[House Report 109-120]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



109th Congress                                                   Report
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 1st Session                                                    109-120

======================================================================



 
            HENRY J. HYDE UNITED NATIONS REFORM ACT OF 2005

                                _______
                                

 June 10, 2005.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

Mr. Hyde, from the Committee on International Relations, submitted the 
                               following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                            DISSENTING VIEWS

                        [To accompany H.R. 2745]

      [Includes cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

    The Committee on International Relations, to whom was 
referred the bill (H.R. 2745) to reform the United Nations, and 
for other purposes, having considered the same, reports 
favorably thereon with an amendment and recommends that the 
bill as amended do pass.

                           TABLE OF CONTENTS

                                                                   Page
The Amendment....................................................     2
Background and Purpose...........................................    21
Summary..........................................................    22
Hearings.........................................................    24
Committee Consideration..........................................    25
Roll Call Votes..................................................    26
Committee Oversight Findings.....................................    26
New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures........................    27
Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate........................    27
Performance Goals and Objectives.................................    28
Constitutional Authority Statement...............................    28
Section-by-Section Analysis......................................    28
Federal Mandates.................................................    47
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported............    47
Dissenting Views.................................................    53

                             The Amendment

    The amendment is as follows:
    Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the 
following:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

    (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Henry J. Hyde 
United Nations Reform Act of 2005''.
    (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as 
follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
Sec. 3. Statement of Congress.

           TITLE I--MISSION AND BUDGET OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Sec. 101. United States financial contributions to the United Nations.
Sec. 102. Weighted voting.
Sec. 103. Budget certification requirements.
Sec. 104.  Accountability.
Sec. 105. Terrorism and the United Nations.
Sec. 106. United Nations treaty bodies.
Sec. 107. Equality at the United Nations.
Sec. 108. Report on United Nations reform.
Sec. 109. Report on United Nations personnel.

  TITLE II--HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL (ECOSOC)

Sec. 201. Human rights.
Sec. 202. Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).

             TITLE III--INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

Sec. 301. International Atomic Energy Agency.
Sec. 302. Sense of Congress regarding the Nuclear Security Action Plan 
of the IAEA.

                         TITLE IV--PEACEKEEPING

Sec. 401. Sense of Congress regarding reform of United Nations 
peacekeeping operations.
Sec. 402. Statement of policy relating to reform of United Nations 
peacekeeping operations.
Sec. 403. Certification.

   TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

Sec. 501. Positions for United States citizens at international 
organizations.
Sec. 502. Budget justification for regular assessed budget of the 
United Nations.
Sec. 503. Review and report.
Sec. 504. Government Accountability Office.

       TITLE VI--CERTIFICATIONS AND WITHHOLDING OF CONTRIBUTIONS

Sec. 601. Certifications and withholding of contributions.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:
            (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means the Committee on 
        International Relations of the House of Representatives and the 
        Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
            (2) Employee.--The term ``employee'' means an individual 
        who is employed in the general services, professional staff, or 
        senior management of the United Nations, including contractors 
        and consultants.
            (3) General assembly.--The term ``General Assembly'' means 
        the General Assembly of the United Nations.
            (4) Member state.--The term ``Member State'' means a Member 
        State of the United Nations. Such term is synonymous with the 
        term ``country''.
            (5) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary 
        of State.
            (6) Secretary general.--The term ``Secretary General'' 
        means the Secretary General of the United Nations.
            (7) Security council.--The term ``Security Council'' means 
        the Security Council of the United Nations.
            (8) Specialized agencies and specialized agencies of the 
        united nations.--The terms ``specialized agencies'' and 
        ``specialized agencies of the United Nations'' mean--
                    (A) the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO);
                    (B) the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA);
                    (C) the International Civil Aviation Organization 
                (ICAO);
                    (D) the International Fund for Agricultural 
                Development (IFAD);
                    (E) the International Labor Organization (ILO);
                    (F) the International Maritime Organization (IMO);
                    (G) the International Telecommunication Union 
                (ITU);
                    (H) the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and 
                Cultural Organization (UNESCO);
                    (I) the United Nations Industrial Development 
                Organization (UNIDO);
                    (J) the Universal Postal Union (UPU);
                    (K) the World Health Organization (WHO) and its 
                regional agencies;
                    (L) the World Meteorological Organization (WMO); 
                and
                    (M) the World Intellectual Property Organization 
                (WIPO).

SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF CONGRESS.

    Congress declares that, in light of recent history, it is incumbent 
upon the United Nations to enact significant reform measures if it is 
to restore the public trust and confidence necessary for it to achieve 
the laudable goals set forth in its Charter. To this end, the following 
Act seeks to reform the United Nations.

           TITLE I--MISSION AND BUDGET OF THE UNITED NATIONS

SEC. 101. UNITED STATES FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS.

    (a) Statements of Policy.--
            (1) In general.--It shall be the policy of the United 
        States to use its voice, vote, and influence at the United 
        Nations to--
                    (A) pursue a streamlined, efficient, and 
                accountable regular assessed budget of the United 
                Nations; and
                    (B) shift funding mechanisms of certain 
                organizational programs of the United Nations specified 
                under paragraph (4) from the regular assessed budget to 
                voluntarily funded programs.
            (2) United states contributions.--It shall be the policy of 
        the United States to--
                    (A) redirect United States contributions to the 
                United Nations to achieve the policy objectives 
                described in paragraph (1)(B); and
                    (B) redirect a portion of funds from the following 
                organizational programs to pursue the policy objectives 
                described in paragraph (1)(A):
                            (i) Public Information.
                            (ii) General Assembly affairs and 
                        conference services.
            (3) Future biennium budgets.--It shall be the policy of the 
        United States to use its voice, vote, and influence at the 
        United Nations to ensure that future biennial budgets of the 
        United Nations, as agreed to by the General Assembly, reflect 
        the shift in funding mechanisms described in paragraph (1)(B) 
        and the redirection of funds described in paragraph (2).
            (4) Certain organizational programs.--The organizational 
        programs referred to in paragraph (1)(B) are the following:
                    (A) Economic and social affairs.
                    (B) Least-developed countries, landlocked 
                developing countries and small island developing 
                States.
                    (C) United Nations support for the New Partnership 
                for Africa's Development.
                    (D) Trade and development.
                    (E) International Trade Center UNCTAD/WTO.
                    (F) Environment.
                    (G) Human settlements.
                    (H) Crime prevention and criminal justice.
                    (I) International drug control.
                    (J) Economic and social development in Africa.
                    (K) Economic and social development in Asia and the 
                Pacific.
                    (L) Economic development in Europe.
                    (M) Economic and social development in in Latin 
                America and the Caribbean.
                    (N) Economic and social development in Western 
                Asia.
                    (O) Regular program of technical cooperation.
                    (P) Development account.
                    (Q) Protection of and assistance to refugees.
                    (R) Palestine refugees.
    (b) Authorization With Respect to the Regular Assessed Budget of 
the United Nations.--Subject to the amendment made by subsection (c), 
the Secretary of State is authorized to make contributions toward the 
amount assessed to the United States by the United Nations for the 
purpose of funding the regular assessed budget of the United Nations.
    (c) United States Financial Contributions to the United Nations.--
Section 11 of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (22 U.S.C. 
287e-3) is amended to read as follows:

``SEC. 11. UNITED STATES FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS.

    ``(a) Policy of the United States Relating to the Regular Assessed 
Budget of the United Nations.--
            ``(1) In general.--The President shall direct the United 
        States Permanent Representative to the United Nations to use 
        the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the 
        United Nations to--
                    ``(A) pursue a streamlined, efficient, and 
                accountable regular assessed budget of the United 
                Nations; and
                    ``(B) shift funding mechanisms of certain 
                organizational programs of the United Nations specified 
                under paragraph (2) of subsection (c) from the regular 
                assessed budget to voluntarily funded programs.
            ``(2) United states contributions.--It shall be the policy 
        of the United States to--
                    ``(A) redirect United States contributions to the 
                United Nations to achieve the policy objectives 
                described in paragraph (1)(B); and
                    ``(B) redirect a portion of funds from the 
                following organizational programs to pursue the policy 
                objectives described in paragraph (1)(A):
                            ``(i) Public Information.
                            ``(ii) General Assembly affairs and 
                        conferences services.
            ``(3) Future biennium budgets.-- The President shall direct 
        the United States Permanent Representative to the United 
        Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United 
        States at the United Nations to ensure that the shifting of 
        funding mechanisms under paragraph (1)(B) and redirecting of 
        contributions under paragraph (2) be reflected in future 
        resolutions agreed to by the General Assembly for the regular 
        assessed budget of the United Nations for the period of a 
        current biennium. To achieve the policies described in 
        paragraphs (1) and (2), the United States Permanent 
        Representative to the United Nations shall withhold the support 
        of the United States for a consensus for such budget until such 
        time as such budget is reflective of such policies.
    ``(b) 22 Percent Limitation.--In accordance with section 601 of the 
Henry J. Hyde United Nations Reform Act of 2005, the Secretary may not 
make a contribution to a regularly assessed biennial budget of the 
United Nations in an amount greater than 22 percent of the amount 
calculable under subsection (c).
    ``(c) Annual Dues.--
            ``(1) In general.--For annual dues paid by the United 
        States to the United Nations each fiscal year, the percentage 
        specified in subsection (b) shall be multiplied by one-half of 
        the amount of the regularly assessed budget of the United 
        Nations for a current biennial period, as agreed to by 
        resolution of the General Assembly.
            ``(2) Calculation with respect to certain organizational 
        programs for redirection.--The percentage specified in 
        subsection (b) shall be multiplied by one-half of the sum of 
        amounts budgeted by resolution of the General Assembly for a 
        current biennial period for the following certain 
        organizational programs:
                    ``(A) Economic and social affairs.
                    ``(B) Least-developed countries, landlocked 
                developing countries and small island developing 
                States.
                    ``(C) United Nations support for the New 
                Partnership for Africa's Development.
                    ``(D) Trade and development.
                    ``(E) International Trade Center UNCTAD/WTO.
                    ``(F) Environment.
                    ``(G) Human settlements.
                    ``(H) Crime prevention and criminal justice.
                    ``(I) International drug control.
                    ``(J) Economic and social development in Africa.
                    ``(K) Economic and social development in Asia and 
                the Pacific.
                    ``(L) Economic development in Europe.
                    ``(M) Economic and social development in in Latin 
                America and the Caribbean.
                    ``(N) Economic and social development in Western 
                Asia.
                    ``(O) Regular program of technical cooperation.
                    ``(P) Development account.
                    ``(Q) Protection of and assistance to refugees.
                    ``(R) Palestine refugees.
            ``(3) Redirection of funds.--Of amounts appropriated for 
        contributions towards payment of regular assessed dues to the 
        United Nations for 2008 and each subsequent year, if the 
        funding mechanisms of one or more of the organizational 
        programs of the United Nations specified in paragraph (2) have 
        not been shifted from the regular assessed budget to 
        voluntarily funded programs in accordance with subsection 
        (a)(1), the Secretary shall ensure that such amounts in each 
        such fiscal year that are specified for each such 
        organizational program pursuant to the resolution agreed to by 
        the General Assembly for the regular assessed budget of the 
        United Nations for the period of a current biennium are 
        redirected from payment of the assessed amount for the regular 
        assessed budget as follows:
                    ``(A) Subject to not less than 30 days prior 
                notification to Congress, the Secretary shall expend an 
                amount, not to exceed 40 percent of the amount 
                specified for each such organizational program pursuant 
                to the resolution agreed to by the General Assembly for 
                the regular assessed budget of the United Nations for 
                the period of a current biennium, as a contribution to 
                an eligible organizational program specified in 
                paragraph (4).
                    ``(B) Subject to not less than 30 days prior 
                notification to Congress, the Secretary shall expend 
                the remaining amounts under this paragraph to 
                voluntarily funded United Nations specialized agencies, 
                funds, or programs.
            ``(4) Eligible organizational programs.--The eligible 
        organizational programs referred to in paragraph (3)(A) for 
        redirection of funds under such paragraph are the following:
                    ``(A) Internal oversight.
                    ``(B) Human rights.
                    ``(C) Humanitarian assistance.
                    ``(D) An organizational program specified in 
                subparagraphs (A) through (P) of paragraph (2), subject 
                to paragraph (5).
            ``(5) Expenditure of remaining amounts to certain 
        organization programs.--
                    ``(A) Voluntary contribution.--Subject to not less 
                than 30 days prior notification to Congress and the 
                limitation specified under subparagraph (B), the 
                Secretary is authorized to make a voluntary 
                contribution to an organizational program of the United 
                Nations specified in subparagraphs (A) through (P) of 
                paragraph (2) of any amounts not contributed in a 
                fiscal year to an eligible organizational program 
                specified in subparagraphs (A) through (C) of paragraph 
                (4).
                    ``(B) 10 percent limitation.--A voluntary 
                contribution under subparagraph (A) to an 
                organizational program of the United Nations specified 
                in subparagraphs (A) through (P) of paragraph (2) may 
                not exceed 10 percent of the total contribution made 
                under paragraph (3)(A).
    ``(d) Further Calculation With Respect to Budgets for Public 
Information and General Assembly Affairs and Conference Services.--
            ``(1) 22 percent limitation.--The Secretary may not make a 
        contribution to a regularly assessed biennial budget of the 
        United Nations in an amount greater than 22 percent of the 
        amount calculable under paragraph (2).
            ``(2) Annual dues each fiscal year.--
                    ``(A) In general.--For annual dues paid by the 
                United States to the United Nations each fiscal year, 
                the percentage specified in paragraph (1) shall be 
                multiplied by one-half of the amount of the regularly 
                assessed budget of the United Nations for a current 
                biennial period, as agreed to by resolution of the 
                General Assembly.
                    ``(B) Calculation with respect to public 
                information and general assembly affairs and conference 
                services.--With respect to such United States annual 
                dues, the percentage specified in paragraph (1) shall 
                be multiplied by one-half of the sum of amounts 
                budgeted by resolution of the General Assembly for the 
                2004-2005 biennial period for the following 
                organizational programs:
                            ``(i) Public Information.
                            ``(ii) General Assembly affairs and 
                        conferences services.
                    ``(C) Redirection of funds.--
                            ``(i) In general.--The President shall 
                        direct the United States Permanent 
                        Representative to the United Nations to make 
                        every effort, including the withholding of 
                        United States support for a consensus budget of 
                        the United Nations, to reduce the budgets of 
                        the organizational programs specified in 
                        subparagraph (B) for 2007 by ten percent 
                        against the budgets of such organizational 
                        programs for the 2004-2005 biennial period. If 
                        the budgets of such organizational programs are 
                        not so reduced, 20 percent the amount 
                        determined under subparagraph (B) for 
                        contributions towards payment of regular 
                        assessed dues for 2007 shall be redirected from 
                        payment for the amount assessed for United 
                        States annual contributions to the regular 
                        assessed budget of the United Nations.
                            ``(ii) Specific amounts.--The Secretary 
                        shall make the amount determined under clause 
                        (i) available as a contribution to an eligible 
                        organizational program specified in 
                        subparagraphs (A) through (C) of paragraph (4) 
                        of subsection (c).
            ``(3) Policy with respect to 2008-2009 biennial period and 
        subsequent biennial periods.--
                    ``(A) In general.--The President shall direct the 
                United States Permanent Representative to the United 
                Nations to make every effort, including the withholding 
                of United States support for a consensus budget of the 
                United Nations, to reduce the budgets of the 
                organizational programs specified in subparagraph (B) 
                of paragraph (2) for the 2008-2009 biennial period and 
                each subsequent biennial period by 20 percent against 
                the budgets of such organizational programs for the 
                2004-2005 biennial period.
                    ``(B) Certification.--In accordance with section 
                601, a certification shall be required that certifies 
                that the reduction in budgets described in subparagraph 
                (A) has been implemented.''.
    (d) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (c) shall 
take effect and apply beginning on October 1, 2006.

SEC. 102. WEIGHTED VOTING.

    It shall be the policy of the United States to actively pursue 
weighted voting with respect to all budgetary and financial matters in 
the Administrative and Budgetary Committee and in the General Assembly 
in accordance with the level of the financial contribution of a Member 
State to the regular assessed budget of the United Nations.

SEC. 103. BUDGET CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS.

    (a) Certification.--In accordance with section 601, a certification 
shall be required that certifies that the conditions described in 
subsection (b) have been satisfied.
    (b) Conditions.--The conditions under this subsection are the 
following:
            (1) New budget practices for the united nations.--The 
        United Nations is implementing budget practices that--
                    (A) require the maintenance of a budget not in 
                excess of the level agreed to by the General Assembly 
                at the beginning of each United Nations budgetary 
                biennium, unless increases are agreed to by consensus 
                and do not exceed ten percent; and
                    (B) require the identification of expenditures by 
                the United Nations by functional categories such as 
                personnel, travel, and equipment.
            (2) Program evaluation.--
                    (A) Existing authority.--The Secretary General and 
                the Director General of each specialized agency have 
                used their existing authorities to require program 
                managers within the United Nations Secretariat and the 
                Secretariats of the specialized agencies to conduct 
                evaluations in accordance with the standardized 
                methodology referred to in subparagraph (B) of--
                            (i) United Nations programs approved by the 
                        General Assembly; and
                            (ii) programs of the specialized agencies.
                    (B) Development of evaluation criteria.--
                            (i) United nations.--The Office of Internal 
                        Oversight Services has developed a standardized 
                        methodology for the evaluation of United 
                        Nations programs approved by the General 
                        Assembly, including specific criteria for 
                        determining the continuing relevance and 
                        effectiveness of the programs.
                            (ii) Specialized agencies.--Patterned on 
                        the work of the Office of Internal Oversight 
                        Services of the United Nations, each 
                        specialized agency has developed a standardized 
                        methodology for the evaluation of the programs 
                        of the agency, including specific criteria for 
                        determining the continuing relevance and 
                        effectiveness of the programs.
                    (C) Report.--The Secretary General is assessing 
                budget requests and, on the basis of evaluations 
                conducted under subparagraph (B) for the relevant 
                preceding year, submits to the General Assembly a 
                report containing the results of such evaluations, 
                identifying programs that have satisfied the criteria 
                for continuing relevance and effectiveness, and an 
                identification of programs that have not satisfied such 
                criteria and should be terminated.
                    (D) Sunset of programs.--Consistent with the July 
                16, 1997, recommendations of the Secretary General 
                regarding a sunset policy and results-based budgeting 
                for United Nations programs, the United Nations and 
                each specialized agency has established and is 
                implementing procedures to require all new programs 
                approved by the General Assembly to have a specific 
                sunset date.

SEC. 104. ACCOUNTABILITY.

