[House Report 109-51]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



109th Congress                                                   Report
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 1st Session                                                     109-51

======================================================================



 
               CHILD INTERSTATE ABORTION NOTIFICATION ACT

                                _______
                                

 April 21, 2005.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

 Mr. Sensenbrenner, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted the 
                               following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                            DISSENTING VIEWS

                        [To accompany H.R. 748]

      [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

  The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred the bill 
(H.R. 748) to amend title 18, United States Code, to prevent 
the transportation of minors in circumvention of certain laws 
relating to abortion, and for other purposes, having considered 
the same, reports favorably thereon with an amendment and 
recommends that the bill as amended do pass.

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page
The Amendment....................................................     2
Purpose and Summary..............................................     4
Background and Need for the Legislation..........................     7
Hearings.........................................................    45
Committee Consideration..........................................    45
Vote of the Committee............................................    45
Committee Oversight Findings.....................................    50
New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures........................    51
Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate........................    51
Performance Goals and Objectives.................................    52
Constitutional Authority Statement...............................    52
Section-by-Section Analysis and Discussion.......................    52
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported............    54
Markup Transcript................................................    58
Dissenting Views.................................................   121

                             The Amendment

    The amendment is as follows:
    Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the 
following:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Child Interstate Abortion 
Notification Act''.

SEC. 2. TRANSPORTATION OF MINORS IN CIRCUMVENTION OF CERTAIN LAWS 
                    RELATING TO ABORTION.

    Title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting after chapter 
117 the following:

 ``CHAPTER 117A--TRANSPORTATION OF MINORS IN CIRCUMVENTION OF CERTAIN 
                       LAWS RELATING TO ABORTION

``Sec.
``2431. Transportation of minors in circumvention of certain laws 
relating to abortion.

``Sec. 2431. Transportation of minors in circumvention of certain laws 
                    relating to abortion

    ``(a) Offense.--
            ``(1) Generally.--Except as provided in subsection (b), 
        whoever knowingly transports a minor across a State line, with 
        the intent that such minor obtain an abortion, and thereby in 
        fact abridges the right of a parent under a law requiring 
        parental involvement in a minor's abortion decision, in force 
        in the State where the minor resides, shall be fined under this 
        title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
            ``(2) Definition.--For the purposes of this subsection, an 
        abridgement of the right of a parent occurs if an abortion is 
        performed or induced on the minor, in a State other than the 
        State where the minor resides, without the parental consent or 
        notification, or the judicial authorization, that would have 
        been required by that law had the abortion been performed in 
        the State where the minor resides.
    ``(b) Exceptions.--
            ``(1) The prohibition of subsection (a) does not apply if 
        the abortion was necessary to save the life of the minor 
        because her life was endangered by a physical disorder, 
        physical injury, or physical illness, including a life 
        endangering physical condition caused by or arising from the 
        pregnancy itself.
            ``(2) A minor transported in violation of this section, and 
        any parent of that minor, may not be prosecuted or sued for a 
        violation of this section, a conspiracy to violate this 
        section, or an offense under section 2 or 3 based on a 
        violation of this section.
    ``(c) Affirmative Defense.--It is an affirmative defense to a 
prosecution for an offense, or to a civil action, based on a violation 
of this section that the defendant--
            ``(1) reasonably believed, based on information the 
        defendant obtained directly from a parent of the minor, that 
        before the minor obtained the abortion, the parental consent or 
        notification took place that would have been required by the 
        law requiring parental involvement in a minor's abortion 
        decision, had the abortion been performed in the State where 
        the minor resides; or
            ``(2) was presented with documentation showing with a 
        reasonable degree of certainty that a court in the minor's 
        State of residence waived any parental notification required by 
        the laws of that State, or otherwise authorized that the minor 
        be allowed to procure an abortion.
    ``(d) Civil Action.--Any parent who suffers harm from a violation 
of subsection (a) may obtain appropriate relief in a civil action.
    ``(e) Definitions.--For the purposes of this section--
            ``(1) the term `abortion' means the use or prescription of 
        any instrument, medicine, drug, or any other substance or 
        device intentionally to terminate the pregnancy of a female 
        known to be pregnant with an intention other than to increase 
        the probability of a live birth, to preserve the life or health 
        of the child after live birth, or to remove a dead unborn child 
        who died as the result of a spontaneous abortion, accidental 
        trauma or a criminal assault on the pregnant female or her 
        unborn child;
            ``(2) the term a `law requiring parental involvement in a 
        minor's abortion decision' means a law--
                    ``(A) requiring, before an abortion is performed on 
                a minor, either--
                            ``(i) the notification to, or consent of, a 
                        parent of that minor; or
                            ``(ii) proceedings in a State court; and
                    ``(B) that does not provide as an alternative to 
                the requirements described in subparagraph (A) 
                notification to or consent of any person or entity who 
                is not described in that subparagraph;
            ``(3) the term `minor' means an individual who is not older 
        than the maximum age requiring parental notification or 
        consent, or proceedings in a State court, under the law 
        requiring parental involvement in a minor's abortion decision;
            ``(4) the term `parent' means--
                    ``(A) a parent or guardian;
                    ``(B) a legal custodian; or
                    ``(C) a person standing in loco parentis who has 
                care and control of the minor, and with whom the minor 
                regularly resides, who is designated by the law 
                requiring parental involvement in the minor's abortion 
                decision as a person to whom notification, or from whom 
                consent, is required; and
            ``(5) the term `State' includes the District of Columbia 
        and any commonwealth, possession, or other territory of the 
        United States.''.

SEC. 3. CHILD INTERSTATE ABORTION NOTIFICATION.

    Title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting after chapter 
117A the following:

         ``CHAPTER 117B--CHILD INTERSTATE ABORTION NOTIFICATION

``Sec.
``2432. Child interstate abortion notification.

``Sec. 2432. Child interstate abortion notification

    ``(a) Offense.--
            ``(1) Generally.--A physician who knowingly performs or 
        induces an abortion on a minor in violation of the requirements 
        of this section shall be fined under this title or imprisoned 
        not more than one year, or both.
            ``(2) Parental notification.--A physician who performs or 
        induces an abortion on a minor who is a resident of a State 
        other than the State in which the abortion is performed must 
        provide at least 24 hours actual notice to a parent of the 
        minor before performing the abortion. If actual notice to such 
        parent is not possible after a reasonable effort has been made, 
        24 hours constructive notice must be given to a parent.
    ``(b) Exceptions.--The notification requirement of subsection 
(a)(2) does not apply if--
            ``(1) the abortion is performed or induced in a State that 
        has a law in force requiring parental involvement in a minor's 
        abortion decision and the physician complies with the 
        requirements of that law;
            ``(2) the physician is presented with documentation showing 
        with a reasonable degree of certainty that a court in the 
        minor's State of residence has waived any parental notification 
        required by the laws of that State, or has otherwise authorized 
        that the minor be allowed to procure an abortion;
            ``(3) the minor declares in a signed written statement that 
        she is the victim of sexual abuse, neglect, or physical abuse 
        by a parent, and, before an abortion is performed on the minor, 
        the physician notifies the authorities specified to receive 
        reports of child abuse or neglect by the law of the State in 
        which the minor resides of the known or suspected abuse or 
        neglect; or
            ``(4) the abortion is necessary to save the life of the 
        minor because her life was endangered by a physical disorder, 
        physical injury, or physical illness, including a life 
        endangering physical condition caused by or arising from the 
        pregnancy itself.
    ``(c) Civil Action.--Any parent who suffers harm from a violation 
of subsection (a) may obtain appropriate relief in a civil action.
    ``(d) Definitions.--For the purposes of this section--
            ``(1) the term `abortion' means the use or prescription of 
        any instrument, medicine, drug, or any other substance or 
        device intentionally to terminate the pregnancy of a female 
        known to be pregnant with an intention other than to increase 
        the probability of a live birth, to preserve the life or health 
        of the child after live birth, or to remove a dead unborn child 
        who died as the result of a spontaneous abortion, accidental 
        trauma, or a criminal assault on the pregnant female or her 
        unborn child;
            ``(2) the term `actual notice' means the giving of written 
        notice directly, in person;
            ``(3) the term `constructive notice' means notice that is 
        given by certified mail, return receipt requested, restricted 
        delivery to the last known address of the person being 
        notified, with delivery deemed to have occurred 48 hours 
        following noon on the next day subsequent to mailing on which 
        regular mail delivery takes place, days on which mail is not 
        delivered excluded;
            ``(4) the term a `law requiring parental involvement in a 
        minor's abortion decision' means a law--
                    ``(A) requiring, before an abortion is performed on 
                a minor, either--
                            ``(i) the notification to, or consent of, a 
                        parent of that minor; or
                            ``(ii) proceedings in a State court;
                    ``(B) that does not provide as an alternative to 
                the requirements described in subparagraph (A) 
                notification to or consent of any person or entity who 
                is not described in that subparagraph;
            ``(5) the term `minor' means an individual who is not older 
        than 18 years and who is not emancipated under State law;
            ``(6) the term `parent' means--
                    ``(A) a parent or guardian;
                    ``(B) a legal custodian; or
                    ``(C) a person standing in loco parentis who has 
                care and control of the minor, and with whom the minor 
                regularly resides;
        as determined by State law;
            ``(7) the term `physician' means a doctor of medicine 
        legally authorized to practice medicine by the State in which 
        such doctor practices medicine, or any other person legally 
        empowered under State law to perform an abortion; and
            ``(8) the term `State' includes the District of Columbia 
        and any commonwealth, possession, or other territory of the 
        United States.''.

SEC. 4. CLERICAL AMENDMENT.

    The table of chapters at the beginning of part I of title 18, 
United States Code, is amended by inserting after the item relating to 
chapter 117 the following new items:

``117A. Transportation of minors in circumvention of certain       2431
                            laws relating to abortion.
``117B. Child interstate abortion notification..............    2432''.

SEC. 5. SEVERABILITY AND EFFECTIVE DATE.

    (a) The provisions of this Act shall be severable. If any provision 
of this Act, or any application thereof, is found unconstitutional, 
that finding shall not affect any provision or application of the Act 
not so adjudicated.
    (b) The provisions of this Act shall take effect upon enactment.

                          Purpose and Summary

    H.R. 748, the ``Child Interstate Abortion Notification 
Act'' (``CIANA''), has two primary purposes. The first is to 
protect the health and safety of young girls by preventing 
valid and constitutional state parental involvement laws from 
being circumvented. The second is to protect the health and 
safety of young girls by protecting the rights of parents to be 
involved in the medical decisions of their minor daughters when 
such decisions involve interstate abortions. To achieve these 
purposes, CIANA contains two sections, each of which creates a 
new Federal crime subject to a $100,000 fine, or 1 year in 
jail, or both.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3559(a)(6) (``An offense that is not 
specifically classified by a letter grade in the section defining it, 
is classified if the maximum term of imprisonment authorized is 1 year 
or less but more than 6 months, as a Class A misdemeanor.''), CIANA 
would be classified as a Class A misdemeanor. Under the Federal fine 
statute, the sentence for a Class A misdemeanor that does not result in 
death is not more than $100,000. See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3571(b)(5). 
Therefore, the maximum allowable fine under CIANA is $100,000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    First, CIANA makes it a Federal crime to transport a minor 
across state lines to obtain an abortion in another state in 
order to avoid a state law requiring parental involvement in a 
minor's abortion decision. Twenty-three states currently have 
parental involvement laws.\2\ The purpose of the first section 
of CIANA is to prevent people--including abusive boyfriends and 
older men who may have committed rape--from pressuring young 
girls into circumventing their state's parental involvement 
laws by receiving a secret out-of-State abortion. This section 
of CIANA does not apply to minors themselves, or to their 
parents. It also does not apply in life-threatening emergencies 
that may require that an abortion be provided immediately.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Those states are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, 
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Rhode 
Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Second, CIANA applies when a minor from one state crosses 
state lines to have an abortion in another state that does not 
have a state law requiring parental involvement in a minor's 
abortion decision, or when a minor from one state crosses state 
lines to have an abortion in another state that does have a 
state law requiring parental involvement in a minor's abortion 
decision, but the physician fails to comply with such law. In 
such a case, CIANA makes it a Federal crime for the abortion 
provider to fail to give one of the minor's parents, or a legal 
guardian if necessary, 24 hours' notice (or notice by mail if 
necessary) of the minor's abortion decision before the abortion 
is performed. The purpose of this section is to protect 
fundamental parental rights by giving parents a chance to help 
their young daughters through difficult circumstances as best 
they can, including by giving a health care provider their 
daughter's medical history to ensure she receives safe medical 
care and any necessary follow-up treatment.
    Dr. Bruce A. Lucero, an abortion provider, has supported 
this legislation because ``parents are usually the ones who can 
best help their teenager consider her options'' and because 
``patients who receive abortions at out-of-State clinics 
frequently do not return for follow-up care, which can lead to 
dangerous complications.'' \3\ Parental notification also 
allows parents to assist their daughter in the selection of a 
competent abortion provider. This section of CIANA does not 
apply in the following circumstances: where the abortion 
provider is presented with court papers showing that the 
parental involvement law in effect in the minor's state of 
residence has been complied with; where the minor states that 
she has been the victim of abuse by a parent and the abortion 
provider informs the appropriate state authorities of such 
abuse; or where a life-threatening emergency may require that 
an abortion be provided immediately.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ Bruce A. Lucero, M.D., ``Parental Guidance Needed,'' The New 
York Times (July 12, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    CIANA supports state laws that provide parents with the 
necessary information to fulfill their obligation to care for 
their minor children, and it affirms the common-sense notion 
that parents have the legal right to be involved in medical 
decisions relating to their minor children when those decisions 
involve interstate abortions.
    CIANA does not supercede, override, or in any way alter 
existing state parental involvement laws. CIANA addresses the 
interstate transportation of minors in order to circumvent 
valid, existing state laws, and uses Congress' authority to 
regulate interstate activity to protect those laws from evasion 
and to protect parental involvement when minors cross state 
lines to obtain an abortion.
    A total of 44 States have enacted some form of a parental 
involvement law. Twenty-three of these States currently enforce 
statutes that require the consent or notification of at least 
one parent, or court authorization, before a minor can obtain 
an abortion. Such laws reflect widespread agreement that it is 
the parents of a pregnant minor who are best suited to provide 
her counsel, guidance, and support as she decides whether to 
continue her pregnancy or to undergo an abortion. These laws 
not only help to ensure the health and safety of pregnant young 
girls, but also protect fundamental parental rights.
    Despite widespread support for parental involvement laws 
and clear public policy considerations justifying them, 
substantial evidence exists that such laws are regularly evaded 
by adults who transport minors to abortion providers in States 
that do not have parental notification or consent laws. CIANA 
would curb the interstate circumvention of these laws, thereby 
protecting the rights of parents and the interests of 
vulnerable minors. CIANA ensures that State parental 
involvement laws are not evaded through interstate activity.
    Parental involvement in the abortion decisions of minor 
girls will lead to improved medical care for minors seeking 
abortions and provide increased protection for young girls 
against sexual exploitation by adult men. When parents are not 
involved in the abortion decisions of a child, the risks to the 
child's health significantly increase. Parental involvement 
will ensure that parents have the opportunity to provide 
additional medical history and information to abortion 
providers prior to performance of an abortion. The medical, 
emotional and psychological consequences of an abortion are 
serious and lasting. An adequate medical and psychological case 
history is important to the physician, and parents can provide 
such information for their daughters as well as any pertinent 
family medical history, refer the physician to other sources of 
medical history, such as family physicians, and authorize 
family physicians to give relevant data.
    Only parents are likely to know a young girl's allergies to 
anesthesia and medication or previous bouts with specific 
medical conditions, including depression. A more complete and 
thus more accurate medical history of the patient will enable 
abortion providers to disclose not only medical risks that 
ordinarily accompany abortions but also those risks that may be 
specific to the pregnant minor.
    Parental involvement also improves medical treatment of 
pregnant minors by ensuring that parents have adequate 
knowledge to recognize and respond to any post-abortion 
complications that may develop. Without the knowledge that 
their daughters have had abortions, parents are unable to 
ensure that their children obtain routine postoperative care 
and unable to provide an adequate medical history to physicians 
called upon to treat any complications that may arise. These 
omissions may allow complications such as infection, 
perforation, or depression to continue untreated. Such 
complications may be lethal if left untreated.
    Teenage pregnancies often occur as a result of predatory 
practices of men who are substantially older than the minor 
victim, resulting in the transportation of the girl across 
State lines by an individual who has a great incentive to avoid 
criminal liability for his conduct. Experience suggests that 
sexual predators recognize the advantage of their victims 
obtaining an abortion. Not only does an abortion eliminate 
critical evidence of the criminal conduct, it allows the abuse 
to continue undetected. Parental involvement laws ensure that 
parents have the opportunity to protect their daughters from 
those who would victimize them further.

                Background and Need for the Legislation

    H.R. 748 is much-needed legislation, overwhelmingly 
supported by the American people, that will protect both the 
health and safety of our minor children and parental rights.

                           SUPPORT FOR CIANA

    Polls show that the American people overwhelmingly support 
parental involvement laws by huge majorities that have grown 
over the last decade. As recently as March, 2005, 75 percent of 
over 1,500 registered voters surveyed favored ``requiring 
parental notification before a minor could get an abortion,'' 
and only 18 percent were opposed.\4\ According to another poll 
conducted in 2003, 73 percent of non-whites and 82 percent of 
Hispanics support parental notification laws.\5\ A Wirthlin 
Worldwide poll conducted in October, 2001, found that 83 
percent of those surveyed support laws requiring notification 
to one parent before an abortion can be performed on a minor 
daughter.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ Quinnipiac University Poll (conducted March 2-7, 2005, with 
1,534 registered voters surveyed; margin of error: 2.5percent).
    \5\ Wirthlin Worldwide Poll (October 21-23, 2003).
    \6\ Wirthlin Worldwide National Poll (October 19-22, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    African Americans and Hispanics overwhelmingly support 
parental notification laws. A Public Opinion Strategies poll 
surveyed 1,000 African-American registered voters on the 
question: ``Would you favor or oppose a law that would require 
a parent or guardian to be notified before a minor child, under 
the age of 18, undergoes an abortion procedure?'' 84 percent 
favored such a law (74 percent ``strongly favor'' and 10 
percent ``somewhat favor'').\7\ A Zogby poll of California 
voters showed that 71 percent of those surveyed in that state 
support laws requiring notification to one parent before an 
abortion can be performed on a minor daughter.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ Public Opinion Strategies Survey (July 30, 2002).
    \8\ Zogby California Poll (June 2002).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Moreover, during the November, 2004, elections, Florida 
overwhelmingly passed an amendment to its state constitution 
that provides that ``the Legislature is authorized to require 
by general law for notification to a parent or guardian of a 
minor before the termination of the minor's pregnancy.'' \9\ 
Nearly 65 percent of Florida voters in November, 2004, approved 
this state constitutional amendment.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ F.S.A. Const. Art. 10 Sec. 22.
    \10\ See Jackie Hallifax, ``Group Seeks Parental Notice End,'' The 
Brandenton Herald (January 11, 2005) at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Even more rigid requirements of parental consent are 
overwhelmingly supported by the American public. A Gallup poll 
conducted in January, 2003, showed that 78 percent of those 
surveyed favor laws requiring a 24-hour waiting period before 
an abortion can be obtained, and 73 percent favor laws 
requiring minors to get parental consent before an abortion can 
be obtained.\11\ These numbers have been confirmed in other 
polls.\12\ Similar results are found in polls that consistently 
reflect over 70 percent of the American public support parental 
consent or notification laws,\13\ including 69 percent of the 
Hispanic population.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ Lydia Saad, Gallup News Service (January 20, 2003).
    \12\ See Los Angeles Times Poll (June 8-13, 2000); CBS News/New 
York Times Poll (January 1998).
    \13\ See, e.g., CBS News/ NY Times Poll (released January 15, 1998) 
(78 percent of those polled favor requiring parental consent before a 
girl under 18 years of age could have an abortion); Americans United 
for Life, Abortion and Moral Beliefs, A Survey of American Opinion 
(1991); Wirthlin Group Survey, Public Opinion, May-June 1989; Life/
Contemporary American Family (released December, 1981) (78 percent of 
those polled believed that ``a girl who is under 18 years of age 
[should] have to notify her parents before she can have an abortion'').
    \14\ Latino Opinions poll (October 5, 2004) (survey of 1,000 
national adult Hispanics on the question ``[D]o you support or oppose 
requiring underage teenage girls to get permission from their parents 
before they are allowed to get an abortion?'' to which 58 percent 
reported ``strongly support'' and 11 percent reported ``somewhat 
support'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As the Associated Press has reported, even ``[o]pponents 
[of parental notice laws] agree that young women are better off 
telling parents about a pregnancy[.]'' \15\ Even Senator John 
Kerry, the former Democratic nominee for President, has said he 
supports parental notification laws. On the NBC News program 
``Meet the Press,'' Senator Kerry said ``I am for parental 
notification.'' \16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ David Crary, ``Passage of Teen Abortion Bill Called Likely,'' 
The Associated Press (January 31, 2005).
    \16\ NBC News, ``Meet the Press'' (January 30, 2005) (transcript).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    There is widespread agreement among abortion rights 
advocates and pro-life advocates that it is the parents of a 
pregnant minor who are best suited to provide her counsel, 
guidance, and support as she decides whether to continue her 
pregnancy or to undergo an abortion. Organizations such as 
Planned Parenthood and the National Abortion and Reproductive 
Rights Action League all advise pregnant minors to consult 
their parents before proceeding with an abortion.\17\ In 
addition, the American Medical Association urges physicians to 
``strongly encourage minors to discuss their pregnancy with 
their parents'' and to ``explain how parental involvement can 
be helpful and that parents are generally very understanding 
and supportive.'' \18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\ See Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc., Fact 
Sheets: Teenagers, Abortion, and Government Intrusion Laws, at http://
www.plannedparenthood.org/library/ABORTION/laws.html (last visited 
February 2, 2005) (``Few would deny that most teenagers, especially 
younger ones, would benefit from adult guidance when faced with an 
unwanted pregnancy. Few would deny that such guidance ideally should 
come from the teenager's parents.''); National Abortion and 
Reproductive Rights Action League, Young Women: Reproductive Rights 
Issues, at http://www.naral.org/Issues/youngwomen/index.cfm (last 
visited February 1, 2005) (``Responsible parents should be involved 
when their young daughters face a crisis pregnancy.'').
    \18\ Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical 
Association, ``Mandatory Parental Consent to Abortion,'' 269 JAMA 82, 
83 (1993).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

          THE SCOPE OF THE INTERSTATE PROBLEM CIANA ADDRESSES

    There is no serious dispute regarding the fact that the 
transportation of minors across state lines in order to obtain 
abortions is both a widespread and frequent practice. Even 
groups opposed to this bill acknowledge that large numbers of 
minors are transported across state lines to obtain abortions, 
in many cases by adults other than their parents. In 1995, 
Kathryn Kolbert, then an attorney with the Center for 
Reproductive Law and Policy (a national legal defense 
organization that supports abortion), stated that thousands of 
adults are helping minors cross state lines to get abortions in 
states whose parental involvement requirements are less 
stringent or non-existent: ``There are thousands of minors who 
cross state lines for an abortion every year and who need the 
assistance of adults to do that.'' \19\ She asked, ``How does a 
14-year-old get to New Hampshire from Boston without getting a 
ride?'' \20\ In 2001, New Jersey's Star-Ledger reported that 
Laurie Lowenstein, Executive Director of Right to Choose, an 
abortion rights advocacy group, stated that she would quit her 
job to shuttle pregnant young girls to states without parental 
notification laws if New Jersey enacted a parental notification 
law.\21\ Only Congress, with its constitutional authority to 
regulate interstate commerce, can curb such flagrant disregard 
of state laws. The experience of a number of States illuminates 
the scope of this problem.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ ``Labor of Love Is Deemed Criminal,'' The National Law Journal 
(November 11, 1996) at A8.
    \20\ See ``Woman Charged in Secret Abortion,'' Philadelphia 
Inquirer, (September 16, 1995).
    \21\ Jeff Whelan, ``McGreevey Reveals Latest Abortion Stance,'' The 
Star-Ledger (August 30, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pennsylvania
    Since Pennsylvania's current parental consent law took 
effect in March, 1994, news reports have confirmed that many 
Pennsylvania teenagers are going out of state to New Jersey and 
New York to obtain abortions. In 1995, the New York Times 
reported that ``Planned Parenthood in Philadelphia has a list 
of clinics, from New York to Baltimore, to which they will 
refer teenagers, according to the organization's executive 
director, Joan Coombs.'' \22\ Moreover, the New York Times gave 
accounts of clinics that had seen an increase in patients from 
Pennsylvania.\23\ One clinic, in Cherry Hill, New Jersey, 
reported seeing a threefold increase in Pennsylvania teenagers 
coming for abortions.\24\ Likewise, a clinic in Queens, New 
York, reported that it was not unusual to see Pennsylvania 
teenagers as patients in 1995, though earlier it had been 
rare.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\ ``Teen-Agers Cross State Lines in Abortion Exodus,'' The New 
York Times (December 18, 1995) at B6.
    \23\ See id.
    \24\ See id.
    \25\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In the period just prior to the Pennsylvania law taking 
effect, efforts were underway to make it easier for teenagers 
to go out of state for abortions. For instance, Newsday 
reported that ``[c]ounselors and activists are meeting to plot 
strategy and printing maps with directions to clinics in New 
York, New Jersey, Delaware and Washington, D.C., where 
teenagers can still get abortions without parental consent . . 
. `We will definitely be encouraging teenagers to go out of 
state,' said Shawn Towey, director of the Greater Philadelphia 
Woman's Medical Fund, a nonprofit organization that gives money 
to women who can't afford to pay for their abortions.'' \26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\ Charles V. Zehren, ``New Restrictive Abortion Law,'' Newsday 
(February 22, 1994).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Moreover, some abortion clinics in nearby states, such as 
New Jersey and Maryland, and others, use the lack of parental 
involvement requirements in their own states as a ``selling 
point'' in advertising directed at minors in Pennsylvania, 
stating ``No Parental Consent Required.'' \27\ A Rockville, 
Maryland, abortionist ran a similar advertisement in the May 
1998-April 1999 Yellow Pages for Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. Such 
advertisements have appeared in telephone directories for 
Wilkes-Barre and Dallas, Scranton, Clarks Summit, and 
Carbondale, Bethlehem, Allentown, York, and Erie.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \27\ See attachment, page 11, for copies of such advertisements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                               ATTACHMENT


Missouri
    A study in the American Journal of Public Health reported 
that a leading abortion provider in Missouri refers minors out 
of state for abortions if the girls do not want to involve 
their parents. Reproductive Health Services, which performs 
over half of the abortions performed in Missouri, refers minors 
to the Hope Clinic for Women in Granite City, Illinois.\28\ 
Research reveals that based on the available data the odds of a 
minor traveling out of state for an abortion increased by over 
50 percent when Missouri's parental consent law went into 
effect. Furthermore, compared to older women, underage girls 
were significantly more likely to travel out of state to have 
their abortions.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \28\ See Charlotte Ellertson, Ph.D., ``Mandatory Parental 
Involvement in Minors' Abortions: Effects of the Laws in Minnesota, 
Missouri, and Indiana,'' American Journal of Public Health (August 
1997).
    \29\ See id. at 1371.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A St. Louis Post-Dispatch news report confirms that the 
Hope Clinic in Illinois attracted underage girls seeking 
abortions without parental involvement.\30\ A clinic counselor 
estimates that she sees two girls each week seeking to avoid 
their home state's parental involvement law. One example was a 
16-year-old girl from Missouri who had called abortion clinics 
in St. Louis and learned that parental consent was required 
before a minor could obtain an abortion. According to the 
report, the Hope Clinic performed 3,200 abortions on out-of-
State women in 1998, and the clinic's executive director 
estimates that number is 45 percent of the total abortions 
performed at the clinic. The executive director also estimates 
that 13 percent of the clinic's clients are minors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \30\ See Kevin McDermott and Mark Schauerte, ``Illinois May Tighten 
Rules on Abortions For Teens; Parental Consent Is Not Required; 
Abortion Bill Targets Illinois as Teen Haven For Abortion,'' St. Louis 
Post-Dispatch (February 25, 1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Massachusetts
    Massachusetts has also seen an increase in out-of-State 
abortions performed on its teenage residents since the state's 
parental consent law went into effect in April 1981, according 
to a published study.\31\ A study published in the American 
Journal of Public Health found that in the 4 months prior to 
implementation of the parental consent law, an average of 29 
Massachusetts minors obtained out-of-State abortions each month 
in Rhode Island, New Hampshire, Connecticut, and New York (data 
for Maine was not available).\32\ After the parental consent 
law was implemented, however, the average jumped to between 90 
and 95 out-of-State abortions per month, using data from the 
five states of Rhode Island, New Hampshire, Connecticut, New 
York, and Maine, representing one-third of the abortions 
obtained by Massachusetts' minors.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \31\ The Massachusetts law was changed in 1997 to require the 
consent of one parent (or judicial authorization), rather than both 
parents as previously required.
    \32\ See Virginia G. Cartoof & Lorraine V. Klerman, ``Parental 
Consent for Abortion: Impact of the Massachusetts Law,'' American 
Journal of Public Health 397 (April 1986).
    \33\ See id. at 398.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The study noted that due to what the authors described as 
``astute marketing,'' one abortion clinic in New Hampshire was 
able to nearly double the monthly average of abortions 
performed on Massachusetts minors (from 14 in 1981 to 27 in 
1982). The abortionist ``began advertising in the 1982 Yellow 
Pages of metropolitan areas along the northern Massachusetts 
border, stating `consent for minors not required.' '' \34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \34\ Id. at 399.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In April 1991, the Planned Parenthood League of 
Massachusetts estimated that approximately 1,200 Massachusetts 
minor girls travel out of state for abortions each year, the 
majority of them to New Hampshire. Planned Parenthood said that 
surveys of New Hampshire clinics revealed an average of 100 
appointments per month by Massachusetts minors.\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \35\ See M.A.J. McKenna, ``Mass. Abortion Laws Push Teens Over 
Border,'' Boston Herald (April 7, 1991) at A1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mississippi
    A study of the effect of Mississippi's parental consent law 
revealed that Mississippi has also experienced an increase in 
the number of minors traveling out of state for abortions. The 
study, published in Family Planning Perspectives, compared data 
for the 5 months before the parental consent law took effect in 
June 1993, with data for the 6 months after it took effect, and 
found that ``[a]mong Mississippi residents having an abortion 
in the state, the ratio of minors to older women decreased by 
13 percent . . . However, this decline was largely offset by a 
32 percent increase in the ratio of minors to older women among 
Mississippi residents traveling to other states for abortion 
services.'' \36\ Based on the available data, the study 
suggests that the Mississippi parental consent law appeared to 
have ``little or no effect on the abortion rate among minors 
but a large increase in the proportion of minors who travel to 
other states to have abortions, along with a decrease in minors 
coming from other states to Mississippi.'' \37\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \36\ Stanley K. Henshaw, ``The Impact of Requirements for Parental 
Consent on Minors' Abortions in Mississippi,'' Family Planning 
Perspectives (June, 1995) at 121.
    \37\ Id. at 122.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Virginia
    Grace S. Sparks, executive director of the Virginia League 
of Planned Parenthood, predicted in February 1997 that if 
Virginia were to pass a parental notification law, teenagers 
would travel out of state for abortions: ``In every state where 
they've passed parental notification, . . . there's been an 
increase in out-of-State abortions,'' she said, adding, ``I 
suspect that that's what will happen in Virginia, that teen-
agers who cannot tell their parents . . . will go out of state 
and have abortions . . .'' \38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \38\ Lisa A. Singh, ``Those Are the People Who Are Being Hurt,'' 
Style Weekly (February 11, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Virginia's parental notification law took effect on July 1, 
1997. Initial reports indicated that abortions performed on 
Virginia minors dropped 20 percent during the first 5 months 
that the law was in effect (from 903 abortions during the same 
time period in 1996 to approximately 700 abortions in 
1997).\39\ It appears, however, that Virginia teenagers are 
traveling to the District of Columbia in order to obtain an 
abortion without involving their parents. In fact, the National 
Abortion Federation (``NAF''), which runs a toll-free national 
abortion hotline, said that calls from Virginia teenagers 
seeking information on how to obtain an abortion out of state 
were the largest source of teenage callers seeking out-of-State 
abortions, at seven to ten calls per day.\40\ NAF hotline 
operator Amy Schriefer has gone so far as to talk a Richmond 
area teenage girl through the route (involving a Greyhound bus 
and the Metro's Red Line) to obtain an abortion in the District 
of Columbia.\41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \39\ Ellen Nakashima, ``Fewer Teens Receiving Abortions In 
Virginia,'' The Washington Post (March 3, 1998).
    \40\ See id.
    \41\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                 CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONIALS HIGHLIGHT 
                     THE NEED FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION

    At hearings during the 105th, 106th, 107th, and 108th 
Congresses, the Subcommittee on the Constitution heard 
testimony from two mothers whose daughters were secretly taken 
for abortions, with devastating consequences. Joyce Farley, the 
mother of a minor girl, recounted how her 12-year-old daughter 
was provided alcohol, raped, and then taken out of state by the 
rapist's mother for an abortion.\42\ In the words of Joyce 
Farley, the abortion was arranged to destroy evidence--evidence 
that her 12-year-old daughter had been raped.\43\ On August 31, 
1995, her daughter, who had just turned 13, underwent a 
dangerous medical procedure without anyone present who knew her 
past medical history (as shown by the false medical history 
that was given to the abortionist).\44\ Following the abortion, 
the mother of the rapist dropped off the child in another town 
30 miles from the child's home.\45\ The child returned to her 
home with severe pain and bleeding which revealed complications 
from an incomplete abortion.\46\ When Joyce Farley contacted 
the original clinic that performed the abortion, the clinic 
told her that the bleeding was normal and to increase her 
daughter's Naprosyn, a medication given to her for pain, every 
hour if needed.\47\ Fortunately, Ms. Farley, being a nurse, 
knew this advice was wrong and could be harmful, but her 
daughter would not have known this.\48\ Because of her mother's 
intervention, Ms. Farley's daughter ultimately received further 
medical care and a second procedure to complete the 
abortion.\49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \42\ See Child Custody Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 3682 Before 
the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 
105th Cong., (May 21, 1998) (statement of Joyce Farley).
    \43\ See id.
    \44\ See id.
    \45\ See id.
    \46\ See id.
    \47\ See id.
    \48\ See id.
    \49\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As Ms. Farley testified before the House Constitution 
Subcommittee last year:

          [I]n 1995, my then 12-year-old daughter, Crystal, was 
        intoxicated and raped by a 19-year-old male . . . On 
        August 31, 1995, I discovered my 13-year-old daughter, 
        Crystal, was missing from home. An investigation by the 
        police, school officials and myself revealed the 
        possibility that Crystal had been transported out of 
        State for an abortion. I can't begin to tell you the 
        fear that enveloped me not knowing where my daughter 
        was, who she was with, if she was in harm's way, and to 
        learn in this manner that my young daughter was 
        pregnant. By early afternoon Crystal was home safe with 
        me, but so much had taken place in that 1 day. The 
        mother of this 19-year-old male had taken Crystal for 
        an abortion in the State of New York. Apparently, this 
        woman decided this was the best solution for the 
        situation caused by her son, with little regard for the 
        welfare of my daughter. Situations such as this is what 
        the Child Custody Act [H.R. 1755 in the 108th Congress, 
        which included provisions that are also in CIANA] was 
        designed to help prevent. I am a loving, responsible 
        parent, whose parenting was interfered with by an adult 
        unknown to me. My child was taken for a medical 
        procedure to an unknown facility and physician without 
        my permission. When Crystal developed complications 
        from this medical procedure, this physician was not 
        available. He refused to supply necessary medical 
        records to a physician that was available to provide 
        Crystal the medical care she needed. I ask you to 
        please, in considering the Child Custody Protection 
        Act, to put aside your personal opinions on abortion. 
        Please just consider the safety of the minor children 
        of our Nation whose lives are put at risk when taken 
        out of their home State . . . Please allow loving, 
        careful and responsible parents the freedom to provide 
        the care their adolescent daughters need without 
        interference from criminals or people who think they 
        may be helping, but actually cause more harm than good. 
        An abortion is a medical procedure with physical and 
        emotional risks. An adolescent who's had an abortion 
        needs the care and support of family. Crystal, 
        unfortunately, developed both physical and emotional 
        side effects. Some of the effects are still present 
        today after 9 years have lapsed.\50\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \50\ Child Custody Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 1755 Before the 
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th 
Cong., 6-7 (July 20, 2004) (statement of Joyce Farley).

