House Report 109-51 - CHILD INTERSTATE ABORTION NOTIFICATION ACT

[House Report 109-51]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

109th Congress Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
1st Session 109-51

======================================================================

CHILD INTERSTATE ABORTION NOTIFICATION ACT

_______

April 21, 2005.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed

_______

Mr. Sensenbrenner, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted the
following

R E P O R T

together with

DISSENTING VIEWS

[To accompany H.R. 748]

[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred the bill
(H.R. 748) to amend title 18, United States Code, to prevent
the transportation of minors in circumvention of certain laws
relating to abortion, and for other purposes, having considered
the same, reports favorably thereon with an amendment and
recommends that the bill as amended do pass.

CONTENTS

Page
The Amendment.................................................... 2
Purpose and Summary.............................................. 4
Background and Need for the Legislation.......................... 7
Hearings......................................................... 45
Committee Consideration.......................................... 45
Vote of the Committee............................................ 45
Committee Oversight Findings..................................... 50
New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures........................ 51
Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate........................ 51
Performance Goals and Objectives................................. 52
Constitutional Authority Statement............................... 52
Section-by-Section Analysis and Discussion....................... 52
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported............ 54
Markup Transcript................................................ 58
Dissenting Views................................................. 121

The Amendment

The amendment is as follows:
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the
following:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ``Child Interstate Abortion
Notification Act''.

SEC. 2. TRANSPORTATION OF MINORS IN CIRCUMVENTION OF CERTAIN LAWS
RELATING TO ABORTION.

Title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting after chapter
117 the following:

``CHAPTER 117A--TRANSPORTATION OF MINORS IN CIRCUMVENTION OF CERTAIN
LAWS RELATING TO ABORTION

``Sec.
``2431. Transportation of minors in circumvention of certain laws
relating to abortion.

``Sec. 2431. Transportation of minors in circumvention of certain laws
relating to abortion

``(a) Offense.--
``(1) Generally.--Except as provided in subsection (b),
whoever knowingly transports a minor across a State line, with
the intent that such minor obtain an abortion, and thereby in
fact abridges the right of a parent under a law requiring
parental involvement in a minor's abortion decision, in force
in the State where the minor resides, shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
``(2) Definition.--For the purposes of this subsection, an
abridgement of the right of a parent occurs if an abortion is
performed or induced on the minor, in a State other than the
State where the minor resides, without the parental consent or
notification, or the judicial authorization, that would have
been required by that law had the abortion been performed in
the State where the minor resides.
``(b) Exceptions.--
``(1) The prohibition of subsection (a) does not apply if
the abortion was necessary to save the life of the minor
because her life was endangered by a physical disorder,
physical injury, or physical illness, including a life
endangering physical condition caused by or arising from the
pregnancy itself.
``(2) A minor transported in violation of this section, and
any parent of that minor, may not be prosecuted or sued for a
violation of this section, a conspiracy to violate this
section, or an offense under section 2 or 3 based on a
violation of this section.
``(c) Affirmative Defense.--It is an affirmative defense to a
prosecution for an offense, or to a civil action, based on a violation
of this section that the defendant--
``(1) reasonably believed, based on information the
defendant obtained directly from a parent of the minor, that
before the minor obtained the abortion, the parental consent or
notification took place that would have been required by the
law requiring parental involvement in a minor's abortion
decision, had the abortion been performed in the State where
the minor resides; or
``(2) was presented with documentation showing with a
reasonable degree of certainty that a court in the minor's
State of residence waived any parental notification required by
the laws of that State, or otherwise authorized that the minor
be allowed to procure an abortion.
``(d) Civil Action.--Any parent who suffers harm from a violation
of subsection (a) may obtain appropriate relief in a civil action.
``(e) Definitions.--For the purposes of this section--
``(1) the term `abortion' means the use or prescription of
any instrument, medicine, drug, or any other substance or
device intentionally to terminate the pregnancy of a female
known to be pregnant with an intention other than to increase
the probability of a live birth, to preserve the life or health
of the child after live birth, or to remove a dead unborn child
who died as the result of a spontaneous abortion, accidental
trauma or a criminal assault on the pregnant female or her
unborn child;
``(2) the term a `law requiring parental involvement in a
minor's abortion decision' means a law--
``(A) requiring, before an abortion is performed on
a minor, either--
``(i) the notification to, or consent of, a
parent of that minor; or
``(ii) proceedings in a State court; and
``(B) that does not provide as an alternative to
the requirements described in subparagraph (A)
notification to or consent of any person or entity who
is not described in that subparagraph;
``(3) the term `minor' means an individual who is not older
than the maximum age requiring parental notification or
consent, or proceedings in a State court, under the law
requiring parental involvement in a minor's abortion decision;
``(4) the term `parent' means--
``(A) a parent or guardian;
``(B) a legal custodian; or
``(C) a person standing in loco parentis who has
care and control of the minor, and with whom the minor
regularly resides, who is designated by the law
requiring parental involvement in the minor's abortion
decision as a person to whom notification, or from whom
consent, is required; and
``(5) the term `State' includes the District of Columbia
and any commonwealth, possession, or other territory of the
United States.''.

SEC. 3. CHILD INTERSTATE ABORTION NOTIFICATION.

Title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting after chapter
117A the following:

``CHAPTER 117B--CHILD INTERSTATE ABORTION NOTIFICATION

``Sec.
``2432. Child interstate abortion notification.

``Sec. 2432. Child interstate abortion notification

``(a) Offense.--
``(1) Generally.--A physician who knowingly performs or
induces an abortion on a minor in violation of the requirements
of this section shall be fined under this title or imprisoned
not more than one year, or both.
``(2) Parental notification.--A physician who performs or
induces an abortion on a minor who is a resident of a State
other than the State in which the abortion is performed must
provide at least 24 hours actual notice to a parent of the
minor before performing the abortion. If actual notice to such
parent is not possible after a reasonable effort has been made,
24 hours constructive notice must be given to a parent.
``(b) Exceptions.--The notification requirement of subsection
(a)(2) does not apply if--
``(1) the abortion is performed or induced in a State that
has a law in force requiring parental involvement in a minor's
abortion decision and the physician complies with the
requirements of that law;
``(2) the physician is presented with documentation showing
with a reasonable degree of certainty that a court in the
minor's State of residence has waived any parental notification
required by the laws of that State, or has otherwise authorized
that the minor be allowed to procure an abortion;
``(3) the minor declares in a signed written statement that
she is the victim of sexual abuse, neglect, or physical abuse
by a parent, and, before an abortion is performed on the minor,
the physician notifies the authorities specified to receive
reports of child abuse or neglect by the law of the State in
which the minor resides of the known or suspected abuse or
neglect; or
``(4) the abortion is necessary to save the life of the
minor because her life was endangered by a physical disorder,
physical injury, or physical illness, including a life
endangering physical condition caused by or arising from the
pregnancy itself.
``(c) Civil Action.--Any parent who suffers harm from a violation
of subsection (a) may obtain appropriate relief in a civil action.
``(d) Definitions.--For the purposes of this section--
``(1) the term `abortion' means the use or prescription of
any instrument, medicine, drug, or any other substance or
device intentionally to terminate the pregnancy of a female
known to be pregnant with an intention other than to increase
the probability of a live birth, to preserve the life or health
of the child after live birth, or to remove a dead unborn child
who died as the result of a spontaneous abortion, accidental
trauma, or a criminal assault on the pregnant female or her
unborn child;
``(2) the term `actual notice' means the giving of written
notice directly, in person;
``(3) the term `constructive notice' means notice that is
given by certified mail, return receipt requested, restricted
delivery to the last known address of the person being
notified, with delivery deemed to have occurred 48 hours
following noon on the next day subsequent to mailing on which
regular mail delivery takes place, days on which mail is not
delivered excluded;
``(4) the term a `law requiring parental involvement in a
minor's abortion decision' means a law--
``(A) requiring, before an abortion is performed on
a minor, either--
``(i) the notification to, or consent of, a
parent of that minor; or
``(ii) proceedings in a State court;
``(B) that does not provide as an alternative to
the requirements described in subparagraph (A)
notification to or consent of any person or entity who
is not described in that subparagraph;
``(5) the term `minor' means an individual who is not older
than 18 years and who is not emancipated under State law;
``(6) the term `parent' means--
``(A) a parent or guardian;
``(B) a legal custodian; or
``(C) a person standing in loco parentis who has
care and control of the minor, and with whom the minor
regularly resides;
as determined by State law;
``(7) the term `physician' means a doctor of medicine
legally authorized to practice medicine by the State in which
such doctor practices medicine, or any other person legally
empowered under State law to perform an abortion; and
``(8) the term `State' includes the District of Columbia
and any commonwealth, possession, or other territory of the
United States.''.

SEC. 4. CLERICAL AMENDMENT.

The table of chapters at the beginning of part I of title 18,
United States Code, is amended by inserting after the item relating to
chapter 117 the following new items:

``117A. Transportation of minors in circumvention of certain 2431
laws relating to abortion.
``117B. Child interstate abortion notification.............. 2432''.

SEC. 5. SEVERABILITY AND EFFECTIVE DATE.

(a) The provisions of this Act shall be severable. If any provision
of this Act, or any application thereof, is found unconstitutional,
that finding shall not affect any provision or application of the Act
not so adjudicated.
(b) The provisions of this Act shall take effect upon enactment.

Purpose and Summary

H.R. 748, the ``Child Interstate Abortion Notification
Act'' (``CIANA''), has two primary purposes. The first is to
protect the health and safety of young girls by preventing
valid and constitutional state parental involvement laws from
being circumvented. The second is to protect the health and
safety of young girls by protecting the rights of parents to be
involved in the medical decisions of their minor daughters when
such decisions involve interstate abortions. To achieve these
purposes, CIANA contains two sections, each of which creates a
new Federal crime subject to a $100,000 fine, or 1 year in
jail, or both.\1\
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\1\ Under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3559(a)(6) (``An offense that is not
specifically classified by a letter grade in the section defining it,
is classified if the maximum term of imprisonment authorized is 1 year
or less but more than 6 months, as a Class A misdemeanor.''), CIANA
would be classified as a Class A misdemeanor. Under the Federal fine
statute, the sentence for a Class A misdemeanor that does not result in
death is not more than $100,000. See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3571(b)(5).
Therefore, the maximum allowable fine under CIANA is $100,000.
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First, CIANA makes it a Federal crime to transport a minor
across state lines to obtain an abortion in another state in
order to avoid a state law requiring parental involvement in a
minor's abortion decision. Twenty-three states currently have
parental involvement laws.\2\ The purpose of the first section
of CIANA is to prevent people--including abusive boyfriends and
older men who may have committed rape--from pressuring young
girls into circumventing their state's parental involvement
laws by receiving a secret out-of-State abortion. This section
of CIANA does not apply to minors themselves, or to their
parents. It also does not apply in life-threatening emergencies
that may require that an abortion be provided immediately.
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\2\ Those states are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana,
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming.
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Second, CIANA applies when a minor from one state crosses
state lines to have an abortion in another state that does not
have a state law requiring parental involvement in a minor's
abortion decision, or when a minor from one state crosses state
lines to have an abortion in another state that does have a
state law requiring parental involvement in a minor's abortion
decision, but the physician fails to comply with such law. In
such a case, CIANA makes it a Federal crime for the abortion
provider to fail to give one of the minor's parents, or a legal
guardian if necessary, 24 hours' notice (or notice by mail if
necessary) of the minor's abortion decision before the abortion
is performed. The purpose of this section is to protect
fundamental parental rights by giving parents a chance to help
their young daughters through difficult circumstances as best
they can, including by giving a health care provider their
daughter's medical history to ensure she receives safe medical
care and any necessary follow-up treatment.
Dr. Bruce A. Lucero, an abortion provider, has supported
this legislation because ``parents are usually the ones who can
best help their teenager consider her options'' and because
``patients who receive abortions at out-of-State clinics
frequently do not return for follow-up care, which can lead to
dangerous complications.'' \3\ Parental notification also
allows parents to assist their daughter in the selection of a
competent abortion provider. This section of CIANA does not
apply in the following circumstances: where the abortion
provider is presented with court papers showing that the
parental involvement law in effect in the minor's state of
residence has been complied with; where the minor states that
she has been the victim of abuse by a parent and the abortion
provider informs the appropriate state authorities of such
abuse; or where a life-threatening emergency may require that
an abortion be provided immediately.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Bruce A. Lucero, M.D., ``Parental Guidance Needed,'' The New
York Times (July 12, 1998).
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CIANA supports state laws that provide parents with the
necessary information to fulfill their obligation to care for
their minor children, and it affirms the common-sense notion
that parents have the legal right to be involved in medical
decisions relating to their minor children when those decisions
involve interstate abortions.
CIANA does not supercede, override, or in any way alter
existing state parental involvement laws. CIANA addresses the
interstate transportation of minors in order to circumvent
valid, existing state laws, and uses Congress' authority to
regulate interstate activity to protect those laws from evasion
and to protect parental involvement when minors cross state
lines to obtain an abortion.
A total of 44 States have enacted some form of a parental
involvement law. Twenty-three of these States currently enforce
statutes that require the consent or notification of at least
one parent, or court authorization, before a minor can obtain
an abortion. Such laws reflect widespread agreement that it is
the parents of a pregnant minor who are best suited to provide
her counsel, guidance, and support as she decides whether to
continue her pregnancy or to undergo an abortion. These laws
not only help to ensure the health and safety of pregnant young
girls, but also protect fundamental parental rights.
Despite widespread support for parental involvement laws
and clear public policy considerations justifying them,
substantial evidence exists that such laws are regularly evaded
by adults who transport minors to abortion providers in States
that do not have parental notification or consent laws. CIANA
would curb the interstate circumvention of these laws, thereby
protecting the rights of parents and the interests of
vulnerable minors. CIANA ensures that State parental
involvement laws are not evaded through interstate activity.
Parental involvement in the abortion decisions of minor
girls will lead to improved medical care for minors seeking
abortions and provide increased protection for young girls
against sexual exploitation by adult men. When parents are not
involved in the abortion decisions of a child, the risks to the
child's health significantly increase. Parental involvement
will ensure that parents have the opportunity to provide
additional medical history and information to abortion
providers prior to performance of an abortion. The medical,
emotional and psychological consequences of an abortion are
serious and lasting. An adequate medical and psychological case
history is important to the physician, and parents can provide
such information for their daughters as well as any pertinent
family medical history, refer the physician to other sources of
medical history, such as family physicians, and authorize
family physicians to give relevant data.
Only parents are likely to know a young girl's allergies to
anesthesia and medication or previous bouts with specific
medical conditions, including depression. A more complete and
thus more accurate medical history of the patient will enable
abortion providers to disclose not only medical risks that
ordinarily accompany abortions but also those risks that may be
specific to the pregnant minor.
Parental involvement also improves medical treatment of
pregnant minors by ensuring that parents have adequate
knowledge to recognize and respond to any post-abortion
complications that may develop. Without the knowledge that
their daughters have had abortions, parents are unable to
ensure that their children obtain routine postoperative care
and unable to provide an adequate medical history to physicians
called upon to treat any complications that may arise. These
omissions may allow complications such as infection,
perforation, or depression to continue untreated. Such
complications may be lethal if left untreated.
Teenage pregnancies often occur as a result of predatory
practices of men who are substantially older than the minor
victim, resulting in the transportation of the girl across
State lines by an individual who has a great incentive to avoid
criminal liability for his conduct. Experience suggests that
sexual predators recognize the advantage of their victims
obtaining an abortion. Not only does an abortion eliminate
critical evidence of the criminal conduct, it allows the abuse
to continue undetected. Parental involvement laws ensure that
parents have the opportunity to protect their daughters from
those who would victimize them further.

Background and Need for the Legislation

H.R. 748 is much-needed legislation, overwhelmingly
supported by the American people, that will protect both the
health and safety of our minor children and parental rights.

SUPPORT FOR CIANA

Polls show that the American people overwhelmingly support
parental involvement laws by huge majorities that have grown
over the last decade. As recently as March, 2005, 75 percent of
over 1,500 registered voters surveyed favored ``requiring
parental notification before a minor could get an abortion,''
and only 18 percent were opposed.\4\ According to another poll
conducted in 2003, 73 percent of non-whites and 82 percent of
Hispanics support parental notification laws.\5\ A Wirthlin
Worldwide poll conducted in October, 2001, found that 83
percent of those surveyed support laws requiring notification
to one parent before an abortion can be performed on a minor
daughter.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Quinnipiac University Poll (conducted March 2-7, 2005, with
1,534 registered voters surveyed; margin of error: 2.5percent).
\5\ Wirthlin Worldwide Poll (October 21-23, 2003).
\6\ Wirthlin Worldwide National Poll (October 19-22, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
African Americans and Hispanics overwhelmingly support
parental notification laws. A Public Opinion Strategies poll
surveyed 1,000 African-American registered voters on the
question: ``Would you favor or oppose a law that would require
a parent or guardian to be notified before a minor child, under
the age of 18, undergoes an abortion procedure?'' 84 percent
favored such a law (74 percent ``strongly favor'' and 10
percent ``somewhat favor'').\7\ A Zogby poll of California
voters showed that 71 percent of those surveyed in that state
support laws requiring notification to one parent before an
abortion can be performed on a minor daughter.\8\
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\7\ Public Opinion Strategies Survey (July 30, 2002).
\8\ Zogby California Poll (June 2002).
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Moreover, during the November, 2004, elections, Florida
overwhelmingly passed an amendment to its state constitution
that provides that ``the Legislature is authorized to require
by general law for notification to a parent or guardian of a
minor before the termination of the minor's pregnancy.'' \9\
Nearly 65 percent of Florida voters in November, 2004, approved
this state constitutional amendment.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ F.S.A. Const. Art. 10 Sec. 22.
\10\ See Jackie Hallifax, ``Group Seeks Parental Notice End,'' The
Brandenton Herald (January 11, 2005) at 5.
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Even more rigid requirements of parental consent are
overwhelmingly supported by the American public. A Gallup poll
conducted in January, 2003, showed that 78 percent of those
surveyed favor laws requiring a 24-hour waiting period before
an abortion can be obtained, and 73 percent favor laws
requiring minors to get parental consent before an abortion can
be obtained.\11\ These numbers have been confirmed in other
polls.\12\ Similar results are found in polls that consistently
reflect over 70 percent of the American public support parental
consent or notification laws,\13\ including 69 percent of the
Hispanic population.\14\
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\11\ Lydia Saad, Gallup News Service (January 20, 2003).
\12\ See Los Angeles Times Poll (June 8-13, 2000); CBS News/New
York Times Poll (January 1998).
\13\ See, e.g., CBS News/ NY Times Poll (released January 15, 1998)
(78 percent of those polled favor requiring parental consent before a
girl under 18 years of age could have an abortion); Americans United
for Life, Abortion and Moral Beliefs, A Survey of American Opinion
(1991); Wirthlin Group Survey, Public Opinion, May-June 1989; Life/
Contemporary American Family (released December, 1981) (78 percent of
those polled believed that ``a girl who is under 18 years of age
[should] have to notify her parents before she can have an abortion'').
\14\ Latino Opinions poll (October 5, 2004) (survey of 1,000
national adult Hispanics on the question ``[D]o you support or oppose
requiring underage teenage girls to get permission from their parents
before they are allowed to get an abortion?'' to which 58 percent
reported ``strongly support'' and 11 percent reported ``somewhat
support'').
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As the Associated Press has reported, even ``[o]pponents
[of parental notice laws] agree that young women are better off
telling parents about a pregnancy[.]'' \15\ Even Senator John
Kerry, the former Democratic nominee for President, has said he
supports parental notification laws. On the NBC News program
``Meet the Press,'' Senator Kerry said ``I am for parental
notification.'' \16\
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\15\ David Crary, ``Passage of Teen Abortion Bill Called Likely,''
The Associated Press (January 31, 2005).
\16\ NBC News, ``Meet the Press'' (January 30, 2005) (transcript).
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There is widespread agreement among abortion rights
advocates and pro-life advocates that it is the parents of a
pregnant minor who are best suited to provide her counsel,
guidance, and support as she decides whether to continue her
pregnancy or to undergo an abortion. Organizations such as
Planned Parenthood and the National Abortion and Reproductive
Rights Action League all advise pregnant minors to consult
their parents before proceeding with an abortion.\17\ In
addition, the American Medical Association urges physicians to
``strongly encourage minors to discuss their pregnancy with
their parents'' and to ``explain how parental involvement can
be helpful and that parents are generally very understanding
and supportive.'' \18\
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\17\ See Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc., Fact
Sheets: Teenagers, Abortion, and Government Intrusion Laws, at http://
www.plannedparenthood.org/library/ABORTION/laws.html (last visited
February 2, 2005) (``Few would deny that most teenagers, especially
younger ones, would benefit from adult guidance when faced with an
unwanted pregnancy. Few would deny that such guidance ideally should
come from the teenager's parents.''); National Abortion and
Reproductive Rights Action League, Young Women: Reproductive Rights
Issues, at http://www.naral.org/Issues/youngwomen/index.cfm (last
visited February 1, 2005) (``Responsible parents should be involved
when their young daughters face a crisis pregnancy.'').
\18\ Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical
Association, ``Mandatory Parental Consent to Abortion,'' 269 JAMA 82,
83 (1993).
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THE SCOPE OF THE INTERSTATE PROBLEM CIANA ADDRESSES

There is no serious dispute regarding the fact that the
transportation of minors across state lines in order to obtain
abortions is both a widespread and frequent practice. Even
groups opposed to this bill acknowledge that large numbers of
minors are transported across state lines to obtain abortions,
in many cases by adults other than their parents. In 1995,
Kathryn Kolbert, then an attorney with the Center for
Reproductive Law and Policy (a national legal defense
organization that supports abortion), stated that thousands of
adults are helping minors cross state lines to get abortions in
states whose parental involvement requirements are less
stringent or non-existent: ``There are thousands of minors who
cross state lines for an abortion every year and who need the
assistance of adults to do that.'' \19\ She asked, ``How does a
14-year-old get to New Hampshire from Boston without getting a
ride?'' \20\ In 2001, New Jersey's Star-Ledger reported that
Laurie Lowenstein, Executive Director of Right to Choose, an
abortion rights advocacy group, stated that she would quit her
job to shuttle pregnant young girls to states without parental
notification laws if New Jersey enacted a parental notification
law.\21\ Only Congress, with its constitutional authority to
regulate interstate commerce, can curb such flagrant disregard
of state laws. The experience of a number of States illuminates
the scope of this problem.
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\19\ ``Labor of Love Is Deemed Criminal,'' The National Law Journal
(November 11, 1996) at A8.
\20\ See ``Woman Charged in Secret Abortion,'' Philadelphia
Inquirer, (September 16, 1995).
\21\ Jeff Whelan, ``McGreevey Reveals Latest Abortion Stance,'' The
Star-Ledger (August 30, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pennsylvania
Since Pennsylvania's current parental consent law took
effect in March, 1994, news reports have confirmed that many
Pennsylvania teenagers are going out of state to New Jersey and
New York to obtain abortions. In 1995, the New York Times
reported that ``Planned Parenthood in Philadelphia has a list
of clinics, from New York to Baltimore, to which they will
refer teenagers, according to the organization's executive
director, Joan Coombs.'' \22\ Moreover, the New York Times gave
accounts of clinics that had seen an increase in patients from
Pennsylvania.\23\ One clinic, in Cherry Hill, New Jersey,
reported seeing a threefold increase in Pennsylvania teenagers
coming for abortions.\24\ Likewise, a clinic in Queens, New
York, reported that it was not unusual to see Pennsylvania
teenagers as patients in 1995, though earlier it had been
rare.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ ``Teen-Agers Cross State Lines in Abortion Exodus,'' The New
York Times (December 18, 1995) at B6.
\23\ See id.
\24\ See id.
\25\ See id.
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In the period just prior to the Pennsylvania law taking
effect, efforts were underway to make it easier for teenagers
to go out of state for abortions. For instance, Newsday
reported that ``[c]ounselors and activists are meeting to plot
strategy and printing maps with directions to clinics in New
York, New Jersey, Delaware and Washington, D.C., where
teenagers can still get abortions without parental consent . .
. `We will definitely be encouraging teenagers to go out of
state,' said Shawn Towey, director of the Greater Philadelphia
Woman's Medical Fund, a nonprofit organization that gives money
to women who can't afford to pay for their abortions.'' \26\
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\26\ Charles V. Zehren, ``New Restrictive Abortion Law,'' Newsday
(February 22, 1994).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Moreover, some abortion clinics in nearby states, such as
New Jersey and Maryland, and others, use the lack of parental
involvement requirements in their own states as a ``selling
point'' in advertising directed at minors in Pennsylvania,
stating ``No Parental Consent Required.'' \27\ A Rockville,
Maryland, abortionist ran a similar advertisement in the May
1998-April 1999 Yellow Pages for Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. Such
advertisements have appeared in telephone directories for
Wilkes-Barre and Dallas, Scranton, Clarks Summit, and
Carbondale, Bethlehem, Allentown, York, and Erie.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ See attachment, page 11, for copies of such advertisements.
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ATTACHMENT

Missouri
A study in the American Journal of Public Health reported
that a leading abortion provider in Missouri refers minors out
of state for abortions if the girls do not want to involve
their parents. Reproductive Health Services, which performs
over half of the abortions performed in Missouri, refers minors
to the Hope Clinic for Women in Granite City, Illinois.\28\
Research reveals that based on the available data the odds of a
minor traveling out of state for an abortion increased by over
50 percent when Missouri's parental consent law went into
effect. Furthermore, compared to older women, underage girls
were significantly more likely to travel out of state to have
their abortions.\29\
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\28\ See Charlotte Ellertson, Ph.D., ``Mandatory Parental
Involvement in Minors' Abortions: Effects of the Laws in Minnesota,
Missouri, and Indiana,'' American Journal of Public Health (August
1997).
\29\ See id. at 1371.
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A St. Louis Post-Dispatch news report confirms that the
Hope Clinic in Illinois attracted underage girls seeking
abortions without parental involvement.\30\ A clinic counselor
estimates that she sees two girls each week seeking to avoid
their home state's parental involvement law. One example was a
16-year-old girl from Missouri who had called abortion clinics
in St. Louis and learned that parental consent was required
before a minor could obtain an abortion. According to the
report, the Hope Clinic performed 3,200 abortions on out-of-
State women in 1998, and the clinic's executive director
estimates that number is 45 percent of the total abortions
performed at the clinic. The executive director also estimates
that 13 percent of the clinic's clients are minors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ See Kevin McDermott and Mark Schauerte, ``Illinois May Tighten
Rules on Abortions For Teens; Parental Consent Is Not Required;
Abortion Bill Targets Illinois as Teen Haven For Abortion,'' St. Louis
Post-Dispatch (February 25, 1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Massachusetts
Massachusetts has also seen an increase in out-of-State
abortions performed on its teenage residents since the state's
parental consent law went into effect in April 1981, according
to a published study.\31\ A study published in the American
Journal of Public Health found that in the 4 months prior to
implementation of the parental consent law, an average of 29
Massachusetts minors obtained out-of-State abortions each month
in Rhode Island, New Hampshire, Connecticut, and New York (data
for Maine was not available).\32\ After the parental consent
law was implemented, however, the average jumped to between 90
and 95 out-of-State abortions per month, using data from the
five states of Rhode Island, New Hampshire, Connecticut, New
York, and Maine, representing one-third of the abortions
obtained by Massachusetts' minors.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ The Massachusetts law was changed in 1997 to require the
consent of one parent (or judicial authorization), rather than both
parents as previously required.
\32\ See Virginia G. Cartoof & Lorraine V. Klerman, ``Parental
Consent for Abortion: Impact of the Massachusetts Law,'' American
Journal of Public Health 397 (April 1986).
\33\ See id. at 398.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The study noted that due to what the authors described as
``astute marketing,'' one abortion clinic in New Hampshire was
able to nearly double the monthly average of abortions
performed on Massachusetts minors (from 14 in 1981 to 27 in
1982). The abortionist ``began advertising in the 1982 Yellow
Pages of metropolitan areas along the northern Massachusetts
border, stating `consent for minors not required.' '' \34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ Id. at 399.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In April 1991, the Planned Parenthood League of
Massachusetts estimated that approximately 1,200 Massachusetts
minor girls travel out of state for abortions each year, the
majority of them to New Hampshire. Planned Parenthood said that
surveys of New Hampshire clinics revealed an average of 100
appointments per month by Massachusetts minors.\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ See M.A.J. McKenna, ``Mass. Abortion Laws Push Teens Over
Border,'' Boston Herald (April 7, 1991) at A1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mississippi
A study of the effect of Mississippi's parental consent law
revealed that Mississippi has also experienced an increase in
the number of minors traveling out of state for abortions. The
study, published in Family Planning Perspectives, compared data
for the 5 months before the parental consent law took effect in
June 1993, with data for the 6 months after it took effect, and
found that ``[a]mong Mississippi residents having an abortion
in the state, the ratio of minors to older women decreased by
13 percent . . . However, this decline was largely offset by a
32 percent increase in the ratio of minors to older women among
Mississippi residents traveling to other states for abortion
services.'' \36\ Based on the available data, the study
suggests that the Mississippi parental consent law appeared to
have ``little or no effect on the abortion rate among minors
but a large increase in the proportion of minors who travel to
other states to have abortions, along with a decrease in minors
coming from other states to Mississippi.'' \37\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ Stanley K. Henshaw, ``The Impact of Requirements for Parental
Consent on Minors' Abortions in Mississippi,'' Family Planning
Perspectives (June, 1995) at 121.
\37\ Id. at 122.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Virginia
Grace S. Sparks, executive director of the Virginia League
of Planned Parenthood, predicted in February 1997 that if
Virginia were to pass a parental notification law, teenagers
would travel out of state for abortions: ``In every state where
they've passed parental notification, . . . there's been an
increase in out-of-State abortions,'' she said, adding, ``I
suspect that that's what will happen in Virginia, that teen-
agers who cannot tell their parents . . . will go out of state
and have abortions . . .'' \38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\ Lisa A. Singh, ``Those Are the People Who Are Being Hurt,''
Style Weekly (February 11, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Virginia's parental notification law took effect on July 1,
1997. Initial reports indicated that abortions performed on
Virginia minors dropped 20 percent during the first 5 months
that the law was in effect (from 903 abortions during the same
time period in 1996 to approximately 700 abortions in
1997).\39\ It appears, however, that Virginia teenagers are
traveling to the District of Columbia in order to obtain an
abortion without involving their parents. In fact, the National
Abortion Federation (``NAF''), which runs a toll-free national
abortion hotline, said that calls from Virginia teenagers
seeking information on how to obtain an abortion out of state
were the largest source of teenage callers seeking out-of-State
abortions, at seven to ten calls per day.\40\ NAF hotline
operator Amy Schriefer has gone so far as to talk a Richmond
area teenage girl through the route (involving a Greyhound bus
and the Metro's Red Line) to obtain an abortion in the District
of Columbia.\41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\ Ellen Nakashima, ``Fewer Teens Receiving Abortions In
Virginia,'' The Washington Post (March 3, 1998).
\40\ See id.
\41\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONIALS HIGHLIGHT
THE NEED FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION

At hearings during the 105th, 106th, 107th, and 108th
Congresses, the Subcommittee on the Constitution heard
testimony from two mothers whose daughters were secretly taken
for abortions, with devastating consequences. Joyce Farley, the
mother of a minor girl, recounted how her 12-year-old daughter
was provided alcohol, raped, and then taken out of state by the
rapist's mother for an abortion.\42\ In the words of Joyce
Farley, the abortion was arranged to destroy evidence--evidence
that her 12-year-old daughter had been raped.\43\ On August 31,
1995, her daughter, who had just turned 13, underwent a
dangerous medical procedure without anyone present who knew her
past medical history (as shown by the false medical history
that was given to the abortionist).\44\ Following the abortion,
the mother of the rapist dropped off the child in another town
30 miles from the child's home.\45\ The child returned to her
home with severe pain and bleeding which revealed complications
from an incomplete abortion.\46\ When Joyce Farley contacted
the original clinic that performed the abortion, the clinic
told her that the bleeding was normal and to increase her
daughter's Naprosyn, a medication given to her for pain, every
hour if needed.\47\ Fortunately, Ms. Farley, being a nurse,
knew this advice was wrong and could be harmful, but her
daughter would not have known this.\48\ Because of her mother's
intervention, Ms. Farley's daughter ultimately received further
medical care and a second procedure to complete the
abortion.\49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\ See Child Custody Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 3682 Before
the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
105th Cong., (May 21, 1998) (statement of Joyce Farley).
\43\ See id.
\44\ See id.
\45\ See id.
\46\ See id.
\47\ See id.
\48\ See id.
\49\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As Ms. Farley testified before the House Constitution
Subcommittee last year:

[I]n 1995, my then 12-year-old daughter, Crystal, was
intoxicated and raped by a 19-year-old male . . . On
August 31, 1995, I discovered my 13-year-old daughter,
Crystal, was missing from home. An investigation by the
police, school officials and myself revealed the
possibility that Crystal had been transported out of
State for an abortion. I can't begin to tell you the
fear that enveloped me not knowing where my daughter
was, who she was with, if she was in harm's way, and to
learn in this manner that my young daughter was
pregnant. By early afternoon Crystal was home safe with
me, but so much had taken place in that 1 day. The
mother of this 19-year-old male had taken Crystal for
an abortion in the State of New York. Apparently, this
woman decided this was the best solution for the
situation caused by her son, with little regard for the
welfare of my daughter. Situations such as this is what
the Child Custody Act [H.R. 1755 in the 108th Congress,
which included provisions that are also in CIANA] was
designed to help prevent. I am a loving, responsible
parent, whose parenting was interfered with by an adult
unknown to me. My child was taken for a medical
procedure to an unknown facility and physician without
my permission. When Crystal developed complications
from this medical procedure, this physician was not
available. He refused to supply necessary medical
records to a physician that was available to provide
Crystal the medical care she needed. I ask you to
please, in considering the Child Custody Protection
Act, to put aside your personal opinions on abortion.
Please just consider the safety of the minor children
of our Nation whose lives are put at risk when taken
out of their home State . . . Please allow loving,
careful and responsible parents the freedom to provide
the care their adolescent daughters need without
interference from criminals or people who think they
may be helping, but actually cause more harm than good.
An abortion is a medical procedure with physical and
emotional risks. An adolescent who's had an abortion
needs the care and support of family. Crystal,
unfortunately, developed both physical and emotional
side effects. Some of the effects are still present
today after 9 years have lapsed.\50\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\50\ Child Custody Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 1755 Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th
Cong., 6-7 (July 20, 2004) (statement of Joyce Farley).

