[House Report 109-434]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



109th Congress                                                   Report
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 2d Session                                                     109-434
_______________________________________________________________________

                                     

                                     

                                     

                                                 Union Calendar No. 241
 
2006 CONGRESSIONAL DRUG CONTROL BUDGET AND POLICY ASSESSMENT: A REVIEW 
OF THE 2007 NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL BUDGET AND 2006 NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL 
                                STRATEGY

                               __________

                              SIXTH REPORT

                                 by the

                     COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

                             together with

                            ADDITIONAL VIEWS


                                     


                                     

  Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
                               index.html
                      http://www.house.gov/reform

 April 25, 2006.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed



                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
26-504                      WASHINGTON : 2006
_____________________________________________________________________________
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov  Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512ï¿½091800  
Fax: (202) 512ï¿½092250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402ï¿½090001

                     COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

                     TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut       HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
DAN BURTON, Indiana                  TOM LANTOS, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida         MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York             EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOHN L. MICA, Florida                PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota             CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana              ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio           DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania    DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
CHRIS CANNON, Utah                   WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee       DIANE E. WATSON, California
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan          STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio              CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
DARRELL E. ISSA, California          LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
JON C. PORTER, Nevada                C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
KENNY MARCHANT, Texas                BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia        ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 
PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina       Columbia
CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania                    ------
VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina        BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont 
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio                       (Independent)
------ ------

                      David Marin, Staff Director
                     Keith Ausbrook, Chief Counsel
                       Teresa Austin, Chief Clerk
          Phil Barnett, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel

   Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources

                   MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana, Chairman
PATRICK T. McHenry, North Carolina   ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
DAN BURTON, Indiana                  BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
JOHN L. MICA, Florida                DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota             DIANE E. WATSON, California
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio           LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
CHRIS CANNON, Utah                   C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan          MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina        ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio                       Columbia

                               Ex Officio

TOM DAVIS, Virginia                  HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
            J. Marc Wheat, Staff Director and Chief Counsel
                         James Kaiser, Counsel
                           Malia Holst, Clerk
            Tony Haywood, Minority Professional Staff Member
?

                         LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

                              ----------                              

                                  House of Representatives,
                                    Washington, DC, April 25, 2006.
Hon. J. Dennis Hastert,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Speaker: By direction of the Committee on 
Government Reform, I submit herewith the committee's sixth 
report to the 109th Congress. The committee's report is based 
on a study conducted by its Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, 
Drug Policy, and Human Resources.
                                                 Tom Davis,
                                                          Chairman.

                                 (iii)

                                     
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page
  I. The National Drug Control Strategy: General Overview and Concerns1
      1. Methamphetamine.........................................     7
      2. Drug Interdiction Reclassified as Non-Homeland Security 
          Mission................................................    12
      3. Prevention..............................................    13
      4. State and Local Law Enforcement Drug Control Efforts....    14
      5. Interdiction............................................    17
 II. Strategic and Budgetary Analysis of Federal Drug Control Programs 
     and Agencies....................................................31
  A. Department of Defense.......................................    31
      1. Central Transfer Account [CTA]..........................    32
      2. U.S. Military Support to Counterdrug Operations.........    33
      3. Joint Interagency Task Force South [JIATF South]........    33
      4. Maritime Patrol Aircraft................................    34
      5. Maritime Refueling Vessel [Oiler].......................    35
      6. U.S. Navy--Aviation Use of Force [AUF]..................    36
      7. Tethered Aerostat Radar System [TARS]...................    39
      8. Afghanistan Operations..................................    41
      9. Colombian Operations....................................    45
      10. Department of Defense Performance Measures.............    48
  B. Department of Education.....................................    49
      1. Safe and Drug Free Schools..............................    49
      2. Student Drug Testing....................................    53
      3. Lack of Diligence in Reporting to Congress..............    54
  C. Department of Health and Human Services.....................    55
      1. National Institute on Drug Abuse [NIDA].................    57
      2. Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services 
          Administration [SAMHSA]................................    59
  D. Department of Homeland Security.............................    63
      1. Reorganization..........................................    63
      2. Congressional Responsiveness............................    64
      3. Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement [CNE]............    65
      4. United States Coast Guard [USCG]........................    66
      5. Immigration and Customs Enforcement [ICE]...............    71
      6. Customs and Border Protection [CBP].....................    74
      7. U.S. Border Patrol......................................    77
  E. Department of Justice.......................................    79
      1. Assistance to State and Local Law Enforcement...........    79
      2. Prescription Drug Monitoring Program....................    80
      3. Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant..........    81
      4. Regional Information Sharing System [RISS]..............    83
      5. Weed and Seed Program...................................    83
      6. Drug Court Program......................................    84
      7. Residential Substance Abuse Treatment Program [RSAT]....    86
      8. Southwest Border Prosecutor Initiative..................    87
      9. Prisoner Re-entry Initiative............................    88
      10. Cannabis Eradication Program...........................    88
      11. Bureau of Prisons......................................    89
      12. National Drug Intelligence Center [NDIC]...............    90
      13. Drug Enforcement Administration [DEA]..................    91
      14. Interagency Crime and Drug Enforcement/Organized Crime 
          Drug Enforcement Task Force [OCDETF]...................    94
      15. Department of Justice Financial Management.............    98
  F. Office of National Drug Control Policy [ONDCP]..............   100
      1. High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas [HIDTA]...........   103
      2. National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign.................   111
      3. Drug Free Communities Program [DFC].....................   116
      4. Counter Drug Technology Assessment Center [CTAC]........   119
      5. Counter Drug Intelligence Executive Secretariat [CDX]...   120
      6. National Drug Court Institute [NDCI]....................   121
      7. National Alliance for Model State Drug Laws.............   122
      8. U.S. Anti-Doping Agency [USADA] and Membership Dues to 
          World Anti-Doping Agency [WADA]........................   123
      9. National Drug Control Program Performance Measures......   124
  G. Department of State.........................................   125
      1. Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 
          Affairs [INL]..........................................   125
      2. Andean Counter Drug Initiative [ACI]....................   126
  H. U.S. Agency for International Development [USAID]...........   133
      1. Andean Counter Drug Initiative and Alternative 
          Development............................................   134
      2. Afghanistan and Alternative Development.................   134
      3. Office of Management and Budget PART Performance 
          Evaluation.............................................   138
      4. Harm Reduction..........................................   140
  I. Department of Treasury......................................   142
      1. Internal Revenue Service [IRS] Drug Control Funding.....   142
  J. Department of Veteran Affairs [VA]..........................   144
      1. General.................................................   144
      2. Narrowing the Scope of the Provision of Treatment.......   144
      3. Specialized Treatment...................................   145
      4. Inter-Agency Cooperation................................   146

                                 VIEWS

Additional views of Hon. Henry A. Waxman and Hon. Elijah E. 
  Cummings.......................................................   147
  
                                                 Union Calendar No. 241
109th Congress                                                   Report
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 2d Session                                                     109-434

======================================================================


2006 CONGRESSIONAL DRUG CONTROL BUDGET AND POLICY ASSESSMENT: A REVIEW 
OF THE 2007 NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL BUDGET AND 2006 NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL 
                                STRATEGY

                                _______
                                

 April 25, 2006.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

 Mr. Tom Davis, from the Committee on Government Reform submitted the 
                               following

                              SIXTH REPORT

    On March 9, 2006, the Committee on Government Reform 
approved and adopted a report entitled, ``2006 Congressional 
Drug Control Budget and Policy Assessment: a Review of the 2007 
National Drug Control Budget and 2006 National Drug Control 
Strategy.'' The chairman was directed to transmit a copy to the 
Speaker of the House.

  I. The National Drug Control Strategy: General Overview and Concerns

    Significant progress has been made in protecting young 
people from the devastating effects of drug abuse. Director 
John Walters of the Office of National Drug Control Policy 
recently testified before the committee that ``overall teen 
drug use has declined significantly since the President took 
office. Current use of illicit drugs by 8th, 10th, and 12th 
graders combined has dropped 19 percent since 2001.'' \1\ 
Nonetheless, the committee is concerned about the potential 
negative effects of the administration's proposed drug control 
budget for FY 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ See National Drug Control Budget for Fiscal Year 2007: Hearing 
before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and 
Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 109th Cong. (Feb. 16, 
2006) (testimony of John Walters, Director, Office of National Drug 
Control Policy). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/
EventSingle.aspx?EventID=39638. 


    The committee believes it is necessary to remind the 
administration that when well-established drug programs were 
significantly reduced in the early 1990's dramatic increases in 
drug use among our youth followed.\2\ From 1992 until 1996, as 
depicted above, drug use among 8th, 10th, and 12th grades 
doubled from near 10 percent to over 20 percent.\3\ Having 
learned this lesson in the past decade, the administration must 
acknowledge that the substantial, proposed cuts to the drug 
budget cannot be endured without an immediate and predictable 
increase in drug usage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, (Feb. 2006) at 
1. At http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/ndcs06/ 
(last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \3\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The 2006 National Drug Control Strategy presents the 
administration's approach as based upon three pillars: 
prevention, treatment, and interdiction.\4\ Each of these three 
pillars supplement one another, creating a ``balanced, 
integrated plan aimed at . . . reducing drug use.'' \5\ The 
committee strongly agrees that this proposed, multi-faceted 
approach is the most effective in dealing with the complex 
social and political issues raised by illicit drug smuggling 
and abuse.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ Id. at 2.
    \5\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Prevention, including primarily educational and drug-
testing initiatives, seeks to reduce or eliminate the demand 
for illicit drugs on the domestic front. Prevention--``stopping 
use before it starts,'' \6\ in the words of President Bush's 
recent National Drug Strategy Report--is a vital component of 
any effective drug control strategy. In many respects, it is 
the most important component, since it is the demand for drugs 
that attracts the supply. Prevention aimed at reducing drug use 
by young people is, in turn, the most important kind of demand 
reduction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ Id. at 11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Federal Government's major prevention programs include 
the Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities (SDFSC) program 
at the Department of Education, which includes formula grants 
to the states, and ``national programs'' that are competed for 
at the national level: the National Youth Anti-Drug Media 
Campaign (the ``Media Campaign'') at the Office of National 
Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), which helps fund a national 
advertising campaign to educate young people and parents about 
the dangers of drug abuse; the Drug-Free Communities (DFC) 
program at ONDCP, which provides small grants to local 
coalitions of organizations and individuals who come together 
for drug use prevention efforts in their communities; and 
prevention programs funded through grants provided by the 
Center for Substance Abuse Prevention (CSAP), part of the 
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration 
(SAMHSA) at the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS).
    The Federal Government supports significant research and 
development of drug prevention methods through CSAP and the 
Counterdrug Technology Assessment Center (CTAC) at ONDCP. The 
Federal Government also funds research into the health risks of 
drug abuse at the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA), a 
division of the National Institutes of Health, the results of 
which are then publicized by NIDA and other Federal agencies.
    Drug treatment programs set out to provide ready and 
effective means of rehabilitating those caught in the vicious 
cycle of substance dependence. Since ``19.1 million Americans 
have used at least one illicit substance in the past month,'' 
identifying those in need and providing accessible treatment 
programs are essential components in any drug strategy.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Drug addiction is a complex disorder that can involve 
virtually every aspect of an individual's functioning in the 
family, at work, and in the community. Because of addiction's 
complexity and pervasive consequences, drug addiction treatment 
typically must involve many components. Some of those 
components focus directly on the individual's drug use. Others 
focus on restoring the addicted individual to productive 
membership in the family and society.
    A variety of scientifically based approaches to drug 
addiction treatment exist. Drug addiction treatment can include 
behavioral therapy (such as counseling, cognitive therapy, or 
psychotherapy), medications, or their combination. Federal drug 
treatment programs are found within the Substance Abuse and 
Mental Health Services Administration, which oversees and 
implements drug treatment programs; the National Institute on 
Drug Abuse, which focuses on drug prevention research; and the 
Department of Health and Human Services, which also provides 
programs that address drug abuse treatment.
    Finally, interdiction efforts, comprised of multiple agency 
and interagency missions within the Department of Justice & 
Department of Homeland Security, and supported by the 
Department of Defense, have been developed over the past few 
decades to efficiently and dramatically disrupt the flow of 
illicit drugs from various source countries.
    The Government Reform Committee, particularly via the 
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human 
Resources, is responsible for oversight of all aspects of the 
Federal Government's drug control policy and budget. Recent 
hearings at the committee and subcommittee levels have focused 
on drug use prevention, \8\ drug addiction treatment, \9\ 
Federal drug enforcement, \10\ and international supply 
reduction.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ See Drug Prevention Programs and the FY 2006 Drug Control 
Budget: Is the Federal Government Neglecting Illegal Drug Use 
Prevention? Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, 
Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 109th 
Cong. (Apr. 26, 2005). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/
EventSingle.aspx?EventID=26210; Stopping the Methamphetamine Epidemic: 
Lessons From the Pacific Northwest: Hearing before the Subcommittee on 
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on 
Government Reform, 109th Cong. (Oct. 14, 2005). At http://
reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=35704; Fiscal 
Year 2006 Drug Budget: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on 
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on 
Government Reform, 109th Cong. (Feb. 10, 2005). At http://
reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=22068; ONDCP 
Reauthorization: The National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign: Hearing 
before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and 
Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Mar. 27, 
2003); Drug Production on Public Lands--A Growing Problem: Hearing 
before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and 
Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Oct. 10, 
2003). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/
EventSingle.aspx?EventID=7225; To Do No Harm: Strategies For Preventing 
Prescription Drug Abuse: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on 
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on 
Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Feb. 9, 2004). At http://
reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=10001; 
Marijuana and Medicine: The Need For a Science-Based Approach: Hearing 
before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and 
Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Apr. 1, 
2004). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/
EventSingle.aspx?EventID=13362; ONDCP Reauthorization and the National 
Drug Control Strategy for 2003: Hearing before the House Subcommittee 
on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on 
Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Mar. 5, 2003); The Office of National 
Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act 2003, H.R. 2086: Hearing before 
the House Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (May 22, 2003).
    9 See Harm Reduction or Harm Maintenance: Is There Such 
a Thing as Safe Drug Abuse? Hearing before the House Subcommittee on 
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on 
Government Reform, 109th Cong. (Feb. 16, 2005). At http://
reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=22570; 
Authorizing the President's Vision: Making Permanent the Faith-Based 
and Community Initiative: H.R. 1054, The Tools for Community Initiative 
Act: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug 
Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 109th 
Cong. (June 21, 2005). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/
EventSingle.aspx?EventID=29319; Recovery Now: The President's Drug 
Treatment Initiative: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal 
Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government 
Reform, 108th Cong. (Feb. 27, 2003); Faith-Based Perspectives on the 
Provision of Community Services--Field Hearing in Franklin, TN: Hearing 
before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and 
Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (June 16, 
2003); The Role of Faith-Based Organizations in Providing Effective 
Social Services: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal 
Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government 
Reform, 108th Cong. (July 2, 2003); Faith-Based Perspectives on the 
Provision of Community Services--Field Hearing in Chicago, IL: Hearing 
before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and 
Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Aug. 25, 
2003); Faith-Based Perspectives on the Provision of Community 
Services--Field Hearing in Charlotte, NC: Hearing before the House 
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, 
Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Dec. 10, 2003); Faith-
Based Perspectives on the Provision of Community Services--Field 
Hearing in Los Angeles California: Hearing before the House 
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, 
Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Jan. 12, 2004). At http://
reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=10078; Faith-
Based Perspectives on the Provision of Community Services--Field 
Hearing in Colorado Springs, CO: Hearing before the House Subcommittee 
on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on 
Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Jan. 23, 2004); Legal and Practical 
Issues Related to the Faith Based Initiative: Hearing before the House 
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, 
Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Mar. 23, 2004). At http://
reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=11573; 
Measuring the Effectiveness of Drug Addiction Treatment Programs: 
Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, 
and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Mar. 
30, 2004). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/
EventSingle.aspx?EventID=11695; Faith Based Perspectives on the 
Provision of Community Services--Field Hearing in Seattle, WA: Hearing 
before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and 
Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Apr. 26, 
2004); Access to Recovery: Improving Participation and Access in Drug 
Treatment: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, 
Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th 
Cong. (Sept. 22, 2004). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/
EventSingle.aspx?EventID=19353.
    \10\ See How Can the Federal Government Support Local and State 
Initiatives to Protect Citizens and Communities Against Drug-Related 
Violence and Witness Intimidation? Hearing before the House 
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, 
Committee on Government Reform, 109th Cong. (May 2, 2005). At http://
reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=26376; FY 
2006 Drug Control Budget and Byrne Grant, HIDTA, and Other Law 
Enforcement Programs: Are we Jeopardizing Federal, State and Local 
Cooperation? Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, 
Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 109th 
Cong. (Mar. 10, 2005). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/
EventSingle.aspx?EventID=23722; Fighting Meth in America's Heartland: 
Assessing Federal, State, and Local Efforts: Hearing before the House 
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, 
Committee on Government Reform, 109th Cong. (June 27, 2005). At http://
reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=29587; 
Fighting Meth in America's Heartland: Assessing the Impact on Local Law 
Enforcement and Child Welfare Agencies: Hearing before the House 
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, 
Committee on Government Reform, 109th Cong. (July 26, 2005). At http://
reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=31114; Law 
Enforcement and the Fight Against Methamphetamine: Improving Federal, 
State, and Local Efforts: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on 
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on 
Government Reform, 109th Cong. (Aug. 23, 2005). At http://
reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=33151; ONDCP 
Reauthorization: The High-Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas Program and 
CTAC: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug 
Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th 
Cong. (Apr. 8, 2003); Facing the Methamphetamine Problem in America: 
Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, 
and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (July 
18, 2003). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/
EventSingle.aspx?EventID=7300; Facing the Methamphetamine Problem in 
America: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, 
Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th 
Cong. (July 18, 2003). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/
EventSingle.aspx?EventID=7300; How Can the Federal Government Assist 
State and Local Programs to Protect Citizens & Communities Against 
Drug-Related Violence? Hearing before the House Subcommittee on 
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on 
Government Reform, 108th Cong. (July 21, 2003). At http://
reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=7306; 
Fighting Methamphetamine in the Heartland: Hearing before the House 
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, 
Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Feb. 6, 2004). At http://
reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=10066; 
Terrorist Financing and Money Laundering Investigations: Who 
Investigates and How Effective Are They? Hearing before the House 
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, 
Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (May 11, 2004). At http://
reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=13993; Ice in 
the Ozarks: The Methamphetamine Epidemic in Arkansas: Hearing before 
the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human 
Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (June 28, 2004). 
At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/
EventSingle.aspx?EventID=16356; Drugs and Security in a Post-9/11 
World: Coordinating the Counternarcotics Mission at the Department of 
Homeland Security: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal 
Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government 
Reform, 108th Cong. (July 22, 2004). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/
Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=16918; Law Enforcement and the Fight 
Against Methamphetamine: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on 
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on 
Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Nov. 18, 2004). At http://
reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=20333; DOD 
Counternarcotics: What Is Congress Getting for Its Money? Hearing 
before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and 
Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Apr. 21, 
2004). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/
EventSingle.aspx?EventID=13557; The Poisoning of Paradise: Crystal 
Methamphetamine in Hawaii: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on 
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on 
Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Aug. 2, 2004). At http://
reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=17259.
    \11\ See Threat Convergence Along the Border: How Can We Improve 
the Federal Effort To Dismantle Criminal Smuggling Organizations: 
Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, 
and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 109th Cong. (July 
12, 2005). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/
EventSingle.aspx?EventID=30454; 2006 DOD Counternarcotics Budget: Does 
It Deliver the Necessary Support? Hearing before the House Subcommittee 
on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on 
Government Reform, 109th Cong. (May 10, 2005). At http://
reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=27247; Threat 
Convergence Along the Border: How Does Drug Trafficking Impact Our 
Borders? Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, 
Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 109th 
Cong. (June 14, 2005). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/
EventSingle.aspx?EventID=29024; Interrupting Narco-terrorist Threats on 
the High Seas: Do We Have Enough Wind in Our Sails? Hearing before the 
House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human 
Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 109th Cong. (June 29, 2005). 
At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/
EventSingle.aspx?EventID=29727; The Impact of the Drug Trade on Border 
Security and National Parks: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on 
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on 
Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Mar. 10, 2003); The Impact of the Drug 
Trade on Border Security: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on 
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on 
Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Apr. 15, 2003); Disrupting the Market: 
Strategy, Implementation, and Results in Narcotics Source Nations: 
Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, 
and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (July 
9, 2003). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/
EventSingle.aspx?EventID=7484; Implementation of a National Supply 
Reduction Strategy: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal 
Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government 
Reform, 108th Cong. (Sept. 17, 2003). At http://reform.house.gov/
CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=7291; Afghanistan: Law 
Enforcement Interdiction Efforts in Transshipment Countries to Stem the 
Flow of Heroin: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal 
Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government 
Reform, 108th Cong. (Feb. 26, 2004). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/
Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=10843; Andean Counterdrug Initiative: 
Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, 
and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Mar. 
2, 2004). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/
EventSingle.aspx?EventID=11000; Afghanistan: Are British 
Counternarcotics Efforts Going Wobbly? Hearing before the House 
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, 
Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Apr. 1, 2004). At http://
reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=13347; 
Northern Ice: Stopping Methamphetamine Precursor Chemical Smuggling 
Across the U.S.-Canada Border: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on 
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on 
Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Apr. 20, 2004). At http://
reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=13368; The 
Impact of the Drug Trade on Border Security--Field Hearing in Las 
Cruses, NM: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, 
Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th 
Cong. (June 29, 2004). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/
EventSingle.aspx?EventID=16366; The War Against Drugs and Thugs: A 
Status Report on Plan Columbia Successes and Remaining Challenges: 
Hearing before the House Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. 
(June 17, 2004); Securing Our Borders: What We Have Learned From 
Government Initiatives and Citizen Patrols: Hearing before the House 
Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (May 12, 2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Moreover, the committee and subcommittee are responsible 
for the authorization of the White House Office of National 
Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) and related programs.\12\ In 
fulfilling its oversight function the committee has identified 
and highlighted several fundamental issues of utmost concern 
that are significantly impacted by the 2007 National Drug 
Control Strategy and Budget Summary.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ 21 U.S.C. 1703(c)(3).
    \13\ ``It is a shameful thing to be weary of inquiry when what we 
search for is excellent.'' Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43 BC), Roman 
Senator.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Methamphetamine

    The committee is concerned about the administration's 
complete unwillingness to provide any leadership or strategy to 
address the growing methamphetamine epidemic throughout the 
country. U.S. Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez stated that 
``in terms of damage to children and to our society, meth is 
now the most dangerous drug in America.'' \14\ According to 
surveys conducted by the National Association of Counties, meth 
is now the number one drug problem for the majority (58 
percent) of county law enforcement agencies, and the drug is 
having far-reaching impacts on child welfare services.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ Jefferson, David J., The Meth Epidemic--Inside America's New 
Drug Crisis, Newsweek, Aug. 8, 2005.
    \15\ National Association of Counties, The Impact of Meth on 
Children: Out of Home Placement and The Criminal Effect of Meth on 
Communities, July 5, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Methamphetamine, because of its insidious, devastating 
social and personal side effects, has presented a novel 
opportunity to raise our country's cultural awareness of the 
threat of illicit drug use in general. The committee remains 
disappointed that ONDCP has not utilized the heightened media 
attention that the methamphetamine issue receives to fully 
develop public awareness and education.
    Since the first mention of a meth strategy in the long-
overdue October 2004 ``National Synthetic Drug Action Plan,'' 
the Office of National Drug Control Policy has done nothing but 
repeat its intention to provide a methamphetamine strategy, as 
evidenced by the following statement in the Nation Drug Control 
Strategy for FY 2006: ``The Administration is in the process of 
developing and releasing a strategic document that details next 
steps for addressing the problem of synthetic drugs like 
methamphetamine.'' \16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy (Feb. 2006) at 
15. 


    Methamphetamine has been steadily moving across the country 
for years, starting on the West coast and moving eastward, 
devastating countless communities in its wake.\17\ The 
President of the International Narcotics Control Board recently 
stated: ``The major problem that they have (in the United 
States) is with methamphetamine . . . Methamphetamine is 
pandemic now.'' \18\ In response, the administration has only 
delayed, refusing to provide a necessary, comprehensive 
strategy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\ Methamphetamine, 15 CQ Researcher Num. 25, 589, 592 (2006).
    \18\ Francis Murphy, UN Narcotics Watchdog Sees New Pandamic, 
Reuters Health, Mar. 1, 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Absence of Administration Legislative Efforts on 
                    Methamphetamine
    The administration claims to have supported legislative 
efforts by Congress to lead in addressing the methamphetamine 
epidemic: ``The Bush Administration has urged Congress to enact 
legislation that would limit the amount of pseudoephedrine for 
retail sale to what could be used for individual, legitimate 
medical purposes.'' \19\ Despite such rhetoric, however, the 
administration provided no help to Congress when it was 
considering the Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act that is now 
a part of the Patriot Act. In fact, a State Department 
memorandum sharply critical of some provisions of the bill 
circulated among congressional offices the night before a 
committee mark-up, while the New York Times reported that the 
FDA was working behind the scenes to block it.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy (Feb. 2006) at 
15.
    \20\ Gardiner Harris, Fighting Methamphetamine, Lawmakers Reach 
Accord to Curb Sale of Cold Medicines, New York Times, Dec. 15, 2005, 
at 33; at http://select.nytimes.com/gst/
abstract.html?res=F10810FA34550C768DDDAB0994DD404482 (last visited Feb. 
24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In addition, ONDCP also states: ``To ensure that the drug 
[pseudoephedrine] is not rerouted away from legitimate 
businesses and consumers, the Administration is working with 
other countries to improve the flow of information to the US 
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) about bulk shipments of 
this chemical.'' \21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy (Feb. 2006) at 
15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Although a great deal of attention has been paid to the 
local production of meth in small, clandestine (or ``clan'') 
laboratories, the majority of the U.S. supply of illegal meth 
is now believed to come from Mexico, or is controlled by 
Mexican drug trafficking organizations. Moreover, virtually all 
of the world's supply of the major meth precursor chemical--
pseudoephedrine--is manufactured overseas, in only relatively 
few factories. As such, meth is as much an international as a 
local problem. Of genuine concern is the report of the seizure 
of a methamphetamine laboratory in Colombia in 2005, the first 
of its kind in that country.\22\ On its own the seizure appears 
to have little significance, however given the entrepreneurial 
bent Colombia drug traffickers have displayed in the past, 
neither the seizure, nor its potential, can be ignored.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\ International Narcotics Control Board, 2005 Report, (Mar. 1, 
2006) at 66.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Most of the methamphetamine problem can be attributed to 
one simple fact: the U.S. and the international community have 
failed to set up an effective control system for 
pseudoephedrine and other precursor chemical products. Unlike 
meth, pseudoephedrine cannot be made clandestinely--it can only 
be manufactured in large facilities using very sophisticated 
equipment. As a groundbreaking report by The Oregonian 
newspaper recently showed, only a few companies worldwide make 
the chemical, and virtually all of the world's supply comes 
from three countries: Germany, India, and China.\23\ As such, 
it would not be very difficult for the U.S. and its allies to 
get better control of the chemical and prevent its large-scale 
diversion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\ Suo, Steve, The Mexican Connection, Oregonian, June 5, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Instead, huge amounts of pseudoephedrine products are being 
shipped all over the world, with little or no tracking or 
control. Many nations are importing far more than they can 
legitimately consume, meaning that the excess is probably being 
diverted to meth production. Mexican imports of 
pseudoephedrine, the primary meth precursor, have risen from 
almost 100 tons in 2001 to nearly 224 tons in 2003. Mexican 
authorities estimate their legitimate demand for 
pseudoephedrine at only 70 tons per year.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs 
(INL) very recently released its annual report in which 
international precursor chemical control is substantially 
addressed. The INL report stated: ``The emergence of 
methamphetamine as a major drug of abuse and a significant 
domestic law enforcement problem in the United States was the 
most important factor impacting U.S. chemical control in 
2005.'' \25\ The report also indicates that ``Mexico is now 
tightening its controls on methamphetamine precursors and the 
concern is that they will be sold to countries with fewer 
controls and smuggled into Mexico, or the U.S., for drug 
production.'' \26\ ``Traffickers continue to evade the reach of 
these initiatives by turning to nonparticipating countries to 
obtain these . . . chemicals. Many of these countries lack the 
legal, administrative, and law enforcement infrastructure to 
control the chemicals.'' \27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \25\ Dept. of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement Affairs, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 
vol. I, (Mar. 2006) at 73.
    \26\ Id.
    \27\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Where precursor control legislation is tightened, 
traffickers have reverted to nations in Africa where controls 
are weaker.\28\ Further, traffickers are using methods of 
concealment for precursor chemicals that were previously 
reserved for the drugs themselves.\29\ These occurrences are 
causes for uneasiness for the international community. They add 
weight to the call from International Narcotics Control Board 
(INCB) for countries to provide pre-export notification of 
precursor chemicals to importing nations.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \28\ International Narcotics Control Board, 2005 Report, (Mar. 1, 
2006) at 42.
    \29\ Id, at 71.
    \30\ Id, at 28.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The committee strongly encourages such international 
efforts to address the control of international precursor 
chemicals, but was very disappointed by the Department of 
State's (DOS) direct opposition to the international provisions 
addressing precursor chemical reporting within the Combat 
Methamphetamine Epidemic Act. Moreover, no substantive support, 
beyond technical comments, was received from the Department of 
Justice (DOJ).
    Cooperation with involved administration Departments and 
agencies, such as DEA, State, & DOJ is the specific 
responsibility of ONDCP. In sum, the committee must express its 
deep dissatisfaction with ONDCP which offered no support 
throughout the legislative process, despite being responsible 
for leading drug policy efforts within the administration.
    Beyond legislation, the committee seeks to highlight 
particular Federal programs that have been established to 
counteract the continuous and devastating spread of 
methamphetamine abuse. These programs, critical to mitigating 
the ongoing threat of methamphetamine, are in substantial 
danger of being severely degraded by the proposed FY 2007 drug 
control budget. Foremost among such programs are COPS Meth Hot 
Spots and methamphetamine-oriented High Intensity Drug 
Trafficking Areas.

            Department of Justice: Methamphetamine-Related Assistance 
                    (COPS Meth Hot Spots) \31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \31\ For further information, see the COPS website, http://
www.cops.usdoj.gov/, or call the COPS office at (202) 616-1728.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The committee has ongoing concerns about the proposed 
reduction in funds administered by the Department of Justice's 
Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) office dedicated to 
law enforcement activities against methamphetamine trafficking. 
To assist these overburdened agencies, Congress approved 
$63,590,000 for fiscal year 2006 (up from $52,556,000 in fiscal 
year 2005) for policing initiatives to combat methamphetamine 
production and trafficking and to enhance policing initiatives 
in ``drug hot spots.''
    Disappointingly, the administration again proposes to 
eliminate the remaining ``Meth Hot Spots'' funding for other 
anti-meth enforcement activities--which Congress has always 
appropriated in the form of specific earmarks for designated 
projects.
    The committee believes that Congress and the administration 
need to work together to restore and reform the additional Hot 
Spots funding. The proposed elimination of the rest of the 
``Meth Hot Spots'' funding would greatly reduce the ability of 
affected state and local law enforcement agencies to help their 
Federal partners in reducing methamphetamine abuse, 
particularly given the proposed overall reduction in other 
state and local law enforcement assistance grants.

            ONDCP: Methamphetamine oriented High Intensity Drug 
                    Trafficking Areas (HIDTAs)

    Each High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) that is 
primarily focused on combating the spread of methamphetamine 
was created after 1990. The Midwest HIDTA, which includes Iowa, 
Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska and South Dakota, was created 
specifically to fight the spread of meth in the Midwest. It 
promotes a comprehensive, cooperative strategy by law 
enforcement at the Federal, state and local levels to reduce 
drug trafficking.
    The collection of multi-agency leaders participating on 
individual HIDTA boards, individual task force boards and/or 
oversight committees allows for current information and trends 
to be shared on the growing concerns and dangers of 
methamphetamine production, distribution, and use. Nationally, 
the latest survey indicates there are 211 HIDTA task forces 
across the nation with 5,321 officers representing 34 states 
and territories which, in addition to other duties, are 
substantially involved in enforcement efforts regarding the 
distribution and/or manufacturing of methamphetamine.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \32\ See Law Enforcement and the Fight Against Methamphetamine: 
Improving Federal, State, and Local Efforts: Hearing before the House 
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, 
Committee on Government Reform, 109th Cong. (Aug. 23, 2005) (testimony 
of John Sommer, Director, Ohio High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The methamphetamine issue will continue to be a high 
priority for the committee. Such commitment is necessary when 
Congress is forced to embrace a leadership role where ONDCP has 
left a void.

2. Drug Interdiction Reclassified as Non-Homeland Security Mission 
        within DHS

    Another issue of serious concern to the committee is the 
unannounced reclassification of the drug interdiction mission 
within DHS. The congressional authorization that created DHS in 
2002 specifically defined the drug interdiction mission as one 
of the primary missions of the Department.\33\ This year, 
without any formal explanation or announcement, the 
administration's budget request for the Coast Guard 
recategorized ``Illegal Drug Interdiction'' and ``Other Law 
Enforcement'' missions as ``Non-Homeland Security'' 
missions.\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \33\ H.R. 5005, 107th Cong. Sec. 888 (2002). Public Law 107-296.
    \34\ U.S. Coast Guard, Budget in Brief, FY 2007, Feb. 2006, 
Appendix B, at B-2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The connection between terrorism and drug smuggling is 
being increasingly established by incoming intelligence. 
Antonio Maria Costa, the head of the United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime, stated: ``The world is seeing the birth of a 
new hybrid of organized-crime-terrorist organization.'' \35\ 
This new hybrid, according to many intelligence analysts, is 
comprised of ``terrorist organizations stealing whole chapters 
out of the criminal playbook--trafficking in narcotics, illegal 
goods, counterfeit goods, illegal aliens--and in the process 
converting their terrorist cells into criminal gangs.'' \36\ A 
stark example, ``the terrorists behind the Madrid attacks were 
major drug dealers, with a network stretching from Morocco 
through Spain to Belgium and the Netherlands.'' \37\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \35\ David E. Kaplan, Paying for Terror, U.S. News & World Report, 
(Dec. 5, 2005) at 41.
    \36\ Id, at 42.
    \37\ Id, at 44.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This proposed change clearly runs contrary to the organic 
statute establishing DHS.\38\ When asked about the initiatives 
being taken by ONDCP to counteract this fundamental, wide 
reaching policy change, Director John Walters of ONCDP 
indicated a complete lack of awareness of the issue or its 
details.\39\ Moreover, the reclassification is not even 
mentioned, much less properly highlighted and explained, in the 
main body of the Coast Guard Budget in Brief.\40\ Inexplicably, 
the only indication of this infrastructural policy realignment 
must be found and interpreted from a program cost summary 
table.\41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \38\ H.R. 5005, 107th Cong. Sec. 888 (2002). Public Law 107-296.
    \39\ See National Drug Control Budget for Fiscal Year 2007: Hearing 
before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and 
Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 109th Cong. (Feb. 16, 
2006) (testimony of John Walters, Director, Office of National Drug 
Control Policy).
    \40\ U.S. Coast Guard, Budget in Brief, FY 2007, Feb. 2006.
    \41\ Id, Appendix B, at B-2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    At a February 7, 2006, DHS budget briefing a DHS Budget 
officer confirmed that the reclassification is not isolated to 
the Coast Guard but is being implemented as a DHS policy 
throughout each agency whose mission includes drug 
interdiction.\42\ The reclassification explicitly excludes drug 
interdiction from the general homeland security mission of DHS 
and, over time, will gradually increase the ongoing diversion 
of resources away from drug interdiction missions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \42\ Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human 
Resources staff briefing with DHS representatives on 2007 DHS drug 
budget, Feb. 7, 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The committee's skepticism concerning DHS's transparency 
and willingness to communicate has been further strained by 
this unauthorized recategorization which knowingly brushes 
aside Congress's clear intent to classify drug interdiction as 
a homeland security mission.\43\ In addition, ONDCP's utter 
ignorance of this new DHS policy illustrates reason for the 
committee's deep dissatisfaction with the leadership within the 
administration that ONDCP is supposed to provide.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \43\ H.R. 5005, 107th Cong. Sec. 888 (2002). Public Law 107-296.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Prevention

    The administration asserts that it seeks a ``balanced 
strategy that focuses on three primary elements: stopping drug 
use before it starts, healing drug users, and disrupting the 
market for illicit drugs.'' \44\ As in years past, the 
administration's 2006 National Drug Control Strategy identifies 
drug use prevention--``stopping drug use before it starts''--as 
one of the three key pillars of its drug strategy. However, 
since prevention comprises only 11.7 percent of the entire FY 
2007 drug control budget and represents a 19.3 percent decrease 
in prevention funding from that enacted in FY 2006, the 
committee questions the administration's claim that it has 
``set a bold agenda'' in its prevention efforts.\45\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \44\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, (Feb. 2006) 
at 1. At http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/
ndcs06/.
    \45\ Id, at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ``Over the FY 2001--FY 2007 period, demand reduction 
(prevention and treatment) has increased only $49 million or 
1.1 percent whereas supply reduction (enforcement and 
interdiction) increased by $3.2 billion, or 66.1 percent.'' 
\46\ In light of the profound emphasis the current 
administration has placed on enforcement and interdiction, the 
committee questions whether prevention, which has steadily 
decreased in funding, authentically represents a ``pillar'' of 
the administration's approach to the drug problem.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \46\ Carnevale Associates, Policy Brief, FY '07 Drug Budget: Demand 
Reduction Being De-Emphasized, LLC, Feb. 2006. At http://
www.carnevaleassociates.com/
Federal--Drug--Budget--FY07.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    With respect to particular prevention programs, the 
committee has concerns about the proposed elimination of the 
State Grants program, representing the substantial portion of 
the Safe and Drug Free Schools and Communities (SDFSC) program 
at the Department of Education. Congress emphatically rejected 
a similar proposal in last year's budget.
    The grants distributed under the State Grants program serve 
as vital leverage that allows local communities to 
significantly augment their capacity to provide drug prevention 
programs.

        Elimination of this funding will have a catastrophic 
        effect in the balance of drug usage among school-aged 
        children in America. Many school systems across America 
        have found unique ways to combine these SDFSCA funds 
        with very little local moneys in order to provide the 
        highest level of drug prevention. Removing the monetary 
        foundation of these programs could cause many if not 
        all of them to collapse. I know this because in our 
        system, one of the wealthiest in the nation, 
        elimination of these funds would severely impact or 
        cancel many well developed, well documented, and 
        successful drug prevention programs. I can't imagine 
        how drug prevention programs in other smaller systems 
        will survive.\47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \47\ See Drug Prevention Programs and the Fiscal Year 2006 Drug 
Control Budget: Is the Federal Government Neglecting Illegal Drug Use 
Prevention: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, 
Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 109th 
Cong, (Apr. 26, 2005) (testimony of Clarence Jones, coordinator, Safe 
and Drug-Free Youth Section, Fairfax County Public Schools).

    The State Grants programs serves as a vehicle for bringing 
effective anti-drug education to millions of young people in 
our schools. As we recommended last year, the committee 
strongly suggests that the administration take substantial 
steps to reform the well established State Grants program.

4. State and Local Law Enforcement Drug Control Efforts

    The committee focuses much concern on the administration's 
approach to programs directly impacting the cooperation between 
Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies and 
initiatives. Since State and local agencies make over 95 
percent of the arrests of drug violators, the vital role 
carried out by non-Federal enforcement is unquestionable and 
indispensable to furthering intelligence and operational 
activities at the Federal level.\48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \48\ Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United States, 
Uniform Crime Report, U.S. Department of Justice (2002).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The administration's recent budget proposal to realign 
HIDTA under the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force 
(OCDETF) \49\ while decreasing its funding, to eliminate the 
Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant program, and to 
diminish the Counterdrug Technology Assessment Center (CTAC) 
would severely impede, if not permanently incapacitate, the 
current system of broad-based interagency cooperation and 
information sharing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \49\ Dept. of Justice, FY 2007 Budget and Performance Summary, 
Annual Rep. at 107: ``The FY 2007 President's Budget proposes the 
transfer of the HIDTA program from [ONDCP] to OCDETF.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA)

    This year, the administration has requested $209 million 
for the HIDTA program but has again asked that it be moved to 
the Department of Justice despite the same proposal being 
rejected last year. If enacted, these proposals would 
effectively terminate the current HIDTA program. For this 
reason, the committee again \50\ strongly opposes the budget 
cut, any radical reallocation of funding (if unaccompanied by a 
comprehensive, performance-based justification), and the move 
of the program into the Justice Department.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \50\ The National Drug Control Strategy for 2005 and the National 
Drug Control Budget for Fiscal Year 2006, Committee on Government 
Reform Report, H. Rept. 109-172, (2005) at 29.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Moving HIDTA into the Justice Department is highly 
problematic. Notably, the administration's representatives who 
testified at the March 10, 2005, hearing declined to inform the 
Congress how HIDTA would be managed under OCDETF and how 
decisions would be made at the local HIDTA.\51\ Such a 
significant change demands prior planning that can be clearly 
and thoroughly communicated to Congress. Transferring the HIDTA 
to OCDETF without any clear plan concerning the manner in which 
the program would be administered is not an authentic proposal 
that deserves consideration by Congress.\52\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \51\ See FY 2006 Drug Control Budget and Byrne Grant, HIDTA, and 
Other Law enforcement programs: Are we jeopardizing Federal, state and 
local cooperation? Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal 
Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government 
Reform, 109th Cong. (Mar. 10, 2005).
    \52\ Dept. of Justice, 2007 Budget and Performance Summary, Annual 
Rep. at 107: ``The FY 2007 President's Budget proposes the transfer of 
the HIDTA program from [ONDCP] to OCDETF.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Beyond the reasons just mentioned, the proposed transfer to 
the Justice Department is contrary to existing law and to sound 
drug enforcement policy. It would potentially be even more 
disruptive to the HIDTA program than simple budget cuts.\53\ 
From a legal perspective, transferring this program across 
departments is contrary to every authorization the Congress has 
passed for HIDTA. Moreover, attempting to move the program 
through an appropriations bill would almost certainly conflict 
with any reauthorization legislation agreed to by the House and 
Senate during the 109th Congress.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \53\ The committee's reasons for opposing the transfer of the HIDTA 
program to the Justice Department are discussed in greater detail in 
the committee's report on H.R. 2829 (H. Rept. 109-315, Part I, pps. 52-
53).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In addition, eliminating or eviscerating particular HIDTAs 
would be a far greater financial loss to Federal drug 
enforcement efforts than simply the money spent by the Federal 
Government directly on their budgets. State and local agencies 
make significant contributions of their own agents, employees, 
office space, and equipment to HIDTA task forces--much of which 
is not reimbursed with Federal dollars and which frequently 
dwarf, in their dollar value, the Federal budget components of 
the individual HIDTAs. We risk losing those contributions 
without the individual HIDTAs.

            Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant

    The committee opposes the administration's renewed proposal 
to terminate the state formula grants portion of the Edward 
Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant program. The 
administration has asked Congress to eliminate it entirely and 
restrict Federal assistance for state and local law enforcement 
programs to a series of enumerated grants (most of which are 
previously existing programs) under a ``Justice Assistance'' 
account. In practice, this will sharply limit the amount of 
money available to help state and local agencies.\54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \54\ The Byrne Formula Grant Program was created by the Anti-Drug 
Abuse Act of 1988 (Public Law 100-690). One-half of the appropriated 
funds is to be awarded to the states based on their relative 
populations, while the other half is to be awarded on the basis of the 
violent crime rates in the states.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The administration's drastic proposed cuts would create 
massive shortfalls in the budgets of state and local law 
enforcement agencies across the country. Numerous state and 
local officials have informed the committee members and staff 
that many programs--particularly drug enforcement programs--
within their states would have to be shut down if all Byrne 
Grant and similar funding were cut off.\55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \55\ See FY 2006 Drug Control Budget and Byrne Grant, HIDTA, and 
other law enforcement programs: Are we jeopardizing Federal, state and 
local cooperation? Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal 
Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government 
Reform, 109th Cong. (Mar. 10, 2005) (testimony of Tom Donahue, 
Director, Chicago HIDTA, and Mark Henry, president, Illinois Drug 
Enforcement Officer's Association).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Moreover, it is not necessarily the case that Federal 
support for state and local efforts lacks national impact. 
Particularly in the area of drug enforcement, state and local 
participation is vital to our national success. As mentioned 
above, state and local agencies make more than 95 percent of 
arrests of drug violators.\56\ Collectively, they have far more 
personnel and resources than the Federal Government does. 
Federal support for these agencies can have a very positive 
national impact by facilitating their involvement as partners 
in the fight against drug trafficking and other criminal 
activities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \56\ Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United States, 
Uniform Crime Report, U.S. Department of Justice (2002).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

            Counterdrug Technology Assessment Center (CTAC)

    The committee opposes the administration's current request 
of only $9.6 million for the CTAC program, a drastic cut from 
the $29.7 million appropriated for fiscal year 2006 (which was 
itself a major cut from the $41.7 million appropriated for 
fiscal year 2005). The CTAC research program provides support 
to law enforcement supply reduction by developing advancement 
in technology for drug detection, communications, surveillance 
and methods to share drug crime investigative information.\57\ 
In addition, funding is available for research into drug abuse 
and addiction. Further, CTAC supports the Technology Transfer 
Program which supplies new counterdrug technologies to state 
and local law enforcement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \57\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at 89.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The proposed decreases would cut the research program from 
$14 million to $9.6 million--while completely eliminating 
Technology Transfer Program (appropriated at nearly $16 million 
in fiscal year 2006). The committee strongly opposes the 
termination of the Technology Transfer Program which provides 
another means of building operational cooperation between 
Federal, State, and local law enforcement.
    The committee believes that reform is the appropriate 
remedy for any CTAC difficulties. At a time when assistance to 
state and local drug enforcement is under consistent attack 
throughout the current drug control budget, it is unwise for 
the Federal Government to cut off yet another source of badly 
needed anti-drug trafficking technology.
    HITDA, Byrne Grants, and the CTAC Technology Transfer 
program represent networks of enforcement cooperation between 
Federal, State, and local agencies in which information, 
intelligence, and assets are shared and ultimately maximized. 
The particular relationships and venues for dialog that 
comprise this multi-level cooperation have been gradually 
developed since the creation of the first HIDTAs in 1990.
    If the proposed budget changes are implemented, it could 
take another 16 years to recover and rebuild these programs to 
their current level of operational sophistication. 
Consequently, the committee, after much experience with the 
profoundly improved and necessary impact made by collaboration 
between Federal, State, and local law enforcement, believes 
that maintaining these programs is of the highest priority.

