[Senate Report 109-71]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
109th Congress
SENATE
Report
1st Session 109-71
_______________________________________________________________________
Calendar No. 112
HOMELAND SECURITY GRANT ENHANCEMENT ACT OF 2005
__________
R E P O R T
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
to accompany
S. 21
together with
ADDITIONAL VIEWS
TO PROVIDE FOR HOMELAND SECURITY GRANT COORDINATION AND SIMPLIFICATION,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
May 24, 2005.--Ordered to be printed
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine, Chairman
TED STEVENS, Alaska JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio CARL LEVIN, Michigan
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
TOM COBURN, Oklahoma THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware
LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah FRANK LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico MARK PRYOR, Arkansas
JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia
Michael D. Bopp, Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Jonathan T. Nass, Counsel
Joyce A. Rechtschaffen, Minority Staff Director and Counsel
Beth M. Grossman, Minority Counsel
Trina D. Tyrer, Chief Clerk
Calendar No. 112
109th Congress
SENATE
Report
1st Session 109-71
======================================================================
HOMELAND SECURITY GRANT ENHANCEMENT ACT OF 2005
_______
May 24, 2005.--Ordered to be printed
_______
Ms. Collins, from the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, submitted the following
R E P O R T
[To accompany S. 21]
The Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, to which was referred the bill (S. 21) to provide for
homeland security grant coordination and simplification, and
for other purposes, having considered the same reports
favorably thereon with amendments and recommends that the bill
do pass.
I. Purpose and Summary
The Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
Committee (the Committee) approved S. 21, the Homeland Security
Grant Enhancement Act of 2005 on April 13, 2005. This bill
seeks to create a stronger, more streamlined, yet accountable
program of federal financial assistance to State and local
governments and first responders responsible for protecting our
homeland.
Nearly 4 years have passed since the attacks on September
11, 2001 and over 2 years since the formation of the Department
of Homeland Security. While the Senate spent more than three
months debating the Homeland Security Act, the law contains
virtually no guidance on how the Department is to assist those
at the State and local level with their homeland security
needs. Congress wrote a 187-page law creating the Department,
yet included but a single paragraph on grant programs for first
responders. As a result, the Department has been left with
little guidance from Congress as to how State and local grant
decisions should be made.
As with so many other issues, much of the front-line
responsibility for homeland security has fallen squarely on the
shoulders of our State and local officials and more than 9
million first responders. Communities across America have risen
to this challenge and developed scores of innovative homeland
security strategies.
Instead of encouraging these new ideas, however, the
tangled web of federal homeland security grant programs has the
potential to stifle the Department's ability to foster State
and local innovation. Instead of providing a foundation on
which States and localities can build homeland security
strategies tailored to specific risks, the various federal
homeland security programs present States and communities with
a mountain of paperwork. Instead of giving communities the
flexibility they need, State and local officials face an
inflexible grant structure. The current grant system is slow
and uncoordinated. Much of this problem stems from the lack of
planning before funds are spent.
In February 2005, the Government Accountability Office
issued a report entitled ``Homeland Security: Management of
First Responder Grant Programs has Improved, but Challenges
Remain.'' It concluded that a ``major challenge in
administering first responder grants is balancing two goals:
minimizing the time it takes to distribute grant funds to state
and local first responders, and ensuring appropriate planning
and accountability for the effective use of grant funds.'' GAO
further opined that ``[e]ffective collaboration among ODP,
states, and others in developing appropriate preparedness
performance goals and measures will be essential to ensuring
that the nation's emergency response capabilities are
appropriately identified, assessed, and strengthened.''
Other observers also have found that while DHS grant
management has improved in recent years, much more needs to be
done. For example, the Office of the Inspector General for the
Department of Homeland Security issued a report in December
2004 entitled ``Major Management Challenges Facing the
Department of Homeland Security.'' Among departmental
challenges described in the report were the management of
homeland security grants. S. 21 takes a balanced approach to
restructuring the homeland security grant system to fix
systemic flaws and require resource allocation decisions to be
based on risk, while ensuring predictable funding to address
the most pressing homeland security needs.
The homeland security grant system is fundamentally flawed
because it operates backwards. For example, under the Urban
Area Security Initiative (UASI), DHS issues funds to a limited
number of cities, which then apply to DHS for approval to
``drawdown'' funds for each purchase. The result is cities get
funds before they know what they will spend them on. This is a
backwards approach, forcing cities only after the fact to make
decisions and draw-up plans on how to draw-down funds. This
legislation would reverse that order and require planning
first, and spending second. The result will be quicker and
smarter expenditures of funds combined with better long-term
thinking. The legislation will also require that national
benchmarks be adopted to measure the nation's progress toward
better terrorism preparedness and ensure that resources are
spent wisely.
The current system also often fails to think regionally.
The lack of regional thinking was highlighted by a recent DHS
decision to eliminate several cities from the UASI program. The
list retained Minneapolis, Minnesota as eligible for urban area
funding, but eliminated St. Paul, Minnesota from the list. The
absurd result was half of the ``Twin Cities'' designated as at
risk of terrorist attack such that UASI funding was
appropriate, and the other half designated as not at risk and
not eligible for funding. S. 21 will encourage more resource
allocation decisions to be made on a regional basis resulting
in better national preparedness coverage at a lower aggregate
cost.
This legislation would provide State and local governments
and communities with the resources they need to protect their
communities by establishing a predictable stream of funding to
each and every State while at the same time directing more
resources to the areas most at risk of a terrorist attack;
making it easier to apply for grants; promoting flexibility in
the use of homeland security funding; and resulting in smarter,
more effective spending of funds.
Departmental organization
S. 21 would reorganize the administrative process for
obtaining selected first responder grant programs within the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The legislation would
codify action the Secretary took in March 2004 to consolidate
the Office for Domestic Preparedness and the Office of State
and Local Government Coordination (SLGC).
Streamlining homeland security grant programs
S. 21 also creates an Interagency Committee to Coordinate
and Streamline Homeland Security Grant Programs (Interagency
Committee) to be led by the Secretary of DHS. Among its duties,
the Interagency Committee would identify all duplicative
application, planning, and reporting requirements among Federal
homeland security assistance programs; assess State and local
needs and capabilities; and advise the DHS Secretary on
implementing appropriate performance measures for grant
recipients. In addition, the Interagency Committee would
provide recommendations to Federal agencies on the coordination
of homeland security grant programs; specifically,
recommendations on streamlining and standardizing application,
reporting, and planning requirements.
Information clearinghouse
In addition, S. 21 establishes a Homeland Security
Information Clearinghouse within the OSLGC, which would be
maintained by the Office for Domestic Preparedness. The
clearinghouse would be charged with providing States and
localities with information on grant programs and the use of
Federal funds. The clearinghouse would gather and publish
information on best practices in homeland security and
voluntary standards for training programs, equipment, and
exercises. The Committee finds that the Lessons Learned
Information Sharing network (LLIS.gov) is one effective way to
meet this need. The Committee strongly encourages the Office of
State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness's
continued use of LLIS.gov, in conjunction with the Memorial
Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, as the nationwide
lessons learned and information-sharing network for emergency
response providers and homeland security officials. The
Committee also encourages SLGCP to expand the LLIS.gov model to
address lessons learned, best practices, and information-
sharing imperatives for both the Private Sector as well as the
American Public. Further, the committee expects the Department
to incorporate LLIS.gov into its annual budget to ensure
consistent resourcing of this vital program.
Voluntary consensus standards
S. 21 requires that the Secretary support the development
of national voluntary consensus standards for first responder
equipment and training. Applicants for grant funds who want to
use those funds to purchase or upgrade equipment that did not
meet these standards would have the burden of explaining why
such equipment would better serve their needs than equipment
that did meet the standards.
The Committee supports the efforts of the System Assessment
and Validation for Emergency Responders (SAVER) program.
Operated by the Office for Domestic Preparedness System Support
Division, the SAVER program provides independent equipment
assessment and validation of commercially-available off-the-
shelf emergency responder products. The Committee supports the
expansion of this service for first responders to cover a broad
spectrumof first responder products and urges vigorous
dissemination of this valuable information.