    (a) Certification of Creation of Independent Oversight Board.--In 
accordance with section 601, a certification shall be required that 
certifies that the following reforms related to the establishment of an 
Independent Oversight Board (IOB) have been adopted by the United 
Nations:
            (1) An IOB is established from existing United Nations 
        budgetary and personnel resources. Except as provided in this 
        subsection, the IOB shall be an independent entity within the 
        United Nations and shall not be subject to budget authority or 
        organizational authority of any entity within the United 
        Nations.
            (2) The head of the IOB shall be a Director, who shall be 
        nominated by the Secretary General and who shall be subject to 
        Security Council approval by a majority vote. The IOB shall 
        also consist of four other board members who shall be nominated 
        by the Secretary General and subject to Security Council 
        approval by a majority vote. The IOB shall be responsible to 
        the Security Council and the Director and board members shall 
        each serve terms of six years, except that the terms of the 
        initial board shall be staggered so that no more than two board 
        members' terms will expire in any one year. No board member may 
        serve more than two terms. An IOB board member may be removed 
        for cause by a majority vote of the Security Council. The 
        Director shall appoint a professional staff headed by a Chief 
        of Staff and may employ contract staff as needed.
            (3) The IOB shall receive operational and budgetary funding 
        through appropriations by the General Assembly from existing 
        levels of United Nations budgetary and personnel resources, and 
        shall not be dependent upon any other entity, bureau, division, 
        department, or specialized agency of the United Nations for 
        such funding.
            (4) While the IOB shall have the authority to evaluate all 
        operations of the United Nations, the primary mission of the 
        IOB is to oversee the Office of Internal Oversight Services and 
        the Board of External Auditors. The IOB may direct the Office 
        of Internal Oversight Services or the Board of External 
        Auditors to initiate, abandon, or modify the scope of an 
        investigation. Every three months or more frequently when 
        appropriate, the IOB shall submit, as appropriate, to the 
        Secretary General, the Security Council, the General Assembly, 
        or the Economic and Social Council a report on its activities, 
        relevant observations, and recommendations relating to its 
        audit operations, including information relating to the 
        inventory and status of investigations by the Office of 
        Internal Oversight Services.
            (5) In extraordinary circumstances and with the concurrence 
        of the Secretary General or the Security Council by majority 
        vote, the IOB may augment the Office of Internal Oversight 
        Services with a special investigator and staff consisting of 
        individuals who are not employees of the United Nations, to 
        investigate matters involving senior officials of the United 
        Nations or of its specialized agencies when allegations of 
        serious misconduct have been made and such a special 
        investigation is necessary to maintain public confidence in the 
        integrity of the investigation. A special investigator and 
        staff shall comply with all United Nations financial disclosure 
        and conflict of interest rules, including the filing of an 
        individual Annual Financial Disclosure Form in accordance with 
        subsection (c).
            (6) The IOB shall recommend annual budgets for the Office 
        of Internal Oversight Services and the Board of External 
        Auditors.
    (b) Certification of United Nations Reforms of the Office of 
Internal Oversight Services.--In accordance with section 601, a 
certification shall be required that certifies that the following 
reforms related to the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) 
have been adopted by the United Nations:
            (1) The OIOS is designated as an independent entity within 
        the United Nations. The OIOS shall not be subject to budget 
        authority or organizational authority of any entity within the 
        United Nations except as provided in this section.
            (2) The regular assessed budget of the United Nations shall 
        fully fund the Internal Oversight Budget from existing levels 
        of United Nations budgetary and personnel resources and shall 
        not be dependent upon any other entity, bureau, division, 
        department, or specialized agency of the United Nations for 
        such funding.
            (3) All United Nations officials, including officials from 
        any entity, bureau, division, department, or specialized agency 
        of the United Nations, may--
                    (A) make a recommendation to the OIOS to initiate 
                an investigation of any aspect of the United Nations; 
                or
                    (B) report to the OIOS information or allegations 
                of misconduct or inefficiencies within the United 
                Nations.
            (4) The OIOS may, sua sponte, initiate and conduct an 
        investigation or audit of any entity, bureau, division, 
        department, specialized agency, employee (including the 
        Secretary General) of the United Nations, including any 
        employee of the specialized agencies of the United Nations, or 
        contractor or consultant for the United Nations or its 
        specialized agencies.
            (5) At least every three months and more frequently when 
        appropriate, the OIOS shall submit to the IOB a report 
        containing an inventory and status of its investigations.
            (6) The OIOS shall establish procedures for providing 
        ``whistle-blower'' status and employment protections for all 
        employees of the United Nations, including employees of the 
        specialized agencies of the United Nations, who provide 
        informational leads and testimony related to allegations of 
        wrongdoing. Such procedures shall be adopted throughout the 
        United Nations. Such status and protection may not be conferred 
        on the Secretary General.
            (7) The OIOS shall annually publish a public report 
        determining the proper number, distribution, and expertise of 
        auditors within the OIOS necessary to carry out present and 
        future duties of the OIOS, including assessing the staffing 
        requirements needed to audit United Nations contracting 
        activities throughout the contract cycle from the bid process 
        to contract performance.
            (8) Not later than six months after the date of the 
        enactment of this Act, the Director shall establish a position 
        of Associate Director of OIOS for Specialized Agencies and 
        Funds and Programs who shall be responsible for supervising the 
        OIOS liaison or oversight duties for each of the specialized 
        agencies and funds and programs of the United Nations. With the 
        concurrence of the Director, the Associate Director of OIOS for 
        Specialized Agencies and Funds and Programs may, from existing 
        levels of United Nations budgetary and personnel resources, 
        hire and appoint necessary OIOS staff, including staff serving 
        within and located at specialized agencies and funds and 
        programs permanently or as needed to liaison with existing 
        audit functions within each specialized agency and fund and 
        program.
            (9) Not later than six months after the date of the 
        enactment of this Act, the Director shall establish a position 
        of Associate Director of OIOS for Peacekeeping Operations, who 
        shall be responsible for the oversight and auditing of the 
        field offices attached to United Nations peacekeeping 
        operations. The Associate Director of OIOS for Peacekeeping 
        Operations shall receive informational leads and testimony from 
        any person regarding allegations of wrongdoing by United 
        Nations officials or peacekeeping troops or regarding 
        inefficiencies associated with United Nations peacekeeping 
        operations. The Associate Director of OIOS for Peacekeeping 
        Operations shall be responsible for initiating, conducting, and 
        overseeing investigations within peacekeeping operations.
            (10) Not later than six months after the date of the 
        enactment of this Act, the Director shall establish a position 
        of Associate Director of OIOS for Procurement and Contract 
        Integrity, who shall be responsible for auditing and inspecting 
        procurement and contracting win the United Nations, including 
        within the specialized agencies. The Associate Director of OIOS 
        for Procurement and Contract Integrity shall receive 
        informational leads and testimony from any person regarding 
        allegations of wrongdoing by United Nations officials or 
        regarding inefficiencies associated with United Nations 
        procurement or contracting activities. The Associate Director 
        of OIOS for Procurement and Contract Integrity shall be 
        responsible for initiating, conducting, and overseeing 
        investigations of procurement and contract activities. Not 
        later than 12 months after the establishment of the position of 
        Associate Director of OIOS for Procurement and Contract 
        Integrity, the Director, with the assistance of the Associate 
        Director of OIOS for Procurement and Contract Integrity, shall 
        undertake a review of contract procedures to ensure that 
        practices and policies are in place to ensure that--
                    (A) the United Nations has ceased issuing single 
                bid contracts except for such contracts issued during 
                an emergency situation that is justified by the Under 
                Secretary General for Management;
                    (B) the United Nations has established effective 
                controls to prevent conflicts of interest in the award 
                of contracts; and
                    (C) the United Nations has established effective 
                procedures and policies to ensure effective and 
                comprehensive oversight and monitoring of United 
                Nations contract performance.
    (c) Certification of Establishment of United Nations Office of 
Ethics.--In accordance with section 601, a certification shall be 
required that certifies that the following reforms related to the 
establishment of a United Nations Office of Ethics have been adopted by 
the United Nations:
            (1) A United Nations Office of Ethics (UNOE) is 
        established. The UNOE shall be an independent entity within the 
        United Nations and shall not be subject to budget authority or 
        organizational authority of any entity within the United 
        Nations. The UNEO shall be responsible for establishing, 
        managing, and enforcing a code of ethics for all employees of 
        United Nations and its specialized agencies. The UNEO shall 
        also be responsible for providing such employees with annual 
        training related to such code. The head of the UNEO shall be a 
        Director who shall be nominated by the Secretary General and 
        who shall be subject to Security Council approval by majority 
        vote.
            (2) The UNEO shall receive operational and budgetary 
        funding through appropriations by the General Assembly from 
        existing levels of United Nations budgetary and personnel 
        resources and shall not be dependent upon any other entity, 
        bureau, division, department, or specialized agency of the 
        United Nations for such funding.
            (3) The Director of the UNEO shall, not later than six 
        months after the date of its establishment, publish a report 
        containing proposals for implementing a system for the filing 
        and review of individual Annual Financial Disclosure Forms by 
        each employee of the United Nations, including by each employee 
        of its specialized agencies, at the P-5 level and above and by 
        all contractors and consultants compensated at any salary 
        level. Such system shall be in place and operational not later 
        than six months after the date of the publication of the 
        report. Such completed forms shall be made available to the 
        Office of Internal Oversight Services at the request of the 
        Director of the Office of Internal Oversight Services. Such 
        system shall seek to identify and prevent conflicts of interest 
        by United Nations employees and shall be comparable to the 
        system used for such purposes by the United States Government. 
        Such report shall also address broader reforms of the ethics 
        program for the United Nations, including--
                    (A) the effect of the establishment of ethics 
                officers throughout all organizations within the United 
                Nations;
                    (B) the effect of retention by the UNEO of Annual 
                Financial Disclosure Forms;
                    (C) proposals for making completed Annual Financial 
                Disclosure Forms available to the public on request 
                through their Member State's mission to the United 
                Nations;
                    (D) proposals for annual disclosure to the public 
                of information related to the annual salaries and 
                payments, including pension payments and buyouts, of 
                employees of the United Nations, including employees of 
                its specialized agencies, and of consultants;
                    (E) proposals for annual disclosure to the public 
                of information related to per diem rates for all 
                bureaus, divisions, departments, or specialized 
                agencies within the United Nations;
                    (F) proposals for disclosure upon request by the 
                Ambassador of a Member State of information related to 
                travel and per diem payments made from United Nations 
                funds to any person; and
                    (G) proposals for annual disclosure to the public 
                of information related to travel and per diem rates and 
                payments made from United Nations funds to any person.
    (d) Certification of United Nations Establishment of Position of 
Chief Operating Officer.--In accordance with section 601, a 
certification shall be required that certifies that the following 
reforms related to the establishment of the position of a Chief 
Operating Officer have been adopted by the United Nations:
            (1) There is established the position of Chief Operating 
        Officer (COO). The COO shall report to the Secretary General.
            (2) The COO shall be responsible for formulating general 
        policies and programs for the United Nations in coordination 
        with the Secretary General and in consultation with the 
        Security Council and the General Assembly. The COO shall be 
        responsible for the daily administration, operation and 
        supervision, and the direction and control of the business of 
        the United Nations. The Chief Operating Officer shall also 
        perform such other duties and may exercise such other powers as 
        from time to time may be assigned to the COO by the Secretary 
        General.
    (e) Certification of Access by Member States to Reports and Audits 
by Board of External Auditors.--In accordance with section 601, a 
certification shall be required that certifies that Member States may, 
upon request, have access to all reports and audits completed by the 
Board of External Auditors.

SEC. 105. TERRORISM AND THE UNITED NATIONS.

    The President shall direct the United States Permanent 
Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and 
influence of the United States at the United Nations to work toward 
adoption by the General Assembly of--
            (1) a definition of terrorism that builds upon the 
        recommendations of the Secretary General's High-Level Panel on 
        Threats, Challenges, and Change, and includes as an essential 
        component of such definition any action that is intended to 
        cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians with the 
        purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a government 
        or an international organization to do, or abstain from doing, 
        any act; and
            (2) a comprehensive convention on terrorism that includes 
        the definition described in paragraph (1).

SEC. 106. UNITED NATIONS TREATY BODIES.

    The United States shall withhold from United States contributions 
to the regular assessed budget of the United Nations for a biennial 
period amounts that are proportional to the percentage of such budget 
that are expended with respect to a United Nations human rights treaty 
monitoring body or committee that was established by--
            (1) a convention (without any protocols) or an 
        international covenant (without any protocols) to which the 
        United States is not party; or
            (2) a convention, with a subsequent protocol, if the United 
        States is a party to neither.

SEC. 107. EQUALITY AT THE UNITED NATIONS.

    (a) Inclusion of Israel in WEOG.--
            (1) In general.--The President shall direct the United 
        States Permanent Representative to the United Nations to use 
        the voice, vote, and influence of the United States to expand 
        the Western European and Others Group (WEOG) in the United 
        Nations to include Israel as a permanent member with full 
        rights and privileges.
            (2) Notification to congress.--Not later than six months 
        after the date of the enactment of this Act and every six 
        months thereafter for the next two years, the Secretary of 
        State shall notify the appropriate congressional committees 
        concerning the treatment of Israel in the United Nations and 
        the expansion of WEOG to include Israel as a permanent member.
    (b) Department of State Review and Report.--
            (1) In general.--To avoid duplicative efforts and funding 
        with respect to Palestinian interests and to ensure balance in 
        the approach to Israeli-Palestinian issues, the Secretary 
        shall, not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment 
        of this Act--
                    (A) conduct an audit of the functions of the 
                entities listed in paragraph (2); and
                    (B) submit to the appropriate congressional 
                committees a report containing recommendations for the 
                elimination of such duplicative entities and efforts.
            (2) Entities.--The entities referred to in paragraph (1) 
        are the following:
                    (A) The United Nations Division for Palestinian 
                Rights.
                    (B) The Committee on the Exercise of the 
                Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People.
                    (C) The United Nations Special Coordinator for the 
                Middle East Peace Process and Personal Representative 
                to the Palestine Liberation Organization and the 
                Palestinian Authority.
                    (D) The NGO Network on the Question of Palestine.
    (c) Implementation by Permanent Representative.--
            (1) In general.--The President shall direct the United 
        States Permanent Representative to the United Nations to use 
        the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the 
        United Nations to seek the implementation of the 
        recommendations contained in the report required under 
        subsection (b)(1).
            (2) Withholding of funds.--Until such recommendations have 
        been implemented, the United States shall withhold from United 
        States contributions to the regular assessed budget of the 
        United Nations for a biennial period amounts that are 
        proportional to the percentage of such budget that are expended 
        for such entities.
    (d) GAO Audit.--The Comptroller General of the United States of the 
Government Accountability Office shall conduct an audit of--
            (1) the status of the implementation of the recommendations 
        contained in the report required under subsection (b)(1); and
            (2) United States actions and achievements under subsection 
        (c).

SEC. 108. REPORT ON UNITED NATIONS REFORM.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and one year thereafter, the Secretary shall 
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on United 
Nations reform since 1990.
    (b) Contents.--The report required under paragraph (1) shall 
describe--
            (1) the status of the implementation of management reforms 
        within the United Nations and its specialized agencies;
            (2) the number of outputs, reports, or other items 
        generated by General Assembly resolutions that have been 
        eliminated;
            (3) the progress of the General Assembly to modernize and 
        streamline the committee structure and its specific 
        recommendations on oversight and committee outputs, consistent 
        with the March 2005 report of the Secretary General entitled 
        ``In larger freedom: towards development, security and human 
        rights for all'';
            (4) the status of the review by the General Assembly of all 
        mandates older than five years and how resources have been 
        redirected to new challenges, consistent with such March 2005 
        report of the Secretary General; and
            (5) the continued utility and relevance of the Economic and 
        Financial Committee and the Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural 
        Committee, in light of the duplicative agendas of those 
        committees and the Economic and Social Council.

SEC. 109. REPORT ON UNITED NATIONS PERSONNEL.

    (a) In General.--Not later than one year after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees a report--
            (1) concerning the progress of the General Assembly to 
        modernize human resource practices, consistent with the March 
        2005 report of the Secretary General entitled ``In larger 
        freedom: towards development, security and human rights for 
        all''; and
            (2) containing the information described in subsection (b).
    (b) Contents.--The report shall include--
            (1) a comprehensive evaluation of human resources reforms 
        at the United Nations, including an evaluation of--
                    (A) tenure;
                    (B) performance reviews;
                    (C) the promotion system;
                    (D) a merit-based hiring system and enhanced 
                regulations concerning termination of employment of 
                employees; and
                    (E) the implementation of a code of conduct and 
                ethics training.
            (2) the implementation of a system of procedures for filing 
        complaints and protective measures for work-place harassment, 
        including sexual harassment;
            (3) policy recommendations relating to the establishment of 
        a rotation requirement for nonadministrative positions;
            (4) policy recommendations relating to the establishment of 
        a prohibition preventing personnel and officials assigned to 
        the mission of a Member State to the United Nations from 
        transferring to a position within the United Nations 
        Secretariat that is compensated at the P-5 level and above;
            (5) policy recommendations relating to a reduction in 
        travel allowances and attendant oversight with respect to 
        accommodations and airline flights; and
            (6) an evaluation of the recommendations of the Secretary 
        General relating to greater flexibility for the Secretary 
        General in staffing decisions to accommodate changing 
        priorities.

  TITLE II--HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL (ECOSOC)

SEC. 201. HUMAN RIGHTS.

    (a) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United 
States to use its voice, vote, and influence at the United Nations to 
ensure that a credible and respectable Human Rights Council or other 
human rights body is established within the United Nations whose 
participating Member States uphold the values embodied in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.
    (b) Human Rights Reforms at the United Nations.--The President 
shall direct the United States Permanent Representative to the United 
Nations to ensure that the following human rights reforms have been 
adopted by the United Nations:
            (1) A Member State that fails to uphold the values embodied 
        in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights shall be 
        ineligible for membership on any United Nations human rights 
        body.
            (2) A Member State shall be ineligible for membership on 
        any United Nations human rights body if such Member State is--
                    (A) subject to sanctions by the Security Council; 
                or
                    (B) under a Security Council-mandated investigation 
                for human rights abuses.
            (3) A Member State that is currently subject to an adopted 
        country specific resolution, in the principal body in the 
        United Nations for the promotion and protection of human 
        rights, relating to human rights abuses perpetrated by the 
        government of such country in such country, or has been the 
        subject of such an adopted country specific resolution in such 
        principal body within the previous three years, shall be 
        ineligible for membership on any United Nations human rights 
        body. For purposes of this subsection, an adopted country 
        specific resolution shall not include consensus resolutions on 
        advisory services.
            (4) A Member State that violates the principles of a United 
        Nations human rights body to which it aspires to join shall be 
        ineligible for membership on such body.
            (5) No human rights body has a standing agenda item that 
        relates only to one country or region.
    (c) Certification.--In accordance with section 601, a certification 
shall be required that certifies that the human rights reforms 
described under subsection (b) have been adopted by the United Nations.
    (d) Prevention of Abuse of ``No Action'' Motions.--The United 
States Permanent Representative shall work to prevent abuse of ``no 
action'' motions, particularly as such motions relate to country 
specific resolutions.
    (e) Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights.--
            (1) Statement of policy.--It shall be the policy of the 
        United States to continue to strongly support the Office of the 
        United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.
            (2) Certification.--In accordance with section 601, a 
        certification shall be required that certifies that the Office 
        of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has 
        been given greater authority in field operation activities, 
        such as in the Darfur region of Sudan and in the Democratic 
        Republic of the Congo, in furtherance of the purpose and 
        mission of the United Nations.

SEC. 202. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL (ECOSOC).

    (a) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United 
States to use its voice, vote, and influence at the United Nations to--
            (1) abolish secret voting in the Economic and Social 
        Council (ECOSOC);
            (2) ensure that, until such time as the Commission on Human 
        Rights of the United Nations is abolished, only countries that 
        are not ineligible for membership on a human rights body in 
        accordance with paragraph (1) through (4) of section 201(b) 
        shall be considered for membership on the Commission on Human 
        Rights; and
            (3) ensure that after candidate countries are nominated for 
        membership on the Commission on Human Rights, the Economic and 
        Social Council conducts a recorded vote to determine such 
        membership.
    (b) Certification.--In accordance with section 601, a certification 
shall be required that certifies that the policies described in 
subsection (a) have been implemented by the Economic and Social 
Council.

             TITLE III--INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

SEC. 301. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY.

