,'' after ``the Federal Bureau of 
                Investigation,''; and
          (2) in subparagraph (K), by striking ``, including the Office 
        of Intelligence of the Coast Guard''.

                         TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS

                Subtitle A--General Intelligence Matters

SEC. 501. AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE PLATFORMS.

  (a) Limitation on Termination of U-2 Aircraft Program.--The Secretary 
of Defense may not begin the process to terminate the U-2 aircraft 
program until the Secretary certifies in accordance with subsection (b) 
that there would be no loss of national or Department of Defense 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities in 
transitioning from the U-2 aircraft program to the Global Hawk RQ-4 
unmanned aerial vehicle platform.
  (b) Report and Certification.--
          (1) Study.--The Secretary of Defense shall conduct a study of 
        aerial reconnaissance platforms to determine whether the Global 
        Hawk RQ-4 unmanned aerial vehicle has reached mission 
        capability and has attained collection capabilities on a par 
        with the collection capabilities of the U-2 Block 20 aircraft 
        program as of April 1, 2006.
          (2) Report.--The Secretary shall submit to the congressional 
        committees specified in subsection (c) a report containing the 
        results of the study. The Secretary shall include in the report 
        the Secretary's determination as to whether the Global Hawk RQ-
        4 unmanned aerial vehicle--
                  (A) has reached mission capability; and
                  (B) has attained collection capabilities on a par 
                with the collection capabilities of the U-2 Block 20 
                aircraft program as of April 1, 2006.
          (3) Certification.--The Secretary shall include with the 
        report the Secretary's certification, based on the results of 
        the study, as to whether or not there would be a loss of 
        national or Department of Defense intelligence, surveillance, 
        and reconnaissance capabilities with a transition from the U-2 
        aircraft program to the Global Hawk RQ-4 unmanned aerial 
        vehicle platform.
  (c) Specified Committees.--The congressional committees specified in 
this subsection are the following:
          (1) The Committee on Armed Services and the Select Committee 
        on Intelligence of the Senate.
          (2) The Committee on Armed Services and the Permanent Select 
        Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

SEC. 502. EXTENSION OF NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR REVIEW OF RESEARCH AND 
                    DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS OF THE UNITED STATES 
                    INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

  (a) Extension.--
          (1) In general.--Section 1007(a) of the Intelligence 
        Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 50 
        U.S.C. 401 note) is amended by striking ``September 1, 2004'' 
        and inserting ``September 1, 2008''.
          (2) Effective date.--The amendment made by subsection (a)(1) 
        shall take effect as if included in the enactment of section 
        1007 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
        2003.
  (b) Funding.--
          (1) In general.--Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated 
        by this Act for the Intelligence Community Management Account, 
        the Director of National Intelligence shall make $2,000,000 
        available to the National Commission for the Review of the 
        Research and Development Programs of the United States 
        Intelligence Community (in this subsection referred to as the 
        ``Commission'') established under section 1002(a) of the 
        Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 
        107-306; 116 Stat. 2438; 50 U.S.C. 401 note) to carry out title 
        X of such Act.
          (2) Availability.--Amounts made available to the Commission 
        under paragraph (1) shall remain available until expended.

                    Subtitle B--Technical Amendments

SEC. 511. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATING TO THE MULTIYEAR NATIONAL 
                    INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.

  (a) In General.--Subsection (a) of section 1403 of the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (50 U.S.C. 404b) is 
amended--
          (1) in the subsection heading, by striking ``Foreign''; and
          (2) by striking ``foreign'' each place it appears.
  (b) Responsibility of DNI.--That section is further amended--
          (1) in subsections (a) and (c), by striking ``Director of 
        Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of National 
        Intelligence''; and
          (2) in subsection (b), by inserting ``of National 
        Intelligence'' after ``Director''.
  (c) Conforming Amendment.--The heading of that section is amended to 
read as follows:

``SEC. 1403. MULTIYEAR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.''.

SEC. 512. TECHNICAL CLARIFICATION OF CERTAIN REFERENCES TO JOINT 
                    MILITARY INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM AND TACTICAL 
                    INTELLIGENCE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES.

  Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1) 
is amended--
          (1) in subsection (c)(3)(A), by striking ``annual budgets for 
        the Joint Military Intelligence Program and for Tactical 
        Intelligence and Related Activities'' and inserting ``annual 
        budget for the Military Intelligence Program or any successor 
        program or programs''; and
          (2) in subsection (d)(1)(B), by striking ``Joint Military 
        Intelligence Program'' and inserting ``Military Intelligence 
        Program or any successor program or programs''.

SEC. 513. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947.

  The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is 
amended--
          (1) in section 102A (50 U.S.C. 403-1)--
                  (A) in subsection (c)(7)(A), by striking ``section'' 
                and inserting ``subsection'';
                  (B) in subsection (d)--
                          (i) in paragraph (3), by striking 
                        ``subparagraph (A)'' in the matter preceding 
                        subparagraph (A) and inserting ``paragraph 
                        (1)(A)''; and
                          (ii) in paragraph (5)(A), by striking ``or 
                        personnel'' in the matter preceding clause (i);
                  (C) in subsection (l)(2)(B), by striking ``section'' 
                and inserting ``paragraph''; and
                  (D) in the heading of subsection (n), by striking 
                ``Acquisition Authorities'' and inserting ``Acquisition 
                and Other Authorities''; and
          (2) in section 119(c)(2)(B) (50 U.S.C. 404o(c)(2)(B)), by 
        striking ``subsection (h)'' and inserting ``subsection (i)''.

SEC. 514. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM 
                    PREVENTION ACT OF 2004.

  (a) Amendments to National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 
2004.--The National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (title I 
of Public Law 108-458) is amended as follows:
          (1) In section 1016(e)(10)(B) (6 U.S.C. 485(e)(10)(B)), by 
        striking ``Attorney General'' the second place it appears and 
        inserting ``Department of Justice''.
          (2) In section 1061 (5 U.S.C. 601 note)--
                  (A) in subsection (d)(4)(A), by striking ``National 
                Intelligence Director'' and inserting ``Director of 
                National Intelligence''; and
                  (B) in subsection (h), by striking ``National 
                Intelligence Director'' and inserting ``Director of 
                National Intelligence''.
          (3) In section 1071(e), by striking ``(1)''.
          (4) In section 1072(b), by inserting ``Agency'' after 
        ``Intelligence''.
  (b) Other Amendments to Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention 
Act of 2004.--The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 
2004 (Public Law 108-458) is amended as follows:
          (1) In section 2001 (28 U.S.C. 532 note)--
                  (A) in subsection (c)(1), by inserting ``of'' before 
                ``an institutional culture'';
                  (B) in subsection (e)(2), by striking ``the National 
                Intelligence Director in a manner consistent with 
                section 112(e)'' and inserting ``the Director of 
                National Intelligence in a manner consistent with 
                applicable law''; and
                  (C) in subsection (f), by striking ``shall,'' in the 
                matter preceding paragraph (1) and inserting ``shall''.
          (2) In section 2006 (28 U.S.C. 509 note)--
                  (A) in paragraph (2), by striking ``the Federal'' and 
                inserting ``Federal''; and
                  (B) in paragraph (3), by striking ``the specific'' 
                and inserting ``specific''.

SEC. 515. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE.

  (a) Executive Schedule Level II.--Section 5313 of title 5, United 
States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to the Director 
of Central Intelligence and inserting the following new item:
          ``Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.''.
  (b) Executive Schedule Level IV.--Section 5315 of title 5, United 
States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to the General 
Counsel of the Office of the National Intelligence Director and 
inserting the following new item:
          ``General Counsel of the Office of the Director of National 
        Intelligence.''.

SEC. 516. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATING TO TITLES OF CENTRAL 
                    INTELLIGENCE AGENCY POSITIONS.

  Section 17(d)(3)(B)(ii) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 
1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(d)(3)(B)(ii)) is amended--
          (1) in subclause (I), by striking ``Executive Director'' and 
        inserting ``Associate Deputy Director'';
          (2) in subclause (II), by striking ``Deputy Director for 
        Operations'' and inserting ``Director of the National 
        Clandestine Service''; and
          (3) in subclause (IV), by striking ``Deputy Director for 
        Administration'' and inserting ``Director for Support''.

SEC. 517. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATING TO REDESIGNATION OF THE 
                    NATIONAL IMAGERY AND MAPPING AGENCY AS THE NATIONAL 
                    GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

  (a) Title 5, United States Code.--(1) Title 5, United States Code, is 
amended by striking ``National Imagery and Mapping Agency'' each place 
it appears in a provision as follows and inserting ``National 
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency'':
          (A) Section 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii).
          (B) Section 3132(a)(1)(B).
          (C) Section 4301(1) (in clause (ii)).
          (D) Section 4701(a)(1)(B).
          (E) Section 5102(a)(1) (in clause (x)).
          (F) Section 5342(a)(1)(K).
          (G) Section 6339(a)(1)(E).
          (H) Section 7323(b)(2)(B)(i)(XIII).
  (2) Section 6339(a)(2)(E) of such title is amended by striking 
``National Imagery and Mapping Agency, the Director of the National 
Imagery and Mapping Agency'' and inserting ``National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency''.
  (b) Title 44, United States Code.--(1)(A) Section 1336 of title 44, 
United States Code, is amended by striking ``National Imagery and 
Mapping Agency'' both places it appears and inserting ``National 
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency''.
  (B) The heading of such section is amended to read as follows:

``Sec. 1336. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency: special 
                    publications''.

  (2) The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 13 of such 
title is amended by striking the item relating to section 1336 and 
inserting the following new item:

``1336. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency: special 
publications.''.

  (c) Homeland Security Act of 2002.--Section 201(f)(2)(E) of the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121(f)(2)(E)) is amended by 
striking ``National Imagery and Mapping Agency'' and inserting 
``National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency''.
  (d) Inspector General Act of 1978.--Section 8H of the Inspector 
General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended by striking ``National 
Imagery and Mapping Agency'' each place it appears and inserting 
``National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency''.
  (e) Ethics in Government Act of 1978.--Section 105(a)(1) of the 
Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended by striking 
``National Imagery and Mapping Agency'' and inserting ``National 
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency''.
  (f) Other Acts.--(1) Section 7(b)(2)(A)(i) of the Employee Polygraph 
Protection Act of 1988 (29 U.S.C. 2006(b)(2)(A)(i)) is amended by 
striking ``National Imagery and Mapping Agency'' and inserting 
``National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency''.
  (2) Section 207(a)(2)(B) of the Legislative Branch Appropriations 
Act, 1993 (44 U.S.C. 501 note) is amended by striking ``National 
Imagery and Mapping Agency'' and inserting ``National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency''.

                                Purpose

    The purpose of H.R. 2082 is to authorize the intelligence 
and intelligence-related activities of the United States 
Government for FY 2008 in order to enhance the national 
security of the United States, to support and assist the armed 
forces of the United States, and to support and oversee the 
President's execution of the foreign policy of the United 
States. The bill also clarifies certain Intelligence Community 
authorities and makes technical corrections to existing 
statutes.

                 Classified Annex and Committee Intent

    The classified annex to this report includes the classified 
Schedule of Authorizations and its associated explanatory 
language. The Committee views the classified annex as an 
integral part of this legislation. The classified annex 
contains a thorough discussion of the issues considered by the 
Committee underlying the funding authorizations found in the 
classified Schedule of Authorizations. The Committee intends 
that all intelligence programs discussed in the classified 
annex to this report be conducted in accordance with the 
guidance and limitations set forth as associated language 
therein. The classified Schedule of Authorizations is 
incorporated directly into this legislation by virtue of 
Section 102 of the bill. The classified annex is available for 
review by all Members of the House of Representatives, subject 
to the requirements of clause 13 of rule XXIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, and rule 14 of the Rules of 
Procedure for the House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence. In addition, Section 105 of the bill incorporates 
reporting requirements of the Classified Annex and any Joint 
Explanatory Statement into the Act.

                       Scope of Committee Review

    The bill authorizes U.S. intelligence and intelligence-
related activities under the jurisdiction of the Committee, 
including the National Intelligence Program (NIP), the Military 
Intelligence Program (MIP), and the Information System Security 
Program (ISSP). The NIP consists of all activities of the 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, as well as 
national foreign intelligence, intelligence-related, and/or 
counterintelligence activities conducted by: (1) the Central 
Intelligence Agency; (2) the Department of Defense; (3) the 
Defense Intelligence Agency; (4) the National Security Agency; 
(5) the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; (6) the 
Coast Guard; (7) the Department of State; (8) the Department of 
the Treasury; (9) the Department of Energy; (10) the Department 
of Justice; (11) the Federal Bureau of Investigation; (12) the 
Drug Enforcement Administration; (13) the National 
Reconnaissance Office; (14) the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency; and (15) the Department of Homeland 
Security. The Committee has exclusive legislative, authorizing 
and oversight jurisdiction of these programs.

                     Committee Statement and Views


                              A. OVERVIEW

    The change in leadership of the Congress, coupled with the 
appointment of a new Director of National Intelligence (DNI) in 
early 2007, provides a fresh opportunity for assessing the work 
of America's Intelligence Community.
    On a bipartisan basis, Members of the Committee have spent 
countless hours in briefings, hearings, and field visits with 
the professionals who comprise the Intelligence Community. The 
Committee is consistently impressed with their patriotism, 
dedication to mission, and commitment to doing our nation's 
most sensitive--and dangerous--business, often without public 
acknowledgment or recognition.
    More than five years after the attacks of September 11, 
2001, no one disputes the importance that good intelligence 
plays in protecting American lives. Intelligence assessments 
also play a pivotal role in informing policymakers as they 
grapple with monumental decisions about war and peace. And, as 
we tragically learned in the context of the Iraq war, faulty 
intelligence or the distortion of the intelligence process can 
lead to disastrous consequences for the nation.
    Today, the United States faces a dynamic set of threats, 
challenges, and opportunities. The pressing challenges of Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and Al Qa'ida, as well as other long-term 
problems, have been the subject of multiple Committee hearings 
in the 110th Congress.
    Each of these problems requires an integrated, focused 
intelligence capability. Two years ago, Congress established 
the Director of National Intelligence and reshaped the U.S. 
Intelligence Community. Today, that reorganization has clearly 
yielded some important benefits to U.S. national security, but 
serious challenges remain.
    Specifically, the Committee recognizes the important 
innovation of providing intelligence from across the Community 
to the President and senior policymakers in their daily 
briefings. As a result, analysis has become more careful and 
more integrated. The Committee also applauds the efforts to 
integrate intelligence collection by the Mission Managers--
particularly those for Iran and North Korea--and by other 
elements of the DNI staff to hone the process of developing 
analysis-driven collection requirements to fill key 
intelligence gaps.
    The Committee has been less impressed with the effort to 
restrain the growth of the DNI's office into a new layer of 
bureaucracy. The recent 100-day agenda released by the DNI 
contained a great deal of bureaucratic verbiage but failed to 
articulate a clear and compelling plan for addressing chronic 
problems plaguing the Intelligence Community, such as 
deficiencies in foreign language capability, lack of diversity, 
information-sharing impediments, overclassification, and the 
lack of common security clearance practices.
    The Committee believes the President has appointed a 
seasoned intelligence professional as DNI. The new Director has 
both the experience and the acumen needed to transform the 
Intelligence Community and fix the long-standing tension 
between the Intelligence Community and the Defense Department. 
It is our hope that nothing will distract Director McConnell 
from the core task of the DNI: identifying gaps in what America 
knows (ranging from the whereabouts of a specific terrorist 
cell to the long-range intentions of a rival nation); 
corralling the intelligence collectors to close those gaps as 
quickly as possible; and applying focused analysis to provide 
the support that U.S. policymakers need to address national 
security threats.

                        B. THE COMMITTEE REVIEW

    The Committee completed its review of the President's FY 
2008 budget request, carrying out its annual responsibility to 
prepare an authorization based on close examination of the U.S. 
government's intelligence programs and proposed expenditures.
    The Committee conducted 15 formal Committee and 
Subcommittee budget hearings on numerous topics, including the 
following:
         National Intelligence Program overview
         Military Intelligence Program overview
         Facilities and Infrastructure
         Signals Intelligence
         Geospatial Intelligence
         Counterintelligence
         Integration of Domestic Intelligence
         Research & Development and Systems Acquisition
         Personnel and Security
         Human Intelligence
         All-Source Analysis and Analytic Tradecraft
         Covert Action
    In addition to these formal hearings, Committee Members and 
staff have taken numerous budget-related briefings covering all 
major intelligence programs within the National Intelligence 
Program, the Military Intelligence Program, and the Information 
System Security Program.
    As always, the Committee's legislative and budgetary 
actions are based on more than these budget-specific hearings 
and briefings. The actions taken in this bill are the result of 
the Committee's ongoing, rigorous oversight of the U.S. 
Intelligence Community. This oversight activity includes the 
scores of Committee and subcommittee hearings and briefings; 
site visits and fact-finding trips; reviews of congressionally 
directed reports; and studies of intelligence capabilities, 
strategies, plans, and challenges throughout the year.