This year, Marcia Carroll testified before the Constitution
Subcommittee and described the following terrifying story that
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CIANA, had it been enacted into law, would have prevented:

On Christmas Eve 2004, my daughter informed me she
was pregnant. I assured her I would seek out all
resources and help that was available. As her parents,
her father and I would stand beside her and support any
decision she made. We scheduled appointments with her
pediatrician, her private counselor, and her school
nurse. I followed all of their advice and
recommendations. They referred us to Healthy Beginnings
Plus, Lancaster Family Services, and the WIC program.
They discussed all her options with her. I purposefully
allowed my daughter to speak alone with professionals
so that she would speak her mind and not just say what
she thought I wanted to hear. My daughter chose to have
the baby and raise it. My family fully supported my
daughter's decision to keep her baby and offered her
our love and support.
Subsequently, her boyfriend's family began to harass
my daughter and my family. They started showing up at
our house to express their desire for my daughter to
have an abortion. When that did not work, his
grandmother started calling my daughter without my
knowledge. They would tell her that if she kept the
baby, she couldn't see her boyfriend again. They
threatened to move out of state.
I told his family that my daughter had our full
support in her decision to keep the baby. She also had
the best doctors, counselors, and professionals to help
her through the pregnancy. We all had her best
interests in mind.
The behavior of the boy's family began to concern me
to the point where I called my local police department
for advice. Additionally, I called the number for an
abortion center to see how old you have to be to have
an abortion in our state.
I felt safe when they told me my minor daughter had
to be 16 years of age in the state of Pennsylvania to
have an abortion without parental consent. I found out
later that the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act
actually says that parental consent is needed for a
minor under 18 years of age. It never occurred to me
that I would need to check the laws of other states
around me. I thought as a resident of the state of
Pennsylvania that she was protected by Pennsylvania
state laws. Boy, was I ever wrong.
On Feb. 16, I sent my daughter to her bus stop with
two dollars of lunch money. I thought she was safe at
school. She and her boyfriend even had a prenatal class
scheduled after school.
However, what really happened was that her boyfriend
and his family met with her down the road from her bus
stop and called a taxi. The adults put the children in
the taxi to take them to the train station. His
stepfather met the children at the train station, where
he had to purchase my daughter's ticket since she was
only fourteen. They put the children on the train from
Lancaster to Philadelphia. From there, they took two
subways to New Jersey. That is where his family met the
children and took them to the abortion clinic, where
one of the adults had made the appointment.
When my daughter started to cry and have second
thoughts, they told her they would leave her in New
Jersey. They planned, paid for, coerced, harassed, and
threatened her into having the abortion. They left her
alone during the abortion and went to eat lunch.
After the abortion, his stepfather and grandmother
drove my daughter home from New Jersey and dropped her
off down the road from our house. My daughter told me
that on the way home she started to cry, they got angry
at her and told her there was nothing to cry about.
Anything could have happened to my daughter at the
abortion facility or on the ride back home. These
people did not know my daughter's medical history, yet
they took her across state lines to have a medical
procedure without my knowledge or consent. Our family
will be responsible for the medical and psychological
consequences for my daughter as a result of this
procedure that was completed unbeknownst to me. I was
so devastated that this could have been done that I
called the local police department to see what could be
done. They were just as shocked and surprised as I was
that there was nothing that could be done in this
horrible situation.
The state of Pennsylvania does have a parental
consent law. Something has to be done to prevent this
from happening to other families. This is just not
acceptable to me and should not happen to families in
this country. If your child goes to her school clinic
for a headache, a registered nurse can't give her a
Tylenol or aspirin without a parent's written
permission.
As a consequence of my daughter being taken out of
our state for an abortion without parental knowledge,
she is suffering intense grief. My daughter cries
herself to sleep at night and lives with this everyday.
I think about what I could or should have done to
keep her safe. Everybody tells me I did everything I
could have and should have done. It doesn't make me
feel any better, knowing everything I did was not
enough to protect my daughter.
It does ease my mind to know with your help that we
can make a difference and change the law to protect
other girls and their families. I urge your support for
The Child Interstate Abortion Notification Act. It is
critical that this law passes in Congress. The right of
parents to protect the health and welfare of their
minor daughters needs to be protected. No one should be
able to circumvent state laws by performing an abortion
in another state on a minor daughter without parental
consent.

The physician who performed an abortion on Marcia Carroll's
daughter, Dr. Vikram Kaji, had a long history of sexually
abusing his patients. Marcia Carroll should have been given an
opportunity to learn about the history of her child's doctor.
Apparently the people who coerced her daughter into having the
abortion did not care who performed an abortion on her. Dr.
Kaji was professionally disciplined by the State of New Jersey
on November 1, 1993, and given a 12-month suspension for
sexually abusing three patients and indiscriminately
prescribing controlled dangerous substances.\51\ He was
disciplined for having sex with one patient in his office, and
for performing ``improper'' rectal and breast exams on two
other patients.\52\ According to a consent order, Dr. Kaji knew
the woman he had sex with suffered from severe depression, had
been sexually abused as a child, and had once been hospitalized
for psychiatric problems.\53\ He was also disciplined by the
Federal Drug Enforcement Agency on February 22, 1994, and made
to surrender his controlled substance license.\54\ He was also
disciplined by the State of Pennsylvania on December 23, 1994,
and his license was suspended for 36 months.\55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\51\ See Sidney Wolfe, M.D., Mary Gabay, Phyllis McCarthy, Alana
Bame, and Benita Marcus Adler, ``Questionable Doctors: Disciplined by
States or the Federal Government'' (State Listing for New Jersey; A
Public Citizen Health Research Group Report) (March 1996) at 68.
\52\ See American Political Network, ``State Reports Pennsylvania:
PA Suspends Abortion Provider's License,'' (March 23, 1995) at 6.
\53\ See Kathy Boccella, ``Abortion Doctor Banned One Year,'' The
Philadelphia Inquirer (October 29, 1993) at B1 (``A woman who had been
a patient of Kaji's since 1976 said that `numerous times (he) made
sexual advances toward her and fondled her' in his office between 1980
and 1988, the consent order read . . . Kaji knew the woman suffered
from severe depression, had been sexually abused as a child and had
once been hospitalized for psychiatric problems, the order read.'').
\54\ See id. at 68.
\55\ See id. at 68.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When Marcia Carroll was asked why she came to testify on
behalf of CIANA, she said, ``[my daughter] does suffer. She has
gone to counseling for this. I just know that she cries and she
wished she could redo everything, relive that day over. It's
just sad that it had to happen this way and this is what she
had to go through. But she did want me to come here today and
speak on her behalf. She said, `Mom, just one phone call is all
it would have taken to stop this from happening . . .' So she
asked me to come here for her sake and for other girls' safety
to speak and let you know what was happening.'' That is
precisely what CIANA affirms: the right of parents to be given
the chance to help their children through difficult times. The
parents of this Nation want to be given the chance to make sure
their children's doctors are not potential sexual abusers and
controlled substance pushers, and CIANA would give them that
chance.
Eileen Roberts also testified that her 13-year-old daughter
was encouraged by a boyfriend, with the assistance of his adult
friend, to obtain a secret abortion.\56\ The adult friend drove
Ms. Roberts' daughter to an abortion clinic 45 miles from her
home and paid for her daughter to receive the abortion.\57\
After 2 weeks of observing their daughter's depression, Ms.
Roberts and her husband learned that the young girl had an
abortion from a questionnaire they found under her pillow,
which their daughter had failed to return to the abortion
clinic.\58\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\56\ See Child Custody Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 476 Before
the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
107th Cong. (Sept. 6, 2001) (statement of Eileen Roberts).
\57\ See id. While Ms. Roberts' daughter was not taken to another
state, her story is illustrative of the harms involved when a child is
secretly taken away from her parents for an abortion. After this
experience, Ms. Roberts formed an organization called Mothers Against
Minor Abortions (MAMA). Ms. Roberts testified: ``I speak today for
those parents I know around the country, whose daughters have been
taken out of State for their abortions.'' Id.
\58\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ms. Roberts' daughter was then hospitalized as a result of
the depression, and a physical examination revealed that the
abortion had been incompletely performed and required surgery
to repair the damage done by the abortionist.\59\ The hospital
called Ms. Roberts and told her that they could not do
reparative surgery without a signed consent form.\60\ The
following year, Ms. Roberts' daughter developed an infection
and was diagnosed with having pelvic inflammatory disease,
which again required a 2-day hospitalization for antibiotic
therapy and a signed consent form.\61\ Ms. Roberts and her
family were responsible for over $27,000 in medical costs, all
of which resulted from this one secret abortion.\62\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\59\ See id.
\60\ See id.
\61\ See id.
\62\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

STATE LAW AND CIANA'S PROTECTION OF STATE LAW

There are currently 44 states with parental involvement
statutes on the books.\63\ Of these 44 statutes, 34 are in
effect today.\64\ Although 11 of these thirty-four statutes
reflect a legislative intention to simply encourage the
pregnant minor to consult with her parents, another relative,
or a trusted friend before she decides to undergo an
abortion,\65\ the laws on the books in the remaining 23 states
require a parent to either be notified of their minor
daughter's intention to undergo an abortion or to consent to
the performance of an abortion on their minor daughter. Despite
widespread support for parental involvement laws and clear
public policy considerations justifying such laws, there exists
substantial evidence, outlined above, that they are frequently
circumvented by adults who transport minors to abortion
providers in states that do not have parental notification or
consent laws. One purpose of CIANA is to curb the interstate
circumvention of these laws, thereby protecting the rights of
parents and the interests of vulnerable minors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\63\ See Ala. Code Sec. Sec. 26-21-1 to -8 (2003); Alaska Stat.
Sec. Sec. 18.16.010-030 (Michie 2003); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Sec. 36-2152
(2004); Ark. Code Ann. Sec. Sec. 20-16-801 to -808 (Michie 2003); Cal.
Health & Safety Code Sec. 123450 (West 2004); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann.
Sec. Sec. 12-37.5-101 to -108 (West 2004); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann.
Sec. 19a-601 (West 2003); Del. Code Ann. tit. 24, Sec. Sec. 1780-1789B
(2003); Fla. Stat. Ann. ch. 390.01115 (Harrison 2004); Ga. Code Ann.
Sec. Sec. 15-11-110 to -118 (Harrison 2003); Idaho Code Sec. 18-609A
(2003); 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 70/1-99 (West 2004); Ind. Code Ann.
Sec. Sec. 16-18-2-267, 16-34-2-4 (West 2004); Iowa Code Ann.
Sec. Sec. 135L.1-.8 (West 2003); Kan. Stat. Ann. Sec. 65-6705 (2003);
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. Sec. 311.732 (Michie 2003); La. Rev. Stat. Ann.
Sec. 40:1299.35.5 (West 2004); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, Sec. 1597-A
(West 2003); Md. Code Ann., Health-Gen. I Sec. 20-103 (2004); Mass.
Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 112, Sec. 12S (West 2004); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.
Sec. Sec. 722.901-.908 (West 2004); Minn. Stat. Ann. Sec. 144.343 (West
2004); Miss. Code Ann. Sec. Sec. 41-41-51 to -63 (2003); Mo. Ann. Stat.
Sec. Sec. 188.015, 188.028 (West 2004); Mont. Code Ann. Sec. Sec. 50-
20-201 to -215 (2003); Neb. Rev. Stat. Sec. Sec. 71-6901 to - 6909
(2003); Nev. Rev. Stat. Sec. Sec. 442.255-.257 (2003); N.H. Rev. Stat.
Ann. Sec. Sec. 132:24-28 (2003); N.J. Stat. Ann. Sec. Sec. 9:17A-1 to -
1.12 (West 2004); N.M. Stat. Ann. Sec. Sec. 30-5-1 to -3 (Michie 2003);
N.C. Gen. Stat. Sec. Sec. 90-21.6 to .10 (2003); N.D. Cent. Code
Sec. Sec. 14-02.1-03.1 (2003); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. Sec. Sec. 2919.12,
2919.121-.122 (West 2004); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. Sec. 3206 (West
2004); R.I. Gen. Laws Sec. 23-4.7-6 (2003); S.C. Code Ann.
Sec. Sec. 44-41-30 to -37 (Law. Co-op. 2003); S.D. Codified Laws
Sec. 34-23A-7 (Michie 2004); Tenn. Code Ann. Sec. 37-10-301 to -304
(2004); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. Sec. Sec. 33.001-.004 (Vernon 2004); Utah
Code Ann. Sec. 76-7-304 (2003); Va. Code Ann. Sec. 16.1-241 (Michie
2004); W. Va. Code Sec. Sec. 16-2F-1 to -8 (2004); Wis. Stat. Ann.
Sec. 48.375 (West 2003); Wyo. Stat. Ann. Sec. 35-6-118 (Michie 2003).
\64\ See Planned Parenthood v. Heed, 390 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2004)
(unconstitutional for lack of health exception); Planned Parenthood of
Idaho, Inc. v. Wasden, 376 F.3d 908 (9th Cir. 2004) (concluding that
the Idaho statute's definition of a medical emergency is
unconstitutionally narrow and that, without an adequate medical
exception, the parental consent statute is invalid); Glick v. McKay,
937 F.2d 434 (9th Cir. 1991) (judicial bypass procedure rendered
statute unconstitutional); Zbaraz v. Ryan, No. 84 CV771, 1996 WL
33293423 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 8, 1996) (the Illinois Supreme Ct. refused to
issue rules implementing the Illinois statute); Planned Parenthood of
Alaska, Inc. v. State, No. 3AN-97-6014 CI (Alaska Super. Ct. Oct. 13,
2003) (decision on remand from State v. Planned Parenthood of Alaska,
35 P.3d 30 (Alaska 2001)) (parental consent law with judicial waiver
violates state constitution); American Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren,
940 P.2d 797, 800 (Cal. 1997) (parental consent statute violated state
constitutional right to privacy); N. Fla. Women's Health and Counseling
Services, Inc. v. State, 866 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 2003) (state supreme
court held that law violated state right to privacy; however, the state
constitution was amended in November 2004 to allow parental
notification); Wicklund v. State, No. ADV-97-671 (Mont. Dist. Ct. Feb.
11, 1999) available at http://www.mtbizlaw.com/1stjd99/WICKLUND--2--
11.htm (parental notification law violated state constitution); Planned
Parenthood of Central New Jersey v. Farmer, 762 A.2d 620 (N.J. 2000)
(parental notification law with judicial waiver violates state
constitution); N.M. A.G. Op. No. 90-19 (Oct. 3 1990) (State attorney
general holds law unenforceable due to lack of judicial bypass
procedure). In addition, Ohio's parental notification law is in effect
because a subsequently enacted parental consent statute was enjoined.
See Cincinnati Women's Services v. Voinovich, No. C-1-98-289 (S.D. Ohio
Apr. 29, 1998) (preliminary injunction preventing enforcement of the
law).
\65\ See Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. Sec. Sec. 12-37.5-101 to -108 (West
2004) (if a minor is living with a relative and not a parent, she may
notify that relative instead of her parent); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann.
Sec. 19a-601 (West 2003) (stating that the abortion provider need only
discuss the possibility of parental involvement); Del. Code Ann. tit.
24, Sec. Sec. 1780-1789B (2003) (allowing notice to a grandparent or a
licensed mental health professional not associated with an abortion
provider); Iowa Code Ann. Sec. Sec. 135L.1-.8 (West 2003) (allowing
notice to a grandparent); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, Sec. 1597-A
(West 2003) (allowing notice to an adult family member and allowing a
minor to give informed consent after counseling by the abortion
provider); Md. Code Ann., Health-Gen. I Sec. 20-103 (2004) (providing
that notice does not have to be given if the minor does not live with a
parent or guardian or if a physician determines that parental notice is
not in the minor's best interest); N.C. Gen. Stat. Sec. Sec. 90-21.6 to
.10 (2003) (allowing notice to a grandparent with whom the minor has
been living for at least 6 months); Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
Sec. Sec. 2919.12, 2919.121-.122 (West 2004) (allowing notice to a
brother, sister, step-parent, or grandparent if certain qualifications
are met); S.C. Code Ann. Sec. Sec. 44-41-30 to -37 (Law. Co-op. 2003)
(allowing notice to a grandparent or any person who has been standing
in loco parentis to the minor for a period not less than sixty days);
W. Va. Code Sec. Sec. 16-2F-1 to -8 (2004) (stating that a physician
not affiliated with an abortion provider may waive the notice
requirement); Wis. Stat. Ann. Sec. 48.375 (West 2003) (allowing notice
to any adult family member). The Illinois parental involvement law
allows notice to be given to an adult family member; however, it is not
in effect.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Parental involvement laws have been in force for decades,
and there is no case where it has been established that these
laws led to parental abuse or to self-inflicted injury.\66\
Similarly, there is no evidence that these laws have led to an
increase in illegal abortions.\67\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\66\ A 1989 memo prepared by the Minnesota Attorney General
regarding Minnesota's experience with its parental involvement law
states that ``after some 5 years of the statute's operation, the
evidence does not disclose a single instance of abuse or forceful
obstruction of abortion for any Minnesota minor.'' Testimony before the
Texas House of Representatives on Massachusetts' experience with its
parental consent law revealed a similar absence of unintended, but
harmful, consequences. Ms. Jamie Sabino, chair of the Massachusetts
Judicial Consent for Minors Lawyer Referral Panel, could identify no
case of a Massachusetts' minor being abused or abandoned as a result of
the law. See Hearing on Tex. H.B. 1073 Before the House State Affairs
Comm., 76th Leg., R.S. 21 (Apr. 19, 1999) (statement by Jamie Sabino).
\67\ See Hearing on Tex. H.B. 1073 Before the House State Affairs
Comm., 76th Leg., R.S. 21 (Apr. 19, 1999) (statement by Jamie Sabino,
testifying that there had been no increase in the number of illegal
abortions in Massachusetts since the enactment of the statute in 1981).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite these critical benefits of better-informed
selection of abortion providers, improved medical histories,
appropriate post-operative care, and the affirmation of
parental rights, opponents of CIANA argue that mandatory
parental involvement results in girls' delaying their decisions
to obtain abortions, thus increasing the risks attendant to the
procedure.\68\ There is no evidence, however, that parental
involvement laws result in medically significant delays in
obtaining abortions. A study of Minnesota's parental
notification law found that, ``Regardless [of the reason], the
claim that the law caused more minors to obtain late abortions
is unsubstantiated. In fact, the reverse is true. For ages 15-
17, the number of late abortions per 1,000 women decreased
following the enactment of the law. Therefore, an increased
medical hazard due to a rising number of late abortions was not
realized.'' \69\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\68\ Parental Notification of Abortion: Hearings on H. 218 Before
the House Comm. on Judiciary, 2001-2002 Legis. (Vt. 2001) (Lori Burris,
representative of Vermont Academy of Pediatrics).
\69\ Rogers, James L., Boruch, Robert F., Stoms, George B. &
DeMoya, Dorothy, ``Impact of the Minnesota Parental Notification Law on
Abortion and Birth,'' 81 Amer. J. Pub. Health 294, 297 (Mar. 1991). Cf.
Ellertson, Charlotte, ``Mandatory Parental Involvement in Minors'
Abortions: Effects of the Laws in Minnesota, Missouri, and Indiana,''
87 Am. J. Pub. Health 1367, 1372 (August 1997) (``Evidence concerning
delay is mixed.''). See also id. at 1374 (``During periods of the laws'
enforcement in Minnesota and Indiana, the two states with gestational
age at abortion, in-state abortions for minors were probably delayed
into the second month of pregnancy, although probably not into the
second trimester.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

OTHER PARENTAL NOTICE STATUTES

CIANA will strengthen the effectiveness of state laws
designed to protect children from the health and safety risks
associated with abortion.\70\ Across the country, officials
must obtain parental consent before performing even routine
medical services such as providing aspirin and before including
children in certain activities such as field trips and contact
sports.\71\ Regarding body piercing, states require written
parental consent,\72\ a parent to be present when a minor is
pierced,\73\ and written permission or a parent's physical
presence.\74\ As of April, 2004, 35 states have laws
prohibiting adolescents from getting tattoos without parental
consent, 27 states have laws against body piercing without
parental consent, and 26 states have laws that prohibit both
without parental consent.\75\ Also, in Maryland, for example,
as The Washington Post reports, eleven school systems require a
parent's note before sunscreen can be applied to a minor
student.\76\ Notwithstanding the extensive body of State law
requiring parental consent before minor children can engage in
a range of less consequential activity, people other than
parents can secretly take children across state lines without
the consent of their parents for abortions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\70\ In 2001, 853,485 legal induced abortions were reported to CDC.
See Lilo T. Strauss, M.A., Joy Herndon, M.S., Jeani Chang, M.P.H.,
Wilda Y. Parker Sonya, V. Bowens, M.S., Suzanne B. Zane, D.V.M.,
Cynthia J. Berg, M.D., ``Abortion Surveillance--United States, 2001,''
Centers for Disease Control, Division of Reproductive Health, National
Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion (November
26, 2004).
\71\ See, e.g., William D. Valente, 2 Education Law: Public and
Private Sec. 19.23 at 212 (acknowledging ``[t]he common school practice
of obtaining written parental consents or waivers . . . for designated
[school field trip] activities''); Cal. Educ Code Ann Sec. 49302
(requiring parental consent before pupils can be transported).
\72\ See, e.g., Ala. Code Sec. 22-17A2; Alaska Stat.
Sec. 08.13.217; Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, Sec. 1114; 720 Ill. Comp. Stat.
Ann. 5/12-10.1; Kan. Stat. Ann. Sec. 65-1953; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit.
32, Sec. 4323; Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. Sec. 333.13102; Mo. Ann. Stat.
Sec. 324.520; N.C. Gen. Stat. Sec. 14-400; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21,
Sec. 842.1; Tenn. Code Ann. Sec. 62-38-302; Tex. Health & Safety Code
Ann. Sec. 146.012.
\73\ See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. Sec. 13-3721; La. Rev. Stat.
Ann. Sec. 14:93.2; R.I. Gen. Laws Sec. 23-1-39; Utah Code Ann. Sec. 76-
10-2201; Va. Code Ann. Sec. 18.2-371.3.
\74\ See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code Sec. 652; Fla. Stat. Ann.
Sec. 381.0075(7); Ind. Code Ann. Sec. 35-42-2-7; S.C. Code Ann.
Sec. 44-32-120.
\75\ Ala. Code 22-17A-2 (prohibits anyone from performing a tattoo,
brand or body piercing on a minor unless prior written informed consent
is obtained from the minor's parent or legal guardian); Ariz. Rev.
Stat. Ann. Sec. 13-3721 (establishes that it is unlawful to either
tattoo or body pierce anyone under age 18 without the physical presence
of the parent or legal guardian; violators are guilty of a Class 6
felony; allows anyone to avoid prosecution if he or she requested the
ID and relied on the accuracy of the information contained in the ID);
Ark. Stat. Ann. Sec. 5-27-228 (prohibits anyone from tattooing, body
piercing or branding a minor without the written consent of one of the
minor's parents, a guardian or a custodian; violators are guilty of a
misdemeanor and, upon conviction, will be fined between $20 and $200);
Cal. Penal Code Sec. 652 (establishes that it is unlawful to tattoo or
offer to tattoo anyone under age 18; violators are guilty of a
misdemeanor; prohibits anyone from performing or offering to perform
body piercing upon anyone under age 18 unless the piercing is performed
in the presence of a parent or guardian or as directed by and notarized
by the minor's parent or guardian; does not apply to emancipated minors
and does not include pierces of the ear); Col. Rev. Stat. Ann. Sec. 25-
4-2103 (prohibits anyone from performing a body art procedure on a
minor unless the artist has received express consent from the minor's
parent or guardian; failure to obtain permission before performing the
procedures on a minor shall constitute a petty offense punishable by a
fine of $250); Conn. Gen. Stat. Sec. 19a-92g (establishes that it is
illegal to tattoo an unemancipated minor under age 18 without the
written consent of the minor's parent or guardian; requires written
consent of the minor's parent in order to perform body piercing on an
unemancipated minor under age 18); Del. Code Ann. Title 11, Ch 5
Sec. 1114(a) (it is illegal for a person to either knowingly or
negligently tattoo or body pierce a minor without the prior written
consent of the parent or legal guardian who must be over age 18); Fla.
Stat. Sec. 381.0075 (requires written, notarized consent of a minor's
parent or legal guardian in order to tattoo a minor; prohibits body
piercing of a minor without the written, notarized consent of the
parent or legal guardian or if he or she is accompanied by a parent or
legal guardian); Ga. Code Sec. 16-5-71.1 (prohibits the tattooing of
anyone under age 18 by anyone other than a licensed osteopath or
technician acting under the direct supervision of a licensed physician
or osteopath; violators are guilty of a misdemeanor; prohibits anyone
from body piercing anyone under age 18 without prior written consent of
the custodial parent or guardian; violators are guilty of a
misdemeanor); Idaho Chapter No. 127 2004 (effective July 1, 2004)
(prohibits the tattooing, branding or body piercing of minors under the
age of 14; prohibits the tattooing, branding or body piercing on anyone
between the ages of 14 and 18 without the written informed consent of
the minor's parent or legal guardian; written informed consent must be
executed in the presence of the person performing the act or an
employee or agent of that person; violators are guilty of a misdemeanor
and will be fined up to $500 and subsequent violations within 1 year
will be fined between $500 and $1,000; piercing of the ear lobes and
piercing for medical purposes are exempted from this legislation) Ill.
Compiled Stat. 5/12-10.1 (it is a Class C misdemeanor for anyone, other
than a person licensed to practice medicine in all branches, to tattoo
or offer to tattoo a person under age 21; establishes that anyone who
pierces the body of a minor under age 18 without written consent of the
parent or legal guardian commits a Class C misdemeanor; does not apply
to emancipated or married minors; Ind. Code Ann. Sec. 35-42-2-7
(requires a minor's parent or legal guardian to be present on order to
either tattoo or perform body piercing on a minor under age 18;
requires the parent or guardian to also provide written permission for
the minor to receive the tattoo or body piercing); Iowa Code
Sec. 135.37 (prohibits anyone from tattooing an unmarried minor under
age 18; upon conviction, violators are guilty of a serious
misdemeanor); Ky. Rev. Stat. Sec. 211.760 (prohibits anyone from
tattooing or body piercing minors without the written, notarized
consent of a parent or guardian); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. Sec. 14:93.2 (it
is unlawful for anyone to tattoo or body pierce a minor under age 18
without the consent of the minor's accompanying parent or legal
custodian; upon conviction, violators shall be fined between $100 and
$500 or imprisoned between 30 and 100 days, or both); Me. Rev. Stat.
Ann. Title 32, Ch. 64 Sec. 4323 (establishes that it is illegal to
tattoo anyone under age 18; requires prior written consent of a minor's
parent or legal guardian to perform body piercing on anyone under age
18); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. Sec. 333.13102 (prohibits anyone from either
tattooing or performing body piercing on a minor without prior written,
informed consent of the minor's parent or legal guardian; requires the
parent or legal guardian to execute the consent in the presence of
either the person performing the body piercing or tattooing on the
minor or in the presence of an employee or agent of the individual;
does not include emancipated minors); Minn. Stat. Sec. 609.2246 (it is
unlawful for anyone under age 18 to receive a tattoo without written
parental consent); Miss. Laws Sec. 73-61-3 (prohibits anyone from
tattooing or body piercing a minor under age 18; violators are guilty
of a misdemeanor and will be fined a maximum of $500); Mo. Rev. Stat.
Sec. 324.520 (prohibits anyone from knowingly tattooing or body
piercing a minor without prior written, informed consent of the minor's
parent or legal guardian; requires the parent or legal guardian to
execute the written consent in the presence of either the person
performing the tattooing or body piercing or an employee or agent of
that person; violators are guilty of a misdemeanor and will be fined a
maximum of $500; subsequent violations within 1 year of the initial
violation will be subject to a fine of between $500 and $1,000); Mont.
Code Ann. Sec. 45-5-623 (prohibits anyone from knowingly tattooing a
child under the age of majority without the explicit in-person consent
of the child's parent or guardian; upon conviction, violators will be
either fined a maximum of $500, imprisoned for up to 6 months, or both;
those convicted of a second offense will either be fined a maximum of
$1,000, imprisoned for up to 6 months, or both); N.C. Gen. Stat.
Sec. 14-400 (prohibits anyone from tattooing a minor under age 18;
violators are guilty of a Class 2 misdemeanor; prohibits anyone from
piercing any part of a minor under age 18 other than the ears without
the prior consent of the custodial parent; violators are guilty of a
Class 2 misdemeanor); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. Sec. 3730.06 (it is illegal
to tattoo, body pierce or pierce the ears of anyone under age 18
without the consent of the minor's parent, guardian or custodian;
requires the consenting individual to appear in person at the business
at the time the procedure is performed and sign a document that
provides informed consent); Okla. Stat. Title 21 Sec. Sec. 841 and
842.1 (prohibits anyone other than a licensed practitioner of the
healing arts in the course of their practice from tattooing or offering
to tattoo anyone; it is unlawful for anyone to perform, or offer to
perform, body piercing on a child under age 18 unless the parent or
legal guardian gives written consent for and is present during the
procedure; penalties for violations include imprisonment for up to 90
days and a fine of up to $500, or both); Pa. Cons. Stat. Title 18
Sec. 6311 (it is unlawful to provide tattoo services to anyone under
age 18 without the consent of the parent or guardian; violators are
guilty of a misdemeanor of the third degree and, upon conviction, will
be sentenced to either pay a maximum fine of $100 or be imprisoned a
maximum of 3 years, or both); R.I. General Laws Sec. Sec. 11-9-15; 23-
1-39 (prohibits tattooing or body piercing a minor who is unaccompanied
by his or her consenting parent or guardian; violators are guilty of a
misdemeanor and, upon conviction, will either be imprisoned a maximum
of 1 year or fined a maximum of $300); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. Sec. 26-
10-19 (requires anyone who is tattooing a minor under age 18 to obtain
a signed consent form from the minor's parents authorizing a tattoo;
violators are guilty of a Class 2 misdemeanor); Tenn. Code Ann.
Sec. Sec. 62-38-207; 62-38-305 and 306 (establishes that a minor age 16
or older may be tattooed with the written consent of the parent or
legal guardian to cover up an existing tattoo and requires the parent
or legal guardian to be present during the procedure; it is a Class C
misdemeanor for anyone to tattoo a person under age 18; allows a minor
age 18 or younger to undergo body piercing with the written consent of
the parent, legal guardian or legal custodian and requires them to be
present during the procedure; they must sign a document that explains
the procedure and methods for proper care, present proof of age and
attest in writing that they are the minor's parent, legal guardian or
legal custodian; violators will be charged with a Class C misdemeanor
and will be imprisoned for up to 30 days or pay a fine of up to $50);
Texas Health and Safety Code Ann. Sec. Sec. 146.012; 146.0125
(prohibits anyone from performing a tattoo on anyone under age 18
without the consent of a parent or guardian who believes it is in the
best interest of the minor to cover an obscene of offensive tattoo;
required consent may be the physical presence of the individual's
parent or guardian or the provision of evidence that he or she is the
parent or guardian of the person who is getting the tattoo; prohibits
anyone from performing body piercing on an individual under age 18
without the consent of the individual's parent, managing conservator or
guardian; consent must specify the part of the body to be pierced.
Required consent is the physical presence of the individual's parent or
guardian and the provision of evidence stating their parental or
guardian status); Utah Code Ann. Sec. 76-10-2201 (prohibits anyone from
performing or offering to perform a tattoo or body piercing upon a
minor without receiving the consent of the minor's parent or legal
guardian; establishes that a person is not guilty of a violation if he
or she (a) had no actual knowledge of the minor's age and (b) reviewed,
recorded and maintained a personal identification number for the minor
prior to performing the body piercing or tattoo; violators are guilty
of a Class C misdemeanor and the owner or operator of the establishment
where the act takes place is subject to a civil penalty of $750 for
each violation); Vt. Stat. Ann. Title 26 Sec. 4102 (prohibits anyone
from tattooing a minor without the written consent of his or her parent
or guardian); Va. Code Sec. 18.2-371.3 (prohibits anyone from tattooing
or performing body piercing on a person under age 18, knowing or having
reason to believe that the person is under 18 except (a) in the
presence of the person's parent or guardian or (b) when done by or
under the supervision of a medical doctor, registered nurse, or other
medical services personnel in the performance of their duties;
violators are guilty of a Class 2 misdemeanor. A second or subsequent
violation shall be punished as a Class 1 misdemeanor; excludes ear
piercing as a form of body piercing); Wash. Rev. Code Sec. 26.28.085
(applying a tattoo to a minor under age 18 is illegal and violators are
guilty of a misdemeanor; prohibits anyone from stating that he or she
did not know the minor's age as a defense to prosecution, unless he or
she establishes that by a preponderance of evidence he or she made a
reasonable attempt to determine the true age of the minor by requiring
a driver's license or other picture ID card and did nor rely solely on
oral allegations); W. Va. Code Sec. 16-38-3 (requires prior written
consent from a parent or guardian for the tattooing of a minor); Wis.
Stat. Sec. 948.70 (prohibits anyone other than a physician in the
course of his or her professional practice from tattooing or offering
to tattoo a child; violators are subject to a Class D forfeiture); Wyo.
Stat. Sec. 14-3-107 Chapter 47 2004 (Effective July 1, 2004) (prohibits
anyone from tattooing a person under the age of majority, except with
the consent of the person's parent or legal guardian who is present at
the time the procedure is performed; violators are guilty of a
misdemeanor and punishable by imprisonment for a maximum of 6 months, a
fine of a maximum of $750, or both; prohibits performing body art on
anyone who had not reached the age of majority without the consent of
the parent or legal guardian and who is present at the time of the
procedure; violators are guilty of a misdemeanor and punishable by
imprisonment for a maximum of 6 months, a fine of a maximum of $750, or
both; body art is defined as the practice of body piercing, branding
scarification, sculpting or tattooing).
\76\ See Daniel de Vise, ``Bill Would Legislate Maryland Students'
Use of Sunscreen,'' The Washington Post (March 29, 2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