    (a) Enforcement and Compliance.--
            (1) Office of compliance.--
                    (A) Establishment.--The President shall direct the 
                United States Permanent Representative to International 
                Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to use the voice, vote, and 
                influence of the United States at the IAEA to establish 
                an Office of Compliance in the Secretariat of the IAEA.
                    (B) Operation.--The Office of Compliance shall--
                            (i) function as an independent body 
                        composed of technical experts who shall work in 
                        consultation with IAEA inspectors to assess 
                        compliance by IAEA Member States and provide 
                        recommendations to the IAEA Board of Governors 
                        concerning penalties to be imposed on IAEA 
                        Member States that fail to fulfill their 
                        obligations under IAEA Board resolutions;
                            (ii) base its assessments and 
                        recommendations on IAEA inspection reports; and
                            (iii) shall take into consideration 
                        information provided by IAEA Board Members that 
                        are one of the five nuclear weapons states as 
                        recognized by the Treaty on the Non-
                        Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (21 UST 483) 
                        (commonly referred to as the ``Nuclear 
                        Nonproliferation Treaty'' or the ``NPT'').
                    (C) Staffing.--The Office of Compliance shall be 
                staffed from existing personnel in the Department of 
                Safeguards of the IAEA or the Department of Nuclear 
                Safety and Security of the IAEA.
            (2) Special committee on safeguards and verification.--
                    (A) Establishment.--The President shall direct the 
                United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to 
                use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States 
                at the IAEA to establish a Special Committee on 
                Safeguards and Verification.
                    (B) Responsibilities.--The Special Committee 
                shall--
                            (i) improve the ability of the IAEA to 
                        monitor and enforce compliance by Member States 
                        of the IAEA with the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
                        Treaty and the Statute of the International 
                        Atomic Energy Agency; and
                            (ii) consider which additional measures are 
                        necessary to enhance the ability of the IAEA, 
                        beyond the verification mechanisms and 
                        authorities contained in the Additional 
                        Protocol to the Safeguards Agreements between 
                        the IAEA and Member States of the IAEA, to 
                        detect with a high degree of confidence 
                        undeclared nuclear activities by a Member 
                        State.
            (3) Penalties.--
                    (A) In general.--The President shall direct the 
                United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to 
                use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States 
                at the IAEA to ensure that a Member State of the IAEA 
                that is under investigation for a breach of or 
                noncompliance with its IAEA obligations or the purposes 
                and principles of the Charter of the United Nations has 
                its privileges suspended, including--
                            (i) limiting its ability to vote on its 
                        case;
                            (ii) being prevented from receiving any 
                        technical assistance; and
                            (iii) being prevented from hosting 
                        meetings.
                    (B) Termination of penalties.--The penalties 
                specified under subparagraph (A) shall be terminated 
                when such investigation is concluded and such Member 
                State is no longer in such breach or noncompliance.
    (b) United States Contributions.--
            (1) Voluntary contributions.--Voluntary contributions of 
        the United States to the IAEA should primarily be used to fund 
        activities relating to Nuclear Safety and Security or 
        activities relating to Nuclear Verification.
            (2) Limitation on use of funds.--The President shall direct 
        the United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use 
        the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the IAEA 
        to--
                    (A) ensure that funds for safeguards inspections 
                are prioritized for countries that have newly 
                established nuclear programs or are initiating nuclear 
                programs; and
                    (B) block the allocation of funds for any other 
                IAEA development, environmental, or nuclear science 
                assistance or activity to a country--
                            (i) the government of which the Secretary 
                        of State has determined, for purposes of 
                        section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act 
                        of 1979, section 620A of the Foreign Assistance 
                        Act of 1961, section 40 of the Arms Export 
                        Control Act, or other provision of law, is a 
                        government that has repeatedly provided support 
                        for acts of international terrorism and the 
                        government of which the Secretary has 
                        determined has not dismantled and surrendered 
                        its weapons of mass destruction programs under 
                        international verification;
                            (ii) that is under investigation for a 
                        breach of or noncompliance with its IAEA 
                        obligations or the purposes and principles of 
                        the Charter of the United Nations; or
                            (iii) that is in violation of its IAEA 
                        obligations or the purposes and principles of 
                        the Charter of the United Nations.
            (3) Detail of expenditures.--The President shall direct the 
        United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use the 
        voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the IAEA to 
        secure, as part of the regular budget presentation of the IAEA 
        to Member States of the IAEA, a detailed breakdown by country 
        of expenditures of the IAEA for safeguards inspections and 
        nuclear security activities.
    (c) Membership.--
            (1) In general.--The President shall direct the United 
        States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use the voice, 
        vote, and influence of the United States at the IAEA to block 
        the membership on the Board of Governors of the IAEA for a 
        Member State of the IAEA that has not signed and ratified the 
        Additional Protocol and--
                    (A) is under investigation for a breach of or 
                noncompliance with its IAEA obligations or the purposes 
                and principles of the Charter of the United Nations; or
                    (B) that is in violation of its IAEA obligations or 
                the purposes and principles of the Charter of the 
                United Nations.
            (2) Criteria.--The United States Permanent Representative 
        to the IAEA shall make every effort to modify the criteria for 
        Board membership to reflect the principles described in 
        paragraph (1).
    (d) Report.--Not later than six months after the date of the 
enactment of this Act and annually for two years thereafter, the 
President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a 
report on the implementation of this section.

SEC. 302. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE NUCLEAR SECURITY ACTION PLAN 
                    OF THE IAEA.

    It is the sense of Congress that the national security interests of 
the United States are enhanced by the Nuclear Security Action Plan of 
the IAEA and the Board of Governors should recommend, and the General 
Conference should adopt, a resolution incorporating the Nuclear 
Security Action Plan into the regular budget of the IAEA.

                         TITLE IV--PEACEKEEPING

SEC. 401. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING REFORM OF UNITED NATIONS 
                    PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) although United Nations peacekeeping operations have 
        contributed greatly toward the promotion of peace and stability 
        for the past 57 years and the majority of peacekeeping 
        personnel who have served under the United Nations flag have 
        done so with honor and courage, the record of United Nations 
        peacekeeping has been severely tarnished by operational 
        failures and unconscionable acts of misconduct; and
            (2) if the reputation of and confidence in United Nations 
        peacekeeping operations is to be restored, fundamental and far-
        reaching reforms, particularly in the areas of planning, 
        management, training, conduct, and discipline, must be 
        implemented without delay.

SEC. 402. STATEMENT OF POLICY RELATING TO REFORM OF UNITED NATIONS 
                    PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.

    It shall be the policy of the United States to pursue reform of 
United Nations peacekeeping operations in the following areas:
            (1) Planning and management.--
                    (A) Global audit.--As the size, cost, and number of 
                United Nations peacekeeping operations have increased 
                substantially over the past decade, an independent 
                audit of each such operation, with a view toward 
                ``right-sizing'' operations and ensuring that such 
                operations are cost effective, should be conducted and 
                its findings reported to the Security Council.
                    (B) Review of mandates and closing operations.--In 
                conjunction with the audit described in subparagraph 
                (A), the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping 
                Operations should conduct a comprehensive review of all 
                United Nations peacekeeping operation mandates, with a 
                view toward identifying objectives that are practical 
                and achievable, and report its findings to the Security 
                Council. In particular, the review should consider the 
                following:
                            (i) Activities that fall beyond the scope 
                        of traditional peacekeeping activities should 
                        be delegated to a new Peacebuilding Commission, 
                        described in paragraph (3).
                            (ii) Long-standing operations that are 
                        static and cannot fulfill their mandate should 
                        be downsized or closed.
                            (iii) Where there is legitimate concern 
                        that the withdrawal from a country of an 
                        otherwise static United Nations peacekeeping 
                        operation would result in the resumption of 
                        major conflict, a burden-sharing arrangement 
                        that reduces the level of assessed 
                        contributions, similar to that currently 
                        supporting the United Nations Peacekeeping 
                        Force in Cyprus, should be explored and 
                        instituted.
                    (C) Leadership.--As peacekeeping operations become 
                larger and increasingly complex, the Secretariat should 
                adopt a minimum standard of qualifications for senior 
                leaders and managers, with particular emphasis on 
                specific skills and experience, and current senior 
                leaders and managers who do not meet those standards 
                should be removed or reassigned.
                    (D) Pre-deployment training.--Pre-deployment 
                training on interpretation of the mandate of the 
                operation, specifically in the areas of use of force, 
                civilian protection and field conditions, the Code of 
                Conduct, HIV/AIDS, and human rights should be 
                mandatory, and all personnel, regardless of category or 
                rank, should be required to sign an oath that each has 
                received and understands such training as a condition 
                of participation in the operation.
            (2) Conduct and discipline.--
                    (A) Adoption of a uniform code of conduct.--A 
                single, uniform Code of Conduct that has the status of 
                a binding rule and applies equally to all personnel 
                serving in United Nations peacekeeping operations, 
                regardless of category or rank, should be promulgated, 
                adopted, and enforced.
                    (B) Understanding the code of conduct.--All 
                personnel, regardless of category or rank, should 
                receive training on the Code of Conduct prior to 
                deployment with a peacekeeping operation, in addition 
                to periodic follow-on training. In particular--
                            (i) all personnel, regardless of category 
                        or rank, should be provided with a personal 
                        copy of the Code of Conduct that has been 
                        translated into the national language of such 
                        personnel, regardless of whether such language 
                        is an official language of the United Nations;
                            (ii) all personnel, regardless of category 
                        or rank, should sign an oath that each has 
                        received a copy of the Code of Conduct, that 
                        each pledges to abide by the Code of Conduct, 
                        and that each understands the consequences of 
                        violating the Code of Conduct, including 
                        immediate termination of the participation of 
                        such personnel in the peacekeeping operation to 
                        which such personnel is assigned as a condition 
                        of appointment to such operation; and
                            (iii) peacekeeping operations should 
                        conduct educational outreach programs to reach 
                        local communities where peacekeeping personnel 
                        of such operations are based, including 
                        explaining prohibited acts on the part of 
                        United Nations peacekeeping personnel and 
                        identifying the individual to whom the local 
                        population may direct complaints or file 
                        allegations of exploitation, abuse, or other 
                        acts of misconduct.
                    (C) Monitoring mechanisms.--Dedicated monitoring 
                mechanisms, such as the Personnel Conduct Units already 
                deployed to support United Nations peacekeeping 
                operations in Haiti, Liberia, Burundi, and the 
                Democratic Republic of Congo, should be present in each 
                operation to monitor compliance with the Code of 
                Conduct, and--
                            (i) should report simultaneously to the 
                        Head of Mission, the United Nations Department 
                        of Peacekeeping Operations, and the Associate 
                        Director of OIOS for Peacekeeping Operations 
                        (established under section 104(b)(10)); and
                            (ii) should be tasked with designing and 
                        implementing mission-specific measures to 
                        prevent misconduct, conduct follow-on training 
                        for personnel, coordinate community outreach 
                        programs, and assist in investigations, as OIOS 
                        determines necessary and appropriate.
                    (D) Investigations.--A permanent, professional, and 
                independent investigative body should be established 
                and introduced into United Nations peacekeeping 
                operations. In particular--
                            (i) the investigative body should include 
                        professionals with experience in investigating 
                        sex crimes, as well as experts who can provide 
                        guidance on standards of proof and evidentiary 
                        requirements necessary for any subsequent legal 
                        action;
                            (ii) provisions should be included in a 
                        Model Memorandum of Understanding that obligate 
                        Member States that contribute troops to a 
                        peacekeeping operation to designate a military 
                        prosecutor who will participate in any 
                        investigation into an allegation of misconduct 
                        brought against an individual of such Member 
                        State, so that evidence is collected and 
                        preserved in a manner consistent with the 
                        military law of such Member State;
                            (iii) the investigative body should be 
                        regionally based to ensure rapid deployment and 
                        should be equipped with modern forensics 
                        equipment for the purpose of positively 
                        identifying perpetrators and, where necessary, 
                        for determining paternity; and
                            (iv) the investigative body should report 
                        directly to the Associate Director of OIOS for 
                        Peacekeeping Operations, while providing copies 
                        of any reports to the Department of 
                        Peacekeeping Operations, the Head of Mission, 
                        and the Member State concerned.
                    (E) Follow-up.--A dedicated unit, similar to the 
                Personnel Conduct Units, staffed and funded through 
                existing resources, should be established within the 
                headquarters of the United Nations Department of 
                Peacekeeping Operations and tasked with--
                            (i) promulgating measures to prevent 
                        misconduct;
                            (ii) coordinating allegations of 
                        misconduct, and reports received by field 
                        personnel; and
                            (iii) gathering follow-up information on 
                        completed investigations, particularly by 
                        focusing on disciplinary actions against the 
                        individual concerned taken by the United 
                        Nations or by the Member State that is 
                        contributing troops to which such individual 
                        belongs, and sharing such information with the 
                        Security Council, the Head of Mission, and the 
                        community hosting the peacekeeping operation.
                    (F) Financial liability and victims assistance.--
                Although peacekeeping operations should provide 
                immediate medical assistance to victims of sexual abuse 
                or exploitation, the responsibility for providing 
                longer-term treatment, care, or restitution lies solely 
                with the individual found guilty of the misconduct. In 
                particular, the following reforms should be 
                implemented:
                            (i) The United Nations should not assume 
                        responsibility for providing long-term 
                        treatment or compensation by creating a 
                        ``Victims Trust Fund'', or any other such 
                        similar fund, financed through assessed 
                        contributions to United Nations peacekeeping 
                        operations, thereby shielding individuals from 
                        personal liability and reinforcing an 
                        atmosphere of impunity.
                            (ii) If an individual responsible for 
                        misconduct has been repatriated, reassigned, 
                        redeployed, or is otherwise unable to provide 
                        assistance, responsibility for providing 
                        assistance to a victim should be assigned to 
                        the Member State that contributed the troops to 
                        which such individual belonged or to the 
                        manager concerned.
                            (iii) In the case of misconduct by a member 
                        of a military contingent, appropriate funds 
                        shall be withheld from the troop contributing 
                        country concerned.
                            (iv) In the case of misconduct by a 
                        civilian employee or contractor of the United 
                        Nations, appropriate wages shall be garnished 
                        from such individual or fines shall be imposed 
                        against such individual, consistent with 
                        existing United Nations Staff Rules.
                    (G) Managers and commanders.--The manner in which 
                managers and commanders handle cases of misconduct by 
                those serving under them should be included in their 
                individual performance evaluations, so that managers 
                and commanders who take decisive action to deter and 
                address misconduct are rewarded, while those who create 
                a permissive environment or impede investigations are 
                penalized or relieved of duty, as appropriate.
                    (H) Data base.--A centralized data base should be 
                created and maintained within the United Nations 
                Department of Peacekeeping Operations to track cases of 
                misconduct, including the outcome of investigations and 
                subsequent prosecutions, to ensure that personnel who 
                have engaged in misconduct or other criminal 
                activities, regardless of category or rank, are 
                permanently barred from participation in future 
                peacekeeping operations.
                    (I) Welfare.--Peacekeeping operations should assume 
                responsibility for maintaining a minimum standard of 
                welfare for mission personnel to ameliorate conditions 
                of service, while adjustments are made to the 
                discretionary welfare payments currently provided to 
                Member States that contribute troops to offset the cost 
                of operation-provided recreational facilities.
            (3) Peacebuilding commission.--
                    (A) Establishment.--Consistent with the 
                recommendations of the High Level Panel Report, the 
                United Nations should establish a Peacebuilding 
                Commission, supported by a Peacebuilding Support 
                Office, to marshal the efforts of the United Nations, 
                international financial institutions, donors, and non-
                governmental organizations to assist countries in 
                transition from war to peace.
                    (B) Structure and membership.--The Commission 
                should--
                            (i) be a subsidiary body of the United 
                        Nations Security Council, limited in size to 
                        ensure efficiency;
                            (ii) include members of the United Nations 
                        Security Council, major donors, major troop 
                        contributing countries, appropriate United 
                        Nations organizations, the World Bank, and the 
                        International Monetary Fund; and
                            (iii) invite the President of ECOSOC, 
                        regional actors, Member States that contribute 
                        troops, regional development banks, and other 
                        concerned parties that are not already members, 
                        as determined appropriate, to consult or 
                        participate in meetings as observers.
                    (C) Responsibilities.--The Commission should seek 
                to ease the demands currently placed upon the 
                Department of Peacekeeping Operations to undertake 
                tasks that fall beyond the scope of traditional 
                peacekeeping, by--
                            (i) developing and integrating country-
                        specific and system-wide conflict prevention, 
                        post-conflict reconstruction, and long-term 
                        development policies and strategies; and
                            (ii) serving as the key coordinating body 
                        for the design and implementation of military, 
                        humanitarian, and civil administration aspects 
                        of complex missions.
                    (D) Resources.--The establishment of the 
                Peacebuilding Commission and the related Peacebuilding 
                Support Office, should be staffed within existing 
                resources.

SEC. 403. CERTIFICATION.

    (a) New or Expanded Peacekeeping Operations Contingent Upon 
Presidential Certification of Peacekeeping Operations Reforms.--
            (1) No new or expanded peacekeeping operations.--
                    (A) Certification.--Except as provided in 
                subparagraph (B), until the Secretary of State 
                certifies that the requirements described in paragraph 
                (2) have been satisfied, the President shall direct the 
                United States Permanent Representative to the United 
                Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the 
                United States at the United Nations to oppose the 
                creation of new, or expansion of existing, United 
                Nations peacekeeping operations.
                    (B) Exception and notification.--The requirements 
                described under subparagraphs (F) and (G) of paragraph 
                (2) may be waived until January 1, 2007, if the 
                President determines that such is in the national 
                interest of the United States. If the President makes 
                such a determination, the President shall, not later 
                than 15 days before the exercise of such waiver, notify 
                the appropriate congressional committees of such 
                determination and resulting waiver.
            (2) Certification of peacekeeping operations reforms.--The 
        certification referred to in paragraph (1) is a certification 
        made by the Secretary to the appropriate congressional 
        committees that the following reforms, or an equivalent set of 
        reforms, related to peacekeeping operations have been adopted 
        by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations or 
        the General Assembly, as appropriate:
                    (A) A single, uniform Code of Conduct that has the 
                status of a binding rule and applies equally to all 
                personnel serving in United Nations peacekeeping 
                operations, regardless of category or rank, has been 
                adopted by the General Assembly and mechanisms have 
                been established for training such personnel concerning 
                the requirements of the Code and enforcement of the 
                Code.
                    (B) All personnel, regardless of category or rank, 
                serving in a peacekeeping operation have been trained 
                concerning the requirements of the Code of Conduct and 
                each has been given a personal copy of the Code, 
                translated into the national language of such 
                personnel.
                    (C) All personnel, regardless of category or rank, 
                are required to sign an oath that each has received a 
                copy of the Code of Conduct, that each pledges to abide 
                by the Code, and that each understands the consequences 
                of violating the Code, including the immediate 
                termination of the participation of such personnel in 
                the peacekeeping operation to which such personnel is 
                assigned as a condition of the appointment to such 
                operation.
                    (D) All peacekeeping operations have designed and 
                implemented educational outreach programs to reach 
                local communities where peacekeeping personnel of such 
                operations are based to explain prohibited acts on the 
                part of United Nations peacekeeping personnel and to 
                identify the individual to whom the local population 
                may direct complaints or file allegations of 
                exploitation, abuse, or other acts of misconduct.
                    (E) A centralized data base has been created and is 
                being maintained in the United Nations Department of 
                Peacekeeping Operations that tracks cases of 
                misconduct, including the outcomes of investigations 
                and subsequent prosecutions, to ensure that personnel, 
                regardless of category or rank, who have engaged in 
                misconduct or other criminal activities are permanently 
                barred from participation in future peacekeeping 
                operations.
                    (F) A Model Memorandum of Understanding between the 
                United Nations and each Member State that contributes 
                troops to a peacekeeping operation has been adopted by 
                the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping 
                Operations that specifically obligates each such Member 
                State to--
                            (i) designate a competent legal authority, 
                        preferably a prosecutor with expertise in the 
                        area of sexual exploitation and abuse, to 
                        participate in any investigation into an 
                        allegation of misconduct brought against an 
                        individual of such Member State;
                            (ii) refer to its competent national or 
                        military authority for possible prosecution, if 
                        warranted, any investigation of a violation of 
                        the Code of Conduct or other criminal activity 
                        by an individual of such Member State;
                            (iii) report to the Department of 
                        Peacekeeping Operations on the outcome of any 
                        such investigation;
                            (iv) undertake to conduct on-site court 
                        martial proceedings relating to allegations of 
                        misconduct alleged against an individual of 
                        such Member State; and
                            (v) assume responsibility for the provision 
                        of appropriate assistance to a victim of 
                        misconduct committed by an individual of such 
                        Member State.
                    (G) A professional and independent investigative 
                and audit function has been established within the 
                United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
                and the OIOS to monitor United Nations peacekeeping 
                operations.

   TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

SEC. 501. POSITIONS FOR UNITED STATES CITIZENS AT INTERNATIONAL 
                    ORGANIZATIONS.

    The Secretary of State shall make every effort to recruit United 
States citizens for positions within international organizations.

SEC. 502. BUDGET JUSTIFICATION FOR REGULAR ASSESSED BUDGET OF THE 
                    UNITED NATIONS.

    (a) Detailed Itemization.--The annual congressional budget 
justification shall include a detailed itemized request in support of 
the assessed contribution of the United States to the regular assessed 
budget of the United Nations.
    (b) Contents of Detailed Itemization.--The detailed itemization 
required under subsection (a) shall--
            (1) contain information relating to the amounts requested 
        in support of each of the various sections and titles of the 
        regular assessed budget of the United Nations; and
            (2) compare the amounts requested for the current year with 
        the actual or estimated amounts contributed by the United 
        States in previous fiscal years for the same sections and 
        titles.
    (c) Adjustments and Notification.--If the United Nations proposes 
an adjustment to its regular assessed budget, the Secretary of State 
shall, at the time such adjustment is presented to the Advisory 
Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), notify and 
consult with the appropriate congressional committees.