5. Interdiction

    It is crucial that the Federal Government pursue the most 
effective interdiction strategy possible. In what appears to be 
a rapidly developing partnership, illicit drug production and 
smuggling is being directly linked to terrorist cells around 
the world.\58\ Traffickers smuggle drugs, money, people, 
information, weapons, and substances the same way terrorists 
do. Sometimes, narco-traffickers are terrorists.\59\ When 
speaking about the Colombian insurgency, Chairman Tom Davis of 
the House Government Reform Committee stated, ``These are not 
idealistic liberators; they're thugs and terrorists, funded by 
the illicit drug trade.'' \60\ When drugs are interdicted, the 
financing of terrorist operations becomes more difficult.\61\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \58\ Miles, Donna, Rumsfeld, Ecuadoran Leaders Vow Continued 
Cooperation, American Forces Press Service, Nov. 16, 2004, at http://
www.defenselink.mil/news/Nov2004/n11162004--2004111604.html 
(last visited Feb. 24, 2006); Department of Defense Press Briefing by 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff General Richard Myers on Jan. 6, 2004, at http://
www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20040106-secdef1104.html (last 
visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \59\ Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug 
Policy, and Human Resources drug control budget briefing with 
Department of Defense Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
Counternarcotics, Nov. 10, 2005; Dept. of State, Designated Foreign 
Terrorist Organizations, 2004, at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/45323.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \60\ See The War Against Drugs and Thugs: A Status Report on Plan 
Colombia Successes and Remaining Challenges: Hearing before the House 
Committee on Government Reform, 109th Cong. (2004) (statement of 
Chairman Tom Davis).
    \61\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, (Feb. 2006) 
at 33.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    For the third straight year, joint service, interagency, 
and multinational forces in the transit zone have seized and 
disrupted a record amount of cocaine.\62\ A critical element of 
the strategy to disrupt the market focuses U.S. interdiction 
efforts on seizing cocaine and other illicit drugs bound for 
the U.S. from South America in the transit zone. The transit 
zone is a six million square mile area that encompasses Central 
America, Mexico, the Caribbean Sea, the Gulf of Mexico, and the 
eastern Pacific Ocean. Transit zone seizures and disruptions in 
2005 amounted to 254 metric tons of cocaine, compared to 219 
metric tons in 2004 and 176 metric tons in 2003.\63\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \62\ Id. Joint service, interagency, and multinational forces in 
the transit zone seized 254 metric tons of cocaine in 2005.
    \63\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Transit zone interdiction is a team effort that relies on 
the successful execution of several steps in an interdiction 
continuum, including the collection and dissemination of 
actionable intelligence, the detection and monitoring of 
suspect vessels, and the physical interdiction of those 
vessels.\64\ The primary operations center and coordinator for 
detecting and monitoring suspected air and maritime drug 
trafficking events in the transit zone is Joint Interagency 
Task Force South (JIATF-South). Located in Key West, Florida, 
JIATF-South includes representatives from Defense, Justice, 
Homeland Security, and nations such as France, the Netherlands, 
and the United Kingdom.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \64\ Id, at 35. 

    
    
    The chart depicted above reflects JIATF-South's estimates 
of the intercontinental flow of cocaine out of the source 
countries. However, estimates of the drug flow through the 
transit zone are problematic. In its assessment for 2004, ONDCP 
reported that between 325 metric tons and 675 metric tons of 
cocaine may be moving toward the United States.\65\ Given the 
lower and upper bound flow estimates, the committee has deep 
reservations regarding the credibility of eradication, 
production, interdiction, and usage estimates and performance 
measures.\66\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \65\ Drug Control: Agencies Need to Plan for Likely Declines in 
Drug Interdiction Assets, and Develop Better Performance Measures for 
Transit Zone Operations, GAO Report No. 06-2000, (Nov. 2005) at 6.
    \66\ Id, at 25; The principal source of information about cocaine 
flow in the transit zone is ONDCP's Interagency Assessment of Cocaine 
Movement (IACM). The IACM is prepared annually for ONDCP by an 
interagency group representing departments and agencies involved in 
U.S. counternarcotics efforts. For 2003 and 2004, according to the 
interagency group, the IACM's estimate of the amount of cocaine 
available for export was too low in relation to estimated U.S. and non-
U.S. demand for cocaine after taking into account seizures and 
disruptions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The majority of ``frontline'' interdiction personnel and 
assets are contained within the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS). In addition, the Department of Defense (DOD) has been 
designated as the single lead agency of the Federal Government 
for the detection and monitoring of the aerial and maritime 
transit of illegal drugs into the U.S.\67\ DOD carries out this 
responsibility by providing aircraft and ships to patrol the 
transit zones, utilizing radars and other technologies to 
monitor drug smuggling routes, and employing tactical 
intelligence units. With the ongoing DOD and DHS focus on the 
global war on terrorism and illegal immigration, the committee 
is deeply concerned that many of the resources within these 
departments traditionally integral to drug interdiction will be 
increasingly diverted for anti-terror and immigration missions, 
and the administration is not adequately addressing the 
interagency detection and monitoring capabilities that support 
U.S. interdiction efforts in the transit zone.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \67\ 10 U.S.C. Sec. 124 (1989).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Increasing the challenge of interdicting drugs in the 
transit zones is the mounting shortage of detecting, monitoring 
and interdiction assets (ships, planes, and helicopters) 
allocated to this critical mission. This is the result of the 
administration's failure to plan to replace aging DHS and DOD 
assets. The shortage of these assets is perhaps more pronounced 
recently because of substantial gains that have been made in 
developing ``known actionable'' maritime events.\68\ Moreover, 
the Director of JIATF-South recently reconfirmed what Congress 
was told last year: JIATF-South now has more actionable drug 
intelligence than there are interdiction assets available to 
respond to smuggling events.\69\ The impressive level of 
intelligence is displayed by the accompanying graphic in which 
known, specific, smuggling events are broken down to the means 
of transportation used (``go-fast'' speed boat (57.2 percent), 
fishing vessel (30.5 percent), motor vessel (9.6 percent), 
other (2.7 percent).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \68\ Drug Control: Agencies Need to Plan for Likely Declines in 
Drug Interdiction Assets, and Develop Better Performance Measures for 
Transit Zone Operations, GAO Report No. 06-2000, (Nov. 2005) at 17.
    \69\ Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug 
Policy, and Human Resources visit to JIATF-South, Key West, Florida on 
Jan. 12, 2006. 



    The committee is alarmed that the administration has not 
directly addressed the issue of insufficient interdiction 
assets. Equally troubling, ONDCP does not identify and discuss 
this issue in its 2007 Strategy, other than to highlight the 
improvements in intelligence. The committee is concerned that 
until ONDCP clearly articulates the current shortages in drug 
interdiction assets, the administration will not provide the 
support necessary to respond.
    Another crucial piece necessary to understanding the 
challenge of the interdiction process addresses the vast 
distances associated with the high seas maritime transit zones 
that are manipulated by drug smugglers to their strategic 
advantage. The Eastern Pacific maritime transit zone, as 
depicted in the graphic nearby, places tremendous strains on 
U.S. interdiction intelligence, personnel, and assets. Over 
time the smugglers have measured the interdiction capabilities 
of these assets and have continually utilized these known 
limits to exploit weaknesses, irresolvable without an 
additional commitment of assets, to continue the flow of 
illegal drugs into the continental United States. 



    In addition to the vast distance being covered, the means 
most frequently used by smugglers, even if detected, present a 
substantial challenge to the interdiction mission. High-speed 
``go-fast'' vessels are used in the majority of the smuggling 
events in the transit zone. ``Go-fast'' vessels, which are very 
hard to detect by ship and helicopter acting without maritime 
patrol aircraft, are capable of speeds up to 40+ knots while 
hauling as much as four metric tons of cocaine. In the Eastern 
Pacific, these speed boats seek to avoid U.S. interdiction 
forces by taking broad, round-about paths into the middle of 
the Pacific Ocean before heading north to Mexico. In the 
Caribbean, they leave Colombia's North Coast at night, rapidly 
transit across the Caribbean basin, and then hug the Central 
American coastline in the voyage north to Mexico.
    The number of go-fast boats involved in smuggling has 
increased substantially since 1995. Such craft are small, very 
fast, nearly invisible to radar, and difficult to see in 
daylight when painted in blue (seized go-fast (left) with four 
200 horsepower outboard engines is pictured with a U.S. Coast 
Guard over-the-horizon small boat). 



    Since calendar year 2000, JIATF-South officials report that 
they had information about more maritime drug movements than 
they could detect visually.\70\ The number of ``known 
actionable'' maritime events in the western Caribbean Sea and 
the eastern Pacific Ocean more than doubled from 154 in 2000 to 
330 in 2004.\71\ According to JIATF-South officials, in many 
cases the maritime event is too far away for available ships 
and aircraft to go to the area and visually locate the 
suspected drug movement. However, once JIATF-South locates a 
suspect movement, the disruption rate has significantly 
increased since 2000--from less than 60 percent in 2000 and 
2001 to over 80 percent in 2003 to 2005.\72\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \70\ Drug Control: Agencies Need to Plan for Likely Declines in 
Drug Interdiction Assets, and Develop Better Performance Measures for 
Transit Zone Operations, GAO Report No. 06-2000, (Nov. 2005) at 17.
    \71\ Id.
    \72\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            The critical need for Maritime Patrol Aircraft
    One of the most critical areas of concern to the committee 
is the steady reduction of DOD and DHS maritime patrol aircraft 
(MPA) patrol hours. MPA assets are the linchpin of maritime 
interdiction operations and play a key role virtually every 
significant maritime drug seizure. These aircraft provide the 
necessary detection and monitoring capability in the transit 
zones on which all other interdiction and law enforcement 
efforts depend.
    In his opening remarks to the House Committee on 
International Relations Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere 
on November 9, 2005, Chairman Dan Burton said that many of the 
air assets in the drug transit zone had been ``. . . taken out 
of the interdiction business and committed to counter-terrorism 
and homeland security. This often leaves us with more 
actionable intelligence on drug shipments than assets to 
intercept them.'' This lack of air assets often leaves law 
enforcement with no way to counteract drug shipments, leaving 
them to merely watch as drugs made their way into the 
country.\73\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \73\ See Illicit Drug Transit Zone in Central America: Hearing 
before House Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Committee on 
International Relations, 109th Cong. (Nov. 9, 2005) (statement of 
Chairman Dan Burton).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    While the U.S. interdiction forces have seized record 
amounts of cocaine over the past three years,\74\ the Coast 
Guard, Customs and Border Protection and DOD face several 
challenges in maintaining current level of assets to support 
transit zone interdiction operations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \74\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, (Feb. 2006) 
at 33.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

 ON STATION FLIGHT HOURS FOR INTERDICTION IN THE TRANSIT ZONE, FISCAL 
                            YEARS 2000-2005 



    According to JIATF-South and U.S. Interdiction Coordinator 
officials, because of its longer range, the P-3 aircraft can 
monitor a much larger surface area than other maritime patrol 
aircraft and can provide covert surveillance until other 
interdiction assets arrive.\75\ As displayed in the nearby 
graph, the availability of the U.S. Navy P-3 maritime patrol 
aircraft has steadily declined since 2002, and will degrade 
JIATF-South's ability to detect and monitor maritime 
movements.\76\ JIATF-South, Coast Guard, CBP, and U.S. 
Interdiction Coordinator officials stated that while some 
short-term fixes have been made, the longer-term implications 
of the likely continued declines in the monitoring and 
interdiction assets for the transit zone have not been 
addressed.\77\ The committee is concerned that the reduced 
availability of the U.S. Navy P-3 maritime patrol aircraft and 
the apparent lack of a suitable replacement aircraft are the 
most critical issues challenging the future of interdiction 
efforts in the transit zone.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \75\ Drug Control: Agencies Need to Plan for Likely Declines in 
Drug Interdiction Assets, and Develop Better Performance Measures for 
Transit Zone Operations, GAO Report No. 06-2000, (Nov. 2005) at 18.
    \76\ See Interrupting Narco-terrorist Threats on the High Seas: Do 
We Have Enough Wind in Our Sails? Hearing before the House Subcommittee 
on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on 
Government Reform, 109th Cong. (June 29, 2005) (testimony of Rear 
Admiral Jeffrey Hathaway, Director of JIATF-South).
    \77\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

  TOTAL P-3 ON-STATION FLIGHT HOURS IN THE TRANSIT ZONE, FISCAL YEARS 
                               2000-2005 



    The availability of the P-3 aircraft has declined for 
several reasons. In fiscal years 2000-2003, the U.S. Navy 
provided the majority of P-3 maritime patrol flying hours in 
support of interdiction efforts. However, in FY 2004, the Navy 
began limiting the use of its P-3 maritime patrol aircraft for 
transit zone interdiction missions because of structural 
problems in the P-3's wings \78\ and other worldwide 
commitments. Since FY 2000, the number of hours flown by U.S. 
Navy P-3s has decreased nearly 60 percent to about 1,500 hours 
in FY 2005.\79\ In addition, in December 2004, the Netherlands 
removed the P-3 aircraft it used to fly interdiction missions 
in the transit zone and sold its planes to Germany for use in 
the Baltic. According to the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator, the 
P-3s flown by the Netherlands were vital to interdiction 
efforts in the Caribbean Sea, averaging over 1,300 flight hours 
during fiscal years 2000-2004. In April 2005, the Netherlands 
began using the Fokker F-60, a shorter-range twin engine 
aircraft, to fly interdiction missions, but, according to 
Defense officials, these aircraft are less capable than the P-
3.\80\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \78\ The P-3 is a 40-year-old aircraft that has begun to develop 
cracks in its wing structure. Presently, the Navy plans to retire the 
P-3 and replace it with a different aircraft. However, the full fleet 
of aircraft will not be available until 2013, leaving a potential gap 
in Maritime Patrol hours.
    \79\ Drug Control: Agencies Need to Plan for Likely Declines in 
Drug Interdiction Assets, and Develop Better Performance Measures for 
Transit Zone Operations, GAO Report No. 06-2000, (Nov. 2005) at 18.
    \80\ Id, at 19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Defense Department plans to support Maritime Patrol 
                    Aircraft
    The steady reduction of DOD maritime patrol aircraft 
resource hours and the apparent gap in providing a replacement 
aircraft or unmanned aerial vehicles in the transit zone 
reflects woeful shortcomings in DOD's management of its 
detection and monitoring responsibilities. The committee 
believes that if DOD is unable to fully perform its statutory 
responsibility as the lead Federal agency for the detection and 
monitoring of illicit drug trafficking, other agencies, most 
notably the enforcement agencies at the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS), should be provided the resources necessary to 
fill the void in illicit drug detection, monitoring and 
interdiction missions.

            Customs and Border Protection plans to support Maritime 
                    Patrol Aircraft
    To help compensate for the reduction in U.S. Navy P-3 
availability, the Department of Homeland Security's Customs and 
Border Protection (CBP) has increased its P-3 maritime patrol 
on-station flight hours in the transit zone from about 1,777 
flight hours in 2000 \81\ to over 4,300 in 2005.\82\ The 
committee strongly supports CBP's increasing role in transit 
zone. However, CBP P-3 aircraft, which are formally owned and 
operated by the U.S. Navy, are challenged with the same 
maintenance issues of a Vietnam-era aircraft. The committee has 
grave concerns about the apparent lack of replacement or 
service life extension plans for CBP's aging air fleet. Also, 
it is not clear what steps CBP or DHS, as a whole, are taking 
to ensure continued P-3 aircraft support to counterdrug 
missions in the transit zone, and are not diverted to other CBP 
mission areas.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \81\ Statistics provided in letter from Mary Beth Long, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics to Mark Souder, 
chairman, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human 
Resources, Committee on Government Reform (July 13, 2005) (on file with 
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources).
    \82\ Drug Control: Agencies Need to Plan for Likely Declines in 
Drug Interdiction Assets, and Develop Better Performance Measures for 
Transit Zone Operations, GAO Report No. 06-2000, (Nov. 2005) at 19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    We recommend that the DHS closely evaluate current CBP 
procurement and modernization proposals and submit 
recommendations to Congress that will maintain these critical 
MPA capabilities throughout the projected gap period before 
U.S. Navy replacement aircraft come on-line. Without these 
capabilities, DHS efforts to combat terrorism and illegal drug 
movements in the source, transit, and arrival zones and to 
provide interagency law enforcement support would be severely 
hindered and may threaten national security. The committee 
recommends CBP Air program continue to fully support all 
international and MPA missions in the transit zones.

            Coast Guard plans to support Maritime Patrol Aircraft
    The Coast Guard, although hampered by its aging assets, has 
also attempted to rise to the task. The Service is now 
dedicating more maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) hours to drug 
interdiction missions since the 9/11 terrorist attacks.\83\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \83\ Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug 
Policy, and Human Resources Staff budget summary briefing with U.S. 
Coast Guard officials on Nov. 17, 2005; Resource hours committed to the 
drug interdiction mission include on-station hours spent on detection, 
monitoring and interdiction operations, and also transit hours needed 
for assets to get into position to begin operations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    However, the Coast Guard airframe which supports the MPA 
mission, the HC-130, is less capable than the P-3 aircraft, and 
the percentage of time the HC-130 maritime patrol surveillance 
aircraft were available to perform MPA missions was below the 
target level in fiscal year 2004. Additionally, the surface 
radar system on the aircraft is subject to frequent 
failures.\84\ In some instances, mission flight crews had to 
look out the windows of the aircraft for targets because the 
radar systems were inoperable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \84\ Drug Control: Agencies Need to Plan for Likely Declines in 
Drug Interdiction Assets, and Develop Better Performance Measures for 
Transit Zone Operations, GAO Report No. 06-2000, (Nov. 2005) at 21.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The administration has developed a strategic plan to 
replace the Coast Guard's aging ships and aircraft. The 
committee believes the Coast Guard's Deepwater fleet 
modernization project is critical to U.S. transit zone drug 
interdictions. However, the Coast Guard needs to develop 
aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles that can effectively 
perform the MPA mission, with the type of radars and sensors 
capable of complementing the aging fleet of P-3 currently 
performing the mission. Consequently, the administration and 
DHS need to ensure they are putting the right tools and 
equipment into the hands of Coast Guard men and women so that 
they may continue to effectively interdict drugs on the high 
seas, and deliver the maritime safety and security America 
deserves.

 II. Strategic and Budgetary Analysis of Federal Drug Control Programs 
                              and Agencies


                     A. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD)

                                     DOD Drug Control Funding (in millions)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                             FY 2005       FY 2005        FY 2006        FY 2006       FY 2007
            DOD Drug Control             Requested \85\   Final \86\  Requested \87\  Enacted \88\  Request \89\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AGENCY TOTAL...........................         $852.7     $1,147.8*         $895.7         $936.1        $926.9
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Includes supplemental appropriations.


Contact Information: Department of Defense Office of Public 
Affairs: 703-428-0711, http://www.defenselink.mil/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \85\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005 
Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 
2006).
    \86\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \87\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \88\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \89\ Id.

    The President's budget proposal includes approximately $927 
million for Department of Defense (DOD) counterdrug funding. 
However, this budget request does not reflect the total amount 
of money given to the Department for Drug Control programs. DOD 
has received counterdrug funds through the War Supplemental 
Appropriations process to support programs in Afghanistan. The 
committee is concerned that ONDCP does not account for this 
supplemental counterdrug funding. It is very difficult for 
ONDCP to provide effective oversight on the entire U.S. 
National Drug Control Strategy if some DOD programs are funded 
outside the established process for coordinating programs.
    The committee understands and greatly appreciates the 
efforts of U.S. Armed Forces in carrying out dangerous missions 
around the world. It was on the heels of September 11th that a 
changed world brought this marriage of drugs and terror into 
stark focus. In a special briefing on Humanitarian Assistance 
for Afghanistan, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense for 
Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Affairs, Joseph Collins, said 
Osama bin Laden and the Taliban had been ``. . . closely 
associated with major drug traffickers since 1996.'' He added, 
``With overseas donations, kickbacks from Al Qaeda, and a huge 
drug business, the Taliban has not lacked for financing.'' \90\ 
In November 2004, an unnamed senior defense official traveling 
with Defense Secretary Rumsfeld in Central America told a 
reporter that drug trafficking (among other illegal activities) 
in the region was helping fund Hamas and Hezbollah.\91\ In a 
January 2004 press briefing, General Richard Myers, accompanied 
by Secretary Rumsfeld, responded to a question concerning 
recent ship seizures in the Persian Gulf that contained illegal 
drugs. General Myers said it was clear there was a connection 
between terrorism and the drug business, both in South America 
and the Middle East.\92\ Mary Beth Long, Deputy Assistant 
Defense Secretary for Counternarcotics testified in June 2005, 
that Colombian narcoterrorists receive the majority of their 
funds from protecting, ``taxing'' and engaging in this illegal 
drug trade, and they seek to overthrow the freely elected 
Colombian government, the oldest democracy in Latin 
America.\93\ ``Financial, political and operational linkages 
already exist among narcotics trafficking, smuggling at large, 
and the regional and global expansion and movement of 
terrorists.'' \94\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \90\ Special Press Briefing on Humanitarian Assistance for 
Afghanistan by Joseph Collins, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Affairs, Nov. 15, 2001, at http://
www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2001/
t11152001--t1115aid.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \91\ Rumsfeld, Ecuadoran Leaders Vow Continued Cooperation, 
American Forces Press Service, Nov. 16, 2004 at http://
www.defenselink.mil/news/articles.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \92\ Dept. of Defense Press Briefing by Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard 
Myers on Jan. 6, 2004 at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/ (last 
visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \93\ See 2006 DOD Counternarcotics Budget: Does It Deliver the 
Necessary Support? Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal 
Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government 
Reform, 109th Cong. (May 10, 2005) (Testimony of Mary Beth Long, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics). At http://
reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=26864.
    \94\ Dept. of Defense, Office of Counternarcotics policy statement 
describing the link between counternarcotics and terrorism, at http://
defenselink.mil/policy/sections/policy--offices/solic/cn/
cn--terrorism.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The counternarcotics mission offers a solid opportunity for 
DOD collaboration with other nations combating drug 
trafficking. The development of ties and partnerships extends 
beyond the drug issue and overlaps into other areas. For 
example, the Quadrennial Defense Review Report stated, ``Where 
possible, the United States will cooperate with Russia on 
shared interests such as countering the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction, combating terrorism, and counter 
the trafficking of narcotics.'' \95\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \95\ Quadrennial Defense Review Report, (Department of Defense), 
Feb. 2006, at 29.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    DOD has recently developed new counternarcotics policies 
and programs that support the Global War on Terrorism, advance 
security cooperation goals, and contribute to national 
security. In order to accomplish these new policies, DOD has 
defined ``narcoterrorists'' to include ``Terrorists who benefit 
from narcotics production and trafficking.'' \96\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \96\ Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug 
Policy, and Human Resources drug control budget brief with Department 
of Defense, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
Counternarcotics, Nov. 10, 2005 (on file with Subcommittee on Criminal 
Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Central Transfer Account (CTA)

    In an effort to align DOD's financial management accounts 
to support this new definition of narcoterrorists, the 
Department has proposed combining the one counternarcotics 
central transfer account (CTA) with that of the much larger 
counterterrorism account. No rationale has been offered by DOD 
to support this change. In effect, DOD would fund all counter-
terrorism activities worldwide out of this one account. As a 
practical consequence, it would merely augment the Department's 
discretion over these funds and significantly frustrate 
Congress' ability to hold DOD accountable for its mandated 
counterdrug mission.\97\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \97\ Letter from Mark Souder, chairman of the Subcommittee on 
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on 
Government Reform to DOD Secretary Rumsfeld (Sept. 30, 2005) (on file 
with Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human 
Resources).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Currently, DOD's Assistant Secretary for Special Operations 
and Low Intensity Conflict (SOLIC) is responsible for 
supervising how DOD counternarcotics programs will be 
prioritized and coordinated with approved national drug 
strategies. Since the CTA funding mechanism is with the policy-
maker, timely disbursements can be, and have been made to take 
advantage of immediate opportunities. The proposed takeover of 
the CTA would make it virtually impossible for SOLIC to 
continue to preserve the integrity of counterdrug 
appropriations, allow for historical data collection, and 
provide the basis for conducting cost-effectiveness and 
comparative analyses.
    The Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, 
Drug Policy, and Human Resources raised similar concerns in 
correspondence to the Department.\98\ The committee was 
startled at the insolent response from DOD, which stated, ``If 
we make changes to the Department's internal management of the 
Counternarcotics program we will notify you immediately.'' \99\ 
The Department's lack of coordination and clarity on this issue 
raises grave doubts and concerns about the priority and status 
of all counternarcotics programs within DOD.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \98\ Id; Letter from Mark Souder, chairman of the Subcommittee on 
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on 
Government Reform to DOD Secretary Rumsfeld (Jan. 30, 2006), at http://
reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=39045 (on 
file with Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human 
Resources); Roxana Tiron, Pentagon's possible move to eliminate special 
ops oversight office could trigger Hill ire, The Hill, Feb. 1, 2006, at 
http://www.thehill.com/thehill/export/TheHill/News/Frontpage/020106/
rumsfeld.html.
    \99\ Letter from Thomas O'Connell, Assistant Secretary of Defense, 
to Mark Souder, chairman of the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug 
Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform (Oct. 11, 
2005) (on file with Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and 
Human Resources).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The committee agrees with the Department's assertion that 
terrorists may benefit from drug smuggling and that the 
Department performs a critical role as the lead agency for the 
detection and monitoring of drug trafficking into the United 
States. Be that as it may, the committee opposes any attempt to 
change the existing management, structure and procedures of the 
Central Transfer Account. While a successful effort to combat 
drug smuggling can deny funds to terrorists, it is less clear 
that a successful effort against terrorists can impact the drug 
trade. The committee strongly believes that DOD's current 
authority is sufficient and preserves important safeguards 
against the unnecessary diversion of counterdrug resources to 
non-drug interdiction operations.

2. U.S. Military Support to Counterdrug Operations

    The Department of Defense's role in support of stopping 
illicit drug trafficking is clearly spelled out in statute; the 
Department shall serve as the single lead agency of the Federal 
Government for the detection and monitoring of aerial and 
maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States.\100\ 
The Department carries out this responsibility by providing 
aircraft and ships to patrol the transit zones, utilizing radar 
and other technologies to monitor drug smuggling routes, and 
employing tactical intelligence units. The tactical 
intelligence units utilize DOD's intelligence assets and 
procedures to collect and analyze information about smuggling 
events.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \100\ 10 U.S.C. Sec. 124 (1989).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF South)

    The committee fully supports the efforts of DOD's Joint 
Interagency Task Force South (JIATF South), located in Key 
West, Florida, which serves as the central operations center 
for detection and monitoring activities covering the Caribbean 
and Eastern Pacific transit zones. In recent years, JIATF South 
has achieved remarkable results in coordinating the detection, 
monitoring and eventual interdiction of record quantities of 
cocaine in the transit zone. In FY 2005, the Coast Guard seized 
over 300,000 pounds of cocaine.\101\ The committee recognizes 
the Coast Guard's success is a direct result of the highly 
successful efforts of JIATF South and its participating 
agencies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \101\ U.S. Coast Guard, Budget in Brief, FY 2007, Feb. 2006, 
Appendix B, at B-2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    We commend the work of JIATF South and fully support the 
international, interagency team effort that has led to record 
drug seizures. The teamwork and unity of effort effectively 
demonstrated at JIATF South should be fully supported and used 
as an example of how U.S. departments and agencies can work 
together to achieve a common goal.\102\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \102\ Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug 
Policy, and Human Resources visit to JIATF-South, Key West, Florida on 
Jan. 12, 2006; The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, (Feb. 
2006) at 34. At http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/
policy/ndcs06/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    JIATF South's continued success is based partly on their 
efforts in fusing a wide range of information sources to 
support patrolling ships and aircraft in the transit zones. The 
committee fully supports JIATF South's focus on intelligence 
and support of specific programs such as Operation Panama 
Express. The committee recommends that DOD and JIATF South 
continue to enhance these programs which have produced 
outstanding results.

4. Maritime Patrol Aircraft

    The committee supports the efforts of DOD to focus its 
counternarcotics role in areas that uniquely call for military 
support. However, we are concerned that DOD may not be 
currently capable of fulfilling its assigned role in the source 
and transit zones (i.e., Latin America, the Caribbean, and the 
Eastern Pacific Ocean).

              DOD Maritime Patrol Aircraft On-station Hours
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                             Maritime
                       Fiscal Year                            Patrol
                                                             Aircraft
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2001 \103\...........................................           7,229
FY 2002.................................................           6,425
FY 2003.................................................           6,000
FY 2004.................................................           4,426
FY 2005 \104\...........................................           2,940
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As shown above, the steady drop in DOD MPA hours has 
steadily reduced a much needed detection and monitoring 
capability in the transit zones and, subsequently, diminished 
JIATF South's operational capabilities.\105\ JIATF South 
officials attribute the recent declines primarily to the 
reduced availability of U.S. Navy P-3 MPA because of structural 
problems with the older aircraft.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \103\ Statistics provided in letter from Mary Beth Long, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics to Mark Souder, 
chairman of the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and 
Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform (July 13, 2005) (on 
file with Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human 
Resources).
    \104\ Drug Control: Agencies Need to Plan for Likely Declines in 
Drug Interdiction Assets, and Develop Better Performance Measures for 
Transit Zone Operations, GAO Report No. 06-2000, (Nov. 2005) at 15.
    \105\ Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug 
Policy, and Human Resources visit to JIATF-South, Key West, Florida on 
Jan. 12, 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The lack of maritime patrol aircraft assets supporting 
JIATF South is a crisis, as the U.S. has been unable to respond 
to known shipments of drugs departing Colombia into the 
Caribbean and Eastern Pacific transit zone. Credible 
intelligence information far exceeds our ability to respond to 
these shipments. The committee believes that if DOD is unable 
to fully support the detection and monitoring mission, other 
agencies, most notably the enforcement agencies at the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), should be provided the 
resources necessary to fill the critical void in drug 
detection, monitoring and interdiction missions.

5. Maritime Refueling Vessel for the Eastern Pacific

    The committee is aware of and concerned about the flow of 
drugs bound for the U.S. and recognizes the unique challenges 
and vulnerabilities associated with U.S. interdiction efforts 
in the transit zone. At the May 11, 2005 House International 
Relations Committee hearing, Speaker Dennis Hastert testified 
that Congress ``must continue to find ways to stop those 
illicit drugs that are not eradicated from traveling through 
the transit zone to our shores.'' \106\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \106\ See Plan Colombia: Major Successes and New Challenges: 
Hearing before the House Committee on International Relations, 109th 
Cong. (May 11, 2005) (testimony of Speaker Dennis Hastert).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In the Eastern Pacific transit area, which is larger than 
the continental U.S., there are, on average, four ships 
dedicated to the drug interdiction mission. The example is 
certainly sobering: four ships to patrol an area larger than 
the continental U.S., trying to stop smugglers who will risk 
everything to evade U.S. law enforcement efforts.\107\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \107\ Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug 
Policy, and Human Resources visit to Eleventh Coast Guard District, 
Alameda, CA, on Nov. 29, 2005. 



    The Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland 
Security report that narcotics smuggling organizations continue 
to avoid U.S. drug interdiction efforts by transiting deep into 
the Eastern Pacific ocean, often south and west of the 
Galapagos Islands, which is well beyond the endurance of 
employed U.S. ships.\108\ The graphic nearby details this 
intentional, evasive strategy on the part of smugglers that 
strikes at this persistent, yet unaddressed, vulnerability of 
U.S. efforts. The traffickers have developed a sophisticated 
refueling system using support ships, while the U.S. has 
nothing similar.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \108\ Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug 
Policy, and Human Resources briefing at JIATF-South, Key West, Florida, 
on Jan. 13, 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Drug smugglers use the Eastern Pacific transit zone for 
moving narcotics into Mexico and then the United States. On any 
given day, U.S. and Allied forces seize an average of 100 
kilograms of cocaine per ship when patrolling in the Eastern 
Pacific maritime transit zone. Because of the lack of a 
maritime oiler ship, the U.S. Coast Guard estimates it loses 
100 ``ship-days'' each year due to lengthy refueling trips to 
central and South American countries.\109\ U.S. Navy ships 
conducting drug interdiction operations also face similar 
refueling challenges.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \109\ See Interrupting Narco-terrorist Threats on the High Seas: Do 
We Have Enough Wind in Our Sails? Hearing before the Subcommittee on 
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on 
Government Reform, 109th Cong. (June 29, 2005) (testimony of Rear 
Admiral Dennis Sirois, Assistant Commandant for Operations, U.S. Coast 
Guard). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/
EventSingle.aspx?EventID=29727.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As detailed above, interdiction efforts in the maritime 
transit zones are hampered by the absence of a refueling ship. 
The U.S. needs a maritime refueling vessel in the Eastern 
Pacific transit zone for drug interdiction operations. U.S. 
Coast Guard, U.S. Navy, and Allied warships performing drug 
interdiction missions currently have no ``at-sea'' refueling 
capability in that area and thus cannot operate for any 
significant length of time before they must return to port to 
refuel.
    Acting U.S. Interdiction Coordinator (USIC) Ralph Utley 
testified on June 29, 2005, that there would be substantial 
benefits if a maritime oiler ship were employed to support 
interdiction activities in the Eastern Pacific maritime transit 
zone.\110\ At the same hearing, witnesses representing the 
Department of Defense, the U.S. Coast Guard, Customs and Border 
Protection, and the Drug Enforcement Administration testified 
that they believe the employment of a maritime oiler vessel 
would be an immediate improvement to U.S. interdiction 
operations in the transit zone.\111\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \110\ Id, (testimony of Ralph Utley, Acting U.S. Interdiction 
Coordinator).
    \111\ Id, (testimony of Rear Admiral Jeffrey Hathaway, Director of 
JIATF-South) (testimony of Rear Admiral Dennis Sirois, Assistant 
Commandant for Operations, U.S. Coast Guard) (testimony of Mr. Charles 
E. Stallworth II, Acting Assistant Commissioner, Office of Air and 
Marine Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection) (testimony of 
Mr. Thomas M. Harrigan, Chief of Enforcement Operations, Drug 
Enforcement Administration).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The U.S. Navy, which manages a fleet of refueling and 
support ships, has been unable to commit refueling ships to 
support the drug interdiction mission. On July 13, 2005, the 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics 
wrote to the Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal 
Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources that ``the assets are 
simply not available.'' \112\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \112\ Letter from Mary Beth Long, Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Counternarcotics to Mark Souder, chairman of the 
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, 
Committee on Government Reform (July 13, 2005) (on file with 
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In the post 9/11 world, where both securing and detecting 
threats to our nation's borders have become critical national 
security objectives, we cannot continue to neglect the fact 
that narco-traffickers are breaching our borders on a daily 
basis and transporting deadly narcotics onto our nation's 
streets. Drug trafficking organizations have already adapted to 
these long transit routes by employing support ships to refuel 
drug laden boats on the high seas. The committee believes it is 
time that U.S. interdiction agencies be provided the right 
tools to respond to this unique opportunity to stop smugglers 
in the Eastern Pacific.
    Congress has recently attempted to address this 
vulnerability. Amendment No. 10 to H.R. 889, The Coast Guard 
and Maritime Transportation Act of 2005, was agreed to by voice 
vote on September 15, 2005, having received the support of 
leadership and the Committee on Transportation and 
Infrastructure. The Amendment authorized $50 million to enable 
the State Department's Bureau for International Narcotics 
Control and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) to purchase or lease 
a maritime refueling support vessel capable of refueling U.S. 
and Allied vessels engaged in drug interdiction in the Eastern 
Pacific transit zone.\113\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \113\ 109 Congressional Record H8047 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 2005) 
(statement of Representative Souder), available at http://
thomas.loc.gov (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This is the second time the House voted in favor of 
procuring a drug interdiction refueling vessel. On July 19, 
2005, a similar amendment was agreed to by voice vote and 
included in H.R. 2601, The Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 
Fiscal Years 2006 and 2007.\114\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \114\ 109 Congressional Record H6049 (daily ed. July 19, 2005) 
(statement of Representative Souder), available at http://
thomas.loc.gov (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The committee commends DOD for reaching out to our 
international partners and requesting maritime refueling 
assistance. In November 2005, DOD stated that the Chilean Navy 
had an oiler available to support U.S. interdiction efforts in 
the transit zones and that a trial period would begin in the 
Spring of 2006.\115\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \115\ Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug 
Policy, and Human Resources drug control budget brief with Department 
of Defense Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
Counternarcotics, on Nov. 10, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

6. U.S. Navy--Aviation Use of Force (AUF)

    The committee fully supports the U.S Navy's new armed 
helicopter program for drug interdiction missions.\116\ We 
believe that the Coast Guard's Helicopter Interdiction Squadron 
(HITRON) has clearly demonstrated a safe and effective 
capability to stop fleeing, drug-laden speedboats. Although the 
process of developing the capability has been slow and was 
originally scheduled to be fully capable in October 2005, the 
committee commends the U.S. Navy for demonstrating flexibility 
and initiative to incorporate the Coast Guard's 
techniques.\117\ The committee has high expectations that the 
new AUF capabilities will provide immediate results in 
interdicting go-fast smuggling vessels in the transit zones.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \116\ Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug 
Policy, and Human Resources drug control budget brief with Department 
of Defense, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
Counternarcotics, on Nov. 10, 2005; The White House, National Drug 
Control Strategy, (Feb. 2006) at 35.
    \117\ Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug 
Policy, and Human Resources detection and monitoring brief with 
Department of Defense Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
Counternarcotics, on Aug. 31, 2005; Government Reform Subcommittee on 
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources visit to Coast Guard 
HITRON, Jacksonville, Florida, on Jan. 9, 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

7. Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS)

    The degrading of the Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS) 
is an area of concern for the committee. As demonstrated in the 
graphic nearby, the U.S. Air Force, which took over control of 
TARS from the U.S. Customs Service, has reduced the number of 
TARS radar sites from 14 to 8. This reduction in capability has 
left the U.S. relatively blind to air and marine smuggling 
activities along the entire Gulf Coast (stretching from the 
east coast of Texas to the southern tip of Florida) and from 
the eastern coast of Florida to Puerto Rico. 



    The Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, 
Drug Policy, and Human Resources has raised concerns in 
correspondence to the Department.\118\ In response, DOD has 
stated they have developed an over-the-horizon radar system to 
replace the old Caribbean radar network, \119\ but the 
committee believes this new system has limited ability to 
detect vector and speed and that TARS is superior. In addition, 
DOD stated that drug smuggling through the U.S. gulf coast has 
always been deemed to be negligible. The committee is very 
concerned that a ``gap'' between detection systems may be 
developing in the gulf coast region. As record seizures and 
enforcement actions are increased in both the maritime transit 
zones and along the Southwest Border with Mexico, the gulf 
coast region will provide an easy entry way for traffickers 
wanting to avoid detection.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \118\ Letter from Mark Souder, chairman of the Subcommittee on 
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on 
Government Reform to DOD Office of the Secretary of Defense, to U.S. 
Southern Command and to U.S. Northern Command, (July 29, 2005) (on file 
with Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human 
Resources); Letter from Mark Souder, chairman of the Subcommittee on 
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on 
Government Reform, to Director, Joint Interagency Task Force South, 
(Jan. 31, 2005) (on file with Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug 
Policy, and Human Resources).
    \119\ Letter from Mary Beth Long, Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Counternarcotics, to Congressman Mark Souder, chairman of 
the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, 
Committee on Government Reform (July 13, 2005) (on file with 
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    If DOD is not committed to managing the TARS program as 
designed, the committee recommends that the Customs and Border 
Protection program in DHS, with appropriate funding for 
maintenance and improvements, regain operational responsibility 
for the TARS program. DOD, however, should retain the 
responsibility for the program's logistics and procurement.

8. Afghanistan Operations

    ``We live in a world that is full of conflict, 
contradictions, and accelerating change. Viewed from the 
perspective of the Director of National Intelligence, the most 
dramatic change of all is the exponential increase in the 
number of targets we must identify, track, and analyze. Today, 
in addition to hostile nation-states, we are focusing on 
terrorist groups, proliferation networks, alienated 
communities, charismatic individuals, narcotraffickers, and 
microscopic influenza.'' \120\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \120\ See Current and Projected National Security Threats to the 
United States Hearing before Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 
109th Cong. (Feb. 2, 2006) (testimony of John D. Negroponte, Director 
of National Intelligence).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The connection between heroin production and terrorism in 
Afghanistan cannot be overstated. ``The booming drug trade has 
given a strong second wind to the stubborn insurgency being 
waged by the Taliban and Islamists warlords--The ballooning 
dope trade is rapidly creating narco-states in central Asia, 
destroying what little border control exists and making it 
easier for terrorist groups to operate.'' \121\ In an April 
2004 hearing, Rear Admiral Bruce Clingan for U.S. Central 
Command told the Senate Armed Services Committee Subcommittee 
on Emerging Threats and Capabilities that the counternarcotics 
program in Afghanistan was a ``key element'' in the U.S. 
campaign against terrorism.\122\ The cultivation of poppies, 
which was regulated and taxed under Taliban rule, flourished 
after the elimination of the Taliban regime.\123\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \121\ David E. Kaplan, Paying for Terror, U.S. News & World Report, 
(Dec. 5, 2005) at 50.
    \122\ See U.S. Central Command's Counter Narcotics Program Hearing 
before the Senate Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, 
Senate Armed Services Committee, 109th Cong. (Apr. 2, 2004) (testimony 
of Rear Admiral Bruce Clingan, USN, Deputy J-3, U.S. Central Command). 
At http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/
2004--hr/040402-clingan.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \123\ U.S. Set to Battle Afghan Drug Trade, New York Times on the 
Web, Aug. 11, 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In August 2005, the U.N. reported that opium production had 
decreased by 21 percent from its 2004 level but, even with this 
decrease, Afghanistan still ranks as the world's largest opium 
supplier accounting for 87 percent of the world's supply, 
according to the U.N.\124\ There is reportedly evidence that 
the Taliban are ordering increased poppy production from Afghan 
farmers in remote regions beyond the government's control as a 
means to make money to finance their operations and also to 
weaken the Afghan central government.\125\ In Helmand province, 
the new governor recently stated that the Taliban have forged 
an alliance with drug smugglers, providing protection for drug 
convoys and mounting attacks to keep the government away and 
the poppy flourishing.\126\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \124\ The Opium Situation in Afghanistan as of 29 Aug. 2005, the 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, (UN Report), Aug. 2005.
    \125\ Philip Shishkin and David Crawford, In Afghanistan, Heroin 
Trade Soars Despite U.S. Aid, Wall Street Journal, Jan. 18, 2006, and 
Declan Walsh, In Afghanistan, Taliban Turning to the Drug Trade, Boston 
Globe, Dec. 18, 2005.
    \126\ Carlotta Gall, Another Year of Drug War, and the Poppy Crop 
Flourishes, New York Times on the Web, Feb. 17, 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The committee believes that U.S. counterdrug efforts in 
Afghanistan have failed to prevent the explosion in heroin 
production and trafficking. If all of Afghanistan's opium were 
converted to heroin, the result would be 526 metric tons.\127\ 
Recent estimates from the United Nations office on Drugs and 
Crime indicate that 87 percent of the world's illegal opiates 
are produced in Afghanistan.\128\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \127\ Briefing by Drug Enforcement Administration to the Speaker's 
Drug Policy Task Force, Washington, DC, (Jan. 26, 2006).
    \128\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, (Feb. 2006) 
at 38.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ``For my money, the No. 1 problem in Afghanistan is 
drugs,'' said U.S. Marine Corps General James L. Jones, the 
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) and the Commander of 
the United States European Command (COMUSEUCOM).\129\ Despite 
recognition by some U.S. military leaders that drugs are 
currently Afghanistan's primary security problem, DOD has 
played only a supporting role in counternarcotics operations in 
Afghanistan. The committee fully agrees with General Jones. The 
illicit drug trade must be addressed through a coordinated 
effort of involved U.S. agencies and coalition forces before 
stability and democracy can take hold in Afghanistan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \129\ Associated Press, Drugs Main Threat in Afghanistan, General 
Says, Los Angeles Times, Dec. 16, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In 2005, the Department of Defense increased its 
counternarcotics role in Afghanistan but did not become 
actively involved in counterdrug operations on the ground. The 
U.S. military in Afghanistan supported efforts by Afghan and 
U.S. agencies such as the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) 
by providing helicopter and cargo aircraft transport and 
planning and intelligence assets.\130\ To fund efforts to 
combat the drug trade in Afghanistan, DOD requested $257 
million, \131\ and Congress approved $242 million (Public Law 
109-13, 119 Stat. 240) to fund facilities, equipment, 
communications, and training, and to lease and refurbish 
helicopters for the Afghan government. These funds are in 
addition to the $15.4 million in DOD's FY 2005 Defense Budget 
for counternarcotics assistance to the Afghan government.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \130\ Thom Shanker, Pentagon Sees Antidrug Effort in Afghanistan, 
New York Times, Mar. 25, 2005, and James Gordon Meek, DEA Team to Fight 
Afghani Opium Trade, New York Daily News, Apr. 3, 2005.
    \131\ Department of Defense FY 2005 Supplemental Request for 
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and 
Operation Unified Assistance, (DOD) Feb. 2005, at 81.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The committee supports the goals outlined in the 
President's Drug Control Strategy Report.\132\ Many of these 
efforts are pictured below, which call for helping the Afghans 
build a judicial system, construct a narcotics prosecution task 
force, establish border crossings and border strong points, and 
train and equip a counternarcotics police force. However, while 
the committee agrees that these are appropriate goals, they are 
better suited to programs run by the State Department and not 
efforts and missions to which DOD should be tasked.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \132\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, (Feb. 2006) 
at 38. 



    Instead, the committee believes that the destruction of 
heroin producing laboratories, stockpiles of precursor 
chemicals, opium, and heroin should be DOD's primary mission 
areas for counterdrug activity in Afghanistan. DOD should 
target and destroy Afghan drug production infrastructures and 
trafficking operations. The reluctance to target known 
stockpiles of opium products will encourage even more heroin 
production, threatening to increase heroin addiction in Europe 
and the U.S. and providing increased funding for the terrorists 
who are currently engaging our troops in Afghanistan. Until DOD 
shows a willingness to take effective action against heroin 
production and to closely coordinate its efforts with the State 
Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID), and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), limited 
progress will be made.
    The committee is similarly concerned about the limited 
support being provided by DOD to U.S. and Allied agencies 
actually trying to conduct counterdrug operations in 
Afghanistan. DOD has been reluctant to provide aviation assets 
or other logistical support to DEA personnel.
    Not only does the administration need to refine U.S. 
mission areas in Afghanistan, but DOD needs to better align and 
coordinate with U.S. agencies with similar mission sets. The 
committee was pleased to learn of the Department's recent 
decision to lease low-quality Soviet-era MI-17 helicopters to 
support and transport DEA teams, and believes it is long 
overdue. The committee recommends that the Department provide 
better support to DEA's counterdrug efforts.

