[House Report 109-411]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



109th Congress                                                   Report
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 2d Session                                                     109-411

======================================================================
 
          INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2007

                                _______
                                

 April 6, 2006.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

  Mr. Hoekstra, from the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 
                        submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                             MINORITY VIEWS

                        [To accompany H.R. 5020]

      [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

  The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, to whom was 
referred the bill (H.R. 5020) to authorize appropriations for 
fiscal year 2007 for intelligence and intelligence-related 
activities of the United States Government, the Community 
Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency 
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, 
having considered the same, report favorably thereon with an 
amendment and recommend that the bill as amended do pass.
  The amendment is as follows:
  Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the 
following:

SEC. 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

  (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007''.
  (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as 
follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Intelligence Community Management Account.
Sec. 105. Incorporation of reporting requirements.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.

   TITLE III--INTELLIGENCE AND GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by 
law.
Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence Activities.
Sec. 303. Clarification of definition of Intelligence Community under 
the National Security Act of 1947.
Sec. 304. Delegation of authority for travel on common carriers for 
intelligence collection personnel.
Sec. 305. Retention and use of amounts paid as debts to Elements of the 
Intelligence Community.
Sec. 306. Availability of funds for travel and transportation of 
personal effects, household goods, and automobiles.
Sec. 307. Purchases by elements of the intelligence community of 
products of federal prison industries.

  TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

      Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence

Sec. 401. Clarification of delegation of transfer or reprogramming 
authority.
Sec. 402. Clarification of limitation on co-location of the Office of 
the Director of National Intelligence.
Sec. 403. Additional duties of the Director of Science and Technology 
of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
Sec. 404. Appointment and title of Chief Information Officer of the 
Intelligence Community.
Sec. 405. Leadership and location of certain offices and officials.
Sec. 406. Eligibility for incentive awards of personnel assigned to the 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
Sec. 407. Repeal of certain authorities relating to the Office of the 
national counterintelligence Executive.
Sec. 408. Membership of the Director of National Intelligence on the 
transportation security oversight Board.
Sec. 409. Temporary inapplicability to the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence of certain financial reporting requirements.
Sec. 410. Comprehensive inventory of special access programs.
Sec. 411. Sense of Congress on multi-level security clearances.
Sec. 412. Access to information by staff and members of the 
congressional intelligence committees.
Sec. 413. Study on revoking pensions of persons who commit unauthorized 
disclosures of classified information.

                Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency

Sec. 421. Enhanced protection of Central Intelligence Agency 
intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.
Sec. 422. Additional exception to foreign language proficiency 
requirement for certain senior level positions in the Central 
Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 423. Additional functions and authorities for protective personnel 
of the central intelligence agency.
Sec. 424. Protective services for former officials of the intelligence 
community.
Sec. 425. Strategic review process.

              Subtitle C--Defense Intelligence Components

Sec. 431. Enhancements of National Security Agency training Program.
Sec. 432. Codification of authorities of national security agency 
protective personnel.

                       Subtitle D--Other Elements

Sec. 441. Clarification of inclusion of Coast Guard and Drug 
Enforcement Administration elements in the Intelligence Community.
Sec. 442. Clarifying amendments relating to Section 105 of the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004.

                         TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS

Sec. 501. Aerial reconnaissance platforms.
Sec. 502. Elimination of certain reporting requirements.
Sec. 503. Technical amendments to the National Security Act of 1947.
Sec. 504. Technical clarification of certain references to joint 
military intelligence Program and tactical intelligence and related 
Activities.
Sec. 505. Technical amendments to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004.
Sec. 506. Technical amendment to the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 
1949.
Sec. 507. Technical amendments relating to the multiyear National 
Intelligence Program.
Sec. 508. Technical amendments to the Executive Schedule.
Sec. 509. Technical amendments relating to redesignation of the 
National Imagery and Mapping Agency as the national Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency.

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

  Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2007 
for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities 
of the following elements of the United States Government:
          (1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
          (2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
          (3) The Department of Defense.
          (4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
          (5) The National Security Agency.
          (6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, 
        and the Department of the Air Force.
          (7) The Department of State.
          (8) The Department of the Treasury.
          (9) The Department of Energy.
          (10) The Department of Justice.
          (11) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
          (12) The National Reconnaissance Office.
          (13) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
          (14) The Coast Guard.
          (15) The Department of Homeland Security.
          (16) The Drug Enforcement Administration.

SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.

  (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The amounts 
authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and the authorized 
personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2007, for the conduct of the 
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the elements listed 
in such section, are those specified in the classified Schedule of 
Authorizations prepared to accompany the conference report on the bill 
H.R. 5020 of the One Hundred Ninth Congress.
  (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.--The 
Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the Committees on 
Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and to the 
President. The President shall provide for suitable distribution of the 
Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the 
executive branch.

SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.

  (a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the Director of 
the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of National 
Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess 
of the number authorized for fiscal year 2007 under section 102 when 
the Director of National Intelligence determines that such action is 
necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions, 
except that the number of personnel employed in excess of the number 
authorized under such section may not, for any element of the 
intelligence community, exceed 2 percent of the number of civilian 
personnel authorized under such section for such element.
  (b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of National 
Intelligence shall promptly notify the Select Committee on Intelligence 
of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
House of Representatives whenever the Director exercises the authority 
granted by this section.

SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

  (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the 
Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2007 the sum of 
$990,000,000. Within such amount, funds identified in the classified 
Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for advanced 
research and development shall remain available until September 30, 
2008.
  (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the 
Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National 
Intelligence are authorized 1,539 full-time personnel as of September 
30, 2007. Personnel serving in such elements may be permanent employees 
of the Intelligence Community Management Account or personnel detailed 
from other elements of the United States Government.
  (c) Classified Authorizations.--
          (1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to amounts 
        authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community 
        Management Account by subsection (a), there are also authorized 
        to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management 
        Account for fiscal year 2007 such additional amounts as are 
        specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred 
        to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts for research and 
        development shall remain available until September 30, 2007.
          (2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the personnel 
        authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Intelligence 
        Community Management Account as of September 30, 2007, there 
        are also authorized such additional personnel for such elements 
        as of that date as are specified in the classified Schedule of 
        Authorizations.
  (d) Reimbursement.--Except as provided in section 113 of the National 
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h), during fiscal year 2007 any 
officer or employee of the United States or a member of the Armed 
Forces who is detailed to the staff of the Intelligence Community 
Management Account from another element of the United States Government 
shall be detailed on a reimbursable basis, except that any such 
officer, employee, or member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis 
for a period of less than one year as the Director of National 
Intelligence considers necessary.

SEC. 105. INCORPORATION OF REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

  (a) In General.--Each requirement to submit a report to the 
congressional intelligence committees that is included in the joint 
explanatory statement to accompany the conference report on the bill 
H.R. 5020 of the One Hundred Ninth Congress, or in the classified annex 
to this Act, is hereby incorporated into this Act, and is hereby made a 
requirement in law.
  (b) Congressional Intelligence Committees Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``congressional intelligence committees'' means--
          (1) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
          (2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
        House of Representatives.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

  There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence 
Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 2007 the sum of 
$256,400,000.

   TITLE III--INTELLIGENCE AND GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY 
                    LAW.

  Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, 
and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such 
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in 
such compensation or benefits authorized by law.

SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

  The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed 
to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity 
which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of 
the United States.

SEC. 303. CLARIFICATION OF DEFINITION OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY UNDER 
                    THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947.

  Subparagraph (L) of section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 
(50 U.S.C. 401a(4)) is amended by striking ``other'' the second place 
it appears.

SEC. 304. DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY FOR TRAVEL ON COMMON CARRIERS FOR 
                    INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PERSONNEL.

  (a) Delegation of Authority.--Section 116(b) of the National Security 
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404k(b)) is amended--
          (1) by inserting ``(1)'' before ``The Director'';
          (2) in paragraph (1), by striking ``may only delegate'' and 
        all that follows and inserting ``may delegate the authority in 
        subsection (a) to the head of any other element of the 
        intelligence community.''; and
          (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
  ``(2) The head of an element of the intelligence community to whom 
the authority in subsection (a) is delegated pursuant to paragraph (1) 
may further delegate such authority to such senior officials of such 
element as are specified in guidelines prescribed by the Director of 
National Intelligence for purposes of this paragraph.''.
  (b) Submittal of Guidelines to Congress.--Not later than six months 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
Intelligence shall prescribe and submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees the guidelines referred to in paragraph (2) of 
section 116(b) of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by 
subsection (a).
  (c) Congressional Intelligence Committees Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``congressional intelligence committees'' means--
          (1) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
          (2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
        House of Representatives.

SEC. 305. RETENTION AND USE OF AMOUNTS PAID AS DEBTS TO ELEMENTS OF THE 
                    INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

  (a) In General.--Title XI of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
U.S.C. 442 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new 
section:
    ``retention and use of amounts paid as debts to elements of the 
                         intelligence community
  ``Sec. 1103. (a) Authority to Retain Amounts Paid.--Notwithstanding 
section 3302 of title 31, United States Code, or any other provision of 
law, the head of an element of the intelligence community may retain 
amounts paid or reimbursed to the United States, including amounts paid 
by an employee of the Federal Government from personal funds, for 
repayment of a debt owed to the element of the intelligence community.
  ``(b) Crediting of Amounts Retained.--(1) Amounts retained under 
subsection (a) shall be credited to the current appropriation or 
account from which such funds were derived or whose expenditure formed 
the basis for the underlying activity from which the debt concerned 
arose.
  ``(2) Amounts credited to an appropriation or account under paragraph 
(1) shall be merged with amounts in such appropriation or account, and 
shall be available in accordance with subsection (c).
  ``(c) Availability of Amounts.--Amounts credited to an appropriation 
or account under subsection (b) with respect to a debt owed to an 
element of the intelligence community shall be available to the head of 
such element, for such time as is applicable to amounts in such 
appropriation or account, or such longer time as may be provided by 
law, for purposes as follows:
          ``(1) In the case of a debt arising from lost or damaged 
        property of such element, the repair of such property or the 
        replacement of such property with alternative property that 
        will perform the same or similar functions as such property.
          ``(2) The funding of any other activities authorized to be 
        funded by such appropriation or account.
  ``(d) Debt Owed to an Element of the Intelligence Community 
Defined.--In this section, the term `debt owed to an element of the 
intelligence community' means any of the following:
          ``(1) A debt owed to an element of the intelligence community 
        by an employee or former employee of such element for the 
        negligent or willful loss of or damage to property of such 
        element that was procured by such element using appropriated 
        funds.
          ``(2) A debt owed to an element of the intelligence community 
        by an employee or former employee of such element as repayment 
        for default on the terms and conditions associated with a 
        scholarship, fellowship, or other educational assistance 
        provided to such individual by such element, whether in 
        exchange for future services or otherwise, using appropriated 
        funds.
          ``(3) Any other debt or repayment owed to an element of the 
        intelligence community by a private person or entity by reason 
        of the negligent or willful action of such person or entity, as 
        determined by a court of competent jurisdiction or in a lawful 
        administrative proceeding.''.
  (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in the first section 
of that Act is amended by adding at the end the following new item:

``Sec. 1103. Retention and use of amounts paid as debts to elements of 
the intelligence community.''.

SEC. 306. AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR TRAVEL AND TRANSPORTATION OF 
                    PERSONAL EFFECTS, HOUSEHOLD GOODS, AND AUTOMOBILES.

  (a) Funds of Office of Director of National Intelligence.--Funds 
appropriated to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and 
available for travel and transportation expenses shall be available for 
such expenses when any part of the travel or transportation concerned 
begins in a fiscal year pursuant to travel orders issued in such fiscal 
year, notwithstanding that such travel or transportation is or may not 
be completed during such fiscal year.
  (b) Funds of Central Intelligence Agency.--Funds appropriated to the 
Central Intelligence Agency and available for travel and transportation 
expenses shall be available for such expenses when any part of the 
travel or transportation concerned begins in a fiscal year pursuant to 
travel orders issued in such fiscal year, notwithstanding that such 
travel or transportation is or may not be completed during such fiscal 
year.
  (c) Travel and Transportation Expenses Defined.--In this section, the 
term ``travel and transportation expenses'' means the following:
          (1) Expenses in connection with travel of personnel, 
        including travel of dependents.
          (2) Expenses in connection with transportation of personal 
        effects, household goods, or automobiles of personnel.

SEC. 307. PURCHASES BY ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY OF 
                    PRODUCTS OF FEDERAL PRISON INDUSTRIES.

  Section 404 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2004 (Public Law 108-177; 117 Stat. 2632) is amended--
          (1) by striking ``by the Central Intelligence Agency'' and 
        inserting ``by an element of the intelligence community (as 
        defined in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 
        (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)))''; and
          (2) by striking ``the Director of the Central Intelligence 
        Agency determines that the product or service'' and inserting 
        ``the head of that element determines that the product or 
        service (including a surveying or mapping service)''.

  TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

      Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence

SEC. 401. CLARIFICATION OF DELEGATION OF TRANSFER OR REPROGRAMMING 
                    AUTHORITY.

  Section 102A(d)(5)(B) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
403-1(d)(5)(B)), as added by section 1011(a) of the National Security 
Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (title I of Public Law 108-458; 118 
Stat. 3643), is amended in the second sentence by striking ``or agency 
involved'' and inserting ``involved or the Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency (in the case of the Central Intelligence Agency)''.

SEC. 402. CLARIFICATION OF LIMITATION ON CO-LOCATION OF THE OFFICE OF 
                    THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.

  Section 103(e) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-
3(e)) is amended--
          (1) in the heading, by striking ``With'' and inserting ``of 
        Headquarters With Headquarters Of'' ;
          (2) by inserting ``the headquarters of'' before ``the 
        Office''; and
          (3) by striking ``any other element'' and inserting ``the 
        headquarters of any other element''.

SEC. 403. ADDITIONAL DUTIES OF THE DIRECTOR OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 
                    OF THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL 
                    INTELLIGENCE.

  (a) Coordination and Prioritization of Research Conducted by Elements 
of Intelligence Community.--Subsection (d) of section 103E of the 
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3e) is amended--
          (1) in paragraph (3)(A), by inserting ``and prioritize'' 
        after ``coordinate''; and
          (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
  ``(4) In carrying out paragraph (3)(A), the Committee shall identify 
basic, advanced, and applied research programs to be carried out by 
elements of the intelligence community.''.
  (b) Development of Technology Goals.--Such section is further 
amended--
          (1) in subsection (c)--
                  (A) in paragraph (4), by striking ``and'' at the end;
                  (B) by redesignating paragraph (5) as paragraph (6); 
                and
                  (C) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following 
                new paragraph:
          ``(5) assist the Director in establishing goals for the 
        elements of the intelligence community to meet the technology 
        needs of the intelligence community; and''; and
          (2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
  ``(e) Goals for Technology Needs of Intelligence Community.--In 
carrying out subsection (c)(5), the Director of Science and Technology 
shall--
          ``(1) systematically identify and assess the most significant 
        intelligence challenges that require technical solutions; and
          ``(2) examine options to enhance the responsiveness of 
        research and design programs of elements of the intelligence 
        community to meet the requirements of the intelligence 
        community for timely support.''.
  (c) Report.--(1) Not later than June 30, 2007, the Director of 
National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report containing a 
strategy for the development and use of technology in the intelligence 
community through 2021.
  (2) The report shall include--
          (A) an assessment of the highest priority intelligence gaps 
        across the intelligence community that may be resolved by the 
        use of technology;
          (B) goals for advanced research and development and a 
        strategy to achieve such goals;
          (C) an explanation of how each advanced research and 
        development project funded under the National Intelligence 
        Program addresses an identified intelligence gap;
          (D) a list of all current and projected research and 
        development projects by research type (basic, advanced, or 
        applied) with estimated funding levels, estimated initiation 
        dates, and estimated completion dates; and
          (E) a plan to incorporate technology from research and 
        development projects into National Intelligence Program 
        acquisition programs.
  (3) The report may be submitted in classified form.

SEC. 404. APPOINTMENT AND TITLE OF CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER OF THE 
                    INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

  (a) Appointment.--
          (1) In general.--Subsection (a) of section 103G of the 
        National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3g) is amended by 
        striking ``the President, by and with the advice and consent of 
        the Senate'' and inserting ``the Director of National 
        Intelligence''.
          (2) Applicability.--The amendment made by paragraph (1) shall 
        take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act, and shall 
        apply with respect to any nomination of an individual as Chief 
        Information Officer of the Intelligence Community that is made 
        on or after that date.
  (b) Title.--Such section is further amended--
          (1) in subsection (a), by inserting ``of the Intelligence 
        Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer'';
          (2) in subsection (b), by inserting ``of the Intelligence 
        Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer'';
          (3) in subsection (c), by inserting ``of the Intelligence 
        Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer''; and
          (4) in subsection (d), by inserting ``of the Intelligence 
        Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer''.

SEC. 405. LEADERSHIP AND LOCATION OF CERTAIN OFFICES AND OFFICIALS.

  (a) National Counter Proliferation Center.--Section 119A(a) of the 
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404o-1(a)) is amended--
          (1) by striking ``Establishment.--Not later than 18 months 
        after the date of the enactment of the National Security 
        Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, the'' and inserting ``(1) 
        Establishment.--The''; and
          (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:
  ``(2) Director.--The head of the National Counter Proliferation 
Center shall be the Director of the National Counter Proliferation 
Center, who shall be appointed by the Director of National 
Intelligence.
  ``(3) Location.--The National Counter Proliferation Center shall be 
located within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.''.
  (b) Officers.--Section 103(c) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)) is 
amended--
          (1) by redesignating paragraph (9) as paragraph (13); and
          (2) by inserting after paragraph (8) the following new 
        paragraphs:
          ``(9) The Chief Information Officer of the intelligence 
        community.
          ``(10) The Inspector General of the intelligence community.
          ``(11) The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center.
          ``(12) The Director of the National Counter Proliferation 
        Center.''.

SEC. 406. ELIGIBILITY FOR INCENTIVE AWARDS OF PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO THE 
                    OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.

  (a) In General.--Subsection (a) of section 402 of the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1984 (50 U.S.C. 403e-1) is amended to 
read as follows:
  ``(a) Authority for Payment of Awards.--(1) The Director of National 
Intelligence may exercise the authority granted in section 4503 of 
title 5, United States Code, with respect to Federal employees and 
members of the Armed Forces detailed or assigned to the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence in the same manner as such authority 
may be exercised with respect to personnel of the Office.
  ``(2) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency may exercise 
the authority granted in section 4503 of title 5, United States Code, 
with respect to Federal employees and members of the Armed Forces 
detailed or assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency in the same 
manner as such authority may be exercised with respect to personnel of 
the Agency.''.
  (b) Repeal of Obsolete Authority.--Such section is further amended--
          (1) by striking subsection (c); and
          (2) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (c).
  (c) Conforming Amendments.--Such section is further amended--
          (1) in subsection (b), by striking ``to the Central 
        Intelligence Agency or to the Intelligence Community Staff'' 
        and inserting ``to the Office of the Director of National 
        Intelligence or to the Central Intelligence Agency''; and
          (2) in subsection (c), as redesignated by subsection (b)(2) 
        of this section, by striking ``Director of Central 
        Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of National 
        Intelligence or Director of the Central Intelligence Agency''.
  (d) Technical and Stylistic Amendments.--That section is further 
amended--
          (1) in subsection (b)--
                  (A) by inserting ``Personnel Eligible for Awards.--'' 
                after ``(b)'';
                  (B) by striking ``subsection (a) of this section'' 
                and inserting ``subsection (a)''; and
                  (C) by striking ``a date five years before the date 
                of enactment of this section'' and inserting ``December 
                9, 1978''; and
          (2) in subsection (c), as so redesignated, by inserting 
        ``Payment and Acceptance of Awards.--'' after ``(c)''.

SEC. 407. REPEAL OF CERTAIN AUTHORITIES RELATING TO THE OFFICE OF THE 
                    NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE.

  (a) Repeal of Certain Authorities.--Section 904 of the 
Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (title IX of Public Law 
107-306; 50 U.S.C. 402c) is amended--
          (1) by striking subsections (d), (g), (h), (i), and (j); and
          (2) by redesignating subsections (e), (f), (k), (l), and (m) 
        as subsections (d), (e), (f), (g), and (h), respectively.
  (b) Conforming Amendments.--That section is further amended--
          (1) in subsection (d), as redesignated by subsection (a)(2) 
        of this section, by striking ``subsection (f)'' each place it 
        appears in paragraphs (1) and (2) and inserting ``subsection 
        (e)''; and
          (2) in subsection (e)(2), as so redesignated, by striking 
        ``subsection (e)(2)'' and inserting ``subsection (d)(2)''.

