[House Report 109-218]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]




109th Congress 
 1st Session            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES          Rept. 109-218
                                                                 Part 1
_______________________________________________________________________

                                     


                     CHILDREN'S SAFETY ACT OF 2005

                               __________

                              R E P O R T

                                 of the

                       COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              to accompany

                               H.R. 3132


                             together with

                            DISSENTING VIEWS




               September 9, 2005.--Ordered to be printed




For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov  Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512-1800  
Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001




109th Congress                                            Rept. 109-218
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 1st Session                                                     Part 1

======================================================================



 
                     CHILDREN'S SAFETY ACT OF 2005

                                _______
                                

               September 9, 2005.--Ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

 Mr. Sensenbrenner, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted the 
                               following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                            DISSENTING VIEWS

                        [To accompany H.R. 3132]

  The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred the bill 
(H.R. 3132) to make improvements to the national sex offender 
registration program, and for other purposes, having considered 
the same, reports favorably thereon with an amendment and 
recommends that the bill as amended do pass.

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page
The Amendment....................................................     1
Purpose and Summary..............................................    20
Background and Need for the Legislation..........................    22
Hearings.........................................................    40
Committee Consideration..........................................    41
Vote of the Committee............................................    41
Committee Oversight Findings.....................................    44
New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures........................    44
Performance Goals and Objectives.................................    44
Constitutional Authority Statement...............................    44
Section-by-Section Analysis and Discussion.......................    45
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported............    55
Committee Jurisdiction Letters...................................    95
Markup Transcript................................................    98
Dissenting Views.................................................   249

                             The Amendment

  The amendment is as follows:
  Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the 
following:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

  (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Children's Safety 
Act of 2005''.
  (b) Table of Contents.--

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

        TITLE I--SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION AND NOTIFICATION ACT

Sec. 101. Short title.
Sec. 102. Declaration of purpose.

Subtitle A--Jacob Wetterling Sex Offender Registration and Notification 
                                Program

Sec. 111. Relevant definitions, including Amie Zyla expansion of sex 
offender definition and expanded inclusion of child predators.
Sec. 112. Registry requirements for jurisdictions.
Sec. 113. Registry requirements for sex offenders.
Sec. 114. Information required in registration.
Sec. 115. Duration of registration requirement.
Sec. 116. In person verification.
Sec. 117. Duty to notify sex offenders of registration requirements and 
to register.
Sec. 118. Jessica Lunsford Address Verification Program.
Sec. 119. National Sex Offender Registry.
Sec. 120. Dru Sjodin National Sex Offender Public Website.
Sec. 121. Public access to sex offender information through the 
Internet.
Sec. 122. Megan Nicole Kanka and Alexandra Nicole Zapp Community 
Notification Program.
Sec. 123. Actions to be taken when sex offender fails to comply.
Sec. 124. Immunity for good faith conduct.
Sec. 125. Development and availability of registry management software.
Sec. 126. Federal duty when State programs not minimally sufficient.
Sec. 127. Period for implementation by jurisdictions.
Sec. 128. Failure to comply.
Sec. 129. Sex Offender Management Assistance (SOMA) Program.
Sec. 130. Demonstration project for use of electronic monitoring 
devices.
Sec. 131. Bonus payments to States that implement electronic 
monitoring.
Sec. 132. National Center for Missing and Exploited Children access to 
Interstate Identification Index.
Sec. 133. Limited immunity for National Center for Missing and 
Exploited Children with respect to CyberTipline.

   Subtitle B--Criminal law enforcement of registration requirements

Sec. 151. Amendments to title 18, United States Code, relating to sex 
offender registration.
Sec. 152. Investigation by United States Marshals of sex offender 
violations of registration requirements.
Sec. 153. Sex offender apprehension grants.
Sec. 154. Use of any controlled substance to facilitate sex offense.
Sec. 155. Repeal of predecessor sex offender program.

                      TITLE II--DNA FINGERPRINTING

Sec. 201. Short title.
Sec. 202. Expanding use of DNA to identify and prosecute sex offenders.
Sec. 203. Stopping Violent Predators Against Children.
Sec. 204. Model code on investigating missing persons and deaths.

TITLE III--PREVENTION AND DETERRENCE OF CRIMES AGAINST CHILDREN ACT OF 
                                  2005

Sec. 301. Short title.
Sec. 302. Assured punishment for violent crimes against children.
Sec. 303. Ensuring fair and expeditious Federal collateral review of 
convictions for killing a child.

  TITLE IV--PROTECTION AGAINST SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN ACT OF 
                                  2005

Sec. 401. Short title.
Sec. 402. Increased penalties for sexual offenses against children.

 TITLE V--FOSTER CHILD PROTECTION AND CHILD SEXUAL PREDATOR DETERRENCE

Sec. 501. Short title.
Sec. 502. Requirement to complete background checks before approval of 
any foster or adoptive placement and to check national crime 
information databases and state child abuse registries; suspension and 
subsequent elimination of opt-Out.
Sec. 503. Access to Federal crime information databases by child 
welfare agencies for certain purposes.
Sec. 504. Penalties for coercion and enticement by sex offenders.
Sec. 505. Penalties for conduct relating to child prostitution.
Sec. 506. Penalties for sexual abuse.
Sec. 507. Sex offender submission to search as condition of release.
Sec. 508. Kidnapping penalties and jurisdiction.
Sec. 509. Marital communication and adverse spousal privilege.
Sec. 510. Abuse and neglect of Indian children.
Sec. 511. Civil commitment.
Sec. 512. Mandatory penalties for sex-trafficking of children.
Sec. 513. Sexual abuse of wards.

        TITLE I--SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION AND NOTIFICATION ACT

SEC. 101. SHORT TITLE.

  This title may be cited as the ``Sex Offender Registration and 
Notification Act''.

SEC. 102. DECLARATION OF PURPOSE.

  In response to the vicious attacks by violent sexual predators 
against the victims listed below, Congress in this Act establishes a 
comprehensive national system for the registration of sex offenders:
          (1) Jacob Wetterling, who was 11 years old, was abducted in 
        1989 in Minnesota, and remains missing.
          (2) Megan Nicole Kanka, who was 7 years old, was abducted, 
        sexually assaulted and murdered in 1994, in New Jersey.
          (3) Pam Lychner, who was 31 years old, was attacked by a 
        career offender in Houston, Texas.
          (4) Jetseta Gage, who was 10 years old, was kidnapped, 
        sexually assaulted, and murdered in 2005 in Cedar Rapids, Iowa.
          (5) Dru Sjodin, who was 22 years old, was sexually assaulted 
        and murdered in 2003, in North Dakota.
          (6) Jessica Lunsford, who was 9 years, was abducted, sexually 
        assaulted, buried alive, and murdered in 2005, in Homosassa, 
        Florida.
          (7) Sarah Lunde, who was 13 years old, was strangled and 
        murdered in 2005, in Ruskin, Florida.
          (8) Amie Zyla, who was 8 years old, was sexually assaulted in 
        1996 by a juvenile offender in Waukesha, Wisconsin, and has 
        become an advocate for child victims and protection of children 
        from juvenile sex offenders.
          (9) Christy Ann Fornoff, who was 13 years old, was abducted, 
        sexually assaulted and murdered in 1984, in Tempe, Arizona.
          (10) Alexandra Nicole Zapp, who was 30 years old, was 
        brutally attacked and murdered in a public restroom by a repeat 
        sex offender in 2002, in Bridgewater, Massachusetts.

Subtitle A--Jacob Wetterling Sex Offender Registration and Notification 
                                Program

SEC. 111. RELEVANT DEFINITIONS, INCLUDING AMIE ZYLA EXPANSION OF SEX 
                    OFFENDER DEFINITION AND EXPANDED INCLUSION OF CHILD 
                    PREDATORS.

  In this title the following definitions apply:
          (1) Sex offender registry.--The term ``sex offender 
        registry'' means a registry of sex offenders, and a 
        notification program, maintained by a jurisdiction.
          (2) Jurisdiction.--The term jurisdiction means any of the 
        following:
                  (A) A State.
                  (B) The District of Columbia.
                  (C) The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
                  (D) Guam.
                  (E) American Somoa.
                  (F) Northern Mariana Islands.
                  (G) The United States Virgin Islands.
                  (H) A federally recognized Indian tribe.
          (3) Amie zyla expansion of sex offender definition.--The term 
        ``sex offender'' means an individual who, either before or 
        after the enactment of this Act, was convicted of, or 
        adjudicated a juvenile delinquent for, an offense (other than 
        an offense involving sexual conduct where the victim was at 
        least 13 years old and the offender was not more than 4 years 
        older than the victim and the sexual conduct was consensual, or 
        an offense consisting of consensual sexual conduct with an 
        adult) whether Federal, State, local, tribal, foreign (other 
        than an offense based on conduct that would not be a crime if 
        the conduct took place in the United States), military, 
        juvenile or other, that is--
                  (A) a specified offense against a minor;
                  (B) a serious sex offense; or
                  (C) a misdemeanor sex offense against a minor.
          (4) Expansion of definition of offense to include all child 
        predators.--The term ``specified offense against a minor'' 
        means an offense against a minor that involves any of the 
        following:
                  (A) Kidnapping (unless committed by a parent).
                  (B) False imprisonment (unless committed by a 
                parent).
                  (C) Solicitation to engage in sexual conduct.
                  (D) Use in a sexual performance.
                  (E) Solicitation to practice prostitution.
                  (F) Possession, production, or distribution of child 
                pornography.
                  (G) Criminal sexual conduct towards a minor.
                  (H) Any conduct that by its nature is a sexual 
                offense against a minor.
                  (I) Any other offense designated by the Attorney 
                General for inclusion in this definition.
                  (J) Any attempt or conspiracy to commit an offense 
                described in this paragraph.
          (5) Sex offense.--The term ``sex offense'' means a criminal 
        offense that has an element involving sexual act or sexual 
        contact with another, or an attempt or conspiracy to commit 
        such an offense.
          (6) Serious sex offense.--The term ``serious sex offense'' 
        means--
                  (A) a sex offense punishable under the law of a 
                jurisdiction by imprisonment for more than one year;
                  (B) any Federal offense under chapter 109A, 110, 117, 
                or section 1591 of title 18, United States Code;
                  (C) an offense in a category specified by the 
                Secretary of Defense under section 115(a)(8)(C) of 
                title I of Public Law 105-119 (10 U.S.C. 951 note);
                  (D) any other offense designated by the Attorney 
                General for inclusion in this definition.
          (7) Misdemeanor sex offense against a minor.-- The term 
        ``misdemeanor sex offense against a minor'' means a sex offense 
        against a minor punishable by imprisonment for not more than 
        one year.
          (8) Student.--The term ``student'' means an individual who 
        enrolls or attends an educational institution, including 
        (whether public or private) a secondary school, trade or 
        professional school, and institution of higher education.
          (9) Employee.--The term ``employee'' includes an individual 
        who is self-employed or works for any other entity, whether 
        compensated or not.
          (10) Resides.--The term ``resides'' means, with respect to an 
        individual, the location of the individual's home or other 
        place where the individual lives.
          (11) Minor.--The term ``minor'' means an individual who has 
        not attained the age of 18 years.

SEC. 112. REGISTRY REQUIREMENTS FOR JURISDICTIONS.

  Each jurisdiction shall maintain a jurisdiction-wide sex offender 
registry conforming to the requirements of this title. The Attorney 
General shall issue and interpret guidelines to implement the 
requirements and purposes of this title.

SEC. 113. REGISTRY REQUIREMENTS FOR SEX OFFENDERS.

  (a) In General.--A sex offender must register, and keep the 
registration current, in each jurisdiction where the offender resides, 
where the offender is an employee, and where the offender is a student.
  (b) Initial Registration.--The sex offender shall initially 
register--
          (1) before completing a sentence of imprisonment with respect 
        to the offense giving rise to the registration requirement; or
          (2) not later than 5 days after being sentenced for that 
        offense, if the sex offender is not sentenced to a term of 
        imprisonment.
  (c) Keeping the Registration Current.--A sex offender must inform 
each jurisdiction involved, not later than 5 days after each change of 
residence, employment, or student status.
  (d) Retroactive Duty to Register.--The Attorney General shall 
prescribe a method for the registration of sex offenders convicted 
before the enactment of this Act.
  (e) State Penalty for Failure to Comply.--Each jurisdiction shall 
provide a criminal penalty, that includes a maximum term of 
imprisonment that is greater than one year, for the failure of a sex 
offender to comply with the requirements of this title.

SEC. 114. INFORMATION REQUIRED IN REGISTRATION.

  (a) Provided by the Offender.--The sex offender must provide the 
following information to the appropriate official for inclusion in the 
sex offender registry:
          (1) The name of the sex offender (including any alias used by 
        the individual).
          (2) The Social Security number of the sex offender.
          (3) The address and location of the residence at which the 
        sex offender resides or will reside.
          (4) The place where the sex offender is employed or will be 
        employed.
          (5) The place where the sex offender is a student or will be 
        a student.
          (6) The license plate number of any vehicle owned or operated 
        by the sex offender.
          (7) A photograph of the sex offender.
          (8) A set of fingerprints and palm prints of the sex 
        offender, if the appropriate official determines that the 
        jurisdiction does not already have available an accurate set.
          (9) A DNA sample of the sex offender, if the appropriate 
        official determines that the jurisdiction does not already have 
        available an appropriate DNA sample.
          (10) Any other information required by the Attorney General.
  (b) Provided by the Jurisdiction.--The jurisdiction in which the sex 
offender registers shall include the following information in the 
registry for that sex offender:
          (1) A statement of the facts of the offense giving rise to 
        the requirement to register under this title.
          (2) The criminal history of the sex offender.
          (3) Any other information required by the Attorney General.

SEC. 115. DURATION OF REGISTRATION REQUIREMENT.

  A sex offender shall keep the registration current--
          (1) for the life of the sex offender, if the offense is a 
        specified offense against a minor, a serious sex offense, or a 
        second misdemeanor sex offense against a minor; and
          (2) for a period of 20 years, in any other case.

SEC. 116. IN PERSON VERIFICATION.

  A sex offender shall appear in person and verify the information in 
each registry in which that offender is required to be registered not 
less frequently than once every six months.

SEC. 117. DUTY TO NOTIFY SEX OFFENDERS OF REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS AND 
                    TO REGISTER.

  An appropriate official shall, shortly before release from custody of 
the sex offender, or, if the sex offender is not in custody, 
immediately after the sentencing of the sex offender, for the offense 
giving rise to the duty to register--
          (1) inform the sex offender of the duty to register and 
        explain that duty;
          (2) require the sex offender to read and sign a form stating 
        that the duty to register has been explained and that the sex 
        offender understands the registration requirement; and
          (3) ensure that the sex offender is registered.

SEC. 118. JESSICA LUNSFORD ADDRESS VERIFICATION PROGRAM.

  (a) Establishment.--There is established the Jessica Lunsford Address 
Verification Program (hereinafter in this section referred to as the 
``Program'').
  (b) Verification.--In the Program, an appropriate official shall 
verify the residence of each registered sex offender not less than 
monthly or, in the case of a sex offender required to register because 
of a misdemeanor sex offense against a minor, not less than quarterly.
  (c) Use of Mailed Form Authorized.--Such verification may be achieved 
by mailing a nonforwardable verification form to the last known address 
of the sex offender. The date of the mailing may be selected at random. 
The sex offender must return the form, including a notarized signature, 
within a set period of time. A failure to return the form as required 
may be a failure to register for the purposes of this title.

SEC. 119. NATIONAL SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY.

  The Attorney General shall maintain a national database at the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation for each sex offender and other person 
required to register in a jurisdiction's sex offender registry. The 
database shall be known as the National Sex Offender Registry.

SEC. 120. DRU SJODIN NATIONAL SEX OFFENDER PUBLIC WEBSITE.

  (a) Establishment.--There is established the Dru Sjodin National Sex 
Offender Public Website (hereinafter referred to as the ``Website'').
  (b) Information to Be Provided.--The Attorney General shall maintain 
the Website as a site on the Internet which allows the public to obtain 
relevant information for each sex offender by a single query in a form 
established by the Attorney General.
  (c) Electronic Forwarding.--The Attorney General shall ensure 
(through the National Sex Offender Registry or otherwise) that updated 
information about a sex offender is immediately transmitted by 
electronic forwarding to all relevant jurisdictions, unless the 
Attroney General determines that each jurisdiction has so modified its 
sex offender registry and notification program that there is no longer 
a need for the Attorney General to do.

SEC. 121. PUBLIC ACCESS TO SEX OFFENDER INFORMATION THROUGH THE 
                    INTERNET.

  Each jurisdiction shall make available on the Internet all 
information about each sex offender in the registry, except for the 
offender's Social Security number, the identity of any victim, and any 
other information exempted from disclosure by the Attorney General. The 
jurisdiction shall provide this information in a manner that is readily 
accessible to the public.

SEC. 122. MEGAN NICOLE KANKA AND ALEXANDRA NICOLE ZAPP COMMUNITY 
                    NOTIFICATION PROGRAM.

  (a) Establishment of Program.--There is established the Megan Nicole 
Kanka and Alexandra Nicole Zapp Community Program (hereinafter in this 
section referred to as the ``Program'').
  (b) Notification.--In the Program, as soon as possible, and in any 
case not later than 5 days after a sex offender registers or updates a 
registration, an appropriate official in the jurisdiction shall provide 
the information in the registry (other than information exempted from 
disclosure by the Attorney General) about that offender to the 
following:
          (1) The Attorney General, who shall include that information 
        in the National Sex Offender Registry.
          (2) Appropriate law enforcement agencies (including probation 
        agencies, if appropriate), and each school and public housing 
        agency, in each area in which the individual resides, is 
        employed, or is a student.
          (3) Each jurisdiction from or to which a change of residence, 
        work, or student status occurs.
          (4) Any agency responsible for conducting employment-related 
        background checks under section 3 of the National Child 
        Protection Act of 1993 (42 U.S.C. 5119a).
          (5) Social service entities responsible for protecting minors 
        in the child welfare system.
          (6) Volunteer organizations in which contact with minors or 
        other vulnerable individuals might occur.

SEC. 123. ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN WHEN SEX OFFENDER FAILS TO COMPLY.

  An appropriate official shall notify the Attorney General and 
appropriate State and local law enforcement agencies of any failure by 
a sex offender to comply with the requirements of a registry. The 
appropriate official, the Attorney General, and each such State and 
local law enforcment agency shall take any appropriate action to ensure 
compliance.

SEC. 124. IMMUNITY FOR GOOD FAITH CONDUCT.

  Law enforcement agencies, employees of law enforcement agencies and 
independent contractors acting at the direction of such agencies, and 
officials of jurisdictions and other political subdivisions shall not 
be civilly or criminally liable for good faith conduct under this 
title.

SEC. 125. DEVELOPMENT AND AVAILABILITY OF REGISTRY MANAGEMENT SOFTWARE.

   The Attorney General shall develop and support software for use to 
establish, maintain, publish, and share sex offender registries.

SEC. 126. FEDERAL DUTY WHEN STATE PROGRAMS NOT MINIMALLY SUFFICIENT.

  If the Attorney General determines that a jurisdiction does not have 
a minimally sufficient sex offender registration program, the 
Department of Justice shall, to the extent practicable, carry out the 
duties imposed on that jurisdiction by this title.

SEC. 127. PERIOD FOR IMPLEMENTATION BY JURISDICTIONS.

  Each jurisdiction shall implement this title not later than 2 years 
after the date of the enactment of this Act. However, the Attorney 
General may authorize a one-year extension of the deadline.

SEC. 128. FAILURE TO COMPLY.

  (a) In General.--For any fiscal year after the end of the period for 
implementation, a jurisdiction that fails to implement this title shall 
not receive 10 percent of the funds that would otherwise be allocated 
for that fiscal year to the jurisdiction under each of the following 
programs:
          (1) Byrne.--Subpart 1 of part E of title I of the Omnibus 
        Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. 3750 et 
        seq.), whether characterized as the Edward Byrne Memorial State 
        and Local Law Enforcement Assistance Programs, the Edward Byrne 
        Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Program, or otherwise.
          (2) LLEBG.--The Local Government Law Enforcement Block Grants 
        program.
  (b) Reallocation.--Amounts not allocated under a program referred to 
in paragraph (1) to a jurisdiction for failure to fully implement this 
title shall be reallocated under that program to jurisdictions that 
have not failed to implement this title.

SEC. 129. SEX OFFENDER MANAGEMENT ASSISTANCE (SOMA) PROGRAM.

  (a) In General.--The Attorney General shall establish and implement a 
Sex Offender Management Assistance program (in this title referred to 
as the ``SOMA program'') under which the Attorney General may award a 
grant to a jurisdiction to offset the costs of implementing this title.
  (b) Application.--The chief executive of a jurisdiction shall, on an 
annual basis, submit to the Attorney General an application in such 
form and containing such information as the Attorney General may 
require.
  (c) Bonus Payments for Prompt Compliance.--A jurisdiction that, as 
determined by the Attorney General, has implemented this title not 
later than two years after the date of the enactment of this Act is 
eligible for a bonus payment. Such payment shall be made under the SOMA 
program for the first fiscal year beginning after that determination. 
The amount of the payment shall be--
          (1) 10 percent of the total received by the jurisdiction 
        under the SOMA program for the preceding fiscal year, if 
        implementation is not later than one year after the date of 
        enactment of this Act; and
          (2) 5 percent of such total, if not later than two years 
        after that date.
  (d) Authorization of Appropriations.--In addition to any amounts 
otherwise authorized to be appropriated, there are authorized to be 
appropriated such sums as may be necessary to the Attorney General, to 
be available only for the SOMA program, for fiscal years 2006 through 
2008.

SEC. 130. DEMONSTRATION PROJECT FOR USE OF ELECTRONIC MONITORING 
                    DEVICES.

  (a) Project Required.--The Attorney General shall carry out a 
demonstration project under which the Attorney General makes grants to 
jurisdictions to demonstrate the extent to which electronic monitoring 
devices can be used effectively in a sex offender management program.
  (b) Use of Funds.--The jurisdiction may use grant amounts under this 
section directly, or through arrangements with public or private 
entities, to carry out programs under which the whereabouts of sex 
offenders are monitored by electronic monitoring devices.
  (c) Participants.--Not more than 10 jurisdictions may participate in 
the demonstration project at any one time.
  (d) Factors.--In selecting jurisdictions to participate in the 
demonstration project, the Attorney General shall consider the 
following factors:
          (1) The total number of sex offenders in the jurisdiction.
          (2) The percentage of those sex offenders who fail to comply 
        with registration requirements.
          (3) The threat to public safety posed by those sex offenders 
        who fail to comply with registration requirements.
          (4) Any other factor the Attorney General considers 
        appropriate.
  (e) Duration.--The Attorney General shall carry out the demonstration 
project for fiscal years 2007, 2008, and 2009.
  (f) Reports.--The Attorney General shall submit to Congress an annual 
report on the demonstration project. Each such report shall describe 
the activities carried out by each participant, assess the 
effectiveness of those activities, and contain any other information or 
recommendations that the Attorney General considers appropriate.
  (g) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be 
appropriated to carry out this section such sums as may be necessary.

SEC. 131. BONUS PAYMENTS TO STATES THAT IMPLEMENT ELECTRONIC 
                    MONITORING.

  (a) In General.--A State that, within 3 years after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, has in effect laws and policies described in 
subsection (b) shall be eligible for a bonus payment described in 
subsection (c), to be paid by the Attorney General from any amounts 
available to the Attorney General for such purpose.
  (b) Electronic Monitoring Laws and Policies.--
          (1) In general.--Laws and policies referred to in subsection 
        (a) are laws and policies that ensure that electronic 
        monitoring is required of a person if that person is released 
        after being convicted of a State sex offense in which an 
        individual who has not attained the age of 18 years is the 
        victim.
          (2) Monitoring required.--The monitoring required under 
        paragraph (1) is a system that actively monitors and identifies 
        the person's location and timely reports or records the 
        person's presence near or within a crime scene or in a 
        prohibited area or the person's departure from specified 
        geographic limitations.
          (3) Duration.--The electronic monitoring required by 
        paragraph (1) shall be required of the person--
                  (A) for the life of the person, if--
                          (i) an individual who has not attained the 
                        age of 12 years is the victim; or
                          (ii) the person has a prior sex conviction 
                        (as defined in section 3559(e) of title 18, 
                        United States Code); and
                  (B) for the period during which the person is on 
                probation, parole, or supervised release for the 
                offense, in any other case.
          (4) State required to monitor all sex offenders residing in 
        state.--In addition, laws and policies referred to in 
        subsection (a) also includee laws and policies that ensure that 
        the State frequently monitors each person residing in the State 
        for whom electronic monitoring is required, whether such 
        monitoring is required under this section or under section 
        3563(a)(9) of title 18, United States Code.
  (c) Bonus Payments.--The bonus payment referred to in subsection (a) 
is a payment equal to 10 percent of the funds that would otherwise be 
allocated for that fiscal year to the jurisdiction under each of the 
following programs:
          (1) Byrne.--Subpart 1 of part E of title I of the Omnibus 
        Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. 3750 et 
        seq.), whether characterized as the Edward Byrne Memorial State 
        and Local Law Enforcement Assistance Programs, the Edward Byrne 
        Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Program, or otherwise.
          (2) LLEBG.--The Local Government Law Enforcement Block Grants 
        program.
  (d) Definition.--In this section, the term ``State sex offense'' 
means any criminal offense in a range of offenses specified by State 
law which is comparable to or which exceeds the range of offenses 
encompassed by the following:
          (1) A specified offense against a minor.
          (2) A serious sex offense.

SEC. 132. NATIONAL CENTER FOR MISSING AND EXPLOITED CHILDREN ACCESS TO 
                    INTERSTATE IDENTIFICATION INDEX.

  (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the 
Attorney General shall ensure that the National Center for Missing and 
Exploited Children has access to the Interstate Identification Index, 
to be used by the Center only within the scope of its duties and 
responsibilities under Federal law. The access provided under this 
section shall be authorized only to personnel of the Center that have 
met all the requirements for access, including training, certification, 
and background screening.
  (b) Immunity.--Personnel of the Center shall not be civilly or 
criminally liable for any use or misuse of information in the 
Interstate Identification Index if in good faith.

SEC. 133. LIMITED IMMUNITY FOR NATIONAL CENTER FOR MISSING AND 
                    EXPLOITED CHILDREN WITH RESPECT TO CYBERTIPLINE.

  Section 227 of the Victims of Child Abuse Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 
13032) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
  ``(g) Limitation on Liability.--
          ``(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and 
        (3), the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, 
        including any of its directors, officers, employees, or agents, 
        is not liable in any civil or criminal action for damages 
        directly related to the performance of its CyberTipline 
        responsibilities and functions as defined by this section.
          ``(2) Intentional, reckless, or other misconduct.--Paragraph 
        (1) does not apply in an action in which a party proves that 
        the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, or its 
        officer, employee, or agent as the case may be, engaged in 
        intentional misconduct or acted, or failed to act, with actual 
        malice, with reckless disregard to a substantial risk of 
        causing injury without legal justification, or for a purpose 
        unrelated to the performance of responsibilities or functions 
        under this section.
          ``(3) Ordinary business activities.--Paragraph (1) does not 
        apply to an act or omission related to an ordinary business 
        activity, such as an activity involving general administration 
        or operations, the use of motor vehicles, or personnel 
        management.''.

   Subtitle B--Criminal Law Enforcement of Registration Requirements

SEC. 151. AMENDMENTS TO TITLE 18, UNITED STATES CODE, RELATING TO SEX 
                    OFFENDER REGISTRATION.

  (a) Criminal Penalties for Nonregistration.--Part I of title 18, 
United States Code, is amended by inserting after chapter 109A the 
following:

   ``CHAPTER 109B--SEX OFFENDER AND CRIMES AGAINST CHILDREN REGISTRY

``Sec.
``2250. Failure to register.

``Sec. 2250. Failure to register

  ``Whoever receives a notice from an official that such person is 
required to register under the Sex Offender Registration and 
Notification Act and--
          ``(1) is a sex offender as defined for the purposes of that 
        Act by reason of a conviction under Federal law; or
          ``(2) thereafter travels in interstate or foreign commerce, 
        or enters or leaves Indian country;
and knowingly fails to register as required shall be fined under this 
title and imprisoned not less than 5 years nor more than 20 years.''.
  (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of chapters for part I of title 
18, United States Code, is amended by inserting after the item relating 
to chapter 109A the following new item:

``109B. Sex offender and crimes against children registry...    2250''.
  (c) False Statement Offense.--Section 1001(a) of title 18, United 
States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: ``If the 
matter relates to an offense under chapter 109A, 109B, 110, or 117, 
then the term of imprisonment imposed under this section shall be not 
less than 5 years nor more than 20 years.''
  (d) Probation.--Paragraph (8) of section 3563(a) of title 18, United 
States Code, is amended to read as follows:
          ``(8) for a person required to register under the Sex 
        Offender Registration and Notification Act, that the person 
        comply with the requirements of that Act; and''.
  (e) Supervised Release.--Section 3583 of title 18, United States 
Code, is amended--
          (1) in subsection (d), in the sentence beginning with ``The 
        court shall order, as an explicit condition of supervised 
        release for a person described in section 4042(c)(4)'', by 
        striking ``described in section 4042(c)(4)'' and all that 
        follows through the end of the sentence and inserting 
        ``required to register under the Sex Offender Registration and 
        Notification Act that the person comply with the requirements 
        of that Act.''
          (2) in subsection (k)--
                  (A) by striking ``2244(a)(1), 2244(a)(2)'' and 
                inserting ``2243, 2244, 2245, 2250'';
                  (B) by inserting ``not less than 5,'' after ``any 
                term of years''; and
                  (C) by adding at the end the following: ``If a 
                defendant required to register under the Sex Offender 
                Registration and Notification Act violates the 
                requirements of that Act or commits any criminal 
                offense for which imprisonment for a term longer than 
                one year can be imposed, the court shall revoke the 
                term of supervised release and require the defendant to 
                serve a term of imprisonment under subsection (e)(3) 
                without regard to the exception contained therein. Such 
                term shall be not less than 5 years, and if the offense 
                was an offense under chapter 109A, 109B, 110, or 117, 
                not less than 10 years.'' .
  (f) Duties of Bureau of Prisons.--Paragraph (3) of section 4042(c) of 
title 18, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:
  ``(3) The Director of the Bureau of Prisons shall inform a person who 
is released from prison and required to register under the Sex Offender 
Registration and Notification Act of the requirements of that Act as 
they apply to that person and the same information shall be provided to 
a person sentenced to probation by the probation officer responsible 
for supervision of that person.''.
  (g) Conforming Amendment of Cross Reference.--Paragraph (1) of 
section 4042(c) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by striking 
``(4)'' and inserting ``(3)''.
  (h) Conforming Repeal of Deadwood.--Paragraph (4) of section 4042(c) 
of title 18, United States Code, is repealed.

SEC. 152. INVESTIGATION BY UNITED STATES MARSHALS OF SEX OFFENDER 
                    VIOLATIONS OF REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS.

  (a) In General.--The Attorney General shall use the authority 
provided in section 566(e)(1)(B) of title 28, United States Code, to 
assist States and other jurisdictions in locating and apprehending sex 
offenders who violate sex offender registration requirements.
  (b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be 
appropriated such sums as may be necessary for fiscal years 2006 
through 2008 to implement this section.

SEC. 153. SEX OFFENDER APPREHENSION GRANTS.

  Title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 is 
amended by adding at the end the following new part:

              ``PART JJ--SEX OFFENDER APPREHENSION GRANTS

``SEC. 3011. AUTHORITY TO MAKE SEX OFFENDER APPREHENSION GRANTS.

  ``(a) In General.--From amounts made available to carry out this 
part, the Attorney General may make grants to States, units of local 
government, Indian tribal governments, other public and private 
entities, and multi-jurisdictional or regional consortia thereof for 
activities specified in subsection (b).
  ``(b) Covered Activities.--An activity referred to in subsection (a) 
is any program, project, or other activity to assist a State in 
enforcing sex offender registration requirements.

``SEC. 3012. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

  ``There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be 
necessary for fiscal years 2006 through 2008 to carry out this part.''.

SEC. 154. USE OF ANY CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE TO FACILITATE SEX OFFENSE.

  (a) Increased Punishment.--Chapter 109A of title 18, United States 
Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

``Sec. 2249. Use of any controlled substance to facilitate sex offense

  ``(a) Whoever, knowingly uses a controlled substance to substantially 
impair the ability of a person to appraise or control conduct, in order 
to commit a sex offense, other than an offense where such use is an 
element of the offense, shall, in addition to the punishment provided 
for the sex offense, be imprisoned for any term of years not less than 
10, or for life.
  ``(b) As used in this section, the term `sex offense' means an 
offense under this chapter other than an offense under this section.''.
  (b) Amendment to Table.--The table of sections at the beginning of 
chapter 109A of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at 
the end the following new item:

``2249. Use of any controlled substance to facilitate sex offense.''.

SEC. 155. REPEAL OF PREDECESSOR SEX OFFENDER PROGRAM.

  Sections 170101 (42 U.S.C. 14071) and 170102 (42 U.S.C. 14072) of the 
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, and section 8 of 
the Pam Lychner Sexual Offender Tracking and Identification Act of 1996 
(42 U.S.C. 14073), are repealed.

                      TITLE II--DNA FINGERPRINTING

SEC. 201. SHORT TITLE.

  This title may be cited as the ``DNA Fingerprinting Act of 2005''.

SEC. 202. EXPANDING USE OF DNA TO IDENTIFY AND PROSECUTE SEX OFFENDERS.

  (a) Expansion of National DNA Index System.--Section 210304 of the 
DNA Identification Act of 1994 (42 U.S.C. 14132) is amended--
          (1) in subsection (a)(1)(C), by striking ``, provided'' and 
        all that follows through ``System''; and
          (2) by striking subsections (d) and (e).
  (b) DNA Sample Collection From Persons Arrested or Detained Under 
Federal Authority.--
          (1) In general.--Section 3 of the DNA Analysis Backlog 
        Elimination Act of 2000 (42 U.S.C. 14135a) is amended
                  (A) in subsection (a)--
                          (i) in paragraph (1), by striking ``The 
                        Director'' and inserting the following:
                  ``(A) The Attorney General may, as provided by the 
                Attorney General by regulation, collect DNA samples 
                from individuals who are arrested, detained, or 
                convicted under the authority of the United States. The 
                Attorney General may delegate this function within the 
                Department of Justice as provided in section 510 of 
                title 28, United States Code, and may also authorize 
                and direct any other agency of the United States that 
                arrests or detains individuals or supervises 
                individuals facing charges to carry out any function 
                and exercise any power of the Attorney General under 
                this section.
                  ``(B) The Director''; and
                          (ii) in paragraphs (3) and (4), by striking 
                        ``Director of the Bureau of Prisons'' each 
                        place it appears and inserting ``Attorney 
                        General, the Director of the Bureau of 
                        Prisons,''; and
                  (B) in subsection (b), by striking ``Director of the 
                Bureau of Prisons'' and inserting ``Attorney General, 
                the Director of the Bureau of Prisons,''.
          (2) Conforming amendment.--Subsections (b) and (c)(1)(A) of 
        section 3142 of title 18, United States Code, are each amended 
        by inserting ``and subject to the condition that the person 
        cooperate in the collection of a DNA sample from the person if 
        the collection of such a sample is authorized pursuant to 
        section 3 of the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000 
        (42 U.S.C. 14135a)'' after ``period of release''.
  (c) Tolling of Statute of Limitations in Sexual Abuse Cases.--Section 
3297 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by striking ``except 
for a felony offense under chapter 109A,''.

SEC. 203. STOPPING VIOLENT PREDATORS AGAINST CHILDREN.

  In carrying out Acts of Congress relating to DNA databases, the 
Attorney General shall give appropriate consideration to the need for 
the collection and testing of DNA to stop violent predators against 
children.

SEC. 204. MODEL CODE ON INVESTIGATING MISSING PERSONS AND DEATHS.

  (a) Model Code Required.--Not later than 60 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Attorney General shall publish a model 
code setting forth procedures to be followed by law enforcement 
officers when investigating a missing person or a death. The procedures 
shall include the use of DNA analysis to help locate missing persons 
and to help identify human remains.
  (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that each State 
should, not later than 1 year after the date on which the Attorney 
General publishes the model code, enact laws implementing the model 
code.
  (c) GAO Study.--Not later than 2 years after the date on which the 
Attorney General publishes the model code, the Comptroller General 
shall submit to Congress a report on the extent to which States have 
implemented the model code. The report shall, for each State--
          (1) describe the extent to which the State has implemented 
        the model code; and
          (2) to the extent the State has not implemented the model 
        code, describe the reasons why the State has not done so.

TITLE III--PREVENTION AND DETERRENCE OF CRIMES AGAINST CHILDREN ACT OF 
                                  2005

SEC. 301. SHORT TITLE.

  This title may be cited as the ``Prevention and Deterrence of Crimes 
Against Children Act of 2005''.

SEC. 302. ASSURED PUNISHMENT FOR VIOLENT CRIMES AGAINST CHILDREN.

  (a) Special Sentencing Rule.--Subsection (d) of section 3559 of title 
18, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:
  ``(d) Mandatory Minimum Terms of Imprisonment for Violent Crimes 
Against Children.--A person who is convicted of a felony crime of 
violence against the person of an individual who has not attained the 
age of 18 years shall, unless a greater mandatory minimum sentence of 
imprisonment is otherwise provided by law and regardless of any maximum 
term of imprisonment otherwise provided for the offense--
          ``(1) if the crime of violence results in the death of a 
        person who has not attained the age of 18 years, be sentenced 
        to death or life in prison;
          ``(2) if the crime of violence is kidnapping, aggravated 
        sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or maiming, or results in serious 
        bodily injury (as defined in section 2119(2)) be imprisoned for 
        life or any term of years not less than 30;
          ``(3) if the crime of violence results in bodily injury (as 
        defined in section 1365) or is an offense under paragraphs (1), 
        (2), or (5) of section 2244(a), be imprisoned for life or for 
        any term of years not less than 20;
          ``(4) if a dangerous weapon was used during and in relation 
        to the crime of violence, be imprisoned for life or for any 
        term of years not less than 15; and
          ``(5) in any other case, be imprisoned for life or for any 
        term of years not less than 10.''.

SEC. 303. ENSURING FAIR AND EXPEDITIOUS FEDERAL COLLATERAL REVIEW OF 
                    CONVICTIONS FOR KILLING A CHILD.

  (a) Limits on Cases.--Section 2254 of title 28, United States Code, 
is amended by adding at the end the following:
  ``(j)(1) A court, justice, or judge shall not have jurisdiction to 
consider any claim relating to the judgment or sentence in an 
application described under paragraph (2), unless the applicant shows 
that the claim qualifies for consideration on the grounds described in 
subsection (e)(2). Any such application that is presented to a court, 
justice, or judge other than a district court shall be transferred to 
the appropriate district court for consideration or dismissal in 
conformity with this subsection, except that a court of appeals panel 
must authorize any second or successive application in conformity with 
section 2244 before any consideration by the district court.
  ``(2) This subsection applies to an application for a writ of habeas 
corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a 
State court for a crime that involved the killing of a individual who 
has not attained the age of 18 years.
  ``(3) For an application described in paragraph (2), the following 
requirements shall apply in the district court:
          ``(A) Any motion by either party for an evidentiary hearing 
        shall be filed and served not later than 90 days after the 
        State files its answer or, if no timely answer is filed, the 
        date on which such answer is due.
          ``(B) Any motion for an evidentiary hearing shall be granted 
        or denied not later than 30 days after the date on which the 
        party opposing such motion files a pleading in opposition to 
        such motion or, if no timely pleading in opposition is filed, 
        the date on which such pleading in opposition is due.
          ``(C) Any evidentiary hearing shall be--
                  ``(i) convened not less than 60 days after the order 
                granting such hearing; and
                  ``(ii) completed not more than 150 days after the 
                order granting such hearing.
          ``(D) A district court shall enter a final order, granting or 
        denying the application for a writ of habeas corpus, not later 
        than 15 months after the date on which the State files its 
        answer or, if no timely answer is filed, the date on which such 
        answer is due, or not later than 60 days after the case is 
        submitted for decision, whichever is earlier.
          ``(E) If the district court fails to comply with the 
        requirements of this paragraph, the State may petition the 
        court of appeals for a writ of mandamus to enforce the 
        requirements. The court of appeals shall grant or deny the 
        petition for a writ of mandamus not later than 30 days after 
        such petition is filed with the court.
  ``(4) For an application described in paragraph (2), the following 
requirements shall apply in the court of appeals:
          ``(A) A timely filed notice of appeal from an order issuing a 
        writ of habeas corpus shall operate as a stay of that order 
        pending final disposition of the appeal.
          ``(B) The court of appeals shall decide the appeal from an 
        order granting or denying a writ of habeas corpus--
                  ``(i) not later than 120 days after the date on which 
                the brief of the appellee is filed or, if no timely 
                brief is filed, the date on which such brief is due; or
                  ``(ii) if a cross-appeal is filed, not later than 120 
                days after the date on which the appellant files a 
                brief in response to the issues presented by the cross-
                appeal or, if no timely brief is filed, the date on 
                which such brief is due.
          ``(C)(i) Following a decision by a panel of the court of 
        appeals under subparagraph (B), a petition for panel rehearing 
        is not allowed, but rehearing by the court of appeals en banc 
        may be requested. The court of appeals shall decide whether to 
        grant a petition for rehearing en banc not later than 30 days 
        after the date on which the petition is filed, unless a 
        response is required, in which case the court shall decide 
        whether to grant the petition not later than 30 days after the 
        date on which the response is filed or, if no timely response 
        is filed, the date on which the response is due.
          ``(ii) If rehearing en banc is granted, the court of appeals 
        shall make a final determination of the appeal not later than 
        120 days after the date on which the order granting rehearing 
        en banc is entered.
          ``(D) If the court of appeals fails to comply with the 
        requirements of this paragraph, the State may petition the 
        Supreme Court or a justice thereof for a writ of mandamus to 
        enforce the requirements.
  ``(5)(A) The time limitations under paragraphs (3) and (4) shall 
apply to an initial application described in paragraph (2), any second 
or successive application described in paragraph (2), and any 
redetermination of an application described in paragraph (2) or related 
appeal following a remand by the court of appeals or the Supreme Court 
for further proceedings.
  ``(B) In proceedings following remand in the district court, time 
limits running from the time the State files its answer under paragraph 
(3) shall run from the date the remand is ordered if further briefing 
is not required in the district court. If there is further briefing 
following remand in the district court, such time limits shall run from 
the date on which a responsive brief is filed or, if no timely 
responsive brief is filed, the date on which such brief is due.
  ``(C) In proceedings following remand in the court of appeals, the 
time limit specified in paragraph (4)(B) shall run from the date the 
remand is ordered if further briefing is not required in the court of 
appeals. If there is further briefing in the court of appeals, the time 
limit specified in paragraph (4)(B) shall run from the date on which a 
responsive brief is filed or, if no timely responsive brief is filed, 
from the date on which such brief is due.
  ``(6) The failure of a court to meet or comply with a time limitation 
under this subsection shall not be a ground for granting relief from a 
judgment of conviction or sentence, nor shall the time limitations 
under this subsection be construed to entitle a capital applicant to a 
stay of execution, to which the applicant would otherwise not be 
entitled, for the purpose of litigating any application or appeal.''.
  (b) Victims' Rights in Habeas Cases.--Section 3771(b) of title 18, 
United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: 
``The rights established for crime victims by this section shall also 
be extended in a Federal habeas corpus proceeding arising out of a 
State conviction to victims of the State offense at issue.''.
  (c) Application to Pending Cases.--
          (1) In general.--The amendment made by this section apply to 
        cases pending on the date of the enactment of this Act as well 
        as to cases commenced on and after that date.
          (2) Special rule for time limits.--In a case pending on the 
        date of the enactment of this Act, if the amendment made by 
        subsection (a) provides that a time limit runs from an event or 
        time that has occurred before that date, the time limit shall 
        instead run from that date.

  TITLE IV--PROTECTION AGAINST SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN ACT OF 
                                  2005

SEC. 401. SHORT TITLE.

  This title may be cited as the ``Protection Against Sexual 
Exploitation of Children Act of 2005''.

SEC. 402. INCREASED PENALTIES FOR SEXUAL OFFENSES AGAINST CHILDREN.

  (a) Sexual Abuse and Contact.--
          (1) Aggravated sexual abuse of children.--Section 2241(c) of 
        title 18, United States Code, is amended by striking ``, 
        imprisoned for any term of years or life, or both.'' and 
        inserting ``and imprisoned for not less than 30 years or for 
        life.''.
          (2) Abusive sexual contact with children.--Section 2244 of 
        chapter 109A of title 18, United States Code, is amended--
                  (A) in subsection (a)--
                          (i) in paragraph (1), by inserting 
                        ``subsection (a) or (b) of'' before ``section 
                        2241'';
                          (ii) by striking ``or'' at the end of 
                        paragraph (3);
                          (iii) by striking the period at the end of 
                        paragraph (4) and inserting ``; or''; and
                          (iv) by inserting after paragraph (4) the 
                        following:
          ``(5) subsection (c) of section 2241 of this title had the 
        sexual contact been a sexual act, shall be fined under this 
        title and imprisoned for not less than 10 years and not more 
        than 25 years.''; and
                  (B) in subsection (c), by inserting ``(other than 
                subsection (a)(5))'' after ``violates this section''.
          (3) Sexual abuse of children resulting in death.--Section 
        2245 of title 18, United States Code, is amended--
                  (A) by inserting ``, chapter 110, chapter 117, or 
                section 1591'' after ``this chapter'';
                  (B) by striking ``A person'' and inserting ``(a) In 
                General.--A person''; and
                  (C) by adding at the end the following:
  ``(b) Offenses Involving Young Children.--A person who, in the course 
of an offense under this chapter, chapter 110, chapter 117, or section 
1591 engages in conduct that results in the death of a person who has 
not attained the age of 12 years, shall be punished by death or 
imprisoned for not less than 30 years or for life.''.
          (4) Death penalty aggravating factor.--Section 3592(c)(1) of 
        title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting ``section 
        2245 (sexual abuse resulting in death),'' after ``(wrecking 
        trains),''.
  (b) Sexual Exploitation and Other Abuse of Children.--
          (1) Sexual exploitation of children.--Section 2251(e) of 
        title 18, United States Code, is amended--
                  (A) by striking ``15 years nor more than 30 years'' 
                and inserting ``25 years or for life'';
                  (B) by inserting ``section 1591,'' after ``this 
                chapter,'' the first place it appears;
                  (C) by striking ``the sexual exploitation of 
                children'' the first place it appears and inserting 
                ``aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, abusive sexual 
                contact involving a minor or ward, or sex trafficking 
                of children, or the production, possession, receipt, 
                mailing, sale, distribution, shipment, or 
                transportation of child pornography'';
                  (D) by striking ``not less than 25 years nor more 
                than 50 years, but if such person has 2 or more prior 
                convictions under this chapter, chapter 71, chapter 
                109A, or chapter 117, or under section 920 of title 10 
                (article 120 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice), 
                or under the laws of any State relating to the sexual 
                exploitation of children, such person shall be fined 
                under this title and imprisoned not less than 35 years 
                nor more than life.'' and inserting ``life.''; and
                  (E) by striking ``any term of years or for life'' and 
                inserting ``not less than 30 years or for life''.
          (2) Activities relating to material involving the sexual 
        exploitation of children.--Section 2252(b) of title 18, United 
        States Code, is amended--
                  (A) in paragraph (1)--
                          (i) by striking ``paragraphs (1)'' and 
                        inserting ``paragraph (1)'';
                          (ii) by inserting ``section 1591,'' after 
                        ``this chapter,'';
                          (iii) by inserting ``, or sex trafficking of 
                        children'' after ``pornography'';
                          (iv) by striking ``5 years and not more than 
                        20 years'' and inserting ``25 years or for 
                        life''; and
                          (v) by striking ``not less than 15 years nor 
                        more than 40 years.'' and inserting ``life.''; 
                        and
                  (B) in paragraph (2)--
                          (i) by striking ``or imprisoned not more than 
                        10 years'' and inserting ``and imprisoned for 
                        not less than 10 nor more than 30 years'';
                          (ii) by striking ``, or both''; and
                          (iii) by striking ``10 years nor more than 20 
                        years.'' and inserting ``30 years or for 
                        life.''.
          (3) Activities relating to material constituting or 
        containing child pornography.--Section 2252A(b) of title 18, 
        United States Code, is amended--
                  (A) in paragraph (1)--
                          (i) by inserting ``section 1591,'' after 
                        ``this chapter,'';
                          (ii) by inserting ``, or sex trafficking of 
                        children'' after ``pornography'';
                          (iii) by striking ``5 years and not more than 
                        20 years'' and inserting ``25 years or for 
                        life''; and
                          (iv) by striking ``not less than 15 years nor 
                        more than 40 years'' and inserting ``life''; 
                        and
                  (B) in paragraph (2)--
                          (i) by striking ``or imprisoned not more than 
                        10 years, or both'' and inserting ``and 
                        imprisoned for not less than 10 nor more than 
                        30 years''; and
                          (ii) by striking ``10 years nor more than 20 
                        years'' and inserting ``30 years or for life''.
          (4) Using misleading domain names to direct children to 
        harmful material on the internet.--Section 2252B(b) of title 
        18, United States Code, is amended by striking ``or imprisoned 
        not more than 4 years, or both'' and inserting `` and 
        imprisoned not less than 10 nor more than 30 years''.
          (5) Production of sexually explicit depictions of children.--
        Section 2260(c) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by 
        striking paragraphs (1) and (2) and inserting the following:
          ``(1) shall be fined under this title and imprisoned for any 
        term or years not less than 25 or for life; and
          ``(2) if the person has a prior conviction under this 
        chapter, section 1591, chapter 71, chapter 109A, or chapter 
        117, or under section 920 of title 10 (article 120 of the 
        Uniform Code of Military Justice), shall be fined under this 
        title and imprisoned for life.''.
  (c) Mandatory Life Imprisonment for Certain Repeated Sex Offenses 
Against Children.--Section 3559(e)(2)(A) of title 18, United States 
Code, is amended--
          (1) by striking ``or 2423(a)'' and inserting ``2423(a)''; and
          (2) by inserting ``, 2423(b) (relating to travel with intent 
        to engage in illicit sexual conduct), 2423(c) (relating to 
        illicit sexual conduct in foreign places), or 2425 (relating to 
        use of interstate facilities to transmit information about a 
        minor)'' after ``minors)''.

 TITLE V--FOSTER CHILD PROTECTION AND CHILD SEXUAL PREDATOR DETERRENCE

SEC. 501. SHORT TITLE.

  This title may be cited as the ``Foster Child Protection and Child 
Sexual Predator Sentencing Act of 2005''.

SEC. 502. REQUIREMENT TO COMPLETE BACKGROUND CHECKS BEFORE APPROVAL OF 
                    ANY FOSTER OR ADOPTIVE PLACEMENT AND TO CHECK 
                    NATIONAL CRIME INFORMATION DATABASES AND STATE 
                    CHILD ABUSE REGISTRIES; SUSPENSION AND SUBSEQUENT 
                    ELIMINATION OF OPT-OUT.