    This year, Marcia Carroll testified before the Constitution 
Subcommittee and described the following terrifying story that 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CIANA, had it been enacted into law, would have prevented:

          On Christmas Eve 2004, my daughter informed me she 
        was pregnant. I assured her I would seek out all 
        resources and help that was available. As her parents, 
        her father and I would stand beside her and support any 
        decision she made. We scheduled appointments with her 
        pediatrician, her private counselor, and her school 
        nurse. I followed all of their advice and 
        recommendations. They referred us to Healthy Beginnings 
        Plus, Lancaster Family Services, and the WIC program. 
        They discussed all her options with her. I purposefully 
        allowed my daughter to speak alone with professionals 
        so that she would speak her mind and not just say what 
        she thought I wanted to hear. My daughter chose to have 
        the baby and raise it. My family fully supported my 
        daughter's decision to keep her baby and offered her 
        our love and support.
          Subsequently, her boyfriend's family began to harass 
        my daughter and my family. They started showing up at 
        our house to express their desire for my daughter to 
        have an abortion. When that did not work, his 
        grandmother started calling my daughter without my 
        knowledge. They would tell her that if she kept the 
        baby, she couldn't see her boyfriend again. They 
        threatened to move out of state.
          I told his family that my daughter had our full 
        support in her decision to keep the baby. She also had 
        the best doctors, counselors, and professionals to help 
        her through the pregnancy. We all had her best 
        interests in mind.
          The behavior of the boy's family began to concern me 
        to the point where I called my local police department 
        for advice. Additionally, I called the number for an 
        abortion center to see how old you have to be to have 
        an abortion in our state.
          I felt safe when they told me my minor daughter had 
        to be 16 years of age in the state of Pennsylvania to 
        have an abortion without parental consent. I found out 
        later that the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act 
        actually says that parental consent is needed for a 
        minor under 18 years of age. It never occurred to me 
        that I would need to check the laws of other states 
        around me. I thought as a resident of the state of 
        Pennsylvania that she was protected by Pennsylvania 
        state laws. Boy, was I ever wrong.
          On Feb. 16, I sent my daughter to her bus stop with 
        two dollars of lunch money. I thought she was safe at 
        school. She and her boyfriend even had a prenatal class 
        scheduled after school.
          However, what really happened was that her boyfriend 
        and his family met with her down the road from her bus 
        stop and called a taxi. The adults put the children in 
        the taxi to take them to the train station. His 
        stepfather met the children at the train station, where 
        he had to purchase my daughter's ticket since she was 
        only fourteen. They put the children on the train from 
        Lancaster to Philadelphia. From there, they took two 
        subways to New Jersey. That is where his family met the 
        children and took them to the abortion clinic, where 
        one of the adults had made the appointment.
          When my daughter started to cry and have second 
        thoughts, they told her they would leave her in New 
        Jersey. They planned, paid for, coerced, harassed, and 
        threatened her into having the abortion. They left her 
        alone during the abortion and went to eat lunch.
          After the abortion, his stepfather and grandmother 
        drove my daughter home from New Jersey and dropped her 
        off down the road from our house. My daughter told me 
        that on the way home she started to cry, they got angry 
        at her and told her there was nothing to cry about.
          Anything could have happened to my daughter at the 
        abortion facility or on the ride back home. These 
        people did not know my daughter's medical history, yet 
        they took her across state lines to have a medical 
        procedure without my knowledge or consent. Our family 
        will be responsible for the medical and psychological 
        consequences for my daughter as a result of this 
        procedure that was completed unbeknownst to me. I was 
        so devastated that this could have been done that I 
        called the local police department to see what could be 
        done. They were just as shocked and surprised as I was 
        that there was nothing that could be done in this 
        horrible situation.
          The state of Pennsylvania does have a parental 
        consent law. Something has to be done to prevent this 
        from happening to other families. This is just not 
        acceptable to me and should not happen to families in 
        this country. If your child goes to her school clinic 
        for a headache, a registered nurse can't give her a 
        Tylenol or aspirin without a parent's written 
        permission.
          As a consequence of my daughter being taken out of 
        our state for an abortion without parental knowledge, 
        she is suffering intense grief. My daughter cries 
        herself to sleep at night and lives with this everyday.
          I think about what I could or should have done to 
        keep her safe. Everybody tells me I did everything I 
        could have and should have done. It doesn't make me 
        feel any better, knowing everything I did was not 
        enough to protect my daughter.
          It does ease my mind to know with your help that we 
        can make a difference and change the law to protect 
        other girls and their families. I urge your support for 
        The Child Interstate Abortion Notification Act. It is 
        critical that this law passes in Congress. The right of 
        parents to protect the health and welfare of their 
        minor daughters needs to be protected. No one should be 
        able to circumvent state laws by performing an abortion 
        in another state on a minor daughter without parental 
        consent.

    The physician who performed an abortion on Marcia Carroll's 
daughter, Dr. Vikram Kaji, had a long history of sexually 
abusing his patients. Marcia Carroll should have been given an 
opportunity to learn about the history of her child's doctor. 
Apparently the people who coerced her daughter into having the 
abortion did not care who performed an abortion on her. Dr. 
Kaji was professionally disciplined by the State of New Jersey 
on November 1, 1993, and given a 12-month suspension for 
sexually abusing three patients and indiscriminately 
prescribing controlled dangerous substances.\51\ He was 
disciplined for having sex with one patient in his office, and 
for performing ``improper'' rectal and breast exams on two 
other patients.\52\ According to a consent order, Dr. Kaji knew 
the woman he had sex with suffered from severe depression, had 
been sexually abused as a child, and had once been hospitalized 
for psychiatric problems.\53\ He was also disciplined by the 
Federal Drug Enforcement Agency on February 22, 1994, and made 
to surrender his controlled substance license.\54\ He was also 
disciplined by the State of Pennsylvania on December 23, 1994, 
and his license was suspended for 36 months.\55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \51\ See Sidney Wolfe, M.D., Mary Gabay, Phyllis McCarthy, Alana 
Bame, and Benita Marcus Adler, ``Questionable Doctors: Disciplined by 
States or the Federal Government'' (State Listing for New Jersey; A 
Public Citizen Health Research Group Report) (March 1996) at 68.
    \52\ See American Political Network, ``State Reports Pennsylvania: 
PA Suspends Abortion Provider's License,'' (March 23, 1995) at 6.
    \53\ See Kathy Boccella, ``Abortion Doctor Banned One Year,'' The 
Philadelphia Inquirer (October 29, 1993) at B1 (``A woman who had been 
a patient of Kaji's since 1976 said that `numerous times (he) made 
sexual advances toward her and fondled her' in his office between 1980 
and 1988, the consent order read . . . Kaji knew the woman suffered 
from severe depression, had been sexually abused as a child and had 
once been hospitalized for psychiatric problems, the order read.'').
    \54\ See id. at 68.
    \55\ See id. at 68.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    When Marcia Carroll was asked why she came to testify on 
behalf of CIANA, she said, ``[my daughter] does suffer. She has 
gone to counseling for this. I just know that she cries and she 
wished she could redo everything, relive that day over. It's 
just sad that it had to happen this way and this is what she 
had to go through. But she did want me to come here today and 
speak on her behalf. She said, `Mom, just one phone call is all 
it would have taken to stop this from happening . . .' So she 
asked me to come here for her sake and for other girls' safety 
to speak and let you know what was happening.'' That is 
precisely what CIANA affirms: the right of parents to be given 
the chance to help their children through difficult times. The 
parents of this Nation want to be given the chance to make sure 
their children's doctors are not potential sexual abusers and 
controlled substance pushers, and CIANA would give them that 
chance.
    Eileen Roberts also testified that her 13-year-old daughter 
was encouraged by a boyfriend, with the assistance of his adult 
friend, to obtain a secret abortion.\56\ The adult friend drove 
Ms. Roberts' daughter to an abortion clinic 45 miles from her 
home and paid for her daughter to receive the abortion.\57\ 
After 2 weeks of observing their daughter's depression, Ms. 
Roberts and her husband learned that the young girl had an 
abortion from a questionnaire they found under her pillow, 
which their daughter had failed to return to the abortion 
clinic.\58\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \56\ See Child Custody Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 476 Before 
the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 
107th Cong. (Sept. 6, 2001) (statement of Eileen Roberts).
    \57\ See id. While Ms. Roberts' daughter was not taken to another 
state, her story is illustrative of the harms involved when a child is 
secretly taken away from her parents for an abortion. After this 
experience, Ms. Roberts formed an organization called Mothers Against 
Minor Abortions (MAMA). Ms. Roberts testified: ``I speak today for 
those parents I know around the country, whose daughters have been 
taken out of State for their abortions.'' Id.
    \58\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Ms. Roberts' daughter was then hospitalized as a result of 
the depression, and a physical examination revealed that the 
abortion had been incompletely performed and required surgery 
to repair the damage done by the abortionist.\59\ The hospital 
called Ms. Roberts and told her that they could not do 
reparative surgery without a signed consent form.\60\ The 
following year, Ms. Roberts' daughter developed an infection 
and was diagnosed with having pelvic inflammatory disease, 
which again required a 2-day hospitalization for antibiotic 
therapy and a signed consent form.\61\ Ms. Roberts and her 
family were responsible for over $27,000 in medical costs, all 
of which resulted from this one secret abortion.\62\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \59\ See id.
    \60\ See id.
    \61\ See id.
    \62\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

             STATE LAW AND CIANA'S PROTECTION OF STATE LAW

    There are currently 44 states with parental involvement 
statutes on the books.\63\ Of these 44 statutes, 34 are in 
effect today.\64\ Although 11 of these thirty-four statutes 
reflect a legislative intention to simply encourage the 
pregnant minor to consult with her parents, another relative, 
or a trusted friend before she decides to undergo an 
abortion,\65\ the laws on the books in the remaining 23 states 
require a parent to either be notified of their minor 
daughter's intention to undergo an abortion or to consent to 
the performance of an abortion on their minor daughter. Despite 
widespread support for parental involvement laws and clear 
public policy considerations justifying such laws, there exists 
substantial evidence, outlined above, that they are frequently 
circumvented by adults who transport minors to abortion 
providers in states that do not have parental notification or 
consent laws. One purpose of CIANA is to curb the interstate 
circumvention of these laws, thereby protecting the rights of 
parents and the interests of vulnerable minors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \63\ See Ala. Code Sec. Sec. 26-21-1 to -8 (2003); Alaska Stat. 
Sec. Sec. 18.16.010-030 (Michie 2003); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Sec. 36-2152 
(2004); Ark. Code Ann. Sec. Sec. 20-16-801 to -808 (Michie 2003); Cal. 
Health & Safety Code Sec. 123450 (West 2004); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
Sec. Sec. 12-37.5-101 to -108 (West 2004); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. 
Sec. 19a-601 (West 2003); Del. Code Ann. tit. 24, Sec. Sec. 1780-1789B 
(2003); Fla. Stat. Ann. ch. 390.01115 (Harrison 2004); Ga. Code Ann. 
Sec. Sec. 15-11-110 to -118 (Harrison 2003); Idaho Code Sec. 18-609A 
(2003); 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 70/1-99 (West 2004); Ind. Code Ann. 
Sec. Sec. 16-18-2-267, 16-34-2-4 (West 2004); Iowa Code Ann. 
Sec. Sec. 135L.1-.8 (West 2003); Kan. Stat. Ann. Sec. 65-6705 (2003); 
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. Sec. 311.732 (Michie 2003); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
Sec. 40:1299.35.5 (West 2004); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, Sec. 1597-A 
(West 2003); Md. Code Ann., Health-Gen. I Sec. 20-103 (2004); Mass. 
Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 112, Sec. 12S (West 2004); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. 
Sec. Sec. 722.901-.908 (West 2004); Minn. Stat. Ann. Sec. 144.343 (West 
2004); Miss. Code Ann. Sec. Sec. 41-41-51 to -63 (2003); Mo. Ann. Stat. 
Sec. Sec. 188.015, 188.028 (West 2004); Mont. Code Ann. Sec. Sec. 50-
20-201 to -215 (2003); Neb. Rev. Stat. Sec. Sec. 71-6901 to - 6909 
(2003); Nev. Rev. Stat. Sec. Sec. 442.255-.257 (2003); N.H. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. Sec. Sec. 132:24-28 (2003); N.J. Stat. Ann. Sec. Sec. 9:17A-1 to -
1.12 (West 2004); N.M. Stat. Ann. Sec. Sec. 30-5-1 to -3 (Michie 2003); 
N.C. Gen. Stat. Sec. Sec. 90-21.6 to .10 (2003); N.D. Cent. Code 
Sec. Sec. 14-02.1-03.1 (2003); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. Sec. Sec. 2919.12, 
2919.121-.122 (West 2004); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. Sec. 3206 (West 
2004); R.I. Gen. Laws Sec. 23-4.7-6 (2003); S.C. Code Ann. 
Sec. Sec. 44-41-30 to -37 (Law. Co-op. 2003); S.D. Codified Laws 
Sec. 34-23A-7 (Michie 2004); Tenn. Code Ann. Sec. 37-10-301 to -304 
(2004); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. Sec. Sec. 33.001-.004 (Vernon 2004); Utah 
Code Ann. Sec. 76-7-304 (2003); Va. Code Ann. Sec. 16.1-241 (Michie 
2004); W. Va. Code Sec. Sec. 16-2F-1 to -8 (2004); Wis. Stat. Ann. 
Sec. 48.375 (West 2003); Wyo. Stat. Ann. Sec. 35-6-118 (Michie 2003).
    \64\ See Planned Parenthood v. Heed, 390 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2004) 
(unconstitutional for lack of health exception); Planned Parenthood of 
Idaho, Inc. v. Wasden, 376 F.3d 908 (9th Cir. 2004) (concluding that 
the Idaho statute's definition of a medical emergency is 
unconstitutionally narrow and that, without an adequate medical 
exception, the parental consent statute is invalid); Glick v. McKay, 
937 F.2d 434 (9th Cir. 1991) (judicial bypass procedure rendered 
statute unconstitutional); Zbaraz v. Ryan, No. 84 CV771, 1996 WL 
33293423 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 8, 1996) (the Illinois Supreme Ct. refused to 
issue rules implementing the Illinois statute); Planned Parenthood of 
Alaska, Inc. v. State, No. 3AN-97-6014 CI (Alaska Super. Ct. Oct. 13, 
2003) (decision on remand from State v. Planned Parenthood of Alaska, 
35 P.3d 30 (Alaska 2001)) (parental consent law with judicial waiver 
violates state constitution); American Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 
940 P.2d 797, 800 (Cal. 1997) (parental consent statute violated state 
constitutional right to privacy); N. Fla. Women's Health and Counseling 
Services, Inc. v. State, 866 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 2003) (state supreme 
court held that law violated state right to privacy; however, the state 
constitution was amended in November 2004 to allow parental 
notification); Wicklund v. State, No. ADV-97-671 (Mont. Dist. Ct. Feb. 
11, 1999) available at http://www.mtbizlaw.com/1stjd99/WICKLUND--2--
11.htm (parental notification law violated state constitution); Planned 
Parenthood of Central New Jersey v. Farmer, 762 A.2d 620 (N.J. 2000) 
(parental notification law with judicial waiver violates state 
constitution); N.M. A.G. Op. No. 90-19 (Oct. 3 1990) (State attorney 
general holds law unenforceable due to lack of judicial bypass 
procedure). In addition, Ohio's parental notification law is in effect 
because a subsequently enacted parental consent statute was enjoined. 
See Cincinnati Women's Services v. Voinovich, No. C-1-98-289 (S.D. Ohio 
Apr. 29, 1998) (preliminary injunction preventing enforcement of the 
law).
    \65\ See Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. Sec. Sec. 12-37.5-101 to -108 (West 
2004) (if a minor is living with a relative and not a parent, she may 
notify that relative instead of her parent); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. 
Sec. 19a-601 (West 2003) (stating that the abortion provider need only 
discuss the possibility of parental involvement); Del. Code Ann. tit. 
24, Sec. Sec. 1780-1789B (2003) (allowing notice to a grandparent or a 
licensed mental health professional not associated with an abortion 
provider); Iowa Code Ann. Sec. Sec. 135L.1-.8 (West 2003) (allowing 
notice to a grandparent); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, Sec. 1597-A 
(West 2003) (allowing notice to an adult family member and allowing a 
minor to give informed consent after counseling by the abortion 
provider); Md. Code Ann., Health-Gen. I Sec. 20-103 (2004) (providing 
that notice does not have to be given if the minor does not live with a 
parent or guardian or if a physician determines that parental notice is 
not in the minor's best interest); N.C. Gen. Stat. Sec. Sec. 90-21.6 to 
.10 (2003) (allowing notice to a grandparent with whom the minor has 
been living for at least 6 months); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 
Sec. Sec. 2919.12, 2919.121-.122 (West 2004) (allowing notice to a 
brother, sister, step-parent, or grandparent if certain qualifications 
are met); S.C. Code Ann. Sec. Sec. 44-41-30 to -37 (Law. Co-op. 2003) 
(allowing notice to a grandparent or any person who has been standing 
in loco parentis to the minor for a period not less than sixty days); 
W. Va. Code Sec. Sec. 16-2F-1 to -8 (2004) (stating that a physician 
not affiliated with an abortion provider may waive the notice 
requirement); Wis. Stat. Ann. Sec. 48.375 (West 2003) (allowing notice 
to any adult family member). The Illinois parental involvement law 
allows notice to be given to an adult family member; however, it is not 
in effect.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Parental involvement laws have been in force for decades, 
and there is no case where it has been established that these 
laws led to parental abuse or to self-inflicted injury.\66\ 
Similarly, there is no evidence that these laws have led to an 
increase in illegal abortions.\67\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \66\ A 1989 memo prepared by the Minnesota Attorney General 
regarding Minnesota's experience with its parental involvement law 
states that ``after some 5 years of the statute's operation, the 
evidence does not disclose a single instance of abuse or forceful 
obstruction of abortion for any Minnesota minor.'' Testimony before the 
Texas House of Representatives on Massachusetts' experience with its 
parental consent law revealed a similar absence of unintended, but 
harmful, consequences. Ms. Jamie Sabino, chair of the Massachusetts 
Judicial Consent for Minors Lawyer Referral Panel, could identify no 
case of a Massachusetts' minor being abused or abandoned as a result of 
the law. See Hearing on Tex. H.B. 1073 Before the House State Affairs 
Comm., 76th Leg., R.S. 21 (Apr. 19, 1999) (statement by Jamie Sabino).
    \67\ See Hearing on Tex. H.B. 1073 Before the House State Affairs 
Comm., 76th Leg., R.S. 21 (Apr. 19, 1999) (statement by Jamie Sabino, 
testifying that there had been no increase in the number of illegal 
abortions in Massachusetts since the enactment of the statute in 1981).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Despite these critical benefits of better-informed 
selection of abortion providers, improved medical histories, 
appropriate post-operative care, and the affirmation of 
parental rights, opponents of CIANA argue that mandatory 
parental involvement results in girls' delaying their decisions 
to obtain abortions, thus increasing the risks attendant to the 
procedure.\68\ There is no evidence, however, that parental 
involvement laws result in medically significant delays in 
obtaining abortions. A study of Minnesota's parental 
notification law found that, ``Regardless [of the reason], the 
claim that the law caused more minors to obtain late abortions 
is unsubstantiated. In fact, the reverse is true. For ages 15-
17, the number of late abortions per 1,000 women decreased 
following the enactment of the law. Therefore, an increased 
medical hazard due to a rising number of late abortions was not 
realized.'' \69\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \68\ Parental Notification of Abortion: Hearings on H. 218 Before 
the House Comm. on Judiciary, 2001-2002 Legis. (Vt. 2001) (Lori Burris, 
representative of Vermont Academy of Pediatrics).
    \69\ Rogers, James L., Boruch, Robert F., Stoms, George B. & 
DeMoya, Dorothy, ``Impact of the Minnesota Parental Notification Law on 
Abortion and Birth,'' 81 Amer. J. Pub. Health 294, 297 (Mar. 1991). Cf. 
Ellertson, Charlotte, ``Mandatory Parental Involvement in Minors' 
Abortions: Effects of the Laws in Minnesota, Missouri, and Indiana,'' 
87 Am. J. Pub. Health 1367, 1372 (August 1997) (``Evidence concerning 
delay is mixed.''). See also id. at 1374 (``During periods of the laws' 
enforcement in Minnesota and Indiana, the two states with gestational 
age at abortion, in-state abortions for minors were probably delayed 
into the second month of pregnancy, although probably not into the 
second trimester.'').
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                     OTHER PARENTAL NOTICE STATUTES

    CIANA will strengthen the effectiveness of state laws 
designed to protect children from the health and safety risks 
associated with abortion.\70\ Across the country, officials 
must obtain parental consent before performing even routine 
medical services such as providing aspirin and before including 
children in certain activities such as field trips and contact 
sports.\71\ Regarding body piercing, states require written 
parental consent,\72\ a parent to be present when a minor is 
pierced,\73\ and written permission or a parent's physical 
presence.\74\ As of April, 2004, 35 states have laws 
prohibiting adolescents from getting tattoos without parental 
consent, 27 states have laws against body piercing without 
parental consent, and 26 states have laws that prohibit both 
without parental consent.\75\ Also, in Maryland, for example, 
as The Washington Post reports, eleven school systems require a 
parent's note before sunscreen can be applied to a minor 
student.\76\ Notwithstanding the extensive body of State law 
requiring parental consent before minor children can engage in 
a range of less consequential activity, people other than 
parents can secretly take children across state lines without 
the consent of their parents for abortions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \70\ In 2001, 853,485 legal induced abortions were reported to CDC. 
See Lilo T. Strauss, M.A., Joy Herndon, M.S., Jeani Chang, M.P.H., 
Wilda Y. Parker Sonya, V. Bowens, M.S., Suzanne B. Zane, D.V.M., 
Cynthia J. Berg, M.D., ``Abortion Surveillance--United States, 2001,'' 
Centers for Disease Control, Division of Reproductive Health, National 
Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion (November 
26, 2004).
    \71\ See, e.g., William D. Valente, 2 Education Law: Public and 
Private Sec. 19.23 at 212 (acknowledging ``[t]he common school practice 
of obtaining written parental consents or waivers . . . for designated 
[school field trip] activities''); Cal. Educ Code Ann Sec. 49302 
(requiring parental consent before pupils can be transported).
    \72\ See, e.g., Ala. Code Sec. 22-17A2; Alaska Stat. 
Sec. 08.13.217; Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, Sec. 1114; 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 
Ann. 5/12-10.1; Kan. Stat. Ann. Sec. 65-1953; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 
32, Sec. 4323; Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. Sec. 333.13102; Mo. Ann. Stat. 
Sec. 324.520; N.C. Gen. Stat. Sec. 14-400; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, 
Sec. 842.1; Tenn. Code Ann. Sec. 62-38-302; Tex. Health & Safety Code 
Ann. Sec. 146.012.
    \73\ See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. Sec. 13-3721; La. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. Sec. 14:93.2; R.I. Gen. Laws Sec. 23-1-39; Utah Code Ann. Sec. 76-
10-2201; Va. Code Ann. Sec. 18.2-371.3.
    \74\ See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code Sec. 652; Fla. Stat. Ann. 
Sec. 381.0075(7); Ind. Code Ann. Sec. 35-42-2-7; S.C. Code Ann. 
Sec. 44-32-120.
    \75\ Ala. Code 22-17A-2 (prohibits anyone from performing a tattoo, 
brand or body piercing on a minor unless prior written informed consent 
is obtained from the minor's parent or legal guardian); Ariz. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. Sec. 13-3721 (establishes that it is unlawful to either 
tattoo or body pierce anyone under age 18 without the physical presence 
of the parent or legal guardian; violators are guilty of a Class 6 
felony; allows anyone to avoid prosecution if he or she requested the 
ID and relied on the accuracy of the information contained in the ID); 
Ark. Stat. Ann. Sec. 5-27-228 (prohibits anyone from tattooing, body 
piercing or branding a minor without the written consent of one of the 
minor's parents, a guardian or a custodian; violators are guilty of a 
misdemeanor and, upon conviction, will be fined between $20 and $200); 
Cal. Penal Code Sec. 652 (establishes that it is unlawful to tattoo or 
offer to tattoo anyone under age 18; violators are guilty of a 
misdemeanor; prohibits anyone from performing or offering to perform 
body piercing upon anyone under age 18 unless the piercing is performed 
in the presence of a parent or guardian or as directed by and notarized 
by the minor's parent or guardian; does not apply to emancipated minors 
and does not include pierces of the ear); Col. Rev. Stat. Ann. Sec. 25-
4-2103 (prohibits anyone from performing a body art procedure on a 
minor unless the artist has received express consent from the minor's 
parent or guardian; failure to obtain permission before performing the 
procedures on a minor shall constitute a petty offense punishable by a 
fine of $250); Conn. Gen. Stat. Sec. 19a-92g (establishes that it is 
illegal to tattoo an unemancipated minor under age 18 without the 
written consent of the minor's parent or guardian; requires written 
consent of the minor's parent in order to perform body piercing on an 
unemancipated minor under age 18); Del. Code Ann. Title 11, Ch 5 
Sec. 1114(a) (it is illegal for a person to either knowingly or 
negligently tattoo or body pierce a minor without the prior written 
consent of the parent or legal guardian who must be over age 18); Fla. 
Stat. Sec. 381.0075 (requires written, notarized consent of a minor's 
parent or legal guardian in order to tattoo a minor; prohibits body 
piercing of a minor without the written, notarized consent of the 
parent or legal guardian or if he or she is accompanied by a parent or 
legal guardian); Ga. Code Sec. 16-5-71.1 (prohibits the tattooing of 
anyone under age 18 by anyone other than a licensed osteopath or 
technician acting under the direct supervision of a licensed physician 
or osteopath; violators are guilty of a misdemeanor; prohibits anyone 
from body piercing anyone under age 18 without prior written consent of 
the custodial parent or guardian; violators are guilty of a 
misdemeanor); Idaho Chapter No. 127 2004 (effective July 1, 2004) 
(prohibits the tattooing, branding or body piercing of minors under the 
age of 14; prohibits the tattooing, branding or body piercing on anyone 
between the ages of 14 and 18 without the written informed consent of 
the minor's parent or legal guardian; written informed consent must be 
executed in the presence of the person performing the act or an 
employee or agent of that person; violators are guilty of a misdemeanor 
and will be fined up to $500 and subsequent violations within 1 year 
will be fined between $500 and $1,000; piercing of the ear lobes and 
piercing for medical purposes are exempted from this legislation) Ill. 
Compiled Stat. 5/12-10.1 (it is a Class C misdemeanor for anyone, other 
than a person licensed to practice medicine in all branches, to tattoo 
or offer to tattoo a person under age 21; establishes that anyone who 
pierces the body of a minor under age 18 without written consent of the 
parent or legal guardian commits a Class C misdemeanor; does not apply 
to emancipated or married minors; Ind. Code Ann. Sec. 35-42-2-7 
(requires a minor's parent or legal guardian to be present on order to 
either tattoo or perform body piercing on a minor under age 18; 
requires the parent or guardian to also provide written permission for 
the minor to receive the tattoo or body piercing); Iowa Code 
Sec. 135.37 (prohibits anyone from tattooing an unmarried minor under 
age 18; upon conviction, violators are guilty of a serious 
misdemeanor); Ky. Rev. Stat. Sec. 211.760 (prohibits anyone from 
tattooing or body piercing minors without the written, notarized 
consent of a parent or guardian); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. Sec. 14:93.2 (it 
is unlawful for anyone to tattoo or body pierce a minor under age 18 
without the consent of the minor's accompanying parent or legal 
custodian; upon conviction, violators shall be fined between $100 and 
$500 or imprisoned between 30 and 100 days, or both); Me. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. Title 32, Ch. 64 Sec. 4323 (establishes that it is illegal to 
tattoo anyone under age 18; requires prior written consent of a minor's 
parent or legal guardian to perform body piercing on anyone under age 
18); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. Sec. 333.13102 (prohibits anyone from either 
tattooing or performing body piercing on a minor without prior written, 
informed consent of the minor's parent or legal guardian; requires the 
parent or legal guardian to execute the consent in the presence of 
either the person performing the body piercing or tattooing on the 
minor or in the presence of an employee or agent of the individual; 
does not include emancipated minors); Minn. Stat. Sec. 609.2246 (it is 
unlawful for anyone under age 18 to receive a tattoo without written 
parental consent); Miss. Laws Sec. 73-61-3 (prohibits anyone from 
tattooing or body piercing a minor under age 18; violators are guilty 
of a misdemeanor and will be fined a maximum of $500); Mo. Rev. Stat. 
Sec. 324.520 (prohibits anyone from knowingly tattooing or body 
piercing a minor without prior written, informed consent of the minor's 
parent or legal guardian; requires the parent or legal guardian to 
execute the written consent in the presence of either the person 
performing the tattooing or body piercing or an employee or agent of 
that person; violators are guilty of a misdemeanor and will be fined a 
maximum of $500; subsequent violations within 1 year of the initial 
violation will be subject to a fine of between $500 and $1,000); Mont. 
Code Ann. Sec. 45-5-623 (prohibits anyone from knowingly tattooing a 
child under the age of majority without the explicit in-person consent 
of the child's parent or guardian; upon conviction, violators will be 
either fined a maximum of $500, imprisoned for up to 6 months, or both; 
those convicted of a second offense will either be fined a maximum of 
$1,000, imprisoned for up to 6 months, or both); N.C. Gen. Stat. 
Sec. 14-400 (prohibits anyone from tattooing a minor under age 18; 
violators are guilty of a Class 2 misdemeanor; prohibits anyone from 
piercing any part of a minor under age 18 other than the ears without 
the prior consent of the custodial parent; violators are guilty of a 
Class 2 misdemeanor); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. Sec. 3730.06 (it is illegal 
to tattoo, body pierce or pierce the ears of anyone under age 18 
without the consent of the minor's parent, guardian or custodian; 
requires the consenting individual to appear in person at the business 
at the time the procedure is performed and sign a document that 
provides informed consent); Okla. Stat. Title 21 Sec. Sec. 841 and 
842.1 (prohibits anyone other than a licensed practitioner of the 
healing arts in the course of their practice from tattooing or offering 
to tattoo anyone; it is unlawful for anyone to perform, or offer to 
perform, body piercing on a child under age 18 unless the parent or 
legal guardian gives written consent for and is present during the 
procedure; penalties for violations include imprisonment for up to 90 
days and a fine of up to $500, or both); Pa. Cons. Stat. Title 18 
Sec. 6311 (it is unlawful to provide tattoo services to anyone under 
age 18 without the consent of the parent or guardian; violators are 
guilty of a misdemeanor of the third degree and, upon conviction, will 
be sentenced to either pay a maximum fine of $100 or be imprisoned a 
maximum of 3 years, or both); R.I. General Laws Sec. Sec. 11-9-15; 23-
1-39 (prohibits tattooing or body piercing a minor who is unaccompanied 
by his or her consenting parent or guardian; violators are guilty of a 
misdemeanor and, upon conviction, will either be imprisoned a maximum 
of 1 year or fined a maximum of $300); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. Sec. 26-
10-19 (requires anyone who is tattooing a minor under age 18 to obtain 
a signed consent form from the minor's parents authorizing a tattoo; 
violators are guilty of a Class 2 misdemeanor); Tenn. Code Ann. 
Sec. Sec. 62-38-207; 62-38-305 and 306 (establishes that a minor age 16 
or older may be tattooed with the written consent of the parent or 
legal guardian to cover up an existing tattoo and requires the parent 
or legal guardian to be present during the procedure; it is a Class C 
misdemeanor for anyone to tattoo a person under age 18; allows a minor 
age 18 or younger to undergo body piercing with the written consent of 
the parent, legal guardian or legal custodian and requires them to be 
present during the procedure; they must sign a document that explains 
the procedure and methods for proper care, present proof of age and 
attest in writing that they are the minor's parent, legal guardian or 
legal custodian; violators will be charged with a Class C misdemeanor 
and will be imprisoned for up to 30 days or pay a fine of up to $50); 
Texas Health and Safety Code Ann. Sec. Sec. 146.012; 146.0125 
(prohibits anyone from performing a tattoo on anyone under age 18 
without the consent of a parent or guardian who believes it is in the 
best interest of the minor to cover an obscene of offensive tattoo; 
required consent may be the physical presence of the individual's 
parent or guardian or the provision of evidence that he or she is the 
parent or guardian of the person who is getting the tattoo; prohibits 
anyone from performing body piercing on an individual under age 18 
without the consent of the individual's parent, managing conservator or 
guardian; consent must specify the part of the body to be pierced. 
Required consent is the physical presence of the individual's parent or 
guardian and the provision of evidence stating their parental or 
guardian status); Utah Code Ann. Sec. 76-10-2201 (prohibits anyone from 
performing or offering to perform a tattoo or body piercing upon a 
minor without receiving the consent of the minor's parent or legal 
guardian; establishes that a person is not guilty of a violation if he 
or she (a) had no actual knowledge of the minor's age and (b) reviewed, 
recorded and maintained a personal identification number for the minor 
prior to performing the body piercing or tattoo; violators are guilty 
of a Class C misdemeanor and the owner or operator of the establishment 
where the act takes place is subject to a civil penalty of $750 for 
each violation); Vt. Stat. Ann. Title 26 Sec. 4102 (prohibits anyone 
from tattooing a minor without the written consent of his or her parent 
or guardian); Va. Code Sec. 18.2-371.3 (prohibits anyone from tattooing 
or performing body piercing on a person under age 18, knowing or having 
reason to believe that the person is under 18 except (a) in the 
presence of the person's parent or guardian or (b) when done by or 
under the supervision of a medical doctor, registered nurse, or other 
medical services personnel in the performance of their duties; 
violators are guilty of a Class 2 misdemeanor. A second or subsequent 
violation shall be punished as a Class 1 misdemeanor; excludes ear 
piercing as a form of body piercing); Wash. Rev. Code Sec. 26.28.085 
(applying a tattoo to a minor under age 18 is illegal and violators are 
guilty of a misdemeanor; prohibits anyone from stating that he or she 
did not know the minor's age as a defense to prosecution, unless he or 
she establishes that by a preponderance of evidence he or she made a 
reasonable attempt to determine the true age of the minor by requiring 
a driver's license or other picture ID card and did nor rely solely on 
oral allegations); W. Va. Code Sec. 16-38-3 (requires prior written 
consent from a parent or guardian for the tattooing of a minor); Wis. 
Stat. Sec. 948.70 (prohibits anyone other than a physician in the 
course of his or her professional practice from tattooing or offering 
to tattoo a child; violators are subject to a Class D forfeiture); Wyo. 
Stat. Sec. 14-3-107 Chapter 47 2004 (Effective July 1, 2004) (prohibits 
anyone from tattooing a person under the age of majority, except with 
the consent of the person's parent or legal guardian who is present at 
the time the procedure is performed; violators are guilty of a 
misdemeanor and punishable by imprisonment for a maximum of 6 months, a 
fine of a maximum of $750, or both; prohibits performing body art on 
anyone who had not reached the age of majority without the consent of 
the parent or legal guardian and who is present at the time of the 
procedure; violators are guilty of a misdemeanor and punishable by 
imprisonment for a maximum of 6 months, a fine of a maximum of $750, or 
both; body art is defined as the practice of body piercing, branding 
scarification, sculpting or tattooing).
    \76\ See Daniel de Vise, ``Bill Would Legislate Maryland Students' 
Use of Sunscreen,'' The Washington Post (March 29, 2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                    STATE JUDICIAL BYPASS PROCEDURES

