[House Report 109-271]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



109th Congress                                                   Report
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 1st Session                                                 109-271   

======================================================================



 
       SECURE ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND COURT PROTECTION ACT OF 2005

                                _______
                                

November 7, 2005.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

 Mr. Sensenbrenner, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted the 
                               following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

            DISSENTING VIEWS AND ADDITIONAL DISSENTING VIEWS

                        [To accompany H.R. 1751]

      [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

  The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred the bill 
(H.R. 1751) to amend title 18, United States Code, to protect 
judges, prosecutors, witnesses, victims, and their family 
members, and for other purposes, having considered the same, 
reports favorably thereon with an amendment and recommends that 
the bill as amended do pass.

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page
The Amendment....................................................     2
Purpose and Summary..............................................    11
Background and Need for the Legislation..........................    11
Hearings.........................................................    18
Committee Consideration..........................................    18
Vote of the Committee............................................    18
Committee Oversight Findings.....................................    20
New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures........................    20
Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate........................    20
Performance Goals and Objectives.................................    24
Constitutional Authority Statement...............................    24
Section-by-Section Analysis and Discussion.......................    24
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported............    28
Markup Transcript................................................    41
Dissenting Views.................................................   189
Additional Dissenting Views......................................   195

                             The Amendment

  The amendment is as follows:
  Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the 
following:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Secure Access to Justice and Court 
Protection Act of 2005''.

SEC. 2. PENALTIES FOR INFLUENCING, IMPEDING, OR RETALIATING AGAINST 
                    JUDGES AND OTHER OFFICIALS BY THREATENING OR 
                    INJURING A FAMILY MEMBER.

    Section 115 of title 18, United States Code, is amended--
            (1) in each of subparagraphs (A) and (B) of subsection 
        (a)(1), by inserting ``federally funded public safety officer 
        (as defined for the purposes of section 1123)'' after ``Federal 
        law enforcement officer,'';
            (2) so that subsection (b) reads as follows:
    ``(b)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the punishment for an 
offense under this section is as follows:
            ``(A) The punishment for an assault in violation of this 
        section is the same as that provided for a like offense under 
        section 111.
            ``(B) The punishment for a kidnapping, attempted 
        kidnapping, or conspiracy to kidnap in violation of this 
        section is the same as provided for a like violation in section 
        1201.
            ``(C) The punishment for a murder, attempted murder, or 
        conspiracy to murder in violation of this section is the same 
        as provided for a like offense under section 1111, 1113, and 
        1117.
            ``(D) A threat made in violation of this section shall be 
        punished by a fine under this title or imprisonment for not 
        more than 10 years, or both.
    ``(2) If the victim of the offense under this section is an 
immediate family member of a United States judge, a Federal law 
enforcement officer (as defined for the purposes of section 1114) or of 
a federally funded public safety officer (as defined for the purposes 
of section 1123), in lieu of the punishments otherwise provided by 
paragraph (1), the punishments shall be as follows:
                    ``(A) The punishment for an assault in violation of 
                this section is as follows:
                            ``(i) If the assault is a simple assault, a 
                        fine under this title or a term of imprisonment 
                        for not more than one year, or both.
                            ``(ii) If the assault resulted in bodily 
                        injury (as defined in section 1365), a fine 
                        under this title and a term of imprisonment for 
                        not less than one year nor more than 10 years.
                            ``(iii) If the assault resulted in 
                        substantial bodily injury (as defined in 
                        section 113), a fine under this title and a 
                        term of imprisonment for not less than 3 years 
                        nor more than 12 years.
                            ``(iv) If the assault resulted in serious 
                        bodily injury (as defined in section 2119), a 
                        fine under this title and a term of 
                        imprisonment for not less than 10 years nor 
                        more than 30 years.
                    ``(B) The punishment for a kidnapping, attempted 
                kidnapping, or conspiracy to kidnap in violation of 
                this section is a fine under this title and 
                imprisonment for any term of years not less than 30, or 
                for life.
                    ``(C) The punishment for a murder, attempted 
                murder, or conspiracy to murder in violation of this 
                section is a fine under this title and imprisonment for 
                any term of years not less than 30, or for life, or, if 
                death results, the offender may be sentenced to death.
                    ``(D) A threat made in violation of this section 
                shall be punished by a fine under this title and 
                imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than 
                10 years.
                    ``(E) If a dangerous weapon was used during and in 
                relation to the offense, the punishment shall include a 
                term of imprisonment of 5 years in addition to that 
                otherwise imposed under this paragraph.''.

SEC. 3. PENALTIES FOR CERTAIN ASSAULTS.

    (a) Inclusion of Federally Funded Public Safety Officers.--Section 
111(a) of title 18, United States Code, is amended--
            (1) in paragraph (1), by inserting ``or a federally funded 
        public safety officer (as defined in section 1123)'' after 
        ``1114 of this title''; and
            (2) in paragraph (2), by inserting ``or a federally funded 
        public safety officer (as defined in section 1123)'' after 
        ``1114''.
    (b) Alternate Penalty Where Victim Is a United States Judge, a 
Federal Law Enforcement Officer, or Federally Funded Public Safety 
Officer.--Section 111 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by 
adding at the end the following:
    ``(c) Alternate Penalty Where Victim Is a United States Judge, a 
Federal Law Enforcement Officer, or Federally Funded Public Safety 
Officer.--(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), if the offense is an 
assault and the victim of the offense under this section is a United 
States judge, a Federal law enforcement officer (as defined for the 
purposes of section 1114) or of a federally funded public safety 
officer (as defined for the purposes of section 1123), in lieu of the 
penalties otherwise set forth in this section, the offender shall be 
subject to a fine under this title and--
            ``(A) If the assault is a simple assault, a fine under this 
        title or a term of imprisonment for not more than one year, or 
        both.
            ``(B) if the assault resulted in bodily injury (as defined 
        in section 1365), shall be imprisoned not less than one nor 
        more than 10 years;
            ``(C) if the assault resulted in substantial bodily injury 
        (as defined in section 113), shall be imprisoned not less than 
        3 nor more than 12 years; and
            ``(D) if the assault resulted in serious bodily injury (as 
        defined in section 2119), shall be imprisoned not less than 10 
        nor more than 30 years.
    ``(2) If a dangerous weapon was used during and in relation to the 
offense, the punishment shall include a term of imprisonment of 5 years 
in addition to that otherwise imposed under this subsection.''.

SEC. 4. PROTECTION OF FEDERALLY FUNDED PUBLIC SAFETY OFFICERS.

    (a) Offense.--Chapter 51 of title 18, United States Code, is 
amended by adding at the end the following:

``Sec. 1123. Killing of federally funded public safety officers

    ``(a) Whoever kills, or attempts or conspires to kill, a federally 
funded public safety officer while that officer is engaged in official 
duties, or arising out of the performance of official duties, or kills 
a former federally funded public safety officer arising out of the 
performance of official duties, shall be punished by a fine under this 
title and imprisonment for any term of years not less than 30, or for 
life, or, if death results, may be sentenced to death.
    ``(b) As used in this section--
            ``(1) the term `federally funded public safety officer' 
        means a public safety officer for a public agency (including a 
        court system, the National Guard of a State to the extent the 
        personnel of that National Guard are not in Federal service, 
        and the defense forces of a State authorized by section 109 of 
        title 32) that receives Federal financial assistance, of an 
        entity that is a State of the United States, the District of 
        Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands 
        of the United States, Guam, American Samoa, the Trust Territory 
        of the Pacific Islands, the Commonwealth of the Northern 
        Mariana Islands, or any territory or possession of the United 
        States, an Indian tribe, or a unit of local government of that 
        entity;
            ``(2) the term `public safety officer' means an individual 
        serving a public agency in an official capacity, as a judicial 
        officer, as a law enforcement officer, as a firefighter, as a 
        chaplain, or as a member of a rescue squad or ambulance crew;
            ``(3) the term `judicial officer' means a judge or other 
        officer or employee of a court, including prosecutors, court 
        security, pretrial services officers, court reporters, and 
        corrections, probation, and parole officers; and
            ``(4) the term `firefighter' includes an individual serving 
        as an official recognized or designated member of a legally 
        organized volunteer fire department and an officially 
        recognized or designated public employee member of a rescue 
        squad or ambulance crew; and
            ``(5) the term `law enforcement officer' means an 
        individual involved in crime and juvenile delinquency control 
        or reduction, or enforcement of the laws.''.
    (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the beginning of 
chapter 51 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the 
end the following new item:

``1123. Killing of federally funded public safety officers.''.

SEC. 5. GENERAL MODIFICATIONS OF FEDERAL MURDER CRIME AND RELATED 
                    CRIMES.

    (a) Murder Amendments.--Section 1111 of title 18, United States 
Code, is amended in subsection (b), by inserting ``not less than 30'' 
after ``any term of years''.
    (b) Manslaughter Amendments.--Section 1112(b) of title 18, United 
States Code, is amended--
            (1) by striking ``ten years'' and inserting ``20 years''; 
        and
            (2) by striking ``six years'' and inserting ``10 years''.

SEC. 6. MODIFICATION OF DEFINITION OF OFFENSE AND OF THE PENALTIES FOR, 
                    INFLUENCING OR INJURING OFFICER OR JUROR GENERALLY.

    Section 1503 of title 18, United States Code, is amended--
            (1) so that subsection (a) reads as follows:
    ``(a)(1) Whoever--
            ``(A) corruptly, or by threats of force or force, endeavors 
        to influence, intimidate, or impede a juror or officer in a 
        judicial proceeding in the discharge of that juror or officer's 
        duty;
            ``(B) injures a juror or an officer in a judicial 
        proceeding arising out of the performance of official duties as 
        such juror or officer; or
            ``(C) corruptly, or by threats of force or force, 
        obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or 
        impede, the due administration of justice;
or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be punished as provided in 
subsection (b).
    ``(2) As used in this section, the term `juror or officer in a 
judicial proceeding' means a grand or petit juror, or other officer in 
or of any court of the United States, or an officer who may be serving 
at any examination or other proceeding before any United States 
magistrate judge or other committing magistrate.''; and
            (2) in subsection (b), by striking paragraphs (1) through 
        (3) and inserting the following:
            ``(1) in the case of a killing, or an attempt or a 
        conspiracy to kill, the punishment provided in section 1111, 
        1112, 1113, and 1117; and
            ``(2) in any other case, a fine under this title and 
        imprisonment for not more than 30 years.''.

SEC. 7. MODIFICATION OF TAMPERING WITH A WITNESS, VICTIM, OR AN 
                    INFORMANT OFFENSE.

    (a) Changes in Penalties.--Section 1512 of title 18, United States 
Code, is amended--
            (1) in each of paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (a), 
        insert ``or conspires'' after ``attempts'';
            (2) so that subparagraph (A) of subsection (a)(3) reads as 
        follows:
            ``(A) in the case of a killing, the punishment provided in 
        sections 1111 and 1112;'';
            (3) in subsection (a)(3)--
                    (A) in the matter following clause (ii) of 
                subparagraph (B) by striking ``20 years'' and inserting 
                ``30 years'' ; and
                    (B) in subparagraph (C), by striking ``10 years'' 
                and inserting ``20 years'';
            (4) in subsection (b), by striking ``ten years'' and 
        inserting ``30 years''; and
            (5) in subsection (d), by striking ``one year'' and 
        inserting ``20 years''.

SEC. 8. MODIFICATION OF RETALIATION OFFENSE.

    Section 1513 of title 18, United States Code, is amended--
            (1) in subsection (a)(1), by inserting ``or conspires'' 
        after ``attempts'';
            (2) in subsection (a)(1)(B)--
                    (A) by inserting a comma after ``probation''; and
                    (B) by striking the comma which immediately follows 
                another comma;
            (3) in subsection (a)(2)(B), by striking ``20 years'' and 
        inserting ``30 years'';
            (4) in subsection (b), by striking ``ten years'' and 
        inserting ``30 years'';
            (5) in the first subsection (e), by striking ``10 years'' 
        and inserting ``30 years''; and
            (6) by redesignating the second subsection (e) as 
        subsection (f).

SEC. 9. INCLUSION OF INTIMIDATION AND RETALIATION AGAINST WITNESSES IN 
                    STATE PROSECUTIONS AS BASIS FOR FEDERAL 
                    PROSECUTION.

    Section 1952 of title 18, United States Code, is amended in 
subsection (b)(2), by inserting ``intimidation of, or retaliation 
against, a witness, victim, juror, or informant,'' after ``extortion, 
bribery,''.

SEC. 10. CLARIFICATION OF VENUE FOR RETALIATION AGAINST A WITNESS.

    Section 1513 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding 
at the end the following:
    ``(g) A prosecution under this section may be brought in the 
district in which the official proceeding (whether or not pending, 
about to be instituted or completed) was intended to be affected or was 
completed, or in which the conduct constituting the alleged offense 
occurred.''.

SEC. 11. WITNESS PROTECTION GRANT PROGRAM.

    Title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 
is amended by inserting after part BB (42 U.S.C. 3797j et seq.) the 
following new part:

                  ``PART CC--WITNESS PROTECTION GRANTS

``SEC. 2811. PROGRAM AUTHORIZED.

    ``(a) In General.--From amounts made available to carry out this 
part, the Attorney General may make grants to States, units of local 
government, and Indian tribes to create and expand witness protection 
programs in order to prevent threats, intimidation, and retaliation 
against victims of, and witnesses to, crimes.
    ``(b) Uses of Funds.--Grants awarded under this part shall be--
            ``(1) distributed directly to the State, unit of local 
        government, or Indian tribe; and
            ``(2) used for the creation and expansion of witness 
        protection programs in the jurisdiction of the grantee.
    ``(c) Preferential Consideration.--In awarding grants under this 
part, the Attorney General may give preferential consideration, if 
feasible, to an application from a jurisdiction that--
            ``(1) has the greatest need for witness and victim 
        protection programs;
            ``(2) has a serious violent crime problem in the 
        jurisdiction; and
            ``(3) has had, or is likely to have, instances of threats, 
        intimidation, and retaliation against victims of, and witnesses 
        to, crimes.
    ``(d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be 
appropriated to carry out this section $20,000,000 for each of fiscal 
years 2006 through 2010.''.

SEC. 12. GRANTS TO STATES TO PROTECT WITNESSES AND VICTIMS OF CRIMES.

    (a) In General.--Section 31702 of the Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act of 1994 (42 U.S.C. 13862) is amended--
            (1) in paragraph (3), by striking ``and'' at the end;
            (2) in paragraph (4), by striking the period at the end and 
        inserting ``; and'' ; and
            (3) by adding at the end the following:
            ``(5) to create and expand witness and victim protection 
        programs to prevent threats, intimidation, and retaliation 
        against victims of, and witnesses to, violent crimes.''.
    (b) Authorization of Appropriations.--Section 31707 of the Violent 
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (42 U.S.C. 13867) is 
amended to read as follows:

``SEC. 31707. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

    ``There are authorized to be appropriated $20,000,000 for each of 
the fiscal years 2006 through 2010 to carry out this subtitle.''.

SEC. 13. JUDICIAL BRANCH SECURITY REQUIREMENTS.

    (a) Ensuring Consultation and Coordination With the Administrative 
Office of the United States Courts.--Section 566 of title 28, United 
States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
    ``(i) The United States Marshals Service shall consult with the 
Administrative Office of the United States Courts on a continuing basis 
regarding the security requirements for the Judicial Branch, and inform 
the Administrative Office of the measures the Marshals Service intends 
to take to meet those requirements.''.
    (b) Conforming Amendment.--Section 604(a) of title 28, United 
States Code, is amended--
            (1) by redesignating existing paragraph (24) as paragraph 
        (25);
            (2) by striking ``and'' at the end of paragraph (23); and
            (3) by inserting after paragraph (23) the following:
            ``(24) Consult with the United States Marshals Service on a 
        continuing basis regarding the security requirements for the 
        Judicial Branch, and inform the Administrative Office of the 
        measures the Marshals Service intends to take to meet those 
        requirements; and''.

SEC. 14. PROTECTIONS AGAINST MALICIOUS RECORDING OF FICTITIOUS LIENS 
                    AGAINST A FEDERAL EMPLOYEE.

    (a) Offense.--Chapter 73 of title 18, United States Code, is 
amended by adding at the end the following:

``Sec. 1521. Retaliating against a Federal employee by false claim or 
                    slander of title

    ``Whoever, with the intent to harass a person designated in section 
1114 on account of the performance of official duties, files, in any 
public record or in any private record which is generally available to 
the public, any false lien or encumbrance against the real or personal 
property of that person, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be 
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or 
both.''.
    (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the beginning of 
chapter 73 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the 
end the following new item:

``1521. Retaliating against a Federal employee by false claim or 
slander of title.''.

SEC. 15. PROHIBITION OF POSSESSION OF DANGEROUS WEAPONS IN FEDERAL 
                    COURT FACILITIES.

    Section 930(e) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by 
inserting ``or other dangerous weapon'' after ``firearm''.

SEC. 16. REPEAL OF SUNSET PROVISION.

    Section 105(b)(3) of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. 
App) is amended by striking subparagraph (E).

SEC. 17. PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUALS PERFORMING CERTAIN FEDERAL AND OTHER 
                    FUNCTIONS.

    (a) Offense.--Chapter 7 of title 18, United States Code, is amended 
by adding at the end the following:

``Sec. 117. Protection of individuals performing certain Federal and 
                    federally assisted functions

    ``(a) Whoever knowingly, and with intent to harm, intimidate, or 
retaliate against a covered official makes restricted personal 
information about that covered official publicly available through the 
Internet shall be fined under this title and imprisoned not more than 5 
years, or both.
    ``(b) It is a defense to a prosecution under this section that the 
defendant is a provider of Internet services and did not knowingly 
participate in the offense.
    ``(c) As used in this section--
            ``(1) the term `restricted personal information' means, 
        with respect to an individual, the Social Security number, the 
        home address, home phone number, mobile phone number, personal 
        email, or home fax number of, and identifiable to, that 
        individual; and
            ``(2) the term `covered official' means--
                    ``(A) an individual designated in section 1114;
                    ``(B) a public safety officer (as that term is 
                defined in section 1204 of the Omnibus Crime Control 
                and Safe Streets Act of 1968); or
                    ``(C) a grand or petit juror, witness, or other 
                officer in or of, any court of the United States, or an 
                officer who may be serving at any examination or other 
                proceeding before any United States magistrate judge or 
                other committing magistrate.''.
    (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the beginning of 
chapter 7 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the 
end the following new item:

``117. Protection of individuals performing certain Federal and 
federally assisted functions.''.

SEC. 18. ELIGIBILITY OF COURTS TO APPLY DIRECTLY FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 
                    DISCRETIONARY GRANTS AND REQUIREMENT THAT STATE AND 
                    LOCAL GOVERNMENTS CONSIDER COURTS WHEN APPLYING FOR 
                    GRANT FUNDS.

    (a) Courts Treated as Units of Local Governments for Purposes of 
Discretionary Grants.--Section 901 of the Omnibus Crime Control and 
Safe Streets Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. 3791) is amended in subsection 
(a)(3)--
            (1) by redesignating subparagraphs (C) and (D) as 
        subparagraphs (D) and (E), respectively; and
            (2) by inserting after subparagraph (B) the following new 
        subparagraph:
                    ``(C) the judicial branch of a State or of a unit 
                of local government within the State for purposes of 
                discretionary grants;''.
    (b) State and Local Governments to Consider Courts.--The Attorney 
General shall ensure that whenever a State or unit of local government 
applies for a grant from the Department of Justice, the State or unit 
demonstrate that, in developing the application and distributing funds, 
the State or unit--
            (1) considered the needs of the judicial branch of the 
        State or unit, as the case may be; and
            (2) consulted with the chief judicial officer of the 
        highest court of the State or unit, as the case may be.

SEC. 19. REPORT ON SECURITY OF FEDERAL PROSECUTORS.

    Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
the Attorney General shall submit to the Committee on the Judiciary of 
the House of Representatives and the Committee on the Judiciary of the 
Senate a report on the security of assistant United States attorneys 
and other Federal attorneys arising from the prosecution of terrorists, 
violent criminal gangs, drug traffickers, gun traffickers, white 
supremacists, and those who commit fraud and other white-collar 
offenses. The report shall describe each of the following:
            (1) The number and nature of threats and assaults against 
        attorneys handling those prosecutions and the reporting 
        requirements and methods.
            (2) The security measures that are in place to protect the 
        attorneys who are handling those prosecutions, including 
        measures such as threat assessments, response procedures, 
        availability of security systems and other devices, firearms 
        licensing (deputations), and other measures designed to protect 
        the attorneys and their families.
            (3) The Department of Justice's firearms deputation 
        policies, including the number of attorneys deputized and the 
        time between receipt of threat and completion of the deputation 
        and training process.
            (4) For each measure covered by paragraphs (1) through (3), 
        when the report or measure was developed and who was 
        responsible for developing and implementing the report or 
        measure.
            (5) The programs that are made available to the attorneys 
        for personal security training, including training relating to 
        limitations on public information disclosure, basic home 
        security, firearms handling and safety, family safety, mail 
        handling, counter- surveillance, and self-defense tactics.
            (6) The measures that are taken to provide the attorneys 
        with secure parking facilities, and how priorities for such 
        facilities are established--
                    (A) among Federal employees within the facility;
                    (B) among Department of Justice employees within 
                the facility; and
                    (C) among attorneys within the facility.
            (7) The frequency such attorneys are called upon to work 
        beyond standard work hours and the security measures provided 
        to protect attorneys at such times during travel between office 
        and available parking facilities.
            (8) With respect to attorneys who are licensed under State 
        laws to carry firearms, the Department of Justice's policy as 
        to--
                    (A) carrying the firearm between available parking 
                and office buildings;
                    (B) securing the weapon at the office buildings; 
                and
                    (C) equipment and training provided to facilitate 
                safe storage at Department of Justice facilities.
            (9) The offices in the Department of Justice that are 
        responsible for ensuring the security of the attorneys, the 
        organization and staffing of the offices, and the manner in 
        which the offices coordinate with offices in specific 
        districts.
            (10) The role, if any, that the United States Marshals 
        Service or any other Department of Justice component plays in 
        protecting, or providing security services or training for, the 
        attorneys.

SEC. 20. FLIGHT TO AVOID PROSECUTION FOR KILLING PEACE OFFICERS.

    (a) Flight.--Chapter 49 of title 18, United States Code, is amended 
by adding at the end the following:

``Sec. 1075. Flight to avoid prosecution for killing peace officers

    ``Whoever moves or travels in interstate or foreign commerce with 
intent to avoid prosecution, or custody or confinement after 
conviction, under the laws of the place from which he flees or under 
section 1114 or 1123, for a crime consisting of the killing, an 
attempted killing, or a conspiracy to kill, an individual involved in 
crime and juvenile delinquency control or reduction, or enforcement of 
the laws or for a crime punishable by section 1114 or 1123, shall be 
fined under this title and imprisoned, in addition to any other 
imprisonment for the underlying offense, for any term of years not less 
than 10.''.
    (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the beginning of 
chapter 49 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the 
end the following new item:

``1075. Flight to avoid prosecution for killing peace officers.''.

SEC. 21. SPECIAL PENALTIES FOR MURDER, KIDNAPPING, AND RELATED CRIMES 
                    AGAINST FEDERAL JUDGES AND FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 
                    OFFICERS.

    (a) Murder.--Section 1114 of title 18, United States Code, is 
amended--
            (1) by inserting ``(a)'' before ``Whoever''; and
            (2) by adding at the end the following:
    ``(b) If the victim of a murder punishable under this section is a 
United States judge (as defined in section 115) or a Federal law 
enforcement officer (as defined in 115) the offender shall be punished 
by a fine under this title and imprisonment for any term of years not 
less than 30, or for life, or, if death results, may be sentenced to 
death.''.
    (b) Kidnapping.--Section 1201(a) of title 18, United States Code, 
is amended by adding at the end the following: ``If the victim of the 
offense punishable under this subsection is a United States judge (as 
defined in section 115) or a Federal law enforcement officer (as 
defined in 115) the offender shall be punished by a fine under this 
title and imprisonment for any term of years not less than 30, or for 
life, or, if death results, may be sentenced to death.''.