  (a) Requirement to Complete Background Checks Before Approval of Any 
Foster or Adoptive Placement and to Check National Crime Information 
Databases and State Child Abuse Registries; Suspension of Opt-out.--
          (1) Requirement to check national crime information databases 
        and state child abuse registries.--Section 471(a)(20) of the 
        Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 671(a)(20)) is amended--
                  (A) in subparagraph (A)--
                          (i) in the matter preceding clause (i)--
                                  (I) by inserting ``, including checks 
                                of national crime information databases 
                                (as defined in section 534(e)(3)(A) of 
                                title 28, United States Code),'' after 
                                ``criminal records checks''; and
                                  (II) by striking ``on whose behalf 
                                foster care maintenance payments or 
                                adoption assistance payments are to be 
                                made'' and inserting ``regardless of 
                                whether foster care maintenance 
                                payments or adoption assistance 
                                payments are to be made on behalf of 
                                the child''; and
                          (ii) in each of clauses (i) and (ii), by 
                        inserting ``involving a child on whose behalf 
                        such payments are to be so made'' after ``in 
                        any case''; and
                  (B) by adding at the end the following:
          ``(C) provides that the State shall--
                  ``(i) check any child abuse and neglect registry 
                maintained by the State for information on any 
                prospective foster or adoptive parent and on any other 
                adult living in the home of such a prospective parent, 
                and request any other State in which any such 
                prospective parent or other adult has resided in the 
                preceding 5 years, to enable the State to check any 
                child abuse and neglect registry maintained by such 
                other State for such information, before the 
                prospective foster or adoptive parent may be finally 
                approved for placement of a child, regardless of 
                whether foster care maintenance payments or adoption 
                assistance payments are to be made on behalf of the 
                child under the State plan under this part;
                  ``(ii) comply with any request described in clause 
                (i) that is received from another State; and
                  ``(iii) have in place safeguards to prevent the 
                unauthorized disclosure of information in any child 
                abuse and neglect registry maintained by the State, and 
                to prevent any such information obtained pursuant to 
                this subparagraph from being used for a purpose other 
                than the conducting of background checks in foster or 
                adoptive placement cases;''.
          (2) Suspension of opt-out.--Section 471(a)(20)(B) of such Act 
        (42 U.S.C. 671(a)(20)(B)) is amended--
                  (A) by inserting ``, on or before September 30, 
                2005,'' after ``plan if''; and
                  (B) by inserting ``, on or before such date,'' after 
                ``or if''.
  (b) Elimination of Opt-Out.--Section 471(a)(20) of such Act (42 
U.S.C. 671(a)(20)), as amended by subsection (a) of this section, is 
amended--
          (1) in subparagraph (A), in the matter preceding clause (i), 
        by striking ``unless an election provided for in subparagraph 
        (B) is made with respect to the State,''; and
          (2) by striking subparagraph (B) and redesignating 
        subparagraph (C) as subparagraph (B).
  (c) Effective Date.--
          (1) In general.--The amendments made by subsection (a) shall 
        take effect on October 1, 2005, and shall apply with respect to 
        payments under part E of title IV of the Social Security Act 
        for calendar quarters beginning on or after such date, without 
        regard to whether regulations to implement the amendments are 
        promulgated by such date.
          (2) Elimination of opt-out.--The amendments made by 
        subsection (b) shall take effect on October 1, 2007, and shall 
        apply with respect to payments under part E of title IV of the 
        Social Security Act for calendar quarters beginning on or after 
        such date, without regard to whether regulations to implement 
        the amendments are promulgated by such date.
          (3) Delay permitted if state legislation required.--If the 
        Secretary of Health and Human Services determines that State 
        legislation (other than legislation appropriating funds) is 
        required in order for a State plan under section 471 of the 
        Social Security Act to meet the additional requirements imposed 
        by the amendments made by a subsection of this section, the 
        plan shall not be regarded as failing to meet any of the 
        additional requirements before the first day of the first 
        calendar quarter beginning after the first regular session of 
        the State legislature that begins after the otherwise 
        applicable effective date of the amendments. If the State has a 
        2-year legislative session, each year of the session is deemed 
        to be a separate regular session of the State legislature.

SEC. 503. ACCESS TO FEDERAL CRIME INFORMATION DATABASES BY CHILD 
                    WELFARE AGENCIES FOR CERTAIN PURPOSES.

  (a) In General.--The Attorney General shall, upon request of the 
chief executive of a State, ensure that appropriate officers of child 
welfare agencies have the authority for ``read only'' online access to 
the databases of the national crime information databases (as defined 
in section 534 of title 28, United States Code) to carry out criminal 
history records checks, subject to subsection (b).
  (b) Limitation.--An officer may use the authority under subsection 
(a) only in furtherance of the purposes of the agency and only on an 
individual relevant to casework of the agency.
  (c) Protection of Information.--An individual having information 
derived as a result of a check under subsection (a) may release that 
information only to appropriate officers of child welfare agencies or 
another person authorized by law to receive that information.
  (d) Criminal Penalties.--An individual who knowingly exceeds the 
authority in subsection (a), or knowingly releases information in 
violation of subsection (c), shall be imprisoned not more than 10 years 
or fined under title 18, United States Code, or both.
  (e) Child Welfare Agency Defined.--In this section, the term ``child 
welfare agency'' means--
          (1) the State or local agency responsible for administering 
        the plan under part B or part E of title IV of the Social 
        Security Act; and
          (2) any other public agency, or any other private agency 
        under contract with the State or local agency responsible for 
        administering the plan under part B or part E of title IV of 
        the Social Security Act, that is responsible for the placement 
        of foster or adoptive children.

SEC. 504. PENALTIES FOR COERCION AND ENTICEMENT BY SEX OFFENDERS.

  Section 2422(a) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by 
striking ``or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both'' and 
inserting ``and imprisoned not less than 10 years nor more than 30 
years''.

SEC. 505. PENALTIES FOR CONDUCT RELATING TO CHILD PROSTITUTION.

  Section 2423 of title 18, United States Code, is amended--
          (1) in subsection (a), by striking ``5 years and not more 
        than 30 years'' and inserting ``30 years or for life'';
          (2) in subsection (b), by striking ``or imprisoned not more 
        than 30 years, or both'' and inserting ``and imprisoned for not 
        less than 10 years and not more than 30 years'';
          (3) in subsection (c), by striking ``or imprisoned not more 
        than 30 years, or both'' and inserting ``and imprisoned for not 
        less than 10 years and not more than 30 years''; and
          (4) in subsection (d), by striking ``imprisoned not more than 
        30 years, or both'' and inserting ``and imprisoned for not less 
        than 10 nor more than 30 years''.

SEC. 506. PENALTIES FOR SEXUAL ABUSE.

  (a) Aggravated Sexual Abuse.--Section 2241 of title 18, United States 
Code, is amended--
          (1) in subsection (a), by striking ``, imprisoned for any 
        term of years or life, or both'' and inserting ``and imprisoned 
        for any term of years not less than 30 or for life''; and
          (2) in subsection (b), by striking ``, imprisoned for any 
        term of years or life, or both'' and inserting ``and imprisoned 
        for any term of years not less than 25 or for life''.
  (b) Sexual Abuse.--Section 2242 of title 18, United States Code, is 
amended by striking ``, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both'' 
and inserting ``and imprisoned not less than 15 years nor more than 40 
years''.
  (c) Abusive Sexual Contact.--Section 2244(a) of title 18, United 
States Code, is amended--
          (1) in paragraph (2), by striking ``, imprisoned not more 
        than three years, or both'' and inserting ``and imprisoned not 
        less than 5 years nor more than 30 years'';
          (2) in paragraph (3), by striking ``, imprisoned not more 
        than two years, or both'' and inserting ``and imprisoned not 
        less than 4 years nor more than 20 years''; and
          (3) in paragraph (4), by striking ``, imprisoned not more 
        than six months, or both'' and inserting ``and imprisoned not 
        less than 2 years nor more than 10 years''.

SEC. 507. SEX OFFENDER SUBMISSION TO SEARCH AS CONDITION OF RELEASE.

  (a) Conditions of Probation.--Section 3563(a) of title 18, United 
States Code, is amended----
          (1) in paragraph (9), by striking the period and inserting 
        ``; and''; and
          (2) by inserting after paragraph (9) the following:
          ``(10) for a person who is a felon or required to register 
        under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, that 
        the person submit his person, and any property, house, 
        residence, vehicle, papers, computer, other electronic 
        communication or data storage devices or media, and effects to 
        search at any time, with or without a warrant, by any law 
        enforcement or probation officer with reasonable suspicion 
        concerning a violation of a condition of probation or unlawful 
        conduct by the person, and by any probation officer in the 
        lawful discharge of the officer's supervision functions.''.
  (b) Supervised Release.--Section 3583(d) of title 18, United States 
Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: ``The court may 
order, as an explicit condition of supervised release for a person who 
is a felon or required to register under the Sex Offender Registration 
and Notification Act, that the person submit his person, and any 
property, house, residence, vehicle, papers, computer, other electronic 
communications or data storage devices or media, and effects to search 
at any time, with or without a warrant, by any law enforcement or 
probation officer with reasonable suspicion concerning a violation of a 
condition of supervised release or unlawful conduct by the person, and 
by any probation officer in the lawful discharge of the officer's 
supervision functions.''

SEC. 508. KIDNAPPING PENALTIES AND JURISDICTION.

  Section 1201 of title 18, United States Code, is amended--
          (1) in subsection (a)(1), by striking ``if the person was 
        alive when the transportation began'' and inserting ``, or the 
        offender travels in interstate or foreign commerce or uses the 
        mail or any means, facility, or instrumentality of interstate 
        or foreign commerce in committing or in furtherance of the 
        commission of the offense''; and
          (2) in subsection (b), by striking ``to interstate'' and 
        inserting ``in interstate''.

SEC. 509. MARITAL COMMUNICATION AND ADVERSE SPOUSAL PRIVILEGE.

  (a) In General.--Chapter 119 of title 28, United States Code, is 
amended by inserting after section 1826 the following:

``Sec. 1826A. Marital communications and adverse spousal privilege

  ``The confidential marital communication privilege and the adverse 
spousal privilege shall be inapplicable in any Federal proceeding in 
which a spouse is charged with a crime against--
          ``(1) a child of either spouse; or
          ``(2) a child under the custody or control of either 
        spouse.''.
  (b) Technical and Conforming Amendment.--The table of sections for 
chapter 119 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by inserting 
after the item relating to section 1826 the following:

``1826A. Marital communications and adverse spousal privilege.''.

SEC. 510. ABUSE AND NEGLECT OF INDIAN CHILDREN.

  Section 1153(a) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by 
inserting ``felony child abuse or neglect,'' after ``years,''.

SEC. 511. CIVIL COMMITMENT.

  Chapter 313 of title 18, United States Code, is amended--
          (1) in the chapter analysis--
                  (A) in the item relating to section 4241, by 
                inserting ``or to undergo postrelease proceedings'' 
                after ``trial''; and
                  (B) by inserting at the end the following:

``4248. Civil commitment of a sexually dangerous person.'';
          (2) in section 4241--
                  (A) in the heading, by inserting ``or to 
                undergo postrelease proceedings'' 
                after ``trial'';
                  (B) in the first sentence of subsection (a), by 
                inserting ``or at any time after the commencement of 
                probation or supervised release and prior to the 
                completion of the sentence,'' after ``defendant,'';
                  (C) in subsection (d)--
                          (i) by striking ``trial to proceed'' each 
                        place it appears and inserting ``proceedings to 
                        go forward''; and
                          (ii) by striking ``section 4246'' and 
                        inserting ``sections 4246 and 4248''; and
                  (D) in subsection (e)--
                          (i) by inserting ``or other proceedings'' 
                        after ``trial''; and
                          (ii) by striking ``chapter 207'' and 
                        inserting ``chapters 207 and 227'';
          (3) in section 4247--
                  (A) by striking ``, or 4246'' each place it appears 
                and inserting ``, 4246, or 4248'';
                  (B) in subsections (g) and (i), by striking ``4243 or 
                4246'' each place it appears and inserting ``4243, 
                4246, or 4248'';
                  (C) in subsection (a)--
                          (i) by amending subparagraph (1)(C) to read 
                        as follows:
                  ``(C) drug, alcohol, and sex offender treatment 
                programs, and other treatment programs that will assist 
                the individual in overcoming a psychological or 
                physical dependence or any condition that makes the 
                individual dangerous to others; and'';
                          (ii) in paragraph (2), by striking ``and'' at 
                        the end;
                          (iii) in paragraph (3), by striking the 
                        period at the end and inserting a semicolon; 
                        and
                          (iv) by inserting at the end the following:
          ``(4) `bodily injury' includes sexual abuse;
          ``(5) `sexually dangerous person' means a person who has 
        engaged or attempted to engage in sexually violent conduct or 
        child molestation and who is sexually dangerous to others; and
          ``(6) `sexually dangerous to others' means that a person 
        suffers from a serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder 
        as a result of which he would have serious difficulty in 
        refraining from sexually violent conduct or child molestation 
        if released.'';
                  (D) in subsection (b), by striking ``4245 or 4246'' 
                and inserting ``4245, 4246, or 4248''; and
                  (E) in subsection (c)(4)--
                          (i) by redesignating subparagraphs (D) and 
                        (E) as subparagraphs (E) and (F) respectively; 
                        and
                          (ii) by inserting after subparagraph (C) the 
                        following:
                  ``(D) if the examination is ordered under section 
                4248, whether the person is a sexually dangerous 
                person;''; and
          (4) by inserting at the end the following:

``Sec. 4248. Civil commitment of a sexually dangerous person

  ``(a) Institution of Proceedings.--In relation to a person who is in 
the custody of the Bureau of Prisons, or who has been committed to the 
custody of the Attorney General pursuant to section 4241(d), or against 
whom all criminal charges have been dismissed solely for reasons 
relating to the mental condition of the person, the Attorney General or 
any individual authorized by the Attorney General or the Director of 
the Bureau of Prisons may certify that the person is a sexually 
dangerous person, and transmit the certificate to the clerk of the 
court for the district in which the person is confined. The clerk shall 
send a copy of the certificate to the person, and to the attorney for 
the Government, and, if the person was committed pursuant to section 
4241(d), to the clerk of the court that ordered the commitment. The 
court shall order a hearing to determine whether the person is a 
sexually dangerous person. A certificate filed under this subsection 
shall stay the release of the person pending completion of procedures 
contained in this section.
  ``(b) Psychiatric or Psychological Examination and Report.--Prior to 
the date of the hearing, the court may order that a psychiatric or 
psychological examination of the defendant be conducted, and that a 
psychiatric or psychological report be filed with the court, pursuant 
to the provisions of section 4247(b) and (c).
  ``(c) Hearing.--The hearing shall be conducted pursuant to the 
provisions of section 4247(d).
  ``(d) Determination and Disposition.--If, after the hearing, the 
court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person is a 
sexually dangerous person, the court shall commit the person to the 
custody of the Attorney General. The Attorney General shall release the 
person to the appropriate official of the State in which the person is 
domiciled or was tried if such State will assume responsibility for his 
custody, care, and treatment. The Attorney General shall make all 
reasonable efforts to cause such a State to assume such responsibility. 
If, notwithstanding such efforts, neither such State will assume such 
responsibility, the Attorney General shall place the person for 
treatment in a suitable facility, until--
          ``(1) such a State will assume such responsibility; or
          ``(2) the person's condition is such that he is no longer 
        sexually dangerous to others, or will not be sexually dangerous 
        to others if released under a prescribed regimen of medical, 
        psychiatric, or psychological care or treatment;
whichever is earlier. The Attorney General shall make all reasonable 
efforts to have a State to assume such responsibility for the person's 
custody, care, and treatment.
  ``(e) Discharge.--When the Director of the facility in which a person 
is placed pursuant to subsection (d) determines that the person's 
condition is such that he is no longer sexually dangerous to others, or 
will not be sexually dangerous to others if released under a prescribed 
regimen of medical, psychiatric, or psychological care or treatment, he 
shall promptly file a certificate to that effect with the clerk of the 
court that ordered the commitment. The clerk shall send a copy of the 
certificate to the person's counsel and to the attorney for the 
Government. The court shall order the discharge of the person or, on 
motion of the attorney for the Government or on its own motion, shall 
hold a hearing, conducted pursuant to the provisions of section 
4247(d), to determine whether he should be released. If, after the 
hearing, the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
person's condition is such that--
          ``(1) he will not be sexually dangerous to others if released 
        unconditionally, the court shall order that he be immediately 
        discharged; or
          ``(2) he will not be sexually dangerous to others if released 
        under a prescribed regimen of medical, psychiatric, or 
        psychological care or treatment, the court shall--
                  ``(A) order that he be conditionally discharged under 
                a prescribed regimen of medical, psychiatric, or 
                psychological care or treatment that has been prepared 
                for him, that has been certified to the court as 
                appropriate by the Director of the facility in which he 
                is committed, and that has been found by the court to 
                be appropriate; and
                  ``(B) order, as an explicit condition of release, 
                that he comply with the prescribed regimen of medical, 
                psychiatric, or psychological care or treatment.
        The court at any time may, after a hearing employing the same 
        criteria, modify or eliminate the regimen of medical, 
        psychiatric, or psychological care or treatment.
  ``(f) Revocation of Conditional Discharge.--The director of a 
facility responsible for administering a regimen imposed on a person 
conditionally discharged under subsection (e) shall notify the Attorney 
General and the court having jurisdiction over the person of any 
failure of the person to comply with the regimen. Upon such notice, or 
upon other probable cause to believe that the person has failed to 
comply with the prescribed regimen of medical, psychiatric, or 
psychological care or treatment, the person may be arrested, and, upon 
arrest, shall be taken without unnecessary delay before the court 
having jurisdiction over him. The court shall, after a hearing, 
determine whether the person should be remanded to a suitable facility 
on the ground that he is sexually dangerous to others in light of his 
failure to comply with the prescribed regimen of medical, psychiatric, 
or psychological care or treatment.
  ``(g) Release to State of Certain Other Persons.--If the director of 
the facility in which a person is hospitalized or placed pursuant to 
this chapter certifies to the Attorney General that a person, against 
him all charges have been dismissed for reasons not related to the 
mental condition of the person, is a sexually dangerous person, the 
Attorney General shall release the person to the appropriate official 
of the State in which the person is domiciled or was tried for the 
purpose of institution of State proceedings for civil commitment. If 
neither such State will assume such responsibility, the Attorney 
General shall release the person upon receipt of notice from the State 
that it will not assume such responsibility, but not later than 10 days 
after certification by the director of the facility.''.

SEC. 512. MANDATORY PENALTIES FOR SEX-TRAFFICKING OF CHILDREN.

  Section 1591(b) of title 18, United States Code, is amended--
          (1) in paragraph (1)--
                  (A) by striking ``or imprisonment'' and inserting 
                ``and imprisonment'';
                  (B) by inserting ``not less than 20'' after ``any 
                term of years''; and
                  (C) by striking ``, or both''; and
          (2) in paragraph (2)--
                  (A) by striking ``or imprisonment for not'' and 
                inserting ``and imprisonment for not less than 10 years 
                nor''; and
                  (B) by striking ``, or both''.

SEC. 513. SEXUAL ABUSE OF WARDS.

  Chapter 109A of title 18, United States Code, is amended--
          (1) in section 2243(b), by striking ``one year'' and 
        inserting ``five years'';
          (2) in section 2244(b), by striking ``six months'' and 
        inserting ``two years''; and
          (3) by inserting after ``Federal prison,'' each place it 
        appears, other than the second sentence of section 2241(c), the 
        following: ``or being in the custody of the Attorney General or 
        the Bureau of Prisons or confined in any institution or 
        facility by direction of the Attorney General or the Bureau of 
        Prisons,''.

                          Purpose and Summary

    H.R. 3132, the ``Children's Safety Act of 2005,'' is a 
comprehensive bill to address the growing epidemic of sexual 
violence against children. Recently, public attention has been 
focused on several tragic attacks in which young children have 
been murdered, kidnapped, and sexually assaulted by sexual 
offenders and career criminals, including: (1) the abduction, 
rape and killing of 9-year-old Jessica Lunsford who was buried 
alive in Florida; (2) the slaying of 13-year-old Sarah Lunde in 
Florida; (3) the murder of Jetseta Marie Gage by a sex offender 
in Iowa; and (4) the kidnapping of Ashta and Dylan Grohne, and 
murder of Dylan and their family members in Idaho.
    These tragic events have underscored the continuing 
epidemic of violence against children, and the need to 
reexamine existing laws intended to protect children--i.e., the 
``Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent 
Offender Registration Act,'' ``Megan's Law,'' and the ``Pam 
Lyncher Sex Offender Trafficking and Identification Act.'' 
During the 109th Congress, several bills were introduced by 
Members of Congress to address loopholes and deficiencies in 
existing laws.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\H.R. 764, The Child Abuse and Neglect Database Act; H.R. 95, The 
Dru Sjodin National Sex Offender Public Database Act of 2005; H.R. 
1355, The Child Predator Act of 2005; H.R. 1505, The Jessica Lunsford 
Act; H.R. 2423, The Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act; 
H.R. 244, The Save Our Children: Stop the Violent Predators Against 
Children DNA Act of 2005; H.R. 2796, The DNA Fingerprinting Act of 
2005; and H.R. 2797, The Amie Zyla Act of 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The ``Children's Safety Act of 2005,'' incorporates these 
proposals into a comprehensive child safety bill. Title I of 
the legislation, the Sex Offender Registration and Notification 
Act: (1) expands the coverage of registration and notification 
requirements to a larger number of sex offenders; (2) increases 
the duration of registration requirements for sex offenders; 
(3) requires States to provide Internet availability of sex 
offender information; (4) ensures timely registration by sex 
offenders and verification of information provided by sex 
offenders; (5) requires sex offenders to register in-person and 
on a regular basis, and to provide detailed personal 
information whenever they move to a new area to live, attend 
school or work; (6) requires a State to notify the Attorney 
General, law enforcement agencies, schools, housing agencies, 
and development, background check agencies, social service 
agencies and volunteer organizations in the area where a sex 
offender may live, work or attend school; (7) authorizes 
demonstration programs for new electronic monitoring programs 
(e.g. anklets and Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) monitoring 
which will require examination of multi-jurisdictional 
monitoring procedures); (8) creates a new National Sex Offender 
Registry; (9) creates a new Federal crime punishable by a 5-
year mandatory minimum when a sex offender fails to register; 
and (10) authorizes the U.S. Marshals to apprehend sex 
offenders who fail to register and increases grants to States 
to apprehend sex offenders who are in violation of the 
registration requirements.
    Title II of H.R. 3132, the DNA Fingerprinting Act of 2005, 
revises DNA laws to include arrestee DNA profiles, strikes the 
expungement provisions for removal of DNA profiles from 
existing databases, and strikes the exclusion of sexual abuse 
offenses from the statute of limitations tolling provisions for 
John Doe indictments.
    Title III of H.R. 3132, the Prevention and Deterrence of 
Crimes Against Children Act of 2005, adopts new mandatory 
minimum penalties for violent crimes committed against 
children. Criminal penalties range from: a death sentence or 
life imprisonment when a child is murdered; a mandatory minimum 
of 30 years imprisonment to life when the crime of violence 
against the child is a kidnapping, maiming, or aggravated 
sexual abuse, or where the crime results in serious bodily 
injury (Sec. 1365); a mandatory minimum of 20 years when the 
crime of violence results in bodily injury to the child (as 
defined in Sec. 1365); a mandatory minimum of 15 years to life 
imprisonment when the defendant uses a dangerous weapon; and a 
mandatory minimum of 10 years imprisonment or up to life in any 
other case (e.g. attempt or conspiracy to commit any crime of 
violence against a child). Title III also imposes time limits 
and substantive limits on Federal courts' review of habeas 
corpus petitions challenging a State-court conviction for 
killing a child.
    Title IV of the legislation, the Protection Against Sexual 
Exploitation of Children Act of 2005, modifies the criminal 
penalties for several existing sexual offenses against children 
by raising existing mandatory penalties for: engaging in a 
sexual act with a child; committing abusive sexual contact; 
sexual exploitation of children; trafficking in child 
pornography, and using misleading domain names.
    Title V of H.R. 3132, the Foster Child Protection Act of 
2005: (1) adopts requirements for States to complete background 
checks using national criminal history databases before 
approving a foster or adoptive parent placement; (2) authorizes 
child welfare agencies to obtain read-only access to national 
criminal history databases; (3) requires sex offenders to 
submit to searches as a condition of supervised release or 
probation, modifies kidnapping and sex trafficking statutes, 
and establishes procedures for civil commitment of Federal sex 
offenders who are dangerous to others because of serious mental 
illness, abnormality or disorder; and (4) adopts increased 
penalties for sexual abuse and sex trafficking involving 
children.

                Background and Need for the Legislation

    The sexual victimization of children is overwhelming in 
magnitude and largely unrecognized and underreported. 
Statistics show that 1 in 5 girls and 1 in 10 boys are sexually 
exploited before they reach adulthood, yet less than 35 percent 
of these assaults are reported to authorities. This problem is 
exacerbated by the number of children who are solicited 
online--according to the Department of Justice, 1 in 5 children 
(10 to 17 years old) receive unwanted sexual solicitations 
online.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs--Office of 
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Fact Sheet, Highlights of 
the Youth Internet Safety Survey (March 2004), available at http://
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/fs200104.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Department of Justice statistics underscore the 
staggering toll that violence takes on our youth.\3\ Data from 
12 States during the period of 1991 to 1996 show that 67 
percent of all victims of sexual assault were juveniles (under 
the age of 18), and 34 percent were under the age of 12. One of 
every seven victims of sexual assault was under the age of 
6.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\DOJ national crime surveys do not account for victims under the 
age of 12, but even for 12 to 18 year olds, the figures are alarming.
    \4\In a June 1997 report, the Justice Department found that sexual 
offenses are more likely than other types of criminal conduct to elude 
the criminal justice system. Offenders report vastly more victim-
involved incidents than those for which they were convicted. Child 
abusers have been known to re-offend as late as 20 years following 
release into the community. U.S. Department of Justice Office of 
Justice Programs--National Institute of Justice Research Report, Child 
Sexual Molestation: Research Issues (June 1997), available at 
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/163390.pdf..
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                      SEX OFFENDERS AND RECIDIVISM

    Sex offenders have recidivism rates that often exceed those 
of other criminals. In a 2001 Report, the Center for Sex 
Offender Management reached the following staggering 
conclusions as to recidivism by sex offenders:\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\U.S. Department of Justice A Project of the Office of Justice 
Programs--Center for Sex Offender Management, Recidivism of Sex 
Offenders (May 2001), available at 
http://www.csom.org/pubs/recidsexof.html.

         LSexual offense recidivism rates are 
        underreported. Researchers compared official records of 
        a sample of sex offenders with ``unofficial'' sources 
        of data. They found that the number of subsequent sex 
        offenses revealed through unofficial sources was 2.4 
        times higher than the number that was recorded in 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        official reports.

         LResearch using information generated through 
        polygraph examinations on a sample of imprisoned sex 
        offenders with fewer than two known victims (on 
        average), found that these offenders actually had an 
        average of 110 victims and 318 offenses.

         LAnother polygraph study found a sample of 
        imprisoned sex offenders to have extensive criminal 
        histories, committing sex crimes for an average of 16 
        years before being apprehended and convicted.

    In a 2003 report, the Justice Department found that 
released child molesters were more likely to be rearrested for 
child molesting than non-child molesters.\6\ Released sex 
offenders were four times more likely to be rearrested for a 
sex crime than released non-sex offenders. The median age of 
the victims of imprisoned sexual assaulters was less than 13 
years old; the median age of rape victims was about 22 years. 
On average, child molesters were released after serving about 3 
years of their 7-year sentence (43 percent of their sentence). 
Justice Department data also shows that in 15 States in 1994, 
5.3 percent of 9,691 sex offenders who were released from 
prison were arrested for a new sex crime within 3 years of 
release--in real terms that means approximately 480 sex 
offenders committed new sex crimes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs--Bureau of 
Justice Statistics, Recidivism of Sex Offenders Released from Prison in 
1994 (November 2003), available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/rsorp94.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    One of the most prevalent manifestations of the growing 
problem of child exploitation and sexual abuse crimes is the 
escalating presence of child pornography. There has been an 
explosive growth in the trade of child pornography due to the 
ease and speed of distribution, and the relative anonymity 
afforded by the Internet. The distribution of child pornography 
has progressed beyond exchanges between individuals and now 
includes commercial ventures. Furthermore, once on the 
Internet, the images are easily transmitted from offender to 
offender. The ease of electronic transmission of these images 
may reinforce the sexual predators of child offenders or 
motivate those who have contemplated assaulting a child to do 
so.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\While recidivism by sex offenders is a significant problem, the 
treatment of sex offenders is problematic. Several studies have 
evaluated the outcomes of offenders receiving sex offender treatment, 
compared to a group of offenders not receiving treatment. The results 
of these studies are mixed. For example, Barbaree and Marshall (1988) 
found a substantial difference in the recidivism rates of extra-
familial child molesters who participated in a community based 
cognitive-behavioral treatment program, compared to a group of similar 
offenders who did not receive treatment. Those who participated in 
treatment had a recidivism rate of 18 percent over a 4-year follow-up 
period, compared to a 43 percent recidivism rate for the 
nonparticipating group of offenders. However, no positive effect of 
treatment was found in several other quasi-experiments involving an 
institutional behavioral program (Rice, Quinsey, and Harris, 1991) or a 
milieu therapy approach in an institutional setting (Hanson, Steffy, 
and Gauthier, 1993).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                 SEX OFFENDER AND NOTIFICATION PROGRAM

    Recent events have underscored gaps and problems with 
existing Federal and State laws, as well as implementation of 
sex offender registration and notification programs. There is a 
wide disparity among State registration requirements and 
notification obligations for sex offenders. This lack of 
uniformity has been exploited by child sexual offenders with 
tragic consequences. Given the transient nature of sex 
offenders and the inability of the States to track these 
offenders, it is conservatively estimated that approximately 20 
percent of 400,000 sex offenders are ``lost'' under State sex 
offender registry programs. In addition, there is a disparity 
among State programs as to the existence of Internet 
availability of relevant sex offender information, as well as 
the type of information included on such websites. Recently, 
the Justice Department announced that it has begun implementing 
a public, national sex offender database connecting State 
sexual offender registries into one national website, starting 
with the linking of 22 State Internet websites for search 
purposes.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs Press 
Release, July 20, 2005, Department of Justice Activates National Sex 
Offender Public Registry Website, available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/pressreleases/BJA05028.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Given the lack of basic uniformity and effective operation 
among the various States in administering sex registry 
programs, there is a need to re-evaluate basic requirements for 
such registries, particularly the need to ensure sex offender 
compliance with registration requirements when a sex offender 
changes residence, employment or student status. As noted 
above, 20 percent of sexual offenders are ``lost,'' and there 
is a strong public interest in finding them and having them 
register with current information to mitigate the risks of 
additional crimes against children. The Federal Government's 
recent announcement of the creation of a National Sex Offender 
Public Registry, the State's role in providing accurate data 
will be even more critical. In order to ensure their utility, 
Internet websites maintained by States need to include basic 
information about an offender, such as the offender's name, 
address, specific offense(s) committed, vehicle used, place of 
employment or school, current picture, and other relevant 
information. Current limitations in existing law further 
require an increase in apprehension resources to bring sexual 
offenders into compliance by authorizing the United States 
Marshals Service to participate in locating sex offenders who 
are not in compliance with registry requirements.
    Compounding the problem of ``lost'' sex offenders, States 
tend to take a passive role in disseminating sex offender 
information, relying instead on law enforcement to disseminate 
such information to interested entities such as schools and 
community groups. H.R. 3132 requires the Federal Government and 
the States to take a more active role in disseminating sex 
offender information to notify other States, entities, 
organizations and local communities of the status and location 
of convicted sexual offenders.

                    DEFINITIONS AND APPLICATION TO 
                   EXPANDED CATEGORY OF SEX OFFENDERS

    H.R. 3132 includes a new and broader definition of sex 
offenders--two classes--those who commit serious felonies and 
those that commit misdemeanors involving a minor. This broader 
definition provides a clearer distinction for imposing sex 
offender registration and notification requirements. Existing 
legal definitions of a ``sexually violent predator'' are 
unworkable, too narrow, and depend on determinations of 
``mental abnormality or personality disorder,'' which may vary 
from State-to-State based on generalized concepts. H.R. 3132 
draws the line on a simple principal--if the offender was 
subject to imprisonment for more than one year for a sex crime, 
then he should be treated differently than a misdemeanor sex 
offense against a minor where the offender was subject to a 
penalty of less than one year.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\It is important to note that misdemeanor offenses against adults 
are not included, and that consensual sex offenses are, for the most 
part, excluded, except where such conduct involves younger children who 
are unable, as a matter of law, to consent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    H.R. 3132 also expands the coverage of the registration and 
notification requirements to include foreign sex crimes (so 
long as activity would have constituted a crime if committed in 
the United States), tribal, military, and Federal. There is no 
reason that a criminal sex offender--no matter what law--should 
be exempted from any State registration and notification 
requirements.

                EXPANDING COVERAGE TO INCLUDE JUVENILES

    H.R. 3132 expands the coverage of sex offenders to include 
juvenile sex offenders. Juvenile sex offenders commit a 
significant number of sexual abuse crimes. According to recent 
FBI crime data, approximately 34 percent of forcible rape 
arrests were of juveniles; and 42 percent of all other sexual 
offenses were committed by juveniles.
    Several States, including Wisconsin, have modified their 
sex offender registration and notification programs to include 
juvenile sex offenders. All too often, juvenile sex offenders 
have exploited current limitations that permit them to escape 
notification requirements to commit sexual offenses. While the 
Committee recognizes that States typically protect the identity 
of a juvenile who commits criminal acts, in the case of sexual 
offenses, the balance needs to change; no longer should the 
rights of the juvenile offender outweigh the rights of the 
community and victims to be free from additional sexual crimes. 
For victims, whether the offenders is an adult or a juvenile 
has no bearing on the impact of that sexual offense on the life 
of the victim. H.R. 3132 strikes the balance in favor of 
protecting victims, rather than protecting the identity of 
juvenile sex offenders.

                   EXPANDED NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS

    As noted above, H.R. 3132 expands the notification 
requirements to implement a more proactive approach to the 
dissemination of sex offender information. Some may argue that 
requiring notification to so many entities could tend to 
``vilify'' or ``ostracize'' sex offenders once they reach a 
community. For that reason, H.R. 3132 includes a new 
requirement that the community have access to information 
relating to the specific facts underlying the sex offender's 
criminal case--so that law enforcement, the community, parents, 
and other interested persons can assess the risk themselves, 
and take the appropriate steps they believe are necessary to 
protect their families or themselves from sex offenders.
    The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children has 
reported that one of the primary deficiencies in the current 
program is reliance on ``passive'' notification rather than 
proactive steps to notify members of the community. Under the 
current system, law enforcement is notified subsequently and 
required to notify the community and take active steps to 
verify the sex offender's compliance. Such steps are not 
typical, and law enforcement has been practically unable to 
take any proactive steps. H.R. 3132 includes additional 
notification requirements consistent with those recommended by 
the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children--broad 
and active notification of the community including law 
enforcement, volunteer organizations, child welfare agencies, 
public housing agencies, and ensuring wide public availability 
of such information on both State and Federal websites in order 
to maximize the availability of sexual offender information to 
the public.

              ENSURING COMPLIANCE AND CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT

    The most significant enforcement issue in the sex offender 
program is that over 100,000 sex offenders, or nearly one-fifth 
in the Nation are ``missing,'' meaning that they have not 
complied with sex offender registration requirements. This 
typically occurs when the sex offender moves from one State to 
another. When a sex offender fails to register in a State in 
which he or she resides, there is no effective system by which 
the States can notify each other about the change in a sex 
offenders status. H.R. 3132 will address this problem in 
several ways.
    First, H.R. 3132 requires sex offenders to keep addresses, 
employment and student status, and do so within 5 days of any 
change. Second, failure would subject a sex offender to a 
felony criminal penalty. Third, the proposed law would require 
a sex offender to verify his information by an in-person 
appearance every 6 months, and States would be required to 
conduct address verification programs, including the Jessica 
Lunsford Verification Program, as frequently as every month for 
felony sex offenders and every quarter for misdemeanor sex 
offenders. Fourth, if the sex offender either moves to a new 
State, works in a new State, or attends school in a new State, 
the new State is required to notify the other State that the 
sex offender is doing so in that State.
    To ensure compliance, States are required to inform the sex 
offender of his or her obligations, and obtain a signed form 
indicating that he or she understands legal requirements and 
will comply with them. Sex offenders who fail to comply will 
face felony criminal prosecution. More importantly, in order to 
address the problem of sex offenders, sex offenders will now 
face Federal prosecution with a mandatory minimum penalty of 5 
years in prison if they cross a State line and fail to comply 
with the sex offender registration and notification 
requirements contained in the legislation. To assist in the 
apprehension of those that do not comply with sex offender 
registration requirements, the bill includes provisions 
authorizing the United States Marshals to help locate and 
apprehend non-complying sex offenders and provides grants to 
States to assist in any apprehension programs. The combination 
of incentives for the sex offender to comply, enhanced criminal 
penalties, and additional law enforcement resources to focus on 
this problem will reduce the overwhelming number of non-
complying or ``lost'' sex offenders in our communities.

                      STATE COMPLIANCE AND FUNDING

    The changes required by this legislation are significant at 
both the Federal and the State level. H.R. 3132 requires the 
States to comply in 2 years, and the Attorney General may 
extend this deadline for an additional year. To assist the 
States in funding obligations contained in the legislation, 
H.R. 3132 creates new incentive grants for States that comply 
before the two-year deadline. The existing program is funded 
from a variety of sources, including Violence Agaisnt Women Act 
(``VAWA''), National Criminal History Improvement Programs, 
Byrne grants, and other funding sources. The proposal 
reauthorizes the Sex Offender Management Assistance (SOMA) 
program as the primary vehicle for funding the program.

                      ELECTRONIC TRACKING DEVICES

    Several States, including Florida, are using electronic 
tracking devices--ankle bracelets or Global Positioning Service 
(GPS) devices--to track sex offenders in their communities. 
There are a number of technical and logistical issues relating 
to those technologies, including compatibility and 
interoperability among States. Given the technical issues that 
need to be resolved, H.R. 3132 authorizes up to 10 
demonstration programs to identify the effectiveness of such 
technologies and to examine how to utilize these technologies 
most effectively to ensure coordination among the States.

       FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF SEX OFFENSES AND CHILD PORNOGRAPHY

    Child pornography offenses, as well as other child 
exploitation offenses involving enticement of minors to engage 
in illegal sexual activity, travel to engage in illegal sexual 
activity with a minor, or transportation of a minor to engage 
in illegal sexual activity often implicate interstate or 
foreign commerce. Accordingly, these offenses are often 
prosecuted under Federal law. On the other hand, sexual abuse 
of children is typically prosecuted under State law. When a 
child is sexually abused on Federal land such as a military 
base or Indian territory, the offense may be prosecuted under 
Federal law. Accordingly, Federal laws prohibiting sexual abuse 
have an important role in combating these devastating crimes, 
even though most sexual abuse cases are prosecuted under State 
statutes.
    Crimes against children such as child exploitation and 
sexual abuse are a growing problem. For example, according to 
the Executive Office for United States Attorneys, in Fiscal 
Year 1997, 352 cases were filed by the Department of Justice 
charging child pornography crimes (18 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 2251-
2260), and 299 convictions were obtained. In Fiscal Year 2004, 
child pornography charges were filed against approximately 
1,486 defendants, and approximately 1,066 convictions on such 
charges were obtained.
    Nationwide, according to a Department of Health and Human 
Services' 2003 report on child maltreatment, an estimated 
906,000 children were victims of child abuse or neglect.\10\ 
Approximately 20 percent of these victims were physically 
abused, and approximately 10 percent were sexually abused. 
Moreover, according to that report, Pacific Islander children 
and American Indian or Alaska Native children are among those 
experiencing the highest rates of victimization. As the special 
maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States may 
cover many of these children, a Federal legislative response to 
violence against children and child sexual abuse is clearly 
neccessary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Administration for 
Children and Families--Administration on Children, Youth and Families 
Children's Bureau Child Maltreatment 2003, available at http://
www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/publications/cm03/cm2003.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Federal sentences imposed for sexual abuse and 
exploitation of children appear to be unduly lenient. More 
frequently, judges are exercising their discretion to impose 
sentences that depart from the carefully considered ranges 
developed by the U.S. Sentencing Commission. In the process, we 
risk losing a sentencing system that requires serious sentences 
for serious offenders and helps prevent disparate sentences for 
equally serious crimes.
    The sentencing data for the last year shows that for sexual 
abuse crimes, the mean sentence length was only 73 months and 
the median was 41 months. For pornography and prostitution, the 
mean sentence was 63 months and the median was 33 months. 
Judges continued to hand out a number of downward departures 
for offenders who commit criminal sexual abuse (U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines Manual Sec. 2A3.1) where approximately 15 percent 
(15 of 97 sentences) of offenders received Government-sponsored 
downward departures (non-substantial assistance) and 13 percent 
(13 of 97 sentences) of the offenders received non-Government-
sponsored downward departures; for criminal sexual abuse (U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines Manual Sec. 2A3.2), 4.5 percent (6 of 
133) offenders received Government-sponsored downward 
departures (non-substantial assistance), and approximately 11 
percent (15 of 133) of the offenders received non-Government 
sponsored downward departures.
    For child exploitation crimes, sentencing data shows a 
similar pattern. For trafficking in material involving the 
sexual exploitation of a minor (U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 
Manual Sec. Sec. 2G2.2 and 2G2.4) approximately 17 percent (94 
of 536 of the sentences) of the offenders received non-
Government sponsored downward departures. (Less than one 
percent of the offenders received Government-sponsored downward 
departures).\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\The 2003 sentencing data shows that a total of 355 sexual abuse 
cases were filed, and approximately 45 percent (166) involved white 
defendants, approximately 38 percent (136) involved Native American 
defendants, 7 percent (25) involved Hispanic defendants, and 6 percent 
(23) involved Black defendants. The 2003 sentencing data shows that a 
total 734 cases for promoting a commercial sex act, sexually exploiting 
a minor, trafficking in or possession of material involving sexual 
exploitation of a minor, and importing, mailing or transporting obscene 
matter--629 of the cases or 88 percent involved white defendants, 49 
involved Hispanic defendants, 26 involved Asian of Pacific Islanders, 
23 involved Black defendants, and 5 involved Native Americans.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    To ensure that a proper minimum sentence is imposed on sex 
offenders,\12\ H.R. 3132 includes a section modifying the 
existing statute, section 3559(d), of title 18, governing the 
sentencing of defendants for crimes committed against children, 
and adopts new penalties for felony crimes of violence (18 
U.S.C. Sec. 16) crimes committed against children. Criminal 
penalties range from a death sentence or life imprisonment when 
a child is killed; a mandatory minimum of 30 years imprisonment 
to life where the crime of violence is a kidnapping, maiming, 
aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse or where the crime 
results in serious bodily injury (18 U.S.C. 2119(2)); a 
mandatory minimum of 20 years where the crime of violence 
results in bodily injury to the child (as defined in 1365); a 
mandatory minimum of 15 years to life imprisonment where the 
defendant uses a dangerous weapon; and a mandatory minimum of 
10 years imprisonment or up to life in any other case (e.g. 
attempt or conspiracy to commit any crime of violence against a 
child). Section 402 of H.R. 3132 increases penalties for 
several existing sexual offenses against children.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\Mandatory Sentencing Schemes Mandatory sentencing schemes--
truth-in-sentencing, determinate sentencing practices, ``three-strikes 
and you're out,'' have resulted in dramatic reductions in crime since 
the 1970's. Steven D. Levitt, Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 
1990's: Four Factors That Explain the Decline and Seven That Do Not, 18 
J.Econ. Perspectives 163 (2004); Joanna M. Shepherd, Police, 
Prosecutors, Criminals and Determinate Sentencing: The Truth about 
Truth-in-Sentencing Laws, 45 J.L. & Econ. 509 (2002). Other studies 
confirm the obvious point--incarcerating an offender prevents him from 
repeating his crimes while he is in prison. Peter W. Greenwood et al., 
Three Strikes and You're Out: Estimated Benefits and Costs of 
California's New Mandatory-Sentencing Law, in Three Strikes and You're 
Out: Vengeance as Public Policy (David Schichor & Dale K. Sechrest eds. 
1996). Joanna M. Shepherd, Fear of First Strike: The Full Deterrent 
Effect of California's Two- and Three-Strikes Legislation, 31 J. Legal 
Stud. 159 (2002). John J. Donahue III & Peter Siegelman, Allocating 
Resources Among Prisons and Social Programs in the Battle Against 
Crime, 27 J. Legal STUD. 1, 12-14 (1998); James Q. Qilson, Prisons in a 
Free Society, 117 Pub. Interest 37, 38 (Fall 1994); Thomas Marvell & 
Carlisle Moody, Prison Population Growth and Crime Reduction, 10 J. 
Quantitative Criminal. 109 (1994).
    \13\Contrary to claims made by opponents of mandatory-minimum 
sentencing schemes, such laws have typically been passed by large bi-
partisan majorities. For example, in the 107th Congress, the House 
Judiciary Committee passed HR 5422 the ``Child Abduction Prevention Act 
of 2002'' containing mandatory minimum provisions for child abductions. 
Only four members of the Committee expressed concern with the mandatory 
minimum provisions as reflected in the Dissenting Views. [Report 107-
723]. On the Floor of the House, 178 Democrats voted for the bill with 
its mandatory minimum provisions, including 11 Democrat Members of the 
Judiciary Committee [See, rollcall 446, Oct.8, 2002.] Only 23 Members 
voted against the bill. The mandatory minimums were included in the 
PROTECT Act which passed the Senate 98-0 and the House 400-25 (April 
10, 2003).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Likewise, the mandatory minimum provisions of H.R. 10, 
passed last Congress with overwhelming bipartisan support to 
assure appropriate penalties for serious offenses--possession 
and threats of atomic, chemical and biological weapons and 
anti-aircraft missiles. Sections 2403-2406 providing for tough 
mandatory minimums (30 years and Life imprisonment) was passed 
as a floor amendment to H.R. 10 by a vote of 385-30 with 164 
Democrats voting in favor. Every Democrat Member of the House 
Judiciary voted for the amendment except for Reps. Watt and 
Scott. Every House conferee, including every Democrat conferee 
(Reps. Harman, Menendez, Skelton) voted in favor of the 
mandatory minimums.

                            CIVIL COMMITMENT

    H. R. 3132 authorizes civil commitment of certain Federal 
sex offenders who are dangerous to others because of serious 
mental illness, abnormality or disorder. Such procedures would 
apply, for example, in circumstances in which a pedophile who 
was sentenced to imprisonment for child molestation offenses 
and States his intention to resume such conduct upon his 
release from jail. Under the civil commitment provisions in 
existing law, the sex offender must be hospitalized while 
incarcerated and the director of the facility must certify that 
the offender is suffering from a ``mental disease or defect'' 
creating a substantial risk of harm to others. Such a standard 
is narrow and does not include sex offenders with mental 
disorders who are clearly dangerous but who do not fall within 
the narrowly applied definition of metal illness. The first 
condition--prior hospitalization--is an unjustified impediment 
to seeking civil commitment. The civil commitment provision 
contained in this legislation combines commitment standards 
substantively similar to those approved by the Supreme Court in 
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997), and Kansas v. Crane, 
122 S.Ct 867 (2002).

                           DNA FINGERPRINTING

    In light of the critical role played by DNA evidence in 
solving sex crimes, and recent examples of successes in solving 
such crimes through the collection of DNA information from 
persons arrested for various crimes, the legislation expands 
the use of DNA. More specifically, the proposed language amends 
the DNA Identification Act to eliminate the restrictions on the 
DNA profiles that can be included in the National DNA Index 
(NDIS). Specifically, it strikes limiting language in Section 
14132(a)(1)(C) which excludes unindicted arrestee and 
elimination DNA profiles from NDIS; strikes the expungement 
provisions of Section 14132(d); and strikes the ``keyboard 
search'' provisions of Section 14132(e), which serve no purpose 
once the unjustified restrictions on including DNA profiles in 
NDIS are eliminated. This section also would authorize the 
Attorney General to collect DNA samples from Federal arrestees 
and detainees. Finally, this section strikes the exclusion of 
chapter 109A (``sexual abuse '') offenses from the statute of 
limitations tolling provision for cases involving DNA 
identification under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3297.
    The importance of collecting DNA from arrested persons or 
voluntary samples has been highlighted by recent cases in which 
crimes were solved using such data:

        In April 2005, a man suspected of setting fires to 46 
        houses and apartments in the Washington area was 
        apprehended through DNA analysis of items found at 
        several crime scenes and eventually identified through 
        comparison to a voluntary sample given by the offender 
        to law enforcement several weeks before to a different 
        law enforcement agency. Just recently, in Albany New 
        York, police solved a series of murder and rape charges 
        in three separate incidents where they had DNA evidence 
        linking the three incidents but no suspect to identify. 
        It was not until several years later, after the suspect 
        was convicted of a robbery offense, that his DNA data 
        was placed in the database--which eventually revealed a 
        match. If the data had been put in the database at the 
        time of the suspect's arrest on the robbery charge, 
        rather than awaiting the conviction, the three separate 
        murders and rapes would have been solved that much 
        earlier.

    It is also important to note that privacy concerns 
associated with the use of DNA data are far less significant 
than other types of evidence; in practice, the taking of a swab 
of saliva is no different than a photograph, a fingerprint or 
other identifying information. Once entered, such data cannot 
be used for discrimination purposes since the only identifiable 
information from a DNA sample to the naked eye is the sex of 
the person.

                   HABEAS REVISIONS FOR CHILD KILLERS

    Currently Federal habeas corpus cases involving State death 
penalty prosecutions require 10, 15, or even 20 years to 
complete. These delays burden the courts and deny justice to 
defendants with meritorious claims. They also are deeply unfair 
to victims of serious, violent crimes and their families. A 
parent whose child has been murdered, or someone who has been 
the victim of a violent assault, cannot be expected to ``move 
on'' without knowing how the case against the attacker has been 
resolved. Endless litigation, and the uncertainty that it 
brings, is unnecessarily cruel to these victims and their 
families.
    As President Clinton noted of the 1996 habeas corpus 
reforms, ``it should not take eight or nine years and three 
trips to the Supreme Court to finalize whether a person in fact 
was properly convicted or not.''\14\ Unfortunately, the facts, 
particularly with respect to murders of children, show that 
habeas review of child killers continues to move at a snail's 
pace, where petitions sometimes sit at the Federal court for 
anywhere between 7 and 15 years before being resolved.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\Purdum, Tom S. ``Terror in Oklahoma: The President; Clinton 
Warns Partisan Bickering Could Stall Effort to Combat Terrorism.'' New 
York Times 29 Apr. 1995, late ed.: A11
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Time limits are necessary given the Federal courts 
inability or unwillingness to decide habeas cases in a timely 
manner. In Morales v. Woodford, 336 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2003), 
for example, the Ninth Circuit took 3 years to decide the case 
after briefing was completed, and after issuing its decision, 
the court took another 16 months to reject a petition for a 
rehearing. Similarly, in Williams v. Woodford, 306 F.3d 665 
(9th Cir. 2002), the court waited 25 months to decide the 
case--and then waited another 27 months to reject a petition 
for rehearing for a total delay of almost four and a half years 
after appellate briefing had been completed. This is too long 
for either defendants or victims to have to wait for justice.
    Ms. Carol Fornoff testified before the Committee on the 
circumstances of the murder of her daughter Christy Ann in 
1984, and the extraordinary delays caused by Federal habeas 
review of the killer's conviction. In 1985, the man responsible 
for the sexual assault and murder of Christy Ann was convicted, 
based on overwhelming evidence of his guilt. The conviction was 
upheld in a lengthy opinion by the Arizona Supreme Court. The 
killer raised many more challenges, but his last State appeals 
were finally rejected in 1992.
    In 1992 the killer filed another challenge to his 
conviction in the United States District Court. That challenge 
remained in that court for another seven years. Finally, in 
November 1999, the district court dismissed the case. A few 
years later, the Federal Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
sent the case back to the district court for more hearings. 
Today, the case remains before that same Federal district 
court. It has now been over 21 years since Christy was 
murdered. By this fall, the case will have been in the Federal 
courts for longer than Christy was ever alive.
    Ms. Fornoff eloquently described the pain caused by the 
continuing delays in Federal habeas review of her daughter's 
murder case in testimony received by the Subcommittee on Crime, 
Terrorism, and Homeland Security.