SEC. 408. MEMBERSHIP OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ON THE 
                    TRANSPORTATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT BOARD.

  Subparagraph (F) of section 115(b)(1) of title 49, United States 
Code, is amended to read as follows:
                  ``(F) The Director of National Intelligence, or the 
                Director's designee.''.

SEC. 409. TEMPORARY INAPPLICABILITY TO THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF 
                    NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OF CERTAIN FINANCIAL 
                    REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

  The Director of National Intelligence shall not be required to submit 
an audited financial statement under section 3515 of title 31, United 
States Code, for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
with respect to fiscal year 2005 or 2006.

SEC. 410. COMPREHENSIVE INVENTORY OF SPECIAL ACCESS PROGRAMS.

  Not later than January 15, 2007, the Director of National 
Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees 
(as defined in section 3(7) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
U.S.C. 401a(7))) a classified report providing a comprehensive 
inventory of all special access programs under the National 
Intelligence Program (as defined in section 3(6) of the National 
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(6))).

SEC. 411. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON MULTI-LEVEL SECURITY CLEARANCES.

  It is the sense of Congress that the Director of National 
Intelligence should promptly establish and oversee the implementation 
of a multi-level security clearance system across the intelligence 
community to leverage the cultural and linguistic skills of subject 
matter experts and individuals proficient in foreign languages critical 
to national security.

SEC. 412. ACCESS TO INFORMATION BY STAFF AND MEMBERS OF THE 
                    CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES.

  Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
the Director of National Intelligence shall provide to the members and 
staff of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate 
accounts for and access to the Intelink System (or any successor 
system) through the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System 
(or any successor system). Such access shall include access up to and 
including the level of sensitive compartmented information and shall be 
provided in the sensitive compartmented information facilities of each 
Committee.

SEC. 413. STUDY ON REVOKING PENSIONS OF PERSONS WHO COMMIT UNAUTHORIZED 
                    DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.

  (a) Study.--The Director of National Intelligence shall conduct a 
study on the feasibility of revoking the pensions of personnel in the 
intelligence community (as defined in section 3(4) of the National 
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4))) who commit unauthorized 
disclosures of classified information, including whether revoking such 
pensions is feasible under existing law or under the administrative 
authority of the Director of National Intelligence or any other head of 
an element of the intelligence community.
  (b) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate 
a report containing the results of the study conducted under subsection 
(a).

                Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency

SEC. 421. ENHANCED PROTECTION OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 
                    INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS FROM UNAUTHORIZED 
                    DISCLOSURE.

  (a) Responsibility of Director of Central Intelligence Agency Under 
National Security Act of 1947.--Subsection (d) of section 104A of the 
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4a) is amended--
          (1) in paragraph (3), by striking ``and'' at the end;
          (2) by redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph (5); and
          (3) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following new 
        paragraph:
          ``(4) protect intelligence sources and methods of the Central 
        Intelligence Agency from unauthorized disclosure, consistent 
        with any direction issued by the President or the Director of 
        National Intelligence; and''.
  (b) Protection Under Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949.--
Section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 
403g) is amended by striking ``section 102A(i)'' and all that follows 
through ``unauthorized disclosure'' and inserting ``sections 102A(i) 
and 104A(d)(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-
1(i), 403-4a(d)(4))''.
  (c) Construction With Exemption From Requirement for Disclosure of 
Information to Public.--Section 104A(d)(4) of the National Security Act 
of 1947, as amended by subsection (a), and section 6 of the Central 
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as amended by subsection (b), shall be 
treated as statutes that specifically exempt from disclosure the 
matters specified in such sections for purposes of section 552(b)(3) of 
title 5, United States Code.
  (d) Technical Amendments to Central Intelligence Agency Retirement 
Act.--Section 201(c) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act 
(50 U.S.C. 2011(c)) is amended--
          (1) in the subsection heading, by striking ``of DCI'';
          (2) by striking ``section 102A(i)'' and inserting ``sections 
        102A(i) and 104A(d)(4)'';
          (3) by striking ``of National Intelligence''; and
          (4) by inserting ``of the Central Intelligence Agency'' after 
        ``methods''.

SEC. 422. ADDITIONAL EXCEPTION TO FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY 
                    REQUIREMENT FOR CERTAIN SENIOR LEVEL POSITIONS IN 
                    THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

  (a) Additional Exception.--Subsection (g) of section 104A of the 
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4a) is amended--
          (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``paragraph (2)'' and 
        inserting ``paragraphs (2) and (3)'';
          (2) in paragraph (2), by striking ``position or category of 
        positions'' each place it appears and inserting ``individual, 
        individuals, position, or category of positions''; and
          (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
  ``(3) Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any individual in the 
Directorate of Intelligence or the Directorate of Operations of the 
Central Intelligence Agency who is serving in a Senior Intelligence 
Service position as of December 23, 2005, regardless of whether such 
individual is a member of the Senior Intelligence Service.''.
  (b) Report on Waivers.--Section 611(c) of the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-487; 118 Stat. 
3955) is amended--
          (1) in the first sentence, by inserting ``individuals or'' 
        before ``positions''; and
          (2) in the second sentence, by striking ``position or 
        category of positions'' and inserting ``individual, 
        individuals, position, or category of positions''.

SEC. 423. ADDITIONAL FUNCTIONS AND AUTHORITIES FOR PROTECTIVE PERSONNEL 
                    OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

  (a) Protection of Certain Persons.--Section 5(a)(4) of the Central 
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403f(a)(4)) is amended--
          (1) by striking ``and the protection'' and inserting ``the 
        protection''; and
          (2) by striking the semicolon and inserting ``, and the 
        protection of the Director of National Intelligence and such 
        personnel of the Office of the Director of National 
        Intelligence as the Director of National Intelligence may 
        designate;''.
  (b) Authority to Arrest.--
          (1) Chapter 203 of title 18, United States Code, is amended 
        by adding at the end the following:

``Sec. 3065. Powers of authorized personnel in the Central Intelligence 
                    Agency

  ``(a) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency may issue 
regulations to allow personnel designated to carry out protective 
functions for the Central Intelligence Agency under section 5(a)(4) of 
the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403f) to, while 
engaged in such protective functions, make arrests without a warrant 
for any offense against the United States committed in the presence of 
such personnel, or for any felony cognizable under the laws of the 
United States, if such personnel have probable cause to believe that 
the person to be arrested has committed or is committing that felony 
offense.
  ``(b) The powers granted under subsection (a) may be exercised only 
in accordance with guidelines approved by the Attorney General.''.
          (2) The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 203 of 
        title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end 
        the following:

``3065. Powers of authorized personnel in the Central Intelligence 
Agency.''.

SEC. 424. PROTECTIVE SERVICES FOR FORMER OFFICIALS OF THE INTELLIGENCE 
                    COMMUNITY.

  (a) In General.--Title III of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
U.S.C. 409a et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 303 the 
following new section:
    ``protective services for former officials of the intelligence 
                               community
  ``Sec. 304. (a) In General.--Subject to subsection (b), the head of 
an element of the intelligence community may not provide personnel for 
the protection of a former official of an element of the intelligence 
community unless--
  ``(1) there is a specific and credible threat to such former official 
arising from the service of such former official to the United States; 
and
  ``(2) such head of an element of the intelligence community submits 
to the Director of National Intelligence notice of the intention to 
provide such personnel and an assessment of--
          ``(A) the threat to such former official; and
          ``(B) the level of protective services necessary to protect 
        such former official based on such threat.
  ``(b) Exception for Recent Termination of Employment.--The head of an 
element of the intelligence community may provide personnel for the 
protection of a former official of an element of the intelligence 
community without a specific and credible threat to such former 
official for not more than one year after the termination of the 
employment of such former official if such former official requests 
such protection.
  ``(c) Threat Assessment Updates.--Not later than 180 days after the 
date on which the head of an element of the intelligence community 
begins providing personnel for the protection of a former official of 
an element of the intelligence community, and at least every 180 days 
thereafter until such head of an element of the intelligence community 
determines that there is no longer a threat to such former official, 
such head of an element of the intelligence community shall submit to 
the Director of National Intelligence an updated assessment of the 
threat to such former official and the level of protective services 
necessary to protect such former official based on such threat.
  ``(d) Termination of Protective Services.--If the head of an element 
of the intelligence community that is providing personnel for the 
protection of a former official of an element of the intelligence 
community pursuant to subsection (a) determines that there is no longer 
a threat to such former official, such head of an element of the 
intelligence community shall cease providing personnel for the 
protection of such former official not later than 30 days after 
determining such threat no longer exists.
  ``(e) Report.--Not later than 7 days after the date on which the head 
of an element of the intelligence community begins providing personnel 
for the protection of a former official of an element of the 
intelligence community, the Director of National Intelligence shall 
submit to the congressional intelligence committees notice of the 
provision of personnel for the protection of such former official.''.
  (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents of such Act is amended 
by--
          (1) striking the second item relating to section 301;
          (2) striking the second item relating to section 302;
          (3) striking the items relating to sections 304, 305, and 
        306; and
          (4) inserting after the item relating to section 303 the 
        following new item:

``Sec. 304. Protective services for former officials of the 
intelligence community.''.

SEC. 425. STRATEGIC REVIEW PROCESS.

  Section 102A(f) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-
1(f)) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
  ``(9) Not later than September 30, 2007, and every four years 
thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence shall, in 
consultation with the heads of the elements of the intelligence 
community, manage and oversee the conduct of a strategic review of the 
intelligence community to develop intelligence capabilities required to 
address threats to national security. Such review shall analyze near-
term, mid-term, and future threats to national security and shall 
include estimates of the allocation of resources and structural change 
that should be reflected in future budget requests.''.

              Subtitle C--Defense Intelligence Components

SEC. 431. ENHANCEMENTS OF NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY TRAINING PROGRAM.

  (a) Termination of Employees.--Subsection (d)(1)(C) of section 16 of 
the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is 
amended by striking ``terminated either by'' and all that follows and 
inserting ``terminated--
                  ``(i) by the Agency due to misconduct by the 
                employee;
                  ``(ii) by the employee voluntarily; or
                  ``(iii) by the Agency for the failure of the employee 
                to maintain such level of academic standing in the 
                educational course of training as the Director of the 
                National Security Agency shall have specified in the 
                agreement of the employee under this subsection; and''.
  (b) Authority to Withhold Disclosure of Affiliation With NSA.--
Subsection (e) of such section is amended by striking ``(1) When an 
employee'' and all that follows through ``(2) Agency efforts'' and 
inserting ``Agency efforts''.

SEC. 432. CODIFICATION OF AUTHORITIES OF NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY 
                    PROTECTIVE PERSONNEL.

  (a) Protection of Certain Persons.--The National Security Agency Act 
of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended by adding at the end the 
following new section:
  ``Sec. 20. (a) The Director is authorized to designate personnel of 
the Agency to perform protective functions for the Director and for any 
personnel of the Agency designated by the Director.
  ``(b) Nothing in this section shall be construed to impair or 
otherwise affect any authority under any other provision of law 
relating to the performance of protective functions.''.
  (b) Authority to Arrest.--
          (1) Chapter 203 of title 18, United States Code, as amended 
        by section 423 of this Act, is amended by adding at the end the 
        following:

``Sec. 3066. Powers of authorized personnel in the National Security 
                    Agency

  ``(a) The Director of the National Security Agency may issue 
regulations to allow personnel designated to carry out protective 
functions for the Agency to--
          ``(1) carry firearms; and
          ``(2) make arrests without warrant for any offense against 
        the United States committed in the presence of such personnel, 
        or for any felony cognizable under the laws of the United 
        States, if such personnel have probable cause to believe that 
        the person to be arrested has committed or is committing that 
        felony offense.
  ``(b) The powers granted under subsection (a) may be exercised only 
in accordance with guidelines approved by the Attorney General.''.
          (2) Clerical amendment.--The table of sections at the 
        beginning of chapter 203 of title 18, United States Code, as 
        amended by section 423 of this Act, is amended by adding at the 
        end the following:

``3066. Powers of authorized personnel in the National Security 
Agency.''.

                       Subtitle D--Other Elements

SEC. 441. CLARIFICATION OF INCLUSION OF COAST GUARD AND DRUG 
                    ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION ELEMENTS IN THE 
                    INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

  Section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)) 
is amended--
          (1) in subparagraph (H)--
                  (A) by inserting ``the Coast Guard,'' after ``the 
                Marine Corps,''; and
                  (B) by inserting ``the Drug Enforcement 
                Administration,'' after ``the Federal Bureau of 
                Investigation,''; and
          (2) in subparagraph (K), by striking ``, including the Office 
        of Intelligence of the Coast Guard''.

SEC. 442. CLARIFYING AMENDMENTS RELATING TO SECTION 105 OF THE 
                    INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 
                    2004.

  Section 105(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2004 (Public Law 108-177; 117 Stat. 2603; 31 U.S.C. 311 note) is 
amended--
          (1) by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and 
        inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''; and
          (2) by inserting ``or in section 313 of such title,'' after 
        ``subsection (a)),''.

                         TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS

SEC. 501. AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE PLATFORMS.

  (a) Limitation on Termination of U-2 Aircraft Program.--The Secretary 
of Defense may not begin the process to terminate the U-2 aircraft 
program until the Secretary certifies in accordance with subsection (b) 
that there would be no loss of national or Department of Defense 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities in 
transitioning from the U-2 aircraft program to the Global Hawk RQ-4 
unmanned aerial vehicle platform.
  (b) Report and Certification.--
          (1) Study.--The Secretary of Defense shall conduct a study of 
        aerial reconnaissance platforms to determine whether the Global 
        Hawk RQ-4 unmanned aerial vehicle has reached mission 
        capability and has attained collection capabilities on a par 
        with the collection capabilities of the U-2 Block 20 aircraft 
        program as of April 1, 2006.
          (2) Report.--The Secretary shall submit to the congressional 
        committees specified in subsection (c) a report containing the 
        results of the study. The Secretary shall include in the report 
        the Secretary's determination as to whether the Global Hawk RQ-
        4 unmanned aerial vehicle--
                  (A) has reached mission capability; and
                  (B) has attained collection capabilities on a par 
                with the collection capabilities of the U-2 Block 20 
                aircraft program as of April 1, 2006.
          (3) Certification.--The Secretary shall include with the 
        report the Secretary's certification, based on the results of 
        the study, as to whether or not there would be a loss of 
        national or Department of Defense intelligence, surveillance, 
        and reconnaissance capabilities with a transition from the U-2 
        aircraft program to the Global Hawk RQ-4 unmanned aerial 
        vehicle platform.
  (c) Specified Committees.--The congressional committees specified in 
this subsection are the following:
          (1) The Committee on Armed Services and the Select Committee 
        on Intelligence of the Senate.
          (2) The Committee on Armed Services and the Permanent Select 
        Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

SEC. 502. ELIMINATION OF CERTAIN REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

  (a) Intelligence Sharing With UN.--Section 112 of the National 
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404g) is amended by striking subsection 
(b).
  (b) Improvement of Financial Statements for Auditing Purposes.--The 
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended--
          (1) by striking section 114A; and
          (2) in the table of contents in the first section, by 
        striking the item relating to section 114A.
  (c) Financial Intelligence on Terrorist Assets.--The National 
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended--
          (1) by striking section 118; and
          (2) in the table of contents in the first section, by 
        striking the item relating to section 118.
  (d) Counterdrug Intelligence.--The Intelligence Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306) is amended--
          (1) by striking section 826; and
          (2) in the table of contents in section 1(b), by striking the 
        item relating to section 826.

SEC. 503. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947.

  The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended 
as follows:
          (1) In section 102A (50 U.S.C. 403-1)--
                  (A) in subsection (c)(7)(A), by striking ``section'' 
                and inserting ``subsection'';
                  (B) in subsection (d)--
                          (i) in paragraph (3), by striking 
                        ``subparagraph (A)'' in the matter preceding 
                        subparagraph (A) and inserting ``paragraph 
                        (1)(A)''; and
                          (ii) in paragraph (5)(A), by striking ``or 
                        personnel'' in the matter preceding clause (i); 
                        and
                  (C) in subsection (l)(2)(B), by striking ``section'' 
                and inserting ``paragraph''.
          (2) In section 119(c)(2)(B) (50 U.S.C. 404o(c)(2)(B)), by 
        striking ``subsection (h)'' and inserting ``subsection (i)''.

SEC. 504. TECHNICAL CLARIFICATION OF CERTAIN REFERENCES TO JOINT 
                    MILITARY INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM AND TACTICAL 
                    INTELLIGENCE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES.

  Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1) 
is amended--
          (1) in subsection (c)(3)(A), by striking ``annual budgets for 
        the Joint Military Intelligence Program and for Tactical 
        Intelligence and Related Activities'' and inserting ``annual 
        budget for the Military Intelligence Program or any successor 
        program or programs''; and
          (2) in subsection (d)(1)(B), by striking ``Joint Military 
        Intelligence Program'' and inserting ``Military Intelligence 
        Program or any successor program or programs''.

SEC. 505. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM 
                    PREVENTION ACT OF 2004.

  (a) Amendments to National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 
2004.--The National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (title I 
of Public Law 108-458) is amended as follows:
          (1) In section 1016(e)(10)(B) (6 U.S.C. 458(e)(10)(B)), by 
        striking ``Attorney General'' the second place it appears and 
        inserting ``Department of Justice''.
          (2) In section 1061 (5 U.S.C. 601 note)--
                  (A) in subsection (d)(4)(A), by striking ``National 
                Intelligence Director'' and inserting ``Director of 
                National Intelligence''; and
                  (B) in subsection (h), by striking ``National 
                Intelligence Director'' and inserting ``Director of 
                National Intelligence''.
          (3) In section 1071(e), by striking ``(1)''.
          (4) In section 1072(b), by inserting ``Agency'' after 
        ``Intelligence''.
  (b) Other Amendments to Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention 
Act of 2004.--The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 
2004 (Public Law 108-458) is amended as follows:
          (1) In section 2001 (28 U.S.C. 532 note)--
                  (A) in subsection (c)(1), by inserting ``of'' before 
                ``an institutional culture'';
                  (B) in subsection (e)(2), by striking ``the National 
                Intelligence Director in a manner consistent with 
                section 112(e)'' and inserting ``the Director of 
                National Intelligence in a manner consistent with 
                applicable law''; and
                  (C) in subsection (f), by striking ``shall,'' in the 
                matter preceding paragraph (1) and inserting ``shall''.
          (2) In section 2006 (28 U.S.C. 509 note)--
                  (A) in paragraph (2), by striking ``the Federal'' and 
                inserting ``Federal''; and
                  (B) in paragraph (3), by striking ``the specific'' 
                and inserting ``specific''.

SEC. 506. TECHNICAL AMENDMENT TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 
                    1949.

  Section 5(a)(1) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 
U.S.C. 403f(a)(1)) is amended by striking ``authorized under paragraphs 
(2) and (3) of section 102(a), subsections (c)(7) and (d) of section 
103, subsections (a) and (g) of section 104, and section 303 of the 
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403(a)(2), (3), 403-3(c)(7), 
(d), 403-4(a), (g), and 405)'' and inserting ``authorized under 
subsections (c), (d), (e), and (f) of section 104A of the National 
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4a)''.

SEC. 507. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATING TO THE MULTIYEAR NATIONAL 
                    INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.

  (a) In General.--Subsection (a) of section 1403 of the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (50 U.S.C. 404b) is 
amended--
          (1) in the subsection heading, by striking ``Foreign''; and
          (2) by striking ``foreign'' each place it appears.
  (b) Responsibility of DNI.--That section is further amended--
          (1) in subsections (a) and (c), by striking ``Director of 
        Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of National 
        Intelligence''; and
          (2) in subsection (b), by inserting ``of National 
        Intelligence'' after ``Director''.
  (c) Conforming Amendment.--The heading of that section is amended to 
read as follows:

``SEC. 1403. MULTIYEAR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.''.

SEC. 508. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE.

  (a) Executive Schedule Level II.--Section 5313 of title 5, United 
States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to the Director 
of Central Intelligence and inserting the following new item:
                  ``Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.''.
  (b) Executive Schedule Level IV.--Section 5315 of title 5, United 
States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to the General 
Counsel of the Office of the National Intelligence Director and 
inserting the following new item:
                  ``General Counsel of the Office of the Director of 
                National Intelligence.''.

