[Senate Report 109-259]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



109th Congress                                                   Report
                                 SENATE
 2d Session                                                     109-259

======================================================================



 
          INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2007

                                _______
                                

                  May 25, 2006.--Ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

 Mr. Roberts, from the Select Committee on Intelligence, submitted the 
                               following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                            ADDITIONAL VIEWS

                         [To accompany S. 3237]

    The Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI or Committee), 
having considered the original bill (S. 3237), to authorize 
appropriations for fiscal year 2007 for intelligence and 
intelligence-related activities of the United States 
Government, the Intelligence Community Management Account, and 
the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability 
System, and for other purposes, reports an original bill 
without amendment favorably thereon and recommends that the 
bill do pass.

             CLASSIFIED SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMITTEE REPORT

    The classified nature of United States intelligence 
activities precludes disclosure by the Committee of details of 
its budgetary recommendations in this Report. The Committee has 
prepared a classified supplement to this Report that contains 
(a) the Classified Annex to this Report and (b) the classified 
Schedule of Authorizations. The Schedule of Authorizations is 
incorporated by reference in the Act and has the same legal 
status as public law. The Classified Annex to this Report 
explains the full scope and intent of the Committee's actions 
in the classified Schedule of Authorizations. The Classified 
Annex has also been incorporated by reference in Section 103. 
As such, the Intelligence Community is required to comply with 
any directions or requirements contained therein as it would 
any other statutory requirement.
    The classified supplement to the Report is available for 
review by any Member of the Senate, subject to the provisions 
of Senate Resolution 400 of the 94th Congress, as amended by 
Senate Resolution 445 of the 108th Congress.
    The classified supplement is made available to the 
Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of 
Representatives, to the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence of the House of Representatives, and to the 
President. The President shall provide for appropriate 
distribution within the Executive Branch.

              SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS AND EXPLANATION

    The following is a section-by-section analysis and 
explanation of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2007, as reported herein. Following the section-by-section 
analysis and explanation there are Committee comments on other 
matters. The report also includes additional views offered by 
Committee Members regarding this legislation and other matters.

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES


Section 101. Authorization of appropriations

    Section 101 lists the United States government departments, 
agencies, and other elements for which the Act authorizes 
appropriations for intelligence and intelligence-related 
activities for fiscal year 2007.

Section 102. Classified schedule of authorizations

    Section 102 makes clear that the details of the amounts 
authorized to be appropriated for intelligence and 
intelligence-related activities and the applicable personnel 
ceilings covered under this title for fiscal year 2007 are 
contained in a classified Schedule of Authorizations. The 
Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the 
Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of 
Representatives and to the President.

Section 103. Incorporation of classified annex

    Section 103 incorporates into law the Classified Annex to 
this Report. Unless otherwise specifically stated, the amounts 
authorized in the Classified Annex are not in addition to 
amounts authorized to be appropriated by other provisions of 
the Act or by the classified Schedule of Authorizations.
    The Committee has taken the step of incorporating the 
Classified Annex because the Executive Branch, in the past, has 
refused to treat with equal weight the language in the 
classified annexes and the text of recent authorization acts 
and their accompanying classified schedules of authorizations. 
This Committee, and Congress, will not permit the Executive 
Branch to ignore the clear instructions of Congress merely 
because the directives are contained, by necessity of 
classification, in an annex accompanying the report associated 
with intelligence authorizing legislation. The Committee 
directs the Executive Branch to comply fully with any directed 
transfers, temporary limitations on use (fences), or other 
limitations or instructions contained in the Classified Annex 
to this Report.

Section 104. Personnel ceiling adjustments

    Section 104 authorizes the Director of National 
Intelligence (DNI), with the approval of the Director of the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB), in fiscal year 2007 to 
authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the 
personnel ceilings applicable to the elements of the 
Intelligence Community under Section 102 by an amount not to 
exceed 2 percent of the total of the ceilings applicable under 
Section 102. The DNI may exercise this authority only if 
necessary to the performance of important intelligence 
functions. Any exercise of this authority must be reported to 
the intelligence committees of the Congress.

Section 105. Intelligence Community Management Account

    Section 105 authorizes appropriations for the Intelligence 
Community Management Account (CMA) of the DNI and sets the 
personnel end-strength for the elements within the CMA for 
fiscal year 2007.
    Subsection (a) authorizes appropriations of $648,952,000 
for fiscal year 2007 for the activities of the CMA of the DNI. 
Subsection (a) also authorizes funds identified for advanced 
research and development to remain available for two years.
    Subsection (b) authorizes 1,575 full-time personnel for 
elements within the CMA for fiscal year 2007 and provides that 
such personnel may be permanent employees of a CMA element or 
detailed from other elements of the United States government.
    Subsection (c) authorizes additional appropriations and 
personnel for the CMA as specified in the classified Schedule 
of Authorizations and permits the additional funding for 
research and development to remain available through September 
30, 2008.
    Subsection (d) requires that, except as provided in Section 
113 of the National Security Act of 1947, personnel from 
another element of the United States government shall be 
detailed to an element of the CMA on a reimbursable basis, 
except that for temporary functions such personnel may be 
detailed on a non-reimbursable basis for periods of less than 
one year.

Section 106. Incorporation of reporting requirements

    Section 106 incorporates into the Act by reference each 
requirement to submit a report contained in the Joint 
Explanatory Statement to accompany the Conference Report or in 
the Classified Annex accompanying the Conference Report.

Section 107. Availability to public of certain intelligence funding 
        information

    Section 107 would require the President to disclose the 
aggregate amount of funds requested for the National 
Intelligence Program in the annual budget submission for the 
program. The section would also require Congress to disclose 
the aggregate amount of funds authorized to be appropriated, 
and the aggregate amount appropriated, for the National 
Intelligence Program. It also directs the DNI to conduct a 
study to assess the advisability of publicly disclosing the 
aggregate amount of funding requested, authorized, and 
appropriated for each of the 16 elements of the Intelligence 
Community. The report must be submitted to Congress within 180 
days of enactment of this Act.

Section 108. Response of Intelligence Community to requests from 
        Congress for intelligence documents and information

    Section 108 provides for certain procedural requirements 
related to the ability of Congress to gain access, through the 
intelligence committees and other committees of jurisdiction, 
to intelligence reports, assessments, estimates, legal 
opinions, and other intelligence information. The provision 
states that elements of the Intelligence Community must provide 
to the intelligence committees any intelligence documents or 
information requested by the Chairman or Vice Chairman (or 
Ranking Minority Member) of such committees. The statutory 
requirement applies only to existing intelligence documents and 
information and would not apply to requests to generate new 
intelligence assessments, reports, estimates, legal opinions, 
or other information.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM


Section 201. Authorization of appropriations

    Section 201 authorizes appropriations in the amount of 
$256,400,000 for fiscal year 2007 for the Central Intelligence 
Agency Retirement and Disability Fund.

   TITLE III--INTELLIGENCE AND GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS


Section 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized 
        by law

    Section 301 provides that funds authorized to be 
appropriated by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other 
benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such 
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for 
increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law.

Section 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities

    Section 302 provides that the authorization of 
appropriations by the Act shall not be deemed to constitute 
authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity that is 
not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or laws of the 
United States.

Section 303. Clarification of definition of Intelligence Community 
        under the National Security Act of 1947

    Section 303 amends Section 3(4)(L) of the National Security 
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)(L)) to permit the designation as 
``elements of the intelligence community'' of other elements of 
departments and agencies of the United States government not 
listed in Section 3(4).

Section 304. Improvement of notification of Congress regarding 
        intelligence activities of the United States Government

    Section 304 amends the requirements for notifications to 
Congress under Sections 502 and 503 of the National Security 
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413a & 413b). First, Section 304 amends 
the definition of ``congressional intelligence committees'' in 
Section 3(7) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
401a(7)), specifically including ``each member'' of the Select 
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
Representatives within such definition. Second, Section 304 
requires that, in the event that the DNI or the head of an 
Intelligence Community element does not provide to all Members 
of the ``congressional intelligence committees'' the 
notification required by Section 502 (relating to intelligence 
activities other than covert actions) or Section 503 (relating 
to covert actions) of the National Security Act of 1947, that 
all Members will be provided with a notification of this fact 
and will be provided with a summary of the intelligence 
activity or covert action in a manner sufficient to permit such 
Members to assess the legality, benefits, costs, and 
advisability of the intelligence activity or covert action. 
Third, Section 304 extends requirements in Section 502 of the 
National Security Act of 1947 on the form and contents of 
reports to the ``congressional intelligence committees'' on 
intelligence activities other than covert actions to the 
requirements for notifications to Congress under Section 503 of 
that Act (relating to covert actions). Fourth, the section 
requires that any change to a covert action finding under 
Section 503 of that Act must be reported to the committees, 
rather than the existing requirement to report any 
``significant'' change.

Section 305. Delegation of authority for travel on common carriers for 
        intelligence collection personnel

    Section 116 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
404k) allows the DNI to authorize travel on any common carrier 
when it is consistent with Intelligence Community mission 
requirements or, more specifically, is required for cover 
purposes, operational needs, or other exceptional 
circumstances. As presently written, the DNI may only delegate 
this authority to the Principal Deputy DNI (PDDNI) or, with 
respect to Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) employees, to the 
Director of the CIA.
    Section 305 of this bill provides that the DNI may delegate 
the authority in Section 116 of the National Security Act of 
1947 to the head of any element of the Intelligence Community. 
This expansion is consistent with the view of the Committee 
that the DNI should be able to delegate authority throughout 
the Intelligence Community when such delegation serves the 
overall interests of the Community.
    Section 305 also provides that the head of an Intelligence 
Community element to whom travel authority has been delegated 
is also empowered to delegate the authority to senior officials 
of the element as specified in guidelines issued by the DNI. 
This allows for administrative flexibility, consistent with the 
guidance of the DNI, for the entire Community. To facilitate 
Congressional oversight, the DNI shall submit the guidelines to 
the intelligence committees of the Congress.

Section 306. Modification of availability of funds for different 
        intelligence activities

    Section 306 conforms the text of Section 504(a)(3)(B) of 
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414(a)(3)(B) 
(governing the funding of intelligence activities)) with the 
text of Section 102A(d)(5)(A)(ii) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 403-
1(d)(5)(A)(ii)), as amended by Section 1011(a) of the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Pub. 
L. No. 108-458 (Dec. 17, 2004)) (governing the transfer and 
reprogramming by the DNI of certain intelligence funding). In 
particular, this conforming amendment replaces the ``unforeseen 
requirements'' standard in Section 504(a)(3)(B) with a clearer 
standard to govern reprogrammings and transfers of funds 
authorized for a different intelligence or intelligence-related 
activity. Under the new standard, a reprogramming or transfer 
would be authorized if, in addition to the other requirements 
of Section 504(a)(3), the new use of funds would ``support an 
emergent need, improve program effectiveness, or increase 
efficiency.'' This modification brings the standard for 
reprogrammings or transfers of intelligence funding into 
conformity with the standards applicable to reprogrammings and 
transfers under Section 102A of the National Security Act of 
1947. The modification preserves Congressional oversight of 
proposed reprogrammings and transfers while enhancing the 
Intelligence Community's ability to carry out missions and 
functions vital to national security.

Section 307. Additional limitation on availability of funds for 
        intelligence and intelligence-related activities

    Section 307 specifies that appropriated funds may be 
obligated or expended for an intelligence or intelligence-
related activity only if the ``congressional intelligence 
committees'' have been ``fully and currently informed'' of that 
activity, or if all Members have been provided a summary of the 
activity, consistent with the requirements of Sections 502(b) 
and 503(c)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
413a(b) & 413b(c)(5)), as amended by Section 304 of this Act.

Section 308. Increase in penalties for disclosure of undercover 
        intelligence officers and agents

    Section 308 amends Section 601 of the National Security Act 
(50 U.S.C. 421) to increase the criminal penalties for 
individuals with authorized access to classified information 
whointentionally disclose any information identifying a covert 
agent, if those individuals know that the United States is taking 
affirmative measures to conceal such covert agent's intelligence 
relationship to the United States. Currently, the maximum sentence for 
disclosure by someone who has had ``authorized access to classified 
information that identifies a covert agent'' is 10 years. Subsection 
(a) increases that maximum sentence to 15 years. Currently, the maximum 
sentence for disclosure by someone who ``as a result of having 
authorized access to classified information, learns of the identity of 
a covert agent'' is 5 years. Subsection (b) increases that maximum 
sentence to 10 years.

Section 309. Retention and use of amounts paid as debts to elements of 
        the Intelligence Community

    Section 309 adds a new Section 1103 to the National 
Security Act of 1947, authorizing Intelligence Community 
elements to accept, retain, and--for certain purposes--use 
amounts received from private parties as repayment of debts 
owed to such element.
    Each year some property purchased with appropriated funds 
is damaged beyond use or is lost through the negligence of a 
private party or an employee of the Intelligence Community. The 
damaged or lost property may have been used to support wartime 
activities or other national intelligence missions and, thus, 
waiting for additional funds to be provided through the next 
annual appropriation cycle inhibits the Intelligence 
Community's ability to quickly and efficiently support the war 
fighter and other national intelligence missions.
    Section 309 addresses this shortcoming by authorizing 
elements of the Intelligence Community to accept and retain 
reimbursement, outside of the annual appropriations cycle, from 
a private party, including a Federal employee, who has been 
found to have negligently lost or damaged property. As a 
result, elements of the Intelligence Community will be able to 
expeditiously repair or replace lost or damaged property 
without waiting for the next appropriation cycle. Similarly, 
this new section also authorizes elements of the Intelligence 
Community to retain funds paid by Intelligence Community 
employees or former employees as repayment of a default on the 
terms and conditions of scholarship, fellowship, or other 
educational assistance provided by the Community to the 
employee. The section authorizes crediting payments only to the 
current appropriation account related to the debt and limits 
the subsequent use of the funds.

Section 310. Pilot program on disclosure of records under the Privacy 
        Act relating to certain intelligence activities