        I cannot describe to you how painful our experience 
        with the court system has been. I cannot believe that 
        just one court took over 7 years to decide our case. 
        Some might ask why we can't just move on, and forget 
        about the killer's appeals. But it doesn't work that 
        way. She was our daughter, our beautiful little girl, 
        and he took her away. We want to know if he was 
        properly convicted. We want to know, will his 
        conviction be thrown out? Will there be another trial? 
        I cannot imagine testifying at a trial again. And would 
        they even be able to convict this man again? It has 
        been 21 years. How many witnesses are still here, is 
        all of the evidence even still available? Could this 
        man 1 day be released? Could I run into him on the 
        street, a free man--the man who assaulted and killed 
        our little daughter? The courts have turned this case 
        into an open wound for our family--a wound that has not 
        been allowed to heal for 21 years.

        I understand that people are concerned about innocent 
        people being behind bars, but that is not what my 
        daughter's killer is suing about. Right now, the issue 
        that is being litigated in the Federal courts is 
        whether the trial court made a mistake by allowing the 
        jury to hear that he told a prison counselor that he 
        ``didn't mean to kill the little Fornoff girl.'' He 
        claims that the counselor was like his doctor, and that 
        the statement is private, even though he said it in 
        front of other prisoners. Earlier this year, a Federal 
        court held a hearing on whether the killer had a right 
        to prevent the jury from hearing about this statement. 
        But the statement is irrelevant. Whether or not he said 
        it, the evidence of his guilt--the hairs, the fibers, 
        the bodily fluids--is overwhelming. The issue that the 
        killer is suing about was already resolved before by 
        the Arizona Supreme Court--over 17 years ago. Yet here 
        we are, 21 years after my daughter died, arguing about 
        the same legal technicalities.

        I urge you, Mr. Chairman, to do what you can to fix 
        this system. My family and I have forgiven our 
        daughter's murderer. But we cannot forgive a justice 
        system that would treat us this way.

    Unfortunately, stories like Ms. Fornoff's are quite common. 
A second case recently in the news underscores the improper 
role of Federal habeas review of State court convictions. In 
June 1983, a defendant murdered three members of the Ryen 
family and Christopher Hughes in Chino Hills, California. The 
killer in that case was an escaped convict from a nearby 
prison. He has since admitted that he spent two days hiding in 
a vacant house next to the home of the Ryen family. After 
several unsuccessful telephone calls to friends asking them to 
give him a ride, the killer took a hatchet and buck knife from 
the vacant house and set out to find a vehicle. The California 
Supreme Court describes the rest of what occurred (53 Cal.3d 
771, 794-95):

          On Saturday, June 4, 1983, the Ryens and Chris Hughes 
        attended a barbecue in Los Serranos, a few miles from 
        the Ryen home in Chino. Chris had received permission 
        to spend the night with the Ryens. Between 9 and 9:30 
        p.m., they left to drive to the Ryen home. Except for 
        Josh [the Ryen's 8-year-old son], they were never seen 
        alive again.
          The next morning, June 5, Chris's mother, Mary 
        Hughes, became concerned when he did not come home. A 
        number of telephone calls to the Ryen residence 
        received only busy signals. [Mary's husband] William 
        went to the Ryen home to investigate.
          William observed the Ryen truck at the home, but not 
        the family station wagon. Although the Ryens normally 
        did not lock the house when they were home, it was 
        locked on this occasion. William walked around the 
        house trying to look inside. When he reached the 
        sliding glass doors leading to the master bedroom, he 
        could see inside. William saw the bodies of his son and 
        Doug and Peggy Ryen on the bedroom floor. Josh was 
        lying between Peggy and Chris. Only Josh appeared 
        alive.
          William frantically tried to open the sliding door; 
        in his emotional state, he pushed against the fixed 
        portion of the doors, not the sliding door. He rushed 
        to the kitchen door, kicked it in, and entered. As he 
        approached the master bedroom, he found Jessica on the 
        floor, also apparently dead. In the bedroom, William 
        touched the body of his son. It was cold and stiff. 
        William asked Josh who had done it. Josh appeared 
        stunned; he tried to talk but could only make 
        unintelligible sounds.
          William tried to use a telephone in the house but it 
        did not work. He drove to a neighbor's house seeking 
        help. The police arrived shortly. Doug, Peggy, Chris, 
        and Jessica were dead, the first three in the master 
        bedroom, Jessica in the hallway leading to that 
        bedroom. Josh was alive but in shock, suffering from an 
        obvious neck wound. He was flown by helicopter to Loma 
        Linda University Hospital.
          The victims died from numerous chopping and stabbing 
        injuries. Doug Ryen had at least 37 separate wounds, 
        Peggy 32, Jessica 46, and Chris 25. The chopping wounds 
        were inflicted by a sharp, heavy object such as a 
        hatchet or axe, the stabbing wounds by a weapon such as 
        a knife.

    The escaped prisoner who committed this crime was caught 
two months later. He admitted that he stayed in the house next 
door, but denied any involvement in the murders. According to 
the California Supreme Court, however, the evidence of 
defendant's guilt was ``overwhelming.'' Not only had the 
defendant stayed at the vacant house right next door at the 
time of the murders; the hatchet used in the murders was taken 
from the vacant house; shoe prints in the Ryen house matched 
those in the vacant house and were from a type of shoe issued 
to prisoners; bloody items, including a prison-issue button, 
were found in the vacant house; prison-issue tobacco was found 
in the Ryen station wagon, which was recovered in Long Beach; 
and the defendant's blood type and hair matched that found in 
the Ryen house. The defendant was convicted of the murders and 
sentenced to death in 1985, and the California Supreme Court 
upheld the defendant's conviction and sentence in 1991.
    The defendant's Federal habeas proceedings began shortly 
thereafter, and they continue to this day--22 years after the 
murders. In 2000, the defendant asked the courts for DNA 
testing of a blood spot in the Ryen house, a t-shirt near the 
crime scene, and the tobacco found in the car. Despite the 
overwhelming evidence of his guilt, the courts allowed more 
testing. All three tests found that the blood and saliva 
matched the defendant, to a degree of certainty of one in 320 
billion. Blood on the t-shirt matched both the defendant and 
one of the victims.
    One might have thought that this would end the case, but in 
February 2004, the en banc Ninth Circuit sua sponte authorized 
defendant to file a second habeas petition to pursue theories 
that police had planted this DNA evidence. Since the evidence 
had been in court custody since 1983, the Ninth Circuit's 
theory not only required police to plan and execute a vast 
conspiracy to plant the evidence--it also required them to 
foresee the future invention of the DNA technology that would 
make that evidence useful in future habeas proceedings.
    The record before the Committee is replete with other 
examples of unreasonable delays in resolving Federal habeas 
petitions. In California, over 100 of the inmates on 
California's death row have been there for over two decades. 
For example, the case of Robin Samsoe, a 12-year-old, was 
kidnapped on the beach in Huntington Beach, California, and 
murdered in June 1979. A friend who had been with her on the 
beach described a strange man who had taken pictures of her. 
Police produced a composite sketch of this man, who was soon 
recognized by his parole officer. He had a history of 
kidnapping and sexually assaulting young girls--he had raped 
and nearly killed an 8-year-old girl, for which he served just 
two years in prison. He was awaiting trial for raping another 
girl at the time that Robin disappeared. He had taken that girl 
to the mountains outside Los Angeles--which is also where 
Robin's body was found. He attacked a third girl near the same 
spot on the beach where Robin was last seen. When police 
tracked this man down, the television news began broadcasting 
his composite sketch. A friend of Robin's family recognized him 
as the man who was with Robin on the beach. And in a locker 
that he rented, police officers found an earring that Robin had 
borrowed from her mother. Robin's mother recognized the earring 
as hers because of changes that she had made to it with a nail 
clipper.
    Despite all this evidence, in June 2003--exactly 24 years 
after Robin was murdered--the Federal Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit granted this man a new trial. This protracted 
delay imposed a terrible burden on Robin's mother. According to 
one newspaper story, she described her reaction to the decision 
as ``like somebody had slapped me hard in the face.'' At the 
same time that he was granted a new trial in Robin's killing, 
DNA evidence linked him to a rape and murder that he committed 
in 1977, and police have said that they will prosecute him for 
that case--after his new trial in Robin's case. Nevertheless, 
the impact on the family of the way that this case has been 
handled in the courts has been horrific. One of the news 
stories notes that Robin's family has even lost their home 
because they have spent so much time away from work at the 
trials and hearings in the case. Today, Robin's family is 
preparing for another trial of the man who killed their 12-
year-old daughter. If Robin had lived, she would be 37 years 
old today.
    Or consider the case of Benjamin Brenneman, who was 
murdered in 1981 and was 12 years old. Benjamin was a newspaper 
carrier, and also was kidnapped, sexually assaulted, and killed 
while delivering newspapers at an apartment complex. Benjamin's 
killer tied him up in a way that strangled him when he moved. 
Police began by questioning a man in the building who was a 
prior sex offender. They found Benjamin's special orthopedic 
sandals in the suspect's apartment. When they interviewed him, 
he admitted that he kidnapped Benjamin, but claimed that ``he 
was alive when I left him.'' Police found Benjamin's body in a 
nearby rural area the next day.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\More information about the case is available in the court 
opinion for the State appeal, People v. Thompson, 785 P.2d 857.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Benjamin's killer was convicted and sentenced to death. 
After the State courts finished their review of the case, the 
killer filed a habeas corpus petition in the Federal District 
Court in 1990. Today, 15 years later, the case is still before 
that same court. To put the matter in perspective, so far, and 
with no end in sight, the litigation before that one district 
court has outlived Benjamin by 3 years.
    In another case Michelle and Melissa Davis, ages 7 and 2, 
were killed in 1982. An ex-boyfriend of the sister of Kathy 
Davis took revenge on the sister for severing their 
relationship by killing Kathy's husband and her two young 
daughters, Michelle and Melissa. The killer confessed to the 
crime. The State courts finished their review of the case in 
1991. (People v. Deere, 808 P.2d 1181.)
    The next year, the defendant went to the Federal District 
Court. He remained there for the rest of the decade, until 
2001. When he lost there, he appealed, and in 2003, the Federal 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit sent the case back to 
the district court for another hearing. Today, 14 years after 
State appeals were completed, and 23 years after Michelle and 
Melissa were taken from their mother, the case remains before 
the same district court.
    Vanessa Iberri and her friend Kelly, also 12 years old, 
were both shot in the head while walking through a campground 
in 1981. Kelly survived, but Vanessa did not. The killer did 
not dispute that he shot the two girls. (The case is described 
in People v. Edwards, 819 P.2d 436.) The State courts finished 
their review of the case in 1991--a full decade after the 
crimes were comitted. The killer then went to Federal court in 
1993. The Federal District Court finally held an evidentiary 
hearing in December 2004, and dismissed the case in March of 
this year. Twelve years after the case entered the Federal 
courts, and 24 years after the murders occurred, the appeal to 
the Federal Court of Appeals is just beginning.
    Michelle Melander was 5 months old, and her brother 
Michael, then 5 years old, were kidnapped in Parker, Arizona, 
in July 1981. The killer dropped off Michael along the road. 
Michelle's body was discovered six days later at a garbage dump 
several miles down the same road. She had been severely beaten 
and sexually mutilated. The State court opinion describes the 
many injuries that this helpless baby suffered. The man who 
committed this horrific crime later attempted to kidnap and 
rape a 10-year-old girl.
    State courts finished their review of his case in 1991. 
(People v. Pensinger, 805 P.2d 899.) The case then went to 
Federal District Court in 1992. The defendant raised claims 
that he had never argued in State court, so the Federal court 
sent the case back to State court. Five years later, the case 
returned to Federal court. Today, the case remains before the 
same Federal District Court where the Federal appeals began in 
1992. Baby Michelle would be 24 years old now if she had lived, 
and there is no end in sight for her killer's appeals.
    The habeas corpus reforms enacted with the Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 were supposed to 
prevent delays in Federal collateral review. As the Justice 
Department noted in testimony before the House Crime 
Subcommittee in July 2003, there are ``significant gaps [in the 
habeas corpus statutes] *_*_* which can result in highly 
protracted litigation, and some of the reforms that Congress 
did adopt in 1996 have been substantially undermined in 
judicial application.''\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\Advancing Justice Through Forensic DNA Technology: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security of the 
House. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 22-23 (2003) (prepared 
statement of Sarah V. Hart, Director, National Institute of Justice, 
Department of Justice).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                              SECTION 303

    Section 303 of H.R. 3132 would effectively restrict the 
jurisdiction of Federal courts to entertain a first petition 
for Federal habeas corpus review, in cases involving the murder 
of a child, to the same grounds that now govern their ability 
to consider second or successive petitions for Federal habeas 
corpus review filed by any State prisoner. Thus, in State cases 
involving the murder of a child, Federal habeas courts would no 
longer be able to review any exhausted Federal constitutional 
claim; rather, Federal courts would only have jurisdiction to 
consider habeas claims based on: (1) new rules of 
constitutional law that have been made retroactively applicable 
by the Supreme Court; or (2) newly discovered evidence that 
clearly and convincingly establishes that, but for the 
existence of a constitutional error, no reasonable fact finder 
would have found the petitioner guilty of the underlying 
offense.
    Section 303 also imposes time limits and substantive limits 
on Federal courts' review of habeas corpus petitions 
challenging a State-court conviction for killing a child. In 
the district court, parties will be required to move for an 
evidentiary hearing within 90 days of the completion of 
briefing, the court must act on the motion within 30 days, and 
the hearing must begin 60 days later and last no longer than 3 
months. All district court review must be completed within 15 
months of the completion of briefing. In the court of appeals, 
the court must complete review within 120 days of the 
completion of briefing. In most cases, these limits will ensure 
that Federal review of a defendant's appeal is completed within 
less than two years. This section also makes these deadlines 
practical and enforceable by limiting Federal review to those 
claims presenting meaningful evidence that the defendant did 
not commit the crime--defendants would be barred from re-
litigating claims unrelated to guilt or innocence. Defendants 
will continue to be permitted to litigate all their claims in 
State court on direct review and State-habeas review, and in 
petitions for certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court.
    Some critics contend that Congress lacks the authority to 
narrow the set of issues that Federal courts may review on 
collateral review of State convictions--and that any such 
narrowing would ``suspend'' the writ of habeas corpus.
    First, it bears emphasis that the legislation in no way 
limits the State courts' review of State criminal convictions, 
nor does it affect the U.S. Supreme Court's review of either a 
defendant's direct appeals or State-habeas petitions. The 
provision only restricts the Federal habeas review that begins 
in the lower Federal courts after all State appeals and U.S. 
Supreme Court certiorari reviews are completed. Congress has 
clear authority to limit such review.
    When the 1996 limits on Federal habeas were enacted, some 
criminal defendants argued that those restrictions constituted 
an unconstitutional ``suspension'' of Federal habeas. The 
Federal courts rejected this argument at the time, ruling that 
Congress has the power both to expand and to limit Federal 
habeas review of State convictions. In Felker v. Turpin, 116 
S.Ct. 2333 (1996), the U.S. Supreme Court noted the utter lack 
of basis for the view that Congress is required to grant lower 
Federal courts unrestricted power over State convictions:

        The first Congress made the writ of habeas corpus 
        available only to prisoners confined under the 
        authority of the United States, not under State 
        authority. *_*_*_* It was not until 1867 that Congress 
        made the writ generally available in ``all cases where 
        any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in 
        violation of [federal law].'' And it was not until well 
        into this century that this Court interpreted that 
        provision to allow a final judgment of conviction to be 
        collaterally attacked on habeas.

    The Supreme Court concluded: ``We have long recognized that 
the power to award the writ by any of the courts of the United 
States, must be given by written law, and we have likewise 
recognized that judgments about the proper scope of the writ 
are normally for Congress to make.''
    The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
elaborated on this point in Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856 (rev'd 
on other grounds, 521 U.S. 320), explaining the nature of the 
constitutional habeas right:

        The writ known in 1789 was the pre-trial contest to the 
        executive's power to hold a person captive, the device 
        that prevents arbitrary detention without trial. The 
        power thus enshrined did not include the ability to 
        reexamine judgments rendered by courts possessing 
        jurisdiction. Under the original practice, ``a judgment 
        of conviction rendered by a court of general criminal 
        jurisdiction was conclusive proof that confinement was 
        legal *_*_* [and] prevented issuance of a writ.'' The 
        founding-era historical evidence suggests a prevailing 
        view that State courts were adequate fora for 
        protecting Federal rights. Based on this assumption, 
        there was (and is) no constitutionally enshrined right 
        to mount a collateral attack on a State court's 
        judgment in the inferior Article III courts and, a 
        fortiori, no mandate that State court judgments 
        embracing questionable (or even erroneous) 
        interpretations of the Federal Constitution be reviewed 
        by the inferior Article III courts. (Citations 
        omitted.)

    The Seventh Circuit concluded: ``Any suggestion that the 
[Constitution] forbids every contraction of the [federal 
habeas] power bestowed by Congress in 1885, and expanded by the 
1948 and 1966 amendments, is untenable.''
    The scope of Federal review of State convictions clearly is 
a matter for legislative determination--it is not dictated by 
constitutional mandates. It is for Congress to decide how much 
review, and under what conditions and limits, is appropriate. 
Under section 303 of the legislation, habeas claims may 
continue to go forward if they meet the ``actual innocence'' 
test in 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(e)(2). Section 2254(e)(2) does not 
simply require that the evidence could show actual innocence. 
Rather, it requires that the evidence of innocence be clear and 
convincing, and it requires that petitioner show that he could 
not previously have discovered the evidence through due 
diligence.
    The Justice Department proposed using the actual innocence 
test contained in title 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(e)(2) (or the 
related provision in Sec. 2244(b)(2)) as the standard for 
allowing unexhausted or defaulted claims to go forward in its 
July 17, 2003 testimony before the House Crime Subcommittee. 
State prosecutors also have stressed the importance of using 
this standard--rather than a simple claim of actual innocence--
as a gateway for allowing procedurally improper claims to 
proceed. The purpose of habeas review is not simply to litigate 
the trial to reweigh the same evidence that the jury already 
considered. However, if the standard for an exception to 
procedural rules were just a claim of innocence, any defendant 
who went to trial could simply present the same evidence that 
he presented to (and that was rejected by) the jury. Moreover, 
in every criminal trial, the defense counsel will choose not to 
use some of the exculpatory evidence that is available to him. 
Such evidence may be cumulative--it merely reproves a fact 
whose existence already is strongly proved by other evidence. 
Alternatively, the evidence may be insubstantial--it does not 
show much. A system of procedure simply could not function if 
all of such evidence could be used as a basis for further 
litigation and further hearings. There must be a gatekeeper in 
place for narrowing the range of evidence to that which is 
truly worth a second look. Evidence that previously was not 
available to the defense meets this standard.
    Existing sections 2254(e)(2) and 2244(b)(2) of title 18, 
are proven and flexible. These two code sections were enacted 
as part of the 1996 reforms--they have been in use for nearly a 
decade. ``Discoverable through due diligence'' is a flexible 
standard that gives courts discretion to decide whether the 
defendant really could have presented his evidence earlier (and 
thus it likely is merely cumulative or is not probative), or 
whether it is evidence that the defendant surely would have 
presented if he had access to it (and thus it is important).
    Opponents of this standard cannot cite a single case where 
18 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 2254(e)(2) or 2244(b)(2) have prevented a 
court from considering a compelling claim of actual innocence. 
If these standards are so overly restrictive, surely opponents 
would be able to cite at least one case where these sections 
barred a claim that we could all agree should have been allowed 
to go forward.
    The reason for requiring that habeas evidence be able to 
show ``clear and convincing'' proof of innocence (rather than 
just preponderance) is simple: it is the jury which heard all 
of the witnesses testify and that heard all of the evidence 
when it was still fresh. If the jury comes to a conclusion 
about the facts after reviewing all of the evidence at trial, 
that conclusion is entitled to deference. The jury's findings 
should be set aside only if a contrary finding is clear enough 
that it outweighs the superior access to the evidence enjoyed 
by the jury.

         DEATH PENALTY PROVISIONS IN THE CHILDREN'S SAFETY ACT

    Sections 302 and 402 of H.R. 3132 expand application of the 
death penalty to any killing of a minor or sexual abuse of a 
minor resulting in the death of the minor. The need for a swift 
and effective death penalty is significant in the case of 
violent offenders who murder children.
    Several scientifically valid statistical studies--those 
that examine a period of years, and control for national 
trends--consistently show that capital punishment is a 
substantial deterrent and saves lives--recent estimates show 
that each execution deters 18 murders. H. Naci Mocan, R. Kaj 
Gittings, Removals from Death Row, Executions, and Homicide, 
University of Colorado at Denver, Dep't of Economics, at 21 
(available on the Internet at: 
http://econ.cudenver.edu/gittings/KajPaperJune.pdf). Hashem 
Dezhbaksh, Paul H. Rubin, Joanna Mehlhop Shepherd, Does Capital 
Punishment Have A Deterrent Effect? New Evidence from Post-
moratorium Panel Data, Emory University (January 2002), at 27 
(study available on the Internet at: http://
userwww.service.emory.edu/cozden/Dezhbakhsh--01--01--
paper.pdf); Layson, Homicide and Deterrence: A Reexamination of 
the United States Time-Series Evidence, 52 S. Econ. J. 68, 75, 
80 (1984); Layson, United States Time-Series Homicide 
Regressions with Adaptive Expectations, 62 Bull. N.Y. Acad. 
Med. 589 (1986).
    With respect to the Federal death penalty, opponents 
continue to argue, contrary to the evidence, that imposition of 
the death penalty has been racially-biased and had a 
disproportionate impact on minority populations. To the 
contrary, the evidence demonstrates that the Federal death 
penalty, with its rigorous review procedures, is imposed at a 
higher rate against white defendants than minority defendants.
    The Justice Department has concluded, after two 
comprehensive studies--one conducted in 2000 (Attorney General 
Janet Reno) and another in 2001, that at no stage of the [death 
penalty] review process were decisions to recommend or approve 
the seeking of a capital sentence made at higher rates for 
black or hispanic defendants than for white defendants.\17\ For 
example, as noted in the September 12, 2000 Justice Department 
study, in the cases considered by the Attorney General, the 
Attorney General approved seeking the death penalty for 38 
percent of white defendants, 25 percent of black defendants, 
and 20 percent of hispanic defendants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\U.S. Department of Justice, 12 Sept. 2000--Survey of the 
Federal Death Penalty System (1988-2000), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/dag/pubdoc/dp--survey--toc.pdf. U.S. Department of 
Justice, 6 June 2001-The Federal Death Penalty System: Supplementary 
Data, Analysis and Revised Protocols for Capitol Case Review, available 
at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/pubdoc/dp--survey--toc.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    At every stage of the Federal penalty review process (i.e., 
U.S. Attorney recommendation, Capital Case Review Committee, 
Attorney General decision), the recommendation and decision to 
seek the death penalty was less likely at each stage of the 
process for black and hispanic defendants than for white 
defendants. In other words, United States Attorneys recommended 
the death penalty in smaller proportions of the submitted cases 
involving black or hispanic defendants than in those involving 
white defendants; the Attorney General's capital case review 
committee likewise recommended the death penalty in smaller 
proportions of the submitted cases involving black or hispanic 
defendants than in those involving white defendants; and the 
Attorney General made a decision to seek the death penalty in 
smaller proportions of the submitted cases involving black or 
hispanic defendants than in those involving white defendants. 
(2000 Report at p. 7)
    More specifically, in the cases considered by the Attorney 
General, the Attorney General decided to seek the death penalty 
for 38 percent of the white defendants, 25 percent of the black 
defendants, and 20 percent of the hispanic defendants. (Sept. 
12 report at 7.) The finding that the death penalty was sought 
at lower rates for black and hispanic defendants than for white 
defendants held true both in ``intraracial'' cases, involving 
defendants and victims of the same race and ethnicity, and in 
``interracial'' cases, involving defendants and victims of 
different races or ethnicities. (Sept. 12 report at 25-26.)
    The 2001 Report reached similar findings--there was no 
evidence of favoritism towards White defendants in comparison 
with minority defendants. Rather, potential capital cases 
involving black or hispanic defendants were less likely to 
result in capital charges and submission of the case to the 
review procedure. Specifically, capital charges were brought 
and the case was submitted for review for 81 percent of the 
white defendants; the corresponding figures for black 
defendants and hispanic defendants were 79 percent and 56 
percent respectively.
    Likewise, considering the process as a whole, potential 
capital cases involving black or hispanic defendants were less 
likely to result in decisions to seek the death penalty. 
Specifically, the Attorney General ultimately decided to seek 
the death penalty for 27 percent of the white defendants (44 
out of 166), 17 percent of the black defendants (71 out of 
408), and 9 percent of the hispanic defendants (32 out of 350).
    Despite these facts, critics continue to maintain that 
these rates are disproportionate to the percentages of minority 
populations. Such a claim ignores one simple truth--crime and 
victimization are not evenly distributed across the general 
population, and there is no reason to expect that the racial 
and ethnic proportions in potential capital cases will be the 
same as the racial and ethnic proportions in the general 
population.

                                Hearings

    The Committee's Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and 
Homeland Security held a series of three hearings on child 
crime issues related to H.R. 3132, on June 7 and 9, 2005. The 
first hearing focused on H.R. 2138, the ``Prevention and 
Deterrence of Violence Against Children's Act,'' and H.R. 2188, 
the ``Protection Against Sexual Exploitation of Children Act.'' 
Testimony was received from four witnesses, representing the 
United States Department of Justice, the Attorney General from 
the State of Florida, Ms. Carol Fornoff, the mother of Christy 
Ann Fornoff, who was murdered in 1984, and a representative 
from the Federal Public Defender in Montana.
    The second hearing, on June 9, 2005, focused on legislative 
proposals relating to child safety. Testimony was received 
from: the Honorable Mark Foley, from the 16th Congressional 
District of the State of Florida; the Honorable Ted Poe, from 
the 2nd Congressional District of the State of Texas; the 
Honorable Ginny Brown-Waite, from the 5th Congressional 
District of the State of Florida; and the Honorable Earl 
Pomeroy, who serves At Large in the State of North Dakota.
    The third hearing, on June 9, 2005, focused on protecting 
children from sexual predators and violent criminals. Testimony 
was received from a representative from the United States 
Department of Justice, Ernie Allen, President of the National 
Center for Missing and Exploited Children; Amie Zyla, a child 
victim of sexual assault by a convicted sex offender; and Dr. 
Fred Berlin, Associate Professor in the Department of 
Psychiatry at the Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine.

                        Committee Consideration

    On July 27, 2005, the Committee met in open session and 
ordered favorably reported the bill H.R. 3132 with an amendment 
by a recorded vote of 22 yeas to 4 nays, a quorum being 
present.

                         Vote of the Committee

    In compliance with clause 3(b) of Rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, the following rollcall votes 
occurred during the Committee's consideration of H.R. 3132.
    1. The Committee voted 16 yeas to 17 nays not to adopt an 
amendment offered by Rep. Scott which would have deleted the 5-
year mandatory minimum penalty for failing to register in 
Section 105 of H.R. 3132.

                                                 ROLLCALL NO. 1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                       Ayes            Nays           Present
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Hyde........................................................
Mr. Coble.......................................................                              X
Mr. Smith (Texas)...............................................                              X
Mr. Gallegly....................................................                              X
Mr. Goodlatte...................................................
Mr. Chabot......................................................                              X
Mr. Lungren.....................................................              X
Mr. Jenkins.....................................................                              X
Mr. Cannon......................................................                              X
Mr. Bachus......................................................
Mr. Inglis......................................................              X
Mr. Hostettler..................................................                              X
Mr. Green.......................................................                              X
Mr. Keller......................................................                              X
Mr. Issa........................................................                              X
Mr. Flake.......................................................              X
Mr. Pence.......................................................                              X
Mr. Forbes......................................................                              X
Mr. King........................................................                              X
Mr. Feeney......................................................                              X
Mr. Franks......................................................                              X
Mr. Gohmert.....................................................              X
Mr. Conyers.....................................................              X
Mr. Berman......................................................              X
Mr. Boucher.....................................................
Mr. Nadler......................................................              X
Mr. Scott.......................................................              X
Mr. Watt........................................................              X
Ms. Lofgren.....................................................
Ms. Jackson Lee.................................................              X
Ms. Waters......................................................              X
Mr. Meehan......................................................              X
Mr. Delahunt....................................................
Mr. Wexler......................................................
Mr. Weiner......................................................              X
Mr. Schiff......................................................                              X
Ms. Sanchez.....................................................              X
Mr. Van Hollen..................................................              X
Ms. Wasserman Schultz...........................................              X
Mr. Sensenbrenner, Chairman.....................................                              X
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
    Total.......................................................             16              17
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    2. The Committee voted 12 yeas to 18 nays not to adopt an 
amendment offered by Rep. Scott which would have struck section 
303, relating to habeas reform, in H.R. 3132.

                                                 ROLLCALL NO. 2
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                       Ayes            Nays           Present
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Hyde........................................................
Mr. Coble.......................................................                              X
Mr. Smith (Texas)...............................................                              X
Mr. Gallegly....................................................
Mr. Goodlatte...................................................
Mr. Chabot......................................................                              X
Mr. Lungren.....................................................                              X
Mr. Jenkins.....................................................                              X
Mr. Cannon......................................................                              X
Mr. Bachus......................................................
Mr. Inglis......................................................                              X
Mr. Hostettler..................................................                              X
Mr. Green.......................................................                              X
Mr. Keller......................................................                              X
Mr. Issa........................................................                              X
Mr. Flake.......................................................                              X
Mr. Pence.......................................................
Mr. Forbes......................................................                              X
Mr. King........................................................                              X
Mr. Feeney......................................................                              X
Mr. Franks......................................................                              X
Mr. Gohmert.....................................................                              X
Mr. Conyers.....................................................              X
Mr. Berman......................................................              X
Mr. Boucher.....................................................
Mr. Nadler......................................................              X
Mr. Scott.......................................................              X
Mr. Watt........................................................
Ms. Lofgren.....................................................
Ms. Jackson Lee.................................................              X
Ms. Waters......................................................              X
Mr. Meehan......................................................
Mr. Delahunt....................................................
Mr. Wexler......................................................              X
Mr. Weiner......................................................              X
Mr. Schiff......................................................              X
Ms. Sanchez.....................................................              X
Mr. Van Hollen..................................................              X
Ms. Wasserman Schultz...........................................              X
Mr. Sensenbrenner, Chairman.....................................                              X
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
    Total.......................................................             12              18
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    3. The Committee voted 9 yeas to 17 nays not to adopt an 
amendment offered by Rep. Nadler to amend sections 922(d) and 
(g) of title 18 United States Code to include as a prohibited 
person anyone convicted of a sex offense against a minor.

                                                 ROLLCALL NO. 3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                       Ayes            Nays           Present
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Hyde........................................................
Mr. Coble.......................................................                              X
Mr. Smith (Texas)...............................................                              X
Mr. Gallegly....................................................
Mr. Goodlatte...................................................
Mr. Chabot......................................................                              X
Mr. Lungren.....................................................                              X
Mr. Jenkins.....................................................                              X
Mr. Cannon......................................................                              X
Mr. Bachus......................................................
Mr. Inglis......................................................                              X
Mr. Hostettler..................................................                              X
Mr. Green.......................................................                              X
Mr. Keller......................................................                              X
Mr. Issa........................................................                              X
Mr. Flake.......................................................                              X
Mr. Pence.......................................................
Mr. Forbes......................................................                              X
Mr. King........................................................                              X
Mr. Feeney......................................................
Mr. Franks......................................................                              X
Mr. Gohmert.....................................................                              X
Mr. Conyers.....................................................              X
Mr. Berman......................................................
Mr. Boucher.....................................................
Mr. Nadler......................................................              X
Mr. Scott.......................................................              X
Mr. Watt........................................................
Ms. Lofgren.....................................................
Ms. Jackson Lee.................................................
Ms. Waters......................................................
Mr. Meehan......................................................              X
Mr. Delahunt....................................................
Mr. Wexler......................................................
Mr. Weiner......................................................              X
Mr. Schiff......................................................              X
Ms. Sanchez.....................................................              X
Mr. Van Hollen..................................................              X
Ms. Wasserman Schultz...........................................              X
Mr. Sensenbrenner, Chairman.....................................                              X
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
    Total.......................................................              9              17
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    4. The Committee voted 22 yeas to 4 nays to report 
favorably H.R. 3132, as amended.

                                                 ROLLCALL NO. 4
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                       Ayes            Nays           Present
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Hyde........................................................
Mr. Coble.......................................................              X
Mr. Smith (Texas)...............................................              X
Mr. Gallegly....................................................
Mr. Goodlatte...................................................
Mr. Chabot......................................................              X
Mr. Lungren.....................................................              X
Mr. Jenkins.....................................................              X
Mr. Cannon......................................................              X
Mr. Bachus......................................................
Mr. Inglis......................................................              X
Mr. Hostettler..................................................              X
Mr. Green.......................................................              X
Mr. Keller......................................................              X
Mr. Issa........................................................
Mr. Flake.......................................................
Mr. Pence.......................................................
Mr. Forbes......................................................              X
Mr. King........................................................              X
Mr. Feeney......................................................              X
Mr. Franks......................................................              X
Mr. Gohmert.....................................................              X
Mr. Conyers.....................................................                              X
Mr. Berman......................................................
Mr. Boucher.....................................................
Mr. Nadler......................................................                              X
Mr. Scott.......................................................                              X
Mr. Watt........................................................
Ms. Lofgren.....................................................              X
Ms. Jackson Lee.................................................
Ms. Waters......................................................
Mr. Meehan......................................................              X
Mr. Delahunt....................................................
Mr. Wexler......................................................
Mr. Weiner......................................................              X
Mr. Schiff......................................................              X
Ms. Sanchez.....................................................                              X
Mr. Van Hollen..................................................              X
Ms. Wasserman Schultz...........................................              X
Mr. Sensenbrenner, Chairman.....................................              X
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
    Total.......................................................             22               4
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                      Committee Oversight Findings

    In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of Rule XIII of the Rules 
of the House of Representatives, the Committee reports that the 
findings and recommendations of the Committee, based on 
oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of Rule X of the 
Rules of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in the 
descriptive portions of this report.

               New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures

    Clause 3(c)(2) of Rule XIII of the Rules of the House of 
Representatives is inapplicable because this legislation does 
not provide new budgetary authority or increased tax 
expenditures.

                    Performance Goals and Objectives

    The Committee states that pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of 
Rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, H.R. 
3132, is intended to improve the national sex offender 
registration program and protect children from sexual abuse and 
exploitation and other violent crimes.

                   Constitutional Authority Statement

    Pursuant to clause 3(d)(1) of Rule XIII of the Rules of the 
House of Representatives, the Committee finds the authority for 
this legislation in article I, section 8, of the Constitution.

               Section-by-Section Analysis and Discussion

    The following discussion describes the bill as reported by 
the Committee.
Sec. 1. Short Title; Table of Contents
    This section designates the short title as the ``Children's 
Safety Act of 2005,'' and lists a table of contents for the 
five titles in the Act.

        TITLE I--SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION AND NOTIFICATION ACT

Sec. 101. Short Title
    This section names the short title for title I as the ``Sex 
Offender Registration Act.''
Sec. 102. Declaration of Purpose
    This section states the purpose of title I is for Congress 
to create a comprehensive national system for the registration 
of sex offenders in order to protect children, and is in 
response to brutal sexual attacks against children and adults 
by convicted sexual offenders: (1) Jacob Wetterling; (2) Megan 
Nicole Kanka; (3) Pam Lyncher; (4) Jetseta Gaga; (5) Dru 
Sjodin; (6) Jessica Lunsford; (7) Sarah Lunde; (8) Amie Zyla; 
(9) Christy Fornoff; and (10) Alexandra Nicole Zapp.

SUBTITLE A--JACOB WETTERLING SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION AND NOTIFICATION 
                                PROGRAM

Sec. 111. Relevant Definitions, Including Amie Zyla Expansion of Sex 
        Offender Definition and Expanded Inclusion of Child Predators
    This section sets forth the definitions for title I of the 
Act and expands several existing terms to include a broader 
category of sexual offenders, additional specified crimes 
against minors, and needed clarifications to the existing law. 
In particular, the category of crimes covered by the Act is 
expanded to include juvenile sex offenses, possession of child 
pornography, and a new definition of sex offense.
Sec. 112. Registry Requirements for Jurisdictions
    This section requires each jurisdiction to maintain a 
jurisdiction-wide sex offender registry conforming to the 
requirements of this title and authorizes the Attorney General 
to prescribe guidelines to carry out the purposes of the title.
Sec. 113. Registry Requirements for Sex Offenders
    This section requires a sex offender to register, and 
maintain current information in each jurisdiction where the sex 
offender resides, is employed or attends school. It also 
requires that such registration be filed prior to release from 
jail or no later than 5 days after a sentence not requiring 
imprisonment is imposed, not later than 5 days after any change 
in residence, employment or student status. The Attorney 
General is authorized to issue guidelines on application of the 
Act to sex offenders who were not previously covered by the sex 
offender registration requirements. Each jurisdiction is 
required to provide a felony criminal offense for failure to 
comply with the registration requirements.
Sec. 114. Information Required in Registration
    This section specifies, at a minimum, what information the 
registry must include. The sex offender must provide: (1) the 
name (and any alias) of the sex offenders; (2) the sex 
offender's Social Security number; (3) the sex offender's 
address; (4) the sex offender's employment address; (5) the sex 
offender's school address; (6) the license plate of any vehicle 
owned or used by the sex offender; (7) a photograph; (8) a set 
of fingerprints and palm prints; (9) DNA information; and (10) 
any other information required by the Attorney General. The 
jurisdiction must provide: (1) a statement of the facts 
underlying the conviction for which the sex offender is 
registering; (2) the sex offender's criminal history; and (3) 
any other information required by the Attorney General.
Sec. 115. Duration of Registration Requirement
    This section specifies the duration of the registration 
requirement: (a) life for sex offenders who commit a felony sex 
offense, commit a specified crime against a minor, or commit a 
second misdemeanor sex offense against a minor; or (b) 20 years 
for a sex offender who commits a misdemeanor sex offense 
involving a minor.
Sec. 116. In Person Verification
    This section requires a sex offender to appear in person 
for verification of registration information no less frequently 
than once every 6 months.
Sec. 117. Duty to Notify Sex Offenders of Registration Requirements and 
        to Register
    This section requires a jurisdiction official to inform the 
sex offender of the registration requirements, make sure the 
sex offender understands the requirements by executing a form 
that confirms the sex offender's understanding, and register 
the sex offender.
Sec. 118. Jessica Lunsford Address Verification Program
    This section establishes the Jessica Lunsford Verification 
Program that requires State officials to verify the residence 
of each registered sex offender every month if the underlying 
conviction is a felony sex offense or specified criminal 
offense against a minor, or every quarter if the underlying 
conviction is a misdemeanor sex offense. In carrying out such 
verification, the jurisdiction official can use a 
nonforwardable mailing which can be sent on a random date and 
returned, including a notarized signature, by a set date. The 
failure to return such a mailing would constitute a failure to 
register.
Sec. 119. National Sex Offender Registry
    This section requires the Attorney General to maintain a 
National Sex Offender Registry.
Sec. 120. Dru Sjodin National Sex Offender Public Website
    This section creates the Dru Sjodin National Sex Offender 
Public Website which allows the public to obtain relevant 
information about sex offenders through a single query to the 
website. In addition, the Attorney General is required to 
forward electronically to any relevant jurisdiction any changes 
in the registry information for a sex offender.
Sec. 121. Public Access to Sex Offender Information through the 
        Internet
    This section requires each jurisdiction to make available 
to the public through an Internet site information pertaining 
to a sex offender except for the offender's Social Security 
Number, the victim's identity or any other information exempted 
by the Attorney General.
Sec. 122. Megan Nicole Kanka and Alexandra Nicole Zapp Community 
        Notification Program
    This section requires an appropriate official to notify, 
within 5 days of a change in a sex offender's information, the 
following: (1) the Attorney General, who shall include the 
update information in the National Sex Offender Registry; (2) 
an appropriate law enforcement agency in the area where the sex 
offender resides, is employed or is a student; (3) each 
jurisdiction to or from which a change in residence, work or 
student status occurs; (4) any agency responsible for 
conducting employment-related background checks; (5) social 
service entities responsible for protecting minors in the child 
welfare system; and (6) volunteer organizations where contact 
with minors or other vulnerable individuals might occur.
Sec. 123. Actions to be Taken When Sex Offender Fails to Comply
    This section requires an appropriate official from the 
State or other jurisdiction to notify the Attorney General and 
appropriate State and local law enforcement agencies to inform 
them of any failure by a sex offender to comply with the 
registry requirements. The appropriate official, the Attorney 
General, and each such State and local law enforcement agency 
is required to take any appropriate action to ensure 
compliance.
Sec. 124. Immunity for Good Faith Conduct
    This section provides that law enforcement agencies, 
employees of law enforcement agencies, contractors acting at 
the direction of law enforcement agencies, and officials from 
State and other jurisdictions shall not be held criminally or 
civilly liable for carrying out a duty in good faith.
Sec. 125. Development and Availability of Registry Management Software
    This section requires the Attorney General to develop 
software and make it available to States and jurisdictions to 
establish, maintain, publish and share sex offender registries.
Sec. 126. Federal Duty when State Programs Not Minimally Sufficient
    This section requires that, if the Attorney General 
determines that a jurisdiction does not have a minimally 
sufficient sex offender registry program, the Attorney General 
shall seek, to the extent practicable, to carry out the 
obligations of the registry program.
Sec. 127. Compliance by State and Other Jurisdictions
    This section requires jurisdictions to comply with the 
requirements of this title within two years of enactment. The 
Attorney General may authorize a one-year extension to a 
jurisdiction to comply.
Sec. 128. Failure to Comply
    This section imposes a 10-percent reduction in Byrne grant 
and Local Government Law Enforcement Block grants in funding to 
any jurisdiction that fails to comply with the requirements of 
this Act.
Sec. 129. Sex Offender Management Assistance (SOMA) Program
    This section authorizes the Sex Offender Management 
Assistance (SOMA) Program to fund grants to jurisdictions to 
implement the sex offender registry requirements. Bonus 
payments to jurisdictions are authorized at 10 percent of prior 
fiscal year funding for those entities complying with the 
requirements within 1 year of enactment; and 5 percent bonus 
payments for those entities complying with the requirements 
within 2 years of enactment. Finally, this section authorizes 
funding of such sums necessary to carry out this title for 
fiscal years 2006 through 2008.
Sec. 130. Demonstration Projects for Use of Electronic Monitoring 
        Devices
    This section authorizes the Attorney General to create up 
to 10 projects to demonstrate the extent to which electronic 
monitoring devices can be used effectively in a sex offender 
registry program.
Sec. 131. Bonus Payments to States that Implement Electronic Monitoring
    This section authorizes the Attorney General to award 
grants to States that implement electronic monitoring programs 
for life for certain dangerous sex offenders and for the period 
of court supervision for any other case.
Sec. 132. National Center for Missing and Exploited Children Access to 
        Interstate Identification Index
    This section provides NCMEC with access to Interstate 
Identification Index data to carry out its duties and 
responsibilities, and is limited to only those personnel who 
have met all requirements for training, certification and 
background screening.
Sec. 133. Limited Immunity for National Center for Missing and 
        Exploited Children with Respect to Cybertipline
    This section provides NCMEC with limited immunity related 
to its CyberTipline, except for intentional, reckless or other 
deliberate misconduct.

   SUBTITLE B--CRIMINAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OF REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS

Sec. 151. Amendments to Title 18, United States Code, Relating to Sex 
        Offender Registration
    This section creates a new Federal crime for a sex offender 
who receives notice of the requirements to register in a sex 
offender registry and: (1) is a Federal sex offender or (2) a 
State or local sex offender who travels in interstate or 
foreign commerce, or enters or leaves Indian country, and; (3) 
knowingly fails to register. Such an offense is punishable by a 
mandatory minimum sentence of 5 years imprisonment and a 
maximum of 20 years imprisonment. In addition, this modifies 
section 1001, of title 18 to add a mandatory minimum penalty of 
5 years imprisonment and a maximum of 20 years imprisonment for 
a false statement made in the investigation of various sex 
offenses. This section also requires a defendant to comply with 
registration requirements as a mandatory condition of probation 
or supervised release, and if such a violation of that 
condition occurs, the defendant's probation or supervised 
release shall be revoked and the defendant detained pending 
resolution of such revocation proceeding. The court shall 
impose a 5 year mandatory minimum sentence of imprisonment for 
a failure to register and a 10 year mandatory minimum sentence 
for an offense involving a violation of Chapters 109A, 109B, 
110 or 117. Finally, this section requires the Bureau of 
Prisons to register sex offenders as required under this title 
for the applicable jurisdiction.
Sec. 152. Investigation by United States Marshals of Sex Offender 
        Violations of Registration Requirements
    This section reiterates the United States Marshals 
authority to assist in the apprehension of sex offenders who 
have failed to comply with applicable registration 
requirements. In addition, this section authorizes funding of 
such sums as necessary to undertake these activities for fiscal 
years 2006 to 2008.
Sec. 153. Sex Offender Apprehension Grants
    This section authorizes funding of such sums as necessary 
for fiscal years 2006 to 2008 for the Attorney General to 
provide grants to States and other jurisdictions to apprehend 
sex offenders who fail to comply with registration 
requirements.
Sec. 154. Use of Any Controlled Substances to Facilitate Sex Offense
    This section creates an enhanced criminal penalty for the 
use of a controlled substance against a victim to facilitate 
the commission of a sex offense.
Sec. 155. Repeal of Predecessor Sex Offender Program
    This section repeals the predecessor sex offender registry 
program.

                      TITLE II--DNA FINGERPRINTING

Sec. 201. Short Title
    This section names the short title as the ``DNA 
Fingerprinting Act of 2005.''
Sec. 202. Expanding Use of DNA to Identify and Prosecute Sex Offenders
    This section amends the DNA Identification Act to eliminate 
the restrictions on the DNA profiles that can be included in 
the national DNA index (NDIS). Specifically, it strikes 
limiting language in Section 14132(a)(1)(C) that excludes 
unindicted arrestees and eliminates DNA profiles from NDIS; 
strikes the expungement provisions of Section 14132(d); and 
strikes the ``keyboard search'' provisions of Section 14132(e), 
which serve no purpose once the unjustified restrictions on 
including DNA profiles in NDIS are eliminated. This section 
also would authorize the Attorney General to collect DNA 
samples from Federal arrestees and detainees. Finally, this 
section strikes the exclusion of chapter 109A (``sexual abuse 
'') offenses from the statute of limitations tolling provision 
for cases involving DNA identification under 18 U.S.C. 3297.
Sec. 203. Stopping Violent Predators Against Children
    This section directs the Attorney General to give 
appropriate consideration to the need for collection and 
testing of DNA to stop violent predators against children.
Sec. 204. Model Code on Investigating Missing Persons and Deaths
    This section requires the Attorney General, within 60 days 
of enactment, to publish a model code for law enforcement 
officers when investigating a missing person or a death, 
including DNA analysis to help locate missing persons and 
identify human remains. In addition, this section directs the 
GAO to conduct a study 2 years after the publication of the 
model code on the extent to which States have implemented it.

TITLE III--PREVENTION AND DETERRENCE OF CRIMES AGAINST CHILDREN ACT OF 
                                  2005

Sec. 301. Short Title
    This section designates this title as the ``Prevention and 
Deterrence of Crimes Against Children Act of 2005.''
Sec. 302. Assured Punishment for Violent Crimes Against Children
    This section modifies the existing statute, section 
3559(d), of title 18, governing the sentencing of defendants 
for crimes committed against children, and adopts new penalties 
for felony crimes of violence (section 16 of title 18) crimes 
committed against children. Criminal penalties range from a 
death sentence or life imprisonment when a child is killed; a 
mandatory minimum of 30 years imprisonment to life where the 
crime of violence is a kidnapping, maiming, aggravated sexual 
abuse, sexual abuse or where the crime results in serious 
bodily injury (section 2119(2)); a mandatory minimum of 20 
years where the crime of violence results in bodily injury to 
the child (as defined in 1365); a mandatory minimum of 15 years 
to life imprisonment when the defendant uses a dangerous 
weapon; and a mandatory minimum of 10 years imprisonment or up 
to life in any other case (e.g. attempt or conspiracy to commit 
any crime of violence against a child).
Sec. 303. Ensuring Fair and Expeditious Federal Collateral Review of 
        Convictions for Killing of a Child.
    This section imposes time limits and substantive limits on 
Federal courts' review of habeas corpus petitions challenging a 
State-court conviction for killing a child. In the district 
court, parties will be required to move for an evidentiary 
hearing within 90 days of the completion of briefing, the court 
must act on the motion within 30 days, and the hearing must 
begin 60 days later and last no longer than 3 months. All 
district-court review must be completed within 15 months of the 
completion of briefing. In the court of appeals, the court must 
complete review within 120 days of the completion of briefing. 
In most cases, these limits will ensure that Federal review of 
a defendant's appeal is completed within less than two years. 
This section also makes these deadlines practical and 
enforceable by limiting Federal review to those claims 
presenting meaningful evidence that the defendant did not 
commit the crime--defendants would be barred from re-litigating 
claims unrelated to guilt or innocence. (Defendants still will 
be permitted to litigate all their claims in State court on 
direct review and State-habeas review, and in petitions for 
certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court).

