[Senate Executive Report 109-1]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



109th Congress                                              Exec. Rept.
                                 SENATE
 1st Session                                                     109-01

======================================================================
 
   THE NOMINATION OF JOHN R. BOLTON TO BE U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE 
 UNITED NATIONS WITH RANK OF AMBASSADOR AND U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE 
UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO SESSIONS OF 
  THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY DURING HIS TENURE OF SERVICE AS 
               U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS

                                _______
                                

                 May 18, 2005.-- Ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

          Mr. Lugar, from the Committee on Foreign Relations,
                        submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                     [together with minority views]

    The Committee on Foreign Relations, to which was referred 
the nomination of John R. Bolton to be U.S. Representative to 
The United Nations with Rank Of Ambassador and U.S. 
Representative to the United Nations Security Council and to be 
U.S. Representative to Sessions of the United Nations General 
Assembly during his tenure of service as U.S. Representative to 
the United Nations, having considered the same, reports without 
recommendation his nomination to the Senate.

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page

  I. Committee Action.................................................1
 II. Committee Comments...............................................2
III. Report on the Investigation......................................2
 IV. Minority Views.................................................276

                          I. Committee Action

    The nomination of John R. Bolton, to be the U.S. Permanent 
Representative to the United Nations was submitted to the 
Senate by President Bush and referred to the committee on March 
17, 2005. A hearing was held on April 11, 2005. An additional 
hearing was held as part of the nomination process on April 12, 
2005, when the committee heard the views on the nominee from 
Mr. Carl W. Ford, Jr., a former Assistant Secretary of State 
for Intelligence and Research.
    The committee again considered Mr. Bolton's nomination at a 
business session held on April 19, 2005 where the committee by 
general agreement, postponed the vote on the nominee until May 
12, 2005 in order for committee staff to investigate various 
allegations raised at the meeting.
    At its business meeting on May 12, 2005, the committee 
voted by a vote of 10 to 8, with a quorum present and a 
majority of those members physically present and voting in the 
affirmative, to report the nomination without recommendation. 
The following Senators voted in the affirmative: Lugar, Hagel, 
Chafee, Allen, Coleman, Voinovich, Alexander, Sununu, 
Murkowski, and Martinez. The following Senators voted in the 
negative: Biden, Sarbanes, Dodd, Kerry, Feingold, Boxer, 
Nelson, and Obama. Senator Biden requested that a report be 
prepared to which members of the committee could submit 
addition views on the nominee.

                         II. Committee Comments

    On May 12, 2005, the committee carefully considered the 
nomination of Mr. Bolton. It recognized his many years of 
public service and depth of knowledge on matters of foreign 
policy and the United Nations, as well as his responses to 
Questions for the Record (QFRs) submitted by various committee 
members. The full text of Mr. Bolton's own opening statement to 
the committee as presented at his nomination hearing (see Annex 
A), his response to those QFRs are included in Annex (D). A 
sampling of the numerous letters of support are included in 
Annex C including letters signed by five former Secretaries of 
State, Margaret Thatcher, and former USAID and Department of 
Justice officials including Ed Meese and Richard Thornburgh.
    During the committee's consideration of the nomination of 
Mr. Bolton, Senator Biden and other members of the minority 
raised concerns about the nominee related to his interactions 
with various staff of the State Department and Central 
Intelligence Agency as well as various speeches and testimony 
related to his capacity as Undersecretary of State for Arms 
Control and International Security.
    The committee determined that Secretary Bolton is a highly 
qualified nominee with deep experience in UN affairs. There was 
a consensus on the committee that the United Nations is in need 
of reform. The scandal afflicting the UN's Oil for Food Program 
has revealed serious dysfunction within the United Nations 
bureaucracy. President Bush nominated Secretary Bolton to help 
facilitate reform at the UN in addition to representing the 
American perspective. The President specifically chose 
Secretary Bolton for the position with this goal in mind.

                    III. Report on the Investigation

    The first business meeting on Secretary Bolton's 
nomination, where a vote had been scheduled, was adjourned 
without a vote after some Senators said the committee needed 
more time to look into allegations regarding Secretary Bolton's 
character and his ethical behavior while in office. An intense 
period of investigation by joint Majority and Minority staffs 
ensued. The committee sought and received some 800 pages of 
emails, memos and draft speeches from the Department of State, 
the Agency for International Development and the Central 
Intelligence Agency. Additionally, the committee staffs jointly 
conducted some 35 interviews which produced some 1,000 pages of 
transcripts. It is important to understand the context and the 
results of that investigation.
    In the days immediately following Secretary Rice's March 7 
announcement of Secretary Bolton's nomination, most Democratic 
members of this committee expressed their opposition to the 
nomination on policy grounds. A March 8 T3Associated Press  
report states, ``Almost immediately after Bolton's nomination 
was announced, Democrats objected.'' The March 8, edition of 
the T3Baltimore Sun  said, ``Reaction from Senate Democrats 
promised contentious confirmation hearings for Bolton when he 
goes before the Foreign Relations Committee.''
    In several cases the statements by Democrats were 
unequivocal in opposition. In several other cases, statements 
were very negative, leaving open only the smallest of 
possibilities that the Senator would ultimately support the 
nominee. In all of these cases, objections were based on 
Secretary Bolton's supposed attitudes toward the United 
Nations. By March 31, still almost two weeks before the Bolton 
hearing, a T3Los Angeles Times  report noted, ``Democrats are 
likely to vote unanimously against John R. Bolton when his 
nomination to be U.S. ambassador to the United Nations comes 
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee--according to 
Democratic and Republican lawmakers and aides.''
    Senators have the right to oppose a nominee because of his 
substantive views and his past statements. However, the ethical 
inquiry into Secretary Bolton's background was pressed by 
members who planned to vote against him even before the 
committee began interviewing witnesses. They had the right to 
ask questions, and the committee had a responsibility to follow 
up credible allegations. But it also important to understand 
that at times the inquiry followed a more prosecutorial path 
than most nominees have to endure.
    The committee staff worked long and hard to run down 
allegations that were raised at the first business meeting, and 
they checked others that arose during that process.
    The end result of all this is that Secretary Bolton emerged 
looking better than when it began. Some allegations turned out 
not to be as serious as they first appeared, new information 
has cast others in a different light, most have proven to be 
groundless or, at best, highly overstated, while some were 
apparently judged by the Democratic Members as not even worth 
looking into. The interviews and documents showed Secretary 
Bolton to be a hardworking public servant, a pro-active 
policymaker eager to implement President Bush's agenda, with 
strong views and a blunt style that, frankly, sometimes rubbed 
people the wrong way.
    But there was no evidence to support the most serious 
charge, that Secretary Bolton sought to manipulate 
intelligence. He may have disagreed with intelligence findings 
but in the end, he always accepted the final judgment of the 
intelligence community.
    One of the most sensationalized accusations against 
Secretary Bolton is that 11 years ago, he chased a woman around 
a Moscow hotel throwing things at her. This is problematic 
first because the behavior described seems so out of place. But 
secondly, because it was very difficult for committee staff, 
despite many hours of interviews on this matter, to ascertain 
just what happened.
    The woman, Melody Townsel, who lives in Dallas, admits that 
she is a liberal Democrat who worked for Mothers Opposing Bush 
in the last election. Ms. Townsel also stated that her original 
accusation, contained in a letter that was made public, may 
have been too strong in some places. She said: `` `Chasing' may 
not be the best word.'' What she meant was that Secretary 
Bolton would approach her whenever he saw her at the hotel 
where they were both staying because, as she describes it, she 
did not want to meet with him over a legal matter. It is 
important to remember that Secretary Bolton was a private 
lawyer at that time. He was not representing the U.S. 
government. He was working for a company against which Ms. 
Townsel had made some very serious charges--charges which 
proved unfounded--that could have cost his company an important 
USAID contract in the former Soviet Union.
    Ms. Townsel provided no eyewitnesses to the incidents, 
which are said to have occurred in public or open areas of the 
hotel. Moreover, although she claimed this was a highly 
traumatic encounter and that she told several people about it, 
staff had difficulty finding others who knew about it. Three 
people whom Ms. Townsel identified as having heard her 
complaints at the time of the events told staff that they had 
no recollection of Ms. Townsel mentioning Secretary Bolton. Her 
boss, Charles Black, of Black, Manafort, Stone and Kelly, who 
hired her for the post, said she never mentioned it to him. 
Neither did her immediate supervisor back in Washington. An 
employee of a sister company who assisted Ms. Townsel in making 
her charges against the prime contractor on her project and 
with whom she said she was in close touch at the time, also 
knows nothing about it. Staffs talked to three representatives 
of the contractor, a small Virginia firm which has long 
experience working for USAID overseas. Those officials also 
heard nothing about this encounter. They said that Secretary 
Bolton was in Moscow at that time, but he was working as a 
consultant for a health project they were involved in, not 
doing legal work for them. Staff did find one of Ms. Townsel's 
friends and co-workers from that time, who was not in Moscow, 
who recalls talking with her by telephone about it, as well as 
a subordinate of hers in a later USAID-funded project who 
recalls her mentioning it.
    Ultimately, the results of the lengthy investigation into 
this isolated, long-ago incident were, at most, inconclusive. 
On this point, Sen. Biden, the ranking member, concurred with 
the judgment of the chairman. At the second business meeting, 
Sen. Biden, the ranking member, said the charges remained 
``unsubstantiated.'' Ms. Townsel went on to another USAID 
project in the former Soviet Union, and the company she accused 
of mismanagement was awarded more USAID contracts and continues 
to be well regarded. The original charge against Secretary 
Bolton appeared to be overstated. On the basis of what is 
known, there was nothing to offset Secretary Bolton's long 
record of public service in several different administrations.
    It has been charged that Secretary Bolton sought to 
retaliate in some way against analysts and others with whom he 
disagreed. Committee staff looked into these cases thoroughly, 
and in each one the allegations proved to be overstated. In the 
case of Christian Westermann, the INR analyst whom the 
committee heard about from Carl Ford, the dispute was over a 
procedural issue and Mr. Westermann continued in his job. The 
focus of Mr. Ford's complaint was that Secretary Bolton should 
not have raised his objections directly with Mr. Westermann, 
not that Mr. Bolton was wrong to raise the issue. Democratic 
members at the first business meeting made much of the fact 
that after this incident Secretary Powell had to go all the way 
down to INR to boost morale. But Secretary Powell's chief of 
staff, Lawrence Wilkerson, told staff that such visits were not 
uncommon. It was part of the Secretary's leadership style to 
visit with staff in the ``bowels of the building,'' including 
INR.
    In the case of the NIO for Latin America, e-mails the 
committee staff viewed make it clear that Secretary Bolton's 
primary objection was over disparaging and inaccurate comments 
the analyst made to members of Congress about a speech. 
Secretary Bolton took his complaint to the CIA. Although the 
NIO has said he feels his career was damaged by Secretary 
Bolton, his superiors fully backed him at the time, and other 
witnesses told the committee that if he did not get the 
promotions he felt he deserved, it was for other reasons. 
Again, as far as Secretary Bolton was concerned, the dispute 
was procedural. There was no attempt to fabricate intelligence.
    Other allegations related to managerial style show the same 
pattern upon examination--disagreement over procedure, not 
policy. In the case of Rexon Ryu, a mid-level civil servant in 
the non-proliferation bureau under Secretary Bolton, no policy 
issues were involved at all. Secretary Bolton believed--
incorrectly, according to Mr. Ryu's supervisor--that Mr. Ryu 
had deliberately neglected to share information with Bolton's 
office. Some months later, Mr. Ryu was up for a job that would 
have required him to work closely with Secretary Bolton. 
Secretary Bolton, perhaps regrettably, expressed his opposition 
to working with Mr. Ryu. Mr. Ryu was given another prized post 
instead, an assignment to the deputy secretary.
    The case of the State Department attorney, also raised by 
the minority, is even more off the mark. This attorney fully 
supported what Secretary Bolton wanted to do. It was only 
because of miscommunication that Secretary Bolton thought the 
attorney had given out wrong information on a case involving 
sanctions against a Chinese company. The State Department Legal 
Advisor, Will Taft, told committee staff that he quickly 
straightened things out. The attorney stayed on the case, and 
he even wrote the affidavit that Secretary Bolton later 
submitted to court.
    Staff also looked at a new case that came up. Secretary 
Bolton's chief of staff, it was learned during the 
investigation, went to an INR analyst to complain that he had 
inappropriately attached to a CIA document a cover memo that 
took exception to some of the CIA's findings regarding China. 
Further inquiry revealed that no action was sought against the 
analyst and none was taken. The issue was procedural, no 
intelligence was manipulated, and Secretary Bolton was not even 
directly involved, because he was out of the country at the 
time.
    Secretary Bolton's credibility has also been called into 
question regarding his testimony before the committee on April 
11. Members questioned whether Mr. Bolton really went to the 
CIA to learn about the National Intelligence Council. Stuart 
Cohen, the acting head of the NIC, said that while he could not 
recall exactly why Secretary Bolton wanted to come, it was 
``perfectly reasonable'' to believe that was the reason. In 
fact, he added, ``I was delighted at the prospect that somebody 
would come out wanting to know more about the NIC.'' He also 
said that Secretary Bolton only talked about reassigning, not 
firing, the NIO, just as Mr. Bolton testified. The 
investigation has found nothing contrary to Secretary Bolton's 
claim that his dispute with Mr. Westermann was over procedure, 
not policy. 
    Former Ambassador to South Korea Thomas Hubbard called the 
committee after Secretary Bolton's testimony about a 
controversial speech he gave in South Korea. Secretary Bolton 
testified that Ambassador Hubbard had thanked him for the 
speech afterwards. The ambassador told committee staff he 
indeed had thanked Secretary Bolton afterwards, but only for 
making certain changes in the speech that he had requested. 
Ambassador Hubbard told staff that he wanted to correct the 
record on that point, but he was not accusing Secretary Bolton 
of being deliberately misleading.
    That speech was one of several by Secretary Bolton that 
opponents of the nomination have questioned. The investigation 
showed that many of these speeches and Congressional testimony 
were preceded by strong policy debates within the 
administration. As one witness told staff, ``That's how good 
policy is made.'' In each case it was found that, in the end, 
Secretary Bolton delivered a speech that was properly cleared 
and that expressed official U.S. policy.
    Finally, it is important to note while these are the major 
allegations that the committee has investigated against Mr. 
Bolton, they are not the only ones raised during the first 
business meeting by Democratic Members when they asked for a 
delay. For instance, one member said there were allegations 
``that he harassed a career Justice Department attorney while 
he was serving as the Attorney General for the Civil Rights 
Division--in that case Mr. Bolton allegedly went to the lengths 
to deny a career Justice Department attorney's request for 
additional unpaid maternity leave--ultimately, the Deputy 
Attorney General stepped in and overruled Mr. Bolton; that he 
may have blocked important information from going to senior 
members of the State Department, including Secretary Powell, 
Secretary Armitage, and even Secretary Rice--information that 
has been characterized, and I quote `As vital to the U.S. 
strategies on Iran,' and related to the lack of international 
support for Mr. Bolton's effort to have the head of the IAEA 
removed.'' Yet even though the Chairman granted every witness 
interview request, and did not oppose any document request, 
these other charges remain both unsubstantiated--Secretary 
Rice, for instance, has said she got all the information she 
needed from Mr. Bolton in a timely way--and uninvestigated 
because Democratic members apparently did not feel they were 
worth the trouble. The ranking member, when he said he would 
pursue the issue of getting full access to the NSA intercept 
information that Secretary Bolton had sought, stated that he 
believes that the results will be inconsequential for the 
nominee.
    Despite the fact that many charges were not proven or even 
investigated, it has been charged that collectively the 
allegations against Secretary Bolton form an unacceptable 
pattern of behavior. This is an unfortunate argument by 
opponents, because it depends on doubts arising from an intense 
investigation of accusations, many of which had no 
substantiation. By its nature, it also discounts the dozens of 
positive testimonials on Secretary Bolton's behalf from former 
co-workers who attest to his character and effectiveness.
    It is important to be clear about the context of the 
allegations leveled against Secretary Bolton. First, this has 
been an extremely public inquiry. By its nature, it has 
encouraged anyone with a grudge or disagreement with Secretary 
Bolton stretching back to 1983 to come forward and tell their 
story. There have been no thematic limits on the allegations 
that opponents of the nominee have asked to be investigated. No 
one working in Washington in high-ranking positions for that 
long would come out unscathed from such a process. Any 
assertive policy-maker will develop opponents based on 
stylistic differences, personal disputes, or partisan 
disagreements. Most members of this committee have been in 
public life for decades. If they were nominated for a similar 
position of responsibility after their terms in the Senate, how 
many would want the same standard to be applied to their 
confirmation process? How many of them would want any instance 
of conflict or anger directed at their staffs or colleagues to 
be fair game?
    Second, as mentioned, the oldest allegation dates back all 
the way to 1983. Thus, the committee subjected 22 years of 
Secretary Bolton's career to a microscope. This included 
service in many government jobs, as well as time spent in the 
private sector. Given the length of John Bolton's service in 
high-ranking positions, it is inevitable that he would have 
conflict with co-workers of various ranks and political 
persuasions. He would have had literally thousands of contacts, 
meetings, and issues to deal with during his career. In this 
context, the volume of alleged incidents is not that profound.
    Third, in John Bolton's case unsubstantiated charges may 
seem more material than they are because he has a reputation 
for being an aggressive and blunt negotiator. But this should 
not be a disqualifying factor, especially for a post that 
historically has included a number of blunt, plain-spoken 
individuals, including Jeane Kirkpatrick and our former 
colleague Pat Moynihan. In fact, President Bush has cited John 
Bolton's direct style as one of the reasons that he has picked 
him for this particular job.

                                ANNEXES

                              ----------                              


                                ANNEX A


           Opening Statement of the Honorable John R. Bolton


   NOMINEE FOR REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE 
                             UNITED NATIONS

 T3Senate Foreign Relations Committee
 T3April 11, 2005

    Chairman Lugar, Senator Biden, I am honored to appear 
before you today as President Bush's nominee to be the U.S. 
Permanent Representative to the United Nations. I am grateful 
for your consideration and I look forward to discussing the 
critical leadership role that the United States plays in the 
United Nations. I would like to extend my warm thanks to 
Senator Warner for his kind words and introduction. He is a 
true and valued friend, and his remarks are all the more 
appreciated given his long history of service to our nation.
    Mr. Chairman, I am grateful for the opportunities that I 
have had to work with this Committee over the years. This is 
the fourth time I have appeared before this Committee in a 
confirmation hearing. If confirmed, I pledge to fulfill the 
President's vision of working in close partnership with the 
United Nations.
    The United States is committed to the success of the United 
Nations and we view the UN as an important component of our 
diplomacy. As the President stated before the UN General 
Assembly last September, ``Let history show that in a decisive 
decade, members of the United Nations did not grow weary in our 
duties, or waver in meeting them.''
    The Secretary has made this a top priority as well. She was 
unequivocal in her remarks about how, ``The American people 
respect the idealism that sparked the creation of the United 
Nations and we share the UN's unshakable support for human 
dignity. At this time of great opportunity and great promise, 
the charge to the international community is clear: we who are 
on the right side of freedom's divide have an obligation to 
help those who were unlucky enough to be born on the wrong side 
of that divide. The hard work of freedom is a task of 
generations; yet, it is also urgent work that cannot be 
deferred. . . . Now, more than ever, the UN must play a 
critical role as it strives to fulfill the dreams and hopes and 
aspirations of its original promise to save succeeding 
generations from the scourge of war, to reaffirm faith and 
fundamental human rights and to promote social progress and 
better standards of life in larger freedom.''
    If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with this 
Committee to forge a stronger relationship between the United 
States and the United Nations, which depends critically on 
American leadership. Such leadership in turn must rest on broad 
bipartisan support in Congress that must be earned by putting 
to rest skepticism that too many feel about the UN system.
    Through the course of three decades of public service, both 
in and out of government, I have learned that this consensus is 
not only essential, but possible. Working together, in the 
spirit of bipartisan cooperation, I believe we can take 
important steps to restore confidence in the United Nations. 
Mr. Chairman, we are at a critical juncture, and I fully share 
the sentiments you expressed in 1997, when you remarked that, 
``It is time to decide if we want a strong and viable United 
Nations that can serve United States interests, or a United 
Nation that is crippled by insolvency and hobbled by 
controversy and uncertainty.''

A Stronger, More Effective United Nations

    The President and Secretary Rice believe that a stronger, 
better, more effective United Nations is one which requires 
sustained and decisive American leadership, broad bipartisan 
support, and the support of the American public. If confirmed, 
that would be my objective as well. Walking away from the 
United Nations is not an option. I undertake to do my utmost to 
uphold the confidence that the President, Secretary Rice, and 
the Senate will have placed in me if confirmed.
    Mr. Chairman, now more than ever, the United Nations needs 
American leadership. President Franklin Roosevelt and Prime 
Minister Winston Churchill promoted a post-war international 
organization to avert another world war when they envisioned a 
collective security organization that would resist aggressor 
states that threatened international peace and security. 
Accordingly, the UN Charter lists as its first objective, ``to 
save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.''
    If the UN is to play a role in fulfilling that mission, 
however, it is not enough that it reform its internal 
structures. It must also clearly and forcefully address the new 
challenges we face. Rogue states, which do not necessarily 
subscribe to theories of deterrence, now threaten the global 
community as both possessors and proliferators of weapons of 
mass destruction. These weapons could also be transferred to 
terrorist organizations that would have no compunction about 
using them in cold blood against innocent civilian populations.
    I believe my past government experience and writings 
reflect my awareness of both the strengths and weaknesses of 
the United Nations. I learned much about the UN's potential 
when I served for four years as Assistant Secretary of State 
for International Organization Affairs in 1989-1993, and again 
later when I worked for the United Nations pro bono between 
1997 and 2000, assisting former Secretary of State James Baker 
in his capacity as the Secretary General's Personal Envoy for 
the Western Sahara. I saw firsthand the impact of armed 
conflict and repression, and the devastating consequences this 
can have on innocent civilian populations.
    I therefore wish to assure the Committee, the American 
people, and potential future colleagues at the United Nations 
that, if confirmed, I will strive to work with all interested 
parties to build a stronger and more effective United Nations. 
Doing so will promote not only American interests, but will 
inevitably improve and enhance the UN's ability to serve all of 
its members as well.
    Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, I pledge to bring my strong 
record of experience of working cooperatively within the United 
Nations to fulfill the intentions and aspirations of its 
original promise. In particular, I will work closely with the 
Congress and this Committee to achieve that goal. In attempting 
to strengthen the UN's effort to promote international peace 
and security, I would like to identify several priorities.

Supporting Freedom and Democracy

    One priority is to strengthen and build institutions that 
serve as the cornerstone of freedom in nascent democracies. I 
am proud of my record in this regard. In 1981, as General 
Counsel of the Agency for International Development, I proposed 
that we fund international observers to witness upcoming 
elections in El Salvador so that there would be an independent 
assessment of whether those elections would be free and fair. 
Many experts at the time thought that the Government of El 
Salvador would not accept this idea, but, with the support of 
USAID Administrator Peter McPherson and Deane Hinton, then our 
Ambassador to El Salvador, I was encouraged to raise the 
possibility with President Jose Napoleon Duarte in late 1981. I 
did so and we were able to fund international election 
observers through Section 116 of the Foreign Assistance Act, 
very likely the first such assistance provided by USAID, thus 
leading to further success stories in legitimizing and 
instilling confidence in democracy in countries once torn apart 
by violence.
    During my service in IO in President George H.W. Bush's 
Administration, I personally observed the legislative elections 
in Namibia in 1989 as part of a presidential delegation led by 
former Senator Edward Muskie, the largest effort to organize 
elections by the United Nations in its history to that point. 
It constituted a major test of UN capabilities and resources, 
and served as a successful model for future elections in 
Nicaragua, Cambodia and elsewhere.
    Some of these earlier missions have no doubt helped pave 
the way for the recent and remarkable success stories we have 
observed in Afghanistan and Iraq, where UN assistance in both 
countries played a critical role. Many of us today, myself 
included, still marvel at the success of those elections--
elections which are having repercussions throughout the region 
and beyond, as they are already doing in Lebanon. We appreciate 
that the United Nations is committed over the long-term to 
respond positively to the elected Iraqi Government's request 
for help with its constitutional process and subsequent 
elections, as laid out in Resolution 1546.
    Mr. Chairman, we should never underestimate the impact of 
free and fair elections on a country. I look forward, if 
confirmed, to working with relevant UN agencies to enable them 
to contribute further to democratic institutions in countries 
freed from the bonds of oppression. I am sure that many of you 
are aware of our support for programs such as the Community of 
Democracies. If confirmed, I also look forward to working with 
you on President Bush's request for $10 million in the Fiscal 
Year 2006 budget to set up a Democracy Fund within the United 
Nations, and I am grateful to Secretary General Annan for 
endorsing the President's proposal in his new report on UN 
reform. This fund would have a lean staff of experts who 
identify carefully tailored projects for strengthening 
democratic institutions, political parties, administration of 
justice programs and respect for human rights advocacy. If 
successful, the Fund will be among the best diplomatic tools we 
have in the global war on terrorism.
    While the UN has had its successes in the human rights 
field, there have been problems as well, such as in the United 
Nations Commission on Human Rights (``UNHRC''). For too long, 
some of the most egregious violators of human rights have 
undercut the UNHRC's principles and its effectiveness. The 
consequence, as Secretary-General Kofi Annan has said, is that 
the Commission's important work has ``been increasingly 
undermined by its declining credibility and professionalism.'' 
We must work with our friends and allies to keep those who 
would usurp the moral authority of this Commission off of it, 
and we must send clear and strong signals that we will not shy 
away from naming human-rights violators.
    We must work to galvanize the General Assembly to focus its 
attention on issues of true importance. Sadly, there have been 
times when the General Assembly has gone off track. In my view, 
one of the greatest stains on the United Nations was the 
abominable Resolution 3379 equating Zionism with racism. This 
canard for many years distracted the General Assembly from 
focusing its attention on the very real problems confronting 
the international community. I am proud to have been an active 
player in getting this resolution repealed. I recall fondly the 
day of December 16, 1991, when the General Assembly voted 111-
25 to repeal this odious resolution, when our delegation was 
led by Acting Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, 
accompanied in the General Assembly by Senator Moynihan. I was 
proud to have served also as one of the original members of the 
U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom from 1999-
2001.

Stopping the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

    Mr. Chairman, a second priority should I be confirmed will 
be stemming the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to 
ensure that terrorist organizations and the world's most 
dangerous regimes are unable to threaten the United States, our 
friends, and our allies.
    As Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and 
International Security, I have worked with our friends and 
allies to press states that have violated important treaties to 
stop WMD proliferation such as the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention, and the Chemical 
Weapons Convention, to live up to their obligations or face a 
referral to the UN Security Council. I have worked hard to 
promote effective multilateral action to curb the flow of these 
dangerous weapons. I served as the lead U.S. negotiator in the 
creation of the G-8 Global Partnership Against the 
Proliferation of WMD, through which we aim to add an additional 
$10 billion in Nunn/Lugar type programs through contributions 
by other nations. In the case of Libya, I had the opportunity 
to work in close consultation with our British colleagues in 
diplomatic efforts to secure the verifiable elimination of 
their weapons of mass destruction programs.
    I helped build a coalition of more than 60 countries to 
help combat the spread of dangerous weapons through President 
Bush's Proliferation Security Initiative (``PSI''). The 
Administration welcomes the endorsement of this initiative in 
the recently published Secretary Generals' Report, 
``Strengthening the United Nations: an agenda for further 
change.'' And despite fears that the U.S. withdrawal from the 
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty would result in a new arms race, 
exactly the opposite occurred. I was proud to serve as the 
Administration's chief negotiator for the Treaty of Moscow, 
signed by Presidents Putin and Bush in 2002, which reduced 
operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads by two-
thirds.
    Effective multilateral solutions reflect a commitment on 
the part of this Administration to use the best tools in our 
arsenal. Activities such as these are helping to create a new 
international consensus that recognizes the danger posed by 
these weapons of terror. I have no doubt these efforts played a 
crucial role in enabling the United States to lead the Security 
Council to pass Resolution 1540, first suggested by President 
Bush in his speech to the General Assembly in September, 2003. 
This resolution calls upon ``all Member States to fulfill their 
obligations in relation to arms control and disarmament and to 
prevent proliferation in all its aspects of all weapons of mass 
destruction.'' Resolution 1540 was the first of its kind 
focusing on WMD proliferation, and I am proud that our strong 
leadership contributed to its unanimous adoption. I am happy to 
report that as of March 15, over 80 countries have submitted 
reports required by the resolution outlining their plans to 
enact and implement measures to stop WMD proliferation. I look 
forward to working with Security Council members to achieve 
100% compliance with the Resolution.
    We also cannot ignore the real possibility that countries 
may be brought before the Security Council if they do not cease 
the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. Failure of the 
Security Council to act on such fundamental threats to 
international peace and security will only weaken the Council's 
role in security issues more generally. If confirmed, I would 
make it a top priority to work with the Security Council to 
take meaningful action in the face of these grave threats.

Winning the Global War on Terror

    A third priority that I would pursue if confirmed is 
supporting the global war on terror. As we all learned on 
September 11, 2001, no one is safe from the devastating effects 
of terrorists' intent on harming innocent people. Confronting 
and triumphing in the global war on terror remains a central 
priority of the Bush Administration, and to win this war 
requires long-term cooperation with all like-minded nations.
    The President is firmly committed to working with the 
United Nations to make this shared goal of the civilized world 
a reality. As he noted in his speech to the UN General Assembly 
in September 2003, ``All governments that support terror are 
complicit in a war against civilization. No government should 
ignore the threat of terror, because to look the other way 
gives terrorists the chance to regroup, recruit and prepare. 
And all nations that fight terror, as if the lives of their own 
people depend on it, will earn the favorable judgment of 
history.''
    The United Nations has taken positive steps to support the 
war on terror, but more of course remains to be done. In the 
wake of September 11th, we have been actively encouraging 
Member States to become parties to the UN Conventions on 
Terrorism. I have been personally involved in the past four 
years as well in working to complete the negotiations on a 
Nuclear Terrorism Convention. We must build upon Security 
Council Resolution 1368, passed one day after the tragic events 
of September 11th, which for the first time classified every 
act of international terrorism as a threat to international 
peace and security. We must also work together to help Member 
States build capacities to combat terrorism as outlined in 
Resolution 1373, passed on September 28, 2001. This resolution 
obligates all UN member states to use their domestic laws and 
courts to keep terrorists from sheltering resources or finding 
safe haven anywhere in the world and to cooperate in 
investigating, prosecuting, and preventing terrorism wherever 
it may spring up. The UN Security Council is monitoring 
compliance with the requirements of this resolution, with 
impressive results: to date 142 countries have issued orders 
freezing the assets of suspected terrorists and terrorist 
organizations; accounts totaling almost $105 million have been 
blocked--$34 million in the U.S. and over twice that amount in 
other countries. Overall, Resolution 1373 has been the 
framework for unprecedented international consultation and 
coordination against terrorism, including the provision of 
technical assistance to governments that want to do the right 
thing, but may not have the specialized expertise necessary.

International Humanitarian Efforts

    Mr. Chairman, a fourth priority of mine should I be 
confirmed is addressing humanitarian crises. Following the 
successful prosecution of the first Gulf War, we worked through 
the Security Council to address the humanitarian disaster 
caused by Saddam Hussein's repression of Shiites in southern 
Iraq and the Kurdish population in the north and east of that 
country. As we are all aware, this was a thorny and delicate 
issue--one that required carefully calibrated coordination 
within the Security Council.
    During 1990, we were successful in having the United 
Nations impose its most comprehensive economic sanctions 
package ever, in Resolution 661, against Iraq. We were also 
successful in passing the first Security Council authorization 
for the use of force since Korea in Resolution 678. It was not 
lost upon us, however, that a humanitarian crisis was beginning 
to erupt. Hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing Iraq into 
other countries would certainly have had a dramatic and 
destabilizing effect, in addition to the humanitarian costs of 
lives lost and displaced.
    As a result of our leadership and collaborative efforts, we 
secured the adoption of Resolution 688, which decided that 
internal repression causing substantial refugee flows could be 
a threat to international peace and security. This gave the 
Security Council jurisdiction to approve intervention into 
Iraqi territory to aid displaced persons. The United States 
took the lead in implementing this Resolution, under the name 
``Operation Provide Comfort.'' Success stories such as these 
are a direct result of decisive American leadership and our 
effective multilateral diplomacy.
    Of pressing urgency now is stopping the genocide and 
violence devastating the Darfur region in the Sudan. The United 
Nations has already played a critical role in bringing 
attention to this crisis. But we all know there is much more to 
be done. If confirmed, I pledge to work with our partners in 
the Security Council to pressure parties to stop the violence 
in Darfur, deploy the new peacekeeping mission to secure 
implementation of the comprehensive North-South peace 
agreement, and to assist the African Union mission in Darfur to 
punish those responsible for the genocide. My hope is that we 
can build upon the United Nation's considerable success record 
in helping to ensure free and fair elections in the Sudan 
despite its tortured past of violence and strife.
    Careful oversight of such operations is critical, 
particularly in light of recent reports concerning abuse by UN 
peacekeepers themselves. If confirmed, I will make every effort 
to see that the Secretary General's new zero-tolerance policy 
of such behavior by UN personnel is enforced. There is a 
pressing need to do so. In light of the current global 
situation, we anticipate that 70,000 peacekeepers will be 
deployed by the end of 2005, compared with 39,000 by the end of 
2002. Since October 2003, the UN has created four new missions 
including Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, Burundi, and Haiti and has 
expanded the Congo mission. In addition to the proper oversight 
of such troops, there are additional concerns about capacity 
and stressing the UN system too far. This is not lost upon UN 
officials either. Jean-Marie Guehenno, Under Secretary-General 
for Peacekeeping Operations, acknowledges the system is getting 
stretched to its limits, and that, in his own words, ``It is 
difficult to run and tie your shoelaces properly. I sincerely 
hope that the organization will not be required to deploy any 
new complex peacekeeping operations in 2005, beyond what is 
already on our plate or in the pipeline.'' Currently, we pay 
roughly 27% of the costs of these operations.
    Other humanitarian crises demand our attention as well. It 
is not just the scourge of war we must confront. We must 
confront the scourge of disease and afflictions such as HIV/
AIDS through strong U.S. leadership in the United Nations 
system. We strongly support the UN Declaration of Commitment on 
HIV/AIDS and are working to ensure resources from the Global 
Fund for AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis are available to 
countries most severely affected. We are actively pursuing the 
President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, a five-year $15 
billion investment, the largest commitment ever by a nation 
toward an international health initiative for a single disease 
or affliction.
    I will make it a key priority as well to improve programs 
that have been involved in the tsunami relief effort, so that 
we can enhance and build upon structures and institutions 
already in place. Doing so will not only help current victims 
and communities, who will surely need help for years to come, 
but will help prepare for the next time a natural disaster of 
this magnitude strikes. More broadly, we must confront the 
scourge of poverty, which leaves hundreds of millions on the 
margins of societies scrambling for food or shelter with little 
opportunity to improve their lives or those of their children.
    We also must make sure that the UN acts effectively in 
promoting the economic and social advancement of all people. 
For far too long, the UN promoted statist solutions to the 
problems of poverty and underdevelopment. Today, we know the 
private sector can do the best job in generating flows of 
investment capital and encourage small entrepreneurship, as set 
out in the remarkable report of the Commission on the Private 
Sector and Development, chaired by President Zedillo and 
Martin, and in the consensus results of the Monterey Conference 
on Financing for Development. Policy reform, institution 
building, appropriate technology transfer and private sector 
involvement are all necessary for underpinning sustained 
economic growth. We will continue to support the contribution 
of women to economic growth and development as well as their 
critical role in the growth of democratic institutions 
worldwide.
    The UN, in conjunction with U.S. leadership, is hopefully 
now recognizing that the traditional models of development are 
insufficient to achieve development objectives and better the 
lives of people around the world. The Partnership for Maternal, 
New Born and Child Health, The Global Alliance for Vaccinations 
& Immunizations, and Roll Back Malaria, are all examples of how 
UN agencies, such as UNICEF, are working along side the private 
sector, charitable organizations, and foundations, such as the 
Gates Foundation, to leverage resources, generate new 
activities and impact the lives of millions in developing 
countries.
    To enhance these efforts, if I am confirmed, I hope I would 
have your support in increasing the level of American 
representation in UN agencies and affiliated organizations. 
This is not a question of simply getting our fair share of 
positions. Americans have the skills and training to contribute 
significantly to making the UN more efficient, effective, and 
accountable.

A More Efficient UN Will Make a Stronger UN

    Accountability and reform of the United Nations is 
something I know this Committee has encouraged, including by 
holding a hearing on this important question just last month. 
This will be a top priority of mine if confirmed. During the 
first President Bush's Administration, I worked hard to secure 
appropriations to repay U.S. arrearages. Working with the 
Congress, we also made sure that the United Nations would 
target these arrearages to effective programs rather than 
treating them as a ``windfall.'' If confirmed, I would look 
forward to working with the Congress again to make certain that 
the money you allocate is spent wisely and accountably.
    I look forward if confirmed to reviving the concept of the 
``Unitary UN,'' which served as a guiding analytical construct 
during our work under Secretaries Baker and Eagleburger. As the 
system has grown, there has been too little attention paid by 
member governments to coordinating their efforts in key 
programs. The consequence is a tremendous waste of resources 
due to duplication, overlap and inefficiencies, all of which 
can be corrected if member governments have the political will.
    The Administration welcomes the Secretary-General's new 
report on UN Reform, and we are examining carefully its many 
recommendations. I hope to work closely with the Secretary-
General and my colleagues if confirmed to bring greater 
accountability and transparency to the United Nations. The key 
is to implement changes to the UN structure and management, 
including budget, personnel, and oversight reforms. Scandals, 
such as those we have witnessed with the Oil-for-Food program, 
undermine not only America's confidence in the United Nations, 
but the confidence of the international community as well. They 
must not recur. To make this outcome a reality, we must 
recognize the proper roles and capabilities of UN agencies, 
funds and programs. Some have all but concluded that the Oil-
for-Food scandal was bound to happen because it was beyond the 
UN's capabilities. Even the Deputy Secretary-General Louise 
Frechette, has lamented, ``Personally, I hope to God we never 
get another oil-for-food program or anything approaching that 
kind of responsibility, which was tantamount to trying to 
oversee the entire import-export regime of a country of 24 
million people.'' Whether or not this is so, we must never lose 
sight of the reality that ultimately it is member governments 
that must take responsibility for the UN's actions, whether 
they be successes or failures.
    The successful implementation of any reform will require 
broad consensus among member states. If confirmed, I will work 
actively with my colleagues at the United Nations and with 
Congress to help restore confidence in the organization.
    Mr. Chairman, let me close by reiterating what I said at 
the beginning. If confirmed, I will work closely and 
effectively with this Committee and both Houses of Congress. 
The President and Secretary Rice are committed to building a 
strong, effective United Nations. The United Nations affords us 
the opportunity to move our policies forward together with 
unity of purpose. Now, more than ever, the UN must play a 
critical role as it strives to fulfill the dreams and hopes and 
aspirations of its original promise to save succeeding 
generations from the scourge of war, to reaffirm faith and 
fundamental human rights and to promote social progress and 
better standards of life in larger freedom. This effort demands 
decisive American leadership, broad bipartisan support, and the 
backing of the American public. I will undertake to do my 
utmost to uphold the confidence that the President, Secretary 
Rice, and the Senate will have placed in me.
    Thank you, and I would welcome the opportunity to answer 
your questions.

                                ------                                


                                ANNEX B


                           Biographic Summary


                              (HIGHLIGHTS)

NAME:

   John Robert Bolton

POSITION FOR WHICH CONSIDERED:

   Representative of the United States of America to 
        the United Nations

PRESENT POSITION:

   Under Secretary of State (Arms Control and 
        International Security Affairs)

LEGAL RESIDENCE:

   Maryland

OFFICE ADDRESS:

   Washington, DC

DATE/PLACE OF BIRTH:

   November 20, 1948--Baltimore, Maryland

MARITAL STATUS:

   Married

NAME OF SPOUSE:

   Gretchen Louise Bolton

NAMES OF CHILDREN:

   Jennifer Sarah Bolton

EDUCATION:

   J.D., Yale Law School, 1971-1974;

   B.A., Yale College, 1966-1970

MILITARY SERVICE:

   U.S. Army Reserves, 1974-1976;

   U.S. Army National Guard, 1970-1974 (Honorable 
        Discharge)

FOREIGN LANGUAGES:

   French

EXPERIENCE:

   2001-present--Under Secretary of State (Arms Control 
        and International Security Affairs)

   1997-2001--Senior Vice President, American 
        Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC

   Dec 1999-2001--Of Counsel Kutak Rock LLP, 
        Washington, D.C.

   May 1999-2001--Commissioner, U.S. Commission on 
        International Religion Freedom

   1995-1996--President, National Policy Forum, 
        Washington, D.C.

   1994-1996--Adjunct Professor, George Mason 
        University School of Law, Arlington, Virginia

   1993-1999--Partner, Lerner, Reed, Bolton & McManus 
        (and predecessor firms) Washington, D.C.

   Jan 1993-July 1993--Senior Fellow, Manhattan 
        Institute, Washington, D.C.

   1989-1993--Assistant Secretary of State for 
        International Organization Affairs

   1988-1989--Assistant Attorney General for the Civil 
        Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC

   1985-1988--Assistant Attorney General for 
        Legislative Affairs, Department of Justice, Washington, 
        D.C.

   1983-1985--Partner, Covington & Burling, Washington, 
        D.C.

   Aug 1993-Sept 1993--Consultant, Republican National 
        Committee, Washington, D.C.

   1983-1983--Assistant Administrator for program and 
        Policy Coordination, U.S. Agency for International 
        Development, Washington, D.C.

   1981-1982--General Counsel, U.S. Agency for 
        International Development, Washington, D.C.

   1974-1981--Associate, Covington & Burling, 
        Washington, DC

   June 1973-Aug 1973--Summer, associate Lord, Day & 
        Lord, New York, N.Y.

   June 1972-Aug 1972--White House summer Intern, 
        Office of the Vice President

   1970-1971--Executive Director, Lux et Veritas, Inc. 
        New Haven, Connecticut

HONORS/AWARDS:

   U.S. Department of Justice Edmund J. Randolph Award, 
        1998

   U.S. Department of State Distinguished Service 
        Award, 1993

   Tree of Life Award, Northern and Southern New 
        England Regions of Hadassah, 1990

   Editor, Yale Law Journal

   Phi Sigma Alpha

   Phi Beta Kappa

   Scholarships to McDonogh School, Yale College and 
        Yale Law School

ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS:

   Member, Subcommittee on International Law, 
        Federalist Society, 1999-2001

   Member of Board of Directors, Project for a New 
        American Century, 1989-2001

   Advisory Board Member, Jewish Institute for National 
        Security Affairs, 1994-2001

                                ------                                


                                ANNEX C




  BUSINESS MEETING TO CONSIDER AND VOTE ON THE NOMINATION OF JOHN R. 
         BOLTON TO BE U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS

                              ----------                              


                         THURSDAY, MAY 12, 2005

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m. in room 
SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar, 
chairman of the committee, presiding.
    Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Chafee, Allen, Coleman, 
Voinovich, Alexander, Sununu, Murkowski, Martinez, Biden, 
Sarbanes, Dodd, Kerry, Feingold, Boxer, Nelson, and Obama.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S. SENATOR FROM 
                            INDIANA

