[House Report 109-71]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



109th Congress                                             Rept. 109-71
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 1st Session                                                     Part 1

======================================================================
 
 DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2006

                                _______
                                

                  May 3, 2005.--Ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

    Mr. Cox, from the Committee on Homeland Security, submitted the 
                               following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                     MINORITY AND ADDITIONAL VIEWS

                        [To accompany H.R. 1817]

  The Committee on Homeland Security, to whom was referred the 
bill (H.R. 1817) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 
2006 for the Department of Homeland Security, and for other 
purposes, having considered the same, report favorably thereon 
with an amendment and recommend that the bill as amended do 
pass.

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page
Purpose and Summary..............................................    23
Background and Need for Legislation..............................    23
Hearings.........................................................    24
Committee Consideration..........................................    26
Committee Votes..................................................    26
Committee Oversight Findings.....................................    43
Statement of General Performance Goals and Objectives............    43
New Budget Authority, Entitlement Authority, and Tax Expenditures    43
Committee Cost Estimate..........................................    43
Congressional Budget Office Estimate.............................    44
Federal Mandates Statement.......................................    44
Advisory Committee Statement.....................................    44
Constitutional Authority Statement...............................    44
Applicability to Legislative Branch..............................    44
Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation...................    44
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported............    85
Minority and Additional Views....................................   101
Letters and Correspondence.......................................   121

  The amendment is as follows:
  Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the 
following:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

  This Act may be cited as the ``Department of Homeland Security 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006''.

SEC. 2. TABLE OF CONTENTS.

  The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title.
Sec. 2. Table of contents.

                TITLE I--AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS

Sec. 101. Department of Homeland Security.
Sec. 102. Border patrol agents.
Sec. 103. Departmental management and operations.
Sec. 104. Critical infrastructure grants.
Sec. 105. Research and development.
Sec. 106. Border and transportation security.
Sec. 107. State and local terrorism preparedness.
Sec. 108. Authorization of appropriations for training of State and 
local personnel in border States performing immigration functions.

     TITLE II--TERRORISM PREVENTION, INFORMATION SHARING, AND RISK 
                               ASSESSMENT

                    Subtitle A--Terrorism Prevention

Sec. 201. Terrorism Prevention Plan and related budget submission.
Sec. 202. Consolidated background check process.

    Subtitle B--Homeland Security Information Sharing and Analysis 
                              Enhancement

Sec. 211. Short title.
Sec. 212. Provision of terrorism-related information to private sector 
officials.
Sec. 213. Analytic expertise on the threats from biological agents and 
nuclear weapons.
Sec. 214. Alternative analysis of homeland security information.
Sec. 215. Assignment of information analysis and infrastructure 
protection functions.
Sec. 216. Authority for disseminating homeland security information.
Sec. 217. 9/11 Memorial Homeland Security Fellows Program.
Sec. 218. Access to nuclear terrorism-related information.
Sec. 219. Access of Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis to 
terrorism information.
Sec. 220. Administration of the Homeland Security Information Network.
Sec. 221. IAIP personnel recruitment.
Sec. 222. Information collection requirements and priorities.
Sec. 223. Homeland Security Advisory System.
Sec. 224. Use of open-source information.
Sec. 225. Full and efficient use of open-source information.

            TITLE III--DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS AND PROTECTION

                Subtitle A--Preparedness and Protection

Sec. 301. National terrorism exercise program.
Sec. 302. Technology development and transfer.
Sec. 303. Review of antiterrorism acquisitions.
Sec. 304. Center of Excellence for Border Security.
Sec. 305. Requirements relating to the Container Security Initiative 
(CSI).
Sec. 306. Security of maritime cargo containers.
Sec. 307. Security plan for general aviation at Ronald Reagan 
Washington National Airport.
Sec. 308. Interoperable communications assistance.
Sec. 309. Report to Congress on implementation of recommendations 
regarding protection of agriculture.

 Subtitle B--Department of Homeland Security Cybersecurity Enhancement

Sec. 311. Short title.
Sec. 312. Assistant Secretary for Cybersecurity.
Sec. 313. Cybersecurity defined.
Sec. 314. Cybersecurity training programs and equipment.
Sec. 315. Information security requirements and OMB responsibilities 
not affected.

         Subtitle C--Security of public transportation systems

Sec. 321. Security best practices.
Sec. 322. Public awareness.

           Subtitle D--Critical infrastructure prioritization

Sec. 331. Critical infrastructure.
Sec. 332. Security review.
Sec. 333. Implementation report.
Sec. 334. Protection of information.

                        TITLE IV--MISCELLANEOUS

Sec. 401. Border security and enforcement coordination and operations.
Sec. 402. GAO report to Congress.
Sec. 403. Plan for establishing consolidated and colocated regional 
offices.
Sec. 404. Plan to reduce wait times.
Sec. 405. Denial of transportation security card.
Sec. 406. Transfer of existing Customs Patrol Officers unit and 
establishment of new CPO units in the Bureau of Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement.

                TITLE I--AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS

SEC. 101. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY.

   There is authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of Homeland 
Security for the necessary expenses of the Department of Homeland 
Security for fiscal year 2006, $34,152,143,000.

SEC. 102. BORDER PATROL AGENTS.

   Of the amount authorized under section 101, there is authorized to 
be appropriated for fiscal year 2006 for border security and control 
between ports of entry, including for the hiring of 2,000 border patrol 
agents in addition to the number employed on the date of enactment of 
this Act, and related training and support costs, $1,916,427,000.

SEC. 103. DEPARTMENTAL MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONS.

   Of the amount authorized under section 101, there is authorized to 
be appropriated for fiscal year 2006 for departmental management and 
operations, $634,687,000, of which--
          (1) $44,895,000 is authorized for the Department of Homeland 
        Security Regions Initiative;
          (2) $4,459,000 is authorized for Operation Integration Staff; 
        and
          (3) $56,278,000 is authorized for Office of Security 
        initiatives.

SEC. 104. CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE GRANTS.

   Of the amount authorized under section 101, there is authorized to 
be appropriated for fiscal year 2006 for grants and other assistance to 
improve critical infrastructure protection, $500,000,000.

SEC. 105. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT.

   Of the amount authorized under section 101, there are authorized to 
be appropriated for fiscal year 2006--
          (1) $76,573,000 to support chemical countermeasure 
        development activities of the Directorate of Science and 
        Technology;
          (2) $197,314,000 to support a nuclear detection office and 
        related activities of such directorate;
          (3) $10,000,000 for research and development of technologies 
        capable of countering threats posed by man-portable air defense 
        systems, including location-based technologies and 
        noncommercial aircraft-based technologies; and
          (4) $10,600,000 for the activities of such directorate 
        conducted pursuant to subtitle G of title VIII of the Homeland 
        Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 441 et seq.).

SEC. 106. BORDER AND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY.

   Of the amount authorized under section 101, there are authorized to 
be appropriated for fiscal year 2006--
          (1) $826,913,000 for expenses related to Screening 
        Coordination and Operations of the Directorate of Border and 
        Transportation Security;
          (2) $100,000,000 for weapons of mass destruction detection 
        technology of such directorate; and
          (3) $133,800,000 for the Container Security Initiative of 
        such directorate.

SEC. 107. STATE AND LOCAL TERRORISM PREPAREDNESS.

  Of the amount authorized under section 101, there is authorized to be 
appropriated for fiscal year 2006--
          (1) $40,500,000 for the activities of the Office for 
        Interoperability and Compatibility within the Directorate of 
        Science and Technology pursuant to section 7303 of the 
        Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (6 
        U.S.C 194); and
          (2) $1,000,000,000 for discretionary grants for high-threat, 
        high-density urban areas awarded by the Office of State and 
        Local Government Coordination and Preparedness.

SEC. 108. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR TRAINING OF STATE AND 
                    LOCAL PERSONNEL IN BORDER STATES PERFORMING 
                    IMMIGRATION FUNCTIONS.

  (a) In General.--To carry out subsection (b), subject to such 
limitations as may be provided in Acts making appropriations for 
Management and Administration for U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement, there are authorized to be appropriated from such amounts 
$40,000,000 for fiscal year 2006, to remain available until September 
30, 2007, for the purpose of enhancing the integrity of the border 
security system of the United States against the threat of terrorism.
  (b) Use of Funds.--From amounts made available under subsection (a), 
the Secretary of Homeland Security may reimburse a State or political 
subdivision described in subsection (c) for the expenses described in 
subsection (d).
  (c) Eligible Recipients.--A State, or a political subdivision of a 
State, is eligible for reimbursement under subsection (b) if the State 
or political subdivision--
          (1) contains a location that is 30 miles or less from a 
        border or coastline of the United States;
          (2) has entered into a written agreement described in section 
        287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 
        1357(g)) under which certain officers or employees of the State 
        or subdivision may be authorized to perform certain functions 
        of an immigration officer; and
          (3) desires such officers or employees to receive training 
        from the Department of Homeland Security in relation to such 
        functions.
  (d) Expenses.--The expenses described in this subsection are actual 
and necessary expenses incurred by the State or political subdivision 
in order to permit the training described in subsection (c)(3) to take 
place, including expenses such as the following:
          (1) Costs of travel and transportation to locations where 
        training is provided, including mileage and related allowances 
        for the use of a privately owned automobile.
          (2) Subsistence consisting of lodging, meals, and other 
        necessary expenses for the personal sustenance and comfort of a 
        person required to travel away from the person's regular post 
        of duty in order to participate in the training.
          (3) A per diem allowance paid instead of actual expenses for 
        subsistence and fees or tips to porters and stewards.
          (4) Costs of securing temporary replacements for personnel 
        traveling to, and participating in, the training.

     TITLE II--TERRORISM PREVENTION, INFORMATION SHARING, AND RISK 
                               ASSESSMENT

                    Subtitle A--Terrorism Prevention

SEC. 201. TERRORISM PREVENTION PLAN AND RELATED BUDGET SUBMISSION.

  (a) Department of Homeland Security Terrorism Prevention Plan.--
          (1) Requirements.--Not later than 1 year after the date of 
        enactment of the Act, and on a regular basis thereafter, the 
        Secretary of Homeland Security shall prepare and submit to the 
        Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives 
        and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 
        of the Senate a Department of Homeland Security Terrorism 
        Prevention Plan. The Plan shall be a comprehensive and 
        integrated plan that includes the goals, objectives, 
        milestones, and key initiatives of the Department of Homeland 
        Security to prevent acts of terrorism on the United States, 
        including its territories and interests.
          (2) Contents.--The Secretary shall include in the Plan the 
        following elements:
                  (A) Identification and prioritization of groups and 
                subgroups that pose the most significant threat of 
                committing acts of terrorism on the United States and 
                its interests.
                  (B) Identification of the most significant current, 
                evolving, and long-term terrorist threats to the United 
                States and its interests, including an evaluation of--
                          (i) the materials that may be used to carry 
                        out a potential attack;
                          (ii) the methods that may be used to carry 
                        out a potential attack; and
                          (iii) the outcome the perpetrators of acts of 
                        terrorism aim to achieve.
                  (C) A prioritization of the threats identified under 
                subparagraph (B), based on an assessment of probability 
                and consequence of such attacks.
                  (D) A description of processes and procedures that 
                the Secretary shall establish to institutionalize close 
                coordination between the Department of Homeland 
                Security and the National Counter Terrorism Center and 
                other appropriate United States intelligence agencies.
                  (E) The policies and procedures the Secretary shall 
                establish to ensure the Department gathers real-time 
                information from the National Counter Terrorism Center; 
                disseminates this information throughout the 
                Department, as appropriate; utilizes this information 
                to support the Department's counterterrorism 
                responsibilities; integrates the Department's 
                information collection and analysis functions; and 
                disseminates this information to its operational units, 
                as appropriate.
                  (F) A description of the specific actions the 
                Secretary shall take to identify threats of terrorism 
                on the United States and its interests, and to 
                coordinate activities within the Department to prevent 
                acts of terrorism, with special emphasis on prevention 
                of terrorist access to and use of weapons of mass 
                destruction.
                  (G) A description of initiatives the Secretary shall 
                take to share critical terrorism prevention information 
                with, and provide terrorism prevention support to, 
                State and local governments and the private sector.
                  (H) A timeline, with goals and milestones, for 
                implementing the Homeland Security Information Network, 
                the Homeland Security Secure Data Network, and other 
                departmental information initiatives to prevent acts of 
                terrorism on the United States and its interests, 
                including integration of these initiatives in the 
                operations of the Homeland Security Operations Center.
                  (I) Such other terrorism prevention-related elements 
                as the Secretary considers appropriate.
          (3) Consultation.--In formulating the Plan the Secretary 
        shall consult with--
                  (A) the Director of National Intelligence;
                  (B) the Director of the National Counter Terrorism 
                Center;
                  (C) the Attorney General;
                  (D) the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
                Investigation;
                  (E) the Secretary of Defense;
                  (F) the Secretary of State;
                  (G) the Secretary of Energy;
                  (H) the Secretary of the Treasury; and
                  (I) the heads of other Federal agencies and State, 
                county, and local law enforcement agencies as the 
                Secretary considers appropriate.
          (4) Classification.--The Secretary shall prepare the Plan in 
        both classified and nonclassified forms.
  (b) Annual Crosscutting Analysis of Proposed Funding for Department 
of Homeland Security Programs.--
          (1) Requirement to submit analysis.--The Secretary of 
        Homeland Security shall submit to the Congress, concurrently 
        with the submission of the President's budget for each fiscal 
        year, a detailed, crosscutting analysis of the budget proposed 
        for the Department of Homeland Security, by budget function, by 
        agency, and by initiative area, identifying the requested 
        amounts of gross and net appropriations or obligational 
        authority and outlays for programs and activities of the 
        Department for each of the following mission areas:
                  (A) To prevent terrorist attacks within the United 
                States.
                  (B) To reduce the vulnerability of the United States 
                to terrorism.
                  (C) To minimize the damage, and assist in the 
                recovery, from terrorist attacks that do occur within 
                the United States.
                  (D) To carry out all functions of the agencies and 
                subdivisions within the Department that are not related 
                directly to homeland security.
          (2) Funding analysis of multipurpose functions.--The analysis 
        required under paragraph (1) for functions that are both 
        related directly and not related directly to homeland security 
        shall include a detailed allocation of funding for each 
        specific mission area within those functions, including an 
        allocation of funding among mission support functions, such as 
        agency overhead, capital assets, and human capital.
          (3) Included terrorism prevention activities.--The analysis 
        required under paragraph (1)(A) shall include the following 
        activities (among others) of the Department:
                  (A) Collection and effective use of intelligence and 
                law enforcement operations that screen for and target 
                individuals who plan or intend to carry out acts of 
                terrorism.
                  (B) Investigative, intelligence, and law enforcement 
                operations that identify and disrupt plans for acts of 
                terrorism or reduce the ability of groups or 
                individuals to commit acts of terrorism.
                  (C) Investigative activities and intelligence 
                operations to detect and prevent the introduction of 
                weapons of mass destruction into the United States.
                  (D) Initiatives to detect potential, or the early 
                stages of actual, biological, chemical, radiological, 
                or nuclear attacks.
                  (E) Screening individuals against terrorist watch 
                lists.
                  (F) Screening cargo to identify and segregate high-
                risk shipments.
                  (G) Specific utilization of information sharing and 
                intelligence, both horizontally (within the Federal 
                Government) and vertically (among Federal, State, and 
                local governments), to detect or prevent acts of 
                terrorism.
                  (H) Initiatives, including law enforcement and 
                intelligence operations, to preempt, disrupt, and deter 
                acts of terrorism overseas intended to strike the 
                United States.
                  (I) Investments in technology, research and 
                development, training, and communications systems that 
                are designed to improve the performance of the 
                Department and its agencies with respect to each of the 
                activities listed in subparagraphs (A) through (H).
          (4) Separate displays for mandatory and discretionary 
        amounts.--Each analysis under paragraph (1) shall include 
        separate displays for proposed mandatory appropriations and 
        proposed discretionary appropriations.

SEC. 202. CONSOLIDATED BACKGROUND CHECK PROCESS.

  (a) Requirement.--The Secretary shall establish a single process for 
conducting the security screening and background checks on individuals 
participating in any voluntary or mandatory departmental credentialing 
or registered traveler program.
  (b) Included Programs.--The process established under subsection (a) 
shall be sufficient to meet the security requirements of all applicable 
Departmental programs, including--
          (1) the Transportation Worker Identification Credential;
          (2) the Hazmat Endorsement Credential;
          (3) the Free and Secure Trade program;
          (4) the NEXUS and SENTRI border crossing programs;
          (5) the Registered Traveler program of the Transportation 
        Security Administration; and
          (6) any other similar program or credential considered 
        appropriate for inclusion by the Secretary.
  (c) Features of Process.--The process established under subsection 
(a) shall include the following:
          (1) A single submission of security screening information, 
        including personal data and biometric information as 
        appropriate, necessary to meet the security requirements of all 
        applicable departmental programs.
          (2) An ability to submit such security screening information 
        at any location or through any process approved by the 
        Secretary with respect to any of the applicable departmental 
        programs.
          (3) Acceptance by the Department of a security clearance 
        issued by a Federal agency, to the extent that the security 
        clearance process of the agency satisfies requirements that are 
        at least as stringent as those of the applicable departmental 
        programs under this section.
          (4) Standards and procedures for protecting individual 
        privacy, confidentiality, record retention, and addressing 
        other concerns relating to information security.
  (d) Deadlines.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall--
          (1) submit a description of the process developed under 
        subsection (a) to the Committee on Homeland Security of the 
        House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security 
        and Governmental Affairs of the Senate by not later than 6 
        months after the date of the enactment of this Act; and
          (2) begin implementing such process by not later than 12 
        months after the date of the enactment of this Act.
  (e) Relationship to Other Laws.--(1) Nothing in this section affects 
any statutory requirement relating to the operation of the programs 
described in subsection (b).
  (2) Nothing in this section affects any statutory requirement 
relating to title III of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 435b et seq.).

    Subtitle B--Homeland Security Information Sharing and Analysis 
                              Enhancement

SEC. 211. SHORT TITLE.

  This subtitle may be cited as the ``Homeland Security Information 
Sharing and Analysis Enhancement Act of 2005''.

SEC. 212. PROVISION OF TERRORISM-RELATED INFORMATION TO PRIVATE SECTOR 
                    OFFICIALS.

  Section 201(d) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121(d)) 
is amended by adding at the end the following:
          ``(20) To require, in consultation with the Assistant 
        Secretary for Infrastructure Protection, the creation and 
        routine dissemination of analytic reports and products designed 
        to provide timely and accurate information that has specific 
        relevance to each of the Nation's critical infrastructure 
        sectors (as identified in the national infrastructure 
        protection plan issued under paragraph (5)), to private sector 
        officials in each such sector who are responsible for 
        protecting institutions within that sector from potential acts 
        of terrorism and for mitigating the potential consequences of 
        any such act.''.

SEC. 213. ANALYTIC EXPERTISE ON THE THREATS FROM BIOLOGICAL AGENTS AND 
                    NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

  Section 201(d) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121(d)) 
is further amended by adding at the end the following:
          ``(21) To ensure sufficient analytic expertise within the 
        Office of Information Analysis to create and disseminate, on an 
        ongoing basis, products based on the analysis of homeland 
        security information, as defined in section 892(f)(1), with 
        specific reference to the threat of terrorism involving the use 
        of nuclear weapons and biological agents to inflict mass 
        casualties or other catastrophic consequences on the population 
        or territory of the United States.''.

SEC. 214. ALTERNATIVE ANALYSIS OF HOMELAND SECURITY INFORMATION.

  (a) Requirement.--Subtitle A of title II of the Homeland Security Act 
of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the 
following:

``SEC. 203. ALTERNATIVE ANALYSIS OF HOMELAND SECURITY INFORMATION.

  ``The Secretary shall establish a process and assign an individual or 
entity the responsibility to ensure that, as appropriate, elements of 
the Department conduct alternative analysis (commonly referred to as 
`red-team analysis') of homeland security information, as that term is 
defined in section 892(f)(1), that relates to potential acts of 
terrorism involving the use of nuclear weapons or biological agents to 
inflict mass casualties or other catastrophic consequences on the 
population or territory of the United States.''.
  (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in section 1(b) of 
such Act is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 202 
the following:

``Sec. 203. Alternative analysis of homeland security information.''.

SEC. 215. ASSIGNMENT OF INFORMATION ANALYSIS AND INFRASTRUCTURE 
                    PROTECTION FUNCTIONS.

  Section 201(b) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121(b)) 
is amended by adding at the end the following:
          ``(4) Assignment of specific functions.--The Under Secretary 
        for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection--
                  ``(A) shall assign to the Assistant Secretary for 
                Information Analysis the responsibility for performing 
                the functions described in paragraphs (1), (4), (7) 
                through (14), (16), and (18) of subsection (d);
                  ``(B) shall assign to the Assistant Secretary for 
                Infrastructure Protection the responsibility for 
                performing the functions described in paragraphs (2), 
                (5), and (6) of subsection (d);
                  ``(C) shall ensure that the Assistant Secretary for 
                Information Analysis and the Assistant Secretary for 
                Infrastructure Protection both perform the functions 
                described in paragraphs (3), (15), (17), and (19) of 
                subsection (d);
                  ``(D) may assign to each such Assistant Secretary 
                such other duties relating to such responsibilities as 
                the Under Secretary may provide;
                  ``(E) shall direct each such Assistant Secretary to 
                coordinate with Federal, State, and local law 
                enforcement agencies, and with tribal and private 
                sector entities, as appropriate; and
                  ``(F) shall direct the Assistant Secretary for 
                Information Analysis to coordinate with elements of the 
                intelligence community, as appropriate.''.

SEC. 216. AUTHORITY FOR DISSEMINATING HOMELAND SECURITY INFORMATION.

  (a) In General.--Title I of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 
U.S.C. 111 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:

``SEC. 104. AUTHORITY FOR DISSEMINATING HOMELAND SECURITY INFORMATION.

  ``(a) Primary Authority.--Except as provided in subsection (b), the 
Secretary shall be the executive branch official responsible for 
disseminating homeland security information to State and local 
government and tribal officials and the private sector.
  ``(b) Prior Approval Required.--No Federal official may disseminate 
any homeland security information, as defined in section 892(f)(1), to 
State, local, tribal, or private sector officials without the 
Secretary's prior approval, except--
          ``(1) in exigent circumstances under which it is essential 
        that the information be communicated immediately; or
          ``(2) when such information is issued to State, local, or 
        tribal law enforcement officials for the purpose of assisting 
        them in any aspect of the administration of criminal 
        justice.''.
  (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in section 1(b) of 
such Act is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 103 
the following:

``Sec. 104. Authority for disseminating homeland security 
information.''.

SEC. 217. 9/11 MEMORIAL HOMELAND SECURITY FELLOWS PROGRAM.

  (a) Establishment of Program.--Subtitle A of title II of the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121 et seq.) is further amended by 
adding at the end the following:

``SEC. 204. 9/11 MEMORIAL HOMELAND SECURITY FELLOWS PROGRAM.

  ``(a) Establishment.--
          ``(1) In general.--The Secretary shall establish a fellowship 
        program in accordance with this section for the purpose of 
        bringing State, local, tribal, and private sector officials to 
        participate in the work of the Homeland Security Operations 
        Center in order to become familiar with--
                  ``(A) the mission and capabilities of that Center; 
                and
                  ``(B) the role, programs, products, and personnel of 
                the Office of Information Analysis, the Office of 
                Infrastructure Protection, and other elements of the 
                Department responsible for the integration, analysis, 
                and dissemination of homeland security information, as 
                defined in section 892(f)(1).
          ``(2) Program name.--The program under this section shall be 
        known as the 9/11 Memorial Homeland Security Fellows Program.
  ``(b) Eligibility.--In order to be eligible for selection as a fellow 
under the program, an individual must--
          ``(1) have homeland security-related responsibilities; and
          ``(2) possess an appropriate national security clearance.
  ``(c) Limitations.--The Secretary--
          ``(1) may conduct up to 4 iterations of the program each 
        year, each of which shall be 90 days in duration; and
          ``(2) shall ensure that the number of fellows selected for 
        each iteration does not impede the activities of the Center.
  ``(d) Condition.--As a condition of selecting an individual as a 
fellow under the program, the Secretary shall require that the 
individual's employer agree to continue to pay the individual's salary 
and benefits during the period of the fellowship.
  ``(e) Stipend.--During the period of the fellowship of an individual 
under the program, the Secretary shall, subject to the availability of 
appropriations--
          ``(1) provide to the individual a stipend to cover the 
        individual's reasonable living expenses during the period of 
        the fellowship; and
          ``(2) reimburse the individual for round-trip, economy fare 
        travel to and from the individual's place of residence twice 
        each month.''.
  (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in section 1(b) of 
such Act is further amended by adding at the end of the items relating 
to such subtitle the following:

``Sec. 204. 9/11 Memorial Homeland Security Fellows Program.''.

SEC. 218. ACCESS TO NUCLEAR TERRORISM-RELATED INFORMATION.

  Section 201(d) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121(d)) 
is further amended by adding at the end the following:
          ``(22) To ensure that--
                  ``(A) the Assistant Secretary for Information 
                Analysis receives promptly and without request all 
                information obtained by any component of the Department 
                if that information relates, directly or indirectly, to 
                a threat of terrorism involving the potential use of 
                nuclear weapons;
                  ``(B) such information is--
                          ``(i) integrated and analyzed 
                        comprehensively; and
                          ``(ii) disseminated in a timely manner, 
                        including to appropriately cleared State, 
                        local, tribal, and private sector officials; 
                        and
                  ``(C) such information is used to determine what 
                requests the Department should submit for collection of 
                additional information relating to that threat.''.

SEC. 219. ACCESS OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INFORMATION ANALYSIS TO 
                    TERRORISM INFORMATION.

  Section 201(d) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121(d)) 
is further amended by adding at the end the following:
          ``(23) To ensure that the Assistant Secretary for Information 
        Analysis--
                  ``(A) is routinely and without request given prompt 
                access to all terrorism-related information collected 
                by or otherwise in the possession of any component of 
                the Department, including all homeland security 
                information (as that term is defined in section 
                892(f)(1)); and
                  ``(B) to the extent technologically feasible has 
                direct access to all databases of any component of the 
                Department that may contain such information.''.

SEC. 220. ADMINISTRATION OF THE HOMELAND SECURITY INFORMATION NETWORK.

  Section 201(d) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121(d)) 
is further amended by adding at the end the following:
          ``(24) To administer the homeland security information 
        network, including--
                  ``(A) exercising primary responsibility for 
                establishing a secure nationwide real-time homeland 
                security information sharing network for Federal, 
                State, and local government agencies and authorities, 
                tribal officials, the private sector, and other 
                governmental and private entities involved in 
                receiving, analyzing, and distributing information 
                related to threats to homeland security;
                  ``(B) ensuring that the information sharing systems, 
                developed in connection with the network established 
                under subparagraph (A), are utilized and are compatible 
                with, to the greatest extent practicable, Federal, 
                State, and local government, tribal, and private sector 
                antiterrorism systems and protocols that have been or 
                are being developed; and
                  ``(C) ensuring, to the greatest extent possible, that 
                the homeland security information network and 
                information systems are integrated and interoperable 
                with existing private sector technologies.''.

SEC. 221. IAIP PERSONNEL RECRUITMENT.

  (a) In General.--Chapter 97 of title 5, United States Code, is 
amended by adding after section 9701 the following:

``Sec. 9702. Recruitment bonuses

  ``(a) In General.--Notwithstanding any provision of chapter 57, the 
Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the Under Secretary for 
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection, may pay a bonus to 
an individual in order to recruit such individual for a position that 
is primarily responsible for discharging the analytic responsibilities 
specified in section 201(d) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 
U.S.C. 121(d)) and that--
          ``(1) is within the Directorate for Information Analysis and 
        Infrastructure Protection; and
          ``(2) would be difficult to fill in the absence of such a 
        bonus.
In determining which individuals are to receive bonuses under this 
section, appropriate consideration shall be given to the Directorate's 
critical need for linguists.
  ``(b) Bonus Amount, Form, Etc.--
          ``(1) In general.--The amount of a bonus under this section 
        shall be determined under regulations of the Secretary of 
        Homeland Security, but may not exceed 50 percent of the annual 
        rate of basic pay of the position involved.
          ``(2) Form of payment.--A bonus under this section shall be 
        paid in the form of a lump-sum payment and shall not be 
        considered to be part of basic pay.
          ``(3) Computation rule.--For purposes of paragraph (1), the 
        annual rate of basic pay of a position does not include any 
        comparability payment under section 5304 or any similar 
        authority.
  ``(c) Service Agreements.--Payment of a bonus under this section 
shall be contingent upon the employee entering into a written service 
agreement with the Department of Homeland Security. The agreement shall 
include--
          ``(1) the period of service the individual shall be required 
        to complete in return for the bonus; and
          ``(2) the conditions under which the agreement may be 
        terminated before the agreed-upon service period has been 
        completed, and the effect of any such termination.
  ``(d) Eligibility.--A bonus under this section may not be paid to 
recruit an individual for--
          ``(1) a position to which an individual is appointed by the 
        President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate;
          ``(2) a position in the Senior Executive Service as a 
        noncareer appointee (as defined under section 3132(a)); or
          ``(3) a position which has been excepted from the competitive 
        service by reason of its confidential, policy-determining, 
        policy-making, or policy-advocating character.
  ``(e) Termination.--The authority to pay bonuses under this section 
shall terminate on September 30, 2008.

``Sec. 9703. Reemployed annuitants

  ``(a) In General.--If an annuitant receiving an annuity from the 
Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund becomes employed in a 
position within the Directorate for Information Analysis and 
Infrastructure Protection of the Department of Homeland Security, the 
annuitant's annuity shall continue. An annuitant so reemployed shall 
not be considered an employee for the purposes of chapter 83 or 84.
  ``(b) Termination.--The exclusion pursuant to this section of the 
Directorate for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection from 
the reemployed annuitant provisions of chapters 83 and 84 shall 
terminate 3 years after the date of the enactment of this section, 
unless extended by the Secretary of Homeland Security. Any such 
extension shall be for a period of 1 year and shall be renewable.
  ``(c) Annuitant Defined.--For purposes of this section, the term 
`annuitant' has the meaning given such term under section 8331 or 8401, 
whichever is appropriate.

``Sec. 9704. Regulations

  ``The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the 
Director of the Office of Personnel Management, may prescribe any 
regulations necessary to carry out section 9702 or 9703.''.
  (b) Clerical Amendment.--The analysis for chapter 97 of title 5, 
United States Code, is amended by adding after the item relating to 
section 9701 the following:

``9702. Recruitment bonuses.
``9703. Reemployed annuitants.
``9704. Regulations.''.

SEC. 222. INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS AND PRIORITIES.

  (a) In General.--Section 102 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 
U.S.C. 112) is amended--
          (1) by redesignating subsections (e), (f), and (g), as 
        subsections (f), (g), and (h), respectively; and
          (2) by inserting after subsection (d) the following new 
        subsection (e):
  ``(e) Participation in Foreign Collection Requirements and Management 
Processes.--The Secretary shall be a member of any Federal Government 
interagency board, established by Executive order or any other binding 
interagency directive, that is responsible for establishing foreign 
collection information requirements and priorities for estimative 
analysis.''.
  (b) Homeland Security Information Requirements Board.--
          (1) In general.--Title I of such Act (6 U.S.C. 111 et seq.) 
        is further amended by adding at the end the following new 
        section:

``SEC. 105. HOMELAND SECURITY INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS BOARD.

  ``(a) Establishment of Board.--There is established an interagency 
Homeland Security Information Requirements Board (hereinafter in this 
section referred to as the `Information Requirements Board').
  ``(b) Membership.--The following officials are members of the 
Information Requirements Board:
          ``(1) The Secretary of Homeland Security, who shall serve as 
        the Chairman of the Information Requirements Board.
          ``(2) The Attorney General.
          ``(3) The Secretary of Commerce.
          ``(4) The Secretary of the Treasury.
          ``(5) The Secretary of Defense.
          ``(6) The Secretary of Energy.
          ``(7) The Secretary of State.
          ``(8) The Secretary of the Interior.
          ``(9) The Director of National Intelligence.
          ``(10) The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
          ``(11) The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center.
          ``(12) The Chief Privacy Officer of the Department of 
        Homeland Security.
  ``(c) Functions.--
          ``(1) Oversight of homeland security requirements.--The 
        Information Requirements Board shall oversee the process for 
        establishing homeland security requirements and collection 
        management for all terrorism-related information and all other 
        homeland security information (as defined in section 892(f)(1)) 
        collected within the United States.
          ``(2) Determination of collection priorities.--The 
        Information Requirements Board shall--
                  ``(A) determine the domestic information collection 
                requirements for information relevant to the homeland 
                security mission; and
                  ``(B) prioritize the collection and use of such 
                information.
          ``(3) Coordination of collection requirements and management 
        activities.--
                  ``(A) Coordination with counterpart agencies.--The 
                Chairman shall ensure that the Information Requirements 
                Board carries out its activities in a manner that is 
                fully coordinated with the Board's counterpart 
                entities.
                  ``(B) Participation of counterpart entities.--The 
                Chairman and the Director of National Intelligence 
                shall ensure that each counterpart entity--
                          ``(i) has at least one representative on the 
                        Information Requirement Board and on every 
                        subcomponent of the Board; and
                          ``(ii) meets jointly with the Information 
                        Requirements Board (and, as appropriate, with 
                        any subcomponent of the Board) as often as the 
                        Chairman and the Director of National 
                        Intelligence determine appropriate.
                  ``(C) Counterpart entity defined.--In this section, 
                the term `counterpart entity' means an entity of the 
                Federal Government that is responsible for foreign 
                intelligence collection requirements and management.
  ``(d) Meetings.--
          ``(1) In general.--The Information Requirements Board shall 
        meet regularly at such times and places as its Chairman may 
        direct.
          ``(2) Invited representatives.--The Chairman may invite 
        representatives of Federal agencies not specified in subsection 
        (b) to attend meetings of the Information Requirements 
        Board.''.
          (2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents in section 
        1(b) of such Act is further amended by inserting after the item 
        relating to section 104 the following new item:

``Sec. 105. Homeland Security Information Requirements Board.''.

