[House Report 109-165]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



109th Congress                                                   Report
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 1st Session                                                    109-165

======================================================================



 
                     EAST ASIA SECURITY ACT OF 2005

                                _______
                                

 July 12, 2005.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

 Mr. Hyde from the Committee on International Relations, submitted the 
                               following

                              R E P O R T

                        [To accompany H.R. 3100]

                  [Including Committee cost estimate]

    The Committee on International Relations, to whom was 
referred the bill (H.R. 3100) to authorize measures to deter 
arms transfers by foreign countries to the People's Republic of 
China, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon 
without amendment and recommends that the bill do pass.

                           TABLE OF CONTENTS

                                                                   Page
Purpose and Summary..............................................     1
Background and Need for the Legislation..........................     2
Exchange of Letters on Committee Jurisdiction....................     3
Hearings.........................................................     4
Committee Consideration..........................................     4
Votes of the Committee...........................................     4
Committee Oversight Findings.....................................     5
New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures........................     5
Committee Cost Estimate..........................................     5
Performance Goals and Objectives.................................     5
Constitutional Authority Statement...............................     5
Section-by-Section Analysis and Discussion.......................     5
New Advisory Committees..........................................    11
Congressional Accountability Act.................................    11
Federal Mandates.................................................    12

                          Purpose and Summary

    H.R. 3100 would accomplish several important objectives 
with respect to continuing United States concerns regarding 
arms-related sales to the People's Republic of China by member 
states of the European Union. The bill would ensure Congress 
has the information it needs from the Executive Branch to 
perform its constitutional oversight duties in this area. There 
is little information available publicly about European arms-
related sales to China after 2003 and that information which is 
available is at a high level of generality.
    Under H.R. 3100, the President would henceforth submit an 
annual report to the Congress on European companies that sell 
arms-related technology to China and on European governments 
whose policies condone those sales. Moreover, for those 
European companies and governments that continue their 
dangerous arms relationships with China, the bill would 
establish additional United States Government oversight 
requirements of a procedural nature governing their access to 
sensitive U.S. weapons technology. In such a case, H.R. 3100 
would require mandatory export licenses and Congressional 
notification procedures for certain types of licenses.
    Further, the President would be given new authority to help 
deter future European arms-related sales. The bill would 
provide a menu of measures or restrictions the President could 
draw on in limiting or denying the access of culpable persons 
to United States weapons technology. The measures would be 
discretionary to begin with, but would become mandatory for 
``repeat offenders.'' Even then, however, H.R. 3100 would give 
the President substantial latitude to waive application of the 
measures if he determines it is important to the national 
security interests of the United States to do so.
    Significantly, the bill would not have a retroactive 
character; it would not ``reach back'' to cover European arms-
related transfers that occurred prior to January 1, 2005, 
however egregious they may have been. That is because the main 
purpose of the bill is not punitive in nature, but to deter 
dangerous future conduct and to facilitate improved policy 
coordination on the matter of China's military buildup between 
the United States and member states of the European Union. In 
this context, the optimal report Congress could receive under 
the provisions of H.R. 3100 would be one in which no European 
company or government is named. However, if EU member states do 
not make it possible for this to happen, the President would 
then be in a position under H.R. 3100 to take other necessary 
steps (e.g., application of the authorized measures), in 
consultation with the Congress, to safeguard United States 
security interests.

                Background and Need for the Legislation

    The supply of European weapons technology to China has been 
increasing steadily in recent years, both in quantity and 
sophistication. In the 3-year period between 2001 and 2003 (the 
latest year for which data are publicly available from the 
European Union) European arms sales increased eightfold to $540 
million. Quantitatively, this level of arms sales (more than 
one-half billion dollars) exceeds the level which the United 
States Government licenses on an annual basis to more than 85 
percent of the member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (e.g., of the other 25 NATO member countries, only 
U.S. arms sales licensed for the UK, Germany, Italy and Turkey 
exceeded $500 million in fiscal year 2004). Qualitatively, 
European arms-related sales since the early 1990s that have 
been revealed in press reports have also included a number of 
systems which increase the range, reliability and lethality of 
China's attack aircraft and other offensive weapons systems. 
The implications of these arms-related sales are uniformly 
negative for the security of United States Armed Forces in East 
Asia, for the defense of United States friends and allies in 
the region, and for regional stability more broadly. China, 
itself, faces no threat from any of its neighbors that could 
justify the acquisition of threatening military capabilities.
    On February 2, 2005, the House agreed to House Resolution 
57 by an overwhelming vote (411-3). That resolution called on 
the European Union to maintain its arms embargo on China and to 
eliminate gaps and other weaknesses in its embargo, as well as 
in the national policies of EU member states, which have 
permitted European arms-related sales to China to escalate to 
an alarming level.
    The European Union has apparently decided for now not to 
terminate its formal arms embargo on China. But, the European 
Union and its member states have remained silent on actually 
stopping the supply of weapons related technology to China. 
This implies that European countries which have been aiding 
China's military buildup may continue to do so, even while a 
new strategic dialogue on security in East Asia has begun with 
the United States Government.

