[House Report 109-120]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
109th Congress Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
1st Session 109-120
======================================================================
HENRY J. HYDE UNITED NATIONS REFORM ACT OF 2005
_______
June 10, 2005.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Hyde, from the Committee on International Relations, submitted the
following
R E P O R T
together with
DISSENTING VIEWS
[To accompany H.R. 2745]
[Includes cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
The Committee on International Relations, to whom was
referred the bill (H.R. 2745) to reform the United Nations, and
for other purposes, having considered the same, reports
favorably thereon with an amendment and recommends that the
bill as amended do pass.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
The Amendment.................................................... 2
Background and Purpose........................................... 21
Summary.......................................................... 22
Hearings......................................................... 24
Committee Consideration.......................................... 25
Roll Call Votes.................................................. 26
Committee Oversight Findings..................................... 26
New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures........................ 27
Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate........................ 27
Performance Goals and Objectives................................. 28
Constitutional Authority Statement............................... 28
Section-by-Section Analysis...................................... 28
Federal Mandates................................................. 47
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported............ 47
Dissenting Views................................................. 53
The Amendment
The amendment is as follows:
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the
following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Henry J. Hyde
United Nations Reform Act of 2005''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as
follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
Sec. 3. Statement of Congress.
TITLE I--MISSION AND BUDGET OF THE UNITED NATIONS
Sec. 101. United States financial contributions to the United Nations.
Sec. 102. Weighted voting.
Sec. 103. Budget certification requirements.
Sec. 104. Accountability.
Sec. 105. Terrorism and the United Nations.
Sec. 106. United Nations treaty bodies.
Sec. 107. Equality at the United Nations.
Sec. 108. Report on United Nations reform.
Sec. 109. Report on United Nations personnel.
TITLE II--HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL (ECOSOC)
Sec. 201. Human rights.
Sec. 202. Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).
TITLE III--INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
Sec. 301. International Atomic Energy Agency.
Sec. 302. Sense of Congress regarding the Nuclear Security Action Plan
of the IAEA.
TITLE IV--PEACEKEEPING
Sec. 401. Sense of Congress regarding reform of United Nations
peacekeeping operations.
Sec. 402. Statement of policy relating to reform of United Nations
peacekeeping operations.
Sec. 403. Certification.
TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Sec. 501. Positions for United States citizens at international
organizations.
Sec. 502. Budget justification for regular assessed budget of the
United Nations.
Sec. 503. Review and report.
Sec. 504. Government Accountability Office.
TITLE VI--CERTIFICATIONS AND WITHHOLDING OF CONTRIBUTIONS
Sec. 601. Certifications and withholding of contributions.
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means the Committee on
International Relations of the House of Representatives and the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
(2) Employee.--The term ``employee'' means an individual
who is employed in the general services, professional staff, or
senior management of the United Nations, including contractors
and consultants.
(3) General assembly.--The term ``General Assembly'' means
the General Assembly of the United Nations.
(4) Member state.--The term ``Member State'' means a Member
State of the United Nations. Such term is synonymous with the
term ``country''.
(5) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary
of State.
(6) Secretary general.--The term ``Secretary General''
means the Secretary General of the United Nations.
(7) Security council.--The term ``Security Council'' means
the Security Council of the United Nations.
(8) Specialized agencies and specialized agencies of the
united nations.--The terms ``specialized agencies'' and
``specialized agencies of the United Nations'' mean--
(A) the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO);
(B) the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA);
(C) the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO);
(D) the International Fund for Agricultural
Development (IFAD);
(E) the International Labor Organization (ILO);
(F) the International Maritime Organization (IMO);
(G) the International Telecommunication Union
(ITU);
(H) the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO);
(I) the United Nations Industrial Development
Organization (UNIDO);
(J) the Universal Postal Union (UPU);
(K) the World Health Organization (WHO) and its
regional agencies;
(L) the World Meteorological Organization (WMO);
and
(M) the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO).
SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF CONGRESS.
Congress declares that, in light of recent history, it is incumbent
upon the United Nations to enact significant reform measures if it is
to restore the public trust and confidence necessary for it to achieve
the laudable goals set forth in its Charter. To this end, the following
Act seeks to reform the United Nations.
TITLE I--MISSION AND BUDGET OF THE UNITED NATIONS
SEC. 101. UNITED STATES FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS.
(a) Statements of Policy.--
(1) In general.--It shall be the policy of the United
States to use its voice, vote, and influence at the United
Nations to--
(A) pursue a streamlined, efficient, and
accountable regular assessed budget of the United
Nations; and
(B) shift funding mechanisms of certain
organizational programs of the United Nations specified
under paragraph (4) from the regular assessed budget to
voluntarily funded programs.
(2) United states contributions.--It shall be the policy of
the United States to--
(A) redirect United States contributions to the
United Nations to achieve the policy objectives
described in paragraph (1)(B); and
(B) redirect a portion of funds from the following
organizational programs to pursue the policy objectives
described in paragraph (1)(A):
(i) Public Information.
(ii) General Assembly affairs and
conference services.
(3) Future biennium budgets.--It shall be the policy of the
United States to use its voice, vote, and influence at the
United Nations to ensure that future biennial budgets of the
United Nations, as agreed to by the General Assembly, reflect
the shift in funding mechanisms described in paragraph (1)(B)
and the redirection of funds described in paragraph (2).
(4) Certain organizational programs.--The organizational
programs referred to in paragraph (1)(B) are the following:
(A) Economic and social affairs.
(B) Least-developed countries, landlocked
developing countries and small island developing
States.
(C) United Nations support for the New Partnership
for Africa's Development.
(D) Trade and development.
(E) International Trade Center UNCTAD/WTO.
(F) Environment.
(G) Human settlements.
(H) Crime prevention and criminal justice.
(I) International drug control.
(J) Economic and social development in Africa.
(K) Economic and social development in Asia and the
Pacific.
(L) Economic development in Europe.
(M) Economic and social development in in Latin
America and the Caribbean.
(N) Economic and social development in Western
Asia.
(O) Regular program of technical cooperation.
(P) Development account.
(Q) Protection of and assistance to refugees.
(R) Palestine refugees.
(b) Authorization With Respect to the Regular Assessed Budget of
the United Nations.--Subject to the amendment made by subsection (c),
the Secretary of State is authorized to make contributions toward the
amount assessed to the United States by the United Nations for the
purpose of funding the regular assessed budget of the United Nations.
(c) United States Financial Contributions to the United Nations.--
Section 11 of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (22 U.S.C.
287e-3) is amended to read as follows:
``SEC. 11. UNITED STATES FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS.
``(a) Policy of the United States Relating to the Regular Assessed
Budget of the United Nations.--
``(1) In general.--The President shall direct the United
States Permanent Representative to the United Nations to use
the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the
United Nations to--
``(A) pursue a streamlined, efficient, and
accountable regular assessed budget of the United
Nations; and
``(B) shift funding mechanisms of certain
organizational programs of the United Nations specified
under paragraph (2) of subsection (c) from the regular
assessed budget to voluntarily funded programs.
``(2) United states contributions.--It shall be the policy
of the United States to--
``(A) redirect United States contributions to the
United Nations to achieve the policy objectives
described in paragraph (1)(B); and
``(B) redirect a portion of funds from the
following organizational programs to pursue the policy
objectives described in paragraph (1)(A):
``(i) Public Information.
``(ii) General Assembly affairs and
conferences services.
``(3) Future biennium budgets.-- The President shall direct
the United States Permanent Representative to the United
Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United
States at the United Nations to ensure that the shifting of
funding mechanisms under paragraph (1)(B) and redirecting of
contributions under paragraph (2) be reflected in future
resolutions agreed to by the General Assembly for the regular
assessed budget of the United Nations for the period of a
current biennium. To achieve the policies described in
paragraphs (1) and (2), the United States Permanent
Representative to the United Nations shall withhold the support
of the United States for a consensus for such budget until such
time as such budget is reflective of such policies.
``(b) 22 Percent Limitation.--In accordance with section 601 of the
Henry J. Hyde United Nations Reform Act of 2005, the Secretary may not
make a contribution to a regularly assessed biennial budget of the
United Nations in an amount greater than 22 percent of the amount
calculable under subsection (c).
``(c) Annual Dues.--
``(1) In general.--For annual dues paid by the United
States to the United Nations each fiscal year, the percentage
specified in subsection (b) shall be multiplied by one-half of
the amount of the regularly assessed budget of the United
Nations for a current biennial period, as agreed to by
resolution of the General Assembly.
``(2) Calculation with respect to certain organizational
programs for redirection.--The percentage specified in
subsection (b) shall be multiplied by one-half of the sum of
amounts budgeted by resolution of the General Assembly for a
current biennial period for the following certain
organizational programs:
``(A) Economic and social affairs.
``(B) Least-developed countries, landlocked
developing countries and small island developing
States.
``(C) United Nations support for the New
Partnership for Africa's Development.
``(D) Trade and development.
``(E) International Trade Center UNCTAD/WTO.
``(F) Environment.
``(G) Human settlements.
``(H) Crime prevention and criminal justice.
``(I) International drug control.
``(J) Economic and social development in Africa.
``(K) Economic and social development in Asia and
the Pacific.
``(L) Economic development in Europe.
``(M) Economic and social development in in Latin
America and the Caribbean.
``(N) Economic and social development in Western
Asia.
``(O) Regular program of technical cooperation.
``(P) Development account.
``(Q) Protection of and assistance to refugees.
``(R) Palestine refugees.
``(3) Redirection of funds.--Of amounts appropriated for
contributions towards payment of regular assessed dues to the
United Nations for 2008 and each subsequent year, if the
funding mechanisms of one or more of the organizational
programs of the United Nations specified in paragraph (2) have
not been shifted from the regular assessed budget to
voluntarily funded programs in accordance with subsection
(a)(1), the Secretary shall ensure that such amounts in each
such fiscal year that are specified for each such
organizational program pursuant to the resolution agreed to by
the General Assembly for the regular assessed budget of the
United Nations for the period of a current biennium are
redirected from payment of the assessed amount for the regular
assessed budget as follows:
``(A) Subject to not less than 30 days prior
notification to Congress, the Secretary shall expend an
amount, not to exceed 40 percent of the amount
specified for each such organizational program pursuant
to the resolution agreed to by the General Assembly for
the regular assessed budget of the United Nations for
the period of a current biennium, as a contribution to
an eligible organizational program specified in
paragraph (4).
``(B) Subject to not less than 30 days prior
notification to Congress, the Secretary shall expend
the remaining amounts under this paragraph to
voluntarily funded United Nations specialized agencies,
funds, or programs.
``(4) Eligible organizational programs.--The eligible
organizational programs referred to in paragraph (3)(A) for
redirection of funds under such paragraph are the following:
``(A) Internal oversight.
``(B) Human rights.
``(C) Humanitarian assistance.
``(D) An organizational program specified in
subparagraphs (A) through (P) of paragraph (2), subject
to paragraph (5).
``(5) Expenditure of remaining amounts to certain
organization programs.--
``(A) Voluntary contribution.--Subject to not less
than 30 days prior notification to Congress and the
limitation specified under subparagraph (B), the
Secretary is authorized to make a voluntary
contribution to an organizational program of the United
Nations specified in subparagraphs (A) through (P) of
paragraph (2) of any amounts not contributed in a
fiscal year to an eligible organizational program
specified in subparagraphs (A) through (C) of paragraph
(4).
``(B) 10 percent limitation.--A voluntary
contribution under subparagraph (A) to an
organizational program of the United Nations specified
in subparagraphs (A) through (P) of paragraph (2) may
not exceed 10 percent of the total contribution made
under paragraph (3)(A).
``(d) Further Calculation With Respect to Budgets for Public
Information and General Assembly Affairs and Conference Services.--
``(1) 22 percent limitation.--The Secretary may not make a
contribution to a regularly assessed biennial budget of the
United Nations in an amount greater than 22 percent of the
amount calculable under paragraph (2).
``(2) Annual dues each fiscal year.--
``(A) In general.--For annual dues paid by the
United States to the United Nations each fiscal year,
the percentage specified in paragraph (1) shall be
multiplied by one-half of the amount of the regularly
assessed budget of the United Nations for a current
biennial period, as agreed to by resolution of the
General Assembly.
``(B) Calculation with respect to public
information and general assembly affairs and conference
services.--With respect to such United States annual
dues, the percentage specified in paragraph (1) shall
be multiplied by one-half of the sum of amounts
budgeted by resolution of the General Assembly for the
2004-2005 biennial period for the following
organizational programs:
``(i) Public Information.
``(ii) General Assembly affairs and
conferences services.
``(C) Redirection of funds.--
``(i) In general.--The President shall
direct the United States Permanent
Representative to the United Nations to make
every effort, including the withholding of
United States support for a consensus budget of
the United Nations, to reduce the budgets of
the organizational programs specified in
subparagraph (B) for 2007 by ten percent
against the budgets of such organizational
programs for the 2004-2005 biennial period. If
the budgets of such organizational programs are
not so reduced, 20 percent the amount
determined under subparagraph (B) for
contributions towards payment of regular
assessed dues for 2007 shall be redirected from
payment for the amount assessed for United
States annual contributions to the regular
assessed budget of the United Nations.
``(ii) Specific amounts.--The Secretary
shall make the amount determined under clause
(i) available as a contribution to an eligible
organizational program specified in
subparagraphs (A) through (C) of paragraph (4)
of subsection (c).
``(3) Policy with respect to 2008-2009 biennial period and
subsequent biennial periods.--
``(A) In general.--The President shall direct the
United States Permanent Representative to the United
Nations to make every effort, including the withholding
of United States support for a consensus budget of the
United Nations, to reduce the budgets of the
organizational programs specified in subparagraph (B)
of paragraph (2) for the 2008-2009 biennial period and
each subsequent biennial period by 20 percent against
the budgets of such organizational programs for the
2004-2005 biennial period.
``(B) Certification.--In accordance with section
601, a certification shall be required that certifies
that the reduction in budgets described in subparagraph
(A) has been implemented.''.
(d) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (c) shall
take effect and apply beginning on October 1, 2006.
SEC. 102. WEIGHTED VOTING.
It shall be the policy of the United States to actively pursue
weighted voting with respect to all budgetary and financial matters in
the Administrative and Budgetary Committee and in the General Assembly
in accordance with the level of the financial contribution of a Member
State to the regular assessed budget of the United Nations.
SEC. 103. BUDGET CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS.
(a) Certification.--In accordance with section 601, a certification
shall be required that certifies that the conditions described in
subsection (b) have been satisfied.
(b) Conditions.--The conditions under this subsection are the
following:
(1) New budget practices for the united nations.--The
United Nations is implementing budget practices that--
(A) require the maintenance of a budget not in
excess of the level agreed to by the General Assembly
at the beginning of each United Nations budgetary
biennium, unless increases are agreed to by consensus
and do not exceed ten percent; and
(B) require the identification of expenditures by
the United Nations by functional categories such as
personnel, travel, and equipment.
(2) Program evaluation.--
(A) Existing authority.--The Secretary General and
the Director General of each specialized agency have
used their existing authorities to require program
managers within the United Nations Secretariat and the
Secretariats of the specialized agencies to conduct
evaluations in accordance with the standardized
methodology referred to in subparagraph (B) of--
(i) United Nations programs approved by the
General Assembly; and
(ii) programs of the specialized agencies.
(B) Development of evaluation criteria.--
(i) United nations.--The Office of Internal
Oversight Services has developed a standardized
methodology for the evaluation of United
Nations programs approved by the General
Assembly, including specific criteria for
determining the continuing relevance and
effectiveness of the programs.
(ii) Specialized agencies.--Patterned on
the work of the Office of Internal Oversight
Services of the United Nations, each
specialized agency has developed a standardized
methodology for the evaluation of the programs
of the agency, including specific criteria for
determining the continuing relevance and
effectiveness of the programs.
(C) Report.--The Secretary General is assessing
budget requests and, on the basis of evaluations
conducted under subparagraph (B) for the relevant
preceding year, submits to the General Assembly a
report containing the results of such evaluations,
identifying programs that have satisfied the criteria
for continuing relevance and effectiveness, and an
identification of programs that have not satisfied such
criteria and should be terminated.
(D) Sunset of programs.--Consistent with the July
16, 1997, recommendations of the Secretary General
regarding a sunset policy and results-based budgeting
for United Nations programs, the United Nations and
each specialized agency has established and is
implementing procedures to require all new programs
approved by the General Assembly to have a specific
sunset date.
SEC. 104. ACCOUNTABILITY.
(a) Certification of Creation of Independent Oversight Board.--In
accordance with section 601, a certification shall be required that
certifies that the following reforms related to the establishment of an
Independent Oversight Board (IOB) have been adopted by the United
Nations:
(1) An IOB is established from existing United Nations
budgetary and personnel resources. Except as provided in this
subsection, the IOB shall be an independent entity within the
United Nations and shall not be subject to budget authority or
organizational authority of any entity within the United
Nations.
(2) The head of the IOB shall be a Director, who shall be
nominated by the Secretary General and who shall be subject to
Security Council approval by a majority vote. The IOB shall
also consist of four other board members who shall be nominated
by the Secretary General and subject to Security Council
approval by a majority vote. The IOB shall be responsible to
the Security Council and the Director and board members shall
each serve terms of six years, except that the terms of the
initial board shall be staggered so that no more than two board
members' terms will expire in any one year. No board member may
serve more than two terms. An IOB board member may be removed
for cause by a majority vote of the Security Council. The
Director shall appoint a professional staff headed by a Chief
of Staff and may employ contract staff as needed.
(3) The IOB shall receive operational and budgetary funding
through appropriations by the General Assembly from existing
levels of United Nations budgetary and personnel resources, and
shall not be dependent upon any other entity, bureau, division,
department, or specialized agency of the United Nations for
such funding.
(4) While the IOB shall have the authority to evaluate all
operations of the United Nations, the primary mission of the
IOB is to oversee the Office of Internal Oversight Services and
the Board of External Auditors. The IOB may direct the Office
of Internal Oversight Services or the Board of External
Auditors to initiate, abandon, or modify the scope of an
investigation. Every three months or more frequently when
appropriate, the IOB shall submit, as appropriate, to the
Secretary General, the Security Council, the General Assembly,
or the Economic and Social Council a report on its activities,
relevant observations, and recommendations relating to its
audit operations, including information relating to the
inventory and status of investigations by the Office of
Internal Oversight Services.