National voluntary consensus standards would compliment
DHS's current system for disseminating equipment and vendor
information to grantees, while helping to ensure that first
responders receive the quality equipment that they need and
deserve. There is no complete list of recommended or approved
products that DHS provides to grantees. However, venders are
encouraged to register with a site affiliated with the LLIS
(Lessons Learned Information Sharing)--the Responder Knowledge
Base (http://www2.rkb.mipt.org/). By establishing national
voluntary consensus standards, S. 21 assists DHS in providing
all information that grantees need to spend homeland security
dollars wisely.
Essential capabilities
Building on the National Preparedness Goal recently issued
by DHS, S. 21 requires that the Secretary establish ``essential
capabilities'' for state and local governments. Essential
capabilities are the levels and competence of emergency
personnel, planning and equipment that are needed to prevent,
prepare for, and respond to acts of terrorism and other
catastrophic events. Different types of communities will have
different essential capabilities. The bill also provides for
the creation of a First Responder Task Force, made up of state
and local first responders and other state and local officials,
to advise the Secretary on the establishment and periodic
updating of these essential capabilities.
The Committee does not intend for DHS to take a ``back-to-
the-drawing-board'' approach in implementing this provision.
Rather, the Committee expects the Department to use the
National Preparedness Goal as a starting point from which,
working with first responders and other experts, it is to
develop essential capabilities. The Committee strongly
encourages the Department to broadly solicit comment from first
responders and others to understand how the National
Preparedness Goal, the National Preparedness Guidance, and
associated guidance and standards developed by the Department
are working at the state and local level, so that the
Department may take these lessons into account in establishing
essential capabilities.
The establishment of essential capabilities will provide
important guidance to states and localities trying to improve
their terrorism preparedness, as well as benchmarks for
measuring both state and national progress in achieving that
preparedness. Essential capabilities, moreover, would be
intimately tied to the grant decision making process by
requiring consideration of how funding decisions will help
accomplish key preparedness goals, and thereby providing a
basis for prioritizing among needs. The establishment of
essential capabilities also creates an important barrier to
wasteful and inappropriate spending, as states and regions, in
applying for and allocating homeland security grant funds, will
have to demonstrate that the funds are being used to achieve
specific capabilities.
Homeland security grants
S. 21 authorizes formula based and discretionary homeland
security grants to States and regions for first responder
preparation activities, such as emergency planning, risk
assessments, mutual aid agreements, equipment, training, and
exercises. Funding would be provided for overtime expenses
incurred during periods of heightened alerts, for training
activities, and for certain activities in support of federal
border protection. To be eligible for a homeland security
grant, States would be required to complete a State Homeland
Security Plan that addresses matters including interoperable
communications, incident command systems, regional
coordination, response planning, and training exercises. The
plan must also include a three-year strategy for allocating
funding to localities based on risk, capability, and need, as
well as an assessment of the shortfall between existing and
needed response capabilities. The bill provides basic
guidelines for States to use in developing their plans,
including mandatory input from local officials, first
responders, and the private sector.
Accountability
Considerable attention has been devoted to the alleged
misuse of homeland security grant funding. S. 21 contains a
variety of tools to preserve the integrity of these programs.
S. 21 includes a number of other provisions designed to
increase accountability and ensure the appropriate use of
homeland security grant funds. These include:
1. Independent Audit: An annual GAO audit and report
on Homeland Security grants to states.
2. Robust Reporting Requirements: Grant recipients
will be required annually to report to the Secretary on
how funds were spent and on progress toward achieving
essential capabilities. Currently, states report
spending in broad categories, which means that wasteful
expenditures easily could be missed.
3. Tying Spending to Standards: A requirement that
states distribute and spend Homeland Security funding
only in ways that measurably help state, local, or
tribal jurisdictions meet preparedness standards and
achieve essential capabilities to be set by the
Department (i.e., funds cannot be spent on leather
jackets or garbage trucks unless they demonstrably
increase preparedness and essential capabilities as
defined by DHS).
4. Providing Remedies for Non-Compliance: Authorizes
the Secretary of Homeland Security to terminate or
reduce grant payments if a state or locality fails to
comply with the bill's accountability requirements.
5. Coordinating Expenditures of Federal Funds:
Establishes an interagency committee to ensure that
federal homeland security dollars from all sources are
spent in a coordinated manner, avoiding purchases of
duplicative equipment or services, or the purchase of
incompatible equipment.
State and local flexibility
The needs of our States, localities, and first responders
vary widely across the nation. This legislation would ensure
that federal homeland security assistance is sufficiently
flexible to meet these diverse needs.
Prior to the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations
Act of 2003, the Office for Domestic Preparedness allocated the
same percentage of each State's funds for training, equipment,
exercises, and planning, thus leaving no room to accommodate
different States' priorities. In each and every State, 70
percent of the federal funds were required to be spent for
equipment, 18 percent for exercises, 7 percent for planning,
and 5 percent for training. In allocating funds this way, the
federal government effectively said that Maine must spend
exactly the same portion of its homeland security dollars on
training as Ohio and Hawaii. Moreover, States could not
transfer surplus funds from one category to another to meet
their needs.
The bill would give State and local governments greater
flexibility with previously appropriated ODP grant funds by
allowing grant recipients to request and the Secretary to
approve funding transfers among different activities, including
equipment, training, exercises, and planning. For new funding,
State and local governments have even more flexibility in
funding, provided that such spending is consistent with State
homeland security plans.
Smuggling weapons of mass destruction
The bill would impede the smuggling of weapons of mass
destruction into the United States using vehicles that carry
municipal solid waste. Approximately 180 municipal trash trucks
from Canada cross the U.S. border every day, for example, to
deposit cargo in Michigan landfills. Because the dense and
variable cargo in these vehicles, sometimes including sludge,
resists analysis using the mechanical inspection devices
typically at U.S. border crossings, and because discovery of
illegal drugs on one such Canadian vehicle confirmed the
truck's use in smuggling, serious questions have arisen about
the effectiveness of current border screening procedures for
detecting chemical, nuclear, biological or radiological
materials that could be concealed on these vehicles.
The bill would bar further entry of these vehicles into the
United States unless and until the Secretary certifies to
Congress that the methods and technologies being used to screen
these vehicles for such weapons are as effective as the methods
and technologies being used to screen for such weapons in other
items of commerce entering the United States via other
commercial vehicle transport. This provision is intended to
prompt a thorough re-evaluation of the screening procedures now
being used for vehicles carrying municipal solid waste, and to
strengthen U.S. border protections against efforts to use these
vehicles to secretly transport chemical, nuclear, biological or
radiological materials into the country.
II. Background
At present, State and local governments receive assistance
for homeland security activities from a range of Federal
departments and agencies as well as DHS. Despite the diffuse
origins of funding, these Federal programs share a similar
goal: To assist State and local governments in their efforts to
enhance the capabilities of first responders to prepare for and
respond to terrorist attacks, particularly attacks involving
weapons of mass destruction.
The vast majority of these activities fall into the
categories of emergency planning, training, equipment, and
exercises. Congress has also provided limited funding for
personnel compensation and overtime expenses incurred during
times of heightened alert through these entities and programs.
Federal assistance is also available from programs that are
not specifically oriented to first responders or terrorism
preparedness. State and local governments may seek emergency
preparedness assistance in the form of block grants and
categorical grants from programs administered by the
Departments of Health and Human Services (HHS), Justice (DOJ),
and Transportation (DOT), and the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA).
Since the terrorist attacks of September 2001, both
Congress and the President have given increased attention to
the role of first responders in the nation's homeland security
efforts. This attention is evident in the funding Congress
provided in fiscal year 2004 where $2.925 billion was
appropriated for the programs authorized in S. 21. Additional
funds were provided to first responders under other programs
such as the FIRE Act grants and Emergency Management
Performance grants. The Administration and Congress have made
numerous proposals to restructure existing first responder
assistance programs. Thus far, none has been enacted into law.
A wide range of policy concerns led to the development of
S. 21. These concerns are not limited to first responder
preparedness programs. Rather, they are pertinent to the
broader debate over Federal assistance for State and local
homeland security efforts. A number of such policy concerns are
discussed briefly below.
Complexity of grant applications and planning requirements
At present, State and local governments seeking Federal
assistance for their homeland security efforts, and emergency
preparedness in general, may apply to DOJ, DOT, EPA, and HHS,
as well as to entities within DHS, such as ODP and the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). This multitude of programs
presents a complex array of application requirements. Nearly
all applications contain planning requirements that are
intended to promote the effective use of funds, but they also
create an overwhelming amount of paperwork for State and local
officials. The various application and planning requirements
are often duplicative, calling for similar assessments,
analyses, and spending plans. State and local officials have
told the Committee that each program requires numerous
administrative steps. For example, to receive funds from ODP's
State Homeland Security Grant Program, States must go through
as many as 12 steps in order to obtain approval.