             Exchange of Letters on Committee Jurisdiction

                      Hon. Henry J. Hyde, Chairman,
                House Committee on International Relations,
                                      Washington, DC, July 6, 2005.
Hon. Duncan Hunter, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: I am writing to you concerning the bill, 
H.R. 3100, ``The East Asia Security Act of 2005.'' The 
Committee on International Relations has marked up the bill and 
ordered it reported by a unanimous vote.
    There are certain provisions within the version of the 
legislation ordered reported by the Committee which fall within 
the Rule X jurisdiction of your Committee. Specifically, I 
refer to the language in Section 4, entitled, ``Reports on 
China Arms Transfer Policies of Countries Participating in the 
United States Defense Cooperation Projects; Certain License 
Requirements,'' and Section 7, entitled, ``Application of 
Measures to Certain Foreign Persons.''
    In the interest of permitting this Committee to proceed 
expeditiously to the floor consideration of this bill, I 
request your Committee waive its right to sequential referral 
on this matter. I understand that such a waiver only applies to 
this language in this bill, and not to the underlying subject 
matter. I will urge the Speaker of the House to include Members 
of your Committee in any conference committee which is named to 
consider this bill.
    I appreciate you willingness to allow us to proceed. I will 
insert this exchange of letters into the Committee report on 
this bill.
            Sincerely,
                                   Henry J. Hyde, Chairman.
                              ----------                              


                      Hon. Duncan Hunter, Chairman,
                         House Committee on Armed Services,
                                      Washington, DC, July 6, 2005.
Hon. Henry J. Hyde, Chairman,
Committee on International Relations,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: On June 30, 2005, the Committee on 
International Relations ordered reported H.R. 3100, the ``East 
Asia Security Act of 2005''. As you know, this measure contains 
provisions that are within the jurisdiction of this Committee. 
These provisions include:

        Section 4. Report on China Arms Transfer Policies of 
        Countries Participating in United States Defense 
        Cooperative Projects; Certain License Requirements, and

        Section 7. Application of Measures to Certain Foreign 
        Persons.

    Knowing of your interest in expediting this legislation 
and, indeed, my support for the measure, I will waive 
consideration of H.R. 3100 by the Committee on Armed Services. 
I do so with the understanding that by waiving consideration of 
the bill, the Committee on Armed Services does not waive any 
future jurisdictional claim over these or similar measures. In 
addition, in the event of a conference with the Senate on this 
matter, the Committee on Armed Services reserves the right to 
seek appointment of conferees.
            Sincerely,
                                   Duncan Hunter, Chairman.
                              ----------                              


                                Hearings

    On April 14, 2005, the Committee held a joint hearing with 
the Committee on Armed Services on arms exports to the People's 
Republic of China by member states of the European Union. 
Testimony was received from the Under Secretary for Political 
Affairs, Department of State, the Assistant Secretary for 
International Security Affairs, Department of Defense, and the 
acting Under Secretary for Industry and Security, Department of 
Commerce.

                        Committee Consideration

    H.R. 3100 was introduced on June 29, 2005, by Chairman 
Hyde, cosponsored by Mr. Lantos, Mr. Hunter, Mr. Faleomavaega, 
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen, Mr. McCotter, Mrs. Jo Ann Davis of Virginia, 
Mr. Burton, Mr. Smith of New Jersey, Mr. McCaul, Ms. Harris, 
Mr. Weller, and Mr. Boozman and was referred to the Committee 
on International Relations. On June 30, 2005, the Committee met 
in open session and ordered favorably reported the bill H.R. 
3100, a quorum being present.

                         Votes of the Committee

    There were no recorded votes on H.R. 3100.

                      Committee Oversight Findings

    In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules 
of the House of Representatives, the Committee reports that the 
findings and recommendations of the Committee, based on 
oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of rule X of the 
Rules of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in the 
descriptive portions of this report.