SEC. 223. HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY SYSTEM.

  (a) In General.--Subtitle A of title II of the Homeland Security Act 
of 2002 is further amended--
          (1) in section 201(d)(7) (6 U.S.C. 121(d)(7)) by inserting 
        ``under section 205'' after ``System''; and
          (2) by adding at the end the following:

``SEC. 205. HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY SYSTEM.

  ``(a) Requirement.--The Under Secretary for Information Analysis and 
Infrastructure Protection shall implement a Homeland Security Advisory 
System in accordance with this section to provide public advisories and 
alerts regarding threats to homeland security, including national, 
regional, local, and economic sector advisories and alerts, as 
appropriate.
  ``(b) Required Elements.--The Under Secretary, under the System--
          ``(1) shall include, in each advisory and alert regarding a 
        threat, information on appropriate protective measures and 
        countermeasures that may be taken in response to the threat;
          ``(2) shall, whenever possible, limit the scope of each 
        advisory and alert to a specific region, locality, or economic 
        sector believed to be at risk; and
          ``(3) shall not, in issuing any advisory or alert, use color 
        designations as the exclusive means of specifying the homeland 
        security threat conditions that are the subject of the advisory 
        or alert.''.
  (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in section 1(b) of 
such Act is further amended by adding at the end of the items relating 
to subtitle A of title II the following:

``Sec. 205. Homeland Security Advisory System.''.

SEC. 224. USE OF OPEN-SOURCE INFORMATION.

  Section 201(d) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121(d)) 
is further amended by adding at the end the following:
          ``(25) To ensure that, whenever possible--
                  ``(A) the Assistant Secretary for Information 
                Analysis produces and disseminates reports and analytic 
                products based on open-source information that do not 
                require a national security classification under 
                applicable law; and
                  ``(B) such unclassified open-source reports are 
                produced and disseminated contemporaneously with 
                reports or analytic products concerning the same or 
                similar information that the Assistant Secretary for 
                Information Analysis produces and disseminates in a 
                classified format.''.

SEC. 225. FULL AND EFFICIENT USE OF OPEN-SOURCE INFORMATION.

  (a) Requirement.--Subtitle A of title II of the Homeland Security Act 
of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121 et seq.) is further amended by adding at the end 
the following:

``SEC. 206. FULL AND EFFICIENT USE OF OPEN-SOURCE INFORMATION.

  ``The Under Secretary shall ensure that, in meeting their analytic 
responsibilities under section 201(d) and in formulating requirements 
for collection of additional information, the Assistant Secretary for 
Information Analysis and the Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure 
Protection make full and efficient use of open-source information 
wherever possible.''.
  (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in section 1(b) of 
such Act is further amended by inserting after the item relating to 
section 205 the following:

``Sec. 206. Full and efficient use of open-source information.''.

            TITLE III--DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS AND PROTECTION

                Subtitle A--Preparedness and Protection

SEC. 301. NATIONAL TERRORISM EXERCISE PROGRAM.

  (a) In General.--Section 430(c) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 
(6 U.S.C. 238) is amended by striking ``and'' after the semicolon at 
the end of paragraph (8), by striking the period at the end of 
paragraph (9) and inserting ``; and'', and by adding at the end the 
following:
          ``(10) designing, developing, performing, and evaluating 
        exercises at the national, State, territorial, regional, local, 
        and tribal levels of government that incorporate government 
        officials, emergency response providers, public safety 
        agencies, the private sector, international governments and 
        organizations, and other appropriate entities to test the 
        Nation's capability to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and 
        recover from threatened or actual acts of terrorism.''.
  (b) National Terrorism Exercise Program.--
          (1) Establishment of program.--Title VIII of the Homeland 
        Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) is amended by adding 
        at the end the following new subtitle:

             ``Subtitle J--Terrorism Preparedness Exercises

``SEC. 899A. NATIONAL TERRORISM EXERCISE PROGRAM.

  ``(a) In General.--The Secretary, through the Office for Domestic 
Preparedness, shall establish a National Terrorism Exercise Program for 
the purpose of testing and evaluating the Nation's capabilities to 
prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from threatened or actual 
acts of terrorism that--
          ``(1) enhances coordination for terrorism preparedness 
        between all levels of government, emergency response providers, 
        international governments and organizations, and the private 
        sector;
          ``(2) is--
                  ``(A) multidisciplinary in nature, including, as 
                appropriate, information analysis and cybersecurity 
                components;
                  ``(B) as realistic as practicable and based on 
                current risk assessments, including credible threats, 
                vulnerabilities, and consequences;
                  ``(C) carried out with the minimum degree of notice 
                to involved parties regarding the timing and details of 
                such exercises, consistent with safety considerations;
                  ``(D) evaluated against performance measures and 
                followed by corrective action to solve identified 
                deficiencies; and
                  ``(E) assessed to learn best practices, which shall 
                be shared with appropriate Federal, State, territorial, 
                regional, local, and tribal personnel, authorities, and 
                training institutions for emergency response providers; 
                and
          ``(3) assists State, territorial, local, and tribal 
        governments with the design, implementation, and evaluation of 
        exercises that--
                  ``(A) conform to the requirements of paragraph (2); 
                and
                  ``(B) are consistent with any applicable State 
                homeland security strategy or plan.
  ``(b) National Level Exercises.--The Secretary, through the National 
Terrorism Exercise Program, shall perform on a periodic basis national 
terrorism preparedness exercises for the purposes of--
          ``(1) involving top officials from Federal, State, 
        territorial, local, tribal, and international governments, as 
        the Secretary considers appropriate;
          ``(2) testing and evaluating the Nation's capability to 
        detect, disrupt, and prevent threatened or actual catastrophic 
        acts of terrorism, especially those involving weapons of mass 
        destruction; and
          ``(3) testing and evaluating the Nation's readiness to 
        respond to and recover from catastrophic acts of terrorism, 
        especially those involving weapons of mass destruction.
  ``(c) Consultation With First Responders.--In implementing the 
responsibilities described in subsections (a) and (b), the Secretary 
shall consult with a geographic (including urban and rural) and 
substantive cross section of governmental and nongovernmental first 
responder disciplines, including as appropriate--
          ``(1) Federal, State, and local first responder training 
        institutions;
          ``(2) representatives of emergency response providers; and
          ``(3) State and local officials with an expertise in 
        terrorism preparedness.''.
          (2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents in section 
        1(b) of such Act is amended by adding at the end of the items 
        relating to title VIII the following:

             ``Subtitle J--Terrorism Preparedness Exercises

``Sec. 899a. National terrorism exercise program.''.
  (c) TOPOFF Prevention Exercise.--No later than one year after the 
date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall 
design and carry out a national terrorism prevention exercise for the 
purposes of--
          (1) involving top officials from Federal, State, territorial, 
        local, tribal, and international governments; and
          (2) testing and evaluating the Nation's capability to detect, 
        disrupt, and prevent threatened or actual catastrophic acts of 
        terrorism, especially those involving weapons of mass 
        destruction.

SEC. 302. TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSFER.

  (a) Establishment of Technology Clearinghouse.--Not later than 90 
days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall 
complete the establishment of the Technology Clearinghouse under 
section 313 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002.
  (b) Transfer Program.--Section 313 of the Homeland Security Act of 
2002 (6 U.S.C. 193) is amended--
          (1) by adding at the end of subsection (b) the following new 
        paragraph:
          ``(6) The establishment of a homeland security technology 
        transfer program to facilitate the identification, 
        modification, and commercialization of technology and equipment 
        for use by Federal, State, and local governmental agencies, 
        emergency response providers, and the private sector to 
        prevent, prepare for, or respond to acts of terrorism.'';
          (2) by redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (d); and
          (3) by inserting after subsection (b) the following new 
        subsection:
  ``(c) Technology Transfer Program.--In developing the program 
described in subsection (b)(6), the Secretary, acting through the Under 
Secretary for Science and Technology, shall--
          ``(1) in consultation with the other Under Secretaries of the 
        Department and the Director of the Office for Domestic 
        Preparedness, on an ongoing basis--
                  ``(A) conduct surveys and reviews of available 
                appropriate technologies that have been, or are in the 
                process of being developed, tested, evaluated, or 
                demonstrated by the Department, other Federal agencies, 
                or the private sector or foreign governments and 
                international organizations and that may be useful in 
                assisting Federal, State, and local governmental 
                agencies, emergency response providers, or the private 
                sector to prevent, prepare for, or respond to acts of 
                terrorism;
                  ``(B) conduct or support research, development, 
                tests, and evaluations, as appropriate of technologies 
                identified under subparagraph (A), including any 
                necessary modifications to such technologies for 
                antiterrorism use;
                  ``(C) communicate to Federal, State, and local 
                governmental agencies, emergency response providers, or 
                the private sector the availability of such 
                technologies for antiterrorism use, as well as the 
                technology's specifications, satisfaction of 
                appropriate standards, and the appropriate grants 
                available from the Department to purchase such 
                technologies;
                  ``(D) coordinate the selection and administration of 
                all technology transfer activities of the Science and 
                Technology Directorate, including projects and grants 
                awarded to the private sector and academia; and
                  ``(E) identify priorities based on current risk 
                assessments within the Department of Homeland Security 
                for identifying, researching, developing, testing, 
                evaluating, modifying, and fielding existing 
                technologies for antiterrorism purposes;
          ``(2) in support of the activities described in paragraph 
        (1)--
                  ``(A) consult with Federal, State, and local 
                emergency response providers;
                  ``(B) consult with government agencies and nationally 
                recognized standards development organizations as 
                appropriate;
                  ``(C) enter into agreements and coordinate with other 
                Federal agencies, foreign governments, and national and 
                international organizations as the Secretary determines 
                appropriate, in order to maximize the effectiveness of 
                such technologies or to facilitate commercialization of 
                such technologies; and
                  ``(D) consult with existing technology transfer 
                programs and Federal and State training centers that 
                research, develop, test, evaluate, and transfer 
                military and other technologies for use by emergency 
                response providers; and
          ``(3) establish a working group in coordination with the 
        Secretary of Defense to advise and assist the technology 
        clearinghouse in the identification of military technologies 
        that are in the process of being developed, or are developed, 
        by the Department of Defense or the private sector, which may 
        include--
                  ``(A) representatives from the Department of Defense 
                or retired military officers;
                  ``(B) nongovernmental organizations or private 
                companies that are engaged in the research, 
                development, testing, or evaluation of related 
                technologies or that have demonstrated prior experience 
                and success in searching for and identifying 
                technologies for Federal agencies;
                  ``(C) Federal, State, and local emergency response 
                providers; and
                  ``(D) to the extent the Secretary considers 
                appropriate, other organizations, other interested 
                Federal, State, and local agencies, and other 
                interested persons.''.
  (c) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of 
this Act, the Under Secretary for Science and Technology shall transmit 
to the Congress a description of the progress the Department has made 
in implementing the provisions of section 313 of the Homeland Security 
Act of 2002, as amended by this Act, including a description of the 
process used to review unsolicited proposals received as described in 
subsection (b)(3) of such section.
  (d) Savings Clause.--Nothing in this section (including the 
amendments made by this section) shall be construed to alter or 
diminish the effect of the limitation on the authority of the Secretary 
of Homeland Security under section 302(4) of the Homeland Security Act 
of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 182(4)) with respect to human health-related research 
and development activities.

SEC. 303. REVIEW OF ANTITERRORISM ACQUISITIONS.

  (a) Study.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall conduct a study 
of all Department of Homeland Security procurements, including ongoing 
procurements and anticipated procurements, to--
          (1) identify those that involve any product, equipment, 
        service (including support services), device, or technology 
        (including information technology) that is being designed, 
        developed, modified, or procured for the specific purpose of 
        preventing, detecting, identifying, or deterring acts of 
        terrorism or limiting the harm such acts might otherwise cause; 
        and
          (2) assess whether such product, equipment, service 
        (including support services), device, or technology is an 
        appropriate candidate for the litigation and risk management 
        protections of subtitle G of title VIII of the Homeland 
        Security Act of 2002.
  (b) Summary and Classification Report.--Not later than 180 days after 
the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall transmit to the 
Congress a report--
          (1) describing each product, equipment, service (including 
        support services), device, and technology identified under 
        subsection (a) that the Secretary believes would be an 
        appropriate candidate for the litigation and risk management 
        protections of subtitle G of title VIII of the Homeland 
        Security Act of 2002;
          (2) listing each such product, equipment, service (including 
        support services), device, and technology in order of priority 
        for deployment in accordance with current terrorism risk 
        assessment information; and
          (3) setting forth specific actions taken, or to be taken, to 
        encourage or require persons or entities that sell or otherwise 
        provide such products, equipment, services (including support 
        services), devices, and technologies to apply for the 
        litigation and risk management protections of subtitle G of 
        title VIII of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, and to ensure 
        prioritization of the Department's review of such products, 
        equipment, services, devices, and technologies under such Act 
        in accordance with the prioritization set forth in paragraph 
        (2) of this subsection.

SEC. 304. CENTER OF EXCELLENCE FOR BORDER SECURITY.

  The Secretary of Homeland Security shall establish a university-based 
Center for Excellence for Border Security following the merit-review 
processes and procedures that have been established for selecting 
University Programs Centers of Excellence. The Center shall prioritize 
its activities on the basis of risk to address the most significant 
threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences posed by the Nation's 
borders and border control systems, including the conduct of research, 
the examination of existing and emerging border security technology and 
systems, and the provision of education, technical, and analytical 
assistance for the Department of Homeland Security to effectively 
secure the Nation's borders.

SEC. 305. REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO THE CONTAINER SECURITY INITIATIVE 
                    (CSI).

  (a) Risk Assessment and Designation of New Foreign Seaports.--
          (1) Risk assessment.--The Secretary of Homeland Security 
        shall conduct a risk assessment of each foreign seaport that 
        the Secretary is considering designating as a port under the 
        Container Security Initiative (CSI) on or after the date of the 
        enactment of this Act. Each such assessment shall evaluate the 
        level of risk for the potential compromise of cargo containers 
        by terrorists or terrorist weapons.
          (2) Designation.--The Secretary is authorized to designate a 
        foreign seaport as a port under CSI on or after the date of the 
        enactment of this Act only if the Secretary determines, based 
        on a risk assessment under paragraph (1) and a cost-benefit 
        analysis, that the benefits of designating such port outweigh 
        the cost of expanding the program to such port.
  (b) Deployment of Inspection Equipment to New CSI Ports.--
          (1) Deployment.--The Secretary is authorized to assist in the 
        loaning of nonintrusive inspection equipment for cargo 
        containers, on a nonreimbursable basis, at each CSI port 
        designated under subsection (a)(2) and provide training for 
        personnel at the CSI port to operate the nonintrusive 
        inspection equipment.
          (2) Additional requirements.--The Secretary shall establish 
        technical capability requirements and standard operating 
        procedures for nonintrusive inspection equipment described in 
        paragraph (1) and shall require each CSI port to agree to 
        operate such equipment in accordance with such requirements and 
        procedures as a condition for receiving the equipment and 
        training under such paragraph.
  (c) Deployment of Personnel to New CSI Ports; Reevaluation of 
Personnel at All CSI Ports.--
          (1) Deployment.--The Secretary shall deploy Department of 
        Homeland Security personnel to each CSI port designated under 
        subsection (a)(1) with respect to which the Secretary 
        determines that the deployment is necessary to successfully 
        implement the requirements of CSI at the port.
          (2) Reevaluation.--The Secretary shall periodically review 
        relevant risk assessment information with respect to all CSI 
        ports at which Department of Homeland Security personnel are 
        deployed to assess whether or not continued deployment of such 
        personnel, in whole or in part, is necessary to successfully 
        implement the requirements of CSI at the port.
  (d) Inspection and Screening at United States Ports of Entry.--Cargo 
containers arriving at a United States port of entry from a CSI port 
shall undergo the same level of inspection and screening for potential 
compromise by terrorists or terrorist weapons as cargo containers 
arriving at a United States port of entry from a foreign seaport that 
is not participating in CSI unless the containers were initially 
inspected at the CSI port at the request of CSI personnel and such 
personnel verify and electronically record that the inspection 
indicates that the containers have not been compromised by terrorists 
or terrorist weapons.
  (e) Definition.--In this section, the term ``Container Security 
Initiative'' or ``CSI'' means the program carried out by the Department 
of Homeland Security under which the Department enters into agreements 
with foreign seaports to--
          (1) establish security criteria to identify high-risk 
        maritime cargo containers bound for the United States based on 
        advance information; and
          (2) screen or inspect such maritime cargo containers for 
        potential compromise by terrorists or terrorist weapons prior 
        to shipment to the United States.

SEC. 306. SECURITY OF MARITIME CARGO CONTAINERS.

  (a) Regulations.--
          (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security 
        shall issue regulations for the security of maritime cargo 
        containers moving within the intermodal transportation system 
        in accordance with the requirements of paragraph (2).
          (2) Requirements.--The regulations issued pursuant to 
        paragraph (1) shall be in accordance with recommendations of 
        the Maritime Transportation Security Act Subcommittee of the 
        Advisory Committee on Commercial Operations of the Department 
        of Homeland Security, including recommendations relating to 
        obligation to seal, recording of seal changes, modal changes, 
        seal placement, ocean carrier seal verification, and addressing 
        seal anomalies.
  (b) International Agreements.--The Secretary shall seek to enter into 
agreements with foreign countries and international organizations to 
establish standards for the security of maritime cargo containers 
moving within the intermodal transportation system that, to the maximum 
extent practicable, meet the requirements of subsection (a)(2).
  (c) Container Targeting Strategy.--
          (1) Strategy.--The Secretary shall develop a strategy to 
        improve the ability of the Department of Homeland Security to 
        use information contained in shipping bills of lading to 
        identify and provide additional review of anomalies in such 
        bills of lading. The strategy shall include a method of 
        contacting shippers in a timely fashion to verify or explain 
        any anomalies in shipping bills of lading.
          (2) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
        enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to the 
        appropriate congressional committees a report on the 
        implementation of this subsection, including information on any 
        data searching technologies that will be used to implement the 
        strategy.
  (d) Container Security Demonstration Program.--
          (1) Program.--The Secretary is authorized to establish and 
        carry out a demonstration program that integrates nonintrusive 
        inspection equipment, including radiation detection equipment 
        and gamma ray inspection equipment, at an appropriate United 
        States seaport, as determined by the Secretary.
          (2) Requirement.--The demonstration program shall also 
        evaluate automatic identification methods for containers and 
        vehicles and a data sharing network capable of transmitting 
        inspection data between ports and appropriate entities within 
        the Department of Homeland Security.
          (3) Report.--Upon completion of the demonstration program, 
        the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
        committees a report on the implementation of this subsection.
  (e) Consolidation of Container Security Programs.--The Secretary 
shall consolidate all programs of the Department of Homeland Security 
relating to the security of maritime cargo containers, including the 
demonstration program established pursuant to subsection (d), to 
achieve enhanced coordination and efficiency.

SEC. 307. SECURITY PLAN FOR GENERAL AVIATION AT RONALD REAGAN 
                    WASHINGTON NATIONAL AIRPORT.

  Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the 
Secretary of Homeland Security shall implement section 823(a) of the 
Vision 100--Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act (49 U.S.C. 41718 
note; 117 Stat. 2595).

SEC. 308. INTEROPERABLE COMMUNICATIONS ASSISTANCE.

  (a) Findings.--The Congress finds the following:
          (1) The 9/11 Commission determined that the inability of 
        first responders to communicate effectively on September 11, 
        2001 was a critical obstacle to an effective multi-
        jurisdictional response.
          (2) Many jurisdictions across the country still experience 
        difficulties communicating that may contribute to confusion, 
        delays, or added risks when responding to an emergency.
          (3) During fiscal year 2004, the Office for Domestic 
        Preparedness awarded over $834,000,000 for 2,912 projects 
        through Department of Homeland Security grant programs for the 
        purposes of improving communications interoperability.
          (4) Interoperable communications systems are most effective 
        when designed to comprehensively address, on a regional basis, 
        the communications of all types of public safety agencies, 
        first responder disciplines, and State and local government 
        facilities.
          (5) Achieving communications interoperability is complex due 
        to the extensive training, system modifications, and agreements 
        among the different jurisdictions that are necessary to 
        implement effective communications systems.
          (6) The Congress authorized the Department of Homeland 
        Security to create an Office for Interoperability and 
        Compatibility in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
        Prevention Act of 2004 to, among other things, establish a 
        comprehensive national approach, coordinate federal activities, 
        accelerate the adoption of standards, and encourage research 
        and development to achieve interoperable communications for 
        first responders.
          (7) The Office for Interoperability and Compatibility 
        includes the SAFECOM Program that serves as the umbrella 
        program within the Federal government to improve public safety 
        communications interoperability, and has developed the RAPIDCOM 
        program, the Statewide Communications Interoperability Planning 
        Methodology, and a Statement of Requirements to provide 
        technical, planning, and purchasing assistance for Federal 
        departments and agencies, State and local governments, and 
        first responders.
  (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of the Congress that the 
Department of Homeland Security should implement as expeditiously as 
possible the initiatives assigned to the Office for Interoperability 
and Compatibility under section 7303 of the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 194), including specifically 
the following:
          (1) Establishing a comprehensive national approach to 
        achieving public safety interoperable communications.
          (2) Issuing letters of intent to commit future funds for 
        jurisdictions through existing homeland security grant programs 
        to applicants as appropriate to encourage long-term investments 
        that may significantly improve communications interoperability.
          (3) Providing technical assistance to additional urban and 
        other high-risk areas to support the establishment of 
        consistent, secure, and effective interoperable communications 
        capabilities.
          (4) Completing the report to the Congress on the Department's 
        plans for accelerating the development of national voluntary 
        consensus standards for public safety interoperable 
        communications, a schedule of milestones for such development, 
        and achievements of such development, by no later than 30 days 
        after the date of enactment of this Act.

SEC. 309. REPORT TO CONGRESS ON IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
                    REGARDING PROTECTION OF AGRICULTURE.

  The Secretary of Homeland Security shall report to the Committee on 
Homeland Security of the House of Representatives and the Committee on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate by no later 
than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act regarding how 
the Department of Homeland Security will implement the applicable 
recommendations from the Government Accountability Office report 
entitled ``Homeland Security: Much is Being Done to Protect Agriculture 
from a Terrorist Attack, but Important Challenges Remain'' (GAO-05-
214).

 Subtitle B--Department of Homeland Security Cybersecurity Enhancement

SEC. 311. SHORT TITLE.

  This subtitle may be cited as the ``Department of Homeland Security 
Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2005''.

SEC. 312. ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR CYBERSECURITY.

  (a) In General.--Subtitle A of title II of the Homeland Security Act 
of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121 et seq.) is further amended by adding at the end 
the following:

``SEC. 207. ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR CYBERSECURITY.

  ``(a) In General.--There shall be in the Directorate for Information 
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection a National Cybersecurity Office 
headed by an Assistant Secretary for Cybersecurity (in this section 
referred to as the `Assistant Secretary'), who shall assist the 
Secretary in promoting cybersecurity for the Nation.
  ``(b) General Authority.--The Assistant Secretary, subject to the 
direction and control of the Secretary, shall have primary authority 
within the Department for all cybersecurity-related critical 
infrastructure protection programs of the Department, including with 
respect to policy formulation and program management.
  ``(c) Responsibilities.--The responsibilities of the Assistant 
Secretary shall include the following:
          ``(1) To establish and manage--
                  ``(A) a national cybersecurity response system that 
                includes the ability to--
                          ``(i) analyze the effect of cybersecurity 
                        threat information on national critical 
                        infrastructure; and
                          ``(ii) aid in the detection and warning of 
                        attacks on, and in the restoration of, 
                        cybersecurity infrastructure in the aftermath 
                        of such attacks;
                  ``(B) a national cybersecurity threat and 
                vulnerability reduction program that identifies 
                cybersecurity vulnerabilities that would have a 
                national effect on critical infrastructure, performs 
                vulnerability assessments on information technologies, 
                and coordinates the mitigation of such vulnerabilities;
                  ``(C) a national cybersecurity awareness and training 
                program that promotes cybersecurity awareness among the 
                public and the private sectors and promotes 
                cybersecurity training and education programs;
                  ``(D) a government cybersecurity program to 
                coordinate and consult with Federal, State, and local 
                governments to enhance their cybersecurity programs; 
                and
                  ``(E) a national security and international 
                cybersecurity cooperation program to help foster 
                Federal efforts to enhance international cybersecurity 
                awareness and cooperation.
          ``(2) To coordinate with the private sector on the program 
        under paragraph (1) as appropriate, and to promote 
        cybersecurity information sharing, vulnerability assessment, 
        and threat warning regarding critical infrastructure.
          ``(3) To coordinate with other directorates and offices 
        within the Department on the cybersecurity aspects of their 
        missions.
          ``(4) To coordinate with the Under Secretary for Emergency 
        Preparedness and Response to ensure that the National Response 
        Plan developed pursuant to section 502(6) of the Homeland 
        Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 312(6)) includes appropriate 
        measures for the recovery of the cybersecurity elements of 
        critical infrastructure.
          ``(5) To develop processes for information sharing with the 
        private sector, consistent with section 214, that--
                  ``(A) promote voluntary cybersecurity best practices, 
                standards, and benchmarks that are responsive to rapid 
                technology changes and to the security needs of 
                critical infrastructure; and
                  ``(B) consider roles of Federal, State, local, and 
                foreign governments and the private sector, including 
                the insurance industry and auditors.
          ``(6) To coordinate with the Chief Information Officer of the 
        Department in establishing a secure information sharing 
        architecture and information sharing processes, including with 
        respect to the Department's operation centers.
          ``(7) To consult with the Electronic Crimes Task Force of the 
        United States Secret Service on private sector outreach and 
        information activities.
          ``(8) To consult with the Office for Domestic Preparedness to 
        ensure that realistic cybersecurity scenarios are incorporated 
        into tabletop and recovery exercises.
          ``(9) To consult and coordinate, as appropriate, with other 
        Federal agencies on cybersecurity-related programs, policies, 
        and operations.
          ``(10) To consult and coordinate within the Department and, 
        where appropriate, with other relevant Federal agencies, on 
        security of digital control systems, such as Supervisory 
        Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems.
  ``(d) Authority Over the National Communications System.--The 
Assistant Secretary shall have primary authority within the Department 
over the National Communications System.''.
  (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in section 1(b) of 
such Act is amended by adding at the end of the items relating to 
subtitle A of title II the following:

``Sec. 207. Assistant Secretary for Cybersecurity.''.

SEC. 313. CYBERSECURITY DEFINED.

  Section 2 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101) is 
amended by adding at the end the following:
          ``(17)(A) The term `cybersecurity' means the prevention of 
        damage to, the protection of, and the restoration of computers, 
        electronic communications systems, electronic communication 
        services, wire communication, and electronic communication, 
        including information contained therein, to ensure its 
        availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and 
        nonrepudiation.
          ``(B) In this paragraph--
                  ``(i) each of the terms `damage' and `computer' has 
                the meaning that term has in section 1030 of title 18, 
                United States Code; and
                  ``(ii) each of the terms `electronic communications 
                system', `electronic communication service', `wire 
                communication', and `electronic communication' has the 
                meaning that term has in section 2510 of title 18, 
                United States Code.''.

SEC. 314. CYBERSECURITY TRAINING PROGRAMS AND EQUIPMENT.

  (a) In General.--The Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through 
the Assistant Secretary for Cybersecurity, may establish, in 
conjunction with the National Science Foundation, a program to award 
grants to institutions of higher education (and consortia thereof) 
for--
          (1) the establishment or expansion of cybersecurity 
        professional development programs;
          (2) the establishment or expansion of associate degree 
        programs in cybersecurity; and
          (3) the purchase of equipment to provide training in 
        cybersecurity for either professional development programs or 
        degree programs.
  (b) Roles.--
          (1) Department of homeland security.--The Secretary, acting 
        through the Assistant Secretary for Cybersecurity and in 
        consultation with the Director of the National Science 
        Foundation, shall establish the goals for the program 
        established under this section and the criteria for awarding 
        grants under the program.
          (2) National science foundation.--The Director of the 
        National Science Foundation shall operate the program 
        established under this section consistent with the goals and 
        criteria established under paragraph (1), including soliciting 
        applicants, reviewing applications, and making and 
        administering grant awards. The Director may consult with the 
        Assistant Secretary for Cybersecurity in selecting awardees.
          (3) Funding.--The Secretary shall transfer to the National 
        Science Foundation the funds necessary to carry out this 
        section.
  (c) Grant Awards.--
          (1) Peer review.--All grant awards under this section shall 
        be made on a competitive, merit-reviewed basis.
          (2) Focus.--In making grant awards under this section, the 
        Director shall, to the extent practicable, ensure geographic 
        diversity and the participation of women and underrepresented 
        minorities.
          (3) Preference.--In making grant awards under this section, 
        the Director shall give preference to applications submitted by 
        consortia of institutions to encourage as many students and 
        professionals as possible to benefit from this program.
  (d) Authorization of Appropriations.--Of the amount authorized under 
section 101, there is authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary 
for carrying out this section $3,700,000 for fiscal year 2006.
  (e) Definitions.--In this section, the term ``institution of higher 
education'' has the meaning given that term in section 101(a) of the 
Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001(a)).

SEC. 315. INFORMATION SECURITY REQUIREMENTS AND OMB RESPONSIBILITIES 
                    NOT AFFECTED.

  (a) In General.--This subtitle does not affect--
          (1) any information security requirement under any other 
        Federal law; or
          (2) the responsibilities of the Director of the Office of 
        Management and Budget under any other Federal law.
  (b) Laws Included.--The laws referred to in subsection (a) include 
the following:
          (1) Chapter 35 of title 44, United States Code, popularly 
        known as the Paperwork Reduction Act.
          (2) The Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 (divisions D and E of 
        Public Law 104-106), including the provisions of law enacted by 
        amendments made by that Act.
          (3) The Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 
        (title III of Public Law 107-347), including the provisions of 
        law enacted by amendments made by that Act.

         Subtitle C--Security of Public Transportation Systems

SEC. 321. SECURITY BEST PRACTICES.

  Not later than 120 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the 
Secretary of Homeland Security shall develop, disseminate to 
appropriate owners, operators, and providers of public transportation 
systems, public transportation employees and employee representatives, 
and Federal, State, and local officials, and transmit to Congress, a 
report containing best practices for the security of public 
transportation systems. In developing best practices, the Secretary 
shall be responsible for consulting with and collecting input from 
owners, operators, and providers of public transportation systems, 
public transportation employee representatives, first responders, 
industry associations, private sector experts, academic experts, and 
appropriate Federal, State, and local officials.

SEC. 322. PUBLIC AWARENESS.

  Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the 
Secretary of Homeland Security shall develop a national plan for public 
outreach and awareness. Such plan shall be designed to increase 
awareness of measures that the general public, public transportation 
passengers, and public transportation employees can take to increase 
public transportation system security. Such plan shall also provide 
outreach to owners, operators, providers, and employees of public 
transportation systems to improve their awareness of available 
technologies, ongoing research and development efforts, and available 
Federal funding sources to improve public transportation security. Not 
later than 9 months after the date of enactment of this Act, the 
Secretary shall implement the plan developed under this section.

           Subtitle D--Critical Infrastructure Prioritization

SEC. 331. CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE.

  (a) Completion of Prioritization.--Not later than 90 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security 
shall complete the prioritization of the Nation's critical 
infrastructure according to all of the following criteria:
          (1) The threat of terrorist attack, based on threat 
        information received and analyzed by the Office of Information 
        Analysis of the Department regarding the intentions and 
        capabilities of terrorist groups and other potential threats to 
        the Nation's critical infrastructure.
          (2) The likelihood that an attack would cause the destruction 
        or significant disruption of such infrastructure.
          (3) The likelihood that an attack would result in substantial 
        numbers of deaths and serious bodily injuries, a substantial 
        adverse impact on the national economy, or a substantial 
        adverse impact on national security.
  (b) Cooperation.--Such prioritization shall be developed in 
cooperation with other relevant Federal agencies, State, local, and 
tribal governments, and the private sector, as appropriate.

SEC. 332. SECURITY REVIEW.

  (a) Requirement.--Not later than 9 months after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary, in coordination with other 
relevant Federal agencies, State, local, and tribal governments, and 
the private sector, as appropriate, shall--
          (1) review existing Federal, State, local, tribal, and 
        private sector plans for securing the critical infrastructure 
        included in the prioritization developed under section 331;
          (2) recommend changes to existing plans for securing such 
        infrastructure, as the Secretary determines necessary; and
          (3) coordinate and contribute to protective efforts of other 
        Federal, State, local, and tribal agencies and the private 
        sector, as appropriate, as directed in Homeland Security 
        Presidential Directive 7.
  (b) Contents of Plans.--The recommendations made under subsection 
(a)(2) shall include--
          (1) necessary protective measures to secure such 
        infrastructure, including milestones and timeframes for 
        implementation; and
          (2) to the extent practicable, performance metrics to 
        evaluate the benefits to both national security and the 
        Nation's economy from the implementation of such protective 
        measures.

SEC. 333. IMPLEMENTATION REPORT.