S. 21 would address this problem in two ways. First, the
bill creates an Interagency Committee to identify duplicative
application and planning requirements in emergency preparedness
programs and make recommendations on streamlining those
requirements. Second, the bill sets up a single, clear set of
goals for the Threat-Based Homeland Security Grant Program, the
predecessors of which have, in the past, subjected State and
local governments to annual changes in planning and application
requirements.
Coordination of information within DHS
The Committee supports coordination of programs and
information within DHS. The Committee directs the Office for
Domestic Preparedness to work with the Science and Technology
Directorate and the Information Analysis and Infrastructure
Protection Directorate to ensure that State and local
governments and first responders receive information regarding
threat, vulnerability assessments, and mitigation technologies
for high risk sites in their jurisdictions, such as
manufacturing facilities using chemicals and hazardous
shipments.
Allocation of funds
The State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP), the Law
Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program (LETPP) and the Urban
Area Security Initiative (UASI) currently comprise the core
terrorism-related first responder grant programs. Created in
the wake of the September11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the SHSGP
grants (which provide funding for first responder training and
equipment to all states) and LETPP grants (which provides funding for
the terrorism prevention activities of state and local law enforcement)
have roots in section 1014 of the USA PATRIOT Act (42 U.S.C.
Sec. 3714), which directed the Office for Domestic Preparedness (then
in the Department of Justice) to make a grant to each state ``to
enhance the capability of State and local jurisdictions to prepare for
and respond to terrorist acts.'' The Patriot Act provision, however,
provides virtually no additional guidance on the structure or
priorities for such grant programs. Funds for the UASI program, which
provides grants to a limited number of urban areas deemed to be high-
risk, have been provided for in homeland security appropriations acts,
but UASI is otherwise unmentioned in statute.
To date, all funds under the SHSGP and LETPP programs have
been distributed in accordance with a funding formula. Pursuant
to section 1014 of the Patriot Act, each state (as well as the
District of Columbia and Puerto Rico) receives 0.75% of the
total available funds, with four territories each receiving a
0.25% share; together, these allocations account for 40% of the
total. In the absence of further statutory guidance and likely
not yet in a position to meaningfully assess relative risks,
DHS chose, in previous years, to distribute the remaining 60%
of SHSGP and LETPP funds to states in direct proportion to the
states' population. For FY 2005, Congress effectively ratified
this approach by requiring, in the DHS appropriations Act, that
the Department allocate funding under these programs ``in the
same manner as fiscal year 2004.''
At the other end of the spectrum, the allocation of UASI
grants has been left almost entirely to the discretion of the
Secretary. DHS on its own determines the number of cities that
are to receive UASI grants, the identities of those cities and
the amount each is to receive, based on a largely nonpublic
methodology that has changed each year. The ``application''
process consists of providing various pieces of information and
making certifications to the Department only after the
allocation decisions have been made. The program's ``black
box'' approach to grant distribution has the potential to
create an impression of arbitrariness. While few would question
DHS's decision to award the most substantial UASI grants to the
obviously high-threat cities of New York City and Washington,
D.C., there is a lack of transparency about the overall process
for allocating (and not allocating) UASI grants.
In awarding UASI grants, moreover, DHS has focused narrowly
on individual cities, rather than looking at the full regions
that are likely to be seriously affected by, and required to
respond to, any attack. Perhaps the most obvious example of
this was DHS's decision in FY2005 to award a UASI grant to
Minneapolis but not to St. Paul, ignoring the fact that the so-
called ``Twin Cities'' form a single, interdependent
metropolitan area. This practice can also potentially lead DHS
to focus on one city of a certain size while overlooking a
region of an equal geographic size and with an equal number of
people that happens to be divided into several different towns
(a not uncommon political geography in New England, for
example)--though both areas may be subject to similar risks. In
FY2005, DHS for the first time also imposed a population
threshold for UASI grants, thereby precluding cities that did
not meet this threshold (which was measured solely within the
city limits) from even being considered for any UASI funds,
regardless of the actual risk the city might otherwise face.
S. 21 would replace SHSGP, LETPP and UASI with a new
homeland security grant program, the Threat-Based Homeland
Security Grant Program, aimed at supporting the nation's first
responders and preventers. The new program would not affect
first responder grant programs in existence prior to September
11, 1991, including Emergency Management Performance Grants and
Firefighter Assistance Grants. Nor does the new program
encompass targeted critical infrastructure grants, such as
grants for port security or transit security, which are
intended to remain separate and distinct programs.
The grant program created by S. 21 strives to create a
better and more effective balance between formula funding and
discretionary grants. S. 21 allocates a substantially larger
share of funds to discretionary, threat-based grants than has
previously been the case, but at the same time provides each
state with a significant level of baseline funding. The
Committee believes that maintaining a meaningful level of
baseline funding is necessary to ensure that, as a nation, we
make progress toward achieving an adequate level of nationwide
preparedness. On 9-11, terrorists attacked high-profile targets
in two of our great cities, and no reasonable person would
doubt that terrorists continue to be drawn to such targets. But
it is also true that terrorists around the world have attacked
``soft targets'' and less prominent places: in Bali, Indonesia,
terrorists targeted a discotheque; in Beslan, Russia, they
targeted a school; in Madrid, they targeted a commuter train;
in Oklahoma City, a government building. We simply cannot know
with certainty where terrorists will strike next, and we would
be foolish to leave whole swaths of the country unprotected.
Moreover, the effects of certain kinds of potential attacks,
such as biological weapons attacks or attacks on the nation's
food supply, are unlikely to neatly limit themselves to a
single, circumscribed geographic area. Finally, much of the
money provided from this grant program, like its predecessors,
will be used to help states and localities build long-term
capacity to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks, including
the procurement of equipment over time, and the systematic and
ongoing training of first responder personnel. A predictable,
reasonable level of baseline funding facilitates state planning
and encourages states and localities to invest in these
necessary long-term efforts by helping ensure that funding will
continue to be available to them each year.
S. 21 provides a sliding-scale baseline amount of funding
to each state. Each state would receive a minimum of 0.55% of
the total funds appropriated under the Threat-Based Homeland
Security Grant Program. Because states that are larger and/or
more densely populated face greater risks and greater costs in
preparing for and responding to a terrorist attack, such states
receive higher baseline amounts, based on a formula that
combines population and population density.
All funds beyond those necessary to cover the baseline
allocations--over 60% of the total--would be distributed based
on the relative threat, vulnerability, and consequences faced
by the area from a terrorist attack. In dollar amounts, this
means that S. 21 would distribute twice the money based on risk
as was the case in FY05. From this funding pool, the Secretary
can make threat-based grants to both states and to metropolitan
regions. Grants to regions can comprise up to 50% of the total
threat-based grant funding. All funds are to be distributed to
assist states or region to achieve essential capabilities to
prevent, prepare for, and respond to acts of terrorism and
other catastrophic events.
Encouraging regional cooperation and a regional perspective
on preparedness, S. 21 moves the focus of local funding from
individual cities to metropolitan regions. Unlike the current
``black box'' situation under UASI, moreover, where DHS simply
announces a list of cities it hasselected to fund, S. 21 would
establish an application process for metropolitan region funding. In
applying for funding, communities are given considerable flexibility in
forming regions that make the most sense locally: a region must simply
be made up of two or more contiguous municipalities, counties, parishes
or Indian tribes, and must include the largest city in the metropolitan
area. To place some limits on the number of regional applications DHS
would have to review, only regions within the 100 largest metropolitan
statistical areas (MSAs) would be automatically eligible to apply,
though other regions could apply with the consent of the Governor of
the relevant state or states and of the Secretary.
S. 21 requires that grants to regions be prioritized based
on threat, vulnerability and consequences from a terrorist
attack, with the Secretary directed to give consideration to
such factors as population; population density; the presence of
critical infrastructure and key assets in the region or in
nearby jurisdictions; proximity to international borders and
coastlines; the presence of at-risk sites or activities in
nearby jurisdictions; whether there has been a prior terrorist
attack in the eligible metropolitan region; whether any part of
the eligible metropolitan region has ever had a higher threat
level under the Homeland Security Advisory System than the
threat level for the United States as a whole; and the extent
of unmet essential capabilities in the region. The bill also
directs the Secretary to take into account the extent to which
all the jurisdictions in the metropolitan area are
participating in the regional application; regions that include
more of the jurisdictions in their metropolitan area are to be
given priority in funding--encouraging and rewarding regional
cooperation. The bill also prohibits DHS from establishing a
population threshold for regions that would exclude areas from
consideration that otherwise faced significant threats,
vulnerabilities or consequences from terrorism.