               New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures

    Clause 3(c)(2) of House Rule XIII is inapplicable because 
this legislation does not provide new budgetary authority or 
increased tax expenditures.

                        Committee Cost Estimate

    In compliance with clause 3(d)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules 
of the House of Representatives, the Committee believes that 
the bill will have no cost for the current fiscal year 2005, 
and that the cost incurred in carrying out H.R. 3100 in future 
years would center principally on the complexity of report 
preparation, involving the work of 5 to 7 full-time personnel 
at a cost of $650,000 to $900,00 per year for each of the next 
5 fiscal years.

                    Performance Goals and Objectives

    The goals and objectives of H.R. 3100 are to enhance the 
national security interests of the United States by deterring 
future transfers of weapons-related technology to the People's 
Republic of China and by improving the effectiveness of 
Executive Branch and Congressional oversight of certain foreign 
access to United States weapons-related technology.

                   Constitutional Authority Statement

    Pursuant to clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 
House of Representatives, the Committee finds the authority for 
this legislation in article I, section 8, clause 18 of the 
Constitution (relating to making all laws necessary and proper 
for carrying into execution powers vested by the Constitution 
in the Government of the United States).

               Section-by-Section Analysis and Discussion

Section 1. Short Title.
    This section provides that the bill may be cited as the 
East Asia Security Act of 2005.

Section 2. Statements of Policy.
    This section sets forth several statements of policy. In 
particular, this section welcomes deferral of a decision by the 
European Union (``EU'') to terminate its arms embargo on the 
People's Republic of China but notes that, even while the 
embargo has been in effect, European arms sales increased 
eightfold to $540 million in the 3-year period, 2001-2003 (2003 
being the last year for which data are available). It also 
expresses concern that, notwithstanding a continuation of the 
arms embargo for the near future, none of the EU member states 
which has been selling arms-related technology to Beijing 
through various loopholes in their national policies or in the 
embargo itself has indicated any intention of ceasing or even 
moderating its sales--even while a ``strategic dialogue'' on 
security in East Asia has begun between the United States and 
the EU. In this respect, the Committee has recalled that H. 
Res. 57, overwhelmingly passed by the House (411-3) on February 
2, 2005, called on European leaders to ``close any gaps in the 
European Union's arms embargo on the People's Republic of 
China, in the national export controls systems of EU member 
states, and in the EU's Code of Conduct on Arms Exports in 
order to prevent any future sale of arms or related technology 
to China.'' This section expresses a further concern that 
European firms identified publicly as aiding Beijing's military 
buildup are also participants in leading edge U.S. weapons 
programs through various cooperative research and development 
(``R&D'') projects with the Department of Defense.

Section 3. Report on Foreign Military Exports to China.
    This section requires the President to submit a report 6 
months following enactment and annually thereafter identifying 
every foreign person of the EU for which the United States has 
credible information that such person has exported to China any 
arms or dual use technology for military end use since January 
1, 2005. The arms and related technology covered by the report 
are those specified in the internationally-agreed Munitions 
List and Dual Use List of the Wassenaar Arrangement for Export 
Controls on Conventional Arms and Dual Use Goods and 
Technologies, headquartered in Vienna. Also covered are any 
other (e.g., ``unlisted'') dual use goods and technologies 
intended entirely or in part for use with a munitions item. The 
United States and EU member states participate in this 
arrangement and have accepted these control lists as the basis 
for their national policies. Similarly, the additional category 
covered by the report concerning ``unlisted'' dual use goods 
and technologies intended for military end use in countries 
subject to arms embargoes corresponds to an understanding 
reached in the Wassenaar plenary meeting of 2003 which the 
United States and EU member states have also accepted. However, 
neither this section nor others in the bill covers an export of 
dual use goods and technology strictly for Chinese commercial 
or civil end use. Nor does this bill apply generally to exports 
to Hong Kong in view of sections 103(8) and 201(a) of the 
United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 (Public Law 102-
383). Further, the President is also authorized, but not 
required, to report on the activities of any other non-EU 
foreign persons. The Committee has noted that both Russia and 
Israel have been arms suppliers to China in recent years, and 
that the Executive Branch is taking action to address issues 
associated with recent Israeli transfers. While the situations 
of Russia, Israel and other countries are qualitatively 
different than that of the member states of the European Union 
in terms of the scale and depth of their participation in 
United States weapons programs and defense industrial 
cooperation more broadly, the Committee expects that the 
President will ensure Congress is kept fully informed of all 
foreign support for China's military programs, either through 
the use of the discretionary reporting authority provided in 
this section or through other means.