(5) In extraordinary circumstances and with the concurrence
of the Secretary General or the Security Council by majority
vote, the IOB may augment the Office of Internal Oversight
Services with a special investigator and staff consisting of
individuals who are not employees of the United Nations, to
investigate matters involving senior officials of the United
Nations or of its specialized agencies when allegations of
serious misconduct have been made and such a special
investigation is necessary to maintain public confidence in the
integrity of the investigation. A special investigator and
staff shall comply with all United Nations financial disclosure
and conflict of interest rules, including the filing of an
individual Annual Financial Disclosure Form in accordance with
subsection (c).
(6) The IOB shall recommend annual budgets for the Office
of Internal Oversight Services and the Board of External
Auditors.
(b) Certification of United Nations Reforms of the Office of
Internal Oversight Services.--In accordance with section 601, a
certification shall be required that certifies that the following
reforms related to the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS)
have been adopted by the United Nations:
(1) The OIOS is designated as an independent entity within
the United Nations. The OIOS shall not be subject to budget
authority or organizational authority of any entity within the
United Nations except as provided in this section.
(2) The regular assessed budget of the United Nations shall
fully fund the Internal Oversight Budget from existing levels
of United Nations budgetary and personnel resources and shall
not be dependent upon any other entity, bureau, division,
department, or specialized agency of the United Nations for
such funding.
(3) All United Nations officials, including officials from
any entity, bureau, division, department, or specialized agency
of the United Nations, may--
(A) make a recommendation to the OIOS to initiate
an investigation of any aspect of the United Nations;
or
(B) report to the OIOS information or allegations
of misconduct or inefficiencies within the United
Nations.
(4) The OIOS may, sua sponte, initiate and conduct an
investigation or audit of any entity, bureau, division,
department, specialized agency, employee (including the
Secretary General) of the United Nations, including any
employee of the specialized agencies of the United Nations, or
contractor or consultant for the United Nations or its
specialized agencies.
(5) At least every three months and more frequently when
appropriate, the OIOS shall submit to the IOB a report
containing an inventory and status of its investigations.
(6) The OIOS shall establish procedures for providing
``whistle-blower'' status and employment protections for all
employees of the United Nations, including employees of the
specialized agencies of the United Nations, who provide
informational leads and testimony related to allegations of
wrongdoing. Such procedures shall be adopted throughout the
United Nations. Such status and protection may not be conferred
on the Secretary General.
(7) The OIOS shall annually publish a public report
determining the proper number, distribution, and expertise of
auditors within the OIOS necessary to carry out present and
future duties of the OIOS, including assessing the staffing
requirements needed to audit United Nations contracting
activities throughout the contract cycle from the bid process
to contract performance.
(8) Not later than six months after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director shall establish a position
of Associate Director of OIOS for Specialized Agencies and
Funds and Programs who shall be responsible for supervising the
OIOS liaison or oversight duties for each of the specialized
agencies and funds and programs of the United Nations. With the
concurrence of the Director, the Associate Director of OIOS for
Specialized Agencies and Funds and Programs may, from existing
levels of United Nations budgetary and personnel resources,
hire and appoint necessary OIOS staff, including staff serving
within and located at specialized agencies and funds and
programs permanently or as needed to liaison with existing
audit functions within each specialized agency and fund and
program.
(9) Not later than six months after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director shall establish a position
of Associate Director of OIOS for Peacekeeping Operations, who
shall be responsible for the oversight and auditing of the
field offices attached to United Nations peacekeeping
operations. The Associate Director of OIOS for Peacekeeping
Operations shall receive informational leads and testimony from
any person regarding allegations of wrongdoing by United
Nations officials or peacekeeping troops or regarding
inefficiencies associated with United Nations peacekeeping
operations. The Associate Director of OIOS for Peacekeeping
Operations shall be responsible for initiating, conducting, and
overseeing investigations within peacekeeping operations.
(10) Not later than six months after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director shall establish a position
of Associate Director of OIOS for Procurement and Contract
Integrity, who shall be responsible for auditing and inspecting
procurement and contracting win the United Nations, including
within the specialized agencies. The Associate Director of OIOS
for Procurement and Contract Integrity shall receive
informational leads and testimony from any person regarding
allegations of wrongdoing by United Nations officials or
regarding inefficiencies associated with United Nations
procurement or contracting activities. The Associate Director
of OIOS for Procurement and Contract Integrity shall be
responsible for initiating, conducting, and overseeing
investigations of procurement and contract activities. Not
later than 12 months after the establishment of the position of
Associate Director of OIOS for Procurement and Contract
Integrity, the Director, with the assistance of the Associate
Director of OIOS for Procurement and Contract Integrity, shall
undertake a review of contract procedures to ensure that
practices and policies are in place to ensure that--
(A) the United Nations has ceased issuing single
bid contracts except for such contracts issued during
an emergency situation that is justified by the Under
Secretary General for Management;
(B) the United Nations has established effective
controls to prevent conflicts of interest in the award
of contracts; and
(C) the United Nations has established effective
procedures and policies to ensure effective and
comprehensive oversight and monitoring of United
Nations contract performance.
(c) Certification of Establishment of United Nations Office of
Ethics.--In accordance with section 601, a certification shall be
required that certifies that the following reforms related to the
establishment of a United Nations Office of Ethics have been adopted by
the United Nations:
(1) A United Nations Office of Ethics (UNOE) is
established. The UNOE shall be an independent entity within the
United Nations and shall not be subject to budget authority or
organizational authority of any entity within the United
Nations. The UNEO shall be responsible for establishing,
managing, and enforcing a code of ethics for all employees of
United Nations and its specialized agencies. The UNEO shall
also be responsible for providing such employees with annual
training related to such code. The head of the UNEO shall be a
Director who shall be nominated by the Secretary General and
who shall be subject to Security Council approval by majority
vote.
(2) The UNEO shall receive operational and budgetary
funding through appropriations by the General Assembly from
existing levels of United Nations budgetary and personnel
resources and shall not be dependent upon any other entity,
bureau, division, department, or specialized agency of the
United Nations for such funding.
(3) The Director of the UNEO shall, not later than six
months after the date of its establishment, publish a report
containing proposals for implementing a system for the filing
and review of individual Annual Financial Disclosure Forms by
each employee of the United Nations, including by each employee
of its specialized agencies, at the P-5 level and above and by
all contractors and consultants compensated at any salary
level. Such system shall be in place and operational not later
than six months after the date of the publication of the
report. Such completed forms shall be made available to the
Office of Internal Oversight Services at the request of the
Director of the Office of Internal Oversight Services. Such
system shall seek to identify and prevent conflicts of interest
by United Nations employees and shall be comparable to the
system used for such purposes by the United States Government.
Such report shall also address broader reforms of the ethics
program for the United Nations, including--
(A) the effect of the establishment of ethics
officers throughout all organizations within the United
Nations;
(B) the effect of retention by the UNEO of Annual
Financial Disclosure Forms;
(C) proposals for making completed Annual Financial
Disclosure Forms available to the public on request
through their Member State's mission to the United
Nations;
(D) proposals for annual disclosure to the public
of information related to the annual salaries and
payments, including pension payments and buyouts, of
employees of the United Nations, including employees of
its specialized agencies, and of consultants;
(E) proposals for annual disclosure to the public
of information related to per diem rates for all
bureaus, divisions, departments, or specialized
agencies within the United Nations;
(F) proposals for disclosure upon request by the
Ambassador of a Member State of information related to
travel and per diem payments made from United Nations
funds to any person; and
(G) proposals for annual disclosure to the public
of information related to travel and per diem rates and
payments made from United Nations funds to any person.
(d) Certification of United Nations Establishment of Position of
Chief Operating Officer.--In accordance with section 601, a
certification shall be required that certifies that the following
reforms related to the establishment of the position of a Chief
Operating Officer have been adopted by the United Nations:
(1) There is established the position of Chief Operating
Officer (COO). The COO shall report to the Secretary General.
(2) The COO shall be responsible for formulating general
policies and programs for the United Nations in coordination
with the Secretary General and in consultation with the
Security Council and the General Assembly. The COO shall be
responsible for the daily administration, operation and
supervision, and the direction and control of the business of
the United Nations. The Chief Operating Officer shall also
perform such other duties and may exercise such other powers as
from time to time may be assigned to the COO by the Secretary
General.
(e) Certification of Access by Member States to Reports and Audits
by Board of External Auditors.--In accordance with section 601, a
certification shall be required that certifies that Member States may,
upon request, have access to all reports and audits completed by the
Board of External Auditors.
SEC. 105. TERRORISM AND THE UNITED NATIONS.
The President shall direct the United States Permanent
Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and
influence of the United States at the United Nations to work toward
adoption by the General Assembly of--
(1) a definition of terrorism that builds upon the
recommendations of the Secretary General's High-Level Panel on
Threats, Challenges, and Change, and includes as an essential
component of such definition any action that is intended to
cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians with the
purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a government
or an international organization to do, or abstain from doing,
any act; and
(2) a comprehensive convention on terrorism that includes
the definition described in paragraph (1).
SEC. 106. UNITED NATIONS TREATY BODIES.
The United States shall withhold from United States contributions
to the regular assessed budget of the United Nations for a biennial
period amounts that are proportional to the percentage of such budget
that are expended with respect to a United Nations human rights treaty
monitoring body or committee that was established by--
(1) a convention (without any protocols) or an
international covenant (without any protocols) to which the
United States is not party; or
(2) a convention, with a subsequent protocol, if the United
States is a party to neither.
SEC. 107. EQUALITY AT THE UNITED NATIONS.
(a) Inclusion of Israel in WEOG.--
(1) In general.--The President shall direct the United
States Permanent Representative to the United Nations to use
the voice, vote, and influence of the United States to expand
the Western European and Others Group (WEOG) in the United
Nations to include Israel as a permanent member with full
rights and privileges.
(2) Notification to congress.--Not later than six months
after the date of the enactment of this Act and every six
months thereafter for the next two years, the Secretary of
State shall notify the appropriate congressional committees
concerning the treatment of Israel in the United Nations and
the expansion of WEOG to include Israel as a permanent member.
(b) Department of State Review and Report.--
(1) In general.--To avoid duplicative efforts and funding
with respect to Palestinian interests and to ensure balance in
the approach to Israeli-Palestinian issues, the Secretary
shall, not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act--
(A) conduct an audit of the functions of the
entities listed in paragraph (2); and
(B) submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report containing recommendations for the
elimination of such duplicative entities and efforts.
(2) Entities.--The entities referred to in paragraph (1)
are the following:
(A) The United Nations Division for Palestinian
Rights.
(B) The Committee on the Exercise of the
Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People.
(C) The United Nations Special Coordinator for the
Middle East Peace Process and Personal Representative
to the Palestine Liberation Organization and the
Palestinian Authority.
(D) The NGO Network on the Question of Palestine.
(c) Implementation by Permanent Representative.--
(1) In general.--The President shall direct the United
States Permanent Representative to the United Nations to use
the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the
United Nations to seek the implementation of the
recommendations contained in the report required under
subsection (b)(1).
(2) Withholding of funds.--Until such recommendations have
been implemented, the United States shall withhold from United
States contributions to the regular assessed budget of the
United Nations for a biennial period amounts that are
proportional to the percentage of such budget that are expended
for such entities.
(d) GAO Audit.--The Comptroller General of the United States of the
Government Accountability Office shall conduct an audit of--
(1) the status of the implementation of the recommendations
contained in the report required under subsection (b)(1); and
(2) United States actions and achievements under subsection
(c).
SEC. 108. REPORT ON UNITED NATIONS REFORM.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and one year thereafter, the Secretary shall
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on United
Nations reform since 1990.
(b) Contents.--The report required under paragraph (1) shall
describe--
(1) the status of the implementation of management reforms
within the United Nations and its specialized agencies;
(2) the number of outputs, reports, or other items
generated by General Assembly resolutions that have been
eliminated;
(3) the progress of the General Assembly to modernize and
streamline the committee structure and its specific
recommendations on oversight and committee outputs, consistent
with the March 2005 report of the Secretary General entitled
``In larger freedom: towards development, security and human
rights for all'';
(4) the status of the review by the General Assembly of all
mandates older than five years and how resources have been
redirected to new challenges, consistent with such March 2005
report of the Secretary General; and
(5) the continued utility and relevance of the Economic and
Financial Committee and the Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural
Committee, in light of the duplicative agendas of those
committees and the Economic and Social Council.
SEC. 109. REPORT ON UNITED NATIONS PERSONNEL.
(a) In General.--Not later than one year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report--
(1) concerning the progress of the General Assembly to
modernize human resource practices, consistent with the March
2005 report of the Secretary General entitled ``In larger
freedom: towards development, security and human rights for
all''; and
(2) containing the information described in subsection (b).
(b) Contents.--The report shall include--
(1) a comprehensive evaluation of human resources reforms
at the United Nations, including an evaluation of--
(A) tenure;
(B) performance reviews;
(C) the promotion system;
(D) a merit-based hiring system and enhanced
regulations concerning termination of employment of
employees; and
(E) the implementation of a code of conduct and
ethics training.
(2) the implementation of a system of procedures for filing
complaints and protective measures for work-place harassment,
including sexual harassment;
(3) policy recommendations relating to the establishment of
a rotation requirement for nonadministrative positions;
(4) policy recommendations relating to the establishment of
a prohibition preventing personnel and officials assigned to
the mission of a Member State to the United Nations from
transferring to a position within the United Nations
Secretariat that is compensated at the P-5 level and above;
(5) policy recommendations relating to a reduction in
travel allowances and attendant oversight with respect to
accommodations and airline flights; and
(6) an evaluation of the recommendations of the Secretary
General relating to greater flexibility for the Secretary
General in staffing decisions to accommodate changing
priorities.
TITLE II--HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL (ECOSOC)
SEC. 201. HUMAN RIGHTS.
(a) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United
States to use its voice, vote, and influence at the United Nations to
ensure that a credible and respectable Human Rights Council or other
human rights body is established within the United Nations whose
participating Member States uphold the values embodied in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.
(b) Human Rights Reforms at the United Nations.--The President
shall direct the United States Permanent Representative to the United
Nations to ensure that the following human rights reforms have been
adopted by the United Nations:
(1) A Member State that fails to uphold the values embodied
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights shall be
ineligible for membership on any United Nations human rights
body.
(2) A Member State shall be ineligible for membership on
any United Nations human rights body if such Member State is--
(A) subject to sanctions by the Security Council;
or
(B) under a Security Council-mandated investigation
for human rights abuses.
(3) A Member State that is currently subject to an adopted
country specific resolution, in the principal body in the
United Nations for the promotion and protection of human
rights, relating to human rights abuses perpetrated by the
government of such country in such country, or has been the
subject of such an adopted country specific resolution in such
principal body within the previous three years, shall be
ineligible for membership on any United Nations human rights
body. For purposes of this subsection, an adopted country
specific resolution shall not include consensus resolutions on
advisory services.
(4) A Member State that violates the principles of a United
Nations human rights body to which it aspires to join shall be
ineligible for membership on such body.
(5) No human rights body has a standing agenda item that
relates only to one country or region.
(c) Certification.--In accordance with section 601, a certification
shall be required that certifies that the human rights reforms
described under subsection (b) have been adopted by the United Nations.
(d) Prevention of Abuse of ``No Action'' Motions.--The United
States Permanent Representative shall work to prevent abuse of ``no
action'' motions, particularly as such motions relate to country
specific resolutions.
(e) Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights.--
(1) Statement of policy.--It shall be the policy of the
United States to continue to strongly support the Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.
(2) Certification.--In accordance with section 601, a
certification shall be required that certifies that the Office
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has
been given greater authority in field operation activities,
such as in the Darfur region of Sudan and in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, in furtherance of the purpose and
mission of the United Nations.
SEC. 202. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL (ECOSOC).
(a) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United
States to use its voice, vote, and influence at the United Nations to--
(1) abolish secret voting in the Economic and Social
Council (ECOSOC);
(2) ensure that, until such time as the Commission on Human
Rights of the United Nations is abolished, only countries that
are not ineligible for membership on a human rights body in
accordance with paragraph (1) through (4) of section 201(b)
shall be considered for membership on the Commission on Human
Rights; and
(3) ensure that after candidate countries are nominated for
membership on the Commission on Human Rights, the Economic and
Social Council conducts a recorded vote to determine such
membership.
(b) Certification.--In accordance with section 601, a certification
shall be required that certifies that the policies described in
subsection (a) have been implemented by the Economic and Social
Council.
TITLE III--INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
SEC. 301. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY.
(a) Enforcement and Compliance.--
(1) Office of compliance.--
(A) Establishment.--The President shall direct the
United States Permanent Representative to International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to use the voice, vote, and
influence of the United States at the IAEA to establish
an Office of Compliance in the Secretariat of the IAEA.
(B) Operation.--The Office of Compliance shall--
(i) function as an independent body
composed of technical experts who shall work in
consultation with IAEA inspectors to assess
compliance by IAEA Member States and provide
recommendations to the IAEA Board of Governors
concerning penalties to be imposed on IAEA
Member States that fail to fulfill their
obligations under IAEA Board resolutions;
(ii) base its assessments and
recommendations on IAEA inspection reports; and
(iii) shall take into consideration
information provided by IAEA Board Members that
are one of the five nuclear weapons states as
recognized by the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (21 UST 483)
(commonly referred to as the ``Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty'' or the ``NPT'').
(C) Staffing.--The Office of Compliance shall be
staffed from existing personnel in the Department of
Safeguards of the IAEA or the Department of Nuclear
Safety and Security of the IAEA.
(2) Special committee on safeguards and verification.--
(A) Establishment.--The President shall direct the
United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to
use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States
at the IAEA to establish a Special Committee on
Safeguards and Verification.
(B) Responsibilities.--The Special Committee
shall--
(i) improve the ability of the IAEA to
monitor and enforce compliance by Member States
of the IAEA with the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty and the Statute of the International
Atomic Energy Agency; and
(ii) consider which additional measures are
necessary to enhance the ability of the IAEA,
beyond the verification mechanisms and
authorities contained in the Additional
Protocol to the Safeguards Agreements between
the IAEA and Member States of the IAEA, to
detect with a high degree of confidence
undeclared nuclear activities by a Member
State.
(3) Penalties.--
(A) In general.--The President shall direct the
United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to
use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States
at the IAEA to ensure that a Member State of the IAEA
that is under investigation for a breach of or
noncompliance with its IAEA obligations or the purposes
and principles of the Charter of the United Nations has
its privileges suspended, including--
(i) limiting its ability to vote on its
case;
(ii) being prevented from receiving any
technical assistance; and
(iii) being prevented from hosting
meetings.
(B) Termination of penalties.--The penalties
specified under subparagraph (A) shall be terminated
when such investigation is concluded and such Member
State is no longer in such breach or noncompliance.