STATE JUDICIAL BYPASS PROCEDURES

In Bellotti v. Baird,\77\ a plurality of the United States
Supreme Court set forth the basic test by which judicial bypass
proceedings pursuant to a parental consent statute, if judicial
bypass provisions are enacted at all, must be reviewed. Bypass
procedures must allow the minor to show that she possesses
maturity and information to make the abortion decision, in
consultation with her physician, without regard to her parents'
wishes; allow the minor to show that, even if she cannot make
the decision by herself, the ``desired abortion would be in her
best interests'' \78\; be confidential; and be conducted ``with
expedition to allow the minor an effective opportunity to
obtain the abortion.'' \79\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\77\ 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (Bellotti II).
\78\ Id. at 644.
\79\ Id. Factors that may be considered in determining
``immaturity'' include work and personal experience, appreciation of
the gravity of the procedure, and judgment. See Hodgson v. Minnesota,
497 U.S. 417 (1990). Under the ``best interests'' analysis, judges
often consider medical risks to the minor as a result of the time,
place, or type of procedure to be performed, medical risks particular
to the girl, evidence of physical, sexual, or emotional abuse by
parents or guardians, and abortion alternatives such as marriage,
adoption, and single motherhood.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Critics of CIANA claim that the measure endangers the
health of young girls who are forced to travel out of state to
obtain abortions because the judges in their home states either
refuse to hear judicial bypass petitions or deny them
arbitrarily. In support of this argument, the critics cite
cases like that of Ms. Billie Lominick, who testified before
the Constitution Subcommittee regarding her experience with
South Carolina's judicial bypass procedures. According to Ms.
Lominick, who assisted her grandson's girlfriend in obtaining
an out-of-State abortion, only two judges in the state of South
Carolina would hear a judicial bypass petition, and one of
those judges, according to Ms. Lominick, would hear petitions
only from girls residing in his county.\80\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\80\ See Child Custody Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 1218 Before
the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
106th Cong. (May 27, 1999) (statement of Billie Lominick).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Such examples ignore the fact that CIANA provides
assistance only in the enforcement of constitutional state
parental notice and consent laws. If there are only two judges
in an entire state willing to hear judicial bypass proceedings,
that state's parental involvement laws are likely
unconstitutional under Supreme Court precedent, which requires
the state to provide a minor the opportunity to seek a judicial
bypass with ``sufficient expedition to provide an effective
opportunity for an abortion to be obtained.'' \81\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\81\ Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 644 (1979) (plurality
opinion).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This fact is illustrated by the First Circuit's decision in
Planned Parenthood League v. Bellotti (``Bellotti II'').\82\ In
that case, the court held that the plaintiffs could
successfully challenge the state's judicial bypass procedures
if they could present ``proof of `a systemic failure to provide
a judicial bypass option in the most expeditious, practical
manner.' '' \83\ The court of appeals remanded the case to the
lower court so that the plaintiffs could present evidence that,
among other things, judges were `` `defacto unavailable' to
hear minors' abortion petitions,'' \84\ and many judges were
avoided ``for reasons of hostility.'' \85\ The Sixth Circuit
has also recognized that a constitutional challenge may be
brought for a state's systemic failure to provide an
expeditious judicial bypass.\86\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\82\ 868 F.2d 459 (1st Cir. 1989).
\83\ Id. at 469 (quoting Hodgson v. Minnesota, 648 F. Supp. 756,
777 (D. Minn. 1986)).
\84\ Id. at 463.
\85\ Id. at 461 n.6.
\86\ See Cleveland Surgi-Center, Inc. v. Jones, 2 F.3d 686, 690
(6th Cir. 1993).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Not only must states provide access to judges who are
willing to hear judicial bypass petitions, states must also
ensure that the judges who do hear bypass petitions render
their decisions in an expedited fashion. For example, in
Planned Parenthood v. Lawall,\87\ the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit struck down an Arizona parental consent statute
on the grounds that its judicial bypass provision lacked
specific time limits and was therefore in violation of the
Bellotti II expediency requirement. The court reached this
conclusion even though the Arizona statute stated that such
proceedings were to be given priority and required that ``the
court shall reach the decision [on a bypass request] promptly
and without delay to serve the best interests of a pregnant
minor.'' \88\ The court's rationale in adopting a strict
interpretation of the Supreme Court's timeliness requirement
was that ``[o]pen-ended bypass provisions engender substantial
possibilities of delay for minors seeking abortions.'' \89\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\87\ Planned Parenthood v. Lawall, 180 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 1999).
\88\ Id. at 1027.
\89\ Id. at 1030.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Fifth Circuit employed essentially identical reasoning
in striking down a Louisiana judicial bypass procedure having
indefinite time limits.\90\ The court found that ``not only do
[the bypass procedures] fail to provide any specific time
within which a minor's application will be decided, but they
give no assurances (assurances required by Bellotti II) that
the proceedings will conclude expeditiously.'' \91\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\90\ See Causeway Medical Suite v. Ieyoub, 109 F.3d 1096 (5th Cir.
1997).
\91\ Id. at 1110-11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As these cases illustrate, judicial bypass procedures must
be readily accessible and efficient in order to pass
constitutional muster. CIANA will assist in the enforcement of
only those State parental involvement laws that meet the
relevant constitutional criteria.
In any case, the minority's own witness at a hearing on
H.R. 1755, the ``Child Custody Protection Act,'' which
contained the same provision in CIANA regarding judicial bypass
laws, admitted that ``I am personally not aware of cases where
[a judicial bypass procedure] hasn't worked.'' \92\
Furthermore, testimony received by the Constitution
Subcommittee indicates that, where judicial bypass procedures
are in place, they are not needed in the overwhelming number of
cases because a parent's involvement is obtained. In 2002, 852
girls received abortions in Alabama with a parent's approval
and 12 with a judge's approval, according to state health
department records. Idaho similarly reported less than 5
percent of minors using judicial bypass to avoid that state's
parental consent law (64 minors with parental consent, 3 with
judicial bypass) in 2002. South Dakota reported 14 of 76 minors
obtained judicial bypasses, rather than parental consent. In
Texas where 3,654 minors obtained abortions, the Texas
Department of Health paid for assistance in 284 judicial bypass
proceedings. In Wisconsin, less than 10 percent of the minors
obtaining abortions did so with the use of an order obtained
through judicial bypass (727 with parental involvement, 63 with
judicial bypass).\93\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\92\ Child Custody Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 1755 Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th
Cong., 41 (2004) (testimony of Rev. Lois M. Powell).
\93\ Id. at 37 (statement of Teresa Collett).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
And far from being too complicated or too intrusive, the
judicial bypass procedure has been described as ``remarkably
simple'' by the Nebraska Supreme Court in Orr v. Knowles.\94\
In fact, the average judicial bypass hearing lasts only 12
minutes, and ``more than 92 percent of the hearings [were] less
than or equal to 20 minutes.'' \95\ The young girl is not
subjected to an adversarial process. She is not ``on trial.'' A
young girl must merely present evidence only about her maturity
level, not intimate details of her personal life, to the court.
Then the judge will make his decision.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\94\ See Orr v. Knowles, 337 N.W.2d 699, 706 (Neb. 1983) (``This
statute does not provide that the state or anyone else will contest the
minor's claim that she is mature enough to make the abortion decision
herself. Rather, she will present evidence, and the judge will then
make the decision as to her maturity. Since there is no adversarial
aspect to these proceedings, we find that no petitioning minor,
indigent or otherwise, is entitled to free court-appointed counsel as a
matter of right in proceedings under Sec. 28-347(2).''). Accord Joseph
W. Moylan, ``No Law Can Give Me the Right to Do What Is Wrong,'' in
Life and Learning V: Proceedings of the Fifth University Faculty for
Life Conference at 234, 235 (1995) (explaining Judge Moylan's decision
to resign from a bench in the juvenile court he had occupied for more
than twenty years) (``When the bill, taken from a Minnesota law, did
get passed, it stated that at the hearing the pregnant minor is
entitled to have an attorney appointed for her and even a guardian ad
litem. There is nobody on the other side, unless a judge takes it on
himself. Now I know of no other case that is like that, where it is
truly one-sided. If after that one-sided hearing, the judge finds that
the girl is mature and can give an informed consent, then the judge is
required to authorize the abortion physician to perform the
abortion.'').
\95\ Id. at 648.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Indeed, judicial bypass procedures are overwhelmingly
granted by the courts. Judicial bypasses provide a safe and
effective means of insuring the well-being of young girls
seeking to abort their pregnancies. A survey of Massachusetts
cases found that every minor who sought judicial authorization
to bypass parental consent received it.\96\ Another
Massachusetts study found that only 1 of 477 girls was refused
judicial authorization.\97\ A Minnesota study cited that a
Federal trial court determined that of the 3,573 bypass
petitions filed, six were withdrawn, nine were denied, and
3,558 were granted.\98\ A survey of the Virginia statute
requiring parental notification found that out of 18 requests
for judicial bypass, ``all but one of the requests were granted
eventually.'' \99\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\96\ Robert H. Mnookin, ``Bellotti v. Baird, A Hard Case'' in In
the Interest of Children: Advocacy, Law Reform, and Public Policy 149,
239 (Robert H. Mnookin ed., 1985).
\97\ Susanne Yates & Anita J. Pliner, ``Judging Maturity in the
Courts: the Massachusetts Consent Statute,'' 78 Am. J. Pub. Health 646,
647 (1988).
\98\ Hodgson v. Minnesota, 648 F.Supp. 756, 765 (D. Minn. 1986).
\99\ See Ellen Nakashima, ``Fewer Teens Receiving Abortions in
Virginia: Notification Law to Get Court Test,'' The Washington Post
(March 3, 1998) at A1 (``In Virginia, since the law took effect, 18
teenagers have gone to a judge, who determines whether the girl is
mature enough to make her own decision about abortion. All but one of
the requests were granted eventually.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

CIANA IS BASED ON THE PROPOSITION THAT PARENTS SHOULD BE GIVEN A CHANCE
TO PLAY A ROLE IN THE LIVES OF THEIR MINOR CHILDREN

Children's feelings should not trump parental authority.
Parents are not simply placeholders in a child's life. They are
the foundational pillars of civilization. The family unit has
provided the comfort, stability, and safety necessary to
sustain civilization, and it has done so for millennia. Parents
must be given a chance to work with their own children through
difficult situations. There is no guarantee that parents will
be successful in that endeavor, and unfortunately there will,
no doubt, be a few parents who will be indifferent when they
are made aware of their daughter's pregnancy. But that is
surely the rare case, and even in that rare case nothing in
this legislation will bar an abortion. What this legislation
affirms is the proposition that parents deserve a chance.
Opponents of CIANA must rest their objections on the notion
that most parents do not deserve that simple chance. But
parents do deserve that chance, and CIANA would give that
chance to parents who have not abused or neglected their child.
Even famously liberal Justice Stevens wrote in his concurring
opinion in H.L. v. Matheson that ``[t]he possibility that some
parents will not react with compassion and understanding upon
being informed of their daughter's predicament or that, even if
they are receptive, they will incorrectly advise her, does not
undercut the legitimacy of the State's attempt to establish a
procedure that will enhance the probability that a pregnant
young woman exercise as wisely as possible her right to make
the abortion decision.'' \100\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\100\ 450 U.S. 398, 424 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nothing in this bill requires a minor who was abused by her
parents to notify an abusive parent before having an abortion.
And all state judicial bypass provisions that are protected by
this bill are both the product of state law and required to
conform to the Supreme Court's own standards for judicial
bypass provisions. Furthermore, all the various additional
exceptions opponents have proposed be added to CIANA are simply
legislative excuses to deny parents that chance. Those who
oppose giving parents a chance claim life is hopelessly
confusing and therefore Congress should not act to protect
parental rights. But a sister or a brother, or a minister, or
some other third party, is not a parent. Sisters and brothers,
and ministers, can of course provide their own counseling if a
minor girl seeks it. But parents are special, and parents
deserve unique protections when it comes to their ability to
protect the health and safety of their children. That much is
clear.
Anyone who is truly interested in the best interests of a
pregnant girl--be they a minister, a sibling, a friend, or
anyone else--will encourage her to inform her parents and give
them the chance of helping her address her situation
appropriately. It is beyond dispute that it is not in a
pregnant girl's best interests to allow anyone to assist her in
circumventing state laws providing for parental involvement or
to allow anyone to give a pregnant girl who has crossed state
lines a secret abortion that could have serious medical
consequences without notifying a parent.
Unfortunately, during consideration of this legislation,
some opponents of this legislation have equated parents with
slave owners.\101\ Parental rights are not those of a slave
owner. They are the rights of caring people who deserve a
chance to work with their children through difficult times and
should be provided a chance to express their love to their
children in their children's moments of greatest need. Some
opponents of this bill think parents do not deserve to be
involved in assisting their children as they confront difficult
times because they believe parents are no better than slave
owners. CIANA rejects that view of America's parents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\101\ See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 107-397 (2002) at 56 (``It seems to
me what this bill is, is really akin to the Fugitive Slave Act of the
1850's where you're enabling one State in the South, which had slavery,
to reach over into another State . . . and say, `We want our slave
back.' '') (remarks of Mr. Nadler D-NY).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

THE FUNDAMENTAL NATURE OF PARENTAL RIGHTS

The United States Supreme Court has described parents'
right to control the care of their children as ``perhaps the
oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this
Court.'' \102\ In addressing the right of parents to direct the
medical care of their children, the Supreme Court has stated:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\102\ Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (overturning
Washington visitation statute which unduly interfered with parental
rights).

Our jurisprudence historically has reflected Western
civilization concepts of the family as a unit with
broad parental authority over minor children. Our cases
have consistently followed that course; our
constitutional system long ago rejected any notion that
a child is ``the mere creature of the State'' and, on
the contrary, asserted that parents generally ``have
the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and
prepare [their children] for additional obligations.''
Surely, this includes a ``high duty'' to recognize
symptoms of illness and to seek and follow medical
advice. The law's concept of the family rests on a
presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in
maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment
required for making life's difficult decisions.\103\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\103\ Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (emphasis added)
(citations omitted) (rejecting claim that minors had right to
adversarial proceeding prior to commitment by parents for treatment
related to mental health).

The parents of a minor child have a fundamental right to
direct the upbringing and education of that child. The Supreme
Court first recognized the right to ``establish a home and
bring up children'' as a ``privilege[] long recognized at
common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by
free men'' in the 1923 case of Meyer v. Nebraska in which it
struck down as unconstitutional a Nebraska law forbidding all
schools within its boundaries from teaching pupils in any
language other than English.\104\ Two years later, striking
down an Oregon statute requiring all children, under compulsory
education laws, to attend public schools, the Court affirmed
this principle stating, ``The child is not the mere creature of
the state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have
the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare
him for additional obligations.'' \105\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\104\ 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
\105\ Pierce v. Society of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Coupled with this right, however, is the duty of parents to
provide for the care and safety of their children, including
their physical and medical well-being. A parent's duty to
provide medical care to his or her child is a duty arising from
the relationship of parent and child. Indeed, the Court has
described the ``care and nurture'' of a child as being a
``primary function'' of parents.\106\ Ignoring or violating a
parent's legal right to direct the upbringing of their
children, including the right to direct the medical care
received by those children, can result in liability.\107\ In
Meyer, the Court stated, ``Corresponding to the right of
control, it is the natural duty of the parent to give his
children education suitable to their station in life [.]''
\108\ Certainly this duty to educate includes instructing one's
children on how to best make decisions concerning their health.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\106\ See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
\107\ Unauthorized medical examinations of minors have resulted in
liability. See van Emrik v. Chemung County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 911
F.2d 863, 867 (2d Cir. 1990) (parental consent required for x-ray);
Tenebaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 597-99 (2d Cir. 1999)(parental
consent required for gynecological exam).
\108\ Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Holding that the State of Georgia's commitment procedures
for minor children did not violate the due process rights of
minors, the Court recognized ``the traditional presumption that
the parents act in the best interests of their child'' and
warned against discarding ``wholesale those pages of human
experience that teach that parents generally do act in the
child's best interests.'' \109\ The Court added, ``Surely, this
includes a `high duty' to recognize symptoms of illness and to
seek and follow medical advice.'' \110\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\109\ Parham, 442 U.S. at 602-04. See also Hodgson v. Minnesota,
497 U.S. 417 (1990) (a parent is ``presumed to act in the minor's best
interest and thereby assures that the minor's decision to terminate her
pregnancy is knowing, intelligent, and deliberate'').
\110\ Parharm, 442 U.S. at 602.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that parents
have a legal right to be involved in their minor daughter's
decision to seek medical care, which includes the abortion
procedure. Therefore, the Court has consistently affirmed a
state's right to restrict the circumstances under which a minor
may obtain an abortion in ways in which adult women seeking
abortions may not be restricted. Holding that a state may not
grant to a third party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary,
veto over a minor's decision to have an abortion in Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, the Court added ``the State has
somewhat broader authority to regulate the activities of
children than of adults.'' \111\ Indeed, ``the status of minors
under the law is unique in many respects'' and the ``unique
role in our society of the family, the institution by which `we
inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values,
moral and cultural,' requires that constitutional principles be
applied with sensitivity and flexibility to the special needs
of parents and children.'' \112\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\111\ 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
\112\ Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 633-34 (1979) (Bellotti II).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT SUPPORTS GIVING PARENTS A CHANCE TO PLAY A ROLE
IN THEIR CHILDREN'S ABORTION DECISIONS

Supreme Court precedents support CIANA. The Supreme Court
has observed that ``[t]he medical, emotional, and psychological
consequences of an abortion are serious and can be lasting,''
\113\ and that ``[i]t seems unlikely that [the minor] will
obtain adequate counsel and support from the attending
physician at an abortion clinic, where abortions for pregnant
minors frequently take place.'' \114\ Parental involvement in
such a decision will lead to improved medical care for minors
seeking abortions and provide increased protection for young
girls against sexual exploitation by adult men.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\113\ H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 411 (1981).
\114\ Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 91 (1976).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On an issue as contentious and divisive as abortion, it is
both remarkable and instructive that there is such firm and
long-standing support for laws requiring parental involvement.
Various reasons underlie this broad and consistent support. As
the Supreme Court, including Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Souter, observed in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,\115\ parental
consent and notification laws related to abortions ``are based
on the quite reasonable assumption that minors will benefit
from consultation with their parents and that children will
often not realize that their parents have their best interests
at heart.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\115\ 505 U.S. 833, 895 (1992).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth,\116\
noted liberal Justice Stewart wrote, ``There can be little
doubt that the State furthers a constitutionally permissible
end by encouraging an unmarried pregnant minor to seek the help
and advice of her parents in making the very important decision
whether or not to bear a child.'' \117\ Three years later, in
Bellotti v. Baird,\118\ a plurality of the Court acknowledged
that parental consultation is critical for minors considering
abortion because minors often lack the experience, perspective,
and judgment to avoid choices that could be detrimental to
them. The Bellotti plurality also observed that parental
consultation is particularly desirable regarding the abortion
decision since, for some, the situation raises profound moral
and religious concerns.\119\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\116\ 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
\117\ Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 91 (1976)
(Stewart, J., concurring).
\118\ 443 U.S. 622, 640 (1979) (Bellotti II ) (plurality opinion).
\119\ Id. at 635.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Significantly, the Supreme Court has already concluded that
notice statutes do not give parents any ``veto power'' \120\
over the minor's abortion decision. As the Court reiterated in
Akron II, ``notice statutes are not equivalent to consent
statutes because they do not give anyone a veto power over a
minor's abortion decision.'' \121\ A one-parent notification
law such as one containing CIANA's abuse and life-endangerment
exception does not require a judicial bypass. As the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals recognized in Planned Parenthood of
the Blue Ridge v. Camblos, ``In contrast to its assessment of
parental consent statutes, the [Supreme] Court has consistently
recognized that the same potential for absolute veto over the
abortion decision that inheres in a parental consent statute
does not inhere in a parental notice statute, and therefore
that notice statutes are fundamentally different from--and less
burdensome than--consent statutes.'' \122\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\120\ See H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 411 (1981) (``The Utah
Statute gives neither parents nor judges a veto power over the minor's
abortion decision.'').
\121\ Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502,
511 (1992).
\122\ Planned Parenthood of the Blue Ridge v. Camblos, 155 F.3d
352, 363 (4th Cir. 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Parental involvement in a pregnant minor girl's abortion
decision is supported by the common-sense realization that
minors often lack the maturity to fully comprehend the
significance and consequences of their actions. In 1976, when
it first addressed Massachusetts' parental consent statute, the
Supreme Court recognized that with minors, ``there are
unquestionably greater risks of inability to give an informed
consent.'' \123\ During its second review of Massachusetts'
parental consent law, the Court stated, ``Viewed together, our
cases show that although children generally are protected by
the same constitutional guarantees against governmental
deprivations as are adults, the State is entitled to adjust its
legal system to account for children's vulnerability and their
needs for concern, . . . sympathy, and . . . paternal
attention.'' \124\ The Court continued to describe its previous
rulings to allow states to ``limit the freedom of children to
choose for themselves in the making of important, affirmative
choices with potentially serious consequences'' as being
``grounded in the recognition that, during the formative years
of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience,
perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that
could be detrimental to them.'' \125\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\123\ Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 147 (1976) (Bellotti I).
\124\ Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 635 (quotations and citations
omitted).
\125\ Id. at 635.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Supreme Court has pointed to the ``guiding role of
parents in the upbringing of their children'' as the basis for
its rulings preserving for parents a unique legal authority
over the conduct of their children.\126\ The Court has reasoned
that ``parents naturally take an interest in the welfare of
their children[.]'' \127\ This, in the Court's view, creates
``an important state interest in encouraging a family rather
than a judicial resolution of a minor's abortion decision.''
\128\ In H.L. v. Matheson,\129\ the Court upheld a Utah statute
requiring a physician to notify, if possible, parents of a
minor upon whom an abortion is to be performed and stated:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\126\ See id. at 637.
\127\ Id. at 648.
\128\ Id.
\129\ 450 U.S. 398 (1981).

There can be little doubt that the State furthers a
constitutionally permissible end by encouraging an
unmarried pregnant minor to seek the help and advice of
her parents in making the very important decision
whether or not to bear a child. That is a grave
decision, and a girl of tender years, under emotional
stress, may be ill-equipped to make it without mature
advice and emotional support. It seems unlikely that
she will obtain adequate counsel and support from the
attending physician at an abortion clinic, where
abortions for pregnant minors frequently take
place.\130\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\130\ Id. at 409-10.

In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Court upheld the
parental consent provisions of Pennsylvania's Abortion Control
Act of 1982, stating that they ``provide the parent or parents
of a pregnant young woman the opportunity to consult with her
in private, and to discuss the consequences of her decision in
the context of the values and moral or religious principles of
their family.'' \131\ It continued, ``The State commonly
protects its youth from adverse governmental action and from
their own immaturity by requiring parental consent to or
involvement in important decisions by minors.'' \132\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\131\ 505 U.S. 833, 899-900 (1992).
\132\ Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 637.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is instructive that the Court has always held that this
important duty to ensure and provide for the care and nurture
of minor children lies only with parents--a conclusion that
arises from the traditional legal recognition ``that natural
bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of
their children.'' \133\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\133\ Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979)(emphasis added). See
also Prince v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)
(``It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the
child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom
include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor
hinder.''); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (``The history
and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of
parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This
primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now
established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Significantly for CIANA, the Court recently struck down a
Washington State visitation law under which grandparents were
granted visitation to their grandchildren over the objection of
the children's mother precisely because it failed to provide
special protection for the fundamental right of parents to
control with whom their children associate.\134\ The Court
concluded that the lower court ``gave no special weight at
all'' to a mother's conclusion that excessive grandparent
visitation was not in her minor children's best interests, and
continued, ``so long as a parent adequately cares for his or
her children (i.e., is fit), there will normally be no reason
for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the
family to further question the ability of that parent to make
the best decisions concerning the rearing of that parent's
children.'' \135\ This failure, the Court stated, ``directly
contravened the traditional presumption that a fit parent will
act in the best interest of his or her child.'' \136\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\134\ Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
\135\ Id. at 68-69.
\136\ Id. at 69.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

CIANA PROTECTS THE HEALTH OF MINOR GIRLS

Young girls face serious risks to their health and well-
being when they are secretly taken for abortions without their
parents' knowledge. When an abortion is performed on a girl
without the physician having full knowledge of her medical
history--which is usually available only from a parent--the
risks greatly increase. Moreover, minor girls who do not
involve their parents usually do not return for follow-up
treatment, which can lead to dangerous complications. In many
cases, only a girl's parents know of her prior psychological
and medical history, including allergies to medication and
anesthesia. Also, parents are usually the only people who can
provide authorization for post-abortion medical procedures or
the release of pertinent data from family physicians. None of
these precautions can be taken when a pregnant girl is taken to
have an abortion without her parents' knowledge. Consequently,
when parents are not involved, the risks to the minor girl's
health significantly increase. CIANA is designed to safeguard
minor girls' physical and emotional health by helping to ensure
parental involvement in their interstate abortion decisions.
The medical care that minors seeking abortions receive is
improved when their parents are involved in three ways.
First, parental involvement allows parents to assist their
daughter in the selection of a competent abortion provider.
With all medical procedures, one of the most reliable means of
guaranteeing patient safety is the professional competence of
the physician performing the procedure. In Bellotti v. Baird,
the United States Supreme Court acknowledged that parents
possess a much greater ability to evaluate and select competent
healthcare providers than their minor children often do:

In this case . . . we are concerned only with minors
who, according to the record, range in age from
children of 12 years to 17-year-old teenagers. Even the
latter are less likely than adults to know or be able
to recognize ethical, qualified physicians, or to have
the means to engage such professionals. Many minors who
bypass their parents probably will resort to an
abortion clinic, without being able to distinguish the
competent and ethical from those that are incompetent
or unethical.\137\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\137\ Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 641 n.21 (1979) (Bellotti
II).

The Supreme Court's concern for that ability of minors to
distinguish competent and ethical abortion providers is
particularly justified in states where non-physicians are
allowed, by statute, to perform abortions. The National
Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action League recommends that
patients seeking an abortion confirm that the abortion will be
performed by a licensed physician in good standing with the
state Board of Medical Examiners, and that he or she have
admitting privileges at a local hospital not more than 20
minutes away from the location where the abortion is to
occur.\138\ A well-informed parent seeking to guide her child
is more likely to inquire into the qualifications of the person
performing the abortion, and the availability of a physician
with local admitting privileges, than an emotionally vulnerable
young girl faced with pregnancy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\138\ See National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action League,
Minors' Issues: Reproductive Choice Issues, at http://www.naral.org/
issues/issues--minors.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, parental involvement will ensure that parents have
the opportunity to provide additional medical history and
information to abortion providers prior to performance of the
abortion. As the Supreme Court has stated:

The medical, emotional, and psychological
consequences of an abortion are serious and can be
lasting . . . An adequate medical and psychological
case history is important to the physician. Parents can
provide medical and psychological data, refer the
physician to other sources of medical history, such as
family physicians, and authorize family physicians to
give relevant data.\139\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\139\ H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 411 (1981). Accord Ohio v.
Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502, 518-19 (1990).

Take, for example, the story of Sandra, a fourteen-year-old
girl who committed suicide shortly after obtaining an
abortion.\140\ Sandra's mother, who learned of her daughter's
abortion only after her suicide, sued the abortion provider at
which Sandra's abortion was performed, asserting that her
daughter's death was due to the failure of the abortion
provider to obtain a psychiatric history or monitor Sandra's
mental health.\141\ The court concluded that Sandra was not
insane at the time she committed suicide and, therefore, her
actions broke the chain of causation required for
recovery.\142\ Yet evidence was presented that Sandra had a
history of psychological illness and that her behavior was
noticeably different after the abortion.\143\ If Sandra's
mother had been aware of her daughter's abortion, she would
have had the opportunity to notify the abortion provider of
Sandra's psychological history, and steps could have been taken
to minimize the psychological effect of the abortion on
Sandra's already fragile mental state.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\140\ See Edison v. Reproductive Health Services, 863 S.W.2d 621
(Mo. App. E.D. 1993).
\141\ See id. at 624.
\142\ See id. at 628.
\143\ Edison v. Reproductive Health Services, 863 S.W.2d 621 (Mo.
App. E.D. 1993).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A more complete and thus more accurate medical history of
the patient will enable abortion providers to disclose not only
medical risks that ordinarily accompany abortions but also
those risks that may be specific to a pregnant minor. Parental
involvement provides adults with the opportunity to advise and
assist the girl in giving her informed consent to the
procedure.
Third, parental involvement will improve medical treatment
of pregnant minors by ensuring that parents have adequate
knowledge to recognize and respond to any post-abortion
complications that may develop.\144\ The rate of many of the
complications associated with abortion are unknown. As a
clinician's guide states, ``The abortion reporting systems of
some counties and states in the United States include entries
about complications, but these systems are generally considered
to underreport infections and other problems that appear some
time after the procedure was performed.'' \145\ Furthermore,
women typically have no pre-existing relationship with an
abortion provider,\146\ which likely accounts for the fact that
only about one-third return to the provider for their post-
operative exam.\147\ Teenagers are even less likely to return
for follow-up appointments.\148\ This failure to return for
post-operative exams precludes discovery of post-abortion
complications by abortion providers and subsequent reporting of
these complications. Other healthcare providers may be
reluctant to report any complications for fear of compromising
the secrecy that often surrounds abortions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\144\ See Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502,
519 (1990).
\145\ Stanley K. Henshaw, ``Unintended Pregnancy and Abortion: A
Public Health Perspective,'' in A Clinician's Guide to Medical and
Surgical Abortions 20 (Maureen Paul et al., eds. 1999).
\146\ See Florida Dep't of Health v. North Florida Women's Health
and Counseling Service, 852 So.2d 254, 264 n.3 (Fla. App. 1 Dist.,
2001):

[E]vidence at trial showed, the physician-patient
relationship is often attenuated in the abortion context,
almost to the point of non-existence. Cf. Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 91, 96 S.Ct. 2831, 49
L.Ed.2d 788 (1976) (``It seems unlikely that [the minor]
will obtain adequate counsel and support from the attending
physician at an abortion clinic, where abortions for
pregnant minors frequently take place. ''). Abortion
patients ordinarily see their physicians only once or
twice, very briefly. Most of their interaction is with the
clinic's staff. Physicians performing abortions often
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
perform several in the space of a single hour. Id.