    In Bellotti v. Baird,\77\ a plurality of the United States 
Supreme Court set forth the basic test by which judicial bypass 
proceedings pursuant to a parental consent statute, if judicial 
bypass provisions are enacted at all, must be reviewed. Bypass 
procedures must allow the minor to show that she possesses 
maturity and information to make the abortion decision, in 
consultation with her physician, without regard to her parents' 
wishes; allow the minor to show that, even if she cannot make 
the decision by herself, the ``desired abortion would be in her 
best interests'' \78\; be confidential; and be conducted ``with 
expedition to allow the minor an effective opportunity to 
obtain the abortion.'' \79\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \77\ 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (Bellotti II).
    \78\ Id. at 644.
    \79\ Id. Factors that may be considered in determining 
``immaturity'' include work and personal experience, appreciation of 
the gravity of the procedure, and judgment. See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 
497 U.S. 417 (1990). Under the ``best interests'' analysis, judges 
often consider medical risks to the minor as a result of the time, 
place, or type of procedure to be performed, medical risks particular 
to the girl, evidence of physical, sexual, or emotional abuse by 
parents or guardians, and abortion alternatives such as marriage, 
adoption, and single motherhood.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Critics of CIANA claim that the measure endangers the 
health of young girls who are forced to travel out of state to 
obtain abortions because the judges in their home states either 
refuse to hear judicial bypass petitions or deny them 
arbitrarily. In support of this argument, the critics cite 
cases like that of Ms. Billie Lominick, who testified before 
the Constitution Subcommittee regarding her experience with 
South Carolina's judicial bypass procedures. According to Ms. 
Lominick, who assisted her grandson's girlfriend in obtaining 
an out-of-State abortion, only two judges in the state of South 
Carolina would hear a judicial bypass petition, and one of 
those judges, according to Ms. Lominick, would hear petitions 
only from girls residing in his county.\80\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \80\ See Child Custody Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 1218 Before 
the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 
106th Cong. (May 27, 1999) (statement of Billie Lominick).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Such examples ignore the fact that CIANA provides 
assistance only in the enforcement of constitutional state 
parental notice and consent laws. If there are only two judges 
in an entire state willing to hear judicial bypass proceedings, 
that state's parental involvement laws are likely 
unconstitutional under Supreme Court precedent, which requires 
the state to provide a minor the opportunity to seek a judicial 
bypass with ``sufficient expedition to provide an effective 
opportunity for an abortion to be obtained.'' \81\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \81\ Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 644 (1979) (plurality 
opinion).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This fact is illustrated by the First Circuit's decision in 
Planned Parenthood League v. Bellotti (``Bellotti II'').\82\ In 
that case, the court held that the plaintiffs could 
successfully challenge the state's judicial bypass procedures 
if they could present ``proof of `a systemic failure to provide 
a judicial bypass option in the most expeditious, practical 
manner.' '' \83\ The court of appeals remanded the case to the 
lower court so that the plaintiffs could present evidence that, 
among other things, judges were `` `defacto unavailable' to 
hear minors' abortion petitions,'' \84\ and many judges were 
avoided ``for reasons of hostility.'' \85\ The Sixth Circuit 
has also recognized that a constitutional challenge may be 
brought for a state's systemic failure to provide an 
expeditious judicial bypass.\86\
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    \82\ 868 F.2d 459 (1st Cir. 1989).
    \83\ Id. at 469 (quoting Hodgson v. Minnesota, 648 F. Supp. 756, 
777 (D. Minn. 1986)).
    \84\ Id. at 463.
    \85\ Id. at 461 n.6.
    \86\ See Cleveland Surgi-Center, Inc. v. Jones, 2 F.3d 686, 690 
(6th Cir. 1993).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Not only must states provide access to judges who are 
willing to hear judicial bypass petitions, states must also 
ensure that the judges who do hear bypass petitions render 
their decisions in an expedited fashion. For example, in 
Planned Parenthood v. Lawall,\87\ the Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit struck down an Arizona parental consent statute 
on the grounds that its judicial bypass provision lacked 
specific time limits and was therefore in violation of the 
Bellotti II expediency requirement. The court reached this 
conclusion even though the Arizona statute stated that such 
proceedings were to be given priority and required that ``the 
court shall reach the decision [on a bypass request] promptly 
and without delay to serve the best interests of a pregnant 
minor.'' \88\ The court's rationale in adopting a strict 
interpretation of the Supreme Court's timeliness requirement 
was that ``[o]pen-ended bypass provisions engender substantial 
possibilities of delay for minors seeking abortions.'' \89\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \87\ Planned Parenthood v. Lawall, 180 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 1999).
    \88\ Id. at 1027.
    \89\ Id. at 1030.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Fifth Circuit employed essentially identical reasoning 
in striking down a Louisiana judicial bypass procedure having 
indefinite time limits.\90\ The court found that ``not only do 
[the bypass procedures] fail to provide any specific time 
within which a minor's application will be decided, but they 
give no assurances (assurances required by Bellotti II) that 
the proceedings will conclude expeditiously.'' \91\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \90\ See Causeway Medical Suite v. Ieyoub, 109 F.3d 1096 (5th Cir. 
1997).
    \91\ Id. at 1110-11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As these cases illustrate, judicial bypass procedures must 
be readily accessible and efficient in order to pass 
constitutional muster. CIANA will assist in the enforcement of 
only those State parental involvement laws that meet the 
relevant constitutional criteria.
    In any case, the minority's own witness at a hearing on 
H.R. 1755, the ``Child Custody Protection Act,'' which 
contained the same provision in CIANA regarding judicial bypass 
laws, admitted that ``I am personally not aware of cases where 
[a judicial bypass procedure] hasn't worked.'' \92\ 
Furthermore, testimony received by the Constitution 
Subcommittee indicates that, where judicial bypass procedures 
are in place, they are not needed in the overwhelming number of 
cases because a parent's involvement is obtained. In 2002, 852 
girls received abortions in Alabama with a parent's approval 
and 12 with a judge's approval, according to state health 
department records. Idaho similarly reported less than 5 
percent of minors using judicial bypass to avoid that state's 
parental consent law (64 minors with parental consent, 3 with 
judicial bypass) in 2002. South Dakota reported 14 of 76 minors 
obtained judicial bypasses, rather than parental consent. In 
Texas where 3,654 minors obtained abortions, the Texas 
Department of Health paid for assistance in 284 judicial bypass 
proceedings. In Wisconsin, less than 10 percent of the minors 
obtaining abortions did so with the use of an order obtained 
through judicial bypass (727 with parental involvement, 63 with 
judicial bypass).\93\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \92\ Child Custody Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 1755 Before the 
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th 
Cong., 41 (2004) (testimony of Rev. Lois M. Powell).
    \93\ Id. at 37 (statement of Teresa Collett).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    And far from being too complicated or too intrusive, the 
judicial bypass procedure has been described as ``remarkably 
simple'' by the Nebraska Supreme Court in Orr v. Knowles.\94\ 
In fact, the average judicial bypass hearing lasts only 12 
minutes, and ``more than 92 percent of the hearings [were] less 
than or equal to 20 minutes.'' \95\ The young girl is not 
subjected to an adversarial process. She is not ``on trial.'' A 
young girl must merely present evidence only about her maturity 
level, not intimate details of her personal life, to the court. 
Then the judge will make his decision.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \94\ See Orr v. Knowles, 337 N.W.2d 699, 706 (Neb. 1983) (``This 
statute does not provide that the state or anyone else will contest the 
minor's claim that she is mature enough to make the abortion decision 
herself. Rather, she will present evidence, and the judge will then 
make the decision as to her maturity. Since there is no adversarial 
aspect to these proceedings, we find that no petitioning minor, 
indigent or otherwise, is entitled to free court-appointed counsel as a 
matter of right in proceedings under Sec. 28-347(2).''). Accord Joseph 
W. Moylan, ``No Law Can Give Me the Right to Do What Is Wrong,'' in 
Life and Learning V: Proceedings of the Fifth University Faculty for 
Life Conference at 234, 235 (1995) (explaining Judge Moylan's decision 
to resign from a bench in the juvenile court he had occupied for more 
than twenty years) (``When the bill, taken from a Minnesota law, did 
get passed, it stated that at the hearing the pregnant minor is 
entitled to have an attorney appointed for her and even a guardian ad 
litem. There is nobody on the other side, unless a judge takes it on 
himself. Now I know of no other case that is like that, where it is 
truly one-sided. If after that one-sided hearing, the judge finds that 
the girl is mature and can give an informed consent, then the judge is 
required to authorize the abortion physician to perform the 
abortion.'').
    \95\ Id. at 648.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Indeed, judicial bypass procedures are overwhelmingly 
granted by the courts. Judicial bypasses provide a safe and 
effective means of insuring the well-being of young girls 
seeking to abort their pregnancies. A survey of Massachusetts 
cases found that every minor who sought judicial authorization 
to bypass parental consent received it.\96\ Another 
Massachusetts study found that only 1 of 477 girls was refused 
judicial authorization.\97\ A Minnesota study cited that a 
Federal trial court determined that of the 3,573 bypass 
petitions filed, six were withdrawn, nine were denied, and 
3,558 were granted.\98\ A survey of the Virginia statute 
requiring parental notification found that out of 18 requests 
for judicial bypass, ``all but one of the requests were granted 
eventually.'' \99\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \96\ Robert H. Mnookin, ``Bellotti v. Baird, A Hard Case'' in In 
the Interest of Children: Advocacy, Law Reform, and Public Policy 149, 
239 (Robert H. Mnookin ed., 1985).
    \97\ Susanne Yates & Anita J. Pliner, ``Judging Maturity in the 
Courts: the Massachusetts Consent Statute,'' 78 Am. J. Pub. Health 646, 
647 (1988).
    \98\ Hodgson v. Minnesota, 648 F.Supp. 756, 765 (D. Minn. 1986).
    \99\ See Ellen Nakashima, ``Fewer Teens Receiving Abortions in 
Virginia: Notification Law to Get Court Test,'' The Washington Post 
(March 3, 1998) at A1 (``In Virginia, since the law took effect, 18 
teenagers have gone to a judge, who determines whether the girl is 
mature enough to make her own decision about abortion. All but one of 
the requests were granted eventually.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

CIANA IS BASED ON THE PROPOSITION THAT PARENTS SHOULD BE GIVEN A CHANCE 
          TO PLAY A ROLE IN THE LIVES OF THEIR MINOR CHILDREN

    Children's feelings should not trump parental authority. 
Parents are not simply placeholders in a child's life. They are 
the foundational pillars of civilization. The family unit has 
provided the comfort, stability, and safety necessary to 
sustain civilization, and it has done so for millennia. Parents 
must be given a chance to work with their own children through 
difficult situations. There is no guarantee that parents will 
be successful in that endeavor, and unfortunately there will, 
no doubt, be a few parents who will be indifferent when they 
are made aware of their daughter's pregnancy. But that is 
surely the rare case, and even in that rare case nothing in 
this legislation will bar an abortion. What this legislation 
affirms is the proposition that parents deserve a chance. 
Opponents of CIANA must rest their objections on the notion 
that most parents do not deserve that simple chance. But 
parents do deserve that chance, and CIANA would give that 
chance to parents who have not abused or neglected their child. 
Even famously liberal Justice Stevens wrote in his concurring 
opinion in H.L. v. Matheson that ``[t]he possibility that some 
parents will not react with compassion and understanding upon 
being informed of their daughter's predicament or that, even if 
they are receptive, they will incorrectly advise her, does not 
undercut the legitimacy of the State's attempt to establish a 
procedure that will enhance the probability that a pregnant 
young woman exercise as wisely as possible her right to make 
the abortion decision.'' \100\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \100\ 450 U.S. 398, 424 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Nothing in this bill requires a minor who was abused by her 
parents to notify an abusive parent before having an abortion. 
And all state judicial bypass provisions that are protected by 
this bill are both the product of state law and required to 
conform to the Supreme Court's own standards for judicial 
bypass provisions. Furthermore, all the various additional 
exceptions opponents have proposed be added to CIANA are simply 
legislative excuses to deny parents that chance. Those who 
oppose giving parents a chance claim life is hopelessly 
confusing and therefore Congress should not act to protect 
parental rights. But a sister or a brother, or a minister, or 
some other third party, is not a parent. Sisters and brothers, 
and ministers, can of course provide their own counseling if a 
minor girl seeks it. But parents are special, and parents 
deserve unique protections when it comes to their ability to 
protect the health and safety of their children. That much is 
clear.
    Anyone who is truly interested in the best interests of a 
pregnant girl--be they a minister, a sibling, a friend, or 
anyone else--will encourage her to inform her parents and give 
them the chance of helping her address her situation 
appropriately. It is beyond dispute that it is not in a 
pregnant girl's best interests to allow anyone to assist her in 
circumventing state laws providing for parental involvement or 
to allow anyone to give a pregnant girl who has crossed state 
lines a secret abortion that could have serious medical 
consequences without notifying a parent.
    Unfortunately, during consideration of this legislation, 
some opponents of this legislation have equated parents with 
slave owners.\101\ Parental rights are not those of a slave 
owner. They are the rights of caring people who deserve a 
chance to work with their children through difficult times and 
should be provided a chance to express their love to their 
children in their children's moments of greatest need. Some 
opponents of this bill think parents do not deserve to be 
involved in assisting their children as they confront difficult 
times because they believe parents are no better than slave 
owners. CIANA rejects that view of America's parents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \101\ See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 107-397 (2002) at 56 (``It seems to 
me what this bill is, is really akin to the Fugitive Slave Act of the 
1850's where you're enabling one State in the South, which had slavery, 
to reach over into another State . . . and say, `We want our slave 
back.' '') (remarks of Mr. Nadler D-NY).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

               THE FUNDAMENTAL NATURE OF PARENTAL RIGHTS

    The United States Supreme Court has described parents' 
right to control the care of their children as ``perhaps the 
oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this 
Court.'' \102\ In addressing the right of parents to direct the 
medical care of their children, the Supreme Court has stated:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \102\ Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (overturning 
Washington visitation statute which unduly interfered with parental 
rights).

          Our jurisprudence historically has reflected Western 
        civilization concepts of the family as a unit with 
        broad parental authority over minor children. Our cases 
        have consistently followed that course; our 
        constitutional system long ago rejected any notion that 
        a child is ``the mere creature of the State'' and, on 
        the contrary, asserted that parents generally ``have 
        the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and 
        prepare [their children] for additional obligations.'' 
        Surely, this includes a ``high duty'' to recognize 
        symptoms of illness and to seek and follow medical 
        advice. The law's concept of the family rests on a 
        presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in 
        maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment 
        required for making life's difficult decisions.\103\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \103\ Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (emphasis added) 
(citations omitted) (rejecting claim that minors had right to 
adversarial proceeding prior to commitment by parents for treatment 
related to mental health).

    The parents of a minor child have a fundamental right to 
direct the upbringing and education of that child. The Supreme 
Court first recognized the right to ``establish a home and 
bring up children'' as a ``privilege[] long recognized at 
common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by 
free men'' in the 1923 case of Meyer v. Nebraska in which it 
struck down as unconstitutional a Nebraska law forbidding all 
schools within its boundaries from teaching pupils in any 
language other than English.\104\ Two years later, striking 
down an Oregon statute requiring all children, under compulsory 
education laws, to attend public schools, the Court affirmed 
this principle stating, ``The child is not the mere creature of 
the state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have 
the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare 
him for additional obligations.'' \105\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \104\ 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
    \105\ Pierce v. Society of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Coupled with this right, however, is the duty of parents to 
provide for the care and safety of their children, including 
their physical and medical well-being. A parent's duty to 
provide medical care to his or her child is a duty arising from 
the relationship of parent and child. Indeed, the Court has 
described the ``care and nurture'' of a child as being a 
``primary function'' of parents.\106\ Ignoring or violating a 
parent's legal right to direct the upbringing of their 
children, including the right to direct the medical care 
received by those children, can result in liability.\107\ In 
Meyer, the Court stated, ``Corresponding to the right of 
control, it is the natural duty of the parent to give his 
children education suitable to their station in life [.]'' 
\108\ Certainly this duty to educate includes instructing one's 
children on how to best make decisions concerning their health.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \106\ See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
    \107\ Unauthorized medical examinations of minors have resulted in 
liability. See van Emrik v. Chemung County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 911 
F.2d 863, 867 (2d Cir. 1990) (parental consent required for x-ray); 
Tenebaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 597-99 (2d Cir. 1999)(parental 
consent required for gynecological exam).
    \108\ Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Holding that the State of Georgia's commitment procedures 
for minor children did not violate the due process rights of 
minors, the Court recognized ``the traditional presumption that 
the parents act in the best interests of their child'' and 
warned against discarding ``wholesale those pages of human 
experience that teach that parents generally do act in the 
child's best interests.'' \109\ The Court added, ``Surely, this 
includes a `high duty' to recognize symptoms of illness and to 
seek and follow medical advice.'' \110\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \109\ Parham, 442 U.S. at 602-04. See also Hodgson v. Minnesota, 
497 U.S. 417 (1990) (a parent is ``presumed to act in the minor's best 
interest and thereby assures that the minor's decision to terminate her 
pregnancy is knowing, intelligent, and deliberate'').
    \110\ Parharm, 442 U.S. at 602.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that parents 
have a legal right to be involved in their minor daughter's 
decision to seek medical care, which includes the abortion 
procedure. Therefore, the Court has consistently affirmed a 
state's right to restrict the circumstances under which a minor 
may obtain an abortion in ways in which adult women seeking 
abortions may not be restricted. Holding that a state may not 
grant to a third party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, 
veto over a minor's decision to have an abortion in Planned 
Parenthood v. Danforth, the Court added ``the State has 
somewhat broader authority to regulate the activities of 
children than of adults.'' \111\ Indeed, ``the status of minors 
under the law is unique in many respects'' and the ``unique 
role in our society of the family, the institution by which `we 
inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values, 
moral and cultural,' requires that constitutional principles be 
applied with sensitivity and flexibility to the special needs 
of parents and children.'' \112\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \111\ 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
    \112\ Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 633-34 (1979) (Bellotti II).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT SUPPORTS GIVING PARENTS A CHANCE TO PLAY A ROLE 
                 IN THEIR CHILDREN'S ABORTION DECISIONS

    Supreme Court precedents support CIANA. The Supreme Court 
has observed that ``[t]he medical, emotional, and psychological 
consequences of an abortion are serious and can be lasting,'' 
\113\ and that ``[i]t seems unlikely that [the minor] will 
obtain adequate counsel and support from the attending 
physician at an abortion clinic, where abortions for pregnant 
minors frequently take place.'' \114\ Parental involvement in 
such a decision will lead to improved medical care for minors 
seeking abortions and provide increased protection for young 
girls against sexual exploitation by adult men.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \113\ H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 411 (1981).
    \114\ Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 91 (1976).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On an issue as contentious and divisive as abortion, it is 
both remarkable and instructive that there is such firm and 
long-standing support for laws requiring parental involvement. 
Various reasons underlie this broad and consistent support. As 
the Supreme Court, including Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and 
Souter, observed in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,\115\ parental 
consent and notification laws related to abortions ``are based 
on the quite reasonable assumption that minors will benefit 
from consultation with their parents and that children will 
often not realize that their parents have their best interests 
at heart.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \115\ 505 U.S. 833, 895 (1992).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth,\116\ 
noted liberal Justice Stewart wrote, ``There can be little 
doubt that the State furthers a constitutionally permissible 
end by encouraging an unmarried pregnant minor to seek the help 
and advice of her parents in making the very important decision 
whether or not to bear a child.'' \117\ Three years later, in 
Bellotti v. Baird,\118\ a plurality of the Court acknowledged 
that parental consultation is critical for minors considering 
abortion because minors often lack the experience, perspective, 
and judgment to avoid choices that could be detrimental to 
them. The Bellotti plurality also observed that parental 
consultation is particularly desirable regarding the abortion 
decision since, for some, the situation raises profound moral 
and religious concerns.\119\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \116\ 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
    \117\ Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 91 (1976) 
(Stewart, J., concurring).
    \118\ 443 U.S. 622, 640 (1979) (Bellotti II ) (plurality opinion).
    \119\ Id. at 635.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Significantly, the Supreme Court has already concluded that 
notice statutes do not give parents any ``veto power'' \120\ 
over the minor's abortion decision. As the Court reiterated in 
Akron II, ``notice statutes are not equivalent to consent 
statutes because they do not give anyone a veto power over a 
minor's abortion decision.'' \121\ A one-parent notification 
law such as one containing CIANA's abuse and life-endangerment 
exception does not require a judicial bypass. As the Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals recognized in Planned Parenthood of 
the Blue Ridge v. Camblos, ``In contrast to its assessment of 
parental consent statutes, the [Supreme] Court has consistently 
recognized that the same potential for absolute veto over the 
abortion decision that inheres in a parental consent statute 
does not inhere in a parental notice statute, and therefore 
that notice statutes are fundamentally different from--and less 
burdensome than--consent statutes.'' \122\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \120\ See H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 411 (1981) (``The Utah 
Statute gives neither parents nor judges a veto power over the minor's 
abortion decision.'').
    \121\ Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502, 
511 (1992).
    \122\ Planned Parenthood of the Blue Ridge v. Camblos, 155 F.3d 
352, 363 (4th Cir. 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Parental involvement in a pregnant minor girl's abortion 
decision is supported by the common-sense realization that 
minors often lack the maturity to fully comprehend the 
significance and consequences of their actions. In 1976, when 
it first addressed Massachusetts' parental consent statute, the 
Supreme Court recognized that with minors, ``there are 
unquestionably greater risks of inability to give an informed 
consent.'' \123\ During its second review of Massachusetts' 
parental consent law, the Court stated, ``Viewed together, our 
cases show that although children generally are protected by 
the same constitutional guarantees against governmental 
deprivations as are adults, the State is entitled to adjust its 
legal system to account for children's vulnerability and their 
needs for concern, . . . sympathy, and . . . paternal 
attention.'' \124\ The Court continued to describe its previous 
rulings to allow states to ``limit the freedom of children to 
choose for themselves in the making of important, affirmative 
choices with potentially serious consequences'' as being 
``grounded in the recognition that, during the formative years 
of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, 
perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that 
could be detrimental to them.'' \125\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \123\ Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 147 (1976) (Bellotti I).
    \124\ Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 635 (quotations and citations 
omitted).
    \125\ Id. at 635.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Supreme Court has pointed to the ``guiding role of 
parents in the upbringing of their children'' as the basis for 
its rulings preserving for parents a unique legal authority 
over the conduct of their children.\126\ The Court has reasoned 
that ``parents naturally take an interest in the welfare of 
their children[.]'' \127\ This, in the Court's view, creates 
``an important state interest in encouraging a family rather 
than a judicial resolution of a minor's abortion decision.'' 
\128\ In H.L. v. Matheson,\129\ the Court upheld a Utah statute 
requiring a physician to notify, if possible, parents of a 
minor upon whom an abortion is to be performed and stated:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \126\ See id. at 637.
    \127\ Id. at 648.
    \128\ Id.
    \129\ 450 U.S. 398 (1981).

          There can be little doubt that the State furthers a 
        constitutionally permissible end by encouraging an 
        unmarried pregnant minor to seek the help and advice of 
        her parents in making the very important decision 
        whether or not to bear a child. That is a grave 
        decision, and a girl of tender years, under emotional 
        stress, may be ill-equipped to make it without mature 
        advice and emotional support. It seems unlikely that 
        she will obtain adequate counsel and support from the 
        attending physician at an abortion clinic, where 
        abortions for pregnant minors frequently take 
        place.\130\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \130\ Id. at 409-10.

    In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Court upheld the 
parental consent provisions of Pennsylvania's Abortion Control 
Act of 1982, stating that they ``provide the parent or parents 
of a pregnant young woman the opportunity to consult with her 
in private, and to discuss the consequences of her decision in 
the context of the values and moral or religious principles of 
their family.'' \131\ It continued, ``The State commonly 
protects its youth from adverse governmental action and from 
their own immaturity by requiring parental consent to or 
involvement in important decisions by minors.'' \132\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \131\ 505 U.S. 833, 899-900 (1992).
    \132\ Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 637.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    It is instructive that the Court has always held that this 
important duty to ensure and provide for the care and nurture 
of minor children lies only with parents--a conclusion that 
arises from the traditional legal recognition ``that natural 
bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of 
their children.'' \133\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \133\ Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979)(emphasis added). See 
also Prince v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) 
(``It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the 
child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom 
include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor 
hinder.''); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (``The history 
and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of 
parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This 
primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now 
established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Significantly for CIANA, the Court recently struck down a 
Washington State visitation law under which grandparents were 
granted visitation to their grandchildren over the objection of 
the children's mother precisely because it failed to provide 
special protection for the fundamental right of parents to 
control with whom their children associate.\134\ The Court 
concluded that the lower court ``gave no special weight at 
all'' to a mother's conclusion that excessive grandparent 
visitation was not in her minor children's best interests, and 
continued, ``so long as a parent adequately cares for his or 
her children (i.e., is fit), there will normally be no reason 
for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the 
family to further question the ability of that parent to make 
the best decisions concerning the rearing of that parent's 
children.'' \135\ This failure, the Court stated, ``directly 
contravened the traditional presumption that a fit parent will 
act in the best interest of his or her child.'' \136\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \134\ Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
    \135\ Id. at 68-69.
    \136\ Id. at 69.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                CIANA PROTECTS THE HEALTH OF MINOR GIRLS

    Young girls face serious risks to their health and well-
being when they are secretly taken for abortions without their 
parents' knowledge. When an abortion is performed on a girl 
without the physician having full knowledge of her medical 
history--which is usually available only from a parent--the 
risks greatly increase. Moreover, minor girls who do not 
involve their parents usually do not return for follow-up 
treatment, which can lead to dangerous complications. In many 
cases, only a girl's parents know of her prior psychological 
and medical history, including allergies to medication and 
anesthesia. Also, parents are usually the only people who can 
provide authorization for post-abortion medical procedures or 
the release of pertinent data from family physicians. None of 
these precautions can be taken when a pregnant girl is taken to 
have an abortion without her parents' knowledge. Consequently, 
when parents are not involved, the risks to the minor girl's 
health significantly increase. CIANA is designed to safeguard 
minor girls' physical and emotional health by helping to ensure 
parental involvement in their interstate abortion decisions.
    The medical care that minors seeking abortions receive is 
improved when their parents are involved in three ways.
    First, parental involvement allows parents to assist their 
daughter in the selection of a competent abortion provider. 
With all medical procedures, one of the most reliable means of 
guaranteeing patient safety is the professional competence of 
the physician performing the procedure. In Bellotti v. Baird, 
the United States Supreme Court acknowledged that parents 
possess a much greater ability to evaluate and select competent 
healthcare providers than their minor children often do:

          In this case . . . we are concerned only with minors 
        who, according to the record, range in age from 
        children of 12 years to 17-year-old teenagers. Even the 
        latter are less likely than adults to know or be able 
        to recognize ethical, qualified physicians, or to have 
        the means to engage such professionals. Many minors who 
        bypass their parents probably will resort to an 
        abortion clinic, without being able to distinguish the 
        competent and ethical from those that are incompetent 
        or unethical.\137\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \137\ Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 641 n.21 (1979) (Bellotti 
II).

    The Supreme Court's concern for that ability of minors to 
distinguish competent and ethical abortion providers is 
particularly justified in states where non-physicians are 
allowed, by statute, to perform abortions. The National 
Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action League recommends that 
patients seeking an abortion confirm that the abortion will be 
performed by a licensed physician in good standing with the 
state Board of Medical Examiners, and that he or she have 
admitting privileges at a local hospital not more than 20 
minutes away from the location where the abortion is to 
occur.\138\ A well-informed parent seeking to guide her child 
is more likely to inquire into the qualifications of the person 
performing the abortion, and the availability of a physician 
with local admitting privileges, than an emotionally vulnerable 
young girl faced with pregnancy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \138\ See National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action League, 
Minors' Issues: Reproductive Choice Issues, at http://www.naral.org/
issues/issues--minors.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Second, parental involvement will ensure that parents have 
the opportunity to provide additional medical history and 
information to abortion providers prior to performance of the 
abortion. As the Supreme Court has stated:

          The medical, emotional, and psychological 
        consequences of an abortion are serious and can be 
        lasting . . . An adequate medical and psychological 
        case history is important to the physician. Parents can 
        provide medical and psychological data, refer the 
        physician to other sources of medical history, such as 
        family physicians, and authorize family physicians to 
        give relevant data.\139\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \139\ H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 411 (1981). Accord Ohio v. 
Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502, 518-19 (1990).

    Take, for example, the story of Sandra, a fourteen-year-old 
girl who committed suicide shortly after obtaining an 
abortion.\140\ Sandra's mother, who learned of her daughter's 
abortion only after her suicide, sued the abortion provider at 
which Sandra's abortion was performed, asserting that her 
daughter's death was due to the failure of the abortion 
provider to obtain a psychiatric history or monitor Sandra's 
mental health.\141\ The court concluded that Sandra was not 
insane at the time she committed suicide and, therefore, her 
actions broke the chain of causation required for 
recovery.\142\ Yet evidence was presented that Sandra had a 
history of psychological illness and that her behavior was 
noticeably different after the abortion.\143\ If Sandra's 
mother had been aware of her daughter's abortion, she would 
have had the opportunity to notify the abortion provider of 
Sandra's psychological history, and steps could have been taken 
to minimize the psychological effect of the abortion on 
Sandra's already fragile mental state.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \140\ See Edison v. Reproductive Health Services, 863 S.W.2d 621 
(Mo. App. E.D. 1993).
    \141\ See id. at 624.
    \142\ See id. at 628.
    \143\ Edison v. Reproductive Health Services, 863 S.W.2d 621 (Mo. 
App. E.D. 1993).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A more complete and thus more accurate medical history of 
the patient will enable abortion providers to disclose not only 
medical risks that ordinarily accompany abortions but also 
those risks that may be specific to a pregnant minor. Parental 
involvement provides adults with the opportunity to advise and 
assist the girl in giving her informed consent to the 
procedure.
    Third, parental involvement will improve medical treatment 
of pregnant minors by ensuring that parents have adequate 
knowledge to recognize and respond to any post-abortion 
complications that may develop.\144\ The rate of many of the 
complications associated with abortion are unknown. As a 
clinician's guide states, ``The abortion reporting systems of 
some counties and states in the United States include entries 
about complications, but these systems are generally considered 
to underreport infections and other problems that appear some 
time after the procedure was performed.'' \145\ Furthermore, 
women typically have no pre-existing relationship with an 
abortion provider,\146\ which likely accounts for the fact that 
only about one-third return to the provider for their post-
operative exam.\147\ Teenagers are even less likely to return 
for follow-up appointments.\148\ This failure to return for 
post-operative exams precludes discovery of post-abortion 
complications by abortion providers and subsequent reporting of 
these complications. Other healthcare providers may be 
reluctant to report any complications for fear of compromising 
the secrecy that often surrounds abortions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \144\ See Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502, 
519 (1990).
    \145\ Stanley K. Henshaw, ``Unintended Pregnancy and Abortion: A 
Public Health Perspective,'' in A Clinician's Guide to Medical and 
Surgical Abortions 20 (Maureen Paul et al., eds. 1999).
    \146\ See Florida Dep't of Health v. North Florida Women's Health 
and Counseling Service, 852 So.2d 254, 264 n.3 (Fla. App. 1 Dist., 
2001):

      [E]vidence at trial showed, the physician-patient 
      relationship is often attenuated in the abortion context, 
      almost to the point of non-existence. Cf. Planned 
      Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 91, 96 S.Ct. 2831, 49 
      L.Ed.2d 788 (1976) (``It seems unlikely that [the minor] 
      will obtain adequate counsel and support from the attending 
      physician at an abortion clinic, where abortions for 
      pregnant minors frequently take place. ''). Abortion 
      patients ordinarily see their physicians only once or 
      twice, very briefly. Most of their interaction is with the 
      clinic's staff. Physicians performing abortions often 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
      perform several in the space of a single hour. Id.