(b) United States Contributions.--
(1) Voluntary contributions.--Voluntary contributions of
the United States to the IAEA should primarily be used to fund
activities relating to Nuclear Safety and Security or
activities relating to Nuclear Verification.
(2) Limitation on use of funds.--The President shall direct
the United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use
the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the IAEA
to--
(A) ensure that funds for safeguards inspections
are prioritized for countries that have newly
established nuclear programs or are initiating nuclear
programs; and
(B) block the allocation of funds for any other
IAEA development, environmental, or nuclear science
assistance or activity to a country--
(i) the government of which the Secretary
of State has determined, for purposes of
section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act
of 1979, section 620A of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961, section 40 of the Arms Export
Control Act, or other provision of law, is a
government that has repeatedly provided support
for acts of international terrorism and the
government of which the Secretary has
determined has not dismantled and surrendered
its weapons of mass destruction programs under
international verification;
(ii) that is under investigation for a
breach of or noncompliance with its IAEA
obligations or the purposes and principles of
the Charter of the United Nations; or
(iii) that is in violation of its IAEA
obligations or the purposes and principles of
the Charter of the United Nations.
(3) Detail of expenditures.--The President shall direct the
United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use the
voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the IAEA to
secure, as part of the regular budget presentation of the IAEA
to Member States of the IAEA, a detailed breakdown by country
of expenditures of the IAEA for safeguards inspections and
nuclear security activities.
(c) Membership.--
(1) In general.--The President shall direct the United
States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use the voice,
vote, and influence of the United States at the IAEA to block
the membership on the Board of Governors of the IAEA for a
Member State of the IAEA that has not signed and ratified the
Additional Protocol and--
(A) is under investigation for a breach of or
noncompliance with its IAEA obligations or the purposes
and principles of the Charter of the United Nations; or
(B) that is in violation of its IAEA obligations or
the purposes and principles of the Charter of the
United Nations.
(2) Criteria.--The United States Permanent Representative
to the IAEA shall make every effort to modify the criteria for
Board membership to reflect the principles described in
paragraph (1).
(d) Report.--Not later than six months after the date of the
enactment of this Act and annually for two years thereafter, the
President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a
report on the implementation of this section.
SEC. 302. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE NUCLEAR SECURITY ACTION PLAN
OF THE IAEA.
It is the sense of Congress that the national security interests of
the United States are enhanced by the Nuclear Security Action Plan of
the IAEA and the Board of Governors should recommend, and the General
Conference should adopt, a resolution incorporating the Nuclear
Security Action Plan into the regular budget of the IAEA.
TITLE IV--PEACEKEEPING
SEC. 401. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING REFORM OF UNITED NATIONS
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) although United Nations peacekeeping operations have
contributed greatly toward the promotion of peace and stability
for the past 57 years and the majority of peacekeeping
personnel who have served under the United Nations flag have
done so with honor and courage, the record of United Nations
peacekeeping has been severely tarnished by operational
failures and unconscionable acts of misconduct; and
(2) if the reputation of and confidence in United Nations
peacekeeping operations is to be restored, fundamental and far-
reaching reforms, particularly in the areas of planning,
management, training, conduct, and discipline, must be
implemented without delay.
SEC. 402. STATEMENT OF POLICY RELATING TO REFORM OF UNITED NATIONS
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.
It shall be the policy of the United States to pursue reform of
United Nations peacekeeping operations in the following areas:
(1) Planning and management.--
(A) Global audit.--As the size, cost, and number of
United Nations peacekeeping operations have increased
substantially over the past decade, an independent
audit of each such operation, with a view toward
``right-sizing'' operations and ensuring that such
operations are cost effective, should be conducted and
its findings reported to the Security Council.
(B) Review of mandates and closing operations.--In
conjunction with the audit described in subparagraph
(A), the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping
Operations should conduct a comprehensive review of all
United Nations peacekeeping operation mandates, with a
view toward identifying objectives that are practical
and achievable, and report its findings to the Security
Council. In particular, the review should consider the
following:
(i) Activities that fall beyond the scope
of traditional peacekeeping activities should
be delegated to a new Peacebuilding Commission,
described in paragraph (3).
(ii) Long-standing operations that are
static and cannot fulfill their mandate should
be downsized or closed.
(iii) Where there is legitimate concern
that the withdrawal from a country of an
otherwise static United Nations peacekeeping
operation would result in the resumption of
major conflict, a burden-sharing arrangement
that reduces the level of assessed
contributions, similar to that currently
supporting the United Nations Peacekeeping
Force in Cyprus, should be explored and
instituted.
(C) Leadership.--As peacekeeping operations become
larger and increasingly complex, the Secretariat should
adopt a minimum standard of qualifications for senior
leaders and managers, with particular emphasis on
specific skills and experience, and current senior
leaders and managers who do not meet those standards
should be removed or reassigned.
(D) Pre-deployment training.--Pre-deployment
training on interpretation of the mandate of the
operation, specifically in the areas of use of force,
civilian protection and field conditions, the Code of
Conduct, HIV/AIDS, and human rights should be
mandatory, and all personnel, regardless of category or
rank, should be required to sign an oath that each has
received and understands such training as a condition
of participation in the operation.
(2) Conduct and discipline.--
(A) Adoption of a uniform code of conduct.--A
single, uniform Code of Conduct that has the status of
a binding rule and applies equally to all personnel
serving in United Nations peacekeeping operations,
regardless of category or rank, should be promulgated,
adopted, and enforced.
(B) Understanding the code of conduct.--All
personnel, regardless of category or rank, should
receive training on the Code of Conduct prior to
deployment with a peacekeeping operation, in addition
to periodic follow-on training. In particular--
(i) all personnel, regardless of category
or rank, should be provided with a personal
copy of the Code of Conduct that has been
translated into the national language of such
personnel, regardless of whether such language
is an official language of the United Nations;
(ii) all personnel, regardless of category
or rank, should sign an oath that each has
received a copy of the Code of Conduct, that
each pledges to abide by the Code of Conduct,
and that each understands the consequences of
violating the Code of Conduct, including
immediate termination of the participation of
such personnel in the peacekeeping operation to
which such personnel is assigned as a condition
of appointment to such operation; and
(iii) peacekeeping operations should
conduct educational outreach programs to reach
local communities where peacekeeping personnel
of such operations are based, including
explaining prohibited acts on the part of
United Nations peacekeeping personnel and
identifying the individual to whom the local
population may direct complaints or file
allegations of exploitation, abuse, or other
acts of misconduct.
(C) Monitoring mechanisms.--Dedicated monitoring
mechanisms, such as the Personnel Conduct Units already
deployed to support United Nations peacekeeping
operations in Haiti, Liberia, Burundi, and the
Democratic Republic of Congo, should be present in each
operation to monitor compliance with the Code of
Conduct, and--
(i) should report simultaneously to the
Head of Mission, the United Nations Department
of Peacekeeping Operations, and the Associate
Director of OIOS for Peacekeeping Operations
(established under section 104(b)(10)); and
(ii) should be tasked with designing and
implementing mission-specific measures to
prevent misconduct, conduct follow-on training
for personnel, coordinate community outreach
programs, and assist in investigations, as OIOS
determines necessary and appropriate.
(D) Investigations.--A permanent, professional, and
independent investigative body should be established
and introduced into United Nations peacekeeping
operations. In particular--
(i) the investigative body should include
professionals with experience in investigating
sex crimes, as well as experts who can provide
guidance on standards of proof and evidentiary
requirements necessary for any subsequent legal
action;
(ii) provisions should be included in a
Model Memorandum of Understanding that obligate
Member States that contribute troops to a
peacekeeping operation to designate a military
prosecutor who will participate in any
investigation into an allegation of misconduct
brought against an individual of such Member
State, so that evidence is collected and
preserved in a manner consistent with the
military law of such Member State;
(iii) the investigative body should be
regionally based to ensure rapid deployment and
should be equipped with modern forensics
equipment for the purpose of positively
identifying perpetrators and, where necessary,
for determining paternity; and
(iv) the investigative body should report
directly to the Associate Director of OIOS for
Peacekeeping Operations, while providing copies
of any reports to the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations, the Head of Mission,
and the Member State concerned.
(E) Follow-up.--A dedicated unit, similar to the
Personnel Conduct Units, staffed and funded through
existing resources, should be established within the
headquarters of the United Nations Department of
Peacekeeping Operations and tasked with--
(i) promulgating measures to prevent
misconduct;
(ii) coordinating allegations of
misconduct, and reports received by field
personnel; and
(iii) gathering follow-up information on
completed investigations, particularly by
focusing on disciplinary actions against the
individual concerned taken by the United
Nations or by the Member State that is
contributing troops to which such individual
belongs, and sharing such information with the
Security Council, the Head of Mission, and the
community hosting the peacekeeping operation.
(F) Financial liability and victims assistance.--
Although peacekeeping operations should provide
immediate medical assistance to victims of sexual abuse
or exploitation, the responsibility for providing
longer-term treatment, care, or restitution lies solely
with the individual found guilty of the misconduct. In
particular, the following reforms should be
implemented:
(i) The United Nations should not assume
responsibility for providing long-term
treatment or compensation by creating a
``Victims Trust Fund'', or any other such
similar fund, financed through assessed
contributions to United Nations peacekeeping
operations, thereby shielding individuals from
personal liability and reinforcing an
atmosphere of impunity.
(ii) If an individual responsible for
misconduct has been repatriated, reassigned,
redeployed, or is otherwise unable to provide
assistance, responsibility for providing
assistance to a victim should be assigned to
the Member State that contributed the troops to
which such individual belonged or to the
manager concerned.
(iii) In the case of misconduct by a member
of a military contingent, appropriate funds
shall be withheld from the troop contributing
country concerned.
(iv) In the case of misconduct by a
civilian employee or contractor of the United
Nations, appropriate wages shall be garnished
from such individual or fines shall be imposed
against such individual, consistent with
existing United Nations Staff Rules.
(G) Managers and commanders.--The manner in which
managers and commanders handle cases of misconduct by
those serving under them should be included in their
individual performance evaluations, so that managers
and commanders who take decisive action to deter and
address misconduct are rewarded, while those who create
a permissive environment or impede investigations are
penalized or relieved of duty, as appropriate.
(H) Data base.--A centralized data base should be
created and maintained within the United Nations
Department of Peacekeeping Operations to track cases of
misconduct, including the outcome of investigations and
subsequent prosecutions, to ensure that personnel who
have engaged in misconduct or other criminal
activities, regardless of category or rank, are
permanently barred from participation in future
peacekeeping operations.
(I) Welfare.--Peacekeeping operations should assume
responsibility for maintaining a minimum standard of
welfare for mission personnel to ameliorate conditions
of service, while adjustments are made to the
discretionary welfare payments currently provided to
Member States that contribute troops to offset the cost
of operation-provided recreational facilities.
(3) Peacebuilding commission.--
(A) Establishment.--Consistent with the
recommendations of the High Level Panel Report, the
United Nations should establish a Peacebuilding
Commission, supported by a Peacebuilding Support
Office, to marshal the efforts of the United Nations,
international financial institutions, donors, and non-
governmental organizations to assist countries in
transition from war to peace.
(B) Structure and membership.--The Commission
should--
(i) be a subsidiary body of the United
Nations Security Council, limited in size to
ensure efficiency;
(ii) include members of the United Nations
Security Council, major donors, major troop
contributing countries, appropriate United
Nations organizations, the World Bank, and the
International Monetary Fund; and
(iii) invite the President of ECOSOC,
regional actors, Member States that contribute
troops, regional development banks, and other
concerned parties that are not already members,
as determined appropriate, to consult or
participate in meetings as observers.
(C) Responsibilities.--The Commission should seek
to ease the demands currently placed upon the
Department of Peacekeeping Operations to undertake
tasks that fall beyond the scope of traditional
peacekeeping, by--
(i) developing and integrating country-
specific and system-wide conflict prevention,
post-conflict reconstruction, and long-term
development policies and strategies; and
(ii) serving as the key coordinating body
for the design and implementation of military,
humanitarian, and civil administration aspects
of complex missions.
(D) Resources.--The establishment of the
Peacebuilding Commission and the related Peacebuilding
Support Office, should be staffed within existing
resources.
SEC. 403. CERTIFICATION.
(a) New or Expanded Peacekeeping Operations Contingent Upon
Presidential Certification of Peacekeeping Operations Reforms.--
(1) No new or expanded peacekeeping operations.--
(A) Certification.--Except as provided in
subparagraph (B), until the Secretary of State
certifies that the requirements described in paragraph
(2) have been satisfied, the President shall direct the
United States Permanent Representative to the United
Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the
United States at the United Nations to oppose the
creation of new, or expansion of existing, United
Nations peacekeeping operations.
(B) Exception and notification.--The requirements
described under subparagraphs (F) and (G) of paragraph
(2) may be waived until January 1, 2007, if the
President determines that such is in the national
interest of the United States. If the President makes
such a determination, the President shall, not later
than 15 days before the exercise of such waiver, notify
the appropriate congressional committees of such
determination and resulting waiver.
(2) Certification of peacekeeping operations reforms.--The
certification referred to in paragraph (1) is a certification
made by the Secretary to the appropriate congressional
committees that the following reforms, or an equivalent set of
reforms, related to peacekeeping operations have been adopted
by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations or
the General Assembly, as appropriate:
(A) A single, uniform Code of Conduct that has the
status of a binding rule and applies equally to all
personnel serving in United Nations peacekeeping
operations, regardless of category or rank, has been
adopted by the General Assembly and mechanisms have
been established for training such personnel concerning
the requirements of the Code and enforcement of the
Code.
(B) All personnel, regardless of category or rank,
serving in a peacekeeping operation have been trained
concerning the requirements of the Code of Conduct and
each has been given a personal copy of the Code,
translated into the national language of such
personnel.
(C) All personnel, regardless of category or rank,
are required to sign an oath that each has received a
copy of the Code of Conduct, that each pledges to abide
by the Code, and that each understands the consequences
of violating the Code, including the immediate
termination of the participation of such personnel in
the peacekeeping operation to which such personnel is
assigned as a condition of the appointment to such
operation.
(D) All peacekeeping operations have designed and
implemented educational outreach programs to reach
local communities where peacekeeping personnel of such
operations are based to explain prohibited acts on the
part of United Nations peacekeeping personnel and to
identify the individual to whom the local population
may direct complaints or file allegations of
exploitation, abuse, or other acts of misconduct.
(E) A centralized data base has been created and is
being maintained in the United Nations Department of
Peacekeeping Operations that tracks cases of
misconduct, including the outcomes of investigations
and subsequent prosecutions, to ensure that personnel,
regardless of category or rank, who have engaged in
misconduct or other criminal activities are permanently
barred from participation in future peacekeeping
operations.
(F) A Model Memorandum of Understanding between the
United Nations and each Member State that contributes
troops to a peacekeeping operation has been adopted by
the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping
Operations that specifically obligates each such Member
State to--
(i) designate a competent legal authority,
preferably a prosecutor with expertise in the
area of sexual exploitation and abuse, to
participate in any investigation into an
allegation of misconduct brought against an
individual of such Member State;
(ii) refer to its competent national or
military authority for possible prosecution, if
warranted, any investigation of a violation of
the Code of Conduct or other criminal activity
by an individual of such Member State;
(iii) report to the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations on the outcome of any
such investigation;
(iv) undertake to conduct on-site court
martial proceedings relating to allegations of
misconduct alleged against an individual of
such Member State; and
(v) assume responsibility for the provision
of appropriate assistance to a victim of
misconduct committed by an individual of such
Member State.
(G) A professional and independent investigative
and audit function has been established within the
United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
and the OIOS to monitor United Nations peacekeeping
operations.
TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
SEC. 501. POSITIONS FOR UNITED STATES CITIZENS AT INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS.
The Secretary of State shall make every effort to recruit United
States citizens for positions within international organizations.
SEC. 502. BUDGET JUSTIFICATION FOR REGULAR ASSESSED BUDGET OF THE
UNITED NATIONS.
(a) Detailed Itemization.--The annual congressional budget
justification shall include a detailed itemized request in support of
the assessed contribution of the United States to the regular assessed
budget of the United Nations.
(b) Contents of Detailed Itemization.--The detailed itemization
required under subsection (a) shall--
(1) contain information relating to the amounts requested
in support of each of the various sections and titles of the
regular assessed budget of the United Nations; and
(2) compare the amounts requested for the current year with
the actual or estimated amounts contributed by the United
States in previous fiscal years for the same sections and
titles.
(c) Adjustments and Notification.--If the United Nations proposes
an adjustment to its regular assessed budget, the Secretary of State
shall, at the time such adjustment is presented to the Advisory
Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), notify and
consult with the appropriate congressional committees.
SEC. 503. REVIEW AND REPORT.
Not later than six months after the date of the enactment of this
Act, the Secretary of State shall conduct a review of programs of the
United Nations that are funded through assessed contributions and
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report
containing--
(1) the findings of such review; and
(2) recommendations relating to--
(A) the continuation of such programs; and
(B) which of such programs should be voluntarily
funded, other than those specified in subparagraphs (A)
through (R) of subsection (c)(2) of section 11 of the
United Nations Participation Act of 1945, as amended by
section 101(c) of this Act.
SEC. 504. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE.
(a) Report on United Nations Reforms.--Not later than 12 months
after the date of the enactment of this Act and again 12 months
thereafter, the Comptroller General of the United States of the
Government Accountability Office shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report on the status of the 1997, 2002, and
2005 management reforms initiated by the Secretary General and on the
reforms mandated by this Act.
(b) Report on Department of State Certifications.--Not later than
six months after each certification submitted by the Secretary of State
to the appropriate congressional committees under this Act and
subsection (d)(3) of section 11 of the United Nations Participation Act
of 1945 (as amended by section 101(c) of this Act), the Comptroller
General shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a
report on each such certification. The Secretary shall provide the
Comptroller General with any information required by the Comptroller
General to submit any such report.
TITLE VI--CERTIFICATIONS AND WITHHOLDING OF CONTRIBUTIONS
SEC. 601. CERTIFICATIONS AND WITHHOLDING OF CONTRIBUTIONS.
(a) Certifications.--
(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (3), the
certifications required under subsection (d)(3) of section 11
of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (as amended by
section 101(c) of this Act) and section 103, sections 104(a)
through 104(e), sections 201(c) and 201(e), and section 202 of
this Act are certifications submitted to the appropriate
congressional committees by the Secretary of State that the
requirements of each such section have been satisfied with
respect to reform of the United Nations.
(2) Alternate certification mechanism.--
(A) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph
(3), in the event that the Secretary is unable to
submit a certification in accordance with paragraph
(1), the Secretary may submit to the appropriate
congressional committees, in accordance with
subparagraph (B), an alternate certification that
certifies that the requirements of the section to which
the original certification applies have been
implemented through reforms that are substantially
similar to the requirements of such section or
accomplish the same purposes as the requirements of
such section.