9. Colombian Operations

    U.S. military involvement in Colombia began in 2000 under 
``Plan Colombia'' and was limited to training Colombian 
counternarcotics units, although U.S. forces now train the 
Colombian military in counterinsurgency operations. This change 
of emphasis is a result of the September 11, 2001 terrorist 
attacks, whereby Colombia went from being a part of the ``War 
on Drugs'' to the ``Global War on Terror'' (GWOT). The danger 
to the Americas, even to those nations with long histories of 
self-determination, and of the political instability generated 
by drug trafficking was made clear by Chairman Tom Davis of the 
House Government Reform Committee on October 7, 2005, when he 
said of Colombia, ``(It) is not only one of the oldest 
democracies in our hemisphere, but is also home to three 
terrorist groups who fund their guerilla activities with drugs 
smuggled into the U.S. for American consumption.'' \133\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \133\ Press Release, House Committee on Government Reform, (Oct. 7, 
2005) at www.reform.house.gov.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Colombia occupies a unique position in the administration's 
global war on terror, in that its targeted terrorist groups are 
Marxist, as opposed to Islamic-based, and have no reported 
links to Al Qaeda or other Islamic groups. Colombia has been 
involved for almost forty years in what some describe as a 
civil war and others describe as a counterinsurgency campaign 
against three major groups. The first two groups, the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National 
Liberation Army (ELN) started in the 1950s as Marxist 
revolutionary groups but reportedly have lost most of their 
ideological support and have transformed into violent criminal 
organizations.\134\ The other group, the rightist United Self-
Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) is a conglomerate of illegal 
self-defense groups formed in rural areas where the Colombian 
government did not exert a strong presence.\135\ All three 
groups allegedly fund their activities through drug revenues 
\136\ and are on the administration's official list of 
terrorist organizations.\137\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \134\ Lieutenant Colonel Kevin W. Buckley, U.S. Support to Plan 
Colombia: A Heading Check U.S. Army War College Strategy Research 
Project, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. (2004) at 1 (on 
file with U.S. Army War College).
    \135\ Id.
    \136\ Id.
    \137\ Dept. of State, Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 
(2004) at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/45323.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In June 2004 congressional testimony before the House 
Committee on Government Reform, the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict told 
House members that DOD and other U.S. agencies operating in 
Columbia, ``. . . seek to systematically dismantle drug 
trafficking networks, both to halt the flow of drugs into the 
United States, and to bolster the broader war on terrorism 
effort.'' \138\ Narcoterrorism was reported by Brigadier 
General Benjamin Mixon, Director of Operations, Southern 
Command in a hearing before Senate Armed Services Committee 
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities in April 
2004, as ``. . . erode(ing) the very fabric of democracy by 
spawning terrorism, corrupting public institutions, promoting 
criminal activity, undermining legitimate economies and 
disrupting social order.'' \139\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \138\ See The War Against Drugs and Thugs: A Status Report on Plan 
Colombia Successes and Remaining Challenges: Hearing before the 
Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (June 17, 2004) (testimony 
of Thomas O'Connell, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special 
Operations and Low Intensity Conflict).
    \139\ See Testimony on the Department of Defense Counternarcotics 
Program in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 
2005: Hearing before the Senate Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and 
Capabilities, Senate Armed Services Committee, 108th Cong. (Apr. 2, 
2004) (testimony of Brigadier General Benjamin Mixon, U.S. Army, 
Director of Operations, U.S. Southern Command). 



    About 200 special forces soldiers are currently serving as 
trainers, where they are limited to training in garrison and 
planning support at headquarters, and another 200 troops 
provide ``information support'' including intelligence, 
leadership, and planning support.\140\ Also contributing to 
Colombia's success has been the Air Bridge Denial program.\141\ 
In 2005, this program resulted in seven interdictions, five 
impounded aircraft, the destruction of two aircraft, and the 
seizure of 1.5 metric tons of cocaine in Colombia. 
Additionally, three aircraft and 2.1 metric tons of cocaine 
were impounded in neighboring countries after coordination 
between host nations and JIATF South.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \140\ Kathleen T. Rhem, U.S. Military Helping Colombian Military 
Cope With Drug War's Legacy, American Forces Information Service, Nov. 
29, 2005.
    \141\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, (Feb. 2006) 
at 20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In its Quadrennial Defense Review Report, released February 
6, 2006, DOD justifiably recognized its part in the successes 
achieved in helping stabilize large tracts of Colombia.

        U.S. Southern Command's support for Plan Colombia is 
        yet another example of preventive action. The United 
        States has worked with the Government of Colombia to 
        combat the production and trafficking of illegal drugs. 
        In 2002, at the request of the Administration, Congress 
        granted expanded authorities to help the Colombian 
        Government wage a unified campaign against terrorism as 
        well as drugs, and thereby assert effective control 
        over its territory. This broader mission has helped the 
        Colombian Government seize the initiative against 
        illegal armed groups, demobilize thousands of illegal 
        paramilitaries, decrease violence and return to 
        government authority areas that had been under the 
        control narcoterrorists for decades.\142\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \142\ Dept. of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report,  (Feb. 
2006) at 14. At http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/
Report20060203.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).

    The committee strongly recommends that the Department 
continue to fully support these important programs. These 
efforts, combined with the Government of Colombia's efforts to 
attack powerful drug traffickers and extradite them to the 
United States has produced unparalleled results \143\ and need 
to remain robust to be effective.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \143\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, (Feb. 2006) 
at 21.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Moreover, the committee encourages CENTCOM to coordinate 
the meeting of Colombian military and police personnel with 
Iraqi counterparts to discuss Colombian approaches to oil 
pipeline protection and counterdrug helicopter operations. 
Colombian security services have had vast experience and 
measured success guarding oil pipelines and carrying out 
tactical helicopter missions that may prove beneficial to both 
counterdrug operations and efforts to protect oil pipelines in 
Iraq.

10. Department of Defense Performance Measures

    Congress has had difficulty obtaining sufficient 
information from DOD that would allow for an evaluation of the 
effectiveness of counterdrug programs at the Department. For 
example, the Department has not established a ship and aircraft 
resource hour target to support transit zone detection and 
monitoring programs.\144\ Additionally, DOD's counternarcotics 
program has not yet been reviewed under the administration's 
Performance Assessment Rating Tool (PART) process.\145\ GAO 
reported in November 2005 that DOD ``is developing performance 
measures that focus on the number of disruptions of cocaine 
trafficking events, but it has not yet set any targets or goals 
to assess its progress.\146\ The committee urges the Department 
to make greater progress in performance accountability. In 
particular, the committee believes that substantial increases 
in resources committed to the Department's detection and 
monitoring mission in the transit zone need to be made in order 
to achieve greater supply reduction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \144\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at 15.
    \145\ Id.
    \146\ Drug Control: Agencies Need to Plan for Likely Declines in 
Drug Interdiction Assets, and Develop Better Performance Measures for 
Transit Zone Operations, GAO Report No. 06-2000, Nov. 2005, at 25.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                       B. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

                     Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities State Grants Program Funding
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                         FY 2005        FY 2005        FY 2006         FY 2006        FY 2007
         SDFSC State Grants          Requested \147\  Final \148\  Requested \149\  Enacted \150\  Request \151\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AGENCY TOTAL*......................        $610.98        $437.38             $0         $346.50             $0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in millions.


Contact Information: Office of SDFSC: 202-260-3954, http://
www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/osdfs/index.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \147\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005 
Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 
2006).
    \148\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \149\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \150\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \151\ Id.

1. Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities

    The committee has specific concerns about the 
administration of the Safe and Drug Free Schools and 
Communities (SDFSC) program at the Department of Education. 
Despite the strong rejection by Congress of last year's budget 
proposal to completely eliminate the State grants program and 
ample evidence that the stated reasons behind such a step are 
not properly grounded, the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) has once again made the same proposal with the support of 
officials at the Department of Education.
    Congressman Mark Souder, chairman of the Subcommittee on 
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, expressed 
strong support for the State Grants Program: ``Safe and Drug-
Free Schools and similar programs have great potential as a 
vehicle for bringing effective anti-drug education to millions 
of young people in our schools.'' \152\ Moreover, Ranking 
Member, Representative Elijah Cummings, reemphasized the same 
message:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \152\ See Drug Prevention Programs and the Fiscal Year 2006 Drug 
Control Budget: Is the Federal Government Neglecting Illegal Drug Use 
Prevention? Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, 
Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 109th 
Cong. (Apr. 26, 2005) (statement of Congressman Mark Souder, chairman, 
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources).

        The most severe program cut in the area of prevention 
        is the elimination of $441 million in funding for 
        grants to States under the Safe and Drug-Free Schools 
        program within the Department of Education. If we enact 
        the President's request, the consequences will be felt 
        in classrooms across the country, where States and 
        localities simply cannot afford to fund drug education 
        on their own.\153\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \153\ Id, (statement of Congressman Elijah Cummings, ranking 
member, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human 
Resources).

    The grants distributed under the State Grants program serve 
as leverage that allows local communities to significantly 
augment their capacity to provide drug prevention programs. 
``Many school systems across America have found unique ways to 
combine these SDFSC funds with very little local moneys in 
order to provide the highest level of drug prevention. Removing 
the monetary foundation of these programs could cause many if 
not all of them to collapse.'' \154\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \154\ Id, (statement of Clarence Jones, coordinator, Safe and Drug-
Free Youth Section, Fairfax County Public Schools).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The committee is very concerned that the major reforms 
required in Title IV, Part A of the ``No Child Left Behind 
Act'' (NCLB) \155\ were never implemented by the Department of 
Education. To date, the Department has failed to provide any 
guidance to the states regarding implementation of the 
requirements for a Uniform Management Information and Reporting 
System (UMIRS).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \155\ No Child Left Behind Act, 20 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 6301-6578 
(2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This system was specifically included in the NCLB Act to 
ensure that uniform information, data and outcome measures for 
drug use were collected by every state in a uniform manner and 
reported to the Secretary of Education, so that progress could 
be measured within a state over time, as well as among and 
between all of the states. Congress also specifically included 
a minimum data set as part of the Safe Report required in 
Section 4116 of the NCLB Act.\156\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \156\ Public Law 89-10 (1994).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This minimum data set requires that the following drug use 
data be collected, tracked and reported to the Secretary by all 
states: incidence and prevalence, age of onset, perception of 
health risk and perception of social disapproval of drug use 
and violence by youth in schools and communities. As outlined 
in the law, the data set for the drug-related indicators are 
identical to what is currently being collected successfully by 
both the Office of National Drug Control Policy's Drug-Free 
Communities Act grantees and the Center for Substance Abuse 
Prevention's State Incentive Grant recipients.
    The Department has failed to meet the requirements of Title 
IV, Part A of the NCLB Act, intended to measure the 
effectiveness and outcomes of the SDFSC program. Consequently, 
Congress recently mandated that the following actions be taken 
by the Department of Education to correct this failure of 
implementation, in the Conference Report accompanying the FY 
2006, Labor, Health and Human Services and Education 
Appropriations Act: \157\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \157\ See http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/
getdoc.cgi?dbname=109--cong--reports&docid=f:hr143
.109.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).

        The Conference Committee is concerned that the 
        Department of Education has neglected to report 
        specific data to Congress as required under Section 
        4122(c) of Title IV, Part A of the No Child Left Behind 
        Act. This data is required to be included in the State 
        Report under Section 4116 of the Safe and Drug-Free 
        Schools and Communities program. The report 
        specifically requires all states to collect and report 
        to the Secretary, in a form specified by the Secretary, 
        the following data: incidence and prevalence, age of 
        onset, perception of health risk and perception of 
        social disapproval of drug use and violence by youth in 
        schools and communities. The Conference Committee 
        expects the Department to develop a plan for how it 
        will collect the specified data from the states and 
        report it to Congress in a timely manner. The plan 
        should be submitted to the House and Senate authorizing 
        and oversight committees within 60 days of the passage 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        of this bill.

    The committee focuses its critique on the administration of 
the Safe and Drug-Free Schools program and the proposed 
elimination of the State Grants program. A central reason 
behind this proposal was the determination that this program 
was ``ineffective'' under OMB's Program Assessment Rating Tool 
(PART) review for the fiscal year 2004 Budget. However, in 
qualifying this determination the PART assessment stated that 
the ``existing program indicators use national surveys and 
don't measure . . . drug abuse at State and local levels.'' 
\158\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \158\ Letter from Debra A. Price, Assistant Deputy Secretary, 
Office of Safe and Drug Free Schools, Department of Education, to 
Congressman Mark Souder, chairman, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, 
Drug Policy, and Human Resources, (Dec. 8, 2005) (on file with 
Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and 
Human Resources).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The subcommittee specifically inquired in a November 17, 
2005, letter to the Department of Education concerning the 
steps being taken to address this criticism. The Department 
provided the following response: ``The President's Budget 
request for FY 2006 recommended termination of the Safe and 
Drug-Free Schools State Grants Program.'' \159\ Staff 
interviews with representatives from Safe and Drug-Free Schools 
and Communities also reconfirmed the administration's adherence 
to the program's claimed ``ineffectiveness'' as justification 
for not taking steps to reform the State Grants program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \159\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In the ``Summary: FY 2007 National Drug Control Budget,'' 
the administration once again, repeating the unfounded and 
inadequate reasons given last year, states: ``The President's 
Budget does not include funding for Safe and Drug-Free Schools 
State Grant Program, as grant funds are spread too thinly to 
support quality interventions and it was rated ``ineffective'' 
by PART because of its inability to demonstrate 
effectiveness.'' \160\ However, the SDFSC representatives 
interviewed by staff acknowledged that, utilizing proxy 
measures, the Department of Education has been incapable of 
getting results to show either the effectiveness or the 
ineffectiveness of the State Grants Program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \160\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, (Feb. 2006) 
at 1. At http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/
ndcs06/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Moreover, SDFSC State data collection project officials 
developed a preliminary strategy designed to address the 
problem of collecting data from the states, such as providing 
exemptions from certain reporting requirements for some 
states.\161\ ``However, this strategy has not been finalized, 
and Education has not developed a specific plan of action for 
how they might (1) help states that are deficient, (2) deal 
with state expectations for phasing out the multiple data 
collections, or (3) meet the expectations of their own program 
offices.'' \162\ The committee is dissatisfied with the degree 
of implementation on the part of the administrators of SDFDC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \161\ Education's Data Management Initiative: Significant Progress 
Made, but Better Planning Needed to Accomplish Project Goals, GAO 
Report No. 06-6 (Government Accounting Office), Oct. 28, 2005, at 2.
    \162\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Moreover, Chairman Mark Souder made the following comments 
directly addressing the lack of support the State Grants 
program has received from the administration in general:

        The administration has never attempted to reform this 
        program, however, which ought to be the first step, not 
        eliminating it entirely. And I want to say as a member 
        of the Education Committee, and as somebody who was on 
        it when we did this that we got no leadership at the 
        time we authorized the program either, other than 
        eliminating it.\163\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \163\ See Drug Prevention Programs and the Fiscal Year 2006 Drug 
Control Budget: Is the Federal Government Neglecting Illegal Drug Use 
Prevention? Hearing Before House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug 
Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 109th 
Cong. (Apr. 26, 2005) (statement of Congressman Mark Souder, chairman, 
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources).

    The committee agrees that ineffective programs should be 
held accountable. However, proposing the elimination of a 
program because it is supposedly ``ineffective,'' while also 
admitting that its effectiveness is unknown, is of utmost 
concern. The more serious concern arises from the Department's 
contribution to the claimed inefficiency by having failed to 
implement congressionally-mandated requirements and its failure 
to give the States any specific guidance on how to report their 
data and outcomes. These failures directly impact the 
Department of Education's incapacity to actually determine the 
effectiveness of the State Grants program.
    In FY 2006 Congress emphatically rejected the same 
administration proposal to eliminate the State Grants program. 
Instead of eliminating the program, Congress appropriated 
$346.5 million for the State Grants program. Similar to last 
year, the committee strongly suggests that the administration 
take substantial steps to reform the State Grants program 
rather than eliminate it. More specifically, the committee 
suggests that the administrators of the SDSFC program at the 
Department of Education be held accountable for neglecting the 
legal obligation to collect state data intended to measure the 
effectiveness and outcomes of the SDFSC State Grant program.

2. Student Drug Testing \164\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \164\ For further information, see the Department's website at 
http://web99.ed.gov/GTEP/Program2.nsf/b39cd123fd4a045b8525644400514f2b/
cea6c8f66422784785256d3c0074e597?OpenDocument (last visited Feb. 26, 
2006), or call the Department's Office of SDFS at (202) 260-3428.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    For FY 2006, Congress appropriated $9.09 million for 
school-based drug testing programs for students. The FY 2007 
request of $15 million is a $4.6 million increase over last 
year.\165\ The committee strongly supports this testing 
initiative. However, in light of the administrations proposal 
to eliminate the State Grants Program, a more significant 
augmentation in the funding for student drug testing is 
strongly recommended.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \165\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at 17. At http://
www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/ (last 
visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    By addressing accountability, drug testing in schools has 
proven the single most effective drug-prevention program in the 
United States. In 2002 the Supreme Court declared: ``[W]e find 
that testing students who participate in extracurricular 
activities is a reasonably effective means of addressing the 
School District's legitimate concerns in preventing, deterring, 
and detecting drug use.'' \166\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \166\ Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 837 (2002).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The administration has taken a leadership role in promoting 
drug testing in the schools. Drug testing shows great promise 
in preventing young people from using narcotics. It is also a 
tool for identifying which students will need treatment and 
other special help to get them off drugs and achieve their true 
potential. It is also an excellent tool for measuring the 
success of other drug use prevention programs, as it shows 
whether the true bottom line--reducing drug use--has been 
achieved.'' \167\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \167\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at 17. At http://
www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/ (last 
visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The purpose of drug testing is not to punish students who 
use drugs but to help those in trouble by preventing drug use 
and helping drug-using students become drug-free in a 
confidential manner. The results of a positive drug test should 
be used to intervene with not-yet-dependent students and get 
drug-dependent students into effective treatment. After 
assessing the extent of the problem, parents and administrators 
can recommend further prevention activities such as education 
on the negative effects of drugs, counseling, and if necessary, 
drug treatment.
    ONDCP and the U.S. Department of Education announced the 
release of $7.2 million in Federal grants for schools to 
implement student drug testing programs in October 2005. Fifty-
five grants were awarded to fund random student drug testing 
programs in 352 schools.\168\ The competitive grant program 
supports schools in the design and implementation of a 
confidential and non-punitive program to randomly screen 
selected students and to intervene with assessment, referral, 
and intervention for students whose test results indicate they 
have used illicit drugs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \168\ See ONDCP news release at http://
www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/news/press05/122805.html (last visited 
Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Results from a longitudinal study, the Student Athlete 
Testing Using Random Notification Project (SATURN), reported 
that of the 25 percent of students surveyed who used marijuana 
and of the 60 percent who used alcohol, only 9 percent would 
continue to use drugs and 12 percent would continue to use 
alcohol if mandatory drug testing were present in their 
schools.\169\ Moreover, a study at Hunterdon Central Regional 
High School in New Jersey, highlighted in the chart below, 
stated: ``of students who reported using marijuana in the last 
year, 58 percent reported Random Drug testing (RDT) is a good 
excuse not to use. 81.8 percent of those students who did not 
use marijuana in the past year agreed that RDT is a good excuse 
not to use.'' \170\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \169\ See http://www.studentdrugtesting.org/
SDT%20DUPONT%20STUDY.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \170\ See http://www.studentdrugtesting.org/Hunterdon%20study2.PDF 
(last visited Feb. 24, 2006).

                    Student Past Month Drug Use: Hunterdon County vs. National Average \171\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                  10th       US 10th        12th       US 12th
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alcohol.....................................................    29.9%                     arrow>
Been Drunk..................................................     9.7%                     arrow>
Marijuana...................................................     4.7%                     arrow>
Cocaine.....................................................            0           1%      1.4 
Ecstasy.....................................................         0.1%           NA         0.8%           Na
Heroin......................................................            0          <1%         0.6%          <1%
Cigarettes..................................................    11.5%                     arrow>
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The committee supports the administration's request of $15 
million for non-punitive random student drug testing as an 
effective and economical method to deter drug use and identify 
those in need of treatment. At the same time, if prevention 
authentically represents one of the three pillars of the 
administration's efforts to end illegal drug abuse, then the 
committee strongly recommends a substantial increase to the 
funding of student drug testing as an effective and accountable 
form of drug prevention.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \171\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Lack of Diligence in Reporting to Congress

    The committee is seriously concerned with the Department of 
Education's lack of due diligence in preparing for a drug 
prevention hearing held on April 26, 2005. Department of 
Education representatives were formally notified to prepare to 
testify at the April hearing in a December 16, 2004, briefing. 
Despite being put on notice in December 2004 to prepare for the 
hearing, ED officials claimed immediately prior to the hearing 
in April that they had not had enough time to sufficiently 
prepare to testify.
    If not constituting intentional avoidance of testifying 
before Congress, such unwillingness to be held accountable at 
least is grossly negligent. ED representatives have an 
obligation to promptly and reasonably respond to requests for 
testimony from Congress. Otherwise, the oversight function of 
congressional committees would be seriously impaired.

               C. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES


----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                         FY 2005        FY 2005        FY 2006         FY 2006        FY 2007
                HHS                  Requested \172\  Final \173\  Requested \174\  Enacted \175\  Request \176\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
National Institute of Drug Abuse...       $1,019.1       $1,006.4       $1,010.1        $1,000.0         $994.8
Substance Abuse and Mental Health         $2,637.7       $2,490.5       $2,498.8        $2,442.5       $2,411.1
 Services Administration...........
AGENCY TOTAL*......................       $3,656.8       $3,496.9       $3,508.9        $3,442.5       $3,405.9
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in millions.


Contact Information: HHS Office of Public Affairs: 202-690-
7850, http://www.hhs.gov/budget/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \172\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005 
Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 
2006).
    \173\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \174\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \175\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \176\ Id.

    The President's drug control budget request for the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has historically 
been the largest single-department request. This Department is 
responsible for providing programs addressing drug abuse 
treatment and prevention. The President has requested a total 
of $70.64 billion for all of HHS's programs, of which $3.4 
billion is part of the drug budget.
    The two agencies within HHS that maintain drug control 
programs tracked by the President's drug budget request are (1) 
National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA), and (2) Substance 
Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA). 
Conspicuously absent from the scrutiny of drug budget oversight 
is the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), which is responsible 
for drug approval, labeling and manufacturing standards.
    Perhaps due to the lack of oversight by the administration 
of the FDA, prescription drug abuse today is a critical 
national problem, second only to marijuana abuse.\177\ FDA's 
stubbornly consistent position is that the problem of diverted 
and abused drugs is solely one for the Drug Enforcement 
Administration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \177\ The 2004 National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH) found 
that 6.0 million Americans were current (past-month) non-medical users 
of prescription drugs. Only marijuana was higher, with 14.6 million 
users.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The committee notes with frustration the apparent 
incongruity in FDA's sole authority to approve drugs--including 
drugs likely to be abused--with their official non-involvement 
in any sort of drug control program. Moreover, the FDA has 
failed to act in any meaningful way in the face of twelve 
states \178\ approving the use of botanical marijuana for 
medical purposes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \178\ The 12 states and their relevant statutes are: Alaska [Alaska 
Stat. Sec. 11.71.090 (2005)]; Arizona [Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. Sec. 13-
3412.01(A) (2006)]; California [Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. 
Sec. 11362.5 (2006)]; Colorado [Colo. Const. Art. XVIII Sec. 4 (2005)]; 
Hawaii [Haw. Rev. Stat. Sec. Sec. 29-121 to 329-128 (2005)]; Maine [Me. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22 Sec. 1102 or 2382-B (5) (2005)]; Montana [Mont. 
Code Ann. Sec. Sec. 50-46-101 to 50-46-210 (2005)]; Nevada [Nev. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. Sec. Sec. 453A.010 to 453A.400 (2005)]; Oregon [Ore. Rev. 
Stat. Sec. Sec. 475.300 to 475.346 (2003)]; Rhode Island [R.I. Gen. 
Laws Sec. 21-28.6 (2006)]; Vermont [Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, 
Sec. Sec. 4472-4474d (2005)]; Washington [Wash. Rev. Code Ann. 
Sec. Sec. 69.51A.005 to 69.51A.902 (2005)].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The seriousness of the prescription drug abuse problem 
\179\ should compel, at the very least, FDA action with 
education and approval programs that specifically address this 
type of abuse. Likewise, state approval of drugs for medical 
use should compel the FDA to assert its authority under the 
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act as the sole agency charged with 
determining the safety and efficacy of a drug for therapeutic 
treatment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \179\ See To Do No Harm: Strategies for Preventing Prescription 
Drug Abuse: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, 
Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th 
Cong. (Feb. 9, 2004). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/
EventSingle.aspx?EventID=10001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Although the FDA has never approved marijuana as a 
treatment for any condition, \180\ its inaction when states 
independently determine that marijuana can be used for 
therapeutic purposes significantly undermines FDA's statutory 
authority.\181\ It is possible that continued inaction on the 
part of FDA in these critical abuse areas will prompt 
congressional legislation to correct the problems and perhaps 
formalize a stronger drug approval role for DEA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \180\ In 1978, as part of a lawsuit settlement by HHS, NIDA began 
supplying cannabis to patients whose physicians applied for and 
received, a ``compassionate use'' exemption from the FDA. The practice 
was terminated in 1992, but NIDA was allowed to continue supplying 
cannabis to those patients receiving it at the time, and is currently 
supplying cannabis to seven patients. National Institute on Drug Abuse, 
``Provision of Marijuana and Other Compounds for Scientific Research,'' 
Jan. 1998. At http://www.nida.nih.gov/about/organization/nacda/
marijuanastatement.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \181\ See Marijuana and Medicine: The Need for a Science-Based 
Approach: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, 
Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th 
Cong. (Apr. 1, 2004). At http://reform.house.gov/UploadedFiles/
Nora%20D.%20Volkow%20-%20NIDA.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Finally, the committee notes that it is unhelpful to 
national anti-drug efforts for HHS to sponsor and participate 
in so called ``harm reduction'' conferences promoting a pro-
drug legalization philosophy.\182\ A 2005 harm reduction 
conference \183\ that consumed at least $20,000 of HHS funds 
promoted pro-drug themes that are counter to the 
administration's public approach in fighting illegal drug 
use.\184\ One of the major sessions at this Harm Reduction 
conference was entitled, ``We Don't Need a War on 
Methamphetamine.'' Another conference topic was ``You Don't 
Have to be Clean and Sober. Or Even Want to Be!''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \182\ See Harm Reduction or Harm Maintenance--Is There Such a Thing 
as Safe Drug Abuse? Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal 
Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government 
Reform, 109th Cong. (Feb. 16, 2005). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/
Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=22570.
    \183\ Science & Response, Conference by Harm Reduction Coalition 
and Harm Reduction Project, in Salt Lake City, Utah (Aug. 19-20, 2005). 
HHS was listed on the conference program as a ``primary sponsor'' of 
the event.
    \184\ HHS's sponsorship of this meeting was the subject of a 
critical letter from Mark Souder, chairman of the Subcommittee on 
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on 
Government Reform, to HHS Secretary Michael Leavitt Aug. 12, 2005. At 
http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/News/
DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=32260.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A Senate hearing \185\ revealed that HHS spent more than 
$1.4 billion on conferences since the year 2000. At a time when 
the nation's budget is constrained and our anti-drug efforts 
are affected by certain budget restrictions, the committee 
views as inexcusable for HHS to make lavish expenditures on 
conferences where pro-drug legalization themes are dominant. 
Such money would be better applied to real anti-drug efforts, 
such as methamphetamine treatment programs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \185\ Federal Agencies and Conference Spending: Hearing before the 
Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on 
Federal Financial Management, Government Information and International 
Security, 109th Cong. (Feb. 7, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. National Institute on Drug Abuse--[NIDA]


----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                         FY 2005        FY 2005        FY 2006         FY 2006        FY 2007
                NIDA                 Requested \186\  Final \187\  Requested \188\  Enacted \189\  Request \190\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AGENCY TOTAL*......................       $1,019.1       $1,006.4       $1,010.1        $1,000.0         $994.8
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in millions.


Contact Information: 301-443-1124, http://drugabuse.gov/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \186\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005 
Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 
2006).
    \187\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \188\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \189\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \190\ Id.

    The President's drug budget request of $994.8 million for 
the National Institute on Drug Abuse is a $5.2 million decrease 
from the 2006 enacted amount for the Institute. This would mark 
a two-year decline in the budget for NIDA.
    NIDA is a component of the National Institutes of Health, 
and supplies critical basic research that supports a broad 
range of drug prevention and treatment programs, all designed 
to reduce the adverse health, economic and social consequences 
to individuals, families, and communities affected by drug 
abuse.\191\ NIDA's activities are aimed at providing the 
infrastructure, research and medical compounds for developing 
new treatments for addiction, and its Clinical Trials Network 
(CTN) is designed to bridge 15 to 20-year gap between treatment 
research and practice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \191\ See U.S. National Institute on Drug Abuse, Bringing the Power 
of Science to Bear on Drug Abuse and Addiction: 5 Year Strategic Plan, 
2000-2005. NIH Publication No. 00-4774, Sept. 2000. At http://
www.drugabuse.gov/StrategicPlan/index00-05.html (last visited Feb. 24, 
2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    NIDA's first priority area is prevention research in order 
to better understand normal brain development, how that 
development can be influenced by drugs, and how drug use harms 
the developing brain. NIDA has increased its emphasis on 
adolescent brain development, and the institute is currently 
studying the ``social neuroscience'' of children and evaluating 
the genetics, development, environment and co-morbidity to 
determine which factors play a role in drug use and addiction.
    The second priority area for NIDA is treatment 
interventions. NIDA was instrumental in developing 
buprenorphine, a treatment for opiate dependence, \192\ and has 
placed an emphasis on developing new compounds to address 
addiction to marijuana, America's most abused illegal 
substance.\193\ In particular, NIDA's focus on how marijuana 
abuse \194\ affects the adolescent brain is guiding the agency 
in its development of new prevention and intervention programs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \192\ See U.S. National Institute on Drug Abuse, Successful Trial 
Caps 25-Year Buprenorphine Development Effort, at http://
www.drugabuse.gov/NIDA--notes/NNvol19N3/Successful.html 
(last visited Feb. 21, 2006).
    \193\ See Marijuana and Medicine: The Need for A Science-Based 
Approach: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, 
Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th 
Cong. (Apr. 1, 2004) (statement of Nora Volkow, M.D., Director, NIDA). 
At http://reform.house.gov/UploadedFiles/Nora%20D.%20Volkow%20-
%20NIDA.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2006).
    \194\ See NIDA's webpage devoted to information about Marijuana: 
http://drugabuse.gov/DrugPages/Marijuana.html (last visited Feb. 21, 
2006). See also A Collection of Articles that Address Research on 
Marijuana at http://drugabuse.gov/NIDA--Notes/NN0058.html 
(last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Also a target for treatment intervention, and second only 
to marijuana use, is the abuse of prescription drugs.\195\ 
Abuse of prescription drugs, which are cheaper than illegal 
drugs and can be easier to obtain, is increasing at an alarming 
rate. NIDA has developed science-based materials to educate the 
public and health care community on abuse of prescription 
drugs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \195\ According to the National Survey on Drug Use and Health 
(available at http://www.oas.samhsa.gov/nhsda.htm), 11.4% of youths 
ages 12 to 17 in 2004 reported ever misusing prescription pain 
relievers such as oxycodone and codeine, compared to 1.2% in 1989. See 
Institute of Medicine, Committee on the Assessment of the U.S. Drug 
Safety System, July 19, 2005, Statement of Marc J. Wheat, staff 
director and chief counsel, House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, 
Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform. At 
http://reform.house.gov/UploadedFiles/
Testimony%20for%20Meeting%20Two.pdf; See also To Do No Harm: Strategies 
for Preventing Prescription Drug Abuse: Hearing before the House 
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, 
Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Feb. 9, 2004). At http://
reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=10001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Finally, NIDA recognizes the growing rate of 
methamphetamine use and addiction as a special urgency for 
treatment intervention because of its highly addictive and 
toxic properties.\196\ In addition to the funds NIDA devotes to 
general drug abuse research, NIDA has allocated an increasing 
amount of funds specifically to methamphetamine targeted 
research.\197\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \196\ See NIDA's webpage devoted to information about 
Methamphetamine at http://drugabuse.gov/infofacts/methamphetamine.html 
(last visited Feb. 21, 2006).
    \197\ In FY 2001: $18.2M; FY 2002: $21.3M; FY 2003: $27.2M; FY 
2004: $37.3M; FY 2005: $40.2M; FY 2006: $41.0M.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    NIDA views methamphetamine addiction as chronic--the 
addiction must be constantly treated but cannot be cured. 
NIDA's focus, therefore, with methamphetamine is to minimize 
the rate of relapse. NIDA has developed three promising 
compounds to treat methamphetamine addiction, and its 
Methamphetamine Clinical Trials Group is conducting several 
clinical trials of medications for methamphetamine addiction. 
NIDA expects data on these medications to be available within 
two years.
    NIDA has created the Clinical Trials Network as a way to 
translate the research knowledge into successful treatment 
programs. CTNs systematically test promising behavioral, 
pharmacological, and integrated drug abuse treatments in 
community settings. There are currently seventeen CTN nodes 
comprised of approximately 120 providers.
    In addition to a yearly review, the CTN nodes are 
thoroughly evaluated every five years when each project must go 
through a recompetition process in which applications for new 
grants and continuation proposals can compete. The most recent 
competition process led to the determination that two of them 
would be discontinued.
    The CTN program allows evaluation of treatments from small 
research settings and has had measurable results in adapting 
behavior treatment approaches: in 2005, the project trained 184 
treatment providers \198\ in three treatment approaches adapted 
for community-based settings; to date, the CTN has included 
nearly 6,400 people participating in 21 different treatment 
research protocols. The committee is disappointed that this 
program is at zero growth.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \198\ This number of treatment providers is 94 more than the 
projected target of training 90 treatment providers in 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The committee recognizes the importance of prevention 
programs, and addressing drug abuse with a balanced strategy.

2. Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration [SAMHSA]


----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                         FY 2005        FY 2005        FY 2006         FY 2006        FY 2007
               SAMHSA                Requested \199\  Final \200\  Requested \201\  Enacted \202\  Request \203\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AGENCY TOTAL*......................       $2,637.7       $2,490.5       $2,498.8        $2,442.5       $2,411.1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in millions.


Contact Information: SAMHSA Office of Policy, Planning and 
Budget: 240-276-2200, http://www.samhsa.gov.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \199\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005 
Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 
2006).
    \200\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \201\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \202\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \203\ Id.

    SAMHSA was established by Congress in 1992 ``to fully 
develop the Federal Government's ability to target effectively 
substance abuse and mental health services to the people most 
in need and to translate research in these areas more 
effectively and more rapidly into the general health care 
system.'' \204\ The President has requested $2.41 billion for 
SAMHSA's prevention and treatment programs. This is an overall 
decrease of $31.4 million from the FY 2006 enacted amount. The 
President's request includes $551.6 million for prevention 
programs and $1.86 billion for treatment programs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \204\ Conference Report to Accompany S. 1306, H. Rept. No. 102-522, 
at 125 (1992).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Prevention
    The President has requested a total of $551.6 million for 
SAMHSA's prevention programs. Consistent with the President's 
dramatic overall 19.3 percent reduction in prevention programs 
in the drug control budget, the amount requested for SAMHSA's 
prevention efforts is $11.41 million lower than the FY 2006 
enacted amount. This continues the ongoing decline in funds for 
SAMHSA's prevention programs, \205\ which are not justified by 
SAMHSA in its budget requests.\206\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \205\ FY 2004 prevention programs through SAMHSA were funded at 
$572.7M; FY 2005 prevention programs through SAMHSA were funded at 
$572.6M; FY 2006 prevention programs through SAMHSA are funded at 
$563.0M.
    \206\ In a briefing with the House Subcommittee on Criminal 
Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources staff, SAMHSA stated that the 
2006 prevention reduction was realized through removing special 
earmarks, though this was not discussed in SAMHSA's justification for 
2006. Likewise, there is no discussion in the 2007 budget request 
justifying the prevention reduction, and presumably would not be 
explainable by the removal of earmarks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Reduction in funding for our nation's prevention efforts in 
the area of substance abuses is a matter of serious concern, 
because it impacts our first line of defense. The President's 
Drug Control Strategy emphasizes ``stopping use before it 
starts'' as one of three national priorities for drug control. 
Curtailing prevention efforts will only lead to an increased 
need for treatment, and the committee is very concerned about 
ensuring that prevention programs are adequately funded.
    SAMHSA's prevention efforts are coordinated through the 
Center for Substance Abuse Prevention (CSAP), which brings 
prevention programs to all states nationwide. These programs 
engage states, communities and organizations to reduce risk 
factors for substance abuse through the Strategic Prevention 
Framework (SPF).\207\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \207\ See Drug Prevention Programs and the Fiscal Year 2006 Drug 
Control Budget: Is the Federal Government Neglecting Illegal Drug Use 
Prevention? Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, 
Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 109th 
Cong. (Apr. 26, 2005). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/
EventSingle.aspx?EventID=26210.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The SPF is a step-by-step process allowing communities to 
implement the most effective prevention efforts for their 
specific needs. Built on evidence-based practices, it is a 
five-step model designed to (1) profile community needs and 
readiness (2) mobilize and build needed capacity (3) develop a 
prevention plan (4) implement programs, policies and strategies 
based on what is known to be effective (5) evaluate program 
effectiveness.
    The SPF program is accomplished through State Incentive 
Grants (SIGs) that require 85 percent of the funding must be 
used locally within the state receiving the grant. In Fiscal 
Year 2005, twenty-four states received SPF SIGs. The committee 
applauds SAMHSA's efforts through the SPF program for its 
evidence-based approach to prevention. Through the National 
Registry of Effective Programs and Practices \208\ CSAP 
identifies and works to increase model, evidence-based 
prevention programs in communities throughout the country. This 
demonstrable effort is faithful to the Drug Control Strategy's 
goal of ``stopping use before it starts.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \208\ See SAMHSA's website for a description of the National 
Registry at http://modelprograms.samhsa.gov/template.cfm?page=default 
(last visited Feb. 21, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Treatment
    The President has requested $1.86 billion for SAMHSA's 
treatment efforts, a decrease of $19.99 million from the 
enacted amount for FY 2006. The committee is concerned about 
the fact that this is an ongoing decline in SAMHSA's treatment 
budget (FY 2006 enacted budget was $38.39 million below 2005).
    SAMHSA's treatment efforts are coordinated through the 
Center for Substance Abuse Treatment (CSAT). CSAT promotes the 
availability and quality of community-based substance abuse 
treatment programs.\209\ Working with other Federal agencies, 
state and local governments, organizations, and faith-based and 
community-based providers, CSAT's goals are to increase the 
availability of treatment services, improve and strengthen 
treatment support organizations, and promote and sustain 
evidence-based practices.\210\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \209\ SAMHSA has a substance abuse treatment facility locator on 
its website at http://findtreatment.samhsa.gov/ (last visited Feb. 24, 
2006).
    \210\ See Providing Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment 
Services to Adolescents: Hearing before the Senate Subcommittee on 
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services, Committee on Health, 
Education, Labor and Pensions, 108th Cong. (June 15, 2004). At http://
frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/
getdoc.cgi?dbname=108--senate--hearings&docid=f:94
384.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Within the President's budget request for SAMHSA's 
treatment programs, $98.2 million is being requested for the 
President's Access to Recovery program (ATR). This amount is 
unchanged from the FY 2006 enacted amount. ATR is a state-run 
voucher program allowing Americans with substance abuse 
disorders to choose treatment and recovery support services 
from a range of qualified community-based providers.
    Within the ATR program, the President is requesting that 
$24.8 million be dedicated to a stand-alone methamphetamine 
voucher program, intended to fund approximately ten grants at 
$2.5 million each for states where methamphetamine use and 
treatment is high.
    While the committee strongly supports a targeted approach 
to the methamphetamine plague, it is unclear how the dedicated 
program will materially supplement existing efforts, especially 
when the $24.8 million is not additional funding to existing 
efforts; rather, the request for ATR is level funded, and the 
proposed stand-alone methamphetamine voucher program represents 
a large portion of the existing ATR program.
    The committee strongly supports the ATR initiative. The 
voucher program achieves three key treatment objectives: 
consumer choice, effective treatment outcomes, and increased 
treatment capacity. Since the vouchers are intended to 
supplement current programs, ATR enhances outcome-oriented 
performance incentives in the substance abuse treatment 
system.\211\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \211\ See Access to Recovery: Improving Participation and Access in 
Drug Treatment: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal 
Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government 
Reform, 108th Cong. (Sept. 22, 2004). At http://reform.house.gov/
CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=19353; Recovery Now 
Initiative: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, 
Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th 
Cong. (Feb. 27, 2003). At http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/
getdoc.cgi?dbname=108--house--hearings&docid=f:868
28.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Moreover, individuals are able to access care that might 
otherwise be out of reach for them, including care from faith-
based providers. (Among the providers participating in the ATR 
program, 27 percent are faith-based.)
    ATR requires reporting from the states to demonstrate that 
they are increasing the array of providers and the number of 
people treated. This accountability, and the array of 
providers, including faith-based providers, are characteristics 
applauded by the committee, which strongly supports the ATR 
program.
    The President's request also includes a voucher incentive 
program that would provide up to 25 grant awards of $1 M to $5 
M to States and Tribal organizations who voluntarily commit to 
use a portion of their Block Grant funds to deliver prevention 
and treatment services through vouchers. The committee commends 
this initiative to increase voucher programs.

            Block Grants
    The Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment (SAPT) Block 
Grants are administered through CSAP and CSAT. The SAPT Block 
Grants represent forty percent of total State spending on 
treatment and prevention. The Grants have been level-funded for 
two years, and the President's request for 2007 at $1.76 
billion continues this level-funding trend.
    SAPT block grants are distributed at 20 percent to 
prevention and 80 percent to treatment, in accordance with 
statutory requirements in the Public Health Service Act.\212\ 
As a condition for receiving the funds, States are required to 
spend at least 20 percent of their allotment on primary 
prevention programs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \212\ 42 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1921-1955 (2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The committee is concerned about the fact that there is no 
mandatorily-collected data from the states to determine 
measurable outcomes for the SAPT block grants. Without such 
data, there is poor accountability for the programs that are 
continuously funded and no meaningful measure by which to judge 
the effectiveness of SAPT-funded programs.
    This lack of outcome measures led to a PART review rating 
of ``ineffective'' for the SAPT prevention and treatment 
programs in fiscal year 2005, since there was no quantifiable 
data by which to demonstrate results. The importance of 
performance measurement cannot be overstated, \213\ and the 
committee continues to urge the swift adoption of consistently 
measurable standards to assure accountability with publicly-
funded drug control programs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \213\ See Measuring the Effectiveness of Drug Addiction Treatment: 
Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, 
and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Mar. 
30, 2004). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/
EventSingle.aspx?EventID=11695; Performance and Outcome Measurement in 
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Programs: Hearing before the Senate 
Subcommittee on Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services, Committee 
on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, 108th Cong. (July 20, 2004). 
At http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/
getdoc.cgi?dbname=108--senate--hearings&docid=f:95
101.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    SAMHSA has identified ten domains as National Outcome 
Measures (NOMs) to represent meaningful outcomes for those 
striving to recover from substance abuse: (1) abstinence, (2) 
employment/education, (3) crime/criminal justice, (4) stability 
in housing, (5) access to services/increased service capacity, 
(6) treatment retention, (7) social connectedness, (8) 
perception of care, (9) cost effectiveness and (10) use of 
evidence-based practices.\214\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \214\ Information on SAMHSA's state data and NOMs is available at 
SAMHSA's website: http://nationaloutcomemeasures.samhsa.gov/./outcome/
index.asp (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In an effort to improve data collection for its programs, 
SAMHSA has made funds available for States to use in reporting 
data that is associated with the SAMHSA-identified NOMs. SAMHSA 
expects 32 states to take advantage of these funds for 
enhancing data collection efforts, and the agency expects all 
states to report on all NOMs elements by end of fiscal year 
2007.
    Currently, many states are reporting on various NOMs, but 
no state is reporting on all NOMs. Not one state is reporting 
on cost effectiveness or use of evidence-based practices, a 
disappointing fact that the committee is watching closely.

                   D. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

                                            DHS Drug Control Funding
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                   FY 2005      FY 2005      FY 2006      FY 2006      FY 2007
                      DHS                           \215\     \216\ Final     \217\        \218\        \219\
                                                  Requested                 Requested     Enacted      Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AGENCY TOTAL*..................................     $2,519.4     $2,662.4     $2,936.9     $3,059.9     $3,304.6
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in millions.


Contact Information: DHS Office of Public Affairs: 202-282-
8000, http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \215\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005 
Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 
2006).
    \216\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \217\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \218\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \219\ Id.

    The committee supports the President's request for $3.3 
billion for counterdrug activities at the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS), which is a slight increase over the 
$3.06 billion enacted in fiscal year 2006. That support, 
however, is conditioned on the expectation that such funds will 
actually be used for counterdrug purposes. As discussed 
elsewhere, most of these funds are not actually designated for 
counterdrug purposes; instead they are merely estimates of how 
much time and how many resources the three main interdiction 
agencies at DHS--Coast Guard, Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE), and Customs and Border Protection (CBP)--
will spend on counterdrug activities.
    To ensure that those estimates turn into reality, DHS must 
fulfill its responsibilities to the counterdrug mission. That 
will require not only commitment by the leadership of DHS but 
also diligent oversight by the Office of Counternarcotics 
Enforcement (CNE) and ONDCP.