    The Chairman.  This business meeting of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee is called to order.
    Before beginning our testimony and our debate today, I 
would like to lay out for members how we will proceed. 
Democratic members have requested a 5-hour debate on the 
nomination of John Bolton to be Ambassador to the United 
Nations, and we have agreed to that request. I have agreed to 
hold this debate to give all members of the committee an 
opportunity, once again, to explain their views, and we look 
forward to an enlightening and thoughtful debate.
    Now, in the interest of decorum and order, it's my 
intention to manage this debate much like a debate on the 
Senate floor. I will control 2\1/2\ hours of time--that is, of 
the 5 hours allotted to the debate--yielding time to Republican 
members. Senator Biden, the distinguished ranking member, will 
control the other two and a half hours, yielding time to 
Democratic members.
    Republicans will lead off the debate with approximately 1 
hour of time, to be controlled by myself and my designees, to 
be followed by an equal amount of time, another hour, under the 
control of Senator Biden or designees. At that stage, we will 
alternate between Democrats and Republican members until all 
time on both sides is consumed or given back.
    Now, as chairman and manager of the nomination, I'll 
reserve the final 10 minutes of our time, on the Republican 
side--that is, about 150 minutes--for myself. Throughout this 
process, members should request time through the chairman or 
through the ranking member. Senator Biden and I will be 
responsible for apportioning the time on our respective sides.
    Since 5 hours of debate time has been requested, and we 
have an abundance of speakers on both sides, I will not 
entertain motions or other business during the 5-hour debate. 
If floor votes intervene, I believe we can continue the debate 
without interruption by voting in shifts, as we frequently do. 
I would, likewise, say, as members have need to have a bite to 
eat or to drink a sip of water, they can proceed to do that. 
Hopefully, our debate will continue on in some responsible way 
throughout that period of time.
    My hope is to complete the meeting by close to 3 p.m., as 
members will have invested 5 hours of valuable time during this 
experience. And I would just say, at that point that I begin my 
statement, I will ask the Clerk to be, again, counting the time 
so that our 150 minutes will begin to diminish as I make an 
opening statement to open the debate this morning.
    The Foreign Relations Committee meets today----
    Senator Dodd. Mr. Chairman, could I just----
    The Chairman.  Yes. Senator Dodd.
    Senator Dodd. Senator Biden's not here yet, so I'm 
reluctant--was this something we agreed to, between the Chair 
and the Ranking Member? I'm just unclear as to the--how the 
procedures will work.
    The Chairman.  No, I have not asked for agreement. I'm just 
indicating the structure of our morning. I'm trying, at least, 
in fairness, to allocate 2\1/2\ hours to both sides, indicate 
that Senator Biden and I will manage the 2\1/2\ hours. During 
that time, I hope we can continue the time running while we go 
to vote. We will have a closure vote at 11:30, more or less. In 
other words, I think these are reasonable statements, but, 
nevertheless, the prerogative of the Chair, I think, is to 
structure a debate in a fair manner, which I'm attempting to 
do.
    Senator Dodd. Fine. By the way, I'd ask consent that the--
this discussion here not be time taken away from the 
chairman's----
    The Chairman.  I thank----
    Senator Boxer. Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman.  Senator Boxer.
    Senator Boxer. With the same caveat. Just because you 
went--I was confused--it went on awhile. Now Senator Biden is 
here. Would you please go over--I hate to do this, but could 
you go over this one more time, what your plan is for how we're 
going to take this five hours, so that Senator Biden may hear 
it?
    The Chairman.  Very well.
    Senator Biden. The staff has informed me, but, please----
    The Chairman.  I'll proceed, once again, through the 
statement, so there can be no ambiguity.
    Before beginning, I would like to lay out for all members 
how we will proceed today. Democratic members have requested a 
5-hour debate on the nomination of John Bolton to be Ambassador 
to the United Nations, and I have agreed to that plan. I have 
agreed to hold this debate to give all members of the committee 
a chance to explain their views, and I look forward to an 
enlightening and thoughtful debate.
    In the interest of decorum and order, it's my intention to 
manage the debate much like a debate on the Senate floor. I 
will control 2\1/2\ hours of time, yielding time to Republican 
members. Senator Biden will control the other two and a half 
hours, yielding time to Democratic members.
    Republicans will lead off the debate with approximately 1 
hour of time, to be controlled by myself and by my designees, 
to be followed by an equal amount of time--that is, an hour, 
more or less--under the control of Senator Biden or his 
designees. At that stage, we would alternate between Democrat 
and Republican members until all time is consumed or yielded 
back.
    As chairman and manager of the nomination, I would reserve 
the last 10 minutes of our Republican time--that is, of our 150 
minutes--for myself. Throughout this process, members should 
request time through the chairman or through the ranking 
member. Senator Biden and I will be responsible for 
apportioning the time on our respective sides.
    Since five hours of debate time has been requested, and we 
have an abundance of speakers on both sides, I will not 
entertain motions or other business during the five-hour 
debate. If floor votes intervene, I believe that we can 
continue the debate without interruption by voting in shifts, 
as we frequently do. My intention is to complete the meeting as 
close as possible to 3 p.m.
    But, with that, I would instruct the Clerk to begin keeping 
time now as I begin the opening segment, which I will do 
shortly.
    Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, I think it's good to proceed 
like we do on the floor, but the way usually do it on the floor 
is, the manager of the bill and the opponent of the bill--the 
manager speaks and then the opponent gets to speak--and then 
they control the remaining time. So, I would prefer, if you're 
willing, after you speak, for me to be able to--allowed to make 
my opening statement, and then you control the time. 
Otherwise--I mean, it's not usual, on the floor debate, that we 
would have an hour of Republican or Democratic testimony--or, 
not testimony--debate, other than if it's--if you wish to take 
an hour, that's fine by me, but I would like to be able to open 
at the time when you finish, and then you control the debate, 
in terms of the remaining time, if that's appropriate.
    The Chairman.  Well, I appreciate the Senator's suggestion. 
I would like to follow the path I set forth, because the--in 
the first hour, I will try to make a case for the nominee, but 
then I will yield the remainder of that hour to Senator 
Voinovich, who will approach the case of the nominee in his own 
way, so that members and, I think, the public will have 
perspective of our debate from that hour. And so, I would ask 
the cooperation of the ranking member in allowing us to proceed 
in that way.
    Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, I don't want this committee to 
look like we're just tied up in parliamentary problems. I will 
not object, but that is not how we do it on the floor. And I 
understand your wishing to set the terms of the debate. I got 
that part. And that's okay by me. But let's just not kid 
ourselves; this is not how we do it in the Senate floor. But 
it's okay if you want to do it that way. I understand the deal. 
And I hope you'll be as accommodating to me if I decide to do 
this if I ever become chairman again, and you'll allow me to do 
things that we don't do on the floor.
    Thank you.
    The Chairman.  Well, the Senator knows that I will be 
accommodating and as reasonable as possible, and I thank the 
Senator for his accommodation and his good humor.
    Now, I will----
    Senator Biden. I might have objected if it weren't going to 
be Voinovich second, but that's all right.
    The Chairman.  Very well.
    We will begin now, and I will ask, as I've mentioned 
before, for the countdown. And we'll make available to the 
ranking member and the chairman at various times, at our 
request, how many minutes remain on both sides, so that the 
management may continue as smoothly as possible.
    The Foreign Relations Committee meets today to vote on the 
nomination of John Bolton to be U.S. Ambassador to the United 
Nations. In this capacity, he would play an important role in 
securing greater international support for the national-
security and the foreign-policy objectives of the United 
States.
    The Foreign Relations Committee has reviewed Secretary 
Bolton's actions with respect to several allegations. In the 
process, we have interviewed 29 witnesses, producing 
approximately 1,000 pages of transcripts. We have received and 
reviewed more than 830 pages of documents from the State 
Department, USAID, and the CIA regarding the Bolton nomination. 
We have questioned Secretary Bolton in person for seven hours. 
We have received responses to nearly 100 questions for the 
record, many containing numerous subparts.
    This effort represents one of the most intense and far-
reaching examinations of a nominee in my experience. The depth 
and breadth of the inquiry is particularly notable given that 
Secretary Bolton has been confirmed four times by the Senate 
already and that most of us have had personal experiences with 
him.
    After reviewing this material, it's my judgment that 
Secretary Bolton should be confirmed as U.S. Ambassador to the 
United Nations. I do not believe that the evidence supports a 
disqualification of the President's nominee.
    I was struck by the portrait of Secretary Bolton that 
emerged from interviews of witnesses that shows him serving in 
a job where some of his ideas and strategies were at odds with 
those above and below him at the State Department. It is clear 
from the transcripts that he was combative in defense of his 
perspectives. In some cases, this led to split memos fed up the 
policy chain, communicating multiple points of view. Secretary 
Bolton's actions were not always exemplary. On several 
occasions, he made incorrect assumptions about the behavior and 
motivations of subordinates. At other times, he failed to use 
proper managerial channels or unnecessarily personalized 
internal disputes.
    The picture is one of an aggressive policymaker who pressed 
his missions at every opportunity and argued vociferously for 
his point of view. In the process, his blunt style alienated 
some colleagues, but there is no evidence that he has broken 
laws or engaged in serious ethical misconduct.
    At the core of any nomination process is the question of 
whether the nominee is qualified to undertake the task for 
which he or she is nominated. I have no doubts that Secretary 
Bolton is extremely well qualified. He has just served four 
years in a key Under Secretary position that technically 
outranks the post for which he is now nominated. He has 
succeeded in several high-profile negotiation settings. He was 
the primary negotiator in the creation of the successful 
Proliferation Security Initiative and the landmark Moscow 
Treaty. He played a large role in the agreement with Libya on 
the surrender of that nation's WMD programs and the ``10 Plus 
10 Over 10'' agreement that resulted in $10 billion in pledges 
from the other G8 countries to secure the Soviet weapons-of-
mass-destruction arsenal. These are among the Bush 
administration's most important and indisputable foreign-policy 
successes.
    Opponents have argued that Secretary Bolton's personality 
will prevent him from being effective at the U.N., but his 
diplomatic successes over the last four years belie that 
expectation.
    Few people in government have thought more about U.N. 
reform than John Bolton. He served 4 years as the Assistant 
Secretary of State overseeing international organizations under 
the first President Bush. He has written and commented 
extensively on the subject.
    Senator Biden acknowledged to the nominee at the hearing, 
and I quote, ``There is no question that you have extensive 
experience in U.N. affairs,'' end of quote.
    Deputy Secretary Rich Armitage recently told reporters, and 
I quote, ``John Bolton is eminently qualified. He is one of the 
smartest guys in Washington,'' end of quote.
    Secretary Bolton also demonstrated his ability to get 
things done prior to becoming Under Secretary of State. Perhaps 
the best example is his initiative to repeal U.N. Resolution 
3379, which equated Zionism with racism. In May 1991, as 
Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations, 
John Bolton refused to accept the common wisdom that repealing 
this infamous resolution was impossible. He and his staff 
initiated a campaign to change votes in the General Assembly, 
even though they were advised that they would not be 
successful. Within a few months, they had made substantial 
progress. And, by the fall, the State Department put its full 
weight behind the effort. On December 16, 1991, the U.N. 
General Assembly voted to repeal the resolution, by a vote of 
111 to 25.
    In the private sector, Secretary Bolton made some blunt 
statements about the United Nations, and many of these 
statements were made in academic or think-tank settings where 
debate on these subjects was encouraged. Many of the quotes 
that have been repeated by opponents came in the context of 
much larger speeches that were more nuanced. In fact--or the 
fact that he has strong views and a long record of commentary 
on the job that he is about to undertake should not be 
disqualifying.
    During our hearing, Secretary Bolton spoke of the United 
Nations' important role in international security. He has 
emphasized that he wants the institution to work well on behalf 
of international security and the interests of the United 
States.
    Beyond qualifications, we should recognize that Secretary 
Bolton has the confidence of the President and the Secretary of 
State. The President has made it clear that this is not a 
casual appointment. He wants a specific person to do a specific 
job. President Bush has a reform agenda in mind at the United 
Nations. This reform agenda is generally supported by the U.N. 
Secretary General, who has put forward a reform plan of his 
own. The President wants John Bolton, an avowed and 
knowledgeable reformer, to carry out that reform agenda. Kofi 
Annan has welcomed John Bolton's appointment.
    I would emphasize that Secretary Bolton is being appointed 
to a position that is within the chain of command of the 
President and the Secretary of State. The Ambassador to the 
U.N. reports directly to the President and to the Secretary of 
State. In fact, historically, this ambassadorship has reflected 
directly on the President. The Ambassador is seen as the 
President's voice at the U.N. Consequently, there are few 
positions in government where the President should have more 
latitude in choosing the nominee.
    In my judgment, it would be absolutely extraordinary 
circumstances for the Senate to say, quote, ``Mr. President, 
you can't have your choice to carry out your directive at the 
U.N., even though the Senate has approved him for four other 
high-ranking positions and he is extremely knowledgeable about 
the task that you are giving him,'' end of quote.
    At times during this process, opponents have suggested that 
Secretary Bolton sits outside the mainstream in the Bush 
administration. Senator Biden devoted several minutes of his 
opening statement at Secretary Bolton's hearing to this point, 
saying that, quote, ``Your views, based on what you've said in 
the past, seems to be contrary to the direction the President 
the Secretary now want to take this administration,'' end of 
quote.
    The problem with this assertion is that President Bush is 
telling us that this is not so. President Bush is telling us 
that Secretary Bolton accurately represents his views about the 
U.N. and how that institution should be reformed. President 
Bush is saying that Secretary Bolton is his considered choice 
to implement his policies and diplomatic initiatives at the 
U.N.
    Some observers, who want a different program than the 
President's, may not agree with the President's choice, but the 
results of the 2004 election give the President the 
responsibility and the right to nominate like-minded 
representatives, and to define who a like-minded representative 
is.
    We have ample evidence that the United Nations is in need 
of reform. The Foreign Relations Committee held the first 
congressional hearing on the U.N.'s Oil-for-Food scandal more 
than a year ago. Since that time, through the work of Paul 
Volcker and our colleague, Senator Coleman, and many others, we 
have learned much more about the extent of that corruption and 
mismanagement, and this knowledge has supported the case for 
reform. We know that billions of dollars that should have been 
spend on humanitarian needs in Iraq were siphoned off by Saddam 
Hussein's regime through a system of surcharges, bribes, and 
kickbacks. This corruption depended upon members of the U.N. 
Security Council who were willing to be complicit in these 
activities. It also depended on U.N. officials and contractors 
who were dishonest, inattentive, or willing to make damaging 
compromises in pursuit of the compassionate mission.
    United Nations reform is not a new issue. The structure and 
role of the United Nations have been debated in our country 
almost continuously since the U.N. was established, in 1945. 
But, in 2005, we may have a unique opportunity to improve the 
operations of the U.N. The revelations of the Oil-for-Food 
scandal and the urgency of strengthening global cooperation to 
address terrorism, the AIDS crisis, nuclear proliferation, many 
other international problems, have created momentum in favor of 
constructive reforms at the U.N.
    Secretary General Kofi Annan has proposed a substantial 
reform plan that will provide a platform for further reform 
initiatives and discussions. The United States must be a leader 
in the effort to improve the United Nations, particularly its 
accountability. At a time when the United Nations is appealing 
for greater international help in Iraq, in Afghanistan, and in 
trouble-spots around the world, the diminishment of U.N. 
credibility because of scandal reduces U.S. options and 
increases our own burdens.
    Secretary Bolton has become closely associated with the 
United States efforts to reform the U.N. If he goes to the U.N. 
and helps achieve reform, the U.N. will gain in credibility, 
especially with the American people. If reform moves forward, 
Secretary Bolton will be in an excellent position to help 
convince skeptics that reform has occurred and that the United 
Nations can be an effective partner in achieving global 
security. If we reject Secretary Bolton without even granting 
him a vote on the Senate floor, President Bush's hand will be 
weakened at the U.N. We will recover, but we will have wasted 
time, and we will have strengthened the position of reform 
opponents.
    In the days immediately following Secretary Rice's March 7 
announcement of Secretary Bolton's nomination, most Democrat 
members of this committee expressed their opposition to the 
nomination, on policy grounds.
    A March 8th Associated Press report states, quote, ``Almost 
immediately after Bolton's nomination was announced, Democrats 
objected,'' end of quote.
    The March 8 addition of the Baltimore Sun said, quote, 
``Reaction from Senate Democrats promised contentious 
confirmation hearings for Bolton when he goes before the 
Foreign Relations Committee,'' end of quote.
    In several cases, the statements by Democrats were 
unequivocal in opposition. In several other cases, statements 
were very negative, leaving open only the smallest of 
possibilities that the Senate would ultimately support the 
nominee. In all of these cases, objections were based on 
Secretary Bolton's supposed attitudes toward the United 
Nations.
    Senator Dodd said that Secretary Bolton's, quote, 
``antipathy to the U.N. will prevent him from effectively 
discharging his duties as our ambassador,'' end of quote.
    Senator Kerry says the Bolton nomination, quote, ``was the 
most inexplicable appointment the President could make to 
represent the United States in the world community,'' end of 
quote.
    Senator Boxer said of Secretary Bolton, quote, ``He's 
contemptuous of the U.N.''
    By March 31, still almost two weeks before the Bolton 
hearing, a Los Angeles Times report noted, quote, ``Democrats 
are likely to vote unanimously against John R. Bolton when the 
nomination to the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations comes 
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, according to 
Democratic and Republican lawmakers and aids,'' end of quote.
    Now, Senators have the right to oppose a nominee because of 
his substantive views and his past statements. However, it's 
important to acknowledge that the ethical inquiry into 
Secretary Bolton's background has been pressed by members who 
had planned to vote against him even before we began 
interviewing the witnesses. They have the right to ask 
questions, and the committee has a responsibility to follow up 
credible allegations. But we should also understand that, at 
times, the inquiry has followed a more prosecutorial role than 
many nominees have had to endure.
    The committee staff has worked long and hard to run down 
the salvo of unsubstantiated allegations that were leveled at 
Secretary Bolton at the last business meeting. The end result 
is that many of the accusations have proven to be groundless 
or, at worse, overstated. New information has cast others in a 
different light.
    With regard to the most serious charge, that Secretary 
Bolton sought to improperly manipulate intelligence, the 
insights we have gained do not support that conclusion. He may 
have disagreed with intelligence findings, but, in the end, he 
always accepted the final judgment of the intelligence 
community, and always delivered speeches in their cleared form.
    During this inquiry, there has been the implication that if 
nominee challenged or opposed the conclusions of intelligence 
analysts, he somehow committed an ethical violation. I think we 
need to be very precise that arguing in favor of one's own 
reading of intelligence within the context of an internal 
policy debate is not wrongdoing. Intelligence reports are not 
sacrosanct. They involve interpretations, and they are intended 
to stimulate debate.
    This committee has held numerous classified briefings. The 
word ``briefing'' is perhaps a misnomer, because, as Senators, 
we spent much of the time during those briefings questioning 
the panel. We probe to determine not just what analysts think, 
but why they think it, and often we challenge their 
conclusions.
    Earlier this year, for example, our committee held a highly 
classified briefing on North Korea, in which one of our members 
pointedly disputed the conclusions of the briefer. There was a 
blunt exchange of views, and no resolution to this disagreement 
was achieved. And I am doubtful that any of us who have 
attended a good number of intelligence briefings have not done 
the same thing. My point is that the act of challenging or 
disputing intelligence conclusion is not, in and of itself, 
wrong.
    Some have appeared shocked that Secretary Bolton might have 
challenge intelligence conclusions or advanced alternative 
interpretations, even though the same thing happens every day 
in multiple departments and agencies.
    Congress has the benefit of something called the, quote, 
``speech and debate clause,'' end of quote. Article 1, Section 
6 of the Constitution states that Members of Congress, quote, 
``shall, in all cases, except treason, felony, and breach of 
the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at 
the session of their respective houses. And, in going to and 
returning from the same, and for any speech or debate in either 
house, they shall not be questioned in any other place,'' end 
of quote.
    The Founders put this extraordinary provision in the 
Constitution because they saw the value in debate. The context 
surrounding arguments within an administration over 
intelligence is different, but the principle is the same. 
Policymakers should be free to exert opinions and 
interpretations during the policymaking process.
    Clearly, there are lines that should not be crossed. Some 
may argue that Secretary Bolton crossed these lines, but the 
proof is in the result. After fighting for his interpretation, 
Secretary Bolton conformed to the clearance process and gave 
the speeches as they had been approved.
    It has been charged Secretary Bolton sought to retaliate in 
some way against analysts and others with whom he disagreed. 
Our staffs have looked into these cases thoroughly; and, in 
each one, I believe the allegations are overstated. In the case 
of Christian Westermann, the INR analyst whom the committee 
heard about from Carl Ford, the dispute was over a procedural 
issue, and Mr. Westermann continued in his job. We should 
recall that the focus of Mr. Ford's complaint was that Mr. 
Bolton should not have raised his objections directly with Mr. 
Westermann, not that Mr. Bolton was wrong to raise the issue.
    Our Democratic colleagues, last month, made much of the 
fact that, after this incident, Secretary Powell had to go all 
the way down to INR to boost morale. But we heard, last week, 
from Secretary Powell's chief of staff, that such visits were 
not uncommon, that it was part of the Secretary's leadership 
style to visit with staff in the bowels of the building, 
including INR.
    In the case of the NIO for Latin America, e-mails the 
committee staff has viewed make it clear that Secretary 
Bolton's primary objection was over disparaging and inaccurate 
comments the analysts made to Members of Congress about a 
speech. Secretary Bolton took his complaint to the CIA. 
Although the NIO has said he feels his career was damaged by 
Secretary Bolton, his superiors fully backed him at the time, 
and other witnesses have told the committee that if he did not 
get the promotions he felt he deserved, it was for other 
reasons. Again, as far as Secretary Bolton was concerned, the 
dispute was procedural; there was no attempt to fabricate 
intelligence.
    Other allegations related to managerial style show the same 
pattern, upon examination: disagreement over procedure, not 
policy. In the case of Rexon Ryu, a mid-level civil servant in 
the Nonproliferation Bureau under Secretary Bolton, no policy 
issues were involved at all. Secretary Bolton believed, 
incorrectly, according to Mr. Ryu's supervisor, that Mr. Ryu 
had deliberately neglected to share information with Bolton's 
office. Some months later, Mr. Ryu was up for a job that would 
have required him to work closely with Secretary Bolton. 
Secretary Bolton, perhaps regrettably, expressed his opposition 
to working with Mr. Ryu. Mr. Ryu was given another prized post 
instead, an assignment to be Deputy Secretary.
    The case of the State Department attorney, also raised by 
the other side, is even more off the mark. This attorney fully 
supported what Secretary Bolton wanted to do. It was only 
because of miscommunication that Secretary Bolton thought the 
attorney had given out wrong information on a case involving 
sanctions against a Chinese company. The State Department legal 
advisor, Will Taft, told our staff that he quickly straightened 
things out. The attorney stayed on the case, even wrote the 
affidavit that Secretary Bolton later submitted to the court.
    Staff also looked at a new case that came up. Secretary 
Bolton's chief of staff, we learned, went to an INR analyst to 
complaint that he had inappropriately attached to a CIA 
document a cover memo that took exception to some of the CIA's 
findings regarding China. No action was sought against the 
analyst, none was taken. The issue was procedural. No 
intelligence was manipulated. And Secretary Bolton wasn't even 
directly involved, because he was out of the country at the 
time.
    Secretary Bolton's credibility has also been called into 
question regarding his testimony before our committee on April 
11. Senator Biden questioned whether Mr. Bolton really went to 
the CIA to learn about the National Intelligence Council. 
Stuart Cohen, the acting head of the NIC, said that, while he 
could not recall why Secretary Bolton wanted to come, it was, 
quote, ``perfectly reasonable,'' end of quote, to believe that 
was the reason. In fact, he added, quote, ``I was delighted at 
the prospect that somebody would come out wanting to know more 
about the NIC,'' end of quote. He also said that Secretary 
Bolton only talked about reassigning, not firing, the NIO, just 
as Mr. Bolton testified.
    Our investigation has found nothing contrary to Secretary 
Bolton's claim that his dispute with Mr. Westermann was over 
procedure, and not policy.
    Former Ambassador to South Korea Thomas Hubbard called the 
committee, after Secretary Bolton's testimony, about a 
controversial speech he gave in South Korea. Secretary Bolton 
testified that Ambassador Hubbard had thanked him for the 
speech afterwards. The Ambassador told us he, indeed, had 
thanked Secretary Bolton afterwards, but only for making 
certain changes in the speech that he had requested. Ambassador 
Hubbard told our staff that he wanted to correct the record on 
that point, but he was not accusing Secretary Bolton of being 
deliberately misleading.
    That speech was one of several by Secretary Bolton that 
opponents to the nomination have questioned. Our investigation 
has shown that many of these speeches and congressional 
testimony were preceded by strong policy debates within the 
administration. As one witness told our staff, quote, ``That's 
how good policy is made,'' end of quote. In each case, we've 
found that, in the end, Secretary Bolton delivered a speech 
that was perfectly cleared and that expressed official U.S. 
policy.
    One of the most sensationalized accusations against 
Secretary Bolton is that, 11 years ago, he chased a woman 
around a Moscow hotel, throwing things at her. This is 
problematic, first, because the behavior described seems so out 
of place, but, secondly, because it has been very difficult for 
our staffs, despite many hours of interviews on this matter, to 
ascertain just what happened. The woman, Melody Townsel, who 
lives in Dallas, admits that she is a liberal Democrat who 
worked for Mothers Opposing Bush in the last election. Ms. 
Townsel also told our staffs that her original accusation 
contained a letter, that was made public--may have been too 
strong in some pieces. She said, quote, ``chasing,'' end of 
quote, may not be the best word. What she meant was that 
Secretary Bolton would approach her whenever he saw her at the 
hotel where they were both staying, because, as she describes 
it, she didn't want to meet with him over a legal matter. It's 
important to remember that Secretary Bolton was a private 
lawyer at the time. He was not representing the U.S. 
Government; he was working for company against which Ms. 
Townsel had made some very serious charges, charges which 
proved unfounded, that could have cost this company an 
important USAID contract in the former Soviet Union.
    Ms. Townsel provided no eyewitnesses to the incidents, 
which are said to have occurred in public or open areas of the 
hotel. Moreover, although she claimed that this was a highly 
traumatic encounter and that she told several people about it, 
staff had difficulty finding others who knew about it. Three 
people whom Ms. Townsel identified as having heard her 
complaints at the time of the events told us they had no 
recollection of Ms. Townsel's mentioning Mr. Bolton. Her boss, 
Charles Black, of Black, Manafort, Stone & Kelly, who hired her 
for the post, said she never mentioned it to him. Neither did 
her intermediate supervisor back in Washington.
    An employee of a sister company who assisted Ms. Townsel in 
making her charges against the prime contractor on her project, 
and with whom she said she was in close touch at the time, also 
knows nothing about it.
    Staffs talked to three representatives of the contractor, a 
small Virginia firm, which has long experience working for 
USAID overseas. These officials also heard nothing about this 
encounter. They said that Secretary Bolton was in Moscow at the 
time, but that he was working for a consultant for a health 
project that they were involved in, not doing legal work for 
them.
    We did find one of her friends and coworkers from that 
time, who was not in Moscow, who recalls talking with her by 
telephone about it, as well as a subordinate of hers in a later 
USAID-funded project who recalls her mentioning it.
    Now, ultimately, the results of a lengthy investigation 
into this isolated, long-ago incident are, at most, 
inconclusive. Ms. Townsel went on to another USAID project in 
former Soviet Union, and the company she accused of 
mismanagement was awarded more USAID contracts and continues to 
be well regarded. The original charge against Secretary Bolton 
appears to be overstated.
    On the basis of what we do know, there is nothing to offset 
Secretary Bolton's long record of public service in several 
different administrations.
    It's been charged that, collectively, the allegations 
against Secretary Bolton form an unacceptable pattern of 
behavior. This is an unfortunate argument by opponents, because 
it depends on doubts arising from an intense investigation of 
accusations, many of which had no substantiation. By its 
nature, it also discounts the dozens of positive testimonials 
on Secretary Bolton's behalf from former coworkers, who attest 
to his character and his effectiveness.
    We need to think clearly about the context of the 
allegations leveled against Secretary Bolton.
    First, this has been an extremely public inquiry. By it's 
nature, it has encountered anyone with a grudge or a 
disagreement with Secretary Bolton, stretching back to 1983, to 
come forward and tell their story. There have been no thematic 
limits on the allegations that opponents of the nominee have 
asked to be investigated.
    I would simply submit that no one working in Washington in 
high-ranking positions for that long would come out unscathed 
from such a process. Any assertive policymaker will develop 
opponents based on stylistic differences, personal disputes, or 
partisan disagreements. Most members of this committee have 
been in public life for decades. If we were nominated for a 
similar position of responsibility after our terms in the 
Senate, how many of us would want the same standard to be 
applied to our confirmation process? How many of us would want 
any instance of conflict or anger directed at our staffs or our 
colleagues to be fair game?
    Second, as mentioned, the oldest allegation dates back all 
the way to 1983; thus, we are subjecting 22 years of Secretary 
Bolton's career to a microscope. This included service in many 
government jobs, as well as time spent in the private sector. 
And given the length of John Bolton's service in high-ranking 
positions, it's inevitable that he would have conflict with 
coworkers of various ranks and political persuasions. He would 
have had literally thousands of contacts, meetings, and issues 
to deal with during his career. In this context, the volume of 
alleged incidents is not that profound.
    Third, in John Bolton's case, unsubstantiated charges may 
seem more material than they are, because he has a reputation 
for being an aggressive and blunt negotiator. But this should 
not be a disqualifying factor, especially for a post that, 
historically, has included a number of blunt, plainspoken 
individuals, including Jeane Kirkpatrick and our former 
colleague, Senator Pat Moynihan. In fact, President Bush has 
cited John Bolton's direct style as one of the reasons that 
he's picked him for this particular job.
    It is easy to say that any inquiry into any allegation is 
justified if we are pursuing the truth. But, as Senators who 
are frequently called upon to pass judgment on nominees, we 
know reality is more complicated than that. We want to ensure 
that nominees are qualified, skilled, honest, and open. 
Clearly, we should pursue credible reports of wrongdoing; but, 
in doing so, we should understand that there can be human and 
organizational costs if the inquiry is not focused and fair. We 
have all witnessed quality nominees who have had to endure a 
contentious nomination process that opened them up to any 
charge leveled from any directions.
    Both Republicans and Democrats have been guilty of 
employing prosecuting tactics to oppose nominees with whom they 
did not agree. Some would say that nominees are fair game. If 
they accept an appointment, they enter the public arena, where 
no quarter will be given. But we need capable people who are 
willing to serve our government and the American people. And 
among all the other qualifications, it seems that we require 
nominees to subject themselves and their families to partisan 
scrutiny. This has implications well beyond the current 
nomination.
    Our Democrat colleagues have recognized this fact when they 
have defended Democrat nominees in the past. With respect to 
one nominee, in October 1993, Senator Biden said, quote, ``The 
Senate does nothing to fulfill its responsibility to advise and 
consent on presidential nominations, and does nothing to 
enhance its reputation as the world's greatest liberty body, by 
entertaining a long and disagreeable litany of past policy 
disagreements, not by entertaining anonymous and probably false 
allegations,'' end of quote.
    With regard to a troubled 1999 nomination, Senator Dodd, 
quite insightfully, stated, quote, ``I am one, Mr. Chairman, 
who worries deeply about our ability to attract the best our 
society can produce to serve our country. It is not easy to 
submit yourself and your family to the kind of public scrutiny 
that a nomination of this magnitude involves. We have got to 
sort out some ways in which we can go through this process 
without making it so discouraging to people that--those watch 
the process, think one day they might like to serve their 
country--will be discouraged from doing so, in any 
administration. And I am deeply worried that if we do not get a 
better handle on this, that that will be the net result of what 
we accomplish,'' end of quote.
    Senator Dodd also provided comments for a March 1, 1997, 
Washington Post article about the travails of a different 
nominee. He said, and I quote, ``It's getting harder and harder 
to get good people to serve in government. Advice and consent 
does not have to be abuse,'' end of quote.
    In an investigation of this type, we constantly have to ask 
where we draw the line. Where does legitimate due diligence 
turn into partisanship? Where does the desire for the truth 
turn into a competition over who wins and who loses? Not every 
line of inquiry is justified by our curiosity, or even our 
suspicions.
    The committee has focused a great deal of energy examining 
several accusations against the nominee. And this may leave 
some observers with the false impression that John Bolton's 
service has been dominated by discord and conflict. We need to 
acknowledge that a great many officials with whom he has worked 
have endorsed him, and that many subordinates have attested to 
his managerial character.
    In the interest of fairness, I would like to cite just a 
few of the comments received by the committee in support of 
Secretary Bolton. Former Secretaries of State James Baker, 
Larry Eagleburger, Alexander Haig, Henry Kissinger, and George 
Shultz; former Secretaries of Defense Frank Carlucci, and James 
Schlesinger; former Ambassadors Jeane Kirkpatrick and Max 
Kampelman; former National Security Advisor Richard Allen; 
former Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director Kenneth 
Adelman; former Assistant Secretary of State David Abshire; and 
former Department of State Counselor Helmut Sonnenfeldt 
strongly endorsed Secretary Bolton in a letter to the 
committee, saying, and I quote, ``It is a moment when we must 
have an ambassador in place whose knowledge, experience, 
dedication, and drive will be vital to protecting the American 
interests in an effective, forward-looking United Nations. 
Secretary Bolton, like the administration, has his critics. 
Anyone as energetic and effective as John Bolton is bound to 
encounter those who disagree with some, or even all, of his 
administration policies. But the policies for which he is 
sometimes criticized are those of the President and the 
Department of State, which he has served with loyalty, honor, 
and distinction.''
    Andrew Natsios, the current USAID administrator, and Mr. 
Peter McPherson, a former USAID administrator, along with 37 
officials who worked with John Bolton during his years at 
USAID, wrote, quote, ``We know John to be a forceful policy 
advocate who both encourages and learns from rigorous debate. 
We know him to be a man of balanced judgment. And we know him 
to have a sense of humor, even about himself. John leads from 
in front, with courage and conviction, especially positive 
qualities, we believe, for the assignment he is being asked to 
take on. He is tough, but fair. He does not abuse power or 
people. John is direct, yet thoughtful, in his communications. 
He is highly dedicated, working long hours in a never-ending 
quest to maximize performance, yet he does not place undue time 
demands on his staff, recognizing their family obligations. 
What he does demand from his staff is personal honesty and 
intellectual clarity,'' end of quote from that letter.
    Another letter, from Former Attorneys General Ed Meese and 
Dick Thornburgh, former Governors William Weld and Frank 
Keating, former Counselors to the President C. Boyden Gray and 
Arthur Culvahouse, Jr., and 39 other distinguished officials 
stated, quote, ``Each of us has worked with Mr. Bolton. We know 
him to be a man of personal and intellectual integrity, deeply 
devoted to the service to this country and the promotion of our 
foreign-policy interests, as established by this President and 
Congress. Not one of us has ever witnessed conduct on his part 
that resembles that which has been alleged. We feel our 
collective knowledge of him and what he stands for, combined 
with our experiences in government and in the private sector, 
more than counterbalances the credibility of those who have 
tried to destroy the distinguished achievements of a 
lifetime,'' end of quote from that letter.
    Another letter came from 21 former officials who worked 
with John Bolton in his capacity as Assistant Secretary of 
State for International Organizational Affairs, and states, 
quote, ``Despite what has been said and written in the last few 
weeks, John has never sought to damage the United Nations or 
its mission. Quite the contrary, under John's leadership the 
organization was properly challenged to fulfill its original 
charter. John's energy and innovation transformed IO from a 
State Department backwater into a highly appealing workplace in 
which individuals could effectively articulate and advance U.S. 
policy and their own careers, as well,'' end of quote.
    A letter also arrived from 43 of John Bolton's former 
colleagues at the American Enterprise Institute. It stated, and 
I quote, ``As we have followed the strange allegations suddenly 
leveled at Mr. Bolton in recent days, and reflected among 
ourselves on our own experiences with him, we have come to 
realize how much we have learned from him, and how deep and 
lasting were his contributions. Contrary to portrayals of his 
accusers, he combines a temperate disposition, good spirit, 
utter honesty with his well-known attributes of exceptional 
intelligence and intensity of purpose. This is a rare 
combination and, we would think, highly desirable for an 
American Ambassador to the United Nations,'' end of quote.
    Former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher wrote, in a 
recent letter to Secretary Bolton, quote, ``To combine, as you 
do, clarity of thought, courtesy of expression, and an 
unshakeable commitment to justice is rare in any walk of life, 
but it's particularly so in international affairs. A capacity 
for straight-talking, rather than peddling half-truths, is a 
strength, and not a disadvantage, in diplomacy. Particularly in 
the case of a great power like America, it is essential that 
people know where you stand and assume that you mean what you 
say. With you at the U.N., they will do both. These same 
qualities are also required for any serious reform at the 
United Nations, itself, without which cooperation between 
nations to defend and extend liberty will be far more 
difficult,'' end of quote from Mrs. Thatcher.
    Now, during this inquiry, we have spent a great deal of 
time scrutinizing individual conversations and incidents that 
happened several years ago. Regardless of how each Senator 
plans to vote today, we should not lose sight of the larger 
national-security issues--U.N. reform and international 
diplomacy--that are central to this nomination.
    The President has tasked Secretary Bolton to undertake this 
urgent mission. Secretary Bolton has affirmed his commitment to 
fostering a strong United Nations. He has expressed his intent 
to work hard to secure greater international support at the 
U.N. for the national-security and foreign-policy objectives of 
the United States. He has stated his belief in decisive 
American leadership at the U.N., and underscored that an 
effective United Nations is very much in the interest of U.S. 
national security.
    I believe that the President deserves to have his nominee 
represent him at the United Nations. I am hopeful that we will 
vote to report this nomination to the whole Senate.
    At this time, I would like to yield to--the first 
Republican segment--to Senator Voinovich for his comments.
    Senator Voinovich.

 STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, U.S. SENATOR FROM OHIO

    Senator Voinovich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    First, let me take this opportunity to thank you and your 
staff for your graciousness and hard work on this nomination. 
You have made strong arguments in favor of the nominee 
throughout this process. Additionally, thank you for providing 
all of the members of this committee with timely information 
related to Mr. Bolton. I believe that the inquiry has been fair 
and exhaustive. I'm confident that I have enough information to 
cast my vote today. Again, I appreciate your staff's hard work, 
as well as the administration's efforts.
    Since our last meeting on this subject, I have pored over 
hundreds of pages of testimony, have spoken to dozens, or so, 
of individuals regarding their experiences, interactions, and 
thoughts about John Bolton. Most importantly, in addition to 
the meeting that I had with Mr. Bolton prior to the official 
business meeting that we had on his nomination, I, once again, 
met with Mr. Bolton this week, personally, to share my concerns 
and to listen carefully to his thoughts.
    After great thought and consideration, I have based my 
decision on what I think is the bigger picture. Frankly, there 
is a particular concern that I have about this nomination, and 
it involves the big picture of U.S. public diplomacy.
    It was not long ago when America's love of freedom was a 
force of inspiration to the world, and America was admired for 
its democracy, generosity, and its willingness to help others 
in need of protection. Today, the United States is criticized 
for what the world calls arrogance, unilateralism, and for 
failing to listen and to seek the support of its friends and 
allies. There has been a drastic change in the attitude of our 
friends and allies in such organizations as the United Nations 
and NATO and in the countries of leaders that we need to rely 
upon for help. I discovered this last November, when I met--
when I was in London with people in the Parliament there--I 
found that to be the case when we visited the NATO meeting in 
Italy--that things have really changed in the last several 
years.
    It troubled me deeply that the United States is perceived 
this way in a world community, because the United States will 
face a steeper challenge in achieving its objectives without 
their support. We will face more difficulties in conducting the 
war on terrorism, promoting peace and stability worldwide, and 
building democracies without the help from our friends to share 
the responsibilities, leadership, and costs.
    To achieve these objectives, public diplomacy must once 
again be of high importance. If we cannot win over the hearts 
and minds of the world community, and work together as a team, 
our goals will be more difficult to achieve. Additionally, we 
will be unable to reduce the burden on our own resources. The 
most important of these resources are the human resources, the 
lives of the men and women of our Armed Forces who are leaving 
their families every day to serve their country overseas.
    Just this last Tuesday, we passed an $82 billion 
supplemental bill for our operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
It is clear that the costs of this war are rising all the time, 
and they are not expected to go down anytime soon. There are 
not many allies standing up to join us in bearing the costs of 
these wars, particularly Iraq. We need the help of other 
countries to share the financial burden that is adding to our 
national debt, and the human-resource burden that our Armed 
Forces, national guardsman, and contractors are bearing so 
heavily now, including the deaths of over 1500 American service 
men and women.
    And the key to this, I believe, is public diplomacy. Mr. 
Chairman, I applaud the President and Secretary of State for 
understanding that public diplomacy is an important objective 
and beginning this new term with an emphasis on repairing 
relationships. I applaud the President and Secretary Rice for 
reaching out to our friends in the world community and 
articulating that the United States does respect international 
law and protocol. And I also applaud the President's decision 
to appoint Karen Hughes to help take the lead in this effort.
    Though the United States may have differences with our 
friends at times, and though we may need to be firm with our 
positions, it is important to send the message that we're 
willing to sit down, talk about them, discuss our reasoning, 
and to work for solutions.
    The work of the President and Secretary of State Rice is a 
move in the right direction, but what message are we sending to 
the world community when, in the same breath, we have sought to 
appoint an Ambassador to the United Nations who, himself, has 
been accused of being arrogant, of not listening to his 
friends, of acting unilaterally, of bullying those who do not 
have the ability to properly defend themselves? These are the 
very characteristics that we're trying to dispel in the world 
community.
    We must understand that, next to the President, the Vice 
President, Secretary of State, the next most important 
prominent public diplomat is our Ambassador to the United 
Nations. It is my concern that the confirmation of John Bolton 
would send a contradictory and negative message to the world 
community about U.S. intentions. I'm afraid that his 
confirmation will tell the world that we're not dedicated to 
repairing our relationship or working as a team, but that we 
believe only someone with sharp elbows can deal properly with 
the international community.
    I want to make it clear that I do believe that the U.N. 
needs to be reformed if it's to be relevant in the 21st 
century. I do believe we need to pursue its transformation 
aggressively, sending the strong message that corruption's not 
going to be tolerated. The corruption that occurred under the 
Oil-for-Food Program made it possible for Saddam's Iraq to 
discredit the U.N. and undermine the goals of its members. This 
must never happen again, and severe reforms are needed to 
strengthen the organization. And, yes, I believe that it will 
be necessary to take a firm position so we can succeed. But it 
will take a special individual to succeed at this endeavor, and 
I have great concerns with the current nominee and his ability 
to get the job done.
    And to those who say a vote against John Bolton is against 
reform of the U.N., I say, nonsense. There are many other 
people who are qualified to go to the United Nations that can 
get the job done for our country.
    Frankly, I'm concerned that Mr. Bolton would make it more 
difficult for us to achieve the badly needed reforms to this 
outdated institution. I believe that there could even be more 
obstacles to reform if Mr. Bolton is sent to the United Nations 
than if he were another candidate.
    Those in the international community who do not want to see 
the U.N. reformed will act as a roadblock, and I fear that Mr. 
Bolton's reputation will make it easier for them to succeed. I 
believe that some member nations in the U.N. will use Mr. 
Bolton as part of their agenda to further question the 
integrity and credibility of the United States, and to 
reinforce their negative U.S. propaganda--and there's a lot of 
it out there today.
    Another reason I believe Mr. Bolton is not the best 
candidate for the job is his tendency to act without regard for 
the views of others, and without respect for the chain of 
command. We have heard that Mr. Bolton has a reputation for 
straying off message on occasion. Ambassador Hubbard testified 
that the tone of Mr. Bolton's speech on North Korea hurt, 
rather than helped, efforts to achieve the President's 
objectives. According to several respectable sources, Mr. 
Bolton strayed off message too often, and had to be called on 
the carpet quite often to be reprimanded. In fairness, those 
sources said that, once reprimanded, Mr. Bolton got back on 
track, but that he needs to be kept on a short leash.
    However, this leaves me a very uneasy feeling. Who is to 
say that Mr. Bolton will not continue to stray off message as 
Ambassador to the U.N.? Who is to say he will not hurt, rather 
than help, U.S. relations with the international community and 
our desire to reform the U.N.?
    When discussing all these concerns with Secretary Rice--
John Bolton's propensity to get off message, his lack of 
interpersonal skills, his tendency to abuse others who disagree 
with him--I was informed by the Secretary of State that she 
understood all these things, and, in spite of them, still feels 
that John Bolton is the best choice, and that she would be in 
frequent communication with him, and he would be closely 
supervised. My private thought at the time, and I should have 
expressed it to her, is, Why in the world would you want to 
send somebody up to the U.N. that has to be supervised?
    I'm also concerned about Mr. Bolton's interpersonal skills. 
Mr. Chairman, I understand there will be several vacant senior 
posts on the staff when Mr. Bolton arrives in his new position. 
As a matter of fact, I understand all the senior people, five 
of them, they're leaving right now. For example, Ann Patterson, 
who is highly regarded, is moving to another position. And I've 
been told by several people that, if he gets there, to be 
successful he's going to need somebody like Ann Patterson to 
get the job done for him.
    As such, Mr. Bolton's going to face a challenge. These 
people are gone right now. He's going to have to find some new 
ones. But his challenge right now is to inspire, lead, and 
manage a new team, a staff of 150 individuals that he will need 
to rely on to get the job done.
    We have all witnessed the testimony and observations 
related to Mr. Bolton's interpersonal and management skills. I 
have concerns about Mr. Bolton's ability to inspire and lead 
the team so that it can be as effective as possible in 
completing the important task before him. And I'm not the only 
one. I understand that 59 U.S. diplomats, who served under 
administrations from both sides of the aisle, sent a letter to 
the committee, saying that Mr. Bolton is the wrong man for the 
job.
    I want to note that the interview given by Colin Powell's 
chief of staff, Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson, has said that Mr. 
Bolton would be--would make an abysmal ambassador, that he is, 
quote, ``incapable of listening to people and taking into 
account their views.''
    I would also like to highlight the words of another person 
that I highly respect, who worked with Mr. Bolton, who told me 
that if Mr. Bolton were confirmed, he'd be okay for a short 
time, but, within 6 months his poor interpersonal skills and 
lack of self-discipline would cause major problems.
    Additionally, I wanted to note my concern that Colin 
Powell, the person to whom Mr. Bolton answered to over the last 
four years, was conspicuously absent from a letter signed by 
former Secretaries of State recommending Mr. Bolton's 
confirmation. He's the one that had to deal with him on a day-
to-day basis. He's the one that's more capable of commenting 
about whether or not he's got the ability to get the job done. 
And he--his name was not on that letter.
    We are facing an era of foreign relations in which the 
choice for our Ambassador to the United Nations should be one 
of the most thoughtful decisions we make. The candidate needs 
to be both a diplomat and a manager. A manager is important. 
Interpersonal skills are important. The way you treat other 
people--Do you treat them with dignity and respect?--very 
important. You must have the ability to persuade and to inspire 
our friends, to communicate and convince, to listen, to absorb 
the ideas of others. Without such virtues, we will face more 
challenges in our efforts to win the war on terrorism, to 
spread democracy, and to foster stability globally.
    The question is, Is John Bolton the best person for the 
job? The administration has said they believe he's the right 
man. They say that, despite his interpersonal shortcomings, he 
knows the U.N., and he can reform the organization and make it 
more powerful and relevant to the world.
    Now, let me say, there's no doubt that John Bolton should 
be commended and thanked for his service and his particular 
achievements. He has accomplished an important objective, 
against great odds. As a sponsor of legislation that 
established an Office on Global Anti-Semitism in the State 
Department, legislation that I worked very hard to get passed, 
I am particularly impressed by his work to combat global anti-
Semitism. I wholeheartedly agree with Mr. Bolton that we must 
get the U.N. to change its anti-Israeli bias. Further, I am 
impressed by Mr. Bolton's achievements in the areas of arms 
control; specifically, the Moscow Treaty, the G8 Global 
Partnership Fund, and the President's Proliferation Security 
Initiative.
    Despite these successes, there is no doubt that Mr. Bolton 
has serious deficiencies in the areas that are critical to be a 
good ambassador. As Carl Ford said, ``He is a kiss-up and kick-
down leader, who will not tolerate those who disagree with him, 
and who goes out of his way to retaliate for their 
disagreement.'' As Ambassador Hubbard said, ``He does not 
listen when an esteemed colleague offers or suggests changes to 
temper language in a speech.'' And, as I've already mentioned, 
former Secretary of State Powell's chief of staff, Lawrence 
Wilkerson, said, ``He would be an abysmal ambassador.''
    As some others who have worked closely with Mr. Bolton 
stated, ``He's an ideologue, and fosters an atmosphere of 
intimidation. He does not tolerate disagreement. He does not 
tolerate dissent.'' Another esteemed individual who has worked 
with Mr. Bolton told me that, ``Even when he had success, he 
had the tendency to lord if over and say, `Hey, boy, look what 
I did.' '' Carl Ford testified that he had never seen anyone 
behave as badly in all his days at the State Department, and 
that he would not even have testified before this committee if 
John Bolton had simply followed protocol and simple rules of 
management. You know, just followed the procedure.
    Mr. Chairman, I have to say that, after poring over the 
hundreds of pages of testimony--and, you know, I wasn't here 
for those hearings, but I did my penance; I read all of it----
    [Laughter.]
    Senator Voinovich  [continuing]. I believe that John Bolton 
would have been fired--fired--if he had worked for a major 
corporation. This is not the behavior of a true leader, who 
upholds the kind of democracy that President Bush is seeking to 
promote, globally. This is not the behavior that should be 
endorsed as the face of the United States to the world 
community in the United Nations. Rather, Mr. Chairman, it is my 
opinion that John Bolton is the poster-child of what someone in 
the diplomatic corps should not be. I worry about the signal 
that we're sending to thousands of individuals, under the State 
Department, who are serving their country in Foreign Service 
and Civil Service, living at posts across the world, and, in 
some cases, risking their lives, all so they can represent our 
country, promote diplomacy, and contribute to the safety of 
Americans everywhere.
    I just returned from a trip to the Balkans. I had a chance 
to spend four days with people from the State Department. He's 
not what they consider to be the ideal person, Mr. Chairman, to 
be our Ambassador to the United States--or to the United 
Nations. And I think it's important that we think about the 
signal that we send out there to those people that are all over 
this world, that are doing the very best job that they can to 
represent the United States of America. This is an important 
nomination by the President. What we're saying to these people, 
when we confirm such an individual to one of the highest 
positions--what are we saying?
    I want to emphasize that I've weighed Mr. Bolton's 
strengths carefully. I have weighed the fact that this is the 
President's nominee. All things being equal, it is my 
proclivity to support the President's nominee. However, in this 
case, all things are not equal. It's a different world today 
than it was four years ago. Our enemies are Muslim extremists 
and religious fanatics who have hijacked the Koran and have 
convinced people that the way to get to heaven is through jihad 
against the world, particularly the United States. We must 
recognize that to be successful in this war, one of our most 
important tools is public diplomacy.
    After hours of deliberations, telephone calls, personal 
conversations, reading hundreds of pages of transcripts, and 
asking for guidance from above, I have come to the 
determination that the United States can do better than John 
Bolton. The world needs an ambassador who's interested in 
encouraging other people's points of view and discouraging any 
atmosphere of intimidation. The world needs an American 
Ambassador to the U.N. who will show that the United States has 
respect for other countries and intermediary organizations, 
that we are team players and consensus builders, and promoters 
of symbiotic relationships.
    In moving forward with the international community, we 
should remember the words of the great Scot poet, who said, 
``Oh, that some great power would give me the wisdom to see 
myself as other people see me.''
    That being said, Mr. Chairman, I am not so arrogant to 
think that I should impose my judgment and perspective of the 
U.S. position in the world community on the rest of my 
colleagues. We owe it to the President to give Mr. Bolton and 
up or down vote on the floor of the U.S. Senate. My hope is 
that, on a bipartisan basis, we can sent Mr. Bolton's 
nomination to the floor without recommendation, and let the 
Senate work its will.
    If that goes to the floor, I would plead to my colleagues 
in the Senate to consider the decision and its consequences 
carefully, to read all the pertinent material--so often we get 
nominees, and we don't spend the time to look into the 
background of the individuals--and to ask themselves several 
questions:
    Will John Bolton do the best job possible representing a 
transatlantic face of America at the U.N.?
    Will he be able to pursue the needed reforms at the U.N., 
despite his damaged credibility?
    Will he share information with the right individuals, and 
will he solicit information from the right individuals, 
including his subordinates, so he can make the most informed 
decision?
    Is he capable of advancing the President and Secretary of 
State's efforts to advance our public diplomacy?
    Does he have the character, leadership, interpersonal 
skills, self-discipline, common decency, and understanding of 
the chain of command to lead his team to victory?
    Will he recognize and seize opportunities to repair and 
strengthen relationships, promote peace, uphold democracy as a 
team with our fellow nations?
    Lastly, Mr. Chairman, I would like to say this. I have met 
with Mr. Bolton on two occasions, spent almost two hours with 
him. I like Mr. Bolton. I think he's a decent man. Our 
conversations have been candid and cordial. But, Mr. Chairman, 
I really don't believe he's the best man that we can send to 
the United Nations.
    The Chairman.  Thank you very much, Senator Voinovich.
    I now turn to the distinguished ranking member for his 
statement and disposition of an opening hour of debate.

 STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE

    Senator Biden. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    And I don't know why I thought for a moment that maybe 
Senator Voinovich shouldn't go second. I should have 
reconsidered that position. [Laughter.]
    So much for partisanship.
    Look, I don't--quite frankly, much of what I was going to 
say would be redundant and not as eloquent as what we just 
heard.
    And I have great respect for every one of my colleagues on 
this committee, on both sides of the aisle. And I do respect 
the fact that many of you may reach a conclusion different than 
I have reached and, based on what I just heard, Senator 
Voinovich has reached. I happened to reach the same 
conclusion--and I'm not being solicitous--for the same reason, 
the same basic, fundamental reason.
    I cannot think of a time in my career here where I've heard 
someone so succinctly state in one sentence what really should 
have been the question: Why would you send someone to the 
United Nations that needed to be supervised? I did ask a 
similar question, that question, to the Secretary of State, 
when she had the courtesy, which I appreciate, of calling me 
before--before--the nominee was announced. At that time, she 
asked me--and this is not violating any confidence, that--would 
I withhold stating anything publicly until I had a chance--she 
had a chance to talk with me more? And if you go back, you 
notice what you've read about what Senators said, my name does 
not appear there. I did withhold, until the day of the hearing, 
any comment--to the chagrin, I suspect, of some of my 
Democratic colleagues--my attitude and views and concerns about 
Mr. Bolton.
    I realize there is a very strong--we all are elected 
officials in the most significant legislative body, I would 
say, in the history of the world. And we all know, though, that 
each of our parties have overwhelming requirements, sometimes, 
to meet the concerns of portions of our party. That was implied 
to me as one of the reasons why Mr. Bolton was being nominated.
    The question I asked was, ``Do you know, Madam Secretary, 
how much difficulty Mr. Bolton caused for Secretary Powell, 
your predecessor?'' And the answer was, ``Yes.'' But there had 
been a discussion, and there was a need to find an important 
post for Mr. Bolton, who's been an admirable and bright and 
patriotic servant of this country for a long time. And I asked 
a rhetorical question, ``If you couldn't say no now to that 
nomination, how are you going to say no if, in fact, he 
breaches the control that you indicate to me that will be 
imposed upon him?'' I don't know the answer to that, but I 
would suggest that if there is a need to appoint him for 
reasons, including and beyond his capacity, then it may be 
difficult if, in fact, he strays. But that is not for me to 
decide.
    Mr. Chairman, you and I have worked together for a long 
time. I think it's fair to say we've never had a cross, harsh 
word. And we will not, as far as I'm concerned, have one over 
this. But your opening statement makes it sort of sound that 
it's self-evident that Mr. Bolton was going to be the guy to be 
nominated to the United Nations. I would ask a rhetorical 
question. Was anyone here in the Senate when Bolton's name was 
mentioned, unless you had been briefed ahead of time? Did 
anyone of you say, ``Ah, that fits. That's just what I was 
thinking. That's just what I was thinking--U.N.--Bolton, 
U.N.''? [Laughter.]
    I'm not being facetious. I being deadly earnest. I think it 
goes to this whole question of whether or not everybody's out 
just on a witch hunt to go after Mr. Bolton. You must admit 
that this was an unusual, if not surprising, nomination. If 
someone had said Mr. Bolton was going to head up--he was going 
to be brought in--I would have been less surprised, myself, if 
he had been--if he was going to be--have the spot Mr. Hadley 
has, a more--in some senses, a much more critical spot. I would 
have been less surprised about that. But it's a little bit like 
if one of us announced we're going go back and run for the 
state legislature. It would kind of surprise me. It wouldn't 
fit.
    I want to make a second point. We did not seek out any 
witnesses. I don't know whether you meant to imply, Mr. 
Chairman, but it sounded--it might sound to some like the 
Democrats are out there trying to dig up all they can on 
Bolton. I had nothing to do, nor did any of you, with what now 
is 102 former career ambassadors--Republican, Democratic; 
Republican appointees, Democratic appointees. To the best of my 
knowledge, my word as a--I know of no Democrat that had 
anything to do with getting those folks to write us a letter.
    Tom Hubbard, the Ambassador to South Korea, he contacted us 
after hearing Mr. Bolton's testimony. We did not contact Mr. 
Hubbard.
    Mr. Westermann--nobody contacted Mr. Westermann first. That 
came from Mr. Westermann in an inquiry by the Intelligence 
Committee as to whether or not anyone had been--felt 
intimidated. Mr. Westermann came forward to the Intelligence 
Committee. We found out from the Intelligence Committee. We did 
not go to Mr. Westermann.
    Ms. Townsel--and, I agree, the evidence is not absolutely 
conclusive. I agree with you. I think you honestly stated it, 
as you always do. But we didn't go to Mrs. Townsel. She wrote 
an open letter to us. I never met the woman, had never even 
heard of her before.
    So, I want to make the point that not only did we not seek 
out these witnesses, it would have been irresponsible, in terms 
of out constitutional responsibility, not to talk to them as 
they came forward, or seek our corroboration and/or 
contradictory statements relative to what they had to say.
    And I might point out, the primary witnesses that we 
interviewed, who had the most incredibly damaging things to--
let me rephrase that--who had some very damaging things to say 
about Mr. Bolton's actions, are all in a Republican 
administration. We did not go to a former administration. We 
did not go to the Clinton administration to find former 
assistant secretaries or heads of NIR--or INR. These are all 
Republicans; if not Republicans, appointees and/or serving 
under a Republican administration.
    And, further, the argument that we need John Bolton for 
reform at the U.N., and comparing him to Pat Moynihan--I'm 
reminded of that famous phrase of our friend from Texas, 
Senator Bentsen, ``I knew Pat Moynihan, and he's--and I know 
John Bolton--and he's no Pat Moynihan.'' I mean, I find that 
the biggest stretch--you know that old phrase we Irish say, 
``Pat's probably rolling over in his grave hearing that 
comparison.''
    And so, we're not saying--one last point before I get into 
the detail--we're not saying Mr. Bolton is not a patriotic 
American, has not done very good things in his career, has been 
a failure. We're not saying that. What we're saying is, he's 
done some very good things. One that comes to mind, referenced 
by our colleague from Ohio, the anti-Zionist resolution, 
getting it repealed. That's a big deal. That's a big deal, a 
notable accomplishment. But that does not a U.N. Ambassador 
make. A lot of people have done very good things who turn out 
not to be qualified or the right person for other assignments.
    Mr. Chairman, my intention, obviously, is not to keep our 
committee vote beyond the 3 p.m. agreement we have decided on, 
but I feel obliged to lay out for the record one of my 
institutional concerns here.
    I recognize that the State Department, the CIA, and AID 
have provided hundreds of pages of documents, and declassified 
many of them. I don't minimize that. State and CIA have made 
government officials available for interviews, and more than 
once. But this cooperation has been grudging, to say the least.
    Prior to the April 11th hearing, very little cooperation 
was provided to the Democratic requests, until you, Mr. 
Chairman, stepped in. After our first meeting, on April 19th, 
we made additional document requests to the Department. The 
chairman intervened again to help. But he also implicitly 
invited the Department to ignore part of our request, saying 
that some of our request were, quote, ``extremely broad and may 
have marginal relevance to specific allegations.'' The letter 
then expressed hope that certain specific requests would be 
fulfilled, a list that omitted four parts of the Minority 
request. The Department took the hint, and it has failed to 
turn over some important materials related to preparation of 
speeches and testimony.
    Even after--even after we narrowed our request, at the 
urging of the State Department, only a relatively small amount 
of material that we narrowed the request for was provided. In 
rejecting the request, the Department's offered an 
extraordinary rationale. I think it's important, as a 
committee, that we understand this. They said, in rejecting 
some of the information we sought, quote, The Department,'' 
quote, ``does not believe the request to be specifically tied 
to the issues being deliberated by the committee,'' end of 
quote. As my mom would say, ``Who died and left them boss?''
    Think about it for a minute. First, the Department is 
responding only to the requests endorsed by the Majority, and, 
second, the executive branch is deciding, for itself, the 
issues which are relevant to this committee's review of a 
nomination.
    I believe this is an very important issue before the 
committee. I believe it's very important whether or not Mr. 
Bolton sought to stretch intelligence, to say things in public 
statements that the intelligence would not support, and to keep 
going back to the intelligence community again and again to get 
answers he wants, not the answers the facts support. Put 
another way, Did he attempt to politicize the intelligence 
process for two former--as two former administration officials 
have testified? That's why we requested this information.
    I'm also concerned that the nominee may have given the 
committee some misleading testimony. The material that was not 
provided would shed further light on both these concerns. And 
it relates to the preparation of congressional testimony on 
Syria, their weapons-of-mass-destruction program. The 
preparation of this testimony occurred in the summer of 2003. 
Remember, we already know from intelligence officials that 
there was an intense debate about what Mr. Bolton wanted to say 
and whether he should be able to say it. And this was a time 
when there was open discussion about, Is Syria next? Mr. Bolton 
told us he didn't--hadn't seen the draft, and the Department 
told us, in--later--in the letter yesterday, that he was not 
personally involved in drafting the testimony. But this 
committee has a right and a duty to look at the evidence.
    The Department's letter, yesterday, saying that the 
material is highly classified and compartmentalized, and the 
Department is not prepared, quote, ``to share these 
deliberations that cut across the intelligence community,'' as 
their rational. This answer is unsatisfactory, as a matter of 
principle, for future inquiries by this committee. We've 
already received deliberative-process materials, some of which 
are highly classified. Why won't the administration give us 
this other material? Are they holding back relevant 
information? Could it be that Mr. Bolton was, in fact, involved 
in drafting the testimony? I don't know. But there's no cogent 
rationale why they give us some of this, and not others.
    The Department's attitude during the course of this 
nomination is a significant departure--significant departure--
from past practice, including the past four years. It's been 
the kind of--if this is the kind of cooperation we can expect 
in the future, we may have a long three and a half years.
    I'm even more concerned about the failure of the committee 
to receive information relating to Mr. Bolton's request for NSA 
information, and to identify U.S. persons that he wanted to 
know in those intercepts. On April 13th, Senator Dodd made the 
first request for this information. By a letter dated April 28, 
Senator Lugar made a request for the information through the 
Intelligence Committee. Specifically, Senator Lugar asked 
Senators Roberts and Rockefeller, to seek, quote, ``all 
information related to Mr. Bolton's request and the responses 
thereto, including the unredacted contents of the documents in 
question.'' Unredacted. And the letter said that the chairman 
was, quote, ``prepared to follow the guidance of the Select 
Committee with respect to,'' quote, ``access and storage of 
such materials, as well as the provisions under which such 
materials will be shared with members of the Committee on 
Foreign Relations.''
    Clearly, the chairman was pointing out that the past 
practices mean that we have access to that information, and we 
expected that access. That's why the reference to ``storage 
material and the nature of the access''--not ``if'' we could 
have access. In other words, Mr. Chairman, you made clear our 
expectations that NSA would provide, quote, ``all the 
information'' to the Intelligence Committee, which, in turn, 
would share it with us.
    And I understand that the chairman and vice chairman of the 
Intelligence Committee were briefed Tuesday by General Hayden. 
I understand that they were not given the identities of U.S. 
persons that Mr. Bolton requested and received. And I have no 
information on when, or whether, this committee or Senator 
Lugar or I will be given access to the same information given 
to the Intelligence Committee. So far as I can tell, Mr. 
Chairman, your request has not been fulfilled. And I don't know 
why. I think it's unacceptable. We have a right to this 
information, not only as members of this committee, but in our 
specific responsibility of exercising our advice-and-consent 
responsibility.
    Mr. Bolton has seen this information, but we cannot? Mr. 
Bolton could see this information, but a 32-year Senator, who 
never had once in his entire career had anybody raise a 
question about his treatment of secret or classified data--I'm 
not entitled to see it?
    I would like someone to explain that to me. Can Ambassador 
Negroponte explain it? Can General Hayden explain it? Can 
someone at least do us the courtesy of telling us why this 
information has not been provided?
    After all the work we've done in the past decade to 
strengthen the role of this committee, it is a serious mistake, 
in my view, for all of us to acquiesce when the administration 
is withholding the relevant information, whether they think it 
is relevant or not. The integrity of the nominating process and 
our constitutional role is being challenged, in my view. 
Article 2, Section 2 of the Constitution provides that the 
President ``shall nominate and, by and with the advice and 
consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public 
ministers and counsels, judges of the Supreme Court, and all 
other officers of the United States,'' end of quote.
    The failure of this administration to cooperate with this 
committee, and the rationale offered for this failure, that the 
Department does not believe these requests to be specifically 
tied to issues being deliberated by the committee, it has no 
constitutional justification, and it does damage to the 
standing and the ability of this committee and other committees 
to perform its function of oversight and advice and consent.
    What makes this administration think that it has the right 
to determine what the U.S. Senate needs in order to perform its 
constitutional responsibility? It has asserted neither 
executive privilege, nor any constitutionally based rationale 
for not cooperating with this committee. It has no right under 
past practices, no right under the Constitution, to offer as a 
rationale that, quote--they ``do not believe the request to be 
specifically tied to the issues being deliberated by the 
committee.'' I repeat what my mother says, ``Who died and left 
them boss?''
    I do not work for the President of the United States of 
America. None of you work for the President of the United 
States of America. We are a coequal branch, equally powerful 
and important, with a specifically assigned constitutional 
responsibility that only we have a right to determine whether 
information is relevant or not. Period.
    The doctrine of separation of powers. It's within our 
power, and ours alone, to decide what we think is relevant to 
our deliberations in the exercise of our responsibility.
    With due respect, Mr. Chairman, I think we're making a big 
mistaken by not insisting that this information come forward. 
And I might say, for the record, I don't think the information 
requested is going to shed much light on anything. My guess 
is--I've gone out and asked former Republican--present 
Republicans--former Democrat administration officials, ``Is 
this unusual to ask for this information?'' The answer I got 
was, no, it's not that unusual. But I think this is a matter of 
principle.
    Mr. Chairman, I realize you're in a difficult position. 
I've been there. Seventeen years, I was the chairman or ranking 
member of the Judiciary Committee. I remember a President named 
Clinton contacting me, through his staff and directly. He 
wanted to have a woman named Zoe Baird to be Attorney General. 
It was his first appointment. He needed it badly. Politically, 
it was devastating to lose. I knew what my party would think 
about me, but I insisted that all relevant information be made 
available, even though they argued that it is not relevant to 
the inquiry. I made it clear to the President, ``We will not go 
forward.'' And we defeated--not an act I loved doing--the first 
major appointee after Secretary of State?--we defeated, in the 
Committee, Judiciary, the Attorney General of the United States 
of America, headed by a Democrat and the Majority Democrats.
    Then along came a woman named Zoe Baird. And I asked for 
other--I mean, excuse me, Kimba Wood--and we jointly, 
Republicans and Democrats, said, ``We insist on information 
relating to not only her, but her husband, as related to an 
accusation.'' The administration plead, ``Do not do this.'' 
And, adding insult to injury, a senior Democrat was the guy who 
defeated the second nominee of a first-term President. That's 
our constitutional responsibility.
    Whether or not it causes defeat or not is not relevant. The 
relevant point is, no administration, Democrat or Republican, 
has the right to tell me or this committee or any other 
committee, what is relevant. If they think it violates the 
separation-of-powers doctrine, state it, exert executive 
privilege, state a constitutional basis, but don't tell me, 
don't tell this Senate, ``We, the administration, do not think 
it is relevant.''
    As I said, we don't work for the President. And no 
President is entitled to the appointment of anyone he 
nominates--no President is entitled--by the mere fact he has 
nominated someone. That's why they wrote the Constitution the 
way they did. It says ``advice and consent.'' And I think we 
have undermined our authority, and we have shirked our 
constitutional responsibility. And I intend, even if, tomorrow, 
there is a vote in the Senate and they defeat it--John Bolton--
I would continue to insist we're entitled to that information. 
It's just a matter of principle.
    Let me now turn to the nomination. [Laughter.]
    By the way, this is a big deal to me. I think it's a big 
deal to this committee. We've fought so long and so hard to 
regain--and you've established the stature of this committee, 
Mr. Chairman, under your leadership. It feel in some, what you 
might call, disrepair in the '70s and '80s. We weren't taken 
seriously by Armed Services, by the Intelligence Committee, by 
the Appropriations Committee. And, because of your statute, Mr. 
Chairman, and, I hope, with a little bit of help from me, we've 
reasserted the role, responsibility, and place of this 
committee. And the idea that two guys in the Intelligence 
Committee are going to tell me I can't see this information? 
Give me a break. Give me a break.
    My concern is not about the United Nations. My concern is 
about the U.S. interests at the United Nations. And I believe 
it will be damaged if John Bolton is sent to the United 
Nations.
    Based on the hearings we've held and the interviews we've 
conducted and the documents we've examined, it is clear to me 
that John Bolton is engaged in four distinct patterns of 
conduct that should disqualify him from this job.
    First, Mr. Bolton repeatedly sought the removal of 
intelligence analysts who disagreed with him. The removal of 
them. Taking away their portfolios.
    Second, in speeches and in testimony Mr. Bolton repeatedly 
tried to stretch the intelligence to fit his views, and 
repeatedly went back to the Intelligence community to get the 
facts he wanted, or, as one witness said, ``politicizing the 
process.''
    And, lest you think that's an exaggeration, let me ask all 
you--a rhetorical question of all you reporters out there. You 
write a report about this hearing, and you go back, and it's 
for a major Sunday piece, and your editor says, ``Do you really 
have to mention Lugar or Biden or Jones or whoever in that?'' 
And you say, ``Yeah, I think it's relevant to the story.'' And 
then this afternoon he says to you, ``Now, are you sure you 
really have to mention those two guys?'' And tomorrow morning 
you come in, and he says, ``Look, I read it again. Are you 
sure--are you sure, you reporter, you have to mention this?'' 
And you say, ``Yeah, I think so.'' And then he comes to you in 
the afternoon, before you leave--or evening--and says, ``Look, 
I'm going to ask you one more time, are you sure?''
    Now, I know many of you want to appear in the second 
edition of Profiles in Courage at your newspaper, but I suspect 
it would have a chilling effect on you, especially if you were 
not a nationally known, highly valued at-the-moment reporter at 
your newspaper. That's what I mean by ``politicizing.''
    Third, in his relations with colleagues and subordinates in 
and out of government, Mr. Bolton repeatedly exhibited abusive 
behavior and an intolerance of different views, as my friend 
from Ohio has said.
    And, fourth, Mr. Bolton repeatedly made misleading, 
disingenuous, or nonresponsive statements to this committee.
    But don't take my word for any of this. Look closely at the 
senior Republican--senior officials in this Republican 
administration who have testified before this committee and its 
joint staff. Carl Ford, a respected intelligence professional 
with three decades of government service, who described himself 
as a huge fan--quote, ``huge fan of Vice President Cheney.'' He 
described for us not only the attempt by Mr. Bolton to remove 
Mr. Westermann, one of his analysts, who worked for Mr. Ford, 
but the unprofessional manner in which he treated his analysts. 
Quote, ``Secretary Bolton chose to reach five or six levels 
below him in the bureaucracy, bringing an analyst into his 
office and giving him a tongue-lashing. He was so far over the 
line that he's one--that he's one of the sort of memorable 
moments in my career.'' Continuing the quote, ``I've never seen 
anybody quite like Mr. Bolton--doesn't even come close; I don't 
have a second, third, or fourth, in terms of the way he abuses 
his power, authority--and authority with little people,'' end 
of quote.
    Afterwards, Mr. Ford said the news of Mr. Westermann's 
incident, quote, ``spread like wildfire,'' end of quote, in the 
bureau; so much so that Secretary Powell made a special point 
of coming down to an assembled group of people at NIR--or INR, 
and pointing out the analyst by name, and saying to the other 
analysts that he wanted them to continue, in essence, to speak 
truth to power.
    Let me go right to the testimony here that was before us, 
Mr. Wilkerson's characterization of this, which is that Powell 
always went down. This was nothing unusual.
    Powell's chief of staff, what did he say before our joint 
staff? He said, ``That is to say, one of his leadership''--
referring to Powell--``one of his leadership techniques was to 
walk around the building. He went to the basement and talked to 
the men who clean up in the basement to find out how they felt, 
how his morale was, and so forth. And he'd do it periodically 
throughout the building. This was not that sort of unprompted 
trip. This was a trip because several of his subordinate 
leaders--in this case, I think, Carl Ford, in particular--had 
indicated to him that he thought it might be necessary.''
    So much for the fact that he was just wandering down there 
and did this all the time. He may have, in the context that his 
chief of staff--Powell's chief of staff said he went down.
    Listen to John McLaughlin, a career CIA professional, who 
served as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and, for a 
time, as Acting Director--both positions under President Bush. 
When Mr. McLaughlin was told that Mr. Bolton was seeking to 
have a national intelligence officer for Latin America 
transferred, Mr. McLaughlin recalls that he firmly rejected, 
and I quote, ``the request by saying, `Well, we're not going to 
do that. Absolutely not. No way. End of story.' '' Mr. 
McLaughlin explains why he's so adamantly opposed the request, 
and it's important to his rationale why he opposed this 
request. He said, ``It's perfectly all right for a policymaker 
to express disagreement with NIO or an analyst, and it's 
perfectly all right for them to challenge their work 
vigorously, but I think it's different to then request, because 
of a disagreement, that the person be transferred. And unless 
there is a malfeasance involved here--and in this case, I had a 
high regard for the individual's work; therefore, I had a 
strong negative reaction to the suggestion of moving him.'' 
Hear what he said, ``it's different to then request transfer 
because of disagreement.''
    Listen to Robert Hutchings, chairman of the National 
Intelligence Council, from 2003 to 2005. These are high-level 
intelligence analysts who do the national intelligence 
estimates that administration people get, and we get. He said, 
in the summer of 2003, Mr. Bolton and his team prepared a 
speech on Syria and weapons of mass destruction that, quote, 
``struck me as going well beyond where the evidence would 
ultimately take us. And that was the judgment of the experts on 
my staff, as well. So I said that--under these circumstances, 
that we should not clear this kind of testimony.''
    Hutchings said--went on to say Mr. Bolton took, quote, 
``isolated facts and made much more of them to build a case 
than I thought the intelligence warranted. It was, sort of, 
cherry-picking of little factoids, and little isolated bits 
were drawn out to present the starkest possible case,'' end of 
quote.
    Let me make it clear. No one is saying Mr. Bolton could not 
have his own views on intelligence. All this is about is Mr. 
Bolton, when he--when he made an intelligence analyst--analysis 
in public, had to say, ``I believe this to be case, 
notwithstanding the intelligence community doesn't.'' No one 
ever said a policymaker should be muzzled by the intelligence 
community.
    Let's get this straight, what we're talking about here. 
This is all about whether Mr. Bolton can say the ``intelligence 
community thinks.'' That's the only reason the intelligence 
community's in this.
    I can stand up, as my friend from--my chairman indicated, 
and say, ``We vigorously disagree.'' We can vigorously 
disagree, but I would never walk out of a hearing, nor would 
any member of this committee, after being briefed by the 
intelligence community, saying that there were no weapons of 
mass destruction in Xanadu, the nonexistent country, and walk 
out and say, ``You know, I just got briefed. There are weapons 
of mass destruction in Xanadu.'' I'm allowed to walk out and 
say, ``Speaking for myself, notwithstanding the fact that the 
intelligence community doesn't believe Xanadu has weapons of 
mass destruction, I think they do, and here's why.'' That's 
what this is about.
    I used to have a friend named Sid Bailick, who was a great 
trial lawyer, and I went to work with him early on, as a young 
man, and he'd say to a jury all the time, back in the days 
where--you know, Mitch Miller's long gone, and Lawrence Welk--
he'd say, ``Follow the bouncing ball. Don't take your eye off 
the ball here.'' The ball is not, Are we attempting--or anyone 
attempting to muzzle Mr. Bolton as to what his opinion is? 
That's not what the intelligence community was doing. It was 
attempting to say, ``Don't say we believe that.''
    Listen to Larry Wilkerson, the chief of staff of the 
Secretary of State, a retired marine colonel. He said that Mr. 
Bolton, quote--and I'm quoting--not my quote; his quote--``is a 
lousy leader,'' end of quote, and had objected to him being 
U.N. Ambassador because, quote, ``there are,'' quote, ``100 to 
150 people in New York that have to be led, and led well,'' end 
of quote. He described Mr. Bolton as a man who, quote, ``counts 
beans,'' continue to quote, ``with no willingness, and, in many 
cases, no capacity, to understand that other things that were 
happening around those beans. And that is just a recipe for 
problems at the United Nations,'' end of quote. A Republican, 
colonel, chief of staff for the Secretary of State, with 
indirect responsibility of supervising Mr. Bolton. Mr. 
Wilkerson knows of what he speaks, as chief of staff. He kept, 
as everyone said, and he said, an open door, literally an open 
door, and he describes a regular flow of officials walking 
through it to complain about Mr. Bolton's behavior.
    These aren't anecdotal incidences. Mr. Wilkerson told us 
that because of the problems with Mr. Bolton's speeches not 
always being properly cleared, that Deputy Secretary Armitage, 
quote, ``made a decision that John Bolton would not give any 
testimony, nor give any speech, that wasn't cleared first by 
Rich,'' referring to the Deputy Secretary of State, Rich 
Armitage. And he later told--that is, Mr. Wilkerson told the 
New York Times, and I quote, `` that, if anything, the 
restrictions on Mr. Bolton got more stringent as time went 
on.'' Quoting, ``No one else was subjected to these type 
restrictions,'' end of quote.
    Listen to John Wolf, a career Foreign Service Officer for 
35 years, who worked closely with Mr. Bolton during two 
different tours. His most recent tour was from 2001 to 2004, 
when he was Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation. 
Mr. Wolf told the committee staff, Republicans and Democrats, 
that Mr. Bolton blocked an assignment of a man he described as 
a truly outstanding civil servant some nine months after an 
inadvertent mistake by that officer. Mr. Wolf says that Mr. 
Bolton asked him to remove two other officials because of 
disagreements over policy. And then Mr. Bolton, quote, ``tended 
not to be enthusiastic about alternative views,'' end of quote. 
Talk about State-Department-speak.
    Listen to Mr. Wil Taft, who served as the State 
Department's legal advisor under Secretary Powell, and, before 
that, as general counsel in two other government departments, 
as well as Deputy Secretary of Defense and as former Ambassador 
to NATO. He told the committee that he had to take the 
extraordinary step--the extraordinary step--of going to Deputy 
Secretary Armitage to have Armitage remind Mr. Bolton that Mr. 
Bolton was required to work with Mr. Taft on lawsuits in which 
the State Department was the defendant. Why? Because Mr. Bolton 
decided he could deal with the Justice Department himself on 
the case and unilaterally decided to tell one of Mr. Taft's 
attorneys, working for Mr. Taft, that his attorney was, quote, 
``off the case.''
    Mr. Bolton is an attorney, and a very good attorney. He was 
once an attorney--he was one general counsel to AID, an 
assistant attorney general in the civil division. He should 
have understood the simple concept that the lawyers for Colin 
Powell would need to work on the lawsuit that was filed against 
Colin Powell. Yet, he had the arrogance to think that he knew 
better, and dismissed the State Department's own lawyer, and, 
consequently, had to be reminded, by Mr. Armitage, who was 
boss.
    Read the memo from Mr. Rich Armitage to Mr. Bolton in the 
package of documents the State Department gave us last Friday. 
Then ask yourself whether this is a guy who's likely to follow 
directions from Washington.
    Listen to Tom Hubbard, another career Foreign Service 
Officer of long service, whose last post was as Ambassador to 
South Korea. And I have never heard--nary a negative word, that 
I've heard, has been said about him.
    During the hearing on April 11, Senator Chafee asked Mr. 
Bolton about a speech in Seoul on the eve of the Six-Party 
talks. Mr. Bolton replied, quote, ``And I can tell you what our 
Ambassador to South Korea Tom Hubbard said after the speech. He 
said, `Thanks a lot for the speech, John. It's helps us a lot 
out here.' ''
    What did that trigger? Mr. Hubbard contacting the 
committee. He either read it or heard the answer to your 
question, Senator Chafee, and felt obliged to contact the 
committee. Nobody contacted Ambassador Hubbard, to the best of 
my knowledge.
    He comes to us, Democrat and Republican, and he says, 
basically, ``Let's get the facts straight. I remember it quite 
differently.'' And he volunteered--and when he volunteered, he 
made it clear that he disagreed wholesomely with the tone of 
Mr. Bolton's speech, thought Mr. Bolton's speech was unhelpful 
to the negotiation process, and felt that Mr. Bolton surely 
knew that.
    According to a memorandum for the record prepared by the 
Republican staff of the committee who first interviewed Mr. 
Hubbard, on April 26th, without a Democratic staff present, 
Hubbard said that he felt compelled to contact the committee, 
felt compelled to contact the Republican staff. So much for 
Democratic, you know, digging things up here. He felt compelled 
to go to the Republican staff. And he said that he's--because, 
quote, ``It's misleading, to say the least, to have me praising 
him for the speech.'' Let me read that again. Mr. Hubbard said, 
on his own initiative contacting the Republican staff, quote, 
``It's misleading, to say the least, to have me praising him 
for the speech,'' end of quote.
    If you're keeping track, now, that's seven senior officials 
who have served at the Department of State or the CIA in this 
administration, who have testified to the committee about Mr. 
Bolton's actions. They told us that Mr. Bolton, one, seeks 
retribution against intelligence analysts or policy officials 
who disagree with him. They told us he pushes the envelope on 
intelligence information.
    I don't recall--I've been here for seven Presidents. I'm 
not going to embarrass any of my colleagues what they recall; 
I'll tell you what I don't recall. I don't recall, ever, a 
senior official in a State Department, or Defense Department, 
for that matter, being told by the Secretary of State and/or 
the Deputy Secretary of State or Defense, that you cannot say a 
single thing before a--before the Senate
    Committees or House committees, or make a single public 
speech without clearing it first. Maybe that's happened. If it 
is, it's the best-kept secret in 32 years, since I've been 
here.
    Thirdly, what did they say, these seven senior officials? 
He doesn't like to hear dissent. He doesn't like to follow 
rules. He's a bad manager of people. He can't see the forest 
for the trees. And he mischaracterizes the views of his 
colleagues.
    This is neither hearsay nor innuendo; as suggested in our 
prior meeting, that it was hearsay or innuendo. This is what a 
judge would call direct evidence and testimony and documentary 
evidence--direct evidence. And it's all there for every Senator 
to see.
    Some people might ask, as Senator Lugar did, and may 
assert, that none of this matters. Nobody lost a job. Mr. 
Bolton gave these speeches he was authorized to give--after 
yelling at the State Department lawyer, the lawyer is put back 
in the case. And the young career officer that Mr. Bolton 
blackballed from a career-advancing assignment ultimately 
landed on his feet. No harm, no foul.
    If you think his actions don't matter, then why would so 
many serious people, not working in the government, come 
forward, with little to gain and a lot to lose, to tell their 
stories? We didn't subpoena a single person. We didn't pursue 
anyone to come. We asked, they came. And they came forward 
either without being asked or being asked because their name 
came up. They came forward because they think Mr. Bolton 
actions matter a lot.
    If you think his actions don't matter, why was it necessary 
for Rich Armitage to issue a special decree applied to Mr. 
Bolton's speeches? Because words matter, especially when spoken 
by a high-government official.
    If you think his actions don't matter, why did Armitage, 
according to Larry Wilkerson, chief of staff of the Secretary 
of State, get mad at his Asian expert, Jim Kelly, for clearing 
the Seoul speech? Because it almost impeded the Six-Party 
talks, led Secretary Powell having to send an envoy to New York 
after that speech to encourage the North Koreans to come to the 
talks.
    If you think his actions don't matter, why did Mr. Armitage 
postpone Mr. Bolton's testimony on Syria? By the way, Mr. 
Bolton told us that he canceled his own testimony. But Larry 
Wilkerson said that Secretary Armitage is the one who canceled 
it, because there was, quote, ``some diplomacy at the time that 
might not have served us well, and, also, the testimony was a 
bit off the policy line, and so, needed to be corrected 
somewhat.'' In other words, we didn't let him make the--give 
the testimony.
    Remember, this is summer of 2003, when Iraq--when we're in 
Iraq. Some people are talking about who's next. Syria's high on 
the list. Mr. Bolton wants to give a statement about Syria's 
alleged weapons-of-mass-destruction programs that Mr. Hutchings 
says was not supported by the intelligence. This is just a few 
months after faulty intelligence helped make the case for the 
war in Iraq, and Mr. Bolton is trying to push the intelligence 
envelope on Syria; and Armitage intervenes to stop it, thank 
goodness.
    Connect the dots, folks. Of course it matters. We don't 
know exactly what Mr. Bolton wanted to say, because these are 
among the documents the State Department's refused to turn 
over. But we do know the--what the intelligence community said. 
They said, ``No way. Don't characterize us that way.'' Why are 
they hiding, not providing those documents?
    If you think these actions didn't matter, then why did 
Colin Powell make a special point, to use Carl Ford's words, to 
go down to the Intelligence Bureau to tell--INR--to tell them 
do their jobs? Carl Ford said that he made visits to INR 
before, but both Ford and Larry Wilkerson, who was chief of 
staff, said this instance was a special trip.
    If you think these actions don't matter, why did John Wolf 
have to assign a brilliant mid-level officer to another bureau? 
Because he said, quote--he, Wolf, said--``He didn't want this 
brilliant young analyst manning an empty desk.'' He stayed on a 
good career tack only because Mr. Wolf worked to secure him an 
assignment away from Mr. Bolton's reach, according to Mr. Wolf.
    If you think actions don't matter, then listen to Mr. 
Hutchings on the dangerous policymakers--on the dangers of 
policymakers pushing to stretch the intelligence, even if they 
fail. Here's what he said, ``When policy officials come back 
repeatedly to push the same kind of judgments and push the 
intelligence community to confirm a particular set of 
judgments, it does have an affect of politicizing intelligence, 
because the so-called correct answer becomes all too clear. And 
even when it's successfully resisted, it has an effect.'' 
Continuing to quote, ``It creates a climate of intimidation and 
a culture of conformity that is damaging,'' end of quote.
    It matters, even if they didn't get fired.
    Is Mr. Bolton really worthy of this trouble? Is this really 
the best we can do? Are there no other tough-minded 
professionals in the Republican party?
    It's been said, usually in the same breath about Mr. 
Bolton's reputation of straight talk, that if you oppose Mr. 
Bolton, you oppose U.N. reform. Let me remind you all, it was 
Joe Biden and Jesse Helms--Joe Biden and Jesse Helms--over the 
objection of the chairman and my colleague, Mr. Sarbanes, their 
objection, that got tough on the U.N., wrote the reform 
legislation that the chairman and my senior member opposed. I 
don't need a lesson, from Mr. Bolton or anybody else, how to 
get tough with the U.N., nor does Senator Helms.
    Mr. Bolton isn't the only guy who can push the U.N. reform. 
Matter of fact, he's the worst guy. In fact, the Secretary of 
State has said as much, because--no one talks about this--I 
wanted to get that--I know the vote's almost over--four days 
after Mr. Bolton's nomination was announced, the Secretary of 
State appointed someone else to handle the issue of U.N. 
reform. On March 11th, the Secretary appointed Dr. Tahir Kheli 
to, quote, ``serve as the Secretary's senior advisor and chief 
interlocutor on U.N. reform in collaboration with the Assistant 
Secretary for International Organizations.'' Dr. Tahir Khalid 
reports directly to the Secretary of State. Continuing, the 
Secretary said, ``She will engage the U.N. Secretary General 
and the Secretary on U.N. reform efforts, including the high-
level panel report and the report of the Secretary General on 
Reform. She will coordinate within the State Department and the 
interagency community the U.S. Government's position on 
reform.''
    So much for that being the rationale for why Bolton was 
appointed. I understand why people would say that. It's the 
last straw I think you can grasp at.
    The press release makes no mention--the Secretary's press 
release makes no mention of Mr. Bolton or the U.N. Ambassador. 
So let's not kid each other. It's not about U.N. reform; it's 
about whether the appointment of Mr. Bolton is in the national 
interest. Is it in the national interest to have, as some 
Republican administration officials have characterized, have a 
bully--their words--and a lousy leader--their words--running 
our mission in New York, with 150 people who need strong 
leadership?
    Concluding, Mr. President--Mr. Chairman, I don't believe 
it's in the interest, the national interest, to have an 
ideologue who appears to have no governor on his internal 
engine representing the United States at the U.N.
    Is it in the national interest to have someone who has a 
reputation for exaggerating intelligence, seeking and speaking 
for the U.N. when the next crisis arises, whether it's Iran or 
Syria? And it will arise. We have already lost a lot of 
credibility at home and abroad after the fiasco over the 
intelligence on Iraq, and Mr. Bolton is not the man to help us 
to rebuild it. He's the wrong choice. We can do a lot better. 
And I think an awful lot of our colleagues know that, 
notwithstanding the administration wanting him.
    I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don't know how much time is 
left of the hour we had.
    The Chairman.  The Senator has at least 13 minutes, but we 
just said ``more or less,'' and----
    Senator Biden. Well, I would yield to my friend, Senator 
Specter--not Senator Specter--Senator Sarbanes--he's my friend, 
too----
    [Laughter.]
    Senator Biden  [continuing]. To Senator Sarbanes, as much 
time as he needs.
    I'm going to vote.
    Senator Sarbanes. Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman.  Senator Sarbanes.

 STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL S. SARBANES, U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND

    Senator Sarbanes. Mr. Chairman, I want to take just a 
moment or two of the committee's time, at the outset, to read 
the names of those who have served as the U.S. Ambassador to 
the United Nations, in order to set some context in thinking 
about this nomination: Warren Austin, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., 
James Wadsworth, Adlai Stevenson, Arthur Goldberg, George W. 
Ball, James Russell Wiggins, Charles Yost, George Bush, John 
Scali, Daniel P. Moynihan, William W. Scranton, Andrew J. 
Young, Donald F. McHenry, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Vernon Walters, 
Thomas Pickering, Edward Joseph Perkins, Madeleine Albright, 
Bill Richardson, Richard Holbrooke, John Negroponte, and John 
Danforth.
    Now, I do this to underscore the importance of the U.N. 
ambassadorship, and it's an importance that I think has been 
recognized in prior administrations. In fact, in some 
administrations the U.N. Ambassador has been given Cabinet 
status--not in all, but in some, the position has been elevated 
to Cabinet status. It's a very highly-visible position. In the 
U.N., our Ambassador to the U.N. is, in effect, our spokesman, 
in so many ways, to the world.
    Now, this has been underscored, the importance of the U.N., 
by these selections. The U.N. makes decisions that affect war 
and peace. It has a vital role in advancing U.S. foreign-policy 
objectives, if we are skillful in exercising our leadership at 
the U.N. It helps to determine whether the United States will 
have international support and allies, or will be forced to 
undertake difficult missions on its own, in the face of broad 
opposition across the globe. The United Nations is a forum for 
making our case to the world, for demonstrating international 
leadership and building multilateral cooperation.
    Our representatives at the United Nations must be men and 
women of exceptional integrity and credibility who can listen 
and persuade, whose counsel and leadership other nations will 
seek and rely on. This is a very important position. And the 
quality of the previous ambassadors demonstrates that that is 
how it's been so regarded in administration after 
administration, whether Democratic or Republican.
    Now, over a number of years, Mr. Bolton has demonstrated 
outright hostility for the United Nations as an institution and 
for the legitimacy of international law. He has argued 
repeatedly that the United States has no legal obligation to 
pay its dues to the United Nations, that treaties are nothing 
more than political commitments. He called the Law of the Sea 
Treaty, which has been endorsed by our military and submitted 
by President Bush as an urgent priority for Senate advice and 
consent, an illegitimate method of forcing fundamental policy 
changes on the United States outside the customary political 
process. He is quoted as saying that, ``It is a big mistake for 
us to grant any validity to international law, even when it may 
seem in our short-term interest to do so, because, over the 
long term, the goal of those who think that international law 
really means anything are those who want to constrict the 
United States.''
    To send someone as our Ambassador to the United Nations who 
does not demonstrate a basic respect for the institution and 
its legal foundations is a disservice to our national 
interests. This has nothing to do with whether you're going to 
carry out reforms at the U.N. or more closely monitor its 
activities. This represents very basic questions about one's 
mindset about the United States, about the United Nations, and 
about international law.
    Secondly, I think it's very clear that Mr. Bolton does not 
have the diplomatic skills or, indeed, the demeanor to 
represent our country effectively. There are certainly moments 
when the situation may call for bluntness, when abandoning 
diplomatic niceties can convey the urgency of a particular 
issue or position; however, Mr. Bolton has shown a propensity 
for making extreme and provocative statements that have caused 
unnecessary conflict and confrontation.
    Does it help us in trying to shape the direction in which 
the U.N. is to move when Mr. Bolton says that the Security 
Council should have one permanent member--the United States--
because that's real reflection of the distribution of power in 
the world?
    Does anyone think that Mr. Bolton's assertion that if the 
U.N. Secretariat building in New York lost 10 stories, it 
wouldn't make a bit of difference? Does that help us in 
persuading other countries to support U.N. reform efforts?
    These are not isolated misstatements or slips of the 
tongue, but, rather, his customary and consistent approach to 
dealing with others who disagree with him. Even given the 
opportunity to demonstrate a less confrontational approach, he 
has repeatedly declined to do so. Mr. Bolton, time and time 
again, has shown himself singularly lacking in the willingness 
to hear, to consider, and to respect opposing points of view.
    Contrast that attitude with these comments to the 
committee, in their confirmations hearings, by Ambassador 
Moynihan and by Ambassador Kirkpatrick.
    Now, I might note, Mr. Chairman, that all of these previous 
nominees to be U.N. Ambassadors were approved by overwhelming 
votes in the committee and on the floor of the U.S. Senate. Not 
a one of them had a close vote; many of them, unanimous; and in 
the instances where it wasn't, only a handful of votes.
    Pat Moynihan, in his confirmation hearing before the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee--and I set out these quotes to 
contrast them with all the testimony we received about how Mr. 
Bolton carries on his activities--said, and I quote, ``A 
certain principal statement of views on both sides can be 
useful. It requires that we respect what others think, and try 
to understand what they think, and ask that they do the same in 
return. Things where we disagree are marginal compared with 
where we do agree, and yet it is so easy to grow estranged at 
the first problem. The first question is how to get away from 
the confrontation system, back to the quest for understanding 
in a situation where this is wholly possible and entirely 
necessary.''
    And Ambassador Kirkpatrick, in her confirmation hearing 
before this committee, said, and I quote, ``I do not think that 
one should ever seek confrontation. What I have every intention 
and hope of doing is to operate in a low-key, quiet, 
persuasive, and consensus-building way.''
    Now, thirdly--and I want to speak to the prospects of Mr. 
Bolton's credibility as our spokesperson at the United 
Nations--the material has been quite extensively developed--and 
I'll not go into it in detail here--but it's clear that he's 
attempted to politicize intelligence in a way that I think has 
harmed our nation's diplomacy.
    He sought to transfer two intelligence analysts who 
disagreed with him on substantive matters. There was such a 
feeling of fear and intimidation in the Department that the 
Secretary of State actually visited with the analysts to give 
them reassurance. He's repeatedly attempted to stretch the 
facts to back his own ideological predispositions.
    You know, in testimony here, when he had the hearing, he 
denied that he tried to have analysts punished, or to 
discipline a CIA employee, or that he thought--or sought 
retribution against employees with dissenting views. He told 
us, and I quote, ``I shrugged my shoulders, and I moved on,'' 
when his attempts to have them reassigned were rebuffed. And 
yet we have learned, from extensive interviews with numerous 
administration officials, he did try to have the analysts 
removed from their positions, he did seek to punish people for 
disagreeing with him, and he did persist in his efforts for 
many months after he supposedly made his point and moved on.
    That he was ultimately unsuccessful does not speak for Mr. 
Bolton. The question is not solely whether the truth is in the 
results. What it speaks to is the steadiness and determination 
of those professionals who withstood his demands and refused to 
bend to this inordinate pressure that he was applying.
    Given this conduct, when he goes before the U.N. to make a 
statement about evidence of nuclear weapons production or a 
terrorist plot, or whatever it may be, who's going to believe 
him, knowing that he repeatedly punished intelligence analysts 
who delivered contradictory information, knowing that he is the 
kind of person who, as Robert Hutchings, the former chairman of 
the National Intelligence Council, put it, ``took isolated 
facts and made much more of them to build a case than I thought 
the intelligence warranted. It was a cherry-picking of little 
factoids and little isolated bits that were drawn out to 
present the starkest possible case.''
    We need a credible spokesman at the United Nations, and 
this past conduct on his part casts serious doubt.
    Finally, Mr. Bolton's poor administrative and management 
skills, in my view, make him unfit to exercise a senior 
leadership role. The testimony from Carl Ford, Assistant 
Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, has 
previously been referred to. He said that, ``In my experience 
throughout my time in the executive branch, I have really never 
seen someone so abusive to such a subordinate person.'' He said 
he didn't have anyone else in mind who even comes close to John 
Bolton, in terms of the way that he abuses his power and his 
authority with little people.
    Larry Wilkerson, who was Secretary Powell's chief of staff, 
described to the committee staff the kind of problems he had on 
a daily basis in dealing with Bolton, ``Assistant secretaries, 
principal deputy assistant secretaries, acting assistant 
secretaries coming into my office and telling me, `Can I sit 
down?' And I would say to them, `Sure. Sit down. What's the 
problem?' `I've got to leave.' `What's the problem?' `Bolton.' 
'' When asked if he got similar complaints about other under 
secretaries, he replied, ``On one occasion, on one particular 
individual. The rest were all about Under Secretary Bolton.'' 
In summarizing his experience with Bolton, Wilkerson stated, 
``I think he's a lousy leader. And there are 100 to 150 people 
up there that have to be led. They have to be led well, and 
they have to be led properly.''
    Being Ambassador to the United Nations is not just a 
representational job, it's also a managerial job. There are 125 
full-time permanent State Department employees working there at 
our mission, alongside of numerous detailees from other 
agencies and departments. The Ambassador has supervisory 
responsibility over all these people. Most are career civil 
servants, and they are there to represent the policies of our 
President and to serve the interests of our nation. What are 
they going to do up there in New York if John Bolton repeats 
the kind of abusive behavior that led people in the State 
Department, under incredible duress, to seek the support and 
counsel of their assistant secretaries and the Deputy Secretary 
and the Secretary's chief of staff? There will no one in New 
York to shield them from the wrath and vindictiveness of John 
Bolton.
    Mr. Chairman, let me just say, because, to some now, it's a 
favorite pastime to assault the United Nations, but the United 
Nations has a very important role to play.
    Skillful U.S. leadership can enhance our national interests 
in very significant ways. And part of that skillful leadership 
is to send an ambassador who has the skill and the wisdom and 
all of the other talents that are essential to carrying out his 
responsibilities in an effective manner. I think this nominee 
falls far short of that standard, and that is why I oppose his 
confirmation.
    And let me just add a word on my respect for those 
witnesses who came forward. Now, Senator Biden is absolutely 
right, these people, in effect, volunteered themselves to give 
what they felt would be an accurate view of Mr. Bolton's 
behavior, particularly the interpersonal behavior. It took a 
lot of courage, in my view, for people like Carl Ford and Mr. 
Wilkerson, Mr. Hutchings, Ambassador Hubbard, and others to 
come forward. I'm concerned that they're going to pay a price 
for that, for a very brave action. I deeply regret if that 
should turn out to be the case. I think they--their motive in 
coming was the national interest of their country. In that 
sense, I think they were true patriots. They had nothing to 
gain by opposing the nomination; in fact, they may have much to 
lose. They clearly were not ideologues with an ax to grind. In 
fact, they were very supportive of the policies of the 
President. But they felt that it was their duty, as loyal 
Americans and as public servants, to tell the truth and to take 
the--and to follow their consciences. And I respect that. And I 
want to place that on the record and to thank them for this 
service to their country.
    Thank you very much.
    The Chairman.  Well, thank you very much, Senator Sarbanes.
    Let me ask the Clerk how much time now remains on both 
sides? An hour and 32 minutes remains on both sides. Each? 
Okay. Very well.
    I'd recognize Senator Allen, the distinguished Senator from 
Virginia.

   STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE ALLEN, U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA

    Senator Allen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for 
your patience and the professional manner in which you have 
handled this nomination. You've maintained, I believe, a great 
sense of fairness and full disclosure, which I think is in the 
interest of this committee, the American people, and also this 
nominee.
    The situation here is one where I know some of the other 
side of the aisle will be quoting Senator Voinovich, and some 
seem to worry about these interpersonal skills. You hear 
worries and concerns about John Bolton's speech characterizing 
living in North Korea as ``a hellish nightmare.'' I will remind 
folks that then the North Koreans said that he was ``human 
scum.''
    The reality is, as I--I would think that it is a hellish 
nightmare to have to live in North Korea. And this committee 
has had hearings about how awful it is for those who actually 
do get to escape. They go to China, then China sends them back 
to be tortured, or worse.
    I also will note, just for the history, in some of the 
cases, from some of the colleagues on this committee, in 2001, 
when John Bolton was nominated for Under Secretary of State for 
Arms Control and International Security, before all these 
concerns about speech-writing and--``interpersonal skills'' was 
the phrase used--arose, many of them voted against him then. 
And I would take note of that.
    I appreciate the opportunity to discuss John Bolton and his 
qualifications actually to serve as Ambassador to the United 
Nations. What has been lost, Mr. Chairman, though, in this 
debate, virtually from the very beginning, is the desperate 
need for reform in the United Nations. The testimony before the 
committee, and subsequent interviews conducted by staff, in all 
of this there's virtually no mention or discussion of what 
needs to be done to reform the United Nations.
    I do believe, contrary to my colleague from Maryland, 
Senator Sarbanes, that John Bolton does have the skills. He has 
the wisdom to effectuate these changes. More importantly, he 
also has the principles. I think he's the right person to 
unflinchingly lead those changes as our representative.
    Rather than focusing on all these innuendos and assertions 
against John Bolton and worrying about, gosh, people whose 
sensibilities are easily offended and this fascination with how 
speeches are crafted and noting that he said the same thing 
about Cuban biological weapons capabilities as did Mr. Ford, we 
ought to focus--the one who really ought to be getting the 
scrutiny is the United Nations. The United Nations is the one 
that we need to be worrying about them straying. And, rather 
than worrying about controlling John Bolton, I'd prefer to 
pursue the U.N. abuse and their anti-Americanism. And I'm much 
more concerned about the United Nations being used as a front 
for dictatorships and terrorism.
    The United Nations--you know, we've just witnessed scandal 
after scandal being uncovered. Unfortunately, these are not 
things that can be addressed very easily by internal changes. 
They are issues that have shaken the credibility of the United 
Nations body and caused many of our citizens here in the United 
States, and, indeed, people around the world, to wonder whether 
the United Nations has any real relevance or redeeming role in 
world affairs.
    The United Nations was founded on many principles, one of 
which was to promote universal human rights and freedoms for 
all people. And while the United Nations does a number of 
admirable things, it's also beholden to tyrants and dictators 
and repressive regimes in certain circumstances.
    Not considering even the scandals, this is an organization 
that has allowed the world's worst violators of human rights to 
chair the Commission on Human Rights. When the United States 
has made a commitment to the spread of freedom and justice 
throughout the world, it's difficult for our citizens to see 
the United Nations as anything but a waste of their tax dollars 
when countries like Libya and Sudan chair the Human Rights 
Commission. And, just recently, just last week, Zimbabwe 
selected as a member of the Human Rights Commission. Surely, 
not an indication that Secretary General Kofi Annan's call for 
reform on the Commission of Human Rights is being heeded.
    We're public servants. Obviously, we have to make decisions 
here. We're also stewards of the taxpayers' money. The United 
States is the largest contributor. And it was something that 
Senator Helms and Senator Biden worked out in the funding of 
the United Nations. Over $2 billion a year. Just for their 
regular budget, it's $439 million; but over $2 billion a year 
go to the United Nations. Twenty-two percent of their funding 
comes from American taxpayers.
    As the largest contributor to the United Nations, we ought 
to hold them accountable to certain principles and certain 
policies. One principle surely should be the Commission on 
Human Rights, and to have reasonable requirements that human 
rights are actually honored in the countries who serve on that 
commission.
    I think all Americans want reforms enacted that would 
prevent future abuse programs, such as the Oil-for-Food scandal 
that plowed in--allowed Saddam and his thugs to skim off $20 
billion. We ought to hold the U.N. peacekeepers who commit 
crimes against children accountable. The American people, I 
think, demand swift and severe action against this. And, 
indeed, if our U.S. Government had ever done anything like 
this, our citizens would certainly hold our government 
accountable for it, and we certainly ought to do the same with 
the United Nations.
    We have to look--to work with like-minded reformers at the 
U.N. to make sure policies are implemented to prevent similar 
abuses in the future. And reform is what is necessary. The 
United Nations is in a crisis, and our country and our 
taxpayers have a strong interest in seeing that it emerge as a 
credible and relevant institution once again.
    The U.N. Security Council and International Atomic Energy 
Agency, IAEA, they need--they're very needed in--for discussing 
the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the actions that are 
needed to be taken to ensure that rogue nations do not acquire 
those weapons.
    We have seen, in recent years, that the United Nations can 
provide an important role in helping spread democracy and build 
societies that have been ruined by decades of repression and 
tyranny. The United Nations has an important role to play in 
the future of global affairs and security. But it only can do 
so if it takes serious steps to reform from the extraordinary 
corruption and ineptitude that has plagued it in recent years.
    Now, John Bolton's qualifications. He comes to this 
nomination with a broad and deep knowledge of international 
affairs, from his early days as general counsel to the U.S. 
Agency for International Development under the Reagan 
administration, to his most recent post, of course, as Under 
Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Affairs. 
In all these situations, Mr. Bolton has spent a great deal of 
time and his professional life working on U.S. foreign policy 
and devising strategies to carry out effectively that policy.
    Some have criticized John Bolton as being a rigid 
unilateral--unilateralist who's incapable of building consensus 
with allies. However, his service in this administration shows 
otherwise.
    Mr. Bolton led the U.S. negotiations to develop President 
Bush's Proliferation Security Initiative. That brought in 60 
countries to work with us to help stop, or interdict, the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related 
materials worldwide, and also delivery systems.
    To further combat nuclear proliferation, Mr. Bolton helped 
create the Global Partnership at the G8 Summit in Canada. This 
partnership doubled the size of the nonproliferation effort in 
the former Soviet Union by committing our G8 partners to match 
the United States $1 billion per year Cooperative Threat 
Reduction, or Nunn-Lugar, Program.
    He also played a central role in negotiating the treaty of 
Moscow, which will reduce operationally deployed nuclear 
weapons by two-thirds.
    As Assistant Secretary of State for International 
Organizations, John Bolton led an effort to have the United 
Nations change its odious resolution which likened Zionism to 
racism. And it is hard to get the United Nations, or any group, 
to rescind a resolution, but he was able to do that.
    So, he does have the knowledge, he does have the experience 
to effectively represent the United States in the United 
Nations, and also negotiate the changes that need to be made to 
ensure its relevancy in the future.
    Now, a few of us--a few here may not agree with his 
forthright critique of the United Nations and its failings, but 
it's clear to me that Mr. Bolton has placed a great deal of 
thought into his views. And, in fact, I think his views are 
borne out by the actions, or lack of actions, by the United 
Nations. I think the American people want someone at the United 
Nations who pushes strongly for reform and is not going to be 
seduced by flowery, evasive pontifications from those 
bureaucrats.
    Senator Biden said, ``Well, who was he thinking of? And 
maybe Mr. Bolton should have had another position.'' Well, 
President Bush was elected, and that's who he thought should be 
in this position. And I think that--I'll say for myself--I 
think John Bolton is the type of person, or someone like him, 
should be in this position.
    We are not electing Mr. Congeniality. We do not need Mr. 
Milktoast in the United Nations. We're not electing Mr. Peepers 
to go there and just be really happy and drinking tea with 
their pinkies up and just saying all these meaningless things, 
when we do need a straight-talker and someone who's going to go 
there and shake it up. And it needs shaking up. It needs 
reform.
    We can't just keep spending $2 billion a year of the 
taxpayers' money and have the sort of fraud, abuse, lack of 
accountability, propping up dictators, funneling money to 
corrupt regimes, whether it's Saddam's or others.
    And so, I know that this has been a confirmation process 
that we haven't seen--at least I haven't. I haven't been here 
as long as many in the Senate. And we've pursued all these wild 
claims. They've been exaggerations. The concerns of Mr. 
Westermann or any of these folks, and the speech-crafting--the 
point of the matter, they're all in their jobs. I think they're 
more secure and safe now. But if any of them ever had anyone 
reduce their position, it would be looked upon as retribution, 
so I think, in the grievance procedures, they're safer than 
ever. I thought Mr. Ford was a very engaging, likeable 
individual, but the bottom line was, he wasn't in the meeting 
when the supposed finger-wagging was going on. He couldn't 
remember whether or not the word ``fire'' was used. The bottom 
line is, all these people are still in their positions.
    The exaggerated innuendo that came up in the last hearing 
from Ms. Townsel, I'm not going to repeat all the adequately 
rebutted arguments of our chairman, but Ms. Townsel certainly 
had--did not have much credibility, and the facts simply were 
not as she represented--in fact, clearly were not true.
    So, while we've gone through these overly hyped charges, I 
think they have been refuted, and, really, they don't have much 
bearing, at least in my view, to say there's any compelling 
reason that John Bolton is not the right person to actually 
represent the interests, the principles, and desires of the 
American people in the United Nations. I do think the President 
has selected wisely in John Bolton.
    Now, the way that this is going to proceed--after the last 
hearing we had, where we played for second down--as I 
understand it, the goal here, Mr. Chairman, is to somehow vote 
on John Bolton's nomination and to get him to proceed to the 
Senate floor, where this debate will continue for all of our 
colleagues. And so, I'm encouraged that, notwithstanding some 
of the concerns the Senator from Ohio has about Secretary 
Bolton, I thank him for allowing this nomination to proceed to 
the Senate floor. And we have moved the ball downfield.
    And I thank you, again, Mr. Chairman, for your courtesy and 
your steady, fair leadership on this issue, as well as others.
    Senator Biden. We're looking for an on-sides kick. 
[Laughter.]
    Senator Allen. Say, what?
    Senator Biden. We're looking for an on-sides kick.
    Senator Allen. No, we just got a first down. [Laughter.]
    Haven't scored yet.
    The Chairman.  Thank you, Senator Allen.
    Senator Biden, would you designate----
    Senator Biden. Yes. Senator--we have----
    The Chairman.  Senator Dodd?
    Senator Biden  [continuing]. As I say to my colleagues, we 
have, as I understand it, roughly 15 minutes for all the 
remaining members, each. And if others don't show, then the 
time can be--we can move back. So, if we can try to stay at 15.
    Senator Dodd. Thank you. In fact, if you would put the 
clock on here, and we may try to make it even briefer than 
that.
    Senator Biden. Is that possible, to stick the clock on----
    Senator Dodd. Clock on, so we can keep an eye on our--why 
don't you put it on for 10.
    Senator Biden. Put it on for 10, and we'll see.
    Senator Dodd. And then--try and wrap it up there.

   STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, U.S. SENATOR FROM 
                          CONNECTICUT

    Senator Dodd. First of all, Mr. Chairman, let me begin by 
thanking you, Senator Biden, and your respective staffs. It's 
been over a month--a month ago, yesterday--that we had the 
public hearing, and then, of course, this month-long period in 
which a tremendous amount of work has been done by the 
committee staff. And I would not want the moment here to pass 
without expressing our gratitude to the people who sit behind 
us here, who spent a lot of long hours over the last month in 
gathering the information they have. So, I want them to know 
how much I appreciate the efforts that you've made on behalf of 
us, who sit here in the front seats.
    I appreciate, as well, the chairman's comments during his 
opening remarks about some of my views regarding presidential 
appointees and the process of confirmation.
    I went back and tried to calculate, because of some 
accusations that I was a serial abuser when it came to 
presidential nominees, and, over the 24 years serving under--
eight years under Republican administrations, and eight years 
under a Democratic administration--in senior-level people I've 
voted on one way or another, close to 7,000 presidential 
appointees. And of those 7,000, there were 52 that I voted 
against. Three or four of those, I've written letters and 
apologized to them because I voted against them, and I 
shouldn't have. And I wrote them letters. Everett Koop is one 
that comes to mind immediately. I voted against Everett Koop, 
and regretted, afterwards, having done so, and expressed to him 
in the letter some months later.
    So, I am of a mind, not unlike my friend and colleague from 
Ohio and, I think, most of us here--I think we generally like 
to be supportive of presidential choices. I think that's--
doesn't mean you shouldn't object where you think it's 
appropriate to do so, but, as a general matter, I think we like 
to defer, particularly when it comes to a Cabinet or people who 
are going to be part of the official family, if you will, of an 
administration. And so, I want to be on record as still 
subscribing to the views that the chairman ascribed to me in 
talking about how we ought to handle these matters.
    This is uncomfortable. None of us enjoy this. I think we'd 
much rather be debating policy issues than the fate of one 
individual here to hold a high-level position. We have an awful 
lot of work to do. There are important issues that I think the 
general public would like to see us address. And so, it's 
somewhat disappointing that we find ourselves in this 
situation.
    As I mentioned, Mr. Chairman, I've been here for 24 years. 
And tonight--I keep a, as I think most of us do, a little 
journal. It's not every day. But with my two young children, 
two young daughters, I try to record moments that I think are 
of significance during my tenure here. And I'm going to go home 
tonight and write in my journal about a senatorial moment. We 
don't have them every single day around here, but we had one 
this morning. We had a senatorial moment. And I want to tell my 
colleague from Ohio what a privilege it is to serve with him. 
I've been where you've been on nominations on these matters. 
It's not comfortable. But I look back on those moments, and 
they're some of the proudest moments I've had as a Senator, 
when you stand up against the flow of events and your own 
party--and Senator Biden mentioned moments that he's had as--on 
similar cases. So, I thank him for what he did.
    I want to point out, as well, here that--and Senator 
Sarbanes did this, but I think it's worth noting here--this 
will be resolved in this committee and on the floor of the 
Senate, I presume, in the next number of days. And another 
issue will come along. And those of us who have disagreed on 
this will find matters which we agree on with each other, and 
we'll go about our business. But for an awful lot of people, 
roughly--almost 20 individuals, either presently serving or 
recent appointees of the Bush administration, have either sat 
at this table or sat with our staffs and have done something 
you rarely see. It wasn't just one or two. It's--in my 
experience, I can't think of another example, in my 24 hours on 
this committee, to see as many people of like political stripe, 
of common ideological and philosophical viewpoints, willing to 
come forward and say to us, as a committee, ``Please be careful 
about what you're doing.'' This is a rare moment. And our 
colleagues here need to take note of this.
    And I think it's worth just describing who these people 
are, and quickly going down the list: Stuart Cohen, Acting 
Chairman of the National Intelligence Council at the CIA; Alan 
Foley, former Head of WINPAC at the CIA; John McLaughlin, 
Director of Central Intelligence--Deputy Director and Acting 
Director; Jamie Miscik, former Deputy Director of Intelligence; 
Thomas Hubbard, former U.S. Ambassador to South Korea; John 
Wolf, former Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation; 
Christian Westermann, whom we've talked about, the INR analyst; 
Tom Finger, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and 
Research; Beth Friesa, immediate supervisor to Mr. Westermann; 
a man who's asked that his name not be made public here, but an 
attorney at the State Department who was involved in the issue 
involving Mr. Bolton's efforts to move one of the employees 
there; William Taft, a legal advisor at the State Department; 
Fred Fleitz, the Acting Chief of Staff for Mr. Bolton; Neil 
Silver, the INR Office Director supervising Mr. Westermann; 
Larry Wilkerson, former Chief of Staff to Secretary Powell; 
Robert Hutchings, former Chairman of the National Intelligence 
Council.
    These are all significant people, who have all said to us, 
in their own words, one way or the other, ``This is a bad 
choice.'' And I just think it's important that these people--
whether you agree with them or not, that it's important that we 
encourage people who feel like this to express themselves to a 
committee like us here. And so, I hope that--regardless of the 
outcome of this, that there will be an appreciation of the work 
that they've done.
    And, Mr. Chairman, my--as you know, the very first question 
I asked on the April 11th hearing--in fact, it was the very 
first question the chairman asked at that hearing--had to do 
with what has been my principal concern from the very 
beginning. It's been said by others here today, but let me just 
repeat it. I have--if this were a question of a person's 
style--I think Senator Voinovich made as strong a case that 
could be made about whether or not this kind of a style is what 
you want for someone serving as an Ambassador to the United 
Nations.
    But that's not my objection. I'm--I think if we get into 
the business here of deciding to be for or against people 
because of their styles, this is not going to be terribly 
successful, in terms of how we relate to them, depending upon 
the position, although I don't disagree with his concerns about 
public diplomacy, as my colleague has expressed.
    My concern is that we've just come through an incredible 
period in American history where major decisions were made 
about this nation's foreign policy based on the intelligence we 
are receiving. People are losing their lives every single day 
in a far-off land here, because there was a firm belief, based 
on the intelligence we had, that weapons of mass destruction 
existed. Now, put aside whether or not you think it's right or 
wrong for us to be there today. The reason--the reason--that we 
voted the way we did on that issue was because it was the 
collective wisdom of the intelligence community that weapons of 
mass destruction existed. We now know that not to be the case.
    In the case of Mr. Bolton--putting aside his personality, 
putting aside his style--the fact that he tried to fire--and 
there is just--I don't know how many witnesses you need to have 
stand up here to tell that that's exactly what he did, despite 
what he claimed to do. He tried to fire--fire--intelligence 
analysts because they would not conform to what he wanted to 
say that represented the position of the United States in a 
public speech. We now have further evidence--my colleagues and 
some of them said, ``I need further information.'' During the 
30 interviews that occurred over the last 30 days, we 
discovered e-mails and additional information that, in fact, 
contradict rather significantly what Mr. Bolton said before 
this committee on April 11th, that it wasn't just a casual trip 
to the CIA, it wasn't just ended there. In fact, there were 
significant efforts to penalize, in fact, some of these people 
including taking away their building privileges or their 
identification to go into the State Department. It was--got so 
petty that it went beyond just a casual conversation at the 
CIA.
    That's my major concern here. If we can't make a statement 
to all future nominees who may be serving in critical positions 
today, ``If you do this, you disqualify yourself, in my view. 
Whatever other issues may arise, if you do this, if you try to 
fire people because you didn't like what they had to say, in a 
supervisory position, that disqualifies you, in my view. I 
don't care whether you're a Democrat in the White House, a 
Republican in the White House. Anyone who does that.''
    And my concern is not just that they may be rewarded with a 
position, but what it does down in the positions. Mr. Bolton 
said, ``I lost confidence in Mr. Westermann.'' To lose 
confidence in someone presupposes you had confidence in them 
previously. There's no evidence at all that Mr. Bolton had any 
idea who Mr. Westermann was. In fact, on the chart back here, 
as I pointed out to the committee back on the day we had the 
markup on this nomination, Mr. Bolton's position is a senior 
policy position. Mr. Westermann was down as a GS-14 in the 
analyst office. He didn't know Mr. Westermann. How do you lose 
confidence in someone you have no idea even exists, until 
you've discovered they told you you can't say what you want to 
say?
    Losing confidence in someone. That wasn't the reason that 
he decided he wanted to fire him. He didn't want some GS-14 
telling a presidential appointee that he couldn't say what he 
wanted to say. And he said, ``I'm going to fire you, or try to 
fire you, for doing it.'' That's what Carl Ford said he did. 
That's what the chief of staff of Mr. Bolton said. That's what 
every single person who had any knowledge of this case told 
this committee, either in testimony provided to the staff or in 
front of this committee, itself. That's why, more than any 
other reasons I can think of, this nominee does not deserve the 
support of this committee.
    Now, let me just make one further point here, and I won't 
go into all the details. The information is there. The 
interviews are public.
    I gather, based on what my colleague from Ohio has said 
here--and I know he's--notice he's left the room here, so I--
I'm going to talk about something he said. But, Mr. Chairman, 
there's a reason why committees exist in the Senate. And that 
is--and I'd ask to be able to go on here a couple of minutes 
yet. There's a reason why committees exist in the Senate. Our 
colleagues--we defer to each other, because there's no way a 
hundred people can sit and be busy on every single issue. And 
so, we are asked to draw judgments. I only know of one case--
and I'm sure the staff will contradict me if I'm wrong here--
but only one case in my 24 years where the committee has sent, 
without recommendation, a nominee to the floor of the Senate. I 
think it was the case of Kenneth Adelman, I believe. Now, maybe 
there are--I'm told that's not the case, but--maybe someone has 
a different example.
    The point is, it's, then, very, very rare, in my 
experience, because we're the ones who have to do the work 
here. And our colleagues, I think, would like to rely on us, to 
some degree. Now, I know it's done from time to time; it's not 
without precedent.
    But I think it's deluding ourselves to think that our 
colleagues are going to spend as much time as we have on this 
issue. They may listen to us on the floor. But, in some ways, 
these matters are painful and difficult to deal with.
    But we bear responsibility to our colleagues, and, I think, 
to the public, to move on here. I don't think we're serving the 
President well. I don't think we're serving our role at the 
United Nations well. This is going to drag on. This nominee may 
go to the floor. We're going to be on the floor with this. And 
it's not going to be a short debate on the floor. It's going to 
go on. And I don't think our interests are being well served by 
doing that. This is a painful choice to have to make of 
someone, painful for their families. I understand that.
    But I would hope the committee might reconsider. If the 
decision is not to support this nominee, then it ought to end 
here. End here. And invite the President to send us someone.
    And let me say to my friend from Virginia, who's also left 
the room--I don't--shouldn't take this as an insult--there are 
plenty of good people to fill this job. The idea that there's 
only one individual who can do the job that needs to be done at 
the United Nations is--to quote my friend from Ohio, is 
nonsense. I can think of five or six names, off the top of my 
head, that are bona fide, conservative, blunt Republicans, who 
would serve well in the United Nations and help do the things 
that need to be done there. The idea that John Bolton's the 
only person is an insult, in a way, to the leadership of the 
Republican party that no one else could possibly fulfill this 
role at all.
    And we owe it to the American public, we owe it to 
ourselves, let's end this matter, and let's move on to the more 
serious business we must deal with, major policy issues and 
filling these jobs that need to be filled to get the job done.
    I thank the Chairman.
    The Chairman.  Thank you very much, Senator Dodd.
    The Chair recognizes, now, Senator Chafee.

 STATEMENT OF HON. LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, U.S. SENATOR FROM RHODE 
                             ISLAND

    Senator Chafee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
    This has been a difficult few weeks as we have exercised 
our duty of advice and consent on President Bush's nominee to 
be the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, John Bolton. 
There have been many charges and accusations, and I do agree 
with Senator Dodd that any intimidation of intelligence 
analysts is wrong. And I'm apprehensive that by promoting John 
Bolton, we're signaling an endorsement of that intimidation.
    And I am particularly concerned with the speech that Mr. 
Bolton gave in Seoul, South Korea, in the midst of those six-
nation talks. That speech was cleared--Mr. Bolton says that 
speech was cleared by the highest level of our government. True 
though that may be, it does not diminish the questionable 
wisdom of his having delivered it at such a sensitive time. 
There have been other instances where I've had reservations 
about Mr. Bolton's decision-making.
    I also recognize the diplomatic successes Mr. Bolton has 
had. The Proliferation Security Initiative is one. And, as 
Senator Allen said, this is a global effort that aims to stop 
shipments of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery 
systems, and related materials worldwide. The PSI uses existing 
authorities, national and international, to defeat 
proliferation. Mr. Bolton worked in a multilateral fashion on 
this proposal. Ten other countries--Australia, France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, United 
Kingdom--initially agreed to PSI, and 60 more have agreed 
since.
    I do want to take, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Bolton at his word as 
to how he will perform as our Ambassador to the United Nations. 
He testified, under oath, that, ``If confirmed, I pledge to 
fulfill the President's vision of working in close partnership 
with the United Nations.'' And that vision is that the United 
States is committed to the success of the United Nations. And 
we view the U.N. as an important component of our diplomacy.
    Mr. Bolton said that he will work for a stronger, better, 
more effective United Nations, one which requires sustained and 
decisive American leadership, broad bipartisan support, and 
support of the American public. He said walking away from the 
United Nations is not an option.
    He also said that he assures the committee, the American 
people, and potential future colleagues at the United Nations 
that, if confirmed, he will work to--with all interested 
parties to build a stronger and more effective United Nations. 
He said, ``Doing so will promote not only American interests, 
but will inevitably improve and enhance the U.N.'s ability to 
serve all of its members, as well.'' He went on to say, ``I 
pledge to bring my strong record of experience in working 
cooperatively within the United Nations to fulfill the 
intentions and aspirations of its original promise. In 
particular, I will work closely with the Congress and this 
committee to achieve that goal.'' I will repeat that, ``In 
particular, I will work closely with the Congress and this 
committee to achieve that goal.''
    So, I want to take him at his word, and I will support 
Chairman Lugar and Senator Voinovich's motion.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman.  Thank you very much, Senator Chafee.
    Senator Biden, would you designate----
    [Pause.]
    Senator Biden. Senator Kerry.
    The Chairman.  Senator Kerry is recognized.

      STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY, U.S. SENATOR FROM 
                         MASSACHUSETTS

    Senator Kerry. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Let me 
begin, first of all, by echoing the comments of other 
colleagues. And I thank you, personally, for the way in which 
you've defended this process. And I think you've handled that 
with great grace, and I think you've been terrific at helping 
the committee to fill out the record here, though I certainly 
concur with Senator Biden, I wish we were able to have that 
full record. I think that remains something that we hope we can 
work out with you.
    Secondly, I also want to say to those people who came 
forward, I think this is a very serious moment for the 
committee. And it's hard sometimes to convey that to people, 
because a lot of what happens around here gets politicized, as 
well as trivialized. But this should not be. I regret that some 
have, sort of, circled political wagons in this effort, and I 
think this is one of the most conscientious, legitimate 
processes of the committee that I've been engaged in, in the 
time that I've been here. And it's not party interest; it's 
America's interest. And I think Senator Voinovich articulated 
that. And others, I think, in their statements have tried to 
articulate that, or have articulated it.
    And those people who have come forward, I mean, you just 
can't dismiss that. You can't reduce this, somehow, to 
politics, when people have spontaneously come forward, 
particularly people from the same workplace, people from the 
same ideology, people from the same background, people who are 
invested in the same goals as John Bolton, but who have 
spontaneously come forward to, from their gut, and at great 
risk, put their views on line here. And I think that does raise 
the level of scrutiny that each of us, as Senators, ought to be 
giving this.
    Thirdly, there's this assumption that is thrown out so 
easily by a lot of people that we ought to give a President the 
person the President puts forward. Well, generally speaking, we 
do. But the whole concept of advice and consent embodies in 
its--in the term, not just that we give advice and walk away, 
but that we have to consent, that we do consent. And, as 
Senator Biden, I thought, very forcefully stated, this is 
within the constitutional requirement of us, as Senators, of 
the Senate, and the Congress as a separate and equal branch of 
government. And that consent should not be automatic. It is not 
automatic. It has never been automatic when we conduct 
ourselves properly and do our duty to its fullest.
    Now, I wanted to comment--I'm glad Senator Voinovich is 
back here, because, you know, this puts him in a difficult 
situation, and probably our saying something nice about it puts 
him in a difficult situation. [Laughter.]
    But what I want to say, I think, is not directed only at 
him; it's directed at all of us, as Senators. I was really 
struck, at the meeting we had before, when Senator Voinovich 
stopped the proceedings, rewrote the script, based on his 
conscience. I mean, he just sat up and said, ``I'm 
uncomfortable with this.'' And, lo and behold, people were 
amazed, Washington was amazed, the country was amazed. And I 
was amazed that everybody was amazed, because what is going on 
that a Senator doesn't act according to script, acts according 
to conscience, and everybody is taken aback? I think Senator 
Chafee said this is the first time this has happened in the 
four years that I've been here. Well, then something is wrong 
with ``here,'' not with Senator Voinovich.
    And I was struck that he was, you know, set upon by certain 
automatic forces in the country that are then unleashed to 
vilify him for acting as a Senator ought to act. When I first 
came here, that's the way almost everybody did. That's the way 
it worked. And we shouldn't be so amazed that somebody, in 
fact, stops and thinks about something, and responds according 
to their conscience.
    Now, what is at stake here is not party, not Democrat, not 
Republican. What is at stake here is our national interest, our 
security interest, our ability to advance our interests within 
the United Nations.
    And I take exception with Senator Allen. You know, long 
before he was on this committee, a lot of us were working with 
Senator Kassenbaum, with Senator Helms, Senator Biden, and 
others to reform the United Nations. We were among the first to 
withhold the dues. We were among the first to withhold the 
peacekeeping money. We worked hard to try to advance the cause 
of reform, and we got some distance in that. But there's, of 
course, an enormous amount more to be done.
    This is not about reform at the United Nations. This is 
about who is the best person to advance the serious interests 
of our country in one of the most important fori in the world. 
And a lot of us approached this, indeed, I may comment, 
skeptical, because I think everybody was taken aback, as 
Senator Biden said. I mean, this appointment, on its face, 
struck a lot of people as odd. I respectfully submit that it 
struck a lot of Republican Senators as odd. But then the 
political wagons, kind of, circled.
    I think this is bigger than that now. And the question is 
whether between now and a vote on the floor of the Senate, 
people on the floor of the Senate--people are really going to 
take stock of the full measure of what is at stake here.
    Mr. Chairman, you made the right decision, in the last 
weeks, to keep this process open and to make judgments. And I 
think the record that has been compiled, the additional 
witnesses and testimony that has been compiled, underscores the 
difficulties that this nomination presents on the merits, on an 
apolitical, meritorious judgment of whether or not this is the 
best person to carry out this job, and whether or not this 
person can now, under the circumstances of what we've learned, 
actually advance the cause and our interests at the United 
Nations.
    I mean, imagine when he walks into the--one of the first 
meetings, if he's confirmed. People will sit there and say, 
``Well, here's Ambassador Bolton. Is he sitting on one of the 
floors that he wanted to eliminate?'' ``Here's Ambassador 
Bolton. Is he, today, telling us intelligence that's his view 
or someone else's view?'' And when he makes his view known, 
almost to a certainty, it's going to be second-guessed, and 
people are going to back and say, ``Well, is this--you know, 
are we getting the full speech? Is this what the intelligence 
community says?'' It's going to have to be rechecked. It's 
going to have to be double-efforted in every case, because that 
question is there.
    In fact, Ambassador Bolton, himself, to my astonishment--I 
mean, here he is seeking to represent the country at the United 
Nations, where the views you express have to be those of the 
administration and the others, and he's reserving--he's busy 
reserving the right--in answer of the question I submitted he 
said, ``I understand that, as a policy, official statements 
identifying the views of the Intelligence Committee have to be 
fully vetted. I've submitted to this process throughout my 
tenure. Your question, however, fails to recognize a second 
principle; namely, that a policy official may state his own 
reading of the intelligence as long as he doesn't purport to 
speak for the intelligence community.'' So every time he speaks 
up there, he's going to have to clarify, ``I'm not speaking for 
the intelligence community,'' or, ``I am speaking for the 
intelligence community.''
    But, even more disturbing, he also said, quote, ``The 
intelligence community needs to be pushed. It will not do its 
best unless it is pressed by policymakers, sometimes to the 
point of discomfort.''
    Now, his version of doing that, we have seen, puts people 
at risk, changes the consensus of the intelligence community 
itself, and will, in every instance in which he speaks, my 
colleagues, leave people asking the question of who he is 
speaking for. He has, himself, reiterated that and underscored 
that in this statement.
    Now, I think--you know, let--you know, let me just share 
with colleagues what a prior ambassador to the United Nations 
said about this job. I quote, ``I do not think that one should 
ever seek confrontation. What I have every intention or hope of 
doing is to operate in a low-key, quiet, persuasive, and 
consensus-building way. I think a principal objective should be 
to try to communicate effectively with the representatives of 
as many nations as possible to broaden a bit the areas of 
mutual understanding. We should try to extend a bit the 
frontiers of reason and cooperation. And I think we should work 
to that end, and we should work to establish the patterns of 
consultation and trust.'' These are the words of Jeane 
Kirkpatrick during her January 1981 confirmation.
    Can I continue?
    Senator Biden. Please.
    Senator Kerry. I don't know, how much time have I taken?
    Senator Biden. You've got another 5 minutes.
    Senator Kerry. So, no one's every going to accuse Jeane 
Kirkpatrick of shying away from her views. And, like John 
Bolton, she's a staunch conservative who speaks her mind. But 
she understood and respected the value of diplomacy, 
negotiation, listening to--listening to--and respecting other 
views, seeking a broad point of view.
    And the question is, clearly, on the basis of this record, 
whether you can say that about John Bolton, whether he sees the 
big picture, whether he seeks those views. Could he handle 
opposing points of views? Does he have the leadership skill? 
And, interestingly enough, it was Jeane Kirkpatrick, herself, 
who said of John Bolton that he is not a diplomat.
    Now, the larger issue, I'm not going to go in, because I 
don't have the time, but, you know, you can take Lawrence 
Wilkerson, who was quoted in the New York Times as saying that 
John Bolton--he is the former chief of staff to the Secretary 
of State--who said he thought he would be--John Bolton would be 
an abysmal ambassador to the United Nations. Jeane Kirkpatrick, 
who said, ``He loves to tussle. He may do diplomatic jobs for 
the U.S. Government, but John is not a diplomat.''
    Now, more disturbingly, there are a pattern of things that 
have been laid out here, and I don't have time to go into all 
of them. One is this berating of analysts and what it does to 
intelligence at a time where intelligence needs to be trusted. 
That's one very serious question. The other is the question of 
how he treated people and what that does, in terms of 
leadership. But most importantly, I think, is the question of 
credibility, itself.
    Credibility. When United States speaks to the world, we've 
got to be believable. We have an extraordinary message about 
democracy, about transformation of the world, about our 
leadership. And we need somebody there who is not going to be 
questioned in that. We may have to make the case about Iran or 
North Korea or Syria. But, in each of those cases, North Korea 
and Iran, Mr. Bolton has already made statements that have been 
questioned by the highest officials in our government. And, 
more importantly, he tried to stretch the intelligence to fit 
his own views in each of those cases. Again and again. He tried 
to inflate language about Syria's nuclear activities, beyond 
what intelligence analysts saw. The chairman of the National 
Intelligence Council ordered his staff to resist Mr. Bolton's 
efforts. This is a man who's going to speak for America with 
credibility about Syria?
    Former National Intelligence Council Chair Robert Hutchings 
said, quote, ``Let's say that he took isolated facts and made 
much more of them to build a case than I thought the 
intelligence warranted. It was, sort of, cherry-picking of 
little factoids and little isolated bits that were drawn out to 
present the starkest possible case.''
    I could go on about that, Mr. Chairman. I don't have time 
to do it, because I want to get to one of the most important 
things of all for each of us to think about.
    Not only have you questions about Mr. Bolton's credibility 
on the subject of intelligence and his voice at the U.N., but, 
frankly, we've got serious questions about his credibility 
before this committee, itself.
    In the case of Christian Westermann, he denied trying to 
have him disciplined. He denied, before this committee, under 
oath, trying to have him disciplined. He said, ``I mentioned it 
to Mr. Finger. I may have mentioned it to one or two other 
people.'' ``I may have mentioned it to one or two other 
people.'' This is an intelligent man. This is a man who's been 
cited by everybody as having a steel-trap mind, one of the best 
minds of all. ``But then I shrugged my shoulders and moved 
on,'' he said. That is not true, folks. That's not what he did. 
The testimony of Mr. Westermann and all of his superiors, all 
of his superiors at INR--Ford, Finger, Silver, as well as the 
recollection of his own chief of staff, Mr. Fleitz--make it 
clear that removing Westermann is exactly what he sought. There 
was no if, ands, and buts, no ``may have,'' no ``might have 
talked to somebody.'' He wanted him removed, and that was 
clear, and he wasn't candid with this committee.
    The dispute went on for months. There was no shrugging of 
his shoulders and moving on. It went on for months. And it had 
a lasting impact on Mr. Bolton's relationship with INR.
    Bolton said to this committee, quote, ``I basically thought 
the matter was closed when I got Mr. Finger's e-mail saying, 
`It won't happen again.' '' But a few days later, Bolton took 
up the issue with Carl Ford, and then he took it up with Neil 
Silver. And, despite his characterization to this committee, he 
hardly considered it closed.
    This was not the only time he was not candid with the 
committee, Mr. Chairman. Regarding his efforts to have the NIO 
for Latin America removed, he told the committee, ``I had one 
part of one conversation with one person, one time on Mr. 
Smith, and that was it, I let it go.'' Not true. That wasn't 
it. He didn't let it go. Documentary evidence shows that he 
took steps to remove the NIO, and it was under active 
discussion for four months.
    Letters were drafted that would be signed by Mr. Bolton and 
Otto Reich, the Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere, 
demanding the NIO's removal. On one subsequent occasion, he was 
reported to have told his staff, quote, he didn't ``want the 
matter to slip any further,'' end quote.
    So, Bolton's distortions before the committee weren't 
limited even to these two cases. He told the committee he 
didn't threaten or try to have anyone punished because of their 
policy views, but several witnesses have personally said, 
directly, that he did.
    So, Mr. Chairman, again, you know, he told the committee 
that U.S. Ambassador Hubbard approved and supported his speech, 
but you now know directly from Hubbard, that was not true.
    Does it matter whether you tell the truth or don't tell the 
truth in your confirmation hearings to a committee of the U.S. 
Senate, or doesn't it matter? And if you can't tell the truth 
to this committee, are you going to tell the truth to the other 
people? And will they believe him when he goes to the United 
Nations?
    Senator, you weren't here. This is not about whether or not 
we're all for reform of the United Nations as it is; it's about 
whether or not this is the best person to effect that reform. 
And I don't think that you begin by not being candid to a 
committee of the U.S. Senate, under oath.
    So, there are these serious issues, and more, many more. 
And I hope--I don't think we ought to send it out of this 
committee, personally. I think it ought to end here, because 
this isn't the right person. Now, if it doesn't end here, we 
are going to have a serious debate on the floor of the Senate, 
and that debate will not improve Mr. Bolton's standing at the 
United Nations. So, I think we would be better off doing what 
is appropriate to the record. The record speaks for itself. And 
now this committee ought to speak for itself.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman.  Thank you very much, Senator Kerry.
    Senator Coleman, you are recognized.