    \147\ Stanley K. Henshaw, ``Unintended Pregnancy and Abortion: A 
Public Health Perspective,'' in A Clinician's Guide to Medical and 
Surgical Abortions 20 (Maureen Paul et al., eds. 1999). Cf. Richard S. 
Moon, Why I Don't Do Abortions Anymore, Medical Economics 61 (Mar. 4, 
1985).
    \148\ Parental Notification of Abortion: Hearings on H. 218 Before 
the House Comm. on Health and Welfare, 2001-2002 Legis. (Vt. 2001) 
(Nancy Mosher, President and CEO of Planned Parenthood of Northern New 
England on April 16, 2001) (estimating that two-thirds of Vermont women 
keep their follow up appointments, although ``teenagers are notorious 
for `no-showing' '').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    At least one American court has held that a perforated 
uterus is a ``normal risk'' associated with abortion.\149\ 
Untreated, a perforated uterus may result in an infection, 
complicated by fever, endometritis, and parametritis. According 
to one study, ``[t]he risk of death from post-abortion sepsis 
[infection] is highest for young women, those who are 
unmarried, and those who undergo procedures that do not 
directly evacuate the contents of the uterus . . . A delay in 
treatment allows the infection to progress to bacteremia, 
pelvic abscess, septic pelvic thrombophlebitis, disseminated 
intravascular coagulophy, septic shock, renal failure, and 
death.'' \150\ Evidence about these dangers presented at trial 
persuaded a Florida appellate court to uphold that State's 
parental notification law:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \149\ Reynier v. Delta Women's Clinic, 359 So.2d 733, 738 (La. Ct. 
App. 1978) (``All the medical testimony was to the effect that a 
perforated uterus was a normal risk, but the statistics given by the 
experts indicated that it was an infrequent occurrence and it was rare 
for a major blood vessel to be damaged.''). Frequent injuries from 
incomplete abortions are discussed in Swate v. Schiffers, 975 S.W.2d 70 
(Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998) (abortionist's unsuccessful claim of libel 
against journalist for reports based in part upon one disciplinary 
order that doctor had failed to complete abortions performed on several 
patients and had failed to repair lacerations which occurred during 
abortion procedures). Cf. Sherman v. District of Columbia Bd. of 
Medicine, 557 A.2d 943, 944 (D.C. 1989) (``Dr. Sherman placed his 
patients' lives at risk by using unsterile instruments in surgical 
procedures and by intentionally doing incomplete abortions (using 
septic instruments) to increase his fees by making later surgical 
procedures necessary. His practices made very serious infections (and 
perhaps death) virtually certain to occur. Dr. Sherman does not 
challenge our findings that his misconduct was willful nor that he 
risked serious infections in his patients for money.'').
    \150\ Phillip G. Stubblefield and David A. Grimes, ``Current 
Concepts: Septic Abortions,'' New Eng. J. Med. 310 (August 4, 1994).

          The State proved that appropriate aftercare is 
        critical in avoiding or responding to post-abortion 
        complications. Abortion is ordinarily an invasive 
        surgical procedure attended by many of the risks 
        accompanying surgical procedures generally. If post-
        abortion nausea, tenderness, swelling, bleeding, or 
        cramping persists or suddenly worsens, a minor (like an 
        adult) may need medical attention. A guardian unaware 
        that her ward or a parent unaware that his minor 
        daughter has undergone an abortion will be at a serious 
        disadvantage in caring for her if complications 
        develop. An adult who has been kept in the dark cannot, 
        moreover, assist the minor in following the abortion 
        provider's instructions for post-surgical care. Failure 
        to follow such instructions can increase the risk of 
        complications. As the plaintiffs' medical experts 
        conceded, the risks are significant in the best of 
        circumstances. While abortion is less risky than some 
        surgical procedures, abortion complications can result 
        in serious injury, infertility, and even death.\151\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \151\ Florida Dep't of Health v. North Florida Women's Health and 
Counseling Service, 852 So.2d 254, 262-63 (Fla. App. 1 Dist. 2001), 
quashed by North Florida Women's Health and Counseling Services, Inc. 
v. State, 866 So.2d 612 (Fla. 2003) (striking down state law under 
state constitution's ``right to privacy''). The Florida Constitution 
was subsequently amended to state ``Notwithstanding a minor's right to 
privacy . . . the Legislature is authorized to require by general law 
for notification to a parent or guardian of a minor before the 
termination of the minor's pregnancy.'' Fla. Stat. Ann. Const. Art. 10 
Sec. 22.

    Young adolescent girls are particularly at risk of certain 
adverse medical consequences from an abortion. For instance, 
there is a greater risk of cervical injury associated with 
suction-curettage abortions (at 12 weeks' gestation or earlier) 
performed on girls 17 years-old or younger.\152\ Cervical 
injury is of serious concern because it may predispose the 
young girl to adverse outcomes in future pregnancies. Girls 17 
years-old or younger also face a two and a half times greater 
risk of acquiring endometriosis following an abortion than do 
women 20-29 years-old.\153\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \152\ See Willard Cates, Jr., M.D., M.P.H., Kenneth F. Schulz, 
M.B.A. & David A. Grimes, M.D., The Risks Associated With Teenage 
Abortion, New Eng. J. of Med., Sept. 15, 1983, at 621-24.
    \153\ See Burkman et al., Morbidity Risk Among Young Adolescents 
Undergoing Elective Abortion, Contraception, vol. 30 (1984), at 99-105.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The particular risks faced by minors upon whom abortions 
are performed were articulated by Dr. Bruce A. Lucero. Dr. 
Lucero, who supported the Child Custody Protection Act (federal 
legislation similar to CIANA) in 1998, wrote in The New York 
Times about his own experience with minor girls seeking 
abortions. ``In almost all cases,'' Dr. Lucero wrote, ``the 
only reason that a teen-age girl doesn't want to tell her 
parents about her pregnancy is that she feels ashamed and 
doesn't want to let her parents down.'' \154\ However, 
according to Dr. Lucero, ``parents are usually the ones who can 
best help their teen-ager consider her options. And whatever 
the girl's decision, parents can provide the necessary 
emotional support and financial assistance.'' \155\ Moreover, 
Dr. Lucero explained that ``patients who receive abortions at 
out-of-State clinics frequently do not return for follow-up 
care, which can lead to dangerous complications. And a teen-
ager who has an abortion across state lines without her 
parents' knowledge is even more unlikely to tell them that she 
is having complications.'' \156\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \154\ Bruce A. Lucero, M.D., ``Parental Guidance Needed,'' The New 
York Times (July 12, 1998), section 4, at 1.
    \155\ Id.
    \156\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Opponents also argue that the bill needs a broader ``health 
exception.'' It does not. CIANA specifically provides that its 
notification requirements would not apply if ``the abortion is 
necessary to save the life of the minor because her life was 
endangered by a physical disorder, physical injury, or physical 
illness, including a life-endangering physical condition caused 
by or arising from the pregnancy itself.'' If the concern is 
about health risks of a non life-threatening nature, then the 
best course of action, of course, is involving the parents. 
Finally, the Supreme Court has upheld as constitutional a state 
parental notification statute that did not contain a health 
exception. That state statute provided only for a ``judicial 
bypass'' exception, which would of course take some time for a 
minor to utilize, and an exception for cases in which emergency 
treatment prior to notice ``is necessary to prevent the woman's 
death.'' \157\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \157\ Hodsgon v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 426 n.7 (1990) (citing 
Minnesota statute Sec. 144.343, subd. 4(a)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Without the knowledge that their daughters have had 
abortions, parents are incapable of ensuring that their 
children obtain routine post-operative care or of providing an 
adequate medical history to physicians called upon to treat any 
complications that may arise. The first omission may allow 
complications such as infection, perforation, or depression, to 
continue untreated. The second omission may be lethal. When 
parents do not know that their daughter had an abortion, 
ignorance prevents swift and appropriate intervention by 
emergency room professionals responding to a life-threatening 
condition.
    In short, the physical and psychological risks of abortions 
to minors are great, and laws requiring parental involvement in 
such abortions reduce that risk. The widespread practice of 
evading such laws by transporting minors across State lines 
through interstate commerce may be prevented only through 
Federal legislation.

             CIANA PROTECTS MINOR GIRLS FROM SEXUAL ASSAULT

    In addition to improving the medical care received by young 
girls dealing with an unplanned pregnancy, parental involvement 
will provide increased protection against sexual exploitation 
of minors by adult men. National studies reveal that ``[a]lmost 
two thirds of adolescent mothers have partners older than 20 
years of age.'' \158\ In a study of over 46,000 pregnancies by 
school-age girls in California, researchers found that ``71 
percent, or over 33,000, were fathered by adult post-high-
school men whose mean age was 22.6 years, an average of 5 years 
older than the mothers . . . Even among junior high school 
mothers aged 15 or younger, most births are fathered by adult 
men 6-7 years their senior. Men aged 25 or older father more 
births among California school-age girls than do boys under age 
18.'' \159\ Other studies have found that most teenage 
pregnancies are the result of predatory practices by men who 
are substantially older.\160\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \158\ American Academy of Pediatrics Committee on Adolescence, 
``Adolescent Pregnancy--Current Trends and Issues: 1998,'' 103 
Pediatrics 516, 519 (1999).
    \159\ Mike A. Males, ``Adult Involvement in Teenage Childbearing 
and STD,'' 346 Lancet 64 (July 8, 1995) (emphasis added).
    \160\ See id. (citing HP Boyer and D. Fine, ``Sexual Abuse as a 
Factor in Adolescent Pregnancy and Child Maltreatment,'' 24 Fam. Plan. 
Perspectives 4 (1992)); See also HP Gershenson, et al. ``The Prevalence 
of Coercive Experience Among Teenage Mothers,'' 24 J. Interpersonal 
Violence 4 (1989); American Academy of Pediatrics Committee on 
Adolescence, ``Adolescent Pregnancy--Current Trends and Issues: 1998,'' 
103 Pediatrics 516, 516 (1999) (``Younger teenagers are especially 
vulnerable to coercive and nonconsensual sex. Involuntary sexual 
activity has been reported in 74 percent of sexually active girls 
younger than 14 years and 60 percent of those younger than 15 
years.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A 1989 study of coercive sexual experiences among teenage 
mothers found that of the pregnant teens who had unwanted 
sexual experiences, only 18 percent of the perpetrators were 
within the victim's age group. Another 18 percent were three to 
5 years older than the victim. Seventeen percent were six to 10 
years older, and 40 percent were more than 10 years older than 
their victims.\161\ Another study reports that when a minor's 
parents have not been told about her pregnancy, 58 percent of 
the time it is the girl's boyfriend who accompanies her for an 
abortion, and the minor's boyfriend helped pay for the abortion 
76 percent of the time.\162\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \161\ See Gershenson, et al. ``The Prevalence of Coercive 
Experience Among Teenage Mothers,'' 24 J. Interpersonal Violence 4 
(1989).
    \162\ See Stanley Henshaw & Kathryn Post, Parental Involvement in 
Minors' Abortion Decisions, Family Planning Perspectives, Sept./Oct. 
1992, at 206.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As Professor Teresa Stanton Collett testified before the 
House Constitution Subcommittee:

        [A]s this Congress learned through a congressional 
        report from the Center for Disease Control, two-thirds 
        of the fathers of teenage mothers are age 20 years or 
        older, suggesting that there is in fact differences in 
        power and status between the sexual partners.\163\ In 
        addition to that, a survey of 1,500 unmarried minors 
        having abortions revealed that among the minors who 
        reported that neither parent knew of the abortion, 89 
        percent said that a boyfriend was involved in deciding 
        or arranging the abortion, and 93 percent of those 15 
        and under said that the boyfriend was involved.\164\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \163\ See Department of Health and Human Services, ``Report to 
Congress on Out-of-Wedlock Childbearing'' (September 1995) at x 
(``Evidence also indicates that among unmarried teenage mothers, two-
thirds of the fathers are age 20 or older, suggesting that differences 
in power and status exist between many sexual partners.'').
    \164\ Child Custody Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 1755 Before 
the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 
108th Cong., 22 (July 20, 2004) (statement of Teresa Collett).

    Experience suggests that sexual predators recognize the 
advantage of their victims' obtaining an abortion.\165\ Not 
only does an abortion eliminate a critical piece of evidence of 
the criminal conduct,\166\ but it also allows the abuse to 
continue undetected.\167\ As a recent presentation given at a 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Conference on the 
Sexual Exploitation of Teens showed, of minor girls' first 
sexual experiences, 13percent constitute statutory rape.\168\ 
Further, the younger a sexually experienced teen is, the more 
likely they are to experience statutory rape. Of sexually 
experienced teens age 13 or younger, 65 percent experienced 
statutory rape. Of those age 14, 53 percent experienced 
statutory rape. And of those age 15, 41 percent experienced 
statutory rape.\169\ And young girls who are younger at their 
first sexual experience are more likely to say their first 
sexual experience was non-voluntary.\170\ Also, blacks and 
Hispanics are more likely to experience statutory rape.\171\ 
Parental involvement laws help ensure that parents have the 
opportunity to protect their daughters from those who would 
victimize them further. Secret abortions protect and perpetuate 
the illegal conduct of these adult male predators.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \165\ On June 14, 2000, a 36-year-old Omaha man who impersonated 
the father of his teen-age victim in order to assist her in obtaining 
an abortion was sentenced to 1\1/2\-2 years in prison for felony child 
abuse. See Angie Brunkow, ``Man Who Said He Was Girl's Dad Sentenced,'' 
Omaha World-Herald (June 14, 2000) at 20. A similar attempt to hide the 
consequences of statutory rape is reflected in the testimony of Joyce 
Farley before the United States House of Representatives, Committee on 
the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Constitution. See, e.g., Child 
Custody Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 3682 Before the Subcomm. on 
the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Congress, 
May 21, 1998 (statement of Joyce Farley).
    \166\ See Commonwealth v. Sasville, 616 N.E.2d 476 (Mass. 1993) 
(destruction of aborted fetus precluded prosecution for forcible rape 
of a child under the age of sixteen). Compare Smith v. Commonwealth, 
432 S.E.2d 2 (Va. App. 1993) (prosecution for rape of 14-year-old 
girl), with Hampton v. State, 1987 WL. 28223 (Ark. App. 1987) 
(prosecution for incest), and State v. Khong, 502 N.E.2d 682 (Ohio App. 
1985) (prosecutor subject to contempt order for failure to comply with 
discovery orders).
    \167\ Dee Dee Alonzo testified before the Texas Senate Human 
Services Committee in support of Senate Bill 30, the bill enacting the 
Texas Parental Notification Act. At age sixteen, she was seduced by her 
high school teacher. When she became pregnant, he persuaded her to have 
a secret abortion. She went to the clinic alone, obtained the abortion 
her abuser had paid for, and returned to continue the abusive 
relationship for another year. Ms. Alonzo testified ``No matter what 
their reaction would have been, they were my parents and they were 
adults, and they did love me, it would not have been a secret and the 
man would have been exposed.'' Testimony of Dee Dee Alonzo, Hearing on 
Tex. S.B. 30 Before the Senate Human Servs. Comm., 76th Leg., R.S. 4-5 
(Mar. 10, 1999) (tapes available from the Senate Staff Servs. Office 
and content is from private transcripts of those tapes). A similar 
incident involved another high school student impregnated by her 
teacher. This is revealed in the settlement related to injuries she 
suffered during the abortion of her pregnancy. See Clement v. Riston, 
No.B-131,033, settlement reported in Jury Verdict Research, Research, 
LRP Pub. No. 65904 available on Lexis-Nexis; cf. Patterson v. Planned 
Parenthood, 971 S.W.2d 439, 447 (Tex. 1998) (Gonzales, J., concurring) 
(describing the sexual abuse of a young girl that resulted in two 
pregnancies and two secret abortions).
    \168\ Kristin Moore, Ph.D. and Jennifer Manlove, Ph.D., ``A 
Demographic Portrait of Statutory Rape,'' Presentation given at the 
United States Department of Health and Human Services' Conference on 
the Sexual Exploitation of Teens (March 23-24, 2005) (defining 
statutory rape as occurring when teens aged 15 or younger have sex with 
a partner 3 or more years older).
    \169\ Id.
    \170\ Id. (of those younger than 14, 18 percent; of those age 15-
16, 10 percent; and of those age 17-19, 5 percent).
    \171\ Id. (Hispanic, 17 percent, black, 16percent, white, 11 
percent).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

       CONGRESS HAS CLEAR CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY TO ENACT CIANA

    CIANA is a regulation of commerce among the several 
states.\172\ Commerce, as that term is used in the 
Constitution, includes travel whether or not that travel is for 
reasons of business.\173\ To transport another person across 
state lines is to engage in commerce among the states.\174\ 
Under current Supreme Court precedents, Congress can enact 
legislation concerning interstate commerce, such as CIANA, for 
reasons related primarily to local activity rather than 
commerce itself.\175\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \172\ See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 
U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding enactment of Title II of the Civil Rights 
Act under Congress' commerce clause power).
    \173\ See, e.g., Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917).
    \174\ There is therefore no need to address the scope of Congress' 
power to regulate activity that is not, but that affects, commerce 
among the States. See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United 
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); 
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); United States v. Lopez, 514 
U.S. 549 (1995).
    \175\ See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The interstate transportation of minors for the purpose of 
securing an abortion is clearly a form of interstate commerce 
which the Constitution expressly empowers Congress to 
regulate.\176\ CIANA regulates only conduct which involves 
interstate movement, activity which the national government 
alone is expressly authorized by the Constitution to address.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \176\ U.S. Const., art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Federal Government has long exercised its interstate 
commerce authority to prohibit interstate activity harmful to 
minors and their families. In 1910, Congress used its Commerce 
Clause power to enact the Mann Act,\177\ which, before its 
amendment in 1986, prohibited the interstate transportation of 
women or minors for purposes of ``prostitution or debauchery, 
or for any other immoral purpose.'' The Supreme Court upheld 
the enactment of this law as a constitutional exercise of 
Congress' power over transportation among the several states. 
The Court reasoned that if men and women employ interstate 
transportation to facilitate a wrong, then their right to 
interstate travel can be restricted.\178\ That statute was 
upheld as applied to the transportation of a person to Nevada 
for purposes of engaging in prostitution, even though 
prostitution was legal in Nevada.\179\ The Mann Act flatly 
prohibited the interstate transportation of women for 
``prostitution'' or for ``any other immoral purpose.'' In 
upholding the law as a valid exercise of Congress' commerce 
power, the Court stated:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \177\ 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2421 (1970). As amended, the statute prohibits 
the knowing transportation of any individual across state lines ``with 
intent that such individual engage in prostitution, or in any sexual 
activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, 
or attempts to do so . . .'' 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2421 (1999).
    \178\ See Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 323 (1913) (noting, 
in upholding the constitutionality of the Mann Act, ``that Congress has 
power over transportation `among the several states;' that the power is 
complete in itself, and that Congress, as an incident to it, may adopt 
not only means necessary but convenient to its exercise, and the means 
may have the quality of police regulations.'').
    \179\ See United States v. Pelton, 578 F.2d 701 (8th Cir. 1978).

          The transportation of passengers in interstate 
        commerce, it has long been settled, is within the 
        regulatory power of Congress, under the commerce clause 
        of the Constitution, and the authority of Congress to 
        keep the channels of interstate commerce free from 
        immoral and injurious uses has been frequently 
        sustained, and is no longer open to question.\180\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \180\ Caminetti, 242 U.S. at 491.

    Just as it was appropriate for Congress to use its 
constitutional authority to keep the channels of interstate 
commerce free from ``immoral'' conduct, so it is also 
appropriate for Congress to exercise that authority to keep the 
channels of interstate commerce free from those who transport 
minors across state lines in order to circumvent state parental 
involvement laws, or from physicians who might not otherwise 
notify a minor's parents.
    The Mann Act is not the only example of a Federal law that 
prohibits interstate activities that might be legal in the 
state to which the activity is directed. Indeed, as long ago as 
1876, Congress ``made it a crime to deposit in the mails any 
letters or circulars concerning lotteries, whether illegal or 
chartered by state legislatures.'' \181\ A statute to this 
effect is still in force.\182\ Congress later prohibited the 
transportation of lottery tickets in interstate commerce, 
whether or not lotteries are legal in the state to which the 
tickets are transported.\183\ That provision was upheld by the 
Supreme Court in Champion v. Ames \184\ and is still in effect.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \181\ United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. 418, 421 
(1993).
    \182\ See 18 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1302 (prohibiting the mailing of lottery 
tickets or letters, circulars, and other materials regarding a 
lottery).
    \183\ See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1301.
    \184\ 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    CIANA does not supercede, override, or alter existing state 
laws regarding minors' abortions. Rather, CIANA is predicated 
on Congress' authority to regulate interstate activity. The 
bill does nothing to regulate purely local activity, and it 
does not impose any new rules regarding conduct that occurs 
solely within one state. CIANA embodies rules to regulate 
interstate activities that involve two or more states, as is 
entirely appropriate under the Commerce Clause. In short, CIANA 
does not encroach on state powers.

            CIANA IS CONSISTENT WITH SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT

    In Roe v. Wade,\185\ a majority of the Supreme Court found 
that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, which 
provides that no state shall deprive any person of ``life, 
liberty, or property'' without due process of law, includes 
within it a ``substantive'' component that bars a state from 
prohibiting abortions under some circumstances. This 
substantive component of the Due Process Clause, also described 
in that case as including a ``right to privacy,'' was construed 
to forbid virtually all state prohibitions on abortion during 
the first trimester of pregnancy.\186\ In Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey,\187\ the scope of permissible state regulation of 
abortion and the standards to be applied in evaluating the 
constitutionality of the regulation were significantly changed. 
Instead of declaring that the right to seek an abortion was a 
``fundamental right'' requiring a ``compelling state interest'' 
in order to be regulated, the new holding was that state 
regulation of abortion was permissible so long as such 
regulation did not place an ``undue burden'' on a woman's 
exercise of her constitutional rights with regard to 
abortion.\188\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \185\ 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
    \186\ See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 985 (1992) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
    \187\ 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
    \188\ For the articulation of the ``undue burden'' standard in 
Casey, see id. at 874-80. While the ``undue burden'' standard as 
expressed in Casey appeared only to be the views of the three-person 
plurality, Justice Scalia predicted that ``undue burden'' would 
henceforward be the relevant standard, see id. at 984-95 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). It now appears that the lower Federal courts understand 
that the ``undue burden'' standard is the correct one to be applied in 
abortion cases involving babies that are not viable. See, e.g., Manning 
v. Hunt, 119 F.3d 254, 260 (4th Cir. 1997) (``The trend does appear to 
be a move away from the strict scrutiny standard toward the so-called 
`undue burden' standard of review.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    CIANA does not place an undue burden upon a woman's right 
to an abortion. To the extent that a state rule is inconsistent 
with the Court's doctrine, that rule is ineffective and CIANA 
would not make it effective. Regarding the bill's provisions 
that govern interstate abortions conducted in States without 
parental involvement laws, a requirement that a parent simply 
be notified is not an undue burden.
    Following the Court's decision in Roe v. Wade,\189\ many 
states enacted parental notice or consent statutes requiring 
minors to notify or seek the consent of their parents before 
undergoing an abortion. Parental consent laws generally require 
one or both parents to give actual consent to the minor's 
decision to have an abortion. Parental notification laws 
typically require the physician, or in some statutes another 
health care provider, to notify one or both of the parents of 
the minor female at some time prior to the abortion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \189\ 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Court first considered parental involvement in a minor 
daughter's abortion in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri 
v. Danforth.\190\ The Missouri statute gave a minor girl's 
parent an absolute veto over her decision to have an abortion. 
The majority, led by Justice Blackmun, concluded that such a 
veto power was unconstitutional.\191\ The majority noted, 
however, that the Court ``long has recognized that the State 
has somewhat broader authority to regulate the activities of 
children than of adults'' and ``emphasized'' that its holding 
in the case ``does not suggest that every minor, regardless of 
age . . . may give effective consent for termination of her 
pregnancy.'' \192\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \190\ 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
    \191\ Id. at 74.
    \192\ Id. at 74, 75.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Court next addressed state parental involvement laws in 
Bellotti v. Baird,\193\ remanding a parental consent statute 
that was unclear as to whether the parents had authority to 
veto the abortion and as to the availability of a judicial 
bypass procedure.\194\ The statute returned to the Supreme 
Court in Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti II).\195\ The statute in 
Bellotti II required a minor to obtain the consent of her 
parents or circumvent this requirement through a judicial 
bypass proceeding that did not take into account whether the 
minor was sufficiently mature to make an informed decision 
regarding the abortion. The Supreme Court invalidated the 
statute without a majority opinion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \193\ 428 U.S. 132 (1976).
    \194\ In doing so the Court recognized minors bear ``unquestionably 
greater risks of inability to give an informed consent.'' Id. at 147.
    \195\ 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Justice Powell stated in his plurality opinion, 
``constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized 
that the parents' claim to authority in their own household to 
direct the rearing of their children is basic in the structure 
of our society'' and that ``[p]roperly understood, then, the 
tradition of parental authority is not inconsistent with our 
tradition of individual liberty; rather, the former is one of 
the basic presuppositions of the latter.'' \196\ This has 
become the de facto constitutional standard for parental 
consent and notification laws. In upholding parental 
involvement laws, the plurality found three reasons why the 
constitutional rights of minors were not identical to the 
constitutional rights of adults: ``[t]he peculiar vulnerability 
of children; their inability to make critical decisions in an 
informed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental 
role in child rearing.'' \197\ Thus, the plurality sought to 
design guidelines for a judicial bypass proceeding that allowed 
states to address these interests in a parental consent 
statute.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \196\ Id. at 638.
    \197\ Id. at 634.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In H.L. v. Matheson,\198\ a minor girl challenged the 
constitutional validity of a state statute that required a 
physician to give notice to the parents of a minor girl 
whenever possible before performing an abortion on her. By a 
vote of six to three, the statute was held constitutional. The 
Court held that a state could require notification of the 
parents of a minor girl because the notification ``furthers a 
constitutionally permissible end by encouraging an unmarried 
pregnant minor to seek the help and advice of her parents in 
making the very important decision whether or not to bear a 
child.'' \199\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \198\ 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
    \199\ Id. at 409-10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In Planned Parenthood Association of Kansas City, Missouri, 
Inc. v. Ashcroft,\200\ the Court upheld the constitutionality 
of a State law that required a minor to obtain the consent of 
one of her parents before obtaining an abortion or, in the 
alternative, to obtain the consent of a juvenile court judge. 
While there was no majority opinion, this case marked the first 
time the Court directly upheld a parental consent requirement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \200\ 462 U.S. 476 (1983).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,\201\ the 
Supreme Court upheld a statute that required a physician to 
give notice to one of the minor's parents or, under some 
circumstances, another relative, before performing an abortion 
on the minor. The statute permitted the physician and the minor 
to avoid the requirement by a judicial bypass. Justice Kennedy, 
writing for the majority, held that the bypass proceeding did 
not unconstitutionally impair a minor's rights by the creation 
of unnecessary delay.\202\ The Court established in this case 
that it will not invalidate state procedures so long as they 
seem to be reasonably designed to provide the minor with an 
expedited process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \201\ 497 U.S. 502 (1990).
    \202\ See id. at 514-15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In Hodgson v. Minnesota,\203\ the Court invalidated a state 
statute that required notification of both parents prior to a 
minor girl's abortion without the option of a judicial bypass. 
The Court, however, upheld statutory requirements that both 
parents be notified of the abortion and a 48 hour waiting 
period between notification and the performance of the 
abortion, if such requirements were accompanied by a judicial 
bypass procedure that met constitutional standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \203\ 497 U.S. 417 (1990).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    CIANA, consistent with these Supreme Court precedents, 
requires--in cases in which a minor from one state seeks to 
obtain an abortion in another state without a parental 
involvement law--that before an abortion can be obtained, 
either (1) the physician is presented with documentation 
showing with a reasonable degree of certainty that a court in 
the minor's state of residence has waived any parental 
notification required by the laws of that state, or has 
otherwise authorized that the minor be allowed to procure an 
abortion; (2) the minor declares in a signed written statement 
that she is the victim of sexual abuse, neglect, or physical 
abuse by a parent, and, before an abortion is performed on the 
minor, the physician notifies the authorities specified to 
receive reports of child abuse or neglect by the law of the 
State in which the minor resides of the known or suspected 
abuse or neglect; or (3) the abortion is necessary to save the 
life of the minor because her life was endangered by a physical 
disorder, physical injury, or physical illness, including a 
life endangering physical condition caused by or arising from 
the pregnancy itself.
    In Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth,\204\ 
the first of a series of Supreme Court cases dealing with 
parental consent or notification laws, noted liberal Justice 
Stewart wrote, ``There can be little doubt that the State 
furthers a constitutionally permissible end by encouraging an 
unmarried pregnant minor to seek the help and advice of her 
parents in making the very important decision of whether or not 
to bear a child.'' \205\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \204\ 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
    \205\ Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 91 (1976) 
(Stewart, J., concurring).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    While the Supreme Court has, to date, ``declined to decide 
whether a parental notification statute must include some sort 
of bypass provision to be constitutional,'' \206\ it is of note 
that even famously liberal Justice Stevens wrote in his 
concurring opinion in H.L. v. Matheson, that ``[t]he fact that 
certain members of the class of unmarried minor women who are 
suffering unwanted pregnancies and desire to terminate the 
pregnancies may actually be emancipated or sufficiently mature 
to make a well-reasoned abortion decision does not, in my view, 
undercut the validity of the [state] statute [in question] . . 
. [A] state legislature has constitutional power to utilize, 
for purposes of implementing a parental-notice requirement, a 
yardstick based upon the chronological age of unmarried 
pregnant women. That this yardstick will be imprecise or even 
unjust in particular cases does not render its use by a state 
legislature impermissible under the Federal Constitution.'' 
\207\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \206\ Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292, 295 (1997).
    \207\ H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 424-25 (1981) (Stevens, J., 
concurring) (citations and quotations omitted).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Furthermore, the Court in Hodgson v. Minnesota,\208\ wrote 
that:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \208\ 497 U.S. 417 (1990).

          We think it is clear that a requirement that a minor 
        wait 48 hours after notifying a single parent of her 
        intention to get an abortion would reasonably further 
        the legitimate state interest in ensuring that the 
        minor's decision is knowing and intelligent . . . The 
        brief waiting period provides the parent the 
        opportunity to consult with his or her spouse and a 
        family physician, and it permits the parent to inquire 
        into the competency of the doctor performing the 
        abortion, discuss the religious or moral implications 
        of the abortion decision, and provide the daughter 
        needed guidance and counsel in evaluating the impact of 
        the decision on her future.'' \209\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \209\ Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 448-49 (1990).

    The Supreme Court has clearly indicated that a parental 
notification requirement does not impose an undue burden on a 
minor's ability to obtain an abortion, finding that ``[a] 48-
hour delay imposes only a minimal burden on the right of the 
minor to decide whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.'' 
\210\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \210\ Id. at 449 (emphasis added).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Court then stated in Planned Parenthood v. Casey that:

          Numerous forms of state regulation might have the 
        incidental effect of increasing the cost or decreasing 
        the availability of medical care, whether for abortion 
        or any other medical procedure. The fact that a law 
        which serves a valid purpose, one not designed to 
        strike at the right itself, has the incidental effect 
        of making it more difficult or more expensive to 
        procure an abortion cannot be enough to invalidate it. 
        Only where state regulation imposes an undue burden on 
        a woman's ability to make this decision does the power 
        of the State reach into the heart of the liberty 
        protected by the Due Process Clause.\211\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \211\ Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992).

    The Court continued that ``[a] finding of an undue burden 
is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has 
the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the 
path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.'' 
\212\ A parental notice requirement, which the Supreme Court 
has described as a ``minimal burden'' \213\ is clearly not a 
``substantial obstacle'' \214\ to receiving an abortion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \212\ Id. at 877 (1992) (emphasis added).
    \213\ Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 449 (1990) (emphasis 
added).
    \214\ The Supreme Court elaborated that ``Some guiding principles 
should emerge. What is at stake is the woman's right to make the 
ultimate decision, not a right to be insulated from all others in doing 
so. Regulations which do no more than create a structural mechanism by 
which the State, or the parent or guardian of a minor, may express 
profound respect for the life of the unborn are permitted, if they are 
not a substantial obstacle to the woman's exercise of the right to 
choose.'' Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Supreme Court continued: ``We reject the rigid 
trimester framework of Roe v. Wade. To promote the State's 
profound interest in potential life, throughout pregnancy the 
State may take measures to ensure that the woman's choice is 
informed, and measures designed to advance this interest will 
not be invalidated as long as their purpose is to persuade the 
woman to choose childbirth over abortion. These measures must 
not be an undue burden on the right . . . As with any medical 
procedure, the State may enact regulations to further the 
health or safety of a woman seeking an abortion . . . 
[P]arental notification or consent requirements . . . and our 
judgment that they are constitutional, are based on the quite 
reasonable assumption that minors will benefit from 
consultation with their parents and that children will often 
not realize that their parents have their best interests at 
heart.'' \215\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \215\ Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878, 895 (1992).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Even famously liberal Justice Stevens wrote in his 
concurring opinion in H.L. v. Matheson,\216\ that:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \216\ 450 U.S. 398 (1981).

          In my opinion, the special importance of a young 
        woman's abortion decision . . . provides a special 
        justification for reasonable state efforts intended to 
        ensure that the decision be wisely made. Such 
        reasonable efforts surely may include a requirement 
        that an abortion be procured only after consultation 
        with a licensed physician. And, because the most 
        significant consequences of the [abortion] decision are 
        not medical in character, the State unquestionably has 
        an interest in ensuring that a young woman receive 
        other appropriate consultation as well. In my opinion, 
        the quality of that interest is plainly sufficient to 
        support a state legislature's determination that such 
        appropriate consultation should include parental advice 
        . . . [T]he State may legitimately decide that such 
        consultation should be made more probable by ensuring 
        that parents are informed of their daughter's decision: 
        If there is no parental-[notice] requirement, many 
        minors will submit to the abortion procedure without 
        ever informing their parents. An assumption that the 
        parental reaction will be hostile, disparaging, or 
        violent no doubt persuades many children simply to 
        bypass parental counsel which would in fact be loving, 
        supportive, and, indeed, for some indispensable. It is 
        unrealistic, in my judgment, to assume that every 
        parent-child relationship is either (a) so perfect that 
        communication and accord will take place routinely or 
        (b) so imperfect that the absence of communication 
        reflects the child's correct prediction that the parent 
        will . . . [act] arbitrarily to further a selfish 
        interest rather than the child's interest. A state 
        legislature may conclude that most parents will be 
        primarily interested in the welfare of their children, 
        and further, that the imposition of a parental-[notice] 
        requirement is an appropriate method of giving the 
        parents an opportunity to foster that welfare by 
        helping a pregnant distressed child to make and to 
        implement a correct decision.\217\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \217\ H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 422-24 (1981) (Stevens, J., 
concurring) (citations and quotations omitted).