           TITLE IV--PROTECTION AGAINST SEXUAL EXPLOITATION 
                        OF CHILDREN ACT OF 2005

Sec. 401. Short Title
    The short title of the section is entitled the ``Protection 
Against Sexual Exploitation of Children Act of 2005''.
Sec. 402. Increased Penalties for Sexual Offenses Against Children
    This section modifies the criminal penalties for several 
existing sexual offenses against children by amending:
    (a) Section 2241 to impose a mandatory minimum penalty of 
30 years to life for knowingly engaging in a sexual act with 
either a child less than 12 years old, or a child that is 12-16 
years old by using force or intoxicants if the perpetrator is 
at least 4 years older than the child; current law provides 
that the perpetrator may be imprisoned for zero years up to 
life;
    (b) Section 2241 to require a mandatory minimum of 10 years 
and a maximum of 25 years for engaging in abusive sexual 
contact--i.e., intentional touching of private parts with 
intent to abuse, humiliate, or sexually arouse, a child less 
than 12 years old, or 12-16 years old where the perpetrator 
used force or intoxicants and was at least 4 years older than 
the child; the current penalty is imprisonment for zero up to 
10 years;
    (c) Section 2245 to impose a mandatory minimum of 30 years 
imprisonment to life, or death where a perpetrator commits a 
sexual-abuse offense against a child less than 12 years old 
that results in death (current penalty is a sentence of death 
or imprisonment for zero years up to life);
    (d) Section 2251 to impose a mandatory minimum penalty of 
25 years up to life, life imprisonment for a second conviction; 
and death or life imprisonment, where the death of the child 
results from sexual abuse of a minor for the purpose of 
producing a visual depiction of such conduct, or where a legal 
guardian of a minor knowingly permits the minor to engage in 
such conduct for such purposes, or to advertise for a minor to 
engage in such conduct for such purposes. (Current law makes 
this offense punishable by 15 to 30 years imprisonment, and if 
the perpetrator has one prior conviction for sexual 
exploitation or abuse of children, 25 to 50 years imprisonment, 
and if the perpetrator has two such prior convictions, 35 years 
imprisonment up to life, and if conduct in the course of the 
offense results in death, punishment by death or imprisonment 
for zero years up to life.);
    (e) Section 2252 to impose a mandatory minimum of 20 years 
imprisonment up to life, or mandatory life imprisonment where 
the defendant has a prior conviction for the same offense, 
where a defendant knowingly ships, receives, distributes, 
sells, or possesses with intent to sell, except that a 
mandatory minimum of 10 years to a maximum of 30 years 
imprisonment would be imposed for possession of such material 
or imprisonment for 20 years if the perpetrator has a prior 
conviction for sexual exploitation or abuse of children.. 
(Current law makes all of these offenses other than simple 
possession punishable by 5 to 25 years' imprisonment, and if 
the perpetrator has a prior conviction for sexual exploitation 
or abuse of children, imprisonment for 15 to 40 years;
    (f) Section 2252A to impose new mandatory minimum penalties 
of 20 years up to life, and 10 years to life for possession to 
knowingly mail, ship, reproduce for distribution, sell, possess 
with intent to sell, or simply knowingly possess child 
pornography, or to knowingly provide to a minor a visual 
depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct. 
(Current law makes all of these offenses other than simple 
possession punishable by 5 to 20 years imprisonment, and zero 
to 10 years for simple possession).
    (g) Section 2252B to increase the mandatory minimum penalty 
from 4 years imprisonment to 10 years to a maximum of 30 years 
imprisonment for use of a misleading domain name on the 
Internet with the intent to deceive a minor into viewing 
material that is harmful to minors.
    (h) Section 2260 to increase mandatory minimum penalties to 
25 years to life imprisonment (30 years if perpetrator has 
prior conviction for sexual exploitation or abuse of child) for 
use of a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the 
purpose of producing a visual depiction of such conduct for 
importation into the United States or receive, ship, 
distribute, or sell, or possess with intent to ship, 
distribute, or sell, a visual depiction of a minor engaging in 
sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of importing such 
visual depiction into the United States. (Current law makes 
this offense punishable by zero to 10 years imprisonment, and 
if the perpetrator has a prior conviction for sexual 
exploitation or abuse of children, punishable by zero to 20 
years imprisonment.);
    (i) Section 2423 to increase mandatory minimum penalties to 
30 years up to life to knowingly transport in interstate 
commerce a minor with the intent that the minor engage in child 
prostitution or in sexual activity for which any person can be 
charged with a criminal offense. (Current law makes this 
offense punishable by imprisonment for 5 to 30 years). In 
addition, this section would impose a mandatory minimum of 10 
to 30 years imprisonment to travel in interstate commerce or 
into the United States for the purpose of engaging in a sexual 
act with a minor if that act would be an offense under chapter 
109A if it occurred in a Federal jurisdiction, or for the 
purpose of engaging in a commercial sex act with a minor, or to 
be a U.S. citizen or permanent resident and travel in foreign 
commerce (without regard to the purpose of the travel) and 
either engage in a sexual act with a minor if that act would be 
an offense under chapter 109A. Also, this section imposes a 30 
year mandatory minimum where a perpetrator, for commercial 
advantage or financial gain, arrange or facilitate the travel 
of a person knowing that such person is traveling in interstate 
or foreign commerce in order to either engage in a sexual act 
with a minor if that act would be an offense under chapter 109A 
if it occurred in a Federal jurisdiction, or to engage in a 
commercial sex act with a minor. (Current law makes this 
offense punishable by zero to 30 years imprisonment.)

 TITLE V--FOSTER CHILD PROTECTION AND CHILD SEXUAL PREDATOR DETERRENCE 
                                  ACT

Sec. 501. Short Title
    This section creates a short title ``Foster Child 
Protection and Child Sexual Predator Deterrence Act.''
Sec. 502. Requirement to Complete Background Checks Before Approval of 
        Any Foster or Adoptive Placement and to Check National Crime 
        Information databases and State Child Abuse Registries abd 
        Suspension and Subsequent Elimination of Opt-Out
    This section amends section 471(a)(20) of the Social 
Security Act to require each State to complete background 
checks and abuse registries and to check the national criminal 
information databases relating to any foster parent or adoptive 
parent application, before approval of such an application, and 
provides read-only access to agencies responsible for foster 
parent or adoptive parent placements.
Sec. 503. Access to Federal Crime Information Databases by Child 
        Welfare Agencies For Certain Purposes
    This section authorizes the Attorney General to provide 
read-only access to the national crime information databases 
(section 435 of title 28, United States Code) to carry out 
criminal history records checks. An individual who misuses such 
information would be subject to criminal penalties of up to 10 
years incarceration.
Sec. 504. Penalties for Coercion and Enticement by Sex Offenders
    This section amends section 2422(a) of title 18, United 
States Code, to increase penalties for coercion and enticement 
of a minor by a sex offender.
Sec. 505. Penalties for Conduct Relating to Child Prostitution
    This section increases mandatory-minimum penalties for 
conduct relating to child prostitution ranging from a mandatory 
minimum of 10 years to a mandatory minimum of 20 years 
depending on the severity of the conduct.
Sec. 506. Penalties for Sexual Abuse
    This section amends several statutes relating to sexual 
abuse to create mandatory minimum sentences of 30 years to 
life, and 25 years to life, respectively, for aggravated sexual 
abuse; 15 to 40 years for sexual abuse; and new mandatory 
minimums for abusive sexual contact ranging from 2 years to 5 
years, and maximum terms ranging from 10 to 30 years, depending 
on the severity of the conduct.
Sec. 507. Sex Offender Submission to Search as Condition of Release
    This section expands the list of mandatory conditions of 
probation and supervised release to include submission by the 
sex offender under supervision to searches by law enforcement 
and probation officers with reasonable suspicion, and to 
searches by probation officers in the lawful discharge of their 
supervision functions. This provision is important to permit 
effective monitoring and oversight of released offenders, and 
to enforce the conditions of their release.
Sec. 508. Kidnapping Jurisdiction
    This section expands the Federal jurisdiction nexus for 
kidnapping comparable to that of many other Federal crimes to 
include travel by the offender in interstate or foreign 
commerce, or use of the mails or other means, facilities, or 
instrumentalities of interstate or foreign commerce in 
furtherance of the offense.
Sec. 509. Marital Communication and Adverse Spousal Privilege
    This section restricts the scope of the common law marital 
privileges by making them inapplicable in a criminal child 
abuse case in which the abuser or his or her spouse invokes a 
privilege to avoid testifying.
Sec. 510. Abuse and Neglect of Indian Children
    This section amends 18 U.S.C. Section 1153, the ``Major 
Crimes Act'' for Indian country cases to add felony child abuse 
or neglect to the predicate offenses. Such offenses would 
typically be subject to felony penalties under State law, and 
the only criminal recourse in Indian country is the possibility 
of a misdemeanor prosecution in tribal court.
Sec. 511. Civil Commitment
    This section authorizes civil commitment of certain sex 
offenders who are dangerous to others because of serious mental 
illness, abnormality or disorder. Such procedures would apply, 
for example, where a pedophile who was sentenced to 
imprisonment for child molestation offenses, states his 
intention to resume such conduct upon his release from jail. 
Under the civil commitment provisions in existing law, the sex 
offender must be hospitalized while incarcerated and the 
director of the facility must certify that the offender is 
suffering from a ``mental disease or defect'' creating a 
substantial risk of harm to others. Such a standard is narrow 
and does not include sex offenders with mental disorders who 
are clearly dangerous but who do not fall within the narrowly 
applied definition of mental illness.
    The proposed new section on civil commitment addresses the 
problem in relation to sex offenders in Federal custody by 
creating anew substantive section on this issue, and with 
conforming and related amendments to the general provisions for 
that chapter in Section 4247. The proposed provision combines 
commitment standards substantively similar to those approved by 
the Supreme Court in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997), 
and Kansas v. Crane, 122 S.Ct 867 (2002).
Sec. 512. Mandatory Penalties for Sex Trafficking of Children
    This section amends section 1591 of title 18, United States 
Code, to impose a mandatory-minimum penalty of 20 years when 
the offense involved trafficking of a child under the age of 
14, and a mandatory minimum penalty of 10 years when the 
offense involved trafficking of a child between the ages of 14 
and 17.
Sec. 513. Sexual Abuse of Wards
    This section amends 2243 and 2244 to increase maximum 
penalties for sexual abuse of wards. It also clarifies the 
applicability of the criminal prohibition to Federal contract 
prison facilities.

         Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported

    In compliance with clause 3(e) of Rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by 
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law 
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new 
matter is printed in italics, existing law in which no change 
is proposed is shown in roman):

         SECTION 227 OF THE VICTIMS OF CHILD ABUSE ACT OF 1990

SEC. 227. REPORTING OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY BY ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATION 
                    SERVICE PROVIDERS.

    (a)  * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    (g) Limitation on Liability.--
            (1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraphs 
        (2) and (3), the National Center for Missing and 
        Exploited Children, including any of its directors, 
        officers, employees, or agents, is not liable in any 
        civil or criminal action for damages directly related 
        to the performance of its CyberTipline responsibilities 
        and functions as defined by this section.
            (2) Intentional, reckless, or other misconduct.--
        Paragraph (1) does not apply in an action in which a 
        party proves that the National Center for Missing and 
        Exploited Children, or its officer, employee, or agent 
        as the case may be, engaged in intentional misconduct 
        or acted, or failed to act, with actual malice, with 
        reckless disregard to a substantial risk of causing 
        injury without legal justification, or for a purpose 
        unrelated to the performance of responsibilities or 
        functions under this section.
            (3) Ordinary business activities.--Paragraph (1) 
        does not apply to an act or omission related to an 
        ordinary business activity, such as an activity 
        involving general administration or operations, the use 
        of motor vehicles, or personnel management.
                              ----------                              


TITLE 18, UNITED STATES CODE

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                             PART I--CRIMES

Chap.                                                               Sec.
1.  General provisions............................................     1
     * * * * * * *
2250Sex offender and crimes against children registry...........

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


CHAPTER 47--FRAUD AND FALSE STATEMENTS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 1001. Statements or entries generally

    (a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, whoever, 
in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, 
legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United 
States, knowingly and willfully--
            (1)  * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 
years or, if the offense involves international or domestic 
terrorism (as defined in section 2331), imprisoned not more 
than 8 years, or both. If the matter relates to an offense 
under chapter 109A, 109B, 110, or 117, then the term of 
imprisonment imposed under this section shall be not less than 
5 years nor more than 20 years.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


CHAPTER 53--INDIANS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 1153. Offenses committed within Indian country

    (a) Any Indian who commits against the person or property 
of another Indian or other person any of the following 
offenses, namely, murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, maiming, a 
felony under chapter 109A, incest, assault with intent to 
commit murder, assault with a dangerous weapon, assault 
resulting in serious bodily injury (as defined in section 1365 
of this title), an assault against an individual who has not 
attained the age of 16 years, felony child abuse or neglect, 
arson, burglary, robbery, and a felony under section 661 of 
this title within the Indian country, shall be subject to the 
same law and penalties as all other persons committing any of 
the above offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
United States.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


CHAPTER 55--KIDNAPPING

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 1201. Kidnapping

    (a) Whoever unlawfully seizes, confines, inveigles, decoys, 
kidnaps, abducts, or carries away and holds for ransom or 
reward or otherwise any person, except in the case of a minor 
by the parent thereof, when--
            (1) the person is willfully transported in 
        interstate or foreign commerce, regardless of whether 
        the person was alive when transported across a State 
        boundary [if the person was alive when the 
        transportation began], or the offender travels in 
        interstate or foreign commerce or uses the mail or any 
        means, facility, or instrumentality of interstate or 
        foreign commerce in committing or in furtherance of the 
        commission of the offense;

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    (b) With respect to subsection (a)(1), above, the failure 
to release the victim within twenty-four hours after he shall 
have been unlawfully seized, confined, inveigled, decoyed, 
kidnapped, abducted, or carried away shall create a rebuttable 
presumption that such person has been transported [to] in 
interstate or foreign commerce. Notwithstanding the preceding 
sentence, the fact that the presumption under this section has 
not yet taken effect does not preclude a Federal investigation 
of a possible violation of this section before the 24-hour 
period has ended.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


CHAPTER 77--PEONAGE, SLAVERY, AND TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 1591. Sex trafficking of children or by force, fraud, or coercion

    (a)  * * *
    (b) The punishment for an offense under subsection (a) is--
            (1) if the offense was effected by force, fraud, or 
        coercion or if the person recruited, enticed, harbored, 
        transported, provided, or obtained had not attained the 
        age of 14 years at the time of such offense, by a fine 
        under this title [or] and imprisonment for any term of 
        years not less than 20 or for life[, or both]; or
            (2) if the offense was not so effected, and the 
        person recruited, enticed, harbored, transported, 
        provided, or obtained had attained the age of 14 years 
        but had not attained the age of 18 years at the time of 
        such offense, by a fine under this title [or 
        imprisonment for not] and imprisonment for not less 
        than 10 years nor more than 40 years[, or both].

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                       CHAPTER 109A--SEXUAL ABUSE

Sec.
2241.    Aggravated sexual abuse.
     * * * * * * *
2249.    Use of any controlled substance to facilitate sex offense.

Sec. 2241. Aggravated sexual abuse

    (a) By Force or Threat.--Whoever, in the special maritime 
and territorial jurisdiction of the United States or in a 
Federal prison,  or being in the custody of the Attorney 
General or the Bureau of Prisons or confined in any institution 
or facility by direction of the Attorney General or the Bureau 
of Prisons, knowingly causes another person to engage in a 
sexual act--
            (1)  * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title[, 
imprisoned for any term of years or life, or both] and 
imprisoned for any term of years not less than 30 or for life.
    (b) By Other Means.--Whoever, in the special maritime and 
territorial jurisdiction of the United States or in a Federal 
prison,  or being in the custody of the Attorney General or the 
Bureau of Prisons or confined in any institution or facility by 
direction of the Attorney General or the Bureau of Prisons, 
knowingly--
            (1)  * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title[, 
imprisoned for any term of years or life, or both] and 
imprisoned for any term of years not less than 25 or for life.
    (c) With Children.--Whoever crosses a State line with 
intent to engage in a sexual act with a person who has not 
attained the age of 12 years, or in the special maritime and 
territorial jurisdiction of the United States or in a Federal 
prison, or being in the custody of the Attorney General or the 
Bureau of Prisons or confined in any institution or facility by 
direction of the Attorney General or the Bureau of Prisons, 
knowingly engages in a sexual act with another person who has 
not attained the age of 12 years, or knowingly engages in a 
sexual act under the circumstances described in subsections (a) 
and (b) with another person who has attained the age of 12 
years but has not attained the age of 16 years (and is at least 
4 years younger than the person so engaging), or attempts to do 
so, shall be fined under this title[, imprisoned for any term 
of years or life, or both.] and imprisoned for not less than 30 
years or for life. If the defendant has previously been 
convicted of another Federal offense under this subsection, or 
of a State offense that would have been an offense under either 
such provision had the offense occurred in a Federal prison, 
unless the death penalty is imposed, the defendant shall be 
sentenced to life in prison.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 2242. Sexual abuse

    Whoever, in the special maritime and territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States or in a Federal prison, or 
being in the custody of the Attorney General or the Bureau of 
Prisons or confined in any institution or facility by direction 
of the Attorney General or the Bureau of Prisons, knowingly--
            (1)  * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title[, 
imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both] and imprisoned not 
less than 15 years nor more than 40 years.

Sec. 2243. Sexual abuse of a minor or ward

    (a) Of a Minor.--Whoever in the special maritime and 
territorial jurisdiction of the United States or in a Federal 
prison, or being in the custody of the Attorney General or the 
Bureau of Prisons or confined in any institution or facility by 
direction of the Attorney General or the Bureau of Prisons, 
knowingly engages in a sexual act with another person who--
            (1)  * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    (b) Of a Ward.--Whoever, in the special maritime and 
territorial jurisdiction of the United States or in a Federal 
prison, or being in the custody of the Attorney General or the 
Bureau of Prisons or confined in any institution or facility by 
direction of the Attorney General or the Bureau of Prisons, 
knowingly engages in a sexual act with another person who is--
            (1)  * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title, 
imprisoned not more than [one year] five years, or both.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 2244. Abusive sexual contact

    (a) Sexual Conduct in Circumstances Where Sexual Acts Are 
Punished by This Chapter.--Whoever, in the special maritime and 
territorial jurisdiction of the United States or in a Federal 
prison, or being in the custody of the Attorney General or the 
Bureau of Prisons or confined in any institution or facility by 
direction of the Attorney General or the Bureau of Prisons, 
knowingly engages in or causes sexual contact with or by 
another person, if so to do would violate--
            (1) subsection (a) or (b) of section 2241 of this 
        title had the sexual contact been a sexual act, shall 
        be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than ten 
        years, or both;
            (2) section 2242 of this title had the sexual 
        contact been a sexual act, shall be fined under this 
        title[, imprisoned not more than three years, or both] 
        and imprisoned not less than 5 years nor more than 30 
        years;
            (3) subsection (a) of section 2243 of this title 
        had the sexual contact been a sexual act, shall be 
        fined under this title[, imprisoned not more than two 
        years, or both; or] and imprisoned not less than 4 
        years nor more than 20 years;
            (4) subsection (b) of section 2243 of this title 
        had the sexual contact been a sexual act, shall be 
        fined under this title[, imprisoned not more than six 
        months, or both.] and imprisoned not less than 2 years 
        nor more than 10 years; or
            (5) subsection (c) of section 2241 of this title 
        had the sexual contact been a sexual act, shall be 
        fined under this title and imprisoned for not less than 
        10 years and not more than 25 years.
    (b) In Other Circumstances.--Whoever, in the special 
maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States or 
in a Federal prison, or being in the custody of the Attorney 
General or the Bureau of Prisons or confined in any institution 
or facility by direction of the Attorney General or the Bureau 
of Prisons, knowingly engages in sexual contact with another 
person without that other person's permission shall be fined 
under this title, imprisoned not more than [six months] two 
years, or both.
    (c) Offenses Involving Young Children.--If the sexual 
contact that violates this section (other than subsection 
(a)(5)) is with an individual who has not attained the age of 
12 years, the maximum term of imprisonment that may be imposed 
for the offense shall be twice that otherwise provided in this 
section.

Sec. 2245. Sexual abuse resulting in death

    [A person] (a) In General.--A person who, in the course of 
an offense under this chapter, chapter 110, chapter 117, or 
section 1591, engages in conduct that results in the death of a 
person, shall be punished by death or imprisoned for any term 
of years or for life.
    (b) Offenses Involving Young Children.--A person who, in 
the course of an offense under this chapter, chapter 110, 
chapter 117, or section 1591 engages in conduct that results in 
the death of a person who has not attained the age of 12 years, 
shall be punished by death or imprisoned for not less than 30 
years or for life.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 2249. Use of any controlled substance to facilitate sex offense

    (a) Whoever, knowingly uses a controlled substance to 
substantially impair the ability of a person to appraise or 
control conduct, in order to commit a sex offense, other than 
an offense where such use is an element of the offense, shall, 
in addition to the punishment provided for the sex offense, be 
imprisoned for any term of years not less than 10, or for life.
    (b) As used in this section, the term ``sex offense'' means 
an offense under this chapter other than an offense under this 
section.

    CHAPTER 109B--SEX OFFENDER AND CRIMES AGAINST CHILDREN REGISTRY

Sec.
2250. Failure to register.

Sec. 2250. Failure to register

    Whoever receives a notice from an official that such person 
is required to register under the Sex Offender Registration and 
Notification Act and--
            (1) is a sex offender as defined for the purposes 
        of that Act by reason of a conviction under Federal 
        law; or
            (2) thereafter travels in interstate or foreign 
        commerce, or enters or leaves Indian country;
and knowingly fails to register as required shall be fined 
under this title and imprisoned not less than 5 years nor more 
than 20 years.

CHAPTER 110--SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND OTHER ABUSE OF CHILDREN

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 2251. Sexual exploitation of children

    (a)  * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    (e) Any individual who violates, or attempts or conspires 
to violate, this section shall be fined under this title and 
imprisoned not less than [15 years nor more than 30 years] 25 
years or for life, but if such person has one prior conviction 
under this chapter, section 1591, chapter 71, chapter 109A, or 
chapter 117, or under section 920 of title 10 (article 120 of 
the Uniform Code of Military Justice), or under the laws of any 
State relating to [the sexual exploitation of children] 
aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, abusive sexual contact 
involving a minor or ward, or sex trafficking of children, or 
the production, possession, receipt, mailing, sale, 
distribution, shipment, or transportation of child pornography, 
such person shall be fined under this title and imprisoned for 
[not less than 25 years nor more than 50 years, but if such 
person has 2 or more prior convictions under this chapter, 
chapter 71, chapter 109A, or chapter 117, or under section 920 
of title 10 (article 120 of the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice), or under the laws of any State relating to the sexual 
exploitation of children, such person shall be fined under this 
title and imprisoned not less than 35 years nor more than 
life.] life. Any organization that violates, or attempts or 
conspires to violate, this section shall be fined under this 
title. Whoever, in the course of an offense under this section, 
engages in conduct that results in the death of a person, shall 
be punished by death or imprisoned for [any term of years or 
for life] not less than 30 years or for life..

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 2252. Certain activities relating to material involving the sexual 
                    exploitation of minors

    (a)  * * *
    (b)(1) Whoever violates, or attempts or conspires to 
violate, [paragraphs (1)] paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of 
subsection (a) shall be fined under this title and imprisoned 
not less than [5 years and not more than 20 years] 25 years or 
for life, but if such person has a prior conviction under this 
chapter, section 1591, chapter 71, chapter 109A, or chapter 
117, or under section 920 of title 10 (article 120 of the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice), or under the laws of any 
State relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or 
abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward, or the 
production, possession, receipt, mailing, sale, distribution, 
shipment, or transportation of child pornography, or sex 
trafficking of children, such person shall be fined under this 
title and imprisoned for [not less than 15 years nor more than 
40 years.] life.
    (2) Whoever violates, or attempts or conspires to violate, 
paragraph (4) of subsection (a) shall be fined under this title 
[or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both] and imprisoned 
for not less than 10 nor more than 30 years, but if such person 
has a prior conviction under this chapter, chapter 71, chapter 
109A, or under section 920 of title 10 (article 120 of the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice), or chapter 117, or under the 
laws of any State relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual 
abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward, or 
the production, possession, receipt, mailing, sale, 
distribution, shipment, or transportation of child pornography, 
such person shall be fined under this title and imprisoned for 
not less than [10 years nor more than 20 years.] 30 years or 
for life.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 2252A. Certain activities relating to material constituting or 
                    containing child pornography

    (a)  * * *
    (b)(1) Whoever violates, or attempts or conspires to 
violate, paragraph (1), (2), (3), (4), or (6) of subsection (a) 
shall be fined under this title and imprisoned not less than [5 
years and not more than 20 years] 25 years or for life, but, if 
such person has a prior conviction under this chapter, section 
1591, chapter 71, chapter 109A, or chapter 117, or under 
section 920 of title 10 (article 120 of the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice), or under the laws of any State relating to 
aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual 
conduct involving a minor or ward, or the production, 
possession, receipt, mailing, sale, distribution, shipment, or 
transportation of child pornography, or sex trafficking of 
children, such person shall be fined under this title and 
imprisoned for [not less than 15 years nor more than 40 years] 
life.
    (2) Whoever violates, or attempts or conspires to violate, 
subsection (a)(5) shall be fined under this title [or 
imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both] and imprisoned for 
not less than 10 nor more than 30 years, but, if such person 
has a prior conviction under this chapter, chapter 71, chapter 
109A, or chapter 117, or under section 920 of title 10 (article 
120 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice), or under the laws 
of any State relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, 
or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward, or the 
production, possession, receipt, mailing, sale, distribution, 
shipment, or transportation of child pornography, such person 
shall be fined under this title and imprisoned for not less 
than [10 years nor more than 20 years] 30 years or for life.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 2252B. Misleading domain names on the Internet

    (a)  * * *
    (b) Whoever knowingly uses a misleading domain name on the 
Internet with the intent to deceive a minor into viewing 
material that is harmful to minors on the Internet shall be 
fined under this title [or imprisoned not more than 4 years, or 
both] and imprisoned not less than 10 nor more than 30 years.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 2260. Production of sexually explicit depictions of a minor for 
                    importation into the United States

    (a)  * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    (c) Penalties.--A person who violates subsection (a) or 
(b), or conspires or attempts to do so--
            [(1) shall be fined under this title, imprisoned 
        not more than 10 years, or both; and
            [(2) if the person has a prior conviction under 
        this chapter or chapter 109A, shall be fined under this 
        title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.]
            (1) shall be fined under this title and imprisoned 
        for any term or years not less than 25 or for life; and
            (2) if the person has a prior conviction under this 
        chapter, section 1591, chapter 71, chapter 109A, or 
        chapter 117, or under section 920 of title 10 (article 
        120 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice), shall be 
        fined under this title and imprisoned for life.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


  CHAPTER 117--TRANSPORTATION FOR ILLEGAL SEXUAL ACTIVITY AND RELATED 
CRIMES

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 2422. Coercion and enticement

    (a) Whoever knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or 
coerces any individual to travel in interstate or foreign 
commerce, or in any Territory or Possession of the United 
States, to engage in prostitution, or in any sexual activity 
for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, or 
attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title [or 
imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both] and imprisoned not 
less than 10 years nor more than 30 years.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 2423. Transportation of minors

    (a) Transportation With Intent To Engage in Criminal Sexual 
Activity.--A person who knowingly transports an individual who 
has not attained the age of 18 years in interstate or foreign 
commerce, or in any commonwealth, territory or possession of 
the United States, with intent that the individual engage in 
prostitution, or in any sexual activity for which any person 
can be charged with a criminal offense, shall be fined under 
this title and imprisoned not less than [5 years and not more 
than 30 years] 30 years or for life.
    (b) Travel With Intent To Engage in Illicit Sexual 
Conduct.--A person who travels in interstate commerce or 
travels into the United States, or a United States citizen or 
an alien admitted for permanent residence in the United States 
who travels in foreign commerce, for the purpose of engaging in 
any illicit sexual conduct with another person shall be fined 
under this title [or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or 
both] and imprisoned for not less than 10 years and not more 
than 30 years.
    (c) Engaging in Illicit Sexual Conduct in Foreign Places.--
Any United States citizen or alien admitted for permanent 
residence who travels in foreign commerce, and engages in any 
illicit sexual conduct with another person shall be fined under 
this title [or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both] and 
imprisoned for not less than 10 years and not more than 30 
years.
    (d) Ancillary Offenses.--Whoever, for the purpose of 
commercial advantage or private financial gain, arranges, 
induces, procures, or facilitates the travel of a person 
knowing that such a person is traveling in interstate commerce 
or foreign commerce for the purpose of engaging in illicit 
sexual conduct shall be fined under this title, [imprisoned not 
more than 30 years, or both] and imprisoned for not less than 
10 nor more than 30 years.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


PART II--CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


CHAPTER 207--RELEASE AND DETENTION PENDING JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 3142. Release or detention of a defendant pending trial

    (a)  * * *
    (b) Release on Personal Recognizance or Unsecured 
Appearance Bond.--The judicial officer shall order the pretrial 
release of the person on personal recognizance, or upon 
execution of an unsecured appearance bond in an amount 
specified by the court, subject to the condition that the 
person not commit a Federal, State, or local crime during the 
period of release and subject to the condition that the person 
cooperate in the collection of a DNA sample from the person if 
the collection of such a sample is authorized pursuant to 
section 3 of the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000 
(42 U.S.C. 14135a), unless the judicial officer determines that 
such release will not reasonably assure the appearance of the 
person as required or will endanger the safety of any other 
person or the community.
    (c) Release on Conditions.--(1) If the judicial officer 
determines that the release described in subsection (b) of this 
section will not reasonably assure the appearance of the person 
as required or will endanger the safety of any other person or 
the community, such judicial officer shall order the pretrial 
release of the person--
            (A) subject to the condition that the person not 
        commit a Federal, State, or local crime during the 
        period of release and subject to the condition that the 
        person cooperate in the collection of a DNA sample from 
        the person if the collection of such a sample is 
        authorized pursuant to section 3 of the DNA Analysis 
        Backlog Elimination Act of 2000 (42 U.S.C. 14135a); and

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


CHAPTER 213--LIMITATIONS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 3297. Cases involving DNA evidence

    In a case in which DNA testing implicates an identified 
person in the commission of a felony, [except for a felony 
offense under chapter 109A,] no statute of limitations that 
would otherwise preclude prosecution of the offense shall 
preclude such prosecution until a period of time following the 
implication of the person by DNA testing has elapsed that is 
equal to the otherwise applicable limitation period.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                         CHAPTER 227--SENTENCES

SUBCHAPTER A--GENERAL PROVISIONS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 3559. Sentencing classification of offenses

    (a)  * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    [(d) Death or Imprisonment for Crimes Against Children.--
            [(1) In general.--Subject to paragraph (2) and 
        notwithstanding any other provision of law, a person 
        who is convicted of a Federal offense that is a serious 
        violent felony (as defined in subsection (c)) or a 
        violation of section 2422, 2423, or 2251 shall, unless 
        the sentence of death is imposed, be sentenced to 
        imprisonment for life, if--
                    [(A) the victim of the offense has not 
                attained the age of 14 years;
                    [(B) the victim dies as a result of the 
                offense; and
                    [(C) the defendant, in the course of the 
                offense, engages in conduct described in 
                section 3591(a)(2).
            [(2) Exception.--With respect to a person convicted 
        of a Federal offense described in paragraph (1), the 
        court may impose any lesser sentence that is authorized 
        by law to take into account any substantial assistance 
        provided by the defendant in the investigation or 
        prosecution of another person who has committed an 
        offense, in accordance with the Federal Sentencing 
        Guidelines and the policy statements of the Federal 
        Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994(p) of 
        title 28, or for other good cause.]
    (d) Mandatory Minimum Terms of Imprisonment for Violent 
Crimes Against Children.--A person who is convicted of a felony 
crime of violence against the person of an individual who has 
not attained the age of 18 years shall, unless a greater 
mandatory minimum sentence of imprisonment is otherwise 
provided by law and regardless of any maximum term of 
imprisonment otherwise provided for the offense--
            (1) if the crime of violence results in the death 
        of a person who has not attained the age of 18 years, 
        be sentenced to death or life in prison;
            (2) if the crime of violence is kidnapping, 
        aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or maiming, or 
        results in serious bodily injury (as defined in section 
        2119(2)) be imprisoned for life or any term of years 
        not less than 30;
            (3) if the crime of violence results in bodily 
        injury (as defined in section 1365) or is an offense 
        under paragraphs (1), (2), or (5) of section 2244(a), 
        be imprisoned for life or for any term of years not 
        less than 20;
            (4) if a dangerous weapon was used during and in 
        relation to the crime of violence, be imprisoned for 
        life or for any term of years not less than 15; and
            (5) in any other case, be imprisoned for life or 
        for any term of years not less than 10.
    (e) Mandatory Life Imprisonment for Repeated Sex Offenses 
Against Children.--
            (1)  * * *
            (2) Definitions.--For the purposes of this 
        subsection--
                    (A) the term ``Federal sex offense'' means 
                an offense under section 2241 (relating to 
                aggravated sexual abuse), 2242 (relating to 
                sexual abuse), 2244(a)(1) (relating to abusive 
                sexual contact), 2245 (relating to sexual abuse 
                resulting in death), 2251 (relating to sexual 
                exploitation of children), 2251A (relating to 
                selling or buying of children), 2422(b) 
                (relating to coercion and enticement of a minor 
                into prostitution), [or 2423(a)] 2423(a) 
                (relating to transportation of minors), 2423(b) 
                (relating to travel with intent to engage in 
                illicit sexual conduct), 2423(c) (relating to 
                illicit sexual conduct in foreign places), or 
                2425 (relating to use of interstate facilities 
                to transmit information about a minor);

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SUBCHAPTER B--PROBATION

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 3563. Conditions of probation

    (a) Mandatory Conditions.--The court shall provide, as an 
explicit condition of a sentence of probation--
            (1)  * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

            [(8) for a person described in section 4042(c)(4), 
        that the person report the address where the person 
        will reside and any subsequent change of residence to 
        the probation officer responsible for supervision, and 
        that the person register in any State where the person 
        resides, is employed, carries on a vocation, or is a 
        student (as such terms are defined under section 
        170101(a)(3) of the Violent Crime Control and Law 
        Enforcement Act of 1994); and]
            (8) for a person required to register under the Sex 
        Offender Registration and Notification Act, that the 
        person comply with the requirements of that Act;
            (9) that the defendant cooperate in the collection 
        of a DNA sample from the defendant if the collection of 
        such a sample is authorized pursuant to section 3 of 
        the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000[.]; 
        and
            (10) for a person who is a felon or required to 
        register under the Sex Offender Registration and 
        Notification Act, that the person submit his person, 
        and any property, house, residence, vehicle, papers, 
        computer, other electronic communication or data 
        storage devices or media, and effects to search at any 
        time, with or without a warrant, by any law enforcement 
        or probation officer with reasonable suspicion 
        concerning a violation of a condition of probation or 
        unlawful conduct by the person, and by any probation 
        officer in the lawful discharge of the officer's 
        supervision functions.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SUBCHAPTER D--IMPRISONMENT

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 3583. Inclusion of a term of supervised release after imprisonment

    (a)  * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    (d) Conditions of Supervised Release.--The court shall 
order, as an explicit condition of supervised release, that the 
defendant not commit another Federal, State, or local crime 
during the term of supervision and that the defendant not 
unlawfully possess a controlled substance. The court shall 
order as an explicit condition of supervised release for a 
defendant convicted for the first time of a domestic violence 
crime as defined in section 3561(b) that the defendant attend a 
public, private, or private nonprofit offender rehabilitation 
program that has been approved by the court, in consultation 
with a State Coalition Against Domestic Violence or other 
appropriate experts, if an approved program is readily 
available within a 50-mile radius of the legal residence of the 
defendant. The court shall order, as an explicit condition of 
supervised release for a person [described in section 
4042(c)(4), that the person report the address where the person 
will reside and any subsequent change of residence to the 
probation officer responsible for supervision, and that the 
person register in any State where the person resides, is 
employed, carries on a vocation, or is a student (as such terms 
are defined under section 170101(a)(3) of the Violent Crime 
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994).] required to register 
under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act that 
the person comply with the requirements of that Act. The court 
shall order, as an explicit condition of supervised release, 
that the defendant cooperate in the collection of a DNA sample 
from the defendant, if the collection of such a sample is 
authorized pursuant to section 3 of the DNA Analysis Backlog 
Elimination Act of 2000. The court shall also order, as an 
explicit condition of supervised release, that the defendant 
refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled substance and 
submit to a drug test within 15 days of release on supervised 
release and at least 2 periodic drug tests thereafter (as 
determined by the court) for use of a controlled substance. The 
condition stated in the preceding sentence may be ameliorated 
or suspended by the court as provided in section 3563(a)(4). 
The results of a drug test administered in accordance with the 
preceding subsection shall be subject to confirmation only if 
the results are positive, the defendant is subject to possible 
imprisonment for such failure, and either the defendant denies 
the accuracy of such test or there is some other reason to 
question the results of the test. A drug test confirmation 
shall be a urine drug test confirmed using gas chromatography/
mass spectrometry techniques or such test as the Director of 
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts after 
consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human Services 
may determine to be of equivalent accuracy. The court shall 
consider whether the availability of appropriate substance 
abuse treatment programs, or an individual's current or past 
participation in such programs, warrants an exception in 
accordance with United States Sentencing Commission guidelines 
from the rule of section 3583(g) when considering any action 
against a defendant who fails a drug test. The court may order, 
as a further condition of supervised release, to the extent 
that such condition--
            (1)  * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

any condition set forth as a discretionary condition of 
probation in section 3563(b)(1) through (b)(10) and (b)(12) 
through (b)(20) , and any other condition it considers to be 
appropriate. If an alien defendant is subject to deportation, 
the court may provide, as a condition of supervised release, 
that he be deported and remain outside the United States, and 
may order that he be delivered to a duly authorized immigration 
official for such deportation. The court may order, as an 
explicit condition of supervised release for a person who is a 
felon or required to register under the Sex Offender 
Registration and Notification Act, that the person submit his 
person, and any property, house, residence, vehicle, papers, 
computer, other electronic communications or data storage 
devices or media, and effects to search at any time, with or 
without a warrant, by any law enforcement or probation officer 
with reasonable suspicion concerning a violation of a condition 
of supervised release or unlawful conduct by the person, and by 
any probation officer in the lawful discharge of the officer's 
supervision functions.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    (k) Notwithstanding subsection (b), the authorized term of 
supervised release for any offense under section 1201 involving 
a minor victim, and for any offense under section 1591, 2241, 
2242, [2244(a)(1), 2244(a)(2)] 2243, 2244, 2245, 2250, 2251, 
2251A, 2252, 2252A, 2260, 2421, 2422, 2423, or 2425, is any 
term of years not less than 5, or life. If a defendant required 
to register under the Sex Offender Registration and 
Notification Act violates the requirements of that Act or 
commits any criminal offense for which imprisonment for a term 
longer than one year can be imposed, the court shall revoke the 
term of supervised release and require the defendant to serve a 
term of imprisonment under subsection (e)(3) without regard to 
the exception contained therein. Such term shall be not less 
than 5 years, and if the offense was an offense under chapter 
109A, 109B, 110, or 117, not less than 10 years.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


CHAPTER 228--DEATH SENTENCE

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 3592. Mitigating and aggravating factors to be considered in 
                    determining whether a sentence of death is 
                    justified

    (a)  * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    (c) Aggravating Factors for Homicide.--In determining 
whether a sentence of death is justified for an offense 
described in section 3591(a)(2), the jury, or if there is no 
jury, the court, shall consider each of the following 
aggravating factors for which notice has been given and 
determine which, if any, exist:
            (1) Death during commission of another crime.--The 
        death, or injury resulting in death, occurred during 
        the commission or attempted commission of, or during 
        the immediate flight from the commission of, an offense 
        under section 32 (destruction of aircraft or aircraft 
        facilities), section 33 (destruction of motor vehicles 
        or motor vehicle facilities), section 37 (violence at 
        international airports), section 351 (violence against 
        Members of Congress, Cabinet officers, or Supreme Court 
        Justices), an offense under section 751 (prisoners in 
        custody of institution or officer), section 794 
        (gathering or delivering defense information to aid 
        foreign government), section 844(d) (transportation of 
        explosives in interstate commerce for certain 
        purposes), section 844(f) (destruction of Government 
        property by explosives), section 1118 (prisoners 
        serving life term), section 1201 (kidnapping), section 
        844(i) (destruction of property affecting interstate 
        commerce by explosives), section 1116 (killing or 
        attempted killing of diplomats), section 1203 (hostage 
        taking), section 1992 (wrecking trains), section 2245 
        (sexual abuse resulting in death), section 2280 
        (maritime violence), section 2281 (maritime platform 
        violence), section 2332 (terrorist acts abroad against 
        United States nationals), section 2332a (use of weapons 
        of mass destruction), or section 2381 (treason) of this 
        title, or section 46502 of title 49, United States Code 
        (aircraft piracy).

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


CHAPTER 237--CRIME VICTIMS' RIGHTS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 3771. Crime victims' rights

    (a)  * * *
    (b) Rights Afforded.--In any court proceeding involving an 
offense against a crime victim, the court shall ensure that the 
crime victim is afforded the rights described in subsection 
(a). Before making a determination described in subsection 
(a)(3), the court shall make every effort to permit the fullest 
attendance possible by the victim and shall consider reasonable 
alternatives to the exclusion of the victim from the criminal 
proceeding. The reasons for any decision denying relief under 
this chapter shall be clearly stated on the record. The rights 
established for crime victims by this section shall also be 
extended in a Federal habeas corpus proceeding arising out of a 
State conviction to victims of the State offense at issue.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


PART III--PRISONS AND PRISONERS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


CHAPTER 303--BUREAU OF PRISONS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 4042. Duties of Bureau of Prisons

    (a)  * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    (c) Notice of Sex Offender Release.--(1) In the case of a 
person described in paragraph [(4)] (3) who is released from 
prison or sentenced to probation, notice shall be provided to--
            (A)  * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    [(3) The Director of the Bureau of Prisons shall inform a 
person described in paragraph (4) who is released from prison 
that the person shall be subject to a registration requirement 
as a sex offender in any State in which the person resides, is 
employed, carries on a vocation, or is a student (as such terms 
are defined for purposes of section 170101(a)(3) of the Violent 
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994), and the same 
information shall be provided to a person described in 
paragraph (4) who is sentenced to probation by the probation 
officer responsible for supervision of the person or in a 
manner specified by the Director of the Administrative Office 
of the United States Courts.
    [(4) A person is described in this paragraph if the person 
was convicted of any of the following offenses (including such 
an offense prosecuted pursuant to section 1152 or 1153):
            [(A) An offense under section 1201 involving a 
        minor victim.
            [(B) An offense under chapter 109A.
            [(C) An offense under chapter 110.
            [(D) An offense under chapter 117.
            [(E) Any other offense designated by the Attorney 
        General as a sexual offense for purposes of this 
        subsection.]
    (3) The Director of the Bureau of Prisons shall inform a 
person who is released from prison and required to register 
under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act of the 
requirements of that Act as they apply to that person and the 
same information shall be provided to a person sentenced to 
probation by the probation officer responsible for supervision 
of that person.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


          CHAPTER 313--OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL DISEASE OR DEFECT

Sec.
4241.    Determination of mental competency to stand trial or to undergo 
          postrelease proceedings.
     * * * * * * *
4248.    Civil commitment of a sexually dangerous person.

Sec. 4241. Determination of mental competency to stand trial or to 
                    undergo postrelease proceedings

    (a) Motion To Determine Competency of Defendant.--At any 
time after the commencement of a prosecution for an offense and 
prior to the sentencing of the defendant, or at any time after 
the commencement of probation or supervised release and prior 
to the completion of the sentence, the defendant or the 
attorney for the Government may file a motion for a hearing to 
determine the mental competency of the defendant. The court 
shall grant the motion, or shall order such a hearing on its 
own motion, if there is reasonable cause to believe that the 
defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease or 
defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he 
is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the 
proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    (d) Determination and Disposition.--If, after the hearing, 
the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
defendant is presently suffering from a mental disease or 
defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he 
is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the 
proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense, 
the court shall commit the defendant to the custody of the 
Attorney General. The Attorney General shall hospitalize the 
defendant for treatment in a suitable facility--
            (1) for such a reasonable period of time, not to 
        exceed four months, as is necessary to determine 
        whether there is a substantial probability that in the 
        foreseeable future he will attain the capacity to 
        permit the [trial to proceed] proceedings to go 
        forward; and
            (2) for an additional reasonable period of time 
        until--
                    (A) his mental condition is so improved 
                that trial may proceed, if the court finds that 
                there is a substantial probability that within 
                such additional period of time he will attain 
                the capacity to permit the [trial to proceed] 
                proceedings to go forward; or
                    (B) the pending charges against him are 
                disposed of according to law;
        whichever is earlier.
If, at the end of the time period specified, it is determined 
that the defendant's mental condition has not so improved as to 
permit the [trial to proceed] proceedings to go forward, the 
defendant is subject to the provisions of [section 4246] 
sections 4246 and 4248.
    (e) Discharge.--When the director of the facility in which 
a defendant is hospitalized pursuant to subsection (d) 
determines that the defendant has recovered to such an extent 
that he is able to understand the nature and consequences of 
the proceedings against him and to assist properly in his 
defense, he shall promptly file a certificate to that effect 
with the clerk of the court that ordered the commitment. The 
clerk shall send a copy of the certificate to the defendant's 
counsel and to the attorney for the Government. The court shall 
hold a hearing, conducted pursuant to the provisions of section 
4247(d), to determine the competency of the defendant. If, 
after the hearing, the court finds by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the defendant has recovered to such an extent 
that he is able to understand the nature and consequences of 
the proceedings against him and to assist properly in his 
defense, the court shall order his immediate discharge from the 
facility in which he is hospitalized and shall set the date for 
trial or other proceedings. Upon discharge, the defendant is 
subject to the provisions of [chapter 207] chapters 207 and 
227.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 4247. General provisions for chapter

    (a) Definitions.--As used in this chapter--
            (1) ``rehabilitation program'' includes--
                    (A)  * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                    [(C) drug, alcohol, and other treatment 
                programs that will assist the individual in 
                overcoming his psychological or physical 
                dependence; and]
                    (C) drug, alcohol, and sex offender 
                treatment programs, and other treatment 
                programs that will assist the individual in 
                overcoming a psychological or physical 
                dependence or any condition that makes the 
                individual dangerous to others; and
                    (D) organized physical sports and 
                recreation programs;
            (2) ``suitable facility'' means a facility that is 
        suitable to provide care or treatment given the nature 
        of the offense and the characteristics of the 
        defendant; [and]
            (3) ``State'' includes the District of Columbia[.];
            (4) ``bodily injury'' includes sexual abuse;
            (5) ``sexually dangerous person'' means a person 
        who has engaged or attempted to engage in sexually 
        violent conduct or child molestation and who is 
        sexually dangerous to others; and
            (6) ``sexually dangerous to others'' means that a 
        person suffers from a serious mental illness, 
        abnormality, or disorder as a result of which he would 
        have serious difficulty in refraining from sexually 
        violent conduct or child molestation if released.
    (b) Psychiatric or Psychological Examination.--A 
psychiatric or psychological examination ordered pursuant to 
this chapter shall be conducted by a licensed or certified 
psychiatrist or psychologist, or, if the court finds it 
appropriate, by more than one such examiner. Each examiner 
shall be designated by the court, except that if the 
examination is ordered under section [4245 or 4246] 4245, 4246, 
4248, upon the request of the defendant an additional examiner 
may be selected by the defendant. For the purposes of an 
examination pursuant to an order under section 4241, 4244, or 
4245, the court may commit the person to be examined for a 
reasonable period, but not to exceed thirty days, and under 
section 4242, 4243[, or 4246], 4246, or 4248, for a reasonable 
period, but not to exceed forty-five days, to the custody of 
the Attorney General for placement in a suitable facility. 
Unless impracticable, the psychiatric or psychological 
examination shall be conducted in the suitable facility closest 
to the court. The director of the facility may apply for a 
reasonable extension, but not to exceed fifteen days under 
section 4241, 4244, or 4245, and not to exceed thirty days 
under section 4242, 4243[, or 4246], 4246, or 4248, upon a 
showing of good cause that the additional time is necessary to 
observe and evaluate the defendant.
    (c) Psychiatric or Psychological Reports.--A psychiatric or 
psychological report ordered pursuant to this chapter shall be 
prepared by the examiner designated to conduct the psychiatric 
or psychological examination, shall be filed with the court 
with copies provided to the counsel for the person examined and 
to the attorney for the Government, and shall include--
            (1)  * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

            (4) the examiner's opinions as to diagnosis, 
        prognosis, and--
                    (A)  * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                    (D) if the examination is ordered under 
                section 4248, whether the person is a sexually 
                dangerous person;
                    [(D)] (E) if the examination is ordered 
                under section 4244 or 4245, whether the person 
                is suffering from a mental disease or defect as 
                a result of which he is in need of custody for 
                care or treatment in a suitable facility; or
                    [(E)] (F) if the examination is ordered as 
                a part of a presentence investigation, any 
                recommendation the examiner may have as to how 
                the mental condition of the defendant should 
                affect the sentence.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    (e) Periodic Report and Information Requirements.--(1) The 
director of the facility in which a person is hospitalized 
pursuant to--
            (A) section 4241 shall prepare semiannual reports; 
        or
            (B) section 4243, 4244, 4245[, or 4246], 4246, or 
        4248 shall prepare annual reports concerning the mental 
        condition of the person and containing recommendations 
        concerning the need for his continued hospitalization. 
        The reports shall be submitted to the court that 
        ordered the person's commitment to the facility and 
        copies of the reports shall be submitted to such other 
        persons as the court may direct. A copy of each such 
        report concerning a person hospitalized after the 
        beginning of a prosecution of that person for violation 
        of section 871, 879, or 1751 of this title shall be 
        submitted to the Director of the United States Secret 
        Service. Except with the prior approval of the court, 
        the Secret Service shall not use or disclose the 
        information in these copies for any purpose other than 
        carrying out protective duties under section 3056(a) of 
        this title.
    (2) The director of the facility in which a person is 
hospitalized pursuant to section 4241, 4243, 4244, 4245[, or 
4246], 4246, or 4248 shall inform such person of any 
rehabilitation programs that are available for persons 
hospitalized in that facility.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    (g) Habeas Corpus Unimpaired.--Nothing contained in section 
[4243 or 4246] 4243, 4246, or 4248 precludes a person who is 
committed under either of such sections from establishing by 
writ of habeas corpus the illegality of his detention.
    (h) Discharge.--Regardless of whether the director of the 
facility in which a person is hospitalized has filed a 
certificate pursuant to the provisions of subsection (e) of 
section 4241, 4244, 4245[, or 4246], 4246, or 4248, or 
subsection (f) of section 4243, counsel for the person or his 
legal guardian may, at any time during such person's 
hospitalization, file with the court that ordered the 
commitment a motion for a hearing to determine whether the 
person should be discharged from such facility, but no such 
motion may be filed within one hundred and eighty days of a 
court determination that the person should continue to be 
hospitalized. A copy of the motion shall be sent to the 
director of the facility in which the person is hospitalized 
and to the attorney for the Government.
    (i) Authority and Responsibility of the Attorney General.--
The Attorney General--
            (A)  * * *
            (B) may apply for the civil commitment, pursuant to 
        State law, of a person committed to his custody 
        pursuant to section [4243 or 4246] 4243, 4246, or 4248;
            (C) shall, before placing a person in a facility 
        pursuant to the provisions of section 4241, 4243, 4244, 
        4245[, or 4246], 4246, or 4248, consider the 
        suitability of the facility's rehabilitation programs 
        in meeting the needs of the person; and

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 4248. Civil commitment of a sexually dangerous person

    (a) Institution of Proceedings.--In relation to a person 
who is in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons, or who has been 
committed to the custody of the Attorney General pursuant to 
section 4241(d), or against whom all criminal charges have been 
dismissed solely for reasons relating to the mental condition 
of the person, the Attorney General or any individual 
authorized by the Attorney General or the Director of the 
Bureau of Prisons may certify that the person is a sexually 
dangerous person, and transmit the certificate to the clerk of 
the court for the district in which the person is confined. The 
clerk shall send a copy of the certificate to the person, and 
to the attorney for the Government, and, if the person was 
committed pursuant to section 4241(d), to the clerk of the 
court that ordered the commitment. The court shall order a 
hearing to determine whether the person is a sexually dangerous 
person. A certificate filed under this subsection shall stay 
the release of the person pending completion of procedures 
contained in this section.
    (b) Psychiatric or Psychological Examination and Report.--
Prior to the date of the hearing, the court may order that a 
psychiatric or psychological examination of the defendant be 
conducted, and that a psychiatric or psychological report be 
filed with the court, pursuant to the provisions of section 
4247(b) and (c).
    (c) Hearing.--The hearing shall be conducted pursuant to 
the provisions of section 4247(d).
    (d) Determination and Disposition.--If, after the hearing, 
the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the 
person is a sexually dangerous person, the court shall commit 
the person to the custody of the Attorney General. The Attorney 
General shall release the person to the appropriate official of 
the State in which the person is domiciled or was tried if such 
State will assume responsibility for his custody, care, and 
treatment. The Attorney General shall make all reasonable 
efforts to cause such a State to assume such responsibility. 
If, notwithstanding such efforts, neither such State will 
assume such responsibility, the Attorney General shall place 
the person for treatment in a suitable facility, until--
            (1) such a State will assume such responsibility; 
        or
            (2) the person's condition is such that he is no 
        longer sexually dangerous to others, or will not be 
        sexually dangerous to others if released under a 
        prescribed regimen of medical, psychiatric, or 
        psychological care or treatment;
whichever is earlier. The Attorney General shall make all 
reasonable efforts to have a State to assume such 
responsibility for the person's custody, care, and treatment.
    (e) Discharge.--When the Director of the facility in which 
a person is placed pursuant to subsection (d) determines that 
the person's condition is such that he is no longer sexually 
dangerous to others, or will not be sexually dangerous to 
others if released under a prescribed regimen of medical, 
psychiatric, or psychological care or treatment, he shall 
promptly file a certificate to that effect with the clerk of 
the court that ordered the commitment. The clerk shall send a 
copy of the certificate to the person's counsel and to the 
attorney for the Government. The court shall order the 
discharge of the person or, on motion of the attorney for the 
Government or on its own motion, shall hold a hearing, 
conducted pursuant to the provisions of section 4247(d), to 
determine whether he should be released. If, after the hearing, 
the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
person's condition is such that--
            (1) he will not be sexually dangerous to others if 
        released unconditionally, the court shall order that he 
        be immediately discharged; or
            (2) he will not be sexually dangerous to others if 
        released under a prescribed regimen of medical, 
        psychiatric, or psychological care or treatment, the 
        court shall--
                    (A) order that he be conditionally 
                discharged under a prescribed regimen of 
                medical, psychiatric, or psychological care or 
                treatment that has been prepared for him, that 
                has been certified to the court as appropriate 
                by the Director of the facility in which he is 
                committed, and that has been found by the court 
                to be appropriate; and
                    (B) order, as an explicit condition of 
                release, that he comply with the prescribed 
                regimen of medical, psychiatric, or 
                psychological care or treatment.
        The court at any time may, after a hearing employing 
        the same criteria, modify or eliminate the regimen of 
        medical, psychiatric, or psychological care or 
        treatment.
    (f) Revocation of Conditional Discharge.--The director of a 
facility responsible for administering a regimen imposed on a 
person conditionally discharged under subsection (e) shall 
notify the Attorney General and the court having jurisdiction 
over the person of any failure of the person to comply with the 
regimen. Upon such notice, or upon other probable cause to 
believe that the person has failed to comply with the 
prescribed regimen of medical, psychiatric, or psychological 
care or treatment, the person may be arrested, and, upon 
arrest, shall be taken without unnecessary delay before the 
court having jurisdiction over him. The court shall, after a 
hearing, determine whether the person should be remanded to a 
suitable facility on the ground that he is sexually dangerous 
to others in light of his failure to comply with the prescribed 
regimen of medical, psychiatric, or psychological care or 
treatment.
    (g) Release to State of Certain Other Persons.--If the 
director of the facility in which a person is hospitalized or 
placed pursuant to this chapter certifies to the Attorney 
General that a person, against him all charges have been 
dismissed for reasons not related to the mental condition of 
the person, is a sexually dangerous person, the Attorney 
General shall release the person to the appropriate official of 
the State in which the person is domiciled or was tried for the 
purpose of institution of State proceedings for civil 
commitment. If neither such State will assume such 
responsibility, the Attorney General shall release the person 
upon receipt of notice from the State that it will not assume 
such responsibility, but not later than 10 days after 
certification by the director of the facility.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


TITLE I OF THE OMNIBUS CRIME CONTROL AND SAFE STREETS ACT OF 1968

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


               PART JJ--SEX OFFENDER APPREHENSION GRANTS

SEC. 3011. AUTHORITY TO MAKE SEX OFFENDER APPREHENSION GRANTS.