Sec. 509. Technical amendments relating to redesignation of the 
                    National Imagery and Mapping Agency as the national 
                    Geospatial-Intelligence Agency

  (a) Title 5, United States Code.--(1) Title 5, United States Code, is 
amended by striking ``National Imagery and Mapping Agency'' each place 
it appears in a provision as follows and inserting ``National 
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency'':
          (A) Section 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii).
          (B) Section 3132(a)(1)(B).
          (C) Section 4301(1) (in clause (ii)).
          (D) Section 4701(a)(1)(B).
          (E) Section 5102(a)(1) (in clause (x)).
          (F) Section 5342(a)(1) (in clause (K)).
          (G) Section 6339(a)(1)(E).
          (H) Section 7323(b)(2)(B)(i)(XIII).
  (2) Section 6339(a)(2)(E) of such title is amended by striking 
``National Imagery and Mapping Agency, the Director of the National 
Imagery and Mapping Agency'' and inserting ``National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency''.
  (b) Title 44, United States Code.--(1)(A) Section 1336 of title 44, 
United States Code, is amended by striking ``National Imagery and 
Mapping Agency'' both places it appears and inserting ``National 
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency''.
  (B) The heading of such section is amended to read as follows:

``Sec. 1336. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency: special 
                    publications''.

  (2) The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 13 of such 
title is amended by striking the item relating to section 1336 and 
inserting the following new item:

``1336. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency: special 
publications.''.

  (c) Homeland Security Act of 2002.--Section 201(f)(2)(E) of the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121(f)(2)(E)) is amended by 
striking ``National Imagery and Mapping Agency'' and inserting 
``National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency''.
  (d) Inspector General Act of 1978.--Section 8H of the Inspector 
General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended by striking ``National 
Imagery and Mapping Agency'' each place it appears and inserting 
``National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency''.
  (e) Ethics in Government Act of 1978.--Section 105(a)(1) of the 
Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended by striking 
``National Imagery and Mapping Agency'' and inserting ``National 
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency''.
  (f) Other Acts.--(1) Section 7(b)(2)(A)(i) of the Employee Polygraph 
Protection Act of 1988 (29 U.S.C. 2006(b)(2)(A)(i)) is amended by 
striking ``National Imagery and Mapping Agency'' and inserting 
``National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency''.
  (2) Section 207(a)(2)(B) of the Legislative Branch Appropriations 
Act, 1993 (44 U.S.C. 501 note) is amended by striking ``National 
Imagery and Mapping Agency'' and inserting ``National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency''.

                                Purpose

    The purpose of H.R. 5020 is to authorize the intelligence 
and intelligence-related activities of the United States 
Government for Fiscal Year 2007 in order to enhance the 
national security of the United States, to support and assist 
the armed forces of the United States, and to support the 
President in the execution of the foreign policy of the United 
States. The bill also clarifies certain Intelligence Community 
authorities and makes technical corrections flowing from the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Protection Act.

                 Classified Annex and Committee Intent

    The classified annex to this report includes the classified 
Schedule of Authorizations and its associated explanatory 
language. The Committee views the classified annex as an 
integral part of this legislation. The classified annex 
contains a thorough discussion of the issues considered by the 
Committee underlying the funding authorizations found in the 
classified Schedule of Authorizations. The Committee intends 
that all intelligence programs discussed in the classified 
annex to this report be conducted in accordance with the 
guidance and limitations set forth as associated language 
therein. The classified Schedule of Authorizations is 
incorporated directly into this legislation by virtue of 
section 102 of the bill. The classified annex is available for 
review by all Members of the House of Representatives, subject 
to the requirements of clause 13 of rule XXIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, and rule 14 of the Rules of 
Procedure for the House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence. In addition, Section 105 of the bill incorporates 
reporting requirements of the Classified Annex and any Joint 
Explanatory Statement into the Act.

                       Scope of Committee Review

    The bill authorizes U.S. intelligence and intelligence-
related activities under the jurisdiction of the Committee, 
including the National Intelligence Program (NIP), and the 
Military Intelligence Program (MIP), formerly the Joint 
Military Intelligence Program and the Tactical Intelligence and 
Related Activities. The NIP consists of all activities of the 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, as well as 
those national foreign intelligence, intelligence-related, and/
or counterintelligence activities conducted by: (1) the Central 
Intelligence Agency; (2) the Department of Defense; (3) the 
Defense Intelligence Agency; (4) the National Security Agency; 
(5) the National Reconnaissance Office; (6) the National 
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; (7) the Departments of the 
Army, Navy, and Air Force; (8) the Department of State; (9) the 
Department of the Treasury; (10) the Department of Energy; (11) 
the Department of Justice; (12) the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation; (13) the U.S. Coast Guard; (14) the Department 
of Homeland Security; and (15) the Drug Enforcement 
Administration. The Committee has exclusive legislative, 
authorizing and oversight jurisdiction of these programs.

                     Committee Statement and Views


                        A. THE COMMITTEE REVIEW

    The Committee completed its review of the President's 
fiscal year 2007 budget request, carrying out its annual 
responsibility to prepare an authorization based on close 
examination of the U.S. government's intelligence programs and 
proposed expenditures. In a deliberate departure from past 
practice, the Committee decided to mark up the budget request 
much earlier in the calendar year than normal. This required 
that the Committee's focus be more strategic in nature. Instead 
of many budget-related hearings with witnesses from each 
intelligence program, the Committee held only three, two of 
which had the new Director of National Intelligence (DNI) as 
the primary witness, and one with the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Intelligence. Despite the limited number of formal 
hearings, Members and Staff took dozens of briefings covering 
all major intelligence programs within the National 
Intelligence Program (NIP) and the Military Intelligence 
Program (MIP). This review covered all functional capabilities, 
such as human intelligence, signals intelligence, imagery 
intelligence, open source intelligence, analysis, 
counterintelligence, counternarcotics, and counterterrorism.
    As always, the Committee's legislative and budgetary 
actions are based on more than these budget-specific hearings 
and briefings. The actions taken in this bill are the result of 
the Committee's ongoing, rigorous oversight of the U.S. 
Intelligence Community. This oversight activity includes the 
scores of Committee and subcommittee hearings and briefings, 
site visits, and fact-finding trips, and studies of 
intelligence capabilities, strategies, plans, and challenges 
throughout the year.

Director of National Intelligence

    As was the case for its fiscal year 2006 review, the 
Committee notes the time and attention it has devoted to the 
creation of an empowered, capable and agile U.S. Intelligence 
Community for the 21st Century. Since the end of calendar year 
2004 when it passed sweeping legislation reforming the U.S. 
Intelligence Community, the Congress, and particularly this 
committee, has continued to oversee, assist in, comment on, and 
as necessary, criticize the Administration's effort to realize 
the goals and vision of that legislation. This oversight has 
focused on, but not been limited to, the standup of the Office 
of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). With the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, the Congress 
intended to create a responsible authority that would oversee 
and orchestrate a coordinated effort by the entire Community. 
The Committee has concern that the DNI is pursuing a path that 
will make the ODNI less an intended ``orchestration 
mechanism,'' and more another layer of large, unintended and 
unnecessary bureaucracy. Despite this concern, the Committee is 
committed to supporting all efforts that will make the DNI 
successful in better integrating the disparate members of the 
Intelligence Community and creating the best possible 
intelligence capabilities for America. In that respect, the 
Committee notes, with pleasure, that this year's budget request 
was the first that was fully determined by the DNI, and that 
effort by the DNI to create an Intelligence Community that is 
greater than the sum of its parts is beginning to bear fruit.

The war on terrorism and the Terrorist Surveillance Program

    There is no question about the respect and admiration that 
this Committee has for the intelligence professionals that 
serve all of us in quiet, unheralded service, often in 
dangerous places and situations around the world. In the 
conduct of its oversight responsibilities, the Committee has 
had the opportunity to meet and work with intelligence 
professionals throughout the Community. The work that our 
intelligence personnel do is truly the first line of defense 
for all Americans. We owe them a great deal of gratitude, and 
we owe them every effort to give them the tools, resources, and 
authorities necessary to protect our nation.
    Unfortunately, these honorable men and women have been 
poorly served by a small few who have taken it upon themselves 
to, for political or other motives, recklessly and illegally 
disclose America's necessary secrets and national security 
information. The issue of unauthorized disclosures of 
classified information has been extremely troubling and a focus 
of a major work effort for the Committee. The Committee has 
written to the President expressing its concern that there 
appears to be no reasonable expectation of consequences for 
those who harm America's national security by leaking 
classified information. Each of these perpetrators, whether 
they provide information to the media or to sworn enemies, is 
committing a crime and violating an oath to which they have 
sworn. Further, the Committee finds reprehensible the 
irresponsible reporting of extremely sensitive national 
security information. Such reporting does not serve well the 
national interests, costs untold millions of dollars in lost 
intelligence collection capabilities funded by U.S. taxpayers, 
literally puts lives in jeopardy, and makes the work by the 
honorable people of our Intelligence Community far more 
difficult. Instead of chastising this Community for its lawful 
and protective efforts, we should be fully supporting them with 
all remedies possible to stop these unauthorized disclosures. 
The Committee's work plan for this fiscal year includes 
reviewing all legal avenues to bring to justice those who 
violate the law, including those who knowingly receive, what is 
essentially, stolen classified information.
    One of the most damaging leaks of national security 
information was the revelation of the National Security 
Agency's Terrorist Surveillance Program. As a direct result of 
this illegal compromise of classified information, the ability 
of the United States to protect itself from terrorists has been 
compromised. It can be argued that what factually correct 
information was disclosed in the press was done so for profit 
and to inflict political harm. However, beyond disclosure of 
the classified facts, false and reprehensible claims of 
improper or illegal activities are even more troubling. For 
example, the Minority, in its views accompanying this report, 
state that the President has violated the law by failing to 
``keep the Committee `fully and currently' informed of all 
intelligence activities of the United States.'' In point of 
fact, leaders in Congress had been briefed more than a dozen 
times on the authorization and related activities. Further, the 
Attorney General and the Principal Deputy Director of National 
Intelligence briefed the full Committee at length on the legal 
issues and certain operational details. What the Minority 
further continues to omit in the public version of its position 
is that the National Security Act of 1947 clearly provides that 
``the President and the congressional intelligence committees 
shall each establish such procedures as may be necessary to 
carry out the provisions of this title'' and that the 
requirement to keep the committees ``fully and currently'' 
informed is to be done ``to the extent consistent with due 
regard for the protection from unauthorized disclosure of 
classified information relating to sensitive intelligence 
sources and methods or other exceptionally sensitive matters.'' 
In full accordance with those two provisions of the law, the 
Committee has determined that the extraordinary sensitivities 
of the operational aspects of this program would be limited to 
select Members and Staff of the Committee. That procedure has 
allowed the Committee to get full and current briefings on this 
program to monitor the communications of known terrorists. 
Therefore, it is the Committee position that the President of 
the United States has in no way violated the law with respect 
to notifying the Congress on these activities.
    With respect to the Terrorist Surveillance Program, the 
Committee is fully supportive of this defensive measure to 
understand efforts by known Al Qaeda or its affiliates to 
attack America or its allies. The Committee's position is taken 
with the full understanding that we are a nation at war. This 
is a global war on terrorism: a war that is not being fought 
primarily by conventional military forces on the traditional 
field of battle and governed by time-tested rules of land 
warfare. This is a war of asymmetry: a war to attack the hearts 
and minds of civilized nations; and a war, the battlefield of 
which, includes the homeland, something not seen in more than 
100 years. To combat the elusive, smart, and agile enemy, 
America must think differently, act differently, and be more 
flexible. America's major weapon in this war is the ability to 
create knowledge about the enemy. The primary responsibility to 
``man this weapon'' rests on the Intelligence Community. We, as 
a nation, must not tie the hands of those who are charged with 
defending us, and we must at the same time, and as a culture, 
protect the civil liberties we hold dear. The Terrorist 
Surveillance Program is critical to our national security, and 
the Committee believes firmly that the National Security Agency 
program provides the proper balance between the two. 
Accordingly, the Committee's Republican Majority rejected an 
effort by the Democratic Minority to withhold twenty percent of 
the funding for the overall operation of the National Security 
Agency until the Executive Branch provided cost data on this 
single, extremely small, program. The Majority found that it 
would be completely irresponsible in a time of war to withhold 
funding from an Intelligence Community agency that is providing 
real-time information on terrorists and other foreign 
intelligence targets in a time of war.

Continuing Intelligence Community reform

    In the unclassified report accompanying the fiscal year 
2006 legislation, the Committee commented extensively on the 
need for change within the Intelligence Community. Those 
comments focused on the need to respond positively to the 
criticisms and ``failures'' of intelligence that prompted 
reviews by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon 
the United States (9/11 Commission) and the Commission on the 
Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD Commission). The Committee 
agreed with many of the recommendations of those commissions, 
stating that some of the needed changes will require cultural 
change and, moreover, a real need for the Intelligence 
Community to adopt a more receptive attitude to change. 
Ultimately, such will be necessary to improve the Community's 
overall product--knowledge. The Committee continues to believe 
that a number of systemic and focus area changes need to occur, 
and has, once again, in this legislation attempted to put 
emphasis on those areas of most concern: human intelligence, 
intelligence analysis, community infrastructure, and counter-
intelligence.
    The Committee notes that the President's budget makes good 
progress in improving human intelligence capabilities--
delivering a plan to increase the number of core collectors and 
analysts by fifty percent. The Committee further notes that the 
DNI has had some good success in improving long-standing 
analytic process and tradecraft problems. The Committee's 
funding recommendations further enhances both the human 
intelligence and analytic areas by attempting to drive improved 
changes. With respect to infrastructure issues, the Committee 
is very concerned about the state of basic facilities and, in 
some cases, services throughout the Community. These include 
the relatively mundane, but extraordinarily important, things 
such as power and water utilities, the capacity of training 
facilities and instructors, and support to field operations. 
All of these supporting infrastructure functions are critical 
to collection, analysis and information dissemination, and have 
captured the long-term interest of the Committee. Finally, the 
Committee has focused attention on the issue of 
counterintelligence. There appears to be an alarming increase 
by nation-state and non-nation-state actors to conduct 
intelligence operations against the United States. The 
Committee notes that certain nations are conducting espionage 
efforts against this country at a level not seen since before 
the end of the Cold War. It is nearly inherent that when a 
country is, as we are, at war and focused on that war, its 
enemies will increase their intelligence efforts against it. We 
should expect this to continue as we pursue the Global War on 
Terrorism. This is an alarming situation, and the Committee 
believes that the Intelligence Community must refocus, and 
moreover, reemphasize its counter-intelligence capabilities and 
methodologies.
    Lastly, the Committee finds that the Intelligence Community 
must embrace more fully unconventional and open sources of 
information. Many estimate that large percentages of 
information needs can be satisfied by open source materials, 
and the Committee believes that the growth of the internet and 
mass media has dramatically altered the amount of information 
available through open and unconventional sources. To ignore 
the value of such information is dangerous. The Committee is, 
therefore, pleased that the DNI has moved quickly to make the 
use of open source (unclassified) materials an institutional 
imperative throughout the analytic community. However, it will 
take a dramatic change in cultural philosophy to trust and use 
open source materials that weren't collected or discovered by 
``secret means.'' Conversely, theCommittee is not pleased by 
the reticence of the Community, including the DNI, to more fully 
embrace the notion of unconventional sources of information. For 
example, and to its credit, the ODNI recently began releasing to the 
general public unclassified documents captured during Operation Iraqi 
Freedom. This project will allow the world community to help understand 
the Iraqi positions prior to the start of the war. Already this project 
has brought to light many of the intentions and efforts by the Saddam 
regime to hide materials from the United Nations inspectors and its 
ties with terrorists. However, the Committee's effort to get these 
unconventionally collected materials released was not supported by the 
DNI until forced to do so. Additionally, the Community all too often 
appears to be less-than-enthusiastic in following up on information 
brought to it by people outside the Community, including former 
government officials, experts in particular fields, or even authors who 
have more expertise on specific issues than anyone within the 
Intelligence Community. The Committee finds that opportunities are lost 
and information leads on things such as possible weapons of mass 
destruction locations are not properly followed. This is not the 
hallmark of a flexible and agile-thinking intelligence function that 
was envisioned in the intelligence reform legislation. The Committee 
intends to monitor closely the efforts to improve the use of these open 
source and unconventional sources of information.
    The Intelligence Community today is one of transition. 
There is a continuing mission transition from old mindsets of a 
bipolar world to one of a network-based world. There is a 
philosophical transition from a DCI-centric community of 
disparate agencies to a more corporate-centric community 
orchestrated by the DNI. And, there is a need to recognize that 
transition ``back to the basics'' of good human intelligence to 
act as a basis for our unparalleled technical intelligence 
capabilities is critical. As we continue these transitions, we 
must recognize that there are gaps in capabilities, 
particularly in our ability to persistently stare at targets, 
which must be corrected. And, we must fully recognize that the 
need to focus on the issue of terrorism cannot be an excuse for 
not producing intelligence on the ``traditional'' foreign 
intelligence targets like Iran and North Korea, as well as the 
transnational problem sets, such as illegal narcotics and human 
smuggling. Some of these issues are specifically addressed in 
the `Areas of Special Interest/General Provisions' section 
immediately following. A complete discussion of the Committee's 
oversight findings and recommendations is contained in the 
classified annex to this report.

                             B. LEGISLATION

    The bill and accompanying classified Schedule of 
Authorizations includes the Committee's recommended 
authorizations for the President's Fiscal Year 2007 budget 
request. This includes an authorization for the intelligence 
portion of the funding for the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) 
and operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Committee views 
these funds as an integral part of the Fiscal Year 2007 budget 
and has decided to specifically authorize these activities for 
the full year in this legislation at this time.
    H.R. 5020 provides strategic and substantial enhancements 
in funding for critical world-wide intelligence capabilities. 
The Committee believes there is a need to improve certain 
intelligence capabilities, including human intelligence, 
counterintelligence, analysis, and infrastructure. For a number 
of reasons fully explained in the classified annex, the 
Committee has made some specific and major recommendations to 
realign funding. These changes include:
          Improved U.S. human intelligence (HUMINT) 
        activities, including training, infrastructure, and 
        global capabilities;
          Increased investment in analytic tools; and
          Increases to U.S. counterintelligence 
        programs and personnel.
    In addition to authorization for intelligence and 
intelligence-related activities, the bill includes provisions 
intended to clarify certain authorities of the DNI. These 
provisions are intended to further refine and strengthen the 
authorities provided to the DNI to oversee, coordinate, and 
manage Intelligence Community activities.
    Finally, just as in last year's bill, the Committee has 
focused on the Nation's overhead imagery architecture. Last 
year, a decision was made to terminate a part of the Future 
Imagery Architecture program. Although this tough decision had 
certain positive aspects, one disadvantage is that it is 
essential to ensure that there are no future gaps in 
capability. In this bill, the Committee vigorously urge the 
Intelligence Community toward one of a very limited number of 
options, so that the Nation will have the imagery capability it 
needs in the future. The Committee's action in this area will 
begin a process of fundamental change for the Future Imagery 
Architecture program. Although the Committee expects some 
discomfort within the Intelligence Community with this and 
other provisions, it continues to agree with outside observers 
that the Intelligence Community appears incapable of meaningful 
change without significant outside assistance. The Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 is intended to provide 
such assistance.

                      C. AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST

    In this section, the Committee highlights areas of concern 
that it believes must be addressed as a high priority by the 
Director of National Intelligence in leading the Intelligence 
Community into the future.

Strategic review process

    The Committee believes that achieving the necessary reforms 
of the Intelligence Community will only occur through a 
strategic planning process. Accordingly, Section 425 of the 
bill requires the Director of National Intelligence to, in 
consultation with the heads of the Intelligence Community 
elements, manage and oversee the conduct of a strategic review 
to develop intelligence capabilities required to address 
threats to national security.
    A formalized, periodic, and structured review, much like 
the Quadrennial Defense Review process used by the Department 
of Defense, is intended to identify the breadth and depth of 
national security threats, the capabilities existing and needed 
to combat those threats, and better identify the alignment of 
resources, authorities, and personnel needed to support those 
required capabilities. Such a review will enable the 
Intelligence Community to more readily make and accept change, 
infuse flexibility into its management and operational 
structures, and enable the DNI to gain better insight on 
intelligence and intelligence-related activities throughout the 
U.S. Government. The review also is expected to influence the 
National IntelligenceStrategy by examining requirements 
necessary to address national priorities and objectives, determine 
which intelligence disciplines can provide the best support, and 
properly identify budget resources should be allocated to those 
priorities and objectives.
    The Committee requests that the DNI provide the Committee 
with his plan for initiating and conducting this review.