All funds beyond the baseline allocations that are not
given out in grants to regions would be distributed to states,
based on the threat, vulnerability and consequence faced by the
state from a terrorist attack. As with regional grants, there
would be a competitive application process, and the Secretary
is to consider similar factors in allocating state threat-based
grants: population density; coastline; international borders;
the presence of critical infrastructure and key assets; threats
and vulnerabilities related to at-risk sites or activities in
adjacent jurisdictions; having had a prior terrorist attack in
the State or in a metropolitan region that is wholly or partly
in the state; any part of the state having ever had a higher
threat level under the Homeland Security Advisory System than
the threat level for the nation as a whole; and the extent to
which the state has unmet essential capabilities. Eighty
percent of all state grant funds would have to be passed
through to local governments within 60 days.
S. 21 authorizes $2.925 billion for grants in FY06 and FY07
and such sums as are necessary thereafter. This is the same
level of funding appropriated for SHSGP, LETPP and UASI grants
in FY04. In FY05, funds for these grant programs were reduced
to $2.385 billion and the President's FY06 budget has proposed
that the programs be reduced further to $2.04 billion. The
Committee does not believe that such decreases in first
responder funding are justified. Indeed, evaluations such as
that conducted by a task force of the Council on Foreign
Relations have found that significantly more rather than less
funding is necessary to ensure adequate levels of first
responder preparedness.\1\
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\1\ Warren Rudman, Richard Clarke, Jaime Metzl, et al.,
``Drastically Underfunded, Dangerously Unprepared: Report of an
Independent Task Force Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations,''
Council on Foreign Relations (2003), available at http://www.cfr.org/
pdf/Responders_TF.pdf.
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Additional allocation considerations
The bill recognizes the importance of continued support for
terrorism prevention efforts at the state and local level by
providing for up to 25% of the total funding under the bill to
be used for Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program
purposes. These purposes include information sharing to preempt
terrorist attacks; target hardening; threat recognition;
interoperable communications systems; and overtime expenses
associated with providing enhanced law enforcement operations
in support of Federal Agencies for increased border security
and border crossing enforcement. The Committee approves of the
activities conducted under Operation Stonegarden as an
important method to buttress federal border protection
activities using state and local law enforcement personnel.
The Committee recognizes that threat, risk, and
vulnerability related to critical infrastructure or key
national assets, as identified in the State Homeland Security
Plan or as identified by the Secretary can take many different
forms. Key national assets include national nuclear weapons
laboratories; nuclear power plants; land and sea ports of
entry; US military bases, service academies and other defense
assets; homeland security training centers; chemical
industries; and maritime centers. The Committee particularly
notes the national interest in the securing of the national
food systems from threats of terrorist attack. The Committee
commends the work conducted by 11 mid-western states to
collaborate on efforts to prevent agroterrorism in the
Multistate Partnership for Security in Agriculture. The
Committee feels that this is the type of collaborative state
initiative and participation that S. 21 seeks to foster and
encourage elsewhere in the country.
In allocating discretionary grants to states and
metropolitan regions, the Committee also strongly urges the
Secretary to consider military, tourist, and commuter
populations that may be present in an area at any given time.
Although generally not included in the official population
figures for a state or metropolitan area, these transient
populations can be substantial--Las Vegas, NV, for example,
hosts an average of nearly 300,000 short-term residents on any
given day--and require similar protection to other residents in
the event of a terrorist attack or other catastrophic event. In
the past, DHS has considered some locations at risk of a
potential terrorist attack because of their increased short-
term populations; at a minimum, these additional populations
place increased burdens on state and local first responders and
preventers. It is important that regions and states with
substantial short-term populations have sufficient resources to
ensure the safety of these visitors.
Funding applications and distribution
Under S. 21, discretionary, threat-based grants to both
metropolitan regions and states would be given out in a
competitive, application-based process. This reverses the
current process and would, sensibly, require applications and
planning before homeland security grant funds are awarded.
States are required to submit to the Secretary applications
for grants that detail how the requested funds will be used to
achieve essential capabilities. In order to receive grants,
statesmust also have an approved state homeland security plan,
developed with the input of local officials and first responders, that
addresses how the state will respond to terrorist attacks and other
catastrophic events and includes priorities for the allocation of
funding to local governments, based on the localities' risks,
capabilities and needs. By requiring states to plan how they will
distribute money before they receive grants, the Committee hopes to
speed up the actual obligation and disbursement of funds to localities
once the grants are awarded, and so help address an issue that has been
a continuing source of frustration for some local governments.
In order to ensure statewide coordination and consistency
with state plans, eligible metropolitan regions intending to
apply for threat-based grants must submit their application to
DHS through the Governor of each state within which the
metropolitan region is a part. The Governor is given the
opportunity to notify the Secretary if the Governor believes
that the application is inconsistent with the state plan or if
the Governor otherwise does not support the application, but
the Governor may not prevent the application from being
considered by DHS and must transmit the application to the
Secretary within 30 days of receipt.
A number of State and local organizations, including the
National Conference of State Legislatures, the National
Governors Association, the National Association of Counties,
the Council of State Governments, and the International City/
County Management Association support State coordination of the
first responder grant program, with 80 percent of the resources
being distributed by the States to units of local government.
The Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for
Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, established in
accordance with Section 1405 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Public Law 105-261,
agreed with this approach. In its fourth annual report to
Congress, the Advisory Panel, also known as the Gilmore
Commission, concluded that States must have discretion over the
use of grant funds to ensure the allocation of resources on the
basis of assessed needs.
The Committee agrees that state-wide coordination in
homeland security planning is needed, but also cautions that
funding must reach the local level in a timely manner. S. 21
would require States, consistent with their state homeland
security plans, to provide 80 percent of all grant funds to
local governments. This approach would allow states to
coordinate their homeland security plans with local entities
and to retain funds for initiatives and planning that is more
effectively accomplished on a state-wide basis, while ensuring
that the large majority of homeland security funding is
provided to localities. For grants received pursuant to an
award to an eligible metropolitan region wholly or partly
within the state, the state must use any of the money it
retains on items or services that benefit the eligible
metropolitan region. Furthermore, States would be required to
distribute all funds to localities within 60 days of receipt.
S. 21 requires funds to be allocated based on the State
Homeland Security Plan approved by the Secretary. The Committee
understands, however, that in certain cases state and local
officials and first responders should be authorized to address
security needs, such as those required to protect large public
events, not foreseen during the development of the homeland
security plan. The Secretary should ensure that state and local
governments and first responders have sufficient flexibility to
meet these immediate security needs, should they arise.
Existing regional mechanism
The Committee recognizes that there is a long-standing,
well established network of councils of governments, regional
planning commissions, regional planning organizations,
development districts and other multi-purpose associations of
local governments that have the capability and expertise
necessary to coordinate regional emergency response plans. The
composition of these entities varies widely. These
organizations, collectively known as Regional Councils, are
multi-purpose, multi-jurisdictional public organizations
created by local governments to respond to Federal and State
programs. Many of them are bi-state or even tri-state and are
officially recognized in the states and localities they serve.
Regional Councils have a long history of working with each
other on projects that cross regions and cross state lines.
Having more than 40 years of experience in planning economic
development, disaster recovery, and transportation and
infrastructure analysis, they serve as conveners that bring
together the public, private, and civic sectors. These Regional
Councils may already be in a unique position to fill a void in
planning and coordinating homeland security plans across
jurisdictional boundaries while providing an unbiased and
apolitical environment capable of analyzing needs based on
merit alone without creating another layer of government
bureaucracy. The Committee urges the Department to fully
utilize Regional Councils in the grant-making process.
Distribution of funds to tribes
The Committee recognizes that Indian tribes, authorized
tribal organizations, and Alaska Native villages play an
important role in protecting our communities from terrorist
incidents. The Committee is concerned by reports that
sufficient homeland security funding is not being allocated to
the tribal governments by the states.