(B) Equivalency.--Reforms are substantially similar
or accomplish the same purposes if--
(i) such reforms are formally adopted in
written form by the entity or committee of the
United Nations or of its specialized agency
that has authority to enact or implement such
reforms or are issued by the Secretariat or the
appropriate entity or committee in written
form; and
(ii) such reforms are not identical to the
reforms required by a particular certification
but in the determination of the Secretary will
have the same, or nearly the same effect, as
such reforms.
(C) Written justification and consultation.--
(i) Written justification.--Not later than
30 days before submitting an alternate
certification in accordance with subparagraph
(A), the Secretary shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a written
justification explaining in detail the basis
for such alternate certification.
(ii) Consultation.--After the Secretary has
submitted the written justification under
clause (i), but no later than 15 days before
the Secretary exercises the alternate
certification mechanism described under
subparagraph (A), the Secretary shall consult
with the appropriate congressional committees
regarding such exercise.
(3) Limited exception for substantial compliance.--
(A) Substantial compliance.--Subject to
subparagraph (B), if at least 32 of the 39 reforms
represented by the ten certifications specified under
paragraph (1) have been implemented, all such reforms
(including the unimplemented reforms) so represented
shall be deemed to have been implemented for the year
in which the Secretary submits such certifications.
(B) Mandatory implementation of certain reforms.--
(i) In general.--The provisions of
subparagraph (A) shall not apply unless the
reforms under the following sections have been
implemented for the year to which subparagraph
(A) applies:
(I) Subsection (d)(3) of section 11
of the United Nations Participation Act
of 1945 (as amended by section 101(c)
of this Act).
(II) Section 103(b)(1)(A).
(III) Section 103(b)(2)(D).
(IV) Section 104(a)(1).
(V) Section 104(a)(6).
(VI) Section 104(b)(1).
(VII) Section 104(b)(2).
(VIII) Section 104(c)(1).
(IX) Section 201(b)(1).
(X) Section 201(b)(2).
(XI) Section 201(b)(3).
(XII) Section 201(b)(5).
(XIII) Section 202(a)(1).
(XIV) Section 202(a)(2).
(ii) Full compliance in succeeding year.--
If the unimplemented reforms under subparagraph
(A) are not implemented in the year succeeding
the year to which subparagraph (A) applies, the
provisions of subsection (b) shall apply for
such succeeding year.
(b) Withholding of United States Contributions to Regular Assessed
Budget of the United Nations.--
(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (4) and in
accordance with paragraph (2), until such time as all
certifications (or alternate certifications) are submitted in
accordance with subsection (a), the United States shall
appropriate, but withhold from expenditure, 50 percent of the
contributions of the United States to the regular assessed
budget of the United Nations for a biennial period.
(2) Available until expended.--The contributions
appropriated but withheld from expenditure under paragraph (1)
are authorized to remain available until expended.
(3) Application with respect to section 11(b) of the united
nation participation act of 1945.--Until such time as all
certifications (or alternate certifications) are submitted in
accordance with subsection (a), subsection (b) of section 11 of
the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (as amended by
section 101(c) of this Act) shall be administered as though
such section reads as follows: ``The Secretary may not make a
contribution to a regularly assessed biennial budget of the
United Nations in an amount greater than 11 percent of the
amount calculable under subsection (c).''.
(4) Section 11(d)(3) of united nations participation act of
1945.--
(A) Special rule.--A certification under subsection
(d)(3) of section 11 of the United Nations
Participation Act of 1945 (as amended by section 101(c)
of this Act) (relating to the 2008-2009 biennial period
and subsequent biennial periods) shall not be required
until such time as the United Nations makes its formal
budget presentation for the 2008-2009 biennial period.
(B) Application.--If the Secretary does not submit
a certification under such section, the 50 percent
withholding described under paragraph (1) shall apply.
(c) Release of Funds.--At such time as all certifications (or
alternate certifications) are submitted in accordance with subsection
(a), the United States shall transfer to the United Nations amounts
appropriated but withheld from expenditure under subsection (b).
(d) Annual Reviews.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary shall conduct annual
reviews, beginning one year after the date on which the
Secretary submits the final certification (or alternate
certification) in accordance with subsection (a), to determine
if the United Nations continues to remain in compliance with
all such certifications (or alternate certifications). Not
later than 30 days after the completion of each such review,
the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report containing the findings of each such
review.
(2) Action.--If during the course of any such review the
Secretary determines that the United Nations has failed to
remain in compliance with a certification (or an alternate
certification) that was submitted in accordance with subsection
(a), the 50 percent withholding described under subsection (b)
shall re-apply with respect to United States contributions each
fiscal year to the regular assessed budget of the United
Nations beginning with the fiscal year immediately following
such review and subsequent fiscal years until such time as all
certifications (or alternate certifications) under subsection
(a) have been submitted.
(e) Effective Date.--The certifications (or alternate
certifications) specified under subsection (a) shall be required with
respect to United States contributions towards payment of regular
assessed dues of the United Nations for 2007 and subsequent years.
Background and Purpose
The Henry J. Hyde United Nations Reform Act of 2005
provides a comprehensive framework for implementing crucial
reforms in the United Nations. Scandals involving the United
Nations Oil-for-Food Program and United Nations specialized
agencies such as the World Meteorological Society and the World
Intellectual Property Organization, as well as alleged
wrongdoing by high-level United Nations staff, have illustrated
systemic weaknesses in the United Nations. Despite budgetary
reform initiatives by the Secretary-General in 1997 and 2002,
the regular assessed budget of the United Nations remains
replete with outdated, obsolete programmatic mandates that
continue to be funded, with little regard for prioritization of
mandated initiatives by the General Assembly. Additionally,
many programs currently funded through regular assessed dues
would be better suited for voluntary funding, thereby
increasing transparency, efficiency, and engendering a more
results-oriented approach in implementation. Further, the
undisputed deplorable state of the Commission on Human Rights,
which allows countries such as Cuba and Sudan to act as
arbiters of human rights, must no longer continue unchecked.
Moreover, it is undeniable that the record of United Nations
peacekeeping since the end of the Cold War has been tainted by
disastrous operational failures and unconscionable acts of
misconduct. Allegations of sexual exploitation, abuse, and rape
by United Nations peacekeepers cannot go unaddressed. The Henry
J. Hyde United Nations Reform Act of 2005 seeks to address
these and other areas that are long overdue for serious,
meaningful and practical reform.
History has evidenced that the United States Congress can
prompt meaningful change at the United Nations by applying the
power of the purse. Through the Kassebaum-Solomon amendment in
1985, Congress was able to use the power of the purse to
promote budget accountability, as evidenced by the eventual
implementation of consensus-based budgeting procedures. A
Congressional directive in the Foreign Relations Authorization
Act, FY94 and FY95, to withhold contributions unless an
internal oversight structure was created, loomed when the
United Nations established the Office of Internal Oversight
Services. The Helms-Biden legislation in 1999 provided for the
payment of arrearages to the United Nations if certain
conditions, including reforms, were met. Here, once again, the
United Nations was prompted into action by the United States
Congress, the outstanding conditions were met, and arrearages
were paid.
Reform, however, should not be a periodic event undertaken
because of the threat of financial penalty. Rather, it should
be an integral part of the culture of the United Nations, a
body that was founded: ``(1) To maintain international peace
and security, and to that end: to take effective collective
measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the
peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other
breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means,
and in conformity with the principles of justice and
international law, adjustment or settlement of international
disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the
peace; (2) To develop friendly relations among nations based on
respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate
measures to strengthen universal peace; (3) To achieve
international co-operation in solving international problems of
an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and
in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race,
sex, language, or religion; and (4) To be a centre for
harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these
common ends.'' (Excerpt from the United Nations Charter.) With
such crucial and laudable goals, it is incumbent upon the
United Nations to continue to raise its own standards of
performance and expectations of excellence for the world
community that it serves. Yet, as recent history evidences, not
only has it failed too often to meet the expectations of the
world community, but it also lacks the political will and
ability to enact the changes necessary to reform itself from
within. When these unfortunate circumstances occur, the United
States Congress must act. It must act, not only in the interest
of the United States, but also in the interest of the
betterment of the United Nations for the world community.
The Henry J. Hyde United Nations Reform Act of 2005 is
designed with these goals in mind. The Act contains six titles:
Mission and Budget of the United Nations, Human Rights and the
Economic and Social Council, International Atomic Energy
Agency, Peacekeeping, Department of State and Government
Accountability Office, and Certifications and Withholding of
Contributions.
Summary
In the first title, the bill highlights the need to pursue
a streamlined, efficient, effective and accountable regular
assessed budget of the United Nations and to shift the funding
mechanisms of certain organizational programs from the regular
assessed budget to voluntarily funded programs. It specifies
eighteen programs for shifting from assessed to voluntary
funding and calls for the budgets of two additional programs,
``Public Information'' and ``General Assembly Affairs and
Conference Services,'' to be streamlined. It also seeks to
implement budget practices that would instill results-oriented
methodologies upon which to measure effectiveness and relevance
of programs, as well as to call for procedures to provide
specific sunset dates for new programs.
Accountability is an overriding theme throughout the Act.
The bill establishes an Independent Oversight Board and
designates the Office of Internal Oversight Services as an
independent entity, with a budget isolated from political
influence, and robust authority to investigate at its own
discretion and to provide whistle-blower protection to United
Nations employees offering information of wrongdoing. It also
creates a United Nations Office of Ethics, which is responsible
for establishing, and enforcing a code of ethics for all United
Nations employees, and which requires much greater financial
disclosure than that which presently exists. It establishes the
position of Chief Operating Officer, and requires that Member
States have access to all reports and audits by the Board of
External Auditors.
It also addresses the withholding of financial support to
those human rights treaty monitoring bodies or committees that
the United States is a party to neither the underlying
convention or international covenant, nor protocol.
Finally, Title I seeks equality at the United Nations by
calling for the expansion of the Western European and Others
Group (WEOG) to afford Israel permanent membership in this
group with full rights and privileges. It calls for a
Department of State review and assessment of the work performed
by the various United Nations commissions, committees, and
offices focusing exclusively on the Palestinian agenda,
followed by the submission of a report to Congress recommending
areas for reform, including proposals for the elimination by
the United Nations of such duplicative entities and efforts. It
also calls for withholding proportional U.S. contributions
until such time as the recommendations are implemented.
Title II mandates that the United Nations adopt criteria
for membership in current and future human rights bodies. Under
these criteria, countries that fail to uphold the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights would be ineligible for membership.
Likewise, countries that are subject to sanctions by the
Security Council, or are under a Security Council-mandated
investigation for human rights abuses, or are the subject of
country-specific human rights resolutions, would be ineligible
for membership. In addition to other criteria, the bill
mandates that no human rights body have a standing agenda item
that relates only to one country or region. Title II also
mandates that the membership criteria be adhered to in the
Economic and Social Council, which is the body that selects the
Commission on Human Rights' members, and that a recorded
transparent vote take place on membership.
Title III seeks to strengthen the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) by calling for the establishment of an
Office of Compliance and a Special Committee on Safeguards and
Verification. It also directs that U.S. voluntary contributions
should primarily be used to fund activities relating to nuclear
safety and security, or activities relating to nuclear
verification. In addition, it directs the U.S. Permanent
Representative to the IAEA to pursue membership reform of the
Board of Governors that would bar countries that have not
signed and ratified the Additional Protocol, or that are under
investigation for a breach of, or noncompliance with, their
IAEA obligations, or that are in violation of their IAEA
obligations.
Title IV calls for peacekeeping reforms and mandates the
withholding of U.S. support for new or expanded peacekeeping
missions until the most critical, but immediately achievable,
of those reforms are instituted. These reforms include the
adoption of and training in a uniform Code of Conduct, and the
creation of a database to track cases of misconduct to ensure
that violators of the Code are permanently barred from
peacekeeping operations. Two additional reforms, the adoption
of a Model Memorandum of Understanding and the establishment of
independent investigative and audit functions for peacekeeping,
must be certified by January 1, 2007.
Title V sets forth ways to improve budget practices by
requiring budget justifications, consultations with Congress on
budget changes, a review of new budgeting options and a review
by the Government Accountability Office of the progress the
United Nations is making on implementing reforms identified in
various United Nations management reports.
Title VI provides various levers to encourage the United
Nations to enact reforms, including the withholding of 50
percent of U.S. assessed dues if the Secretary of State cannot
make certifications that the United Nations has accomplished
certain reforms in key areas. The title also mandates annual
reviews by the Secretary of State to ensure that the United
Nations remains in compliance with the mandated reforms and to
require the withholding of 50 percent of U.S. assessed dues if
the United Nations fails to maintain compliance with the reform
provisions in the Henry J. Hyde United Nations Reform Act of
2005.
Hearings
The Committee and its Subcommittees has held numerous
hearings on United Nations issues. Last year, the Full
Committee held two hearings on the Oil-for-Food Program. The
first, on April 28, 2004, ``The United Nations Oil-for-Food
Program: Issues of Accountability and Transparency,'' had six
private witnesses giving testimony: Howar Zaid, United Nations
Liaison Office; Danielle Pletka, American Enterprise Institute;
Claudia Rosett, Foundation for the Defense of Democracies; Dr.
John G. Ruggie, Harvard University; Michael Soussan, former
coordinator of the Oil-for-Food Program; and Joseph A.
Christoff, Government Accountability Office. The other hearing,
entitled, ``The Oil-for-Food Program: Tracking the Funds,' was
held on November 17, 2004. Testimony was received from: Charles
A. Duelfer, Special Advisor to the Director of Central
Intelligence on Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction, Central
Intelligence Agency; and Everett Schenk, Chief Executive
Officer, BNP-Paribas, North America.
The Full Committee held two hearings earlier this year. The
first was held on March 15, 2005, and was entitled, ``U.N.
Reform: Challenges and Prospects.'' Testimony was received
from: Richard C. Holbrooke, former U.S. Permanent
Representative to the United Nations; Jeane J. Kirkpatrick,
former U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations; and
Richard S. Williamson, former U.S. Alternate Representative for
Special Political Affairs in the United Nations. The second
hearing, ``Reforming the United Nations: Budget and Management
Perspectives'' was held on May 19, 2005. Testimony was heard
from: Dr. Mark Lagon, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
International Organization Affairs, U.S. Department of State;
Catherine Bertini, Former Under-Secretary General for
Management, United Nations; and the President of the United
Nations Foundation, former Senator Tim Wirth.
The Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights and
International Operations held three hearings on issues related
to the United Nations Reform Act. The first was held on March
1, 2005, and entitled, ``United Nations Organization Mission in
the Democratic Republic of Congo: A Case for Peacekeeping
Reform.'' Testimony was received from: Hon. Kim Holmes,
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Organization
Affairs, U.S. Department of State; Hon. Princeton N. Lyman,
Former Assistant Secretary of State for International
Organization Affairs; Dr. Nile Gardiner, The Heritage
Foundation; and Anneke Van Woudenberg, Human Rights Watch. On
April 19, 2005, the Subcommittee held a hearing entitled, ``The
United Nations Commission on Human Rights: Protector or
Accomplice?'' with Assistant Secretary-General Danilo Turk of
the Department of Political Affairs at the United Nations
testifying. On May 18, 2005, the Subcommittee held a hearing
entitled, ``U.N. Peacekeeping Reform: Seeking Greater
Accountability and Integrity.'' Testimony was received from:
Philo L. Dibble, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau
of Organization Affairs, U.S. Department of State; Eric
Schwartz of the Council on Foreign Relations; and Victoria Holt
of the Henry L. Stimson Center.
The Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations held
numerous hearings on United Nations-related issues. The first,
on February 9, 2005, was entitled, ``The Volcker Interim Report
on United Nations Oil-for-Food Program.'' Testimony was
received from: former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger;
former Ambassador Dennis Ross; Dr. Zaid Asali, of the American
Task Force on Palestine; and Danielle Pletka of the American
Enterprise Institute. The second hearing, entitled, ``United
Nations Operations: Integrity and Accountability,'' was held on
March 2, 2005. Testimony was heard from the following
witnesses: Patrick F. Kennedy, Ambassador to the United Nations
for Management and Reform, U.S. Mission to the U.N.; and Joseph
A. Christoff, Government Accountability Office. The
Subcommittee held another U.N.-related hearing, ``The United
Nations Oil-for-Food Program: The Cotecna and Saybolt
Inspection Firms'' on March 17, 2005. Testimony was received
from three private witnesses: John Denson of the Saybolt Group,
Houston Texas; Dr. Rehan Mullick, Former Research Officer for
the United Nations Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator in
Iraq; and Evelyn Suarez, an attorney representing Cotecna S.A.
The final U.N.-related hearing held by the Subcommittee, ``The
Role of BNP-Paribas SA in the United Nations Oil-for-Food
Program,'' was held on April 28, 2005. Testimony was heard from
several officials of BNP-Paribas SA: Everett Schenck, Patricia
Herbert, William Vassallo, and Harold Lehmann.
The Subcommittee on International Terrorism and
Nonproliferation held a hearing on March 17, 2005, on terrorism
issues related to the U.N. Testimony at this hearing, ``The
United Nations and the Fight Against Terrorism,'' was heard
from the following: Victor Comras, former member of the United
Nations al-Qaeda monitoring group; and Anne Bayefsky, The
Hudson Institute.
Committee Consideration
On June 8, 2005, the International Relations Committee
marked up the bill, H.R. 2745, pursuant to notice, in open
session. The Committee agreed to a motion offered by Chairman
Hyde to favorably report the bill, as amended, to the House of
Representatives, by a record vote of 25 ayes to 22 nays, a
quorum being present. During the markup, three amendments were
offered. The first, offered by Mr. Lantos, was an amendment in
the nature of a substitute. It was defeated by a record vote of
23 ayes to 24 noes. The second amendment, offered by Mr. Leach,
regarding expansion of the United Nations Security Council, was
withdrawn. The third amendment, offered by Mr. Paul, to
terminate U.S. participation in the United Nations, was
defeated by a record vote of 3 ayes to 39 nays, with one voting
``present.'' A unanimous consent request was made to change the
title of the bill to ``The Henry J. Hyde United Nations Reform
Act of 2005.'' There was no objection.