Reporting regarding Iran and North Korea

    The development by Iran and North Korea of nuclear, 
chemical, biological or radiological weapons and the missiles 
capable of delivering them are among the most significant 
potential threats to the United States. The Committee believes 
that it is imperative that the Intelligence Community continue 
to improve its collection and analysis of intelligence 
information on Iran and North Korea.
    This point was highlighted by the bipartisan WMD 
Commission. The Commission's 2005 report stated: ``Across the 
board, the Intelligence Community knows disturbingly little 
about the nuclear programs of the world's most dangerous 
actors. In some cases, it knows less now than it did five or 
ten years ago.'' This statement aptly describes the challenge 
faced by U.S. policymakers with regard to Iran and North 
Korea's nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs.
    If the President and Congress are to develop effective 
policies to counter Iran's and North Korea's weapons programs, 
such policies must be based on accurate and timely 
intelligence. The Committee has conducted regular and ongoing 
oversight of these efforts, and expects the DNI to ensure that 
the Intelligence Community continues to provide timely, 
detailed, and frequent reporting on the current intentions and 
capabilities on Iran and North Korea's nuclear, chemical, 
biological, radiological, and missile programs, as well as the 
Intelligence Community's capabilities to understand and 
evaluate these programs.
    In particular, the Committee is interested in receiving on 
an ongoing basis: (1) current assessments of Iran's and North 
Korea's nuclear, chemical, biological weapons, and missile 
programs; (2) information on new intelligence developed, 
including intelligence collected from both open and clandestine 
sources; and (3) full discussion of any gaps in knowledge, 
dissents, caveats, or other information that would tend to 
reduce confidence in the overall assessment.
    The Committee believes that these reports will provide 
timely information to help better inform Congress as it is 
asked to make decisions regarding U.S. policy towards Iran and 
North Korea.

Risk-taking and discouragement of risk averse culture

    Intelligence is an art, not a science, and therefore 
imperfect, and it takes significant time to hone the 
operational skills necessary to conduct effective intelligence 
operations. The Committee recognizes that setbacks and 
shortcomings are inevitable while developing and conducting 
operations, especially against extremely difficult targets. 
However, fear of setbacks or ``failures'' should never be a 
deterrent to conducting high risk, essential intelligence 
operations.
    As the Intelligence Community increases operations in 
exceptionally dangerous circumstances and against unpredictable 
targets, mistakes may occur. However, the Committee believes it 
is more realistic to measure success in the effort and 
initiative exhibited and not necessarily in the interim result. 
Lessons learned from failed operations should highlight 
shortcomings, and changes should be made. Only in this way can 
mission success be achieved. Although the Committee supports 
the notion ``failure is not an option,'' strict adherence to 
such a view may contribute to the development of a risk adverse 
culture in which certain operations are not conducted because 
of a fear of answering for failure. Although the Committee is 
responsible for investigating intelligence failures, it 
understands that honest mistakes will be made in highly fluid 
and complex operational environments. Our Intelligence 
Community must constantly strive for the ``perfect,'' but be 
willing to accept and take responsibility for failure; we must 
not foster a risk averse society.
    The men and women of the Intelligence Community are among 
the bravest in the country, readily accepting the extreme 
personal risks inherent in their chosen profession. The 
Committee honors the sacrifices they make daily in their 
professional and personal lives and commits to the notion that 
honest failure is a price we must pay for being bold and 
proactive.

Unauthorized disclosures of classified information

    As previously stated, the Committee remains gravely 
concerned with the problem of unauthorized disclosures of 
classified information, which harms national security, places 
American citizens and intelligence community personnel at 
increased risk, and inevitably results in substantial 
consequences to the United States--both tangible and 
intangible.
    The Committee continues to address this important issue 
through two separate endeavors. It is continuing a legislative 
review, including hearings, to examine relevant issues and what 
changes to the law may be desirable. Those efforts have clearly 
established that prosecution under current laws relating to 
unauthorized disclosure has not been an effective deterrent 
tool, although it remains unclear whether this lack of 
effectiveness requires changes in the law or is due to other 
factors. In either event, the Committee believes that 
additional and more creative steps to deter unauthorized 
disclosures are warranted. Section 413 of the bill is a first 
step, requiring the DNI to review whether current law or 
administrative authorities enable the revocation of pensions of 
intelligence community personnel who commit unauthorized 
disclosures of classified information.
    In addition, the Committee has initiated a review of 
certain specific potential unauthorized disclosures of 
classified information at the request of the Speaker of the 
House. That review primarily is concentrating on an 
investigation of four cases to develop a better understanding 
of the related facts and circumstances. The investigation is in 
turn expected to better enable the Committee to understand how 
and why unauthorized disclosures occur, and how the protection 
of classified information is perceived in practice.
    It is important to emphasize that the Committee's concern 
is in no way intended to limit or reduce proper oversight of 
intelligence community activities or of activities with 
heightened potential to affect civil liberties. As one of the 
primary bodies intended to conduct oversight of intelligence 
activities on behalf of the American people, we are mindful of 
the need for ongoing and thorough review of such activities. 
However, the delicate balance between protecting national 
security and safeguarding civil liberties must be carried out 
in a manner that fully protects both interests, through 
mechanisms such as regular reporting to the congressional 
intelligence committees and the use of the Intelligence 
Community Whistleblower Protection Act. By definition, no 
individual--whether a journalist, government official, or 
intelligence community employee--can or should singlehandedly 
presume to determine what information ``deserves'' to be 
withheld from disclosure in order to protect national security, 
especially without full knowledge of the surrounding context.

Prosecution of espionage

    Investigators, analysts, inspectors, and prosecutors from 
the Departments of Justice, Defense, and Homeland Security are 
working together in an effort to combat espionage. The 
Committee is pleased to note that since 2005, their combined 
efforts have resulted in the arrest of at least ten individuals 
in the United States accused of spying on behalf of a number of 
foreign countries.
    The Committee is concerned, however, that these individuals 
will face relatively light sentences if found guilty. All of 
them are charged under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 793 (gathering, 
transferring, or losing defense information) or 18 U.S.C. 
Sec. 951 (agents of foreign governments), which carry penalties 
of no more than ten years imprisonment. The Committee notes 
that most, if not all, were not charged under 18 U.S.C. 
Sec. 794 (gathering or delivering defense information to aid 
foreign governments), which carries penalties ranging from life 
imprisonment to death. The Committee also notes that some of 
these individuals stand accused of stealing defense-related 
trade secrets from U.S. companies. However, none of these 
suspects were charged with violating 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1831 
(economic espionage), which carries a maximum penalty of 15 
years imprisonment for stealing trade secrets to benefit a 
foreign government.
    The Committee believes that the penalties facing these 
accused spies are not an effective deterrent to espionage. 
Americans tempted to spy on behalf of a foreign power should 
understand clearly that doing so will have extremely negative 
consequences, resulting in their arrest, conviction, and long-
term imprisonment.
    The Committee notes the effective work of Justice 
Department prosecutors, but encourages the Attorney General to 
review the Department's counterespionage strategies. The review 
should address the following questions: Is the current strategy 
an effective deterrent to espionage? Are those convicted of 
espionage and related charges receiving the punishment they 
deserve? Why are more spies not charged under 18 U.S.C. 
Sec. 794 and Sec. 1831? Would stricter penalties for violating 
18 U.S.C. Sec. 793 act as a better deterrent to espionage? The 
Committee expects the Attorney General to update it 
periodically on the status of such a review.

Counterintelligence field activity

    The Committee remains concerned about improper instances of 
maintaining information regarding U.S. persons at the 
Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA) within the Department 
of Defense, and believes it is important to highlight the 
incident as well as the corrective actions promptly taken by 
the Department to address those practices.
    CIFA was established to bring leadership to 
counterintelligence efforts within the Department. The 
counterintelligence mission involves the identification and 
neutralization of the pervasive foreign intelligence and 
terrorism threat directed globally against the Department of 
Defense and the U.S. Government. CIFA is responsible for 
overseeing counterintelligence investigations, operations, and 
services within the Department; overseeing and conducting joint 
CI advanced training and analyzing counterintelligence 
information to identify and target the threat in our 
increasingly complex and asymmetrical world.
    In the course of gathering information believed to relate 
to force protection, CIFA improperly collected and retained 
information on U.S. persons engaged in constitutionally-
protected protests at the University of California. In response 
to a congressional inquiry, the Department of Defense 
acknowledged that CIFA failed to follow policies regarding the 
collection and retention of information about U.S. persons. 
These failures were especially troubling in light of CIFA's 
important mission to set the standards while protecting the 
Constitutional rights of American citizens.
    The Department of Defense subsequently has assessed that 
approximately 260 records out of 13,000 records in a classified 
CIFA database, or two percent of the total, improperly 
contained information relating to U.S. persons. Department 
leadership has responded to this assessment and directed that 
the database should be used only to report information 
regarding possible international terrorist activity, required 
supervisors to review all reports before inclusion in the 
database, and provided for refresher training for Department 
personnel on what information properly may be included in the 
database.
    The Committee understands that the Department of Defense 
Inspector General is in the process of preparing a report 
addressing at least some of these issues. The Committee 
requests that the Inspector General submit no later than 
February 1, 2007 a report which includes the results of any 
audits relating to CIFA including but not limited to the 
collection, retention, and dissemination of information 
relating to U.S. persons. In addition, the Department of 
Defense shall submit no later than February 1, 2007, a report 
containing the results of any internal department review or 
investigation of policies, guidelines, and practices of CIFA 
related to the collection, retention, and dissemination of 
information relating to U.S. persons, as well as a description 
of remedial actions taken to address the findings and 
recommendations of the Inspector General and any other internal 
review.

Intelligence support for transformational diplomacy strategy

    The Secretary of State has launched a major initiative to 
reposition U.S. diplomatic personnel across the world. This 
includes moving hundreds of positions to critical emerging 
areas in Africa, South Asia, East Asia, and the Middle East 
over the next several years. Thisyear alone, the Department 
will move approximately 100 positions out of Washington and European 
capitals. Enhancements to the Department's ability to monitor Iran--
through the establishment of a new Office of Iranian Affairs and the 
creation of Iran ``watcher'' positions in Dubai, London, Frankfurt, and 
other capitals--represent perhaps the most dramatic, and most critical, 
elements of this transformation.
    Such a major realignment of strategic priorities and of 
diplomats working on the ``front lines'' may require a 
significant shift in intelligence support provided to 
Department policymakers by the Bureau of Intelligence and 
Research (INR). To its credit, INR analysts have worked on 
their areas of expertise longer, on average, than many of their 
colleagues in other agencies, and INR has one of the lowest 
personnel turnover rates in the Intelligence Community. 
However, the long tenure and low turnover of INR analysts may 
make it difficult for the Bureau to adjust to changing 
priorities.
    This Committee has previously urged the Department to 
increase the resources provided to INR, which has remained 
relatively constant in recent years. Given the proposed 
transformations to the Department's overall strategy, the 
Committee strongly encourages the Secretary of State to examine 
INR's current allocation of human and financial resources to 
ensure that INR will be able to adequately support the 
Department's new strategic priorities.

Director of National Intelligence Office of the Inspector General

    Section 1078 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004 provided the Director of National 
Intelligence with the authority to establish an Office of the 
Inspector General. On September 7, 2005, the DNI established 
such an office, ``charged with detecting fraud, waste, and 
abuse; evaluating performance; and making recommendations to 
promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the ODNI and 
the Intelligence Community.'' Although the Committee supports 
the DNI's desire to have an Office of the Inspector General, it 
is concerned that it is currently chartered in a way that does 
not ensure the maximum utility of that office to act as a 
coordinating organization for all Intelligence Community 
Inspector Generals, specifically with regard to keeping the 
Committee informed of its activities and findings.
    As an example, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act provided that any Office of the Inspector 
General created by the DNI would have the duties, 
responsibilities, and authorities contained in the Inspector 
General Act of 1978. That law requires each Inspector General 
to prepare semi-annual reports summarizing the activities of 
the office during the preceding six month period, which are to 
be forwarded to the agency head and transmitted to the 
appropriate committees of Congress. The DNI instruction calls 
for only an annual report, and makes no reference to a copy 
being provided to Congress.
    The Inspector General Act also requires those offices to 
keep Congress and the appropriate Committees fully and 
currently informed about problems and deficiencies it discovers 
as well as the necessity for and progress of corrective action. 
The Committee is concerned that the structure for congressional 
interaction with the DNI Inspector General outlined in the 
September 2005 Instruction is overly restrictive of the flow of 
information to the Committee. The Instruction states:

          The Inspector General shall notify the DNI and the 
        Director, Office of Legislative Affairs, of any request 
        from the intelligence committees or any other committee 
        or subcommittee of the Congress for any report or 
        findings and recommendations of any inspection, 
        investigation, audit, or other inquiry conducted by the 
        Inspector General, and after consultation with the DNI, 
        prepare an appropriate response to any such request.

It is unclear what role the Office of Legislative Affairs plays 
in these transactions, and the Committee envisions scenarios 
where it may be appropriate for direct interaction between the 
Committee and the Inspector General, as currently practiced 
with the Inspectors General from the Central Intelligence 
Agency and others.
    Another area of Committee concern deals with the DNI's 
authority to direct the Inspector General not to initiate, 
carry out, or complete any review without notification to 
Congress. While other Inspectors General within the 
Intelligence Community operate subject to similar authority, 
there is also the requirement for a notification to Congress on 
the use of such authority. That requirement calls for 
statements to be submitted by both the affected Inspector 
General and the official who exercised the authority. The DNI's 
September 2005 Instruction has no such provision for 
Congressional notification.
    One final area of concern relates to the reporting of 
``urgent concerns'' from whistleblowers, and ``particularly 
serious or flagrant'' issues. In 1998, Congress created special 
whistleblower protections and procedures applicable within the 
Intelligence Community. The September 2005 Instruction makes 
reference to the DNI's Inspector General conducting reviews 
based on information from employees or contractors of the ODNI 
or any element of the intelligence community and states that 
they should ``be subject to, and in accordance with, DNI policy 
and regulations concerning whistleblower protection.'' However, 
it is unclear that these policies and regulations conform to 
existing law governing whistleblower protection and 
notification to Congress.
    The Committee notes also that the CIA's Inspector General 
is required to report immediately to the Director of that 
agency ``whenever he becomes aware of particularly serious or 
flagrant problems, abuses, or deficiencies relating to the 
administration of programs and operations.'' The Director is to 
transfer such reports to the Committee within seven calendar 
days. The Committee believes that similarly prompt reporting of 
issues identified by the DNI Inspector General is necessary.
    In order to strengthen the foundation on which the DNI 
Office of Inspector General was created and to ensure that the 
appropriate oversight committees receive the maximum utility 
from its efforts, the Committee requests that within 180 days 
of enactment of this legislation the DNI issue an updated 
notification that incorporates elements of the Inspector 
General Act and the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 
that relate to Congressional notification and whistleblower 
protections.

Enterprise architecture

    The Committee continues to believe that well-formed and 
successfully executed Enterprise Architecture (EA) frameworks 
in individual intelligence agencies and across the Intelligence 
Community will ensure more reliable Information Technology (IT) 
financial management and planning. These EA structures guide 
the IT budget and decisionmaking processes, which in turn 
should facilitate informed strategic investments and unified 
controls. This belief led in large part to the inclusion of 
responsibilities relating to EA for the Intelligence Community 
Chief Information Officer (CIO) and other responsible officials 
in the Intelligence and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.
    In 2005, the Committee noted its view that ``the IC would 
benefit greatly by undertaking a formal IC-wide EA effort, as 
this process would take these `linkages' and fuse them together 
across the community in the form of standard business, 
performance, data and information, service component, and 
technical models.'' H. Rept. 108-558, at 35. The Committee also 
directed that the Intelligence Community CIO in conjunction 
with the agency level CIOs to ``draft the implementation plan 
for an IC-wide EA, which will conform the agencies' EAs to the 
broader IC strategy. * * *'' The Committee understands that the 
creation and implementation of these EA frameworks is ongoing 
and urges the DNI to continue to work collaboratively with the 
Intelligence Community agencies to ensure that these are 
completed within the timeframe prescribed. The Committee 
directs that the fiscal year 2008 National Intelligence Program 
and Military Intelligence Program budgets tie all IT spending 
to their respective EA frameworks at both the agency-level and 
Intelligence Community-wide.

Space acquisition programs--personnel

    There is a general acknowledgement that the U.S. space 
acquisition programs at the National Reconnaissance Office and 
the Space and Missile Systems Center are in trouble. Simply 
put, expensive and complex acquisition endeavors always take 
longer, and therefore end up costing more than the initial 
estimates. Unanticipated delays can cause budgetary problems 
for other Intelligence Community programs, particularly when 
competition for resources leaves very little reserve to absorb 
unplanned cost overruns.
    The Committee is interested in promoting greater continuity 
of personnel assigned to intelligence-related acquisition 
programs. It is not uncommon for space acquisition programs to 
take ten years, beginning with concept exploration, then 
developing an acquisition strategy, performing the source 
selection, and ultimately developing, launching, initializing, 
and operating the system (which can last decades). A seasoned 
acquisition professional will experience the interdependencies 
of all of these phases, and more importantly, gains an 
understanding of how the consequences of decisions made in any 
one phase ultimately affect the following phases. The Committee 
notes that previous personnel policies allowed uniformed 
military officers to remain assigned to NRO programs for the 
entire duration of an acquisition--in fact many Air Force 
officers made an entire career in the NRO. These extended 
assignments contributed to a sense of ownership, dedication, 
and commitment that is immeasurable and invaluable.
    As anecdotally suggested, today's two-year rotational 
assignments do not provide an effective environment for 
successful space acquisitions. The Committee understands the 
military's desire to develop future leaders that have a breadth 
of experience, including experience focused in space related 
assignments. However, the Committee believes the mission to 
provide effective space acquisition professionals and to 
deliver these critical systems to the country far outweigh the 
need to develop well-rounded senior officers who are 
generalists.
    Simply put, complex space systems acquisition requires 
extraordinarily specialized knowledge, skills, and dedicated 
effort overtime. This specialty deserves a focused, protected, 
long-term career status. The Committee believes that recreating 
a protected career field that focuses on acquisition of space 
systems is a key to fixing the underlying problems with our 
space developments.
    Further, the Committee believes that current personnel 
assignment policies should be improved to allow space 
acquisition professionals to obtain greater experience and 
technical depth. Today's policies place a high degree of 
importance on rotational assignments to obtain broad 
experience. This model leads to high turnover rate in personnel 
and impedes military officers from developing the technical 
expertise required to manage complex space programs. In 
contrast, civilian acquisition personnel career progression is 
rooted in specific program management experience and a high 
degree of relevant continuing education. The Committee believes 
that such longer-term assignments for military officers would 
provide the acquisition professionals with more experience, 
with better judgment, and result in more personal commitment to 
success, than the current short rotational assignments.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the Secretary of Defense, 
in cooperation with the Director of National Reconnaissance 
Office and the Secretary of the Air Force, to commission a 
study to determine the value and feasibility of establishing a 
protected career service for space acquisition professionals 
(similar to the JAG or Medical Corps) and how such a policy can 
be implemented. The Committee directs that the report be 
delivered to the congressional intelligence committees no later 
than 120 days after enactment of this legislation.

                   D. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT REFORM

    Many of the studies and reports that have emphasized the 
need for reform within various federal departments and agencies 
have also highlighted the need to modernize congressional 
oversight. The Final Report of the National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (``9/11 Commission'') 
labeled congressional oversight of intelligence 
``dysfunctional'' (p. 420). Many of the criticisms can be 
summarized by stating that ``Congress is engaged in too much of 
the wrong kind of oversight--too few national debates on major 
issues and far too much time and energy being spent on 
relatively minor and parochial issues.'' (Center for Strategic 
and International Studies, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense 
Reform for a New Strategic Era, March 2004.)
    Specific recommendations of the Commission on the 
Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD Commission) to improve 
congressional oversight include:

    Both the House and the Senate intelligence committees have 
indicated their intention to establish oversight subcommittees. 
But these subcommittees will not improve intelligence if they 
simply demand additional testimony from top intelligence 
officials on the crisis or scandal of the day. We suggest that, 
if created, the oversight subcommittees limit their activities 
to ``strategic oversight,'' meaning they would set an agenda at 
the start of the year or session of Congress, based on top 
priorities such as information sharing, and stick to that 
agenda. (p. 338).
    Encourage more informal discussions and collaboration 
between the Intelligence Community and its congressional 
overseers. (p. 340).