    As a result of reporting requirements in the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Pub. L. No. 108-177 
(Dec. 13, 2003)) intended to improve information access, the 
Intelligence Community, Department of Defense (DoD), Department 
of Homeland Security, and Federal law enforcement agencies 
formed the Information Sharing Working Group (ISWG) to, inter 
alia, identify impediments to information access in existing 
laws and in Intelligence Community and DoD policies. The ISWG 
issued its report in December 2004.
    In the report, the ISWG noted that certain provisions of 
the Privacy Act could prevent the sharing of intelligence 
information within the Executive Branch. Generally, the Privacy 
Act (5 U.S.C. 552a) precludes the dissemination of information 
regarding U.S. persons stored within a system of records 
maintained by the United States government without the consent 
of that individual. There are, however, twelve exceptions to 
this general rule. For example, one exception permits the 
sharing of information to support a civil or criminal law 
enforcement activity under certain prescribed circumstances. 
There is no exception permitting Intelligence Community 
elements and other United States government agencies to share 
foreign intelligence or counterintelligence information 
(including information concerning international terrorism or 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction) between or with 
elements of the Intelligence Community.
    To address this shortcoming, Section 310 creates a pilot 
program to study a narrow intelligence exception to the Privacy 
Act. Specifically, the provision allows transfers under three 
circumstances. First, the provision permits elements of the 
Intelligence Community to share with other elements of the 
Intelligence Community information covered by the Privacy Act 
pertaining to an identifiable individual when that information 
is relevant to a lawful and authorized foreign intelligence or 
counterintelligence activity. To share such foreign 
intelligence or counterintelligence information under this 
provision pertaining to other than an identifiable individual 
would require the authorization of the DNI or his designee. 
Second, the provision permits the head of an element of the 
Intelligence Community to request in writing from another 
United States government agency Privacy Act records relevant to 
a lawful and authorized activity of that element to protect 
against international terrorism or the proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction. Third, the provision authorizes heads of 
non-Intelligence Community agencies to share Privacy Act 
records with an element of the Intelligence Community if the 
record constitutes ``terrorism information'' (as defined in 
Section 1016(a)(4) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004 (Pub. L. No. 108-458 (Dec. 17, 2004)) or 
information concerning the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, if the receiving element of the Intelligence 
Community is lawfully authorized to collect or analyze the 
information to protect against international terrorism or 
proliferation. When necessary to determine whether a record 
held by a non-Intelligence Community agency constitutes 
terrorism information or information concerning the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the head of such 
agency may consult the DNI or the Attorney General. Section 310 
also extends to the pilot program an exemption from certain 
records access and disclosure accounting requirements. In order 
to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized 
disclosure, this exemption is similar to the exemption extended 
to the DNI under Section 416 of this Act.
    Section 310 will not be effective until the DNI and the 
Attorney General issue guidelines governing the implementation 
and exercise of the authorities granted by the section. The 
guidelines will ensure that Section 310 is implemented in a 
manner designed to protect theconstitutional rights of U.S. 
persons and consistent with existing law, regulations, and Executive 
orders governing the conduct of intelligence activities.
    It is important to note that Section 310 facilitates the 
sharing only of intelligence information already lawfully 
collected and maintained within United States government record 
systems and relevant to a lawful and authorized foreign 
intelligence or counterintelligence activity (with a particular 
focus on sharing by non-Intelligence Community elements of 
information concerning international terrorism and the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction). The provision 
expressly states that the new authority to share already 
collected information does not permit the collection or 
retention of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence 
information not otherwise authorized by law.
    To ensure that the exception to the Privacy Act permits 
necessary sharing of critical foreign intelligence and 
counterintelligence information while providing appropriate 
protections for the privacy and civil liberties of U.S. 
persons, Section 310 establishes a three-year pilot program. 
The exception to the Privacy Act will expire three years after 
the DNI and the Attorney General issue the guidelines discussed 
above, unless renewed. During the course of the program, the 
DNI and the Attorney General, in consultation with the Privacy 
and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, are required to submit to 
the intelligence committees annual reports on the status and 
implementation of the pilot program. Additionally, six months 
prior to the expiration of the program, the DNI and the 
Attorney General, in coordination with the Privacy and Civil 
Liberties Oversight Board, will submit a final report to the 
intelligence committees, including any recommendations 
regarding continued authorization of the exception. Similarly, 
the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board will submit to 
the intelligence committees a separate report providing the 
Board's advice and counsel on the development and 
implementation of the authorities provided under this Section.
    Section 310 includes modifications proposed by the Armed 
Services Committee, the Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs Committee, and individual Members of the Senate. Both 
the Office of the DNI and the Department of Justice (DoJ) have 
expressed their support for this provision. Specifically, in a 
letter to the Committee dated December 1, 2005, referring to a 
provision similar to Section 310 in the Committee-passed 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, the DNI 
wrote, the ``Administration strongly supports this provision 
because it would facilitate the type of information sharing 
mandated by the [Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention 
Act of 2004], consistent with the need to protect privacy and 
civil liberties.'' Similarly, in a separate letter to the 
Committee dated November 28, 2005, the Assistant Attorney 
General for Legislative Affairs wrote, ``We support section 307 
[of the Committee-passed Intelligence Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2006]. * * * We believe that this provision would 
help in resolving some of the concerns that some agencies have 
expressed about sharing information with the FBI for 
counterterrorism purposes.'' In fact, the DNI included a 
Privacy Act exception similar to Section 310 in this year's 
annual request for legislative authorities.

Section 311. Extension to Intelligence Community of authority to delete 
        information about receipt and disposition of foreign gifts and 
        decorations

    Current law requires that certain Federal ``employees''--a 
term that generally applies to all officials and personnel of 
the Intelligence Community and certain contractors, spouses, 
dependents, and others--file reports with their ``employing'' 
agency regarding the receipt of gifts or ``decorations'' from 
foreign governments. See 5 U.S.C. 7342. Following compilation 
of these reports, the ``employing'' agency is required to 
annually file with the Secretary of State detailed information 
about the receipt of foreign gifts and decorations reported by 
its employees, including the source of the gift. See 5 U.S.C. 
7342(f). The Secretary of State is then required to publish a 
comprehensive list of the agency reports in the Federal 
Register. See id. With respect to the activities of the 
Intelligence Community, the public disclosure of such gifts or 
decorations in the Federal Register has the potential to 
compromise intelligence sources (e.g., the confirmation of an 
intelligence relationship with a foreign government) and could 
undermine national security. Recognizing this potential 
concern, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was granted 
a limited exemption from reporting certain specified 
information about such foreign gifts or decorations where the 
publication of the information could adversely affect United 
States intelligence sources. See Pub. L. No. 95-105, Sec. 
515(a) (Aug. 17, 1977). Section 1079 of the Intelligence Reform 
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458 (Dec. 
17, 2004) (``Intelligence Reform Act''), extended a similar 
exemption to the DNI (in addition to amending the existing 
exemption to apply to the Director of the CIA).
    Section 311 amends existing law to provide to the heads of 
each Intelligence Community element the same limited exemption 
from specified public reporting requirements that is currently 
authorized for the DNI and the Director of the CIA. The 
national security concerns that prompted the initial DCI 
exemption, and the subsequent exemptions for the DNI and 
Director of the CIA, apply with equal weight to other 
Intelligence Community elements--the publication of certain 
information relating to foreign gifts or decorations provided 
to employees of all Intelligence Community agencies could 
adversely affect United States intelligence sources. Section 
311 provides the exemption necessary to protect national 
security, but mandates that the information not provided to the 
Secretary of State be provided to the DNI to ensure continued 
independent oversight of the receipt by Intelligence Community 
``employees'' of foreign gifts or decorations.

Section 312. Availability of funds for travel and transportation of 
        personal effects, household goods, and automobiles

    Section 312 provides the CIA and the Office of the DNI the 
same authority that is granted to the Department of State by 
Section 2677 of Title 22, United States Code, when travel and 
transportation authorized by valid travel orders begins in one 
fiscal year, but may not be completed during that same fiscal 
year. The Committee believes this authority will relieve the 
administrative burden of charging the eligible costs to two 
fiscal years' appropriations and adjusting associated accounts.

Section 313. Director of National Intelligence report on compliance 
        with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005

    Section 313 requires the DNI to submit a classified report 
to the intelligence committees on all measures taken by the 
Office of the DNI, and by any element of the Intelligence 
Community with relevant responsibilities, on compliance with 
two provisions of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. The 
report is to be submitted no later than September 1, 2006.
    The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 provides, in part, that 
no individual in the custody or under the physical control of 
the United States, regardless of nationality or physical 
location, shall be subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment or punishment. The report required by Section 313 
shall include a description of any detention or interrogation 
methods that have been determined to comply with this 
prohibition or have been discontinued pursuant to it.
    The Detainee Treatment of Act of 2005 also provides, in 
part, for the protection, against civil or criminal liability, 
for United States Government personnel who had engaged in 
officially authorized interrogations that were determined to be 
lawful at the time. Section 313 requires the DNI to report on 
actions taken to implement that provision.
    The report required by Section 313 shall also include an 
appendix containing all guidelines on the application of the 
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 to the detention or 
interrogation activities, if any, of any element of the 
Intelligence Community. The appendix shall also include all 
legal opinions of the DoJ about the meaning of the Detainee 
Treatment Act of 2005 or its application to detention or 
interrogation activities, if any, of any element of the 
Intelligence Community.

Section 314. Report on alleged clandestine detention facilities for 
        individuals captured in the global war on terrorism

    Section 314 requires the DNI to submit a classified, 
detailed report to the Members of the intelligence committees 
that provides a full accounting on each clandestine prison or 
detention facility, if any, currently or formerly operated by 
the United States Government, regardless of location, at which 
detainees in the global war on terrorism are or have been held. 
Section 314 sets forth required elements of this report: the 
location and size of each such prison or facility, its 
disposition if no longer operated by the United States 
Government, plans for the ultimate disposition of detainees 
currently held, a description of interrogation procedures used 
or formerly used, and whether those procedures are or were in 
compliance with United States obligations under the Geneva 
Conventions and the Convention Against Torture. The classified 
report is to be submitted no later than 60 days after enactment 
of this Act.

  TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY


      Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence


Section 401. Additional authorities of the Director of National 
        Intelligence on intelligence information sharing

    Section 401 amends the National Security Act of 1947 to 
provide the DNI statutory authority to use National 
Intelligence Program funds to quickly address deficiencies or 
needs that arise in intelligence information access or sharing 
capabilities. The new Section 102A(g)(1)(G) of the National 
Security Act of 1947 authorizes the DNI to provide to a 
receiving agency or component--for that agency or component to 
accept and use--funds that have been authorized and 
appropriated to address intelligence information access or 
sharing needs. In the alternative, the DNI may provide to a 
receiving agency necessary or associated services and equipment 
procured with funds from the National Intelligence Program. The 
new Section 102A(g)(1)(H) of the National Security Act of 1947 
also grants the DNI the authority to provide funds to non-
National Intelligence Program activities for the purpose of 
addressing critical gaps in intelligence information access or 
sharing capabilities. Without the authority, the development 
and implementation of necessary capabilities could be delayed 
by an agency's lack of authority to accept or utilize systems 
funded from the National Intelligence Program, inability to use 
or identify current-year funding, or concerns regarding the 
augmentation of appropriations. These new DNI authorities are 
similar to authority granted to the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency (NGA) with respect to imagery and imagery-
related systems. See Section 105(b)(2)(D)(ii) of the National 
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-5).

Section 402. Modification of limitation on delegation by the Director 
        of National Intelligence of the protection of intelligence 
        sources and methods

    Section 402 amends the National Security Act of 1947 to 
modify the limitation on delegation by the DNI of the authority 
to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized 
disclosure. The provision permits the DNI to delegate the 
authority to the Deputy Directors of National Intelligence or 
the Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community. A 
previous provision in the National Security Act of 1947 had 
vested the power to protect sources and methods in the DCI, but 
did not constrain further delegation of the authority.

Section 403. Authority of the Director of National Intelligence to 
        manage access to human intelligence information

    Section 403 provides the DNI with the authority to ensure 
the dissemination of intelligence information collected through 
human sources, including the underlying operational data 
necessary to understand that reporting, to appropriately 
cleared analysts or other intelligence officers throughout the 
Intelligence Community. Recent intelligence failures--
particularly related to pre-war intelligence assessments on 
Iraq--have demonstrated the importance of rebuilding 
andimproving the nation's human intelligence capabilities. While the 
Intelligence Community is making some progress in this regard, a great 
deal remains to be done, particularly in the area of access to 
intelligence gathered through human intelligence operations.
    The Committee's review of the Intelligence Community's pre-
war assessments on Iraq highlighted the impact of unnecessary 
restrictions on access by intelligence analysts to human 
intelligence information. In its Report of the Select Committee 
on Intelligence on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Pre-War 
Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, the Committee concluded that 
the Intelligence Community's failure to provide cleared 
analysts with a legitimate ``need-to-know'' broader access to 
human intelligence reporting, including the operational data 
underlying that reporting, contributed to the flawed 
intelligence assessments on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction 
programs. Access to this data--controlled by the agencies that 
collected the information--would have provided analysts with a 
better understanding of the reliability of the sources of the 
reporting, as well as other significant intelligence 
information required for their work.
    The Intelligence Reform Act provides the DNI with a number 
of tools to foster greater information access within the 
Community. Section 403 builds on these tools by providing the 
DNI with the specific authority to ensure analysts and other 
Intelligence Community officers are provided with improved 
access to human intelligence reporting, consistent with the 
DNI's determinations regarding the protection of intelligence 
sources and methods. Although the Committee expects that 
individual elements will continue to retain human intelligence 
operational data, access decisions will be made by the DNI as a 
neutral arbiter of need-to-know. No longer will these access 
decisions be left to individual agencies with a parochial--and 
understandable--desire to protect sources at all costs. Access 
to human intelligence reporting, and underlying operational 
reporting, must be balanced against real threats to sources and 
methods. Under Section 403, the Committee expects the DNI to 
perform the necessary balancing. Section 403 also provides the 
DNI with full and regular access to the information necessary 
to ``manage and direct * * * the tasking of, collection, 
analysis, production, and dissemination of national 
intelligence by elements of the intelligence community.'' See 
Section 102A(f)(1)(A)(ii) of the National Security Act of 1947 
(50 U.S.C. 403-1(f)(1)(A)(ii)).
    To effectively implement Section 403, the DNI should 
standardize security clearance processes across Intelligence 
Community elements to resolve issues that have hampered 
information access in the past. The Committee does not believe 
that working in a particular agency makes one Intelligence 
Community officer inherently more trustworthy than a 
counterpart with the same security clearance and a legitimate 
``need-to-know'' at another element. Resolution of disparate 
clearance standards and processes, however, should provide 
Intelligence Community elements with an additional degree of 
comfort that, while information from sources for which those 
agencies are responsible has received greater distribution, the 
recipients of that information are appropriately cleared 
consistent with DNI standards. Based on the authorities 
provided to the DNI in the Intelligence Reform Act and this 
section, the Committee is confident that the DNI can implement 
the protections necessary for intelligence sources and methods, 
while making human intelligence information more readily 
available to appropriately cleared intelligence officers who 
need the information for the conduct of their duties.

Section 404. Additional administrative authority of the Director of 
        National Intelligence

    From an organizational standpoint, the DNI should be able 
to rapidly focus the Intelligence Community on a particular 
intelligence issue through a coordinated effort that uses all 
available resources. The ability of the DNI to respond with 
flexibility and to coordinate the Intelligence Community 
response to an emerging threat should not depend on the time-
sensitive vagaries of the budget cycle and should not be 
constrained by general limitations found in appropriations law 
(e.g., 31 U.S.C. 1532) or the annual limitation set forth in 
the ``General Provisions'' of the Transportation, Treasury, 
Housing and Urban Development, the Judiciary, the District of 
Columbia, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act. See, 
e.g., Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, Division H--
Transportation, Treasury, Independent Agencies, and General 
Government Appropriations Act, 2005, Section 610, Pub. L. No. 
108-447 (Dec. 8, 2004); see also, e.g., In re: Veterans 
Administration Funding of Federal Executive Boards, 65 Comp. 
Gen. 689 (July 1, 1986) (discussing history of prohibition on 
interagency financing of boards, commissions, councils, 
committees, or similar groups).
    To provide this needed operational and organizational 
flexibility, Section 404 grants the DNI the authority--
notwithstanding certain specified provisions of general 
appropriations law--to approve interagency financing of 
national intelligence centers (authorized under Section 119B of 
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404o-2)) and of 
other boards, commissions, councils, committees, or similar 
groups established by the DNI (e.g., ``mission managers,'' as 
recommended by the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities 
of the United States regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD 
Commission)). Under Section 404, the DNI could authorize the 
pooling of resources from various Intelligence Community and 
non-Intelligence Community agencies to finance national 
intelligence centers or other organizational groupings designed 
to address identified intelligence matters. Once approved by 
the DNI, the provision also expressly permits other United 
States government departments and agencies, including 
Intelligence Community elements, to fund, or participate in the 
funding of, the authorized activities.
    The Committee recognizes the need for coordinated responses 
to national security threats and intelligence problems. To 
better understand how the DNI intends to utilize the authority 
provided under Section 404, the Committee directs the DNI to 
provide an annual report--through the end of fiscal year 2010--
providing details on how this authority has been exercised, 
what amount of appropriated funds attributable to each 
interagency contributor has been accessed to finance each 
national intelligence center or other organizational grouping 
under this section, and whether the National Intelligence 
Program or other budget account has been modified to provide 
specific funding for such national intelligence centers or 
other organizational groupings or whether funding will continue 
to be provided under the authority of Section 404.

Section 405. Clarification of limitation on co-location of the Office 
        of the Director of National Intelligence

    Section 405 clarifies that the ban on co-location of the 
Office of the DNI with any other Intelligence Community 
element, which is slated to take effect as of October 1, 2008, 
applies to the co-location of the headquarters of the Office of 
the DNI with the headquarters of any other Intelligence 
Community agency or element. This provision provides 
flexibility to ensure that components of the Office of the DNI 
may be located in the most appropriate facility or facilities, 
including co-location with components of Intelligence Community 
agencies or elements. The Committee is aware that the DNI 
intends to find a headquarters that is separate and apart from 
the headquarters of the various Intelligence Community 
elements, consistent with the expressed intent of Congress.