    Even earlier, the Court stated in H.L. v. Matheson that 
``[t]he Constitution does not compel a state to fine-tune its 
statutes so as to encourage or facilitate abortions. To the 
contrary, state action encouraging childbirth except in the 
most urgent circumstances is rationally related to the 
legitimate governmental objective of protecting potential 
life.'' \218\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \218\ Id. at 413 (citations and quotations omitted).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

              THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL IS PRESERVED UNDER CIANA

    Opponents also argue that CIANA violates the rights of 
residents of each of the United States and of the District of 
Columbia to travel to and from any state of the Union for 
lawful purposes. Those opposed to CIANA on these grounds argue 
that the legislation will hold a pregnant minor ``hostage'' to 
the laws of her home state.
    As an initial matter, it does not appear that the Supreme 
Court has ever held that Congress' power to regulate interstate 
commerce is ever limited by the ``right to travel.'' Even 
assuming, however, that Congress' authority under the Commerce 
Clause is limited by the right to travel doctrine,\219\ the 
Supreme Court has recognized that the right to travel is ``not 
absolute,'' and is not violated so long as there is a 
``substantial reason for the discrimination beyond the mere 
fact that they are citizens of other States.'' \220\ Congress 
obviously has a substantial interest in protecting the health 
and well-being of minor girls and in protecting the rights of 
parents to raise their children.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \219\ Contrary to claims by some opponents of CIANA, Saenz v. Roe, 
526 U.S. 489 (1999) does not in any way impugn the constitutionality of 
CIANA. In Saenz, the Supreme Court addressed ``the citizen's right to 
be treated equally in her new State of residence.'' Id. at 505 
(emphasis added). A minor who is a resident of one state and who 
crosses state lines to obtain an abortion in another state is by 
definition not a resident of the state in which such abortion is 
performed. Both operative sections of CIANA specifically restrict its 
applications to situations in which a minor resides in one state and 
seeks an abortion in another state.
    \220\ Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502 (1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    However, the notion that CIANA is inconsistent with the 
constitutional right to travel is not supportable under the 
Supreme Court's jurisprudence. Neither a state nor the Federal 
Government can interfere with a citizen's ability to leave a 
state for the purpose of visiting another State or prevent its 
citizens from returning; either would violate ``the right of a 
citizen of one State to enter and to leave another State.'' 
\221\ CIANA does not even implicate this limitation, for it 
does not preclude the minor from traveling. The minor's right 
to travel to another state is wholly unimpeded by CIANA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \221\ See id. at 500.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In addition, the Court has recognized that the right to 
interstate travel ``may be regulated or controlled by the 
exercise of a State's police power'' and by the Federal 
Government as well.\222\ Protecting the health and well-being 
of minor girls and the rights of parents to raise their 
children are substantial, indeed compelling, reasons for 
restricting minors from obtaining an abortion without parental 
involvement. First, young adolescent girls who undergo 
abortions face a heightened risk of suffering from long-term 
physical and psychological complications. Second, 
``[c]onstitutional interpretation has consistently recognized 
that the parents' claim to authority in their own household to 
direct the rearing of their children is basic in the structure 
of our society,'' and that ``[p]roperly understood, then, the 
tradition of parental authority is not inconsistent with our 
tradition of individual liberty; rather, the former is one of 
the basic presuppositions of the latter.'' \223\ Thus, 
``[u]nder the Constitution, the State can properly conclude 
that parents . . . who have [the] primary responsibility for 
children's well-being are entitled to the support of laws 
designed to aid discharge of that responsibility.'' \224\ 
Third, the fundamental rights of minors, including the right to 
travel, are not equal to those of adults. Although the Court 
has previously concluded that the fundamental rights of a child 
are ``virtually coextensive with that of an adult,'' \225\ it 
also has recognized that ``[t]hese rulings have not been made 
on the uncritical assumption that the constitutional rights of 
children are indistinguishable from those of adults.'' \226\ 
Thus, ``the State is entitled to adjust its legal system to 
account for children's vulnerability and their needs for 
`concern, . . . sympathy, and . . . paternal attention.' '' 
\227\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \222\ United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 759 n.17 (1966).
    \223\ Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638 (1979) (Bellotti II).
    \224\ Id. at 639.
    \225\ Id. at 634.
    \226\ Id. at 635.
    \227\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Based upon this reasoning, the Court has allowed States to 
enact laws that ``account for children's vulnerability'' and 
that protect the unique role of parents:

        [T]he Court has held that the States validly may limit 
        the freedom of children to choose for themselves in the 
        making of important, affirmative choices with 
        potentially serious consequences. These rulings have 
        been grounded in the recognition that, during the 
        formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors 
        often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to 
        recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental 
        to them.\228\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \228\ Id.

    Therefore, ``[l]egal restrictions on minors, especially 
those supportive of the parental role, may be important to the 
child's chances for the full growth and maturity that make 
eventual participation in a free society meaningful and 
rewarding.'' \229\ Consequently, a State may properly subject 
minors to more stringent limitations than are permissible with 
respect to adults. Examples include laws that prohibit the sale 
of cigarettes and alcoholic beverages to minors, laws that 
prohibit the sale of firearms and deadly weapons to minors 
without parental consent, and laws that prohibit third parties 
from exposing minors to certain types of literature. Similarly, 
Congress may restrict the right of minors to travel across 
state lines to a greater extent than it may adults.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \229\ Id. at 638-39.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    CIANA's opponents sometimes also argue that CIANA violates 
the rights of states to enact and enforce their own laws 
governing conduct within their territorial boundaries. This 
contention is clearly specious because CIANA does not attempt 
to regulate conduct occurring solely within the territorial 
boundaries of a state. Rather, CIANA regulates interstate 
commerce, and Congress has the exclusive authority to regulate 
such activity.

                                Hearings

    The Committee's Subcommittee on the Constitution held a 
hearing on H.R. 748 on March 3, 2005. Testimony was received 
from the following witnesses: Marcia Carroll, Lancaster, 
Pennsylvania; Richard Myers, Professor of Law, Ave Maria School 
of Law; Warren Seigel, Director of Adolescent Medicine, 
Chairman of Pediatrics, Coney Island Hospital; Teresa S. 
Collett, Professor of Law, University of St. Thomas School of 
Law. Additional material was submitted by individuals and 
organizations.

                        Committee Consideration

    On March 17, 2005, the Subcommittee on the Constitution met 
in open session and ordered favorably reported the bill H.R. 
748, as amended, by a vote of 7 to 2, a quorum being present. 
On April 13, 2005, the Committee met in open session and 
ordered favorably reported the bill H.R. 748 with an amendment 
by a recorded vote of 20 yeas to 13 nays, a quorum being 
present.

                         Vote of the Committee

    In compliance with clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, the Committee notes that the 
following rollcall votes occurred during the committee's 
consideration of H.R. 748.
    1. Mr. Nadler offered an amendment that would have created 
an additional layer of Federal court review that could be used 
by sexual predators to escape conviction under the bill. By a 
rollcall vote of 11 yeas to 16 nays, the amendment was 
defeated.

                                                   ROLLCALL NO. 1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                       Ayes            Nays           Present
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Hyde........................................................
Mr. Coble.......................................................                              X
Mr. Smith (Texas)...............................................                              X
Mr. Gallegly....................................................
Mr. Goodlatte...................................................                              X
Mr. Chabot......................................................                              X
Mr. Lungren.....................................................                              X
Mr. Jenkins.....................................................                              X
Mr. Cannon......................................................
Mr. Bachus......................................................                              X
Mr. Inglis......................................................                              X
Mr. Hostettler..................................................                              X
Mr. Green.......................................................                              X
Mr. Keller......................................................                              X
Mr. Issa........................................................
Mr. Flake.......................................................
Mr. Pence.......................................................                              X
Mr. Forbes......................................................                              X
Mr. King........................................................                              X
Mr. Feeney......................................................
Mr. Franks......................................................                              X
Mr. Gohmert.....................................................
Mr. Conyers.....................................................              X
Mr. Berman......................................................              X
Mr. Boucher.....................................................
Mr. Nadler......................................................              X
Mr. Scott.......................................................              X
Mr. Watt........................................................              X
Ms. Lofgren.....................................................              X
Ms. Jackson Lee.................................................
Ms. Waters......................................................              X
Mr. Meehan......................................................              X
Mr. Delahunt....................................................
Mr. Wexler......................................................
Mr. Weiner......................................................
Mr. Schiff......................................................              X
Ms. Sanchez.....................................................              X
Mr. Smith (Washington)..........................................
Mr. Van Hollen..................................................              X
Mr. Sensenbrenner, Chairman.....................................                              X
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
    Total.......................................................             11              16
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    2. Mr. Nadler offered an amendment that would have exempted 
sexual predators from prosecution under the bill if they were 
grandparents or adult siblings of a minor. By a rollcall vote 
of 12 yeas to 19 nays, the amendment was defeated.

                                                   ROLLCALL NO. 2
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                       Ayes            Nays           Present
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Hyde........................................................
Mr. Coble.......................................................                              X
Mr. Smith (Texas)...............................................                              X
Mr. Gallegly....................................................
Mr. Goodlatte...................................................                              X
Mr. Chabot......................................................                              X
Mr. Lungren.....................................................                              X
Mr. Jenkins.....................................................                              X
Mr. Cannon......................................................                              X
Mr. Bachus......................................................                              X
Mr. Inglis......................................................                              X
Mr. Hostettler..................................................                              X
Mr. Green.......................................................                              X
Mr. Keller......................................................                              X
Mr. Issa........................................................                              X
Mr. Flake.......................................................                              X
Mr. Pence.......................................................                              X
Mr. Forbes......................................................                              X
Mr. King........................................................
Mr. Feeney......................................................                              X
Mr. Franks......................................................                              X
Mr. Gohmert.....................................................
Mr. Conyers.....................................................              X
Mr. Berman......................................................
Mr. Boucher.....................................................
Mr. Nadler......................................................              X
Mr. Scott.......................................................              X
Mr. Watt........................................................              X
Ms. Lofgren.....................................................              X
Ms. Jackson Lee.................................................              X
Ms. Waters......................................................              X
Mr. Meehan......................................................              X
Mr. Delahunt....................................................
Mr. Wexler......................................................              X
Mr. Weiner......................................................
Mr. Schiff......................................................              X
Ms. Sanchez.....................................................              X
Mr. Smith (Washington)..........................................
Mr. Van Hollen..................................................              X
Mr. Sensenbrenner, Chairman.....................................                              X
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
    Total.......................................................             12              19
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    3. Mr. Scott offered an amendment that would have exempted 
sexual predators from prosecution if they are taxicab drivers, 
bus drivers, or others in the business of professional 
transport. By a rollcall vote of 13 yeas to 17 nays, the 
amendment was defeated.

                                                   ROLLCALL NO. 3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                       Ayes            Nays           Present
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Hyde........................................................
Mr. Coble.......................................................                              X
Mr. Smith (Texas)...............................................
Mr. Gallegly....................................................
Mr. Goodlatte...................................................                              X
Mr. Chabot......................................................                              X
Mr. Lungren.....................................................                              X
Mr. Jenkins.....................................................                              X
Mr. Cannon......................................................
Mr. Bachus......................................................                              X
Mr. Inglis......................................................                              X
Mr. Hostettler..................................................                              X
Mr. Green.......................................................                              X
Mr. Keller......................................................                              X
Mr. Issa........................................................                              X
Mr. Flake.......................................................
Mr. Pence.......................................................                              X
Mr. Forbes......................................................                              X
Mr. King........................................................                              X
Mr. Feeney......................................................                              X
Mr. Franks......................................................                              X
Mr. Gohmert.....................................................
Mr. Conyers.....................................................              X
Mr. Berman......................................................
Mr. Boucher.....................................................
Mr. Nadler......................................................              X
Mr. Scott.......................................................              X
Mr. Watt........................................................              X
Ms. Lofgren.....................................................              X
Ms. Jackson Lee.................................................              X
Ms. Waters......................................................              X
Mr. Meehan......................................................              X
Mr. Delahunt....................................................
Mr. Wexler......................................................              X
Mr. Weiner......................................................
Mr. Schiff......................................................              X
Ms. Sanchez.....................................................              X
Mr. Smith (Washington)..........................................              X
Mr. Van Hollen..................................................              X
Mr. Sensenbrenner, Chairman.....................................                              X
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
    Total.......................................................             13              17
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    4. Mr. Scott offered an amendment that would have exempted 
from prosecution under the bill those who aid and abet 
criminals who could be prosecuted under the bill. By a rollcall 
vote of 12 yeas to 18 nays, the amendment was defeated.

                                                   ROLLCALL NO. 4
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                       Ayes            Nays           Present
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Hyde........................................................
Mr. Coble.......................................................                              X
Mr. Smith (Texas)...............................................
Mr. Gallegly....................................................
Mr. Goodlatte...................................................                              X
Mr. Chabot......................................................                              X
Mr. Lungren.....................................................                              X
Mr. Jenkins.....................................................                              X
Mr. Cannon......................................................
Mr. Bachus......................................................                              X
Mr. Inglis......................................................                              X
Mr. Hostettler..................................................                              X
Mr. Green.......................................................                              X
Mr. Keller......................................................                              X
Mr. Issa........................................................                              X
Mr. Flake.......................................................                              X
Mr. Pence.......................................................                              X
Mr. Forbes......................................................                              X
Mr. King........................................................                              X
Mr. Feeney......................................................                              X
Mr. Franks......................................................                              X
Mr. Gohmert.....................................................
Mr. Conyers.....................................................              X
Mr. Berman......................................................
Mr. Boucher.....................................................
Mr. Nadler......................................................              X
Mr. Scott.......................................................              X
Mr. Watt........................................................              X
Ms. Lofgren.....................................................              X
Ms. Jackson Lee.................................................              X
Ms. Waters......................................................              X
Mr. Meehan......................................................              X
Mr. Delahunt....................................................
Mr. Wexler......................................................
Mr. Weiner......................................................              X
Mr. Schiff......................................................              X
Ms. Sanchez.....................................................              X
Mr. Smith (Washington)..........................................              X
Mr. Van Hollen..................................................
Mr. Sensenbrenner, Chairman.....................................                              X
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
    Total.......................................................             12              18
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    5. Ms. Jackson-Lee offered an amendment that would have 
exempted sexual predators from prosecution under the bill if 
they were clergy, godparents, aunts, uncles, or first cousins 
of a minor, and would require a study by the Government 
Accounting Office. By a rollcall vote of 13 yeas to 20 nays, 
the amendment was defeated.

                                                   ROLLCALL NO. 5
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                       Ayes            Nays           Present
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Hyde........................................................
Mr. Coble.......................................................                              X
Mr. Smith (Texas)...............................................                              X
Mr. Gallegly....................................................                              X
Mr. Goodlatte...................................................                              X
Mr. Chabot......................................................                              X
Mr. Lungren.....................................................                              X
Mr. Jenkins.....................................................                              X
Mr. Cannon......................................................                              X
Mr. Bachus......................................................                              X
Mr. Inglis......................................................                              X
Mr. Hostettler..................................................                              X
Mr. Green.......................................................                              X
Mr. Keller......................................................                              X
Mr. Issa........................................................                              X
Mr. Flake.......................................................                              X
Mr. Pence.......................................................                              X
Mr. Forbes......................................................                              X
Mr. King........................................................                              X
Mr. Feeney......................................................
Mr. Franks......................................................                              X
Mr. Gohmert.....................................................
Mr. Conyers.....................................................              X
Mr. Berman......................................................
Mr. Boucher.....................................................
Mr. Nadler......................................................              X
Mr. Scott.......................................................              X
Mr. Watt........................................................              X
Ms. Lofgren.....................................................              X
Ms. Jackson Lee.................................................              X
Ms. Waters......................................................              X
Mr. Meehan......................................................              X
Mr. Delahunt....................................................
Mr. Wexler......................................................              X
Mr. Weiner......................................................              X
Mr. Schiff......................................................              X
Ms. Sanchez.....................................................
Mr. Smith (Washington)..........................................              X
Mr. Van Hollen..................................................              X
Mr. Sensenbrenner, Chairman.....................................                              X
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
    Total.......................................................             13              20
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    6. Motion to Report H.R. 748 with an amendment in the 
nature of a substitute was agreed to by a rollcall vote of 20 
yeas to 13 nays.

                                                   ROLLCALL NO. 6
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                       Ayes            Nays           Present
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Hyde........................................................
Mr. Coble.......................................................              X
Mr. Smith (Texas)...............................................              X
Mr. Gallegly....................................................              X
Mr. Goodlatte...................................................              X
Mr. Chabot......................................................              X
Mr. Lungren.....................................................              X
Mr. Jenkins.....................................................              X
Mr. Cannon......................................................              X
Mr. Bachus......................................................              X
Mr. Inglis......................................................              X
Mr. Hostettler..................................................              X
Mr. Green.......................................................              X
Mr. Keller......................................................              X
Mr. Issa........................................................              X
Mr. Flake.......................................................              X
Mr. Pence.......................................................              X
Mr. Forbes......................................................              X
Mr. King........................................................              X
Mr. Feeney......................................................
Mr. Franks......................................................              X
Mr. Gohmert.....................................................
Mr. Conyers.....................................................                              X
Mr. Berman......................................................
Mr. Boucher.....................................................
Mr. Nadler......................................................                              X
Mr. Scott.......................................................                              X
Mr. Watt........................................................                              X
Ms. Lofgren.....................................................                              X
Ms. Jackson Lee.................................................                              X
Ms. Waters......................................................                              X
Mr. Meehan......................................................                              X
Mr. Delahunt....................................................
Mr. Wexler......................................................                              X
Mr. Weiner......................................................                              X
Mr. Schiff......................................................                              X
Ms. Sanchez.....................................................                              X
Mr. Smith (Washington)..........................................                              X
Mr. Van Hollen..................................................
Mr. Sensenbrenner, Chairman.....................................              X
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
    Total.......................................................             20              13
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                      Committee Oversight Findings

    In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of Rule XIII of the Rules 
of the House of Representatives, the Committee reports that the 
findings and recommendations of the Committee, based on 
oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of Rule X of the 
Rules of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in the 
descriptive portions of this report.

               New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures

    Clause 3(c)(2) of Rule XIII of the Rules of the House of 
Representatives is inapplicable because this legislation does 
not provide new budgetary authority or increased tax 
expenditures.

               Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate

    In compliance with clause 3(c)(3) of Rule XIII of the Rules 
of the House of Representatives, the Committee sets forth, with 
respect to the bill, H.R. 748, the following estimate and 
comparison prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget 
Office under section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 
1974:

                                                    April 21, 2005.
Hon. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has 
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 748, the Child 
Interstate Abortion Notification Act.
    If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be 
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Mark 
Grabowicz.
            Sincerely,
                                               Douglas Holtz-Eakin.
    Enclosure.

H.R. 748--Child Interstate Abortion Notification Act

    CBO estimates that implementing H.R. 748 would not result 
in any significant cost to the federal government. Enacting 
H.R. 748 could affect direct spending and revenues; however, 
CBO estimates that any such impact would not be significant. 
H.R. 748 contains both an intergovernmental and a private-
sector mandate as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act 
(UMRA) by requiring doctors, in certain cases, to provide 
parental notification before preforming an abortion on a minor. 
CBO estimates the costs for public and private doctors to 
comply with those mandates would be minimal and well below the 
annual thresholds established in UMRA ($62 million for 
intergovernmental mandates and $123 million for private-sector 
mandates in 2005, adjusted for inflation).
    H.R. 748 would make it a federal crime to transport a minor 
across state lines, under certain circumstances, to obtain an 
abortion without parental notification; in addition, the bill 
would make it a crime for a physician to perform such an 
abortion. Violators would be subject to imprisonment and fines. 
As a result, the federal government would be able to pursue 
cases that it otherwise would not be able to prosecute. CBO 
expects that any increase in federal costs for law enforcement, 
court proceedings, or prison operations would not be 
significant, however, because of the small number of cases 
likely to be involved. Any such additional costs would be 
subject to the availability of appropriated funds.
    Because those prosecuted and convicted under H.R. 748 could 
be subject to criminal fines, the federal government might 
collect additional fines if the bill is enacted. Collections of 
such fines are recorded in the budget as revenues, which are 
deposited in the Crime Victims Fund and later spent. CBO 
expects that any additional revenues and direct spending would 
be negligible.
    The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Mark Grabowicz. 
This estimate was approved by Peter H. Fontaine, Deputy 
Assistant Director for Budget Analysis.

                    Performance Goals and Objectives

    The Committee states that pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of 
Rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, H.R. 
748 would protect the health and safety of young girls by 
preventing valid and constitutional state parental involvement 
laws from being circumvented, and it would protect the health 
and safety of young girls by protecting the rights of parents 
to be involved in the medical decisions of their minor 
daughters when such decisions involve interstate abortions.

                   Constitutional Authority Statement

    Pursuant to clause 3(d)(1) of Rule XIII of the Rules of the 
House of Representatives, the Committee finds the authority for 
this legislation in article I, section 8, clause 3 of the 
Constitution.

               Section-by-Section Analysis and Discussion

    The following discussion describes the bill as reported by 
the Committee.

Sec. 1. Short title.

    Section 1 provides this Act may be cited as the ``Child 
Interstate Abortion Notification Act.''

Sec. 2. Transportation of Minors in Circumvention of Certain Laws 
        Relating to Abortion.

    Subsection (a) of Section 2 provides that, unless one of 
the exceptions listed below is met, whoever knowingly 
transports a minor across a State line, with the intent that 
such minor obtain an abortion, and thereby abridges the right 
of a parent under a law (in force in the minors state of 
residence) requiring parental involvement in a minor's abortion 
decision, shall be fined or imprisoned not more than 1 year, or 
both. An abridgement of a parent's right occurs if an abortion 
is performed or induced on the minor, in a State other than the 
State where the minor resides, without the parental consent or 
notification, or the judicial authorization, that would have 
been required by that law had the abortion been performed in 
the State where the minor resides.
    Subsection (b) of Section 2 provides for the following 
exceptions to prosecuting or suing someone under this section: 
(1) the prohibition does not apply if the abortion was 
necessary to save the life of the minor because her life was 
endangered by a physical disorder, physical injury, or physical 
illness, including a life endangering physical condition caused 
by or arising from the pregnancy itself; (2) the bill exempts 
from prosecution or suit the minor herself (the girl being 
transported) and any parent of that minor.
    Subsection (c) of Section 2 provides that a defendant can 
present an affirmative defense to a prosecution for an offense, 
or to a lawsuit, based on a violation of this section if the 
defendant: (1) reasonably believed, based on information the 
defendant obtained directly from a parent of the minor, that 
before the minor obtained the abortion, the parental consent or 
notification took place that was required under State law had 
the abortion been performed in the State where the minor 
resides; or (2) was presented with documentation showing with a 
reasonable degree of certainty that a court in the minor's 
State of residence waived any parental notification required by 
the laws of that State, or otherwise authorized that the minor 
be allowed to obtain an abortion.
    Subsection (d) of Section 2 provides that any parent who 
suffers harm from a violation of subsection (a) may obtain 
appropriate relief in a civil action.
    Subsection (e) of Section 2 provides, among other, the 
following definitions. The term a ``law requiring parental 
involvement in a minor's abortion decision'' means a law 
requiring, before an abortion is performed on a minor, either: 
(1) notification to, or consent of, a parent of that minor; or 
(2) proceedings in a State court. A ``law requiring parental 
involvement in a minor's abortion decision'' does not include a 
law that allows notification or consent to be given by anyone 
other than a ``parent'' as defined in the bill. The term 
``minor'' means an individual who is not older than the maximum 
age requiring parental notification or consent, or proceedings 
in a State court, under the State law requiring parental 
involvement in a minor's abortion decision. The term ``parent'' 
means: (1) a parent or guardian; (2) a legal custodian; or (3) 
a person with the requisite legal status to have care and 
control of the minor, and with whom the minor regularly 
resides, who is designated by the law requiring parental 
involvement in the minor's abortion decision as a person to 
whom notification, or from whom consent, is required.

Sec. 3. Child Interstate Abortion Notification.

    Subsection (a) of Section 3 provides that a physician who 
knowingly performs or induces an abortion on a minor in 
violation of the requirements of this section shall be fined 
under this title or imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both. 
Subsection (a) further provides that, unless one of the 
exceptions described below is met, a physician who knowingly 
performs or induces an abortion on a minor who is a resident of 
a State other than the State in which the abortion is performed 
must provide at least 24 hours actual notice to a parent of the 
minor before performing the abortion. If actual notice to such 
parent is not possible after a reasonable effort has been made, 
24 hours constructive notice must be given to a parent.
    Subsection (b) of Section 3 provides that subsection (a) 
does not apply if: (1) the abortion is performed or induced in 
a State that has a law in force requiring parental involvement 
in a minor's abortion decision and the physician complies with 
the requirements of that law; (2) the physician is presented 
with documentation showing with a reasonable degree of 
certainty that a court in the minor's State of residence has 
waived any parental notification required by the laws of that 
State, or has otherwise authorized that the minor be allowed to 
procure an abortion; (3) the minor declares in a signed written 
statement that she is the victim of sexual abuse, neglect, or 
physical abuse by a parent, and, before an abortion is 
performed on the minor, the physician notifies the authorities 
specified to receive reports of child abuse or neglect by the 
law of the State in which the minor resides of the known or 
suspected abuse or neglect; or (4) the abortion is necessary to 
save the life of the minor because her life was endangered by a 
physical disorder, physical injury, or physical illness, 
including a life endangering physical condition caused by or 
arising from the pregnancy itself.
    Subsection (c) of Section 3 provides that any parent who 
suffers harm from a violation of subsection (a) may obtain 
appropriate relief in a civil action.
    Subsection (d) of Section 3 defines the following terms, 
among others. The term ``actual notice'' means the giving of 
written notice directly, in person. The term ``constructive 
notice'' means notice that is given by certified mail, return 
receipt requested, restricted delivery to the last known 
address of the person being notified, with delivery deemed to 
have occurred 48 hours following noon on the next day 
subsequent to mailing on which regular mail delivery takes 
place, days on which mail is not delivered excluded. The term a 
``law requiring parental involvement in a minor's abortion 
decision'' is given the same meaning as in Section 2. The term 
``minor'' means an individual who is not older than 18 years 
and who is not emancipated under State law. The term ``parent'' 
means a parent or guardian; a legal custodian; or a person 
standing in loco parentis who has care and control of the 
minor, and with whom the minor regularly resides, as determined 
by State law. The term ``physician'' means a doctor of medicine 
legally authorized to practice medicine by the State in which 
such doctor practices medicine, or any other person legally 
empowered under State law to perform an abortion.

Sec. 4. Severability and Effective Date.

    Subsection (a) of Section 4 provides that if any provision 
of this Act, or any application thereof, is found 
unconstitutional, that finding shall not affect any provision 
or application of the Act not so adjudicated.
    Subsection (b) of Section 4 provides that the provisions of 
this Act shall take effect upon enactment.

         Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported

  In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by 
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (new matter is 
printed in italic and existing law in which no change is 
proposed is shown in roman):

                      TITLE 18, UNITED STATES CODE




           *       *       *       *       *       *       *
PART I--CRIMES

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Chap.                                                               Sec.
    1.       General provisions...................................     1
     * * * * * * *
117A.    Transportation of minors in circumvention of certain laws 
              relating to abortion................................  2431
117B.    Child interstate abortion notification...................  2432
     * * * * * * *

CHAPTER 117A--TRANSPORTATION OF MINORS IN CIRCUMVENTION OF CERTAIN LAWS 
                          RELATING TO ABORTION

Sec.
2431.    Transportation of minors in circumvention of certain laws 
          relating to abortion.

Sec. 2431. Transportation of minors in circumvention of certain laws 
                    relating to abortion

    (a) Offense.--
            (1) Generally.--Except as provided in subsection 
        (b), whoever knowingly transports a minor across a 
        State line, with the intent that such minor obtain an 
        abortion, and thereby in fact abridges the right of a 
        parent under a law requiring parental involvement in a 
        minor's abortion decision, in force in the State where 
        the minor resides, shall be fined under this title or 
        imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
            (2) Definition.--For the purposes of this 
        subsection, an abridgement of the right of a parent 
        occurs if an abortion is performed or induced on the 
        minor, in a State other than the State where the minor 
        resides, without the parental consent or notification, 
        or the judicial authorization, that would have been 
        required by that law had the abortion been performed in 
        the State where the minor resides.
    (b) Exceptions.--
            (1) The prohibition of subsection (a) does not 
        apply if the abortion was necessary to save the life of 
        the minor because her life was endangered by a physical 
        disorder, physical injury, or physical illness, 
        including a life endangering physical condition caused 
        by or arising from the pregnancy itself.
            (2) A minor transported in violation of this 
        section, and any parent of that minor, may not be 
        prosecuted or sued for a violation of this section, a 
        conspiracy to violate this section, or an offense under 
        section 2 or 3 based on a violation of this section.
    (c) Affirmative Defense.--It is an affirmative defense to a 
prosecution for an offense, or to a civil action, based on a 
violation of this section that the defendant--
            (1) reasonably believed, based on information the 
        defendant obtained directly from a parent of the minor, 
        that before the minor obtained the abortion, the 
        parental consent or notification took place that would 
        have been required by the law requiring parental 
        involvement in a minor's abortion decision, had the 
        abortion been performed in the State where the minor 
        resides; or
            (2) was presented with documentation showing with a 
        reasonable degree of certainty that a court in the 
        minor's State of residence waived any parental 
        notification required by the laws of that State, or 
        otherwise authorized that the minor be allowed to 
        procure an abortion.
    (d) Civil Action.--Any parent who suffers harm from a 
violation of subsection (a) may obtain appropriate relief in a 
civil action.
    (e) Definitions.--For the purposes of this section--
            (1) the term ``abortion'' means the use or 
        prescription of any instrument, medicine, drug, or any 
        other substance or device intentionally to terminate 
        the pregnancy of a female known to be pregnant with an 
        intention other than to increase the probability of a 
        live birth, to preserve the life or health of the child 
        after live birth, or to remove a dead unborn child who 
        died as the result of a spontaneous abortion, 
        accidental trauma or a criminal assault on the pregnant 
        female or her unborn child;
            (2) the term a ``law requiring parental involvement 
        in a minor's abortion decision'' means a law--
                    (A) requiring, before an abortion is 
                performed on a minor, either--
                            (i) the notification to, or consent 
                        of, a parent of that minor; or
                            (ii) proceedings in a State court; 
                        and
                    (B) that does not provide as an alternative 
                to the requirements described in subparagraph 
                (A) notification to or consent of any person or 
                entity who is not described in that 
                subparagraph;
            (3) the term ``minor'' means an individual who is 
        not older than the maximum age requiring parental 
        notification or consent, or proceedings in a State 
        court, under the law requiring parental involvement in 
        a minor's abortion decision;
            (4) the term ``parent'' means--
                    (A) a parent or guardian;
                    (B) a legal custodian; or
                    (C) a person standing in loco parentis who 
                has care and control of the minor, and with 
                whom the minor regularly resides, who is 
                designated by the law requiring parental 
                involvement in the minor's abortion decision as 
                a person to whom notification, or from whom 
                consent, is required; and
            (5) the term ``State'' includes the District of 
        Columbia and any commonwealth, possession, or other 
        territory of the United States.

          CHAPTER 117B--CHILD INTERSTATE ABORTION NOTIFICATION

Sec.
2432.    Child interstate abortion notification.