Section 4. Report on China Arms Transfer Policies of Countries 
        Participating in United States Defense Cooperative Projects; 
        Certain License Requirements.
    This section requires the President to submit a report 6 
months after enactment and at annual intervals thereafter 
identifying every foreign country engaged in U.S. cooperative 
weapons R&D projects whose policies on or after the date of 
enactment permit transfers to China covered by section 3 of the 
bill (i.e., arms and dual use items for military purposes). The 
President would be authorized to combine this report with the 
report under section 3.
    This section also provides that a State Department 
munitions license would be required for the export of U.S. 
weapons technology in furtherance of a cooperative project to a 
country identified in a report under this section when 
undertaken by any person not an officer or employee of the U.S. 
Government (e.g., such as a private U.S. contractor). In recent 
years, the State Department has adopted a practice of 
deemphasizing the requirement for an export license in cases 
involving private exports related to cooperative weapons 
projects. During the 108th Congress, the Chairman of the 
Committee raised several questions with the Departments of 
State and Defense (which remain unanswered) concerning this 
practice under existing United States law, while noting that 
the use of export license exemptions for such purposes is 
generally suspect on legal and policy grounds. When used to 
transfer U.S. weapons technology to foreign firms which are 
also contractors for Chinese military programs, the use of 
license exemptions becomes even more problematic.
    In this regard, the Committee is concerned by the 
heightened risk to the security of United States weapons 
technology presented in cooperative projects with countries 
which have policies permitting weapons-related transfers to 
China. The Committee understands there are several hundred such 
cooperative projects underway at various levels involving other 
countries and their private defense contractors, many of them 
European. The Committee has also noted that, historically, such 
projects further well-established patterns of transatlantic 
cooperation and the objectives of the Arms Export Control Act 
in reducing the costs of future weapons research and 
development through collaboration with North Atlantic Treaty 
allies, the underlying premise for which has been a sense of 
shared security interests. However, in a period of changing 
allied relationships in which traditional concepts of mutual 
security appear less certain, the Committee is troubled by the 
conflict of interest that arises through the participation of 
the same or affiliated foreign contractors in both United 
States and Chinese weapons programs and the implications of 
such conflicted interests for safeguarding sensitive United 
States weapons technology. The Committee concurs with the 
assessment of the Chairman of the Committee on Armed Services 
during the April 14, 2005, Joint Hearing of the Committee on 
Armed Services and the Committee on International Relations 
that the technology-control management problems presented by 
European corporations which are at once working with the United 
States and availing themselves of some of the most sensitive 
United States technology and at the same time working with the 
Chinese on important military systems may result in a ``mission 
impossible.''
    In this respect, the Committee has noted a variety of 
public reports which implicate European contractors involved in 
United States cooperative weapons R&D projects as key suppliers 
to China's armed forces. For example, to cite one example, a 
variety of public reports indicate that the Chinese fighter/
interceptor aircraft Chengdu F-7 has been equipped with the 
Grifo-7 air combat radar (e.g., CRS Report for Congress: 
``European Union's Arms Embargo on China: Implications and 
Options for U.S. Policy (Updated May 27, 2005). The Grifo 
radars are a family of advanced radars featuring high 
electronic counter measures immunity with ``look up/look down'' 
capabilities. They are manufactured by Galileo Avionica SpA, a 
Finmeccanica company based in Italy. Galileo Avionica 
specializes in mission electronics, avionics and electro-optics 
and is also working on several contracts in these areas for the 
U.S. Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program, including elements of 
the JSF electro-optical targeting system. Such a dual supplier 
role by European defense firms (which is not unique to Galileo 
Avionica) would appear to imply elevated risks to the U.S. 
program of inappropriate technology transfer to China, which 
may not be easy to mitigate.
    While this section would not bar the simultaneous 
participation of foreign military contractors for China in 
United States weapons research programs, other provisions of 
this bill would authorize the President to do so in appropriate 
circumstances (discussed below). However, this section would 
require that United States weapons technology transferred by 
private persons to any country in which such contractors are 
based be subject to an export license requirement under section 
38 of the Arms Export Control Act, unless exported by an 
officer or employee of the United States Government, and that 
issuance of any such export license be preceded by notification 
to Congress through long-standing procedures under section 36 
of the Arms Export Control Act. The first of these requirements 
is the essence of what is already required under sections 27 
and 38 of the Arms Export Control Act. The Committee believes 
these measures are the minimum necessary to ensure that any 
subsequent unlawful use or diversion of the United States 
weapons technology may be susceptible to enforcement action by 
our Government and that an appropriate level of Congressional 
oversight is assured for such complex arrangements involving an 
elevated risk of inappropriate technology transfer, through 
which the Committee would intend to scrutinize very carefully 
any technology-control management issues presented in such 
matters. By the same measure, the Committee hopes that 
additional Congressional oversight will not become necessary by 
virtue of the fact that European companies will not engage in 
future arms-related transfers to China and European governments 
will adopt policies preventing future arms-related transfers, 
such that there would be no basis for them to be identified in 
any report from the President required by this bill.