    The Committee takes such recommendations seriously and is 
determined to improve congressional oversight for the benefit 
of our national goals. At the beginning of the 109th Congress, 
the Committee created the Subcommittee on Oversight, which is 
specifically charged with conducting strategic oversight. Among 
the subject areas assigned to the Subcommittee are the 
responsibility for overseeing implementation of the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, including the 
creation of the office of DNI, and specific oversight emphasis 
items, such as information sharing, unauthorized disclosures of 
classified information, intelligence analysis, and information 
assurance. This subcommittee has taken a number of steps to 
improve congressional oversight, including developing 
performance criteria to measure Intelligence Community progress 
and studying the practice of Congressionally Directed Actions.

Metrics within the intelligence community

    To facilitate increased oversight, the Committee has placed 
special attention on the development of objective oversight 
metrics. Few organizations outside of government do not use 
objective measurements as a tool to gauge success and to track 
progress. Many government organizations, even without the 
profit motive, have found effective ways to measure progress 
and improvement through objective measurements. For example, 
some agencies have developed measurements to track use of their 
products and modify them when customers aren't using them.
    Logically, every intelligence agency should use some set of 
metrics as a management tool. Correspondingly, the Committee in 
its oversight role needs to have a useful set of metrics, 
likely somewhat different than those used by program managers, 
to evaluate the productivity of the Community. The standards 
should not be too different, however, because all branches of 
the U.S. Government should be working toward the same goal.
    The Director of the National Quality Program at the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology observed that 
``We generally measure the easy, rather than the important. The 
challenge is to define the important.'' The Committee seeks to 
work in partnership with the Intelligence Community to jointly 
identify and understand what is important--or at least that 
which points to the important. A former Speaker of the House 
has noted that ``It's what you inspect, not what you expect'' 
that drives what agencies do in response to oversight. The 
Committee is not interested in receiving reporting merely for 
the sake of reporting or in creating data for its own end.
    Any effective measurements should be tied to clear goals 
and objectives. As illustrated by the observation ``if you 
don't know where you're going, any road will get you there,'' 
it will be hard to measure progress without understanding what 
the Intelligence Community needs to achieve and where it needs 
to go. Once the Community and Congress clearly understand those 
objectives they can determine how to measure and understand 
what is aiding or hindering progress on important issues. The 
Committee seeks to work closely with leaders of the 
Intelligence Community and develop meaningful metrics to 
measure the progress in reforming intelligence and improving 
important processes within the Intelligence Community.
    The Subcommittee on Oversight has conducted an intensive 
review with outside experts. In particular, the Committee has 
reviewed the Baldridge review process and notes that 
significant improvements have taken place in companies and 
government agencies that have participated in the process. The 
Committee encourages the DNI to review this process and 
determine how it could be adapted and implemented within the 
Intelligence Community.

Congressionally directed actions

    Historically, the Committee has included congressionally 
directed actions (CDAs) as part of the report language of 
yearly Intelligence Authorization Acts as a way to direct 
specific actions or to formally obtain information that could 
not be obtained through other means. CDAs also spark debate on 
key issues or gaps that, in the Committee's opinion, are not 
receiving the required attention of Intelligence Community 
agencies, leadership, and management. However, the Committee 
believes that responses to CDAs often do not satisfy the intent 
of the request, do not include a sufficient level of detail, 
and may not be properly used when received.
    In the recent past, neither the Intelligence Community nor 
the Committee have had consistent processes in place to track, 
review or provide feedback on congressionally directed actions. 
Now is the time to improve the quality of both CDA tasking and 
their responses. It is the Committee's intent to move CDA 
reporting from the insufficient, resource draining exercise it 
has often been to the worthwhile information exchange it was 
intended to be. The Committee hopes to increase the quality of 
CDA responses from the Intelligence Community and decrease 
duplication or unnecessary reporting requirements tasked to the 
Intelligence Community.
    The Committee notes that some CDAs are the result of 
internal congressional compromises or carry annual reporting 
requirements without sunset provisions, resulting in a growing 
list of required reports that may have lost relevance. For 
instance, in the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2000, the President is required to submit annual reports on the 
Public Identification of Significant Foreign Narcotics 
Traffickers. The Committee is at a loss as to why it currently 
needs specific reporting of the names of convicted narcotics 
traffickers, especially when other processes are in place to 
ensure proper efforts are undertaken against such traffickers. 
More broadly, the Intelligence Community currently must answer 
72 annual CDAs, in addition to those newly assigned each year. 
Many contain useful information needed to perform the 
Committee's oversight responsibilities. Fiscal Year 2005 marked 
a high point for CDA tasking in the past ten years, with the 
Intelligence Community answering 248, while in Fiscal Year 2006 
the Intelligence Community was tasked with 197 CDAs.
    In the spirit of congressional oversight reform, the 
Committee would like to establish uniform procedures with 
respect to CDAs. For example, the Committee may agree that a 
briefing would satisfy certain CDA requests where that format 
is most conductive to the exchange of information. In addition, 
the Subcommittee on Oversight is conducting a thorough review 
of all annual reporting requirements to assess the usefulness 
and the cost to prepare the other reports now required. As a 
result of an initial review, the Committee-reported bill 
repeals provisions of law requiring several of these annual 
reports. It is a good beginning.
    The Committee would like to acknowledge the work put into 
CDA responses by the Intelligence Community workforce, and by 
the ODNI to ensure that all CDAs are answered in a timely, 
worthwhile manner. Going forward, it is in the best interest of 
our national security to minimize duplication and waste in all 
areas, and the Committee sees the clarification and 
restructuring of CDAs as a perfect opportunity.

               Committee Consideration and Rollcall Votes

    On March 30, 2006, the Committee met in open and closed 
session and ordered the bill H.R. 5020 favorably reported, as 
amended.

                              OPEN SESSION

    In open session, the Committee considered the text of the 
bill H.R. 5020.
    Chairman Hoekstra offered an amendment in the nature of a 
substitute to H.R. 5020. The contents of the amendment in the 
nature of a substitute are described in the Section-by-Section 
analysis and the Explanation of Amendment. The Committee 
considered the following amendments to the amendment in the 
nature of a substitute:
    Mr. Hastings offered an amendment to require the President 
to submit a separate statement of the proposed budget for the 
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board and to authorize 
appropriations. It was not agreed to by a record vote of 8 ayes 
to 10 noes:
          Voting aye: Ms. Harman, Mr. Hastings, Mr. Reyes, Mr. 
        Boswell, Mr. Cramer, Ms. Eshoo, Mr. Holt, Mr. Tierney.
          Voting no: Mr. Hoekstra (Chairman), Mr. LaHood, Mr. 
        Everett, Ms. Wilson, Ms. Davis, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. 
        McHugh, Mr. Tiahrt, Mr. Rogers, Mr. Renzi.
    Mr. Everett offered an amendment to limit termination of 
the U-2 aircraft program. It was agreed to by voice vote.

                             CLOSED SESSION

    Ms. Harman then moved to close the meeting because national 
security would be endangered if the matters to be considered 
were disclosed. The motion was agreed to by a record vote of 15 
ayes to 0 noes:
          Voting aye: Mr. Hoekstra (Chairman), Mr. LaHood, Ms. 
        Wilson, Ms. Davis, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. McHugh, Mr. 
        Tiahrt, Mr. Renzi, Ms. Harman, Mr. Reyes, Mr. Boswell, 
        Mr. Cramer, Ms. Eshoo, Mr. Holt, Mr. Tierney.
          Voting no: None
    Ms. Eshoo offered an amendment to provide that not more 
than 80 percent of the funds specified for a program in the 
classified Schedule of Authorizations shall be authorized until 
the President submits a report on the cost of the program 
described in the weekly radio address of the President on 
December 17, 2005.

                              OPEN SESSION

    After debate, the Committee returned to open session by 
unanimous consent. The amendment was not agreed to by a record 
vote of 8 ayes to 10 noes:
          Voting aye: Ms. Wilson, Ms. Harman, Mr. Hastings, Mr. 
        Reyes, Mr. Boswell, Ms. Eshoo, Mr. Holt, Mr. Tierney.
          Voting no: Mr. Hoekstra (Chairman), Mr. LaHood, Mr. 
        Everett, Mr. Gallegly, Ms. Davis, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. 
        McHugh, Mr. Tiahrt, Mr. Rogers, Mr. Renzi.
    The Committee then adopted the amendment in the nature of a 
substitute by voice vote.

                             CLOSED SESSION

    Ms. Harman then moved to close the meeting because national 
security would be endangered if the matters to be considered 
were disclosed. The motion was agreed to by a record vote of 15 
ayes to 0 noes:
          Voting aye: Mr. Hoekstra (Chairman), Mr. Everett, Ms. 
        Wilson, Ms. Davis, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. McHugh, Mr. 
        Tiahrt, Mr. Rogers, Ms. Harman, Mr. Hastings, Mr. 
        Boswell, Mr. Cramer, Ms. Eshoo, Mr. Holt, Mr. Tierney.
          Voting no: None
    Ms. Eshoo offered an amendment to modify the funding level 
for a program contained in the classified Schedule of 
Authorizations. In lieu of the amendment, the Schedule of 
Authorizations was modified by unanimous consent.
    Mr. Boswell offered an amendment to modify the funding 
levels for programs contained in the classified Schedule of 
Authorizations. It was not agreed to by a record vote of 7 ayes 
to 10 noes:
          Voting aye: Ms. Harman, Mr. Hastings, Mr. Reyes, Mr. 
        Boswell, Ms. Eshoo, Mr. Holt, Mr. Tierney.
          Voting no: Mr. Hoekstra (Chairman), Mr. Everett, Ms. 
        Wilson, Mr. Gallegly, Ms. Davis, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. 
        McHugh, Mr. Tiahrt, Mr. Rogers, Mr. Renzi.
    The Committee then adopted the classified Schedule of 
Authorizations by voice vote.

                              OPEN SESSION

    By unanimous consent, the Committee returned to open 
session.
    By voice vote, the Committee adopted a motion by the 
Chairman to favorably report the bill H.R. 5020 to the House, 
as amended.

      Section-by-Section Analysis and Explanation of the Amendment


Section 1--Short title and table of contents

    Section 1 contains the short title for the bill and the 
Table of Contents.

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES


Section 101--Authorization of appropriations

    Section 101 of the bill authorizes appropriations for the 
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of these 
elements of the United States Government: The Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence, the Central Intelligence 
Agency, the Department of Defense, the Defense Intelligence 
Agency, the National Security Agency, the Departments of the 
Army, Navy and Air Force, the Department of State, the 
Department of the Treasury, the Department of Justice, the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, the National Reconnaissance 
Office, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the Coast 
Guard, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Drug 
Enforcement Administration.

Section 102--Classified schedule of authorizations

    Section 102 provides that the amounts and personnel 
ceilings authorized under Section 101 shall be specified in the 
accompanying classified Schedule of Authorizations, which shall 
be made available to the Committee on Appropriations and to the 
President.

Section 103--Personnel ceiling adjustments

    Section 103 permits the Director of National Intelligence 
(DNI) to authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess 
of the authorized number when the DNI determines that it is 
necessary to the performance of important intelligence 
functions and promptly notifies the congressional intelligence 
committees.

Section 104--Intelligence community management account

    Section 104 authorizes specified funds, as well as 
classified amounts, for the Intelligence Community Management 
Account and provides that personnel detailed to that staff from 
other agencies are detailed on a reimbursable basis.

Section 105--Incorporation of reporting requirements

    Section 105 provides that each requirement to submit a 
report to the congressional intelligence committees included in 
the joint explanatory statement to accompany the conference 
report on the bill is incorporated into the Act and made a 
requirement in law.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM


Section 201--Authorization of appropriations

    Section 201 authorizes funds for the CIA Retirement and 
Disability System.

                     TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS


Section 301--Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized 
        by law

    Section 301 permits the authorized amounts to be increased 
to provide increases in compensation and benefits authorized by 
law.

Section 302--Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities

    Section 302 provides that the authorization of funds in 
this act does not constitute authority for the conduct of any 
intelligence activity not otherwise authorized by the 
Constitution or laws of the United States.

Section 303--Clarification of definition of intelligence community 
        under the National Security Act of 1947

    Section 303 provides a technical clarification with respect 
to designation of members of the Intelligence Community.

Section 304--Delegation of authority for travel on common carriers for 
        intelligence collection personnel

    Section 304 permits the DNI to delegate authority to 
approve certain travel on common carriers to the heads of 
individual Intelligence Community elements.

Section 305--Retention and use of amounts paid as debts to elements of 
        the intelligence community

    Section 305 authorizes intelligence community elements to 
accept, retain, and use certain amounts received from private 
parties as repayment of debts arising from negligent or willful 
damage or misconduct, or repayment for default on the terms of 
educational assistance.

Section 306--Availability of funds for travel and transportation of 
        personal effects, household goods, and automobiles

    Section 306 permits DNI and CIA travel expenses to be 
charged to the fiscal year in which travel begins, even if not 
concluded in that year.

Section 307--Purchases by elements of the intelligence community of 
        products of Federal Prison Industries

    Section 307 provides that intelligence community elements 
must determine that a product or service to be purchased from 
Federal Prison Industries best meets the needs of the Agency.

  TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY


      Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence


Section 401--Clarification of delegation of transfer or reprogramming 
        authority

    Section 401 makes a technical clarification to the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act.

Section 402--Clarification of limitation of co-location of the Office 
        of the Director of National Intelligence

    Section 402 clarifies that the prohibition on the co-
location of the DNI with any other intelligence community 
element applies only to the co-location of the headquarters of 
each.

Section 403--Additional duties for the DNI Director of Science and 
        Technology

    Section 403 provides that the DNI Science and Technology 
Committee shall prioritize research and development related to 
intelligence (in addition to coordinating such research and 
development), including identification of basic, applied, and 
advanced research programs to be carried out by the 
intelligence community. The DNI's Director of Science and 
Technology is also directed to assist the DNI in establishing 
goals for the elements of the intelligence community to meet 
its technology needs. Section 403 further provides for a report 
to Congress by the DNI containing a strategy for the 
development and use of technology in the intelligence community 
through 2021.

Section 404--Appointment and title of Chief Information Officer of the 
        Intelligence Community

    Section 404 clarifies that the Chief Information Officer 
for the DNI acts as the Chief Information Officer for the 
Intelligence Community, and provides that the position shall be 
directly appointed by the DNI.

Section 405--Leadership and location of certain offices and officials

    Section 405 includes the Director of the National 
Counterproliferation Center and the Director of the National 
Counterterrorism Center in the list of officers within the 
ODNI, and provides that the NCPC Director shall be appointed by 
the DNI.

Section 406--Eligibility for incentive awards of personnel assigned to 
        the Office of the Director of National Intelligence

    Section 406 permits the DNI to provide incentive awards to 
federal employees and military personnel assigned to the Office 
of the DNI.

Section 407--Repeal of certain authorities relating to the Office of 
        the National Counterintelligence Executive

    Section 407 makes conforming changes to incorporate the 
Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive into the 
Office of the DNI.

Section 408--Membership of the Director of National Intelligence on the 
        Transportation Security Oversight Board

    Section 408 adds the Director of National Intelligence to 
the Transportation Security Oversight Board.

Section 409--Temporary inapplicability to the Office of the Director of 
        National Intelligence of certain financial reporting 
        requirements

    Section 409 exempts the DNI from the legal requirement to 
submit an audited financial statement for Fiscal Year 2005 or 
2006 to facilitate transition to the DNI.

Section 410--Comprehensive inventory of special access programs

    Section 410 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees, by January 15, 2007, a classified 
comprehensive inventory of special access programs conducted 
within the National Intelligence Program.

Section 411--Sense of Congress on multi-level security clearances

    Section 411 expresses the Sense of Congress that the DNI 
should promptly examine the need for establishing and 
overseeing the implementation of a multi-level security 
clearance system across the intelligence community to leverage 
the cultural and linguistic skills of subject matter experts 
and individuals proficient in foreign languages critical to 
national security.

Section 412--Access to information by staff and members of the 
        Congressional Intelligence Committees

    Section 412 requires the DNI to provide members and staff 
of the Congressional Intelligence Committees with access to the 
JWICS computer network no later than 180 days after the date of 
enactment.

Section 413--Study on revoking pensions of persons who commit 
        unauthorized disclosures of classified information

    Section 412 requires the DNI to review whether current law 
or administrative authorities enable the revocation of pensions 
of persons who commit unauthorized disclosures of classified 
information.

                Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency


Section 421--Enhanced protection of Central Intelligence Agency sources 
        and methods from unauthorized disclosure

    Section 421 restores the independent authority to the 
Director of the CIA to protect intelligence sources and 
methods.

Section 422--Additional exception to foreign language proficiency 
        requirement for certain senior level positions in the Central 
        Intelligence Agency

    Section 422 ``grandfathers'' current Senior Intelligence 
Service personnel from certain new language proficiency 
requirements and permits waivers for individuals.

Section 423--Additional functions and authorities for protective 
        personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency

    Section 423 permits the CIA to provide a protective detail 
for the DNI and clarifies the arrest authorities of CIA 
protective personnel.

Section 424--Protective services for former officials of the 
        intelligence community

    Section 424 requires showing of a specific and credible 
threat to continue protective services to former senior 
intelligence community officials beginning one year after 
departure from the government.

Section 425--Strategic review process

    Section 425 provides that not later than September 30, 
2007, the DNI shall, in consultation with the heads of the 
elements of the intelligence community, manage and oversee the 
conduct of a strategic review of the intelligence community to 
develop intelligence capabilities required to address threats 
to national security and shall include estimates of the 
allocation of resources and structural change that should be 
reflected in future budget requests.

              Subtitle C--Defense Intelligence Components


Section 431--Enhancements of National Security Agency training program

    Section 431 clarifies that employees failing to maintain 
satisfactory academic performance in a contractually provided 
educational course of training shall be liable for repayment in 
lieu of any service obligation.

Section 432--Codification of authorities of National Security Agency 
        protective personnel

    Section 432 clarifies the arrest authorities of NSA 
protective personnel.

                       Subtitle D--Other Elements


Section 441--Clarification of inclusion of Coast Guard and Drug 
        Enforcement Administration elements in the Intelligence 
        Community

    Section 441 formally includes the Coast Guard and Drug 
Enforcement Administration in the list of Intelligence 
Community agencies included in the National Security Act.

Section 442--Clarifying amendments relating to section 105 of the 
        Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 2004

    Section 442 makes a technical correction relating to the 
DNI's authorities regarding intelligence activities at the 
Department of the Treasury.

                         Title V--OTHER MATTERS


Section 501--Aerial reconnaissance platforms

    Section 501 provides that the Secretary of Defense shall 
conduct a study and certify the mission capability of the 
Global Hawk RQ-4 platform prior to termination of the U-2 
platform program.

Section 502--Elimination of certain reporting requirements

    Section 502 eliminates certain reporting requirements that 
are encompassed in other reports or no longer necessary.

Section 503--Technical amendments to the National Security Act of 1947

    Section 503 makes technical amendments to the National 
Security Act of 1947.

Section 504--Technical clarification of certain references to Joint 
        Military Intelligence Program and Tactical Intelligence and 
        Related Activities

    Section 504 makes technical amendments clarifying 
transition from the Joint Military Intelligence Program and 
Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities to the Military 
Intelligence Program.

Section 505--Technical amendments to the Intelligence Reform and 
        Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004

    Section 505 makes technical amendments to the Intelligence 
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.

Section 506--Technical amendments to the Central Intelligence Agency 
        Act of 1949

    Section 506 makes technical amendments to the Central 
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949.

Section 507--Technical amendments relating to the Multiyear National 
        Intelligence Program

    Section 507 makes technical amendments to the Multiyear 
National Intelligence Program.

Section 508--Technical amendments relating to the Executive Schedule

    Section 508 makes technical amendments to the Executive 
Schedule.