\147\ Stanley K. Henshaw, ``Unintended Pregnancy and Abortion: A
Public Health Perspective,'' in A Clinician's Guide to Medical and
Surgical Abortions 20 (Maureen Paul et al., eds. 1999). Cf. Richard S.
Moon, Why I Don't Do Abortions Anymore, Medical Economics 61 (Mar. 4,
1985).
\148\ Parental Notification of Abortion: Hearings on H. 218 Before
the House Comm. on Health and Welfare, 2001-2002 Legis. (Vt. 2001)
(Nancy Mosher, President and CEO of Planned Parenthood of Northern New
England on April 16, 2001) (estimating that two-thirds of Vermont women
keep their follow up appointments, although ``teenagers are notorious
for `no-showing' '').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At least one American court has held that a perforated
uterus is a ``normal risk'' associated with abortion.\149\
Untreated, a perforated uterus may result in an infection,
complicated by fever, endometritis, and parametritis. According
to one study, ``[t]he risk of death from post-abortion sepsis
[infection] is highest for young women, those who are
unmarried, and those who undergo procedures that do not
directly evacuate the contents of the uterus . . . A delay in
treatment allows the infection to progress to bacteremia,
pelvic abscess, septic pelvic thrombophlebitis, disseminated
intravascular coagulophy, septic shock, renal failure, and
death.'' \150\ Evidence about these dangers presented at trial
persuaded a Florida appellate court to uphold that State's
parental notification law:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\149\ Reynier v. Delta Women's Clinic, 359 So.2d 733, 738 (La. Ct.
App. 1978) (``All the medical testimony was to the effect that a
perforated uterus was a normal risk, but the statistics given by the
experts indicated that it was an infrequent occurrence and it was rare
for a major blood vessel to be damaged.''). Frequent injuries from
incomplete abortions are discussed in Swate v. Schiffers, 975 S.W.2d 70
(Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998) (abortionist's unsuccessful claim of libel
against journalist for reports based in part upon one disciplinary
order that doctor had failed to complete abortions performed on several
patients and had failed to repair lacerations which occurred during
abortion procedures). Cf. Sherman v. District of Columbia Bd. of
Medicine, 557 A.2d 943, 944 (D.C. 1989) (``Dr. Sherman placed his
patients' lives at risk by using unsterile instruments in surgical
procedures and by intentionally doing incomplete abortions (using
septic instruments) to increase his fees by making later surgical
procedures necessary. His practices made very serious infections (and
perhaps death) virtually certain to occur. Dr. Sherman does not
challenge our findings that his misconduct was willful nor that he
risked serious infections in his patients for money.'').
\150\ Phillip G. Stubblefield and David A. Grimes, ``Current
Concepts: Septic Abortions,'' New Eng. J. Med. 310 (August 4, 1994).

The State proved that appropriate aftercare is
critical in avoiding or responding to post-abortion
complications. Abortion is ordinarily an invasive
surgical procedure attended by many of the risks
accompanying surgical procedures generally. If post-
abortion nausea, tenderness, swelling, bleeding, or
cramping persists or suddenly worsens, a minor (like an
adult) may need medical attention. A guardian unaware
that her ward or a parent unaware that his minor
daughter has undergone an abortion will be at a serious
disadvantage in caring for her if complications
develop. An adult who has been kept in the dark cannot,
moreover, assist the minor in following the abortion
provider's instructions for post-surgical care. Failure
to follow such instructions can increase the risk of
complications. As the plaintiffs' medical experts
conceded, the risks are significant in the best of
circumstances. While abortion is less risky than some
surgical procedures, abortion complications can result
in serious injury, infertility, and even death.\151\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\151\ Florida Dep't of Health v. North Florida Women's Health and
Counseling Service, 852 So.2d 254, 262-63 (Fla. App. 1 Dist. 2001),
quashed by North Florida Women's Health and Counseling Services, Inc.
v. State, 866 So.2d 612 (Fla. 2003) (striking down state law under
state constitution's ``right to privacy''). The Florida Constitution
was subsequently amended to state ``Notwithstanding a minor's right to
privacy . . . the Legislature is authorized to require by general law
for notification to a parent or guardian of a minor before the
termination of the minor's pregnancy.'' Fla. Stat. Ann. Const. Art. 10
Sec. 22.

Young adolescent girls are particularly at risk of certain
adverse medical consequences from an abortion. For instance,
there is a greater risk of cervical injury associated with
suction-curettage abortions (at 12 weeks' gestation or earlier)
performed on girls 17 years-old or younger.\152\ Cervical
injury is of serious concern because it may predispose the
young girl to adverse outcomes in future pregnancies. Girls 17
years-old or younger also face a two and a half times greater
risk of acquiring endometriosis following an abortion than do
women 20-29 years-old.\153\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\152\ See Willard Cates, Jr., M.D., M.P.H., Kenneth F. Schulz,
M.B.A. & David A. Grimes, M.D., The Risks Associated With Teenage
Abortion, New Eng. J. of Med., Sept. 15, 1983, at 621-24.
\153\ See Burkman et al., Morbidity Risk Among Young Adolescents
Undergoing Elective Abortion, Contraception, vol. 30 (1984), at 99-105.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The particular risks faced by minors upon whom abortions
are performed were articulated by Dr. Bruce A. Lucero. Dr.
Lucero, who supported the Child Custody Protection Act (federal
legislation similar to CIANA) in 1998, wrote in The New York
Times about his own experience with minor girls seeking
abortions. ``In almost all cases,'' Dr. Lucero wrote, ``the
only reason that a teen-age girl doesn't want to tell her
parents about her pregnancy is that she feels ashamed and
doesn't want to let her parents down.'' \154\ However,
according to Dr. Lucero, ``parents are usually the ones who can
best help their teen-ager consider her options. And whatever
the girl's decision, parents can provide the necessary
emotional support and financial assistance.'' \155\ Moreover,
Dr. Lucero explained that ``patients who receive abortions at
out-of-State clinics frequently do not return for follow-up
care, which can lead to dangerous complications. And a teen-
ager who has an abortion across state lines without her
parents' knowledge is even more unlikely to tell them that she
is having complications.'' \156\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\154\ Bruce A. Lucero, M.D., ``Parental Guidance Needed,'' The New
York Times (July 12, 1998), section 4, at 1.
\155\ Id.
\156\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Opponents also argue that the bill needs a broader ``health
exception.'' It does not. CIANA specifically provides that its
notification requirements would not apply if ``the abortion is
necessary to save the life of the minor because her life was
endangered by a physical disorder, physical injury, or physical
illness, including a life-endangering physical condition caused
by or arising from the pregnancy itself.'' If the concern is
about health risks of a non life-threatening nature, then the
best course of action, of course, is involving the parents.
Finally, the Supreme Court has upheld as constitutional a state
parental notification statute that did not contain a health
exception. That state statute provided only for a ``judicial
bypass'' exception, which would of course take some time for a
minor to utilize, and an exception for cases in which emergency
treatment prior to notice ``is necessary to prevent the woman's
death.'' \157\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\157\ Hodsgon v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 426 n.7 (1990) (citing
Minnesota statute Sec. 144.343, subd. 4(a)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Without the knowledge that their daughters have had
abortions, parents are incapable of ensuring that their
children obtain routine post-operative care or of providing an
adequate medical history to physicians called upon to treat any
complications that may arise. The first omission may allow
complications such as infection, perforation, or depression, to
continue untreated. The second omission may be lethal. When
parents do not know that their daughter had an abortion,
ignorance prevents swift and appropriate intervention by
emergency room professionals responding to a life-threatening
condition.
In short, the physical and psychological risks of abortions
to minors are great, and laws requiring parental involvement in
such abortions reduce that risk. The widespread practice of
evading such laws by transporting minors across State lines
through interstate commerce may be prevented only through
Federal legislation.

CIANA PROTECTS MINOR GIRLS FROM SEXUAL ASSAULT

In addition to improving the medical care received by young
girls dealing with an unplanned pregnancy, parental involvement
will provide increased protection against sexual exploitation
of minors by adult men. National studies reveal that ``[a]lmost
two thirds of adolescent mothers have partners older than 20
years of age.'' \158\ In a study of over 46,000 pregnancies by
school-age girls in California, researchers found that ``71
percent, or over 33,000, were fathered by adult post-high-
school men whose mean age was 22.6 years, an average of 5 years
older than the mothers . . . Even among junior high school
mothers aged 15 or younger, most births are fathered by adult
men 6-7 years their senior. Men aged 25 or older father more
births among California school-age girls than do boys under age
18.'' \159\ Other studies have found that most teenage
pregnancies are the result of predatory practices by men who
are substantially older.\160\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\158\ American Academy of Pediatrics Committee on Adolescence,
``Adolescent Pregnancy--Current Trends and Issues: 1998,'' 103
Pediatrics 516, 519 (1999).
\159\ Mike A. Males, ``Adult Involvement in Teenage Childbearing
and STD,'' 346 Lancet 64 (July 8, 1995) (emphasis added).
\160\ See id. (citing HP Boyer and D. Fine, ``Sexual Abuse as a
Factor in Adolescent Pregnancy and Child Maltreatment,'' 24 Fam. Plan.
Perspectives 4 (1992)); See also HP Gershenson, et al. ``The Prevalence
of Coercive Experience Among Teenage Mothers,'' 24 J. Interpersonal
Violence 4 (1989); American Academy of Pediatrics Committee on
Adolescence, ``Adolescent Pregnancy--Current Trends and Issues: 1998,''
103 Pediatrics 516, 516 (1999) (``Younger teenagers are especially
vulnerable to coercive and nonconsensual sex. Involuntary sexual
activity has been reported in 74 percent of sexually active girls
younger than 14 years and 60 percent of those younger than 15
years.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A 1989 study of coercive sexual experiences among teenage
mothers found that of the pregnant teens who had unwanted
sexual experiences, only 18 percent of the perpetrators were
within the victim's age group. Another 18 percent were three to
5 years older than the victim. Seventeen percent were six to 10
years older, and 40 percent were more than 10 years older than
their victims.\161\ Another study reports that when a minor's
parents have not been told about her pregnancy, 58 percent of
the time it is the girl's boyfriend who accompanies her for an
abortion, and the minor's boyfriend helped pay for the abortion
76 percent of the time.\162\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\161\ See Gershenson, et al. ``The Prevalence of Coercive
Experience Among Teenage Mothers,'' 24 J. Interpersonal Violence 4
(1989).
\162\ See Stanley Henshaw & Kathryn Post, Parental Involvement in
Minors' Abortion Decisions, Family Planning Perspectives, Sept./Oct.
1992, at 206.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As Professor Teresa Stanton Collett testified before the
House Constitution Subcommittee:

[A]s this Congress learned through a congressional
report from the Center for Disease Control, two-thirds
of the fathers of teenage mothers are age 20 years or
older, suggesting that there is in fact differences in
power and status between the sexual partners.\163\ In
addition to that, a survey of 1,500 unmarried minors
having abortions revealed that among the minors who
reported that neither parent knew of the abortion, 89
percent said that a boyfriend was involved in deciding
or arranging the abortion, and 93 percent of those 15
and under said that the boyfriend was involved.\164\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\163\ See Department of Health and Human Services, ``Report to
Congress on Out-of-Wedlock Childbearing'' (September 1995) at x
(``Evidence also indicates that among unmarried teenage mothers, two-
thirds of the fathers are age 20 or older, suggesting that differences
in power and status exist between many sexual partners.'').
\164\ Child Custody Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 1755 Before
the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
108th Cong., 22 (July 20, 2004) (statement of Teresa Collett).

Experience suggests that sexual predators recognize the
advantage of their victims' obtaining an abortion.\165\ Not
only does an abortion eliminate a critical piece of evidence of
the criminal conduct,\166\ but it also allows the abuse to
continue undetected.\167\ As a recent presentation given at a
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Conference on the
Sexual Exploitation of Teens showed, of minor girls' first
sexual experiences, 13percent constitute statutory rape.\168\
Further, the younger a sexually experienced teen is, the more
likely they are to experience statutory rape. Of sexually
experienced teens age 13 or younger, 65 percent experienced
statutory rape. Of those age 14, 53 percent experienced
statutory rape. And of those age 15, 41 percent experienced
statutory rape.\169\ And young girls who are younger at their
first sexual experience are more likely to say their first
sexual experience was non-voluntary.\170\ Also, blacks and
Hispanics are more likely to experience statutory rape.\171\
Parental involvement laws help ensure that parents have the
opportunity to protect their daughters from those who would
victimize them further. Secret abortions protect and perpetuate
the illegal conduct of these adult male predators.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\165\ On June 14, 2000, a 36-year-old Omaha man who impersonated
the father of his teen-age victim in order to assist her in obtaining
an abortion was sentenced to 1\1/2\-2 years in prison for felony child
abuse. See Angie Brunkow, ``Man Who Said He Was Girl's Dad Sentenced,''
Omaha World-Herald (June 14, 2000) at 20. A similar attempt to hide the
consequences of statutory rape is reflected in the testimony of Joyce
Farley before the United States House of Representatives, Committee on
the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Constitution. See, e.g., Child
Custody Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 3682 Before the Subcomm. on
the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Congress,
May 21, 1998 (statement of Joyce Farley).
\166\ See Commonwealth v. Sasville, 616 N.E.2d 476 (Mass. 1993)
(destruction of aborted fetus precluded prosecution for forcible rape
of a child under the age of sixteen). Compare Smith v. Commonwealth,
432 S.E.2d 2 (Va. App. 1993) (prosecution for rape of 14-year-old
girl), with Hampton v. State, 1987 WL. 28223 (Ark. App. 1987)
(prosecution for incest), and State v. Khong, 502 N.E.2d 682 (Ohio App.
1985) (prosecutor subject to contempt order for failure to comply with
discovery orders).
\167\ Dee Dee Alonzo testified before the Texas Senate Human
Services Committee in support of Senate Bill 30, the bill enacting the
Texas Parental Notification Act. At age sixteen, she was seduced by her
high school teacher. When she became pregnant, he persuaded her to have
a secret abortion. She went to the clinic alone, obtained the abortion
her abuser had paid for, and returned to continue the abusive
relationship for another year. Ms. Alonzo testified ``No matter what
their reaction would have been, they were my parents and they were
adults, and they did love me, it would not have been a secret and the
man would have been exposed.'' Testimony of Dee Dee Alonzo, Hearing on
Tex. S.B. 30 Before the Senate Human Servs. Comm., 76th Leg., R.S. 4-5
(Mar. 10, 1999) (tapes available from the Senate Staff Servs. Office
and content is from private transcripts of those tapes). A similar
incident involved another high school student impregnated by her
teacher. This is revealed in the settlement related to injuries she
suffered during the abortion of her pregnancy. See Clement v. Riston,
No.B-131,033, settlement reported in Jury Verdict Research, Research,
LRP Pub. No. 65904 available on Lexis-Nexis; cf. Patterson v. Planned
Parenthood, 971 S.W.2d 439, 447 (Tex. 1998) (Gonzales, J., concurring)
(describing the sexual abuse of a young girl that resulted in two
pregnancies and two secret abortions).
\168\ Kristin Moore, Ph.D. and Jennifer Manlove, Ph.D., ``A
Demographic Portrait of Statutory Rape,'' Presentation given at the
United States Department of Health and Human Services' Conference on
the Sexual Exploitation of Teens (March 23-24, 2005) (defining
statutory rape as occurring when teens aged 15 or younger have sex with
a partner 3 or more years older).
\169\ Id.
\170\ Id. (of those younger than 14, 18 percent; of those age 15-
16, 10 percent; and of those age 17-19, 5 percent).
\171\ Id. (Hispanic, 17 percent, black, 16percent, white, 11
percent).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

CONGRESS HAS CLEAR CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY TO ENACT CIANA

CIANA is a regulation of commerce among the several
states.\172\ Commerce, as that term is used in the
Constitution, includes travel whether or not that travel is for
reasons of business.\173\ To transport another person across
state lines is to engage in commerce among the states.\174\
Under current Supreme Court precedents, Congress can enact
legislation concerning interstate commerce, such as CIANA, for
reasons related primarily to local activity rather than
commerce itself.\175\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\172\ See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379
U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding enactment of Title II of the Civil Rights
Act under Congress' commerce clause power).
\173\ See, e.g., Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917).
\174\ There is therefore no need to address the scope of Congress'
power to regulate activity that is not, but that affects, commerce
among the States. See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942);
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549 (1995).
\175\ See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The interstate transportation of minors for the purpose of
securing an abortion is clearly a form of interstate commerce
which the Constitution expressly empowers Congress to
regulate.\176\ CIANA regulates only conduct which involves
interstate movement, activity which the national government
alone is expressly authorized by the Constitution to address.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\176\ U.S. Const., art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Federal Government has long exercised its interstate
commerce authority to prohibit interstate activity harmful to
minors and their families. In 1910, Congress used its Commerce
Clause power to enact the Mann Act,\177\ which, before its
amendment in 1986, prohibited the interstate transportation of
women or minors for purposes of ``prostitution or debauchery,
or for any other immoral purpose.'' The Supreme Court upheld
the enactment of this law as a constitutional exercise of
Congress' power over transportation among the several states.
The Court reasoned that if men and women employ interstate
transportation to facilitate a wrong, then their right to
interstate travel can be restricted.\178\ That statute was
upheld as applied to the transportation of a person to Nevada
for purposes of engaging in prostitution, even though
prostitution was legal in Nevada.\179\ The Mann Act flatly
prohibited the interstate transportation of women for
``prostitution'' or for ``any other immoral purpose.'' In
upholding the law as a valid exercise of Congress' commerce
power, the Court stated:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\177\ 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2421 (1970). As amended, the statute prohibits
the knowing transportation of any individual across state lines ``with
intent that such individual engage in prostitution, or in any sexual
activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense,
or attempts to do so . . .'' 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2421 (1999).
\178\ See Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 323 (1913) (noting,
in upholding the constitutionality of the Mann Act, ``that Congress has
power over transportation `among the several states;' that the power is
complete in itself, and that Congress, as an incident to it, may adopt
not only means necessary but convenient to its exercise, and the means
may have the quality of police regulations.'').
\179\ See United States v. Pelton, 578 F.2d 701 (8th Cir. 1978).

The transportation of passengers in interstate
commerce, it has long been settled, is within the
regulatory power of Congress, under the commerce clause
of the Constitution, and the authority of Congress to
keep the channels of interstate commerce free from
immoral and injurious uses has been frequently
sustained, and is no longer open to question.\180\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\180\ Caminetti, 242 U.S. at 491.

Just as it was appropriate for Congress to use its
constitutional authority to keep the channels of interstate
commerce free from ``immoral'' conduct, so it is also
appropriate for Congress to exercise that authority to keep the
channels of interstate commerce free from those who transport
minors across state lines in order to circumvent state parental
involvement laws, or from physicians who might not otherwise
notify a minor's parents.
The Mann Act is not the only example of a Federal law that
prohibits interstate activities that might be legal in the
state to which the activity is directed. Indeed, as long ago as
1876, Congress ``made it a crime to deposit in the mails any
letters or circulars concerning lotteries, whether illegal or
chartered by state legislatures.'' \181\ A statute to this
effect is still in force.\182\ Congress later prohibited the
transportation of lottery tickets in interstate commerce,
whether or not lotteries are legal in the state to which the
tickets are transported.\183\ That provision was upheld by the
Supreme Court in Champion v. Ames \184\ and is still in effect.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\181\ United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. 418, 421
(1993).
\182\ See 18 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1302 (prohibiting the mailing of lottery
tickets or letters, circulars, and other materials regarding a
lottery).
\183\ See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1301.
\184\ 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CIANA does not supercede, override, or alter existing state
laws regarding minors' abortions. Rather, CIANA is predicated
on Congress' authority to regulate interstate activity. The
bill does nothing to regulate purely local activity, and it
does not impose any new rules regarding conduct that occurs
solely within one state. CIANA embodies rules to regulate
interstate activities that involve two or more states, as is
entirely appropriate under the Commerce Clause. In short, CIANA
does not encroach on state powers.

CIANA IS CONSISTENT WITH SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT

In Roe v. Wade,\185\ a majority of the Supreme Court found
that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, which
provides that no state shall deprive any person of ``life,
liberty, or property'' without due process of law, includes
within it a ``substantive'' component that bars a state from
prohibiting abortions under some circumstances. This
substantive component of the Due Process Clause, also described
in that case as including a ``right to privacy,'' was construed
to forbid virtually all state prohibitions on abortion during
the first trimester of pregnancy.\186\ In Planned Parenthood v.
Casey,\187\ the scope of permissible state regulation of
abortion and the standards to be applied in evaluating the
constitutionality of the regulation were significantly changed.
Instead of declaring that the right to seek an abortion was a
``fundamental right'' requiring a ``compelling state interest''
in order to be regulated, the new holding was that state
regulation of abortion was permissible so long as such
regulation did not place an ``undue burden'' on a woman's
exercise of her constitutional rights with regard to
abortion.\188\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\185\ 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
\186\ See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 985 (1992)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
\187\ 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
\188\ For the articulation of the ``undue burden'' standard in
Casey, see id. at 874-80. While the ``undue burden'' standard as
expressed in Casey appeared only to be the views of the three-person
plurality, Justice Scalia predicted that ``undue burden'' would
henceforward be the relevant standard, see id. at 984-95 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). It now appears that the lower Federal courts understand
that the ``undue burden'' standard is the correct one to be applied in
abortion cases involving babies that are not viable. See, e.g., Manning
v. Hunt, 119 F.3d 254, 260 (4th Cir. 1997) (``The trend does appear to
be a move away from the strict scrutiny standard toward the so-called
`undue burden' standard of review.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CIANA does not place an undue burden upon a woman's right
to an abortion. To the extent that a state rule is inconsistent
with the Court's doctrine, that rule is ineffective and CIANA
would not make it effective. Regarding the bill's provisions
that govern interstate abortions conducted in States without
parental involvement laws, a requirement that a parent simply
be notified is not an undue burden.
Following the Court's decision in Roe v. Wade,\189\ many
states enacted parental notice or consent statutes requiring
minors to notify or seek the consent of their parents before
undergoing an abortion. Parental consent laws generally require
one or both parents to give actual consent to the minor's
decision to have an abortion. Parental notification laws
typically require the physician, or in some statutes another
health care provider, to notify one or both of the parents of
the minor female at some time prior to the abortion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\189\ 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Court first considered parental involvement in a minor
daughter's abortion in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri
v. Danforth.\190\ The Missouri statute gave a minor girl's
parent an absolute veto over her decision to have an abortion.
The majority, led by Justice Blackmun, concluded that such a
veto power was unconstitutional.\191\ The majority noted,
however, that the Court ``long has recognized that the State
has somewhat broader authority to regulate the activities of
children than of adults'' and ``emphasized'' that its holding
in the case ``does not suggest that every minor, regardless of
age . . . may give effective consent for termination of her
pregnancy.'' \192\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\190\ 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
\191\ Id. at 74.
\192\ Id. at 74, 75.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Court next addressed state parental involvement laws in
Bellotti v. Baird,\193\ remanding a parental consent statute
that was unclear as to whether the parents had authority to
veto the abortion and as to the availability of a judicial
bypass procedure.\194\ The statute returned to the Supreme
Court in Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti II).\195\ The statute in
Bellotti II required a minor to obtain the consent of her
parents or circumvent this requirement through a judicial
bypass proceeding that did not take into account whether the
minor was sufficiently mature to make an informed decision
regarding the abortion. The Supreme Court invalidated the
statute without a majority opinion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\193\ 428 U.S. 132 (1976).
\194\ In doing so the Court recognized minors bear ``unquestionably
greater risks of inability to give an informed consent.'' Id. at 147.
\195\ 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Justice Powell stated in his plurality opinion,
``constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized
that the parents' claim to authority in their own household to
direct the rearing of their children is basic in the structure
of our society'' and that ``[p]roperly understood, then, the
tradition of parental authority is not inconsistent with our
tradition of individual liberty; rather, the former is one of
the basic presuppositions of the latter.'' \196\ This has
become the de facto constitutional standard for parental
consent and notification laws. In upholding parental
involvement laws, the plurality found three reasons why the
constitutional rights of minors were not identical to the
constitutional rights of adults: ``[t]he peculiar vulnerability
of children; their inability to make critical decisions in an
informed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental
role in child rearing.'' \197\ Thus, the plurality sought to
design guidelines for a judicial bypass proceeding that allowed
states to address these interests in a parental consent
statute.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\196\ Id. at 638.
\197\ Id. at 634.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In H.L. v. Matheson,\198\ a minor girl challenged the
constitutional validity of a state statute that required a
physician to give notice to the parents of a minor girl
whenever possible before performing an abortion on her. By a
vote of six to three, the statute was held constitutional. The
Court held that a state could require notification of the
parents of a minor girl because the notification ``furthers a
constitutionally permissible end by encouraging an unmarried
pregnant minor to seek the help and advice of her parents in
making the very important decision whether or not to bear a
child.'' \199\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\198\ 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
\199\ Id. at 409-10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In Planned Parenthood Association of Kansas City, Missouri,
Inc. v. Ashcroft,\200\ the Court upheld the constitutionality
of a State law that required a minor to obtain the consent of
one of her parents before obtaining an abortion or, in the
alternative, to obtain the consent of a juvenile court judge.
While there was no majority opinion, this case marked the first
time the Court directly upheld a parental consent requirement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\200\ 462 U.S. 476 (1983).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,\201\ the
Supreme Court upheld a statute that required a physician to
give notice to one of the minor's parents or, under some
circumstances, another relative, before performing an abortion
on the minor. The statute permitted the physician and the minor
to avoid the requirement by a judicial bypass. Justice Kennedy,
writing for the majority, held that the bypass proceeding did
not unconstitutionally impair a minor's rights by the creation
of unnecessary delay.\202\ The Court established in this case
that it will not invalidate state procedures so long as they
seem to be reasonably designed to provide the minor with an
expedited process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\201\ 497 U.S. 502 (1990).
\202\ See id. at 514-15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In Hodgson v. Minnesota,\203\ the Court invalidated a state
statute that required notification of both parents prior to a
minor girl's abortion without the option of a judicial bypass.
The Court, however, upheld statutory requirements that both
parents be notified of the abortion and a 48 hour waiting
period between notification and the performance of the
abortion, if such requirements were accompanied by a judicial
bypass procedure that met constitutional standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\203\ 497 U.S. 417 (1990).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CIANA, consistent with these Supreme Court precedents,
requires--in cases in which a minor from one state seeks to
obtain an abortion in another state without a parental
involvement law--that before an abortion can be obtained,
either (1) the physician is presented with documentation
showing with a reasonable degree of certainty that a court in
the minor's state of residence has waived any parental
notification required by the laws of that state, or has
otherwise authorized that the minor be allowed to procure an
abortion; (2) the minor declares in a signed written statement
that she is the victim of sexual abuse, neglect, or physical
abuse by a parent, and, before an abortion is performed on the
minor, the physician notifies the authorities specified to
receive reports of child abuse or neglect by the law of the
State in which the minor resides of the known or suspected
abuse or neglect; or (3) the abortion is necessary to save the
life of the minor because her life was endangered by a physical
disorder, physical injury, or physical illness, including a
life endangering physical condition caused by or arising from
the pregnancy itself.
In Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth,\204\
the first of a series of Supreme Court cases dealing with
parental consent or notification laws, noted liberal Justice
Stewart wrote, ``There can be little doubt that the State
furthers a constitutionally permissible end by encouraging an
unmarried pregnant minor to seek the help and advice of her
parents in making the very important decision of whether or not
to bear a child.'' \205\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\204\ 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
\205\ Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 91 (1976)
(Stewart, J., concurring).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While the Supreme Court has, to date, ``declined to decide
whether a parental notification statute must include some sort
of bypass provision to be constitutional,'' \206\ it is of note
that even famously liberal Justice Stevens wrote in his
concurring opinion in H.L. v. Matheson, that ``[t]he fact that
certain members of the class of unmarried minor women who are
suffering unwanted pregnancies and desire to terminate the
pregnancies may actually be emancipated or sufficiently mature
to make a well-reasoned abortion decision does not, in my view,
undercut the validity of the [state] statute [in question] . .
. [A] state legislature has constitutional power to utilize,
for purposes of implementing a parental-notice requirement, a
yardstick based upon the chronological age of unmarried
pregnant women. That this yardstick will be imprecise or even
unjust in particular cases does not render its use by a state
legislature impermissible under the Federal Constitution.''
\207\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\206\ Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292, 295 (1997).
\207\ H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 424-25 (1981) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (citations and quotations omitted).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Furthermore, the Court in Hodgson v. Minnesota,\208\ wrote
that:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\208\ 497 U.S. 417 (1990).

We think it is clear that a requirement that a minor
wait 48 hours after notifying a single parent of her
intention to get an abortion would reasonably further
the legitimate state interest in ensuring that the
minor's decision is knowing and intelligent . . . The
brief waiting period provides the parent the
opportunity to consult with his or her spouse and a
family physician, and it permits the parent to inquire
into the competency of the doctor performing the
abortion, discuss the religious or moral implications
of the abortion decision, and provide the daughter
needed guidance and counsel in evaluating the impact of
the decision on her future.'' \209\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\209\ Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 448-49 (1990).

The Supreme Court has clearly indicated that a parental
notification requirement does not impose an undue burden on a
minor's ability to obtain an abortion, finding that ``[a] 48-
hour delay imposes only a minimal burden on the right of the
minor to decide whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.''
\210\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\210\ Id. at 449 (emphasis added).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Court then stated in Planned Parenthood v. Casey that:

Numerous forms of state regulation might have the
incidental effect of increasing the cost or decreasing
the availability of medical care, whether for abortion
or any other medical procedure. The fact that a law
which serves a valid purpose, one not designed to
strike at the right itself, has the incidental effect
of making it more difficult or more expensive to
procure an abortion cannot be enough to invalidate it.
Only where state regulation imposes an undue burden on
a woman's ability to make this decision does the power
of the State reach into the heart of the liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause.\211\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\211\ Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992).

The Court continued that ``[a] finding of an undue burden
is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has
the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the
path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.''
\212\ A parental notice requirement, which the Supreme Court
has described as a ``minimal burden'' \213\ is clearly not a
``substantial obstacle'' \214\ to receiving an abortion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\212\ Id. at 877 (1992) (emphasis added).
\213\ Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 449 (1990) (emphasis
added).
\214\ The Supreme Court elaborated that ``Some guiding principles
should emerge. What is at stake is the woman's right to make the
ultimate decision, not a right to be insulated from all others in doing
so. Regulations which do no more than create a structural mechanism by
which the State, or the parent or guardian of a minor, may express
profound respect for the life of the unborn are permitted, if they are
not a substantial obstacle to the woman's exercise of the right to
choose.'' Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Supreme Court continued: ``We reject the rigid
trimester framework of Roe v. Wade. To promote the State's
profound interest in potential life, throughout pregnancy the
State may take measures to ensure that the woman's choice is
informed, and measures designed to advance this interest will
not be invalidated as long as their purpose is to persuade the
woman to choose childbirth over abortion. These measures must
not be an undue burden on the right . . . As with any medical
procedure, the State may enact regulations to further the
health or safety of a woman seeking an abortion . . .
[P]arental notification or consent requirements . . . and our
judgment that they are constitutional, are based on the quite
reasonable assumption that minors will benefit from
consultation with their parents and that children will often
not realize that their parents have their best interests at
heart.'' \215\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\215\ Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878, 895 (1992).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Even famously liberal Justice Stevens wrote in his
concurring opinion in H.L. v. Matheson,\216\ that:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\216\ 450 U.S. 398 (1981).

In my opinion, the special importance of a young
woman's abortion decision . . . provides a special
justification for reasonable state efforts intended to
ensure that the decision be wisely made. Such
reasonable efforts surely may include a requirement
that an abortion be procured only after consultation
with a licensed physician. And, because the most
significant consequences of the [abortion] decision are
not medical in character, the State unquestionably has
an interest in ensuring that a young woman receive
other appropriate consultation as well. In my opinion,
the quality of that interest is plainly sufficient to
support a state legislature's determination that such
appropriate consultation should include parental advice
. . . [T]he State may legitimately decide that such
consultation should be made more probable by ensuring
that parents are informed of their daughter's decision:
If there is no parental-[notice] requirement, many
minors will submit to the abortion procedure without
ever informing their parents. An assumption that the
parental reaction will be hostile, disparaging, or
violent no doubt persuades many children simply to
bypass parental counsel which would in fact be loving,
supportive, and, indeed, for some indispensable. It is
unrealistic, in my judgment, to assume that every
parent-child relationship is either (a) so perfect that
communication and accord will take place routinely or
(b) so imperfect that the absence of communication
reflects the child's correct prediction that the parent
will . . . [act] arbitrarily to further a selfish
interest rather than the child's interest. A state
legislature may conclude that most parents will be
primarily interested in the welfare of their children,
and further, that the imposition of a parental-[notice]
requirement is an appropriate method of giving the
parents an opportunity to foster that welfare by
helping a pregnant distressed child to make and to
implement a correct decision.\217\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\217\ H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 422-24 (1981) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (citations and quotations omitted).