                           C. THE LEGISLATION

    The bill and accompanying classified Schedule of 
Authorizations includes the Committee's recommended 
authorizations for the President's FY 2008 budget request. This 
includes an authorization for the intelligence portion of the 
FY 2008 Emergency Supplemental for funding counterterrorism 
operations and operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The 
Committee views these funds as an integral part of the FY 2008 
budget and has specifically decided to authorize these 
activities for the full year in this legislation at this time.
    H.R. 2082 improves U.S. intelligence capabilities in 
several important respects.
    First, the bill promotes responsible budgeting by shifting 
significant resources from the Supplemental request into the 
base budget, for both the NIP and the MIP. The Administration's 
over-reliance on so-called ``emergency'' supplemental bills has 
been a tactic to shield government spending from the scrutiny 
of the regular budget process. For years, the Committee has 
pressed the Administration to change this practice as it 
relates to easily foreseeable programs, particularly in the 
counterterrorism area. Shifting money from the supplemental to 
the base allows for operators in the field to plan operations 
for the year and promotes greater oversight by the Committee.
    Second, the bill focuses on improving capabilities in areas 
of cross-community importance, such as human capital, research 
and development, analysis, human intelligence, 
counterintelligence, and acquisition management. The bill 
shifts resources into higher priority areas and requires the 
Intelligence Community to provide greater focus on areas of 
acute need. For example, the bill:
         Adds funds to both the General Defense 
        Intelligence Program (GDIP) and the Central 
        Intelligence Agency (CIA) for human intelligence 
        (HUMINT) training;
         Forces managers of a major HUMINT initiative 
        to develop a stronger organizational strategy for 
        penetrating hard targets;
         Invests in language training for collectors 
        and analysts as well as in language translation 
        capabilities;
         Adds funding to send additional analysts 
        overseas;
         Cuts wasteful spending on contractors at a 
        major agency;
         Adds funds to implement the recommendations of 
        an advisory panel that will result in a greater 
        integration of tasking for critical overhead assets;
         Attempts to improve the chances for success of 
        the National Security Agency's (NSA) flagship 
        modernization program by mandating the creation of a 
        streamlined acquisition oversight process;
         Provides for additional counterintelligence 
        field operations, both in the Federal Bureau of 
        Investigation (FBI) and the Department of Defense;
          Forces creation of a detailed plan to ensure 
        coordinated, de-conflicted, and prioritized Research & 
        Development in the Intelligence Community; and
          Adds funds to develop a transition strategy 
        between current and planned overhead collection systems 
        to prevent a future capability gap.
    Third, the bill compels the Administration to address 
critical overhead architecture issues that have been festering 
for some time and have been made worse by a series of 
acquisition failures. The difficult choices in this area will 
ensure that the Intelligence Community's limited resources are 
directed towards the systems that will help the U.S. to 
maintain its technological edge, particularly in space, and to 
support the full range of customers who depend upon space 
assets.
    Finally, the bill strengthens internal and external 
oversight of covert action programs.

                      D. AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST

Director of National Intelligence

    This year, the Committee is reviewing the DNI's second 
intelligence budget, and the Committee believes that this is an 
appropriate time to evaluate the DNI's progress in meeting the 
goals of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 
(IRTPA).
    The Committee continues to be disappointed that the DNI has 
not assumed a more directive role in coordinating the 
Intelligence Community. Changing the culture of the 
intelligence agencies, breaking down stovepipes, and creating a 
unified Intelligence Community takes more than a consensus-
based approach to management. Also, the Committee is concerned 
that the DNI has not taken a consistent approach on whether the 
ODNI will serve as coordinator, or executor, of Intelligence 
Community functions.
    The Committee is concerned that the DNI has had several 
false starts in meeting the goals of the IRTPA. The Committee 
observes that the DNI started, re-evaluated, and changed 
direction on both internal organization and on establishing an 
integrated collection architecture for the Intelligence 
Community. In other areas, the DNI has yet to establish 
community-wide requirements to measure progress. In particular, 
the Committee is concerned that the DNI remains unable to set 
goals and requirements for important skills, including foreign 
language capability.

The President's Domestic Surveillance Program

    The Administration has proposed sweeping changes to the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). The Committee is 
encouraged that the Administration's response to any 
shortcomings in the law is not circumvention of FISA but rather 
a legislative proposal to change FISA.
    The Committee will seriously consider the Administration's 
FISA proposal in both open and closed hearings. We welcome 
proposals to ensure that the FISA system has sufficient 
resources to conduct surveillance on terrorists operating in 
the United States. We also welcome proposals to ensure that 
FISA is up to date and technology neutral (i.e., does not 
distinguish between ``wire'' and ``radio'' communications).
    It is, however, also essential that FISA's original purpose 
be maintained: to keep national-security-related surveillance 
tightly focused on the people who would do America harm while 
protecting the 4th Amendment rights of the American people.
    But before the Committee will support any change to 
existing law, it is essential that the President provide some 
measure of assurance that were he to sign a bill modifying FISA 
into law, he would agree to be bound by it.
    The Committee believes it is essential to continue its 
close oversight of NSA surveillance conducted as part of the 
President's Domestic Surveillance Program. Although 
surveillance now operates under the supervision of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court, to our knowledge, the actual 
surveillance activities have not changed. To better understand 
what the President authorized, the Committee will continue to 
urge the Executive Branch to provide the Intelligence 
Committees with copies of the President's authorizations for 
this program, as well as underlying memos explaining its 
legality. No serious oversight can proceed without these 
fundamental documents.

Detainees held by the Intelligence Community

    On September 6, 2006, the President revealed the existence 
of a CIA program to hold and interrogate certain detainees 
suspected of terrorist activities. In that same announcement, 
the President declared that all detainees being held in the 
program at that time had been transferred to the U.S. Naval 
Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, but he stated that this program 
would continue and that, in the future, the CIA was authorized 
to hold and interrogate other detainees.
    This policy continues to be the subject of considerable 
controversy, and the Committee believes that allegations of 
detainee mistreatment--to include allegations of torture--have 
undermined the reputation of the U.S. government. The 
perception that the U.S. is not fully committed to the 
principles of the Geneva Conventions and recognized standards 
of humane treatment endangers U.S. military and civilian 
personnel around the world. The Committee believes that 
allowing access by an independent, impartial organization would 
increase confidence that U.S. treatment of detainees complies 
with obligations under the Geneva Conventions as well as U.S. 
and international law.
    Accordingly, the Committee strongly urges the DNI to begin 
negotiations with the International Committee for the Red Cross 
(ICRC) on the terms and conditions under which the ICRC would 
be provided access to any detainee held by any element of the 
Intelligence Community, and to allow the ICRC access to such 
facilities.
    The ICRC is provided access to all military detention 
facilities, and has demonstrated its ability to keep the 
records of such visits confidential. The Committee believes 
that the ICRC would be able to keep its visits to Intelligence 
Community facilities under heightened secrecy and 
confidentiality. The DNI should work in consultation with the 
Committee to develop an acceptable protocol for allowing ICRC 
experts to assess the conditions under which any element of the 
Intelligence Community is holding or interrogating any 
detainee.

FBI's use of national security letters

    The Committee considered very carefully the March 2007 
report by the Department of Justice Inspector General (IG) 
regarding the FBI's use of national security letters (NSLs). 
The report made clear that the FBI believes NSLs are vital for 
uncovering threats to our country's national security.
    However, as many Members made clear during the Committee's 
March 28, 2007 hearing in open session on the IG report, the 
Committee is dismayed by the FBI's failure to properly oversee 
its use of these investigative tools. Accordingly, the 
Committee will continue to evaluate the use of these 
authorities and determine whether there is a need to modify 
existing legislation.
    When Congress was reconsidering NSLs during the 
reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act in 2005, FBI and Justice 
Department officials offered assurances that the NSL 
authorities would be used with great care because of the 
potential that NSLs, if abused, could enable law enforcement 
officials to infringe upon Americans' civil liberties.
    Despite these assurances, the Justice Department IG made 
clear that no effective management controls were put in place: 
Agents had little understanding of NSL authorities; FBI 
officials who were not authorized to issue NSLs sent more than 
700 ``exigent letters'' that improperly cited an immediate 
threat in order to justify the provision of records; critical 
documents were not kept; databases were flawed; violations of 
law and policy were not reported as required; and the FBI's 
reports to Congress on its use of NSLs were inaccurate. These 
myriad management problems led the Inspector General to assert 
in congressional testimony that the FBI may have violated the 
law, attorney general guidelines, or FBI policies as many as 
3,000 times. While the Inspector General found no evidence of 
malicious or even intentional misconduct, any misuse of NSL 
authorities, for whatever reason, is unacceptable.
    Perhaps most disturbingly, FBI officials testified that 
these problems might not have been uncovered were it not for 
the congressionally mandated Inspector General's inquiry. This 
assessment demonstrates the need for outside oversight of NSLs, 
as well as the need for improvement in the FBI's ability to 
police itself.
    The FBI and Justice Department have pledged to take many 
corrective measures to address the problems uncovered in the 
IG's report, to include an internal investigation to determine 
where the Bureau failed and to assess accountability for these 
failures. The Committee directs the FBI Director to provide the 
FBI's report of this investigation, upon completion, to the 
Committee and to inform the Committee of all corrective 
measures it takes as a result of this investigation.
    FBI officials also asserted that the Bureau is developing a 
computer system that will automate many administrative aspects 
of NSL requests to prevent mistakes, to ensure compliance with 
law, policy, and regulations, and to guarantee accurate reports 
to Congress. The Committee requests that the FBI provide 
quarterly briefings on the status of the development and 
deployment of this computer system beginning in the first 
quarter of FY 2008 and continuing until the system has been 
fully operational for at least one year.

Counterintelligence

    The Committee believes that the nation's management of its 
counterintelligence services is in need of significant reform. 
Although the nation's vulnerability to foreign intelligence 
collection efforts stems from a variety of factors, the 
Committee believes that one of the primary factors is 
insufficient coordination of the nation's counterintelligence 
activities at the national level.
    The Congress and the President created the office of the 
National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX) to coordinate the 
nation's disparate counterintelligence functions and to 
establish a national policy for counterintelligence. After 
nearly five years in operation, the NCIX has yet to fulfill its 
initial mandates. As a result, the nation's counterintelligence 
activities suffer from redundant structures, inconsistent and 
sometimes insufficient training, and a decentralized approach 
to carrying out the nation's counterintelligence strategy that 
leaves no one person in charge and, therefore, leaves no one 
person directly responsible for its failures when they occur.
    When management failures do occur in counterintelligence 
they can have a dramatic impact on both the national security 
of the country and the civil liberties of U.S. citizens. For 
example, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board 
recently confirmed that the Defense Department's failure to 
properly manage the Counterintelligence Field Activity's (CIFA) 
TALON database led to the inappropriate collection and 
retention of information on U.S. persons. Although the 
Committee is encouraged by recent reports that the Defense 
Department intends to shut down TALON, the fact remains that 
the management structures in place failed the American people 
by establishing a system that allowed for such wrongdoing to 
occur in the first place.
    There are positive signs of reform within the nation's 
counterintelligence activities. The office of the NCIX has been 
reinvigorated by the work of its new Director and by the DNI's 
designation of the NCIX as the Intelligence Community's Mission 
Manager for Counterintelligence. Also, the Defense Department 
recently named a new Director of CIFA and is undertaking a 
wholesale review of CIFA's activities to determine whether it 
is carrying out its missions and operating within its mandate.
    In its bill, the Committee has made specific authorizations 
that bolster the nation's counterintelligence efforts, 
including an increase to the resources available for conducting 
traditional counterintelligence functions. Also, in order to 
more properly exercise its oversight responsibilities over 
counterintelligence, the Committee intends to engage in a 
comprehensive review of the nation's counterintelligence 
effort. The Committee's first step in this review is to request 
a report on the full scope of the nation's counterintelligence 
capabilities. The Committee's specific authorizations and its 
request for a report on the nation's counterintelligence 
capabilities are set forth more fully in the classified annex 
to this bill.

Financial statement auditability

    The Committee appreciates the comprehensive report 
delivered by the DNI on the status of financial statement 
auditability in the Intelligence Community and the accompanying 
plan for each intelligence agency to achieve a ``clean'' audit. 
The Committee is extremely disappointed that, according to 
current projections, this goal will not be reached until 2011, 
despite the intensified leadership focus on this issue under 
the new DNI. The Committee understands that the inability to 
achieve a clean audit does not mean that the intelligence 
agencies are failing to conduct responsible accounting for 
their funds. Rather, the problem is that certain aspects of 
intelligence agencies' financial management processes prevent 
them from getting a clean opinion. Nevertheless, the Committee 
views it as extremely important for the Intelligence Community 
to abide by the same accounting standards as the rest of the 
federal government and urges the DNI to accelerate this 
timeline with the submission of the FY 2009 budget.
    The ODNI has identified three key areas that are preventing 
the Intelligence Community agencies from achieving clean 
audits: (1) Fund Balance with Treasury (FBwT); (2) Property, 
Plant and Equipment (PP&E) issues; and (3) Intragovernmental 
Transactions (IGT).
    With respect to PP&E issues, the problem is that the 
Intelligence Community agencies' antiquated PP&E ``feeder 
systems'' were not designed to accumulate the required cost 
data for the balance sheet. With the exception of one sensitive 
CIA issue (which may be more a matter of policy than finance), 
the Intelligence Community's PP&E challenges are within the 
DNI's power to fix and can be resolved through hard work and 
sharing of best practices.
    The other two issues--FBwT and IGT--are problems for those 
intelligence agencies that reside within the Department of 
Defense, and these cannot be resolved without the cooperation 
of the Department itself. Because of systemic problems with the 
Defense Finance and Accounting System that will certainly not 
be resolved within the next five years, NSA, NGA and DIA are 
unable to reconcile their FBwT or their IGT transactions, both 
of which are prerequisites to achieving a clean audit.
    The DNI reports that it is working with the Defense 
Department to implement solutions to these problems by allowing 
intelligence agencies to reconcile their fund balance directly 
with the Department of the Treasury, and to create a zero-
balance account to allow proper reconciliation of Military 
Inter-Departmental Purchase Requests. Given the fact that the 
Intelligence Community cannot achieve the congressional 
directive for auditability without these accommodations, the 
Committee directs the DNI to submit a report by September 1, 
2007, on the progress of these negotiations with the Defense 
Department and whether or not appropriate ``fixes'' will be 
implemented at the beginning of FY 2008, as laid out in the 
DNI's plan. In the meantime, the DNI is urged to accelerate 
work on the PP&E issue and advise the Committee if a 
legislative solution is required for the CIA in the FY 2009 
intelligence authorization bill.

Al Qa'ida

    The Committee is not satisfied with efforts to defeat the 
al Qa'ida network. Al Qa'ida's leaders--Osama Bin Laden and 
Ayman al Zawahiri--remain at large. Key operatives in the 
terrorist network continue to operate from Pakistan and 
Afghanistan. Perhaps most disturbingly, the Al Qa'ida ``brand'' 
appears to be growing in strength, as evidenced by the 2007 
North Africa attacks by the newly named ``Al Qa'ida in the 
Maghreb.''
    The Committee is also concerned that, as intelligence 
requirements have grown for Iraq, resources have been drained 
from the global fight against Al Qa'ida.

Iraq

    The January 2007 Iraq National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 
included several unclassified Key Judgments that identified a 
wide range of political, social, economic, and security 
conditions that will, in the Intelligence Community's 
collective judgment, lead the security situation in Iraq to 
continue to deteriorate.
    The NIE provided some important insights; however, the 
Committee believes that the NIE did not adequately address the 
likelihood that increased coalition military activities in 
Baghdad could lead to an increase in violence elsewhere in the 
country--a phenomenon which appears to have occurred as the 
Baghdad security plan began to be implemented in the Spring of 
2007.
    The Committee is also disappointed that the NIE assessed 
the security implications of a rapid withdrawal of U.S. forces 
but failed to evaluate the impact of a gradual drawdown of 
troops, along the lines of proposals endorsed by a majority of 
Congress. The NIE's assessment of only the most extreme troop 
redeployment option available presented the impression that the 
United States has an ``all or nothing'' choice between current 
troop levels or total rapid withdrawal. If the Intelligence 
Community offers assessments of the impact that U.S. government 
policy decisions may have on stability in Iraq, it should offer 
a nuanced analysis of the several alternatives actually under 
consideration, not solely the most extreme and unlikely option.

Iran and North Korea

    Iran and North Korea currently represent perhaps the most 
serious strategic threats to the United States and to U.S. 
interests.
    Iran is widely believed to be developing a nuclear weapon 
in violation of its international agreements; providing support 
to terrorist groups, like Hezbollah, that undermine regional 
stability; and contributing to sectarian strife and supporting 
armed insurgents in Iraq. Its military activities in the 
Arabian Gulf--highlighted by its capture of British sailors and 
marines in March 2007--threaten U.S. allies in the region and 
undermine international commerce. Finally, its geopolitical 
position in the region has undoubtedly been strengthened by the 
U.S.-led removal of rival regimes in countries to its east and 
west, transforming Iran into a regional hegemon.
    North Korea is a heavily militarized state that recently 
tested a nuclear weapon; continues efforts to enhance its 
nuclear arsenal; proliferates WMD-related weapons technologies; 
and poses a serious threat to South Korea, a close U.S. ally, 
with its conventional munitions alone. The fact that North 
Korea is perhaps the most closed and isolated society in the 
world means that Pyongyang and the West each lack the cultural 
and political understanding to interpret the other's actions 
accurately. This means that a small-scale incident could 
potentially escalate into an armed conflict that engulfs all of 
east Asia.
    The Committee has closely followed the efforts of U.S. 
intelligence agencies to improve the quality of its analysis 
and collection capabilities on both countries and will continue 
to do so. A regular and structured reporting requirement will 
help ensure that policymakers are receiving the intelligence 
needed to thoroughly understand the nature of the threat 
emanating from Iran and North Korea.
    The existence of a nuclear-armed North Korea and the 
prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran are the gravest elements of 
the threats posed by these regimes. Though the Intelligence 
Community has made great improvements in analytic tradecraft 
since its shortcomings were identified in the WMD Commission 
report, the Committee is concerned that its analysis on these 
weapons programs--particularly given the dearth of reliable 
information--could easily fall victim to groupthink, political 
pressure, or acquiescence to conventional wisdom.