    (a) In General.--From amounts made available to carry out 
this part, the Attorney General may make grants to States, 
units of local government, Indian tribal governments, other 
public and private entities, and multi-jurisdictional or 
regional consortia thereof for activities specified in 
subsection (b).
    (b) Covered Activities.--An activity referred to in 
subsection (a) is any program, project, or other activity to 
assist a State in enforcing sex offender registration 
requirements.

SEC. 3012. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

    There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be 
necessary for fiscal years 2006 through 2008 to carry out this 
part.
                              ----------                              


VIOLENT CRIME CONTROL AND LAW ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 1994

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                  TITLE XVII--CRIMES AGAINST CHILDREN

   Subtitle A--Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually 
                   Violent Offender Registration Act

[SEC. 170101. JACOB WETTERLING CRIMES AGAINST CHILDREN AND SEXUALLY 
                    VIOLENT OFFENDER REGISTRATION PROGRAM.

    [(a) In General.--
            [(1) State guidelines.--The Attorney General shall 
        establish guidelines for State programs that require--
                    [(A) a person who is convicted of a 
                criminal offense against a victim who is a 
                minor or who is convicted of a sexually violent 
                offense to register a current address for the 
                time period specified in subparagraph (A) of 
                subsection (b)(6); and
                    [(B) a person who is a sexually violent 
                predator to register a current address unless 
                such requirement is terminated under 
                subparagraph (B) of subsection (b)(6).
            [(2) Determination of sexually violent predator 
        status; waiver; alternative measures.--
                    [(A) In general.--A determination of 
                whether a person is a sexually violent predator 
                for purposes of this section shall be made by a 
                court after considering the recommendation of a 
                board composed of experts in the behavior and 
                treatment of sex offenders, victims' rights 
                advocates, and representatives of law 
                enforcement agencies.
                    [(B) Waiver.--The Attorney General may 
                waive the requirements of subparagraph (A) if 
                the Attorney General determines that the State 
                has established alternative procedures or legal 
                standards for designating a person as a 
                sexually violent predator.
                    [(C) Alternative measures.--The Attorney 
                General may also approve alternative measures 
                of comparable or greater effectiveness in 
                protecting the public from unusually dangerous 
                or recidivistic sexual offenders in lieu of the 
                specific measures set forth in this section 
                regarding sexually violent predators.
            [(3) Definitions.--For purposes of this section:
                    [(A) The term ``criminal offense against a 
                victim who is a minor'' means any criminal 
                offense in a range of offenses specified by 
                State law which is comparable to or which 
                exceeds the following range of offenses:
                            [(i) kidnapping of a minor, except 
                        by a parent;
                            [(ii) false imprisonment of a 
                        minor, except by a parent;
                            [(iii) criminal sexual conduct 
                        toward a minor;
                            [(iv) solicitation of a minor to 
                        engage in sexual conduct;
                            [(v) use of a minor in a sexual 
                        performance;
                            [(vi) solicitation of a minor to 
                        practice prostitution;
                            [(vii) any conduct that by its 
                        nature is a sexual offense against a 
                        minor;
                            [(viii) production or distribution 
                        of child pornography, as described in 
                        section 2251, 2252, or 2252A of title 
                        18, United States Code; or
                            [(ix) an attempt to commit an 
                        offense described in any of clauses (i) 
                        through (vii), if the State--
                                    [(I) makes such an attempt 
                                a criminal offense; and
                                    [(II) chooses to include 
                                such an offense in those which 
                                are criminal offenses against a 
                                victim who is a minor for the 
                                purposes of this section.
                For purposes of this subparagraph conduct which 
                is criminal only because of the age of the 
                victim shall not be considered a criminal 
                offense if the perpetrator is 18 years of age 
                or younger.
                    [(B) The term ``sexually violent offense'' 
                means any criminal offense in a range of 
                offenses specified by State law which is 
                comparable to or which exceeds the range of 
                offenses encompassed by aggravated sexual abuse 
                or sexual abuse (as described in sections 2241 
                and 2242 of title 18, United States Code, or as 
                described in the State criminal code) or an 
                offense that has as its elements engaging in 
                physical contact with another person with 
                intent to commit aggravated sexual abuse or 
                sexual abuse (as described in such sections of 
                title 18, United States Code, or as described 
                in the State criminal code).
                    [(C) The term ``sexually violent predator'' 
                means a person who has been convicted of a 
                sexually violent offense and who suffers from a 
                mental abnormality or personality disorder that 
                makes the person likely to engage in predatory 
                sexually violent offenses.
                    [(D) The term ``mental abnormality'' means 
                a congenital or acquired condition of a person 
                that affects the emotional or volitional 
                capacity of the person in a manner that 
                predisposes that person to the commission of 
                criminal sexual acts to a degree that makes the 
                person a menace to the health and safety of 
                other persons.
                    [(E) The term ``predatory'' means an act 
                directed at a stranger, or a person with whom a 
                relationship has been established or promoted 
                for the primary purpose of victimization.
                    [(F) The term ``employed, carries on a 
                vocation'' includes employment that is full-
                time or part-time for a period of time 
                exceeding 14 days or for an aggregate period of 
                time exceeding 30 days during any calendar 
                year, whether financially compensated, 
                volunteered, or for the purpose of government 
                or educational benefit.
                    [(G) The term ``student'' means a person 
                who is enrolled on a full-time or part-time 
                basis, in any public or private educational 
                institution, including any secondary school, 
                trade, or professional institution, or 
                institution of higher education.
    [(b) Registration Requirement Upon Release, Parole, 
Supervised Release, or Probation.--An approved State 
registration program established under this section shall 
contain the following elements:
            [(1) Duties of responsible officials.--
                    [(A) If a person who is required to 
                register under this section is released from 
                prison, or placed on parole, supervised 
                release, or probation, a State prison officer, 
                the court, or another responsible officer or 
                official, shall--
                            [(i) inform the person of the duty 
                        to register and obtain the information 
                        required for such registration;
                            [(ii) inform the person that if the 
                        person changes residence address, the 
                        person shall report the change of 
                        address as provided by State law;
                            [(iii) inform the person that if 
                        the person changes residence to another 
                        State, the person shall report the 
                        change of address as provided by State 
                        law and comply with any registration 
                        requirement in the new State of 
                        residence, and inform the person that 
                        the person must also register in a 
                        State where the person is employed, 
                        carries on a vocation, or is a student;
                            [(iv) obtain fingerprints and a 
                        photograph of the person if these have 
                        not already been obtained in connection 
                        with the offense that triggers 
                        registration; and
                            [(v) require the person to read and 
                        sign a form stating that the duty of 
                        the person to register under this 
                        section has been explained.
                    [(B) In addition to the requirements of 
                subparagraph (A), for a person required to 
                register under subparagraph (B) of subsection 
                (a)(1), the State prison officer, the court, or 
                another responsible officer or official, as the 
                case may be, shall obtain the name of the 
                person, identifying factors, anticipated future 
                residence, offense history, and documentation 
                of any treatment received for the mental 
                abnormality or personality disorder of the 
                person.
            [(2) Transfer of information to state and fbi; 
        participation in national sex offender registry.--
                    [(A) State reporting.--State procedures 
                shall ensure that the registration information 
                is promptly made available to a law enforcement 
                agency having jurisdiction where the person 
                expects to reside and entered into the 
                appropriate State records or data system. State 
                procedures shall also ensure that conviction 
                data and fingerprints for persons required to 
                register are promptly transmitted to the 
                Federal Bureau of Investigation.
                    [(B) National reporting.--A State shall 
                participate in the national database 
                established under section 170102(b) in 
                accordance with guidelines issued by the 
                Attorney General, including transmission of 
                current address information and other 
                information on registrants to the extent 
                provided by the guidelines.
            [(3) Verification.--
                    [(A) For a person required to register 
                under subparagraph (A) of subsection (a)(1), 
                State procedures shall provide for verification 
                of address at least annually.
                    [(B) The provisions of subparagraph (A) 
                shall be applied to a person required to 
                register under subparagraph (B) of subsection 
                (a)(1), except that such person must verify the 
                registration every 90 days after the date of 
                the initial release or commencement of parole.
            [(4) Notification of local law enforcement agencies 
        of changes in address.--A change of address by a person 
        required to register under this section shall be 
        reported by the person in the manner provided by State 
        law. State procedures shall ensure that the updated 
        address information is promptly made available to a law 
        enforcement agency having jurisdiction where the person 
        will reside and entered into the appropriate State 
        records or data system.
            [(5) Registration for change of address to another 
        state.--A person who has been convicted of an offense 
        which requires registration under this section and who 
        moves to another State, shall report the change of 
        address to the responsible agency in the State the 
        person is leaving, and shall comply with any 
        registration requirement in the new State of residence. 
        The procedures of the State the person is leaving shall 
        ensure that notice is provided promptly to an agency 
        responsible for registration in the new State, if that 
        State requires registration.
            [(6) Length of registration.--A person required to 
        register under subsection (a)(1) shall continue to 
        comply with this section, except during ensuing periods 
        of incarceration, until--
                    [(A) 10 years have elapsed since the person 
                was released from prison or placed on parole, 
                supervised release, or probation; or
                    [(B) for the life of that person if that 
                person--
                            [(i) has 1 or more prior 
                        convictions for an offense described in 
                        subsection (a)(1)(A); or
                            [(ii) has been convicted of an 
                        aggravated offense described in 
                        subsection (a)(1)(A); or
                            [(iii) has been determined to be a 
                        sexually violent predator pursuant to 
                        subsection (a)(2).
            [(7) Registration of out-of-state offenders, 
        federal offenders, persons sentenced by courts martial, 
        and offenders crossing state borders.--As provided in 
        guidelines issued by the Attorney General, each State 
        shall include in its registration program residents who 
        were convicted in another State and shall ensure that 
        procedures are in place to accept registration 
        information from--
                    [(A) residents who were convicted in 
                another State, convicted of a Federal offense, 
                or sentenced by a court martial; and
                    [(B) nonresident offenders who have crossed 
                into another State in order to work or attend 
                school.
    [(c) Registration of Offender Crossing State Border.--Any 
person who is required under this section to register in the 
State in which such person resides shall also register in any 
State in which the person is employed, carries on a vocation, 
or is a student.
    [(d) Penalty.--A person required to register under a State 
program established pursuant to this section who knowingly 
fails to so register and keep such registration current shall 
be subject to criminal penalties in any State in which the 
person has so failed.
    [(e) Release of Information.--
            [(1) The information collected under a State 
        registration program may be disclosed for any purpose 
        permitted under the laws of the State.
            [(2) The State or any agency authorized by the 
        State shall release relevant information that is 
        necessary to protect the public concerning a specific 
        person required to register under this section, except 
        that the identity of a victim of an offense that 
        requires registration under this section shall not be 
        released. The release of information under this 
        paragraph shall include the maintenance of an Internet 
        site containing such information that is available to 
        the public and instructions on the process for 
        correcting information that a person alleges to be 
        erroneous.
    [(f) Immunity for Good Faith Conduct.--Law enforcement 
agencies, employees of law enforcement agencies and independent 
contractors acting at the direction of such agencies, and State 
officials shall be immune from liability for good faith conduct 
under this section.
    [(g) Compliance.--
            [(1) Compliance date.--Each State shall have not 
        more than 3 years from the date of enactment of this 
        Act in which to implement this section, except that the 
        Attorney General may grant an additional 2 years to a 
        State that is making good faith efforts to implement 
        this section.
            [(2) Ineligibility for funds.--
                    [(A) A State that fails to implement the 
                program as described in this section shall not 
                receive 10 percent of the funds that would 
                otherwise be allocated to the State under 
                section 506 of the Omnibus Crime Control and 
                Safe Streets Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. 3765).
                    [(B) Reallocation of funds.--Any funds that 
                are not allocated for failure to comply with 
                this section shall be reallocated to States 
                that comply with this section.
    [(h) Fingerprints.--Each requirement to register under this 
section shall be deemed to also require the submission of a set 
of fingerprints of the person required to register, obtained in 
accordance with regulations prescribed by the Attorney General 
under section 170102(h).
    [(i) Grants to States for Costs of Compliance.--
            [(1) Program authorized.--
                    [(A) In general.--The Director of the 
                Bureau of Justice Assistance (in this 
                subsection referred to as the `Director') shall 
                carry out a program, which shall be known as 
                the ``Sex Offender Management Assistance 
                Program'' (in this subsection referred to as 
                the ``SOMA program''), under which the Director 
                shall award a grant to each eligible State to 
                offset costs directly associated with complying 
                with this section.
                    [(B) Uses of funds.--Each grant awarded 
                under this subsection shall be--
                            [(i) distributed directly to the 
                        State for distribution to State and 
                        local entities; and
                            [(ii) used for training, salaries, 
                        equipment, materials, and other costs 
                        directly associated with complying with 
                        this section.
            [(2) Eligibility.--
                    [(A) Application.--To be eligible to 
                receive a grant under this subsection, the 
                chief executive of a State shall, on an annual 
                basis, submit to the Director an application 
                (in such form and containing such information 
                as the Director may reasonably require) 
                assuring that--
                            [(i) the State complies with (or 
                        made a good faith effort to comply 
                        with) this section; and
                            [(ii) where applicable, the State 
                        has penalties comparable to or greater 
                        than Federal penalties for crimes 
                        listed in this section, except that the 
                        Director may waive the requirement of 
                        this clause if a State demonstrates an 
                        overriding need for assistance under 
                        this subsection.
                    [(B) Regulations.--
                            [(i) In general.--Not later than 90 
                        days after the date of enactment of 
                        this subsection, the Director shall 
                        promulgate regulations to implement 
                        this subsection (including the 
                        information that must be included and 
                        the requirements that the States must 
                        meet) in submitting the applications 
                        required under this subsection. In 
                        allocating funds under this subsection, 
                        the Director may consider the annual 
                        number of sex offenders registered in 
                        each eligible State's monitoring and 
                        notification programs.
                            [(ii) Certain training programs.--
                        Prior to implementing this subsection, 
                        the Director shall study the 
                        feasibility of incorporating into the 
                        SOMA program the activities of any 
                        technical assistance or training 
                        program established as a result of 
                        section 40152 of this Act. In a case in 
                        which incorporating such activities 
                        into the SOMA program will eliminate 
                        duplication of efforts or 
                        administrative costs, the Director 
                        shall take administrative actions, as 
                        allowable, and make recommendations to 
                        Congress to incorporate such activities 
                        into the SOMA program prior to 
                        implementing the SOMA program.
            [(3) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is 
        authorized to be appropriated for each of the fiscal 
        years 2004 through 2007 such sums as may be necessary 
        to carry out the provisions of section 1701(d)(10) of 
        the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 
        (42 U.S.C. 3796dd(d)(10)), as added by the PROTECT Act.
    [(j) Notice of Enrollment at or Employment by Institutions 
of Higher Education.--
            [(1) Notice by offenders.--
                    [(A) In general.--In addition to any other 
                requirements of this section, any person who is 
                required to register in a State shall provide 
                notice as required under State law--
                            [(i) of each institution of higher 
                        education in that State at which the 
                        person is employed, carries on a 
                        vocation, or is a student; and
                            [(ii) of each change in enrollment 
                        or employment status of such person at 
                        an institution of higher education in 
                        that State.
                    [(B) Change in status.--A change in status 
                under subparagraph (A)(ii) shall be reported by 
                the person in the manner provided by State law. 
                State procedures shall ensure that the updated 
                information is promptly made available to a law 
                enforcement agency having jurisdiction where 
                such institution is located and entered into 
                the appropriate State records or data system.
            [(2) State reporting.--State procedures shall 
        ensure that the registration information collected 
        under paragraph (1)--
                    [(A) is promptly made available to a law 
                enforcement agency having jurisdiction where 
                such institution is located; and
                    [(B) entered into the appropriate State 
                records or data system.
            [(3) Request.--Nothing in this subsection shall 
        require an educational institution to request such 
        information from any State.

[SEC. 170102. FBI DATABASE.

    [(a) Definitions.--For purposes of this section--
            [(1) the term ``FBI'' means the Federal Bureau of 
        Investigation;
            [(2) the terms ``criminal offense against a victim 
        who is a minor'', ``sexually violent offense'', 
        ``sexually violent predator'', ``mental abnormality'', 
        ``predatory'', ``employed, carries on a vocation'', and 
        ``student'' have the same meanings as in section 
        170101(a)(3); and
            [(3) the term ``minimally sufficient sexual 
        offender registration program'' means any State sexual 
        offender registration program that--
                    [(A) requires the registration of each 
                offender who is convicted of an offense in a 
                range of offenses specified by State law which 
                is comparable to or exceeds that described in 
                subparagraph (A) or (B) of section 
                170101(a)(1);
                    [(B) participates in the national database 
                established under subsection (b) of this 
                section in conformity with guidelines issued by 
                the Attorney General;
                    [(C) provides for verification of address 
                at least annually;
                    [(D) requires that each person who is 
                required to register under subparagraph (A) 
                shall do so for a period of not less than 10 
                years beginning on the date that such person 
                was released from prison or placed on parole, 
                supervised release, or probation.
    [(b) Establishment.--The Attorney General shall establish a 
national database at the Federal Bureau of Investigation to 
track the whereabouts and movement of--
            [(1) each person who has been convicted of a 
        criminal offense against a victim who is a minor;
            [(2) each person who has been convicted of a 
        sexually violent offense; and
            [(3) each person who is a sexually violent 
        predator.
    [(c) Registration Requirement.--Each person described in 
subsection (b) who resides in a State that has not established 
a minimally sufficient sexual offender registration program 
shall register a current address, fingerprints of that person, 
and a current photograph of that person with the FBI for 
inclusion in the database established under subsection (b) for 
the time period specified under subsection (d).
    [(d) Length of Registration.--A person described in 
subsection (b) who is required to register under subsection (c) 
shall, except during ensuing periods of incarceration, continue 
to comply with this section--
            [(1) until 10 years after the date on which the 
        person was released from prison or placed on parole, 
        supervised release, or probation; or
            [(2) for the life of the person, if that person--
                    [(A) has 2 or more convictions for an 
                offense described in subsection (b);
                    [(B) has been convicted of aggravated 
                sexual abuse, as defined in section 2241 of 
                title 18, United States Code, or in a 
                comparable provision of State law; or
                    [(C) has been determined to be a sexually 
                violent predator.
    [(e) Verification.--
            [(1) Persons convicted of an offense against a 
        minor or a sexually violent offense.--In the case of a 
        person required to register under subsection (c), the 
        FBI shall, during the period in which the person is 
        required to register under subsection (d), verify the 
        person's address in accordance with guidelines that 
        shall be promulgated by the Attorney General. Such 
        guidelines shall ensure that address verification is 
        accomplished with respect to these individuals and 
        shall require the submission of fingerprints and 
        photographs of the individual.
            [(2) Sexually violent predators.--Paragraph (1) 
        shall apply to a person described in subsection (b)(3), 
        except that such person must verify the registration 
        once every 90 days after the date of the initial 
        release or commencement of parole of that person.
    [(f) Community Notification.--
            [(1) In general.--Subject to paragraph (2), the FBI 
        may release relevant information concerning a person 
        required to register under subsection (c) that is 
        necessary to protect the public.
            [(2) Identity of victim.--In no case shall the FBI 
        release the identity of any victim of an offense that 
        requires registration by the offender with the FBI.
    [(g) Notification of FBI of Changes in Residence.--
            [(1) Establishment of new residence.--For purposes 
        of this section, a person shall be deemed to have 
        established a new residence during any period in which 
        that person resides for not less than 10 days.
            [(2) Persons required to register with the fbi.--
        Each establishment of a new residence, including the 
        initial establishment of a residence immediately 
        following release from prison, or placement on parole, 
        supervised release, or probation, by a person required 
        to register under subsection (c) shall be reported to 
        the FBI not later than 10 days after that person 
        establishes a new residence.
            [(3) Individual registration requirement.--A person 
        required to register under subsection (c) or under a 
        State sexual offender offender registration program, 
        including a program established under section 170101, 
        who changes address to a State other than the State in 
        which the person resided at the time of the immediately 
        preceding registration shall, not later than 10 days 
        after that person establishes a new residence, register 
        a current address, fingerprints, and photograph of that 
        person, for inclusion in the appropriate database, 
        with--
                    [(A) the FBI; and
                    [(B) the State in which the new residence 
                is established.
            [(4) State registration requirement.--Any time any 
        State agency in a State with a minimally sufficient 
        sexual offender registration program, including a 
        program established under section 170101, is notified 
        of a change of address by a person required to register 
        under such program within or outside of such State, the 
        State shall notify--
                    [(A) the law enforcement officials of the 
                jurisdiction to which, and the jurisdiction 
                from which, the person has relocated; and
                    [(B) the FBI.
            [(5) Verification.--
                    [(A) Notification of local law enforcement 
                officials.--The FBI shall ensure that State and 
                local law enforcement officials of the 
                jurisdiction from which, and the State and 
                local law enforcement officials of the 
                jurisdiction to which, a person required to 
                register under subsection (c) relocates are 
                notified of the new residence of such person.
                    [(B) Notification of fbi.--A State agency 
                receiving notification under this subsection 
                shall notify the FBI of the new residence of 
                the offender.
                    [(C) Verification.--
                            [(i) State agencies.--If a State 
                        agency cannot verify the address of or 
                        locate a person required to register 
                        with a minimally sufficient sexual 
                        offender registration program, 
                        including a program established under 
                        section 170101, the State shall 
                        immediately notify the FBI.
                            [(ii) FBI.--If the FBI cannot 
                        verify the address of or locate a 
                        person required to register under 
                        subsection (c) or if the FBI receives 
                        notification from a State under clause 
                        (i), the FBI shall--
                                    [(I) classify the person as 
                                being in violation of the 
                                registration requirements of 
                                the national database; and
                                    [(II) add the name of the 
                                person to the National Crime 
                                Information Center Wanted 
                                person file and create a wanted 
                                persons record: Provided, That 
                                an arrest warrant which meets 
                                the requirements for entry into 
                                the file is issued in 
                                connection with the violation.
    [(h) Fingerprints.--
            [(1) FBI registration.--For each person required to 
        register under subsection (c), fingerprints shall be 
        obtained and verified by the FBI or a local law 
        enforcement official pursuant to regulations issued by 
        the Attorney General.
            [(2) State registration systems.--In a State that 
        has a minimally sufficient sexual offender registration 
        program, including a program established under section 
        170101, fingerprints required to be registered with the 
        FBI under this section shall be obtained and verified 
        in accordance with State requirements. The State agency 
        responsible for registration shall ensure that the 
        fingerprints and all other information required to be 
        registered is registered with the FBI.
    [(i) Penalty.--A person who is--
            [(1) required to register under paragraph (1), (2), 
        or (3) of subsection (g) of this section and knowingly 
        fails to comply with this section;
            [(2) required to register under a sexual offender 
        registration program in the person's State of residence 
        and knowingly fails to register in any other State in 
        which the person is employed, carries on a vocation, or 
        is a student;
            [(3) described in section 4042(c)(4) of title 18, 
        United States Code, and knowingly fails to register in 
        any State in which the person resides, is employed, 
        carries on a vocation, or is a student following 
        release from prison or sentencing to probation; or
            [(4) sentenced by a court martial for conduct in a 
        category specified by the Secretary of Defense under 
        section 115(a)(8)(C) of title I of Public Law 105-119, 
        and knowingly fails to register in any State in which 
        the person resides, is employed, carries on a vocation, 
        or is a student following release from prison or 
        sentencing to probation, shall, in the case of a first 
        offense under this subsection, be imprisoned for not 
        more than 1 year and, in the case of a second or 
        subsequent offense under this subsection, be imprisoned 
        for not more than 10 years.
    [(j) Release of Information.--The information collected by 
the FBI under this section shall be disclosed by the FBI--
            [(1) to Federal, State, and local criminal justice 
        agencies for--
                    [(A) law enforcement purposes; and
                    [(B) community notification in accordance 
                with section 170101(d)(3); and
            [(2) to Federal, State, and local governmental 
        agencies responsible for conducting employment-related 
        background checks under section 3 of the National Child 
        Protection Act of 1993 (42 U.S.C. 5119a).
    [(k) Notification Upon Release.--Any State not having 
established a program described in section 170102(a)(3) must--
            [(1) upon release from prison, or placement on 
        parole, supervised release, or probation, notify each 
        offender who is convicted of an offense described in 
        subparagraph (A) or (B) of section 170101(a)(1) of 
        their duty to register with the FBI; and
            [(2) notify the FBI of the release of each offender 
        who is convicted of an offense described in 
        subparagraph (A) or (B) of section 170101(a)(1).]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


       SECTION 8 OF THE PAM LYCHNER SEXUAL OFFENDER TRACKING AND 
                       IDENTIFICATION ACT OF 1996

[SEC. 8. IMMUNITY FOR GOOD FAITH CONDUCT.

    [State and Federal law enforcement agencies, employees of 
State and Federal law enforcement agencies, and State and 
Federal officials shall be immune from liability for good faith 
conduct under section 170102.]
                              ----------                              


          SECTION 210304 OF THE DNA IDENTIFICATION ACT OF 1994

SEC. 210304. INDEX TO FACILITATE LAW ENFORCEMENT EXCHANGE OF DNA 
            IDENTIFICATION INFORMATION.
    (a) Establishment of Index.--The Director of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation may establish an index of--
            (1) DNA identification records of--
                    (A)  * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                    (C) other persons whose DNA samples are 
                collected under applicable legal authorities[, 
                provided that DNA profiles from arrestees who 
                have not been charged in an indictment or 
                information with a crime, and DNA samples that 
                are voluntarily submitted solely for 
                elimination purposes shall not be included in 
                the National DNA Index System];

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    [(d) Expungement of Records.--
            [(1) By director.--(A) The Director of the Federal 
        Bureau of Investigation shall promptly expunge from the 
        index described in subsection (a) the DNA analysis of a 
        person included in the index on the basis of a 
        qualifying Federal offense or a qualifying District of 
        Columbia offense (as determined under sections 3 and 4 
        of the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000, 
        respectively) if the Director receives, for each 
        conviction of the person of a qualifying offense, a 
        certified copy of a final court order establishing that 
        such conviction has been overturned.
            [(B) For purposes of subparagraph (A), the term 
        ``qualifying offense'' means any of the following 
        offenses:
                    [(i) A qualifying Federal offense, as 
                determined under section 3 of the DNA Analysis 
                Backlog Elimination Act of 2000.
                    [(ii) A qualifying District of Columbia 
                offense, as determined under section 4 of the 
                DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000.
                    [(iii) A qualifying military offense, as 
                determined under section 1565 of title 10, 
                United States Code.
            [(C) For purposes of subparagraph (A), a court 
        order is not ``final'' if time remains for an appeal or 
        application for discretionary review with respect to 
        the order.
            [(2) By states.--(A) As a condition of access to 
        the index described in subsection (a), a State shall 
        promptly expunge from that index the DNA analysis of a 
        person included in the index by that State if--
                    [(i) the responsible agency; or official of 
                that State receives, for each conviction of the 
                person of an offense on the basis of which that 
                analysis was or could have been included in the 
                index, a certified copy of a final court order 
                establishing that such conviction has been 
                overturned; or
                    [(ii) the person has not been convicted of 
                an offense on the basis of which that analysis 
                was or could have been included in the index, 
                and all charges for which the analysis was or 
                could have been included in the index have been 
                dismissed or resulted in acquittal.
            [(B) For purposes of subparagraph (A), a court 
        order is not ``final'' if time remains for an appeal or 
        application for discretionary review with respect to 
        the order.
    [(e) Authority for Keyboard Searches.--
            [(1) In general.--The Director shall ensure that 
        any person who is authorized to access the index 
        described in subsection (a) for purposes of including 
        information on DNA identification records or DNA 
        analyses in that index may also access that index for 
        purposes of carrying out a one-time keyboard search on 
        information obtained from any DNA sample lawfully 
        collected for a criminal justice purpose except for a 
        DNA sample voluntarily submitted solely for elimination 
        purposes.
            [(2) Definition.--For purposes of paragraph (1), 
        the term ``keyboard search'' means a search under which 
        information obtained from a DNA sample is compared with 
        information in the index without resulting in the 
        information obtained from a DNA sample being included 
        in the index.
            [(3) No preemption.--This subsection shall not be 
        construed to preempt State law.]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


     SECTION 3 OF THE DNA ANALYSIS BACKLOG ELIMINATION ACT OF 2000

SEC. 3. COLLECTION AND USE OF DNA IDENTIFICATION INFORMATION FROM 
                    CERTAIN FEDERAL OFFENDERS.

    (a) Collection of DNA Samples.--
            (1) From individuals in custody.--[The Director]
                    (A) The Attorney General may, as provided 
                by the Attorney General by regulation, collect 
                DNA samples from individuals who are arrested, 
                detained, or convicted under the authority of 
                the United States. The Attorney General may 
                delegate this function within the Department of 
                Justice as provided in section 510 of title 28, 
                United States Code, and may also authorize and 
                direct any other agency of the United States 
                that arrests or detains individuals or 
                supervises individuals facing charges to carry 
                out any function and exercise any power of the 
                Attorney General under this section.
                    (B) The Director of the Bureau of Prisons 
                shall collect a DNA sample from each individual 
                in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons who is, 
                or has been, convicted of a qualifying Federal 
                offense (as determined under subsection (d)) or 
                a qualifying military offense, as determined 
                under section 1565 of title 10, United States 
                Code.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

            (3) Individuals already in codis.--For each 
        individual described in paragraph (1) or (2), if the 
        Combined DNA Index System (in this section referred to 
        as ``CODIS'') of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
        contains a DNA analysis with respect to that 
        individual, or if a DNA sample has been collected from 
        that individual under section 1565 of title 10, United 
        States Code, the [Director of the Bureau of Prisons] 
        Attorney General, the Director of the Bureau of 
        Prisons, or the probation office responsible (as 
        applicable) may (but need not) collect a DNA sample 
        from that individual.
            (4) Collection procedures.--(A) The [Director of 
        the Bureau of Prisons] Attorney General, the Director 
        of the Bureau of Prisons, or the probation office 
        responsible (as applicable) may use or authorize the 
        use of such means as are reasonably necessary to 
        detain, restrain, and collect a DNA sample from an 
        individual who refuses to cooperate in the collection 
        of the sample.
            (B) The [Director of the Bureau of Prisons] 
        Attorney General, the Director of the Bureau of 
        Prisons, or the probation office, as appropriate, may 
        enter into agreements with units of State or local 
        government or with private entities to provide for the 
        collection of the samples described in paragraph (1) or 
        (2).

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    (b) Analysis and Use of Samples.--The [Director of the 
Bureau of Prisons] Attorney General, the Director of the Bureau 
of Prisons, or the probation office responsible (as applicable) 
shall furnish each DNA sample collected under subsection (a) to 
the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who shall 
carry out a DNA analysis on each such DNA sample and include 
the results in CODIS.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


TITLE 28, UNITED STATES CODE

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


PART V--PROCEDURE

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                    CHAPTER 119--EVIDENCE; WITNESSES

Sec.
1821.    Per diem and mileage generally; subsistence.
     * * * * * * *
1826A. Marital communications and adverse spousal privilege.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 1826A. Marital communications and adverse spousal privilege

    The confidential marital communication privilege and the 
adverse spousal privilege shall be inapplicable in any Federal 
proceeding in which a spouse is charged with a crime against--
            (1) a child of either spouse; or
            (2) a child under the custody or control of either 
        spouse.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


PART VI--PARTICULAR PROCEEDINGS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


CHAPTER 153--HABEAS CORPUS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 2254. State custody; remedies in federal courts

    (a)  * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    (j)(1) A court, justice, or judge shall not have 
jurisdiction to consider any claim relating to the judgment or 
sentence in an application described under paragraph (2), 
unless the applicant shows that the claim qualifies for 
consideration on the grounds described in subsection (e)(2). 
Any such application that is presented to a court, justice, or 
judge other than a district court shall be transferred to the 
appropriate district court for consideration or dismissal in 
conformity with this subsection, except that a court of appeals 
panel must authorize any second or successive application in 
conformity with section 2244 before any consideration by the 
district court.
    (2) This subsection applies to an application for a writ of 
habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the 
judgment of a State court for a crime that involved the killing 
of a individual who has not attained the age of 18 years.
    (3) For an application described in paragraph (2), the 
following requirements shall apply in the district court:
            (A) Any motion by either party for an evidentiary 
        hearing shall be filed and served not later than 90 
        days after the State files its answer or, if no timely 
        answer is filed, the date on which such answer is due.
            (B) Any motion for an evidentiary hearing shall be 
        granted or denied not later than 30 days after the date 
        on which the party opposing such motion files a 
        pleading in opposition to such motion or, if no timely 
        pleading in opposition is filed, the date on which such 
        pleading in opposition is due.
            (C) Any evidentiary hearing shall be--
                    (i) convened not less than 60 days after 
                the order granting such hearing; and
                    (ii) completed not more than 150 days after 
                the order granting such hearing.
            (D) A district court shall enter a final order, 
        granting or denying the application for a writ of 
        habeas corpus, not later than 15 months after the date 
        on which the State files its answer or, if no timely 
        answer is filed, the date on which such answer is due, 
        or not later than 60 days after the case is submitted 
        for decision, whichever is earlier.
            (E) If the district court fails to comply with the 
        requirements of this paragraph, the State may petition 
        the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus to enforce 
        the requirements. The court of appeals shall grant or 
        deny the petition for a writ of mandamus not later than 
        30 days after such petition is filed with the court.
    (4) For an application described in paragraph (2), the 
following requirements shall apply in the court of appeals:
            (A) A timely filed notice of appeal from an order 
        issuing a writ of habeas corpus shall operate as a stay 
        of that order pending final disposition of the appeal.
            (B) The court of appeals shall decide the appeal 
        from an order granting or denying a writ of habeas 
        corpus--
                    (i) not later than 120 days after the date 
                on which the brief of the appellee is filed or, 
                if no timely brief is filed, the date on which 
                such brief is due; or
                    (ii) if a cross-appeal is filed, not later 
                than 120 days after the date on which the 
                appellant files a brief in response to the 
                issues presented by the cross-appeal or, if no 
                timely brief is filed, the date on which such 
                brief is due.
            (C)(i) Following a decision by a panel of the court 
        of appeals under subparagraph (B), a petition for panel 
        rehearing is not allowed, but rehearing by the court of 
        appeals en banc may be requested. The court of appeals 
        shall decide whether to grant a petition for rehearing 
        en banc not later than 30 days after the date on which 
        the petition is filed, unless a response is required, 
        in which case the court shall decide whether to grant 
        the petition not later than 30 days after the date on 
        which the response is filed or, if no timely response 
        is filed, the date on which the response is due.
            (ii) If rehearing en banc is granted, the court of 
        appeals shall make a final determination of the appeal 
        not later than 120 days after the date on which the 
        order granting rehearing en banc is entered.
            (D) If the court of appeals fails to comply with 
        the requirements of this paragraph, the State may 
        petition the Supreme Court or a justice thereof for a 
        writ of mandamus to enforce the requirements.
    (5)(A) The time limitations under paragraphs (3) and (4) 
shall apply to an initial application described in paragraph 
(2), any second or successive application described in 
paragraph (2), and any redetermination of an application 
described in paragraph (2) or related appeal following a remand 
by the court of appeals or the Supreme Court for further 
proceedings.
    (B) In proceedings following remand in the district court, 
time limits running from the time the State files its answer 
under paragraph (3) shall run from the date the remand is 
ordered if further briefing is not required in the district 
court. If there is further briefing following remand in the 
district court, such time limits shall run from the date on 
which a responsive brief is filed or, if no timely responsive 
brief is filed, the date on which such brief is due.
    (C) In proceedings following remand in the court of 
appeals, the time limit specified in paragraph (4)(B) shall run 
from the date the remand is ordered if further briefing is not 
required in the court of appeals. If there is further briefing 
in the court of appeals, the time limit specified in paragraph 
(4)(B) shall run from the date on which a responsive brief is 
filed or, if no timely responsive brief is filed, from the date 
on which such brief is due.
    (6) The failure of a court to meet or comply with a time 
limitation under this subsection shall not be a ground for 
granting relief from a judgment of conviction or sentence, nor 
shall the time limitations under this subsection be construed 
to entitle a capital applicant to a stay of execution, to which 
the applicant would otherwise not be entitled, for the purpose 
of litigating any application or appeal.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


                 SECTION 471 OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT

           STATE PLAN FOR FOSTER CARE AND ADOPTION ASSISTANCE

    Sec. 471. (a) In order for a State to be eligible for 
payments under this part, it shall have a plan approved by the 
Secretary which--
            (1)  * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

            (20)(A) unless an election provided for in 
        subparagraph (B) is made with respect to the State, 
        provides procedures for criminal records checks, 
        including checks of national crime information 
        databases (as defined in section 534(e)(3)(A) of title 
        28, United States Code), for any prospective foster or 
        adoptive parent before the foster or adoptive parent 
        may be finally approved for placement of a child [on 
        whose behalf foster care maintenance payments or 
        adoption assistance payments are to be made] regardless 
        of whether foster care maintenance payments or adoption 
        assistance payments are to be made on behalf of the 
        child under the State plan under this part, including 
        procedures requiring that--
                    (i) in any case involving a child on whose 
                behalf such payments are to be so made in which 
                a record check reveals a felony conviction for 
                child abuse or neglect, for spousal abuse, for 
                a crime against children (including child 
                pornography), or for a crime involving 
                violence, including rape, sexual assault, or 
                homicide, but not including other physical 
                assault or battery, if a State finds that a 
                court of competent jurisdiction has determined 
                that the felony was committed at any time, such 
                final approval shall not be granted; and
                    (ii) in any case involving a child on whose 
                behalf such payments are to be so made in which 
                a record check reveals a felony conviction for 
                physical assault, battery, or a drug-related 
                offense, if a State finds that a court of 
                competent jurisdiction has determined that the 
                felony was committed within the past 5 years, 
                such final approval shall not be granted; and
            (B) subparagraph (A) shall not apply to a State 
        plan if, on or before September 30, 2005, the Governor 
        of the State has notified the Secretary in writing that 
        the State has elected to make subparagraph (A) 
        inapplicable to the State, or if, on or before such 
        date, the State legislature, by law, has elected to 
        make subparagraph (A) inapplicable to the State; and
            (C) provides that the State shall--
                    (i) check any child abuse and neglect 
                registry maintained by the State for 
                information on any prospective foster or 
                adoptive parent and on any other adult living 
                in the home of such a prospective parent, and 
                request any other State in which any such 
                prospective parent or other adult has resided 
                in the preceding 5 years, to enable the State 
                to check any child abuse and neglect registry 
                maintained by such other State for such 
                information, before the prospective foster or 
                adoptive parent may be finally approved for 
                placement of a child, regardless of whether 
                foster care maintenance payments or adoption 
                assistance payments are to be made on behalf of 
                the child under the State plan under this part;
                    (ii) comply with any request described in 
                clause (i) that is received from another State; 
                and
                    (iii) have in place safeguards to prevent 
                the unauthorized disclosure of information in 
                any child abuse and neglect registry maintained 
                by the State, and to prevent any such 
                information obtained pursuant to this 
                subparagraph from being used for a purpose 
                other than the conducting of background checks 
                in foster or adoptive placement cases;

 [Pursuant to section 502(c)(2) of HR 3132, effective October 1, 2007 
                   paragraph (20) reads as follows:]

            (20)(A) [unless an election provided for in 
        subparagraph (B) is made with respect to the State,] 
        provides procedures for criminal records checks for any 
        prospective foster or adoptive parent before the foster 
        or adoptive parent may be finally approved for 
        placement of a child on whose behalf foster care 
        maintenance payments or adoption assistance payments 
        are to be made under the State plan under this part, 
        including procedures requiring that--
                    (i) in any case in which a record check 
                reveals a felony conviction for child abuse or 
                neglect, for spousal abuse, for a crime against 
                children (including child pornography), or for 
                a crime involving violence, including rape, 
                sexual assault, or homicide, but not including 
                other physical assault or battery, if a State 
                finds that a court of competent jurisdiction 
                has determined that the felony was committed at 
                any time, such final approval shall not be 
                granted; and
                    (ii) in any case in which a record check 
                reveals a felony conviction for physical 
                assault, battery, or a drug-related offense, if 
                a State finds that a court of competent 
                jurisdiction has determined that the felony was 
                committed within the past 5 years, such final 
                approval shall not be granted; and
            [(B) subparagraph (A) shall not apply to a State 
        plan if the Governor of the State has notified the 
        Secretary in writing that the State has elected to make 
        subparagraph (A) inapplicable to the State, or if the 
        State legislature, by law, has elected to make 
        subparagraph (A) inapplicable to the State; and]
                    [(C)] (B) provides that the State shall--
                            (i) check any child abuse and 
                        neglect registry maintained by the 
                        State for information on any 
                        prospective foster or adoptive parent 
                        and on any other adult living in the 
                        home of such a prospective parent, and 
                        request any other State in which any 
                        such prospective parent or other adult 
                        has resided in the preceding 5 years, 
                        to enable the State to check any child 
                        abuse and neglect registry maintained 
                        by such other State for such 
                        information, before the prospective 
                        foster or adoptive parent may be 
                        finally approved for placement of a 
                        child, regardless of whether foster 
                        care maintenance payments or adoption 
                        assistance payments are to be made on 
                        behalf of the child under the State 
                        plan under this part;
                            (ii) comply with any request 
                        described in clause (i) that is 
                        received from another State; and
                            (iii) have in place safeguards to 
                        prevent the unauthorized disclosure of 
                        information in any child abuse and 
                        neglect registry maintained by the 
                        State, and to prevent any such 
                        information obtained pursuant to this 
                        subparagraph from being used for a 
                        purpose other than the conducting of 
                        background checks in foster or adoptive 
                        placement cases;

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                     Committee Jurisdiction Letters


                               ATTACHMENT


                           Markup Transcript



                            BUSINESS MEETING

                        WEDNESDAY, JULY 27, 2005

                  House of Representatives,
                                Committee on the Judiciary,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:38 a.m., in 
Room 2141, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. F. James 
Sensenbrenner, Jr. (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
    [Intervening business.]
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Pursuant to notice, I now call up 
the bill H.R. 3132, the ``Children's Safety Act of 2005,'' for 
purposes of markup and move its favorable recommendation to the 
House. Without objection, the bill will be considered as read 
and open for amendment at any point.
    [The bill, H.R. 3132, follows:]
      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The Chair recognizes himself for 5 
minutes to explain the bill.
    On June 30th, I introduced, along with 11 original and 
bipartisan cosponsors, the Children's Safety Act of 2005. This 
bill addresses the growing epidemic of violence against 
children and enhances the safety of children and the security 
of our communities by enhancing protection from convicted sex 
offenders through coordinated State registration and 
coordination programs. In recent months, our country has been 
devastated by a series of brutal attacks against our children.
    In June, America was shocked by the kidnapping of 8-year-
old Shasta Groene and the abduction and murder of her 9-year-
old brother Dylan. Joseph Duncan, a convicted sex offender, 
kidnapped these kids from their homes after murdering their 
older brother, mother, and her boyfriend. Duncan repeatedly 
sexually abused both Dylan and Shasta before he killed Dylan, 
dumped his body in a Montana campground, and reportedly boasted 
to Shasta about using a hammer and shotgun to kill her family. 
Duncan had previously been convicted for molesting two young 
boys near a school playground, was released on bail, and 
subsequently failed to check in with his probation officer.
    In March, 9-year-old Jessica Lunsford was abducted, raped, 
and buried alive. In April, 13-year-old Sarah Lundy was 
murdered. Both were murdered by convicted sex offenders.
    While horrific violence against children is by no means 
uncommon, statistics show that one in five girls and one in ten 
boys were sexually exploited before they reached adulthood. And 
yet less than 50--excuse me, less than 35 percent of these 
assaults are reported to the authorities.
    According to the Department of Justice, one in five 
children 10 to 17 years old received unwanted sexual 
solicitations online; 67 percent of all the victims of sexual 
assault are under age 18; and 34 percent are under the age of 
12. One out of every seven victims of sexual assault is under 
the age of 6.
    Last month, the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and 
Homeland Security held three hearings focusing on violent 
crimes against children, sexual exploitation of children, the 
sex offender registration and notification program, and related 
issue. Yesterday, I participated in a news conference focusing 
on this legislation and the urgent need to better protect 
America's children against sexual predators.
    John Walsh of ``America's Most Wanted,'' Ernie Allen from 
the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, and 
Robbie Callaway from the Boys and Girls Clubs, and other 
victims and representatives of victims organizations urged 
Congress to enact this legislation. As their testimonials 
demonstrate, violence against children occurs with heart-
breaking regularity and the time for action is now.
    This bill helps eliminate loopholes in the sex offender and 
registration program in important ways. It expands coverage of 
registration and notification requirements; increases the 
duration of registration requirements for sex offenders; 
requires States to provide Internet availability of sex 
offender information; ensures timely registration by sex 
offenders and verification; requires sex offenders to register 
in person and on a regular basis and to provide details 
personal information whenever they move to a new area to live, 
attend school, or work; requires States to notify the Attorney 
General, law enforcement agencies, schools, housing agencies 
and development background check agencies, social service 
agencies, and volunteer organizations in the area where a sex 
offender may live, work, or attend school; and authorizes 
demonstration programs for a new electronic monitoring program, 
such as DPS monitoring, which will requires examination of 
multijurisdictional monitoring procedures; creates a new 
national sex offender registry; establishes a new Federal crime 
for a sex offender's failure to register; authorizes U.S. 
Marshals to apprehend sex offenders who fail to register; and 
increases grants to States to apprehend sex offenders who are 
in violation of registration requirements.
    The legislation also revises law relating to the use of DNA 
evidence; increases penalty for violent crimes committed 
against children or sexual exploitation of children; 
streamlines habeas review of State death sentences imposed 
against child killers; and enhances protection of foster 
children by requiring foster parents to complete criminal 
background checks, authorizing child welfare agencies to obtain 
access to national criminal history databases, and requiring 
sex offenders to submit to searches as a condition of 
supervised release or probation.
    It's a good bill. I would urge that it be enacted, and I 
yield to the gentleman from Michigan.
    Mr. Conyers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Well, here we are 
again with a bill that combines several bills. There have been 
partial hearings on some of them.
    Now, all the parts of the bill that deal with trying to 
invest in preventive solutions that get to the root of this 
serious social problem--the vulnerability of children to 
molesters that prey on them--I support. But here is a measure 
that just incidentally creates about 36 new mandatory minimum 
criminal penalties.
    I have a deep, long-lasting opposition about mandatory 
minimum sentences, which have been proven arbitrary, 
ineffective at reducing crime, and a rather considerable waste 
of our tax money.
    Mandatory sentences now constitute almost 10 percent of all 
those who are incarcerated in State and Federal prisons, are 
serving life sentences, an 83-percent increase since 1992.
    What do we have to show for these statistics? The answer is 
simple: the largest prison system in the world, roughly 
quadruple the number of individuals incarcerated in 1985 in 
this country, at a cost of about $40 billion a year to run and 
operate.
    So my appeal is to Members of this Committee to move past 
the emotional side of this issue and let's work together to 
come up with solutions to prevent such tragedies from occurring 
in the future. And to the extent that we look at registration, 
Internet consideration, Attorney General and other kinds of 
notification, fine. But when we start talking about mandatory 
minimums at about the rate of about three dozen a bill, I know 
we're rushing to get out of here, but this is sort of going 
over the top.
    Did you know there were two new death penalty eligible 
offenses installed at a time when all available evidence 
suggests to many that the death penalty should be curbed, if 
not eliminated, but certainly not expanded? This spring, 120 
death row inmates so far have been exonerated due to new proof 
of innocence.
    What is the point? That the death penalty fails to serve as 
an adequate deterrent, unfairly punishes the poor, and is very 
definitely racially biased.
    So, in the end, if we're truly serious about protecting our 
children from the acts of sexual exploitation and violence, we 
need to invest in solutions of a preventive nature that try 
more carefully to get at the root of the problem. The measure 
before us, 3132, fails in that respect in a very large way.
    I return any time that may be unused, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection, all Members may 
include opening statements in the record at this point.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Green follows:]
  Prepared Statement of the Honorable Mark Green, a Representative in 
                  Congress from the State of Wisconsin
    Good morning, I want to first thank the Chairman for working with 
me and many other colleagues to put together this comprehensive bill 
that will help protect children from violent predators.
    Unfortunately the news is all too often riddled with stories of 
children being abducted, assaulted and/or murdered. Each story is 
shocking, heartbreaking to see, and, more importantly, means a family's 
life is forever changed.
    Sadly, there are too many examples of brutal acts of violence and 
exploitation of our children occurring every day. Just think, 
statistics show that 1 in 5 girls and 1 in 10 boys are sexually 
exploited before they reach adulthood. 67 percent of all victims of 
sexual assault were juveniles under the age of 18, 34 percent were 
under the age of 12 and one of every seven victims of sexual assault 
was under the age of 6.
    One job our government must do is protect us. That begins with 
protecting our most vulnerable of citizens--our children. It means 
ensuring we are giving law enforcement the tools they need to catch the 
criminals before they escalate to worse crimes. This begins with 
allowing the police to take a DNA sample when they are booking 
criminals--DNA fingerprinting. We know that criminals escalate their 
behavior and that breaking and entering can evolve into violent sexual 
assault. By expanding the DNA database we will help the police find 
matches to sex crimes faster which will get these criminals off of the 
streets. This is a common sense step to help protect our communities.
    We also must increase penalties for crimes against children. If for 
no other reason we need longer sentences because it will keep these 
monsters off the streets and away from our children. Sexual predators 
are the worst kind of criminals, not only violating their victim but 
leaving them with fear, guilt and hurt many years after the attack. 
These cases lead to suicidal thoughts and actions--I met with a family 
whose five-year-old was molested and she, at the age of six, is 
displaying suicidal tendencies. These predators are monsters in every 
sense of the word and must be locked up for a long time--if not 
forever. The measures in this legislation will ensure these criminals 
can be taken off the streets and out of our lives.
    This legislation will help protect children, ensure their safety 
and, hopefully, prevent another tragedy--like the tragedies that struck 
Amie Zyla, Jessica Lunsford, Sarah Lunde or the many other children we 
have heard about. It is imperative that we act quickly and send a 
strong message that we will not allow our children to be victimized. 
This bill does that and I urge my colleagues to support it.
    Thank you.