  (a) In General.--Not later than 15 months after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit a report to the 
Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives and the 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate 
on the implementation of section 332. Such report shall detail--
          (1) the Secretary's review and coordination of security plans 
        under section 332; and
          (2) the Secretary's oversight of the execution and 
        effectiveness of such plans.
  (b) Update.--Not later than 1 year after the submission of the report 
under subsection (a), the Secretary shall provide an update of such 
report to the congressional committees described in subsection (a).

SEC. 334. PROTECTION OF INFORMATION.

  Information that is generated, compiled, or disseminated by the 
Department of Homeland Security in carrying out this section--
          (1) is exempt from disclosure under section 552 of title 5, 
        United States Code; and
          (2) shall not, if provided by the Department to a State or 
        local government or government agency--
                  (A) be made available pursuant to any State or local 
                law requiring disclosure of information or records;
                  (B) otherwise be disclosed or distributed to any 
                person by such State or local government or government 
                agency without the written consent of the Secretary; or
                  (C) be used other than for the purpose of protecting 
                critical infrastructure or protected systems, or in 
                furtherance of an investigation or the prosecution of a 
                criminal act.

                        TITLE IV--MISCELLANEOUS

SEC. 401. BORDER SECURITY AND ENFORCEMENT COORDINATION AND OPERATIONS.

  (a) Findings.--The Congress makes the following findings:
          (1) In creating the Department of Homeland Security, the 
        Congress sought to enhance the Nation's capabilities to 
        prevent, protect against, and respond to terrorist acts by 
        consolidating existing Federal agencies with homeland security 
        functions into a single new Department, and by realigning the 
        missions of those legacy agencies to more directly support our 
        national homeland security efforts.
          (2) As part of this massive government reorganization, 
        section 442 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 
        107-273) established a Bureau of Border Security and 
        transferred into it all of the functions, programs, personnel, 
        assets, and liabilities pertaining to the following programs: 
        the Border Patrol; alien detention and removal; immigration-
        related intelligence, investigations, and enforcement 
        activities; and immigration inspections at ports of entry.
          (3) Title IV of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 
        107-273) also transferred to the new Department the United 
        States Customs Service, as a distinct entity within the new 
        Department, to further the Department's border integrity 
        mission.
          (4) Utilizing its reorganization authority provided in the 
        Homeland Security Act of 2002, the President submitted a 
        reorganization plan for the Department on January 30, 2003.
          (5) This plan merged the customs and immigration border 
        inspection and patrol functions, along with agricultural 
        inspections functions, into a new entity called United States 
        Customs and Border Protection.
          (6) The plan also combined the customs and immigration 
        enforcement agents, as well as the Office of Detention and 
        Removal Operations, the Office of Federal Protective Service, 
        the Office of Federal Air Marshal Service, and the Office of 
        Intelligence, into another new entity called United States 
        Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
          (7) The President's January 30, 2003, reorganization plan did 
        not explain the reasons for separating immigration inspection 
        and border patrol functions from other immigration-related 
        enforcement activities, which was contrary to the single Bureau 
        of Border Security as prescribed by the Congress in the section 
        441 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002.
          (8) Two years after this structure has been in effect, 
        questions remain about whether the Department has organized 
        itself properly, and is managing its customs and immigration 
        enforcement and border security resources in the most 
        efficient, sensible, and effective manner.
          (9) The current structure has resulted in less cooperation 
        and information sharing between these two critical functions 
        than is desirable, and has caused operational and 
        administrative difficulties that are hampering efforts to 
        secure our borders and ensure the integrity of our border 
        control system.
          (10) United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement has 
        faced major budgetary challenges that are, in part, 
        attributable to the inexact division of resources upon the 
        separation of immigration functions. These budget shortfalls 
        have forced United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
        to impose hiring freezes and to release aliens that otherwise 
        should be detained.
          (11) The current structure also has resulted in unnecessary 
        overlap and duplication between United States Immigration and 
        Customs Enforcement and United States Customs and Border 
        Protection, both in the field and at the headquarters level. 
        There are intelligence, legislative affairs, public affairs, 
        and international affairs offices in both agencies.
          (12) Border security and customs and immigration enforcement 
        should be one seamless mission.
  (b) Report.--
          (1) In general.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the 
        enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall 
        review and evaluate the current organizational structure of the 
        Department of Homeland Security established by the President's 
        January 30, 2003, reorganization plan and submit a report of 
        findings and recommendations to the Congress.
          (2) Contents of report.--The report shall include--
                  (A) a description of the rationale for, and any 
                benefits of, the current organizational division of 
                United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement and 
                United States Customs and Border Protection, with 
                respect to the Department's immigration and customs 
                missions;
                  (B) a description of the organization, missions, 
                operations, and policies of United States Customs and 
                Border Protection and United States Immigration and 
                Customs Enforcement, and areas of unnecessary overlap 
                or operational gaps among and between these missions;
                  (C) an analysis of alternative organizational 
                structures that could provide a more effective way to 
                deliver maximum efficiencies and mission success;
                  (D) a description of the current role of the 
                Directorate of Border and Transportation Security with 
                respect to providing adequate direction and oversight 
                of the two agencies, and whether this management 
                structure is still necessary;
                  (E) an analysis of whether the Federal Air Marshals 
                and the Federal Protective Service are properly located 
                within the Department within United States Immigration 
                and Customs Enforcement;
                  (F) the proper placement and functions of a 
                specialized investigative and patrol unit operating at 
                the southwest border on the Tohono O'odham Nation, 
                known as the Shadow Wolves;
                  (G) the potential costs of reorganization, including 
                financial, programmatic, and other costs, to the 
                Department; and
                  (H) recommendations for correcting the operational 
                and administrative problems that have been caused by 
                the division of United States Customs and Border 
                Protection and United States Immigration and Customs 
                Enforcement, including any appropriate reorganization 
                plans.

SEC. 402. GAO REPORT TO CONGRESS.

   Not later than 6 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
the Comptroller General of the United States shall submit to the 
Congress a report that sets forth--
          (1) an assessment of the effectiveness of the organizational 
        and management structure of the Department of Homeland Security 
        in meeting the Department's missions; and
          (2) recommendations to facilitate and improve the 
        organization and management of the Department to best meet 
        those missions.

SEC. 403. PLAN FOR ESTABLISHING CONSOLIDATED AND COLOCATED REGIONAL 
                    OFFICES.

  Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
the Secretary of Homeland Security shall develop and submit to the 
Congress a plan for establishing consolidated and colocated regional 
offices for the Department of Homeland Security in accordance with 
section 706 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 346).

SEC. 404. PLAN TO REDUCE WAIT TIMES.

  Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the 
Secretary of Homeland Security shall develop a plan--
          (1) to improve the operational efficiency of security 
        screening checkpoints at commercial service airports so that 
        average peak waiting periods at such checkpoints do not exceed 
        20 minutes; and
          (2) to ensure that there are no significant disparities in 
        immigration and customs processing times among airports that 
        serve as international gateways.

SEC. 405. DENIAL OF TRANSPORTATION SECURITY CARD.

  Section 70105(c) of title 46, United States Code, is amended--
          (1) in paragraph (3) by inserting before the period ``before 
        an administrative law judge''; and
          (2) by adding at the end the following:
  ``(5) In making a determination under paragraph (1)(D), the Secretary 
shall not consider a felony conviction if--
          ``(A) that felony occurred more than 7 years prior to the 
        date of the Secretary's determination; and
          ``(B) the felony was not related to terrorism (as that term 
        is defined in section 2 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 
        U.S.C. 101)).''.

SEC. 406. TRANSFER OF EXISTING CUSTOMS PATROL OFFICERS UNIT AND 
                    ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW CPO UNITS IN THE BUREAU OF 
                    IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT.

  (a) Transfer of Existing Unit.--Not later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security 
shall transfer to the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement all 
functions (including the personnel, assets, and obligations held by or 
available in connection with such functions) of the Customs Patrol 
Officers unit of the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection operating 
on the Tohono O'odham Indian reservation (commonly known as the `Shadow 
Wolves' unit).
  (b) Establishment of New Units.--The Secretary is authorized to 
establish within the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
additional units of Customs Patrol Officers in accordance with this 
section.
  (c) Duties.--The Secretary is authorized to establish within the 
Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement additional units of 
Customs Patrol Officers in accordance with this section.
  (d) Basic Pay for Journeyman Officers.--The rate of basic pay for a 
journeyman Customs Patrol Officer in a unit described in this section 
shall be not less than the rate of basic pay for GS-13 of the General 
Schedule.
  (e) Supervisors.--Each unit described under this section shall be 
supervised by a Chief Customs Patrol Officer, who shall have the same 
rank as a resident agent-in-charge of the Office of Investigations.

                          Purpose and Summary

    The purpose of H.R. 1817 is To authorize appropriations for 
fiscal year 2006 for the Department of Homeland Security, and 
for other purposes.

                  Background and Need for Legislation

    The core mission of the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) is threefold: first, preventing terrorist attacks within 
the United States; second, reducing America's vulnerability to 
terrorism; and third, responding to and recovering from 
terrorist attacks if and when they occur. It is equally 
essential that the Department carry out this mission in a 
manner that promotes our Nation's economic security through the 
facilitation of legitimate trade and travel. The President's 
proposed discretionary budget for the Department--and its 
180,000 employees--for Fiscal Year 2006 is $34.2 billion. With 
mandatory funding accounts included, the total exceeds $41 
billion. DHS is thus the third largest Cabinet agency, and its 
challenges are surely magnified by the fact that it is the 
result of a recent merger of 22 legacy agencies, each of which 
brought with it its own policies, systems, processes, and 
culture.
    The complexity of the Department's missions, coupled with 
the enormity of its management and operational challenges, 
requires the close and continuing oversight that an annual 
Congressional re-authorization provides. Like the Department of 
Defense and the Intelligence Community agencies, DHS is--first 
and foremost--a national security agency. And like those other 
national security agencies, DHS should be subject to an annual 
authorization process through which the evolving needs of the 
Department can be met, and through which Congressional 
direction, oversight, and prioritization can take place. An 
annual authorization will help the Department improve the 
overall management and integration of its various legacy 
agencies, to guide resource allocation and prioritization, to 
set clear and achievable benchmarks for progress and success, 
and to enhance the Department's implementation of its critical 
mission.
    H.R. 1817 is the first DHS authorization bill to be 
reported to the House since the creation of the Department in 
the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296), two and half 
years ago in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001. Given the pendency of the new Secretary of Homeland 
Security's comprehensive 90-day review of the Department's 
management, operations, and organization, the intent of this 
bill is not to make significant changes to the Department's 
overall budget and structure. Rather, the intent of this bill 
is to make some targeted and necessary improvements in the 
Department's operations, and to lay the foundation for a more 
comprehensive, annual review in collaboration with the 
Department.
    In particular, H.R. 1817 will enhance terrorism-related 
information analysis, integration, and sharing, bolster efforts 
to develop and deploy critical anti-terrorism technologies, 
elevate the cybersecurity mission within the Department, fully 
fund 2,000 additional Border Patrol agents to help secure our 
Nation's vast borders against infiltration by terrorists or 
terrorist weapons, and enhance cargo and port security. 
Further, H.R. 1817 accomplishes these goals within a realistic 
budgetary framework, consistent with the House-passed Budget 
Resolution and the President's Fiscal Year 2006 budget request 
for the Department.

                                Hearings

    Prior to the introduction of H.R. 1817, the Committee held 
numerous hearings on the Department of Homeland Security's 
Budget and the issues considered within H.R. 1817.
    On Wednesday, April 13, 2005, the Full Committee held a 
hearing entitled ``The Department of Homeland Security: 
Promoting Risk-Based Prioritization and Management.'' The 
Committee received testimony from The Honorable Michael 
Chertoff, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security.
    On Thursday, February 10, 2005, the Subcommittee on 
Emergency Preparedness, Science, and Technology held a hearing 
entitled ``The Proposed Fiscal Year 2006 Budget: Enhancing 
Terrorism Preparedness for First Responders.'' The Subcommittee 
received testimony from the Honorable Penrose ``Parney'' 
Albright, Ph.D., Assistant Secretary, Science and Technology 
Directorate, Department of Homeland Security; Mr. Matt A. 
Mayer, Acting Executive Director, Office of State and Local 
Government Coordination and Preparedness, Department of 
Homeland Security; and General Dennis Reimer (Ret.), Director, 
National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism.
    On Wednesday, February 16, 2005, the Subcommittee on 
Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk 
Assessment held a hearing entitled ``The Proposed Fiscal Year 
2006 Budget: Building the Information Analysis Capability of 
DHS.'' The Subcommittee received testimony from Lt. General Pat 
Hughes (Ret.), Acting Under Secretary, Information Analysis and 
Infrastructure Protection, Department of Homeland Security.
    On Wednesday, March 2, 2005, the Subcommittee on Economic 
Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity held a 
hearing entitled ``Proposed FY 2006 Budget: Integrating 
Homeland Security Screening Operations.'' The Subcommittee 
received testimony from Mr. Jim Williams, Director, US-VISIT 
Program, Border and Transportation Security Directorate, 
Department of Homeland Security; Ms. Carol DiBattiste, Deputy 
Administrator, Transportation Security Administration, 
Department of Homeland Security; and Ms. Deborah J. Spero, 
Deputy Commissioner, Bureau of U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection, Department of Homeland Security.
    On Wednesday, March 9, 2005, the Subcommittee on 
Management, Integration, and Oversight held a hearing entitled 
``CBP and ICE: Does the Current Organizational Structure Best 
Serve U.S. Homeland Security Interests?'' Testimony was 
received from Dr. James Carafano, Senior Research Fellow, The 
Heritage Foundation; Mr. Michael Cutler, Former Senior Special 
Agent, U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service; Mr. David 
Venturella, Former Director, Office of Detention and Removal 
Operations, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 
Department of Homeland Security; Mr. T.J. Bonner, President, 
National Border Patrol Council; and public witnesses.
    On Thursday, April 14, 2005, the Subcommittee on 
Management, Integration, and Oversight held a hearing entitled 
``The Need to Strengthen Information Security at the Department 
of Homeland Security.'' Testimony was received from Mr. Steven 
I. Cooper, Chief Information Officer, Department of Homeland 
Security; Mr. Gregory C. Wilshusen, Director, Information 
Security Issues Government Accountability Office; and public 
witnesses.
    On Tuesday, April 19, 2005, the Subcommittee on Prevention 
of Nuclear and Biological Attack held a hearing entitled ``DHS 
Coordination of Nuclear Detection Efforts, Part I.'' Testimony 
was received from public witnesses.
    On Wednesday, April 20, 2005, the Subcommittee on 
Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attack held a hearing 
entitled ``DHS Coordination of Nuclear Detection Efforts, Part 
II.'' Testimony was received from Mr. Vayl Oxford, Acting 
Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, Department of 
Homeland Security.
    On Wednesday, April 20, 2005, Subcommittee on Management, 
Integration, and Oversight, held a hearing entitled 
``Management Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland 
Security.'' Testimony was received from Mr. Richard L. Skinner, 
Acting Inspector General, Office of the Inspector General, 
Department of Homeland Security; Mr. Norman Rabkin, Managing 
Director, Homeland Security and Justice, Government 
Accountability Office; the Honorable Asa Hutchison, Chairman of 
the Homeland Security Practice, Veneble, LLC; the Honorable 
James S. Gilmore, III, Chairman, National Council on Readiness 
and Preparedness; and Mr. Clark Kent Ervin, Director, Homeland 
Security Initiative, The Aspen Institute.
    On Wednesday, April 20, 2005, the Subcommittee on Economic 
Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity held a 
hearing on H.R. 285, the Department of Homeland Security 
Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2005. Testimony was received 
from public witnesses.

                        Committee Consideration

    On Tuesday, April 19, 2005, the Subcommittee on Emergency 
Preparedness, Science, and Technology met in open markup 
session to consider a Committee Print entitled ``To amend the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002 to provide for homeland security 
technology development and transfer.'' The Subcommittee ordered 
favorably reported to the Full Committee for consideration, 
without amendment, by voice vote. Provisions of this Committee 
Print were included within section 302 of H.R. 1817, as 
introduced.
    On Wednesday, April 20, 2005, prior to introduction of H.R. 
1817, the Subcommittee on Economic Security, Infrastructure 
Protection, and Cybersecurity met in open markup session to 
consider H.R. 265, the ``Department of Homeland Security 
Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2005.'' The Subcommittee 
ordered the bill favorably reported to the Full Committee for 
consideration, without amendment, by voice vote. Provisions of 
H.R. 265 were included within subtitle B of Title III of H.R. 
1817, as introduced.
    On Tuesday, April 26, 2005, the Subcommittee on 
Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk 
Assessment met in open markup session to consider a Committee 
Print entitled ``The Homeland Security Information Sharing and 
Enhancement Act of 2005.'' The Subcommittee ordered the 
Committee Print favorably reported to the Full Committee for 
consideration, without amendment, by voice vote. Provisions of 
the Committee Print were included within Title II of H.R. 1817, 
as introduced, and within the Manager's Amendment offered by 
Mr. Cox during the Full Committee consideration of H.R. 1817.
    H.R. 1817 was introduced by Mr. Cox on April 26, 2005, and 
referred solely to the Committee on Homeland Security. Within 
the Committee on Homeland Security, H.R. 1817 was retained at 
the Full Committee.
    On April 27, 2005, the Full Committee met in open markup 
session, a quorum being present, and ordered H.R.1817 favorably 
reported to the House of Representatives, amended, by a 
unanimous voice vote.

                            Committee Votes

    Clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of 
Representatives requires the Committee to list the record votes 
on the motion to report legislation and amendments thereto.
    H.R. 1817, Department of Homeland Security Authorization 
Act for FY 2006; was ordered favorably reported to the House, 
amended, by unanimous Voice Vote.
    The following amendments were offered:
    A Managers Amendment offered by Mr. Cox (#1), was AGREED TO 
by Unanimous Consent.
    An amendment offered by Mr. Thompson (#2), an Amendment in 
the Nature of a Substitute, was NOT AGREED TO by a recorded 
vote of 12 yeas and 16 nays (Record Vote No. 4)


    An amendment offered by Mr. Weldon (#3), at the appropriate 
place in the bill, insert a new section entitled 
``Reestablishment of EMP Commission.'', was WITHDRAWN by 
Unanimous Consent.
    An amendment offered by Mr. Meek (#4), to add at the end a 
new title entitled ``Accountability: Addressing Management 
Challenges of the Department of Homeland Security'', was NOT 
AGREED TO by a recorded vote of 11 Yeas and 16 Yays (Record 
Vote No. 5).


    An amendment offered by Mr. Young (#5), at the appropriate 
place in the bill, insert the following new section entitled 
``Transfer of Preparedness Functions to Under Secretary for 
Emergency Preparedness and Response'', was WITHDRAWN by 
Unanimous Consent.
    An amendment offered by Mr. Pascrell (#6), add at the end 
the following new title entitled ``Enhancement of Emergency 
Preparedness'', was NOT AGREED TO by a recorded vote of 10 Yeas 
and 18 Nays (Record Vote No. 6).


    An amendment offered by Mr. Etheridge (#7), add at the end 
a new section entitled ``Report to Congress on Implementation 
of Recommendations Regarding Protection of Agriculture'', was 
AGREED TO by Voice Vote.
    An amendment offered by Mr. Souder (#8), at the appropriate 
place in the bill, insert the following new title entitled 
``Border and Transportation Security Reorganization'', was 
WITHDRAWN by Unanimous Consent.
    An amendment offered by Mr. Langevin (#9), add at the end a 
new title entitled ``Title V-Preparing Against Biological 
Attack'', was NOT AGREED TO by a recorded vote of 11 Yeas and 
17 Nays (Record Vote No. 7).


    An amendment offered by Mr. Smith (#10), at the end of 
title IV, add a new section entitled ``Center of Excellence for 
Border Security'', was AGREED TO by Voice Vote.
    An amendment offered by Mr. Davis (#11), at the end of 
title IV of the bill, add the following new section entitled 
``Plan to Reduce Wait Times'', was AGREED TO, as modified by a 
unanimous consent request by Mr. Davis, by Voice Vote. A 
Unanimous Consent request by Mr. Davis to consider the 
amendment en bloc with an amendment to, in section 202(e) add a 
new section (2) relating to statutory requirements, was not 
objected to.
    An amendment offered by Mr. Dicks (#12), add at the end a 
new section entitled ``Optimizing Technology to Enhance 
Homeland Security'', was WITHDRAWN by Unanimous Consent.
    An amendment offered by Mr. Simmons (#13), at the end of 
section 301, add the following new subsection (c) entitled 
``Topoff Prevention Exercise'', was AGREED TO by Voice Vote.
    An amendment offered by Ms. Sanchez (#14), at the end of 
the bill add a new section entitled ``Customs-Trade Partnership 
Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) Program'', was AGREED TO, as 
modified by a unanimous consent request, by Voice Vote. A 
Unanimous Consent request by Ms. Sanchez to strike all, except 
for sections 509(a)-509(e), was not objected to.
    An amendment offered by Mr. Rogers (#15), at the 
appropriate place, insert the following new section entitled 
``Authorization of Appropriations for Training of State and 
Local Personnel in Border States Performing Immigration 
Functions'', was AGREED TO by Voice Vote.
    An amendment offered by Ms. Jackson-Lee (#16), at the end 
of the bill, add a new title entitled ``Securing Our Land 
Borders'', was NOT AGREED TO by a recorded vote of 11 Yeas and 
16 Nays (Record Vote No. 8).


    An amendment offered by Mr. Reichert (#17), in section 301, 
add a new section (c) entitled ``Consultation With First 
Responders'', was AGREED TO by Voice Vote.
    An amendment offered by Ms. Norton (#18), at the end of the 
bill, add a new title entitled ``Security of Public 
Transportation Systems'', was AGREED TO, as modified by a 
unanimous consent request by Mr. Cox, by Voice Vote. A 
Unanimous Consent request by Mr. Cox to strike all, except for 
sections 4 and 5, was not objected to.
    An amendment offered by Mr. Pearce (#19), in section 102, 
insert a new section (b) relating to the priority of additional 
border agents, was WITHDRAWN by Unanimous Consent.
    An amendment offered by Mr. Weldon (#20), in title III, 
insert a new section, a sense of Congress entitled 
``Interoperable Communications Assistance'', was AGREED TO by 
Voice Vote.
    An amendment offered by Mr. Markey (#21), add at the end a 
new title entitled ``Securing Critical Infrastructure'', was 
NOT AGREED TO by a record vote of 12 Yeas and 16 Nays (Record 
Vote No. 9).


    An amendment offered by Mr. Souder (#22), at the 
appropriate place in the bill, insert the following new title 
entitled ``Shadow Wolves'', was AGREED TO by Voice Vote.
    An amendment offered by Ms. Harman (#23), insert at the end 
a new title entitled ``Harnessing Intelligence'', was AGREED 
TO, as modified by a unanimous consent request by Mr. Cox, and 
amended, by Voice Vote. A Unanimous Consent request by Mr. Cox 
to insert ``tribal'' after references to ``State, and local 
government'', was not objected to.
    An amendment offered by Mr. Cox (#23A) to the amendment 
offered by Ms. Harman, to insert after page 3 a new section 
entitled ``Protection of Information'', was AGREED TO by Voice 
Vote.
    An amendment offered by Mr. Young (#24), add at end a new 
title entitled ``Denial of Transportation Security Cards'', was 
AGREED TO by Voice Vote.
    An amendment offered by Mr. DeFazio (#25), at the end of 
the bill add a new title entitled ``Aviation Security'', was 
NOT AGREED TO by a recorded vote of 13 Yeas and 19 Nays (Record 
Vote No. 10).


    An amendment offered by Mr. Souder (#26), at the 
appropriate place in the bill, insert the following new section 
entitled ``Report and Plan Regarding Information and 
Intelligence Sharing by Department of Homeland Security'', was 
WITHDRAWN by Unanimous Consent.
    An amendment offered by Ms. Jackson-Lee (#27), add at the 
end a new title entitled ``Ensuring Diversity in Department of 
Homeland Security Programs'', was WITHDRAWN, as amended by a 
unanimous consent request by Mr. Thompson, by Unanimous 
Consent. A Unanimous Consent request by Mr. Thompson to 
consider en bloc an additional amendment: add at the end a new 
title ``Additional Provision'', was not objected to.
    An amendment offered by Mr. Pearce (#28), to insert a new 
section 404 relating to mobile communications coverage on the 
U.S.-Mexico border, was WITHDRAWN by Unanimous Consent.
    An amendment offered by Mr. Markey (#29), add at the end of 
title IV of the bill a new section 403 entitled ``Inspection of 
Cargo Carries Aboard Commercial Aircraft'', was NOT AGREED TO 
by a recorded vote of 8 Yeas, 20 Nays, and 1 voting Present 
(Record Vote No. 11).


    An amendment offered by Mr. Weldon (#30), at the end of 
title I add a new section entitled ``State and Local Terrorism 
Preparedness'', was AGREED TO by Voice Vote.
    An amendment offered by Mrs. Christensen (#31), insert a 
new Title entitled ``Office of Tribal Security'', was WITHDRAWN 
by Unanimous Consent.
    An amendment offered by Mr. Weldon (#32), in section 
302(b)(3), insert a new subsection 313(c) establishing a 
working group with the Secretary of Defense on military 
technologies, was AGREED TO by Voice Vote.
    An amendment offered by Mrs. Christensen (#33), at the 
appropriate place, insert a new section entitled ``Border 
Patrol Unit for Virgin Islands'', was WITHDRAWN by Unanimous 
Consent.
    An amendment offered by Mr. Meek (#34), add at the end a 
new section entitled ``Authority of Chief Information 
Officer'', was WITHDRAWN by Unanimous Consent.
    An amendment offered by Mr. Thompson (#35), at the end of 
the bill add a new title entitled ``Study of Applications Under 
Safety Act'', was WITHDRAWN by Unanimous Consent.
    An amendment offered by Mr. Markey (#36), In subtitle A of 
title II, add at the end a new section entitled ``Sec. 203. 
Homeland Security Impact Review of Liquefied Natural Gas'', was 
WITHDRAWN by Unanimous Consent.
    An amendment offered by Ms. Jackson-Lee (#37), at the end 
of the bill insert a new section entitled ``Report on Border 
Violence'', was WITHDRAWN by Unanimous Consent.

                      Committee Oversight Findings

    Pursuant to clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 
House of Representatives, the Committee has held oversight 
hearings and made findings that are reflected in this report.

         Statement of General Performance Goals and Objectives

    The purpose of H.R. 1817, the Department of Homeland 
Security Authorization Act for FY 2006 is to authorize 
appropriations for fiscal year 2006 for the Department of 
Homeland Security, and for other purposes.

   New Budget Authority, Entitlement Authority, and Tax Expenditures

    In compliance with clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules 
of the House of Representatives, the Committee finds that 
H.R.1817, the Department of Homeland Security Authorization Act 
for FY 2006, would result in no new or increased budget 
authority, entitlement authority, or tax expenditures or 
revenues.

                  Congressional Budget Office Estimate

    Pursuant to clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 
House of Representatives, a cost estimate provided by the 
Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section 402 of the 
Congressional Budget Act of 1974 was not made available to the 
Committee in time for the filing of this report. The Chairman 
of the Committee shall cause such estimate to be printed in the 
Congressional Record upon its receipt by the Committee.

                       Federal Mandates Statement

    An estimate of Federal mandates prepared by the Director of 
the Congressional Budget
    Office pursuant to section 423 of the Unfunded Mandates 
Reform Act was not made available to the Committee in time for 
the filing of this report. The Chairman of the Committee shall 
cause such estimate to be printed in the Congressional Record 
upon its receipt by the Committee.

                      Advisory Committee Statement

    No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b) 
of the Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this 
legislation.

                   Constitutional Authority Statement

    Pursuant to clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 
House of Representatives, the Committee finds that the 
Constitutional authority for this legislation is provided in 
Article I, section 8, clause 1, which grants Congress the power 
to provide for the common Defense of the United States.

                  Applicability to Legislative Branch

    The Committee finds that the legislation does not relate to 
the terms and conditions of employment or access to public 
services or accommodations within the meaning of section 
102(b)(3) of the Congressional Accountability Act.

             Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation


Sec. 1. Short title

    This Act may be cited as the ``Department of Homeland 
Security Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006.''

                TITLE I--AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS

Sec. 101. Department of Homeland Security

    This section authorizes the top-line funding level for the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as a whole, consistent 
with the President's Fiscal Year 2006 budget proposal for DHS 
and the House-passed Budget Resolution. All other specific 
authorizations included in this Act are subsumed herein. 
Programs not specifically authorized in this Act are not 
affected.

Sec. 102. Border patrol agents

    This section authorizes more than $1.9 billion for border 
control and security between ports of entry--which is $310 
million above the President's proposed Fiscal Year 2006 budget 
for such purposes. These additional funds will permit the 
Secretary of Homeland Security, in Fiscal Year 2006, to fully 
hire, train, and equip the 2,000 additional Border Patrol 
agents originally authorized under the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458).
    The Committee strongly believes that our Nation's top 
homeland security priority must be the prevention of terrorist 
attacks, and a critical component of such a strategy is 
ensuring the security and integrity of America's borders 
against those who would carry out such attacks and the means by 
which they would carry them out. Additional Border Patrol 
agents provide a significant deterrent to individuals seeking 
to illegally enter the United States, or to smuggle in 
terrorist weapons, and this increase in funding will bolster 
our Nation's apprehension capabilities by approximately 20 
percent.
    The Committee also strongly believes that this additional 
funding for Border Patrol agents must come from reducing funds 
for lower priority programs and activities within the 
Department of Homeland Security, given the realities of the 
Department's overall budget for Fiscal Year 2006. In subsequent 
sections of this Act, the Committee's other programmatic 
authorizations reflect offsets to cover the entire $310 million 
increase in this account.
    Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, additional 
staff, resources, and coordination have closed gaps along parts 
of the border. However, operational control is still lacking 
over large sections of the Nation's border. As certain areas 
are fortified, illegal border activity is re-directed to other 
less-monitored areas. In deploying the additional 2,000 border 
patrol agents authorized in this section, the Secretary shall 
make every effort to ensure that the less-monitored sectors 
along the U.S. international border with Mexico and Canada are 
adequately staffed to combat increasing illegal border 
activity.
    Further, and in light of the additional 2,000 new Border 
Patrol agents authorized under this section, the Committee 
directs the Secretary to conduct a risk assessment as to 
whether some of these new agents should be placed, on a 
permanent basis, in the Caribbean region, particularly in the 
United States Virgin Islands. There currently is no Border 
Patrol station in within the U.S. Virgin Islands. The station 
responsible for covering this area is the Ramey Sector, located 
in Puerto Rico. The United States Virgin Islands has 175 miles 
of coastal borders and is a gateway to the continental U.S. 
This region has been increasingly exploited by human and drug 
smugglers to move people and narcotics, undetected, into the 
U.S. mainland.
    The Committee also has a great interest in the America's 
Shield Initiative (ASI). This program will significantly 
improve U.S. border control capabilities, and the Committee 
expects the Department to issue a robust Request for Proposal 
(RFP) that addresses the National and regional requirements for 
this program sometime this summer. The current activities on 
the border highlight the need for a holistic, flexible, and 
integrated solution that contains the right mix of people, 
process, technology, and infrastructure. The complexity and 
strategic importance of this program require that DHS give 
careful consideration to project management and oversight. The 
ASI mission of integrating disparate Federal, State, local and 
tribal jurisdictions and agencies to provide a national 
solution to border control is paramount. The Committee supports 
the significant increase in the President's proposed budget for 
this program, which reflects the urgency of this program.

Sec. 103. Departmental management and operations

    Of the amount authorized under section 101, this section 
authorizes to be appropriated $634,687,000, in Fiscal Year (FY) 
2006 for Department of Homeland Security (Department or DHS) 
management and operations.
    Specifically, this section authorizes $44,895,000 for the 
DHS Regions Initiative. Section 706 of the Homeland Security 
Act of 2002 requires the DHS Secretary to develop and submit a 
plan to Congress for consolidating and co-locating the regional 
and field offices of DHS' legacy components. The plan was due 
to Congress in November 2003; however, the Department has not 
yet finalized and submitted this plan.
    The Committee is advised that the regional structure is now 
under consideration during the Secretary's 90-day review of the 
Department's policies, programs, operations, and organization. 
It is expected that integration and consolidation of the 
regional offices will result in increased efficiencies, 
improved program delivery, and cost savings.
    The Fiscal Year 2006 budget request includes a request for 
$50,000,000 to support the establishment of the DHS regional 
structure. The Committee recognizes, however, that it is 
unlikely that full development and implementation of the plan 
could occur in FY 2006. Therefore, the Committee reduces the 
requested budget increase by $5,000,000.
    This section also authorizes $4,459,000 for the DHS 
Operational Integration Staff Initiative. The Committee 
recognizes that the Fiscal Year 2006 budget request includes an 
increase of $10 million to create a permanent Operational 
Integration Staff in the Office of the Secretary ``to provide 
high-level coordination and integration.'' According to the 
budget request, the funding would be used to establish this 
staff as a ``permanent entity.'' The Committee is advised that 
the Secretary already has established an Operational 
Integration Staff, referred to as ``I-STAFF.'' The Committee is 
further advised that this staff includes at least 8 Full Time 
Employees (FTEs).
    Integration of DHS is expected to result in increased 
efficiencies, reassignment of personnel to meet the 
Department's missions more effectively, and cost savings. These 
efficiencies and cost savings within the Department should 
allow the Secretary to shift resources to priority functions, 
rather than requiring an increase in FTEs for integration 
staff. Therefore, while the Committee strongly supports the 
integration function, the Committee reduces the proposed budget 
increase for this new, permanent entity by $5,000,000.
    This section also authorizes $56,278,000 for the DHS Office 
of Security. The Committee strongly supports the role of the 
Office of Security in processing personnel security clearances 
and accesses, conducting security awareness education and 
training, and providing security accreditation of the 
Department's facilities and select information systems.
    The Fiscal Year 2006 budget request includes a program 
increase of $39,445,000, which would more than double the 
budget for this Office to $61,278,000. The Committee 
recognizes, however, that provisions in the Intelligence Reform 
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, enacted in December 2004, 
as P.L. 108-458, will help to streamline clearance processing 
and reduce some of the burden on this Office. Therefore, the 
Committee believes a reduction of $5 million in the requested 
budget increase is warranted. The funding level authorized by 
the Committee would still more than double the budget of the 
Office, an increase the Committee believes is warranted due to 
the importance of the Office's mission and its increased 
workload.
    The savings outlined above, $15 million in total, have been 
dedicated for increased Border Patrol agents, consistent with 
Section 102 of this Act.