Section 406. Additional duties of the Director of Science and 
        Technology of the Office of the Director of National 
        Intelligence

    As part of the restructuring of the nation's intelligence 
infrastructure in the Intelligence Reform Act, Congress created 
a Director of Science and Technology within the Office of the 
DNI. Under the Act, the Director of Science and Technology 
serves as the DNI's chief representative for science and 
technology, assisting the DNI in formulating a long-term 
strategy for scientific advances in the field of intelligence 
and on the science and technology elements of the intelligence 
budget. Additionally, the Director of Science and Technology 
chairs the DNI's Science and Technology Committee--responsible 
for coordinating advances in intelligence-related research and 
development.
    The House-passed version of the Intelligence Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2007, H.R. 5020 (109th Cong., 2d Sess.), 
contains a provision (Section 403) that further expounds on the 
role of the Director of Science and Technology. Section 403 in 
H.R. 5020 would require the Director of Science and Technology 
to systematically identify the Intelligence Community's most 
significant challenges requiring technical solutions and to 
develop options to enhance research and development efforts to 
meet requirements in a timely manner. Section 403 would also 
require the DNI to submit to Congress a report detailing the 
strategy for development and use of technology throughout the 
Intelligence Community through 2021. The report is to identify 
the Community's highest priority intelligence gaps that may be 
resolved by the use of technology; identify goals for advanced 
research and development; explain how advanced research and 
development projects funded under the National Intelligence 
Program address the identified gaps; specify current and 
projected research and development projects; and provide a plan 
for incorporating technology from research and development 
projects into National Intelligence Program acquisition 
programs.
    Section 406 incorporates additional requirements into a 
provision otherwise similar to Section 403 of H.R. 5020.
    The Committee supports the House provision, but also 
believes that such a provision should make clear that it is the 
responsibility of the Director of Science and Technology to 
assist the DNI in ensuring that the Intelligence Community's 
research and development priorities and projects are consistent 
with national intelligence requirements; that a priority be 
placed on addressing identified deficiencies in the collection, 
processing, analysis, or dissemination of national 
intelligence; that the research and development priorities and 
projects account for program development and acquisition 
funding constraints; and that such priorities and projects 
address system requirements from collection to final 
dissemination.
    The Committee further requires the Director of Science and 
Technology, at the direction of the DNI, to develop and 
maintain an integrated Technical Standards System for major 
acquisitions. The Technical Standards System should improve the 
availability of technical standards for the design, 
development, and operation of Intelligence Community programs 
and projects; reduce duplication of effort and improve 
interoperability within the Intelligence Community, with the 
private sector, and with international partners; and enhance 
awareness of standardization in the Intelligence Community. 
Under this provision, the Director of Science and Technology 
will develop standards that document uniform engineering and 
technical requirements for processes, procedures, practices, 
and methods, including requirements for selection, application, 
and design criteria of particular items. The Committee 
encourages the DNI to consult, as appropriate, with the heads 
of other United States government departments and agencies 
(e.g., the Secretary of Defense, the Administrator of the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Secretary of 
Homeland Security) when developing standards and specifications 
under this provision.

Section 407. Appointment and title of Chief Information Officer of the 
        Intelligence Community

    Section 407 converts the position of Chief Information 
Officer (CIO) of the Intelligence Community from an appointment 
by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the 
Senate, to an appointment by the DNI. The provision also 
expressly designates the position as CIO of the Intelligence 
Community. The modification to the title of the position of CIO 
is consistent with the position's overall responsibilities as 
outlined in Section 103G(b) of the National Security Act of 
1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3g(b)). Section 407 shall apply with 
respect to any appointment of an individual to serve as CIO of 
the Intelligence Community that is made on or after the date of 
enactment of this Act.
    The CIO of the Intelligence Community has reorganized his 
office to reflect his legislative responsibilities. The 
reorganized office consists of the following units: (1) 
Intelligence Community Governance; (2) Intelligence Community 
Enterprise Architecture; (3) Information Sharing and Customer 
Outreach; (4) Intelligence Community Information Technology 
Management; and (4) Enterprise Services. The CIO of the 
Intelligence Community has also established a CIO Council that 
is composed of program managers from several key Intelligence 
Community elements. The CIO of the Intelligence Community also 
plans onestablishing a ``board of governors'' consisting of 
officials from the various agencies who will work together to resolve 
issues.
    The creation of a CIO of the Intelligence Community 
(Section 303 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2005 (Pub. L. No. 108-487 (Dec. 23, 2004))), combined with 
the budgetary authorities and information technology 
responsibilities of the DNI (see, e.g., Section 1011 of the 
Intelligence Reform Act), laid an important foundation for 
improvements in the information technology infrastructure of 
the Intelligence Community. The Committee believes that the CIO 
of the Intelligence Community must provide direction and 
guidance to all elements of the Intelligence Community to 
ensure that information technology research and development, 
security, and acquisition programs support information access 
throughout the Intelligence Community. The modification to the 
manner in which the CIO of the Intelligence Community is 
appointed should not be construed to diminish the authorities 
or responsibilities of the position.

Section 408. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community

    Section 1078 of the Intelligence Reform Act authorizes the 
DNI to establish an Office of Inspector General if the DNI 
determines that an Inspector General ``would be beneficial to 
improving the operations and effectiveness of the Office of the 
DNI.'' It further provides that the DNI may grant to the 
Inspector General ``any of the duties, responsibilities, and 
authorities'' set forth in the Inspector General Act of 1978. 
The DNI has now appointed an Inspector General and has granted 
the Inspector General certain authorities pursuant to Director 
of National Intelligence Instruction No. 2005-10 (Sept. 7, 
2005). The duties, responsibilities, and authorities of the 
Inspector General, and his ability to exercise his authorities 
across all elements of the Community, remain ambiguous, 
however. In H.R. Rep. 109-411 (April 6, 2006) (report of the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
Representatives (HPSCI) to accompany H.R. 5020, the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007), the HPSCI 
has also expressed concerns that ``[the Office of the Inspector 
General] is currently chartered in a way that does not ensure 
the maximum utility of that office to act as a coordinating 
organization for all Intelligence Community Inspector Generals 
[sic], specifically with regard to keeping the Committee 
informed of its activities and findings.''
    The problems expressed by the HPSCI report and the concerns 
identified in the Committee's oversight must be addressed by an 
empowered and effective Inspector General to serve the DNI and 
the Intelligence Community. A strong Inspector General is vital 
to achieving the goal, set forth in the Intelligence Reform 
Act, of improving the operations and effectiveness of the 
Intelligence Community. It is also vital to achieving the 
broader goal of identifying problems and deficiencies wherever 
they may be found in the Intelligence Community, including the 
manner in which elements of the Community interact with each 
other in such matters as providing access to information and 
undertaking joint or cooperative activities. To that end, by 
way of a proposed new Section 103H of the National Security Act 
of 1947, Section 408 of this Act establishes an Inspector 
General of the Intelligence Community.
    The office will be established within the Office of the 
DNI. The Inspector General will keep both the DNI and the 
intelligence committees fully and currently informed about 
problems and deficiencies in Intelligence Community programs 
and operations and the need for corrective actions. The 
Inspector General will be appointed by the President, with the 
advice and consent of the Senate, and will report directly to 
the DNI. To bolster the Inspector General's independence within 
the Intelligence Community, the Inspector General may be 
removed only by the President, who must then communicate the 
reasons for the Inspector General's removal to the intelligence 
committees.
    The DNI may prohibit the Inspector General from conducting 
an investigation, inspection, or audit if the DNI determines 
that such action is necessary to protect vital national 
security interests. If the DNI exercises the authority to 
prohibit an investigation, the DNI must provide the reasons for 
taking such action to the intelligence committees within seven 
days. The Inspector General may, as necessary, provide a 
response to the intelligence committees regarding the actions 
of the DNI.
    The Inspector General will have direct and prompt access to 
the DNI and any Intelligence Community employee, or employee of 
a contractor, whose testimony is needed. The Inspector General 
will also have direct access to all records that relate to 
programs and activities for which the Inspector General has 
responsibility. Failure to cooperate will be grounds for 
appropriate administrative action.
    The Inspector General will have subpoena authority; 
however, information within the possession of the United States 
government must be obtained through other procedures. Subject 
to the DNI's concurrence, the Inspector General may request 
information from any United States government department, 
agency, or element. Upon receiving such a request from the 
Inspector General, heads of United States government 
departments, agencies, and elements, insofar as practicable and 
not in violation of law or regulation, must provide the 
requested information to the Inspector General.
    The Inspector General must submit semiannual reports to the 
DNI that include a description of significant problems relating 
to Intelligence Community programs and operations and to the 
relationships between Intelligence Community elements. The 
reports must include a description of Inspector General 
recommendations and a statement whether corrective action has 
been completed. Within 30 days of receiving the report from the 
Inspector General, the DNI must submit each semiannual report 
to Congress.
    The Inspector General must immediately report to the DNI 
particularly serious or flagrant violations. Within seven days, 
the DNI must transmit those reports to the intelligence 
committees, together with any comments. In the event the 
Inspector General is unable to resolve differences with the 
DNI, the Inspector General is authorized to report the serious 
or flagrant violation directly to the intelligence committees. 
Reports to the intelligence committees are also required with 
respect to investigations concerning high-ranking Intelligence 
Community officials.
    Intelligence Community employees, or employees of 
contractors, who intend to report to Congress an ``urgent 
concern''--such as a violation of law or Executive order, a 
false statement to Congress, or a willful withholding from 
Congress--may report such complaints and supporting information 
to the Inspector General. Following a review by the Inspector 
General to determine the credibility of the complaint or 
information, the Inspector General must transmit such complaint 
and information to the DNI. On receiving the complaints or 
information from the Inspector General (together with the 
Inspector General's credibility determination), the DNI must 
transmit such complaint or information to the intelligence 
committees. If the Inspector General does not find a complaint 
or information to be credible, the reporting individual may 
submit the matter directly to the intelligence committees by 
following appropriate security practices outlined by the DNI. 
Reprisals or threats of reprisal against reporting individuals 
constitute reportable ``urgent concerns.'' The Committee will 
not tolerate actions by the DNI, or by any Intelligence 
Community element, constituting a reprisal for reporting an 
``urgent concern'' or any other matter to Congress. 
Nonetheless, reporting individuals should ensure that the 
complaint and supporting information are provided to Congress 
consistent with appropriate procedures designed to protect 
intelligence sources and methods and other sensitive matters.
    For matters within the jurisdiction of both the Inspector 
General of the Intelligence Community and an Inspector General 
for another Intelligence Community element (or a parent 
department or agency), the Inspectors General must 
expeditiously resolve who will undertake the investigation, 
inspection, or audit. For investigations, inspections, or 
audits commenced by an Inspector General of an Intelligence 
Community element prior to the enactment of this Act, the 
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community should exercise 
his authority in a manner that does not disrupt the timely 
completion of such investigations, inspections, or audits or 
result in unnecessary duplication of effort. An Inspector 
General for an Intelligence Community element must share the 
results of any inspection, investigation, or audit with any 
other Inspector General, including the Inspector General of the 
Intelligence Community, who otherwise would have had 
jurisdiction over the investigation.
    Consistent with existing law, the Inspector General must 
report to the Attorney General any information, allegation, or 
complaint received by the Inspector General relating to 
violations of Federal criminal law.
    Section 408 includes modifications proposed by the Armed 
Services Committee of the Senate during its sequential 
consideration of S. 1803, the Intelligence Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2006. In addition to technical modifications, 
these proposed modifications: (1) removed the authority of the 
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community to serve as the 
final arbiter of jurisdictional disputes among Intelligence 
Community Inspectors General; (2) exempted initial 
investigations, inspections, or audits of the DoD Inspector 
General, or any other Inspectors General within the DoD, from 
the authority of the Inspector General of the Intelligence 
Community to conduct a subsequent investigation, inspection, or 
audit of the same matter if the initial investigation, 
inspection, or audit was deemed deficient; and (3) deleted a 
requirement that Intelligence Community Inspectors General must 
comply fully with requests for information or assistance from 
the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community. Compare S. 
1803, Section 408, as reported by the Committee (S. Rep. 109-
142 (Sept. 29, 2005) (adding proposed subsection (g)(1), 
(g)(3), and (h)(3)(C) of new Section 103H of the National 
Security Act of 1947)) with S. 1803, Section 408, as reported 
by the Armed Services Committee (S. Rep. 109-173 (Oct. 27, 
2005) (modifying proposed subsection (g)(1), (g)(3), and 
(h)(3)(C))).

Section 409. Leadership and location of certain offices and officials

    Section 409 expressly establishes four new officers within 
the Office of the DNI: (1) the CIO of the Intelligence 
Community; (2) the Inspector General of the Intelligence 
Community; (3) the Director of the National Counterterrorism 
Center; and (4) the Director of the National Counter 
Proliferation Center (NCPC). It also provides that the DNI 
shall appoint the Director of the NCPC.
    The establishment of a Director of the NCPC is consistent 
with Section 1022 of the Intelligence Reform Act. Section 1022 
added a new Section 119A of the National Security Act of 1947, 
which provides that the President shall establish an NCPC. 
Under the Act, the NCPC has seven missions and objectives and 
should serve as the primary organization within the United 
States government for analyzing and integrating all 
intelligence pertaining to proliferation. Among its other 
powers, the NCPC is authorized to coordinate the counter 
proliferation plans and activities of all United States 
government departments and agencies. Section 119A also provided 
that the NCPC should conduct ``strategic operational planning'' 
for the United States government to prevent the spread of 
weapons of mass destruction, delivery systems, and materials 
and technologies.
    Congress provided the President with the authority to waive 
any, or all, of the requirements of Section 119A if it was 
determined that they did not materially improve the 
nonproliferation ability of the United States. At the time 
Congress enacted the Intelligence Reform Act, the WMD 
Commission had not completed its work. Congress provided that 
the President, after receiving the WMD Commission report, 
should submit to Congress his views on the establishment of the 
NCPC.
    In its March 31, 2005, report, the WMD Commission 
recommended that the President establish a relatively small 
NCPC that manages and coordinates analysis and collection 
across the Intelligence Community on nuclear, biological, and 
chemical weapons. The WMD Commission supported the concept of 
``strategic operational planning,'' but recommended that it not 
be performed by the NCPC.
    On June 29, 2005, the White House announced that the 
President had endorsed the establishment of an NCPC. The 
statement provided that the NCPC would exercise ``strategic 
oversight'' of the Intelligence Community's weapons of mass 
destruction activities. The DNI would ensure that the NCPC 
establishes strategic intelligence collection and analysis 
requirements regarding WMD that are consistent with United 
States policies. Under the President's plan, the NCPC would be 
established within the Office of the DNI, and the DNI would 
appoint the Directorof the NCPC who would then report to the 
DNI. On August 8, 2005, the DNI announced the appointment of the first 
Director of the NCPC. This appointment represented an important first 
step in the establishment of the NCPC.
    Section 409 does not amend any other procedural or 
substantive provision of Section 119A of the National Security 
Act of 1947. If the President determines not to assign to the 
NCPC any power provided by Section 119A, notice must be 
provided to Congress in writing as required by that section.

Section 410. National Space Intelligence Center

    The United States maintains a very large investment in 
satellites, and this investment has grown dramatically in 
recent years. These satellites serve the commercial and 
national security needs of the nation. As such, a loss of any 
or all of these assets could do tremendous harm to our economy 
and security.
    At the same time, our investment in intelligence collection 
concerning threats to our interests in space has declined 
markedly as a function of our overall investment in space 
systems. Despite this significant investment, some estimates 
indicate that we commit only 10 percent of what we did nearly 
25 years ago to the analysis of threats to space systems. 
Recent international events have only served to highlight this 
problem.
    In an effort to better understand the future threats to our 
space assets, as well as potential threats to the United States 
from space, Section 410 establishes a National Space 
Intelligence Center (NSIC). It is not the intent of the 
Committee that the NSIC be a physical consolidation of existing 
intelligence entities with responsibilities for various types 
of intelligence related to space. Rather, the Committee 
believes that the first function of the NSIC is to coordinate 
all collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence 
related to space, as well as participate in Intelligence 
Community analyses of requirements for space systems. The NSIC 
augments the existing efforts of the National Air and Space 
Intelligence Center (NASIC) and Missile and Space Intelligence 
Center (MSIC); it is not designed to replace them. Indeed, the 
Committee intends that the NSIC work closely with NASIC and 
MSIC to ensure a coordinated Intelligence Community response to 
issues that intersect the responsibilities of all three 
organizations.
    The Director of the NSIC shall be the National Intelligence 
Officer for Science and Technology, and the Committee 
encourages the appointment of an Executive Director from the 
Senior Intelligence Service. Further details related to the 
mission of the NSIC can be found in the Classified Annex 
accompanying this Act.