SEC. 22. MEDIA COVERAGE OF COURT PROCEEDINGS.

    (a) Findings.--The Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The right of the people of the United States to freedom 
        of speech, particularly as it relates to comment on 
        governmental activities, as protected by the first amendment to 
        the Constitution, cannot be meaningfully exercised without the 
        ability of the public to obtain facts and information about the 
        Government upon which to base their judgments regarding 
        important issues and events. As the United States Supreme Court 
        articulated in Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947), ``A trial 
        is a public event. What transpires in the court room is public 
        property.''.
            (2) The right of the people of the United States to a free 
        press, with the ability to report on all aspects of the conduct 
        of the business of government, as protected by the first 
        amendment to the Constitution, cannot be meaningfully exercised 
        without the ability of the news media to gather facts and 
        information freely for dissemination to the public.
            (3) The right of the people of the United States to 
        petition the Government to redress grievances, particularly as 
        it relates to the manner in which the Government exercises its 
        legislative, executive, and judicial powers, as protected by 
        the first amendment to the Constitution, cannot be meaningfully 
        exercised without the availability to the public of information 
        about how the affairs of government are being conducted. As the 
        Supreme Court noted in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. 
        Commonwealth of Virginia (1980), ``People in an open society do 
        not demand infallibility from their institutions, but it is 
        difficult for them to accept what they are prohibited from 
        observing.''
            (4) In the twenty-first century, the people of the United 
        States obtain information regarding judicial matters involving 
        the Constitution, civil rights, and other important legal 
        subjects principally through the print and electronic media. 
        Television, in particular, provides a degree of public access 
        to courtroom proceedings that more closely approximates the 
        ideal of actual physical presence than newspaper coverage or 
        still photography.
            (5) Providing statutory authority for the courts of the 
        United States to exercise their discretion in permitting 
        televised coverage of courtroom proceedings would enhance 
        significantly the access of the people to the Federal 
        judiciary.
            (6) Inasmuch as the first amendment to the Constitution 
        prevents Congress from abridging the ability of the people to 
        exercise their inherent rights to freedom of speech, to freedom 
        of the press, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
        grievances, it is good public policy for the Congress 
        affirmatively to facilitate the ability of the people to 
        exercise those rights.
            (7) The granting of such authority would assist in the 
        implementation of the constitutional guarantee of public trials 
        in criminal cases, as provided by the sixth amendment to the 
        Constitution. As the Supreme Court stated in In re Oliver 
        (1948), ``Whatever other benefits the guarantee to an accused 
        that his trial be conducted in public may confer upon our 
        society, the guarantee has always been recognized as a 
        safeguard against any attempt to employ our courts as 
        instruments of persecution. The knowledge that every criminal 
        trial is subject to contemporaneous review in the forum of 
        public opinion is an effective restraint on possible abuse of 
        judicial power.''.
    (b) Authority of Presiding Judge to Allow Media Coverage of Court 
Proceedings.--
            (1) Authority of appellate courts.--Notwithstanding any 
        other provision of law, the presiding judge of an appellate 
        court of the United States may, in his or her discretion, 
        permit the photographing, electronic recording, broadcasting, 
        or televising to the public of court proceedings over which 
        that judge presides.
            (2) Authority of district courts.--
                    (A) In general.--Notwithstanding any other 
                provision of law, any presiding judge of a district 
                court of the United States may, in his or her 
                discretion, permit the photographing, electronic 
                recording, broadcasting, or televising to the public of 
                court proceedings over which that judge presides.
                    (B) Obscuring of witnesses and jurors.--(i) Upon 
                the request of any witness (other than a party) or a 
                juror in a trial proceeding, the court shall order the 
                face and voice of the witness or juror (as the case may 
                be) to be disguised or otherwise obscured in such 
                manner as to render the witness or juror unrecognizable 
                to the broadcast audience of the trial proceeding.
                    (ii) The presiding judge in a trial proceeding 
                shall inform--
                            (I) each witness who is not a party that 
                        the witness has the right to request that his 
                        or her image and voice be obscured during the 
                        witness' testimony; and
                            (II) each juror that the juror has the 
                        right to request that his or her image be 
                        obscured during the trial proceeding.
            (3) Advisory guidelines.--The Judicial Conference of the 
        United States is authorized to promulgate advisory guidelines 
        to which a presiding judge, in his or her discretion, may refer 
        in making decisions with respect to the management and 
        administration of photographing, recording, broadcasting, or 
        televising described in paragraphs (1) and (2).
    (c) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) Presiding judge.--The term ``presiding judge'' means 
        the judge presiding over the court proceeding concerned. In 
        proceedings in which more than one judge participates, the 
        presiding judge shall be the senior active judge so 
        participating or, in the case of a circuit court of appeals, 
        the senior active circuit judge so participating, except that--
                    (A) in en banc sittings of any United States 
                circuit court of appeals, the presiding judge shall be 
                the chief judge of the circuit whenever the chief judge 
                participates; and
                    (B) in en banc sittings of the Supreme Court of the 
                United States, the presiding judge shall be the Chief 
                Justice whenever the Chief Justice participates.
            (2) Appellate court of the united states.--The term 
        ``appellate court of the United States'' means any United 
        States circuit court of appeals and the Supreme Court of the 
        United States.
    (d) Sunset.--The authority under subsection (b)(2) shall terminate 
on the date that is 3 years after the date of the enactment of this 
Act.

SEC. 23. FUNDING FOR STATE COURTS TO ASSESS AND ENHANCE COURT SECURITY 
                    AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS.

    (a) In General.--The Attorney General, through the Office of 
Justice Programs, shall make grants under this section to the highest 
State courts in States participating in the program, for the purpose of 
enabling such courts--
            (1) to conduct assessments focused on the essential 
        elements for effective courtroom safety and security planning; 
        and
            (2) to implement changes deemed necessary as a result of 
        the assessments.
    (b) Essential Elements.--As used in subsection (a)(1), the 
essential elements include, but are not limited to--
            (1) operational security and standard operating procedures;
            (2) facility security planning and self-audit surveys of 
        court facilities;
            (3) emergency preparedness and response and continuity of 
        operations;
            (4) disaster recovery and the essential elements of a plan;
            (5) threat assessment;
            (6) incident reporting;
            (7) security equipment;
            (8) developing resources and building partnerships; and
            (9) new courthouse design.
    (c) Applications.--To be eligible for a grant under this section, a 
highest State court shall submit to the Attorney General an application 
at such time, in such form, and including such information and 
assurances as the Attorney General shall require.
    (d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be 
appropriated to carry out this section $20,000,000 for each of fiscal 
years 2006 through 2010.

SEC. 24. ADDITIONAL AMOUNTS FOR UNITED STATES MARSHALS SERVICE TO 
                    PROTECT THE JUDICIARY.

    In addition to any other amounts authorized to be appropriated for 
the United States Marshals Service, there are authorized to be 
appropriated for the United States Marshals Service to protect the 
judiciary, $20,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2006 through 2010 for--
            (1) hiring entry-level deputy marshals for providing 
        judicial security;
            (2) hiring senior-level deputy marshals for investigating 
        threats to the judiciary and providing protective details to 
        members of the judiciary and Assistant United States Attorneys; 
        and
            (3) for the Office of Protective Intelligence, for hiring 
        senior-level deputy marshals, hiring program analysts, and 
        providing secure computer systems.

SEC. 25. GRANTS TO STATES FOR THREAT ASSESSMENT DATABASES.

    (a) In General.--From amounts made available to carry out this 
section, the Attorney General shall carry out a program under which the 
Attorney General makes grants to States for use by the State to 
establish and maintain a threat assessment database described in 
subsection (b).
    (b) Database.--For purposes of subsection (a), a threat assessment 
database is a database through which a State can--
            (1) analyze trends and patterns in domestic terrorism and 
        crime;
            (2) project the probabilities that specific acts of 
        domestic terrorism or crime will occur; and
            (3) develop measures and procedures that can effectively 
        reduce the probabilities that those acts will occur.
    (c) Core Elements.--The Attorney General shall define a core set of 
data elements to be used by each database funded by this section so 
that the information in the database can be effectively shared with 
other States and with the Department of Justice.
    (d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be 
appropriated to carry out this section such sums as may be necessary 
for each of fiscal years 2006 through 2009.

SEC. 26. GRANTS FOR YOUNG WITNESS ASSISTANCE.

    (a) Definitions.--For purposes of this section:
            (1) Director.--The term ``Director'' means the Director of 
        the Bureau of Justice Assistance.
            (2) Juvenile.--The term ``juvenile'' means an individual 
        who is 17 years of age or younger.
            (3) Young adult.--The term ``young adult'' means an 
        individual who is between the ages of 18 and 21.
            (4) State.--The term ``State'' means any State of the 
        United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of 
        Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, American Samoa, Guam, and the 
        Northern Mariana Islands.
    (b) Program Authorization.--The Director may make grants to State 
and local prosecutors and law enforcement agencies in support of 
juvenile and young adult witness assistance programs, including State 
and local prosecutors and law enforcement agencies that have existing 
juvenile and adult witness assistance programs.
    (c) Eligibility.--To be eligible to receive a grant under this 
section, State and local prosecutors and law enforcement officials 
shall--
            (1) submit an application to the Director in such form and 
        containing such information as the Director may reasonably 
        require; and
            (2) give assurances that each applicant has developed, or 
        is in the process of developing, a witness assistance program 
        that specifically targets the unique needs of juvenile and 
        young adult witnesses and their families.
    (d) Use of Funds.--Grants made available under this section may be 
used--
            (1) to assess the needs of juvenile and young adult 
        witnesses;
            (2) to develop appropriate program goals and objectives; 
        and
            (3) to develop and administer a variety of witness 
        assistance services, which includes--
                    (A) counseling services to young witnesses dealing 
                with trauma associated in witnessing a violent crime;
                    (B) pre- and post-trial assistance for the youth 
                and their family;
                    (C) providing education services if the child is 
                removed from or changes their school for safety 
                concerns;
                    (D) protective services for young witnesses and 
                their families when a serious threat of harm from the 
                perpetrators or their associates is made; and
                    (E) community outreach and school-based initiatives 
                that stimulate and maintain public awareness and 
                support.
    (e) Reports.--
            (1) Report.--State and local prosecutors and law 
        enforcement agencies that receive funds under this section 
        shall submit to the Director a report not later than May 1st of 
        each year in which grants are made available under this 
        section. Reports shall describe progress achieved in carrying 
        out the purpose of this section.
            (2) Report to congress.--The Director shall submit to 
        Congress a report by July 1st of each year which contains a 
        detailed statement regarding grant awards, activities of grant 
        recipients, a compilation of statistical information submitted 
        by applicants, and an evaluation of programs established under 
        this section.
    (f) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be 
appropriated to carry out this section $3,000,000 for each of fiscal 
years 2006, 2007, and 2008.

                          Purpose and Summary

    H.R. 1751, the ``Secure Access to Justice and Court 
Protection Act of 2005,'' is a comprehensive measure designed 
to improve the security and protection of judges, law 
enforcement, prosecutors, and other personnel. The tragic 
shootings of family members of United States District Judge 
Joan Lefkow, and the brutal slayings of Judge Rowland Barton, 
his court reporter, his deputy sheriff, and a Federal officer 
in Atlanta, as well as the violent attacks outside the Tyler, 
Texas courthouse--all underscore the importance of enhanced 
security for judges, courthouse personnel, witnesses and law 
enforcement officers.
    At the State and local level, there is a clear and 
demonstrated need for assistance in the protection of judges, 
law enforcement officers, witnesses and courthouse personnel. 
The bulk of criminal prosecutions occur at the State and local 
level. Witness intimidation is a regular occurrence in State 
courthouses. H.R. 1751 provides a number of important new 
protections and resources for Federal, State and local judges, 
law enforcement officers, witnesses and other courthouse 
personnel.

                Background and Need for the Legislation

    The administration of justice requires that court and law 
enforcement personnel discharge their responsibilities without 
fear of violence or intimidation. The House Committee on the 
Judiciary has for many years focused on the issue of protecting 
witnesses and victims of crime. Recent brutal acts of violence, 
increasing number of threats, and attempts to derail our civil 
and criminal justice system only underscore the urgency of 
addressing this issue. Judges, witnesses, courthouse personnel 
and law enforcement officers must be free of threats and 
violence when carrying out their duties. H.R. 1751 seeks to 
provide the resources and the tools necessary to ensure the 
safety to those who play critical roles in our judicial system.
    Courthouse protection should not be confined to the 
physical security of the courthouse itself--security must 
extend to the homes and areas that judges, prosecutors, law 
enforcement and witnesses reside. Without such protection, 
justice will be subverted as criminals seek to undermine our 
justice system. H.R. 1751 would strengthen the integrity of our 
judicial system by enhancing protections against: a disgruntled 
civil litigant; a dangerous criminal seeking to harm a judge or 
a prosecutor; the murder of a gang member who has agreed to 
testify against other gang members; or the murder of innocent 
civilian witnesses who are trying to merely carry out their 
civil obligation to testify against a violent criminal.
    At the Federal level, the United States Marshals Service is 
charged with protecting those working in the Judicial Branch, 
as well as witnesses in Federal trials. The Committee has 
received information that raises concerns about the United 
States Marshals' ability to carry out its duties. A recent 
Inspector General's report raised questions about the Marshals' 
witness protection program.\1\ In addition, there are questions 
regarding: the adequacy of critical resources allocated to the 
Marshals necessary in fulfilling their mission; the proper 
allocation of resources between the field and headquarters 
locations; and arbitrary decisions at the Marshals' 
Headquarters that may adversely impact both morale and security 
efforts in the field.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ U.S. Department of Justice, March 2004--Review of United States 
Marshal's Judicial Security Process, March 2004, Report No. I-2004-
0004, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/reports/USMS/e0404/
final.pdf
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Murders and Assaults of Law Enforcement Officers
    According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, 52 law 
enforcement officers were feloniously killed in the United 
States in 2003. In 2002, 56 officers were killed in the United 
States. In the ten-year period from 1994 through 2003, a total 
of 616 law enforcement officers were feloniously killed in the 
line of duty in the United States, 100 of whom were killed in 
ambush situations--i.e. entrapment or premeditated 
situations.\2\ If bulletproof vests had not been provided to 
these personnel, it is estimated that an additional 400 
officers would have been killed over the last decade.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice, 
November 2004--Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted 2003, 
available at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/killed/leoka03.pdf.
    \3\ Faye Fiore & Miles Corwin, Tole of Violence Haunts Families of 
Police Officers, N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1994, at 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Of those responsible for the unlawful killings of police 
officers between 1994 through 2003, 521 had a prior criminal 
arrest--including 153 who had a prior arrest for assaulting a 
police officer or resisting arrest; 264 for a crime of 
violence; 230 for a weapons violation; and 23 for murder. More 
than 57,000 law enforcement officers were assaulted in 2003, or 
one in every 10 officers serving in the United States.\4\ These 
attacks have been increasing since 1999, even as other crime 
rates have decreased or held steady. As the Executive Director 
of the Fraternal Order of Police recently noted, ``there's less 
respect for authority in general and police officers 
specifically. The predisposition of criminals to use firearms 
is probably at the highest point in our history.'' \5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ Id.
    \5\ Jerry Nachtigal, Crime Down, but Number of Police Officers 
Killed Holds Steady, Associated Press Newswires, Apr. 11, 1999.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    H.R. 1751 addresses this problem by sending a strong 
message of deterrence to would-be assailants. The existing 
penalty for assaulting a law enforcement officer is 8 years (15 
with a weapon). Under current criminal law, a false statement 
made to an FBI agent in a terrorism investigation carries the 
same penalty as a violent assault of a police officer. The bill 
adopts a reasonable penalty structure requiring 1 to 10 years 
for an assault that results in bodily injury (cut, abrasion, 
bruise, burn or disfigurement, pain, illness); 3 to 12 years 
for substantial bodily injury (temporary but substantial 
disfigurement, temporary but substantial loss or impairment); 
and 10 to 30 years for serious bodily injury (substantial risk 
of death, extreme physical pain, protracted and obvious 
disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function 
of a bodily member, organ or mental faculty). These penalties 
roughly correspond to existing guideline ranges and simply 
ensure that Federal judges impose the required penalty, but can 
exercise discretion to a higher penalty if warranted.
Assaults and Violence Against Judges
    Federal, State and local judges have suffered from rising 
threats and deadly attacks against courthouse personnel--
prosecutors, witnesses, defense counsel and others have also 
come under more regular and violent assault. These include the 
killing of an individual with a grenade in the Seattle Federal 
courthouse, the killing of a State judge and other court 
personnel in Atlanta, the murders of a Federal Judge Lefkow's 
family members, and the murders immediately outside the Tyler, 
Texas courthouse. According to the Administrative Office of 
United States Courts, there are almost 700 threats a year made 
against Federal judges, and in numerous cases Federal judges 
have had security details assigned to them for fear of attack 
by members of terrorist associates, violent gangs, drug 
organizations and disgruntled litigants.
    The recent killing of Judge Lefkow's husband and mother by 
a disgruntled litigant shows that this threat extends to judges 
and their family members. The Judge Lefkow attack follows on 
the heels of the 1989 bombing of Circuit Judge Robert Vance in 
the 11th Circuit, the 1998 shooting of Judge Daronoco, and the 
1979 shooting of Judge Wood outside his San Antonio home.
    At the State and local level, there is no comprehensive 
data or incident reports. However, the recent slayings of Judge 
Rowland Barton, his court reporter, his deputy sheriff, and a 
Federal officer in Atlanta, and the cold-blooded shootings 
outside the Tyler, Texas courthouse all underscore the 
importance of security for judges, courthouse personnel, 
witnesses and law enforcement officers. The scourge of violence 
against these individuals threatens the very integrity of our 
judicial system.
    Two States, Missouri and Massachusetts, have gathered data 
that shows an increasing trend of violence against courts and 
court personnel. For the years 2003 and 2004, in Massachusetts, 
assaults and disturbances, medical emergencies, and weapons/
contraband seized constituted the majority of incidents 
reported (72.12 percent) for the 2004 reporting period. There 
were 295 assaults and 30 threats against judges or courthouse 
employees. In Missouri, for 2001, 74 percent of reporting 
courts indicated that their court had experienced at least one 
security incident during the reporting period. Of the five most 
frequent types of security incidents, four involved a level of 
violence or threat of violence.
    H.R. 1751 authorizes but does not require Federal 
prosecution of Federally-funded State and local judges, and 
first responders (law enforcement officers, firefighters and 
ambulance crews). First, the bill provides that jurisdiction 
only exists when it involves Federal funding and the protection 
of Federal investment. Second, under current Federal law the 
Department of Justice pays survivor benefits to families of 
first responders who are killed in the line of duty. The 
Federal interest in minimizing these assaults and murders is 
obvious.
    These crucial provisions would authorize Federal 
prosecution only after State, local, and Federal prosecutors 
determine where such prosecution would best be brought. Some 
States do not have a death penalty and Federal prosecution of a 
law enforcement murder suspect may be warranted; Federal 
prosecution may be advantageous over State or local prosecution 
for a variety of reasons (law relating to evidence, statute of 
limitations, or other reasons). The provisions do not require 
Federal prosecution, but add another vital tool to Federal, 
State, and local efforts to protect law enforcement officers, 
judges and other courthouse personnel.
Witness Intimidation and Killings
    A 1996 Justice Department study concluded that ``witness 
intimidation is a pervasive and insidious problem. No part of 
the country is spared and no witness can feel entirely free or 
safe.'' \6\ Prosecutors estimated that witness intimidation 
occurs in 75 percent to 100 percent of the violent crimes 
committed in some gang-dominated neighborhoods.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ National Institute of Justice, Department of Justice, 
Preventing Gang- and Drug-Related Witness Intimidation (1996).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    States do not have significant witness protection programs. 
However, States do not have the ability to relocate witnesses 
and their families, if necessary, like the Federal system. 
There is an overwhelming need for such programs. Prosecutors in 
Baltimore estimate that 35 percent to 50 percent of non-fatal 
shooting cases in the city cannot proceed because of reluctant 
witnesses, and about 90 percent of all homicide cases involve 
some manner of witness intimidation. Every year in New York 
City, hundreds of witnesses in court cases report being 
threatened, and at least 19 have been killed since 1980, 
according to law enforcement officials.
    H.R. 1751 addresses the issue of witness intimidation by: 
(1) authorizing a new grant program to provide funding to 
States to create witness protection programs; (2) amending 
existing grant program authorizations to include witness 
protection; (3) raising the maximum penalties for applicable 
crimes (18 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1512-13); and (4) adding witness 
obstruction crimes in Interstate Transportation in Aid of 
Racketeering.
Penalty Enhancement
    The bill includes mandatory minimum penalties for assaults 
and killings of police officers, judges and family members. Law 
enforcement officers deserve our fullest protection--brazen 
criminals show less and less regard for the police and the hard 
work that they do. As revised, the mandatory minimums are 
commensurate with existing Federal sentencing guidelines. 
However, in the absence of a mandatory guideline system, there 
is too much at risk to leave the sentencing decisions to judges 
who sometimes depart from the guidelines when presented with a 
case.
    Mandatory minimum penalties protect law enforcement, 
judges, witnesses, and send a significant message--if you 
attack members of the judicial system or law enforcement 
officers, you will pay a definite price. Such penalties 
increase public safety, and provide effective tools against 
criminals who depend on witness intimidation and judicial 
obstruction to derail the justice system. Mandatory minimum 
penalties are effective means for ensuring consistency in 
sentencing. Since the Supreme Court's decision in United States 
v. Booker, judges now have complete discretion to ignore the 
Federal sentencing guidelines and impose whatever sentence they 
want--all to the detriment of public safety and fairness in 
sentencing through consistent and clear punishment schemes.
    Congress has a duty to set sentencing policies for Federal 
crimes--and to make sure that judges impose such sentences. 
Unfortunately, that has not been the experience since the 
Booker decision. Once freed from mandatory sentencing schemes, 
Federal judges are now starting to ignore the guidelines: in 1 
of every 10 criminal cases, they are imposing sentences below 
the previously mandated guideline range. In a recently released 
report, United States Sentencing Commission data confirmed that 
this trend is continuing, and highlighted such data by 
Circuits. This data showed that judges in the 2nd and 9th 
Circuits followed the guideline ranges in imposing sentences in 
a substantially lower percentage than other circuits. Sentences 
now for similar crimes are being handed in disparate fashion 
depending on the region in which the offense occurs. This 
sentencing disparity imperils equal justice in the Federal 
system.
    In a recent speech, Attorney General Gonzales noted the 
problems since the Booker decision and the absence of a 
mandatory sentencing scheme.

        More and more frequently, judges are exercising their 
        discretion to impose sentences that depart from the 
        carefully considered ranges developed by the U.S. 
        Sentencing Commission. In the process, we risk losing a 
        sentencing system that requires serious sentences for 
        serious offenders and helps prevent disparate sentences 
        for equally serious crimes. . . . And, indeed, the 
        evidence the Department has seen since the Booker 
        decision suggests an increasing disparity in sentences, 
        and a drift toward lesser sentences.