                               ATTACHMENT


    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Are there amendments? Are there 
amendments? The gentleman from California, Mr. Schiff, for what 
purpose do you seek recognition?
    Mr. Schiff. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report the 
amendment.
    The Clerk. Amendment to H.R. 3132, offered by Mr. Schiff of 
California. Insert after section 130 the following new section: 
Section 130A. Bonus Payments to States That Implement 
Electronic Monitoring. (a) In General.--A State that, within 3 
years after the date of the enactment of this Act, has in 
effect laws and policies described in subsection (b) shall be 
eligible for a bonus payment described in subsection----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection, the amendment 
will be considered as read.
    [The amendment follows:]
      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from California is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Schiff. I thank the Chairman.
    At the outset I want to express my support for the 
legislation. I have expressed many reservations during the 
course of time, particularly last year since the Booker 
decision with the growth of proposals that provide mandatory 
minimums, and those concerns are certainly implicated in this 
bill. But there are cases, I think, where an exception is 
warranted, where I can support an exception, and this is one of 
them.
    I have been very discouraged, I know as many around the 
country, that people that prey on children that are sexual 
predators recidivate. They do not have a good rate of 
rehabilitation, and the consequences are devastating.
    I had the opportunity just a few weeks ago to sit down with 
Mark Lunsford, Jessica Lunsford's father, and talk about his 
terrible experience. And, frankly, I'm much less concerned 
about those of us on this panel being potential victims of 
crime than our children being victims of crime or our 
grandchildren. And we have the highest obligation to keep our 
kids safe.
    So I support the legislation even if there are some 
provisions in it that I would write differently. But one I 
wanted to propose as an amendment is one that draws on 
Florida's experience, Florida's tragic experience, but also 
their legislative response. Specifically, Florida law 
establishes a mandatory sentence of 25 years to life behind 
bars for people convicted of certain sex crimes against 
children 11 and younger, with lifetime tracking by global 
positioning satellites after they're released. All other 
offenders would have to be monitored electronically only during 
their probation, not for life.
    The State of Oklahoma has also passed an electronic 
monitoring law that applies to repeat offenders.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Will the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Schiff. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. I have reviewed--I thank the 
gentleman for yielding. I have reviewed the amendment, and I 
think the amendment is a great step in the right direction 
because it does incentivize the States to do the right thing, 
to track these folks.
    The concern that I have with the gentleman's amendment is 
that the definition of the sex crime in the amendment is not 
the same as the definition of the sex crime that is in the 
bill. And I would be willing to work with the gentleman from 
California, if he would withdraw the amendment at this point, 
so that we have an identical definition of sex crimes in the 
bill and in the amendment so there is not any confusion. And 
either the gentleman can offer, re-offer his amendment that is 
corrected later on today, or we can offer it when the bill 
reaches the floor in September.
    But at this point I'd like to ask the gentleman to withdraw 
the amendment so that we have an identical definition of sex 
crimes in both the bill and the amendment.
    Mr. Schiff. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I'd be more than 
willing to do that, and depending on the length of the hearing, 
perhaps we can correct it in time to take it up again.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. If the staff will work on that, and 
I'd like to get it out before the bill is reported, so they've 
got something to do between now and the end of the 
consideration of this bill.
    Mr. Schiff. Mr. Chairman, if I might just conclude for a 
moment on the bill itself, again, it's with great reluctance 
that I embrace a bill that has as many mandatory minimums as 
this one. But I just don't see, frankly, another way to make 
sure these people never commit these crimes again. And when I 
learned, for example, recently of the murder of this family and 
the kidnapping of these two children, the murder of one of 
them, the molestation of the other, and the person who did this 
was out on $15,000 bail, which the judge defended, the 
prosecutor in that case argued, well, hey, the prosecutor asked 
for $25,000 bail, which I found equally inexplicable. This was 
somebody who had a prior conviction for molestation of a child 
at gunpoint who was now brought up on subsequent charges of 
molesting another child, and the prosecutor was only asking for 
$25,000 bail.
    You know, I think the vast majority of prosecutors and 
judges do good, difficult work, but these cases are all too 
common and too terrifying for parents and too devastating for 
children. And I'm prepared to embrace the strong measures that 
are in this bill, and I yield back.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Does the gentleman----
    Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Does the gentleman withdraw his 
amendment?
    Mr. Schiff. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
    Ms. Lofgren. Would the gentleman yield?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The amendment is withdrawn.
    Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Are there further amendments?
    Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from New York.
    Mr. Nadler. I do not have an amendment. I have a--I move to 
strike the last word.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Nadler. I just wanted to ask a question in view of the 
comments of the gentleman from California a moment ago about 
this tragedy in which the perpetrator was free on bail. That 
was pre-trial bill? If the gentleman would yield?
    Mr. Schiff. if the gentleman would yield, as I understand 
it, yes, it was pre-trial----
    Mr. Nadler. Reclaiming my time, I don't believe--and I hope 
the Chairman or someone will correct me if I'm wrong--that this 
bill would do anything about pre-trial bail, would it?
    Mr. Schiff. Would the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Nadler. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Schiff. You know, again, I don't know all the 
particulars of this case. What it would potentially have had 
the most significant impact on is the prior conviction for 
which he had served his time and was out and would have 
prevented the subsequent--potentially prevented the subsequent 
molestation, depending on the age of the first victim, which is 
a question I don't know. But not only would it have had an 
impact potentially----
    Mr. Nadler. Reclaiming my time, this bill would do a lot of 
things, but I want to be very clear. People make statements 
about people being released on bail and he should have been on 
a $15,000 bail or he should have been on $25,000 bail. But the 
fact of the matter is bail is a question that has to be set--
that has to be dealt with on its own merits. And this bill 
would do nothing about the question of bail. It would do 
nothing good, it would do nothing bad. As far as I can tell, it 
would have no impact on that and we shouldn't bring it into 
this discussion for emotional purposes. I yield back----
    Mr. Issa. Would the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Nadler. I'll yield--if I can reclaim my time, I'll 
yield.
    Mr. Issa. I thank the gentleman. I might only bring to the 
gentleman's attention that consideration of bail in a judge's 
mind includes what he's charged with and the length of time of 
incarceration. The higher the penalty for which he is charged, 
such as a life imprisonment charge, the greater the flight 
risk. So very well had there been high minimum penalties, it 
could have affected his flight risk characteristics and----
    Mr. Nadler. Reclaiming my time, that is possible. It might 
have affected the judge's consideration. I will grant that. But 
the bill itself--but the bill does nothing specifically about 
bail, and I don't want to leave anybody with the impression 
that it does, because there's too much misinformation about 
this kind of legislation all around, anyway.
    Ms. Lofgren. Would the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Nadler. Yes, I'll yield.
    Ms. Lofgren. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
    I would just like to note that we can--there's no way to 
know what a judge would have done on a bail motion with a 
different set of facts. But I would like to--there has been--I 
think my colleague Mr. Schiff and others have talked about the 
issue of mandatory minimums, which I think have had an adverse 
impact that has not promoted necessarily the goals of justice 
in America when it comes to drug crimes. I think that has 
become clear.
    However, you know, I formed my opinion in a positive sense 
on mandatory minimums when it came to child molestation when I 
was in local government and had occasion to review the 
sentencing patterns on a daily basis because of our jail 
overcrowding lawsuit on who was in jail and why. And it was 
absolutely shocking to me the kind of sentences that were being 
handed down for people who victimized children. And I came to 
the conclusion over a period of time, without mentioning any 
individual judges, that it was because, really, this is a crime 
that is a majority of the time committed by white men because 
white men are the majority of men in America and this is a 
crime that is not--and I think the judges who were of a similar 
racial and economic background were unwilling to sentence these 
offenders in a way that their crime deserved.
    And I think that the mandatory minimum in this case is 
really a necessity to overcome that institutional bias on the 
part of the bench to really be too easy on the offenders who 
look just like them and who are from an economic class just 
like them. And it's--I support this bill. It's not perfect, but 
I just thought it was worthwhile to share that personal 
experience that I had in local government.
    I thank the gentleman for yielding.
    Mr. Nadler. Thank you. I thank the gentlelady for her 
comments, and I yield back the balance of my time.
    Mr. Coble. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from North Carolina, 
Mr. Coble.
    Mr. Coble. Mr. Chairman, move to strike the last word.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Coble. And, Mr. Chairman and colleagues, I will not 
take the full 5 minutes, but I just want to weigh in.
    I have previously during this session expressed some 
reservation about mandatory minimums ad infinitum. I think 
maybe we can go overboard sometimes with imposing mandatory 
minimums, but when citizens commit crimes against the most 
innocent and the most vulnerable in our society, i.e., 
children, I think perhaps at that point mandatory minimums 
might well be in order. The gentlelady from California has 
touched on it. The gentleman from California touched on it. 
Perhaps the Chairman did.
    But that's the extent of my comments, Mr. Chairman. I yield 
back.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Are there amendments? The gentleman 
from Virginia, Mr. Scott.
    Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk, 
number one.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report the 
amendment.
    The Clerk. Amendment to H.R. 3132, offered by Mr. Scott of 
Virginia. On page 6, line 19, after the semi-colon, insert 
``or,'' and on line 20 strike ``or'' and all that follows 
through line 22.
    [The amendment follows:]
    
    
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Virginia is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman, the intent of this amendment is to 
remove misdemeanor offenses from the coverage of the bill. This 
way, the way the scheme works is an offender could be required 
to register and be subjected to a 5-year mandatory minimum 
felony for some technical problem with the registration 
requirement that could be deemed failure to register. For 
example, a homeless person may have problems registering and 
may find himself subject to a 5-year mandatory minimum because 
he didn't get a shelter or where--whether it was a shelter or 
where he last lived, or whatever.
    Once someone is labeled a sex offender under these 
requirements, people are not likely to make the distinction 
about how they respond or treat anyone whose name is published. 
Employment or other normal activities will not be feasible for 
anybody on the list because as the list gets more publicity and 
promotion to protect families from the potential ridicule or 
harassment that they may be subject to by anxious and sometimes 
hysterical public with the notoriety of the incidents that has 
occurred, many offenders will have to leave their homes or be 
forced out of their families who are trying to avoid the impact 
on their children or adults with the situation associated with 
the registry.
    Sometimes this registry can have a counter--can have a 
counterproductive effect. One incidence that has been listed 
was where a grade school teacher trying to protect their 
students read the names of everybody on the list to a class. At 
the mention of one of those names, a student blurted out to 
another student, ``Isn't that your father?''
    And so, Mr. Chairman, I'd like--we would hope that if we're 
going to have this list, it would not include misdemeanor 
offenses, and I'd hope the Committee would adopt another 
amendment which I'll offer, which would classify offenders by 
their assessed risk rather than just the fact that they were 
convicted. The extent to which we apply such measures will be 
working its way through the courts, and I hope we will have a 
much better chance than having those--this scheme actually 
found constitutional if we put some limitations on it. So I 
would hope it would be the pleasure to adopt this amendment to 
eliminate misdemeanor offenses from the coverage of the bill.
    Mr. Lungren. Would the gentleman yield on that point?
    Mr. Scott. I yield.
    Mr. Lungren. I'm just interested in the particular incident 
the gentleman mentioned. It's been my experience that at times 
child molestation takes place by the parent or guardian of 
another child. And you object to the fact that information 
would be given that a particular child's parent happened to be 
a registered sex offender when, in fact, at least on numerous 
occasions that's the avenue by which a child molestation takes 
place?
    Mr. Scott. Reclaiming my time, the gentleman is exactly 
right, but if you're going to be spreading this information all 
over town, the question is what kind of offenses should be 
included. This amendment would delete misdemeanor sexual 
offenses. It could not be the kind of predatory offenses. It 
could be just a misdemeanor. And you're going to--somebody 
commits a misdemeanor like that early in their life, for the 
rest of their life they're on this registry.
    Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Would the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Scott. I yield.
    Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Can you give me an example of the 
kinds of misdemeanor sex offenses that you're talking about so 
we can be more clear about what you'd be removing from the 
bill?
    Mr. Scott. Contributing to the delinquency of a minor, 
exposure, some things that would be misdemeanors, early in 
life.
    Ms. Wasserman Schultz. What would be an example of 
contributing to the delinquency of a minor? A sex crime that 
would be----
    Mr. Scott. It would be the court rules that it's a sex 
offense, but it's contributing--well, having sex with a friend 
that happens to be a 19-year-old and a 15-year-old, having sex, 
you're on the sexual registry. Of course, that's a felony for 
which you can get life without parole if you cross a State line 
under one of those bills. But if it was just a misdemeanor, 
you'd still be--these are teenagers--you know, teenagers can be 
committing these offenses.
    Ms. Wasserman Schultz. The reason I'm asking----
    Mr. Scott. Touching.
    Ms. Wasserman Schultz. I just want to figure out 
specifically what kinds of crimes--misdemeanor sex crimes are 
that you'd be removing to ensure that I would feel comfortable 
knowing that I wouldn't want that type of criminal to be on a 
sex registry.
    Mr. Scott. First of all, it can't be too serious because 
it's a misdemeanor.
    Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Right.
    Mr. Scott. And, second of all, it could be committed by 
someone who is, in fact, a teenager, would have this registry 
for life. So when they're 43 years old, they're still being 
registered as a sex offender, having their name read to 
children in the neighborhood.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman's time has expired.
    The gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Green.
    Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I rise in strong 
opposition to----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Green. The accuracy and completeness of the sexual 
offender registry system is vitally important to our national 
efforts to fight crimes against kids. It is essential.
    One of the opening statements today said that we need to 
focus more on prevention. This is one of the ways we focus on 
prevention, by creating usable tools where communities have the 
information they need to take steps to be safe. It is very 
important that we build up this registry system so that it is 
accessible, that it is usable, that it contains the kind of 
information that we need for communities to be able to make 
choices and to take into account the actions of those who may 
move into their community. It is awfully important.
    I have far more faith than the gentleman does of the 
ability of communities, of citizens, of organizations to judge 
the seriousness of a crime. And so it may be a misdemeanor that 
is reported, and that can be taken into account when people are 
able to access that information. But they need to know it.
    If someone is convicted of a sex crime against a kid and 
that person moves into my neighborhood, as a father I demand 
the right to know that he's there. I cannot take steps to 
prevent my kids if I don't have that information. It is vitally 
important.
    The bottom line for me is real simple. If people who commit 
these misdemeanor offenses are worried about being part of the 
registry, don't commit the crime. They have chosen to commit 
the crime. And when they chose to commit the crime, yes, they 
surrendered certain things; and, yes, people are going to find 
out about what they did. I'm sorry if that's unpleasant for 
them.
    I yield back----
    Mr. Lungren. Would the gentleman yield for a moment? Would 
the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Green. I would be happy to yield to the gentleman.
    Mr. Lungren. The fact of the matter is if you know anything 
about these cases, you understand how difficult it is to 
prosecute sex cases because of the complaining witness is a 
child. In many cases, there's on corroborating witness. So 
oftentimes prosecutors accept a plea to a lesser offense, and 
for someone to suggest that an inappropriate touching of a 
sexual nature is--if it's classified as a misdemeanor is an 
insignificant crime for which we ought not to be aware, I would 
just--I would just register opposition to that.
    The nature of these crimes have in the past been extremely 
difficult to prosecute. When we first came up with a public 
registry in California, I heard the same arguments the 
gentleman has registered, that it would embarrass people, that 
there would be vigilantes, that they would be targeted, that 
they would have to move out of town. That may have happened in 
a very, very, very few cases. I can think of one vigilante case 
in California since we did that some 12 years ago where someone 
burned an automobile of someone who was a registered sex 
offender.
    We have penalties in the law for people who would use the 
registry for purposes of taking violent action against an 
individual. So I would just say this is--some might call it a 
unique area of the law, but because of the nature of the 
crimes, because of the difficulty in prosecuting, because of 
oftentimes the acceptance of a plea to a lesser offense, I 
think there is a reason for us to treat these categories of 
crimes differently.
    Ms. Lofgren. Would the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Green. Mr. Chairman, in the limited time I have left, I 
guess I'd also like to bring out another point, and I hope I'll 
have a chance to talk about it a little bit further on. But a 
well-publicized case back in my home State of Wisconsin led to 
the passage in Wisconsin of the Aime Zyla Act, and she was 
brutally assaulted, but she was assaulted by a young man, a 
juvenile, I guess a youthful error, some might call it. But the 
offense he committed was serious. The record had been sealed, 
so when he was released back into the community, people weren't 
notified. And, of course, he went on to commit a number of 
offenses and molest a number of other children, and I blame the 
incompleteness and the inaccessibility of the sexual offender 
registry.
    It is vitally important that we are able to count upon that 
registry, and that means making sure that it is complete, that 
we have the information in there that parents can use, that 
communities can use, and organizations can use. That's why I 
think it's so important that this kind of information remain 
part of the registry, which is warning letter under this 
legislation.
    And with that, Mr. Chairman----
    Ms. Lofgren. Would the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Green.--I yield back.
    Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from New York, Mr. 
Nadler.
    Mr. Nadler. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of 
the amendment.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Nadler. Thank you, and I'd like to address some of the 
arguments.
    The idea of a sex--of a registry which follows you for 
life, while we have to do it in some cases, it is fundamentally 
against our normal sense of justice. Our normal sense of 
justice says someone who commits a crime should be punished for 
that crime with an appropriate punishment, and once that 
appropriate punishment is finished, should be free of it and go 
about his business and try to be--fit into society. That's our 
normal sense of justice.
    Because we know that certain types of crime, certain types 
of sex crimes tend to have a great degree of recidivism and we 
want to protect our children and protect our people from them, 
we say, okay, we'll suspend some of our normal objections to a 
lifetime hounding of a person, and in order to protect society, 
we'll have a sexual offenders registry.
    I go along with that. That's fine. But it's not the ideal. 
We don't live an ideal world. We have to do that. But we have 
to do that only--we should limit it to the seriousness of what 
we're doing and to the risk that promotes it. And I would 
submit that if the predicate offense is a misdemeanor, it 
doesn't justify it.
    Now, two arguments are advanced against this. One, there 
are some serious things that are misdemeanors. Well, if they're 
serious things, the State or the Federal Government should 
amend the law and they shouldn't be misdemeanors. They should 
be felonies. If they're misdemeanors, they're by definition not 
to serious that you should get a lifetime registry to follow a 
person for life. And maybe something should be reclassified 
from misdemeanors to felonies, but that's a different law, 
that's a different bill. This bill should say that for serious 
sex offenses, we will strengthen our law on sex registries, and 
it would be a fine bill if it did that. But that doesn't mean 
misdemeanors.
    Mr. Lungren raises the issue that, well, because of the 
difficulty of prosecuting some of these offenses, on occasion, 
maybe many occasions, you get a situation where a prosecutor 
will accept a plea to a misdemeanor when what was really 
committed was a felony and, therefore, we better have the sex 
registry because this guy's really a dangerous guy.
    Well, that amendment--or that comment is not totally 
fallacious, but it's fundamentally subversive of our notion of 
justice, because what you're really saying is you should punish 
someone not for what he was convicted of but for what he might 
have been guilty of but you couldn't prove.
    What you're saying is that this guy--we know he committed a 
felony or we think he committed a felony. The prosecutor thinks 
he committed a felony. We'll take the prosecutor's word for it, 
even though he couldn't convict him of it and he took a plea to 
a misdemeanor. Well, sometimes you have to take pleas to 
misdemeanors, and sometimes the guy didn't commit the felony. 
Sometimes people plead to misdemeanors because they can't 
afford a good lawyer even though they're entirely innocent. It 
works both ways.
    So to predicate a lifetime hounding of a person, which is 
what a sex registry amounts to, which we may have to do 
sometimes to protect our children, granted, but to predicate it 
on something that isn't really serious, on a misdemeanor, on 
the off chance that maybe the guy really committed a serious 
crime but you couldn't convict him of it, that is fundamentally 
subversive of our notion of justice that we punish people for 
crimes they are convicted of. What this is saying is that we 
are going to protect ourselves by punishing a person for 
something of which he was not convicted or really making a much 
too serious punishment for a light crime because maybe he was 
really guilty of a more serious crime.
    That doesn't make sense. That we shouldn't do because it 
destroys our entire system of justice. It destroys the 
difference between felonies and misdemeanors. It destroys the 
difference between serious and non-serious crimes. And it 
destroys the notion of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt 
if we start putting heavy penalties on things because maybe he 
committed a more serious crime than what he was convicted of.
    So if it's not a misdemeanor, if it's a serious crime, use 
the sex registry. If it's a misdemeanor, it's too light a crime 
to justify it, and you can't justify it by saying, well, maybe 
he's really guilty of a more serious crime. So I urge the 
adoption of this amendment.
    Thank you and I yield back.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The question is on the amendment 
offered by the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott. Those in 
favor will say aye? Opposed, no?
    The noes appear to have it. The noes have it, and the 
amendment is not agreed to.
    Are there further amendments?
    Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. 
Scott.
    Mr. Scott. I have an amendment at the desk, number two.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report the 
amendment.
    The Clerk. Amendment to H.R. 3132, offered by Mr. Scott of 
Virginia. On page 7, line 17 strike subsection (I), and 
redesignate the succeeding subsection accordingly.
    [The amendment follows:]
    
    
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman, could I have number three and we 
can take them en bloc because they're very similar?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report amendment 
number three.
    The Clerk. Amendment to H.R. 3132, offered by Mr. Scott of 
Virginia. On page 8, line 13 strike subsection (D).
    [The amendment follows:]
    
    
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection, the amendments 
are considered en bloc, and the gentleman from Virginia is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Chairman amendment two would delete the authority of 
the Attorney General to essentially legislate who is a sexual 
predator by delegating to the Attorney General the ability to 
designate any other offense--any other offense for inclusion in 
the definition of a specified offense against a minor.
    Amendment three deals with the authority of the Attorney 
General to designate what constitutes a serious sex offense. 
And both of those, it is unfair for the defendant in an 
adversarial situation to give the ability of the other side the 
ability to essentially legislate whether they're guilty or not. 
If we're going to have standards, we ought to put the standards 
on who has to register, who doesn't register, and we shouldn't 
designate to the Attorney General the ability to kind of make 
it up as he goes along.
    There may be, in fact, an unconstitutional delegation of 
legislative authority to the executive branch under several 
Supreme Court decisions by giving the Attorney General the 
ability to make that designation. So I would hope that we would 
delete that provision.
    I yield back.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. 
Green.
    Mr. Green. Move to strike the last word.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I rise in opposition. 
These amendments together would take away, as I understand it, 
the ability, the authority of the Attorney General to add 
serious sex offenses to the list of offenses for which 
registration would be required. The sad reality is that 
Congress is a slow-moving body, and I believe that in this 
case, these crimes are so serious that the Attorney General 
needs the ability to add offenses, again, because the registry 
is such an important part of our national effort against crimes 
against kids. I think it is appropriate that he have that 
ability to add those offenses.
    Again, what we are talking about here is not putting new 
penalties. We are talking about making a registry accurate and 
complete so that communities and parents and organizations can 
use it and rely upon it. I think it is important that the 
Attorney General have that authority, and with that I yield 
back.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The question is on the amendments 
en bloc offered by the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott. 
Those in favor will say aye? Opposed, no?
    The noes appear to have it. The noes have it. The 
amendments are not agreed to.
    Are there further amendments? The gentleman from Virginia, 
Mr. Scott.
    Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk, 
number four.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report amendment 
number four.
    The Clerk. Amendment to H.R. 3132, offered by Mr. Scott of 
Virginia. On page 24, line 11 and starting on line 21, strike 
``less than 5 years nor.''
    [The amendment follows:]
    
    
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman, this amendment would change two 
mandatory minimum sentences related to the registration 
requirements to a scheme with a maximum number of years and 
leave it to the Sentencing Commission and the courts to 
determine the gradation of seriousness and punishment and the 
appropriate punishment.
    We have been told by the Judicial Conference time and time 
again that mandatory minimum sentences violate common sense. 
For someone who deserves the time, they have no effect because 
they'll get that time. For someone who clearly does not deserve 
the time, they'll get that time, anyway, whether it makes sense 
or not.
    In our everyday experience, judges can see differences 
small and great in the facts and circumstances of the cases 
before them. The name of the crime is often a very poor 
reflector of the facts and circumstances of the crime, and it 
makes sense to have a rational assessor who has heard and seen 
the evidence and the facts and circumstances in the case making 
the decision of the appropriate sentence within a range that 
relates to the gradations of seriousness of the crime and the 
characteristics of the offender. That system was what we 
established in 1984 with the Sentencing Reform and establishing 
the Sentencing Commission. Yet we are constantly violating that 
system with mandatory minimum sentences. Those sentences are 
not based on any rational determination of their impact but, 
unfortunately, often just the politics of the day.
    The Sentencing Commission has recently substantially 
enhanced the punishment guidelines for sex offenses against 
children, and we've already seen the harsh mandatory minimums 
that we've set in the PROTECT Act. Here we are back again to 
increase those mandatory minimums and more before we have even 
see--had an opportunity to see whether they have an effect or 
not.
    There's one caveat. When we do these mandatory minimums, 
it's just those with Federal jurisdiction, which means that our 
Native Americans will bear the unfortunate brunt of this 
rhetorical flourish. About 70 percent of the cases in Federal 
jurisdiction involve Native Americans, and there's no 
suggestion that Native Americans have more problem in this area 
than others.
    And before I finish, Mr. Chairman, I just want to remind 
everyone that 90 to 95 percent of those who are committing 
sexual crimes against children are not going to be covered by 
these registrations, anyway, and 99 percent of those covered 
and having to register are not a threat. It is a very 
inefficient way to have registrations and jailings and the 
expense involved in that. It's a very inefficient way to try to 
protect children. There are a lot of other things we can do in 
a much more cost-effective way to prevent child abuse against--
child and sexual abuse against children, and this bill is 
certainly not one of them.
    I would hope that we would eliminate this mandatory 
minimum, and I yield back the balance of my time.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. 
Green.
    Mr. Green. I move to strike the last word.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I rise in opposition to 
this amendment, and strongly so.
    First off, before I deal specifically with the points of 
the amendment, the gentleman just made an argument that I think 
he's going to try to make over and over again today. He's 
arguing--making an argument that we are unfairly focusing on 
offenses that may take place in reservations, in tribal 
jurisdictions. Remember--and I represent as many reservations 
and as much tribal land as probably anybody in this House. 
Children of Native Americans are no less worthy of protection, 
no less deserving of protection than anyone else. And when the 
argument is made that somehow this shouldn't apply to tribal 
lands, I think that's offensive.
    We need to make sure that children are protected. And it is 
true that a large part of Federal jurisdiction, Federal lands, 
may be lands that are in trust. But, nonetheless, those 
children, many of whom I am fortunate to represent in my neck 
of the woods, are certainly deserving of our strongest possible 
protection.
    Now to the question of the registry, and the gentleman 
would remove the mandatory minimum penalty for failing to 
register as a sex offender when you cross State lines. Again, 
I've said it before and I think it's so crucial today. We know 
that the information that can be gleaned from the sexual 
offender registry is effective. It can help communities, it can 
help parents, it can help organizations take precautions to 
keep kids safe. It is vitally important--vitally important--
that sex offenders are required to register and required to 
update the registry when their lives change, when they move, 
when they change careers. That is information that we must 
have, that we need to have if we're going to keep our kids 
safe.
    So removing the mandatory minimum here is a terrible idea. 
It is the heart of this bill that we update our registry and we 
make it more accessible, we make it more effective. And taking 
away the penalty for those who would avoid the accuracy and the 
reach that the sexual offender registry provides, removing the 
penalty I think is a terrible idea.
    With that I yield back.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The question is on the amendment 
number----
    Mr. Watt. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from North Carolina, 
Mr. Scott.
    Mr. Watt. Mr. Watt, you mean.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Mr. Watt. I'm sorry.
    Mr. Watt. I move to strike the last word.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman Mr. Watt is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Watt. And I yield to Mr. Scott.
    Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman, you had it right. [Laughter.]
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. I'm not fooled.
    Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman, I would just point out that this 
mandatory minimum is not for committing another offense. On 
page 24, line 11, the section--it says knowingly fails to 
register as required shall be fined and imprisoned for not less 
than 5, no more than 20 years. This is not for committing 
another offense.
    Mr. Green. Would the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Scott. This is just failing to register. You can get up 
to 20 years whether you eliminate the mandatory minimum or not. 
We're just talking about failing to register.
    Mr. Green. Would the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Watt. I would yield to the gentleman.
    Mr. Green. So the gentleman does not believe that failing 
to register is an offense.
    Mr. Scott. Reclaiming--would the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Watt. I would yield to the gentleman.
    Mr. Scott. I would say that failing to register should 
subject you to a punishment of up to 20 years.
    Mr. Green. So it should be--but it is an offense. You agree 
with that.
    Mr. Scott. Up to 20 years. But not a mandatory minimum.
    Mr. Nadler. Would the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Watt. I will yield to the gentleman from New York.
    Mr. Nadler. Thank you. I think the distinction here which 
may be being lost is that it's a heck of a thing to say 
something is a 5-year minimum, 5 to 20, as opposed to saying up 
to 20 years. And what the gentleman is saying, I think--correct 
me if I'm wrong--is that failing to register as opposed to a 
sex offense itself, but failing to register should be an 
offense for up to 20 years, but should not have a mandatory 
minimum of 5 years, just the offense of failing to register. 
Letting a judge have discretion of saying--it's a serious 
crime. Up to 20 years in prison, it's a serious crime. You 
don't need the minimum of 5 years in prison simply for failing 
to register. So the judge can make that determination.
    I think that's what the gentleman is saying. It's clearly 
an offense. It's clearly a serious offense. It's not a sex 
offense, and it shouldn't have the mandatory minimum of 5 
years, but it could be a serious offense of up to 20 years.
    I yield back to the gentleman. I thank the gentleman for 
yielding.
    Mr. Watt. I yield to the gentleman from Virginia.
    Mr. Scott. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
    I want to remind everyone who just voted against my last 
amendment that this entire process can be provoked with a 
misdemeanor for which the punishment was less than 1 year, and 
you're going to get as a result of the punishment for that 
failing to register for what you committed, the offense was 
less than 1 year, you can get 5 years mandatory minimum if you 
fail to register. The original offense was an offense that the 
Government thought wasn't worth even 12 months, and here you 
are giving a 5-year mandatory minimum.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Florida, Mr. 
Keller.
    Mr. Keller. Move to strike the last word.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Keller. And I will yield to Mr. Green.
    Mr. Green. I thank the gentleman for yielding. Everything 
that my friend Mr. Scott has said may be on occasion true, but, 
again, the importance of the registry is so great that I 
believe that when you are required to report and fail to do so, 
you have, in fact, committed a very serious offense. And it is 
a serious offense because you have, at least in part, hurt the 
accuracy and the completeness of that registry.
    Mr. Nadler. Would the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Green. And as we have heard in case after case in 
recent months, where the tragedies have arisen in part because 
of the lack of completeness of that registry, it is a very 
serious offense when you fail to do something that you have 
been ordered to do.
    I think it should be a mandatory minimum. The gentleman 
disagrees and that's a fair philosophical difference. But in my 
view, if we are going to begin to get our arms around the 
problem of sex crimes against kids, if we are, in fact, going 
to take steps to prevent future crimes against kids, we have to 
have tools like this registry. They have to be complete. People 
have to be able to count upon them. It is in my view a very 
serious offense.
    Mr. Nadler. Would the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Green. It's not my time.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The time belongs to the gentleman 
from Florida.
    Mr. Keller. Yes, I'll yield.
    Mr. Nadler. Thank you. I thank the gentleman for yielding. 
But the fact is that it is a very serious offense. You're 
leaving--without the mandatory minimum, it's up to 20 years 
imprisonment. Normally we write laws that say this shall be 
punished by a fine not exceeding X thousand dollars and a term 
of imprisonment not more than 5 years or 20 years or whatever. 
Twenty years is a very serious sentence, up to 20 years is a 
very serious sentence. Five years--what you're really saying 
with this, with the mandatory minimum, is that you should not 
leave to the judge any discretion to look at what's happening 
here. And certainly I think that depending on what the initial 
predicate offense was and what the evidence was, if it was a 
serious crime, 5 to 20 might be reasonable for not registering. 
Maybe 10 to 20 would be reasonable for not registering.
    Mr. Keller. Reclaiming my time----
    Mr. Nadler. But if it was not a serious crime----
    Mr. Keller. Reclaiming my time, and I yield to the 
gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Green.
    Mr. Green. I thank the gentleman for yielding. The problem 
is under your approach the person may get a month or 2 months. 
That hardly sends a serious, clear message that this is a 
serious offense. Yes, it is possible they get 20 years. It is 
also possible to get a matter of months.
    Mr. Nadler. Would the----
    Mr. Green. I believe that this is a case where we do need 
to send a very strong signal, and I think that's what a 
mandatory minimum here does. So that's the difference that we 
have.
    Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Does the gentleman from Florida 
yield back?
    Mr. Keller. I'll yield back.
    Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from New York, Mr. 
Nadler.
    Mr. Nadler. Thank you. I strike the last word.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Nadler. Thank you. It is theoretically possible that 
someone could get a month, but the reality is that the 
Sentencing Commission, which is what we have--we've established 
a Sentencing Commission to set up ranges for all different 
types of circumstances. We cannot sitting here envision the 
different crimes, the different circumstances, the different 
situations. That's why we have, A, a Sentencing Commission and, 
B, a judge.
    We've all been offended at times by reading of grossly 
disproportionate sentences for trivial crimes or grossly light 
sentences for heavy crimes, and that's what inevitably happens 
when you try to dictate from this Committee room. That's why we 
have a Sentencing Commission, to make it somewhat finer. That's 
why we have judges.
    And, again, the fact is that if we're saying up to 20 
years, you've got to allow a judge, you've got to allow the 
Sentencing Commission some discretion to look at the situation 
of this case and say, well, this was a serious sex offense this 
guy was committed for, and he tried to evade registering and he 
fled the jurisdiction and he moved next to a school and we're 
going to hit him with 20 years, or, well, it was only a 
misdemeanor he was convicted of and it was really trivial, it 
was only a technicality that we call it under the law a sex 
offense, and it wasn't as serious--serious enough to be labeled 
as such, but not as serious. And, anyway, his crime was coming 
in on the sixth day instead of the fifth day to register and 
it's technically a violation because we're only giving him 5 
days. So we'll give him a year.
    You've got to allow some discretion for circumstances that 
you can't foresee because, otherwise, you get great 
miscarriages of justice in all directions. And that's why 
mandatory minimums as a result are not a good idea. And 
certainly when you're allowing--when you're talking not about 
the crime itself but simply failing to register, and when the 
predicate for that failing to register can be a misdemeanor, a 
5-year mandatory minimum does not make any sense at all.
    It makes no sense, frankly, to have a mandatory minimum on 
a failure to register when the predicate is much less than--the 
predicate offense can be much less than 5 years. The failure to 
register is much more seriously punished than the sex offense 
that you're talking about? That doesn't make any sense at all.
    Now, if you're saying that this only applies to felonies, 
to underlying felonies whose minimum sentence is 5 years, 
maybe. But you got to have some flexibility in the law; 
otherwise, you're setting up very, very unjust situations, and 
situations that we can't now foresee. All wisdom does not 
reside in this room. That's why we have a Sentencing 
Commission, that's why we have judges, and that's why we 
shouldn't have this mandatory minimum in this situation.
    Mr. Scott. Would the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Nadler. So I support the amendment, and I yield to 
gentleman from Virginia.
    Mr. Scott. Thanks for yielding. I remind people that if the 
appropriate sentence says usually at least 5 to 20, there could 
be circumstances where 5 years for something that started off 
as a misdemeanor--it might have been a technical violation--5 
years might be too much in a given circumstance. That's why the 
Sentencing Commission has explained to us time and time again 
that mandatory minimums violate common sense. When it violates 
common sense, you got to impose it anyway.
    I would hope that we would allow the Sentencing Commission 
and the Judge looking at the facts and circumstances to give a 
punishment up to 20 years but not be bound by a 5-year 
mandatory minimum in all circumstances.
    Thank the gentleman for yielding.
    Mr. Nadler. I thank the gentleman. I yield back.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from South Carolina, 
Mr. Inglis.
    Mr. Inglis. Move to strike the last word, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Inglis. I'm inclined to agree with the gentleman from 
Virginia, Mr. Scott. I think that he's got a reasonable 
amendment. I also agree with Chairman Coble in what he said 
about my misgivings about mandatory minimum don't apply so much 
in the case of sexual predators, and the underlying bill I'm 
happy with. But here we really could be talking about a 
technical violation that could end up with a 5-year mandatory 
minimum, which could work great injustice.
    For example, I'm working right now with a fellow who's a 
contractor in Iraq. He has a sexual crime in his background. By 
all accounts that I have heard from some people in our 
community, he really has cleaned up his act. He wants back in 
the active duty. It's going to be hard to get him there. Maybe 
he gets National Guard, let's say. Maybe he gets called up, and 
maybe in the calling up process there's confusion about where 
the gentleman lives. In that case he comes before a judge and 
he has technically failed to register within 5 days of moving 
jurisdictions, he's facing a mandatory minimum of 5 years in 
that confusion. And I can see some judges saying, ``I can't 
believe I'm going to have to give this guy 5 years.''
    So it seems to me reasonable to give the judge discretion 
in a technical violation like that where somebody just fails to 
register, perhaps because of good reason, confusing about where 
he's residing and where he is at the moment, say, of call up in 
this fellow's case.
    This hasn't happened. This is a hypothetical. This has not 
happened to this fellow, but I can see something like that 
happening, in which case why not make it so that it's just up 
to 20 years, rather than mandatory 5 and up to 20? It seems 
reasonable to me.
    Mr. Green. Would the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Inglis. Happy to yield.
    Mr. Green. First off, let me say my guess is a fair number 
of folks who are caught in that situation are going to say it's 
a technical violation even if it isn't a technical violation. 
What else are you going to say? But remember who we are talking 
about here. We are talking about sex offenders, and as we know, 
the recidivism rates for sex offenders much higher than for 
other types of crimes. And we also know that each subsequent 
crime committed against a child is a life in some cases 
destroyed, a family upended and seriously damaged for many, 
many years. The tools that they have to take steps to keep 
their kids safe include an accurate and complete sexual 
offender registry.
    That's why we hold it up to be so important. That's why we 
have in past Congresses and this Congress and I suspect in 
future Congresses will take such strides, such important steps 
to build upon it to make sure that the funding is there for it, 
to make sure that it is accessible, because it is that 
important. Some may say a technical violation, but again, 
remember, on the other hand, creating loopholes and cracks in a 
system that we have to be able to rely upon, is so very, very 
important, and that's something I would remind the gentleman 
of, the types of offenses that we're talking here----
    Mr. Inglis. If I may reclaim my time, it's this, the 
underlying bill, as I say, requires mandatory minimums for the 
offense, and I don't have a problem with that. I join Mr. Coble 
and some others on the Democratic side in saying even though I 
have real hesitations about mandatory minimums because of the 
recidivism problem, I'm willing to go with it in this case. But 
you really are talking about potentially some technical 
violations, and in those cases, I'm willing to trust a judge. I 
mean, after all, we do confirm these judges----
    Mr. Green. If the gentleman will yield?
    Mr. Inglis. Happy to yield.
    Mr. Green. We are here because unfortunately, judges have 
failed us in these types of cases. That's one of the reasons 
that we are here. That's why some of these families are here, 
that sadly, some judges, a small number, but some judges have 
failed. Where the discretion has existed, the discretion I'm 
afraid has--and my colleague and friend, Mr. Schiff, has raised 
the case early on--I'm afraid that we have an obligation to 
take strong steps here because in too many cases judicial 
discretion has failed families and has failed children. That's 
why we're here taking up this strong legislation.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman's time has expired. 
The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from 
Virginia, Mr. Scott. Those in favor will say aye.
    Opposed, no.
    The noes appear to have it--recorded vote is ordered. The 
question is on agreeing to the Scott amendment. Those in favor 
will, as your names are called, answer aye, those opposed no, 
and the clerk will call the roll.
    The Clerk. Mr. Hyde?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Coble?
    Mr. Coble. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Coble, no. Mr. Smith?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Gallegly?
    Mr. Gallegly. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Gallegly, no. Mr. Goodlatte?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Chabot?
    Mr. Chabot. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chabot, no. Mr. Lungren?
    The Clerk. Mr. Jenkins?
    Mr. Jenkins. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Jenkins, no. Mr. Cannon?
    Mr. Cannon. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Cannon, no. Mr. Bachus?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Inglis?
    Mr. Inglis. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Inglis, aye. Mr. Hostettler?
    Mr. Hostettler. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Hostettler, no. Mr. Green?
    Mr. Green. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Green, no. Mr. Keller?
    Mr. Keller. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Keller, no. Mr. Issa?
    Mr. Issa. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Issa, no. Mr. Flake?
    Mr. Flake. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Flake, aye. Mr. Pence?
    Mr. Pence. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Pence, no. Mr. Forbes?
    Mr. Forbes. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Forbes, no. Mr. King?
    Mr. King. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. King, no. Mr. Feeney?
    Mr. Feeney. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Feeney, no. Mr. Franks?
    Mr. Franks. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Franks, no. Mr. Gohmert?
    Mr. Gohmert. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Gohmert, aye. Mr. Conyers?
    Mr. Conyers. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Conyers, aye. Mr. Berman?
    Mr. Berman. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Berman, aye. Mr. Boucher?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Nadler?
    Mr. Nadler. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Nadler, aye. Mr. Scott?
    Mr. Scott. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Scott, aye. Mr. Watt?
    Mr. Watt. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Watt, aye. Ms. Lofgren?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Ms. Jackson Lee?
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Jackson Lee, aye. Ms. Waters?
    Ms. Waters. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Waters, aye. Mr. Meehan?
    Mr. Meehan. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Meehan, aye. Mr. Delahunt?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Wexler?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Weiner?
    Mr. Weiner. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Weiner, aye. Mr. Schiff?
    Mr. Schiff. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Schiff, no. Ms. Sanchez?
    Ms. Sanchez. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Sanchez, aye. Mr. Van Hollen?
    Mr. Van Hollen. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Van Hollen, aye. Ms. Wasserman Schultz?
    Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Wasserman Schultz, aye. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Members who wish to cast or change 
their votes? Gentleman from Texas, Mr. Smith?
    Mr. Smith. I vote no.
    The Clerk. Mr. Smith, no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Gentleman from California, Mr. 
Lungren?
    Mr. Lungren. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Lungren, aye.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Further Members who wish to cast of 
change their votes? If not, the clerk will report.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, there are 16 ayes and 17 noes.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. And the amendment is not agreed to. 
Are three further amendments? The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. 
Scott.
    Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk, 
Amendment 6,
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report Scott No. 6.
    The Clerk. Amendment to H.R. 3132 offered by Mr. Scott of 
Virginia.
    On page 12, line 24, insert ``and'' after the semicolon; 
strike subsection ``(2)'' and redesignate subsections 
accordingly.
    [The amendment follows:]
    