Latin America

    In the past several years, a number of Latin American 
countries have experienced significant political and economic 
upheavals that affect U.S. interests, and the Committee is not 
convinced that the Intelligence Community has effectively 
allocated its resources to address these changes. The Committee 
intends to examine the Intelligence Community's ability to 
understand and manage the challenges emanating from Latin 
America, as well as its ability to address the region 
strategically.
    Venezuela and Cuba present the two greatest challenges to 
U.S. interests in the hemisphere. President Hugo Chavez of 
Venezuela has made rabid anti-Americanism a cornerstone of his 
rule, and he has helped export this sentiment to new regimes in 
Bolivia, Ecuador, and elsewhere. Cuba--whose leader, Fidel 
Castro, has recently suffered serious health problems--will 
possibly experience momentous change that could reverse almost 
five decades of Cuban hostility to the United States. The 
Committee was pleased that the previous DNI created a Mission 
Manager to address cross-agency intelligence collection and 
analysis challenges presented by these two countries and hopes 
the DNI takes the needed steps to identify and appoint a 
successor. The Committee expects to have a regular and ongoing 
dialogue with the new Mission Manager on Intelligence Community 
efforts to better understand the challenges posed by these two 
nations.
    At the same time, a number of threats to U.S. interests 
from Latin America seem impervious to change. Despite years of 
U.S. assistance that bolstered the capabilities of Colombia's 
security forces and produced some short-term successes, 
Colombia continues to suffer from the ravages of coca 
cultivation and the violence it engenders--to include concerns 
about possible human rights violations at the hands of 
government officials. Few strategic victories have been won 
against the drug traffickers and paramilitaries, in part 
because of extensive government corruption and a thriving world 
narcotics market. Similarly, the Committee is concerned that 
the tri-border area where Argentina, Paraguay, and Brazil 
intersect remains a center of illicit finance, smuggling and 
terrorist-related activities, despite efforts by the countries 
of the region to understand and control these developments.
    The Committee intends to examine the ways in which the 
Intelligence Community has approached threats from this region 
to determine how it might improve its understanding of these 
issues.

Sub-Saharan Africa

    Committee Members and staff have traveled to numerous 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa in the past few years, and the 
Committee has held a wide range of briefings and other 
discussions on countries in the region. The Committee believes 
that interagency coordination on sub-Saharan Africa is flawed 
and that the Intelligence Community needs to realign its 
collection, analytic, and linguistic resources to better 
understand the threats emanating from this region.
    Included among the myriad challenges that Africa poses to 
U.S. and regional security are the growth of Islamic extremism; 
proliferation; armed conflict; humanitarian disasters, some of 
which, such as the crisis in Darfur, stem from state-sponsored 
genocide; failed states; and the establishment of ungoverned 
spaces and terrorist safe havens, in which terrorists' 
exploitation of weak laws and weak or non-existent government 
institutions allow them to move money, people, and weapons. 
Though the Intelligence Community must address a wide range of 
threats that often seem more critical than the challenges posed 
by events and trends in Africa, the Committee believes that an 
improvement in Intelligence Community expertise in this region 
is required to address potentially serious threats from that 
region. The Committee will closely scrutinize the Community's 
Africa posture during the 110th Congress.

American citizens detained abroad

    The Committee expresses its concern at the delay in 
provision of consular services to Amir Mohamed Meshal--an 
American citizen who fled Somalia in January 2007--while he was 
detained in both Kenya and Ethiopia. It is the view of the 
Committee that--in order to ensure that the rights of American 
citizens are protected--all officers of U.S. government 
agencies have a duty to notify the local U.S. ambassador or 
chief of mission as soon as they learn of the detention abroad 
of an American citizen.

Space acquisition programs--personnel

    The Committee is concerned about the career management of 
uniformed acquisitions personnel assigned to the National 
Reconnaissance Office (NRO)--particularly those from the Air 
Force, who make up the vast majority of military personnel 
assigned to NRO. The Committee believes that strong space 
acquisition programs require depth of expertise and continuity 
within the space systems acquisition workforce.
    The establishment of the Space Professional Development 
Program Certification standards and the creation of the Space 
Assignment Advisory Board (SAAB) are encouraging steps toward 
providing better management of the Air Force space cadre. The 
Committee hopes that the SAAB and the Space Professional 
Management Office will have the authority to manage assignments 
based on the needs of space acquisition programs, while 
promoting space expertise within all acquisition and space-
related specialties. Furthermore, given the particular 
importance of having qualified Air Force personnel working on 
NRO programs, the Committee is pleased with the assignment of a 
senior Air Force officer to the new NRO Deputy Director 
position. The Committee trusts that the officers who hold this 
position will serve as strong advocates for the personnel 
professionalization needs of the NRO and for the development of 
space expertise within the acquisition workforce.
    The Committee remains concerned, however, that although the 
military spends time and resources to educate and train members 
of the space cadre, it does not appear to make every attempt to 
ensure that this workforce remains in space-related assignments 
for the majority of their careers. The Committee believes that 
there is significant value in having space acquisition 
professionals who spend the vast majority of their careers 
working in space-related assignments. Conceptually, this runs 
counter to standard Air Force assignment policies, but may be 
necessary for the proper development of our national overhead 
systems.
    The Committee urges the Department of Defense, and, in 
particular the Secretary of the Air Force, to give serious 
consideration to not only allowing, but encouraging members of 
the uniformed space cadre to, over the course of their careers, 
gain both depth and breadth of experience from a focused set of 
assignments within the space field. In this respect, the 
Committee awaits the results of the review commissioned in the 
Fiscal Year 2007 National Defense Authorization Act to study 
the feasibility of a specialized career field for military 
space acquisitions personnel.
    The Committee is also concerned that the NRO, and its 
nationally critical systems development, acquisitions, and 
operations, may be negatively impacted by the Air Force's 
pending force reduction. The Committee encourages the DNI, in 
coordination with the Director of the NRO and the Chief of 
Staff of the Air Force, to determine what, if any, impact the 
Air Force changes in workforce and manning will have on the NRO 
mission, and establish a mitigation plan as necessary. The 
Committee requests to be informed of any plan or the results of 
any review that addresses these issues.

Major systems acquisitions

    The Committee is concerned with the state of acquisition of 
major systems across the Intelligence Community and applauds 
the ODNI for standing up a Deputy Director of National 
Intelligence for Acquisition to provide additional guidance in 
that sector. The Committee appreciates and acknowledges the 
effort put forth in preparing the DNI's 2006 Annual Report to 
Congress on Intelligence Community Program Management Plans, 
the first such report to assess performance of major 
acquisition programs across the National Intelligence Program. 
Through this report, the DNI established a baseline against 
which future performance can be measured and through which 
major programs can be tracked over time. The Committee believes 
that, had this assessment been performed effectively in the 
past, many of the Intelligence Community's acquisition troubles 
could have been uncovered earlier.
    Good project management is essential to successful 
acquisition programs. While the Committee encourages the use of 
whatever tools and training are available to teach the 
fundamentals of project management, the Committee has observed 
that classroom training alone--in the absence of on-the-job 
training and mentoring--yields limited success. Therefore, as 
part of its acquisition coordination, the Committee recommends 
that the DNI require each agency to review their preparation of 
future acquisition leaders and optimize the use of successful 
techniques, such as mentoring programs.
    Because of the significant cost and technical impact of 
acquisition failures, the Committee encourages the DNI to 
formalize a policy to link poor acquisition performance by the 
contractor workforce to the withholding of award incentives for 
the contractor. Such a link would underscore the expectations 
for contractor acquisition personnel.
    In light of highly publicized cost overruns and schedule 
slips, the Committee expects the DNI to use the results of its 
annual report to help reform acquisition across the 
Intelligence Community. Specifically, if common practices lead 
to troubled acquisitions, the Committee expects the DNI to 
recommend community-wide changes to reduce reliance on these 
practices. Similarly if common practices lead to successful 
acquisitions, the Committee expects the DNI to recommend 
community-wide changes to encourage these practices.
    The Committee appreciates the observations and findings 
presented in the annual report, as many of these align with 
what the Committee has observed in its oversight of the 
Intelligence Community. The Committee strongly encourages the 
DNI to scrutinize the use of contractors in major systems 
acquisitions. The Committee agrees with the contractor 
assessments provided in the report, but would also like to more 
fully understand the impact of corporate mergers--specifically 
of System Engineering/Integration support companies with 
development/manufacturing companies--and the effectiveness of 
firewalls that separate merged corporate entities. The 
Committee directs the DNI to provide this assessment in a 
report to be submitted within 120 days of enactment of this 
Act.
    Finally, the Committee is concerned with the fast rotation 
timelines for acquisition program managers. The Committee urges 
the DNI to review its program management data to assess impacts 
caused by acquisition personnel having tenures shorter than 
three years and impacts from personnel changes with 
insufficient overlap. The findings from such a review should be 
shared with the Intelligence Community.

Advanced research and development

    The Committee is concerned that, within the Intelligence 
Community, an increased focus on solving near-term problems has 
left insufficient funds available to address long-term 
challenges. Citing a need for more cutting-edge, long-term or 
basic research, the ODNI notified Congress in January 2007 of 
its desire to establish the Intelligence Advanced Research 
Projects Activity (IARPA). The DNI proposed that IARPA assume 
financial and scientific management of basic research currently 
performed at the individual agencies in order to better align 
all activities with the DNI's long-term research strategy.
    While the Committee agrees that there is a need to promote 
basic research, there is concern about the construct chosen for 
IARPA and whether it is the best option for the Intelligence 
Community. Adding to this concern, the DNI has provided only 
limited details on how IARPA will function within the 
Intelligence Community. Noticeably absent from this proposal is 
any discussion of the likely impact on existing Intelligence 
Community research entities as a result of their proposed 
merger under IARPA. Also missing is any detail on how a 
director will be chosen or on what qualifications are required 
for that position.
    Given the importance of research in the Intelligence 
Community, it is critical that the DNI have a plan not only to 
protect current research activities but also to align future 
research according to a long-term research strategy. It is also 
critical that the DNI select a well-recognized leader and 
manager with research experience to direct IARPA.
    The Committee believes that the ODNI is essential to the 
coordination and de-confliction of intelligence research. The 
Committee observes that the plan for IARPA appears to be 
execution-oriented. In this, it seems inconsistent with the 
coordination and de-confliction role originally intended for 
the ODNI. Because of this inconsistency, and because of the 
lack of detailed planning discussed above, the Committee has 
removed scientific and financial management of Intelligence 
Community research centers from under IARPA and has designated 
specific funding to protect these centers. The Committee has 
also fenced a portion of the funds requested for new 
initiatives until details are provided on the way ahead for 
research in the Intelligence Community and on IARPA's specific 
role in that effort.

Intelligence program management

    The Committee notes with some distress that both 
Intelligence Community acquisition and intelligence program 
management have recently suffered serious disappointments. 
Despite increasing attention from this Committee, the 
Intelligence Community has failed to develop internal 
standards, practices, and procedures to ensure that program 
risk is managed with adequate attention devoted to cost, 
schedule, and performance.
    Many programs managed by intelligence agencies are over 
cost, behind schedule, and have failed to achieve key 
performance parameters. The Committee is frustrated by delays 
in notifying Congress that major programs have failed to adhere 
to planned development milestones. By the time the Committee 
learns of program failure, the program has already expended 
millions of dollars.
    In order to remedy this issue, the Committee directs the 
ODNI to develop in consultation with the Committee a program 
notification standard to keep the Committee fully informed of 
program issues. The Nunn-McCurdy amendment to the Department of 
Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1982 provides an 
example of the standard the Committee is requesting. For 
example, the DNI should develop guidance for program managers 
to ensure congressional notification of total program 
acquisition unit costs for each major intelligence program on 
the last day of each fiscal quarter. The policy should also 
include a requirement to notify the Committee if the DNI has 
reason to believe the program will exceed the authorized 
funding by a specific percentage. The Committee requests that 
this policy be reported to the Committee no later than December 
1, 2007.

Diversity in the intelligence community

    It is clear that the Intelligence Community suffers from a 
lack of diversity. The DNI acknowledges that Intelligence 
Community must address this shortfall to protect our national 
security. Critical shortfalls also exist in language capability 
and cultural understanding for countries in Asia and the Middle 
East that pose continuing security challenges.
    Pursuant to statutory mandate, the Intelligence Community 
has submitted annual reports on workforce diversity. Sadly, the 
Intelligence Community is still far short of the mark on 
diversity. In the FY 2006 Intelligence Community diversity 
report, the DNI reported that minority representation in the 
Intelligence Community was 21%--far less than the 37% of the 
overall U.S. population. Similarly, women comprise 39% of the 
Intelligence Community workforce compared to 51% of the overall 
U.S. population. Despite increased hiring of women and 
minorities, Intelligence Community core mission areas, senior 
grades and management ranks fail to reflect the diversity of 
our country.
    Unfortunately, the DNI's actions to address the lack of 
diversity have been slow, limited, and ineffective. Improving 
diversity is not a mission limited to the Equal Employment 
Opportunity offices of the various agencies, but must be 
infused throughout leadership efforts in the Intelligence 
Community. For example, the DNI's Strategic Human Capital Plan 
does not identify concrete steps to improve diversity in any of 
its reforms. The Committee is concerned that some human capital 
reforms may, in fact, undermine the limited, ongoing diversity 
efforts.
    While the Committee commends the DNI's decision to retain 
the Diversity Senior Advisory Panel for the Intelligence 
Community (DSAPIC), the Committee is concerned that the DNI has 
not made sufficient progress in acting on that panel's 2004 
recommendations. Although the panel recommended that agency 
directors set measurable diversity objectives to serve as the 
basis for evaluating performance and to submit those plans to 
the DNI within six months, these plans have not yet been 
submitted. The DNI has failed to complete its Community-wide 
assessment of knowledge, skills, abilities, and talents needed 
for the Intelligence Community workforce.
    The Committee encourages the DNI's efforts to get senior 
leaders in the Intelligence Community to take ownership of 
diversity efforts by their respective agencies. The Committee 
is aware that the EEO and Diversity Office in the DNI has 
provided agency leaders with the results of the Annual Report 
on Hiring and Retention of Minority Employees in the 
Intelligence Community, and produced a box score on diversity 
to show these leaders where their agencies stand in comparison 
to each other on hiring, representation, retention, attrition, 
and promotion of women, minorities, and persons with 
disabilities.
    The Committee notes that these box scores only compare the 
agencies to each other, and do not demonstrate the true lack of 
diversity in the Intelligence Community in comparison to the 
federal and civilian workforces nor in comparison to U.S. 
census data. If the DNI is serious about building a workforce 
that looks like America, then the leaders of the Intelligence 
Community must know how their workforce compares to the 
population as a whole, not just to other agencies.
    While the Committee welcomes the use of affinity groups to 
encourage diversity in the Intelligence Community, this 
approach is insufficient. University efforts cannot rest solely 
on the shoulders of individuals who represent these diverse 
groups. Each leader and manager in the Intelligence Community 
bears responsibility for diversity. These efforts should be 
visible, specific, personal, and persistent.
    The Committee encourages the DNI to develop, as a core part 
of its strategic plan, a training program for managers and 
senior intelligence executives in diversity awareness, and to 
make such training mandatory upon promotion to those positions. 
In the same way that the military's joint duty assignment 
policy ensures that senior military leaders are aware of 
different organizational cultures, the DNI should ensure that 
the intelligence agencies' senior leaders are aware of 
diversity goals and the challenges that each agency faces.
    In addition, the DNI should ensure that agency managers are 
held accountable for diversity within their organizations. In 
developing performance measurements for managers, the DNI 
should include metrics for how well those managers support and 
encourage diversity within their organizations, especially in 
core mission areas. The Committee further urges the DNI to 
establish a structured mentorship program to pair senior 
leaders with minority proteges.

Pay for performance system

    The Committee is concerned that the DNI is moving forward 
aggressively on implementation of the pay-for-performance 
system to replace the existing General Schedule Civil-Service 
System. The DNI is pushing implementation before this system 
has been designed, before it has been reviewed by the 
appropriate oversight committees, and before it has the 
necessary personnel tracking tools developed and in place. 
While the Committee supports the goal of rewarding performance, 
proper oversight and safeguards must be in place before 
allowing such a radical change to the Community's personnel 
management.
    The Comptroller General of the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) has testified that federal agencies should not 
implement pay-for-performance systems until they have met four 
requirements: ``(1) a strategic human capital planning process 
linked to the agency's overall strategic plan; (2) capabilities 
to design and implement a new human capital system effectively; 
(3) a modern, effective, credible, and validated performance 
management system that provides a clear linkage between 
institutional, unit, and individual performance-oriented 
outcomes, and results in meaningful distinctions in ratings; 
and (4) adequate internal and external safeguards to ensure the 
fair, effective, and non-discriminatory implementation of the 
system.''
    Developing the wrong performance measurements could 
undermine the Intelligence Community. Performance measurements 
in a pay-for-performance system could easily have the 
unintended consequence of rewarding the wrong kinds of 
performance, especially in an area where success may be 
difficult to quantify. A pay-for-performance system could 
impose pressures on collectors and analysts to produce quantity 
instead of quality. Analysts could feel pressure to make their 
analysis conform with the views of their managers or risk loss 
of income. Collectors might shift their focus to projects that 
yield results within their pay period, rather than focusing 
projects that might take longer to yield results. Further, it 
is unclear how a pay-for-performance system would reward 
teamwork and collaboration rather than individual performance.
    The Committee is also concerned that the pay-for-
performance plan under consideration by the Office of the DNI 
does not have sufficient safeguards to protect the rights of 
employees.
    DNI witnesses have testified that the pay-for-performance 
system will have safeguards. However, the Committee has yet to 
see the details of such safeguards. Any system must have 
internal and external safeguards to protect employees from 
cronyism, discrimination, harassment, partisan pressures, or 
arbitrary and capricious management.
    In particular, the Committee is concerned that without 
proper safeguards and management training, implementation of a 
pay-for-performance system may undermine the DNI's diversity 
goals. Women and minorities are already underrepresented in the 
Intelligence Community. This underrepresentation is even more 
pronounced in the senior grades and in management positions. 
Without sufficient safeguards to protect equal opportunity, the 
Committee is deeply concerned that the pay-for-performance 
system will further erode the deficient diversity 
representation in the Intelligence Community.
    For these reasons, the Committee has fenced all funds in 
the General Defense Intelligence Program that are designated 
for conversion to the pay modernization system until 45 days 
after the DNI provides a plan for the pay-for-performance 
system generally, and a plan for any agency-specific pilot 
program specifically. In addition, the Committee directs that 
any funds in the Community Management Account and the CIA 
program designated for pay modernization be spent only on 
developing these plans, rather than implementing or converting 
to the pay modernization system.
    The Committee believes that employees should assist in the 
design of the compensation system in which they will have to 
operate. To that end, the Committee encourages the DNI to 
establish and consult with an employee advisory group in the 
development of the plan submitted to Congress. In selecting 
this advisory committee, the DNI should ensure it has a diverse 
range of occupations, demographic groups, geographic locations, 
and seniority. The comments of the advisory group should be 
included in the DNI's report to Congress.