1. Reorganization

    When Congress created DHS in 2002, it established an 
Undersecretary for Border and Transportation Security (BTS) 
Directorate. The Directorate was assigned the legacy agencies 
of the U.S. Customs Service (USCS), the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS), the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA), the port of entry inspector of the 
Department of Agriculture, the Federal Air Marshals Service 
(FAMS), and the Federal Protective Service.
    The newly created organization, once implemented, did not 
bring forth the improvements intended. Far from providing 
effective coordination and oversight, BTS served simply as a 
policy office with little or no operational functions, adding 
another layer of unnecessary bureaucracy.
    Recognizing the mistake, DHS announced the results of a 
``Second Stage Review'' (2SR) in July 2005 which realigned the 
Department to increase its ability to prepare, prevent, and 
respond to terrorist attacks and others emergencies.\220\ These 
changes were intended to better integrate the Department and 
its employees to improve the performance of their mission. The 
2SR plan included the formation of a Directorate of Policy to 
serve as the primary Department-wide coordinator for policy, 
regulations and other initiatives. The new policy office 
assumed the functions previously performed by BTS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \220\ Press Release, Department of Homeland Security, Secretary 
Chertoff's Second Stage Review (July 13, 2005) (on file with 
subcommittee). Very few documents were provided to Congress on the 
Second Stage Review.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The committee believes that DHS' 2SR reorganization may not 
have gone far enough, and may need to be revisited. The 
Department must address the problems created by the arbitrary 
and increasingly unworkable divisions which still exist within 
DHS between the bureaus of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 
and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). As former CBP 
Commissioner Robert Bonner said, separating ICE and CBP was 
like separating the cops ``on the beat'' from their 
detectives.\221\ And even more importantly, the division means 
that neither ICE nor CBP, nor any other Federal agency, has a 
border security strategy for inside and beyond the border--not 
just at the land border.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \221\ Jerry Seper, Bonner Pitches Merging Agencies, Washington 
Times, Dec. 7, 2005 at http://washingtontimes.com/national/20051206-
105109-9990r.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Department's own Inspector General has issued a report 
calling for ICE and CBP to be put back together.\222\ The 
committee believes that until the current organizational 
structure is remedied, DHS will continue to operate with great 
inefficiencies. Such inefficiencies are exemplified by the 
breakdowns in; 1) coordination between apprehension, detention 
and removal efforts; 2) coordination between interdiction and 
investigative efforts; and 3) coordination of intelligence 
activities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \222\ DHS Office of Inspector General Report, OIG-06-04, (Nov. 
2005) at http://www.mipt.org/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Congressional Responsiveness

    The committee is very concerned about the apparent lack of 
responsiveness on the part of DHS in providing information to 
Congress in a timely fashion. DHS has a legal responsibility to 
use due diligence in promptly responding to the legitimate 
information requests of Congress. Specifically, when DHS makes 
``major'' media announcements such as the 2SR event or the 
recent Secure Border Initiative (SBI), there is frequently no 
plan behind the media event. These media events should be 
clearly premised by distinctively articulated and communicated 
plans, with specific details, so that Congress can fully 
understand how and where the Department intends to achieve its 
advertised goals. The committee believes that DHS needs to 
provide more strategic, internal management documents instead 
of just generalizations tailored for public relations events.
    Additionally, the committee is disappointed to report that 
certain elements of the newly created DHS bureaucracy have 
already distinguished themselves as major obstacles to 
congressional oversight. Leading this list is DHS' Customs and 
Border Protection program. The frequent and consistent lack of 
responsiveness to congressional correspondence by this program 
is cause for great concern and heightened scrutiny.
    The apparent lack of strategic planning, coordination and 
communication demonstrated as CBP reorganized its Air program 
has grave implications. CBP Air's P-3 airplanes provide 
essential maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) and are crucial to the 
Department's and the nation's efforts against drug trafficking 
in the ``transit zone.'' \223\ They also perform other vital 
homeland security missions, such as providing airspace 
security. For these reasons, the committee is concerned about 
the nature of the Department's commitment to maintain the 
current level of operation of each of the sixteen P-3s.\224\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \223\ As Acting Assistant Commissioner, Charles E. Stallworth 
testified, ``The backbone of CBP's efforts in support of transit zone 
interdiction operations is our fleet of aging P-3 aircraft.'' See 
Interrupting Narco-terrorist Threats on the High Seas: Do We Have 
Enough Wind in Our Sails? Hearing before the House Subcommittee on 
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on 
Government Reform, 109th Cong. (June 29, 2005) (Statement of Charles E. 
Stallworth, Assistant Commissioner, Office of Air and Marine 
Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection). At http://
reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=29727.
    \224\ Letter from Mark Souder, chairman of the Subcommittee on 
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on 
Government Reform to CBP Commissioner Robert Bonner (Nov. 4, 2005) (on 
file with Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human 
Resources).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Equally disturbing is the disregard CBP has for briefing 
relevant congressional committees. The Government Reform 
Committee's Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and 
Human Resources has submitted frequent requests for information 
regarding CBP Air strategic and recapitalization plans, and 
only after frequent reminders has the Department 
responded.\225\ The committee strongly recommends that DHS 
renew efforts to properly update congressional offices on 
relevant issues and developments. In addition, specifically in 
reference to CBP, DHS needs to reestablish control of an 
apparently troubled operation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \225\ Letter from Mark Souder, chairman of the Subcommittee on 
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on 
Government Reform, to DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff (Nov. 30, 2005); 
Letter from Mark Souder, chairman of the Subcommittee on Criminal 
Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government 
Reform, to Acting CBP Commissioner Deborah Spero (Dec. 20, 2005); 
Letter from Mark Souder, chairman of the Subcommittee on Criminal 
Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government 
Reform to Acting CBP Commissioner Deborah Spero (Jan. 23, 2006) (on 
file with Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human 
Resources); Letter from Mark Souder, chairman of the Subcommittee on 
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on 
Government Reform to DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff (Jan. 23, 2006) (on 
file with Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human 
Resources).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement (CNE)

    When Congress created DHS in 2002, it combined some of the 
most important anti-drug trafficking agencies in the Federal 
Government. To assist DHS in meeting its vital counterdrug 
responsibilities, Congress originally created the 
Counternarcotics Officer (CNO) position. The original law did 
not clearly define how the CNO was to fulfill those duties, nor 
did it give the CNO adequate status or resources to carry out 
what Congress had envisioned. In order to correct these 
problems, Congress passed legislation in 2004 that replaced the 
CNO with a new Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement, headed 
by a Director nominated by the President and confirmed by the 
Senate. \226\ The law authorized up to $6 million of the 
Department's management funds for a dedicated budget for the 
new Office.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \226\ Intelligence and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Public Law 
108-458, (2004).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The committee fully supports the administration's proposed 
appropriation of $2.8 million for the CNE program in fiscal 
year 2007, but is disappointed that there was no specific line 
item in the budget request.\227\ The additional funding is 
viewed as a positive indication that drug control remains a 
priority within DHS. However, the committee recommends that 
Congress specifically designate a line item for the Office of 
Counternarcotics Enforcement in DHS appropriations legislation. 
Adequate and specific funding will allow DHS CNE to hire 
sufficient staff for the Office and provide critical internal 
oversight for the Department's counternarcotics efforts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \227\ Department of Homeland Security, Budget in Brief, FY 2007, 
(Feb. 2006) at 102.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. United States Coast Guard

                                      U.S. Coast Guard Drug Control Funding
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                   FY 2005      FY 2005      FY 2006      FY 2006      FY 2007
           USCG Drug Control Funding                \228\     \229\ Final     \230\        \231\        \232\
                                                  Requested                 Requested     Enacted      Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AGENCY TOTAL*..................................       $822.3       $871.9       $972.7     $1,032.4     $1,030.1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in millions.


Contact Information: Coast Guard Office of Public Affairs: 202-
267-1587, http://www.uscg.mil/USCG.shtm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \228\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005 
Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 
2006).
    \229\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \230\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \231\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \232\ Id.

    The President's budget proposal includes $8.4 billion for 
the U.S. Coast Guard, of which $1.03 billion is estimated to be 
used for drug control. Like other DHS agencies, the Coast Guard 
does not have a specific appropriation for drug interdiction 
activities. The committee conditionally supports this year's 
proposal which is approximately the same amount as provided for 
drug control in fiscal year 2006. The committee believes the 
administration's proposal to ``flat line'' the Coast Guard 
budget may have a leveling effect on the Coast Guard's drug 
interdiction removal rate and prevent the service from 
achieving the administration's established performance 
standards in the upcoming year.\233\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \233\ U.S. Coast Guard, Budget in Brief, FY 2007, (Feb., 2006) at 
Appendix B, B-13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As highlighted by its response to Hurricane Katrina in 
August and September of 2005, the Coast Guard has continued to 
struggle to balance new missions with traditional ones as a 
component within DHS. Moreover, a rapidly deteriorating fleet 
of ships and aircraft and limited resources made proper 
prioritization of the manifold missions of the Coast Guard 
increasingly difficult.
    Regarding competing mission interests, the committee also 
is gravely concerned with the administration's decision, 
highlighted in the 2007 proposed budget, to tap the Coast Guard 
to assume the airborne security mission within the National 
Capitol Region (NCR) surrounding Washington, DC.\234\ The 
administration's proposed budget includes $62.4 million for the 
Coast Guard to establish a permanent National Capital Region 
Air Defense program.\235\ Specifically, the committee is very 
concerned about the impact of this new NCR mission on existing 
Coast Guard missions, and specifically, counterdrug patrols 
utilizing armed helicopters in the transit zone. It is not 
clear how the NCR airspace security mission should fall to the 
Coast Guard within any of the traditional or expanded DHS 
missions of the Coast Guard. Furthermore, no specific plan has 
been divulged to Congress explaining how the proposed funding 
($62.4 million) would provide the additional helicopters, 
personnel and equipment necessary to adequately support the new 
mission without significantly degrading existing mission areas, 
including its critical work in the maritime transit zones.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \234\ Department of Homeland Security, Budget in Brief, FY 2007, 
(Feb. 2006) at 53.
    \235\ U.S. Coast Guard, Budget in Brief, FY 2007, (Feb. 2006) at 
19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As shown in the diagram below, Coast Guard ``total'' 
resource hours devoted to counterdrug patrols since the 
terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 have steadily 
declined.\236\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \236\ Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug 
Policy, and Human Resources staff budget summary briefing with U.S. 
Coast Guard officials on Nov. 17, 2005, (on file with Subcommittee on 
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources). 



    The downward trend of Coast Guard resource hours supporting 
the counterdrug mission is due to new post-9/11 operational 
requirements, ongoing traditional missions such as search and 
rescue and maritime safety, and the Coast Guard's rapidly 
deteriorating inventory of aging cutters and aircraft.
    As an example, the administration's 2007 budget proposal 
includes plans to decommission two veteran ships, the 61 year-
old cutter STORIS and the 64 year-old cutter GENTIAN.\237\ The 
STORIS, based in Kodiak, Alaska, will be replaced by the 35 
year-old cutter MUNRO. Saddled with many Vietnam-era deepwater 
cutters, the Coast Guard is challenged to perform its important 
missions with aged and nearly obsolete equipment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \237\ U.S. Coast Guard, Budget in Brief, FY 2007, (Feb. 2006) at 
10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    During fiscal years 2000 through 2004, the readiness rates 
of the Coast Guard's older ships and aircraft showed a general 
decline, although the rates fluctuated from year to year.\238\ 
For example, ships used to monitor drug trafficking activities 
and carry the helicopters that disable and stop go-fast boats 
were below their target levels for time free of major 
deficiencies or loss of at least one primary mission. These 
declines are directly linked to the rapidly deteriorating 
mechanical readiness of its aged assets.\239\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \238\ Drug Control: Agencies Need to Plan for Likely Declines in 
Drug Interdiction Assets, and Develop Better Performance Measures for 
Transit Zone Operations, GAO Report No. 06-2000, (Nov. 2005) at 21; The 
Coast Guard uses these assets to perform a variety of missions, such as 
interdicting illicit drug shipments and illegal migrants or rescuing 
mariners at sea.
    \239\ Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug 
Policy, and Human Resources staff visit to Cutter GALLATIN (WMEC 721), 
in Key West, Florida on Jan. 14, 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The diagram above also shows an increasing seizure rate 
beginning in 2003, resulting from several record years of 
cocaine seizures. In 2005, the Coast Guard prevented a record 
338,000 pounds of cocaine and more than 10,000 pounds of 
marijuana from reaching the U.S.\240\ These outstanding results 
were due to a combination of the Coast Guard utilizing new 
tools such as armed ``HITRON'' helicopters and specialized law 
enforcement detachments. Equally important, the record-setting 
year was a result of increasing and improved inter-department 
and inter-agency cooperation, as well as significantly improved 
intelligence developed through Operation Panama Express and 
Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-South).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \240\ U.S. Coast Guard, Budget in Brief, FY 2007, Feb. 2006, 
Appendix B, B-12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Director of JIATF-South has recently stated that there 
continues to be more known actionable intelligence available 
than there are surface and air assets available to 
respond.\241\ The national drug interdiction community and the 
Coast Guard need more surface and air assets to respond to this 
growing supply of invaluable intelligence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \241\ Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug 
Policy, and Human Resources visit to JIATF-South, Key West, Florida, on 
Jan. 12, 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Coast Guard, although hampered by its aging assets, has 
attempted to rise to the task. As the following statistics 
show, the service is now dedicating more maritime patrol 
aircraft (MPA) hours to drug interdiction missions since the 9/
11 terrorist attacks.\242\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \242\ Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug 
Policy, and Human Resources staff budget summary briefing with U.S. 
Coast Guard officials on Nov. 17, 2005; Resource hours committed to the 
drug interdiction mission include on-station hours spent on detection, 
monitoring and interdiction operations, and also transit hours needed 
for assets to get into position to begin operations.

       U.S. Coast Guard Maritime Patrol Aircraft On-station Hours
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                             Maritime
                       Fiscal Year                            Patrol
                                                             Aircraft
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2001 \243\...........................................           1,889
FY 2002.................................................             997
FY 2003.................................................           1,410
FY 2004.................................................           2,721
FY 2005 \244\...........................................           2,780
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    However, the percentage of time the HC-130 maritime patrol 
surveillance aircraft were available to perform missions was 
below the target level in fiscal year 2004, and the surface 
radar system on the aircraft is subject to frequent 
failures.\245\ In some instances, mission flight crews had to 
look out the windows of the aircraft for targets because the 
radar systems were inoperable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \243\ Statistics provided in letter from Mary Beth Long, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics to Congressman Mark 
Souder, chairman, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and 
Human Resources (July 13, 2005) (on file with Subcommittee on Criminal 
Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources).
    \244\ Drug Control: Agencies Need to Plan for Likely Declines in 
Drug Interdiction Assets, and Develop Better Performance Measures for 
Transit Zone Operations, GAO Report No. 06-2000, (Nov. 2005) at 15.
    \245\ Drug Control: Agencies Need to Plan for Likely Declines in 
Drug Interdiction Assets, and Develop Better Performance Measures for 
Transit Zone Operations, GAO Report No. 06-2000, (Nov. 2005) at 21.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The administration and the Coast Guard have developed a 
strategic plan to replace its legacy ships and aircraft. The 
committee believes the Coast Guard's Deepwater fleet 
modernization project is critical to U.S. transit zone drug 
interdictions. However, the Coast Guard needs to develop an 
aircraft that can effectively perform the MPA mission. 
Consequently, the administration and DHS need to ensure they 
are putting the right tools and equipment into the hands of 
Coast Guard men and women so that they may continue to 
effectively interdict drugs on the high seas and deliver the 
maritime safety and security America deserves.

            Program Assessment Rating
    The committee is pleased to see improvements in the Coast 
Guard's measures of performance, specifically regarding the 
drug interdiction program. As briefed by Coast Guard officials, 
the service has recently updated and aligned its measures with 
ONDCP's established goals and leveraged improvements in 
intelligence.\246\ The Coast Guard now measures drug 
interdiction performance using a Removal Rate figure, as 
opposed to the previously established Seizure Rate. The new 
Removal Rate includes drugs seized, and also includes drugs 
jettisoned, destroyed, or otherwise lost at sea, and is vetted 
through an interagency group led by the U.S. Interdiction 
Coordinator's (USIC) Consolidated Counterdrug database (CCDB). 
Although there is great concern and debate regarding the 
overall quantity of drugs smuggled through the transit zones, 
the committee is pleased to see the Coast Guard's efforts to 
measure its drug control performance against national 
standards.\247\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \246\ Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug 
Policy, and Human Resources staff budget summary briefing with U.S. 
Coast Guard officials on Nov. 17, 2005.
    \247\ Drug Control: Agencies Need to Plan for Likely Declines in 
Drug Interdiction Assets, and Develop Better Performance Measures for 
Transit Zone Operations, GAO Report No. 06-2000, (Nov. 2005) at 25.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

5. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)

                                            ICE Drug Control Funding
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                   FY 2005      FY 2005      FY 2006      FY 2006      FY 2007
            ICE Drug Control Funding                \248\     \249\ Final     \250\        \251\        \252\
                                                  Requested                 Requested     Enacted      Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AGENCY TOTAL*..................................       $575.8       $361.5       $453.3       $436.5       $477.9
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in millions.


Contact Information: ICE Office of Public Affairs: 202-514-
2648, http://www.ice.gov/graphics/index/htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \248\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005 
Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 
2006).
    \249\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \250\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \251\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \252\ Id.

    The committee supports the President's request for ICE, 
which is estimated by ONDCP to include $477.9 million for drug 
control operations. This would be an increase of approximately 
$42 million over the $436.5 million enacted for fiscal year 
2006. This increase, however, needs to be actually utilized by 
ICE to fulfill drug control responsibilities and not diverted 
to other missions.
    The committee is concerned about ICE's annual budgetary 
shortfalls. The ongoing funding shortage has led to serious and 
continuous operational difficulties in pursuing drug 
investigations and other critical mission areas for the agency. 
It is unclear how the proposed 2007 budget will resolve these 
financial management issues, and allow ICE agents to fully 
focus on DHS investigations.

            Mission Alignment
    The committee is concerned about the evolving missions of 
ICE within DHS. It is very important that the ``front line'' 
officers of CBP and the Border Patrol have a clear and 
effective relationship with the investigators of ICE. 
Currently, despite being the largest investigative arm within 
the Department, it is not evident that ICE has a clearly 
established role as the lead investigative arm within DHS. 
Although ICE officials have testified that the agency is 
responsible for identifying and eliminating vulnerabilities at 
our Nation's border, there appear to be several bureaucratic 
obstacles predating the creation of DHS that prevent ICE from 
effectively and consistently supporting the Department.\253\ 
Specifically, the role of ICE appears to vary in different 
regions of the country because of non-uniform, out-dated 
memoranda which have carried over from legacy U.S. Customs 
Service and U.S. Border Patrol.\254\ Currently, some U.S. 
Border Patrol drug seizures are turned over to the DEA and 
others are turned over to ICE, depending upon where the seizure 
occurs along the border. The fact that ICE and CBP are now 
within the same Department should be reflected in standard 
management protocols that eliminate circumstantially outdated 
management techniques. The committee recommends DHS, ICE, CBP 
and DEA move quickly to establish new protocols and procedures 
for investigating all seizures at the border, be it illegal 
immigrants, drugs or other illicit contraband. DHS's campaign 
to establish ``one face at the border'' should be broadened to 
include ``one investigator at the border.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \253\ See Threat Convergence Along the Border: How Does Drug 
Trafficking Impact Our Borders? Hearing before the House Subcommittee 
on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on 
Government Reform, 109th Cong. (June 14, 2005) (Statement by John P. 
Torres, Assistant Director, Immigration and Customs Enforcement). At 
http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=29024.
    \254\ Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug 
Policy, and Human Resources staff visit to Messina, NY, on Aug. 15, 
2005, Detroit, MI, on Aug. 16, 2005, and Bellingham, WA, on Aug. 18, 
2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Financial Investigations
    As stated in the 2006 National Drug Control Strategy, the 
lure of making large sums of cash is the main motivation that 
drives drug trafficking.\255\ It is critically important that 
U.S. law enforcement strategically target and seize moneys and 
revenue resulting from the illicit drug trade. This will cause 
a significant disruption to the supply of illegal drugs 
entering the U.S. and is a major focus both of DHS, through 
ICE, and the Department of Justice, through the OCDETF program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \255\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, (Feb. 2006) 
at 32. At http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/
ndcs06/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Nationally, ICE financial investigations have resulted in 
the seizure of more than $477 million over the past three 
fiscal years, with $100 million of that in bulk currency. Since 
ICE was created in 2003, ICE arrests in financial 
investigations, including those involving drug smuggling, 
increased from 1,224 that year to 1,567 in FY 2005. The number 
of indictments increased from 865 to 932 and the number of 
convictions increased from 703 to 823. From FY 2003 to FY 2005, 
ICE agents arrested 260 individuals for bulk cash smuggling 
alone. In FY 2004, ICE agents seized nearly $159 million in 
currency and monetary instruments and executed approximately 
1,400 arrests for financial crimes, many directly related to 
drug smuggling and drug money laundering activities.\256\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \256\ For additional information regarding Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement financial investigations see http://www.ice.gov/graphics/
cornerstone/index.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ICE has introduced a number of new initiatives aimed at 
analyzing and combating the movement of illicit funds by bulk 
cash smuggling, trade-based money laundering, courier hubs, 
money service businesses, charities, and alternative remittance 
systems. Some of these initiatives, highlighted in the U.S. 
Money Laundering Threat Assessment, include the creation of a 
trade transparency unit, the creation of a foreign political 
task force, and a multi-agency approach designed to target 
unlicensed money service businesses that are involved in 
utilizing money transmitters to wire illicit drug proceeds to 
recipients in foreign countries.\257\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \257\ U.S. Money Laundering Threat Assessment, (Dec. 2005) at I. At 
http://www.ots.treas.gov/docs/4/480215.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 
2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The committee fully supports the efforts of ICE to 
coordinate DHS financial investigations. For this reason, it is 
important that ICE investigators be closely integrated into all 
drug and money seizures along the border by the U.S. Border 
Patrol and CBP officers. As Custom and Border Protection's 
Director of Drug Interdiction, Greg Passic, testified before 
the Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug 
Policy, and Human Resources, ``Nothing is more worthless . . . 
than a load of dope that doesn't belong to anybody.'' \258\ 
Investigators are the critical link in establishing connections 
between random drug seizures at the border and trafficking 
networks. The committee believes it is vitally important that 
all CBP seizures along the border be coordinated with ICE 
investigators.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \258\ See Threat Convergence Along the Border: How Does Drug 
Trafficking Impact Our Borders? Hearing before the House Subcommittee 
on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on 
Government Reform, 109th Cong. (June 14, 2005) (Statement by Gregory 
Passic, Director of Drug Interdiction, Custom and Border Protection). 
At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/
EventSingle.aspx?EventID=29024.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ICE coordination with OCDETF and DEA investigators is also 
paramount to a unified, effective strategy to disrupt drug 
supply revenues. Last year ICE's Deputy Assistant Director, 
John Torres, testified that ICE does not currently participate 
in the OCDETF Drug Fusion Center because of pre-existing legal 
hurdles dealing with immigration and proprietary commercial 
business relations.\259\ The committee fully supports ICE's 
pending partnership in the OCDETF Drug Fusion Center.\260\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \259\ See Threat Convergence Along the Border: How Does Drug 
Trafficking Impact Our Borders? Hearing before the House Subcommittee 
on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on 
Government Reform, 109th Cong. (June 14, 2005) (Statement by John P. 
Torres, Assistant Director, Immigration and Customs Enforcement). At 
http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=29024.
    \260\ Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug 
Policy, and Human Resources staff budget summary briefing with 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement officials on Dec. 9, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Drug Investigations
    Like the Coast Guard, ICE has struggled to re-balance its 
counterdrug resources to sustainable levels since the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001. ICE agents are tasked with 
conducting investigations of persons and events subject to the 
administrative and criminal provisions of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act. Although ICE continues to enforce U.S. drug 
laws, primarily with a nexus to the border, investigative 
resources are lacking due to the expanded responsibilities of 
immigration enforcement.
    The role of ICE as the primary criminal immigration 
enforcement agency is critical to the nation's national 
security. ICE has continued to increase its apprehensions of 
criminal aliens while, at the same time, increasing its 
seizures of narcotics. In 2003, DHS agents and officers 
apprehended 1,046,422 aliens. DHS removed 186,151 aliens in FY 
2003. This was an increase of approximately 36,067 from FY 
2002.\261\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \261\ For additional Immigration and Customs Enforcement background 
information and statistics see http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/
statistics/yearbook/2003/2003ENF.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In 2004, DHS agents and officers apprehended an estimated 
1,241,098 foreign nationals and removed 88,897 criminal aliens 
from the United States. Approximately 33,367 or 37.5 percent of 
the criminal aliens removed in 2004 were for dangerous 
drugs.\262\ In 2003, DHS agents and officers removed 79,395 
criminal aliens, an 11 percent increase from FY 2002. 
Approximately 31,352 or 39 percent of the criminal aliens 
removed in 2003 were for dangerous drugs.\263\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \262\ Id.
    \263\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In FY 2003, ICE completed 82,236 immigration-related 
criminal investigations, an increase of 3,395 from the previous 
year.\264\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \264\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The committee is very concerned about the apparent downward 
trend in resources committed to drug investigations due to the 
increased demand of immigration investigations. The committee 
recommends that DHS and ICE take the necessary corrective 
actions to ensure DHS' investigators at ICE have the proper 
resources to keep drug investigations a top priority at the 
border.

            Program Assessment Rating
    The ICE Office of Investigations received an ``adequate'' 
rating in the administration's Performance Assessment Rating 
Tool (PART) process.\265\ The ICE Office of Investigations had 
43.8 percent of their cases result in an enforcement 
consequence (arrest, indictment, conviction, seizure, fine or 
penalty). The committee hopes that ICE will continue to make 
progress in its performance measurement system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \265\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at 53.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

6. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)

                                            CBP Drug Control Funding
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                   FY 2005      FY 2005      FY 2006      FY 2006      FY 2007
            CBP Drug Control Funding                \266\     \267\ Final     \268\        \269\        \270\
                                                  Requested                 Requested     Enacted      Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AGENCY TOTAL*..................................     $1,121.4       $1,429     $1,510.9       $1,591     $1,796.5
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in millions.


Contact Information: CBP Office of Public Affairs: 202-344-
1770, http://www.cbp.gov.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \266\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005 
Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 
2006).
    \267\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \268\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \269\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \270\ Id.

    The committee supports the President's request for $1.8 
billion for counterdrug activities at Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP), which is a sizeable increase over the $1.6 
billion enacted in fiscal year 2006. That support, however, is 
conditioned on the expectation that such funds will actually be 
used for counterdrug purposes. As discussed previously, most of 
these funds are not actually designated for counterdrug 
purposes; instead they are merely estimates of how much time 
and how many resources the three ``frontline forces'' at CBP--
U.S. Border Patrol, Air and Marine Program and Office of Field 
Operations--will spend on counterdrug activities.
    A significant portion of the increase to the drug budget 
for CBP, $152 million, is to support the Secure Border 
Initiative (SBI). The total increase for the SBI initiative, 
which includes drug and non-drug funding, is $639 million. Most 
of the SBI program comes in the form of new Border Patrol 
agents, and technology and assets designed for border 
operations. However, almost all of the Border Patrol's drug 
seizures occur at checkpoints on the highways behind the ports 
of entry. In other words, the new assets for Border Patrol 
aren't primarily intended for the places where Border Patrol 
agents actually seize drugs. The committee is concerned that 
the only reason the administration's ``drug budget'' shows an 
increase is because of these broad and often inaccurate 
assumptions regarding drug budget assets and activities. The 
committee strongly recommends the administration refine its 
drug budget methodology so that drug control funds will 
actually be used for drug control purposes.
    The Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) combines 
the port of entry inspectors of the legacy Customs Service and 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service, as well as the 
Department of Agriculture's port of entry inspectors, the U.S. 
Border Patrol, and the Air and Marine Operations (AMO) division 
of legacy Customs. The Customs inspectors, AMO aviators and 
boat operators, and Border Patrol agents are crucial to our 
drug interdiction and enforcement efforts. The committee is 
very concerned that drugs remain a priority at CBP as the 
agency vigorously attempts to ``take control of the border.''

            CBP Air and Marine Operations
    The President's budget includes $276 million for Operations 
and Maintenance for CBP's Air and Marine Operations program 
(CBP Air). It is not clear what percentage of the operations 
and maintenance budget will be dedicated to support counterdrug 
missions. The committee is concerned that the administration's 
proposal will not be sufficient to cover CBP Air's current 
commitments in the ``source'' zones of South America, in the 
transit zones, and along the northern border.
    The 2007 proposed budget also includes $61.3 million for 
the procurement of 30 small helicopters to support the Secure 
Border Initiative (SBI).\271\ The committee believes that the 
SBI is a worthwhile effort to control the land borders, but it 
should not come at the expense of CBP withdrawing from the 
counterdrug mission. It is unclear how the administration's 
budget will support the operations, maintenance and upgrades 
for CBP Air's fleet of P-3 maritime patrol aircraft (MPA). The 
CBP P-3 aircraft provide essential maritime patrol coverage and 
as such are crucial to the administration's efforts against 
drug trafficking in the transit zone. The committee strongly 
recommends the administration and CBP remain committed to the 
counterdrug mission and continue to provide and support CBP's 
drug interdiction aircraft.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \271\ Customs and Border Protection, Budget in Brief, FY 2007, 
(Feb. 2006) at 25.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Additionally, CBP's Air and Marine Operations Center 
(AMOC), the agency's primary tracking and monitoring facility 
located in Riverside, California, remains undermanned and 
underutilized.\272\ With the personnel shortfalls, AMOC 
managers must selectively choose what radar feeds to monitor, 
leaving the nation vulnerable in the sectors that AMOC cannot 
watch. Additionally, with the development of Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles (UAV), AMOC can perform an important role in the 
command, control and coordination for UAV operations within the 
Department.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \272\ Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug 
Policy, and Human Resources visit to CBP's Air and Marine Operations 
Center (AMOC), Riverside, CA, on Mar. 29, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In December 2005, CBP stated that all CBP air assets will 
be tracked by AMOC in the very near future.\273\ The AMOC is a 
unique tool which, if used properly, can provide crucial 
operational and safety information to all CBP and Department 
units, especially as DHS operations intensify along the 
Southwest Border.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \273\ Letter from Thaddeus Bingel, Assistant Commissioner, Customs 
and Border Protection, to Mark Souder, chairman, the Subcommittee on 
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on 
Government Reform, (Dec. 28, 2005) (on file with Subcommittee on 
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As the statistics below demonstrate, and as discussed 
previously, CBP Air plays a critical role in providing air 
detection and interdiction support to drug control programs, 
both domestically and internationally. The Director of the 
Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-South) recently 
emphasized that there continues to be more actionable 
intelligence available than there are surface and air assets 
available to respond.\274\ As a result, the national drug 
interdiction community needs more maritime patrol aircraft 
(MPA) to respond to the growing supply of invaluable 
intelligence. The committee recommends CBP Air continue to 
fully support all international and MPA missions in the transit 
zones to both support JIATF-South's actionable intelligence and 
continue to directly promote record cocaine seizures on the 
high seas.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \274\ Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug 
Policy, and Human Resources visit to JIATF-South on Jan. 12, 2006.

 Customs and Border Protection Maritime Patrol Aircraft On-station Hours
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                             Maritime
                       Fiscal Year                            Patrol
                                                             Aircraft
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2001 \275\...........................................           1,771
FY 2002.................................................           2,367
FY 2003.................................................           2,300
FY 2004.................................................           4,654
FY 2005 \276\...........................................           4,385
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The committee has grave concerns about the apparent lack of 
replacement or modernization plans for the aging air fleet 
found within the CBP. It is not clear what steps the program or 
DHS are taking to ensure continued support to counterdrug 
missions. We recommend that the Department closely evaluate 
current agency modernization proposals and submit 
recommendations to Congress that will maintain critical air 
capabilities. Without these capabilities, U.S. efforts to 
combat terrorism and illegal drug movement in the source, 
transit, and arrival zones, provide law enforcement support, 
and perform other air security missions would be severely 
hindered and threaten national security.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \275\ Statistics provided in letter from Mary Beth Long, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics, to Congressman 
Mark Souder, chairman, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, 
and Human Resources (July 13, 2005) (on file with Subcommittee on 
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources).
    \276\ Drug Control: Agencies Need to Plan for Likely Declines in 
Drug Interdiction Assets, and Develop Better Performance Measures for 
Transit Zone Operations, GAO Report No. 06-2000, (Nov. 2005) at 15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            CBP Air and Marine Operations--Reorganization
    Regardless of the status of the proposed ICE and CBP 
merger, it is critically important to the National Drug Control 
Strategy that the fixed wing aircraft of the CBP Air program 
continue to support U.S. and Allied nation interdiction efforts 
in the transit zones. Fiscal year 2005 was another record year 
of cocaine seizures in the transit zones, and the CBP P-3 
aircraft played a critical and necessary role in the detection 
and monitoring of smuggling vessels and further directing Coast 
Guard ships and helicopters towards their drug-laden targets.
    Last year the committee applauded DHS' efforts to 
consolidate aviation and marine assets by merging the Border 
Patrol's air and marine program with the legacy U.S. Customs 
Service Air and Marine Operations (AMO) program. The merger was 
intended to help consolidate the operation, training, 
maintenance, and procurement of these high-value/low density 
law enforcement assets.
    The committee's enthusiasm was misplaced. It appears that 
the drug interdiction mission has suffered as a result of the 
merger. The AMO program has historically been responsible for 
interdicting drug-smuggling airplanes and ``go-fast'' speed 
boats, supporting Customs drug investigations and raids (as 
well as migrant interdictions), providing airspace security in 
the nation's Capital (and at special events like the Olympics), 
and for providing critical maritime patrol aircraft, most 
notably the fleet of P-3 radar planes, for drug interdiction 
operations in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific.
    Today, however, CBP is attempting to transfer control of 
most of AMO's operations to individual sector chiefs of the 
Border Patrol. While the AMO program is responsible for 
supporting Border Patrol missions, that is only one of its 
traditional duties. However, despite the diversion of AMO 
assets from drug interdiction activities, no proposal from CBP 
has been forthcoming to address or replace the critical 
aircraft. The committee feels it is unwise for CBP to take such 
a vital national asset and ``regionalize'' it. That model did 
not serve the old Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) 
well, and it will not serve DHS or the country well.
    To solve this problem, the committee recommends that DHS 
re-establish AMO with a clearly defined interdiction mission in 
the transit zone requiring both air support for ICE and CBP, 
and continuing to provide traditional MPA detection to the 
international, interagency effort led by JIATF-South. AMO 
should remain a truly national program, accountable both to the 
Secretary and to Congress for its crucial missions.

7. U.S. Border Patrol

    There are over 11,000 Border Patrol agents that are 
assigned the mission of detecting and apprehending any illegal 
entrants between the ports-of-entry along the United States 
land borders. These illegal entries include alien and drug 
smugglers, potential terrorists, wanted criminals, and persons 
seeking to avoid inspection at the designated ports of entry.
    The committee has deep concerns about the level of 
commitment of all sectors of the Border Patrol to the drug 
interdiction mission. In many sectors, the Border Patrol 
appears to be far more focused on illegal migrant interdiction 
than stopping drug traffickers. Moreover, the Border Patrol's 
willingness to cooperate with other law enforcement agencies on 
drug investigations and operations leaves room for improvement. 
Stopping illegal immigration is certainly a vital mission of 
the Border Patrol. If, however, the Border Patrol is going to 
be the primary agency responsible for protecting our nation's 
land borders, it must take a more active role not only in 
conducting its own drug interdiction operations, but in 
supporting the border-related drug investigations of other 
agencies as well.
    As noted above, former CBP Commissioner Robert Bonner 
recently said that separating ICE and CBP was like separating 
the cops ``on the beat'' from their detectives.\277\ Currently, 
some Border Patrol drug seizures are turned over to the DEA, 
and others are turned over to ICE. The fact that CBP and ICE 
are now both within DHS should be reflected in updated 
procedures and protocols. The current divisions between ICE and 
the U.S. Border Patrol mean that neither CBP nor ICE, nor any 
other Federal agency, has a border security strategy for inside 
and beyond the border.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \277\ Jerry Seper, Bonner Pitches Merging Agencies, Washington 
Times, Dec. 7, 2005, at http://washingtontimes.com/national/20051206-
105109-9990r.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Shadow Wolves Customs Patrol Officers
    The committee has grave concerns about the status of the 
last remaining unit of Customs Patrol Officers patrolling the 
border, the ``Shadow Wolves'' unit that works on the 76-mile 
stretch of the Mexico-Arizona border contained in the Tohono 
O'odham sovereign Indian Nation. The Shadow Wolves are all 
Native Americans, who combine traditional tracking methods and 
modern technology to find, follow, and arrest drug traffickers. 
The Shadow Wolves have historically been one of our nation's 
most effective drug enforcement units, seizing over 100,000 
pounds of narcotics annually, with only 15 agents.
    The Shadow Wolves were a part of the U.S. Customs Service 
until March 2003, when DHS assigned them to CBP, which in turn 
placed them under the control of the Border Patrol. Border 
Patrol management has not been successful, as the missions, 
priorities, and methods of the two groups are substantially 
distinct. Only 15 of the 21 Shadow Wolves agents in uniform in 
2003 are still active, and there is a serious risk that the 
rest will retire or move to other employers if the problems are 
not addressed. The Border Patrol itself has reportedly asked 
that the unit be transferred to another agency.
    The committee agrees that the Shadow Wolves should be moved 
to another agency within DHS. Two possible new ``homes'' for 
the unit are the Office of Air and Marine Operations (AMO) at 
CBP, or the Office of Investigations at ICE. Both of these 
units worked very successfully with the Shadow Wolves prior to 
2003 (when they were all part of the Customs Service). The 
committee may pursue legislation to address this problem if DHS 
is unwilling or unable to take the initiative.

            Program Assessment Rating
    The overall CBP drug control program has not been reviewed 
under the administration's Program Assessment Rating Tool 
(PART) process. However, the Office of Border Patrol, found 
within CBP, received a ``Results not Demonstrated'' rating from 
the PART process due to a lack of suitable outcome measures for 
the agency. A November 2005 GAO report noted that ``CBP is 
developing performance measures related to operational 
readiness rates (a measure of its ability to responds when 
requested), but these rates are not specific to transit zones 
or to counternarcotics activities and do not measure results.'' 
\278\ The committee recommends that CBP take prompt action to 
develop an effective performance management tool for its 
counterdrug programs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \278\ Drug Control: Agencies Need to Plan for Likely Declines in 
Drug Interdiction Assets, and Develop Better Performance Measures for 
Transit Zone Operations, GAO Report No. 06-2000, (Nov. 2005) at 25.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                        E. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

    The Department of Justice is home to some of the most 
important drug control agencies and programs in the Federal 
Government. As our nation's primary law enforcement agency, its 
efforts are crucial to the struggle to reduce drug trafficking 
and abuse. Moreover, the grant programs it administers--which 
assist state and local agencies with everything from 
investigations to drug treatment for prisoners--are vital to 
Federal, state, and local coordination and cooperation on drug 
policy.

Contact Information: Department of Justice Office of Public 
Affairs: 202-514-2007, http://www.usdoj.gov.

1. Assistance to State and Local Law Enforcement

                            Methamphetamine-Related Assistance (COPS Meth Hot Spots)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                   FY 2005      FY 2005      FY 2006      FY 2006      FY 2007
              COPS Meth Hot Spots                   \279\     \280\ Final     \281\        \282\        \283\
                                                  Requested                 Requested     Enacted      Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AGENCY TOTAL*..................................          $20        $52.6          $20       $63.59        $40.1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in millions.


Contact Information: COPS Office: 202-616-1728, http://
www.cops.usdoj.gov.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \279\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005 
Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 
2006).
    \280\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \281\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \282\ White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget 
Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \283\ Id.

    The committee has ongoing concerns about the proposed 
reduction in funds (administered by the Department of Justice's 
Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) office) dedicated 
to law enforcement activities against methamphetamine 
trafficking. Methamphetamine abuse has ravaged communities 
across the United States and put severe strains on state and 
local enforcement agencies forced to find clandestine drug 
labs, clean up the environmental damage they create, protect 
the citizens who assist law enforcement, \284\ and arrest the 
drug trafficking rings that operate them. To assist these 
overburdened agencies, Congress approved $63,590,000 for fiscal 
year 2006 (up from $52,556,000 in fiscal year 2005) for 
policing initiatives to combat methamphetamine production and 
trafficking and to enhance policing initiatives in ``drug hot 
spots.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \284\ See How Can the Federal Government Support Local and State 
Initiatives to Protect Citizens and Communities Against Drug-Related 
Violence and Witness Intimidation? Hearing before the House 
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, 
Committee on Government Reform, 109th Cong. (May 2, 2005). At http://
reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=26376 .
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The administration has increased its request for the 
program from only $20,000,000 for fiscal year 2006 to 
$40,084,000 for fiscal year 2007. As in previous years, 
however, the administration is still only requesting funds for 
the DEA-administered fund that reimburses state and local 
agencies for the costs of cleaning up toxic meth lab sites. 
Thus, the administration again proposes to eliminate the 
remaining ``Meth Hot Spots'' funding for other anti-meth 
enforcement activities--which Congress has always spent in the 
form of specific earmarks for designated projects.
    The committee fully supports the DEA reimbursement fund and 
commends the administration for proposing to increase it. The 
committee also believes, however, that Congress and the 
administration need to work together to restore and reform the 
additional Hot Spots funding. The proposed elimination of the 
rest of the ``Meth Hot Spots'' funding would greatly reduce the 
ability of affected state and local law enforcement agencies to 
help their Federal partners in reducing methamphetamine abuse, 
particularly given the proposed overall reduction in other 
state and local law enforcement assistance grants.
    It should be noted, however, that Congress itself needs to 
take steps to ensure that Federal assistance is targeted to the 
most affected areas of the country. Excessive ``earmarking'' of 
these funds undermines their efficiency. Although many states 
and communities suffer from methamphetamine trafficking and 
abuse, Federal dollars are limited and must be directed to the 
areas where they will make the most difference from a national 
point of view. The committee urges Congress and the 
administration to work together in finding ways to address this 
issue.

2. Prescription Drug Monitoring Program


----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                FY 2005      FY 2006      FY 2006      FY 2007
      Prescription Drug Monitoring Program         FY 2005    \285\ Final     \286\        \287\        \288\
                                                  Requested                 Requested     Enacted      Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AGENCY TOTAL*..................................           $0         $9.9         $5.0         $7.4       $9.919
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in millions.


Contact Information: Department of Bureau of Justice 
Assistance: 202-616-6500, http://www.usdoj.gov/BJA/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \285\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \286\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \287\ White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget 
Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \288\ Id.

    The committee also has concerns about the continuing 
reductions in funding for a prescription drug monitoring 
program. For fiscal year 2006, Congress approved $7,500,000 for 
this program--but that was itself a 25 percent cut from 2005 
funding. This year, the administration has requested only 
$9,919,000--about two-thirds of fiscal year 2005's appropriated 
level.
    Prescription drug abuse is a serious and growing problem 
throughout the United States, as illustrated by the recent wave 
of OxyContin and other oxycodone-related overdoses. In fact, 
according to the Monitoring the Future survey of drug abuse 
among high school students, prescription drugs were the only 
drugs that showed an increase in student use in 2005.\289\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \289\ See Press Release, Meth And Steroid Use Decline Sharply Among 
Youth; Overall Youth Drug Use Down Again, ONDCP (Dec. 19, 2005) at 
http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/news/press05/121905.html. (last 
visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    One major difficulty facing Federal, State and local law 
enforcement agencies in dealing with this threat is the lack of 
sufficient information about how these drugs are being diverted 
from their proper medical uses to illegal trafficking and 
abuse.\290\ The Federal Government needs to continue work on 
the establishment of a monitoring system that would track 
supplies of prescription drugs and give law enforcement 
officials more information about illegal diversion.\291\ A 
truly effective program will require more, not less, financial 
assistance from the Federal Government.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \290\ See To Do No Harm: Strategies for Preventing Prescription 
Drug Abuse: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, 
Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th 
Cong. (Feb. 9, 2004). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/
EventSingle.aspx?EventID=10843.
    \291\ See Hearing before the Institute of Medicine's Committee on 
the Assessment of the U.S. Drug Safety System, 109th Cong. (2005) 
(statement by J. Marc Wheat, staff director of the Subcommittee on 
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources) at 
www.reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant


----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                             FY 2006      FY 2006      FY 2007
              Byrne Memorial Grant                 FY 2005      FY 2005       \292\        \293\        \294\
                                                  Requested      Final      Requested     Enacted      Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AGENCY TOTAL*..................................         $508         $634           $0       $416.5           $0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in millions.

    The committee opposes the administration's renewed proposal 
to terminate the state formula grants portion of the Edward 
Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant program. Congress 
appropriated only $416,478,000 for the formula Byrne Grants for 
fiscal year 2006, down from $634,000,000 for fiscal year 
2005.\295\ The administration has again asked Congress to 
eliminate it entirely and restrict Federal assistance for state 
and local law enforcement programs to a series of enumerated 
grants (most of which are previously existing programs) under a 
``Justice Assistance'' account. In practice, this will sharply 
limit the amount of money available to help state and local 
agencies.\296\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \292\ 2005 Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 
2006, Appendix, 706.
    \293\ 2006 Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 
2007, Appendix, 708.
    \294\ Id.
    \295\ Note that in addition to this funding for the Byrne state 
formula grants, Congress also appropriated $191,704,000 for the so-
called Byrne ``discretionary grants''--the vast majority of which is 
earmarked in the appropriations bill for specific projects.
    \296\ The Byrne Formula Grant Program was created by the Anti-Drug 
Abuse Act of 1988 (Public Law 100-690). One-half of the appropriated 
funds are to be awarded to the states based on their relative 
populations, while the other half is to be awarded on the basis of the 
violent crime rates in the states.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The administration's proposed reduction appears to reflect, 
in additional to fiscal constraints, a concern about excessive 
Federal subsidization of law enforcement at the state and local 
level. The Federal treasury is not infinite and simply cannot 
pay for law enforcement at all levels and in every area. 
Moreover, choices about how much to spend on law enforcement in 
a state or community are, properly, choices that should be made 
at the state or local level--and the responsibility of paying 
for those choices should also remain at that level. Excessive 
subsidization of state and local law enforcement by the Federal 
Government may lead to inefficiency and imbalance in our 
overall law enforcement strategy.
    The committee shares those concerns, but the 
administration's drastic proposed cuts would create massive 
shortfalls in the budgets of state and local law enforcement 
agencies across the country. Numerous state and local officials 
have informed the committee members and staff that many 
programs--particularly drug enforcement programs--within states 
would have to be shut down if all Byrne Grant and similar 
funding were cut off.\297\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \297\ See Fiscal Year 2006 Drug Control Budget and the Byrne Grant, 
HIDTA and Other Law Enforcement Programs: Are We Jeopardizing Federal, 
State and Local Cooperation? Hearing before the House Subcommittee on 
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on 
Government Reform, 109th Cong. (Mar. 10, 2005). At http://
reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=23722.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Moreover, it is not necessarily the case that Federal 
support for state and local efforts lacks national impact. 
Particularly in the area of drug enforcement, state and local 
participation is vital to our national success. State and local 
agencies make more than 95 percent of arrests of drug 
violators.\298\ Collectively, they have far more personnel and 
resources than does the Federal Government. Federal support for 
these agencies can have a very positive national impact if it 
helps involve them as partners in the fight against drug 
trafficking and other criminal activities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \298\ Crime in the United States 2002, 2002 U.S. Dept. of Justice, 
Federal Bureau of Investigation Uniform Crime Report, sec. IV at http:/
/www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius--02/pdf/02crime.pdf. (last visited on 
Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The administration should instead propose reforms, where 
needed, to some of the Federal Government's assistance grants. 
Specifically, legislation may be needed to help the Federal 
Government collect more data about how these grants are being 
used and to make them more accountable. Such reform proposals 
should be accompanied by a comprehensive plan for how, and for 
what specific purposes, future Federal assistance to state and 
local law enforcement should be provided. Without such a plan, 
the proposed massive reductions lack a complete and coherent 
justification and leave the programs vulnerable to continued 
earmarking and potential misallocation of funds.

4. Regional Information Sharing System \299\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \299\ For further information on the RISS program, see the program 
website at http://www.rissinfo.com/, or call the Justice Department 
RISS program manager at (202) 616-7829.


----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                   FY 2005      FY 2005      FY 2006      FY 2006      FY 2007
                      RISS                          \300\     \301\ Final     \302\        \303\        \304\
                                                  Requested                 Requested     Enacted      Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AGENCY TOTAL*..................................        $45.0        $39.5        $45.0        $40.2        $39.7
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in millions.


Contact Information: Justice Department RISS Program Manager: 
202-616-7829, http://www.rissinfo.com.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \300\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005 
Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 
2006).
    \301\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \302\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \303\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \304\ Id.

    The committee supports the administration's request for 
$39,676,000 for the Regional Information Sharing System (RISS), 
only a 1 percent reduction from the $40,233,000 appropriated 
for fiscal year 2006. The committee believes that RISS, which 
facilitates electronic, computerized sharing of intelligence 
and information among Federal, state, and local law enforcement 
agencies, is an important tool in the fight against drug 
trafficking and other organized crime.
    The committee does question, however, why the 
administration has included the entire RISS budget request in 
the Drug Budget Summary, though the system is not exclusively 
intended or used for drug enforcement. It would be more 
accurate to estimate the percentage used for drug enforcement 
activities and include only that estimated portion in the drug 
budget. If the entire RISS budget is included in the drug 
budget, then it is unclear why none of the COPS grant funds are 
included.

5. Weed and Seed Program


----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                   FY 2005      FY 2005      FY 2006      FY 2006      FY 2007
              Weed & Seed Program                   \305\     \306\ Final     \307\        \308\        \309\
                                                  Requested                 Requested     Enacted      Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AGENCY TOTAL*..................................        $58.3        $61.2        $59.6        $48.6        $49.3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in millions.