At least twenty-eight Indian tribes inhabit land on or
easily accessible to the Mexican and Canadian borders. In some
areas, the international border is guarded by wooden or barbed-
wire fences or has no barrier. Numerous pieces of critical
infrastructure, including energy resources that serve county
and state governments, are located in Indian Country. The
Committee is concerned that, even though the critical
infrastructure, international borders, and populations that
reside on tribal land are incorporated in state homeland
security plans and grant applications, most states do not
allocate a corresponding level of funding to the tribes.
Many Indian tribal governments have entered into Memoranda
of Understanding or inter-governmental agreements with county,
state, and local law enforcement to address criminal activity
and civil disorder on Indian lands. However, numerous counties
and states have historic disputes with tribes on law
enforcement and jurisdictional issues that hamper the ability
to enter into such agreements. Consequently, some Indian tribes
are not included in state homeland security planning and do not
receive resources to enhance their ability to respond
immediately to terrorist threats that may affect infrastructure
and resources located on or adjacent to Indian lands.
The Committee intends for states to provide homeland
security funding allocations to tribes in the same manner local
governments are provided funding. S. 21 holds States
accountable for providing the necessary resources to help
tribal communities achieve essential capabilities. Thebill
further directs that tribes do not have to go through a local
government to receive funding, but rather should receive funding
directly from the State.
The Committee is troubled by reports that some States are
using tribal sovereignty as a reason to refuse to allocate
funds to tribes. For the purposes of homeland security planning
and funding, the Committee directs State governments to respect
tribal sovereignty by providing funding to tribes so that
tribes may exercise their responsibility for tribal lands
located within State borders. However, the Committee respects
the separate sovereign status and jurisdictional authority of
tribes and is not implying that tribes are local governments
for purposes of homeland security.
Flexibility of Homeland Security grant funds
At present, terrorism preparedness programs generally fund
four broad categories of assistance: planning, training,
equipment, and exercises. In some instances, funding may also
be used for personnel compensation, overtime, and construction.
Prior to the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act
of 2003, ODP's formula program, which is the largest grant for
terrorism preparedness, gave recipients separate allocations
for planning, training, equipment, and exercises, but did not
give them discretion to transfer funds among these activities.
Many State and local officials have told the Committee that
the range of eligible activities should be expanded to give
State and local recipients broad discretion in the use of
funds. Specifically, they have asked for the flexibility to
transfer past funds among different activities (i.e., planning,
training, equipment, and exercises) and for overtime expenses
incurred during times of heightened alert.
S. 21 would give State and local governments greater
discretion over the use of terrorism preparedness grant funds.
Section 4 would allow grants to be used to fund overtime
expenses relating to training activities and increased security
during times of heightened alert status, as determined by the
Secretary.
The Committee is concerned by testimony that local
jurisdictions have been unable to take advantage of WMD
training for first responders due to the cost of `backfilling'
positions of employees assigned to training. The Committee
directs ODP to allow the use of formula grant funds for
overtime costs that are directly attributable to participation
in ODP-funded first responder training.
Communications system grants
S. 21, as amended, includes International Border Community
Interoperable Communications Demonstration Project, a program
to examine solutions to the daunting problem of cross border
interoperability. In selecting communities for participation,
the Committee strongly urges the Secretary to select sites
along the borders that reflect a variety of conditions,
including at least one site with significant border crossings
(at least 8,000,000 crossings per year), commerce activity (at
least $50,000,000,000 in commerce per year and other economic
activities), and critical infrastructure, such as bridges,
railways, pipelines and water resources.
III. Legislative History
S. 21 builds upon a bill first introduced in the last
Congress, S. 1245, the Homeland Security Grant Enhancement Act
of 2003 which was introduced on June 12, 2003 by Senator Susan
M. Collins of Maine. S. 1245 was offered as an amendment to the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 in
October of 2004. It passed the Senate by voice vote, but
ultimately, it was not included in the enacted legislation.
S. 21, the Homeland Security Grant Enhancement Act of 2005
was introduced on January 21, 2005. Senators Lieberman, Carper,
Akaka, Feingold, and Voinovich joined as original cosponsors.
Senators Chafee and Coburn followed as cosponsors thereafter.
On April 13, 2005, the Committee met in a business session
to consider S. 21. An amendment in the nature of a substitute
was offered by Chairman Collins and Ranking Member Lieberman.
The substitute was adopted by voice vote.
The Committee adopted by voice vote an amendment offered by
Senator Levin and co-sponsored by Senators Collins and
Lieberman to authorize a demonstration project for cross border
interoperable communications.
The Committee opposed, in a 15-1 roll call vote, an
amendment sponsored by Senator Lautenberg to add as a finding
to the bill selected portions of a 9/11 Commission
recommendation.
The Committee adopted by voice vote an Amendment sponsored
by Senators Lautenberg and Warner to add to the list of
criteria to be considered in allocating threat-based funds to
states and eligible metropolitan regions two additional
factors: first, whether an area has been previously attacked by
terrorists; and second, whether an area has been issued a DHS
alert level that is higher than the rest of the country.
S. 21 was then reported out of Committee by voice vote.
IV. Section-by-Section
Section 1. Short Title
Section 1 sets the short title of S. 21 as the ``Homeland
Security Grant Enhancement Act of 2005.''
Section 2. Interagency Committee To Streamline Grant Programs
Subsection (a) would amend the Homeland Security Act of
2002 by inserting section 802.
HSA section 802--Interagency committee to coordinate and streamline
homeland security grant programs
Establishment
Establishes the Interagency Committee to Coordinate and
Streamline Homeland Grant Programs to ensure coordination of
separate federal department or agency grant programs. The
Interagency Committee would also ensure coordination among DHS
grant programs for State and local preparedness.
Composition
The Committee shall include representatives of the
Department of Homeland Security (including the U.S. Fire
Administration), the Department of Health and Human Services,
the Department of Transportation, the Department of Justice,
the Environmental Protection Agency, and other federal
government representatives determined to be necessary by the
President.
Responsibilities
Provides that the Interagency Committee shall consult with
State and local governments and emergency response providers
regarding their homeland security needs and capabilities. This
Interagency Committee would also advise the Secretary on the
development of performance measures for homeland security grant
programs. The Interagency Committee would report any findings
to the information clearinghouse established under section
801(c).
No later than 1 year after enactment, the Interagency
Committee must develop a proposal to streamline and standardize
planning requirements to eliminate duplication, ensure
accountability, and promote coordination in homeland security
assistance programs.
The section also requires the Interagency Committee to
report to Congress and the President on these studies.
Section 3. Streamlining Federal Homeland Security Grants Administration
Section 3 codifies existing practice by establishing the
Office for State and Local Government Coordination and
Preparedness (OSLGCP) within the Office of the Secretary. It
creates a presidentially-appointed, Senate-confirmed position
of Executive Director of this office. It also moves the Office
for Domestic Preparedness from the Directorate of Border and
Transportation Security into OSLGCP, provides that the Director
of the Office for Domestic Preparedness report to the Executive
Director of OSLGCP and eliminates the requirement that the
Director be Presidentially appointed and Senate confirmed.
Homeland Security Information Clearinghouse
Subsection (d) of section 3 would amend section 801 of the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101 et seq.) by
establishing a Homeland Security Information Clearinghouse,
within the Office of State and Local Government Coordination
and Preparedness. It would have the Clearinghouse assist State
and local governments, and first responders by creating or
enhancing a web site, a toll-free number, and a single
publication containing information on homeland security grant
programs.
Under this section, the Clearinghouse, in consultation with
the Interagency Committee, would coordinate any Federal
agency's technical assistance to State and local governments to
conduct threat and vulnerability assessments. The Clearinghouse
would also establish templates for conducting threat analyses
and vulnerability assessments.
This section instructs the Clearinghouse to work with State
and local governments, first responders, the National Domestic
Preparedness Consortium, the National Memorial Institute for
the Prevention of Terrorism, and private organizations to
gather and validate best practices in State and local homeland
security programs and practices. Information on equipment,
training, and other services acquired with Federal funds under
the homeland security grant programs would be gathered by the
Clearinghouse and made available to State and local governments
and first responders. Information regarding voluntary standards
of training, equipment, and exercises would also be provided to
State and local governments and first responders. The section
further instructs the Clearinghouse to provide States,
localities, and first responders with any other information the
Secretary determines necessary.