SEC. 503. REVIEW AND REPORT.

    Not later than six months after the date of the enactment of this 
Act, the Secretary of State shall conduct a review of programs of the 
United Nations that are funded through assessed contributions and 
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report 
containing--
            (1) the findings of such review; and
            (2) recommendations relating to--
                    (A) the continuation of such programs; and
                    (B) which of such programs should be voluntarily 
                funded, other than those specified in subparagraphs (A) 
                through (R) of subsection (c)(2) of section 11 of the 
                United Nations Participation Act of 1945, as amended by 
                section 101(c) of this Act.

SEC. 504. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE.

    (a) Report on United Nations Reforms.--Not later than 12 months 
after the date of the enactment of this Act and again 12 months 
thereafter, the Comptroller General of the United States of the 
Government Accountability Office shall submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees a report on the status of the 1997, 2002, and 
2005 management reforms initiated by the Secretary General and on the 
reforms mandated by this Act.
    (b) Report on Department of State Certifications.--Not later than 
six months after each certification submitted by the Secretary of State 
to the appropriate congressional committees under this Act and 
subsection (d)(3) of section 11 of the United Nations Participation Act 
of 1945 (as amended by section 101(c) of this Act), the Comptroller 
General shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a 
report on each such certification. The Secretary shall provide the 
Comptroller General with any information required by the Comptroller 
General to submit any such report.

       TITLE VI--CERTIFICATIONS AND WITHHOLDING OF CONTRIBUTIONS

SEC. 601. CERTIFICATIONS AND WITHHOLDING OF CONTRIBUTIONS.

    (a) Certifications.--
            (1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (3), the 
        certifications required under subsection (d)(3) of section 11 
        of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (as amended by 
        section 101(c) of this Act) and section 103, sections 104(a) 
        through 104(e), sections 201(c) and 201(e), and section 202 of 
        this Act are certifications submitted to the appropriate 
        congressional committees by the Secretary of State that the 
        requirements of each such section have been satisfied with 
        respect to reform of the United Nations.
            (2) Alternate certification mechanism.--
                    (A) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph 
                (3), in the event that the Secretary is unable to 
                submit a certification in accordance with paragraph 
                (1), the Secretary may submit to the appropriate 
                congressional committees, in accordance with 
                subparagraph (B), an alternate certification that 
                certifies that the requirements of the section to which 
                the original certification applies have been 
                implemented through reforms that are substantially 
                similar to the requirements of such section or 
                accomplish the same purposes as the requirements of 
                such section.
                    (B) Equivalency.--Reforms are substantially similar 
                or accomplish the same purposes if--
                            (i) such reforms are formally adopted in 
                        written form by the entity or committee of the 
                        United Nations or of its specialized agency 
                        that has authority to enact or implement such 
                        reforms or are issued by the Secretariat or the 
                        appropriate entity or committee in written 
                        form; and
                            (ii) such reforms are not identical to the 
                        reforms required by a particular certification 
                        but in the determination of the Secretary will 
                        have the same, or nearly the same effect, as 
                        such reforms.
                    (C) Written justification and consultation.--
                            (i) Written justification.--Not later than 
                        30 days before submitting an alternate 
                        certification in accordance with subparagraph 
                        (A), the Secretary shall submit to the 
                        appropriate congressional committees a written 
                        justification explaining in detail the basis 
                        for such alternate certification.
                            (ii) Consultation.--After the Secretary has 
                        submitted the written justification under 
                        clause (i), but no later than 15 days before 
                        the Secretary exercises the alternate 
                        certification mechanism described under 
                        subparagraph (A), the Secretary shall consult 
                        with the appropriate congressional committees 
                        regarding such exercise.
            (3) Limited exception for substantial compliance.--
                    (A) Substantial compliance.--Subject to 
                subparagraph (B), if at least 32 of the 39 reforms 
                represented by the ten certifications specified under 
                paragraph (1) have been implemented, all such reforms 
                (including the unimplemented reforms) so represented 
                shall be deemed to have been implemented for the year 
                in which the Secretary submits such certifications.
                    (B) Mandatory implementation of certain reforms.--
                            (i) In general.--The provisions of 
                        subparagraph (A) shall not apply unless the 
                        reforms under the following sections have been 
                        implemented for the year to which subparagraph 
                        (A) applies:
                                    (I) Subsection (d)(3) of section 11 
                                of the United Nations Participation Act 
                                of 1945 (as amended by section 101(c) 
                                of this Act).
                                    (II) Section 103(b)(1)(A).
                                    (III) Section 103(b)(2)(D).
                                    (IV) Section 104(a)(1).
                                    (V) Section 104(a)(6).
                                    (VI) Section 104(b)(1).
                                    (VII) Section 104(b)(2).
                                    (VIII) Section 104(c)(1).
                                    (IX) Section 201(b)(1).
                                    (X) Section 201(b)(2).
                                    (XI) Section 201(b)(3).
                                    (XII) Section 201(b)(5).
                                    (XIII) Section 202(a)(1).
                                    (XIV) Section 202(a)(2).
                            (ii) Full compliance in succeeding year.--
                        If the unimplemented reforms under subparagraph 
                        (A) are not implemented in the year succeeding 
                        the year to which subparagraph (A) applies, the 
                        provisions of subsection (b) shall apply for 
                        such succeeding year.
    (b) Withholding of United States Contributions to Regular Assessed 
Budget of the United Nations.--
            (1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (4) and in 
        accordance with paragraph (2), until such time as all 
        certifications (or alternate certifications) are submitted in 
        accordance with subsection (a), the United States shall 
        appropriate, but withhold from expenditure, 50 percent of the 
        contributions of the United States to the regular assessed 
        budget of the United Nations for a biennial period.
            (2) Available until expended.--The contributions 
        appropriated but withheld from expenditure under paragraph (1) 
        are authorized to remain available until expended.
            (3) Application with respect to section 11(b) of the united 
        nation participation act of 1945.--Until such time as all 
        certifications (or alternate certifications) are submitted in 
        accordance with subsection (a), subsection (b) of section 11 of 
        the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (as amended by 
        section 101(c) of this Act) shall be administered as though 
        such section reads as follows: ``The Secretary may not make a 
        contribution to a regularly assessed biennial budget of the 
        United Nations in an amount greater than 11 percent of the 
        amount calculable under subsection (c).''.
            (4) Section 11(d)(3) of united nations participation act of 
        1945.--
                    (A) Special rule.--A certification under subsection 
                (d)(3) of section 11 of the United Nations 
                Participation Act of 1945 (as amended by section 101(c) 
                of this Act) (relating to the 2008-2009 biennial period 
                and subsequent biennial periods) shall not be required 
                until such time as the United Nations makes its formal 
                budget presentation for the 2008-2009 biennial period.
                    (B) Application.--If the Secretary does not submit 
                a certification under such section, the 50 percent 
                withholding described under paragraph (1) shall apply.
    (c) Release of Funds.--At such time as all certifications (or 
alternate certifications) are submitted in accordance with subsection 
(a), the United States shall transfer to the United Nations amounts 
appropriated but withheld from expenditure under subsection (b).
    (d) Annual Reviews.--
            (1) In general.--The Secretary shall conduct annual 
        reviews, beginning one year after the date on which the 
        Secretary submits the final certification (or alternate 
        certification) in accordance with subsection (a), to determine 
        if the United Nations continues to remain in compliance with 
        all such certifications (or alternate certifications). Not 
        later than 30 days after the completion of each such review, 
        the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
        committees a report containing the findings of each such 
        review.
            (2) Action.--If during the course of any such review the 
        Secretary determines that the United Nations has failed to 
        remain in compliance with a certification (or an alternate 
        certification) that was submitted in accordance with subsection 
        (a), the 50 percent withholding described under subsection (b) 
        shall re-apply with respect to United States contributions each 
        fiscal year to the regular assessed budget of the United 
        Nations beginning with the fiscal year immediately following 
        such review and subsequent fiscal years until such time as all 
        certifications (or alternate certifications) under subsection 
        (a) have been submitted.
    (e) Effective Date.--The certifications (or alternate 
certifications) specified under subsection (a) shall be required with 
respect to United States contributions towards payment of regular 
assessed dues of the United Nations for 2007 and subsequent years.

                         Background and Purpose

    The Henry J. Hyde United Nations Reform Act of 2005 
provides a comprehensive framework for implementing crucial 
reforms in the United Nations. Scandals involving the United 
Nations Oil-for-Food Program and United Nations specialized 
agencies such as the World Meteorological Society and the World 
Intellectual Property Organization, as well as alleged 
wrongdoing by high-level United Nations staff, have illustrated 
systemic weaknesses in the United Nations. Despite budgetary 
reform initiatives by the Secretary-General in 1997 and 2002, 
the regular assessed budget of the United Nations remains 
replete with outdated, obsolete programmatic mandates that 
continue to be funded, with little regard for prioritization of 
mandated initiatives by the General Assembly. Additionally, 
many programs currently funded through regular assessed dues 
would be better suited for voluntary funding, thereby 
increasing transparency, efficiency, and engendering a more 
results-oriented approach in implementation. Further, the 
undisputed deplorable state of the Commission on Human Rights, 
which allows countries such as Cuba and Sudan to act as 
arbiters of human rights, must no longer continue unchecked. 
Moreover, it is undeniable that the record of United Nations 
peacekeeping since the end of the Cold War has been tainted by 
disastrous operational failures and unconscionable acts of 
misconduct. Allegations of sexual exploitation, abuse, and rape 
by United Nations peacekeepers cannot go unaddressed. The Henry 
J. Hyde United Nations Reform Act of 2005 seeks to address 
these and other areas that are long overdue for serious, 
meaningful and practical reform.
    History has evidenced that the United States Congress can 
prompt meaningful change at the United Nations by applying the 
power of the purse. Through the Kassebaum-Solomon amendment in 
1985, Congress was able to use the power of the purse to 
promote budget accountability, as evidenced by the eventual 
implementation of consensus-based budgeting procedures. A 
Congressional directive in the Foreign Relations Authorization 
Act, FY94 and FY95, to withhold contributions unless an 
internal oversight structure was created, loomed when the 
United Nations established the Office of Internal Oversight 
Services. The Helms-Biden legislation in 1999 provided for the 
payment of arrearages to the United Nations if certain 
conditions, including reforms, were met. Here, once again, the 
United Nations was prompted into action by the United States 
Congress, the outstanding conditions were met, and arrearages 
were paid.
    Reform, however, should not be a periodic event undertaken 
because of the threat of financial penalty. Rather, it should 
be an integral part of the culture of the United Nations, a 
body that was founded: ``(1) To maintain international peace 
and security, and to that end: to take effective collective 
measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the 
peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other 
breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, 
and in conformity with the principles of justice and 
international law, adjustment or settlement of international 
disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the 
peace; (2) To develop friendly relations among nations based on 
respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate 
measures to strengthen universal peace; (3) To achieve 
international co-operation in solving international problems of 
an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and 
in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, 
sex, language, or religion; and (4) To be a centre for 
harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these 
common ends.'' (Excerpt from the United Nations Charter.) With 
such crucial and laudable goals, it is incumbent upon the 
United Nations to continue to raise its own standards of 
performance and expectations of excellence for the world 
community that it serves. Yet, as recent history evidences, not 
only has it failed too often to meet the expectations of the 
world community, but it also lacks the political will and 
ability to enact the changes necessary to reform itself from 
within. When these unfortunate circumstances occur, the United 
States Congress must act. It must act, not only in the interest 
of the United States, but also in the interest of the 
betterment of the United Nations for the world community.
    The Henry J. Hyde United Nations Reform Act of 2005 is 
designed with these goals in mind. The Act contains six titles: 
Mission and Budget of the United Nations, Human Rights and the 
Economic and Social Council, International Atomic Energy 
Agency, Peacekeeping, Department of State and Government 
Accountability Office, and Certifications and Withholding of 
Contributions.

                                Summary

    In the first title, the bill highlights the need to pursue 
a streamlined, efficient, effective and accountable regular 
assessed budget of the United Nations and to shift the funding 
mechanisms of certain organizational programs from the regular 
assessed budget to voluntarily funded programs. It specifies 
eighteen programs for shifting from assessed to voluntary 
funding and calls for the budgets of two additional programs, 
``Public Information'' and ``General Assembly Affairs and 
Conference Services,'' to be streamlined. It also seeks to 
implement budget practices that would instill results-oriented 
methodologies upon which to measure effectiveness and relevance 
of programs, as well as to call for procedures to provide 
specific sunset dates for new programs.
    Accountability is an overriding theme throughout the Act. 
The bill establishes an Independent Oversight Board and 
designates the Office of Internal Oversight Services as an 
independent entity, with a budget isolated from political 
influence, and robust authority to investigate at its own 
discretion and to provide whistle-blower protection to United 
Nations employees offering information of wrongdoing. It also 
creates a United Nations Office of Ethics, which is responsible 
for establishing, and enforcing a code of ethics for all United 
Nations employees, and which requires much greater financial 
disclosure than that which presently exists. It establishes the 
position of Chief Operating Officer, and requires that Member 
States have access to all reports and audits by the Board of 
External Auditors.
    It also addresses the withholding of financial support to 
those human rights treaty monitoring bodies or committees that 
the United States is a party to neither the underlying 
convention or international covenant, nor protocol.
    Finally, Title I seeks equality at the United Nations by 
calling for the expansion of the Western European and Others 
Group (WEOG) to afford Israel permanent membership in this 
group with full rights and privileges. It calls for a 
Department of State review and assessment of the work performed 
by the various United Nations commissions, committees, and 
offices focusing exclusively on the Palestinian agenda, 
followed by the submission of a report to Congress recommending 
areas for reform, including proposals for the elimination by 
the United Nations of such duplicative entities and efforts. It 
also calls for withholding proportional U.S. contributions 
until such time as the recommendations are implemented.
    Title II mandates that the United Nations adopt criteria 
for membership in current and future human rights bodies. Under 
these criteria, countries that fail to uphold the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights would be ineligible for membership. 
Likewise, countries that are subject to sanctions by the 
Security Council, or are under a Security Council-mandated 
investigation for human rights abuses, or are the subject of 
country-specific human rights resolutions, would be ineligible 
for membership. In addition to other criteria, the bill 
mandates that no human rights body have a standing agenda item 
that relates only to one country or region. Title II also 
mandates that the membership criteria be adhered to in the 
Economic and Social Council, which is the body that selects the 
Commission on Human Rights' members, and that a recorded 
transparent vote take place on membership.
    Title III seeks to strengthen the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) by calling for the establishment of an 
Office of Compliance and a Special Committee on Safeguards and 
Verification. It also directs that U.S. voluntary contributions 
should primarily be used to fund activities relating to nuclear 
safety and security, or activities relating to nuclear 
verification. In addition, it directs the U.S. Permanent 
Representative to the IAEA to pursue membership reform of the 
Board of Governors that would bar countries that have not 
signed and ratified the Additional Protocol, or that are under 
investigation for a breach of, or noncompliance with, their 
IAEA obligations, or that are in violation of their IAEA 
obligations.
    Title IV calls for peacekeeping reforms and mandates the 
withholding of U.S. support for new or expanded peacekeeping 
missions until the most critical, but immediately achievable, 
of those reforms are instituted. These reforms include the 
adoption of and training in a uniform Code of Conduct, and the 
creation of a database to track cases of misconduct to ensure 
that violators of the Code are permanently barred from 
peacekeeping operations. Two additional reforms, the adoption 
of a Model Memorandum of Understanding and the establishment of 
independent investigative and audit functions for peacekeeping, 
must be certified by January 1, 2007.
    Title V sets forth ways to improve budget practices by 
requiring budget justifications, consultations with Congress on 
budget changes, a review of new budgeting options and a review 
by the Government Accountability Office of the progress the 
United Nations is making on implementing reforms identified in 
various United Nations management reports.
    Title VI provides various levers to encourage the United 
Nations to enact reforms, including the withholding of 50 
percent of U.S. assessed dues if the Secretary of State cannot 
make certifications that the United Nations has accomplished 
certain reforms in key areas. The title also mandates annual 
reviews by the Secretary of State to ensure that the United 
Nations remains in compliance with the mandated reforms and to 
require the withholding of 50 percent of U.S. assessed dues if 
the United Nations fails to maintain compliance with the reform 
provisions in the Henry J. Hyde United Nations Reform Act of 
2005.

                                Hearings

    The Committee and its Subcommittees has held numerous 
hearings on United Nations issues. Last year, the Full 
Committee held two hearings on the Oil-for-Food Program. The 
first, on April 28, 2004, ``The United Nations Oil-for-Food 
Program: Issues of Accountability and Transparency,'' had six 
private witnesses giving testimony: Howar Zaid, United Nations 
Liaison Office; Danielle Pletka, American Enterprise Institute; 
Claudia Rosett, Foundation for the Defense of Democracies; Dr. 
John G. Ruggie, Harvard University; Michael Soussan, former 
coordinator of the Oil-for-Food Program; and Joseph A. 
Christoff, Government Accountability Office. The other hearing, 
entitled, ``The Oil-for-Food Program: Tracking the Funds,' was 
held on November 17, 2004. Testimony was received from: Charles 
A. Duelfer, Special Advisor to the Director of Central 
Intelligence on Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction, Central 
Intelligence Agency; and Everett Schenk, Chief Executive 
Officer, BNP-Paribas, North America.
    The Full Committee held two hearings earlier this year. The 
first was held on March 15, 2005, and was entitled, ``U.N. 
Reform: Challenges and Prospects.'' Testimony was received 
from: Richard C. Holbrooke, former U.S. Permanent 
Representative to the United Nations; Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, 
former U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations; and 
Richard S. Williamson, former U.S. Alternate Representative for 
Special Political Affairs in the United Nations. The second 
hearing, ``Reforming the United Nations: Budget and Management 
Perspectives'' was held on May 19, 2005. Testimony was heard 
from: Dr. Mark Lagon, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of 
International Organization Affairs, U.S. Department of State; 
Catherine Bertini, Former Under-Secretary General for 
Management, United Nations; and the President of the United 
Nations Foundation, former Senator Tim Wirth.
    The Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights and 
International Operations held three hearings on issues related 
to the United Nations Reform Act. The first was held on March 
1, 2005, and entitled, ``United Nations Organization Mission in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo: A Case for Peacekeeping 
Reform.'' Testimony was received from: Hon. Kim Holmes, 
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Organization 
Affairs, U.S. Department of State; Hon. Princeton N. Lyman, 
Former Assistant Secretary of State for International 
Organization Affairs; Dr. Nile Gardiner, The Heritage 
Foundation; and Anneke Van Woudenberg, Human Rights Watch. On 
April 19, 2005, the Subcommittee held a hearing entitled, ``The 
United Nations Commission on Human Rights: Protector or 
Accomplice?'' with Assistant Secretary-General Danilo Turk of 
the Department of Political Affairs at the United Nations 
testifying. On May 18, 2005, the Subcommittee held a hearing 
entitled, ``U.N. Peacekeeping Reform: Seeking Greater 
Accountability and Integrity.'' Testimony was received from: 
Philo L. Dibble, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau 
of Organization Affairs, U.S. Department of State; Eric 
Schwartz of the Council on Foreign Relations; and Victoria Holt 
of the Henry L. Stimson Center.
    The Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations held 
numerous hearings on United Nations-related issues. The first, 
on February 9, 2005, was entitled, ``The Volcker Interim Report 
on United Nations Oil-for-Food Program.'' Testimony was 
received from: former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger; 
former Ambassador Dennis Ross; Dr. Zaid Asali, of the American 
Task Force on Palestine; and Danielle Pletka of the American 
Enterprise Institute. The second hearing, entitled, ``United 
Nations Operations: Integrity and Accountability,'' was held on 
March 2, 2005. Testimony was heard from the following 
witnesses: Patrick F. Kennedy, Ambassador to the United Nations 
for Management and Reform, U.S. Mission to the U.N.; and Joseph 
A. Christoff, Government Accountability Office. The 
Subcommittee held another U.N.-related hearing, ``The United 
Nations Oil-for-Food Program: The Cotecna and Saybolt 
Inspection Firms'' on March 17, 2005. Testimony was received 
from three private witnesses: John Denson of the Saybolt Group, 
Houston Texas; Dr. Rehan Mullick, Former Research Officer for 
the United Nations Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator in 
Iraq; and Evelyn Suarez, an attorney representing Cotecna S.A. 
The final U.N.-related hearing held by the Subcommittee, ``The 
Role of BNP-Paribas SA in the United Nations Oil-for-Food 
Program,'' was held on April 28, 2005. Testimony was heard from 
several officials of BNP-Paribas SA: Everett Schenck, Patricia 
Herbert, William Vassallo, and Harold Lehmann.
    The Subcommittee on International Terrorism and 
Nonproliferation held a hearing on March 17, 2005, on terrorism 
issues related to the U.N. Testimony at this hearing, ``The 
United Nations and the Fight Against Terrorism,'' was heard 
from the following: Victor Comras, former member of the United 
Nations al-Qaeda monitoring group; and Anne Bayefsky, The 
Hudson Institute.

