[House Report 109-172]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



109th Congress                                                   Report
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 1st Session                                                    109-172
_______________________________________________________________________

                                     

                                     

                                     

                                                 Union Calendar No. 107

   THE NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY FOR 2005 AND THE NATIONAL DRUG 
                  CONTROL BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2006

                               __________

                              FIRST REPORT

                                 by the

                     COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

                             together with

                             MINORITY VIEWS

                                     


                                     

  Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house
                      http://www.house.gov/reform

 July 18, 2005.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed
                     COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

                     TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut       HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
DAN BURTON, Indiana                  TOM LANTOS, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida         MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York             EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOHN L. MICA, Florida                PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota             CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana              ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio           DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania    DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
CHRIS CANNON, Utah                   WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee       DIANE E. WATSON, California
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan          STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio              CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
DARRELL E. ISSA, California          LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida           C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
JON C. PORTER, Nevada                BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
KENNY MARCHANT, Texas                ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 
LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia            Columbia
PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina               ------
CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania        BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont 
VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina            (Independent)
------ ------

                    Melissa Wojciak, Staff Director
       David Marin, Deputy Staff Director/Communications Director
                     Keith Ausbrook, Chief Counsel
                  Rob Borden, Parliamentarian/Counsel
                       Teresa Austin, Chief Clerk
          Phil Barnett, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel

   Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources

                   MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana, Chairman
PATRICK T. McHenry, North Carolina   ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
DAN BURTON, Indiana                  BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
JOHN L. MICA, Florida                DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota             DIANE E. WATSON, California
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio           LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
CHRIS CANNON, Utah                   C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan          MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida           ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 
VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina            Columbia

                               Ex Officio

TOM DAVIS, Virginia                  HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
            J. Marc Wheat, Staff Director and Chief Counsel
                      Nicolas P. Coleman, Counsel
                           Malia Holst, Clerk
                Julian Anthony Haywood, Minority Counsel


                         LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

                              ----------                              

                                  House of Representatives,
                                     Washington, DC, July 18, 2005.
Hon. J. Dennis Hastert,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Speaker: By direction of the Committee on 
Government Reform, I submit herewith the committee's first 
report to the 109th Congress. The committee's report is based 
on a study conducted by its Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, 
Drug Policy, and Human Resources.
                                                 Tom Davis,
                                                          Chairman.

                                 (iii)

                                     
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page
Introduction.....................................................     1
  I. Background: The National Drug Control Strategy Report and the 
     National Drug Control Program Budget.............................2
        A. The Administration's National Drug Control Strategy...     3
              1. Prevention......................................     3
              2. Treatment.......................................     4
              3. Enforcement.....................................     5
              4. Interdiction....................................     6
              5. International Supply Reduction..................    20
        B. National Drug Control Budget..........................    21
              1. The President's Request.........................    21
              2. The President's Drug Budget and the Strategy....    21
              3. Division of Counterdrug Resources to Non-
                counterdrug Purposes.............................    23
 II. Strategic and Budgetary Analysis of Federal Drug Control Programs 
     and Agencies....................................................26
        A. Office of National Drug Control Policy [ONCDP]........    26
              1. High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas [HIDTA] 
                Program..........................................    27
              2. National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign.........    32
              3. Drug Free Communities [DFC] Program.............    32
              4. Counterdrug Technology Assessment Center [CTAC].    33
              5. Counterdrug Intelligence Executive Secretariat 
                (CDX)............................................    34
              6. National Drug Court Institute [NDCI]............    34
              7. National Alliance for Model State Drug Laws.....    34
              8. United States Anti-Doping Agency [USADA] and 
                Membership Dues to World Anti-Doping Agency 
                [WADA]...........................................    35
              9. National Drug Control Program Performance 
                Measures.........................................    35
        B. Department of Homeland Security [DHS].................    36
              1. Department of Homeland Security [DHS] Office of 
                Counternarcotics Enforcement [OCNE]..............    36
              2. Border and Transportation Security [BTS]........    36
              3. Immigration and Customs Enforcement [ICE].......    37
              4. Customs and Border Protection [CBP].............    38
              5. United States Coast Guard [USCG]................    41
        C. Department of Justice [DOJ]...........................    44
              1. Assistance to State and Local Law Enforcement...    44
              2. Bureau of Prisons [BOP].........................    49
              3. National Drug Intelligence Center [NDIC]........    49
              4. Drug Enforcement Administration [DEA]...........    50
              5. Interagency Crime and Drug Enforcement/Organized 
                Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force [OCDETF].......    51
              6. Department of Justice Financial Management......    52
        D. Department of Defense [DOD]...........................    53
              1. Budget..........................................    53
              2. Domestic Programs...............................    54
              3. Afghan Operations...............................    58
        E. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International 
            Development [USAID]..................................    59
              1. International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 
                Afghan Programs..................................    59
              2. Andean Counterdrug Initiative [ACI].............    60
              3. United States Agency for International 
                Development [USAID]..............................    60
              4. Andean Counterdrug Initiative and Alternative 
                Development......................................    60
              5. ACI: Office of Management and Budget PART 
                Performance Evaluation...........................    61
              6. Afghanistan.....................................    61
              7. Harm Reduction..................................    62
        F. Department of Education...............................    64
              1. Safe and Drug Free Schools......................    64
              2. Drug Testing....................................    66
        G. Department of Health and Human Services [DHHS]........    66
              1. National Institute on Drug abuse [NIDA].........    66
              2. Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services 
                Administration [SAMHSA]..........................    67
        H. Department of Veterans Affairs [DVA]..................    68
              1. General.........................................    68
              2. Waning Services With Waxing Resources...........    68
              3. Specialized Treatment...........................    68
              4. Inter-Departmental Cooperation..................    69
              5. Research and Development........................    69
              6. VA and the Drug Budget..........................    69

                                 Views

Minority views of Hon. Henry A. Waxman, Hon. Paul E. Kanjorski, 
  Hon. Carolyn B. Maloney, Hon. Elijah E. Cummings, Hon. Diane E. 
  Watson, and Hon. Brian Higgins.................................    71


                                                 Union Calendar No. 107
109th Congress                                                   Report
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 1st Session                                                    109-172

======================================================================

 
   THE NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY FOR 2005 AND THE NATIONAL DRUG 
                  CONTROL BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2006

                                _______
                                

 July 18, 2005.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

 Mr. Tom Davis, from the Committee on Government Reform submitted the 
                               following

                              FIRST REPORT

                             together with

                             MINORITY VIEWS

    On June 16, 2005, the Committee on Government Reform 
approved and adopted a report entitled, ``The National Drug 
Control Strategy for 2005 and the National Drug Control Budget 
for Fiscal Year 2006.'' The chairman was directed to transmit a 
copy to the Speaker of the House.

                              Introduction

    Drug abuse is our Nation's No. 1 public health problem, 
taking a terrible toll on our families and communities. 
According to the Centers for Disease Control, every year about 
20,000 American lives are lost as a direct consequence of 
illegal drug use. Countless more are destroyed by the indirect 
but inevitable consequences of this scourge. The Office of 
National Drug Control Policy [ONDCP] estimates that the annual 
economic cost of drug abuse to the United States--in lost 
productivity, health care costs, and wasted lives--is now well 
over the $150 billion mark.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ DEA Fiscal Year 2005 President's Budget Request, Budget Summary 
p. 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Government Reform Committee and its Subcommittee on 
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources are 
responsible for oversight of all aspects of the Federal 
Government's drug control policy--whether related to drug use 
prevention, drug addiction treatment, drug enforcement, or 
international supply reduction. In addition, the committee and 
subcommittee are responsible for all legislation relating to 
ONDCP and its programs. No other committee or subcommittee of 
the Congress is tasked with this holistic view of the drug 
abuse problem and its solutions.
    This report seeks to help Congress and the American public 
gain a better understanding of the Federal Government's drug 
control policies, as set forth in the annual National Drug 
Control Strategy Report and the National Drug Control Program 
Budget. These documents, both issued by ONDCP in February 2005, 
describe the strategy chosen by the President to reduce drug 
abuse, and the resources requested to carry out that strategy.
    These policy choices have major implications for our 
communities. They will help determine, for example, how much 
effort the U.S. Government will dedicate to reducing the opium 
poppy trade controlled by narco-terrorists in Afghanistan; how 
much money our local schools will receive to fund anti-drug 
education programs for our children; what organizations will be 
able to help people break free of drug addiction; and how much 
training and equipment our State and local police will receive 
to investigate and clean up methamphetamine labs.

   I. Background: The National Drug Control Strategy Report and the 
                  National Drug Control Program Budget

    The Office of National Drug Control Policy [ONDCP], created 
by Congress in 1988, is tasked with the following 
responsibilities: \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ 21 U.S.C. 1702.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (1) [D]evelop national drug control policy;
          (2) coordinate and oversee the implementation of that 
        national drug control policy;
          (3) assess and certify the adequacy of national drug 
        control programs and the budget for those programs; and
          (4) evaluate the effectiveness of the national drug 
        control programs.
    The Director of ONDCP is tasked with ensuring that those 
directives are carried out. He also serves as the President's 
principal advisor and spokesman with respect to all aspects of 
drug control policy--treatment, drug use prevention, law 
enforcement, interdiction, and international programs.
    Among the most important responsibilities of ONDCP is to 
formulate the 5-year National Drug Control Strategy for the 
Federal Government, designed to reduce illegal drug use, drug-
related crime, and illegal drug availability by specific, 
quantifiable amounts.\3\ ONDCP is required to submit an annual 
report not later than February of each year (the ``Strategy 
Report''), updating Congress and the American public on the 
administration's progress toward reaching the Strategy's goals. 
ONDCP is also required to submit an annual National Drug 
Control Program budget (the ``Drug Control Budget'') proposal, 
which details the administration's budget proposals for Federal 
agencies and programs that have responsibilities under the 
Strategy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ 21 U.S.C. 1705.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

         A. THE ADMINISTRATION'S NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY

    This administration has achieved significant success in the 
national effort to reduce drug abuse. When President Bush took 
office in 2001, drug use, particularly by young people, had 
risen significantly since 1993 after steep declines in the 
1980's and early 1990's. Faced with this increase in drug 
abuse, the administration reexamined Federal policies and set 
forth a new National Drug Control Strategy in February 2002. 
The new Strategy set very ambitious goals--most notably a 
decrease of illegal drug use by young people of 10 percent in 2 
years.
    Since the President's Strategy was issued, drug use by 
young people has steadily decreased, dropping by 11 percent 
over the first 2 years, and 17 percent over 3 years.\4\ These 
successes are the result of a balanced Strategy, in which 
treatment, prevention, enforcement, and international supply 
reduction complement each other, rather than competing with one 
another.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ The committee is concerned about the validity of the data 
referenced by ONDCP. The National Academy of Sciences report entitled, 
``Informing America's Policy on Illegal Drugs,'' National Academy 
Press, 2001, raises several issues about the validity of the data and 
therefore may understate the extent of drug use among teenagers.
    \5\ Fiscal Year 2005 National Drug Control Strategy [NDCS], p. 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The administration is to be commended for its successes. 
There is, however, room for improvement, as there are some 
programs in need of greater direction and attention from the 
administration. The successes, and the opportunities for 
improvement, are outlined below.

1. Prevention

    Prevention--``stopping use before it starts,'' \6\ in the 
words of this year's Strategy Report is a vital component of 
any effective drug control strategy. In many respects, it is 
the most important component, since it is the demand for drugs 
that attracts the supply. Prevention aimed at reducing drug use 
by young people is, in turn, the most important kind of demand 
reduction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ Fiscal Year 2005 NDCS p. 15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The major policy decision made by the Bush administration 
in the area of prevention was the revitalization of the 
National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign (the ``Media 
Campaign''), administered by ONDCP. In the late 1990's, the 
Media Campaign had suffered from a lack of direction as well as 
contractor difficulties (due to accounting irregularities by 
Ogilvie & Mather, the advertising firm responsible for the 
Media Campaign). Questions were raised as to whether the Media 
Campaign should be continued at all.
    ONDCP Director John Walters made the Media Campaign a major 
priority for the administration. First, ONDCP took steps to 
resolve the accounting irregularities, eventually replacing 
Ogilvie & Mather. Second, the Media Campaign sought to maximize 
its impact by running a series of advertisements intended to 
educate young people and parents about specific problems--
including the dangers of ecstasy (MDMA), the link between the 
drug trade and terrorism, the importance of parental guidance, 
and the risks of marijuana use.
    The results--in increased accountability, increased 
awareness among young people of the dangers of drug use, and 
decreased youth drug abuse--speak for themselves. Although not 
all of the program's advertisements are equally successful, 
this is true of any advertising campaign. Overall, the Media 
Campaign has been established as a major component of effective 
drug control policy.
    The administration has also taken a leadership role in 
promoting drug testing in the schools. Drug testing shows great 
promise in preventing young people from using narcotics; it is 
also a tool for identifying which students will need treatment 
and other special help to get them off drugs and achieve their 
true potential.
    There are, however, additional prevention programs that 
could use the same kind of reform and revitalization from the 
administration. For example, the Safe and Drug-Free Schools 
grant program, administered by the U.S. Department of 
Education, has great potential as a vehicle for bringing 
effective anti-drug education to millions of young people in 
our schools. The program, however, has suffered from a lack of 
accountability (due to statutory limits on data collection), as 
well as a lack of focus on drug abuse education. The 
administration has not attempted to reform this program, and 
indeed has now simply proposed to eliminate it (see discussion 
of the 2006 National Drug Control Budget below).
    Similarly, other prevention programs--such as the Drug-Free 
Communities Program, which provides grants to new 
``coalitions'' in local communities to assist them in their 
anti-drug education efforts--would benefit from additional 
accountability measures. With prevention programs now 
accounting for only 13 percent of the administration's 2006 
Drug Control Budget, it is more important than ever for ONDCP 
to focus attention on this vital area of drug policy.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ Fiscal Year 2005 NDCS, p. 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Treatment

    Drug addiction treatment is another key component of demand 
reduction. Most Americans do not use illegal drugs, but those 
who do create suffering not merely for themselves but for their 
families and neighbors. They represent the ``hard core'' of the 
market for illegal drugs. As a Nation, we have a strong moral 
and practical interest in providing effective treatment to 
reduce the number of drug users.
    Drug treatment programs have, however, historically 
suffered from two main problems: a lack of sufficient 
resources, and a lack of consistent, quantifiable measures of 
effectiveness. Treatment can be very expensive, and it can also 
be very difficult to determine whether the dollars spent have 
actually succeeded in long-term reductions in drug use. As a 
result, policymakers have often hesitated to commit significant 
funds to these programs.
    The administration has attempted to remedy both of these 
problems through its Access to Recovery [ATR] initiative. This 
initiative, first announced by the President in 2002, provides 
new funds to the States for drug treatment programs. These 
funds are expended, however, through an innovative voucher 
system, in which an addicted person seeks out and chooses the 
treatment provider that is best for him. The ATR initiative has 
expanded the range of eligible providers to include faith-based 
as well as secular organizations.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ Fiscal Year 2005 NDCS, p. 26.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    To remain eligible to receive these ``voucherized'' funds, 
however, an organization must demonstrate results. The 
administration has been developing a comprehensive set of 
performance measures for treatment programs, with the ultimate 
goal of applying them to all such programs funded by the 
Federal Government. When completed, this will be a significant 
step toward full accountability and measurability for treatment 
programs.
    The administration is to be commended for its leadership in 
improving the quantity and quality of drug treatment services. 
The committee hopes that the ATR model will be applied to other 
treatment initiatives--such as those designed to help drug 
addicted prisoners.

3. Enforcement

    Neither prevention nor treatment programs will be effective 
unless drug enforcement is also effective. Enforcement of our 
drug laws provides the ultimate deterrent to drug trafficking 
and drug use (both supply and demand), and the incentive to get 
off and stay off drugs. Tough, effective enforcement increases 
the cost of drug trafficking, and sends a clear message to 
young people and others at risk that illegal drug use is 
dangerous and wrong, and will not be tolerated.
    The administration has rightly emphasized the importance of 
uniformly enforcing our Nation's drug laws, even when that has 
been unpopular in some areas of the country. The 
administration's stand against attempts to legalize illegal 
drugs--under the guise of misleading phrases such as so-called 
``medical'' marijuana--is entirely proper. Drug dealers do not 
recognize State or local boundaries; neither should drug 
enforcement.
    The administration has also worked to improve the 
effectiveness of law enforcement by targeting its investigative 
resources at major drug trafficking organizations. For example, 
Operation Mountain Express, a major investigation that involved 
several U.S. Federal agencies as well as Canadian authorities, 
recently disrupted the smuggling of methamphetamine precursor 
chemicals across the Northern border. This kind of operation is 
a crucial part of our efforts to decrease the supply of illegal 
drugs.
    The administration, however, could make greater 
improvements in the sharing of drug enforcement intelligence. 
Although the administration recently has taken steps in this 
direction through initiatives like the new ``drug intelligence 
fusion center'' at the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task 
Force [OCDETF], that center has still not reached agreement 
with non-Justice Department agencies like the bureau of 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement [ICE] at the Department of 
Homeland Security. The administration should work to resolve 
any disputes about intelligence sharing, investigative 
authority, and interagency cooperation. We cannot afford to 
allow drug traffickers to slip through the cracks while Federal 
agencies engage in ``turf battles.''
    Similarly, the administration needs to improve the 
relationship between Federal, State, and local law enforcement 
agencies. State and local agencies make over 95 percent of the 
arrests of drug violators.\9\ Besides fighting on the ``front 
lines'' in the struggle against drug trafficking, these 
agencies gather a wealth of information and intelligence that 
would be of great value to Federal agencies. The 
administration's efforts to foster this kind of interagency 
cooperation and information sharing, however, have been 
severely undermined by recent budget proposals recommending 
deep cuts in funds for Federal-State-local task forces and 
other joint law enforcement activities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ Crime in the United States, 2002. Uniform Crime Report, Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Interdiction

    It is crucial that the Federal Government employ the most 
effective interdiction policies possible. The vast majority of 
the illegal drugs entering the United States are produced in 
foreign countries--cocaine and heroin in Colombia; marijuana, 
methamphetamine, and heroin in Mexico; high-potency marijuana 
in Canada; and ecstasy in the Netherlands and Belgium.\10\ 
Those drugs have to be smuggled into the United States to do 
harm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ National Drug Threat Assessment 2005 Executive Summary, 
National Drug Intelligence Center.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The principle coordinating agency for detection and 
monitoring of U.S. drug interdiction efforts in the maritime 
transit zones is the Department of Defense's Joint Interagency 
Task Force South [JIATF-South]. Through multiple intelligence 
sources JIATF-South has projected the anticipated flow of 
cocaine being smuggled into the United States from the Andean 
Ridge nations. The drug flow rates are consistent with the 
notion that over 80 percent of the cocaine flow into the United 
States transits through Mexico.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ The JIATF South projected cocaine flow rates from South 
America (as shown) differ greatly from ONDCP projections. For 2004, 
ONDCP estimated a combined total of 640 metric tons of cocaine was 
produced in Colombia, Peru and Bolivia. Narcotics Digest Weekly, Vol. 
4, No. 18, May 3, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The flow chart depicted below reflects a wide disparity of 
flow estimates. The JIATF-S flow estimates are based on a 
cocaine demand model and do not reflect actual intelligence 
driven events or seized cocaine in the source and transit 
zones. The Consolidated Cocaine Data Base [CCDB], on the other 
hand, establishes a base for cocaine flow by reporting 
confirmed and substantiated cocaine seizures and disruptions. 
Given the disparity of flow models, the actual production rates 
in the source zone will also have widely varying estimates, 
possibly minimizing their validity. The committee has grave 
concerns that the wide disparity in flow rate estimates could 
invalidate eradication, production, interdiction, and usage 
estimates.


    Nearly all of our interdiction personnel--including port-
of-entry inspectors, investigative agents, patrol officers, 
aviators, and ship operators--are located within the Department 
of Homeland Security [DHS], in the Coast Guard, Border Patrol, 
and legacy Customs Service (the latter agency currently being 
divided between the bureaus of Customs and Border Protection 
[CBP] and Immigration and Customs Enforcement [ICE]). 
Additional interdiction personnel and assets are also located 
in the Department of Defense, which, although it does not have 
actual arrest authority, provides crucial logistical support to 
DHS.

                        The Tyranny of Distance

    A major challenge to U.S. interdiction efforts has been the 
vast distances associated with the high seas maritime transit 
zones in which drug smugglers operate, as depicted in the 
graphic of the Eastern Pacific maritime transit zone. U.S. 
Naval and Coast Guard vessels cruise at 10-15 knots (11-17 MPH) 
for fuel economy purposes, and are capable of speeds up to 
approximately 30 knots (34 MPH). With those rates of travel it 
is easy to visualize the daunting task associated with drug 
interdiction efforts in the Eastern Pacific.