Section 411. Operational files in the Office of the Director of 
        National Intelligence

    Section 411 adds a new Section 700 to the National Security 
Act of 1947. It ensures that protected operational files 
provided by elements of the Intelligence Community to the 
Office of the DNI carry with them any exemption such files had 
from Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requirements for search, 
review, publication, or disclosure.
    In the CIA Information Act, Congress authorized the DCI to 
exempt operational files of the CIA from several requirements 
of the FOIA, particularly those requiring search and review in 
response to FOIA requests. In a series of enactments codified 
in Title VII of the National Security Act of 1947, Congress has 
extended the exemption to the operational files of the NGA, the 
National Security Agency (NSA), the National Reconnaissance 
Office (NRO), and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). It has 
also provided that the files of the Office of the National 
Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX) should be treated as 
operational files of the CIA (to the extent they meet the 
criteria for CIA operational files).
    The components of the Office of the DNI, including the 
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), require access to 
information contained in operational files. The purpose of 
Section 411 is to make clear that the operational files of any 
component of the Intelligence Community, for which an 
operational files exemption is applicable, retain their 
exemption from FOIA search, review, disclosure, or publication.
    The new Section 700 of the National Security Act of 1947 
provides several limitations. The exemption does not apply to 
information disseminated beyond the Office of the DNI. Also, as 
Congress has provided in the operational files exemptions for 
the CIA and other Intelligence Community elements, Section 700 
provides that the exemption from search and review does not 
apply to requests by United States citizens or permanent 
residents for information about themselves (although other FOIA 
exemptions, such as appropriate classification, may continue to 
protect such files from public disclosure). The search and 
review exemption would not apply to the subject matter of 
Congressional or Executive Branch investigations into 
improprieties or violations of law.
    In the DNI's annual request to the Committee for 
legislative authorities during the fiscal year 2006 legislative 
cycle, the Office of the DNI asked for a broader exemption from 
the FOIA than currently provided in Section 411. The Committee 
considers it likely that the operations of the Office of the 
DNI, in particular the activities of the NCTC and the NCPC, may 
require an operational files exemption. Before acting on such a 
request, the DNI, through the CIO of the Intelligence Community 
or other appropriate officers, should systematically study and 
report to the intelligence committees regarding the application 
of the FOIA to the Office of the DNI.
    As part of this review, the DNI should report on the 
responsibility assigned by Congress in the Intelligence Reform 
Act concerning operational file exemptions. Congress amended 
each operational file statute to provide that the exemption 
should be made only with the coordination of the DNI. Congress 
also provided that the decennial review of the exemptions in 
force must be undertaken with the DNI. These decennial reviews 
must include consideration of the historical value or other 
public interest in categories of files and the potential for 
declassifying a significant amount of the material in them. The 
DNI should advise the intelligence committees on the benefits 
of coordinating the five decennial reviews which now occur at 
different times.

Section 412. Eligibility for incentive awards of personnel assigned to 
        the Office of the Director of National Intelligence

    Section 412 updates Section 402 of the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1984 (Pub. L. No. 98-215 
(Dec. 9, 1983)) to reflect and incorporate organizational 
changes made by the Intelligence Reform Act. Section 412 also 
makes other technical and stylistic amendments and strikes a 
subsection of the law that applied only during fiscal year 
1987.

Section 413. Repeal of certain authorities relating to the Office of 
        the National Counterintelligence Executive

    Section 413 amends the authorities and structure of the 
Office of the NCIX to eliminate certain independent 
administrative authorities that had been vested in the NCIX 
when that official was appointed by, and reported to, the 
President. Those authorities are unnecessary, redundant, and 
anomalous now that the NCIX is to be appointed by, and under 
the authority, direction, and control of the DNI.

Section 414. Inapplicability of Federal Advisory Committee Act to 
        advisory committees of the Office of the Director of National 
        Intelligence

    Congress enacted the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) 
(5 U.S.C. App.) to regulate the use of advisory committees 
throughout the Federal Government. The FACA sets forth the 
responsibilities of Congress and the Executive Branch with 
regard to such committees and outlines procedures and 
requirements for such committees. As originally enacted in 
1972, the FACA expressly exempted advisory committees utilized 
by the CIA and the Federal Reserve System. Section 414 amends 
the FACA to extend this exemption to those advisory committees 
established or used by the Office of the DNI.

Section 415. Membership of the Director of National Intelligence on the 
        Transportation Security Oversight Board

    Section 415 substitutes the DNI, or the DNI's designee, as 
a Member of the Transportation Security Oversight Board 
established under Section 115(b)(1) of Title 49, United States 
Code, in place of the Director of the CIA, or the Director of 
the CIA's designee.

Section 416. Applicability of the Privacy Act to the Director of 
        National Intelligence and Office of the Director of National 
        Intelligence

    The Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. 552a) has long contained a 
provision under which the Director of the CIA could promulgate 
rules to exempt any system of records within the CIA from 
certain disclosure requirements under the Act. The provision 
was designed to ensure that the CIA could provide adequate and 
appropriate safeguards for certain sensitive information in its 
records systems. In assuming the leadership of the Intelligence 
Community, the DNI similarly requires the ability to safeguard 
sensitive information in records systems within the Office of 
the DNI. Section 416 extends to the DNI the authority to 
promulgate rules under which certain records systems of the 
Office of the DNI may be exempted from certain Privacy Act 
disclosure requirements.

                Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency


Section 421. Director and Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence 
        Agency

    The Intelligence Reform Act established the positions of 
the DNI and the PDDNI and abolished the positions of DCI and 
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence as those positions had 
previously existed. The DNI and PDDNI are responsible for 
leading the entire Intelligence Community, which includes many 
components from the DoD. Moreover, the DNI and PDDNI must 
ensure that the war fighter continues to receive timely, 
actionable intelligence. Accordingly, the Intelligence Reform 
Act continued the tradition of permitting a commissioned 
officer to serve as either the leader or principal deputy of 
the Intelligence Community, so long as both positions are not 
filled by commissioned officers at the same time.
    In establishing the positions of DNI and PDDNI, the Act 
separated the leadership of the Intelligence Community from the 
leadership of the CIA. Although the Act explicitly provided for 
a Director of the CIA, it did not provide for a statutory 
deputy to the Director.
    Section 421 establishes the position of Deputy Director of 
the CIA. The Deputy Director will be appointed by the 
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, 
and will assist the Director of the CIA in carrying out the 
duties and responsibilities of that office. In the event of a 
vacancy in the position of Director of the CIA, or during the 
absence or disability of the Director, the Deputy Director will 
act for, and exercise the powers of, the Director. The DNI will 
recommend a nominee to the President to fill any vacancy in 
this position.
    With the amendments made by Section 421, the Presidential 
nomination of both the Director and Deputy Director of the CIA 
must be confirmed by the advice and consent of the Senate. 
Given the sensitive operations of the CIA, nominees for the 
positions of Director and Deputy Director of the CIA merit 
close scrutiny by Congress to examine the nominees' 
qualifications prior to their assumption of the duties of these 
offices. With respect to the Deputy Director of the CIA, the 
requirement for Senate confirmation also provides assurance 
that, in the event of a vacancy in the position of Director of 
the CIA, or during the absence or disability of the Director, 
Congress will have previously expressed its confidence in the 
ability of the nominee to assume those additional duties.
    Section 421 also requires that both the Director and Deputy 
Director of the CIA be appointed ``from civilian life.'' The 
considerations that encourage appointment of a military officer 
to the position of DNI or PDDNI do not apply to the leadership 
of the CIA. Indeed, given the CIA's establishment in 1947 as an 
independent civilian intelligence agency with no direct 
military or law enforcement responsibilities, the Committee 
does not believe that a similar construct of military 
leadership is appropriate at that agency. Accordingly, the 
Committeerecommends that both the Director and Deputy Director 
of the CIA should be appointed from civilian life. To preserve the 
important liaison relationship between the military and the CIA, the 
Committee recognizes the important role played by the Associate 
Director of the CIA for Military Support and continues to support the 
appointment of a current military officer to that position.
    Unlike the requirement that the Secretary of Defense be 
appointed ``from civilian life'' (see 10 U.S.C. 113(a)), 
Section 421 does not contain any limitation on how long a 
nominee must have been ``from civilian life'' prior to 
appointment. The only restriction is that an active duty 
officer must first retire or resign his or her commission and 
return to civilian life prior to being appointed as either the 
Director or Deputy Director of the CIA. Thus, the President 
retains the flexibility to nominate candidates with significant 
military experience for either or both positions.
    Given the nomination by the President of General Michael V. 
Hayden to serve as Director of the CIA, and this Committee's 
favorable reporting of that nomination to the full Senate, the 
Committee has included a provision that will make the 
requirement that the Director of the CIA be appointed ``from 
civilian life'' applicable to the nomination of the successor 
to the Director of the CIA in office on the date of enactment 
of this Act.
    With respect to the Deputy Director of the CIA, the 
Committee has also included a provision that will make the 
nomination and confirmation requirements of Section 421 
applicable to the successor to the individual administratively 
performing the duties of the Deputy Director of the CIA on the 
date of enactment of this Act. The prohibition on an active 
duty commissioned officer serving as the Deputy Director of the 
CIA and the requirement that the position be filled by a 
Presidential nominee confirmed by the Senate will not take 
effect until the earlier of the date the President nominates an 
individual to serve in such position or the date the individual 
presently performing the duties of that office leaves the post.
    To insulate an officer serving as the Director or Deputy 
Director of the CIA from undue military influence, Section 421 
provides that so long as the individual continues to perform 
the duties of the Director or Deputy Director of the CIA, he 
may continue to receive military pay and allowances, but he is 
not subject to the supervision or control of the Secretary of 
Defense or any of the military or civilian personnel of the 
DoD.

Section 422. Enhanced protection of Central Intelligence Agency 
        intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure

    Section 422 amends the National Security Act of 1947 to 
provide the Director of the CIA the authority to protect CIA 
intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure, 
consistent with any direction from the President or the DNI. 
Prior to the Intelligence Reform Act, the authority to protect 
intelligence sources and methods had been assigned to the DCI, 
as head of the Intelligence Community. The CIA relied on the 
DCI's sources and methods authority as the CIA's primary 
statutory basis for protecting a range of CIA information, 
including its human sources, from public or unauthorized 
disclosure in a wide range of contexts and proceedings. This 
authority proved critical for assuring current and potential 
human intelligence sources that CIA could, and would, keep the 
fact of their association with the United States government 
secret, whether in civil litigation, administrative 
proceedings, or other arenas. In Section 102A(i) of the 
National Security Act, as added by the Intelligence Reform Act, 
Congress transferred this DCI authority to the DNI.
    In the DNI's annual request to the Committee for 
legislative authorities during the fiscal year 2006 legislative 
cycle, the DNI asked that a provision similar to Section 422 be 
enacted to supplement the grant of authority to the DNI with a 
comparable grant to the Director of the CIA, subject to the 
direction of the President or DNI. It is intended to underscore 
for intelligence sources that the CIA has explicit statutory 
authority to protect its sources and methods. The revision to 
Section 104A(d) of the National Security Act of 1947 is not 
intended to, and does not, authorize the Director of the CIA to 
withhold from the DNI any CIA information to which the DNI is 
entitled by statute, Executive order, Presidential directive, 
or other applicable law or regulation.
    Section 422 also makes conforming changes to Section 6 of 
the CIA Act of 1949.

Section 423. Additional exception to foreign language proficiency 
        requirement for certain senior level positions in the Central 
        Intelligence Agency

    Section 423 modifies statutory provisions pertaining to 
foreign language proficiency for certain senior officials in 
the CIA. Currently, Section 104A(g) of the National Security 
Act of 1947 (Section 421 of the Committee's bill results in the 
re-designation of Section 104A(g) as 104A(h)) provides that an 
individual cannot be appointed to a position in the Senior 
Intelligence Service in the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence 
(DI) or Directorate of Operations (DO) (now the National 
Clandestine Service) unless the individual demonstrates at 
least a specified level of professional speaking and reading 
proficiency in a foreign language. Current law also grants the 
Director of the CIA limited authority to waive this requirement 
with respect to a position or class of positions with 
notification to the intelligence committees.
    Section 423 enhances CIA management flexibility by 
authorizing the Director of the CIA to waive the foreign 
language proficiency requirement, not just with respect to 
positions or categories of positions, but also as to individual 
officers or categories of individual officers--subject to the 
Director of the CIA's determination that such proficiency is 
not necessary for the successful performance of the duties and 
responsibilities involved. The section also adds a 
``grandfather'' clause to the language proficiency requirement, 
creating a transition period that will allow CIA leadership to 
more effectively manage the senior Agency workforce during a 
critical period of change. Section 423 also updates an outdated 
reference to the DO, now the ``National Clandestine Service.'' 
Finally, Section 423 makes appropriate conforming changes to 
the report on waivers currently required by Section 104A(g).
    The Committee expects the CIA to move forward in its 
commitment to enhance its overall language capabilities. The 
personnel flexibility granted by Section 423 will allow the 
Director of the CIA to better integrate requirements for 
language skills into leadership training, promotion,and 
retention decisions and to plan for the projected influx of new DI and 
National Clandestine Service officers.

Section 424. Additional functions and authorities for protective 
        personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency

    Section 424 amends Section 5(a)(4) of the CIA Act of 1949 
(50 U.S.C. 403f(a)(4)) which authorizes protective functions by 
designated security personnel who serve on CIA protective 
details.
            Arrest authority
    Section 424 authorizes protective detail personnel, when 
engaged in the performance of protective functions, to make 
arrests in two circumstances. Under this section, protective 
detail personnel may make arrests without a warrant for any 
offense against the United States--whether a felony, 
misdemeanor, or infraction--that is committed in their 
presence. They may also make arrests without a warrant if they 
have reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be 
arrested has committed or is committing a felony, but not other 
offenses, under the laws of the United States.
    Regulations, approved by the Director of the CIA and the 
Attorney General, will provide safeguards and procedures to 
ensure the proper exercise of this authority. The provision 
specifically does not grant any authority to serve civil 
process or to investigate crimes.
    By granting CIA protective detail personnel limited arrest 
authority, the provision mirrors statutes applicable to certain 
Federal law enforcement agencies that are authorized to perform 
protective functions. The authority provided under this section 
is consistent with those of other Federal elements with 
protective functions, such as the Secret Service (see 18 U.S.C. 
3056(c)(1)(c)), the State Department's Diplomatic Security 
Service (see 22 U.S.C. 2709(a)(5)), and the Capitol Police (see 
2 U.S.C. 1966(c)). Arrest authority will contribute 
significantly to the ability of CIA protective detail personnel 
to fulfill their responsibilities to protect officials against 
serious threats without being dependent on the response of 
Federal, State, or local law enforcement officers. The grant of 
arrest authority under this amendment is supplemental to all 
other authority that CIA protective detail personnel have by 
virtue of their statutory responsibility to perform the 
protective functions set forth in the CIA Act of 1949.
            Protection of personnel of the Office of the DNI
    Section 424 also authorizes the Director of the CIA, on 
request of the DNI, to make CIA protective detail personnel 
available to the DNI and to other personnel within the Office 
of the DNI. The DNI, in consultation with the Director of the 
CIA and the Attorney General, should advise the intelligence 
committees within 180 days of enactment of this Act on whether 
this arrangement meets the protective needs of the Office of 
the DNI or whether other statutory authority is needed.

Section 425. Director of National Intelligence report on retirement 
        benefits for former employees of Air America

    Section 425 provides for a report by the DNI on the 
advisability of providing federal retirement benefits to United 
States citizens who were employees of Air America or an 
associated company prior to 1977, during the time that the 
company was owned or controlled by the United States and 
operated by the CIA. There are bills in the Senate and House 
(S. 651 and H.R. 1276) that would provide federal retirement 
benefits for those employees. By including Section 425 in this 
authorization bill, the Committee takes no position on the 
merits of that legislation. The sole purpose of Section 425 is 
to direct the DNI to undertake a study about Air America, its 
relationship to the CIA, the missions it performed, and 
casualties its employees suffered, as well as the retirement 
benefits that had been contracted for, or promised to, the 
employees and what they received. The DNI shall make 
recommendations on the advisability of legislative action and 
include any views that the Director of the CIA may have on the 
matters covered by the report. On the request of the DNI, the 
Comptroller General shall assist in the preparation of the 
report in a manner consistent with the protection of classified 
information.