Sec. 104. Critical infrastructure grants

    The Committee authorizes to be appropriated $500,000,000 
for Fiscal Year 2006 for grants and other assistance to improve 
critical infrastructure protection. This represents a $135 
million increase over Fiscal Year 2005 for similar critical 
infrastructure grants, although it is $100 million lower than 
the President's request. The Committee is concerned that the 
Department still is not fully employing a risk-based strategy 
for distributing these critical infrastructure grants, and that 
the money that has been allocated in the past has often been 
used for security projects of marginal utility to terrorism 
preparedness. The Committee also remains concerned about the 
delay in use of critical infrastructure grant funds that 
previously have been awarded. This reduction of $100 million 
has been dedicated for increased Border Patrol agents, 
consistent with Section 102 of this Act.
    The President proposes, in his Fiscal Year 2006 budget 
request, to combine all of the critical infrastructure grants 
into a single, risk-based program. While the Committee supports 
the concept of risk-based allocation, the Committee believes 
additional details about how a single critical infrastructure 
grant program would operate are necessary, and its 
authorization under this section is not meant to authorize, at 
this time, a single grant program.

Sec. 105. Research and development

    Of the amounts authorized under section 101, this section 
authorizes appropriations for Fiscal Year 2006 for certain 
research and development (R&D) accounts.
    Specifically, it authorizes appropriations of $76,573,000 
to support chemical countermeasure development activities, a 
$24 million increase over Fiscal Year 2005 levels. The 
Committee supports continuing research in this area, but 
believes that not all of the proposed $49,000,000 increase in 
the President's budget is necessary. Accordingly, the Committee 
has reduced the proposed increase by $25,000,000. Of this 
amount, $20 million will be used to authorize additional Border 
Patrol agents, and $5 million of this reduction will be used to 
authorize additional funds for the SAFETY Act Implementation 
Office (discussed below).
    With respect to the President's proposed Domestic Nuclear 
Detection Office (DNDO), this section authorizes appropriations 
of $197,314,000. The Committee strongly supports the intent of 
the President's initiative. However, given the Committee's 
concerns about the scope and authority of this new office, its 
over-emphasis on detection technology to prevent nuclear 
terrorism, and the likely inability of the new office to fully 
expend the total requested amount during its first year, the 
Committee has authorized $30,000,000 less than the President's 
budget request of $227,000,000. The Committee notes that the 
authorized amount is still a $70,000,000 increase over Fiscal 
Year 2005 for comparable programs. This reduction of $30 
million has been dedicated for increased Border Patrol agents, 
consistent with Section 102 of this Act.
    This section also authorizes $10,000,000 for research and 
development of technologies capable of countering threats posed 
by man-portable air defense systems, including location-based 
technologies and non-commercial aircraft-based technologies. 
The Committee has authorized a sharp reduction in the funding 
for counter-MANPADS Research and Development (R&D) from the 
$110,000,000 proposed in the President's budget request 
($49,000,000 above the Fiscal Year 2005 enacted level). 
Consistent with the budget views and estimates submitted by the 
Committee in March 2005 to the Committee on the Budget, the 
Committee believes that spending such a significant amount of 
funds on R&D and--most expensively--testing of aircraft-based 
counter-MANPADS systems is unjustified, absent a risk and cost 
assessment by either the Administration or the Congress 
supporting the actual deployment of such countermeasures. The 
Committee also believes that R&D funding in this area should be 
open to alternative technologies, which may provide more 
effective solutions to this threat at lower cost. Accordingly, 
the Committee has shifted $100 million from this account to pay 
for additional Border Patrol agents, which should help to 
decrease the ability of terrorists to smuggle anti-aircraft 
missiles into the United States.
    Finally, this section authorizes $10,600,000 for the 
activities of the Science and Technology Directorate relating 
to the responsibilities described in subtitle B of title VIII 
of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296) (6 U.S.C. 
441 et seq.), commonly known as the Support Anti-Terrorism by 
Fostering Effective Technologies (SAFETY) Act of 2002. This is 
$5,000,000 more than the level proposed by the President, which 
would have reduced funding by $4,400,000 below Fiscal Year 2005 
enacted levels.

Sec. 106. Border and transportation security

    This section authorizes funding for the proposed Screening 
Coordination and Operations (SCO) Office at $826,913,000. The 
purpose of the SCO is to coordinate the enrollment and 
credentialing process for selected Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) programs. The Committee supports the idea of the 
SCO and efforts to reduce costs by coordinating and 
consolidating similar processes in the transferred programs, 
which is consistent with reforms contained in Section 202 of 
this Act. Section 106, however, reduces the Fiscal Year 2006 
budget request for this office by $20 million. The Committee 
strongly believes that this type of integration is not only 
necessary, but should help the Department achieve savings 
through efficiencies generated by the integration of multiple, 
overlapping programs. Therefore, the SCO should have sufficient 
resources to stand up and manage the new office without the 
need for additional expenditures and personnel, as called for 
in the President's budget request. The Committee is re-
directing this $20 million to fund additional Border Patrol 
agents.
    This section also authorizes funding for the weapons of 
mass destruction detection technology account at $100 million. 
This provides a $20 million increase above Fiscal Year 2005, 
although it is $25 million less than the Fiscal Year 2006 
request. The Committee supports the deployment of such 
detection technology at U.S. ports of entry, but remains 
concerned about the escalating costs and delayed time frame for 
this program. The Committee also does not believe that the 
Department has a scientifically sound and risk-based deployment 
plan in place. For these reasons, the Committee has reduced the 
proposed increase for this program. From this reduction, $200 
million will be re-directed to fund additional Border Patrol 
agents, and $5 million will be reserved to fund the Pre-
Positioned Equipment (PPE) program. The PPE is one component of 
the Nation's plan to ensure that the necessary equipment is in 
place to respond to weapons of mass destruction attacks, but it 
was not funded in the President's budget request. The Committee 
urges the Department to propose specific funding for this 
program in Fiscal Year 2007, and to make sure that the program 
receives sufficient funding in Fiscal Year 2006 to maintain 
operations.
    This section also authorizes $133,800,000 for the Container 
Security Initiative (CSI) for Fiscal Year 2006. The Committee 
generally supports this program, but is providing for certain 
reforms in other parts of this Act that require DHS to justify 
any further expansion of CSI based on a risk and cost-benefit 
assessment, particularly with respect to the need to deploy DHS 
personnel at such overseas ports. These requirements should 
generate cost savings in this program sufficient to continue 
appropriate expansion without additional resources in Fiscal 
Year 2006. To this end, this section provides for CSI funding 
levels only slightly higher than last year, and roughly $5 
million below the President's Fiscal Year 2006 request. These 
savings will be re-directed to increase available funding for 
Border Patrol agents.

Sec. 107. State and local terrorism preparedness

    Of the total amount authorized under section 101, this 
section authorizes appropriations for Fiscal Year 2006 for 
certain State and Local Terrorism Preparedness programs.
    Specifically, it authorizes appropriations of $40,500,000 
for the activities of the Office for Interoperability and 
Compatibility (OIC) within the Science and Technology (S&T) 
Directorate. This is $20,000,000 more than the level proposed 
by the President in his budget proposal. It is offset by an 
equal reduction to the President's request for discretionary 
grants for high-threat, high-density urban areas. 
Notwithstanding this reduction from the proposed level, the 
$1,000,000,000 authorized for such grants is a $115 million 
increase over Fiscal Year 2005.
    The Committee recognizes that States and local governments, 
such as high-threat, high-density urban areas, require 
technical assistance and guidance to design, install, and 
operate comprehensive and effective interoperable 
communications systems. The OIC's guidance and technical 
assistance will help urban and other high-risk areas best 
utilize their grant funds for such purposes. Moreover, enhanced 
OIC capabilities will result in wiser spending decisions, 
effective communications improvements, and an efficient use of 
grant funds.

Sec. 108. Authorization of appropriations for training of State and 
        local personnel in border States performing immigration 
        functions

    This section authorizes reimbursement to States along U.S. 
borders and coasts for the costs associated with having their 
state and local law enforcement personnel trained and certified 
by the Department of Homeland Security's (the Department or 
DHS) U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to enforce 
Federal immigration laws. Currently, immigration laws can be 
enforced only by Federal law enforcement officials, even when 
state and local authorities encounter persons, in the course of 
performing their routine law enforcement duties, that they 
suspect may not be in the U.S. legally. However, since 1996--
when section 133 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 amended section 287 of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and added subpart (g)--
there has been authority allowing state and local law 
enforcement to be trained and certified by ICE, under voluntary 
agreements entered into between the Federal government and the 
participating State or local jurisdiction.
    Specifically, section 287(g) of the INA authorizes the 
Secretary of Homeland Security to enter into agreements or 
Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) with any State or political 
subdivision for training to be qualified to perform functions 
of an immigration officer, including investigation, 
apprehension, and detention of undocumented aliens in the 
United States. So far, the Department has entered into three 
MOUs: the State of Florida in September 2002, the State of 
Alabama in September 2003; and the county of Los Angeles, 
California, in February 2005. Despite the success of these 
existing programs and interest by at least 14 other 
jurisdictions, expansion to other States and localities has 
stalled because of costs associated with training, including 
the costs associated with the time officers are away from their 
regular duties.
    To address this issue and encourage further expansion of 
this program, this section authorizes $40 million to reimburse 
certain States and political subdivisions for the costs 
associated with their personnel attending such immigration 
training, including travel, transportation, and per diem meals 
and lodging during the training provided by ICE, and the costs 
of replacement personnel. The Committee has focused on States 
that are located along U.S. borders and coastline, where state 
and local law enforcement assistance can be of most value in 
helping to secure the Nation's borders against terrorists or 
other aliens seeking to unlawfully enter the U.S.
    The Committee authorizes the funding from ICE's management 
and administration account, as that will provide maximum 
flexibility to the Department and not directly affect other ICE 
programs. These funds pay for expenses such as operation and 
maintenance of facilities and equipment, supplies and 
materials, rent, and other administrative support. The 
Committee believes that ICE should work to eliminate overlap 
and duplication in administrative functions at the headquarter 
level, and encourages the Secretary of Homeland Security to 
review such matters as part of his ongoing 90-day review of the 
Department's overall organization and management. Specifically, 
the Secretary should review the organizational structure of the 
Border and Transportation Security Directorate (BTS), under 
which ICE resides, to determine how best to eliminate 
duplication of office management and overhead caused by having 
multiple offices for legislative affairs, public affairs, 
international affairs, and intelligence within BTS (including 
within ICE).
    In Fiscal Year 2005, the enacted funding for ICE management 
and administration was $232,565,000, and the requested amount 
for Fiscal Year 2006 is $277,572,000--representing a net 
increase of $45 million dollars. In addition to the $45 million 
increase over last year's budget, ICE is also set to receive a 
substantial reprogramming of fiscal year funds from other 
elements of the Department, and may also receive additional 
funding in the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations bill soon 
to be considered by the Congress. Overall, the budget for ICE 
in Fiscal Year 2005 was $3.8 billion, and the President's 
request for Fiscal Year 2006 is $4.3 billion--representing a 
net increase of $519 million. Given these factors, the 
Committee believes that there is sufficient funding within ICE 
to reimburse States and local governments for assisting with 
the enforcement of Federal immigration law in border States, 
particularly with improved management and more streamlined 
operations.

     TITLE II--TERRORISM PREVENTION, INFORMATION SHARING, AND RISK 
                               ASSESSMENT

Subtitle A--Terrorism Prevention

Sec. 201. Terrorism Prevention Plan and related budget submission

            Subsection (a). Terrorism Prevention Plan
    The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296) sets forth 
the missions of the Department of Homeland Security (Department 
or DHS), which include: (1) to prevent terrorist attacks within 
the United States; (2) to reduce the vulnerability of the 
United States to terrorism; and (3) to minimize the damage, and 
assist in the recovery, from terrorist attacks that occur 
within the United States. Despite the Department's primary 
mission to prevent terrorism, DHS has no department-wide plan 
solely focused on preventing a terrorist attack.
    The Department currently is responsible for developing 
department-wide plans that address the latter two missions. 
Specifically, to reduce our vulnerability, DHS is developing 
the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP). The NIPP 
will serve as a blueprint for actions by the Department and its 
stakeholders to develop and implement a national effort to 
protect infrastructure across all sectors and reduce the 
vulnerability of the United States to terrorism. To coordinate 
efforts to assist in the recovery from a terrorist attack, DHS 
issued its National Response Plan (NRP) in December 2004. This 
plan establishes a single, comprehensive framework for the 
management of domestic incidents designed to minimize the 
damage and assist in the recovery of a terrorist attack.
    Without a comprehensive plan dedicated exclusively to 
prevention, however, it is difficult for the Department and the 
Congress to assess the proper allocation of limited 
counterterrorism resources among prevention, vulnerability 
reduction, and response cannot be achieved. Therefore, this 
subsection requires the Secretary to develop a Department of 
Homeland Security Terrorism Prevention Plan (TPP) that includes 
the Department's goals, objectives, milestones, and key 
initiatives to prevent acts of terrorism on the United States 
and its interests. The Secretary is required to submit the TPP 
to Congress no later than one year after the date of enactment 
of this Act, and on a regular basis thereafter as it is 
modified.
    The TPP will include: the identification and prioritization 
of the most significant threats to, and terrorist groups 
threatening, the United States; an evaluation of the materials 
and methods that terrorists may use and the outcomes the 
terrorists aim to achieve; the process of coordination between 
DHS and the National Counter Terrorism Center; policies and 
procedures regarding how DHS will gather real-time information 
and incorporate it into counterterrorism activities; specific 
initiatives by DHS to identify threats, coordinate activities 
within the Department to prevent acts of terrorism, and share 
information with state and local governments and the private 
sector; the timeline for implementation of departmental 
information-sharing initiatives, such as the Homeland Security 
Information Network; and other terrorism prevention-related 
elements.
    In formulating the TPP, the Secretary of DHS is required to 
consult with the heads of key Federal law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies, as well as State, county, and local law 
enforcement agencies the Secretary considers appropriate. The 
TPP will be prepared in both classified and unclassified forms.
            Subsection (b). Annual Crosscutting Budget Analysis
    In addition to formulation by the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) of a plan to prevent terrorist attacks on the 
United States, it is critical that limited homeland security 
resources are allocated towards the areas of greatest risk, and 
that sufficient emphasis is placed by DHS on activities and 
functions that are effective in preventing terrorist attacks on 
the United States and its interests.
    To accomplish this goal, Congress and the public require a 
clear explanation of how DHS' budget is allocated among its 
various missions--both homeland security-related and non-
homeland security-related missions. The Fiscal Year 2006 DHS 
budget request, however, lacks sufficient data in this regard, 
making it virtually impossible for Congress, the public, and 
even the Department's management to determine whether DHS is 
allocating its finite resources appropriately.
    Therefore, this subsection requires the Secretary of 
Homeland Security to submit to Congress a crosscutting analysis 
of funding levels proposed for DHS programs by mission area, 
which will accompany the President's annual budget request. 
With respect to dual-purpose funding serving both homeland 
security and non-homeland security purposes, such as multi-duty 
personnel and shared capital investments, this subsection 
requires that such funding be analyzed and apportioned 
accordingly. The budget analysis will include separate displays 
for mandatory and discretionary appropriations.
    In light of the importance of preventing terrorist attacks, 
this analysis will specifically identify DHS spending for: 
intelligence activities generally; collection and use of 
intelligence and law enforcement operations that screen for and 
target terrorists; investigative, intelligence, and law 
enforcement operations that disrupt plans for terrorist acts 
and prevent the introduction of weapons of mass destruction 
into the United States; initiatives to detect potential or 
early stages of actual biological, chemical, radiological, or 
nuclear attacks; screening individuals against terrorist watch 
lists; screening cargo for potential compromise by terrorists 
or terrorist weapons; specific utilization by DHS of 
information sharing, both within the Federal Government and 
among Federal, State, and local governments to detect or 
prevent acts of terrorism; and initiatives to preempt, disrupt, 
and deter terrorist acts overseas intended to strike the United 
States. The prevention analysis also will include investments 
in technology, research and development, training, and 
communications systems that are designed to improve the 
performance of DHS in carrying out these functions.

Sec. 202. Consolidated background check process

    The Department of Homeland Security has numerous security 
programs that pre-screen individuals by checking their names 
and biometric identifiers against terrorist watch lists and 
other criminal databases. Each of these programs has its own 
method of application, with a separate fee for each one. These 
programs often have their own enrollment centers, with some 
programs only having one or two sites per State. The Committee 
believes that the redundancies and inefficiencies in the 
application processes for these separate Department programs 
puts an unnecessary strain on the frequent travelers, workers, 
and businesses that conduct commerce across borders and within 
the U.S. They also provide an opportunity for terrorists to 
exploit any gaps between or among these various programs.
    Section 202 of this Act directs the Secretary to address 
these redundancies and inefficiencies, by creating a single 
application process that will meet the security requirements 
for all of the voluntary and mandatory programs listed in the 
section and any additional programs that the Secretary may wish 
to include. The programs that are specifically included in this 
section are: the Transportation Worker Identification 
Credential (TWIC), the Hazmat Endorsement Credential vetting 
program, the Free and Secure Trade (FAST) Program, the NEXUS 
and SENTRI border crossing programs, and the Registered 
Traveler program of the Transportation Security Administration 
(TSA).
    The list of included programs is intended to both specify 
the types of programs that should be included in the 
consolidated program, but also to give the Secretary 
flexibility in adding more programs as the Department 
progresses. The Committee encourages the Secretary to take into 
account this consolidated process in the future when creating 
or implementing any new screening, vetting, or credentialing 
program. The Committee specifically does not intend this list 
to include Federal security clearance applications, which are 
governed by a separate statutory and regulatory framework.
    This section outlines four specific requirements for a 
single security screening process. The first is that the 
program must develop a single submission of security screening 
information that will meet all the requirements of applicable 
Departmental programs, to the greatest extent practicable. By 
developing such an application, applicants who participate in 
more than one of these programs will not need to re-submit such 
information as biometrics and other personal data.
    In carrying out this section, the Secretary should identify 
the commonalities of the application and screening processes 
for the included programs, and these commonalities should be 
leveraged to reduce the burden on applicants who apply to 
multiple programs, and to make it easier for applicants to 
apply to any of the programs. The Committee recognizes that 
some programs have requirements that do not apply across other 
programs. For example, the Registered Traveler program requires 
an in-person interview as part of the application process. The 
Committee does not intend for this language to be construed as 
altering that requirement.
    The Committee has also found that the availability of 
centers or locations for submitting information for the 
programs can differ greatly program to program. In the case of 
the Hazmat Endorsement Credential, some drivers have reported 
the need to drive several hours to submit their information, 
losing valuable work time, during a process that can take two 
or three trips to complete. Thus, the second specific 
requirement under this section is that the Secretary permit 
applicants to apply to any of these programs at any designated 
center or through any designated process. Multiple program 
centers should have the ability to accept biometric information 
or personal application information and submit it to the 
Department. These centers should be made available to the users 
of any of the programs outlined in this section, to the extent 
that the center can accept the information required. The 
Committee does not see the need to establish separate centers 
across the country, collecting similar information, for 
multiple programs. This would also reduce the amount of funds 
needed for start-up or running of such programs.
    The Committee also recognizes that there are other Federal 
clearances outside of the Department of Homeland Security that 
would meet the requirements of the included programs. 
Accordingly, the third specific requirement of this section 
directs the Secretary to ensure the process established above 
accepts any security clearance issued by another Federal 
agency, so long as the requirements for obtaining such a 
clearance are at least as stringent as those of the applicable 
DHS program or programs. For example, there are truck drivers 
who hold Federal security clearances to carry weapons 
munitions, who are then required to be vetted by TSA for a 
Hazmat credential. The Committee believes that this is not an 
efficient use of resources and is an unnecessary burden on such 
drivers.
    Fourth, this section requires that the Secretary 
incorporate protection of privacy, confidentiality, record 
retention, and information security standards and procedures 
when creating the single application process.
    This section also directs the Secretary to transmit to the 
Committee and the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs a description of the Department's plan for 
implementation no later than six (6) months after enactment, 
and requires that the Secretary implement the process no later 
than twelve (12) months after enactment.
    Finally, this section provides that all statutory 
requirements for the operation of the programs described in the 
program are not affected by this section, and that nothing in 
this section affects any statutory requirement relating to 
title III of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention 
Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458) (50 U.S.C. 435b et seq.) (relating 
to Federal security clearance processing).

Subtitle B--Homeland Security Information Sharing and Analysis 
        Enhancement

Sec. 211. Short title

    This section names this subtitle as the ``Homeland Security 
Information Sharing and Analysis Enhancement Act of 2005.''

Sec. 212. Provision of terrorism-related information to private sector 
        officials

    Section 212 amends Sec. 201(d) of the Homeland Security Act 
of 2002 (P.L. 107-296) by requiring the creation and routine 
dissemination of analytic reports and products that provide 
specific information to private sector officials responsible 
for protecting their institutions from terrorist attacks or 
related consequences.
    The Committee believes that the Department's Office of 
Information Analysis should use the Homeland Security 
Information Network (HSIN), authorized under section 220, as 
the normative means by which the Department disseminates the 
analytic reports and products required by this section to 
private sector officials.

Sec. 213. Analytic expertise on the threats from biological agents and 
        nuclear weapons

    This section amends Sec. 201(d) of the Homeland Security 
Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296) by adding a provision making the 
Department of Homeland Security's Under Secretary for 
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection responsible 
for ensuring that the Office of Information Analysis acquires 
sufficient expertise to create, on an ongoing basis, analytic 
products (based on the analysis of homeland security 
information, as defined in section 892(f)(1)), specifically 
relating to the potential threat of terrorism involving the use 
of nuclear weapons and biological agents against the population 
and territory of the United States.
    By including this section, the Committee intends to 
underscore the immediate importance of building, in the 
Department's Office of Information Analysis, a cadre of 
analysts with expertise focused on the risks associated with 
the potential use by terrorists of nuclear weapons and 
biological agents, the consequences of which would be 
unprecedented and unparalleled. In that connection, the 
Committee notes that analysis of homeland security information 
relating to terrorists' potential use of biological agents to 
attack the American people and territory should include 
systematic and sustained consideration of potential threats to, 
and associated measures to safeguard, the Nation's food and 
water supply from such attacks.

Sec. 214. Alternative analysis of homeland security information

    Section 214 adds to subtitle A of title II of the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296) (6 U.S.C. 121 et seq.), a 
provision directing the Secretary to establish an alternative 
analysis process and assign an individual to ensure that the 
Department conducts alternative or ``red-team'' analysis of 
homeland security information that relates to potential acts of 
terrorism involving the use of nuclear weapons and biological 
agents.
    The Committee notes, in this connection, that the Office of 
Information Analysis has already instituted an alternative 
analysis effort. The Committee is encouraged by this important 
initiative and wishes, by the mandate in this section, to 
ensure that the Department's ``red team'' analytic effort 
becomes permanent and non-elective. The Committee expresses no 
view on which of the Department's components the Secretary 
should assign principal responsibility for the alternative 
analysis responsibilities under this section. The Committee 
wishes to stress, nevertheless, the critical importance of 
ensuring that the Department's alternative analysis effort 
remains fully independent of the remainder of its analytic 
effort; otherwise, it has no potential to challenge, but will 
only mirror the analytic approaches and conclusions reflected 
in its more conventional analytic products. As this section 
makes clear, the Committee believes that the Department's 
alternative analysis efforts must focus particularly on the 
terrorist threats that entail the most catastrophic potential 
consequences--specifically, those involving attacks employing 
either nuclear weapons or biological agents.

Sec. 215. Assignment of information analysis and infrastructure 
        protection functions

    Section 215 requires the Department of Homeland Security's 
Under Secretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure 
Protection (IAIP) to allocate the Under Secretary's existing 
responsibilities under section 201(d) of the Homeland Security 
Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296) to the Assistant Secretary for 
Information Analysis (IA) and the Assistant Secretary for 
Infrastructure Protection (IP); both IA and IP will remain 
responsible for certain shared functions. IA is assigned 
201(d)(1), (4), (7) through (14), (16), and (18). IP is 
assigned 201(d)(2), (5) & (6). Both IA and IP should have 
responsibilities for 201(d)(3), (15), (17), and (19). The Under 
Secretary for IAIP may assign additional duties relating to 
their assigned responsibilities to both IA and IP. Both 
Assistant Secretaries have coordinating responsibilities 
relating to their other assigned responsibilities under this 
section, with the Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis 
assigned special responsibility for exercising such 
coordinating functions with respect to elements of the 
intelligence community.
    By more firmly delineating the statutory role of the Office 
of Information Analysis, the Committee is establishing a 
baseline by reference to which any future structural changes 
involving IAIP responsibilities could be made.

Sec. 216. Authority for disseminating homeland security information

    The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296) gave the 
Secretary of Homeland Security special responsibility for 
providing information that relates to the prevention and 
deterrence of, preparation for, and response to potential acts 
of terrorism to State and local government personnel, tribal 
authorities, private sector officials, and the public. (See, 
e.g., Homeland Security Act of 2002, sec. 201(d)(9) and (11).) 
The Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Information Sharing 
signed on March 4, 2003 by the Attorney General (for all 
Federal law enforcement agencies), the Director of Central 
Intelligence (for members of the Intelligence Community), and 
the Secretary of Homeland Security (the MOU), notes, in section 
4(b), that ``the Federal government must, to the greatest 
extent possible, speak with one voice to state and local 
officials, private industry, and the public, in order to 
prevent confusion, mixed signals, and, potentially dangerous 
operational conflicts.'' The parties to the MOU agreed to 
require ``the prior approval of the Secretary of Homeland 
Security'' before any entities under their purview could 
disseminate terrorism- or other homeland security-related 
analysis to State, local, or private sector officials, or to 
the public, except in exigent circumstances or when such 
information is shared with federal, State and local law 
enforcement officials--provided that the Secretary of Homeland 
Security is given the earliest possible notice (MOU, at sec. 
4(b)(ii) through (iv)). This one-voice priority is also 
reflected in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention 
Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458), which at sec. 1011(a), specifically 
provides that the authority of the Director of National 
Intelligence does not extend to ``the direct dissemination of 
information to State government and local government officials 
and private sector entities pursuant to sections 201 and 892 of 
the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121, 482).''
    The Committee agrees that uncoordinated warnings send mixed 
messages to State, local, tribal, and private sector homeland 
security officials, as well as to the general public. Section 
216 recognizes that when conveying homeland security 
information to State, local, tribal, and private sector 
officials, the Federal Government must, whenever possible, 
speak unambiguously and with a single voice. The Committee does 
not think State, local, and private sector officials should be 
left wondering which of multiple federal advisories to believe. 
Section 216, therefore, brings into the Homeland Security Act 
the agreement reflected in the MOU on Information Sharing noted 
above. This will help avoid the confusion that has resulted 
when federal agencies have failed to convey a single, 
coordinated evaluation of the homeland security threat 
situation clearly and through a single node to non-federal 
officials who exercise homeland security responsibilities.
    Nothing in this or any other section of this subtitle is 
intended to suggest that the Department should not continue to 
prioritize, maintain, or, where appropriate, expand the sharing 
of information, including intelligence, relating to trade and 
customs revenue functions, to the extent that such sharing is 
among the customs revenue functions required to be maintained 
by section 412(b) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002.

Sec. 217. 9/11 Memorial Homeland Security Fellows Program

    This section establishes a program named the 9/11 Memorial 
Homeland Security Fellows Program the purpose of bringing 
State, local, tribal, and private sector officials to become 
familiar with the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC), 
including its mission and capabilities, and processes, as well 
as the personnel of the Offices of Information Analysis and 
Infrastructure Protection. This will enable the State, local, 
tribal, and private sector officials selected to interact more 
knowledgeably and efficiently with HSOC and other elements of 
the Directorate of Information Analysis and Infrastructure 
Protection (IAIP) on information sharing and other terrorism 
threat-related matters. The section:
     Establishes eligibility criteria for the program; 
those eligible must have homeland security-related 
responsibilities and possess a current national security 
clearance at the appropriate level.
     Limits the program to four 90-day iterations each 
year.
     Requires the Secretary to ensure that the number 
of fellows in residence at any time will not impede the 
activities of HSOC.
     Requires that a fellow's salary and benefits will 
continue to be paid by his or her home employer during the 
fellowship.
     Provides that each fellow will be reimbursed for 
round-trip, economy fare travel to and from their place of 
residence twice a month.
    Subject to the selection criteria in this section, the 
Committee believes that the Secretary should seek to ensure 
that the individuals selected for participation in the 9/11 
Memorial Homeland Security Fellows Program represent a diverse 
cross section of the State, local, tribal, and private sector 
officials who exercise homeland security-related 
responsibilities.
    The Committee wishes to note, in addition, that individuals 
selected as Fellows under this section must not only possess a 
current national security clearance at the level required by 
the Secretary, but must also, before being given access to the 
Homeland Security Operations Center or to any classified 
information as a Fellow, execute the appropriate nondisclosure 
agreements and be provided and agree to observe appropriate 
security and handling instructions with respect to all 
information, reports, analytic products, and information 
concerning intelligence sources and methods, to which they may 
be given access during the period of their fellowship under 
this program.
    The Committee believes that the Homeland Security 
Operations Center is a valuable information hub for the 
Department and, through the fellowship program established by 
this section seeks to ensure that HSOC and IAIP operations, 
products and personnel become more familiar to, and in tune 
with the needs of, State, local, tribal, and private sector 
homeland security officials.

Sec. 218. Access to nuclear terrorism-related information

    This section ensures that the Assistant Secretary for 
Information Analysis receives promptly and without request all 
information obtained by the Department of Homeland Security 
that relates, directly or indirectly, to a threat of terrorism 
involving the potential use of nuclear weapons. It also ensures 
that such information is integrated and analyzed 
comprehensively, disseminated in a timely manner, including to 
cleared State, local, tribal, and private sector officials, and 
is used to determine what additional requests the Department 
should submit for further collection of information related to 
such threats.
    The Committee notes that the responsibilities of the 
Department's Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis under 
this section do not impinge upon, limit, or affect in any way 
the role and responsibilities of the National Counter 
Proliferation Center established by section 1022 of the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 
108-458). The Assistant Secretary is intended to exercise the 
Assistant Secretary's responsibilities under this section in a 
manner consistent with the role and responsibilities of the 
National Counter Proliferation Center under that Act.

Sec. 219. Access of Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis to 
        terrorism information

    The Committee believes that the Homeland Security Act of 
2002 (P.L. 107-206) clearly envisioned that the Office of 
Information Analysis (IA) serve as the single office within the 
Department of Homeland Security where all terrorist threat-
related information, regardless of its origin, is brought 
together for comprehensive analysis. To serve that role, IA 
must have access to all terrorist threat-related information 
collected by or otherwise in the possession of any of the 
Department's components.
    Section 219 seeks to ensure that the Assistant Secretary 
for Information Analysis is routinely and without request given 
prompt access to all terrorism-related information collected by 
or in the possession of the Department, including direct access 
(where technologically feasible) to all databases of the 
Department that may contain such information.

Sec. 220. Administration of the Homeland Security Information Network

    Through the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN), 
the Department of Homeland Security seeks to provide a 
nationwide, real-time communications node for the Department, 
other Federal agencies, State and local officials, and private 
sector partners. HSIN currently uses the Joint Regional 
Information Exchange System (JRIES) framework. Section 220 
authorizes the HSIN and assigns responsibility for developing 
and administering the network to the Secretary. It also assigns 
the Secretary the responsibility to ensure that the Network's 
information sharing systems utilize and are compatible with 
Federal, State, and local antiterrorism systems and protocols 
that have been or are being developed.
    In making this new responsibility explicit, the Committee 
notes the excellent work done over the past several years by 
the Markle Foundation Task Force on National Security in the 
Information Age. The Markle Foundation Task Force was notable 
in that its members included top-flight private sector cyber-
technologists, as well as experts on both national security and 
privacy issues drawn from every point on the national political 
spectrum. In its October 2002 report, the Markle Foundation 
Task Force wrote:

          As the new Department of Homeland Security takes 
        shape, we have a unique opportunity to design and 
        implement systems that will enable the best use of 
        central and local resources. We have learned a great 
        deal from the rapid growth in networks of all types in 
        recent years. We can draw on our accumulated knowledge 
        and our existing networks to create a robust, 
        decentralized, and networked national security 
        framework. (Protecting America's Freedom in the 
        Information Age (Oct. 2002), at p. 12).