    Mandatory minimums have been supported, and adopted on a 
bipartisan basis in the last 30 years for: (1) drug 
traffickers; (2) armed criminals who commit a drug trafficking 
offense or a crime of violence; (3) criminals who commit crimes 
against children (including 387 Members of Congress who 
recently voted for the ``Children's Safety Act of 2005''); (4) 
criminals who engage in identity theft; and (5) terrorists who 
possess and threaten to use atomic, chemical and biological 
weapons and anti-aircraft missiles.
    Mandatory minimum penalties provide the tools for 
prosecutors to secure the cooperation of co-conspirators, co-
defendants and other organized criminals to solve crimes and 
dismantle organizations that may be involved in child 
pornography. In addition, every defendant may obtain a reduced 
sentence below the statutory mandatory minimum by providing 
``substantial assistance in the investigation and prosecution 
of another person.''
    Mandatory sentencing schemes--truth-in-sentencing, 
determinate sentencing practices, ``three-strikes and you're 
out''--have resulted in dramatic reductions in crime since the 
1970s.\7\ Other studies confirm the obvious point--
incarcerating an offender prevents him from repeating his 
crimes while he is in prison.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ Steven D. Levitt, Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: 
Four Factors That Explain the Decline and Seven That Do Not, 18 J.Econ. 
Perspectives 163 (2004); Joanna M. Shepherd, Police, Prosecutors, 
Criminals and Determinate Sentencing: The Truth about Truth-in-
Sentencing Laws, 45 J.L. & Econ. 509 (2002).
    \8\ Peter W. Greenwood et al., Three Strikes and You're Out: 
Estimated Benefits and Costs of California's New Mandatory-Sentencing 
Law, in Three Strikes and You're Out: Vengeance as Public Policy (David 
Schichor & Dale K. Sechrest eds. 1996). Joanna M. Shepherd, Fear of 
First Strike: The Full Deterrent Effect of California's Two- and Three-
Strikes Legislation, 31 J. Legal Stud. 159 (2002).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Federal Death Penalty
    The need for a swift and effective death penalty is 
significant in the case of violent offenders who assault and 
kill law enforcement officers, judges, and witnesses. Several 
scientifically valid statistical studies--those that examine a 
period of years, and control for national trends--consistently 
show that capital punishment is a substantial deterrent and 
saves lives--recent estimates show that each execution deters 
18 murders.
    With respect to the Federal death penalty, opponents 
continue to argue, contrary to the evidence, that imposition of 
the death penalty has been racially-biased and had a 
disproportionate impact on minority populations. To the 
contrary, the evidence shows that the Federal death penalty, 
with the rigorous review procedures, is imposed at a higher 
rate against white defendants than minority defendants. The 
Justice Department has concluded, after two comprehensive 
studies--one conducted in 2000 (under Attorney General Janet 
Reno) and another in 2001, that at no stage of the [death 
penalty] review process were decisions to recommend or approve 
the seeking of a capital sentence made at higher rates for 
Black or Hispanic defendants than for White Defendants.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ U.S. Department of Justice, 12 Sept. 2000)Survey of the Federal 
Death Penalty System (1988-2000), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
dag/pubdoc/dp--survey--toc.pdf. U.S. Department of Justice, 6 June 
2001--The Federal Death Penalty System: Supplementary Data, Analysis 
and Revised Protocols for Capitol Case Review, available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/dag/pubdoc/dp--survey--toc.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additional Tools to Protect Judges, Law Enforcement Officers and 
        Witnesses
    H.R. 1751 includes provisions to address other security 
issues and problems. First, the bill provides permanent 
authorization for Federal judges to redact information from 
financial disclosure reports that could endanger the filer. It 
is important for Congress to act soon because this essential 
security measure for Federal judges, employees, and their 
families will expire on December 31, 2005.
    In 1998, Congress amended the Ethics in Government Act to 
provide the judiciary with authority to redact financial 
disclosure reports before they are released to the public. 
Congress recognized that the judiciary faced security risks 
greater than those of 25 years earlier when the Ethics in 
Government Act first became law. Congress established a process 
by which the judiciary would consult with the United States 
Marshals Service to determine whether information on a 
financial disclosure report should be redacted because its 
release could jeopardize the life or safety of a judge or 
judiciary employee.
    There have been a disturbingly high number of instances of 
unauthorized incursions into information databases containing 
personal information of court personnel. These incursions, when 
coupled with other personal information already available on 
the Internet, give wrongdoers the capability to cause harm as 
never before. Were the redaction authority to be removed from 
the Act, certain personal information in the financial 
disclosure reports, not otherwise widely available, such as the 
unsecured location where a spouse works or a child attends 
school, may be widely publicized through the Internet and other 
information outlets.
    Making the redaction authority permanent by removing the 
sunset provision from section 105(b)(3)(E) of the Act can be 
accomplished without diminishing the basic purpose of the Act--
to allow members of the public to form independent opinions as 
to the integrity of government officials. The regulations 
adopted by the Judicial Conference carefully balance judges' 
security concerns with the public's right to view the 
information contained in financial disclosure reports. The 
judiciary has made a concerted effort to ensure that the 
authority conferred by section 105(b)(3) is exercised in a 
consistent and prudent manner.

Protected Information and Disclosure
    The bill also restricts Internet dissemination of private 
information concerning law enforcement, judges, and other 
judicial system participants with the intent to harm these 
individuals. It has become all too common for the Internet to 
be used as a conduit to identify cooperating witnesses, 
informants and witnesses for purposes of intimidation, assault 
or even murder. The bill adopts a five-year maximum penalty and 
imposes an intent requirement that such disclosure is meant to 
``harm or retaliate'' against the protected persons.

Coordination/Consultation Between U.S. Marshals and Judges
    At the Federal level, the United States Marshals Service is 
charged with protecting those working in the Judicial Branch, 
as well as witnesses in Federal trials. The Committee has 
received information that raises concerns about the United 
States Marshals' ability to carry out its duties. A recent 
Inspector General's report raised questions about the Marshals' 
witness protection program. In addition, there are questions 
regarding: the adequacy of critical resources allocated to the 
Marshals necessary in fulfilling their mission; the proper 
allocation of resources between the field and headquarters 
locations; and arbitrary decisions at the Marshals' 
Headquarters that may adversely impact both morale and security 
efforts in the field. The bill responds to suggestions made by 
the Federal judiciary and directs coordination and notification 
requirements on the Marshals when dealing with security needs 
of the Federal judiciary. This request is reasonable and will 
ensure that judges are adequately informed, and that they have 
sufficient opportunity to provide input to the United States 
Marshals concerning their security needs. This provision is 
meant to improve communication and coordination efforts between 
the Marshals and the Federal judiciary.

Fictitious Liens and Encumbrances
    The Judicial Conference, as well as the Justice Department, 
have explained that organized efforts to file such liens and 
encumbrances are regularly employed by groups opposed to 
Federal law enforcement and judicial participants, and who 
conduct organized efforts to harass judges, prosecutors and 
other Federal officials. In order to protect court and law 
enforcement personnel, H.R. 1751 creates a new Federal ten year 
maximum penalty crime that provides for the filing of false 
liens and encumbrances against real or personal property.

Flight to Avoid Prosecution for Killing Peace Officers
    The bill incorporates provisions from a bill offered by 
Rep. Drier and Rep. Schiff, the ``Peace Officer Justice Act,'' 
to address the problem of law enforcement murder suspects who 
flee to Mexico in order to escape arrest. Mexico has limited 
extradition authority under treaties with the United States. On 
April 29, 2002, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Deputy David March 
was brutally slain in an execution-style murder during a 
routine traffic stop. Suspect Armando Garcia fled to Mexico 
within hours of Deputy March's death and has eluded prosecution 
by U.S. authorities.
    Tragically, Mexico's refusal to extradite individuals who 
may face the death penalty or life imprisonment has complicated 
efforts to bring Armando Garcia back to the U.S. to face 
prosecution for his crimes. As a result, three years later, 
Armando Garcia and thousands of other fugitives still roam 
free. The provision ensures that criminals who murder law 
enforcement officials and escape to another country will have 
the full weight of the Federal Government on their trail. 
Currently under Federal law, it is a crime to kill a Federal 
peace officer or State and local officers if they are engaged 
in a Federal investigation. H.R. 1751 makes it a Federal crime 
for the killing of a Federally-financed public safety officer. 
The current punishment for fleeing prosecution under existing 
law is no more than five years or merely a fine. Under the 
bill, the punishment would be increased to a mandatory-minimum 
of 10 years to life.

                                Hearings

    The Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, 
Terrorism, and Homeland Security held a legislative hearing on 
H.R. 1751 on April 26, 2005. Testimony was received from four 
witnesses: Judge Jane Roth, Chairwoman of Judicial Conference 
Committee on Facilities; Judge Cynthia Kent, 114th Judicial 
District of Texas; United States Attorney Paul McNulty, Eastern 
District of Virginia; and United States Marshal John Clark, 
Eastern District of Virginia.

                        Committee Consideration

    On June 30, 2005, the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and 
Homeland Security met in open session and ordered favorably 
reported the bill H.R. 1751 as amended by a voice vote, a 
quorum being present. On October 27, 2005, the full Committee 
met in open session and ordered favorably reported the bill 
H.R. 1751 as amended by a recorded vote of 26 to 5, a quorum 
being present.

                         Vote of the Committee

    In compliance with clause 3(b) of Rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, the Committee notes that there 
were the following recorded votes during the committee 
consideration of H.R. 1751:
    1. An amendment offered by Rep. Chabot to permit broadcast 
of Federal judicial proceedings was adopted by a vote of 20 to 
12.

                                                   ROLLCALL NO. 1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                       Ayes            Nays           Present
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Hyde........................................................
Mr. Coble.......................................................              X
Mr. Smith (Texas)...............................................                              X
Mr. Gallegly....................................................                              X
Mr. Goodlatte...................................................              X
Mr. Chabot......................................................              X
Mr. Lungren.....................................................
Mr. Jenkins.....................................................                              X
Mr. Cannon......................................................                              X
Mr. Bachus......................................................
Mr. Inglis......................................................              X
Mr. Hostettler..................................................              X
Mr. Green.......................................................              X
Mr. Keller......................................................                              X
Mr. Issa........................................................                              X
Mr. Flake.......................................................                              X
Mr. Pence.......................................................
Mr. Forbes......................................................                              X
Mr. King........................................................              X
Mr. Feeney......................................................                              X
Mr. Franks......................................................              X
Mr. Gohmert.....................................................                              X
Mr. Conyers.....................................................              X
Mr. Berman......................................................              X
Mr. Boucher.....................................................
Mr. Nadler......................................................              X
Mr. Scott.......................................................                              X
Mr. Watt........................................................                              X
Ms. Lofgren.....................................................              X
Ms. Jackson Lee.................................................
Ms. Waters......................................................              X
Mr. Meehan......................................................              X
Mr. Delahunt....................................................              X
Mr. Wexler......................................................
Mr. Weiner......................................................              X
Mr. Schiff......................................................              X
Ms. Sanchez.....................................................              X
Mr. Van Hollen..................................................              X
Ms. Wasserman Schultz...........................................              X
Mr. Sensenbrenner, Chairman.....................................
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
    Total.......................................................             20              12
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    2. H.R. 1751 was favorably reported to the full House, as 
amended, by a vote of 26 to 5.

                                                   ROLLCALL NO. 2
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                       Ayes            Nays           Present
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Hyde........................................................
Mr. Coble.......................................................
Mr. Smith (Texas)...............................................              X
Mr. Gallegly....................................................              X
Mr. Goodlatte...................................................              X
Mr. Chabot......................................................              X
Mr. Lungren.....................................................              X
Mr. Jenkins.....................................................              X
Mr. Cannon......................................................              X
Mr. Bachus......................................................
Mr. Inglis......................................................              X
Mr. Hostettler..................................................              X
Mr. Green.......................................................              X
Mr. Keller......................................................              X
Mr. Issa........................................................
Mr. Flake.......................................................
Mr. Pence.......................................................
Mr. Forbes......................................................              X
Mr. King........................................................              X
Mr. Feeney......................................................              X
Mr. Franks......................................................              X
Mr. Gohmert.....................................................              X
Mr. Conyers.....................................................                              X
Mr. Berman......................................................              X
Mr. Boucher.....................................................
Mr. Nadler......................................................              X
Mr. Scott.......................................................                              X
Mr. Watt........................................................                              X
Ms. Lofgren.....................................................              X
Ms. Jackson Lee.................................................                              X
Ms. Waters......................................................                              X
Mr. Meehan......................................................              X
Mr. Delahunt....................................................              X
Mr. Wexler......................................................
Mr. Weiner......................................................              X
Mr. Schiff......................................................              X
Ms. Sanchez.....................................................              X
Mr. Van Hollen..................................................              X
Ms. Wasserman Schultz...........................................              X
Mr. Sensenbrenner, Chairman.....................................
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
    Total.......................................................             26               5
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                      Committee Oversight Findings

    In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of Rule XIII of the Rules 
of the House of Representatives, the Committee reports that the 
findings and recommendations of the Committee, based on 
oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of rule X of the 
Rules of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in the 
descriptive portions of this report.

               New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures

    Clause 3(c)(2) of Rule XIII of the Rules of the House of 
Representatives is inapplicable because this legislation does 
not provide new budgetary authority or increased tax 
expenditures.

               Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate

    In compliance with clause 3(c)(3) of Rule XIII of the Rules 
of the House of Representatives, the Committee sets forth, with 
respect to the H.R. 1751, the following estimate and comparison 
prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office 
under section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974:

                                     U.S. Congress,
                               Congressional Budget Office,
                                  Washington, DC, November 7, 2005.
Hon. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chairman,
Committee on the Judiciary,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has 
completed the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 1751, the Secure 
Access to Justice and Court Protection Act of 2005.
    The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Gregory Waring, 
who can be reached at 226-2860.
            Sincerely,
                                       Douglas Holtz-Eakin.

Enclosure

cc:
        Honorable John Conyers, Jr.
        Ranking Member
H.R. 1751--Secure Access to Justice and Court Protection Act of 2005.

                                SUMMARY

    H.R. 1751 would authorize the appropriation of $409 million 
over the 2006-2010 period to provide increased court security 
through the U.S. Marshals Service and to provide grants to 
States to increase the security of courts and protect 
witnesses. CBO estimates that it would authorize additional 
appropriations of $25 million a year over the 2006-2009 period 
for grants to States to create threat assessment databases. The 
bill also would establish mandatory minimum-prison sentences 
for certain crimes committed against judges and certain public 
safety officers and their families. Moreover, H.R. 1751 would 
increase the mandatory minimum-federal sentences for the crimes 
of murder in the second degree and manslaughter.
    Assuming appropriation of the necessary amounts, CBO 
estimates that implementing H.R. 1751 would cost about $385 
million over the 2006-2010 period. Enacting the bill could 
affect direct spending and revenues, but CBO estimates that any 
such effects would not be significant.
    H.R. 1751 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector 
mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA). 
It would benefit State, local, and tribal governments by 
authorizing the appropriation of more than $400 million over 
fiscal years 2006-2010 for new and existing programs to 
increase protection for public safety officers, court 
personnel, and witnesses. Any costs to those governments would 
be incurred voluntarily as a condition of receiving Federal 
assistance.

                ESTIMATED COST TO THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

    The estimated budgetary impact of H.R. 1751 is shown in the 
following table. The cost of this legislation falls within 
budget function 750 (administration of justice).

                 By Fiscal Year, in Millions of Dollars
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                        2006   2007   2008   2009   2010
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHANGES IN SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION \1\
Court Security and Witness Programs
  Authorization Level                     63     63     63     60     60
  Estimated Outlays                       14     33     45     54     61

U.S. Marshals Service
  Authorization Level                     20     20     20     20     20
  Estimated Outlays                       12     26     20     20     20

Threat Assessment Database Grants
  Estimated Authorization Level           25     25     25     25      0
  Estimated Outlays                       61     31     82     22      0

  Total Changes
    Estimated Authorization Level        108    108    108    105     80
    Estimated Outlays                     32     72     83     96    101
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. In addition to the amounts shown above, enacting H.R. 1751 also could
  affect revenues and direct spending, but CBO estimates that any such
  effects would not be significant in any year.

                           BASIS OF ESTIMATE

    For this estimate, CBO assumes that the bill will be 
enacted in December 2005. CBO estimates that implementing H.R. 
1751 would cost about $385 million over the 2006-2010 period, 
assuming appropriation of the necessary funds. We also estimate 
that enacting the bill could increase both direct spending and 
revenues, but any such effects would not be significant in any 
year.
Spending Subject to Appropriation
    For this estimate, CBO assumes that the necessary amounts 
will be appropriated near the start of each fiscal year and 
that spending will follow the historical spending patterns for 
these or similar activities.
    Court Security and Witness Programs. H.R. 1751 would 
authorize the appropriation of:

         L$20 million for each of the fiscal years 2006 
        through 2010 for the Attorney General to make grants to 
        State and local governments to bolster or create 
        witness protection programs;

         L$20 million for each of fiscal years 2006 
        through 2010 for the Attorney General to make grants to 
        community-based programs to assist both witnesses to 
        and victims of violence;

         L$20 million for each of fiscal years 2006 
        through 2010 for the Office of Justice Programs to 
        provide grants to State courts to assess and implement 
        courtroom security needs; and

         L$3 million for each of fiscal years 2006 
        through 2008 for the Bureau of Justice Assistance to 
        make grants to State and local agencies specifically 
        for the needs of juvenile and young adult witnesses.

    U.S. Marshals Service. H.R. 1751 would authorize the 
appropriation of $20 million for each of fiscal years 2006 
through 2010 for the U.S. Marshals Service to provide 
additional protection for the judiciary. The agency would hire 
additional Deputy Marshals, new investigators, and additional 
intelligence officers.
    Threat Assessment Database Grants. The bill would authorize 
appropriation of the necessary amounts for each of fiscal years 
2006 through 2009 for the Attorney General to provide grants to 
States to assess threats of domestic terrorism and crime. State 
recipients would use the funds to analyze trends in historical 
data, project the likelihood of future acts of terrorism and 
crime, and develop steps to reduce the chance such events will 
occur. Based on the cost of similar information sharing and 
technology initiatives, we expect that the Department of 
Justice would award each State around $500,000 a year over this 
period for staff and data analysis tools. Assuming 
appropriation of the necessary amounts ($25 million a year), we 
estimate that the grant program would cost $79 million over the 
2006-2010 period. (Some outlays would occur after 2010.)
    Federal Prison System. H.R. 1751 would establish mandatory 
minimum-prison sentences and fines for a wide range of offenses 
committed by individuals against judges, federally funded 
public safety officers, and family members of such individuals. 
In addition, the bill would increase the mandatory minimum 
sentence for murder in the second degree to not less than 30 
years and the mandatory minimum sentences for voluntary and 
involuntary manslaughter to 20 and 10 years, respectively.
    Based on information from the U.S. Sentencing Commission, 
CBO estimates that the longer sentences required under the bill 
would not have a significant impact on the prison population 
over the 2006-2010 period, and thus, would not impose any 
significant new costs over that period.
Direct Spending and Receipts
    H.R. 1751 would subject individuals to penalties for 
various crimes against judges, federally funded public safety 
officers, and their families. Thus, the Federal Government 
might collect additional fines if the bill is enacted. 
Collections of criminal fines are deposited in the Crime 
Victims Fund and later spent. CBO expects that any additional 
revenues and direct spending would not be significant.

              INTERGOVERNMENTAL AND PRIVATE-SECTOR IMPACT

    This bill contains no intergovernmental or private-sector 
mandates as defined in UMRA. It would benefit State, local, and 
tribal governments by authorizing the appropriation of more 
than $400 million over fiscal years 2006-2010 for new and 
existing programs to increase protection for public safety 
officers, court personnel, and witnesses. Any costs to those 
governments would be incurred voluntarily as a condition of 
receiving Federal assistance.

                         ESTIMATE PREPARED BY:

Federal Costs: Gregory Waring (226-2860)
Impact on State, Local, and Tribal Governments: Melissa Merrell 
    (225-3220)
Impact on the Private Sector: Paige Piper/Bach (226-2940)

                         ESTIMATE APPROVED BY:

Peter H. Fontaine
Deputy Assistant Director for Budget Analysis

                    Performance Goals and Objectives

    The Committee states that pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of 
Rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, H.R 
1751, is intended to protect Federal, State and local judges, 
law enforcement officers, witnesses, victims and other 
courthouse personnel.

                   Constitutional Authority Statement

    Pursuant to clause 3(d)(1) of Rule XIII of the Rules of the 
House of Representatives, the Committee finds the authority for 
this legislation in part. I, Sec. 8 of the Constitution.

               Section-by-Section Analysis and Discussion

    The following describes the bill as reported by the 
Committee.
Sec. 1. Short Title
    This section cites the short title of the bill as ``The 
Secure Access to Justice and Court Protection Act of 2005.''

Sec. 2. Penalties for Influencing, Impeding, to Retaliating Against 
        Judges and Other Officials by Threatening or Injuring a Family 
        Member
    This section increases penalties for assault, kidnaping, 
murdering a member of the immediate family of, or the 
designated persons, including a United States official, a 
United States judge, a Federal law enforcement officer, or an 
official whose killing would be covered under 18 U.S.C. 
Sec. 1114. Criminal penalties for assault, kidnaping, murder 
and threats would be increased: (1) for assaults, the penalty 
would increase depending on the severity of the assault and the 
injuries suffered by the victim; (2) for kidnaping (or attempt 
or conspiracy), the penalty would increase to a mandatory 
minimum of 30 years to a maximum of life imprisonment; and (3) 
for threats, the penalty would increase to a mandatory minimum 
of 1 year to a maximum of 10 years. The substitute amendment 
that was adopted during the Committee's markup made several 
revisions to this section. The amendment added ``Federally 
Financed Public Safety Officer'' to coverage of 18 U.S.C. 
Sec. 1111; provides enhanced criminal penalties where the 
victim is a United States judge, Federal law enforcement 
officer, or a Federally Financed Public Safety Officer (same as 
1B above for assaults and use of a dangerous weapon); restricts 
Federal prosecution of assaults of Federally-financed public 
safety officers to require Attorney General approval, 
consultation with State and local prosecutors, and approval 
only when in the interest of justice; and increases maximum 
penalties for assaults of other Federal officials and 
employees.

Sec. 3. Penalties for Certain Assaults
    The substitute amendment that was adopted during the 
Committee's markup added this section to H.R. 1751. This 
section adds ``Federally Financed Public Safety Officer'' to 
coverage of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1111; provides enhanced criminal 
penalties where the victim is a United States judge, Federal 
law enforcement officer, or a Federally Financed Public Safety 
Officer (same as 1B above for assaults and use of a dangerous 
weapon); restricts Federal prosecution of assaults of 
Federally-financed public safety officers to require Attorney 
General approval, consultation with State and local 
prosecutors, and approval only when in the interest of justice; 
and increases maximum penalties for assaults of other Federal 
officials and employees.

Sec. 4. Protection of Federally-Funded Public Safety Officers
    This section creates a new criminal offense for killing, 
attempting to kill or conspiring to kill, any public safety 
officer for a public agency that receives Federal funding, 
including a judicial officer, judicial employee, law 
enforcement officer, firefighter, or other State or local 
employee. The substitute amendment that was adopted during the 
Committee's markup made several revisions to this section. It 
provides a 30-year mandatory minimum to life or death penalty 
for killing of Federally-financed public safety officer; adds 
provisions from Rep. Drier's proposed bill, H.R. 3900, the 
``Justice for Peace Officer's Act,'' to include killing of 
State and local law enforcement officers; and adds provisions 
from Rep. Mica's bill, H.R. 3833, the ``National Guard 
Emergency Protection Act of 2005,'' to extend to the killing of 
members of the National Guard when authorized by States, as 
protected public safety officers under proposed new Section 
1123 of title 18.

Sec. 5. General Modifications of Federal Murder Crime and Related 
        Crimes
    This section modifies the Federal murder and manslaughter 
statutes to include new mandatory minimums of 30 years 
imprisonment for second-degree murder; and a maximum of 20 
years imprisonment, and 10 years imprisonment for involuntary 
manslaughter; and modifies the attempted murder and conspiracy 
to murder provisions to punish such crimes the same as the 
substantive offense.

Sec. 6. Modification of Definition of Offense and of the Penalties for 
        Influencing or Injuring Officer or Juror Generally
    This section clarifies 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1503 relating to 
influencing or injuring jurors or officers of judicial 
proceedings, and increases maximum penalties for an attempted 
killing, use of force, or threats of force. The substitute 
amendment that was adopted during the Committee's markup 
eliminated the mandatory minimum, but increased the maximum 
punishment to 30 years.