              Subtitle C--Defense Intelligence Components


Section 431. Enhancements of National Security Agency training program

    Section 16 of the NSA Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) 
authorizes the NSA to establish and maintain an undergraduate 
training program to facilitate the recruitment of individuals 
with skills critical to the NSA's mission. Under the program, 
the government has always had the right to recoup the 
educational costs expended for the benefit of employees whose 
employment with NSA is ``terminated''--either voluntarily by 
the employee or by the NSA for misconduct.
    Section 431 amends Section 16(d) of the NSA Act of 1959 to 
clarify that ``termination of employment'' includes situations 
in which employees fail to maintain satisfactory academic 
performance as defined by the Director of NSA. Such employees 
shall be in breach of their contractual agreement and, in lieu 
of any service obligation arising under such agreement, shall 
be liable for repayment. Failure to maintain satisfactory 
academic performance has always been grounds for default 
resulting in the right of the government to recoup the 
educational costs expended for the benefit of the defaulting 
employee. Thus, this provision is a clarification of that 
obligation.
    In addition, Section 431 permits the Director of NSA to 
protect intelligence sources and methods by deleting a 
requirement that the NSA publicly identify to educational 
institutions which students are NSA employees. Deletion of this 
disclosure requirement will enhance the ability of NSA to 
protect personnel and prospective personnel and to preserve the 
ability of training program participants to undertake future 
clandestine or other sensitive assignments for the Intelligence 
Community. The Committee recognizes that nondisclosure is 
appropriate when disclosure would threaten intelligence sources 
or methods, would endanger the life or safety of the student, 
or would limit the employee's or prospective employee's ability 
to perform intelligenceactivities in the future. Despite the 
deletion of the disclosure requirement, the Committee expects the NSA 
to continue to prohibit participants in the training program from 
engaging in any intelligence functions at the institutions they attend 
under the program. See H.R. Rep. 99-690, Part I (July 17, 1986) (``NSA 
employees attending an institution under the program will have no 
intelligence function whatever to perform at the institution.'').

Section 432. Codification of authorities of National Security Agency 
        protective personnel

    Section 432 amends the NSA Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) 
by adding a new Section 20, to clarify and enhance the 
authority of protective details for the NSA.
    New Section 20(a) would authorize the Director of the NSA 
to designate NSA personnel to perform protective detail 
functions for the Director and other personnel of the NSA who 
are designated from time to time by the Director of the NSA as 
requiring protection. Section 11 of the NSA Act of 1959 
presently provides that the Director of NSA may authorize 
agency personnel to perform certain security functions at NSA 
headquarters, at certain other facilities, and around the 
perimeter of those facilities. The new authority for protective 
details would enable the Director of the NSA to provide 
security when the Director or other designated personnel 
require security away from those facilities.
    New Section 20(b) would provide that NSA personnel, when 
performing protective detail functions, may exercise the same 
arrest authority that Section 424 provides for CIA protective 
detail personnel. The arrest authority for NSA protective 
detail personnel would be subject to guidelines approved by the 
Director of the NSA and the Attorney General. The purpose and 
extent of that arrest authority, and the limitations on it, are 
described in the section-by-section explanation for Section 
424. That analysis applies equally to the arrest authority 
provided to NSA protective detail personnel by Section 20(b).
    While this bill provides separately for authority for CIA 
and NSA protective details, the DNI should advise the 
intelligence committees whether overall policies, procedure, 
and authority should be provided for protective services, when 
necessary, for other elements or personnel (or their immediate 
families) of the Intelligence Community.

Section 433. Inspector general matters

    The Inspector General Act of 1978 (Pub. L. No. 95-452 (Oct. 
12, 1978)) established a government-wide system of Inspectors 
General, some appointed by the President with the advice and 
consent of the Senate and others ``administratively appointed'' 
by the heads of their respective Federal entities. These 
Inspectors General were authorized to ``conduct and supervise 
audits and investigations relating to the programs and 
operations'' of the government and ``to promote economy, 
efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of, and * * 
* to prevent and detect fraud and abuse in, such programs and 
operations.'' See 5 U.S.C. App. 2. These Inspectors General 
also perform an important reporting function, ``keeping the 
head of the establishment and the Congress fully and currently 
informed about problems and deficiencies relating to the 
administration of * * * programs and operations and the 
necessity for and progress of corrective action.'' Id. The 
investigative authorities exercised by Inspectors General, and 
their relative independence from the government operations they 
audit and investigate, provide an important mechanism to ensure 
that the operations of the government are conducted as 
efficiently and effectively as possible.
    The Inspectors General of the CIA and the Departments of 
Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, Justice, State, and 
Treasury are appointed by the President, with the advice and 
consent of the Senate. These Inspectors General--authorized by 
either the Inspectors General Act of 1978 or Section 17 of the 
CIA Act of 1949--enjoy a degree of independence from all but 
the head of their respective departments or agencies. These 
Inspectors General also have explicit statutory authority to 
access information from their respective departments or 
agencies or other United States government departments and 
agencies and may use subpoenas to access information (e.g., 
from a department or agency contractor) necessary for them to 
carry out their authorized functions.
    The NRO, DIA, NSA, and NGA have established their own 
``administrative'' Inspectors General. Because they are not 
identified in Section 8G of the Inspector General Act of 1978, 
however, these Inspectors General lack the explicit statutory 
authorization to access information relevant to their audits or 
investigations, or to compel the production of such information 
via subpoena. This lack of authority has impeded access to 
information--in particular, information from contractors--that 
is necessary for these Inspectors General to perform their 
important function. These Inspectors General also lack the 
indicia of independence necessary for the Government 
Accountability Office to recognize the annual financial 
statement audits of these Inspectors General as compliant with 
the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 (Pub. L. No. 101-576 
(Nov. 15, 1990)). This lack of independence also prevents the 
DoD Inspector General, and would prevent the Inspector General 
of the Intelligence Community, from relying on the results of 
NRO, DIA, NSA, or NGA Inspector General audits or 
investigations that must meet ``generally accepted government 
auditing standards.''
    To provide an additional level of independence and to 
ensure prompt access to the information necessary for these 
Inspectors General to perform their audits and investigations, 
Section 433 amends Section 8G(a)(2) of the Inspector General 
Act of 1978 to include the NRO, DIA, NSA, and NGA as 
``designated federal entities.'' As so designated, the heads of 
these Intelligence Community elements will be required by 
statute to administratively appoint Inspectors General for 
these agencies. As designated Inspectors General under the 
Inspector General Act of 1978, these Inspectors General will be 
responsible to the heads of the NRO, DIA, NSA, and NGA. The 
removal or transfer of these Inspectors General from their post 
by the heads of their respective office or agency must be 
promptly reported to the intelligence committees. These 
Inspectors General will also be able to exercise other 
investigative authorities, including those governing access to 
information and the issuance of subpoenas, utilized by other 
Inspectors General under the Inspector General Act of 1978.
    To protect vital national security interests, Section 433 
permits the DNI or the Secretary of Defense to prohibit the 
Inspectors General of the NRO, DIA, NSA, and NGA from 
initiating, carrying out, or completing any audit or 
investigation they are otherwise authorized to conduct. This 
authority-similar to the authority of the Director of the CIA 
under Section 17 of the CIA Act of 1949 with respect to the 
Inspector General of the CIA and the authority of the Secretary 
of Defense under Section 8 of the Inspector General Act of 1978 
with respect to the DoD Inspector General-provides the 
President, through the DNI or the Secretary of Defense, a 
mechanism to protect extremely sensitive intelligence sources 
and methods or other vital national security interests. The 
Committee expects that this authority will be exercised rarely 
by the DNI or the Secretary of Defense.

Section 434. Confirmation of appointment of heads of certain components 
        of the Intelligence Community

    Under present law and practice, the directors of the NSA, 
NGA, and NRO--each with a distinct and significant role in the 
national intelligence mission--are not confirmed by the Senate 
in relation to their leadership positions at these agencies. 
Presently, the President appoints the Directors of NSA and NGA, 
and the Secretary of Defense appoints the Director of the NRO. 
None of the appointments must be confirmed by the Senate, 
unless a military officer is promoted or transferred into the 
position. Under such circumstances, Senate confirmation of the 
officer's promotion or assignment to that position is the 
responsibility of the Committee on Armed Services. The review 
of the Committee on Armed Services, however, relates to the 
military promotion or assignment and not specifically to the 
assumption by the individual of the leadership of these 
critical Intelligence Community elements.
    Section 434 provides, expressly and uniformly, that the 
heads of each of these entities shall be nominated by the 
President and that such nominations will be confirmed by the 
advice and consent of the Senate. The NSA, NGA, and NRO play a 
critical role in the national intelligence mission of the 
United States government. The spending of these agencies 
comprises a significant portion of the entire intelligence 
budget of the United States, and a substantial portion of the 
National Intelligence Program. Through advice and consent, the 
Senate can enable the Congress to fulfill more completely its 
responsibility for providing oversight to the intelligence 
activities of the U.S. Government. Section 434 does not alter 
the role of the Committee on Armed Services in reviewing and 
approving the promotion or assignment of military officers.
    Section 434(b) provides that the amendments made by Section 
434 apply prospectively. Therefore, the Directors of NSA, NGA, 
and NRO as of the date of the enactment of this Act will not be 
affected by the amendments, which will apply initially to the 
appointment and confirmation of their successors.

Section 435. Clarification of national security missions of National 
        Geospatial-Intelligence Agency for analysis and dissemination 
        of certain intelligence information

    The National Imagery and Mapping Agency Act of 1996 (Pub. 
L. No. 104-201 (Sept. 23, 1996) (NIMA Act)) formally merged the 
imagery analysis and mapping efforts of the DoD and the CIA. In 
the NIMA Act, Congress cited a need ``to provide a single 
agency focus for the growing number and diverse types of 
customers for imagery and geospatial information resources 
within the Government * * * to harness, leverage, and focus 
rapid technological developments to serve the imagery, imagery 
intelligence, and geospatial information customers.'' See 
Section 1102(1) of the NIMA Act. Since then, there have been 
rapid developments in airborne and commercial imagery 
platforms, new imagery and geospatial phenomenology, full 
motion video, and geospatial analysis tools.
    Section 921 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2004 (Pub. L. No. 108-136 (Nov. 24, 2003)) changed 
the name of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency to the 
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. The name change was 
intended to introduce the term ``geospatial intelligence'' to 
better describe the unified activities of the NGA related to 
the ``analysis and visual representation of characteristics of 
the earth and activity on its surface.'' See S. Rep 108-46 (May 
13, 2003) (accompanying The National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2004, S. 1050, 108th Cong., 1st Sess.).
    Though the NGA has made significant progress toward 
unifying the traditional imagery analysis and mapping missions 
of the CIA and the DoD, it has been slow to embrace other 
facets of ``geospatial intelligence'' that have recently been 
enabled by advances in technology, including the processing, 
storage, and dissemination of full motion video (FMV) and 
ground-based photography. The NGA's current library of 
geospatial products reflects its heritage--predominantly 
overhead imagery and mapping products. While the NGA is 
beginning to incorporate more airborne and commercial imagery, 
its products are nearly devoid of FMV and ground-based 
photography.
    The Committee believes that these new products (including 
FMV and ground-based photography) should be included, with 
available positional data, in NGA libraries for retrieval on 
DoD and Intelligence Community networks. Current mission 
planners and military personnel are well-served with 
traditional imagery products and maps, but FMV of the route to 
and from a facility or photographs of what a facility would 
look like to a foot soldier--rather than from an aircraft--
would be of immense value to our military personnel and 
intelligence officers. Ground-based photography is amply 
available from open sources, as well as other government 
sources such as military units, U.S. embassy personnel, Defense 
AttachEs, Special Operations Forces, foreign allies, and 
clandestine officers. These products should be better 
incorporated into NGA data libraries.
    To address these concerns, Section 435 adds an additional 
national security mission to the responsibilities of the NGA. 
To fulfill this new mission, the NGA would be required, as 
directed by the DNI, to ``analyze, disseminate, and incorporate 
into the National System forGeospatial-Intelligence, 
likenesses, videos, or presentations produced by ground-based 
platforms, including handheld or clandestine photography taken by or on 
behalf of human intelligence collection organizations or available as 
open-source information.'' Section 435 also makes clear that this new 
responsibility ``does not include the authority to manage or direct the 
tasking of, set requirements and priorities for, set technical 
requirements related to, or modify any classification or dissemination 
limitations related to the collection of, handheld or clandestine 
photography taken by or on behalf or human intelligence collection 
organizations.'' Although Section 435 does not give the NGA direct 
authority to set technical requirements for the collection of 
``handheld or clandestine photography,'' the Committee encourages the 
NGA to engage Intelligence Community partners on these technical 
requirements to ensure that their output can be incorporated into the 
National System for Geospatial-Intelligence.
    Section 435 does not modify the definition of ``imagery'' 
found in Section 467(2)(A) of Title 10, United States Code, or 
alter any of the existing national security missions of the 
NGA. Section 435 stresses the merits of FMV and ground-based 
photography and clarifies that the NIMA Act's exclusion of 
``handheld or clandestine photography taken by or on behalf of 
human intelligence organizations'' from the definition of 
``imagery'' does not prevent the exploitation, dissemination, 
and archiving of that photography. In other words, the NGA 
would still not dictate how human intelligence agencies collect 
ground-based photography, have authority to modify the 
classification or dissemination limitations applicable to such 
photography, or manage collection requirements for such 
photography. Rather, the NGA should simply avail itself of this 
photography, regardless of the source, but within the security 
handling guidelines consistent with the photography's 
classification as determined by the collecting organization.

Section 436. Security clearances in the National Geospatial-
        Intelligence Agency

    Although the NSA and the NGA have much in common as 
technical intelligence agencies administratively linked with 
the DoD, their present authorities for handling security 
clearances differ significantly. The Secretary of Defense has 
delegated to the NSA authority for contracting out background 
investigations and performing adjudications on individuals 
doing work for the agency--both for government employees and 
contractors. In contrast, the NGA must rely on the Defense 
Security Service (DSS) or the Office of Personnel Management 
(OPM) for background investigations and on the DIA for 
adjudication. The consequences for processing times are 
dramatic, particularly regarding contractor clearances. 
According to information provided by the DNI's Special Security 
Center, the average end-to-end processing times for contractors 
in July 2005 was 73 days for NSA and 540 days for NGA. The NSA 
and the NGA processing times for contractors in the first 
quarter of fiscal year 2006 showed that this significant 
discrepancy is continuing. Moreover, the ability of the DSS to 
mitigate the problem suffered a setback on April 25, 2006, when 
the DSS temporarily suspended its acceptance of new contractor 
security clearance applications.
    The NGA's long backlog for contractor clearances is 
deleterious for both the agency and the contractors that 
support it. For the NGA, the backlog drives up financial costs 
and makes it more difficult to compete for talent. The backlog 
also distorts efficiencies and good business practices in the 
private sector, as contractors adjust to the realities of 
significantly different agency clearance timelines.
    The Committee calls upon the DNI to follow closely the 
progress made by the NGA in reducing processing times and to 
monitor the variation between the processing times of other 
intelligence agencies with similar requirements. The Committee 
anticipates that the arrangement created by Section 436 will be 
a temporary measure, pending the consistent attainment of 
reduced processing times by the OPM, the DIA, and the DSS.

                       Subtitle D--Other Elements


Section 441. Foreign language incentive for certain non-special agent 
        employees of the Federal Bureau of Investigation

    Section 441 authorizes the Director of the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI) to pay a cash award, up to 5 percent of 
basic pay, to any FBI employee who uses or maintains foreign 
language skills in support of FBI analyses, investigations, or 
operations to protect against international terrorism or 
clandestine intelligence activities. Such awards are subject to 
the joint guidance of the Attorney General and the DNI.
    The Committee believes that the guidance of the Attorney 
General and DNI should reward FBI employees who are using one 
or more foreign languages in the regular performance of their 
official duties or maintaining proficiency in an obscure 
language that is of occasional operational significance. An 
employee should not automatically receive a 5 percent award for 
proficiency in any language. An FBI employee working in support 
of the FBI's counterintelligence mission who is fluent in 
French, German, or Spanish should not be eligible for a foreign 
language incentive, unless that employee is using those 
language skills in the regular performance of his or her 
official duties. However, the joint guidance should recognize 
that there are certain languages of operational significance 
that are not used on a routine basis, but for which a 
significant incentive should be awarded to maintain the 
necessary proficiency so that the employee can use the skill 
for operational purposes when the need arises. Finally, the 
joint guidelines should also provide for enhanced language 
incentive awards for those employees who use multiple languages 
in the performance of their duties, provided that no language 
incentive award can exceed the cap of 5 percent of basic pay.