                        Committee Consideration

    On June 8, 2005, the International Relations Committee 
marked up the bill, H.R. 2745, pursuant to notice, in open 
session. The Committee agreed to a motion offered by Chairman 
Hyde to favorably report the bill, as amended, to the House of 
Representatives, by a record vote of 25 ayes to 22 nays, a 
quorum being present. During the markup, three amendments were 
offered. The first, offered by Mr. Lantos, was an amendment in 
the nature of a substitute. It was defeated by a record vote of 
23 ayes to 24 noes. The second amendment, offered by Mr. Leach, 
regarding expansion of the United Nations Security Council, was 
withdrawn. The third amendment, offered by Mr. Paul, to 
terminate U.S. participation in the United Nations, was 
defeated by a record vote of 3 ayes to 39 nays, with one voting 
``present.'' A unanimous consent request was made to change the 
title of the bill to ``The Henry J. Hyde United Nations Reform 
Act of 2005.'' There was no objection.

                            Roll Call Votes

    Clause (3)(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of 
Representatives requires that the results of each record vote 
on an amendment or motion to report, together with the names of 
those voting for or against, be printed in the committee 
report. The following record votes occurred during 
consideration of H.R. 2745:
Vote #1--Lantos Substitute Amendment
    Voting aye: Leach, Paul, Lantos, Berman, Ackerman, 
Faleomavaega, Payne, Brown, Sherman, Wexler, Engel, Delahunt, 
Meeks, Lee, Crowley, Blumenauer, Berkley, Napolitano, Schiff, 
Watson, Smith (WA), Chandler, and Cardoza
    Voting no: Hyde, Smith (NJ), Gallegly, Ros-Lehtinen, 
Rohrabacher, Royce, King, Chabot, Tancredo, Issa, Flake, Davis, 
Green, Weller, Pence, McCotter, Harris, Wilson, Boozman, 
Barrett, Mack, Fortenberry, McCaul and Poe
    Ayes 23. Noes 24.
Vote #2--Paul Amendment--U.S. Out of the United Nations
    Voting aye: Paul, Wilson, Barrett
    Voting no: Leach, Smith (NJ), Gallegly, Ros-Lehtinen, King, 
Chabot, Issa, Flake, Davis, Green, Weller, Pence, McCotter, 
Harris, Boozman, Mack, Fortenberry, McCaul, Poe, Lantos, 
Berman, Ackerman, Faleomavaega, Payne, Brown, Wexler, Engel, 
Delahunt, Meeks, Lee, Crowley, Blumenauer, Berkley, Napolitano, 
Schiff, Watson, Smith (WA), Chandler, and Cardoza
    Voting ``Present'': Rohrabacher
    Ayes 3. Noes 39. Present 1.
Vote #3--Report favorably H.R. 2745 to the House, as Amended
    Voting aye: Hyde, Smith (NJ), Gallegly, Ros-Lehtinen, 
Rohrabacher, Royce, King, Chabot, Tancredo, Issa, Flake, Davis, 
Green, Weller, Pence, McCotter, Harris, Wilson, Boozman, 
Barrett, Mack, Fortenberry, McCaul, Poe, Berkley
    Voting no: Leach, Paul, Lantos, Berman, Ackerman, 
Faleomavaega, Payne, Brown, Sherman, Wexler, Engel, Delahunt, 
Meeks, Lee, Crowley, Blumenauer, Napolitano, Schiff, Watson, 
Smith (WA), Chandler, and Cardoza
    Ayes 25. Noes 22.

                      Committee Oversight Findings

    In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules 
of the House of Representatives, the Committee reports that the 
findings and recommendations of the Committee, based on 
oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of rule X of the 
Rules of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in the 
descriptive portions of this report.

               New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures

    Clause 3(c)(2) of House Rule XIII is inapplicable because 
this legislation does not provide new budgetary authority or 
increased tax expenditures.

               Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate

                                     U.S. Congress,
                               Congressional Budget Office,
                                      Washington, DC, June 9, 2005.
Hon. Henry J. Hyde, Chairman,
Committee on International Relations,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has 
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 2745, the Henry J. 
Hyde United Nations Reform Act of 2005.
    If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be 
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Sunita 
D'Monte, who can be reached at 226-2840.
            Sincerely,
                                       Douglas Holtz-Eakin.
Enclosure

cc:
        Honorable Tom Lantos,
        Ranking Member
H.R. 2745--Henry J. Hyde United Nations Reform Act of 2005.
    H.R. 2745 would require the Secretary of State to press for 
many changes at the United Nations. The bill also would require 
the Secretary to withhold 50 percent of the U.S. assessed 
contributions to the regular budget of the United Nations, 
starting in 2007, if the Secretary is unable to certify that 
certain conditions have been met. The bill would not authorize 
appropriations for assessed contributions to the United 
Nations' budget. In 2005, CBO estimates that $362 million will 
be spent on such assessments from current appropriations; for 
2006, the President has requested that Congress appropriate 
$439 million for those costs.
    CBO has no basis for predicting whether or when all the 
necessary certifications would be made. If the Secretary is 
able to make all certifications in a timely manner, assessments 
would not be withheld, and implementation of the bill would 
have no impact on spending subject to appropriation. 
Alternatively, if certifications cannot be made and 50 percent 
of assessments are withheld, such discretionary spending would 
be about $187 million lower in 2007 and about $769 million 
lower over the 2007-2010 period--relative to expected scheduled 
payments under the current-law baseline. The bill would not 
affect direct spending or revenues.
    Among the many changes specified by the bill, it would 
require the Secretary of State to press the United Nations to:

         LReduce and streamline its regular budget,
         LIncrease internal oversight and auditing,
         LEstablish a position of Chief Operating 
        Officer,
         LCreate an Office of Ethics,
         LProhibit membership in any United Nations 
        human rights body to countries that violate human 
        rights,
         LAdopt a uniform and enforceable code of 
        conduct for United Nations peacekeepers, and
         LStrengthen the compliance and enforcement 
        capabilities at the International Atomic Energy Agency.

    H.R. 2745 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector 
mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and 
would not affect the budgets of state, local, or tribal 
governments.

                    Performance Goals and Objectives

    The goals and objectives of this legislation are to provide 
fundamental reforms for the United Nations across a broad set 
of issues, including the areas of budget, oversight, 
accountability and human rights.

                   Constitutional Authority Statement

    Pursuant to clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 
House of Representatives, the Committee finds the authority for 
this legislation in article 1, section 8, of the Constitution.

               Section-by-Section Analysis and Discussion

Section 1. Short Title and Table of Contents
    This Act may be cited as the ``Henry J. Hyde United Nations 
Reform Act of 2005.''
Section 2. Definitions
    Section 2 defines terms used in the Act.
Section 3. Statement of Congress
    Congress declares that, in light of recent history, it is 
incumbent upon the United Nations to enact significant reform 
measures if it is to restore the public trust and confidence 
necessary for it to achieve the laudable goals set forth in its 
Charter. To this end, the following Act seeks to reform the 
United Nations.

           TITLE I--MISSION AND BUDGET OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Section 101. United States Financial Contributions to the United 
        Nations
    Section 101 (a) Statements of Policy. This subsection 
states that it shall be the policy of the United States to use 
its voice, vote and influence at the United Nations to pursue a 
streamlined, efficient, and accountable regular assessed budget 
of the United Nations; and to shift funding mechanisms of 
eighteen organizational programs of the United Nations from the 
regular assessed budget to voluntarily funded programs. In 
order to pursue a more streamlined, efficient accountable 
regular assessed budget, it also states that it shall be the 
policy of the United States to redirect contributions to 
achieve certain policy objectives and to redirect a portion of 
funds from two United Nations organizational programs: 1) 
Public Information; and 2) General Assembly affairs and 
conference services. In addition, this provision states that it 
shall be the policy of the United States to use its voice, 
vote, and influence at the United Nations to ensure that future 
biennial budgets of the United Nations reflect the shift in 
funding mechanisms described above.
    The eighteen organizational programs identified for 
shifting include: (1) Economic and Social Affairs; (2) Least-
developed countries, landlocked developing countries and small 
island developing States; (3) United Nations support for the 
New Partnership for Africa's Development; (4) Trade and 
development; (5) International trade Center UNCTAD/WTO; (6) 
Environment; (7) Human Settlements; (8) Crime prevention and 
criminal justice; (9) International drug control; (10) Economic 
and social development in Africa; (11) Economic and social 
development in Asia and the Pacific; (12) Economic development 
in Europe; (13) Economic and social development in Latin 
America and the Caribbean; (14) Economic and social development 
in Western Asia; (15) Regular program of technical cooperation; 
(16) Development account; (17) Protection of and assistance to 
refugees; and (18) Palestine refugees.
    It is imperative for the United Nations to produce a 
streamlined, efficient accountable United Nations regular 
assessed budget. Steps can and must be taken by the United 
Nations to achieve such a budget. To assist the United Nations 
in achieving this goal, the Committee has identified programs 
to be streamlined (Public Information and General Assembly 
affairs and conference services) and eighteen programs to be 
shifted from the regular assessed budget to voluntarily funded 
programs. Voluntarily funded programs are known to be more 
results-oriented, efficient, and transparent. Further, by 
shifting programs from the regular assessed budget to 
voluntarily funded programs, the United Nations regular 
assessed budget decreases for all Member States, while allowing 
Member States more control over where contributions are 
directed.
    Section 101 (b) Authorization with Respect to the Regular 
Assessed Budget of the United Nations. This subsection 
authorizes the Secretary of State (``Secretary '') to make 
contributions toward the amount assessed to the United States 
by the United Nations for purposes of funding the regular 
assessed budget subject to the amendment made by subsection 
(c).
    Section 101 (c) United States Financial Contributions to 
the United Nations. This subsection amends Section 11 of the 
United Nations Participation Act of 1945 to implement the 
policies stated in subsection (a). It provides the mechanism to 
implement the shifting of programs from the assessed budget to 
voluntarily funded programs; addresses the budget issues of two 
United Nations organizational programs (Public Information and 
General Assembly affairs and conference services), and bars the 
Secretary from contributing to the United Nations regular 
assessed budget for annual United States assessed contributions 
an amount greater than 22 percent of the United Nations regular 
assessed budget.
    This subsection restates the eighteen regular assessed 
programs identified for shifting to voluntarily funded 
programs. It states that if one or more of these programs have 
not been shifted by 2008, the amount of funds assessed to the 
United States for unshifted programs shall be redirected to 
priority areas as follows: subject to Congressional 
notification, not more than 40 percent of the funds shall be 
redirected to Internal Oversight programs, Human Rights 
programs (particularly to assist in strengthening field 
operation activities of the Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights to enable human rights monitors to have a greater 
presence in areas such as Darfur and the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo), and Humanitarian Assistance programs. In addition, 
the Secretary is afforded the flexibility to make voluntary 
contributions to sixteen of the eighteen identified programs, 
not to exceed 10 percent of the 40 percent total. (This 
exception excludes ``Protection of and assistance to 
refugees,'' and ``Palestine refugees,'' because funding for 
refugee programs is drawn from a separate funding account, the 
Migration and Refugee Assistance account.) The remaining 
amounts are to be expended as contributions to voluntarily 
funded United Nations specialized agencies, funds, or programs, 
such as the United Nations Development Program, refugee 
programs administered by the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees, the World Food Programme, and any recently 
shifted programs.
    This subsection allows a reasonable amount of time, more 
than 2 years, for the United Nations to act on the shifting of 
programs from regular assessed to voluntarily funded programs. 
If there are programs that have not been shifted, the remaining 
programs would be subject to the funding parameters set out in 
this subsection. It should be noted that, of the identified 
programs, the Committee believes that certain programs, such as 
``International Drug Control'' should continue to be strongly 
supported as voluntarily funded programs.
    This subsection also mandates that if the budgets for the 
two United Nations organizational programs (Public Information 
and General Assembly Affairs and Conference Services) are not 
each reduced by 10 percent in 2007, the United States shall 
redirect 20 percent of its assessed contributions for these 
programs to Internal Oversight programs, Human Rights programs, 
and Humanitarian Assistance programs. Further, in accordance 
with section 601, in 2008 a certification is required by the 
Secretary that the United Nations Public Information and 
General Assembly Affairs and Conference Services budgets are 
each reduced by 20 percent.
    The Committee notes that General Assembly Affairs and 
Conference Services accounts for approximately 20 percent of 
the assessed regular budget ($280 million per year). Some 
conferences cost upwards of $7,000-$8,000 per hour because of, 
among other things, interpreter, translation and documentation 
costs. Calls for streamlining and scaling back conferences have 
been heard throughout the years, but the United Nations has 
done little to address this issue. Likewise, the Committee 
notes that the Department of Public Information could better 
utilize available technologies and continue to consolidate 
United Nations Information Centers around the world to achieve 
greater efficiency and decreased operational costs.
    Section 101 (d) Effective Date. This subsection states that 
the amendment made by subsection (c) shall take effect and 
apply beginning in October 1, 2006.
    The Committee intends that this provision come into effect 
October 1, 2006. However, per the provision, funding 
implications do not arise until funding requests are made for 
payment toward the United States assessed dues for the 2007 
United Nations regular assessed budget.
Section 102. Weighted Voting
    This section states that it shall be the policy of the 
United States to actively pursue weighted voting with respect 
to all budgetary and financial matters in the Administrative 
and Budgetary Committee (5th Committee) and in the General 
Assembly in accordance with the level of financial 
contributions of Member States to the regular assessed budget 
of the United Nations.
Section 103. Budget Certifications Requirements
    In accordance with section 601, this section requires the 
Secretary to certify that the United Nation's biennial budget 
is maintained at the approved level, and should increases be 
necessary, they may not exceed 10 percent. It also requires the 
United Nations budget to be more transparent by requiring more 
details on the budget categories such as travel or equipment. 
The provision also requires managers to follow rules of 
performance-based budgeting and program evaluation. This 
certification also verifies that the Secretary General is 
assessing budget requests on the basis of evaluations on the 
programs' relevance and effectiveness and is reporting to the 
General Assembly programs that meet the criteria for continued 
support or termination. The final required certification is 
that the United Nations is following a procedure in which all 
new programs approved by the General Assembly have a specific 
sunset date.
    While these ideas are not new, they are important and 
warrant inclusion in this bill. By including this provision, 
the Committee seeks to strengthen the resolve of the General 
Assembly and the Secretariat to incorporate modern budget 
practices and systems that allow for subjective assessments of 
the organizations' performance. Incorporating such practices 
will over time, vastly improve the accountability and 
effectiveness of the United Nations.
Section 104. Accountability
    Section 104 (a) Certification of Creation of Independent 
Oversight Board. In accordance with section 601, certification 
is required by the Secretary that the United Nations has 
created an Independent Oversight Board (IOB). The IOB must be 
an independent entity within the United Nations and not subject 
to budget or organizational authority of any United Nations 
entity other than the General Assembly, which will include in 
its budget all funds for the IOB. The Director of the IOB will 
be nominated by the Secretary General and approved by a 
majority vote of the Security Council. The IOB will consist of 
a total of five members (four others in addition to the 
Director), and all shall be appointed in the same manner as the 
Director. The IOB will be responsible for overseeing the audit 
plans and recommending the annual budgets of the Office of 
Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) and the Board of External 
Auditors. In special circumstances, the IOB may appoint a 
special investigator and staff to investigate matters involving 
senior United Nations officials.
    Section 104 (b) Certification of United Nations Reforms of 
the OIOS. In accordance with section 601, certification is 
required by the Secretary that the United Nations has 
designated the OIOS as an independent entity within the United 
Nations, with the exception of the OIOS' relationship with the 
IOB and the General Assembly. The OIOS will receive all of its 
operating funds through the United Nations regular budget and 
shall not be dependent on any other entity within the United 
Nations for such funding. The OIOS may initiate and conduct an 
investigation or audit of any entity or employee of the United 
Nations. OIOS must establish whistle-blower protection for all 
employees of the United Nations. The Director of the OIOS must 
establish three Associate Directors of the OIOS: Associate 
Director for Specialized Agencies; Associate Director for 
Peacekeeping Operations; and Associate Director for Procurement 
and Contract Integrity. Each Associate Director will be 
responsible for specialized review of each of their areas of 
concern.
    As defined in Section 2 (8), for the purposes of the Act, 
Specialized Agencies of the United Nations shall include the: 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO); 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO); International Fund for 
Agricultural Development (IFAD); International Labor 
Organization (ILO); International Maritime Organization (IMO); 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU); United Nations 
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); 
United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO); 
Universal Postal Union (UPU); World Health Organization (WHO); 
World Meteorological Organization (WMO); and the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).
    Section 104 (c) Certification of Establishment of United 
Nations Office of Ethics. In accordance with section 601, 
certification is required by the Secretary that the United 
Nations has created an Office of Ethics (UNEO) which shall be 
responsible for creating and managing a Code of Ethics for all 
United Nations employees, including making policy, providing 
education and annual training, and overseeing and enforcing the 
implantation of the Code. The UNEO will receive all of its 
operating funds through appropriations from the General 
Assembly and shall not be dependent on any other entity within 
the United Nations for such funding. The Director of the UNEO 
must report on proposals for implementing a system for the 
filing and review of annual financial disclosure forms for all 
United Nations employees at the P-5 level and above, as well as 
for all consultants compensated at any salary level. This 
system for filing financial disclosure forms must be in place 
and operational not later than 6 months after the date of the 
publication of the report by the Director of the UNEO.
    The Director will also include in his report the following 
proposals for making public: all salaries for, and payments to, 
United Nations employees--including, but not limited to, 
pensions and buyouts; annual payments to consultants; and 
travel and per diem rates and payments for all United Nations 
employees. The ethics system will also seek to identify and 
prevent conflicts of interest by United Nations employees and 
shall be comparable to the system used for such purposes by the 
United States Government.
    Section 104 (d) Certification of Establishment of Position 
of Chief Operating Officer. In accordance with section 601, 
certification is required by the Secretary that the United 
Nations has created the position of Chief Operating Officer 
(COO). The COO shall report to the Secretary General, and will 
be responsible for the daily administration, operation and 
supervision, as well as the direction and control of the 
business of the United Nations.
    Section 104 (e) Certification of Access by Member States to 
Reports and Audits by Board of External Auditors. In accordance 
with section 601, certification is required by the Secretary 
that Member States, upon request, are granted access to all 
reports and audits of the Board of External Auditors.
    The Committee has been investigating the United Nations 
Oil-for-Food program (OFFP) since March 2004. To date, the Full 
Committee has held two public hearings, and the Subcommittee on 
Oversight and Investigations has held four public hearings into 
the OFFP. The Committee investigations into the OFFP in 
particular, and United Nations mismanagement in general, are 
ongoing. During the course of this investigation, it has become 
apparent that operations at the United Nations were not well-
managed, and were subject to serious ethical lapses.
    Specifically, the oversight of the OFFP was undercut by 
weak institutional oversight organization and management 
structures within the United Nations. The Office of Internal 
Oversight Services (OIOS) was denied adequate funding, 
manpower, and access needed to properly audit the OFFP. To be 
effective, OIOS and auditing functions in general need greater 
independence within the United Nations management structure. 
Increased oversight and accountability is needed throughout the 
United Nations, ranging from contracting to employee financial 
disclosure statements as part of the establishment of a broader 
ethics Code of Conduct for United Nations employees and 
contractors.
Section 105. Terrorism and the United Nations
    This section translates into an actionable item based on 
the recommendations of the Secretary General's High-Level Panel 
on Threats, Challenges, and Change regarding the need for a 
comprehensive universal definition of terrorism. It establishes 
a directive for the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United 
Nations (``Permanent Representative '') to work toward the 
adoption by the United Nations General Assembly of: (1) a 
terrorism definition that includes any action intended to cause 
death or serious bodily harm to civilians for the purpose of 
intimidation or coercion of populations, governments, or 
international organizations; and (2) a convention on terrorism 
that includes such a definition.
Section 106. United Nations Treaty Bodies
    This section states that the United States shall withhold 
contributions to the regular assessed budget of the United 
Nations for amounts proportional to the percentage of such 
budget that are expended for support of United Nations human 
rights treaty monitoring bodies or committees to which the 
United States is a party to neither a convention or 
international covenant nor a subsequent protocol of a 
particular monitoring body or committee.
    The purpose of this section is to withhold financial 
support to those human rights treaty monitoring bodies or 
committees that the United States is a party to neither the 
underlying convention nor international covenant, nor to the 
protocol. The withholding of funds is not to be interpreted as 
barring United States participation in discussions and 
negotiations in such committees.
Section 107. Equality at the United Nations
    This section seeks to end the discrimination of Israel in 
the United Nations system and ensure fairness and objectivity 
in the United Nations handling of Israeli-Palestinian issues.
    Section 107 (a) Inclusion of Israel in WEOG. This 
subsection calls for the expansion of the Western European and 
Others Group (WEOG) to afford Israel permanent membership in 
this group with full rights and privileges. At the United 
Nations, regional groups nominate members for election to 
United Nations bodies. Asian countries have declined to admit 
Israel into their natural geographic group due to objections by 
Arab countries, depriving Israel of the possibility of 
representation in U.N. bodies. In 2000, Israel was admitted to 
the Western and Others Group in New York, on condition that it 
not stand for election to the Security Council and continue to 
seek membership in the Asian group. Israel's membership to the 
WEOG is severely limited. Every 4 years Israel has to reapply 
for membership, since its status is only temporary. Israel is 
not allowed to present candidacies for open seats in any United 
Nations body and is not able to compete for seats in major U.N. 
bodies. Israel is only allowed to participate in WEOG 
activities in the New York office of the United Nations, and is 
excluded from WEOG discussion and consultations at the United 
Nations offices in Geneva, Nairobi, Rome and Vienna. Therefore, 
Israel cannot participate in United Nations conferences on 
human rights, racism and a number of other issues handled in 
these offices.
    Section 107 (b) Department of State Review and Report. This 
subsection calls for a Department of State review and 
assessment of the work performed by the various United Nations 
commissions, committees, and offices focusing exclusively on 
the Palestinian agenda, followed by the submission of a report 
to the appropriate congressional committees recommending areas 
for reform, including proposals for the elimination by the 
United Nations of such duplicative entities and efforts. The 
General Assembly has created two committees which focus 
negatively on Israeli actions and protectively on the 
Palestinians: the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli 
Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People 
and other Arabs of the Occupied Territories, and the Committee 
on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian 
People. These are in addition to the several organizations 
within the United Nations framework that deal with the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip.
    Section 107 (c) Implementation by Permanent Representative. 
This subsection calls for the Permanent Representative to seek 
the implementation of the recommendations made by the 
Department of State in subsection (b) and to withhold 
proportional U.S. contributions to the United Nations until 
such time as the recommendations are implemented. The objective 
of this section is to ensure United Nations compliance with 
U.S. efforts to improve the efficiency of that body.
    Section 107 (d) GAO Audit. This subsection calls for a 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) audit of the 
implementation of such reform proposals to ensure a third-party 
audit of these efforts.
    In every session, the General Assembly devotes more 
condemnatory resolutions to Israel than to any other country or 
issue. Moreover, the Arab-Israeli conflict has been the subject 
of more Emergency Special Sessions of the Assembly than any 
other issue, with these often marred by one-sided denunciations 
of Israel.
    Severe limitations have been increasingly placed on 
Israel's membership at the United Nations. Israel is denied the 
ability to serve or run for leadership positions in multiple 
United Nations bodies and affiliated agencies. While Israel was 
accepted as a temporary member of the Western European and 
Others Group, it is not allowed to present candidacies for open 
seats in any United Nations body, or able to compete for major 
United Nations bodies. Israel is excluded from consultations at 
United Nations offices in Geneva, Nairobi, Rome and Vienna. As 
long as the United Nations institutionalized reliance on the 
regional system continues, its members are obliged--by the 
principles of its charter--to find a solution to the 
discrimination against Israel. The WEOG states can do so 
without sacrificing their vital interests.
    There are several United Nations groups devoted to 
''Palestinian Rights,'' and there is disproportionate 
representation of Palestinian issues through committees and 
commissions such as: the ``U.N. Division for Palestinian 
Rights''; a ``Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable 
Rights of the Palestinian People''; ``U.N. Special Coordinator 
for the Middle East Peace Process and Personal Representative 
to the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian 
Authority''; and the ``NGO Network on the Question of 
Palestine.''
    In response to this disparity, this section requires that 
the Secretary of State report to Congress on the elimination by 
the United Nations of such duplicative entities and efforts. It 
also requires that the U.S. Permanent Representative to the 
United Nations implement the recommendations of that report, 
and requires the withholding of proportional U.S. contributions 
to the United Nations until such time as the recommendations 
are implemented.