Sec. 2432. Child interstate abortion notification

    (a) Offense.--
            (1) Generally.--A physician who knowingly performs 
        or induces an abortion on a minor in violation of the 
        requirements of this section shall be fined under this 
        title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
            (2) Parental notification.--A physician who 
        performs or induces an abortion on a minor who is a 
        resident of a State other than the State in which the 
        abortion is performed must provide at least 24 hours 
        actual notice to a parent of the minor before 
        performing the abortion. If actual notice to such 
        parent is not possible after a reasonable effort has 
        been made, 24 hours constructive notice must be given 
        to a parent.
    (b) Exceptions.--The notification requirement of subsection 
(a)(2) does not apply if--
            (1) the abortion is performed or induced in a State 
        that has a law in force requiring parental involvement 
        in a minor's abortion decision and the physician 
        complies with the requirements of that law;
            (2) the physician is presented with documentation 
        showing with a reasonable degree of certainty that a 
        court in the minor's State of residence has waived any 
        parental notification required by the laws of that 
        State, or has otherwise authorized that the minor be 
        allowed to procure an abortion;
            (3) the minor declares in a signed written 
        statement that she is the victim of sexual abuse, 
        neglect, or physical abuse by a parent, and, before an 
        abortion is performed on the minor, the physician 
        notifies the authorities specified to receive reports 
        of child abuse or neglect by the law of the State in 
        which the minor resides of the known or suspected abuse 
        or neglect; or
            (4) the abortion is necessary to save the life of 
        the minor because her life was endangered by a physical 
        disorder, physical injury, or physical illness, 
        including a life endangering physical condition caused 
        by or arising from the pregnancy itself.
    (c) Civil Action.--Any parent who suffers harm from a 
violation of subsection (a) may obtain appropriate relief in a 
civil action.
    (d) Definitions.--For the purposes of this section--
            (1) the term ``abortion'' means the use or 
        prescription of any instrument, medicine, drug, or any 
        other substance or device intentionally to terminate 
        the pregnancy of a female known to be pregnant with an 
        intention other than to increase the probability of a 
        live birth, to preserve the life or health of the child 
        after live birth, or to remove a dead unborn child who 
        died as the result of a spontaneous abortion, 
        accidental trauma, or a criminal assault on the 
        pregnant female or her unborn child;
            (2) the term ``actual notice'' means the giving of 
        written notice directly, in person;
            (3) the term ``constructive notice'' means notice 
        that is given by certified mail, return receipt 
        requested, restricted delivery to the last known 
        address of the person being notified, with delivery 
        deemed to have occurred 48 hours following noon on the 
        next day subsequent to mailing on which regular mail 
        delivery takes place, days on which mail is not 
        delivered excluded;
            (4) the term a ``law requiring parental involvement 
        in a minor's abortion decision'' means a law--
                    (A) requiring, before an abortion is 
                performed on a minor, either--
                            (i) the notification to, or consent 
                        of, a parent of that minor; or
                            (ii) proceedings in a State court;
                    (B) that does not provide as an alternative 
                to the requirements described in subparagraph 
                (A) notification to or consent of any person or 
                entity who is not described in that 
                subparagraph;
            (5) the term ``minor'' means an individual who is 
        not older than 18 years and who is not emancipated 
        under State law;
            (6) the term ``parent'' means--
                    (A) a parent or guardian;
                    (B) a legal custodian; or
                    (C) a person standing in loco parentis who 
                has care and control of the minor, and with 
                whom the minor regularly resides;
        as determined by State law;
            (7) the term ``physician'' means a doctor of 
        medicine legally authorized to practice medicine by the 
        State in which such doctor practices medicine, or any 
        other person legally empowered under State law to 
        perform an abortion; and
            (8) the term ``State'' includes the District of 
        Columbia and any commonwealth, possession, or other 
        territory of the United States.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                           Markup Transcript



                            BUSINESS MEETING

                       WEDNESDAY, APRIL 13, 2005

                  House of Representatives,
                                Committee on the Judiciary,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in 
Room 2141, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. F. James 
Sensenbrenner, Jr. [Chairman of the Committee] presiding.
    [Intervening business.]
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. We will now go to H.R. 748, the 
``Child Interstate Abortion Notification Act of 2005.'' The 
Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Chabot, the 
Chairman of the Subcommittee on the Constitution, for a motion.
    Mr. Chabot. Mr. Chairman, the Subcommittee on the 
Constitution reports favorably the bill H.R. 748 and moves its 
favorable recommendation to the full House.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection, the bill will be 
considered as read and open for amendment at any point.
    [The bill, H.R. 748, follows:]
      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The Subcommittee amendment in the 
nature of a substitute, which the Members have before them, 
will be considered as read, considered as the original text for 
purposes of amendment, and open for amendment at any point.
    [The amendment in the nature of a substitute follows:]
      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The Chair recognizes the gentleman 
from Ohio, Mr. Chabot, to strike the last word.
    Mr. Chabot. Mr. Chairman, move to strike the last word.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman's recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Constitution Subcommittee held a legislative hearing on 
the Child Interstate Abortion Notification Act, referred to as 
CIANA, on March 3, 2005. The bill was marked up in the 
Subcommittee on March 17, where it was favorably reported with 
an amendment clarifying the criteria that defines the 
affirmative defense in Section 2 of the bill by a vote of 7 to 
2.
    CIANA contains two sections, each of which creates a new 
Federal crime subject to a $100,000 fine or 1 year in jail, or 
both.
    The first section of CIANA makes it a Federal crime to 
transport a minor across State lines to obtain an abortion in 
another State in order to avoid a State law requiring parental 
involvement in a minor's abortion decision. Twenty-three States 
currently have such parental involvement laws. The primary 
purpose of the first section of CIANA is to prevent people, 
including abusive boyfriends and older men who may have 
committed rape, from pressuring young girls into circumventing 
their State's parental involvement laws by receiving secret, 
out-of-State abortions unknown to their parents.
    The second section of CIANA applies when a minor from one 
State crosses State lines to have an abortion in another State 
that does not have a State law requiring parental involvement 
in a minor's abortion decision. In such a case, CIANA makes it 
a Federal crime for the abortion provider to fail to give one 
of the minor's parents, or a legal guardian if necessary, 24 
hours' notice, or notice by mail if needed, of the minor's 
decision to have an abortion before the abortion is performed. 
The purpose of this section is to protect fundamental rights of 
parents to be involved in their children's life by giving 
parents a chance to help their young daughters through 
difficult circumstances as best they can, including by giving a 
health care provider their daughter's complete and accurate 
medical history to ensure that she receives safe medical care 
and any necessary follow-up treatment.
    CIANA does not give parents any veto power over a minor's 
abortion decision. CIANA simply stands for the proposition that 
parents should be given the chance to help their minor 
daughters in what may be the most important and life-altering 
decision she will make in her life.
    CIANA includes carefully crafted exceptions. These 
exceptions include instances in which a life-threatening 
emergency may require that an abortion be provided immediately 
or the abortion provider is presented with court papers showing 
that the parental involvement law in effect in the minor's 
State of residence has been complied with and where the minor 
states that she has been the victim of abuse by a parent and 
the abortion provider informs the appropriate State authorities 
of such abuse so further abuse can be prevented.
    A vivid and heart-rending example of why this legislation 
is so important comes from Marcia Carroll, who testified on 
behalf of CIANA during a Constitution Subcommittee hearing last 
month. In her testimony, she described how her daughter, 
without her knowledge, was pressured by her boyfriend's 
stepfather to cross State lines and have an abortion she did 
not want, and she now regrets it very deeply. Mrs. Carroll 
said, ``My daughter does suffer. She has gone to counseling for 
this. I just know that she cries and she wishes she could redo 
everything, relive that day over. It's just sad that it had to 
happen this way and this is what she had to go through. But she 
did want me to come here today and speak on her behalf. She 
said, `Mom, just one phone call is all it would have taken to 
stop this from happening.' So she asked me to come here for her 
sake and for others girls' safety to speak and let you know 
what was happening.''
    The parents of this country, such as Mrs. Carroll, should 
be given the chance to be involved in the decisions that their 
daughters make. CIANA would give them that chance.
    The House of Representatives has passed similar legislation 
by over 100-vote margins in recent Congresses, and parental 
notification laws are overwhelmingly supported by Americans. As 
recently as last month, 75 percent of over 1,500 registered 
voters surveyed favored requiring parental notification before 
a minor could get an abortion, with only 18 percent opposing 
parental notification.
    The provisions and notification requirements of CIANA are 
constitutional and constitute--and are consistent with Supreme 
Court precedent. The Supreme Court has described a parents' 
right to control the care of their children as ``perhaps the 
oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this 
Court.'' Further, the Court has upheld as constitutional a 
State parental notification statute that did not contain a 
broad health exception. That State statute--that State statute 
provided only for a judicial bypass exception, which is in this 
particular bill.
    I would urge my colleagues to join in supporting this much 
needed legislation that is overwhelmingly supported by the 
American people to protect both the health and safety of our 
minor children and parental rights.
    I yield back the balance of my time.
    [Intervening business.]
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Consideration will now resume on 
H.R. 748, and the Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York, 
Mr. Nadler, for an opening statement.
    Mr. Nadler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Today we consider legislation that is at once another 
flagrant violation of the Constitution and an assault on the 
health and well-being of young women and their health care 
providers. Some States have chosen to enact parental 
notification or consent laws. Some, like mine, have considered 
this issue and decided it is not good for the welfare of young 
women and have declined to do so. And they have done this for 
various reasons.
    In some cases, the young woman may not be able to go to her 
parents and can turn only to a grandparent, a sibling, or a 
member of the clergy. Indeed, sometimes the parents may pose a 
threat to the life and health of the young woman. That's what 
happened to Spring Adams, a 13-year-old from Idaho. She was 
shot to death by her father after he found out that she planned 
to terminate a pregnancy--a pregnancy caused by his act of 
incest.
    This bill also--and, by the way, in the case that Mr. 
Chabot mentioned, forgetting this law, that was a clear case of 
kidnapping--kidnapping, coercion, violation of about half a 
dozen existing criminal laws. It is hardly a justification for 
this bill.
    This bill also uses a narrow definition of ``medical 
emergency'' that applies only where ``an abortion was necessary 
to save the life of the minor because her life was endangered 
by a physical disorder, physical injury, or physical illness, 
including a life-endangering physical condition caused by or 
arising from the pregnancy itself.'' That clearly falls far 
short of the Supreme Court's requirement that any restriction 
on the right to choose must have an explicit exception to 
protect the life or health of the woman.
    There are many things far short of death that threaten the 
health of a young woman. She deserves prompt and professional 
medical care, and the Constitution still protects her right to 
receive that care. Whether or not the majority cares about the 
Constitution, this bill clearly violates that. Congress should 
not be tempted to play doctor. It is always bad medicine for 
women.
    In an ideal world, loving, supportive, and understanding 
families would join together to face these challenges. That's 
what happens in the majority of cases, law or no law. But we do 
not live in a perfect world. Some parents are violent, some are 
rapists, some young people can turn only to their clergy, to a 
grandparent, a sibling, or some other trusted adult. We should 
not turn these people into criminals simply because they are 
trying to help a young woman in a dire situation.
    This bill is the wrong way to deal with a very real 
problem. It does not provide exceptions to protect a young 
woman's health. It does not provide exceptions where a parent 
has raped a young woman. It even allows the rapist to sue a 
clergyperson or doctor who tries to help the daughter deal with 
the effects of that crime.
    This bill would also substitute the judgment of Congress 
for the judgment of people who live in States like New York 
which have chosen not to enact parental involvement laws. In 
fact, even where the young woman's State of residence and the 
State in which the doctor is located have both decided not to 
enact such laws, this bill would impose a new Federal parental 
notification law that is more draconian and more 
unconstitutional than the laws of most States. Perhaps we 
should just disband our State legislatures and let the people 
in Washington decide these important family issues for us. 
Perhaps the same mind-set that had Congress pass a special law 
for Terry Schiavo when the Florida Legislature declined to do 
so is operating again.
    In some cases, young women--I'm sorry. I will urge my 
colleagues to reject this legislation on both constitutional 
and policy grounds. If only for the sake of humanity, I would 
urge you to join in providing the needed flexibility for the 
most difficult real-world cases involving the lives of real 
young women. We owe them at least that much. And we also owe 
our States the respect to let them have their own laws.
    This bill is the only situation I can think of since the 
Fugitive Slave Act of the 1850's that would have a young person 
carry the law of one State on his back like a cross to another 
State, to enforce the law of the first State in the second 
State where it is not the law. I doubt the constitutionality of 
that, but there is also no good policy reason to impose on one 
State the law of another State.
    I hope we will not enact this bill, though I know we will, 
and I know that the Supreme Court will throw it out as 
unconstitutional. So let the politics reign and never mind the 
policy.
    Thank you. I yield back.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection, all Members' 
opening statements will appear in the record at this point.
    Are there amendments? The gentlewoman from California, Ms. 
Waters, for what purpose do you seek recognition?
    Ms. Waters. I have an amendment at the desk.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report the 
amendment.
    Ms. Waters. I have two amendments. I suppose this--I don't 
know what the number would be, the first amendment.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, I don't have the amendments at the 
desk.
    Ms. Waters. Those amendments should be at the desk, 748--
here they are. We will take them to the desk right now. Just 
hold those. Take the two sets.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report the 
amendment.
    Ms. Waters. We have two amendments.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report the 
amendment.
    The Clerk. Amendment to H.R. 748, offered by Ms. Waters. 
Page 3, after line 2, insert the following: ``(3) The 
prohibition of subsection (a) does not apply if the pregnancy 
is the result of sexual contact with a parent or any other 
person who has permanent or temporary care or custody or 
responsibility for supervision of the minor, or by any health 
or family member.''
    [The amendment follows:]
      
      

  


    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentlewoman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Ms. Waters. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. This 
amendment is being offered because I anticipated that another 
amendment that I had would not--may not be taken up. So this 
amendment--this is a Child Interstate Abortion Notification Act 
amendment. Just one moment, Mr. Chairman. I think we have a 
little problem here.
    This amendment, Mr. Chairman, is an amendment that simply 
recognizes that a young girl may become pregnant as a result of 
sexual contact with a parent or some other person who has 
permanent or temporary care or custody or responsibility for 
supervision of the minor or by any household family member.
    Unfortunately, the bill as it is drafted does not take into 
consideration that when we are talking about parent 
notification, we're asking--we're asking a woman, a young girl 
in particular, to go to the very person who may be responsible 
for the pregnancy to--and somehow give consent or at least be 
notified they're giving information to someone who may have 
been a party to the pregnancy.
    I think it was just mentioned by my colleague that in the 
case of Spring Adams, a 13-year-old sixth grader from Ohio, who 
was actually shot to death by her father after he learned that 
she was planning to terminate a pregnancy caused by his acts of 
incest.
    My amendment provides that the person should not have to go 
to perhaps the party that's responsible for the pregnancy, and 
so I would ask for an aye vote on this amendment.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Does the gentlewoman yield back?
    Mr. Chabot. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Does the gentlewoman yield back?
    Ms. Waters. I will yield back the balance of my time.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. 
Chabot?
    Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Move to strike the 
last word.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Chabot. Thank you. I rise in opposition to the 
amendment. I believe it should be defeated because it would 
trump the judicial bypass provision in place in States that 
allow judges to make case-by-case determinations on these 
issues and allow for alerting the appropriate authorities so 
abusers can be brought to justice. This amendment would allow 
abusers potentially to get off scot free and doom the victims 
of sexual abuse to even more abuse. If the girl is afraid to 
tell her parents of the abortion for fear of past or future 
sexual abuse, she may utilize the judicial bypass process which 
is available in her State. The offense of transporting a minor 
across a State line does not apply if the girl has been granted 
a judicial bypass and the transporter obtained information 
beforehand that the judicial authorization took place.
    This amendment would actually enable potentially a live-in 
foster brother or uncle or grandfather who has been sexually 
abusing the minor girl to transport her across a State line for 
the purpose of abridging a parent's right to know. So we think 
the judicial bypass procedure that's in effect in most States 
should be permitted to rule and, therefore, I would strongly 
oppose this amendment.
    I yield back the balance of my time.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The question is----
    Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from New York.
    Mr. Nadler. Would the distinguished Chairman of the 
Subcommittee yield for a question?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Does the gentleman move to strike 
the last word? Because----
    Mr. Nadler. I do indeed.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman----
    Mr. Nadler. I hate that last word. I move to strike it.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Okay. Well, the last word is 
``member.'' The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Nadler. Would the gentleman yield for a question, Mr. 
Chabot?
    Mr. Chabot. I will yield.
    Mr. Nadler. I was listening to your objection to this 
amendment, and you said that any other--that this would allow a 
household member to take--to get around this bill, essentially. 
That was your objection to the amendment.
    Mr. Chabot. Among others. The bypass procedure is already 
in effect to protect the girl's rights, and this I think just 
muddies up the waters.
    Mr. Nadler. Would you still object to the amendment if the 
last phrase was struck from the amendment and it simply said, 
``The prohibition of subsection (a) does not apply if the 
pregnancy is the result of sexual contact with a parent or any 
other person who has permanent or temporary care or custody of 
responsibility...''? In other words, you don't have to notify 
the parent who committed the--who created the pregnancy. That's 
all it applies to.
    Mr. Chabot. Yes, it trumps back--it would trump the bypass 
procedure, which is already in process. I think the bill as 
currently written----
    Mr. Nadler. But forgetting the bypass, I don't understand. 
If a stepfather, let's say, or a father committed incest, and 
let's say the mother wasn't alive, so the stepfather committed 
incest--or the father committed incest, he's the only person 
who could give parental consent notification, he's the person 
you don't want to go to, what's the point of the judicial 
bypass?
    Mr. Chabot. Taking back my time----
    Mr. Nadler. It's my time. You can--I yield.
    Mr. Chabot. Oh, did you yield?
    Mr. Nadler. I yield, yes.
    Mr. Chabot. Okay. The bypass procedure I think protects the 
young girl in that particular circumstance, and I think it's 
appropriate.
    Mr. Nadler. But I still don't understand. Let's assume it 
does. I mean, there are a lot of problems with the bypass 
procedure. But even if it did, why waste the court's time when 
the only person you're bypassing is the person who committed 
incest?
    Mr. Chabot. I'm not sure I understand your point.
    Mr. Nadler. If the father committed incest and caused the 
pregnancy, if the mother is not alive, then the only person 
you're bypassing is the father who committed the incest and 
caused the pregnancy. Why bother with that? Why waste the 
court's time? Why not just--I mean, under no circumstances----
    Mr. Chabot. Would the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Nadler. Let me just say, under no circumstances 
presumably should you require parental notification or 
involvement if the parent committed a crime. Yes, I yield.
    Mr. Chabot. Would the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Nadler. Sure.
    Mr. Chabot. We want the State bypass procedure to be able 
to work. The court makes that decision, and we think that the 
court is the appropriate place for that decision to be made.
    Mr. Nadler. Reclaiming my time, I just think this 
illustrates how rigid this bill is, even if that amendment 
would not be accepted under those circumstances.
    I yield back.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The question is on the amendment 
offered by the gentlewoman from California, Ms. Waters. Those 
in favor will say aye? Opposed, no?
    The noes appear to have it. The noes have it, and the 
amendment is not agreed to.
    Are there further----
    Ms. Waters. I have another amendment, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report the 
amendment.
    The Clerk. Amendment to H.R. 748, offered by Ms. Waters. 
Page 3, after line 2, insert the following: ``(3) The 
prohibitions of this section do not apply with respect to an 
abortion where the pregnancy resulted from incest.''
    [The amendment follows:]
      
      

  


    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentlewoman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Ms. Waters. Thank you very much.
    Mr. Chairman and Members, the first amendment really 
related to a pregnancy as a result of maybe a parent or other 
household members, not necessarily a relative. This one is 
specific to incest, and certainly as we take a look, no matter 
what side of the issue you're on relative to notification, 
certainly we would not want to place a young person, a young 
woman in the position of having to talk with a relative or a 
parent who's responsible for the pregnancy. So I would hope 
that the focus this time would be on a father in particular who 
we have seen involved in these kind of cases and not to have to 
ask a young lady to share this information, to seek support 
just to know what is happening, when, in fact, they're planning 
on terminating the pregnancy. I would ask for an aye vote.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Does the gentlewoman yield back?
    Ms. Waters. I yield back the balance of my time.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. 
Chabot?
    Mr. Chabot. Move to strike the last word.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I won't take the 5 
minutes. I'll be very brief.
    Essentially, the response would be the same. In essence, it 
has the same substance as the amendment that we just discussed. 
The judicial bypass procedure that's available in the States to 
protect the young girl in one of these situations is what the 
protection is. There's no reason to adopt this amendment; 
therefore, I'd oppose it.
    I yield back.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The question is on the amendment 
offered by the gentlewoman from California, Ms. Waters. Those 
in favor will say aye? Opposed, no?
    The noes appear to have it. The noes have it. The amendment 
is not agreed to.
    Are there further amendments? The gentleman from New York, 
Mr. Nadler.
    Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman, I have two amendments. The first 
is Nadler 008. I don't have eight. I only have two, but 008.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report Nadler 008.
    The Clerk. Amendment to H.R. 748, offered by Mr. Nadler. 
Page 3, after line 2, insert the following: ``(3) Any adult who 
would be subject to prosecution under this Act''----
    Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman?
    The Clerk.--``who can demonstrate, by a preponderance of 
the evidence, that he or she has a reasonable belief that 
compliance with the judicial bypass procedure of the minor's 
State of resident would either--(A) compromise the minor's 
intent to maintain confidentiality with respect to her choice 
to terminate a pregnancy; or (B) be futile because the judicial 
bypass procedure of the minor's State of residence is 
unavailable''----
    Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman?
    The Clerk.--``or ineffective, may apply to a judge of the 
United States District Court in the district in which the minor 
resides for a waiver of the application''----
    Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to waive 
the reading of the amendment.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection.
    Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman, I also ask unanimous consent to 
amend the amendment by removing in line 3 the words ``he or she 
has a reasonable belief that...''
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection, the reading of 
the amendment--further reading of the amendment is waived. Is 
there any objection to deleting the language referred to by the 
gentleman from New York?
    [No response.]
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection, the language is 
deleted, and the gentleman from New York is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    [The amendment follows:]
    
    
    Mr. Nadler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Chairman, this amendment would try to make the bill 
begin to conform to real-world situations. It would allow an 
adult who, by a preponderance of the evidence, can show that a 
judicial bypass procedure in the minor's State is unavailable. 
As the testimony we received on this bill indicates is 
sometimes the case, or where a judicial bypass procedure in the 
minor's home State might compromise her privacy, the minor 
would be allowed to go to the Federal district court to seek 
the required waiver.
    In other words, if you could show by a preponderance of the 
evidence that going for a judicial district waiver in the State 
court would compromise the privacy or that that is an illusory 
remedy because the remedy is not really available in the State 
court, you could go and apply to the Federal district court for 
the waiver based on the same grounds that you would seek in the 
State court.
    It does not eliminate--this bill does not--this amendment, 
rather, does not eliminate the waiver requirement. It simply 
allows the minor to avoid the kinds of real-world problems that 
exist out there in the real world, where local judges, some 
local judges have made clear they will never grant a bypass, or 
where the local judge is so cozy with the young woman's parents 
that confidentiality would be a joke, sometimes with 
catastrophic results.
    I know that my colleagues won't mind removing a small 
number of these cases from State court to Federal court. We 
seem to make a habit of doing that in this Committee. Indeed, 
the Republican leadership dragged us all back from Washington 
to yank a case out of State court into Federal court a few 
weeks ago. So I hope this amendment should not be a problem.
    I yield back.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. 
Chabot?
    Mr. Chabot. Move to strike the last word.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I rise in opposition 
to this amendment. The amendment, I believe, should be defeated 
because it would undermine State judicial bypass proceedings, 
once again. If the State's judicial bypass procedure, in fact, 
fails to effectively maintain a pregnant minor's 
confidentiality or is unavailable or ineffective, under the 
terms of the amendment, then that State's judicial bypass 
system would be held unconstitutional under current case law 
and not enforced under CIANA. CIANA merely reinforces 
constitutional State parental involvement laws. If a State's 
parental involvement law is held unconstitutional, CIANA will 
not have any effect on the operation of that State's laws.
    Mr. Nadler. Would the gentleman yield for a question?
    Mr. Chabot. Not at this time. For example, if there are 
only two judges in an entire State willing to hear judicial 
bypass proceedings, that State's parental involvement law would 
be found unconstitutional under current Supreme Court 
precedent, which requires the State to provide a minor the 
opportunity to seek a judicial bypass with ``sufficient 
expedition to provide an effective opportunity for an abortion 
to be obtained.'' That's existing law. This fact is illustrated 
by the First Circuit's decision in Planned Parenthood League v. 
Bellotti. In that case, the court held that the plaintiffs 
could successfully challenge the State's judicial bypass 
procedures if they could present ``proof of a systematic 
failure to provide a judicial bypass option in the most 
expeditious, practical manner.''
    The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the lower court 
so that the plaintiffs could present evidence that, among other 
things, judges were de facto unavailable to hear minors' 
abortion petitions or were avoided for reasons of hostility, as 
the gentleman mentioned before.
    The Sixth Circuit has also recognized that a constitutional 
challenge may be brought for a State's systematic failure to 
provide an expeditious judicial bypass. Opponents of this 
legislation can't have it both ways by arguing on the one hand 
that the State law must always govern within its State 
boundaries, regardless of interstate effects, and on the other 
hand that States can't be trusted to enact sufficient judicial 
bypass laws.
    So for those reasons, I would strongly oppose this 
amendment, and if the gentleman would like me to yield, I'll 
yield.
    Mr. Nadler. Thank you. The fact is it's hard to see how a 
constitutional challenge to a situation, which may, in fact, 
only exist in the given case where the local judge is a friend 
of the parents, may not be a totally unconstitutional situation 
Statewide. But, in any event, it's hard to see how a 
constitutional challenge could be taken without getting into 
the second and third trimester of pregnancy. I mean, the fact 
is why not let a Federal court judge whether, in fact, the 
judicial bypass is real on an expeditious basis, which is all 
this amendment says.
    Mr. Chabot. Reclaiming my time, I yield back.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The question is on the amendment 
offered by the gentleman from New York, Mr. Nadler. Those in 
favor will say aye? Opposed, no?
    The noes appear to have it.
    Mr. Nadler. A rollcall vote.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. A rollcall is requested. Those in 
favor of the Nadler amendment will as your names are called 
answer aye, those opposed, no, and the clerk will call the 
roll.
    The Clerk. Mr. Hyde?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Coble?
    Mr. Coble. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Coble, no. Mr. Smith?
    Mr. Smith of Texas. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Smith, no. Mr. Gallegly?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Goodlatte?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Chabot?
    Mr. Chabot. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chabot, no. Mr. Lungren?
    Mr. Lungren. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Lungren, no. Mr. Jenkins?
    Mr. Jenkins. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Jenkins, no. Mr. Cannon?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Bachus?
    Mr. Bachus. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Bachus, no. Mr. Inglis?
    Mr. Inglis. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Inglis, no. Mr. Hostettler?
    Mr. Hostettler. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Hostettler, no. Mr. Green?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Keller?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Issa?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Flake?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Pence?
    Mr. Pence. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Pence, no. Mr. Forbes?
    Mr. Forbes. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Forbes, no. Mr. King?
    Mr. King. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. King, no. Mr. Feeney?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Franks?
    Mr. Franks. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Franks, no. Mr. Gohmert?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Conyers?
    Mr. Conyers. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Conyers, aye. Mr. Berman?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Boucher?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Nadler?
    Mr. Nadler. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Nadler, aye. Mr. Scott?
    Mr. Scott. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Scott, aye. Mr. Watt?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Ms. Lofgren?
    Ms. Lofgren. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Lofgren, aye. Ms. Jackson Lee?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Ms. Waters?
    Ms. Waters. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Waters, aye. Mr. Meehan?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Delahunt?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Wexler?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Weiner?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Schiff?
    Mr. Schiff. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Schiff, aye. Ms. Sanchez?
    Ms. Sanchez. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Sanchez, aye. Mr. Smith?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Van Hollen?
    Mr. Van Hollen. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Van Hollen, aye. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Members in the chamber who wish to 
cast or change their votes? The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. 
Goodlatte?
    Mr. Goodlatte. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Goodlatte, no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. 
Green?
    Mr. Green. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Green, no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from California, Mr. 
Berman?
    Mr. Berman. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Berman, aye.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Massachusetts, 
Mr. Meehan?
    Mr. Meehan. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Meehan, aye.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Are there further Members who wish 
to either cast or change their votes? If not, the clerk will 
report--the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Keller?
    Mr. Keller. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Keller, no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Further Members who wish to cast or 
change their votes? The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. 
Watt?
    Mr. Watt. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Watt, aye.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Anybody else who wishes to cast or 
change their votes? If not, the clerk will try again to report.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, there are 11 ayes and 16 noes.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. And the amendment is not agreed to.
    Are there further amendments?
    Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from New York, Mr. 
Nadler.
    Mr. Nadler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have an amendment at 
the desk, number 001.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report the 
amendment.
    The Clerk. Amendment to H.R. 748, offered by Mr. Nadler. 
Page 3, after line 2, insert the following: ``(3) The 
prohibition of subsection (a) does not apply with respect to 
conduct by a grandparent or adult sibling of the minor.''
    [The amendment follows:]
      
      

  


    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from New York is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Nadler. Thank you.
    Mr. Chairman, this amendment would simply exempt a 
grandparent or adult sibling from the criminal and civil 
penalties in this bill. These cases do not involve kidnapping, 
not when it's involved with a grandparent or brother or sister 
of the young woman having the abortion. These cases do not 
involve someone from outside the family intruding into basic 
family decisions. They do allow a responsible adult member of 
the family to intervene in cases involving serious family 
crises, such as rape, incest, family violence, or some other 
terrible problem that will sometimes arise.
    I realize the bill does not have--does have a mandatory 
reporting requirement for crimes. This does not deal with 
dangers that are not crimes of the kind described in the bill. 
It does not deal with threats. It does not deal with the 
prospect of violence. The bill does not deal with a young 
person who is away at school and seeks the support of the 
nearest relative, perhaps a grandparent.
    The bill is really an assault on families and the ability 
of families to deal with their problems to the best of their 
ability. It presumes that Congress knows best just how each 
difficult family situation must be resolved, even within the 
family.
    I do not think Congress possesses that kind of wisdom, 
although it may indeed possess that kind of arrogance. Let us 
at least not turn caring grandparents or siblings into 
criminals. Let us not allow an abusive father to sue his own 
mother if she tries to intervene and help. We should try to 
show just a little humanity and perhaps a little humility. And, 
therefore, I urge the adoption of this amendment.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. 
Chabot?
    Mr. Chabot. I move to strike the last word.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    This amendment would codify the circumvention of parental 
involvement, and the overwhelming majority of Americans support 
parental involvement. In-laws and aunts and uncles and cousins 
and siblings or even priests don't have the authority now to 
authorize a medical procedure for a minor child or even ear 
piercing or the dispensing of aspirin at school. So why should 
a fundamental parental right be thrown aside for the abortion 
procedure alone? Anyone supporting this amendment must have a 
fundamental problem with underlying State laws that allow only 
parents to grant consent for this medical procedure.
    This amendment would sever the essential parental-child 
relationship. Grandparents and adult siblings are not parents. 
It's that simple. It's instructive that the Supreme Court has 
always held that this important duty to ensure and provide for 
the care and nurture of minor children lies only with parents, 
a conclusion which arises from the traditional legal 
recognition that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act 
in the best interests of their own children.
    As Justices O'Connor and Kennedy and Souter observed in 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, parental consent and notification 
laws related to abortion are based on a quite reasonable 
assumption that minors will benefit from consultation with 
their parents and that children will often not realize that 
their parents have their best interests at heart. Parents, not 
anyone else, know and can provide their dependent minor 
children's complete and accurate medical histories, for 
example. Before children undergo medical procedures, parents 
are required to provide the critical information. Without that 
medical history, an abortion could be a devastating event in a 
child's health.
    As the Supreme Court has made clear, the medical, 
emotional, and psychological consequences of an abortion are 
serious and can be lasting. That is particularly so when the 
patient is immature. An adequate medical and psychological case 
history is important to the physician. Parents can provide 
medical and psychological data, refer the physician to other 
sources of medical history such as a family physician, and 
authorizes family physicians to give relevant data. That's what 
the Supreme Court stated.
    So I would strongly urge my colleagues to oppose this 
amendment and yield back the balance of my time.
    Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. 
Scott.
    Mr. Scott. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Chairman, the child can go across the State lines with 
assistance or without assistance. This just says if they've got 
the assistance of the grandparent or adult sibling that you're 
not--that that not be a crime. And even if the prosecutor won't 
prosecute, you don't want civil suits involving family members 
resulting from a violation of this section.
    I would hope that these--these family decisions are bad 
enough. I know the majority in Congress don't mind involving 
themselves in family decisions and encouraging parents and in-
laws to sue each other. But we ought not--I think the poll 
suggested that 80 percent of the public didn't appreciate what 
we did a couple of weeks ago, and having civil suits against 
family members shouldn't be encouraged in this bill. So I would 
hope that we would adopt this amendment, and I will yield to 
the gentleman from New York.
    Mr. Nadler. Thank you. I thank the gentleman for yielding, 
and I obviously agree with him. And I would want to comment on 
what the distinguished Chairman of the Subcommittee said when 
he said most Americans or a majority, something to that effect, 
approve of parental notification and consent laws. That may be. 
But I don't think most Americans approve of criminalizing the 
brother or sister or grandparent who helps someone get an 
abortion if that abortion resulted from incest. And that's what 
we're talking about in this amendment.
    The rhetoric used for this bill basically says that there 
is--that these evil abortion promoters or abortion clinic 
owners are making an industry of spiriting young women across 
State lines for the purpose of evading the parental 
notification requirement. Well, I don't think that's true. But 
even if it were, what this amendment is talking about is not 
anybody connected with an abortion clinic or anybody else. It's 
a grandparent or a brother or a sister--not a cousin, not an 
uncle or an aunt, but a grandparent or a brother or a sister 
who's motivated presumably by concern for the welfare of the 
minor and who agrees with the minor that in this particular 
case--not in most cases perhaps, but in this particular case, 
because of incest, because of parental hostility, because of 
parental drunkenness, for whatever reason, you can't tell or 
involve the parent. And maybe that judgment is correct, and 
maybe they haven't the sophistication to go for judicial 
bypass.
    All this would say is you don't make the sibling, the 
brother or the sister, or the grandparent a criminal in this 
situation where they may very well be right about the welfare 
of the minor. And, therefore, it's very different from the rest 
of the bill. Even if you agree with the rest of the bill, even 
if you agree with the underlying reasoning of parental 
involvement, you shouldn't make a criminal out of a sibling or 
a grandparent who helps the minor.
    That's all this amendment says, and anyone who respects the 
family and family values will support this amendment, because 
although we do accord primacy to the parents, not 100 percent 
of the time, not if the parent is drunk and hostile and 
violent, not if the parent committed incest, not in a number of 
other cases. And we can't know those situations, but the 
sibling or the grandparent can.
    I yield----
    Mr. Conyers. Would the gentleman from Virginia yield?
    Mr. Scott. I yield.
    Mr. Conyers. I wanted to take this time to put my opening 
statement in the record, and I wanted to commend the gentleman 
from New York, the gentleman from Virginia, and the gentlelady 
from California, who are offering opportunities for us to 
correct legislation that seems unconstitutional in at least 
three aspects. It's hard for me to imagine that the other body 
is going to go very far with a measure that offers nine 
different scenarios of parental notice that will be imposed on 
doctors and women across this Nation.
    This is a terrible problem that we're dealing with here, 
dysfunctional families, child abuse, teen pregnancies, and I 
think we need to be far more careful in telling women, young 
women facing this situation, who they must confide in and that 
the Constitution probably won't apply to them.
    I ask unanimous consent to have my statement offered into 
the record.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection.
    Mr. Conyers. Thank you.
    Mr. Scott. I yield back.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The question is on the amendment 
offered by the gentleman from New York, Mr. Nadler. Those in 
favor will say aye? Opposed, no?
    The noes appear to have it. The----
    Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from New York?
    Mr. Nadler. I ask the ayes and nays.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. A rollcall will be ordered. The 
question is on agreeing to the Nadler amendment. Those in favor 
will as your names are called answer aye, those opposed, no, 
and the clerk will call the roll.
    The Clerk. Mr. Hyde?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Coble?
    Mr. Coble. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Coble, no. Mr. Smith?
    Mr. Smith of Texas. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Smith, no. Mr. Gallegly?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Goodlatte?
    Mr. Goodlatte. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Goodlatte, no. Mr. Chabot?
    Mr. Chabot. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chabot, no. Mr. Lungren?
    Mr. Lungren. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Lungren, no. Mr. Jenkins?
    Mr. Jenkins. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Jenkins, no. Mr. Cannon?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Bachus?
    Mr. Bachus. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Bachus, no. Mr. Inglis?
    Mr. Inglis. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Inglis, no. Mr. Hostettler?
    Mr. Hostettler. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Hostettler, no. Mr. Green?
    Mr. Green. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Green, no. Mr. Keller?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Issa?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Flake?
    Mr. Flake. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Flake, no. Mr. Pence?
    Mr. Pence. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Pence, no. Mr. Forbes?
    Mr. Forbes. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Forbes, no. Mr. King?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Feeney?
    Mr. Feeney. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Feeney, no. Mr. Franks?
    Mr. Franks. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Franks, no. Mr. Gohmert?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Conyers?
    Mr. Conyers. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Conyers, aye. Mr. Berman?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Boucher?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Nadler?
    Mr. Nadler. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Nadler, aye. Mr. Scott?
    Mr. Scott. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Scott, aye. Mr. Watt?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Ms. Lofgren?
    Ms. Lofgren. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Lofgren, aye. Ms. Jackson Lee?
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Jackson Lee, aye. Ms. Waters?
    Ms. Waters. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Waters, aye. Mr. Meehan?
    Mr. Meehan. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Meehan, aye. Mr. Delahunt?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Wexler?
    Mr. Wexler. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Wexler, aye. Mr. Weiner?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Schiff?
    Mr. Schiff. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Schiff, aye. Ms. Sanchez?
    Ms. Sanchez. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Sanchez, aye. Mr. Smith?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Van Hollen?
    Mr. Van Hollen. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Van Hollen, aye. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Members in the chamber who wish to 
cast or change their votes? The gentleman from California, Mr. 
Issa?
    Mr. Issa. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Issa, no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from North Carolina, 
Mr. Watt?
    Mr. Watt. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Watt, aye.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Florida, Mr. 
Keller?
    Mr. Keller. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Keller, no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Utah, Mr. 
Cannon?
    Mr. Cannon. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Cannon, no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Further Members in the chamber who 
wish to cast or change their vote? If not, the clerk will 
report.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, there are 12 ayes and 19 noes.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. And the amendment is not agreed to.
    Are there further amendments? The gentleman from Virginia, 
Mr. Scott?
    Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report the 
amendment.
    The Clerk. Amendment to H.R. 748, offered by Mr. Scott of 
Virginia. Page 3, after line 2, insert the following: ``(3) The 
prohibitions of this section do not apply with respect to 
conduct by taxi drivers, bus drivers, or others in the business 
of professional transport.''
    [The amendment follows:]
    