Section 509--Technical amendments relating to Redesignation of the 
        National Imagery and Mapping Agency as the National Geospatial-
        Intelligence Agency

    Section 509 makes technical amendments relating to 
redesignation of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency as the 
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

                 Oversight Findings and Recommendations

    With respect to clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, the Committee held three hearings 
on the classified budgetary issues raised by H.R. 5020. 
Testimony was taken from the Director of National Intelligence 
and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. Such 
testimony related to the activities and plans of the 
Intelligence Community covered by the provisions and 
authorizations, both classified and unclassified, of the 
`Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007.' The 
bill, as reported by the Committee, reflects conclusions 
reached by the Committee in light of this oversight activity.

                General Performance Goals and Objectives

    In accordance with Clause (3)(c) of House rule XIII, the 
Committee's performance goals and objectives are reflected in 
the descriptive portions of this report.

                   Constitutional Authority Statement

    The intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the 
United States government are carried out to support the 
national security interests of the United States, to support 
and assist the armed forces of the United States, and to 
support the President in the execution of the foreign policy of 
the United States.
    Article 1, section 8 of the Constitution of the United 
States provides, in pertinent part, that ``Congress shall have 
power * * * to pay the debts and provide for the common defence 
and general welfare of the United States; * * *''; ``to raise 
and support Armies, * * *'' ``to provide and maintain a Navy; * 
* *'' and ``to make all laws which shall be necessary and 
proper for carrying into execution * * * all other powers 
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United 
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.''

                       Unfunded Mandate Statement

    Section 423 of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment 
Control Act (as amended by Section 101(a)(2) of the Unfunded 
Mandates Reform Act, P.L. 104-4) requires a statement of 
whether the provisions of the reported bill include unfunded 
mandates. In compliance with this requirement, the Committee 
has received a letter from the Congressional Budget Office 
included herein.

     Budget Authority and Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate

    With respect to the requirements of clause 3(c)(2) of rule 
XIII of the House of Representatives and section 308(a) of the 
Congressional Budget Act of 1974 and with respect to 
requirements of 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the House of 
Representatives and section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act 
of 1974, the Committee has received the following cost estimate 
for H.R. 5020 from the Director of the Congressional Budget 
Office:

                                     U.S. Congress,
                               Congressional Budget Office,
                                     Washington, DC, April 6, 2006.
Hon. Peter Hoekstra,
Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has 
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 5020, the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007.
    If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be 
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Jason 
Wheelock.
            Sincerely,
                                          Donald B. Marron,
                                                   Acting Director.
    Enclosure.

H.R. 5020--Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007

    H.R. 5020 would authorize appropriations for fiscal year 
2007 for intelligence activities of the U.S. government, the 
Intelligence Community Management Account, and the Central 
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System (CIARDS).
    This estimate addresses only the unclassified portion of 
the bill. On that limited basis, CBO estimates that 
implementing certain provisions of the bill would cost $550 
million in 2007 and just under $1 billion over the 2007-2011 
period, assuming appropriation of the necessary funds, as shown 
in the following table.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                       By fiscal year, in millions of dollars--
                                                                    --------------------------------------------
                                                                       2007     2008     2009     2010     2011
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                CHANGES IN SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATIONS \1\

Intelligence Community Management Account:
    Authorization Level............................................      990        0        0        0        0
    Estimated Outlays..............................................      545      347       69       20        9
CIARDS: \2\
    Estimated Authorization Level..................................        5        0        0        0        0
    Estimated Outlays..............................................        5        0        0        0        0
Total Changes:
    Estimated Authorization Level..................................      995        0        0        0        0
    Estimated Outlays..............................................      550      347       69       20        0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ In addition to effects on spending subject to appropriation, H.R. 5020 would affect direct spending.
  However, CBO cannot estimate those effects because the data needed to prepare an estimate are classified.
\2\ CBO's March 2006 baseline assumes a mandatory appropriation of $251 million in 2007 for CIARDS. H.R. 5020
  would provide an authorization of $256 million for that year.

    Section 104 would authorize the appropriation of $990 
million for the Intelligence Community Management Account, 
which provides the principal source of funding for the Office 
of the Director of National Intelligence and provides resources 
for coordination of programs, budget oversight, and management 
of the intelligence agencies. CBO estimates that implementing 
this provision would cost $545 million in 2007 and $980 million 
over the 2007-2011 period, assuming appropriation of the 
specified amounts.
    Section 201 would authorize a mandatory appropriation of 
$256 million to CIARDS to cover retirement costs attributable 
to military service and various unfunded liabilities. This 
authorization is above CBO's March 2006 baseline and would 
increase outlays by $5 million in 2007 over that baseline, 
assuming appropriation of the authorized amount.
    Section 305 would authorize elements of the Intelligence 
Community to accept and spend reimbursements from private 
parties and employees of the Intelligence Community who damage 
equipment purchased through appropriated funds or default on 
the terms of any form of education assistance provided by such 
elements. Since these reimbursements would otherwise be 
returned to the Treasury, this section would affect direct 
spending. However, CBO cannot provide an estimate as the data 
necessary to estimate the impact of this provision are 
classified.
    The unclassified sections of this bill contain no 
intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in the 
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and would not affect the budgets 
of state, local, or tribal governments.
    The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Jason Wheelock. 
This estimate was approved by Peter H. Fontaine, Deputy 
Assistant Director for Budget Analysis.

         Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported

  In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by 
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law 
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new 
matter is printed in italic, existing law in which no change is 
proposed is shown in roman):

                     NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947


  Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of America in Congress assembled,

                              short title

  That this Act may be cited as the ``National Security Act of 
1947''.

                            TABLE OF CONTENTS

Sec. 2. Declaration of policy.

               Title I--Coordination for National Security

     * * * * * * *
[Sec. 114A. Annual report on improvement of financial statements for 
          auditing purposes.]
     * * * * * * *
[Sec. 118. Semiannual report on financial intelligence on terrorist 
          assets.]
     * * * * * * *

                        Title III--Miscellaneous

Sec. 301. National Security Agency voluntary separation.
[Sec. 301. Compensation of Secretaries.]
     * * * * * * *
[Sec. 302. Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries.]
     * * * * * * *
[Sec. 304. Status of transferred civilian personnel.
[Sec. 305. Saving provisions.
[Sec. 306. Transfer of funds.]
Sec. 304. Protective services for former officials of the intelligence 
          community.
     * * * * * * *

                       TITLE XI--OTHER PROVISIONS

Sec. 1101. Applicability to United States intelligence activities of 
          Federal laws implementing international treaties and 
          agreements.
     * * * * * * *
Sec. 1103. Retention and use of amounts paid as debts to elements of the 
          intelligence community.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                              DEFINITIONS

  Sec. 3. As used in this Act:
          (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          (4) The term ``intelligence community'' includes the 
        following:
                  (A) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                  (H) The intelligence elements of the Army, 
                the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, the 
                Coast Guard, the Federal Bureau of 
                Investigation, the Drug Enforcement 
                Administration, and the Department of Energy.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                  (K) The elements of the Department of 
                Homeland Security concerned with the analysis 
                of intelligence information[, including the 
                Office of Intelligence of the Coast Guard].
                  (L) Such other elements of any [other] 
                department or agency as may be designated by 
                the President, or designated jointly by the 
                Director of National Intelligence and the head 
                of the department or agency concerned, as an 
                element of the intelligence community.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


TITLE I--COORDINATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


     RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITIES OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL 
                              INTELLIGENCE

  Sec. 102A. (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (c) Budget Authorities.--(1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (3)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall 
participate in the development by the Secretary of Defense of 
the [annual budgets for the Joint Military Intelligence Program 
and for Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities] annual 
budget for the Military Intelligence Program or any successor 
program or programs.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (7)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall provide a 
semi-annual report, beginning April 1, 2005, and ending April 
1, 2007, to the President and the Congress regarding 
implementation of this [section] subsection.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (d) Role of Director of National Intelligence in Transfer and 
Reprogramming of Funds.--(1)(A) * * *
  (B) The Secretary of Defense shall consult with the Director 
of National Intelligence before transferring or reprogramming 
funds made available under the [Joint Military Intelligence 
Program] Military Intelligence Program or any successor program 
or programs.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (3) The Director of National Intelligence may only transfer 
or reprogram funds referred to in [subparagraph (A)] paragraph 
(1)(A)--
          (A) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (5)(A) A transfer or reprogramming of funds [or personnel] 
may be made under this subsection only if--
          (i) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (B) A transfer or reprogramming may be made without regard to 
a limitation set forth in clause (iv) or (v) of subparagraph 
(A) if the transfer has the concurrence of the head of the 
department involved or the Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency (in the case of the Central Intelligence Agency). The 
authority to provide such concurrence may only be delegated by 
the head of the department [or agency involved] involved or the 
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (in the case of the 
Central Intelligence Agency) to the deputy of such officer.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (f) Tasking and Other Authorities.--(1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (9) Not later than September 30, 2007, and every four years 
thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence shall, in 
consultation with the heads of the elements of the intelligence 
community, manage and oversee the conduct of a strategic review 
of the intelligence community to develop intelligence 
capabilities required to address threats to national security. 
Such review shall analyze near-term, mid-term, and future 
threats to national security and shall include estimates of the 
allocation of resources and structural change that should be 
reflected in future budget requests.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (l) Enhanced Personnel Management.--(1) * * *
  (2)(A) * * *
  (B) The Director may prescribe regulations to carry out this 
[section] paragraph.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


            OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

  Sec. 103. (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (c) Composition.--The Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence is composed of the following:
          (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          (9) The Chief Information Officer of the intelligence 
        community.
          (10) The Inspector General of the intelligence 
        community.
          (11) The Director of the National Counterterrorism 
        Center.
          (12) The Director of the National Counter 
        Proliferation Center.
          [(9)] (13) Such other offices and officials as may be 
        established by law or the Director may establish or 
        designate in the Office, including national 
        intelligence centers.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (e) Limitation on Co-Location [With] of Headquarters With 
Headquarters of Other Elements of Intelligence Community.--
Commencing as of October 1, 2008, the headquarters of the 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence may not be co-
located with [any other element] the headquarters of any other 
element of the intelligence community.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                   DIRECTOR OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

  Sec. 103E. (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (c) Duties.--The Director of Science and Technology shall--
          (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          (4) assist the Director on the science and technology 
        elements of the budget of the Office of the Director of 
        National Intelligence; [and]
          (5) assist the Director in establishing goals for the 
        elements of the intelligence community to meet the 
        technology needs of the intelligence community; and
          [(5)] (6) perform other such duties as may be 
        prescribed by the Director of National Intelligence or 
        specified by law.
  (d) Director of National Intelligence Science and Technology 
Committee.--(1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (3) The Committee shall--
          (A) coordinate and prioritize advances in research 
        and development related to intelligence; and

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (4) In carrying out paragraph (3)(A), the Committee shall 
identify basic, advanced, and applied research programs to be 
carried out by elements of the intelligence community.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (e) Goals for Technology Needs of Intelligence Community.--In 
carrying out subsection (c)(5), the Director of Science and 
Technology shall--
          (1) systematically identify and assess the most 
        significant intelligence challenges that require 
        technical solutions; and
          (2) examine options to enhance the responsiveness of 
        research and design programs of elements of the 
        intelligence community to meet the requirements of the 
        intelligence community for timely support.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                       CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER

  Sec. 103G. (a) Chief Information Officer.--To assist the 
Director of National Intelligence in carrying out the 
responsibilities of the Director under this Act and other 
applicable provisions of law, there shall be within the Office 
of the Director of National Intelligence a Chief Information 
Officer of the Intelligence Community who shall be appointed by 
[the President, by and with the advice and consent of the 
Senate] the Director of National Intelligence.
  (b) Chief Information Officer of Intelligence Community.--The 
Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community shall 
serve as the chief information officer of the intelligence 
community.
  (c) Duties and Responsibilities.--Subject to the direction of 
the Director of National Intelligence, the Chief Information 
Officer of the Intelligence Community shall--
          (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (d) Prohibition on Simultaneous Service as Other Chief 
Information Officer.--An individual serving in the position of 
Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community may 
not, while so serving, serve as the chief information officer 
of any other department or agency, or component thereof, of the 
United States Government.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


              DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

  Sec. 104A. (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (d) Responsibilities.--The Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency shall--
          (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          (3) provide overall direction for and coordination of 
        the collection of national intelligence outside the 
        United States through human sources by elements of the 
        intelligence community authorized to undertake such 
        collection and, in coordination with other departments, 
        agencies, or elements of the United States Government 
        which are authorized to undertake such collection, 
        ensure that the most effective use is made of resources 
        and that appropriate account is taken of the risks to 
        the United States and those involved in such 
        collection; [and]
          (4) protect intelligence sources and methods of the 
        Central Intelligence Agency from unauthorized 
        disclosure, consistent with any direction issued by the 
        President or the Director of National Intelligence; and
          [(4)] (5) perform such other functions and duties 
        related to intelligence affecting the national security 
        as the President or the Director of National 
        Intelligence may direct.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (g) Foreign Language Proficiency for Certain Senior Level 
Positions in Central Intelligence Agency.--(1) Except as 
provided pursuant to [paragraph (2)] paragraphs (2) and (3), an 
individual may not be appointed to a position in the Senior 
Intelligence Service in the Directorate of Intelligence or the 
Directorate of Operations of the Central Intelligence Agency 
unless the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency 
determines that the individual--
          (A) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (2) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency may, in 
the discretion of the Director, waive the application of 
paragraph (1) to any [position or category of positions] 
individual, individuals, position, or category of positions 
otherwise covered by that paragraph if the Director determines 
that foreign language proficiency is not necessary for the 
successful performance of the duties and responsibilities of 
such [position or category of positions] individual, 
individuals, position, or category of positions.
  (3) Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any individual in the 
Directorate of Intelligence or the Directorate of Operations of 
the Central Intelligence Agency who is serving in a Senior 
Intelligence Service position as of December 23, 2005, 
regardless of whether such individual is a member of the Senior 
Intelligence Service.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


      RESTRICTIONS ON INTELLIGENCE SHARING WITH THE UNITED NATIONS

  Sec. 112. (a) * * *
  [(b) Annual and Special Reports.--(1) The President shall 
report annually to the appropriate committees of Congress on 
the types and volume of intelligence provided to the United 
Nations and the purposes for which it was provided during the 
period covered by the report. The President shall also report 
to the appropriate committees of Congress within 15 days after 
it has become known to the United States Government that there 
has been an unauthorized disclosure of intelligence provided by 
the United States to the United Nations.
  [(2) The requirement for periodic reports under the first 
sentence of paragraph (1) shall not apply to the provision of 
intelligence that is provided only to, and for the use of, 
appropriately cleared United States Government personnel 
serving with the United Nations.
  [(3) In the case of the annual reports required to be 
submitted under the first sentence of paragraph (1) to the 
congressional intelligence committees, the submittal dates for 
such reports shall be as provided in section 507.]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


  [ANNUAL REPORT ON IMPROVEMENT OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR AUDITING 
                                PURPOSES

  [Sec. 114A. Not later each year than the date provided in 
section 507, the Director of National Intelligence, the 
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of 
the National Security Agency, the Director of the Defense 
Intelligence Agency, and the Director of the National Imagery 
and Mapping Agency shall each submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees a report describing the activities 
being undertaken by such official to ensure that the financial 
statements of such agency can be audited in accordance with 
applicable law and requirements of the Office of Management and 
Budget.]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


   TRAVEL ON ANY COMMON CARRIER FOR CERTAIN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION 
                               PERSONNEL

  Sec. 116. (a) * * *
  (b) Authorized Delegation of Duty.--(1) The Director of 
National Intelligence [may only delegate the authority granted 
by this section to the Principal Deputy Director of National 
Intelligence, or with respect to employees of the Central 
Intelligence Agency, to the Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency.] may delegate the authority in subsection 
(a) to the head of any other element of the intelligence 
community.
  (2) The head of an element of the intelligence community to 
whom the authority in subsection (a) is delegated pursuant to 
paragraph (1) may further delegate such authority to such 
senior officials of such element as are specified in guidelines 
prescribed by the Director of National Intelligence for 
purposes of this paragraph.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


    [SEMIANNUAL REPORT ON FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE ON TERRORIST ASSETS

  [Sec. 118. (a) Semiannual Report.--On a semiannual basis, the 
Secretary of the Treasury (acting through the head of the 
Office of Intelligence Support) shall submit a report to the 
appropriate congressional committees that fully informs the 
committees concerning operations against terrorist financial 
networks. Each such report shall include with respect to the 
preceding six-month period--
          [(1) the total number of asset seizures, 
        designations, and other actions against individuals or 
        entities found to have engaged in financial support of 
        terrorism;
          [(2) the total number of applications for asset 
        seizure and designations of individuals or entities 
        suspected of having engaged in financial support of 
        terrorist activities that were granted, modified, or 
        denied;
          [(3) the total number of physical searches of 
        offices, residences, or financial records of 
        individuals or entities suspected of having engaged in 
        financial support for terrorist activity; and
          [(4) whether the financial intelligence information 
        seized in these cases has been shared on a full and 
        timely basis with the all departments, agencies, and 
        other entities of the United States Government involved 
        in intelligence activities participating in the Foreign 
        Terrorist Asset Tracking Center.
  [(b) Immediate Notification for Emergency Designation.--In 
the case of a designation of an individual or entity, or the 
assets of an individual or entity, as having been found to have 
engaged in terrorist activities, the Secretary of the Treasury 
shall report such designation within 24 hours of such a 
designation to the appropriate congressional committees.
  [(c) Submittal Date of Reports to Congressional Intelligence 
Committees.--In the case of the reports required to be 
submitted under subsection (a) to the congressional 
intelligence committees, the submittal dates for such reports 
shall be as provided in section 507.
  [(d) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this 
section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
means the following:
          [(1) The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 
        the Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on 
        Financial Services of the House of Representatives.
          [(2) The Select Committee on Intelligence, the 
        Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on 
        Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate.]

                    NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER

  Sec. 119. (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (c) Reporting.--(1) * * *
  (2) The matters described in this paragraph are as follows:
          (A) * * *
          (B) The activities of the Directorate of Intelligence 
        of the National Counterterrorism Center under 
        subsection [(h)] (i).