    The committee supports the administration's request for 
$49,348,000 for the Weed and Seed Program, only a 1 percent 
reduction from the $50,000,000 appropriated by Congress for 
fiscal year 2006. The Weed and Seed Program is an important 
initiative designed to help state and local law enforcement 
agencies work with members of the local community to 
investigate and prosecute violent criminals and drug offenders, 
helping to clean up our nation's streets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \305\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005 
Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 
2006).
    \306\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \307\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \308\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \309\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The PART review rated this program as ``adequate,'' and the 
committee is further encouraged by the fact that the 
performance measures selected for the program included real 
results--the percent reduction in homicides. The committee 
believes, however, that the performance measures for the 
program should also include the percent reduction in drug 
crimes or drug availability in funded areas. The program was 
not intended solely to reduce violent crimes but also drug 
crimes, and it should be reviewed on both criteria.
    The committee also believes that ONDCP should (as with some 
other programs administered by the Department of Justice) 
estimate the percentage of funds dedicated to illegal drug 
control and include only that part in the drug budget. 
Including the entire program in the drug budget is inaccurate 
and undermines the ability of Congress to review how much of 
the program's resources is being dedicated to drug control.

6. Drug Court Program


----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                   FY 2005      FY 2005      FY 2006      FY 2006      FY 2007
               Drug Court Program                   \310\     \311\ Final     \312\        \313\        \314\
                                                  Requested                 Requested     Enacted      Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AGENCY TOTAL*..................................        $70.1        $39.5        $70.1        $10.0        $69.2
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in millions.

    The committee supports the administration's request for 
$69,186,000 for the drugs courts program, a significant 
increase over the $10,000,000 actually appropriated by Congress 
for fiscal year 2006. The drug courts program assists state and 
local governments to establish alternatives to prosecution for 
low-level drug offenders. Typically, a state or local agency 
will offer a person facing drug charges the option of entering 
a drug treatment program. If the defendant successfully 
completes the program and avoids being rearrested for a period 
thereafter, the drug charges will be dropped. The drug court 
concept is praised by law enforcement officers, judges, and 
addiction specialists throughout the country and shows a great 
deal of promise.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \310\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005 
Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 
2006).
    \311\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \312\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \313\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \314\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The committee is concerned that the ever-shrinking amounts 
appropriated by Congress for this program jeopardize the 
continued success of drug courts. The committee notes that 
while drug court programs are likely to continue at the state 
and local level, Federal assistance has two beneficial effects. 
First, the financial assistance allows more drug offenders to 
benefit from them. Second, and perhaps even more important, by 
attaching conditions to the funding, Congress can help ensure 
that they meet minimum quality standards. Without funding, 
Congress has little leverage to ensure that these programs 
achieve national goals.
    In light of the most recent PART review (2002) of the 
program, which found ``results not demonstrated,'' \315\ the 
administration must take steps to improve the program's 
accountability and performance management. The committee is 
encouraged that, according to the latest PART review, the 
Department has been able to improve grantees' reporting of 
results. The committee also notes that, unlike many prevention 
programs, the drug courts program is not simply defining 
performance in terms of program expansion (i.e., the simple 
number of drug courts in existence) but in terms of actual 
results (i.e., the re-arrest rate of program participants). 
This is a positive development that will hopefully be expanded, 
not simply within this program but in other prevention and 
treatment initiatives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \315\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy (Feb. 2006) 
at 86. At http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/
ndcs06/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The committee has previously stated its belief that the 
drug courts program should monitor not simply the re-arrest 
rate of program participants but their drug use as well.\316\ 
Ideally, convicts should be sentenced to drug abstinence, not 
just drug treatment. A vigorous, mandatory system of drug 
testing should be applied in every drug court case to ensure 
that program participants are staying off of drugs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \316\ Committee on Government Reform Report, The National Drug 
Control Strategy for 2005 and the National Drug Control Budget for 
Fiscal Year 2006, H. Rept. 109-172, (2005) at 47.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The committee acknowledges, however, that there are 
practical and (potentially) legal limits on what drug court 
programs can achieve in this regard. First, as a practical 
matter, drug court programs have little ability to monitor a 
participant's behavior after the participant has completed the 
drug treatment program. Whether a participant has been re-
arrested is fairly easy to keep track of (provided the 
participant does not move outside the drug court program's 
jurisdiction). Drug use that does not result in re-arrest, 
however, would require drug testing to monitor. Besides being 
expensive, such after-completion drug testing likely would face 
constitutional hurdles. Unlike parolees or probationers, who 
(as convicts) may be required to submit to random drug tests, 
those who complete drug court programs have not been convicted 
of a crime. It is possible that the courts would hold that the 
Fifth Amendment bars such post-program drug testing.
    Given the difficulties associated with long-term, post-
completion drug testing of drug court participants, the 
committee instead makes two recommendations. First, it is 
imperative that the treatment required by a drug court program 
be of sufficient duration to ensure its effectiveness. Second, 
any treatment program should require multiple, random drug 
tests, with serious and graduated consequences for participants 
who fail them. The House recently passed legislation that would 
mandate such testing for drug court programs receiving Federal 
funding, and the committee urges the Senate to enact it into 
law.\317\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \317\ See Conference Report to accompany H.R. 3199 (U.S.A. Patriot 
Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005), H. Rept. 109-333, Sec. 
751 (2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

7. Residential Substance Abuse Treatment (RSAT) Program


----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                   FY 2005      FY 2005      FY 2006      FY 2006      FY 2007
                      RSAT                          \318\     \319\ Final     \320\        \321\        \322\
                                                  Requested                 Requested     Enacted      Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AGENCY TOTAL*..................................        $76.1        $24.7        $44.1          $10           $0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in millions.

    The committee opposes the administration's proposal to 
terminate all funding for the RSAT program. The committee is 
particularly disappointed with the administration's loss of 
commitment to providing drug treatment for state and local 
prisoners. Last year the administration requested $44,119,000 
for the program, and only two years ago it requested 
$76,054,000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \318\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005 
Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 
2006).
    \319\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \320\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \321\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \322\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    It is regrettable that Congress continues to slash funds 
for this program (appropriating only $10,000,000 for fiscal 
year 2006), which is intended to support drug treatment for 
prisoners in state and local prison systems.\323\ Most of our 
nation's drug offenders are incarcerated in state or local 
prisons. Moreover, most of these prisoners are the kind of low-
level offenders who would benefit most from drug treatment. (By 
contrast, those in the Federal prisons are typically major drug 
traffickers whose primary motive was most likely greed, rather 
than the simple need to obtain more drugs to feed addiction.) 
The committee is concerned that the administration's reduced 
requests may accelerate Congress's shrinking commitment to drug 
treatment in the prisons and jails.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \323\ Congressional cuts in this program need to be understood in 
the context of the administration's overall drug budget proposal for 
fiscal year 2006, which attempted to force through severe cuts in drug 
control programs. Though Congress was able to restore some of that 
funding, not all of it could be preserved.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The committee believes that support for the program would 
be increased if the administration took steps to improve 
performance measurement for RSAT. The program's last PART 
review found ``results not demonstrated,'' and it was clear 
that the performance measures identified for the program--
namely the numbers of prisoners treated under the program, and 
the cost per prisoner--address only the size and functioning of 
the program, not its end result. Performance measures should be 
developed to determine how effective the treatment provided 
under the program is, not simply how much it costs or how much 
is provided. Greater attention needs to be paid to monitoring 
the actual positive results of RSAT grants.

8. Southwest Border Prosecutor Initiative


----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                   FY 2005      FY 2005      FY 2006      FY 2006      FY 2007
     Southwest Border Prosecutor Initiative         \324\     \325\ Final     \326\        \327\        \328\
                                                  Requested                 Requested     Enacted      Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AGENCY TOTAL*..................................        $48.4        $29.6        $48.4        $30.0        $29.8
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in millions.

    The committee has concerns about the administration's 
request for only $29,757,000 for the Southwest Border 
Prosecutor Initiative, which is intended to reimburse state and 
local prosecutors in border areas for the increase in local 
crime from border activities (namely, drug and people smuggling 
from Mexico). That would be a significant decrease from the 
$48,418,000 requested for fiscal year 2006 and a slight 
decrease from the $30,000,000 actually appropriated by 
Congress. The committee hopes that the reduced request does not 
reflect a reduced commitment on the part of the administration 
to helping communities overburdened by cross-border drug 
trafficking and other crime.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \324\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005 
Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 
2006).
    \325\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \326\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \327\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \328\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The committee believes that (in accordance with 
congressional intent) the program's funds should be directed 
towards border-related crime--not simply general crimes 
committed in the border area. Information provided by the 
Department to the staff of the Subcommittee on Criminal 
Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources indicates that only a 
quarter (at most) of the program's funds is dedicated to drug 
offenses, and none to immigration offenses.\329\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \329\ Dept. of Justice budget briefing for Staff of Subcommittee on 
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, (Dec. 2004).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    To be sure, the heavy drug and immigration caseload borne 
by Federal prosecutors in border regions may indirectly 
increase the ``general crime'' caseload of state agencies--
since Federal prosecutors may not be able to take on as many 
non-drug or non-immigration cases in those areas. Nevertheless, 
the committee believes that such a low percentage of drug cases 
calls the program's justification into question. Moreover, it 
calls into question the administration's decision to include 
the entire program budget request in the Drug Budget Summaries 
of recent years, distorting the true picture of Federal 
counter-drug activities.

9. Prisoner Re-entry Initiative


----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                             FY 2006                   FY 2007
          Prisoner Re-entry Initiative             FY 2005      FY 2005       \330\       FY 2006       \331\
                                                  Requested      Final      Requested     Enacted      Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AGENCY TOTAL*..................................          $--          $--          $15         $3.0        $14.9
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in millions.

    The committee supports the administration's request for 
$14,879,000 for a prisoner re-entry initiative, designed to 
assist faith and community-based organizations in their 
services to prisoners preparing to reintegrate into society 
after incarceration. The committee hopes that Congress will 
improve on the only $3,000,000 approved for these kinds of 
programs for fiscal year 2006 (as part of the appropriation for 
the Federal prison system).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \330\ 2005 Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 
2006, Appendix, 704.
    \331\ 2006 Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 
2007, Appendix, 706.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The committee held a hearing on this issue last year \332\ 
and was provided information about the significant 
accomplishments of faith and community-based organizations in 
the field of prisoner re-entry services.\333\ The committee 
believes that this proposal would be further strengthened by 
authorizing legislation from the Congress that protects the 
rights of faith and community-based organizations. Legislation 
of that kind would better define the program's goals and 
methods of implementation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \332\ See Confronting Recidivism: Prisoner Re-entry Programs and a 
Just Future for All Americans, Hearing before House Subcommittee on 
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on 
Government Reform, 109th Cong. (Feb. 2, 2005). At http://
reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=21850.
    \333\ Id, (testimony of Pat Nolan, president of Justice 
Fellowship).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

10. Cannabis Eradication Program


----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                             FY 2006      FY 2006      FY 2007
          Cannabis Eradication Program             FY 2005      FY 2005       \334\        \335\        \336\
                                                  Requested      Final      Requested     Enacted      Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AGENCY TOTAL*..................................           $0           $0        $20.0         $5.0        $10.7
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in millions.

    The committee has concerns about the administration's 
request for only $10,713,000 for the Cannabis Eradication 
Program. Only a year ago, the administration requested nearly 
twice as much ($19,100,000)--although it should be noted that 
even this year's request is twice as much as Congress actually 
appropriated for fiscal year 2006 (only $5,000,000).\337\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \334\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \335\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \336\ Id.
    \337\ Congressional cuts in this program need to be understood in 
the context of the administration's overall drug budget proposal for 
fiscal year 2006, which attempted to force through severe cuts in drug 
control programs. Though Congress was able to restore some of that 
funding, not all of it could be preserved.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Led by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the 
Cannabis Eradication Program organizes joint Federal, state, 
and local enforcement actions to stop domestic marijuana 
cultivation. Marijuana growing has become a major problem in 
many parts of the U.S.--presenting a serious challenge to law 
enforcement. For example, in California's national parks and 
forests, marijuana growers (organized by Mexican drug 
trafficking cartels) have caused major environmental damage and 
have used violence against park rangers and tourists.\338\ The 
committee believes that, far from cutting this vital program, 
Congress and the administration should increase its scope to 
tackle the growing problem of marijuana cultivation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \338\ See Drug Production on Public Lands--A Growing Problem: Joint 
Hearing before House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and 
Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, and the House 
Subcommittee on Energy Policy, Natural Resources and Regulatory 
Affairs, 108th Cong. (Oct. 10, 2003). At http://reform.house.gov/
CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=7225.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

11. Bureau of Prisons


----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                   FY 2005      FY 2005      FY 2006      FY 2006      FY 2007
               Bureau of Prisons                    \339\     \340\ Final     \341\        \342\        \343\
                                                  Requested                 Requested     Enacted      Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AGENCY TOTAL*..................................        $49.3        $48.6        $49.7        $49.0        $51.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in millions.


Contact Information: Bureau Of Prisons Public Affairs Division: 
812-244-4400, http://www.bop.gov.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \339\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005 
Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 
2006).
    \340\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \341\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \342\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \343\ Id.

    The committee supports the administration's request for 
$51,000,000 for the Bureau of Prisons' drug treatment programs. 
This would be an increase of approximately $2 million over the 
fiscal year 2006 enacted level.
    The committee believes that the Bureau's efforts to reduce 
drug use and addiction by prisoners are commendable and have 
had very positive results. The Bureau should seek to actively 
participate in programs that strive to replicate these results 
in state and local prisons and jails, where the vast majority 
of drug offenders are incarcerated. In addition, the Bureau 
should foster the drug treatment services of faith-based 
providers, who bring hope for a better future to the prisons.
    The committee is disappointed that the administration did 
not continue its practice, begun just last year, of requesting 
a specific amount for ``inmate programs.'' That line item more 
clearly separated the costs of actually confining prisoners 
from the costs of assisting prisoners to reintegrate into 
society after release. In addition to drug treatment, these 
reintegration programs include education and vocational 
training.
    The committee is appreciative of the administration's 
continued support, specifically mentioned in the Fiscal Year 
2007 Budget, for faith-based programs such as the Life 
Connections Program.\344\ The committee held a hearing last 
year on the issue of prisoner re-entry programs and is seeking 
ways to help promote them.\345\ The committee looks forward to 
working with the administration to continue making progress and 
to replicate these initiatives at the state and local level.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \344\ 2006 Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 
2007, Appendix, at 702.
    \345\ See Confronting Recidivism: Prisoner Re-entry Programs and a 
Just Future for All Americans, Hearing before House Subcommittee on 
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on 
Government Reform, 109th Cong. (Feb. 2, 2005). At http://
reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=21850.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The committee has concerns, however, about the failure of 
the administration in recent fiscal years to identify the other 
drug control-related costs included in the Bureau's budget 
request, including the cost of incarcerating drug offenders, 
the cost of drug testing of prisoners and employees, and the 
cost of screening visitors and packages for illegal drugs. 
These are clearly expenditures directly associated with drug 
control, meaning that it is simply incorrect for ONDCP to claim 
that only 1.0 percent of the Bureau's budget is drug related.

12. National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC)


----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                             FY 2006                   FY 2007
                      NDIC                         FY 2005      FY 2005       \346\       FY 2006       \347\
                                                  Requested      Final      Requested     Enacted      Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AGENCY TOTAL*..................................        $34.9        $39.4          $17          $39       $15.85
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in millions.


Contact Information: National Drug Intelligence Center Public 
Affairs: 814-532-4902, http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \346\ 2005 Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 
2006, Appendix, 1181.
    \347\ 2006 Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 
2007, Appendix, 673.

    The committee supports the administration's request for 
$15,852,000 to fund the shutdown of the National Drug 
Intelligence Center (NDIC) and the transfer of its functions to 
other agencies. Although the goals of NDIC are worthy--the 
analysis of drug intelligence and the gathering of information 
from local law enforcement--it is not clear that the separate 
existence of the Center is necessary. Currently funded at $39 
million for fiscal year 2006, NDIC is an expensive and 
duplicative use of scarce Federal drug enforcement 
resources.\348\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \348\ Though the administration has repeatedly proposed closing the 
Center, Congress has continued to fund it through an earmark in the 
Intelligence Community Management Account, part of the annual 
Department of Defense appropriations bill. Although appropriated on 
that bill, the funds have been directed to be transferred to the 
Department of Justice, which Congress has made responsible for managing 
the Center.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Center is located in Johnstown, Pennsylvania and has a 
staff of nearly 400 employees. First created in 1993, it has 
cost the American taxpayers nearly $400 million. From the 
beginning, the agency was criticized as duplicative of already-
existing drug intelligence centers (such as the DEA's El Paso 
Intelligence Center (EPIC) along the southwest border). Critics 
also questioned why a Federal intelligence center would be 
physically located so far from every other Federal drug 
enforcement agency.\349\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \349\ Bret Schulte, A Drug War Boondoggle, U.S. News & World 
Report, (May 9, 2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In fact, NDIC was never able to fulfill its original 
mission of centralizing and coordinating drug intelligence, 
given its remote location and the unwillingness of the other 
Federal agencies to contribute significant information. 
Instead, over time the Center took on two different missions: 
analysis of ``open source'' (i.e., publicly available) 
information already published by other drug enforcement 
agencies and the development of software capable of analyzing 
documents seized by other agencies (particularly state and 
local agencies).\350\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \350\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Though these missions are acknowledged as having some 
marginal value by other Federal agencies, as well as drug 
policy analysts, it is not clear whether they alone justify the 
continued separate existence of NDIC or its location in 
Johnstown. Moreover, the Center has been plagued by scandal. 
Its director was fired in 2004 by the Justice Department for 
inappropriately taking nearly $164,000 in official trips with 
his secretary.\351\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \351\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The committee agrees that the Center's work has value, but 
also agrees with the administration's assessment that the 
current funding is excessive, and that the separate Johnstown 
facility is unnecessary. In a time of shrinking budgets, it 
makes a great deal of sense to consolidate the existing 
resources and functions of NDIC within other agencies. For 
example, the true intelligence-gathering personnel and 
functions of the Center should be relocated to the southwest 
border at EPIC or within the new drug fusion center established 
by the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF).

13. Drug Enforcement Administration \352\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \352\ DEA budget figures discussed in this section include only 
appropriations, and do not include funding through the Diversion 
Control Fee Account (DFCA)--the fees paid by the pharmaceutical 
industry to the DEA to finance its prescription drug diversion control 
activities.


----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                   FY 2005      FY 2005      FY 2006      FY 2006      FY 2007
                      DEA                           \353\     \354\ Final     \355\        \356\        \357\
                                                  Requested                 Requested     Enacted      Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AGENCY TOTAL*..................................        $1.66        $1.65        $1.69        $1.68        $1.74
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in billions.


Contact Information: Drug Enforcement Administration Public 
Affairs: 202-307-7977, http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \353\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005 
Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 
2006).
    \354\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \355\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \356\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \357\ Id.

    The committee supports the administration's proposal for 
$1,736,491,000 for the Drug Enforcement Administration, an 
increase of approximately $50 million from the $1,686,457,000 
received by DEA for fiscal year 2006. The committee also 
supports the administration's proposal to increase the 
Diversion Control Fee Account (DFCA)--the fees paid by the 
pharmaceutical industry to DEA to finance its prescription drug 
diversion control activities--to approximately $212 million, an 
increase of over $10 million from the level approved by 
Congress for fiscal year 2006 ($201,673,000).

            DEA Demand Reduction
    Given the tremendous cuts proposed by the administration 
for demand reduction programs government-wide, the committee 
can no longer support the administration's proposal to 
eliminate the DEA's Demand Reduction program. Although the 
committee recognizes that the DEA is a law enforcement 
organization, it is imperative that what few demand reduction 
programs remain within the Federal Government survive.
    The committee is grateful that the final appropriations 
conference report approving the DEA Demand Reduction program 
directed it to be targeted against methamphetamine abuse.\358\ 
For such a relatively small program, a specific target like 
methamphetamine will help to maximize its impact.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \358\ Conference Report to accompany H.R. 2862 (Making 
Appropriations for Science, the Departments of State, Justice, and 
Commerce, and Related Agencies for the Fiscal Year Ending Sept. 30, 
2006, and for other purposes), H. Rept. 109-272, at 79 (2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Methamphetamine Enforcement
    The committee continues to be very concerned about the 
growing danger from methamphetamine (meth) and recommends it be 
a top priority at the DEA, and in the nation's overall drug 
strategy. Meth is one of the most powerful and dangerous drugs 
available. The last several years have seen an unprecedented 
rise in its use, trafficking, and manufacturing.\359\ The 
wholesale abuse of the drug itself is serious enough. But when 
we factor in the toxic environmental effects from unregulated 
chemicals used in clandestine laboratories, we see that 
methamphetamine is taking a terrible toll. No community is 
immune. Methamphetamine abuse has devastated communities across 
the nation and put unsustainable strains on the responsible 
State and local enforcement agencies. The committee is 
therefore grateful that the final appropriations conference 
report directed DEA to make methamphetamine enforcement a 
priority.\360\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \359\ See Law Enforcement and the Fight Against Methamphetamine: 
Hearing before House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and 
Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 109th Cong. (Nov. 18, 
2004). (Statement of Joseph T. Rannazzisi, Drug Enforcement 
Administration). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/
EventSingle.aspx?EventID=20333.
    \360\ Conference Report to accompany H.R. 2862 (Making 
Appropriations for Science, the Departments of State, Justice, and 
Commerce, and Related Agencies for the Fiscal Year Ending Sept. 30, 
2006, and for other purposes), H. Rept. 109-272, at 79-80 (2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The committee is therefore opposed to the administration's 
proposal to cut its Mobile Enforcement Teams (METs) by one-
half. The METs, small units of DEA officers who can be rapidly 
deployed to assist local law enforcement, have been invaluable 
tools in the fight against clandestine meth labs and simply 
cannot be replaced. The committee applauds the appropriations 
conference report's insistence that the METs be maintained at 
their current level (rather than reduced as proposed by the 
administration) and targeted at methamphetamine.\361\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \361\ Id, at 79.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The committee is also concerned about the impact of the 
administration's proposal to eliminate the DEA's Regional 
Enforcement Teams. These teams were intended to respond to 
major drug trafficking activity in cities or communities that 
did not have a permanent DEA presence. The elimination of the 
Regional Enforcement Teams could have a detrimental impact on 
rural communities that may lack a DEA office, but that have a 
significant meth trafficking problem.

            DEA Efforts in Afghanistan
    The committee is concerned about the administration's 
decision not to request a specific amount for its efforts 
there. Last year, the administration requested $22 million to 
enhance DEA's anti-heroin activities in Afghanistan. It is 
critically important that DEA be fully supported in these 
efforts to stop heroin production and trafficking by the 
Department of Defense, the State Department's International 
Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) program, and the U.S. 
Agency for International Development. The committee remains 
very concerned that an insufficient level of cooperation is 
taking place in Afghanistan among State, U.S. AID, CENTCOM and 
DEA programs. A specific line item in the budget would allow 
Congress and the executive branch to account for and support 
DEA's critical efforts in this troubled area of the world.
    The committee is grateful that the final appropriations 
conference report for fiscal year 2006 directed DEA to use at 
least some of its funding increase for Afghanistan and Central 
Asian activities.\362\ The committee urges the Appropriations 
Committee, however, to strongly consider designating an actual 
line item in the fiscal year 2007 budget for these activities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \362\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The committee is pleased to learn of the Department of 
Defense's recent decision to lease Soviet era MI-17 helicopters 
to support and transport DEA teams and believes it is long 
overdue. As mentioned previously, it is important that DEA 
personnel be provided the tools and support necessary to safely 
address and curtail heroin production and trafficking in 
Afghanistan.

            Diversion Control
    As noted above, the committee supports the administration's 
proposal to increase the Diversion Control Fee Account (DCFA) 
by approximately $10 million. This program supports DEA's 
efforts to stop the diversion of controlled substances and key 
precursor chemicals (like pseudoephedrine by meth traffickers) 
from being diverted to illegal uses. In an era of increased 
prescription drug abuse and rampant methamphetamine 
manufacturing, diversion control must be a top priority for 
U.S. drug policy.
    According to the budget, $3.4 million of the increase would 
be financed through ``programmatic enhancements,'' and this 
amount would be used to hire new intelligence analysts for the 
program. The remaining increase is projected to come from 
increased fee revenue due to increased industry profits.
    In FY 2006, the DCFA received $47,457,000 in adjustments to 
base and enhancements, which, in part, came from a transfer of 
DCFA-related costs previously paid from DEA's direct budget. In 
late 2005, DEA's proposal to increase the fee paid by the 
registrant community, e.g., manufacturers, distributors, 
pharmacists, and practitioners, was published in the Federal 
Register. The revenue generated from the new fee will allow DEA 
to cover the cost of 2006 enhancements and the DCFA program 
costs in years 2007 and 2008.

            Operation Panama Express
    The committee is appreciative of the administration's 
stated intent in the Budget to fund ``Operation Panama 
Express,'' a joint drug intelligence operation with the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE), Department of Defense, Coast Guard and DEA 
personnel. The committee remains concerned that the successful 
intelligence driven programs of both Panama Express North and 
Panama Express South continue to operate with insufficient 
funding from the Departments of Defense, Justice and Homeland 
Security. Therefore, the committee recommends that funding for 
each Panama Express program (North and South) be clearly 
identified with separate line items and fully supported in the 
administration's budget.

            Performance Measurement
    The DEA has received an ``adequate'' \363\ rating through 
the PART process and has developed new goals, objectives, and 
strategies to support the Justice Department's goal of reducing 
the availability of drugs in the U.S. by 5 percent each year. 
The committee commends this effort to improve accountability 
and performance measures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \363\ See Program Assessment Rating Tool, 2007 Budget, at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2007/sheets/part.xls (last visited on 
Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

14. Interagency Crime and Drug Enforcement/Organized Crime Drug 
        Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF)


----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                         FY 2005        FY 2005        FY 2006         FY 2006        FY 2007
               OCDETF                Requested \364\  Final \365\  Requested \366\  Enacted \367\  Request \368\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AGENCY TOTAL*......................         $580.6           $554           $561         $489.44         $498.5
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in millions.


Contact Information: Executive Office for OCDETF: 202-514-2073, 
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/ocdetf.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \364\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005 
Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 
2006).
    \365\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \366\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \367\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \368\ Id.

    The committee generally supports the administration's 
request for $498,457,000 for ``Interagency Crime and Drug 
Enforcement,'' the account under which the administration 
places its request for funds for the Organized Crime Drug 
Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF). That is an increase of over $9 
million from the FY 2006 enacted funding of $489,440,000. The 
committee does not, however, support the additional transfer of 
$208 million for the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas 
(HIDTA) program from the Office of National Drug Control Policy 
(ONDCP) to OCDETF.\369\ As was the case last year, that 
proposal has not been nearly adequately explained or justified 
by the administration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \369\ FY 2007 USDOJ Budget and Performance Summary 107, (2006) 
(``The FY 2007 President's Budget proposes the transfer of the HIDTA 
program from [ONDCP] to OCDETF.'')
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Program Overview
    The OCDETF program, established in 1982, was intended to 
fund joint, case-specific drug enforcement ``task forces'' 
(both investigative and prosecutorial) between multiple 
Federal, state, and local agencies. Headquartered at the 
Executive Office of OCDETF within the Justice Department, 
OCDETF operates through nine regional boards that oversee 
funded task forces throughout the country.
    Prior to fiscal year 1998, the Justice Department's OCDETF 
office actually managed joint funding not simply for Justice 
Department law enforcement agencies (such as DEA, FBI, and the 
U.S. Marshal's Service), but also for non-Justice Department 
agencies such as the Customs Service and the Internal Revenue 
Service. Beginning in 1998, however, Congress ended this 
practice--meaning that the OCDETF office no longer controls the 
funding for any non-Justice Department Federal agency. Other 
Federal agencies involved in OCDETF ``task forces'' (such as 
ICE, CBP, and IRS), however, are still considered program 
participants and have representatives on OCDETF regional 
boards.
    Today, OCDETF provides funding for investigations and 
prosecutions of drug cases. The prosecutions are primarily 
funded through direct disbursements to local U.S. Attorney's 
offices, which pay for the salaries of full-time Federal 
prosecutors. The investigations are funded both through direct 
disbursements to Federal agencies to pay for full-time agent 
salaries and through reimbursements of overtime pay for state 
and local agents working on OCDETF task force cases.
    In theory, to qualify for any funding under OCDETF, an 
agency or U.S. Attorney's office must seek approval from the 
regional board and the central OCDETF office. That approval, in 
turn, depends on whether the funding is properly tied to a 
specific OCDETF-qualifying case. To qualify, a case must target 
a significant drug trafficking organization. New guidelines set 
forth in 2002 eliminated eligibility for so-called ``local 
impact'' cases not tied to national or at least regional 
organizations.\370\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \370\ OCDETF budget briefing for Government Reform Committee, 
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources 
staff on Dec. 7, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In practice, however, only the funding of state and local 
overtime must be approved in advance. The funding of Federal 
agent and prosecutor salaries is essentially pre-approved 
through an annual allocation and must simply be justified post 
hoc by demonstrating that the particular agency or U.S. 
Attorney's office worked a sufficient number of hours on 
OCDETF-approved cases. By contrast, state and local overtime 
may only be paid after a case has been approved for OCDETF 
status.\371\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \371\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Issues
    The 2002 guidelines were designed to address concerns that 
OCDETF had deviated from its original charter to target major 
narcotic trafficking and money-laundering organizations by 
accepting drug targets that did not meet the major threshold. 
Despite this, the guidelines have apparently not had any 
appreciable effect on the amount of OCDETF funds allocated to 
Federal agencies or to individual U.S. Attorneys' offices. It 
is possible, however, that the guidelines have spurred those 
agencies and offices to target higher-level organizations.\372\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \372\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    One of the weaknesses of the OCDETF program is that it is 
not clear how valuable the assistance being provided by OCDETF 
is to ongoing investigations of non-Justice Department 
agencies. Non-Justice Department Federal agents involved in 
drug investigations, interviewed by the committee staff, 
asserted that OCDETF status merely gained them preferential 
treatment for their cases by the local United States Attorney's 
office. It should be noted, however, that Congress is most 
likely to blame for this problem. When the OCDETF office's 
authority over non-Justice Department agencies' funding was 
eliminated after 1997, the OCDETF program no longer had much to 
offer to those agencies. Moreover, even the funding of state 
and local overtime is unlikely to be of much use to agencies 
focused on drug trafficking at the borders and ports of entry--
notably ICE and the Coast Guard--because their cases rarely 
rely on state and local assistance (unlike DEA, for example).
    The committee is disappointed by the administration's 
failure to re-submit its proposal of last year to use $58 
million to fund additional narcotics agents at the FBI, as well 
as prosecutors. Congress declined to support this proposal in 
last year's appropriations bill, with the final conference 
report expressing the concern that providing funding to the FBI 
through OCDETF would ``unnecessarily limit the FBI's ability to 
allocate resources to the highest priority threats such as 
terrorism, counterintelligence, cyber crime and gang 
enforcement.'' \373\ While these are all important priorities 
for the FBI, the committee believes that drug trafficking is an 
equally serious threat and one which FBI agents have special 
abilities to deal with.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \373\ See Conference Report to accompany H.R. 2862 (Making 
Appropriations for Science, the Departments of State, Justice, and 
Commerce, and Related Agencies for the Fiscal Year Ending Sept. 30, 
2006, and for other purposes), H. Rept. 109-272, at 73 (2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Keeping a certain number of FBI agents primarily focused on 
narcotics enforcement is entirely in keeping with the agency's 
history and practices. Certainly the FBI should be able, as it 
was after September 11, 2001, to temporarily shift agents to 
urgent needs (such as terrorist threats) in a crisis. But 
Congress ought, through funding programs such as OCDETF, to 
ensure that major enforcement agencies do not ``drop the ball'' 
when it comes to drug enforcement, simply because some threats 
garner more media attention than others. The FBI, like other 
agencies, should strive to maintain a constant level of effort 
against key criminal threats (including drugs), regardless of 
the ever-shifting currents of public or political opinion.
    The committee does expect, however, that should Congress 
ever approve this type of request, OCDETF would monitor these 
new employees to make sure that their efforts remain focused on 
drug enforcement. OCDETF should never become a funding source 
for other agencies to conduct non-drug related activities.

            Drug Intelligence Fusion Center
    The committee is disappointed by the administration's 
failure to specify in the Budget how much it proposes to spend 
for the recently developed OCDETF Drug Fusion Center. The 
committee has supported the continued development of the Fusion 
Center computer system that finds criminal linkages by matching 
criminal data inputs from a multitude of Federal drug 
investigative cases. The committee has also supported the 
integration of non-Justice Department agencies (such as U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)) into the Fusion 
Center network and hopes that such integration will be 
completed soon.
    The committee is concerned, however, that the Fusion Center 
not become a one-way street, in which participating agencies 
provide information but receive nothing in return. Such an 
approach may hamper the potential effectiveness of other 
Federal, state and local law enforcement agencies that could 
benefit from the linkage information.
    The committee recommends that programs like OCDETF increase 
their efforts to improve intelligence and information sharing 
by drug enforcement agencies. The shortfalls in intelligence 
and key information sharing described in the 9/11 Commission 
Report are not confined to the FBI and CIA.\374\ Information 
sharing failures extend to the agencies entrusted with 
protecting our borders and interdicting illegal drugs--several 
of which are now combined in the Department of Homeland 
Security. In fact, the 9/11 terrorists each had to clear 
Federal customs and immigration authorities and had brushes 
with local law enforcement. If everyone had had all the 
information on these killers, they might not have been able to 
carry out their planned attacks. These problems can also 
undermine our efforts to identify and stop drug traffickers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \374\ Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission, (2004).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Panama Express
    The committee believes that OCDETF should seek to support 
the efforts of Operation Panama Express, two interagency 
intelligence-driven programs managed by the Departments of 
Justice, Defense and Homeland Security. These programs should 
be used as models for future information sharing efforts and 
joint operations. Criminal Justice Subcommittee Chairman Mark 
Souder and members of the subcommittee staff saw first-hand the 
incredible effectiveness of Panama Express South during a 
recent visit.\375\ The intelligence cueing from this operation 
has allowed Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-South) to 
optimize its DHS and DOD interdiction forces, resulting in the 
seizure of over 480 tons of cocaine and the arrest of over 
1,000 individuals since its inception in February 2000.\376\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \375\ Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug 
Policy, and Human Resources visit to Operation Panama Express South, 
Sarasota, FL, on Jan. 10, 2006.
    \376\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy (Feb. 2006) 
at 33.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The committee is concerned that these successful 
intelligence-driven programs continue to operate with 
insufficient funding from DOD, DHS, and the Department of 
Justice. These programs should be fully supported and enhanced. 
Therefore, the committee again recommends that funding for both 
Panama Express North and South be clearly identified with 
separate line items and fully supported within the 
administration's budget. If Panama Express North can be given a 
line item (in DEA's budget), then Panama Express South can, 
too.

            PART Review
    The OCDETF program has not yet been reviewed by the 
administration's Performance Assessment Rating Tool (PART) 
process. The committee has been informed, however, that a PART 
review will take place soon. The committee believes that in 
addition to other long-term outcome measures, the OCDETF should 
be evaluated for its effectiveness in helping agencies focus on 
high-level drug trafficking organization targets. In 
particular, the PART review should determine whether the new 
2002 guidelines actually caused OCDETF-participating agencies 
to focus more time on such high-value targets.

15. Department of Justice Financial Management

    The Department of Justice has come under heavy criticism in 
recent years for its poor financial management. Beginning in 
2004, the Government Accountability Office statement on Major 
Management Challenges at the Department of Justice noted that 
the results of the fiscal year 2004 financial statement audit 
indicated ``serious financial issues,'' particularly at one of 
Justice's significant components, the Office of Justice 
Programs (OJP).\377\ OJP has assets of $8.4 billion (31 percent 
of DOJ's total assets) and net costs of $4 billion (13 percent 
of DOJ's total net costs). Because OJP is such a large 
component, it is ``material'' to--meaning large enough to 
affect--the financial statements for the entire Department.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \377\ Major Management Challenges at the Department of Justice, 
Government Accountability Office, at http://www.gao.gov/pas/2005/
doj.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The 2004 financial audit revealed serious accounting 
problems that have affected DOJ's ability to achieve its 
mission. The most serious problems occurred in the area of 
grants management, including the Community Oriented Policing 
Services (COPS) Program. In the COPS Program alone, audits by 
DOJ's Inspector General (OIG) alleged that $277 million was 
misspent, and that the OIG has requested documentation from 82 
police agencies that have not explained in detail how they 
spent $111 million. It is clear that poor financial management 
has undermined confidence in the COPS Program and other grants 
programs.\378\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \378\ Peter Eisler, 10 years and $10B later, COPS drawing scrutiny, 
USA Today, (Apr. 11, 2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Proper accounting and management controls could prevent 
these problems. Recognizing the importance of sound financial 
management, Congress passed the Chief Financial Officers Act of 
1990 to require Federal agencies to submit audited financial 
statements. For fiscal year 2004, DOJ's auditors were unable to 
express an opinion as to the reliability of the financial 
statements, and they rescinded the unqualified opinion rendered 
on the 2003 statements.\379\ The committee believes it is 
important to recognize the seriousness of that audit result. In 
the private sector, anything other than an unqualified or 
``clean'' audit opinion would be unacceptable, and any 
restatement of a prior year's audit would be front-page news.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \379\ Independent Accountants' Report on Financial Statements, 
Fiscal Year 2004 Department of Justice Performance and Accountability 
Report, at III-9. At http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/annualreports/pr2004/
TableofContents.htm (last visited on Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    It is not yet clear how much progress the Department has 
made in correcting these problems. It is at least encouraging 
that the fiscal year 2005 independent auditors were able to 
express an opinion on OJP's--and hence the Department's--
financial statements, noting that OJP had at last set up an 
adequate financial accounting system.\380\ Despite this, the 
independent auditors identified two ``material weaknesses'' 
with the Department's financial management and with OJP's in 
particular:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \380\ Independent Auditors' Report on Financial Statements, Fiscal 
Year 2005 Department of Justice Performance and Accountability Report, 
at III-7. At http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/annualreports/pr2005/
TableofContents.htm (last visited on Feb. 24, 2006).

          Fundamental changes are needed in the 
        component's internal control to ensure that financial 
        information can be provided timely to manage the 
        Department's programs and to prepare its financial 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        statements within the reporting deadlines of the OMB.

          Improvements are needed in the Department's 
        and components' financial systems general and 
        application controls.\381\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \381\ Independent Auditors' Report on Financial Statements, Fiscal 
Year 2005 Department of Justice Performance and Accountability Report, 
at III-14. At http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/annualreports/pr2005/
TableofContents.htm (last visited on Feb. 24, 2006).

    Moreover, the last ``scorecard'' in the GAO's Fiscal Year 
2005 Financial Report of the United States Government does not 
indicate substantial improvement. The Department received a 
red, ``Agency has any number of serious flaws'' score for 
financial performance (current status as of September 30, 2005) 
and only a yellow, ``Slippage in implementation schedule, 
quality of deliverables, or other issues requiring adjustments 
by agency in order to achieve initiative on a timely basis,'' 
score for progress in financial performance.\382\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \382\ Fiscal Year 2005 Financial Report of the United States 
Government, at http://www.gao.gov/financial/fy2005financialreport.html 
(last visited on Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The committee urges the Department to make greater progress 
in financial accountability. In particular, the committee 
believes that substantial improvements in the Department's 
financial management need to be made before Congress even 
considers transferring programs like the High Intensity Drug 
Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) program to the Department.

         F. OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY (``ONDCP'')


----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                   FY 2005      FY 2005      FY 2006      FY 2006      FY 2007
                     ONDCP                          \383\     \384\ Final     \385\        \386\        \387\
                                                  Requested                 Requested     Enacted      Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AGENCY TOTAL*..................................       $27.60       $26.80       $24.22       $26.90       $23.31
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in millions.


Contact Information: ONDCP Public Affairs Division: 202-395-
6618, http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \383\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005 
Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/budgetsum04/budgetsum05.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 
2006).
    \384\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/
office--national--drug--control--
policy.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \385\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/ondcp.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \386\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/
office--national--drug--control--
policy.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \387\ Id.

                             BUDGET REQUEST

    The committee generally supports the administration's 
request for $23.31 million for operations at ONDCP. That is, 
however, below the appropriated level of $26.9 million for 
fiscal year 2006, as well as below the administration's own 
requests for $24.224 million for 2006 and $27.6 million for 
fiscal year 2005. Director Walters, in response to written 
questions from the Criminal Justice Subcommittee last year, 
stated that the FY 2006 reduction reflected an attempt to shift 
$2.6 million of ONDCP's rental and health care costs from ONDCP 
to the Office of Administration at the Executive Office of the 
President. Director Walters assured the subcommittee that no 
reduction in ONDCP staffing or activity would occur.\388\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \388\ See Fiscal Year 2006 Drug Control Budget: Hearing before the 
House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human 
Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 109th Cong. (Feb. 10, 2005) 
(testimony of Director Walters). At http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/
cgi-bin/
getdoc.cgi?dbname=109--house--hearings&docid=f:208
78.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The committee appreciates the fact that the administration 
has committed to maintaining current staffing levels at ONDCP. 
As noted above, however, even taking into consideration the 
accounting shift of $2.6 million in costs from one office of 
the Executive Office of the President to another, the 
administration is still requesting nearly $1.7 million less for 
ONDCP than it did two years ago. The committee would like to 
know whether in spite of these steady reductions in ONDCP 
funding requests, Director Walters' previous assurances to the 
subcommittee that no reduction in staffing or operations remain 
in effect. The committee also trusts that the declining funding 
requests do not indicate a corresponding reduction in the 
administration's commitment to the Office and its mission.
    Similarly, the committee is very concerned about--and will 
vigorously oppose--the administration's proposal to allow the 
President to shift up to 10 percent of ONDCP's congressionally-
appropriated funds to any other department or program of his 
choosing, without seeking the approval of Congress.\389\ The 
committee is not, in principle, opposed to a temporary 
reprogramming authority during a national emergency. The 
administration's proposal, however, is not limited to national 
emergencies--it would be unlimited in purpose and duration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \389\ See Office of Management and Budget: General Provisions--
Government-Wide, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 
2007: Appendix, Proposed Sec. 835 at 13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The committee is aware that in a time of shrinking budgets, 
many agencies must share the burden of budget cuts. The 
committee reminds the administration, however, that ONDCP is 
not simply an administrative subdivision of the White House. It 
is both the President's principal advisor with respect to drug 
control policy development and program oversight, and it is 
responsible to Congress to account for the nation's efforts to 
reduce the use, manufacturing, and trafficking of illicit 
drugs. Reductions in its budget and attacks on its independence 
will hinder ONDCP's ability to provide effective policy 
coordination and oversight--a result that this committee will 
strenuously oppose.

                  OVERSIGHT AND COORDINATION BY ONDCP

    The committee has ongoing concerns that ONDCP has not been 
exercising the kind of active leadership, oversight, and 
coordination of executive branch drug control efforts 
envisioned by Congress when it was authorized in 1988. As the 
committee noted in its report last year, ONDCP has not yet 
provided effective responses to several major challenges to 
Federal drug enforcement efforts.\390\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \390\ Committee on Government Reform, Report: The National Drug 
Control Strategy for 2005 and the National Drug Control Budget for 
Fiscal Year 2006, H. Rept. 109-172, (2005) at 27. At http://
reform.house.gov/UploadedFiles/The%20 National%20 Drug%20 Control%20 
Strategy%20 for%20 2005%20 and%20 the%20 National%20 Drug%20 Control%20 
Budget%20 for%20 Fiscal%20 Year%20 2006%20-%20 Report.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    First, ONDCP has not taken the initiative in formulating an 
effective Federal anti-methamphetamine strategy. Although ONDCP 
has been involved in the administration's very limited anti-
meth efforts to date (see Section I.1. above), there is little 
indication that ONDCP has attempted to push other branches of 
the Federal Government to take further, necessary action. 
Indeed, public statements by a number of ONDCP officials 
suggest that the Office does not regard the meth epidemic as a 
priority--or even as an epidemic.\391\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \391\ See, e.g., David J. Jefferson, et al., America's Most 
Dangerous Drug, Newsweek, Aug. 8, 2005 (quoting ONDCP spokesman Tom 
Riley, ``I'm afraid there's also an element of people `crying meth' 
because it's a hot new drug.''); Jim Barnett, Drug Czar Ignoring New 
Peril, Some Say, Syracuse Post-Standard, Aug. 7, 2005 (``Two of [ONDCP 
Director John] Walters' top deputies--Dave Murray and John Horton--
declared that meth still doesn't qualify as an epidemic.''); compare, 
Prepared Remarks of Attorney General Alberto Gonzales at the National 
District Attorneys Association Meeting, (July 18, 2005), at 
www.usdoj.gov (referring to ``the epidemic of methamphetamine drug 
use,'' and stating, ``In terms of damage to children and to our 
society, meth is now the most dangerous drug in America.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Nor is there any indication that ONDCP has effectively 
responded to the increasing pressure on agencies such as the 
FBI, the Coast Guard, the Border Patrol, and the legacy Customs 
Service to abandon or reduce drug enforcement in favor of 
homeland security and counterterrorism missions. This year, 
Director Walters apparently certified a budget request for the 
Department of Homeland Security that would eliminate any 
funding to ensure that vital maritime patrol aircraft will 
remain operational over the next 5-10 years.\392\ As described 
in Section I.5. above, this would have a crippling effect on 
our long-term drug interdiction capabilities. The fact that 
Director Walters certified such a budget request as adequate 
raises serious questions about ONDCP's fulfillment of its 
statutory responsibilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \392\ Customs and Border Protection, Budget in Brief, FY 2007, 
(Feb. 2006) at 25.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Similarly, ONDCP must take more assertive action to respond 
to the reduced commitment of the Department of Defense to 
counterdrug efforts.\393\ The Defense Department has dedicated 
fewer assets to interdiction in the ``transit zones'' of the 
Caribbean and eastern Pacific Ocean, has scaled back National 
Guard assistance to state and local law enforcement, and--most 
significantly--has failed to take effective action against the 
rapid growth of heroin production in Afghanistan. While the 
committee recognizes that ONDCP must frequently defer to the 
Defense Department on questions affecting the military, ONDCP 
should also be assertive in ensuring that the national priority 
of reducing drug trafficking is not forgotten, even by our 
government's largest and most respected institutions. To date, 
however, ONDCP has been publicly silent about the Defense 
Department's reduced commitments--and has failed to present 
Congress with any plans to ``backfill'' those reductions in 
assets and personnel for counternarcotics missions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \393\ See Drug Control: Agencies Need to Plan for Likely Declines 
in Drug Interdiction Assets, and Develop Better Performance Measures 
for Transit Zone Operations, GAO Report No. 06-2000, (Nov. 2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    It was no accident that the original legislation creating 
ONDCP was titled the ``National Narcotics Leadership Act of 
1988'' (emphasis added). Congress expected leadership from 
ONDCP on drug control issues--not simply passive support for 
whatever actions the other branches of the administration take. 
The committee hopes that the Office will increase its efforts 
to forge a strong, unified approach to the drug problem within 
the administration.
    To help the Office achieve that result, the committee 
included a number of provisions in H.R. 2829, the Office of 
National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act of 2005. These 
provisions give ONDCP additional tools as it exercises its 
leadership responsibilities, including:

          A clear statement of congressional intent 
        that the Director of ONDCP has the same rank and status 
        as the heads of the executive Departments he is charged 
        with overseeing and coordinating;

          Requirement for written strategies concerning 
        Southwest Border drug trafficking, Afghan heroin and 
        South American heroin and cocaine;

          Requirement for revised, government-wide 
        General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) and 
        National Interdiction Command and Control Plan (NICCP); 
        and

          Requirement that Federal agencies and 
        programs with drug control responsibilities submit all 
        of their drug control activity budget requests to ONDCP 
        for review and certification.