    
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman's recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman, this strikes section 117, 
subsection 3, which, quote, ``requires the sex offender to read 
and sign a form stating that the duty to register has been 
explained and the sex offender understands the registration 
requirement.'' The purpose of this is--I mean the statement of 
understanding is required whether the person actually 
understands or not. The registration requirement of this and 
other registry laws are complex. Lawyers who represent sex 
offenders report their clients often believe that they are in 
compliance, but are in fact confused, and even the police do 
not always understand or accurately convey the registration 
requirement.
    This section would essentially relieve the prosecution of 
the burden of proof as to an essential element of the offense, 
that as we just provided, will carry a 5-year mandatory 
minimum. We defeated another amendment so it includes 
misdemeanors, 5 years mandatory minimum, and in fact the person 
didn't understand, thought they were in compliance when they 
actually weren't.
    Mr. Chairman, these things can be complex because you have 
to register where you live or where you work, and where you 
work can be sometimes confusing. If you're a carpenter and go 
from place to place, you have to register in all of the 
jurisdictions. Well, if you thought you just had to work at 
your employer's place of business and you're registered, and 
you go somewhere around, are you still in compliance? You could 
be technically out of compliance, convicted because you signed 
the statement. And the only purpose of the statement is to 
relieve the prosecution of the burden of actually having to 
prove that you understood it, so you have a misdemeanor 
offense, 5-year mandatory minimum, and you thought you were in 
compliance when you actually weren't.
    I would hope that we would delete the section and I yield 
back the balance of my time.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. 
Green?
    Mr. Green. I move to strike the last word.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Gentleman's recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I rise in opposition to 
the amendment, and the amendment very simply ensures that the 
sex offender is apprised of his rights and his requirements and 
his obligations under the registry. I think that's a good 
thing. Again, we are attaching serious consequences to it. I 
think it is appropriate that they be fully informed and they be 
required to read the requirements and sign. I think it makes 
sense, and quite frankly, I'm somewhat confused that this is 
the target of the gentleman's amendment.
    Mr. Berman. Would the gentleman yield for a question?
    Mr. Green. Sure, I'd yield for the gentleman.
    Mr. Berman. The gentleman from Virginia mentioned a 
requirement to register at your home. Is it ``and'' at your 
work or is it ``or'' at your work?
    Mr. Green. Well, this provision deals with----
    Mr. Berman. The registration requirement I'm talking about.
    Mr. Green. Right, but that's elsewhere in the bill and I'll 
be happy to get that answer to you later to make sure I'm 
absolutely accurate. This provision in the gentleman's 
amendment----
    Mr. Berman. Is about the understanding, I understand.
    Mr. Green. Correct, yes.
    Mr. Berman. But I was just curious----
    Mr. Green. I will get--I will be happy to get the answer 
for the gentleman so I am absolutely certain shortly, although 
that might affect----
    Mr. Berman. Well, in other words, is there something that--
--
    Mr. Green. Reclaiming my time, that doesn't get to this 
provision because this provision simply says that the person 
questioned should be notified and have their obligations 
explained to them, and sign accordingly, correct.
    Mr. Berman. I tend to agree with the gentleman's arguments. 
All I'm trying to understand, is there something so incredibly 
complicated about the obligation of where one registers, that 
if one--is the place of jurisdiction the county, the State?
    Mr. Green. I'll be happy to find the answer off of that 
gentleman, but let me say this, I don't believe that anything 
we are talking about--I guess the gentleman's question really 
gets more to the information that's explained to the offender, 
how well it's explained, the detail that's involved, and of 
course, we don't deal with that explicitly here in this 
provision, so I'm afraid I can't provide an entirely 
satisfactory answer to the gentleman.
    I yield back my time, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The question is on the----
    Mr. Watt. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. 
Watt.
    Mr. Watt. Move to strike the last word.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman's recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Watt. Yield to the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott.
    Mr. Scott. Thank you. I thank the gentleman for yielding. 
On page 9, line 17, it says--and I apologize to the gentleman 
from California--I said ``or.'' That was imprecise. It is 
``and.'' The language is: A sex offender must register and keep 
the registration current in each jurisdiction where the 
offender resides, where the offender is an employee, and where 
the offender is a student.
    It says where you have to initially register before 
completing a sentence of imprisonment, or not less than 5 days 
after being sentenced for that offense if the sex offender is 
not sentenced to a term of imprisonment, and it says that a sex 
offender--keeping current, a sex offender must inform each 
jurisdiction involved, not later than 5 days after each change 
of residence, employment or student status.
    Now, again, if you're a carpenter or a plumber and cross 
jurisdictional lines, what does ``employee'' mean? I don't 
know. And if you guess wrong, you're looking at a 5-year 
mandatory minimum. Also, I'll remind people, that this whole 
thing could have started off with a misdemeanor and you're 
going to get 5 years mandatory minimum if you guess wrong.
    While I have the floor, Mr. Chairman, I just want to remind 
people of the Department of Justice offender statistics. 
Overall, sex offenders are less likely than non-sex offenders 
to be rearrested for any offense within 3 years of release. 
Generally, non-sex offenders are arrested 68 percent of the 
time, sex offenders 43 percent of the time, and of the 
approximately 4,300 child molesters released from prisons in 15 
States in 1994, 3.3 percent were arrested for another sex crime 
against a child within 3 years. In comparison, released 
offenders with--who are robbers were rearrested 70 percent of 
the time, burglars 74 percent of the time, larceny 74 percent 
of the time, motor vehicle thieves 78 percent of the time, 
possession of stolen property 77 percent of the time, illegal 
weapons 70 percent of the time----
    Mr. Green. Would the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Scott. I yield. It's not my time.
    Mr. Green. Is the gentleman aware of the studies which 
suggest----
    Mr. Watt. I'll yield to the gentleman.
    Mr. Green. I thank the gentleman from North Carolina for 
yielding.
    Is the gentleman from Virginia aware of the numerous 
studies showing that in the area of sex crimes, particularly 
sex crimes against children, that those crimes are dramatically 
under reported. And in fact, the actual numbers, one study 
suggests that from 2001 or at least 2.4 times higher, and that 
when admitted sex offenders are interviewed under polygraph, 
the number of offenses that they confess to having been 
involved with is dramatically higher than what some of the 
studies the gentleman is citing would suggest.
    Mr. Scott. Would the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Watt. Yield to the gentleman from Virginia.
    Mr. Scott. I would think that--that's nice speculation. I'm 
just reading what the Department of Justice has published as 
the recidivism rates showing child offenders much lower than 
about anything else. So the suggestion that there is a higher 
recidivism rate is inconsistent with the numbers the Department 
of Justice has published.
    And so the amendment we're talking about here is just the 
amendment to keep the offender from getting caught up in a 
complex requirement, having to sign a form saying he 
understands it, when in fact he did not, thereby relieving the 
prosecution of that essential element of the offense having to 
be proved. And we've indicated that we didn't know and couldn't 
answer the question as to whether you had to register in your 
place of residence or employment, or is it and employment? And 
what does employment mean? Does that mean everywhere you work 
or just the base of the operations? Do we know? Well, we don't 
have to worry about it, because if they guess wrong, they'll be 
subject to a 5-year mandatory minimum as a result of failing to 
register for something that started off as a misdemeanor. 
They're going to end up with 5 years in prison.
    Mr. Green. Will the gentleman yield? I don't remember whose 
time it is.
    Mr. Watt. It's my time, and I'm looking at Mr. Green. He 
appears to have been confused by the facts here, so if he wants 
me to yield to him, I'll yield.
    Mr. Green. I appreciate it. I am far from confused by the 
facts, though the gentleman from Virginia may be apparently. 
First off, the requirements of registration are laid out pretty 
clearly in section 1 to 14 on pages 10 to 11 of the bill, so I 
refer the gentleman to those. But I am confused by the numbers 
that the gentleman from Virginia was citing, and apparently he 
isn't aware--he didn't answer my question--about the 2001 
report from the Center for Sex Offender Management, which dealt 
head on with the study to which the gentleman refers, and 
again, the numbers here are dramatically higher----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The time of the gentleman has 
expired.
    Mr. Watt. I yield back.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from California, Mr. 
Schiff.
    Mr. Schiff. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Schiff. I just wanted to ask the gentleman from 
Virginia what the impact of the proposed amendment is? As I 
read section 117, if we strike the semicolon and add an ``and'' 
and collapse subsections 1 and 2, is that effectively what we 
would be doing? How does that affect substantively what's being 
required? Because as I read the current section I would think 
you're required to do No. 1 and No. 2 and No. 3. Is it your 
sense, reading the statute, or reading the bill, that all three 
things are not currently required and this would change that?
    Mr. Scott. If the gentleman would yield.
    Mr. Schiff. Yes.
    Mr. Scott. The registration process would require the sex 
offender--inform the sex offender of his duty to register and 
explain that duty, and ensure that the sex offender is 
registered. That's 1 and 3. But the idea that you have to sign 
a form stating that you have received information and that you 
understand it, only serves the purpose of relieving the 
prosecution from proving that particular element of the case. 
If in fact you can show that you had registered in your place 
of employment, but they have concluded that you should have 
registered in all the places that you worked, not just the home 
office, then they don't have to worry about that because you 
understood it.
    Mr. Schiff. If I could reclaim my time, I see. I 
misunderstood the amendment. So you would strike section 2 
effectively?
    Mr. Scott. Right.
    Mr. Schiff. Reclaiming my time, you know, I guess the 
concern I would have with that, I think No. 2 is actually 
designed to be a safeguard so that you don't have a situation 
where the official says they inform the sex offender of their 
duty, but in fact never did, or there's a question about 
whether in fact they gave them the information. Having the sex 
offender sign the form, I think improves the likelihood that 
the appropriate official will actually go through the drill of 
making sure that they're given this information.
    So I guess I view it in a little different context. I view 
it more as a safeguard than as something curtailing the 
obligation of the official to really explain what the 
requirements are.
    I'll yield back the balance of my time.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The question is on the amendment 
offered by the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott. Those in 
favor will say aye.
    Opposed, no.
    The noes appear to have it. The noes have it, and the 
amendment is not agreed to.
    Are there further amendments? The gentleman from 
California, Mr. Schiff?
    Mr. Schiff. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment labeled 95 
revised 2 at the desk.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report the 
amendment.
    The Clerk. Amendment to H.R. 3132 offered by Mr. Schiff of 
California.
    Insert after section 130 the following new section.
    Section----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection, the amendment is 
considered as read. The gentleman from California is recognized 
for 5 minutes.
    [The amendment follows:]
      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


    Chairman Sensenbrenner. And will the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Schiff. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. I am pleased to support the 
amendment. I think it cleans up the objection I expressed to 
his earlier amendment, and I hope we can adopt it.
    Mr. Schiff. I thank the Chairman, and very briefly, this 
will help incentivize States to develop the kind of tracking 
systems that Florida and Oklahoma are pioneering, regrettably 
as a result of their bad experiences, and I would urge my 
colleagues to support it.
    Mr. Nadler. Would the gentleman yield for a question?
    Mr. Schiff. Yes.
    Mr. Nadler. And perhaps the Chairman would answer the 
question or the gentleman. What definition was changed, and 
what is that definition now?
    Mr. Schiff. The definition section that was changed appears 
at the end of the amendment under the section labeled 
``definition.'' And the term ``state sex offense'' means any 
criminal offense in a range of offenses specified by State law, 
which is comparable to or which exceeds the range of offenses 
encompassed the following: (1) a specified offense against a 
minor; or (2) a serious sex offense.
    In fact, if I can go on to say we had a third section that 
included misdemeanor offenses, and we actually struck that 
because it was not our intention to provide this kind of 
monitoring for misdemeanor offenses.
    Mr. Nadler. Thank you. Reclaiming my time, would the 
gentleman yield again? In this definition it says the term 
``state sex offense'' means any criminal offense in a range of 
offenses specified by State law, which is comparable to or 
which exceeds the range of offenses encompassed by the 
following: (1) a specified offense against a minor; or (2) a 
serious sex offense. That 1 and 2, are they defined defenses in 
Federal law?
    Mr. Schiff. Reclaiming my time, yes, they are. They're 
defined in the bill. If you look at page 7 of the bill, the 
term ``sex offense'' means a criminal offense that has as an 
element involving a sexual act or sexual contact with another, 
or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such an offense. It then 
goes into serious sex offenses and misdemeanor sex offenses. So 
we are drawing----
    Mr. Nadler. That's on page 7?
    Mr. Schiff. That's on page 7 of the bill. So we're drawing 
on the definitions of sex offense that are in the legislation, 
and the only change really is we have narrowed it not to 
include misdemeanors because the goal is not to provide in some 
cases lifetime monitoring for a misdemeanor sex offense, but it 
is designed to cover specific offenses and serious sex 
offenses.
    Mr. Nadler. Thank you.
    Mr. Schiff. And with that, I'll yield back the balance of 
my time.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The question is on agreeing to the 
amendment offered by the gentleman from California, Mr. Schiff. 
Those in favor will say aye.
    Opposed, no.
    The ayes appear to have it. The ayes have it and the 
amendment is agreed to.
    Are there further amendments?
    Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentlewoman from Florida, Ms. 
Wasserman Schultz.
    Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. 
Chairman, Members of the--I'm sorry. I have an amendment at the 
desk.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report the 
amendment.
    The Clerk. Amendment to H.R. 3132 offered by Ms. Wasserman 
Schultz of Florida.
    Add at the end of title V the following:
    Sec. 5___. Non-Federal Civil Confinement Programs for 
Sexually Violent Predators.
    (a) Guidelines.--(1) The Attorney General shall establish 
guidelines for State programs that require a person who is a--
--
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection, the amendment is 
considered as read. The gentlewoman from Florida is recognized 
for 5 minutes.
    [The amendment follows:]
      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


    Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. 
Chairman and Members of the Committee, I'm offering an 
amendment that provide guidelines and incentives for States to 
civilly confine violent sexual predators. This amendment, in 
addition to the provision already in the bill that covers 
Federal sexual violent offenders, would guide States to adopt 
their own civil confinement laws. Most criminals deemed as 
sexually violent have broken State rather than Federal laws. 
This amendment would ensure that we keep many more of them off 
the street.
    The amendment offers a carrot and a stick approach to 
States by requiring them to reimburse the Federal Government 
for the cost of Federal investigation assistance for a sexually 
violent predator. It also provides for a grant assistance 
program to assist States in implementing a civil confinement 
law in their State.
    As of 2002, 16 States and the District of Columbia have 
some form of a civil confinement law. Under this amendment, 
civil confinement would not be limited only to those who admit 
their illness, but also to those who are deemed too dangerous 
to return to society without proper treatment and 
rehabilitation. This diagnosis would be determined by a panel 
of experts, including psychiatrists, psychologists, law 
enforcement agencies and mental health professionals.
    Texas prison inmate Larry Don McQuay is a convicted child 
molester, who describes himself as, alternatively, scum of the 
earth, and a monster. McQuay is currently serving a 20-year 
sentence for molesting 3 children. Prior to this conviction, 
McQuay served 6 years of a 8-year sentence for molesting the 6-
year-old son of a former girlfriend. He was then released by 
the State of Texas.
    He claims to have molested more than 240 children and has 
said that he would attack again given the opportunity. We have 
no idea how many of his victimizations occurred during his 
period of release.
    In my home State of Florida, the pedophile who confessed to 
killing young Jessica Lunsford, John Couey, had a long history 
of inappropriate contact with children, and a rap sheet 
totaling 25 arrests for various crimes. Following a 1991 arrest 
in central Florida in which Couey admitted to exposing himself 
to another young girl, he admitted to molesting numerous 
children over the years, but this was the first time he had 
been caught.
    In his confession to Kissimmee Police, Couey told 
investigators that the 5-year prison sentence he was about to 
serve would not cure his desires. State courts and the U.S. 
Supreme Court have all upheld civil confinement laws that 
recognize the need for continued confinement in a non-
correctional setting when the person is still considered 
sexually violent after serving his criminal sentence.
    According to the Department of Justice, sex offenders are 4 
times more likely than non-sex offenders to be arrested for 
another sex crime after being discharged from prison. 
Furthermore, of released sex offenders who allegedly committed 
another sex crime, 40 percent perpetrated the new offense 
within a year or less of their prison discharge. Among child 
molesters, 60 percent are in prison for molesting a child 13 
years old or younger.
    Case studies show that treatment of sexual offenders 
contributes to community safety, and that persons who attend 
and cooperate with these programs are less likely to re-offend 
and commit another sexual crime, according to several published 
studies.
    But civil confinement by itself is not enough. It is only 
one part of a comprehensive approach that provides our justice 
system with all the tools necessary to keep violent criminals 
off of our streets as long as they remain a threat to society, 
and particularly, our most vulnerable, our children.
    This amendment will allow States to protect communities and 
provide treatment where possible to a small but extremely 
dangerous segment of society. When successful treatment is not 
possible, civil confinement will ensure that our children are 
protected by ensuring that these violent sexual predators 
cannot break the heart of one more parent by keeping them 
confined and our children safer.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Will the gentlewoman yield?
    Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Yes.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. I have reviewed the amendment, and 
I think the gentlewoman is on the right track. There are some 
drafting problems with the amendment, and if she will withdraw 
the amendment, I will give her a commitment that between now 
and the time that this bill goes to the floor in September, 
we'll get this drafted right, and we'll incorporate it as a 
part of the bill that passes the House and is sent to the 
Senate.
    Ms. Wasserman Schultz. I thank the Chairman for that kind 
offer. I withdraw the amendment.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Any further amendments? The 
gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott.
    Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk, 
No. 15.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report Scott 15.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, I don't have amendment No.----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Do you have amendment No. 15 now? 
The clerk will report.
    The Clerk. Amendment to H.R. 3132 offered by Mr. Scott of 
Virginia.
    Strike Section 303.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    [The amendment follows:]
    
    
    Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, section 
303 is the habeas corpus provision of the bill. Section 303 
substantially strips the Federal Courts of jurisdiction to 
entertain habeas corpus petitions in cases involving killing of 
persons age 18 or under, under the age of 18, and sets up 
procedural problems of having to be able to get habeas corpus 
review.
    First, Mr. Chairman, as a constitutional matter, it may be 
difficult to justify the basis on which this restriction is 
made. There's no evidence of any constitutional error is less 
likely to be occurring in cases involving young children, 
thereby warranting the wholesale preclusion or review. If 
anything, it's just these kinds of crimes, because of the 
passions they arise in local communities, that are more likely 
to be tainted with unfairness.
    Second, Mr. Chairman, the provisions are unjust and 
unpractical. The circumstances which the jurisdiction would be 
permitted are unjustifiably narrow. It says that a factual 
predicate would have to--could not have been previously 
discovered through the exercise of diligence, and the facts 
underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear 
and convincing evidence that but for the constitutional error, 
no reasonable fact finder would have found the applicant guilty 
of an underlying offense.
    You can have gross constitutional violations of rights, but 
still not be able to overcome the no ``reasonable fact finder 
would have found the person guilty.'' This is an unreasonable 
restriction, Mr. Chairman, and I would hope that we would put 
more thought into the significant deletion of habeas corpus 
review, put more thought into it than just sticking it into a 
bill that appears to be on its way to passage.
    I yield back the balance of my time.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from California, Mr. 
Lungren.
    Mr. Lungren. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman's recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Lungren. And rise in opposition to the amendment. Mr. 
Chairman, this again goes back to the debate as to whether or 
not the trial experience ought to be the prime experience in 
the process. As Chief Justice Rehnquist has said many times, 
under our justice system the trial is supposed to be the main 
event. It's not supposed to be a mere lounge act in Las Vegas 
that prepares you for the big act which is the Federal courts 
coming in and telling us by their wisdom what ought to be done.
    Currently, many Federal habeas corpus cases require 10, 15, 
even 20 years to complete. These delays burden the courts, but 
more importantly, deny justice to defendants with meritorious 
claims. They also are deeply unfair to the victims of serious 
violent crimes. We've had testimony here from a parent whose 
child has been murdered, and they've been waiting for as long 
as 20, 25 years for final resolution whether there really is no 
question about the guilt or innocence, but there's the question 
about when the Federal courts are going to get finally around 
to reviewing it.
    There seems to be this sense that only the Federal courts 
can do justice. I mean if that's the case, let's get rid of all 
the State courts. Let's just go directly to the Federal courts 
because they have the wisdom within themselves to decide these 
particular issues.
    This bill does nothing to limit State appeals. We should 
note that the provision does not in any way limit the State 
court's review of State criminal convictions, nor does it 
affect the U.S. Supreme Court's review of either a defendant's 
direct appeals or State habeas petition. The provision only 
restricts the Federal habeas review that begins in the lower 
Federal courts after--and I repeat--after all State appeals and 
U.S. Supreme Court cert review are completed.
    Congress unquestionably has the authority to limit such 
review. Some people have said in debate that we're doing 
something to the great writ. This has nothing to do with the 
great writ that's in the Constitution. This is the statutory 
writ that was created I believe in 1867, a statutory writ that 
doesn't have to exist. Congress has the full power to eliminate 
this if they wish to, or to limit it in any way, shape or form. 
And under the circumstances we're talking about, with the 
testimony that we have received from parents who have suffered 
such a delay, let me just refer you to the testimony we heard 
from Ms. Carol Fornoff, whose 13-year-old daughter was raped 
and murdered in Tempe, Arizona in 1984. The evidence of the 
guilt of the man convicted of killing her daughter is 
overwhelming. Yet today, 21 years after Christy Ann Fornoff was 
murdered, the defendant is still litigating the habeas appeals 
in the Federal courts.
    Mrs. Fornoff asked us this: ``I understand that the Federal 
Government has a right to create such a system. It can let the 
Federal courts hear any challenge to a State conviction at any 
time with no limits. My question to you, Mr. Chairman, is why 
would we want such a system? Why would we want a system that 
forces someone like me to relive my daughter's murder again and 
again and again. My daughter's killer already litigated all the 
challenges to his case in the State courts. Why should we let 
him bring all the same legal claims again for another round of 
lawsuits in the Federal courts? Why should this killer get a 
second chance? My daughter never had a second chance.''
    The gentleman has talked about the clear and convincing 
standard. It is appropriate and necessary, and the reason for 
requiring that habeas evidence be able to show clear and 
convincing proof of innocence rather than just a preponderance 
is simple and basic: it is the jury, the jury that saw all of 
the witnesses testify and that heard all of the evidence when 
it was fresh. If the jury comes to a conclusion about the facts 
after reviewing all the evidence at trial, that conclusion is 
entitled to deference. Otherwise they're just wasting their 
time. It should not be overruled if a contrary conclusion 
appears probable but is not clear and convincing.
    The jury's finding should be set aside only if a contrary 
finding is clear enough that it outweighs the superior access 
to the evidence enjoyed by the jury. The jury sees the 
witnesses. It sees their demeanor. It gets to check them to see 
if they're honest or not. We're talking about a review years 
after by a Federal judge that doesn't have the opportunity to 
do that, and because of that, the evidence standard should be 
clear and convincing, not mere a preponderance of the evidence.
    The decades long delays in Federal habeas corpus are unfair 
to everyone, especially the victims and the victim's family. 
That simply is why we have this in this bill. It is that 
important. People understand it now. Remember, we are not 
denying any constitutional right. This is a statutory creation 
of Congress. We have the right and the ability to change it as 
we see fit, and for those reasons, I would suggest that the 
gentleman's amendment ought to be voted down.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman's time is expired.
    The gentleman from New York, Mr. Nadler.
    Mr. Nadler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In 1996 this Committee 
and this Congress passed the Antiterrorism and More Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996. I voted against that bill, but that 
bill, which is now the law, severely restricted habeas corpus 
access to the Federal courts against State court decisions on 
death penalties or other serious crimes. We've already severely 
restricted habeas corpus access. What this bill does is to say 
that when you're talking about alleged acts of crimes against 
children, sexual crimes against children, we should further 
severely restrict habeas corpus acts more than we have already 
done for all crimes or for all allegations of crimes which this 
includes.
    Mr. Lungren. Will the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Nadler. No, I will not at this point.
    Now, habeas corpus is not something you do because you want 
to be nice to the prisoner. It is something that we have done 
in order to provide procedural due process to increase the odds 
that we get the right results, that we do not convict innocent 
people, and thereby, if we've convicted an innocent person, the 
real child molester is walking free in society because we think 
we've got the real guy behind bars.
    Now, the fact is that the effect of the provision to 
further restrict habeas corpus would be to bury meritorious 
claims, when they occur, of innocence, and for each innocent 
defendant precluded from court, a guilty murderer or a guilty 
child molester is remaining free, at liberty to strike again.
    Now, the specifics here, this says that you cannot get 
habeas corpus review, is a factual--unless a--well, a factual 
predicate that could not have been--you have to establish a 
factual predicate that could not have been previously 
discovered through the exercise of due diligence, but that 
would preclude the vast majority of claims, which, however 
meritorious, however innocent the alleged person may be, might 
have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence but 
wasn't because very often the court-appointed counsel in some 
of our States that get paid pennies a day, didn't do the job. 
We know that in the majority of cases where people sentenced to 
death were found innocent by DNA proof, the real reason the 
miscarriage of justice occurred, that an innocent person was 
found guilty of murder and the murderer is walking free, was 
because of ineffective assistance of court-appointed counsel 
who was paid pennies a day. This would simply help us keep that 
situation going.
    It also would exclude all cases in which the factual 
predicate was indeed previously discovered and presented to the 
State court but the State court disregarded it.
    Second claim is that the facts underlying the claim would 
be sufficient to establish--second provision of the bill, 
rather--the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to 
establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for 
constitutional error, no reasonable fact finder would have 
found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense, close 
quote.
    This is unfair because many gross constitutional violations 
of fair trial rights would pass this test. For example, you 
could prove that a juror would bribed, and it would pass this 
test. You could prove that the appointed defense lawyer was 
asleep, and it would pass this test. Because the court can 
still say, well, maybe a juror was bribed, but no reasonable 
fact finder would have found to the contrary anyway, guessed 
the judge.
    Many capital cases turn on egregious errors at the 
sentencing phase, and such claims would be excluded. We know 
that many of the cases where people have been proven innocent 
by DNA would be excluded from habeas corpus review by these 
tests which we're putting into this bill.
    I submit, Mr. Chairman, that, you know, we heard from Mr. 
Lungren, that why are you retrying the case? You're not 
retrying the case. The person is in jail, and even if it takes 
a few years, he's in jail. It does it no harm. Where there may 
in fact be real innocence, real constitutional objections, a 
real objection where--we heard that the jury has seen all the 
facts. Very often the jury hasn't seen all the facts because 
the sleeping defense attorney didn't bother to bring the facts, 
or because the prosecution hid the facts, or because no one 
knew the facts.
    The fact is that we know that a fairly high proportion, 
where we have actual scientific evidence, a fairly high 
proportion of our convictions are erroneous. Very often we 
don't find them because we don't have the scientific evidence, 
but that should tell us to be humble. Human justice, human 
institutions are not perfect. Only God's justice is perfect, 
and as long as we know that our justice is not perfect, we 
ought to allow the possibility of review while the offender is 
safely in jail, and we should not cut it off when we know that 
by so doing many innocent people will be--will remain 
convicted, and many guilty people will remain free to roam the 
streets and molest our children.
    I suggest----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Nadler. I ask unanimous consent for one additional 
minute.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection.
    Mr. Nadler. I thank the Chairman.
    So I suggest that we rethink this, that we pass the 
gentleman's amendment. These additional restrictions of habeas 
corpus over and above those that we placed in the bill, that we 
were told then were fine, were completely sufficient, that we 
placed in the law 9 years ago, we don't have to place further 
restrictions on habeas corpus just in these crimes as if it is 
likely that because these are particularly heinous crimes, that 
somehow the people accused are more likely to be guilty than in 
other crimes. They may be guilty, they may be innocent. We 
should--our courts of law should give every avenue of proof 
both ways so we can maximize the odds that we get it right.
    So I urge the gentleman's amendment to be adopted. I thank 
you.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman's time has once again 
expired.
    Mr. Chabot. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. 
Chabot.
    Mr. Chabot. Move to strike the last word.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Chabot. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from 
California.
    Mr. Lungren. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
    The gentleman from New York I hope misspoke when he 
referred to these cases as someone who has been alleged to have 
committed these crimes. We're talking about habeas corpus. That 
is after a conviction. This person has been charged, probably 
indicted as a result of a grand jury, has been prosecuted, has 
been found guilty by a jury of his or her peers, has had the 
judge with the opportunity to overrule that if he or she 
believes that ought to be the case. If it's a capital case, has 
had a bifurcated trial in which after guilt or innocence they 
make the determination as to whether or not it qualifies for 
the death penalty, and then whether the aggravating 
circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances, and then 
at least in my State of California, one has a direct combined 
appeal to the California Supreme Court and the habeas, then has 
an opportunity to go to cert directly to the Supreme Court. 
Then we're talking about habeas corpus.
    This is hardly someone who is alleged to have committed a 
crime. This is a convicted individual who has had greater 
processes--and we're talking the death penalty----
    Mr. Nadler. Would the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Lungren.--than anybody else. No. I'm responding to what 
the gentleman said. The gentleman made a statement about 
alleged perpetrator of a crime.
    Then with respect to the processes that we have, why the 
due diligence predicate? It is appropriate and necessary. State 
prosecutors have stressed the importance of using this standard 
as a gateway for allowing procedurally improper claims to 
proceed for the following reasons.
    First, it is necessary to prevent exception from being used 
to relitigate the same evidence presented at trial. The purpose 
of habeas review is not simply to relitigate the trial, to 
reweigh the same evidence that the jury already considered. Yet 
if the standard for an exception to procedural rules were just 
a claim of innocence, any defendant who went to trial could 
simply present the same evidence that he presented to and was 
rejected by the jury.
    Secondly, it's necessary to present claims based on 
insubstantial or cumulative evidence that defense counsel had 
access to and chose not to use. In every criminal trial, as we 
know, the defense counsel would choose not to use some of the 
exculpatory evidence that's available to him. Such evidence may 
be cumulative. It merely reproves a fact whose existence 
already is strongly proved by other evidence, or the evidence 
may be insubstantial. It does not show much. A system or 
procedure simply could not function if all such evidence could 
be used as a basis for further litigation and further hearings.
    There must be a gatekeeper in place for narrowing the range 
of evidence to that which is truly worth a second look. 
Evidence that previously was not available to the defense meets 
this standard.
    Now, the gentleman said, what's the harm? They're sitting 
there in jail or they're sitting there in prison. Listen to the 
testimony of the parents of the people who have been killed. 
Listen to what they say. Listen to the harm that they undergo. 
I mean I got a case in my old district, Robin Samsoe, 12 years 
old, 1979, shortly after I was here in the Congress the first 
time. Huntington Beach, California. This person brutally raped 
and murdered. And yet after all the evidence is in that goes to 
the proof of absolute guilt in this case, in June 2003, 24 
years after this child was murdered, the Federal Court of 
Appeals on the Ninth Circuit granted the man a new trial.
    There's no evidence whatsoever, in my judgment, that that 
person in fact did not commit the crime, but in any event, why 
did it take 24 years for that to happen? What does that do to 
the parent who has to go through that? Listen to these people 
talking about what they go through. So I reject absolutely the 
notion of the gentleman from New York, it does no harm. It does 
tremendous harm to the families involved. It does tremendous 
harm to the people, the public who believes in a system of 
justice, that what's going to happen to them? They can be left 
slowly twisting in the wind for years and years and years and 
years because somehow some people believe that because you put 
a Federal judge's robe on, you know far more than the State 
court judge.
    I've said this before. We had a Federal District Court 
judge in California named Malcolm Lucas. He was named by George 
Deukmejian, our Governor, as Chief Justice of the California 
Supreme Court. Suddenly he lost all of his wisdom. He lost all 
of his constitutional knowledge. He lost all of his fairness 
because he had taken off the Federal robe and instead put on 
the robe of the Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court.
    I reject that notion absolutely and utterly. There ought to 
be limitations on the abuse of habeas corpus.
    Thank you very much.
    Mr. Berman. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. For what purpose the gentleman from 
California, Mr. Berman, seek recognition?
    Mr. Berman. Move to strike the last word.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman's recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Berman. I yield to the gentleman from New York.
    Mr. Nadler. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
    Mr. Chairman, I must comment on a number of things. I 
probably shouldn't have used the word ``alleged,'' but the fact 
is--and obviously if someone's been adjudged guilty, he has to 
be presumed guilty--but the fact is that 44 percent of the 
death penalty convictions that reach a Federal court on habeas 
corpus are found to have violated procedural due process and 
are remanded for retrial, and a fair percentage of those people 
are found to be innocent at the end. Our system of justice is 
not perfect.
    Number 2. Most of the time, you talk about 24 years till it 
came--till a new trial was granted. Most of the time that is 
spent on Federal review these days is spent on wasting time, 
going back and forth to see whether or not the procedural 
hurdle that we have enacted to getting a habeas review of the 
conviction, whether you have met those hurdles. Once you've met 
those hurdles, the habeas review is fairly quickly. If we'd 
take down those hurdles, you wouldn't have all the litigation 
on whether they jump through the hoops properly.
    Certainly, this fellow spent 24 years in jail and then was 
granted a new trial, and you think that he was guilty. Well, 
the Federal Court, after 24 years, obviously felt that he 
didn't get a fair trial. Maybe he was guilty, maybe he wasn't. 
I have no idea, I don't know the case. But if in fact he wasn't 
guilty, he spent 24 years in jail, and he wasn't guilty. And 
the fact is that we know from scientific evidence, where the 
scientific evidence, the DNA evidence is available, that a lot 
of our convictions are wrong. So it is not harmless error to 
allow habeas review, to allow another review.
    And when 44 percent of the death penalties--we're not 
talking just about death penalties here--but if 44 percent of 
the death penalties that get habeas review are found that the 
conviction violate fair trial standards and they have to be 
retried, that tells you that too many of the States are cutting 
too many corners. And you talk about a trial attorney, a 
defense attorney, who chose not to use certain evidence, we 
know that in a fair number of States, the judge appoints or the 
court appoints a defense attorney.
    That defense attorney has 500 cases pending, doesn't bother 
hiring expert witnesses, doesn't bother getting a handwriting 
expert, doesn't bother doing--performing due diligence, and you 
don't get a real fair trial. He didn't choose, as a matter of 
trial strategy not to introduce this evidence. He didn't bother 
because he was only being paid $2 an hour or whatever. That 
happens in many of our States. That's one of the reasons we 
must have habeas review, and that's why a lot of people don't 
get fair trials and we have a lot of reversals in habeas review 
because there wasn't a fair trial in the first place.
    So to limit--if we were to require, if the Federal 
Government were to require--and no one's suggesting this 
because it would violate States' rights--but if we were to 
require and say, okay, you've got to provide a defense 
attorney, which they have to provide, and you've got to pay him 
at least $300 an hour, and you've got to provide money for 
handwriting experts and ballistics experts and all the other 
things the prosecution has, and you have to provide a really 
fair trial, then you may--then it might be okay to say we'll 
greatly restrict habeas corpus review.
    But to allow the kind of justice that we have in many of 
our States now, frankly, not because our judges on State levels 
have any less brains or any less integrity than our Federal 
judges, but because they don't want to appropriate the money, 
and we haven't required that they appropriate the money. And 
then to have the restrictions on the habeas review guarantees 
that what we know to be happening already will happen in 
greater numbers, namely that innocent people will sit in jail 
and guilty people will continue to roam free to molest our 
children. Greater habeas review is not a question, was not 
primarily a question of not getting closure, it's a question of 
making sure the right person is in jail and the wrong person 
isn't roaming free.
    Since we know that human justice isn't perfect, and since 
we know that our justice, governed as it is to a large extent 
by restrictions on resources made available to the defense, and 
for that matter less so the prosecution is far from perfect, 
then these safeguards are very, very necessary, and we have 
some proof that they're very necessary, is that 44 percent of 
the death penalty convictions that get to the Federal courts 
through the hurdles we set up for various--to get habeas 
review, when they finally get reviewed are set aside because 
exculpatory evidence wasn't provided, because the defense 
attorney didn't do his job, because the court determines there 
was not a fair trial, and the jury did not have all the 
information necessary to it.
    And we should not make it more likely that guilty people 
will go free and innocent persons will be executed or sit in 
jail, and our children subject to the mercies of the guilty 
people roaming the streets, who we don't know about because the 
innocent people who we think are guilty are in jail.
    And so I support the gentleman's amendment.
    Mr. Smith. (Presiding.) The gentleman's time has expired.
    Are there any other Members who wish to----
    Mr. Chabot. Mr. Chairman, could I ask the gentleman to 
yield just one additional minute.
    Mr. Smith. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Chabot. Could I ask unanimous consent the gentleman get 
one more minute?
    Mr. Smith. Without objection, the gentleman is recognized 
for 1 minute.
    Mr. Chabot. Thank you. And I'll be very brief if the 
gentleman would yield.
    The 44 percent figure that the gentleman uses, I just want 
to make clear that we're not talking about 44 percent of the 
cases the people were determined to be innocent of the crime. 
We're talking about some technicality or something because they 
weren't----
    Mr. Nadler. Would the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Chabot. Yeah.
    Mr. Nadler. I think I said this is 44 percent of the cases 
that went to habeas, it was determined that the trial wasn't 
fair--either that the person was innocent or that the trial 
wasn't fair. It was remanded. And there have been a 
technicality or it may have been something very serious.
    Mr. Chabot. I understand that, but oftentimes that's 
loosely thrown around that they were innocent, and I thought 
the gentleman did that----
    Mr. Nadler. I made very clear that 44 percent of----
    Mr. Smith. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Are there any other Members with an amendment? The 
gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Forbes is recognized.
    Mr. Forbes. I move to strike the last word.
    Mr. Smith. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Forbes. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from 
California.
    Mr. Lungren. I thank the gentleman. I don't want to belabor 
this point, but the gentleman did talk about the case that I 
mentioned, and let me just give you the outline of the case 
because it goes right to the core of what we're talking about.
    Robin Samsoe, 12 years old, 1979. In the first 6 months I 
was here in the Congress, sitting in this very place. She was 
kidnaped on a beach in Huntington Beach, California, and 
murdered in June of '79. A friend who had been with her on the 
beach described a strange man had taken pictures of her. Police 
produced a composite sketch of the man who was soon recognized 
by his parole officer.
    He had a history of kidnaping and sexually assaulting young 
girls. He had raped and nearly killed an 8-year-old girl, for 
which he had served just 2 years in prison. And he was awaiting 
trial for raping another girl at the time that Robin 
disappeared. He had taken that girl to the mountains outside of 
Los Angeles, which is also where Robin's body was found. He 
attacked a third girl at the same point on the beach where 
Robin was last seen.
    When police tracked him down after TV news began 
broadcasting his composite sketch, he had just cut his hair 
short and straightened it, and was beginning to make plans to 
leave town.
    A friend of Robin's family recognized him as the man who 
was with Robin on the beach. In a locker that he rented, police 
officers found an earring that Robin had borrowed from her 
mother. Robin's mother recognized the earring as hers because 
of changes that she had made to it with a nail clipper.
    Yet despite all this evidence, in June 2003, exactly 24 
years after she was murdered, the Federal Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuity--yes, the famous Ninth Circuit--granted the 
man a new trial.
    This is a terrible burden on her mother. According to one 
newspaper story, she described the decision as ``like someone 
had slapped me hard in the face.'' In Robin Samsoe's case at 
least the family can know that the killer will almost certainly 
never be free. At the same time, he was granted a new trial in 
Robin's killing, DNA evidence linked him to a rape and murder 
that he committed in 1977, and police have said they'll 
prosecute him for that after his trial in Robin's case.
    Nevertheless, the impact on the family in the way that this 
case has been handled in the course of the courts' 
consideration has been horrific. One of the news stories notes 
that the families even lost their house because they spent so 
much time away from work at the trials and hearings in the 
case.
    Today Robin's family is preparing for another trial of the 
man who killed their 12-year-old daughter. If she had lived, 
she'd be 37 years old today. This is the outrageous actions of 
the Federal courts with the abuse of habeas corpus that I'm 
talking about. It's as if the courts had punished her family 
instead of the man who had killed her.
    And if the gentleman would like I could recite case after 
case after case in California when this has occurred. I will 
admit we are in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, but I will 
also say to you that we in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
utilizing our best efforts to try and reform habeas corpus. And 
I wasn't in the House when it was reformed in '96, but my 
office did write the statutory language that was adopted at 
that time. And we thought it would be sufficient. It has proven 
to be insufficient. And if there are cases that cry out more 
for justice in the area of reform of habeas corpus than these 
cases of child molestations, rapes and killings, I don't know 
what they are.
    I thank the gentleman for yielding.
    Mr. Smith. The gentleman's time has expired.
    The gentleman from California, Mr. Schiff, is recognized.
    Mr. Schiff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I move to strike the 
last word.
    Mr. Smith. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Schiff. I think the gentleman from California, Mr. 
Lungren, has highlighted with the case he cited, some of the 
tragedy of cases that are drawn out, and the enormous impact it 
has on the victims and their families, and I think that's very 
real.
    I think there are ways to streamline the process. I'm not 
sure this is the right formula, and I think, frankly, I don't 
think any of us here on this panel can tell whether what's 
contained in this quite detailed reform, proposed reform of the 
Federal Court processes is the right remedy. I see nothing in 
the majority summary or the minority summary that sheds light, 
for example, on what the Judicial Council has said about these 
proposed timetables or reforms.
    And I question whether this is the bill to enact this kind 
of a sweeping reform.
    Mr. Lungren has a stand-alone bill to reform habeas corpus, 
the Streamline Procedures Act of 2005. It's had, as I 
understand it, in Subcommittee a partial hearing. A further 
hearing on that bill was postponed and has not taken place yet. 
None of us--well, maybe some of us have been privy to partial 
hearing on this issue. I don't know that the murders--cases of 
murder of a child are different in terms of the evidence than 
cases of murder of an adult that warrant different habeas 
procedures. My guess is that this is being put in this bill 
because it's a moving vehicle, but I'm not sure that's how we 
ought to reform the Federal Court system.
    Again, I think there are changes that need to be made to 
prevent exactly the situation which Mr. Lungren describes. But 
I don't think we ought to do it in a piecemeal way. It's one 
thing to increase the penalties for sex offenders that prey on 
kids, to increase the monitoring, to increase the registration 
to make sure these people are taken off the street, and I fully 
support that.
    It's another as part of that same legislation to take 
actions which may have the effect of reducing the confidence in 
whether the right people have been convicted. And regrettably, 
although there is seldom a number, we have found through the 
success of DNA evidence that we have sent on occasion the wrong 
people to death row. And so I would like to see us have a full 
Judiciary Committee Oversight Hearing of how to expedite the 
habeas process in murder cases. I think it's a very important 
issue, but without having the benefit of the feedback from the 
judges themselves, without having the ability to hear witnesses 
talk about what these very detailed changes in procedures would 
do, I just don't think this is the right place to make this 
change.
    I understand why it's been incorporated in this bill, but I 
support the gentleman's amendment. I think this provision 
doesn't belong in this bill, and I think we ought to treat this 
problem across the board, perhaps in the oversight and 
potential markup of Mr. Lungren's standalone bill.
    And with that, Mr. Chairman, I'll yield back the balance of 
my time.
    Mr. Smith. The gentleman yields back the balance of his 
time. Are there other Members who wish to be heard on this 
amendment. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Gohmert is recognized.
    Mr. Gohmert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I have 
to address comments by the gentleman from New York regarding 
defense in felony cases. There are allegations about many of 
our States. Those kind of generalities do a great disservice to 
the people that defend criminal cases. Having handled thousands 
of felony cases as a judge, I'm telling you if somebody does 
the things that you have said they do by not calling witnesses 
they should have, by not presenting defenses they should have, 
by not properly representing their defendants, those things are 
raised on appeal, direct appeal.
    Those things are raised in State habeas corpus proceedings 
and, besides that, if you could be more specific and give me 
examples of attorneys who have acted in the manner in you 
alleged, then I will help you work to get them disbarred. They 
have no business practicing law. Anybody who will not live up 
to their oath as an attorney to represent their clients to the 
full extent of the law should not be practicing, not now, not 
ever.
    So I would be delighted to work with you in those 
situations and as someone who has been one of those who was 
appointed to handle cases I didn't want to handle, I did the 
best job I could and that includes appeal of a capital murder 
case that I did a great job on on behalf of my client.
    So I could not sit here and allow those kind of comments to 
go on. Let's get specific if you have them----
    Mr. Schiff. Would the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Gohmert. Not yet.
    I also would like to address the comments of Mr. Schiff. I 
tend to agree. He says he's not sure that the murder of a child 
should be treated differently from other cases. And I'd be open 
to amending this to make this apply across the board the 
restrictions on habeas corpus not only for murder of children, 
but also adults.
    And also one other comment regarding the timetable. It says 
under subsection D that the district court should act not later 
than 15 months. I don't know why we have to wait 15 months. 
There are State remedies for habeas corpus. There are State 
remedies for direct appeal. There are grievances that should be 
filed against people who are not properly representing their 
client.
    Mr. Schiff. Would the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Gohmert. And----
    Mr. Lungren. Mr. Gohmert?
    Mr. Gohmert. Yeah.
    Mr. Lungren. Mr. Schiff.
    Mr. Gohmert. I yield.
    Mr. Schiff. If I might pose a question to the gentleman 
from California, does your bill, the Streamlined Procedures Act 
of 2005, apply in murder cases of both adults and children?
    Mr. Lungren. If the gentleman will yield, whoever has time, 
yes.
    Mr. Schiff. So we do have a bill that is across the board, 
and I would submit that's the right venue to really hear and 
resolve this issue. And I thank the gentleman for yielding.
    Mr. Gohmert. Thank you. I yield back.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman?
    Mr. Smith. The gentleman yields back the balance of his 
time. The gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much. I simply want to 
acknowledge that the habeas is constitutionally grounded, which 
warrants this Committee with such a high responsibility to look 
at it as a separate issue. I also admit that there is an 
epidemic in child murders and child molestation.
    I believe the habeas issue, however, should be separated, 
and I rise to support the gentleman's amendment; and I yield to 
the gentleman, Mr. Scott.
    Mr. Scott. Thank you, and I thank the gentlelady for 
yielding.
    Mr. Chairman, the discussion we've had I think points to 
some fundamental questions of our concept of justice. How you 
got into Federal court or what the State court should have 
done, the fact is that this amendment requires that you rely on 
facts that could not have previously been discovered to show 
the error and by clear and convincing evidence that no 
reasonable fact finder could have found you guilty.
    Now, if you believe that a person is guilty, and if the 
recitation of the facts that the gentleman from California 
made, if you believe a person is guilty, do you believe that 
the guilty person is entitled to a fair trial, because under 
this amendment if you can prove that the trial was clearly 
unfair, but you are guilty, you still believe the person is 
guilty, then they do not have access to habeas corpus 
consideration.
    So is guilty person entitled to fair trial?
    The other is if you know there's an unfair trial, should an 
innocent person have to prove innocence by showing that they're 
innocent using only evidence that could not have been 
reasonably obtained before the trial and that innocent to the 
point where no reasonable fact finder could believe other than 
not guilty.
    Now, we've had situations where a person could have an 
unfair trial. Does the burden shift? Suppose you have an unfair 
trial where it is clear that the person is probably innocent. 
But some fact finder might have not believed a witness or two 
and concluded not sure whether they are guilty or not.
    In that circumstance, according to this language, they 
would not be entitled to consideration. An allegation that 
you're probably innocent isn't enough. You got to show that 
you're innocent by clear and convincing evidence and that no 
reasonable fact finder could have concluded otherwise.
    Now, Mr. Chairman, we talk about this alleged--whether 
they're alleged or whether they're actually guilty, we've had 
documented cases, case after case, where someone was indicted; 
had what appeared to be a fair trial; had all those endless, 
exhausted appeals; and then through DNA evidence well after the 
fact found they just didn't--weren't the ones. It was somebody 
else. The DNA evidence didn't even--not only showed they were 
not guilty, but pinpointed the guilty offender.
    They had gone through the indictment, the trial, the 
appeal, and the system just got it wrong.
    So when you say well, we believe the person is guilty and 
they've had the fair process, sometimes we just don't get it 
right. And here you have a situation where someone didn't have 
a fair trial, but you'd think somebody might have considered 
them innocent should we be able to review the case, and what do 
you do with somebody that's probably innocent? Do you put them 
to death? They're probably innocent, but some fact finder might 
have found them guilty. Now, what do you do in those 
circumstances?
    These are somewhat fundamental questions. Is a guilty 
person entitled to a fair trial and should an innocent person 
with an unfair trial have to prove their innocence?
    I would hope that we would, as the gentleman from 
California suggested, consider these issues independently and 
not part of a bill that's on the fast track to passage.
    I yield back to the gentlelady.
    Mr. Smith. Does the gentlewoman yield back her time?
    Ms. Jackson Lee. I would yield to the distinguished 
gentleman from New York.
    Mr. Nadler. Thank you. Thank you. I want to associate 
myself with the remarks of the gentleman from Virginia, but I 
would also say going back to Mr. Lungren's case, after 24 
years, I don't know the circumstances of that case, and he gave 
us all the allegations of what happened and that those 
allegations are truly horrible, but the fact is maybe that 
individual is the one who did it, and maybe it's somebody else. 
Now, a court, a lower court, found that that individual did it. 
Twenty-four years later, a Federal court said in effect I 
gather that the original trial failed in some way. It wasn't a 
fair trial. It violated constitutional processes and ordered a 
retrial.
    At that point, you can no longer say this person is guilty. 
This person is now again allegedly guilty, because there's been 
no fair trial that found him guilty.
    And maybe he was guilty and maybe not. I don't know the 
facts of the case, but reciting the horrors of the crime 
doesn't affect the question of whether you got the right 
person. And you can sit here and recite the horrors of the 
crime. You get everybody emotionally upset, but did you get the 
right person.
    And when the Federal court says 24 years later--and it's an 
indictment of the system that it took 24 years to get to that 
point. It's not an indictment that they finally got to that 
point, that the court said you didn't get a fair trial. It's an 
indictment that it took 24 years to get to that point.
    Mr. Smith. The gentlewoman's time has expired.
    Mr. Nadler. Can I ask unanimous consent for one additional 
minute.
    Mr. Smith. Without objection, the gentlewoman is recognized 
for another minute.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. I yield to the gentleman.
    Mr. Nadler. Thank you. It's an indictment that it took 24 
years to get to the point of recognizing that the original 
trial was not fair. So we ought to streamline the process but 
not reduce the safeguards that we have to make sure that the 
trial and the proceedings are fair and that we got the right 
person. And the gentleman from Texas asked me for specifics. I 
don't have any specifics here. But I will say--and the 
gentleman from Texas I'm sure was a wonderful defense 
attorney--but from what I have read, one of the worst offenders 
among the States in giving incompetent counsel to people who go 
to death row is the State of Texas.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Gohmert. Mr. Chairman?
    Mr. Smith. The gentlewoman's time has expired. The 
gentleman from Texas has already I believe spoken on this 
amendment.
    The gentleman from Iowa is recognized.
    Mr. King. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
    Mr. Smith. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I'd yield to the 
gentleman from Texas.
    Mr. Gohmert. Thank you. Mr. Chairman and the gentleman from 
New York, I really do want specifics when you talk about Texas, 
and I hope you won't refer to one case that came from my county 
where he was tried three, maybe four times, and each time ended 
up the court flips it back on a writ, and each time more 
evidence was cut out and he's probably one of these 44 percent 
you're referring to, and even though he was a hero to some when 
the case was finally thrown out, the last straw was when the 
court said the one key witness was dead; and the court's 
allowing his prior testimony at the prior trials no longer 
could be used in the last case. The DA had no choice but to 
dismiss the case.
    There was nothing left, and that's outrageous.
    Now, that--three or four times in one case adds to your 
percentages, and I'm telling you Texas does a good job. There 
was some guy that went to sleep. The case got flipped, and did 
another shot.
    But those are isolated cases, and I know that Texas has 
been taking a lot of shots, but I would be prepared to defend 
any specific case you want to give, whether we agree or 
disagree. Texas is a shining example of good trial procedure, 
and we put our lawyers up against any State. Thank you very 
much.
    Mr. Smith. The gentleman yields back the balance of his 
time.
    Mr. King. I yield back.
    Mr. Smith. The question occurs on the amendment. All those 
in favor say aye.
    All those opposed nay?
    The nays have it. The amendment is not agreed to.
    Are there any other amendments?
    Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman, I ask for a rollcall vote.
    Mr. Smith. The gentleman requests rollcall on his 
amendment. The Clerk will call the roll.
    The Clerk. Mr. Hyde?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Coble?
    Mr. Coble. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Coble, no. Mr. Smith?
    Mr. Smith. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Smith, no. Mr. Gallegly?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Goodlatte?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Chabot?
    Mr. Chabot. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chabot, no. Mr. Lungren?
    Mr. Lungren. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Lungren, no. Mr. Jenkins?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Cannon?
    Mr. Cannon. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Cannon, no. Mr. Bachus?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Inglis?
    Mr. Inglis. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Inglis, no. Mr. Hostettler?
    Mr. Hostettler. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Hostettler, no. Mr. Green?
    Mr. Green. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Green, no. Mr. Keller?
    Mr. Keller. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Keller, no. Mr. Issa?
    Mr. Issa. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Issa, no. Mr. Flake?
    Mr. Flake. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Flake, no. Mr. Pence?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Forbes?
    Mr. Forbes. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Forbes, no. Mr. King?
    Mr. King. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. King, no. Mr. Feeney?
    Mr. Feeney. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Feeney, no. Mr. Franks?
    Mr. Franks. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Franks, no. Mr. Gohmert?
    Mr. Gohmert. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Gohmert, no. Mr. Conyers?
    Mr. Conyers. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Conyers, aye. Mr. Berman?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Boucher?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Nadler?
    Mr. Nadler. Aye..
    The Clerk. Mr. Nadler, aye.. Mr. Scott?
    Mr. Scott. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Scott, aye. Mr. Watt?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Ms Lofgren?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Ms. Jackson Lee?
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Jackson Lee, aye. Ms. Waters?
    Ms. Waters. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Waters, aye. Mr. Meehan?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Delahunt?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Wexler.
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Weiner?
    Mr. Weiner. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Weiner, aye. Mr. Schiff?
    Mr. Schiff. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Schiff, aye. Ms. Sanchez?
    Ms. Sanchez. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Sanchez, aye. Mr. Van Hollen?
    Mr. Van Hollen. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Van Hollen, aye. Ms. Wasserman Schultz?
    Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Wasserman Schultz, aye. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. (Presiding.) No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Further Members who wish to cast or 
change their votes?
    The gentleman from California, Mr. Berman?
    Mr. Berman. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Berman, aye.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Florida, Mr. 
Wexler.
    Mr. Wexler. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Wexler, aye.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. 
Jenkins.
    Mr. Jenkins. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Jenkins, no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Further Members who wish to cast or 
change their votes? If not, the clerk will report.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, there are 12 ayes and 18 noes.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. And the amendment is not agreed to.
    Are there further amendments?
    The gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have an 
amendment at the desk, number two.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report the 
amendment.
    The Clerk. Amendment to H.R. 3132, offered by Ms. Jackson 
Lee of Texas. Under section 202, page 30, line 24, after the 
word arrest----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection, the amendment is 
considered as read. The gentlewoman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    [The amendment follows:]
    