  STATEMENT OF HON. NORM COLEMAN, U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA

    Senator Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Chairman, I do think it's appropriate to acknowledge 
the extraordinary steps that you have taken to work with 
Majority and Minority members in building an incredible record 
to bring us to the point we're at today.
    I also want to compliment you on your statement. I hope 
that all our colleagues on both sides of the aisle read the 
chairman's opening statement.
    I also appreciate your strong statement about U.N. reform. 
I'll talk about that later. I think we all agree on that.
    And I guess the question, in the end is, Is this the right 
guy? And who makes that decision? Who makes that judgment? I 
think we had an election that said who makes that judgment, who 
is weighing, I'm sure, all the stuff that we're weighing here, 
and has come to a conclusion about John Bolton's, and it's a 
conclusion, Mr. Chairman, that I support.
    We've had, over the course of the last 3 weeks, 35 separate 
interviews, 29 different people testifying, 1,000 pages of 
transcripts, I think 7 to 800 pages of documents. And when you 
get through the whole process, where are at? I think we're 
probably right back where we started in this process. I don't 
know if there's anything new that any of us have seen that 
would say that--certainly from my perspective, that John Bolton 
is not qualified to serve in this position. He continues to 
have the support of the President. He continues to have the 
support of the Secretary of State.
    My concern is a little bit about the process. And I'm--I 
think some of the allegations, clearly, are patently false; 
some have been blown wildly out of proportion. My concern is 
about the--as we look to the future, the chilling effect of 
what's going on here and the impact it will have on good 
people. Senator Dodd, in the past, has talked about the--how 
it's getting harder and harder to get good nominees who want to 
serve.
    At the last hearing we had, my colleagues on the other side 
of the aisle raised a concern about an incident that apparently 
took place a number of years ago, when Bolton was in private 
practice. It had to do with an incident that--regarding a 
contractor and then--that he worked for and--doing some work in 
Kyrgyzstan. And, you know, what we heard were all the 
allegations about chasing somebody down in a hotel in Moscow, 
and harassment. I didn't have it at that time, but I think I 
had read a newspaper article that, in fact, the person who 
owned the company, the subcontractor who was, in effect, 
Bolton's boss, had submitted a letter to the committee. I know 
my colleagues on the other side had a copy of that letter. What 
we heard and what the public heard, without refutation, are 
instances about outrageous conduct on the part of John Bolton 
without any retort, without folks saying, ``Hey, this''--you 
know, not only, maybe this isn't the case, but the folks who 
knew the principals and said it wasn't the case, and said it in 
some very, very strong terms.
    And so, I do worry about the chilling effect that we're 
having here. This is certainly not a court of law, and it 
certainly doesn't have the same standards. And, certainly, it's 
a world we have to live with. But I am concerned about what Mr. 
Bolton has gone through, and the nature of these allegations. 
And, as I said, I think, Mr. Chairman, in your opening 
statement, you did a good job of responding and rebutting.
    I do want to talk a little bit about the Cuba speech and 
the conversation between Mr. Bolton and Mr. Westermann.
    Bolton, himself, told Christian Westermann, I quote, ``You 
are welcome to disagree with me, just not behind my back.'' And 
during Westermann's staff interview, when asked about whether 
Bolton made such a statement, he replied, ``That does ring a 
bell.''
    And what happened there--and, again, this one of the cases 
where you get kind of two sides of the story--from Bolton's 
perspective, he was going to give a speech, it was supposed to 
be circulated, it was supposed to be circulated to other 
agencies, and they would make a judgment--intelligence 
agencies--about whether what he's saying was accurate. He 
didn't know that Westermann had put a--had torpedoed it as it 
went out. He didn't know that.
    My colleague from Connecticut has asked, you know, ``On 
what basis does he have to lose confidence in Westermann? He 
didn't have it to begin with.'' The basis is pretty clear, and 
it's in the record, it's in the e-mail that Bolton got from 
Finger when he raised the issue of what happened. And what did 
Mr. Finger--Mr. Westermann's sup---what did he say? He went on 
to say that, ``INR has no position on what a principal--in 
other words, we shouldn't have made the judgment about whether 
this was good or bad information, the right thing, and not to 
say--choice of phrase, ``does not concur, was entirely 
inappropriate.'' And these are Mr. Finger's words, not mine, 
``We screwed up.'' ``We screwed up.''
    So, if you're John Bolton, do you have a reason to lose 
confidence? I guess so. The record would demonstrate that.
    And, again, we can each bring our own take to this, but the 
record clearly shows that, from Mr. Bolton's perspective, 
somebody did something they shouldn't have done. That was 
reaffirmed to him. And then the question becomes--raised is 
whether there was--somehow he was not being candid with us. Mr. 
Bolton says, ``I didn't pursue it.''
    And I would ask the question, Where is the record that the 
dispute went on for months, as some of my colleagues on the 
other side of the aisle have talked about? There isn't any. The 
reality is, is--what you have is, you have Bolton having a 
conversation with Ford that took place over a water fountain, 
that lasted about two minutes, and then a conversation down the 
road with Silver, in which Silver says, ``I asked the issue. Is 
there any other things that you're upset about?'' And then 
Bolton volunteered that.
    This is not the pattern of behavior intent on penalizing 
and hurting somebody, somebody obsessed with ``getting at'' 
somebody because they disagree with them over policy. It's 
consistent with everything John Bolton said.
    There has been no lack of candor here, Mr. Chairman, and I 
think the record is very, very clear on that.
    We talked about the incident in dealing with Melody 
Townsel, and the allegation that she was harassed and had had 
things thrown at her. I think her own testimony challenged 
that. The letter from Jaylon Kalotra, who was the head of the 
company that Bolton was working for, and he was very, very 
clear. He indicated, by the way, that Ms. Townsel had made 
inaccurate and misleading statements. He said he didn't hear 
anything contemporaneously about the incident. He says that her 
recollection didn't square with the facts. He indicated that, 
as a team leader, she attempted, unsuccessfully, to charge the 
U.S. Government for disallowable costs, and she became enraged 
and abusive; and that he found Bolton to be highly intelligent, 
hardworking, entirely ethical.
    And so, what you have there, again, was an incident laid 
out in public to disparage the reputation and the name of John 
Bolton, and then you've got evidence, substantial evidence, on 
the other side, something to the contrary. And we don't know. I 
wasn't there, Mr. Chairman. You weren't there. But to use this 
as a basis for somehow saying that John Bolton's not qualified 
to be U.S. Ambassador is not only wrong, it is another example 
of the kind of chilling impact that I think folks looking at 
this process, who may be called upon to serve, are going to ask 
themselves, ``What am I going to be--what I am going to be 
subject to? And will that be fair?''
    So, what have we done? We've put under the microscope every 
contentious interaction John Bolton had within the State 
Department, and even outside of it. There was an interesting 
editorial. And I'm not always a big fan of the Washington Post, 
but I could say these words--they said it, and I'll say it as I 
said it--talking about--the editorial, about a vote on Bolton, 
and he said, ``The committee interviews have provided some 
colorful details without breaking new ground. What has long 
been a well-understood split in the first Bush administration, 
a split between those who saw themselves as pragmatic 
diplomats, the power camp, and those like Mr. Bolton, who saw 
themselves are more willing to bruise feelings here and abroad 
in standing up for U.S. interests.''
    And they go on to say, as I would say, that, ``The 
President is taking risks, maybe, but, in the end, the 
President knows the role that Mr. Bolton is to play. The 
nominee is intelligent and qualified. We should support him.'' 
I think that's a pretty fair summary.
    Is John Bolton strong-willed? Darn right. There's no 
question about that. But--and it's interesting, because you 
look at the record, and, you know, I guess it depends, you can 
look at all the criticism that are there.
    One of my concerns about this process, Mr. Chairman--and, 
you, again, in your opening statement, lay it out--when this 
nomination was put on the table, it was almost unanimously 
objected to by the other side. And it was about policy. It was 
about policy. Substantial policy disagreements with John Bolton 
and that he shouldn't serve as U.N. Ambassador. And then as the 
process went on, it went from policy to procedure, from policy 
to personality, from policy to the ability to interact and deal 
well with others.
    When I was a prosecutor, we used say--on closing arguments, 
I'd stand in front of the jury, and I'd say, ``You know, you've 
got to watch out for the rabbit-out-of-the-hat's trick.'' And 
what happens is that the defense would come in, they've got a 
hat, a magician's hat, and they've got lots of rabbits, and 
they go running around. And they hope that one member of the 
jury chases one of those rabbits and takes their eye off the 
goal, the main thing--being the main thing.
    And so, we have the rabbit of personal relations, and we 
have the rabbit of violating procedure, and we have the rabbit 
of lack of candor, we have the rabbit of bad policy judgments. 
But the bottom line is that in each and every instance, despite 
every measure of conflict, John Bolton delivered the approved 
speech. He never maliciously impacted the career of a single 
employee. We could just as well have spent this time simply 
reading the record, all the comments made by John Bolton for 
those who worked with him. There's a question about whether he 
can put together a team or work well with others. You had 37 
officials who worked with him at USAID. They worked with him. 
They know him. And their judgment was that, ``John leads in 
front with courage and conviction. He doesn't abuse power. He's 
direct, yet thoughtful, in communication. What he does is 
demand from his staff personal honestly and intellectual 
clarity.''
    And then the letter from 39 other former attorney generals, 
distinguished citizens, again, who know John Bolton, again, 
being extraordinarily positive. Twenty-one former presidential 
appointees, career and noncareer Civil Service and Foreign 
Service employees, again, who worked and know John Bolton. 
Forty-three of John Bolton's former colleagues at the American 
Enterprise Institute. All saying the same thing, that, ``We 
know this guy, that we work with him, and he does have the 
ability and the skill that's needed.''
    And then, in addition to that, the statements of former 
Secretaries of State who also worked with John Bolton. They 
didn't just know him. They worked with him. He's got a long and 
distinguished career. And they were very, very clear about his 
ability to do what has to be done.
    I think the issue here, Mr. Chairman, is what my colleague 
from Virginia has raised. It is about U.N. reform. That's the 
issue in front of us today. The--and I have to say, it's 
interesting, because there are a couple of folks who have been 
at the U.N. who have been pretty blunt on occasion, and one of 
them was Jeane Kirkpatrick, who once said that what takes place 
in the Security Council, and I quote, ``more closely resembles 
a mugging than either a political debate or an effort a 
problem-solving.
    And I would note that my colleague from Massachusetts 
quoted Ms. Kirkpatrick, who said that, you know, we need low-
key, quiet consensus way. And, by the way, Ms. Kirkpatrick 
supports John Bolton. Jeane Kirkpatrick signed a letter in 
support of John Bolton. She knows what the job needs. Jeane 
Kirkpatrick was Ambassador to the U.N. at a time before we had 
evidence of U.N. employees raping and being involved in child 
prostitution in South--in Africa. She was our U.S. Ambassador 
to the U.N. before we had evidence of sexual harassment and 
abuse by senior U.N. officials that went undealt with for over 
8 months. She was Ambassador to the United Nations before Oil-
for-Food scandal, which--where Saddam Hussein was able to rip 
off that program for billions of dollars.
    Just today, Mr. Chairman, the committee that I chair, the 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigation, released reports of 
payoffs to folks who are--British members of Parliament, former 
French foreign ministers, interior ministers, documenting a 
system of them receiving oil allocations and payoffs going back 
to Saddam and then being in a position to enrich their own 
pockets.
    Clearly, clearly, the U.N. needs reform. And I think we've 
got to get back to what my colleague, Senator Chafee, in the 
end, quoted, and that is that statement of John Bolton 
pledging--and I'm going to quote one part of it, ``to fulfill 
the aspirations of its original promise.'' That's what we want 
the United Nations to do.
    My challenge to the United Nations--it's not about 
attacking the United Nations or tearing it down, but it 
certainly needs some strong--right now, it needs strong 
leadership from the United States, working in concert, but 
strong leadership with an individual, John Bolton, who's 
demonstrated that capacity. And I've got to believe that that's 
what the President is looking for, Mr. Chairman. That's what 
he's looking at.
    You know, is John Bolton the nicest guy in the world? He's 
not going to win that prize. Not going to win that prize. But 
look at the challenge that we're faced with, with U.N. reform. 
Just last week, Zimbabwe put on the Human Rights Commission. We 
need a kind of strength. And it's interesting, I'm saying 
``we.'' In the end, Mr. Chairman, I do believe that John Bolton 
is the best person, the best person that the President has 
picked for this job. Because that's what it's about. Elections 
do have consequences. And the President has made a judgment, 
and he's weighed the good, and he's weighed the bad, and he's 
looked at the tough-minded negotiations, how it played a key 
role in Libya's change of heart in achieving the Treaty of 
Moscow. He's looked at what--he's look at the difficulty of 
getting 191 member nations of the United Nations, the number of 
states that changed their ways. And that's not going to be 
very, very easy, Mr. Chairman.
    So, in the end, as I said, in--most importantly, the 
President needs to have the right to appoint members of his 
team. John Bolton has the confidence of the President. In the 
absence of any wrongdoing, there's nothing on this record that 
demonstrates any wrongdoing. We may have disagreements about 
how he interacted with staff. We may have disagreements about 
what's appropriate, in terms of dealing with folks who you 
think back-doored you. But, in the end, the President should 
have the team he wants. He's made the determination that John 
Bolton is the right person to finally bring about U.N. reform. 
And I look forward, Mr. Chairman, when John Bolton is 
confirmed, to be able to work with him in the Permanent 
Subcommittee, and to work with folks at the U.N. to bring about 
reform.
    I urge my colleagues to support the President's choice for 
U.N. Ambassador. No one is better qualified to bring about U.N. 
reform than John Bolton. In the words of my colleague from 
Connecticut, the place clearly needs cleaning up. John Bolton 
represents our best chance to shape a credible, effective world 
body for the next generation. And like my colleague from Rhode 
Island, I'm willing to take him at his word. I'm willing to 
take him at his word. There's nothing in this hearing that 
should have undermined our confidence in taking him at his word 
that what he wants to do is bring back--get the U.N. to fulfill 
its original aspirations. That's a noble goal. He's made that 
commitment. Let's give him a chance.
    The Chairman.  Thank you very much, Senator Coleman.
    As I mentioned in my opening statement, the committee 
congratulates you on your very conscientious work as the s 
I07ubcommittee chairman looking into U.N. reform. And we wish 
you well as you----
    Senator Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman  [continuing]. Continue to proceed.
    Let me just mention that, at this point, there are 58 
minutes remaining to the Republican side, 63 minutes available 
to the Democratic side.
    And I call upon my distinguished ranking member to 
designate a speaker.
    Senator Biden. I would designate Senator Feingold. And if 
he could stay within 15 minutes----

  STATEMENT OF HON. RUSS FEINGOLD, U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN

    Senator Feingold. Certainly. I thank the chairman. I thank 
the ranking member.
    Mr. Chairman, in 2001, this committee voted to confirm John 
Bolton to be the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and 
International Security. I voted for Mr. Bolton at that time, 
despite many strong disagreements with his views on arms 
control and security policy, generally. In fact, it's my 
understanding I was the only Democrat on this committee to vote 
for Mr. Bolton for that position. I did so because I generally 
believe that the President has the right to choose executive 
branch nominees who share his overall world view, even when I 
do not. So, barring serious ethical lapses or a clear lack of 
appropriate qualifications for a give job, I tend to give the 
President a great deal of latitude in making these 
appointments.
    Mr. Chairman, I will vote to oppose--oppose--the 
confirmation of John Bolton to be the next U.S. Ambassador to 
the United Nations. As I indicated last month, Mr. Bolton is 
simply unsuited for the job to which he has been nominated. His 
blatant hostility toward the institution at which he would 
serve, and his history of pursuing his personal policy agenda 
while holding public office, indicate that he would be ill-
equipped to advance U.S. interests as our Ambassador to the 
United Nations.
    I share the views of many who are insisting on reform at 
the U.N. The U.N. must become more effective and more 
accountable. And, as stewards of the American taxpayers' 
dollars, we must insist on that point.
    Mr. Bolton's record suggests that his personal animosity 
toward the United Nations is so great that he would rather see 
the institution dramatically weakened, rather than strengthened 
through reform. He seems to view the U.N. as an instrument to 
be used when it suits only our immediate interests, but one 
best ignored, or even undermined, the rest of the time. His 
failure to grasp the give and take required for effective 
multilateralism makes him a real obstacle to any hope of 
pursuing vital U.S. interets and increasing burden-sharing and 
marshaling a global force strong enough to defeat the 
terrorists networks that seek to do us harm. Mr. Bolton's idea 
of U.N. reform would hurt, rather than help, U.S. interests.
    Mr. Bolton's record also reveals many, many instances of 
intemperance and rash decisionmaking. At least two senior 
intelligence officials told committee staff that Bolton's draft 
testimony prepared for a House hearing on Syria in 2003 went 
well beyond what the intelligence community could clear. This 
wasn't a case in which INR alone had concerns about Bolton's 
proposed language. The CIA, the Department of Energy, and the 
Defense Intelligence Agency all objected. And according to 
interviews conducted by the committee staff, Bolton's office, 
quote, ``pushed back,'' unquote, resisting the intelligence 
community's efforts to alter problematic provisions.
    Bolton was determined to be such a loose cannon that the 
Deputy Secretary of State instituted an extraordinary policy to 
address the problem, requiring all of Mr. Bolton's public 
presentations to be cleared by Larry Wilkerson, Secretary 
Powell's chief of staff, or Deputy Secretary Armitage, himself.
    Given this record, I do not have confidence that Mr. 
Bolton's personal agenda would always be subordinated to that 
of the Secretary of State, who, in testimony before this 
committee and in her first days in office, has placed such a 
premium on restoring frayed diplomatic ties.
    Additional information that has come to light since our 
last meeting has simply affirmed my conclusion that this is one 
of the rare cases in which I must oppose the President's 
nomination for a position in the executive branch.
    First, the record indicating that Mr. Bolton was in the 
business of suppressing dissent has only gotten stronger. It's 
a matter of record that Bolton sought to retaliate against 
intelligence analysts when their work did not suit his policy 
inclinations.
    Now, this is not about careless remarks simply made in the 
heat of a tough bureaucratic dispute. The evidence shows that 
over a period of many months, Mr. Bolton repeatedly sought Mr. 
Westermann's removal from his portfolio at INR, which would 
mean, effectively, ending his career. Mr. Bolton repeatedly 
sought the removal of Mr. Smith from his post as the National 
Intelligence Officer for Latin America, again pursuing this 
vendetta for months--not just of heated minutes, but for 
months--going so far as to consider blocking country clearance 
for Mr. Smith to travel abroad.
    In both cases, the offense that so incensed Mr. Bolton 
appears to be that the analysts did their jobs, they presented 
the facts as they saw them, and they declined to keep silent 
when the facts did not support what Mr. Bolton wanted to say. 
And, in both cases, senior officials with decades of experience 
in government, who were involved in these episodes told 
committee staff that Bolton's actions, his attempts to 
retaliate against these analysts, were absolutely 
extraordinary.
    In addition to these disturbing incidents, other interviews 
revealed a broader pattern of--to simply cut out those who 
disagreed with his policy views, or those who he believed 
disagreed with his policy views, from the policymaking process 
entirely. This kind of tunnel vision, everyone-else-out-of-the-
room approach, was summed up by Secretary of State Powell's 
chief of staff, Larry Wilkerson, who told the committee staff, 
quote, ``When people ignore diplomacy that is aimed at dealing 
with''--referring to North Korea's nuclear weapons development 
problem--``in order to push their pet rocks in other areas, it 
bothers me, as a diplomat and as a citizen of this country.'' 
And then, when asked specifically if he thought that Mr. Bolton 
had done that, Wilkerson said, ``Absolutely.''
    Mr. Wilkerson ended his interview with the committee with 
the following comments, quote, ``I would like to make just one 
statement. I don't have a large problem with Under Secretary 
Bolton serving our country. My objections to what we've been 
talking about here--that is, him being our Ambassador to the 
United Nations--stem from two basic things. One, I think he's a 
lousy leader. And there are 100 to 150 people up there that 
have to be led. They have to be led well, and they have to be 
led properly. I think in that capacity, if he goes up there, 
you'll see the proof of the pudding in a year. Second, I differ 
from a lot of people in Washington, both friend and foe of 
Under Secretary Bolton, as to his, quote, `brilliance,' 
unquote. I didn't see it. I saw a man who counted beans, who 
said, `98 today, 99 tomorrow, 100 the next day,' and had no 
willingness, and, in many cases, no capacity, to understand the 
other things that were happening around those beans. And that 
is just a recipe for problems at the United Nations, and that's 
the only reason I said anything,'' end of quote.
    Some have suggested that because Mr. Bolton did not succeed 
in his attempts to end the careers of analysts whose dissenting 
views angered him, and because he did not succeed in his 
attempts to manipulate the government's processes to shut out 
voices of disagreement, caution, or dissent, that, in the end, 
as I think the phrase that has been used, no harm, no foul, or 
that there's no problem here.
    I cannot believe that any of my colleagues actually believe 
that's true. Why, after all that we have learned about the 
vital importance of dissent in the intelligence community from 
the 9/11 Commission, the Silverman-Robb Commission, and 
numerous other investigations into the major intelligence 
failures that have gravely harmed our credibility and our 
security over the past year, why would we choose to promote to 
a position of prominence and trust and individual who has tried 
strenuously to manipulate intelligence?
    Finally, in recent weeks serious concerns have been raised 
regarding Mr. Bolton's understanding of his obligations to be 
forthcoming with this committee. Several of Mr. Bolton's 
answers to Senators' questions were misleading, and several 
were quite blatantly nonresponsive. In light of the evidence 
this committee has seen in recent weeks, most of us can 
probably agree that if Mr. Bolton does end up being our next 
Ambassador to the United Nations, extremely careful oversight 
will be required. But our oversight responsibilities depend, in 
many instances, upon the executive branch officials who come 
before us understanding that they have a constitutional 
obligation to be forthcoming with Congress. I have no 
confidence that Mr. Bolton intends to adhere to this 
obligation.
    Mr. Bolton's nomination raises fundamental questions 
regarding both credibility and accountability. The credibility 
of our representation at the U.N., the credibility of 
intelligence, the credibility of the oversight process are all 
at stake. And the question of whether or not this committee 
will hold officials who seek to dissent--suppress dissent 
accountable for their actions is before us today, as well.
    I, like many other members of this committee, deeply 
appreciate the extraordinary courage of the many people who 
came forward to share with this committee their own concerns 
about Mr. Bolton's fitness for the U.N. post or to correct 
inaccuracies in the record, in some cases at real risk to their 
careers. I am grateful for their efforts, and I deeply 
appreciate their honesty. And so, Mr. Chairman, after listening 
to them, I'm all the more certain I cannot support this 
nomination.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman.  Thank you very much, Senator Feingold.
    Senator Hagel.

   STATEMENT OF HON. CHUCK HAGEL, U.S. SENATOR FROM NEBRASKA

    Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
    I would like to add my thanks to you and to the ranking 
member for the work that you have produced, contributions 
you've made, the leadership you've shown at a difficult but 
important time. I would add, also, my thanks to the staff, both 
Minority and Majority, for their work.
    There have been some references today to the relevancy and 
the importance of this committee. I believe it was Mr. Biden 
who noted, as others on the Democratic side, their years of 
service on this committee and how, over those years, 
unfortunately, the Foreign Relations Committee in the U.S. 
Senate has diminished, not only in stature, but in importance.
    I make this point, because I recall, when I was elected in 
1996, and I was given, as all new Senators are, their choice of 
committees--limited--and the committee that I asked to be 
considered for first was the Foreign Relations Committee. And I 
was questioned by the political experts at the time, ``Why in 
the world would you waste your time on the Foreign Relations?'' 
Not was only was it a committee that could not raise money, but 
where is the constituency in America for foreign relations? 
Where is the constituency for diplomacy? Where is the 
constituency for the United Nations, their problems. ``They're 
drains on our budget, they're drains on our energy, so why in 
the world would you do that?''
    The second ``Why would you do it?''--because it was not an 
important committee. Maybe it once was. I remember Ted Kennedy 
telling me, years ago, that his brother, John Kennedy, wanted 
to be on the Foreign Relations Committee when he came to the 
Senate, but he couldn't get on it. It took him a few years to 
get on it, because it was then regarded as one of the most 
important committees in the U.S. Senate. Why was that? It was 
after World War II, and we were literally restructuring the 
world. We. I emphasize ``we.'' The United States led, but we 
did it with alliances and coalitions and friends and strong 
allies, who believed in our purpose.
    I also mention this point, not only to, again, acknowledge 
you and the ranking member for what you have done to make this 
a relevant committee once again, but, in fact, it is the 
committee--and this was my answer to those who asked me the 
question about why I would want to be on this committee. My 
answer was, it is the committee that is the framework that 
represents America's interests around the world. When you look 
at the jurisdiction of this committee, is it wide, deep, and 
relevant, and it is becoming more and more so.
    So, therefore, this nomination that we are meeting to 
discuss today, and will vote on later, is important, and this 
committee is important, and, therefore, should never, ever be 
framed up by either the Democratic party or the Republican 
party as a partisan issue. It has never worked that way, nor 
should it ever. And the groups on both sides of this issue do a 
great disservice to our country when they try to simplify it 
into a political common denominator issue. It is not.
    This position, the U.S. Permanent Representative to the 
United Nations, is one of the most important jobs in our 
government. It is the face, the American face, to the world. 
That's important. A hundred and ninety-one nations. No body in 
the world like the United Nations. And who structured and 
framed and led to put the United Nations together after World 
War II? The United States. The United Nations, like all 
multilateral institutions that we led on, we framed, we put 
together after World War II, have been extensions of America's 
purpose and our power, not limitations. It's given us 
alliances. It's given us opportunities to promote who we are. 
And it has, quite frankly, served our foreign-relations 
objectives.
    Now, is the United Nations in need of reform? Of course it 
is. Of course it is. And it has wandered from its original 
charter. And I do not believe that necessarily is the core 
issue here that some have tried to frame up, that if you're 
against John Bolton, you're against reforming the United 
Nations. That's patently ridiculous. That makes no sense. That 
is not the issue.
    And I would say to my friend from Virginia, I would think 
that Mr. Negroponte and our former colleague, Mr. Danforth, who 
have been recent U.N. Ambassadors, would not consider 
themselves as tea-drinkers and milktoasts, nor would I think 
that the first President Bush would consider himself as a 
milktoast and a tea-drinker. Maybe they drink tea. Nor Jeane 
Kirkpatrick. We're talking about something bigger and wider 
here than just those easy characterizations.
    Ladies and gentlemen, we're living through a 
transformational time in the history of man. This is one of the 
most defining, important times in the history of the world. 
That's the bigger picture here. Now, whether Mr. Bolton is 
qualified or not, obviously, is our more concise challenge for 
this committee.
    I have had long conversations with Secretary Rice about Mr. 
Bolton. I have known Mr. Bolton, I have worked with Mr. Bolton, 
and I have had long conversations with Mr. Bolton. As has been 
noted here, mainly on our side of the committee, he has assured 
me, he has assured the President and Secretary Rice, that he 
will carry out the policy of this administration, that policy 
set by the President. Foreign relations is set by the 
President--not the Secretary of State, but the President. And 
President Bush has been forceful, over the last few months, 
talking about the importance of the United Nations. I take the 
President at his word. I take the Secretary of State at her 
word, and Mr. Bolton, in saying that he will be--my words, I 
asked--a uniter, a builder, someone, in fact, not only who will 
carry out the interests of the United States at the United 
Nations, but will go beyond that.
    The expectations are high for Mr. Bolton. And they should 
be. Anyone we send to the United Nations to represent this 
great country to the world should be held to very high 
expectations. But, in the end, he is the agent of the 
President.
    I have enough confidence in this President, this Secretary 
of State, to take them at their word, and Mr. Bolton at his 
word, when he says that, ``I will be a uniter. I will be a 
builder,'' and do the things that will be required, not just to 
reform the United Nations, but to go beyond that.
    This isn't just about reforming the United Nations. This is 
about extending America's purpose and the optics and who we 
are, and reaching out. If there was ever a time in history that 
the United States requires friends and alliances and 
coalitions, it is now. The world is too complicated to do 
otherwise. It is too dangerous to do otherwise.
    Many of you have read Tom Friedman's new book, and I 
recommend it highly. Tom Friedman captures the essence of the 
world that we live in today, but, more importantly, the world 
our children will live in, in the next few years. The name of 
that book is, ``The World is Flat.'' There's a diffusion of 
power in the world today that we've never seen, and I think 
that's good for America. But we've worked for that. That means 
we carry less burden. Hopefully, we will become less and less 
the world's policemen. That means now we've lost--over 1600 
dead in Iraq, and over 12,000 wounded. Hopefully, there will be 
a time when that won't occur, because we are sharing 
responsibilities in the world.
    These are the big issues that we're talking about in this 
committee, and, specifically, for this nominee. Mr. Chairman, I 
am, like all on this committee, grateful to be on the 
committee. I am privileged to serve in the U.S. Senate. And as 
long as I am an elected official in the U.S. Senate, I will do 
what I think is right--not for my party, not for my President--
but for the country that I take, as all my colleagues do, an 
allegiance to when I swear to the Constitution of the United 
States.
    I say this, again, because there is afoot in this land a 
dangerous, dangerous move, in both extremes of the political 
parties, to make foreign policy and everything a political 
issue. We will not only debase our system and our process, but 
we will make the world far more dangerous than it is at a 
complicated historic transformational time in our history. We 
must stop it and get above it. We're dealing with other issues 
like this in the U.S. Senate. We are elected to uphold the 
interests of this country first.
    We will all make our vote today on the Bolton nomination. I 
will support the President, I'll support the Chairman's motion 
to move this nomination out onto the floor of the Senate.
    Mr. Chairman, thank you.
    The Chairman.  Thank you very much, Senator Hagel.
    Senator Biden, will you designate your speaker?
    Senator Biden. My colleague from California.
    The Chairman.  Senator Boxer.

 STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA BOXER, U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA

    Senator Boxer. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank 
you, Senator Biden. Thanks to all the members of the committee 
who feel very strongly about this, one way or the other.
    And I do agree with what Senator Hagel said, that we are at 
a critical moment in U.S. foreign policy--we are a critical 
moment in U.S. foreign policy, a time where we need to lead the 
world to a better place. It is that fork in the road where one 
place is dark and one place is light. And, to do that, we need 
the world with us, so much, or the burdens on our people will 
just be too much to bear. And I think Senator Voinovich said 
that in a magnificent way. I think Senator Hagel also said that 
in a beautiful way, and other members said it in their way. And 
that's why this debate is so important, and that's why the U.N. 
Ambassador is to important. Will this individual unite the 
world with us so that we can move to that better place?
    I was sort of stunned at Senator Coleman, when he asked a 
rhetorical question. ``Who makes the judgment about who is the 
best person to represent the U.N.,'' he asked, rhetorically, 
and then went on to answer his question, ``There was an 
election.'' But, Senator, you forgot something. There was an 
election for individual Senators, too. And maybe it's because--
I remember it because I, also, was on the ballot at the same 
time as the President.
    And I would just urge the Senator to look at Article 2, 
Section 2 of the Constitution, ``The President shall nominate 
and, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall 
appoint ambassadors.'' It doesn't say, ``With the advice and 
consent of the President if he feels like it, or if he's in the 
mood for it, or he should turn to the Senate on Monday at 
3:00.'' It's pretty clear here. It's in the same sentence. And 
I hope that you will have more pride in this institution and 
your responsibility not to say that it is the President, alone, 
regardless of whether the President is a Democrat or a 
Republican. It is a shared responsibility, and that's why this 
debate is so important.
    It also is not about whether Mr. Bolton is nice, as my 
friend said. He said it certainly shouldn't be about that, and 
he's right. It is about many other things of deep importance, 
where my friend just doesn't want to go. And I understand it.
    I do want to pick up on something Senator Dodd said, 
because I think it's key. There is not a majority on this 
committee in favor of Mr. Bolton right now. There is not. And 
it is our job to send a signal to our colleagues. And, I think, 
to send a signal that we're moving this forward would be the 
wrong signal. It's not true. There is not a majority on this 
committee who supports John Bolton today, so I will not be 
voting to move this forward without recommendation.
    And there's another point, Mr. Chairman, and it really 
involves you and Senator Biden more than it involves me. But I 
am deeply disappointed that we have not gotten all the 
information we requested. And I agree with my leader on this 
committee, Senator Biden, that this is a matter of principle. 
Perhaps there's nothing in there, perhaps there's something, 
but there are several areas--the intercepts, that's one area; 
Mr. Freedman and his potential conflicts, we've asked for that 
information; and there's some information about Syria. And I 
will just say, because I'm--Mr. Chairman, I have such respect 
for you, I would never blind-side you--that I am going to do 
all I can to see that we get this information before this moves 
out of here onto the floor--or let me say before this gets onto 
the floor, because it's not right to cast a vote where you 
really don't have the full information.
    Now, Mr. Chairman, I think there are many reasons to oppose 
Mr. Bolton, and I'm going to lay them out, but I'm not going to 
go on, hopefully not, for the full 15 minutes, but it may 
happen. Sometimes I forget to watch the clock. But I would ask 
that my full statement be placed in the record.
    The Chairman.  It will be placed in the record in full.
    Senator Boxer. Thanks.
    So, I will skim through it, and I will not reiterate what 
other people have.
    First, and, to me, the most important, is the 
politicization--and I didn't say it right--of intelligence. 
This is the most important issue, when we see what phony and 
exaggerated intelligence can lead to. It can lead to war. We've 
seen it. It's happening every day. It is tragic. Thousands of 
deaths and injuries--1600 deaths, plus. And in my state we have 
about 25 percent of those deaths, people who were born in 
California or were activated from California, so, wear that 
heavily our state. So, why on earth would we want to hire 
someone who has shown he's willing to put political pressure on 
independent intelligence analysts?
    We know about Westermann. We know about Mr. Smith. I'm not 
going to go through that. We know about it.
    Robert Hutchings, Chairman of the NIC, described the risk 
of this politicizing intelligence in this way, ``I think every 
judgment ought to be challenged and questioned, but when it 
goes beyond that to a search for a pretty clearly defined 
preformed set of judgments, then it's politicization. And even 
when it's successfully resisted, it creates a climate of 
intimidation and a culture of conformity that is damaging.''
    So here we take someone who put pressure on these people--
you saw the chart that Senator Dodd had--reached down. This is 
not a person that we should be promoting when we have the war 
in Iraq that was based on this faulty intelligence. We 
shouldn't do it.
    Second reason, disdain for the U.N. I know that doesn't get 
a lot of votes around here, but, it seems to me, putting 
someone into that situation who has said, ``There is no United 
Nations,'' it just--it is shocking. I mean, Senator Biden said 
``surprising.'' It was shocking to me.
    I think, in that regard, there are inaccurate comparisons 
to Moynihan and Kirkpatrick. I think Senator Kerry pointed that 
out. And I will let that go into the record.
    International law. John Bolton's comments versus Senator 
Moynihan--it's not even in the same league.
    Then there's three, a pattern of retribution and abuse. 
And, again, we know about what he tried to do. So, it's not 
only that he tried to twist arms to get, you know, faulty 
intelligence forward, but he actually exerted retribution on 
people. That's wrong. And someone like that should not be 
promoted.
    And, again, I'll put all of that into the record.
    But I'm going to close with two areas, one that Senator 
Kerry touched on, the failure to be candid with this committee. 
My God, we ought to at least believe that we deserve someone to 
tell us the whole truth. And I want to go through this on a 
chart here, because I can't do it any other way. So, bear with 
me.
    Bolton, ``I never sought to have Mr. Westermann fired at 
all. I, in no sense, sought to have any discipline imposed on 
Mr. Westermann.''
    Carl Ford, responding to that, ``I remember going back to 
my office with the impression that I had been asked to fire the 
analyst. Now, whether the words were `fire,' whether that was, 
`Reassign. Get him away from me. I don't want to see him 
again,' I don't remember. I do remember that I came away with 
the impression that I had just been asked to fire somebody in 
the intelligence community for doing what I considered their 
job.''
    Bolton, quote, ``I may have mentioned the Westermann issue 
to one or two people, but then I shrugged my shoulders and 
moved on.''
    Several months later, Bolton raised Mr. Westermann with the 
INR director, Neil Silver. According to Mr. Silver, quote, ``To 
the best of my recollection, Bolton raised Mr. Westermann's 
name, and he asked or indicated that he would like me to 
consider having him moved to some other portfolio.''
    Bolton, ``So I basically went out to pay a courtesy call on 
Mr. Cohen, and, it's true, I drove my own car out there. I have 
to make a confession here, the CIA is, sort of, more or less, 
on the way home for me, and, from time to time, when I've gone 
out there, I've driven my own car, I've had my meetings--I hate 
to say this, but I left and went home.'' He takes a long time 
to describe how he just dropped by on the way home. He says, 
``I didn't go back to the office.''
    Well, we have Secretary--we have Secretary Bolton's 
calendar here. For the day in question, the meeting with Mr. 
Cohen was scheduled, it was on his schedule for 9:30, and he 
had other meetings scheduled that afternoon.
    And I think we go on with some other charts here. Is that 
the 10 minutes or the----
    Senator Biden. That's ten.
    Senator Boxer. Ten, okay.
    Bolton: ``I went out to pay a courtesy call, and my 
recollection is, the bulk of the meeting was composed of Mr. 
Cohen explaining to me what the NIC did, and told me what their 
complications were and how it had been created, and gave me 
some background on it.
    Committee staff member asks, ``Do you remember giving 
Bolton a primer about the NIC?''
    Mr. Cohen, ``No. I just don't recall the details of the 
meeting, other than the fact that there was a focus on Mr. 
Smith.''
    Bolton, ``I didn't seek to have these people fired. I 
didn't seek to have discipline imposed on them. I said I've 
lost trust in them, and there are other portfolios they could 
follow.''
    Carl Ford, ``I do remember that I came away with the 
impression that I had been asked to fire somebody in the 
intelligence community.''
    John McLaughlin, former Deputy Director of the CIA--``Do 
you recall other--do you recall other requests similar to this, 
to remove one of your analysts?'' John McLaughlin, ``No, this 
is the only time I had ever heard of such a request. I didn't 
think it appropriate.''
    Bolton, ``And I can tell you what our Ambassador to South 
Korea, Tom Hubbard, said after the speech. He said, 'Thanks a 
lot for that speech, John. It'll help us a lot out here.' ''
    Hubbard, former Ambassador to South Korea, quote, ``At the 
very least, he greatly, greatly exaggerated my comments. I told 
the committee that if you're basing your vote on Bolton's 
assertion that I approved his speech, that is not true.''
    So, we see here lack of candor, misleading statements. It's 
absolutely shocking to me that more people on the committee 
aren't disturbed with this.
    I also would say this. The strongest opposition to Mr. 
Bolton, outside of members of this committee, comes from the 
people from the Bush administration. And I don't have time to 
read everything, but here we have, again, Carl Ford, Lawrence 
Wilkerson. He says--I won't repeat that quote, because somebody 
else gave it.
    Elizabeth Jones, former Assistant Secretary of State for 
European and Eurasian Affairs, ``I don't know if he's capable 
of negotiation, but he's unwilling.''
    John Wolf, former Assistant Secretary of State for 
Nonproliferation, ``I believe it would be fair to say that some 
of the officers within my bureau complained that they felt 
undue pressure to conform to the views of the Under Secretary, 
versus the views that they thought they could support.''
    And, again, John McLaughlin, ``It's perfectly all right for 
a policymaker to express disagreement with an NIO or an 
analyst, and it's perfectly all right for them to challenge 
such an individual vigorously, challenge their work, but I 
think it's different to then request, because of the 
disagreement, the person be transferred. I had high regard for 
the individual's work; therefore, I had a strong negative 
reaction to the suggestion about moving him.''
    So, here you have people from the Bush administration, who 
served there proudly, in many cases saying--they're 
conservative, they're Republican, they're proud to support the 
President, the Vice President--coming out against this nominee. 
It is hard for me to understand why the President didn't simply 
say he's going to send down somebody else.
    I guess he wants a fight. I guess he's asking people to 
walk the line. And if that's where we're going, that's where 
we're going, because we're going to have a fight. If this comes 
to the floor, we're going to have a fight. And the American 
people are going to engage in it, and they're going to look at 
it. And I guess, at the end of the day, their sentiments may be 
able to sway some of my colleagues on both sides of the aisle; 
frankly, I don't know even where my Democratic colleagues are 
on this, except for the ones in the committee. But that's the 
greatness of this place. We'll take this to battle. We'll take 
these quotes, we'll take these interviews down to the floor. 
And we're going to ask the American people to help us on this 
one.
    And I thank you all.
    The Chairman.  I thank you, Senator Boxer.
    The Chair would like to recognize Senator Alexander.
    Let me just add, before you commence, Senator Alexander. 
Forty-eight minutes remain on our side, so this means, 
hopefully, framing of 10-minute speeches, more or less. And if 
you would proceed on that basis, I would appreciate it.
    Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman.  Yes.
    Senator Biden. Without us asking for any more time--we 
won't--if you need more time, it's fine by us for your people 
to be able to speak.
    The Chairman.  I appreciate it.
    Senator Alexander.

 STATEMENT OF HON. LAMAR ALEXANDER, U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE

    Senator Alexander. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, 
Senator Biden.
    That should be plenty of time. And if you could let me know 
when that's about expired, I'll expire, as well.
    I'd like to insert my full statement in the record, if I 
may.
    The Chairman.  It'll be included in full in the record.
    [The prepared statement of Senator Alexander follows:]

                Prepared Statement of Senator Alexander

    Mr. Chairman, I'd like to take a few moments to talk about the 
nominee before the committee, his qualifications, the importance of the 
post to which he's been nominated, and some of the charges made against 
him by the other side.
    I believe John Bolton will do a fine job as our next Permanent 
Representative at the United Nations.
    John Bolton has a distinguished background:

   Last four years as Undersecretary of State for Arms Control 
        and International Security;

   Assistant Secretary for International Organizations (like 
        the UN) under the first President Bush

   Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice, 1985-
        1989;

   Assistant Administrator for Program and Policy Coordination, 
        U.S. Agency for International Development, 1982-1983;

   General Counsel, U.S. Agency for International Development, 
        1981-1982; and

   He graduated with a B.A., summa cum laude, from Yale 
        University and received his J.D. from Yale Law School.

    Solid Accomplishments:

   Helped lead the American effort to repeal Resolution 3379, 
        which equated Zionism with racism (under Bush Sr.);

   As Assistant Secretary for International Organizations, 
        steered a critical series of resolutions supporting our 
        liberation of Kuwait in 1991 through the U.N. Security Council;

   Joined former Secretary Jim Baker in supporting the UN's 
        work in Western Sahara in the 1990's--pro bono; and

   Designed this administration's Proliferation Security 
        Initiative, under which more than 60 nations now share 
        intelligence and take action to stop the transfer of dangerous 
        weapons.

    Impressive Appearance Before the Foreign Relations Committee

   Demonstrated command of the issues facing the United 
        Nations;

   Despite intense questioning that lasted more than seven 
        hours, Bolton was calm and collected; and
   He focused on the need for reform of the United Nations

    Strong Support:

   Endorsed by five former Secretaries of State: James Baker, 
        Lawrence Eagleburger, Al Haig, Henry Kissinger, George Shultz;

   Also endorsed by more than 50 former Ambassadors

    I was with one of those former ambassadors a couple weeks ago, the 
former majority leader of this body, Ejpward Baker, with whom I and 
other members had lunch. He remarked about how he had dealt with 
Secretary Bolton over the last 4 years in Tokyo, when Senator Baker was 
our Ambassador to Japan. Senator Baker liked Bolton. He was impressed 
with him. He said he spoke frankly, that he would be a good ambassador.
Intelligence Charges Against Bolton
    The second day of hearings was a little different than the first. I 
was surprised and disappointed by what I heard. There was a man named 
Carl Ford, the former Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and 
Research, who was well respected by members of the committee, who 
presented evidence that John Bolton had ``chewed out,'' to use 
colloquial words, intelligence analysts in the State Department.
    Mr. Ford, to his credit, didn't like that because those persons 
were down the line. Mr. Ford was a pretty good witness because he 
didn't overstate his case. He acknowledged that it wasn't unusual for 
policy people and intelligence analysts to argue, for policy people to 
hope for intelligence that supported their positions. He just didn't 
like the fact that in this case he had heard about--he wasn't there, he 
had heard about--that Mr. Bolton in effect chewed out one of Mr. Ford's 
employees, and Mr. Ford didn't like it. He told Mr. Bolton so, and they 
exchanged words.
    That is what Mr. Ford said.
    There have been some other things said about Mr. Bolton. It was 
suggested that Mr. Bolton was misusing or compromising intelligence. 
But Mr. Ford himself said: ``In this particular case''--the one Mr. 
Ford was led there to complain about--``there wasn't politicization [of 
the intelligence].''
    Mr. Ford was very clear on that point in his testimony to the 
committee.
    In interviews conducted by this committee's staff since that time, 
another issue was raised where there was a disageement over 
intelligence. One of Mr. Bolton's subordinates, who was on detail from 
the CIA, sent a report to the Deputy Secretary of State for review and 
was unhappy that another bureau had put a memo on top of that report 
that said the report was incorrect. This sounds like a simple 
disagreement to me, a disagreement over intelligence that is quite 
common from what we've been told even by Mr. Ford. And in this case, 
there's no evidence Mr. Bolton was even aware of the dispute at all. 
So, again, there is no evidence of politicization of intelligence. 
Rather, it appears that different staff members were arguing for their 
own point of view, which shouldn't surprise anybody.
Other Questionable Charges:
    He is accused of trying to have analysts removed, or reassigned, in 
whom he had lost confidence. But there is no evidence any of these 
individuals suffered in their career path whatsoever--o one was fired 
or reassigned.
    He was accused by a former USAID contractor of ``chasing'' her 
around a Moscow hotel to stop her from damaging his client, but in her 
interview with committee staff, the accuser later admits that perhaps 
``chasing'' wasn't the best word. Rather she ``felt chased'' because he 
kept tryjng to talk to her. Her employer at the time also failed to 
corroborate her story.
    In the end, only one charge appears to have any substance: John 
Bolton has been rude to staff members below him in the bureaucracy.
    I imagine Mr. Bolton is embarrassed by those charges. I didn't like 
to hear them. And perhaps he deserves to be embarrassed by the charges 
and perhaps he has learned a lesson. But what I heard doesn't change my 
vote, even though I hope it might change some of Mr. Bolton's ways of 
dealing with people with whom he works.
    How significant is this charge that he was rude to people in the 
bureaucracy? As has been mentioned by others, if that were the standard 
for remaining in the Senate, we would have a hard time getting a 
quorum.
    There are regularly occasions when busy Senators, eager to make 
their own point, are rude to their staff and even shout at one another. 
In fact, the shouting was so loud in the last business meeting of this 
committee by some of the Senators that I could barely hear the charges 
against Mr. Bolton. That is not attractive, and I don't endorse it. It 
even caused me to think back about times that I may have become angry 
or impatient or startled in dealing with a staff member or another 
person, and made me redouble my efforts to make sure I swallow my pride 
and think about what I say and not do that anymore. It's not good 
business.
    But how significant is this? Here is what former Secretary of State 
Larry Eagleburger had to say about it a couple weeks ago in the 
T3Washington Post . This deserves special attention. Larry Eagleburger 
was Secretary of State for the first President Bush, but in a way he 
was more than that. He had 27 years in the Foreign Service. We hear 
that a football player is a football player's player or a man is a 
man's man or a woman is a woman's woman. Larry Eagleburger is a Foreign 
Service officer's Secretary of State. He had and has enormous respect 
from all those men and women who put their lives on the line around the 
world and in the United States in support of our diplomacy and foreign 
policy. Here is what he said:

          As to the charge that Bolton has been tough on subordinates, 
        I can say only that in more than a decade of association with 
        him in the State Department I never saw or heard anything to 
        support such a charge. Nor do I see anything wrong with 
        challenging intelligence analysts on their findings. They can, 
        as recent history demonstrates, make mistakes. And they must be 
        prepared to defend their findings under intense questioning. If 
        John pushed too hard or dressed down subordinates, he deserves 
        criticism, but it hardly merits a vote against confirmation 
        when balanced against his many accomplishments.
    That is where I am. I think the benefit of hearing Mr. Ford's 
testimony might be a little bit of a lesson to Mr. Bolton and a 
reminder to the rest of us of how unattractive it is to shout at an 
associate or unnecessarily dress down a staff member. I agree with 
Secretary Eagleburger. John Bolton has a distinguished background and 
record. He has dedicated himself to improving our country's foreign 
policy. His action toward subordinates might have been inappropriate. 
Perhaps he has learned a lesson, but it doesn't cause me to change my 
vote. I am glad to support him.
    This is a critical time for the United Nations. Even the Secretary 
General acknowledges it is in need of reform. Billions of dollars 
filtered from the UN's coffers to Saddam Hussein's pockets in the oil-
for-food scandal. Top human rights abusers such as Sudan and Zimbabwe 
sit on the Human Rights Commission. United Nations peacekeepers in 
Africa have been found to rape and pillage.
    Now the United Nations has many important roles in the world. I am 
glad we have it. I want it to work, but I believe the President is 
right in his thinking, that we need to take action to help the UN 
reform itself, and that a frank-talking, experienced diplomat named 
John Bolton is an excellent candidate for that commission. I intend to 
vote for him in committee and on the floor. It is my hope that we will 
report Mr. Bolton's nomination to the floor and the Senate will approve 
it and give him a chance to go to work in reforming the U.N.
In Defense of the Chairman
    Mr. Chairman, I'd also like to take a moment, if I may, to comment 
about the decorum with which this committee has proceeded in 
considering Mr. Bolton's nomination. I want to compliment you, Mr. 
Chairman, because I think you have shown incredible patience and 
diligence in making sure that all Senators have the facts and are able 
to make a well-informed decision.
    Seldom has there been a more thorough investigation of a nominee. 
The committee has heard more than seven hours of sworn testimony from 
Mr. Bolton. Ninety-four questions for the record were further submitted 
to Mr. Bolton in writing, many with multiple parts, and he has 
responded. We heard sworn testimony from Mr. Ford, someone who opposed 
the President's nominee--which is a rarity in itself.
    Further, the committee has conducted 35 additional interviews that 
has resulted in over 1,000 pages of transcripts which are publicly 
available. At the Chairman's insistence, 700 pages of documents have 
been turned over to the committee from various related agencies, 
including the State Department, the CIA, and USAID.
    I have seen in the press some comments that suggest the Chairman 
has somehow ``stonewalled'' efforts to investigate Mr. Bolton. That's 
an outrageous claim, especially when compared to just how far the 
Chairman has bent over backwards to get answers to questions by members 
of the minority. The Chairman supported numerous requests by the other 
side for more information. Indeed, we wouldn't have nearly 2,000 pages 
of documentation without his active leadership.