                 The Detection and Monitoring Challenge

    Increasing the challenge of interdicting drugs in the high 
seas transit zones is the shortage of interdiction assets 
(ships, planes, and helicopters) allocated to this critical 
mission. In January 2005 the Director of JIATF-South told 
subcommittee staff members that he now has more actionable 
intelligence than he has interdiction assets ready to respond 
to smuggling events. This is a recent development that is the 
result of the very successful Operation Panama Express, an 
interagency intelligence-driven program managed by the 
Departments of Justice and Homeland Security.
    Due to impressive intelligence cueing, JIATF-South now has 
improved insight into where, when and how many tons of cocaine 
will be smuggled through the transit zones. However, as shown 
in the following graphic, they do not possess the necessary 
assets to respond to the smuggling threats. Essentially the 
suspected targets from credible intelligence cueing far exceed 
our operational capability to respond to them.


    JIATF-South has developed an analysis comparing 
interdiction requirements to response shortfalls, and the 
results are shown above. These shortages were calculated after 
combining the assets of Departments of Homeland Security, 
Defense and our Allied nations. These identified shortages have 
resulted in many missed interdiction opportunities in the 
maritime transit zones, and therefore had a tangible impact on 
drug interdiction efforts.

                          Missed Opportunities

    As shown in the figure below, although JIATF-South has a 75 
percent chance of successfully interdicting a detected high 
speed (Go-Fast) smuggling vessel, JIATF-South's chances of 
detecting the Go-Fast smuggling event was less than 30 percent 
largely due to the lack of appropriate aircraft responding to 
cued intelligence. Additionally, for the Go-Fast smugglers that 
were not interdicted, 80 percent escaped because there were no 
surface assets on-scene to respond, and 20 percent escaped 
because the surface asset did not possess armed helicopter 
support and/or the necessary speed to catch a Go-Fast vessel.


    It is clear from the identified asset shortages and missed 
opportunities that although progress has been made in improving 
interdiction rates, the interdiction effort still faces great 
challenges. The committee is gravely concerned with the 
identified shortages of assets in the transit zones to stop the 
flow of cocaine, and strongly recommends additional 
interdiction assets be committed to address these shortfalls.
    Given the identified shortfalls in MPA there is a great 
disparity between the cost effectiveness and the detection 
capabilities of the aircraft currently performing these 
missions. As an example, the U.S. Air Force E-3 AWACS and the 
CBP P-3 Dome vary greatly both in cost per flight hour, 
required personnel, and search effectiveness. Often the E-3's 
deploy with 2 AWACS aircraft and a tanker for aerial refueling. 
The cost per flight hour on the E-3 and the KC-135 tanker are 
double the cost per flight hour of the P-3 Dome. When 2 E-3's 
deploy to Manta Ecuador, they have 87 personnel that crew the 
aircraft, provide maintenance and man security details. The KC-
135 tanker adds an additional 10 crewmembers for a total of 97 
people. In comparison, the P-3 deploys with 8-10 crewmembers 
per aircraft and no more than 3 maintenance personnel for a 
total of no more than 23.
    The AWACS, designed for high speed fighter intercepts, is 
capable of detecting large vessels but has a hard time 
detecting 30-40 go fast low radar profile type vessels. The P-3 
Dome, on the other hand, can detect both large and small 
vessels.

                            On Any Given Day

    As shown in the following figure, on any given day there 
are, on average, 13 ships dedicated to drug interdiction in the 
high seas maritime transit zones. These ships include assets 
from the U.S. Navy, U.S. Coast Guard, British Navy and Dutch 
Navy. In the Eastern Pacific transit area, which is larger than 
the continental United States, there are, on average, four 
ships dedicated to the drug interdiction mission.
    This analogy is certainly alarming; four ships to patrol an 
area larger than the continental United States, trying to stop 
smugglers that will risk everything to evade U.S. law 
enforcement efforts.


    As critical as not having enough ships in the transit zones 
may appear, the current shortage of maritime patrol aircraft is 
probably a more critical concern. As shown in the figure below, 
on average, there are six aircraft sorties (missions) dedicated 
to drug interdiction in the transit zones. These aircraft are 
provided by the U.S. Navy, U.S. Coast Guard, Customs and Border 
Protection's Air and Marine Program, U.S. Air Force and Allied 
(British and Dutch) nations.


    The Forward Operating Locations [FOLs] play a key role in 
the U.S.'s counterdrug efforts. These staging areas allow 
aircraft to launch from sites outside of the United States to 
conduct air and marine interdiction patrols in the Source and 
Transit Zones. Having FOL's close to the areas of interest is a 
critical element for mission success. The large distances in 
the Eastern Pacific and Caribbean regions require lengthy 
flights to get to the target area, and require lengthy patrol 
and tracking times to monitor illegal narcotics movements.
            Forward Operating Locations [FOL's]:
           Manta, Ecuador--Location for marine 
        enforcement operations in the Eastern Pacific and for 
        air interdiction flights in Colombia. The FOL is 
        utilized by DOD and DHS assets.
           Curacao--The location allows DOD and DHS 
        aircraft to conduct marine patrols in the Caribbean and 
        air interdiction missions in northern Colombia.
           Comalapa, El Salvador--Used primarily by the 
        U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard to conduct marine patrol 
        operations in the Eastern Pacific and the Caribbean.
            Additional Locations:
           Liberia, Costa Rica--Utilized by DHS 
        aircraft to support marine patrol operations in the 
        Eastern Pacific and the Caribbean.
           Aruba--Primarily used by DHS (Coast Guard) 
        for marine patrols in the Caribbean. DOD use of the 
        location is restricted.
           Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GITMO)--Useful for DOD 
        and DHS aircraft to conduct marine patrol operations in 
        the Caribbean.
           Martinique--Primary location for French twin 
        engine marine patrol aircraft who conduct marine patrol 
        operations in the eastern Caribbean.

    The shortfall in maritime patrol aircraft [MPA] is 
especially noteworthy after comparing detection rates of ships 
operating in the transit zones, both with and without 
helicopters and MPA support.
    The committee feels very strongly that the proper assets be 
used for drug interdiction efforts, so that we are using the 
right tool for the right job, and not wasting taxpayer's money 
gambling with a 9 percent chance of success.


    The Bush administration has, regrettably, been unable to 
reverse a nearly decade-long trend of declining DOD personnel 
and assets dedicated to drug interdiction. Although this trend 
predates the current administration, it has been exacerbated by 
the new demands placed on DHS and the Defense Department after 
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Across the board, 
the United States has fewer aircraft, patrol boats or other 
ships, radars, and personnel actively involved in drug 
interdiction operations.
    The administration justifiably has highlighted recent large 
seizures of drugs off the coast of Colombia. These seizures are 
a product of improved interdiction operations using new tools 
such as the Coast Guard armed ``HITRON'' helicopter, and more 
importantly, the dramatic improvements in intelligence about 
drug trafficking operations. The administration has 
acknowledged this, and has argued that improved intelligence 
makes greater operational capability unnecessary.
    Relying on such intelligence to justify reductions in 
interdiction assets, however, is not a wise strategy. First, 
Federal officials have informed committee staff that while we 
have greater intelligence than ever before, we do not have the 
assets to respond to that intelligence. In other words, our 
Federal interdiction agencies know about many large shipments 
of drugs to the United States that they can do nothing about. 
It does little good to place Americans and foreign nationals at 
risk to obtain intelligence that cannot be acted upon.
    Second, we cannot assume that the present flow of 
intelligence will continue forever. Sources of intelligence can 
disappear or diminish, and there can be substantial delays in 
replacing them. Given that our interdiction assets have 
decreased, once our intelligence sources diminish illegal drug 
flows to the United States will almost certainly rise.

5. International Supply Reduction

    Drug enforcement is targeted at drugs that have already 
entered the United States, while drug interdiction aims at the 
attempted transport of drugs into the country. Our 
international supply reduction efforts are intended to stop the 
production and export of illegal drugs in the source countries 
themselves.
    The greatest supply of illegal drugs comes from countries 
that, willingly or unwillingly, have become safe havens for 
drug traffickers. Our international efforts have focused, 
first, on assisting the host nations' enforcement efforts 
against trafficking organizations, and second, on providing 
alternative livelihoods for those who might be tempted to 
engage in illegal drug production.
    The administration's record has been mixed. The United 
States has achieved significant successes in Colombia through 
assistance to President Uribe. Assistance to the Colombian 
National Police and the Colombian military has helped the 
government retake land used by narco-terrorists, while aerial 
spraying has helped destroy coca crops before they are even 
harvested. ONDCP believes that cocaine production in Colombia 
has dropped, and that production has not risen in neighboring 
countries.
    There is a risk, however, that the United States may help 
Colombia win the war against the narco-terrorists, but then 
lose the peace. A dispute between the U.S. Department of State 
and the U.S. Department of Justice about whether assistance to 
former narco-terrorist combatants who have surrendered and 
agreed to lay down their arms in return for the opportunity to 
live productive lives (referred to as the ``demobilized'') 
would, for technical reasons, be deemed illegal assistance to 
terrorists. Failure to assist Colombia's efforts to turn former 
narco-terrorist armies into peaceful workers and farmers would 
be a tragic mistake, and hopefully the administration will take 
steps to resolve this dispute.
    Following two recent CODELs to Colombia, Members have 
emphasized the importance of resolving this issue with both 
State and DOJ. Appropriations (CJS) Subcommittee Chairman Frank 
Wolf has also voiced concern, and threatened to withhold fiscal 
year 2006 funding to DOJ if progress is not made.
    In stark contrast to our successes in Colombia, however, 
our anti-drug policies in Afghanistan have thus far failed. 
Opium and heroin production have skyrocketed since the United 
States and its allies ousted the Taliban government. The 
Defense Department, which has taken the lead on 
counternarcotics efforts, has essentially refused to engage in 
or allow significant operations against heroin traffickers, 
while the Afghan government has thus far refused to permit any 
aerial eradication of the opium crop. Our efforts, and those of 
our allies, have thus far focused only on training of Afghan 
law enforcement officers and customs agents, whose efforts have 
not yet produced significant results.
    Even the alternative development programs, organized by the 
U.S. Agency for International Development [USAID] have been 
ineffectual, as areas served by USAID that previously did not 
grow opium have since become poppy-producing provinces. It is 
imperative that the administration reevaluate its policies and 
adopt a new, more effective strategy for preventing the 
collapse of Afghanistan into a narco-terrorist state.

                    B. NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL BUDGET

1. The President's Request

    The committee generally supports the President's fiscal 
year 2006 request for the overall National Drug Control Budget 
of $12.4 billion, an increase of approximately $300 million 
over the fiscal year 2005 enacted amount of $12.1 billion. The 
committee notes, however, that the administration's request is 
approximately $200 million less than last year's request ($12.6 
billion). While budget cuts are inevitable in the current 
period of fiscal restraints, the committee has concerns about a 
potential loss of focus or commitment in the area of drug 
control. Drug abuse is directly responsible for the deaths of 
over 20,000 Americans each year, and imposes massive social 
costs.\12\ Congress and the administration cannot afford to 
neglect this critical problem.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/factsht/
drugdata/index.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. The President's Drug Budget and the Strategy

    The committee has continuing concerns about how the 
administration has compiled the National Drug Control Budget. 
As in years past, the administration has included items which, 
on closer review, may not be entirely related to drug control, 
while leaving out significant items--such as the cost of 
incarcerating drug offenders in Federal prisons--which are 
directly related to drug control. This has two major impacts. 
First, the drug budget (as currently presented) fails to do 
what a ``drug budget'' ought to do--provide a full accounting 
of what the Federal Government actually spends on drug control. 
Second, it may artificially limit the legal responsibility of 
the Director of ONDCP to review and certify all programs of the 
President's budget request relating to drug control.
    The administration should develop a more comprehensive and 
coherent ``drug control budget'' that reflects the true level 
of Federal spending on drug control--not simply the funds that 
are administratively easiest to track.
    The committee has deep concerns about the policies 
underlying the administration's drug budget proposals. The 
sweeping changes proposed by the administration appear to 
reflect two basic strategic choices: first, a de-emphasis on 
drug use prevention; and second, a de-emphasis on assistance to 
state and local agencies.
    The first choice indicates that the administration has 
doubts about the efficacy of drug use prevention programs. Of 
the Federal Government's three major drug use prevention 
programs, namely the Safe and Drug-Free Schools state grant 
program at the Department of Education, and the National Youth 
Anti-Drug Media Campaign and the Drug-Free Communities program 
at the Office of National Drug Control Policy, the largest (the 
Schools program) is being targeted for complete elimination, 
while the remaining two would be level-funded (which, when 
inflation is taken into account, amounts to a decrease in total 
resources for the programs). As a result, prevention now 
accounts for only 13 percent of the total drug control budget 
(even as formulated by the administration).
    The committee shares the administration's concerns about 
how effective our prevention programs have been in reducing 
drug use. However, the appropriate response is to reform the 
existing programs by making them more accountable, or to 
propose new and better programs. The administration's deep 
cuts, unaccompanied by any new proposals, suggest a significant 
abandonment of even the concept of prevention. That would be a 
serious mistake. Unless the Nation is able to reduce drug use 
demand, there will always be a market for illegal drugs.
    The second administration choice--to scale back Federal 
support for State and local anti-drug efforts--is equally 
troubling. The administration is proposing the total 
elimination of the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance 
Grants to the States for law enforcement support, the reduction 
(by more than half) of the High Intensity Drug Trafficking 
Areas [HIDTA] program and the transfer of its remaining funds 
to the control of the U.S. Department of Justice, a sharp 
reduction in the Counterdrug Technology Assessment Center's 
Technology Transfer Program, and (as noted above) the 
elimination of the Safe and Drug-Free Schools State grant 
program.
    The message sent by these proposals is that Federal funds 
previously used to support State and local drug enforcement or 
prevention efforts will now be spent exclusively on federally-
controlled programs. The committee agrees that Federal dollars 
should pursue Federal and not purely local concerns; certainly 
the drug budget should not be diverted to ``pork barrel'' 
programs with little or no connection to the Nation's goals. 
This committee has criticized such diversion in the past and 
will work to correct it in the future.
    But it does not follow that all Federal assistance to State 
and local agencies lacks national impact. As noted above, State 
and local law enforcement personnel are fighting on the ``front 
lines'' in the struggle to stop drug trafficking. They make 
over 95 percent of drug-related arrests.\13\ Local schools are 
the venue through which we can educate young people on the 
dangers of drug abuse. State and local prisons house most of 
the Nation's drug offenders, including the low-level offenders 
whose most significant problem may be drug addiction and not 
greed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ Crime in the United States, 2002. Uniform Crime Report, 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Federal assistance to State and local agencies can have a 
major positive impact, by involving them in the national goals 
of enforcement, treatment, and prevention. Although some of 
these agencies may have reduced their own counterdrug financing 
and made up the difference with Federal funds, or otherwise 
failed to tie the funds to national goals, the solution is to 
propose reforms to the programs, rather than simply eliminating 
or reducing them over time.

3. Diversion of Counterdrug Resources to Non-counterdrug Purposes

    The committee is also concerned that much of the purported 
increase in the official drug budget over the last appropriated 
level is the result of increases in the proposed budgets of 
multi-mission agencies at the Department of Homeland Security 
[DHS]--namely the U.S. Coast Guard, and the bureaus of 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement [ICE] and Customs and 
Border Protection [CBP]. The overall budget requests for these 
entities increased substantially (an increase of $390 million 
for the Coast Guard, $196 million for CBP, and nearly $454 
million for ICE). Based on past estimates of the proportion of 
their resources each of these agencies expended on drug 
control, the administration is projecting an increase in drug 
control operations of $127.8 million at the Coast Guard, nearly 
$83 million at CBP, and $96 million at ICE, for a total of 
approximately $305 million.
    That $305 million, however, is only a projection based on 
past levels of drug enforcement level of effort at DHS. It 
assumes that these agencies will be both willing and able to 
continue devoting the same proportion of their resources to 
drug control--including the same proportion of new resources. 
As the committee has learned, however, particularly in the 
post-September 11th era, these agencies have been frequently, 
and unpredictably, forced to pull back assets deployed for drug 
control for counterterrorism purposes. For example, each 
``Orange Alert'' issued by the Department has resulted in a 
substantial redeployment of Coast Guard ships and aircraft to 
the ports from drug interdiction missions. The projected $305 
million ``increase'' in DHS counterdrug operations is thus 
based on assumptions that may not prove accurate over the 
course of the next fiscal year.
    The following graphs show the somewhat inconsistent 
contributions to patrol efforts in the Transit Zone. In 2001 
and for portions of 2002, both Customs and Border Protection 
and the U.S. Coast Guard were heavily involved in Operation 
Liberty Shield, an operation that responded to the September 
11th disaster. In 2003, the CBP aircraft began conducting air 
interdiction missions in Colombia after a full investigation 
into the shooting down of an American missionary airplane in 
Peru. The shift of mission priorities resulted in reduced 
flight hours in the transit zone.
    Similarly, both agencies struggle to operate old equipment 
that is constantly being modified to meet the current 
requirements of the post-September 11th environment. These 
major repairs, modifications, and upgrades take air and marine 
assets out of operational status for extended periods of time.
    In order for the President's National Drug Strategy Budget 
to be effective, it must factor in both seen and unforeseen 
post-September 11th operational requirements. The agencies must 
also submit to Congress the personnel and equipment 
requirements to meet the variable demands of the Department of 
Homeland Security.

       Customs and Border Protection Marine Patrol Aircraft Hours
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                Total
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CY 2001....................................................          571
CY 2002....................................................         1454
CY 2003....................................................          578
CY 2004....................................................         2115
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                                             
                                                             
    Even the increase in the budgets of ostensibly single-
mission counterdrug programs may not actually be devoted to 
drug control. For example, the administration's proposed budget 
for the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force [OCDETF] 
program includes $53 million in new funds for the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation [FBI], to hire new agents who will 
supposedly work on drug cases. The committee welcomes the 
proposed return of the FBI to drug enforcement operations; 
however, past experience indicates that it will be difficult to 
ensure that the FBI maintains its commitment to drug 
investigations. After the September 11, 2001 attacks, the FBI 
redirected virtually all of its drug investigation agents to 
counterterrorism investigations. The committee questions 
whether OCDETF can effectively control the activities of these 
newly funded agents and prevent their diversion to non-
narcotics operations.
    The committee is not proposing that all of the increases in 
drug enforcement and interdiction should be given to single-
mission agencies such as DEA. The committee strongly believes 
that DHS and other multi-mission agencies can and must remain 
actively involved in drug enforcement. However, the 
administration must take steps to ensure that these agencies 
remain focused on their counterdrug responsibilities, even 
during a period when public and political attention are often 
fixed on other threats. The failure of the administration to 
propose any funding for the new Office of Counternarcotics 
Enforcement at DHS suggests that those steps may not be 
forthcoming.

 II. Strategic and Budgetary Analysis of Federal Drug Control Programs 
                              and Agencies

    This section of the committee's report analyzes the 
individual drug control programs and agencies--grouped by their 
Federal department. With respect to each program, Congress 
needs to ask two questions: first, is the program following the 
most effective strategy to meet our national goals, and second, 
would the President's budget request be sufficient to allow 
effective performance.