Section 5. Certain Foreign Ownership and Control of Defense Articles in 
        the United States.
    This section requires that a license be issued under 
section 38(g)(6) of the Arms Export Control Act before 
ownership or control of U.S. weapons and other defense 
articles--and related munitions export licenses--may be 
transferred to certain foreign persons as a result of their 
acquisition or control of a U.S. defense firm required to be 
registered under section 38 of that Act. The foreign persons 
affected by this requirement would be those who are nationals 
of China or otherwise subject to China's jurisdiction, persons 
identified in a report under section 3 of this bill or having 
their principal place of business in a country identified in a 
report under section 4, or business organizations set up in the 
United States but owned or controlled, in fact, by a foreign 
person or country identified in a report under sections 3 or 4 
of this bill.
    This section would also require that a Presidential finding 
under section 902 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 
FY 90-91 (Public Law 101-246) precede issuance of a munitions 
license in the case of Chinese ownership or control of a United 
States defense firm (as already required more generally for 
munitions licenses for China). This section would further 
require that issuance of such a license and of any other 
license under this section be preceded by Congressional 
notification procedures established in section 36 of the Arms 
Export Control Act (as in sections 4 and 6). This section would 
not be retroactive to matters occurring prior to enactment.
    The Committee has noted that section 122.4(b) of the 
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (22 CFR 
Sec. 122.4(b))--the Department of State's regulations for 
implementing the Arms Export Control Act--has long stipulated 
that the Department may require a new (or fresh) license under 
section 38(g)(6) of the Arms Export Control Act in certain 
circumstances involving foreign ownership or control of U.S. 
weapons technology arising from acquisitions or mergers before 
reassigning valid munitions export licenses from one registered 
firm to another (in lieu of merely amending existing licenses 
through an essentially routine procedure to effect a change in 
the name of the licensee). Section 5 would henceforth require a 
new license (or licenses) in the circumstances specified and 
envisages that a regulation would be promulgated to establish 
any details associated with implementation. The Committee would 
expect in such circumstances, given the fundamentally changed 
character of the new licensee, that the reliability of the new 
licensee would not be presumed (as may sometimes have been the 
case in the past with respect to defense firms headquartered in 
European countries) but, instead, would need to be established 
de novo through inter-agency review involving the Department of 
Defense and other agencies, as appropriate, of the full range 
and sensitivity of the U.S. weapons technology covered by the 
munitions export licenses to be conveyed to the new licensee 
and whether new or revised license terms and conditions are 
needed to ensure compliance with U.S. law and policy. By the 
same measure, this section does not prohibit or restrict (other 
than with respect to Chinese control for which a Presidential 
finding is needed) the transfer of U.S. munitions licenses to 
foreign-owned or controlled persons, but mandates a more 
considered review by the Executive Branch through issuance of a 
license (currently a matter of discretion) and by Congress when 
the new licensee is a person named--or the subsidiary of a 
person named--in a report by the President under this bill.