    The Task Force continued: ``There currently is no 
coordinated strategy in the federal government for interaction 
with state and local entities. * * * The Department of Homeland 
Security must establish minimum guidelines and procedures for 
sharing and impose some order on a system that currently is 
almost entirely ad hoc'' (id. At 75). Fourteen months later, 
the Markle Foundation Task Force issued its second report, 
which focused on how such a network should be created, noting 
that ``the DHS has yet to articulate a vision of how it will 
link federal, state, and local agencies in a communications and 
sharing network'' (Creating a Trusted Information Network for 
Homeland Security (Dec. 2003), vol. I at 8). The Committee 
understands the Homeland Security Information Network it is 
authorizing in this section as the vehicle by which the 
Department will link itself to Federal, State, local, tribal, 
and private sector entities in a mutually advantageous and 
durable homeland security information sharing network.
    In recommending such a network, the Markle Foundation Task 
Force worked ``from the premise that security and privacy can 
coexist'' (Oct. 2002 report at 32). The Committee wishes to 
stress that the Department must, as it implements and expands 
the Homeland Security Information Network, pay close attention 
to maintaining privacy and civil rights, inasmuch as the 
Members of the Committee agree with the Task Force that ``[t]he 
American way of life is a critical part of what our government 
is protecting when it provides for America's security'' (Oct. 
2002 report at 76).
    The Committee understands that the technologies and 
applications necessary in order to establish and enhance the 
Homeland Security Information Network authorized by this 
section are, in large measure, already commercially available. 
The Committee wishes to encourage the Department to use such 
existing private sector technologies, whenever possible, in 
building and enhancing this Network. The Committee also 
believes that the Department of Homeland Security should make 
it a priority to link existing networks and applications 
wherever possible into the Homeland Security Information 
Network in order more rapidly and cost-effectively to expand 
the network. In addition, the Department must ensure that HSIN-
users are provided the necessary training and support manage 
HSIN.
    The Committee notes, finally, that the Homeland Security 
Information Network authorized by this section is understood 
and intended to be complementary to and wholly consistent with 
the terms of the Information Sharing Environment provided for 
in section 1016(b) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458).

Sec. 221. IAIP personnel recruitment

    The Directorate of Information Analysis and Infrastructure 
Protection (IAIP) of the Department of Homeland Security is 
required to conduct homeland security terrorist threat analyses 
and vulnerability assessments. To meet these responsibilities 
on an ongoing basis, it is essential that the Department 
develop an expert employed workforce of well-trained, seasoned 
analysts in the IAIP Directorate.
    The Committee understands that the Department's Office of 
Information Analysis (IA) is struggling to compete with more 
established members of the intelligence community, as well as 
with private sector employers, to attract its needed analyst 
cadre from a relatively small pool of experienced and trained 
analysts. Because of the scope of its analytic responsibilities 
and because IA is a new player in the world of intelligence 
analysis and so does not yet have an established reputation to 
assist in its recruiting efforts, the Committee believes the 
Secretary must have the temporary authority to provide unique 
recruitment incentives.
    This section requires the Secretary to approach this 
problem strategically and with an appropriate package of 
financial and other incentives. Incentives would be available 
for three years and include recruitment bonuses, as well as the 
authority to employ civil service annuitants with no diminution 
in the amount of the annuity (putting them in a category 
similar to military retirees). Without such a program, it is 
increasingly difficult to envision IAIP's employed analyst 
cadre attaining the critical mass and capabilities required to 
meet its Homeland Security Act mandates. The Committee 
envisions that these authorities may be used to fill positions 
requiring experts in fields such as linguistics, chemical, 
biological, radiological and nuclear sciences, regional and 
other specialized analysts as the Secretary determines 
necessary.
    Section 221 amends Chapter 97 of title 5, United States 
Code, by adding after section 9701 a new section 9702 entitled 
Recruitment Bonuses. This section allows the Secretary, acting 
through the Under Secretary for IAIP, to pay a bonus to an 
individual in order to recruit an individual for a position 
that is primarily responsible for discharging the analytic 
responsibilities specified in section 201(d) of the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002, and is within the IAIP Directorate and 
would be difficult to fill without the bonus. The section 
contains other requirements, including:
          the bonus may not exceed 50 percent of the annual 
        rate of pay;
          the bonus will be distributed as a lump sum;
          recipient is subject to a written service agreement
          appointees, non-career appointees in the Senior 
        Executive Service, and those exempted from the 
        competitive service are ineligible; and
          authority terminates in 2008
    This section also adds a new section 9703 entitled 
Reemployed Annuitants. Under this provision, an annuitant 
receiving an annuity from the Civil Service Retirement and 
Disability Fund may be employed in a position within the 
Directorate for Information Analysis and Infrastructure 
Protection without losing his or her annuity. This authority 
terminates in 3 years, but can be extended in one-year 
increments by the Secretary.

Sec. 222. Information collection requirements and priorities

    This section amends section 102 of the Homeland Security 
Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296) to add a provision that would make 
the Secretary of Homeland Security a member of any Federal 
Government interagency board that is responsible for 
establishing foreign collection information requirements and 
priorities. This section also establishes an interagency 
Homeland Security Information Requirements Board, chaired by 
the Secretary of Homeland Security, to oversee the process of 
establishing homeland security requirements and collection 
management for all terrorism-related and homeland security 
information collected within the United States.

Sec. 223. Homeland Security Advisory System

    The color-coded designation of threat conditions the public 
has come to associate with the Homeland Security Advisory 
System (HSAS) originated in Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive-3 (March 11, 2002). The Homeland Security Act of 2002 
assigned responsibility for administering the HSAS to the Under 
Secretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure 
Protection of the Department of Homeland Security (P.L. 108-
458, at sec. 201(d)(7)).
    As currently administered, the Committee is concerned that 
the Homeland Security Advisory System fails to provide the 
public with critically necessary information. The Committee's 
oversight of the HSAS has confirmed the Committee's findings 
that the color-coded system is largely ignored by the general 
public and is confusing to law enforcement and emergency 
response personnel. Witnesses have testified that there is a 
general lack of specificity as to the type of attack and when 
and where the attack is likely to occur.
    Section 223 amends Subtitle A of title II of the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002 by adding at the end a new section 205 
entitled the Homeland Security Advisory System. This section:
     Directs the Under Secretary for IAIP to administer 
the Homeland Security Advisory System and provide advisories 
and alerts regarding threats to homeland security, including 
national, regional, local, and economic sector advisories and 
alerts, as appropriate.
     Requires that, in each advisory or alert regarding 
a threat, the appropriate protective measures and 
countermeasures are included.
     Requires whenever possible that each advisory or 
alert is limited to the specific region, locality, or economic 
sector at risk.
     Requires that the issuing of the any advisory or 
alert shall not use color designation as the exclusive means of 
specifying the homeland security threat condition.
    While the Committee understands that the specificity, 
accuracy, classification, and quality of the available 
intelligence will necessarily dictate the specificity of the 
warning given, the Committee believes that the Department must 
be as specific it possibly can when issuing any threat advisory 
or alert under the HSAS.
    The Committee strongly believes that the Homeland Security 
Advisory System must at all times be employed to convey to 
State, local, and tribal first responders and the general 
public the information required to inform them of what to look 
for and what to do to protect themselves and those within their 
area of responsibility during any period of heightened alert. 
Accordingly, this section requires that public advisories and 
alerts issued under the Homeland Security Advisory System 
include information on appropriate protective measures and 
countermeasures.
    The Committee notes that this section does not purport to 
eliminate color-coding to indicate homeland security threat 
conditions--the Secretary should remain free to employ color-
coding where the Secretary deems that appropriate--but it does 
require that the information provided under the Homeland 
Security Advisory System not be limited to indication of a 
color-coded threat condition. This section's primary intention 
is to ensure that advisories and alerts issued under the 
Homeland Security Advisory System provide information 
concerning the protective measures and countermeasures 
appropriate to the threat indicated in that advisory or alert.

Sec. 224. Use of open-source information

    Open-source information--information from unclassified 
sources--covers a vast body of information of potential 
relevance to the fight against terrorism. Harnessing open 
source information is difficult because of its enormous breadth 
and volume. The Committee believes it can, nevertheless, serve 
as an important body of data for augmenting our understanding 
of the capabilities, plans, and intentions of terrorists, as 
well as of the vulnerabilities they may seek to exploit.
    This section amends Section 201(d) of the Homeland Security 
Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296) by adding a provision that requires 
the Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis to produce and 
disseminate reports and analytical products based on open-
source information that does not require national security 
classification, and to ensure that such unclassified reports 
are, whenever possible, produced and disseminated 
contemporaneously with classified reports containing the same 
or similar information. The Committee believes that any open-
source strategy developed within the Department should seek to 
take advantage of the numerous commercial technologies 
available, and should seek to expand existing partnerships with 
industry, academia, and other government agencies.

Sec. 225. Full and efficient use of open-source information

    This section directs the Under Secretary for Information 
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection of the Department of 
Homeland Security to ensure that the Assistant Secretary for 
Information Analysis and the Assistant Secretary for 
Infrastructure Protection make full and efficient use of open-
source information.
    The Committee notes that, in requiring that the Assistant 
Secretary for Information Analysis and the Assistant Secretary 
for Infrastructure Protection make full and efficient use of 
open-source information, it intends to cover not only the 
acquisition and analysis of information from open--
unclassified--sources, but also the dissemination of such open-
source information and products to State, local, tribal, and 
private sector officials, as appropriate.
    The Committee supports the Bio-surveillance Initiative that 
was established in 2005 as an unclassified collaborative 
initiative among the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and the 
Department of Agriculture (USDA). The intent of the initiative 
is to gather, integrate, and analyze in real-time bio-
surveillance data to improve the Federal government's 
capability to rapidly identify and characterize a potential 
bioterrorist attack.
    The Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection 
(IAIP) Directorate in the Department of Homeland Security has 
the specific responsibility to develop the capability for the 
real-time integration of bio-surveillance data from a variety 
of government sources. However, the Committee is concerned 
about the progress made in implementing this initiative, the 
potential difficulties of sharing information from such a wide 
variety of sources, and the roles and responsibilities of each 
participating agency.
    Therefore, the Committee directs IAIP to provide a report, 
no later than 60 days after enactment of this Act, that 
describes the scope, cost, schedule, and key milestones for 
IAIP's portion of the Bio-surveillance Initiative. In addition, 
the report should: (1) Clarify the Department's role in this 
joint initiative; (2) describe the progress made in its 
implementation; (3) give a time frame for finalizing 
connectivity of the affected systems and giving IAIP the 
desired access to this biological surveillance information; (4) 
describe any changes that have been made to existing incident 
reporting or decision-making protocols; (5) provide a time 
frame for finalizing and fully implementing the information 
infrastructure to connect biological detection and collection 
systems; (6) outline the procedure that will be used to 
integrate intelligence with bio-surveillance data; and (7) 
outline the procedure that will be used to enable States and 
local agencies to report and receive relevant bio-surveillance 
data.

            TITLE III--DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS AND PROTECTION

Subtitle A--Preparedness and Protection

Sec. 301. National terrorism exercise program

    Subsection (a) amends the Homeland Security Act (HSA) (P.L. 
107-296) to assign the Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP) 
with primary responsibility for designing, developing, 
performing, and evaluating terrorism preparedness exercises at 
the National, State, territorial, regional, local, and tribal 
levels of government. Specifically, ODP must ensure that such 
exercises test the Nation's capability to prevent, prepare for, 
respond to, and recover from acts of terrorism.
    Subsection (b) establishes a new Subtitle J, entitled 
``National Terrorism Exercise Program,'' within Title VIII of 
the HSA, and directs the Secretary of Homeland Security, 
through ODP, to establish such a national program. The national 
program must: (1) Enhance coordination for terrorism 
preparedness across a broad cross-section of governmental 
entities, first responders, the private sector, and foreign 
entities; (2) be multidisciplinary and as realistic as 
practicable; (3) be based on current risk assessments, 
including credible threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences; 
(4) be as spontaneous as practicable; (5) be evaluated against 
performance measures and followed by corrective action; and (6) 
be assessed to learn and distribute best practices. Such a 
program also must assist State, territorial, local, and tribal 
governments in the design, implementation, and evaluation of 
their own exercises.
    This subsection also directs the Secretary to perform 
periodic, national terrorism preparedness exercises involving 
top government officials from all levels of government (i.e. 
TOPOFF). Such exercises should test and evaluate the Nation's 
capability to prevent, respond to, and recover from 
catastrophic acts of terrorism, especially those involving 
weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, the Secretary, in 
designing and conducting all exercises, must consult with a 
geographic (including urban and rural) and substantive cross-
section of governmental and non-governmental first responder 
disciplines, including, as appropriate, Federal, State, and 
local first responder training institutions, representatives of 
emergency response providers, and State and local officials 
with an expertise in terrorism preparedness.
    Subsection (c) directs the Secretary to conduct a specific 
TOPOFF exercise within one year of enactment that is focused 
solely on testing and evaluating the Nation's capability to 
detect, disrupt, and prevent catastrophic acts of terrorism. 
This additional exercise is not intended to replace the 
periodic, multi-purpose national terrorism exercises.
    To test and evaluate the preparedness of as many first 
responders and top officials as possible in a cost-effective 
manner, the Committee encourages the Secretary to incorporate 
simulations as a component of the National Terrorism Exercise 
Program. Indeed, ODP should give priority to simulations that: 
(1) Use constructive modeling; (2) are geographically and 
architecturally specific for each scenario; (3) operate in 
``real time''; and (4) are not pre-scripted. The Committee also 
believes that the National Terrorism Exercise Program should 
reflect, as accurately as practicable, potential terrorist 
incidents, including biological terrorism. To that end, the 
Committee urges the Secretary to review the efficacy of 
existing laws, regulations, and guidelines governing the 
Department's ability to respond to potential biological events.

Sec. 302. Technology development and transfer.

    Subsection (a) directs the Secretary of Homeland Security 
to complete the establishment of the Technology Clearinghouse 
within the Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate, as called 
for in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (HAS) (P.L. 107-296), 
by no later than 90 days after the date of enactment. The 
Committee remains concerned about the delay in the Department 
of Homeland Security's (DHS) establishment of this 
clearinghouse, as mandated under the HSA.
    Subsection (b) amends the HSA to require the Technology 
Clearinghouse to establish a homeland security technology and 
equipment transfer program to facilitate the identification, 
modification, and commercialization of technology and equipment 
for use by Federal, State, and local government agencies, first 
responders, and the private sector, to prevent, prepare for, 
and respond to acts of terrorism by:
          conducting surveys and reviews of available 
        technologies developed by the Department, other Federal 
        agencies, the private sector, or foreign entities for 
        potential use for homeland security purposes;
          conducting or supporting research and development 
        (R&D) activities of technologies identified to be 
        transferred for homeland security purposes;
          communicating the availability of such technologies, 
        as well as their specifications, satisfaction of 
        standards, and appropriate DHS grants for purchasing 
        such technologies to governmental agencies, first 
        responders, and the private sector;
          coordinating all technology transfer activities of 
        the S&T Directorate, including projects and grants 
        awarded to the private sector and academia;
          identifying technology transfer priorities for the 
        S&T Directorate based on current risk assessments; and 
        working in concert with first responders, foreign 
        governments and international organizations, existing 
        technology transfer programs, and State and local 
        training institutions.
    This subsection also directs the Secretary to establish a 
working group in coordination with the Secretary of Defense to 
advise and assist the Technology Clearinghouse in identifying 
military technologies that may be transferred for homeland 
security purposes. The working group may consist of 
representatives from the Department of Defense, Federal, State, 
and local first responders, and non-governmental organizations 
or private companies engaged in the R&D, testing, evaluation, 
or identification, of military technologies. The Secretary 
should select those private sector entities that have 
demonstrated prior experience and success in searching for, and 
identifying, technologies for other Federal agencies, and that 
possess expertise in homeland or national security 
technologies.
    Subsection (c) requires the Department to report to 
Congress on its status in implementing the functions of the 
Technology Clearinghouse, as well as the S&T Directorate's 
progress in reviewing unsolicited technology proposals.
    Subsection (d) precludes this section from being construed 
to expand the Department's R&D activities into human health-
related R&D, which is prohibited under section 302(4) of the 
HSA.
    The Committee supports the continued growth and operation 
of the Lessons Learned Information Sharing (www.LLIS.gov) 
system by the Office for State and Local Government 
Coordination and Preparedness, in conjunction with the National 
Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, to promote 
the generation and dissemination of peer-validated lessons 
learned, best practices, and corrective actions across the 
entire range of emergency response and homeland security 
disciplines for all State, local, and tribal jurisdictions. The 
Committee believes that the LLIS.gov system may be one of 
several appropriate resources for the Technology Clearinghouse 
to make available or disseminate the results of technology 
surveys and technology transfer activities, including 
information and best practices on the use and availability of 
such technologies to emergency response providers.
    The Committee notes that the Secretary, acting through the 
S&T Under Secretary, must consult with the Department's other 
Under Secretaries and the Director of the Office for Domestic 
Preparedness, with respect to this technology transfer program. 
The Committee encourages the S&T Under Secretary to include the 
U.S. Fire Administration, within the Emergency Preparedness and 
Response Directorate, during its consultations. The Committee 
further recommends that the Department, when coordinating and 
entering into agreements with other Federal agencies to 
facilitate effective commercialization of technologies, should 
consider utilizing existing interagency entities, such as the 
Civil Applications Committee.
    By emphasizing in this section the need for the Department 
to expedite the transfer of homeland security technologies to 
improve preparedness for acts of terrorism, the Committee is 
not suggesting that the Department should ignore the importance 
of technology development and deployment for its important non-
homeland security missions. The Department should continue to 
prioritize, maintain, and expand, where appropriate, technology 
development and transfer activities related to such other 
missions, including trade and customs revenue functions 
consistent with the requirements under Section 412(b)(1) of the 
HSA.

Sec. 303. Review of antiterrorism acquisitions

    Section 303 requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to 
study all Department procurements to identify those involving 
technology that has the purpose of preventing, detecting, 
identifying, or deterring acts of terrorism or limiting the 
harm such acts might otherwise cause, and to assess whether the 
technology is an appropriate candidate for the litigation and 
risk management protections of subtitle G of title VIII of the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296) (more commonly 
known as the ``Support Anti-terrorism by Fostering Effective 
Technologies Act of 2002'' (SAFETY Act)). In addition, the 
provision requires that, within 180 days of enactment, the 
Secretary must submit a report to Congress (1) describing the 
technologies identified as candidates for SAFETY Act 
protection, (2) prioritizing the technologies based on current 
risk assessment information, and (3) setting forth the specific 
actions the Department will take to encourage the sellers of 
those technologies to apply for SAFETY Act protections, and to 
ensure prioritized review of those applications by the 
Department.
    The purpose of this provision is to encourage greater 
collaboration between elements of the Department involved in 
the procurement of antiterrorism technologies, on the one hand, 
and the personnel responsible for reviewing and approving 
SAFETY Act applications, on the other. In addition, this 
section is intended to ensure that the Department prioritizes 
and expedites SAFETY Act review of critical technologies that 
are the subject of pending and future Department procurements.
    The Committee recommends that the Department's Chief 
Procurement Officer (CPO), in conjunction with the Office of 
SAFETY Act Implementation (OSAI), carry out this study and 
report. Successful completion of the directives contained in 
this section will require the Secretary to ensure that the CPO 
and OSAI have the full and timely cooperation of the 
Department's personnel within the procurement offices of all 
organizational elements of the Department, as well as personnel 
in the Office of Information Analysis with respect to the most 
current risk assessments.
    The Committee believes this study will promote greater 
utilization of SAFETY Act protections as part of the 
Department's anti-terrorism procurements, and result in 
prioritized and expedited SAFETY Act review for those 
antiterrorism technologies determined to be most critical based 
on current risk assessments and procurement needs. These steps 
also should improve general awareness of SAFETY Act benefits 
and encourage a higher number of applications among private 
sector sellers of antiterrorism technologies.
    The Committee also strongly believes that the Department 
must move more quickly to reduce the backlog in SAFETY Act 
applications. The SAFETY Act provides vital protection and 
incentives for the private sector to develop the technology 
needed to provide for effective homeland security.

Sec. 304. Center of Excellence for Border Security

    This section directs the Secretary of Homeland Security 
(Department or DHS) to establish a university-based Center for 
Excellence for Border Security utilizing (Center) the same 
merit-review processes and procedures that the Science and 
Technology Directorate have established for selecting such 
centers. This Center shall prioritize its activities on the 
basis of risk to address the most significant threats, 
vulnerabilities and consequences posed by the Nation's borders 
and border control systems. Among other tasks, this Center 
should conduct research, examine border security technologies 
and systems, and provide education, technical, and analytical 
assistance for the Department to effectively secure the 
Nation's borders. The Committee also believes that this Center 
should examine the need to secure our borders from terrorists 
in a cost-effective manner, and how to achieve security without 
impeding legitimate trade and travel or adversely impacting the 
economic and social stability of surrounding communities.
    The Committee notes that the Homeland Security Centers of 
Excellence program, administered by the DHS Science & 
Technology Directorate, is establishing university-based 
centers for multi-disciplinary research to address critical 
homeland security missions. Centers of Excellence bring 
together leading researchers, scientists, and technical experts 
to focus on the most significant terrorist threats facing our 
country. To ensure the Centers include the broadest range of 
expertise available nationally, the Under Secretary for Science 
& Technology shall, to the maximum extent practicable, review 
on an ongoing basis the applicant pool for the Centers of 
Excellence program to ensure that a diverse cross-section of 
our nation's higher educational institutions is represented. If 
the Under Secretary finds that institutions that traditionally 
serve minority or under-represented populations are not 
adequately reflected in the applicant pool, the Under Secretary 
shall actively undertake efforts to inform these institutions 
about the opportunities to participate in the Centers of 
Excellence program.

Sec. 305. Requirements Relating to the Container Security Initiative 
        (CSI)

    This section requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to 
conduct risk assessments on all foreign ports where the 
Container Security Initiative (CSI) program currently is 
operating, and any future port to which the Department of 
Homeland Security (Department or DHS) may consider expanding 
the program. CSI is a Departmental program that ``pushes our 
borders out'' by partnering with selected foreign ports to 
target and inspect containers traveling to the U.S. prior to 
loading at the foreign port.
    The purpose of this section is to ensure that DHS personnel 
and resources are utilized in the most cost-effective manner to 
combat the threat from the potential compromise of cargo 
containers by terrorists or terrorist weapons. The Committee is 
concerned that the CSI program lacks an overall strategy for 
designating CSI ports, and for deploying U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection (CBP) personnel to foreign ports--which is an 
expensive proposition and must be sufficiently cost-justified 
in terms of benefits to the U.S.
    This section also authorizes DHS to use appropriated 
program funds to purchase, install, and provide training for 
screening equipment at foreign ports, under standards 
established by the Secretary. Such funding should help to 
improve the reliability of foreign inspections conducted under 
this program.
    Finally, this section requires that containers arriving in 
the U.S. from a CSI port undergo the same level of inspection 
for potential compromise by terrorists or terrorist weapons as 
containers arriving from non-CSI ports, unless CBP personnel 
under the CSI program have verified that the targeted 
containers were inspected overseas for such purposes and found 
not to have been compromised by terrorists or terrorist 
weapons.

Sec. 306. Security of Maritime Cargo Containers

    This section requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to 
issue container security regulations in accordance with the 
recommendations of the Maritime Transportation Security Act 
Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee on Commercial Operations 
(COAC), within six months after the date of enactment. Many 
security experts believe that the container supply chain is 
vulnerable to being exploited by terrorists. One of the major 
vulnerabilities is the integrity of containers as they are 
shipped from a foreign manufacturer to the United States. The 
COAC recommendations were developed with input from major 
stakeholders in the intermodal transportation and retail 
industries, and will help to ensure that containers are not 
susceptible to terrorist exploitation. Given that the container 
supply chain is global in scope, this section requires the 
Secretary to work with international organizations and foreign 
governments to ensure that the standards established by the 
Department are consistent with those being developed 
internationally.
    This section also requires the Secretary to consolidate the 
Department's various container security technology and 
demonstration programs. The Department has several container 
security programs that appear to be redundant, such as 
Operation Safe Commerce, the Smart Box Initiative, and other 
container security programs in the Science and Technology 
Directorate. The Committee believes that consolidating these 
programs will result in savings and synergies, and will improve 
the Department's efforts to coordinate with industry in the 
development of technologies that will strengthen container 
security in the long term.
    This section also authorizes the Secretary to carry out a 
demonstration project that integrates various non-intrusive 
inspection technologies. Currently, the Department uses two 
separate inspection technologies to screen containers. The 
Department deploys radiation portal monitors, which scan a 
container for radioactive or nuclear material. The Department 
also uses gamma-ray inspection technologies, which show the 
contents of a container similar to an X-ray. This section would 
permit the Department to evaluate whether these technologies 
can be integrated in a way that will maximize a U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection (CBP) inspector's ability to detect a 
weapon of mass destruction or its components in a container.

Sec. 307. Security Plan for General Aviation at Ronald Reagan 
        Washington National Airport

    Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment, the 
Secretary of Homeland Security is directed to implement Section 
823(a) of the Vision 100--Century of Aviation Reauthorization 
Act (P.L. 108-176). This requires the Secretary to develop and 
implement a security plan to permit general aviation aircraft 
to land and take off at Ronald Reagan Washington National 
Airport. In developing this plan, the Secretary shall consider 
reasonable requirements to ensure the security of both the 
operations at the airport and the security of the National 
Capital Region.
    The Committee urges the Secretary to develop a plan to 
address any impact upon the U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection's Air and Marine Operations currently operating out 
of Reagan National Airport, including the considerations and 
feasibility of relocating such operations within the Flight 
Restricted Zone.
    The Committee is concerned about the ongoing operational 
and economic impact associated with the 90-mile area of the 
Washington, D.C. Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), and 
encourages Department of Homeland Security officials to work 
with other relevant agencies to update the reports and 
operational improvements called for in Section 602 of P.L. 108-
176.

Sec. 308. Interoperable Communications Assistance

    This section states that it is the Sense of the Congress 
that the Department of Homeland Security should implement, as 
expeditiously as possible, the initiatives assigned to the 
Office for Interoperability and Compatibility (OIC) under 
section 7303 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458). Specifically, OIC 
should: (1) establish a comprehensive national approach to 
achieving public safety interoperable communications; (2) issue 
letters of intent to commit future funds for jurisdictions 
through existing homeland security grant programs, as 
appropriate, to encourage long-term investments in improving 
interoperability; (3) provide technical assistance to urban and 
other high-risk areas; and (4) complete a report to Congress on 
the Department's plans for accelerating the development of 
national voluntary consensus standards for public safety 
interoperable communications by no later than 30 days after 
enactment of this Act.

Sec. 309. Report to Congress on implementation of recommendations 
        regarding protection of agriculture

    On January 30, 2004, President Bush issued Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive-9 (HSPD-9) focusing on the 
defense of U.S. agriculture and food infrastructures against 
acts of terrorism. The directive establishes a national policy 
to defend the agriculture and food system against terrorist 
attacks, including specific measures for the development of a 
methodology for identifying and prioritizing critical 
agriculture assets, systems, and functions, and for sharing 
protection responsibility with State and local governments and 
the private sector. This is a shared mission between several 
Federal partners, with specific functions and responsibilities 
assigned to the Secretary of Homeland Security (DHS).
    The Government Accountability Office (GAO) recently issued 
a report evaluating the progress of DHS and other Federal 
agencies in implementing the responsibilities assigned under 
HSPD-9 and related executive directives. The GAO report 
observed progress made by DHS, but also identified several 
areas for improvement.
    This section requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to 
submit a formal progress report within 120 days of passage of 
this Act, describing the actions that the Department plans to 
take to implement the recommendations made by the GAO report 
that are relevant to the Department's current statutory 
mandates and executive directives.

Subtitle B--Department of Homeland Security Cybersecurity Enhancement

Sec. 311. Short title

    Section 311 entitled this subtitle as the ``Department of 
Homeland Security Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2005''.

Sec. 312. Assistant Secretary for Cybersecurity

    The Committee believes that it is essential for the 
Department of Homeland Security (Department or DHS) to 
establish a cybersecurity framework to support the Nation's 
economy and security. Sophisticated cyber threats continue to 
emerge, and cyber attacks have increased dramatically in recent 
years. It has become clear that the United States needs to 
develop and maintain a comprehensive cybersecurity strategy.
    Cybersecurity is a critical thread that cuts across every 
single infrastructure sector; it is the underlying foundation 
for the operation of business and government functions. Unlike 
physical vulnerabilities, cybersecurity vulnerabilities and 
threats can change in seconds and protective measures can 
become obsolete just as quickly. As the February 2003 
President's National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace (the 
National Strategy) states:

          A network of networks directly supports the operation 
        of all sectors of our economy--energy (electric power, 
        oil, gas), transportation (rail, air, merchant marine), 
        finance and banking, information and 
        telecommunications, public health, emergency services, 
        water, chemical, defense industrial base, food, 
        agriculture, and postal and shipping * * * They also 
        control physical objects such as electrical 
        transformers, trains, pipeline pumps, chemical vats, 
        and radars. (National Strategy, p. 21.)

    To ensure that the Department addresses these concerns 
systematically and with the requisite sense of urgency, Section 
312 of this Act elevates the National Cybersecurity mission 
within DHS' Directorate for Information Analysis and 
Infrastructure Protection (IAIP)--creating an Assistant 
Secretary for Cybersecurity, who will have primary authority 
for all DHS IAIP cybersecurity-related critical infrastructure 
programs, including policy formulation and program management.
    The Assistant Secretary's responsibilities will, among 
other things, include the establishment and management of a 
national cybersecurity response system, a national 
cybersecurity threat and vulnerability reduction program, and a 
national cybersecurity awareness and training program. These 
responsibilities are based primarily on the President's 
National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace. The Assistant Secretary 
will help to coordinate cybersecurity activities across 
critical infrastructure elements, other DHS organizations, and 
with state and local governments. The Assistant Secretary will 
be in a position to provide critical input into national level 
policy decisions in this area. And elevating the position to 
the Assistant Secretary level will enable DHS to provide a 
single, visible point of contact within the Federal government, 
instead of multiple overlapping points of contact, to improve 
the interface with the private sector--which owns and operates 
roughly 85 percent of the Nation's critical infrastructure.
    The Committee recognizes that the Assistant Secretary will 
have to work closely with the Assistant Secretary for 
Infrastructure Protection, given the interrelationship between 
the physical and cyber aspects of critical infrastructure 
protection. Nonetheless, the Committee disagrees with the 
contention that cybersecurity must remain within the Office for 
Infrastructure Protection in order to ensure such coordination. 
The Committee believes that there are other ways to ensure such 
coordination without making cybersecurity simply a subset of 
infrastructure protection generally.
    In providing the general authority of the Assistant 
Secretary for Cybersecurity, it is the Committee's intent that 
all cybersecurity-related critical infrastructure protection 
programs operated by the United States Secret Service and 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Cyber Crimes Center 
will remain under the primary management and control of those 
respective organizations. Both organizations continue to 
provide leadership in building partnerships with private 
industry, academia and law enforcement agencies at all levels. 
In addition, nothing in this section is intended to alter or 
affect the responsibilities of the Department's Chief 
Information Officer with respect to the security of DHS' own 
critical information systems.
    In addition, nothing in this section is meant to affect the 
operational authority and control by U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection over the Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) 
program or other Internet and technology programs under CBP's 
supervision prior to enactment of this Act.
    The Committee encourages the Assistant Secretary for 
Cybersecurity to request that State Homeland Security Directors 
develop a State cybersecurity strategy with a focus on 
continuity of operations and disaster recovery strategies for 
the critical information and communications technology systems 
and technology assets that support emergency services at the 
State and local levels. The Assistant Secretary should 
encourage the States to conduct risk and needs assessments that 
take into account the multitude of threats to relevant cyber 
systems. The Assistant Secretary should encourage coordination 
with State Homeland Security Directors, State Chief Information 
Officers, and the Office for Domestic Preparedness within DHS 
to develop and promulgate a consistent methodology for 
developing such strategies.
    This section also provides the Assistant Secretary with 
primary authority over the National Communications System. 
Organizationally, DHS treats telecommunications separately from 
information technology, thus dividing the mission and 
operations. Given the rapid convergence of data and telephony, 
however, DHS needs to have one comprehensive and coherent 
mission element. That said, this section allows for the highly 
effective telecommunications mission to remain intact within 
the National Communications System. This organization will 
allow a gradual transitioning as cyber and telecommunications 
continue to merge, while also ensuring strategic policy and 
program direction established under one Assistant Secretary.
    The Committee also recognizes the importance of computer 
network security in protecting sensitive information. One 
element of securing network information is ensuring the 
identity of users. Technologies currently exist to strengthen 
user authentication (e.g., ``passkeys'' that require a 
biometric identifier or provide an ever-changing code that must 
be entered along with user name and password). To ensure 
appropriate access, these types of tools must be employed 
before users can access a system or information. The Committee 
is aware that, in addition to authenticating network users, it 
is now possible to authenticate devices that access computer 
networks, significantly enhancing security. The Committee, 
therefore, encourages the Department to examine device 
authentication alternatives for security and cost-
effectiveness, and to incorporate device authentication in its 
computer networks and recommended best practices for other 
agencies and the private sector.
    Another area of importance to the Committee is the 
promotion and distribution of cybersecurity best practices. The 
responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary include promoting 
voluntary cybersecurity best practices and benchmarks that are 
responsive to rapid technology changes and to the security 
needs of critical infrastructure. As such, the Committee 
encourages DHS to work with the private sector and academia to 
determine the best mechanisms for developing a distribution 
system for cybersecurity best practices and benchmarks.