Section 4. Essential Capabilities for First Responders and the Threat-
based Homeland Security Grant Program
Section 4 would amend Homeland Security Act of 2002 by
adding sections 1801-1808.
HSA section 1801--Definitions
``Metropolitan regions'' are defined as the 100 largest
metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) in the country, or
combined statistical areas that include those MSAs. Both MSAs
and combined statistical areas are as defined by the Office of
Management and Budget.
``Eligible metropolitan regions'' are defined as a
combination of two or more municipalities, counties, parishes
or Indian tribes within a metropolitan region that includes the
largest city in the metropolitan region, or, alternatively, any
other combination of contiguous local governments that is
formally certified by the Secretary and has the consent of the
state(s) in which the local governments are located.
``Essential Capabilities'' are defined as the levels,
availability, and competence of personnel, planning, training
and equipment needed to effectively and efficiently prevent,
prepare for and respond to threatened or actual domestic
terrorist attacks and other catastrophic events.
``Sliding-scale baseline allocation'' is an index used to
calculate a state's allocation under the sliding scale baseline
distribution in HSA section 1804(f)(1) and is defined as 0.001
multiplied by the sum of (a) the value of a State's population
relative to that of the most populous of the 50 States, where
the population of such States has been normalized to a maximum
value of 100 and (b) \1/4\ of the value of a State's population
density relative to that of the most densely populated of the
50 States, where the population density of such States has been
normalized to a maximum value of 100. Normalizing population
and population density means that both values are put on a
scale of 0-to-100, so that the most populous state (or in the
case of population density, the most densely populated state)
has a value of 100, a state with half the population of the
most populous state has a value of 50, a state with a quarter
of the population of the most populous state has a value of 25,
and so on.
This section also defines the terms ``Indian Tribe'',
``Population'', ``Population Density'', and ``Threat-based
Homeland Security Grant program''.
HSA section 1802--Preservation of pre-9/11 grant programs for
traditional first responder missions.
This section excludes the programs that follow from
amendment under this Act: the Firefighter Assistance Program
(including grants awarded under the SAFER Act); the Emergency
Management Performance Grant Program, the Urban Search and
Rescue Grant Program, the Justice Assistance Grants, the Public
Safety and Community Policing Grant Program, grant programs
under the Public Health Service Act, and the Emergency Response
Assistance Program.
HSA section 1803--Essential capabilities for first responders
Establishment
This section would require the Secretary to establish
clearly defined essential capabilities for State and local
government preparedness needs. The Secretary would be required
to build upon the National Preparedness Goal and must consult
with the Task Force on Essential Capabilities, appropriate
federal agencies, State and local emergency response providers,
State and local officials, and relevant consensus-based
standards making organizations. The Secretary must ensure
descriptions of the essential capabilities are provided to the
States and Congress. The States must make them available to
local governments.
Objectives
This section provides that the essential capabilities must
meet the objectives that follow:
Specificity--The essential capabilities must
specifically describe the training, planning,
personnel, and equipment that different types of
communities should possess or have access to in order
to meet the Department's goals for preparedness.
Essential capabilities are to be tailored to address
the different requirements of different types of
communities.
Flexibility--The essential capabilities must be
sufficiently flexible to allow State and local
government officials to set priorities based on local
or regional needs.
Measurability--The essential capabilities must be
designed to enable measurement of progress toward
specific terrorism preparedness goals.
Comprehensiveness--The essential capabilities must be
made within the context of a comprehensive State
emergency management system.
Factors to be considered
Essential capabilities will be different for different
types of communities. A very large and densely populated high-
risk city like New York will have a different level of
essential capabilities that it needs to attain than will a
small, remotely located town. Similarly, a community with a
nuclear power plant or with a port will need to have
capabilities to deal with the particular consequences of
potential attacks on those types of facilities that a community
without such facilities will not need to have. This section
requires that in establishing essential capabilities for
different types of communities, the Secretary must specifically
consider variables of threat, vulnerability, and consequences
with respect to population (including transient commuting and
tourist populations), population density, critical
infrastructure, coastline, and international borders, as well
as other factors the Secretary deems important.
Task force on essential capabilities for first responders
This section would establish an advisory body to assist the
Secretary in formulating the essential capabilities. It would
ensure that the Task Force does not terminate within two years
as generally required under the HSA, and instead requires the
Task Force to terminate in 5 years unless theSecretary extends
it. Within 9 months of enactment, and every three years thereafter, the
Task Force must submit a report to the Secretary on its recommendations
for essential capabilities for preparedness related to acts of
terrorism. This section provides that the membership of the Task Force
shall consist of 25 members appointed by the Secretary and include
members from emergency response field, health professionals, experts
from Federal, State and local governments and the private sector, and
State and local officials with expertise in terrorism preparedness.
Finally, this section mandates compliance with the Federal Advisory
Committee Act.
HSA section 1804--Threat-based Homeland Security grant program
Establishment
Establishes a new grant program, the Threat-Based Homeland
Security Grant Program, which replaces the State Homeland
Security Grant Program, the Law Enforcement Terrorism
Prevention Program and the Urban Area Security Initiative.
Authorizes the Secretary to make grants to States and eligible
metropolitan regions under this program to enhance homeland
security. Provides that the grants made under this section are
to be governed by the terms of this section and not by any
other provision of law, and that any requirement of section
1014 of the USA Patriot Act shall be deemed to be satisfied by
this grant program.
Use of funds
Provides that grants are to be used to address homeland
security matters related to acts of terrorism or catastrophic
events or to address shortfalls in essential capabilities. Sets
forth permissible uses for grant funds, including planning;
purchasing and upgrading equipment; conducting emergency
preparedness exercises; training; the payment of overtime
expenses related to training or an increase in the threat
level; terrorism prevention activities traditionally permitted
under the LETPP program; and other approved activities related
to achieving essential capabilities.
Subsection (b)(3) prohibits the use of grant funds to
acquire land or construct buildings or other physical
facilities, except for those described in section 611 of the
Disaster Relief Act of 1974 (42 U.S.C. 5196). The Committee
understands that section 611 would cover construction to alter
or remodel existing buildings for the purpose of making them
secure against terrorist attack or able to withstand or protect
against chemical, radiological or biological attack, such as by
altering HVAC systems or providing secure testing and treatment
facilities in public health laboratories or in hospitals; and
that grants under this bill could therefore be used for such
construction. To the extent that grants under this bill are
used to construct buildings or facilities as described in
section 611, all of the terms of section 611 will be applicable
and the Committee expects them to be fully complied with.
Equipment standards
Provides that grant applicants who propose to use grant
funds to purchase equipment that does not meet applicable
national voluntary consensus standards must include in their
application an explanation of why such equipment will better
serve their needs than equipment that does meet the standards.
Application
Provides for grant application procedures for States and
metropolitan regions. State applicants must explain how the
requested funds would be used to achieve essential
capabilities; must have an approved homeland security plan; and
must demonstrate satisfactory progress toward achieving
essential capabilities. Eligible metropolitan regions (defined
in HSA Section 1801) must include in their applications an
explanation of how the requested funds would be used to achieve
essential capabilities; and how the use of the funds would be
consistent with relevant state homeland security plans. Where
not all the local jurisdictions in a metropolitan region are
participating in the application, the applicants must explain
why the eligible metropolitan region, as constituted, is an
appropriate unit to receive grants to prevent, prepare for, and
respond to terrorism. Requires that eligible metropolitan
regions submit their applications to the relevant governor(s)
for the governor's review. If the governor does not support the
regional application or finds it inconsistent with the state
plan, the governor is to notify the Secretary of that fact.
Homeland Security plan
States applying for grants are required to have a 3-year
state homeland security plan. This section requires that the
plan include a 3-year strategy for achieving various goals;
measures to assess the extent to which those goals have been
achieved; and priorities for allocating grant funds to local
governments based on risk, capabilities and needs. It also
provides that states are to complete a comprehensive risk
assessment and an assessment of capabilities and needs. The
section provides further that states are to coordinate state
planning activities with the activities of local governments
and are to seek input from local stakeholders through the
establishment of an advisory committee made up of local
officials and emergency response providers.