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                 NATIONAL COUNTER PROLIFERATION CENTER

  Sec. 119A. (a) [Establishment.--Not later than 18 months 
after the date of the enactment of the National Security 
Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, the] (1) Establishment.--The 
President shall establish a National Counter Proliferation 
Center, taking into account all appropriate government tools to 
prevent and halt the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials and 
technologies.
  (2) Director.--The head of the National Counter Proliferation 
Center shall be the Director of the National Counter 
Proliferation Center, who shall be appointed by the Director of 
National Intelligence.
  (3) Location.--The National Counter Proliferation Center 
shall be located within the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


TITLE III--MISCELLANEOUS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


 PROTECTIVE SERVICES FOR FORMER OFFICIALS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

  Sec. 304. (a) In General.--Subject to subsection (b), the 
head of an element of the intelligence community may not 
provide personnel for the protection of a former official of an 
element of the intelligence community unless--
  (1) there is a specific and credible threat to such former 
official arising from the service of such former official to 
the United States; and
  (2) such head of an element of the intelligence community 
submits to the Director of National Intelligence notice of the 
intention to provide such personnel and an assessment of--
          (A) the threat to such former official; and
          (B) the level of protective services necessary to 
        protect such former official based on such threat.
  (b) Exception for Recent Termination of Employment.--The head 
of an element of the intelligence community may provide 
personnel for the protection of a former official of an element 
of the intelligence community without a specific and credible 
threat to such former official for not more than one year after 
the termination of the employment of such former official if 
such former official requests such protection.
  (c) Threat Assessment Updates.--Not later than 180 days after 
the date on which the head of an element of the intelligence 
community begins providing personnel for the protection of a 
former official of an element of the intelligence community, 
and at least every 180 days thereafter until such head of an 
element of the intelligence community determines that there is 
no longer a threat to such former official, such head of an 
element of the intelligence community shall submit to the 
Director of National Intelligence an updated assessment of the 
threat to such former official and the level of protective 
services necessary to protect such former official based on 
such threat.
  (d) Termination of Protective Services.--If the head of an 
element of the intelligence community that is providing 
personnel for the protection of a former official of an element 
of the intelligence community pursuant to subsection (a) 
determines that there is no longer a threat to such former 
official, such head of an element of the intelligence community 
shall cease providing personnel for the protection of such 
former official not later than 30 days after determining such 
threat no longer exists.
  (e) Report.--Not later than 7 days after the date on which 
the head of an element of the intelligence community begins 
providing personnel for the protection of a former official of 
an element of the intelligence community, the Director of 
National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees notice of the provision of personnel 
for the protection of such former official.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


TITLE XI--ADDITIONAL MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


     RETENTION AND USE OF AMOUNTS PAID AS DEBTS TO ELEMENTS OF THE 
                         INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

  Sec. 1103. (a) Authority to Retain Amounts Paid.--
Notwithstanding section 3302 of title 31, United States Code, 
or any other provision of law, the head of an element of the 
intelligence community may retain amounts paid or reimbursed to 
the United States, including amounts paid by an employee of the 
Federal Government from personal funds, for repayment of a debt 
owed to the element of the intelligence community.
  (b) Crediting of Amounts Retained.--(1) Amounts retained 
under subsection (a) shall be credited to the current 
appropriation or account from which such funds were derived or 
whose expenditure formed the basis for the underlying activity 
from which the debt concerned arose.
  (2) Amounts credited to an appropriation or account under 
paragraph (1) shall be merged with amounts in such 
appropriation or account, and shall be available in accordance 
with subsection (c).
  (c) Availability of Amounts.--Amounts credited to an 
appropriation or account under subsection (b) with respect to a 
debt owed to an element of the intelligence community shall be 
available to the head of such element, for such time as is 
applicable to amounts in such appropriation or account, or such 
longer time as may be provided by law, for purposes as follows:
          (1) In the case of a debt arising from lost or 
        damaged property of such element, the repair of such 
        property or the replacement of such property with 
        alternative property that will perform the same or 
        similar functions as such property.
          (2) The funding of any other activities authorized to 
        be funded by such appropriation or account.
  (d) Debt Owed to an Element of the Intelligence Community 
Defined.--In this section, the term ``debt owed to an element 
of the intelligence community'' means any of the following:
          (1) A debt owed to an element of the intelligence 
        community by an employee or former employee of such 
        element for the negligent or willful loss of or damage 
        to property of such element that was procured by such 
        element using appropriated funds.
          (2) A debt owed to an element of the intelligence 
        community by an employee or former employee of such 
        element as repayment for default on the terms and 
        conditions associated with a scholarship, fellowship, 
        or other educational assistance provided to such 
        individual by such element, whether in exchange for 
        future services or otherwise, using appropriated funds.
          (3) Any other debt or repayment owed to an element of 
        the intelligence community by a private person or 
        entity by reason of the negligent or willful action of 
        such person or entity, as determined by a court of 
        competent jurisdiction or in a lawful administrative 
        proceeding.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


           INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT OF FISCAL YEAR 2004



           *       *       *       *       *       *       *
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 105. OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE 
                    TREASURY.

  (a) * * *
  (b) Construction of Authority.--Nothing in section 311 of 
title 31, United States Code (as amended by subsection (a)), or 
in section 313 of such title, shall be construed to alter the 
authorities and responsibilities of the [Director of Central 
Intelligence] Director of National Intelligence with respect to 
the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of 
the Treasury as an element of the intelligence community.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 404. PURCHASES BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OF PRODUCTS OF 
                    FEDERAL PRISON INDUSTRIES.

  Notwithstanding section 4124 of title 18, United States Code, 
purchases [by the Central Intelligence Agency] by an element of 
the intelligence community (as defined in section 3(4) of the 
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4))) from Federal 
Prison Industries shall be made only if [the Director of the 
Central Intelligence Agency determines that the product or 
service] the head of that element determines that the product 
or service (including a surveying or mapping service) to be 
purchased from Federal Prison Industries best meets the needs 
of the Agency.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


 SECTION 402 OF THE INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1984

                    eligibility for incentive awards

  Sec. 402. [(a) The Director of Central Intelligence may 
exercise the authority granted in section 4503 of title 5, 
United States Code, with respect to Federal employees and 
members of the Armed Forces detailed or assigned to the Central 
Intelligence Agency or to the Intelligence Community Staff, in 
the same manner as such authority may be exercised with respect 
to the personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency and the 
Intelligence Community Staff.]
  (a) Authority for Payment of Awards.--(1) The Director of 
National Intelligence may exercise the authority granted in 
section 4503 of title 5, United States Code, with respect to 
Federal employees and members of the Armed Forces detailed or 
assigned to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
in the same manner as such authority may be exercised with 
respect to personnel of the Office.
  (2) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency may 
exercise the authority granted in section 4503 of title 5, 
United States Code, with respect to Federal employees and 
members of the Armed Forces detailed or assigned to the Central 
Intelligence Agency in the same manner as such authority may be 
exercised with respect to personnel of the Agency.
  (b) Personnel Eligible for Awards.--The authority granted by 
[subsection (a) of this section] subsection (a) may be 
exercised with respect to Federal employees or members of the 
Armed Forces detailed or assigned [to the Central Intelligence 
Agency or to the Intelligence Community Staff] to the Office of 
the Director of National Intelligence or to the Central 
Intelligence Agency on or after [a date five years before the 
date of enactment of this section] December 9, 1978.
  [(c) During fiscal year 1987, the Director of Central 
Intelligence may exercise the authority granted in section 
4503(2) of title 5, United States Code, with respect to members 
of the Armed Forces who are assigned to foreign intelligence 
duties at the time of the conduct which gives rise to the 
exercise of such authority.]
  [(d)] (c) Payment and Acceptance of Awards.--An award made by 
the [Director of Central Intelligence] Director of National 
Intelligence or Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to 
an employee or member of the Armed Forces under the authority 
of section 4503 of title 5, United States Code, or this section 
may be paid and accepted notwithstanding--
          (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


     SECTION 904 OF THE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ENHANCEMENT ACT OF 2002

SEC. 904. OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE.

  (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  [(d) General Counsel.--(1) There shall be in the Office of 
the National Counterintelligence Executive a general counsel 
who shall serve as principal legal advisor to the National 
Counterintelligence Executive.
  [(2) The general counsel shall--
          [(A) provide legal advice and counsel to the 
        Executive on matters relating to functions of the 
        Office;
          [(B) ensure that the Office complies with all 
        applicable laws, regulations, Executive orders, and 
        guidelines; and
          [(C) carry out such other duties as the Executive may 
        specify.]
  [(e)] (d) Functions.--Subject to the direction and control of 
the National Counterintelligence Executive, the functions of 
the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive shall 
be as follows:
          (1) National threat identification and prioritization 
        assessment.--Subject to subsection [(f)] (e), in 
        consultation with appropriate department and agencies 
        of the United States Government, and private sector 
        entities, to produce on an annual basis a strategic 
        planning assessment of the counterintelligence 
        requirements of the United States to be known as the 
        National Threat Identification and Prioritization 
        Assessment.
          (2) National counterintelligence strategy.--Subject 
        to subsection [(f)] (e), in consultation with 
        appropriate department and agencies of the United 
        States Government, and private sector entities, and 
        based on the most current National Threat 
        Identification and Prioritization Assessment under 
        paragraph (1), to produce on an annual basis a strategy 
        for the counterintelligence programs and activities of 
        the United States Government to be known as the 
        National Counterintelligence Strategy.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  [(f)] (e) Additional Requirements Regarding National Threat 
Identification and Prioritization Assessment and National 
Counterintelligence Strategy.--(1) * * *
  (2) A National Counterintelligence Strategy under subsection 
[(e)(2)] (d)(2), and any modification of such strategy, shall 
not go into effect until approved by the President.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  [(g) Personnel.--(1) Personnel of the Office of the National 
Counterintelligence Executive may consist of personnel employed 
by the Office or personnel on detail from any other department, 
agency, or element of the Federal Government. Any such detail 
may be on a reimbursable or nonreimbursable basis, at the 
election of the head of the agency detailing such personnel.
  [(2) Notwithstanding section 104(d) or any other provision of 
law limiting the period of the detail of personnel on a 
nonreimbursable basis, the detail of an officer or employee of 
United States or a member of the Armed Forces under paragraph 
(1) on a nonreimbursable basis may be for any period in excess 
of one year that the National Counterintelligence Executive and 
the head of the department, agency, or element concerned 
consider appropriate.
  [(3) The employment of personnel by the Office, including the 
appointment, compensation and benefits, management, and 
separation of such personnel, shall be governed by the 
provisions of law on such matters with respect to the personnel 
of the Central Intelligence Agency, except that, for purposes 
of the applicability of such provisions of law to personnel of 
the Office, the National Counterintelligence Executive shall be 
treated as the head of the Office.
  [(4) Positions in the Office shall be excepted service 
positions for purposes of title 5, United States Code.
  [(h) Support.--(1) The Attorney General, Secretary of 
Defense, and Director of National Intelligence may each provide 
the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive such 
support as may be necessary to permit the Office to carry out 
its functions under this section.
  [(2) Subject to any terms and conditions specified by the 
Director of National Intelligence, the Director may provide 
administrative and contract support to the Office as if the 
Office were an element of the Central Intelligence Agency.
  [(3) Support provided under this subsection may be provided 
on a reimbursable or nonreimbursable basis, at the election of 
the official providing such support.
  [(i) Availability of Funds for Reimbursement.--The National 
Counterintelligence Executive may, from amounts available for 
the Office, transfer to a department or agency detailing 
personnel under subsection (g), or providing support under 
subsection (h), on a reimbursable basis amounts appropriate to 
reimburse such department or agency for the detail of such 
personnel or the provision of such support, as the case may be.
  [(j) Contracts.--(1) Subject to paragraph (2), the National 
Counterintelligence Executive may enter into any contract, 
lease, cooperative agreement, or other transaction that the 
Executive considers appropriate to carry out the functions of 
the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive under 
this section.
  [(2) The authority under paragraph (1) to enter into 
contracts, leases, cooperative agreements, and other 
transactions shall be subject to any terms, conditions, and 
limitations applicable to the Central Intelligence Agency under 
law with respect to similar contracts, leases, cooperative 
agreements, and other transactions.]
  [(k)] (f) Treatment of Activities Under Certain 
Administrative Laws.--The files of the Office shall be treated 
as operational files of the Central Intelligence Agency for 
purposes of section 701 of the National Security Act of 1947 
(50 U.S.C. 431) to the extent such files meet criteria under 
subsection (b) of that section for treatment of files as 
operational files of an element of the Agency.
  [(l)] (g) Oversight by Congress.--The location of the Office 
of the National Counterintelligence Executive within the Office 
of the Director of National Intelligence shall not be construed 
as affecting access by Congress, or any committee of Congress, 
to--
          (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  [(m)] (h) Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be 
construed as affecting the authority of the Director of 
National Intelligence, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary 
of State, the Attorney General, or the Director of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation as provided or specified under the 
National Security Act of 1947 or under other provisions of law.
                              ----------                              


              SECTION 115 OF TITLE 49, UNITED STATES CODE

Sec. 115. Transportation Security Oversight Board

  (a) * * *
  (b) Membership.--
          (1) Number and appointment.--The Board shall be 
        composed of 7 members as follows:
                  (A) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                  [(F) The Director of the Central Intelligence 
                Agency, or the Director's designee.]
                  (F) The Director of National Intelligence, or 
                the Director's designee.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


                CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949



           *       *       *       *       *       *       *
                          general authorities

  Sec. 5. (a) In General.--In the performance of its functions, 
the Central Intelligence Agency is authorized to--
  (1) Transfer to and receive from other Government agencies 
such sums as may be approved by the Office of Management and 
Budget, for the performance of any of the functions or 
activities [authorized under paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 
102(a), subsections (c)(7) and (d) of section 103, subsections 
(a) and (g) of section 104, and section 303 of the National 
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403(a)(2), (3), 403-3(c)(7), 
(d), 403-4(a), (g), and 405)] authorized under subsections (c), 
(d), (e), and (f) of section 104A of the National Security Act 
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4a), and any other Government agency is 
authorized to transfer to or receive from the Agency such sums 
without regard to any provisions of law limiting or prohibiting 
transfers between appropriations. Sums transferred to the 
Agency in accordance with this paragraph may be expended for 
the purposes and under the authority of this Act without regard 
to limitations of appropriations from which transferred;

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (4) Authorize personnel designated by the Director to carry 
firearms to the extent necessary for the performance of the 
Agency's authorized functions, except that, within the United 
States, such authority shall be limited to the purposes of 
protection of classified materials and information, the 
training of Agency personnel and other authorized persons in 
the use of firearms, the protection of Agency installations and 
property, [and the protection] the protection of current and 
former Agency personnel and their immediate families, defectors 
and their immediate families, and other persons in the United 
States under Agency auspices[;], and the protection of the 
Director of National Intelligence and such personnel of the 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence as the Director 
of National Intelligence may designate;

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  Sec. 6. In the interests of the security of the foreign 
intelligence activities of the United States and in order 
further to implement [section 102A(i) of the National Security 
Act of 1947 that the Director of National Intelligence shall be 
responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods 
from unauthorized disclosure] sections 102A(i) and 104A(d)(4) 
of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1(i), 403-
4a(d)(4)), the Agency shall be exempted from the provisions of 
sections 1 and 2, chapter 795 of the Act of August 28, 1935 (49 
Stat. 956, 957; 5 U.S.C. 654), and the provisions of any other 
laws which require the publication or disclosure of the 
organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries, or 
numbers of personnel employed by the Agency: Provided, That in 
furtherance of this section, the Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget shall make no reports to the Congress in 
connection with the Agency under section 607, title VI, chapter 
212 of the Act of June 30, 1945, as amended (5 U.S.C. 947(b)).

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


     SECTION 201 OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT ACT

SEC. 201. THE CIARDS SYSTEM.

  (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (c) Finality of Decisions [of DCI].--In the interests of the 
security of the foreign intelligence activities of the United 
States and in order further to implement [section 102A(i)] 
sections 102A(i) and 104A(d)(4) of the National Security Act of 
1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(1)) that the Director [of National 
Intelligence] shall be responsible for protecting intelligence 
sources and methods of the Central Intelligence Agency from 
unauthorized disclosure, and notwithstanding the provisions of 
chapter 7 of title 5, United States Code, or any other 
provision of law (except section 305(b) of this Act), any 
determination by the Director authorized by this Act shall be 
final and conclusive and shall not be subject to review by any 
court.
                              ----------                              


 SECTION 611 OF THE INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005

SEC. 611. FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY FOR CERTAIN SENIOR LEVEL 
                    POSITIONS IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

  (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (c) Report on Waivers.--The Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency shall submit to Congress a report that 
identifies individuals or positions within the Senior 
Intelligence Service in the Directorate of Intelligence or the 
Directorate of Operations of the Central Intelligence Agency 
that are determined by the Director to require waiver from the 
requirements of section 104A(g) of the National Security Act of 
1947, as added by subsection (a). The report shall include a 
rationale for any waiver granted under section 104A(g)(2), as 
so added, for each [position or category of positions] 
individual, individuals, position, or category of positions so 
identified.
                              ----------                              


              CHAPTER 203 OF TITLE 18, UNITED STATES CODE

                   CHAPTER 203--ARREST AND COMMITMENT

Sec.
3041.  Power of courts and magistrates.
     * * * * * * *
3064.  Powers of Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration.
3065.  Powers of authorized personnel in the Central Intelligence 
          Agency.
3066.  Powers of authorized personnel in the National Security Agency.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 3065. Powers of authorized personnel in the Central Intelligence 
                    Agency

  (a) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency may issue 
regulations to allow personnel designated to carry out 
protective functions for the Central Intelligence Agency under 
section 5(a)(4) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 
(50 U.S.C. 403f) to, while engaged in such protective 
functions, make arrests without a warrant for any offense 
against the United States committed in the presence of such 
personnel, or for any felony cognizable under the laws of the 
United States, if such personnel have probable cause to believe 
that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing 
that felony offense.
  (b) The powers granted under subsection (a) may be exercised 
only in accordance with guidelines approved by the Attorney 
General.

Sec. 3066. Powers of authorized personnel in the National Security 
                    Agency

  (a) The Director of the National Security Agency may issue 
regulations to allow personnel designated to carry out 
protective functions for the Agency to--
          (1) carry firearms; and
          (2) make arrests without warrant for any offense 
        against the United States committed in the presence of 
        such personnel, or for any felony cognizable under the 
        laws of the United States, if such personnel have 
        probable cause to believe that the person to be 
        arrested has committed or is committing that felony 
        offense.
  (b) The powers granted under subsection (a) may be exercised 
only in accordance with guidelines approved by the Attorney 
General.
                              ----------                              


                  NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY ACT OF 1959



           *       *       *       *       *       *       *
  Sec. 16. (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (d)(1) To be eligible for assignment under subsection (b), an 
employee of the Agency must agree in writing--
          (A) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          (C) to reimburse the United States for the total cost 
        of education (excluding the employee's pay and 
        allowances) provided under this section to the employee 
        if, prior to the employee's completing the educational 
        course of training for which the employee is assigned, 
        the assignment or the employee's employment with the 
        Agency is [terminated either by the Agency due to 
        misconduct by the employee or by the employee 
        voluntarily; and] terminated--
                  (i) by the Agency due to misconduct by the 
                employee;
                  (ii) by the employee voluntarily; or
                  (iii) by the Agency for the failure of the 
                employee to maintain such level of academic 
                standing in the educational course of training 
                as the Director of the National Security Agency 
                shall have specified in the agreement of the 
                employee under this subsection; and

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (e)[(1) When an employee is assigned under this section to an 
institution, the Agency shall disclose to the institution to 
which the employee is assigned that the Agency employs the 
employee and that the Agency funds the employee's education.]
  [(2) Agency efforts] Agency efforts to recruit individuals at 
educational institutions for participation in the undergraduate 
training program established by this section shall be made 
openly and according to the common practices of universities 
and employers recruiting at such institutions.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  Sec. 20. (a) The Director is authorized to designate 
personnel of the Agency to perform protective functions for the 
Director and for any personnel of the Agency designated by the 
Director.
  (b) Nothing in this section shall be construed to impair or 
otherwise affect any authority under any other provision of law 
relating to the performance of protective functions.
                              ----------                              


          INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2003

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

  (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003''.
  (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is 
as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

                   TITLE VIII--REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

     * * * * * * *

                  Subtitle C--Recurring Annual Reports

Sec. 821. Annual report on threat of attack on the United States using 
          weapons of mass destruction.
     * * * * * * *
[Sec. 826. Annual report on counterdrug intelligence matters.]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


TITLE VIII--REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Subtitle C--Recurring Annual Reports

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


[SEC. 826. ANNUAL REPORT ON COUNTERDRUG INTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

  [(a) Annual Report.--The Counterdrug Intelligence 
Coordinating Group shall submit to the appropriate committees 
of Congress each year a report on current counterdrug 
intelligence matters. The report shall include the 
recommendations of the Counterdrug Intelligence Coordinating 
Group on the appropriate number of permanent staff, and of 
detailed personnel, for the staff of the Counterdrug 
Intelligence Executive Secretariat.
  [(b) Submittal Date.--The date of the submittal each year of 
the report required by subsection (a) shall be the date 
provided in section 507 of the National Security Act of 1947, 
as added by section 811 of this Act.
  [(c) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this 
section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' 
means--
          [(1) the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate 
        and House of Representatives; and
          [(2) the congressional intelligence committees (as 
        defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 
        1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a)).]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


        INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004



           *       *       *       *       *       *       *
TITLE I--REFORM OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Subtitle A--Establishment of Director of National Intelligence

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 1016. INFORMATION SHARING.

  (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (e) Implementation Plan Report.--Not later than one year 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President 
shall, with the assistance of the program manager, submit to 
Congress a report containing an implementation plan for the 
ISE. The report shall include the following:
          (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          (10) A delineation of the roles of the Federal 
        departments and agencies that will participate in the 
        ISE, including an identification of the agencies that 
        will deliver the infrastructure needed to operate and 
        manage the ISE (as distinct from individual department 
        or agency components that are part of the ISE), with 
        such delineation of roles to be consistent with--
                  (A) * * *
                  (B) the authority of the Secretary of 
                Homeland Security and the Attorney General, and 
                the role of the Department of Homeland Security 
                and the [Attorney General] Department of 
                Justice, in coordinating with State, local, and 
                tribal officials and the private sector.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                Subtitle F--Privacy and Civil Liberties

SEC. 1061. PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD.