           A. OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY [ONDCP]

    The committee generally supports the administration's 
request for $24,224,000 for operations at ONDCP. That is, 
however, below the appropriated level of $26.2 million for 
fiscal year 2005, and below the administration's own request 
for $27.6 million last year. The committee is aware that in a 
time of shrinking budgets, many agencies must share the burden 
of budget cuts.
    ONDCP, however, is the President's principal advisor with 
respect to drug control policy development and program 
oversight, and shoulders the responsibility to guide the 
Nation's efforts to both reduce the use, manufacturing, and 
trafficking of illicit drugs, and to reduce the associated 
crime, violence, and health consequences of illegal drug use. 
Further reductions in its budget will hinder ONDCP's ability to 
provide effective policy coordination and oversight of the 
Federal Government's efforts to reduce drug abuse--a result 
that this committee will strenuously oppose.
    The committee is also concerned that ONDCP has not been 
exercising the kind of active leadership, oversight, and 
coordination of executive branch drug control efforts 
envisioned by Congress in 1988. For example, the increasing 
pressure on agencies such as the FBI, the Coast Guard, the 
Border Patrol, and the legacy Customs Service to abandon or 
reduce drug enforcement in favor of homeland security and 
counterterrorism missions requires a strong and effective 
response from ONDCP. That response has not yet been nearly 
strong or effective enough.
    Similarly, ONDCP must take more assertive action to respond 
to the reduced commitment of the Department of Defense to 
counterdrug efforts. The Defense Department has dedicated fewer 
assets to interdiction in the ``transit zones'' of the 
Caribbean and eastern Pacific Ocean, has scaled back National 
Guard assistance to State and local law enforcement, and--most 
significantly--has failed to take effective action against the 
rapid growth of heroin production in Afghanistan. While the 
committee recognizes that ONDCP must frequently defer to the 
Defense Department on questions affecting the military, ONDCP 
should also be assertive in ensuring that the national priority 
of reducing trafficking drug abuse is not forgotten, even by 
our government's largest and most respected institutions.
    Other agency decisions that undermine national drug 
policies, including the refusal of the Food and Drug 
Administration [FDA] to enforce health and safety regulations 
against purveyors of illegal, unapproved drugs like so-called 
``medical'' marijuana, also call for stronger leadership from 
ONDCP. The committee hopes that the Office will increase its 
efforts to forge a strong, unified approach to the drug problem 
within the administration.
    The Office administers several programs related to drug 
enforcement and prevention. The committee's views on each are 
set forth below:

1. High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas [HIDTA] Program

    The committee is very concerned about the future of the 
High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas [HIDTA] program. When it 
was created in 1990, the program was intended to reduce the 
Nation's overall supply of illegal drugs by bringing together 
Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies in the most 
significant regions (each referred to as a ``HIDTA'') where 
drugs were produced, smuggled, or distributed. As the program's 
budget has grown--from only $25 million at its inception to 
$228 million in fiscal year 2005--the number of designated 
regions has grown as well. From the initial 5 HIDTAs in 1990, 
the program has expanded to 28 HIDTAs, and pressure is building 
in Congress to create even more of them.
    The program's expansion has raised questions about what the 
true purpose of the HIDTAs really is, and whether the current 
program structure fulfills the mission Congress set out for it. 
Those questions are not easy to answer. Some HIDTAs are located 
in areas (such as the Southwest Border HIDTA) that clearly 
serve as major smuggling corridors, while others are located in 
areas more realistically characterized as high drug consumption 
zones (rather than production or transshipment zones), or as 
areas with highly localized drug production and trafficking. 
Even within the HIDTAs, some funded initiatives are targeted at 
major drug trafficking organizations, while others are aimed at 
local manifestations of the drug trade (like open drug markets 
in the streets).
    The HIDTA program is, in practice, a blend of the 
``national'' and ``regional/local'' purposes--both in terms of 
which areas have been designated as HIDTAs, and which 
initiatives have been funded within each HIDTA. Even the most 
nationally significant HIDTAs (like the Southwest Border HIDTA) 
fund some local drug enforcement activities, while even those 
with the least apparent national impact fund some initiatives 
aimed at major drug trafficking organizations.
    The fact that HIDTAs fund some initiatives of greater 
significance to the local community, and some more important to 
Federal law enforcement, is not in itself a problem. In fact, 
the HIDTA program would not be able to carry out its primary 
function--to bring Federal, State, and local drug enforcement 
agencies together for cooperative efforts--if no allowance for 
State and local priorities were permitted. Neither is the fact 
that some HIDTAs have greater ``national'' significance than 
others is itself a weakness; there will always be differences 
in importance and focus from region to region.
    What has been a problem, however, is the program's current 
inability to base its allocation of funds to the individual 
HIDTAs on any criteria at all--national, regional, or local. 
Congress itself bears much of the blame for this. For many 
years, appropriations bills have forbidden ONDCP from funding 
any HIDTA at below its previous year's level--effectively 
locking in $201 million of its budget. ONDCP has had true 
discretion over less than 10 percent of the program's funds.
    The administration, for its part, has done nothing to solve 
this problem. Each appropriations bill has given ONDCP the 
option to request a reallocation of HIDTA funds by presenting a 
plan to the Appropriations Committees in the House and Senate. 
ONDCP, however, has thus far declined to do so.
    As a result, the HIDTA program currently guarantees funds 
to the designated HIDTAs, with little or no regard for 
efficiency, impact, or national priorities. ONDCP cannot (and 
has not even tried to) redirect the program's funds in response 
to the ever-changing drug trafficking threat.
    In response to these difficulties, the administration has 
proposed drastically cutting the program's budget from fiscal 
year 2005's enacted level of $228,350,000 to $100,000,000. Even 
more significantly, the administration has requested that the 
remaining $100 million be funded through the Organized Crime 
Drug Enforcement Task Force [OCDETF], a Department of Justice 
program.
    If enacted, this proposal would effectively terminate the 
current HIDTA program. The committee believes that this would 
be a severe blow to Federal, State, and local cooperation, and 
to drug enforcement in general. For this reason, the committee 
strongly opposes both the budget cut and the move of the 
program into OCDETF.
            Keeping HIDTA at its Current Funding Level
    The budget cut proposed by the administration--56 percent 
of last year's enacted level--would shut down most of the task 
forces, intelligence centers, and ``deconfliction'' activities 
funded by the program. Either most of the 28 individual HIDTAs 
would have to be eliminated, or all of them would have to 
accept very deep cuts. (Notably, at their current funding 
levels the original five HIDTAs alone--the Southwest Border, 
Los Angeles, Houston, New York/New Jersey, and South Florida--
would take up nearly all of the $100 million proposed by the 
administration).
    The administration has been unable to provide any 
information to Congress about how it would implement this 56 
percent cut. Representatives of ONDCP and OCDETF were asked at 
a recent hearing before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, 
Drug Policy, and Human Resources to specify which HIDTAs would 
be reduced or eliminated to permit the $128 million budget 
cut.\14\ They declined to name even one HIDTA that would or 
should be reduced or eliminated, nor did they provide any 
information even about how they would make such determinations. 
As of yet, they claim to have no firm plan about how to reduce 
the program--instead, they insist that Congress simply grant 
them the authority in advance to make the cuts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ Mar. 10, 2005 Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal 
Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources hearing entitled, ``Fiscal 
Year 2006 Drug Control Budget and the Byrne Grant, HIDTA, and Other Law 
Enforcement Programs: Are We Jeopardizing Federal, State and Local 
Cooperation?''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The administration's lack of a plan is disturbing, given 
the potentially severe impact these cuts will have on drug 
enforcement. Seven representatives of State and local law 
enforcement agencies from around the country who work with the 
HIDTA program testified about that impact before the 
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human 
Resources on March 10, 2005.\15\ They testified that the vital 
task forces, intelligence and investigation ``deconfliction'' 
centers, and other interagency activities funded by HIDTA would 
be eliminated if the program ceased operations in their areas.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ Ron Brooks, president, National Narcotics Officer's 
Associations Coalition, Tom Carr, Director, Washington-Baltimore HIDTA, 
Tom Donahue, Director, Chicago HIDTA, Chief Jack Harris, Phoenix Police 
Department and vice-chair, Southwest Border HIDTA, Leonard Hamm, acting 
Baltimore police commissioner, Mark Henry, president, Illinois Drug 
Enforcement Officer's Association, and Sheriff Jack L. Merritt, Greene 
County, MO.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    For example, Sheriff Jack Merritt of Greene County, MO 
testified that the anti-methamphetamine task force that brings 
together Federal, State, and local law enforcement in his 
community would be shut down without the HIDTA program.\16\ 
Baltimore Police Commissioner Leonard Hamm told us that his 
anti-heroin and anti-drug gang task forces would also be ended 
without HIDTA assistance.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ Sheriff Jack Merritt testimony on Mar. 10, 2005 at 
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources 
hearing entitled, ``Fiscal Year 2006 Drug Control Budget and the Byrne 
Grant, HIDTA and Other Law Enforcement Programs: Are We Jeopardizing 
Federal, State and Local Cooperation?''
    \17\ Commissioner Leonard Hamm testimony on Mar. 10, 2005 at 
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources 
hearing entitled, ``Fiscal Year 2006 Drug Control Budget and the Byrne 
Grant, HIDTA and Other Law Enforcement Programs: Are We Jeopardizing 
Federal, State and Local Cooperation?''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Eliminating or eviscerating the individual HIDTAs would be 
a far greater financial loss to Federal drug enforcement 
efforts than simply the $128 million reduction in the budget. 
State and local agencies make very significant contributions of 
their own agents, employees, office space, and equipment to 
HIDTA task forces--most of which are not reimbursed with 
Federal dollars and which dwarf, in their dollar value, the 
Federal budget components of the individual HIDTAs. The 
committee believes we risk losing those contributions if the 
Federal Government ends the balanced control of HIDTA 
operations. For example, Phoenix Police Chief Jack Harris told 
the subcommittee that he would have to pull his officers out of 
the HIDTA-assisted Federal, State, and local drug task force in 
his city if the administration's budget request becomes 
law.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\ Police Chief Jack Harris testimony on Mar. 10, 2005 at 
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources 
hearing entitled, ``Fiscal Year 2006 Drug Control Budget and the Byrne 
Grant, HIDTA and Other Law Enforcement Programs: Are We Jeopardizing 
Federal, State and Local Cooperation?''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Keeping HIDTA in ONDCP
    The proposed transfer to OCDETF is contrary to existing 
law, and to sound drug enforcement policy. It would potentially 
be even more disruptive to the HIDTA program than the simple 
budget cuts.
    First, transferring this program across departments is 
contrary to every authorization the Congress has passed for 
HIDTA. The original legislation creating HIDTA, each of the two 
reauthorizations acts (in 1993 and 1998), and the most recent 
reauthorization bill passed by the House (H.R. 2086, passed in 
2003), specifically placed the program in ONDCP. At no time has 
the House or the Senate passed legislation moving the program 
into the Department of Justice. Moreover, attempting to move 
the program through an appropriations bill would almost 
certainly conflict with any reauthorization legislation agreed 
to by the House and Senate during this Congress.
    Even apart from the legal question, the move of HIDTA into 
OCDETF is highly problematic. At the Subcommittee on Criminal 
Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resource's March 10, 2005 
hearing on this issue, not one of the State and local officials 
who actively work with the HIDTA program supported moving the 
program into OCDETF. They each pointed out that OCDETF is a 
very different program, primarily designed to bring existing 
State and local cases into Federal court by providing funding 
through the U.S. attorneys.
    HIDTA, by contrast, seeks to bring together Federal, State, 
and local law enforcement agencies in cooperative operations, 
intelligence sharing, and investigations. Each HIDTA has an 
executive board made up of equal representatives of Federal 
agencies on the one hand, and State and local agencies on the 
other. The boards then decide how to allocate their HIDTAs' 
budgets among various task forces and other operations.
    This equal voice for State and local agencies has generated 
an unprecedented level of cooperation on the part of all 
participants. It is very unlikely that State and local agencies 
will be willing to make significant contributions of their 
personnel and resources to HIDTA task forces if they believe 
they will not have an equal say in their deployment.
    Notably, the administration's representatives who testified 
at the March 10, 2005 hearing declined to inform the 
subcommittee about how HIDTA would be managed under OCDETF and 
how decisions would be made at the local HIDTA. The Director of 
OCDETF, Catherine O'Neil, simply stated that her program would 
``study'' the HIDTA program if granted control by Congress, and 
make changes at a later date.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ Catherine M. O'Neil testimony on Mar. 10, 2005 at Subcommittee 
on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources hearing entitled, 
``Fiscal Year 2006 Drug Control Budget and the Byrne Grant, HIDTA and 
Other Law Enforcement Programs: Are We Jeopardizing Federal, State and 
Local Cooperation?''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This approach gets things exactly backwards, by demanding 
the authority to change the program before deciding what 
changes to make, or even whether change is necessary. The 
committee agrees that some reforms of the HIDTA program may be 
needed; however, the appropriate response is for the 
administration first to study the program, and then to make 
recommendations for changes in management and funding for 
individual HIDTAs to Congress. After Congress has reviewed the 
administration's recommendations, it can then decide whether to 
include them in reauthorizing legislation. Once this occurs, an 
appropriations request for a revised program would be in order.
            The Administration's Arguments
    Two final arguments made by the administration to justify 
these drastic cuts and changes to the HIDTA program need to be 
addressed. First, the administration relies on the HIDTA's 
Program Assessment Rating Tool [PART] review--which claimed 
that HIDTA had failed to demonstrate results--for its argument 
that the program must be overhauled. However, ONDCP apparently 
failed to provide sufficient information about the HIDTA 
program's results to the Office of Management and Budget [OMB], 
and also failed to establish specific performance measures in 
time for the review. Had OMB been given the complete annual 
reports of the individual HIDTAs, which detail the many 
investigations, arrests, seizures, and other actions undertaken 
by the program, and had OMB waited until the performance 
measures had been fully implemented, it is difficult to see how 
the HIDTA program could have been graded significantly worse 
than the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Coast Guard, or 
any other drug enforcement agency.
    Finally, the administration argues that the program should 
be transferred to OCDETF to consolidate drug enforcement 
programs within the Department of Justice. There are two 
problems with this argument. First, even within the Federal 
Government, drug enforcement cannot be ``consolidated'' within 
the Justice Department. Most Federal drug interdiction 
personnel are employed by agencies at the Department of 
Homeland Security, namely the Coast Guard, Customs and Border 
Protection [CBP], and Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
[ICE], each of which participate in individual HIDTAs. ICE and 
the Internal Revenue Service [IRS], which also participates in 
HIDTAs, also engage in significant drug enforcement and money 
laundering investigations.
    Second, although the Justice Department certainly plays a 
vital role in drug enforcement--both through the investigative 
work done by DEA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI], 
and through prosecutions in Federal court by the U.S. 
Attorneys' offices--that Department does not have an exclusive 
focus on drug control. Instead, drug enforcement is but one of 
many disparate missions that the Justice Department must 
balance, and the committee is concerned that counterdrug money 
would later be absorbed by non-counterdrug programs at the 
Justice Department.
    ONDCP, by contrast, is exclusively dedicated to drug 
control. It is not forced to divert resources or attention to 
other matters. Thus, an anti-drug trafficking program like 
HIDTA, which brings together both Justice Department and non-
Justice Department Federal drug control agencies, as well as 
State and local drug control agencies, is much better located 
within ONDCP.

2. National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign

    The Media Campaign is an integrated effort that combines 
paid and donated advertising with public communications 
outreach. The program is clearly having a positive impact, as 
marijuana and other drug use by young people has fallen 
significantly since 2001.\20\ ONDCP's decision to focus on 
marijuana use has paid dividends, and the committee is hopeful 
that even more progress will be made in the future.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\ Testimony of Stephen Pasierb on Apr. 26, 2005 at Subcommittee 
on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources hearing entitled, 
``Drug Prevention Programs and the Fiscal Year 2006 Drug Control 
Budget: Is the Federal Government Neglecting Illegal Drug Use 
Prevention?''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The committee has concerns about the administration's 
request for only $120 million for the Media Campaign, a 
significant decrease from the $145 million requested for fiscal 
year 2005. Although this current request matches the amount 
actually appropriated by Congress last year, that in itself was 
a sharp decrease from the $135 million appropriated in fiscal 
year 2004. A truly national advertising program requires 
sufficient funding to be effective--the purchased 
advertisements must be of high quality and must reach their 
intended audience. The committee is deeply concerned that these 
reductions will jeopardize the program's effectiveness.
    Moreover, the committee believes that the PART review 
findings for the Campaign--``results not demonstrated''--are 
simply not based in fact.\21\ Although the direct impact of 
advertising on its target audience is always difficult to 
measure, the ultimate ``performance measure'' for an 
advertising campaign is whether the target audience responded 
as hoped. In this case, it is clear that it has: young people 
are reporting decreased use of marijuana. While many factors 
may have contributed to this decline, it is hard not to give at 
least some credit to the marijuana-focused advertisements 
purchased by the Campaign. The committee believes that this 
program is showing clear results, and should be fully funded.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\ NDCS Fiscal Year 2006 Budget Summary, p. 97.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Drug-Free Communities [DFC] Program

    The committee generally supports the administration's 
request for $80 million for the Drug-Free Communities [DFC] 
Program, which assists local community anti-drug coalitions to 
prevent substance abuse among young people. This is the same 
level of funding requested by the administration and 
appropriated by Congress in fiscal year 2005. The committee is 
concerned, however, that if the program's budget does not 
expand, many new coalitions may not be able to start their 
work--particularly in the poorest communities where the need 
for drug use prevention is greatest.
    One significant issue facing the program is performance 
measurement. In its last PART review, DFC received an 
``adequate'' rating--higher than many similar prevention 
programs.\22\ As is the case with other programs, however, the 
targets established for DFC--``enhancing the capabilities of 
community anti-drug coalitions,'' ``enhancing prevention 
activities,'' and ``increase[ing] citizen participation''--have 
more to do with the processes of the program than with its 
intended result, namely reducing drug use. Although DFC should 
not be singled out for criticism on this point, ONDCP and other 
agencies involved in drug use prevention need to start defining 
success less in terms of whether the program is simply 
functioning as planned, and more in terms of whether its 
functions are achieving a quantifiable end result.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\ NDCS Fiscal Year 2006 Budget Summary, p. 96.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On April 26, 2005, in testimony before the subcommittee, 
General Arthur Dean, chairman and CEO of the Community Anti-
Drug Coalitions of America [CADCA], highlighted successes 
achieved by the DFC Program. In communities where DFC grantees 
operate, drug use has sharply decreased in comparison to 
communities in which there is not an anti-drug presence. For 
example, in the period of 1993 to 2000, Cincinnati, OH achieved 
a 41 percent decrease in marijuana use among 7th to 12th 
graders, while communities in this region without the presence 
of an anti-drug coalition experienced a 33 percent 
increase.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\ General Arthur T. Dean U.S. Army, retired, testimony on Apr. 
26, 2005 at Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human 
Resources hearing entitled, ``Drug Prevention Programs and the Fiscal 
Year 2006 Drug Control Budget: Is the Federal Government Neglecting 
Illegal Drug Use Prevention?''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    According to General Dean, DFC has been foundational to our 
Nation's demand reduction strategy because it empowers local 
communities to use their ideas and ingenuity to solve their own 
drug problems.

4. Counterdrug Technology Assessment Center [CTAC]

    The committee has concerns about the administration's 
request for only $30 million for the CTAC program, a sharp 
decrease from the $40 million requested for fiscal year 2005, 
and a 30 percent decrease from the $42 million appropriated by 
Congress. The CTAC program funds research into drug abuse and 
addiction, and through the Technology Transfer Program supplies 
new counterdrug technologies to State and local law 
enforcement. The proposed decreases would cut the research 
program nearly in half--from $18 million to $10 million--while 
reducing the Technology Transfer Program by $4 million, from 
$24 million to $20 million.
    The program is certainly in need of greater direction and 
oversight. ONDCP has not taken sufficient steps to ensure that 
the Technology Transfer Program supports national goals in 
reducing overall drug trafficking and improving interagency 
communication and cooperation. For example, ONDCP needs to make 
sure that any communications or information sharing equipment 
or systems funded by CTAC do not simply benefit the agency 
receiving the transfer. Rather, such systems or equipment 
should only be provided if they also link the recipient agency 
with other Federal, State, and local agencies and result in 
increased information sharing.
    These reforms should be undertaken first; only if the 
program fails to produce results should it be subjected to 
these severe cuts. The committee intends to continue its review 
of the CTAC program and its future as it continues its work on 
the reauthorization of ONDCP and its programs.

5. Counterdrug Intelligence Executive Secretariat (CDX)

    The committee has concerns about the administration's 
proposal to eliminate all funding for the Counterdrug 
Intelligence Executive Secretariat (CDX). This program, which 
was appropriated $2 million for fiscal year 2005, has certainly 
suffered from a lack of direction. It was intended to help 
ONDCP coordinate the drug intelligence policies and activities 
of multiple Federal law enforcement agencies, most notably 
through the creation of a General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan 
[GCIP]. The need for that coordination is as great today as it 
ever was, meaning that the mission of CDX is far from 
fulfilled.
    It may well be that the functions of CDX would be better 
carried out by another agency, such as the Drug Enforcement 
Administration through its El Paso Intelligence Center [EPIC]. 
The administration, however, should set forth its specific 
plans for improving drug intelligence sharing--preferably 
through a new GCIP (which is in great need of updating in the 
post-September 11th era). The committee intends to revisit this 
issue as it continues its work on the reauthorization of ONDCP.

6. National Drug Court Institute

    The committee supports the administration's request for 
$1,000,000 for the National Drug Court Institute, which matches 
last year's request and would be an increase from the 
appropriated level of $750,000 for fiscal year 2005. With the 
increasing popularity of drug court programs around the 
country, it is more important than ever that ONDCP review these 
programs and determine their rate of success.
    The committee feels that better guidance could help improve 
and promote these programs nationwide. A vigorous, mandatory 
system of drug testing should be applied in every drug court 
case, to ensure that program participants are staying off of 
drugs. Convicts should be sentenced to drug abstinence, not 
just drug treatment. Unless participants are given incentives 
to overcome their drug abuse, it is unlikely that they will 
avoid future crimes.

7. National Alliance for Model State Drug Laws

    The committee opposes the administration's proposal to 
eliminate all funding for the National Alliance for Model State 
Drug Laws, which was funded at $1 million in fiscal year 2005. 
The Alliance serves an important function by reviewing the drug 
laws in the various States, and proposing model State laws in 
response to new drug threats or challenges. For example, the 
Alliance recently held a major conference on methamphetamine 
enforcement, bringing together drug enforcement officials from 
numerous States to discuss new solutions to the serious problem 
of meth abuse and trafficking.
    Most drug enforcement, treatment, and prevention is 
provided at the State and local level. The Federal Government 
has a strong interest in effective State drug policies, and the 
Alliance helps to promote such policies.