               Committee Consideration and Rollcall Votes

    On May 2, 2007, the Committee met in open and closed 
session and ordered the bill H.R. 2082 favorably reported, as 
amended.

                              OPEN SESSION

    In open session, the Committee considered the text of the 
bill H.R. 2082.
    Chairman Reyes offered an amendment in the nature of a 
substitute to H.R. 2082. The contents of the amendment in the 
nature of a substitute are described in the Section-by-Section 
analysis and the Explanation of Amendment. The Committee 
considered the following amendments to the amendment in the 
nature of a substitute:
    Mr. Issa offered an amendment to strike a provision in the 
Chairman's mark that requires a National Intelligence Estimate 
on the national security impacts of global climate change.

                             CLOSED SESSION

    Mr. Hoekstra moved to close the meeting because national 
security would be endangered if the matters to be considered 
were disclosed. The motion was agreed to by a record vote of 19 
ayes to 0 noes:
    Voting aye: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Boswell, Mr. Cramer, Ms. Eshoo, 
Mr. Holt, Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Thompson, Ms. Schakowsky, Mr. 
Langevin, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. Everett, Mr. Gallegly, 
Mrs. Wilson, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. McHugh, Mr. Tiahrt, Mr. 
Rogers, Mr. Issa.
    Voting no: None

                              OPEN SESSION

    The Committee returned to open session to complete 
consideration of the Issa Amendment.
    It was not agreed to by a record vote of 9 ayes to 10 noes:
    Voting aye: Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. Everett, Mr. Gallegly, Mrs. 
Wilson, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. McHugh, Mr. Tiahrt, Mr. Rogers, Mr. 
Issa.
    Voting no: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Boswell, Mr. Cramer, Ms. Eshoo, 
Mr. Holt, Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Thompson, Ms. Schakowsky, Mr. 
Langevin, Mr. Murphy.
    Ms. Schakowsky offered an amendment to require the 
President to provide the International Committee of the Red 
Cross access to persons detained by the Intelligence Community. 
Ms. Schakowsky later withdrew her amendment.
    Mr. Rogers of Michigan offered an amendment to reject the 
Administration's request to increase the authorized personnel 
of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

                             CLOSED SESSION

    Mr. Rogers of Michigan moved to close the meeting because 
national security would be endangered if the matters to be 
considered were disclosed. The motion was agreed to by a record 
vote of 19 ayes to 1 noes:
    Voting aye: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Boswell, Mr. Cramer, Ms. Eshoo, 
Mr. Holt, Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Thompson, Ms. Schakowsky, Mr. 
Langevin, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. Everett, Mr. Gallegly, 
Mrs. Wilson, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. McHugh, Mr. Tiahrt, Mr. 
Rogers, Mr. Issa.
    Voting no: Mr. Tierney.

                              OPEN SESSION

    Mr. McHugh offered an amendment to modify a provision in 
the Chairman's amendment in the nature of a substitute that 
requires a report on contractors by the Inspector General for 
the Director of National Intelligence. Mr. McHugh's amendment 
was adopted on voice vote.
    Mr. Holt offered an amendment to establish a reporting 
requirement for Executive Branch requests for information 
concerning officers, employees, and agents of the Intelligence 
Community. Mr. Holt later withdrew the amendment.
    Mr. Rogers of Michigan offered an amendment to close the 
National Drug Intelligence Center. It was not agreed to by a 
record vote of 8 ayes to 11 noes:
    Voting aye: Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. Everett, Mrs. Wilson, Mr. 
Thornberry, Mr. McHugh, Mr. Tiahrt, Mr. Rogers, Mr. Issa.
    Voting no: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Hastings, Mr. Boswell, Mr. 
Cramer, Ms. Eshoo, Mr. Holt, Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Thompson, 
Ms. Schakowsky, Mr. Langevin, Mr. Murphy.
    The Committee then voted on the Rogers amendment to reject 
the Administration's request to increase the authorized 
personnel of the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence. It was not agreed to by a record vote of 9 ayes 
to 10 noes, with one member voting present:
    Voting aye: Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. Everett, Mr. Gallegly, Mrs. 
Wilson, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. McHugh, Mr. Tiahrt, Mr. Rogers, Mr. 
Issa.
    Voting no: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Hastings, Mr. Boswell, Mr. 
Cramer, Mr. Holt, Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Thompson, Ms. 
Schakowsky, Mr. Langevin, Mr. Murphy.
    Voting present: Ms. Eshoo.
    Mr. Rogers offered an amendment relating to an audit of the 
effectiveness and role of the National Drug Intelligence 
Center. It was not agreed to by a record vote of 9 ayes and 10 
noes
    Voting aye: Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. Everett, Mr. Gallegly, Mrs. 
Wilson, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. McHugh, Mr. Tiahrt, Mr. Rogers, Mr. 
Issa.
    Voting no: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Hastings, Mr. Boswell, Mr. 
Cramer, Ms. Eshoo, Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Thompson, Ms. 
Schakowsky, Mr. Langevin, Mr. Murphy.
    Mr. Thornberry offered an amendment requiring the Director 
of National Intelligence to provide an annual report on foreign 
language capability within each element of the Intelligence 
Community. It was agreed to by voice vote.
    Mr. Rogers of Michigan offered an amendment requiring the 
termination of quarterly reports on North Korean and Iranian 
nuclear capabilities and intentions. It was not agreed to by a 
record vote of 9 ayes to 10 noes:
    Voting aye: Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. Everett, Mr. Gallegly, Mrs. 
Wilson, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. McHugh, Mr. Tiahrt, Mr. Rogers, Mr. 
Issa.
    Voting no: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Boswell, Mr. Cramer, Ms. Eshoo, 
Mr. Holt, Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Thompson, Ms. Schakowsky, Mr. 
Langevin, Mr. Murphy.
    Mr. Thornberry offered an amendment requiring the Director 
of National Intelligence to provide a report on those reports 
required by law to be submitted to any of the congressional 
committees that have jurisdiction over elements of the 
Intelligence Community. Mr. Thornberry later withdrew his 
amendment.
    The Committee then recessed for House floor votes and 
reconvened for business two hours later.
    When the Committee reconvened, Mrs. Wilson of New Mexico 
offered an amendment to revise the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act and alter the authorities governing electronic 
surveillance.

                             CLOSED SESSION

    Ms. Wilson moved to close the meeting because national 
security would be endangered if the matters to be considered 
were disclosed. The motion was agreed to by a record vote of 15 
ayes to 0 noes:
    Voting aye: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Hastings, Mr. Boswell, Mr. Holt, 
Ms. Schakowsky, Mr. Langevin, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. 
Everett, Mr. Gallegly, Mrs. Wilson, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. McHugh, 
Mr. Rogers, Mr. Issa.
    Voting no: None.

                              OPEN SESSION

    After debate, the Committee returned to open session. The 
Wilson amendment was not agreed to by a record vote of 9 ayes 
to 10 noes:
    Voting aye: Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. Everett, Mr. Gallegly, Mrs. 
Wilson, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. McHugh, Mr. Tiahrt, Mr. Rogers, Mr. 
Issa.
    Voting no: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Boswell, Mr. Cramer, Ms. Eshoo, 
Mr. Holt, Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Thompson, Ms. 
Schakowsky, Mr. Murphy.

                             CLOSED SESSION

    Mr. Hoekstra moved to close the meeting because national 
security would be endangered if the matters to be considered 
were disclosed. The motion was agreed to by a record vote of 21 
ayes to 0 noes:
    Voting aye: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Hastings, Mr. Boswell, Mr. 
Cramer, Ms. Eshoo, Mr. Holt, Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Tierney, 
Mr. Thompson, Ms. Schakowsky, Mr. Langevin, Mr. Murphy, Mr. 
Hoekstra, Mr. Everett, Mr. Gallegly, Mrs. Wilson, Mr. 
Thornberry, Mr. McHugh, Mr. Tiahrt, Mr. Rogers, Mr. Issa.
    Voting no: None.
    Mr. Hoekstra offered an amendment to modify the classified 
Schedule of Authorizations. The amendment was adopted by voice 
vote.
    Ms. Schakowsky offered an amendment to modify the funding 
level for a program contained in the classified Schedule of 
Authorizations.

                              OPEN SESSION

    After debate, the Committee returned to open session. The 
Schakowsky amendment was not agreed to by a record vote of 7 
ayes to 14 noes:
    Voting aye: Mr. Hastings, Ms. Eshoo, Mr. Holt, Mr. Tierney, 
Mr. Thompson, Ms. Schakowsky, Mr. Murphy.
    Voting no: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Boswell, Mr. Cramer, Mr. 
Ruppersberger, Mr. Langevin, Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. Everett, Mr. 
Gallegly, Mrs. Wilson, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. McHugh, Mr. Tiahrt, 
Mr. Rogers, Mr. Issa.
    By voice vote the Committee adopted the Chairman's 
amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended.
    By voice vote, the Committee adopted a motion by the 
Chairman to favorably report the bill H.R. 2082 to the House, 
as amended.

      Section-by-Section Analysis and Explanation of the Amendment


                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES


Section 101--Authorization of appropriations

    Section 101 of the bill authorizes appropriations for the 
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the Office 
of the Director of National Intelligence; the Central 
Intelligence Agency; the Department of Defense; the Defense 
Intelligence Agency; the National Security Agency; the 
Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force; the Coast Guard; 
the Department of State; the Department of the Treasury; the 
Department of Justice; the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the 
Drug Enforcement Administration; the National Reconnaissance 
Office; the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; and the 
Department of Homeland Security.

Section 102--Classified Schedule of Authorizations

    Section 102 provides that the amounts and personnel 
ceilings authorized under Section 101 shall be specified in the 
accompanying classified Schedule of Authorizations, which shall 
be made available to the Committee on Appropriations and to the 
President.

Section 103--Personnel ceiling adjustments

    Section 103 permits the Director of National Intelligence 
(DNI) to authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess 
of two percent of the authorized number when the DNI determines 
that it is necessary to the performance of important 
intelligence functions. This section also requires the DNI to 
promptly notify the congressional intelligence committees 
whenever he exercises the authority granted under this section.

Section 104--Intelligence Community Management Account

    Section 104 authorizes specified personnel and funds for 
the Intelligence Community Management Account, as well as 
additional personnel and funds in the classified Schedule of 
Authorizations. This section also provides for the detail of 
personnel to the staff of that account on a reimbursable basis 
or on a non-reimbursable basis for periods of less than one 
year for the performance of temporary functions. In addition, 
this section authorizes funding for the National Drug 
Intelligence Center.

Section 105--Incorporation of reporting requirements

    Section 105 provides that each requirement to submit a 
report to the congressional intelligence committees included in 
the joint explanatory statement to accompany the conference 
report on the bill is incorporated into the Act and made a 
requirement in law.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM


Section 201--Authorization of appropriations

    Section 201 authorizes funds for the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) Retirement and Disability System.

Section 202--Technical amendment to mandatory retirement provision

    Section 202 updates the CIA mandatory retirement provision 
to reflect the abolition of pay grades within the Senior 
Intelligence Service and the CIA's adoption of the revised 
Senior Intelligence Service program in February 2004.

 TITLE III--INTELLIGENCE AND GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROVISIONS


Section 301--Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized 
        by law

    Section 301 permits the authorized amounts to be increased 
to provide increases in compensation and benefits authorized by 
law.

Section 302--Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities

    Section 302 provides that the authorization of funds in 
this act does not constitute authority for the conduct of any 
intelligence activity not otherwise authorized by the 
Constitution or laws of the United States.

Section 303--Clarification of definition of Intelligence Community 
        under the National Security Act of 1947

    Section 303 provides a technical clarification with respect 
to designation of members of the Intelligence Community.

Section 304--Extension to the Intelligence Community of authority to 
        delete information about receipt and disposition of foreign 
        gifts

    Section 304 allows the head of any intelligence agency to 
delete information about the donation of foreign gifts if the 
head of such agency certifies in writing to the Secretary of 
State that the publication of such information could adversely 
affect United States intelligence sources or methods.
    Gifts received in the course of ordinary contact between 
senior officials of elements of the Intelligence Community and 
their foreign counterparts should not be excluded under the 
provisions of this amendment unless there is a serious concern 
that such contacts and gifts would adversely affect United 
States intelligence sources or methods.

Section 305--Modification of requirements for reprogramming of funds 
        for intelligence activities

    Section 305 makes the requirements for Intelligence 
Community reprogramming of funds consistent with transfer 
provisions in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention 
Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458).

Section 306--Delegation of authority for travel on common carriers for 
        intelligence collection personnel

    Section 306 permits the DNI to delegate authority to 
approve certain travel on common carriers to the heads of 
individual Intelligence Community elements. It also allows 
further delegation of that authority by those elements pursuant 
to guidelines developed by the DNI and requires such guidelines 
to be submitted to the congressional intelligence committees.

Section 307--Report on pay for performance of Intelligence Community 
        personnel

    Section 307 prohibits the implementation of pay-for-
performance compensation reform until 45 days after the DNI 
submits a report to the congressional intelligence committees 
detailing the proposed plan, performance appraisal standards, 
implementation guidelines, accountability mechanisms and 
projected impact on the workforce.

Section 308--Plan to increase diversity in the Intelligence Community

    Section 308 requires the DNI to submit a strategic plan to 
increase diversity in the Intelligence Community. In developing 
this plan, the DNI should coordinate with the head of each 
agency to ensure that each agency has a specific implementation 
plan to increase diversity. The Intelligence Community is 
authorized to obligate or expend only 80 percent of the amount 
appropriated to the Intelligence Community Management Account 
until the report is delivered to Congress.

  TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY


      Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence


Section 401--Clarification of limitation on co-location of the Office 
        of the Director of National Intelligence

    Section 401 clarifies that the prohibition on the co-
location of the DNI with any other Intelligence Community 
element applies only to the co-location of the headquarters of 
each.

Section 402--Membership of the Director of National Intelligence on the 
        Transportation Security Oversight Board

    Section 402 adds the Director of National Intelligence or 
his designee to the Transportation Security Oversight Board.

Section 403--Additional duties of the Director of Science and 
        Technology of the Office of the Director of National 
        Intelligence

    Section 403 redefines the responsibilities and duties of 
the DNI Director of Science and Technology and the DNI Science 
and Technology Committee to ensure better science and 
technology prioritization and coordination across the 
Intelligence Community. This section further requires the DNI 
to submit to Congress a report outlining the strategy for the 
development and use of technology in the Intelligence Community 
through 2018.

Section 404--Leadership and location of certain offices and officials

    Section 404 includes the Director of the National 
Counterproliferation Center (NCPC), the Director of the 
National Counterterrorism Center, the Chief Information Officer 
and the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community in the 
list of officers within the Office of the DNI. This section 
also provides that the NCPC Director shall be appointed by the 
DNI and that the office located within the Office of the DNI.

Section 405--Eligibility for incentive awards of personnel assigned to 
        the Office of the Director of National Intelligence

    Section 405 authorizes the DNI and the Director of the CIA 
to provide incentive awards to federal employees and military 
personnel assigned to the Office of the DNI.

Section 406--Multi-level security clearances

    Section 406 directs the Director of National Intelligence 
within 180 days after the date of enactment of the Act to 
establish and oversee the implementation of a uniform, 
flexible, multi-level security clearance system across the 
Intelligence Community to fully leverage the cultural, 
linguistic and technical skills of subject matter experts and 
others proficient in foreign languages critical to national 
security.
    The Committee believes that the prompt implementation of a 
uniform, multi-level security clearance system across the 
Intelligence Community would greatly enhance the ability of the 
Intelligence Community to carry out its mission. Many of these 
individuals with cultural knowledge and language skills 
critical to the Intelligence Community's work are prevented 
from working for the Intelligence Community under the current 
security clearance standards and processes. Therefore, the 
Committee believes that it is essential to expeditiously 
implement this new system.

Section 407--National intelligence estimate on global climate change

    Section 407 requires the DNI to submit to Congress a 
National Intelligence Estimate on the impact to U.S. national 
security of the geopolitical effects brought about by global 
climate change. The Committee is encouraged that the National 
Intelligence Council (NIC) is presently engaged in a broad-
based review of this issue with the aim of producing a National 
Intelligence Assessment by the summer. (The NIC has indicated 
that the document may alternatively be a National Intelligence 
Estimate.) The Committee believes that this matter should, in 
fact, be given the weight of a formal National Intelligence 
Estimate.
    Anticipated environmental changes connected to global 
climate change represent a potentially significant threat 
multiplier for instability around the world. Conflict over 
scarce resources could result in increased pressure on already 
fragile countries. Under such circumstances, these countries 
are at greater risk of losing control over their populations 
and of becoming terrorist safe havens. These developments could 
have serious implications for military commanders and 
intelligence operations.
    Eleven former three- and four-star admirals and generals 
recently issued a report highlighting the national security 
implications of global climate change and urging greater study 
of the physical or economic threats to the United States.
    A National Intelligence Estimate will aid policymakers in 
understanding the national security implications of global 
climate change. While the Committee defers to the NIC in 
determining the precise scope and parameters of this study, the 
estimate should include an assessment of the impact of global 
climate change on Intelligence Community operations, personnel, 
and resources globally.
    The Committee does not anticipate that producing an 
Estimate will require the diversion of any collection assets 
away from other key priorities. Cost of the core analytic work 
is already being performed by professionals from across the IC 
who study the environment and resource issues and who are 
drafting the National Intelligence Assessment. Also, the 
scientific data needed for the Estimate is mostly open source 
material that is already in the possession of the U.S. 
government.

Section 408--Plan to implement recommendations of the Data Center 
        Efficiency Reports

    Section 408 requires the DNI to develop a plan to implement 
the recommendations of the Environmental Protection Agency 
report on improving data center efficiency under the Energy 
Star Program.
    The Committee believes that the Intelligence Community has 
a responsibility to assess its use of environmental resources 
as it looks for ways to relieve its power, space, and cooling 
challenges with regard to its use of data centers.