Roll Call Votes
Clause (3)(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of
Representatives requires that the results of each record vote
on an amendment or motion to report, together with the names of
those voting for or against, be printed in the committee
report. The following record votes occurred during
consideration of H.R. 2745:
Vote #1--Lantos Substitute Amendment
Voting aye: Leach, Paul, Lantos, Berman, Ackerman,
Faleomavaega, Payne, Brown, Sherman, Wexler, Engel, Delahunt,
Meeks, Lee, Crowley, Blumenauer, Berkley, Napolitano, Schiff,
Watson, Smith (WA), Chandler, and Cardoza
Voting no: Hyde, Smith (NJ), Gallegly, Ros-Lehtinen,
Rohrabacher, Royce, King, Chabot, Tancredo, Issa, Flake, Davis,
Green, Weller, Pence, McCotter, Harris, Wilson, Boozman,
Barrett, Mack, Fortenberry, McCaul and Poe
Ayes 23. Noes 24.
Vote #2--Paul Amendment--U.S. Out of the United Nations
Voting aye: Paul, Wilson, Barrett
Voting no: Leach, Smith (NJ), Gallegly, Ros-Lehtinen, King,
Chabot, Issa, Flake, Davis, Green, Weller, Pence, McCotter,
Harris, Boozman, Mack, Fortenberry, McCaul, Poe, Lantos,
Berman, Ackerman, Faleomavaega, Payne, Brown, Wexler, Engel,
Delahunt, Meeks, Lee, Crowley, Blumenauer, Berkley, Napolitano,
Schiff, Watson, Smith (WA), Chandler, and Cardoza
Voting ``Present'': Rohrabacher
Ayes 3. Noes 39. Present 1.
Vote #3--Report favorably H.R. 2745 to the House, as Amended
Voting aye: Hyde, Smith (NJ), Gallegly, Ros-Lehtinen,
Rohrabacher, Royce, King, Chabot, Tancredo, Issa, Flake, Davis,
Green, Weller, Pence, McCotter, Harris, Wilson, Boozman,
Barrett, Mack, Fortenberry, McCaul, Poe, Berkley
Voting no: Leach, Paul, Lantos, Berman, Ackerman,
Faleomavaega, Payne, Brown, Sherman, Wexler, Engel, Delahunt,
Meeks, Lee, Crowley, Blumenauer, Napolitano, Schiff, Watson,
Smith (WA), Chandler, and Cardoza
Ayes 25. Noes 22.
Committee Oversight Findings
In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules
of the House of Representatives, the Committee reports that the
findings and recommendations of the Committee, based on
oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of rule X of the
Rules of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in the
descriptive portions of this report.
New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures
Clause 3(c)(2) of House Rule XIII is inapplicable because
this legislation does not provide new budgetary authority or
increased tax expenditures.
Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate
U.S. Congress,
Congressional Budget Office,
Washington, DC, June 9, 2005.
Hon. Henry J. Hyde, Chairman,
Committee on International Relations,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 2745, the Henry J.
Hyde United Nations Reform Act of 2005.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Sunita
D'Monte, who can be reached at 226-2840.
Sincerely,
Douglas Holtz-Eakin.
Enclosure
cc:
Honorable Tom Lantos,
Ranking Member
H.R. 2745--Henry J. Hyde United Nations Reform Act of 2005.
H.R. 2745 would require the Secretary of State to press for
many changes at the United Nations. The bill also would require
the Secretary to withhold 50 percent of the U.S. assessed
contributions to the regular budget of the United Nations,
starting in 2007, if the Secretary is unable to certify that
certain conditions have been met. The bill would not authorize
appropriations for assessed contributions to the United
Nations' budget. In 2005, CBO estimates that $362 million will
be spent on such assessments from current appropriations; for
2006, the President has requested that Congress appropriate
$439 million for those costs.
CBO has no basis for predicting whether or when all the
necessary certifications would be made. If the Secretary is
able to make all certifications in a timely manner, assessments
would not be withheld, and implementation of the bill would
have no impact on spending subject to appropriation.
Alternatively, if certifications cannot be made and 50 percent
of assessments are withheld, such discretionary spending would
be about $187 million lower in 2007 and about $769 million
lower over the 2007-2010 period--relative to expected scheduled
payments under the current-law baseline. The bill would not
affect direct spending or revenues.
Among the many changes specified by the bill, it would
require the Secretary of State to press the United Nations to:
LReduce and streamline its regular budget,
LIncrease internal oversight and auditing,
LEstablish a position of Chief Operating
Officer,
LCreate an Office of Ethics,
LProhibit membership in any United Nations
human rights body to countries that violate human
rights,
LAdopt a uniform and enforceable code of
conduct for United Nations peacekeepers, and
LStrengthen the compliance and enforcement
capabilities at the International Atomic Energy Agency.
H.R. 2745 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector
mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and
would not affect the budgets of state, local, or tribal
governments.
Performance Goals and Objectives
The goals and objectives of this legislation are to provide
fundamental reforms for the United Nations across a broad set
of issues, including the areas of budget, oversight,
accountability and human rights.
Constitutional Authority Statement
Pursuant to clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the Committee finds the authority for
this legislation in article 1, section 8, of the Constitution.
Section-by-Section Analysis and Discussion
Section 1. Short Title and Table of Contents
This Act may be cited as the ``Henry J. Hyde United Nations
Reform Act of 2005.''
Section 2. Definitions
Section 2 defines terms used in the Act.
Section 3. Statement of Congress
Congress declares that, in light of recent history, it is
incumbent upon the United Nations to enact significant reform
measures if it is to restore the public trust and confidence
necessary for it to achieve the laudable goals set forth in its
Charter. To this end, the following Act seeks to reform the
United Nations.
TITLE I--MISSION AND BUDGET OF THE UNITED NATIONS
Section 101. United States Financial Contributions to the United
Nations
Section 101 (a) Statements of Policy. This subsection
states that it shall be the policy of the United States to use
its voice, vote and influence at the United Nations to pursue a
streamlined, efficient, and accountable regular assessed budget
of the United Nations; and to shift funding mechanisms of
eighteen organizational programs of the United Nations from the
regular assessed budget to voluntarily funded programs. In
order to pursue a more streamlined, efficient accountable
regular assessed budget, it also states that it shall be the
policy of the United States to redirect contributions to
achieve certain policy objectives and to redirect a portion of
funds from two United Nations organizational programs: 1)
Public Information; and 2) General Assembly affairs and
conference services. In addition, this provision states that it
shall be the policy of the United States to use its voice,
vote, and influence at the United Nations to ensure that future
biennial budgets of the United Nations reflect the shift in
funding mechanisms described above.
The eighteen organizational programs identified for
shifting include: (1) Economic and Social Affairs; (2) Least-
developed countries, landlocked developing countries and small
island developing States; (3) United Nations support for the
New Partnership for Africa's Development; (4) Trade and
development; (5) International trade Center UNCTAD/WTO; (6)
Environment; (7) Human Settlements; (8) Crime prevention and
criminal justice; (9) International drug control; (10) Economic
and social development in Africa; (11) Economic and social
development in Asia and the Pacific; (12) Economic development
in Europe; (13) Economic and social development in Latin
America and the Caribbean; (14) Economic and social development
in Western Asia; (15) Regular program of technical cooperation;
(16) Development account; (17) Protection of and assistance to
refugees; and (18) Palestine refugees.
It is imperative for the United Nations to produce a
streamlined, efficient accountable United Nations regular
assessed budget. Steps can and must be taken by the United
Nations to achieve such a budget. To assist the United Nations
in achieving this goal, the Committee has identified programs
to be streamlined (Public Information and General Assembly
affairs and conference services) and eighteen programs to be
shifted from the regular assessed budget to voluntarily funded
programs. Voluntarily funded programs are known to be more
results-oriented, efficient, and transparent. Further, by
shifting programs from the regular assessed budget to
voluntarily funded programs, the United Nations regular
assessed budget decreases for all Member States, while allowing
Member States more control over where contributions are
directed.
Section 101 (b) Authorization with Respect to the Regular
Assessed Budget of the United Nations. This subsection
authorizes the Secretary of State (``Secretary '') to make
contributions toward the amount assessed to the United States
by the United Nations for purposes of funding the regular
assessed budget subject to the amendment made by subsection
(c).
Section 101 (c) United States Financial Contributions to
the United Nations. This subsection amends Section 11 of the
United Nations Participation Act of 1945 to implement the
policies stated in subsection (a). It provides the mechanism to
implement the shifting of programs from the assessed budget to
voluntarily funded programs; addresses the budget issues of two
United Nations organizational programs (Public Information and
General Assembly affairs and conference services), and bars the
Secretary from contributing to the United Nations regular
assessed budget for annual United States assessed contributions
an amount greater than 22 percent of the United Nations regular
assessed budget.
This subsection restates the eighteen regular assessed
programs identified for shifting to voluntarily funded
programs. It states that if one or more of these programs have
not been shifted by 2008, the amount of funds assessed to the
United States for unshifted programs shall be redirected to
priority areas as follows: subject to Congressional
notification, not more than 40 percent of the funds shall be
redirected to Internal Oversight programs, Human Rights
programs (particularly to assist in strengthening field
operation activities of the Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights to enable human rights monitors to have a greater
presence in areas such as Darfur and the Democratic Republic of
the Congo), and Humanitarian Assistance programs. In addition,
the Secretary is afforded the flexibility to make voluntary
contributions to sixteen of the eighteen identified programs,
not to exceed 10 percent of the 40 percent total. (This
exception excludes ``Protection of and assistance to
refugees,'' and ``Palestine refugees,'' because funding for
refugee programs is drawn from a separate funding account, the
Migration and Refugee Assistance account.) The remaining
amounts are to be expended as contributions to voluntarily
funded United Nations specialized agencies, funds, or programs,
such as the United Nations Development Program, refugee
programs administered by the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees, the World Food Programme, and any recently
shifted programs.
This subsection allows a reasonable amount of time, more
than 2 years, for the United Nations to act on the shifting of
programs from regular assessed to voluntarily funded programs.
If there are programs that have not been shifted, the remaining
programs would be subject to the funding parameters set out in
this subsection. It should be noted that, of the identified
programs, the Committee believes that certain programs, such as
``International Drug Control'' should continue to be strongly
supported as voluntarily funded programs.
This subsection also mandates that if the budgets for the
two United Nations organizational programs (Public Information
and General Assembly Affairs and Conference Services) are not
each reduced by 10 percent in 2007, the United States shall
redirect 20 percent of its assessed contributions for these
programs to Internal Oversight programs, Human Rights programs,
and Humanitarian Assistance programs. Further, in accordance
with section 601, in 2008 a certification is required by the
Secretary that the United Nations Public Information and
General Assembly Affairs and Conference Services budgets are
each reduced by 20 percent.
The Committee notes that General Assembly Affairs and
Conference Services accounts for approximately 20 percent of
the assessed regular budget ($280 million per year). Some
conferences cost upwards of $7,000-$8,000 per hour because of,
among other things, interpreter, translation and documentation
costs. Calls for streamlining and scaling back conferences have
been heard throughout the years, but the United Nations has
done little to address this issue. Likewise, the Committee
notes that the Department of Public Information could better
utilize available technologies and continue to consolidate
United Nations Information Centers around the world to achieve
greater efficiency and decreased operational costs.
Section 101 (d) Effective Date. This subsection states that
the amendment made by subsection (c) shall take effect and
apply beginning in October 1, 2006.
The Committee intends that this provision come into effect
October 1, 2006. However, per the provision, funding
implications do not arise until funding requests are made for
payment toward the United States assessed dues for the 2007
United Nations regular assessed budget.
Section 102. Weighted Voting
This section states that it shall be the policy of the
United States to actively pursue weighted voting with respect
to all budgetary and financial matters in the Administrative
and Budgetary Committee (5th Committee) and in the General
Assembly in accordance with the level of financial
contributions of Member States to the regular assessed budget
of the United Nations.
Section 103. Budget Certifications Requirements
In accordance with section 601, this section requires the
Secretary to certify that the United Nation's biennial budget
is maintained at the approved level, and should increases be
necessary, they may not exceed 10 percent. It also requires the
United Nations budget to be more transparent by requiring more
details on the budget categories such as travel or equipment.
The provision also requires managers to follow rules of
performance-based budgeting and program evaluation. This
certification also verifies that the Secretary General is
assessing budget requests on the basis of evaluations on the
programs' relevance and effectiveness and is reporting to the
General Assembly programs that meet the criteria for continued
support or termination. The final required certification is
that the United Nations is following a procedure in which all
new programs approved by the General Assembly have a specific
sunset date.
While these ideas are not new, they are important and
warrant inclusion in this bill. By including this provision,
the Committee seeks to strengthen the resolve of the General
Assembly and the Secretariat to incorporate modern budget
practices and systems that allow for subjective assessments of
the organizations' performance. Incorporating such practices
will over time, vastly improve the accountability and
effectiveness of the United Nations.
Section 104. Accountability
Section 104 (a) Certification of Creation of Independent
Oversight Board. In accordance with section 601, certification
is required by the Secretary that the United Nations has
created an Independent Oversight Board (IOB). The IOB must be
an independent entity within the United Nations and not subject
to budget or organizational authority of any United Nations
entity other than the General Assembly, which will include in
its budget all funds for the IOB. The Director of the IOB will
be nominated by the Secretary General and approved by a
majority vote of the Security Council. The IOB will consist of
a total of five members (four others in addition to the
Director), and all shall be appointed in the same manner as the
Director. The IOB will be responsible for overseeing the audit
plans and recommending the annual budgets of the Office of
Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) and the Board of External
Auditors. In special circumstances, the IOB may appoint a
special investigator and staff to investigate matters involving
senior United Nations officials.
Section 104 (b) Certification of United Nations Reforms of
the OIOS. In accordance with section 601, certification is
required by the Secretary that the United Nations has
designated the OIOS as an independent entity within the United
Nations, with the exception of the OIOS' relationship with the
IOB and the General Assembly. The OIOS will receive all of its
operating funds through the United Nations regular budget and
shall not be dependent on any other entity within the United
Nations for such funding. The OIOS may initiate and conduct an
investigation or audit of any entity or employee of the United
Nations. OIOS must establish whistle-blower protection for all
employees of the United Nations. The Director of the OIOS must
establish three Associate Directors of the OIOS: Associate
Director for Specialized Agencies; Associate Director for
Peacekeeping Operations; and Associate Director for Procurement
and Contract Integrity. Each Associate Director will be
responsible for specialized review of each of their areas of
concern.
As defined in Section 2 (8), for the purposes of the Act,
Specialized Agencies of the United Nations shall include the:
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO);
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO); International Fund for
Agricultural Development (IFAD); International Labor
Organization (ILO); International Maritime Organization (IMO);
International Telecommunication Union (ITU); United Nations
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO);
United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO);
Universal Postal Union (UPU); World Health Organization (WHO);
World Meteorological Organization (WMO); and the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).
Section 104 (c) Certification of Establishment of United
Nations Office of Ethics. In accordance with section 601,
certification is required by the Secretary that the United
Nations has created an Office of Ethics (UNEO) which shall be
responsible for creating and managing a Code of Ethics for all
United Nations employees, including making policy, providing
education and annual training, and overseeing and enforcing the
implantation of the Code. The UNEO will receive all of its
operating funds through appropriations from the General
Assembly and shall not be dependent on any other entity within
the United Nations for such funding. The Director of the UNEO
must report on proposals for implementing a system for the
filing and review of annual financial disclosure forms for all
United Nations employees at the P-5 level and above, as well as
for all consultants compensated at any salary level. This
system for filing financial disclosure forms must be in place
and operational not later than 6 months after the date of the
publication of the report by the Director of the UNEO.
The Director will also include in his report the following
proposals for making public: all salaries for, and payments to,
United Nations employees--including, but not limited to,
pensions and buyouts; annual payments to consultants; and
travel and per diem rates and payments for all United Nations
employees. The ethics system will also seek to identify and
prevent conflicts of interest by United Nations employees and
shall be comparable to the system used for such purposes by the
United States Government.
Section 104 (d) Certification of Establishment of Position
of Chief Operating Officer. In accordance with section 601,
certification is required by the Secretary that the United
Nations has created the position of Chief Operating Officer
(COO). The COO shall report to the Secretary General, and will
be responsible for the daily administration, operation and
supervision, as well as the direction and control of the
business of the United Nations.
Section 104 (e) Certification of Access by Member States to
Reports and Audits by Board of External Auditors. In accordance
with section 601, certification is required by the Secretary
that Member States, upon request, are granted access to all
reports and audits of the Board of External Auditors.
The Committee has been investigating the United Nations
Oil-for-Food program (OFFP) since March 2004. To date, the Full
Committee has held two public hearings, and the Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations has held four public hearings into
the OFFP. The Committee investigations into the OFFP in
particular, and United Nations mismanagement in general, are
ongoing. During the course of this investigation, it has become
apparent that operations at the United Nations were not well-
managed, and were subject to serious ethical lapses.
Specifically, the oversight of the OFFP was undercut by
weak institutional oversight organization and management
structures within the United Nations. The Office of Internal
Oversight Services (OIOS) was denied adequate funding,
manpower, and access needed to properly audit the OFFP. To be
effective, OIOS and auditing functions in general need greater
independence within the United Nations management structure.
Increased oversight and accountability is needed throughout the
United Nations, ranging from contracting to employee financial
disclosure statements as part of the establishment of a broader
ethics Code of Conduct for United Nations employees and
contractors.
Section 105. Terrorism and the United Nations
This section translates into an actionable item based on
the recommendations of the Secretary General's High-Level Panel
on Threats, Challenges, and Change regarding the need for a
comprehensive universal definition of terrorism. It establishes
a directive for the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United
Nations (``Permanent Representative '') to work toward the
adoption by the United Nations General Assembly of: (1) a
terrorism definition that includes any action intended to cause
death or serious bodily harm to civilians for the purpose of
intimidation or coercion of populations, governments, or
international organizations; and (2) a convention on terrorism
that includes such a definition.
Section 106. United Nations Treaty Bodies
This section states that the United States shall withhold
contributions to the regular assessed budget of the United
Nations for amounts proportional to the percentage of such
budget that are expended for support of United Nations human
rights treaty monitoring bodies or committees to which the
United States is a party to neither a convention or
international covenant nor a subsequent protocol of a
particular monitoring body or committee.
The purpose of this section is to withhold financial
support to those human rights treaty monitoring bodies or
committees that the United States is a party to neither the
underlying convention nor international covenant, nor to the
protocol. The withholding of funds is not to be interpreted as
barring United States participation in discussions and
negotiations in such committees.
Section 107. Equality at the United Nations
This section seeks to end the discrimination of Israel in
the United Nations system and ensure fairness and objectivity
in the United Nations handling of Israeli-Palestinian issues.