Even earlier, the Court stated in H.L. v. Matheson that
``[t]he Constitution does not compel a state to fine-tune its
statutes so as to encourage or facilitate abortions. To the
contrary, state action encouraging childbirth except in the
most urgent circumstances is rationally related to the
legitimate governmental objective of protecting potential
life.'' \218\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\218\ Id. at 413 (citations and quotations omitted).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL IS PRESERVED UNDER CIANA

Opponents also argue that CIANA violates the rights of
residents of each of the United States and of the District of
Columbia to travel to and from any state of the Union for
lawful purposes. Those opposed to CIANA on these grounds argue
that the legislation will hold a pregnant minor ``hostage'' to
the laws of her home state.
As an initial matter, it does not appear that the Supreme
Court has ever held that Congress' power to regulate interstate
commerce is ever limited by the ``right to travel.'' Even
assuming, however, that Congress' authority under the Commerce
Clause is limited by the right to travel doctrine,\219\ the
Supreme Court has recognized that the right to travel is ``not
absolute,'' and is not violated so long as there is a
``substantial reason for the discrimination beyond the mere
fact that they are citizens of other States.'' \220\ Congress
obviously has a substantial interest in protecting the health
and well-being of minor girls and in protecting the rights of
parents to raise their children.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\219\ Contrary to claims by some opponents of CIANA, Saenz v. Roe,
526 U.S. 489 (1999) does not in any way impugn the constitutionality of
CIANA. In Saenz, the Supreme Court addressed ``the citizen's right to
be treated equally in her new State of residence.'' Id. at 505
(emphasis added). A minor who is a resident of one state and who
crosses state lines to obtain an abortion in another state is by
definition not a resident of the state in which such abortion is
performed. Both operative sections of CIANA specifically restrict its
applications to situations in which a minor resides in one state and
seeks an abortion in another state.
\220\ Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502 (1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, the notion that CIANA is inconsistent with the
constitutional right to travel is not supportable under the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence. Neither a state nor the Federal
Government can interfere with a citizen's ability to leave a
state for the purpose of visiting another State or prevent its
citizens from returning; either would violate ``the right of a
citizen of one State to enter and to leave another State.''
\221\ CIANA does not even implicate this limitation, for it
does not preclude the minor from traveling. The minor's right
to travel to another state is wholly unimpeded by CIANA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\221\ See id. at 500.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, the Court has recognized that the right to
interstate travel ``may be regulated or controlled by the
exercise of a State's police power'' and by the Federal
Government as well.\222\ Protecting the health and well-being
of minor girls and the rights of parents to raise their
children are substantial, indeed compelling, reasons for
restricting minors from obtaining an abortion without parental
involvement. First, young adolescent girls who undergo
abortions face a heightened risk of suffering from long-term
physical and psychological complications. Second,
``[c]onstitutional interpretation has consistently recognized
that the parents' claim to authority in their own household to
direct the rearing of their children is basic in the structure
of our society,'' and that ``[p]roperly understood, then, the
tradition of parental authority is not inconsistent with our
tradition of individual liberty; rather, the former is one of
the basic presuppositions of the latter.'' \223\ Thus,
``[u]nder the Constitution, the State can properly conclude
that parents . . . who have [the] primary responsibility for
children's well-being are entitled to the support of laws
designed to aid discharge of that responsibility.'' \224\
Third, the fundamental rights of minors, including the right to
travel, are not equal to those of adults. Although the Court
has previously concluded that the fundamental rights of a child
are ``virtually coextensive with that of an adult,'' \225\ it
also has recognized that ``[t]hese rulings have not been made
on the uncritical assumption that the constitutional rights of
children are indistinguishable from those of adults.'' \226\
Thus, ``the State is entitled to adjust its legal system to
account for children's vulnerability and their needs for
`concern, . . . sympathy, and . . . paternal attention.' ''
\227\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\222\ United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 759 n.17 (1966).
\223\ Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638 (1979) (Bellotti II).
\224\ Id. at 639.
\225\ Id. at 634.
\226\ Id. at 635.
\227\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Based upon this reasoning, the Court has allowed States to
enact laws that ``account for children's vulnerability'' and
that protect the unique role of parents:

[T]he Court has held that the States validly may limit
the freedom of children to choose for themselves in the
making of important, affirmative choices with
potentially serious consequences. These rulings have
been grounded in the recognition that, during the
formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors
often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to
recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental
to them.\228\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\228\ Id.

Therefore, ``[l]egal restrictions on minors, especially
those supportive of the parental role, may be important to the
child's chances for the full growth and maturity that make
eventual participation in a free society meaningful and
rewarding.'' \229\ Consequently, a State may properly subject
minors to more stringent limitations than are permissible with
respect to adults. Examples include laws that prohibit the sale
of cigarettes and alcoholic beverages to minors, laws that
prohibit the sale of firearms and deadly weapons to minors
without parental consent, and laws that prohibit third parties
from exposing minors to certain types of literature. Similarly,
Congress may restrict the right of minors to travel across
state lines to a greater extent than it may adults.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\229\ Id. at 638-39.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CIANA's opponents sometimes also argue that CIANA violates
the rights of states to enact and enforce their own laws
governing conduct within their territorial boundaries. This
contention is clearly specious because CIANA does not attempt
to regulate conduct occurring solely within the territorial
boundaries of a state. Rather, CIANA regulates interstate
commerce, and Congress has the exclusive authority to regulate
such activity.

Hearings

The Committee's Subcommittee on the Constitution held a
hearing on H.R. 748 on March 3, 2005. Testimony was received
from the following witnesses: Marcia Carroll, Lancaster,
Pennsylvania; Richard Myers, Professor of Law, Ave Maria School
of Law; Warren Seigel, Director of Adolescent Medicine,
Chairman of Pediatrics, Coney Island Hospital; Teresa S.
Collett, Professor of Law, University of St. Thomas School of
Law. Additional material was submitted by individuals and
organizations.

Committee Consideration

On March 17, 2005, the Subcommittee on the Constitution met
in open session and ordered favorably reported the bill H.R.
748, as amended, by a vote of 7 to 2, a quorum being present.
On April 13, 2005, the Committee met in open session and
ordered favorably reported the bill H.R. 748 with an amendment
by a recorded vote of 20 yeas to 13 nays, a quorum being
present.

Vote of the Committee

In compliance with clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, the Committee notes that the
following rollcall votes occurred during the committee's
consideration of H.R. 748.
1. Mr. Nadler offered an amendment that would have created
an additional layer of Federal court review that could be used
by sexual predators to escape conviction under the bill. By a
rollcall vote of 11 yeas to 16 nays, the amendment was
defeated.

ROLLCALL NO. 1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ayes Nays Present
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Hyde........................................................
Mr. Coble....................................................... X
Mr. Smith (Texas)............................................... X
Mr. Gallegly....................................................
Mr. Goodlatte................................................... X
Mr. Chabot...................................................... X
Mr. Lungren..................................................... X
Mr. Jenkins..................................................... X
Mr. Cannon......................................................
Mr. Bachus...................................................... X
Mr. Inglis...................................................... X
Mr. Hostettler.................................................. X
Mr. Green....................................................... X
Mr. Keller...................................................... X
Mr. Issa........................................................
Mr. Flake.......................................................
Mr. Pence....................................................... X
Mr. Forbes...................................................... X
Mr. King........................................................ X
Mr. Feeney......................................................
Mr. Franks...................................................... X
Mr. Gohmert.....................................................
Mr. Conyers..................................................... X
Mr. Berman...................................................... X
Mr. Boucher.....................................................
Mr. Nadler...................................................... X
Mr. Scott....................................................... X
Mr. Watt........................................................ X
Ms. Lofgren..................................................... X
Ms. Jackson Lee.................................................
Ms. Waters...................................................... X
Mr. Meehan...................................................... X
Mr. Delahunt....................................................
Mr. Wexler......................................................
Mr. Weiner......................................................
Mr. Schiff...................................................... X
Ms. Sanchez..................................................... X
Mr. Smith (Washington)..........................................
Mr. Van Hollen.................................................. X
Mr. Sensenbrenner, Chairman..................................... X
-----------------------------------------------
Total....................................................... 11 16
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Mr. Nadler offered an amendment that would have exempted
sexual predators from prosecution under the bill if they were
grandparents or adult siblings of a minor. By a rollcall vote
of 12 yeas to 19 nays, the amendment was defeated.

ROLLCALL NO. 2
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ayes Nays Present
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Hyde........................................................
Mr. Coble....................................................... X
Mr. Smith (Texas)............................................... X
Mr. Gallegly....................................................
Mr. Goodlatte................................................... X
Mr. Chabot...................................................... X
Mr. Lungren..................................................... X
Mr. Jenkins..................................................... X
Mr. Cannon...................................................... X
Mr. Bachus...................................................... X
Mr. Inglis...................................................... X
Mr. Hostettler.................................................. X
Mr. Green....................................................... X
Mr. Keller...................................................... X
Mr. Issa........................................................ X
Mr. Flake....................................................... X
Mr. Pence....................................................... X
Mr. Forbes...................................................... X
Mr. King........................................................
Mr. Feeney...................................................... X
Mr. Franks...................................................... X
Mr. Gohmert.....................................................
Mr. Conyers..................................................... X
Mr. Berman......................................................
Mr. Boucher.....................................................
Mr. Nadler...................................................... X
Mr. Scott....................................................... X
Mr. Watt........................................................ X
Ms. Lofgren..................................................... X
Ms. Jackson Lee................................................. X
Ms. Waters...................................................... X
Mr. Meehan...................................................... X
Mr. Delahunt....................................................
Mr. Wexler...................................................... X
Mr. Weiner......................................................
Mr. Schiff...................................................... X
Ms. Sanchez..................................................... X
Mr. Smith (Washington)..........................................
Mr. Van Hollen.................................................. X
Mr. Sensenbrenner, Chairman..................................... X
-----------------------------------------------
Total....................................................... 12 19
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Mr. Scott offered an amendment that would have exempted
sexual predators from prosecution if they are taxicab drivers,
bus drivers, or others in the business of professional
transport. By a rollcall vote of 13 yeas to 17 nays, the
amendment was defeated.

ROLLCALL NO. 3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ayes Nays Present
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Hyde........................................................
Mr. Coble....................................................... X
Mr. Smith (Texas)...............................................
Mr. Gallegly....................................................
Mr. Goodlatte................................................... X
Mr. Chabot...................................................... X
Mr. Lungren..................................................... X
Mr. Jenkins..................................................... X
Mr. Cannon......................................................
Mr. Bachus...................................................... X
Mr. Inglis...................................................... X
Mr. Hostettler.................................................. X
Mr. Green....................................................... X
Mr. Keller...................................................... X
Mr. Issa........................................................ X
Mr. Flake.......................................................
Mr. Pence....................................................... X
Mr. Forbes...................................................... X
Mr. King........................................................ X
Mr. Feeney...................................................... X
Mr. Franks...................................................... X
Mr. Gohmert.....................................................
Mr. Conyers..................................................... X
Mr. Berman......................................................
Mr. Boucher.....................................................
Mr. Nadler...................................................... X
Mr. Scott....................................................... X
Mr. Watt........................................................ X
Ms. Lofgren..................................................... X
Ms. Jackson Lee................................................. X
Ms. Waters...................................................... X
Mr. Meehan...................................................... X
Mr. Delahunt....................................................
Mr. Wexler...................................................... X
Mr. Weiner......................................................
Mr. Schiff...................................................... X
Ms. Sanchez..................................................... X
Mr. Smith (Washington).......................................... X
Mr. Van Hollen.................................................. X
Mr. Sensenbrenner, Chairman..................................... X
-----------------------------------------------
Total....................................................... 13 17
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Mr. Scott offered an amendment that would have exempted
from prosecution under the bill those who aid and abet
criminals who could be prosecuted under the bill. By a rollcall
vote of 12 yeas to 18 nays, the amendment was defeated.

ROLLCALL NO. 4
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ayes Nays Present
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Hyde........................................................
Mr. Coble....................................................... X
Mr. Smith (Texas)...............................................
Mr. Gallegly....................................................
Mr. Goodlatte................................................... X
Mr. Chabot...................................................... X
Mr. Lungren..................................................... X
Mr. Jenkins..................................................... X
Mr. Cannon......................................................
Mr. Bachus...................................................... X
Mr. Inglis...................................................... X
Mr. Hostettler.................................................. X
Mr. Green....................................................... X
Mr. Keller...................................................... X
Mr. Issa........................................................ X
Mr. Flake....................................................... X
Mr. Pence....................................................... X
Mr. Forbes...................................................... X
Mr. King........................................................ X
Mr. Feeney...................................................... X
Mr. Franks...................................................... X
Mr. Gohmert.....................................................
Mr. Conyers..................................................... X
Mr. Berman......................................................
Mr. Boucher.....................................................
Mr. Nadler...................................................... X
Mr. Scott....................................................... X
Mr. Watt........................................................ X
Ms. Lofgren..................................................... X
Ms. Jackson Lee................................................. X
Ms. Waters...................................................... X
Mr. Meehan...................................................... X
Mr. Delahunt....................................................
Mr. Wexler......................................................
Mr. Weiner...................................................... X
Mr. Schiff...................................................... X
Ms. Sanchez..................................................... X
Mr. Smith (Washington).......................................... X
Mr. Van Hollen..................................................
Mr. Sensenbrenner, Chairman..................................... X
-----------------------------------------------
Total....................................................... 12 18
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

5. Ms. Jackson-Lee offered an amendment that would have
exempted sexual predators from prosecution under the bill if
they were clergy, godparents, aunts, uncles, or first cousins
of a minor, and would require a study by the Government
Accounting Office. By a rollcall vote of 13 yeas to 20 nays,
the amendment was defeated.

ROLLCALL NO. 5
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ayes Nays Present
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Hyde........................................................
Mr. Coble....................................................... X
Mr. Smith (Texas)............................................... X
Mr. Gallegly.................................................... X
Mr. Goodlatte................................................... X
Mr. Chabot...................................................... X
Mr. Lungren..................................................... X
Mr. Jenkins..................................................... X
Mr. Cannon...................................................... X
Mr. Bachus...................................................... X
Mr. Inglis...................................................... X
Mr. Hostettler.................................................. X
Mr. Green....................................................... X
Mr. Keller...................................................... X
Mr. Issa........................................................ X
Mr. Flake....................................................... X
Mr. Pence....................................................... X
Mr. Forbes...................................................... X
Mr. King........................................................ X
Mr. Feeney......................................................
Mr. Franks...................................................... X
Mr. Gohmert.....................................................
Mr. Conyers..................................................... X
Mr. Berman......................................................
Mr. Boucher.....................................................
Mr. Nadler...................................................... X
Mr. Scott....................................................... X
Mr. Watt........................................................ X
Ms. Lofgren..................................................... X
Ms. Jackson Lee................................................. X
Ms. Waters...................................................... X
Mr. Meehan...................................................... X
Mr. Delahunt....................................................
Mr. Wexler...................................................... X
Mr. Weiner...................................................... X
Mr. Schiff...................................................... X
Ms. Sanchez.....................................................
Mr. Smith (Washington).......................................... X
Mr. Van Hollen.................................................. X
Mr. Sensenbrenner, Chairman..................................... X
-----------------------------------------------
Total....................................................... 13 20
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

6. Motion to Report H.R. 748 with an amendment in the
nature of a substitute was agreed to by a rollcall vote of 20
yeas to 13 nays.

ROLLCALL NO. 6
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ayes Nays Present
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Hyde........................................................
Mr. Coble....................................................... X
Mr. Smith (Texas)............................................... X
Mr. Gallegly.................................................... X
Mr. Goodlatte................................................... X
Mr. Chabot...................................................... X
Mr. Lungren..................................................... X
Mr. Jenkins..................................................... X
Mr. Cannon...................................................... X
Mr. Bachus...................................................... X
Mr. Inglis...................................................... X
Mr. Hostettler.................................................. X
Mr. Green....................................................... X
Mr. Keller...................................................... X
Mr. Issa........................................................ X
Mr. Flake....................................................... X
Mr. Pence....................................................... X
Mr. Forbes...................................................... X
Mr. King........................................................ X
Mr. Feeney......................................................
Mr. Franks...................................................... X
Mr. Gohmert.....................................................
Mr. Conyers..................................................... X
Mr. Berman......................................................
Mr. Boucher.....................................................
Mr. Nadler...................................................... X
Mr. Scott....................................................... X
Mr. Watt........................................................ X
Ms. Lofgren..................................................... X
Ms. Jackson Lee................................................. X
Ms. Waters...................................................... X
Mr. Meehan...................................................... X
Mr. Delahunt....................................................
Mr. Wexler...................................................... X
Mr. Weiner...................................................... X
Mr. Schiff...................................................... X
Ms. Sanchez..................................................... X
Mr. Smith (Washington).......................................... X
Mr. Van Hollen..................................................
Mr. Sensenbrenner, Chairman..................................... X
-----------------------------------------------
Total....................................................... 20 13
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Committee Oversight Findings

In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of Rule XIII of the Rules
of the House of Representatives, the Committee reports that the
findings and recommendations of the Committee, based on
oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of Rule X of the
Rules of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in the
descriptive portions of this report.

New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures

Clause 3(c)(2) of Rule XIII of the Rules of the House of
Representatives is inapplicable because this legislation does
not provide new budgetary authority or increased tax
expenditures.

Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate

In compliance with clause 3(c)(3) of Rule XIII of the Rules
of the House of Representatives, the Committee sets forth, with
respect to the bill, H.R. 748, the following estimate and
comparison prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget
Office under section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of
1974:

April 21, 2005.
Hon. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 748, the Child
Interstate Abortion Notification Act.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Mark
Grabowicz.
Sincerely,
Douglas Holtz-Eakin.
Enclosure.

H.R. 748--Child Interstate Abortion Notification Act

CBO estimates that implementing H.R. 748 would not result
in any significant cost to the federal government. Enacting
H.R. 748 could affect direct spending and revenues; however,
CBO estimates that any such impact would not be significant.
H.R. 748 contains both an intergovernmental and a private-
sector mandate as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
(UMRA) by requiring doctors, in certain cases, to provide
parental notification before preforming an abortion on a minor.
CBO estimates the costs for public and private doctors to
comply with those mandates would be minimal and well below the
annual thresholds established in UMRA ($62 million for
intergovernmental mandates and $123 million for private-sector
mandates in 2005, adjusted for inflation).
H.R. 748 would make it a federal crime to transport a minor
across state lines, under certain circumstances, to obtain an
abortion without parental notification; in addition, the bill
would make it a crime for a physician to perform such an
abortion. Violators would be subject to imprisonment and fines.
As a result, the federal government would be able to pursue
cases that it otherwise would not be able to prosecute. CBO
expects that any increase in federal costs for law enforcement,
court proceedings, or prison operations would not be
significant, however, because of the small number of cases
likely to be involved. Any such additional costs would be
subject to the availability of appropriated funds.
Because those prosecuted and convicted under H.R. 748 could
be subject to criminal fines, the federal government might
collect additional fines if the bill is enacted. Collections of
such fines are recorded in the budget as revenues, which are
deposited in the Crime Victims Fund and later spent. CBO
expects that any additional revenues and direct spending would
be negligible.
The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Mark Grabowicz.
This estimate was approved by Peter H. Fontaine, Deputy
Assistant Director for Budget Analysis.

Performance Goals and Objectives

The Committee states that pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of
Rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, H.R.
748 would protect the health and safety of young girls by
preventing valid and constitutional state parental involvement
laws from being circumvented, and it would protect the health
and safety of young girls by protecting the rights of parents
to be involved in the medical decisions of their minor
daughters when such decisions involve interstate abortions.

Constitutional Authority Statement

Pursuant to clause 3(d)(1) of Rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the Committee finds the authority for
this legislation in article I, section 8, clause 3 of the
Constitution.

Section-by-Section Analysis and Discussion

The following discussion describes the bill as reported by
the Committee.

Sec. 1. Short title.

Section 1 provides this Act may be cited as the ``Child
Interstate Abortion Notification Act.''

Sec. 2. Transportation of Minors in Circumvention of Certain Laws
Relating to Abortion.

Subsection (a) of Section 2 provides that, unless one of
the exceptions listed below is met, whoever knowingly
transports a minor across a State line, with the intent that
such minor obtain an abortion, and thereby abridges the right
of a parent under a law (in force in the minors state of
residence) requiring parental involvement in a minor's abortion
decision, shall be fined or imprisoned not more than 1 year, or
both. An abridgement of a parent's right occurs if an abortion
is performed or induced on the minor, in a State other than the
State where the minor resides, without the parental consent or
notification, or the judicial authorization, that would have
been required by that law had the abortion been performed in
the State where the minor resides.
Subsection (b) of Section 2 provides for the following
exceptions to prosecuting or suing someone under this section:
(1) the prohibition does not apply if the abortion was
necessary to save the life of the minor because her life was
endangered by a physical disorder, physical injury, or physical
illness, including a life endangering physical condition caused
by or arising from the pregnancy itself; (2) the bill exempts
from prosecution or suit the minor herself (the girl being
transported) and any parent of that minor.
Subsection (c) of Section 2 provides that a defendant can
present an affirmative defense to a prosecution for an offense,
or to a lawsuit, based on a violation of this section if the
defendant: (1) reasonably believed, based on information the
defendant obtained directly from a parent of the minor, that
before the minor obtained the abortion, the parental consent or
notification took place that was required under State law had
the abortion been performed in the State where the minor
resides; or (2) was presented with documentation showing with a
reasonable degree of certainty that a court in the minor's
State of residence waived any parental notification required by
the laws of that State, or otherwise authorized that the minor
be allowed to obtain an abortion.
Subsection (d) of Section 2 provides that any parent who
suffers harm from a violation of subsection (a) may obtain
appropriate relief in a civil action.
Subsection (e) of Section 2 provides, among other, the
following definitions. The term a ``law requiring parental
involvement in a minor's abortion decision'' means a law
requiring, before an abortion is performed on a minor, either:
(1) notification to, or consent of, a parent of that minor; or
(2) proceedings in a State court. A ``law requiring parental
involvement in a minor's abortion decision'' does not include a
law that allows notification or consent to be given by anyone
other than a ``parent'' as defined in the bill. The term
``minor'' means an individual who is not older than the maximum
age requiring parental notification or consent, or proceedings
in a State court, under the State law requiring parental
involvement in a minor's abortion decision. The term ``parent''
means: (1) a parent or guardian; (2) a legal custodian; or (3)
a person with the requisite legal status to have care and
control of the minor, and with whom the minor regularly
resides, who is designated by the law requiring parental
involvement in the minor's abortion decision as a person to
whom notification, or from whom consent, is required.

Sec. 3. Child Interstate Abortion Notification.

Subsection (a) of Section 3 provides that a physician who
knowingly performs or induces an abortion on a minor in
violation of the requirements of this section shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both.
Subsection (a) further provides that, unless one of the
exceptions described below is met, a physician who knowingly
performs or induces an abortion on a minor who is a resident of
a State other than the State in which the abortion is performed
must provide at least 24 hours actual notice to a parent of the
minor before performing the abortion. If actual notice to such
parent is not possible after a reasonable effort has been made,
24 hours constructive notice must be given to a parent.
Subsection (b) of Section 3 provides that subsection (a)
does not apply if: (1) the abortion is performed or induced in
a State that has a law in force requiring parental involvement
in a minor's abortion decision and the physician complies with
the requirements of that law; (2) the physician is presented
with documentation showing with a reasonable degree of
certainty that a court in the minor's State of residence has
waived any parental notification required by the laws of that
State, or has otherwise authorized that the minor be allowed to
procure an abortion; (3) the minor declares in a signed written
statement that she is the victim of sexual abuse, neglect, or
physical abuse by a parent, and, before an abortion is
performed on the minor, the physician notifies the authorities
specified to receive reports of child abuse or neglect by the
law of the State in which the minor resides of the known or
suspected abuse or neglect; or (4) the abortion is necessary to
save the life of the minor because her life was endangered by a
physical disorder, physical injury, or physical illness,
including a life endangering physical condition caused by or
arising from the pregnancy itself.
Subsection (c) of Section 3 provides that any parent who
suffers harm from a violation of subsection (a) may obtain
appropriate relief in a civil action.
Subsection (d) of Section 3 defines the following terms,
among others. The term ``actual notice'' means the giving of
written notice directly, in person. The term ``constructive
notice'' means notice that is given by certified mail, return
receipt requested, restricted delivery to the last known
address of the person being notified, with delivery deemed to
have occurred 48 hours following noon on the next day
subsequent to mailing on which regular mail delivery takes
place, days on which mail is not delivered excluded. The term a
``law requiring parental involvement in a minor's abortion
decision'' is given the same meaning as in Section 2. The term
``minor'' means an individual who is not older than 18 years
and who is not emancipated under State law. The term ``parent''
means a parent or guardian; a legal custodian; or a person
standing in loco parentis who has care and control of the
minor, and with whom the minor regularly resides, as determined
by State law. The term ``physician'' means a doctor of medicine
legally authorized to practice medicine by the State in which
such doctor practices medicine, or any other person legally
empowered under State law to perform an abortion.

Sec. 4. Severability and Effective Date.

Subsection (a) of Section 4 provides that if any provision
of this Act, or any application thereof, is found
unconstitutional, that finding shall not affect any provision
or application of the Act not so adjudicated.
Subsection (b) of Section 4 provides that the provisions of
this Act shall take effect upon enactment.

Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported

In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (new matter is
printed in italic and existing law in which no change is
proposed is shown in roman):

TITLE 18, UNITED STATES CODE

* * * * * * *
PART I--CRIMES

* * * * * * *

Chap. Sec.
1. General provisions................................... 1
* * * * * * *
117A. Transportation of minors in circumvention of certain laws
relating to abortion................................ 2431
117B. Child interstate abortion notification................... 2432
* * * * * * *

CHAPTER 117A--TRANSPORTATION OF MINORS IN CIRCUMVENTION OF CERTAIN LAWS
RELATING TO ABORTION

Sec.
2431. Transportation of minors in circumvention of certain laws
relating to abortion.

Sec. 2431. Transportation of minors in circumvention of certain laws
relating to abortion

(a) Offense.--
(1) Generally.--Except as provided in subsection
(b), whoever knowingly transports a minor across a
State line, with the intent that such minor obtain an
abortion, and thereby in fact abridges the right of a
parent under a law requiring parental involvement in a
minor's abortion decision, in force in the State where
the minor resides, shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
(2) Definition.--For the purposes of this
subsection, an abridgement of the right of a parent
occurs if an abortion is performed or induced on the
minor, in a State other than the State where the minor
resides, without the parental consent or notification,
or the judicial authorization, that would have been
required by that law had the abortion been performed in
the State where the minor resides.
(b) Exceptions.--
(1) The prohibition of subsection (a) does not
apply if the abortion was necessary to save the life of
the minor because her life was endangered by a physical
disorder, physical injury, or physical illness,
including a life endangering physical condition caused
by or arising from the pregnancy itself.
(2) A minor transported in violation of this
section, and any parent of that minor, may not be
prosecuted or sued for a violation of this section, a
conspiracy to violate this section, or an offense under
section 2 or 3 based on a violation of this section.
(c) Affirmative Defense.--It is an affirmative defense to a
prosecution for an offense, or to a civil action, based on a
violation of this section that the defendant--
(1) reasonably believed, based on information the
defendant obtained directly from a parent of the minor,
that before the minor obtained the abortion, the
parental consent or notification took place that would
have been required by the law requiring parental
involvement in a minor's abortion decision, had the
abortion been performed in the State where the minor
resides; or
(2) was presented with documentation showing with a
reasonable degree of certainty that a court in the
minor's State of residence waived any parental
notification required by the laws of that State, or
otherwise authorized that the minor be allowed to
procure an abortion.
(d) Civil Action.--Any parent who suffers harm from a
violation of subsection (a) may obtain appropriate relief in a
civil action.
(e) Definitions.--For the purposes of this section--
(1) the term ``abortion'' means the use or
prescription of any instrument, medicine, drug, or any
other substance or device intentionally to terminate
the pregnancy of a female known to be pregnant with an
intention other than to increase the probability of a
live birth, to preserve the life or health of the child
after live birth, or to remove a dead unborn child who
died as the result of a spontaneous abortion,
accidental trauma or a criminal assault on the pregnant
female or her unborn child;
(2) the term a ``law requiring parental involvement
in a minor's abortion decision'' means a law--
(A) requiring, before an abortion is
performed on a minor, either--
(i) the notification to, or consent
of, a parent of that minor; or
(ii) proceedings in a State court;
and
(B) that does not provide as an alternative
to the requirements described in subparagraph
(A) notification to or consent of any person or
entity who is not described in that
subparagraph;
(3) the term ``minor'' means an individual who is
not older than the maximum age requiring parental
notification or consent, or proceedings in a State
court, under the law requiring parental involvement in
a minor's abortion decision;
(4) the term ``parent'' means--
(A) a parent or guardian;
(B) a legal custodian; or
(C) a person standing in loco parentis who
has care and control of the minor, and with
whom the minor regularly resides, who is
designated by the law requiring parental
involvement in the minor's abortion decision as
a person to whom notification, or from whom
consent, is required; and
(5) the term ``State'' includes the District of
Columbia and any commonwealth, possession, or other
territory of the United States.

CHAPTER 117B--CHILD INTERSTATE ABORTION NOTIFICATION

Sec.
2432. Child interstate abortion notification.

Sec. 2432. Child interstate abortion notification

(a) Offense.--
(1) Generally.--A physician who knowingly performs
or induces an abortion on a minor in violation of the
requirements of this section shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
(2) Parental notification.--A physician who
performs or induces an abortion on a minor who is a
resident of a State other than the State in which the
abortion is performed must provide at least 24 hours
actual notice to a parent of the minor before
performing the abortion. If actual notice to such
parent is not possible after a reasonable effort has
been made, 24 hours constructive notice must be given
to a parent.
(b) Exceptions.--The notification requirement of subsection
(a)(2) does not apply if--
(1) the abortion is performed or induced in a State
that has a law in force requiring parental involvement
in a minor's abortion decision and the physician
complies with the requirements of that law;
(2) the physician is presented with documentation
showing with a reasonable degree of certainty that a
court in the minor's State of residence has waived any
parental notification required by the laws of that
State, or has otherwise authorized that the minor be
allowed to procure an abortion;
(3) the minor declares in a signed written
statement that she is the victim of sexual abuse,
neglect, or physical abuse by a parent, and, before an
abortion is performed on the minor, the physician
notifies the authorities specified to receive reports
of child abuse or neglect by the law of the State in
which the minor resides of the known or suspected abuse
or neglect; or
(4) the abortion is necessary to save the life of
the minor because her life was endangered by a physical
disorder, physical injury, or physical illness,
including a life endangering physical condition caused
by or arising from the pregnancy itself.
(c) Civil Action.--Any parent who suffers harm from a
violation of subsection (a) may obtain appropriate relief in a
civil action.
(d) Definitions.--For the purposes of this section--
(1) the term ``abortion'' means the use or
prescription of any instrument, medicine, drug, or any
other substance or device intentionally to terminate
the pregnancy of a female known to be pregnant with an
intention other than to increase the probability of a
live birth, to preserve the life or health of the child
after live birth, or to remove a dead unborn child who
died as the result of a spontaneous abortion,
accidental trauma, or a criminal assault on the
pregnant female or her unborn child;
(2) the term ``actual notice'' means the giving of
written notice directly, in person;
(3) the term ``constructive notice'' means notice
that is given by certified mail, return receipt
requested, restricted delivery to the last known
address of the person being notified, with delivery
deemed to have occurred 48 hours following noon on the
next day subsequent to mailing on which regular mail
delivery takes place, days on which mail is not
delivered excluded;
(4) the term a ``law requiring parental involvement
in a minor's abortion decision'' means a law--
(A) requiring, before an abortion is
performed on a minor, either--
(i) the notification to, or consent
of, a parent of that minor; or
(ii) proceedings in a State court;
(B) that does not provide as an alternative
to the requirements described in subparagraph
(A) notification to or consent of any person or
entity who is not described in that
subparagraph;
(5) the term ``minor'' means an individual who is
not older than 18 years and who is not emancipated
under State law;
(6) the term ``parent'' means--
(A) a parent or guardian;
(B) a legal custodian; or
(C) a person standing in loco parentis who
has care and control of the minor, and with
whom the minor regularly resides;
as determined by State law;
(7) the term ``physician'' means a doctor of
medicine legally authorized to practice medicine by the
State in which such doctor practices medicine, or any
other person legally empowered under State law to
perform an abortion; and
(8) the term ``State'' includes the District of
Columbia and any commonwealth, possession, or other
territory of the United States.