Section 442. Authority to secure services by contract for the Bureau of 
        Intelligence and Research of the Department of State

    Section 442 authorizes the Secretary of State, in certain 
circumstances, to enter into personal services contracts to 
support the mission of the Department's Bureau of Intelligence 
and Research (INR). The authority, which is similar to that 
provided to the DoD (see 10 U.S.C. 129b), will enable INR to 
obtain the services of personal services contractors to respond 
to unanticipated surge requirements prompted by emergent events 
or crises or under unique circumstances (e.g., to provide 
temporary backup that will permit full-time employees to 
seekneeded training). Personal services contractors, particularly those 
with previous INR experience, would also be valuable to train and 
mentor new INR personnel.

Section 443. Clarification of inclusion of Coast Guard and Drug 
        Enforcement Administration as elements of the Intelligence 
        Community

    Section 443 restores, with respect to the United States 
Coast Guard, the prior definition of ``intelligence community'' 
in the National Security Act of 1947 applicable to that 
service. See 50 U.S.C. 401a. Section 1073 of the Intelligence 
Reform Act modified the definition of ``intelligence 
community,'' inadvertently limiting the Coast Guard's inclusion 
in the Intelligence Community to the Office of Intelligence or 
those portions of the Coast Guard concerned with the analysis 
of intelligence. Section 444 clarifies that all of the Coast 
Guard's intelligence elements are included within the 
definition of ``intelligence community.''
    Section 443 also codifies the joint decision of the DNI and 
Attorney General to designate an office within the Drug 
Enforcement Administration as an element of the Intelligence 
Community.

Section 444. Clarifying amendments relating to Section 105 of the 
        Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004

    Section 444 clarifies that the establishment of the Office 
of Intelligence and Analysis within the Department of the 
Treasury (Section 105 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2004 (Pub. L. No. 108-177 (Dec. 13, 2003))), and 
its reorganization within the Office of Terrorism and Financial 
Intelligence (Section 222 of the Transportation, Treasury, 
Independent Agencies, and General Government Appropriations 
Act, 2005 (Division H, Pub. L. No. 108-447 (Dec. 8, 2004))), do 
not affect the authorities and responsibilities of the DNI with 
respect to the Office of Intelligence and Analysis as an 
element of the Intelligence Community.

                         TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS


Section 501. Technical amendments to the National Security Act of 1947

    Section 501 corrects several inadvertent technical 
anomalies in the National Security Act of 1947 arising from the 
amendments made to that Act by the Intelligence Reform Act.

Section 502. Technical clarification of certain references to Joint 
        Military Intelligence Program and Tactical Intelligence and 
        Related Activities

    Section 502 makes technical clarifications to Section 102A 
of the National Security Act of 1947 to preserve the 
participation of the DNI in the development of the annual 
budget for the Military Intelligence Program (MIP), the 
successor program of the Joint Military Intelligence Program 
and Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities. Section 502 
also preserves the requirement for consultation by the 
Secretary of the Defense with the DNI in the reprogramming or 
transfer of MIP funds.

Section 503. Technical amendments to the Intelligence Reform and 
        Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004

    Section 503 corrects a number of inadvertent technical 
errors in the specified sections of the Intelligence Reform 
Act.

Section 504. Technical amendments to Title 10, United States Code, 
        arising from enactment of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
        Prevention Act of 2004

    Section 504 corrects a number of inadvertent technical 
errors in Title 10, United States Code, arising from enactment 
of the Intelligence Reform Act.

Section 505. Technical amendment to the Central Intelligence Agency Act 
        of 1949

    Section 505 amends Section 5(a)(1) of the CIA Act of 1949 
by striking or updating outdated references to the National 
Security Act of 1947. The Intelligence Reform Act significantly 
restructured and renumbered multiple sections of the National 
Security Act of 1947, leaving references in Section 5(a)(1) of 
the CIA Act to provisions that no longer exist or that are no 
longer pertinent.

Section 506. Technical amendments relating to the multiyear National 
        Intelligence Program

    Section 506 updates the ``multiyear national foreign 
intelligence program'' provision to incorporate and reflect 
organizational and nomenclature changes made by the 
Intelligence Reform Act.

Section 507. Technical amendments to the Executive Schedule

    Section 507 makes several technical corrections to the 
Executive Schedule. This section substitutes the ``Director of 
the Central Intelligence Agency'' for the previous reference in 
Executive Schedule Level II to the ``Director of Central 
Intelligence.'' See 5 U.S.C. 5313. Section 507 also strikes 
outdated references to Deputy Directors of Central Intelligence 
from Executive Schedule Level III. See 5 U.S.C. 5314. The 
provision also corrects the erroneous reference to the 
``General Counsel to the National Intelligence Director'' in 
Executive Schedule Level IV. See 5 U.S.C. 5315.

Section 508. Technical amendments relating to redesignation of the 
        National Imagery and Mapping Agency as the National Geospatial-
        Intelligence Agency

    Section 508 makes several technical and conforming changes 
to existing law to bring these provisions in line with the 
change in name of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency to 
theNGA, as provided for in Section 921(b) of the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Pub. L. No. 108-136 
(Nov. 24, 2003)).

                           COMMITTEE COMMENTS

Information access: ``Data-level'' information

    Since September 11, 2001, information sharing at the level 
of finished intelligence reporting has improved greatly within 
the Intelligence Community. Intelligence Community officers are 
sensitized to the need to notify others whenever potentially 
significant information comes to their attention. 
Communications and liaison among agencies are also much 
improved.
    Despite these much needed advances, the Committee is 
concerned that information access at the ``raw'' or ``data 
level''--where information has not yet been evaluated or 
minimized to protect U.S. person information--continues to lag 
behind Committee expectations. This ``raw'' or ``data-level'' 
information includes everything from ``raw'' intelligence 
(e.g., operational details in a human intelligence report) to 
partly processed and analyzed information (e.g., metadata, 
stored text, stored cable traffic, translated and transcribed 
audio files). ``Connecting the dots'' is only possible if 
appropriately cleared analysts, with a ``need-to-know,'' have 
access to those ``dots.'' Finished reporting often fails to 
contain all information relevant to a particular topic or issue 
of importance to an analyst or collection officer. These 
oversights are not surprising; the perspective of a reports 
officer is often quite different than that of an analyst or 
collection officer who may be interested in different pieces of 
information relevant to their target. In other words, data that 
may seem insignificant or unimportant to a reports officer may 
fill in a missing puzzle piece for an analyst or expose a 
critical weakness for a collection officer to exploit. For that 
reason, this Committee has continued to support greater ``raw'' 
or ``data-level'' access.
    Agencies and organizations often resist providing access to 
``raw'' or ``data-level'' information on security or privacy 
grounds--concerns that are significantly mitigated when those 
with access are appropriately cleared, have an established 
``need-to-know,'' and are bound by control mechanisms to ensure 
appropriate protections for security and privacy. The Committee 
has also found, however, that a misplaced sense of 
``ownership'' by the collecting agency often inhibits 
information access programs.
    To begin addressing concerns with ``data-level'' access, 
Section 317 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2004 (Pub. L. No. 108-177 (Dec. 13, 2003)) mandated that 
the DCI and Secretary of Defense establish a pilot program to 
assess the ``feasibility and advisability of permitting 
intelligence analysts of various elements of the intelligence 
community to access and analyze intelligence from the databases 
of other elements of the intelligence community.'' To implement 
this provision, a pilot program was established that granted 
the DIA Joint Intelligence Task Force--Combating Terrorism 
(JITF-CT) access to signals intelligence information in NSA 
databases. The NSA/DIA pilot program ran for approximately one 
year, ending in February 2005. According to reports from both 
agencies, the pilot successfully established the value of 
sharing ``data-level'' information, the feasibility of non-NSA 
analysts gaining access to ``raw'' signals intelligence, and 
the means and procedures necessary to protect privacy in the 
process.
    Although the database access and liaison relationships 
formed during the pilot program have been sustained at NSA and 
DIA, the Committee is concerned that database access has not 
been expanded, despite an ardent desire on the part of the 
JITF-CT. The Committee is also concerned that negotiations on a 
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) designed to extend NSA database 
access to other DIA analysts outside of the JITF-CT have not 
been completed, despite a year of negotiations on the topic.
    The Committee directs the NSA and the DIA to complete 
negotiations on the MOA by the end of August 2006. The 
Committee strongly encourages the direct involvement of the 
Office of the DNI in these negotiations. If disputes cannot be 
resolved by the NSA and the DIA directly, the DNI must exercise 
his responsibility ``to ensure maximum availability of and 
access to intelligence information within the intelligence 
community.'' See Section 102A(g) of the National Security Act 
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1(g)). If the MOA is not finished by 
this deadline, the Committee will seek stronger measures in 
conference with the House on the Intelligence Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2007 to ensure timely completion.
    Once completed, this MOA should be posted on Intelink, and 
the NSA and DIA should also post a generic set of procedures, 
derived from the MOA and their experience with the pilot 
program, to inform other interested intelligence organizations 
of the requirements for access to NSA and DIA data. The DNI 
should establish a process for reviewing and approving access 
to other Intelligence Community databases based on the model 
provided by the NSA/DIA MOA. If other Intelligence Community 
elements have a demonstrated need for access to information, 
they should work with the DNI, or his designee within the 
Office of the DNI, to draft similar information access MOAs. 
The DNI should process all requests for database access and, in 
a timely manner, inform requesting organizations of the 
decision of the Office of the DNI, provide an explanation of 
the bases for any rejections, and establish a mechanism to 
appeal access denials.
    Finally, the Committee directs the CIO of the Intelligence 
Community, the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for 
Analysis, the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for 
Customer Outcomes, and the Program Manager for the Information 
Sharing Environment to carefully examine proposals to 
standardize interfaces among NSA legacy databases. These 
databases were typically designed with a unique interface. 
These unique interfaces have inhibited the development and 
application of advanced analytic tools at the NSA. If a 
standard interface can be developed and advanced analytic tools 
made available to NSA analysts, these same analytic tools can 
be made available to other Intelligence Community elements with 
a demonstrated need to access NSA ``data-level'' information. A 
standardized approach to database interface could also be 
applied to other Intelligence Community databases. Properly 
designed and implemented, this technology could allow cross-
agency ``federated queries,'' broader database access for 
analysts, and much greater ease of access to important 
intelligence information.

Information access: Communities of interest

    The NSA/DIA pilot program on information sharing--and other 
information access activities throughout the Intelligence 
Community--introduced an additional concept to help support 
information access: sharing information freely among analysts 
from different agencies and disciplines who are assigned to a 
common mission, which establishes their ``need to know'' and 
forms the basis for close collaboration, virtually or through 
physical co-location. For ease of reference, this concept can 
be summarized as full and equal access within a ``community of 
interest.'' This ``community of interest'' would operate by 
providing ``raw'' or ``data-level'' access to intelligence 
analysts and collection managers working on common missions 
across agencies and disciplines and by co-locating these 
analysts and collectors. Experts in single disciplines would 
help all-source analysts and collection managers understand and 
interpret the information they access.
    Evaluation of the NSA/DIA pilot program led DIA to conclude 
that there would be tremendous value in organizing 
``communities of interest'' with equal access to all relevant 
data ``at the first point of usability.'' Having experts on 
hand from each discipline would help all-source analysts better 
understand the information provided by the collection agencies, 
and all-source analysts would help the analysts from the 
collection agencies understand context and requirements.
    The Committee strongly encourages the creation of 
``communities of interest'' organized in this way. These 
``communities of interest'' would not be a substitute for broad 
information access programs, but a mechanism for deriving the 
full benefit from such programs. The Committee directs the DNI, 
in collaboration with the Directors of NSA, CIA, DIA, and NGA, 
to develop a pilot program to permit all-source analysts from 
across the Intelligence Community to work directly with experts 
from the intelligence collection disciplines (human, signal, 
imagery, and open source intelligence). The pilot program 
should be conducted on a non-terrorism related, high-priority 
intelligence target. The collaboration can be achieved by co-
location or by virtual collaboration. The assigned analysts 
should have common access to all data relevant to the 
designated target from across the collection disciplines. The 
pilot program should be initiated by January 1, 2007, and 
should continue for at least one year. Following completion of 
the pilot program, the DNI should report back to the 
intelligence committees concerning any findings or 
recommendations relevant to the pilot program, including any 
recommendations for further legislation or funding to further 
promote information access.

Report on the creation of an Intelligence Community reserve account

    Since its creation, the CIA has utilized a ``reserve for 
contingencies'' that permitted the DCI (now, the Director of 
the CIA) to transfer funds, with appropriate notification to 
Congress, to address significant intelligence needs that arise 
during a fiscal year and that must be addressed outside the 
normal budget process. The CIA Reserve has proven crucial in 
permitting the flexibility required to address operational 
realities as they arise.
    As the Committee continues to examine the budgetary and 
management authorities of the DNI, it may be appropriate to 
provide the DNI with a ``reserve for contingencies'' for use 
across the Intelligence Community to address emergency needs or 
operational exigencies. Any grant of authority would require 
legislative action outlining specific limitations on use, 
requirements for notification to the intelligence committees, 
and strong control by the DNI. Under extremely limited 
circumstances and with prior notification to Congress, it may 
also be appropriate to permit the DNI to transfer certain 
limited categories of funds to this reserve account for use 
without fiscal year limitation. The flexibility of a reserve 
and the ability to transfer funds to a reserve for later use 
would require a strong commitment from the DNI to eliminate 
waste in budget requests and to fully comply with the 
requirement to produce independent cost estimates for major 
systems, as required by Section 506A of the National Security 
Act of 1947. In addition, the DNI would need to closely examine 
how the reserve account is used so that excessive balances were 
not maintained in the account over extended periods of time.
    To aid the Committee as it considers possible legislative 
action on this topic, the Committee directs the DNI to provide 
a report to the intelligence committees within 90 days of 
release of this Report concerning the possible creation of a 
``reserve for contingencies'' for the Intelligence Community 
and whether the reserve would provide needed budgetary and 
operational flexibility. The DNI should also report to the 
intelligence committees regarding the management of existing 
reserve accounts, including steps the Office of the DNI will 
take to ensure that excessive balances are not maintained in 
these reserves for extended periods. The DNI should also 
provide any additional information deemed appropriate related 
to this topic, including any specific recommendations regarding 
the creation or construction of a ``reserve for contingencies'' 
for the Intelligence Community or other authorities needed to 
provide needed budgetary flexibility.

Central Intelligence Agency non-official cover operations

    The Committee remains concerned that the CIA has not yet 
fully addressed concerns about the use of non-official cover 
(NOC): operational security for NOC officers, support for NOC 
operations, and the extent to which the National Clandestine 
Service is committed to doing what is needed to ensure that NOC 
operations are successful. The Committee is also concerned with 
the training and use of NOC officer candidates and the overuse 
of certain NOC cover vehicles, at the expense of investing time 
and resources in creating new and innovative methodologies.
    The Committee therefore directs that the CIA provide a 
classified report by December 31, 2006, providing details on 
the status of their non-official operations initiatives, 
including the use of NOC officers and non-official platforms; 
steps taken by the CIA to ensure operational security for NOC 
officers; an assessment of the emerging threats posed by 
technological developments to NOC operations; and the steps 
that the CIA has taken to expand the non-official methodologies 
available for operational use. The report should also highlight 
areas that need improvement and offer recommendations for any 
legislative or resource initiatives that would enhance human 
intelligence collection and covert action through the use of 
NOC operations.