8. U.S. Anti-Doping Agency and Membership Dues to World Anti-Doping 
        Agency

    The committee supports the administration's request for 
$7,400,000 for the U.S. Anti-Doping Agency, an increase of 
nearly $6 million over the administration's fiscal year 2005 
request (and only $100,000 less than the appropriated level for 
fiscal year 2005). Similarly, the committee generally supports 
the administration's request for $2,900,000 for our Nation's 
membership dues in the World Anti-Doping Agency, which would 
double the fiscal year 2005 appropriated amount of $1,450,000, 
and nearly triple the amount requested by the administration 
last year ($1 million). Through the U.S. Anti-Doping Agency and 
its international counterpart, the United States seeks to stop 
the use of illegal performance-enhancing drugs by American and 
international athletes in Olympic sports, through education, 
drug testing programs, and similar initiatives.
    The committee remains very committed to investigating 
steroid abuse in professional sports. The committee held 
hearings on March 17, 2005, April 27, 2005, May 19, 2005 and 
June 15, 2005 to examine steroid abuse in professional sports 
and steroid use by young women, and will continue to provide 
oversight regarding this issue in order to establish and 
promote adequate drug prevention and testing programs.

9. National Drug Control Program Performance Measures

    The committee supports the administration's request for $2 
million for the further development of performance measures for 
Federal drug control programs, identical to last year's budget 
request, and double the $1 million actually appropriated for 
fiscal year 2005. ONDCP is tasked by statute with developing 
comprehensive performance measures that will allow Congress and 
the public to weigh the impact of each drug control program, 
and to improve performance.
    The problem of measuring effectiveness in drug control 
programs--whether enforcement, treatment, or prevention--is a 
difficult one. It has never been more necessary, however, than 
now, when tremendous pressure is being placed on every aspect 
of the Federal budget, particularly drug control programs. 
Without adequate performance measures, it will be impossible to 
demonstrate the real, tangible results of the billions of 
dollars being spent on enforcement, treatment, and prevention. 
The committee hopes that ONDCP will make solid progress in 
developing and implementing these performance measures.

                   B. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

    The committee supports the President's request for an 
additional $305 million for counterdrug activities at the 
Department of Homeland Security [DHS]. That support, however, 
is conditioned on the expectation that such funds will actually 
be used for counterdrug purposes. As discussed above, most of 
these funds are not actually designated for counterdrug 
purposes; they are merely estimates of how much time and how 
many resources the three main interdiction agencies at DHS--
Coast Guard, Immigration and Customs Enforcement [ICE], and 
Customs and Border Protection [CBP]--will spend on counterdrug 
activities.
    To ensure that those estimates turn into reality, DHS must 
fulfill its responsibilities to the counterdrug mission. That 
will require not only commitment by the leadership of DHS, but 
also diligent oversight by ONDCP.

1. Department of Homeland Security [DHS]--Office of Counternarcotics 
        Enforcement [OCNE]

    When Congress created DHS in 2002, it combined some of the 
most important anti-drug trafficking agencies in the Federal 
Government. To assist DHS in meeting its vital counterdrug 
responsibilities, Congress originally created the 
Counternarcotics Officer [CNO] position. Unfortunately, the 
original law did not clearly define how the CNO was to fulfill 
those duties, nor did it give the CNO adequate status or 
resources to fulfill them. In order to correct these problems, 
Congress passed legislation in 2004 that replaced the CNO with 
a new Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement, headed by a 
Director nominated by the President and confirmed by the 
Senate.\24\ The legislation authorized up to $6 million of the 
Department's management funds for a dedicated budget for the 
new Office.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\ S. 2845, National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, 
Subtitle D, Section 7407
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The committee is concerned that, despite this clear 
statement of congressional intent, the President's overall 
budget, the Drug Strategy Report, and the Drug Budget summary 
make no mention of the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement. 
In fact, the only time the administration has taken note of the 
new Office is in the DHS Fiscal Year 2006 Funding Report to 
Congress for Counternarcotics Activities, where it states that 
``approximately'' $1,860,000 will be allocated to the Office--
without identifying the source of those funds. This raises the 
question of whether the administration intends to hire 
sufficient staff for the Office, and whether the new Director 
will have any independence or authority to carry out his 
statutory responsibilities or must continue to rely on staffing 
resources from the Office of the Chief of Staff and detailees.
    The committee recommends that Congress specifically 
designate a line item in DHS appropriations legislation, 
setting aside $6 million from the Department's managerial 
funding for the Office.

2. Border and Transportation Security [BTS]

    Although the Drug Budget Summary makes no specific mention 
of counterdrug funds for the Border and Transportation Security 
[BTS] Directorate at DHS, DHS' own report requests $289,000 for 
two additional positions at BTS to respond to counternarcotic 
reports and queries. The committee believes that these 
positions would be better located at the Office of 
Counternarcotics Enforcement, which is specifically tasked with 
drug interdiction policy analysis.

3. Immigration and Customs Enforcement [ICE]

    The committee generally supports the President's request 
for ICE, which is estimated to include $453 million for drug 
control operations. This would be an increase of nearly $100 
million over the $357 million appropriated for fiscal year 
2005. This increase, however, needs to be actually utilized to 
fulfill drug control responsibilities.
    The committee supports the President's request, detailed in 
the Drug Budget Summary, to directly appropriate $43.7 million 
for salary and expenses of ICE agents that were formerly 
appropriated through the Department of Justice's Organized 
Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force [OCDETF] budget.\25\ The 
committee supports the separate line item to resolve continuing 
problems with funding non-Justice Department agencies through 
OCDETF. However, the committee believes that this and other 
proposed increases in salary and expense (a total proposed $116 
million) should be used, to the greatest extent possible, to 
maintain and enhance drug enforcement and money laundering 
operations at ICE.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \25\ NDCS Fiscal Year 2006 Budget Summary p. 45.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Although not mentioned in the National Drug Strategy, the 
committee is concerned about ICE's annual budgetary shortfalls. 
This has led to serious operational difficulties in drug 
enforcement and other critical areas. For example, due to 
insufficient travel funding, ICE has been unable to travel 
abroad in certain cases to enforce the provisions of the 
PROTECT Act that make it a crime for any person to enter the 
United States, or for any citizen to travel abroad, for the 
purpose of sex tourism involving children.
    In response to these difficulties, the committee believes 
that Congress and the administration should carefully consider 
new solutions to the problems at ICE and DHS. For example, the 
Heritage Foundation and CSIS recently issued a report, ``DHS 
2.0: Rethinking the Department of Homeland Security,'' \26\ 
that recommends a merger of the investigative and border 
security elements of ICE and CBP. Such a merger could enhance 
border security by implementing proven administrative, 
logistical, and budget programs currently implemented in CBP 
and lacking at ICE. The merger could also reinvigorate the 
border partnerships formerly held by Customs Inspectors and 
Investigators.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\ http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/sr02.cfm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The ICE Office of Investigations received an ``adequate'' 
rating in the administration's Performance Assessment Rating 
Tool [PART] process.\27\ ICE Office of Investigations had 43.8 
percent of their cases result in an enforcement consequence 
(arrest, indictment, conviction, seizure, fine or penalty). The 
committee hopes that ICE will continue to make progress in its 
performance measurement system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \27\ NDCS Fiscal Year 2006 Budget Summary, p. 48.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Customs and Border Protection [CBP]

    The Bureau of Customs and Border Protection [CBP] combines 
the port of entry inspectors of the legacy Customs Service and 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service, as well as the 
Department of Agriculture's port of entry inspectors; the U.S. 
Border Patrol; and the Air and Marine Operations [AMO] division 
of legacy Customs. The Customs inspectors, AMO aviators and 
boat operators, and Border Patrol agents are crucial to our 
drug interdiction and enforcement efforts.
    The Strategy Report draws attention to the 2,512 CBP 
Officers that are specifically identified with drug 
enforcement. The committee applauds the combining of the former 
CBP enforcement, canine, and analytical units into a single 
unit called the Anti-Terrorism Contraband Enforcement Team [A-
TCET].
            America Shield Initiative
    The committee supports CBP's America Shield Initiative that 
utilizes an Integrated Surveillance Intelligence System [ISIS]. 
However, the committee notes that the $240 million spent on 
border sensor equipment over a 5-year period beginning in 
Fiscal Year 1997 did little to minimize intrusions along the 
southwest and northern borders. The committee supports the 
expenditure of $51.1 million for America Shield Initiative, but 
recommends that newer technologies be employed to detect cross 
border movement. The committee recommends sensors capable of 
hyper-spectral and synthetic aperture imagery with electronic 
linking capabilities to law enforcement command/control 
facilities and law enforcement officers along the border 
through fixed and portable data receivers.
            Office of Air and Marine Operations
    The committee applauds the efforts by the Department to 
consolidate aviation and marine assets by merging the Border 
Patrol's air and marine program with AMO. This merger will help 
to consolidate the operation, training, maintenance, and 
procurement of these high-value/low density law enforcement 
assets.
    There are, however, questions about how the new, merged 
program will balance competing missions such as drug 
interdiction and illegal immigration enforcement. The Drug 
Budget Summary indicates that in the Border Patrol 15 percent 
of total agent time nationwide is related to drug interdiction 
activities, while in AMO, 90 percent of the resources support 
drug-related activities. The committee will continue to monitor 
the progress of the ongoing transition making sure that there 
will not be a reduction in Department's counterdrug 
interdiction and apprehension capabilities.
    For the last 4 years CBP's Air and Marine Operations has 
supported numerous operations in multiple foreign locations. 
The following table reflects the JIATF South portion of the 
total agency foreign obligations. When viewing these flight 
hours, one must understand that the source and transit zone 
hours as reported by JIATF-South represent time flown in the 
prescribed area. The Department of Homeland Security credits 
flying time to that period where the aircraft begins its 
patrolling with its detection systems operating.
    Also in 2001 CBP assets were heavily involved in the 
Liberty Shield efforts following the September 11th disaster. 
In 2001-2003 the United States was prohibited from conducting 
drug interdiction operations due to the Peruvian shootdown of 
an American missionary aircraft in 2001. When President Bush 
signed National Security Presidential Directive 25, in 2003, 
the United States resumed support to Colombian aerial drug 
interdiction efforts.
    The fluctuations in CBP MPA hours are a function of:
          1.  Lack of aircraft availability due to major 
        structural modifications.
          2.  Lack of funding for P-3 flying hours.
          3.  The 2002 shift from source zone to transit zone 
        operations due to Colombian flight restrictions.
          4.  Starting in 2004 additional money for MPA came 
        through the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator.

                            Customs and Border Protection International Flight Hours
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                           MPA Transit
                                                              Source Zone      Zone        Mexico      Bahamas
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CY 2001.....................................................          529          571         1532         1272
CY 2002.....................................................           58         1454         1932         1412
CY 2003.....................................................         1061          578         2279         1202
CY 2004.....................................................         1672         2115         2428          985
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The committee would like to see the Department take further 
steps to enhance efficiency within the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
[UAV] program. The committee favors a UAV that accommodates 
multiple sensors that would meet the needs of all of our 
Federal border security agencies.
    The President's budget recommends that CBP's Air and Marine 
Operations program receive $292,780,000 for Operations, 
Maintenance, and Procurement [O&M] and $136,060,000 for 
salaries and expenses [S&E]. The committee supports the O&M 
increase of $35 million but questions whether the S&E increase 
of only $4.6 million will be sufficient to cover the shortfalls 
at the Air and Marine Operations Center [AMOC] in Riverside, 
the additional requirements for personnel on the northern 
border, and the National Capitol Region which guards the 
airspace over Washington, DC.
    Currently, AMOC, the agency's primary tracking and 
monitoring facility, is only 60 percent staffed.\28\ With the 
manning shortfalls, AMOC managers must selectively choose what 
radar feeds to monitor, leaving the Nation vulnerable in the 
sectors that AMOC cannot watch.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \28\ Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug 
Policy, and Human Resources Feb. 23, 2005 staff visit to Air and Marine 
Operations Center [AMOC], Riverside, CA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    More personnel are also needed at AMO's northern border 
facilities. If these new personnel are not funded, AMO will 
have to shift staff from its southern tier locations. Likewise, 
the National Capitol Region has operated with temporary 
personnel and assets since its inception at great cost to the 
overall AMO program.
    The committee has grave concerns about the aging air and 
marine fleet found within the Department. We recommend that the 
Department closely evaluate the current agency modernization 
proposals and submit recommendations to Congress that will 
maintain air and marine capabilities that combat terrorism and 
illegal drug movement in the source, transit, and arrival 
zones, provide law enforcement support, and perform airspace 
security missions.
            U.S. Border Patrol
    There are over 11,000 Border Patrol agents that are 
assigned the mission of detecting and apprehending any illegal 
entrants between the ports-of-entry along the United States 
land borders. These illegal entries include alien and drug 
smugglers, potential terrorists, wanted criminals, and persons 
seeking to avoid inspection at the designated ports of entry.
    The committee also has deep concerns about the commitment 
of all sectors of the Border Patrol to the drug interdiction 
mission. In many sectors, the Border Patrol appears to be far 
more focused on illegal migrant interdiction than stopping drug 
traffickers. Moreover, the Border Patrol's willingness to 
cooperate with other law enforcement agencies on drug 
investigations and operations leaves room for improvement. 
Stopping illegal immigration is certainly a vital mission of 
the Border Patrol. If, however, the Border Patrol is going to 
be the primary agency responsible for protecting our Nation's 
land borders, it must take a more active role not only in 
conducting its own drug interdiction operations, but in 
supporting the border-related drug investigations of other 
agencies as well.
            Shadow Wolves Customs Patrol Officers
    The committee has grave concerns about the status of the 
last remaining unit of Customs Patrol Officers patrolling the 
border, the ``Shadow Wolves'' unit that works on the 76-mile 
stretch of the Mexico-Arizona border contained in the Tohono 
O'odham sovereign Indian Nation. The Shadow Wolves are all 
Native Americans, who combine traditional tracking methods and 
modern technology to find, follow, and arrest drug traffickers. 
The Shadow Wolves have historically been one of our Nation's 
most effective drug enforcement units, seizing over 100,000 
pounds of narcotics annually, with only 21 agents.
    The Shadow Wolves were a part of the U.S. Customs Service 
until March 2003, when DHS assigned them to CBP, which in turn 
placed them under the control of the Border Patrol. Border 
Patrol management has not been successful, as the missions, 
priorities, and methods of the two groups are simply too 
different. Only 16 of the 21 Shadow Wolves agents in uniform in 
2003 are still active, and there is a serious risk that the 
rest will retire or move to other employers if the problems are 
not addressed. The Border Patrol itself has reportedly asked 
that the unit be transferred to another agency.
    The committee agrees that the Shadow Wolves should be moved 
to another agency within DHS. Two possible new ``homes'' for 
the unit are the Office of Air and Marine Operations [AMO] at 
CBP, and the Office of Investigations at ICE. Both of these 
units worked very successfully with the Shadow Wolves prior to 
2003 (when they were all part of the Customs Service). The 
committee may pursue legislation to address this problem if DHS 
is unwilling or unable to act on its own.
            CBP Financial Management
    The Office of Management and Budget directed the legacy 
Customs Service and other agencies to make certain remaining 
fiscal year 2002 funds available to the Department for startup 
costs and administrative activities. The committee notes that 
$30 million was taken away from the Office of Air and Marine 
Operations [AMO] forcing a cut in flight hours and aircraft 
procurement. The committee would like to see these funds 
reinstated for their originally intended purposes.
    The overall CBP drug control program has not been reviewed 
under the administration's Program Assessment Rating Tool 
[PART] process. However, the Office of Border Patrol, found 
within CBP, received a ``Results not Demonstrated'' rating from 
the PART process due to a lack of suitable outcome measures for 
the agency. The committee recommends that CBP take quick action 
to develop an effective performance management tool.

5. United States Coast Guard

    The President's budget proposal includes a record $6.9 
billion in for the U.S. Coast Guard, of which $973 million is 
estimated to be used for drug control. Like other DHS agencies, 
the Coast Guard does not have a specific appropriation for drug 
interdiction activities. The committee conditionally supports 
this year's proposal which is an 11.4 percent increase from the 
$6.3 billion provided last year.
    The Coast Guard has struggled to re-balance its resources 
to sustainable levels since the terrorist attacks of September 
11, 2001 (see attached diagram).\29\ In fiscal year 2001, 
ONDCP's Budget Summary reported 8,094 full time employees [FTE] 
and 15.9 percent of the Coast Guard's budget were devoted to 
drug interdiction. In the Fiscal Year 2006 National Drug 
Control Budget Summary, the Coast Guard had 5,837 FTE and 11.9 
percent of their budget committed to drug interdiction 
missions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \29\ Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice Drug Policy 
and Human Resources Staff budget summary briefing with U.S. Coast Guard 
officials on Dec. 17, 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
      
    
    
    This downward trend of resources supporting the counterdrug 
mission is due to new post-September 11th operational 
requirements, and the Coast Guard's aging inventory of legacy 
cutters and aircraft. The committee is gravely concerned about 
the Coast Guard's fleet modernization project. The project has 
received considerable bipartisan congressional criticism for 
the extended timeline and cost of the project, and for focusing 
too much on maintaining the existing fleet in lieu of adding 
new vessels. The committee feels that any delays in the fleet 
modernization project will directly impact the Coast Guard's 
ability to interdict drugs in the maritime transit zones.
    The Coast Guard seized a record 240,519 pounds of cocaine 
in the transit zones in fiscal year 2004, worth approximately 
$7.3 billion. These outstanding results were partly due to a 
combination of the Coast Guard utilizing new tools such as 
armed ``HITRON'' helicopters, over-the-horizon small boats and 
specialized law enforcement detachments. More importantly, the 
record setting year was a result of increasing and improved 
inter-department and inter-agency cooperation, as well as 
greater and more accurate and timely intelligence developed 
through Operation Panama Express. The Director of the Joint 
Interagency Task Force South has recently told the committee 
that there is currently more actionable intelligence available 
than there are surface and air assets available to respond. The 
national drug interdiction community needs more surface and air 
assets to respond to this growing supply of invaluable 
intelligence.
    The Coast Guard, although hampered by its aging legacy 
assets, has attempted to rise to the task. As the following 
JIATF-South statistics show, the Coast Guard is now dedicating 
more maritime patrol aircraft [MPA] hours to drug interdiction 
missions.

               U.S. Coast Guard International Flight Hours
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                TOTAL
                                                               (hours)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CY 2001....................................................         1096
CY 2002....................................................         1073
CY 2003....................................................         1653
CY 2004....................................................         2899
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    It is the committee's strong recommendation that the Coast 
Guard continue to keep drug interdiction a top priority, 
regardless of the status of its recapitalization program. The 
committee strongly believes that on any given day, the United 
States needs more than three Coast Guard cutters in the Eastern 
Pacific transit zone, and four in the Caribbean transit zone. 
It is vitally important to the National Drug Control Strategy 
and our National Security that more Coast Guard ships and 
aircraft are now needed for drug interdiction to support the 
law enforcement intelligence available in the Caribbean and 
Eastern Pacific transit zones.
    The committee is also concerned with the Coast Guard's 
measures of performance, specifically regarding the drug 
interdiction program.\30\ While the program is generally well-
managed, it reportedly faces challenges in strategic planning 
and performance. The committee recommends the Coast Guard 
develop useful long-term performance measures and efficiency 
measures to improve future performance. Additionally, the 
committee is concerned that deficiencies in Coast Guard 
financial controls, as determined by DHS's Fiscal Year 2004 
Performance Accountability Report, are damaging the Coast 
Guard's ability to perform its counterdrug mission.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \30\ NDCS Fiscal Year 2006 Budget Summary, p. 56.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                        C. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

    The Department of Justice is home to some of the most 
important drug control agencies and programs in the Federal 
Government. As our Nation's primary law enforcement agency, its 
efforts are crucial to the struggle to reduce drug trafficking 
and abuse. Moreover, the grant programs it administers--which 
assist State and local agencies with everything from 
investigations to drug treatment for prisoners--are vital to 
Federal, State, and local coordination and cooperation on drug 
policy.