Section 107 (a) Inclusion of Israel in WEOG. This
subsection calls for the expansion of the Western European and
Others Group (WEOG) to afford Israel permanent membership in
this group with full rights and privileges. At the United
Nations, regional groups nominate members for election to
United Nations bodies. Asian countries have declined to admit
Israel into their natural geographic group due to objections by
Arab countries, depriving Israel of the possibility of
representation in U.N. bodies. In 2000, Israel was admitted to
the Western and Others Group in New York, on condition that it
not stand for election to the Security Council and continue to
seek membership in the Asian group. Israel's membership to the
WEOG is severely limited. Every 4 years Israel has to reapply
for membership, since its status is only temporary. Israel is
not allowed to present candidacies for open seats in any United
Nations body and is not able to compete for seats in major U.N.
bodies. Israel is only allowed to participate in WEOG
activities in the New York office of the United Nations, and is
excluded from WEOG discussion and consultations at the United
Nations offices in Geneva, Nairobi, Rome and Vienna. Therefore,
Israel cannot participate in United Nations conferences on
human rights, racism and a number of other issues handled in
these offices.
Section 107 (b) Department of State Review and Report. This
subsection calls for a Department of State review and
assessment of the work performed by the various United Nations
commissions, committees, and offices focusing exclusively on
the Palestinian agenda, followed by the submission of a report
to the appropriate congressional committees recommending areas
for reform, including proposals for the elimination by the
United Nations of such duplicative entities and efforts. The
General Assembly has created two committees which focus
negatively on Israeli actions and protectively on the
Palestinians: the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli
Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People
and other Arabs of the Occupied Territories, and the Committee
on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian
People. These are in addition to the several organizations
within the United Nations framework that deal with the West
Bank and Gaza Strip.
Section 107 (c) Implementation by Permanent Representative.
This subsection calls for the Permanent Representative to seek
the implementation of the recommendations made by the
Department of State in subsection (b) and to withhold
proportional U.S. contributions to the United Nations until
such time as the recommendations are implemented. The objective
of this section is to ensure United Nations compliance with
U.S. efforts to improve the efficiency of that body.
Section 107 (d) GAO Audit. This subsection calls for a
Government Accountability Office (GAO) audit of the
implementation of such reform proposals to ensure a third-party
audit of these efforts.
In every session, the General Assembly devotes more
condemnatory resolutions to Israel than to any other country or
issue. Moreover, the Arab-Israeli conflict has been the subject
of more Emergency Special Sessions of the Assembly than any
other issue, with these often marred by one-sided denunciations
of Israel.
Severe limitations have been increasingly placed on
Israel's membership at the United Nations. Israel is denied the
ability to serve or run for leadership positions in multiple
United Nations bodies and affiliated agencies. While Israel was
accepted as a temporary member of the Western European and
Others Group, it is not allowed to present candidacies for open
seats in any United Nations body, or able to compete for major
United Nations bodies. Israel is excluded from consultations at
United Nations offices in Geneva, Nairobi, Rome and Vienna. As
long as the United Nations institutionalized reliance on the
regional system continues, its members are obliged--by the
principles of its charter--to find a solution to the
discrimination against Israel. The WEOG states can do so
without sacrificing their vital interests.
There are several United Nations groups devoted to
''Palestinian Rights,'' and there is disproportionate
representation of Palestinian issues through committees and
commissions such as: the ``U.N. Division for Palestinian
Rights''; a ``Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable
Rights of the Palestinian People''; ``U.N. Special Coordinator
for the Middle East Peace Process and Personal Representative
to the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian
Authority''; and the ``NGO Network on the Question of
Palestine.''
In response to this disparity, this section requires that
the Secretary of State report to Congress on the elimination by
the United Nations of such duplicative entities and efforts. It
also requires that the U.S. Permanent Representative to the
United Nations implement the recommendations of that report,
and requires the withholding of proportional U.S. contributions
to the United Nations until such time as the recommendations
are implemented.
TITLE II--HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL (ECOSOC)
Section 201. Human Rights
Section 201 (a) Statement of Policy. This subsection states
that it shall be the policy of the United States to use its
voice, vote, and influence at the United Nations to ensure that
a credible and respectable Human Rights Council or other human
rights body is established within the United Nations whose
participating Member States uphold the values embodied in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Section 201 (b) Human Rights Reforms at the United Nations.
This subsection states that the President shall direct the
Permanent Representative to ensure that the following human
rights reforms have been adopted by the United Nations: (1) a
Member State that fails to uphold the values embodied in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights shall be ineligible for
membership on any United Nations human rights body; (2) a
Member State that is subject to sanctions by the Security
Council or under a Security Council-mandated investigation for
human rights abuses shall be ineligible for membership in any
United Nations human rights body; (3) a Member State that is
currently subject to an adopted country-specific resolution
relating to human rights abuses perpetrated by the government
of such country in such country, or has been the subject of
such an adopted country-specific resolution within the past 3
years shall be ineligible for membership in any United Nations
human rights body; (4) a Member State that violates the
principles of a United Nations human rights body to which it
aspires to join shall be ineligible for membership in such
body; and (5) no human rights body has a standing agenda item
that relates only to one country or one region.
The purpose of this section is to address the deplorable
state of the current Commission on Human Rights. Violator
countries such as Cuba and Sudan, who are current members,
should not be arbitrators of human rights. This provision
addresses minimum standards for membership in any current or
future human rights body at the United Nations. Regarding the
first criterion, ``A Member State that fails to uphold the
values embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
shall be ineligible for membership on any United Nations human
rights body,'' the Committee intends that such statement be
adopted by the United Nations, as a foundational principle. The
adoption of such a statement allows United States
representatives to the United Nations a basis upon which to
challenge a proposed candidate for membership on a human rights
body that does not uphold the values embodied in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.
Section 201(c) Certification. In accordance with section
601, a certification is required by the Secretary that the
human rights reforms in subsection (b) have been adopted by the
United Nations.
Section 201 (d) Prevention of Abuse of ``No Action''
Motions. This subsection states that the Permanent
Representative shall work to prevent abuse of ``no action''
motions, particularly as such motions relate to country
specific resolutions.
The purpose of this provision is to address the rising
abuse of ``no action'' motions in the Commission on Human
Rights. A successful no action motion prevents debate on the
merits of resolutions, and prevents a vote on a resolution. In
2004, there were successful no action motions on resolutions
relating to China and Zimbabwe. In 2004 and 2005 no action
motions on the human rights situation in Belarus were
considered, but defeated. The Committee maintains that human
rights resolutions, particularly country-specific resolutions
deserve a full debate on the merits and a vote on final
adoption.
Section 201 (e) Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights. This subsection states that the
United States shall continue to strongly support the Office of
the High Commissioner for Human Rights. Additionally, in
accordance with section 601, a certification by the Secretary
is required that the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights has been given greater authority
in field operation activities, such as in the Darfur region,
and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Section 202. Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)
Section 202 (a) Statement of Policy. This subsection states
that is shall be the policy of the United States to use its
voice, vote, and influence at the United Nations to: (1)
abolish secret voting in the Economic and Social Council; (2)
ensure that, until such time as the Commission on Human Rights
is abolished, only countries that are not ineligible for
membership, per section 201(b), shall be considered for
membership; and (3) ensure that after candidate countries are
nominated for membership on the Commission on Human Rights, the
Economic and Social Council conducts a recorded vote to
determine such membership.
Section 202 (b) Certification. In accordance with section
601, the Secretary shall certify that the policies described in
subsection (a) have been implemented.
ECOSOC is the United Nations body in which members of the
Commission on Human Rights are selected. Therefore, condemnable
membership selection must be addressed in ECOSOC, long before
the Commission on Human Rights convenes for its annual meeting
in Geneva, Switzerland. This provision seeks to ensure that
membership criteria addressed in the human rights provision
(201(b)) are adhered to in the body of selection, and that
there is transparency in the selection process.
TITLE III--INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
Section 301. International Atomic Energy Agency
Section 301 (a) Enforcement and Compliance. This subsection
establishes a directive for the U.S. to seek the establishment
of: (1) an Office of Compliance and Enforcement within the
Secretariat of the IAEA to function as an independent body of
technical experts that will assess the activities of Member
States and recommend specific penalties for those that are in
breach or violation of their obligations; and (2) a Special
Committee on Safeguards and Verification to advise the IAEA
Board of Governors on additional measures necessary to enhance
the agency's ability to detect undeclared activities by Member
States. Consideration should be given to the creation of
individual enforcement mechanisms within the IAEA. This
subsection also calls on the U.S. Permanent Representative to
the IAEA to seek the suspension of privileges for Member States
that are under investigation, or are in breach or non-
compliance of their obligations. The IAEA must prevent
countries that are in noncompliance from serving on the Board.
Section 301 (b) United States Contributions. This
subsection reinforces U.S. priorities concerning the safety of
nuclear materials and counterproliferation by: (1) calling for
U.S. voluntary contributions to the IAEA to exclusively fund
activities relating to Nuclear Security or Nuclear
Verification; (2) directing the U.S. Permanent Representative
to the IAEA to ensure that funds for safeguards inspections are
prioritized to focus on countries of proliferation concern, and
to prevent state sponsors of terrorism, proliferators, and
countries under IAEA investigation from benefiting from certain
IAEA assistance programs; and (3) ensuring transparency in the
IAEA budget process by calling for a detailed breakdown of
expenditures for safeguards inspections and nuclear security
activities. U.S. contributions to the IAEA should focus on
enhancing safeguards and inspections, as well as efforts
relating to nuclear safety and security, rather than providing
technical assistance in the agricultural, medical, and other
sectors.
Section 301 (c) Membership. This subsection calls on the
U.S. Permanent Representative to the IAEA to: (1) block
membership on the Board of Governors to countries that are
under investigation or in violation of their obligations and
have not signed or ratified the Additional Protocol; and (2)
work toward the establishment of Board membership criteria that
reflect such priorities. Countries that are in non-compliance
of their obligations under international agreements and in
violation of the rules that serve as the basis for individual
United Nations bodies cannot and must not be entrusted with the
enforcement of those very rules and obligations. They should be
held accountable through suspension of privileges and denial of
certain assistance.
Section 301 (d) Report. This subsection calls for a report
on the status of implementation of this section 6 months after
enactment and annually for 2 years thereafter.
Section 302. Sense of Congress Regarding the Nuclear Security Action
Plan of the IAEA
This section expresses the sense of Congress that the
national security interests of the United States are enhanced
by the Nuclear Security Action Plan of the IAEA and the Board
of Governors should recommend, and the General Conference
should adopt, a resolution incorporating the Nuclear Security
Action Plan into the regular budget of the IAEA.
In recent years, several developments have highlighted the
dual dangers posed by terrorism and proliferation of deadly
unconventional weapons and the confluence of the two. This has
been articulated in the National Security Strategy of the
United States (2002), in which President Bush summarized: ``The
gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of
radicalism and technology. Our enemies have openly declared
that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction, and evidence
indicates that they are doing so with determination. The United
States will not allow these efforts to succeed.''
In addition, the discovery of the A.Q. Khan nuclear black
market network, Iran's unreported nuclear activities (including
secret uranium enrichment facilities), the withdrawal of North
Korea from the nuclear nonproliferation treaty in April 2003,
and the discovery of Libya's covert nuclear weapons program,
renounced in December 2003, have heightened concerns. These
concerns focus on the propensity for rogue states to develop a
nuclear weapons capability and the potential for non-state
actors participating in the global terrorism network to attain
technology, expertise, and nuclear materials that could be used
for nuclear-related terrorism.
The United States has repeatedly viewed the IAEA as a vital
component of U.S. strategies to address these threats. This
title translates policy recommendations into concrete actions
to achieve U.S. proliferation and terrorism goals.
TITLE IV--PEACEKEEPING
Section 401. Sense of Congress Regarding Reform of United Nations
Peacekeeping Operations
This section expresses the Sense of Congress that although
United Nations peacekeeping operations have contributed greatly
toward the promotion of peace and stability, the credibility of
United Nations peacekeeping has been severely tarnished by
operational failures and unconscionable acts of misconduct. To
restore that credibility, fundamental and far-reaching reforms
must be implemented without delay.
Section 402. Statement of Policy Relating to Reform of United Nations
Peacekeeping Operations
This section states that it shall be the policy of the
United States to pursue reform of United Nations peacekeeping
operations in the following areas: (1) planning and management;
(2) conduct and discipline; and (3) peacebuilding.
Subsection (1)(A) recognizes that the size, cost and number
of United Nations peacekeeping missions have increased
substantially over the past decade and calls for a global audit
of such missions with a view toward ``right-sizing'' and
ensuring that they are cost effective. The Committee recommends
that this audit should be conducted in conjunction with a
comprehensive review of all mandates, as described in
subsection (B).
Subsection (1)(B) calls for a comprehensive review of all
mandates to identify objectives which are practical and
achievable. Duties which fall beyond the scope of traditional
peacekeeping, including the conduct of elections and post-
conflict reconstruction, should be tasked to a new
Peacebuilding Commission. Long-standing missions which are
static and cannot fulfill their mandate, such as the United
Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO),
should be closed. Where the complete withdrawal of peacekeepers
is likely to result in the resumption of major conflict, the
budgeting principle utilized by the United Nations Peacekeeping
Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)--which draws, in part, upon voluntary
contributions--should be applied.
Subsection (1)(C) calls for the adoption of a minimum
standard of qualifications for senior leaders and managers,
with a particular emphasis on specific skills and experience.
In response to the August 2000 ``Report of the Panel on United
Nations Peace Operations,'' also known as the ``Brahimi
Report,'' the Secretary General formed a Senior Appointments
Group to establish a leadership profile and generate a list of
``eminent persons'' and senior United Nations personnel
available for rapid deployment. The Special Committee on
Peacekeeping, however, rejected Brahimi's emphasis on
managerial skills and experience, alternatively favoring
``political considerations.'' The Committee finds that as
missions become larger and increasingly complex, the need for
real talent in management positions becomes critical. A minimum
standard of qualifications, including diplomatic, managerial,
and decision-making skill in complex emergencies, should be
established, and Special Representatives, Senior Managers, and
Force Commanders who do not meet those standards should be
removed.
Subsection (1)(D) calls for mandatory pre-deployment
training on interpretation of the mandate of an operation--
particularly in the areas of use of force, civilian protection
and field conditions--the Code of Conduct, HIV/AIDS and human
rights. It also stipulates that all personnel should be
required to sign an oath that they have received such training
and understand that violating the Code of Conduct may result in
immediate termination of their United Nations assignment. The
Committee acknowledges that the conduct of ``pre-deployment
training'' for peacekeepers already serving in the field
clearly would not be possible. To this end, such training
should be conducted prior to any new deployments or
redeployments. Further, training should be conducted for those
who already have been deployed but not trained. Both current
and future peacekeeping personnel should sign the oath required
under this subsection.
Subsection (2)(A) calls for the adoption of a single
uniform Code of Conduct that has the status of a binding rule
and applies equally to all personnel regardless of category or
rank. The Committee recognizes that a major contributing factor
to the problem in addressing misconduct is compounded by the
fact that it currently is governed by 14 different bulletins,
directives, guidelines, and undertakings which apply to up to
five distinct categories of personnel. To this end, and
consistent with the recommendations contained in the
``Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual
Exploitation and Abuse in United Nations Peacekeeping
Operations'' (A/59/710, hereinafter cited the Prince Zeid
Report), the Committee asserts that the General Assembly should
formally adopt a single, uniform Code of Conduct, based on the
principles contained in the Secretary General's bulletin on
special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and
sexual abuse (ST/SGB/2003/13), ``Ten Rules: Code of Personal
Conduct for Blue Helmets,'' and ``We Are United Nations
Peacekeepers,'' which applies to all categories of personnel.
The Committee recommends that this Code of Conduct serve as a
baseline, or a minimum standard of conduct, while recognizing
that such rules may be augmented to meet the needs of
particular missions.
Section 2(B) asserts that all personnel, regardless of
category or rank, should receive pre-deployment and periodic
follow-on training on the Code of Conduct, be provided with a
personal copy of the Code of Conduct translated into their
national language, and sign an oath that they will abide by the
Code of Conduct. The Committee notes the recommendation in the
Prince Zeid report that translations could be provided by
Member States. This subsection also calls for the conduct of
educational outreach programs such that local communities may
understand prohibited acts on the part of peacekeepers and
identify the individual to whom they may direct complaints or
allegations.
Section (2)(C) calls for the presence of dedicated
monitoring mechanisms, such as the Personnel Conduct Units
(PCUs) currently deployed in Haiti, Liberia, Burundi, and the
Democratic Republic of Congo, in each peacekeeping mission to
monitor compliance with the Code of Conduct. Such units should
report simultaneously to the Head of Mission, the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations, and the Associate Director of OIOS for
Peacekeeping Operations (established under section 104(b)(10)),
to ensure that their reports are not effectively obstructed.
Section (2)(D) calls for the establishment of a permanent,
professional and investigative body under OIOS dedicated to
United Nations peacekeeping, which would include professionals
with experience in investigating sex crimes. Though OIOS should
maintain responsibility for the conduct of transparent and
impartial investigations, the Committee recognizes that
ultimate responsibility for pursuing justice lies with Member
States. To this end, provisions should be included in a Model
Memorandum of Understanding that obligate troop contributing
countries to designate professional prosecutors, who will be
available on short notice, to participate in any investigation
into the conduct of one of their nationals and provide guidance
on standards of proof and evidentiary requirements for
subsequent legal action. The Personnel Conduct Units deployed
in the field, as discussed in Section (2)(C), may also provide
support to any OIOS investigation, as deemed appropriate.
Section (2)(E) calls for the establishment of a dedicated
unit within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, staffed
and funded through existing resources, to compile and
coordinate reports of misconduct, outcomes of investigations,
and subsequent legal actions taken. The Committee recommends
that such a unit function as the coordinating body of the
Personnel Conduct Units deployed in the field, and that it be
tasked with following up on completed investigations,
particularly focusing on disciplinary actions taken by troop
contributing countries. Information on subsequent actions
should be shared with the Head of Mission concerned. The
Committee believes that demonstrating that there are
consequences for misconduct will promote confidence in
peacekeeping missions and act as a deterrent to other potential
violators. The Committee notes that substantial progress on
this recommendation already has been made, and encourages the
Department of Peacekeeping Operations to provide this unit with
appropriate staff and funding through existing resources.