    Senator Alexander. And I would like to thank the chairman 
for this opportunity. I'd like to summarize a few points in my 
remarks.
    I've said what I had to say before in this committee. And 
after reviewing the evidence and listening to the hearings, 
which I did, I made a statement just before the recess, about 
10 days ago, about how I felt. So, I'd like to summarize those 
thoughts.
    And, basically, since I think Mr.--I'm convinced Mr. 
Bolton's credentials for the position are well-established, 
superior credentials, and I'd like to try to put in context the 
charges that have been made against him and the conclusion I've 
come to and I evaluate those charges.
    It's important, even though it's been repeated many times, 
to remind ourselves of the credentials. Because of those 
credentials, I expected to be impressed by Mr. Bolton when he 
appeared before the committee, and I was. I mean, not many 
people have been, as the chairman indicated in his remarks, 
confirmed four times by the U.S. Senate for major positions--
Under Secretary, Assistant Secretary, Assistant Attorney 
General in the Department of Justice--that was in another 
administration; that was in the 1980s. Those are big jobs. 
Those are jobs that manage large numbers of attorneys in 
complex cases. And then his academic record is unusually, 
unusually good. And many of the Senators have recited his 
accomplishments in professional life--the U.N. resolution on 
Zionism, the work he did in the U.N. helping--with the U.N. 
helping to shepherd the resolutions about Kuwait in 1991, the 
fact that the Secretary General asked former Secretary of State 
Jim Baker to help with Western Sahara, and Baker invited John 
Bolton. All of those activities suggested a very accomplished 
nominee.
    And so, I was not surprised when, on the first day of our 
hearings, his performance was impressive. I listened. I was 
here for most of it. I thought he displayed a good command of 
the issues, extremely detailed knowledge of the United Nations, 
and that, while he got hard questions, as nominees are supposed 
to get--I was--once had the honor of being--going through a 
confirmation process before a committee of the U.S. Senate. 
It's a very special experience. And I thought he handled that 
experience very, very well. He handled it calmly, he answered 
the questions, he wasn't combative. I went home that day very 
impressed.
    I was impressed by the strong support from the former 
Secretaries of State, who have been mentioned, by the number of 
ambassadors, who have been mentioned. And I had lunch with one 
of those ambassadors the other day who's well known to this 
group, Senator Howard Baker, who was Ambassador to Japan, and 
he volunteered to me, this former Majority Leader of the U.S. 
Senate, how he had dealt with Secretary Bolton over the least 
four years while Senator Baker was in Japan, and how impressed 
he was with him. He said, ``He's a good man. He'd make a good 
ambassador. He spoke frankly. I enjoyed working with him.''
    So, after one day, I was very impressed.
    I was surprised and disappointed by the second day of 
testimony. It was a little different. Carl Ford, who's been 
mentioned here, was a good witness. Very believable. He didn't 
overstate his case. He acknowledged it wasn't unusual for 
policy people and intelligence people to disagree. He was 
really mad about the fact that John Bolton, in his words, ``had 
chewed out somebody way down the line.'' He didn't like it at 
all, and he felt it was important to come before the committee 
and say so. Many members of the committee know and respect him. 
I found his testimony believable, and I was disappointed by it.
    There have been some other things said about Mr. Bolton, 
which Mr. Ford, himself, dismissed. Mr. Ford, himself, said 
there was a politicization of the intelligence that Mr. Bolton 
was accused of misusing.
    There was other testimony, which has been dealt through 
here. Senator Lugar and others have talked about it.
    But it was about--as I've listened very carefully to all of 
the charges, in the one--in the end, only one charge, to me, 
seemed to have any substance, and that is that John Bolton has 
been rude to staff members who had subordinate jobs to his in 
the U.S. Government.
    I imagine Mr. Bolton is embarrassed by those charges. I 
didn't like to hear them, and perhaps he deserves to be 
embarrassed by those charges. And perhaps he's learned a 
lesson.
    What I heard didn't change my vote, but I hope it might 
change some of Mr. Bolton's ways and dealings with his 
colleagues and with other people in the bureaucracies with 
which he will be working.
    How significant is this charge of rudeness? As has been 
mentioned by others, if it were the standard for remaining in 
the U.S. Senate, we probably wouldn't be able to get a quorum. 
There are regular occasions--all of us know about them--when 
Senators eager to make their own points are rude to their 
staffs and even occasionally shout at one another. In fact, the 
noise was so loud in our first hearing, I was not sure I would 
be able to hear the charges against Mr. Bolton above the 
shouting. It's not attractive. I don't endorse it. It's even 
caused me to think back over times I may have become impatient 
or angry or startled in dealing with a staff member or another 
person, and it's redoubled my efforts to try to make sure I 
swallow my pride, think about what I say, and not do that 
anymore. It's not good business.
    But how significant is this?--is the question. Given such a 
distinguished, credentialed person, with such broad experience, 
who this body has confirmed four different times, how big a 
problem is this?
    Here's what former Secretary Larry Eagleburger had to say 
about it. Now, Larry Eagleburger's comments deserve special 
consideration in this--in this discussion. We often hear about 
a man being a football player's football player, or a woman 
who's a woman's woman. Well, Larry Eagleburger is a Foreign 
Service's--Foreign Service Officer's Secretary of State.
    Now, for 27 years he was in the Foreign Service. He has 
enormous respect from all those men and women around the world 
who put their lives on the line in support of our diplomacy and 
foreign policy. And here is what Larry Eagleburger had to say 
about John Bolton, ``As to the charge,'' quoting, ``that Bolton 
has been tough on subordinates, I can say only that in more 
than a decade of association with him in the State Department, 
I never saw or heard anything to support such a charge. I never 
saw or heard anything to support such a charge. Nor do I see 
anything wrong with challenging intelligence analysts on their 
findings. They can, as recent history demonstrates, make 
mistakes, and they must be prepared to defend their findings 
under intense questioning. If John pushed too hard or dressed-
down subordinates, he deserves criticism, but it hardly merits 
a vote against confirmation when balanced against his many 
accomplishments,'' unquote.
    Mr. Chairman, that's where I am. I think the benefit of 
hearing Mr. Ford's testimony might be a little bit of a lesson 
to Mr. Bolton and a reminder to the rest of us of how 
unattractive it is to shout at an associate or a colleague or 
unnecessarily dress-down a staff member in a moment of 
impatience or disagreement.
    I agree with Secretary Eagleburger, though. John Bolton has 
a distinguished background and record, he has dedicated himself 
to improving our country's foreign policy. His action towards 
subordinates might have been inappropriate. Perhaps he has 
learned a lesson. But it doesn't cause me to change my vote. 
I'm glad to support him.
    This is a critical time for the United Nations. It has many 
important roles. I'm glad we have it. I believe a frank-talking 
experienced diplomat named John Bolton is an excellent 
candidate for the commission. And I'm glad--I hope that he will 
move out of this committee to the floor so we can discuss it.
    Two more brief things I would like to say about members of 
the committee. I especially appreciated the comments of the 
Senator from Nebraska as he talked about the role of this 
committee and the importance of our looking at our 
responsibilities in the world on the basis that puts our 
allegiance first to the country. And I'll do my best to do 
that.
    I want to express to Senator Voinovich of Ohio my respect 
for his careful thinking about this. I know him well, and have 
for a long time. He's always been dedicated to civil servants, 
those who work for the government, and he would be the first to 
be offended by rudeness to anyone down the line. I'm not so 
surprised that he reacted strongly to this, and I respect his 
thoughtful statement.
    And I'd like to say to the chairman, who has great 
patience, that he's demonstrated almost all of it during this--
--
    [Laughter.]
    Senator Alexander  [continuing]. During this consideration. 
Ninety-four questions for the record, testimony from Mr. Ford, 
700 pages of documents, some people suggesting you're 
stonewalling.
    You have, with the cooperation of Senator Biden, over time, 
helped this committee be an outpost of decency and 
thoughtfulness in a time of increased partisanship. And for 
that, I thank you, and I appreciate your patience, which has 
been more than almost any of the rest of us would likely have 
had.
    Thank you for the time.
    The Chairman.  I thank the Senator.
    Senator Biden, you designate----
    Senator Biden. Senator Obama.
    The Chairman.  Senator Obama.

   STATEMENT OF HON. BARACK OBAMA, U.S. SENATOR FROM ILLINOIS

    Senator Obama. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking 
Member Biden.
    I was extraordinarily impressed with the presentation that 
Senator Voinovich made, and I think that he expressed a number 
of the concerns that many of us share on this committee. So, 
I'm not going to reiterate all my points. I would like to have 
my statement placed in the record.
    The Chairman.  It will be placed in the record in full.
    There are a couple of issues that I think are important to 
touch on. The first is, I think the tendency in this debate to 
suggest that opposition to Mr. Bolton's nomination is based on 
the fact that he is occasionally rude, he showed some bluster, 
he got mad--the previous speaker is exactly right, if that's 
the only criteria by which we would oppose the nomination, then 
most of us might not qualify, because, at any point in time, 
we've displayed probably inappropriate behavior or anger that 
we regret afterwards. And I think if somebody was to look at 
our life's work and behavior, and was able to scrutinize it, 
that a lot of us would have problems.
    That, unfortunately, is not, I think, the basis for our 
objections. I think the basis for the objections have to do 
with very specific, credible allegations that Mr. Bolton 
reached down, not to immediate subordinates of his, but reached 
far afield to attempt to have fired intelligence officers that 
would not support statements that he was making on behalf of 
the U.S. Government, or wished to make on behalf of the U.S. 
Government.
    Now, we can define ``politicization'' in various ways. What 
I do know is that there is substantial credible evidence from 
Republican appointees serving in the Bush administration that 
Mr. Bolton sought to massage intelligence to fit an ideological 
predisposition.
    Now, it's been stated that intelligence officers are often 
wrong and their analysis should be challenged. In fact, our 
recent history indicates that, where intelligence officers are 
wrong, it primarily has to do with the fact that they succumb 
to the temptation to tell the folks higher up what they want to 
hear. That appears to be part of what happened with respect to 
our failed intelligence in Iraq. And at a time when it is 
critical for us to have sound intelligence, we should be 
sending a message to our intelligence officers that, in fact, 
we want them to play it straight and to tell us stuff even when 
we don't necessarily want to hear it. And that is not what Mr. 
Bolton appears to do. That's now how he operates. And that is 
credible evidence. There may have been some other evidence of 
allegations with respect to Mr. Bolton's behavior that were not 
supported. His attempt to reach down and have intelligence 
officers removed from their positions because they provided 
analysis that was not what he wanted to hear, that does not 
appear to be largely disputed.
    Now, I think the President is entitled to the benefit of 
the doubt when appointing senior members of his team. To that 
end, I supported a number of the President's choices for top 
foreign-policy positions, including Secretary Rice and 
including Robert Zoellick to be her deputy.
    But, as has been emphasized previously, the Constitution 
gives the Senate the power to advise and consent. This is a 
responsibility I take very seriously. I think that the breach 
of the line between politics and policymaking and intelligence, 
in and of itself, renders Mr. Bolton less than credible in his 
position to the United Nations.
    Let me add one additional point that I think may not have 
been touched on in the hearing this morning. It's been 
suggested that perhaps we should vote for Mr. Bolton anyway, 
even if he has a bad temper, even if he showed some poor 
judgment with respect to how he handled intelligence, because 
he is so highly qualified for the job. The suggestion is, is 
that his competence is such, is so unique, that we are willing 
to overlook some of his warts.
    I'm a little bit baffled as to that assertion. This is not 
a line of inquiry that we really pursued much during the course 
of our discussions here. But when I look at the record of Mr. 
Bolton during the last four years at the State Department as 
the top Arms Control and Nonproliferation official for the 
United States, I am not impressed with that record.
    Let's just examine some of the things that he was 
responsible for.
    The approach that was advocated by Mr. Bolton, with respect 
to North Korea, and the administration has simply not worked. 
Here's the bottom line. Under Mr. Bolton's watch, there are no 
longer international inspectors and cameras at any site in 
North Korea. The North Koreans have withdrawn from the NPT. We 
believe that North Korea has developed six to eight nuclear 
weapons during Mr. Bolton's watch.
    Now, when North Korea has one or two nuclear weapons, the 
situation is critical. They can test one weapon and hold one 
weapon. When it has six to eight, the situation is terminal. It 
can test one, hold a couple, sell the rest. And we all know 
that North Korea will do virtually anything for money.
    That's not a record that I'm wildly impressed with.
    And when I hear Mr. Bolton testify, to my questioning, 
directly, and say--when I asked him, ``Do you think that your 
approach with respect to engaging in name-calling with--towards 
North Korea in a speech was helpful?''--and he says, ``The 
Ambassador of South Korea told me, `Thank goodness. You really 
helped out.' ''--and that same Ambassador, a Bush appointee, 
Ambassador Hubbard, has to say, publicly, in the newspapers, 
``I never said such a thing''--that indicates to me a problem.
    Another area that he was responsible with--for, 
Nonproliferation Treaty. There is little doubt that the NPT is 
a critically important tool for combating nuclear 
proliferation. At the same time, it needs to be strengthened. 
The President recognized this reality and pledged to do so, in 
a 2004 speech at National Defense University. A week later, Mr. 
Bolton pledged to do the same.
    What's happened in the interim? Virtually nothing. The 
administration has made very little progress on this issue. The 
NPT Review Conference, currently under way, is not going well. 
Newsweek reports that, quote, ``The United States has been 
losing control of the conference's agenda this week to Iran and 
other countries, a potentially serious setback to U.S. efforts 
to isolate Tehran.''
    Where's Mr. Bolton been throughout this process? In this 
same article in Newsweek, they state, ``John--since last fall, 
Bolton, Bush's embattled nominee to be America's Ambassador to 
the United Nations, has aggressively lobbied for a senior job 
in the second Bush administration. `During that time, Mr. 
Bolton did almost no diplomatic groundwork for the NPT 
Conference,' these official say. `Everyone knew the conference 
was coming and that it would be contentious,' says a former 
senior Bush official, but Bolton stopped all diplomacy on this 
six months ago.''
    This notion that somehow Mr. Bolton is uniquely qualified 
for this task, and we should overlook some of these problems 
with respect to intelligence because he is uniquely qualified 
to reform the United Nations, doesn't seem to be borne out by 
his track record doing his current job.
    Mr. Chairman, I know I'm running out of time, but let me 
just make a couple of other points on this.
    Senator Biden. Excuse me, Senator. You can have some of my 
time.
    Senator Obama. Okay.
    The administration holds up Libya as its biggest success in 
nonproliferation. This is something that Mr. Bolton touts. It 
appears that this deal with respect to Libya was struck in 
spite of Mr. Bolton, not because of Mr. Bolton. There are 
credible reports that he was sidelined from the negotiations by 
the White House, and the British Government did not want him to 
play a role. I've got an article right here, stating--this is 
from MSNBC--``Bolton, for instance, often takes, and is given, 
credit for the administration's Proliferation Security 
Initiative, an agreement to interdict suspected WMD shipments 
on the high seas, and the deal to dismantle Libya's nuclear 
program, a deal that Bolton, by the way, had sought to block. 
But the former senior Bush official who criticized Bolton's 
performance on the NPT conferences says that, in fact, Bolton's 
successor, Robert Joseph, deserves most of the credit for these 
achievements. This official adds that it was Joseph, who was in 
charge of counterproliferation at the NSC, who had to pitch in 
when Bolton fumbled preparations for the NPT conference, as 
well.''
    Last point, along these same lines. Economic Support Fund. 
``Mr. Bolton's predecessors were responsible for administering 
and overseeing around $2 billion in annual Economic Support 
Fund assistance. Secretary Bolton and his staff, during 2001, 
brought the utilization of a large portion of Economic Support 
Fund assistance to a near halt as he and his staff sought to 
micromanage virtually every obligation from the ESF fund--
assistance. It appeared that Under Secretary Bolton was seeking 
to redirect ESF on his own, without consulting other bureaus of 
the Department or, as required by custom and law, the Congress. 
In 2001, a bipartisan group in Congress, completely fed up with 
his management of this money, passed legislation which stripped 
Mr. Bolton's ability to manage this money. The provision 
originated with the House Republicans.''
    Now, here's my point. If we thought that Mr. Bolton was a 
terrific diplomat, maybe some on this committee would choose to 
overlook what I consider to be actions with respect to analysts 
that I think disqualify him from the job. But I could 
understand why some people would say, ``You know what? This is 
the guy to reform the U.N.'' But the record indicates that in 
his current job he has not had much success, which then asks 
me, Why is it that we're so confident that this is the person 
who's going to reform the U.N.?
    I would love to see the U.N. reformed. The notion that we 
have people like Zimbabwe--countries like Zimbabwe and Libya on 
the Human Rights Commission is an insult to all the people who 
are being oppressed in those countries. What happened with 
respect to the Oil-for-Food Program deserved to be 
investigated. Some people on this committee have done good 
work. We need to do some serious cleanup of the United Nations.
    Why is it that we think that this is the best qualified 
person to accomplish that? Do we really believe that there is 
not a tough, straight-talking, conservative, Republican 
diplomat somewhere out there who has credibility and who can 
accomplish this task, other than Mr. Bolton?
    Throughout this testimony, there was a lot of badmouthing 
of the United Nations. I did not hear a single actual plan for 
how Mr. Bolton was planning to reform the United Nations. I 
still don't have a plan from the Bush administration, in terms 
of how this reform is going to take place. And I would argue 
that, as a consequence of Mr. Bolton's diminished credibility, 
I think he is going to be less effective in reforming the U.N. 
than if somebody else was selected. That's the irony of this 
process. I think countries like Zimbabwe and Libya and others, 
who don't want to see reform take place--when Mr. Bolton says 
something, they are going to be able to dismiss him as a U.N.-
basher, somebody who's ideologically disposed to dislike the 
U.N., and use that as a shield to prevent the very reforms that 
need to take place.
    This is a bad choice.
    And let me just close by saying this. You know, in my 
opening testimony, I mentioned the fact that there was a 
gentleman with credibility, temperament, and the diplomatic 
skills to guide us through some very difficult times in the 
United Nations, and that was Adlai Stevenson, a great citizen 
of the state of Illinois. After the Bay of Pigs, despite the 
fact that he had been misinformed about intelligence, he still 
had the credibility to allow the United States to isolate the 
Soviet Union during the Cuban missile crisis, and advance U.S. 
interests at the U.N.
    Given the issues that have surfaced surrounding Mr. 
Bolton's nomination, I'd simply ask my colleagues this. If a 
crisis were to occur with North Korea or Iran right now, are we 
sure that the integrity and credibility of Mr. Bolton would 
command the respect of the rest of the world? Would Mr. Bolton, 
like Adlai Stevenson, be able to convince the world that our 
intelligence and our policies are right and are true? Would Mr. 
Bolton be able to isolate our enemies and build a coalition 
that would ultimately make our troops safer and our mission 
easier?
    Regrettably, Mr. Bolton's testimony leaves me with serious 
doubts that he would be the kind of representative we need in 
the United Nations, and that's why I feel compelled to vote no 
with respect to his nomination.
    Thank you for your forbearance, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman.  Thank you very much, Senator Obama.
    The Chair now recognizes Senator Sununu.

    STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN E. SUNUNU, U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW 
                           HAMPSHIRE

    Senator Sununu. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I think it is instructive to note that the opponents of 
John Bolton cannot decide whether it is behavior or policy or 
management skills that bother them so much about the nominee. 
And----
    Senator Sarbanes. All of the above.
    Senator Sununu  [continuing]. And I--well, I will address 
each of the above, but let's start with behavior.
    Adlai Stevenson was mentioned. I believe it was Adlai 
Stevenson, in his capacity as Permanent Representative to the 
United Nations, that shouted across the room at the Russian 
representative not to dare wait for the translation, because he 
knew what the question was, and he ought to be able to answer 
it right away regarding missile placements in Cuba. Bad 
behavior in diplomatic circles, if there ever was such a thing. 
But was it effective? Was it probably the right thing to do at 
the time for the United States and the United Nations and 
international security? I think so.
    So, you know, I think we need to be careful about reading 
too much into an individual's behavior at a particular time or 
a particular place and suggesting that that renders them 
disqualified for any particular position.
    Second, with regard to the United Nations, Senator Hagel 
made an important point, that a vote against John Bolton isn't 
a vote against reform in the United Nations. This is true. But, 
at the same time, the suggestion that has been made, that John 
Bolton is hostile to the United Nations, that John Bolton would 
like to weaken the United Nations, is demonstrably false. It 
simply cannot be justified, I believe, by any reasonable 
interpretation of the record.
    Cathy Bertini, supporting the nomination of John Bolton, 
underscores the work that he did to strengthen the World Food 
Program, to make the World Food Program work better. And anyone 
that has spent time in New York talking to United Nations 
administrators about their organizations around the world would 
underscore that the World Food Program is probably the one that 
works best and delivers the most important and greatest benefit 
more effectively than any other U.N.-sponsored organizations.
    As was pointed out by Senator Coleman and others, the Anti-
Defamation League strongly is supporting John Bolton, because 
he worked effectively within the United Nations dealing with 
the controversial Zionism-is-racism resolution.
    John Bolton worked to build an organization--or helped put 
together a coalition of 60 states--60 countries opposing the 
proliferation of weapons. And now to suggest that the lead 
State Department official responsible for nonproliferation 
shouldn't really be given any credit at all for the 
nonproliferation achievements with regard to Libya is simply 
ridiculous.
    I think we need to understand and recognize that he has 
worked effectively on a bilateral basis, but John Bolton has 
always worked very effectively with the United Nations to make 
it more effective. And in his--in capacity as a Permanent 
Representative, I think we can expect that kind of an approach 
to continue.
    Second, let me touch on two issues about policy, policy 
that was made--policy that was referenced in two speeches, 
Syria and North Korea. We have heard quotes offered by 
opponents of Mr. Bolton that suggest somehow that the speeches 
on North Korea and Syria were not cleared by the State 
Department. The suggestion that Ambassador Hubbard was--had a 
quote that he didn't agree with the tone of the speech, that 
is--that suggestion is misleading. The suggestion that these 
speeches were not clear is misleading, at best.
    In both cases, the content of the speeches were cleared 
fully and appropriately through the channels in our State 
Department. Period. The speech on North Korea was cleared. The 
testimony on Syria was cleared. Cleared not just by State, but 
also through Homeland Security and the CIA and the NSC. If we 
want to quibble about the timing or the process, that it was 
slower than it should be, well, we can do that, but was the 
testimony cleared? Yes. Was the speech in Korea cleared? 
Absolutely.
    Which brings us to this--the issue, the very specific issue 
of policy versus procedure. And this is important, because, 
again, suggestions were made that simply aren't accurate. In 
particular, I think the phrase was just used that he attempted 
to fire, or have fired, intelligence officers that would not 
support his interpretation of analysis. I think ``arm-
twisting'' was also used, that he twisted the arms of those 
that did not agree with his analysis. It's wrong.
    In two cases in particular, and the two that we've spent 
the most time on here, the Westermann case and the Smith case. 
In the Westermann case, Mr. Ford, in his testimony, said that 
the disagreement--the controversy, if you will--quote, ``had 
nothing to do with intelligence analysis. It had to do with the 
procedures that were used.'' In the Smith case, as well, the 
confrontation wasn't around disagreements on analysis--and 
there may have been disagreements on substance; I'm sure there 
have been many disagreements on substance--but the controversy, 
the argument, the bad behavior centered around disagreement in 
process and procedure.
    Now, let me touch on both of those.
    In the Smith case, there was a concern that Mr. Smith 
misrepresented the truth when he claimed that the--Mr. Bolton's 
speech on Cuba had not been properly cleared within the 
intelligence community. Now, what does that mean? What that 
means is, an intelligence officer, analyst, actually made 
reference in a hearing to, I believe, Senators, but certainly 
to other staff members, and suggested that it hadn't been 
properly cleared, that the proper procedures weren't used. What 
kind of an allegation is that? That's a very serious 
allegation, suggesting that John Bolton didn't properly handle 
intelligence, didn't properly handle information that may or 
may not be classified, that he was cavalier with intelligence.
    Now, I asked a simple question. Senator Lugar, in his 
opening statement, said, ``You know, would we want to be held 
to the same standard that some are placing on John Bolton?'' 
Well, let's look at this case, in particular. What if a staff 
member--we found out that a staff member or a fellow member of 
the Senate were making accusations against us that we couldn't 
properly handle intelligence, that we were not going through 
the proper procedure in dealing with important intelligence 
analysis? Would we be angry? I think some of us would be angry. 
Would we try to have staff fired? I believe I would not. But I 
don't think it's too strong a statement to say that there may 
be members of the U.S. Senate that would actually try to have 
staff fired. Not necessarily the right thing, not good 
behavior. And maybe none of the hundred Senators would do so. 
But what if someone had made such an allegation? And it is not 
a matter of speculation that this allegation was made; it is 
not a matter of speculation that this individual made a--
suggested that proper procedure wasn't used; it's a matter of 
public record.
    Second, the Westermann case. I think the chairman's opening 
statement, and Senator Coleman, highlighted a couple of 
important points here. But, again, this was a question of 
procedure, not a--the confrontation with Mr. Westermann wasn't 
based on a disagreement on analysis or the intelligence, 
itself, even though there may have been a different approach 
that the two have taken. But the argument, the berating, if you 
will, had to do with the fact that Mr. Westermann failed to 
follow proper clearance procedures regarding the 
declassification of this language. That's why there was an e-
mail that same day that said this was inappropriate, quote, 
``We screwed up.'' That refers to the fact that the proper 
procedures weren't followed.
    Now, here's the irony. What if John Bolton was the one that 
failed to follow the proper procedure? What would we be talking 
about then? Of course, his opponents would be criticizing him 
mercilessly for failing to follow proper procedures dealing 
with intelligence analysis.
    So, here we have--his opponents would clearly criticize him 
if he didn't use the proper procedure, and they're criticizing 
him for criticizing someone else for not using the proper 
procedure. This is a double standard, at best; and it is 
hypocrisy, pure and simple, at worse.
    But the point to underscore is that these are questions of 
procedure, where, in the cases of Syria and Korea, his 
speeches, he followed the proper procedure. In the case of his 
disagreement with Mr. Smith, it had to do with the fact that 
Smith accused him of not following procedure, when he did. And, 
in the case of Westermann, it's clear from the record that Mr. 
Westermann did not follow proper procedure.
    This isn't about firing intelligence--members of the 
intelligence community that happened to disagree with him. This 
is serious concerns about using the right procedure. We can 
talk about--and certainly we're raising the issue of whether he 
handled all cases the way he would have preferred to, in 
hindsight. But, I think, when we're making allegations or 
throwing out quotes, we need to make sure we're putting them in 
their proper context. We need to make sure that we understand 
the facts of each of these incidents before we try to cut short 
what has been, I think, a very strong and distinguished career.
    Mr. Chairman, you've been very gracious with the time. I 
thank you very much.
    The Chairman.  Thank you, Senator Sununu.
    Now, let me ask the permission of the distinguished ranking 
member to----
    Senator Biden. Yes, please.
    The Chairman  [continuing]. Recognize----
    Senator Biden. Please continue. We only have one more 
member that wishes to speak, and he's in another--he has 
another appointment. He said he will be here shortly, so----
    The Chairman.  Very well.
    Senator Biden  [continuing]. Whatever time that comes, 
we'll--I'll yield to him.
    The Chairman.  Senator Murkowski.

   STATEMENT OF HON. LISA MURKOWSKI, U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA

    Senator Murkowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I know that this has been a long process, not only for Mr. 
Bolton, but for the committee, as well, and I thank you for 
your indulgence, your patience.
    I also want to thank you for the delay, if you will, the 
time that we have had, since this committee last met, to do 
just exactly what Senator Sununu was talking about, was to get 
to the facts. There were things that were raised at the last 
business meeting, and it was probably your prerogative, as the 
Chair, to move forward at that point in time, but I appreciate 
the chance that you gave this committee to go out and do its 
homework.
    I, as a committee member, undertook that willingly, and 
perhaps--you know, my eyes are paying for it now, but I 
appreciate that you gave us that opportunity, because it is 
important to go into some of the allegations, to go into the 
background.
    I also want to thank the committee staff, who probably 
spent most of their recess going through with the interviews 
and providing the transcripts so that we could then review 
them. That was tough.
    The challenges and the opportunities that face the next 
U.S. Representatives to the U.N. here are incredibly 
significant, and we've heard that repeated here this afternoon. 
But we are at a point--a point in time where real reform can 
take place, where countries that are habitual abusers of human 
rights do not find seats on the Human Rights Commission, and 
that investigations into the Oil-for-Food Program are given the 
real consideration that they deserve. So, this is not the time 
for us--this is not the time for the United States to send an 
individual to the U.N. that is just going to be a caretaker, 
but one who will be proactive in pushing the United States 
agenda.
    So the question that we are faced with today, that has been 
raised by several, the question before us is, Is John Bolton 
the right individual for that particular job?
    Now, prior to the President's nomination of Mr. Bolton to 
be the Representative to the U.N., I had not had any personal 
dealings with this gentleman, I hadn't had an opportunity to 
meet him, to interact with him, so what I knew was really what 
I had heard from the media, fortunately or unfortunately, and 
comments from my colleagues. And since this intervening time in 
this past couple of months, I have come to know a great deal 
about Mr. Bolton. And as I--I told him yesterday, ``I probably 
know far more about you than I had ever hoped to.'' But I think 
it's fair to say that one of the things that I have learned 
about him is that Mr. Bolton has a management style that is 
perhaps far different than my particular management style.
    Now, there's been discussion about behavior, about 
management style, about how one conducts oneself. And, as you 
go through the transcripts, as you listen to the testimony that 
we have heard, and as I have talked to individuals who have had 
the opportunity to work with Mr. Bolton, you hear some words 
that describe him. He has been described as overcharging, hard-
charging, overbearing, and confrontation. Now, there are some 
here that view these characteristics, as--hard-charging, as 
exactly what we need in the U.N. right now, a no-nonsense, 
straight-talking, you know, this-guy's-not-going-to-take-bull-
from-anybody type of a representative.
    I've also had conversations with people, and read the 
testimony from those who have interacted with the nominee that 
have used the word ``brilliant'' when they have described him. 
But they also use the term--they say he's very difficult to 
work with. He can be focused, but he can be over-aggressive.
    It's also become clear to me that when Mr. Bolton has made 
up his mind about an issue, he can be very--it can be difficult 
to change that mindset.
    And I, too--I guess I've paid my penance, as Senator 
Voinovich said, for going through all of the pages and pages, 
the hundreds of pages of testimony. Fortunately, I've got a 
long plane ride between Alaska and D.C., so I had a lot of time 
to do the reading. But I also had a lot of time to do the 
thinking.
    You know, when I first met with Mr. Bolton in our courtesy 
visit--this was prior to the time that any allegations had come 
out that he had been abusive toward staff members, and so, it 
was a topic that we did not discuss. What we did discuss at 
that meeting, though, was his role in New York. We talked about 
some of the inflammatory statements that he had made in the 
past. And the question that I asked him was, Whose opinion 
would he be presenting at the U.N.? Would it be the 
President's, the Secretary of State's, or would it be his own?
    And I bring this up for a couple of reasons. When he made 
his comments about North Korea's leader in his speech in North 
Korea, this became part of the committee's focus during that 
interview process. And we, in Alaska, spend a lot of time and 
energy looking and focusing on the North Korea issue.
    I found Mr. Bolton's comments to be inflammatory at a time 
when we were trying to promote diplomacy in the region, and it 
seemed to me that if he was willing to fan the flames with 
disparaging rhetoric at that point in time, it was a question 
to me as to how he would conduct himself in New York. And it 
was an issue that we brought up at that initial meeting.
    I also understand that Mr. Bolton remarked during his 
confirmation hearing that he received a thank you, from then-
Ambassador Hubbard, for his speech, saying that the speech had 
been helpful, and it would do them some good in South Korea. 
And yet, when I reviewed the transcript from the interview with 
Ambassador Hubbard, it was very clear that Hubbard's intent had 
not been to thank Mr. Bolton for the speech, itself, but for 
making some factual changes to the speech so as not to spread 
the flames any further. And I have to agree with Ambassador 
Hubbard's assessment that the speech did not advance the 
President's objective of verifiably dismantling North Korea's 
nuclear program through negotiation.
    A second matter, I had had concerns that Mr. Bolton might 
get out ahead of instructions while stationed in a post outside 
of Washington. And in reviewing the transcripts, and in 
conversations that I have had with individuals, I believe that 
there is a pattern of Mr. Bolton pushing that envelope on 
whether he could or could not say in trying to push policy that 
was perhaps more ambitious than the administration might be 
willing to go. But then you dig deeper into the evidence. You 
find out Mr. Hubbard's suggestion that it was possible that Mr. 
Bolton may have misinterpreted his remarks leading to his 
comments at the hearing.
    And then we've got Secretary Powell's letter to Senator Kyl 
stating very clearly that Mr. Bolton's speech had been fully 
cleared by the State Department.
    Then you look at the transcript from Lawrence Wilkerson's 
interview, and it was very clear that Bolton went through the 
appropriate hoops and hurdles to have his speech cleared, even 
if those who cleared it may not have given it the attention 
that it needed. We saw that there had been e-mails released 
indicating the appropriate officials had signed off on that 
speech.
    So, whether you support or don't support the content of the 
speech--and I do question the language that was used at that 
particular time--the reality is that Mr. Bolton did what he was 
supposed to do in getting the speech cleared, which was 
approved by those at a higher paygrade.
    Now, when the committee, at the business meeting that we 
had last, learned of the allegations that Mr. Bolton had 
berated an INR analyst in his office, an individual who was not 
directly working for Mr. Bolton, that concerned me. It concerns 
me a great deal. And the additional charges of trying to get 
other personnel removed from their positions only added to that 
concern. Because I do believe that how one treats, not only 
those on in a similar level of authority, but also those with 
not as much power, it says a lot. It says a lot about them as a 
person and how they will work with others. And in this position 
in the U.N., our representative needs to be able to work with 
others to build that--those relationships.
    But, at the same time, I recognize that this is the 
President's nominee. The President deserves to be surrounded by 
individuals that he trusts, by individuals that he selects, and 
by individuals who will advance the interests of the 
administration. And that's a high bar to overcome.
    When it comes down to--right down to it, it's not about Mr. 
Bolton's intelligence. He's certainly demonstrated that he has 
intellectual prowess. It's not about his capability, as he's 
clearly demonstrated, in a number of global projects, he's 
advancing the U.S.'s interests. There's no question in my mind 
that Mr. Bolton has the ability to effectively represent the 
United States in a beneficial manner if that ability is 
directed appropriately.
    My concern, as you can probably tell, has more to do with 
the conduct, how Mr. Bolton conducts himself, how he treats 
those who disagree with his assessments, how he conducts 
himself with his superiors, his equals, and those below him on 
the totem pole. So, it's not how John Bolton treats Lisa 
Murkowski; it's how John Bolton will interact with other 
representatives and their staff in the U.N., and how he 
represents the United States.
    So, ultimately, in a position assigned by the President, 
that conduct is going to reflect on the President and the head 
of the Department. It's the President's responsibility to 
ensure that his nominee is part of the team, he's not a 
freelancer, and that the nominee abides by the chain of 
command, receives the appropriate input, and listens to that 
input. The President has put his trust in John Bolton. 
Secretary Rice has put her trust in John Bolton. The President 
deserves to have an individual that he believes will be most 
effective in that position. And with the understanding that how 
Mr. Bolton conducts himself at the U.N. reflects directly on 
the President of the United States, I will support moving Mr. 
Bolton's nomination to the Senate floor.
    The Chairman.  I thank you, Senator Murkowski.
    Senator Biden, may I recognize Senator Martinez?
    Senator Biden. Sure.
    The Chairman.  Senator Martinez, you're recognized.

   STATEMENT OF HON. MEL MARTINEZ, U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA

    Senator Martinez.  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I would like to, in the interest of time, have my entire 
statement placed in the record.
    The Chairman.  It will be placed in the record in full.
    Senator Martinez.  Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Senator Martinez follows:]

               Prepared Statement of Senator Mel Martinez

    Chairman Lugar, I would like to thank you and your staff for the 
continued time and effort you have put forth on this nomination. You 
and your team have completed an exhaustive review of Mr. Bolton, and I 
commend you for your continued effort on this important nomination.
    Over the years I have observed the work of the Foreign Relations 
Committee, and I have to say one of the reasons I was so drawn to 
working on the Foreign Relations Committee as a new Senator was the 
bipartisan nature of the work done here. So I have been a little 
disappointed by the events of the past several weeks--by what appears 
to be a departure from that proud tradition.
    This is an important appointment at a crucial moment in the history 
of the U.N. Our debate should be about how the U.S. should and can 
contribute to the reform of the United Nations, but I have not heard 
much conversation on the specifics of United Nations reform during this 
process.
    I wholeheartedly agree with the recent remarks made by Deputy 
Secretary of State Richard Armitage, ``John Bolton is eminently 
qualified. He's one of the smartest guys in Washington.''
    Mr. Bolton's legal background, tenure at USAID, experience at the 
State Department, and extensive research and related writing work makes 
him an ideal candidate to serve as the U.S. Ambassador to the United 
Nations. I cannot think of a more qualified individual and it appears 
that this very committee is also aware of Mr. Bolton's qualifications, 
having advanced Mr. Bolton's nomination three times before.
    In 1982, this committee voted in favor of naming Mr. Bolton 
Assistant Administrator for Program and Policy Coordination at USAID. 
In 1989, this committee voted in favor of naming Mr. Bolton Assistant 
Secretary of State for International Organizations Affairs. And, in 
2001, this committee voted in favor of naming for Under Secretary of 
State for Arms Control and International Security. All three of these 
previous nominations were advanced by this committee and confirmed by 
the United States Senate.
    During each of these nominations, this committee undertook a very 
thorough look at Mr. Bolton's qualifications and experience. On January 
27, 1982, the committee received testimony on Mr. Bolton's first 
nomination to be Assistant Administrator for Program and Policy 
Coordination at USAID. Mr. Chairman--Even then, Mr. Bolton already 
possessed an impressive resume, which included General Counsel for 
USAID, and Legal Counsel for the White House and a graduate of Yale 
College, and Yale Law School. And because of this experience and 
background, the Senate confirmed Mr. Bolton's nomination, and Mr. 
Bolton did an honorable job of carrying out that policy during very 
uncertain Cold War times.
    In 1989, this committee again reviewed Mr. Bolton--this time for 
his nomination as the Assistant Secretary of State for International 
Organizations Affairs. In fact, our distinguished colleague from 
Massachusetts, Mr. Kerry, presided over his nomination hearing. As Mr. 
Kerry explained in his opening remarks, as the Assistant Secretary, Mr. 
Bolton would be responsible for U.S. relations with the United Nations.
    Mr. Bolton shared his views on the UN system and why it was 
important to build upon then-recent improvements to its effectiveness. 
Mr. Bolton relayed that the then ``44-year old Charter of the United 
Nations embodies those values which have guided this nation during the 
course of more than two hundred years of our development.'' He 
identified the essence of the U.N. Charter to be a ``Respect for the 
supremacy of law above individuals, for the peaceful resolution of 
disputes between men and nations, and most importantly, the faith that 
mankind can peacefully build a better world for succeeding 
generations.''
    More than 15 years ago, Mr. Bolton was already was talking to this 
Committee about tangible ideas to strengthen and improve the United 
Nations and make sure it was a viable part of our international 
community. This is a man who believed--and still believes--in the 
mission of the UN more than 15 years ago he was already presenting 
solid ideas about how to make the U.N. work and make it better. This is 
a man who fifteen years ago could see both the strengths and the 
weaknesses of the United Nations and identify a positive way ahead.
    For example, Mr. Bolton talked about the quiet day-to-day work the 
UN did to improve the welfare of poverty stricken women, children, the 
sick, and refugees around the world. And he explained that these 
efforts deserve the fullest possible extent of support from us and 
other nations.
    Yet, and I will quote Mr. Bolton's testimony: ``While we seek to 
support the many worthy efforts of the United Nations and its 
specialized agencies we must not turn a blind eye to some excesses and 
poor management that have undermined UN effectiveness. Politicization 
and mismanagement have robbed the UN and some of its agencies of the 
moral high ground in recent years.''
    It is disappointing to me that fifteen years later, Mr. Bolton's 
warning about turning a blind eye remains so fitting to the environment 
we find ourselves in today at the U.N. Rampant corruption, waste and 
ineffectiveness are the norm at the United Nations, and we have an 
institution failing in its mission.
    During the same hearing, the presiding Chairman, our distinguished 
colleague--Mr. Kerry--discussed with Mr. Bolton his qualifications for 
the Assistant Secretary position and Mr. Bolton, I think very 
eloquently, outlined his respective experience.
    How his background as a lawyer would prepare him for the 
international law and legal procedures, which govern the UN. How his 
years at the Justice Department in the Legislative Affairs shop would 
give him insight in the Western-styled legislatures of the General 
Assembly and the various governing councils of the specialized 
agencies.
    And how his time as the General Counsel, and then as Assistant 
Administrator at USAID, gave him the opportunity to learn a 
considerable amount about economic development in the Third World and 
had an opportunity to work with a number of UN agencies, the Rome Food 
Agencies, and others. And because of this experience, Mr. Chairman, the 
Senate confirmed Mr. Bolton's nomination by Unanimous Consent.
    So, now we are spring of 2001--when Mr. Bolton was again before 
this Committee--this time with a nomination to be Under Secretary of 
State for Arms Control and International Security.
    Interestingly, a principal concern about Mr. Bolton's nomination 
for the Under Secretary position was the strength of his background in 
arms control. Ironically, the concern was that Mr. Bolton's background 
was principally in international development, multi-national 
organizations, and foreign assistance. The very background that makes 
him ideal for the position he is being considered for today.
    In fact, as my distinguished colleague from Connecticut remarked 
during the floor debate on Mr. Bolton's nomination, ``there is no 
question that Mr. Bolton is an individual of integrity and 
intelligence.'' Mr. Dodd even said Mr. Bolton had a ``distinguished 
record.'' And as Senator John Warner reported in his introduction of 
Mr. Bolton to the committee, ``he is a seasoned negotiator who knows 
how to represent American national interests in the toughest of 
situations,'' and ``has extensive personal and professional experience 
dealing with multinational organizations.''
    But, similar to today, the heart of the debate was whether or not 
you agreed with John Bolton's thinking and views.
    I think former Chairman Jesse Helms summed up the debate quite well 
when he remarked to Mr. Bolton during his nomination hearing, ``This 
ought not to be a partisan thing . . . Whether they like you or not is 
irrelevant. What should be decided here is whether you are a competent 
man.'' I couldn't agree more.
    Equally intriguing were the subsequent remarks by the Ranking 
Member, Mr. Biden. And if I could, Mr. Chairman, I will quote the 
distinguished Ranking Member directly:

          I want to make it clear, this is not about your competence. 
        My problem with you over the years has been you have been too 
        competent. I mean, I would rather you be stupid and not very 
        effective. I would have been had a better shot over the years. 
        But I really mean it sincerely,--none of this, my questions, 
        nor do I believe any of my colleagues questions, relate to any 
        personal animus about you as a person. I think you're an 
        honorable man and you are extremely competent. It's about how 
        different your views are.

    And this is the very same debate we are facing today.
    This isn't a debate about Mr. Bolton's qualifications or expertise. 
This isn't about whether he has the right experience and background for 
the job the President has nominated him for--what we're dealing with 
today is a very partisan political effort to disqualify Mr. Bolton's 
nomination.
    This is about John Bolton's personality. And, at the risk of 
oversimplifying, whether he is a nice guy. And whether we like him. I 
think the majority of my colleagues--Republican and Democrat alike--
agree that Mr. Bolton is a competent man. His record speaks for itself. 
Previous attempts at discrediting his views, experience, and 
qualifications have failed, so now, all there's left to talk about is 
whether or not he is a nice guy.
    Mr. Chairman, the fact is, even the allegations against Mr. 
Bolton's character are very weak. And they surely haven't revealed any 
pattern of inappropriate conduct. I reinforced this point during the 
last month's hearing with Mr. Ford.
    Mr. Chairman, I'd like to recount my exchange with Mr. Ford, 
specifically his broad sweeping statement, under oath, regarding Mr. 
Bolton's character.

          Senator Martinez.  In other words, there was a confrontation 
        between you and he in a hallway which, admittedly we have to 
        say, you had a pretty good falling out or pretty good 
        discussion, it was heated, it was emotional, it was 
        confrontational.
          Mr. Ford.  That's correct, sir.
          Senator Martinez.  Okay, and that arose out of the same 
        circumstance, the same event which was the conversation between 
        the analyst and Secretary Bolton, correct?
          Mr. Ford.  That's correct.
          Senator Martinez.  But you really cannot, in good faith, 
        under oath, suggest that you have the ability to tell this 
        Committee that this now represents a broader character flaw in 
        Mr. Bolton's part, can you?
          Mr. Ford.  You're absolutely correct in terms of I have 
        absolutely--beyond what I've talked to you about, and 
        admittedly extremely limited--right or wrong, good or bad, I 
        still believe that this was not an exceptional day, or out of 
        the ordinary in terms of his normal management style.
          Senator Martinez.  That's your sense, that's your opinion. 
        But that's not something you can really provide.
          Mr. Ford.  No, sir.
          Senator Martinez.  In the nature of testimony under oath.
          Mr. Ford.  No, certainly not from me, you can't get that.

    Mr. Chairman, one incident does not constitute a pattern. And you 
surely can't speak of something being a pattern if you haven't 
personally witnessed it, even once. Fundamental fairness requires that 
hearsay be discounted. It's just unacceptable that this instance has 
received as much attention as it has.
    Turning to another topic that I believe has been extremely 
inaccurately portrayed, Mr. Chairman, I want to clear up any 
misunderstandings surrounding a supposedly controversial statement that 
Mr. Bolton has made previously, which is that the United States 
believes that Cuba has at least a limited offensive biological warfare 
research effort, and that Cuba has provided dual-use bio-technology to 
other rogue states, and a concern that such technology could support 
bio-weapons programs in those states.
    Let me set the record straight: It is the U.S. position today--as 
it has been since March 2002 when Carl Ford testified before this 
committee that the U.S. believes Cuba does indeed have some biological 
warfare capabilities.
    In February, 2002, there was on all accounts a heated confrontation 
between John Bolton and intelligence analyst, Christian Westermann. At 
issue was Mr. Westermann's attempt to block Mr. Bolton's request to 
have Cuba biological warfare related language declassified for speech 
purposes.
    Specifically, Mr. Westermann went behind Mr. Bolton's back and sent 
a biased and confusing declassification request to the intelligence 
community. He subsequently misled the Under Secretary's office about 
his actions. In a nutshell, because Mr. Westermann did not agree with 
the ``message'' of the requested language, he sought to have it 
changed. Despite Mr. Westermann's efforts Bolton's language was 
ultimately approved for declassification and was included in his May 6, 
2002 Heritage Foundation speech.
    As Mr. Ford confirmed for this committee, that very same statement 
appeared in Mr. Ford's own testimony before this committee during 
March. That very same language was cleared by Mr. Ford's office, as 
well as other intelligence agencies. Former Otto Reich has also used 
the same statement in subsequent remarks.
    This had nothing to do with John Bolton trying to skew intelligence 
on Cuba's biological warfare program. This language was approved by the 
intelligence community and has been used by several sources since its 
approval. And per Mr. Ford, this multiply issued statement reflected 
the correct belief of the United States, as it stood at that time.
    The dispute with Mr. Westermann as the language was developed in 
February 2002 had to do 100% with Westermann's conduct--not a dispute 
over his analysis. I don't see any real issue here, Mr. Chairman.
    One final matter I discussed with Mr. Ford, which I'll briefly 
share with the Committee, was Mr. Ford's concern about how that 
information ultimately became a part of his Mr. Bolton's speech. 
Initially, Mr. Ford suggested to this Committee that the entire 
controversy related to the analyst would have been avoided if Mr. 
Bolton had merely come to Mr. Ford first. Mr. Ford identified this as a 
central cause of the problem. However, when questioned, Mr. Ford 
admitted that Mr. Bolton had, in fact, tried to contact him initially--
but that Mr. Ford was out of the building that day. As such, Mr. Bolton 
didn't reach Mr. Ford. But he got his Principal Deputy, Mr. Fingar. And 
the response from this Principal Deputy was that the behavior by his 
analyst was inappropriate, and that they ``screwed up.'' That ``it 
won't happen again.'' We have all seen copies of the actual email Mr. 
Fingar sent to Mr. Bolton with these remarks.
    Mr. Chairman, this was all contemporaneous with the events. Mr. 
Bolton did, in fact, try to reach Mr. Ford. And in Mr. Ford's absence, 
Mr. Bolton handled the situation with Ford's Principal Deputy. And, the 
Principal Deputy confirmed that the anaylyst was in error. Point being, 
this was a red herring. And the other allegations unearthed against Mr. 
Bolton carry similar meaning and weight. This is merely a collateral 
attack against Mr. Bolton.
    You need more than hearsay, more than unsubstantiated rhetoric to 
carry through--to destroy a person's reputation and character. We 
should be operating on a standard of fundamental fairness. We simply 
haven't met that threshold. We haven't even come close. Interestingly, 
what we do have, is a growing list of individuals coming forward with 
an opposite account of Mr. Bolton's personality and management style.
    I'd like to share, for a moment, what some people who've actually 
worked for John Bolton had to say. In an April 22nd letter to Chairman 
Lugar, 43 former associates of Mr. Bolton at the American Enterprise 
Institute wrote:

          The various allegations that have been raised before your 
        Committee, concerning Mr. Bolton's management style and conduct 
        in other organizations and circumstances, are radically at odds 
        with our experiences in more than four years of intense, 
        frequent, and continuous interaction with him.

          He was unfailingly courteous and respectful to us regardless 
        of our (AEI) positions or seniority.

          John Bolton's management style (at AEI) became legendary for 
        its crispness, openness, fairness, and efficiency.

    In the T3Washington Post,  on April 24, 2005, Former Secretary of 
State Lawrence Eagleburger remarked:

          [A]s to the charge that Bolton has been tough on 
        subordinates, I can say only that in more than a decade of 
        association with him in the State Department, I never saw or 
        heard anything to support such a charge.

    Mr. Chairman, I am sure you have seen a similar outpouring of 
remarks in favor of Mr. Bolton--outlining a ecidedly positive pattern 
of behavior. That said, I think we have to ask ourselves, isn't this a 
very bizarre discussion to be having when it comes to the nomination of 
our Ambassador to the United Nations? We're not voting on his 
popularity for homecoming court--we're looking at his ability to get 
the job done for which he has been nominated--the very important job of 
representing the United States as Ambassador to the United Nations.
    This debate has been hijacked to rehash different allegations about 
personality and whether or not we approve of John Bolton's management 
style, rather than reviewing his respective qualifications, and talking 
meaningfully about how he would tackle some of the key issues 
confronting the UN.
    Contrary to Mr. Bolton's three previous nominations before this 
committee--when committee members questioned Mr. Bolton about 
everything from the CTBT to USAID's partnership with PVOs), there is a 
noted absence of substantive dialogue about key issues. There has been 
no real debate about his qualifications or ability to get the job done.
    For example, what should the future role of the UN be in Haiti? 
What steps would Bolton take to move the UN out of the costly and 
dangerous mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea? And towards a final and 
binding decision of the Boundary Commission? Also absent is meaningful 
dialogue about Mr. Bolton's writings related to the UN and its reform.
    In addition to the congressional testimony I already referenced, 
Mr. Bolton's research and writings have long advocated a stronger UN.
    For example, in 1997, Mr. Bolton wrote that ``traditional 
peacekeeping, together with the often-important role the agencies of 
the U.N. system play in international delivery of humanitarian 
assistance, can work and should be continued.'' He added that the 
United Nations can be a ``useful tool in the American foreign policy 
kit.''
    To me, we should have been using recent hearings and time spent in 
countless interviews talking about John Bolton's ideas for the future 
of the U.N. To talk, in detail, about how we can work with the 
Secretary General and his desire for reform.
    The fact is, President Bush chose John Bolton because he knows how 
to get things done. This nomination is a direct reflection of the 
President's determination to make the UN work. And the President should 
have this push for reform given a chance to succeed.
    Mr. Chairman, I think you would agree that Mr. Bolton's remarks, 
writings, and action over the past twenty plus years, beginning with 
his first nomination hearing before this committee in January, 1982, 
reveal a very comprehensive understanding of the UN--an understanding 
of both its strengths and its weaknesses.
    John Bolton has long been a strong voice for UN reform and 
effective multilateralism, and will continue to be a strong voice at a 
time when the UN is undertaking essential reform initiatives. President 
Bush wants John Bolton as part of his foreign policy team and to 
represent the United States at the United Nations. He is qualified and 
prepared.
    The issues raised questioning his qualifications and character have 
failed to come anywhere close to the level of disqualifying him from 
this position.
    There is no compelling reason to deny the POTUS his choice of 
nominee for this position. I look forward to voting to confirm Mr. 
Bolton and supporting this nominee.

    Senator Martinez.  I want to thank the Chair and the 
ranking member for the manner in which you've conducted all of 
these deliberations.
    I want to also compliment the Chair for the very thoughtful 
opening remarks, which I thought were comprehensive in nature 
and covered the--in a wonderful way, and, I think, also put 
perspective and fairness into a process that I, frankly, at 
times, have wondered about.
    Let me also say that, as Senator Hagel commented, this is a 
committee that has been revered through the history of our 
nation. And as a person not born to this land, but one who's 
adopted it as his own land, I must say that I always remarked 
and marveled at the bipartisan nature of American foreign 
policy and the way in which folks with very different thoughts 
and ideas would come together for the greater good of the 
country. And I would hope, as we go forward in this committee, 
Mr. Chairman--and I know how important that is to you and to 
the ranking member--that we can always keep that in mind, 
because I think in the difficult days in which we live, and the 
difficulties the world faces, and our nation faces in the 
world, it is vitally important that we always keep in mind the 
importance of us to all pull together as Americans--not 
Democrats, not Republicans, but as Americans. And I--my hope, 
in that spirit, is that this committee will always conduct its 
deliberations----
    As I look at the nominee, I believe, first and foremost, 
the President of the United States has nominated him. I think, 
secondarily, our advice and consent responsibility, which I, 
too, take seriously, begins by analyzing the qualifications of 
the candidate. And as it relates to the qualifications of this 
particular nominee, I take a lot of comfort from the comments 
of Under Secretary of State Richard Armitage, who very directly 
worked with Secretary Bolton, who said, ``John Bolton is 
eminently qualified, and he's one of the smartest guys in 
Washington.''
    And, Mr. Chairman, I know that coming in the order of the 
lineup in which I do, there's a tendency to think of myself as 
cleanup. I'm also thinking, though, that I may be hitting 
number nine, which is a very different statement than cleanup. 
But, be that is it may, I want to, maybe, summarize a little of 
what's transpired.
    And I think, you know, looking at his background at USAID, 
his experience in the State Department, and extensive research 
and writing relating to many different subjects, which I think 
prepared him for this role at the United Nations. And then, of 
course, we move on to the various nominations that he has 
received in the past, and confirmations by this committee, in 
1982, as Assistant Administrator for Program and Policy 
Coordination at USAID; in 1989, this committee in favor of 
naming Mr. Bolton Assistant Secretary of State for 
International Organizational Affairs; and, in 2001, voted in 
favor of naming him Under Secretary of State for Arms Control 
and International Security.
    All three of these previous nominations were advanced by 
this committee and confirmed by the U.S. Senate. During each of 
these nominations, this committee undertook a thorough look at 
Mr. Bolton's qualifications and his experience. The committee 
received, on January 27 of '82, Mr. Bolton's first nomination 
for Assistant Secretary of Policy of USAID. And, even at that 
time, Mr. Chairman, he already had a distinguished record of 
accomplishment. And he, in addition to that, did a very 
honorable job in carrying out his assignments during the 
difficult years of the Cold War.
    In 1989, this committee again, reviewed Mr. Bolton; this 
time, for Assistant Secretary of State for International 
Organizations. And my distinguished colleague from 
Massachusetts, Mr. Kerry, presided over his hearing at that 
time. And, as Mr. Kerry explained in his opening remarks, the 
Assistant Secretary, Mr. Bolton, would be responsible for U.S. 
relations with the United Nations.
    At that time, Mr. Bolton shared his views on the U.N. 
system, on why it was important to build upon the then-recent 
improvements to its effectiveness. And Mr. Bolton then 
relayed--the 44-year-old charter of the U.N. embodies those 
values which have guided this nation during the course of more 
than 200 years of our development, and he identified the 
essence of the U.N. charter to be a respect for the supremacy 
of law above individuals, for the peaceful resolution of 
disputes between men and nations, and, most importantly, the 
faith that mankind can peacefully build a better world for 
succeeding generations.
    This doesn't sound to me, Mr. Chairman, as far back as 15 
years ago, as someone who was bent upon the destruction of this 
organization, but someone who held it in high esteem and high 
regard. This is a man who, 15 years ago, could also see the 
strengths and the weaknesses of this organization. Mr. Bolton 
talked quietly--talked about the quiet day-to-day work of the 
U.N. that it did to improve the welfare of poverty-stricken 
women and children, the sick, and refugees around the world. 
And he explained that these efforts deserve the fullest 
possible extent of support from us and other nations.
    And yet I will quote from Mr. Bolton's testimony, ``While 
we seek to support the many worthy efforts of the United 
Nations and its specialized agencies, we must not turn a blind 
eye to some excesses and poor management that have undermined 
its effectiveness. Politicization and mismanagement have robbed 
the U.N. and some of its agencies of the high moral ground in 
recent years.''
    And, Mr. Chairman, 15 years later, it's disappointing to 
know that Mr. Bolton's warning about turning a blind eye 
remains so fitting to the environment we find ourself today in 
the United Nations. Rampant corruption, waste, and 
ineffectiveness are the norm at the U.N., and we have an 
institution that, in many ways, is failing in its mission.
    Because of this experience, Mr. Chairman, the United 
States--because of his experience, the U.S. Senate confirmed 
Mr. Bolton's nomination by unanimous consent.
    And now we're in the spring of 2001, when, again, Mr. 
Bolton was before this committee. And this time the nomination 
for Under Secretary for Arms Control and International 
Security. And, interestingly enough, at that time, the concern 
about Mr. Bolton's nomination for this particular position was 
the strength of his background in arms control. It was then 
said that his background was in international organizations, 
where he had spent so much of his time worrying about the 
world's poor and USAID, worrying about the U.S. relationship 
with the U.N. and other international organizations, and 
whether or not, in fact, he had the sufficient background in 
the arms-control arena.
    And, as my distinguished colleague from Connecticut 
remarked during the floor debate on Mr. Bolton's nomination, 
``There is no question,'' he said, ``that Mr. Bolton is an 
individual of integrity and intelligence.'' Mr. Dodd even said 
Mr. Bolton had a distinguished record.
    Similar to today, the heart of the debate of whether or not 
you agree with--is really about whether you agree with Mr. 
Bolton's thinking. At that time, at that hearing, the remarks 
by the ranking member, Mr. Biden--and, if I could, Mr. 
Chairman, I'll quote again from the ranking member directly--he 
said, ``I want to make it clear that it's not about your 
competence. My problem with you over the years has been that 
you've been too competent. I mean, I would rather you be stupid 
and not very effective. I would have been--it would have been--
it would have been--had a better shot over the years. But I 
really mean it sincerely. None of this--my questions, nor do I 
believe any of my colleagues' questions, relate to any personal 
animus about you as a person. I think you're an honorable man, 
and you're extremely competent. It's about how different your 
views are.''
    And, Mr. Chairman, that's the very same debate we face here 
today. This is not a debate about his qualifications or 
expertise; this is about a debate of whether he has the right 
experience and background for the job. What we're dealing here 
today is a debate that has gotten somewhat partisan, and it 
really has to do about Mr. Bolton's views. The majority of my 
colleagues, Republicans and Democrats alike, agree that Mr. 
Bolton is a competent man, and I believe his record speaks for 
itself. And previous attempts at discrediting his views, 
experience, and qualifications have failed. So now we're 
talking in another direction about--a collateral attack about 
things that cannot be as easily discussed on the record, but 
about his demeanor and so forth.
    And so, I go to Mr. Ford's testimony, here in the 
committee, who made the broad, sweeping statement, under oath, 
regarding Mr. Bolton's character. He simply said that Mr. 
Bolton did not have the temperament necessary, and sweepingly 
attempted to attack his character.
    And, Mr. Chairman, I want to just briefly quote from this 
soliloquy that took place between Mr. Ford and myself.
    I asked the witness, ``In other words, there was a 
confrontation between you--in the hallway, in which--between 
the two of you in the hallway, which you admittedly have to say 
you had a pretty good falling out, a pretty good discussion. It 
was heated. It was emotional. It was confrontational.''
    Mr. Ford, ``That is correct.''
    And then I asked, ``Okay, and that arose out of the same 
circumstance, the same event, which was the conversation 
between the analyst and Secretary Bolton, correct?''
    ``That's correct,'' was his answer.
    And then I asked, ``But you really cannot, in good faith, 
under oath, suggest that you have the ability to tell this 
committee that this now represents a broader character flaw in 
Mr. Bolton's part, can you?''
    Mr. Ford--and Mr. Ford answered, ``You're absolutely 
correct. In terms of--I have absolutely--beyond what I've 
talked about, and admittedly extremely limited, right or wrong, 
good or bad, I still believe that this was not an exceptional 
day or out of the ordinary, in terms of his normal management 
style.''
    And then I asked him, ``That's your sense. That's your 
opinion. But that's not something you can really provide''----
    He interrupted and said, ``No, sir.
    ``--in the nature of testimony under oath.''
    And then he said, ``No, certainly not. Not from me. You 
can't get that.''
    One incident does not constitute a pattern. One event does 
not constitute a way of life. And I believe, Mr. Chairman, that 
one of the things that has been absent from this discussion is 
the principles of fundamental fairness. We have a man with a 
long and distinguished record of public service to his country, 
of dedicated service, of mostly competent service, and that it 
cannot be said that, by the failure of a few incidents, it's 
now without merit and someone whose entire career should be 
diminished by those comments.
    Mr. Chairman, I see my time is up, and I realize that we're 
very short on time, but I believe, in closing, that I would say 
that the fundamental fairness standard is what we should 
operate by. It should not be about hearsay.
    You detailed very well in your statement many of the 
charges that were then rebutted. I do not believe that it can 
ever be said this gentleman was guilty of massaging 
intelligence. That simply does not meet the test of the facts.
    And I would just finish by saying, Mr. Chairman, that one 
thing that should be crystal clear is that Mr. Bolton's 
statement before--the speech that he gave was the very same 
information regarding bioweapons in Cuba than had been given by 
Mr. Ford to the committee here three months earlier, and that, 
undisputed, continues to be the view of the U.S. Government 
today, that Cuba held a potential for biological weapons, and 
that it shared that information with rogue states. That is not 
changed, and that is not any different. That continues to be 
the view of the U.S. Government today.
    So, Mr. Chairman, I'm prepared to support Mr. Bolton's 
nomination. I'm prepared to move it forward. I think he's a 
dedicated and qualified man, who will make us an excellent 
Representative at the United Nations. I look forward to working 
with him, as I know the President has the confidence in him to 
put the United Nations in a better place, take it to a better 
place. It takes someone who will have the courage and the 
forcefulness of Mr. Bolton to help us fix the United Nations, 
because it is important that we have it there for us and the 
rest of the world.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman.  Thank you, Senator Martinez.
    Senator Biden.
    Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, may I ask the staff how much 
time that's in the control of the Senator from Delaware is 
still left?
    The Chairman.  Twenty-four minutes.
    Senator Biden. Twenty-four minutes? I will yield ten 
minutes to my friend from Florida. Actually, I'll yield 15 
minutes to my friend.
    The Chairman.  Senator Nelson.

    STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON, U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA

    Senator Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I don't need that much time. 
I can make my statement very clear to the committee in a very 
short period of time.
    This, to me, is about performance. This, to me, is one of 
the most important jobs that we have representing our country 
to the world body of nations of which we so desperately need 
their help at this time. Look at our position in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. We bemoan the fact that it's mainly us and the 
British that are there, and we need to bring others to table to 
support us, not only in Iraq, but around the world.
    And so, when we're talking about a representative of the 
United States of America to the United Nations, we've got to 
have the best and the brightest, and someone who can reach out 
and bring people together. The good book says, ``Come, let us 
reason together.'' That's the kind of person that we ought to 
have.
    So, to get a clue, we have a saying in the South, ``You can 
tell about where a fellow's going by where he's been.'' Well, 
let's look at his job. Does he deserve being promoted because 
of the job that he's done as arms-control negotiator? Where are 
two of the hotspots in the world where the biggest threat to 
the interest of the United States is today? It's North Korea 
and Iran. And, in four years, how much progress have we made in 
stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons in those two 
countries? And who was the person that was charged with, in 
fact, that arms-control negotiation? And now we are asked to 
promote him to a position representing us in front of the world 
body? It just doesn't make sense to me. And so, I'm going to 
vote no on the nomination.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman.  Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.
    Senator Biden, you have at least 20 minutes----
    Senator Biden. Oh, I won't take that long, but I'm going 
to--at your--whenever your suggest, Mr. Chairman, I will sum 
up, knowing--leaving the remainder of the time----
    The Chairman.  Well, I will leave that to you, because--we 
have four minutes on our side, so I will use that as a summing-
up----
    Senator Biden. Well, obviously, Mr. Chairman, you take as 
much time as you want to sum up. I don't--it's fine by me and 
my side.
    Let me state what I hope is the obvious. Our disagreement 
over Mr. Bolton in this committee, the disagreement you and I 
have over Mr. Bolton, and even the disagreements we've had 
internally about how to proceed, sometimes, I want to make it 
absolutely clear, I pledge that's not going to affect at all, 
regardless of the outcome of this, the continued cooperation, 
as I think it's fair to say we have cooperated, on every major 
foreign-policy issue that has come before this committee. This 
is about an individual, whether he should be in the position 
for which he's nominated. It is not about our willingness to 
cooperate, an attempt to maintain, as best we can here, a 
bipartisan foreign policy.
    And I have been proud, as I know you have, and I hope all 
members have been, that--and it's not a criticism of other 
committees directly, but this has not been a committee that has 
been contentious. This is the most contentious thing we've had 
in recent times, although there was a fairly contentious debate 
over Mr. Holbrooke, which was when you were not chairman, and a 
fairly contentious debate over Mr. Negroponte.
    And, I might add, it's been repeatedly stated here--or, 
excuse me, sorry--several times it's been stated that this has 
taken an extraordinarily long time. Well, obviously, it's been 
stated by those people, understandably, who haven't been here. 
This is not long at all, even for this committee.
    Let me just remind folks, you had, in May of the first 
year, Mr. Holbrooke's name floated to be the nominee. He did 
not get a hearing until the following February. He didn't get 
nominated until the following February. He did not get 
confirmed until the following June. Okay? It was August? 
August. Excuse me. He didn't get--so, February to June--I mean, 
February to August. I've got June on my mind, my wife's 
birthday. Anyway.
    Secondly, Mr. Negroponte. His name came up here in May, and 
he was confirmed in September. So, let's get the record 
straight. Let's get the record straight.
    And in the case of Mr. Holbrooke, he had--three separate 
hearings we brought him back. Three separate times. And none of 
my colleagues were arguing then, including us, that he wasn't--
he was being brought back too many times.
    So, for the record--for the record--just taking the recent 
history--the recent history--this is not a long time, number 
one.
    Now, the second point that I'd like to make is, I am 
confident that our two colleagues in the Intelligence committee 
are going to, at some point, produce a letter saying they 
looked at the information coming from the so- called 
intercepts, and that they see no pattern that would raise any 
alarm. But they will also tell you they were not given what Mr. 
Bolton was given. Notwithstanding the fact that they reach that 
conclusion--I believe they will reach that conclusion--they 
were redacted files. They did not have the name of, quote, 
``the American.''
    Call home. [Laughter.]
    And so, I don't have any doubt. But it doesn't, in any way, 
undercut the argument that we're entitled to see what they saw, 
and they were entitled to see more. And, as I said to you all 
the beginning, I'm not at all sure--I think it's kind of a 
blind alley. I don't think there's probably anything there, 
based on my going to present administration officials who I 
respect and past administration officials. But the facts are 
that we're not--we don't have that information.
    Now, I may be mistaken, but I don't ever recall--at least 
in my tenure on this committee, which is embarrassingly long--I 
don't ever recall a nominee being put forward by a President 
that had so many people who worked for that President come 
forward and say, ``That nominee should not be confirmed.'' I 
don't ever recall that. My friend from Maryland's been here 
almost as long as I have. I'm not being--and my friend from 
Indiana has been here almost as long as I have--I would--I 
stand to be corrected, but I don't think it's ever happened. 
Ever. At least in the last 32 years. I would note, that's 
mildly remarkable.
    And I would also point out that notwithstanding the fact--
let's assume--let's grant--as my friend from Florida, the great 
trial lawyer that he was and is, might say, let's argue this in 
the alternative here. Let's assume every one of us are being 
totally partisan. Even if that were true, it doesn't undercut a 
single thing we're saying. Sometimes even when you're partisan, 
you're right. And I would argue that just look at the number of 
significant present and former administration officials who 
said, ``Uh-uh. Bad idea.''
    Now, I go back to a version of what was stated by one of my 
Republican colleagues earlier today. I'm sure--I shouldn't say 
I'm sure--the Secretary of State has indicated to me--she has 
indicated at least one other member of this committee, based on 
what they said today, and, I suspected, indicated to a lot of 
you, ``Don't worry. He won't go off the reservation.'' I'm 
paraphrasing. ``It won't happen like it has happened at State. 
It won't happen. We'll control him.'' Wow.
    Question that was asked by one of my colleagues, Why would 
you send someone to the United Nations at this moment that you 
acknowledge you're going to need to control? Can you think of 
any time in the recent past where our interests are more at 
stake than this moment at the United Nations? Does anybody 
within earshot think that in the next three years we are not 
going to have to attempt to bring North Korea and Iraq before 
the Security Council? I suspect that may happen. Is there any 
time we might need an Adlai Stevenson, whose effectiveness in 
looking across and say, ``Don't wait''--paraphrasing--``Don't 
wait for the translation.'' Why was it so effective? Because 
that was not his style. It was so remarkable that he did that. 
It was such an exception. A little bit like me being calm. 
[Laughter.]
    So, I just think that we can't really kid ourselves here. 
And I think--and I--and, by the way--I mean this sincerely--
I've worked with a lot of you in this committee a long time. I 
hope my bona fides have--with you, personally, are real. And I 
respect your arguments that you've all made. But, as I listen 
to you all, it comes down to one really compelling argument: 
the President's entitled to his man. I respect that. I disagree 
with that. Unfortunately, Democratic President's have found out 
I disagree with that--Mr. Carter, Mr. Clinton. They found out I 
don't share that view. I don't share the view: because he wants 
it--the President wants it, that he should get it. Although I 
do believe--to quote my--paraphrase my friend from Illinois--
that, on matters of assembling your Cabinet around you, you 
should give deference--we should give deference, as opposed to 
a life-time appointment to a third branch of the government.
    But that seems to be the strongest argument for Mr. Bolton. 
I notice no one has said, on either side of the aisle, either 
side of this committee, that the assertions of Mr. Bolton's 
behavior and management style are not true. They argue that it 
shouldn't matter, or it doesn't matter as much. I didn't hear 
anybody come in here and say, ``No, no, no, this is all wrong. 
You've got this guy wrong. You've got this guy all wrong.'' I 
didn't hear anybody say that he didn't--wasn't aggressive on 
his point of dealing with the intelligence community. Some say 
he's aggressive, and that's good. Some say, he's aggressive, 
that's bad. But nobody suggests that this is a fellow who 
doesn't push his point to the point of exhaustion.
    Now, we can disagree on whether or not that is good or bad, 
appropriate or inappropriate. I think it's inappropriate. But 
no one's saying he didn't do that.
    And, again, I want to make clear, those in the intelligence 
community, or formerly in the intelligence community, who are 
opposed to Mr. Bolton and suggest he should not go forward, are 
not suggesting Mr. Bolton, in his previous position, is not 
entitled to his own opinion. What this was always about was 
whether Mr. Bolton could assert a governmental position that 
was inconsistent with, or at odds with, the intelligence 
community's opinion. In the end of the day, he didn't. That 
shouldn't be remarkable. Because had he--had he done it, he 
would have--I assume he would have gotten fired.
    But, as I say, again, how many times do you have to be 
told, as a subordinate, or at least in a subordinate position, 
by a superior that, ``Are you sure you got that right? Are you 
sure it's not that? I think it's that,'' to not get the 
message?
    Now, the remarkable thing is, most of these folks had the 
political and personal gumption to stand fast. But, more 
importantly, they had men and women of character, who were 
equal to or superior in political strength to Mr. Bolton, to 
tell them to go back sand. They had their protector in each of 
these instances. But the remarkable thing is that, even in the 
first instance, none of these folks caved.
    And I want to mention two things. I won't take any time, 
I'll just put them in the record.
    With regard to the Townsel matter, Senator Coleman made 
much of the unsubstantiated allegations by Mrs. Townsel having 
been discussed at a meeting April 19th. I'll remind everybody, 
that's why I made a motion to go into closed session. Because 
they were unsubstantiated at that moment. That's why I wanted 
to go into closed session.
    Again, I don't recall--it probably has happened, but I 
don't recall a time when a Senator has said to his colleagues, 
``Let's go into closed session for a little bit. I want to tell 
you something I know, an allegation,'' or, ``I want to discuss 
something.'' Speaking of comity, not say, ``Okay, we'll recess 
for 20 minutes and go into closed session.''
    The second point I'd make is, nobody on this side that I 
heard today used as a rationale for voting against Mr. Bolton 
the alleged conduct with regard to Mrs. Townsel. And I'll 
remind everyone that when the chairman raised it, and I--in my 
opening statement, I said what he said--it's he-said/she-said, 
and it's unsubstantiated.
    I would also like to put in the record what we actually 
learned from Mrs.--from the witnesses we, the staff, Minority 
and Majority staff, interviewed with regard to that allegation.
    The Chairman.  It will be put in the record in full.
    Senator Biden. Secondly, the issue of whether or not Mr. 
Bolton obeyed the rules on clearing speeches. It's been 
asserted, flatly, that he has. I would like to put in the 
record--not take the time now--what was stated by witnesses and 
those familiar with how the community works in clearing those 
speeches.
    The Chairman.  It will be placed in the record in full.
    Senator Biden. And, thirdly, the assertion that Mr. Bolton 
went behind--or, excuse me, Mr. Westermann went behind Mr. 
Bolton's back and lost his trust. I just note, and I'll put it 
in the record, the testimony of Carl Ford, Tom Finger, Carol 
Rodley, Neil Silver, and Christian Westermann, confirming that 
Mr. Westermann followed standard operating procedure. And I'd 
ask that be put in the record.
    The Chairman.  It will be placed in the record in full.
    Senator Biden. And, Mr. Chairman, I understand, when we 
finish, after you conclude your statement, you're going to make 
a motion. And, in keeping with what we committed we will do, we 
will not make--unless I'm unaware of something one of my 
colleagues is going to do, we will not make any competing 
motion, if it's the motion that the Senator from Ohio indicated 
he would support, and--in order to move this, out of committee 
in almost the exact time--we said by 3 o'clock, but within the 
time that we were allotted at the beginning here.
    But I would repeat to my colleagues--and I mean this 
sincerely--I think I've demonstrated this--all of whom I 
respect--that I can understand how there is disagreement if you 
start off with this overwhelming presumption that the 
President's entitled to his person. But there are two things 
that seem to me to be operative here. One is that that is the 
controlling rationale for why Mr. Bolton should move forward by 
a majority of members of this committee, if he should move 
forward. And, secondly, that we may be ``damning with faint 
praise'' here.
    And one of my colleagues said, earlier today--and, 
obviously, it is not for me to decide, or the colleague who 
said this--but I truly believe that, in light of what I expect 
is about to happen, the President, in the interest of the 
United States would be better served by Mr. Bolton's nomination 
being pulled down. I don't expect that to happen. But I 
honestly believe he would be better served if that were the 
case. And it--there is precedent for that, in Democratic 
administrations and in Republican administrations.
    I might add, there's also precedent--on our watch, we were 
in charge, the Democrats, we voted out--someone out of the 
committee with a negative recommendation. We have voted people 
out, I would submit for the record, without recommendation. And 
we've voted people out with a favorable recommendation. But it 
is somewhat unusual. It is somewhat unusual to move that way.
    And I'm not, in any way, questioning the majority's right 
to do that, but I would suggest that it doesn't appear that Mr. 
Bolton has the confidence of the majority of this committee. 
And I would suggest that it may be worth the President's 
interest to take note of that.
    I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for your 
cooperation. And I still will, on another matter, pursue those 
issues--not in terms of stopping the nomination, but as a 
matter of policy and principle that we should be able to, you 
and I and this committee, have access to the information that 
we sought. I think that is an institutional issue.
    So, I thank you, and I yield back our time.
    The Chairman.  Well, I thank the distinguished ranking 
member. I thank all members. All 18 of us have spoken. The 
statements were, I believe, thoughtful, well-drafted issues 
expressed as the debate continues.
    Let me just take this moment to thank the distinguished 
ranking member, in particular, because I can recall, although 
it is not a comparable moment, when we had debates over several 
weeks and months prior to American being engaged in Iraq. And 
we had a very difficult time wrestling with those issues in the 
committee. Now, the chairman was then Senator Biden. The 
ultimate conclusion was that we would support the President. 
But it was not unanimous in this committee, nor on the floor. 
And, indeed, historians, I suspect, will still argue some of 
the points that were argued in the committee at that point.
    I mention that because we have work to do. The chairman has 
mentioned North Korea, Iran, just to think of two, quite apart 
from the work--support in the peace process in the Middle East, 
tremendously important deliberations before this committee. The 
need for unity, insofar as we can have it, is imperative.
    And I appreciate very much the fact that members on both 
sides of the aisle were here for this business meeting, and 
stayed, and participated. That, I appreciate. I appreciate we 
were not challenged by the parliamentary procedure on the 
floor. It would have prevented us from meeting. Now, I'm sure 
that was not by chance. I thank the distinguished ranking 
member for making that possible.
    But we now have had an important debate, in which I believe 
we must move forward. The chairman has indicated the motion 
that I'm about to make. It was, I suspect, more than hinted by 
Senator Voinovich's comments earlier this morning. The Chair 
has listened carefully, has attempted to find a motion that a 
majority of our committee can agree upon.
    And so, I will say now, the question is on the nomination 
of John R. Bolton to be U.S. Representative to the United 
Nations, with rank of Ambassador. The vote will be to report 
the nomination without recommendation.
    The Clerk will call the roll.
    The Clerk.  Mr. Hagel.
    Senator Hagel. Aye.
    The Clerk.  Mr. Chafee.
    Senator Chafee. Aye.
    The Clerk.  Mr. Allen.
    Senator Allen. Aye.
    The Clerk.  Mr. Coleman.
    Senator Coleman. Aye.
    The Clerk.  Mr. Voinovich.
    Senator Voinovich. Aye.
    The Clerk.  Mr. Alexander.
    Senator Alexander. Aye.
    The Clerk.  Mr. Sununu.
    Senator Sununu. Aye.
    The Clerk.  Ms. Murkowski.
    Senator Murkowski. Aye.
    The Clerk.  Mr. Martinez.
    Senator Martinez.  Aye.
    The Clerk.  Mr. Biden.
    Senator Biden. No.
    The Clerk.  Mr. Sarbanes.
    Senator Sarbanes. No.
    The Clerk.  Mr. Dodd.
    Senator Dodd. No.
    The Clerk.  Mr. Kerry.
    Senator Kerry. No.
    The Clerk.  Mr. Feingold.
    Senator Feingold. No.
    The Clerk.  Mrs. Boxer.
    Senator Boxer. No.
    The Clerk.  Mr. Nelson.
    Senator Nelson. No.
    The Clerk.  Mr. Obama.
    Senator Obama. No.
    The Clerk.  Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman.  Aye.
    Will the Clerk please report the tally?
    The Clerk.  Ten aye, eight nay.
    The Chairman.  Ten ayes, eight nays. And, therefore, the 
nomination is reported, and the business meeting is concluded.
    Senator Biden. Wait, wait, wait. Mr. Chairman, before we 
conclude, I want to state to my colleagues what I said to you 
privately. We will have--so there is no delay, we will have the 
Minority views written and available to the committee by 
Monday.
    The Chairman.  I appreciate that.
    Senator Biden. And so, we----
    Senator Sarbanes. Mr. Chairman, right at the end you said, 
``The nomination is reported to the floor''--but without 
recommendation, is that----
    The Chairman.  That's correct. That was the motion.
    I thank the distinguished ranking member once again----
    Senator Biden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman  [continuing]. And all members. Thank you.
    [Whereupon, at 3:19 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

                                ------                                


                                ANNEX D


            Material in Support of John Bolton's Nomination

                              ----------                               
I53 May 6, 2005.

Hon. Richard G. Lugar,
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Dirksen Senate Office 
        Building, Washington, DC.
     Dear Senator Lugar: The attached letter is co-signed by 
former presidential appointees, career and non-career Civil 
Service and Foreign Service employees who knew and worked with 
John Bolton from 1989-1993. These people and many more have 
indicated their strong support for Secretary Bolton. For 
example, John's former supervisors including former Secretary 
of State James A. Baker III, former Under Secretary for 
Political Affairs Robert Kimmitt, and I, have publicly 
expressed our foil confidence and support for John, and our 
belief that he will be a superb representative of the United 
States in the United Nations.
    The attached letter demonstrates that many of those who 
worked for or with him share this belief. Ipersonally know if 
others who now hold positions in the United Nations or the 
State Department who support John, but for ``conflict of 
interest'' reasons prefer to express that support through 
private letters to you and your colleagues.
            Sincerely,
                                           Lawrence S. Eagleburger.

                                                       May 6, 2005.
Hon. Richard G. Lugar,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
     Dear Mr. Chairman: We are former presidential appointees, 
career and non-career Civil Service and Foreign Service 
employees who knew and worked with John Bolton in his capacity 
as Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization 
Affairs under the leadership of Secretaries James A. Baker III 
and Lawrence S. Eagleburger from 1989-1993. While we have 
followed John's nomination to serve as U.S. Ambassador to the 
United Nations with great interest and enthusiasm, the recent 
and unreasonable attacks on his character and integrity during 
his Senate confirmation process have precipitated this letter 
of support; we only regret that we did not act sooner in 
conveying our views and strong support for his nomination.
    Despite what has been said and written in the last few 
weeks, John has never sought to damage the United Nations or 
its mission. Quite the contrary--under John's leadership the 
organization was properly challenged to fulfill its original 
charter. John's energy and innovation transformed 10 from a 
State Department backwater into a highly appealing work place 
in which individuals could effectively articulate and advance 
U.S. policy and their own careers as well. During the Persian 
Gulf War, John played a significant and substantive role in 
achieving the numerous Security Council resolutions adopted 
during the first Bush administration. He was also deeply 
engaged in matters beyond the spotlight of the Security 
Council, including refugees, human rights, development, 
democracy, food aid, UN management and budgets. His call for a 
``unitary UN'' guided and motivated the 10 bureau to promote 
consistent and piuductive practices across the entire gamut of 
UN organizations. John championed this concept in order to 
fashion a more effective United Nations, and a signal 
achievement in this regard was his effort to repeal the 
execrable ``Zionism is Racism'' resolution, which was a stain 
on the credibility of that institution. It is this laudable 
record of professional achievement in IO that we were 
privileged to witness, as well as over three decades of public 
service to this country, which define his character and 
capabilities.
    We are proud to have served with John, and grateful for his 
leadership, integrity, and vision. The allegations about his 
abuse of subordinates simply do not accord with our experience 
while he was Assistant Secretary for International Organization 
Affairs. His treatment now before the Committee on Foreign 
Relations is thus particularly disturbing and disheartening to 
those who have been fortunate enough to work for and with him. 
We hope this letter will help set the record straight and 
inform your committee's decision.
            Sincerely yours,

Margaret D. Tutwiler, Former Assistant Secretary for Public 
        Affairs and Spokesman
John F.W. Rogers, Former Under Secretary for Management
Ambassador Dennis Ross, Former Director of Policy Planning, 
        Former Special Middle East Coordinator
Ambassador Jackie Wolcott Sanders, Former Deputy Assistant 
        Secretary for International Organization Affairs
Sonia Landau, Former Assistant Secretary of State, rank of 
        Ambassador
Richard Burt, Former Assistant Secretary of State
Randall M. Fort, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 
        Analysis and Research
Richard Schifter, Former Assistant Secretary of State for Human 
        Rights and Humanitarian Affairs
Catherine Bertini, Former Assistant Secretary, U.S. Department 
        of Agriculture
Richard T. Miller, Former U.S. Observer to UNESCO
Caroline Weil Barnett, Former Special Assistant to Assistant 
        Secretary John R. Bolton
Christine E. Samuelian, Former Confidential Assistant to 
        Assistant Secretary John R. Bolton
David A. Schwarz, Former Special Assistant to U.S. Permanent 
        Representative to the European Office of the United 
        Nations
John M. Herzberg, Former Public Affairs Officer, Bureau for 
        International Organization Affairs
C. Craig Smith, Former Confidential Assistant to the DAS, 
        International Organization Affairs
Frederick H. Fleitz, Intelligence Analyst, Central Intelligence 
        Agency
Fran Westner, Former Director of Public Affairs, International 
        Organization Affairs
Thomas A. Johnson, Counselor for Legal Affairs, U.S. Mission, 
        Geneva
M. Deborah Wynes, Former Civil Service Employee, U.S Department 
        of State
Lena Murrell, Former Secretary to Deputy Assistant Secretary, 
        International Organization Affairs
Sam Brock, Former Action Officer, Office of UN Political 
        Affairs, Bureau for International Organization Affairs
Antonio Gayoso, Former Agency Director, USAID
                                ------                                

                                                       May 6, 2005.
Hon. Richard G. Lugar,
Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, DC.
     Dear Senator Lugar: We write to express our full 
confidence in the professionalism and integrity of John R. 
Bolton and to offer our strong support for his nomination to be 
permanent representative of the United States at the United 
Nations.
    As signatories we are diverse; career and non-career, 
Republican and Democrat, employed and retired. Many of us 
worked directly with John Bolton during his service at USAID 
under President Reagan. Some of us have served at USAID 
following his legacy. All of us deeply respect and admire John 
Bolton as a leader who exhibits the utmost integrity, fairness, 
intellect, and sense of America's national interests. Based on 
this personal experience, we know the caricature drawn of 
Secretary Bolton in this confirmation process is unrecognizable 
and grossly unfair.
    We know John to be a forceful policy advocate who both 
encourages and learns from rigorous debate. We know him to be a 
man of balanced judgment. And we know him to have a sense of 
humor, even about himself.
    John leads from in front with courage and conviction--
especially positive qualities, we believe, for the assignment 
he is being asked to take on. He is tough but fair. He does not 
abuse power or people. John is direct, yet thoughtful in his 
communication. He is highly dedicated, working long hours in a 
never-ending quest to maximize performance. Yet, he does not 
place undue time demands on his staff, recognizing their family 
obligations. What he does demand from staff is personal honesty 
and intellectual clarity.
    Throughout his illustrious career John Bolton has been an 
energetic change agent. As such, he has made enemies, for there 
are always those who abhor and resist change. But John is known 
more for his friends than his enemies. We ask that you listen 
to his friends, giving them at least equal weight.
    We highly recommend Secretary Bolton to you with the full 
confidence that be will serve his country as U.S. Ambassador to 
the United Nations with honor and great distinction.
            Respectfully,

M. Peter McPherson, Former Administrator, U.S. Agency for 
        International Development
Andrew S. Natsios, Administrator, U.S. Agency for International 
        Development
Frederick W. Schieck, Deputy Administrator, U.S. Agency for 
        International Development
Kate Semerad, Former Assistant Administrator, External Affairs, 
        USAID
Michelle D. Laxalt, Former Director, Legislative Affairs, USAID
Frank Ruddy, Former Assistant Administrator for Africa, USAID, 
        Former General Counsel, U.S. Department of Energy, 
        Former U.S. Ambassador to Equatorial Guinea
Elise du Pont, Former Assistant Administrator (and founder) for 
        Private Enterprise, USAID
Charlotte Norwood Walker, Former Secretary to Elise du Pont, 
        Bureau for Private Enterprise, USAID
Otto J. Reich, Former Assistant Administrator of USAID, Former 
        U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela, former Assistant 
        Secretary of State, former Special Envoy of the 
        President for Western Hemisphere Initiatives.
Marc Leland, Former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for 
        International Affairs
Molly Hageboeck, Former Chief of Staff, USAID
Mary Beth Allen Yarbrough, Commissioned Foreign Service 
        Officer, USAID)
Franklin L. Lavin, Special Assistant Bureau for Asia, Bureau 
        for Africa, USAID
Barbara A. Upton, Former Director, Office of International 
        Donor Coordination, USAID
Sarah Tinsley Demarest, Former Director, Office of Women in 
        Development, USAID
Caroline Weil Barnett, Former Special Assistant to General 
        Counsel and Assistant Administrator John R. Bolton
Kevin E. Rushton, Former Special Assistant, USAID, Former 
        Economic Advisor to the U.S. Ambassador to the Asian 
        Development Bank
R. Blair Downing, Former Special Assistant USAID, Former 
        Executive Secretary, Department of Treasury
Patrice Malone Pisinski, Former Special Assistant, USAID
Liliane Willens, Ph.D., Former Desk Officer for Indian Ocean 
        States, Africa Bureau, USAID
Clark D. Horvath, Horvath and Associates
Michael Ussery, U.S. Ambassador (Ret.)
John L. Wilkinson, Brigadier General, USAFR (Ret.), Former 
        Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Asia and 
        Near East; Former Deputy Assistant Administrator, 
        Bureau for Private Enterprise, USAID
Joseph P. Duggan, Formerly U.S. Mission to the United Nations; 
        Department of State; White House Staff; USAID
Richard Derham, Former General Counsel, UDAID, Former Assistant 
        Administrator for Program and Policy Coordination
Kay Davies, Former Director, Office of Women in Development
Dee Ann Smith Shuff, Executive Officer, Foreign Service (Ret.)
Carole Neideffer Gallagher, Confidential Assistant to 
        Administrator McPherson (Ret.)
David M. Rybak, U.S. Agency for International Development, 
        Retired Foreign Service
Rick Endres, Former Special Assistant, Office of Interbureau 
        Affairs and Officer, Office of Foreign, Disaster 
        Assistance, USAID; Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
        Commerce for Technology Policy
Matthew C. Freedman, Former International Development Advisor, 
        USAID
Sean Walsh, Former Director of Office of Urban Programs for the 
        NIS
Kimberley McGraw Euston, Former Interim Program Officer for the 
        Caribbean--Bureau of INM, U.S. State, Department, 
        Former Confidential Assistant to the Vice President's 
        National Security Advisor
Nadine M. Hogan, Former Mission Director, USAID
Dr. Edwin W. Hullander, Former Associate Assistant 
        Administrator for Policy, Programs and Project Review; 
        Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism Programs, AID
Ed Lijewski, Program Analyst, USAID
Bob Hawkins, Chairman, Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental 
        Affairs, President of The Institute for Contemporary 
        Studies
Neal S. Zank, Former policy analyst, Bureau for Program and 
        Policy Coordination, USAID
Richard Sheppard, Former Office Director, Bureau for Program 
        and Policy Coordination, USAID
Emily Leonard, USAID (FEOC) Ret.
Peter K. Monk, Formerly Keene-Monk Associates
                                ------                                

                The Rt. Hon. the Baroness Thatcher,
                                            House of Lords,
                                      London, England, May 4, 2005.
Hon. John R. Bolton,
Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, 
        Washington, DC.
     Dear John: I am writing this letter in order to let you 
know how strongly I support your nomination as U.S. ambassador 
to the United Nations. On the basis of our years of friendship, 
I know from experience the great qualities you will bring to 
that demanding post.
    To combine, as you do, clarity of thought, courtesy of 
expression and an unshakable commitment to justice is rare in 
any walk of life. But it is particularly so in international 
affairs. A capacity for straight talking rather than peddling 
half-truths is a strength and not a disadvantage in diplomacy. 
Particularly in the case of a great power like America, it is 
essential that people know where you stand and assume that you 
mean what you say. With you at the UN, they will do both. Those 
same qualities are also required for any serious reform of the 
United Nations itself, without which cooperation between 
nations to defend and extend liberty will be far more 
difficult.
    I cannot imagine anyone better fitted to undertake these 
tasks than you.
    All good wishes,
            Yours ever,
                                                 Margaret Thatcher.
                                ------                                

                                                    April 22, 2005.
Hon. Richard G. Lugar,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hart Senate Office Building, 
        Washington, DC.
     Dear Mr. Chairman: We, the undersigned, have been appalled 
at the charges that have been leveled at John Bolton during the 
course of his nomination hearing to be this country's 
ambassador to the United Nations. Rather than a rational, 
mature discussion about the future course American policy 
should take with respect to the United Nations, or whether and 
to what extent Mr. Bolton's extensive knowledge and experience 
with the UN further that course, what we have witnessed instead 
has been a character assassination masquerading as a nomination 
hearing. Mr. Bolton spent a full day before your Committee 
prepared to delve deeply into issues of foreign policy, and yet 
all but a sliver of the Committee's time was devoted to 
unsubstantiated allegations of misconduct.
    Each of us has worked with Mr. Bolton. We know him to be a 
man of personal and intellectual integrity, deeply devoted to 
the service of this country and the promotion of our foreign 
policy interests as established by this President and the 
Congress. Not one of us has ever witnessed conduct on his part 
that resembles that which has been alleged. We feel our 
collective knowledge of him and what he stands for, combined 
with our own experiences in government and in the private 
sector, more than counterbalances the credibility of those who 
have tried to destroy the distinguished achievements of a 
lifetime.
    President Bush and Secretary Rice have personally expressed 
confidence in Mr. Bolton's ability to effectively represent 
this country in the United Nations. And for those of us who 
have worked with and known John Bolton for decades, we urge you 
and the Committee to consider our views. We believe John Bolton 
deserves to have the Foreign Relations Committee's vote of 
confidence and support as well.
            Sincerely,

Ed Meese, Former Attorney General of the United States
Dick Thornburgh, Former Governor of Pennsylvania, Former 
        Attorney General of the United States, Former Under 
        Secretary General for Administration and Management, 
        The United Nations
Frank Keating, Former Governor of Oklahoma, Former Associate 
        Attorney General, Former General Counsel, Department of 
        Housing and Urban Development, Former Assistant 
        Secretary of the Treasury
William F. Weld, Former Governor of Massachusetts, Former 
        Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division
Arthur B. Culvahouse, Jr., Former Counsel to President Ronald 
        Reagan
C. Boyden Gray, Former Counsel to the President George H.W. 
        Bush
T. Kenneth Cribb, Jr., Former Assistant to the President, for 
        Domestic Affairs
Richard Willard, Former Assistant Attorney General, Civil 
        Division
Wm. Bradford Reynolds, Former Assistant Attorney General, Civil 
        Rights Division
Douglas W. Kmiec, Former Assistant Attorney General, Office of 
        Legal Counsel
Thomas M. Boyd, Former Assistant Attorney General, Office of 
        Legislative Affairs, Former Director, Office of Policy 
        Development
James F. Rill, Former Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust 
        Division
Charles J. Cooper, Former Assistant Attorney General, Office of 
        Legal Counsel
Becky Norton Dunlop, Former Senior Special Advisor to the 
        Attorney General
Eugene W. Hickok, Former Special Assistant, Office of Legal 
        Counsel, Former Deputy Secretary of Education
Mark R. Levin, Former Chief of Staff to the Attorney General
John Richardson, Former Chief of Staff to the Attorney General
William P. Cook, Former General Counsel, U.S. Immigration & 
        Naturalization Service
Steve Calabresi, Former Special Assistant to the Attorney 
        General
Murray Dickman, Former Assistant to the Undersecretary General 
        of the United Nations, Former Assistant to the Attorney 
        General
Terry Eastland, Former Director of Public Affairs
Roger Pilon, Former Director, Asylum Policy and Review Unit
Lee Liberman Otis, Former Associate Deputy Attorney General, 
        Former General Counsel, Department of Energy
C.H ``Bud'' Albright, Jr., Former Deputy Associate Attorney 
        General
Gary L. McDowell, Former Associate Director of Public Affairs
Laura Nelson, Former Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office 
        of Legislative Affairs
Michael Carvin, Former Deputy Assistant Attorney General, 
        Office of Legal Counsel
Mark R. Disler, Former Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil 
        Rights Division
Brent 0. Hatch, Former Associate White House Counsel, Former 
        General Counsel National Endowment for the Humanities, 
        Former Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil 
        Division
Steven R. Valentine, Former Deputy Assistant Attorney General, 
        Civil Division
David B. Rivkin, Jr., Former Deputy Director, Office of Policy 
        Development, Member, U.N. Sub-commission on the 
        Promotion and Protection of Human Rights
Lee A. Casey, Former Attorney Advisor, Office of Legal Counsel, 
        Member, U.N. Sub-commission on the Promotion and 
        Protection of Human Rights
                                ------                                

                      American Enterprise Institute
                                for Public Policy Research,
                                    Washington, DC, April 22, 2005.
Hon. Richard G. Lugar,
Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
     Dear Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Biden: We were close 
colleagues of John Bolton during his tenure as senior vice 
president of the American Enterprise Institute from January 
1997 through May 2001. (Our positions at AEI during Mr. 
Bolton's tenure are given below our signatures.) We are writing 
to tell you and your colleagues that the various allegations 
that have been raised before your Committee, concerning Mr. 
Bolton's management style and conduct in other organizations 
and circumstances, are radically at odds with our experiences 
in more than four years of intense, frequent, and continuous 
interaction with him.
    Mr. Bolton was a demanding colleague--and was always at 
least as demanding of himself as of those around him. He was 
unfailingly courteous and respectful to us regardless of our 
AEI positions or seniority. Several of us were Mr. Bolton's 
subordinates, and the idea that he would seek to punish or 
settle scores with those who disagreed with him seems 
particularly preposterous to us. At AEI, whenever uncertainties 
or disagreements arose concerning research or administrative 
matters, the Bolton style was clear and consistent: he would 
state his own views openly and directly, expect others to be 
equally open and direct, and go out of his way to encourage 
subordinates to be open and direct, all in the service of 
arriving at the best possible decision. Disagreement was never 
discouraged and often led him to revise his own views; once a 
decision was reached, he expected subordinates to follow the 
decision with the same alacrity with which he followed the 
decisions of his peers or superiors.
    For these and other reasons, John Bolton's management style 
at AEI became legendary for its crispness, openness, fairness, 
and efficiency. As we have followed the strange allegations 
suddenly leveled at Mr. Bolton in recent days and reflected 
among ourselves on our own experiences with him, we have come 
to realize how much we learned from him, and how deep and 
lasting were his contributions to improving AEI's management 
and esprit de corps as well as the substance of our research 
programs. Contrary to the portrayals of his accusers, he 
combines a temperate disposition, good spirit, and utter 
honesty with his well-known attributes of exceptional 
intelligence and intensity of purpose. This is a very rare 
combination and, we would think, highly desirable for an 
American ambassador to the United Nations.
    We respectfully request that this letter be shared with the 
other members of the Committee on Foreign Relations and entered 
into its records.
            Yours truly,

Leon Aron, Resident Scholar
Douglas Besharov, Resident Scholar
Claude Barfield, Resident Scholar
Frances Bolton, Assistant to the Senior Vice President
Steven Berchem, Vice President
Elizabeth Bowen, Director of Conferences
Walter Berns, Resident Scholar
Karlyn Bowman, Resident Fellow
Montgomery Brown, Director of Communications
Mark Falcoff, Resident Scholar
Virginia Bryant, Director of Publications, Marketing
Isabel Ferguson, Director of Conferences
Seth Cropsey, Visiting Fellow
David Gerson, Executive Vice President
Aimee Dayhoff, Assistant to the Senior Vice President
Newt Gingrich, Senior Fellow
Christopher DeMuth, President
James Glassman, Resident Fellow
Nicholas Eberstadt, Resident Scholar
Jack Landman Goldsmith III, Adjunct Scholar
Bob Hahn, Resident Scholar
Danielle Maxwell, Marketing Manager for Donor Relations
Kevin Hassett, Resident Scholar
Allan Meltzer, Visiting Scholar
Robert Helms, Resident Scholar
Michael Novak, Resident Scholar
R. Glenn Hubbard, Visiting Scholar
Richard Perle, Resident Fellow
Jeane Kirkpatrick, Senior Fellow
Jeremy Rabkin, Adjunct Scholar
Marvin Kosters, Resident Scholar
Robert Riley, Computer Operations Specialist
Michael Ledeen, Freedom Scholar
Veronique Rodman, Director of Public Affairs
Nicole Ruman Skinner, Director of Marketing
Audrey Williams, Training Manager and Research/Staff Assistant
Kathryn Staulcup, Communications Assistant
Joanna Yu, Staff Assistant
Tarn Sweeney, Marketing Communications Manager
MangHao Zhao, Research Assistant
Peter Wallison, Resident Fellow
Scott Walter, Senior Editor, The American Enterprise
Ben Wattenberg, Senior Fellow
                                ------                                

                                                    April 12, 2005.
 Hon. Richard G. Lugar,
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hart Senate Office 
        Building, Washington, DC.
     Dear Senator Lugar:  Your Committee will soon be reasoning 
together on the nomination of John R. Bolton as our country's 
next Ambassador to the United Nations. We urge you to give 
special weight at this time to the explosions of freedom now 
taking place in Ukraine, Lebanon, Iraq, Egypt, Kyrgyzstan, 
Zimbabwe, to name just a few. We believe that these early 
stirrings of courageous groups within countries that for too 
long have held on to rigid authoritarian or in some cases 
totalitarian rule reflect in large measure the policies and 
optimistic realism of President George W. Bush.
    No one in the world of diplomacy and geo-political policy 
has a better grounding of proven experience than John Bolton. 
He was on hand as an active participant during the period of 
the break-up of the Soviet Union and made important 
contributions to policy-making at a time of total ambiguity 
when the world of two superpowers was morphing into what we 
have today.
    We believe it is in the best interest of the community of 
nations as represented by the United Nations, for the 
maintenance of world peace and security, that the views of 
America's President be clearly and directly presented in both 
the General Assembly and the Security Council of the UN.
    It is for this reason more than any other that we urge you 
to quickly and clearly approve John's nomination.
            Sincerely,

Bruce S. Geib, former Director of USIA; former Ambassador to 
        Belgium
Anne L. Armstrong, former Ambassador to the United Kingdom
William S. Farish, former Ambassador to the United Kingdom
Walter J.P. Curley, former Ambassador to France and Ireland
Richard R. Burt, former Ambassador to Germany
Edward N. Ney, former Ambassador to Canada
Chic Hecht, former Ambassador to The Bahamas; former U.S. 
        Senator
Alfred H. Kingon, former Ambassador to the European Union; 
        former Assistant Secretary of Commerce
Thomas Patrick Melady, former Ambassador to The Vatican, Uganda 
        and Burundi
Frank Shakespeare, former Ambassador to Portugal and The 
        Vatican
Michael Sotirhos, former Ambassador to Greece and Jamaica
Robert D. Stuart, Jr., former Ambassador to Norway
Weston Adams, former Ambassador to Malawi
Everett E. Bierman, former Ambassador to Papua New Guinea, the 
        Solomon Islands and Vanuatu
Stephen F. Brauer, former Ambassador to Belgium
Nancy G. Brinker, former Ambassador to Hungary
Keith L. Brown, former Ambassador to Denmark and Lesotho
Richard W. Carlson, former Director of VOA; former Ambassador 
        to Seychelles
Gerald P. Carmen, former Ambassador to the United Nations
Sue McCourt Cobb, former Ambassador to Jamaica
Charles E. Cobb, Jr., former Ambassador to Iceland
Peter H. Dailey, former Ambassador to Ireland and Special Envoy 
        to NATO
Diana Lady Dougan, former Ambassador--U.S. Coordinator for 
        International Communications and Information Policy
Richard J. Egan, former Ambassador to Ireland
William H.G. Fitzgerald, former Ambassador to Ireland
Joseph Ghougassian, former Ambassador to Qatar and Senior 
        member in Coalition Provisional Authority, Iraq
Joseph B. Gildenhorn, former Ambassador to Switzerland
Glen A. Holden, former Ambassador to Jamaica
Richard L. Holwill, former Ambassador to Ecuador
Charles W. Hostler, former Ambassador to Bahrain
Roy M. Huffington, former Ambassador to Austria
O. Philip Hughes, former Ambassador to Barbados, Dominica, St. 
        Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Lester B. Korn, former Ambassador to the United Nations 
        Economic and Social Council
Paul C. Lambert, former Ambassador to Ecuador
L.W. Lane, Jr., former Ambassador to Australia and Nauru
Ronald S. Lauder, former Ambassador to Austria
John Langeloth Loeb, Jr., former Ambassador to Denmark
Gregory J. Newell, former Ambassador to Sweden; former 
        Assistant Secretary of State for International 
        Organizations
Julian M. Niemczyk, former Ambassador to Czechoslovakia
Sally Z. Novetzke, former Ambassador to Malta
Penne Korth Peacock, former Ambassador to Mauritius
Joseph Canton Petrone, former Ambassador to the United Nations 
        European Office (Geneva)
Charles J. Pilliod, Jr., former Ambassador to Mexico
James W. Rawlings, former Ambassador to Zimbabwe
Frank Ruddy, former Ambassador to Equatorial Guinea
Paul A. Russo, former Ambassador to Barbados, St. Kitts, 
        Antigua, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and 
        Dominica
Ronald J. Sorini, former Ambassador and Chief Textile 
        Negotiator
Timothy L. Towell, former Ambassador to Paraguay
Helene van Damm, former Ambassador to Austria
Leon J. Weil, former Ambassador to Nepal
Faith Whittlesey, former Ambassador to Switzerland
Joseph Zappala, former Ambassador to Spain
                                ------                                

                                                     April 5, 2005.
Senator Richard G. Lugar,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
     Dear Mr. Chairman:  We write to urge that the Senate act 
expeditiously to confirm John Bolton as our ambassador to the 
United Nations. This is a moment when unprecedented turbulence 
at the United Nations is creating momentum for much needed 
reform. It is a moment when we must have an ambassador in place 
whose knowledge, experience, dedication and drive will be vital 
to protecting the American interest in an effective, forward-
looking United Nations.
    In his position as Undersecretary of State, John Bolton has 
taken the lead in strengthening international community 
approaches to the daunting problem of the proliferation of 
nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD). As a 
result of his hard work, intellectual as well as operational, 
the G-8 has supported U.S. proposals to strengthen safeguards 
and verification at the International Atomic Energy Agency and 
the Proliferation Security Initiative was launched and 
established within three months--a world speed record in these 
complex, multilateral matters. Moreover, Secretary Bolton led 
the successful effort to complete the negotiation of UN 
Security Council Resolution 1540, adopted unanimously in April, 
2004. UN 1540 called on member states to criminalize the 
proliferation of WMD--which it declared to be a threat to 
international peace and security--and to enact strict export 
controls.
    Secretary Bolton, like the Administration, has his critics, 
of course. Anyone as energetic and effective as John is bound 
to encounter those who disagree with some or even all of the 
Administration's policies. But the policies for which he is 
sometimes criticized are those of the President and the 
Department of State which he has served with loyalty, honor and 
distinction.
    Strong supporters of the United Nations understand the 
challenges it now faces. With his service as assistant 
secretary of state for international organizations, where he 
was instrumental in securing the repeal of the repugnant 
resolution equating Zionism with racism, and as undersecretary 
for arms control and international security, we believe John 
Bolton will bring great skill and energy to meeting those 
challenges.
            Sincerely yours,

The Honorable David Abshire, former Assistant Secretary of 
        State
The Honorable Kenneth Adelman, former Director, Antis Control 
        Disarmament Agency
The Honorable Richard Allen, former Assistant to the President 
        for National Security
The Honorable James Baker, former Secretary of State
The Honorable Frank Carlucci, former Secretary of Defense
The Honorable Lawrence Eagleburger, former Secretary of State
The Honorable Al Haig, former Secretary of State
Ambassador Max Kampelman, former Ambassador and Head of the 
        U.S. Delegation to the Negotiations with the Soviet 
        Union on Nuclear and Space Arms.
Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, former Ambassador to the United 
        Nations
The Honorable Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of State
The Honorable James Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense
The Honorable George Shultz, former Secretary of State
The Honorable Helmut Sonnenfeldt, former Counselor, Department 
        of State
                                ------                                 
I89[From the Washington Post, May 12, 2005]


                          A Vote on Mr. Bolton

    On April 19 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
unexpectedly postponed a vote on the nomination of John R. 
Bolton as ambassador to the United Nations, citing concerns 
that he had engaged in a pattern of abuse of subordinates and 
manipulation of intelligence. Three weeks of further digging, 
mostly by Democratic committee staff members, have not produced 
evidence of such a pattern. The committee ought to give Mr. 
Bolton a vote today. Ours would be an unenthusiastic, 
deference-to-the-president yes.
    It's as clear now as it was on April 19 that Mr. Bolton is 
a contentious figure who has both strong admirers and 
impassioned critics in Washington. He engages in hand-to-hand 
bureaucratic combat, and on a couple of occasions he pushed too 
hard. He challenged intelligence analysts, but it's naive to 
think that such analysts are always ideologically neutral and 
beyond politics--that they should never be challenged. What 
emerges from the interviews conducted by committee staffers is 
how intensely policy-driven, as opposed to personal, were most 
of Mt Bolton's clashes in the State Department, during 
President Bush's first term, under Secretary of State Colin L. 
PowelL
    If anyone might have been expected to provide evidence of 
dysfunctional behavior, for exaniple, it would be Lawrence B. 
Wilkerson, who was Mr. Powell's chief of staff. Mr. Wilkerson 
has said that he does not believe Mr. Bolton is fit to be U.N. 
ambassador, and by his description he knew pretty much 
everything that was happening at Foggy Bottom: ``I was also a 
sponge, sopping up everything! could about the Department, 
about its efficiency; about its effectiveness, about its people 
. . . and reporting to Powell.''
    Yet in an interview last Friday, Mr. Wilkerson was unable 
to provide any fresh examples of misbehavior by Mr. Bolton. 
Instead he complained about policy differences: Mr. Bolton was 
too eager to sanction Chinese companies that violated the 
nonproliferation regime, thereby making diplomacy more 
difficult. He was too zealous in carring out his mission to 
persuade other countries to exempt U.S. soldiers from the 
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. When Mr. 
Bolton delivered a speech vilifying North Korean leader Kim 
Jong II, ``Rich was very angry''--that would be former deputy 
secretary Richard L. Armitage--but, Mr. Wilkerson acknowledged, 
he was angry because the speech had been cleared by the 
assistant secretary for Asia, a Powell ally.
    The committee interviews have provided some colorful 
details without breaking new ground on what has long been a 
well-understood split in the first Bush administration: a split 
between those who saw themselves as pragmatic diplomats (the 
Powell camp) and those, like Mr. Bolton, who saw themselves as 
more willing to bruise feelings here and abroad in standing up 
for U.S. interests. Our view was that Mr. Bolton often, though 
not always, had the worse end of those arguments; he helped 
hamstring diplomacy toward Iran and North Korea, and his 
single-minded focus on the International Criminal Court 
endangered relations even with allies who were supporting the 
United States in Iraq.
    Moreover, the first-term divisions themselves were harmful 
to U.S. policymaking. Will Mr. Bolton perpetuate the divisions 
from a new perch in New York? That seems to us a risk. But it 
also strikes us as a risk that a president is entitled to take 
on if he wants. Mr. Bush surely knows what role Mr. Bolton 
played in the first term, and he says he wants to put Mr. 
Bolton's bluntness to work at the United Nations. The nominee 
is intelligent and qualified, we still see no compelling reason 
to deny the president his choice.
                                ------                                

                                    The Secretary of State,
                                   Washington, DC, August 26, 2003.
Hon. Jon Kyl,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
     Dear Jon:  I am pleased to reply to your recent letter 
concerning John Bolton's speech in Korea and our reaction.
    Undersecretary Bolton's speech was fully cleared within the 
Department. It was consistent with Administration policy, did 
not really break new ground with regard to our disdain for the 
North Korean leadership and, as such, was official. The speech 
was given during a time of delicate negotiations on the part of 
the Chinese government to arrange six-party multilateral 
discussions. As a result, it got a lot of attention in the 
regional press and drew a sharp North Korean reaction directed 
towards Secretary Bolton.
    My acting spokesman, Phil Reeker, and the president's press 
officer, Scott McClellan, both supported Mr. Bolton. Mr. Bolton 
even cleared the response Phil Reeker used at his press 
conference. We refused to be drawn into a debate with the North 
Koreans, noting that Mr. Bolton spoke officially and the 
Secretary and the President would decide who would represent 
the United States in the talks. If you read the full text of 
Mr. Armitage's statement in Australia, you will see that he 
also supported that line. Assistant Secretary Jim Kelly, during 
a background briefing on August 22, got the question yet again 
and gave the same response.
    Mr. Jack Pritchard, who you mentioned in your letter, from 
time to time meets with the North Korean Ambassador to the UN. 
His job is to listen to whatever they have to say, tell them 
whatever we want them to hear. He does not debate with them or 
even engage them beyond seeking clarification of their remarks. 
I've read the transcript of his recent meeting. They complained 
about Mr. Bolton. Mr. Pritchard took note of their complaint 
and said they were aware of U.S. policy. He did not say or 
imply that Mr. Bolton was speaking only in a personal capacity.
    We know who we are dealing with when we deal with the North 
Koreans. The President has given me solid guidance how to 
manage this difficult account and I believe we are making 
progress. I am fortunate to receive informed advice and 
judgment from Mr. Bolton, Mr. Kelly and Mr. Pritchard. Mr. 
Pritchard has just resigned having requested retirement some 
months ago. I am pleased I was able to keep him on a while 
longer and grateful for his many years of dedicated service to 
our country.
    With best wishes,
            Sincerely,
                                                   Colin L. Powell.
                                ------                                


                    A Dictatorship at the Crossroad


 BY JOHN R. BOLTON, UNDER SECRETARY FOR ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL 
   SECURITY AFFAIRS, EAST ASIA INSTITUTE, SEOUL HILTON, SEOUL, SOUTH 
                          KOREA, JULY 31, 2003

    Distinguished guests, it is a pleasure to have the 
opportunity to speak to you again. Since I last spoke here in 
Seoul nearly 1 year ago, the United States and the Republic of 
Korea have forged ahead in strengthening our alliance and 
friendship. The foundation for this was made all the stronger 
by the extremely successful summit last May between President 
Bush and President Roh. At that summit, our two presidents made 
the firm commitment to move in lock-step to meet our shared 
challenges and opportunities. I am happy to say that we are 
taking the shared vision of our presidents and putting it into 
action.
    Indeed, action is needed. As we stand here today having 
just celebrated the 50th anniversary of the Armistice agreement 
that ended combat on the peninsula, the threat to the North 
posed by the Kim Jong Il dictatorship is a constant reminder of 
a powerful truth--freedom is not free.
    In preserving freedom, it is important for all to have a 
shared understanding of the threats we face. Unfortunately, the 
last year has seen a dizzying whirlwind of developments on the 
threat posed by the Kim Jong Il dictatorship. Being so close to 
North Korea, there is no doubt that the threat posed by Kim 
Jong Il must weigh heavily on you. While it would be naive and 
disingenuous for me to dismiss the danger, let me start off by 
striking a positive note: The world is united in working 
together to seek a peaceful solution to the threat posed by Kim 
Jong Il. Rarely have we seen the international community so 
willing to speak with the same voice and deliver a consistent 
message on an issue. In addition to consistency, there is a 
striking clarity to this message as well: The world will not 
tolerate Kim Jong Il threatening international peace and 
security with weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear 
weapons.
    The brazenness of Kim Jong Il's behavior in the past year 
is striking. While nuclear blackmail used to be the province of 
fictional spy movies, Kim Jong Il is forcing us to live that 
reality as we enter the new millennium. To give in to his 
extortionist demands would only encourage him, and perhaps more 
ominously, other would-be tyrants around the world. One needs 
little reminding that we have tested Kim Jong Il's intentions 
many times before--a test he has consistently failed. Since 
1994, billions of dollars in economic and energy assistance 
have flowed into the coffers of Pyongyang to buy off their 
nuclear weapons program. Nine years later, Kim Jong Il has 
repaid us by threatening the world with not one, but two 
separate nuclear weapons programs--one based on plutonium, the 
other highly enriched uranium.
    If history is any guide, Kim Jong Il probably expects that 
his current threats wit! result in newfound legitimacy and 
billions of dollars of economic and energy assistance pouring 
into his failed economy. in this case, however, history is not 
an especially good guide--a page has been turned. Particularly 
after September 11, the world is acutely aware of the danger 
posed to civilian populations by weapons of mass destruction 
being developed by tyrannical rogue state leaders like Kim Jong 
Il or falling into the hands of terrorists. Simply put, the 
world has changed. Consider that in 1994, I could have used the 
term ``WMD'' and most audiences would have stared at me 
blankly. In 2003, we all know it is shorthand for ``weapons of 
mass destruction.'' Clearly, this is a sad reflection on the 
dangerous times we live in.
    Let us also consider the fact that in 1994, North Korea 
could have chosen to enter the international community on a new 
and different footing. While communist dictatorships were 
collapsing or reforming across the globe, there was even hope 
that Kim Il Sung's North Korea would follow suit. When power 
passed to Kim Jong Il, the world hoped he would be more 
enlightened and recognize the benefits of participating in the 
global community--as opposed to threatening and blackmailing 
it.
    Unfortunately; this still has not come to pass. Even a 
cursory glance of the first decade of Kim Jong Il's dictatorial 
reign suggests that he has done nothing but squander 
opportunity after opportunity, olive branch after olive branch. 
Sadly, as an editorial cartoon in The Economist recently 
expressed so well, Kim Jong Il seems to care more about 
enriching uranium than enriching his own people.
    Kim Jong Il, of course, has not had to endure the 
consequences of his failed policies. While he lives like 
royalty in Pyongyang, he keeps hundreds of thousands of his 
people locked in prison camps with millions more mired in 
abject poverty, scrounging the ground for food. For many in 
North Korea, life is a hellish nightmare. As reported by the 
State Department Report on Human Rights, we believe that some 
400,000 persons died in prison since 1972 and that starvation 
and executions were common. Entire families, including 
children, were imprisoned when only one member of the family 
was accused of a crime. Consider the testimony of Lee Soon-ok, 
a woman who spent years in North Korean prison camps. She 
testified before the U.S. Senate that she witnessed severe 
beatings and torture involving water forced into a victim's 
stomach with a rubber hose and pumped out by guards jumping on 
a board placed across the victim's abdomen. She also reported 
chemical and biological warfare experiments conducted on 
inmates by the army.
    And while Kim Jong Il is rumored to enjoy the internet so 
he can observe the outside world, he does not afford that right 
to his own people who are forced to watch and listen to only 
government television and radio programs.
    Why is Kim Jong Il so scared of letting his people observe 
the outside world? The answer, of course, is that they will see 
the freedom enjoyed by much of the world and what they have 
been denied. They will see their brothers and sisters in Seoul, 
the capital of a booming vibrant democracy. They will see that 
there is a world where children stand a good chance to live to 
adulthood--a dream of every parent. More important, they will 
see that the excuses for their failed system provided by Kim 
Jong Il don't stand scrutiny. It is not natural disasters that 
are to blame for the deprivation of the North Korean people--
but the failed policies of Kim Jong Il. They will see that, 
unless he changes course, his regime is directly responsible 
for bringing economic ruin to their country. The world already 
knows this--which is why we will continue to give humanitarian 
food aid to the starving people of North Korea. But let there 
be no doubt about where blame falls for the misery of the North 
Korean people--it falls squarely on the shoulders of Kim Jong 
Il and his regime.
    There is still hope that Kim Jong Il may change course. All 
civilized nations and peace-loving people hope this to be true. 
But Kim Jong Il must make the personal decision to do so and 
choose a different path.
    It is holding out this hope that has prompted the United 
States, in lock-step with our friends and allies in the region, 
to pursue the multilateral negotiations track. Let me be clear: 
the United States seeks a peaceful solution to this situation. 
President Bush has unambiguously led the way in mobilizing 
world public opinion to support us in finding a lasting 
multilateral solution to a problem that threatens the security 
of the entire world.
    The operative term is ``multilateral.'' It would be the 
height of irresponsibility for the Bush administration to enter 
into another bilateral agreement with the Kim Jong Il 
dictatorship. The Clinton administration bravely tried with the 
Agreed Framework but failed because Kim Jong Il instructed his 
subordinates to systematically violate it in secret. To enter 
into a similar type of agreement again would simply postpone 
the problem for some future administration--something the Bush 
administration will not do.
    Postponing the elimination of Kim Jong Il's nuclear weapons 
program will only allow him time to amass even more nuclear, 
chemical and biological weapons and to develop even longer 
range missiles. Any doubts that Kim Jong Il would peddle 
nuclear materials or nuclear weapons to any buyer on the 
international market were dispelled last April when his envoy 
threatened to do just that.
    This will not stand. Some have speculated that the U.S. is 
resigned to nuclear weapons on the peninsula and we will simply 
have to learn to live with nuclear weapons in the hands of a 
tyrannical dictator, who has threatened to export them. Nothing 
could be further from the truth.
    This is why we are working so hard on pursuing the 
multilateral track in Beijing. Having just been in Beijing, I 
can confirm that we all believe this track is alive and well, 
but the ball is North Korea's court. The key now is to get 
South Korea and Japan, and ultimately Russia and others, a seat 
at the table. We know that as crucial players in the region, 
and the countries most threatened by Kim Jong Il, the roles of 
Seoul and Tokyo are vital to finding any permanent solution. 
Those with a direct stake in the outcome must be part of the 
process. On this point we will not waver.
    While the Beijing track is on course, prudence suggests 
that we pursue other tracks as well. We have been clear in 
saying that we seek a peaceful solution to resolve the threat 
posed by Kim Jong Il, but that all options are on the table. I 
would like to discuss two complementary tracks that we are 
pursuing now.
    The first is action through the United Nations Security 
Council. As the UN body charged with protecting international 
peace and security, it could play an important role in helping 
to reach a peaceful settlement. Unfortunately, the Council is 
not playing the part it should. It was 6 months ago that the 
Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
voted overwhelmingly to report North Korea's violations to the 
Security Council.
    To date, virtually nothing has happened. We believe that 
appropriate and timely action by the Security Council would 
complement our efforts on the multilateral track in Beijing. 
Just as important, it would send a signal to the rest of the 
world that the Council takes its responsibilities seriously. I 
would note that when North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty the first time in March 1993, the 
Council took action within a month. Ignoring this issue will 
not make it go away--it will only reduce confidence in the 
Council and suggest to proliferators that they can sell their 
deadly arsenals with impunity.
    The other track we are pursuing now is through the 
Proliferation Security Initiative, or PSI. When I spoke in 
Seoul almost a year ago, I detailed at length the WMD programs 
actively being pursued by Kim Jong Il. The last year has seen 
Kim Jong Il accelerate these programs, particularly on the 
nuclear front. Brazenly threatening to demonstrate, even 
export, nuclear weapons, Kim Jong Il and his supports have 
defied the unanimous will of the international community.
    If Pyongyang thought the international community would 
simply ignore its threats--it was mistaken. Recently, I 
attended the second meeting of the PSI, held in Brisbane, 
Australia and met with officials from 10 other countries on the 
threats posed by dictators like Kim Jong Il. As the Chairman's 
Statement underscores, ``the PSI is a global initiative with 
global reach.'' And we ``agreed to move quickly on direct, 
practical measures to impede the trafficking in weapons of mass 
destruction, missiles and related items.'' Specifically, we are 
working on ``defining actions necessary to collectively or 
individually interdict shipments of WMD or missiles and related 
items at sea, in the air or on land.''
    While global in scope, the PSI is cognizant of the reality 
that different countries pose different degrees of threat. Just 
as the South Korean Ministry of National Defense recently 
defined North Korea as the ``main enemy,'' the nations 
participating in the PSI put North Korea and Iran at the top of 
the list of proliferant countries. That North Korea has earned 
this dubious distinction should come as little surprise in 
light of Pyongyang's trafficking in death and destruction to 
keep Kim Jong Il in power. It is practically their only source 
of hard currency earnings, unless of course you add narcotics 
and other illegal activities.
    Hopefully, initiatives such as PSI will send a clear 
message to dictators like Kim Jong Il. In his specific case, we 
hope to communicate that while actively pursuing and believing 
that multilateral talks are a preferable way to find a lasting 
solution to the situation, we are not going to allow the DPRK 
regime to peddle its deadly arsenals to rogue states and 
terrorists throughout the world. Our national security, and our 
allies, as well as the lives of our citizens are at stake. 
Already, we are, planning operational training exercises on 
interdiction utilizing both military and civilian assets. Kim 
Jong Il would be wise to consider diversifying his export base 
to something besides weapons of mass destruction and ballistic 
missiles.
    The international community's tolerance for actions that 
defy global norms is fast shrinking. There is growing political 
will to take concrete steps to prevent dictators such as Kim 
Jong Il from profiting in ill-gotten gains. We are moving to 
translate this political will into action.
    This choice is Kim Jong Il's and his alone. In coordination 
with our allies, we are prepared to welcome a reformed North 
Korea into the world of civilized nations. This would mean, 
however, that Kim Jong Il makes the political decision to 
undergo sweeping reforms. A good start would be to respect the 
human rights of his people and not starve them to death or put 
them in death camps. He should allow the families of the 
Japanese abductees to be reunited, and he should provide a full 
account of the cause of death for the eight deceased abductees.
    It would also mean respecting international norms and 
abiding by international commitments and giving up their 
extensive chemical and biological weapons programs. And it will 
certainly require Kim Jong Il to dismantle his nuclear weapons 
program--completely, verifiably, and irreversibly.
    The days of DPRK blackmail are over. Kim Jong Il is dead 
wrong to think that developing nuclear weapons will improve his 
security. Indeed, the opposite is true. As President Bush has 
made clear: ``A decision to develop a nuclear arsenal is one 
that will alienate you from the rest of the world.'' Kim Jong 
Il has already squandered the first decade of his rule. To 
continue down the path toward nuclear weapons will squander his 
legacy as well. The choice is his to make--but whichever path 
he does choose--the United States and its allies are prepared. 
Let us hope he makes the right choice.
                                ------                                


   Beyond the Axis of Evil: Additional Threats From Weapons of Mass 
                              Destruction


 BY JOHN R. BOLTON, UNDER SECRETARY FOR ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL 
 SECURITY, REMARKS TO THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, WASHINGTON, DC, MAY 6, 
                                  2002

    Thank you for asking me here to the Heritage Foundation. 
I'm pleased to be able to speak to you today about the Bush 
Administration's efforts to combat the proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction. The spread of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) to state sponsors of terrorism and terrorist groups is, 
in my estimation, the gravest security threat we now face. 
States engaging in this behavior--some of them parties to 
international treaties prohibiting such activities--must be 
held accountable, and must know that only by renouncing 
terrorism and verifiably forsaking WMD can they rejoin the 
community of nations.