  (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (d) Access to Information.--
          (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          (4) Exceptions for national security.--
                  (A) In general.--If the [National 
                Intelligence Director] Director of National 
                Intelligence, in consultation with the Attorney 
                General, determines that it is necessary to 
                withhold information requested under paragraph 
                (3) to protect the national security interests 
                of the United States, the head of the 
                department or agency concerned shall not 
                furnish such information to the Board.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (h) Security Clearances.--The appropriate departments and 
agencies of the executive branch shall cooperate with the Board 
to expeditiously provide Board members and staff with 
appropriate security clearances to the extent possible under 
applicable procedures and requirements. Promptly upon 
commencing its work, the Board shall adopt, after consultation 
with the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, and the 
[National Intelligence Director] Director of National 
Intelligence, rules and procedures of the Board for physical, 
communications, computer, document, personnel, and other 
security in relation to the work of the Board.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Subtitle G--Conforming and Other Amendments

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 1071. CONFORMING AMENDMENTS RELATING TO ROLES OF DIRECTOR OF 
                    NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL 
                    INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

  (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (e) Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.--[(1)] The 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 
et seq.) is amended by striking ``Director of Central 
Intelligence'' each place it appears and inserting ``Director 
of National Intelligence''.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 1072. OTHER CONFORMING AMENDMENTS

  (a) * * *
  (b) Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949.--Section 6 of 
the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403g) is 
amended by striking ``section 103(c)(7) of the National 
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(7))'' and inserting 
``section 102A(i) of the National Security Act of 1947''.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


        INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004



           *       *       *       *       *       *       *
               TITLE II--FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

SEC. 2001. IMPROVEMENT OF INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES OF THE FEDERAL 
                    BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.

  (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (c) National Intelligence Workforce.--(1) In developing and 
maintaining a national intelligence workforce under subsection 
(b), the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall, 
develop and maintain a specialized and integrated national 
intelligence workforce consisting of agents, analysts, 
linguists, and surveillance specialists who are recruited, 
trained, and rewarded in a manner which ensures the existence 
within the Federal Bureau of Investigation of an institutional 
culture with substantial expertise in, and commitment to, the 
intelligence mission of the Bureau.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (e) Discharge of Improvements.--(1) * * *
  (2) The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall 
carry out subsections (b) through (d) under the joint guidance 
of the Attorney General and [the National Intelligence Director 
in a manner consistent with section 112(e)] the Director of 
National Intelligence in a manner consistent with applicable 
law.
  (f) Budget Matters.--The Director of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation [shall,] shall establish a budget structure of 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation to reflect the four 
principal missions of the Bureau as follows:
          (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 2006. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION USE OF TRANSLATORS.

  Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of 
this Act, and annually thereafter, the Attorney General of the 
United States shall submit to the Committee on the Judiciary of 
the Senate and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of 
Representatives a report that contains, with respect to each 
preceding 12-month period--
          (1) * * *
          (2) any legal or practical impediments to using 
        translators employed by [the] Federal, State, or local 
        agencies on a full-time, part-time, or shared basis;
          (3) the needs of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
        for [the] specific translation services in certain 
        languages, and recommendations for meeting those needs;

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


 SECTION 1403 OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT OF FISCAL YEAR 
                                  1991

[SEC. 1403. MULTIYEAR NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM]

SEC. 1403. MULTIYEAR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.

  (a) Annual Submission of Multiyear National [Foreign] 
Intelligence Program.--The [Director of Central Intelligence] 
Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the 
congressional committees specified in subsection (d) each year 
a multiyear national [foreign] intelligence program plan 
reflecting the estimated expenditures and proposed 
appropriations required to support that program. Any such 
multiyear national [foreign] intelligence program plan shall 
cover the fiscal year with respect to which the budget is 
submitted and at least four succeeding fiscal years.
  (b) Time of Submission.--The Director of National 
Intelligence shall submit the report required by subsection (a) 
each year at or about the same time that the budget is 
submitted to Congress pursuant to section 1105(a) of title 31, 
United States Code.
  (c) Consistency With Budget Estimates.--The [Director of 
Central Intelligence] Director of National Intelligence and the 
Secretary of Defense shall ensure that the estimates referred 
to in subsection (a) are consistent with the budget estimates 
submitted to Congress pursuant to section 1105(a) of title 31, 
United States Code, for the fiscal year concerned and with the 
estimated expenditures and proposed appropriations for the 
multiyear defense program submitted pursuant to section 114a of 
title 10, United States Code.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


                      TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE



           *       *       *       *       *       *       *
PART III--EMPLOYEES

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SUBPART A--GENERAL PROVISIONS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


CHAPTER 23--MERIT SYSTEM PRINCIPLES

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 2302. Prohibited personnel practices

  (a)(1) For the purpose of this title, ``prohibited personnel 
practice'' means any action described in subsection (b).
  (2) For the purpose of this section--
          (A) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          (C) ``agency'' means an Executive agency and the 
        Government Printing Office, but does not include--
                  (i) * * *
                  (ii) the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the 
                Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense 
                Intelligence Agency, the [National Imagery and 
                Mapping Agency] National Geospatial-
                Intelligence Agency, the National Security 
                Agency, and, as determined by the President, 
                any Executive agency or unit thereof the 
                principal function of which is the conduct of 
                foreign intelligence or counterintelligence 
                activities; or

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SUBPART B--EMPLOYMENT AND RETENTION

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


CHAPTER 31--AUTHORITY FOR EMPLOYMENT

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SUBCHAPTER II--THE SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 3132. Definitions and exclusions

  (a) For the purpose of this subchapter--
          (1) ``agency'' means an Executive agency, except a 
        Government corporation and the Government 
        Accountability Office, but does not include--
                  (A) * * *
                  (B) the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the 
                Drug Enforcement Administration, the Central 
                Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence 
                Agency, the [National Imagery and Mapping 
                Agency] National Geospatial-Intelligence 
                Agency, the National Security Agency, 
                Department of Defense intelligence activities 
                the civilian employees of which are subject to 
                section 1590 of title 10, and, as determined by 
                the President, an Executive agency, or unit 
                thereof, whose principal function is the 
                conduct of foreign intelligence or 
                counterintelligence activities;

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SUBPART C--EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


CHAPTER 43--PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                    SUBCHAPTER I--GENERAL PROVISIONS

Sec. 4301. Definitions

  For the purpose of this subchapter--
          (1) ``agency'' means--
                  (A) an Executive agency; and
                  (B) the Government Printing Office;
        but does not include--
                  (i) a Government corporation;
                  (ii) the Central Intelligence Agency, the 
                Defense Intelligence Agency, the [National 
                Imagery and Mapping Agency] National 
                Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National 
                Security Agency, or any Executive agency or 
                unit thereof which is designated by the 
                President and the principal function of which 
                is the conduct of foreign intelligence or 
                counterintelligence activities; or

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


CHAPTER 47--PERSONNEL RESEARCH PROGRAMS AND DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 4701. Definitions

  (a) For the purpose of this chapter--
          (1) ``agency'' means an Executive agency and the 
        Government Printing Office, but does not include--
                  (A) a Government corporation;
                  (B) the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the 
                Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense 
                Intelligence Agency, the [National Imagery and 
                Mapping Agency] National Geospatial-
                Intelligence Agency, the National Security 
                Agency, and, as determined by the President, 
                any Executive agency or unit thereof which is 
                designated by the President and which has as 
                its principal function the conduct of foreign 
                intelligence or counterintelligence activities; 
                or

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                     SUBPART D--PAY AND ALLOWANCES

CHAPTER 51--CLASSIFICATION

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 5102. Definitions; application

  (a) For the purpose of this chapter--
          (1) ``agency'' means--
                  (A) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

        but does not include--
                  (i) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                  (x) the [National Imagery and Mapping Agency] 
                National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, 
                Department of Defense.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


CHAPTER 53--PAY RATES AND SYSTEMS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SUBCHAPTER II--EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE PAY RATES

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 5313. Positions at level II

  Level II of the Executive Schedule applies to the following 
positions, for which the annual rate of basic pay shall be the 
rate determined with respect to such level under chapter 11 of 
title 2, as adjusted by section 5318 of this title:
          Deputy Secretary of Defense.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          [Director of Central Intelligence.]
          Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 5315. Positions at level IV

  Level IV of the Executive Schedule applies to the following 
positions, for which the annual rate of basic pay shall be the 
rate determined with respect to such level under chapter 11 of 
title 2, as adjusted by section 5318 of this title:
          Deputy Administrator of General Services.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          [General Counsel of the Office of the National 
        Intelligence Director.]
          General Counsel of the Office of the Director of 
        National Intelligence.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SUBCHAPTER IV--PREVAILING RATE SYSTEMS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 5342. Definitions; application

  (a) For the purpose of this subchapter--
          (1) ``agency'' means an Executive agency; but does 
        not include--
                  (A) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                  (K) the [National Imagery and Mapping Agency] 
                National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, 
                Department of Defense;

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SUBPART E--ATTENDANCE AND LEAVE

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


CHAPTER 63--LEAVE

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SUBCHAPTER III--VOLUNTARY TRANSFERS OF LEAVE

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 6339. Additional leave transfer programs

  (a) For the purpose of this section--
          (1) the term ``excepted agency'' means--
                  (A) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                  (E) the [National Imagery and Mapping Agency] 
                National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; and

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          (2) the term ``head of an excepted agency'' means--
                  (A) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                  (E) with respect to the [National Imagery and 
                Mapping Agency, the Director of the National 
                Imagery and Mapping Agency] National 
                Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the Director of 
                the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; 
                and

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SUBPART F--LABOR-MANAGEMENT AND EMPLOYEE RELATIONS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


CHAPTER 73--SUITABILITY, SECURITY, AND CONDUCT

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SUBCHAPTER III--POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 7323. Political activity authorized; prohibitions

  (a) * * *
  (b)(1) * * *
  (2)(A) * * *
  (B) The provisions of subparagraph (A) shall apply to--
          (i) an employee of--
                  (I) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                  (XIII) the [National Imagery and Mapping 
                Agency] National Geospatial-Intelligence 
                Agency; or

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


               CHAPTER 13 OF TITLE 44, UNITED STATES CODE

              CHAPTER 13--PARTICULAR REPORTS AND DOCUMENTS

Sec.
1301. Agriculture, Department of: report of Secretary.
     * * * * * * *
[1336. National Imagery and Mapping Agency: special publications.]
1336. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency: special publications.
     * * * * * * *

[Sec. 1336. National Imagery and Mapping Agency: special publications]

Sec. 1336. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency: special 
                    publications

  The Director of the [National Imagery and Mapping Agency] 
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency may authorize the 
printing of notices to mariners, light lists, sailing 
directions, bulletins, and other special publications of the 
[National Imagery and Mapping Agency] National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency in editions the interests of the Government 
and of the public may require.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


            SECTION 201 OF THE HOMELAND SECURITY ACT OF 2002

SEC. 201. DIRECTORATE FOR INFORMATION ANALYSIS AND INFRASTRUCTURE 
                    PROTECTION.

  (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (f) Detail of Personnel.--
          (1) * * *
          (2) Covered agencies.--The agencies referred to in 
        this paragraph are as follows:
                  (A) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                  (E) The [National Imagery and Mapping Agency] 
                National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


                SECTION 8H INSPECTOR GENERAL ACT OF 1978

  Sec. 8H. (a)(1)(A) An employee of the Defense Intelligence 
Agency, the [National Imagery and Mapping Agency] National 
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance 
Office, or the National Security Agency, or of a contractor of 
any of those Agencies, who intends to report to Congress a 
complaint or information with respect to an urgent concern may 
report the complaint or information to the Inspector General of 
the Department of Defense (or designee).

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (g)(1) The Inspector General of the Defense Intelligence 
Agency, the [National Imagery and Mapping Agency] National 
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance 
Office, and the National Security Agency shall each submit to 
the congressional intelligence committees each year a report 
that sets forth the following:
          (A) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


          SECTION 105 OF THE ETHICS IN GOVERNMENT ACT OF 1978

                CUSTODY OF AND PUBLIC ACCESS TO REPORTS

  Sec. 105. (a) Each agency, each supervising ethics office in 
the executive or judicial branch, the Clerk of the House of 
Representatives, and the Secretary of the Senate shall make 
available to the public, in accordance with subsection (b), 
each report filed under this title with such agency or office 
or with the Clerk or the Secretary of the Senate, except that--
          (1) this section does not require public availability 
        of a report filed by any individual in the Office of 
        the Director of National Intelligence, the Central 
        Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, 
        the [National Imagery and Mapping Agency] National 
        Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, or the National 
        Security Agency, or any individual engaged in 
        intelligence activities in any agency of the United 
        States, if the President finds or has found that, due 
        to the nature of the office or position occupied by 
        such individual, public disclosure of such report 
        would, be revealing the identity of the individual or 
        other sensitive information, compromise the national 
        interest of the United States; and such individuals may 
        be authorized, notwithstanding section 104(a), to file 
        such additional reports as are necessary to protect 
        their identity from public disclosure if the President 
        first finds or has found that such filing is necessary 
        in the national interest; and
          (2) any report filed by an independent counsel whose 
        identity has not been disclosed by the division of the 
        court under chapter 40 of title 28, United States Code, 
        and any report filed by any person appointed by that 
        independent counsel under such chapter, shall not be 
        made available to the public under this title.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


        SECTION 7 OF THE EMPLOYEE POLYGRAPH PROTECTION ACT 1988

SEC. 7. EXEMPTIONS.

  (a) * * *
  (b) National Defense and Security Exemption.--
          (1) * * *
          (2) Security.--Nothing in this Act shall be construed 
        toprohibit the administration, by the Federal 
        Government, in theperformance of any intelligence or 
        counterintelligence function,of any lie detector test 
        to--
                  (A)(i) any individual employed by, assigned 
                to, or detailedto, the National Security 
                Agency, the Defense IntelligenceAgency, the 
                [National Imagery and Mapping Agency] National 
                Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, or the Central 
                Intelligence Agency,

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


     SECTION 207 OF THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 1993

  Sec. 207. (a)(1) * * *
  (2) Paragraph (1) does not apply to (A) individual printing 
orders costing not more than $1,000, if the work is not of a 
continuing or repetitive nature, and, as certified by the 
Public Printer, if the work is included in a class of work 
which cannot be provided more economically through the 
Government Printing Office, (B) printing for the Central 
Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, [National 
Imagery and Mapping Agency] National Geospatial-Intelligence 
Agency, or the National Security Agency, or (C) printing from 
other sources that is specifically authorized by law.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                             MINORITY VIEWS

    In considering the Intelligence Authorization for fiscal 
year 2007, we are mindful of the bravery and sacrifice of the 
women and men who serve in U.S. intelligence agencies, often 
under-cover and usually in some of the most dangerous corners 
of the world. We have visited those dangerous corners, and 
appreciate the risks that these professionals take for our 
freedom.
    Because the budget authorized by HR 5020 is classified--and 
therefore shielded from public scrutiny--four Committee's 
oversight must be all-the-more rigorous.
    Certain features in the bill are worthy of special 
emphasis.
    First, HR 5020 contained a provision to limit the overhead 
growth of the Office of the DNI (ODNI) absent a strategy from 
the DNI on how its requirements for additional funds and 
personnel would bring value to the management of the 
intelligence community. We want the ODNI to become a joint 
commander of the 16 intelligence agencies, not another 
bureaucracy, seeking more billets and buildings.
    Second, the bill provides full-funding for 
counterterrorism. The President's budget had only requested 78% 
of what the intelligence community says it will need for 
counterterrorism operations in fiscal year 2007. That request 
was inadequate--and dangerous. Relying on supplemental funding 
for counterterrorism prevents operations in the field from 
planning operations, and it virtually eliminates this 
Committee's ability to conduct oversight over those funds. For 
years since 9-11, we have underscored the need to fully fund 
counterterrorism. This Authorization bill now does that.
    Third, we are also pleased the Chairman has agreed to 
include, in the report to accompany HR 5020, enhanced reporting 
requirements on a number of key topics. This includes the 
domestic surveillance activities of the Department of Defense 
Counter Intelligence Field Activity (CIFA), as well as 
intelligence assessments on the WMD capabilities and intentions 
of Iran and North Korea--two countries where we must get it 
right.
    Despite these attributes, the bill would have been stronger 
if it included three Amendments offered by Democratic members.
    Representatives Hastings, Reyes and Holt offered an 
amendment to require a dedicated funding line for the Privacy 
and Civil Liberties Oversight Board in the President's annual 
budget submission to Congress, and to authorize $3 million 
annually for the Board's activities.
    The Board was created by the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act, which was signed into law in December 
2004. This Board was designed to serve as a civil liberties 
``watchdog'' as the American people grow increasingly concerned 
about the potential erosion of Constitutional rights in the 
post-911 era. Fifteen months later, the Board is barely up and 
running. The President did not nominate the members of the 
Board for 9 months, and the Senate took five months to confirm 
the Chair and Vice Chair. In addition, the Administration 
budget request did not include a request for funds for the 
Board in fiscal year 2007.
    The Hastings/Reyes/Holt Amendment would have sent an 
unmistakable signal that this Board deserves dedicated 
resources to carry out its vital mission. Unfortunately, the 
amendment was voted down on a party-line vote (10-8).
    Representative Eshoo offered an amendment to fence, or 
withhold, 20% of the NSA's budget until the Executive Branch 
provides the Committee with the total cost of the President's 
NSA surveillance program.
    The Eshoo Amendment was a modest, narrowly-tailored 
amendment. It would not have required the Administration to 
provide the full Committee with operational details about the 
program (although we believe the President is required to do 
so.) Nor would the Amendment have passed judgment on the 
legality of the program. The amendment simply asked for 
financial data, so that members casting a vote to authorize the 
budget would know how much money was dedicated to the program.
    The Eshoo Amendment was defeated 10 to 8, with all Minority 
members and one Majority member voting for it. By defeating 
this amendment, the Majority members refused to employ a common 
oversight tool (a fence of funds) employed 14 other times in 
the bill's Annex--to require the President to tell the 
Committee how much this program has and will cost the American 
taxpayer. We strongly urge the full Committee to continue to 
seek this information.
    Third, Representatives Tierney, Boswell and Holt offered an 
amendment to prevent the DNI from transferring budget and 
personnel related to national intelligence functions out of the 
National Intelligence Program (NIP) to the Military 
Intelligence Program (MIP). We believe these transfers are 
demonstrative of a lack of strong community leadership further 
compounded by a culture of resistance to change. If left 
unchecked, this could render DNI ineffectual and powerless to 
integrate intelligence efforts to respond to emerging crises.
    The Tierney/Boswell/Holt Amendment was defeated 10 to 7. In 
defeating this Amendment, the Committee missed an opportunity 
to prevent the dismantling of statutory authorities of the DNI 
and the ceding of key budget authorities over large numbers of 
intelligence personnel and resources to the Pentagon.
    Throughout the mark-up, Members expressed their views on a 
variety of topics of relating to the intelligence community. 
Perhaps no topic received more attention than the President's 
NSA surveillance program.
    We strongly support intercepting the communications of Al 
Qaeda into and out of the United States. This capability is 
vital. However, we have become deeply concerned that the 
Executive Branch is engaging in two violations of law with 
respect to the NSA program.
    First, in failing to brief the entire Committee on the 
operational details of the Program, the President is violating 
the National Security Act--which requires that the President 
shall keep the Committee ``currently and fully'' informed of 
all intelligence activities of the United States. Failure to 
brief the full Committee compromises our oversight and is a 
violation of law.
    Second, eavesdropping on U.S. persons must fully comply 
with Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). Nobody has 
yet persuaded us why FISA, as currently drafted, cannot cover 
the entire Program. The law is unambiguous--all eavesdropping 
on Americans in America must comply with FISA.
    Allowing the NSA surveillance program to proceed without 
fully complying with the law threatens to undermine our entire 
Constitutional order--our system of checks and balances. As 
Justice O'Connor wrote in the Hamdi case, ``We have long since 
made clear that a state of war is not a blank check for the 
President when it comes to the rights of the Nation's 
citizens.''
    In authorizing the activities of the U.S. intelligence 
community today, we are mindful of the words of Justice 
O'Connor and the solemn duty our Committee has to uphold the 
rule of law and the values we cherish as a nation--for that is 
ultimately what our brave intelligence professionals are 
fighting so hard to defend.

                                   Jane Harman.
                                   Alcee L. Hastings.
                                   Silvestre Reyes.
                                   Leonard L. Boswell.
                                   Bud Cramer.
                                   Anna G. Eshoo.
                                   Rush Holt.
                                   C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger.
                                   John F. Tierney.

    Note: Mr. Ruppersberger was unable to attend the mark-up 
due to the death of his father earlier in the week. We send him 
and his family our deepest sympathies.

                                  
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