Section 409--Comprehensive inventory of special access programs

    Section 409 requires the DNI to provide a comprehensive 
inventory of special access programs to the Committee.

Section 410--Quarterly intelligence reports to Congress on Iran and 
        North Korea

    Section 410 requires the DNI to report to the House and 
Senate Intelligence Committees every 90 days on the current 
intentions and capabilities of Iran and North Korea with regard 
to their nuclear programs.
    Iran and North Korea are among the greatest strategic 
threats to U.S. national security. Both countries' efforts to 
develop a nuclear weapons capability undermine regional 
security, and present an ongoing challenge to U.S. interests 
globally. This provision is intended to ensure that the 
Committee receives reports related to this important subject 
matter on a routine and structured basis to further oversight 
objectives regarding the collection and analysis of information 
regarding these threats.

Section 411--Accountability in intelligence contracting

    Section 411 requires the DNI to provide a series of reports 
to the House and Senate Intelligence Committees to promote 
greater accountability in intelligence contracting. The section 
requires the DNI to provide the intelligence committees with an 
annual report on contractors committing waste, fraud, abuse, 
failing to perform on a contract, or violating the law; review 
contract accountability mechanisms; and review the effect of 
contractors on the Intelligence Community workforce.
    A recent Intelligence Community contractor survey did not 
include a review of accountability mechanisms in core 
contracts, nor any data to judge whether any contractors have 
committed waste, fraud, abuse, or criminal violations. Based on 
this and other observations, the Committee has concluded that 
Intelligence Community leaders do not have an adequate 
understanding of the size and composition of the contractor 
work force, a consistent and well-articulated method for 
assessing contractor performance, or strategies for managing a 
combined staff-contractor workforce. In addition, the Committee 
is concerned that the Intelligence Community does not have a 
clear definition of what functions are ``inherently 
governmental'' and, as a result, whether there are contractors 
performing inherently governmental functions.

Section 412--Annual report on foreign language proficiency in the 
        Intelligence Community

    Section 412 requires directs the DNI, in coordination with 
the heads of the elements of each intelligence agency, to 
report to the Committee on foreign language requirements and 
capabilities in the Intelligence Community. This section also 
requires the DNI to report on foreign language training tools.
    In assessing methods and models for basic, advanced, and 
intensive foreign language training, the DNI should explore new 
methods for effective language training. For example, one 
particularly innovative process, called ``the national network 
for language learning,'' brings students together with 
professional linguists, learning specialists, experts in the 
target language and civilization, and native speaking tutors in 
non-traditional settings.
    The Intelligence Community's mission increasingly requires 
skills fluency in difficult-to-master languages and deep 
expertise in foreign cultures. Increasing the number of 
employees proficient in hard-target languages will allow the 
Intelligence Community to improve its collection and analysis 
capabilities.
    While the Committee appreciates the steps that the 
Intelligence Community has taken to recruit individuals 
proficient in foreign languages, the Committee recognizes that 
these efforts have not fully met the high demand for language 
skills. Additionally, the Committee remains concerned that 
neither the Intelligence Community nor the Committee has an 
effective and objective mechanism to gauge progress in 
improving foreign language capacity and capabilities within the 
IC. Factual statistical information will allow Committees of 
jurisdiction to better assess the Intelligence Community's 
ability to manage language resources.

Section 413--Intelligence Community reports on foreign language 
        proficiency

    Section 413 requires the head of each element of the 
Intelligence Community to submit a detailed report to the DNI 
providing several different data points concerning the number 
of foreign-language-capable positions and personnel at each 
such element. This section further requires the DNI to submit 
all of these reports to several congressional committees along 
with an assessment of foreign language capacity and 
capabilities in the Intelligence Community and recommendations 
for the elimination of required reports relating to foreign-
language proficiency that the DNI considers outdated.

                Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency


Section 421--Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency

    Section 421 establishes in statute the position of the 
Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and 
requires that the individual serving in such position be 
nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. This 
section also describes the duties and authorities of the Deputy 
Director, and specifies that the position shall be at Level III 
of the Executive Schedule.

Section 422--General authorities of the Central Intelligence Agency

    Section 422 clarifies the CIA's authority to transfer funds 
to other federal elements to carry out functions which the CIA 
is authorized by law to carry out.

Section 423--Review of covert action programs by Inspector General of 
        the CIA

    Section 423 requires the CIA Inspector General to conduct 
audits of each covert action program at least once every three 
years.
    The Committee was dismayed at a recent incident wherein the 
Intelligence Community failed to inform the Congress of a 
significant covert action activity. This failure to notify 
Congress constitutes a violation of the National Security Act 
of 1947. Despite agency explanations that the failure was 
inadvertent, the Committee is deeply troubled over the fact 
that such an oversight could occur, whether intentionally or 
inadvertently.
    The Committee firmly believes that scrupulous transparency 
between the Intelligence Community and this Committee is an 
absolute necessity on matters related to covert action. The 
Committee intends this audit and reporting requirement to act 
as a further check against the risk of insufficient 
notification, whether deliberate or inadvertent.

Section 424--Report on audited financial statement progress

    Section 424 repeals the requirement for the CIA to submit 
an annual report describing steps taken to ensure that its 
financial statements can be audited in accordance with 
applicable law and Office of Management and Budget 
requirements. This section reflects the fact that the CIA has 
now submitted, and has promised it will continue to submit, 
audited financial statements in accordance with the 
Accountability of Tax Dollars Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-289; 
31 U.S.C. 3515).

                       Subtitle C--Other Elements


Section 431--Clarifying amendments relating to Section 105 of the 
        Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004

    Section 431 makes a technical correction to section 105 of 
the Intelligence Authorization for Fiscal Year 2004, which 
clarified that the establishment of the Office of Intelligence 
and Analysis within the Department of Treasury and its 
reorganization within the Office of Terrorism and Financial 
Intelligence did not affect the authorities of the Director of 
Central Intelligence with regard to the Office of Intelligence 
and Analysis. This section updates section 105 to reflect the 
authorities and responsibilities of the DNI as they relate to 
these elements of the Department of the Treasury.

Section 432--Repeal of certain authorities relating to the Office of 
        the National Counterintelligence Executive

    Section 432 makes conforming changes to reflect the 
incorporation of the Office of the National Counterintelligence 
Executive (NCIX) into the Office of the DNI. These amendments 
include the elimination of certain independent administrative 
authorities that had been vested in the NCIX when that official 
was appointed by and reported to the President prior to 
enactment of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention 
Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458), which placed the NCIX under the 
authority, direction and control of the DNI.

Section 433--Clarification of inclusion of Coast Guard and Drug 
        Enforcement Administration elements in the Intelligence 
        Community

    Section 433 formally includes the Coast Guard and Drug 
Enforcement Administration in the list of Intelligence 
Community agencies included in the National Security Act.

                         TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS


                Subtitle A--General Intelligence Matters


Section 501--Aerial reconnaissance platforms

    Section 501 restricts the Secretary of Defense's ability to 
terminate the U-2 program until he certifies there will be no 
loss of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) 
capabilities in transitioning from the U-2 to the Global Hawk. 
This section also requires a comparative study of the two 
platforms and a report on the results of the study to be 
delivered to the intelligence and armed services committees.

Section 502--Extension of National Commission for Review of Research 
        and Development Programs of the United States Intelligence 
        Community

    Section 502 extends the reporting deadline for the National 
Commission for Review and Research and Development Programs of 
the United States Intelligence Community until September 1, 
2008, and authorizes funds for the commission's activities. The 
commission was originally created in Section 1007 of the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (P.L. 107-
306; 50 U.S.C. 401 note).

                    Subtitle B--Technical Amendments


Section 511--Technical Amendments relating to the Multiyear National 
        Intelligence Program

    Section 511 updates the ``multiyear national intelligence 
program'' provision to incorporate and reflect organizational 
and nomenclature changes made by the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458).

Section 512--Technical clarification of certain references to the Joint 
        Military Intelligence Program and Tactical Intelligence and 
        Related Activities

    Section 512 makes a technical clarification to reflect the 
consolidation of the Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP) 
and the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities program 
(TIARA) into the Military Intelligence Program.
    The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 
2004 (P.L. 108-458) included a requirement for the DNI to 
participate in the development of the annual JMIP and TIARA 
budgets and for the Secretary of Defense to consult with the 
DNI prior to the transfer or reprogramming of JMIP funds. 
Changes provided Section 512 replace the obsolete JMIP and 
TIARA references with the new Military Intelligence Program.

Section 513--Technical amendments to the National Security Act of 1947

    Section 513 makes technical changes to the National 
Security Act of 1947.

Section 514--Technical amendments to the Intelligence Reform and 
        Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004

    Section 514 makes technical changes to the Intelligence 
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458)

Section 515--Technical amendments to the Executive Schedule

    Section 515 makes technical amendments to the Executive 
Schedule relating to the Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency and the General Counsel of the Office of the DNI.

Section 516--Technical Amendments to titles of Central Intelligence 
        Agency positions

    Section 516 makes technical changes to correct outdated 
references to the Executive Director, Deputy Director for 
Operations, and the Deputy Director for Administration in 
Section 17(d)(3)(B)(ii) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act 
of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(d)(3)(B)(ii)).
    These amendments reflect the recent changes of the titles 
of the Executive Director to the Associate Deputy Director; the 
Deputy Director for Operations to the Director of the National 
Clandestine Service; and the Deputy Director for Administration 
to the Director for Support.

Section 517--Technical amendments relating to redesignation of the 
        National Imagery and Mapping Agency as the National Geospatial-
        Intelligence Agency

    Section 517 makes technical changes to the United States 
Code reflect the change in name of the National Imagery and 
Mapping Agency to the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency 
as provided for in section 921(b) of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (P.L. 108-136).

               Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate


H.R. 2082--Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008

    Summary: H.R. 2082 would authorize appropriations for 
fiscal year 2008 for intelligence activities of the U.S. 
Government, for the Intelligence Community Management Account, 
and for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and 
Disability System (CIARDS).
    This estimate addresses only the unclassified portion of 
the bill. On that limited basis, CBO estimates that 
implementing certain provisions of the bill would cost $406 
million in 2008 and approximately $730 million over the 2008-
2012 period, assuming appropriation of the authorized funds. 
Enacting H.R. 2082 would not affect direct spending or 
revenues.
    The unclassified sections of H.R. 2082 would extend an 
existing mandate, as defined by the Unfunded Mandates Reform 
Act (UMRA), on intergovernmental and private-sector entities, 
but CBO estimates that the costs of the mandate would not 
exceed the annual thresholds established in that act ($67 
million for intergovernmental mandates and $134 million for 
private-sector mandates in 2007, adjusted annually for 
inflation).
    Estimated cost to the Federal Government: The estimated 
budgetary impact of H.R. 2082 is shown in the following table. 
The costs of this legislation fall within budget function 050 
(national defense).

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                     By fiscal year, in millions of dollars--
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
                                                                   2008    2009    2010    2011    2012    2013
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                  CHANGES IN SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION
 
Intelligence Community Management Account:
    Authorization Level.........................................     738       0       0       0       0       0
    Estimated Outlays...........................................     406     258      52      15       0       0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Basis of estimate: Section 104 would authorize the 
appropriation of $738 million for the Intelligence Community 
Management Account, which provides the principal source of 
funding for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
and provides resources for coordination of programs, budget 
oversight, and management of the intelligence agencies. CBO 
estimates that implementing this provision would cost $406 
million in 2008 and approximately $730 million over the 2008-
2012 period, assuming appropriation of the specified amount.
    Section 201 would authorize the appropriation of $263 
million to CIARDS to cover retirement costs attributable to 
military service and various unfunded liabilities. The 
appropriation to CIARDS is considered mandatory, and the 
authorization under this bill would be the same as assumed in 
the CBO baseline. Thus, this estimate does not ascribe any 
additional cost to that provision.
    Intergovernmental and private-sector impact: The 
unclassified sections of this bill would extend the National 
Commission for the Review of the Research and Development 
Programs of the U.S. Intelligence Community and the authority 
of the commission to subpoena testimony and evidence. State, 
local, and tribal governments, and entities in the private 
sector, if subpoenaed by the commission, would be required to 
provide testimony, documents, or other evidence. CBO expects 
that the commission would likely exercise this authority 
sparingly and that the costs to comply with a subpoena would 
not be significant. Thus, CBO estimates that the costs to 
public and private entities would be small and well below the 
annual thresholds established in UMRA ($67 million for 
intergovernmental mandates and $134 million for private-sector 
mandates in 2007, adjusted annually for inflation).
    The remaining unclassified provisions of the bill contain 
no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates and would 
impose no costs on state, local, or tribal governments.
    Estimate prepared by: Federal Costs: Jason Wheelock. Impact 
on State, Local, and Tribal Governments: Melissa Merrell. 
Impact on the Private Sector: David Arthur.
    Estimate approved by: Peter H. Fontaine, Deputy Assistant 
Director for Budget Analysis.


         Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported

  In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by 
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law 
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new 
matter is printed in italic, existing law in which no change is 
proposed is shown in roman):

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT ACT

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *



  TITLE II--THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY 
SYSTEM

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Part D--Benefits Accruing to Certain Participants

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 235. MANDATORY RETIREMENT.

  (a) * * *
  (b) Mandatory Retirement for Age.--
          (1) In general.--A participant in the system shall be 
        automatically retired from the Agency--
                  [(A) upon reaching age 65, in the case of a 
                participant in the system receiving 
                compensation under the Senior Intelligence 
                Service pay schedule at the rate of level 4 or 
                above; and]
                  (A) upon reaching age 65, in the case of a 
                participant in the system serving in a position 
                with a Senior Intelligence Service rank of 
                level 4 or above;

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


                     NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947

  Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of America in Congress assembled,

                              short title

  That this Act may be cited as the ``National Security Act of 
1947''.

                            TABLE OF CONTENTS

Sec. 2. Declaration of policy.
     * * * * * * *

               Title I--Coordination for National Security

Sec. 101. National Security Council.
     * * * * * * *
Sec. 104B. Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
     * * * * * * *
Sec. 120. Annual reports on foreign language proficiency.
     * * * * * * *

           Title V--Accountability for Intelligence Activities

Sec. 501. General congressional oversight provisions.
     * * * * * * *
Sec. 508. Quarterly intelligence reports to Congress on Iran and North 
          Korea.
Sec. 509. Report on intelligence community contractors.
Sec. 510. Report on foreign language proficiency in the intelligence 
          community.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                              DEFINITIONS

  Sec. 3. As used in this Act:
          (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          (4) The term ``intelligence community'' includes the 
        following:
                  (A) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                  (H) The intelligence elements of the Army, 
                the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, the 
                Coast Guard, the Federal Bureau of 
                Investigation, the Drug Enforcement 
                Administration, and the Department of Energy.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                  (K) The elements of the Department of 
                Homeland Security concerned with the analysis 
                of intelligence information[, including the 
                Office of Intelligence of the Coast Guard].
                  (L) Such other elements of any [other] 
                department or agency as may be designated by 
                the President, or designated jointly by the 
                Director of National Intelligence and the head 
                of the department or agency concerned, as an 
                element of the intelligence community.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


TITLE I--COORDINATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


     RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITIES OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL 
                              INTELLIGENCE

  Sec. 102A. (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (c) Budget Authorities.--(1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (3)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall 
participate in the development by the Secretary of Defense of 
the [annual budgets for the Joint Military Intelligence Program 
and for Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities] annual 
budget for the Military Intelligence Program or any successor 
program or programs.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (7)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall provide a 
semi-annual report, beginning April 1, 2005, and ending April 
1, 2007, to the President and the Congress regarding 
implementation of this [section] subsection.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (d) Role of Director of National Intelligence in Transfer and 
Reprogramming of Funds.--(1)(A) * * *
  (B) The Secretary of Defense shall consult with the Director 
of National Intelligence before transferring or reprogramming 
funds made available under the [Joint Military Intelligence 
Program] Military Intelligence Program or any successor program 
or programs.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (3) The Director of National Intelligence may only transfer 
or reprogram funds referred to in [subparagraph (A)] paragraph 
(1)(A)--
          (A) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (5)(A) A transfer or reprogramming of funds [or personnel] 
may be made under this subsection only if--
          (i) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (l) Enhanced Personnel Management.--(1) * * *
  (2)(A) * * *
  (B) The Director may prescribe regulations to carry out this 
[section] paragraph.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (n) Acquisition and Other Authorities.--(1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (s) Multi-Level Security Clearances.--The Director of 
National Intelligence shall establish a multi-level security 
clearance system for the intelligence community to enable the 
intelligence community to more efficiently make use of persons 
proficient in foreign languages or with cultural, linguistic, 
or other subject matter expertise that is critical to national 
security.

            OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

  Sec. 103. (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (c) Composition.--The Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence is composed of the following:
          (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          (9) The Chief Information Officer of the intelligence 
        community.
          (10) The Inspector General of the intelligence 
        community.
          (11) The Director of the National Counterterrorism 
        Center.
          (12) The Director of the National Counter 
        Proliferation Center.
          [(9)] (13) Such other offices and officials as may be 
        established by law or the Director may establish or 
        designate in the Office, including national 
        intelligence centers.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (e) Limitation on Co-Location [With] of Headquarters With 
Headquarters of Other Elements of Intelligence Community.--
Commencing as of October 1, 2008, the headquarters of the 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence may not be co-
located with the headquarters of any other element of the 
intelligence community.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                   DIRECTOR OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

  Sec. 103E. (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (c) Duties.--The Director of Science and Technology shall--
          (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          (4) assist the Director on the science and technology 
        elements of the budget of the Office of the Director of 
        National Intelligence; [and]
          (5) assist the Director in establishing goals for the 
        elements of the intelligence community to meet the 
        technology needs of the intelligence community; and
          [(5)] (6) perform other such duties as may be 
        prescribed by the Director of National Intelligence or 
        specified by law.
  (d) Director of National Intelligence Science and Technology 
Committee.--(1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (3) The Committee shall--
          (A) coordinate and prioritize advances in research 
        and development related to intelligence; and

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (4) In carrying out paragraph (3)(A), the Committee shall 
identify basic, advanced, and applied research programs to be 
executed by elements of the intelligence community.
  (e) Goals for Technology Needs of Intelligence Community.--In 
carrying out subsection (c)(5), the Director of Science and 
Technology shall--
          (1) systematically identify and assess the most 
        significant intelligence challenges that require 
        technical solutions;
          (2) examine options to enhance the responsiveness of 
        research programs; and
          (3) ensure that programs are designed to meet the 
        technical requirements of the intelligence community.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


           DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

  Sec. 104B.  (a) Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency.--There is a Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the 
advice and consent of the Senate.
  (b) Duties.--The Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency shall--
          (1) assist the Director of the Central Intelligence 
        Agency in carrying out the duties and responsibilities 
        of the Director; and
          (2) act for, and exercise the powers of, the Director 
        of the Central Intelligence Agency during the absence 
        or disability of the Director of the Central 
        Intelligence Agency, or during a vacancy in the 
        position of Director of the Central Intelligence 
        Agency.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


   ANNUAL REPORT ON IMPROVEMENT OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR AUDITING 
                                PURPOSES

  Sec. 114A. Not later each year than the date provided in 
section 507, the Director of National Intelligence, [the 
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency,] the Director of 
the National Security Agency, the Director of the Defense 
Intelligence Agency, and the Director of the National Imagery 
and Mapping Agency shall each submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees a report describing the activities 
being undertaken by such official to ensure that the financial 
statements of such agency can be audited in accordance with 
applicable law and requirements of the Office of Management and 
Budget.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


   TRAVEL ON ANY COMMON CARRIER FOR CERTAIN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION 
                               PERSONNEL

  Sec. 116. (a) * * *
  (b) Authorized Delegation of Duty.--(1) The Director of 
National Intelligence [may only delegate the authority granted 
by this section to the Principal Deputy Director of National 
Intelligence, or with respect to employees of the Central 
Intelligence Agency, to the Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency.] may delegate the authority in subsection 
(a) to the head of any other element of the intelligence 
community.
  (2) The head of an element of the intelligence community to 
whom the authority in subsection (a) is delegated pursuant to 
paragraph (1) may further delegate such authority to such 
senior officials of such element as are specified in guidelines 
prescribed by the Director of National Intelligence for 
purposes of this paragraph.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                    NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER

  Sec. 119. (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (c) Reporting.--(1) * * *
  (2) The matters described in this paragraph are as follows:
          (A) * * *
          (B) The activities of the Directorate of Intelligence 
        of the National Counterterrorism Center under 
        [subsection (h)] subsection (i).

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                 NATIONAL COUNTER PROLIFERATION CENTER

  Sec. 119A. (a) [Establishment.--Not later than 18 months 
after the date of the enactment of the National Security 
Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, the] (1) Establishment.--The 
President shall establish a National Counter Proliferation 
Center, taking into account all appropriate government tools to 
prevent and halt the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials and 
technologies.
  (2) Director.--The head of the National Counter Proliferation 
Center shall be the Director of the National Counter 
Proliferation Center, who shall be appointed by the Director of 
National Intelligence.
  (3) Location.--The National Counter Proliferation Center 
shall be located within the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


             ANNUAL REPORTS ON FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY

  Sec. 120. (a) In General.--The head of each element of the 
intelligence community shall annually submit to the Director of 
National Intelligence a report on the foreign language 
proficiency of the personnel of such element.
  (b) Contents.--
          (1) In general.--Each report submitted under 
        subsection (a) shall include, for each foreign language 
        and, where appropriate, dialect of a foreign language--
                  (A) the number of positions of such element 
                that require proficiency in the foreign 
                language or dialect;
                  (B) the number of personnel of such element 
                that are serving in a position that--
                          (i) requires proficiency in the 
                        foreign language or dialect to perform 
                        the primary duty of the position; and
                          (ii) does not require proficiency in 
                        the foreign language or dialect to 
                        perform the primary duty of the 
                        position;
                  (C) the number of personnel that are 
                proficient in the foreign language or dialect 
                that--
                          (i) are authorized for the element of 
                        the intelligence community for which 
                        the report is submitted; and
                          (ii) the head of such element 
                        considers necessary for such element 
                        for each of the five years following 
                        the date of the submission of the 
                        report;
                  (D) the number of personnel of such element 
                rated at each level of proficiency of the 
                Interagency Language Roundtable;
                  (E) whether the number of personnel at each 
                level of proficiency of the Interagency 
                Language Roundtable meets the requirements of 
                such element;
                  (F) the number of personnel serving or hired 
                to serve as linguists for such element that are 
                not qualified as linguists under the standards 
                of the Interagency Language Roundtable;
                  (G) the number of personnel hired to serve as 
                linguists for such element during the preceding 
                calendar year;
                  (H) the number of personnel serving as 
                linguists that discontinued serving such 
                element during the preceding calendar year;
                  (I) the percentage of work requiring 
                linguistic skills that is fulfilled by an ally 
                of the United States;
                  (J) the percentage of work requiring 
                linguistic skills that is fulfilled by 
                contractors; and
                  (K) the percentage of work requiring 
                linguistic skills that is fulfilled by members 
                of the Armed Forces.
          (2) Military personnel.--Except as provided in 
        paragraph (1)(K), a report submitted under subsection 
        (a) shall not include personnel that are members of the 
        Armed Forces on active duty assigned to the element for 
        which the report is submitted.
  (c) Dni Report to Congress.--The Director of National 
Intelligence shall annually submit to the Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence and the Subcommittee on Defense of 
the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives 
and the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Subcommittee 
on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate a 
report containing--
          (1) each report submitted to the Director of National 
        Intelligence for a year under subsection (a);
          (2) an assessment of the foreign language capacity 
        and capabilities of the intelligence community as a 
        whole; and
          (3) recommendations for eliminating required reports 
        relating to foreign-language proficiency that the 
        Director of National Intelligence considers outdated or 
        no longer relevant.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


          TITLE V--ACCOUNTABILITY FOR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

               GENERAL CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PROVISIONS

  Sec. 501. (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (f) As used in this section, the term ``intelligence 
activities'' includes covert actions as defined in section 
[503(e)] 503(g), and includes financial intelligence 
activities.

     REPORTING OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OTHER THAN COVERT ACTIONS

  Sec. 502. (a) In General.--To the extent consistent with due 
regard for the protection from unauthorized disclosure of 
classified information relating to sensitive intelligence 
sources and methods or other exceptionally sensitive matters, 
the Director of National Intelligence and the heads of all 
departments, agencies, and other entities of the United States 
Government involved in intelligence activities shall--
          (1) keep the congressional intelligence committees 
        fully and currently informed of all intelligence 
        activities, other than a covert action (as defined in 
        section [503(e)] 503(g)), which are the responsibility 
        of, are engaged in by, or are carried out for or on 
        behalf of, any department, agency, or entity of the 
        United States Government, including any significant 
        anticipated intelligence activity and any significant 
        intelligence failure; and

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


         PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL AND REPORTING OF COVERT ACTIONS

  Sec. 503. (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (e) Inspector General Audits of Covert Actions.--
          (1) In general.--Subject to paragraph (2), the 
        Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency 
        shall conduct an audit of each covert action at least 
        every three years.
          (2) Terminated, suspended programs.--The Inspector 
        General of the Central Intelligence Agency is not 
        required to conduct an audit under paragraph (1) of a 
        covert action that has been terminated or suspended if 
        such covert action was terminated or suspend prior to 
        the last audit of such covert action conducted by the 
        Inspector General and has not been restarted after the 
        date on which such audit was completed.
          (3) Report.--Not later than 60 days after the 
        completion of an audit conducted pursuant to paragraph 
        (1), the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence 
        Agency shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
        committees a report containing the results of such 
        audit.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  [(e)] (g) As used in this title, the term ``covert action'' 
means an activity or activities of the United States Government 
to influence political, economic, or military conditions 
abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States 
Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly, but 
does not include--
          (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                   FUNDING OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

  Sec. 504. (a) Appropriated funds available to an intelligence 
agency may be obligated or expended for an intelligence or 
intelligence-related activity only if--
          (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          (3) in the case of funds specifically authorized by 
        the Congress for a different activity--
                  (A) * * *
                  [(B) the need for funds for such activity is 
                based on unforseen requirements; and]
                  (B) the activity to be funded supports an 
                emergent need, improves program effectiveness, 
                or increases efficiency; and

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (c) No funds appropriated for, or otherwise available to, any 
department, agency, or entity of the United States Government 
may be expended, or may be directed to be expended, for any 
covert action, as defined in section [503(e)] 503(g), unless 
and until a Presidential finding required by subsection (a) of 
section 503 has been signed or otherwise issued in accordance 
with that subsection.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


  DATES FOR SUBMITTAL OF VARIOUS ANNUAL AND SEMIANNUAL REPORTS TO THE 
                 CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES

  Sec. 507. (a) Annual Reports.--(1) The date for the submittal 
to the congressional intelligence committees of the following 
annual reports shall be the date each year provided in 
subsection (c)(1)(A):
          (A) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          [(N)] (J) The annual report on hiring and retention 
        of minority employees in the intelligence community 
        required by section 114(c).
          (K) The annual report on intelligence community 
        contractors required by section 509.
          (L) The annual report on foreign language proficiency 
        in the intelligence community required by section 510.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


   QUARTERLY INTELLIGENCE REPORTS TO CONGRESS ON IRAN AND NORTH KOREA

  Sec. 508. (a) Report.--
          (1) In general.--On a quarterly basis, the Director 
        of National Intelligence shall submit to the 
        congressional intelligence committees a report on the 
        current intentions and capabilities of the Islamic 
        Republic of Iran and Democratic People's Republic of 
        Korea (North Korea) with regard to the nuclear programs 
        of Iran and North Korea, respectively, including--
          (A) an assessment of nuclear weapons programs;
          (B) an evaluation, consistent with existing reporting 
        standards and practices, of the sources upon which the 
        intelligence is based, including the number of sources 
        and the reliability of each source;
          (C) a summary of any new intelligence gathered or 
        developed since the previous report, including 
        intelligence collected from both open and clandestine 
        sources; and
          (D) a discussion of any dissents, caveats, gaps in 
        knowledge, or other information that would reduce 
        confidence in the overall assessment.
  (2) Form.--Each report submitted under paragraph (1) may be 
submitted in classified form.
  (b) Access to Report.--Each report submitted under subsection 
(a)(1) shall be made available to all members of the 
congressional intelligence committees and to all staff of the 
congressional intelligence committees with appropriate security 
clearance. Other members of the Senate or the House of 
Representatives may review the reports in accordance with 
security procedures established by each of the congressional 
intelligence committees.

              REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CONTRACTORS

  Sec. 509. Not later each year than the date provided in 
section 507, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit 
to the congressional intelligence committees a report on 
contractors funded under the National Intelligence Program. 
Such report shall include--
          (1) a list of all contractors that--
                  (A) have been the subject of an investigation 
                completed by the Inspector General of any 
                element of the intelligence community during 
                the preceding fiscal year,
                  (B) are the subject of an investigation by 
                such an Inspector General during the current 
                fiscal year, or
                  (C) will be the subject of an investigation 
                that may affect the ability of the contractor 
                to deliver contracted services to the 
                intelligence community by such an Inspector 
                General during the current fiscal year,
        either as a corporate entity or an individual employee, 
        for financial waste, fraud, abuse of government 
        resources, failure to perform a contract, or criminal 
        violations; and
          (2) the number of contractors performing services for 
        each element of the intelligence community.

  REPORT ON FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

  Sec. 510. Not later each year than the date provided in 
section 507, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit 
to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the 
foreign language proficiency of each element of the 
intelligence community, including--
          (1) the number of positions authorized for such 
        element that require foreign language proficiency and 
        the level of proficiency required;
          (2) the number of positions authorized for such 
        element that require foreign language proficiency that 
        are filled by--
                  (A) military personnel; and
                  (B) civilian personnel;
          (3) the number of applicants for positions in such 
        element in the previous fiscal year that indicated 
        foreign language proficiency, including the foreign 
        language indicated and the proficiency level;
          (4) the number of persons hired by such element with 
        foreign language proficiency, including the foreign 
        language and proficiency level;
          (5) the number of personnel of such element currently 
        attending foreign language training, including the 
        provider of such training;
          (6) a description of such element's efforts to 
        recruit, hire, train, and retain personnel that are 
        proficient in a foreign language; and
          (7) an assessment of methods and models for basic, 
        advanced, and intensive foreign language training.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


PART III--EMPLOYEES

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SUBPART A--GENERAL PROVISIONS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


CHAPTER 23--MERIT SYSTEM PRINCIPLES

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 2302. Prohibited personnel practices

  (a)(1) * * *
  (2) For the purpose of this section--
          (A) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          (C) `a`agency'' means an Executive agency and the 
        Government Printing Office, but does not include--
                  (i) * * *
                  (ii) the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the 
                Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense 
                Intelligence Agency, the [National Imagery and 
                Mapping Agency] National Geospatial-
                Intelligence Agency, the National Security 
                Agency, and, as determined by the President, 
                any Executive agency or unit thereof the 
                principal function of which is the conduct of 
                foreign intelligence or counterintelligence 
                activities; or

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SUBPART B--EMPLOYMENT AND RETENTION

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


CHAPTER 31--AUTHORITY FOR EMPLOYMENT

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SUBCHAPTER II--THE SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 3132. Definitions and exclusions

  (a) For the purpose of this subchapter--
          (1) ``agency'' means an Executive agency, except a 
        Government corporation and the Government 
        Accountability Office, but does not include--
                  (A) * * *
                  (B) the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the 
                Drug Enforcement Administration, the Central 
                Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence 
                Agency, the [National Imagery and Mapping 
                Agency] National Geospatial-Intelligence 
                Agency, the National Security Agency, 
                Department of Defense intelligence activities 
                the civilian employees of which are subject to 
                section 1590 of title 10,, and, as determined 
                by the President, an Executive agency, or unit 
                thereof, whose principal function is the 
                conduct of foreign intelligence or 
                counterintelligence activities;

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SUBPART C--EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


CHAPTER 43--PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                    SUBCHAPTER I--GENERAL PROVISIONS

Sec. 4301. Definitions

  For the purpose of this subchapter--
          (1) ``agency'' means--
                  (A) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

        but does not include--
                  (i) * * *
                  (ii) the Central Intelligence Agency, the 
                Defense Intelligence Agency, the [National 
                Imagery and Mapping Agency] National 
                Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National 
                Security Agency, or any Executive agency or 
                unit thereof which is designated by the 
                President and the principal function of which 
                is the conduct of foreign intelligence or 
                counterintelligence activities; or

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


CHAPTER 47--PERSONNEL RESEARCH PROGRAMS AND DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 4701. Definitions

  (a) For the purpose of this chapter--
          (1) ``agency'' means an Executive agency and the 
        Government Printing Office, but does not include--
                  (A) * * *
                  (B) the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the 
                Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense 
                Intelligence Agency, the [National Imagery and 
                Mapping Agency] National Geospatial-
                Intelligence Agency, the National Security 
                Agency, and, as determined by the President, 
                any Executive agency or unit thereof which is 
                designated by the President and which has as 
                its principal function the conduct of foreign 
                intelligence or counterintelligence activities; 
                or

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SUBPART D--PAY AND ALLOWANCES

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


CHAPTER 51--CLASSIFICATION

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 5102. Definitions; application

  (a) For the purpose of this chapter--
          (1) ``agency'' means--
                  (A) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

        but does not include--
                  (i) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                  (x) the [National Imagery and Mapping Agency] 
                National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, 
                Department of Defense.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


CHAPTER 53--PAY RATES AND SYSTEMS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SUBCHAPTER II--EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE PAY RATES

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 5313. Positions at level II

  Level II of the Executive Schedule applies to the following 
positions, for which the annual rate of basic pay shall be the 
rate determined with respect to such level under chapter 11 of 
title 2, as adjusted by section 5318 of this title:

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          [Director of Central Intelligence.]
          Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 5314. Positions at level III

  Level III of the Executive Schedule applies to the following 
positions, for which the annual rate of basic pay shall be the 
rate determined with respect to such level under chapter 11 of 
title 2, as adjusted by section 5318 of this title:

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          [Deputy Directors of Central Intelligence (2).]
          Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 5315. Positions at level IV

  Level IV of the Executive Schedule applies to the following 
positions, for which the annual rate of basic pay shall be the 
rate determined with respect to such level under chapter 11 of 
title 2, as adjusted by section 5318 of this title:

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          [General Counsel of the Office of the National 
        Intelligence Director.]
          General Counsel of the Office of the Director of 
        National Intelligence.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SUBCHAPTER IV--PREVAILING RATE SYSTEMS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 5342. Definitions; application

  (a) For the purpose of this subchapter--
          (1) ``agency'' means an Executive agency; but does 
        not include--
                  (A) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                  (K) the [National Imagery and Mapping Agency] 
                National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, 
                Department of Defense;

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SUBPART E--ATTENDANCE AND LEAVE

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


CHAPTER 63--LEAVE

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SUBCHAPTER III--VOLUNTARY TRANSFERS OF LEAVE

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 6339. Additional leave transfer programs

  (a) For the purpose of this section--
          (1) the term ``excepted agency'' means--
                  (A) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                  (E) the [National Imagery and Mapping Agency] 
                National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; and

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          (2) the term ``head of an excepted agency'' means--
                  (A) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                  (E) with respect to the [National Imagery and 
                Mapping Agency, the Director of the National 
                Imagery and Mapping Agency] National 
                Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the Director of 
                the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; 
                and

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SUBPART F--LABOR-MANAGEMENT AND EMPLOYEE RELATIONS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


CHAPTER 73--SUITABILITY, SECURITY, AND CONDUCT

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SUBCHAPTER III--POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 7323. Political activity authorized; prohibitions

  (a) * * *
  (b)(1) * * *
  (2)(A) * * *
  (B) The provisions of subparagraph (A) shall apply to--
          (i) an employee of--
                  (I) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                  (XIII) the [National Imagery and Mapping 
                Agency] National Geospatial-Intelligence 
                Agency; or