Sec. 7. Modification of Tampering with a Witness, Victim, or Informant 
        Offense
    This section modifies 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1512 to increase 
maximum penalties for killing or attempting to kill a witness, 
victim or informant to obstruct justice. The substitute 
amendment that was adopted during the Committee's markup 
eliminated all three proposed mandatory minimums for 18 U.S.C. 
Sec. 1512, and increased the maximum penalties.

Sec. 8. Modification of Retaliation Offense
    This section modifies 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1513 for killing or 
attempting to kill a witness, victim or an informant in 
retaliation for their testifying or providing information to 
law enforcement by increasing maximum penalties. The substitute 
amendment that was adopted during the Committee's markup 
eliminated two mandatory minimum penalties and increased the 
maximum penalties.

Sec. 9. Inclusion of Intimidation and Retaliation Against Witnesses in 
        State Prosecutions as Basis for Federal Prosecution
    This section amends 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1952 relating to 
interstate and foreign travel in aid of racketeering enterprise 
by expanding the prohibition against ``unlawful activity'' to 
include ``intimidation of, or retaliation against, a witness, 
victim, juror, or informant.''

Sec. 10. Clarification of Venue for Retaliation Against a Witness
    This section amends 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1513 to clarify proper 
venue for prosecutions to include the district in which the 
official proceeding or conduct occurred.

Sec. 11. Witness Protection Grant Program
    This section creates a new grant program for States, units 
of local government, and Indian tribes to create and expand 
witness protection programs in order to prevent threats, 
intimidation and retaliation against victims of, and witnesses 
to, crimes. The authorized funding is $20 million for each 
fiscal year 2006 through 2010.

Sec. 12. Grants to States to Protect Witnesses and Victims of Crime
    This section amends the Violent Crime Control Act to 
authorize grants to create and expand witness protection 
programs to assist witnesses and victims of crime. The 
authorized funding is $20 million for each fiscal year 2006 
through 2010.

Sec. 13. Judicial Branch Security Requirements
    This section would ensure consultation and coordination in 
determining security requirements for United States Courts 
between the United States Marshals Service and the 
Administrative Office of the United States Courts. This section 
seeks to improve the coordination and implementation of 
security measures to protect judges, court employees, law 
enforcement officers, jurors and other members of the public 
who are regularly in Federal courthouses and other buildings 
used by the Judicial Branch. This section would not alter the 
responsibility of the Marshals Services for protection of the 
judiciary in buildings occupied by the courts, pursuant to a 
memorandum of understanding between the General Services 
Administration and the Marshals Service, and the Marshals 
Service would still be responsible for the security of the 
judges and the court facilities.

Sec. 14. Protections Against Malicious Recording of Fictitious Liens 
        Against Federal Judges and Attorneys
    This section would create a new Federal criminal offense 
for the filing of fictitious liens against real or personal 
property owned by Federal judges, Federal attorneys and Federal 
employees. The substitute amendment that was adopted during 
markup restricted coverage to Federal officials and employees 
(including judges, law enforcement officers and prosecutors).

Sec. 15. Prohibition of Dangerous Weapons in Federal Court Facilities
    This section amends 18 U.S.C. Sec. 930(c) to prohibit the 
possession of ``a dangerous weapon'' in a Federal court 
facility.

Sec. 16. Repeal of Sunset Provision
    This section repeals the sunset applicable to the filing of 
disclosure statements by Federal judges pursuant to the Ethics 
in Government Act of 1978 so that Federal judges may continue 
to redact identifying information about them and their families 
while ensuring that sufficient information is publicly 
available to ensure that no conflicts or other potential 
conflicts may arise while conducting their official duties.

Sec. 17. Protection of Individuals Performing Certain Federal and 
        Federally-Assisted Functions
    This section creates a new Federal criminal offense 
prohibiting persons from making available on the Internet 
restricted personal information concerning judges, law 
enforcement, public safety officers, jurors, witnesses or other 
officers in any United States Court. The penalty for a knowing 
violation is a maximum term of imprisonment of 5 years. The 
substitute amendment that was adopted during the Committee's 
markup required the intent to harm or retaliate for the new 
criminal offense protecting disclosure of personal information 
on the Internet.

Sec. 18. Eligibility of Courts to Apply Directly for Law Enforcement 
        Discretionary Grants and Requirement that State and Local 
        Governments Consider Courts When Applying for Grant Funds
    This section modifies the eligibility requirements for 
discretionary Byrne grants to restrict State court eligibility 
for Justice Department programs to discretionary grants.

Sec. 19. Report on Security of Federal Prosecutors
    This section requires the Justice Department to submit a 
report to the House and Senate Judiciary Committees on security 
measures taken to protect Assistant U.S. Attorneys and other 
Federal attorneys.

Sec 20. Flight to Avoid Prosecution for Killing Peace Officers
    This section is derived from H.R. 3900, the ``Justice for 
Peace Officers Act'' (Rep. Dreier). It creates a new Federal 
criminal offense for flight to avoid prosecution for killing a 
peace officer, and imposes mandatory-minimum penalty of ten 
years imprisonment for violating its terms.

Sec 21. Special penalties for Murder and Kidnaping and Related Crimes 
        Against Federal Judges and Federal Law Enforcement Officers
    This section creates a mandatory minimum of 30 years 
imprisonment or, life or death penalty if death results for 
crimes against Federal judges and law enforcement officers.

Sec. 22. Media Coverage of Court Proceedings
    This section authorizes the presiding judges of each court 
to permit media broadcast of judicial proceedings, and provides 
specific procedures to be used to protect the security of 
witnesses.

Sec. 23. Funding for State Courts to Enhance Court Security and 
        Emergency Preparedness
    This section authorizes grants to State courts to conduct 
threat assessments and implement recommended security changes.

Sec. 24. Additional Amounts for the United States Marshals Service to 
        Protect the Federal Judiciary
    This section authorizes an additional $20 million for the 
U.S. Marshals service to protect the Federal judiciary.

Sec. 25. Grants to States For Threat Assessment Databases
    This section authorizes a new grant program to provide 
States with funds to develop threat assessment databases.

Sec. 26. Grants for Young Witness Assistance
    This section authorizes grants for State and local 
prosecutors and law enforcement agencies to provide witnesses 
assistance programs for young witnesses.

         Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported

  In compliance with clause 3(e) of Rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by 
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law 
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new 
matter is printed in italics, existing law in which no change 
is proposed is shown in roman):

                      TITLE 18, UNITED STATES CODE



           *       *       *       *       *       *       *
PART I--CRIMES

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                           CHAPTER 7--ASSAULT

Sec.
111.    Assaulting, resisting, or impeding certain officers or 
          employees.
     * * * * * * *
117.    Protection of individuals performing certain Federal and 
          federally assisted functions.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 111. Assaulting, resisting, or impeding certain officers or 
                    employees

    (a) In General.--Whoever--
            (1) forcibly assaults, resists, opposes, impedes, 
        intimidates, or interferes with any person designated 
        in section 1114 of this title or a federally funded 
        public safety officer (as defined in section 1123) 
        while engaged in or on account of the performance of 
        official duties; or
            (2) forcibly assaults or intimidates any person who 
        formerly served as a person designated in section 1114 
        or a federally funded public safety officer (as defined 
        in section 1123) on account of the performance of 
        official duties during such person's term of service,

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    (c) Alternate Penalty Where Victim Is a United States 
Judge, a Federal Law Enforcement Officer, or Federally Funded 
Public Safety Officer.--(1) Except as provided in paragraph 
(2), if the offense is an assault and the victim of the offense 
under this section is a United States judge, a Federal law 
enforcement officer (as defined for the purposes of section 
1114) or of a federally funded public safety officer (as 
defined for the purposes of section 1123), in lieu of the 
penalties otherwise set forth in this section, the offender 
shall be subject to a fine under this title and--
            (A) If the assault is a simple assault, a fine 
        under this title or a term of imprisonment for not more 
        than one year, or both.
            (B) if the assault resulted in bodily injury (as 
        defined in section 1365), shall be imprisoned not less 
        than one nor more than 10 years;
            (C) if the assault resulted in substantial bodily 
        injury (as defined in section 113), shall be imprisoned 
        not less than 3 nor more than 12 years; and
            (D) if the assault resulted in serious bodily 
        injury (as defined in section 2119), shall be 
        imprisoned not less than 10 nor more than 30 years.
    (2) If a dangerous weapon was used during and in relation 
to the offense, the punishment shall include a term of 
imprisonment of 5 years in addition to that otherwise imposed 
under this subsection.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 115. Influencing, impeding, or retaliating against a Federal 
                    official by threatening or injuring a family member

    (a)(1) Whoever--
            (A) assaults, kidnaps, or murders, or attempts or 
        conspires to kidnap or murder, or threatens to assault, 
        kidnap or murder a member of the immediate family of a 
        United States official, a United States judge, a 
        Federal law enforcement officer, federally funded 
        public safety officer (as defined for the purposes of 
        section 1123) or an official whose killing would be a 
        crime under section 1114 of this title; or
            (B) threatens to assault, kidnap, or murder, a 
        United States official, a United States judge, a 
        Federal law enforcement officer, federally funded 
        public safety officer (as defined for the purposes of 
        section 1123) or an official whose killing would be a 
        crime under such section,
with intent to impede, intimidate, or interfere with such 
official, judge, or law enforcement officer while engaged in 
the performance of official duties, or with intent to retaliate 
against such official, judge, or law enforcement officer on 
account of the performance of official duties, shall be 
punished as provided in subsection (b).
    [(b)(1) An assault in violation of this section shall be 
punished as provided in section 111 of this title.
    [(2) A kidnapping, attempted kidnapping, or conspiracy to 
kidnap in violation of this section shall be punished as 
provided in section 1201 of this title for the kidnapping or 
attempted kidnapping of, or a conspiracy to kidnap, a person 
described in section 1201(a)(5) of this title.
    [(3) A murder, attempted murder, or conspiracy to murder in 
violation of this section shall be punished as provided in 
sections 1111 and 1113 of this title.
    [(4) A threat made in violation of this section shall be 
punished by a fine under this title or imprisonment for a term 
of not more than 10 years, or both, except that imprisonment 
for a threatened assault shall not exceed 6 years.]
    (b)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the punishment 
for an offense under this section is as follows:
            (A) The punishment for an assault in violation of 
        this section is the same as that provided for a like 
        offense under section 111.
            (B) The punishment for a kidnapping, attempted 
        kidnapping, or conspiracy to kidnap in violation of 
        this section is the same as provided for a like 
        violation in section 1201.
            (C) The punishment for a murder, attempted murder, 
        or conspiracy to murder in violation of this section is 
        the same as provided for a like offense under section 
        1111, 1113, and 1117.
            (D) A threat made in violation of this section 
        shall be punished by a fine under this title or 
        imprisonment for not more than 10 years, or both.
    (2) If the victim of the offense under this section is an 
immediate family member of a United States judge, a Federal law 
enforcement officer (as defined for the purposes of section 
1114) or of a federally funded public safety officer (as 
defined for the purposes of section 1123), in lieu of the 
punishments otherwise provided by paragraph (1), the 
punishments shall be as follows:
                    (A) The punishment for an assault in 
                violation of this section is as follows:
                            (i) If the assault is a simple 
                        assault, a fine under this title or a 
                        term of imprisonment for not more than 
                        one year, or both.
                            (ii) If the assault resulted in 
                        bodily injury (as defined in section 
                        1365), a fine under this title and a 
                        term of imprisonment for not less than 
                        one year nor more than 10 years.
                            (iii) If the assault resulted in 
                        substantial bodily injury (as defined 
                        in section 113), a fine under this 
                        title and a term of imprisonment for 
                        not less than 3 years nor more than 12 
                        years.
                            (iv) If the assault resulted in 
                        serious bodily injury (as defined in 
                        section 2119), a fine under this title 
                        and a term of imprisonment for not less 
                        than 10 years nor more than 30 years.
                    (B) The punishment for a kidnapping, 
                attempted kidnapping, or conspiracy to kidnap 
                in violation of this section is a fine under 
                this title and imprisonment for any term of 
                years not less than 30, or for life.
                    (C) The punishment for a murder, attempted 
                murder, or conspiracy to murder in violation of 
                this section is a fine under this title and 
                imprisonment for any term of years not less 
                than 30, or for life, or, if death results, the 
                offender may be sentenced to death.
                    (D) A threat made in violation of this 
                section shall be punished by a fine under this 
                title and imprisonment for not less than one 
                year nor more than 10 years.
                    (E) If a dangerous weapon was used during 
                and in relation to the offense, the punishment 
                shall include a term of imprisonment of 5 years 
                in addition to that otherwise imposed under 
                this paragraph.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 117. Protection of individuals performing certain Federal and 
                    federally assisted functions

    (a) Whoever knowingly, and with intent to harm, intimidate, 
or retaliate against a covered official makes restricted 
personal information about that covered official publicly 
available through the Internet shall be fined under this title 
and imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.
    (b) It is a defense to a prosecution under this section 
that the defendant is a provider of Internet services and did 
not knowingly participate in the offense.
    (c) As used in this section--
            (1) the term ``restricted personal information'' 
        means, with respect to an individual, the Social 
        Security number, the home address, home phone number, 
        mobile phone number, personal email, or home fax number 
        of, and identifiable to, that individual; and
            (2) the term ``covered official'' means--
                    (A) an individual designated in section 
                1114;
                    (B) a public safety officer (as that term 
                is defined in section 1204 of the Omnibus Crime 
                Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968); or
                    (C) a grand or petit juror, witness, or 
                other officer in or of, any court of the United 
                States, or an officer who may be serving at any 
                examination or other proceeding before any 
                United States magistrate judge or other 
                committing magistrate.

CHAPTER 44--FIREARMS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 930. Possession of firearms and dangerous weapons in Federal 
                    facilities

    (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    (e)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), whoever 
knowingly possesses or causes to be present a firearm or other 
dangerous weapon in a Federal court facility, or attempts to do 
so, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 2 
years, or both.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                   CHAPTER 49--FUGITIVES FROM JUSTICE

Sec.
1071.    Concealing person from arrest.
     * * * * * * *
1075.    Flight to avoid prosecution for killing peace officers.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 1075. Flight to avoid prosecution for killing peace officers

    Whoever moves or travels in interstate or foreign commerce 
with intent to avoid prosecution, or custody or confinement 
after conviction, under the laws of the place from which he 
flees or under section 1114 or 1123, for a crime consisting of 
the killing, an attempted killing, or a conspiracy to kill, an 
individual involved in crime and juvenile delinquency control 
or reduction, or enforcement of the laws or for a crime 
punishable by section 1114 or 1123, shall be fined under this 
title and imprisoned, in addition to any other imprisonment for 
the underlying offense, for any term of years not less than 10.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                          CHAPTER 51--HOMICIDE

Sec.
1111.    Murder.
     * * * * * * *
1123.    Killing of federally funded public safety officers.

Sec. 1111. Murder

    (a) * * *
    (b) Within the special maritime and territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States,
    Whoever is guilty of murder in the first degree shall be 
punished by death or by imprisonment for life;
    Whoever is guilty of murder in the second degree, shall be 
imprisoned for any term of years not less than 30 or for life.

Sec. 1112. Manslaughter

    (a) * * *
    (b) Within the special maritime and territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States,
    Whoever is guilty of voluntary manslaughter, shall be fined 
under this title or imprisoned not more than [ten] 20 years, or 
both;
    Whoever is guilty of involuntary manslaughter, shall be 
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than [six] 10 
years, or both.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 1114. Protection of officers and employees of the United States

    (a) Whoever kills or attempts to kill any officer or 
employee of the United States or of any agency in any branch of 
the United States Government (including any member of the 
uniformed services) while such officer or employee is engaged 
in or on account of the performance of official duties, or any 
person assisting such an officer or employee in the performance 
of such duties or on account of that assistance, shall be 
punished--
            (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    (b) If the victim of a murder punishable under this section 
is a United States judge (as defined in section 115) or a 
Federal law enforcement officer (as defined in 115) the 
offender shall be punished by a fine under this title and 
imprisonment for any term of years not less than 30, or for 
life, or, if death results, may be sentenced to death.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 1123. Killing of federally funded public safety officers

    (a) Whoever kills, or attempts or conspires to kill, a 
federally funded public safety officer while that officer is 
engaged in official duties, or arising out of the performance 
of official duties, or kills a former federally funded public 
safety officer arising out of the performance of official 
duties, shall be punished by a fine under this title and 
imprisonment for any term of years not less than 30, or for 
life, or, if death results, may be sentenced to death.
    (b) As used in this section--
            (1) the term ``federally funded public safety 
        officer'' means a public safety officer for a public 
        agency (including a court system, the National Guard of 
        a State to the extent the personnel of that National 
        Guard are not in Federal service, and the defense 
        forces of a State authorized by section 109 of title 
        32) that receives Federal financial assistance, of an 
        entity that is a State of the United States, the 
        District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 
        the Virgin Islands of the United States, Guam, American 
        Samoa, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, the 
        Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, or any 
        territory or possession of the United States, an Indian 
        tribe, or a unit of local government of that entity;
            (2) the term ``public safety officer'' means an 
        individual serving a public agency in an official 
        capacity, as a judicial officer, as a law enforcement 
        officer, as a firefighter, as a chaplain, or as a 
        member of a rescue squad or ambulance crew;
            (3) the term ``judicial officer'' means a judge or 
        other officer or employee of a court, including 
        prosecutors, court security, pretrial services 
        officers, court reporters, and corrections, probation, 
        and parole officers; and
            (4) the term ``firefighter'' includes an individual 
        serving as an official recognized or designated member 
        of a legally organized volunteer fire department and an 
        officially recognized or designated public employee 
        member of a rescue squad or ambulance crew; and
            (5) the term ``law enforcement officer'' means an 
        individual involved in crime and juvenile delinquency 
        control or reduction, or enforcement of the laws.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


CHAPTER 55--KIDNAPPING

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 1201. Kidnapping

    (a) Whoever unlawfully seizes, confines, inveigles, decoys, 
kidnaps, abducts, or carries away and holds for ransom or 
reward or otherwise any person, except in the case of a minor 
by the parent thereof, when--
            (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

shall be punished by imprisonment for any term of years or for 
life and, if the death of any person results, shall be punished 
by death or life imprisonment. If the victim of the offense 
punishable under this subsection is a United States judge (as 
defined in section 115) or a Federal law enforcement officer 
(as defined in 115) the offender shall be punished by a fine 
under this title and imprisonment for any term of years not 
less than 30, or for life, or, if death results, may be 
sentenced to death.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                   CHAPTER 73--OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE

Sec.
1501.    Assault on process server.
     * * * * * * *
1521.    Retaliating against a Federal employee by false claim or 
          slander of title.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 1503. Influencing or injuring officer or juror generally

    [(a) Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any 
threatening letter or communication, endeavors to influence, 
intimidate, or impede any grand or petit juror, or officer in 
or of any court of the United States, or officer who may be 
serving at any examination or other proceeding before any 
United States magistrate judge or other committing magistrate, 
in the discharge of his duty, or injures any such grand or 
petit juror in his person or property on account of any verdict 
or indictment assented to by him, or on account of his being or 
having been such juror, or injures any such officer, magistrate 
judge, or other committing magistrate in his person or property 
on account of the performance of his official duties, or 
corruptly or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter 
or communication, influences, obstructs, or impedes, or 
endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due 
administration of justice, shall be punished as provided in 
subsection (b). If the offense under this section occurs in 
connection with a trial of a criminal case, and the act in 
violation of this section involves the threat of physical force 
or physical force, the maximum term of imprisonment which may 
be imposed for the offense shall be the higher of that 
otherwise provided by law or the maximum term that could have 
been imposed for any offense charged in such case.]
    (a)(1) Whoever--
            (A) corruptly, or by threats of force or force, 
        endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede a juror 
        or officer in a judicial proceeding in the discharge of 
        that juror or officer's duty;
            (B) injures a juror or an officer in a judicial 
        proceeding arising out of the performance of official 
        duties as such juror or officer; or
            (C) corruptly, or by threats of force or force, 
        obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, 
        obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice;
or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be punished as 
provided in subsection (b).
    (2) As used in this section, the term ``juror or officer in 
a judicial proceeding'' means a grand or petit juror, or other 
officer in or of any court of the United States, or an officer 
who may be serving at any examination or other proceeding 
before any United States magistrate judge or other committing 
magistrate.
    (b) The punishment for an offense under this section is--
            [(1) in the case of a killing, the punishment 
        provided in sections 1111 and 1112;
            [(2) in the case of an attempted killing, or a case 
        in which the offense was committed against a petit 
        juror and in which a class A or B felony was charged, 
        imprisonment for not more than 20 years, a fine under 
        this title, or both; and
            [(3) in any other case, imprisonment for not more 
        than 10 years, a fine under this title, or both.]
            (1) in the case of a killing, or an attempt or a 
        conspiracy to kill, the punishment provided in section 
        1111, 1112, 1113, and 1117; and
            (2) in any other case, a fine under this title and 
        imprisonment for not more than 30 years.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 1512. Tampering with a witness, victim, or an informant

    (a)(1) Whoever kills or attempts or conspires to kill 
another person, with intent to--
            (A) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    (2) Whoever uses physical force or the threat of physical 
force against any person, or attempts or conspires to do so, 
with intent to--
            (A) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    (3) The punishment for an offense under this subsection 
is--
            [(A) in the case of murder (as defined in section 
        1111), the death penalty or imprisonment for life, and 
        in the case of any other killing, the punishment 
        provided in section 1112;]
            (A) in the case of a killing, the punishment 
        provided in sections 1111 and 1112;
            (B) in the case of--
                    (i) an attempt to murder; or
                    (ii) the use or attempted use of physical 
                force against any person;
imprisonment for not more than [20] 30 years; and
            (C) in the case of the threat of use of physical 
        force against any person, imprisonment for not more 
        than [10] 20 years.
    (b) Whoever knowingly uses intimidation, threatens, or 
corruptly persuades another person, or attempts to do so, or 
engages in misleading conduct toward another person, with 
intent to--
            (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 
[ten years] 30 years, or both.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    (d) Whoever intentionally harasses another person and 
thereby hinders, delays, prevents, or dissuades any person 
from--
            (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than [one year] 20 years, or both.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 1513. Retaliating against a witness, victim, or an informant

    (a)(1) Whoever kills or attempts or conspires to kill 
another person with intent to retaliate against any person 
for--
            (A) * * *
            (B) providing to a law enforcement officer any 
        information relating to the commission or possible 
        commission of a Federal offense or a violation of 
        conditions of probation, supervised release,[,] parole, 
        or release pending judicial proceedings,
    (2) The punishment for an offense under this subsection 
is--
            (A) * * *
            (B) in the case of an attempt, imprisonment for not 
        more than [20] 30 years.
    (b) Whoever knowingly engages in any conduct and thereby 
causes bodily injury to another person or damages the tangible 
property of another person, or threatens to do so, with intent 
to retaliate against any person for--
            (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than [ten] 30 years, or both.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    (e) Whoever knowingly, with the intent to retaliate, takes 
any action harmful to any person, including interference with 
the lawful employment or livelihood of any person, for 
providing to a law enforcement officer any truthful information 
relating to the commission or possible commission of any 
Federal offense, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned 
not more than [10] 30 years, or both.
    [(e)] (f) Whoever conspires to commit any offense under 
this section shall be subject to the same penalties as those 
prescribed for the offense the commission of which was the 
object of the conspiracy.
    (g) A prosecution under this section may be brought in the 
district in which the official proceeding (whether or not 
pending, about to be instituted or completed) was intended to 
be affected or was completed, or in which the conduct 
constituting the alleged offense occurred.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 1521. Retaliating against a Federal employee by false claim or 
                    slander of title

    Whoever, with the intent to harass a person designated in 
section 1114 on account of the performance of official duties, 
files, in any public record or in any private record which is 
generally available to the public, any false lien or 
encumbrance against the real or personal property of that 
person, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be fined under 
this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


CHAPTER 95--RACKETEERING

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 1952. Interstate and foreign travel or transportation in aid of 
                    racketeering enterprises

    (a) * * *
    (b) As used in this section (i) ``unlawful activity'' means 
(1) any business enterprise involving gambling, liquor on which 
the Federal excise tax has not been paid, narcotics or 
controlled substances (as defined in section 102(6) of the 
Controlled Substances Act), or prostitution offenses in 
violation of the laws of the State in which they are committed 
or of the United States, (2) extortion, bribery, intimidation 
of, or retaliation against, a witness, victim, juror, or 
informant, or arson in violation of the laws of the State in 
which committed or of the United States, or (3) any act which 
is indictable under subchapter II of chapter 53 of title 31, 
United States Code, or under section 1956 or 1957 of this title 
and (ii) the term ``State'' includes a State of the United 
States, the District of Columbia, and any commonwealth, 
territory, or possession of the United States.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


           OMNIBUS CRIME CONTROL AND SAFE STREETS ACT OF 1968

TITLE I--JUSTICE SYSTEM IMPROVEMENT

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                          Part I--Definitions

                              DEFINITIONS

    Sec. 901. (a) As used in this title--
            (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

            (3) ``unit of local government'' means--
                    (A) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                    (C) the judicial branch of a State or of a 
                unit of local government within the State for 
                purposes of discretionary grants;
                    [(C)] (D) an Indian Tribe (as that term is 
                defined in section 103 of the Juvenile Justice 
                and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 (42 
                U.S.C. 5603)) that performs law enforcement 
                functions, as determined by the Secretary of 
                the Interior; or
                    [(D)] (E) for the purposes of assistance 
                eligibility, any agency of the government of 
                the District of Columbia or the Federal 
                Government that performs law enforcement 
                functions in and for--
                            (i) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                   PART CC--WITNESS PROTECTION GRANTS

SEC. 2811. PROGRAM AUTHORIZED.