    
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Virginia is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is a very simple 
amendment. It will just immunize taxicab drivers and others who 
transport minors under this Act. The bill as written--the bill 
as written would make the taxicab driver a criminal if they do 
the simple task of responding to a call and even if they are 
not aware that the minor is evading a State's consent laws. If 
the minor hops in the cab and says, ``Take me to the abortion 
clinic,'' that would make--then the cab driver complies with 
that direction and accepts the fee for the job, that taxicab 
driver would be in violation of this section.
    If you read the language of the bill, page 1 of the 
Subcommittee amendment in the nature of a substitute, it says 
that ``whoever knowingly transports a minor across a State 
line, with the intent that such minor obtain an abortion,'' and 
then it clearly says--you don't have to know whether you're 
evading parental consent laws or not because it says, ``and 
thereby in fact abridges the right of a parent under a law 
requiring parental involvement...shall be fined under this 
title or imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both.''
    Now, even if the prosecutor uses intelligent prosecutorial 
discretion and decides not to prosecute the taxicab driver, the 
fact is that the bill allows civil liability so that the 
parents can sue the taxicab driver for civil damages.
    I would hope, Mr. Chairman, that--I don't think that's the 
intent of the bill. I would hope that we would exclude taxicab 
drivers, bus drivers, and others who might take someone across 
a State line and technically violate this section. I would hope 
that we would not rope them in and allow parents to sue them to 
get money if they violate--if they violate this section. And I 
yield back.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr> 
Chabot?
    Mr. Chabot. Move to strike the last word.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I move in--I rise in 
opposition to this amendment.
    First, taxicab drivers are not generally liable under this 
bill, which allows for the conviction of an individual who 
knowingly transports a minor across a State line with the 
intent that such individual obtain an abortion. So that's the 
point: with the intent that they obtain the abortion. Although 
a taxicab driver may have the knowledge that the minor that he 
or she is transporting will obtain an abortion as soon as she 
arrives at her destination, his or her intent is not that the 
minor obtain an abortion; rather, it's to transport the minor 
to the destination of her choice, whether it's an abortion 
clinic or a shopping mall. In other words, the taxicab driver's 
reason for transporting the minor is to receive the fare, not 
to ensure that she obtains an abortion. So a taxicab driver 
will not generally have the requisite intent necessary for 
prosecution under the bill.
    Mr. Scott. Would the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Chabot. So the amendment is, in my view, unnecessary.
    Mr. Scott. Would the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Chabot. I'd be happy to yield.
    Mr. Scott. If the young lady asks the cab driver to ``Take 
me to the abortion clinic,'' wouldn't he then know what the 
deal is?
    Mr. Chabot. Reclaiming my time, that's not his purpose for 
transporting her there for the purpose of her getting an 
abortion. It's to get his fare.
    Now, if--and I know that the gentleman----
    Mr. Scott. I'm reading the bill.
    Mr. Chabot. Excuse me?
    Mr. Scott. I'm reading the bill.
    Mr. Chabot. That's fine. But it's the purpose of--now, if 
the taxicab driver had impregnated the girl and, therefore, he 
was taking her there with the intent that she obtain an 
abortion, then he may be prosecutable under this particular 
bill. But if he is taking her there for the purpose of 
obtaining a fare and transporting her wherever she wants to go, 
I cannot imagine that he would be prosecuted under this bill. 
So I think your amendment is just unnecessary.
    Mr. Scott. Would the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Chabot. I'd be happy to yield.
    Mr. Scott. It says ``with the intent that such minor obtain 
an abortion.'' The minor announces that she's going to the 
abortion clinic, and it doesn't say anything about purpose.
    Mr. Chabot. Sure, it does. It says ``with the''--reclaiming 
my time, it says for the purpose of obtaining an abortion. If 
he transports her there with the intention that she obtain an 
abortion, then he may be prosecutable. But that's not his 
intention. His intention is to obtain a fare. He would take her 
to the movie theater or the mall to get her nails done or 
anything else. He's not going to be prosecutable because of the 
place that she intends to go. And so I think your amendment is 
just unnecessary, and I yield back the balance of my time.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from New York, Mr. 
Nadler?
    Mr. Nadler. Well, Mr. Chairman, first of all, just 
continuing this little dialogue with Mr. Chabot, it doesn't say 
anything about purpose. It says ``with the intent that such 
minor obtain an abortion.'' The gentleman may be correct. The 
gentleman may be correct that a court might read that as 
saying, well, he would have taken her, you know, for any 
purpose and he didn't have the intent.
    On the other hand, a court might read it as saying, well, 
since she said, ``Take me to the ABC Abortion Clinic,'' he knew 
damn well why she was going there, and that was his intent. So 
my----
    Mr. Chabot. Would the gentleman----
    Mr. Nadler. So my question is: If it's unnecessary, why not 
make it explicit? What's the harm of the amendment? Make it 
clear, and then we don't have to guess.
    Mr. Chabot. Would the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Nadler. Sure.
    Mr. Chabot. Before it even gets to the court or the judge, 
the prosecutor would have to look at this case, read the law, 
and believe----
    Mr. Nadler. Well, reclaiming my time, there's a civil 
lawsuit, too. You don't need a prosecutor. This bill provides 
for a civil lawsuit. So my question, which I will yield again 
to you, is: I understand your intent in the way the bill is 
written. I think our intent is the same. We don't like the 
bill, but the intent for this purpose is the same. So why not 
take this amendment and make it clear. Nobody has to guess. I 
yield.
    Mr. Chabot. Again, the cab driver wouldn't have the 
requisite criminal intent under the law, and relative to a 
civil case--I mean, that's what the courts are for in this 
country. Hopefully, in most cases, the courts exercise----
    Mr. Nadler. But, again, I'll ask: Why not make it clear 
that that's what you mean?
    Mr. Chabot. I think it's unnecessary. I think the bill----
    Mr. Nadler. But is it harmful? Why not make it clear?
    Mr. Chabot. All your amendments that are offered on your 
side could make the bill better, arguably on your side.
    Mr. Nadler. No, no, no. My question--but I'm going to ask 
you this again, Steve. Most of the amendments we offer change 
the bill substantively. You're saying this amendment doesn't 
change the bill substantively. I'm saying that, well, it makes 
clear what you say is the intent. So why not take it?
    Mr. Chabot. Would the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Nadler. Yes.
    Mr. Chabot. I've already said my principal argument, but 
I'll just give you another one.
    You could potentially immunize guilty cab drivers if there 
were those out there that were involved in some sort of racket 
to--maybe they were some sort of agent for the abortion clinic. 
Or, again, as I said before, maybe the cab driver impregnated 
the girl to begin with.
    Mr. Nadler. Reclaiming----
    Mr. Chabot. There are many instances, and we wouldn't want 
to immunize----
    Mr. Nadler. Reclaiming my time, I yield to the gentleman 
from Virginia.
    Mr. Scott. Thank you, and I thank the gentleman for 
yielding. It says, ``whoever knowingly transports a minor 
across a State line, with the intent that such minor obtain an 
abortion,'' the minor has already announced where she's going 
and, in fact, could announce what she's going to do when she 
gets there. They could get involved--they can get involved in a 
conversation.
    When the parents find out, the parents are going to be mad 
and are going to be looking for somebody to sue. And when they 
find out it was a taxicab driver with deep pockets, that's who 
they're going to sue. And that's what this bill allows, and I 
don't think that's right. Maybe that's the intent that you're 
going to make sure that no taxicab driver, no bus driver, 
nobody else is going to take the minor across State lines. On 
the way, if the minor is with somebody, the taxicab driver may 
hear the conversation and learn what the purpose of the trip 
is, and when the parents find out, they're going to get sued, 
and deep pockets. And those trial lawyers that some Members of 
this Committee don't like are going to get a fee for suing 
them.
    Mr. Bachus. Would the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Scott. It's the gentleman from New York's time. I yield 
back.
    Mr. Bachus. Did you say a taxicab driver----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is yielding----
    Mr. Bachus.--with deep pockets? [Laughter.]
    Mr. Nadler. I think he meant that under the doctrine of 
agency, the taxicab driving company.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Okay. Well, the time still belongs 
to the gentleman from Virginia, if he wishes to--the question 
is on----
    Mr. Scott. I yield back.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The question is on the amendment 
offered by the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott. Those in 
favor will say aye? Opposed, no?
    The noes appear to have it
    Mr. Scott. Recorded vote.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. A recorded vote is requested and 
will be ordered. Those in favor of the Scott amendment will as 
your names are called answer aye, those opposed, no, and the 
clerk will call the roll.
    The Clerk. Mr. Hyde?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Coble?
    Mr. Coble. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Coble, no. Mr. Smith?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Gallegly?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Goodlatte?
    Mr. Goodlatte. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Goodlatte, no. Mr. Chabot?
    Mr. Chabot. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chabot, no. Mr. Lungren?
    Mr. Lungren. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Lungren, no. Mr. Jenkins?
    Mr. Jenkins. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Jenkins, no. Mr. Cannon?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Bachus?
    Mr. Bachus. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Bachus, no. Mr. Inglis?
    Mr. Inglis. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Inglis, no. Mr. Hostettler?
    Mr. Hostettler. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Hostettler, no. Mr. Green?
    Mr. Green. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Green, no. Mr. Keller?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Issa?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Flake?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Pence?
    Mr. Pence. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Pence, no. Mr. Forbes?
    Mr. Forbes. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Forbes, no. Mr. King?
    Mr. King. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. King, no. Mr. Feeney?
    Mr. Feeney. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Feeney, no. Mr. Franks?
    Mr. Franks. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Franks, no. Mr. Gohmert?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Conyers?
    Mr. Conyers. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Conyers, aye. Mr. Berman?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Boucher?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Nadler?
    Mr. Nadler. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Nadler, aye. Mr. Scott?
    Mr. Scott. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Scott, aye. Mr. Watt?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Ms. Lofgren?
    Ms. Lofgren. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Lofgren, aye. Ms. Jackson Lee?
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Jackson Lee, aye. Ms. Waters?
    Ms. Waters. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Waters, aye. Mr. Meehan?
    Mr. Meehan. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Meehan, aye. Mr. Delahunt?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Wexler?
    Mr. Wexler. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Wexler, aye. Mr. Weiner?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Schiff?
    Mr. Schiff. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Schiff, aye. Ms. Sanchez?
    Ms. Sanchez. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Sanchez, aye. Mr. Smith?
    Mr. Smith of Washington. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Smith, aye. Mr. Van Hollen?
    Mr. Van Hollen. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Van Hollen, aye. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Further Members in the chamber who 
wish to cast or change their votes? The gentleman from 
California, Mr. Issa?
    Mr. Issa. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Issa, no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Florida, Mr. 
Keller?
    Mr. Keller. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Keller, no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Further Members who wish to cast or 
change their vote? If not, the clerk will report.
    The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Watt?
    Mr. Watt. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Watt, aye.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will try again.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, there are 13 ayes and 17 noes.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. And the amendment is not agreed to.
    Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Are there further amendments? The 
gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott.
    Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk. 
It's marked number 3.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report the 
amendment.
    The Clerk. Page 3, after line 2, insert the following: 
``(3) Limitation on Prosecution--No prosecution can be brought 
with respect to a violation of this section other than against 
the person committing the offense in the first degree.''
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection, the amendment is 
considered as read.
    [The amendment follows:]
    
    
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Virginia will be 
recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman, this amendment would prohibit 
prosecutions under Section 2 and 3 of the criminal code. It 
would require the person actually committing the offense--the 
criminal code Sections 2 and 3 say that if you're a--after the 
fact, aiding and abetting, conspiracy, all get prosecuted 
similar to the person actually committing the crime. This could 
be a grandmother, sister, or friend who offers care and comfort 
after the fact, someone arranging for transportation back to 
the--back home, all of this, even ministers and relatives who 
want to ensure that the minor undergoes a safe procedure and 
comes home unharmed would be considered criminals and subject 
to civil liability.
    So, Mr. Chairman, I would hope that we would not expand 
this bill to accessories after the fact, those who may be 
involved as technically conspirators, aiding and abetting, as 
principals in the first degree, not only subject to criminal 
liability but also to civil liability. I would hope we would 
adopt the amendment.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Does the gentleman yield back?
    Mr. Scott. I yield back. I'm sorry.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. 
Chabot?
    Mr. Chabot. Move to strike the last word.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll be brief. I rise 
in opposition to this amendment.
    The amendment should be defeated because it would, for 
example, exempt from prosecution a sexual predator who pays 
another to transport a young girl across State lines in order 
to circumvent parental involvement laws and destroy evidence of 
his sexual crimes. CIANA contains an exception for the 
transported minor and her parents so that they cannot be 
prosecuted or sued.
    As to other people, this amendment would excuse--it would 
create an abortion exception to exclude them from general 
Federal criminal laws and such an exemption is entirely 
unwarranted. The amendment would violate fundamental rules that 
hold aiders and abettors equally responsible for their crimes, 
and that is wrong and that is why I oppose this amendment.
    Mr. Scott. Would the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Chabot. I'd be happy to yield.
    Mr. Scott. If someone offers aid and comfort after the 
fact, would they be subject to civil liability under the bill?
    Mr. Chabot. Reclaiming my time----
    Mr. Bachus. Would the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Chabot. I'll yield, yes.
    Mr. Bachus. They would not be responsible because they 
would not be transporting the child for the purpose of gaining 
an abortion. She would have already had an abortion.
    Mr. Scott. If you'll yield. The civil liability occurs--
attaches when you've violated the law. This is a criminal 
statute. You've violated the law----
    Mr. Bachus. Well, you'd have to violate the law by 
transporting her across a State line to obtain an abortion.
    Mr. Chabot. Yes, reclaiming----
    Mr. Bachus. Not after the fact----
    Mr. Chabot.--my time----
    Mr. Scott. Aiding and abetting is a crime.
    Mr. Chabot. Reclaiming my time----
    Mr. Bachus. Aiding and abetting----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The time belongs to the gentleman 
from Ohio, who wants it back.
    Mr. Chabot. Yes, reclaiming my time, the gentleman's 
amendment refers to a criminal prosecution, and, therefore, 
that's what you're talking about. So it would depend upon 
whether you had the necessary criminal intent to have violated 
this statute, this law.
    Mr. Scott. Would the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Chabot. I'll yield.
    Mr. Scott. And if you cannot be criminally prosecuted, you 
can't be exposed to civil liability. That's the whole point of 
the amendment, to get people from--if you're providing aid and 
comfort after the fact, the criminal code allows you to be 
prosecuted. And if you can be prosecuted, you're civilly 
liable. If you can't be prosecuted, you're not civilly liable 
under the bill. What I'm trying to do is get those who may be 
offering aid and comfort after the fact----
    Mr. Bachus. Mr. Chairman?
    Mr. Scott.--from under the provisions of the bill.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The time belongs----
    Mr. Chabot. Reclaiming my time, I'll yield to the gentleman 
from----
    Mr. Bachus. Mr. Chairman, that analogy doesn't fly under 
this bill. You have to--to be guilty, you have to aid and abet 
someone to cross State lines for the purpose of getting a 
divorce--I mean getting an abortion.
    Mr. Scott. Would the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Bachus. After the fact, you're not aid--when you're 
helping them return home, you're not in any way aiding and 
abetting them in gaining----
    Mr. Scott. Would the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Chabot. I'll reclaim my time, and I'll yield to the 
gentleman from Virginia.
    Mr. Scott. Well, what about accessory after the fact?
    Mr. Bachus. How could you be an accessory after the fact 
when you----
    Mr. Chabot. Reclaiming my time, I don't think it's relevant 
to this, the bill, and I yield back.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The question is on the amendment 
offered by the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott. Those in 
favor will say aye? Opposed, no?
    The noes appear to have it. The gentleman--a rollcall will 
be ordered. Those in favor of the Scott of Virginia amendment 
will as your names are called answer aye, those opposed, no, 
and the clerk will call the roll.
    The Clerk. Mr. Hyde?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Coble?
    Mr. Coble. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Coble, no. Mr. Smith?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Gallegly?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Goodlatte?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Chabot?
    Mr. Chabot. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chabot, no. Mr. Lungren?
    Mr. Lungren. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Lungren, no. Mr. Jenkins?
    Mr. Jenkins. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Jenkins, no. Mr. Cannon?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Bachus?
    Mr. Bachus. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Bachus, no. Mr. Inglis?
    Mr. Inglis. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Inglis, no. Mr. Hostettler?
    Mr. Hostettler. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Hostettler, no. Mr. Green?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Keller?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Issa?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Flake?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Pence?
    Mr. Pence. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Pence, no. Mr. Forbes?
    Mr. Forbes. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Forbes, no. Mr. King?
    Mr. King. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. King, no. Mr. Feeney?
    Mr. Feeney. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Feeney, no. Mr. Franks?
    Mr. Franks. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Franks, no. Mr. Gohmert?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Conyers?
    Mr. Conyers. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Conyers, aye. Mr. Berman?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Boucher?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Nadler?
    Mr. Nadler. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Nadler, aye. Mr. Scott?
    Mr. Scott. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Scott, aye. Mr. Watt?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Ms. Lofgren?
    Ms. Lofgren. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Lofgren, aye. Ms. Jackson Lee?
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Jackson Lee, aye. Ms. Waters?
    Ms. Waters. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Waters, aye. Mr. Meehan?
    Mr. Meehan. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Meehan, aye. Mr. Delahunt?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Wexler?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Weiner?
    Mr. Weiner. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Weiner, aye. Mr. Schiff?
    Mr. Schiff. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Schiff, aye. Ms. Sanchez?
    Ms. Sanchez. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Sanchez, aye. Mr. Smith?
    Mr. Smith of Washington. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Smith, aye. Mr. Van Hollen?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Further Members who wish to cast or 
change their votes? The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Keller?
    Mr. Keller. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Keller, no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from California, Mr. 
Issa?
    Mr. Issa. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Issa, no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Arizona, Mr. 
Flake?
    Mr. Flake. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Flake, no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from North Carolina, 
Mr. Watt?
    Mr. Watt. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Watt, aye.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. 
Goodlatte?
    Mr. Goodlatte. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Goodlatte, no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. 
Green?
    Mr. Green. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Green, no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Further Members who wish to cast or 
change their vote? If not, the clerk will report?
    The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, there are 12 ayes and 18 noes.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. And the amendment is not agreed to.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Are there further amendments? The 
gentlewoman from Texas?
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, I have two amendments that 
I'd like to take en bloc, please, 005 and 006.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report the 
amendments.
    The Clerk. Amendments to H.R. 748, offered by Ms. Jackson 
Lee. Page 3, after line 2, insert the following----
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Let's take a look at them first.
    The Clerk. ``(3) The prohibitions of this section do not 
apply with respect to conduct by clergy, godparents, aunts, 
uncles, or first cousins.''
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection, the amendments 
are considered as read. And without objection, the amendments 
are considered en bloc.
    [The amendments follow:]
      
      

  


      
      

  


    Chairman Sensenbrenner. And the gentlewoman from Texas is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much. I'm hoping that we 
can find some collegiate spirit and recognize the importance of 
a young woman receiving counsel when she makes this significant 
decision. Frankly, I believe that we would honor the integrity 
of the Constitution if we would allow a young woman her 
relationship with her God and her counsel to help her make 
these decisions.
    My amendment, the first amendment in the en bloc, allows 
for the young woman to consult with clergy, godparents, aunts, 
uncles, or first cousins, and that conduct by those individuals 
would not be criminalized. It's a very simple amendment but 
necessary because it helps to eliminate the excessive punitive 
nature of this legislation. A young woman should not lose her 
right to seek counsel and guidance from a member of the clergy, 
her godparent, or the family member enumerated in the text of 
the amendment.
    Twenty-three States follow all provisions of the Child 
Custody Protection Act which make it a Federal crime for an 
adult to accompany a minor across State lines. Ten States have 
a provision that requires some parental notice, but other 
adults may be notified. And 17 States have no law restricting a 
woman's access to abortion in this case. The law, of course, is 
confused, and I think it's inappropriate for the Federal law to 
intrude on States who do not have any prohibition whatsoever. 
This allows for an expanded list of individuals not to be 
criminalized, and I ask my colleagues to support it.
    A second amendment deals with asking for a GAO study 
detailing the impact of the number of unsafe and illegal 
abortions performed on minors who would be affected by this law 
and report to Congress the results of that study within a year 
of the enactment of this law. This law is suggested to be 
corrective. I would argue that it's going to increase the 
number of unsafe abortions because young women are going to be 
forced into the back alleys again because they cannot find a 
way in an open way to counsel with individuals, to seek clergy 
support, and, frankly, it is going to take us back as opposed 
to take us further.
    I'd ask my colleagues to support these amendments, and I 
yield my time.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. 
Chabot.
    Mr. Chabot. Move to strike the last word.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me address the 
study first. I would oppose both. The amendment I believe 
should be defeated because there is no evidence that these laws 
have led to an increase in illegal abortions. During the 
Committee testimony, we had one of our witnesses, Professor 
Teresa Stanton Collett. She testified that--and I will quote--
``Parental involvement laws are on the books in over two-thirds 
of the States, some for over 20 years, and there's almost no 
case where it's been established that these laws led to 
parental abuse or to self-inflicted injury, and there's no 
evidence that these laws have led to an increase in illegal 
abortions.'' I don't think the study is necessary.
    Now, relative to the grandparents and aunts and uncles and 
the rest, I already stated previously so I'm not going to go 
into as much detail, but the folks mentioned in the amendment, 
they don't have the authority now to authorize any medical 
procedure for a minor child. I mean, even ear piercings or 
anything else, disbursing of aspirin, any of those types of 
things, has to be the parents who do this. So there's no reason 
that we can make something that can be so significant to this 
child's life or teenager's life as having an abortion that the 
parents shouldn't be involved. The parents have the best 
interest of the children involved. We've got the bypass 
procedure if you have a bad parent, as has been argued time and 
again on the other side. So there's really no reason for this 
amendment. I oppose it.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Would the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Chabot. I'd be happy to yield.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the gentleman very much, and I 
really appreciate how you have sought to engage.
    Let me just say with respect to the first amendment, we 
should expand rights, not deny rights. It's interesting in the 
most recent case we're willing--even though it was by law that 
Terry Schiavo had the guardianship of her spouse, we denied 
parental rights. Obviously, she was an adult.
    In this instance, however, you have three different--three 
different positions that States have taken: strict rules, less 
strict, and no rules. This is a Federal law that you are 
impacting on these States, and there should be flexibility. 
Clergy should not be denied.
    On the study, the reason for the study is that this is a 
new Federal law that will impact more greatly and more 
severely, and, therefore, I believe it's important to determine 
how many illegal abortions will occur because of this law. We 
want to do right, I would assume, and I'd hope my colleagues 
with support both amendments.
    Mr. Chabot. Well, reclaiming my time, as I stated before, 
during the hearing we had experts who indicated that it was not 
felt that there would be an increase in illegal abortions. And, 
secondly, again, I just want to reiterate that we believe that 
parents are the people that are best in a position to make 
these types of decisions for their minor children, not the 
aunts or uncles or grandparents or taxidrivers or anybody else. 
And I yield back the balance of my time.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The question is on the amendments 
offered by the gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee, en 
bloc. Those in favor will say aye? Opposed, no?
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The noes appear to have it.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, a rollcall.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. A rollcall is ordered. Those in 
favor of the Jackson Lee amendments en bloc will as your names 
are called answer aye, those opposed, no, and the clerk will 
call the roll.
    The Clerk. Mr. Hyde?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Coble?
    Mr. Coble. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Coble, no. Mr. Smith?
    Mr. Smith of Texas. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Smith, no. Mr. Gallegly?
    Mr. Gallegly. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Gallegly, no. Mr. Goodlatte?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Chabot?
    Mr. Chabot. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chabot, no. Mr. Lungren?
    Mr. Lungren. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Lungren, no. Mr. Jenkins?
    Mr. Jenkins. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Jenkins, no. Mr. Cannon?
    Mr. Cannon. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Cannon, no. Mr. Bachus?
    Mr. Bachus. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Bachus, no. Mr. Inglis?
    Mr. Inglis. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Inglis, no. Mr. Hostettler?
    Mr. Hostettler. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Hostettler, no. Mr. Green?
    Mr. Green. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Green, no. Mr. Keller?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Issa?
    Mr. Issa. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Issa, no. Mr. Flake?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Pence?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Forbes?
    Mr. Forbes. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Forbes, no. Mr. King?
    Mr. King. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. King, no. Mr. Feeney?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Franks?
    Mr. Franks. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Franks, no. Mr. Gohmert?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Conyers?
    Mr. Conyers. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Conyers, aye. Mr. Berman?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Boucher?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Nadler?
    Mr. Nadler. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Nadler, aye. Mr. Scott?
    Mr. Scott. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Scott, aye. Mr. Watt?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Ms. Lofgren?
    Ms. Lofgren. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Lofgren, aye. Ms. Jackson Lee?
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Jackson Lee, aye. Ms. Waters?
    Ms. Waters. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Waters, aye. Mr. Meehan?
    Mr. Meehan. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Meehan, aye. Mr. Delahunt?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Wexler?
    Mr. Wexler. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Wexler, aye. Mr. Weiner?
    Mr. Weiner. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Weiner, aye. Mr. Schiff?
    Mr. Schiff. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Schiff, aye. Ms. Sanchez?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Smith?
    Mr. Smith of Washington. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Smith, aye. Mr. Van Hollen?
    Mr. Van Hollen. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Van Hollen, aye. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Further Members in the chamber who 
wish to cast or change their votes? The gentleman from Florida, 
Mr. Keller?
    Mr. Keller. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Keller, no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Arizona, Mr. 
Flake?
    Mr. Flake. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Flake, no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. 
Pence?
    Mr. Pence. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Pence, no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. 
Goodlatte?
    Mr. Goodlatte. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Goodlatte, no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Further Members who wish to cast--
Mr. Watt of North Carolina?
    Mr. Watt. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Watt, aye.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, there are 13 ayes and 20 noes.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. And the amendments are not agreed 
to.
    Are there further amendments? If there are no further 
amendments, a reporting quorum is present. Without objection, 
the Subcommittee amendment in the nature of a substitute laid 
down as the base text is adopted. The question occurs on the 
motion to report the bill H.R. 748 favorably as amended. All in 
favor will say aye? Opposed, no?
    The ayes appear to have it--a recorded vote is requested 
and will be ordered. Those in favor of reporting H.R. 748 
favorably as amended will as your names are called answer aye, 
those opposed, no, and the clerk will call the roll.
    The Clerk. Mr. Hyde?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Coble?
    Mr. Coble. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Coble, aye. Mr. Smith?
    Mr. Smith of Texas. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Smith, aye. Mr. Gallegly?
    Mr. Gallegly. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Gallegly, aye. Mr. Goodlatte?
    Mr. Goodlatte. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Goodlatte, aye. Mr. Chabot?
    Mr. Chabot. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chabot, aye. Mr. Lungren?
    Mr. Lungren. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Lungren, aye. Mr. Jenkins?
    Mr. Jenkins. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Jenkins, aye. Mr. Cannon?
    Mr. Cannon. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Cannon, aye. Mr. Bachus?
    Mr. Bachus. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Bachus, aye. Mr. Inglis?
    Mr. Inglis. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Inglis, aye. Mr. Hostettler?
    Mr. Hostettler. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Hostettler, aye. Mr. Green?
    Mr. Green. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Green, aye. Mr. Keller?
    Mr. Keller. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Keller, aye. Mr. Issa?
    Mr. Issa. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Issa, aye. Mr. Flake?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Pence?
    Mr. Pence. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Pence, aye. Mr. Forbes?
    Mr. Forbes. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Forbes, aye. Mr. King?
    Mr. King. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. King, aye. Mr. Feeney?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Franks?
    Mr. Franks. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Franks, aye. Mr. Gohmert?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Conyers?
    Mr. Conyers. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Conyers, no. Mr. Berman?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Boucher?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Nadler?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Scott?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Scott--Mr. Watt?
    [No response.]
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will continue to call the 
roll.
    The Clerk. Mr. Scott?
    Mr. Scott. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Scott, no. Mr. Watt?
    Mr. Watt. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Watt, no. Ms. Lofgren?
    Ms. Lofgren. No.
    The Clerk. Ms. Lofgren, no. Ms. Jackson Lee?
    Ms. Jackson Lee. No.
    The Clerk. Ms. Jackson Lee, no. Ms. Waters?
    Ms. Waters. No.
    The Clerk. Ms. Waters, no. Mr. Meehan?
    Mr. Meehan. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Meehan, no. Mr. Delahunt?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Wexler?
    Mr. Wexler. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Wexler, no. Mr. Weiner?
    Mr. Weiner. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Weiner, no. Mr. Schiff?
    Mr. Schiff. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Schiff, no. Ms. Sanchez?
    Ms. Sanchez. No.
    The Clerk. Ms. Sanchez, no. Mr. Smith?
    Mr. Smith of Washington. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Smith, no. Mr. Van Hollen?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, aye.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Members who wish to cast or change 
their votes? The gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Flake?
    Mr. Flake. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Flake, aye.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from New York, Mr. 
Nadler?
    Mr. Nadler. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Nadler, no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Further Members who wish to cast or 
change their votes? If not, the clerk will report.
    Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. For what purpose does the gentleman 
from----
    Mr. Scott. Could I ascertain how I'm recorded?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. How is the gentleman from Virginia 
recorded?
    The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Scott is recorded as a no.
    Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, there are 20 ayes and 13 noes.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. And the amendment to report the 
bill favorably as amended is agreed to. Without objection, the 
staff will be directed to make any technical and conforming 
changes, and all Members will be given 2 days as provided by 
the House rules in which to submit additional, dissenting, 
supplemental, or minority views.
    [Intervening business.]
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The Committee stands adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 4:02 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]

                            DISSENTING VIEWS

    We strongly dissent from H.R. 748. This legislation will 
increase health risks to young women who choose to have an 
abortion, is anti-family, anti-physician, and is clearly 
unconstitutional.
    H.R. 748 consists of two dangerous and objectionable new 
criminal laws--proposed new 18 U.S.C. sections 2431 and 2432. 
The proposed new section 2431--the Travel Provision--contains 
the provisions of the bill previously known as the ``Child 
Custody Protection Act,'' which would impose criminal 
(including up to 1 year in prison) and civil penalties upon a 
person other than a parent--including a grandmother, aunt, 
sibling, or clergy member--who helps a teen cross certain state 
lines for an abortion unless the teen had already fulfilled the 
requirements of her home state's law restricting teens' 
abortions.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ The proposed law would not require that the defendant know that 
the state's parental involvement law has not been satisfied, or that 
the defendant intend to aid in its circumvention. At the subcommittee 
markup, Representative Chabot offered an amendment that eliminated a 
possible affirmative defense in the original bill that the physicians 
could use any information or ``compelling facts'' from the minor 
herself in order to not comply with this bill. The amendment changed 
the bill to only allow for actual evidence from the parents or 
reasonable documentation from a court as affirmative defenses.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The proposed new section 2432--the Federal Notification 
Provision--would create a sweeping new parental notification 
requirement on young women who need abortion services in a 
state where they do not reside, by imposing criminal (up to 1 
year in prison) and civil penalties on physicians that do not 
provide at least a 24 hours notice to the parent, even where 
the parent brings his or her child to the physician.\2\ 
Significantly, neither the Travel Provision (section 2431) nor 
the Federal Notification Provision (section 2432) contain any 
exception for when an abortion may be necessary to protect a 
teen's health, in violation of Supreme Court precedent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ If the physician is in a state where no parental consent or 
notification law or where a more reasonable parental consent or 
notification law is in force, this section requires that a doctor or a 
member of his staff provide ``actual notice'' to the parents of a 
patient in person at least 24 hours before the doctor provides the 
abortion. If the doctor is unable to provide actual notice after making 
a reasonable effort, then the doctor must provide 48 hours 
``constructive notice'' instead.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In effect, H.R. 748 will make those state laws that the 
Majority prefers (those requiring involvement of a parent or 
guardian) controlling in states with laws that it does not like 
(those allowing other adults to receive notice or provide 
consent or with no parental involvement requirements). This is 
an unprecedented Congressional intrusion into what has 
traditionally been an arena in which each state regulates its 
own citizens.
    It is important to note that twenty-seven states and the 
District of Columbia either have no parental involvement laws 
or a law more lenient than the bill's definition of a 
``parental involvement law.'' Thus, within those states, 
representing approximately 57% of the United States population, 
H.R. 748 will impose the laws of the other twenty-three states, 
representing just 43% of the population.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ Fewer than half of the states enforce a requirement for 
notification or consent of a parent:

   GTwenty-three states have laws that appear to match the Teen 
Endangerment Act's restrictive definition of a ``parental involvement 
law:'' Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, 
Nebraska, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming.