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SUBCHAPTER IV--FOREIGN GIFTS AND DECORATIONS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 7342. Receipt and disposition of foreign gifts and decorations

  (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (f)(1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  [(4)(A) In transmitting such listings for the Central 
Intelligence Agency, the Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency may delete the information described in subparagraphs 
(A) and (C) of paragraphs (2) and (3) if the Director certifies 
in writing to the Secretary of State that the publication of 
such information could adversely affect United States 
intelligence sources.
  [(B) In transmitting such listings for the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence, the Director of National 
Intelligence may delete the information described in 
subparagraphs (A) and (C) of paragraphs (2) and (3) if the 
Director certifies in writing to the Secretary of State that 
the publication of such information could adversely affect 
United States intelligence sources.]
  (4) In transmitting such listings for an element of the 
intelligence community (as such term is defined in section 3(4) 
of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4))), the 
head of such element of the intelligence community may delete 
the information described in subparagraphs (A) and (C) of 
paragraphs (2) and (3) if the head of such element of the 
intelligence community certifies in writing to the Secretary of 
State that the publication of such information could adversely 
affect United States intelligence sources or methods.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


TITLE 49, UNITED STATES CODE

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                SUBTITLE I--DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

CHAPTER 1--ORGANIZATION

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 115. Transportation Security Oversight Board

  (a) * * *
  (b) Membership.--
          (1) Number and appointment.--The Board shall be 
        composed of 7 members as follows:
                  (A) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                  [(F) The Director of the Central Intelligence 
                Agency, or the Director's designee.]
                  (F) The Director of National Intelligence, or 
                the Director's designee.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1984

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


TITLE IV--ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS RELATED TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 
AGENCY AND THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                    ELIGIBILITY FOR INCENTIVE AWARDS

  Sec. 402. [(a) The Director of Central Intelligence may 
exercise the authority granted in section 4503 of title 5, 
United States Code, with respect to Federal employees and 
members of the Armed Forces detailed or assigned to the Central 
Intelligence Agency or to the Intelligence Community Staff, in 
the same manner as such authority may be exercised with respect 
to the personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency and the 
Intelligence Community Staff.]
  (a) Authority for Payment of Awards.--(1) The Director of 
National Intelligence may exercise the authority granted in 
section 4503 of title 5, United States Code, with respect to 
Federal employees and members of the Armed Forces detailed or 
assigned to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
in the same manner as such authority may be exercised with 
respect to personnel of the Office.
  (2) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency may 
exercise the authority granted in section 4503 of title 5, 
United States Code, with respect to Federal employees and 
members of the Armed Forces detailed or assigned to the Central 
Intelligence Agency in the same manner as such authority may be 
exercised with respect to personnel of the Agency.
  (b) Personnel Eligible for Awards.--The authority granted by 
[subsection (a) of this section] subsection (a) may be 
exercised with respect to Federal employees or members of the 
Armed Forces detailed or assigned [to the Central Intelligence 
Agency or to the Intelligence Community Staff] to the Office of 
the Director of National Intelligence or to the Central 
Intelligence Agency on or after [a date five years before the 
date of enactment of this section] December 9, 1978.
  [(c) During fiscal year 1987, the Director of Central 
Intelligence may exercise the authority granted in section 
4503(2) of title 5, United States Code, with respect to members 
of the Armed Forces who are assigned to foreign intelligence 
duties at the time of the conduct which gives rise to the 
exercise of such authority.]
  [(d)] (c) Payment and Acceptance of Awards.--An award made by 
the [Director of Central Intelligence] Director of National 
Intelligence or Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to 
an employee or member of the Armed Forces under the authority 
of section 4503 of title 5, United States Code, or this section 
may be paid and accepted notwithstanding--
          (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                          GENERAL AUTHORITIES

  Sec. 5. (a) In General.--In the performance of its functions, 
the Central Intelligence Agency is authorized to--
  (1) Transfer to and receive from other Government agencies 
such sums as may be approved by the Office of Management and 
Budget, for the performance of [any of the functions or 
activities authorized under paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 
102(a), subsections (c)(7) and (d) of section 103, subsections 
(a) and (g) of section 104, and section 303 of the National 
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403(a)(2), (3), 403-3(c)(7), 
(d), 403-4(a), (g), and 405),] any functions or activities 
authorized by law to be conducted by the Central Intelligence 
Agency and any other Government agency is authorized to 
transfer to or receive from the Agency such sums without regard 
to any provisions of law limiting or prohibiting transfers 
between appropriations. Sums transferred to the Agency in 
accordance with this paragraph may be expended for the purposes 
and under the authority of this Act without regard to 
limitations of appropriations from which transferred;

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 17. INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE AGENCY.

  (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (d) Semiannual Reports; Immediate Reports of Serious or 
Flagrant Problems; Reports of Functional Problems; Reports to 
Congress on Urgent Concerns.--(1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (3) In the event that--
          (A) * * *
          (B) an investigation, inspection, or audit carried 
        out by the Inspector General should focus on any 
        current or former Agency official who--
                  (i) * * *
                  (ii) holds or held the position in the 
                Agency, including such a position held on an 
                acting basis, of--
                          (I) [Executive Director] Associate 
                        Deputy Director;
                          (II) [Deputy Director for Operations] 
                        Director of the National Clandestine 
                        Service;

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                          (IV) [Deputy Director for 
                        Administration] Director for Support; 
                        or

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 105. OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE 
                    TREASURY.

  (a) * * *
  (b) Construction of Authority.--Nothing in section 311 of 
title 31, United States Code (as amended by subsection (a)), or 
in section 313 of such title, shall be construed to alter the 
authorities and responsibilities of the [Director of Central 
Intelligence] Director of National Intelligence with respect to 
the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of 
the Treasury as an element of the intelligence community.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


     SECTION 904 OF THE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ENHANCEMENT ACT OF 2002

SEC. 904. OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE.

  (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  [(d) General Counsel.--(1) There shall be in the Office of 
the National Counterintelligence Executive a general counsel 
who shall serve as principal legal advisor to the National 
Counterintelligence Executive.
  [(2) The general counsel shall--
          [(A) provide legal advice and counsel to the 
        Executive on matters relating to functions of the 
        Office;
          [(B) ensure that the Office complies with all 
        applicable laws, regulations, Executive orders, and 
        guidelines; and
          [(C) carry out such other duties as the Executive may 
        specify.]
  [(e)] (d) Functions.--Subject to the direction and control of 
the National Counterintelligence Executive, the functions of 
the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive shall 
be as follows:
          (1) National threat identification and prioritization 
        assessment.--Subject to [subsection (f)] subsection 
        (e), in consultation with appropriate department and 
        agencies of the United States Government, and private 
        sector entities, to produce on an annual basis a 
        strategic planning assessment of the 
        counterintelligence requirements of the United States 
        to be known as the National Threat Identification and 
        Prioritization Assessment.
          (2) National counterintelligence strategy.--Subject 
        to [subsection (f)] subsection (e), in consultation 
        with appropriate department and agencies of the United 
        States Government, and private sector entities, and 
        based on the most current National Threat 
        Identification and Prioritization Assessment under 
        paragraph (1), to produce on an annual basis a strategy 
        for the counterintelligence programs and activities of 
        the United States Government to be known as the 
        National Counterintelligence Strategy.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  [(f)] (e) Additional Requirements Regarding National Threat 
Identification and Prioritization Assessment and National 
Counterintelligence Strategy.--(1) * * *
  (2) A National Counterintelligence Strategy under [subsection 
(e)(2)] subsection (d)(2), and any modification of such 
strategy, shall not go into effect until approved by the 
President.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  [(g)] (f) Personnel.--(1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  [(3) The employment of personnel by the Office, including the 
appointment, compensation and benefits, management, and 
separation of such personnel, shall be governed by the 
provisions of law on such matters with respect to the personnel 
of the Central Intelligence Agency, except that, for purposes 
of the applicability of such provisions of law to personnel of 
the Office, the National Counterintelligence Executive shall be 
treated as the head of the Office.
  [(4) Positions in the Office shall be excepted service 
positions for purposes of title 5, United States Code.
  [(h) Support.--(1) The Attorney General, Secretary of 
Defense, and Director of National Intelligence may each provide 
the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive such 
support as may be necessary to permit the Office to carry out 
its functions under this section.
  [(2) Subject to any terms and conditions specified by the 
Director of National Intelligence, the Director may provide 
administrative and contract support to the Office as if the 
Office were an element of the Central Intelligence Agency.
  [(3) Support provided under this subsection may be provided 
on a reimbursable or nonreimbursable basis, at the election of 
the official providing such support.
  [(i) Availability of Funds for Reimbursement.--The National 
Counterintelligence Executive may, from amounts available for 
the Office, transfer to a department or agency detailing 
personnel under subsection (g), or providing support under 
subsection (h), on a reimbursable basis amounts appropriate to 
reimburse such department or agency for the detail of such 
personnel or the provision of such support, as the case may be.
  [(j) Contracts.--(1) Subject to paragraph (2), the National 
Counterintelligence Executive may enter into any contract, 
lease, cooperative agreement, or other transaction that the 
Executive considers appropriate to carry out the functions of 
the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive under 
this section.
  [(2) The authority under paragraph (1) to enter into 
contracts, leases, cooperative agreements, and other 
transactions shall be subject to any terms, conditions, and 
limitations applicable to the Central Intelligence Agency under 
law with respect to similar contracts, leases, cooperative 
agreements, and other transactions.]
  [(k)] (g) Treatment of Activities Under Certain 
Administrative Laws.--The files of the Office shall be treated 
as operational files of the Central Intelligence Agency for 
purposes of section 701 of the National Security Act of 1947 
(50 U.S.C. 431) to the extent such files meet criteria under 
subsection (b) of that section for treatment of files as 
operational files of an element of the Agency.
  [(l)] (h) Oversight by Congress.--The location of the Office 
of the National Counterintelligence Executive within the Office 
of the Director of National Intelligence shall not be construed 
as affecting access by Congress, or any committee of Congress, 
to--
          (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  [(m)] (i) Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be 
construed as affecting the authority of the Director of 
National Intelligence, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary 
of State, the Attorney General, or the Director of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation as provided or specified under the 
National Security Act of 1947 or under other provisions of law.
                              ----------                              


INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2003

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


  TITLE X--NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR REVIEW OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 
PROGRAMS OF THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 1007. FINAL REPORT; TERMINATION.

  (a) Final Report.--Not later than [September 1, 2004] 
September 1, 2008, the Commission shall submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees, the Director of Central 
Intelligence, and the Secretary of Defense a final report as 
required by section 1002(h)(2).

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


SECTION 1403 OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 
                                  1991

[SEC. 1403. MULTIYEAR NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM]

SEC. 1403. MULTIYEAR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.

  (a) Annual Submission of Multiyear National [Foreign] 
Intelligence Program.--The [Director of Central Intelligence] 
Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the 
congressional committees specified in subsection (d) each year 
a multiyear national [foreign] intelligence program plan 
reflecting the estimated expenditures and proposed 
appropriations required to support that program. Any such 
multiyear national [foreign] intelligence program plan shall 
cover the fiscal year with respect to which the budget is 
submitted and at least four succeeding fiscal years.
  (b) Time of Submission.--The Director of National 
Intelligence shall submit the report required by subsection (a) 
each year at or about the same time that the budget is 
submitted to Congress pursuant to section 1105(a) of title 31, 
United States Code.
  (c) Consistency With Budget Estimates.--The [Director of 
Central Intelligence] Director of National Intelligence and the 
Secretary of Defense shall ensure that the estimates referred 
to in subsection (a) are consistent with the budget estimates 
submitted to Congress pursuant to section 1105(a) of title 31, 
United States Code, for the fiscal year concerned and with the 
estimated expenditures and proposed appropriations for the 
multiyear defense program submitted pursuant to section 114a of 
title 10, United States Code.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


NATIONAL SECURITY INTELLIGENCE REFORM ACT OF 2004

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


TITLE I--REFORM OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Subtitle A--Establishment of Director of National Intelligence

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 1016. INFORMATION SHARING.

  (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (e) Implementation Plan Report.--Not later than one year 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President 
shall, with the assistance of the program manager, submit to 
Congress a report containing an implementation plan for the 
ISE. The report shall include the following:
          (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          (10) A delineation of the roles of the Federal 
        departments and agencies that will participate in the 
        ISE, including an identification of the agencies that 
        will deliver the infrastructure needed to operate and 
        manage the ISE (as distinct from individual department 
        or agency components that are part of the ISE), with 
        such delineation of roles to be consistent with--
                  (A) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                  (B) the authority of the Secretary of 
                Homeland Security and the Attorney General, and 
                the role of the Department of Homeland Security 
                and the [Attorney General] Department of 
                Justice, in coordinating with State, local, and 
                tribal officials and the private sector.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                Subtitle F--Privacy and Civil Liberties

SEC. 1061. PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD.

  (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (d) Access to Information.--
          (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          (4) Exceptions for national security.--
                  (A) In general.--If the [National 
                Intelligence Director] Director of National 
                Intelligence, in consultation with the Attorney 
                General, determines that it is necessary to 
                withhold information requested under paragraph 
                (3) to protect the national security interests 
                of the United States, the head of the 
                department or agency concerned shall not 
                furnish such information to the Board.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (h) Security Clearances.--The appropriate departments and 
agencies of the executive branch shall cooperate with the Board 
to expeditiously provide Board members and staff with 
appropriate security clearances to the extent possible under 
applicable procedures and requirements. Promptly upon 
commencing its work, the Board shall adopt, after consultation 
with the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, and the 
[National Intelligence Director] Director of National 
Intelligence, rules and procedures of the Board for physical, 
communications, computer, document, personnel, and other 
security in relation to the work of the Board.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


              Subtitle G--Conforming and Other Amendments

SEC. 1071. CONFORMING AMENDMENTS RELATING TO ROLES OF DIRECTOR OF 
                    NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL 
                    INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

  (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (e) Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.--[(1)] The 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 
et seq.) is amended by striking ``Director of Central 
Intelligence'' each place it appears and inserting ``Director 
of National Intelligence''.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 1072. OTHER CONFORMING AMENDMENTS

  (a) * * *
  (b) Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949.--Section 6 of 
the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403g) is 
amended by striking ``section 103(c)(7) of the National 
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(7))'' and inserting 
``section 102A(i) of the National Security Act of 1947''.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


               TITLE II--FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

SEC. 2001. IMPROVEMENT OF INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES OF THE FEDERAL 
                    BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.

  (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (c) National Intelligence Workforce.--(1) In developing and 
maintaining a national intelligence workforce under subsection 
(b), the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall, 
develop and maintain a specialized and integrated national 
intelligence workforce consisting of agents, analysts, 
linguists, and surveillance specialists who are recruited, 
trained, and rewarded in a manner which ensures the existence 
within the Federal Bureau of Investigation of an institutional 
culture with substantial expertise in, and commitment to, the 
intelligence mission of the Bureau.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (e) Discharge of Improvements.--(1) * * *
  (2) The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall 
carry out subsections (b) through (d) under the joint guidance 
of the Attorney General and [the National Intelligence Director 
in a manner consistent with section 112(e)] the Director of 
National Intelligence in a manner consistent with applicable 
law.
  (f) Budget Matters.--The Director of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation [shall,] shall establish a budget structure of 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation to reflect the four 
principal missions of the Bureau as follows:
          (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 2006. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION USE OF TRANSLATORS.

  Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of 
this Act, and annually thereafter, the Attorney General of the 
United States shall submit to the Committee on the Judiciary of 
the Senate and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of 
Representatives a report that contains, with respect to each 
preceding 12-month period--
          (1) * * *
          (2) any legal or practical impediments to using 
        translators employed by [the] Federal, State, or local 
        agencies on a full-time, part-time, or shared basis;
          (3) the needs of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
        for [the] specific translation services in certain 
        languages, and recommendations for meeting those needs;

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


TITLE 44, UNITED STATES CODE

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


              CHAPTER 13--PARTICULAR REPORTS AND DOCUMENTS

Sec.
1301. Agriculture, Department of: report of Secretary.
     * * * * * * *
[1336. National Imagery and Mapping Agency: special publications.]
1336. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency: special publications.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


[Sec. 1336. National Imagery and Mapping Agency: special publications]

Sec. 1336. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency: special 
                    publications

  The Director of the [National Imagery and Mapping Agency] 
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency may authorize the 
printing of notices to mariners, light lists, sailing 
directions, bulletins, and other special publications of the 
[National Imagery and Mapping Agency] National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency in editions the interests of the Government 
and of the public may require.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


            SECTION 201 OF THE HOMELAND SECURITY ACT OF 2002

SEC. 201. DIRECTORATE FOR INFORMATION ANALYSIS AND INFRASTRUCTURE 
                    PROTECTION.

  (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (f) Detail of Personnel.--
          (1) * * *
          (2) Covered agencies.--The agencies referred to in 
        this paragraph are as follows:
                  (A) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                  (E) The [National Imagery and Mapping Agency] 
                National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


SECTION 8H OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL ACT OF 1978

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


  Sec. 8H.(a)(1)(A) An employee of the Defense Intelligence 
Agency, the [National Imagery and Mapping Agency] National 
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance 
Office, or the National Security Agency, or of a contractor of 
any of those Agencies, who intends to report to Congress a 
complaint or information with respect to an urgent concern may 
report the complaint or information to the Inspector General of 
the Department of Defense (or designee).