Intelligence Community personnel growth

    Shortly after September 11, 2001, the Intelligence 
Community began an aggressive campaign to recruit and hire both 
government and contractor personnel to support the war on 
terrorism. According to the Administration's current 
projections, the number of Intelligence Community personnel 
will continue to increase at a steady pace over the next 
several years. In February 2005, the Committee initiated an 
audit to examine the full scope of activities and resources 
necessary to support the Administration's proposed personnel 
growth, as well as the underlying requirements and projected 
mission impact. The results of the audit indicate that the 
Intelligence Community faces significant challenges 
implementing the proposed growth.
    The Committee is concerned that the up-front processes 
necessary to support personnel growth, including recruiting, 
screening, hiring, and training programs are already 
overburdened and that additional new employees could cripple 
the system. As more seasoned employees retire and new employees 
enter the workforce, the Intelligence Community will also face 
significant challenges finding sufficiently experienced 
officers to mentor and manage these new hires. Even at current 
personnel levels, the Intelligence Community has indicated that 
it lacks adequate secure space for cleared employees. Despite 
proposed growth, the Intelligence Community has been unable to 
quantify the facility requirements associated with new hires. 
Despite the plainly obvious lack of preparedness, the 
Intelligence Community continues to implement the hiring 
process associated with the proposed growth.
    The Committee is also concerned that the full scope of the 
proposed personnel growth is ill defined. There are no specific 
documented requirements for the additional personnel. Indeed, 
the generic ``more is better'' argument appears to be the 
driving force behind the proposals. The Intelligence Community 
also cannot quantify future contractor requirements and is 
unable to determine whether the number of contractors will 
increase or decrease as more personnel are hired. The Committee 
has seen no metrics that would link the additional proposed 
personnel to improvements in the Intelligence Community's 
ability to detect, predict, analyze, and counter current and 
future threats to the United States.
    Given the identified deficiencies associated with the 
proposed personnel growth and the significant funding problems 
already facing the Intelligence Community, the Committee is 
concerned that the Administration's proposal may not be 
achievable. Due to the significant funding requirements 
projected from fiscal year 2007 through fiscal year 2011, the 
proposed personnel growth will rival, if not surpass, the costs 
associated with a major system acquisition. As with any other 
major and costly acquisition program, the Intelligence 
Community must take immediate steps to define the mission 
needs, relate those mission needs to specific, validated 
requirements, and provide detailed plans for funding the 
proposed growth. To address the aforementioned concerns, the 
Committee is fencing funds related to such growth and directs 
the DNI to provide a comprehensive personnel growth strategy, 
as outlined in the classified annex.

Intelligence Community document and media exploitation audit

    The Committee, through its Audit and Evaluation Staff, is 
currently reviewing the Intelligence Community's document and 
media exploitation (DOCEX) activities. The Committee is 
concerned that current DOCEX activities are uncoordinated and 
that too many disparate efforts exist, with little transparency 
among Intelligence Community elements. The Committee is 
encouraged by the broader role for the National Media 
Exploitation Center (NMEC) outlined in a December 2005 letter 
from the PDDNI to the Director of the DIA concerning 
Intelligence Community centers. Indeed, the Committee believes 
that the NMEC should serve to integrate all of the Intelligence 
Community's DOCEX elements, not merely those of the DIA. 
Without Intelligence Community-wide leadership on this issue, 
there will be unnecessary duplication of effort and 
insufficient access to information obtained by, or through, 
DOCEX activities.
    The Committee is also concerned about several funding 
issues. Funding for DOCEX activities currently resides in 
several different budget accounts. This segregation makes it 
exceedingly difficult to assess aggregate Intelligence 
Community DOCEX expenditures and to coordinate Intelligence 
Community investment strategies. There also appears to be 
significant redundancy in the funding of translation tools, 
technology, and research and development initiatives. 
Intelligence Community elements have also failed to leverage 
existing technology and translation capabilities to improve 
DOCEX activities. Based on these redundant capabilities and 
inability to leverage existing capabilities, the Intelligence 
Community appears to be funding duplicative technology 
development efforts.
    The Committee believes that current efforts to provide 
access to information derived by, or through, DOCEX activities 
are inadequate. Unless this information is readily accessible 
to the intelligence collectors and analysts who need it, these 
DOCEX efforts will be largely fruitless. For example, the 
HARMONY database is intended to be the Intelligence Community's 
centralized national repository for foreign military, 
technical, and open-source documents, including documents and 
media captured or collected to support the global war on 
terrorism and Operation Iraqi Freedom. While HARMONY is 
accessible to most intelligence officers, it is not widely used 
outside the DoD. Moreover, some Intelligence Community elements 
maintain their own, separate DOCEX databases, limiting access 
to only employees of that element. The Committee also notes, 
with concern, that a significant amount of intelligence 
information from documents and media is never posted to HARMONY 
because the Intelligence Community lacks standards for what 
constitutes a ``document exploitation'' activity or any common 
processes to ensure proper dissemination of the information. 
The Committee believes that documents and media that do not 
constitute sensitive information should be accessible 
throughout the Intelligence Community via a single database 
that truly functions as a national repository for DOCEX. 
Regardless of the manner in which documents and media are 
acquired--whether discovered in a cave in Afghanistan, captured 
during a raid in Iraq, or collected through human intelligence 
operations--the Committee believes that such information should 
be governed by standardized rules for DOCEX and that the 
information contained in the documents and media should be 
accessible to appropriately cleared officers with a ``need-to-
know.''
    To address the identified DOCEX concerns, the Committee 
encourages the DNI to appoint a program manager for National 
Intelligence Program DOCEX efforts. The DNI should also develop 
a national DOCEX strategy. The strategy should include clear 
``lanes in the road'' that delineate responsibilities for DOCEX 
activities; preclude duplication of effort; institute 
Community-wide DOCEX standards and procedures; establish a 
single, common DOCEX database; and provide for an aggregate 
annual budget for all National Intelligence Program-funded 
DOCEX activities. To ensure the expeditious completion of a 
national DOCEX strategy, the Committee has fenced DOCEX-related 
funds as outlined in the classified annex.
    The Committee also believes that the DNI should form a 
DOCEX technology investments board to guide and develop a 
coordinated, Community-wide research and development strategy. 
The DOCEX technology investments board should include 
representatives from the offices of the CIO of the Intelligence 
Community, the Director of Science and Technology, the Deputy 
Director of National Intelligence for Analysis, and 
representatives from other DOCEX stakeholders. The Director of 
NMEC should chair the board. The board should assist the DNI in 
managing investments in DOCEX research and development to 
alleviate redundant proposals for future technologies. The 
board should also work to ensure existing DOCEX capabilities 
are appropriately shared and that redundant capabilities are 
eliminated.
    With respect to non-National Intelligence Program DOCEX 
activities, the DNI must engage the Secretary of Defense to 
coordinate and deconflict the activities of the Intelligence 
Community and DoD, whether such activities are funded by the 
Military Intelligence Program or otherwise. Such coordination 
should include coordination of research and development for 
technology related to DOCEX activities.
    Finally, the Committee is impressed with the language 
expertise resident at the Combined Media Processing Center in 
Doha, Qatar, and believes that maintaining this capability in 
the future could address some of the critical shortages in 
language-proficient intelligence officers. The Committee 
encourages the DNI to seek ways to retain this vital resource 
once the current surge in processing documents from Operation 
Iraqi Freedom ceases.

All-source intelligence analysis by the National Geospatial-
        Intelligence Agency

    The Committee continues to question the NGA's production of 
all-source intelligence. The NGA will be challenged in the 
foreseeable future to master new geospatial phenomena, to 
provide geospatial intelligence support to its growing customer 
base, and to exploit the increasing volumes of geospatial data 
being collected by airborne and commercial platforms. These are 
sufficient challenges for the NGA's analytic cadre without the 
diversion of effort to all-source intelligence analysis.
    Geospatial intelligence, like signals and human 
intelligence, is a singular intelligence discipline which, when 
combined with all other sources of information, forms a basis 
for all-source intelligence products. The Intelligence 
Community already consists of a number of all-source 
intelligence elements: the CIA; the DIA; the State Department's 
INR; national intelligence centers such as the NCTC and NCPC; 
intelligence elements of the Departments of Homeland Security, 
Energy, and Treasury; the FBI's National Security Branch; the 
armed services' science and technology centers, such as NASIC, 
MSIC, and the Office of Naval Intelligence; the Combatant 
Command Joint Intelligence Centers; and hundreds of 
intelligence staffs in joint task forces, combined task forces, 
and tactical units. The NGA is the single entity tasked to 
provide geospatial intelligence support to all of these all-
source entities. The NGA should focus on providing geospatial-
intelligence support to these entities rather than duplicating 
their all-source analytic missions.
    Analysts at the NGA are by no measure simple photographic 
interpreters. Their expertise in certain areas is well known. 
They should, and do, access all-source information to help 
focus their imagery exploitation and to facilitate 
collaboration with their Intelligence Community partners. They 
should not, however, let that all-source information, or the 
tendency to develop independent assessments, influence their 
interpretation of imagery signatures, as apparently occurred 
during interpretations of otherwise ambiguous signatures at 
suspected Iraqi WMD facilities.
    The intended consolidation of NGA facilities into a single 
campus may have an unintended consequence of encouraging a ``go 
it alone'' mentality within the NGA. NGA must avoid the 
temptation to develop assessments independent of their all-
source intelligence customers. By permitting ``mission creep'' 
from geospatial-intelligence analysis to all-source 
intelligence analysis, the NGA leadership has failed to heed a 
cautionary note sounded in Section 1111(d) of the NIMA Act of 
1996, which states, ``In managing the establishment of [the 
NIMA], the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the 
Director of Central Intelligence, shall ensure that imagery 
intelligence support provided to all-source analysis and 
production is in no way degraded or compromised.''
    The Committee will remain watchful of this issue and urges 
the DNI to provide appropriate guidance to the NGA to ensure 
the most efficient use of the NGA's skilled workforce, while 
not duplicating all-source intelligence efforts throughout the 
Intelligence Community or diluting the geospatial-intelligence 
support provided by the NGA to those same entities.

Intelligence Community financial management

    The Committee is concerned about the overall lack of sound 
financial management within the Intelligence Community. Despite 
significant increases in funding for national intelligence 
activities over the last five years, the state of the 
Intelligence Community's finances has not improved. Funding for 
major system acquisitions and major policy initiatives is 
realigned each year to compensate for programmatic content in 
excess of programmed fiscal resources. The Committee is 
concerned that the Intelligence Community has failed to fund 
several major system acquisitions to the level identified in 
the independent cost estimate applicable to such acquisition. 
Indeed, the Committee is concerned that many independent cost 
estimates are prepared by the element responsible for the 
proposed acquisition, and merely adopted by the Intelligence 
Community Cost Analysis and Improvement Group.
    In addition to the lack of sound programmatic judgment, the 
Committee is concerned that the CIA, NSA, NGA, DIA, NRO, and 
the Office of the DNI are unable to produce auditable financial 
statements, and are therefore unable to verify to the Committee 
how they are spending their appropriated funds. These same 
institutions are developing unique, customized financial 
management software systems, and the DNI currently does not 
have a plan to integrate or consolidate any of these systems. 
These problems are compounded by the development of unique 
budget formulation systems. Finally, because personnel are 
transferred in and out of the financial discipline every two or 
three years, the Intelligence Community is unable to retain a 
cadre of experienced financial professionals.
    To address these issues, the Committee directs the DNI and 
the Director of OMB to develop a plan to transform Intelligence 
Community financial management. Specifically, the Committee 
directs the DNI and Director of OMB to submit a strategic plan 
that outlines how the existing systems of CIA, NSA, NGA, DIA, 
NRO, and the Office of the DNI will be used, upgraded or 
replaced, and subsequently integrated in a single financial 
management system. The plan should identify the associated 
system acquisitions, deployment schedule, agency roles and 
responsibilities, key steps and milestones, resource 
requirements (both financial- and personnel-related), and 
performance measures. The plan should address all steps 
necessary to produce a single, consolidated financial statement 
for the National Intelligence Program for fiscal year 2009. The 
plan should address the development of a common accounting code 
and standard business processes for the Intelligence Community. 
The plan should leverage costs already incurred to develop 
budget formulation systems, such as IRIS, to ensure that the 
financial management and budget formulation systems can 
seamlessly integrate data. Finally, the Committee directs the 
above mentioned plan to include a comprehensive financial 
management human resources policy that outlines how financial 
expertise can be strengthened in each Intelligence Community 
element. To ensure the expeditious completion of this plan, the 
Committee has fenced certain funding as outlined in the 
classified annex.

Department of Energy counterintelligence

    On March 9, 2006, the Deputy Secretary of Energy approved 
the consolidation of the Office of Intelligence and Office of 
Counterintelligence under the leadership of the Department's 
Senior Intelligence Officer. The name of the new organization 
is the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence. The 
Office of the DNI concurred in the appointment of one 
individual to serve as both the Director of the Office of 
Intelligence and as the Director of the Office of 
Counterintelligence. The Committee did not receive advance 
notice of this reorganization, although it appears to have been 
a significant anticipated intelligence activity for which the 
Committee should have received prior notice in accordance with 
Section 502 of the National Security Act (50 U.S.C. 413a).
    The Committee recognizes the authority of the Secretary of 
the Energy, under current law (42 U.S.C. 7253), to consolidate 
organizational units or components within the Department as he 
may deem necessary or appropriate. Such reorganization 
authority, however, does not ``extend to the abolition of 
organizational units or components established by this chapter, 
or to the transfer of functions vested by this chapter in any 
organizational unit or component.'' See 42 U.S.C. 7253(a). The 
Committee considers it an open question whether this 
reorganization amounts to a ``transfer of functions'' vested 
separately in the Department's Office of Intelligence and 
Office of Counterintelligence. Current law arguably requires a 
separate Office of Intelligence and Office of 
Counterintelligence, each with a director who reports directly 
to the Secretary of Energy. See 42 U.S.C. 7144b & 7144c. 
Presumably, the Senior Intelligence Officer will assume the 
responsibilities for establishing Departmental policy for 
counterintelligence programs and activities. If this amounts to 
a ``transfer of function'' from the Office of 
Counterintelligence or the Office of Intelligence to a new 
layer of bureaucracy within the Office of Intelligence and 
Counterintelligence, then the Deputy Secretary's consolidation 
effort is arguably inconsistent with current law. See 42 U.S.C. 
7253.
    Another troubling aspect of this reorganization is its 
inconsistency with Presidential Decision Directive 61 (PDD-61), 
which requires that: (1) the Office of Counterintelligence and 
Office of Intelligence be established as two separate 
independent offices reporting directly to the Secretary of 
Energy; (2) the Director of the Office of Counterintelligence 
be a senior executive from the FBI; and (3) the Director of the 
Office of Counterintelligence have direct access to the 
Secretary of Energy, the DNI, and the Director of the FBI. See 
White House Fact Sheet, U.S. Department of energy 
Counterintelligence Program Presidential Decision Directive 61. 
It is the Committee's understanding that PDD-61 has not been 
rescinded. Under the current reorganization, the offices are no 
longer separate and independent. Also, the current Senior 
Intelligence Officer, who is now serving as both the Director 
for the Office of Intelligence and the Office of 
Counterintelligence, is not a senior executive from the FBI.
    It is uncertain whether the ``synergies'' obtained as a 
result of this consolidation will justify the added layer of 
bureaucracy. The Committee believes that the policies behind 
the current statutes and PDD-61 still strike the right balance 
for the Department of Energy (DoE). They provide a mechanism to 
ensure that counterintelligence concerns have an independent 
advocate within the DoE and to provide the Secretary of Energy 
with immediate access to the perspective of a senior FBI 
counterintelligence executive with respect to DoE 
counterintelligence threats. The Committee is concerned that 
the current reorganization effort may undermine these important 
policy considerations and constitute a return to past failed 
practices. The Committee will continue to monitor this 
reorganization effort and expects to be briefed in advance of 
further developments.

Support to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States

    Recent high profile foreign acquisitions of United States 
firms have highlighted the important role the Intelligence 
Community plays in supporting the government review of these 
transactions. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United 
States (CFIUS) relies on various elements of the Intelligence 
Community to assess risks associated with any such acquisition. 
The Committee understands that the Office of the DNI has taken 
steps to better coordinate the preparation of these risk 
assessments and other support to CFIUS. The Committee strongly 
endorses the DNI's effort.
    The Intelligence Community risk assessments must be 
conducted and finalized quickly in order to comply with the 
short time frames provided under the CFIUS review process. With 
the volume of CFIUS filings increasing that pressure is even 
greater. The Committee adopted an amendment offered by Senators 
Rockefeller and Wyden to the Classified Annex to this Report to 
provide additional resources to enable the Office of the DNI to 
carry out this mission.

                            COMMITTEE ACTION

Motion to close

    On May 23, 2006, on the motion of Chairman Roberts, the 
Committee agreed, by voice vote, to close the markup because 
matters under consideration at the meeting would require the 
discussion of information necessary to be kept secret in the 
interests of national defense or the confidential conduct of 
the foreign relations of the United States.