    (a) In General.--From amounts made available to carry out 
this part, the Attorney General may make grants to States, 
units of local government, and Indian tribes to create and 
expand witness protection programs in order to prevent threats, 
intimidation, and retaliation against victims of, and witnesses 
to, crimes.
    (b) Uses of Funds.--Grants awarded under this part shall 
be--
            (1) distributed directly to the State, unit of 
        local government, or Indian tribe; and
            (2) used for the creation and expansion of witness 
        protection programs in the jurisdiction of the grantee.
    (c) Preferential Consideration.--In awarding grants under 
this part, the Attorney General may give preferential 
consideration, if feasible, to an application from a 
jurisdiction that--
            (1) has the greatest need for witness and victim 
        protection programs;
            (2) has a serious violent crime problem in the 
        jurisdiction; and
            (3) has had, or is likely to have, instances of 
        threats, intimidation, and retaliation against victims 
        of, and witnesses to, crimes.
    (d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized 
to be appropriated to carry out this section $20,000,000 for 
each of fiscal years 2006 through 2010.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


         VIOLENT CRIME CONTROL AND LAW ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 1994



           *       *       *       *       *       *       *
TITLE III--CRIME PREVENTION

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Subtitle Q--Community-Based Justice Grants for Prosecutors

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 31702. USE OF FUNDS.

    Grants made by the Attorney General under this section 
shall be used--
            (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

            (3) to fund programs that coordinate criminal 
        justice resources with educational, social service, and 
        community resources to develop and deliver violence 
        prevention programs, including mediation and other 
        conflict resolution methods, treatment, counseling, 
        educational, and recreational programs that create 
        alternatives to criminal activity; [and]
            (4) in rural States (as defined in section 1501(b) 
        of title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
        Streets Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. 3796bb(B)), to fund 
        cooperative efforts between State and local 
        prosecutors, victim advocacy and assistance groups, 
        social and community service providers, and law 
        enforcement agencies to investigate and prosecute child 
        abuse cases, treat youthful victims of child abuse, and 
        work in cooperation with the community to develop 
        education and prevention strategies directed toward the 
        issues with which such entities are concerned[.]; and
            (5) to create and expand witness and victim 
        protection programs to prevent threats, intimidation, 
        and retaliation against victims of, and witnesses to, 
        violent crimes.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


[SEC. 31707. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

    [There are authorized to be appropriated to carry out this 
subtitle--
            [(1) $7,000,000 for fiscal year 1996;
            [(2) $10,000,000 for fiscal year 1997;
            [(3) $10,000,000 for fiscal year 1998;
            [(4) $11,000,000 for fiscal year 1999; and
            [(5) $12,000,000 for fiscal year 2000.]

SEC. 31707. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

    There are authorized to be appropriated $20,000,000 for 
each of the fiscal years 2006 through 2010 to carry out this 
subtitle.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


                      TITLE 28, UNITED STATES CODE



           *       *       *       *       *       *       *
PART II--DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


CHAPTER 37--UNITED STATES MARSHALS SERVICE

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 566. Powers and duties

    (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    (i) The United States Marshals Service shall consult with 
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts on a 
continuing basis regarding the security requirements for the 
Judicial Branch, and inform the Administrative Office of the 
measures the Marshals Service intends to take to meet those 
requirements.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


PART III--COURT OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


CHAPTER 41--ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF UNITED STATES COURTS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 604. Duties of Director generally(a) The Director shall be the 
                    administrative officer of the courts, and under the 
                    supervision and direction of the Judicial 
                    Conference of the United States, shall:

            (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

            (23) Regulate and pay annuities to judges of the 
        United States Court of Federal Claims in accordance 
        with section 178 of this title; [and]
            (24) Consult with the United States Marshals 
        Service on a continuing basis regarding the security 
        requirements for the Judicial Branch, and inform the 
        Administrative Office of the measures the Marshals 
        Service intends to take to meet those requirements; and
            [(24)] (25) Perform such other duties as may be 
        assigned to him by the Supreme Court or the Judicial 
        Conference of the United States.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


          SECTION 105 OF THE ETHICS IN GOVERNMENT ACT OF 1978

                CUSTODY OF AND PUBLIC ACCESS TO REPORTS

    Sec. 105. (a) * * *
    (b)(1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    (3)(A) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    [(E) This paragraph shall expire on December 31, 2005, and 
apply to filings through calendar year 2005.]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                           Markup Transcript



                            BUSINESS MEETING

                       THURSDAY, OCTOBER 27, 2005

                  House of Representatives,
                                Committee on the Judiciary,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:06 a.m., in 
Room 2141, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Howard 
Coble, (acting Chair of the Committee) presiding.
    Mr. Coble. I note the presence of a working quorum and we 
will come to order.
    Before we start, I want to advise Members of the Committee 
that the Chairman's sister-in-law died as a result of an 
accident last night, and he will not be able to be here today. 
But we will proceed accordingly. I have been pressed into duty 
here, so we will do the best we can today, folks.
    [Intervening business.]
    Mr. Coble. The next item on the agenda is H.R. 1751, the 
``Secure Access to Justice and Court Protection Act of 2005.'' 
The chair recognizes the primary sponsor, the distinguished 
gentleman from Texas, Mr. Gohmert, to explain the bill.
    [The bill, H.R. 1751, follows:]
  



    Mr. Gohmert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    First of all, let me express what I know is everyone's 
heartfelt feeling, and that is the deepest and sincerest 
sympathy to Chairman Sensenbrenner's family in the loss of his 
sister-in-law so tragically and untimely. We do appreciate the 
opportunity to go forward with this today and thank you for 
this opportunity.
    I have some general statements to make and then I'll 
explain exactly what the manager's amendment does here today. 
To start with, I would like to thank not only Chairman 
Sensenbrenner but also Chairman Coble for bringing H.R. 1751 up 
for markup, as we did at Subcommittee. Additionally, I want to 
thank the Committee counsels, who worked tirelessly on this 
bill. They've done a superb job. I want to thank Mr. Lungren 
and his staff, who consulted with my staff on this bill, and 
also thank Mr. Weiner and the other co-sponsors. Your support 
is greatly appreciated.
    This legislation is a culmination of many individuals' 
proposals. It's a good, strong bill that addresses some real 
weaknesses in our criminal code and the way we protect our 
court personnel. Already this year we have seen tragedies in 
Chicago, Atlanta, my hometown in Tyler, Texas, that involved 
judges, their families and other individuals around the courts.
    It should also be noted that Senator Kyl has introduced a 
similar bill across the way, S. 1605, the ``Law Enforcement 
Officers Protection Act.'' So I'm hopeful that we will see some 
movement, kind of like we're seeing up and down the aisle here, 
some movement on these important issues. We really need to get 
this bill to the House floor, the Senate should get it to the 
Senate floor, and then hopefully on to the President's desk 
this year. That is that important.
    We worked with Mr. Lungren and his staff to ensure that our 
law enforcement officers were taken care of and properly 
protected in this bill and that we had strong yet proportional 
punishments for individuals who harm our law enforcement 
officers. We worked with Chairman Dreier and his staff to 
ensure that criminals who harm our public safety officers and 
flee the United States get what they deserve when they're 
extradited. And finally, we incorporated Mr. Mica's idea to 
ensure that our National Guardsmen are covered by Federal 
criminal laws when they are acting in either their State or 
Federal capacity.
    Many of us are always concerned with preserving principles 
of federalism. Be reassured, there is a Federal nexus here. It 
is also very important that the legislative history attached to 
this bill reflect that it is not Congress' intent that the U.S. 
Attorneys prosecute every killing of every federally funded 
public safety officer, but rather, those killings in States 
that lack the death penalty or where, for various reasons, the 
local prosecutors really want and need the Federal prosecutors 
to pursue the prosecution.
    Regarding mandatory minimums, we lowered some, took some 
out completely, and instead raised the maximum penalties, all 
in an effort to make this bill more palatable for our friends 
across the aisle. I appreciate Mr. Scott's suggestions in that 
regard. However, the mandatory minimums that still remain in 
the bill after the adjustments are for the worst of the worst 
crimes, crimes that are inherently evil or, in other words, 
malum prohibitum crimes.
    Now to get down to what the bill actually does. The bill 
will protect immediate family members of federally funded 
public safety officers and judges at all levels. It provides 
enhanced criminal penalties where the victim is a U.S. judge, 
Federal law enforcement officer, or federally funded public 
safety officer. It raises maximum punishments for crimes 
against victims, witnesses, jurors, and informants. It adds a 
new Federal crime prohibiting recording of fictitious liens by 
covering officers or employees of the U.S., including Federal 
judiciary and its employees. It provides a 30-year mandatory 
minimum to life in prison or the death penalty for the killing 
of a federally funded public safety officer. Of course, for the 
defendant to get the death penalty, a death must have resulted.
    The manager's amendment adds provisions from Representative 
Mica's bill, 3833, to include killing of members of the 
National Guard when authorized by the States as protected 
public safety officers. The amendment adds a new section to the 
bill, section 20, requiring a report to the House and Senate 
Judiciary Committees on the security of Federal prosecutors and 
measures taken to protect assistant U.S. attorneys and other 
Federal attorneys. These folks are on the front lines 
prosecuting drug dealers, gang members, white collar criminals, 
so they need protection.
    Witnesses, including Judge Jane Roth, Third Circuit Court 
of Appeals and chair on the Committee on Security and 
Facilities, testified before the Crime Subcommittee she 
supported section 14 requiring the U.S. marshals consult and 
coordinate with the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts 
regarding security. Judge Roth also endorsed section 15, which 
makes it a Federal crime to file a false claim or slander of 
title in certain Federal officials. Other Federal judges have 
personally told Mr. Lungren and me the same thing.
    Just to reiterate, the amendment includes Chairman Dreier's 
legislation. This security would create a new Federal criminal 
offense for flight to avoid prosecution for killing a peace 
officer. To deter, we must punish the perpetrators. We must 
also take preventative steps. This bill does that in two 
different ways. First----
    Mr. Coble. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Gohmert. All right. If I might in conclusion mention 
that I talked to Judge Joan Lefkow earlier this morning, a 
gracious woman. She supports the bill. She supports what it 
does to protect people. She appreciates the requirements to 
consult between U.S. marshals and the courts. She didn't 
support the writ provisions, but she is a very gracious woman 
and indicated her support as well.
    Mr. Coble. For what purpose does the gentleman from 
California seek recognition?
    Mr. Lungren. To make a motion, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Chairman, the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and 
Homeland Security reports favorably the bill H.R. 1751, with a 
single amendment in the nature of a substitute, and moves its 
favorable recommendation to the full House.
    Mr. Coble. I thank the gentleman.
    The distinguished gentleman from Virginia, the Ranking 
Member, is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Chairman, I appreciate you calling this meeting, but 
unfortunately I cannot support the bill in its present form. 
The bill still contains extraneous political sound bites which 
do nothing to protect or assist the courts, but will assist the 
campaigns of those who want to sound tough on crime. With 
several sensational incidents in recent years involving murders 
of judges, family members of judges, court personnel, 
witnesses, and others, we've come to see the consequences of 
insufficient security for our court operations and persons 
associated with them.
    We all agree that enhancement of security for our courts 
and personnel is imperative, yet the proponents of H.R. 1751 
have chosen to address those needs in a manner apparently 
calculated to prevent or undermine the prospects of broad 
bipartisan support. Unfortunately, H.R. 1751 is another effort 
to use appropriate use of concern for the Nation as a vehicle 
for extraneous, controversial, and general provisions of law 
that are unnecessary, costly, and counterproductive.
    Yet here we go again considering the bill purports to 
address a serious concern, the concern for adequate protection 
and security of judges, when in essence the bill is merely a 
host of more draconian penalties aimed at ensuring that bit 
players and major players in a crime face the same 
consequences. Among several provisions of the bill, seven new 
death penalties, a speedy habeas corpus procedure to ensure 
that people are put to death quicker and increase the chances 
innocent people may be put to death, and to increase the number 
of death penalties by applying the provision ex post facto. 
You've got 22 new mandatory minimum sentences, provisions to 
punish attempts and conspiracies the same as completion of the 
offense.
    The habeas corpus provision is particularly troubling, 
given that 119 death row inmates have been exonerated from 
death penalties in the past 12 years after languishing on death 
row for many years. The impact of this provision would be to 
ensure that such persons are executed before they have time 
enough to get exonerated. As we the Effective Death Penalty Act 
of 1996, the public rationale undergirding that provision is 
apparently that it's more important for us to administer 
executions efficiently than to administer them accurately.
    The public is clearly rethinking the appropriateness of the 
death penalty in general due to the evidence that it is 
ineffective in deterring crime and it is especially racially 
discriminatory. In Illinois it was found to be more often 
erroneously applied than not. In the 23-year comprehensive 
study of the death penalty, one study found that 68 percent of 
the death penalties were erroneously applied, so it's not 
surprising that 119 people sentenced to death over the last 12 
years have been exonerated from those crimes--and not only 
exonerated from those crimes, many others have had the death 
penalty removed.
    Mr. Chairman, the mandatory minimum sentences clearly 
detract from the importance of the bill. Through rigorous study 
and analysis, they have been shown to be less effective and 
therefore wasteful when compared to effective and less costly 
approaches. They have been found to be racially discriminatory 
in application and been found to be violative of common sense.
    Also, the way the bill is written is somewhat confusing. 
Under section 7 of the bill, for example, any--Mr. Chairman, we 
have heard from the Judicial Conference every time we have 
these mandatory minimums, and we would just incorporate by 
reference what the Judicial Conference has said.
    Mr. Chairman, in closing, the State court judges have 
considered the measure of security, and I want to ask unanimous 
consent to introduce their statement and resolution on court 
security and on habeas corpus. You will note, Mr. Chairman, 
that their desire is for grants to provide actual court 
security. There's no mention of habeas corpus. There's no 
mention of the death penalty, no mention of the need for 
mandatory minimums. Mr. Chairman, I think we can trust judges 
to apply appropriate sentences for people charged with 
assaulting judges.
    Mr. Coble. Without objection it will be received.
    Mr. Scott. And we don't need the draconian provisions in 
the bill. I would hope we would defeat the bill and get back to 
a bill that would actually provide court security.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Coble. I thank the gentleman. Without objection the 
bill will be considered as read and open for amendment at any 
point.
    And the Subcommittee amendment in the nature of a 
substitute which the Members have before them will be 
considered as read, considered as the original text for 
purposes of amendment, and open for amendment at any point.
    [The amendment in the nature of a substitute follows:]
  



    Mr. Coble. Are there second degree amendments?
    Mr. Chabot. Mr. Chairman?
    Mr. Coble. The distinguished gentleman from Ohio. For what 
purpose do you seek recognition?
    Mr. Chabot. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
    Mr. Coble. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Watt. Mr. Chairman, I reserve a point of order.
    Mr. Coble. The gentleman from North Carolina reserved a 
point of order.
    Mr. Watt. Against this amendment.
    The Clerk. Amendment to the amendment in the nature of a 
substitute.
    Mr. Coble. The second degree amendment will be considered 
as read. The gentleman from Ohio is recognized for 5 minutes.
    [The amendment of Mr. Chabot follows:]
      