  TITLE II--HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL (ECOSOC)

Section 201. Human Rights
    Section 201 (a) Statement of Policy. This subsection states 
that it shall be the policy of the United States to use its 
voice, vote, and influence at the United Nations to ensure that 
a credible and respectable Human Rights Council or other human 
rights body is established within the United Nations whose 
participating Member States uphold the values embodied in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
    Section 201 (b) Human Rights Reforms at the United Nations. 
This subsection states that the President shall direct the 
Permanent Representative to ensure that the following human 
rights reforms have been adopted by the United Nations: (1) a 
Member State that fails to uphold the values embodied in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights shall be ineligible for 
membership on any United Nations human rights body; (2) a 
Member State that is subject to sanctions by the Security 
Council or under a Security Council-mandated investigation for 
human rights abuses shall be ineligible for membership in any 
United Nations human rights body; (3) a Member State that is 
currently subject to an adopted country-specific resolution 
relating to human rights abuses perpetrated by the government 
of such country in such country, or has been the subject of 
such an adopted country-specific resolution within the past 3 
years shall be ineligible for membership in any United Nations 
human rights body; (4) a Member State that violates the 
principles of a United Nations human rights body to which it 
aspires to join shall be ineligible for membership in such 
body; and (5) no human rights body has a standing agenda item 
that relates only to one country or one region.
    The purpose of this section is to address the deplorable 
state of the current Commission on Human Rights. Violator 
countries such as Cuba and Sudan, who are current members, 
should not be arbitrators of human rights. This provision 
addresses minimum standards for membership in any current or 
future human rights body at the United Nations. Regarding the 
first criterion, ``A Member State that fails to uphold the 
values embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
shall be ineligible for membership on any United Nations human 
rights body,'' the Committee intends that such statement be 
adopted by the United Nations, as a foundational principle. The 
adoption of such a statement allows United States 
representatives to the United Nations a basis upon which to 
challenge a proposed candidate for membership on a human rights 
body that does not uphold the values embodied in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.
    Section 201(c) Certification. In accordance with section 
601, a certification is required by the Secretary that the 
human rights reforms in subsection (b) have been adopted by the 
United Nations.
    Section 201 (d) Prevention of Abuse of ``No Action'' 
Motions. This subsection states that the Permanent 
Representative shall work to prevent abuse of ``no action'' 
motions, particularly as such motions relate to country 
specific resolutions.
    The purpose of this provision is to address the rising 
abuse of ``no action'' motions in the Commission on Human 
Rights. A successful no action motion prevents debate on the 
merits of resolutions, and prevents a vote on a resolution. In 
2004, there were successful no action motions on resolutions 
relating to China and Zimbabwe. In 2004 and 2005 no action 
motions on the human rights situation in Belarus were 
considered, but defeated. The Committee maintains that human 
rights resolutions, particularly country-specific resolutions 
deserve a full debate on the merits and a vote on final 
adoption.
    Section 201 (e) Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights. This subsection states that the 
United States shall continue to strongly support the Office of 
the High Commissioner for Human Rights. Additionally, in 
accordance with section 601, a certification by the Secretary 
is required that the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights has been given greater authority 
in field operation activities, such as in the Darfur region, 
and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Section 202. Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)
    Section 202 (a) Statement of Policy. This subsection states 
that is shall be the policy of the United States to use its 
voice, vote, and influence at the United Nations to: (1) 
abolish secret voting in the Economic and Social Council; (2) 
ensure that, until such time as the Commission on Human Rights 
is abolished, only countries that are not ineligible for 
membership, per section 201(b), shall be considered for 
membership; and (3) ensure that after candidate countries are 
nominated for membership on the Commission on Human Rights, the 
Economic and Social Council conducts a recorded vote to 
determine such membership.
    Section 202 (b) Certification. In accordance with section 
601, the Secretary shall certify that the policies described in 
subsection (a) have been implemented.
    ECOSOC is the United Nations body in which members of the 
Commission on Human Rights are selected. Therefore, condemnable 
membership selection must be addressed in ECOSOC, long before 
the Commission on Human Rights convenes for its annual meeting 
in Geneva, Switzerland. This provision seeks to ensure that 
membership criteria addressed in the human rights provision 
(201(b)) are adhered to in the body of selection, and that 
there is transparency in the selection process.

             TITLE III--INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

Section 301. International Atomic Energy Agency
    Section 301 (a) Enforcement and Compliance. This subsection 
establishes a directive for the U.S. to seek the establishment 
of: (1) an Office of Compliance and Enforcement within the 
Secretariat of the IAEA to function as an independent body of 
technical experts that will assess the activities of Member 
States and recommend specific penalties for those that are in 
breach or violation of their obligations; and (2) a Special 
Committee on Safeguards and Verification to advise the IAEA 
Board of Governors on additional measures necessary to enhance 
the agency's ability to detect undeclared activities by Member 
States. Consideration should be given to the creation of 
individual enforcement mechanisms within the IAEA. This 
subsection also calls on the U.S. Permanent Representative to 
the IAEA to seek the suspension of privileges for Member States 
that are under investigation, or are in breach or non-
compliance of their obligations. The IAEA must prevent 
countries that are in noncompliance from serving on the Board.
    Section 301 (b) United States Contributions. This 
subsection reinforces U.S. priorities concerning the safety of 
nuclear materials and counterproliferation by: (1) calling for 
U.S. voluntary contributions to the IAEA to exclusively fund 
activities relating to Nuclear Security or Nuclear 
Verification; (2) directing the U.S. Permanent Representative 
to the IAEA to ensure that funds for safeguards inspections are 
prioritized to focus on countries of proliferation concern, and 
to prevent state sponsors of terrorism, proliferators, and 
countries under IAEA investigation from benefiting from certain 
IAEA assistance programs; and (3) ensuring transparency in the 
IAEA budget process by calling for a detailed breakdown of 
expenditures for safeguards inspections and nuclear security 
activities. U.S. contributions to the IAEA should focus on 
enhancing safeguards and inspections, as well as efforts 
relating to nuclear safety and security, rather than providing 
technical assistance in the agricultural, medical, and other 
sectors.
    Section 301 (c) Membership. This subsection calls on the 
U.S. Permanent Representative to the IAEA to: (1) block 
membership on the Board of Governors to countries that are 
under investigation or in violation of their obligations and 
have not signed or ratified the Additional Protocol; and (2) 
work toward the establishment of Board membership criteria that 
reflect such priorities. Countries that are in non-compliance 
of their obligations under international agreements and in 
violation of the rules that serve as the basis for individual 
United Nations bodies cannot and must not be entrusted with the 
enforcement of those very rules and obligations. They should be 
held accountable through suspension of privileges and denial of 
certain assistance.
    Section 301 (d) Report. This subsection calls for a report 
on the status of implementation of this section 6 months after 
enactment and annually for 2 years thereafter.
Section 302. Sense of Congress Regarding the Nuclear Security Action 
        Plan of the IAEA
    This section expresses the sense of Congress that the 
national security interests of the United States are enhanced 
by the Nuclear Security Action Plan of the IAEA and the Board 
of Governors should recommend, and the General Conference 
should adopt, a resolution incorporating the Nuclear Security 
Action Plan into the regular budget of the IAEA.
    In recent years, several developments have highlighted the 
dual dangers posed by terrorism and proliferation of deadly 
unconventional weapons and the confluence of the two. This has 
been articulated in the National Security Strategy of the 
United States (2002), in which President Bush summarized: ``The 
gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of 
radicalism and technology. Our enemies have openly declared 
that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction, and evidence 
indicates that they are doing so with determination. The United 
States will not allow these efforts to succeed.''
    In addition, the discovery of the A.Q. Khan nuclear black 
market network, Iran's unreported nuclear activities (including 
secret uranium enrichment facilities), the withdrawal of North 
Korea from the nuclear nonproliferation treaty in April 2003, 
and the discovery of Libya's covert nuclear weapons program, 
renounced in December 2003, have heightened concerns. These 
concerns focus on the propensity for rogue states to develop a 
nuclear weapons capability and the potential for non-state 
actors participating in the global terrorism network to attain 
technology, expertise, and nuclear materials that could be used 
for nuclear-related terrorism.
    The United States has repeatedly viewed the IAEA as a vital 
component of U.S. strategies to address these threats. This 
title translates policy recommendations into concrete actions 
to achieve U.S. proliferation and terrorism goals.

