[House Report 109-291]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



109th Congress                                                   Report
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 1st Session                                                    109-291

======================================================================
 
    REQUESTING THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND DIRECTING THE 
 SECRETARY OF STATE TO PROVIDE TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES CERTAIN 
  DOCUMENTS IN THEIR POSSESSION RELATING TO THE WHITE HOUSE IRAQ GROUP

                                _______
                                

 November 10, 2005.--Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be 
                                printed

                                _______
                                

Mr. Hyde, from the Committee on International Relations, submitted the 
                               following

                             ADVERSE REPORT

                             together with

                            DISSENTING VIEWS

                       [To accompany H. Res. 505]

    The Committee on International Relations, to whom was 
referred the resolution (H. Res. 505) requesting the President 
of the United States and directing the Secretary of State to 
provide to the House of Representatives certain documents in 
their possession relating to the White House Iraq Group, having 
considered the same, report unfavorably thereon without 
amendment and recommend that the resolution not be agreed to.

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page
Purpose and Summary..............................................     1
Background and Need for the Legislation..........................     2
Hearings.........................................................     5
Committee Consideration..........................................     5
Vote of the Committee............................................     5
Committee Oversight Findings.....................................     5
New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures........................     6
Performance Goals and Objectives.................................     6
Constitutional Authority Statement...............................     6
New Advisory Committees..........................................     6
Congressional Accountability Act.................................     6
Federal Mandates.................................................     6
Dissenting Views.................................................     7

                          Purpose and Summary

    House Resolution 505 requests the President and directs the 
Secretary of State to transmit to the House of Representatives, 
not later than 14 days after the date of the adoption of the 
resolution, certain documents in their possession relating to 
the White House Iraq Group. These include: all documents from 
2003 pertaining to the taskforce organized by Andrew Card, 
known as the White House Iraq Group, consisting of Karl Rove, 
Karen Hughes, Mary Matalin, Nicholas E. Calio, James R. 
Wilkinson, Condoleezza Rice, Stephen Hadley and I. Lewis Libby; 
all drafts of all white papers on the topic of Iraq's nuclear 
threat assembled in 2003 by the White House Iraq Group; and all 
documents, including notes from meetings, memos, telephone and 
electronic mail records, logs and calendars, and records of 
internal discussions in the possession of the President or the 
Secretary of State relating to the White House Iraq Group.

                Background and Need for the Legislation

    House Resolution 505 is a resolution of inquiry, which 
pursuant to Rule XIII, clause 7 of the Rules of the House of 
Representatives, directs the Committee to act on the resolution 
within 14 legislative days, or a privileged motion to discharge 
the Committee is in order. H. Res. 505 was introduced and 
referred to the Committee on International Relations on October 
20, 2005 and was reported adversely by the Committee on 
November 9, 2005.
    Under the rules and precedents of the House, a resolution 
of inquiry is one of the methods used by the House to obtain 
information from the executive branch. According to Deschler's 
Procedure, it is a ``simple resolution making a direct request 
or demand of the President or the head of an executive 
department to furnish the House of Representatives with 
specific factual information in the possession of the executive 
branch.''
    On October 20, 2005, Rep. Dennis Kucinich of Ohio 
introduced H. Res. 505. Rep. Kucinich's resolution requests the 
President and directs the Secretary of State to turn over 
certain documents relating to the White House Iraq Group: all 
documents from 2003 pertaining to the taskforce organized by 
Andrew Card, consisting of Karl Rove, Karen Hughes, Mary 
Matalin, Nicholas E. Calio, James R. Wilkinson, Condoleezza 
Rice, Stephen Hadley and I. Lewis Libby, known as the White 
House Iraq Group; all drafts of all white papers on the topic 
of Iraq's nuclear threat assembled in 2003 by the White House 
Iraq Group; and, all documents, including notes from meetings, 
memos, telephone and electronic mail records, logs and 
calendars, and records of internal discussions in the 
possession of the President or the Secretary of State relating 
to the White House Iraq Group.
    On November 4, 2005, on the Floor of the House, Rep. 
Kucinich spoke in support of H. Res. 505, and stated: ``One of 
the attempted false justifications for the war in Iraq was that 
Iraq was trying to get uranium from Niger to make nuclear 
weapons.'' Mr. Kucinich describes this as a ``lie'' and ``key'' 
to ``understanding why we are in Iraq.''
    Prior to introduction of H. Res. 505, thorough, lengthy 
reports were issued by the U.S. Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence, the U.S. Commission on the Intelligence 
Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (known as the Silberman-Robb Commission), the 
British House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, and the 
British Hutton inquiry. None of these reports found any 
evidence that Administration officials attempted to coerce, 
influence or pressure members of the intelligence community to 
``fix'' intelligence.
    The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence reviewed 
intelligence records on Iraq going back to the First Gulf War. 
The Senate's report ran over 500 pages and was the product of 
over twelve months of Committee review of over 45,000 pages of 
intelligence documents, interviews of over 200 individuals, 
including National Security Council staff members, and four 
committee hearings.
    Conclusion number 83 in the Senate Intelligence Committee 
report entitled, ``U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar 
Intelligence Assessments on Iraq'' states: ``The Committee did 
not find any evidence that Administration officials attempted 
to coerce, influence or pressure analysts to change their 
judgments related to Iraq's weapons of mass destruction 
capabilities.'' This conclusion, as is true of the entire 
report, was approved by a unanimous, bipartisan vote by the 
Senate Committee.
    The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
reviewed U.S. intelligence regarding the amount or existence of 
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, including the issues of 
bias, dissenting views and how intelligence was disseminated, 
and the linkages between Iraq and terrorist organizations. The 
Chairman and Ranking Member of the House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence informed the House International 
Relations Committee that members of the International Relations 
Committee had been granted access to the documentation provided 
by the Central Intelligence Agency that the Intelligence 
Committee was studying in its review. Again, no evidence of 
``fixing'' intelligence surfaced in the course of this 
congressional review.
    The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the 
United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (the 
Silberman-Robb Commission) has been viewed as producing the 
definitive report on prewar intelligence. This was a blue 
ribbon, bipartisan commission headed by former Senator Charles 
S. Robb and Judge Laurence H. Silberman, which included a 
talented and experienced group of commissioners such as Senator 
John McCain, Walter Slocombe, Judge Patricia Wald, and Lloyd 
Cutler, and was supported by a bipartisan, experienced staff of 
over 80 professionals and consultants. The following 
conclusions are particularly relevant to H. Res. 505:

    We conclude that the Intelligence Community was dead wrong 
in almost all of its pre-war judgments about Iraq's weapons of 
mass destruction. . . . Its principal causes were the 
Intelligence Community's inability to collect good information 
about Iraq's WMD programs, serious errors in analyzing what 
information it could gather, and a failure to make clear just 
how much of its analysis was based on assumptions, rather than 
good evidence.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


    After a thorough review, the Commission found no indication 
that the Intelligence Community distorted the evidence 
regarding Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. What the 
intelligence professionals told you about Saddam Hussein's 
programs was what they believed. They were simply wrong.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


    Finally, we closely examined the possibility that 
intelligence analysts were pressured by policymakers to change 
their judgments about Iraq's nuclear, biological, and chemical 
weapons programs. The analysts who worked Iraqi's weapons 
issues universally agreed that in no instance did political 
pressure cause them to skew or alter any of their analytical 
judgments.

    In reviewing the mountain of public evidence that refutes 
the notion of any ``fixing'' of intelligence, we should not 
ignore the obvious. There was no need for supporters of the war 
to ``fix'' intelligence in the run-up to the war because the 
pre-war belief among the Intelligence Community and 
policymakers that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction was 
overwhelming. Both the Intelligence Community and leaders of 
both political parties believed with certainty Iraq had weapons 
of mass destruction.
    In 1998, in a speech at the Pentagon, President Clinton 
stated: ``We have to defend our future from these predators of 
the 21st century. They feed on the free flow of information and 
technology. They actually take advantage of the freer movement 
of people, information and ideas. And they will be all the more 
lethal if we allow them to build arsenals of nuclear, chemical 
and biological weapons and the missiles to deliver them. We 
simply cannot allow that to happen. There is no more clear 
example of this threat than Saddam Hussein's Iraq. His regime 
threatens the safety of his people, the stability of his region 
and the security of all the rest of us.'' That same year, 
National Security Advisor Sandy Berger remarked: ``Year after 
year, in conflict after conflict, Saddam has proven that he 
seeks weapons, including weapons of mass destruction, in order 
to use them.''
    In 2004, when asked whether it was a fair statement that 
the Administration misled the American people in building the 
case for war, former Weapons Inspector David Kay responded: ``I 
think it's not fair and it also trivializes what we did find 
and the problem we face. The problem we face is that before the 
war not only the U.S. administration and U.S. intelligence, but 
the French, British, Germans, the U.N. all thought Saddam had 
weapons of mass destruction.'' David Kay noted that ``this view 
of Iraq was held during the Clinton administration and didn't 
change in the Bush administration. It is not a political ``got 
you'' issue.''
    The British inquiry into pre-war intelligence on Iraq made 
findings similar to those made in all the U.S. reports. In his 
summary of conclusions, Lord Hutton dismissed the allegation 
that the British intelligence dossier supporting the use of 
force against Iraq was ``sexed-up'': ``I consider that the 
allegation was unfounded as it would have been understood by 
those who heard the broadcasts to mean that the dossier had 
been embellished with intelligence known or believed to be 
false or unreliable, which was not the case.''
    The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence recently 
announced its intention to complete its second phase of its 
investigation into the Bush Administration's use of pre-war 
intelligence in Iraq. This second phase will focus on the 
question raised by H. Res. 505, the White House's presentation 
to the public of its case for Iraq: That is, how Bush 
administration officials, including the White House Iraq Group, 
handled prewar intelligence, including whether the information 
was misrepresented in White House statements to the public.
    The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has collected 
public statements of Bush administration officials, as well as 
intelligence data available at the time. The Senators will 
determine if such public statements were justified by the data.
    In light of all of these past and ongoing investigations 
into the Administration's use of pre-war intelligence on Iraq, 
the House International Relations Committee need not insert 
itself into an intelligence issue best addressed by the select 
committees on intelligence.
    Given these circumstances, the Committee deemed the 
document requests made in H. Res. 505 to be unnecessary and 
voted to report it adversely.