    Mr. Chabot. I thank the gentleman for recognizing me. Move 
to strike the last word.
    Mr. Coble. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Chabot. Mr. Chairman, I want to take this opportunity 
to say a few words about the amendment introduced concerning 
the use of cameras in the Federal courtrooms. We've debated and 
talked about this issue for a number of years. It's passed a 
number of times.
    I want to first thank my friends across the aisle, who have 
always made this a bipartisan issue. There are many Republicans 
for it, against it, many Democrats for it and against it, so it 
is one of those rare issues around this place where it truly is 
bipartisan.
    Mr. Delahunt has been a leading cosponsor of this in the 
past. Mr. Conyers, I believe, is the leading cosponsor this 
year, and I understand they both will participate in the 
debate.
    I also want to thank Mr. Nadler, my Ranking Member in the 
past. He's been helpful in that he offered an amendment in the 
past to obscure the identity of witnesses who might be 
considered to be in danger if it were a mob-related type case 
or whatever, and I appreciated that helpful amendment that he 
had offered in the past.
    I've advocated televised coverage of Federal court 
proceedings really since my early days in Congress, and even 
prior to that. When I was a member of Cincinnati City Council I 
had pushed to get Council on cable TV access so the public had 
access to them. When I moved over to the Hamilton County 
Commission, did the same thing here. And when I came to 
Congress, this has always been one of the things that I felt 
was important as well. I mean Congress wasn't on television 
early on as well, and we now--I mean how can you imagine being 
without CSPAN? I know the public is just glued to around the 
country.
    The cameras in the courtroom amendment would give Federal 
judges the discretion--I want to emphasize the discretion, they 
don't have to do it, but it's discretion--to allow media 
coverage of courtroom proceedings.
    Currently the Judicial Conference guidelines prohibit 
cameras in these courtrooms, reflecting the previous philosophy 
of the late Chief Justice Rehnquist. However, every State 
except for the District of Columbia allows for cameras in the 
courtroom in some form, either at the appellate level or at the 
trial level or both. The principle of open Government is 
embodied in this amendment. The American people deserve greater 
access to the Federal court system. It is good public policy 
for Congress to facilitate through media access to the 
courtroom. The ability of people to exercise their right to 
freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and to petition the 
Government for redress of grievances.
    The Supreme Court has also acknowledged these rights in the 
case of Craig v. Harney. Quote, ``A trial is a public event. 
What transpires in the courtroom is public property,'' unquote.
    The amendment also recognizes the special concerns that 
surround televising trials, and includes language to disguise 
the voice and image of non-party witnesses and jurors upon 
their request. And again I want to recognize Mr. Nadler for his 
contribution in including that in the amendment.
    A sunset provision, again, was someone's suggestion, I 
believe, and that was also included to review the status of 
cameras in the courtroom after 3 years so we can always come 
back at this. If we find there have been problems, we can 
modify it or do away with it all together. I don't anticipate 
that we would do that because I think it will be fine, just as 
the State courts have found around this country. There were all 
kinds of complaints about they put State courts on camera, what 
would happen? And the States have consistently kept that in the 
law as well.
    The nomination hearings of Justice Roberts brought the 
issue of cameras in the courtroom to light once again, and both 
Senator Grassley and Senator Specter and Senator Schumer and 
Senator Leahy, and many others, have authored legislation 
addressing this issue. There's considerable support in the 
other body. I would ask House Members to consider supporting 
this regardless of that fact.
    When Judge Roberts was asked by several Senators about the 
use of cameras in the courtroom, the new Chief Justice stated, 
and I quote, ``Well, you know, my new best friend, Senator 
Thompson, assures me that television cameras are nothing to be 
afraid of, but I don't have a set view on that,'' unquote.
    Passage of this amendment would send a strong signal to the 
Chief Justice, I believe, that coverage of Supreme Court 
proceedings is long overdue.
    The chambers of Congress are open to all citizens through 
the CSPAN, as I mentioned before, allowing the American people 
to stay apprised of the actions of the Legislative Branch of 
Government. Why should the Judicial Branch be any different? 
Lifetime tenure for unelected officials conveys a tremendous 
amount of power. When the Supreme Court is in session, you can 
walk by and see hundreds of people waiting for their 
opportunity to observe the judicial process. Why should our 
constituents not be allowed to observe this process, and why 
should people be forced to rely on the new media to interpret 
and filter the proceedings when cameras would allow citizens to 
watch for themselves?
    Mr. Chairman, I'd ask for another 10 seconds. I'm almost 
done.
    Mr. Coble. Without objection.
    Mr. Chabot. Thank you.
    I'd urge my colleagues to support this, and as I say, this 
has been a bipartisan measure in the past, and I would invite 
suggestions from my colleagues as to how to improve this 
legislation, either here or on the floor. And I yield.
    Mr. Coble. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Does the gentleman from North Carolina insist upon his 
point of order?
    Mr. Watt. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I make a point of order that 
while this may be important, it is not germane to this bill. 
The underlying purpose of the bill is securing witnesses, and 
there is no connection between this amendment and the 
underlying purpose of this bill. So I would insist on my point 
of order.
    Mr. Chabot. Mr. Chairman, if I could be heard?
    Mr. Coble. Does the proponent wish to be heard in response?
    Mr. Chabot. Yes. I'll be very brief.
    Mr. Coble. The gentleman is recognized.
    Mr. Chabot. I thank the gentleman. I believe it's clearly 
germane. It also has to do with security. For example, if a 
person does wish to do harm and is in the crowd, if people 
have--if cameras are in the courtroom there's a better chance 
they may be identified either ahead of time and be able to 
avoid something from happening, or if something does happen it 
would enable us to be able to prosecute that individual that's 
been responsible for that. And clearly I think it's relevant to 
this particular bill.
    And section 19, I've been informed also, clearly would make 
it germane and open it up for germaneness.
    Mr. Coble. The gentleman will suspend for just a moment.
    [Pause.]
    Mr. Coble. Mr. Watt, I am advised by the Parliamentarian 
that this is a close call, but House Rule XVI requires 
amendments to be related to the underlying bill in the 
amendment, and the amendment is germane in that it does apply 
to security of the courtroom, I am told by the Parliamentarian.
    Mr. Watt. In what way does it apply to security in the 
courtroom? There's nothing in this amendment that relates to 
any security in the courtroom.
    Mr. Chabot. Mr. Chairman, I think the statement that I made 
clearly indicates how it would do that. If you have cameras in 
the courtroom, clearly ahead of time there's a possibility of 
being able to----
    Mr. Watt. Increased insecurity in the courtroom by exposing 
witnesses maybe, but that's a stretch.
    Mr. Chabot. I don't think it's a stretch at all. I mean 
that's one of the reasons you have cameras in buildings is for 
security purposes.
    Mr. Nadler. Would the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Watt. This is not about security in the courtroom. This 
is about----
    Mr. Nadler. If there were cameras in the courtroom, you 
might spot--yes, but if there are cameras in the courtroom, Mr. 
Chabot, might you not spot extraneous objects and be able to 
afford appropriate protection that way?
    Mr. Chabot. Absolutely----
    Mr. Watt. A security camera, not television cameras.
    Mr. Chabot. That's what I just indicated, the individuals, 
and the gentleman has indicated spotting objects as well.
    Mr. Schiff. Mr. Chairman, may I make a question, 
parliamentary inquiry?
    Mr. Coble. The Chair will--reclaiming my time, the Chair 
has ruled the that amendment, that the--that this is germane to 
the subject matter.
    Mr. Schiff. Mr. Chairman, may I have a parliamentary 
inquiry?
    Mr. Coble. Parliamentary inquiry from whom? The gentleman 
from California.
    Mr. Schiff. Mr. Chairman, I may support the amendment, but 
I am concerned about some of the parliamentary procedures in 
the Committee because it seems like the germaneness rule is 
applied with great inconsistency and great flexibility, which 
the only consistency I can find is it's employed to the 
disadvantage of the minority.
    When we offered amendments to the PATRIOT bill, for 
example, a great many of which were directly relevant and 
germane to the subject matter, far more germane I think than 
this amendment--which I may support--is--to a court security 
bill, they were held to be non-germane. And I don't know how 
the same germaneness standard that precluded things that were 
clearly within the PATRIOT bill were non-germane and somehow 
this is germane. I would like an explanation for what the 
contours are of this germaneness rule that seems so adaptable, 
depending on the will of the majority.
    Mr. Coble. Well, I say to my friend from California the 
Chair has ruled, and in the Chair's defense, I have not been 
inconsistent but this is my debut. I'm the rookie in the chair 
today. [Laughter.]
    Mr. Berman says I'm like the Twelfth Circuit.
    Are there additional amendments?
    Mr. Watt. Mr. Chairman?
    Mr. Coble. Gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Watt.
    Mr. Watt. I move to strike the last word.
    Mr. Coble. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Watt. And I won't take 5 minutes. I just--I know 
there's substantial difference of opinion. I don't think this 
has anything to do with the underlying bill, not that it's not 
important, and shouldn't be the subject of a debate at some 
point. We've had the debate before, some Republicans and 
Democrats on opposite sides.
    I happen to feel like while the access of the public and 
the press is an important thing--and I have been a very, very 
strong supporter of it--the access to justice is more 
important. And this amendment I think is going to--has the 
prospect of jeopardizing the more important ingredient of 
providing justice in the courtroom. And I've said that before. 
That's been my consistent position.
    There are some things that take precedence even over free 
speech and access to the press, and the one thing that I think 
is absolutely critically important to our courts is that they 
be able to operate in a way that assures a just outcome that is 
not influenced by public opinion, and I think the effect of 
this amendment would be to jeopardize that.
    I will yield back.
    Mr. Chabot. Would the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Watt. I'm happy to yield to the gentleman, although I'm 
prepared to yield my time back, but I'm----
    Mr. Chabot. I will be very brief. I understand. I 
appreciate the gentleman's concern because I know he has always 
in the past been outspoken in trying to assure that justice 
does prevail in the courts. I would just point out that the 
State courts have had cameras in the courtroom, virtually all 
the States, mostly at the trial level, I think 40 out of 50 at 
the trial level, and others at the appellate level, and most 
both. And there hasn't, to my--able to be determined at my 
level that there has been a diminution of justice at the State 
level as a result of this. And why would we expect the Federal 
courts not to be able to----
    Mr. Watt. I just reclaim my time long enough to say that 
you all seem to have a lot of confidence in the State courts 
when it's convenient for you to have a lot of confidence in the 
State court, but, you know, maybe that's one of the reasons you 
all are trying to reverse the State courts so often. Maybe 
you're not getting the level of justice that you want out of 
State court.
    Mr. Chabot. Would the gentleman yield? This is a convenient 
argument that you're making. You use it to your advantage of 
disadvantage.
    Mr. Coble. The gentleman's time expired. The question 
occurs on----
    Mr. Watt. Mr. Chairman, my time hadn't expired. You all 
never even started the clock.
    Mr. Coble. It was well over, Mel.
    Mr. Watt. You didn't even start the clock on this time.
    Mr. Coble. Yeah, we did. You want another additional 
minute, Mr. Watt?
    Mr. Watt. I don't want another additional minute. People 
were asking me to yield. I didn't want the extra time that Mr. 
Chabot took.
    Mr. Coble. Gentleman from New York.
    Mr. Watt. I was prepared to yield back a long time ago, but 
I'm also prepared to respond if people want me to respond to 
whatever they want to respond to.
    Mr. Coble. The gentleman from New York, Mr. Nadler. For 
what purpose do you seek recognition, Mr. Nadler?
    Mr. Nadler. To strike the last word.
    Mr. Coble. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Nadler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I am delighted to be able to agree with the distinguished 
Chairman of the Constitution Subcommittee, which we usually 
don't, on this amendment. I led the opposition in the State 
legislature in New York, and I was opposed here for years to 
cameras in the courtroom because I was concerned about, not 
just about, about the intimidation of witnesses, not just in 
mob cases, as Mr. Chabot mentioned. I was concerned about the 
fact that--I never had a problem with cameras in the courtroom 
in an appellate case. In fact, I would go further, I would 
mandate it in appellate cases in Federal courts. But in the----
    Mr. Gohmert. Will the gentleman yield? I'll work with you 
on that.
    Mr. Nadler. Okay, I appreciate that.
    But in the trial courts I was concerned that very often 
you're seeking witnesses who observed the accident, who 
observed the murder, whatever, and it's intimidating enough on 
witnesses to come forward without worrying not only that they 
might be the subject of a mob hit if they're a witness in the 
wrong trial, but just worrying about appearing in public on 
television in front of their friends and neighbors, and having 
to undergo cross-examination by some lawyer whose job it is to 
make them look not like the most accomplished, intelligent 
person, and that you might, therefore, lose witnesses.
    The amendment that's in this bill that at the request of 
the witness or the jury you can obscure his or her identity, I 
think satisfies that concern. And with that concern of losing 
potential witnesses taken care of, I see no reason whatsoever 
why----
    Mr. Scott. Will the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Nadler. In one moment. Why you shouldn't have cameras 
in the courtroom in any case in which you allow the press in 
the courtroom. There are some cases where a trial must be held 
behind closed doors--rare, but it does happen, and in that case 
obviously we're not going to have cameras in the courtroom. But 
that aside, wherever the public is allowed in the courtroom, I 
see no reason--now that we've taken care of the witness 
problem--not to allow cameras, so I am delighted to support 
this amendment. and I'll yield.
    Mr. Scott. Where do you find the right----
    Mr. Coble. The gentleman yields back?
    Mr. Scott. No, he yielded to me.
    Mr. Nadler. I yielded to the gentleman from----
    Mr. Coble. I stand corrected. Gentleman from----
    Mr. Scott. Where do you find the witness having a right to 
have his image obscured? Page 5, line 9, page 5, line 9 says 
that the witness has a right to request, doesn't say he has a 
right to have his image or voice obscured, he has a right to--
--
    Mr. Nadler. Reclaiming my time. Page 4, starting line 23, 
``Upon the request of any witness other than a party or a juror 
in a trial proceeding, the court shall order''--shall order--
``the face and voice of the witness or juror, as the case may 
be, to be disguised or otherwise obscured,'' et cetera.
    Mr. Scott. And is the presiding judge bound by any Judicial 
Conference advisory guidelines in making his decisions?
    Mr. Nadler. Reclaiming my time, I don't think he has a 
decision to make. The language is preemptory. It says ``The 
court shall order'' upon the request.
    Mr. Scott. This is another question. Never mind. I'll just 
get my own time.
    Mr. Nadler. Thank you.
    Mr. Chairman, this is a good amendment. I urge its passage 
and I yield back.
    Mr. Coble. The gentleman yields back.
    The gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Delahunt, for what 
purpose do you seek recognition?
    Mr. Delahunt. I move to strike the last word.
    Mr. Coble. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Delahunt. And I rise in support of the Chabot 
amendment. In the past I've filed legislation similar to the 
language that's embraced in the amendment. I think this is 
really long overdue.
    And while I can respect my colleagues on my side, Mr. 
Schiff and Mr. Watt for raising a point of order, but I think 
it's a good time to at least revisit what we're trying to 
accomplish with this amendment.
    I am one who has advocated, as many of my colleagues on 
this side of the aisle, for discretion in trial justices. I 
have consistently opposed legislation that incorporate 
mandatory minimum sentences because I believe it erodes that 
discretion in judges. And yet, ironically, now I hear my 
colleagues on this side of the aisle inferring that we can't 
trust judges to make decisions regarding witnesses and 
regarding whether cameras in the courtroom are appropriate or 
not. I say to my friends on this side, you can't have it both 
ways. Yeah, they do. But we can't, okay? [Laughter.]
    And they're in the majority. But the reality is, if you are 
a practitioner, if you are either a prosecutor or counsel for a 
criminal defendant, you know that I can't even imagine in an 
egregious case, where at the request of either the State or the 
Federal Government or a counsel for a criminal defendant, or in 
civil litigation by either one of the parties, that a court 
would listen diligently to the rationale for the request, and 
if it made minimal sense, common sense, that it would not be 
respected by a jurist who had discretion. I mean, let's talk 
about the real world other than some hypothetical case, because 
the benefits of having cameras in a courtroom, I would submit, 
are enormous in terms of educating the American people as to 
the judicial system.
    We hear many, again on the other side of the aisle, speak 
about activist judges, about the courts doing things that are 
not reflective of sound public policy. Well, let the public 
decide by seeing unfiltered what's happening in our courtrooms. 
This is putting CSPAN----
    Mr. Watt. Would the gentleman yield at some point, whenever 
you finish that thought?
    Mr. Delahunt. I'll yield to my friend, sure.
    Mr. Watt. I guess my concern is all of this is public 
policy stuff you're talking about, and the public has some 
right to participate at some level, but I was always taught 
that the courts are for the benefit of the litigants to get a 
fair trial. This bill says nothing about giving the litigants 
the right to decide whether their case is tried or not on 
television, so----
    Mr. Delahunt. Reclaiming my time.
    Mr. Watt. I just want to be clear that the basic underlying 
problem I have is different than what you're talking about. 
This is not a political body. This is----
    Mr. Delahunt. Reclaiming my time.
    Mr. Watt. This is a judicial body.
    Mr. Delahunt. Reclaiming my time. You know, the courts are 
a public institution. You know, the courts are there 
fundamentally for the benefit, not just of the litigants, but 
for our democratic order, and that there is an overriding 
concern on the part of the American people about what is 
transpiring in terms of the judiciary. It's not like it's a 
controversy that we hear frequently in the halls of Congress.
    Mr. Conyers. Would the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Delahunt. I'll yield to Mr. Conyers.
    Mr. Conyers. I merely want to observe that all of my 
criticism about unfairness in the courts would have been taken 
care of had we had cameras there. There are more things that go 
wrong in courts that are not seen or heard or made public, than 
I am worried about anything else. I think throwing a light--
continuing to throw a light on court proceedings is a very 
important step forward in the dispensation of justice in the 
court.
    Mr. Delahunt. Reclaiming my time, I think that when we say 
that--when we oppose this legislation by suggesting that there 
are not enough safeguards to protect the interests of private 
litigants, that by inference what we say is that we can't trust 
judges.
    Mr. Coble. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Delahunt. And I think that's a mistake.
    Mr. Coble. The question occurs on the second----
    Mr. Lungren. Mr. Chairman?
    Mr. Coble. The gentleman from California.
    Mr. Lungren. I rise to strike the requisite number of 
words?
    Mr. Coble. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Lungren. Mr. Chairman, just on a couple points. One, 
yes, trials are for the litigants. But they're more than that, 
they're for the public, and the Supreme Court has spoken on 
that specifically in the Craig v. Harney case, where the 
Supreme Court said this: ``A trial is a public event. What 
transpires in the courtroom is public property.''
    It is strange that we limit the public nature of it by the 
number of seats that are in the courtroom. And I would agree 
with the gentlemen on both sides of the aisle who suggest that 
all the Federal Appellate Courts have no excuse for not 
televising their proceedings, starting with the U.S. Supreme 
Court. I mean the idea----
    Mr. Watt. Would the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Lungren.--that the U.S. Supreme Court would be such a 
small, physical body, that you have to rotate people in during 
important arguments, and that they barely allow us to have 
recordings of the arguments, is, I think, the essence of 
arrogance.
    But in this particular case I thought it important for us 
to note, as we've gone through in this debate, that this does 
not mandate televising proceedings in Federal District Court. 
This allows, in the language of the bill, that any presiding 
judge of a District Court in the United States may, in his or 
her discretion, permit the photographing, electronic recording, 
broadcasting or televising to the public of court proceedings 
over which that judge presides.
    So again, we are giving it to the judges to make that 
decision. There are instances, in my judgment, where it would 
be inappropriate. There are instance where I think it has been 
inappropriate. My State had a very publicly broadcast trial, 
the O.J. Simpson, trial, and I think in fact the presence of 
cameras in that courtroom did influence that jury. There are 
some other cases I could think of where it did. This allows----
    Mr. Watt. And that's okay, I guess?
    Mr. Lungren. No, no. This allows the judge to make the 
determination as to whether or not that would be the case. 
Judges don't always get it right, but I think in most cases 
they would get it right. And then we also have the protection 
built in as a result of the incorporation of the Nadler 
amendment with respect to the concerns of witnesses. That is 
something we don't have in California law. That is something I 
wish we did have in California law, and that I think is a vast 
improvement over the laws if several jurisdictions that I've 
reviewed.
    So I think the gentleman, the Chairman of the Constitution 
Law Subcommittee has done a good job of reaching out to the 
other side and incorporating a number of the concerns that have 
been expressed, and all in all, I think this does give us the 
change to put into practice what the Supreme Court has said, 
that is, that the trial is a public event, and that what 
transpires in the courtroom is public property. In this time, 
in this place in our society, televising of events is the most 
efficient way of allowing the public to participate in those 
events by observation.
    I thank the----
    Mr. Watt. Would the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Lungren. I will be happy to yield, yes.
    Mr. Watt. I just wanted to thank the gentleman for taking 
up for the Supreme Court in this ruling about whether a trial 
is public. I hope he'll try to take up for them when we do the 
next markup.
    Mr. Lungren. I appreciate it, and the Supreme Court does 
get it right.
    Mr. Coble. The gentleman yields back the--I was going to 
call the question, but I think----
    Mr. Gohmert. Mr. Chairman?
    Mr. Coble. Mr. Watt, did you want to be recognized earlier? 
I guess his question.
    The gentleman from Texas, for what purpose do you seek 
recognition?
    Mr. Gohmert. To strike the last word, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Coble. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Gohmert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    As a judge I was supportive of having a camera in the 
courtroom. I had a rather lengthy protective order that allowed 
me to dictate not only what happened in the courtroom with the 
media, but outside it gave me great leverage.
    I would be supportive of this in some other setting, rather 
than as part of the court security bill.
    I did have a provision in my protective order to address 
one of the things that was said earlier, that any litigant 
could object to the proceedings being televised, and that would 
be given deference. But as part of the court security bill, it 
seems that by the amount of public policy arguments being waged 
here, that it's clear that, you know--step back a moment.
    What we're trying to do here today is to provide additional 
help and security to the courts, and although it was said 
earlier that, let's see, that this court security bill does 
nothing to address adequate protection of judges, that it just 
provides a bunch of sound bites to our side of the aisle, I 
really am deeply offended by that comment. It would seem that 
rather that's more like a case of the kettle calling the pot 
copper here, because this does do some good in the court 
security bill. If it did not, then I would assume the gentleman 
that made that statement would be in favor of dropping the 
penalty to 1 day in jail for killing a Congressman, and seeing 
if there isn't some deterrent effect to having longer, more 
profound sentences.
    There is a deterrent effect. This bill does provide that, 
but it appears that the story of the day will not be that our 
Committee did a very good thing to protect the judiciary. The 
story will be that we rammed cameras into their courtroom in 
some setting.
    I would be open, as I said earlier, to be cosponsoring a 
bill to put them in the Supreme Court so that people can see 
what goes on.
    Mr. Chabot. Would the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Gohmert. But anyway----
    Mr. Chabot. Would the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Gohmert. I am concerned about we're losing focus and 
this will completely blur the intent of providing security. I 
called out the name of Judge Lefkow, whose husband and mother 
were tragically and horribly killed because of her position as 
a Federal judge. She is an eminent jurist, and it was just in 
visiting with her this morning--I should say she and other 
Federal judges have indicated to me they'd rather that 
provision that they had heard might happen sometime, regarding 
cameras in the courtroom, not be allowed.
    I think that allowing them the discretion to make that 
determination addresses that, but I'm concerned about this 
public policy debate being a part of the court security rather 
than stand alone.
    And, yes, I will be glad to yield.
    Mr. Chabot. Very briefly, as far as ramming it, this is 
clearly--you indicated--it's discretion. In addition to that, 
we can't write the story.
    We had a hearing the other day, our first hearing on the 
Voting Rights Act, and as a side issue it was raised relative 
to allowing felons to vote, and that was the story that the 
press in that instance picked up that got more play than the 
whole hearing. You really can't affect how the press plays 
this. Of course, relative to this bill, if you have cameras in 
the courtroom it's ultimately the public that can see firsthand 
and not be filtered through the press.
    Yield back.
    Mr. Gohmert. Thank the gentleman.
    Mr. Coble. Gentleman yields back.
    Mr. Gohmert. But the goal today is to provide additional 
security to the judiciary. I think this bill does it, and I am 
required, though I like the concept and would support it in any 
other setting, to oppose it to this.
    Mr. Coble. Prior to recognizing Mr. Scott, let me remind 
everybody again, we've got to get these three bills reported 
out today, and we're going to try to work for another 30 
minutes here, and then we will recess for lunch for about 30 
minutes. And when the bill on the floor, Mr. Smith, that you 
will be managing, we will suspend for that. But then after 
that, the Legal Abuse Bill is resolved or disposed of, then 
we'll all come back here.
    Now, I am pleased to recognize the distinguished gentleman 
from Virginia, Mr. Scott, who will strike the last word.
    Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, if you 
wanted to expedite the proceedings, you should have ruled the 
other way on this amendment. We haven't even started the debate 
for today.
    Mr. Chairman, I join the gentleman from Texas. I'm offended 
that we've hijacked the court security bill and converted it 
into the cameras in the courtroom bill, and we're talking about 
camera--the idea that this is a security measure. You could 
have security cameras. That is not what this bill is all about. 
We're talking about broadcast. And this would be a good idea or 
bad idea. We talked about the State courts. Sure, some of the 
State courts have done it, but they haven't stuck it on the 
back of somebody else's bill and tried to make the policy that 
way. They've had hearings and discussed it, and had input from 
everybody to figure out what's going on.
    Mr. Chairman, we're supposed to be discussing whether or 
not you're going to have the habeas corpus reform and the death 
penalty and the mandatory minimums, whether there's going to be 
a grant program in the court security bill. All of that's going 
to get lost. As the gentleman from Texas has indicated, that's 
lost. By the ruling of the Chair and getting this on here, now 
we're going to discuss cameras in the courtroom, and, you know, 
that's the rest of the bill.
    We don't know whether the--we don't have anything before us 
that would suggest what effect this is going to have on 
litigants, whether or not witnesses are intimidated or may 
change their testimony by virtue of the fact that they're going 
to be on television, what effect it has on a trial. Obviously, 
there's a difference in the effect of cameras in the courtroom 
with the Supreme Court, the appellate courts and the trial 
level.
    All of that, Mr. Chairman, we're not putting two cents 
worth of thought into. You have down here that--the gentleman 
from New York has pointed out that a witness other than a party 
or a juror can request the name--excuse me--that the court 
shall order the face and voice of the witness or juror be 
disguised or otherwise obscured. It doesn't say anything about 
the name.
    Mr. Nadler. Would the gentleman yield for a second?
    Mr. Scott. I yield.
    Mr. Nadler. I would simply point out that without cameras 
in the courtroom, the name is available to the press under 
present law. That's why this amendment doesn't say that.
    Mr. Scott. Well, I would just say that when people see 
what's going on and all of this is now publicly broadcast, the 
name is not protected, the party can't decide whether they want 
the trial broadcast.
    Broadcasting it makes a difference, may be good, may be 
bad, but it makes a difference, and I would hope that we would 
consider this not as stuck onto the back of a bill, but would 
give appropriate deliberation to this, and that all kinds of 
implications and whether you're going to get a fair trial or 
not, what kinds of trials, what kinds of discretion. The bill 
says that the advisory guidelines, the presiding judge may 
refer to them if he feels like it. Basically, some judges are 
going to allow it, some judges aren't. There's no guidance 
there.
    I'd yield to the gentleman from North Carolina.
    Mr. Watt. I just want to reiterate the point that 
Representative Scott made. This is a great debate, and our 
Judiciary Committee needs to have it, but it needs to have it 
in the context of hearings because there obviously is a strong 
difference of opinion among a number of people on this 
Committee about what benefit the courts play and how it fits 
into our whole system. Some people apparently think it's about 
the public's benefit. The courts in our system were not for the 
public's benefit. The first line of the basis for a court is to 
resolve disputes between litigants, so that they don't go out 
in the street and duel like we used to.
    So I mean this is an important debate, but we have----
    Mr. Delahunt. Would the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Watt. We need to have hearings about it. We need to----
    Mr. Delahunt. Would the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Watt.--to give it the kind of dignity that it really 
deserves, and not put it on the back of a bill that it really 
has nothing to do with, regardless of what the technical 
germaneness requirement may say. This amendment has nothing to 
do with the underlying purpose of this bill, and we all know 
it, and now we spent a whole hour here talking about something 
that----
    Mr. Delahunt. Would the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Watt.--really should have had hearings and could have 
had hearings if you just drop the bill separately and let it go 
through the process.
    Mr. Delahunt. Would the gentleman from Virginia yield?
    Mr. Coble. The gentleman from Virginia has the time.
    Mr. Delahunt. Would the gentleman from Virginia yield?
    Mr. Scott. I'm sorry. Yes, the gentleman from 
Massachusetts.
    Mr. Delahunt. You know, every State in the Nation permits 
in some fashion or another cameras in the courtroom, and I hear 
these questions, and I have heard them before, and they are 
legitimate questions: Well, what's the impact on litigants? 
What's the impact on this--I can never remember in any of the 
multiple hearings that we've had on this issue a single piece 
of data indicating that there has been a problem. We just can't 
go making up----
    Mr. Watt. We had hearings about it.
    Mr. Delahunt. I have the time. I mean, let's not just 
create problems where they don't exist. Let's rely on the 
discretion of judges, because that's how the system best 
operates, whether it's cameras in the courtroom or whether it's 
sentencing.
    Mr. Coble. The time has expired. The question occurs on the 
second degree amendment of the gentleman from Ohio. All in 
favor say aye? All opposed, nay?
    It appears the noes have it.
    Mr. Chabot. Mr. Chairman, I ask for a record----
    Mr. Coble. The gentleman from Ohio, a rollcall has been 
requested. When your names are called, if you favor the 
amendment in the nature of a substitute, you will vote aye, if 
you oppose, you will vote nay. The clerk will call the roll.
    The Clerk. Mr. Hyde?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Smith?
    Mr. Smith. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Smith, no. Mr. Gallegly?
    Mr. Gallegly. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Gallegly, no. Mr. Goodlatte?
    Mr. Goodlatte. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Goodlatte, aye. Mr. Chabot?
    Mr. Chabot. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chabot, aye. Mr. Lungren?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Jenkins?
    Mr. Jenkins. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Jenkins, no. Mr. Cannon?
    Mr. Cannon. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Cannon, no. Mr. Bachus?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Inglis?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Hostettler?
    Mr. Hostettler. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Hostettler, aye. Mr. Green?
    Mr. Green. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Green, aye. Mr. Keller?
    Mr. Keller. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Keller, no. Mr. Issa?
    Mr. Issa. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Issa, no. Mr. Flake?
    Mr. Flake. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Flake, no. Mr. Pence?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Forbes?
    Mr. Forbes. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Forbes, no. Mr. King?
    Mr. King. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. King, aye. Mr. Feeney?
    Mr. Feeney. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Feeney, no. Mr. Franks?
    Mr. Franks. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Franks, aye. Mr. Gohmert?
    Mr. Gohmert. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Gohmert, no. Mr. Conyers?
    Mr. Conyers. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Conyers, aye. Mr. Berman?
    Mr. Berman. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Berman, aye. Mr. Boucher?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Nadler?
    Mr. Nadler. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Nadler, aye. Mr. Scott?
    Mr. Scott. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Scott, no. Mr. Watt?
    Mr. Watt. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Watt, no. Ms. Lofgren?
    Ms. Lofgren. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Lofgren, aye. Ms. Jackson Lee?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Ms. Waters?
    Ms. Waters. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Waters, aye. Mr. Meehan?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Delahunt?
    Mr. Delahunt. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Delahunt, aye. Mr. Wexler?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Weiner?
    Mr. Weiner. Pass.
    The Clerk. Mr. Weiner, pass. Mr. Schiff?
    Mr. Schiff. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Schiff, aye. Ms. Sanchez?
    Ms. Sanchez. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Sanchez, aye. Mr. Van Hollen?
    Mr. Van Hollen. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Van Hollen, aye. Ms. Wasserman Schultz?
    Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Wasserman Schultz, aye. Mr. Chairman?
    Mr. Coble. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, aye.
    Mr. Coble. Are there Members in the assembly who wish to 
vote--change or--vote or change their vote? The gentleman from 
Massachusetts.
    Mr. Meehan. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Meehan, aye.
    Mr. Coble. The gentleman from South Carolina.
    Mr. Inglis. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Inglis, aye.
    Mr. Coble. Are there other Members who wish to--the 
gentleman from New York.
    Mr. Weiner. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Weiner, aye.
    Mr. Coble. Are there other Members who wish to vote or 
change their vote? If not, the clerk will report.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, there are 20 ayes and 12 noes.
    Mr. Coble. And the second degree amendment is approved.
    Are there additional second degree amendments?
    Mr. Schiff. Mr. Chairman?
    Mr. Coble. The distinguished gentleman from California.
    Mr. Schiff. Mr. Chairman, I have two amendments I'd like to 
offer en bloc, 104 and 108.
    Mr. Coble. The gentleman is recognized.
    Mr. Schiff. Mr. Chairman, before I get to the amendments, I 
want to thank my colleague for his work on this bill, and 
also----
    Mr. Coble. The Committee will come to order, and, Mr. 
Schiff, I will say to you in the interest of time, you may 
identify your amendments. But the Chair will accept those 
amendments. You may identify them, however.
    Mr. Schiff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    [The amendments offered by Mr. Schiff follow:]
    