    The Office administers several programs related to drug 
enforcement and prevention. The committee's views on each are 
set forth below:

1. High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) Program


----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                             FY 2005      FY 2005                       FY 2006
                  HIDTA                       \394\     \395\ Final   FY 2006 \396\      \398\     FY 2007 \399\
                                            Requested                Requested \397\    Enacted    Request \400\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL*...................................       $208.4       $226.5           $100           $227          $208
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in millions.

    The committee has deep concerns about the administration's 
proposals for the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) 
program. The administration has requested $208 million for the 
program but has again (as it did last year) proposed moving it 
(via the appropriations process) from ONDCP to the Department 
of Justice's Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force 
(OCDETF).\401\ The administration has also stated its 
intention, should Congress approve that request, to create a 
``better focused'' HIDTA program that will ``focus funds on 
regions that are primary national drug distribution or transit 
zones.'' \402\ The administration has not explained what it 
means by that statement. The committee has received reports 
from sources inside the program, however, indicating that ONDCP 
and the Justice Department may intend to redirect most, if not 
all of the requested funding to the five HIDTAs originally 
designated in 1990--eliminating up to 23 of the current HIDTAs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \394\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005 
Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/budgetsum04/budgetsum05.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 
2006).
    \395\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/
office--national--drug--control--
policy.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \396\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/ondcp.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \397\ The administration requested that funding for the HIDTA 
program for fiscal year 2006 be shifted to the Organized Crime Drug 
Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) program at the Justice Department; 
Congress rejected that request.
    \398\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/
office--national--drug--control--
policy.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \399\ Id.
    \400\ The administration is again requesting that the HIDTA program 
funding be transferred from ONDCP to OCDETF at the Department of 
Justice for fiscal year 2007.
    \401\ The specific budget language proposed by the administration 
is somewhat vague as to whether HIDTA would be officially controlled by 
OCDETF. Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2007: 
Appendix, at 1157 (stating only that HIDTA is ``to be carried out by 
the Attorney General''). However, the appropriation requested by the 
administration would be under the ``Interagency Crime and Drug 
Enforcement'' heading, which is (in practice) the appropriation for 
OCDETF. Id. Moreover, in its own budget submission, the Department 
states, ``The FY 2007 President's Budget proposes the transfer of the 
HIDTA program from [ONDCP] to OCDETF.'' 2006-2007 DOJ Budget and 
Performance Summary, 107.
    \402\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                           PROGRAM BACKGROUND

    When it was created in 1990, the program was intended to 
reduce the nation's overall supply of illegal drugs by bringing 
together Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in 
the most significant regions (each referred to as a ``HIDTA'') 
where drugs were produced, smuggled, or distributed. As the 
program's budget has grown--from only $25 million at its 
inception to $228 million in fiscal year 2005--the number of 
designated regions has grown as well. From the initial five 
HIDTAs in 1990, the program has expanded to 28 HIDTAs, and 
pressure is building in Congress to create even more of them.
    The program's expansion has raised questions about what the 
true purpose of the HIDTAs really is, and whether the current 
program structure fulfills the mission Congress set out for it. 
Those questions are not easy to answer. Some HIDTAs are located 
in areas (such as the Southwest Border HIDTA) that clearly 
serve as major smuggling corridors, while others are located in 
areas more realistically characterized as high drug consumption 
zones (rather than production or transshipment zones) or as 
areas with highly localized drug production and trafficking. 
Even within the HIDTAs, some funded initiatives are targeted at 
major drug trafficking organizations, while others are aimed at 
local manifestations of the drug trade (like open drug markets 
in the streets).
    The HIDTA program is, in practice, a blend of the 
``national'' and ``regional/local'' purposes--both in terms of 
which areas have been designated as HIDTAs and which 
initiatives have been funded within each HIDTA. Even the most 
nationally significant HIDTAs (like the Southwest Border HIDTA) 
fund some local drug enforcement activities, while even those 
with the least apparent national impact fund some initiatives 
aimed at major drug trafficking organizations.
    The fact that HIDTAs fund some initiatives of greater 
significance to the local community and some more important to 
Federal law enforcement is not in itself a problem. In fact, 
the HIDTA program would not be able to carry out its primary 
function--to bring Federal, state, and local drug enforcement 
agencies together for cooperative efforts--if no allowance for 
state and local priorities were permitted. Neither is the fact 
that some HIDTAs have greater ``national'' significance than 
others is itself a weakness. There will always be differences 
in importance and focus from region to region.
    What has been a problem, however, is the program's current 
inability to base its allocation of funds to the individual 
HIDTAs on any criteria at all--national, regional, or local. 
Congress bears much of the blame for this. For many years, 
appropriations bills have forbidden ONDCP from funding any 
HIDTA at below its previous year's level--effectively locking 
in over $200 million of its budget. ONDCP has had true 
discretion over less than 10 percent of the program's funds.
    The administration, for its part, has done nothing to solve 
this problem. Each appropriations bill has given ONDCP the 
option to request a reallocation of HIDTA funds by presenting a 
plan to the Appropriations Committees in the House and Senate. 
ONDCP has thus far declined to do so.
    As a result, the HIDTA program currently guarantees funds 
to the designated HIDTAs with little or no regard for 
efficiency, impact, or national priorities. ONDCP cannot (and 
until now has not even tried to) redirect the program's funds 
in response to the ever-changing drug trafficking threat.

                     THE ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSAL

    In response to these difficulties, the administration has 
proposed drastic changes to the program in each of its last two 
budget proposals. Last year, the administration asked Congress 
to cut the program's budget from fiscal year 2005's enacted 
level of $228,350,000 to $100,000,000 and to transfer the 
administration of the remaining funds to the Organized Crime 
Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF), a Department of Justice 
program. Congress rejected both proposals, electing to keep 
HIDTA at ONDCP and to fund the program at $227 million.
    This year, the administration has requested $208 million 
for the HIDTA program but has again asked that it be moved to 
OCDETF. Moreover, as noted above, the administration has stated 
its intention to redirect the program dollars to those HIDTAs 
that are the most important national drug transit and 
distribution regions.
    If enacted, these proposals would effectively terminate the 
current HIDTA program. The committee believes that this would 
be a severe blow to Federal, state, and local cooperation and 
to drug enforcement in general. For this reason, the committee 
strongly opposes the budget cut, any radical reallocation of 
funding (if unaccompanied by a comprehensive, performance-based 
justification), and the move of the program into the Justice 
Department.

Keeping HIDTA at its Current Funding Level

    At first glance, the administration did avoid this year one 
of the mistakes from its fiscal year 2006 budget proposal: the 
56 percent cut in the HIDTA program budget. Instead, the 
administration proposes a more modest cut--$19 million--from 
the HIDTA budget approved by Congress for fiscal year 2006.
    The committee is concerned, however, that the higher 
request may not reflect any greater long-term commitment to the 
HIDTA program. The administration did not provide any 
explanation for the drastic cut in its budget proposal last 
year; neither has it provided an explanation for restoring the 
funding this year. This suggests that no serious study has gone 
into what the proper level of funding ought to be. Rather, it 
appears to reflect political and not practical considerations.
    In any case, the committee believes that HIDTA funding 
should continue at last year's level of $227 million. The $19 
million cut proposed by the administration would eliminate the 
only portion of the program budget that ONDCP has any real 
discretion over. The regular budgets of the existing 28 HIDTAs, 
together with ONDCP's administrative costs for the program, 
would exhaust virtually all of the $208 million requested by 
the administration. Since (as noted above) language requiring 
``level funding'' of each individual HIDTA has been included in 
Congress' appropriations bills for nearly a decade, ONDCP has 
virtually no discretion over the allocation of those funds.
    ONDCP has had discretion over the additional funds--
approximately $20 million per year--approved by Congress for 
the HIDTA program. Such funds have, in the past, been used to 
fund emergency counterdrug activity in specific HIDTAs (for 
example, maintaining National Guard assistance at ports of 
entry in the Southwest Border HIDTA), and to fund special, 
high-priority investigations of major drug trafficking 
organizations on the Justice Department's Consolidated Priority 
Organization Target (CPOT) list.
    The committee strongly supports these uses of the program 
discretionary funds and urges Congress to continue providing 
those funds. The committee also urges Congress, however, to 
delete or amend language included in the fiscal year 2006 
appropriations bill prohibiting the use of any HIDTA funds for 
the CPOT program. While the committee agrees that HIDTA funds 
should not be redirected to non-HIDTA programs, ONDCP should be 
permitted to use the discretionary funds to reward those HIDTAs 
that target CPOT organizations.

Keeping HIDTA in ONDCP

    The proposed transfer to the Justice Department is contrary 
to existing law and to sound drug enforcement policy.\403\ It 
would potentially be even more disruptive to the HIDTA program 
than simple budget cuts.\404\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \403\ See Office of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization 
Act of 2005, H.R. 2829: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Criminal 
Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government 
Reform, 109th Cong. (June 15, 2005). At http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/
257/2422/08dec20051200/www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house/pdf/109hrg/
23688.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \404\ The committee's reasons for opposing the transfer of the 
HIDTA program to the Department of Justice are discussed in greater 
detail in the committee's report on H.R. 2829 (H. Rept. 109-315, Part 
I, at 52-53).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    First, transferring this program across departments is 
contrary to every authorization the Congress has passed for 
HIDTA. The original legislation creating HIDTA, each of the two 
reauthorization acts (in 1993 and 1998), and the most recent 
reauthorization bill passed by the House (H.R. 2086, passed in 
2003) specifically placed the program in ONDCP. At no time has 
the House or the Senate passed legislation moving the program 
into the Department of Justice. Congress emphatically rejected 
moving HIDTA out of ONDCP in the final fiscal year 2006 
budget.\405\ Letters signed by 90 Members of the House and 56 
Senators expressed Congress' broad-based opposition to any 
transfer or substantial reduction in HIDTAs.\406\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \405\ Public Law 109-115.
    \406\ Letter from Mark Souder, chairman of the Subcommittee on 
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on 
Government Reform, et al., to House Appropriations Committee (Apr. 12, 
2005) (on file with subcommittee); Letter from Senator Max Baucus, 
Senator Chuck Grassley, et al., to Senate Appropriations Committee Apr. 
20, 2005 (on file with the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug 
Policy, and Human Resources).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Moreover, attempting to move the program through an 
appropriations bill would almost certainly conflict with any 
reauthorization legislation agreed to by the House and Senate 
during this Congress. Notably, the current reauthorization 
legislation approved by the committee, H.R. 2829, would keep 
the HIDTA program within ONDCP.
    Even apart from the legal question, moving HIDTA into the 
Justice Department is highly problematic. At the Subcommittee 
on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources' March 
10, 2005 hearing on this issue, not one of the state and local 
officials who actively work with the HIDTA program supported 
moving the program into the Justice Department. Also, in 
written responses to questions submitted after the hearing, not 
one of the HIDTA directors supported moving the program.\407\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \407\ See Fiscal Year 2006 Drug Control Budget and the Byrne Grant, 
HIDTA and Other Law Enforcement Programs: Are We Jeopardizing Federal, 
State and Local Cooperation: Hearing before the Subcommittee on 
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on 
Government Reform, 109th Cong. (Mar. 10, 2005). At http://
a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/01sep20051200/www.access.gpo.gov/
congress/house/pdf/109hrg/22201.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    HIDTA, unlike any program currently administered by the 
Justice Department, seeks to bring together Federal, state, and 
local law enforcement agencies in cooperative operations, 
intelligence sharing, and investigations. Each HIDTA has an 
executive board made up of equal representation of Federal 
agencies on the one hand, and state and local agencies on the 
other. The boards then decide how to allocate their budgets 
among various task forces and other operations.
    This equal voice for state and local agencies has generated 
an unprecedented level of cooperation on the part of all 
participants. It is unlikely that state and local agencies will 
be willing to make significant contributions of their personnel 
and resources to HIDTA task forces if they believe they will 
not have an equal say in their deployment.
    Notably, the administration's representatives who testified 
at the March 10, 2005 hearing declined to inform the 
subcommittee about how HIDTA would be managed under OCDETF and 
how decisions would be made at the local HIDTA.\408\ The 
Director of OCDETF, Catherine O'Neil, simply stated that her 
program would ``study'' the HIDTA program if granted control by 
Congress and make changes at a later date.\409\ The 
administration has been no more forthcoming this year about how 
the Justice Department would administer the HIDTA program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \408\ See Fiscal Year 2006 Drug Control Budget and the Byrne Grant, 
HIDTA and Other Law Enforcement Programs: Are We Jeopardizing Federal, 
State and Local Cooperation? Hearing before the Subcommittee on 
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on 
Government Reform, 109th Cong. (Mar. 10, 2005) (testimony of Catherine 
M. O'Neil, and John Horton). At http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/
2422/01sep20051200/www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house/pdf/109hrg/
22201.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \409\ Id, (testimony of Catherine M. O'Neil).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This approach gets things backwards by demanding the 
authority to change the program before deciding what changes to 
make or even whether change is necessary. The committee agrees 
that some reforms of the HIDTA program may be needed. However, 
the appropriate response is for the administration first to 
study the program and then make recommendations to Congress for 
changes in management and funding for individual HIDTAs. After 
Congress has reviewed the administration's recommendations, it 
can then decide whether to include them in reauthorizing 
legislation. Once this occurs, an appropriations request for a 
revised program would be in order.
    Two additional arguments made by the administration to 
justify moving the HIDTA program need to be addressed. First, 
the administration relies on the HIDTA's Program Assessment 
Rating Tool (PART) review--which claimed that HIDTA had failed 
to demonstrate results--for its argument that the program must 
be overhauled. However, ONDCP apparently failed to provide 
sufficient information about the HIDTA program's results to the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and also failed to 
establish specific performance measures in time for the review. 
Had OMB been given the complete annual reports of the 
individual HIDTAs, which detail the many investigations, 
arrests, seizures, and other actions undertaken by the program, 
and had OMB waited until the performance measures had been 
fully implemented, it is difficult to see how the HIDTA program 
could have been graded significantly worse than the Drug 
Enforcement Administration, the Coast Guard, or any other drug 
enforcement agency. As noted above, the HIDTA directors have 
developed a uniform performance measurement system, which now 
awaits the approval of ONDCP. The committee urges ONDCP to 
adopt that system expeditiously and to resubmit HIDTA for PART 
review when sufficient data has been collected.
    Finally, the administration argues that the program should 
be transferred in order to consolidate drug enforcement 
programs within the Department of Justice. There are two 
problems with this argument. First, even within the Federal 
Government, drug enforcement cannot be ``consolidated'' within 
the Justice Department. Most Federal drug interdiction 
personnel are employed by agencies at the Department of 
Homeland Security, namely the Coast Guard, Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP), and Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE), each of which participate in individual HIDTAs. ICE and 
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), which also participates in 
HIDTAs, also engage in significant drug enforcement and money-
laundering investigations.
    Second, although the Justice Department certainly plays a 
vital role in drug enforcement--both through the investigative 
work done by DEA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
and through prosecutions in Federal court by the U.S. 
Attorneys' offices--that Department does not have an exclusive 
focus on drug control. Instead, drug enforcement is but one of 
many disparate missions that the Justice Department must 
balance, and the committee is concerned that counterdrug money 
would later be absorbed there by non-counterdrug programs. For 
example, in its press release announcing the fiscal year 2007 
Department of Justice budget proposal, the Department mentioned 
``terrorism'' eleven times--and drugs only once.\410\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \410\ Press Release, Department of Justice FY 2007 Budget Request 
(Feb. 6, 2006) at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2006/Feb./
06--ag--062.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ONDCP, by contrast, is exclusively dedicated to drug 
control. It is not forced to divert resources or attention to 
other matters. Thus, an anti-drug trafficking program like 
HIDTA, which brings together both Justice Department and non-
Justice Department Federal drug control agencies, as well as 
state and local drug control agencies, is much better located 
within ONDCP.

Reallocation of HIDTA Funds

    The budget cut proposed last year by the administration--56 
percent of the previous year's enacted level--if enacted would 
have shut down most of the task forces, intelligence centers, 
and ``deconfliction'' activities funded by the program. This is 
because either most of the 28 individual HIDTAs would have had 
to be eliminated, or all of them would have had to accept very 
deep cuts. The funding level requested for fiscal year 2007--
$208 million--in principle avoids this problem, since it would 
permit each HIDTA to be funded at last year's base level.
    The committee has questions, however, about how the 
administration intends to implement its proposal to ``focus'' 
the HIDTA program's funding on only the most significant drug 
distribution and transit areas. Presumably, this means that the 
administration would reallocate funding among the various 
HIDTAs--ending the current practice of ``level funding'' for 
the HIDTAs. Indeed, if the administration has no plans to shift 
the program's funds, then there seems to be little reason to 
move it from ONDCP.
    At present, however, it is unclear which HIDTAs meet the 
administration's new standards--or even what the standards 
actually are. The committee is aware of reports that the 
administration is considering attempting to redirect all or 
most of the program's funds into the original five HIDTAs. This 
would (if fully implemented) eliminate 23 of the existing 
HIDTAs, including:


----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chicago HIDTA                                                                                      Midwest HIDTA
Michigan HIDTA                                                                        Washington/Baltimore HIDTA
Appalachia HIDTA                                                                                 Milwaukee HIDTA
Rocky Mountain HIDTA                                                                       Central Florida HIDTA
Ohio HIDTA                                                                                     North Texas HIDTA
Gulf Coast HIDTA                                                                                   Atlanta HIDTA
Central Valley HIDTA                                                                                Hawaii HIDTA
Lake County HIDTA                                                                                   Nevada HIDTA
New England HIDTA                                                                            North Florida HIDTA
Northern California HIDTA                                                                        Northwest HIDTA
Oregon HIDTA                                                                           Philadelphia/Camden HIDTA
Puerto Rico/U.S.V.I. HIDTA
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The committee is not opposed to a reallocation of resources 
among the various HIDTAs to meet the ever-changing drug 
trafficking threat. Moreover, the committee strongly supports 
the proposition that those HIDTAs which could have the greatest 
potential impact on the national supply and distribution of 
drugs should receive most of the program's funds. In fact, both 
of the ONDCP reauthorization bills adopted by the committee in 
recent years--H.R. 2086 in 2003, and H.R. 2829 in 2005--
envisioned the possibility of annual, evidence-based 
reallocations among the HIDTAs.
    The committee believes, however, that Congress must have a 
great deal more information about the administration's long-
term plans for the HIDTA program before it grants such sweeping 
authority. The termination of numerous HIDTAs will have a 
severe impact on drug enforcement in the affected regions. The 
23 HIDTAs designated after 1990 cover a broad section of the 
country, including major urban centers, island ``transit 
zones,'' and rural areas devastated by methamphetamine 
production and trafficking. The total elimination of all or 
most of them would have deep repercussions for drug enforcement 
throughout the country.
    Most importantly, the loss of these 23 HIDTAs would destroy 
one of the most significant means for Federal, state, and local 
cooperative efforts against drug trafficking. Federal drug 
agencies cannot expect to have real success in controlling drug 
trafficking without the assistance of state and local law 
enforcement--the country is simply too large for DEA or any 
other agency to police it. HIDTA is perhaps our most important 
tool for enlisting the support of state and local agencies for 
national anti-drug trafficking efforts.
    Seven representatives of state and local law enforcement 
agencies from around the country who work with the HIDTA 
program testified about that impact at the Criminal Justice 
Subcommittee's hearing on March 10, 2005. They told the 
subcommittee that the vital task forces, intelligence and 
investigation ``deconfliction'' centers, and other interagency 
activities funded by HIDTA would be eliminated if the program 
ceased operations in their areas.\411\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \411\ See Fiscal Year 2006 Drug Control Budget and the Byrne Grant, 
HIDTA and Other Law Enforcement Programs: Are We Jeopardizing Federal, 
State and Local Cooperation? Hearing before the House Subcommittee on 
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on 
Government Reform, 109th Cong. (Mar. 10, 2005) (testimony of Ron 
Brooks, president, National Narcotics Officer's Associations Coalition, 
Tom Carr, Director, Washington-Baltimore HIDTA, Tom Donahue, Director, 
Chicago HIDTA, Chief Jack Harris, Phoenix Police Dept. & Vice-Chair, 
Southwest Border HIDTA, Leonard Hamm, acting Baltimore police 
commissioner, Mark Henry, president, Illinois Drug Enforcement 
Officer's Association, and Sheriff Jack L. Merritt, Greene County, MO). 
At http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/01sep20051200/
www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house/pdf/109hrg/22201.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Furthermore, the loss of these HIDTAs would seriously 
damage our national anti-methamphetamine efforts. All of the 
HIDTAs with a primary or significant focus on meth were 
designated after 1990. Some of these HIDTAs--such as the 
Midwest HIDTA and the Rocky Mountain HIDTA--organize Federal, 
state, and local efforts to stop the proliferation of meth 
labs. Other HIDTAs--most notably the Central Valley HIDTA in 
California--target the ``superlabs'' that have flooded the 
entire country with meth. In both cases, the loss to our anti-
meth strategy would be irreparable. For example, Sheriff Jack 
Merritt of Greene County, Missouri testified last March that 
the anti-methamphetamine task force that brings together 
Federal, state, and local law enforcement in his community 
would be shut down without the HIDTA program.\412\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \412\ Id, (testimony of Sheriff Jack Merritt).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The impact would not be confined to anti-meth efforts, 
however. Many of the threatened HIDTAs are designed to combat 
the drug gangs that plague inner-city and other urban centers. 
These HIDTAs--including the Philadelphia/Camden, Lake County 
(Indiana), Washington/Baltimore, and Chicago HIDTAs--have been 
the primary centers of joint Federal, state, and local anti-
drug gang activity. The elimination of these HIDTAs would 
destroy one of our best weapons against the drug dealers who 
terrorize city streets. Baltimore Police Commissioner Leonard 
Hamm, for example, testified last March that his anti-heroin 
and anti-drug gang task forces would also end without HIDTA 
assistance.\413\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \413\ Id, (testimony of Commissioner Leonard Hamm).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Eliminating or eviscerating these individual HIDTAs would 
be a far greater financial loss to Federal drug enforcement 
efforts than simply the money spent by the Federal Government 
directly on their budgets. State and local agencies make 
significant contributions of their own agents, employees, 
office space, and equipment to HIDTA task forces--much of which 
is not reimbursed with Federal dollars and which frequently 
dwarf, in their dollar value, the Federal budget components of 
the individual HIDTAs. We risk losing those contributions 
without the individual HIDTAs.\414\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \414\ Id, (written responses of each HIDTA director).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The committee proposes, instead, that the administration 
present to Congress a comprehensive, evidence-based 
reallocation plan for the HIDTA program--as permitted by recent 
appropriations bills (and as would be required by H.R. 2829). 
The plan would allow Congress to evaluate the current state of 
the HIDTA program overall, the purpose and impact of the 
individual HIDTAs, and recent trends that have altered the drug 
trafficking landscape since present funding levels were set in 
the late 1990's. That would allow Congress and the 
administration to work together to ensure that HIDTA remains a 
vital tool in our national anti-drug efforts.

2. National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign


----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                         FY 2005        FY 2005        FY 2006         FY 2006        FY 2007
           Media Campaign            Requested \415\  Final \416\  Requested \417\  Enacted \418\  Request \419\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL*.............................           $145           $120           $120            $100           $120
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in millions.

    The committee is deeply concerned about the future of the 
National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign, and believes that the 
administration is not working for adequate funding for it. The 
Campaign, an integrated effort that combines paid and donated 
advertising with public communications outreach to bring drug 
abuse prevention messages to young people, has suffered 
repeated, deep cuts in its budget since 2001. The cuts have 
been so deep that the Campaign is now at a crossroads: if the 
administration and Congress do not increase its budget, the 
program will likely slip into irrelevance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \415\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005 
Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 
2006).
    \416\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \417\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \418\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \419\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Program Overview and History
    The Media Campaign funds television, radio, print, and 
Internet advertisements designed to communicate the dangers of 
drug abuse to young people and parents. Most of the program's 
dollars are spent on the purchase of advertising ``time and 
space,'' namely the cost of actually airing or printing an 
advertisement. The Campaign also funds the creation, testing, 
and evaluation of advertisements, industry outreach, and 
strategic partnerships with local communities. Each dollar 
spent on time and space must be ``matched'' by the entity 
accepting the dollar with one dollar of donated time and space, 
doubling the impact of the Campaign's expenditures. No match is 
required for other services purchased by the Campaign, however.
    The Campaign was created by Congress in 1997 to expand and 
enhance the efforts of the Partnership for a Drug-Free America 
(PDFA), a not-for-profit organization created in 1987 to curb 
illegal drug use among America's youth. In a collaborative 
effort, the PDFA solicited anti-drug ads from various ad 
agencies who donated their creative talent to design and 
produce anti-drug television ads (pro bono). The PDFA also 
solicited and obtained donated media airtime from the big three 
television networks to run the anti-drug ads as public service 
announcements (PSAs).
    For over ten years, the PDFA coordinated these activities 
with great success and at no expense to the American taxpayer. 
According to the annual University of Michigan Monitoring the 
Future survey, at the same time that the level of anti-drug 
television ads was rising, attitudes about the social 
disapproval and the perceived risks of illegal drug use were 
also rising. Likewise, there was a corresponding decrease in 
illegal drug use among young people during the same period. The 
program seemed to be working.
    Beginning in 1991, however, the donated airtime from the 
big three media networks began to decline significantly. 
Throughout the nineties, the PDFA worked diligently to rebuild 
the donated air times to previous levels (in 1991 the estimated 
value of donated media air time was $350 million)--but that 
effort did not fully succeed.
    In 1996, the PDFA commissioned an ad agency study which 
determined that an effective media campaign would require an 
exposure rate of 4 times per day and frequency rate of 90 
percent of the target audiences. The minimum cost for such an 
effort was determined to be $175 million (in 1996 dollars), 
which represented one-half of the $350 million donated in 1991.
    Realizing they needed help to reach their goals, the PDFA 
approached Congress for assistance. In 1997, President Clinton 
requested $175 million in Federal funds for the program, to be 
named the ``National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign.'' Congress 
appropriated $195 million (for fiscal year 1998) and ultimately 
gave statutory authorization for the program in 1998.

            Early Problems with the Campaign
    The Campaign has not been problem-free, however. Almost 
from its inception, some critics have attacked the program as 
either ineffective, and/or an inappropriate use of Federal 
funds.
    Such criticism was amplified when, in 2000, it was reported 
that Ogilvy & Mather, the advertising agency that ONDCP 
(through its contracting agent, the Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS)) had hired in 1998 to make media purchases 
for the Campaign, had improperly charged the government for 
services during 1999. A subsequent investigation by the GAO 
determined that Ogilvy had indeed improperly billed the 
government and that HHS had inadequately managed the contract, 
in particular by awarding the contract before sufficiently 
determining whether Ogilvy had an adequate accounting 
system.\420\ A criminal investigation of Ogilvy by the Justice 
Department resulted in a settlement in 2002, under which the 
firm agreed to pay $1.8 million to the government. In 2005, two 
former Ogilvy employees were convicted of conspiracy and making 
false statements in connection with the investigation.\421\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \420\ Anti-Drug Media Campaign: Aspects of Advertising Contract 
Mismanaged by the Government; Contractor Improperly Charged Some Costs, 
GAO, Report No. GAO-01-623, (June 2001).
    \421\ Joshua Chaffin, Former Ogilvy partner sentenced to prison, 
Financial Times, July 13, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The negative publicity from the accounting scandal was 
further exacerbated when, despite the accounting 
irregularities, ONDCP's new contracting agent, the Department 
of the Navy, exercised its option to renew the contract with 
Ogilvy in 2001. Indeed, Ogilvy was retained to provide services 
for the Campaign until the expiration of the contract in 2004. 
ONDCP defended the government's decision to retain Ogilvy as 
reasonable in light of all the circumstances, and that argument 
was not without merit. Nevertheless, the continuing involvement 
of Ogilvy almost certainly eroded congressional and public 
support for the program.

            Evaluating and Reforming the Campaign
    When Congress first authorized the Campaign, it required 
extensive evaluations to ensure the program's effectiveness at 
reducing youth drug use. Beginning in 1998, ONDCP commissioned 
the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) at HHS to conduct 
regular evaluations of the Campaign through the program's 
initial authorization period (i.e., until the end of fiscal 
year 2003). NIDA then contracted with Westat, a private 
research firm, to evaluate the effectiveness of the Campaign-
funded advertisements.
    Westat's regular reports, the last of which was released in 
December 2003 (covering the period ending in June 2003), 
indicated that while the Campaign's advertisements had some 
positive impact on the attitudes of parents, there was no 
positive impact on the attitudes of young people.\422\ This led 
many, including some in Congress, to question the utility of 
the Campaign.\423\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \422\ Westat, Evaluation of the National Youth Anti-Drug Media 
Campaign: 2003 Report of Findings, (Dec. 2003), executive summary 
available at http://www.mediacampaign.org/publications/
performance.html).
    \423\ See, e.g., Conference Report to Accompany H.J. Res. 2 (Making 
Continuing Appropriations for the Fiscal Year 2003, and for Other 
Purposes), H. Rept. 108-10, 1345-1346 (2003).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In response to Westat's reports, Director Walters 
acknowledged the Campaign's shortcomings in 2002, \424\ and 
ONDCP undertook a major strategic overhaul of the program. 
Major changes included better targeting of advertisements at 
key age groups, a renewed focus on testing of advertisements 
before airing, and a primary focus on marijuana, the primary 
illegal drug of abuse among teenagers.\425\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \424\ Christopher Newton, Survey: Anti-Drug Ads Have No Effect, 
Associated Press, May 14, 2002.
    \425\ See ONDCP Reauthorization & the National Youth Anti-Drug 
Media Campaign: Hearing before House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, 
Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th 
Cong. (Mar. 27, 2003) (testimony of Christopher Marston). At http://
frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/
getdoc.cgi?dbname=108--house--hearings&docid=f:874
50.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The committee believes that the preponderance of the 
evidence indicates that the post-2002 changes have made the 
Campaign significantly more effective. A survey by the 
Partnership for a Drug-Free America (PDFA) in August 2003 
demonstrated a significant positive connection between the 
Campaign-funded advertisements and youth perceptions of 
marijuana use risk.\426\ In June 2005, the Substance Abuse and 
Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), a division of 
HHS, released a report showing that young people who reported 
having seen or heard prevention messages in the media during 
the past year were much less likely than their peers to report 
illicit drug use.\427\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \426\ Partnership for a Drug-Free America, Partnership Attitude 
Tracking Study-2003 Teens Study: Survey of Teens' Attitudes and 
Behaviors Toward Marijuana, (Aug. 2003), at http://
www.mediacampaign.org/publications/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 
2006).
    \427\ National Survey on Drug Use and Health, SAMHSA, (June 2005) 
at http://oas.samhsa.gov/nsduh.htm#NSDUHinfo (last visited Feb. 24, 
2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Finally, the ultimate evidence of the Campaign's success is 
the continuing decline since 2002 in overall drug use, and 
particularly marijuana use, among teens nationwide.\428\ The 
bottom line is that when adequately funded and properly 
managed, the Campaign works.\429\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \428\ See Monitoring the Future, 2005, at http://
monitoringthefuture.org/.
    \429\ For these reasons, the committee believes that the most 
recent OMB PART review findings for the Campaign--``results not 
demonstrated''--are simply not based in fact. Although the direct 
impact of advertising on its target audience is always difficult to 
measure, the ultimate ``performance measure'' for an advertising 
campaign is whether the target audience responded as hoped. In this 
case, it is clear that it has: young people are reporting decreased use 
of marijuana. While many factors may have contributed to this decline, 
it is hard not to give at least some credit to the marijuana-focused 
advertisements purchased by the Campaign. The committee believes that 
this program is showing clear results, and should be fully funded.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Program Funding
    Despite that record of improvement and success, Congress 
has not adequately funded the Campaign in recent years. When 
the program was first created in 1997, it was funded at $195 
million (for fiscal year 1998). From fiscal years 1999 through 
2001, it was funded at approximately $185 million per year; 
thereafter Congress cut the budget dramatically--to $180 
million in fiscal year 2002, $150 million in 2003, $145 million 
in 2004 and $120 million in 2005. Last year, Congress approved 
only $100 million for fiscal year 2006. Following Congress' 
lead, the administration began reducing its budget requests for 
the Campaign, from $185 million for fiscal year 2002, to $180 
million for 2003, $170 million for 2004, $145 million for 2005 
and $120 million for 2006. Finally, for 2007, the 
administration has broken this pattern by requesting $120 
million--although this would simply restore the Campaign to 
2005's already low level.
    In fact, when inflation is taken into account, the budget 
of the Media Campaign has declined from $195 million in 1998 to 
only (approximately) $83 million (in constant 1998 dollars) for 
2006--a drop of well over 50 percent in the Campaign's 
resources. The damage to the Campaign is amplified by the fact 
that advertising costs have far outpaced the overall rate of 
inflation.\430\ Moreover, since the Campaign relies on the 
``match'' requirement, a drop of one dollar in appropriated 
funds is, in fact, a two dollar cut in actual advertising 
exposure--since the Media Campaign cannot obtain a match for 
that lost dollar.\431\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \430\ See Fiscal Year 2006 Drug Control Budget and the Byrne Grant, 
HIDTA and Other Law Enforcement Programs: Are We Jeopardizing Federal, 
State and Local Cooperation? Hearing before the House Subcommittee on 
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on 
Government Reform, 109th Cong. (Mar. 10, 2005) (testimony of Stephen 
Pasierb, PDFA) (media advertising cost inflation has averaged between 8 
and 12 percent over past 8 years). At http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/
257/2422/01sep20051200/www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house/pdf/109hrg/
22201.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \431\ Id, at 123.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In the face of these facts, Congress nevertheless began 
slashing funding for the Campaign at the precise moment when 
ONDCP corrected many of its early problems. There are probably 
many reasons for this. First, the negative publicity 
surrounding the Ogilvy scandal and the early Westat reports 
garnered far more attention than subsequent improvements. 
Second, ONDCP's refusal (until just last year) to target any 
Campaign advertisements at the burgeoning epidemic of 
methamphetamine abuse meant the Campaign lost an opportunity to 
build support for the program in rural and other communities 
hardest hit by that drug. Moreover, continuing disputes over 
whether the Campaign has been effective, and even how to 
evaluate it, have also taken their toll.\432\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \432\ The committee is aware, in particular, of a dispute between 
ONDCP and Westat over how to evaluate the Campaign, which may result in 
the replacement of Westat. That dispute is apparently being reviewed by 
the GAO, with the GAO's findings to be released sometime this year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Whatever the reason, the Campaign is now at a crossroads. 
The committee urges Congress and the administration to support 
full funding for the program. If the current, greatly reduced 
funding levels are continued or lowered even further, the 
Campaign will no longer be able to function as originally 
envisioned by Congress in 1998. A Campaign that cannot reach 
its audience with sufficient frequency or quality of message is 
probably not worth funding at all. The committee hopes that 
such a result will be avoided.

            The Future of the Campaign
    In addition to the funding problems faced by the Campaign, 
two major issues need to be addressed by Congress and the 
administration. First, despite the fact that the Campaign's 
original, primary purpose was to buy media time and space for 
anti-drug advertisements (to ensure that they reach the 
national youth audience with sufficient frequency), a growing 
amount of program funds have been expended on other activities, 
such as media consultants, and ``outreach'' to the media 
industry. A recent report by the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) revealed that the Campaign spent over 28 percent 
of the program's funds from fiscal years 2002-2004 on such 
activities.\433\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \433\ Anti-Drug Media Campaign: An Array of Services Was Provided, 
but Most Funds Were Committed to Buying Media Time and Space, GAO 
Report No. GAO-05-175, Mar. 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Concerns about this trend were raised by the Senate 
Appropriations Committee and by this committee during the 108th 
Congress.\434\ Although some such expenditures are undoubtedly 
necessary to ensure program effectiveness and adequate 
management of the Campaign by ONDCP, care must be taken to 
prevent excessive diversion of program dollars away from their 
primary purpose. This is particularly important now when the 
Campaign's budget is shrinking. In a time of scarce resources, 
the program must focus on its major purpose of getting 
advertisements on the air.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \434\ See Senate Committee on Appropriations, Report to Accompany 
S. 1589 (Transportation, Treasury and General Government Appropriations 
Bill, 2004), S. Rept. No. 108-146, (2003) at 143; See ONDCP 
Reauthorization: The National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign: Hearing 
before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and 
Human Resource, Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Mar. 27, 
2003). At http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/
getdoc.cgi?dbname=108--house--hearings&docid=f:874
50.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    To ensure that result, the committee has twice approved 
legislation that would set a minimum percentage of program 
funds for purchasing media time and space. H.R. 2829 (as did 
H.R. 2086 during the 108th Congress) would require, under 
normal circumstances, that at least 77 percent of Campaign 
funds be spent on time and space. However, that percentage 
would rise to 82 percent when the program's budget falls below 
$125 million and would fall to 72 percent if the budget rose 
above $195 million. By doing so, the legislation seeks to 
minimize the loss of media time and space in a time of falling 
budgets and to allow for greater diversification in a time of 
rising budgets.
    Second, although the Media Campaign has produced effective 
advertisements targeted at marijuana abuse since 2002, only 
last year (after a great deal of criticism from Congress and 
the public) did the ONDCP agree to use Campaign funds to 
produce similar advertisements targeted at the growing epidemic 
of methamphetamine abuse. ONDCP has thus far committed to 
spending $1 million to produce such advertisements (but has not 
stated how much it will spend to ensure that they are actually 
aired).
    The committee believes that the Campaign needs to do more 
to deal with methamphetamine and similar emerging drug threats. 
Last year, a bipartisan amendment to add $25 million for anti-
meth advertisements to the Media Campaign's budget was passed 
in the House. Regrettably, the Senate did not reciprocate that 
move. The committee will explore amending H.R. 2829, however, 
to set aside some percentage of Campaign funds for anti-meth 
and similar targeted advertisements for emerging drugs.

3. Drug-Free Communities (DFC) Program


----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                         FY 2005        FY 2005        FY 2006         FY 2006        FY 2007
                DFC                  Requested \435\  Final \436\  Requested \437\  Enacted \438\  Request \439\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL*.............................            $80            $80            $80             $80         $79.19
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in millions.

    The committee generally supports the administration's 
request for $79,190,000 for the Drug-Free Communities (DFC) 
Program, which assists local community anti-drug coalitions to 
prevent substance abuse among young people. This is slightly 
below the same level of funding requested by the administration 
and appropriated by Congress for fiscal years 2005 and 2006. 
The reduction, however, is largely due to the fact that the 
administration is only requesting the maximum amount ($750,000) 
authorized by statute for the National Community Anti-Drug 
Coalition Institute. Last year, Congress appropriated funds ($2 
million) exceeding the maximum amount authorized (see 
discussion below).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \435\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005 
Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 
2006).
    \436\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \437\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \438\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \439\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    While the committee agrees that the Institute should not be 
funded above its authorized level (see below), the committee is 
concerned about the administration's unwillingness to redirect 
all of the excess funds into new coalition grants (keeping the 
total program funds at $80 million). If the program's budget 
does not expand, many new coalitions may not be able to start 
their work--particularly in the poorest communities where the 
need for drug use prevention is greatest.
    One significant issue facing the program is performance 
measurement. In its 2006 PART review, DFC received an 
``adequate'' rating--higher than many similar prevention 
programs.\440\ As is the case with other programs, however, the 
targets established for DFC--``enhancing the capabilities of 
community anti-drug coalitions,'' ``enhancing prevention 
activities,'' and ``increase[ing] citizen participation''--have 
more to do with the processes of the program than with its 
intended result, namely reducing drug use. Although DFC should 
not be singled out for criticism on this point, ONDCP and other 
agencies involved in drug use prevention need to start defining 
success less in terms of whether the program is simply 
functioning as planned and more in terms of whether its 
functions are achieving a quantifiable result.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \440\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 
Budget Summary, 96 (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    There is some evidence that the program is achieving that 
result. In testimony before the subcommittee on April 26, 2005, 
General Arthur Dean, chairman and CEO of the Community Anti-
Drug Coalitions of America (CADCA), highlighted successes 
achieved by the DFC Program. According to General Dean, in 
communities where DFC grantees operate, drug use has sharply 
decreased in comparison to communities in which there is not an 
anti-drug presence. For example, in the period of 1993 to 2000, 
Cincinnati, Ohio achieved a 41 percent decrease in marijuana 
use among 7th to 12th graders, while communities in this region 
without the presence of an anti-drug coalition experienced a 33 
percent increase.\441\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \441\ See Drug Prevention Programs and the Fiscal Year 2006 Drug 
Control Budget: Is the Federal Government Neglecting Illegal Drug Use 
Prevention? Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, 
Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 109th 
Cong. (Apr. 26, 2005) (statement of General Arthur T. Dean, U.S. Army, 
retired, on behalf of CADCA). At http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/
2422/01sep20051200/www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house/pdf/109hrg/
22201.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The committee is pleased by this evidence and hopes that 
coalitions receiving grants will continue to make efforts to 
show their quantifiable successes. Such data will help Congress 
evaluate competing programs for scarce counterdrug funding.

            National Community Anti-Drug Coalition Institute
    As noted above, the administration is only requesting 
$750,000 for the Institute, which is the maximum amount 
authorized by statute for fiscal year 2007.\442\ The Institute, 
currently operated by CADCA, provides training and other 
technical assistance to coalitions receiving funds under the 
program.\443\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \442\ Public Law 107-82, Sec. 4(d) (2005).
    \443\ Public Law 107-82, Sec. 4(c) (2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Congress authorized $2 million for each of the first two 
years of the Institute's existence, but thereafter funding was 
to decrease to $1 million for two years and then $750,000 for 
fiscal years 2006 and 2007.\444\ As this committee noted when 
it approved the legislation authorizing the Institute, Federal 
funding was only supposed to be temporary. The Institute was 
expected to seek private funding and end all dependence on the 
Federal budget within a few years.\445\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \444\ Public Law 107-82, Sec. 4(d) (2005).
    \445\ Government Reform Committee Report, To Extend The 
Authorization Of The Drug-Free Communities Support Program For An 
Additional 5 Years, To Authorize A National Community Antidrug 
Coalition Institute, And For Other Purposes (H.R. 2291), H. Rept. 107-
175, Pt. 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Committee staff have subsequently been informed by 
personnel at CADCA that the Institute has been unable to obtain 
the expected private funding. While the committee is 
sympathetic, that is a problem shared by many organizations and 
institutions. While $1.25 million may not seem to be a large 
amount of money in the context of the entire Federal budget, it 
potentially represents grants to at least 12 new coalitions. 
The committee believes that the Institute should be funded at 
no more than its authorized level, with additional dollars to 
go to new grants under the main program.

            2005 Drug-Free Communities Grant Application Process
    The committee is closely monitoring a significant dispute 
that has arisen in the wake of the 2005 DFC grants application 
process. Major changes implemented at the direction of ONDCP in 
the review process for grant applications have resulted in the 
de-funding of 63 community coalitions that had been receiving 
grants and the placing on probation of 88 more coalitions. The 
controversy threatens to undermine confidence in the program, 
and the committee hopes that it can be resolved soon.
    The changes implemented by ONDCP began with the replacement 
in 2004 of the agency responsible for evaluating proposals and 
awarding grants--the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention (OJJDP) at the Justice Department--with the 
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration 
(SAMHSA) at the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). 
Though ONDCP indicated to program participants that the change 
in administrator would not affect the actual administration of 
the program, in fact a number of significant changes were made 
in the evaluation procedures.
    It is still not entirely clear how the decisions to fund, 
de-fund, or place existing coalitions on probation were made by 
ONDCP and SAMHSA. The co-chairs of the Senate Caucus on 
International Narcotics Control have requested a full 
investigation of the revised process by the GAO.\446\ From 
evidence provided to the committee, however, several general 
statements may be made about the revised grant review process:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \446\ Letter from Senators Grassley and Biden to GAO (Oct. 18, 
2005) at http://cadca.org/CoalitionResources/pp-main.asp (last visited 
Feb. 24, 2006).

          Unlike in previous years, the professional 
        ``peer reviews'' of coalition activity were given far 
        less importance in the final decision to continue 
        funding a coalition, as many of the defunded coalitions 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        received high peer review scores;

          The policy staff of ONDCP played a far more 
        active role in deciding which coalitions would continue 
        to receive funding;

          Although the grant eligibility criteria 
        applied to the coalitions supposedly did not change, it 
        is clear that ONDCP's interpretation of those criteria 
        did change, as coalitions were defunded on the grounds 
        that they no longer met the eligibility criteria--and 
        there is no evidence that the coalitions themselves 
        changed in any way;

          ONDCP did a poor job of explaining to 
        defunded and probationed coalitions the precise grounds 
        for the adverse decision; \447\ and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \447\ For example, the letters sent to de-funded coalitions simply 
listed all possible grounds why the coalition was found to be 
ineligible--without specifying which specific grounds, or the facts 
supporting the particular determination.

          ONDCP placed 88 coalitions on probation 
        because they supposedly exceeded a 20 percent cap on 
        ``direct services'' spending (namely, spending on 
        specific programs), even though the 20 percent cap is 
        not mentioned anywhere in statute.\448\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \448\ For more specific information about the controversy, see 
Letters from Senators Grassley and Biden to Director Walters, (Oct. 18, 
2005, and Dec. 2, 2005) at http://cadca.org/CoalitionResources/pp-
main.asp (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).

    There are a number of other questions that remain to be 
answered, including whether the 20 percent ``direct services'' 
cap was actually used as an eligibility criteria--a policy not 
authorized by the statute. Moreover, the controversy as a whole 
raises the question of whether ONDCP attempted to implement a 
significant policy shift in the program--by essentially 
redefining the purposes and goals of DFC--through what was 
intended to be a merely administrative process. The committee 
hopes that GAO will be able to report back to Congress soon on 
this matter.
    Until then, the committee urges ONDCP and SAMHSA to 
reexamine some of the decisions made during the 2005 grants 
review process. In particular, it may be appropriate for ONDCP 
to implement an ``appeals'' process for defunded or probationed 
coalitions, as has been urged by the bipartisan co-chairs of 
the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control.\449\ The 
committee also expects that the 2006 grants review process will 
be conducted in a more transparent manner, ensuring that the 
program's fairness is not left in doubt.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \449\ See letter from Senators Grassley and Biden to Director 
Walters (Dec. 2, 2005) at http://cadca.org/CoalitionResources/pp-
main.asp (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Counterdrug Technology Assessment Center (CTAC)


----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                         FY 2005        FY 2005        FY 2006         FY 2006        FY 2007
                CTAC                 Requested \450\  Final \451\  Requested \452\  Enacted \453\  Request \454\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL*.............................            $40          $41.7            $30           $29.7           $9.6
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in millions.