    
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Green knows that in the course of the work that many of 
us have done on this issue of child predators that I offered 
legislation regarding DNA and a DNA bank dealing with the 
question of convicted child predators.
    This helps refine this particular section by adding the 
language ``or convicted.'' And I hope to work with the 
Committee as we move toward the House and, of course, the 
Senate to provide that separate and distinctive DNA bank on the 
basis of providing for----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Will the gentlewoman yield?
    Ms. Jackson Lee. I'd be happy to yield.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. I believe this a very constructive 
amendment and am prepared to accept it.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the distinguished gentleman for 
his accepting, and I'd like to conclude by thanking him for 
accepting it saying that I hope as recognize that there is an 
epidemic in the nation frankly, maybe in around the world, on 
the attacks on children, brutal attacks on children, that we 
will work toward making sure that this legislation provides 
some long-standing tools for our law enforcement, which would 
include this DNA bank.
    I ask my colleagues to support the amendment. I thank the 
Chairman for supporting it by adding the language ``or 
convicted'' to this, and I ask for my statement to be in its 
entirety submitted into the record.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection, so ordered.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Jackson Lee follows:]

    ********** COMMITTEE INSERT **********

    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The question is on agreeing to the 
amendment offered by the gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. Jackson 
Lee. Those in favor will say aye.
    Opposed, no?
    The ayes appear to have it. The ayes have it, and the 
amendment is agreed to.
    Are there further amendments?
    The gentleman from New York, Mr. Nadler?
    Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report the 
amendment.
    The Clerk. Amendment to H.R. 3132, offered by Mr. Nadler.
    At the end of Title IV, insert the following: 18 USC 922(d) 
is amended by inserting the following at the end: '(10).
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection, the amendment is 
considered as read. The gentleman from New York is recognized 
for 5 minutes.
    [The amendment follows:]
    
    
    Mr. Nadler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Under current law, it 
is illegal to transfer a gun to anyone convicted of a crime 
punishable by more than 1 year.
    It is also illegal for any such individual to posses a gun. 
However, for some crimes that we consider to be particularly 
serious, we prohibit all transfers of guns to or possession of 
guns by individuals convicted of any such crime.
    For example, we prohibit anyone convicted of a crime of 
domestic violence whether a felony or a misdemeanor from 
purchasing or possessing a gun. I believe child sex crimes are 
such a case. We should not treat child sex offenders any more 
leniently with respect to possessing guns than we do domestic 
abusers.
    I ask my colleagues to support this amendment to close this 
loophole. I yield back.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. 
Green.
    Mr. Green. Mr. Speaker, or, Mr. Chairman, you have me 
saying it now. I'm still studying the amendment, so don't wish 
to be recognized at this time.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The question is on agreeing to the 
amendment offered by the gentleman from New York, Mr. Nadler. 
Those in favor--the gentleman from Iowa, Mr. King.
    Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I move to strike the 
last word.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. King. And I'll be brief, Mr. Chairman. But I just 
wanted to speak to this issue and I recall that I have in the 
past for this Committee listed the exceptions to gun rights 
that's in the Federal Code, and they're called those rights are 
disabled, according to the Federal Code. I have the section 
here in front of me that already covers this amendment. So I 
would suggest and submit that this is a redundant amendment 
that's already covered by another section of the code, which I 
believe is 922(g). And I----
    Mr. Nadler. Would the gentleman yield?
    Mr. King. I would yield.
    Mr. Nadler. Yeah. I think it's incorrect. It covers more 
than 1 year. It does not cover any crime committed against a 
child--any crime of violence committed against a child.
    Mr. King. Reclaiming my time, I'm suggesting that this 
section of the code covers any crime committed that precludes a 
person from having a gun. That's a felony. Anything that's a 
felony----
    Mr. Nadler. If the gentleman would yield?
    Mr. King. I would yield.
    Mr. Nadler. It has to be a felony. This does not have to be 
a felony. You're quite correct. It--well, you're correct in 
that sentence. It covers any crime committed, punishable by 
more than a year. It does not cover crimes of violence against 
a child or child sex crimes rather. It does not cover child sex 
crimes punishable by less than a year, and we had part of that 
discussion with respect to making that a predicate for a 5-year 
sentence for failure to register earlier today. But that is not 
covered. This amendment would cover that for possession or 
transfer of a gun.
    Mr. King. Reclaiming my time, if the gentleman could cite 
that section of the Code, I'm sure this Committee would be 
interested in that section. Otherwise, I'll be opposing this 
amendment. Thank you, and I yield back.
    Mr. Nadler. Would the gentleman--Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from New York has 
already been recognized.
    Mr. Nadler. I ask unanimous consent for 30 seconds.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection, the gentleman is 
recognized.
    Mr. Nadler. Thank you. The section is 18 U.S.C., 922(d). 
It's cited right in the amendment. I yield back.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The question is on agreeing to the 
amendment offered by the gentleman from New York. Those in 
favor will say aye. Opposed, no?
    The noes appear to have it.
    Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman, I ask for the ayes and nays.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. A rollcall is ordered. Those in 
favor of the Nadler Amendment will, as your names are called, 
answer aye. Those opposed, no, and the clerk will call the 
roll.
    The Clerk will call the roll.
    The Clerk. Mr. Hyde?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Coble?
    Mr. Coble. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Coble, no. Mr. Smith?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Gallegly?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Goodlatte?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Chabot?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Lungren?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Jenkins?
    Mr. Jenkins. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Jenkins, no. Mr. Cannon?
    Mr. Cannon. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Cannon, no. Mr. Bachus?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Bachus?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Inglis?
    Mr. Inglis. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Inglis, no. Mr. Hostettler?
    Mr. Hostettler. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Hostettler, no. Mr. Green?
    Mr. Green. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Green, no. Mr. Keller?
    Mr. Keller. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Keller, no. Mr. Issa?
    Mr. Issa. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Issa, no. Mr. Flake?
    Mr. Flake. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Flake, no. Mr. Pence?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Forbes?
    Mr. Forbes. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Forbes, no. Mr. King?
    Mr. King. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. King, no. Mr. Feeney?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Franks?
    Mr. Franks. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Franks, no. Mr. Gohmert?
    Mr. Gohmert. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Gohmert, no. Mr. Conyers?
    Mr. Conyers. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Conyers, aye. Mr. Berman?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Boucher?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Nadler?
    Mr. Nadler. Aye..
    The Clerk. Mr. Nadler, aye.. Mr. Scott?
    Mr. Scott. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Scott, aye. Mr. Watt?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Ms Lofgren?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Ms. Jackson Lee?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Ms. Waters?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Meehan?
    Mr. Meehan. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Meehan, aye. Mr. Delahunt?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Wexler.
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Weiner?
    Mr. Weiner. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Weiner, aye. Mr. Schiff?
    Mr. Schiff. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Schiff, aye. Ms. Sanchez?
    Ms. Sanchez. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Sanchez, aye. Mr. Van Hollen?
    Mr. Van Hollen. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Van Hollen, aye. Ms. Wasserman Schultz?
    Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Wasserman Schultz, aye. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Members who wish to cast or change 
their votes?
    The gentleman from California, Mr. Lungren.
    Mr. Lungren. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Lungren, no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. 
Smith.
    Mr. Smith. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Smith, no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. 
Chabot.
    Mr. Chabot. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chabot, no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Further Members who wish to cast or 
change their vote. If not, the clerk will report.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, there are 9 ayes and 17 noes.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. And the amendment is not agreed to.
    Are there further amendments?
    The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott.
    Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk, 
number 13.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report the 
amendment.
    The Clerk. Amendment to H.R. 3132, offered by Mr. Scott of 
Virginia. On page 40, line 21, insert the following: Section 
304, Sex Offender Treatment Programs. The Federal Bureau of 
Prisons shall establish sufficient----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection, the amendment is 
considered as read.
    The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott, is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    [The amendment follows:]
    
    
    Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman, the Department of Justice 
statistics reveals that the recidivism rate among child sex 
offenders is about 3 percent. This came from a comprehensive 
study tracking thousands of offenders over a 3-year period. And 
we've heard documented evidence during our hearings that 
intensive sex offender treatment cuts the recidivism rate in 
half.
    Despite that fact that we can cut the recidivism rate in 
half, the Federal Bureau of Prisons has only one sex offender 
treatment program, and that program turns away many inmates who 
seek treatment. As a result, only 1 percent of sex offenders in 
Federal prison receive treatment before they're released, 
notwithstanding the fact that we could reduce recidivism----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Will the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Scott. I yield.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. I think the gentleman has gone down 
the right road with this amendment. I would like to see the 
amendment be made more specific and more targeted so that the 
Federal Bureau of Prisons will have a precise idea of what the 
Congress wants them to do in this area.
    If the gentleman will withdraw the amendment now, I'll be 
willing to work with him between now and the floor so we can 
sharpen up the razor so that it is a very targeted amendment, 
and we'll do the job.
    Mr. Scott. With that, Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, I 
would withdraw the amendment.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The amendment is withdrawn.
    Are there further amendments?
    The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott.
    Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk, 
number 9.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report the 
amendment.
    The Clerk. Amendment to H.R. 3132, offered by Mr. Scott of 
Virginia. On page 12, line 4, insert the following section and 
redesignate each succeeding section accordingly. Section 1----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection, the amendment is 
considered as read. The gentleman from Virginia will be 
recognized for 5 minutes.
    [The amendment follows:]
    
    
    Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, the title 
of the bill is the Sex Offender Registration and Notification 
Act, and it states that its purpose is to respond to ``vicious 
attacks by violent sexual predators.'' It would apply, however, 
to people who are not, in fact, sexual predators and pose--and 
also pose no risk of reoffense.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Will the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Scott. I yield.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. I will make the same deal that I 
made on his previous amendment with this one. Sharpen it up.
    Mr. Scott. I would withdraw the amendment, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The amendment is withdrawn.
    Are there further amendments?
    Mr. Scott. I have an amendment at the desk, number 17.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report Scott Number 
17.
    The Clerk. Amendment to H.R. 3132, offered by Mr. Scott of 
Virginia.
    On page 57, line 15, strike ``shall'' and insert ``may''.
    [The amendment follows:]
    
    
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk is--or excuse me--the 
gentleman from Virginia is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, this 
amendment is under the supervised release. The language in the 
bill says the court----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Will the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Scott. I yield.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. This looks like a good and sharp 
amendment, and I'm prepared to accept it.
    Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Chairman, I withdraw the amendment. No, excuse me.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The Chair objects.
    Mr. Scott. I yield back the balance of my time.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Yeah. The question is on agreeing 
to Scott Amendment Number 17. Those in favor will say aye. 
Opposed, no.
    The ayes appear to have it. The ayes have it, and the 
amendment is agreed to. Are there further amendments?
    Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to mention the 
fact that I have another amendment at the desk, number 16.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report the 
amendment.
    The Clerk. Amendment to H.R. 3132, offered by Mr. Scott of 
Virginia.
    Mr. Scott. I move that the reading of the amendment be 
waived.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection. And the 
gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
    [The amendment follows:]
    
    
    Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman, this amendment would eliminate the 
death penalties and mandatory minimums from the bill. I would 
incorporate at this point the discussion that we have had on 
this and rather than waste the Committee's time just point out 
that we had an opportunity to eliminate all the mandatory 
minimums and the death penalty, and I would yield back the 
balance of my time.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. 
Green.
    Mr Green. Move to strike the last word, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Green. I rise in opposition to the amendment, as the 
gentleman from Virginia would probably guess.
    The crimes that we are talking about here today, the crimes 
that are dealt with in this legislation are among the most 
serious crimes that we can possibly have in society, because 
they strike at the heart of who we are, our sensibility, our 
families, our sense of security. I believe that these crimes 
are worthy in some cases the death penalty, and they are worthy 
of mandatory minimums. I believe that we do need to send a very 
strong signal about how society--what society's attitude is 
towards those who would prey upon our kids.
    And they are mandatory minimums because, sadly, we have 
learned that judicial discretion in too many cases and too many 
places has been abused, and has given rise to some of the 
crimes that are really represented by those pictures over to 
the side of these chambers.
    It is important for us as policy makers, as the elected 
representatives of families all across this country, to not 
only send a strong signal about our attitudes towards those who 
would prey upon our kids, but also to take steps to prevent 
future such actions.
    You know, it's interesting in some of the opening 
statements, I heard some say that the penalties that we have in 
this legislation will not deter. I'm not sure deterrence is the 
purpose. One thing we do know: we do know that those who 
repeatedly prey upon our kids are likely to do it yet again.
    But with this legislation, and the tough approach that 
we've taken, the mandatory minimums, in some places the most 
serious punishment, the capital punishment, we are taking steps 
to ensure that at least these offenders will not claim future 
victims.
    I made reference earlier to some studies that have been 
done of admitted child molesters and the extraordinary 
likelihood that they will reoffend. Sexual offender recidivism 
is underreported. The rate that it's underreported by is at 
least two and half times.
    When imprisoned sex offenders are interviewed in polygraph 
sessions, the numbers are truly frightening. In one study, 
sexual offenders had an average of 110 victims, and 318 
offenses. And each one of those numbers represents a life 
destroyed, a family destroyed, a shattering of a community, the 
shaking of a neighborhood down to its very core.
    Another study suggested that convicted sex offenders commit 
their sex crimes for an average of 16 years before they're 
caught.
    So when you see those numbers, and you see the--or hear the 
stories of those victims, what makes it even worse is when you 
realize that it is extremely likely that there are many, many 
victims before the victim that you've seen on that TV screen or 
on that picture or read about in that story.
    The chances are very likely that there have been a whole 
string of young lives destroyed. These are serious crimes. They 
deserve our most serious penalties.
    The public is crying out for it. We have all seen the 
stories, and we've all been outraged. This legislation, in my 
view, takes a very strong step forward in providing new tools, 
in providing new penalties. It is an appropriate response.
    This amendment will take away in so many ways the most 
important part of this: that strong stance; those tough 
penalties; those penalties that will remove those offenders 
from society that will keep our families safe and hopefully 
protect the innocent.
    I strongly urge that you reject the amendment.
    Mr. Chairman, with that I yield back.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The question is on agreeing to the 
Scott amendment number 16. Those in favor will say aye? 
Opposed, no?
    The noes appear to have it. The noes have it. The amendment 
is not agreed to.
    Are there further amendments?
    The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott.
    Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that a 
letter from Professor Eric Friedman be entered into the record.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection.
    [The letter from Professor Friedman follows:]
    
    
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Are there further amendments? There 
are no further amendments.
    A reporting quorum is present. The question occurs on the 
motion to report the bill H.R. 3132 favorably, as amended. All 
in favor will say aye? Opposed, no?
    The ayes appear to have it.
    Mr. Green. Mr. Chairman, on that I would request the ayes 
and nays.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. rollcall will be ordered.
    Those in favor of reporting the bill H.R. 3132 favorably, 
as amended, will, as your names are called, answer aye; those 
opposed, no. And the clerk will call the roll.
    The Clerk. Mr. Hyde?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Coble?
    Mr. Coble. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Coble, aye. Mr. Smith?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Gallegly?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Goodlatte?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Chabot?
    Mr. Chabot. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chabot, aye. Mr. Lungren?
    Mr. Lungren. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Lungren, aye. Mr. Jenkins?
    Mr. Jenkins. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Jenkins, aye. Mr. Cannon?
    Mr. Cannon. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Cannon, aye. Mr. Bachus?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Inglis?
    Mr. Inglis. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Inglis, aye. Mr. Hostettler?
    Mr. Hostettler. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Hostettler, aye. Mr. Green?
    Mr. Green. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Green, aye. Mr. Keller?
    Mr. Keller. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Keller, aye. Mr. Issa?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Flake?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Pence?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Forbes?
    Mr. Forbes. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Forbes, aye. Mr. King?
    Mr. King. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. King, aye. Mr. Feeney?
    Mr. Feeney. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Feeney, aye. Mr. Franks?
    Mr. Franks. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Franks, aye. Mr. Gohmert?
    Mr. Gohmert. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Gohmert, aye. Mr. Conyers?
    Mr. Conyers. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Conyers, no. Mr. Berman?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Boucher?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Nadler?
    Mr. Nadler. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Nadler, no. Mr. Scott?
    Mr. Scott. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Scott, no. Mr. Watt?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Ms. Lofgren?
    Ms. Lofgren. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Lofgren, aye. Ms. Jackson Lee?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Ms. Waters?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Meehan?
    Mr. Meehan. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Meehan, aye. Mr. Delahunt?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Wexler?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Weiner?
    Mr. Weiner. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Weiner, aye. Mr. Schiff?
    Mr. Schiff. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Schiff, aye. Ms. Sanchez?
    Ms. Sanchez. No.
    The Clerk. Ms. Sanchez, no. Mr. Van Hollen?
    Mr. Van Hollen. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Van Hollen, aye. Ms. Wasserman Schultz?
    Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Wasserman Schultz, aye. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, aye.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Further Members who wish to cast or 
change their votes? The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Smith?
    Mr. Smith. Mr. Chairman, I vote aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Smith, aye.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Further Members in the chamber who 
wish to cast or change their vote? If not, the clerk will 
report.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, there are 22 ayes and 4 noes.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. And the motion to favorably report 
the bill, as amended, is agreed to. Without objection, the bill 
will be reported favorably to the House in the form of a single 
amendment in the nature of a substitute incorporating the 
amendments adopted here today.
    Without objection, the staff is directed to make any 
technical and conforming changes, and all Members will be given 
2 days, as provided by the House rules, in which to submit 
additional, dissenting, supplemental, or minority views.
    [Intervening business.]
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The business having been concluded, 
without objection the Committee stands adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 1:45 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]

                            DISSENTING VIEWS

    We strongly dissent from H.R. 3132. While we agree with the 
legislation's stated objective of tackling the problem of 
violence against children, in particular violent offenses 
committed by sexual offenders, it does so in a manner that 
trammels the Constitution beyond the justifications underlying 
the bill itself. Specifically, the legislation would impose 
unduly harsh and discriminatory mandatory minimum sentences; it 
would expand the use of the federal death penalty to new 
offenses; and it would limit habeas corpus review in certain 
cases, leading to an increase in the number of innocent people 
being executed or languishing in prison. In addition, the 
legislation would unwisely treat juvenile offenders on par with 
adults and would have a disproportionate impact on Native 
Americans. Multiplying these important substantive issues, we 
are also concerned that many provisions of the bill are being 
rushed through Committee without adequate debate, consideration 
or consultation.
    Among the professionals who have opposed, or have expressed 
serious concerns with H.R. 3132 are scientific researchers, 
treatment professionals, and child advocates, including: Mark 
Chaffin, Ph.D., Professor and Director of Research, Center on 
Child Abuse and Neglect; Steven J. Ondersma, Ph.D. Editor-in-
Chief, Child Maltreatment: The Journal of the American 
Professional Society on the Abuse of Children; Barbara L. 
Bonner, Ph.D., University of Oklahoma Health Sciences Center; 
David Finkelhor, Ph.D., Director, Crimes against Children 
Research Center; John E.B. Myers, Professor of Law, University 
of the Pacific; Benjamin E. Saunders, Ph.D. Professor and 
Director, Family and Child Program, National Crime Victims 
Research and Treatment Center; William N. Friedrich, Ph.D, Mayo 
Clinic and Mayo Medical School; Jill Levenson, Ph.D., L.C.S.W., 
Professor of Human Services, Board of Directors, Association 
for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers; David Prescott, Treatment 
Assessment Director, Sand Ridge Secure Treatment Center; Robert 
E. Longo, MRC; LPC, Sexual Abuse Prevention & Education 
Resources International; Toni Cavanagh Johnson, Ph.D., Author 
and Consultant; Jane F. Silovsky, Ph.D., Director, Child Sexual 
Behavior Problem Treatment Program; Paul Stern, J.D. Board of 
Directors, Association for the Treatment of Sexual Offenders; 
Daniel Smith, Ph.D. Associate Professor and Director of 
Training, National Crime Victims Research & Treatment Center; 
Lucy Berliner, Harborview Center for Sexual Assault & Traumatic 
Stress; and the American Civil Liberties Union.
    For the reasons set forth herein, we respectfully dissent 
from H.R. 3132.

                     Description of Legislation\1\

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\H.R. 3132 is a compilation (with some modification) of five 
different bills: H.R. 2423, the ``Sex Offender Registration and 
Notification Act of 2005;'' H.R. 2796, the ``DNA Fingerprinting Act of 
2005;'' H.R. 2388, the ``Prevention and Deterrence of Crimes Against 
Children Act of 2005;'' H.R. 2318, the ``Protection Against Sexual 
Exploitation of Children Act of 2005;'' and H.R. 3129, the ``Foster 
Child Protection and Child Sexual Predator Sentencing Act of 2005.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Title I of H.R. 3132, entitled ``Sex Offender Registration 
and Notification Act,'' would establish a mandatory sex 
offender registry and notification program to be implemented by 
all relevant jurisdictions, including every federally 
recognized Indian tribe, within two years.\2\ It would require 
these jurisdictions to: (1) ensure that each person required to 
register does so; (2) collect specified information and prepare 
a statement of facts, criminal history and any other 
information required by the Attorney General; (3) publish this 
information on an internet website\3\ ; (4) transmit the 
information to various federal, state and local agencies within 
5 days of registration or any change in information; (5) verify 
the address of each registrant monthly for a sex offense 
against a minor (quarterly for a misdemeanor); and (6) enact a 
penalty of more than one year for failure to register. See 
Sections 112, 114, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, and 127.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\Relevant jurisdictions include every State, the District of 
Columbia, every federally recognized Indian tribe, Guam, American 
Samoa, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
    \3\This includes publication of ``all'' information about ``each 
sex offender'' except social security number, victim's identity and any 
other information exempted by the Attorney General, on the 
jurisdiction's own internet website. See Sec. 121.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Under Title I, the term ``sex offender'' places juveniles 
in the same category as adults: it is one who has a conviction 
of or adjudication as a juvenile delinquent for a ``specified 
offense against a minor,'' a ``serious sex offense,'' or a 
``misdemeanor sex offense against a minor.'' See Sec. 111. More 
importantly, Title I imposes a myriad of registration 
requirements\4\ and numerous mandatory minimums for even the 
slightest violation of these requirements. These mandatory 
minimums include, among others:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\The registration requirements placed on sex offenders include:
     Registration in each jurisdiction where the individual 
resides, works or goes to school
     Initial registration before completion of a sentence of 
imprisonment or if not sentenced to imprisonment not later than 5 days 
after being sentenced
     Notice to each jurisdiction involved of any change in 
residence, work or school not later than 5 days after such change
     If convicted before enactment, retroactively registration 
under a method determined by the Attorney General (Sec. 113)
     Lifetime registration generally or for a first misdemeanor 
sex offense against a minor for twenty years (Sec. 115)
     Verification of information in person at least once every 
six months (Sec. 116).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
           Each jurisdiction must enact legislation 
        requiring punishment of a maximum term of imprisonment 
        exceeding one year (Sec. 113(e))
           Creates a new offense, Chapter 109B, 18 
        U.S.C. Sec. 2250: A person who receives a notice from 
        an official that s/he is required to register, and is a 
        sex offender by reason of a conviction of one of the 
        listed offenses or thereafter travels in interstate or 
        foreign commerce or leaves Indian country, and 
        knowingly fails to register is subject to imprisonment 
        for a mandatory minimum of 5 years and not more than 20 
        years. (Sec. 151).\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\Note that shortly before release from custody or immediately 
after sentencing, an ``appropriate official'' must ``require the sex 
offender to read and sign a form stating that the duty to register has 
been explained and that the sex offender understands the registration 
requirement,'' whether the person actually understands the registration 
requirement or not. (Sec. 117(2)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Title II of H.R. 3132 expands the national DNA Index 
System, but includes many controversial provisions in the 
process. For example, Section 202 amends Section 3 of the DNA 
Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000 (42 U.S.C. 14135a) to 
give the Attorney General (or any agency within the Department 
of Justice or any agency that arrests, detains or supervises 
individuals facing charges) the power to collect DNA samples 
from persons who have not been found guilty, but are merely 
``arrested or detained under the authority of the United 
States.''
    Title III of the legislation, entitled ``Prevention and 
Deterrence of Crimes Against Children Act,'' limits the ability 
of any individual convicted of killing a child to petition the 
court for habeas corpus review.\6\ In addition, Title III adds 
a host of mandatory minimum sentences. For example, Sec. 302 
would require for a ``felony crime of violence against the 
person'' of someone under 18, unless a higher mandatory minimum 
otherwise applies and regardless of any maximum:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\Sec. 303, entitled ``Ensuring Fair and Expeditious Federal 
Collateral Review of Convictions for Killing a Child,'' would strip 
federal courts of jurisdiction to review claims on habeas corpus of 
persons in state custody for a ``crime that involved the killing of'' a 
person under 18 unless ``(A) the claim relies on--(i) a new rule of 
constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by 
the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or (ii) a factual 
predicate that could not have been previously discovered through the 
exercise of due diligence; and (B) the facts underlying the claim would 
be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but 
for constitutional error, no reasonable fact finder would have found 
the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.'' The rare claim that 
cleared this hurdle would be subjected to a complex set of truncated 
timetables.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
           Life or death if death results--this would 
        substantially broaden the offenses for which life or 
        death may be imposed, and require a life sentence even 
        in the absence of one of the mental culpability 
        factors. That is, it would require a life sentence if 
        death resulted from recklessness, negligence or by 
        accident.
           Not less than 30 years or for life if the 
        ``crime of violence'' is kidnapping, aggravated sexual 
        abuse, sexual abuse, maiming, or results in serious 
        bodily injury, i.e., involves a substantial risk of 
        death, extreme physical pain, protracted and obvious 
        disfigurement, or protracted loss of the function of a 
        bodily member, organ or mental faculty.
           Not less than 20 years or for life if the 
        ``crime of violence'' is a sexual contact offense under 
        18 U.S.C. 2244(a)(1), (2) or (5), or results in bodily 
        injury, i.e., a cut, abrasion, bruise, burn, or 
        disfigurement, physical pain, illness, impairment of a 
        bodily member, organ, or mental faculty, or any other 
        injury to the body, no matter how temporary.
           Not less than 15 years or for life if a 
        ``dangerous weapon was used during and in relation to 
        the crime of violence'' (dangerous weapon is not 
        defined in the federal criminal code, and has been held 
        under state law to include anything from a firearm to a 
        shoe, and even a pencil)
           Not less than 10 years or for life in any 
        other case.
    Title IV, entitled ``Protection Against Sexual Exploitation 
of Children Act,'' and Title V, entitled ``Foster Child 
Protection and Child Sexual Predator Deterrence Act,'' create a 
host of mandatory minimums criminal penalties and increase a 
number of existing mandatory minimum sentences. For example, 
Title IV would create mandatory minimums for felonies under 
Title 18, Chapter 109A, Sec. Sec. 2241, 2244, 2245, which are 
specifically included in the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. 
Sec. 1153, and would add death as a possible penalty for 
offenses under Chapter 110, Chapter 117, and Section 1591. It 
would also increase mandatory minimums for offenses under Title 
18, Chapter 110, Sec. Sec. 2251, 2252, 2252A, 2252B and 2260, 
which are not specifically included in the Major Crimes Act. 
Title V would also provide for the civil commitment of 
individuals determined to be ``sexually dangerous persons.''

  I. THE LEGISLATION IMPOSES INEFFECTIVE AND DISCRIMINATORY MANDATORY 
                                MINIMUMS

    The premise underlying H.R. 3132 is that tough mandatory 
minimum sentences will solve the problem of sex crimes against 
minors.\6\ The empirical evidence, however, does not support 
this premise. The Judicial Conference of the United States and 
the U.S. Sentencing Commission have found that mandatory 
minimums distort the sentencing process and have the ``opposite 
of their intended effect.''\7\ Mandatory minimums ``destroy 
honesty in sentencing by encouraging charge and fact plea 
bargains.'' Moreover, mandatory minimums result in unwarranted 
sentencing disparity. That is, ``mandatory minimums * * * treat 
dissimilar offenders in a similar manner, although those 
offenders can be quite different with respect to the 
seriousness of their conduct or their danger to society * * *'' 
and * * * ``require the sentencing court to impose the same 
sentence on offenders when sound policy and common sense call 
for reasonable differences in punishment.''\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\The legislation establishes 36 new mandatory minimum sentences 
and increases the sentences in eight existing provisions.
    \7\See U.S. Sentencing Commission, Special Report to Congress: 
Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice System 
(August 1991).
    \8\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In addition, mandatory minimums tend to discriminate 
against minorities. Both the Judicial Center in its study 
report entitled ``The General Effects of Mandatory Minimum 
Prison Terms: a Longitudinal Study of Federal Sentences 
Imposed'' and the United States Sentencing Commission in its 
study entitled ``Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal 
Criminal Justice System'' found that minorities were 
substantially more likely than whites under comparable 
circumstances to receive mandatory minimum sentences. The 
Sentencing Commission study also reflected that mandatory 
minimum sentences increased the disparity in sentencing of like 
offenders with no evidence that mandatory minimum sentences had 
any more crime-reduction impact than discretionary sentences.
    Finally, the mandatory minimum sentences prescribed in H.R. 
3132 have an additional dimension of harshness and unfairness 
in the form of technical registration requirements. Under the 
bill, an offender who is required to register could be 
subjected to a 5 year mandatory minimum sentence for some 
technical problem with the registration requirement that could 
be deemed a failure to register.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\In this regard, Mr. Scott offered an amendment that would have 
eliminated the mandatory minimum sentences related to the registration 
requirements in favor of a scheme with maximum sentences, granting 
discretion to the Sentencing Commission and the courts to determine the 
gradation of seriousness and punishment. Unfortunately, the amendment 
was narrowly defeated by a 17 to 16 vote.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    H.R. 3132 simply takes the wrong approach. Instead of 
focusing on correctional and rehabilitative programs, it unduly 
focuses on registration requirements. For example, a recent 
report by the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction 
demonstrated that paroled sex offenders completing basic sex 
offender programming while incarcerated had a lower recidivism 
rate than those who did not have programming. This was true for 
both recidivism of any type (33.9% with programming recidivated 
compared with 55.3% without programming) and sex-related 
recidivism (7.1% with programming recidivated compared with 
16.5% without programming).\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\``Ten-Year Recidivism Follow-up of 1989 Sex Offender 
Releases,'' Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, Ohio (April 
2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In fact, excluding those convicted of rape, numerous 
studies evidence that sex offenders are highly treatable and 
have very low recidivism rates.\11\ For example, according to 
the latest comprehensive Department of Justice offender 
statistics, overall, sex offenders are less likely than non-sex 
offenders to be rearrested for any offense within 3 years of 
release--43 percent of sex offenders versus 68 percent of non-
sex offenders. And of the approximately 4,300 child molesters 
released from prisons in 15 States in 1994, 3.3% of these were 
rearrested for another sex crime against a child within 3 years 
of release from prison. In comparison, released prisoners with 
the highest re-arrest rates were robbers (70.2%), burglars 
(74.0%), larcenists (74.6%), motor vehicle thieves (78.8%), 
those in prison for possessing or selling stolen property 
(77.4%), and those in prison for possessing, using or selling 
illegal weapons (70.2%). Therefore, there is little evidence 
that harsher penalties in the form of technical registration 
requirements are needed to solve the problem of sexual abuse of 
children.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\See Orlando, Dennise, ``Sex Offenders,'' Special Needs 
Offenders Bulletin, a publication of the Federal Judicial Center, No. 
3, Sept. 1998, at 8; see also Alexander, M.A., ``Sexual Offender 
Treatment Efficacy Revisited,'' 11 Sexual Abuse: A journal of Research 
and Treatment 2, at 101-117 ( cited in Center for Sex Offender 
Management, ``Recidivism of Sex Offenders,'' 13-14 (May 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

  II. THE LEGISLATION UNJUSTIFIABLY EXPANDS THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY

    H.R. 3132 would create 2 new death penalty provisions at a 
time when evidence continues to expose the fallibility of the 
system and its discriminatory effects.
    Numerous studies, including those conducted by the ACLU and 
the University of Michigan among others, have documented the 
exposure of innocent individuals to the death penalty 
system.\12\ Last year, a University of Michigan study 
identified 199 murder exonerations since 1989, 73 of them in 
capital cases. The same study found that death row inmates 
represent a quarter of 1 percent of the prison population but 
22 percent of the exonerated. Since 1973, 119 innocent people 
have been released from death row. An earlier study found that 
more than two out of every three capital judgments reviewed by 
the courts during a 23-year period were seriously flawed. 
Moreover, when experts reviewed all the capital cases and 
appeals imposed in the United States between 1973 and 1995 at 
the state and federal levels, they found a national error rate 
of 68%. In other words, over two-thirds of all capital 
convictions and sentences are reversed because of serious error 
during trial or sentencing phase. This does not include errors 
that were not serious enough to warrant a reversal.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\See American Bar Association, ``Gideon's Broken Promise: 
America's Continuing Quest for Equal Justice'' (2005) (demonstrating 
that innocent people are wrongfully convicted in our criminal justice 
system due to the lack of effective defense representation for the 
poor). In fact, Governor Ryan of Illinois declared a moratorium in his 
state after 13 people were released from death row because of 
innocence. Ryan wanted assurances that the system was working before 
resuming executions. Some death penalty proponents have argued that the 
problems in Illinois are exceptional. In fact, however the error rate 
in Illinois is 66%, slightly lower than the national average of 68%.
    \13\See ``A Broken System: Error Rates in Capital Cases'', 1973-
1995 (Retrieved April 26, 2005 from http:// justice.policy.net/
jpreport/).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In fact, due in part to the high number of wrongful 
convictions with respect to the death penalty, Congress passed 
the Justice for All Act of 2004,\14\ which received strong 
bipartisan support. The Act increases federal resources 
available to state and local governments to combat crimes with 
DNA technology and provides safeguards to prevent wrongful 
convictions and executions. Title III of the Innocence 
Protection Act also provides access to post-conviction DNA 
testing in federal cases, helps States improve the quality of 
legal representation in capital cases and increases 
compensation in federal cases of wrongful conviction. By 
increasing the number of federal death penalty provisions, H.R. 
3132 runs counter to the spirit of the Innocence Protection Act 
and would actually prevent that legislation from achieving its 
full purpose. Even worse, these new death penalties are being 
proposed at a time when the Innocence Protection Act has not 
even been funded.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\Pub. L. No. 108-405, S. 401-432 (2004).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Furthermore, the death penalty has been shown to be 
racially and economically discriminatory.\15\ Studies which 
examine the relationship between race and the death penalty 
have now been conducted in every active death penalty state. In 
96% of these reviews, there was a pattern of either race-of-
victim or race-of-defendant discrimination, or both. After its 
careful study of the death penalty in the United States, the 
United Nations' Human Rights Commission in 1998 issued a report 
which rightly concluded: ``Race, ethnic origin and economic 
status appear to be key determinants of who will, and who will 
not, receive a sentence of death.''\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\See Department of Justice Report, ``The Federal Death Penalty 
System: A Statistical Survey'' (1988-2000) (finding numerous racial and 
geographic disparities in the death penalty and revealing that 80% of 
the cases submitted by federal prosecutors for death penalty review in 
the past five years have involved racial minorities as defendants); see 
also University of Maryland Report, ``An Empirical Analysis of 
Maryland's Death Sentencing System With Respect to the Influence of 
Race and Legal Jurisdiction,'' (2003) (available at newsdesk.umd.edu/
pdf/finalrep.pdf) (concluding that defendants are much more likely to 
be sentenced to death if they have killed a Caucasian).
    \16\Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or 
Arbitrary Executions, Mission to the United States of America, U.N. 
ESCOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 54th Sess., Agenda Item 10, P 62, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/1998/68/Add.3 (1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

 III. THE LEGISLATION UNJUSTIFIABLY LIMITS THE RIGHT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
                                 REVIEW

    H.R. 3132 seeks to limit the ability of an individual to 
apply for a writ of habeas corpus in any case that involves the 
killing of a person under the age of eighteen. In essence, this 
bill completely strips federal judges, justices and courts of 
jurisdiction over this very rare class of claims.
    The constitutional review of state cases assigned to 
federal courts is a serious matter, calling for careful 
consideration. It is a hallmark of the liberty that defines 
America. In the past, Congress has consistently avoided 
enacting such jurisdiction-stripping legislation. In fact, in 
1996 when Congress passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act (AEDPA), Congress intentionally decided against 
eliminating habeas jurisdiction, in its entirety, for any class 
of cases or claims.
    Additionally, the need for such a measure is doubtful. 
Since passage of the AEDPA, there has been a clear decline in 
the number of state prisoners filing habeas corpus petitions in 
the federal district courts. Over the last five years, the 
number of state prisoners seeking federal habeas corpus review 
has declined 13%; the number of federal habeas corpus cases 
filed by state death-row inmates has declined 17% during that 
period.\17\ Needless to say, these declines are quite 
significant, given that the 9% increase in the total state 
prison population.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\See, Administrative Office of the United States Courts, 
Judicial Facts and Figures, Table 2.9, available at http://
www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/table2.09.pdf.
    \18\See, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice, 
Prison and Jail Inmates at Midyear 2000 and at Midyear 2004, available 
at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/pjm00.pdf and http://
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/pjim04.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        IV. THE LEGISLATION UNWISELY TREATS JUVENILES AS ADULTS

    H.R. 3132 unwisely includes juveniles within its ambit and 
treats juvenile offenders on par with adult offenders. Under 
the current provisions of H.R. 3132, the legislation would 
mandate lifetime sex offender registration for children and 
youth.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\Youth in grade school or junior high will be swept up alongside 
paroled adult sex offenders. Many caught in it will be 13 and 14 year 
olds. In some states, children 10 and under would be registered.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    H.R. 3132 does not recognize the extensive research which 
underscores significant differences between youth who sexually 
abuse younger children and adult sex offenders. One significant 
difference is that the vast majority of children and teenagers 
adjudicated for sex crimes exhibit a high response rate to 
treatment and also do not progress onward to become adult sex 
offenders.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\In fact, low recidivism rates are a consistent finding across 
over five decades of follow-up research and over 30 studies. For 
example, the Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers (ATSA), 
the largest international organization of professionals studying sex 
offender risk assessment and management approaches, states: ``Recent 
research suggests that there are important distinctions between 
juvenile and adult sexual offenders, as well as the finding that not 
all juvenile sexual offenders are the same. There is little evidence to 
support the assumption that the majority of juvenile sexual offenders 
are destined to become adult sexual offenders * * * recent prospective 
and clinical outcome studies suggest that many juveniles who sexually 
abuse will cease this behavior by the time they reach adulthood, 
especially if they are provided with specialized treatment and 
supervision. Research also indicates that juvenile offenders may be 
more responsive to treatment than their adult counterparts due to their 
emerging development.'' (ATSA Position Paper, 2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Moreover, childhood and adolescent sexual offenses are 
different from adult sex offenses in their motivation, nature, 
and extent. For example, a deviant sexual interest in young 
children, which is a major driving factor among persistent 
adult sex offenders, does not appear to play a role in the 
behavior of most children and teens. With rare exception, these 
youth are not pedophiles. Rather, for many children and youth, 
these behaviors are opportunistic, driven by curiosity and poor 
judgment, and are more impulsive rather than compulsive. 
Critical distinctions such as these between juveniles and 
adults have been clearly pointed out by blue-ribbon panels 
commissioned by the U.S. Department of Justice and by public 
information resources such as the Center for Sex Offender 
Management (CSOM), the National Center on the Sexual Behavior 
of Youth (NCSBY), and by professional and research 
organizations.
    The United States has a century-long tradition of 
maintaining different standards and treatment for juvenile 
delinquents as opposed to adult criminals. Our values dictate 
that individuals should not be stigmatized for life based on 
childhood or early teenage behavior. Including juveniles under 
H.R. 3132 violates this tradition of American justice and 
creates a special class of juveniles mandated to bear lifetime 
public stigma.

V. THE LEGISLATION FAILS TO PROHIBIT THE SELL OF DANGEROUS FIREARMS TO 
                        CONVICTED SEX OFFENDERS

    HR 3132 fails to address a glaring loophole that presently 
exists in our current system of gun laws. Namely, it fails to 
prohibit the sell of dangerous firearms to all convicted sex 
offenders.
    Under current law, it is illegal to transfer a gun to 
anyone convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year. 
In addition, we also prohibit the transfer of such weapons to 
individuals convicted of committing misdemeanor crimes that we 
consider to be of a particularly serious nature. For example, 
we prohibit anyone convicted of committing a misdemeanor crime 
of domestic violence from purchasing or possessing a gun. 
Unfortunately, similar restrictions are not placed on 
individuals convicted of committing misdemeanor sex offenses.
    Guaranteeing that all sex offenders are prevented from 
gaining access to dangerous firearms is of grave importance. 
Not long ago, Keith Dwayne Lyons, a high-risk sex offender, was 
convicted of engaging in unlawful sexual intercourse with a 
minor. According to filed police reports, Mr. Lyon was aided by 
the use of a firearm in carrying-out his crime.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\Reno Gazette-Journal, ``High Risk Sex Offender Arrested'', Page 
5c December 10, 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    We also have been made painfully aware of the recent child 
molestations involving at least three Boy Scout officials who, 
over the course of the past several years, have been accused of 
molesting dozens of young boys. In the case of one of the 
alleged molesters in particular, Mr. Dennis Empey, we also 
learned he had been previously convicted of committing a sex 
offense after having been accused of ``flashing a gun before 
sodomizing his victims.''\22\ During the course of the 
Committee's consideration of HR 3132, Representative Nadler 
offered an amendment to address this problem. Unfortunately, 
that amendment was defeated on a straight party-line basis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\Idaho's ``Post Register'' Uncovers Pedophiles Among Boy Scout 
Officials, Editor & Publisher, July 5, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

   VI. THE LEGISLATION WILL HAVE A DISPROPORTIONATE IMPACT ON NATIVE 
                               AMERICANS

    H.R. 3132's creation of additional federal crimes will 
disproportionately affect Native Americans who are 
significantly over-represented in the federal criminal 
system.\23\ H.R. 3132 would add felony child abuse and neglect 
to the Major Crimes Act,\24\ and would impose a host of harsh 
new mandatory minimum sentences for existing offenses under the 
Major Crimes Act. This will have a disproportionate impact on 
Native Americans because they comprise the vast majority of 
people prosecuted in federal court for offenses listed in the 
Major Crimes Act, and their sentences are already significantly 
longer than the sentences imposed in state courts on others for 
the same conduct.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\As Indian reservations are considered federal reserves which 
fall under federal jurisdiction, a significant amount of federal 
criminal prosecution is focused on Indian reservations. Native 
Americans are consequently over-represented in the federal prison 
population. As of 2000, while Native Americans are roughly 1% of the 
population, they represent 1.5% of the prison population. The rate of 
incarceration for Native Americans increases significantly in states 
with larger reservations. For example, while Native Americans are 6% of 
the population of Montana, Native Americans account for more than 20% 
of those incarcerated there, and 32% of women incarcerated in that 
state. Overall, Native Americans are incarcerated there at a rate more 
than 4 times that of white residents.
    \24\Under the Major Crimes Act, any ``Indian'' who commits one of a 
list of felonies in ``Indian country'' is subject to prosecution and 
sentencing exclusively under federal law. H.R. 3132 would add ``felony 
child abuse or neglect'' to the list of offenses in the Major Crimes 
Act.
    \25\In June of 2002, the United States Sentencing Commission formed 
the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Native American Sentencing Issues 
(``Advisory Group'') in response to concerns that Native American 
defendants were treated more harshly under the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines than similarly situated defendants prosecuted by the states. 
Focusing solely on aggravated assault, sexual abuse, and manslaughter, 
the Advisory Group found that sentences for sexual abuse and aggravated 
assault under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines were significantly longer 
than those imposed for the same conduct by state courts, and were 
either higher or lower with respect to manslaughter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

  VII. PROVISIONS OF THE LEGISLATION ARE BEING RUSHED THROUGH WITHOUT 
                            ADEQUATE DEBATE

    A number of substantive provisions of H.R. 3132 are being 
rushed through the House without adequate debate, consideration 
or consultation with relevant interest groups. For example, as 
mentioned above, Sec. 510 of the bill adds felony child abuse 
and neglect to the Major Crimes Act; however, to date there has 
been no deliberative consultation with the representatives from 
the group most affected by the legislation, Native 
Americans.\26\ Moreover, no hearing has been held on some of 
the more controversial provisions of the bill, including the 
provision which authorizes the Attorney General to collect DNA 
samples from any person arrested or detained under federal 
authority. Finally, the Committee has yet to hold hearings on 
the mandatory mininum provisions of the legislation, a central 
aspect of how H.R. 3132 addresses sex offenses.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\There are a number of other provisions of the bill that would 
disproportionately affect Native Americans, but about which 
representative groups have not been consulted. See Sec. 302, 402, 504, 
505, 506, 508, 512, and 513.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                               Conclusion

    While there is no question that we must address the problem 
of violence against children and in particular violent offenses 
committed by sexual offenders, the emphasis of H.R. 3132 on the 
death penalty, mandatory minimums, and unforgiving registration 
requirements is misplaced. Mandatory minimum sentences have 
been studied extensively and have been proven to be ineffective 
in preventing crime. Moreover, the death penalty system has 
numerous deficiencies, not to mention its discriminatory 
effects. The bill also unwisely advocates lumping juvenile 
offenders with adult criminals without recognizing the critical 
distinctions between the two. Unfortunately, instead of 
addressing the issues underlying violence against children, 
H.R. 3132 adopts a ``lock 'em up and throw away the key'' 
strategy with technical registration requirements and mandatory 
minimum sentences.

        Description of Amendments Offered by Democratic Members


1. Amendment offered by Rep. Adam Schiff

    Description of amendment: The Schiff amendment proposed to 
award bonus payments to any state that implemented an 
electronic monitoring system of sex offenders following their 
release from prison.
    Vote on Amendment: The amendment was agreed to by voice-
vote.

2. Amendment offered by Rep. Bobby Scott (#1)

    Description of amendment: The Scott amendment proposed to 
eliminate the registration requirements for any individual 
convicted of a misdemeanor sex offense.
    Vote on Amendment: The amendment was defeated by voice-
vote.

3. Amendment offered by Rep. Bobby Scott (#2)

    Description of amendment: The Scott amendment proposed to 
delete the two provisions of the bill that authorized the 
Attorney General to determine who should be labeled a `sexual 
predator' for purposes of the registry and the provision that 
authorized the AG to designate which crimes would constitute a 
`serious sex offense' under the terms of the bill.
    Vote on Amendment: The amendment was defeated by voice-
vote.

4. Amendment offered by Rep. Bobby Scott (#3)

    Description of amendment: The Scott amendment proposed to 
eliminate the five year mandatory minimum penalty for 
individuals who fail to register or make false statements when 
complying with the registration requirements, as prescribed by 
the bill.
    Vote on Amendment: The amendment was defeated by voice-
vote.

5. Amendment offered by Rep. Bobby Scott (#4)

    Description of amendment: The Scott amendment proposed to 
strike the language in section 117, subsection 3 of the bill 
requiring a sex offender to ``read and sign a form stating that 
the duty to register has been explained and the sex offender 
understands the registration requirement.''
    Vote on Amendment: The amendment was defeated by a vote of 
16-17. Ayes: Representatives Conyers, Berman, Nadler, Scott, 
Watt, Jackson Lee, Waters, Meehan, Weiner, Sanchez, Van Hollen, 
Wasserman Schultz, Lungren, Inglis, Flake, Gohmert. Nays: 
Representatives Sensenbrenner, Coble, Smith, Gallegly, Chabot, 
Jenkins, Cannon, Hostettler, Green, Keller, Issa, Pence, 
Forbes, King, Feeney, Franks, Schiff.

6. Amendment offered by Rep. Bobby Scott (#5)

    Description of amendment: The Scott amendment proposed to 
strike section 303 of the bill in its entirety; thereby 
eliminating the restrictions that the bill places on 
applications for the writ of habeas corpus review.
    Vote on Amendment: The amendment was defeated by a vote of 
12-18. Ayes: Representatives Conyers, Berman, Nadler, Scott, 
Jackson Lee, Waters, Wexler, Weiner, Schiff, Sanchez, Van 
Hollen, Wasserman Schultz. Nays: Representatives Sensenbrenner, 
Coble, Smith, Chabot, Lungren, Jenkins, Cannon, Inglis, 
Hostettler, Green, Keller, Issa, Flake, Forbes, King, Feeney, 
Franks, Gohmert.

7. Amendment offered by Rep. Debbie Wasserman Schultz

    Description of amendment: The Wasserman Schultz amendment 
directed the Attorney General to establish guidelines for the 
civil confinement of certain sexually violent predators within 
state institutions.
    Vote on Amendment: The amendment was withdrawn.

8. Amendment offered by Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee

    Description of amendment: The Jackson Lee amendment 
proposed to expand the authority of the Attorney General to 
collect DNA samples from anyone convicted of committing a 
federal crime.
    Vote on Amendment: The amendment was agreed to by voice-
vote.

9. Amendment offered by Rep. Jerrold Nadler

    Description of amendment: The Nadler amendment proposed to 
amend section 922 of title 18 U.S.C. in order to prohibit the 
transfer or possession of a firearm by any individual who had 
been convicted of committing a sex offense against a minor.
    Vote on Amendment: The amendment was defeated on a straight 
party-line basis by a vote of 9 to 17. Ayes: Representatives 
Conyers, Nadler, Scott, Meehan, Weiner, Schiff, Sanchez, Van 
Hollen, Wasserman Schultz. Nays: Representatives Sensenbrenner, 
Coble, Smith, Chabot, Lungren, Jenkins, Cannon, Inglis, 
Hostettler, Green, Keller, Issa, Flake, Forbes, King, Franks, 
Gohmert.

10. Amendment offered by Rep. Bobby Scott (#6)

    Description of amendment: The Scott amendment directed the 
Federal Bureau of Prisons to establish and provide access to a 
sex offender treatment program for all federal inmates, prior 
to the time of their release.
    Vote on Amendment: The amendment was withdrawn with the 
understanding that Majority and Minority staff would work out a 
mutually agreeable version to be accepted by the Majority.

11. Amendment offered by Rep. Bobby Scott (#7)

    Description of amendment: The Scott amendment proposed to 
establish a comprehensive risk classification for all sex 
offenders based upon the offender's risk of re-offense and 
degree of dangerousness to the public.
    Vote on Amendment: The amendment was withdrawn with the 
understanding that Majority and Minority staff would work out a 
mutually agreeable version to be accepted by the Majority.

12. Amendment offered by Rep. Bobby Scott (#8)

    Description of amendment: The Scott amendment proposed to 
provide the court with greater discretion in establishing the 
terms of supervised release for individuals covered under the 
bill.
    Vote on Amendment: The amendment was agreed to by voice-
vote.

13. Amendment offered by Rep. Bobby Scott (#9)

    Description of amendment: The Scott amendment proposed to 
strike all of the death penalty eligible offenses and mandatory 
minimum sentences included throughout the bill.
    Vote on Amendment: The amendment was defeated by voice-
vote.

                                   John Conyers, Jr.
                                   Robert C. Scott.
                                   Linda Sanchez.

                              ATTACHMENTS