* * * * * * *

Markup Transcript

BUSINESS MEETING

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 13, 2005

House of Representatives,
Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in
Room 2141, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. F. James
Sensenbrenner, Jr. [Chairman of the Committee] presiding.
[Intervening business.]
Chairman Sensenbrenner. We will now go to H.R. 748, the
``Child Interstate Abortion Notification Act of 2005.'' The
Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Chabot, the
Chairman of the Subcommittee on the Constitution, for a motion.
Mr. Chabot. Mr. Chairman, the Subcommittee on the
Constitution reports favorably the bill H.R. 748 and moves its
favorable recommendation to the full House.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection, the bill will be
considered as read and open for amendment at any point.
[The bill, H.R. 748, follows:]

Chairman Sensenbrenner. The Subcommittee amendment in the
nature of a substitute, which the Members have before them,
will be considered as read, considered as the original text for
purposes of amendment, and open for amendment at any point.
[The amendment in the nature of a substitute follows:]

Chairman Sensenbrenner. The Chair recognizes the gentleman
from Ohio, Mr. Chabot, to strike the last word.
Mr. Chabot. Mr. Chairman, move to strike the last word.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman's recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Constitution Subcommittee held a legislative hearing on
the Child Interstate Abortion Notification Act, referred to as
CIANA, on March 3, 2005. The bill was marked up in the
Subcommittee on March 17, where it was favorably reported with
an amendment clarifying the criteria that defines the
affirmative defense in Section 2 of the bill by a vote of 7 to
2.
CIANA contains two sections, each of which creates a new
Federal crime subject to a $100,000 fine or 1 year in jail, or
both.
The first section of CIANA makes it a Federal crime to
transport a minor across State lines to obtain an abortion in
another State in order to avoid a State law requiring parental
involvement in a minor's abortion decision. Twenty-three States
currently have such parental involvement laws. The primary
purpose of the first section of CIANA is to prevent people,
including abusive boyfriends and older men who may have
committed rape, from pressuring young girls into circumventing
their State's parental involvement laws by receiving secret,
out-of-State abortions unknown to their parents.
The second section of CIANA applies when a minor from one
State crosses State lines to have an abortion in another State
that does not have a State law requiring parental involvement
in a minor's abortion decision. In such a case, CIANA makes it
a Federal crime for the abortion provider to fail to give one
of the minor's parents, or a legal guardian if necessary, 24
hours' notice, or notice by mail if needed, of the minor's
decision to have an abortion before the abortion is performed.
The purpose of this section is to protect fundamental rights of
parents to be involved in their children's life by giving
parents a chance to help their young daughters through
difficult circumstances as best they can, including by giving a
health care provider their daughter's complete and accurate
medical history to ensure that she receives safe medical care
and any necessary follow-up treatment.
CIANA does not give parents any veto power over a minor's
abortion decision. CIANA simply stands for the proposition that
parents should be given the chance to help their minor
daughters in what may be the most important and life-altering
decision she will make in her life.
CIANA includes carefully crafted exceptions. These
exceptions include instances in which a life-threatening
emergency may require that an abortion be provided immediately
or the abortion provider is presented with court papers showing
that the parental involvement law in effect in the minor's
State of residence has been complied with and where the minor
states that she has been the victim of abuse by a parent and
the abortion provider informs the appropriate State authorities
of such abuse so further abuse can be prevented.
A vivid and heart-rending example of why this legislation
is so important comes from Marcia Carroll, who testified on
behalf of CIANA during a Constitution Subcommittee hearing last
month. In her testimony, she described how her daughter,
without her knowledge, was pressured by her boyfriend's
stepfather to cross State lines and have an abortion she did
not want, and she now regrets it very deeply. Mrs. Carroll
said, ``My daughter does suffer. She has gone to counseling for
this. I just know that she cries and she wishes she could redo
everything, relive that day over. It's just sad that it had to
happen this way and this is what she had to go through. But she
did want me to come here today and speak on her behalf. She
said, `Mom, just one phone call is all it would have taken to
stop this from happening.' So she asked me to come here for her
sake and for others girls' safety to speak and let you know
what was happening.''
The parents of this country, such as Mrs. Carroll, should
be given the chance to be involved in the decisions that their
daughters make. CIANA would give them that chance.
The House of Representatives has passed similar legislation
by over 100-vote margins in recent Congresses, and parental
notification laws are overwhelmingly supported by Americans. As
recently as last month, 75 percent of over 1,500 registered
voters surveyed favored requiring parental notification before
a minor could get an abortion, with only 18 percent opposing
parental notification.
The provisions and notification requirements of CIANA are
constitutional and constitute--and are consistent with Supreme
Court precedent. The Supreme Court has described a parents'
right to control the care of their children as ``perhaps the
oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this
Court.'' Further, the Court has upheld as constitutional a
State parental notification statute that did not contain a
broad health exception. That State statute--that State statute
provided only for a judicial bypass exception, which is in this
particular bill.
I would urge my colleagues to join in supporting this much
needed legislation that is overwhelmingly supported by the
American people to protect both the health and safety of our
minor children and parental rights.
I yield back the balance of my time.
[Intervening business.]
Chairman Sensenbrenner. Consideration will now resume on
H.R. 748, and the Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York,
Mr. Nadler, for an opening statement.
Mr. Nadler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Today we consider legislation that is at once another
flagrant violation of the Constitution and an assault on the
health and well-being of young women and their health care
providers. Some States have chosen to enact parental
notification or consent laws. Some, like mine, have considered
this issue and decided it is not good for the welfare of young
women and have declined to do so. And they have done this for
various reasons.
In some cases, the young woman may not be able to go to her
parents and can turn only to a grandparent, a sibling, or a
member of the clergy. Indeed, sometimes the parents may pose a
threat to the life and health of the young woman. That's what
happened to Spring Adams, a 13-year-old from Idaho. She was
shot to death by her father after he found out that she planned
to terminate a pregnancy--a pregnancy caused by his act of
incest.
This bill also--and, by the way, in the case that Mr.
Chabot mentioned, forgetting this law, that was a clear case of
kidnapping--kidnapping, coercion, violation of about half a
dozen existing criminal laws. It is hardly a justification for
this bill.
This bill also uses a narrow definition of ``medical
emergency'' that applies only where ``an abortion was necessary
to save the life of the minor because her life was endangered
by a physical disorder, physical injury, or physical illness,
including a life-endangering physical condition caused by or
arising from the pregnancy itself.'' That clearly falls far
short of the Supreme Court's requirement that any restriction
on the right to choose must have an explicit exception to
protect the life or health of the woman.
There are many things far short of death that threaten the
health of a young woman. She deserves prompt and professional
medical care, and the Constitution still protects her right to
receive that care. Whether or not the majority cares about the
Constitution, this bill clearly violates that. Congress should
not be tempted to play doctor. It is always bad medicine for
women.
In an ideal world, loving, supportive, and understanding
families would join together to face these challenges. That's
what happens in the majority of cases, law or no law. But we do
not live in a perfect world. Some parents are violent, some are
rapists, some young people can turn only to their clergy, to a
grandparent, a sibling, or some other trusted adult. We should
not turn these people into criminals simply because they are
trying to help a young woman in a dire situation.
This bill is the wrong way to deal with a very real
problem. It does not provide exceptions to protect a young
woman's health. It does not provide exceptions where a parent
has raped a young woman. It even allows the rapist to sue a
clergyperson or doctor who tries to help the daughter deal with
the effects of that crime.
This bill would also substitute the judgment of Congress
for the judgment of people who live in States like New York
which have chosen not to enact parental involvement laws. In
fact, even where the young woman's State of residence and the
State in which the doctor is located have both decided not to
enact such laws, this bill would impose a new Federal parental
notification law that is more draconian and more
unconstitutional than the laws of most States. Perhaps we
should just disband our State legislatures and let the people
in Washington decide these important family issues for us.
Perhaps the same mind-set that had Congress pass a special law
for Terry Schiavo when the Florida Legislature declined to do
so is operating again.
In some cases, young women--I'm sorry. I will urge my
colleagues to reject this legislation on both constitutional
and policy grounds. If only for the sake of humanity, I would
urge you to join in providing the needed flexibility for the
most difficult real-world cases involving the lives of real
young women. We owe them at least that much. And we also owe
our States the respect to let them have their own laws.
This bill is the only situation I can think of since the
Fugitive Slave Act of the 1850's that would have a young person
carry the law of one State on his back like a cross to another
State, to enforce the law of the first State in the second
State where it is not the law. I doubt the constitutionality of
that, but there is also no good policy reason to impose on one
State the law of another State.
I hope we will not enact this bill, though I know we will,
and I know that the Supreme Court will throw it out as
unconstitutional. So let the politics reign and never mind the
policy.
Thank you. I yield back.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection, all Members'
opening statements will appear in the record at this point.
Are there amendments? The gentlewoman from California, Ms.
Waters, for what purpose do you seek recognition?
Ms. Waters. I have an amendment at the desk.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report the
amendment.
Ms. Waters. I have two amendments. I suppose this--I don't
know what the number would be, the first amendment.
The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, I don't have the amendments at the
desk.
Ms. Waters. Those amendments should be at the desk, 748--
here they are. We will take them to the desk right now. Just
hold those. Take the two sets.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report the
amendment.
Ms. Waters. We have two amendments.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report the
amendment.
The Clerk. Amendment to H.R. 748, offered by Ms. Waters.
Page 3, after line 2, insert the following: ``(3) The
prohibition of subsection (a) does not apply if the pregnancy
is the result of sexual contact with a parent or any other
person who has permanent or temporary care or custody or
responsibility for supervision of the minor, or by any health
or family member.''
[The amendment follows:]

Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentlewoman is recognized for 5
minutes.
Ms. Waters. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. This
amendment is being offered because I anticipated that another
amendment that I had would not--may not be taken up. So this
amendment--this is a Child Interstate Abortion Notification Act
amendment. Just one moment, Mr. Chairman. I think we have a
little problem here.
This amendment, Mr. Chairman, is an amendment that simply
recognizes that a young girl may become pregnant as a result of
sexual contact with a parent or some other person who has
permanent or temporary care or custody or responsibility for
supervision of the minor or by any household family member.
Unfortunately, the bill as it is drafted does not take into
consideration that when we are talking about parent
notification, we're asking--we're asking a woman, a young girl
in particular, to go to the very person who may be responsible
for the pregnancy to--and somehow give consent or at least be
notified they're giving information to someone who may have
been a party to the pregnancy.
I think it was just mentioned by my colleague that in the
case of Spring Adams, a 13-year-old sixth grader from Ohio, who
was actually shot to death by her father after he learned that
she was planning to terminate a pregnancy caused by his acts of
incest.
My amendment provides that the person should not have to go
to perhaps the party that's responsible for the pregnancy, and
so I would ask for an aye vote on this amendment.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. Does the gentlewoman yield back?
Mr. Chabot. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Sensenbrenner. Does the gentlewoman yield back?
Ms. Waters. I will yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr.
Chabot?
Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Move to strike the
last word.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you. I rise in opposition to the
amendment. I believe it should be defeated because it would
trump the judicial bypass provision in place in States that
allow judges to make case-by-case determinations on these
issues and allow for alerting the appropriate authorities so
abusers can be brought to justice. This amendment would allow
abusers potentially to get off scot free and doom the victims
of sexual abuse to even more abuse. If the girl is afraid to
tell her parents of the abortion for fear of past or future
sexual abuse, she may utilize the judicial bypass process which
is available in her State. The offense of transporting a minor
across a State line does not apply if the girl has been granted
a judicial bypass and the transporter obtained information
beforehand that the judicial authorization took place.
This amendment would actually enable potentially a live-in
foster brother or uncle or grandfather who has been sexually
abusing the minor girl to transport her across a State line for
the purpose of abridging a parent's right to know. So we think
the judicial bypass procedure that's in effect in most States
should be permitted to rule and, therefore, I would strongly
oppose this amendment.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. The question is----
Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from New York.
Mr. Nadler. Would the distinguished Chairman of the
Subcommittee yield for a question?
Chairman Sensenbrenner. Does the gentleman move to strike
the last word? Because----
Mr. Nadler. I do indeed.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman----
Mr. Nadler. I hate that last word. I move to strike it.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. Okay. Well, the last word is
``member.'' The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Nadler. Would the gentleman yield for a question, Mr.
Chabot?
Mr. Chabot. I will yield.
Mr. Nadler. I was listening to your objection to this
amendment, and you said that any other--that this would allow a
household member to take--to get around this bill, essentially.
That was your objection to the amendment.
Mr. Chabot. Among others. The bypass procedure is already
in effect to protect the girl's rights, and this I think just
muddies up the waters.
Mr. Nadler. Would you still object to the amendment if the
last phrase was struck from the amendment and it simply said,
``The prohibition of subsection (a) does not apply if the
pregnancy is the result of sexual contact with a parent or any
other person who has permanent or temporary care or custody of
responsibility...''? In other words, you don't have to notify
the parent who committed the--who created the pregnancy. That's
all it applies to.
Mr. Chabot. Yes, it trumps back--it would trump the bypass
procedure, which is already in process. I think the bill as
currently written----
Mr. Nadler. But forgetting the bypass, I don't understand.
If a stepfather, let's say, or a father committed incest, and
let's say the mother wasn't alive, so the stepfather committed
incest--or the father committed incest, he's the only person
who could give parental consent notification, he's the person
you don't want to go to, what's the point of the judicial
bypass?
Mr. Chabot. Taking back my time----
Mr. Nadler. It's my time. You can--I yield.
Mr. Chabot. Oh, did you yield?
Mr. Nadler. I yield, yes.
Mr. Chabot. Okay. The bypass procedure I think protects the
young girl in that particular circumstance, and I think it's
appropriate.
Mr. Nadler. But I still don't understand. Let's assume it
does. I mean, there are a lot of problems with the bypass
procedure. But even if it did, why waste the court's time when
the only person you're bypassing is the person who committed
incest?
Mr. Chabot. I'm not sure I understand your point.
Mr. Nadler. If the father committed incest and caused the
pregnancy, if the mother is not alive, then the only person
you're bypassing is the father who committed the incest and
caused the pregnancy. Why bother with that? Why waste the
court's time? Why not just--I mean, under no circumstances----
Mr. Chabot. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Nadler. Let me just say, under no circumstances
presumably should you require parental notification or
involvement if the parent committed a crime. Yes, I yield.
Mr. Chabot. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Nadler. Sure.
Mr. Chabot. We want the State bypass procedure to be able
to work. The court makes that decision, and we think that the
court is the appropriate place for that decision to be made.
Mr. Nadler. Reclaiming my time, I just think this
illustrates how rigid this bill is, even if that amendment
would not be accepted under those circumstances.
I yield back.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. The question is on the amendment
offered by the gentlewoman from California, Ms. Waters. Those
in favor will say aye? Opposed, no?
The noes appear to have it. The noes have it, and the
amendment is not agreed to.
Are there further----
Ms. Waters. I have another amendment, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report the
amendment.
The Clerk. Amendment to H.R. 748, offered by Ms. Waters.
Page 3, after line 2, insert the following: ``(3) The
prohibitions of this section do not apply with respect to an
abortion where the pregnancy resulted from incest.''
[The amendment follows:]

Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentlewoman is recognized for 5
minutes.
Ms. Waters. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman and Members, the first amendment really
related to a pregnancy as a result of maybe a parent or other
household members, not necessarily a relative. This one is
specific to incest, and certainly as we take a look, no matter
what side of the issue you're on relative to notification,
certainly we would not want to place a young person, a young
woman in the position of having to talk with a relative or a
parent who's responsible for the pregnancy. So I would hope
that the focus this time would be on a father in particular who
we have seen involved in these kind of cases and not to have to
ask a young lady to share this information, to seek support
just to know what is happening, when, in fact, they're planning
on terminating the pregnancy. I would ask for an aye vote.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. Does the gentlewoman yield back?
Ms. Waters. I yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr.
Chabot?
Mr. Chabot. Move to strike the last word.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I won't take the 5
minutes. I'll be very brief.
Essentially, the response would be the same. In essence, it
has the same substance as the amendment that we just discussed.
The judicial bypass procedure that's available in the States to
protect the young girl in one of these situations is what the
protection is. There's no reason to adopt this amendment;
therefore, I'd oppose it.
I yield back.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. The question is on the amendment
offered by the gentlewoman from California, Ms. Waters. Those
in favor will say aye? Opposed, no?
The noes appear to have it. The noes have it. The amendment
is not agreed to.
Are there further amendments? The gentleman from New York,
Mr. Nadler.
Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman, I have two amendments. The first
is Nadler 008. I don't have eight. I only have two, but 008.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report Nadler 008.
The Clerk. Amendment to H.R. 748, offered by Mr. Nadler.
Page 3, after line 2, insert the following: ``(3) Any adult who
would be subject to prosecution under this Act''----
Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman?
The Clerk.--``who can demonstrate, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that he or she has a reasonable belief that
compliance with the judicial bypass procedure of the minor's
State of resident would either--(A) compromise the minor's
intent to maintain confidentiality with respect to her choice
to terminate a pregnancy; or (B) be futile because the judicial
bypass procedure of the minor's State of residence is
unavailable''----
Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman?
The Clerk.--``or ineffective, may apply to a judge of the
United States District Court in the district in which the minor
resides for a waiver of the application''----
Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to waive
the reading of the amendment.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection.
Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman, I also ask unanimous consent to
amend the amendment by removing in line 3 the words ``he or she
has a reasonable belief that...''
Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection, the reading of
the amendment--further reading of the amendment is waived. Is
there any objection to deleting the language referred to by the
gentleman from New York?
[No response.]
Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection, the language is
deleted, and the gentleman from New York is recognized for 5
minutes.
[The amendment follows:]

Mr. Nadler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, this amendment would try to make the bill
begin to conform to real-world situations. It would allow an
adult who, by a preponderance of the evidence, can show that a
judicial bypass procedure in the minor's State is unavailable.
As the testimony we received on this bill indicates is
sometimes the case, or where a judicial bypass procedure in the
minor's home State might compromise her privacy, the minor
would be allowed to go to the Federal district court to seek
the required waiver.
In other words, if you could show by a preponderance of the
evidence that going for a judicial district waiver in the State
court would compromise the privacy or that that is an illusory
remedy because the remedy is not really available in the State
court, you could go and apply to the Federal district court for
the waiver based on the same grounds that you would seek in the
State court.
It does not eliminate--this bill does not--this amendment,
rather, does not eliminate the waiver requirement. It simply
allows the minor to avoid the kinds of real-world problems that
exist out there in the real world, where local judges, some
local judges have made clear they will never grant a bypass, or
where the local judge is so cozy with the young woman's parents
that confidentiality would be a joke, sometimes with
catastrophic results.
I know that my colleagues won't mind removing a small
number of these cases from State court to Federal court. We
seem to make a habit of doing that in this Committee. Indeed,
the Republican leadership dragged us all back from Washington
to yank a case out of State court into Federal court a few
weeks ago. So I hope this amendment should not be a problem.
I yield back.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr.
Chabot?
Mr. Chabot. Move to strike the last word.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I rise in opposition
to this amendment. The amendment, I believe, should be defeated
because it would undermine State judicial bypass proceedings,
once again. If the State's judicial bypass procedure, in fact,
fails to effectively maintain a pregnant minor's
confidentiality or is unavailable or ineffective, under the
terms of the amendment, then that State's judicial bypass
system would be held unconstitutional under current case law
and not enforced under CIANA. CIANA merely reinforces
constitutional State parental involvement laws. If a State's
parental involvement law is held unconstitutional, CIANA will
not have any effect on the operation of that State's laws.
Mr. Nadler. Would the gentleman yield for a question?
Mr. Chabot. Not at this time. For example, if there are
only two judges in an entire State willing to hear judicial
bypass proceedings, that State's parental involvement law would
be found unconstitutional under current Supreme Court
precedent, which requires the State to provide a minor the
opportunity to seek a judicial bypass with ``sufficient
expedition to provide an effective opportunity for an abortion
to be obtained.'' That's existing law. This fact is illustrated
by the First Circuit's decision in Planned Parenthood League v.
Bellotti. In that case, the court held that the plaintiffs
could successfully challenge the State's judicial bypass
procedures if they could present ``proof of a systematic
failure to provide a judicial bypass option in the most
expeditious, practical manner.''
The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the lower court
so that the plaintiffs could present evidence that, among other
things, judges were de facto unavailable to hear minors'
abortion petitions or were avoided for reasons of hostility, as
the gentleman mentioned before.
The Sixth Circuit has also recognized that a constitutional
challenge may be brought for a State's systematic failure to
provide an expeditious judicial bypass. Opponents of this
legislation can't have it both ways by arguing on the one hand
that the State law must always govern within its State
boundaries, regardless of interstate effects, and on the other
hand that States can't be trusted to enact sufficient judicial
bypass laws.
So for those reasons, I would strongly oppose this
amendment, and if the gentleman would like me to yield, I'll
yield.
Mr. Nadler. Thank you. The fact is it's hard to see how a
constitutional challenge to a situation, which may, in fact,
only exist in the given case where the local judge is a friend
of the parents, may not be a totally unconstitutional situation
Statewide. But, in any event, it's hard to see how a
constitutional challenge could be taken without getting into
the second and third trimester of pregnancy. I mean, the fact
is why not let a Federal court judge whether, in fact, the
judicial bypass is real on an expeditious basis, which is all
this amendment says.
Mr. Chabot. Reclaiming my time, I yield back.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. The question is on the amendment
offered by the gentleman from New York, Mr. Nadler. Those in
favor will say aye? Opposed, no?
The noes appear to have it.
Mr. Nadler. A rollcall vote.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. A rollcall is requested. Those in
favor of the Nadler amendment will as your names are called
answer aye, those opposed, no, and the clerk will call the
roll.
The Clerk. Mr. Hyde?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Coble?
Mr. Coble. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Coble, no. Mr. Smith?
Mr. Smith of Texas. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Smith, no. Mr. Gallegly?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Goodlatte?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Chabot?
Mr. Chabot. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Chabot, no. Mr. Lungren?
Mr. Lungren. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Lungren, no. Mr. Jenkins?
Mr. Jenkins. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Jenkins, no. Mr. Cannon?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Bachus?
Mr. Bachus. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Bachus, no. Mr. Inglis?
Mr. Inglis. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Inglis, no. Mr. Hostettler?
Mr. Hostettler. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Hostettler, no. Mr. Green?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Keller?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Issa?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Flake?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Pence?
Mr. Pence. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Pence, no. Mr. Forbes?
Mr. Forbes. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Forbes, no. Mr. King?
Mr. King. No.
The Clerk. Mr. King, no. Mr. Feeney?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Franks?
Mr. Franks. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Franks, no. Mr. Gohmert?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Conyers?
Mr. Conyers. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Conyers, aye. Mr. Berman?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Boucher?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Nadler?
Mr. Nadler. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Nadler, aye. Mr. Scott?
Mr. Scott. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Scott, aye. Mr. Watt?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Ms. Lofgren?
Ms. Lofgren. Aye.
The Clerk. Ms. Lofgren, aye. Ms. Jackson Lee?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Ms. Waters?
Ms. Waters. Aye.
The Clerk. Ms. Waters, aye. Mr. Meehan?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Delahunt?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Wexler?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Weiner?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Schiff?
Mr. Schiff. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Schiff, aye. Ms. Sanchez?
Ms. Sanchez. Aye.
The Clerk. Ms. Sanchez, aye. Mr. Smith?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Van Hollen?
Mr. Van Hollen. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Van Hollen, aye. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Sensenbrenner. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, no.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. Members in the chamber who wish to
cast or change their votes? The gentleman from Virginia, Mr.
Goodlatte?
Mr. Goodlatte. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Goodlatte, no.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr.
Green?
Mr. Green. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Green, no.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from California, Mr.
Berman?
Mr. Berman. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Berman, aye.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Massachusetts,
Mr. Meehan?
Mr. Meehan. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Meehan, aye.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. Are there further Members who wish
to either cast or change their votes? If not, the clerk will
report--the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Keller?
Mr. Keller. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Keller, no.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. Further Members who wish to cast or
change their votes? The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr.
Watt?
Mr. Watt. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Watt, aye.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. Anybody else who wishes to cast or
change their votes? If not, the clerk will try again to report.
The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, there are 11 ayes and 16 noes.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. And the amendment is not agreed to.
Are there further amendments?
Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from New York, Mr.
Nadler.
Mr. Nadler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have an amendment at
the desk, number 001.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report the
amendment.
The Clerk. Amendment to H.R. 748, offered by Mr. Nadler.
Page 3, after line 2, insert the following: ``(3) The
prohibition of subsection (a) does not apply with respect to
conduct by a grandparent or adult sibling of the minor.''
[The amendment follows:]

Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from New York is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Nadler. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, this amendment would simply exempt a
grandparent or adult sibling from the criminal and civil
penalties in this bill. These cases do not involve kidnapping,
not when it's involved with a grandparent or brother or sister
of the young woman having the abortion. These cases do not
involve someone from outside the family intruding into basic
family decisions. They do allow a responsible adult member of
the family to intervene in cases involving serious family
crises, such as rape, incest, family violence, or some other
terrible problem that will sometimes arise.
I realize the bill does not have--does have a mandatory
reporting requirement for crimes. This does not deal with
dangers that are not crimes of the kind described in the bill.
It does not deal with threats. It does not deal with the
prospect of violence. The bill does not deal with a young
person who is away at school and seeks the support of the
nearest relative, perhaps a grandparent.
The bill is really an assault on families and the ability
of families to deal with their problems to the best of their
ability. It presumes that Congress knows best just how each
difficult family situation must be resolved, even within the
family.
I do not think Congress possesses that kind of wisdom,
although it may indeed possess that kind of arrogance. Let us
at least not turn caring grandparents or siblings into
criminals. Let us not allow an abusive father to sue his own
mother if she tries to intervene and help. We should try to
show just a little humanity and perhaps a little humility. And,
therefore, I urge the adoption of this amendment.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr.
Chabot?
Mr. Chabot. I move to strike the last word.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This amendment would codify the circumvention of parental
involvement, and the overwhelming majority of Americans support
parental involvement. In-laws and aunts and uncles and cousins
and siblings or even priests don't have the authority now to
authorize a medical procedure for a minor child or even ear
piercing or the dispensing of aspirin at school. So why should
a fundamental parental right be thrown aside for the abortion
procedure alone? Anyone supporting this amendment must have a
fundamental problem with underlying State laws that allow only
parents to grant consent for this medical procedure.
This amendment would sever the essential parental-child
relationship. Grandparents and adult siblings are not parents.
It's that simple. It's instructive that the Supreme Court has
always held that this important duty to ensure and provide for
the care and nurture of minor children lies only with parents,
a conclusion which arises from the traditional legal
recognition that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act
in the best interests of their own children.
As Justices O'Connor and Kennedy and Souter observed in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, parental consent and notification
laws related to abortion are based on a quite reasonable
assumption that minors will benefit from consultation with
their parents and that children will often not realize that
their parents have their best interests at heart. Parents, not
anyone else, know and can provide their dependent minor
children's complete and accurate medical histories, for
example. Before children undergo medical procedures, parents
are required to provide the critical information. Without that
medical history, an abortion could be a devastating event in a
child's health.
As the Supreme Court has made clear, the medical,
emotional, and psychological consequences of an abortion are
serious and can be lasting. That is particularly so when the
patient is immature. An adequate medical and psychological case
history is important to the physician. Parents can provide
medical and psychological data, refer the physician to other
sources of medical history such as a family physician, and
authorizes family physicians to give relevant data. That's what
the Supreme Court stated.
So I would strongly urge my colleagues to oppose this
amendment and yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Virginia, Mr.
Scott.
Mr. Scott. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, the child can go across the State lines with
assistance or without assistance. This just says if they've got
the assistance of the grandparent or adult sibling that you're
not--that that not be a crime. And even if the prosecutor won't
prosecute, you don't want civil suits involving family members
resulting from a violation of this section.
I would hope that these--these family decisions are bad
enough. I know the majority in Congress don't mind involving
themselves in family decisions and encouraging parents and in-
laws to sue each other. But we ought not--I think the poll
suggested that 80 percent of the public didn't appreciate what
we did a couple of weeks ago, and having civil suits against
family members shouldn't be encouraged in this bill. So I would
hope that we would adopt this amendment, and I will yield to
the gentleman from New York.
Mr. Nadler. Thank you. I thank the gentleman for yielding,
and I obviously agree with him. And I would want to comment on
what the distinguished Chairman of the Subcommittee said when
he said most Americans or a majority, something to that effect,
approve of parental notification and consent laws. That may be.
But I don't think most Americans approve of criminalizing the
brother or sister or grandparent who helps someone get an
abortion if that abortion resulted from incest. And that's what
we're talking about in this amendment.
The rhetoric used for this bill basically says that there
is--that these evil abortion promoters or abortion clinic
owners are making an industry of spiriting young women across
State lines for the purpose of evading the parental
notification requirement. Well, I don't think that's true. But
even if it were, what this amendment is talking about is not
anybody connected with an abortion clinic or anybody else. It's
a grandparent or a brother or a sister--not a cousin, not an
uncle or an aunt, but a grandparent or a brother or a sister
who's motivated presumably by concern for the welfare of the
minor and who agrees with the minor that in this particular
case--not in most cases perhaps, but in this particular case,
because of incest, because of parental hostility, because of
parental drunkenness, for whatever reason, you can't tell or
involve the parent. And maybe that judgment is correct, and
maybe they haven't the sophistication to go for judicial
bypass.
All this would say is you don't make the sibling, the
brother or the sister, or the grandparent a criminal in this
situation where they may very well be right about the welfare
of the minor. And, therefore, it's very different from the rest
of the bill. Even if you agree with the rest of the bill, even
if you agree with the underlying reasoning of parental
involvement, you shouldn't make a criminal out of a sibling or
a grandparent who helps the minor.
That's all this amendment says, and anyone who respects the
family and family values will support this amendment, because
although we do accord primacy to the parents, not 100 percent
of the time, not if the parent is drunk and hostile and
violent, not if the parent committed incest, not in a number of
other cases. And we can't know those situations, but the
sibling or the grandparent can.
I yield----
Mr. Conyers. Would the gentleman from Virginia yield?
Mr. Scott. I yield.
Mr. Conyers. I wanted to take this time to put my opening
statement in the record, and I wanted to commend the gentleman
from New York, the gentleman from Virginia, and the gentlelady
from California, who are offering opportunities for us to
correct legislation that seems unconstitutional in at least
three aspects. It's hard for me to imagine that the other body
is going to go very far with a measure that offers nine
different scenarios of parental notice that will be imposed on
doctors and women across this Nation.
This is a terrible problem that we're dealing with here,
dysfunctional families, child abuse, teen pregnancies, and I
think we need to be far more careful in telling women, young
women facing this situation, who they must confide in and that
the Constitution probably won't apply to them.
I ask unanimous consent to have my statement offered into
the record.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection.
Mr. Conyers. Thank you.
Mr. Scott. I yield back.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. The question is on the amendment
offered by the gentleman from New York, Mr. Nadler. Those in
favor will say aye? Opposed, no?
The noes appear to have it. The----
Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from New York?
Mr. Nadler. I ask the ayes and nays.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. A rollcall will be ordered. The
question is on agreeing to the Nadler amendment. Those in favor
will as your names are called answer aye, those opposed, no,
and the clerk will call the roll.
The Clerk. Mr. Hyde?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Coble?
Mr. Coble. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Coble, no. Mr. Smith?
Mr. Smith of Texas. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Smith, no. Mr. Gallegly?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Goodlatte?
Mr. Goodlatte. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Goodlatte, no. Mr. Chabot?
Mr. Chabot. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Chabot, no. Mr. Lungren?
Mr. Lungren. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Lungren, no. Mr. Jenkins?
Mr. Jenkins. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Jenkins, no. Mr. Cannon?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Bachus?
Mr. Bachus. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Bachus, no. Mr. Inglis?
Mr. Inglis. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Inglis, no. Mr. Hostettler?
Mr. Hostettler. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Hostettler, no. Mr. Green?
Mr. Green. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Green, no. Mr. Keller?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Issa?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Flake?
Mr. Flake. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Flake, no. Mr. Pence?
Mr. Pence. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Pence, no. Mr. Forbes?
Mr. Forbes. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Forbes, no. Mr. King?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Feeney?
Mr. Feeney. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Feeney, no. Mr. Franks?
Mr. Franks. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Franks, no. Mr. Gohmert?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Conyers?
Mr. Conyers. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Conyers, aye. Mr. Berman?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Boucher?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Nadler?
Mr. Nadler. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Nadler, aye. Mr. Scott?
Mr. Scott. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Scott, aye. Mr. Watt?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Ms. Lofgren?
Ms. Lofgren. Aye.
The Clerk. Ms. Lofgren, aye. Ms. Jackson Lee?
Ms. Jackson Lee. Aye.
The Clerk. Ms. Jackson Lee, aye. Ms. Waters?
Ms. Waters. Aye.
The Clerk. Ms. Waters, aye. Mr. Meehan?
Mr. Meehan. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Meehan, aye. Mr. Delahunt?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Wexler?
Mr. Wexler. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Wexler, aye. Mr. Weiner?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Schiff?
Mr. Schiff. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Schiff, aye. Ms. Sanchez?
Ms. Sanchez. Aye.
The Clerk. Ms. Sanchez, aye. Mr. Smith?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Van Hollen?
Mr. Van Hollen. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Van Hollen, aye. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Sensenbrenner. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, no.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. Members in the chamber who wish to
cast or change their votes? The gentleman from California, Mr.
Issa?
Mr. Issa. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Issa, no.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from North Carolina,
Mr. Watt?
Mr. Watt. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Watt, aye.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Florida, Mr.
Keller?
Mr. Keller. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Keller, no.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Utah, Mr.
Cannon?
Mr. Cannon. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Cannon, no.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. Further Members in the chamber who
wish to cast or change their vote? If not, the clerk will
report.
The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, there are 12 ayes and 19 noes.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. And the amendment is not agreed to.
Are there further amendments? The gentleman from Virginia,
Mr. Scott?
Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report the
amendment.
The Clerk. Amendment to H.R. 748, offered by Mr. Scott of
Virginia. Page 3, after line 2, insert the following: ``(3) The
prohibitions of this section do not apply with respect to
conduct by taxi drivers, bus drivers, or others in the business
of professional transport.''
[The amendment follows:]

Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Virginia is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is a very simple
amendment. It will just immunize taxicab drivers and others who
transport minors under this Act. The bill as written--the bill
as written would make the taxicab driver a criminal if they do
the simple task of responding to a call and even if they are
not aware that the minor is evading a State's consent laws. If
the minor hops in the cab and says, ``Take me to the abortion
clinic,'' that would make--then the cab driver complies with
that direction and accepts the fee for the job, that taxicab
driver would be in violation of this section.
If you read the language of the bill, page 1 of the
Subcommittee amendment in the nature of a substitute, it says
that ``whoever knowingly transports a minor across a State
line, with the intent that such minor obtain an abortion,'' and
then it clearly says--you don't have to know whether you're
evading parental consent laws or not because it says, ``and
thereby in fact abridges the right of a parent under a law
requiring parental involvement...shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both.''
Now, even if the prosecutor uses intelligent prosecutorial
discretion and decides not to prosecute the taxicab driver, the
fact is that the bill allows civil liability so that the
parents can sue the taxicab driver for civil damages.
I would hope, Mr. Chairman, that--I don't think that's the
intent of the bill. I would hope that we would exclude taxicab
drivers, bus drivers, and others who might take someone across
a State line and technically violate this section. I would hope
that we would not rope them in and allow parents to sue them to
get money if they violate--if they violate this section. And I
yield back.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr>
Chabot?
Mr. Chabot. Move to strike the last word.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I move in--I rise in
opposition to this amendment.
First, taxicab drivers are not generally liable under this
bill, which allows for the conviction of an individual who
knowingly transports a minor across a State line with the
intent that such individual obtain an abortion. So that's the
point: with the intent that they obtain the abortion. Although
a taxicab driver may have the knowledge that the minor that he
or she is transporting will obtain an abortion as soon as she
arrives at her destination, his or her intent is not that the
minor obtain an abortion; rather, it's to transport the minor
to the destination of her choice, whether it's an abortion
clinic or a shopping mall. In other words, the taxicab driver's
reason for transporting the minor is to receive the fare, not
to ensure that she obtains an abortion. So a taxicab driver
will not generally have the requisite intent necessary for
prosecution under the bill.
Mr. Scott. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Chabot. So the amendment is, in my view, unnecessary.
Mr. Scott. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Chabot. I'd be happy to yield.
Mr. Scott. If the young lady asks the cab driver to ``Take
me to the abortion clinic,'' wouldn't he then know what the
deal is?
Mr. Chabot. Reclaiming my time, that's not his purpose for
transporting her there for the purpose of her getting an
abortion. It's to get his fare.
Now, if--and I know that the gentleman----
Mr. Scott. I'm reading the bill.
Mr. Chabot. Excuse me?
Mr. Scott. I'm reading the bill.
Mr. Chabot. That's fine. But it's the purpose of--now, if
the taxicab driver had impregnated the girl and, therefore, he
was taking her there with the intent that she obtain an
abortion, then he may be prosecutable under this particular
bill. But if he is taking her there for the purpose of
obtaining a fare and transporting her wherever she wants to go,
I cannot imagine that he would be prosecuted under this bill.
So I think your amendment is just unnecessary.
Mr. Scott. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Chabot. I'd be happy to yield.
Mr. Scott. It says ``with the intent that such minor obtain
an abortion.'' The minor announces that she's going to the
abortion clinic, and it doesn't say anything about purpose.
Mr. Chabot. Sure, it does. It says ``with the''--reclaiming
my time, it says for the purpose of obtaining an abortion. If
he transports her there with the intention that she obtain an
abortion, then he may be prosecutable. But that's not his
intention. His intention is to obtain a fare. He would take her
to the movie theater or the mall to get her nails done or
anything else. He's not going to be prosecutable because of the
place that she intends to go. And so I think your amendment is
just unnecessary, and I yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from New York, Mr.
Nadler?
Mr. Nadler. Well, Mr. Chairman, first of all, just
continuing this little dialogue with Mr. Chabot, it doesn't say
anything about purpose. It says ``with the intent that such
minor obtain an abortion.'' The gentleman may be correct. The
gentleman may be correct that a court might read that as
saying, well, he would have taken her, you know, for any
purpose and he didn't have the intent.
On the other hand, a court might read it as saying, well,
since she said, ``Take me to the ABC Abortion Clinic,'' he knew
damn well why she was going there, and that was his intent. So
my----
Mr. Chabot. Would the gentleman----
Mr. Nadler. So my question is: If it's unnecessary, why not
make it explicit? What's the harm of the amendment? Make it
clear, and then we don't have to guess.
Mr. Chabot. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Nadler. Sure.
Mr. Chabot. Before it even gets to the court or the judge,
the prosecutor would have to look at this case, read the law,
and believe----
Mr. Nadler. Well, reclaiming my time, there's a civil
lawsuit, too. You don't need a prosecutor. This bill provides
for a civil lawsuit. So my question, which I will yield again
to you, is: I understand your intent in the way the bill is
written. I think our intent is the same. We don't like the
bill, but the intent for this purpose is the same. So why not
take this amendment and make it clear. Nobody has to guess. I
yield.
Mr. Chabot. Again, the cab driver wouldn't have the
requisite criminal intent under the law, and relative to a
civil case--I mean, that's what the courts are for in this
country. Hopefully, in most cases, the courts exercise----
Mr. Nadler. But, again, I'll ask: Why not make it clear
that that's what you mean?
Mr. Chabot. I think it's unnecessary. I think the bill----
Mr. Nadler. But is it harmful? Why not make it clear?
Mr. Chabot. All your amendments that are offered on your
side could make the bill better, arguably on your side.
Mr. Nadler. No, no, no. My question--but I'm going to ask
you this again, Steve. Most of the amendments we offer change
the bill substantively. You're saying this amendment doesn't
change the bill substantively. I'm saying that, well, it makes
clear what you say is the intent. So why not take it?
Mr. Chabot. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Nadler. Yes.
Mr. Chabot. I've already said my principal argument, but
I'll just give you another one.
You could potentially immunize guilty cab drivers if there
were those out there that were involved in some sort of racket
to--maybe they were some sort of agent for the abortion clinic.
Or, again, as I said before, maybe the cab driver impregnated
the girl to begin with.
Mr. Nadler. Reclaiming----
Mr. Chabot. There are many instances, and we wouldn't want
to immunize----
Mr. Nadler. Reclaiming my time, I yield to the gentleman
from Virginia.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, and I thank the gentleman for
yielding. It says, ``whoever knowingly transports a minor
across a State line, with the intent that such minor obtain an
abortion,'' the minor has already announced where she's going
and, in fact, could announce what she's going to do when she
gets there. They could get involved--they can get involved in a
conversation.
When the parents find out, the parents are going to be mad
and are going to be looking for somebody to sue. And when they
find out it was a taxicab driver with deep pockets, that's who
they're going to sue. And that's what this bill allows, and I
don't think that's right. Maybe that's the intent that you're
going to make sure that no taxicab driver, no bus driver,
nobody else is going to take the minor across State lines. On
the way, if the minor is with somebody, the taxicab driver may
hear the conversation and learn what the purpose of the trip
is, and when the parents find out, they're going to get sued,
and deep pockets. And those trial lawyers that some Members of
this Committee don't like are going to get a fee for suing
them.
Mr. Bachus. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Scott. It's the gentleman from New York's time. I yield
back.
Mr. Bachus. Did you say a taxicab driver----
Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is yielding----
Mr. Bachus.--with deep pockets? [Laughter.]
Mr. Nadler. I think he meant that under the doctrine of
agency, the taxicab driving company.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. Okay. Well, the time still belongs
to the gentleman from Virginia, if he wishes to--the question
is on----
Mr. Scott. I yield back.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. The question is on the amendment
offered by the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott. Those in
favor will say aye? Opposed, no?
The noes appear to have it
Mr. Scott. Recorded vote.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. A recorded vote is requested and
will be ordered. Those in favor of the Scott amendment will as
your names are called answer aye, those opposed, no, and the
clerk will call the roll.
The Clerk. Mr. Hyde?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Coble?
Mr. Coble. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Coble, no. Mr. Smith?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Gallegly?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Goodlatte?
Mr. Goodlatte. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Goodlatte, no. Mr. Chabot?
Mr. Chabot. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Chabot, no. Mr. Lungren?
Mr. Lungren. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Lungren, no. Mr. Jenkins?
Mr. Jenkins. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Jenkins, no. Mr. Cannon?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Bachus?
Mr. Bachus. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Bachus, no. Mr. Inglis?
Mr. Inglis. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Inglis, no. Mr. Hostettler?
Mr. Hostettler. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Hostettler, no. Mr. Green?
Mr. Green. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Green, no. Mr. Keller?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Issa?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Flake?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Pence?
Mr. Pence. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Pence, no. Mr. Forbes?
Mr. Forbes. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Forbes, no. Mr. King?
Mr. King. No.
The Clerk. Mr. King, no. Mr. Feeney?
Mr. Feeney. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Feeney, no. Mr. Franks?
Mr. Franks. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Franks, no. Mr. Gohmert?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Conyers?
Mr. Conyers. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Conyers, aye. Mr. Berman?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Boucher?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Nadler?
Mr. Nadler. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Nadler, aye. Mr. Scott?
Mr. Scott. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Scott, aye. Mr. Watt?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Ms. Lofgren?
Ms. Lofgren. Aye.
The Clerk. Ms. Lofgren, aye. Ms. Jackson Lee?
Ms. Jackson Lee. Aye.
The Clerk. Ms. Jackson Lee, aye. Ms. Waters?
Ms. Waters. Aye.
The Clerk. Ms. Waters, aye. Mr. Meehan?
Mr. Meehan. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Meehan, aye. Mr. Delahunt?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Wexler?
Mr. Wexler. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Wexler, aye. Mr. Weiner?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Schiff?
Mr. Schiff. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Schiff, aye. Ms. Sanchez?
Ms. Sanchez. Aye.
The Clerk. Ms. Sanchez, aye. Mr. Smith?
Mr. Smith of Washington. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Smith, aye. Mr. Van Hollen?
Mr. Van Hollen. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Van Hollen, aye. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Sensenbrenner. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, no.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. Further Members in the chamber who
wish to cast or change their votes? The gentleman from
California, Mr. Issa?
Mr. Issa. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Issa, no.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Florida, Mr.
Keller?
Mr. Keller. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Keller, no.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. Further Members who wish to cast or
change their vote? If not, the clerk will report.
The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Watt?
Mr. Watt. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Watt, aye.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will try again.
The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, there are 13 ayes and 17 noes.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. And the amendment is not agreed to.
Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Sensenbrenner. Are there further amendments? The
gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott.
Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
It's marked number 3.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report the
amendment.
The Clerk. Page 3, after line 2, insert the following:
``(3) Limitation on Prosecution--No prosecution can be brought
with respect to a violation of this section other than against
the person committing the offense in the first degree.''
Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection, the amendment is
considered as read.
[The amendment follows:]

Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Virginia will be
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman, this amendment would prohibit
prosecutions under Section 2 and 3 of the criminal code. It
would require the person actually committing the offense--the
criminal code Sections 2 and 3 say that if you're a--after the
fact, aiding and abetting, conspiracy, all get prosecuted
similar to the person actually committing the crime. This could
be a grandmother, sister, or friend who offers care and comfort
after the fact, someone arranging for transportation back to
the--back home, all of this, even ministers and relatives who
want to ensure that the minor undergoes a safe procedure and
comes home unharmed would be considered criminals and subject
to civil liability.
So, Mr. Chairman, I would hope that we would not expand
this bill to accessories after the fact, those who may be
involved as technically conspirators, aiding and abetting, as
principals in the first degree, not only subject to criminal
liability but also to civil liability. I would hope we would
adopt the amendment.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. Does the gentleman yield back?
Mr. Scott. I yield back. I'm sorry.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr.
Chabot?
Mr. Chabot. Move to strike the last word.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll be brief. I rise
in opposition to this amendment.
The amendment should be defeated because it would, for
example, exempt from prosecution a sexual predator who pays
another to transport a young girl across State lines in order
to circumvent parental involvement laws and destroy evidence of
his sexual crimes. CIANA contains an exception for the
transported minor and her parents so that they cannot be
prosecuted or sued.
As to other people, this amendment would excuse--it would
create an abortion exception to exclude them from general
Federal criminal laws and such an exemption is entirely
unwarranted. The amendment would violate fundamental rules that
hold aiders and abettors equally responsible for their crimes,
and that is wrong and that is why I oppose this amendment.
Mr. Scott. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Chabot. I'd be happy to yield.
Mr. Scott. If someone offers aid and comfort after the
fact, would they be subject to civil liability under the bill?
Mr. Chabot. Reclaiming my time----
Mr. Bachus. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Chabot. I'll yield, yes.
Mr. Bachus. They would not be responsible because they
would not be transporting the child for the purpose of gaining
an abortion. She would have already had an abortion.
Mr. Scott. If you'll yield. The civil liability occurs--
attaches when you've violated the law. This is a criminal
statute. You've violated the law----
Mr. Bachus. Well, you'd have to violate the law by
transporting her across a State line to obtain an abortion.
Mr. Chabot. Yes, reclaiming----
Mr. Bachus. Not after the fact----
Mr. Chabot.--my time----
Mr. Scott. Aiding and abetting is a crime.
Mr. Chabot. Reclaiming my time----
Mr. Bachus. Aiding and abetting----
Chairman Sensenbrenner. The time belongs to the gentleman
from Ohio, who wants it back.
Mr. Chabot. Yes, reclaiming my time, the gentleman's
amendment refers to a criminal prosecution, and, therefore,
that's what you're talking about. So it would depend upon
whether you had the necessary criminal intent to have violated
this statute, this law.
Mr. Scott. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Chabot. I'll yield.
Mr. Scott. And if you cannot be criminally prosecuted, you
can't be exposed to civil liability. That's the whole point of
the amendment, to get people from--if you're providing aid and
comfort after the fact, the criminal code allows you to be
prosecuted. And if you can be prosecuted, you're civilly
liable. If you can't be prosecuted, you're not civilly liable
under the bill. What I'm trying to do is get those who may be
offering aid and comfort after the fact----
Mr. Bachus. Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Scott.--from under the provisions of the bill.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. The time belongs----
Mr. Chabot. Reclaiming my time, I'll yield to the gentleman
from----
Mr. Bachus. Mr. Chairman, that analogy doesn't fly under
this bill. You have to--to be guilty, you have to aid and abet
someone to cross State lines for the purpose of getting a
divorce--I mean getting an abortion.
Mr. Scott. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Bachus. After the fact, you're not aid--when you're
helping them return home, you're not in any way aiding and
abetting them in gaining----
Mr. Scott. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Chabot. I'll reclaim my time, and I'll yield to the
gentleman from Virginia.
Mr. Scott. Well, what about accessory after the fact?
Mr. Bachus. How could you be an accessory after the fact
when you----
Mr. Chabot. Reclaiming my time, I don't think it's relevant
to this, the bill, and I yield back.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. The question is on the amendment
offered by the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott. Those in
favor will say aye? Opposed, no?
The noes appear to have it. The gentleman--a rollcall will
be ordered. Those in favor of the Scott of Virginia amendment
will as your names are called answer aye, those opposed, no,
and the clerk will call the roll.
The Clerk. Mr. Hyde?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Coble?
Mr. Coble. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Coble, no. Mr. Smith?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Gallegly?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Goodlatte?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Chabot?
Mr. Chabot. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Chabot, no. Mr. Lungren?
Mr. Lungren. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Lungren, no. Mr. Jenkins?
Mr. Jenkins. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Jenkins, no. Mr. Cannon?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Bachus?
Mr. Bachus. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Bachus, no. Mr. Inglis?
Mr. Inglis. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Inglis, no. Mr. Hostettler?
Mr. Hostettler. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Hostettler, no. Mr. Green?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Keller?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Issa?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Flake?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Pence?
Mr. Pence. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Pence, no. Mr. Forbes?
Mr. Forbes. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Forbes, no. Mr. King?
Mr. King. No.
The Clerk. Mr. King, no. Mr. Feeney?
Mr. Feeney. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Feeney, no. Mr. Franks?
Mr. Franks. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Franks, no. Mr. Gohmert?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Conyers?
Mr. Conyers. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Conyers, aye. Mr. Berman?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Boucher?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Nadler?
Mr. Nadler. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Nadler, aye. Mr. Scott?
Mr. Scott. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Scott, aye. Mr. Watt?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Ms. Lofgren?
Ms. Lofgren. Aye.
The Clerk. Ms. Lofgren, aye. Ms. Jackson Lee?
Ms. Jackson Lee. Aye.
The Clerk. Ms. Jackson Lee, aye. Ms. Waters?
Ms. Waters. Aye.
The Clerk. Ms. Waters, aye. Mr. Meehan?
Mr. Meehan. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Meehan, aye. Mr. Delahunt?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Wexler?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Weiner?
Mr. Weiner. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Weiner, aye. Mr. Schiff?
Mr. Schiff. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Schiff, aye. Ms. Sanchez?
Ms. Sanchez. Aye.
The Clerk. Ms. Sanchez, aye. Mr. Smith?
Mr. Smith of Washington. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Smith, aye. Mr. Van Hollen?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Sensenbrenner. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, no.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. Further Members who wish to cast or
change their votes? The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Keller?
Mr. Keller. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Keller, no.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from California, Mr.
Issa?
Mr. Issa. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Issa, no.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Arizona, Mr.
Flake?
Mr. Flake. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Flake, no.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from North Carolina,
Mr. Watt?
Mr. Watt. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Watt, aye.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Virginia, Mr.
Goodlatte?
Mr. Goodlatte. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Goodlatte, no.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr.
Green?
Mr. Green. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Green, no.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. Further Members who wish to cast or
change their vote? If not, the clerk will report?
The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, there are 12 ayes and 18 noes.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. And the amendment is not agreed to.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Sensenbrenner. Are there further amendments? The
gentlewoman from Texas?
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, I have two amendments that
I'd like to take en bloc, please, 005 and 006.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report the
amendments.
The Clerk. Amendments to H.R. 748, offered by Ms. Jackson
Lee. Page 3, after line 2, insert the following----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent----
Chairman Sensenbrenner. Let's take a look at them first.
The Clerk. ``(3) The prohibitions of this section do not
apply with respect to conduct by clergy, godparents, aunts,
uncles, or first cousins.''
Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection, the amendments
are considered as read. And without objection, the amendments
are considered en bloc.
[The amendments follow:]

Chairman Sensenbrenner. And the gentlewoman from Texas is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much. I'm hoping that we
can find some collegiate spirit and recognize the importance of
a young woman receiving counsel when she makes this significant
decision. Frankly, I believe that we would honor the integrity
of the Constitution if we would allow a young woman her
relationship with her God and her counsel to help her make
these decisions.
My amendment, the first amendment in the en bloc, allows
for the young woman to consult with clergy, godparents, aunts,
uncles, or first cousins, and that conduct by those individuals
would not be criminalized. It's a very simple amendment but
necessary because it helps to eliminate the excessive punitive
nature of this legislation. A young woman should not lose her
right to seek counsel and guidance from a member of the clergy,
her godparent, or the family member enumerated in the text of
the amendment.
Twenty-three States follow all provisions of the Child
Custody Protection Act which make it a Federal crime for an
adult to accompany a minor across State lines. Ten States have
a provision that requires some parental notice, but other
adults may be notified. And 17 States have no law restricting a
woman's access to abortion in this case. The law, of course, is
confused, and I think it's inappropriate for the Federal law to
intrude on States who do not have any prohibition whatsoever.
This allows for an expanded list of individuals not to be
criminalized, and I ask my colleagues to support it.
A second amendment deals with asking for a GAO study
detailing the impact of the number of unsafe and illegal
abortions performed on minors who would be affected by this law
and report to Congress the results of that study within a year
of the enactment of this law. This law is suggested to be
corrective. I would argue that it's going to increase the
number of unsafe abortions because young women are going to be
forced into the back alleys again because they cannot find a
way in an open way to counsel with individuals, to seek clergy
support, and, frankly, it is going to take us back as opposed
to take us further.
I'd ask my colleagues to support these amendments, and I
yield my time.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr.
Chabot.
Mr. Chabot. Move to strike the last word.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me address the
study first. I would oppose both. The amendment I believe
should be defeated because there is no evidence that these laws
have led to an increase in illegal abortions. During the
Committee testimony, we had one of our witnesses, Professor
Teresa Stanton Collett. She testified that--and I will quote--
``Parental involvement laws are on the books in over two-thirds
of the States, some for over 20 years, and there's almost no
case where it's been established that these laws led to
parental abuse or to self-inflicted injury, and there's no
evidence that these laws have led to an increase in illegal
abortions.'' I don't think the study is necessary.
Now, relative to the grandparents and aunts and uncles and
the rest, I already stated previously so I'm not going to go
into as much detail, but the folks mentioned in the amendment,
they don't have the authority now to authorize any medical
procedure for a minor child. I mean, even ear piercings or
anything else, disbursing of aspirin, any of those types of
things, has to be the parents who do this. So there's no reason
that we can make something that can be so significant to this
child's life or teenager's life as having an abortion that the
parents shouldn't be involved. The parents have the best
interest of the children involved. We've got the bypass
procedure if you have a bad parent, as has been argued time and
again on the other side. So there's really no reason for this
amendment. I oppose it.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Chabot. I'd be happy to yield.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the gentleman very much, and I
really appreciate how you have sought to engage.
Let me just say with respect to the first amendment, we
should expand rights, not deny rights. It's interesting in the
most recent case we're willing--even though it was by law that
Terry Schiavo had the guardianship of her spouse, we denied
parental rights. Obviously, she was an adult.
In this instance, however, you have three different--three
different positions that States have taken: strict rules, less
strict, and no rules. This is a Federal law that you are
impacting on these States, and there should be flexibility.
Clergy should not be denied.
On the study, the reason for the study is that this is a
new Federal law that will impact more greatly and more
severely, and, therefore, I believe it's important to determine
how many illegal abortions will occur because of this law. We
want to do right, I would assume, and I'd hope my colleagues
with support both amendments.
Mr. Chabot. Well, reclaiming my time, as I stated before,
during the hearing we had experts who indicated that it was not
felt that there would be an increase in illegal abortions. And,
secondly, again, I just want to reiterate that we believe that
parents are the people that are best in a position to make
these types of decisions for their minor children, not the
aunts or uncles or grandparents or taxidrivers or anybody else.
And I yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. The question is on the amendments
offered by the gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee, en
bloc. Those in favor will say aye? Opposed, no?
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Sensenbrenner. The noes appear to have it.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, a rollcall.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. A rollcall is ordered. Those in
favor of the Jackson Lee amendments en bloc will as your names
are called answer aye, those opposed, no, and the clerk will
call the roll.
The Clerk. Mr. Hyde?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Coble?
Mr. Coble. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Coble, no. Mr. Smith?
Mr. Smith of Texas. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Smith, no. Mr. Gallegly?
Mr. Gallegly. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Gallegly, no. Mr. Goodlatte?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Chabot?
Mr. Chabot. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Chabot, no. Mr. Lungren?
Mr. Lungren. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Lungren, no. Mr. Jenkins?
Mr. Jenkins. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Jenkins, no. Mr. Cannon?
Mr. Cannon. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Cannon, no. Mr. Bachus?
Mr. Bachus. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Bachus, no. Mr. Inglis?
Mr. Inglis. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Inglis, no. Mr. Hostettler?
Mr. Hostettler. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Hostettler, no. Mr. Green?
Mr. Green. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Green, no. Mr. Keller?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Issa?
Mr. Issa. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Issa, no. Mr. Flake?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Pence?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Forbes?
Mr. Forbes. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Forbes, no. Mr. King?
Mr. King. No.
The Clerk. Mr. King, no. Mr. Feeney?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Franks?
Mr. Franks. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Franks, no. Mr. Gohmert?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Conyers?
Mr. Conyers. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Conyers, aye. Mr. Berman?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Boucher?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Nadler?
Mr. Nadler. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Nadler, aye. Mr. Scott?
Mr. Scott. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Scott, aye. Mr. Watt?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Ms. Lofgren?
Ms. Lofgren. Aye.
The Clerk. Ms. Lofgren, aye. Ms. Jackson Lee?
Ms. Jackson Lee. Aye.
The Clerk. Ms. Jackson Lee, aye. Ms. Waters?
Ms. Waters. Aye.
The Clerk. Ms. Waters, aye. Mr. Meehan?
Mr. Meehan. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Meehan, aye. Mr. Delahunt?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Wexler?
Mr. Wexler. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Wexler, aye. Mr. Weiner?
Mr. Weiner. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Weiner, aye. Mr. Schiff?
Mr. Schiff. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Schiff, aye. Ms. Sanchez?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Smith?
Mr. Smith of Washington. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Smith, aye. Mr. Van Hollen?
Mr. Van Hollen. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Van Hollen, aye. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Sensenbrenner. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, no.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. Further Members in the chamber who
wish to cast or change their votes? The gentleman from Florida,
Mr. Keller?
Mr. Keller. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Keller, no.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Arizona, Mr.
Flake?
Mr. Flake. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Flake, no.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Indiana, Mr.
Pence?
Mr. Pence. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Pence, no.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Virginia, Mr.
Goodlatte?
Mr. Goodlatte. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Goodlatte, no.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. Further Members who wish to cast--
Mr. Watt of North Carolina?
Mr. Watt. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Watt, aye.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report.
The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, there are 13 ayes and 20 noes.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. And the amendments are not agreed
to.
Are there further amendments? If there are no further
amendments, a reporting quorum is present. Without objection,
the Subcommittee amendment in the nature of a substitute laid
down as the base text is adopted. The question occurs on the
motion to report the bill H.R. 748 favorably as amended. All in
favor will say aye? Opposed, no?
The ayes appear to have it--a recorded vote is requested
and will be ordered. Those in favor of reporting H.R. 748
favorably as amended will as your names are called answer aye,
those opposed, no, and the clerk will call the roll.
The Clerk. Mr. Hyde?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Coble?
Mr. Coble. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Coble, aye. Mr. Smith?
Mr. Smith of Texas. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Smith, aye. Mr. Gallegly?
Mr. Gallegly. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Gallegly, aye. Mr. Goodlatte?
Mr. Goodlatte. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Goodlatte, aye. Mr. Chabot?
Mr. Chabot. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Chabot, aye. Mr. Lungren?
Mr. Lungren. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Lungren, aye. Mr. Jenkins?
Mr. Jenkins. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Jenkins, aye. Mr. Cannon?
Mr. Cannon. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Cannon, aye. Mr. Bachus?
Mr. Bachus. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Bachus, aye. Mr. Inglis?
Mr. Inglis. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Inglis, aye. Mr. Hostettler?
Mr. Hostettler. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Hostettler, aye. Mr. Green?
Mr. Green. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Green, aye. Mr. Keller?
Mr. Keller. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Keller, aye. Mr. Issa?
Mr. Issa. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Issa, aye. Mr. Flake?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Pence?
Mr. Pence. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Pence, aye. Mr. Forbes?
Mr. Forbes. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Forbes, aye. Mr. King?
Mr. King. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. King, aye. Mr. Feeney?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Franks?
Mr. Franks. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Franks, aye. Mr. Gohmert?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Conyers?
Mr. Conyers. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Conyers, no. Mr. Berman?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Boucher?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Nadler?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Scott?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Scott--Mr. Watt?
[No response.]
Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will continue to call the
roll.
The Clerk. Mr. Scott?
Mr. Scott. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Scott, no. Mr. Watt?
Mr. Watt. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Watt, no. Ms. Lofgren?
Ms. Lofgren. No.
The Clerk. Ms. Lofgren, no. Ms. Jackson Lee?
Ms. Jackson Lee. No.
The Clerk. Ms. Jackson Lee, no. Ms. Waters?
Ms. Waters. No.
The Clerk. Ms. Waters, no. Mr. Meehan?
Mr. Meehan. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Meehan, no. Mr. Delahunt?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Wexler?
Mr. Wexler. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Wexler, no. Mr. Weiner?
Mr. Weiner. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Weiner, no. Mr. Schiff?
Mr. Schiff. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Schiff, no. Ms. Sanchez?
Ms. Sanchez. No.
The Clerk. Ms. Sanchez, no. Mr. Smith?
Mr. Smith of Washington. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Smith, no. Mr. Van Hollen?
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Sensenbrenner. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, aye.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. Members who wish to cast or change
their votes? The gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Flake?
Mr. Flake. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Flake, aye.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from New York, Mr.
Nadler?
Mr. Nadler. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Nadler, no.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. Further Members who wish to cast or
change their votes? If not, the clerk will report.
Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Sensenbrenner. For what purpose does the gentleman
from----
Mr. Scott. Could I ascertain how I'm recorded?
Chairman Sensenbrenner. How is the gentleman from Virginia
recorded?
The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Scott is recorded as a no.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report.
The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, there are 20 ayes and 13 noes.
Chairman Sensenbrenner. And the amendment to report the
bill favorably as amended is agreed to. Without objection, the
staff will be directed to make any technical and conforming
changes, and all Members will be given 2 days as provided by
the House rules in which to submit additional, dissenting,
supplemental, or minority views.
[Intervening business.]
Chairman Sensenbrenner. The Committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:02 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]

DISSENTING VIEWS

We strongly dissent from H.R. 748. This legislation will
increase health risks to young women who choose to have an
abortion, is anti-family, anti-physician, and is clearly
unconstitutional.
H.R. 748 consists of two dangerous and objectionable new
criminal laws--proposed new 18 U.S.C. sections 2431 and 2432.
The proposed new section 2431--the Travel Provision--contains
the provisions of the bill previously known as the ``Child
Custody Protection Act,'' which would impose criminal
(including up to 1 year in prison) and civil penalties upon a
person other than a parent--including a grandmother, aunt,
sibling, or clergy member--who helps a teen cross certain state
lines for an abortion unless the teen had already fulfilled the
requirements of her home state's law restricting teens'
abortions.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The proposed law would not require that the defendant know that
the state's parental involvement law has not been satisfied, or that
the defendant intend to aid in its circumvention. At the subcommittee
markup, Representative Chabot offered an amendment that eliminated a
possible affirmative defense in the original bill that the physicians
could use any information or ``compelling facts'' from the minor
herself in order to not comply with this bill. The amendment changed
the bill to only allow for actual evidence from the parents or
reasonable documentation from a court as affirmative defenses.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The proposed new section 2432--the Federal Notification
Provision--would create a sweeping new parental notification
requirement on young women who need abortion services in a
state where they do not reside, by imposing criminal (up to 1
year in prison) and civil penalties on physicians that do not
provide at least a 24 hours notice to the parent, even where
the parent brings his or her child to the physician.\2\
Significantly, neither the Travel Provision (section 2431) nor
the Federal Notification Provision (section 2432) contain any
exception for when an abortion may be necessary to protect a
teen's health, in violation of Supreme Court precedent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ If the physician is in a state where no parental consent or
notification law or where a more reasonable parental consent or
notification law is in force, this section requires that a doctor or a
member of his staff provide ``actual notice'' to the parents of a
patient in person at least 24 hours before the doctor provides the
abortion. If the doctor is unable to provide actual notice after making
a reasonable effort, then the doctor must provide 48 hours
``constructive notice'' instead.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In effect, H.R. 748 will make those state laws that the
Majority prefers (those requiring involvement of a parent or
guardian) controlling in states with laws that it does not like
(those allowing other adults to receive notice or provide
consent or with no parental involvement requirements). This is
an unprecedented Congressional intrusion into what has
traditionally been an arena in which each state regulates its
own citizens.
It is important to note that twenty-seven states and the
District of Columbia either have no parental involvement laws
or a law more lenient than the bill's definition of a
``parental involvement law.'' Thus, within those states,
representing approximately 57% of the United States population,
H.R. 748 will impose the laws of the other twenty-three states,
representing just 43% of the population.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Fewer than half of the states enforce a requirement for
notification or consent of a parent:

GTwenty-three states have laws that appear to match the Teen
Endangerment Act's restrictive definition of a ``parental involvement
law:'' Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Nebraska, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota,
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming.