                         TITLE IV--PEACEKEEPING

Section 401. Sense of Congress Regarding Reform of United Nations 
        Peacekeeping Operations
    This section expresses the Sense of Congress that although 
United Nations peacekeeping operations have contributed greatly 
toward the promotion of peace and stability, the credibility of 
United Nations peacekeeping has been severely tarnished by 
operational failures and unconscionable acts of misconduct. To 
restore that credibility, fundamental and far-reaching reforms 
must be implemented without delay.
Section 402. Statement of Policy Relating to Reform of United Nations 
        Peacekeeping Operations
    This section states that it shall be the policy of the 
United States to pursue reform of United Nations peacekeeping 
operations in the following areas: (1) planning and management; 
(2) conduct and discipline; and (3) peacebuilding.
    Subsection (1)(A) recognizes that the size, cost and number 
of United Nations peacekeeping missions have increased 
substantially over the past decade and calls for a global audit 
of such missions with a view toward ``right-sizing'' and 
ensuring that they are cost effective. The Committee recommends 
that this audit should be conducted in conjunction with a 
comprehensive review of all mandates, as described in 
subsection (B).
    Subsection (1)(B) calls for a comprehensive review of all 
mandates to identify objectives which are practical and 
achievable. Duties which fall beyond the scope of traditional 
peacekeeping, including the conduct of elections and post-
conflict reconstruction, should be tasked to a new 
Peacebuilding Commission. Long-standing missions which are 
static and cannot fulfill their mandate, such as the United 
Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), 
should be closed. Where the complete withdrawal of peacekeepers 
is likely to result in the resumption of major conflict, the 
budgeting principle utilized by the United Nations Peacekeeping 
Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)--which draws, in part, upon voluntary 
contributions--should be applied.
    Subsection (1)(C) calls for the adoption of a minimum 
standard of qualifications for senior leaders and managers, 
with a particular emphasis on specific skills and experience. 
In response to the August 2000 ``Report of the Panel on United 
Nations Peace Operations,'' also known as the ``Brahimi 
Report,'' the Secretary General formed a Senior Appointments 
Group to establish a leadership profile and generate a list of 
``eminent persons'' and senior United Nations personnel 
available for rapid deployment. The Special Committee on 
Peacekeeping, however, rejected Brahimi's emphasis on 
managerial skills and experience, alternatively favoring 
``political considerations.'' The Committee finds that as 
missions become larger and increasingly complex, the need for 
real talent in management positions becomes critical. A minimum 
standard of qualifications, including diplomatic, managerial, 
and decision-making skill in complex emergencies, should be 
established, and Special Representatives, Senior Managers, and 
Force Commanders who do not meet those standards should be 
removed.
    Subsection (1)(D) calls for mandatory pre-deployment 
training on interpretation of the mandate of an operation--
particularly in the areas of use of force, civilian protection 
and field conditions--the Code of Conduct, HIV/AIDS and human 
rights. It also stipulates that all personnel should be 
required to sign an oath that they have received such training 
and understand that violating the Code of Conduct may result in 
immediate termination of their United Nations assignment. The 
Committee acknowledges that the conduct of ``pre-deployment 
training'' for peacekeepers already serving in the field 
clearly would not be possible. To this end, such training 
should be conducted prior to any new deployments or 
redeployments. Further, training should be conducted for those 
who already have been deployed but not trained. Both current 
and future peacekeeping personnel should sign the oath required 
under this subsection.
    Subsection (2)(A) calls for the adoption of a single 
uniform Code of Conduct that has the status of a binding rule 
and applies equally to all personnel regardless of category or 
rank. The Committee recognizes that a major contributing factor 
to the problem in addressing misconduct is compounded by the 
fact that it currently is governed by 14 different bulletins, 
directives, guidelines, and undertakings which apply to up to 
five distinct categories of personnel. To this end, and 
consistent with the recommendations contained in the 
``Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual 
Exploitation and Abuse in United Nations Peacekeeping 
Operations'' (A/59/710, hereinafter cited the Prince Zeid 
Report), the Committee asserts that the General Assembly should 
formally adopt a single, uniform Code of Conduct, based on the 
principles contained in the Secretary General's bulletin on 
special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and 
sexual abuse (ST/SGB/2003/13), ``Ten Rules: Code of Personal 
Conduct for Blue Helmets,'' and ``We Are United Nations 
Peacekeepers,'' which applies to all categories of personnel. 
The Committee recommends that this Code of Conduct serve as a 
baseline, or a minimum standard of conduct, while recognizing 
that such rules may be augmented to meet the needs of 
particular missions.
    Section 2(B) asserts that all personnel, regardless of 
category or rank, should receive pre-deployment and periodic 
follow-on training on the Code of Conduct, be provided with a 
personal copy of the Code of Conduct translated into their 
national language, and sign an oath that they will abide by the 
Code of Conduct. The Committee notes the recommendation in the 
Prince Zeid report that translations could be provided by 
Member States. This subsection also calls for the conduct of 
educational outreach programs such that local communities may 
understand prohibited acts on the part of peacekeepers and 
identify the individual to whom they may direct complaints or 
allegations.
    Section (2)(C) calls for the presence of dedicated 
monitoring mechanisms, such as the Personnel Conduct Units 
(PCUs) currently deployed in Haiti, Liberia, Burundi, and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, in each peacekeeping mission to 
monitor compliance with the Code of Conduct. Such units should 
report simultaneously to the Head of Mission, the Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations, and the Associate Director of OIOS for 
Peacekeeping Operations (established under section 104(b)(10)), 
to ensure that their reports are not effectively obstructed.
    Section (2)(D) calls for the establishment of a permanent, 
professional and investigative body under OIOS dedicated to 
United Nations peacekeeping, which would include professionals 
with experience in investigating sex crimes. Though OIOS should 
maintain responsibility for the conduct of transparent and 
impartial investigations, the Committee recognizes that 
ultimate responsibility for pursuing justice lies with Member 
States. To this end, provisions should be included in a Model 
Memorandum of Understanding that obligate troop contributing 
countries to designate professional prosecutors, who will be 
available on short notice, to participate in any investigation 
into the conduct of one of their nationals and provide guidance 
on standards of proof and evidentiary requirements for 
subsequent legal action. The Personnel Conduct Units deployed 
in the field, as discussed in Section (2)(C), may also provide 
support to any OIOS investigation, as deemed appropriate.
    Section (2)(E) calls for the establishment of a dedicated 
unit within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, staffed 
and funded through existing resources, to compile and 
coordinate reports of misconduct, outcomes of investigations, 
and subsequent legal actions taken. The Committee recommends 
that such a unit function as the coordinating body of the 
Personnel Conduct Units deployed in the field, and that it be 
tasked with following up on completed investigations, 
particularly focusing on disciplinary actions taken by troop 
contributing countries. Information on subsequent actions 
should be shared with the Head of Mission concerned. The 
Committee believes that demonstrating that there are 
consequences for misconduct will promote confidence in 
peacekeeping missions and act as a deterrent to other potential 
violators. The Committee notes that substantial progress on 
this recommendation already has been made, and encourages the 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations to provide this unit with 
appropriate staff and funding through existing resources.
    Section (2)(F) states that while peacekeeping operations 
should provide immediate medical assistance to victims of 
sexual abuse or exploitation, the responsibility for providing 
long-term treatment, care or restitution lies solely with the 
individual guilty of misconduct. The Committee rejects 
proposals for the creation of a Victim's Trust Fund, or any 
similar fund, financed through assessed contributions. Such 
funds would only shield individuals from personal liability and 
reinforce an atmosphere of impunity. Alternatively, personal 
liability may act as a deterrent to misconduct. In the event 
that an individual responsible for misconduct has been 
repatriated, reassigned, redeployed, or is otherwise unable to 
provide restitution, responsibility for providing victims' 
assistance should be assigned to the troop contributing country 
or the manager concerned. In the case of misconduct by a member 
of a military contingent, funds must be withheld from the 
payments made by the United Nations to the troop-contributing 
country concerned. (The Committee notes that each troop-
contributing country receives a payment of $1080 per 
peacekeeper per month). In the case of misconduct by a civilian 
employee or contractor, the United Nations must garnish wages 
and/or impose appropriate fines.
    Section (2)(G) recognizes the role which Managers and 
Commanders play in creating an atmosphere of either compliance 
or impunity, and suggests that such information be included in 
their personal performance evaluations. To this end, Managers 
and Commanders who take decisive action to deter and address 
misconduct should be commended and rewarded, while those who 
create a permissive environment or impede investigations into 
misconduct should be relieved of duty.
    Section (2)(H) calls for the establishment of a centralized 
database within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to 
track the cases of misconduct, particularly to ensure that 
those guilty of violations are permanently barred from 
participation in future missions. The Committee notes that such 
a data base already is being created, and urges the Department 
of Peacekeeping Operations to move quickly and decisively to 
ensure this undertaking is completed without delay and the data 
base is used as an effective management tool.
    Section (2)(I) calls for the adjustment of discretionary 
``welfare payments'' currently provided to troop-contributing 
countries to offset the cost of operation-provided recreational 
facilities. The Committee recognizes that conditions in a 
peacekeeping mission undoubtedly are difficult for military 
contingents and civilians alike, and it is incumbent upon the 
United Nations to take effective measures to ameliorate 
conditions of service. The Committee notes that troop 
contributing countries currently are provided with $1080 per 
month per peacekeeper to maintain their contingents. Of that 
$1080, eight dollars has been designated for recreational 
funds. Unfortunately, the manner in which troop contributing 
countries disburse these funds is not transparent. This seems 
to be particularly true of the funds designated for 
recreational purposes. To this end, the Committee finds that 
funds designated for recreation should be deducted from the 
standard allowance disbursed to troop contributing countries 
and, alternatively, redirected toward the mission itself. The 
Head of Mission would then assume responsibility for ensuring 
that recreational dollars are spent in a manner consistent with 
their purpose.
    Section (3) calls for the creation of a Peacebuilding 
Commission, and a related Peace Support Office, to ease the 
demands placed upon the Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
and marshal the efforts of the United Nations, international 
financial institutions, donors and nongovernmental 
organizations to assist countries in transition from war to 
peace. The Committee notes that this proposal was included in 
the U.N.'s High-Level Panel Report, although details about the 
Commission's membership and areas of specific areas of 
responsibility were not provided. The Committee asserts that 
the Commission should be a subsidiary body of the United 
Nations Security Council, limited in membership to ensure 
efficiency, and staffed through existing resources.
Section 403. Certification
    This section requires the President to direct the U.S. 
Permanent Representative to the United Nations to oppose the 
creation of any new, or expansion of any existing, United 
Nations peacekeeping operation until the Secretary can certify 
to the Congress that the most immediate reforms outlined in 
Section 402 above have been implemented, including: (1) the 
adoption of a single, uniform Code of Conduct and establishment 
of training mechanisms to educate personnel on requirements and 
enforcement of the Code; (2) the provision to all personnel of 
a personal copy of the Code, translated into their national 
language; (3) the signature of an oath that they will abide by 
the Code and understand the consequences of violating the Code 
as a condition of their appointment; (4) the design and conduct 
of educational outreach programs within local communities to 
explain prohibited acts and identify the individual to whom the 
local population may direct complaints or allegations of 
exploitation, abuse, or other acts of misconduct; (5) the 
creation of a centralized database to track cases of 
misconduct; (6) the establishment of an independent 
investigative and audit function within DPKO and OIOS; and (7) 
the adoption of a Model Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), 
which obligates troop contributing countries to: (a) designate 
legal authorities to participate in any investigation into 
allegations of misconduct by an individual of such Member 
State; (b) refer investigations into violations of the Code of 
Conduct by an individual of such Member State to its competent 
national or military authority for possible prosecution; (c) 
report to DPKO on the outcome of any such investigations; (d) 
undertake to conduct on-site court martial proceedings where 
appropriate; and (e) assume responsibility for the provision of 
assistance to a victim of misconduct committed by an individual 
of such Member State.
    As the last two reforms (the establishment of an 
independent investigative and audit function and the adoption 
of a Model MOU) may not be immediately achievable, the 
respective certifications on implementation are required no 
later than January 1, 2007. The preceding five reforms, 
however, must be certified immediately.
    The Committee determines that such a withholding should not 
affect the United Nations' ability to take decisive action in 
Darfur, Sudan. Pursuant to United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 1590 (March 24, 2005), 10,000 peacekeepers already 
have been authorized to be deployed to support implementation 
of the peace agreement between the Government of Sudan and the 
Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) in southern Sudan. 
This resolution also authorizes the United Nations Mission in 
Sudan (UNMIS) to ``closely and continuously liaise and 
coordinate at all levels with the African Union Mission in 
Sudan (AMIS) with a view toward expeditiously reinforcing the 
effort to foster peace in Darfur,'' and to reinforce AMIS by 
providing logistical support, technical assistance, and reserve 
capacity. The deployment plan for UNMIS includes a presence in 
Darfur toward this end.
    When the State Department notified the Congress of the 
Administration's intent to support UNMIS, it stated that the 
troop ceiling of 10,000 assumed a ``re-hatting'' of AMIS, such 
that it eventually would be folded into the United Nations 
mission. The Committee supports a stronger United Nations role 
in Darfur and, therefore, does not interpret the withholding of 
support for an expanded mission to include that re-hatting of 
AMIS under the current troop ceiling of 10,000. The Committee 
thus finds that the resources and personnel required to 
support, or even immediately take over, the AMIS mission 
already exist.
    The Committee further notes that all but one of the reforms 
linked to the certification required under this section already 
have been endorsed by the United Nations Special Committee on 
Peacekeeping. The Committee commends the Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations' and the Special Committee on 
Peacekeeping's prompt response to the recommendations contained 
in the Prince Zeid report, but urges the United Nations to move 
expeditiously to ensure that these reforms are not merely 
endorsed, but immediately implemented.

   TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE.

Section 501. Positions for United States Citizens at International 
        Organizations
    This section requires the Secretary to make every effort to 
recruit U.S. citizens for positions within international 
organizations. Historically, the U.S. has been underserved in 
international organizations. In general, there has not been 
growth in the number of Americans taking positions in 
international organizations. The Committee encourages the 
Department to continue efforts to attract Americans to such 
jobs by utilizing all available means to do so.
Section 502. Budget Justification for Regular Assessed Budget of the 
        United Nations
    This section requires that the annual budget for assessed 
contributions to the United Nations include an itemization of 
the budget. It also requires that, at the earliest possible 
time, Congress is consulted about any changes under 
consideration to the regular assessed budget. The United 
Nations adopts a 2-year budget. In recent years, for the second 
year of the budget, the General Assembly has approved increases 
to cover new activities, such as coordinating the elections in 
Iraq, or to properly improve security of United Nations 
facilities. In 2005, the United Nations budget increased by 
$447 million. The increase was for: security of United Nations 
premises and personnel ($118 million); special political 
missions ($192 million); exchange rate losses ($79 million); 
inflation and salary-related adjustments ($45 million); and 
other miscellaneous increases ($13 million). However, there is 
little effort to offset increases.
    With respect to budget adjustments, Committees of Congress 
are unaware of considerations of budget increases until such 
time as the U.S. has already made a commitment. The consequence 
is an increase in the U.S. assessment that Congress is 
obligated to fund. Congressional participation at an earlier 
stage is important in order to control unjustified budgetary 
commitments of the United Nations and to provide the U.S. 
Permanent Representative to the United Nations with a better 
understanding of Congressional expectations.
Section 503. Review and Report
    This section requires the Secretary to conduct a review of 
programs of the United Nations that are funded through the 
assessed budget and provide recommendations to the Congress on 
the continuation of such programs and which programs should no 
longer be part of the assessed budget, but should be 
voluntarily funded.
    This report should serve as an important baseline for 
pursuit of a more rational approach to United Nations 
budgeting. Furthermore, such an effort to identify core 
programs and those that truly should be supported by the 
interested countries will restore and refocus the United 
Nations with regard to its core mandate.
Section 504. Government Accountability Office
    This section requires the GAO to report on the status of 
the management reforms recommended by the Secretary General in 
1997, 2002 and 2005. As an oversight tool for Congress, this 
section also requires the GAO to report on each certification 
issued by the Secretary.

       TITLE VI--CERTIFICATIONS AND WITHOLDINGS OF CONTRIBUTIONS

Section 601. Certifications and Withholding of Contributions
    Section 601 (a) Certifications. The Secretary must certify 
to appropriate congressional committees that the United Nations 
has made certain reforms included in this Act. In the event the 
Secretary is unable to make such certifications, and only after 
providing the Congress with written justification and 
consultation, the Secretary may certify that the United Nations 
has made reforms that are substantially similar to the 
requirements or accomplish the same purposes as the 
requirements in this Act. In addition, if at least 32 of the 39 
reforms mandated under the Act are in fact accomplished in this 
manner, all 39 certifiable reforms shall be deemed to have been 
implemented for the year in which the Secretary submits such 
certifications. However, the remaining seven reforms must be 
certified the following year.
    Additionally, 14 of the 32 certifications which the 
Secretary makes must include the following certifications: 
Subsection (d)(3) of Section 11 of the United Nations 
Participation Act of 1945, as amended by Section 101(c) of this 
Act, requiring the United Nations regular assessed 2008-2009 
biennium budget for Public Information and General Assembly 
Affairs and Conference Services be reduced by 20 percent 
against the budgets of such organizational programs for the 
2004-2005 biennial period; Section 103(b)(1)(A), requiring the 
maintenance of a budget not in excess of the level agreed to by 
the General Assembly at the beginning of each United Nations 
budgetary biennium, unless increases are agreed to by consensus 
and do not exceed 10 percent; Section 103(b)(2)(D), the United 
Nations and each specialized agency has reestablished and are 
implementing sunset provisions for all new programs; Section 
104(a)(1), establishing an Independent Oversight Board (IOB); 
Section 104(a)(6), requiring the IOB to recommend annual 
budgets for the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) 
and the Board of External Auditors; Section 104(b)(1), 
designating the OIOS as an independent entity within the United 
Nations; Section 104(b)(2), making the OIOS's budget more 
independent and less subject to manipulation by including the 
OIOS in the General Assembly's budget process; Section 
104(c)(1), establishing a United Nations Office of Ethics; 
Section 201(b)(1), adopting measures to ensure that if a Member 
State fails to uphold the values embodied in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, it shall be ineligible for 
membership on any United Nations human rights body; Section 
201(b)(2), adopting measures preventing Member States that are 
subject to sanctions by the Security Council, or under a 
Security Council-mandated investigation for human rights 
abuses, be eligible for membership on any United Nations human 
rights body; Section 201(b)(3), adopting measures prohibiting 
Member States that are currently, or within the past 3 years, 
subject to an adopted country-specific resolution relating to 
human rights abuses in the principal body within the United 
Nations, for the promotion and protection of human rights 
relating to human rights abuses perpetrated by a government of 
such country in such country, are ineligible for membership on 
any United Nations human rights body; Section 201(b)(5), 
barring any United Nations human rights body from having a 
standing agenda item that relates only to one country or 
region; Section 202(a)(1), abolishing secret voting in the 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC); and Section 202(a)(2), 
adopting measures to ensure that until the Commission on Human 
Rights of the United Nations is abolished, only countries that 
are eligible for membership on a United Nations human rights 
body under this Act can be considered for membership on the 
Commission on Human Rights.
    The Committee intends to effect the 2007 United Nations 
regular assessed budget through this provision. Accordingly, 
certifications would implicate those contributions which the 
United States makes toward the United Nations 2007 budget, and 
subsequent budgets.
    Section 601 (b) Withholding of United States Contributions 
to the Regular Assessed Budget of the United Nations. Until the 
Secretary certifies to the Congress that the United Nations has 
made the reforms mandated by this Act, the United States shall 
appropriate, but withhold from expenditure, 50 percent of the 
contributions of the United States to the regular assessed 
budget of the United Nations for a biennial period, which shall 
be authorized to remain available until expended.
    Section 601 (c) Release of Funds. This subsection states 
that when all certifications (or alternative certifications) 
are submitted, the U.S. shall transfer to the United Nations 
amounts appropriated but withheld from expenditure under 
subsection (b).
    Section 601 (d) Annual Reviews. The Secretary is required 
to: (1) conduct annual reviews of compliance, beginning 1 year 
after the date on which the Secretary submits the final 
certification; and (2) forward a report to the appropriate 
congressional committees of the findings of such review. If the 
Secretary determines that the United Nations has failed to 
remain in compliance with a certification (or an alternate 
certification), the 50 percent withholdings described in 
subsection (b) shall re-apply and take effect in the subsequent 
fiscal year(s) until all certifications (or alternative 
certifications) under subsection (a) have been submitted.
    Section 601 (e) Effective Date. This section states that 
the certifications (or alternate certifications) specified 
under subsection (a) shall be required with respect to U.S. 
contributions towards payment of regular assessed dues of the 
United Nations for 2007 and subsequent years. Accordingly, 
certifications would implicate those contributions which the 
United States makes toward the United Nations 2007 budget and 
subsequent budgets.
    The Henry J. Hyde United Nations Reform Act of 2005 
provides strong but necessary measures to prompt the United 
Nations to undertake such fundamental reforms.
    This bill provides the new U.S. Permanent Representative to 
the United Nations with a reasonable amount of time to work 
through diplomatic channels with other countries which also 
want to see the United Nations reform and restore its 
credibility. It gives the United Nations until 2007 to adopt 
the bulk of these reforms and until 2008 for the remainder. 
However, if the United Nations fails to implement what are 
widely seen as reasonable reforms, financial penalties will 
ensue. Should withholdings occur, the United States will 
appropriate the 50 percent of contributions but withhold them 
from expenditure until such time as the certifications are 
made.
    As explained above in detail, the Act mandates that 39 
reforms be tied to certifications in the areas of budgeting, 
oversight and accountability, and human rights. It also 
provides the United Nations flexibility for implementation by 
requiring only 32 of 39 reforms be enacted no later than 2007, 
with the remaining seven to be acted upon within the next year.
    It should be noted that if the United Nations makes the 
necessary reforms promptly, no arrearages will result from this 
Act. If the United Nations fails to act, however, the US 
taxpayers should not be expected to continue to pay for 
programs that operate with essentially a blank check--with no 
accountability for producing results, no check on outdated, 
inefficient, duplicative initiatives, no effective oversight of 
management of programs, and a human rights body that allows 
violator countries to sit as arbitrators of human rights.
    Some have asked whether the United States has a legal 
obligation to pay its United Nations dues even in the event the 
United Nations continues to resist fundamental reform as set 
forth in this Act. In the 1980s, the Reagan Administration and 
some Members of Congress came to the conclusion that the U.S. 
obligation to pay assessed U.N. payments as limited and not 
absolute. Jeane Kirkpatrick, while serving as the U.S. 
Ambassador to the United Nations stated: ``It is sometimes 
argued that as signatories to the treaty, we assume an absolute 
legal obligation to pay the assessed share of the budget, it 
seems to me, after consultation and reflection, that this 
obligations is real, substantial, and serious, but also that it 
is not absolute. . . I do not suggest the United States should 
take lightly the obligation to pay its assessed share of the 
budget. This is a serious, but not, in my opinion, an absolute 
obligation. To be sure, article 17 of the U.N. Charter requires 
Member States to pay their share of the U.N. budget as assessed 
by the General Assembly. We should not assume, however, that 
any expense apportioned by the General Assembly is absolutely 
valid.''
    The United States was the originator of the concept of 
having a United Nations organization. Americans have invested 
heavily in the principles and ideals that form the foundation 
of the United Nations--this Committee intends to, once again, 
look to history as a guide, and by providing constructive 
direction, commitment, and leverage of the power of the purse, 
the U.S. can remain part of the process to work toward 
meaningful reform. These actions will ultimately revitalize and 
strengthen the U.N.

                            Federal Mandates

    H.R. 2745 provides no Federal mandates.

         Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported

    In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by 
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law 
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new 
matter is printed in italics, existing law in which no change 
is proposed is shown in roman):

       SECTION 11 OF THE UNITED NATIONS PARTICIPATION ACT OF 1945

[SEC. 11. LIMITATION ON THE UNITED STATES SHARE OF ASSESSMENTS FOR 
                    UNITED NATIONS REGULAR BUDGET.

    [None of the funds available to the Department of State 
shall be used to pay the United States share of assessed 
contributions for the regular budget of the United Nations in 
an amount greater than 22 percent of the total of all assessed 
contributions for that budget.]

SEC. 11. UNITED STATES FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS.