   GTen states have parental involvement laws that do not limit 
the notification or consent requirement to a parent exclusively, but 
allow involvement of some other adult, such as a grandparent or other 
relative, or allow a physician to waive the parental involvement 
requirement in certain situations: Colorado, Delaware, Iowa, Maine, 
Maryland, North Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina, West Virginia, and 
Wisconsin.

   GEleven states have enacted parental involvement laws that 
are not enforced within the state because the laws are legally 
defective, as established by court rulings or Attorney General 
opinions: Alaska, California, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Montana, 
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, and Oklahoma.

   GThe District of Columbia and the other six states--
Connecticut, Hawaii, New York, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington--have 
not enacted forced parental involvement laws.
    The legislation is opposed by a wide variety of groups that 
are committed to reducing teenage pregnancy and protecting a 
woman's right to choose, such as Planned Parenthood, NARAL Pro-
Choice America, the American Civil Liberties Union, and the 
Center for Reproductive Rights.\4\ In addition, major medical 
associations, including the American Medical Association, the 
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, the 
American College of Physicians, and the American Public Health 
Association--have longstanding policies opposing mandatory 
parental-involvement laws, such as H.R. 748, because of the 
dangers they pose to young women and the need for confidential 
access to physicians. The American Academy of Pediatrics and 
Society for Adolescent Medicine oppose the legislation because 
it increases the risk of harm to adolescents by delaying or 
denying access to appropriate medical care.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ Memorandum from the American Civil Liberties Union, to Members 
of the House Committee on the Judiciary (Mar. 2, 2005) (on file with 
the minority staff of the House Judiciary Committee); Memorandum from 
Planned Parenthood, to Members of the House Committee on the Judiciary 
(Apr. 12, 2005) (on file with minority staff of the House Judiciary 
Committee); Memorandum from National Abortion and Reproductive Rights 
Action League, to Members of the House Committee on the Judiciary (Apr. 
12, 2005) (on file with the minority staff of the House Judiciary 
Committee); American Medical Association, Ethics Op. 2.015 (1994) 
(discussing mandatory parental consent for minors seeking an abortion); 
National Abortion Federation, Teen Endangerment Act Repackaged: A 
Menacing Maze for Young Woman, Their Families, and Their Doctors (2005) 
available at http://www.prochoice.org/policy/national/teen--
endangerment.html; Center for Reproductive Rights, The Teen 
Endangerment Act: Harming Young Women Who Seek Abortions, (April 2005) 
available at http://www.reproductiverights.org/pdf/pub--bp--tea.pdf. 
For organizations opposed to nearly identical Federal parental consent 
legislation, see also Letter from American Academy of Pediatrics, 
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists; American Medical 
Women's Association, Society for Adolescent Medicine, to Members of the 
House of Representatives (Apr. 2, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    We believe the bill denies young women facing unintended 
pregnancies the assistance of trusted adults, endangers their 
health, and violates their constitutional rights. For these 
reasons, and the reasons set forth below, we dissent from H.R. 
748.

                  I. LEGISLATION ENDANGERS YOUNG WOMEN

    Both the Travel Provision (section 2431) and the Federal 
Notification Provision (section 2432) will operate to endanger 
the lives and health of young women.
    With regard to the Travel Provision, we would note that 
although an abortion is generally very safe, it is still far 
preferable and safer to permit a trusted friend or family 
member to drive a woman home from this surgical procedure.\5\ 
Moreover, responsible health care providers do not provide 
these services unless they are confident the patient has 
someone who will accompany them and assist them following the 
procedure. Unfortunately, under the Travel Provision, teenagers 
who are unable to satisfy a state parental involvement law--
either because they cannot tell one parent (or in some states, 
both parents) about their pregnancy or because they have no 
fair chance of obtaining a judicial bypass--will be forced to 
travel alone across state lines to obtain an abortion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ Many teenagers seeking an abortion must travel out-of-state to 
obtain the procedure, either because the closest facility is located in 
a neighboring state or because there is no in-state provider available. 
In fact, currently 86% of counties--home to 32% of women of 
childbearing age--lack an physician. See Stanley K. Henshaw, Abortion 
Services in the United States, 1995 and 1996, 30 Fam. Plan. Persp. 262, 
266 (1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As much as we would prefer the active and supportive 
involvement of parents in young people's major decisions, it is 
not always realistic to expect them to seek parental 
involvement willingly in the sensitive area of abortion. Where 
a child is unwilling or unable to seek parental consent, the 
results can be tragic. The testimony of Bill and Mary Bell 
before the Constitution Subcommittee during consideration of 
predecessor legislation in the 105th Congress is telling in 
this regard.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ See Hearing on H.R. 3682: The Child Custody Protection Act 
before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 105th Cong. 17 (May 28, 1998) (statement of Bill and Mary 
Bell, submitted for the record); See also The National Abortion 
Federation, The True Victims of S. 1645/H.R. 3682 The Teen Endangerment 
Act (1998) (describing the case of Keishawn, an eleven year old from 
Maryland, who was impregnated by her step-father, and sought an 
abortion with the assistance of her aunt, Vicky Simpson, who was 
awaiting an order granting her custody of Keishawn. Upon learning of 
the pregnancy, Keishawn's doctors in Maryland recommended that Keishawn 
have anesthesia during the abortion procedure, but none of the 
hospitals in Maryland would allow the abortion to be provided at their 
facility. As a result, Keishawn's aunt sought the attention of a 
specialist practicing in a neighboring state, who agreed to provide the 
abortion. Under H.R. 748, Vicki could have been federally prosecuted 
for helping her young niece cope with this pregnancy resulting from 
incest).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Bells were the parents of a daughter who died after an 
illegal, unsafe abortion that she sought instead of telling her 
parents about her pregnancy, notwithstanding Indiana's parental 
notice law. A Planned Parenthood counselor in Indiana informed 
Becky that she would have to notify her parents or petition a 
judge in order to obtain an abortion. Becky responded that she 
did not want to inform her parents because she did not want to 
hurt them. She also replied that if she could not tell her 
parents, with whom she was very close, she would not feel 
comfortable asking a judge she did not even know. Instead of 
traveling 110 miles away to Kentucky, Becky opted to undergo an 
illegal abortion close to her home. Tragically, Becky developed 
serious complications from her illegal abortion that caused her 
death. It is unlikely that H.R. 748 could have changed this 
outcome or would have convinced Becky to confide in her parents 
about her pregnancy. In fact, the new restrictions and 
liabilities imposed on health care providers under this bill 
would undoubtedly make such situations even worse.
    Some young women justifiably fear that they would be 
physically abused if forced to disclose their pregnancy to 
their parents. Nearly one-third of minors who choose not to 
consult with their parents have experienced violence in their 
family, feared violence, or feared being forced to leave 
home.\7\ Enacting this legislation and forcing young women in 
these circumstances to notify their parents of their 
pregnancies will only exacerbate the dangerous cycle of 
violence in dysfunctional families. This is the lesson of 
Spring Adams, an Idaho teenager who was shot to death by her 
father after he learned she was planning to terminate a 
pregnancy caused by his acts of incest.\8\ It is clear that 
when a young woman believes that she cannot involve her parents 
in her decision to terminate a pregnancy, the law cannot 
mandate healthy, open family communication.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ See Henshaw, supra note 10, at 196.
    \8\ See Maggie Boule, An American Tragedy, Sunday Oregonian, Aug. 
27, 1989.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    We are well aware of proponents' claims that the travel 
provision would protect the rights of minors who cannot obtain 
parental consent because they have the option to appear before 
judges and obtain a judicial bypass for any parental 
involvement laws. While bypasses may have some theoretical 
benefits, in many cases it is difficult if not impossible for 
troubled young women to obtain them. Some teenagers live in 
regions where the local judges consistently refuse to grant 
bypasses, regardless of the facts involved. For example, one 
study found that a number of judges in Massachusetts either 
refuse to handle abortion petitions or focus inappropriately on 
the morality of abortion.\9\ Other young women may live in 
small communities where the judge may be a friend of the 
parents, a family member, or even the parent of a friend. Still 
others may live in regions where the relevant courts are not 
open in the evenings or on weekends, when minors could seek a 
bypass without missing school or arousing suspicion.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ See Patricia Donovan, Judging Teenagers: How Minors Fare When 
They Seek Court-Authorized Abortions, 15 Fam. Plan. Persp. 259 (1983); 
see also Hodgson v. Minnesota, 487 U.S. 417, 476 (1990) (finding that 
in Minnesota, many judges refuse even to hear bypass proceedings); In 
re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1190 (Fla. 1989) (describing how a judge in 
Florida, after denying a bypass petition to a teenage girl who was in 
high school, participated in extracurricular activities, worked 20 
hours a week, and baby-sat regularly for her mother, suggested that he, 
as a representative of the court, had standing to represent the state's 
interest when the minor appealed the denial).
    \10\ The courts in Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Rhode Island are 
not open in the evenings or on weekends. See Donovan, supra, at 259.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The difficulties in obtaining a judicial bypass were 
clearly illustrated by Ms. Billie Lominick during her testimony 
before the Subcommittee on the Constitution. Ms. Lominick was a 
63-year-old grandmother who helped a pregnant minor from a 
physically and sexually abusive household cross state lines to 
obtain an abortion.\11\ Ms. Lominick testified that her 
assistance was essential because the minor was unable to find 
any judge in her home state of South Carolina who would hear 
her judicial bypass petition.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ See Hearing on H.R. 1218 `The Child Custody Protection Act' 
before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 106th Cong. 23 (May 27, 1999) (statement of Billie 
Lominick).
    \12\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Moreover, reliance on the judicial bypass system as an 
effective alternative to parental consent understates the 
intimidating effect of seeking a court-sanctioned abortion. 
Many minors fear that the judicial bypass procedure lacks the 
necessary confidentiality. The American Medical Association has 
noted that ``because the need for privacy may be compelling, 
minors may be driven to desperate measures to maintain the 
confidentiality of their pregnancies. . . . The desire to 
maintain secrecy has been one of the leading reasons for 
illegal abortion deaths since . . . 1973.'' \13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ See Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical 
Association, Mandatory Parental Consent to Abortion, JAMA, Jan. 6, 
1993, at 83.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Many young women, faced with the violation of 
confidentiality or the prospect of embarrassment and social 
stigma would resort to drastic measures rather than undergo the 
humiliation of revealing intimate details of their lives to a 
series of strangers in a formal, legal process. Young women's 
concerns about confidentiality are especially acute in rural 
areas. For example, in one case a minor discovered that her 
bypass hearing would be conducted by her former Sunday school 
teacher.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ See Memphis Planned Parenthood v. Sundquist, No. 3:89-0520, 
slip op. at 13 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 26, 1997); See also Tamar Lewin, 
Parental Consent to Abortion: How Enforcement Can Vary, N.Y. Times, May 
29, 1992, at A1 (describing how a judge in Toledo, Ohio denied 
permission to a 17\1/2\-year-old woman, an ``A'' student who planned to 
attend college and who testified she was not financially or emotionally 
prepared for college and motherhood at the same time, stating that the 
girl had ``not had enough hard knocks in her life'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    With respect to the Federal Notification Provision, the 
section requires a 24-hour or more waiting period and written 
notification, with no medical emergency exception, even if a 
parent accompanies his or her daughter to an out-of-state 
physician and consents to the abortion services. In such cases, 
this requirement acts as a built-in mandatory delay, imposing 
logistical and financial hardships on functional families who 
are trying to support their daughters. Even in a health 
emergency, this bill robs a parent of his or her ability to 
authorize immediate care. For example, if a parent and daughter 
were vacationing together in California and the parent brought 
her daughter to a hospital for emergency abortion services, 
this provision would needlessly require a doctor to wait 24 
hours before providing that care.
    We would also observe that the Federal Notification 
Provision's very limited exceptions provide no safety net for 
the most vulnerable teens. For example, the section's 
``exception'' for teen victims of certain forms of abuse only 
applies if the young woman ``declares in a signed written 
statement that she is the victim of abuse.'' This ``exception'' 
ignores the painful reality that most abused teens are too 
afraid to tell anyone that they are being abused. Moreover, 
because the bill requires the doctor to notify the authorities 
of the abuse before the abortion is performed, many teens will 
not report the abuse for fear that their parents will discover 
the abuse report. As Justice O'Connor aptly stated in Hodgson 
v. Minnesota, an ``exception to notification for minors who are 
victims of neglect or abuse is, in reality, a means of 
notifying the parents.'' \15\ Morever, ``[t]he combination of 
the abused minor's reluctance to report sexual or physical 
abuse . . . with the likelihood that invoking the abuse 
exception for the purpose of avoiding notice will result in 
notice, makes the abuse exception less than effectual.'' \16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ 497 U.S. 417, 460 (1990) (O'Connor, J. concurring) (noting 
that an abuse report ``requires the welfare agency to immediately 
`conduct an assessment;' '' if the ``agency interviews the victim, it 
must notify the parent of the fact of the interview'' and the parent 
has the right to access te investigation record).
    \16\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                     II. LEGISLATION IS ANTI-FAMILY

    H.R. 748 is also overtly hostile to families. Despite the 
proponents' belief that the bill would enforce parents' right 
to counsel their daughters, the reality is that it is 
impossible to legislate complex family relationships. Studies 
reveal that more than half of all young women who do not 
involve a parent in a decision to terminate a pregnancy choose 
to involve another trusted adult, who is very often a 
relative.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\ See Henshaw, supra, at 207.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Although the Travel Provision (section 2431) exempts 
parents from criminal and civil liability, non-parent adults 
who are raising a child will be swept in by the bill's 
prohibitions. This is because the exception is excessively 
narrow and refers only to a parent or guardian; a legal 
custodian; or a person designated by a state's parental 
involvement law as a person to whom notification, or from whom 
consent, is required.\18\ Several amendments were offered 
during the markup to ameliorate these harsher consequences of 
section 2431. Representative Nadler offered an amendment that 
would have exempted the minor's grandparent or adult 
sibling.\19\ Similarly, Representative Jackson Lee offered an 
amendment exempting clergy, godparents, aunts, uncles, or first 
cousins that was rejected by a vote of 13 to 20.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\ H.R. 748, Sec. 2 (proposed 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2431(e)(2)).
    \19\ Child Interstate Abortion Notification Act: Markup of H.R. 748 
Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 37-38 (2005) 
(statement of Rep. Nadler).
    \20\ Id. at 76, 81 (2005) (statement of Rep. Jackson Lee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The bill also illogically sanctions the criminal activity 
of a parent by authorizing lawsuits to be brought by parents 
suffering ``legal harm'' against any person assisting a minor 
in obtaining an abortion across state lines.\21\ The private 
civil remedy aspect of both the Travel and Federal Notification 
Provisions are so broad that even a father who committed rape 
or incest against his own daughter would be empowered to bring 
a lawsuit seeking compensation under the legislation. If the 
pregnancy of the minor is a result of incest with her father, 
the minor must still comply with any parental consent or 
notification law in the state of her residence under this bill 
unless she signs a written statement and agrees to allow the 
physician to notify the authorities about the sexual abuse.\22\ 
If the minor decides not to sign a written statement or notify 
the authorities and is accompanied by her grandmother across 
state lines to a doctor in another state for abortion services, 
the father who committed the incest can bring a civil action 
against the grandmother and the doctor, effectively profiting 
from his own criminal wrongdoing.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\ H.R. 748, Sec. 2 (proposed 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2431(d)).
    \22\ Id. Sec. 3 (proposed 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2432(b)(3)).
    \23\ Id. (proposed 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2432(c)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Representative Waters offered an amendment at markup that 
would have provided an exception to this civil liability if the 
pregnancy was the result of sexual contact with the parent or 
any other person that had permanent or temporary custody of the 
minor.\24\ Representative Waters also offered an additional 
amendment that would only provide an exception if the pregnancy 
resulted directly from acts of incest.\25\ Both amendments were 
defeated.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\ Child Interstate Abortion Notification Act: Markup of H.R. 748 
Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 17-18 (2005) 
(statement of Rep. Waters).
    \25\ Id. at 24-25.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

               III. LEGISLATION IS DANGEROUSLY OVER BROAD

    Supporters of this bill claim the Travel Provision merely 
targets predatory individuals who force and coerce a minor into 
obtaining an abortion. However, the net cast by this section is 
far broader and more problematic. The Travel Provision includes 
a criminal penalty against persons who ``knowingly transport an 
individual who has not attained the age of 18 years across a 
State line, with the intent that such individual obtain an 
abortion.'' \26\ In other words, this provision would make it a 
federal crime to assist a pregnant minor to obtain an abortion 
that would be lawful in the state in which it was provided. The 
bill does not require proof of any intent to avoid state 
parental consent laws. Anyone simply transporting a minor--a 
bus driver, taxi driver, family member or friend--could be 
jailed for up to a year or fined or both. The same applies to 
emergency medical personnel who may be aware they are taking a 
minor across state lines to obtain an abortion but would have 
no choice if a medical emergency were occurring.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\ H.R. 748, Sec. 2 (proposed 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2431(a)(1)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Similarly, a nurse at a clinic providing directions to a 
minor or her driver could be convicted as an accessory under 
this legislation. A doctor who procures a ride home for a minor 
and the person accompanying her because of car troubles coupled 
with the minor's expressed fear of calling her parents for 
assistance could be convicted as an accessory after the fact. A 
sibling of the minor who merely agrees to transport a minor 
across state lines without any knowledge of any intent to evade 
the resident state's parental consent or notification laws 
could be thrown in jail and convicted of a conspiracy to 
violate this statute.
    The supporters of this bill inaccurately compare it to the 
Mann Act, which prohibits the transport of ``any individual 
under the age of 18 years in interstate or foreign commerce, or 
in any Territory or Possession of the U.S., with intent that 
such individual engage in prostitution, or in a sexual activity 
for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense. . 
. .'' \27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \27\ 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2421 (2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Mann Act, like most other criminal laws, contains a 
specific mens rea component, that requires that criminally 
liable individuals have an intention to break the law.\28\ A 
person convicted of possessing stolen property, for example, 
must know or have reason to know that the property they possess 
is stolen. The Travel Provision has no such specific intent 
requirement and, therefore, imposes strict criminal liability 
for anyone in violation.\29\ Where the Mann Act purports to 
guard against corruption of minors, a laudable but not 
constitutionally-protected purpose, the Travel Provision 
imposes significant restrictions on a constitutionally-
protected right to an abortion. Moreover, the Mann Act requires 
that the minor be transported across state lines for the 
purpose of engaging in an act that is illegal, while this 
legislation would impose civil and criminal liability for the 
act of taking a minor across state lines to engage in an 
activity which is legal in that second state, and 
constitutionally protected.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \28\ Id.
    \29\ The affirmative defense available in H.R. 748 does not address 
this problem.
    \30\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In an attempt to clarify who would face criminal or civil 
liability, Representative Scott offered two amendments to the 
Travel Provision. The first would have exempted taxicab 
drivers, bus drivers, and others in the business transportation 
profession from the criminal provisions of this statute.\31\ 
This amendment was defeated by a vote of 13 to 17.\32\ 
Representative Scott also offered an amendment that would have 
limited criminal liability to persons who had committed the 
crimes in the first degree, excluding potential defendants who 
had helped the minor after the fact, or individuals with a 
tangential role in the act.\33\ The amendment was defeated by a 
vote of 12 to 18.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \31\ Child Interstate Abortion Notification Act: Markup of H.R. 748 
Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 49-51 (2005) 
(statement of Rep. Scott).
    \32\ Id. at 61.
    \33\ Child Interstate Abortion Notification Act: Markup of H.R. 748 
Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 63 (2005) 
(statement of Rep. Scott).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

   IV. LEGISLATION IMPOSES CONVOLUTED AND COMPLEX LEGAL REQUIREMENTS.

    Both the Travel and Federal Notification Provisions 
operating separately and in conjunction, serve to impose an 
impossibly complex patchwork of legal requirements, on both 
young women and physicians. In essence, the legislation creates 
a Byzantine system of parental notification mandates that would 
impose extra hurdles on some teens and leave others with no 
options and expose physicians to new and unprecedented legal 
liability.
    For example, under the Travel Provision, many young women 
would have to comply with two states' teen abortion laws. Thus, 
a minor who travels with assistance from Missouri to Kansas for 
an abortion must comply with both Missouri's law and Kansas' 
law. A young woman who is unable to involve her parents in her 
abortion decision, and thus pursues a court waiver, must 
therefore obtain a judicial bypass in both her home state and 
the provider's state before she can obtain an abortion.
    Likewise, the Federal Notification Provision also imposes 
complex and absurd requirements for physicianss and their 
patients. As noted above, section 2432 would require that the 
physician give 24 hours ``actual notice'' to a parent before 
performing an abortion on a minor from out-of-state. This 
provision would apply even if the minor came from a state that 
did not have a parental consent or notification law, and even 
if the parent went to the other state fully intending and 
approving of his or her child's abortion. The section defines 
``actual notice'' as ``the giving of a written notice directly, 
in person.'' This section would seem to require that the 
physician or a member of her staff travel out-of-state to visit 
the parents of the patient in person. The section would allow 
for the physician to give ``constructive notice'' to the 
patient's parents if it is not possible to provide them with 
``actual notice'' after the physician has made a ``reasonable 
effort'' to do so. The section defines ``constructive notice'' 
as notice that is given by certified mail, to the last known 
address of the person being notified with delivery deemed to 
have occurred 48 hours following noon--on the day after the 
mailing occurred. The section does not define ``reasonable 
effort.''
    Consider the incredible new burdens this provision imposes 
on physicians. Under the threat of civil and criminal 
penalties, the Federal Notification Provision requires doctors 
to make ``reasonable'' efforts to provide in-person, written 
notice of an out-of-state teen's parents. It provides no 
guidance to help a physician know what efforts suffice as 
``reasonable'' to track down a parent in another state to 
provide this in-person written notice. This requirement places 
extremely burdensome, if not impossible, demands on doctors. 
Because many communities do not have physicians, women often 
have to travel to a neighboring state to obtain an abortion; 
thus, doctors could routinely be forced to travel hundreds of 
miles out-of-state in order to comply with the bill's in-person 
notification mandate. This Federal in-person notification 
requirement is more onerous than even the most stringent state 
laws. Moreover, because the bill operates differently depending 
on a teen's state of origin, it requires health care providers 
to be familiar with the legal regimes of all 50 states and to 
understand the interaction between these varying legal regimes 
and the local state laws of the provider.
    The requirements on physicians if a young woman informs him 
or her that she is a victim of abuse are equally convoluted. 
Under Section 2432 such a conversation then triggers a new 
mandate on the doctor to not only notify the ``authorities'' of 
the parents' abuse, but to provide such notification in another 
state. Each state has its own legal requirements in this area, 
and its own agencies to which the behavior must be reported--
and in some cases the reports must be filed in the county. 
Additionally, the Federal Notification Provision establishes no 
mechanism for this new type of cross-state reporting, and does 
not specify in what manner or with what level of detail the 
reporting must occur. This is far from being a mere 
bureaucratic headache; the legislation gives doctors no 
guidance about to whom or what detail the report must be made, 
and therefore they cannot be sure that even their most thorough 
and good-faith attempts to comply with the law will keep them 
from risking fines or a prison sentence.
    It is important to note that these requirements will quite 
frequently come into play when young women are forced to cross 
state lines to obtain an abortion, not because of differing 
laws, but because of sheer availability. As of 2000, there were 
no known physicians in 87 percent of the counties in the United 
States.\34\ For many young women, the closest available 
physician is located in another state, and others may be unable 
to obtain an abortion anywhere in their home state.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \34\ Lawrence B. Finer & Stanley K. Henshaw, Abortion Incidence and 
Services in the United States in 2000, 35 Perspectives on Sexual and 
Reproductive Health 6 (2003).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                       V. CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS

    By imposing substantial new obstacles and dangers in the 
path of a minor seeking an abortion, the Travel and Federal 
Notification Provisions raise at least three serious 
constitutional concerns.
    First, the legislation raises numerous federalism and equal 
protection problems. It is impermissible to pass a law which 
has the effect of imposing one state's legal requirements on 
another state, as both section 2431 and 2432 do. In essence the 
bill imposes on states and physicians the laws of the states 
that have the most stringent requirements on abortion. 
Federalism dictates that one has the right to be treated as a 
welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly alien when 
temporarily present in another state as delineated by the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \35\ Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500-01 (1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Court held in Saenz that a state cannot discriminate 
against the citizen of another state when there is no 
substantial reason for the discrimination except for the fact 
that they are citizens of another state.\36\ The Court has 
found that certain rights are protected by the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if they bear 
``upon the vitality of the Nation as a single entity'' or those 
rights that are deemed ``fundamental.'' \37\ The Court in Saenz 
specifically referred to Doe v. Bolton where it held that a 
state could not limit access to its medical care facilities for 
abortions to in-state residents.\38\ A state must treat all 
that are seeking medical care within that state in an equal 
manner.\39\ This protection would extend to minors since the 
Court held in Danforth that minors have a constitutional right 
to choose whether to terminate a pregnancy or not.\40\ The 
Court further held that Congress also does not have the power 
to validate a law that violates the rights guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.\41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \36\ Id. at 502.
    \37\ Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371, 382-83 
(1978).
    \38\ Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 200 (1973).
    \39\ Id.
    \40\ Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74-
75 (1976).
    \41\ Id. at 508. One may argue that this means that Congress itself 
cannot pass laws that treat non-residents visiting a particular state 
differently than residents of that particular state.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In the present case, both the Travel and Federal 
Notification Provisions cause young women to carry their own 
state laws with them, ``strapped on their backs'' \42\ when 
they travel to other states. For example, this bill treats a 
young woman who travels to a state, or who resides in a state 
temporarily (such as a college student), differently than a 
minor living in that state. Thus, because New York does not 
have a law restricting teen abortions, a minor living in New 
York need not notify her parents in order to obtain an 
abortion. However, a minor who travels into New York, or who 
temporarily resides in New York, is saddled with an entirely 
different legal scheme: she must either obtain a court bypass 
from her home state or, if no bypass is available, be subject 
to the bill's mandatory notice requirements. The bill thus 
would discriminate against teenagers within the same state on 
the basis of their state or origin and would deprive teens of 
their right to travel to engage in conduct legal in another 
state in violation of constitutionally protected rights to 
equal protection and interstate travel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \42\ As Professors Laurence Tribe of Harvard Law School and Peter 
Rubin of Georgetown University Law Center explained that the 
predecessor version of this legislation ``amounts to a statutory 
attempt to force this most vulnerable class of young women to carry the 
restrictive laws of their home states strapped to their backs, bearing 
the great weight of those laws like the bars of a prison that follows 
them wherever they go (unless they are willing to go alone).'' 
Memorandum from Laurence H. Tribe & Ralph S. Tyler Professor of 
Constitutional Law, Harvard University and Peter J. Rubin, Visiting 
Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University, to the House Comm. 
on the Judiciary, at 2 (September 2, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Second, both the Travel and Federal Notification Provisions 
have an unconstitutionally narrow life exception for the woman 
and no health exception. These exceptions are especially 
important in light of the tremendous uncertainty and onerous 
civil and criminal penalties responsible adults and health care 
providers would face. In particular, the delay that the bill's 
notice requirements would impose under section 2432 could prove 
fatal or dangerous to a young woman's health and future 
fertility.
    The narrowness of the ``life'' exception in both sections--
applying only ``if the abortion was necessary to save the life 
of the minor because her life was endangered by a physical 
disorder, physical injury, or physical illness, including a 
life endangering physical condition caused by or arising from 
the pregnancy itself'' would also place health care providers 
in an impossible position. Just how severe must a physical 
threat to a woman's health be before a physician feels 
confident that a life exception may be invoked? How much would 
a court second-guess a medical decision of this type in a 
future court proceeding? What would be the cost of defending 
such a case even if a physician ultimately prevails in a civil 
or criminal case, or both? As the Supreme Court has recognized, 
laws containing life exceptions cannot pick and choose among 
life-threatening circumstances.\43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \43\ Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 
879 (1992).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The lack of any health exception is also constitutionally 
problematic. In Stenberg v Carhart, the Court held that a 
statute must provide a pre-viability and post-viability health 
exception in order to be constitutional.\44\ The majority held 
that the Partial Birth Ban Act lacked a health exception 
required under Roe when the procedure is necessary in the 
doctor's judgment for the preservation of the health or life of 
the woman.\45\ Any restriction on abortion must have an 
exception ``where it is necessary, in appropriate medical 
judgment, for the preservation of the life or the health of the 
mother.'' \46\ Yet the legislation contains no health exception 
whatsoever, in clear violation of Supreme Court precedent.\47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \44\ Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 930 (2000). Courts have 
held that the recently enacted Partial-Birth Abortion Act is 
unconstitutional because of concerns similar to those in Stenberg, see 
Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 249 F.3d 603, 604-05 (7th Cir. 2001); Richmond 
Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, 224 F.3d 337, 339 (4th Cir. 2000); 
Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Farmer, 220 F.3d 127, 142 (3rd Cir. 
2000). Additionally, courts have also struck down these statutes 
because they were overbroad. See Little Rock Family Planning Servs. v. 
Jegley, 192 F.3d 794, 797-98 (8th Cir. 1999).
    \45\ Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 938. The Court further stated that 
``where substantial medical authority supports the proposition that 
banning a particular abortion procedure could endanger women's health'' 
a health exception is needed. Id.
    \46\ Id. at 930 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 879).
    \47\ Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 930 (2000) (determining 
that the partial-birth ban act did need a health exception when the 
procedure is necessary in the doctor's judgment for the preservation of 
the health or life of the woman); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879-80 (1992) (upholding a Pennsylvania 
statute that defined a medical emergency as a condition that requires 
an abortion of the fetus or a condition that would ``create serious 
risk of substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily 
function'' because it would not impose an undue burden on a woman's 
right to choose); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973) (finding 
that a state may regulate or proscribe post-viability abortions with 
the exception where it is necessary for the preservation of the life or 
health of the woman).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Third, both the Federal Notification and Travel Provisions 
are in conflict with the courts holding that any restriction 
that has the purpose or effect of placing an ``undue burden'' 
on a woman's right to choose to have an abortion up until pre-
viability is unconstitutional.\48\ The Federal Notification 
Provision does this in two ways. As an initial matter, it 
denies many young women the option of obtaining a court waiver 
at all. This is because the bill takes away the option of going 
to court for those teens who live in a state without an 
enforceable teen abortion restriction \49\ and who seek an 
abortion in another state that either does not have an 
enforceable teen abortion law or has a law that does not meet 
the bill's standards for such a law.\50\ In these situations, 
the minor's home state has no waiver system in place and the 
bill does not permit use of another state's waiver system. 
Accordingly, the teen will not be able to obtain an abortion 
until the doctor provides notice of the abortion to one of her 
parents. The Federal Notification Provision thus makes parental 
involvement mandatory for these teens with absolutely no option 
for a court bypass. The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that, in 
order to be constitutional, a statute requiring parental 
involvement must offer an alternative such as a judicial 
bypass.\51\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \48\ Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 
874 (1992).
    \49\ The following states do not have enforceable parental 
involvement laws: AK, CA, CT, FL, HI, ID, IL, MT, NV, NH, NJ, NM, NY, 
OK, OR, VT, WA, and D.C.
    \50\ H.R. 748, Sec. 2 (proposed 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2432 (d)(4)).
    \51\ Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 420 (1990); Ohio v. Akron 
Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502, 510 (1990).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Moreover, the provision in the Federal Notification 
Provision requiring that the doctor must provide 24 hours 
actual notice or at least 48 hours more constructive notice to 
the parents of the minor before providing the abortion care 
would also appear to impose an undue burden on a woman's right 
to choose.\52\ The Court in Casey found the reason the 24-hour 
delay was constitutional was because there was a health 
exception for the preservation of the life and health of the 
woman.\53\ Without this exception present, the Federal 
Notification Provision would likely be held unconstitutional 
because these delays will put an ``undue burden'' on a woman's 
right to choose.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \52\ Id.
    \53\ Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 
886 (1992).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    With respect to the Travel Provision, a young woman who 
determined that she could not involve her parents may have to 
go through a judicial bypass in two states, also constituting 
an undue burden. For instance, if the young woman lived in a 
state with a consent law, but the closest health care provider 
was in a state that also had a consent law, the minor would 
have to go through the judicial bypass in each state if she 
felt that she could not obtain either parent's consent. 
Requiring two judicial proceedings necessarily results in 
delays, thereby further compounding the medical risk of the 
procedure. In addition, the judicial bypass process often does 
not provide a real alternative for minors who need to obtain 
abortions. Many states have judicial bypass procedures that are 
applied inconsistently by local judges making them an 
unreliable alternative for minors residing in those states.\54\
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    \54\ Dr. Michele Wilson, Associate Professor, University of 
Alabama-Birmingham, Statement (Sept. 1, 2001) (on file with author); 
Beverly Howard, Court-appointed Advocate and Attorney, Montgomery, 
Alabama (June 10, 1998) (on file with author); Bernadette McNabb, 
Executive Director, Knoxville Center for Reproductive Health (on file 
with author).
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                               CONCLUSION

    While promoting the involvement of parents in decisions 
concerning the pregnancy of a minor is a laudable and desirable 
goal, the heavy-handed approach in this legislation that 
ignores the real circumstances affecting real people attempting 
to grapple with some of life's most difficult decisions is 
neither sound, nor is it humane. The rights of parents are 
important, but the right of young people to seek out the 
protection of responsible adults in difficult and sometimes 
dangerous situations is a value Congress must respect. This 
bill violates these basic principles of humanity and regard for 
human dimension of these problems. It is reckless in its 
disregard for the welfare of young people in difficult 
situations.

                                   John Conyers, Jr.
                                   Howard L. Berman.
                                   Jerrold Nadler.
                                   Robert C. Scott.
                                   Melvin L. Watt.
                                   Zoe Lofgren.
                                   Sheila Jackson Lee.
                                   Maxine Waters.
                                   Martin T. Meehan.
                                   William D. Delahunt.
                                   Robert Wexler.
                                   Anthony D. Weiner.
                                   Linda T. Sanchez.
                                   Adam Smith.

                                  
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