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (g)(1) The Inspector General of the Defense Intelligence 
Agency, the [National Imagery and Mapping Agency] National 
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance 
Office, and the National Security Agency shall each submit to 
the congressional intelligence committees each year a report 
that sets forth the following:
          (A) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


          SECTION 105 OF THE ETHICS IN GOVERNMENT ACT OF 1978

                CUSTODY OF AND PUBLIC ACCESS TO REPORTS

  Sec. 105. (a) Each agency, each supervising ethics office in 
the executive or judicial branch, the Clerk of the House of 
Representatives, and the Secretary of the Senate shall make 
available to the public, in accordance with subsection (b), 
each report filed under this title with such agency or office 
or with the Clerk or the Secretary of the Senate, except that--
  (1) this section does not require public availability of a 
report filed by any individual in the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency, the 
Defense Intelligence Agency, the [National Imagery and Mapping 
Agency] National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, or the 
National Security Agency, or any individual engaged in 
intelligence activities in any agency of the United States, if 
the President finds or has found that, due to the nature of the 
office or position occupied by such individual, public 
disclosure of such report would, be revealing the identity of 
the individual or other sensitive information, compromise the 
national interest of the United States; and such individuals 
may be authorized, notwithstanding section 104(a), to file such 
additional reports as are necessary to protect their identity 
from public disclosure if the President first finds or has 
found that such filing is necessary in the national interest; 
and

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


       SECTION 7 OF THE EMPLOYEE POLYGRAPH PROTECTION ACT OF 1988

SEC. 7. EXEMPTIONS.

  (a) * * *
  (b) National Defense and Security Exemption.--
          (1) * * *
          (2) Security.--Nothing in this Act shall be construed 
        to prohibit the administration, by the Federal 
        Government, in the performance of any intelligence or 
        counterintelligence function, of any lie detector test 
        to--
                  (A)(i) any individual employed by, assigned 
                to, or detailed to, the National Security 
                Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the 
                [National Imagery and Mapping Agency] National 
                Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, or the Central 
                Intelligence Agency,

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


     SECTION 207 OF THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 1993

  Sec. 207. (a)(1) * * *
  (2) Paragraph (1) does not apply to (A) individual printing 
orders costing not more than $1,000, if the work is not of a 
continuing or repetitive nature, and, as certified by the 
Public Printer, if the work is included in a class of work 
which cannot be provided more economically through the 
Government Printing Office, (B) printing for the Central 
Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, [National 
Imagery and Mapping Agency] National Geospatial-Intelligence 
Agency, or the National Security Agency, or (C) printing from 
other sources that is specifically authorized by law.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                             MINORITY VIEWS

    We join with our majority colleagues in the provisions of 
this bill that provide bipartisan support to critical national 
security programs protecting our nation in a time of continued 
struggle against worldwide threats posed by radical jihadists 
and others who seek to harm America and its interests. We have 
significant concerns, however, that aspects of this bill would 
begin to take us back to the failed, politically-based, 
policies of the 1990s that dangerously impaired our national 
security and intelligence capabilities by questionable 
allocation and underfunding of resources and significant 
``politically correct'' restrictions and constraints on 
intelligence operations.
    In numerous important respects, this bill fails to provide 
adequate support to intelligence community activities at the 
forefront of its ability to protect our national security. In 
the classified annex, the majority cuts human intelligence 
programs counter to the recommendations of the 9111 Commission, 
and significantly cuts certain specific initiatives related to 
America's efforts to counter radical jihadists and to support 
our nation's objectives in Iraq. In another key intelligence 
collection area, the bill would have dramatically cut key 
activities had a Republican amendment to preserve the resources 
for a vital classified national intelligence capability not 
succeeded. In yet another key area, a Democratic amendment 
would have terminated one of America's most essential 
programs--which has been conducted in full accordance with the 
law and under close oversight by the Committee--had it not been 
defeated after Republican opposition.
    While it is not possible to describe these issues in 
greater detail due to the classified nature of the programs and 
the Schedule of Authorizations, these are the most significant 
shortcomings of the bill and we wish to strongly emphasize the 
importance of these programs and this funding in a time of 
continued threat. We are a nation locked in a struggle with 
radical jihadists, and facing continued uncertainty and other 
threats around the globe. Republicans will not diminish our 
support for a robust, empowered, and capable intelligence 
community that provides our first line of defense.
    The Committee also failed to support the intelligence 
community and our national defense against attack by rejecting 
a Republican amendment to include important legislation to 
modernize the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. This 
identical language passed the House of Representatives last 
year with bipartisan support. In fact, just over six months ago 
the bill was reported from this Committee by voice vote. The 
current legal framework governing electronic surveillance of 
foreign terrorists and spies is outdated. It significantly 
impairs the responsiveness of the intelligence community while 
simultaneously diverting resources away from protecting the 
privacy and civil liberties of Americans. Legal uncertainty 
with respect to FISA continues to threaten our capabilities to 
detect and prevent potential terrorist acts, and it is critical 
for the Congress to act immediately to definitively clarify the 
statute to preserve necessary capabilities, control the 
exercise of authority by the Executive Branch affecting civil 
liberties, and forestall the possibility that the matter would 
be improperly legislated by unelected judges.
    In addition to these significant shortcomings, we are 
concerned that this bill begins a return to the ``politically 
correct'' intelligence policies that undermined the 
capabilities of the United States IC in the 1990s. There is no 
better illustration of this problem than Section 407 of the 
bill, which would require the intelligence community to direct 
its resources to a National Intelligence Estimate on global 
climate change when answers to even fundamental questions about 
al Qaeda and such potential adversaries as Iran, North Korea, 
and China remain unknown due to their inherent challenge. The 
majority decries that investments in Iraq are undermining the 
IC's ability to provide information on other priorities around 
the world. We believe that studies such as this are far less 
important than emphasizing intelligence support to our military 
forces in harm's way.
    In this bill, the intelligence community is not being asked 
to assess whether global warming is a reality; it is being 
asked to analyze supposed risks from global warming as an 
intelligence issue. The task of the intelligence community is 
to steal foreign secrets. Global climate change simply does not 
require clandestinely acquired, classified information or 
analysis. The United States is spending more than $6.5 billion 
in FY07 on global climate change. Thousands of reports have 
been paid for on global climate change across the U.S. 
government. Hundreds of universities and private organizations 
have written many more reports on climate change. This is not 
the time to force our intelligence professionals to waste 
scarce intelligence resources on trendy topics such as global 
warming for the purposes of ``political correctness''.
    The bill would also significantly hamper the intelligence 
community for the purposes of making a political statement in 
Section 307, which would impose prescriptive and burdensome 
reporting requirements as a prerequisite to the implementation 
of a ``pay for performance'' personnel management system in the 
intelligence community. While as a general matter the overall 
performance of our personnel remains outstanding, specific 
examples of both publicly known and unknown shortcomings should 
make the desirability of such incentives to promote and reward 
urgency and innovation obvious. This initiative should not be 
delayed for the purposes of promoting political agendas. The 
Executive Branch has learned many lessons and corrected issues 
with earlier such efforts. The pilot program at issue would be 
pursued based on those lessons learned.
    Finally, it is unfortunate that the Democratic majority 
killed Republican efforts to end--or in fact to even audit--
wasteful spending funneled through the intelligence budget that 
could have been better directed to true national security 
interests. A Republican amendment would have followed the 
recommendation of the President's budget and provided for the 
termination of the National Drug Intelligence Center (with 
transfer of some functions). A formal oversight report by the 
Committee on Government Reform last year concluded that NDIC is 
``an expensive and duplicative use of scarce Federal drug 
enforcement resources.''\1\ The report noted that the agency 
overlaps with already-existing drug intelligence centers such 
as the Drug Enforcement Administration's El Paso Intelligence 
Center. Critics also questioned why a federal intelligence 
center would be physically located so far--in Johnstown, 
Pennsylvania--from every other Federal drug enforcement agency.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\H. Rpt. 109-434, ``2006 Congressional Drug Control Budget and 
Policy Assessment: A Review of the 2007 National Drug Control Budget 
and 2006 National Drug Control Strategy,'' Committee on Government 
Reform, April 25, 2006, at 90.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Democratic majority rejected this amendment even though 
nearly $400 million has been spent on this program that media 
reports have called a ``boondoggle''. When the amendment 
failed, Republicans then offered an amendment to have the 
Department of Justice Inspector General conduct a neutral audit 
of whether the National Drug Intelligence Center in fact 
duplicates functions carried out by other components of the 
Department of Justice. Without any substantive explanation, 
even this wholly uncontroversial proposition to explore 
potential waste and abuse was rejected by a party-line vote.
    The annual Intelligence Authorization Act ultimately should 
seek to provide the fullest possible support to America's 
intelligence community to protect the national security 
interests of the United States on behalf of all Americans, and 
not to advance political or parochial interests. While many of 
the provisions of this bill deserve our support for doing so, 
it is important to emphasize our significant concern with the 
elements of the legislation that do not.
    In addition, we are concerned at an unusual partisan or 
political tone to certain specific provisions of the majority's 
report. We wish to clarify and provide our view on these 
important issues.

                     TERRORIST SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM

    Although the issue may appear to be simply one of partisan 
semantics, the irresponsible use by the majority of the 
political term ``The President's Domestic Surveillance 
Program'' to describe an ongoing initiative to detect and 
prevent potential terrorist attacks in the United States is 
inaccurate, alarmist, and deserves public clarification. The 
term, of course, evokes images of the President personally 
conducting unfettered snooping on private conversations between 
ordinary Americans for purposes that it is implicitly suggested 
must be nefarious.
    Democratic Committee members have been fully and 
extensively briefed on this program, as has the current Speaker 
of the House since its inception. Because of its clear 
importance to national security, none have called for it to be 
ended, and the majority should know full well that its implicit 
fearmongering is contrary to the facts. As has publicly been 
explained on repeated occasions, the Terrorist Surveillance 
Program is limited to international communications between a 
user in the United States and one in a foreign country, and 
only where probable cause is established to believe that one 
end of the conversation is associated with al Qaeda or 
affiliated terrorists. The program--which is now subject to the 
approval of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court--is 
carried out by career professionals for the limited purpose of 
detecting terrorists and potential attacks. The procedures and 
constraints which govern it to protect civil liberties are 
extensive, as has been recognized on a bipartisan basis by 
members of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board. As 
Democrat Lanny Davis pointed out, ``If the American public, 
especially civil libertarians like myself, could be more 
informed about how careful the government is to protect our 
privacy [in this program] while still protecting us from 
attacks, we'd be more reassured.''\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\Solomon, ``Oversight Board Told of Privacy Protections,'' 
Associated Press, November 28, 2006. (http://www.boston.com/news/
nation/washington/articles/2006/11/28/oversight_board
_told_of_privacy_protections/), accessed May 4, 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As we noted above, there are significant, serious, and 
substantive issues involving the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act that require immediate and careful attention. 
As the proxies for the American people with respect to these 
classified and highly sensitive matters, the Committee should 
seek to help inform the American people on these issues as Mr. 
Davis suggested rather than to alarm and mislead them.

                                AL QAEDA

    The Committee Report includes four puzzling sentences about 
the threat from al Qaeda. The majority says that it ``is not 
satisfied with efforts to defeat the al Qaeda network'', 
specifically noting worldwide al Qaeda activity. At the same 
time, however, the majority claims that increased Iraq-related 
intelligence requirements have drained resources from the fight 
against al Qaeda. This contradicts the April 2006 National 
Intelligence Estimate, ``Trends in Global Terrorism: 
Implications for the United States,'' which said in its 
declassified key judgments:

          Al-Qa'ida, now merged with Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi's 
        network, is exploiting the situation in Iraq to attract 
        new recruits and donors and to maintain its leadership 
        role.

    It should be beyond dispute that the struggle against 
radical jihadists is a global and unified one, and that Iraq is 
a critical front--a front that al Qaeda itself has specifically 
stated as its priority. On April 26, 2007, General David 
Petraeus noted that ``Iraq is, in fact, the central front of al 
Qaeda's global campaign.'' The January, 2007, National 
Intelligence Estimate on Iraq assessed that if a rapid 
withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq were to take place, ``AQI 
would attempt to use parts of the country--particularly al-
Anbar province--to plan increased attacks in and outside of 
Iraq * * *'' In January, CIA Director Hayden testified in the 
Committee that ``I strongly believe [U.S. failure in Iraq] 
would lead to al Qaeda with what it is they said is their goal 
there, which is the foundations of the caliphate, and in 
operational terms for us, a safe haven from which then to plan 
and conduct attacks against the West.''
    The majority significantly misapprehends the potential 
threat from al Qaeda in Iraq and proposes in the classified 
annex to decrease intelligence funding the President has 
requested to fight al Qaeda in Iraq. It is important to 
emphasize that the problem of sectarian violence in Iraq cannot 
be separated from the threat from al Qaeda, because al Qaeda's 
explicit goal is to create sectarian violence to destabilize 
the government so they can establish a safe haven within the 
country. It should be clear that the intelligence requirements 
in Iraq are specifically supporting the fight against al Qaeda.

                                  IRAQ

    The majority attempts to influence the priority and output 
of analysis by the intelligence community by suggesting a 
specific analytical framework, selectively citing elements of a 
careful and balanced National Intelligence Estimate to suit its 
political objectives. Specifically, the majority faults the 
Intelligence Community for not providing intelligence 
assessments of the implications of various ways Democrats have 
proposed that the United States withdraw from Iraq.
    This criticism amounts to political pressure on the 
intelligence community. Intelligence analysts should follow the 
evidence where it leads them and draw the appropriate 
conclusions. They should not be subjected to criticism--
unrelated to any authorization or legislative text of the 
bill--because they did not write papers that conform to the 
foreign policy assumptions and positions of the majority.

                          IRAN AND NORTH KOREA

    The majority's view on Iran and North Korea represents an 
improvement in its realization about the seriousness of the 
threat from these nations' nuclear weapons programs. Just last 
fall, for example, some Democratic members denounced as too 
alarmist a bipartisan Committee report on Iran that discussed 
the threat from its nuclear weapons program and raised 
questions about Intelligence Community analysis. They had 
similar criticism for a HPSCI report on North Korea.\3\ Since 
then, the Iran report was proven right by new revelations about 
Iranian behavior. We are grateful that the majority now is 
beginning to recognize the reality of the threats posed by both 
Iran's and North Korea's nuclear programs and the reliability 
of the reports the Republican majority stewarded on a 
bipartisan basis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\Subsequent to the Committee's report, North Korea tested a 
nuclear device.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    However, the Committee report language on Iran is off the 
mark in claiming that U.S. removal of rival regimes has turned 
Iran into a regional hegemon, apparently because of the fall of 
the Saddam Hussein and Taliban regimes. This language bizarrely 
attempts to blame America for the radical agenda of the Iranian 
leadership, even though President Ahmadinejad's philosophy may 
date as far back as the 1979 hostage crisis. Apparently, the 
majority believes that the region would be better off if the 
Taliban and Saddam were still in power.
    While we agree that intelligence analysis on North Korea 
and Iran needs improvement, we regard the requirement for 
quarterly reports on these nations as unnecessarily burdensome 
since the Committee is already regularly briefed on these 
topics. The additional legislated requirement could actually 
detract from the quality of information provided to the 
Committee by providing such a rigid, specified structure. 
Moreover, the intelligence community provided the Committee 
with over a dozen written reports on each country over the last 
year. We believe there are more important projects our 
intelligence analysts could be spending their time on instead 
of writing reports for Congress that duplicate what they are 
already providing.

                                COLOMBIA

    The majority claims that ``[f]lew strategic victories have 
been won against the drug traffickers and paramilitiaries'' in 
Colombia--a breathtakingly inaccurate mischaracterization of 
the facts. While the situation in Colombia remains complex, 
just last month Democratic Western Hemisphere Subcommittee 
Chairman Eliot Engel recognized ``the impact that Plan Colombia 
has had in reducing homicides, kidnappings and massacres, 
particularly under President [Alvaro] Uribe. Kidnappings in 
Colombia are down by 76 percent since 2000 and homicides are 
down by 40 percent.'' He also noted that Colombian coca 
cultivation fell 47% from 2000 to 2005.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\Opening Statement of Chairman Eliot L. Engel, ``U.S.-Colombia 
Relations,'' Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Western 
Hemisphere, April 24, 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Former Speaker of the House J. Dennis Hastert testified at 
the same hearing that ``In every significant category Columbia 
is improving: rates of homicides, kidnappings, acts of 
terrorism, and displaced persons are all significantly down. 
Conversely, school enrollment, GDP, unemployment and poverty 
rates, and beneficiaries of public health care have 
considerably improved.'' Speaker Hastert further pointed out 
that ``wholesale heroin purity seized at major U.S. ports of 
entry has sharply declined in recent years, suggesting a 
reduction in Colombian heroin production. Furthermore, 
according to ONDCP, there is a continuing decline in purity for 
cocaine in the U.S. * * * In part, this has led to a 23% 
decrease in overall youth drug use since 2001.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\Statement by Representative J. Dennis Hastert, ``U.S.-Colombia 
Relations,'' Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Western 
Hemisphere, April 24, 2007.
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    We wish to correct and clarify the record on these issues.

                                   Peter Hoekstra.
                                   Terry Everett.
                                   Elton Gallegly.
                                   Mac Thornberry.
                                   John M. McHugh.
                                   Mike Rogers.
                                   Darrell Issa.

                    ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF THE CHAIRMAN

    I am disappointed by the tone and substance of the Minority 
Views.
    The Committee worked on a bipartisan basis to help set the 
funding levels for key intelligence programs in this bill. 
These programs would help detect and disrupt the plans of 
America's enemies. It is strange that instead of expressing 
support for these vital programs, the Minority has chosen to 
make this a political issue. Politicizing intelligence is a 
practice that has harmed America's national security, and the 
Committee strongly urges the Minority to reject this approach.
    The Minority claims that this bill ``significantly cuts 
certain specific initiatives related to America's efforts to 
counter radical jihadists.'' In a press statement, the Ranking 
Minority Member has referred to ``deep cuts to classified CIA 
programs.'' I invite Members to review the classified annex of 
the legislation to see how misleading these statements are. In 
fact, in the FY 2007 Authorization, the Minority voted to cut 
the same CIA programs by the same percentage.
    Additionally, the Committee added funding and support for 
key programs to analyze critical intelligence on terrorist 
activities. The total FY 2008 budget request for CIA programs 
was trimmed by less than 2% to eliminate wasteful spending on 
programs some of which have come under criticism by both the 
Majority and Minority.
    The work of this Committee and its oversight 
responsibilities should never be politicized. The national 
security of this country is too important for that.
                                                   Silvestre Reyes.