    (a) Policy of the United States Relating to the Regular 
Assessed Budget of the United Nations.--
            (1) In general.--The President shall direct the 
        United States Permanent Representative to the United 
        Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the 
        United States at the United Nations to--
                    (A) pursue a streamlined, efficient, and 
                accountable regular assessed budget of the 
                United Nations; and
                    (B) shift funding mechanisms of certain 
                organizational programs of the United Nations 
                specified under paragraph (2) of subsection (c) 
                from the regular assessed budget to voluntarily 
                funded programs.
            (2) United states contributions.--It shall be the 
        policy of the United States to--
                    (A) redirect United States contributions to 
                the United Nations to achieve the policy 
                objectives described in paragraph (1)(B); and
                    (B) redirect a portion of funds from the 
                following organizational programs to pursue the 
                policy objectives described in paragraph 
                (1)(A):
                            (i) Public Information.
                            (ii) General Assembly affairs and 
                        conferences services.
            (3) Future biennium budgets.-- The President shall 
        direct the United States Permanent Representative to 
        the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and 
        influence of the United States at the United Nations to 
        ensure that the shifting of funding mechanisms under 
        paragraph (1)(B) and redirecting of contributions under 
        paragraph (2) be reflected in future resolutions agreed 
        to by the General Assembly for the regular assessed 
        budget of the United Nations for the period of a 
        current biennium. To achieve the policies described in 
        paragraphs (1) and (2), the United States Permanent 
        Representative to the United Nations shall withhold the 
        support of the United States for a consensus for such 
        budget until such time as such budget is reflective of 
        such policies.
    (b) 22 Percent Limitation.--In accordance with section 601 
of the Henry J. Hyde United Nations Reform Act of 2005, the 
Secretary may not make a contribution to a regularly assessed 
biennial budget of the United Nations in an amount greater than 
22 percent of the amount calculable under subsection (c).
    (c) Annual Dues.--
            (1) In general.--For annual dues paid by the United 
        States to the United Nations each fiscal year, the 
        percentage specified in subsection (b) shall be 
        multiplied by one-half of the amount of the regularly 
        assessed budget of the United Nations for a current 
        biennial period, as agreed to by resolution of the 
        General Assembly.
            (2) Calculation with respect to certain 
        organizational programs for redirection.--The 
        percentage specified in subsection (b) shall be 
        multiplied by one-half of the sum of amounts budgeted 
        by resolution of the General Assembly for a current 
        biennial period for the following certain 
        organizational programs:
                    (A) Economic and social affairs.
                    (B) Least-developed countries, landlocked 
                developing countries and small island 
                developing States.
                    (C) United Nations support for the New 
                Partnership for Africa's Development.
                    (D) Trade and development.
                    (E) International Trade Center UNCTAD/WTO.
                    (F) Environment.
                    (G) Human settlements.
                    (H) Crime prevention and criminal justice.
                    (I) International drug control.
                    (J) Economic and social development in 
                Africa.
                    (K) Economic and social development in Asia 
                and the Pacific.
                    (L) Economic development in Europe.
                    (M) Economic and social development in in 
                Latin America and the Caribbean.
                    (N) Economic and social development in 
                Western Asia.
                    (O) Regular program of technical 
                cooperation.
                    (P) Development account.
                    (Q) Protection of and assistance to 
                refugees.
                    (R) Palestine refugees.
            (3) Redirection of funds.--Of amounts appropriated 
        for contributions towards payment of regular assessed 
        dues to the United Nations for 2008 and each subsequent 
        year, if the funding mechanisms of one or more of the 
        organizational programs of the United Nations specified 
        in paragraph (2) have not been shifted from the regular 
        assessed budget to voluntarily funded programs in 
        accordance with subsection (a)(1), the Secretary shall 
        ensure that such amounts in each such fiscal year that 
        are specified for each such organizational program 
        pursuant to the resolution agreed to by the General 
        Assembly for the regular assessed budget of the United 
        Nations for the period of a current biennium are 
        redirected from payment of the assessed amount for the 
        regular assessed budget as follows:
                    (A) Subject to not less than 30 days prior 
                notification to Congress, the Secretary shall 
                expend an amount, not to exceed 40 percent of 
                the amount specified for each such 
                organizational program pursuant to the 
                resolution agreed to by the General Assembly 
                for the regular assessed budget of the United 
                Nations for the period of a current biennium, 
                as a contribution to an eligible organizational 
                program specified in paragraph (4).
                    (B) Subject to not less than 30 days prior 
                notification to Congress, the Secretary shall 
                expend the remaining amounts under this 
                paragraph to voluntarily funded United Nations 
                specialized agencies, funds, or programs.
            (4) Eligible organizational programs.--The eligible 
        organizational programs referred to in paragraph (3)(A) 
        for redirection of funds under such paragraph are the 
        following:
                    (A) Internal oversight.
                    (B) Human rights.
                    (C) Humanitarian assistance.
                    (D) An organizational program specified in 
                subparagraphs (A) through (P) of paragraph (2), 
                subject to paragraph (5).
            (5) Expenditure of remaining amounts to certain 
        organization programs.--
                    (A) Voluntary contribution.--Subject to not 
                less than 30 days prior notification to 
                Congress and the limitation specified under 
                subparagraph (B), the Secretary is authorized 
                to make a voluntary contribution to an 
                organizational program of the United Nations 
                specified in subparagraphs (A) through (P) of 
                paragraph (2) of any amounts not contributed in 
                a fiscal year to an eligible organizational 
                program specified in subparagraphs (A) through 
                (C) of paragraph (4).
                    (B) 10 percent limitation.--A voluntary 
                contribution under subparagraph (A) to an 
                organizational program of the United Nations 
                specified in subparagraphs (A) through (P) of 
                paragraph (2) may not exceed 10 percent of the 
                total contribution made under paragraph (3)(A).
    (d) Further Calculation With Respect to Budgets for Public 
Information and General Assembly Affairs and Conference 
Services.--
            (1) 22 percent limitation.--The Secretary may not 
        make a contribution to a regularly assessed biennial 
        budget of the United Nations in an amount greater than 
        22 percent of the amount calculable under paragraph 
        (2).
            (2) Annual dues each fiscal year.--
                    (A) In general.--For annual dues paid by 
                the United States to the United Nations each 
                fiscal year, the percentage specified in 
                paragraph (1) shall be multiplied by one-half 
                of the amount of the regularly assessed budget 
                of the United Nations for a current biennial 
                period, as agreed to by resolution of the 
                General Assembly.
                    (B) Calculation with respect to public 
                information and general assembly affairs and 
                conference services.--With respect to such 
                United States annual dues, the percentage 
                specified in paragraph (1) shall be multiplied 
                by one-half of the sum of amounts budgeted by 
                resolution of the General Assembly for the 
                2004-2005 biennial period for the following 
                organizational programs:
                            (i) Public Information.
                            (ii) General Assembly affairs and 
                        conferences services.
                    (C) Redirection of funds.--
                            (i) In general.--The President 
                        shall direct the United States 
                        Permanent Representative to the United 
                        Nations to make every effort, including 
                        the withholding of United States 
                        support for a consensus budget of the 
                        United Nations, to reduce the budgets 
                        of the organizational programs 
                        specified in subparagraph (B) for 2007 
                        by ten percent against the budgets of 
                        such organizational programs for the 
                        2004-2005 biennial period. If the 
                        budgets of such organizational programs 
                        are not so reduced, 20 percent the 
                        amount determined under subparagraph 
                        (B) for contributions towards payment 
                        of regular assessed dues for 2007 shall 
                        be redirected from payment for the 
                        amount assessed for United States 
                        annual contributions to the regular 
                        assessed budget of the United Nations.
                            (ii) Specific amounts.--The 
                        Secretary shall make the amount 
                        determined under clause (i) available 
                        as a contribution to an eligible 
                        organizational program specified in 
                        subparagraphs (A) through (C) of 
                        paragraph (4) of subsection (c).
            (3) Policy with respect to 2008-2009 biennial 
        period and subsequent biennial periods.--
                    (A) In general.--The President shall direct 
                the United States Permanent Representative to 
                the United Nations to make every effort, 
                including the withholding of United States 
                support for a consensus budget of the United 
                Nations, to reduce the budgets of the 
                organizational programs specified in 
                subparagraph (B) of paragraph (2) for the 2008-
                2009 biennial period and each subsequent 
                biennial period by 20 percent against the 
                budgets of such organizational programs for the 
                2004-2005 biennial period.
                    (B) Certification.--In accordance with 
                section 601, a certification shall be required 
                that certifies that the reduction in budgets 
                described in subparagraph (A) has been 
                implemented.
                            Dissenting Views

                                SUMMARY

    We express our profound disagreement with the Republican 
members of the Committee who are sending this deeply flawed 
legislation to the whole House. While we share their commitment 
to meaningful and thorough reforms at the United Nations, this 
legislation may do more to undermine the current efforts at 
reform underway in New York rather than bolster them. By 
declaring our unilateral intention to withhold 50% of the dues 
we owe to the U.N. in a automatic and mechanical way, by 
mandating withholding of dues from programs that do not get 
moved from the U.N.'s assessed budget to a system of voluntary 
contribution and by requiring that the President immediately 
start vetoing U.N. security Council Resolutions establishing 
new or expanded peacekeeping missions if certain reforms are 
not met, this legislation will undermine our efforts at 
cooperation with like minded countries in New York, will lead 
to isolating us on the U.N. and budgetary reforms in a way that 
will undermine our own efforts to focus the U.N. on real 
transnational threats, and will hamper our ability to foster 
greater stability in the world, including even requiring more 
deployments of U.S. troops at a time when we are so fully 
committed in Iraq, Afghanistan and around the world. We need 
reforms at the U.N., but this legislation represents a bludgeon 
that could well undermine both it and our influence there. The 
Democratic alternative provides for comprehensive reforms at 
the U.N. similar to those in the Republican bill but provides 
sufficient flexibility to allow the United States to cooperate 
with like-minded countries at the U.N. to achieve the reforms 
we all seek.

                             THE U.N. TODAY

    The U.N. system composed of the U.N. itself and its 
specialized agencies, such as the United Nations Development 
Program, the World Health Organization, and the World Food 
Program, are a remarkable set of institutions that would need 
to be invented if they did not exist. Through actions and 
programs of these institutions, we have eliminated the scourge 
of deadly infectious diseases, responded to famines of huge 
proportions, and settled international disputes of 
extraordinary scope.
    And the U.N. frequently serves critical U.S. interests. 
Just to point out some recent cases, U.N. officials helped 
organize the successful Presidential elections in Afghanistan, 
trained thousands of workers for the critical Iraqi 
Parliamentary elections earlier this year, and helped mediate 
the withdrawal of Syrian armed forces from Lebanon. Often the 
U.N. can take action that would not be acceptable if proposed 
by another country, particularly in an environment of hostility 
and suspicion that can often exist in the developing world 
towards former colonial powers or countries that are perceived 
as a threat.
    However, the U.N. has faults as well as virtues. It is not 
a fully independent actor with its own separate personality. 
Rather, it reflects less-than-perfect member states in a deeply 
flawed world. The U.N. is an organization composed of 191 
member states that, in varying degrees, have their own 
shortcomings, injustices, flaws and hypocrisies of all types 
which are reflected, to some degree, in the institution itself. 
Any organization that has as its Board of Directors, which is 
in effect what the U.N. General Assembly is, so many disparate 
and numerous members will inevitably show dysfunction.
    The abuses of the Oil-For-Food scandal and the repeated 
transgressions of U.N. peacekeeping forces, so fundamentally 
inconsistent with the basic tenets of the U.N. itself, 
demonstrate that there is much wrong with the U.N.. This global 
institution must become more transparent and open, its 
employees must be held to the highest ethical and moral 
standards, and new structures must be created to prevent U.N. 
peacekeepers from exploiting their station and punishing those 
who do.
    And the United Nations must put an end to its persecution 
of the democratic state of Israel, which has become the 
whipping boy for totalitarian regimes around the globe. Serial 
human rights abusers must also be kept off the U.N. 
institutions explicitly designed to speak for the cause of 
human rights and democracy globally.
    These scandals and self-evident problems have created a 
crisis at the U.N. and have created a unique moment for reform. 
The Secretary General's High Level Advisory Panel Report, the 
Secretary General's own report ``In Larger Freedom'' and the 
Volker Commission's investigation of the Oil-For-Food scandal 
have all created a consensus for profound change at the 
organization, much of which may culminate in a new vision for 
the U.N. to come out of the Millennium Summit scheduled for 
September 2005.
    It is in this context that the Committee considered U.N. 
reform legislation. Indeed, it is ironic that just when there 
is more momentum for reform than ever before, the legislation 
that has been approved by this Committee may undercut the U.S. 
ability to press effectively for the very reforms we all seek.

                          THE HYDE LEGISLATION

    Over the past several weeks, we have attempted to work with 
our Republican colleagues on the Committee to work out a 
compromise agreement on U.N. reform legislation. Despite our 
best efforts, we have been unable to reach an agreement. Given 
the normally bipartisan work of this committee, this is truly 
unfortunate.
    The legislation before us has features are very troubling. 
While we agree with the goal of the legislation and believe 
that many of the specific provisions are essentially correct, 
we believe the legislation itself is flawed.
    First, the Republican bill would require the U.S. to go 
into arrears with the U.N. by withholding its proportionate 
share of U.N. dues for nearly 20 organizational programs, 
including crime control, environment and refugees if the U.N. 
does not agree to allow us to opt-out of our obligation to fund 
them as part of the U.N. regular budget.
    Second Republican bill would require even larger arrears by 
requiring the withholding of 50 percent of U.N. dues if two 
relatively small programs, public information and conferences, 
are not cut by 20% in the next 2 years.
    Third, the Republican bill would require the same 50 
percent withholding of our U.N. dues if any one of some 15 
affiliated agencies, which are wholly outside of the U.N.'s 
direct management authority, do not implement difficult 
reforms.
    Fourth, the Republican bill has a number of very detailed 
management benchmarks which must be fulfilled in order to avoid 
the same automatic 50 percent withholding. Of the 39 such 
benchmarks, 14 have to be met without change. Thus, if the U.N. 
were to carry out 38 of 39 reforms, but failed to implement one 
of the mandatory reforms in the exact form conceptualized by 
Republican majority, the United States would STILL need to 
withhold 50 percent of its annual dues.
    Fifth, the Republican bill would require the United States 
to veto any new or expanded U.N. peacekeeping mission, even if 
such a mission supported vital U.S. interests, until certain 
peacekeeping reforms are implemented.
    Sixth, the Republican bill has only sticks, and no carrots. 
There are no incentives to convince Member States that we want 
to strengthen the institution. Indeed, the bill is full of 
unfunded mandates for new offices, positions and mechanisms. 
Indeed, some would argue that this is more bureaucracy to cure 
too much bureaucracy.
    Finally, the Republican bill would put us into peacekeeping 
arrears. Current law left over from the 1990s forces the U.S. 
contribution to the U.N. for peacekeeping operations to be 
capped at 25 percent. When, in accordance with the Helm-Biden 
legislation, former U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Richard 
Holbrooke obtained agreement to reduce the U.S. contribution to 
27.1 percent from slightly over 30 percent, Congress agreed on 
a bipartisan basis to increase the cap from 25 percent to 27.1 
percent on a temporary basis. The failure to extend this 
authority to pay at 27.1 percent will cause us to immediately 
go into arrears for operations that are designed to help those 
in conflict-ridden areas.
    The automatic nature of these cutoffs is troubling. Three 
weeks ago, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Mark Lagon told 
this Committee that our annual dues to the United Nations is 
``an obligation we have signed onto'' and that the Executive 
Branch ``stands by . . . its request for appropriations for our 
dues for both the regular budget and the peacekeeping budget.''
    High-ranking officials at the State Department later 
conveyed to us the Department's strong opposition to the 
legislation currently before the Committee. State Department 
officials told us that the legislation would undoubtedly create 
new arrears at the United Nations because the U.N. reform 
benchmarks contained in the bill are not achievable. While many 
of the U.N. reforms being sought in this legislation are worthy 
goals, many of them, particularly in the budget area, require 
unanimous agreement by all 191 U.N. member states, including 
the likes of Iran and Syria. We believe that this legislation, 
as crafted, is akin to threatening to blow up the universe 
because we find that the planets have refused to align. Planets 
are stubborn. Once in a while, they WILL line up--but not on 
demand, and certainly not under an imminent threat.
    On one of the bill's central proposals to move some 
programs from the ``assessed'' budget to the ``voluntary'' 
budget--these same senior officials said that they ``can't 
possibly see a way'' to accomplish this task, and that even our 
closest reform-minded allies at the U.N. would also oppose this 
initiative. This approach may lead to the adoption of a U.N. 
budget over our objections; to the detriment of financial 
support for initiatives that are in our interest, such as 
support for elections in Afghanistan and Iraq or the disruption 
of terrorism financing.
    We also note that another provision of the bill would 
require the United States to withhold its proportionate share 
of its contribution to the U.N. assessed budget for the costs 
of any treaty-based commission if the United States is not a 
party to the treaty. This provision is clearly aimed at the 
commission that reviews implementation of the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. 
Although the views of the majority on this treaty are well 
known, trying to prevent other countries from discussing the 
crucial issue of discrimination against women around the world 
simply weakens human rights mechanisms instead of strengthening 
them.
    In addition, the restrictions on new and expanded 
peacekeeping missions are particularly troubling. As mentioned, 
under the legislation, if five conditions are not met, upon 
enactment of the legislation, the President would be required 
to veto new or expanded peacekeeping missions, including 
missions that are critical to U.S. interests. These reforms 
include adopting a code of conduct and then training 68,000 
military personnel and 10,000 civilian personnel on this code. 
Given the U.N.'s small training staff, this will take months if 
not years. Thus, the President would be forced to veto 
peacekeeping missions, even if they were to stop the genocide 
in Darfur or take over our mission in Afghanistan. Such a 
requirement with no flexibility is simply not in our national 
interest. Indeed, by forcing the veto of needed U.N. 
peacekeeping missions, this legislation may well force the 
United States to take on greater global responsibilities at a 
moment when our troops and our diplomats are already spread 
thin.
    In addition, this provision may raise serious 
constitutional concerns. The decision to vote for a new or 
expanded peacekeeping mission at the U.N. is a decision of the 
President that ultimately may rest fully within his 
constitutional responsibilities. Not giving him a waiver is 
inviting a Presidential veto of this legislation that will 
suggest to those who do not know better that our government is 
divided on U.N. reform, which is not the case.
    In short, while the majority's U.N. reform bill may have 
been written with the best of intentions, it will immediately 
cause our nation to go back into arrears at the United Nations 
without achieving the desired outcomes. It is simply 
incomprehensible that the Republican majority is prepared to 
tie the hands of our distinguished Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice as she pursues reform at the United Nations. 
The legislation before the Committee micromanages every 
possible reform at the United Nations, creates mechanical and 
automatic withholdings, and gives Secretary Rice no flexibility 
to get the job done.

                       THE DEMOCRATIC ALTERNATIVE

    For these reasons, we offered a substitute amendment to 
bring about U.N. reform but which is a modulated and carefully 
crafted, flexible tool rather than a massive bludgeon and which 
gives Secretary of State Rice the flexibility she needs and 
deserves from Congress.
    With this substitute amendment, the Democrats on the 
Committee align ourselves strongly with those, including those 
in our Administration, who are fighting to ensure that the 
United States is better armed to promote serious U.N. reform, 
and not forced to cut off funds to the United Nations in a 
manner that is counterproductive to our national interest.
    The substitute amendment addresses all of the primary 
deficiencies with the majority bill before the committee.
    First, the substitute does not sever the link between 
achieving U.N. reform benchmarks and the possibility of 
withholding half of our U.N. dues. Rather, the tough benchmarks 
are largely the same as in the majority's bill. But our 
substitute would give Secretary Rice the authority to withhold 
up to 50% of our U.N. dues, but would not mandate such a cut. 
While it is possible that the threat of withholding funds may 
help Secretary Rice achieve reforms at the U.N., the United 
States must not be forced to cut off funds according to some 
mechanical withholding formula.
    Second, the substitute changes the provision in the 
majority's bill under which the United States would 
unilaterally withhold a portion of our dues to the U.N. if its 
member states refuse to change certain programs from the 
``assessed'' to the ``voluntary'' budget. The amendment keeps 
this reform as a goal, but does not link it to a mandatory $100 
million deduction in U.S. contributions. It is clear that this 
reform is largely unachievable in the foreseeable future, and 
Secretary Rice should not be forced to withhold U.S. dues from 
the U.N. for this reason. As a budgetary matter, this proposal 
would have to be agreed to by consensus at the U.N., giving the 
likes of Syria, Iran, Sudan and Burma a veto over this 
proposal. Indeed, this amendment hands a weapon to those who 
want to embarrass the United States and who do not really care 
about reform efforts there.
    Third, the substitute addresses the inflexibility of the 
majority's bill on peacekeeping. The substitute keeps the far-
reaching peacekeeping reforms, but provides Secretary Rice with 
a waiver in the event that a new mission is essential to 
America's national interest.
    Fourth, the Democratic substitute also ensures that we do 
not withhold funds from the U.N. when it is separate 
specialized agencies, such as the World Health Organization or 
the World Intellectual Property Organization, that have failed 
to make necessary reforms. It is fundamentally flawed reasoning 
to hold the U.N. accountable for the mistakes of U.N. 
affiliated organizations that do not operate under the 
authority of U.N. management. Rather then let these 
organizations proceed without any reform, the substitute would 
give the Secretary the flexibility to target the withholding of 
U.S. funds from each specialized agency that fails to undertake 
reforms, instead of automatically withholding money from the 
U.N..
    Fifth, the substitute provides for an extension of the 
authority to pay our peacekeeping dues at 27.1 percent for the 
next 2 years.
    Finally, the amendment includes incentives by supporting an 
effort to pay our dues on time (we now pay in the last quarter 
of the calendar year), supports an increased U.N. budget for 
the large number of new offices that will be needed to 
implement the reforms, supports a well structured buyout of 
unneeded U.N. personnel and supports a contribution to the U.N. 
Democracy Fund.
    We believe the amendment demonstrates the need for U.N. 
reform, lays out benchmarks that are at least as tough as those 
of the majority bill, provides for a flexible tool to carry out 
these reforms, and protects our national interest. We believe 
it is a superior approach and we are gratified that it 
engendered bipartisan support.

                                   Tom Lantos.
                                   Howard L. Berman.
                                   Gary L. Ackerman.
                                   Eni F. H. Faleomavaega.
                                   Robert Menendez.
                                   Sherrod Brown.
                                   Brad Sherman.
                                   Robert Wexler.
                                   Eliot L. Engel.
                                   William D. Delahunt.
                                   Joseph Crowley.
                                   Earl Blumenauer.
                                   Grace F. Napolitano.
                                   Adam B. Schiff.
                                   Diane E. Watson.
                                   Adam Smith.
                                   Betty McCollum.
                                   Ben Chandler.

                                  
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