GTen states have parental involvement laws that do not limit
the notification or consent requirement to a parent exclusively, but
allow involvement of some other adult, such as a grandparent or other
relative, or allow a physician to waive the parental involvement
requirement in certain situations: Colorado, Delaware, Iowa, Maine,
Maryland, North Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin.

GEleven states have enacted parental involvement laws that
are not enforced within the state because the laws are legally
defective, as established by court rulings or Attorney General
opinions: Alaska, California, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Montana,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, and Oklahoma.

GThe District of Columbia and the other six states--
Connecticut, Hawaii, New York, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington--have
not enacted forced parental involvement laws.
The legislation is opposed by a wide variety of groups that
are committed to reducing teenage pregnancy and protecting a
woman's right to choose, such as Planned Parenthood, NARAL Pro-
Choice America, the American Civil Liberties Union, and the
Center for Reproductive Rights.\4\ In addition, major medical
associations, including the American Medical Association, the
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, the
American College of Physicians, and the American Public Health
Association--have longstanding policies opposing mandatory
parental-involvement laws, such as H.R. 748, because of the
dangers they pose to young women and the need for confidential
access to physicians. The American Academy of Pediatrics and
Society for Adolescent Medicine oppose the legislation because
it increases the risk of harm to adolescents by delaying or
denying access to appropriate medical care.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Memorandum from the American Civil Liberties Union, to Members
of the House Committee on the Judiciary (Mar. 2, 2005) (on file with
the minority staff of the House Judiciary Committee); Memorandum from
Planned Parenthood, to Members of the House Committee on the Judiciary
(Apr. 12, 2005) (on file with minority staff of the House Judiciary
Committee); Memorandum from National Abortion and Reproductive Rights
Action League, to Members of the House Committee on the Judiciary (Apr.
12, 2005) (on file with the minority staff of the House Judiciary
Committee); American Medical Association, Ethics Op. 2.015 (1994)
(discussing mandatory parental consent for minors seeking an abortion);
National Abortion Federation, Teen Endangerment Act Repackaged: A
Menacing Maze for Young Woman, Their Families, and Their Doctors (2005)
available at http://www.prochoice.org/policy/national/teen--
endangerment.html; Center for Reproductive Rights, The Teen
Endangerment Act: Harming Young Women Who Seek Abortions, (April 2005)
available at http://www.reproductiverights.org/pdf/pub--bp--tea.pdf.
For organizations opposed to nearly identical Federal parental consent
legislation, see also Letter from American Academy of Pediatrics,
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists; American Medical
Women's Association, Society for Adolescent Medicine, to Members of the
House of Representatives (Apr. 2, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We believe the bill denies young women facing unintended
pregnancies the assistance of trusted adults, endangers their
health, and violates their constitutional rights. For these
reasons, and the reasons set forth below, we dissent from H.R.
748.

I. LEGISLATION ENDANGERS YOUNG WOMEN

Both the Travel Provision (section 2431) and the Federal
Notification Provision (section 2432) will operate to endanger
the lives and health of young women.
With regard to the Travel Provision, we would note that
although an abortion is generally very safe, it is still far
preferable and safer to permit a trusted friend or family
member to drive a woman home from this surgical procedure.\5\
Moreover, responsible health care providers do not provide
these services unless they are confident the patient has
someone who will accompany them and assist them following the
procedure. Unfortunately, under the Travel Provision, teenagers
who are unable to satisfy a state parental involvement law--
either because they cannot tell one parent (or in some states,
both parents) about their pregnancy or because they have no
fair chance of obtaining a judicial bypass--will be forced to
travel alone across state lines to obtain an abortion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Many teenagers seeking an abortion must travel out-of-state to
obtain the procedure, either because the closest facility is located in
a neighboring state or because there is no in-state provider available.
In fact, currently 86% of counties--home to 32% of women of
childbearing age--lack an physician. See Stanley K. Henshaw, Abortion
Services in the United States, 1995 and 1996, 30 Fam. Plan. Persp. 262,
266 (1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As much as we would prefer the active and supportive
involvement of parents in young people's major decisions, it is
not always realistic to expect them to seek parental
involvement willingly in the sensitive area of abortion. Where
a child is unwilling or unable to seek parental consent, the
results can be tragic. The testimony of Bill and Mary Bell
before the Constitution Subcommittee during consideration of
predecessor legislation in the 105th Congress is telling in
this regard.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ See Hearing on H.R. 3682: The Child Custody Protection Act
before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 105th Cong. 17 (May 28, 1998) (statement of Bill and Mary
Bell, submitted for the record); See also The National Abortion
Federation, The True Victims of S. 1645/H.R. 3682 The Teen Endangerment
Act (1998) (describing the case of Keishawn, an eleven year old from
Maryland, who was impregnated by her step-father, and sought an
abortion with the assistance of her aunt, Vicky Simpson, who was
awaiting an order granting her custody of Keishawn. Upon learning of
the pregnancy, Keishawn's doctors in Maryland recommended that Keishawn
have anesthesia during the abortion procedure, but none of the
hospitals in Maryland would allow the abortion to be provided at their
facility. As a result, Keishawn's aunt sought the attention of a
specialist practicing in a neighboring state, who agreed to provide the
abortion. Under H.R. 748, Vicki could have been federally prosecuted
for helping her young niece cope with this pregnancy resulting from
incest).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Bells were the parents of a daughter who died after an
illegal, unsafe abortion that she sought instead of telling her
parents about her pregnancy, notwithstanding Indiana's parental
notice law. A Planned Parenthood counselor in Indiana informed
Becky that she would have to notify her parents or petition a
judge in order to obtain an abortion. Becky responded that she
did not want to inform her parents because she did not want to
hurt them. She also replied that if she could not tell her
parents, with whom she was very close, she would not feel
comfortable asking a judge she did not even know. Instead of
traveling 110 miles away to Kentucky, Becky opted to undergo an
illegal abortion close to her home. Tragically, Becky developed
serious complications from her illegal abortion that caused her
death. It is unlikely that H.R. 748 could have changed this
outcome or would have convinced Becky to confide in her parents
about her pregnancy. In fact, the new restrictions and
liabilities imposed on health care providers under this bill
would undoubtedly make such situations even worse.
Some young women justifiably fear that they would be
physically abused if forced to disclose their pregnancy to
their parents. Nearly one-third of minors who choose not to
consult with their parents have experienced violence in their
family, feared violence, or feared being forced to leave
home.\7\ Enacting this legislation and forcing young women in
these circumstances to notify their parents of their
pregnancies will only exacerbate the dangerous cycle of
violence in dysfunctional families. This is the lesson of
Spring Adams, an Idaho teenager who was shot to death by her
father after he learned she was planning to terminate a
pregnancy caused by his acts of incest.\8\ It is clear that
when a young woman believes that she cannot involve her parents
in her decision to terminate a pregnancy, the law cannot
mandate healthy, open family communication.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ See Henshaw, supra note 10, at 196.
\8\ See Maggie Boule, An American Tragedy, Sunday Oregonian, Aug.
27, 1989.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We are well aware of proponents' claims that the travel
provision would protect the rights of minors who cannot obtain
parental consent because they have the option to appear before
judges and obtain a judicial bypass for any parental
involvement laws. While bypasses may have some theoretical
benefits, in many cases it is difficult if not impossible for
troubled young women to obtain them. Some teenagers live in
regions where the local judges consistently refuse to grant
bypasses, regardless of the facts involved. For example, one
study found that a number of judges in Massachusetts either
refuse to handle abortion petitions or focus inappropriately on
the morality of abortion.\9\ Other young women may live in
small communities where the judge may be a friend of the
parents, a family member, or even the parent of a friend. Still
others may live in regions where the relevant courts are not
open in the evenings or on weekends, when minors could seek a
bypass without missing school or arousing suspicion.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ See Patricia Donovan, Judging Teenagers: How Minors Fare When
They Seek Court-Authorized Abortions, 15 Fam. Plan. Persp. 259 (1983);
see also Hodgson v. Minnesota, 487 U.S. 417, 476 (1990) (finding that
in Minnesota, many judges refuse even to hear bypass proceedings); In
re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1190 (Fla. 1989) (describing how a judge in
Florida, after denying a bypass petition to a teenage girl who was in
high school, participated in extracurricular activities, worked 20
hours a week, and baby-sat regularly for her mother, suggested that he,
as a representative of the court, had standing to represent the state's
interest when the minor appealed the denial).
\10\ The courts in Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Rhode Island are
not open in the evenings or on weekends. See Donovan, supra, at 259.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The difficulties in obtaining a judicial bypass were
clearly illustrated by Ms. Billie Lominick during her testimony
before the Subcommittee on the Constitution. Ms. Lominick was a
63-year-old grandmother who helped a pregnant minor from a
physically and sexually abusive household cross state lines to
obtain an abortion.\11\ Ms. Lominick testified that her
assistance was essential because the minor was unable to find
any judge in her home state of South Carolina who would hear
her judicial bypass petition.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ See Hearing on H.R. 1218 `The Child Custody Protection Act'
before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 106th Cong. 23 (May 27, 1999) (statement of Billie
Lominick).
\12\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Moreover, reliance on the judicial bypass system as an
effective alternative to parental consent understates the
intimidating effect of seeking a court-sanctioned abortion.
Many minors fear that the judicial bypass procedure lacks the
necessary confidentiality. The American Medical Association has
noted that ``because the need for privacy may be compelling,
minors may be driven to desperate measures to maintain the
confidentiality of their pregnancies. . . . The desire to
maintain secrecy has been one of the leading reasons for
illegal abortion deaths since . . . 1973.'' \13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ See Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical
Association, Mandatory Parental Consent to Abortion, JAMA, Jan. 6,
1993, at 83.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Many young women, faced with the violation of
confidentiality or the prospect of embarrassment and social
stigma would resort to drastic measures rather than undergo the
humiliation of revealing intimate details of their lives to a
series of strangers in a formal, legal process. Young women's
concerns about confidentiality are especially acute in rural
areas. For example, in one case a minor discovered that her
bypass hearing would be conducted by her former Sunday school
teacher.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ See Memphis Planned Parenthood v. Sundquist, No. 3:89-0520,
slip op. at 13 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 26, 1997); See also Tamar Lewin,
Parental Consent to Abortion: How Enforcement Can Vary, N.Y. Times, May
29, 1992, at A1 (describing how a judge in Toledo, Ohio denied
permission to a 17\1/2\-year-old woman, an ``A'' student who planned to
attend college and who testified she was not financially or emotionally
prepared for college and motherhood at the same time, stating that the
girl had ``not had enough hard knocks in her life'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With respect to the Federal Notification Provision, the
section requires a 24-hour or more waiting period and written
notification, with no medical emergency exception, even if a
parent accompanies his or her daughter to an out-of-state
physician and consents to the abortion services. In such cases,
this requirement acts as a built-in mandatory delay, imposing
logistical and financial hardships on functional families who
are trying to support their daughters. Even in a health
emergency, this bill robs a parent of his or her ability to
authorize immediate care. For example, if a parent and daughter
were vacationing together in California and the parent brought
her daughter to a hospital for emergency abortion services,
this provision would needlessly require a doctor to wait 24
hours before providing that care.
We would also observe that the Federal Notification
Provision's very limited exceptions provide no safety net for
the most vulnerable teens. For example, the section's
``exception'' for teen victims of certain forms of abuse only
applies if the young woman ``declares in a signed written
statement that she is the victim of abuse.'' This ``exception''
ignores the painful reality that most abused teens are too
afraid to tell anyone that they are being abused. Moreover,
because the bill requires the doctor to notify the authorities
of the abuse before the abortion is performed, many teens will
not report the abuse for fear that their parents will discover
the abuse report. As Justice O'Connor aptly stated in Hodgson
v. Minnesota, an ``exception to notification for minors who are
victims of neglect or abuse is, in reality, a means of
notifying the parents.'' \15\ Morever, ``[t]he combination of
the abused minor's reluctance to report sexual or physical
abuse . . . with the likelihood that invoking the abuse
exception for the purpose of avoiding notice will result in
notice, makes the abuse exception less than effectual.'' \16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ 497 U.S. 417, 460 (1990) (O'Connor, J. concurring) (noting
that an abuse report ``requires the welfare agency to immediately
`conduct an assessment;' '' if the ``agency interviews the victim, it
must notify the parent of the fact of the interview'' and the parent
has the right to access te investigation record).
\16\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

II. LEGISLATION IS ANTI-FAMILY

H.R. 748 is also overtly hostile to families. Despite the
proponents' belief that the bill would enforce parents' right
to counsel their daughters, the reality is that it is
impossible to legislate complex family relationships. Studies
reveal that more than half of all young women who do not
involve a parent in a decision to terminate a pregnancy choose
to involve another trusted adult, who is very often a
relative.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ See Henshaw, supra, at 207.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although the Travel Provision (section 2431) exempts
parents from criminal and civil liability, non-parent adults
who are raising a child will be swept in by the bill's
prohibitions. This is because the exception is excessively
narrow and refers only to a parent or guardian; a legal
custodian; or a person designated by a state's parental
involvement law as a person to whom notification, or from whom
consent, is required.\18\ Several amendments were offered
during the markup to ameliorate these harsher consequences of
section 2431. Representative Nadler offered an amendment that
would have exempted the minor's grandparent or adult
sibling.\19\ Similarly, Representative Jackson Lee offered an
amendment exempting clergy, godparents, aunts, uncles, or first
cousins that was rejected by a vote of 13 to 20.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ H.R. 748, Sec. 2 (proposed 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2431(e)(2)).
\19\ Child Interstate Abortion Notification Act: Markup of H.R. 748
Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 37-38 (2005)
(statement of Rep. Nadler).
\20\ Id. at 76, 81 (2005) (statement of Rep. Jackson Lee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The bill also illogically sanctions the criminal activity
of a parent by authorizing lawsuits to be brought by parents
suffering ``legal harm'' against any person assisting a minor
in obtaining an abortion across state lines.\21\ The private
civil remedy aspect of both the Travel and Federal Notification
Provisions are so broad that even a father who committed rape
or incest against his own daughter would be empowered to bring
a lawsuit seeking compensation under the legislation. If the
pregnancy of the minor is a result of incest with her father,
the minor must still comply with any parental consent or
notification law in the state of her residence under this bill
unless she signs a written statement and agrees to allow the
physician to notify the authorities about the sexual abuse.\22\
If the minor decides not to sign a written statement or notify
the authorities and is accompanied by her grandmother across
state lines to a doctor in another state for abortion services,
the father who committed the incest can bring a civil action
against the grandmother and the doctor, effectively profiting
from his own criminal wrongdoing.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ H.R. 748, Sec. 2 (proposed 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2431(d)).
\22\ Id. Sec. 3 (proposed 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2432(b)(3)).
\23\ Id. (proposed 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2432(c)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Representative Waters offered an amendment at markup that
would have provided an exception to this civil liability if the
pregnancy was the result of sexual contact with the parent or
any other person that had permanent or temporary custody of the
minor.\24\ Representative Waters also offered an additional
amendment that would only provide an exception if the pregnancy
resulted directly from acts of incest.\25\ Both amendments were
defeated.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ Child Interstate Abortion Notification Act: Markup of H.R. 748
Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 17-18 (2005)
(statement of Rep. Waters).
\25\ Id. at 24-25.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

III. LEGISLATION IS DANGEROUSLY OVER BROAD

Supporters of this bill claim the Travel Provision merely
targets predatory individuals who force and coerce a minor into
obtaining an abortion. However, the net cast by this section is
far broader and more problematic. The Travel Provision includes
a criminal penalty against persons who ``knowingly transport an
individual who has not attained the age of 18 years across a
State line, with the intent that such individual obtain an
abortion.'' \26\ In other words, this provision would make it a
federal crime to assist a pregnant minor to obtain an abortion
that would be lawful in the state in which it was provided. The
bill does not require proof of any intent to avoid state
parental consent laws. Anyone simply transporting a minor--a
bus driver, taxi driver, family member or friend--could be
jailed for up to a year or fined or both. The same applies to
emergency medical personnel who may be aware they are taking a
minor across state lines to obtain an abortion but would have
no choice if a medical emergency were occurring.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ H.R. 748, Sec. 2 (proposed 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2431(a)(1)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Similarly, a nurse at a clinic providing directions to a
minor or her driver could be convicted as an accessory under
this legislation. A doctor who procures a ride home for a minor
and the person accompanying her because of car troubles coupled
with the minor's expressed fear of calling her parents for
assistance could be convicted as an accessory after the fact. A
sibling of the minor who merely agrees to transport a minor
across state lines without any knowledge of any intent to evade
the resident state's parental consent or notification laws
could be thrown in jail and convicted of a conspiracy to
violate this statute.
The supporters of this bill inaccurately compare it to the
Mann Act, which prohibits the transport of ``any individual
under the age of 18 years in interstate or foreign commerce, or
in any Territory or Possession of the U.S., with intent that
such individual engage in prostitution, or in a sexual activity
for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense. .
. .'' \27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2421 (2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Mann Act, like most other criminal laws, contains a
specific mens rea component, that requires that criminally
liable individuals have an intention to break the law.\28\ A
person convicted of possessing stolen property, for example,
must know or have reason to know that the property they possess
is stolen. The Travel Provision has no such specific intent
requirement and, therefore, imposes strict criminal liability
for anyone in violation.\29\ Where the Mann Act purports to
guard against corruption of minors, a laudable but not
constitutionally-protected purpose, the Travel Provision
imposes significant restrictions on a constitutionally-
protected right to an abortion. Moreover, the Mann Act requires
that the minor be transported across state lines for the
purpose of engaging in an act that is illegal, while this
legislation would impose civil and criminal liability for the
act of taking a minor across state lines to engage in an
activity which is legal in that second state, and
constitutionally protected.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ Id.
\29\ The affirmative defense available in H.R. 748 does not address
this problem.
\30\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In an attempt to clarify who would face criminal or civil
liability, Representative Scott offered two amendments to the
Travel Provision. The first would have exempted taxicab
drivers, bus drivers, and others in the business transportation
profession from the criminal provisions of this statute.\31\
This amendment was defeated by a vote of 13 to 17.\32\
Representative Scott also offered an amendment that would have
limited criminal liability to persons who had committed the
crimes in the first degree, excluding potential defendants who
had helped the minor after the fact, or individuals with a
tangential role in the act.\33\ The amendment was defeated by a
vote of 12 to 18.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ Child Interstate Abortion Notification Act: Markup of H.R. 748
Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 49-51 (2005)
(statement of Rep. Scott).
\32\ Id. at 61.
\33\ Child Interstate Abortion Notification Act: Markup of H.R. 748
Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 63 (2005)
(statement of Rep. Scott).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

IV. LEGISLATION IMPOSES CONVOLUTED AND COMPLEX LEGAL REQUIREMENTS.

Both the Travel and Federal Notification Provisions
operating separately and in conjunction, serve to impose an
impossibly complex patchwork of legal requirements, on both
young women and physicians. In essence, the legislation creates
a Byzantine system of parental notification mandates that would
impose extra hurdles on some teens and leave others with no
options and expose physicians to new and unprecedented legal
liability.
For example, under the Travel Provision, many young women
would have to comply with two states' teen abortion laws. Thus,
a minor who travels with assistance from Missouri to Kansas for
an abortion must comply with both Missouri's law and Kansas'
law. A young woman who is unable to involve her parents in her
abortion decision, and thus pursues a court waiver, must
therefore obtain a judicial bypass in both her home state and
the provider's state before she can obtain an abortion.
Likewise, the Federal Notification Provision also imposes
complex and absurd requirements for physicianss and their
patients. As noted above, section 2432 would require that the
physician give 24 hours ``actual notice'' to a parent before
performing an abortion on a minor from out-of-state. This
provision would apply even if the minor came from a state that
did not have a parental consent or notification law, and even
if the parent went to the other state fully intending and
approving of his or her child's abortion. The section defines
``actual notice'' as ``the giving of a written notice directly,
in person.'' This section would seem to require that the
physician or a member of her staff travel out-of-state to visit
the parents of the patient in person. The section would allow
for the physician to give ``constructive notice'' to the
patient's parents if it is not possible to provide them with
``actual notice'' after the physician has made a ``reasonable
effort'' to do so. The section defines ``constructive notice''
as notice that is given by certified mail, to the last known
address of the person being notified with delivery deemed to
have occurred 48 hours following noon--on the day after the
mailing occurred. The section does not define ``reasonable
effort.''
Consider the incredible new burdens this provision imposes
on physicians. Under the threat of civil and criminal
penalties, the Federal Notification Provision requires doctors
to make ``reasonable'' efforts to provide in-person, written
notice of an out-of-state teen's parents. It provides no
guidance to help a physician know what efforts suffice as
``reasonable'' to track down a parent in another state to
provide this in-person written notice. This requirement places
extremely burdensome, if not impossible, demands on doctors.
Because many communities do not have physicians, women often
have to travel to a neighboring state to obtain an abortion;
thus, doctors could routinely be forced to travel hundreds of
miles out-of-state in order to comply with the bill's in-person
notification mandate. This Federal in-person notification
requirement is more onerous than even the most stringent state
laws. Moreover, because the bill operates differently depending
on a teen's state of origin, it requires health care providers
to be familiar with the legal regimes of all 50 states and to
understand the interaction between these varying legal regimes
and the local state laws of the provider.
The requirements on physicians if a young woman informs him
or her that she is a victim of abuse are equally convoluted.
Under Section 2432 such a conversation then triggers a new
mandate on the doctor to not only notify the ``authorities'' of
the parents' abuse, but to provide such notification in another
state. Each state has its own legal requirements in this area,
and its own agencies to which the behavior must be reported--
and in some cases the reports must be filed in the county.
Additionally, the Federal Notification Provision establishes no
mechanism for this new type of cross-state reporting, and does
not specify in what manner or with what level of detail the
reporting must occur. This is far from being a mere
bureaucratic headache; the legislation gives doctors no
guidance about to whom or what detail the report must be made,
and therefore they cannot be sure that even their most thorough
and good-faith attempts to comply with the law will keep them
from risking fines or a prison sentence.
It is important to note that these requirements will quite
frequently come into play when young women are forced to cross
state lines to obtain an abortion, not because of differing
laws, but because of sheer availability. As of 2000, there were
no known physicians in 87 percent of the counties in the United
States.\34\ For many young women, the closest available
physician is located in another state, and others may be unable
to obtain an abortion anywhere in their home state.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ Lawrence B. Finer & Stanley K. Henshaw, Abortion Incidence and
Services in the United States in 2000, 35 Perspectives on Sexual and
Reproductive Health 6 (2003).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

V. CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS

By imposing substantial new obstacles and dangers in the
path of a minor seeking an abortion, the Travel and Federal
Notification Provisions raise at least three serious
constitutional concerns.
First, the legislation raises numerous federalism and equal
protection problems. It is impermissible to pass a law which
has the effect of imposing one state's legal requirements on
another state, as both section 2431 and 2432 do. In essence the
bill imposes on states and physicians the laws of the states
that have the most stringent requirements on abortion.
Federalism dictates that one has the right to be treated as a
welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly alien when
temporarily present in another state as delineated by the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500-01 (1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Court held in Saenz that a state cannot discriminate
against the citizen of another state when there is no
substantial reason for the discrimination except for the fact
that they are citizens of another state.\36\ The Court has
found that certain rights are protected by the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if they bear
``upon the vitality of the Nation as a single entity'' or those
rights that are deemed ``fundamental.'' \37\ The Court in Saenz
specifically referred to Doe v. Bolton where it held that a
state could not limit access to its medical care facilities for
abortions to in-state residents.\38\ A state must treat all
that are seeking medical care within that state in an equal
manner.\39\ This protection would extend to minors since the
Court held in Danforth that minors have a constitutional right
to choose whether to terminate a pregnancy or not.\40\ The
Court further held that Congress also does not have the power
to validate a law that violates the rights guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment.\41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ Id. at 502.
\37\ Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371, 382-83
(1978).
\38\ Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 200 (1973).
\39\ Id.
\40\ Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74-
75 (1976).
\41\ Id. at 508. One may argue that this means that Congress itself
cannot pass laws that treat non-residents visiting a particular state
differently than residents of that particular state.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the present case, both the Travel and Federal
Notification Provisions cause young women to carry their own
state laws with them, ``strapped on their backs'' \42\ when
they travel to other states. For example, this bill treats a
young woman who travels to a state, or who resides in a state
temporarily (such as a college student), differently than a
minor living in that state. Thus, because New York does not
have a law restricting teen abortions, a minor living in New
York need not notify her parents in order to obtain an
abortion. However, a minor who travels into New York, or who
temporarily resides in New York, is saddled with an entirely
different legal scheme: she must either obtain a court bypass
from her home state or, if no bypass is available, be subject
to the bill's mandatory notice requirements. The bill thus
would discriminate against teenagers within the same state on
the basis of their state or origin and would deprive teens of
their right to travel to engage in conduct legal in another
state in violation of constitutionally protected rights to
equal protection and interstate travel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\ As Professors Laurence Tribe of Harvard Law School and Peter
Rubin of Georgetown University Law Center explained that the
predecessor version of this legislation ``amounts to a statutory
attempt to force this most vulnerable class of young women to carry the
restrictive laws of their home states strapped to their backs, bearing
the great weight of those laws like the bars of a prison that follows
them wherever they go (unless they are willing to go alone).''
Memorandum from Laurence H. Tribe & Ralph S. Tyler Professor of
Constitutional Law, Harvard University and Peter J. Rubin, Visiting
Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University, to the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, at 2 (September 2, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, both the Travel and Federal Notification Provisions
have an unconstitutionally narrow life exception for the woman
and no health exception. These exceptions are especially
important in light of the tremendous uncertainty and onerous
civil and criminal penalties responsible adults and health care
providers would face. In particular, the delay that the bill's
notice requirements would impose under section 2432 could prove
fatal or dangerous to a young woman's health and future
fertility.
The narrowness of the ``life'' exception in both sections--
applying only ``if the abortion was necessary to save the life
of the minor because her life was endangered by a physical
disorder, physical injury, or physical illness, including a
life endangering physical condition caused by or arising from
the pregnancy itself'' would also place health care providers
in an impossible position. Just how severe must a physical
threat to a woman's health be before a physician feels
confident that a life exception may be invoked? How much would
a court second-guess a medical decision of this type in a
future court proceeding? What would be the cost of defending
such a case even if a physician ultimately prevails in a civil
or criminal case, or both? As the Supreme Court has recognized,
laws containing life exceptions cannot pick and choose among
life-threatening circumstances.\43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\43\ Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
879 (1992).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The lack of any health exception is also constitutionally
problematic. In Stenberg v Carhart, the Court held that a
statute must provide a pre-viability and post-viability health
exception in order to be constitutional.\44\ The majority held
that the Partial Birth Ban Act lacked a health exception
required under Roe when the procedure is necessary in the
doctor's judgment for the preservation of the health or life of
the woman.\45\ Any restriction on abortion must have an
exception ``where it is necessary, in appropriate medical
judgment, for the preservation of the life or the health of the
mother.'' \46\ Yet the legislation contains no health exception
whatsoever, in clear violation of Supreme Court precedent.\47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\44\ Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 930 (2000). Courts have
held that the recently enacted Partial-Birth Abortion Act is
unconstitutional because of concerns similar to those in Stenberg, see
Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 249 F.3d 603, 604-05 (7th Cir. 2001); Richmond
Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, 224 F.3d 337, 339 (4th Cir. 2000);
Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Farmer, 220 F.3d 127, 142 (3rd Cir.
2000). Additionally, courts have also struck down these statutes
because they were overbroad. See Little Rock Family Planning Servs. v.
Jegley, 192 F.3d 794, 797-98 (8th Cir. 1999).
\45\ Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 938. The Court further stated that
``where substantial medical authority supports the proposition that
banning a particular abortion procedure could endanger women's health''
a health exception is needed. Id.
\46\ Id. at 930 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 879).
\47\ Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 930 (2000) (determining
that the partial-birth ban act did need a health exception when the
procedure is necessary in the doctor's judgment for the preservation of
the health or life of the woman); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879-80 (1992) (upholding a Pennsylvania
statute that defined a medical emergency as a condition that requires
an abortion of the fetus or a condition that would ``create serious
risk of substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily
function'' because it would not impose an undue burden on a woman's
right to choose); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973) (finding
that a state may regulate or proscribe post-viability abortions with
the exception where it is necessary for the preservation of the life or
health of the woman).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Third, both the Federal Notification and Travel Provisions
are in conflict with the courts holding that any restriction
that has the purpose or effect of placing an ``undue burden''
on a woman's right to choose to have an abortion up until pre-
viability is unconstitutional.\48\ The Federal Notification
Provision does this in two ways. As an initial matter, it
denies many young women the option of obtaining a court waiver
at all. This is because the bill takes away the option of going
to court for those teens who live in a state without an
enforceable teen abortion restriction \49\ and who seek an
abortion in another state that either does not have an
enforceable teen abortion law or has a law that does not meet
the bill's standards for such a law.\50\ In these situations,
the minor's home state has no waiver system in place and the
bill does not permit use of another state's waiver system.
Accordingly, the teen will not be able to obtain an abortion
until the doctor provides notice of the abortion to one of her
parents. The Federal Notification Provision thus makes parental
involvement mandatory for these teens with absolutely no option
for a court bypass. The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that, in
order to be constitutional, a statute requiring parental
involvement must offer an alternative such as a judicial
bypass.\51\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\48\ Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
874 (1992).
\49\ The following states do not have enforceable parental
involvement laws: AK, CA, CT, FL, HI, ID, IL, MT, NV, NH, NJ, NM, NY,
OK, OR, VT, WA, and D.C.
\50\ H.R. 748, Sec. 2 (proposed 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2432 (d)(4)).
\51\ Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 420 (1990); Ohio v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502, 510 (1990).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Moreover, the provision in the Federal Notification
Provision requiring that the doctor must provide 24 hours
actual notice or at least 48 hours more constructive notice to
the parents of the minor before providing the abortion care
would also appear to impose an undue burden on a woman's right
to choose.\52\ The Court in Casey found the reason the 24-hour
delay was constitutional was because there was a health
exception for the preservation of the life and health of the
woman.\53\ Without this exception present, the Federal
Notification Provision would likely be held unconstitutional
because these delays will put an ``undue burden'' on a woman's
right to choose.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\52\ Id.
\53\ Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
886 (1992).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With respect to the Travel Provision, a young woman who
determined that she could not involve her parents may have to
go through a judicial bypass in two states, also constituting
an undue burden. For instance, if the young woman lived in a
state with a consent law, but the closest health care provider
was in a state that also had a consent law, the minor would
have to go through the judicial bypass in each state if she
felt that she could not obtain either parent's consent.
Requiring two judicial proceedings necessarily results in
delays, thereby further compounding the medical risk of the
procedure. In addition, the judicial bypass process often does
not provide a real alternative for minors who need to obtain
abortions. Many states have judicial bypass procedures that are
applied inconsistently by local judges making them an
unreliable alternative for minors residing in those states.\54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\54\ Dr. Michele Wilson, Associate Professor, University of
Alabama-Birmingham, Statement (Sept. 1, 2001) (on file with author);
Beverly Howard, Court-appointed Advocate and Attorney, Montgomery,
Alabama (June 10, 1998) (on file with author); Bernadette McNabb,
Executive Director, Knoxville Center for Reproductive Health (on file
with author).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

CONCLUSION

While promoting the involvement of parents in decisions
concerning the pregnancy of a minor is a laudable and desirable
goal, the heavy-handed approach in this legislation that
ignores the real circumstances affecting real people attempting
to grapple with some of life's most difficult decisions is
neither sound, nor is it humane. The rights of parents are
important, but the right of young people to seek out the
protection of responsible adults in difficult and sometimes
dangerous situations is a value Congress must respect. This
bill violates these basic principles of humanity and regard for
human dimension of these problems. It is reckless in its
disregard for the welfare of young people in difficult
situations.

John Conyers, Jr.
Howard L. Berman.
Jerrold Nadler.
Robert C. Scott.
Melvin L. Watt.
Zoe Lofgren.
Sheila Jackson Lee.
Maxine Waters.
Martin T. Meehan.
William D. Delahunt.
Robert Wexler.
Anthony D. Weiner.
Linda T. Sanchez.
Adam Smith.