1. Assistance to State and Local Law Enforcement

            Methamphetamine-Related Assistance
    The committee has concerns about the proposed reduction in 
funds (administered by the Department of Justice's Community 
Oriented Policing Services [COPS] office) dedicated to law 
enforcement activities against methamphetamine trafficking. 
Methamphetamine abuse has ravaged communities across the United 
States, and put severe strains on State and local enforcement 
agencies forced to find clandestine drug labs, clean up the 
environmental damage they create, and arrest the drug 
trafficking rings that operate them. To assist these 
overburdened agencies, Congress approved $54,050,000 in fiscal 
year 2004 and $52,556,000 in fiscal year 2005 for policing 
initiatives to combat methamphetamine production and 
trafficking and to enhance policing initiatives in ``drug hot 
spots.''
    The current proposal requests only $20 million for fiscal 
year 2006 (identical to last year's request for $20 million), a 
cut of more than 60 percent from appropriated funds for 2005. 
This would greatly reduce the ability of State and local law 
enforcement agencies to help their Federal partners in reducing 
methamphetamine abuse, particularly given the proposed overall 
reduction in State and local law enforcement assistance grants.
    It should be noted, however, that Congress itself needs to 
take steps to ensure that Federal assistance is targeted to the 
most affected areas of the country. Excessive ``earmarking'' of 
these funds undermines their efficiency. Although many States 
and communities suffer from methamphetamine trafficking and 
abuse, Federal dollars are limited and must be directed to the 
areas where they will make the most difference from a national 
point of view. The committee urges Congress and the 
administration to work together in finding ways to address this 
issue.
    The committee also questions why this program--which is 
clearly drug control-related--has not been included in the 
administration's Drug Budget Summary in recent years. Omitting 
it leaves an incomplete picture of what the Federal Government 
spends annually on drug control, and diminishes the level of 
oversight that might otherwise be expected from ONDCP.
            Prescription Drug Monitoring Program
    The committee also has concerns about the proposed 
reduction in funding for a prescription drug monitoring 
program. In fiscal year 2005, Congress approved $10 million for 
this program, despite the administration's refusal to request 
any funds for it. This year, the administration has agreed to 
request some funds for the program, but only $5 million--half 
of fiscal year 2005's appropriated level.
    Prescription drug abuse is a serious and growing problem 
throughout the United States, as illustrated by the recent wave 
of OxyContin and other oxycodone-related overdoses. One major 
difficulty facing Federal, State and local law enforcement 
agencies in dealing with this threat is the lack of sufficient 
information about how these drugs are being diverted from their 
proper medical uses to illegal trafficking and abuse.\31\ The 
Federal Government needs to continue work on the establishment 
of a monitoring system that would track supplies of 
prescription drugs and give law enforcement officials more 
information about illegal diversion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \31\ Feb. 9, 2004 Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal 
Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Orlando field hearing 
entitled, ``To Do No Harm: Strategies for Preventing Prescription Drug 
Abuse.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant
    The committee opposes the administration's proposal to 
terminate the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant 
program. Congress already complied with the administration's 
request to consolidate previously separate grant programs into 
the single Byrne Grants program (Congress appropriated $634 
million for these grants for fiscal year 2005). The 
administration now proposes to eliminate it entirely, and 
restrict Federal assistance for State and local law enforcement 
programs to a series of enumerated grants (most of which are 
previously existing programs) under a ``Justice Assistance'' 
account. In practice, this will sharply limit the amount of 
money available to help State and local agencies.
    The administration's proposed reduction appears to reflect, 
in additional to fiscal constraints, a concern about excessive 
Federal subsidization of law enforcement at the State and local 
level. The Federal Treasury is not infinite, and simply cannot 
pay for law enforcement at all levels and in every area. 
Moreover, choices about how much to spend on law enforcement in 
a State or community are, properly, choices that should be made 
at the State or local level--and the responsibility of paying 
for those choices should also remain at that level. Excessive 
subsidization of State and local law enforcement by the Federal 
Government may lead to inefficiency and imbalance in our 
overall law enforcement strategy.
    The committee shares those concerns, but the 
administration's drastic proposed cuts would create massive 
shortfalls in the budgets of State and local law enforcement 
agencies across the country. Numerous State and local officials 
have informed the committee members and staff that many 
programs--particularly drug enforcement programs--within States 
would have to be shut down if all Byrne Grant and similar 
funding were cut off.
    Moreover, it is not necessarily the case that Federal 
support for State and local efforts lacks national impact. 
Particularly in the area of drug enforcement, State and local 
participation is vital to our national success. State and local 
agencies make more than 95 percent of arrests of drug 
violators.\32\ Collectively, they have far more personnel and 
resources than the Federal Government does. Federal support for 
these agencies can have a very positive national impact if it 
helps involve them as partners in the fight against drug 
trafficking and other criminal activities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \32\ Crime in the United States, 2002. Uniform Crime Report, 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The administration should instead propose reforms, where 
needed, to some of the Federal Government's assistance grants. 
Specifically, legislation may be needed to help the Federal 
Government collect more data about how these grants are being 
used, and to make them more accountable. Such reform proposals 
should be accompanied by a comprehensive plan for how, and for 
what specific purposes, future Federal assistance to State and 
local law enforcement should be provided. Without such a plan, 
the proposed massive reductions lack a complete and coherent 
justification, and leave the programs vulnerable to continued 
earmarking and potential misallocation of funds.
            Regional Information Sharing System
    The committee supports the administration's request for 
$45,049,000 for the Regional Information Sharing System [RISS], 
virtually identical to the $45,000,000 appropriated for fiscal 
year 2005. The committee believes that RISS, which facilitates 
electronic, computerized sharing of intelligence and 
information among Federal, State, and local law enforcement 
agencies, is an important tool in the fight against drug 
trafficking and other organized crime.
    The committee does question, however, why the 
administration has included the entire RISS budget request in 
the Drug Budget Summary, when the system is not exclusively 
intended or used for drug enforcement. It would be more 
accurate to estimate the percentage used for drug enforcement 
activities, and include only that estimated portion in the drug 
budget. If the entire RISS budget is included in the drug 
budget, then it is unclear why none of the COPS grant funds are 
included.
            Weed and Seed Program
    The committee supports the administration's request for 
$59,599,000 for the Weed and Seed Program, an increase from 
last year's request for $58,265,000, but less than the $62 
million appropriated by Congress for fiscal year 2005. The Weed 
and Seed Program is an important initiative designed to help 
State and local law enforcement agencies work with members of 
the local community to investigate and prosecute violent 
criminals and drug offenders, helping to clean up our Nation's 
streets.
    The PART review rated this program as ``adequate,'' and the 
committee is further encouraged by the fact that the 
performance measures selected for the program included real 
results--the percent reduction in homicides. The committee 
believes, however, that the performance measures for the 
program should also include the percent reduction in drug 
crimes or drug availability in funded areas. The program was 
not intended solely to reduce violent crimes but also drug 
crimes, and it should be reviewed on both criteria.
    The committee also believes that ONDCP should (as with some 
other programs administered by the Department of Justice) 
estimate the percentage of funds dedicated to illegal drug 
control and include only that part in the drug budget. 
Including the entire program in the drug budget is inaccurate 
and undermines the ability of Congress to review how much of 
the program's resources is being dedicated to drug control.
            Drug Court Program
    The committee supports the administration's request for 
$70,060,000 for the drugs courts program, identical to last 
year's request for $70,060,000, and a significant increase over 
the $40 million actually appropriated by Congress for 2005. The 
drug courts program is praised by law enforcement officers, 
judges, and addiction specialists throughout the country, and 
shows a great deal of promise.
    In light, however, of the PART review of the program, which 
found ``results not demonstrated,'' \33\ the administration 
must take steps to improve the program's accountability and 
performance management. The committee is encouraged that, 
according to the latest PART review, the Department has been 
able to improve grantees' reporting of results. The committee 
also notes that, unlike many prevention programs, the drug 
courts program is not simply defining performance in terms of 
program expansion (i.e., the simple number of drug courts in 
existence) but in terms of actual results (i.e., the re-arrest 
rate of program participants). This is a positive development 
that will hopefully be expanded, not simply within this program 
but in other prevention and treatment initiatives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \33\ NDCS Fiscal Year 2006 Budget Summary, p. 80.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    However, the committee believes that the drug courts 
program should monitor not simply the re-arrest rate of program 
participants, but their drug use as well. A vigorous, mandatory 
system of drug testing should be applied in every drug court 
case, to ensure that program participants are staying off of 
drugs. Convicts should be sentenced to drug abstinence, not 
just drug treatment. Unless participants are given incentives 
to overcome their drug abuse, it is unlikely that they will 
avoid future crimes. The committee believes that the 
administration should take steps to ensure this kind of 
accountability in the drug courts program.
            Residential Substance Abuse Treatment [RSAT] Program
    The committee generally supports the administration's 
request for $44,119,000 for the RSAT program. Although this is 
an increase over the $25 million actually appropriated by 
Congress for fiscal year 2005, it is sharply lower than the 
$76,054,000 the administration requested last year.
    It is regrettable that Congress has not provided more funds 
for the program, which is intended to support drug treatment 
for prisoners in State and local prison systems. Most of our 
Nation's drug offenders are incarcerated in State or local 
prisons. Moreover, most of these prisoners are the kind of low-
level offenders who would benefit most from drug treatment. (By 
contrast, those in the Federal prisons are typically major drug 
traffickers whose primary motive was most likely greed, rather 
than the simple need to obtain more drugs to feed addiction.) 
The committee is concerned that the administration's reduced 
request may indicate a reduced commitment to drug treatment in 
the prisons and jails.
    The committee believes that support for the program would 
be increased if the administration took steps to improve 
performance measurement for RSAT. The program's last PART 
review found ``results not demonstrated,'' and it was clear 
that the only performance measures identified for the program--
namely the numbers of prisoners treated under the program, and 
the cost per prisoner--address only the size and functioning of 
the program, not its end result. Performance measures should be 
developed to determine how effective the treatment provided 
under the program is, not simply how much it costs or how much 
is provided. Greater attention needs to be paid to monitoring 
the actual positive results of RSAT grants.
            Southwest Border Prosecutor Initiative
    The committee supports the administration's request for 
$48,418,000 for the Southwest Border Prosecutor Initiative, 
which is intended to reimburse State and local prosecutors in 
border areas for the increase in local crime from border 
activities (namely, drug and people smuggling from Mexico). 
That is a slight increase from the $48,377,000 requested for 
fiscal year 2005, and a significant increase over the $30 
million actually appropriated by Congress.
    The committee believes, however, that (in accordance with 
congressional intent) the program's funds should be directed 
toward border-related crime--not simply general crime. 
Information provided by the Department to the staff of the 
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human 
Resources indicates that only a quarter (at most) of the 
program's funds is dedicated to drug offenses, and none to 
immigration offenses. That information calls the program's 
justification into question; moreover, it calls into question 
the administration's decision to include the entire program 
budget request in the Drug Budget Summaries of recent years, 
distorting the true picture of Federal counter-drug activities.
            Prisoner Re-entry Initiative
    The committee supports the administration's request for $15 
million for a prisoner re-entry initiative, designed to assist 
faith- and community-based organizations in their services to 
prisoners preparing to reintegrate into society after 
incarceration. The committee has held a hearing on this 
issue,\34\ and was provided information about the significant 
accomplishments of faith- and community-based organizations in 
the field of prisoner re-entry services.\35\ The committee 
believes that this proposal would be further strengthened by 
authorizing legislation from the Congress. Legislation of that 
kind, such as the ``Second Chance Act'' sponsored by 
Representatives Rob Portman and Danny Davis, would better 
define the program's goals and methods of implementation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \34\ Feb. 2, 2005 Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal 
Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources hearing entitled, 
``Confronting Recidivism: Prisoner Re-entry Programs and a Just Future 
for All Americans.''
    \35\ Pat Nolan testimony on Feb. 2, 2005 at Subcommittee on 
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources hearing entitled, 
``Confronting Recidivism: Prisoner Re-entry Programs and a Just Future 
for All Americans.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Bureau of Prisons

    The committee supports the administration's request for 
$49,745,000 for the Bureau of Prisons' drug treatment programs. 
This would be an increase of $1.1 million over the fiscal year 
2005 enacted level, and a $400,000 increase over the 
administration's request for last year.
    The committee believes that the Bureau's efforts to reduce 
drug use and addiction by prisoners are commendable, and have 
had very positive results. The Bureau should seek actively to 
participate in programs that seek to replicate these results in 
State and local prisons and jails, where the vast majority of 
drug offenders are incarcerated. In addition, the Bureau should 
foster the drug treatment services of faith-based providers, 
who bring hope for a better future to the prisons.
    The committee also supports the administration's overall 
request for $253 million for ``inmate programs.'' This is a new 
line item in the administration's budget request, which more 
clearly separates the costs of actually confining prisoners 
from the costs of assisting prisoners to reintegrate into 
society after release. In addition to drug treatment, these 
reintegration programs include education and vocational 
training, and support for faith-based programs such as the Life 
Connections Program. The committee recently held a hearing (on 
February 3, 2005) on the issue of prisoner reentry programs, 
and is seeking ways to help promote them. The President's 
proposal is a positive step, and this committee looks forward 
to working with the administration to continue making progress 
and to replicate these initiatives at the State and local 
level.
    The committee has concerns, however, about the failure of 
the administration in recent fiscal years to identify the other 
drug control-related costs included in the Bureau's budget 
request, including the cost of incarcerating drug offenders, 
the cost of drug testing of prisoners and employees, and the 
cost of screening visitors and packages for illegal drugs. 
These are clearly expenditures directly associated with drug 
control, meaning that it is simply incorrect for ONDCP to 
claim--as it did in this year's Drug Budget Summary--that only 
1 percent of the Bureau's budget is drug related.\36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \36\ NDCS Fiscal Year 2006 Budget Summary, p. 57.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. National Drug Intelligence Center [NDIC]

    The committee supports the administration's request for $17 
million to fund the shutdown of the National Drug Intelligence 
Center [NDIC] and the transfer of its functions to other 
agencies. Although the goals of NDIC are worthy--the analysis 
of drug intelligence and the gathering of information from 
local law enforcement--it is not clear that the separate 
existence of the Center is necessary. Most of the analytical 
reports issued by NDIC are based entirely on intelligence 
provided by the DEA's El Paso Intelligence Center [EPIC], 
raising the question of why these analysts are not simply 
working directly for EPIC. Moreover, the intelligence-gathering 
functions of NDIC could also be located within EPIC, or within 
the proposed new drug fusion center within the Organized Crime 
Drug Enforcement Task Force [OCDETF]. At a time when 
intelligence analysts are needed at EPIC and other existing 
agencies, isolating these employees in NDIC is not an efficient 
use of resources.

4. Drug Enforcement Administration [DEA]

    The committee supports the administration's proposal for 
$1,892,700,000 for the Drug Enforcement Administration, an 
increase of over $100 million from the $1.785 billion received 
by DEA for fiscal year 2005, and approximately $76 million more 
than the administration's proposal of last year. It should be 
noted, however, that the administration is actually only 
requesting $1.69 billion in appropriations from Congress, which 
will cover DEA's regular domestic and international enforcement 
expenses. That is only a slight (1 percent) increase from the 
$1.63 billion provided by Congress for that purpose in fiscal 
year 2005. The rest of the increase in DEA's proposed budget 
would come from the Diversion Control Fee Account--the fees 
paid by the pharmaceutical industry to DEA to finance its 
prescription drug diversion control activities. The 
administration is requesting ``programmatic enhancements'' to 
the Fee Account system to allow it to get these new resources.
    The committee agrees with the administration's proposal to 
eliminate the DEA's Demand Reduction program. Although drug use 
prevention is a critical element in the National Drug Control 
Strategy, the committee recognizes that the DEA is a law 
enforcement organization, and such programs are better located 
elsewhere in the Federal Government.
    The committee is very concerned about the growing danger 
from methamphetamine (meth), and recommends it be a top 
priority at the DEA, and in the Nation's overall drug strategy. 
Meth is one of the most powerful and dangerous drugs available. 
At present, the United States is experiencing an unprecedented 
rise in the use, trafficking, and manufacturing of 
methamphetamine.\37\ The wholesale abuse of the drug itself is 
serious enough. But when we factor in the toxic environmental 
effects from unregulated chemicals used in clandestine 
laboratories, we see that methamphetamine is taking a terrible 
toll. No community is immune. Methamphetamine abuse has 
devastated communities across the Nation, and put unsustainable 
strains on the responsible State and local enforcement 
agencies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \37\ Joseph T. Rannazzisi testimony on Nov. 18, 2004 at 
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources 
hearing entitled, ``Law Enforcement and the Fight Against 
Methamphetamine.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The committee strongly supports the administration's 
request for $22 million to enhance the DEA's efforts in 
Afghanistan. It is critically important that DEA be fully 
supported in these efforts to stop heroin production and 
trafficking by the Department of Defense, the State 
Department's International Narcotics and Law Enforcement [INL] 
program, and the U.S. Agency for International Development. The 
committee is very concerned that an insufficient level of 
cooperation is taking place in Afghanistan among State, U.S. 
AID, CENTCOM and DEA programs.
    The DEA has received an ``adequate'' \38\ rating through 
the PART process, and has developed new goals, objectives, and 
strategies to support the Justice Department's goal of reducing 
the availability of drugs in the United States by 5 percent 
each year. The committee commends this effort to improve 
accountability and performance measures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \38\ NDCS Fiscal Year 2006 Budget Summary, p. 66.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

5. Interagency Crime and Drug Enforcement/Organized Crime Drug 
        Enforcement Task Force [OCDETF]

    The committee generally supports the President's proposed 
increase of budget proposal includes $661,940,000 for 
``Interagency and Crime Drug Enforcement,'' the account under 
which the administration places its request for funds for the 
Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force [OCDETF]. That is 
an increase of over $100 million from the fiscal year 2005 
enacted funding of $553.539 million, and over $80 million from 
the administration's request of last year ($580 million). That 
increase, however, is almost entirely due to the proposed 
transfer of the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas [HIDTA] 
program from the Office of National Drug Control Policy [ONDCP] 
to OCDETF--a proposal that has not been nearly adequately 
explained or justified by the administration.
    The committee also has concerns that OCDETF has deviated 
from its original charter to target major narcotic trafficking 
and money laundering organizations. It appears that OCDETF has 
begun to accept drug targets that do not meet the major 
trafficking and money laundering threshold.
    Moreover, it is not clear how valuable the assistance being 
provided by OCDETF is to ongoing investigations. Federal agents 
involved in drug investigations, interviewed by the committee 
staff, assert that OCDETF status merely gained them 
preferential treatment for their case by the local U.S. 
Attorney's office. While prosecution assistance is, of course, 
very important to drug investigations of all types, the OCDETF 
program should provide a broader array of services, and seek to 
bring together Federal, State, and local agencies to work 
toward shared goals.
    The committee supports the administration's proposal to use 
$58 million to fund additional narcotics agents at the FBI, as 
well as prosecutors. The committee hopes, however, that OCDETF 
will monitor these new employees to make sure that their 
efforts remain focused on drug enforcement. OCDETF should not 
become a funding source for other agencies to conduct non-drug 
related activities.
    The committee supports the administration's proposal to 
spend $14,693,000 for a new OCDETF Drug Fusion Center. The 
committee also supports the development of the Fusion Center 
computer system that will find criminal linkages by matching 
criminal data inputs from a multitude of Federal drug 
investigative cases. Information input into this computer 
system will also include the highly sensitive information 
gained from the DEA's Special Operations Division [SOD]. Once 
the linkages are known, the Drug Fusion Center officials will 
determine the linkage dissemination.
    The committee is concerned, however, that the Fusion Center 
not become a one-way street, in which participating agencies 
provide information, but receive nothing in return. Such an 
approach may hamper the potential effectiveness of other 
Federal, State and local law enforcement agencies that could 
benefit from the linkage information.
    The committee recommends that programs like OCDETF increase 
their efforts to improve intelligence and information sharing 
by drug enforcement agencies. The shortfalls in intelligence 
and key information sharing described in the 9/11 Commission 
Report are not confined to the FBI and CIA. Information sharing 
failures extend to the agencies entrusted with protecting our 
borders and interdicting illegal drugs--several of which are 
now combined in the Department of Homeland Security. In fact, 
the September 11th terrorists each had to clear Federal 
customs, and immigration authorities, and had brushes with 
local law enforcement. If everyone had all the information on 
these killers, they might not have been able to carry out their 
planned attacks. These problems can also undermine our efforts 
to identify and stop drug traffickers.
    The committee believes that OCDETF should seek to support 
the efforts of Operation Panama Express South, an interagency 
intelligence-driven program managed by the Department's of 
Justice and Homeland Security, should be used as a model for 
future information sharing efforts. After a recent visit, the 
committee saw first hand the incredible effectiveness of this 
intelligence program. The intelligence cueing from this 
operation has allowed Joint Interagency Task Force South 
[JIATF-South] to optimize its DHS and DOD interdiction forces, 
resulting in the seizure of over 30 tons of cocaine in 
September 2004. The committee is very concerned that this 
successful intelligence driven program continues to operate 
with insufficient funding from DOD, DHS, and the Department of 
Justice; this program should be fully supported and enhanced. 
Therefore, the committee recommends that funding for Panama 
Express South be clearly identified with a separate line item 
and fully supported within the administration's budget.
    The OCDETF program has not yet been reviewed by the 
administration's Performance Assessment Rating Tool [PART] 
process. The committee recommends that OCDETF take quick action 
to develop appropriate long-term outcome measures.