Allocation
Provides for an initial baseline distribution of grant
funds to states. Each state would receive the greater of either
(1) 0.55% of all appropriated funds or (2) the state's sliding
scale baseline allocation (defined in Section 1801) multiplied
by 28.62% of the total amount appropriated for the Threat-Based
Homeland Security Grant Program. The District of Columbia would
receive a fixed 0.55% share, Puerto Rico 0.35%, and the
remaining territories, 0.055% each. The sliding-scale figure in
option 2), above, represents each state's weighted share (where
weighting is done based on a combination of population and
population density) of the pot of money (28.62%) that results
from adding together the 0.55% minimum distribution to each
state, plus the amounts allocated for the District of Columbia
and the remaining territories.
After the initial baseline distribution, the section
provides for up to 50% of the remaining fundsto be used to
provide grants to eligible metropolitan regions to assist in achieving
essential capabilities. In making such grants, the Secretary is to
prioritize among regional applications by considering the relative
threat, vulnerability, and consequences faced by the eligible
metropolitan region from a terrorist attack, including consideration of
whether there has been a prior terrorist attack in the eligible
metropolitan region; whether any part of the eligible metropolitan
region has ever had a higher threat level under the Homeland Security
Advisory System than the threat level for the nation as a whole; the
eligible metropolitan region's population; its population density; the
degree of threat, vulnerability and consequence related to the presence
of critical infrastructure in the region or in nearby jurisdictions;
whether the eligible metropolitan region has a coastline bordering
ocean or international waters; whether it is at or near an
international border; the extent to which the eligible metropolitan
region includes all municipalities, counties, parishes and Indian
tribes within the region; and the extent to which the eligible region
has unmet essential capabilities. Grants to eligible metropolitan
regions are to be distributed through the state or states in which the
region is located. The state or states provide not less than 80% of the
funds to the eligible metropolitan region, and any funds retained by
the state must be expended on items or services that benefit the
eligible metropolitan region.
The section provides that all remaining funds are to be
used to provide grants to each state to assist in achieving
essential capabilities. It requires the Secretary to prioritize
among state applications by considering the relative threat,
vulnerability, and consequences faced by the state from a
terrorist attack, including consideration of whether there has
been a prior terrorist attack in the State or in a metropolitan
region that is wholly or partly in the State; whether any part
of the State has ever had a higher threat level under the
Homeland Security Advisory System than the threat level for the
nation as a whole; the percent of a State's population residing
in MSAs; threat, vulnerability and consequence related to the
presence of critical infrastructure; whether the state has an
international border; whether the state has a coastline
bordering ocean or international waters; threats,
vulnerabilities and consequences related to at-risk sites or
activities in adjacent states; and the extent to which the
state has unmet essential capabilities. It further requires
that, in prioritizing among states applications that the
Secretary balance the competing goals of ensuring that the
essential capabilities of the highest-risk areas are achieved
quickly and that basic levels of preparedness are achieved
nationwide.
This section provides that the State must make available to
local governments not less than 80% of the grant funds the
state receives and must do so within 60 days. It requires that
grant funds supplement and not supplant other state and local
government funds.
This section provides that the Secretary may designate not
more than 25% of the total amounts appropriated to be used for
the LETPP program, to provide grants to law enforcement to
enhance capabilities for terrorism prevention.
Report on Homeland Security spending
Requires that all grant recipients annually submit a report
to the Secretary of DHS that contains an accounting of how
grants funds were spent and the progress the recipient is
making in achieving essential capabilities.
Accountability
Provides that any grant recipient that expends $500,000 or
more in a fiscal year is to submit to the Secretary an
organization-wide financial and compliance audit report.
Remedies for non-compliance
Provides that, where the Secretary finds that a grant
recipient has failed to substantially comply with any provision
in the section, the Secretary shall terminate or reduce
payments or limit the use of funds to activities not affected
by the failure to comply. This section also provides that,
where a state fails to comply, including failing to provide
grants funds to local governments in a timely fashion, local
governments may petition for funds to be provided directly to
the local government.
Reports to Congress
Requires that the Secretary submit an annual report to
Congress that provides an accounting on how resources provided
to state and local governments were expended and evaluating the
progress of States and local governments in achieving essential
capabilities.
Authorization of appropriations
Authorizes $2.925 billion for fiscal years 2006 and fiscal
year 2007 and such sums as are necessary for each fiscal year
thereafter.
HSA section 1805--Eliminating Homeland Security fraud, waste and abuse
Section (a) requires an annual Government Accountability
Office audit of the Threat-Based Homeland Security Grant
Program and a report to Congress of the results. Section (b)
requires the Secretary to conduct reviews of grants authorized
under this Act to ensure that recipients allocate funds
consistent with the guidelines established by the Department.
HSA section 1806--Flexibility in unspent Homeland Security funds
This section would allow for reallocation of funds among
different categories of uses, upon request of a State and with
the approval of the Director of the Office of Domestic
Preparedness.
HSA section 1807--National standards for first responder equipment and
training
The section requires that the Secretary support the
development of national voluntary consensus standards for first
responder equipment and training. Applicants for grant funds
who want to use those funds to purchase or upgrade equipment
that did not meet these standards would have the burden of
explaining why such equipment would better serve their needs
than equipment that meets the standards.
HSA section 1808--Certification relative to the screening of municipal
solid waste
This section requires the Bureau of Customs and Border
Protection to submit a report to Congress examining the
methodologies and technologies used to screen municipal solid
waste entering the United States for chemical, nuclear,
biological or radiological weapons. If those methods and
technologies are less effective than those used to screen other
commercial commerce, the report must detail what actions the
Bureau will take to achieve the same level of effectiveness in
the screening of solid waste. If the Bureau fails to implement
the additional actions, if required, the Secretary must deny
entry into the U.S., vehicles carrying solid waste until it can
be reported to Congress that the screening technologies for
solid waste are as effective as those used to screen other
types of commercial cargo.
Section 5. Communication System Grants
This section establishes the International Border Community
Interoperable Communications Demonstrations Project. The
Demonstration Project would involve at least six communities,
three on each border, to foster interoperable communications
among Federal, State, local, and tribal government agencies in
the United States with similar agencies in Canada or Mexico.
V. Evaluation of Regulatory Impact
Paragraph 11(b)(1) of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of
the Senate requires that each report accompanying a bill
evaluate the ``regulatory impact which would be incurred in
carrying out this bill.'' Carrying out S. 21 would have no
regulatory impact.
VI. Changes to Existing Law
Pursuant to Paragraph 12, Rule XXVI of the Standing Rules
of the Senate, this section describes changes to existing law.
Title VIII of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C.
361 et seq.) is amended by inserting Section 802 to establish
an Interagency Committee to Coordinate and Streamline Homeland
Security Grant Programs.
Section 801(a) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6
U.S.C. 361 (a)) is amended to rename ``the Office for State and
Local Government Coordination'' ``the Office for State and
Local Governmental Coordination and Preparedness.'' Subsection
(a) is further amended by inserting paragraph (2) providing for
this Office to be headed by the Executive Director of State and
Local Government Coordination Preparedness, who is to be
appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent
of the Senate.
Section 430 (a) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6
U.S.C. 430) is amended by striking the provisions locating the
Office for Domestic Preparedness within the Directorate of
Border and Transportation Security. The remaining provisions of
this section are moved to the newly designated Section 803.
Subsection (b) of Section 803 is further amended by striking
``who shall be appointed by the President'' and inserting ``who
shall report directly to the Executive Director of State and
Local Government Coordination and Preparedness.'' Technical
amendments are made to clarify that the transferred office
would no longer be located within a specific Directorate and to
assign the management of the Homeland Security Information
Clearinghouse to the Office for Domestic Preparedness.
Section 801 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C.
361) is amended by adding section (c) at the end to establish a
Homeland Security Information Clearinghouse.
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101 et seq.) is
amended by inserting Title XVIII Essential Capabilities for
First Responders and Threat-Based Homeland Security Grant
Program at the end of the Act.
Section 2(6) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C.
101(6)) is amended by inserting ``(including fire services)''
after ``local emergency public safety''.
VII. Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate
S. 21--Homeland Security Grant Enhancement Act of 2005
Summary: S. 21 would authorize the Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to change the criteria
used to distribute funding for three existing first-responder
grant programs established after September 11, 2001--the State
Homeland Security, the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention,
and the Urban Area Security Initiative grant programs. Under
the bill, these three grant programs would be governed by the
provisions of a new initiative known as the Threat-Based
Homeland Security Grant Program. In addition, this bill would
authorize the appropriation of $2.9 billion for first-responder
grants for both 2006 and 2007, and such sums as are necessary
for each subsequent year for first responder grants.