Section 6. Chinese Military End Use of Dual Use Exports.
    This section would require a license for any item proposed 
for export to China described in section 3 (i.e., arms and dual 
use items for military end use) that does not already require a 
license under section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act. This 
statement also welcomes the December 2003 statement of 
understanding reached by the United States, EU member states, 
and other members of the Wassenaar arrangement concerning the 
need to ensure appropriate governmental authorization for non-
listed dual use items when intended for military end use in an 
embargoed country.
    This section would require additionally that such a license 
be notified to Congress under section 36 procedures of the Arms 
Export Control Act before issuance (as in sections 4 and 5, 
discussed above).
    The Committee has recalled the testimony of the acting 
Under Secretary for Industry and Security of the Department on 
Commerce on April 14, 2005, before a joint hearing of the 
Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on International 
Relations concerning the policy of the Administration not to 
approve exports of dual use goods and technology to the Chinese 
military. The Committee has also recalled from that same 
testimony that the Department of Commerce is preparing a new 
regulation to eliminate ambiguity in the Export Administration 
Regulations concerning this question.
    The Committee has also noted that the Department of 
Commerce has furnished the Chairman of the Committee with 
documents describing approximately fifty thousand (50,000) dual 
use goods and technologies that have been classified by the 
Department of Commerce since fiscal year 1996 in such a way 
that their export to the Chinese military is permissible under 
Commerce Department rules and procedures without the need to 
apply for an export license. The Committee has similarly noted 
the Chairman's receipt of additional information from the 
Commerce Department stating that it has confirmed that more 
than $2 million worth of such goods and technologies were, in 
fact, transferred to the Chinese military from the United 
States in recent years, but that the Commerce Department was 
not able to analyze each of the 50,000 items to determine if 
they were actually exported to the Chinese military. This is 
because, according to the Department of Commerce, it would be 
extremely difficult and resource-intensive to attempt to 
confirm for these 50,000 commodity classifications whether 
items were actually shipped, to which destinations the items 
may have been shipped, and the specific end-users for the items 
actually shipped. Because the Department of Commerce does not 
have complete and reliable records in this respect, the 
Committee cannot know whether the $2 million in goods exported 
represents the totality of all U.S. dual use goods and 
technology shipped to the Chinese military without a license or 
merely some fraction thereof.
    The Committee believes that if, as has been suggested by 
the Department of Commerce, unlicensed U.S. trade in dual-use 
goods and technology with the Chinese military is at a low 
level, the application of a licensing requirement to these 
technologies when sent to the Chinese military will not result 
in any burden on the Commerce Department or U.S. business. On 
the other hand, if unlicensed trade with the Chinese military 
in these 50,000 areas (which by the Commerce Department's 
definition involve goods and technologies that may be deployed 
in a military or proliferation mode) has become substantial 
notwithstanding the U.S. arms embargo on China, it is important 
for the U.S. Government to know this and to apply the necessary 
oversight, including review by the Defense Department. Further, 
although not mandated by this bill, the Department of Commerce 
would be free to promulgate a broad prohibition on all dual use 
goods and technology to the Chinese military, which it has 
recently testified is the essence of its policy in any case.

Section 7. Application of Measures to Certain Foreign Persons.
    This section provides the President with discretionary 
authority to impose for 2 years or longer any or all of certain 
enumerated measures (e.g., denial of U.S. security assistance, 
participation in U.S. weapons research, etc.) with respect to a 
foreign person identified in a report under section 3. In the 
case of a foreign person identified in more than one report 
(e.g., ``repeat offenders''), the President would be required 
to impose measures, but in section 9 (discussed below) is also 
given the power to waive their imposition, subject to certain 
conditions.

Section 8. Procedures if Discretionary Measures Are Not Applied.
    This section requires a report by the President to Congress 
in instances where he may decide not to impose discretionary 
measures.

Section 9. Determinations Exempting Foreign Persons from Mandatory 
        Measures.
    This section provides in cases where the imposition of 
measures is mandatory (e.g., ``repeat offenders'') for their 
waiver upon submission of a report to Congress by the President 
reflecting his determination that: (1) the involved foreign 
person did not knowingly export the item at issue; or (2) the 
foreign government having primary jurisdiction has concluded an 
agreement with the United States to resolve the matter 
consistent with criteria specified in this section of the bill.
    This section also provides the President with additional 
authority to waive any mandatory measure upon a determination 
and report to Congress that it is important to the 
counterterrorism, nonproliferation or other national security 
interests of the United States to do so.

Section 10. Definitions.
    This section provides the definitions of terms commonly 
used throughout the bill, which are generally terms well-
established in the Arms Export Control Act, the Export 
Administration Act, or the regulations promulgated by the 
Departments of State and Commerce, respectively, to implement 
those Acts (known as the International Traffic in Arms 
Regulations and the Export Administration Regulations).

                        New Advisory Committees

    H.R. 3100 does not establish or authorize any new advisory 
committee.

                    Congressional Accountability Act

    H.R. 3100 does not apply to the legislative branch.

                            Federal Mandates

    H.R. 3100 imposes no Federal mandates.

                                  
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