    The committee opposes the administration's current request 
for only $9.6 million for the CTAC program, a drastic cut from 
the $29.7 million appropriated for fiscal year 2006 (which was 
itself a major cut from the $41.7 million appropriated for 
fiscal year 2005). The CTAC research program provides support 
to law enforcement supply reduction by developing advancement 
in technology for drug detection, communications, surveillance 
and methods to share drug crime investigative information.\455\ 
In addition, funding is available for research into drug abuse 
and addiction. Further, CTAC supports the Technology Transfer 
Program which supplies new counterdrug technologies to state 
and local law enforcement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \450\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005 
Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \451\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \452\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \453\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \454\ Id.
    \455\ Id. at 89.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The proposed decreases would cut the research program from 
$14 million to $9.6 million, while completely eliminating 
Technology Transfer Program (appropriated at nearly $16 million 
in fiscal year 2006). The committee strongly opposes the 
termination of the Technology Transfer Program.
    The program is certainly in need of greater direction and 
oversight. ONDCP has not taken sufficient steps to ensure that 
the Technology Transfer Program supports national goals in 
reducing overall drug trafficking and improving interagency 
communication and cooperation. For example, ONDCP needs to make 
sure that any communications or information sharing equipment 
or systems funded by CTAC do not simply benefit the agency 
receiving the transfer. Rather, such systems or equipment 
should only be provided if they also link the recipient agency 
with other Federal, state, and local agencies and result in 
increased information sharing.
    Legislation approved by the committee (H.R. 2829) would 
help ONDCP to improve the program's accountability and 
effectiveness. The bill would give priority, for example, to 
technology transfers in border drug trafficking regions. It 
would also require an annual report to Congress listing where 
transfers were made and what the criteria were for awarding 
them.
    The committee believes that reform of this kind--not 
termination--is the appropriate remedy for CTAC's difficulties. 
At a time when assistance to state and local drug enforcement 
is under consistent attack, it is unwise for the Federal 
Government to cut off yet another source of badly needed anti-
drug trafficking technology.

5. Counterdrug Intelligence Executive Secretariat (CDX)


----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                         FY 2005        FY 2005        FY 2006         FY 2006        FY 2007
                CDX                  Requested \456\  Final \457\  Requested \458\  Enacted \459\  Request \460\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL*.............................           $4.5          $1.98             $0              $0             $0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in millions.

    In its report last year, the committee expressed concerns 
about the administration's proposal to eliminate all funding 
for the Counterdrug Intelligence Executive Secretariat (CDX). 
Congress ultimately decided not to provide any funding for CDX 
for fiscal year 2006, and it is the committee's understanding 
that the last remaining member CDX staff has since been 
transferred to the Drug Enforcement Administration's El Paso 
Intelligence Center (EPIC). This year's budget again proposes 
no funding for CDX.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \456\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005 
Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 
2006).
    \457\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \458\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \459\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \460\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This program, which was last appropriated at slightly less 
than $2,000,000 for fiscal year 2005, certainly suffered from a 
lack of direction. It was intended to help ONDCP coordinate the 
drug intelligence policies and activities of multiple Federal 
law enforcement agencies, most notably through the creation of 
a General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP). The need for 
that coordination is as great today as it ever was, meaning 
that the mission of CDX is far from fulfilled.
    It may well be that the functions of CDX would be better 
carried out by another agency, such as EPIC, or the new drug 
intelligence fusion center created by the Justice Department's 
Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF). The 
administration, however, should set forth its specific plans 
for improving drug intelligence sharing, preferably through a 
new GCIP (which is in great need of updating in the post-9/11 
era).\461\ For that reason, the committee included a 
requirement for a new GCIP in H.R. 2829.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \461\ The current General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan may be 
found at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/gcip/
index.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

6. National Drug Court Institute


----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                         FY 2005        FY 2005        FY 2006         FY 2006        FY 2007
   National Drug Court Institute     Requested \462\  Final \463\  Requested \464\  Enacted \465\  Request \466\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL*.............................           $1.0         $0.744           $1.0            $1.0          $0.99
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in millions.


Contact Information: 703-575-9400, http://www.NDCI.org.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \462\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005 
Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 
2006).
    \463\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \464\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \465\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \466\ Id.

    The committee generally supports the administration's 
request for $990,000 for the National Drug Court Institute, 
which is slightly less than last year's request and the 
appropriated level for fiscal year 2006 ($1 million). The cut 
is small, but with the increasing popularity of drug court 
programs around the country, it is more important than ever 
that ONDCP review these programs and determine their rate of 
success.
    The committee believes that better guidance could help 
improve and promote these programs nationwide. A vigorous, 
mandatory system of drug testing should be applied in every 
drug court case to ensure that program participants are staying 
off of drugs. Convicts should be sentenced to drug abstinence, 
not just drug treatment. Unless participants are given 
incentives to overcome their drug abuse, it is unlikely that 
they will avoid future crimes. It is not clear that ONDCP has 
pursued this issue since the committee's last report. The 
committee therefore intends to explore the matter further.

7. National Alliance for Model State Drug Laws \467\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \467\ For more information on the National Alliance for Model State 
Drug Laws, see the Alliance's website at http://www.natlalliance.org/, 
or contact the Alliance at (703) 836-6100.


----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 National Alliance for Model State       FY 2005        FY 2005        FY 2006         FY 2006        FY 2007
             Drug Laws               Requested \468\  Final \469\  Requested \470\  Enacted \471\  Request \472\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL*.............................             $0         $0.992             $0            $1.0             $0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in millions.


Contact Information: 703-836-6100, http://www.Natlalliance.org.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \468\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005 
Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 
2006).
    \469\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \470\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \471\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \472\ Id.

    The committee opposes the administration's proposal to 
eliminate all Federal funding for the National Alliance for 
Model State Drug Laws, which was funded at $1,000,000 in fiscal 
year 2006. The Alliance serves an important function by 
reviewing the drug laws in the various states and by proposing 
model state laws in response to new drug threats or challenges. 
For example, the Alliance recently held a major conference on 
methamphetamine legislation and policy, bringing together law 
enforcement officials, addiction treatment professionals, 
elected officials, and public health officials from 38 states, 
4 countries, the District of Columbia and Guam to discuss new 
solutions to the serious problems related to meth abuse, 
production, and trafficking.
    Most drug enforcement, treatment and prevention is provided 
at the state and local level. The Federal Government has a 
strong interest in effective state drug policies, and the 
Alliance helps to promote such policies.
    Although Director Walters has claimed that the work of the 
Alliance could be performed by ONDCP staff, \473\ the committee 
strongly disagrees. Since the administration has not proposed 
to add any new staff positions to ONDCP, it is unclear which 
current staff have the additional free time to take up the work 
of the Alliance. The committee is not of the opinion that ONDCP 
is completely fulfilling its current responsibilities. There is 
thus little indication that the Office is prepared to provide 
the extensive legal analysis, outreach to state and local 
governments, and coordination of multi-state information 
sharing that the Alliance does.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \473\ See Fiscal Year 2006 Drug Budget: Hearing before the House 
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, 
Committee on Government Reform, 109th Cong. 46 (Feb. 10, 2005). At 
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/
getdoc.cgi?dbname=109--house--hearings&docid=f:208
78.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

8. United States Anti-Doping Agency and Membership Dues to World Anti-
        Doping Agency


----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                         FY 2005        FY 2005        FY 2006         FY 2006        FY 2007
      U.S. Anti-Doping Agency        Requested \474\  Final \475\  Requested \476\  Enacted \477\  Request \478\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL*.............................           $1.5          $7.44           $7.4            $8.5           $8.5
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in millions.



----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                         FY 2005        FY 2005        FY 2006         FY 2006        FY 2007
      World Anti-Doping Agency       Requested \479\  Final \480\  Requested \481\  Enacted \482\  Request \483\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL*.............................           $1.0         $1.438           $2.9            $2.9           $1.5
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in millions.

    The committee supports the administration's request for 
$8,500,000 for the U.S. Anti-Doping Agency, an increase of 
nearly $7 million over the administration's fiscal year 2005 
request (and identical to the appropriated level for fiscal 
year 2006). Similarly, the committee generally supports the 
administration's request for $1,500,000 for our nation's 
membership dues in the World Anti-Doping Agency. Through the 
U.S. Anti-Doping Agency and its international counterpart, the 
United States seeks to stop the use of illegal performance-
enhancing drugs by American and international athletes in 
Olympic sports through education, drug testing programs, and 
similar initiatives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \474\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005 
Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 
2006).
    \475\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \476\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \477\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \478\ Id.
    \479\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005 
Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 
2006).
    \480\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \481\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \482\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \483\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The committee remains committed to investigating steroid 
abuse in professional sports. The committee held hearings on 
March 17, 2005, April 27, 2005, May 19, 2005 and June 15, 2005 
to examine steroid abuse in professional sports and steroid use 
by young women and will continue to provide oversight regarding 
this issue in order to establish and promote adequate drug 
prevention and testing programs. The committee hopes that ONDCP 
and other elements of the administration will increase their 
efforts to stop steroids, doping, and other unhealthy and 
illegal performance enhancement practices.

9. National Drug Control Program Performance Measures


----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                         FY 2005        FY 2005        FY 2006         FY 2006        FY 2007
     NDCP Performance Measures       Requested \484\  Final \485\  Requested \486\  Enacted \487\  Request \488\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL*.............................           $2.0         $0.992           $2.0            $1.5          $1.98
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in millions.

    The committee supports the administration's request for 
$1,980,000 for the further development of performance measures 
for Federal drug control programs, an increase of $480,000 from 
the $1,500,000 actually appropriated for fiscal year 2006. The 
committee notes, however, that the ``performance measures'' 
funds provided by Congress to ONDCP since fiscal year 2003 have 
not been used (nor were they intended by Congress to be used) 
to develop a truly comprehensive performance measurement system 
for the national drug control programs. Instead, the funds have 
been intended and used for research into discrete issues of 
performance measurement. For example, the $1.5 million 
appropriated for fiscal year 2006 will be spent to replace the 
Justice Department's discontinued Arrestee Drug Abuse 
Monitoring (ADAM) system.\489\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \484\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005 
Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 
2006).
    \485\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \486\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \487\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \488\ Id.
    \489\ Office of National Drug Control Policy, FY 2007 Congressional 
Budget Submission (Feb. 2006) at 129.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In fact, there has been no attempt to generate a 
comprehensive performance measurement system since 2002. ONDCP 
was tasked in its 1998 reauthorization statute with developing 
and submitting a report containing a comprehensive performance 
measurement system in 1999.\490\ ONDCP submitted annual updates 
to that report through 2002, but the program was discontinued 
thereafter. Beginning in 2003, Congress began appropriating 
limited funds to ONDCP for the more limited research programs 
now in development.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \490\ 21 U.S.C. 1705(c) (2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The problem of measuring effectiveness in drug control 
programs--whether enforcement, treatment, or prevention--is a 
difficult one. It has never been more necessary than now, 
however, when tremendous pressure is being placed on every 
aspect of the Federal budget, particularly drug control 
programs. Without adequate performance measures, it will be 
impossible to demonstrate the real, tangible results of the 
billions of dollars being spent on enforcement, treatment, and 
prevention.
    The committee hopes that ONDCP will make solid progress in 
developing and implementing such performance measures. To that 
end, the new reauthorization legislation approved by the 
committee (H.R. 2829) requires ONDCP to submit a comprehensive 
performance measurement system as part of each annual National 
Drug Control Strategy. While the research currently funded 
should continue, ONDCP needs to ensure a more systematic and 
inclusive measurement system that will allow Congress and the 
public to evaluate the progress made by the Federal Government 
against drug trafficking and abuse.

                         G. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

    The Department of State receives significant Federal 
funding in relation to its various drug interdiction, supply 
reduction and alternative development programs.

1. Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL)


----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                   FY 2005      FY 2005      FY 2006      FY 2006      FY 2007
                                                    \491\     \492\ Final     \493\        \494\        \495\
                                                  Requested                 Requested     Enacted      Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) Budget*....         $731       $725.2       $734.5       $727.2       $721.5
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement           $190.6         $178       $341.2         $301       $445.2
 (INCLE) Budget*...............................
Supplemental Account*..........................            -         $260            -            -            -
Total INL Budget*..............................     $1,089.8       $2,833     $1,218.4     $1,199.6     $1,166.7
Drug Resources Percentage......................        84.6%        41.1%        88.3%        85.7%        76.9%
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in millions.


Contact Information: Andean Counterdrug Initiative: 202-647-
8464, Afghanistan: 202-647-6642 (Office of Civilian Police and 
Asia, Africa and Europe Programs) or 202-647-5175 (Afghanistan 
Country Desk) http://www.state.gov/p/inl/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \491\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005 
Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/budgetsum04/agency--budget.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \492\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/dept--state.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 24, 2006).
    \493\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/06budget.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \494\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/dept--state.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 24, 2006).
    \495\ Id.

    The President's FY 2007 budget requests $721.5 million for 
the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI). This is a $5.7 million 
decrease from the FY 2006 enacted amount of $727.2 million. 
While the committee supports the FY 2007 budget request, we are 
concerned with the decline in the proposed levels of financial 
support for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative and the dire 
situation in Afghanistan. It is encouraging to see that the 
President's FY 2007 budget includes $297.4 million for 
counterdrug support in Afghanistan.\496\ It is vital that the 
U.S. work with its allies to continue to stamp out drug 
production at the source and build and maintain momentum for 
these critical programs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \496\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    During a committee-initiated briefing with INL held in 
November 2005, it was suggested by INL staff that their 
counter-narcotics mission may be better supported and achieved 
if their budget resources were divided between counter-
narcotics missions and law enforcement support missions, 
instead of by country program. The INL budget is currently 
divided into an ACI account and an International Narcotics 
Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account, which seems to 
inhibit the discretion of INL to designate resources to purely 
counterdrug missions. This type of division may provide INL 
with more flexibility to move money to the programs or 
countries that are in need of additional counterdrug resources 
at a specific time. Although no proposals have been made to 
affect this change, the committee supports research into this 
possible new budget structure, on the condition that INL 
provide strong justification for this change.
    Programs operated by INL support two of the State 
Department's strategic goals, which are ``to reduce the entry 
of illegal drugs into the United States'' and ``to minimize the 
impact of international crime on the United States and its 
citizens.'' \497\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \497\ For more information, see the Bureau for International 
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs home page at http://
www.state.gov/p/inl/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    While counter-terrorism operations receive the highest 
priority in many of the regions of the world in which INL 
functions, according to documents received from INL, 85.75 
percent of their FY 2006 budget has been designated for 
counterdrug missions.\498\ Illegal drug production and trade 
has long been believed to finance terrorist activities, so the 
committee commends INL for prioritizing counterdrug missions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \498\ Letter from William Todd, Principal Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for Civilian Police and Asia, Africa and Europe Programs, 
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. 
Department of State, to Mark Souder, chairman of the Subcommittee on 
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on 
Government Reform (Jan. 9, 2006) (on file with the Subcommittee on 
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Andean Counterdrug Initiative

    The State Department's INL Bureau and its Andean 
Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) have both received ``adequate'' 
ratings in the administration's CY 2005 Performance Assessment 
Rating Tool (PART) process.\499\ The committee supports the 
programs' efforts to develop long-term performance and 
efficiency measures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \499\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/06budget.pdf. At http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/59169.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The committee supports the administration's request for 
$721.5 million for the ACI but is disappointed that it 
represents a $5.7 million decrease from $727.2 million 
appropriated for FY 2006. The ACI budget provides support to 
Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Brazil, Venezuela and 
Panama.\500\ These funds are needed to continue programs in law 
enforcement, border control, crop reduction, alternative 
economic development, democratic institution building, and 
administration of justice and human rights programs in the 
region. It is critical to maintain the priority of funding drug 
control programs in Colombia, since 90 percent of the cocaine 
that enters the United States either originates in, or transits 
through, Colombia.\501\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \500\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/dept--state.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 24, 2006).
    \501\ Connie Veillette, Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) and 
Related Funding Programs: FY2006 Assistance, CRS Report No. RL 33253 
(Congressional Research Service) (Jan. 27, 2006) at http://
www.congress.gov/erp/rl/pdf/RL33253.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The committee is also concerned about funding for the Air 
Bridge Denial program, which provides assets to conduct 
surveillance and drug interdiction in Colombia. The Air Bridge 
Denial program was once a separate line item with separate 
funding and requests, in order to facilitate congressional 
oversight, but is now funded through the ACI.\502\ The 
administration has proposed $465 million for Colombia under 
ACI, with approximately $13 million designated for the Air 
Bridge Denial program. This is a slight decrease from the $14 
million appropriated in FY 2006.\503\ Moreover, the request is 
significantly lower than the State Department FY 2006 request 
for $21 million.\504\ As stated in the National Drug Control 
Strategy, the Air Bridge Denial program contributes to 
Colombia's success.\505\ The committee agrees with this 
assessment, and recommends the administration provide greater 
support for the program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \502\ Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2007: 
Appendix, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2007/appendix.html 
(last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \503\ See Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 3057 (Foreign 
Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act 
of 2006) H.R. Conf. Rep. Public Law 109-102, at http://
frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/
getdoc.cgi?dbname=109--cong--bills&docid=f:h3057eh
.txt.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \504\ Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 
Affairs, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, (Mar. 2005) 
at http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2005/vol1/html/42361.htm (last 
visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \505\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, (Feb. 2006) 
at 20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    It is crucial that the State Department be provided with 
appropriate air assets and equipment, which are essential to 
the counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism missions in the 
Andean Region. In its FY 2007 budget, the administration has 
requested $65.7 million for the Critical Flight Safety Program 
(CFSP), which is intended to upgrade aged and ailing aircraft. 
While this seems like a noble objective, the committee is 
concerned that this sum of money has been designated solely for 
upgrading 35 year-old helicopters, with over 10,100 airframe 
hours, instead of purchasing new aircraft, which will serve 
their mission for a longer period of time.\506\ For the amount 
of money designated to refurbish 35 year-old helicopters--with 
6,000 more airframe hours than DOD customarily allows its 
helicopters to remain in service \507\--the administration may 
be able to purchase nearly 20 new Huey II helicopters.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \506\ Dept. of State, Secretary of State, Summary and Highlights: 
International Affairs, Function 150, Fiscal Year 2007, at http://
www.state.gov/documents/organization/60297.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 
2006).
    \507\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Following seven years of counterdrug work, U.S. efforts in 
Colombia are increasingly bearing concrete results directly 
impacting the domestic supply in America. The price of cocaine 
and heroin originating from the Andean region has risen and the 
purity has decreased.\508\ These successes are due in large 
part to interdiction missions carried out by the Marine Patrol 
Aircraft (MPA) and other air-based interdiction efforts. In 
order to capitalize on these gains, the committee agrees with 
International Relations Committee chairman, Henry Hyde, in 
urging the State Department to replenish and bolster MPA air 
assets for the Colombian Navy.\509\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \508\ Id.
    \509\ Letter from Henry Hyde, chairman of the International 
Relations Committee, to Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State (Feb. 14, 
2006) (on file with the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, 
and Human Resources).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In order to maintain the outstanding results to date under 
plan Colombia, both with coca and opium eradication it is 
essential that the 22 aircraft (fixed and rotor) lost by the 
Colombian National Police (CNP) since 2000 be promptly 
replaced. In addition, to ensure the safety and ongoing 
training of the CNP pilots and to foster Colombianization of 
the counternarcotics program, INL should upgrade the rotary 
simulator and purchase a fixed wing simulator that will assist 
the CNP in the performance of nighttime operations.\510\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \510\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In addition, in order to produce successful efforts to stem 
the flow of illicit narcotics from the Andean Region, 
participating parties must be adequately supplied with 
surveillance assets. The committee is pleased with the progress 
being made to train more Bell 212 pilots and to equip these 
aircrafts with Night Vision Goggle (NVG) capabilities as a part 
of the plan to improve the technical capacity of the CNP. INL 
held an NVG training session in early January 2006 for 5 Bell 
212 pilots. In addition, INL has recently placed an order for 
42 upgrade kits for ANVIS-6 NVGs, totaling $284,000, as well as 
an order for 52 new ANVIS-9 goggles, totaling $454,000. These 
new NVGs and the upgrade kits will be delivered in May 
2006.\511\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \511\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The committee believes the administration should take a 
more active role to ensure that the U.S. Government provides 
financial and technical support for Colombia's demobilization 
program. Under this program, former members of narco-terrorist 
organizations (such as the FARC, ELN and AUC) agree to lay down 
their weapons, stop drug trafficking, provide valuable 
intelligence to Colombia's security agencies, and seek 
employment in the civilian economy. Recently, a legal dispute 
between the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Department of 
Justice has delayed American support for Colombia's 
demobilization program and has squandered important 
opportunities. The administration should actively seek to 
resolve those differences immediately to prevent any further 
disruption in U.S. support for this vital program.
    Finally, the committee commends the work of INL to stem the 
international flow of illicit drugs across our American borders 
and into our neighborhoods. However, the lack of significant 
coordination between agencies to achieve this goal is a vital 
concern. The committee is disappointed that the U.S. Department 
of State and the U.S. Department of Defense cannot agree on 
where to station crucial air assets, and that they cannot reach 
an agreement on a counter-narcotics mission. The committee is 
gravely concerned by the lack of coordination among USG 
agencies to achieve a comprehensive, counter-narcotics strategy 
and recommends that ONDCP take a prominent leadership role in 
developing and coordinating a strategy.

            Bolivia
    ACI funding is given to seven countries located in the 
Andean Region. While the focus of the initiative has 
historically and logically been Colombia, Bolivia has lately 
become a particularly volatile country.
    On December 18, 2005, Evo Morales, former leader of the 
Coca Grower's Union, was elected president by an overwhelming 
majority. Morales, an indigenous cocalero, ran on a platform of 
nationalism. He vowed to alleviate poverty and discrimination 
towards indigenous persons. During his campaign, Morales 
promised to re-examine the current coca eradication 
programs.\512\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \512\ Dept. of State, Post Reports, (Jan. 25, 2006), at http://
foia.state.gov/phonebook/postrpt/
pr--view--all.asp?CntryID=18 (last visited Feb. 
24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    President Morales claims that he wants to increase the 
production of coca for use in medicines, toothpaste and soft 
drinks. Eradication efforts are hampered to some extent because 
the cultivation and sale of small amounts of coca is legal in 
Bolivia. The United States contends that additional production 
of the plant--the main ingredient used to make cocaine--
eventually ends up on illegal drug markets. To further 
complicate matters, the coca plant is prized by Bolivian 
indigenous farmers for traditional medicinal uses and herbal 
teas.\513\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \513\ Coca grower in Bolivia drug post, BBC News, (Jan. 28, 2006) 
at http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/bizarre/3619594.html (last 
visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Although he has been in office less than one month, Morales 
has made numerous cabinet selections believed to be based more 
on loyalty to his administration rather than qualifications or 
credentials for the position. Most notable was his selection of 
Felipe Caceres, a former coca grower, as Bolivia's new drug 
czar. In an interview with BBC concerning his appointment, Mr. 
Caceres said he was convinced he would help lead a successful 
fight within President Morales' government to end drug-
trafficking in Bolivia, proclaimed, ``What we say is no to 
drugs, but yes to the coca leaf,'' adding he would not stop 
production on his own plantation.\514\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \514\ Coca grower in Bolivia drug post, BBC News, (Jan. 28, 2006) 
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4658880.stm (last visited Feb. 
24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Prior to taking office, Morales himself was a coca farmer 
who often protested against U.S.-backed eradication efforts. 
Since being elected President, Morales has repeatedly said he 
is seeking a drug-fighting program whose emphasis would be, 
``No to zero coca, but yes to zero cocaine.'' \515\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \515\ Coca grower appointed drug czar in Bolivia, Reuters News 
Service, (Jan. 28, 2006) at http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/
bizarre/3619594.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    While it is too soon to predict Morales' stance on counter-
narcotics and drug eradication, he has agreed that it, along 
with U.S. assistance, is important. During campaign speeches, 
Morales indicated his loyalty to coca farmers by taking the 
position of ``long live coca, death to gringos.'' However, he 
has altered his slogan somewhat since his election to ``long 
live coca, death to cocaine.'' \516\ Since taking office, no 
eradication has occurred, although drug interdiction seems to 
be improving.\517\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \516\ State Department Briefing to House Committee on International 
Relations, (Feb. 10, 2006).
    \517\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Afghanistan
    The administration is requesting $297.4 million for the 
State Department's International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 
(INL) programs in Afghanistan.\518\ According to the ONDCP 
Budget Summary of the FY 2007 National Drug Control Budget, 
``Funds will be used to expand the opium poppy elimination 
program from 12 to 14 provinces, providing coverage for 90 
percent of the territory where the poppy crop is grown.'' \519\ 
While this funding will be used to accelerate the development 
of police programs and to reduce opium poppy cultivation by 
providing a drug control capacity, the committee is concerned 
that an insufficient level of cooperation is taking place in 
Afghanistan among State, DEA, USAID and CENTCOM elements to 
assure that the issue is properly addressed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \518\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/dept--state.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 24, 2006).
    \519\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The committee is pleased that the President's FY 2007 
budget requests funding up front for State Department counter-
narcotics programs in Afghanistan, rather than seeking to fund 
it through supplemental requests. Although, there is much more 
work to be done. The U.S. agencies need to coordinate and 
depend on many other countries' assistance for military support 
and assistance, however, counterdrug operations are carried out 
mostly by Afghan forces. The German mission statement, for 
example, states, ``The responsibility for drug law enforcement 
is with the Afghan government, it is not part of the mission of 
the German forces in Afghanistan. It is a central task for the 
German reconstruction teams to create an atmosphere of security 
in which Afghan drug law enforcement forces can be trained and 
in which these forces can be supported realizing their long 
term drug fighting strategy by the International Community.'' 
\520\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \520\ Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 15/ 5996 Antrag der 
Bundesregierung, Fortsetzung der Beteiligung bewaffneter deutscher 
reitkraefte an dem Einsatz einer Internationalen 
Sicherheitsunterstuetzungstruppe in Afghanistan unter Fuehrung der NATO 
auf Grundlage der Resolutionen 1386 (2001) vom 20. Dezember des 
Sicherheitsrates der Vereinten Nationen.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Despite multinational efforts to reduce poppy cultivation 
and drug trafficking in Afghanistan, in 2005 it continued to 
supply 87 percent of the world's illicit opium.\521\ In 
addition, the export of Afghan opium in 2005, which totaled 
$2.7 billion, was equivalent to 52 percent of the nation's GDP. 
Of this sum, 80 percent ends up in the pockets of drug 
trafficking networks, while the rest is distributed among the 
nation's two million poppy farmers.\522\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \521\ Christopher Blanchard, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. 
Policy, CRS Report RL 32686 (Congressional Research Service) (Jan. 25, 
2006), at http://www.congress.gov/erp/rl/pdf/RL32686.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 24, 2006).
    \522\ Press Release, Dept. of State, Office of the Spokesman, Fact 
Sheet: Counter-Narcotics (Jan. 31, 2006) (on file with the Subcommittee 
on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on 
Government Reform).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    While the number of hectares of opium poppy decreased 
slightly in FY 2005 to 104,000 hectares from 131,000 hectares 
in FY 2004, the average opium yield increased from 32 kg/ha in 
FY 2004 to 39 kg/ha in FY 2005, which represented a nearly 22 
percent increase in yield.\523\ According to the UN report, the 
Southern Region, including the Helmand province, displayed a 
136.3 percent increase in opium poppy production from 27.8 kg/
ha in 2004 to 37.9 kg/ha 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \523\ Summary Findings of Opium Trends in Afghanistan, 2005 (United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime), (Sept. 12, 2005) at http://
www.unodc.org/pdf/afghanistan--2005/annex--opium-
afghanistan-2005-09-09.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Afghan President Hamid Karzai has made a ``. . . clear 
commitment to stemming drug production and trade in Afghanistan 
and has set the goal of a 20 percent reduction in opium 
cultivation in 2006.'' \524\ In order to assist Afghanistan in 
its effort to eliminate its illicit drug economy, strong 
narcotics laws and law enforcement must be present. The 
committee is pleased that the President's FY 2007 budget 
reflects and prioritizes the strategic role of the State 
Department in assisting the Government of Afghanistan in the 
development of its legal system and the rule of law. Both the 
Afghan Counter-narcotics Tribunal (CNT) and the Counter-
narcotics Justice Center (CNJC), which have nationwide 
jurisdiction over prosecution of mid-level and high-level drug 
trafficking crimes, are now fully operational.\525\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \524\ Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and 
Law Enforcement Affairs, International Narcotics Control Strategy 
Report, (Mar. 2006) vol. I, at 208.
    \525\ Press Release, Dept. of State, Office of the Spokesman, Fact 
Sheet: Strengthening the Rule of Law (Jan. 31, 2006) (on file with the 
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, 
Committee on Government Reform).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    While this progress is promising, much work still remains 
to solidify the criminal justice system in Afghanistan and to 
disarm drug trafficking organizations.\526\ A recent New York 
Times article criticized the multinational poppy eradication, 
alternative development and law enforcement efforts in 
Afghanistan, noting that farmers have continued growing opium 
poppy against the directive of the head of the Afghan anti-
narcotics department in the Helmand province, and in spite of 
personal pleas from President Hamid Karzai.\527\ According to 
Fazel Ahmad Sherzad, the head of the Afghan anti-narcotics 
department in the Helmand province, ``Last year 40 percent of 
land was used for poppy cultivation . . . This year it is up to 
80 percent in places.'' According to Mr. Sherzad, many believe 
that eradication efforts last year were ``a joke'' as 
cultivation in Kandahar and Farah increased. Eradication 
missions even led to conflict between farmers and Afghan 
eradication teams trained by USAID alternative development 
contractor, DynCorp.\528\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \526\ See Afghanistan--Law Enforcement Interdiction Efforts in 
Transshipment Countries to Stem the Flow of Heroin: Hearing before the 
House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human 
Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Feb. 26, 2004) 
at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/
getdoc.cgi?dbname=108--house--hearings&docid=f:965
24.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \527\ Carlotta Gall, Another Year of Drug War, and the Poppy Crop 
Flourishes, The New York Times, (Feb. 17, 2006) at http://
www.nytimes.com/2006/02/17/international/asia/
17poppy.html?--r=1&oref=slogin (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \528\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In a country that is so vital to the security of the United 
States and its allies, opium growth and in turn narcotic 
production and smuggling, which are widely known to support 
terrorism, must be eliminated.\529\ The Taliban is currently 
conducting a PR campaign to raise drug money to carry out their 
terrorist activities by circulating flyers demanding farmers to 
continue growing poppy. According to the new governor in 
Helmand, the Taliban have forged an alliance with drug 
smugglers, providing protection for drug convoys and mounting 
attacks to keep the government away and the poppy 
flourishing.\530\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \529\ See U.S. Counternarcotics Policy in Afghanistan: Time for 
Leadership: Hearing before the House Committee on International 
Relations, 109th Cong., (Mar. 17, 2005) at http://wwwc.house.gov/
international--relations/109/20058.pdf (last visited Feb. 
24, 2006).
    \530\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The committee strongly encourages the Department of State 
and other Federal agencies to coordinate their efforts with 
each other, as well as with their multinational partners and 
the Afghan government. The committee advises the Department of 
State to work closely with the Department of Defense in a joint 
effort to root out the production and trade of illicit 
narcotics, which finance the Taliban and potentially other 
terrorist groups.\531\ Strong government and law enforcement 
presence is needed in these poppy growing provinces to enforce 
existing laws, and to protect those who are carrying out the 
eradication and alternative development efforts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \531\ See Afghanistan: Are the British Counternarcotics Efforts 
Going Wobbly? Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal 
Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government 
Reform, 108th Cong. (Apr. 1, 2004) at http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/
LPS57423 (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    It is crucial that every agency responsible for carrying 
out the international counter-drug strategy remain open and 
mindful to structural changes that may enhance their efficiency 
in achieving this strategy. During a committee-initiated 
briefing with INL held in November 2005, INL staff suggested 
that counterdrug goals and priorities in Afghanistan may be 
more effectively achieved if the USAID Alternative Livelihoods 
alternative development program were to be moved under the 
supervision of, and funded through, INL. This move would ensure 
that the USAID Alternative Livelihoods program supports the 
counter-narcotics strategy of INL. The committee supports this 
effort.

            Methamphetamine
    According to the INL FY 2006 Budget Justification, in 
addition to its traditional mission to stem the flow of cocaine 
and heroin from Andean countries, ``INL is also targeting . . . 
Mexico, which is . . . a source country for heroin, marijuana 
as well as methamphetamines. Finally, INL is also giving 
increased attention the entry of synthetic drugs via the 
Western Hemisphere into the United States.'' \532\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \532\ Dept. of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement Affairs, Fiscal Year 2006 Budget, Congressional 
Justification, at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/54134.pdf 
(last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In FY 2007, Mexico will receive $39 million in INL funding, 
which will be used for three major programs to combat narcotics 
trafficking, including efforts to stem the flow of 
methamphetamine to America. These programs include Homeland/
Border Security, Counternarcotics and Institutional 
Development.\533\ According to a State Department publication, 
``attacking methamphetamine production facilities will be a top 
enforcement priority.'' \534\ The committee supports this 
decision and is pleased that a substantial portion of the $39 
million will be used to protect America against the threat of 
methamphetamine production and trafficking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \533\ Dept. of State, Summary and Highlights: International 
Affairs, Function 150, Fiscal Year 2007.
    \534\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    According to correspondence received from INL by the 
committee, INL funds and supports a variety of precursor 
chemical diversion programs in key nations. Recent multilateral 
success in regulating the importation of precursors from Canada 
has shifted the flow of precursors from the Northern Border to 
the Southern Border. Mexico has become a major source of meth 
and its precursors, which are frequently smuggled into America 
across our common border.\535\ In order to address this new 
challenge, INL is collaborating with the Mexican government to 
establish training programs, prosecution teams, and specialized 
teams to dismantle methamphetamine labs. INL also contributes 
financial support to the International Narcotics Control 
Board's Databank for Precursor Control, which assists 
governments in their effort to prevent the diversion of 
precursor chemicals.\536\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \535\ Letter from William Todd, Principal Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for Civilian Police and Asia, Africa and Europe Programs, 
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. 
Department of State, to Mark Souder, chairman of the Subcommittee on 
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on 
Government Reform (Jan. 9, 2006) (on file with the subcommittee).
    \536\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The committee commends the efforts of INL to assist law 
enforcement institutions in other countries in stemming the 
international flow of illicit narcotics. However, we encourage 
INL not to neglect the movement of precursor chemicals (those 
chemicals needed in the production process) in the effort to 
reduce meth, heroin and cocaine production. Meth use and demand 
are increasing in the U.S. and elsewhere. Therefore, INL must 
continue to fund meth precursor interdiction, as well as law 
enforcement training programs, at appropriate levels.
    We must address the meth epidemic using a comprehensive 
approach of State laws restricting pseudoephedrine and 
production controls on the few factories that produce 
pseudoephedrine internationally.\537\ The committee encourages 
the State Department to work toward a protocol for global 
tracking of pseudoephedrine shipments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \537\ Meth still pouring through loopholes: Congress must adopt 
global controls to put meth ingredients out of the long reach of the 
Mexican drug cartels, The Oregonian, Jan. 24, 2006, at http://
www.oregonlive.com/search/index.ssf?/base/editorial/
1138065917166080.xml?oregonian?ede&coll=7#continue (last visited Feb. 
24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Finally, the committee expects the State Department to be 
aggressive in its implementation of the methamphetamine 
certification statute in the Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic 
Act of 2005.\538\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \538\ The U.S.A. Patriot Act, Title II--The Combat Methamphetamine 
Epidemic Act of 2005, S. 2118, 108th Cong., at http://
frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/
getdoc.cgi?dbname=109--cong--bills&docid=f:s2118is
.txt.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

         H. UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

    The President's FY 2007 budget requests $337.8 million for 
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 
to supplement counter-narcotics missions in Afghanistan and the 
Andean Region. This represents a $31.6 million decrease from 
the FY 2006 enacted amount of $369.4. While the committee 
supports the FY 2007 budget request for USAID, we have numerous 
areas of concern, particularly with respect to deficiencies in 
the administration of taxpayer money.\539\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \539\ Letter from Mark Souder, chairman of the Subcommittee on 
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on 
Government Reform, to Randall Tobias, U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator, 
U.S. Department of State, (Feb. 6, 2006) at http://reform.house.gov/
UploadedFiles/
02.06.06%20State%20Tobias%20USAID%20prostitution%20lies.pdf.


----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                             FY 2005      FY 2005        FY 2006         FY 2006       FY 2007
                  USAID                     Requested      Final     Requested \540\  Enacted \541\    Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ACI--Alternative Development*............  $229.3 \542       $235.1         $216.3          $228.8   $228.8 \543
                                                     \                                                         \
Afghanistan Alternative Livelihoods*.....  $95.7 \544\         $175           $146          $140.6          $109
Total USAID counterdrug moneys*..........         $325       $362.3         $410.1          $369.4        $337.8
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in millions.


Contact Information: U.S. Agency for International Development: 
202-712-4810, http://www.usaid.gov/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \540\ U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev., Congressional Budget 
Justification, FY 2006, at http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2006/
summary.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \541\ Making Appropriations for Foreign Operations, Export 
Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 2006, Public Law 
109-102 to Accompany H.R. 3057, H.R. Conf. Rept. No. 109-265. At http:/
/frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/
getdoc.cgi?dbname=109--cong--reports&docid=f:hr265
.109.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \542\ U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev., Congressional Budget 
Justification, FY 2005, at http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2005/
summary.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \543\ Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2007: 
Appendix, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2007/appendix.html 
(last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \544\ U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev., Afghanistan Budget Summary, at 
http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2006/ane/af.html.

1. Andean Counterdrug Initiative and Alternative Development

    The committee supports the administration's FY 2007 request 
for $721.5 million for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative but is 
disappointed that it represents a $13 million decrease from 
$734.5 million appropriated for FY 2006.\545\ Of this FY 2007 
ACI request, nearly $207 million will be allocated to USAID in 
order to carry out alternative development and institution-
building programs.\546\ This money will fund projects needed to 
continue the enforcement, border control, crop reduction, 
alternative economic development, democratic institution 
building, and administration of justice and human rights 
programs in the region.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \545\ The Conference Report on H.R. 3057, Foreign Operations, 
Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 2006 
(Public Law 109-102), provides $734.5 million for the Andean 
Counterdrug Initiative, of which $228.8 million was directed for 
alternative development and institution building programs, to be 
carried out by USAID. Of this amount, $131.2 million was allocated for 
Colombia; $37 million for Bolivia; $11.54 million for Ecuador; and $49 
million for Peru.
    \546\ Press Release, U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev., USAID Fiscal Year 
2007 Budget Request (Feb. 8, 2006) at http://www.usaid.gov/press/
factsheets/2006/fs060208.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    While the committee applauds the work of USAID in the 
Andean Region, it is concerned with the decrease in FY 2007 
funding for its alternative development program within the 
Andean Counterdrug Initiative.
    USAID has the responsibility to take effective action to 
eliminate illicit coca production and to establish licit, 
sustainable farm-level production capacity and economic 
stability in countries throughout the Andean Region. USAID uses 
ACI funds for programs in four Andean countries--Colombia, 
Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador.\547\ These programs include 
expanding a licit agricultural economy, assisting displaced 
groups, strengthening democratic institutions, promoting the 
rule of law, human rights, and judicial reform. This work is 
crucial to our nation's drug control strategy and must be 
funded at appropriate levels.\548\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \547\ Dept. of State, Summary and Highlights: International 
Affairs, Function 150, Fiscal Year 2007.
    \548\ U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev., Budget Justification to the 
Congress FY 2006, at http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2006/
summary.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The committee believes that the USAID counter-narcotics 
mission should coordinate more effectively with the State 
Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement Affairs (INL), and because of their expertise, INL 
must take a more active lead in the apportioning of designated 
dollars. USAID acknowledges how important its efforts are in 
the ACI supply reduction and alternative development efforts, 
and therefore, moneys spent must be included in the national 
drug budget.
    The ACI budget provides support to Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, 
Ecuador, Brazil, Venezuela and Panama. The subcommittee is 
concerned that the 13 percent reduction between 2003 and the 
administration's 2005 request for the initiative (from $841 
million to $731 million) stifles the hard-earned successes that 
have recently become evident.

2. Afghanistan and Alternative Development

    While the USAID alternative development programs in 
Colombia can be called a qualified success, the committee is 
cautious about making the same pronouncement of USAID's efforts 
in Afghanistan. Although USAID's Alternative Livelihoods 
Program (AL) is part of the strategy of ``The 1384 (2005) 
Counter Narcotics Implementation Plan--to tackle the 
cultivation, production and trafficking of drugs in 
Afghanistan,'' this program has failed to curtail Afghan opium 
poppy production, which has greatly increased since the 
inception of AL in 2004.\549\ The AL Program was initially 
funded at $5 million in FY 2004 but was financed at $175 
million in FY 2005. In FY 2006, USAID will only receive $146 
million for the AL Program, which is a $29 million decrease 
from FY 2005. The committee is concerned with the declining 
trend in the families of the AL program. USAID received $146 
million for the AL Program in FY 2006 and has requested only 
$109 million for FY 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \549\ The 1384 (2005) Counter Narcotics Implementation Plan of the 
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, at http://www.mcn.gov.af/
imp--plan.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The committee encourages USAID to be clear and consistent 
in its presentation of the condition of poppy cultivation, 
yield and opium production in Afghanistan. When the term 
``cultivation'' is used, it refers to the number of hectares 
that have been planted and the amount of land area used for 
planting. The Federal agencies involved in opium poppy 
eradication frequently use this measurement to determine the 
number of hectares of poppy grown and the number of acres 
devoted to poppy cultivation. The recent decrease in 
cultivation is indeed a significant stride in the right 
direction. However, it does not portray the complete picture. 
One must also look at the poppy yield to determine the success 
of eradication programs.
    The term ``yield'' refers to the quality of the actual 
harvest (or crop) of poppy in terms of its potential to produce 
illicit opium. While it is important to determine whether poppy 
cultivation is up or down, it is even more important to ensure 
that the opium poppy yield decreases. A decrease or increase in 
yield is often dependent on factors such as growing conditions 
and weather, which are out of the control of those involved in 
eradication. Yield may also be a result of better quality 
fertilizer and other farming techniques. And finally, 
``production'' refers to the actual production of illicit opium 
from the good quality poppy crop.
    Under the watch of USAID and other U.S. Government agents, 
Afghan opium poppy cultivation dramatically increased, from 
80,000 hectares in 2003, to 131,000 hectares in 2004.\550\ 
Similarly, the production of opium increased from 3,600 metric 
tons (mt) in 2003 to 4,200 mt in 2004.\551\ On the other hand, 
while opium cultivation and production increased, the average 
opium yield decreased from 45 kg/ha in 2003 to 32 kg/ha in 
2004.\552\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \550\ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Afghanistan Opium 
Survey, 2004, (Nov. 2004) at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/afg/
afghanistan--opium--survey--2004.pdf 
(last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \551\ Id.
    \552\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As discussed previously, while cultivation of opium poppy 
decreased slightly in FY 2005 to 104,000, the average opium 
yield increased from 32 kg/ha in FY 2004 to 39 kg/ha in FY 
2005.\553\ According to the UN report, the Southern Region, 
including the Helmand province, displayed a 136.3 percent 
increase in opium poppy production from 27.8 kg/ha in 2004 to 
37.9 kg/ha 2005. USAID focuses much of its AL program in 
Helmand.\554\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \553\ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Summary Findings of 
Opium Trends in Afghanistan, 2005 (Sept. 12, 2005) at http://
www.unodc.org/pdf/afghanistan--2005/annex--opium-
afghanistan-2005-09-09.pdf.
    \554\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    State Department's anticipated cultivation trends for 2006 
are alarming for Afghanistan. Only three of the thirty-four 
provinces in the country are expected to see a decrease in 
poppy cultivation.\555\ Another thirteen are expected to see 
increases in production, with seven of those seeing growth of 
greater than fifty percent over 2005.\556\ Helmand Province 
alone is anticipated to produce 75,000 to 85,000 hectares of 
opium poppy which represents 51 percent of the world's 
anticipated opium poppy harvest.\557\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \555\ Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human 
Resources staff briefing with INL Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary 
on INL Afghanistan Operations, Mar. 8, 2006.
    \556\ Id.
    \557\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    While the committee finds the initial efforts of AL 
praiseworthy, the committee urges quick action to address 
deficiencies. The committee is shocked and dismayed to learn 
that the greatest increases in opium poppy production have 
taken place in the areas where USAID administers its AL 
programs.

                     FACT SHEET--AFGHANISTAN \558\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \558\ Id.


----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                Variation on
                                                                   2004             2004              2005
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Net opium poppy cultivation...............................         131,000 ha            -21%         104,000 ha
  in percent of actual agricultural land..................               2.9%  ..............               2.3%
  number of provinces affected............................           32 (all)  ..............                 25
Average opium yield.......................................           32 kg/ha             22%           39 kg/ha
Production of opium.......................................            4200 mt          - 2.4%           4,100 mt
  in percent of world illicit opium production............                87%  ..............                87%
Number of households involved in opium cultivation........            356,000            -13%            309,000
Number of persons involved in opium cultivation...........        2.3 million  ..............        2.0 million
  in percent of total population (23 million).............                10%  ..............               8.7%
Average farm-gate price of fresh opium at harvest time....             US $92            +11%         US $102/kg
Average farm-gate price of dry opium at harvest time......            US $142             -3%         US $138/kg
Afghanistan GDP...........................................    US $4.7 billion           +10.4    US $5.2 billion
Total export value of opium to neighboring countries......    US $2.8 billion           -3.6%    US $2.7 billion
  in percent of GDP.......................................                61%  ..............                52%
    gross trafficking profits of Afghan traffickers.......    US $2.2 billion           -2.7%   US $2.14 billion
    total farm-gate value of opium production:............    US $600 million            6.6%    US $560-million
Household average yearly gross income from opium of opium           US $1,700             +6%          US $1,800
 growing families.........................................
Per capita gross income from opium of opium growing                   US $260  ..............            US $280
 families.................................................
Afghanistan's GDP per capita..............................            US $206  ..............            US $226
Indicative gross income from opium per ha.................          US $4,600            +17%          US $5,400
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In correspondence with the committee, USAID cited both U.S. 
and United Nations estimates, which indicate a decrease in the 
total area under cultivation for poppy in Afghanistan from 2004 
to 2005.\559\ These estimates, which range from a decrease of 
21 percent according to the UN, to 48 percent, according to the 
United States, are misleading because they do not account for 
the total increase in opium poppy yield. While the total area 
dedicated to poppy cultivation decreased in 2005, improved 
growing conditions resulted in a higher yield than in 
2004.\560\ Consequently, the total production of opium 
decreased by a much smaller margin than the decrease in the 
total area under cultivation.\561\ A better representation of 
the level of poppy production in Afghanistan would show only a 
2.4 percent decrease from 2004 to 2005, and a 22 percent 
increase in opium yield.\562\ The committee suggests that USAID 
use the measurement of opium yield (in kilograms), rather than 
total area under cultivation, in order to properly measure 
progress in Afghanistan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \559\ Letter from J. Edward Fox, Assistant Administrator, Bureau 
for Legislative and Public Affairs, to Mark Souder, chairman of the 
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, 
Committee on Government Reform (Jan. 12, 2006) (on file with the 
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources).
    \560\ See Afghanistan: Are the British Counternarcotics Efforts 
Going Wobbly? Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal 
Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government 
Reform, 108th Cong. (Apr. 1, 2004) at http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/
LPS57423, (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \561\ Press Release, U.S. Department of State, Office of the 
Spokesman, Fact Sheet: Counter-Narcotics (Jan. 31, 2006) (on file with 
the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human 
Resources).
    \562\ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Summary Findings of 
Opium Trends in Afghanistan, 2005, (Sept. 12, 2005) at http://
www.unodc.org/pdf/afghanistan--2005/annex--opium-
afghanistan-2005-09-09.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Interviews of USAID officials by committee staff confirmed 
numerous deficiencies in the management of the AL program. 
Specifically, the committee is troubled by what it learned 
about AL systems for delivering crop fertilizer and monitoring 
its use. No standard or system had been established to certify 
the use of fertilizer for its intended application to 
alternative crops. The USAID officials interviewed on January 
18, 2006, were unable to cite any steps taken in AL to ensure 
that fertilizer is not being diverted to cultivate on the opium 
poppy crops it was intended to help eradicate.\563\ However, 
USAID representatives recently confirmed that for the most 
recent Seed and Fertilizer distribution, USAID contractors and 
the Government Accountability Office (GAO) officials met with 
farmers and village elders in advance of the distribution to 
ensure that recipients used the fertilizer for licit means. 
From these meetings, a written agreement was signed with local 
officials that committed the recipients to not grow poppy; and 
the GAO is responsible for monitoring compliance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \563\ The staff of the Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal 
Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, received a briefing from 
USAID on Jan. 18, 2006, in which the lack of sufficient monitoring of 
fertilizer distribution was discussed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Similarly, in order to properly monitor the AL Program, the 
Committee urges USAID to perform vigilant oversight of both: 
the Afghanistan AL contractors Development Alternatives Inc., 
Chemonics, and PADCO; as well as those used as a part of ACI. 
USAID must be able to show that grants and contracts are 
awarded through a competitive process. Appropriate requirements 
for grantees or contractors must also be instituted in order to 
work with USAID.
    Finally, the committee believes that if a country is on the 
``majors list'' (i.e. a major drug producer), then funding for 
USAID programs should be co-managed with INL, thereby 
facilitating more coordination to improve and accomplish the 
counter-narcotics strategy.
    In a Foreign Press Center Briefing in New York City on 
September 15, 2005, Nancy J. Powell, Assistant Secretary of 
State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 
noted the 20 countries listed on the President's 2005 majors 
list. These countries are: Afghanistan, the Bahamas, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Burma, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Guatemala, Haiti, India, Jamaica, Laos, Mexico, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela. In order for a 
country to be among the world's largest drug producing/drug 
transit countries, it must be one in which:

        ``(A) 1,000 hectares or more of illicit opium poppy is 
        cultivated or harvested during a year; (B) 1,000 
        hectares or more of illicit coca is cultivated or 
        harvested during a year; or (C) 5,000 hectares or more 
        of illicit cannabis is cultivated or harvested during a 
        year, unless the President determines that such illicit 
        cannabis production does not significantly affect the 
        United States. FAA Sec. 481(e) (2).'' \564\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \564\ See http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/1999/916.htm (last 
visited Feb. 24, 2006).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Or

        ``(A) That is a significant direct source of illicit 
        narcotic or psychotropic drugs or other controlled 
        substances significantly affecting the United States; 
        or (B) Through which are transported such drugs or 
        substances. FAA Sec. 481(e) (5).'' \565\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \565\ Id.