6. Department of Justice Financial Management

    In fiscal year 2004, the taxpayers spent nearly $30 billion 
to fund the operation of the Department of Justice. According 
to the Government Accountability Office statement on Major 
Management Challenges at the Department of Justice, the results 
of the fiscal year 2004 financial statement audit indicate 
``serious financial management issues,'' particularly at one of 
Justice's significant components, the Office of Justice 
Programs [OJP]. OJP has assets of $8.4 billion (31 percent of 
DOJ's total assets) and net costs of $4 billion (13 percent of 
DOJ's total net costs). Because OJP is such a large component, 
it is ``material'' to--meaning large enough to affect--the 
financial statements for the entire Department.
    The programs of the Department of Justice [DOJ] impact the 
lives of millions of Americans on a daily basis. From 
overseeing the Federal prison system and enforcing the Nation's 
laws to providing grants for State and local governments, 
management at DOJ affects law enforcement at every level of 
society. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 
Federal law enforcement continues to divert resources away from 
traditional crime fighting to strengthen counterterrorism 
capabilities, leaving a void that only State and local law 
enforcement are positioned to fill. To help meet this need, DOJ 
administers nearly $5 billion in grants annually.
    In times of tightening budgets, accountability is 
imperative. It becomes increasingly important to account for 
every Federal dollar in the most effective manner possible, 
whether an agency is managing grants or investing in 
information technology. Without accurate financial information 
and appropriate controls, it becomes nearly impossible to 
manage programs effectively.
    The latest financial audit revealed serious accounting 
problems that have impacted DOJ's ability to achieve its 
mission. The most serious problems occurred in the area of 
grants management, including the Community Oriented Policing 
Services [COPS] Program. In the COPS Program alone, a recent 
story in USA Today stated that audits by DOJ's Inspector 
General [OIG] alleged that $277 million was misspent, and that 
the OIG has requested documentation from 82 police agencies 
that have not explained in detail how they spent $111 million. 
It is clear that poor financial management has undermined 
confidence in the COPS Program and other grants programs. DOJ 
has also endured criticism for its mismanagement of a large 
information technology investment at another of DOJ's 
components, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which spent 
nearly $170 million on a system that will not work as intended.
    Proper accounting and management controls could prevent 
these problems. Recognizing the importance of sound financial 
management, Congress passed the Chief Financial Officers Act of 
1990 to require Federal agencies to submit audited financial 
statements. For fiscal year 2004, DOJ's auditors were unable to 
express an opinion as to the reliability of the financial 
statements, and they rescinded the unqualified opinion rendered 
on the 2003 statements. The committee believes it is important 
to recognize the seriousness of this audit result: in the 
private sector, anything other than an unqualified or ``clean'' 
audit opinion is unacceptable, and any restatement of a prior 
year's audit is front-page news.

                     D. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE [DOD]

1. Budget

    The President's National Drug Control Strategy Budget 
Summary includes $896 million for the Department of Defense 
[DOD]. However, this budget request does not reflect the total 
amount of money given to DOD for drug control. In particular, 
the Office of National Drug Control Policy [ONDCP] failed to 
account for, or estimate the amount of counterdrug money 
allocated in this year's war supplemental appropriation bill 
for fiscal year 2005. The fiscal year 2006 budget requested 
amount includes $400 million to accelerate training and 
procurement of equipment of the Afghan national police and 
border police and $194 million to support ongoing counter-
narcotic and alternative development programs in Afghanistan.
    Of the proposed $896 million DOD counterdrug budget, $153 
million has been proposed to support the National Guard State 
Plans that support domestic law enforcement efforts. The 
committee supports the continued involvement of the National 
Guard in counterdrug operations, particularly through 
assistance to State and local law enforcement, assistance to 
Customs inspectors at the ports of entry, and the training and 
deployment of intelligence analysts for drug enforcement 
operations. The committee has questions about the utility of 
some National Guard assets deployed in traditional interdiction 
patrols, but overall welcomes the involvement of the National 
Guard in counterdrug operations--at least until other agencies 
are fully funded to ``backfill'' the Guard's efforts.
    The committee agrees with the Strategy's assertion that 
terrorists may benefit from drug smuggling. However, the 
committee would oppose any attempt to change the existing 
procedures whereby DOD may, under limited circumstances, use 
counternarcotics funds and authorities for purposes other than 
assistance to drug interdiction. While a successful effort to 
combat drug smuggling can deny funds to terrorists, it is less 
clear that a successful fight against terrorists can impact the 
drug trade. The committee believes that DOD's current authority 
is sufficient, and preserves important safeguards against the 
unnecessary diversion of counterdrug resources to non-drug 
interdiction operations.

2. Domestic Programs

    The President's National Drug Control Strategy states, ``In 
light of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and the 
department's continuing global war against terror, DOD will 
limit its domestic contributions to the war on drugs to those 
functions that are militarily unique and benefit the 
department's primary missions.'' The committee agrees with this 
statement but would add that because of DOD's war fighting and 
homeland defense responsibilities, its ability to perform their 
counterdrug responsibilities in the Western Hemisphere has been 
severely degraded.
    The committee supports the efforts of DOD to focus its 
counternarcotics role in areas that uniquely call for military 
support. However, it is doubtful whether DOD is currently 
capable of fulfilling its assigned role in the source and 
transit zones (i.e., Latin America, the Caribbean, and the 
Eastern Pacific Ocean). The committee believes that other 
agencies, most notably the enforcement agencies at the 
Department of Homeland Security [DHS], may be better suited to 
provide the necessary operational efficiency and law 
enforcement expertise required for effective leadership in drug 
interdiction missions.

                                          DOD Source Zone Flight Hours
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                              U.S. Air Force                                             U.S. Navy
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                        C130          E3         EC130         EP3          P3C         P3CDU
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CY 2001...........................          274          157           79          619           13          353
CY 2002...........................            0            0          967            0           17           45
CY 2003...........................            0            0          721          424          244           14
CY 2004...........................            0           81          294          403            9            0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    DOD flights within the Source Zone reflect a diminishing 
level of support in the region. The EC-130 and EP-3 are 
aircraft that intercept radio transmissions whose utilization 
would not be appropriate to the classification of this report. 
However, the lack of E-3 AWACS hours in 2001 and 2004 is 
indicative of a diminished commitment. The loss of P-3 and P-3 
CDU (Counter Drug Update) flights has severely crippled the 
U.S. counterdrug efforts in the Source Zone.
    DOD has, by statute, been given the lead role in the 
detection and monitoring aspects of drug interdiction. It 
accomplishes this task by providing air and marine radar 
coverage in areas of known drug smuggling activities. However, 
DOD has been unable or unwilling to fulfill this 
responsibility, as evidenced by the sharp reduction in maritime 
patrol aircraft [MPA] patrol hours in the transit zone.\39\ The 
lack of MPA assets seriously hampers our counterdrug efforts to 
respond to known shipments of drugs departing Colombia into the 
Caribbean and Eastern Pacific regions. Credible intelligence 
information now far exceeds our ability to respond to these 
shipments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \39\ Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug 
Policy, and Human Resources staff visit to Joint Interagency Task Force 
South [JIATF-S] on Jan. 13, 2005.

                   DOD Maritime Patrol Aircraft Hours
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                            USN                                 TOTAL
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CY 2001....................................................         3389
CY 2002....................................................         5964
CY 2003....................................................         4634
CY 2004....................................................         1741
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Joint Interagency Task Force South has set a 
requirement to have one domed radar type aircraft in the 
Eastern Pacific and one in the Caribbean region to conduct 
maritime patrols. Additionally they have a need to have at 
least 2 flights of aircraft capable of tracking spotted suspect 
vessels. Only 2 domed radar aircraft exist in the mix of 
aircraft assigned to JIATF-South. They are the U.S. Air Force 
E-3 AWACS and the CBP P-3C Dome. The AWACS currently operates 
on a limited basis in the Source Zone leaving the P-3C Dome to 
search both the Eastern Pacific and Caribbean regions. Marine 
tracking aircraft have fallen short of the requirements for 
tracking of drug laden vessels. The noticeable drop in P-3 
aircraft hours have severely diminished JIATF South's 
operational capabilities.
    The degrading of the DOD's Tethered Aerostat Radar System 
[TARS] is another example of a reduced commitment to 
counterdrug mission. The U.S. Air Force, which took over 
control of TARS from the U.S. Customs Service, has reduced the 
number of TARS radar sites from 14 to 8. This has left our 
country blind to air and marine smuggling activities along the 
entire Gulf Coast (stretching from the east coast of Texas to 
the southern tip of Florida) and from the eastern coast of 
Florida to Puerto Rico.


    The picture above shows the evolution of the Tethered 
Aerostat Radar System [TARS] as originally planned, through its 
maximum implementation in 1992, and the gradual degradation to 
its current state in 2005.
    Due to the war fighting demands placed upon DOD, the 
committee recommends that DHS assume leadership of all 
operational aspects of drug interdiction efforts in the Western 
Hemisphere. In this, the committee agrees with the President's 
Strategy Report that states, ``DOD does not conduct 
counternarcotics interdictions, rather it is in a supporting 
role to law enforcement agencies.'' The committee would like 
DHS and the Department of Justice to assume more responsibility 
in the JIATF South operations helping to coordinate counterdrug 
efforts in the source and transit zones. The committee also 
recommends that DHS, with appropriate funding for maintenance 
and improvements, regain operational responsibility for the 
TARS program, with DOD retaining the responsibility for the 
program's logistics and procurement.

3. Afghan Operations

    The committee believes that DOD's counterdrug efforts in 
Afghanistan have failed to prevent the explosion in heroin 
production and trafficking in that country. As the President's 
Strategy Report notes, ``If all of Afghanistan's opium were 
converted to heroin, the result would be 582 metric tons of 
heroin. By comparison, Colombia and Mexico combined produced 
roughly 22 metric tons of pure heroin in 2003, more than enough 
to satisfy U.S. consumption.'' \40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \40\ Fiscal Year 2005 NDCS, p. 50.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The committee supports the goals outlined in the 
President's Strategy Report, which call for helping the Afghans 
with a public affairs campaign, construction of a narcotics 
prosecution task force, opportunities for the growth of 
legitimate and high value crops, destruction of poppy fields, 
and an increase in the size and mobility of the 
counternarcotics police force. However, while the committee 
agrees that these are appropriate goals, they are not ones for 
which DOD should be tasked.
    Instead, the committee believes that destruction of the 
stockpiled opium and heroin should be DOD's primary response to 
this immediate threat. The reluctance to target known 
warehoused opium products will encourage even more heroin 
production, threatening to increase heroin addiction in Europe 
and the United States, and providing increased funding for the 
terrorists who are engaging our troops currently in 
Afghanistan.
    This connection between heroin production and terrorism in 
Afghanistan cannot be overstated. Indeed, the President's own 
Strategy Report states, ``According to United Nations drug 
production estimates, illicit poppy cultivation and heroin 
production in Afghanistan nearly $3 billion, equivalent to 
about 60 percent of Afghanistan's gross domestic product. This 
level of illicit income fosters instability and supports 
criminals, terrorists, and militias.'' \41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \41\ Fiscal Year 2005 NDCS, p. 50.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The committee agrees with the President's funding that 
there is a strong connection between heroin production and the 
funding of terrorism. Therefore, the committee believes that it 
is imperative that DOD focus on the destruction of stockpiled 
drugs and drug processing facilities, support aerial and ground 
eradication of opium poppy, and interdict precursor chemicals 
necessary for drug production. These efforts are essential for 
Afghanistan to be firmly set on the road to democracy and away 
from corruption, tyranny, and terrorism.

 E. DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
                                [USAID]

    The Department of State is a key player in our 
international counterdrug efforts. Particularly through its 
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs 
[INL], the State Department is responsible for obtaining the 
cooperation of other nations with the U.S. Government's anti-
drug policies, and for improving international coordination of 
counterdrug efforts. The committee supports the 
administration's request for $1,075,000,000 for INL, an 
increase of $177 million over last year's enacted level.
    The committee is concerned, however, that the Drug Budget 
Summary ignores a key partner agency of the Department of 
State, specifically the U.S. Agency for International 
Development [USAID]. This is inconsistent with the Strategy 
Report, which repeatedly references the importance of 
alternative development programs in Colombia and Afghanistan. 
In Afghanistan, it appears that two out of the five ``pillars'' 
of U.S. policy involve the USAID programs of a public affairs 
campaign and alternative economic development. If these 
programs warrant discussion in the Strategy document, then they 
should be discussed in the Drug Budget Summary, and the 
Director of ONDCP should exercise his responsibility to review 
and certify their budget proposals.
    The State Department's INL Bureau and its Andean 
Counterdrug Initiative [ACI] have received ``adequate'' ratings 
in the administration's Performance Assessment Rating Tool 
[PART] process.\42\ The subcommittee supports both programs' 
efforts to develop long-term performance and efficiency 
measures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \42\ NDCS Fiscal Year 2006 Budget Summary, p. 108.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Afghan Programs

    The administration is requesting $437 million for State 
Department's International Narcotics and Law Enforcement [INL] 
programs in Afghanistan. While this funding will be used to 
accelerate the development of police programs and to reduce 
opium poppy cultivation by providing a drug control capacity, 
the committee is concerned that an insufficient level of 
cooperation is taking place in Afghanistan among State, DEA, 
USAID and CENTCOM elements to assure us that the issue is 
properly addressed.
    ONDCP reported in November 2004 that the most recent U.S. 
Government estimate for opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan 
shows a 239 percent increase in the poppy crop and a 73 percent 
increase in potential opium production over 2003 estimates. The 
committee is further concerned that at a time when eradication 
programs and foreign law enforcement assistance and training 
efforts elsewhere in the world show a positive return on 
resources, the efforts in Afghanistan show very little chance 
of success in their current form.

2. Andean Counterdrug Initiative

    The committee supports the administration's request for 
$735 million for the ACI (an increase from $731 million 
appropriated for fiscal year 2005). These funds are needed to 
continue programs in law enforcement, border control, crop 
reduction, alternative economic development, democratic 
institution building, and administration of justice and human 
rights programs in the region. The ACI budget provides support 
to Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Brazil, Venezuela and 
Panama.
    The committee is concerned, however, that the 
administration requested only $463 million for Colombia under 
the ACI, which is no larger than the previous year. More 
resources may be required to support Colombia's unified 
campaign against drug trafficking and narco-terrorists. 
Increased funding will lead to higher efforts made by the 
Colombian Army's aviation program and drug units, as well as 
the Colombian National Police in the areas of aviation, 
eradication and interdiction.
    The committee believes the administration should take a 
more active role to ensure that the U.S. Government provides 
financial and technical support for Colombia's demobilization 
program. Under this program, former members of narco-terrorist 
organizations (such as the FARC, ELN and AUC) agree to lay down 
their weapons, stop drug trafficking, provide valuable 
intelligence to Colombia's security agencies, and seek 
employment in the civilian economy. Recently, disagreements 
between the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Department of 
Justice have delayed American support for Colombia's 
demobilization program and have squandered important 
opportunities. The administration should actively seek to 
resolve those differences immediately, to prevent any 
disruption in U.S. support for this vital program.

3. United States Agency for International Development

    The President is requesting $4,137,668,000 for the U.S. 
Agency for International Development [USAID] and the programs 
it administers. That is a nearly $95 million decrease from the 
fiscal year 2005 enacted amount of $4,233,663,000. The 
committee has serious concerns about USAID's administration of 
taxpayer money.

4. Andean Counterdrug Initiative and Alternative Development

    As part of its request for the ACI, the administration is 
requesting $264,600,000 for alternative development and 
institution building programs, to be administered by USAID. Of 
this amount, $125,700,000 would be allocated specifically for 
assistance in Colombia. This is virtually identical to the 
$264.6 million actually appropriated for fiscal year 2005, of 
which $125.7 million is intended for programs in Colombia.
    USAID has the responsibility to take effective action to 
eliminate illicit coca production, and to establish licit, 
sustainable farm-level production capacity and economic 
stability in countries throughout the Andean Region. These 
alternative development programs include: strengthening a licit 
agricultural economy, assisting displaced groups, as well as 
programs to strengthen democratic institutions, and promote the 
rule of law, human rights, and judicial reform.
    The committee supports the administration's request, but 
has concerns about the reluctance to provide more assistance. 
Our efforts in Colombia are finally bearing fruit; now is the 
time to capitalize on those gains. Moreover, it appears that 
the cocaine and heroin production may be moving out of Colombia 
and into neighboring countries. If so, the United States will 
have to increase its efforts in those nations.
    The committee is concerned by a General Accountability 
Office [GAO] report entitled, ``Drug Control-Efforts to Develop 
Alternatives to Cultivating Illicit Crops in Colombia Have Made 
Little Progress and Face Serious Obstacles'' issued in 2002 
which discussed the poor coordination of alternative 
development, interdiction and eradication activities in 
Colombia.\43\ The USAID counternarcotics mission should 
coordinate more effectively with the State Department's Bureau 
of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs [INL]. 
In light of its greater expertise in counternarcotics work, INL 
should take control of USAID-administered funds in source 
countries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \43\ February 2002 GAO report (GAO-02-291) entitled, ``DRUG 
CONTROL--Efforts to Develop Alternatives to Cultivating Illicit Crops 
in Colombia Have Made Little Progress and Face Serious Obstacles,'' p. 
3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

5. ACI: Office of Management and Budget PART Performance Evaluation

    The OMB PART Program Assessment scored the Andean 
Counterdrug Initiative with an overall ``adequate'' rating.\44\ 
While USAID received good marks for its yearly and long-term 
output measures (i.e. measuring hectares of licit crops in 
USAID assisted areas), the PART evaluation indicates that USAID 
needs to generate outcome measurements that are targeted toward 
ultimate results.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \44\ NDCS Fiscal Year 2006 Budget Summary, p. 108.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The PART review also illustrated a lack of coordination and 
consultation at the headquarters level between USAID and INL. 
In addition, USAID and INL do not work effectively with ONDCP 
when setting annual and long-term goals. The subcommittee hopes 
that INL and USAID will follow through on their recent 
commitment to improve coordination.

6. Afghanistan

    While the USAID alternative development programs in 
Colombia can be called a qualified success, the committee does 
not believe the same can be said of USAID's efforts in 
Afghanistan.\45\ USAID's Alternative Livelihoods program [AL], 
an effort to eradicate opium poppy production in Afghanistan, 
was initially funded at $10 million as a pilot program, but was 
expected to rise to a total of $130 million by the end of 
January 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \45\ The committee is concerned that the GAO identified several 
programmatic issues in Colombia that may affect overall program success 
in a July 2004 report (GAO-04-726) entitled, ``DRUG CONTROL--U.S. 
Nonmilitary Assistance to Colombia Is Beginning to Show Intended 
Results, but Programs Are Not Readily Sustainable,'' p. 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Under the watch of USAID and other U.S. Government 
agencies, Afghan opium poppy production dramatically increased, 
from 80,000 hectares in 2003, to 131,000 hectares in 2004 
according to the 2004 UN Afghanistan Opium Survey. Also 
according to the UN report, the Helmand province, where USAID 
focused much of its Alternative Livelihoods program, displayed 
a 91 percent increase in opium poppy production from 2003-2004. 
That is the highest increase of any province in Afghanistan. 
Yet more disturbing, is the fact that the CIA's estimates of 
Helmand's opium poppy hectares are double the UN estimates.
    While the committee finds the intent of the Alternative 
Livelihoods program praiseworthy, the committee urges quick 
action to address these obvious deficiencies. The committee is 
dismayed to learn that the greatest increases in opium poppy 
production have taken place in the areas where USAID 
administers its Alternative Livelihood programs.
    Interviews of USAID officials by committee staff confirmed 
numerous deficiencies in the Alternative Livelihood 
program.\46\ Specifically, the committee is very troubled by 
what it learned about Alternative Livelihood systems for 
delivering crop fertilizer and monitoring its use. No standard 
or system has been established to certify the use of fertilizer 
for its intended application to alternative crops. Interviewed 
USAID officials are unable to cite any steps taken in 
Alternative Livelihood to insure that fertilizer is not being 
used on opium poppy crops.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \46\ Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug 
Policy, and Human Resources staff meeting with USAID officials on Dec. 
13, 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The committee believes these problems are unacceptable. The 
committee objects to the use of USAID moneys where American 
taxpayers may be supporting the production of illicit 
narcotics. Until assurances can be established for AL program 
efficacy, the committee encourages more aggressive and direct 
crop eradication.