Sec. 313. Cybersecurity defined

    This section provides an authoritative definition for the 
term ``cybersecurity'' for use within the Department and the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296). The term 
``cybersecurity'' is defined as the prevention of damage to, 
the protection of, and the restoration of computers, electronic 
communications systems, electronic communication services, wire 
communications, and electronic communications, including 
information contained therein, to ensure its availability, 
integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation. 
This definition references terms from Federal statutes used by 
the U.S. Justice Department to prosecute electronic crimes:
     the term ``damage'' means any impairment to the 
integrity or availability of data, a program, a system, or 
information;
     the term ``computer'' means an electronic, 
magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other high speed data 
processing device performing logical, arithmetic, or storage 
functions, and includes any data storage facility or 
communications facility directly related to or operating in 
conjunction with such device, but such term does not include an 
automated typewriter or typesetter, a portable hand held 
calculator, or other similar device;
     the term ``electronic communications system'' 
means any wire, radio, electromagnetic, photo-optical or photo-
electronic facility for the transmission of wire or electronic 
communications, and any computer facility or related electronic 
equipment for the electronic storage of such communications;
     ``electronic communication service'' means any 
service that provides to users thereof the ability to send or 
receive wire or electronic communications;
     ``wire communication'' means any aural transfer 
made in whole or in part through the use of facilities for the 
transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or 
other like connection between the point of origin and the point 
of reception (including the use of such connection in a 
switching station) furnished or operated by any person engaged 
in providing or operating such facilities for the transmission 
of interstate or foreign communications or communications 
affecting interstate or foreign commerce; and
     ``electronic communications'' means any transfer 
of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or 
intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a 
wire, radio, electromagnetic, photo-electronic or photo-optical 
system that affects interstate or foreign commerce. (See 18 
U.S.C. 1030 and 18 U.S.C. 2510.)
    From a security standpoint, this definition recognizes the 
convergence of emerging technologies, particularly between 
information technology and telecommunications. Technology is 
increasingly allowing individuals to transmit voice 
communications via the Internet and electronic data through 
wire lines. The Committee believes that there must be a 
comprehensive and consistent approach to securing these two 
types of networks, as well as future types of networks that 
might emerge. Given the rapid convergence of technology, the 
Committee strongly urges the Department to use this definition 
to guide its mission and policy functions.

Sec. 314. Cybersecurity training programs and equipment

    Subsection (a) permits the Secretary of Homeland Security, 
acting through the Assistant Secretary for Cybersecurity, to 
establish a program, in conjunction with the National Science 
Foundation (NSF), to award grants to institutions of higher 
education (and consortia thereof) to: (1) establish or expand 
professional development programs in cybersecurity; (2) 
establish or expand associate degree programs in cybersecurity; 
and (3) purchase equipment to provide training for the 
professional development and associate degree programs.
    Subsection (b) directs the Secretary, acting through the 
Assistant Secretary and in consultation with the NSF, to 
establish goals for the grant program and criteria for awarding 
grants. The Director of the NSF shall operate the program 
consistent with the established goals and criteria.
    Subsection (c) specifies that the grants should be awarded 
on a competitive, merit-reviewed basis. In awarding the grants, 
the Director also shall, to the extent practicable, ensure 
geographic diversity and the participation of women and 
underrepresented minorities.
    Subsection (d) provides that, of the amount authorized for 
the Department of Homeland Security in section 101, subsection 
(d) authorizes $3,700,000 for carrying out this section.
    Subsection (e) contains relevant definitions.
    The Committee recognizes that the threat to, and 
vulnerabilities of, our Nation's computer systems have 
increased the need for an educated and skilled workforce in the 
area of information security. System administrators and 
computer professionals are the first line of defense against 
cyber attacks. In order to create an educated workforce, 
however, the United States must have in place educational 
programs to provide future information technology professionals 
with specialized skills in information security. This new grant 
program will help us achieve that goal by providing hands-on 
training for a new generation of cybersecurity specialists.

Sec. 315. Information security requirements and OMB responsibilities 
        not affected

    This section clarifies that this subtitle, creating an 
Assistant Secretary for Cybersecurity within the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS), does not affect any Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) responsibilities under any Federal 
law, including Chapter 35 of title 44, United States Code, 
known as the Paperwork Reduction Act; the Clinger-Cohen Act of 
1996 (divisions D and E of P.L.--104-106), including the 
provisions of law enacted by amendments made by that Act; and 
the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (title 
III of P.L. 107-347), including the provisions of law enacted 
by amendments made by that Act. The role of the Assistant 
Secretary within DHS is not meant to duplicate OMB's existing 
role with respect to the security of Federal information 
systems, but rather to provide an operational program element 
that works with owners and operators of critical cyber 
infrastructures to enhance information security.

Subtitle C--Security of public transportation systems

Sec. 321. Security best practices

    This section requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to 
partner with public transportation stakeholders and public 
officials to develop and disseminate security-related best 
practices for public transportation systems. The attack that 
occurred on a commuter train in Madrid, Spain on March 11, 
2004, exposed the vulnerabilities of the U.S. public 
transportation system. The various systems of rail and mass 
transportation are vulnerable because of their inherent 
openness, size, and the need to operate in a timely manner to 
facilitate the travel of millions of passengers on a daily 
basis. This section will allow the Secretary of Homeland 
Security to receive input on the most effective security 
measures to be taken by transportation authorities, in order to 
develop these measures into a set of practices that can be 
applied nationwide.
    The Committee also is concerned about the security of 
extremely hazardous materials in transportation. The security 
of these materials presents a challenge for the Department of 
Homeland Security as it must balance security with the free 
flow of commerce.
    The Committee encourages the Secretary to improve the 
Department's efforts, in consultation with the Secretary of 
Transportation, to enhance the security of extremely hazardous 
materials shipments, as part of the broader effort to secure 
the Nation's transportation systems. The Committee believes the 
Secretary should continue to work with industry to research and 
implement ways to improve the physical security of rail cars 
and tanks carried by trucks containing extremely hazardous 
materials, to revise and implement existing extremely hazardous 
materials security plans to include the most current 
information and practices, to assist coordination between first 
responders and shippers of extremely hazardous materials, and 
to help develop and implement security training programs for 
employees. The Secretary should work with the Department of 
Transportation, State and local governments, and industry, to 
ensure that local jurisdictions have adequate response plans in 
place.

Sec. 322. Public awareness

    This section requires the Secretary to partner with 
stakeholders to develop a national plan for public awareness of 
transportation security risks, which will increase the 
awareness and vigilance of public transportation employees and 
the riding public.

Subtitle D--Critical infrastructure prioritization

Sec. 331. Critical infrastructure

    This section requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to 
complete the prioritization of critical infrastructure no later 
than 90 days after enactment. To be listed as priority critical 
infrastructure under this section, the Secretary must find that 
all of the following criteria for prioritization apply: the 
likelihood of the threat of terrorist attack, based on 
information received by the Department of Homeland Security's 
(DHS) Office of Information Analysis regarding the intentions 
and capabilities of terrorist groups and other potential 
threats; the likelihood that, due to vulnerabilities, such an 
attack would cause the destruction or significant disruption of 
such infrastructure; and the likelihood that such an attack 
would result in a substantial number of human deaths or serious 
bodily injuries, a significant adverse impact on the national 
economy, or a significant adverse impact on the national 
security. The Committee finds that it is necessary that the 
complete prioritized list of critical infrastructure be based 
on the above criteria to ensure that only high-risk critical 
infrastructure is included.
    The Committee is concerned about the speed at which the 
Department is presently compiling and prioritizing its critical 
infrastructure list, and expects this section will ensure the 
process is completed adequately and in a timely fashion. In 
carrying out this section, the Secretary shall coordinate with 
other agencies and the private sector as necessary.
    In conducting the prioritization of critical infrastructure 
required by subsection (a) of this Section, the Secretary shall 
review the appropriate sector-specific sections of the list 
with the appropriate information sharing and analysis 
organization, as defined by section 212(5) of the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002. The Secretary shall receive the 
organizations' recommendations for changes no later than 21 
days before finalizing the list of critical infrastructure 
priorities.
    The Committee also is concerned about the security of 
extremely hazardous materials in transportation. The security 
of these materials presents a challenge for the Department of 
Homeland Security as it must balance security with the free 
flow of commerce.
    The Committee encourages the Secretary to improve the 
Department's efforts, in consultation with the Secretary of 
Transportation, to enhance the security of extremely hazardous 
materials shipments, as part of the broader effort to secure 
the Nation's transportation systems. The Committee believes the 
Secretary should continue to work with industry to research and 
implement ways to improve the physical security of rail cars 
and tanks carried by trucks containing extremely hazardous 
materials, to revise and implement existing extremely hazardous 
materials security plans to include the most current 
information and practices, to assist coordination between first 
responders and shippers of extremely hazardous materials, and 
to help develop and implement security training programs for 
employees. The Secretary should work with the Department of 
Transportation, State and local governments, and industry, to 
ensure that local jurisdictions have adequate response plans in 
place.

Sec. 332. Security review

    This section requires the Secretary of the Department of 
Homeland Security to review existing security plans for 
securing the specific facilities included in the prioritized 
list, to recommend changes to existing security plans, and to 
coordinate and contribute to critical infrastructure protective 
efforts of Federal, State, and local agencies and the private 
sector as set out in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 
(HSPD-7, Dec. 17, 2003). Recommendations for security plans 
made under this section shall include protective measures to 
secure such infrastructure, and milestones and timeframes for 
implementation.
    The Committee recognizes that one of the key purposes of 
developing a prioritized list of critical infrastructure is to 
ensure that this infrastructure has adequate security plans. 
The Committee remains concerned that, in addition to 
encountering difficulties completing a prioritized list of 
critical infrastructure, the Department may not be moving 
quickly enough to assist the owners and operators of critical 
infrastructure in developing adequate security plans. This 
section will ensure the Department completes this task within a 
set time-frame.

Sec. 333. Implementation report

    This section directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to 
report on the implementation of this subtitle no later than 15 
months after enactment of this Act, and provide an update one 
year later.

Sec. 334. Protection of information

    This section exempts from disclosure under the Freedom of 
Information Act information that is generated, compiled, or 
disseminated by the Department of Homeland Security (Department 
of DHS) in carrying out this subtitle. If the information 
covered by this provision is provided to a State or local 
government, it may not be made available pursuant to any State 
or local law requiring disclosure of information or records; 
otherwise be disclosed by a State or local government without 
written consent of the entity submitting the information; or be 
used other than to protect critical infrastructure, or to 
further criminal investigation or prosecution.
    Under 6 CFR Sec. 29.8(g), certain information that is 
related to the security of critical infrastructure that is 
voluntarily submitted to the Department for its use regarding 
the security of critical infrastructure and protected systems, 
analysis, warning, interdependency study, recovery, 
reconstitution, or other informational purpose is treated as 
exempt from the Freedom of Information Act, and if such 
information is provided by certain officials in the Department 
to a State or local government agency, entity or authority, or 
an employee or contractor thereof, it is protected from any 
State or local law requiring disclosure of records or 
information. Section 334 clarifies that similar protections 
from the Freedom of Information Act and State and local record 
and information disclosure laws apply to information that is 
generated, compiled, or disseminated by the Department in 
carrying out this subtitle.
    Certain critical infrastructure information, including 
information generated, compiled, or disseminated by the 
Department, may also be designated as classified or protected 
from public disclosure under existing regulations, and this 
section is not intended to affect any such other authorities.

                        TITLE IV--MISCELLANEOUS

Sec. 401. Border security and enforcement coordination and operations

    This section requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to 
review and evaluate the current organizational structure of 
U.S. Customs and Immigration Enforcement (ICE) and U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection (CBP), and submit a report of findings 
and recommendations to the Congress within 30 days of 
enactment.
    Subsection (a) enumerates 12 findings of Congress 
expressing concern about the organizational, operational, and 
administrative division of ICE and CBP, and the need for the 
Secretary's review and report to Congress. These findings are 
based on oversight conducted by the Committee, including a 
hearing with current and former ICE and CBP personnel who 
testified about the problems with the current division of ICE 
and CBP.
    Subsection (b) requires, and specifies, the content of the 
report, including the following: a description of the rationale 
for, and any benefits of, the current organizational division 
of ICE and CBP; an analysis of alternative organizational 
structures for delivering maximum efficiency and mission 
success; and recommendations for correcting operational and 
administrative problems that have been caused by the division 
of border security and immigration and customs enforcement, 
including any appropriate reorganization plans.
    The Committee is very concerned about the effects of such 
division on the integrity and effectiveness of our border 
control system. The Committee understands that the Secretary of 
Homeland Security is currently undertaking a review that 
includes, among other things, the proper organization of CBP 
and ICE, and their component parts. The Committee strongly 
encourages the Secretary to consider whether a merger of CBP 
and ICE would help to ensure a more seamless and effective 
border control system.
    The Committee also has been made aware of concerns 
regarding possible delays in processing by the Bureau of 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Dallas Finance Center of 
invoices for Federal Protective Service (FPS) contracts. 
Therefore, the analysis required by this section also should 
include an assessment of the impact of the current 
organizational structure on the timeliness of processing 
invoices for FPS contracts.
    The Committee recognizes the challenges presented at the 
land borders of the United States due to the steadily rising 
number of commercial vehicles and the Federal and state 
requirements to conduct homeland security inspections and state 
safety inspections, respectively. In an effort to help 
facilitate legitimate trade and travel with Mexico and Canada, 
the Committee encourages the Department of Homeland Security to 
consider the feasibility and legal implications of combining, 
to the extent practicable, state and Federal operations in 
shared ``one-stop'' facilities, and to examine the use of new 
technology systems for the purpose of enhancing homeland 
security and safety inspections, while expediting transport of 
people and goods.
    It has come to the attention of the Committee that legacy 
Customs Inspectors and Bureau of Customs and Border Protection 
(CBP) Officers, who participated in six-day training sessions 
sponsored by the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center 
(FLETC) during the period from January 1, 2002 through October 
1, 2004, may not have been fully compensated. Concerns have 
been raised that a number of these Officers and legacy 
Inspectors may have been entitled to, but not provided, 
compensation for their sixth day of training each week during 
their nine- to 12-week training programs. Therefore, the 
Committee requests that the Commissioner of CBP submit a status 
report on this issue, including the number of CBP Officers and 
legacy Customs Inspectors who may be eligible under applicable 
regulations to back compensation for their sixth training day, 
the estimated total cost of any back compensation that may be 
due, and the steps CBP is taking to resolve this issue.
    The Committee also has been made aware of concerns 
regarding possible delays in processing by the Bureau of 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Dallas Finance Center of 
invoices for Federal Protective Service (FPS) contracts. 
Therefore, the analysis required by this section also should 
include an assessment of the impact of the current 
organizational structure on the timeliness of processing 
invoices for FPS contracts.

Sec. 402. GAO Report to Congress

    Based on its oversight, the Committee recognizes that there 
are serious management challenges facing the Department, with 
respect to its organization and chains of command, and with 
respect to the integration of its many separate legacy agencies 
into a single, efficient, and effective department. Among these 
challenges are: (1) the lack of accountability of critical 
support personnel to the senior operating officers, such as the 
Chief Information Officer, the Chief Financial Officer, and the 
Chief Procurement Officer; (2) the lack of consistent and 
coordinated contract management throughout the Department, 
particularly involving large, complex, high-cost procurement 
programs; (3) the challenge of securing the Department's 
Information Technology infrastructure, and making it effective 
for communications and information exchange; and (4) the lack 
of comprehensive risk assessments to help set priorities and 
guide department-wide funding and policy strategies.
    The Committee supports the 90-day review of the Department 
of Homeland Security's programs, policies, organization, and 
operations that was recently initiated by the Secretary. The 
Committee recognizes, however, that the Congress also has a 
responsibility to fully examine these management challenges, 
which--if left unaddressed for too long--could have serious 
consequences for our national security. Therefore, this section 
requires the Comptroller General of the United States to submit 
to Congress not later than six months after enactment of this 
Act an assessment of the effectiveness of the organizational 
and management structure of the Department of Homeland Security 
in meeting its missions, and recommendations on how to address 
the challenges that remain in achieving a comprehensive 
management integration strategy for the Department of Homeland 
Security.
    The Committee also notes that it supports the efforts of 
the Department's Office of the Chief Information Officer and 
the Directorate for Information Analysis and Infrastructure 
Protection to create efficiencies through the Department's data 
center consolidation. The Committee recognizes that 
interoperability between and among existing data centers 
remains a challenge, and acknowledges that data centers must be 
secure, survivable, and able to support continuing operations 
and continuity of essential government operations in emergency 
situations. DHS is requested to report back to the Committee 
with respect to: (1) current plans to enhance, develop, and/or 
consolidate data centers and data storage facilities; (2) the 
operational scope of such facilities; (3) details of how DHS 
plans to implement a fully operational data center back-up 
function consistent with unclassified continuity of operations 
standards and classified continuity of government requirements; 
and (4) how the Office of Management and Budget's data 
redundancy requirements will be achieved.

Sec. 403. Plan for establishing consolidated and colocated regional 
        offices

    The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (HSA) (Public Law 107-
296) required the DHS Secretary to develop and submit to 
Congress a plan for consolidating and co-locating regional and 
field offices that DHS acquired from its legacy agencies. The 
HSA required the Secretary to submit this plan not later than 
one year after enactment of this Act. The Committee notes that 
this submission was due to Congress by November 2003, and 
currently is overdue by 17 months.
    Therefore, this section requires the Secretary to develop 
and submit to Congress not later than 60 days after enactment 
of this Act the plan required by Section 706 of the Homeland 
Security Act. This plan is essential to enable a rapid, robust, 
and coordinated Federal response to threats and incidents; 
provide for integration of capabilities among the Department of 
Homeland Security, other Federal agencies, and state and local 
governments; and maximize cost savings and efficiencies through 
establishment of regional offices at current Department of 
Homeland Security agency regional structures with contiguous 
multi-state operations, wherever appropriate.

Sec. 404. Plan to reduce wait times

    This section directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to 
develop a plan, not later than 180 days after enactment, to 
improve the operational efficiency of the passenger screening 
checkpoints to ensure that the average peak time waiting 
periods do not exceed twenty (20) minutes. It also directs that 
the Secretary's plan should ensure that no significant 
disparities exist between immigration and customs processing 
times among international airports. The Committee has been 
informed that there are disparities in wait times among 
international airports in the United States, and there is 
concern that such disparate wait times will have a long-term 
economic impact at airports with longer wait times. The 
Secretary's plan shall also ensure that there is no reduction 
in security by the measures that may be implemented to 
eliminate disparities among international airports.

Sec. 405. Denial of transportation security card

    Section 70105 of Title 46 of the U.S. Code requires the 
issuance of Transportation Worker Identification Cards (TWICs) 
for workers that enter secure areas on vessels or maritime 
facilities. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is 
currently preparing regulations and testing technologies in 
advance of fully implementing this requirement.
    Section 70105(c)(1) sets out the criteria under which the 
Secretary can deny a TWIC to an individual, and Section 
70105(c)(2) establishes the process under which a waiver of the 
denial can be obtained. Under paragraph (1) of subsection (c), 
the Secretary can deny a TWIC to an individual who has been 
convicted of certain felonies in the preceding seven years, or 
who otherwise poses a terrorism security risk. Section 405 of 
this Act clarifies that, when determining if a worker is 
``otherwise a terrorism security risk,'' the Secretary can 
consider felonies that occurred more than seven years before 
the issuance of the TWIC only if the felony was related to 
terrorism, as that term is defined in the Homeland Security Act 
of 2002 (Public Law 107-296).
    Section 405 also requires that a hearing under the waiver 
process established in paragraph (2) be before an 
Administrative Law Judge. This provision assures that the 
review of the waiver will be conducted in a separate forum from 
that in which the determination under paragraph (1) was made.
    The Committee recognizes that the TWIC program was 
developed to address threats and vulnerabilities across all 
modes of the U.S. transportation system. The Committee is 
confident that, once implemented, TWIC will ensure the security 
of passengers, transportation workers, vehicles, and facilities 
by establishing a system-wide common credential for all 
personnel requiring unescorted physical or logical access to 
secure or sensitive areas of the U.S. transportation system. 
The Committee takes note that, while the initiative is complex, 
implementation of TWIC has been unnecessarily slow. Therefore, 
the Committee directs TSA to report to the Committee on the 
status of the TWIC technology, deployment, and program 
guidelines within 90 days of enactment.

Sec. 406. Transfer of existing Customs Patrol Officers unit and 
        establishment of new CPO units in the Bureau of Immigration and 
        Customs Enforcement

    The ``Shadow Wolves'' are a specialized unit of Customs 
Patrol Officers (CPO), created by Congress in 1972, that 
patrols the international land border within the Tohono O'odham 
Nation, a sovereign Indian nation, in the State of Arizona. The 
Shadow Wolves officers are Native Americans who combine modern 
technology and ancient tracking techniques to identify, pursue, 
and arrest smugglers along the 76 miles of border and 2.8 
million acres within the Tohono O'odham Nation. This unit has 
proven to be one of the Nation's most valuable assets against 
narcotics smuggling. Each year, the 21 agents in the Shadow 
Wolves unit have combined to seize over 100,000 pounds of 
illegal narcotics.
    After the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, 
the Shadow Wolves unit was transferred to U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection, and placed under the administrative control 
of the Tucson Sector of the U.S. Border Patrol. This 
reorganization has produced uncertainty and a lack of clear 
direction for the unit, negatively impacting operations and 
retention of personnel.
    This section transfers the Shadow Wolves to U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), since the unit's 
work most closely resembles that of ICE Special Agents who 
investigate and attempt to close down large drug smuggling 
operations. In addition, this section sets the pay scale of the 
Shadow Wolves at the same rate as ICE Special Agents.
    This section also authorizes new units, similar to the 
Shadow Wolves, to operate on other similarly situated Indian 
reservations--such as the Akwesasne (Mohawk) Reservation in 
upstate New York.

Additional Committee Concerns:

                 Mass Spectrometry Screening Technology

    The committee is aware that the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) will have deployed 14 explosive detection 
trace portals in U.S. airports by May 31, 2005. These portals 
use a trace detection method called ion mobility spectrometry, 
which the National Academy of Sciences has found to have 
limited utility, as they are designed to detect only a specific 
list of explosives and cannot easily be reconfigured to detect 
an expanded list of explosives, or chemical and biological 
threat substances. The National Academy of Sciences has 
recommended the use of mass spectrometry to improve upon these 
existing explosive trace detection systems. Based on the 
National Academy's research, and the recommendation of the 9/11 
Commission that this Committee give priority attention to 
improving the ability of screening checkpoints to detect 
explosives on aviation passengers, the Committee is supportive 
of the use of mass spectrometry technology for passenger 
screening purposes. The Committee, therefore, encourages TSA to 
continue to develop and deploy mass spectrometry screening 
portal technology.

               Preparation for 2010 Olympic Winter Games

    The Committee understands that the 2010 Olympic Winter 
Games will be conducted in Vancouver, British Columbia, from 
February 12 through February 28, and the 2010 Paralympic Winter 
Games from March 12 through March 21 of that same year. The 
Committee anticipates that these events of international 
significance will greatly increase the amount of people and 
goods crossing the border between Washington State and Canada. 
The Committee directs the Department of Homeland Security to 
conduct a review, in conjunction with appropriate Washington 
State and Canadian entities, and to report back to the 
Committee on Homeland Security within one year, of all relevant 
Departmental issues related to the Vancouver Olympic and 
Paralympic Games, including, but not limited to, expected 
increases in border flow, necessary enhancements to border 
security, estimated border crossing wait times, and any need 
for increased border personnel to be deployed during those 
times.

                         Border Communications

    The Committee recognizes that mobile communications 
coverage does not exist in much of the remote areas along the 
U.S. border with Mexico. This lack of coverage prevents the 
local residents who observe illegal border activity from 
rapidly and reliably communicating with the United States 
Border Patrol. Accordingly, the Department of Homeland Security 
should work with appropriate entities to improve mobile 
communications coverage in remote areas along the border. 
Enhancing communication capabilities will greatly enhance the 
ability of the Border Patrol to detect and apprehend unknown 
persons attempting to illegally enter the United States.

                      IDENT/IAFIS Interoperability

    The report that accompanied the Fiscal Year 2005 Department 
of Homeland Security Appropriations Act (PL 108-334) contained 
language directing the Department to report, by January 16, 
2005, on the status of the effort to ensure operational 
interoperability of the database systems known as IDENT--an 
immigration-related database--and IAFIS (Integrated Automoated 
Fingerprint Identification System)--an FBI criminal database. 
Both of these databases contain biometric information on law 
violators, and are used by border security officials in 
screening entrants into the United States. The report is 
supposed to include an estimate of funds needed and a timetable 
for full interoperability. The Committee understands that this 
report has not yet been completed. The Committee is deeply 
concerned about the progress of the Department in achieving 
full interoperability between these systems, and directs the 
Department to report back to the Committee on the status of 
this effort within 60 days of enactment.

          Improving Border Management and Immigration Security

    The Committee notes that the US-VISIT office within the 
Department of Homeland Security is currently moving towards a 
comprehensive border management system that utilizes the most 
current technology available to greatly enhance our homeland 
security. The Committee further notes that, currently, 
immigration applications and records of immigrant and non-
immigrant entries and exits into and out of the United States 
are largely in paper form. There is no way to access the forms 
quickly and easily to coordinate events encountered by various 
bureaus in charge of immigration. A visitor arriving at an 
airport may have an application for admission that had 
previously been denied for security reasons just a day or two 
before. The immigrant may immediately try to enter the United 
States through a different procedure, but U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection personnel at a port of entry will have no 
immediate access to the information suggesting that the 
immigrant should not be admitted. The Committee wishes to 
stress the urgent security need for the Department to move as 
quickly as possible to complete this border management system.
    To this end, the Committee stresses the need for the 
Secretary in the next six months, in consultation with the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and other 
appropriate agencies, to examine and analyze all biometric 
identifiers that have been or might be collected in the future 
as part of the integrated entry and exit data system required 
under section 110 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (8 U.S.C. 1365a), to 
conduct background checks with Federal intelligence agencies, 
to check non-immigrant and immigrant applicants against 
terrorist or other watch lists, and for purposes of processing 
and adjudicating applications and petitions for immigration 
benefits. In this examination and analysis, the Secretary, in 
consultation with NIST, should consider such factors as 
accuracy, currently available technology, and the potential for 
new technology in the future, as well as economic 
considerations, storage capabilities, efficiency, and 
feasibility. Based on this study, the Secretary should set 
appropriate biometric standards for Department-wide immigration 
and border management purposes.
    The Committee also notes the urgent security need for the 
Department to have instantaneous access to all files on 
immigrant and non-immigrant applicants for admission into the 
United States through organized and digital or electronic 
means. To satisfy this need, the Committee stresses that, in 
the next six months, the Secretary should analyze and examine 
options to improve security by establishing a plan to have 
instantaneous digital access to all Department of Homeland 
Security immigrant and non-immigrant files, all actions taken 
by various agencies that come into contact with immigrants and 
non-immigrants, and any other information necessary to securely 
and accurately decide whether to admit an immigrant or non-
immigrant into the United States. This analysis and examination 
should consider costs, data security, data privacy, and the 
ability for immigrants and non-immigrants to correct 
information stored in their digital files.
    Further, the Committee believes there is a need for an 
analysis and plan on the most accurate and efficient way to 
organize and access all files on immigrant and non-immigrant 
applicants and petitioners. The Secretary, in the next six 
months, should examine and analyze whether all immigrant or 
non-immigrant files should be registered or catalogued by the 
receiving agency using a biometric identifier. The Secretary, 
in consultation with NIST and other appropriate agencies, 
should choose one or more alternative biometric identifiers to 
be used for such purposes.
    The Committee also wishes to stress the security need for 
the Department to have instantaneous digital access to the 
entry and exit history of all immigrants and non-immigrants 
seeking admission at a port of entry. To satisfy this need, the 
Secretary, in the next six months, should analyze and consider 
replacing Department of Homeland Security paper Form Number I-
94 (Arrival/Departure Record) and Form Number I-94W (NIV Waiver 
Arrival/Departure Record) with procedures that ensure that the 
functions served by such forms are being carried out by 
electronic or digitized means. In examining this matter, the 
Secretary should consider the costs and savings to the Federal 
government of such replacement, the ability for immigrants or 
non-immigrants to correct information stored in their digital 
files, and whether there are any other reasons, including law 
enforcement or investigative reasons, to maintain paper forms 
as an additional source of such information.

        DHS Compliance with Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act

    In order to fully comply with the Law Enforcement Officers 
Safety Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-277), the Secretary of 
Homeland Security is directed to issue guidelines to its 
component agencies to which the Act would apply. Such 
guidelines should include, among other things, a determination 
of the current, retired, and legacy employees who meet the 
definition of ``law enforcement officer'' as applied under the 
Act. The Department shall report back to the Committee within 
180 days after enactment of this Act regarding the issuance of 
such guidelines and the Department's plans for implementing 
them.

        DHS Compliance with Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act

    In order to fully comply with the Law Enforcement Officers 
Safety Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-277), the Secretary of 
Homeland Security is directed to issue guidelines to its 
component agencies to which the Act would apply. Such 
guidelines should include, among other things, a determination 
of the current, retired, and legacy employees who meet the 
definition of ``law enforcement officer'' as applied under the 
Act. The Department shall report back to the Committee within 
180 days after enactment of this Act regarding the issuance of 
such guidelines and the Department's plans for implementing 
them.

         Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported

  In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by 
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law 
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new 
matter is printed in italic, existing law in which no change is 
proposed is shown in roman):

HOMELAND SECURITY ACT OF 2002

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *



SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

  (a) * * *
  (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is 
as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
     * * * * * * *

                TITLE I--DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Sec. 101. Executive department; mission.
     * * * * * * *
Sec. 104. Authority for disseminating homeland security information.
Sec. 105. Homeland Security Information Requirements Board.

      TITLE II--INFORMATION ANALYSIS AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION

  Subtitle A--Directorate for Information Analysis and Infrastructure 
                    Protection; Access to Information

Sec. 201. Directorate for Information Analysis and Infrastructure 
          Protection.
     * * * * * * *
Sec. 203. Alternative analysis of homeland security information.
Sec. 204. 9/11 Memorial Homeland Security Fellows Program.
Sec. 205. Homeland Security Advisory System.
Sec. 206. Full and efficient use of open-source information.
Sec. 207. Assistant Secretary for Cybersecurity.
     * * * * * * *

 TITLE VIII--COORDINATION WITH NON-FEDERAL ENTITIES; INSPECTOR GENERAL; 
      UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE; COAST GUARD; GENERAL PROVISIONS

     * * * * * * *

              Subtitle J--Terrorism Preparedness Exercises

Sec. 899a. National terrorism exercise program.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

  In this Act, the following definitions apply:
          (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          (17)(A) The term ``cybersecurity'' means the 
        prevention of damage to, the protection of, and the 
        restoration of computers, electronic communications 
        systems, electronic communication services, wire 
        communication, and electronic communication, including 
        information contained therein, to ensure its 
        availability, integrity, authentication, 
        confidentiality, and nonrepudiation.
          (B) In this paragraph--
                  (i) each of the terms ``damage'' and 
                ``computer'' has the meaning that term has in 
                section 1030 of title 18, United States Code; 
                and
                  (ii) each of the terms ``electronic 
                communications system'', ``electronic 
                communication service'', ``wire 
                communication'', and ``electronic 
                communication'' has the meaning that term has 
                in section 2510 of title 18, United States 
                Code.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


TITLE I--DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 102. SECRETARY; FUNCTIONS.

  (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (e) Participation in Foreign Collection Requirements and 
Management Processes.--The Secretary shall be a member of any 
Federal Government interagency board, established by Executive 
order or any other binding interagency directive, that is 
responsible for establishing foreign collection information 
requirements and priorities for estimative analysis.
  [(e)] (f) Issuance of Regulations.--The issuance of 
regulations by the Secretary shall be governed by the 
provisions of chapter 5 of title 5, United States Code, except 
as specifically provided in this Act, in laws granting 
regulatory authorities that are transferred by this Act, and in 
laws enacted after the date of enactment of this Act.
  [(f)] (g) Special Assistant to the Secretary.--The Secretary 
shall appoint a Special Assistant to the Secretary who shall be 
responsible for--
          (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  [(g)] (h) Standards Policy.--All standards activities of the 
Department shall be conducted in accordance with section 12(d) 
of the National Technology Transfer Advancement Act of 1995 (15 
U.S.C. 272 note) and Office of Management and Budget Circular 
A-119.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 104. AUTHORITY FOR DISSEMINATING HOMELAND SECURITY INFORMATION.

  (a) Primary Authority.--Except as provided in subsection (b), 
the Secretary shall be the executive branch official 
responsible for disseminating homeland security information to 
State and local government and tribal officials and the private 
sector.
  (b) Prior Approval Required.--No Federal official may 
disseminate any homeland security information, as defined in 
section 892(f)(1), to State, local, tribal, or private sector 
officials without the Secretary's prior approval, except--
          (1) in exigent circumstances under which it is 
        essential that the information be communicated 
        immediately; or
          (2) when such information is issued to State, local, 
        or tribal law enforcement officials for the purpose of 
        assisting them in any aspect of the administration of 
        criminal justice.

SEC. 105. HOMELAND SECURITY INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS BOARD.