Motion to report committee bill favorably subject to amendments

    On May 23, 2006, on the motion of Senator Bond, by a vote 
of 15 ayes and 0 noes, the Committee voted to report the bill 
favorably, subject to amendment. The votes in person or by 
proxy were as follows: Chairman Roberts--aye; Senator Hatch--
aye; Senator DeWine--aye; Senator Bond--aye; Senator Lott--aye; 
Senator Snowe--aye; Senator Hagel--aye; Senator Chambliss--aye; 
Vice Chairman Rockefeller--aye; Senator Levin--aye; Senator 
Feinstein--aye; Senator Wyden--aye; Senator Bayh--aye; Senator 
Mikulski--aye; Senator Feingold--aye.

Amendments to committee bill

    On May 23, 2006, by a vote of 9 ayes and 6 noes, the 
Committee agreed to an amendment by Senator Feinstein to modify 
certain requirements for notifications to Congress under 
Sections 502 and 503 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
U.S.C. 413a & 413b) and to place an additional limitation on 
the availability of funds for intelligence and intelligence-
related activities under Section 504 of the National Security 
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414). See Sections 304 and 307 of the 
Act. The votes in person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman 
Roberts--no; Senator Hatch--no; Senator DeWine--no; Senator 
Bond--no; Senator Lott--no; Senator Snowe--aye; Senator Hagel--
aye; Senator Chambliss--no; Vice Chairman Rockefeller--aye; 
Senator Levin--aye; Senator Feinstein--aye; Senator Wyden--aye; 
Senator Bayh--aye; Senator Mikulski--aye; Senator Feingold--
aye.
    On May 23, 2006, by unanimous consent, the Committee agreed 
to an amendment by Senator Mikulski requiring the Secretary of 
Defense to delegate certain security clearance responsibilities 
to the Director of the NGA until December 31, 2007. See Section 
436 of the Act.
    On May 23, 2006, by a vote of 9 ayes and 6 noes, the 
Committee agreed to an amendment by Senator Levin to require a 
report by the DNI on compliance by the Intelligence Community 
with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (Pub. L. No. 109-148, 
Div. A, Title X (Dec. 30, 2005)). See Section 313 of the Act. 
The votes in person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman 
Roberts--no; Senator Hatch--no; Senator DeWine--no; Senator 
Bond--no; Senator Lott--no; Senator Snowe--aye; Senator Hagel--
aye; Senator Chambliss--no; Vice Chairman Rockefeller--aye; 
Senator Levin--aye; Senator Feinstein--aye; Senator Wyden--aye; 
Senator Bayh--aye; Senator Mikulski--aye; Senator Feingold--
aye.
    On May 23, 2006, by a vote of 9 ayes and 6 noes, the 
Committee agreed to an amendment by Senator Wyden to increase 
the penalties applicable to certain violations of Section 601 
of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 421), relating 
to the unauthorized disclosure of the identity of a covert 
agent. See Section 308 of the Act. The votes in person or by 
proxy were as follows: Chairman Roberts--no; Senator Hatch--no; 
Senator DeWine--no; Senator Bond--no; Senator Lott--no; Senator 
Snowe--aye; Senator Hagel--aye; Senator Chambliss--no; Vice 
Chairman Rockefeller--aye; Senator Levin--aye; Senator 
Feinstein--aye; Senator Wyden--aye; Senator Bayh--aye; Senator 
Mikulski--aye; Senator Feingold--aye.
    On May 23, 2006, by a vote of 8 ayes and 7 noes, the 
Committee agreed to an amendment by Senator Levin (for himself 
and Senator Hagel) that would require certain officials to 
provide to Congress requested intelligence documents and 
information within 15 days, unless the President refuses to 
provide the documents or information based on an assertion of a 
privilege pursuant to the Constitution. See Section 108 of the 
Act. The votes in person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman 
Roberts--no; Senator Hatch--no; Senator DeWine--no; Senator 
Bond--no; Senator Lott--no; Senator Snowe--no; Senator Hagel--
aye; Senator Chambliss--no; Vice Chairman Rockefeller--aye; 
Senator Levin--aye; Senator Feinstein--aye; Senator Wyden--aye; 
Senator Bayh--aye; Senator Mikulski--aye; Senator Feingold--
aye.
    On May 23, 2006, by a vote of 9 ayes and 6 noes, the 
Committee agreed to an amendment by Senator Levin to require 
the DNI to submit a classified, detailed report to the Members 
of the intelligence committees concerning each clandestine 
prison or detention facility, if any, currently or formerly 
operated by the United States Government, regardless of 
location, at which detainees in the global war on terrorism are 
or have been held. See Section 314 of the Act. The votes in 
person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman Roberts--no; 
Senator Hatch--no; Senator DeWine--no; Senator Bond--no; 
Senator Lott--no; Senator Snowe--aye; Senator Hagel--aye; 
Senator Chambliss--no; Vice Chairman Rockefeller--aye; Senator 
Levin--aye; Senator Feinstein--aye; Senator Wyden--aye; Senator 
Bayh--aye; Senator Mikulski--aye; Senator Feingold--aye.
    On May 23, 2006, by a vote of 9 ayes and 6 noes, the 
Committee agreed to an amendment by Senator Wyden to mandate 
the public disclosure of the aggregate amount of funding 
requested, authorized, and appropriated for the National 
Intelligence Program for each fiscal year after fiscal year 
2007. See Section 107 of the Act. The votes in person or by 
proxy were as follows: Chairman Roberts--no; Senator Hatch--no; 
Senator DeWine--no; Senator Bond--no; Senator Lott--no; Senator 
Snowe--aye; Senator Hagel--aye; Senator Chambliss--no; Vice 
Chairman Rockefeller--aye; Senator Levin--aye; Senator 
Feinstein--aye; Senator Wyden--aye; Senator Bayh--aye; Senator 
Mikulski--aye; Senator Feingold--aye.
    On May 23, 2006, by a vote of 7 ayes and 8 noes, the 
Committee rejected an amendment by Senator Feingold to require 
a report on past intelligence activities not previously 
notified to all Members serving on the intelligence committees 
at the time the activities were undertaken. The votes in person 
or by proxy were as follows: Chairman Roberts--no; Senator 
Hatch--no; Senator DeWine--no; Senator Bond--no; Senator Lott--
no; Senator Snowe--aye; Senator Hagel--no; Senator Chambliss--
no; Vice Chairman Rockefeller--aye; Senator Levin--aye; Senator 
Feinstein--aye; Senator Wyden--aye; Senator Bayh--aye; Senator 
Mikulski--no; Senator Feingold--aye.

                           ESTIMATE OF COSTS

    Pursuant to paragraph 11(a)(3) of rule XXVI of the Standing 
Rules of the Senate, the Committee deems it impractical to 
include an estimate of the costs incurred in carrying out the 
provisions of this report due to the classified nature of the 
operations conducted pursuant to the legislation. On May 25, 
2006, the Committee transmitted this bill to the Congressional 
Budget Office and requested that it conduct an estimate of the 
costs incurred in carrying out the provisions of this bill.

                    EVALUATION OF REGULATORY IMPACT

    In accordance with paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the 
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that no 
substantial regulatory impact will be incurred by implementing 
the provisions of this legislation.

                        CHANGES IN EXISTING LAWS

    In the opinion of the Committee, it is necessary to 
dispense with the requirements of paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of 
the Standing Rules of the Senate in order to expedite the 
business of the Senate.

  ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATORS ROCKEFELLER, LEVIN, FEINSTEIN, WYDEN, 
                      BAYH, MIKULSKI, AND FEINGOLD

    Thirty years ago this month, the Senate passed Senate 
Resolution 400, establishing the Select Committee on 
Intelligence and charging the Committee with providing 
``vigilant legislative oversight over the intelligence 
activities of the United States to assure that such activities 
are in conformity with the Constitution and laws of the United 
States.'' The Committee is marking this anniversary by 
reporting legislation that takes significant steps toward 
reinvigorating our oversight responsibilities.
    Current practice limits some Executive Branch briefings 
about major intelligence programs to the so-called ``Gang of 
Eight,'' which consists of the four House and Senate leaders 
and the two chairmen and two senior minority party members of 
each intelligence committee. This limitation can hobble efforts 
by the full Intelligence Committees to carry out effective 
oversight. Sections 304 and 307 of the Committee's bill would 
clarify that it is the obligation of the Intelligence Community 
to fully and currently inform all members of the congressional 
intelligence committees about intelligence activities.
    Effective oversight also depends on members of Congress 
having timely access to intelligence information. But too 
often, members of Congress, even those of us who are members of 
committees of jurisdiction, do not have timely access to the 
intelligence information necessary to carry out our oversight 
responsibilities. Section 108 of the Committee bill requires 
the Intelligence Community to provide, upon request from 
Congressional committees of jurisdiction or the Chairman or 
Vice Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee or Chairman 
or Ranking Member of the House Intelligence Committee, timely 
access to existing intelligence assessments, reports, 
estimates, legal opinions, or other intelligence information.
    The Committee's bill not only takes important steps toward 
improving oversight generally, but advances our oversight of 
particular matters. Section 313 of the Committee's bill 
requires a report from the Director of National Intelligence 
relative to the requirement of the Detainee Treatment Act of 
2005, also known as the McCain Amendment, that no person in the 
custody or under the physical control of the United States 
shall be subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. 
While the report itself will be classified, this provision 
requiring the DNI report to the Congress on compliance with the 
McCain Amendment is publicly stated in this bill. Similarly, 
Section 314 of the Committee's bill requires the DNI to submit 
a classified report on any clandestine detention facilities 
operated by the United States Government. These public law 
requirements reflect the determination by the Committee to 
undertake serious oversight of any Intelligence Community 
detention, interrogation, and rendition practices.
    In recent years, overly restrictive requests by the 
Executive Branch to limit access to sensitive material have 
hampered the Committee's ability to conduct effective 
oversight. The Committee is calling on the President, the 
Director of National Intelligence and the Director of the 
National Security Agency to work with the Committee to 
establish the mechanisms necessary to review all the 
operational, legal and budgetary aspects of the President's 
warrantless surveillance program. The Committee is also calling 
for greater staff access to information about programs related 
to fighting international terrorism, especially in light of the 
role of intelligence in this long-term national priority.
    In addition, the Committee's bill strengthens oversight by 
requiring that the Directors of the National Security Agency, 
the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the National 
Reconnaissance Office each be appointed by the President with 
the advice and consent of the Senate. These agencies' budgets 
comprise a significant portion of the entire intelligence 
budget of the United States and it is appropriate that the 
President's choices to head these agencies be subject to Senate 
confirmation.
    The Committee bill also establishes, within the Office of 
the DNI, an Inspector General of the Intelligence Community. 
The Inspector General will have authorities, including 
responsibilities to Congress, that are commensurate with those 
of the CIA Inspector General but are applicable across the 
Intelligence Community. The creation of an Inspector General of 
the Intelligence Community will strengthen accountability 
throughout the Intelligence Community by permitting independent 
examinations of serious problems, abuses, or deficiencies not 
only within elements of the Community, but in any lack of 
cooperation among those elements.
    Section 107 of the Committee's bill declassifies the 
aggregate amount of money requested by the President and 
authorized or appropriated by the Congress. The public ought to 
know how much money the government is spending on intelligence 
activities and the Senate has long sought this sensible reform. 
We believe declassifying the aggregate amount of money the 
nation spends on intelligence would not harm the nation's 
security.
    Collectively, the provisions in the Committee bill will 
strengthen efforts at Congressional oversight. We look forward 
to the leadership's scheduling of the Committee's bill for 
floor action as promptly as possible after the Committee on 
Armed Services considers the bill, given the imperative that 
the Senate not allow another year to pass without enactment of 
an intelligence authorization bill. We cannot defeat today's 
threats without the strongest and most cost-effective 
Intelligence Community, and we believe these enhanced oversight 
requirements support both goals.

                                   John D. Rockefeller IV.
                                   Carl Levin.
                                   Dianne Feinstein.
                                   Ron Wyden.
                                   Evan Bayh.
                                   Barbara A. Mikulski.
                                   Russell D. Feingold.

                  ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR FEINGOLD

    The Fiscal Year 2007 Intelligence Authorization bill, along 
with the accompanying classified annex, is a critically 
important piece of legislation. It provides our Intelligence 
Community with the resources to combat terrorist organizations, 
protect America, and serve American interests overseas. It also 
reflects the importance of congressional oversight, a principle 
that has been challenged by the current Administration's 
failure to keep the congressional intelligence committees fully 
and currently informed of all intelligence activities.
    Despite the belated briefing conducted for all members of 
the Committee on May 17, 2006, the Administration is still 
impeding the Committee from conducting thorough, ongoing 
oversight of the NSA's illegal warrantless surveillance 
program. I was pleased, therefore, that the Committee accepted 
my amendment to the classified annex calling on the 
Administration to work with the Committee to establish the 
mechanisms necessary to review all the operational, legal and 
budgetary aspects of the program.
    I was also pleased that the Committee accepted my amendment 
to the annex calling for greater staff access to programs 
related to fighting terrorism. Just as our nation must adopt a 
strategic, global approach to this struggle, those responsible 
for oversight need to assess whether our policies and 
priorities are serving our overall national security interests. 
When the Administration seeks to restrict access to important 
intelligence programs, it undermines the Committee's ability to 
take a comprehensive approach to oversight.
    The National Security Act requires that the congressional 
intelligence committees be kept fully and currently informed of 
all intelligence activities. The law provides for briefings for 
less than the full membership of the committees only in cases 
of covert action and, even then, only if the President 
determines that it is essential to limit access to meet 
extraordinary circumstances affecting vital interests of the 
United States. Given the Administration's failure to comply 
with this law with regard to the warrantless surveillance 
program, I strongly support the Committee's actions to further 
clarify these legal obligations, and to ensure that the full 
committee is at least offered an indication of which 
intelligence activities are not briefed to the full membership. 
I also believe, however, that the Committee must know the full 
extent of how these limited briefings have been conducted in 
the recent past. The Administration should inform the members 
of the Committee with regard to programs they have not been 
notified about so that members can begin to assess whether the 
practice of briefing the so-called ``Gang of Eight'' has, 
indeed, complied with the law. In addition, an accounting of 
previously unknown intelligence activities will allow members 
of the Committee to consider the impact of these activities on 
current national security policies, as well as learn the 
lessons of past successes and failures.
    I was pleased that the Committee accepted an amendment to 
the annex that I offered, along with Senator Rockefeller, 
calling for more intelligence resources to be directed toward 
Africa. The continent presents a wide range of threats, such as 
terrorist havens and the transnational movements of terrorist 
organizations, while corruption, authoritarianism and poverty 
allow these conditions to fester. Armed conflict, genocide and 
humanitarian disasters are all critical challenges to our 
national security, and require greater information and 
understanding. Of particular concern is Somalia, where the 
Committee encouraged the Intelligence Community to work with 
other agencies of the U.S. government on a comprehensive 
strategic plan for stability.
    I am concerned about sections of the bill containing 
temporary modifications to the Privacy Act. While it is 
imperative that our intelligence agencies effectively share 
information with each other, I am concerned about the removal 
of Privacy Act limitations on the ability of intelligence 
agencies to obtain information from other government agencies 
that are not part of the Intelligence Community. While 
circumstances may arise in which intelligence agencies need 
access to ordinary government information like student loan 
data or government benefits information, the exemption provided 
by the bill may be broader than necessary. I am also concerned 
that, while the bill appropriately involves the Privacy and 
Civil Liberties Board, this important institution is still not 
fully up and running.
    I am also concerned about broad new arrest authorities 
being granted to CIA and NSA protective personnel. These 
personnel should be granted all the authority they need to 
safeguard those they have been assigned to protect. But the 
broad language in the bill effectively authorizes the arrest of 
any person committing any crime, even if he or she is in no way 
threatening agency personnel or property, as well as persons 
who have committed an unrelated felony in the past. Without a 
compelling reason why current law is insufficient, I am 
reluctant to extend broad new authorities.
    Finally, I believe we must reform the financial management 
practices of the Intelligence Community to include more 
reporting and greater accountability for cost overruns related 
to the acquisition of major systems. We can keep America safe 
while also serving the U.S. taxpayer. I look forward to working 
with my colleagues on important reform legislation.

                                               Russell D. Feingold.

                                  
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