Section (2)(F) states that while peacekeeping operations
should provide immediate medical assistance to victims of
sexual abuse or exploitation, the responsibility for providing
long-term treatment, care or restitution lies solely with the
individual guilty of misconduct. The Committee rejects
proposals for the creation of a Victim's Trust Fund, or any
similar fund, financed through assessed contributions. Such
funds would only shield individuals from personal liability and
reinforce an atmosphere of impunity. Alternatively, personal
liability may act as a deterrent to misconduct. In the event
that an individual responsible for misconduct has been
repatriated, reassigned, redeployed, or is otherwise unable to
provide restitution, responsibility for providing victims'
assistance should be assigned to the troop contributing country
or the manager concerned. In the case of misconduct by a member
of a military contingent, funds must be withheld from the
payments made by the United Nations to the troop-contributing
country concerned. (The Committee notes that each troop-
contributing country receives a payment of $1080 per
peacekeeper per month). In the case of misconduct by a civilian
employee or contractor, the United Nations must garnish wages
and/or impose appropriate fines.
Section (2)(G) recognizes the role which Managers and
Commanders play in creating an atmosphere of either compliance
or impunity, and suggests that such information be included in
their personal performance evaluations. To this end, Managers
and Commanders who take decisive action to deter and address
misconduct should be commended and rewarded, while those who
create a permissive environment or impede investigations into
misconduct should be relieved of duty.
Section (2)(H) calls for the establishment of a centralized
database within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to
track the cases of misconduct, particularly to ensure that
those guilty of violations are permanently barred from
participation in future missions. The Committee notes that such
a data base already is being created, and urges the Department
of Peacekeeping Operations to move quickly and decisively to
ensure this undertaking is completed without delay and the data
base is used as an effective management tool.
Section (2)(I) calls for the adjustment of discretionary
``welfare payments'' currently provided to troop-contributing
countries to offset the cost of operation-provided recreational
facilities. The Committee recognizes that conditions in a
peacekeeping mission undoubtedly are difficult for military
contingents and civilians alike, and it is incumbent upon the
United Nations to take effective measures to ameliorate
conditions of service. The Committee notes that troop
contributing countries currently are provided with $1080 per
month per peacekeeper to maintain their contingents. Of that
$1080, eight dollars has been designated for recreational
funds. Unfortunately, the manner in which troop contributing
countries disburse these funds is not transparent. This seems
to be particularly true of the funds designated for
recreational purposes. To this end, the Committee finds that
funds designated for recreation should be deducted from the
standard allowance disbursed to troop contributing countries
and, alternatively, redirected toward the mission itself. The
Head of Mission would then assume responsibility for ensuring
that recreational dollars are spent in a manner consistent with
their purpose.
Section (3) calls for the creation of a Peacebuilding
Commission, and a related Peace Support Office, to ease the
demands placed upon the Department of Peacekeeping Operations
and marshal the efforts of the United Nations, international
financial institutions, donors and nongovernmental
organizations to assist countries in transition from war to
peace. The Committee notes that this proposal was included in
the U.N.'s High-Level Panel Report, although details about the
Commission's membership and areas of specific areas of
responsibility were not provided. The Committee asserts that
the Commission should be a subsidiary body of the United
Nations Security Council, limited in membership to ensure
efficiency, and staffed through existing resources.
Section 403. Certification
This section requires the President to direct the U.S.
Permanent Representative to the United Nations to oppose the
creation of any new, or expansion of any existing, United
Nations peacekeeping operation until the Secretary can certify
to the Congress that the most immediate reforms outlined in
Section 402 above have been implemented, including: (1) the
adoption of a single, uniform Code of Conduct and establishment
of training mechanisms to educate personnel on requirements and
enforcement of the Code; (2) the provision to all personnel of
a personal copy of the Code, translated into their national
language; (3) the signature of an oath that they will abide by
the Code and understand the consequences of violating the Code
as a condition of their appointment; (4) the design and conduct
of educational outreach programs within local communities to
explain prohibited acts and identify the individual to whom the
local population may direct complaints or allegations of
exploitation, abuse, or other acts of misconduct; (5) the
creation of a centralized database to track cases of
misconduct; (6) the establishment of an independent
investigative and audit function within DPKO and OIOS; and (7)
the adoption of a Model Memorandum of Understanding (MOU),
which obligates troop contributing countries to: (a) designate
legal authorities to participate in any investigation into
allegations of misconduct by an individual of such Member
State; (b) refer investigations into violations of the Code of
Conduct by an individual of such Member State to its competent
national or military authority for possible prosecution; (c)
report to DPKO on the outcome of any such investigations; (d)
undertake to conduct on-site court martial proceedings where
appropriate; and (e) assume responsibility for the provision of
assistance to a victim of misconduct committed by an individual
of such Member State.
As the last two reforms (the establishment of an
independent investigative and audit function and the adoption
of a Model MOU) may not be immediately achievable, the
respective certifications on implementation are required no
later than January 1, 2007. The preceding five reforms,
however, must be certified immediately.
The Committee determines that such a withholding should not
affect the United Nations' ability to take decisive action in
Darfur, Sudan. Pursuant to United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1590 (March 24, 2005), 10,000 peacekeepers already
have been authorized to be deployed to support implementation
of the peace agreement between the Government of Sudan and the
Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) in southern Sudan.
This resolution also authorizes the United Nations Mission in
Sudan (UNMIS) to ``closely and continuously liaise and
coordinate at all levels with the African Union Mission in
Sudan (AMIS) with a view toward expeditiously reinforcing the
effort to foster peace in Darfur,'' and to reinforce AMIS by
providing logistical support, technical assistance, and reserve
capacity. The deployment plan for UNMIS includes a presence in
Darfur toward this end.
When the State Department notified the Congress of the
Administration's intent to support UNMIS, it stated that the
troop ceiling of 10,000 assumed a ``re-hatting'' of AMIS, such
that it eventually would be folded into the United Nations
mission. The Committee supports a stronger United Nations role
in Darfur and, therefore, does not interpret the withholding of
support for an expanded mission to include that re-hatting of
AMIS under the current troop ceiling of 10,000. The Committee
thus finds that the resources and personnel required to
support, or even immediately take over, the AMIS mission
already exist.
The Committee further notes that all but one of the reforms
linked to the certification required under this section already
have been endorsed by the United Nations Special Committee on
Peacekeeping. The Committee commends the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations' and the Special Committee on
Peacekeeping's prompt response to the recommendations contained
in the Prince Zeid report, but urges the United Nations to move
expeditiously to ensure that these reforms are not merely
endorsed, but immediately implemented.
TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE.
Section 501. Positions for United States Citizens at International
Organizations
This section requires the Secretary to make every effort to
recruit U.S. citizens for positions within international
organizations. Historically, the U.S. has been underserved in
international organizations. In general, there has not been
growth in the number of Americans taking positions in
international organizations. The Committee encourages the
Department to continue efforts to attract Americans to such
jobs by utilizing all available means to do so.
Section 502. Budget Justification for Regular Assessed Budget of the
United Nations
This section requires that the annual budget for assessed
contributions to the United Nations include an itemization of
the budget. It also requires that, at the earliest possible
time, Congress is consulted about any changes under
consideration to the regular assessed budget. The United
Nations adopts a 2-year budget. In recent years, for the second
year of the budget, the General Assembly has approved increases
to cover new activities, such as coordinating the elections in
Iraq, or to properly improve security of United Nations
facilities. In 2005, the United Nations budget increased by
$447 million. The increase was for: security of United Nations
premises and personnel ($118 million); special political
missions ($192 million); exchange rate losses ($79 million);
inflation and salary-related adjustments ($45 million); and
other miscellaneous increases ($13 million). However, there is
little effort to offset increases.
With respect to budget adjustments, Committees of Congress
are unaware of considerations of budget increases until such
time as the U.S. has already made a commitment. The consequence
is an increase in the U.S. assessment that Congress is
obligated to fund. Congressional participation at an earlier
stage is important in order to control unjustified budgetary
commitments of the United Nations and to provide the U.S.
Permanent Representative to the United Nations with a better
understanding of Congressional expectations.
Section 503. Review and Report
This section requires the Secretary to conduct a review of
programs of the United Nations that are funded through the
assessed budget and provide recommendations to the Congress on
the continuation of such programs and which programs should no
longer be part of the assessed budget, but should be
voluntarily funded.
This report should serve as an important baseline for
pursuit of a more rational approach to United Nations
budgeting. Furthermore, such an effort to identify core
programs and those that truly should be supported by the
interested countries will restore and refocus the United
Nations with regard to its core mandate.
Section 504. Government Accountability Office
This section requires the GAO to report on the status of
the management reforms recommended by the Secretary General in
1997, 2002 and 2005. As an oversight tool for Congress, this
section also requires the GAO to report on each certification
issued by the Secretary.
TITLE VI--CERTIFICATIONS AND WITHOLDINGS OF CONTRIBUTIONS
Section 601. Certifications and Withholding of Contributions
Section 601 (a) Certifications. The Secretary must certify
to appropriate congressional committees that the United Nations
has made certain reforms included in this Act. In the event the
Secretary is unable to make such certifications, and only after
providing the Congress with written justification and
consultation, the Secretary may certify that the United Nations
has made reforms that are substantially similar to the
requirements or accomplish the same purposes as the
requirements in this Act. In addition, if at least 32 of the 39
reforms mandated under the Act are in fact accomplished in this
manner, all 39 certifiable reforms shall be deemed to have been
implemented for the year in which the Secretary submits such
certifications. However, the remaining seven reforms must be
certified the following year.
Additionally, 14 of the 32 certifications which the
Secretary makes must include the following certifications:
Subsection (d)(3) of Section 11 of the United Nations
Participation Act of 1945, as amended by Section 101(c) of this
Act, requiring the United Nations regular assessed 2008-2009
biennium budget for Public Information and General Assembly
Affairs and Conference Services be reduced by 20 percent
against the budgets of such organizational programs for the
2004-2005 biennial period; Section 103(b)(1)(A), requiring the
maintenance of a budget not in excess of the level agreed to by
the General Assembly at the beginning of each United Nations
budgetary biennium, unless increases are agreed to by consensus
and do not exceed 10 percent; Section 103(b)(2)(D), the United
Nations and each specialized agency has reestablished and are
implementing sunset provisions for all new programs; Section
104(a)(1), establishing an Independent Oversight Board (IOB);
Section 104(a)(6), requiring the IOB to recommend annual
budgets for the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS)
and the Board of External Auditors; Section 104(b)(1),
designating the OIOS as an independent entity within the United
Nations; Section 104(b)(2), making the OIOS's budget more
independent and less subject to manipulation by including the
OIOS in the General Assembly's budget process; Section
104(c)(1), establishing a United Nations Office of Ethics;
Section 201(b)(1), adopting measures to ensure that if a Member
State fails to uphold the values embodied in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, it shall be ineligible for
membership on any United Nations human rights body; Section
201(b)(2), adopting measures preventing Member States that are
subject to sanctions by the Security Council, or under a
Security Council-mandated investigation for human rights
abuses, be eligible for membership on any United Nations human
rights body; Section 201(b)(3), adopting measures prohibiting
Member States that are currently, or within the past 3 years,
subject to an adopted country-specific resolution relating to
human rights abuses in the principal body within the United
Nations, for the promotion and protection of human rights
relating to human rights abuses perpetrated by a government of
such country in such country, are ineligible for membership on
any United Nations human rights body; Section 201(b)(5),
barring any United Nations human rights body from having a
standing agenda item that relates only to one country or
region; Section 202(a)(1), abolishing secret voting in the
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC); and Section 202(a)(2),
adopting measures to ensure that until the Commission on Human
Rights of the United Nations is abolished, only countries that
are eligible for membership on a United Nations human rights
body under this Act can be considered for membership on the
Commission on Human Rights.
The Committee intends to effect the 2007 United Nations
regular assessed budget through this provision. Accordingly,
certifications would implicate those contributions which the
United States makes toward the United Nations 2007 budget, and
subsequent budgets.
Section 601 (b) Withholding of United States Contributions
to the Regular Assessed Budget of the United Nations. Until the
Secretary certifies to the Congress that the United Nations has
made the reforms mandated by this Act, the United States shall
appropriate, but withhold from expenditure, 50 percent of the
contributions of the United States to the regular assessed
budget of the United Nations for a biennial period, which shall
be authorized to remain available until expended.
Section 601 (c) Release of Funds. This subsection states
that when all certifications (or alternative certifications)
are submitted, the U.S. shall transfer to the United Nations
amounts appropriated but withheld from expenditure under
subsection (b).
Section 601 (d) Annual Reviews. The Secretary is required
to: (1) conduct annual reviews of compliance, beginning 1 year
after the date on which the Secretary submits the final
certification; and (2) forward a report to the appropriate
congressional committees of the findings of such review. If the
Secretary determines that the United Nations has failed to
remain in compliance with a certification (or an alternate
certification), the 50 percent withholdings described in
subsection (b) shall re-apply and take effect in the subsequent
fiscal year(s) until all certifications (or alternative
certifications) under subsection (a) have been submitted.
Section 601 (e) Effective Date. This section states that
the certifications (or alternate certifications) specified
under subsection (a) shall be required with respect to U.S.
contributions towards payment of regular assessed dues of the
United Nations for 2007 and subsequent years. Accordingly,
certifications would implicate those contributions which the
United States makes toward the United Nations 2007 budget and
subsequent budgets.
The Henry J. Hyde United Nations Reform Act of 2005
provides strong but necessary measures to prompt the United
Nations to undertake such fundamental reforms.
This bill provides the new U.S. Permanent Representative to
the United Nations with a reasonable amount of time to work
through diplomatic channels with other countries which also
want to see the United Nations reform and restore its
credibility. It gives the United Nations until 2007 to adopt
the bulk of these reforms and until 2008 for the remainder.
However, if the United Nations fails to implement what are
widely seen as reasonable reforms, financial penalties will
ensue. Should withholdings occur, the United States will
appropriate the 50 percent of contributions but withhold them
from expenditure until such time as the certifications are
made.
As explained above in detail, the Act mandates that 39
reforms be tied to certifications in the areas of budgeting,
oversight and accountability, and human rights. It also
provides the United Nations flexibility for implementation by
requiring only 32 of 39 reforms be enacted no later than 2007,
with the remaining seven to be acted upon within the next year.
It should be noted that if the United Nations makes the
necessary reforms promptly, no arrearages will result from this
Act. If the United Nations fails to act, however, the US
taxpayers should not be expected to continue to pay for
programs that operate with essentially a blank check--with no
accountability for producing results, no check on outdated,
inefficient, duplicative initiatives, no effective oversight of
management of programs, and a human rights body that allows
violator countries to sit as arbitrators of human rights.
Some have asked whether the United States has a legal
obligation to pay its United Nations dues even in the event the
United Nations continues to resist fundamental reform as set
forth in this Act. In the 1980s, the Reagan Administration and
some Members of Congress came to the conclusion that the U.S.
obligation to pay assessed U.N. payments as limited and not
absolute. Jeane Kirkpatrick, while serving as the U.S.
Ambassador to the United Nations stated: ``It is sometimes
argued that as signatories to the treaty, we assume an absolute
legal obligation to pay the assessed share of the budget, it
seems to me, after consultation and reflection, that this
obligations is real, substantial, and serious, but also that it
is not absolute. . . I do not suggest the United States should
take lightly the obligation to pay its assessed share of the
budget. This is a serious, but not, in my opinion, an absolute
obligation. To be sure, article 17 of the U.N. Charter requires
Member States to pay their share of the U.N. budget as assessed
by the General Assembly. We should not assume, however, that
any expense apportioned by the General Assembly is absolutely
valid.''
The United States was the originator of the concept of
having a United Nations organization. Americans have invested
heavily in the principles and ideals that form the foundation
of the United Nations--this Committee intends to, once again,
look to history as a guide, and by providing constructive
direction, commitment, and leverage of the power of the purse,
the U.S. can remain part of the process to work toward
meaningful reform. These actions will ultimately revitalize and
strengthen the U.N.
Federal Mandates
H.R. 2745 provides no Federal mandates.
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported
In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new
matter is printed in italics, existing law in which no change
is proposed is shown in roman):
SECTION 11 OF THE UNITED NATIONS PARTICIPATION ACT OF 1945
[SEC. 11. LIMITATION ON THE UNITED STATES SHARE OF ASSESSMENTS FOR
UNITED NATIONS REGULAR BUDGET.
[None of the funds available to the Department of State
shall be used to pay the United States share of assessed
contributions for the regular budget of the United Nations in
an amount greater than 22 percent of the total of all assessed
contributions for that budget.]
SEC. 11. UNITED STATES FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS.
(a) Policy of the United States Relating to the Regular
Assessed Budget of the United Nations.--
(1) In general.--The President shall direct the
United States Permanent Representative to the United
Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the
United States at the United Nations to--
(A) pursue a streamlined, efficient, and
accountable regular assessed budget of the
United Nations; and
(B) shift funding mechanisms of certain
organizational programs of the United Nations
specified under paragraph (2) of subsection (c)
from the regular assessed budget to voluntarily
funded programs.
(2) United states contributions.--It shall be the
policy of the United States to--
(A) redirect United States contributions to
the United Nations to achieve the policy
objectives described in paragraph (1)(B); and
(B) redirect a portion of funds from the
following organizational programs to pursue the
policy objectives described in paragraph
(1)(A):
(i) Public Information.
(ii) General Assembly affairs and
conferences services.
(3) Future biennium budgets.-- The President shall
direct the United States Permanent Representative to
the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and
influence of the United States at the United Nations to
ensure that the shifting of funding mechanisms under
paragraph (1)(B) and redirecting of contributions under
paragraph (2) be reflected in future resolutions agreed
to by the General Assembly for the regular assessed
budget of the United Nations for the period of a
current biennium. To achieve the policies described in
paragraphs (1) and (2), the United States Permanent
Representative to the United Nations shall withhold the
support of the United States for a consensus for such
budget until such time as such budget is reflective of
such policies.
(b) 22 Percent Limitation.--In accordance with section 601
of the Henry J. Hyde United Nations Reform Act of 2005, the
Secretary may not make a contribution to a regularly assessed
biennial budget of the United Nations in an amount greater than
22 percent of the amount calculable under subsection (c).
(c) Annual Dues.--
(1) In general.--For annual dues paid by the United
States to the United Nations each fiscal year, the
percentage specified in subsection (b) shall be
multiplied by one-half of the amount of the regularly
assessed budget of the United Nations for a current
biennial period, as agreed to by resolution of the
General Assembly.
(2) Calculation with respect to certain
organizational programs for redirection.--The
percentage specified in subsection (b) shall be
multiplied by one-half of the sum of amounts budgeted
by resolution of the General Assembly for a current
biennial period for the following certain
organizational programs:
(A) Economic and social affairs.
(B) Least-developed countries, landlocked
developing countries and small island
developing States.
(C) United Nations support for the New
Partnership for Africa's Development.
(D) Trade and development.
(E) International Trade Center UNCTAD/WTO.
(F) Environment.
(G) Human settlements.