7. Harm Reduction

    The Washington, DC, USAID office exercises very little 
oversight over its field offices, especially in Central Asia 
and Eastern Europe. These offices are in essence independent 
agencies in their ``development'' programs, but they are 
financed by the U.S. Government, via the State Department/
USAID.
    USAID field offices are known to finance the production of 
``Harm Reduction'' materials and brochures in Central Asia and 
East Asia, however, these moneys are not accounted for by the 
USAID Washington, DC, office, or in the ONDCP national drug 
budget. ``Harm reduction'' is a position identified with the 
views of drug legalization financier George Soros, which 
assumes certain individuals are incapable of making healthy 
decisions. Advocates of this position hold that dangerous 
behaviors, such as drug abuse, therefore simply must be 
accepted by society and those who choose such lifestyles--or 
become trapped in them--should be enabled to continue these 
behaviors in a less ``harmful'' manner. Often, however, these 
lifestyles are the result of addiction, mental illness of other 
conditions that should and can be treated rather than accepted 
as normative, healthy behaviors.
    In its annual report released March 2, 2004, the 
International Narcotics Control Board--the United Nations' drug 
agency--sharply criticized ``harm reduction'' measures such as 
needle exchange programs and so-called ``safe injecting 
rooms,'' because such policies encourage drug use and violate 
``article 4 of the 1961 Convention [which] obliges State 
parties to ensure that the production, manufacture, import, 
export, distribution of, trade in, use and possession of drugs 
is to be limited exclusively to medical and scientific 
purposes. Therefore, from a legal point of view, such 
facilities violate the international drug control 
conventions.''
    The committee is deeply concerned that at the same time 
that the International Narcotics Control Board was warning 
parties to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961), the 
Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971), and the United 
Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs 
and Psychotropic Substances (1988) that government financing of 
``harm reduction'' schemes may be in violation of those 
accords, it appears that USAID was financing a ``harm 
reduction'' agenda of its own.
    On February 10, 2005, ONDCP Director John Walters testified 
before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and 
Human Resources.\47\ He was asked about USAID's involvement in 
two questionable ``harm reduction'' projects. The first project 
was the 14th International Conference on Reduction of Drug 
Related Harm held in Chiang Mai, Thailand from April 6-10, 
2003. In an e-mail invitation to the conference, it was 
promoted as having a ``special emphasis on harm reduction 
advocacy . . . Harm reduction has to fight hard to get a 
hearing in the midst of all this and to challenge the new 
social order campaigns.'' The conference was sponsored by the 
International Harm Reduction Association, the Asian Harm 
Reduction Network, and cosponsored by the Centre for Harm 
Reduction and USAID.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \47\ John Walters' testimony on Feb. 10, 2005 at Subcommittee on 
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources hearing entitled, 
``Fiscal Year 2006 Drug Budget.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The second project was the Asian Harm Reduction Network's 
350-page, second-edition Manual for Reducing Drug Related Harm 
in Asia (which bears a USAID logo). USAID's role in the 
production of the manual is acknowledged inside the cover: 
``This publication was made possible through support provided 
by the Office of Strategic Planning, Operations, and Technical 
Support, Bureau for Asia and the Near East, U.S. Agency for 
International Development. . .'' Included in the second chapter 
of the manual, ``Rationale for Harm Reduction,'' are sections 
on ``needle and syringe programs,'' ``sales and purchasing of 
injecting equipment,'' and ``removing barriers.'' In the fifth 
chapter, ``Injecting Safely,'' are sections devoted to 
``sharing of injecting equipment,'' and ``safe injecting.''
    ONDCP Director Walters responded that he was not aware of 
the ``harm reduction'' publication financed by USAID nor did he 
attend the USAID-cosponsored 14th International Conference on 
Reduction of Drug Related Harm. He added, however, that he has 
been aggressive in rebuking international organizations which 
promote ``harm reduction.'' He pledged to look into this 
regrettable matter and report back to the subcommittee.
    On February 11, 2005, the Committee on Government Reform 
sent a letter to Andrew Natsios, Administrator of USAID, 
outlining the above concerns about USAID's involvement in 
``harm reduction'' programs, and requested all documents 
related to USAID financing or any other support of ``harm 
reduction'' or drug legalization.\48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \48\ Tom Davis, chairman, Committee on Government Reform, and Mark 
Souder, chairman of the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, 
and Human Resources, letter to Andrew Natsios, Administrator, USAID, 
Feb. 11, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    While this matter is under investigation by the White 
House, the committee recommends that any drug-related programs 
of USAID be put under close oversight and management by the 
State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement. Ultimately, taxpayer subsidies of ``Harm 
Reduction'' efforts should be eliminated, and all drug-related 
activity by USAID be accounted for in the national drug budget, 
and, therefore, supervised by ONDCP.

                       F. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

1. Safe and Drug Free Schools

    The committee has special concerns about the Safe and Drug-
Free Schools program at the Department of Education. The 
largest of the Safe and Drug-Free programs, the State Grants 
program, would be completely eliminated under the budget 
proposal submitted by the President, after receiving $441 
million in fiscal year 2005.
    The committee is disappointed with this large cut to the 
Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities program, and urges 
the administration to restore the State Grants funding. While 
over half of the Local Education Agencies [LEAs] in the country 
receive less than $10,000 from this funding source, most of 
these districts have leveraged those dollars for additional 
community resources. These funds have contributed in part to 
the 17 percent drop in youth drug use over the past 3 years.
    The Strategy Report explains that the State Grants program 
was cut because it had not been proven effective.\49\ OMB's 
Program Assessment Rating Tool [PART] review for the fiscal 
year 2004 Budget rated the Safe and Drug-Free Schools State 
Grants program ``ineffective,'' with the program receiving a 
score of zero in the category of program results. The PART 
assessment found that ``Existing program indicators use 
national surveys and don't measure youth crime and drug abuse 
at State and local levels.'' Additionally, a 2001 RAND study 
determined that the structure of the Safe and Drug-Free Schools 
State Grants program is fundamentally flawed and that the funds 
are spread too thinly to support quality interventions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \49\ NDCS Fiscal Year 2006 Budget Summary, p. 19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    While the committee agrees that ineffective programs should 
be held accountable, cutting a program based on the lack of 
good data at the local level does not mean the program is 
``ineffective.'' \50\ The program may actually be producing 
positive results that could be measured if evaluated 
appropriately. What is needed is a better system of performance 
management and monitoring.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \50\ NDCS Fiscal Year 2006 Budget Summary, p. 20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In response to the PART assessment, the Education 
Department recently developed a new strategy for measuring 
positive outcomes in the State Grants program. The fiscal year 
2005 Justification of Appropriations Estimates to the Congress 
stated that the new strategy would use ``national survey data 
on the prevalence of youth drug use and violence, coupled with 
data on the extent to which recipients of SDFSC State Grant 
funds are implementing research-based practices, and 
evaluations using rigorous methodology for measuring the impact 
of promising interventions.''
    While this new strategy for measuring outcomes is a good 
start, it still relies too heavily on national data. The key 
data are not national outcomes, but the outcomes in the 
specific areas where grants funds are spent. Each grantee needs 
to be held accountable.
    The Education Department is understandably trying to allow 
flexibility at the State and local level in its programs, but 
it also has a responsibility to ensure that Federal taxpayers' 
funds are being used effectively. The committee encourages the 
Education Department to ensure that its new performance 
assessment strategy measures the extent to which the State 
Grants program is helping reduce actual drug use among 
participating students at the local level.
    Additionally, the committee continues to recommend that the 
Safe and Drug-Free Schools program should be focused more on 
the drug prevention purpose of the program. The committee 
addressed the Safe and Drug-Free Schools program in the 108th 
Congress in its report (H. Rept. 108-167) accompanying H.R. 
2086,\51\ the bill to reauthorize the Office of National Drug 
Control Policy. The report states that activities of the 
program should ``include a clear anti-drug message or purpose 
intended to reduce drug use.'' The report observes,
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \51\ H.R. 2086 ``Office of National Drug Control Policy 
Reauthorization Act of 2003.''

        The Safe and Drug Free Schools program is one of the 
        primary Federal drug prevention programs. As with law 
        enforcement programs, however, resources are being 
        diverted away from that intended goal to several other 
        purposes, such as violence prevention. Significant 
        broadening of the program to other purposes creates a 
        substantial risk of dilution not only of its 
        effectiveness as a drug prevention program, but also as 
        a whole. . . The committee believes that the budget for 
        the Safe and Drug Free Schools program cannot be deemed 
        adequate unless each program activity includes a clear 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        anti-drug message or purpose to reduce drug use. . .

    Instead of cutting the State Grants program, the committee 
recommends that the administration take steps to reform it. By 
ensuring that the program funds drug use prevention programs 
that are focused and effective, the administration can preserve 
one of our most important tools in the national drug strategy.
    On April 26, 2005, in testimony before the subcommittee, 
General Dean, chairman and CEO of CADCA, expressed the 
importance of drug use prevention in the lives of our Nation's 
youth. He warned that the elimination of the State Grants 
portion of the Safe and Drug-Free Schools program (-$441 
million) would have a detrimental effect on level of drug use 
and abuse among adolescents, and in turn, among adult 
citizens.\52\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \52\ Apr. 26, 2005 testimony of General Arthur T. Dean, U.S. Army, 
retired, chairman and CEO, Community Anti-Drug Coalitions of America.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In his testimony, General Dean cited a 2003 study conducted 
by the NIAAA, which explained that addiction is a disorder 
developed in adolescence, for which effective prevention is 
crucial.\53\ It has also been shown that youth who experiment 
with marijuana before age 14 are over five times more likely to 
abuse drugs in adulthood.\54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \53\ NIAAA National Epidemiologic Survey on Alcohol and Related 
Conditions, 2003.
    \54\ Department on Health and Human Services, Substance Abuse and 
Mental Health Services Administration, Office of Applied Science. 
(2003) The 2002 National Household Survey on Drug Use. Rockville, MD.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In addition, unchecked drug use in our Nation's schools has 
proven to devastate academic performance and achievement among 
students--America's future. A recent study by the University of 
Washington determined that students who avoided substance use 
scored an average of 45 points higher in reading tests, and 18 
points higher in reading tests.\55\ On the other hand, those 
who use alcohol or drugs were found five times more likely to 
drop out of school.\56\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \55\ Bence, M., Brandon, R., Lee, I., Tran, H. University of 
Washington. (2000). Impact of peer substance use on middle school 
performance in Washington: Summary. Washington Kids Count/University of 
WA: Seattle, WA. Available: http://www.hspc.org/wkc/special/pdf/
peer--sub--091200.pdf.
    \56\ Lane, J., Gerstein, D., Huang, L., & Wright, D. (1998). Risk 
and protective factors for adolescent drug use: Findings from the 1997 
National Household Survey on Drug Abuse. Available: http://
www.samhsa.gov/hhsurvey/hhsurvey.html; Bray, J.W., Zarkin, G.A., 
Ringwalt, C., & Qi, J. (2000). Health Economics. ``The relationship 
between marijuana initiation and dropping out of high school.'' 9(1), 
9-18.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The President's proposed budgetary purge of the State Grant 
portion of the Safe and Drug-Free Schools program would no 
doubt prove injurious to America's youth, and in turn, to the 
fabric of our Nation.

2. Drug Testing

    The Strategy Report and the Drug Budget Summary also 
propose $25.4 million for school-based drug testing programs 
for students. The committee strongly supports this testing 
initiative. By addressing accountability, drug testing in 
schools has proven the single most effective drug-prevention 
program in the United States.

           G. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES [DHHS]

1. National Institute on Drug Abuse [NIDA]

    The committee supports the President's request of 
$1,010,130,000 million for the National Institute on Drug 
Abuse. We note, however, that that is less than a $4 million 
increase over the 2005 enacted level. NIDA supplies critical 
basic research that supports a broad range of drug prevention 
and treatment programs. In particular, NIDA's research 
activities include developing new treatments for drug 
addiction, especially America's most abused drug, marijuana. 
NIDA's research is also currently targeted at understanding the 
biology of addiction, which will ultimately enhance prevention 
programs. NIDA's cooperation with SAMHSA to integrate drug 
abuse treatments in community settings has had measurable 
results.

2. Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration [SAMHSA]

            Prevention
    The President has requested an overall increase of $8.3 
million for SAMHSA's prevention and treatment programs. 
However, the proposed budget reflects a reduction of $14.4 
million in funding for prevention programs. The Budget Summary 
provides no explanation for this large reduction in funding for 
prevention programs.\57\ This prevention funding reduction will 
affect, among other prevention programs, the Center for 
Substance Abuse and Prevention's [CSAP] State Incentive Grants 
[SIG], which implement the five-step process that the 
administration notes is ``known to promote youth development, 
reduce risk-taking behaviors, build on assets, and prevent 
problem behaviors.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \57\ The requested budget summary makes special note of a PART 
review rating of ``ineffective'' for the prevention set-aside of the 
SAPT Block Grant programs. However, the committee is concerned about 
this ``ineffective'' rating, in that there is no uniformly defined 
information by which to assess the effectiveness of the program, and 
therefore the PART rating may not accurately reflect the effectiveness 
of the SAPT prevention set aside programs. Moreover, the requested 
funding for the SAPT Block Grant program is unchanged from the 2005 
enacted amount.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The committee is disappointed by this proposed reduction, 
and recommends full funding for SAMHSA's prevention efforts. 
The President's Strategy Report emphasizes that ``stopping use 
before it starts,'' is one of the adminsitration's three 
national priorities. However, the significantly reduced funding 
for prevention programs is a matter of serious concern, and 
seems to undermine this important priority of stopping use 
before it starts.
            Treatment
    The overall increase in SAMHSA's drug programs results from 
an increase of $24.7 million for drug treatment programs. The 
committee strongly supports the President's request to increase 
funding for treatment programs, especially the increased 
funding for the Access to Recovery [ATR] program, for which the 
President requested an increase of $50.8 million (bringing the 
total funding for ATR to $150 million). The ATR program--by 
providing individuals with vouchers to pay for clinical 
treatment and/or recovery support--allows those individuals who 
most need help to access care that might otherwise be out of 
reach. The committee applauds this initiative, and is 
especially pleased with the ongoing ability of individuals 
using ATR vouchers to choose faith-based programs to obtain the 
help they need.
    The committee is encouraged that the ONDCP is making 
program performance data a central part of the budget 
decisionmaking process. Although there is a Program Assessment 
Rating Tool [PART] process for some of the programs within the 
President's drug control budget, it appears that close to half 
of the dug control budget is not assessed in any systematic 
manner. Oversight activities by the committee have strongly 
suggested the need for a set of uniform and unambiguous 
standards for measuring the results and accountability of drug 
treatment programs. Therefore, the committee believes that 
adequate measures are essential to ensure the effectiveness and 
accountability of the programs as a whole, and continues to 
support uniform standards to measure effectiveness.

                   H. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS

1. General

    The Department of Veteran's Affairs [VA] has served a vital 
role in preventing and treating the abuse of drugs by our 
former military personnel. The committee supports the 
administration's fiscal year 2006 budget request for VA drug 
control. But the Department's stated strategy in the Strategy 
Report and Drug Budget Summary is of concern. Disappointingly, 
while the VA's drug control budget is increasing 16 percent, it 
is actually reducing its provision of services.

2. Waning Services With Waxing Resources

    The VA's ONDCP strategy articulates its intention to 
suspend drug treatment services to new Priority 8 veterans, 
that is, veterans who have an income of $38,100 or more and no 
service-related disability. According to the ONDCP budget 
summary, the suspension is intended by the VA to offset greater 
numbers of patients with ``available resources.'' Given the 16 
percent requested increase of available resources in the VA 
drug treatment budget over fiscal year 2005, the committee 
expresses its concern about a policy of reducing the number of 
servable patients.
    The committee also urges steps toward offering a wider 
variety of residential treatment options, including faith-based 
service providers. Staff interviews of the VA and inspection of 
VA drug treatment facility lists indicate that such programs 
are currently absent from VA services. While such programs are 
proving successful throughout the country and other Federal 
agencies are embracing such options, the VA appears to be 
uninterested. With the recent addition of a Center for Faith-
Based and Community Initiatives at the VA, such a move should 
be made simpler and would be consistent with VA and 
administration goals.

3. Specialized Treatment

    With an increase of drug abuse patients expected from 
currently deployed troops, the committee supports the estimated 
request of $524 million for VA drug treatment programs for 
fiscal year 2006. This compares to the enacted fiscal year 2005 
level of $448 million.
    Split into three areas, the ``Specialized Treatment'' 
account funds ``Domiciliary,'' ``Inpatient,'' and 
``Outpatient'' care. The fiscal year 2006 domiciliary request 
is $47.6 million compared to the fiscal year 2005 enacted 
budget of $45.9 million. The fiscal year 2006 inpatient request 
is $216.7 million compared to the fiscal year 2005 enacted 
budget of $180.3 million. The fiscal year 2006 outpatient 
request is $259.6 million compared to the fiscal year 2005 
enacted budget of $221.7 million. The committee supports the 
division of the budget into these areas and supports their 
budget levels.
    The Strategy Report's stated intention of methadone 
treatment expansion at the VA is of particular concern to the 
committee. The wider national medical community has sought to 
replace methadone treatment with buprenorphine treatment to 
limit addiction. The committee believes that VA should 
reconsider its plan to expand methadone treatment, and instead 
develop more effective methods.

4. Inter-Departmental Cooperation

    The Drug Budget Summary states that VA intends to establish 
a cooperative relationship with the Department of Health and 
Human Services [HHS] and the Department of Defense [DOD] to 
enhance patient treatment. Unfortunately, while this intent 
invokes the appropriate spirit of cooperation, it does not 
indicate how this is to be achieved. Disappointingly, the VA's 
stated intent does not indicate any initiative to gain new 
perspective, but only to provide its own knowledge to other 
departments. The committee strongly urges swift action by the 
VA to engage in a cooperative exchange with the HHS Substance 
Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration [SAMHSA] and 
DOD. According to staff interviews with the VA, SAMHSA and DOD, 
cooperation is nearly non-existent. Immediate action should be 
taken to rectify this disparity between intent and realization.
    Moreover, the committee supports greater cooperation with 
DOD to ensure continuity of care for military personnel. This 
would offer substantial benefit to veterans who are discharged 
from active duty with a substance addiction. The VA strategy 
shows only partial fulfillment of the Department's own goals 
for continuity of care.

5. Research and Development

    The VA's enacted fiscal year 2005 budget for research and 
development on drug abuse was estimated at $9.1 million 
compared to the fiscal year 2006 request of $8.9 million. The 
committee supports the President's request, but we encourage 
greater inter-agency coordination of research and development. 
Although, the Drug Budget Summary describes an initiative to 
share SAMHSA Treatment Improvement Protocols [TIPs], evidence 
indicates that even this initiative has yielded little 
substance. As VA interviews with committee staff made clear, 
the department's drug abuse research is disconnected from 
research conducted at the Department of Health and Human 
Services [HHS] and other Federal agencies. Furthermore, SAMHSA 
TIPs regarding buprenorphine treatment appear to be ignored by 
the VA's focus on methadone expansion. Additionally, there is a 
lack of common reporting statistics amongst researchers at the 
VA and at SAMHSA. The committee encourages greater focus on 
these issues in carrying out the VA's drug control strategy.

6. VA and the Drug Budget

    The committee praises the VA and ONDCP for efforts to offer 
clear budgetary numbers for those costs which are exclusively 
drug related. These exclusive drug treatment services include 
215 substance abuse treatment programs. In fiscal year 2003, 
the VA reports having treated nearly 70,000 veterans who used 
abused illicit drugs. The Department's data collection also 
indicates that most of these veterans transited VA treatment in 
14-28 days where cocaine and heroin are the first and second 
most abused narcotics.
    The departure between the VA's strategy and its budget 
process, however, represent a number of concerns. These 
concerns include the absence of an Office of Management and 
Budget [OMB] PART for the VA drug control budget. The committee 
recommends VA, OMB and ONDCP utilize the abundance of results 
data made available through the VA Program Evaluation Resource 
Center [PERC] to clearly justify budget needs to Congress.

 MINORITY VIEWS OF HON. HENRY A. WAXMAN, HON. PAUL E. KANJORSKI, HON. 
CAROLYN B. MALONEY, HON. ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, HON. DIANE E. WATSON, AND 
                           HON. BRIAN HIGGINS

    We concur with this report in many areas. As stated in 
minority views accompanying the committee's fiscal year 2006 
budget views and estimates, we share the majority's concerns 
regarding the administration's proposed cuts for key drug 
control programs. These cuts include the proposed elimination 
of Safe and Drug Free Schools State grants within the 
Department of Education and Byrne Justice Grants within the 
Department of Justice. We also join the majority in opposing 
the administration's proposal to slash the budget for the High-
Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas program by 56 percent and 
transfer the HIDTA program out of the Office of National Drug 
Control Policy's administrative purview to the Department of 
Justice's Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Forces 
program.
    While there are many areas of agreement, it should be noted 
that, in some areas, the report is simply far too specific in 
its views and findings to represent a true consensus of a 
committee with a large and philosophically and geographically 
diverse membership, even leaving aside partisan differences. 
The minority views that follow do not attempt to catalog these 
instances but rather aim to highlight a few key differences in 
perspective.