                                Hearings

    The Committee did not hold hearings on H. Res. 505.

                        Committee Consideration

    On November 9, 2005, the Full Committee marked up the 
resolution, H. Res. 505, pursuant to notice, in open session. 
The Committee agreed to a motion to report the resolution 
adversely to the House by a record vote of 25 ayes to 23 nays.

                         Vote of the Committee

    Clause (3)(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of 
Representatives requires that the results of each record vote 
on an amendment or motion to report, together with the names of 
those voting for or against, be printed in the Committee 
report. The following record votes occurred during 
consideration of H. Res. 505:
    Vote to report to the House adversely:
    Voting yes: Hyde, Smith (NJ), Burton, Gallegly, Ros-
Lehtinen, Rohrabacher, Royce, King, Chabot, Tancredo, Issa, 
Flake, Davis, Green, Weller, Pence, McCotter, Harris, Wilson, 
Boozman, Barrett, Mack, Fortenberry, McCaul, and Poe.
    Voting no: Leach, Paul, Lantos, Ackerman, Payne, Menendez, 
Brown, Sherman, Wexler, Engel, Delahunt, Meeks, Lee, Crowley, 
Blumenauer, Berkley, Napolitano, Schiff, Watson, Smith (WA), 
McCollum, Chandler and Cardoza.
    H. Res. 505 was ordered reported adversely to the House by 
a vote of 25 ayes to 23 noes.

                      Committee Oversight Findings

    The Committee held no oversight activities under clause 
2(b)(1) of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives.

               New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures

    Clause 3(c)(2) of House Rule XIII is inapplicable because 
H. Res. 505 does not provide new budgetary authority or 
increased tax expenditures.

                    Performance Goals and Objectives

    The rule requiring a statement of performance goals and 
objectives is inapplicable.

                   Constitutional Authority Statement

    Pursuant to clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 
House of Representatives, the Committee finds the authority for 
this resolution in article I, section 1 of the Constitution.

                        New Advisory Committees

    H. Res. 505 does not establish or authorize any new 
advisory committees.

                    Congressional Accountability Act

    H. Res. 505 does not apply to the legislative branch.

                            Federal Mandates

    H. Res. 505 provides no Federal mandates.
                            DISSENTING VIEWS

    The United States is currently engaged in a war in Iraq 
that has claimed the lives of over 2000 brave men and women of 
the U.S. Armed Forces who have made the ultimate sacrifice. 
Many thousands of others have lost limbs or suffered other 
grievous wounds from the insurgents who have arisen there. We 
all honor these patriots and their families for all that they 
have given for their country.
    The Administration presented a case for war based on its 
view that that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction and ties to 
al Qaeda, and this committee received briefings on the case for 
this intelligence. It was on the basis of the perceived threats 
arising from these claims that the House International 
Relations Committee voted to authorize the President to go to 
war with Iraq on October 7, 2002, soon followed by the full 
House of Representatives on October 16, 2002, and the United 
States invaded Iraq on March 19, 2003.
    We now know that the intelligence contained in these 
briefings was faulty, based on unsound sources and on 
information that was subject to debate within the intelligence 
community. Questions have arisen as to whether the intelligence 
that was gathered was misused by Administration officials to 
press aggressively for war.
    We owe it to our soldiers and to all our constituents to 
develop a complete picture of the decision-making and analysis 
that led the United States to go to war to bring down the 
regime of Saddam Hussein. And the Executive Branch owes it to 
the American people to make certain that their representatives 
are fully informed. Unfortunately, despite these concerns and 
despite allegations that Administration officials knew that 
their claims were questionable, controversial and even false, 
this Committee has consistently refused to investigate either 
the pre-war intelligence or its use. Indeed, the House as a 
whole has not looked at the use of the intelligence, and this 
matter has been stalled in the other body until recently.
    H. Res. 505, a resolution of inquiry, would have required 
the President and Secretary of State to transmit documents to 
Members of the House of Representatives which would take steps 
toward revealing whether or not the Administration was truthful 
in presenting its case for war in Iraq to Congress and the 
American people. Specifically, H. Res. 505 would have required 
the President and Secretary of State to turn over to the House 
of Representatives all white papers, minutes, notes, e-mails or 
other communications relating to a high-level White House 
taskforce known as the White House Iraq Group (WHIG).
    The WHIG was created in August 2002 to specifically market 
a war in Iraq and included high-level advisers of the President 
and Vice President: Karl Rove, Karen Hughes, Mary Matalin, 
Nicholas E. Calio, James R. Wilkinson, Condoleezza Rice, 
Stephen Hadley and I. Lewis ``Scooter'' Libby. Reports suggest 
that many of the Administration's claims stemmed from WHIG's 
work.
    The WHIG produced memos that were the basis for talking 
points for the President and other high-level Administration 
officials regarding the supposed imminent threat that the 
United States faced from Iraq. Furthermore, beginning in 
September 2002, the WHIG launched a public information campaign 
and bombarded the media with exaggerated and false claims about 
the threat of Iraq, even though members of the WHIG received 
reports from intelligence agencies and the Department of Energy 
that their claims were inaccurate. These claims included the 
following:

         LIraq sought uranium from Niger.
          L  Stephen Hadley, the President's then-Deputy 
        National Security Advisor admitted that the CIA warned 
        him at least three times in the fall of 2002 that the 
        claim that Iraq was seeking uranium from Africa was not 
        reliable.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Stephen Hadley, White House Briefing, July 22, 2003

         LIraq's aluminum tubes could only be used for 
        enriching nuclear weapons programs.
          L  Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, then-National 
        Security Advisor claimed on CNN on September 8, 2002 
        that the aluminum tubes were ``only really suited for 
        nuclear weapons programs.'' But according to reports in 
        the New York Times almost one year before, Secretary 
        Rice's staff had been told by the Department of Energy 
        that ``the government's foremost nuclear experts 
        seriously doubted that the tubes were for nuclear 
        weapons.'' \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ ``How White House Embraced Suspect Iraq Arms Intelligence,'' 
New York Times, October 3, 2004
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          L  Furthermore, the Department of Energy published a 
        dissenting view disputing the claim about the aluminum 
        tubes in the CIA's October 2002 National Intelligence 
        Estimate.

         LIraq trained Al Qaeda terrorists.
          L  According to the Washington Post, in February 
        2002, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) submitted a 
        report to the National Security Council that questioned 
        the reliability of a captured top Al Qaeda operative 
        whom the Administration had cited to make claims that 
        terrorists had been trained to use chemical and 
        biological weapons in Iraq.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ ``Newly release data undercut prewar claims,'' Washington Post, 
November 6, 2005

    Despite repeated warnings by intelligence agencies and the 
Department of Energy about the validity of intelligence claims 
on Iraq, between September 2002 and March 2003, President Bush, 
Vice President Cheney, then-National Security Advisor 
Condoleezza Rice, then-CIA Director George J. Tenet, then-
Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, and other top 
Administration officials, cited faulty intelligence in speeches 
and public appearances to gather support for the war.
    For the good of the nation, these issues need to be pursued 
and the accuracy of these reports must be investigated and 
judgments must be made on how these episodes occurred. The 
release of all the materials surrounding the White House Iraq 
Group is a necessary first step to restore the American 
people's faith in their government and its conduct of foreign 
policy.
    However, the consequence of the rejection of this 
resolution by the majority is the failure of Congress to 
perform its Constitutional duty of oversight of the Executive 
Branch. As one of the seminal thinkers on democracy has said, 
``the proper office of a representative assembly is to watch 
and control the government; to throw the light of publicity on 
its acts; to compel a full exposition and justification of all 
of them which any one considers questionable.'' \4\ We could 
not agree more strongly with this view and anything less 
constitutes a basic and dangerous infringement on the system of 
checks and balances that is guaranteed by the Constitution. We 
believe the people sent us to ensure that these powers be 
exercised, not surrendered.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government 
104 (1861)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This resolution would have taken one important step in 
shining the necessary light on the Administration's role in the 
lead-up to the war in Iraq. Congress owes it to the 
Constitution, our democratic traditions and the American people 
to uphold democracy by uncovering the truth.

                                   Gary L. Ackerman.
                                   Donald M. Payne.
                                   Sherrod Brown.
                                   Barbara Lee.
                                   Joseph Crowley.
                                   Earl Blumenauer.
                                   Grace F. Napolitano.
                                   Diane E. Watson.
                                   Adam Smith.
                                   Betty McCollum.

                                  
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