(H) Crime prevention and criminal justice.
(I) International drug control.
(J) Economic and social development in
Africa.
(K) Economic and social development in Asia
and the Pacific.
(L) Economic development in Europe.
(M) Economic and social development in in
Latin America and the Caribbean.
(N) Economic and social development in
Western Asia.
(O) Regular program of technical
cooperation.
(P) Development account.
(Q) Protection of and assistance to
refugees.
(R) Palestine refugees.
(3) Redirection of funds.--Of amounts appropriated
for contributions towards payment of regular assessed
dues to the United Nations for 2008 and each subsequent
year, if the funding mechanisms of one or more of the
organizational programs of the United Nations specified
in paragraph (2) have not been shifted from the regular
assessed budget to voluntarily funded programs in
accordance with subsection (a)(1), the Secretary shall
ensure that such amounts in each such fiscal year that
are specified for each such organizational program
pursuant to the resolution agreed to by the General
Assembly for the regular assessed budget of the United
Nations for the period of a current biennium are
redirected from payment of the assessed amount for the
regular assessed budget as follows:
(A) Subject to not less than 30 days prior
notification to Congress, the Secretary shall
expend an amount, not to exceed 40 percent of
the amount specified for each such
organizational program pursuant to the
resolution agreed to by the General Assembly
for the regular assessed budget of the United
Nations for the period of a current biennium,
as a contribution to an eligible organizational
program specified in paragraph (4).
(B) Subject to not less than 30 days prior
notification to Congress, the Secretary shall
expend the remaining amounts under this
paragraph to voluntarily funded United Nations
specialized agencies, funds, or programs.
(4) Eligible organizational programs.--The eligible
organizational programs referred to in paragraph (3)(A)
for redirection of funds under such paragraph are the
following:
(A) Internal oversight.
(B) Human rights.
(C) Humanitarian assistance.
(D) An organizational program specified in
subparagraphs (A) through (P) of paragraph (2),
subject to paragraph (5).
(5) Expenditure of remaining amounts to certain
organization programs.--
(A) Voluntary contribution.--Subject to not
less than 30 days prior notification to
Congress and the limitation specified under
subparagraph (B), the Secretary is authorized
to make a voluntary contribution to an
organizational program of the United Nations
specified in subparagraphs (A) through (P) of
paragraph (2) of any amounts not contributed in
a fiscal year to an eligible organizational
program specified in subparagraphs (A) through
(C) of paragraph (4).
(B) 10 percent limitation.--A voluntary
contribution under subparagraph (A) to an
organizational program of the United Nations
specified in subparagraphs (A) through (P) of
paragraph (2) may not exceed 10 percent of the
total contribution made under paragraph (3)(A).
(d) Further Calculation With Respect to Budgets for Public
Information and General Assembly Affairs and Conference
Services.--
(1) 22 percent limitation.--The Secretary may not
make a contribution to a regularly assessed biennial
budget of the United Nations in an amount greater than
22 percent of the amount calculable under paragraph
(2).
(2) Annual dues each fiscal year.--
(A) In general.--For annual dues paid by
the United States to the United Nations each
fiscal year, the percentage specified in
paragraph (1) shall be multiplied by one-half
of the amount of the regularly assessed budget
of the United Nations for a current biennial
period, as agreed to by resolution of the
General Assembly.
(B) Calculation with respect to public
information and general assembly affairs and
conference services.--With respect to such
United States annual dues, the percentage
specified in paragraph (1) shall be multiplied
by one-half of the sum of amounts budgeted by
resolution of the General Assembly for the
2004-2005 biennial period for the following
organizational programs:
(i) Public Information.
(ii) General Assembly affairs and
conferences services.
(C) Redirection of funds.--
(i) In general.--The President
shall direct the United States
Permanent Representative to the United
Nations to make every effort, including
the withholding of United States
support for a consensus budget of the
United Nations, to reduce the budgets
of the organizational programs
specified in subparagraph (B) for 2007
by ten percent against the budgets of
such organizational programs for the
2004-2005 biennial period. If the
budgets of such organizational programs
are not so reduced, 20 percent the
amount determined under subparagraph
(B) for contributions towards payment
of regular assessed dues for 2007 shall
be redirected from payment for the
amount assessed for United States
annual contributions to the regular
assessed budget of the United Nations.
(ii) Specific amounts.--The
Secretary shall make the amount
determined under clause (i) available
as a contribution to an eligible
organizational program specified in
subparagraphs (A) through (C) of
paragraph (4) of subsection (c).
(3) Policy with respect to 2008-2009 biennial
period and subsequent biennial periods.--
(A) In general.--The President shall direct
the United States Permanent Representative to
the United Nations to make every effort,
including the withholding of United States
support for a consensus budget of the United
Nations, to reduce the budgets of the
organizational programs specified in
subparagraph (B) of paragraph (2) for the 2008-
2009 biennial period and each subsequent
biennial period by 20 percent against the
budgets of such organizational programs for the
2004-2005 biennial period.
(B) Certification.--In accordance with
section 601, a certification shall be required
that certifies that the reduction in budgets
described in subparagraph (A) has been
implemented.
Dissenting Views
SUMMARY
We express our profound disagreement with the Republican
members of the Committee who are sending this deeply flawed
legislation to the whole House. While we share their commitment
to meaningful and thorough reforms at the United Nations, this
legislation may do more to undermine the current efforts at
reform underway in New York rather than bolster them. By
declaring our unilateral intention to withhold 50% of the dues
we owe to the U.N. in a automatic and mechanical way, by
mandating withholding of dues from programs that do not get
moved from the U.N.'s assessed budget to a system of voluntary
contribution and by requiring that the President immediately
start vetoing U.N. security Council Resolutions establishing
new or expanded peacekeeping missions if certain reforms are
not met, this legislation will undermine our efforts at
cooperation with like minded countries in New York, will lead
to isolating us on the U.N. and budgetary reforms in a way that
will undermine our own efforts to focus the U.N. on real
transnational threats, and will hamper our ability to foster
greater stability in the world, including even requiring more
deployments of U.S. troops at a time when we are so fully
committed in Iraq, Afghanistan and around the world. We need
reforms at the U.N., but this legislation represents a bludgeon
that could well undermine both it and our influence there. The
Democratic alternative provides for comprehensive reforms at
the U.N. similar to those in the Republican bill but provides
sufficient flexibility to allow the United States to cooperate
with like-minded countries at the U.N. to achieve the reforms
we all seek.
THE U.N. TODAY
The U.N. system composed of the U.N. itself and its
specialized agencies, such as the United Nations Development
Program, the World Health Organization, and the World Food
Program, are a remarkable set of institutions that would need
to be invented if they did not exist. Through actions and
programs of these institutions, we have eliminated the scourge
of deadly infectious diseases, responded to famines of huge
proportions, and settled international disputes of
extraordinary scope.
And the U.N. frequently serves critical U.S. interests.
Just to point out some recent cases, U.N. officials helped
organize the successful Presidential elections in Afghanistan,
trained thousands of workers for the critical Iraqi
Parliamentary elections earlier this year, and helped mediate
the withdrawal of Syrian armed forces from Lebanon. Often the
U.N. can take action that would not be acceptable if proposed
by another country, particularly in an environment of hostility
and suspicion that can often exist in the developing world
towards former colonial powers or countries that are perceived
as a threat.
However, the U.N. has faults as well as virtues. It is not
a fully independent actor with its own separate personality.
Rather, it reflects less-than-perfect member states in a deeply
flawed world. The U.N. is an organization composed of 191
member states that, in varying degrees, have their own
shortcomings, injustices, flaws and hypocrisies of all types
which are reflected, to some degree, in the institution itself.
Any organization that has as its Board of Directors, which is
in effect what the U.N. General Assembly is, so many disparate
and numerous members will inevitably show dysfunction.
The abuses of the Oil-For-Food scandal and the repeated
transgressions of U.N. peacekeeping forces, so fundamentally
inconsistent with the basic tenets of the U.N. itself,
demonstrate that there is much wrong with the U.N.. This global
institution must become more transparent and open, its
employees must be held to the highest ethical and moral
standards, and new structures must be created to prevent U.N.
peacekeepers from exploiting their station and punishing those
who do.
And the United Nations must put an end to its persecution
of the democratic state of Israel, which has become the
whipping boy for totalitarian regimes around the globe. Serial
human rights abusers must also be kept off the U.N.
institutions explicitly designed to speak for the cause of
human rights and democracy globally.
These scandals and self-evident problems have created a
crisis at the U.N. and have created a unique moment for reform.
The Secretary General's High Level Advisory Panel Report, the
Secretary General's own report ``In Larger Freedom'' and the
Volker Commission's investigation of the Oil-For-Food scandal
have all created a consensus for profound change at the
organization, much of which may culminate in a new vision for
the U.N. to come out of the Millennium Summit scheduled for
September 2005.
It is in this context that the Committee considered U.N.
reform legislation. Indeed, it is ironic that just when there
is more momentum for reform than ever before, the legislation
that has been approved by this Committee may undercut the U.S.
ability to press effectively for the very reforms we all seek.
THE HYDE LEGISLATION
Over the past several weeks, we have attempted to work with
our Republican colleagues on the Committee to work out a
compromise agreement on U.N. reform legislation. Despite our
best efforts, we have been unable to reach an agreement. Given
the normally bipartisan work of this committee, this is truly
unfortunate.
The legislation before us has features are very troubling.
While we agree with the goal of the legislation and believe
that many of the specific provisions are essentially correct,
we believe the legislation itself is flawed.
First, the Republican bill would require the U.S. to go
into arrears with the U.N. by withholding its proportionate
share of U.N. dues for nearly 20 organizational programs,
including crime control, environment and refugees if the U.N.
does not agree to allow us to opt-out of our obligation to fund
them as part of the U.N. regular budget.
Second Republican bill would require even larger arrears by
requiring the withholding of 50 percent of U.N. dues if two
relatively small programs, public information and conferences,
are not cut by 20% in the next 2 years.
Third, the Republican bill would require the same 50
percent withholding of our U.N. dues if any one of some 15
affiliated agencies, which are wholly outside of the U.N.'s
direct management authority, do not implement difficult
reforms.
Fourth, the Republican bill has a number of very detailed
management benchmarks which must be fulfilled in order to avoid
the same automatic 50 percent withholding. Of the 39 such
benchmarks, 14 have to be met without change. Thus, if the U.N.
were to carry out 38 of 39 reforms, but failed to implement one
of the mandatory reforms in the exact form conceptualized by
Republican majority, the United States would STILL need to
withhold 50 percent of its annual dues.
Fifth, the Republican bill would require the United States
to veto any new or expanded U.N. peacekeeping mission, even if
such a mission supported vital U.S. interests, until certain
peacekeeping reforms are implemented.
Sixth, the Republican bill has only sticks, and no carrots.
There are no incentives to convince Member States that we want
to strengthen the institution. Indeed, the bill is full of
unfunded mandates for new offices, positions and mechanisms.
Indeed, some would argue that this is more bureaucracy to cure
too much bureaucracy.
Finally, the Republican bill would put us into peacekeeping
arrears. Current law left over from the 1990s forces the U.S.
contribution to the U.N. for peacekeeping operations to be
capped at 25 percent. When, in accordance with the Helm-Biden
legislation, former U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Richard
Holbrooke obtained agreement to reduce the U.S. contribution to
27.1 percent from slightly over 30 percent, Congress agreed on
a bipartisan basis to increase the cap from 25 percent to 27.1
percent on a temporary basis. The failure to extend this
authority to pay at 27.1 percent will cause us to immediately
go into arrears for operations that are designed to help those
in conflict-ridden areas.
The automatic nature of these cutoffs is troubling. Three
weeks ago, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Mark Lagon told
this Committee that our annual dues to the United Nations is
``an obligation we have signed onto'' and that the Executive
Branch ``stands by . . . its request for appropriations for our
dues for both the regular budget and the peacekeeping budget.''
High-ranking officials at the State Department later
conveyed to us the Department's strong opposition to the
legislation currently before the Committee. State Department
officials told us that the legislation would undoubtedly create
new arrears at the United Nations because the U.N. reform
benchmarks contained in the bill are not achievable. While many
of the U.N. reforms being sought in this legislation are worthy
goals, many of them, particularly in the budget area, require
unanimous agreement by all 191 U.N. member states, including
the likes of Iran and Syria. We believe that this legislation,
as crafted, is akin to threatening to blow up the universe
because we find that the planets have refused to align. Planets
are stubborn. Once in a while, they WILL line up--but not on
demand, and certainly not under an imminent threat.
On one of the bill's central proposals to move some
programs from the ``assessed'' budget to the ``voluntary''
budget--these same senior officials said that they ``can't
possibly see a way'' to accomplish this task, and that even our
closest reform-minded allies at the U.N. would also oppose this
initiative. This approach may lead to the adoption of a U.N.
budget over our objections; to the detriment of financial
support for initiatives that are in our interest, such as
support for elections in Afghanistan and Iraq or the disruption
of terrorism financing.
We also note that another provision of the bill would
require the United States to withhold its proportionate share
of its contribution to the U.N. assessed budget for the costs
of any treaty-based commission if the United States is not a
party to the treaty. This provision is clearly aimed at the
commission that reviews implementation of the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.
Although the views of the majority on this treaty are well
known, trying to prevent other countries from discussing the
crucial issue of discrimination against women around the world
simply weakens human rights mechanisms instead of strengthening
them.
In addition, the restrictions on new and expanded
peacekeeping missions are particularly troubling. As mentioned,
under the legislation, if five conditions are not met, upon
enactment of the legislation, the President would be required
to veto new or expanded peacekeeping missions, including
missions that are critical to U.S. interests. These reforms
include adopting a code of conduct and then training 68,000
military personnel and 10,000 civilian personnel on this code.
Given the U.N.'s small training staff, this will take months if
not years. Thus, the President would be forced to veto
peacekeeping missions, even if they were to stop the genocide
in Darfur or take over our mission in Afghanistan. Such a
requirement with no flexibility is simply not in our national
interest. Indeed, by forcing the veto of needed U.N.
peacekeeping missions, this legislation may well force the
United States to take on greater global responsibilities at a
moment when our troops and our diplomats are already spread
thin.
In addition, this provision may raise serious
constitutional concerns. The decision to vote for a new or
expanded peacekeeping mission at the U.N. is a decision of the
President that ultimately may rest fully within his
constitutional responsibilities. Not giving him a waiver is
inviting a Presidential veto of this legislation that will
suggest to those who do not know better that our government is
divided on U.N. reform, which is not the case.
In short, while the majority's U.N. reform bill may have
been written with the best of intentions, it will immediately
cause our nation to go back into arrears at the United Nations
without achieving the desired outcomes. It is simply
incomprehensible that the Republican majority is prepared to
tie the hands of our distinguished Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice as she pursues reform at the United Nations.
The legislation before the Committee micromanages every
possible reform at the United Nations, creates mechanical and
automatic withholdings, and gives Secretary Rice no flexibility
to get the job done.
THE DEMOCRATIC ALTERNATIVE
For these reasons, we offered a substitute amendment to
bring about U.N. reform but which is a modulated and carefully
crafted, flexible tool rather than a massive bludgeon and which
gives Secretary of State Rice the flexibility she needs and
deserves from Congress.
With this substitute amendment, the Democrats on the
Committee align ourselves strongly with those, including those
in our Administration, who are fighting to ensure that the
United States is better armed to promote serious U.N. reform,
and not forced to cut off funds to the United Nations in a
manner that is counterproductive to our national interest.
The substitute amendment addresses all of the primary
deficiencies with the majority bill before the committee.
First, the substitute does not sever the link between
achieving U.N. reform benchmarks and the possibility of
withholding half of our U.N. dues. Rather, the tough benchmarks
are largely the same as in the majority's bill. But our
substitute would give Secretary Rice the authority to withhold
up to 50% of our U.N. dues, but would not mandate such a cut.
While it is possible that the threat of withholding funds may
help Secretary Rice achieve reforms at the U.N., the United
States must not be forced to cut off funds according to some
mechanical withholding formula.
Second, the substitute changes the provision in the
majority's bill under which the United States would
unilaterally withhold a portion of our dues to the U.N. if its
member states refuse to change certain programs from the
``assessed'' to the ``voluntary'' budget. The amendment keeps
this reform as a goal, but does not link it to a mandatory $100
million deduction in U.S. contributions. It is clear that this
reform is largely unachievable in the foreseeable future, and
Secretary Rice should not be forced to withhold U.S. dues from
the U.N. for this reason. As a budgetary matter, this proposal
would have to be agreed to by consensus at the U.N., giving the
likes of Syria, Iran, Sudan and Burma a veto over this
proposal. Indeed, this amendment hands a weapon to those who
want to embarrass the United States and who do not really care
about reform efforts there.
Third, the substitute addresses the inflexibility of the
majority's bill on peacekeeping. The substitute keeps the far-
reaching peacekeeping reforms, but provides Secretary Rice with
a waiver in the event that a new mission is essential to
America's national interest.
Fourth, the Democratic substitute also ensures that we do
not withhold funds from the U.N. when it is separate
specialized agencies, such as the World Health Organization or
the World Intellectual Property Organization, that have failed
to make necessary reforms. It is fundamentally flawed reasoning
to hold the U.N. accountable for the mistakes of U.N.
affiliated organizations that do not operate under the
authority of U.N. management. Rather then let these
organizations proceed without any reform, the substitute would
give the Secretary the flexibility to target the withholding of
U.S. funds from each specialized agency that fails to undertake
reforms, instead of automatically withholding money from the
U.N..
Fifth, the substitute provides for an extension of the
authority to pay our peacekeeping dues at 27.1 percent for the
next 2 years.
Finally, the amendment includes incentives by supporting an
effort to pay our dues on time (we now pay in the last quarter
of the calendar year), supports an increased U.N. budget for
the large number of new offices that will be needed to
implement the reforms, supports a well structured buyout of
unneeded U.N. personnel and supports a contribution to the U.N.
Democracy Fund.
We believe the amendment demonstrates the need for U.N.
reform, lays out benchmarks that are at least as tough as those
of the majority bill, provides for a flexible tool to carry out
these reforms, and protects our national interest. We believe
it is a superior approach and we are gratified that it
engendered bipartisan support.
Tom Lantos.
Howard L. Berman.
Gary L. Ackerman.
Eni F. H. Faleomavaega.
Robert Menendez.
Sherrod Brown.
Brad Sherman.
Robert Wexler.
Eliot L. Engel.
William D. Delahunt.
Joseph Crowley.
Earl Blumenauer.
Grace F. Napolitano.
Adam B. Schiff.
Diane E. Watson.
Adam Smith.
Betty McCollum.
Ben Chandler.