                         Reductions in Drug Use

    The report credits the administration with ``achieving 
significant success in the national effort to reduce drug 
abuse.'' While we acknowledge that reductions in overall drug 
use by youth have accelerated since the release of the 
President's 2002 National Drug Control Strategy, it bears 
noting that, in fact, the downward trend in drug use by youth 
began in 1996, 4 years prior to the beginning of this 
administration's first term.
    We further note that the administration's claims of success 
regarding significant reductions in the use of ``any illicit 
drug'' by American youth may be misleading to the extent that 
the overall reductions are almost entirely the result of 
reduced reported use of marijuana, the most widely used drug 
among both youth and adults. There has not been a similar 
downward trend in the use of more harmful drugs such as 
cocaine, crack cocaine, or heroin by youth.
    Indeed, reducing marijuana use has been the principal, if 
not exclusive, focus of ONDCP's primary prevention tool, the 
National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign. Given the narrowness 
of the administration's prevention focus on marijuana, the 
report may be overly generous to the extent it suggests that 
the administration deserves credit for ``achieving'' reported 
reductions in the use by youth of dangerous drugs such as 
methamphetamine (or ``meth'') and MDMA/ecstasy. Anti-drug 
advertising produced by ONDCP's principal creative partner in 
the Media Campaign, the Partnership for a Drug-Free America, 
may have contributed to reported reductions in the use of meth 
and ecstasy, but these ads generally were produced and aired 
independent of any support or direction from the Federal 
Government.
    There is, in any case, ample room for improvement in terms 
of reducing cocaine and heroin use among youth and reducing 
drug use among adults, particularly young adults, overall. 
According to testimony before the committee by ONDCP Director 
John Walters, roughly 26,000 Americans died as a result of drug 
abuse last year; regrettably, that number is higher than in 
previous years. The Nation's drug control strategy should aim 
to reduce this number drastically. Although a singular focus on 
preventing and reducing marijuana use may be an effective 
strategy for meeting the President's goals for reducing overall 
drug use, it will not achieve the objective of reducing 
significantly the number of lives annually lost to drug abuse.

                          Student Drug Testing

    There is a diversity of views among committee members 
concerning the appropriateness of student drug testing and the 
extent to which it should be emphasized in the Nation's drug 
control strategy and budget as a prevention tool.

                  Access to Recovery Treatment Program

    With the President's Access to Recovery [ATR] treatment 
program in its very early stages, it is premature to recommend 
that ATR's voucher-based approach to drug treatment services 
delivery should be expanded to other programs or that it should 
supplant any existing drug treatment services delivery system. 
The strategy and budget should support to a greater extent the 
expansion of access to voluntary drug treatment services. The 
administration's budget request for the Substance Abuse and 
Mental Health Services Administration proposes merely level 
funding for the Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment Block 
Grant and programs other than ATR that seek to reduce the so-
called ``treatment gap'' between drug treatment availability 
and the need for treatment. The block grant has long served as 
the backbone of the Nation's drug treatment funding 
infrastructure, and Targeted Capacity Expansion Grants within 
the Center for Substance Abuse Treatment's Programs of National 
and Regional Significance serve to meet regional and emerging 
needs for drug treatment to ensure that treatment is available 
to those who seek it. It is, at best, premature for the 
administration to rely on ATR as an alternative to established 
programs; moreover, Director Walters has provided explicit 
assurances to the committee that ATR is intended to augment and 
not supplant the existing infrastructure for Federal funding of 
drug treatment services.

              Harm Reduction and Needle Exchange Programs

    Finally, we vigorously disagree with the report's 
statements and findings concerning the purpose, efficacy, and 
legality of ``harm reduction'' strategies, particularly as they 
relate to needle- or syringe-exchange programs (or ``SEPs''). 
Ranking Minority Member Waxman and Criminal Justice, Drug 
Policy, and Human Resources Subcommittee Ranking Minority 
Member Cummings have previously stated their concerns about 
correspondence sent to administration officials by Chairman 
Davis and Subcommittee Chairman Souder that incorrectly 
suggests that SEPs violate the 1961 Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs. In fact, as Ranking Members Waxman and Cummings 
noted in letters to Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice and U.S. 
Agency for International Development Administrator Andrew S. 
Natsios, the International Narcotics Control Board [INCB] has 
stated the following concerning needle-exchange:

        In a number of countries, Governments have introduced 
        since the end of the 1980s programmes for the exchange 
        or distribution of needles or syringes for drug 
        addicts, with the aim of limiting the spread of HIV/
        AIDS. The Board maintains the position expressed by it 
        already in 1987 that Governments need to adopt measures 
        that may decrease the sharing of hypodermic needles 
        among injection drug abusers in order to limit the 
        spread of HIV/AIDS. At the same time, the Board has 
        been stressing that any prophylactic measures should 
        not promote and/or facilitate drug abuse.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ International Narcotics Control Board, Report of the 
International Narcotics Control Board for 2003, 36 (online at http://
www.incb.org/e/ind--ar.htm).

Nowhere has the INCB identified SEPs as violating any provision 
of the Single Convention, despite the majority's interpretation 
of the INCB's 2003 report.
    Since 1991, there have been at least 17 major reviews and 
assessments of needle exchange programs by expert bodies such 
as the National Commission on AIDS, the Institute of Medicine, 
the National Institutes of Health, the Centers for Disease 
Control, the American Medical Association, the American Society 
of Addiction Medicine, and the World Health Organization. These 
assessments have found that needle exchange programs help 
reduce the spread of AIDS and other dangerous infectious 
disease without encouraging or increasing drug use. In fact, 
according to experts, needle exchange programs provide valuable 
opportunities to reduce illegal drug use.
    In part as a result of these conclusions, needle exchange 
programs have been endorsed by a wide range of expert 
scientific and medical organizations, including the American 
Academy of Family Physicians,\2\ the American Academy of 
Pediatrics,\3\ the American Academy of Physician Assistants,\4\ 
the American College of Preventive Medicine,\5\ the American 
Medical Association,\6\ the American Nurses Association,\7\ the 
American Psychological Association,\8\ the Association of 
Nurses in AIDS Care,\9\ and the Infectious Diseases Society of 
America.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ American Academy of Family Physicians, Substance and Alcohol 
Abuse and Addiction (2003) (online at http://www.aafp.org/x7096.xml).
    \3\ American Academy of Pediatrics, Provisional Committee on 
Pediatric AIDS, Reducing the Risk of Human Immunodeficiency Virus 
Infection Associated with Illicit Drug Use, Pediatrics, 945-7 (Dec. 
1994) (online at http://aappolicy.aappublications.org/cgi/reprint/ 
pediatrics;94/6/945.pdf).
    \4\ American Academy of Physician Assistants, Needle/Syringe Access 
for the Prevention of HIV Transmission (policy paper adopted 2003) 
(http://www.aapa.org/policy/needle--access.html).
    \5\ American College of Preventive Medicine, Public Policy on 
Needle-Exchange Programs to Reduce Drug-Associated Morbidity and 
Mortality, American Journal of Preventive Medicine, 173-5 (2000) 
(online at http://www.acpm.org/ajpm369.pdf).
    \6\ American Medical Association, Syringe and Needle Exchange 
Programs (Policy Statement H-95.958) (online at http://www.ama-
assn.org/apps/pf--new/
pf--online?f--n=resultLink&doc=pol- icyfiles/HnE/
H-
95.958.HTM&s--t=syringe+and+needle+exchange+programs&catg=AMA
/HnE& catg=AMA/BnGnC&catg=AMA/DIR&&nth=1&&st--p=0&nth=1&).
    \7\ American Nurses Association, Position Statement: Needle 
Exchange and HIV (effective Apr. 2, 1993) (online at http://
nursingworld.org/readroom/position/blood/blnedl.htm).
    \8\ American Psychological Association, APA Council Endorses Fair-
Testing Code, Forms New Working Group, Among Other Actions (Apr. 4, 
2001) (online at http://www.apa.org/monitor/apr04/endorses.html).
    \9\ Association of Nurses in AIDS Care, Position Statement: Needle 
and Syringe Exchange (rev. Sept. 2002) (online at http://
www.anacnet.org/media/pdfs/
PS--Needle--Syringe--Exch--4
-2003.pdf).
    \10\ Infectious Diseases Society of America, Supporting Document 
for IDSA's Policy Statement on Syringe Exchange, Prescribing and 
Paraphernalia Laws (Oct. 5, 2001) (online at http://www.idsociety.org/
Content/ContentGroups/
Public--Statements--and--Policies1/
Statements/Sup- 
porting--Document--for--IDSA's--
Policy--Statement--on--Syringe--
Exchange--Prescribing--and-- 
Paraphernalia--L.htm) (emphasis in original).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In chronological order, expert reviews and assessments of 
needle exchange programs include the following:

  LIn 1991, the National Commission on AIDS, whose 
members included then-Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney, 
convened a hearing on drug use and HIV. Based on the 
testimonies of expert witnesses at the hearing and a review of 
scientific evidence, the Commission issued a report that found:

        Outreach programs which operate needle exchanges and 
        distribute bleach not only help to control the spread 
        of HIV, but also refer many individuals to treatment 
        programs . . . . Most significantly, these programs, 
        rather than encouraging substance use, lead a 
        substantial number of substance users to seek 
        treatment.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ National Commission on Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, 
The Twin Epidemics of Substance Use and HIV (July 1991) (online at 
http://www.dogwoodcenter.org/references/
studies91F.html#RECOMMENDATION%202).

  LIn 1995, a report prepared by a joint panel of the 
National Research Council and the Institute of Medicine 
reviewed the available evidence on needle exchange programs and 
concluded: ``Needle exchange programs reduce the spread of 
HIV--the virus that causes AIDS--without increasing either the 
injection of illegal drugs among program participants or the 
number of new initiates to injection drug use.'' \12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ National Academies, Needle Exchange Programs Reduce HIV 
Transmission among People Who Inject Illegal Drugs (Sept. 18, 1995) 
(online at http://www4.nationalacademies.org/news.nsf/isbn/
0309052963?OpenDocument).

  LIn 1997, a Consensus Panel convened by the National 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Institutes of Health concluded:

        An impressive body of evidence suggests powerful 
        effects from needle exchange programs. The number of 
        studies showing beneficial effects on behaviors such as 
        needle sharing greatly outnumber those showing no 
        effects. There is no longer doubt that these programs 
        work . . . . Does needle exchange promote drug use? A 
        preponderance of evidence shows either no change or 
        decreased drug use.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ National Institutes of Health, Interventions to Prevent HIV 
Risk Behaviors (Feb. 11-13, 1997) (Consensus Statement No. 104) (online 
at http://consensus.nih.gov/cons/104/104--statement.htm).

  LIn 1997, the Council on Scientific Affairs of the 
American Medical Association issued a report on the medical and 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
scientific literature on needle exchange programs that found:

        There is substantial evidence of reduced needle-sharing 
        among regular participants in needle-exchange programs. 
        More importantly, HIV infection rates among drug users 
        have been consistently lower in cities with needle-
        exchange programs . . . . For example, while the HIV 
        infection rate among injection drug users remained 1% 
        to 2% in the Scottish city of Glasgow, where a needle-
        exchange program was quickly established, it reached 
        70% in nearby Edinburgh, where the response of 
        government officials was to implement even more 
        stringent controls over injection equipment.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ American Medical Association, Report 8 of the Council on 
Scientific Affairs (A-97) (June 1997) (online at http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/category/13636.html).

  LIn 1997, the American Public Health Association 
stated that ``an enormous body of published research'' exists 
``attesting to the efficacy of clean needle exchange for 
reducing HIV transmission among drug users. Moreover, study 
after study has shown that needle exchange does not lead to an 
increase of illegal drug use.'' \15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ American Public Health Association, American Public Health 
Association Supports Lifting Federal Ban on Funding for Needle Exchange 
(Aug. 20, 1997) (online at http://www.apha.org/news/press/1997/
needle.htm).

  LIn 2000, the U.S. Surgeon General and other senior 
scientists at the Department of Health and Human Services 
reviewed scientific research completed since April 1998 on 
needle exchange programs. In a published summary of the review, 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the Surgeon General announced:

        After reviewing all of the research to date, the senior 
        scientists of the Department and I have unanimously 
        agreed that there is conclusive scientific evidence 
        that syringe exchange programs, as part of a 
        comprehensive HIV prevention strategy, are an effective 
        public health intervention that reduces the 
        transmission of HIV and does not encourage the use of 
        illegal drugs.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Evidence-Based 
Findings on the Efficacy of Syringe Exchange Programs: An Analysis of 
the Scientific Research Completed since April 1998 (Mar. 17, 2000).

  LIn 2000, the Institute of Medicine released a report 
on the findings of a committee it had convened at the request 
of the Centers for Disease Control to conduct a comprehensive 
review of current HIV prevention efforts in the United States. 
The report described the evidence on needle exchange programs 
as ``compelling'' and cited a study that suggested that 
``expanded provision of needle exchange programs in the United 
States could have averted between 10,000 and 20,000 new 
infections over the past decade.'' \17\ According to the 
report:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\ Institute of Medicine, No Time to Lose: Getting More from HIV 
Prevention, 114-5 (2000) (online at http://books.nap.edu/books/
0309071372/html/1.html#pagetop).

        Although many communities and law enforcement officials 
        have expressed concern that increasing availability of 
        injection equipment will lead to increased drug use, 
        criminal activity, and discarded contaminated syringes, 
        studies have found no scientifically reliable evidence 
        of these negative effects.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\ Institute of Medicine, No Time to Lose: Getting More from HIV 
Prevention, 114-5 (2000) (online at http://books.nap.edu/books/
0309071372/html/1.html#pagetop).

  LIn 2000, the Academy for Educational Development, in 
a policy report prepared in collaboration with the Centers for 
Disease Control, observed that much research had been conducted 
on needle exchange programs. Citing this research, the report 
concludes that ``SEPs [syringe exchange programs] have 
significant positive effects on preventing adverse health 
consequences associated with injection drug use and . . . do 
not increase drug use or promote the initiation of injection 
drug use.'' \19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ Academy for Educational Development, A Comprehensive Approach: 
Preventing Blood-Borne Infections among Injection Drug Users, A7 (Dec. 
2000) (online at http://www.thebody.com/cdc/pdfs/comprehensive-
approach.pdf).

  LIn 2000, the American Society of Addition Medicine 
reported that ``[n]eedle exchange programs have been shown to 
be a crucial component of a spectrum of HIV prevention services 
to injection drug users, resulting in an effective reduction in 
the transmission of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus.'' The 
Society of Addiction Medicine also reported that ``[t]here has 
not been an increase in drug use or an increase in injection as 
a route of drug administration as a result of implementation of 
needle exchange programs, nor has there been demonstration of 
an increase in contaminated injection equipment in the 
community.'' \20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\ American Society of Addiction Medicine, Public Policy of ASAM: 
Access to Sterile Syringes and Needles (adopted Dec. 20, 2000) (online 
at http://www.asam.org/ppol/Needle%20Exchange.htm).

  LIn 2002, the Centers for Disease Control summarized 
scientific studies of needle exchange programs. CDC explained: 
``SEPs have been shown to be an effective way to link some 
hard-to-reach IDUs [intravenous drug users] with important 
public health services, including TB and STD treatment. Through 
their referrals to substance abuse treatment, SEPs can help 
IDUs stop using drugs. Studies also show that SEPs do not 
encourage drug use among SEP participants or the recruitment of 
first-time drug users.'' \21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\ Centers for Disease Control, Syringe Exchange Programs (Jan. 
2002) (online at http://www.cdc.gov/idu/facts/
aed--idu--syr.htm).

  LIn 2002, the National Institute on Drug Abuse 
published a research-based guide to preventing HIV in drug-
using populations. Concerning needle exchange programs, the 
guide stated: ``Evaluations of these programs indicate that 
they are an effective part of a comprehensive strategy to 
reduce the injection drug use-related spread of HIV and other 
blood-borne infections. In addition they do not encourage the 
use of illicit drugs.'' \22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\ National Institutes of Health, National Institute on Drug 
Abuse, Principles of HIV Prevention in Drug-Using Populations: A 
Research-Based Guide (Mar. 2002).

  LIn 2002, a Consensus Panel convened by the National 
Institutes of Health on management of hepatitis C found that 
``needle and syringe exchange programs . . . have been shown to 
be effective in preventing HIV transmission and are likely to 
be useful for decreasing HCV transmission.'' \23\ The panel 
recommended: ``Institute measures to reduce transmission of HCV 
among IDUs, including providing access to sterile syringes 
through needle exchange, physician prescription, and pharmacy 
sales.'' \24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\ National Institutes of Health, Management of Hepatitis C: 2002 
(June 10-12, 2002) (http://consensus.nih.gov/cons/116/
091202116cdc--statement.htm#5).
    \24\ Id.

  LIn 2003, the head of the HIV/AIDS unit of the 
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Societies, stated: ``There is clear scientific evidence that 
needle exchange programmes work. They help contain the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic, and in a very cost effective way. Evidence is also 
clear that these programmes do not promote drug use.'' \25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \25\ International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Societies, Spreading the Light of Science: Guidelines on Harm Reduction 
Related to Injecting Drug Use, 53 (2003) (online at http://
www.ifrc.org/cgi/pdf--pubs.pl?health/hivaids/
harm--reduction.pdf).

  LIn 2004, the Association of State and Territorial 
Health Officials, together with the National Alliance of State 
and Territorial AIDS Directors, the National Association of 
County and City Health Officials, and the Council of State and 
Territorial Epidemiologists, stated that ``[s]cientific 
evidence demonstrates that needle exchange programs and 
pharmacy sales of sterile syringes can be effective public 
health strategies to reduce the transmission of injection-
related HIV infection without increasing drug use.'' \26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\ Association of State and Territorial Health Officials, 
Position Statement: Guiding Principles for HIV Prevention (approved 
June 18, 2004) (online at http://www.astho.org/
policy--statements/HIV%20Position%20Statement.pdf).

  LIn 2004, Dr. Elias A. Zerhouni, Director of the 
National Institutes of Health, wrote a letter to Members of 
Congress in response to an inquiry about the scientific 
evidence on syringe exchange programs. The letter stated: ``A 
number of studies conducted in the U.S. have shown that SEPs do 
not increase drug use among participants or surrounding 
community members and are associated with reductions in the 
incidence of HIV, hepatitis B, and hepatitis C in the drug-
using population.'' \27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \27\ Letter from NIH Director Dr. Elias A. Zerhouni to 
Representatives Henry A. Waxman and Elijah E. Cummings (Oct. 7, 2004).

  LIn 2004, a policy brief from the World Heath 
Organization discussed the evidence obtained from a review of 
more than 200 studies on needle and syringe exchange programs. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The policy brief reported:

        There is compelling evidence that increasing the 
        availability and utilization of sterile injecting 
        equipment for both out-of-treatment and in-treatment 
        injecting drug users contributes substantially to 
        reductions in the rate of HIV transmission. . . . There 
        is no convincing evidence of major unintended negative 
        consequences of programmes providing sterile injecting 
        equipment to injecting drug users, such as initiation 
        of injecting among people who have not injected 
        previously, or an increase in the duration or frequency 
        of illicit drug use or drug injection.\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \28\ World Health Organization, Policy Brief: Provision of Sterile 
Injecting Equipment to Reduce HIV Transmission (2004) (online at http:/
/www.wpro.who.int/NR/rdonlyres/BA463DB4-2390-4964-9D86-11CBABCC9DA9/0/
provisionofsterileen.pdf).

  LIn 2004, the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/
AIDS noted that ``[a] review comparing HIV prevalence in cities 
across the globe with and without needle and syringe programmes 
found that cities which introduced such programmes showed a 
mean annual 19% decrease in HIV prevalence. This compares with 
an 8% increase in cities that failed to implement prevention 
measures.'' \29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \29\ United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS, 2004 Report on the 
Global AIDS Epidemic, 85 (June 2004) (online at http://www.unaids.org/
bangkok2004/GAR2004--pdf/
Chapter4--prevention--en.pdf).

    We strongly believe that U.S. policy on syringe-exchange 
should be based upon scientific evidence as to its efficacy and 
that the United States should not exercise is disproportionate 
influence in international organizations and forums to 
discourage the implementation of non-U.S.-funded syringe 
exchange programs. The international community should not be 
restricted from opting to implement programs to prevent the 
transmission of HIV/AIDS among injection drug users and the 
broader population. Syringe exchange may hold the promise of 
saving millions of lives in developing countries that are at 
high risk of suffering an explosion in HIV/AIDs infections as a 
result of IDU-driven transmission; further, as the scientific 
evidence indicates, it can do so without increasing drug use 
among participants or surrounding community members.
    The committee's apparently ongoing inquiry into USAID 
activities relating to harm reduction has yielded no evidence 
that any USAID funds have been improperly expended.

                                   Hon. Henry A. Waxman.
                                   Hon. Paul E. Kanjorski.
                                   Hon. Carolyn B. Maloney.
                                   Hon. Elijah E. Cummings.
                                   Hon. Diane E. Watson.
                                   Hon. Brian Higgins.

                                 
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