  (a) Establishment of Board.--There is established an 
interagency Homeland Security Information Requirements Board 
(hereinafter in this section referred to as the ``Information 
Requirements Board'').
  (b) Membership.--The following officials are members of the 
Information Requirements Board:
          (1) The Secretary of Homeland Security, who shall 
        serve as the Chairman of the Information Requirements 
        Board.
          (2) The Attorney General.
          (3) The Secretary of Commerce.
          (4) The Secretary of the Treasury.
          (5) The Secretary of Defense.
          (6) The Secretary of Energy.
          (7) The Secretary of State.
          (8) The Secretary of the Interior.
          (9) The Director of National Intelligence.
          (10) The Director of the Federal Bureau of 
        Investigation.
          (11) The Director of the National Counterterrorism 
        Center.
          (12) The Chief Privacy Officer of the Department of 
        Homeland Security.
  (c) Functions.--
          (1) Oversight of homeland security requirements.--The 
        Information Requirements Board shall oversee the 
        process for establishing homeland security requirements 
        and collection management for all terrorism-related 
        information and all other homeland security information 
        (as defined in section 892(f)(1)) collected within the 
        United States.
          (2) Determination of collection priorities.--The 
        Information Requirements Board shall--
                  (A) determine the domestic information 
                collection requirements for information 
                relevant to the homeland security mission; and
                  (B) prioritize the collection and use of such 
                information.
          (3) Coordination of collection requirements and 
        management activities.--
                  (A) Coordination with counterpart agencies.--
                The Chairman shall ensure that the Information 
                Requirements Board carries out its activities 
                in a manner that is fully coordinated with the 
                Board's counterpart entities.
                  (B) Participation of counterpart entities.--
                The Chairman and the Director of National 
                Intelligence shall ensure that each counterpart 
                entity--
                          (i) has at least one representative 
                        on the Information Requirement Board 
                        and on every subcomponent of the Board; 
                        and
                          (ii) meets jointly with the 
                        Information Requirements Board (and, as 
                        appropriate, with any subcomponent of 
                        the Board) as often as the Chairman and 
                        the Director of National Intelligence 
                        determine appropriate.
                  (C) Counterpart entity defined.--In this 
                section, the term ``counterpart entity'' means 
                an entity of the Federal Government that is 
                responsible for foreign intelligence collection 
                requirements and management.
  (d) Meetings.--
          (1) In general.--The Information Requirements Board 
        shall meet regularly at such times and places as its 
        Chairman may direct.
          (2) Invited representatives.--The Chairman may invite 
        representatives of Federal agencies not specified in 
        subsection (b) to attend meetings of the Information 
        Requirements Board.

      TITLE II--INFORMATION ANALYSIS AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION

  Subtitle A--Directorate for Information Analysis and Infrastructure 
                   Protection; Access to Information

SEC. 201. DIRECTORATE FOR INFORMATION ANALYSIS AND INFRASTRUCTURE 
                    PROTECTION.

  (a) * * *
  (b) Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis; Assistant 
Secretary for Infrastructure Protection.--
          (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          (4) Assignment of specific functions.--The Under 
        Secretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure 
        Protection--
                  (A) shall assign to the Assistant Secretary 
                for Information Analysis the responsibility for 
                performing the functions described in 
                paragraphs (1), (4), (7) through (14), (16), 
                and (18) of subsection (d);
                  (B) shall assign to the Assistant Secretary 
                for Infrastructure Protection the 
                responsibility for performing the functions 
                described in paragraphs (2), (5), and (6) of 
                subsection (d);
                  (C) shall ensure that the Assistant Secretary 
                for Information Analysis and the Assistant 
                Secretary for Infrastructure Protection both 
                perform the functions described in paragraphs 
                (3), (15), (17), and (19) of subsection (d);
                  (D) may assign to each such Assistant 
                Secretary such other duties relating to such 
                responsibilities as the Under Secretary may 
                provide;
                  (E) shall direct each such Assistant 
                Secretary to coordinate with Federal, State, 
                and local law enforcement agencies, and with 
                tribal and private sector entities, as 
                appropriate; and
                  (F) shall direct the Assistant Secretary for 
                Information Analysis to coordinate with 
                elements of the intelligence community, as 
                appropriate.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (d) Responsibilities of Under Secretary.--Subject to the 
direction and control of the Secretary, the responsibilities of 
the Under Secretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure 
Protection shall be as follows:
          (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          (7) To administer the Homeland Security Advisory 
        System under section 205, including--
                  (A) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          (20) To require, in consultation with the Assistant 
        Secretary for Infrastructure Protection, the creation 
        and routine dissemination of analytic reports and 
        products designed to provide timely and accurate 
        information that has specific relevance to each of the 
        Nation's critical infrastructure sectors (as identified 
        in the national infrastructure protection plan issued 
        under paragraph (5)), to private sector officials in 
        each such sector who are responsible for protecting 
        institutions within that sector from potential acts of 
        terrorism and for mitigating the potential consequences 
        of any such act.
          (21) To ensure sufficient analytic expertise within 
        the Office of Information Analysis to create and 
        disseminate, on an ongoing basis, products based on the 
        analysis of homeland security information, as defined 
        in section 892(f)(1), with specific reference to the 
        threat of terrorism involving the use of nuclear 
        weapons and biological agents to inflict mass 
        casualties or other catastrophic consequences on the 
        population or territory of the United States.
          (22) To ensure that--
                  (A) the Assistant Secretary for Information 
                Analysis receives promptly and without request 
                all information obtained by any component of 
                the Department if that information relates, 
                directly or indirectly, to a threat of 
                terrorism involving the potential use of 
                nuclear weapons;
                  (B) such information is--
                          (i) integrated and analyzed 
                        comprehensively; and
                          (ii) disseminated in a timely manner, 
                        including to appropriately cleared 
                        State, local, tribal, and private 
                        sector officials; and
                  (C) such information is used to determine 
                what requests the Department should submit for 
                collection of additional information relating 
                to that threat.
          (23) To ensure that the Assistant Secretary for 
        Information Analysis--
                  (A) is routinely and without request given 
                prompt access to all terrorism-related 
                information collected by or otherwise in the 
                possession of any component of the Department, 
                including all homeland security information (as 
                that term is defined in section 892(f)(1)); and
                  (B) to the extent technologically feasible 
                has direct access to all databases of any 
                component of the Department that may contain 
                such information.
          (24) To administer the homeland security information 
        network, including--
                  (A) exercising primary responsibility for 
                establishing a secure nationwide real-time 
                homeland security information sharing network 
                for Federal, State, and local government 
                agencies and authorities, tribal officials, the 
                private sector, and other governmental and 
                private entities involved in receiving, 
                analyzing, and distributing information related 
                to threats to homeland security;
                  (B) ensuring that the information sharing 
                systems, developed in connection with the 
                network established under subparagraph (A), are 
                utilized and are compatible with, to the 
                greatest extent practicable, Federal, State, 
                and local government, tribal, and private 
                sector antiterrorism systems and protocols that 
                have been or are being developed; and
                  (C) ensuring, to the greatest extent 
                possible, that the homeland security 
                information network and information systems are 
                integrated and interoperable with existing 
                private sector technologies.
          (25) To ensure that, whenever possible--
                  (A) the Assistant Secretary for Information 
                Analysis produces and disseminates reports and 
                analytic products based on open-source 
                information that do not require a national 
                security classification under applicable law; 
                and
                  (B) such unclassified open-source reports are 
                produced and disseminated contemporaneously 
                with reports or analytic products concerning 
                the same or similar information that the 
                Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis 
                produces and disseminates in a classified 
                format.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 203. ALTERNATIVE ANALYSIS OF HOMELAND SECURITY INFORMATION.

  The Secretary shall establish a process and assign an 
individual or entity the responsibility to ensure that, as 
appropriate, elements of the Department conduct alternative 
analysis (commonly referred to as ``red-team analysis'') of 
homeland security information, as that term is defined in 
section 892(f)(1), that relates to potential acts of terrorism 
involving the use of nuclear weapons or biological agents to 
inflict mass casualties or other catastrophic consequences on 
the population or territory of the United States.

SEC. 204. 9/11 MEMORIAL HOMELAND SECURITY FELLOWS PROGRAM.

  (a) Establishment.--
          (1) In general.--The Secretary shall establish a 
        fellowship program in accordance with this section for 
        the purpose of bringing State, local, tribal, and 
        private sector officials to participate in the work of 
        the Homeland Security Operations Center in order to 
        become familiar with--
                  (A) the mission and capabilities of that 
                Center; and
                  (B) the role, programs, products, and 
                personnel of the Office of Information 
                Analysis, the Office of Infrastructure 
                Protection, and other elements of the 
                Department responsible for the integration, 
                analysis, and dissemination of homeland 
                security information, as defined in section 
                892(f)(1).
          (2) Program name.--The program under this section 
        shall be known as the 9/11 Memorial Homeland Security 
        Fellows Program.
  (b) Eligibility.--In order to be eligible for selection as a 
fellow under the program, an individual must--
          (1) have homeland security-related responsibilities; 
        and
          (2) possess an appropriate national security 
        clearance.
  (c) Limitations.--The Secretary--
          (1) may conduct up to 4 iterations of the program 
        each year, each of which shall be 90 days in duration; 
        and
          (2) shall ensure that the number of fellows selected 
        for each iteration does not impede the activities of 
        the Center.
  (d) Condition.--As a condition of selecting an individual as 
a fellow under the program, the Secretary shall require that 
the individual's employer agree to continue to pay the 
individual's salary and benefits during the period of the 
fellowship.
  (e) Stipend.--During the period of the fellowship of an 
individual under the program, the Secretary shall, subject to 
the availability of appropriations--
          (1) provide to the individual a stipend to cover the 
        individual's reasonable living expenses during the 
        period of the fellowship; and
          (2) reimburse the individual for round-trip, economy 
        fare travel to and from the individual's place of 
        residence twice each month.

SEC. 205. HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY SYSTEM.

  (a) Requirement.--The Under Secretary for Information 
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection shall implement a 
Homeland Security Advisory System in accordance with this 
section to provide public advisories and alerts regarding 
threats to homeland security, including national, regional, 
local, and economic sector advisories and alerts, as 
appropriate.
  (b) Required Elements.--The Under Secretary, under the 
System--
          (1) shall include, in each advisory and alert 
        regarding a threat, information on appropriate 
        protective measures and countermeasures that may be 
        taken in response to the threat;
          (2) shall, whenever possible, limit the scope of each 
        advisory and alert to a specific region, locality, or 
        economic sector believed to be at risk; and
          (3) shall not, in issuing any advisory or alert, use 
        color designations as the exclusive means of specifying 
        the homeland security threat conditions that are the 
        subject of the advisory or alert.

SEC. 206. FULL AND EFFICIENT USE OF OPEN-SOURCE INFORMATION.

  The Under Secretary shall ensure that, in meeting their 
analytic responsibilities under section 201(d) and in 
formulating requirements for collection of additional 
information, the Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis 
and the Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection make 
full and efficient use of open-source information wherever 
possible.

SEC. 207. ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR CYBERSECURITY.

  (a) In General.--There shall be in the Directorate for 
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection a National 
Cybersecurity Office headed by an Assistant Secretary for 
Cybersecurity (in this section referred to as the ``Assistant 
Secretary''), who shall assist the Secretary in promoting 
cybersecurity for the Nation.
  (b) General Authority.--The Assistant Secretary, subject to 
the direction and control of the Secretary, shall have primary 
authority within the Department for all cybersecurity-related 
critical infrastructure protection programs of the Department, 
including with respect to policy formulation and program 
management.
  (c) Responsibilities.--The responsibilities of the Assistant 
Secretary shall include the following:
          (1) To establish and manage--
                  (A) a national cybersecurity response system 
                that includes the ability to--
                          (i) analyze the effect of 
                        cybersecurity threat information on 
                        national critical infrastructure; and
                          (ii) aid in the detection and warning 
                        of attacks on, and in the restoration 
                        of, cybersecurity infrastructure in the 
                        aftermath of such attacks;
                  (B) a national cybersecurity threat and 
                vulnerability reduction program that identifies 
                cybersecurity vulnerabilities that would have a 
                national effect on critical infrastructure, 
                performs vulnerability assessments on 
                information technologies, and coordinates the 
                mitigation of such vulnerabilities;
                  (C) a national cybersecurity awareness and 
                training program that promotes cybersecurity 
                awareness among the public and the private 
                sectors and promotes cybersecurity training and 
                education programs;
                  (D) a government cybersecurity program to 
                coordinate and consult with Federal, State, and 
                local governments to enhance their 
                cybersecurity programs; and
                  (E) a national security and international 
                cybersecurity cooperation program to help 
                foster Federal efforts to enhance international 
                cybersecurity awareness and cooperation.
          (2) To coordinate with the private sector on the 
        program under paragraph (1) as appropriate, and to 
        promote cybersecurity information sharing, 
        vulnerability assessment, and threat warning regarding 
        critical infrastructure.
          (3) To coordinate with other directorates and offices 
        within the Department on the cybersecurity aspects of 
        their missions.
          (4) To coordinate with the Under Secretary for 
        Emergency Preparedness and Response to ensure that the 
        National Response Plan developed pursuant to section 
        502(6) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 
        312(6)) includes appropriate measures for the recovery 
        of the cybersecurity elements of critical 
        infrastructure.
          (5) To develop processes for information sharing with 
        the private sector, consistent with section 214, that--
                  (A) promote voluntary cybersecurity best 
                practices, standards, and benchmarks that are 
                responsive to rapid technology changes and to 
                the security needs of critical infrastructure; 
                and
                  (B) consider roles of Federal, State, local, 
                and foreign governments and the private sector, 
                including the insurance industry and auditors.
          (6) To coordinate with the Chief Information Officer 
        of the Department in establishing a secure information 
        sharing architecture and information sharing processes, 
        including with respect to the Department's operation 
        centers.
          (7) To consult with the Electronic Crimes Task Force 
        of the United States Secret Service on private sector 
        outreach and information activities.
          (8) To consult with the Office for Domestic 
        Preparedness to ensure that realistic cybersecurity 
        scenarios are incorporated into tabletop and recovery 
        exercises.
          (9) To consult and coordinate, as appropriate, with 
        other Federal agencies on cybersecurity-related 
        programs, policies, and operations.
          (10) To consult and coordinate within the Department 
        and, where appropriate, with other relevant Federal 
        agencies, on security of digital control systems, such 
        as Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) 
        systems.
  (d) Authority Over the National Communications System.--The 
Assistant Secretary shall have primary authority within the 
Department over the National Communications System.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


TITLE III--SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN SUPPORT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 313. TECHNOLOGY CLEARINGHOUSE TO ENCOURAGE AND SUPPORT INNOVATIVE 
                    SOLUTIONS TO ENHANCE HOMELAND SECURITY.

  (a) * * *
  (b) Elements of Program.--The program described in subsection 
(a) shall include the following components:
          (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          (6) The establishment of a homeland security 
        technology transfer program to facilitate the 
        identification, modification, and commercialization of 
        technology and equipment for use by Federal, State, and 
        local governmental agencies, emergency response 
        providers, and the private sector to prevent, prepare 
        for, or respond to acts of terrorism.
  (c) Technology Transfer Program.--In developing the program 
described in subsection (b)(6), the Secretary, acting through 
the Under Secretary for Science and Technology, shall--
          (1) in consultation with the other Under Secretaries 
        of the Department and the Director of the Office for 
        Domestic Preparedness, on an ongoing basis--
                  (A) conduct surveys and reviews of available 
                appropriate technologies that have been, or are 
                in the process of being developed, tested, 
                evaluated, or demonstrated by the Department, 
                other Federal agencies, or the private sector 
                or foreign governments and international 
                organizations and that may be useful in 
                assisting Federal, State, and local 
                governmental agencies, emergency response 
                providers, or the private sector to prevent, 
                prepare for, or respond to acts of terrorism;
                  (B) conduct or support research, development, 
                tests, and evaluations, as appropriate of 
                technologies identified under subparagraph (A), 
                including any necessary modifications to such 
                technologies for antiterrorism use;
                  (C) communicate to Federal, State, and local 
                governmental agencies, emergency response 
                providers, or the private sector the 
                availability of such technologies for 
                antiterrorism use, as well as the technology's 
                specifications, satisfaction of appropriate 
                standards, and the appropriate grants available 
                from the Department to purchase such 
                technologies;
                  (D) coordinate the selection and 
                administration of all technology transfer 
                activities of the Science and Technology 
                Directorate, including projects and grants 
                awarded to the private sector and academia; and
                  (E) identify priorities based on current risk 
                assessments within the Department of Homeland 
                Security for identifying, researching, 
                developing, testing, evaluating, modifying, and 
                fielding existing technologies for 
                antiterrorism purposes;
          (2) in support of the activities described in 
        paragraph (1)--
                  (A) consult with Federal, State, and local 
                emergency response providers;
                  (B) consult with government agencies and 
                nationally recognized standards development 
                organizations as appropriate;
                  (C) enter into agreements and coordinate with 
                other Federal agencies, foreign governments, 
                and national and international organizations as 
                the Secretary determines appropriate, in order 
                to maximize the effectiveness of such 
                technologies or to facilitate commercialization 
                of such technologies; and
                  (D) consult with existing technology transfer 
                programs and Federal and State training centers 
                that research, develop, test, evaluate, and 
                transfer military and other technologies for 
                use by emergency response providers; and
          (3) establish a working group in coordination with 
        the Secretary of Defense to advise and assist the 
        technology clearinghouse in the identification of 
        military technologies that are in the process of being 
        developed, or are developed, by the Department of 
        Defense or the private sector, which may include--
                  (A) representatives from the Department of 
                Defense or retired military officers;
                  (B) nongovernmental organizations or private 
                companies that are engaged in the research, 
                development, testing, or evaluation of related 
                technologies or that have demonstrated prior 
                experience and success in searching for and 
                identifying technologies for Federal agencies;
                  (C) Federal, State, and local emergency 
                response providers; and
                  (D) to the extent the Secretary considers 
                appropriate, other organizations, other 
                interested Federal, State, and local agencies, 
                and other interested persons.
  [(c)] (d) Miscellaneous Provisions.--
          (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


TITLE IV--DIRECTORATE OF BORDER AND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Subtitle C--Miscellaneous Provisions

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 430. OFFICE FOR DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS.

  (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (c) Responsibilities.--The Office for Domestic Preparedness 
shall have the primary responsibility within the executive 
branch of Government for the preparedness of the United States 
for acts of terrorism, including--
          (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          (8) those elements of the Office of National 
        Preparedness of the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
        which relate to terrorism, which shall be consolidated 
        within the Department in the Office for Domestic 
        Preparedness established under this section; [and]
          (9) helping to ensure the acquisition of 
        interoperable communication technology by State and 
        local governments and emergency response providers[.]; 
        and
          (10) designing, developing, performing, and 
        evaluating exercises at the national, State, 
        territorial, regional, local, and tribal levels of 
        government that incorporate government officials, 
        emergency response providers, public safety agencies, 
        the private sector, international governments and 
        organizations, and other appropriate entities to test 
        the Nation's capability to prevent, prepare for, 
        respond to, and recover from threatened or actual acts 
        of terrorism.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


TITLE VIII--COORDINATION WITH NON-FEDERAL ENTITIES; INSPECTOR GENERAL; 
UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE; COAST GUARD; GENERAL PROVISIONS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


              Subtitle J--Terrorism Preparedness Exercises

SEC. 899A. NATIONAL TERRORISM EXERCISE PROGRAM.

  (a) In General.--The Secretary, through the Office for 
Domestic Preparedness, shall establish a National Terrorism 
Exercise Program for the purpose of testing and evaluating the 
Nation's capabilities to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and 
recover from threatened or actual acts of terrorism that--
          (1) enhances coordination for terrorism preparedness 
        between all levels of government, emergency response 
        providers, international governments and organizations, 
        and the private sector;
          (2) is--
                  (A) multidisciplinary in nature, including, 
                as appropriate, information analysis and 
                cybersecurity components;
                  (B) as realistic as practicable and based on 
                current risk assessments, including credible 
                threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences;
                  (C) carried out with the minimum degree of 
                notice to involved parties regarding the timing 
                and details of such exercises, consistent with 
                safety considerations;
                  (D) evaluated against performance measures 
                and followed by corrective action to solve 
                identified deficiencies; and
                  (E) assessed to learn best practices, which 
                shall be shared with appropriate Federal, 
                State, territorial, regional, local, and tribal 
                personnel, authorities, and training 
                institutions for emergency response providers; 
                and
          (3) assists State, territorial, local, and tribal 
        governments with the design, implementation, and 
        evaluation of exercises that--
                  (A) conform to the requirements of paragraph 
                (2); and
                  (B) are consistent with any applicable State 
                homeland security strategy or plan.
  (b) National Level Exercises.--The Secretary, through the 
National Terrorism Exercise Program, shall perform on a 
periodic basis national terrorism preparedness exercises for 
the purposes of--
          (1) involving top officials from Federal, State, 
        territorial, local, tribal, and international 
        governments, as the Secretary considers appropriate;
          (2) testing and evaluating the Nation's capability to 
        detect, disrupt, and prevent threatened or actual 
        catastrophic acts of terrorism, especially those 
        involving weapons of mass destruction; and
          (3) testing and evaluating the Nation's readiness to 
        respond to and recover from catastrophic acts of 
        terrorism, especially those involving weapons of mass 
        destruction.
  (c) Consultation With First Responders.--In implementing the 
responsibilities described in subsections (a) and (b), the 
Secretary shall consult with a geographic (including urban and 
rural) and substantive cross section of governmental and 
nongovernmental first responder disciplines, including as 
appropriate--
          (1) Federal, State, and local first responder 
        training institutions;
          (2) representatives of emergency response providers; 
        and
          (3) State and local officials with an expertise in 
        terrorism preparedness.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


PART III--EMPLOYEES

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SUBPART I--MISCELLANEOUS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


              CHAPTER 97--DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Sec.
9701.  Establishment of human resources management system.
9702.  Recruitment bonuses.
9703.  Reemployed annuitants.
9704.  Regulations.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 9702. Recruitment bonuses

  (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any provision of chapter 57, 
the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the Under 
Secretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure 
Protection, may pay a bonus to an individual in order to 
recruit such individual for a position that is primarily 
responsible for discharging the analytic responsibilities 
specified in section 201(d) of the Homeland Security Act of 
2002 (6 U.S.C. 121(d)) and that--
          (1) is within the Directorate for Information 
        Analysis and Infrastructure Protection; and
          (2) would be difficult to fill in the absence of such 
        a bonus.
In determining which individuals are to receive bonuses under 
this section, appropriate consideration shall be given to the 
Directorate's critical need for linguists.
  (b) Bonus Amount, Form, Etc.--
          (1) In general.--The amount of a bonus under this 
        section shall be determined under regulations of the 
        Secretary of Homeland Security, but may not exceed 50 
        percent of the annual rate of basic pay of the position 
        involved.
          (2) Form of payment.--A bonus under this section 
        shall be paid in the form of a lump-sum payment and 
        shall not be considered to be part of basic pay.
          (3) Computation rule.--For purposes of paragraph (1), 
        the annual rate of basic pay of a position does not 
        include any comparability payment under section 5304 or 
        any similar authority.
  (c) Service Agreements.--Payment of a bonus under this 
section shall be contingent upon the employee entering into a 
written service agreement with the Department of Homeland 
Security. The agreement shall include--
          (1) the period of service the individual shall be 
        required to complete in return for the bonus; and
          (2) the conditions under which the agreement may be 
        terminated before the agreed-upon service period has 
        been completed, and the effect of any such termination.
  (d) Eligibility.--A bonus under this section may not be paid 
to recruit an individual for--
          (1) a position to which an individual is appointed by 
        the President, by and with the advice and consent of 
        the Senate;
          (2) a position in the Senior Executive Service as a 
        noncareer appointee (as defined under section 3132(a)); 
        or
          (3) a position which has been excepted from the 
        competitive service by reason of its confidential, 
        policy-determining, policy-making, or policy-advocating 
        character.
  (e) Termination.--The authority to pay bonuses under this 
section shall terminate on September 30, 2008.

Sec. 9703. Reemployed annuitants

  (a) In General.--If an annuitant receiving an annuity from 
the Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund becomes 
employed in a position within the Directorate for Information 
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection of the Department of 
Homeland Security, the annuitant's annuity shall continue. An 
annuitant so reemployed shall not be considered an employee for 
the purposes of chapter 83 or 84.
  (b) Termination.--The exclusion pursuant to this section of 
the Directorate for Information Analysis and Infrastructure 
Protection from the reemployed annuitant provisions of chapters 
83 and 84 shall terminate 3 years after the date of the 
enactment of this section, unless extended by the Secretary of 
Homeland Security. Any such extension shall be for a period of 
1 year and shall be renewable.
  (c) Annuitant Defined.--For purposes of this section, the 
term ``annuitant'' has the meaning given such term under 
section 8331 or 8401, whichever is appropriate.

Sec. 9704. Regulations

  The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the 
Director of the Office of Personnel Management, may prescribe 
any regulations necessary to carry out section 9702 or 9703.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


             SECTION 70105 OF TITLE 46, UNITED STATES CODE

Sec. 70105. Transportation security cards

  (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (c) Determination of Terrorism Security Risk.--(1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (3) The Secretary shall establish an appeals process under 
this section for individuals found to be ineligible for a 
transportation security card that includes notice and an 
opportunity for a hearing before an administrative law judge.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (5) In making a determination under paragraph (1)(D), the 
Secretary shall not consider a felony conviction if--
          (A) that felony occurred more than 7 years prior to 
        the date of the Secretary's determination; and
          (B) the felony was not related to terrorism (as that 
        term is defined in section 2 of the Homeland Security 
        Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101)).

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                             MINORITY VIEWS

                              Introduction

    The Committee reported H.R. 1817, the Homeland Security 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, on Wednesday, April 27, 
2005. The bill is the first-ever authorization of the 
Department of Homeland Security by the standing Committee on 
Homeland Security. Unfortunately, the legislation, as voted out 
of Committee, is sparse and far from comprehensive. While we 
agree with the majority of the provisions, the piecemeal and 
incomplete approach of the legislation will do little to cure 
the Department of its ills. It may treat the agency's symptoms, 
but not its many ailments. Even Chairman Cox agreed with this 
assessment during Committee mark-up, saying in his opening 
statement, ``[t]his authorization bill is by no means as 
comprehensive as I would have liked.''
    We appreciate that the Chairman included provisions in H.R. 
1817 that help enhance technology at the Department and create 
an Assistant Secretary for Cybersecurity. The latter is 
especially relevant as Congresswoman Zoe Lofgren, along with 
Congressman Mac Thornberry, have advocated this elevation for 
the nation's cyber czar since the early days of the 108th 
Congress when they served as Ranking Member and Chairman, 
respectively, of the Cybersecurity, Science, and Research & 
Development Subcommittee of the Select Committee on Homeland 
Security. This provision has almost universally been supported 
by the private sector and academia. There is no reason to 
continue to leave cybersecurity as an afterthought in our 
nation's security efforts.
    We also fully support the Manager's amendment offered by 
Chairman Cox and Ranking Member Thompson. This amendment 
includes provisions to reform the ineffective color-coded 
Homeland Security Advisory System, create a 9-11 Memorial 
Fellows program, and create cybersecurity training programs in 
institutions of higher learning.
    That said, the bill does not address a large number of 
dangerous security gaps. The bill leaves virtually untouched 
several key homeland security areas, including the following:
     risks facing critical infrastructures such as 
chemical and nuclear plants and the energy grid;
     threats to our airplanes and passengers;
     risks to our rail, public transit system, and 
buses;
     need for first responders to be able to 
communicate more effectively;
     need for a comprehensive border strategy;
     threat to our food supply;
     protection of privacy, civil rights, and civil 
liberties;
     protection of our nation against bioterrorism 
attacks;
     threats to our ports; and
     improvements in management and organization 
efficiency and oversight.
    All these gaps must be met if our nation is to be as secure 
as it needs to be. A homeland security authorization bill that 
does not address these issues is incomplete. We presented a 
substitute bill at mark-up that addressed the issues that H.R. 
1817 did, but also provided for the security of America in 
those areas with the most glaring gaps. When that substitute 
was rejected by all the Republicans, we offered several 
amendments on individual security gaps. The Republican majority 
on the Committee chose to reject the bulk of these amendments 
as well.

        ``The Complete Homeland Security Act''--Substitute Bill 

    The Democratic substitute to H.R. 1817, ``The Complete 
Homeland Security Act,'' addresses the significant gaps that 
exist in our nation's homeland security efforts. The substitute 
provides for a comprehensive border protection plan, mandates 
the protection of key critical infrastructures, supports the 
development of new technologies, establishes structural changes 
at the Department to better organize it, and takes a number of 
additional steps. The Democratic substitute represents a 
genuine strategy for ensuring our homeland is protected now.
    The Democratic substitute makes the Department of Homeland 
Security's budget a priority. It funds the discretionary 
programs of the Department at approximately $41 billion, $6.9 
billion above the President's request. Unlike the President's 
budget, however, no part of these funds will come from taxing 
airline tickets. This is because raising the government-
mandated ``fee'' to fly is bad for aviation, for consumers, and 
for our economy.
    The Democratic substitute prioritizes funding for local 
homeland security programs. It provides $6.49 billion for 
grants to state and local governments, $2.29 billion more than 
the President's budget, to help acquire the tools needed by law 
enforcement and first responders on the front-line of 
preventing and responding to a terrorist attack. Beyond the 
President's budget, the Democratic substitute provides:
     $80 million to restore funding to the State 
Homeland Security Grant Program, the primary source of funds 
used by the states for acquiring the tools needed to prevent 
and responds to a terrorist attack;
     $500 million to ensure that all first responders 
can communicate with one another in the event of an emergency;
     $400 million to restore funding to the Law 
Enforcement Terrorism Prevention program, which is eliminated 
under the President's budget. This program provides funding to 
law enforcement agencies to enhance capabilities for detecting, 
deterring, disrupting, and preventing acts of terrorism;
     $1 billion to provide grants for port, rail, 
transit and bus security. These funds are badly needed. The 
Coast Guard estimates that ports alone will need $5.4 billion 
in new security investments over the next 10 years;
     $10 million to restore funding to the Emergency 
Management and Performance Grants (EMPG) program, which is cut 
by six percent in the President's budget. The EMPG program 
helps states and local governments strengthen their emergency 
management capabilities, while addressing issues of national 
concern;
     $50 million to restore funding to the Metropolitan 
Medical Response Systems (MMRS) grant program, which is 
eliminated in the President's budget, and to expand the 
program. The MMRS program provides grants to ensure that 
hospital systems in major metropolitan areas are prepared to 
respond to mass casualties created by a terrorist attack or 
other emergency;
     $100 million to hire over 1,000 new firefighters 
nationwide through the SAFER program. The President's budget 
has no funding for this program; and
     $150 million to restore funding to the FIRE Act 
grants program, which provides fire departments across the 
nation with the equipment they need to respond to a terrorist 
attack or other emergency.
    The substitute also ensures that critical research and 
development at the Department actually happens. It provides 
$1.8 billion for Science and Technology Directorate programs, 
including $418 million to fulfill the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2005 (9/11 Act) commitment to 
aviation security research and development, such as on the next 
generation of baggage screening technology. The substitute also 
provided $115 million for research on technologies to counter 
Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS), and broadens the 
scope of research to include ground-based technologies 
previously unsupported by DHS. In addition, the substitute 
provides $35.4 million for new biological countermeasures and 
technologies to protect American agriculture from terrorist 
attack.
    To ensure that our critical infrastructure is secure, the 
substitute provides $873 million to improve assessments of the 
risks to nuclear power plants, chemical facilities, the energy 
grid, and other critical infrastructure. It also provides for 
an adequate number of border patrol agents, inspectors and 
other Federal law enforcement needs by providing $28.4 billion 
to the Border and Transportation Security Directorate. The 
substitute also provided funding for immigration processing and 
other security functions, such as hiring, training, and 
equipping 2,000 new border agents, as called for in the 9/11 
Act.
    To assist our first responders, the substitute provides 
$3.2 billion for Federal emergency preparedness and response 
programs. This will ensure that the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) is able to continue its traditional 
mission of providing assistance during natural disasters.
    The substitute also saves money, including $53 million by 
eliminating the implementation of a new personnel system at the 
Department that is unworkable and would adversely affect the 
hard-working career employees at the agency who give their all 
every day to securing our nation. Rather than penalizing the 
Department's workers, the Democratic substitute also provides 
needed funding for the under-staffed and overworked Office of 
Inspector General by increasing its budget to $200 million and 
allowing it to hire at least another 500 more investigators and 
auditors.
    The substitute requires the President to complete a report 
on why his budget request for Fiscal Year 2006 does not fulfill 
the homeland security commitments in the 9/11 Act he signed 
into law in December, 2004. At the time that he signed the 
legislation into law the President said, ``We'll continue to 
work with Congress to make sure they've got the resources 
necessary to do their jobs.'' Despite this statement, President 
Bush's budget falls far short of funding the provisions in the 
9/11 Act. For example, the Act authorized the hiring of 2,000 
new border patrol agents, but President Bush's budget only 
provides enough funding to hire 210 new agents, despite the 
continued attention being paid to the lack of security on our 
borders.
    The substitute also provides for a number of policy 
initiatives that are critically needed to secure our nation. 
When our substitute was rejected by the Republican majority, we 
offered a number of these initiatives as individual amendments.

   Enhancing Accountability: Addressing Management Challenges at the 
                    Department of Homeland Security

    We offered a comprehensive management amendment to assist 
the Department in getting its house in order. It is clear from 
hearings and oversight conducted by this Committee that the 
Department's organizational and structural problems need to be 
addressed. Experts from within the government, private sector, 
and academia have all raised questions about the Department's 
structure and the challenges it faces. While many of our 
Republican colleagues agreed that the Department's organization 
is flawed, they still chose to vote against this amendment and 
leave the Department in a disorganized state. We believe this 
is simply unacceptable.
    The amendment would give the Department's Chief Information 
Officer the authority needed to secure the DHS' information 
technology and databases against hackers and terrorists. Our 
amendment provides new resources to the Department's Office of 
Inspector General to investigate waste, fraud and abuse and 
help the Department become the agency that Congress envisioned, 
and that the American people deserve. It would provide the 
Office of Inspector General with a $200 million budget, 
allowing the Inspector General to hire another 500 
investigators and auditors. In addition, we believe that the 
Department's employees should have the same collective 
bargaining and appeals rights that most Federal employees have, 
as well as minimal guarantees as to compensation as they are 
transitioned to a new personnel system. Our amendment also gave 
``whistleblower'' protection to DHS employees who come forward 
to expose security gaps.
    This comprehensive amendment also would make other 
organizational changes such as the establishing co-located DHS 
regional offices and an Office of Tribal Security, and 
strengthening of the Department's Privacy Office. While the 
Majority rejected these provisions, they did agree to address 
the issue of tribal coordination in the Manager's amendment. We 
look forward to seeing their language on this issue before 
determining if their proposal is adequate.
    We also believe that the Department needs to be reorganized 
along better operational lines. While we appreciate Mr. 
Souder's amendment to combine CBP and ICE into one 
organization, the Democrats believe we should wait to make 
structural changes until the current evaluation by the DHS 
Office of the Inspector General is completed. Additionally, we 
are concerned that this particular merger would still leave the 
Department with disorganized and disparate operational 
entities. In order for the Department to function effectively, 
it needs to be organized based on common business functions and 
lines of business. The quick merger of 22 agencies and 
subsequent splitting of several is what created the problems 
that a proposed merger is supposed to solve. There may be 
functions and operations that certainly should be merged to 
promote efficiency and security. By the same token, there may 
be functions and entities that may be executed more effectively 
if housed in another area of the Department. We should take 
this opportunity to do it right. The Committee must act to 
undertake a comprehensive reorganization of the Department to 
ensure it effectively and efficiently secures the homeland.