Assuming appropriation of the authorized and estimated
amounts, CBO estimates that implementing the bill would cost
about $9.9 billion over the 2006-2010 period. Enacting S. 21
would not affect direct spending or revenues.
S. 21 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector
mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA).
The bill would provide several benefits to state, local, and
tribal governments. Assuming the authorized amounts are fully
appropriated, the bill would increase funding for existing aid
programs while changing conditions for receiving those funds;
any costs to state, local, or tribal governments would be
incurred voluntarily.
Estimated cost to the Federal Government: The estimated
budgetary impact of S. 21 is shown in the following table. The
costs of this legislation fall within budget function 450
(community and regional development).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
By fiscal year, in millions of
dollars--
---------------------------------------
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHANGES IN SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION
First-responder grant program: a
Estimated authorization 2,925 2,925 2,989 3,054 3,123
level......................
Estimated outlays........... 293 1,375 2,282 2,931 2,962
Border interoperability
demonstration project:
Estimated authorization 5 5 5 0 0
level......................
Estimated outlays........... 1 3 5 4 2
Total changes:
Estimated authorization 2,930 2,930 2,994 3,054 3,123
level......................
Estimated outlays........... 294 1,378 2,287 2,935 2,964
------------------------------------------------------------------------
a Under current law, such sums as necessary are authorized to be
appropriated for 2006 and 2007 for first-responder grants.
Basis of estimate: For this estimate, CBO assumes that S.
21 will be enacted near the start of fiscal year 2006 and that
the specified and estimated amounts will be appropriated for
each year. CBO estimates that implementing S. 21 would cost
about $9.9 billion over the 2006-2010 period.
Threat-based Homeland Security grant program
The Office of Domestic Preparedness (within DHS) derives
its primary authority to distribute grants to states and
localities to prepare and respond to terrorism from the USA
PATRIOT Act (Public Law 107-56). Almost $9 billion has been
appropriated for these first-responder grants since fiscal year
2003, including about $2.7 billion in fiscal year 2005. That
law authorizes the appropriation of such sums as necessary for
first-responder grants through fiscal year 2007. S. 21 would
replace this authorization of appropriations with a specific
authorization level of just over $2.9 billion annually in 2006
and 2007. The bill also would extend the authority for such
grants after 2007 at whatever level is necessary. For this
estimate, CBO assumes that the authorized amount will be
appropriated for 2006 and 2007 and that the program will
continue at that level with adjustments for anticipated
inflation.
For this estimate, CBO assumes that states would need to
update their State Homeland Security Plans for approval by DHS
to reflect new grant requirements. After that update, we expect
that spending under the bill would follow historical spending
patterns for existing state and local grant programs for
emergency management activities. CBO estimates that
implementing the Threat-Based Homeland Security grant program
would cost about $9.9 billion over the 2006-2010 period.
Demonstration program
S. 21 would authorize the appropriation of such sums as are
necessary over the 2006-2008 period for an International Border
Community Interoperable Communications Demonstration Project.
Under this provision, DHS would select six communities, at
least three on the southern border and three on the northern
border, to serve as demonstration projects to address issues
concerning communications across the nation's borders. The
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
(Public Law 108-458) established the Office for
Interoperability and Compatibility within DHS's Directorate of
Science and Technology. For this estimate, we assume that this
new office would manage the international demonstration project
as well as a domestic interoperability program. Based on
information from DHS, CBO estimates that $5 million would be
needed each year over the 2006-2008 period. Assuming
appropriation of the necessary funds, CBO estimates that
implementing this provision would cost $15 million over the
2006-2010 period.
Intergovernmental and private-sector impact: S. 21 contains
no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in
UMRA. Section 4 of the bill would deny entry of commercial
motor vehicles carrying municipal solid waste into the United
States unless the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection
certifies to the Congress that the methodologies and
technologies used to screen such vehicles for weapons are as
effective as the screening of other commercial materials
entering the United States. The Bureau of Customs and Border
Protection indicates that such certification would be provided
before the deadline specified in the bill. CBO believes,
therefore, there would be no interruption of service, and thus
no mandate.
The bill would make several changes to existing grant
programs for state, local, and tribal governments. First, it
would consolidate at least three current programs--the State
Homeland Security Grant, the Law Enforcement Terrorism
Prevention Program, and the Urban Area Security Initiative--and
authorize the appropriation of almost $15 billion over the
2006-2010 period. Second, it would change how those funds are
allocated. While some states would receive less funding than in
previous years and others would receive more, assuming
authorizedfunds are fully appropriated, there would be a small
increase in total funding, and each state would receive a minimum of
0.55 percent of available funds. This bill would allow certain
metropolitan areas to apply for funds directly and would expand
eligible activities to include covering the costs of some overtime
activities during heightened threat alerts and training activities.
The bill also would authorize DHS to transfer funds
directly to the local recipients, reduce the portion of grants
retained by the state, or impose additional restrictions if
states fail to provide funds to local first responders in a
timely manner. States would be required to provide 80 percent
of the funds or resources to local recipients within 60 days of
receipt. If states fail to comply with that requirement, funds
would be allocated directly to local jurisdictions. Any costs
to state, local, or tribal governments as a result of these
changes to the grant programs would be incurred voluntarily.
State, local, and tribal governments would benefit from
several other provisions of the bill that require DHS to
create, with input from local first responders and trade
representatives, essential capabilities and voluntary standards
for equipment and training for first responders; a
demonstration project for interoperable communication systems;
and a Homeland Security Information Clearinghouse.
Estimate prepared by: Federal Costs: Julie Middleton;
Impact on State, Local, and Tribal Governments: Melissa
Merrell; Impact on the Private Sector: Paige Piper/Bach.
Estimate approved by: Peter H. Fontaine, Deputy Assistant
Director for Budget Analysis.
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN
This legislation includes language that I offered that will
assist our first responders by creating demonstration projects
at our northern and southern borders. The amendment provides
that the Secretary of Homeland Security shall establish at
least six International Border Community Interoperable
Communications Demonstration Projects--no fewer than three of
these demonstration projects shall be on the northern border,
and no fewer than three of these demonstration projects shall
be on the southern border. These Interoperable Communications
Demonstrations will address the interoperable communications
needs of police officers, firefighters, emergency medical
technicians, National Guard, and other emergency response
providers at our borders.
Further, this bill contains language I proposed that
requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to deny entry of
any commercial motor vehicle carrying municipal solid waste
from Canada until the Secretary certifies that the methods and
technology used to inspect the vehicles for potential weapons
of mass destruction as well as biological, chemical and nuclear
materials, are as efficient as the methods and technology used
to inspect other commercial vehicles.
Each month, thousands of trucks of solid municipal waste
are being brought into the United States for disposal in U.S.
landfills. The large size and dense character of these
shipments provide opportunities for malicious individuals or
groups who may wish to evade detection as they attempt to
smuggle dangerous contraband into our country. This language
will help to ensure the effective screening for weapons of mass
destruction in shipments of solid municipal waste.
Carl Levin.
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR DANIEL K. AKAKA
The Homeland Security Grant Enhancement Act provides for a
fair and equitable distribution of funds between the States.
However, I am concerned about the lack of access tribal
governments have to this funding. In the current funding
mechanism, federal homeland security grants are allocated to
States, which in turn are supposed to direct at least 80
percent of the funding to local and tribal governments.
However, more often than not, Indian tribes are being passed
over by the States.
Even though the population, critical infrastructure, and
international borders that lie on tribal land are incorporated
in State homeland security plans and grant applications, most
States do not allocate a corresponding level of funding to the
tribes. For example, the Tohono O'odham Nation has received
less than $100,000 from the State of Arizona over the past
three years, yet the Nation is responsible for securing 75
miles of border between the United States and Mexico. As
security tightens up along the rest of the Arizona border, more
and more illegal immigrants are choosing to cross through
Indian country because of the lack of border enforcement.
I do not believe this problem will be solved simply by
directing States to include tribal governments in the funding
allocation process since States know there will be no
significant consequences if they ignore such a direction.
Numerous counties and States have historic disputes with Indian
tribes over jurisdictional and funding issues which can impede
the funding pass-through process. In addition, there are
reports that States are using tribal sovereignty as a reason to
refuse allocation of funds to tribes. In order for the
international borders and critical infrastructure that lie on
tribal land to be adequately protected, tribes must be allowed
to bypass State governments and apply directly to the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for funding.
Daniel K. Akaka