    
      
      

  


    Mr. Schiff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Briefly, for the purpose of identification, the first 
amendment provides a grant program for the State courts so that 
courts can improve their security and can apply directly for 
Federal funding to make those needed improvements. We had a 
meeting this morning with chief justices from around the 
country who talked about the importance of a funding stream 
that would go directly to them to improve courthouse security.
    The second also authorizes some additional resources for 
the U.S. Marshals Service and particularly their Protective 
Intelligence Division to help them, currently only staffed by 
three people and underresourced.
    I thank the gentleman for accepting the amendments. Before 
I conclude, I just want to also thank Mr. Gohmert and other 
Members for incorporating provisions that Congressman Dreier 
have authored that allow Federal prosecutors to go after cop 
killers as well as penalize those who flee the country after 
killing a cop.
    Mr. Coble. We will accept both amendments, I say to Mr. 
Schiff.
    Mr. Schiff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I have a statement 
from Mr. Dreier I would like to offer for the record.
    Mr. Coble. Without objection.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Dreier follows:]
    
    
    Mr. Coble. Are there further second degree amendments?
    Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman?
    Mr. Coble. Hearing----
    Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman? I'm sorry.
    Mr. Coble. The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott, is 
recognized.
    Mr. Scott. I have an amendment at the desk, the one that 
strikes Section 11, Scott 053.
    Mr. Smith. [Presiding.] The clerk will read the amendment.
    The Clerk. Amendment to the amendment in the nature of a 
substitute to H.R. 1751, offered by Mr. Scott of Virginia. 
Strike----
    Mr. Smith. Without objection, the amendment will be 
considered as read.
    [The amendment offered by Mr. Scott of Virginia follows:]
      
      

  


    Mr. Smith. The gentleman from Virginia is recognized to 
explain it.
    Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman, this strikes the habeas provisions 
in the bill. We have heard from the State court 
representatives, and habeas was not part of anything that they 
requested. This is very controversial. People will not be 
getting their appropriate due process within the death penalty. 
We already know we make mistakes, and people have gone many 
years before those mistakes have been rectified. So I would 
hope that we would not complicate the bill that has been vastly 
improved by the amendments that have just been adopted, which 
will actually provide some security, security for grants to the 
courts so that they can provide security, and grants for 
additional personnel to provide security so the----
    Mr. Lungren. Will the gentleman----
    Mr. Smith. Will the gentleman from Virginia yield?
    Mr. Scott. I yield.
    Mr. Smith. We are prepared to accept that amendment, but I 
know the gentleman from California, Mr. Lungren, would like to 
speak on it as well. So if you will yield to the gentleman from 
California, we'll be able to expedite the process.
    Mr. Scott. I yield.
    Mr. Gohmert.
    Mr. Lungren. If you would yield to the gentleman from Texas 
first, and then----
    Mr. Scott. To whom it may concern. [Laughter.]
    Mr. Gohmert. Thank you. I do believe these are good 
provisions that have been placed in here regarding speeding up 
of the application for writ process. But we have discussed this 
and are willing to accept that and take this out of the bill, 
once again to focus on court security and have this as a stand-
alone provision.
    I would like to yield also to my friend from--the gentleman 
from California.
    Mr. Smith. Actually, the gentleman from Virginia has the 
time, and I'm sure he'll be happy to yield to the gentleman 
from California.
    Mr. Scott. I yield.
    Mr. Lungren. The gentleman knows I am very, very interested 
in this provision, as I have the habeas corpus reform bill that 
we have been discussing in our Subcommittee, and hopefully 
we'll mark it up at some time.
    This would have applied only in one set of circumstances 
where there's been a killing of a public safety officer while 
that person was in the performance of his or her official 
duties. I think it does make sense for us to deal with the 
habeas corpus reform in a single bill. But I just want to say 
that this is an important issue.
    In my home State of California, there are 26 cop killers 
who have been sentenced to death. Not a single one has had the 
sentence carried out. Every time a California cop killer's 
death sentence has been affirmed by the State courts, the Ninth 
Circuit--remember that circuit we were talking about a little 
earlier?--has either reversed the sentence or ordered 
additional hearings in the case. I could give you chapter and 
verse of the cases. One of them that I'm very familiar with is 
Police Officer Kenneth Reidy, who was murdered in 1983. There's 
no question about the guilt of the party involved, but here we 
are this many years thereafter, and the Ninth Circuit is 
still--still considering this particular case. And the damage 
done to the family of that police officer is incalculable.
    So by this side agreeing to your amendment, we in no way 
mean to signal that we don't think this is a serious issue that 
ought to be addressed, but we hope to address it in a 
comprehensive fashion in another stand-alone bill.
    I thank the gentleman.
    Mr. Scott. Thank you. I yield to the gentleman from North 
Carolina.
    Mr. Watt. I understand that we're striking the entire 
provision, but I just wanted to make sure I understand the 
underlying provision. Would the underlying provision that 
you're agreeing to strike set up a different habeas review 
standard for some people than other people? Is that--would that 
be the effect of what the underlying bill----
    Mr. Scott. It would have--it would be a separate standard, 
and, furthermore, it would be a complicated standard. So, Mr. 
Chairman, I think if we're going to have habeas corpus reform, 
it seems to me to have--to make much more sense to do it as the 
gentleman--as it's been explained, in a separate piece of 
legislation where all these questions can be answered.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Watt. Would the gentleman yield one more--can we agree 
to put the camera provision over into that category, too, so--
--
    Mr. Smith. The gentleman yields back, and as I say, the 
Chair has accepted the amendment.
    Are there any other amendments?
    Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman, on the same amendment.
    Mr. Smith. The gentleman from New York is recognized.
    Mr. Nadler. Thank you. I'll be very brief.
    I support the amendment. I just have to comment on the 
gentleman from California's comment. Getting it right is more 
important when you're dealing with the death penalty or any 
other serious crime than getting it fast. We very much 
tightened up, in my judgment, far too much on habeas corpus in 
the Antiterrorism and More Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. 
I think we--innocent people will be executed because of the--
because of not being afforded habeas corpus. To go further is 
to wreak more injustice.
    Taking it out of this bill enables me to vote for this bill 
in Committee. And it is certainly preferable to consider any 
further refinements to the habeas corpus statutes in a full 
discussion in a bill standing by itself. I expect not to agree 
with the gentleman at that time, but at least it will get, I 
presume, a full discussion rather than being passed as part of 
a different bill without proper consideration, I simply wanted 
to say. So I'm glad it's being taken out of this bill. It will 
enable me to vote for this bill in Committee, but I'm glad--but 
I just couldn't let those remarks pass unremarked upon. I think 
we've gone too far in restricting habeas--not having gone far--
--
    Mr. Lungren. Would the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Smith. The gentleman from Virginia's time has expired.
    Mr. Nadler. I had the time.
    Mr. Smith. I'm sorry. The gentleman from New York.
    Mr. Nadler. And I would yield to the gentleman.
    Mr. Lungren. Would the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Nadler. Yes.
    Mr. Lungren. I understand the gentleman's concern, but I 
hope that we won't continue to hear this when we attempt to try 
and look at reform of habeas corpus that somehow we're acting 
too fast. The case I specifically mentioned, Police Officer 
Kenneth Reidy was killed 22 years ago. He was sentenced to 
death by a California court in 1984. That was affirmed by the 
California Supreme Court in 1989. I would defy anyone to 
suggest that that is a rush to judgment.
    Mr. Nadler. I will--I will--reclaiming my time, that's 
obviously not a rush to judgment in that case, and I don't know 
anything about that case so I can't comment on it. But I will 
say that when we look at habeas statutes, we have to be very 
careful because we know of cases where people have been 
executed or--and we also know of cases, frankly--we know of 
cases, frankly, where time goes by not because they're 
litigating new evidence as to the guilt or innocence of the 
accused, but because they are litigating for years and years 
whether technical requirements for habeas corpus that were 
imposed in 1996 are met before you ever get to those cases. But 
this is a discussion that should be held for when we get to 
that bill.
    So I'll yield back at this time.
    Mr. Smith. I was just going to say the gentleman's time has 
expired. He yields back.
    The question occurs on the second degree amendment offered 
by Mr. Scott. All in favor, say aye? All opposed, nay?
    The ayes have it. The agreement is--the amendment is agreed 
to.
    And are there any further amendments? The gentleman from 
Virginia, Mr. Scott, for the purpose of offering an amendment.
    Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk 
offered by me and the gentlelady from California, Ms. Waters.
    Mr. Smith. The clerk will report the amendment.
    The Clerk. Amendment to the amendment in the nature of a 
substitute to H.R. 1751----
    Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent--Mr. 
Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment, which is 
fairly lengthy, be considered as read.
    Mr. Smith. Without objection.
    [The amendment offered by Mr. Scott of Virginia follows:]
    
    
    Mr. Smith. The gentleman is recognized to explain the 
amendment.
    Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman, although it's a long amendment, it 
has--it's fairly straightforward. It just eliminates all the 
mandatory minimums in the legislation. Mr. Chairman, we know 
that mandatory minimums have been shown to be ineffective in 
preventing crime. They distort the sentencing process, and 
they've been studied and been shown to waste the taxpayers' 
money, and they're discriminatory in application.
    The Rand Commission studied it and titled their study 
``Mandatory Minimum Drug Sentences: Throwing Away the Key or 
the Taxpayers' Money,'' concluding that mandatory sentences 
were not cost-effective, indeed much less effective than 
ordinary discretionary sentencing.
    Mr. Chairman, every time we consider one of these--I 
haven't seen the letter yet, but I'm sure there's one that we 
can enter into the record at this point from the Judicial 
Conference of the United States, which has reminded us that 
mandatory minimums violate common sense. The idea is that if 
the sentence makes sense, it can be applied; if it doesn't make 
sense, mandatory minimums make you apply it anyway.
    The late Chief Justice Rehnquist, who was not generally 
known to be soft on crime, stated that, and I quote, 
``Mandatory minimums are frequently the result of floor 
amendments that demonstrate emphatically that legislators want 
to `get tough on crime.' ''
    Just as frequently, they do not involve any careful 
consideration of the effect they might have on the Sentencing 
Guidelines as a whole. Even former President Bush, while still 
a Member of Congress, spoke in support of a bill that would 
repeal mandatory minimums, declaring that, and I quote, 
``Contrary to what one might imagine, the bill repealing 
Federal mandatory minimums will result in better justice and 
more appropriate sentences.''
    Furthermore, and finally, Mr. Chairman, in this context, 
mandatory minimums are absolutely ridiculous. If there is 
anywhere we can trust judges to apply the appropriate sentence, 
it's when the charge is assaulting judges. I don't think they 
need mandatory minimum guidance to do the right thing on those 
kinds of charges. So I would hope that we would eliminate all 
of the mandatory minimums in the bill.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Smith. Okay. Would the gentleman from Virginia yield?
    Mr. Scott. I yield back.
    Mr. Smith. First of all, without objection, the letter that 
you mentioned from the Judicial Conference will be made a part 
of the record.
    [The information follows:]
    
    
    Mr. Smith. The second is that I understand that the 
gentleman has had--second of all, I understand that the 
gentleman has had discussions with the Chairman of the 
Committee, Mr. Sensenbrenner, and we intend to work with the 
gentleman from Virginia between now and the next step in the 
process to try to address some of his concerns, and if that's 
the case, would the gentleman like to have--ask unanimous 
consent to withdraw his amendment?
    Mr. Scott. I think this is better known as the faith-based 
initiative. [Laughter.]
    I withdraw the amendment, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Smith. All right. Without objection, the amendment is 
withdrawn.
    Are there any other amendments?
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman?
    Mr. Smith. The gentlewoman from Texas is recognized.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have two 
amendments at the desk, and I'd like to take them en bloc.
    Mr. Smith. Okay. Without objection, the clerk will report 
the amendments.
    The Clerk. Amendments to the amendment in the nature of a 
substitute offered by Ms. Jackson Lee of Texas. At the end of 
the matter proposed to be inserted by the amendment, add the 
following new section: Sec.--Grants to States for threat 
assessment databases. A. In general, from amounts made 
available to carry out this section, the Attorney General shall 
carry out a program under which the Attorney General makes 
grants to States for use by the State to establish and maintain 
a threat assessment database----
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman?
    The Clerk.--described in subsection (b).
    Ms. Jackson Lee. I'd like the amendments be considered as 
read.
    Mr. Smith. Okay.
    [The amendments offered by Ms. Jackson Lee follow:]
      



    Mr. Smith. The gentlelady from Texas is recognized, but let 
me say before she begins the explanation of the amendments that 
the Chair is prepared to accept her amendments, if that might 
persuade her to limit her remarks.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. It certainly will, Mr. Chairman, and so I 
thank you very much. Let me just simply say that amendment 
number 174 is dealing with a threat assessment provision for 
the courts. The U.S. Marshals Service has such a threat 
assessment, but the courts do not have access to such. With the 
various endangerment that we've seen I our courts, we know that 
this would be a vital service. So I ask my colleagues to accept 
it.
    I thank the Chairman. That is amendment number 174.
    Number 175 is an amendment that simply would give the 
Attorney General the authority to make grants to State and 
local prosecutors and law enforcement agencies to help protect 
young witnesses who are witnesses to crimes such as armed 
robbery, assault, murder, sexual abuse, and domestic violence. 
We recognize that with the number of kidnappings that we have 
seen of very young victims who ultimately may be witnesses or 
witnesses to other horrific acts, the protection of these 
witnesses and the guiding of these witnesses is crucial to 
making the case against a violent predator or violent 
perpetrator of a crime.
    I ask my colleagues to support it, and I ask that both 
amendments be supported. I yield back to the Chairman.
    [The prepared statements of Ms. Jackson Lee follow:] deg.
    Mr. Smith. Thank you. The question occurs on the amendment 
offered by the gentlewoman from Texas. All in favor, say aye? 
Opposed, nay?
    The ayes have it. The agreement--I mean, the amendment is 
agreed to.
    Are there any further amendments?
    Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman?
    Mr. Smith. The gentleman from New York, Mr. Nadler, is 
recognized for the purpose of offering an amendment.
    Mr. Nadler. Thank you. Mr. Speaker--Mr. Chairman, I have an 
amendment at the desk.
    Mr. Smith. The clerk will report the amendment.
    The Clerk. Amendment to the amendment in the nature of a 
substitute to H.R. 1751, offered by Mr. Nadler. Add at the end 
the following: SEC.--Incitement----
    Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent----
    Mr. Smith. Without objection, the amendment will be 
considered as read.
    [The amendment offered by Mr. Nadler follows:]
    
    
    Mr. Smith. The gentleman from New York is recognized for 
the purposes of explaining his amendment.
    Mr. Nadler. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I commend you and the 
Committee for responding to the reign of terror being directed 
at some of our institutions of justice. A free society and 
Nation of laws must protect the rule of law. Plainly, that can 
never be accomplished if those entrusted with its 
administration and their families face violence or death simply 
because they are doing the public's business. We have seen 
countries where violence against court officials has destroyed 
the rule of law. We cannot allow that to happen here.
    Unfortunately, there are some in our society who believe 
that they have the right to be a law unto themselves. They are 
convinced that courts that act in ways they do not approve of 
must be stopped by any means, legal or not. Sometimes 
demagogues have stirred individuals to commit heinous crimes or 
to attempt heinous crimes against judges and law enforcement 
officials. When that incitement goes beyond mere advocacy, it 
should be a crime.
    The law has long recognized the difference between 
protected speech, even advocacy of violence and other 
wrongdoing, and incitement, which is not protected.
    My amendment is drawn from existing law, making it a crime 
to incite others to riot. It requires overt acts and 
specifically excludes advocacy of ideas or expressions in 
support of violence. The incitement to riot statute has 
successfully withstood constitutional challenge. The amendment 
would make it a crime ``to incite, to organize, promote, 
encourage, participate in, or carry on, to commit any act of 
violence in furtherance of, or to aid or abet any person'' to 
commit the new crimes in the bill. In other words, it would 
make it a crime to incite violence against judges and judicial 
personnel.
    There is no place in our society for violence. When someone 
steps over the line from protected speech and by inciting 
criminal violence against judges or other law enforcement 
officers creates a clear and present danger of violence or 
murder, that person should not be permitted to walk away from 
the consequences of their act.
    I know that I have parted company with many of my 
colleagues in other bills restricting what the courts have held 
to be protected speech because I believe we should protect 
speech to a very great extent. I hope we can, at the very 
least, however, agree that incitement to violence and murder 
for the purpose of destroying our justice system, speech that 
has consistently been held to be outside the protection of the 
First Amendment cannot be tolerated. If we can have a crime of 
incitement to riot, we should have a crime to incitement to 
violence against court--against court personnel and judges.
    I urge the adoption of this amendment and yield back the 
balance of my time.
    Mr. Gohmert. Mr. Chairman? Mr. Chairman?
    Mr. Smith. The gentleman yields back his time. Do any 
Members wish to be heard in opposition to the amendment? The 
gentleman from Texas, Mr. Gohmert, is recognized.
    Mr. Gohmert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do stand in 
opposition to this amendment. I believe it is overly broad, 
that it is constitutionally suspect under the Brandenberg case. 
I get very concerned any time someone attempts to limit free 
speech, even though sometimes the Supreme Court itself has 
trouble understanding what protected political free speech 
should be, as we saw in the McCain-Feingold debacle.
    But, anyway, gee, by just making a sarcastic remark, I 
guess if someone ever did violence, they could say Gohmert 
aided and abetted and encouraged violence against the Supreme 
Court. And, folks, I'm telling you, there is a huge difference 
between protected free speech and violence. A huge difference.
    This country is one in which, as the gentleman says, 
violence should not be tolerated, absolutely not, and that's 
why we have this court security bill coming here today. We need 
to protect the judiciary. We need to protect the participants 
in the process. And they deserve harsher penalties, all those 
who would attempt to do violence, who would attempt to do harm, 
would conspire or actually do violence or harm. And that's why 
this bill is here.
    But heaven help us if we get to the point that we say we 
cannot criticize the Supreme Court, because when I took to the 
floor or I took to writing an editorial criticizing the 
ridiculous Supreme Court opinion saying that a city or a 
governmental entity could take someone's private property just 
because somebody else is going to pay more taxes, lo and 
behold, I could be----
    Mr. Nadler. Would the gentleman yield for a question?
    Mr. Gohmert. Not right now. I'm on a roll. [Laughter.]
    But I could be brought up and accused and taken before the 
grand jury because I incited somebody to get upset about a 
ridiculous Supreme Court decision.
    I will never yield my right to free speech. You know, as 
Patrick Henry said, ``is life so short and peace so sweet it 
could be purchased at the price of chains and slavery? Forbid 
it, Almighty God.'' I ought to have the right to free speech. I 
do not want to ever give that up, and I am concerned that 
anyone who seeks to criticize or does criticize an opinion of a 
wayward court, including the Ninth Circuit, something happens 
and some idiot out there does violence, then you come back on 
those who exercise their constitutional free speech and all 
under this kind of thing.
    I am extremely opposed to this amendment. There is no place 
for violence in our society. I harshly sentenced people who 
thought there was. But there is no place in this country, I 
hope and pray, to limit free speech and criticism of government 
officials.
    Mr. Nadler. Now would the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Gohmert. I will yield now.
    Mr. Nadler. Thank you, Mr. Gohmert.
    First of all, the language says ``to incite, to organize, 
promote, encourage, participate in, or carry on, to commit any 
act of violence''--not to criticize a court. To incite an act 
of violence. And does the gentleman believe that the incitement 
to riot statute is unconstitutional?
    Mr. Gohmert. I don't, but I know where this is going. 
You're including it in--you're seeking to include it in a court 
bill, and the intent would be that--to protect criticism 
against a court----
    Mr. Nadler. Well, would the----
    Mr. Gohmert. And I understand how this works. All you have 
to do is go in and say, Well, you know what? That speech he 
gave, you know, a Patrick Henry-style speech, incited people to 
violence, and the next thing you go, you got some yay-hoo like 
Ronnie Earle out there trying to indict somebody for inciting 
violence.
    Mr. Nadler. Would the gentleman yield again?
    Mr. Gohmert. Yes, I will.
    Mr. Nadler. I don't know if the gentleman has read the 
amendment because it clearly says that this amendment shall not 
be deemed to mean the mere oral or written, one, advocacy of 
ideas or, two, expression of belief, not involving advocacy of 
an act of violence or assertion of the rightness of or the 
right to commit any such act. That is, act of violence. So--
unquote. So everything you're talking about is expressly 
excluded from this amendment.
    Mr. Gohmert. It is broad enough, though, that it could 
allow a prosecutor to pursue somebody on political grounds, and 
so I am concerned about the broadness of the bill, and I do 
stand in opposition.
    Thank you. I yield back.
    Mr. Lungren. Mr. Speaker--or, Mr. Chairman?
    Mr. Smith. The gentleman yields back. Are there any other 
Members who wish to be heard on this side? If not, the 
gentleman from California, Mr. Lungren, is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Lungren. Mr. Chairman, I ask to strike the requisite 
number of words.
    This is an issue that's very, very important. I don't doubt 
the gentleman's intentions on this, but it recalls the 
difficult time that many States and the Federal Government had 
in coming up with the right formula to outlaw cross burning. As 
you may recall, the United States Supreme Court in one instance 
found the anti-cross-burning statutes to be unconstitutional, 
and then in a later decision found one to be constitutional. 
Very difficult in terms of the technical language that they 
utilized.
    As I understand the Brandenberg case, the Court requires an 
element of immediacy. So it's more than just urging. And I 
suppose you can even urge or incite someone in a non-immediate 
manner and you wouldn't be allowed to be prosecuted under a 
reading of our free speech clause of the Constitution.
    And so I would just tell the gentleman, I find a tension 
between his two sections where he talks about the fact that it 
shall not mean to--mere oral or written advocacy or expression, 
but before that, you include within the definition to incite or 
organize, that it includes but not limited to urging or--and 
that seems so broad. And if it is more broad than just urging, 
what is not contained in it. And, frankly, I would just say I 
would be happy to be--to work with the gentleman----
    Mr. Nadler. Which language are you--which language are you 
referring to? What line?
    Mr. Lungren. Well, I'm referring on page 4 as it continues 
over from subsection (e). The gentleman talks about the 
promotion--well, to promote, encourage, which are far different 
than participate in, a violation of the section, that includes 
but is not limited to an urging. And then you go into other 
words. That seems rather expansive to me.
    Now, maybe the gentleman can show previous legislative 
history to prior--to other laws that are that broad, but that 
to me is----
    Mr. Nadler. Would the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Lungren.--in tension with what the Supreme Court has 
instructed----
    Mr. Nadler. Would the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Lungren. I'll be happy to yield.
    Mr. Nadler. I would ask unanimous consent to amend the 
amendment to take out the words ``but is not limited to.''
    Mr. Lungren. He's asked unanimous consent--I don't know if 
that's--that's on the table.
    Mr. Nadler. I ask--well, because you--the gentleman just 
pointed out----
    Mr. Lungren. No, I know. I understand that. But I'm talking 
about procedure where he has to consider your unanimous 
consent.
    Mr. Nadler. Oh. Well, I would ask unanimous consent to 
delete the words in line 2 on page 4, ``but is limited''--``but 
is not limited to.'' I think the point the gentleman makes may 
be well taken and I don't need those words.
    Mr. Smith. Okay. Is there an objection to the unanimous 
consent request?
    [No response.]
    Mr. Smith. All right. If not, without objection, so 
ordered.
    Mr. Lungren. So, reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman, I think 
that improves it. I'm not sure it answers my questions 
entirely. What I was going to say to the gentleman is I'd be 
happy to work with you--others may as well--to try and see if 
we could come up with something perhaps in a stand-alone piece 
of legislation, because this really needs some delicate 
treatment, and I'm not prepared to support an amendment like 
this at this time without us working harder. And I----
    Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman--if the gentleman would yield?
    Mr. Lungren. I'd be happy to yield to the gentleman.
    Mr. Nadler. Thank you. I appreciate the--what the gentleman 
says. I'll ask unanimous consent, with that view, to try to 
work this out, because I do think it is important. I'll 
withdraw the amendment at this time.
    Mr. Smith. Does the gentleman ask unanimous consent to 
withdraw the amendment?
    Mr. Nadler. Yes. I just did.
    Mr. Smith. Without objection, so ordered.
    Are there any other amendments? The gentleman from 
Virginia, Mr. Scott, is recognized for the purposes of offering 
an amendment.
    Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk. 
It's the one that's handwritten.
    Mr. Smith. The clerk will report the handwritten amendment.
    The Clerk. Amendment to the amendment in the nature of a 
substitute, offered by Mr. Scott of Virginia. Page 6, line 18, 
after ``life,'' delete ``, or, if death results, may be 
sentenced to death.''
    [The amendment offered by Mr. Scott of Virginia follows:]
    