  Emergency Preparedness: Ensuring That Our First Responders Have the 
    Resources and Tools Necessary To Protect America and Themselves

    Democrats presented an emergency preparedness amendment 
intended to provide greater focus and coordination to emergency 
preparedness and first responder issues. We sought to provide 
additional resources for communications interoperability, 
including additional spectrum and funding to achieve 100 
percent interoperability. There was universal agreement from 
the Committee that additional spectrum is needed for first 
responders, but jurisdiction remains a problem. The Minority 
was pleased to support the Majority's proposal to provide 
additional technical assistance to local governments for 
communications interoperability. We also supported the creation 
of a working group for the transition of defense technology to 
first responder applications.
    Democrats also sought to authorize the existing Citizen 
Corps Program. This crucial program provides guidance and 
funding to local Citizen Corps Councils to help prepare 
citizens for any emergency. We were pleased that the Chairman 
agreed with us that this issue was important and committed to 
holding a hearing on citizen preparedness. For existing 
programs, we supported the authorization of the TOPOFF exercise 
program and the addition of a prevention exercise to the 
authorization. We also supported the proposal to require 
coordination with first responders for all future exercises.
    However, on the subject of coordination, we were 
disappointed that we could not come to an agreement on the 
creation of a single entity to coordinate emergency medical 
services (EMS) issues within DHS. The Minority strongly 
supports the creation of an EMS Administration within DHS to 
ensure that EMS receives adequate homeland security funding. 
Recent reports by both DHS and outside groups have indicated 
that EMS providers have only received approximately four 
percent of homeland security funding. The Minority also 
supports the concept of the amendment, which was withdrawn, by 
Mr. Young to merge the preparedness functions of DHS within 
FEMA. This change would provide greater coordination for 
preparedness activities and should be explored further.
    In the Democratic emergency preparedness amendment, we 
worked to ensure that two existing grant programs continue as 
intended. The EMPG Program, which existed before 9/11, has many 
applications beyond homeland security and is crucial to local 
emergency management activities. We strongly believe that this 
grant program should be distributed directly to the state 
emergency management officials, rather than going through the 
state homeland security directors. This change would avoid 
unnecessary delays that are currently taking place. We are 
pleased the Majority has agreed to provide report language on 
this subject. We also attempted to authorize the existing 
Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS) program. The MMRS 
program enables jurisdictions to achieve an enhanced local 
capability to respond to mass casualty events during the first 
hours of a response until significant external assistance can 
arrive.

            Bioterrorism: Preparing and Preventing an Attack

    Democrats offered an amendment to close four serious gaps 
in our biopreparedness. Specifically, our amendment (1) lays 
the foundation for a comprehensive overhaul of the ``bug-to-
drug'' process used to develop new vaccines and medicines; (2) 
allows DHS to track dangerous biological materials; (3) 
requires the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to assess 
whether the Health and Human Services Department (HHS) is 
effectively administering the Bioshield Act; and (4) requires 
the Secretary, in consultation with the Director of the 
National Institutes of Health, to study whether the dilution of 
the smallpox vaccine in the Strategic National Stockpile would 
impact the effectiveness of the vaccine. We are disappointed 
that the amendment was voted down along party lines.
    The ``bug-to-drug'' provision in the Democratic amendment, 
also known as ``The RAPID Cures Act,'' requires the Secretary 
to conduct the first-ever comprehensive assessment of the drug 
and vaccine development process, as well as an assessment of 
research and technological opportunities and needs. This 
provision also requests a detailed proposal from DHS, the 
Department of Defense, and HHS on how to apply Federal 
resources and work in partnership with the private sector to 
begin a program to meet the identified needs. We believe this 
type of analysis is essential to conduct before implementing or 
overhauling the current system of developing a new medical 
countermeasure--which typically takes over 14 years and could 
cost up to $1 billion. If a bioterror attack occurs, we do not 
have that kind of time to respond. The world's experience with 
SARS demonstrated that new infectious diseases can emerge and 
spread far more quickly than our ability to respond, but we are 
still not able to rapidly produce a vaccine or cure.
    The second element of our amendment addresses another 
critical element of defending against a bioterror attack: 
knowing the location of dangerous biological materials at all 
times. Our amendment requires the Secretary to report to 
Congress on federal and state pathogen controls, including: an 
inventory of federal and state laws and regulations governing 
the inventory management, storage, transportation, handling and 
access to biological warfare agents and other human and 
zoonotic pathogens; an analysis of inconsistencies and gaps in 
the application and enforcement of pathogen control regimes; 
and recommendations for harmonizing and strengthening pathogen 
controls. We believe it is critical to track these dangerous 
materials closely, somewhat similar to the systems we use--or 
should use--to track nuclear materials because the release of 
either material can produce the death of thousands or millions 
of people.
    We believe it is also worthwhile to examine whether 
existing supplies of smallpox vaccine in the National Stockpile 
could be diluted, to provide treatment to more people, without 
reducing its effectiveness. If so, this could save limited 
government funds as well as lives. Smallpox is a disease which 
kills approximately 30 percent of its victims, and is estimated 
to have killed between 300 and 500 million people in the 
twentieth century before the World Health Organization's 
successful eradication program. Smallpox now only exists in 
restricted labs throughout the world. Despite its limited 
availability, the magnitude of destruction resulting from a 
terror attack involving a smallpox outbreak is enough to make 
us take this threat seriously. That is why we developed tools 
to protect our citizens, such as the smallpox vaccine. It is 
vital that we investigate whether this asset can be leveraged 
from existing supplies to treat a greater number of people in 
the event of an outbreak.
    The Democrats are further concerned about how aggressively 
HHS is implementing the BioShield Program. We believe a GAO 
study and its recommendations are necessary to help to clarify 
which cabinet department should administer the program. HHS has 
had a complicated and often contentious relationship with the 
biopharma industry. In contrast, the Department of Homeland 
Security appears to be developing a culture that is willing to 
actively partner with the private sector, and that, perhaps, 
that can be extended to the biopharma industry. We believe a 
good working relationship is critical to the success of such an 
important program as BioShield II which Congress will begin 
considering shortly. That is why the issue of ``who is in 
charge'' is central to all of our homeland security issues.
    Finally, we appreciate that the Chairman agreed to include 
report language that raises concerns about the Biosurveillance 
Program. We also appreciate his willingness to work with us to 
craft bipartisan legislation to address many of these concerns. 
The Biosurveillance Program, established by the President, 
integrates health data to rapidly recognize and detect 
dispersal of biological agents in human and animal populations, 
food, water, agriculture, and the environment. Creating a 
national bioawareness system will help to identify a biological 
attack at the earliest possible moment and permit initiation of 
a robust response to prevent unnecessary loss of life, economic 
losses, and social disruption. We look forward to working with 
our Republican colleagues to craft bipartisan legislation to 
address these shortfalls in the near future.

      Agroterrorism: Protecting Our Food Supply From Field to Fork

    We are pleased that the Committee adopted our Democratic 
amendment requiring the Department of Homeland Security to 
detail to Congress how it will implement recommendations from a 
recent GAO report entitled, ``Homeland Security: Much Is Being 
Done To Protect Agriculture From a Terrorist Attack, but 
Important Challenges Remain.'' This report evaluated the 
progress of DHS in implementing the duties assigned under 
current statutory mandates, Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive 9 (HSPD-9), and related executive decisions. The GAO 
report observed some progress made by DHS, but also identified 
several areas for improvement by DHS. This bill language 
acknowledges DHS has not fully implemented its responsibilities 
under HSPD-9, which focuses on the defense of U.S. agriculture 
and food infrastructures, and holds them accountable for that 
lack of progress. The Department's role in HSPD-9 is largely to 
coordinate the efforts of other agencies, but this is a 
critical role that ensures all of our agroterror efforts work 
together as seamlessly as possible.

                Securing Our Borders: Land, Air, and Sea

    The Democrats believe that the authorization bill does not 
adequately address the critical issue of land border security. 
Keeping our borders open to legitimate travel and trade, and 
closing the door to harmful people and cargo will mean 
substantial changes at our land borders, and require the right 
mix of personnel, technology, and new facilities. Securing the 
5,525 miles of the northern border with Canada and 1,933 miles 
of southern border with Mexico is critical to both our national 
and economic security. According to the Department's own 
statistics, the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection 
processes 1.1 million passengers and pedestrians, including 
724,192 aliens, 64,432 truck, rail, and sea containers, 2,639 
aircraft, 365,079 vehicles and 75,734 merchandise entries in 
the course of a regular day, making 135 arrests at ports of 
entry and 3,179 arrests between ports of entry. In the post 9/
11 era, security programs must serve the dual purpose of 
facilitating travel and commerce.
    We believe that the Department should develop and implement 
a Comprehensive Land Border Security Strategy based on threat 
and vulnerability assessments of our ports of entry and the 
vast stretches of land between these ports of entry. The 
Strategy should also include staffing assessments of the Border 
Patrol and the inspections staff, and an evaluation of 
infrastructure needs.
    Additionally, we wholeheartedly support the use of 
technology and the expansion of the ``American Shield'' 
initiative to address vulnerabilities between the ports of 
entry. Technology, an important part of the border security 
solution, does not replace the inspector or the Border Patrol 
agent. The need for additional Border Patrol resources was 
highlighted by the ``Minutemen Project,'' a group of volunteers 
patrolling the Arizona border. While frustration over illegal 
immigration is understandable, civilian patrols along our 
national borders, and especially armed patrols, are troubling 
since they create a great risk of violence. Underscoring the 
potential for a serious accident, the incidents of violence and 
the intensity of the attacks on the agents in the Border 
Patrol's Tucson sector is averaging one assault every two days 
and, at that pace, it will experience an 80 percent increase 
this year. As expressed during the mark up of the legislation, 
there is a need to further examine this issue and we hope to 
work with the Majority to do so.
    Even with the increases the Border Patrol has received over 
the past three years, from approximately 350 agents to 1,000 
agents, the Border Patrol's ability to stop illegal border 
crossers along the U.S.-Canada border remains limited. It is 
important to understand that at any point in time 1,000 Border 
Patrol agents are not monitoring the northern border. Rather, 
this total number is divided into shifts that provide 24-hours-
a-day coverage. T.J. Bonner, president of the National Border 
Patrol Union indicates that it ``takes three shifts to provide 
24/7 coverage, and that, coupled with days off, annual and sick 
leave, training, etc., leaves only about 25 percent of the 
workforce on duty at any given time.'' Thus, the number that we 
currently use for patrolling the northern border is probably 
more in the area of 250 agents for 5,525 miles--or one agent 
for every 22 miles of the border. Additionally, many agents are 
located away from the border transporting and processing the 
illegal immigrants that they arrest.
    Adding to the staffing difficulties, the recent phase of 
the Arizona Border Control Initiative which began March 30, 
2005, has resulted in the diversion of Border Patrol resources. 
While it is unclear from which areas the personnel and 
equipment were relocated, we believe that the areas from which 
resources were pulled are now at greater risk. The urgent need 
to relocate resources to Arizona simply emphasizes the need to 
permanently increase staffing and funding overall. Adding to 
the shortage at our borders, hundreds of the Border Patrol 
agents have responded to our nation's call and have been called 
to active duty in the National Guard. For Fiscal Year 2002 
through Fiscal Year 2005, 282 Border Patrol agents were 
deployed--189 have returned from duty. The need to determine 
appropriate staffing levels for inspectors at the ports of 
entry is just as critical as it is for Border Patrol agents. 
The Democrats strongly encourage the Department to examine 
overall staffing levels.
    Lastly, the Democrats believe that the enforcement of our 
immigration laws is a federal responsibility. We are deeply 
concerned about the federal government's desire to outsource 
that problem and the subsequent cost of enforcing immigration 
law to the state and local law enforcement authorities. The 
Democrats believe that funding of the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act is a more appropriate and effective 
way to improve our nation's border security.
    The problems outlined are a result of a piecemeal approach 
to land border security. This is why we called for a Land 
Border Security strategy. Pending the completion of the 
comprehensive Land Border Security Strategy and staffing 
assessment, we support full funding for the border security 
provisions in the 9/11 Act, which includes the hiring ``of not 
less than 2,000'' Border Patrol agents. We believe that in 
addition to agents, the Border Patrol must have funding for 
additional support staff, vehicles, training and facilities in 
which to place their agents. We also support the creation of a 
Center for Excellence focused on land border security and 
appreciate the work of Congressmen Reyes, Smith, and McCaul in 
bringing this idea to the Committee.
    We also support Mr. Souder's amendment that addresses key 
concerns raised by the Shadow Wolves, an elite unit based on 
the Tohono O'odham Nation, composed solely of Native Americans 
of Blackfoot, Cheyenne and Pima tribes, who are known for their 
ability to track aliens and the drugs they may carry. We 
understand that for the Shadow Wolves to function effectively 
they must be able to maintain a close working relationship with 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) investigators, and 
that this is difficult because they are in Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP), reporting to the Border Patrol. It is clear 
to us that this elite unit belongs in ICE and not in CBP--and 
that these frontline officers have more in common with ICE 
agents than with Border Patrol agents. That said, in order for 
the Shadow Wolves to be effective and fully integrated within 
ICE, the Committee must act to designate them as investigators 
to better reflect their role in homeland security. We hope we 
can work with our Republican colleagues to affect his change in 
the amendment.

        Securing our Ports and Coastlines from Terrorist Attack

    The Democrats offered an amendment that would strengthen 
port security by improving the validation process for the 
Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), requiring 
the Department to take steps to improve container security, and 
authorize $400 million for port security grants. We appreciate 
the Majority's acceptance of the container security provision, 
but feel that this authorization bill does not fully address 
the many challenges associated with port security. We fully 
support C-TPAT because the trade community plays such a large 
role in port security, but believe that the program lacks 
accountability. There are currently 5,000 C-TPAT companies that 
are less likely to have their containers inspected when they 
arrive in the United States. The fact that only 500 of these 
have had their security validated by the Department creates a 
major security threat. This amendment gives C-TPAT members the 
option of being validated by CBP or by a private company--
certified by the Department. This choice could accelerate the 
validation process. We also believe the port security funding 
since September 11th has been wholly inadequate. The 
Administration issued port security regulations that will 
require ports to spend $5.4 million over ten years. The 
country's economic security is dependent on open and secure 
ports. Given that ports have very thin profit margins and will 
have to invest heavily in infrastructure improvements to stay 
competitive in the global economy, we believe that the balance 
of security and commerce requires an increase in port security 
funding.

           Securing Trains and Public Transit Across America

    Democrats offered an amendment that authorized $2.8 billion 
over three years for rail and transit security grants. It also 
requires grant recipients to submit emergency response plans 
and training exercises to the Department as a condition for 
funding, creates a National Transportation Security Center, and 
requires the Department to partner with industry to develop 
security best practices and public awareness initiatives. We 
appreciate the Majority's acceptance of the provisions 
requiring the development of best practices and public 
awareness initiatives, as both will go a long way to improving 
rail and transit security.
    We believe, however, that the Majority largely ignored rail 
and transit security in this bill. The two attacks that 
occurred in Madrid and Russia last year highlight the 
vulnerability of our rail and transit systems to terrorism. 
According to major transit operators, funding is the primary 
barrier to improving security. The American Public 
Transportation Association states that transit operators have 
$6 billion in long-term security costs; to this point the Bush 
Administration has distributed $250 million for rail and 
transit security. State and local governments are doing all 
they can to assist rail and transit security costs but greater 
federal assistance will be needed. We believe that the 
vulnerability of our rail and transit system to attack 
necessitates the urgent attention of this Administration and 
Congress to ensure that the 14 million passengers that use mass 
transit are safe and secure.

                           Securing Our Skies

    Democrats offered an amendment that would increase funding 
for in-line Explosive Detection Systems (EDS), require 
personnel that have access to secure areas of airports undergo 
security screening and background checks, authorize funding for 
ground based MANPAD research, evaluate communications devices 
that could be used by flight crews and air marshals, make 
improvements to the Federal Flight Deck Officer program, and 
reopen general aviation at Ronald Reagan National Airport. The 
Majority expressed concerns that we were increasing funding 
without regards to risk. Specifically, Chairman Cox cited the 
provision on MANPAD countermeasures, which he felt could lead 
the Department to spend billions of dollars on a system that 
may not be necessary. Our provision authorized $5 million more 
the Administration's request for MANPAD countermeasures 
research. It also required that research focus on alternative 
technologies beyond those that are aircraft centered, which are 
the most expensive, to see if less costly systems are 
available.
    We also believe that more funding is required for the 
installation of in-line EDS systems to detect explosives items 
that could be stashed in passenger baggage. The Department's 
Inspector General issued an unclassified summary of a 
classified report on screener performance on April 19, 2005 
that concluded that screener performance will not improve 
without upgrades and enhancements in technology. Funding for 
EDS installation comes from fees assessed to airline 
passengers. Currently, $250 million is spent on in-line EDS 
installation, the DeFazio amendment would have increased this 
amount to $650 million and would have also required the 
installation of adequate technology at screening checkpoints. 
We feel that this amendment addresses the recommendations of 
the 9/11 Commission Report. The Report stated that the 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and Congress must 
give priority to improving checkpoint screening and that TSA 
should expedite the installation of in-line baggage screening 
systems.

               Transportation Worker Identification Card

    Democrats support Mr. Young's amendment requiring that 
transportation workers that are seeking a waiver under section 
70105(c)(2) of the Maritime Transportation Security Act and are 
denied a Transportation Worker Identification Card (TWIC) have 
their appeal decided by an administrative law judge. The 
amendment also states that a worker cannot be denied a TWIC for 
a felony conviction that occurred more than seven years ago, 
unless it is connected to terrorism, as defined by the Homeland 
Security Act. This provision helps assure that workers who have 
kept a clean record for several years are not punished for past 
mistakes. While some changes in the legislative language will 
need to occur before the bill reaches the floor, we believe 
that individuals that have access to secure areas of 
transportation facilities should undergo a background check.

           Harnessing Our Nation's Intelligence Capabilities

    We appreciate the adoption of the amendment offered by 
Democrats entitled, ``Harnessing Intelligence,'' as amended by 
the Chairman. We agree with the Republicans' description of 
this amendment in report language and the purposes it serves.

                  Securing Our Critical Infrastructure

    We offered an amendment to secure chemical plants, nuclear 
plants, and the transportation of hazardous material shipments, 
but this amendment was rejected by the Republican majority. Our 
amendment authorized the Secretary to:
     require chemical facilities to conduct 
vulnerability assessments and make related improvements;
     certify that the location and design of a proposed 
high-risk nuclear facility provided adequate protection for 
public health and safety if subject to a terrorist attack;
     conduct comprehensive security assessments of 
nuclear reactors; and
     regulate the transportation of hazardous materials 
within six months of enactment of the authorization bill.
    We are disappointed that our Republican colleagues chose to 
leave infrastructures unprotected. This is puzzling, especially 
in light of observations made by the Chairman that chemical 
plant security is a vitally important issue that must be 
addressed.
    The rejected amendment would also have made the 
transportation of hazardous materials safer and provided for 
re-routing of such materials, when a safer route existed. It 
also would have required a Department evaluation of the 
location and design of proposed high-risk nuclear facilities 
for purposes of ensuring adequate protection of public health 
and safety in the event of a terrorist attack.
    We appreciate the Majority's willingness to work with us on 
the need to include a role for the Department of Homeland 
Security in the evaluation of security issues surrounding the 
siting of new Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) facilities and the 
expansion of existing LNG terminals. LNG likely will play an 
increasingly important part in our nation's energy strategy, 
and it is essential that the security vulnerabilities of these 
facilities are thoroughly assessed before siting or expansion 
decisions are finalized

                         Protecting Cyberspace

    Democrats strongly support the idea of conducting basic 
research in the area of cybersecurity, especially within the 
Science and Technology Directorate at the Department. We 
believe this is a necessary precursor to developing new tools 
to increase the security of the Internet and related systems 
and networks. We further believe that research into the design 
and roll-out of new infrastructure should occur at all levels 
of networking and computer use, so that security becomes 
``invisible'' to the end users and, for the system creators, an 
integrated aspect of system design and management.
    The Internet is currently based upon a series of protocols 
that were conceived for use within military and academic 
networks and were not designed for today's modern Internet, 
which is available to almost anyone located anywhere. The old 
protocols do not contain security controls sufficient to assure 
the trusted quality of today's global commercial economy. As a 
result, new protocols and systems are developed, some in high-
risk areas such as the intelligence field, without building 
adequate security into the ``backbone'' of these systems. This 
means that security is always an ``afterthought,'' instead of 
something that forms the basis of the system. With today's 
ever-changing threats in cyberspace, we cannot afford to rely 
on outdated security measures. This will continue to be the 
case without extensive security research and development to 
design necessary tools, structures and solutions. We accept the 
Chairman's offer to continue working on a bi-partisan basis 
with industry to further refine the parameters of the 
cybersecurity research that must be done.

                   Optimizing Screening Capabilities

    We believe that the Department is failing to fully utilize 
technology to optimize its screening capabilities. The 
Department should have real-time electronic access to all 
information needed for its screening operations and digitize 
all related paper forms. Only after the Department achieves 
this objective will we be able to fully monitor the true 
movement of foreign travelers.
    We offered an amendment to require the Secretary to report 
to Congress on the status of efforts to achieve real-time 
interoperability between the Integrated Automated Fingerprint 
Identification System and Automated Biometric Identification 
System databases. The amendment also required the examination 
of all biometric identifiers and requested recommendations as 
to which among these identifiers would be most appropriate for 
all screening functions, and analyze digitizing all arrival/
departure forms.
    We thank our Republican colleague for agreeing to work with 
us on report language that would require the Department to 
achieve these goals.

           Ensuring Opportunity at the Department of Homeland

    To ensure opportunity at the Department for all Americans, 
we offered an amendment that would have required the Department 
to improve participation rates of employees of all races, 
national origins, genders, and disabilities at all levels. The 
amendment also required the Department to address obstacles 
that small business, minority and women-owned businesses face 
in trying to do business with the Department. Finally, the 
amendment creates new opportunities for Historically Black 
Colleges and Universities, Hispanic Serving Institutions and 
other minority-serving institutions to participate in the 
Centers of Excellence program.
    We are pleased that the Chairman agreed to work with us to 
develop legislative language on diversity for inclusion in his 
Manager's amendment. The Chairman also worked with us to 
develop report language requiring the Department to review, on 
an ongoing basis, the applicant pool for the Centers of 
Excellence program to ensure that a diverse cross-section of 
institutions is represented.

                               Conclusion

    As elected officials, we have a duty to do all we can to 
secure America. As Members of the Committee on Homeland 
Security, that responsibility is even greater as our leadership 
has trusted us to provide the guidance and oversight necessary 
to make the Department of Homeland Security a success. We are 
sorely disappointed that our Republican colleagues chose to 
limit this authorization bill to a few issues, rather than 
taking a comprehensive approach to protecting our nation. The 
Committee's first authorization bill should have addressed all 
the glaring gaps in homeland security, as well as the 
deficiencies our oversight has uncovered at the Department. The 
legislation voted favorably by the Committee addresses too few 
issues and is incomplete. We voted in support of the bill 
because the few provisions that were included were, with 
limited exceptions, good provisions. We remain concerned that 
the Committee has given too little guidance to the Department 
to allow it to set a course that will correct many of the 
problems it experienced in its first two years of existence.

                                   Bennie G. Thompson,
                                           Ranking Member.
                                   Edward J. Markey,
                                           Member.
                                   Jane Harman,
                                           Member.
                                   Nita M. Lowey,
                                           Member.
                                   Loretta Sachez,
                                           Ranking Member, Subcommittee 
                                               on Economic Security, 
                                               Infrastructure 
                                               Protection, and 
                                               Cybersecurity.
                                   Norman D. Dicks,
                                           Member.
                                   Peter A. DeFazio,
                                           Member.
                                   Eleanor Holmes Norton,
                                           Member.
                                   Zoe Lofgren,
                                           Ranking Member, Subcommittee 
                                               on Intelligence, 
                                               Information Sharing, and 
                                               Terrorism Risk 
                                               Assessment.
                                   Bill Pascrell, Jr.,
                                           Ranking Member, Subcommittee 
                                               on Emergency 
                                               Preparedness, Science, 
                                               and Technology.
                                   Bob Etheridge,
                                           Member.
                                   Kendrick B. Meek,
                                           Ranking Member, Subcommittee 
                                               on Management, 
                                               Integration, and 
                                               Oversight.
                                   Sheila Jackson-Lee,
                                           Member.
                                   Donna M. Christensen,
                                           Member.
                                   James R. Langevin,
                                           Ranking Member, Subcommittee 
                                               on Prevention of Nuclear 
                                               and Biological Attack.

          ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF REPRESENTATIVES EDWARD J. MARKEY

    More than three and a half years after the September 11th 
attacks, gaping loopholes in our country's homeland security 
continue to put Americans at risk of another devastating 
attack. The Department of Homeland Security's former Inspector 
General Clark Kent Ervin testified recently before the 
Committee's Management, Integration, and Oversight Subcommittee 
that: ``Even in the area where the most time, attention, and 
resources have been invested--aviation security--serious 
vulnerabilities remain.''
    One of our most dangerous vulnerabilities is the failure to 
screen 100 percent of the cargo that is carried on passenger 
planes and all-cargo aircraft. Every time we fly, we wait in 
security lines, empty our pockets, remove our shoes, walk 
through metal detectors, and have our baggage inspected. We do 
not complain much--after all, we are told that this is required 
to keep our planes secure--and we accept that. But what many 
people do not realize is that every time commercial cargo is 
loaded onto the very same passenger planes or placed on 
aircraft that transport only cargo, almost none of it is ever 
inspected at all.
    The security risk created by unscreened cargo is not just 
theoretical: Pan Am Flight 103 was brought down in 1988 over 
Lockerbie, Scotland by a bomb contained in unscreened baggage, 
and Air India flight 182 was downed in 1985 off the coast of 
Ireland by a bomb placed in unscreened luggage.
    Uninspected freight on all-cargo carriers also poses a 
serious danger. Last summer, the 9/11 Commission reported that 
Al Qaeda operative Zacharias Moussaoui ``Worked * * * on * * * 
terrorist schemes, such as buying four tons of ammonium nitrate 
for bombs to be planted on cargo planes.'' Ammonium nitrate is 
the same chemical compound that Timothy McVeigh used to kill 
168 innocent men, women and children at the Murrah Federal 
Building in Oklahoma City 10 years ago. Less than two years 
ago, a young man shipped himself undetected aboard a cargo 
plane from New York to Texas. We were lucky he was just a 
lonely twenty-something, not a terrorist.
    It is long past the time when we should have adopted a 
policy that subjects cargo on passenger and all-cargo aircraft 
to the same level of screening that is performed daily on 
passengers' checked and carry-on luggage.
    During Committee consideration of the Department's Fiscal 
Year 2006 authorization bill I offered an amendment to require 
the Secretary of Homeland Security to establish and begin 
implementing a system to inspect all the cargo transported on 
passenger planes and all-cargo carriers, so that this cargo is 
subject to the same level of scrutiny as passengers' luggage. 
The House has voted twice overwhelmingly--by votes of 278 to 
146 and 347 to 47--to require 100% screening of cargo carried 
on passenger planes. The airline industry and the Bush 
Administration strenuously objected to the 100 percent 
screening mandate, and the Senate ultimately dropped it from 
the final version of the Department's FY04 appropriations bill.
    The aviation experts who are this Committee's ``eyes and 
ears''--namely, the pilots and flight attendants who work 
aboard aircraft every day--support my amendment to screen 100 
percent of the cargo transported on passenger planes and all-
cargo carriers. The Coalition of Airline Pilots Associations 
(CAPA), which represents 30,000 pilots at American Airlines, 
Southwest, AirTran and other airlines, endorses my amendment. 
Since offering my amendment last year, I addressed the concerns 
of the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) by including all-
cargo carriers under the 100% cargo screening mandate and 
providing for federal appropriations to implement this mandate, 
and ALPA supports my amendment. The Association of Flight 
Attendants, with its 46,000 members, supports my amendment.
    While last year's appropriations bill for the Department 
and the 9/11 reform implementation act included funding for 
cargo screening R&D, additional cargo inspectors, and related 
provisions, these measures do not go far enough.
    TSA currently handles the screening of cargo carried on 
passenger planes by using a process it calls the ``Known 
Shipper Program.'' The Known Shipper Program requires only 
paperwork to be filed, but no screening to be done. Mail and 
packages weighing less than 16 ounces are not even subject to 
the paperwork check--they are loaded straight onto the plane 
without even a perfunctory paper check! When it comes to 
freight on all-cargo carriers, inspection is the exception, not 
the rule--only a tiny portion is physically inspected before 
loading onboard. TSA now requires air carriers to conduct 
random inspections of cargo that are randomly verified by TSA--
but this still results in almost none of the cargo on passenger 
planes being physically inspected for explosives or other 
dangerous materials. TSA is unable to inform us of how many 
cargo inspections are performed by the air carriers because the 
air carriers do not have to report to TSA the number of cargo 
inspections they conduct.
    Some have argued that the technology to screen 100% of 
cargo is not available. But there are numerous companies that 
are currently selling technology that is being used to screen 
cargo, including American Science and Engineering; L3 Security 
and Detection Systems; and Raytheon Cargo Screen. Some have 
argued that 100% screening is not technically feasible. But 
countries including Israel, the United Kingdom, and the 
Netherlands routinely screen cargo. Moreover, Logan Airport in 
Massachusetts, which has been conducting a cargo screening 
pilot program, reported in February that ``100 percent of all 
air cargo on all types of aircraft is technically possible.'' 
Some have argued that the Known Shipper program is enough to 
assure the security of cargo. The Known Shipper program is 
dangerously flawed and easily exploited. TSA has admitted that 
it has not audited most of the so-called known shippers in its 
database, and packages weighing less than 16 ounces are not 
even subject to the Known Shipper Program, even though the bomb 
that brought down Pan-Am Flight 103 contained less than 16 
ounces of explosive!
    While my amendment was defeated during mark-up of the 
authorization bill, I will continue to work to close a 
dangerous loophole that puts our nation at risk.

                                   Edward J. Markey.

            ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF CONGRESSMAN KENDRICK B. MEEK

    Airlines and airports are more than just transportation 
depots. They are economic engines that employ millions of 
people, sustain local economies and create many kinds of 
commercial opportunities. Airlines, especially those serving 
international passengers, are totally dependent on the federal 
government for the staffing support and processing of 
passengers that is required by federal law. They cannot do it 
themselves. And by failing to provide the needed federal 
inspection personnel, the federal government itself is putting 
American businesses--big and small alike--at a huge competitive 
disadvantage.
    The staff shortages in South Florida are instructive. Miami 
International Airport (MIA) is particularly dependent on 
federal inspectors. MIA has the most foreign nationals entering 
our country of any U.S. airport, as well as the most visitors 
from countries for which the U.S. requires a visa. In addition, 
MIA continues to have more international transiting 
passengers--those foreign travelers connecting through MIA from 
one international destination to another--than any other U.S. 
airport. These passengers still must be admitted into the U.S. 
and clear customs before boarding their next flight. Miami is 
also one the largest cargo airports in the nation, and the 
majority of arriving goods are perishables requiring 
agricultural inspections.
    However, despite the great and demonstrable need for 
federal inspection personnel at MIA, Customs and Border Patrol 
(CBP) is unable to staff the available primary inspection 
booths during peak international arrival periods--a major 
contributor to what the federal government's own statistics 
demonstrate are among the nation's longest wait times for 
customs and immigration inspections. But MIA is hardly unique. 
Many major international airports in the U.S. have a shortage 
of Federal Inspection Service (FIS) officers.
    The problem is getting worse. MIA's new South Terminal, 
which is nearing completion, will have a state-of-the-art FIS 
facility with 40 primary inspection booths capable of handling 
2,000 passengers per hour. This new inspection facility, along 
with the two already in operation, needs to be fully staffed at 
peak times to accommodate the thousands of passengers arriving 
daily. However, despite the fact of present shortages and the 
predictable need for more, the committee has not acted to 
address this need.
    In addition, smaller airports such as Opa-Locka Airport and 
Fort Lauderdale Executive Airport have developed growing 
businesses in private aircraft and executive jet travel, but 
their growth is limited because of the limited hours of CBP 
operations.
    Instead of addressing these problems, I am concerned that 
the committee is actually avoiding them. Among the amendments 
offered to this bill and not supported by the majority was one 
that simply required an objective assessment of the adequacy of 
CBP personnel nationwide. I am hopeful that we can correct this 
deficiency and address the CBP and Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement staffing problems as this authorization, bill moves 
through the legislative process, for this would greatly improve 
the bill.
                                   Kendrick B. Meek.





          
                                   