    The USAID efforts in the Andean Region are currently funded 
through INL, whereas the USAID Alternative Livelihoods Program 
in Afghanistan is funded from a separate fund in the State 
Department budget. Funding for the AL Program comes from a 
combination of Economic Support Funds and Development 
Assistance funds.\566\ The committee suggests that this funding 
discrepancy be investigated and that appropriate changes be 
made in the funding source of the USAID AL Program in 
Afghanistan. More specifically, the committee strongly 
recommends that the Afghan AL program be funded through INL as 
in Colombia.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \566\ Letter from J. Edward Fox, Assistant Administrator, Bureau 
for Legislative and Public Affairs, to Mark Souder, chairman of the 
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, 
Committee on Government Reform (Jan. 12, 2006) (on file with the 
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) PART Performance Evaluation of 
        ACI

    A recent OMB Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) 
evaluation examined the USAID operations within the Andean 
Counterdrug Initiative over a three month period from June 30, 
2005 through September 30, 2005.\567\ While this was not a 
comprehensive PART review, it did illuminate some apparent 
flaws in the performance measures used to assess USAID 
programs. The terms used in the performance measurements are 
vague and must be defined so that performance measures 
accurately reflect success or failure. The committee believes 
that the performance measures used to assess USAID programs 
must be unambiguous so that the Agency can be properly held 
accountable for the taxpayer dollars they receive.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \567\ Letter from J. Edward Fox, Assistant Administrator, Bureau 
for Legislative and Public Affairs, to Mark Souder, chairman of the 
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, 
Committee on Government Reform (Jan. 12, 2006) (on file with the 
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The FY 2006 OMB PART Program Assessment scored the Andean 
Counterdrug Initiative with an overall ``adequate'' 
rating.\568\ In the PART evaluation of ACI, it is clear that 
USAID is a crucial actor not only in capacity-building programs 
in the Andean Region but also in providing assistance directly 
to those institutions and communities so as to prevent the 
cultivation, processing and trafficking of illicit drugs. This 
further supports the inclusion of USAID programs within the ACI 
in the ONDCP National Drug Budget.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \568\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at 107. At http://
www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/06budget/06budget.pdf 
(last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    While USAID received good marks for its yearly and long-
term output measures (i.e. measuring hectares of licit crops in 
USAID assisted areas), the PART evaluation notes a deficiency 
in USAID outcome measurements. It should be noted, therefore, 
that although USAID has a long-term output measure for its 
alternative development programs in the Andean region, the 
agency ``has not yet developed long-term outcome measures for 
the alternative development component of the program.'' \569\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \569\ Id, at 108.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The PART review also illustrated a lack of coordination and 
consultation at the Washington headquarters level between USAID 
and INL, specifically concerning whether the USAID alternative 
development goals sufficiently complement INL's goals of 
eradication. In addition, USAID and INL must effectively 
collaborate with ONDCP when setting annual and long-term goals. 
INL and USAID have, however, committed to closer coordination 
in the planning of their complementary program goals.
    The committee strongly urges USAID to work with OMB and 
ONDCP to develop new and more detailed performance measurements 
to be used in the PART Program Assessment, as well as in 
ongoing outcome measurements. For example, in measuring the 
success of USAID Alternative Development Programs, it would be 
helpful to know how many villagers, either in the Andean Region 
or Afghanistan, have formally agreed not to grow illicit crops 
and not to divert seed and fertilizer for illicit purposes. 
Similarly, it would be useful to measure success by the number 
of acres that once grew illicit crops, but are now growing 
legal crops or have been used to build a business and create 
jobs.
    The committee commends USAID for participating in so many 
counterdrug strategy Working Groups with other Federal 
agencies, as well as with host country governments. The Working 
Groups include weekly counter-narcotics core group meetings at 
the US Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan, weekly Afghanistan 
Working Group meetings, the Afghanistan Interagency Operations 
Group (AIOG), in which ONDCP plays a leadership role, and the 
Committee for International Drug Control, which is periodically 
chaired by ONDCP.\570\ We urge ONDCP to ensure that these 
Working Groups are truly collaborative in nature and that they 
serve to provide cooperation, partnership and deconfliction 
among the parties represented. If these Working Group meetings 
are merely a formality, then they are not serving to achieve 
goals to stem the flow of illicit narcotics into America.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \570\ Letter from J. Edward Fox, Assistant Administrator, Bureau 
for Legislative and Public Affairs, to Mark Souder, chairman of the 
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, 
Committee on Government Reform (Jan. 12, 2006) (on file with the 
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Harm Reduction

    A recurring criticism is that the Washington, D.C. USAID 
office exercises very little oversight over its field offices, 
which are largely responsible to the embassies to which they 
are attached, but less so to USAID headquarters.
    USAID field offices are known to finance the production of 
``Harm Reduction'' materials and brochures in Central Asia and 
East Asia. However, these moneys are not accounted for by the 
USAID Washington, D.C. office, or in the ONDCP national drug 
budget. ``Harm Reduction'' is an ideological position 
identified with the views of drug legalization financier George 
Soros, which assumes certain individuals are incapable of 
making healthy decisions. Advocates of this position hold that 
dangerous behaviors, such as drug abuse, therefore simply must 
be accepted by society and those who choose such lifestyles--or 
become trapped in them--should be enabled to continue these 
behaviors in a ``less harmful'' manner. Often, however, these 
lifestyles are the result of addiction, mental illness or other 
conditions that should and can be treated rather than accepted 
as normative, healthy behaviors.
    In its annual report released March 2, 2004, the 
International Narcotics Control Board--the United Nations' drug 
agency--sharply criticized ``harm reduction'' measures such as 
needle exchange programs and so-called ``safe injecting 
rooms,'' because such policies encourage drug use and violate 
``article 4 of the 1961 Convention [which] obliges State 
parties to ensure that the production, manufacture, import, 
export, distribution of, trade in, use and possession of drugs 
is to be limited exclusively to medical and scientific 
purposes. Therefore, from a legal point of view, such 
facilities violate the international drug control 
conventions.'' \571\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \571\ Dept. of State, International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, 
Drugs, The Law and Human Rights, Annual Report for 2003, at http://
www.release.org.uk/news/
International--Narcotics--Control--Boar
d--040316.pdf#search='International%20Narcotics%20Board% 
202003%20annual%20report (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The committee is deeply concerned that while the 
International Narcotics Control Board was warning parties to 
the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961), the Convention 
on Psychotropic Substances (1971), and the United Nations 
Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances (1988) that government financing of 
``harm reduction'' schemes may be in violation of those 
accords, it appears that USAID was financing a ``harm 
reduction'' agenda of its own.\572\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \572\ For more information on these treaties, see the International 
Narcotics Control Board website at http://www.incb.org/incb/index.html 
(last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On February 10 2005, the White House Office of National 
Drug Control Policy Director John Walters testified before the 
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human 
Resources.\573\ He was asked about USAID's involvement in two 
questionable ``harm reduction'' projects. The first project was 
the 14th International Conference on Reduction of Drug Related 
Harm held in Chiang Mai, Thailand from April 6-10, 2003.\574\ 
The conference was sponsored by the International Harm 
Reduction Association, the Asian Harm Reduction Network, and 
cosponsored by the Centre for Harm Reduction and USAID.\575\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \573\ See Fiscal Year 2006 Drug Budget: Hearing before the House 
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, 
Committee on Government Reform, 109th Cong. (Feb. 10, 2005) (statement 
of John Walters, Director of the White House Office of National Drug 
Control Policy). At http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/
getdoc.cgi?dbname=109--house--hearings&docid=f:208
78.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \574\ For more information on the 14th International Conference on 
Reduction of Drug Related Harm held in Chiang Mai, Thailand from Apr. 
6-10, 2003, see https://www.globalhealth.org/news/article/2194 (last 
visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \575\ For more information on the Asian Harm Reduction Network, see 
http://ahrn.thaiis.us/
index.php?option=content&task=view&id=2117&Itemid=2 (last visited Feb. 
24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The second project was the Asian Harm Reduction Network's 
350-page, second-edition Manual for Reducing Drug Related Harm 
in Asia (which bears a USAID logo). USAID's role in the 
production of the manual is acknowledged inside the cover: 
``This publication was made possible through support provided 
by the Office of Strategic Planning, Operations, and Technical 
Support, Bureau for Asia and the Near East, U.S. Agency for 
International Development. . .\576\ Included in the second 
chapter of the manual, ``Rationale for Harm Reduction,'' are 
sections on ``needle and syringe programs,'' ``sales and 
purchasing of injecting equipment,'' and ``removing barriers.'' 
\577\ In the fifth chapter, ``Injecting Safely,'' are sections 
devoted to ``sharing of injecting equipment,'' and ``safe 
injecting.'' \578\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \576\ Manual for Reducing Drug Related Harm in Asia, Macfarlane 
Burnet Centre for Medical Research and Asian Harm Reduction Network, 
(the Centre for Harm Reduction), at http://www.chr.asn.au/freestyler/
gui/files/
Manual.pdf#search='manual%20for%20reducing%20drug%20related%20harm%20in%
20asia' (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \577\ Id.
    \578\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ONDCP Director Walters responded that he was not aware of 
the ``harm reduction'' publication financed by USAID nor did he 
attend the USAID-cosponsored 14th International Conference on 
Reduction of Drug Related Harm.\579\ He added, however, that he 
has been aggressive in rebuking international organizations 
which promote ``harm reduction.'' \580\ He pledged to look into 
this regrettable matter and report back to the Committee.\581\ 
He has not yet done so.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \579\ For more information on the 14th International Conference on 
Reduction of Drug Related Harm held in Chiang Mai, Thailand from Apr. 
6-10, 2003, see https://www.globalhealth.org/news/article/2194 (last 
visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \580\ See Fiscal Year 2006 Drug Budget: Hearing before the House 
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, 
Committee on Government Reform, 109th Cong. (2005) (Statement of John 
Walters, Director of the White House Office of National Drug Control 
Policy), at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/
getdoc.cgi?dbname=109--house--hearings&docid=f:208
78.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \581\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    While this matter is under investigation by the White 
House, the committee recommends that any drug-related programs 
of USAID be put under close oversight and management by the 
State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement. Ultimately, taxpayer subsidies of ``Harm 
Reduction'' efforts should be eliminated and all drug-related 
activity by USAID must be accounted for in the national drug 
budget, and, therefore, supervised by ONDCP.
    In February 2005, the Government Reform Subcommittee on 
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources requested 
that USAID provide comprehensive documentation of all financial 
interactions with the Soros Foundation, the Open Society 
Institute, and other organizations affiliated with George Soros 
or the ``Harm Reduction'' movement. In a letter received on 
January 12, 2006, from USAID, it is stated that, ``USAID has 
not and does not support any `harm reductions' strategies 
inconsistent with either U.S. law or policy.'' \582\ To date, 
USAID has provided 11 CD-ROMs, with over 3000 documents 
detailing financial interactions with these groups. The 
committee is in the process of analyzing these documents and 
thanks USAID for its cooperation and disclosure.\583\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \582\ Letter from J. Edward Fox, Assistant Administrator, Bureau 
for Legislative and Public Affairs, to Mark Souder, chairman of the 
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, 
Committee on Government Reform (Jan. 12, 2006) (on file with the 
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources).
    \583\ USAID's cooperation and disclosure was markedly improved 
after a Nov. 16, 2005 meeting with committee staff inquiring why USAID 
should not receive a subpoena for document requests left unanswered for 
an unreasonable amount of time. For more material on this meeting, see, 
e.g., Letter from Mark Souder, chairman of the Subcommittee on Criminal 
Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government 
Reform, to Randall Tobias, U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator, U.S. 
Department of State, (Feb. 6, 2006) at http://reform.house.gov/
UploadedFiles/
02.06.06%20State%20Tobias%20USAID%20prostitution%20lies.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                       I. Department of Treasury


1. Internal Revenue Service

                                     IRS Drug Control Funding (in millions)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                   FY 2005                   FY 2006      FY 2006      FY 2007
            IRS Drug Control Funding                \584\       FY 2005       \585\        \586\        \587\
                                                  Requested      Final      Requested     Enacted      Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AGENCY TOTAL...................................            $            $        $55.6        $55.0        $55.6
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Contact Information: Department of Treasury Office of Public 
Affairs: 202-622-2960, http://www.irs.gov/compliance/
enforcement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \584\ FY 2006 was the first year that the IRS received a direct 
appropriation to support drug control programs. In previous years, the 
IRS would receive drug control funding through the Department of 
Justice's OCDETF program.
    \585\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \586\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006)
    \587\ Id.

    The committee supports the President's request for Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) drug control programs, which is estimated 
to include $55.6 million for drug control investigations. This 
would be an increase of less than $1 million over the $55 
million enacted for fiscal year 2006. This funding would 
provide 329 FTE to support the Department of Justice's 
Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) program.
    As stated in the 2006 National Drug Control Strategy, it is 
critically important that U.S. law enforcement focus its 
resources to attack the financial infrastructure of drug 
trafficking organizations.\588\ This will cause a significant 
disruption to the supply of illegal drugs entering the U.S. and 
is a major focus both of the Department of Homeland Security, 
the Department of Justice (through the OCDETF program) and the 
Internal Revenue Service.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \588\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, (Feb. 2006) 
at 32. At http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/
ndcs06/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Money laundering--the process of disguising or concealing 
illicit funds to make them appear legitimate--is a serious 
crime, with an estimated $500 billion to $1 trillion laundered 
worldwide annually, according to the United Nations Office of 
Drug Control and Prevention.\589\ Money laundering provides the 
fuel for terrorists, drug dealers, arms traffickers, and other 
criminals to operate and expand their activities, which can 
have devastating social and economic consequences.\590\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \589\ See Threat Convergence at the Border: How Can We Improve the 
Federal Effort To Dismantle Criminal Smuggling Organizations? Hearing 
Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human 
Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (July 12, 2005) 
(testimony of Richard M. Stana, Director of Homeland Security and 
Justice Issues, Government Accountability Office), at http://
reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=30454.
    \590\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The committee recognizes that the IRS plays a unique role 
in illicit drug money investigations. The IRS has sole 
jurisdiction for criminal violations of the Internal Revenue 
Code (IRC), Title 26 of the United States Code.\591\ According 
to the code, gross income is defined as ``. . . all income from 
whatever source derived.'' This has been held by the courts to 
include income earned from illegal activities such as drug 
trafficking. The primary criminal statutes violated include 
evasion of income tax, false income tax returns, and failure to 
file tax returns, among others.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \591\ Additional IRS background information at http://www.irs.gov/
taxpros/article/0,,id=98137,00.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The IRS, as part of its core tax administration mission, 
addresses both the criminal and civil aspects of money 
laundering. The IRS Criminal Investigations Division (CID) is 
involved in several initiatives which identify, target, disrupt 
and dismantle drug traffickers. IRS-CI special agents ``follow 
the money'' within various inter-agency task forces and 
centers. Some of these initiatives include establishing 41 
Suspicious Activity Review Teams (SAR-RT) to review and analyze 
suspicious activity data, and participation in both High 
Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) and the Department of 
Justice's Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) 
initiatives.\592\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \592\ More information available at http://www.irs.gov/compliance/
enforcement/article/0,,id=107488,00.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The committee fully supports the efforts of the IRS to 
support counterdrug financial investigations. Given the unique 
statutory authorities of the IRS, it is important that its 
investigators be closely integrated into all major drug and 
money seizures pursued by the Federal law enforcement agencies. 
The committee believes that investigators are the critical link 
in establishing connections between random drug seizures and 
trafficking networks.

                   J. Department of Veterans Affairs


1. General

                                             VA Drug Control Funding
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                         FY 2005        FY 2005        FY 2006         FY 2006        FY 2007
                DVA                  Requested \593\  Final \594\  Requested \595\  Enacted \596\  Request \597\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AGENCY TOTAL*......................       $822.787        $396.13       $532.947        $412.648       $428.349
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in millions.


Contact Information: Office of Public Affairs: 202-273-6000, 
http://www.va.gov.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \593\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005 
Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 
2006).
    \594\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \595\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \596\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
    \597\ Id.

    The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has served an 
essential role in preventing and treating the abuse of drugs by 
former military personnel. The committee generally supports the 
administration's fiscal year 2007 budget request for VA drug 
control. However, the committee has particular concerns, 
detailed below, addressing the VA portion of the 
administration's Drug Strategy and Budget.

2. Narrowing the Scope of the Provision of Treatment

    The committee is deeply concerned with the administration's 
strategy with respect to the availability of drug treatment for 
military personnel now returning from active deployment. The 
current VA policy allows for only a two-year window in which 
all military personnel, including National Guard, returning 
from duty abroad qualify for VA drug treatment.
    VA officials made clear that current scientific evidence 
indicates, based on studies dating back to Vietnam era 
personnel, that 70-80 percent of those returning from active 
duty will not begin to seek drug treatment until two years 
after returning from active deployment.\598\ Consequently, the 
committee expresses deep concern that the VA is not making drug 
treatment sufficiently available to military personnel 
returning from active duty. The committee strongly suggests 
that the VA revise this policy to provide for a five-year 
window for drug treatment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \598\ Paula P. Schnurr, Carole A. Lunney, Anjana Sengupta, & Lynn 
C. Waelde, A Descriptive Analysis of PTSD Chronicity in Vietnam 
Veterans, 16 J. of Traumatic Stress, (2003) at 545.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The committee also repeats last year's critique of the VA 
policy of restricting access to drug treatment services by 
excluding those veterans without dependents who have an income 
of more than $29,903 or do not have a service-related 
disability. Such an arbitrary delineation both restricts a 
veteran's access to care and provides no assurance that 
alternative care is available. This economic focus has been 
described as being a ``Department wide'' policy in staff 
interviews.\599\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \599\ Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug 
Policy, and Human Resources, drug control budget briefing with the 
Department of Veterans Affairs on Dec. 16, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Although the committee supports the position that those who 
are most unable to provide treatment by private means should 
receive treatment priority, the reality is that drug addiction 
and dependence, commonly resulting from active duty, do not 
respect the economic background of particular veterans.

3. Specialized Treatment

    With an increase of drug abuse patients expected from 
currently deployed troops, the committee supports the estimated 
request of $428.3 million for VA drug treatment programs for 
fiscal year 2007. This compares to the enacted fiscal year 2006 
level of $412.6 million.\600\ In fiscal year 2004, the VA 
reports having treated 89,000 veterans with substance abuse 
disorders.\601\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \600\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at 6.
    \601\ Dr. John D. McKellar & Meghan Saweikis, M.S., Health Services 
for VA Substance Use Disorder Patients: Comparison of Utilization in 
Fiscal Years 2004, 2003, and 1998, (2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The committee supports the VA's prioritization on improving 
specialized treatment. As indicated in our most recent Staff 
interviews, the specific priorities are the replacement of 
methadone treatment with buprenorphine treatment for opiate 
addicts, the expansion of residential treatment capabilities, 
and generally increasing overall treatment availability.\602\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \602\ Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug 
Policy, and Human Resources, drug control budget briefing with the 
Department of Veterans Affairs on Dec. 16, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Patients who have acquired familiarity with methadone 
treatment are extremely reluctant to adopt other forms of 
treatment.\603\ In light of such difficulties involved with 
replacing methadone treatment with buprenorphine treatment, the 
committee supports the VA's initiative to utilize buprenorphine 
with all new patient cases. VA representatives disclosed in 
staff interviews that approximately 138 VA physicians have 
received training and are currently prescribing 
buprenorphine.\604\ VA is also planning four regional training 
seminars for certification in prescribing buprenorphine.\605\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \603\ Id.
    \604\ Id..
    \605\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Continued training of VA physicians on buprenorphine 
treatment is also strongly supported in order that VA 
physicians will both understand its benefits over methadone 
treatment and acquire a familiarity with its implementation 
with new patients. The committee strongly suggests that 
methadone treatments be entirely phased out and replaced by the 
more effective buprenorphine treatment with new patients.
    The committee also supports the VA's continued efforts to 
expand its residential treatment capabilities. Specialized 
treatment includes the cost generated by the treatment of 
patients with a drug use disorder who are treated in a 
substance abuse treatment program, including inpatient 
programs, outpatient treatment, residential treatment, and 
methadone and buprenorphine treatment. Staff interviews 
revealed that approximately 125,000 veterans currently need 
special treatment while only 89,000 receive it, many of whom 
require residential treatment in order to receive optimal 
care.\606\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \606\ Dr. John D. McKellar & Meghan Saweikis, M.S., Health Services 
for VA Substance Use Disorder Patients: Comparison of Utilization in 
Fiscal Years 2004, 2003, and 1998, (2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Inter-Departmental Cooperation

    Staff interviews indicate the VA's strong collaboration, 
specifically relating to research and development, with the 
Center for Substance Abuse Treatment and the National Institute 
for Drug Abuse.

          DHHS--VA senior officials serve on the 
        National Advisory Councils of NIDA, the Center for 
        Substance Abuse Treatment (CSAT), and the Center for 
        Substance Abuse Prevention (CSAP). VA officials also 
        have a seat on a planning committee with SAMHSA on the 
        preparation of a conference in March 2006, on the 
        ``Returning Veteran.'' The Program Evaluation and 
        Resource Center (PERC) shares data on VA programs with 
        SAMHSA, one of the major data sets being the triennial 
        Drug Abuse Program Survey (DAPS).

          DOD--VA and DOD have jointly prepared a 
        detailed set of Treatment Guidelines for substance 
        abuse for use in both departments. Both departments 
        currently are actively involved in implementing the 
        ``seamless transition'' initiative for returning 
        veterans.

          NIDA--a number of VA investigators have 
        grants for their research from NIDA, and VA was a 
        primary site for research in NIDA's medication 
        development project.

          ONDCP--VA works closely with ONDCP on 
        programming and budgetary issues relating to VA's 
        substance abuse treatment activities.\607\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \607\ E-mail from Dr. Richard T. Suchinsky, Associate Chief for 
Addictive Disorders, Department of Veterans Affairs, to James Kaiser, 
counsel, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human 
Resources, Committee on Government Reform, (Feb. 9, 2006, 12:42 EST) 
(on file with the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and 
Human Resources).

    Such dialog and information sharing is strongly encouraged 
in order to most efficiently utilize resources allocated 
towards research and development.

  ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF HON. HENRY A. WAXMAN AND HON. ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS

    The report adopted by the committee was prepared by the 
majority staff of the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug 
Policy, and Human Resources, without the consultation or 
participation of the minority. Nevertheless, we concur, or do 
not take issue, with many of the majority views expressed in 
the report.
    Fundamentally, we share a deep concern about the 
substantial downward shift in the proportion of Federal drug 
control funding devoted to demand reduction programs (i.e., 
drug prevention and drug treatment) versus supply reduction 
programs (e.g., domestic enforcement, interdiction, and source-
country eradication) since President Bush issued his 
administration's first National Drug Control Strategy in 2002. 
If the President's fiscal year 2007 budget request is enacted, 
prevention and treatment together will account for just 35.5 
percent of the President's drug budget request, down from 47 
percent in fiscal year 2001, while supply reduction will have 
increased from 53 percent to 64.5 percent over the same period.
    With more than 20,000 Americans dying from illegal drugs 
annually, our Nation cannot afford to shrink from its 
commitment to reducing demand for illegal drugs through 
prevention and expanding access to drug treatment for those in 
need. The administration has invested much effort in attempting 
to alter the delivery mechanism for drug treatment services 
with its Access to Recovery voucher initiative and this year's 
proposal to ``voucher-ize'' treatment services delivered with 
Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment Block Grant funding, 
but it has failed to make significant progress in closing the 
gap between the number of people needing treatment and the 
woefully inadequate volume of accessible treatment services. It 
is difficult to see how a budget that further reduces funding 
for the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services 
Administration's Center for Substance Abuse Treatment will turn 
the tide.
    We hope that, like last year, Congress will reject the bulk 
of the administration's proposed cuts for key demand reduction 
programs within the Department of Education and the Department 
of Health and Human Services and for programs, including the 
High-Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas program, Byrne Justice 
Assistance Grants, and Community Oriented Policing Services 
program, that support and amplify State and local drug 
enforcement efforts.

              Harm Reduction and Needle Exchange Programs

    As in years past, we strongly disagree with the majority's 
perspective and representations concerning the purpose, 
efficacy, and legality of ``harm reduction'' strategies, 
particularly as they relate to needle- or syringe-exchange 
programs [SEPs].
    In arguing the need for increased oversight of USAID 
activities, the majority offers the following 
mischaracterization:

        ``Harm reduction'' is an ideological position . . . 
        which assumes certain individuals are incapable of 
        making healthy decisions. Advocates of this position 
        hold that dangerous behaviors, such as drug abuse, 
        therefore simply must be accepted by society and those 
        who choose such lifestyles--or become trapped in them--
        should be enabled to continue these behaviors in a less 
        harmful manner. Often however, these lifestyles are the 
        result of addiction, mental illness o[r] other 
        conditions that should and can be treated rather than 
        accepted as normative, healthy behaviors.

    Harm reduction is, in fact, a basic conceptual pillar of 
mainstream public health policy in many contexts. With respect 
to HIV prevention among drug abusers, harm reduction is 
embodied in the National Institute on Drug Abuse's ``Principles 
of HIV Prevention in Drug-Using Populations.'' This publication 
describes a ``hierarchy of HIV/AIDS risk-reduction messages, 
beginning with the most effective behavioral changes that drugs 
users can make,'' as follows:

         LStop using and injecting drugs

         LEnter and complete drug abuse treatment, 
        including relapse prevention

         LIf you continue to inject drugs, take the 
        following steps to reduce personal and public health 
        risks:

                 LNever re-use or ``share'' syringes, 
                water, or drug preparation equipment

                 LUse only sterile syringes obtained 
                from a reliable source (e.g., a pharmacy or a 
                syringe access program)

                 LAlways use a new, sterile syringe to 
                prepare and inject drugs

                 LIf possible, use sterile water to 
                prepare drugs; otherwise use clean water from 
                reliable source (e.g., fresh tap water)

                 LAlways use a new or disinfected 
                container (``cooker'') and a new filter 
                (``cotton'') to prepare drugs

                 LClean the injection site with a new 
                alcohol swab before injecting drugs

                 LSafely dispose of syringes after one 
                use \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ National Institute on Drug Abuse, Principles of HIV Prevention 
in Drug-Using Populations (NIH Pub. No. 02-4733) 13 (Mar. 2002), 
(online at http://www.nida.nih.gov/PDF/POHP.pdf).

Similarly, the Department of Health and Human Service has 
published ``A Guide to Primary Care of People with HIV/AIDS'' 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
that advises:

        The primary care provider should routinely screen for 
        drug abuse and treat or refer for treatment as quickly 
        as possible . . . [and] the provider should also 
        counsel patients who are actively using drugs not to 
        share needles with others and to take advantage of the 
        programs that distribute clean needles.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Health Resources and Services Administration, A Guide to 
Primary Care of People with HIV/AIDS, 105, 111 (2004) (online at http:/
/hab.hrsa.gov/tools/primarycareguide/).

    Neither NIDA nor HHS advocates the view that ``addiction, 
mental illness o[r] other [unspecified treatable] conditions'' 
should be ``accepted as normative, healthy behaviors'' instead 
of being treated. On the contrary, their advice to public 
health professionals is consistent with ample research 
demonstrating that the most effective approach to preventing 
the spread of HIV among drug users is a comprehensive strategy 
that includes community-based outreach, drug abuse treatment, 
and access to sterile injection equipment.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ Principles of HIV Prevention in Drug-Using Populations, supra 
note 1, at 16-17.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Since 1991, there have been at least 17 major reviews and 
assessments of needle exchange programs by expert bodies such 
as the National Commission on AIDS, the Institute of Medicine, 
the National Institutes of Health, the Centers for Disease 
Control, the American Medical Association, the American Society 
of Addiction Medicine, and the World Health Organization. These 
assessments have found that needle exchange programs help 
reduce the spread of AIDS and other dangerous infectious 
disease without encouraging or increasing drug use. In fact, 
according to experts, needle exchange programs provide valuable 
opportunities to reduce illegal drug use.
    In part as a result of these conclusions, needle exchange 
programs have been endorsed by a wide range of expert 
scientific and medical organizations, including the American 
Academy of Family Physicians,\4\ the American Academy of 
Pediatrics,\5\ the American Academy of Physician Assistants,\6\ 
the American College of Preventive Medicine,\7\ the American 
Medical Association,\8\ the American Nurses Association,\9\ the 
American Psychological Association,\10\ the Association of 
Nurses in AIDS Care,\11\ and the Infectious Diseases Society of 
America.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ American Academy of Family Physicians, Substance and Alcohol 
Abuse and Addiction (2003) (online at http://www.aafp.org/x7096.xml).
    \5\ American Academy of Pediatrics, Provisional Committee on 
Pediatric AIDS, Reducing the Risk of Human Immunodeficiency Virus 
Infection Associated with Illicit Drug Use, Pediatrics, 945-7 (Dec. 
1994) (online at http://aappolicy.aappublications.org/cgi/reprint/
pediatrics;94/6/945.pdf).
    \6\ American Academy of Physician Assistants, Needle/Syringe Access 
for the Prevention of HIV Transmission (policy paper adopted 2003) 
(http://www.aapa.org/policy/needle--access.html).
    \7\ American College of Preventive Medicine, Public Policy on 
Needle-Exchange Programs to Reduce Drug-Associated Morbidity and 
Mortality, American Journal of Preventive Medicine, 173-5 (2000) 
(online at http://www.acpm.org/ajpm369.pdf).
    \8\ American Medical Association, Syringe and Needle Exchange 
Programs (Policy Statement H-95.958) (online at http://www.ama-
assn.org/apps/pf--new/
pf--online?f--n=resultLink&doc= policyfiles/HnE/
H-95.958.HTM&s--t=syringe+and+needle+exchange+programs&catg=A
MA/HnE&catg=AMA/BnGnC&catg=AMA/DIR&&nth=1&&st--p=0&nth=1&).
    \9\ American Nurses Association, Position Statement: Needle 
Exchange and HIV (effective Apr. 2, 1993) (online at http://
nursingworld.org/readroom/position/blood/blnedl.htm).
    \10\ American Psychological Association, APA Council Endorses Fair-
Testing Code, Forms New Working Group, among Other Actions (Apr. 4, 
2001) (online at http://www.apa.org/monitor/apr04/endorses.html).
    \11\ Association of Nurses in AIDS Care, Position Statement: Needle 
and Syringe Exchange (rev. Sept. 2002) (online at http://
www.anacnet.org/media/pdfs/ 
PS--Needle--Syringe--Exch--4
-2003.pdf).
    \12\ Infectious Diseases Society of America, Supporting Document 
for IDSA's Policy Statement on Syringe Exchange, Prescribing and 
Paraphernalia Laws (Oct. 5, 2001) (online at http://www.idsociety.org/
Content/ContentGroups/
Public--Statements--and--Policies1/
Statements/
Supporting--Document--for--IDSA's--
Policy--Statement--on--Syringe--
Exchange,--Prescribing--and-- 
Paraphernalia--L.htm) (emphasis in original).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In chronological order, expert reviews and assessments of 
needle exchange programs include the following:

 LIn 1991, the National Commission on AIDS, whose 
members included then-Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney, 
convened a hearing on drug use and HIV. Based on the 
testimonies of expert witnesses at the hearing and a review of 
scientific evidence, the Commission issued a report that found:

        Outreach programs which operate needle exchanges and 
        distribute bleach not only help to control the spread 
        of HIV, but also refer many individuals to treatment 
        programs . . .. Most significantly, these programs, 
        rather than encouraging substance use, lead a 
        substantial number of substance users to seek 
        treatment.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ National Commission on Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, 
The Twin Epidemics of Substance Use and HIV (July 1991) (online at 
http://www.dogwoodcenter.org/references/ 
studies91F.html#RECOMMENDATION%202).

 LIn 1995, a report prepared by a joint panel of the 
National Research Council and the Institute of Medicine 
reviewed the available evidence on needle exchange programs and 
concluded: ``Needle exchange programs reduce the spread of 
HIV--the virus that causes AIDS--without increasing either the 
injection of illegal drugs among program participants or the 
number of new initiates to injection drug use.'' \14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ National Academies, Needle Exchange Programs Reduce HIV 
Transmission among People Who Inject Illegal Drugs (Sept. 18, 1995) 
(online at http://www4.nationalacademies.org/news.nsf/isbn/ 
0309052963?OpenDocument).

 LIn 1997, a Consensus Panel convened by the National 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Institutes of Health concluded:

        An impressive body of evidence suggests powerful 
        effects from needle exchange programs. The number of 
        studies showing beneficial effects on behaviors such as 
        needle sharing greatly outnumber those showing no 
        effects. There is no longer doubt that these programs 
        work. . . . Does needle exchange promote drug use? A 
        preponderance of evidence shows either no change or 
        decreased drug use.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ National Institutes of Health, Interventions to Prevent HIV 
Risk Behaviors (Feb. 11-13, 1997) (Consensus Statement No. 104) (online 
at http://consensus.nih.gov/cons/104/104--statement.htm).

 LIn 1997, the Council on Scientific Affairs of the 
American Medical Association issued a report on the medical and 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
scientific literature on needle exchange programs that found:

        There is substantial evidence of reduced needle-sharing 
        among regular participants in needle-exchange programs. 
        More importantly, HIV infection rates among drug users 
        have been consistently lower in cities with needle-
        exchange programs. . . . For example, while the HIV 
        infection rate among injection drug users remained 1% 
        to 2% in the Scottish city of Glasgow, where a needle-
        exchange program was quickly established, it reached 
        70% in nearby Edinburgh, where the response of 
        government officials was to implement even more 
        stringent controls over injection equipment.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ American Medical Association, Report 8 of the Council on 
Scientific Affairs (A-97) (June 1997) (online at http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/category/13636.html).

 LIn 1997, the American Public Health Association 
stated that ``an enormous body of published research'' exists 
``attesting to the efficacy of clean needle exchange for 
reducing HIV transmission among drug users. Moreover, study 
after study has shown that needle exchange does not lead to an 
increase of illegal drug use.'' \17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\ American Public Health Association, American Public Health 
Association Supports Lifting Federal Ban on Funding for Needle Exchange 
(Aug. 20, 1997) (online at http://www.apha.org/news/press/1997/
needle.htm).

 LIn 2000, the U.S. Surgeon General and other senior 
scientists at the Department of Health and Human Services 
reviewed scientific research completed since April 1998 on 
needle exchange programs. In a published summary of the review, 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the Surgeon General announced:

        After reviewing all of the research to date, the senior 
        scientists of the Department and I have unanimously 
        agreed that there is conclusive scientific evidence 
        that syringe exchange programs, as part of a 
        comprehensive HIV prevention strategy, are an effective 
        public health intervention that reduces the 
        transmission of HIV and does not encourage the use of 
        illegal drugs.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\ U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Evidence-Based 
Findings on the Efficacy of Syringe Exchange Programs: An Analysis of 
the Scientific Research Completed since April 1998 (Mar. 17, 2000).

 LIn 2000, the Institute of Medicine released a report 
on the findings of a committee it had convened at the request 
of the Centers for Disease Control to conduct a comprehensive 
review of current HIV prevention efforts in the United States. 
The report described the evidence on needle exchange programs 
as ``compelling'' and cited a study that suggested that 
``expanded provision of needle exchange programs in the United 
States could have averted between 10,000 and 20,000 new 
infections over the past decade.'' \19\ According to the 
report:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ Institute of Medicine, No Time to Lose: Getting More from HIV 
Prevention, 114-5 (2000) (online at http://books.nap.edu/books/
0309071372/html/1.html#pagetop).

        Although many communities and law enforcement officials 
        have expressed concern that increasing availability of 
        injection equipment will lead to increased drug use, 
        criminal activity, and discarded contaminated syringes, 
        studies have found no scientifically reliable evidence 
        of these negative effects.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\ Institute of Medicine, No Time to Lose: Getting More from HIV 
Prevention, 114-5 (2000) (online at http://books.nap.edu/books/
0309071372/html/1.html#pagetop).

 LIn 2000, the Academy for Educational Development, in 
a policy report prepared in collaboration with the Centers for 
Disease Control, observed that much research had been conducted 
on needle exchange programs. Citing this research, the report 
concludes that ``SEPs [syringe exchange programs] have 
significant positive effects on preventing adverse health 
consequences associated with injection drug use and . . . do 
not increase drug use or promote the initiation of injection 
drug use.'' \21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\ Academy for Educational Development, A Comprehensive Approach: 
Preventing Blood-Borne Infections among Injection Drug Users, A7 (Dec. 
2000) (online at http://www.thebody.com/cdc/pdfs/comprehensive-
approach.pdf).

 LIn 2000, the American Society of Addition Medicine 
reported that ``[n]eedle exchange programs have been shown to 
be a crucial component of a spectrum of HIV prevention services 
to injection drug users, resulting in an effective reduction in 
the transmission of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus.'' The 
Society of Addiction Medicine also reported that ``[t]here has 
not been an increase in drug use or an increase in injection as 
a route of drug administration as a result of implementation of 
needle exchange programs, nor has there been demonstration of 
an increase in contaminated injection equipment in the 
community.'' \22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\ American Society of Addiction Medicine, Public Policy of ASAM: 
Access to Sterile Syringes and Needles (adopted Dec. 20, 2000) (online 
at http://www.asam.org/ppol/Needle%20 Exchange.htm).

 LIn 2002, the Centers for Disease Control summarized 
scientific studies of needle exchange programs. CDC explained: 
``SEPs have been shown to be an effective way to link some 
hard-to-reach IDUs [intravenous drug users] with important 
public health services, including TB and STD treatment. Through 
their referrals to substance abuse treatment, SEPs can help 
IDUs stop using drugs. Studies also show that SEPs do not 
encourage drug use among SEP participants or the recruitment of 
first-time drug users.'' \23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\ Centers for Disease Control, Syringe Exchange Programs (Jan. 
2002) (online at http://www.cdc.gov/idu/facts/
aed--idu--syr.htm).

 LIn 2002, the National Institute on Drug Abuse 
published a research-based guide to preventing HIV in drug-
using populations. Concerning needle exchange programs, the 
guide stated: ``Evaluations of these programs indicate that 
they are an effective part of a comprehensive strategy to 
reduce the injection drug use-related spread of HIV and other 
blood-borne infections. In addition they do not encourage the 
use of illicit drugs.'' \24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\ National Institutes of Health, National Institute on Drug 
Abuse, Principles of HIV Prevention in Drug-Using Populations: A 
Research-Based Guide (Mar. 2002).

 LIn 2002, a Consensus Panel convened by the National 
Institutes of Health on management of hepatitis C found that 
``needle and syringe exchange programs . . . have been shown to 
be effective in preventing HIV transmission and are likely to 
be useful for decreasing HCV transmission.'' \25\ The panel 
recommended: ``Institute measures to reduce transmission of HCV 
among IDUs, including providing access to sterile syringes 
through needle exchange, physician prescription, and pharmacy 
sales.'' \26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \25\ National Institutes of Health, Management of Hepatitis C: 2002 
(June 10-12, 2002) (http://consensus.nih.gov/cons/116/
091202116cdc--statement.htm#5).
    \26\ Id.

 LIn 2003, the head of the HIV/AIDS unit of the 
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Societies, stated: ``There is clear scientific evidence that 
needle exchange programmes work. They help contain the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic, and in a very cost effective way. Evidence is also 
clear that these programmes do not promote drug use.'' \27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \27\ International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Societies, Spreading the Light of Science: Guidelines on Harm Reduction 
Related to Injecting Drug Use, 53 (2003) (online at http://
www.ifrc.org/cgi/pdf--pubs.pl?health/ hivaids/
harm--reduction.pdf).

 LIn 2004, the Association of State and Territorial 
Health Officials, together with the National Alliance of State 
and Territorial AIDS Directors, the National Association of 
County and City Health Officials, and the Council of State and 
Territorial Epidemiologists, stated that ``[s]cientific 
evidence demonstrates that needle exchange programs and 
pharmacy sales of sterile syringes can be effective public 
health strategies to reduce the transmission of injection-
related HIV infection without increasing drug use.'' \28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \28\ Association of State and Territorial Health Officials, 
Position Statement: Guiding Principles for HIV Prevention (approved 
June 18, 2004) (online at http://www.astho.org/
policy--statements/HIV% 20Position%20Statement.pdf).

 LIn 2004, Dr. Elias A. Zerhouni, Director of the 
National Institutes of Health, wrote a letter to Members of 
Congress in response to an inquiry about the scientific 
evidence on syringe exchange programs. The letter stated: ``A 
number of studies conducted in the U.S. have shown that SEPs do 
not increase drug use among participants or surrounding 
community members and are associated with reductions in the 
incidence of HIV, hepatitis B, and hepatitis C in the drug-
using population.'' \29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \29\ Letter from NIH Director Dr. Elias A. Zerhouni to 
Representatives Henry A. Waxman and Elijah E. Cummings (Oct. 7, 2004).

 LIn 2004, a policy brief from the World Heath 
Organization discussed the evidence obtained from a review of 
more than 200 studies on needle and syringe exchange programs. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The policy brief reported:

        There is compelling evidence that increasing the 
        availability and utilization of sterile injecting 
        equipment for both out-of-treatment and in-treatment 
        injecting drug users contributes substantially to 
        reductions in the rate of HIV transmission. . . . There 
        is no convincing evidence of major unintended negative 
        consequences of programmes providing sterile injecting 
        equipment to injecting drug users, such as initiation 
        of injecting among people who have not injected 
        previously, or an increase in the duration or frequency 
        of illicit drug use or drug injection.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \30\ World Health Organization, Policy Brief: Provision of Sterile 
Injecting Equipment to Reduce HIV Transmission (2004) (online at http:/
/www.wpro.who.int/NR/rdonlyres/BA463DB4-2390-4964-9D86-11CBABCC9DA9/ 0/
provisionofsterileen.pdf).

 LIn 2004, the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/
AIDS noted that ``[a] review comparing HIV prevalence in cities 
across the globe with and without needle and syringe programmes 
found that cities which introduced such programmes showed a 
mean annual 19 percent decrease in HIV prevalence. This 
compares with an 8 percent increase in cities that failed to 
implement prevention measures.'' \31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \31\ United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS, 2004 Report on the 
Global AIDS Epidemic, 85 (June 2004) (online at http://www.unaids.org/
bangkok2004/GAR2004--pdf/Chapter4-- 
prevention--en.pdf).

    We strongly believe that U.S. policy on syringe-exchange 
should be based upon scientific evidence as to its efficacy and 
that the United States should not exercise is disproportionate 
influence in international organizations and forums to 
discourage the implementation of non-U.S.-funded syringe 
exchange programs. The international community should not be 
restricted from opting to implement the most effective programs 
to prevent the transmission of HIV/AIDS among injection drug 
users and the broader population.
    In this regard, we reiterate our previous rejection of the 
erroneous assertion by Chairman Davis and Subcommittee Chairman 
Souder, repeated in this report, that SEPs violate the 1961 
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. As we noted in letters to 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and U.S. Agency for 
International Development Administrator Andrew S. Natsios, the 
International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) has stated the 
following concerning needle-exchange:

        In a number of countries, Governments have introduced 
        since the end of the 1980s programmes for the exchange 
        or distribution of needles or syringes for drug 
        addicts, with the aim of limiting the spread of HIV/
        AIDS. The Board maintains the position expressed by it 
        already in 1987 that Governments need to adopt measures 
        that may decrease the sharing of hypodermic needles 
        among injection drug abusers in order to limit the 
        spread of HIV/AIDS. At the same time, the Board has 
        been stressing that any prophylactic measures should 
        not promote and/or facilitate drug abuse.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \32\ International Narcotics Control Board, Report of the 
International Narcotics Control Board for 2003, 36 (online at http://
www.incb.org/e/ind--ar.htm).

Nowhere has the INCB identified SEPs as violating any provision 
of the Single Convention, despite the majority's interpretation 
of the INCB's 2003 report.
    In many developing and highly populous nations including 
Russia, China, and Vietnam, injection drug use, not sexual 
transmission, is the principal factor driving HIV transmission 
rates.\33\ Indeed, one in three new infections outside Africa 
is attributed to injection drug use. Even in many areas where 
sexual transmission is the principal mode of HIV transmission, 
injection drug use is a major contributing factor, because 
high-risk drug use behaviors and high-risk sexual behaviors 
often are linked.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \33\ Taking Drugs Can Lead to HIV/AIDS, Fact Sheet, United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime (2004); Spreading the Light of Science: 
Guidelines on Harm Reduction Relating to Injecting Drug Use, 
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 
(2003).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Syringe exchange may hold the promise of saving millions of 
lives in developing countries that are at high risk of 
suffering an explosion in HIV/AIDs infections as a result of 
IDU-driven transmission; moreover, as the scientific evidence 
overwhelmingly indicates, it can do so without increasing drug 
use among participants or surrounding community members.
    Finally, we note that the committee's 2-year-long and 
apparently ongoing inquiry into USAID activities relating to 
harm reduction still has yielded no evidence that any USAID 
funds have been expended in a manner inconsistent with U.S. law



                                   Hon. Henry A. Waxman.
                                   Hon. Elijah E. Cummings.

                                 