    
    Mr. Smith. Okay. The gentleman from Virginia is recognized 
for 5 minutes to explain the amendment.
    Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Chairman, I apologize for it being handwritten, but it 
was pointed out that the part we struck in the original 
amendment didn't--it struck too much so we had to amend it. 
This basically takes the death penalty out of the bill.
    Mr. Chairman, what we know about the death penalty is, at 
best, there's a debate on whether it reduces crime or not. I 
think most of the evidence shows if it does anything, it 
increases crime. But it's debatable whether it does anything or 
not.
    We know the death penalty is applied in an arbitrary 
manner, it's applied in a discriminatory manner, and it's 
applied with mistakes. Furthermore, Mr. Chairman, this has 
problems not only that apply to general death penalties, but 
the way it's applied in this bill, you have federalism 
problems. It gives the Federal Government authority to 
prosecute murders that are clearly State crimes. It imposes a 
Federal will on jurisdictions that do not have any death 
penalty. And it sets up a tenuous connection for the extension 
of Federal authority into what is traditionally State domain, 
which will probably induce turmoil and litigation as to whether 
it's even constitutional to do what we're doing.
    It's, furthermore, Mr. Chairman, not really timely. We 
still make mistakes in the death penalty. The Innocence 
Protection Act has not done all it should have done. We're 
still working through the mistakes in the process. We have 
talked about habeas corpus and what--how that fits in. And we 
should not be creating new Federal death penalties when we 
haven't gotten the old death penalty straight yet.
    Finally, Mr. Chairman, I previously asked unanimous consent 
to introduce into the record comments by the State Courts--
National Conference of State Courts on this bill. They've asked 
for a lot to help court security. The death penalty wasn't one 
of them. I would remind the Members of that and yield back the 
balance of my time.
    Mr. Smith. The gentleman yields back. For what purpose does 
the gentleman from Texas seek recognition?
    Mr. Gohmert. Strike the last word.
    Mr. Smith. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Gohmert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I do appreciate the motivation of the gentleman from 
Virginia, but with regard to striking the death penalty, that 
is one of the principal components of this. It makes the death 
penalty available for those who would seek to kill, murder--
kidnap and kill, murder a Federal official and especially a 
Federal judge, a member of a Federal judge's family, providing 
those kinds of protection.
    Now, there is--there are many constitutional protections 
involved in the death penalty as we've seen, not merely just 
protection of a jury of one's peers, but also the enormous 
appellate avenues available, the writ process.
    Let me just mention some of the groups that are supporting 
this so that everyone understands. We've gotten indications of 
support, unsolicited, but some have just notified us they want 
to support this: the Federal Bar Association, the Federal 
Criminal Investigator Association, the Fraternal Order of 
Police. Those are--State entities. International Association of 
Campus Law Enforcement Administrators, International Union of 
Police Association, the AFL-CIO, Major County Sheriffs 
Association, National Association of Assistant U.S. Attorneys, 
National Law Enforcement Council, California State Sheriffs 
Association, National Sheriffs Association, National Troopers 
Coalition--those are State troopers--American Federation of 
State, County, and Municipal Employees, and the National Court 
Reporters Association.
    As I said earlier, if tougher sentences do not help reduce 
crime, then the trend over the last 20 years of having tougher 
sentences and the crime rate going down, they may not seem 
related to some, but I can tell you this, as a judge who has 
tried capital murder cases: Jurors are extremely concerned 
about the evidence that shows someone is a future danger, about 
any evidence that mitigates against the death penalty. Those 
are proper considerations for the jury. But I can also tell you 
without any regard for whether you believe this study, don't 
believe that study, take the position that waiting 22 years to 
impose a capital punishment penalty just skews any proper study 
of the deterrent effect, I can tell you this: The recidivism 
rate for those who would kill or murder a Federal judge or a 
Federal judge's family will be zero.
    Mr. Scott. Would the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Gohmert. I yield back my time.
    Mr. Scott. Would the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Smith. The gentleman has yielded back his time.
    The gentleman from New York, Mr. Nadler.
    Mr. Nadler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I move to strike the 
last word.
    Mr. Smith. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Nadler. I support this excellent amendment, and I yield 
to the gentleman from Virginia.
    Mr. Scott. Thank you, and I thank the gentleman for 
yielding.
    First of all, this doesn't say whether you can have a death 
penalty or not. The States, if they want, can have a death 
penalty. This just--there just wouldn't be any Federal death 
penalty. And, furthermore, Mr. Chairman, this isn't just for 
Federal judges. It's for anybody who has--whose job is even 
partially paid for with Federal money, a federally funded 
public safety officer. So that could be--that could be local 
police if you've got COPS money.
    So, Mr. Chairman, I would hope that we would adopt the 
amendment.
    Mr. Smith. The gentleman from New York, does he yield back 
the balance of his time?
    Mr. Nadler. Yes, I do.
    Mr. Smith. If so the question occurs on the second degree 
amendment. All those in favor, say aye? All those opposed, say 
nay?
    The nays appear to have it. The nays have it. The amendment 
is not agreed to.
    Are there any other amendments? If not, the question occurs 
on the amendment in the nature of a substitute as amended 
offered by the gentleman from Texas. All in favor, say aye? All 
opposed---- [Laughter.]
    All opposed, nay?
    The ayes still have it, and the amendment in the nature of 
a substitute is agreed to.
    The question occurs on the motion to report the bill H.R. 
1751 favorably as amended. All in favor, say aye? All opposed, 
no?
    The ayes have it, and the motion to report the bill 
favorably is agreed to. Without objection, the bill will----
    Mr. Gohmert. Could I have a recorded vote on that, Mr. 
Chairman?
    Mr. Smith. A request has been made for a reported--a 
recorded vote, and the clerk will call the roll.
    The Clerk. Mr. Hyde?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Coble?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Gallegly?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Goodlatte?
    Mr. Goodlatte. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Goodlatte, aye. Mr. Chabot?
    Mr. Chabot. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chabot, aye. Mr. Lungren?
    Mr. Lungren. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Lungren, aye. Mr. Jenkins?
    Mr. Jenkins. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Jenkins, aye. Mr. Cannon?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Bachus?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Inglis?
    Mr. Inglis. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Inglis, aye. Mr. Hostettler?
    Mr. Hostettler. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Hostettler, aye. Mr. Green?
    Mr. Green. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Green, aye. Mr. Keller?
    Mr. Keller. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Keller, aye. Mr. Issa?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Flake?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Pence?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Forbes?
    Mr. Forbes. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Forbes, aye. Mr. King?
    Mr. King. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. King, aye. Mr. Feeney?
    Mr. Feeney. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Feeney, aye. Mr. Franks?
    Mr. Franks. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Franks, aye. Mr. Gohmert?
    Mr. Gohmert. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Gohmert, aye. Mr. Conyers?
    Mr. Conyers. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Conyers, no. Mr. Berman?
    Mr. Berman. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Berman, aye. Mr. Boucher?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Nadler?
    Mr. Nadler. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Nadler, aye. Mr. Scott?
    Mr. Scott. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Scott, no. Mr. Watt?
    Mr. Watt. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Watt, no. Ms. Lofgren?
    Ms. Lofgren. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Lofgren, aye. Ms. Jackson Lee?
    Ms. Jackson Lee. No.
    The Clerk. Ms. Jackson Lee, no. Ms. Waters?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Meehan?
    Mr. Meehan. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Meehan, aye. Mr. Delahunt?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Wexler?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Weiner?
    Mr. Weiner. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Weiner, aye. Mr. Schiff?
    Mr. Schiff. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Schiff, aye. Ms. Sanchez?
    Ms. Sanchez. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Sanchez, aye. Mr. Van Hollen?
    Mr. Van Hollen. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Van Hollen, aye. Ms. Wasserman Schultz?
    Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Wasserman Schultz, aye. Mr. Chairman?
    Mr. Smith. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, aye.
    Mr. Smith. Are there any other Members who wish to vote or 
change their vote? The gentleman from California, Mr. Gallegly?
    Mr. Gallegly. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Gallegly, aye.
    Mr. Smith. The gentleman from Utah, Mr. Cannon.
    Mr. Cannon. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Cannon, aye.
    Mr. Smith. Are there any other Members who wish to vote or 
change their vote? The gentleman from Massachusetts.
    Mr. Delahunt. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Delahunt, aye.
    Mr. Smith. The gentlewoman from California.
    Ms. Waters. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Waters, aye.
    Mr. Smith. Are there any other Members who wish to vote or 
change their vote? If not, the clerk will report the vote.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, there are 27 ayes and 4 noes.
    Mr. Smith. The motion to report the bill as agreed to. 
Without objection, the bill will be reported favorably to the 
House in the form of a single amendment in the nature of a 
substitute incorporating the amendments adopted here today.
    Without objection, the staff is directed to make any 
technical and conforming changes. All Members will be given 2 
days as provided by the House Rules in which to submit 
additional dissenting, supplemental, or minority views.
    Let me make an announcement to all our Members who are 
here. We obviously have a series of votes that have just been 
called. Also the Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act, which came out of 
this Committee is on the House floor immediately after these 
votes. So we will be standing in recess pending the call of the 
Chair until after the Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act is considered 
on the House floor. Then we will return and take up the third 
and remaining bill that we have to consider today.
    Without--the gentlewoman from California has asked 
unanimous consent to change her vote, and without objection, 
that will be done and the record will reflect the correct vote.
    We stand in recess until the call of the Chair.
    [Intervening business.]
    That concludes the markup. I thank everyone for their 
participation. Without objection, the markup is adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 6:22 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
                            Dissenting Views

    H.R. 1751, the ``Secure Access to Justice and Court 
Protection Act of 2005'' was introduced to address acts of 
violence occurring in and around courthouses and against 
judges, prosecutors, witnesses, law enforcement, and other 
court personnel.\1\ However, in it's original form, the 
legislation failed to include several key provisions that would 
help it achieve this objective. Namely, it failed to provide 
state courts with adequate funding in the form of grants in 
order to improve courtroom safety and security. It also failed 
to provide the U.S. Marshals Service with the necessary 
resources to expand the investigative and protective services 
it currently provides to members of the federal judiciary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Hearing on H.R. 1751, the ``Secure Access to Justice and Court 
Protection Act of 2005'' Before the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism 
and Homeland Security of the Committee on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 7, 
10 (2005) (statement of Chairman Howard Coble)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Fortunately, thanks to the Majority's willingness to work 
with the Democratic members on the committee, many of these 
issues have been adequately addressed. However, two important 
issues still remain. Specifically, the legislation's creation 
of sixteen new mandatory minimum criminal sentences and its 
establishment of a new death penalty eligible offense. It is 
for these reasons, and those set out below, that we 
respectfully dissent.

   THE LEGISLATION IMPOSES INEFFECTIVE AND DISCRIMINATORY MANDATORY 
                           MINIMUM SENTENCES

    HR 1751 proposes to add 16 new mandatory minimum sentences 
to the current criminal code. Mandatory minimum penalties have 
been studied extensively and the vast majority of available 
research clearly indicates that they do not work. Among other 
things, they have been shown to distort the sentencing process, 
to discriminate against minorities in their application, and to 
waste valuable taxpayer money.
    The Judicial Conference of the United States, which sees 
the impact of mandatory minimum sentences on individual cases 
as well as on the criminal justice system as whole, has 
expressed its deep opposition to mandatory minimum sentencing 
over a dozen times to Congress, noting that these sentences 
``severely distort and damage the Federal sentencing system . . 
. undermine the Sentencing Guideline regimen'' established by 
Congress to promote fairness and proportionality, and ``destroy 
honesty in sentencing by encouraging charge and fact plea 
bargains.''
    In fact, in a recent letter to Members of the Crime 
Subcommittee regarding H.R. 1279, the ``Gang Deterrence and 
Community Protection Act of 2005,'' the Conference noted that 
mandatory minimum sentences create ``the opposite of their 
intended effect. Far from fostering certainty in punishment, 
mandatory minimums result in unwarranted sentencing disparity. 
Mandatory minimums . . . treat dissimilar offenders in a 
similar manner, although those offenders can be quite different 
with respect to the seriousness of their conduct or their 
danger to society . . .'' and . . . , ``require the sentencing 
court to impose the same sentence on offenders when sound 
policy and common sense call for reasonable differences in 
punishment.''
    Additionally, both the Judicial Center in its study report 
entitled ``The General Effects of Mandatory Minimum Prison 
Terms: A Longitudinal Study of Federal Sentences Imposed'' and 
the United States Sentencing Commission in its study entitled 
``Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice 
System'' found that minorities were substantially more likely 
than whites under comparable circumstances to receive mandatory 
minimum sentences. The Sentencing Commission study also 
reflected that mandatory minimum sentences increased the 
disparity in sentencing of like offenders with no evidence that 
mandatory minimum sentences had any more crime-reduction impact 
than discretionary sentences.
    The inconsistent and arbitrary nature of mandatory minimum 
sentences is made readily apparent by a quick analysis of 
section 2 of the bill. Section 2 establishes a one year 
mandatory minimum (with a 10 year maximum criminal penalty) for 
assaulting the immediate family member of a law enforcement 
officer or judge--if the assault results in bodily injury. 
However, just a few lines later in the same section, an 
identical criminal penalty is established for a simple threat. 
Thus, the same section of the bill makes two completely 
different actions, with considerably varying outcomes, subject 
to the same term of imprisonment.
    Ultimately, the continued reliance on mandatory minimum 
sentences will not lead to a decrease in crime as some contend, 
but only further expand an ever-increasing prison population. 
And, with more than 2.1 million Americans currently in jail or 
prison--roughly quadruple the number of individuals 
incarcerated in 1985--it's hard to see how anyone can continue 
with such a deeply flawed strategy. Today, the United States 
incarcerates its citizens at a rate 14 times that of Japan, 8 
times the rate of France and 6 times the rate of Canada; and 
expends approximately $40 billion a year in incarceration 
costs, alone.

            THE LEGISLATION UNWISELY EXPANDS THE USE OF THE 
                         FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY

    H.R. 1751 unwisely creates a new death penalty eligible 
offense for anyone convicted of killing a federally funded 
public safety officer.\2\ Expansion of the use of the federal 
death penalty in the current environment is patently 
unwarranted. The public is clearly rethinking the 
appropriateness of the death penalty, in general, due to the 
evidence that it is ineffective in deterring crime, is racially 
discriminatory, and is more often than not found to be 
erroneously applied. In a 23-year comprehensive study of death 
penalties, 68% were found to be erroneously applied. So, it is 
not surprising that 119 people sentenced to death for murder 
over the past 12 years have been completely exonerated of those 
crimes. Nor is it surprising with that such a lackluster record 
of death penalty administrations that several states have 
abolished the death penalty. For example, Connecticut has not 
executed anyone in 45 years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Section 4 defines a ``federally funded public safety officer'' 
as any individual who receives federal financial assistance while 
serving a public (federal, state or local government) agency in the 
capacity of a judicial officer, law enforcement officer, firefighter, 
chaplain, or as a member of a rescue squad or ambulance crew.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Without a doubt, the increasing numbers of innocent people 
released from death row illustrates the fallibility of the 
current system. Last year, a University of Michigan study 
identified 199 murder exonerations since 1989, 73 of them in 
capital cases. Moreover, the same study found that death row 
inmates represent a quarter of 1 percent of the prison 
population but 22 percent of the exonerated.
    Equally disturbing is the fact that in its application, the 
death penalty is often applied in a racially and economically 
discriminatory manner. A careful study of the use of the death 
penalty in the United States undertaken by the United Nations' 
Human Rights Commission in 1998 issued a report which rightly 
concluded that: ``Race, ethnic origin and economic status 
appear to be key determinants of who will, and who will not, 
receive a sentence of death.''
    Unfortunately, these problems are not confined to state 
systems. A recent Department of Justice survey documents 
racial, ethnic and geographic disparity in the charging of 
federal capital cases. Indeed, the review found that in 75 
percent of the cases in which a federal prosecutor sought the 
death penalty, the defendant was a member of a minority group. 
The explanation for these extremely troubling disparities is 
unclear, but the possibility of discrimination and bias cannot 
be ruled out.

        DESCRIPTION OF AMENDMENTS OFFERED BY DEMOCRATIC MEMBERS

1. Amendment offered by Rep. Chabot & Rep. Conyers
    Description of amendment: The Chabot/Conyers amendment 
provides federal judges with the discretion to allow media 
coverage of courtroom proceedings.
    Vote on amendment: The amendment was adopted by a vote of 
20 to 12. Ayes: Representatives Goodlatte, Chabot, Hostettler, 
Green, King, Franks, Conyers, Berman, Nadler, Lofgren, Waters, 
Delahunt, Schiff, Sanchez, Van Hollen, Wasserman Schultz, 
Coble, Meehan, Inglis, Weiner.
    Nays: Representatives Smith, Gallegly, Jenkins, Canon, 
Keller, Issa, Flake, Forbes, Feeney, Gohmert, Scott, Watt.
2. Amendment offered by Rep. Schiff & Rep. Weiner
    Description of amendment: The Schiff/Weiner amendment 
directs the Attorney General, through the Office of Justice 
Programs, to award grants to state courts in order to enhance 
courtroom safety and security.
    Vote on amendment: The amendment was agreed to by voice-
vote.
3. Amendment offered by Rep. Schiff & Rep. Weiner
    Description of amendment: The Schiff/Weiner amendment 
authorizes $20 million for each of fiscal years 2006 to 2010 
for the hiring of entry-level deputy marshals to provide 
judicial security; for the hiring of senior-level deputy 
marshals to investigate threats; and to enhance the Office of 
Protective Intelligence.
    Vote on amendment: The amendment was agreed to by voice-
vote.
4. Amendment offered by Rep. Scott
    Description of amendment: The Scott amendment proposed to 
strike section 11 of the bill. Section 11 placed limits on the 
ability of an individual to apply for the writ of habeas 
corpus.
    Vote on amendment: The amendment was agreed to by voice-
vote.
5. Amendment offered by Rep. Scott & Rep. Waters
    Description of amendment: The Scott/Waters amendment 
proposed to strike all of the mandatory minimum criminal 
sentences from the text of the substitute amendment.
    Vote on amendment: Subject to an agreement between the 
Majority and Mr. Scott to work together to address some of the 
concerns highlighted by the amendment, the amendment was 
withdrawn.
6. Amendment offered by Rep. Jackson Lee
    Description of amendment: The Jackson Lee amendment directs 
the Attorney General to establish a grant program for states to 
establish threat assessment databases.
    Vote on amendment: The amendment was agreed to by voice-
vote.
7. Amendment offered by Rep. Jackson Lee
    Description of amendment: The Jackson Lee amendment 
authorizes the Director of Bureau Justice Assistance to make 
grants available to state and local prosecutors and law 
enforcement agencies for the establishment of juvenile and 
young adult witness assistance programs.
    Vote on amendment: The amendment was agreed to without a 
recorded vote.
8. Amendment offered by Rep. Nadler
    Description of amendment: Building upon the current 
incitement to riot statute, the Nadler amendment would make it 
a crime to incite, to organize, promote, encourage, participate 
in, or carry on, to commit any act of violence against a judge 
or other court personnel.
    Vote on amendment: The amendment was withdrawn by Rep. 
Nadler.
9. Amendment offered by Rep. Scott
    Description of amendment: The Scott amendment proposed to 
eliminate the new death penalty offense created in subsection 
(a) of section 4 of the substitute amendment.
    Vote on amendment: The amendment was defeated by voice-
vote.
                                   John Conyers, Jr.
                                   Robert C. Scott.
                                   Melvin L. Watt.
                                   Sheila Jackson Lee.
                                   Maxine Waters.
                      Additional Dissenting Views

    I share the concerns expressed in the dissenting views that 
H.R. 1751 unnecessarily and unwisely creates sixteen new 
mandatory minimum criminal sentences and a new death penalty 
eligible offense. In addition, I also believe that the bill as 
reported contains an ill-advised provision authorizing the 
discretionary use of cameras in federal courtrooms.
    During the markup I raised a point of order that the 
amendment offered by Mr. Chabot and Ranking Member Conyers was 
not germane. My objection was overruled and the amendment 
passed. The broad authorization to use cameras in courtrooms 
now included in H.R. 1751, however, clearly has no direct 
relation to the security issues underlying the bill as 
introduced. Moreover, although there is a substantial body of 
law and literature balancing the competing rights of defendants 
to a fair trial with the rights of the public and the press to 
access to the courtroom, this amendment was adopted without the 
benefit of any consideration or evaluation of this information. 
Because I believe that there was inadequate process for 
considering this amendment and also disagree with the policy it 
authorizes, I respectfully dissent.

                                   Melvin L. Watt.

                                  
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