The New Security Environment

    Eight months into the war on terror, the United States and 
its partners have made great strides. We have helped the Afghan 
people overthrow an oppressive, terrorist-harboring regime in 
Afghanistan, foiled terrorist plots in places such as Germany, 
Yemen, Spain and Singapore, and stanched the flow of funds that 
allowed Al-Qaeda's schemes to come to fruition. We have 
captured the number three man in Al-Qaeda, and will bring him 
to justice. And this is just the beginning.
    The attacks of September 11 reinforced with blinding 
clarity the need to be steadfast in the face of emerging 
threats to our security. The international security environment 
has changed, and our greatest threat comes not from the specter 
of nuclear war between two superpowers, as it did during the 
Cold War, but from transnational terrorist cells that will 
strike without warning using weapons of mass destruction. Every 
nation--not just the United States--has had to reassess its 
security situation, and to decide where it stands on the war on 
terrorism.
    In the context of this new international security 
situation, we are working hard to create a comprehensive 
security strategy with Russia, a plan President Bush calls the 
New Strategic Framework. The New Strategic Framework involves 
reducing offensive nuclear weapons, creating limited defensive 
systems that deter the threat of missile attacks, strengthening 
nonproliferation and counterproliferation measures, and 
cooperating with Russia to combat terrorism. It is based on the 
premise that the more cooperative, post-Cold War relationship 
between Rissia and the United States makes new approaches to 
these issues possible.
    In preparation for the summit meeting in Moscow and St. 
Petersburg later this month, we have been working closely with 
the Russians to embody the reductions in offensive warheads 
into a legally-binding document that will outlast the 
administrations of both Presidents. We are also working to 
draft a political declaration on the New Strategic Framework 
that would cover the issues of strategic offensive and 
defensive systems, nonproliferation and counterproliferation. 
We are optimistic that we will have agreement in time for the 
summit in Moscow, May 23rd to 25th.
    Strengthening the U.S.-Russian relationship has been a 
priority of the Bush Administration, even prior to the 
September 11 attacks. In the current security climate, 
cooperation with Russia becomes even more important, so that we 
can work together to combat terrorism and the spread of weapons 
of mass destruction, which threaten both our countries.

Preventing Terrorism's Next Wave

    President Bush believes it is critical not to underestimate 
the threat from terrorist groups and rogue states intent on 
obtaining weapons of mass destruction. As he said on the six-
month anniversary of the attacks, ``Every nation in our 
coalition must take seriously the growing threat of terror on a 
catastrophic scale--terror armed with biological, chemical, or 
nuclear weapons.'' We must not doubt for a moment the possible 
catastrophic consequences of terrorists or their rogue state 
sponsors who are willing to use disease as a weapon to spread 
chemical agents to inflict pain and death, or to send suicide-
bound adherents armed with radiological weapons on missions of 
mass murder.
    Every nation must commit itself to preventing the 
acquisition of such weapons by state sponsors of terrorism or 
terrorist groups. As President Bush said: ``Our lives, our way 
of life, and our every hope for the world depend on a single 
commitment: The authors of mass murder must be defeated, and 
never allowed to gain or use the weapons of mass destruction.'' 
To this end, we use a variety of methods to combat the spread 
of weapons of mass destruction, including export controls, 
missile defense, arms control, nonproliferation and counter-
proliferation measures.
    In the past, the United States relied principally on 
passive measures to stem proliferation. Arms control and 
nonproliferation regimes, export controls, and diplomatic 
overtures were the primary tools used in this fight. But 
September 11th, the subsequent anthrax attacks, and our 
discoveries regarding Al-Qaeda and its WMD aspirations has 
required The U.S to complement these more traditional 
strategies with a new approach. The Bush Administration is 
committed to combating the spread of nuclear, chemical, and 
biological weapons, missiles, and related equipment, and is 
determined to prevent the use of these deadly weapons against 
our citizens, troops, allies, and friends. While diplomatic 
efforts and multilateral regimes will remain important to our 
efforts, we also intend to complement this approach with other 
measures, as we work both in concert with likeminded nations, 
and on our own, to prevent terrorists and terrorist regimes 
from acquiring or using WMD. In the past, we looked at 
proliferation and terrorism as entirely separate issues. As 
Secretary Powell said in his Senate testimony April 24, ``There 
are terrorists in the world who would like nothing better than 
to get their hands on and use nuclear, chemical or biological 
weapons. So there is a definite link between terrorism and WMD. 
Not to recognize that link would be foolhardy to the extreme.''
    America is determined to prevent the next wave of terror. 
States that sponsor terror and pursue WMD must stop. States 
that renounce terror and abandon WMD can become part of our 
effort. But those that do not can expect to become our targets. 
This means directing firm international condemnation toward 
states that shelter--and in some cases directly sponsor--
terrorists within their borders. It means uncovering their 
activities that may be in violation of international treaties. 
It means having a direct dialogue with the rest of the world 
about what is at stake. It means taking action against 
proliferators, middlemen, and weapons brokers, by exposing 
them, sanctioning their behavior, and working with other 
countries to prosecute them or otherwise bring a halt to their 
activities. It means taking law-enforcement action against 
suspect shipments, front companies, and financial institutions 
that launder prollferator's funds. And it requires, above all, 
effective use, improvement, and enforcement of the multilateral 
tools at our disposal--both arms control and nonproliferation 
treaties and export control regimes.

The Problem of Noncompliance

    Multilateral agreements are important to our 
nonproliferation arsenal. This Administration strongly supports 
treaties such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the 
Biological Weapons Convention. But in order to be effective and 
provide the assurances they are designed to bring, they must be 
carefully and universally adhered to by all signatories. 
Therefore, strict compliance with existing treaties remains a 
major goal of our arms control policy.
    This has been our aim in particular with the Biological 
Weapons Convention (BWC). In 1969, President Nixon announced 
that the United States would unilaterally renounce biological 
weapons. The U.S. example was soon followed by other countries, 
and by 1972 the BWC was opened for signature. This 
international treaty, to which more than 140 countries are 
parties, prohibits the development, production, stockpiling, 
acquisition or retention of biological and toxin weapons.
    While the vast majority of the BWC's parties have 
conscientiously met their commitments, the United States is 
extremely concerned that several states are conducting 
offensive biological weapons programs while publicly avowing 
compliance with the agreement. To expose some of these 
violators to the international community, last November, I 
named publicly several states the U.S. government knows to be 
producing biological warfare agents in violation of the BWC.
    Foremost is Iraq. Although it became a signatory to the BWC 
in 1972 and became a State Party in 1991, Iraq has developed, 
produced, and stockpiled biological warfare agents and weapons. 
The United States strongly suspects that Iraq has taken 
advantage of more than three years of no UN inspections to 
improve all phases of its offensive BW program. Iraq also has 
developed, produced, and stockpiled chemical weapons, and shown 
a continuing interest in developing nuclear weapons and longer 
range missiles.
    Next is North Korea. North Korea has a dedicated, national-
level effort to achieve a BW capability and has developed and 
produced, and may have weaponized, BW agents in violation of 
the Convention. Despite the fact that its citizens are 
starving, the leadership in Pyongyang has spent large sums of 
money to acquire the resources, including a biotechnology 
infrastructure, capable of producing infectious agents, toxins, 
and other crude biological weapons. It likely has the 
capability to produce sufficient quantities of biological 
agents for military purposes within weeks of deciding to do so, 
and has a variety of means at its disposal for delivering these 
deadly weapons.
    In January, I also named North Korea and Iraq for their 
covert nuclear weapons programs, in violation of the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty. This year, North Korea did not meet 
Congressional certification requirements because of its 
continued lack of cooperation with the International Atomic 
Energy Agency, its failure to make any progress toward 
implementing the North-South Joint Denuclearization Declaration 
as called for under the Agreed Framework, and for proliferating 
long-range ballistic missiles. Finally, we believe that North 
Korea has a sizeable stockpile of chemical weapons, and can 
manufacture all manner of CW agents.
    Then comes Iran. Iran's biological weapons program began 
during the Iran-Iraq war, and accelerated after Tehran learned 
how far along Saddam Hussein had progressed in his own program. 
The Iranians have all of the necessary pharmaceutical 
expertise, as well as the commercial infrastructure needed to 
produce--and hide--a biological warfare program. The United 
States believes Iran probably has produced and weaponized BW 
agents in violation of the Convention. Again, Iran's BW program 
is complemented by an even more aggressive chemical warfare 
program, Iran's ongoing interest in nuclear weapons, and its 
aggressive ballistic missile research, development, and flight 
testing regimen.
    President Bush named these three countries in his State of 
the Union address earlier this year as the world's most 
dangerous proliferators. ``States like these, and their 
terrorist allies,'' he said, ``constitute an axis of evil, 
arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons 
of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing 
danger.''

Trouble Ahead

    Beyond the axis of evil, there are other rogue states 
intent on acquiring weapons of mass destruction--particularly 
biological weapons. Given our vulnerability to attack from 
biological agents, as evidenced recently in the anthrax 
releases, it is important to carefully assess and respond to 
potential proliferators. Today, I want to discuss three other 
state sponsors of terrorism that are pursuing or who have the 
potential to pursue weapons of mass destruction or have the 
capability to do so in violation of their treaty obligations. 
While we will continue to use diplomatic efforts and 
multilateral regimes with these countries, it is important to 
review the challenges we face and to underline the issues that 
these states must address. As the President has said, ``America 
will do what is necessary to ensure our nation's security. 
We'll be deliberate. Yet time is not on our side. I will not 
wait on events while dangers gather. I will not stand by as 
peril draws closer and closer.''
    First, Libya. There is no doubt that Libya continues its 
longstanding pursuit of nuclear weapons. We believe that since 
the suspension of UN sanctions against Libya in 1999, Libya has 
been able to increase its access to dual use nuclear 
technologies. Although Libya would need significant foreign 
assistance to acquire a nuclear weapon, Tripoli's nuclear 
infrastructure enhancement remains of concern. Qaddafi hinted 
at this in a recent (25 March) interview with Al-Jazirah when 
he said, ``We demanded the dismantling of the weapons of mass 
destruction that the Israelis have; we must continue to demand 
that. Otherwise, the Arabs will have the right to possess that 
weapon.''
    Among its weapons of mass destruction programs, Libya--
which is not a party to the CWC--continues its goal of 
reestablishing its offensive chemical weapons ability, as well 
as pursuing an indigenous chemical warfare production 
capability. Libya has produced at least 100 tons of different 
kinds of chemical weapons, using its Rabta facility. That 
facility closed down after it was subject to media scrutiny, 
but then re-opened as a pharmaceutical plant in 1995. Although 
production of chemical agents reportedly has been halted, CW 
production at Rabta cannot be ruled out. It remains heavily 
dependent on foreign suppliers for precursor chemicals, 
technical expertise, and other key chemical warfare-related 
equipment. Following the suspension of UN sanctions in April 
1999, Libya has reestablished contacts with illicit foreign 
sources of expertise, parts, and precursor chemicals in the 
Middle East, Asia, and Western Europe.
    Conversely, Libya has publicly indicated its intent to join 
the CWC. While our perceptions of Libya would not change 
overnight, such a move could be positive. Under the CWC, Libya 
would be required to declare and destroy all chemical weapons 
production facilities and stockpiles, make declarations about 
any dual use chemical industry, undertake not to research or 
produce any chemical weapons, and not to export certain 
chemicals to countries that have not signed the CWC. Libya 
would also be subject to challenge inspections of any facility, 
declared or not.
    Significantly for predictive purposes, Libya became a State 
Party to the BWC in January 1982, but the U.S. believes that 
Libya has continued its biological warfare program. Although 
its program is in the research and development stage, Libya may 
be capable of producing small quantities of biological agent 
Libya's BW program has been hindered, in part, by the country's 
poor scientific and technological base, equipment shortages, 
and a lack of skilled personnel, as well as by UN sanctions in 
place from 1992 to 1999.
    Libya is also continuing its efforts to obtain ballistic 
missile-related equipment, materials, technology, and expertise 
from foreign sources. Outside assistance--particularly Serbian, 
Indian, North Korean, and Chinese--is critical to its ballistic 
missile development programs, and the suspension of UN 
sanctions in 1999 has allowed Tripoli to expand its procurement 
effort. Libya's current capability probably remains limited to 
its Scud B missiles, but with continued foreign assistance it 
may achieve an MRBM capability--a long desired goal-or 
extended-range Scud capability.
    Although Libya is one of seven countries on the State 
Department's list of state sponsors of terror \1\ N, the U.S. 
has noted recent positive steps by the Libyan government that 
we hope indicate that Tripoli wishes to rejoin the community of 
civilized states. In 1999, Libya turned over two Libyans wanted 
in connection with the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over 
Lockerbie, Scotland, for trial in the Netherlands. In 2001, it 
condemned the September 11 attacks publicly and signed the 
twelve terrorist conventions listed in UN Security Council 
Resolution 1273. And, as I have already mentioned, Libya has 
also announced its intention to accede to CWC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     N\1\ ``Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000,'' U.S. Department of 
State, April 20, 2001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    However, as I have also said, words are not enough. The key 
is to see clear, hard evidence that Libya will, in fact, live 
up to the public standards it has set for itself. Libya can 
make a positive gesture in this regard by fulfilling its 
obligations under WMD treaties and becoming a party to the CWC. 
Moreover, Libya must honor the relevant UN Security Council 
Resolutions relating to the resolution of Pan Am 103, arguably 
the worst air terrorist disaster prior to September 11. Libya 
has yet to comply fully with these resolutions, which include 
accepting responsibility and paying compensation. It is past 
time that Libya did this.
    The United States also knows that Syria has long had a 
chemical warfare program. It has a stockpile of the nerve agent 
sarin and is engaged in research and development of the more 
toxic and persistent nerve agent VX. Although Damascus 
currently is dependent on foreign sources for key elements of 
its chemical warfare program, including precursor chemicals and 
key production equipment, we are concerned about Syrian 
advances in its indigenous CW infrastructure which would 
significantly increase the independence of its CW program. We 
think that Syria has a variety of aerial bombs and SCUD 
warheads, which are potential means of delivery of deadly 
agents capable of striking neighboring countries.
    Syria, which has signed but not ratified the BWC, is 
pursuing the development of biological weapons and is able to 
produce at least small amounts of biological warfare agents. 
While we believe Syria would need foreign assistance to launch 
a large-scale biological weapons program right now, it may 
obtain such assistance by the end of this decade.
    Syria has a combined total of several hundred Scud B, Scud 
C and SS-21 SRBMs, It is pursuing both solid- and liquid-
propellant missile programs and relies extensively on foreign 
assistance in these endeavors. North Korean and Russian 
entities have been involved in aiding Syria's ballistic missile 
development. All of Syria's missiles are mobile and can reach 
much of Israel, Jordan, and Turkey from launch sites well 
within the country.
    In addition to Libya and Syria, there is a threat coming 
from another BWC signatory, and one that lies just 90 miles 
from the U.S. mainland--namely, Cuba. This totalitarian state 
has long been a violator of human rights. The State Department 
said last year in its Annual Report on Human Rights Practices 
that ``the Government continued to violate systematically the 
fundamental civil and political rights of its citizens. 
Citizens do not have the right to change their government 
peacefully. Prisoners died in jail due to lack of medical care. 
Members of the security forces and prison officials continued 
to beat and otherwise abuse detainees and prisoners . . . The 
Government denied its citizens the freedoms of speech, press, 
assembly and association.''
    Havana has long provided safehaven for terrorists, earning 
it a place on the State Department's list of terrorist-
sponsoring states. The country is known to be harboring 
terrorists from Colombia, Spain, and fugitives from the United 
States. We know that Cuba is collaborating with other state 
sponsors of terror.
    Castro has repeatedly denounced the U.S. war on terrorism. 
He continues to view terror as a legitimate tactic to further 
revolutionary objectives. Last year, Castro visited Iran. Syria 
and Libya--all designees on the same list of terrorist-
sponsoring states. At Tehran University, these were his words: 
``Iran and Cuba, in cooperation with each other, can bring 
America to its knees. The U.S. regime is very weak, and we are 
witnessing this weakness from close up.''
    But Cuba's threat to our security often has been 
underplayed. An official U.S. government report in 1998 
concluded that Cuba did not represent a significant military 
threat to the United States or the region. It went only so far 
as to say that, ``Cuba has a limited capacity to engage in some 
military and intelligence activities which could pose a danger 
to U.S. citizens under some circumstances.'' However, then-
Secretary of Defense William Cohen tried to add some balance to 
this report by expressing in the preface his serious concerns 
about Cuba's intelligence activities against the United States 
and its human rights practices. Most notably, he said, ``I 
remain concerned about Cuba's potential to develop and produce 
biological agents, given its biotechnology infrastructure . . 
.''
    Why was the 1998 report on Cuba so unbalanced? Why did it 
underplay the threat Cuba posed to the United States? A major 
reason is Cuba's aggressive intelligence operations against the 
United States, which included recruiting the Defense 
Intelligence Agency's senior Cuba analyst, Ana Belen Montes, to 
spy for Cuba. Montes not only had a hand in drafting the 1998 
Cuba report but also passed some of our most sensitive 
information about Cuba back to Havana. Montes was arrested last 
fall and pleaded guilty to espionage on March 19th.
    For four decades Cuba has maintained a well-developed and 
sophisticated biomedical industry, supported until 1990 by the 
Soviet Union. This industry is one of the most advanced in 
Latin America, and leads in the production of pharmaceuticals 
and vaccines that are sold worldwide. Analysts and Cuban 
defectors have long cast suspicion on the activities conducted 
in these biomedical facilities.
    Here is what we now know: The United States believes that 
Cuba has at least a limited offensive biological warfare 
research and development effort. Cuba has provided dual-use 
biotechnology to other rogue states. We are concerned that such 
technology could support BW programs in those states. We call 
on Cuba to cease all BW-applicable cooperation with rogue 
states and to fully comply with all of its obligations under 
the Biological Weapons Convention.

Conclusion

    America is leading in the fight to root out and destroy 
terror. Our goals are to stop the development of weapons of 
mass destruction and insure compliance with existing arms 
control and nonproliferation treaties and commitments, which 
the Bush Administration strongly supports, but experience has 
shown that treaties and agreements are an insufficient check 
against state sponsors of terrorism. Noncompliance can 
undermine the efficacy and legitimacy of these treaties and 
regimes. After all, any nation ready to violate one agreement 
is perfectly capable of violating another, denying its actual 
behavior all the while. And so I close with four fundamental 
conclusions. First, that global terrorism has changed the 
nature of the threat we face. Keeping WMD out of terrorist 
hands must be a core element of our nonproliferation strategy.
    Second, the Administration supports an international 
dialogue on weapons of mass destruction and encourages 
countries to educate their publics on the WMD threat. We must 
not shy away from truth telling.
    Third, the Administration will not assume that because a 
country's formal subscription to UN counterterrorism 
conventions or its membership in multilateral regimes 
necessarily constitutes an accurate reading of its intentions. 
We call on Libya, Cuba, and Syria to live up to the agreements 
they have signed. We will watch closely their actions, not 
simply listen to their words. Working with our allies, we will 
expose those countries that do not live up to their 
commitments.
    Finally, the United States will continue to exercise strong 
leadership in multilateral forums and will take whatever steps 
are necessary to protect and defend our interests and eliminate 
the terrorist threat.
    Thank you.
                                ------                                


  Announcement of Nomination of John Bolton as U.S. Ambassador to the 
                                  U.N.


BY SECRETARY CONDOLEEZZA RICE, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN ROOM, WASHINGTON, DC, 
                             MARCH 7, 2005

    SECRETARY RICE: Good afternoon. This past September at the 
United Nations General Assembly, President Bush spoke of our 
nation's commitments to working in close partnership with the 
United Nations. The United States is committed to the success 
of the United Nations and we view the U.N. as an important 
component of our diplomacy. The American people respect the 
idealism that sparked the creation of the United Nations and we 
share the UN's unshakable support for human dignity.
    At this time of great opportunity and great promise, the 
charge to the International community is clear: we who are on 
the right side of freedom's divide have an obligation to help 
those who were unlucky enough to be born on the wrong side of 
that divide. The hard work of freedom is a task of generations; 
yet, it is also urgent work that cannot be deferred.
    We have watched in awe in Afghanistan, as men and women 
once suppressed by the Tatiban walked miles and stood for hours 
in the snow just to cast a ballot for their first vote as a 
free people. We have watched as millions of Iraqi men and women 
defied terrorists and cast their free votes and began their 
nation's new history. We have seen determination in the faces 
of citizens in places like Ukraine and Georgia and the 
Palestinian territories, as they have stood firm for their 
freedom.
    We are seeing political reforms begin to take place in 
Qatar and Jordan and Egypt and Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, and 
this very morning we applaud the courage of those on the 
frontlines of freedom in Lebanon who are seeking free and fair 
elections. In this era of expanding freedom, there is room for 
optimism but much hard work lies ahead. The international 
community has a challenging agenda before it, from the Middle 
East to Sudan to Haiti to the Balkans from Iran to the Korean 
Peninsula and on many other issues.
    Now, more than ever, the U.N. must play a critical role as 
it strives to fulfill the dreams and hopes and aspirations of 
its original promise to save succeeding generations from the 
scourge of war, to reaffirm faith and fundamental human rights 
and to promote social progress and better standards of life in 
larger freedom. President Bush has sent our most skilled and 
experienced diplomats to represent the United States at the 
U.N. Today, I am honored to continue that tradition by 
announcing that President Bush intends to nominate John Bolton 
to be our next Ambassador to the United Nations.
    The President and I have asked John to do this work because 
he knows how to get things done. He is a tough-minded diplomat, 
he has a strong record of success and he has a proven track 
record of effective multilateralism. For the past four years 
John has served as Under Secretary of State for Arms Control 
and International Security Affairs. In that position, John has 
held primary responsibility for the issue that U.N. Secretary 
General Kofi Annan has identified as one of our most crucial 
challenges to international peace and security: stemming the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
    John helped build a coalition of more than 60 countries to 
help combat the spread of WMD through the President's 
Proliferation Security Initiative. John played a key diplomatic 
role in our sensitive negotiations with Libya when that nation 
made the wise choice to give up its pursuit of weapons of mass 
destruction. And John was the chief negotiator of the Treaty of 
Moscow, which was signed by Presidents Putin and Bush to reduce 
nuclear warheads by two-thirds.
    In President George H.W. Bush's Administration, John served 
as Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations 
and worked on several key diplomatic initiatives with the U.N., 
including work on U.N. reform and work on the repayment of 
arrearages and assessments. In 1991, John was the principal 
architect behind the initiative that finally led the United 
Nations General Assembly to repeal the notorious resolution 
that equated Zionism and racism.
    And few may remember this, but John worked between 1997 and 
2000 as an assistant to former Secretary James Baker in his 
capacity as the Secretary General's personal envoy to the 
Western Sahara. John did work pro bono. If few Americans have 
direct experience working for the United Nations, I'm confident 
that fewer still have gained that experience on their own 
nickel. Through history, some of our best ambassadors have been 
those with the strongest voices, ambassadors like Jeane 
Kirkpatrick and Daniel Patrick Moynihan.
    John Bolton is personally committed to the future success 
of the United Nations and he will be a strong voice for reform 
at a time when the United Nations has begun to reform itself to 
help meet the challenging agenda before the international 
community. John will also help to build a broader base of 
support here in the United Nations for the U.N.--in the United 
States for the U.N. and its mission. As Secretary General Annan 
has said, ``U.S. support the U.N. is critical to the success of 
this institution.'' The United States will continue to do its 
part.
    John, you have my confidence and that of the President. We 
thank you for the work you have done on behalf of our nation. 
To John's wife, Gretchen, and daughter Jennifer Sarah and other 
friends of John who are here with us today, we thank you for 
all that you do. But John, your most important work is yet to 
come. And I look forward to working closely with you on behalf 
of our nation and the international community in support of the 
United Nations.

    UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: Madame Secretary, you and the 
President have done me a great honor in nominating me to be the 
United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations. 
If confirmed by the Senate, I will continue to work closely 
with members of Congress and our colleagues both in the Foreign 
Service and in the civil service to advance President Bush's 
policies.
    As you know, Madame Secretary, I've worked in the 
government for many years, at the Agency for International 
Development, the Department of Justice and here at the 
Department of State. This work has afforded me the opportunity 
to learn from some of our nation's finest public servants. It 
has been an honor and a privilege to represent the United 
States Government in crafting many multinational and bilateral 
agreements to further our National Security objectives.
    Madame Secretary, my record over many years demonstrates 
clear support for effective multilateral diplomacy. Whether it 
be the Proliferation Security Initiative, the G-8 global 
partnership or adopting UN resolutions, working closely with 
others is essential to ensuring a safer world. We all agree 
that there are numerous challenges facing the United States and 
the security of our country and all freedom-loving peoples must 
be protected. Close cooperation and the time-honored tradition 
of frank communication is central to achieving our mutually-
held objectives. The United Nations affords us the opportunity 
to move our policies forward together with unity of purpose.
    As you know, I have over the years written critically about 
the U.N. Indeed, one highlight of my professional career was 
the 1991 successful effort to repeal the General Assembly's 
1975 resolution equating Zionism with racism, thus removing the 
greatest stain on the U.N.'S reputation. I have consistently 
stressed in my writings that American leadership is critical to 
the success of the U.N., an effective U.N., one that is true to 
the original intent of its charter's framers.
    This is a time of opportunity for the U.N. which, likewise, 
requires American leadership to achieve successful reform. I 
know you and the President will provide that leadership. If 
confirmed by the Senate, I will roll up my sleeves to join you 
in that effort which will require close, bipartisan 
Congressional support.
    Finally a personal note, I'd like to thank two very special 
people who have been with me for many years, my wife Gretchen 
and our daughter Jennifer Sarah, who have endured my many 
foreign trips and long absences in the service of our country.
    Madame Secretary, again, I want to thank you and the 
President for your confidence and for your support.
                                ------                                


  Memo re: Unclassified Briefing on the Process of Getting Identities 
                          From NSA Intercepts

    On Friday, May 6, officials from the State Department's 
bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) gave a briefing to 
majority and minority staffs on how policymakers and others can 
obtain the blacked-out names of Americans in intercepts from 
the National Security Agency (NSA). The NSA regularly sends 
relevant, highly-classified reports to various policymakers, as 
well as to INR, as part of the normal intelligence briefing 
process. The volume of reports depends on both availability of 
information and the interest of the policymaker. Sometimes 
those reports will include excerpts of intercepted 
conversations between foreigners that mention U.S. citizens. By 
law, the American names are blacked out, and it is noted that 
speakers are referring to ``named U.S. person'', ``named U.S. 
official'' or ``named U.S. company.''
    If the person receiving the NSA report wants to know the 
identity of the ``named'' person, he or she contacts the 
relevant INR analyst and asks for it. INR prepares a formal 
request for NSA, signed by INR's Principal Deputy Assistant 
Secretary. The requester needs to give no special reason other 
than he/she needs the name ``to assess the intelligence value 
of the report.'' INR rarely if ever questions the requester. 
The request is sent over to the NSA, and the name comes back, 
sometimes overnight, or a day or so later. No request has ever 
been denied by NSA, as far as we were told. The analyst is 
shown the ``ident'', and then goes and informs the requester. 
Requesters can be ``any policy customer who has the authority 
to see the report.'' Typically the individual is at the Deputy 
Assistant Secretary rank or above, sometimes office director or 
above.
    The briefers said they receive ``two or three'' such 
requests a week, especially from INR analysts, who need the 
information to understand better the intelligence they are 
analyzing. The Committee has been told that during Secretary 
Bolton's tenure, 400 such requests were made by the State 
Department, including 10 by Secretary Bolton. An estimated 50% 
of the 400 requests come from INR; an almost equally large 
number are requested by officials from Diplomatic Security.
    By law, the NSA may not eavesdrop on the conversations of a 
U.S. citizen, even if that citizen is abroad. Therefore, any 
blacked-out names would be Americans who are being talked 
about, not Americans who are talking on the intercept.
    The NSA reports are typically so highly classified that 
they do not stay with the requester once he or she has read it. 
They must be stored in more secure facilities than most 
officials have in their offices. When the name comes back from 
NSA (via secure e-mail), the analyst is shown the name, but 
apparently is not given it on a piece of paper. The analyst 
then takes the original intercept report to the requester, 
discloses the ``ident'', then takes the report back again.
    There is some discrepancy about how many requests have been 
made. If the requester asks for two different names on the same 
report, INR counts that as two requests, NSA counts it as one. 
Therefore, INR counts somewhat more requests than NSA's 400. 
INR assumes that if a request comes from the chief of staff or 
some other top person in an official's office, it is coming 
from the official. The briefers did not believe INR's records 
are scrupulous in recording whether the request came directly 
from the principal or from staff. The INR records of the idents 
are destroyed within nine months.
    Like any SCI material, the NSA reports are available only a 
need to know basis. Someone with a clearance can't simply go 
rooting around NSA reports. A person requesting an ident on a 
report clearly outside his/her area would raise a red flag.
                                ------                                

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                    Washington, DC, April 28, 2005.
Hon. Pat Roberts,
Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence,
U.S. Senate, Washington DC.
Hon. Jay Rockefeller,
Vice Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence,
U.S. Senate, Washington DC.
     Dear Mr. Chairman/Vice Chairman: As part of the Committee 
on Foreign Relations' due diligence process, in connection with 
the nomination of John Bolton to be the United States 
Representative to the United Nations, questions have arisen 
with regard to requests by the nominee in his capacity as Under 
Secretary of State for Arms Control. More specifically, Mr. 
Bolton has testified that, on approximately ten occasions 
between 2001 and 2004, he requested the names of U.S. persons 
that were redacted in the release to policymakers of various 
intelligence products.
    A number of questions have been raised regarding these 
types of requests, including the process by which such requests 
are made, transmitted, and approved. There is also concern as 
to whether information regarding Mr. Bolton's specific requests 
has been handled appropriately by those with knowledge of such 
requests.
    Therefore, the Committee, working with and through the 
Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate, 
hereby requests that you solicit from the appropriate 
intelligence agencies or elements thereof all information 
related to Mr. Bolton's requests and the responses thereto, 
including but not limited to, the unredacted contents of the 
documents in question, the process by which Mr. Bolton's 
requests were handled, the contents of the responses and the 
process by which they were communicated, as well as any 
conclusions reached by the appropriate intelligence agencies or 
elements thereto as to any violations of procedures, 
directives, regulations, or law by those with knowledge of Mr. 
Bolton's requests.
    Assuming the provision of such material, the Committee on 
Foreign Relations is prepared to follow the guidance of the 
Select Committee on Intelligence with access and storage of 
such material, as well as the provisions under which such 
materials will be shared with Members of the Committee on 
Foreign Relations.
    Thank you for your consideration of this request.
            Sincerely,
                                          Richard G. Lugar,
                                                          Chairman.
                                ------                                

                                       U.S. Senate,
                                 Committee on Intelligence,
                                       Washington, DC, May 5, 2005.
Hon. Richard Lugar,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington DC.
     Dear Mr. Chairman: The Committee has received your letter 
of April 28, 2005. As you requested in that letter, the Select 
Committee on Intelligence is prepared to assist the Foreign 
Relations Committee in its review of specific Intelligence 
Community holdings as they relate to the nomination of John 
Bolton to be the U.S. Representative to the United Nations.
    The Select Committee on Intelligence looks forward to 
working with you and your Committee in order to facilitate this 
request.
            Sincerely,
                                               Pat Roberts,
                                                          Chairman.

                                ANNEX E




 HEARING ON NOMINATION OF JOHN R. BOLTON TO BE U.S., REPRESENTATIVE TO 
                           THE UNITED NATIONS

                              ----------                              


                         MONDAY, APRIL 11, 2005

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in Room 
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar, 
Chairman of the committee, presiding.
    Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Chafee, Allen, Coleman, 
Alexander, Biden, Sarbanes, Dodd, Kerry, Feingold, Boxer, 
Nelson, and Obama.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S. SENATOR FROM 
                            INDIANA

    The Chairman.  This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee is called to order.
    The Foreign Relations Committee meets today to consider 
President George W. Bush's nomination of John Bolton to be 
United States Ambassador to the United Nations. Mr. Bolton has 
served the last four years as the Under Secretary of State for 
Arms Control and International Security Affairs. In this 
capacity, he has played an important role in several of the 
Bush administration's most notable diplomatic successes, 
including the President's proliferation security initiative, 
the Moscow Treaty, the G8 Global Partnership Against the 
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the opening 
of Libya's WMD programs.
    Secretary Bolton also served for four years in the 
administration of George H.W. Bush, as the Assistant Secretary 
of State for International Organizations. In this position, he 
was heavily involved in matters related to the United Nations, 
including United Nations financing and reform proposals. He 
also assisted former Secretary of State James Baker in his role 
as the Secretary General's personal envoy for the Western 
Sahara.
    In announcing this nomination, Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice stated, and I quote, ``John Bolton is 
personally committed to the future success of the United 
Nations, and he will be a strong voice for reform at a time 
when the United Nations has begun to reform itself to help meet 
the challenging agenda before the international community,'' 
end of quote from Dr. Rice.
    Perhaps no organization is so frequently oversimplified by 
both its proponents and its detractors as the United Nations. 
The United Nations is not a monolithic entity controlled by a 
Secretary General; rather, it's a complex collection of 
agencies, programs, diplomatic venues, traditions, and 
agreements that depend on the actions of the individual member 
states. As such, the various parts of the U.N. often work 
independently from one another with little coordination or 
oversight.
    The U.N. has produced great accomplishments, even as some 
of its structures have experienced episodes of corruption, 
mismanagement, contentiousness, or timidity. Some agencies and 
programs, like the World Health Organization, the World Food 
Program, and UNICEF, have a proven record of achievement and 
are trusted by people and nations around the world. Other 
endeavors, like the Oil-for-Food Program or the U.N. Commission 
on Human Rights, have been gravely flawed and suffer from 
severe organizational deficiencies.
    Foreign Relations Committee held the first congressional 
hearing on the U.N.'s Oil-for-Food scandal a year ago this 
month. At that hearing, I said, and I quote, ``Billions of 
dollars that should have been spent on humanitarian needs in 
Iraq were siphoned off by Saddam Hussein's regime through a 
system of surcharges, bribes, and kickbacks. This corruption 
was not solely a product of Saddam Hussein's machination; he 
depended upon members of the U.N. Security Council who were 
willing to be complicit in his activities, and they needed U.N. 
officials and contractors who were dishonest, inattentive, or 
willing to make damaging compromises in pursuit of a 
compassionate mission,'' end of quote.
    During the last year, we have learned much more about the 
extent of that corruption and mismanagement involved, and this 
knowledge has supported the case for reform.
    United Nations reform is not a new issue. The structure and 
role of the United Nations has been debated in our country 
almost continuously since the U.N. was established, in 1945. 
But in 2005 we may have a unique opportunity to improve the 
operations of the U.N. The revelations of the Oil-for-Food 
scandal and the urgency of strengthening global cooperation to 
address terrorism, the AIDS crisis, nuclear proliferation, and 
many other international problems have created momentum in 
favor of constructive reforms at the U.N.
    Secretary General Annan has proposed a substantial reform 
plan that will provide a platform for further reform 
initiatives and discussion. The United States must be a leader 
in the effort to improve the United Nations, particularly its 
accountability. At a time when the United Nations is appealing 
for greater international help in Iraq, in Afghanistan, in 
trouble spots around the world, the diminishment of U.N. 
credibility because of scandal reduces U.S. options and 
increases our burdens.
    Secretary Bolton has thought a great deal about this 
subject, and we are anxious to listen to his ideas for reform, 
as well as his evaluation of the Secretary General's plan. We 
want to know what specific parts of that plan deserve United 
States support. Beyond substantive evaluation, we want to know 
how the nominee intends to pursue these reform ideas. What 
strategy does he propose for making constructive changes a 
reality? How will he apply the substantial experience in this 
area?
    Even as reform must be a priority, the world will not stop 
while we attempt to improve the structures of the U.N. The next 
U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. must pursue reform without 
diminishing the effectiveness of its core diplomatic mission; 
namely, securing greater international support for the 
national-security and foreign-policy objectives of the United 
States.
    During the last several months, President Bush and 
Secretary Rice have undertaken important missions designed to 
reinvigorate relations with allies and partners. This is an 
urgent national-security imperative that cannot be neglected by 
the next ambassador to the U.N. The United States does not 
possess infinite financial and military resources. We need help 
to advance security, democracy, and human rights. This fact 
should not preclude us from taking unilateral action when it is 
in our interest, but it does require that we be persistent and 
imaginative in our pursuits of international support.
    The nomination of Secretary Bolton to be Ambassador to the 
United Nations has generated public debate on U.S. policies 
toward the United Nations and on the degree to which the United 
States should embrace multilateralism. In this context, 
opponents of Mr. Bolton have criticized some statements of the 
nominee as abrasive, confrontational, and insensitive. Some of 
these same statements have been celebrated by supporters of the 
nominee as demonstrating a tough-minded, refreshingly blunt 
approach to diplomacy. But in the diplomatic world, neither 
bluntness nor rhetorical sensitivity is a virtue, in itself. 
There are times when blunt talk serves a policy purpose. Other 
times, it does not.
    When President Ronald Reagan stood before the Brandenburg 
Gate in 1987 and said, ``Mr. Gorbachev, tear down that wall,'' 
blunt speech was serving a carefully planned diplomatic 
purpose. It reflected broader themes of democracy that had been 
nurtured for years by the Reagan administration. It reaffirmed 
to Germany, on both sides of the wall, the United States would 
have staying power in Europe. It underscored to the Kremlin, in 
a personal, tangible way, that the United States and its allies 
were intent on achieving the peaceful transformation of Eastern 
Europe.
    Blunt as it was, there was nothing gratuitous about 
President Reagan's statement. Diplomatic speech by any high-
ranking administration official has policy consequences. It 
should never be undertaken simply to score international 
debating points, to appeal to segments of the U.S. public 
opinion, or to validate a personal point of view.
    As President John Kennedy once said, and I quote, ``The 
purpose of foreign policy is not to provide an outlet for our 
own sentiments of hope or indignation; it is to shape real 
events in a real world,'' end of quote.
    I believe that diplomats serving under the President and 
Secretary of State can apply a basic three-part test to almost 
anything they utter in a diplomatic context. First, is the 
statement true? Second, is the statement consistent with the 
policies and directives of the President and the Secretary of 
State? And, third, is there a rational expectation that the 
statement will advance or support U.S. interests?
    It is particularly important that the statements of our 
ambassadors to the U.N. meet this test, because, more so than 
any other American ambassadors, they are perceived as speaking 
directly for the President of the United States.
    President Bush has selected John Bolton, a nominee of 
experience and accomplishment, to be his spokesman and 
representative at the United Nations. Given the importance of 
the position, it is vital that we act both expeditiously and 
thoroughly in evaluating the nominee. We look forward to 
hearing the nominee's insights and learning how he will work on 
behalf of the President and the Secretary of State in 
fulfilling this duty.
    I'd like to turn now to the distinguished Ranking Member of 
the committee, Senator Biden, for his opening statement.

   STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., U.S. SENATOR FROM 
                            DELAWARE

    Senator Biden.  Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, 
Mr. Secretary.
    Let me say, at the outset, I'm probably--of all the people 
up here, I'm going to be the least critical of anyone who's 
blunt. I don't like to indict myself publicly that way. But--I 
hadn't planned on starting this way, but I think that the--to 
state my grave concern with this appointment, Mr. Chairman, I 
think that the test you set out for diplomacy is the accurate 
one: true, consistent with the policy of the administration, 
and a rational expectation that it would be in U.S. interests.
    Obviously, all of this is subject to explanation and 
rebuttal and--by our friend, Mr. Bolton, but I think that my 
problem with your statements about the U.N. is, I don't think 
they're true, I don't think they're consistent with U.S. 
policy, and I don't think--I clearly believe they do not 
advance U.S. interests. And, you know, you can be blunt. 
President Reagan was blunt about the Berlin Wall, because it 
was, in fact, clear to the whole world that it was an odious 
thing. I think your statements, which I'll go into in a minute, 
about the U.N. are a little bit like being blunt about NATO. If 
you had said, which you haven't, to the best of my knowledge, 
``NATO forces can't keep with us--up with us. The French air 
force can't fly on our wing,'' et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. 
That would be blunt. That be also clearly against U.S. 
interests to say those things. But it would be blunt. And I 
would think that's more akin to my criticism of what you will 
soon hear of your statements about the U.N. than the Berlin 
Wall.
    I don't believe--well, I should point out, at the outset, 
Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank you for your cooperation. You 
have been, as always, straightforward and honorable and fair to 
both the witness and to the minority. I don't believe this 
hearing, quite frankly, is ready to be conducted today, because 
we've not completed the review of certain allegations, none of 
which go to the integrity, the honesty, the personal conduct of 
the nominee. When I say ``allegations,'' I'll get into what I 
mean by that, allegations involving the nominee. They all 
relate to whether or not he attempted to use his influence 
unfairly to get certain analysts fired because they didn't 
agree with his assessments. That's what I mean, at the outset, 
so the press doesn't think there's anything nefarious about 
this. That's the issue that's going to be discussed here, among 
others.
    On March 21st, I asked the State Department for access to 
certain individuals and documents related to an incident 
involving the nominee and a State Department employee relating 
to whether or not that person should or should not have been 
fired. For two weeks, the Department stonewalled. It was only 
after you, Mr. Chairman, intervened, last Thursday--and we sent 
repeated letters to the State Department--last Thursday that 
you intervened, that we received some cooperation.
    On Thursday, last, at 1:45 p.m., the Democratic staff was 
informed that two individuals--we asked for four--would be made 
available that afternoon, starting at 3:00 p.m. On Friday 
morning, some of the documents we requested began to arrive, 
but the committee was not allowed to retain them or make copies 
of them, but only take notes, further handicapping our ability 
to review the materials.
    Since Thursday afternoon, staff on both sides--this has 
been on both sides--I asked my chief of staff to correct me--on 
every interview, there's been a majority member staff person 
there, so this isn't a--this isn't--the Democrats are asking 
for it, but this--none of this has been done absent a majority 
staff person being present.
    Since Thursday afternoon, staff on both sides have worked 
diligently to interview the witnesses and review materials. And 
so, I'm grateful for your intervention at the time that you 
intervened, because I was having no success with Secretary 
Rice. But the committee's work to investigate this matter, 
which would have proceeded over the past two-week period, was 
compressed into 90 hours. The staff still only--has at least 
two more interviews to conduct, and I don't believe that all 
documents responsive to the request have been provided.
    And because many of the documents are classified, they 
could not be made available to Senators to review unless they 
happened to be in Washington during this period. Many of us 
were--the reason it was initially postponed is, many of us were 
in Rome with the President's funeral. Excuse me. Freudian. I 
beg your pardon. At the Pope's funeral that the President 
attended.
    This is not a way that we should do business. The 
Department's lack of cooperation--this is not Mr. Bolton; he 
did not fail to cooperate, the Department did not cooperate 
until the last possible minute--stands in marked contrast to 
the nomination four years ago for this same position. In that 
case, involving John Negroponte, the committee reviewed, with 
full cooperation, and obtained hundreds of pages of documents 
without delay or resistance. And my friend from Connecticut was 
a prime mover in dealing with that nomination.
    The fact is that, unlike four years ago, Under Secretary 
Bolton, when he came before this committee, had little 
background in Arms Controls, and we confirmed him. But there's 
no question that he comes before us today with extensive 
experience in U.N. affairs. He served as the Assistant 
Secretary of State during the first Bush administration, 
supervising policy regarding the United Nations. And he has 
written and testified frequently about the subject. And it is 
precisely the record in his first part of this--the first Bush 
term that concerns me.
    I believe the President is entitled to significant 
deference in his appointment of senior personnel, and I've --
but I have opposed nominees, however, who I believe were 
hostile to the mission for which--to which they were assigned. 
For example, I voted against two--one Secretary of the Interior 
who was--clearly had an animus toward that Department, under 
the Reagan administration. And I voted against Secretaries of 
Education appointed by Reagan, because he said he was 
appointing them for the express purpose of doing away with the 
Department of Education.
    And so, this will--not the first time I have voted against 
a--if I vote against John--it would not be the first time that 
I voted against a nominee for--that the President has put 
forward that's not a member of the judiciary.
    And, quite frankly, I'm surprised that the nominee wants 
the job that he's been nominated for, given his--the many 
negative things he had to say about the U.N., international 
institutions, and international law. Now, you've going to have 
an opportunity to respond to all these kinds of things. They're 
taken--they're attempted to be in context, but they're--but I'm 
just going to cite some of the things you said, and they'll be 
put in context during the question-and-answer period.
    You said, there's no such thing as the United Nations --
quote, ``There's no such thing as the United Nations.''
    You said, and I quote, that--excuse me--you said, If they 
removed ten stories from the 38-story U.N. headquarters, quote, 
``it wouldn't make a bit of difference,'' end of quote.
    You said that if the Security Council were to be made 
today, that you would have only one permanent member, the 
United States.
    You said that international law really isn't, quote, 
``It''--that it really isn't law, and that, quote, ``While 
treaties may well be politically or even morally binding, they 
are not legally obligatory,'' end of quote.
    You said the International Court of Justice, a body created 
under the U.N. Charter, is a, quote, ``travesty and a pretend 
court,'' end of quote.
    You said that the peace-enforcement operations of the 
United--of nation and nation-building should, quote, ``be 
relegated to history's junk pile at the first opportunity,'' 
end of quote, because they resulted in, as you said, quote, 
``American personnel and resources being committed to U.N. 
operations far removed from America's vital interests,'' end of 
quote, even though they wouldn't be there unless we--if we 
didn't want them there, we could veto the effort.
    I want to give you a chance to explain, clarify, and 
possibly, hopefully, repudiate these and other statements 
you've made over the years, but, for now, let me point to two 
things.
    First, the logical conclusion of your views is that--in my 
view, is that if the U.S. Embassy is sacked by a foreign state, 
or a U.S. soldier tortured, then this country and its citizens 
have no recourse under international law, because, in your 
view, there's no such thing as international law. How can that 
possibly be in America's interest?
    Second, it seems to me your views about the U.N. treaties 
and international law are out of sync with those of the 
President of the United States and Secretary Rice. Soon after 
his election, the President stated that one of his priorities 
for the second term was, quote, ``to defend our security and 
spread freedom by building effective multinational and 
multilateral institutions and supporting effective multilateral 
action,'' end of quote.
    The President, right now, is demanding, to his great 
credit, Syria's full withdrawal from Lebanon, under the 
authority of a U.N. Security Council Resolution. The 
administration has finally joined the European effort to 
convince Iran to forego nuclear weapons. Quote, ``We're working 
closely with Britain, France, and Germany,'' the President 
said, continuing the quote, ``as they insist that Tehran comply 
with international law.''
    The President recently decided the United States, quote, 
``will discharge its international obligations,'' end of quote, 
under decisions of the International Court of Justice by having 
several state courts, including courts in Texas, give effect to 
the decision of that court in certain death-penalty cases. Does 
he know that he's implementing an order that is from a 
``pretend court''?
    The administration strongly endorses the U.N. decision to 
send 10,000 peacekeepers to Sudan to help secure a North-South 
peace agreement, a mission your statements about peacekeeping 
suggest that you'd have trouble supporting.
    During her confirmation hearing, Secretary Rice told this 
committee, quote, ``that the time for diplomacy is now,'' end 
of quote.
    This month, speaking before the American Society of 
International Law, she said, and I quote, ``One of the pillars 
of that diplomacy is our strong belief that international law 
is a vital and powerful force in the search for freedom,'' end 
of quote.
    I suspect that if President Clinton's Secretary of State 
had made that same statement, you might have been leading the 
charge that this was an ill-founded statement. I could be 
wrong. I'm anxious to hear what you have to say.
    In the past two months, the President and the Secretary 
have made clear that there is a new-found commitment to work 
closely with others, including the United Nations. And I'm 
hopeful that they're trying to return America to its historic 
role in building a strong international system that serves our 
interests, rather than running roughshod over it.
    Your views seem, based on what you've said in the past, 
John, to be contradictory and contrary to the direction the 
President and the Secretary of State now want to take this 
administration, which leads me to believe that it must mean 
that you no longer agree with those statements, because they 
appointed you. I wonder, as I did in 2001, about your 
diplomatic temperament. You have a habit of belittling your 
opposition, and even some of your friends.
    You said that, quote, ``Republicans are adults on foreign-
policy questions, and we define what we're willing to do 
militarily and politically by what is in the best interest of 
the United States.'' I wonder what you think of the motives of 
some of us who aren't Republicans.
    You once quoted that the head of the International Law 
Commission--you once quoted the head of the International Law 
Commission as evidence of the grandiose ambitions of supporters 
in the International Criminal Court by saying, quote, ``That's 
not the same as knuckle-dragging''--excuse me--``That's''--
excuse me--of the International Criminal Court by saying, 
quote, ``That's not some knuckle-dragging Republican from some 
southern state, it's the head of the International Law 
Commission,'' end of quote. I don't think that's the kind of 
attitude that is going to serve us very well in the United 
Nations if it continues.
    The U.N. needs reform. Lots of it. I work with former 
Chairman Jesse Helms to promote such reforms. The Helm-Biden 
amendment was--the legislation was part of that reform. That 
work's not finished. We need a strong voice in New York who 
knows the U.N. and who can advance our reform agenda, but we 
don't need a voice which people may not be inclined to listen 
to. And I fear that, knowing your reputation, and your 
reputation known well at the U.N., people will be inclined to 
tune you out. Above all, we need an able diplomat skilled in 
working the corridors of a complex international institution. 
Some have said that sending you to New York would be like 
sending Nixon to China. I'm concerned it'll be more like 
sending a bull into a china shop.
    Ambassador Kirkpatrick, who served at the U.N. under 
President Reagan and strongly supports you, may have summed it 
up best in describing you in the New York Times. She said, ``He 
may not--he may do diplomatic jobs for the U.S. Government, but 
John is not a diplomat,'' end of quote.
    So we'll want to spend some more time exploring your views 
on the United Nations and how you approach the job, if 
confirmed. We also have an obligation to assess your 
performance in your current job, Under Secretary of State for 
Arms Control and International Security. The fact is that, on 
your watch, in areas in which you are responsible, the world 
has gotten more, and not less, dangerous. Not your fault, but 
that's a fact. We didn't create these threats, but it's our 
responsibility to contend with them wisely and effectively. 
And, in my judgement, your judgement on how to deal with the 
emerging threats have not been particularly useful.
    Over the past four years, Korea has increased its nuclear-
weapons capacity by as much as 400 percent. It may now have as 
many as eight nuclear weapons, which it could test, hide, sell, 
or sell to the highest bidder. During your 2001 confirmation 
hearing, you highlighted a danger posed by North Korea 27 
times. You were right. But the record suggests that your 
approach has undermined the efforts to address the growing 
threat posed by Pyongyang.
    Over the past four years, Iran has accelerated its own 
nuclear program. It's much closer to the bomb than when the 
President took office. The record suggests you opposed the 
President's policy, the one finally adopted by President Bush. 
He's come around to, after several years, a coordinated 
strategy of carrots and sticks with our European partners. No 
one can guarantee it will work. We do know that the approach 
you apparently advocated has not worked.
    Over the past four years, the invaluable program Chairman 
Lugar started to help Russia account and destroy excess nuclear 
weapons and a complementary program to deal with its chemical 
arsenal has to withstand efforts by some in this administration 
to cut it. Now these programs have become mired in red tape, 
and despite the fact that loose Russian weapons pose one of the 
greatest potential threats to our security, we still haven't 
cut through that red tape.
    The administration did succeed in convincing Libya to give 
up its weapons of mass destruction, but, according to press 
accounts--and I'd like to hear what your view is--that only 
happened after you were taken off the case. And that success 
was the result of a policy begun by a previous administration 
that you roundly disparaged.
    Finally, a serious concern has been raised about your 
attitude toward dissenting views. Specifically, it has been 
alleged that, on at least two occasions, you sought to have 
removed from their positions officials who disagreed with your 
assessment of critical intelligence matters. After all this 
country has been through with Iraq and faulty intelligence, if 
that's true, that's not the approach we should be rewarding. 
You'll have a full opportunity to address these complaints.
    John, I have great respect for your abilities and your 
intellectual capacity. It's your judgement and temperament, as 
well as your approach to many of these issues, that give me 
great pause.
    Let me conclude with this. After a necessary war in 
Afghanistan and a optional war in Iraq, Americans are rightly 
confident in the example of our power. But I've been concerned 
that many in this administration have forgotten the power of 
our example. Foreign policy is not a popularity contest. We 
must confront hard issues. Sometimes they require hard choices 
that other countries don't like. But, above all, they require 
American leadership. That's the kind that persuades others to 
follow. And I'm not convinced this nominee has that as his 
strongest suit.
    I thank the Chair, and I yield back to the Chair.
    The Chairman.  I thank the distinguished Ranking Member.
    I would mention that when the hearing was originally 
scheduled for Thursday of last week, our distinguished 
colleague, Senator Warner, had planned to join us to introduce 
Secretary Bolton. With the rescheduling of the hearing for this 
morning, Senator Warner is unable to attend because of 
commitments in his state. He's asked me to convey to the 
committee his strong support for the nominee. And I would ask 
unanimous consent that Senator Warner's statement be included 
in the record. [The prepared statement of Senator Warner 
follows:]
    Senator Biden.  Mr. Chairman, may I clarify the point I 
made? I said ``every witness has been interviewed jointly.'' 
Three weeks ago, the Democratic staff interviewed one witness 
alone, and then, I believe, notified--am I correct?--notified 
the majority staff, who then interviewed that nominee, which 
began this ball rolling. So there was one interview, that I'm 
aware of, that the initial interview did not take place with 
both majority and minority in the room. That was the only one. 
I just wanted to clarify the record.
    The Chairman.  I thank the Senator for the clarification.
    Let me say, at the outset, that we have good attendance 
this morning, for which the Chair is grateful, and I would ask 
that Members limit their questions to ten minutes. We will have 
a ten-minute round, followed by an additional ten-minute round. 
I would just simply announce my willingness to preside over the 
committee throughout the afternoon and into an evening session, 
if that is required, for Members to have opportunity to ask all 
the questions that they wish to ask. I want to make that clear 
at the outset, that Members will have that opportunity 
throughout the morning, the afternoon, and the evening, but I 
would ask Members to respect the ten-minute time limit.
    Now, the Chair will not stop the witness from responding 
when the ten minutes comes to a conclusion, but I will ask the 
Senator involved to restrain from further doing business during 
that period until another turn comes around, in fairness to 
most Members who have changed their plans in order to be here 
today and have come at least to do business, to participate in 
the hearing.
    Having mentioned that, I will ask the Clerk to start the 
clock on my questioning, and I will ask the first ten minutes 
of questions and then yield to my distinguished colleague, 
Senator Biden. We'll go back and forth, then, with our 
questions.
    Excuse me, I've jumped the gun. We've not heard from the 
nominee. [Laughter.]
    The Chairman.  And we do want to hear from the nominee. 
[Laughter.]
    The Chairman.  We were so excited about asking you 
questions, Secretary Bolton--[Laughter.]
    The Chairman.  --that we just wanted to get right into it. 
But, nevertheless, we do look forward to your statement. Please 
take the time that is required, really, to fully express your 
views, and then I'll start the clock on my ten minutes of 
questioning.
    Secretary Bolton?

     STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN R. BOLTON, NOMINEE TO BE U.S. 
REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED STATES WITH THE RANK OF AMBASSADOR 
AND U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL 
   AND U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO SESSIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
     GENERAL ASSEMBLY DURING HIS TENURE OF SERVICE AS U.S. 
              REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED STATES

    Mr. Bolton.  Thank you, Chairman Lugar, Senator Biden.
    I am honored to appear before you today as President Bush's 
nominee to be U.S. Permanent Representative to the United 
Nations. I'm grateful for your consideration, and I look 
forward to discussing the critical leadership role that the 
United States plays in the United Nations.
    I'd like to thank Senator Warner, who would have been here, 
as you suggested, had the schedule not changed, and my wife 
Gretchen, who is here with me today.
    I do have a longer statement, Senator, if I could, I'd 
submit for the record, and I'll just read a shorter version of 
it.
    The Chairman.  It will be published in the record in full.
    Mr. Bolton.  Mr. Chairman, I am grateful for the 
opportunities that I have had to work with this committee over 
the years. This is the fourth time I have appeared before this 
committee in a confirmation hearing. If confirmed, I pledge to 
fulfill the President's vision of working in close partnership 
with the United Nations.
    The United States is committed to the success of the United 
Nations, and we view the U.N. as an important component of our 
diplomacy. As the President stated before the U.N. General 
Assembly last September, ``Let history show that, in a decisive 
decade, members of the United Nations did not grow weary in our 
duties or waver in meeting them.''
    The Secretary has made this a top priority, as well. She 
was unequivocal in her remarks, and I quote, ``The American 
people respect the idealism that sparked the creation of the 
United Nations, and we share the U.N.'s unshakeable support for 
human dignity. At this time of great opportunity and great 
promise, the charge to the international community is clear. 
We, who are on the right side of freedom's divide, have an 
obligation to help those who were unlucky enough to be born on 
the wrong side of that divide. The hard work of freedom is a 
task of generations, yet it is also urgent work that cannot be 
deferred. Now, more than ever, the U.N. must play a critical 
role as it strives to fulfill the dreams and hopes and 
aspirations of its original promise to save succeeding 
generations from the scourge of war, to reaffirm faith in 
fundamental human rights, and to promote social progress and 
better standards of life in larger freedom.''
    If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with this 
committee to forge a stronger relationship between the United 
States and the United Nations, which depends critically on 
American leadership. Such leadership, in turn, must rest upon 
broad bipartisan support in Congress. It must be earned by 
putting to rest skepticism that so many feel about the U.N. 
system.
    Through the course of three decades of public service, both 
in and out of government, I have learned that this consensus is 
not only essential, but possible. Working together in a spirit 
of bipartisan cooperation, I believe we can take important 
steps to restore confidence in the United Nations.
    Mr. Chairman, we are at a critical juncture, and I fully 
share the sentiments that you expressed in 1997 when you 
remarked, and I quote, ``It is time to decide if we want a 
strong and viable United Nations that can serve United States' 
interests, or a United Nations that is crippled by insolvency 
and hobbled by controversy and uncertainty.''
    Mr. Chairman, there are four priorities that I believe are 
important to pursue if confirmed as U.S. Representative to the 
U.N. One priority is to strengthen and build institutions that 
serve as the cornerstone of freedom in nascent democracies. Mr. 
Chairman, we should never underestimate the impact of free and 
fair elections on a country. I look forward, if confirmed, to 
working with relevant U.N. agencies to enable them to 
contribute further to the growth of democratic institutions in 
countries freed from the bonds of oppression.
    I also look forward to working with you on President Bush's 
request for $10 million in the fiscal year 2006 budget to set 
up a democracy fund within the United Nations. I'm grateful to 
Secretary General Annan for endorsing the President's proposal 
in his new report in U.N. reform.
    While the U.N. has had its successes in the human-rights 
field, there have been problems, as well, such as the United 
Nations Commission on Human Rights. For too long, some of the 
most egregious violators of human rights have undercut UNHRC's 
principles and its effectiveness. The consequence, as Secretary 
General Annan has said, is that the Commission's important work 
has, and I quote, ``been increasingly undermined by its 
declining credibility and professionalism,'' close quote. We 
must work with our friends and allies to keep those who would 
usurp the moral authority of this Commission off of it, and to 
send clear and strong signals that we will not shy away from 
naming human-rights violators.
    We must work to galvanize the General Assembly to focus its 
attention on issues of true importance. Sadly, there have been 
times when the General Assembly has gone off track, such as 
with the abominable Resolution 3379, equating Zionism with 
racism. I am proud to have been an active player in getting 
this resolution repealed.
    Mr. Chairman, a second priority, should I be confirmed will 
be stemming the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to 
ensure that terrorist organizations and the world's most 
dangerous regimes are unable to threaten the United States, our 
friends, and our allies. As Under Secretary of State for Arms 
Control and International Security, I have worked hard to 
promote effective multilateral action to curb the flow of 
dangerous weapons. As you know, I served as the lead U.S. 
negotiator in the creation of the G8 Global Partnership Against 
the Proliferation of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, 
which will add an additional $10 billion over ten years in 
Nunn-Lugar-type programs.
    In the case of Libya, I had the opportunity to work in 
close consultation with our British colleagues in diplomatic 
efforts to secure the verifiable elimination of Libyan weapons 
of mass destruction. I also helped build a coalition of more 
than 60 countries to help combat the spread of dangerous 
weapons through President Bush's Proliferation Security 
Initiative.
    I have no doubt that these efforts played a critical role 
in enabling the United States to lead the Security Council to 
pass Resolution 1540, first suggested by President Bush in his 
speech to the General Assembly in September 2003. This 
resolution calls upon ``all member states to fulfill their 
obligations in relation to arms control and disarmament, and to 
prevent proliferation in all its aspects of all weapons of mass 
destruction.''
    Resolution 1540 was the first of its kind focusing on WMD 
proliferation. I am proud that our strong leadership 
contributed to its unanimous adoption. I'm happy to report 
that, as of March 15, over 80 countries have submitted reports 
required by the resolution, outlining their plans to enact and 
implement measures to stop WMD proliferation. I look forward to 
working with Security Council members to achieve 100 percent 
compliance with the resolution.
    A third priority that I would pursue, if confirmed, is 
supporting the global war on terror. As we all learned on 
September the 11th, 2001, no one is safe from the devastating 
effects of terrorists intent on harming innocent people. 
Confronting and triumphing in the global war on terror remains 
the central priority of the Bush administration. To win this 
war requires long-term cooperation with all like-minded 
nations.
    The President is firmly committed to working with the 
United Nations to make this shared goal of the civilized world 
a reality. As he noted in his speech to the U.N. General 
Assembly in September 2003, ``All governments that support 
terror are complicit in a war against civilization. No 
government should ignore the threat of terror, because to look 
the other way gives terrorists the chance to regroup, recruit, 
and prepare. And all nations that fight terror as if the lives 
of their own people depend on it will earn the favorable 
judgement of history.''
    The United Nations has taken positive steps to support the 
war on terror, but more, of course, remains to be done. In the 
wake of September the 11th, we have been actively encouraging 
member states to become parties to the U.N. conventions on 
terrorism. I have been personally involved, in the past four 
years, as well, in working to complete the negotiations on a 
Nuclear Terrorism Convention. We must built upon Security 
Council Resolution 1368, passed one day after the tragic events 
of September 11, and which, for the first time, classified 
every act of international terrorism as a threat to 
international peace and security.
    We must also work together to help member states build 
capacities to combat terrorism, as outlined in Resolution 1373, 
passed on September 28th, 2001. This resolution obligates all 
U.N. member states to use their domestic laws and courts to 
keep terrorists from sheltering resources or finding safe 
havens anywhere in the world and to cooperate in investigating, 
prosecuting, and preventing terrorism wherever it may spring 
up.
    The U.N. Security Council is monitoring compliance with the 
requirements of this resolution, with impressive results. To 
date, 142 countries have issued orders freezing the assets of 
suspected terrorists and terrorist organizations. Accounts 
totaling almost 105 million have been blocked; 34 million in 
the U.S., and over twice that amount in other countries.
    Overall, Resolution 1373 has been the framework for 
unprecedented international consultation and coordination 
against terrorism, including the provision of technical 
assistance to governments that want to do the right thing, but 
may not have the specialized expertise necessary.
    Mr. Chairman, a fourth priority is addressing humanitarian 
crises. It is not just the scourge of war we must confront. We 
must confront the scourge of disease and affliction, such as 
HIV/AIDS, through strong U.S. leadership in the United Nations 
system. Along with the President's emergency plan for AIDS 
relief, a five-year, $15 billion investment, we are strong 
supporters of the U.N. declaration of commitment on HIV/AIDS 
and are working to ensure resources from the global fund for 
AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis are available to countries most 
severely affected by the disease.
    I will make it a key priority, as well, to improve programs 
that have been involved in the tsunami relief effort so that we 
can enhance and build upon structures and institutions already 
in place.
    More broadly, we must confront the scourge of poverty, 
which leaves hundreds of millions on the margins of societies 
scrambling for food or shelter, with little opportunity to 
improve their lives or those of their children.
    We must also make sure that the U.N. acts effectively in 
promoting the economic and social advancement of all people. 
Policy reform, institution-building, appropriate technology 
transfer, and private-sector involvement are critical for 
sustained economic growth. We will continue to support the 
contributions of women to economic growth and development, as 
well as their critical role in the growth of democratic 
institutions worldwide.
    The U.N., in conjunction with U.S. leadership, has 
recognized that the traditional models of development have been 
insufficient to achieve development objectives and better the 
lives of people around the world. The Partnership for Maternal, 
Newborn, and Child Health, the Global Alliance for Vaccinations 
and Immunizations, and Rollback Malaria are all examples of how 
U.N. agencies, such as UNICEF, are working alongside the 
private sector, charitable organizations, and foundations such 
as the Gates Foundation, to leverage resources, generate new 
activities, and impact the lives of millions in developing 
countries. We support these new and innovative structures that 
rely less on bureaucracy and more on putting resources into the 
field, aiding results-based performance standards.
    This brings me to the issue of accountability and reform. 
The administration welcomes the Secretary General's new report 
on U.N. reform, and we are examining carefully its many 
recommendations. I hope to work closely with the Secretary 
General and my colleagues to bring greater accountability and 
transparency to the United Nations.
    On a personal note, I should mention that Secretary General 
Kofi Annan and I have had a relationship that goes back 16 
years, based on mutual respect and friendship, and I was 
pleased to receive a call from him last week.
    The key is to implement changes to the U.N. structure and 
management, including budget, personnel, and oversight reforms. 
Scandals such as those that we have witnessed with the Oil-for-
Food Program, undermine, not only America's confidence in the 
United Nations, but the confidence of the international 
community, as well. They must not recur. And we must never lose 
sight of the reality that ultimately it is member governments 
that must take responsibility for the U.N.'s actions, whether 
they be successes or failures.
    Mr. Chairman, let me close by reiterating what I said at 
the beginning. If confirmed, I will work closely and 
effectively with this committee in both houses of Congress. The 
President and Secretary Rice are committed to building a 
strong, effective United Nations. The United Nations affords us 
an opportunity to move our policies forward together with unity 
of purpose. Now, more than ever, the U.N. must play a critical 
role as it strives to fulfill the dreams and hopes and 
aspirations of its original promise to save succeeding 
generations from the scourge of war, to reaffirm faith in 
fundamental human rights, and to promote social progress and 
better standards of life in larger freedom. This effort demands 
decisive American leadership, broad bipartisan support, and the 
backing of the American public. I will undertake to do my 
utmost to uphold the confidence that the President, Secretary 
Rice, and the Senate will have placed in me.
    Thank you, and I would welcome the opportunity to answer 
your questions. [The prepared statement of Mr. Bolton follows:]
    The Chairman.  Thank you very much, Secretary Bolton, for 
your opening statement.
    I'd like to mention that Mrs. Bolton is with us today, on 
the front row, and we're delighted that you are here, and we 
appreciate your coming to the hearing.
    Now, as I mentioned earlier, and prematurely, we'll have a 
ten-minute round of questioning, and we'll begin the clock now, 
as I commence my ten minutes of questioning. Then I will yield 
to Senator Biden.
    Secretary Bolton, as Senator Biden has mentioned in his 
opening statement, prior to this hearing staff on both sides of 
the aisle have visited with Mr. Carl Ford. Carl Ford was 
supervisor for Christian Westermann, who is an INR biological 
warfare analyst. Now, I mention this because the allegation has 
been made that, in a speech that you were preparing for the AEI 
on Cuba, and which, I might mention, was on television this 
morning in its entirety, that you wished to change some 
language. Christian Westermann, the analyst, refused to change 
the language. You were severe in your criticism of him. And so, 
herein lies at least what appears to be a major flap for the 
last 90 hours, as Senator Biden has pointed out.
    Now, staff has, in fact, interviewed Mr. Westermann and 
Carl Ford, who will be appearing before the committee, as I 
understand, tomorrow morning, at our hearing at 9:30, Mr. Fred 
Fleitz, the Bolton special assistant, who might know something 
about this, Tom Fingar, the INR Principal Deputy Assistant 
Secretary at the time, Fulton Armstrong, National Intelligence 
Office for Latin America at the NIC at the time, Stuart Cohen, 
Mr. Armstrong's supervisor at the NIC at that time. These 
interviews took place, aside from the Carl Ford interview, 
which Senator Biden has pointed out occurred earlier, on April 
5, the other interviews on April 7 and April 8, and lasted, in 
most cases, for two hours, although the Fingar interview was 
only an hour and a quarter, and 30 minutes devoted to Stuart 
Cohen.
    Now, I mention all of this because, very clearly, there has 
been at least an allegation that pressure was applied, and, as 
Senator Biden suggested, making a transfer, that I think is a 
stretch. But we are very sensitive in this country about 
reports given on Iraq intelligence and how accurate, or how 
comprehensive, our intelligence agencies were, whether anyone 
distorted that, or misused that, or went beyond that 
intelligence with regard to public policy. Nonetheless, you 
were talking about biological warfare in Cuba. Your suggestions 
for change were not accepted. The speech, therefore, did not 
have words that you wanted, but it had the official 
interpretation. And, as a matter of fact, no one was 
discharged, although feelings may have been hurt.
    I raise all of this, in this context, simply to give you an 
opportunity to explain, if you can, what the flap is about. In 
essence, who said what to whom, and for what reason? And if you 
had it to do all over again, would you do it the same way? In 
essence, give your side of the story.
    Mr. Bolton.  Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think that 
the couple of points I'd want to stress from the outset is that 
all of these allegations have been reviewed in the past by the 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and the committee 
found that there was no evidence of any indication of an 
attempt to influence or pressure analysts in their professional 
conclusions.
    Second, with respect to the speech, which was in May of 
2002, and was entitled ``Beyond the Axis of Evil,'' it was a 
discussion of WMD efforts in a number of countries--really had 
preparations begun earlier in the year, just a few months after 
September the 11th, when I think we all conclude that, however 
horrible September the 11th was, it could have been far worse 
had the terrorists had access to chemical, biological, or 
nuclear weapons. And it was our feeling in the administration 
that we wanted to talk seriously to the American public about 
these kinds of threats.
    The intelligence community gave appropriate clearance to 
declassified language and to the text of the speech itself. The 
speech was cleared throughout the State Department, including 
the Office of the Deputy Secretary, throughout the interagency. 
Assistant Secretaries Ford and Otto Reich used essentially the 
same declassified language in testimony in March, before the 
speech; in June, after the speech; and elsewhere.
    And I wanted to say, also, Mr. Chairman, as you say, there 
have been a lot of interviews and transcripts and documents 
produced. I haven't seen all of them. But I want to say to the 
committee, right here, unequivocally, I'd be happy if all of 
that were made public right now. There are problems with 
classifications. Some of it, I think, we need to be concerned 
about privacy for people who are, sort of, collaterally 
involved, the issues that have to be worked out. Mr. Chairman, 
there is nothing there, there, and I would put it all out on 
the public record. All of it.
    The Chairman.  Well, I would indicate, Secretary Bolton, 
that State Department and CIA representatives stayed with the 
materials as they were made available in the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee offices. There were a number of pages that 
were classified, and that, I think, is an important point. But, 
at the same time, I appreciate your forthcoming desire that all 
of this be made public. And I suspect that that can be 
accommodated.
    Now, I simply want to know, with the specific allegation of 
pressure and discharge and those specific thoughts surrounding 
Mr. Westermann, specifically, what is the case? What happened?
    Mr. Bolton.  I never sought to have Mr. Westermann fired, 
at all. And, in fact, you have e-mail from the Principal Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State for the Intelligence Research 
Bureau the day of the conversation, Tom Fingar; his e-mail to 
me that day that said that Mr. Westermann behavior was, and I 
quote, ``entirely inappropriate,'' close quote. Mr. Fingar 
said, referring to INR, quote, ``We screwed up,'' close quote. 
And he said, twice in a relatively short e-mail, quote, ``It 
won't happen again,'' close quote.
    The Chairman.  Well, I thank you for that clarification. I 
suspect that we will hear more about it throughout the hearing. 
But, at the outset, I wanted to raise it, because it appears to 
me to have been the source, really, of almost half of the 
controversy about your nomination thus far.
    Now, let me get into the second half. What are you going to 
do about reform at the U.N.? You have mentioned specific 
desirable aspects, but clearly one of the rationales given by 
the President, and, even more emphatically, by the Secretary of 
State, is that you are a person who is going to be able to 
bring about reform of the institution so it will be 
strengthened. The United Nations is important for our foreign 
policy. It's more important if, in fact, it's a strong 
organization, with greater integrity, in terms of its 
activities. What do you have in mind as you approach this task?
    Mr. Bolton.  I think there are--analytically, there are 
basically two categories of reform that one can consider. The 
first category is the reform of governance structures in the 
U.N., how the member governments of the U.N. carry out their 
business. The second analytical category, I would call 
management, budget, and personnel, actual operation, actual 
delivery of product from U.N. agencies. And I think that 
there's a lot of work to be done in both categories.
    And I mentioned, in my prepared remarks, the widespread 
feeling, including as shared by Secretary General Kofi Annan 
himself, that the U.N. Human Rights Commission had come close 
to completely crashing. That definitely needs to be fixed.
    We must address, I think, the most important question, 
governance question in the U.N. system, the composition of the 
permanent membership of the Security Council. This is an issue 
that I faced, myself, going back to the first Bush 
administration, when Japan made a very strong case for its 
becoming a permanent member, a case which has grown even 
stronger over the years, and which Secretary Rice commented on 
during her recent trip.
    There are a lot of very complex and competing claims for 
change in the composition of the Security Council. It's going 
to take time to work that out. I think one rule I hope we can 
all agree on one objective to achieve in working on that 
structure is that we not make the Council less effective than 
it is now, and that's going to be, I think, a very arduous 
task.
    I think, just quickly, on the management side, back in the 
first Bush administration I developed a concept called the 
``unitary U.N.,'' which was a way of trying to look at the U.N. 
system as a whole, not bits and pieces; not loosely structured, 
unconnected specialized agencies, but looking at the system as 
a whole to try and rationalize its delivery of services, the 
research that it carries out, the work of the various 
specialized agencies and funds and programs that, on an 
organizational chart, are really quite complex.
    These are some of the things I hope to get into, if 
confirmed, and I think I've had the benefit of, as you 
mentioned, four years of service as Assistant Secretary for 
International Organizations, and the chance to work for the 
U.N. on a pro-bono basis, myself.
    The Chairman.  Thank you for those responses. My time is 
up.
    And I recognize the distinguished Senator from Delaware, 
Senator Biden.
    Senator Biden.  Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    There's a number of things, Mr. Secretary, I'd like to 
discuss with you. I'm going to try to do it in sort of an 
orderly way.
    I will be asking you a number of questions this afternoon, 
and as long as we go, about the issue of trying to have 
professionals removed from--I don't think anybody's ever said 
you tried to have them fired--``have them removed from your 
portfolio,'' I think is the term of art. Did you ever ask 
anyone to remove Mr. Westermann from your portfolio?
    Mr. Bolton.  I think, as the interviews that your staff 
conducted show--and that's one reason why I want to get them 
all out in public--we believe Mr. Westermann had behaved in an 
underhanded fashion. And I think I--as my assistant mentioned 
to your staff, I said to him at the time, ``I don't care if you 
disagree with me, just don't do it behind my back.'' I 
mentioned it----
    Senator Biden.  Well, that's not my question. I only have 
ten minutes, so I don't want you to be a Senator and filibuster 
me.
    Did you attempt to have him removed from your portfolio?
    Mr. Bolton.  I mentioned it to Mr. Fingar. I may have 
mentioned it to one or two other people. But then I shrugged my 
shoulders, and I moved on. He was----
    Senator Biden.  So the answer is, yes, you did.
    Mr. Bolton.  And he was not moved, and I did not----
    Senator Biden.  Okay, and that's all I wanted--I just 
wanted to make sure we're talking about the same thing.
    Let me talk about the U.N. I'll go back to----
    Mr. Bolton.  I, in no sense, sought to have any discipline 
imposed on Mr. Westermann.
    Senator Biden.  Other than removed from your----
    Mr. Bolton.  No.
    Senator Biden. --portfolio.
    Mr. Bolton.  No. I said, to at least one of his 
supervisors, that I specifically had no intention whatever to 
cause him any ill will, but I----
    Senator Biden.  I'm not suggesting that.
    Mr. Bolton.  --had lost trust and confidence in him. And I 
think in any professional relationship, you need trust and 
confidence.
    Senator Biden.  No, I got that. I just want to make sure 
our terminology is--we're all using the same terminology when I 
talk about this with you this afternoon.
    But let me speak about the U.N., if I may, for a moment. As 
you know, Chairman Lugar and I have been working to improve the 
Federal Civilian Response to post-conflict reconstruction and 
stabilization crises that we now face, and will face in the 
future, and we strongly support the new Office of the 
Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization of the State 
Department, which, really, the overwhelming credit should go to 
my colleague from Indiana. The mission statement of that office 
outlines, and I quote, ``Failing in post-conflict states pose 
one of the greatest national, international security--and 
international security challenges of our day. Struggling states 
can provide breeding grounds for terrorism, crime, trafficking, 
and human catastrophes, and can destabilize an entire region.''
    Now, that's the statement, the mission statement of the 
office. You have stated, on the record, unrelated to that 
office, before--and, as a matter of fact, in your capacity--
well, I believe the date was in '97. You said, quote, ``We 
should be relegated--what should be relegated to history's junk 
pile at the first opportunity is this chimerical Clinton notion 
of U.N.,'' quote, ``peaceful enforcement and nation-building 
and enlargement. Those unworldly concepts have resulted in 
American personnel and resources being committed to U.N. 
operations far removed from vital American interests.'' And 
that was in the ``Creation, Fall--Rise and Fall of the United 
Nations'' speech I believe you delivered.
    How do you define, in that context, ``America's vital 
interests''?
    Mr. Bolton.  Well, I don't--I don't think you have that 
quote accurately, Senator, but I won't slow down----
    Senator Biden.  Well, no, that's very important. I do not 
want to, in any way, misrepresent what you say. Let's get 
everything really straight.
    Mr. Bolton.  And I would----
    Senator Biden.  Because now--with all due respect, I don't 
want to--I don't want to put you in a spot to say something you 
didn't say. ``Creation, Fall, and Rise of the United Nations,'' 
John R. Bolton--where was this speech made? Pardon me? And 
what's the name of the book? It's chapter 3 of a book entitled 
``Delusions of Grandeur.'' And I want to read it again so 
we're--
    It says, ``Traditional peacekeeping, together with the 
often important role of agencies of the U.N. system play in 
international delivery of humanitarian assistance can work and 
should be continued. Although peacekeeping has only been 
limited--has had only limited use throughout much of U.N. 
history, it is an option that we should preserve for 
appropriate use, such as U.N. disengagement observer force 
along the Golan Heights, between Israel and Syria. What should 
be relegated to history's junk pile at the first opportunity, 
however, are''--am I pronouncing it correctly?--c-h-i-m-e-r-i-
c-a-l, chimerical?
    Mr. Bolton.  Chimerical.
    Senator Biden. --``Clinton notions of U.N.''--internal 
quotes, ``'peace enforcement,''' comma, quote, ``'nation-
building,''' comma, ``and,'' quote, ``'enlargement''' period. 
``Those unworldly concepts have resulted in American personnel 
and resources being committed to U.N. operations far removed 
from vital American interests. These concepts are based on 
misreadings of what happened in the world and in the U.N. in 
the late '80s and early '90s,'' end of quote.
    Now, my question to you is--and here's the cover--title of 
the book, ``Delusions of Grandeur, the United Nations and 
Global Intervention,'' edited by Ted Galen Carpenter, ``Why We 
Shouldn't Give the U.N. More Power,'' Cato, 1997.
    Now, my question is, to you--and I'm going to run out of 
time very quickly, obviously--and let me be more precise--the 
United States strongly endorses the recent U.N. Security 
Council resolution to send 10,000 U.N. peacekeepers to Sudan to 
support North-South peace agreement. Is this an example of an 
operation far removed from the vital interests of the United 
States?
    Mr. Bolton.  Absolutely not. And, in fact, in the passage 
you read, the second time you read, you referred--you read what 
I had written about the effectiveness, the historical 
effectiveness of U.N. peacekeeping operations, citing the 
example of the U.N. disengagement observer force along the 
Golan Heights.
    At least part of the distinction I was making there was 
between peacekeeping, as that term has been historically 
defined in U.N. operations, and peace enforcement. 
Traditionally, peacekeeping relies on the consent of the 
parties to the conflict, the consent to U.N. involvement, and 
U.N. neutrality, as between the parties, and the very limited 
rules of engagement for the peacekeepers, essentially being 
authorized to use force only as a means of self defense.
    By contrast, peace enforcement, as envisaged conceptually, 
would give the--would give U.N. forces a role without the 
consent of the parties. The U.N. would not act in a neutral 
fashion, and the U.N. rules of engagement would be much more 
robust.
    Senator Biden.  Which is----
    Mr. Bolton.  The situation in the Sudan is a peacekeeping 
role, as traditionally defined. We have a historic agreement 
between the government in Khartoum and the rebels in the south 
that Senator Danforth and many others worked on. The force to 
be deployed, pursuant to the recently adopted resolution, I 
would say, is clearly a traditional U.N. peacekeeping 
operation.
    Senator Biden.  Now, is that--do you support it, or not? I 
thought I--I thought you said peacekeeping and peace--what's 
the other alternative?
    Mr. Bolton.  The analytical terms----
    Senator Biden.  It's enforcement, right?
    Mr. Bolton.  --that are implied are peace-----
    Senator Biden.  Keeping and enforcing.
    Mr. Bolton.  ---keeping versus peace enforcement. And those 
imply separate kinds of operations. The force to be deployed in 
Sudan is a peacekeeping force.
    Senator Biden.  And do you support the peacekeeping----
    Mr. Bolton.  Absolutely.
    Senator Biden.  If it had been a peace-enforcement 
operation?
    Mr. Bolton.  Well, I think that's a hypothetical, because--
--
    Senator Biden.  Okay, take Kosovo.
    Mr. Bolton.  But it's an important----
    Senator Biden.  Let's take Kosovo. Now, it didn't involve 
the U.N. It involved NATO.
    Mr. Bolton.  Right.
    Senator Biden.  In terms of Kosovo. That was a--would that 
be--if that had been a U.N. operation, would that have been 
called a peace-enforcement operation?
    Mr. Bolton.  That would have been called peace enforcement, 
I think, that's correct. And that's--I think that's one reason 
why it never--it never achieved the approval of the Security 
Council.
    Senator Biden.  That's true. Now, would you not have 
supported that?
    Mr. Bolton.  I did not feel, at the time, that that was an 
appropriate action.
    Senator Biden.  Was--what was the U.N. role in Korea? Was 
that peace enforcement or peacekeeping?
    Mr. Bolton.  Well, the--that was very definitely a kind of 
peace enforcement, but one that the U.N. has only engaged in 
essentially twice in its history, once in Korea, when the 
authorization to use force was adopted, because the Soviet 
Union was boycotting the Security Council in protest of the 
continued presence of the Republic of China holding the Chinese 
permanent seat. When the Russians--Soviets realized that their 
absence from the Council and their inability to veto 
resolutions was allowing coalition resistance to the North 
Korean invasion, they returned, and that ended the 
effectiveness of the Security Council in the Korean incident.
    The second, of course, was in the first President Bush's 
administration, in the immediate aftermath of the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait, when President Bush and Secretary Baker led 
the successful effort through a series of Security Council 
resolutions, ultimately resulting in Resolution 678, which was 
only the second authorization to use force in U.N. Security 
Council history.
    Senator Biden.  So when you say that--is peace enforcement 
associated with nation-building?
    Mr. Bolton.  No, I think it's very separate concepts.
    Senator Biden.  And so, the peace enforcement and nation-
building and enlargement are things we should stay out of, not 
be involved with, with the United Nations. Is that right?
    Mr. Bolton.  I think they're very--I think they're very 
separate contexts. I was writing, at that point, specifically 
critiquing the Clinton administration policy, yes, sir.
    Senator Biden.  I'll come back to that.
    Thank you very much.
    The Chairman.  Thank you, Senator Biden.
    Senator Hagel?
    Senator Hagel.  Mr. Chairman, thank you.
    Secretary Bolton, welcome. Thank you for agreeing to take 
on a big job if this committee and the United States Senate 
work its will and send you to that big job. We appreciate what 
you're doing.
    I have been a United States Senator who has strongly 
supported the United Nations. It's an imperfect institution, 
like all institutions are, but if the world had not had this 
body over the last almost 60 years, I don't think we would have 
seen the kind of progress in the world that we've seen that's 
occurred in a complicated post-World War II community. Much yet 
to be accomplished, and you've noted some of those challenges 
in your statement. But the entire purpose, the focus on the 
United Nations, as you have also alluded to, was to bring the 
world community together in common purpose to deal with common 
challenges in a common-interest way. It hasn't always worked. 
There have been difficulties. Obviously, reform is a dimension 
of institutions, every institution, that is always in play.
    And I want to start with the reform part of this and then 
work our way down into a couple of the specific questions I 
have for you.
    You noted in your four principles, which I agree with, 
where you would focus your priorities, where America should 
focus its priorities, working with our allies at the United 
Nations. And you talk about reform. You talk about the 
Secretary General, who you have a relationship with. Give me 
some sense of the larger context of reforming that institution, 
without getting into a lot of the specifics, because I suspect 
we will get into those when Senator Coleman's time is here. We 
will talk about Oil-for-Food and other issues. But I'm 
interested in your philosophy about the future of the United 
Nations. How should it be reformed? Less power? More power? 
More engagement? Less engagement? Give this committee some 
sense of your own feeling about that issue.
    Mr. Bolton.  Well, I think that there is enormous potential 
in the institution that is often not allowed to be developed, 
in part because of the attitude of member governments. And this 
is one of the points, I suppose, will come to a little bit 
later in some statements I've made over the years. But I 
alluded to this in my opening statement. I think it's 
important. The United States puts an enormous amount of 
resources at the State Department and its missions around the 
world to working on U.N. matters. And I think that it's because 
we believe that, as the largest paying member government, that 
we have a big responsibility for what goes on in the United 
Nations.
    I think, though, even within the United States and in a 
number of other countries, there's sometimes the temptation to 
say, ``Well, if we, sort of, give a problem to the United 
States--to the United Nations, it takes it off our plate, and 
that people can say, 'Well, the United Nations is handling 
it.'''
    Fundamentally, talking about any element of reform is to 
recognize that the United Nations is made up of member 
governments, and the United Nations does what member 
governments want it to do. And reform in the U.N. means member 
governments have to take their responsibilities seriously. 
That's something I think that we have historically done here. I 
think it's important that all member governments do that.
    I think that in implementing, then, the policies that we're 
trying to pursue, that you have to take into account what's 
possible in the real world, and you have to be realistic about 
what can be done through, not just the United Nations, but 
through any institution, any international organization we've 
set up. And I think that the sustained attention to these kinds 
of issues is required.
    This is nothing that can be overcome in a matter of a few 
months, or even a few years; this is something that's going to 
take a lot of work over a long period of time.
    Senator Hagel.  Thank you.
    Let me ask about a specific area of the United Nations, the 
International Atomic Energy Agency. I'd like to hear your 
thoughts about the relevancy, the effectiveness of the IAEA, 
Director Baradei, what you think of him. I think most who are 
following your nomination are aware--certainly, this panel is 
aware--that as we have seen the results of more of our internal 
intelligence reports, the Senator Intelligence Committee, the 
recent Silverman-Robb Commission report, the 9/11 Report, what 
we've seen is that Hans Blix and the United Nations inspectors 
had it right in Iraq; we had it wrong. I would like you to work 
your way into that. How could they, the United Nations 
inspectors, be so right and our Intelligence Committee be so 
wrong? And that cuts to the bigger question of the future of 
the IAEA. Do you support the IAEA? Do you support Mr. Baradei's 
continuation as director?
    Mr. Bolton.  Well, perhaps I could address the IAEA 
question first, and then try to come to your larger question. I 
have been, since the first Bush administration, a supporter of 
the IAEA. I remember the first President Bush, in the hours 
before giving one of his speeches to the General Assembly, 
saying how much he wanted to strengthen the hand of the IAEA. 
It's been a phrase that has stayed in my mind ever since then. 
And I think we've seen, just in the first four years of this 
administration, that the level of cooperation with the IAEA on 
the question of North Korea, before North Korea withdrew from 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty, was very good.
    I think that we have had a number of transactions with the 
IAEA involving Iran, involving sharing some pretty sensitive 
information that's been very helpful. We have maintained our 
contributions to the IAEA. We are--we've had numerous voluntary 
contributions to the IAEA's work.
    Our feeling on the Director General is that we support the 
longstanding policy of two terms for Director Generals. That's 
been the policy. We'll--there are no--currently, there are no 
candidates to oppose him, so we'll have to see how that policy 
plays out. But we've said repeatedly that's not a policy aimed 
at him or anybody else, it's a policy that we think is good for 
the U.N. system as a whole.
    On your larger question, I don't think there's any doubt 
that what we've learned about--what we've learned post-war in 
Iraq about our intelligence is the kind of lesson that we need 
to address, and in a very serious way, in a very urgent manner.
    I think the Silverman-Robb Commission--and I haven't--I 
don't want to say I've carefully studied all of it, including 
the classified portions, but I have read large parts of it, and 
particularly the parts on Iraq, and I think that the Silverman-
Robb Commission really captured quite well many of the failings 
that, not just our intelligence community, but many of us had.
    And I would describe the principal insight that they had 
that I think is just very clarifying of what the problem was, 
that reasonable hypotheses about what Saddam was up to and what 
Iraq's capabilities were became hardened in the minds of the 
intelligence community over the years into assumptions and then 
presumptions that were not subjected to repeated scrutiny and 
verification by hard facts, and that then were not really 
corroborated in more recent years by hard intel on the ground 
in Iraq.
    So there are two basic failings, among others. One, the 
belief, the reasonable belief, that Saddam Hussein's inability, 
for example, to account for large stocks of chemical-weapon 
agent that he had declared in the aftermath of the first Gulf 
War, his inability to prove he had destroyed those stocks led 
to the hypothesis that they still existed.
    Senator Hagel.  May I interrupt you? And I apologize for 
this, but I have very little time left.
    Let me ask you, in following along with your point here, 
How could the United Nations inspectors be right? And why 
didn't we listen to them? Which cuts right to the question that 
you answered about the credibility, and are they important, 
should we continue to strengthen them? But following along with 
your point here, how did we miss it, and they told us?
    Mr. Bolton.  Yeah.
    Senator Hagel.  In fact, I was briefed many times by the 
U.N. inspectors. And so, how could we miss it?
    Mr. Bolton.  I would say two things, if I could. And I see 
your time is short here.
    On the chemical-weapons point, Hans Blix, himself, took 
seriously the absence of records that Saddam had actually 
destroyed the chemical weapons. And he said--it was reported 
publicly, he had said to the Iraqis, ``Look, this stuff isn't 
marmalade. You must have records that you've destroyed it.'' 
Now, that--it still hasn't been found. And his conclusion, that 
the hypothesis that the chemical agents still existed was 
wrong, was probably right.
    On the IAEA, you know, the IAEA was pretty clear that they 
did not see evidence of a revived uranium enrichment program. 
And contrary to what some press reports have indicated, I think 
we believe that that was right. It's very hard to hide an 
extensive uranium enrichment program. It's much easier in the 
case of chemical or biological weapons, because of the inherent 
dual-use nature of that sort of thing. But I don't really think 
that the IAEA conclusions on the absence of an ongoing Iraqi 
uranium enrichment program were really disputed by the 
administration.
    Senator Hagel.  Thank you.
    The Chairman.  Thank you very much, Senator Hagel.
    Senator Sarbanes?
    Senator Sarbanes.  Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Bolton, what's your position on the Law of the Sea 
Treaty?
    Mr. Bolton.  The administration has submitted the Law of 
the Sea Treaty as one of its priorities, and I support that.
    Senator Sarbanes.  That's simply because it's an 
administration position, or does that represent your own view 
of it?
    Mr. Bolton.  Well, I haven't personally read the Law of the 
Sea Treaty. I don't think I've ever read it, to be honest with 
you. The issues that--concerning the Law of the Sea Treaty that 
came within the cognizance of bureaus operating under my 
supervision this time, the--basically, Law of the Sea aspects 
dealing with military use of international waters--the Pentagon 
approved, and I had no reason to dispute them.
    Senator Sarbanes.  Well, now, in an article in a book 
entitled ``Understanding Unilateralism in American Foreign 
Relations,'' published by the Royal Institute of International 
Affairs in London, you called the Law of the Sea Treaty not 
only undesirable as a policy, but also illegitimate methods of 
forcing fundamental policy changes on the United States outside 
the customary political process. Am I correct about that?
    Mr. Bolton.  I don't--I don't have the article in front of 
me, Senator. It was--this was a Chatham House publication?
    Senator Sarbanes.  I assume so, yes.
    Mr. Bolton.  Yeah. The issue that I believe led President 
Reagan to oppose the Law of the Sea Treaty in the first 
instance was the--were the provisions having to do with the 
undersea mining issue that were--and that's why President 
Reagan withdrew American support for it. Those issues were 
addressed later during the Clinton administration, and reviewed 
by people, not including myself. During this administration, a 
decision on--the decision was that the provisions had been 
adequately fixed. I----
    Senator Sarbanes.  But you wrote this article in 2000.
    Mr. Bolton.  Right.
    Senator Sarbanes.  That's after these problems had been 
addressed, by your own statement, just now.
    Mr. Bolton.  Right. I have not----
    Senator Sarbanes.  Well, if the problems had been 
addressed, which you just suggested made the treaty acceptable, 
how could you, at that point, be writing that it was a--not 
only undesirable as a policy, but also illegitimate methods of 
forcing fundamental policy changes on the United States outside 
the customary political process?
    Mr. Bolton.  That was my opinion at the time, based on what 
I knew at the time.
    Senator Sarbanes.  But you just told me that you were --
that you thought the problems that President Reagan found had 
been addressed by that point, correct?
    Mr. Bolton.  The analysis----
    Senator Sarbanes.  You were still holding to a position 
regarding this as illegitimate and undesirable.
    Mr. Bolton.  I think what I said, Senator--I hope that I 
said this--if I didn't, if I was unclear, I apologize--I think 
what I said was, those who had--those in the Bush 
administration who reviewed these particular provisions of the 
charter--and that did not include me, because they were not 
part of my responsibility--concluded that the issues had been 
successfully addressed, and that, therefore, they were to 
recommend to the President that he support the treaty.
    I've not independently gone back into that, because I've 
been busy with other things, frankly. But if it's the opinion 
of my colleagues in the administration who are expert in these 
matters that it's satisfactory, I accept that.
    Senator Sarbanes.  What's your view of the NGOs and their 
involvement in the U.N. system?
    Mr. Bolton.  Well, I think that, in terms of delivery of 
humanitarian services, and in disaster situations, in work in 
international development, my own experience, in two and a half 
years of the U.S. Agency for International Development has 
given me a view that they can be--they can be very effective.
    Senator Sarbanes.  Well, now, in an article you wrote for 
the Oxford Companion, ``The Politics of the World,'' in 2001, 
you stated, and I quote, ``The penetration into the U.N. system 
by NGOs has had profoundly undemocratic consequences by giving 
some, but not all, interest groups a second bite at 
international decision-making.'' How do you square that with 
the--what you just said about----
    Mr. Bolton.  I think----
    Senator Sarbanes. --the role of the NGOs?
    Mr. Bolton.  It's two separate issues, Senator. The 
question of the role of the NGOs goes to--and there's a huge 
literature on this, both in the academic world and in the 
policy world--that goes to how decision-making in an 
organization composed of member governments should be made, 
that the--in my judgement, member governments should make the 
decisions, member governments should set the policy. NGOs, in 
democratic societies, have every right, and should be 
encouraged, to make their voices known within their democratic 
societies. And through elections, and through all of the 
political processes that we're familiar with, governments come 
up with policies. Those policies are then negotiated out by the 
governments that are members of the international organization.
    The second-bite-at-the-apple concept comes when some NGOs 
that are perhaps disappointed in their ability to influence 
policy within their own--within their own government, try and 
come back at it again. They are not accountable to anybody. 
Nobody elected them. That's what the basic problem of 
democratic theory is there.
    Senator Sarbanes.  Well, then how would they--I thought, at 
the outset, you wanted to encourage the NGOs' involvement in 
the U.N. process.
    Mr. Bolton.  I think, as I said--I hope I was clear; let me 
try it again--the NGOs, as deliverers of services providing 
humanitarian assistance, for example, in the case of the recent 
tsunami and other natural disasters, in civil conflicts, their 
contribution in the longer-term effort of international 
development, as recipients of grants or contracts by USAID, The 
World Bank, or the U.N. Development Program--I think these are 
all very desirable, and should be encouraged. The issue is not 
their participation in the economic and social and humanitarian 
operational side of things. It's the democratic theory question 
about whether they should have influence outside of, and above, 
member governments.
    Senator Sarbanes.  In other words, their influence has to 
go through the member governments? Is that the way you see it?
    Mr. Bolton.  Well, I think, as a matter of democratic 
theory, within the United States we have interest groups that 
cover the entire spectrum, and they can, and should, under our 
system of liberty, make their influence felt any way they 
choose, that they can participate in elections, they sponsor 
seminars, they engage in public education. And out of this 
process that we're all familiar with comes a United States 
Government position.
    Senator Sarbanes.  Well, now, it's not just the U.S. 
Government. You took the further--you made the statement to the 
U.N. Conference on the Illicit Trade and Small Arms and Light 
Weapons, in 2001, ``We do not support the promotion of 
international advocacy activity by international or 
nongovernmental organizations.'' Is that your position?
    Mr. Bolton.  That was a statement that was cleared within 
the United States Government and reflected our view of what the 
U.N.'s role in the small arms and light weapons arena should 
be. That is a reflection of----
    Senator Sarbanes.  Let me broaden it beyond that issue. Is 
that your position with respect to advocacy activity by 
international or nongovernmental organizations?
    Mr. Bolton.  Senator, that was in the context of a larger 
statement, which, again, I don't have in front of me, but which 
explained the circumstances that we faced at that conference, 
in 2001.
    Senator Sarbanes.  Well, I'm trying to get you to go 
outside of that particular issue. You're not prepared to do 
that, I take it?
    Mr. Bolton.  Not without the document in front of me, 
Senator. You know, that----
    Senator Sarbanes.  What's your general position on the 
NGOs----
    Mr. Bolton.  Well, I think people-----
    Senator Sarbanes. --and advocacy?
    Mr. Bolton.  I mean, I think anybody is free to advocate 
anytime they want.
    Senator Sarbanes.  But you don't think they--you think it 
counters democratic theory if they do that, not working through 
the country, is that correct?
    Mr. Bolton.  I think--well, I think this is an important 
question of democratic theory.
    Senator Sarbanes.  All right, now, who speaks for people in 
undemocratic countries?
    Mr. Bolton.  The issue----
    Senator Sarbanes.  If the NGOs can't present an advocacy 
position because they have to work through their government, 
who speaks for the people in undemocratic countries?
    Mr. Bolton.  Senator, the context--well, I think it's 
permissible for them to speak for people in nondemocratic 
countries. The precise context I was speaking of was in 
democratic countries, where NGOs participate in the broad 
political process. I'm not confining it to the electoral 
process. They participate in the broad political process. The 
result is a policy that the government, of which they are 
citizens, espouses. And then the question is whether, having 
participated in that democratic process, they get a second bite 
of the apple.
    Senator Sarbanes.  Well, now, in the past, the U.S. has 
been at the forefront of encouraging the United Nations and 
other multilateral institutions actually to invite and welcome 
the participation of civil-society groups, albeit outside the 
formal decision-making process. I take it, from what you're 
telling me today, you have difficulty with that encouragement.
    Mr. Bolton.  I have difficulty when international 
organizations try to influence opinion within democratic 
societies. And I think some of the groups, not all of them, 
have that in mind. That's been very evident in some of their 
public statements. And I do think this is a--this is an 
important question of democratic theory. Responsible 
government, representative government, rests on constitutional 
structures that define who participates, and how. And, for us, 
as Americans, those structures are the foundation of legitimacy 
in government. And I think if those structures are disregarded, 
we have a potential problem.
    Senator Sarbanes.  So would you welcome--I'll close with 
this question, Mr. Chairman; I see the red light is on--would 
you welcome the participation of an NGO in the U.N. process if 
the NGO was speaking on behalf of peoples in an undemocratic 
country?
    Mr. Bolton.  I would not object to that.
    Senator Sarbanes.  You wouldn't.
    Mr. Bolton.  I would not.
    Senator Sarbanes.  Uh-huh. What is it you would object to?
    Mr. Bolton.  The second bite at the apple. In other words, 
the--as I said before--I guess that's about as clear as I can 
be on it.
    Senator Sarbanes.  Would you welcome an NGO from a 
democratic country speaking on behalf of the peoples of an 
undemocratic country?
    Mr. Bolton.  I don't have any trouble with that.
    Senator Sarbanes.  Even if it runs counter to the policy of 
the democratic country?
    Mr. Bolton.  I think--I think that's a different 
circumstance. What I'm talking about is the challenge to 
legitimacy----
    Senator Sarbanes.  All right----
    Mr. Bolton.  --of representative----
    Senator Sarbanes. --thank you.
    Senator Sarbanes. --government.
    Senator Sarbanes.  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman.  Thank you, Senator Sarbanes.
    Senator Chafee?
    Senator Chafee.  Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
    Welcome, Mr. Bolton. You said all the right things in your 
opening statement. And one of them, you said that Kofi Annan--
Secretary General Kofi Annan had called. I'm curious, did he 
endorse your candidacy? [Laughter.]
    Mr. Bolton.  He said--well, I probably shouldn't get into 
it, but he said, ``Get yourself confirmed quickly.''
    Senator Chafee.  Well, I think that's important.
    My question is having to do with your confirmation hearing 
in 2001, and you said that you felt that the admission of 
Taiwan to the United Nations would be consistent with this 
administration's ``one-China policy.'' You explained how Taiwan 
meets the requirements of statehood, and, therefore, entrance 
to the U.N. And you went on to compare our government's 
position on Taiwan to our prior positions on Germany and the 
two Koreas.
    The one-China policy has been successful due to consistent 
and partly ambiguous statements by government officials. A 
careful balance of words has to be struck in order to help 
preserve the relationships we have with both countries, and 
their confidence that current actions on our part are intended 
to help strike a balance across the Straits.
    I would like to know how you would balance these competing 
interests of wishing to support our democratic ally, Taiwan, 
and trying to gain various concessions from the People's 
Republic of China.
    Mr. Bolton.  Well, Senator, perhaps I could answer your 
question by falling back a little bit on the subject of the 
comments I had made on Taiwan during my time as a private 
citizen in think-tanks and so on, where I was expressing my 
opinions as a private citizens on--and without the 
responsibility of being a government official. And I think I 
was--in the 2001 hearing, I still had the luxury of being a 
private citizen, and I was discussing it at that point. I think 
I can say that this is a good example of something where I've 
had an opinion, and I've expressed it. I don't back away from 
the opinion. But time and tide have moved on. President Bush 
has expressed his view on the relationship between Taiwan and 
China. He's made it clear the administration has supported 
Taiwan as observer in the World Health Organization, but that 
he doesn't go beyond that. And I accept that.
    I think when a person comes into the government, either 
fresh or when you go into a new position, just because you've 
had an opinion ten years before doesn't give you the chance to 
say, ``Okay, let's start over at square one and talk about my 
opinions.'' I'm not a golfer, but I think the metaphor is, you 
have to play it as it lays. And I know what the President's 
policy is, and I'm prepared to follow it.
    Senator Chafee.  Well, thank you very much.
    As the Six-Party talks commenced with North Korea, you gave 
a speech that some would say undermined the stated policy of 
the State Department at the time. And there was a bit of a 
dispute with Mr. Pritchard and him saying, ``Those are your own 
personal views.'' Ultimately, he resigned. Can you tell us what 
happened there? Especially in view of saying that you like to 
play it as it lies, using the golf metaphor.
    Mr. Bolton.  Senator, on that speech, I can assure you that 
speech was fully cleared within the appropriate bureaucracy and 
was given in Seoul. People knew it was coming for weeks, and 
the timing of it. And I can tell you what our Ambassador to 
South Korea, Tom Hubbard, said after the speech. He said, 
``Thanks a lot for that speech, John. It'll help us a lot out 
here.''
    Senator Chafee.  Why would Mr. Pritchard take exception to 
that?
    Mr. Bolton.  Probably his----
    Senator Chafee.  His position at the time was Special Envoy 
for Negotiations with North Korea. He's the point man.
    Mr. Bolton.  Probably for the same reason he resigned from 
the administration. I don't think he agreed with the 
President's policy. I respect Mr. Pritchard, but I don't think 
he agreed with the President's policy.
    Senator Chafee.  Was the State Department policy at odds 
with the President's policy?
    Mr. Bolton.  Not at that point, no. I think--and, as I say, 
the speech was cleared within the State Department and 
throughout the interagency.
    Senator Chafee.  Well, the ramifications from that dispute 
were that, at the time, some of the top diplomats in China were 
saying that United States does not have a negotiating strategy, 
and they considered the United States their main obstacle--
these are their quotes, back at the time--to progress on these 
Six-Party talks. And one of their diplomats, Chinese--People's 
Republic of China diplomats said, ``How the U.S. is threatening 
the DPRK, this needs to be further discussed in the next round 
of talks.'' He says, ``Washington's negative policy towards 
North Korea is an impediment.'' So the ramifications of this 
dispute seem to be impeding our progress as we try and work 
with North Korea.
    Mr. Bolton.  Well, I think that North Korea has taken 
exception to a number of things that we've said. They took 
exception to the President putting them in the ``axis of 
evil.'' Most recently, they took exception to Secretary Rice 
calling them an ``outpost of tyranny.'' I think that the fact 
is, though, that, as I say, the speech was in preparation for 
quite some time. It was known within the Department of State. 
Everybody who should have had a chop on it, did have a chop on 
it. And it was given with the full knowledge and understanding 
of the Department, as a whole.
    I think--I don't mean to underestimate, at all, the 
difficulty of working these Six-Party talks. It's something 
that the President is very committed to. We've worked hard on 
it. We've worked particularly hard with China, which has been 
the host of three rounds of the Six-Party talks. Secretary 
Rice, as you know, was recently there, and worked hard with 
China to try and get the North Koreans back to the negotiating 
table. It's now been ten months since the last round of Six-
Party talks, and we've been prepared, for quite some time, to 
sit down and resume those talks.
    Senator Chafee.  Well, very good. On the positive side, 
certainly one of the initiatives you had at the State 
Department, which you were rightfully praised for, is the 
Proliferation Security Initiative. And the PSI is a global 
effort that aims to stop shipments of weapons of mass 
destruction, the delivery systems, and related materials 
worldwide. The PSI uses existing authorities, national and 
international, to defeat proliferation. And you worked in a 
multilateral fashion on this proposal. Ten other countries--
Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom--all agreed initially 
to PSI, and 60 more have signed on since.
    But you have said that you are loathe to call it an 
organization. You call it an activity. And you said, in Tokyo, 
``Our goal with the PSI is based on an equally simple tenet, 
that the impact of states working together in a deliberatively 
cooperative manner would be greater than the states alone in an 
ad-hoc fashion.'' And this statement would seem to point to 
your support of the kind of cooperation a body like the U.N. 
can foster.
    Can you outline your feelings on the best way to set up 
multilateral agreements?
    Mr. Bolton.  Well, I think PSI is an example of a flexible 
approach to a very serious problem. And, as you indicated, 
there's no doubt in our minds that international trafficking in 
weapons and materials of mass destruction can only be addressed 
in a multilateral fashion. The United States acting alone 
simply is unable to stop that international trafficking. That's 
why we began with our original 11-country core group to put 
together the statement of interdiction principles and then to 
try and persuade others to accept the PSI.
    I think that--and we've had some notable successes, not 
least of which was the interception of the ship, the BBC China, 
which I think played a material role in Libya's strategic 
decision to give up the pursuit of nuclear weapons. And I think 
the lesson that I derived from PSI and from the G8 Global 
Partnership is that you can conduct multilateral activity 
effectively without large bureaucracies. That's not to say 
that, in some cases, you don't need bureaucracies. The IAEA 
that Senator Hagel asked me about a minute ago is an example. 
You need experts in an organization like that to build up their 
knowledge and conduct operations over a long period of time. 
But surely you can do this without large bureaucracies that 
don't deliver effectively.
    And so, I think there's always room for improvement in 
bureaucracy, and the lesson I draw from PSI is, the leaner you 
make the operation, the more successful you're likely to be.
    Senator Chafee.  And can you make some relationship to how 
you'll work now with the United Nations, which is a gigantic 
bureaucracy?
    Mr. Bolton.  Yeah, well, I hope--I hope the lesson of PSI 
is that you can take what many people thought at the time was a 
pretty controversial idea, the physical interdiction of weapons 
or materials of mass destruction in international commerce, 
explain that we were prepared to do it entirely consistently 
with existing international and national authorities, and rally 
support for it. I think that's the kind of thing that I had a 
small hand--I was a junior official at the time in first 
President Bush's administration, when he and Secretary Baker 
rallied the Security Council and the international community to 
the series of resolutions that led to the ouster of Saddam 
Hussein from Kuwait. But I think that is possible. I think 
that's what our objective should be.
    Senator Chafee.  Thank you very much, Secretary.
    The Chairman.  Thank you very much, Senator Chafee.
    Senator Dodd?
    The Chairman.  The Chair calls for order. The hearing is 
adjourned until order is restored. [Whereupon, at 11:12 a.m., 
the hearing was adjourned.] [Whereupon, at 11:14 a.m., the 
hearing was resumed.]
    The Chairman.  The hearing will recommence.
    I now call upon the distinguished Senator from Connecticut, 
Senator Dodd.
    Senator Dodd.  Does that come out of my time, by the way? 
[Laughter.]
    The Chairman.  The full ten minutes are restored.
    Senator Dodd.  Timing's everything.
    Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I have some opening 
comments, but I'd like to ask unanimous consent they be 
included in the record, if I may----
    The Chairman.  They will be included in the record in full.
    Senator Dodd. --and lay out some thoughts on this, on the 
nomination, generally, if we could.
    Secondly, let me just say, I think most of my colleagues--
I've been on this committee for 24 years. I've enjoyed working 
with several Members here during that entire period of time. I 
was trying to recall other occasions in this committee when 
I've opposed a nominee, and I can't recall one. There have only 
been a handful. In fact, many of my colleagues on this side, I 
know, are disappointed from time to time when I've supported 
nominees of the administration, not because I agreed with their 
views, but because I've generally embraced the view that 
Presidents, once elected, have a right to put together their 
official families, people who share their views. So I--others 
have a different criteria, but that's generally been my point 
of view.
    So I begin, Mr. Chairman, as I think you do, and others 
have over the years, with the assumption that if a President 
sends up a nominee here, that the Presidents begin, with my 
view, anyway, to be able to have that team, unless there are 
reasons which would disqualify an individual under any set of 
circumstances, not just their views with particular matter of 
policy; in this case, foreign policy.
    I'd ask, as well, Mr. Chairman--Mr. Bolton has made the 
request, and I don't think it's an unfair one at all--you may 
want to evaluate how to do this--but I think all of these 
interviews and e-mails and so forth ought to be made a part of 
the public record. And I'll make the request. If you want to 
think about that, Mr. Chairman, I'll--before you want to 
respond to it, but I'd make the request, because I think it 
deserves to be out there in the public domain so that people 
can have a full opportunity to review what's been said, what 
are in e-mails, what other witnesses--we've interviewed some; I 
think the staff have jointly--some six different people, who 
bring a particular set of facts regarding what I think are the 
most serious allegations about your nomination, and that is the 
allegation that you tried to have two analysts removed from 
their jobs because you disagreed with their intelligence 
conclusions. That, to me, is, in this environment we're in 
today, Mr. Bolton, I would say, putting aside your views about 
the United Nations and other things--if that is true, then I 
don't think you have a right to serve in a high post. I think 
it would be unfortunate to set the example, in this day and 
age, when we're trying to get the best intelligence we can, if 
you tried to remove someone. Whether or not you were successful 
or not is not the issue. Trying to rob a bank and failing to do 
so is not--is a crime, in my view. Trying to remove someone, as 
an analyst, from their job, because you disagree with what 
they're saying, I think, is dreadfully wrong. And you've got an 
opportunity to defend yourself here, and I want to get to the 
bottom of it if we can.
    Now, you've made the statement, in response to Senator 
Biden, that you did not try to--or you did try to remove --or 
at least you recommended that these two individuals--one we've 
talked about, Mr. Westermann; the other we'll just call an 
intelligence officer, because his name should be kept private. 
Is that--did I hear you correctly when you responded to Senator 
Biden?
    Mr. Bolton.  I don't think so, Senator, respectfully. The 
way you put it, at the beginning, was that I tried to have 
people removed because of their--because I disagreed with their 
intelligence conclusions, and that's not true.
    Senator Dodd.  You thought because they went behind your 
back----
    Mr. Bolton.  I thought in--I thought, in both cases, if I 
may say so, their conduct was unprofessional and broke my 
confidence and trust, which I think--I think is important in 
all professional relationships, especially in ones involving 
intelligence.
    Senator Dodd.  Let me address that particular point. Now, 
as I understand it, Mr. Westermann, who, by the way, has a 
distinguished background, is highly regarded by his peers--and 
I'll lay that out for the record hearing here, going back and 
interviewing his superiors and others over the years. As I 
understand it--and you correct me if I'm wrong, now--that this 
going behind your back--Mr. Westermann sent an e-mail to your 
Chief of Staff, as I understand it now, Frederick Fleitz--is 
that how you pronounce his name?
    Mr. Bolton.  That's correct.
    Senator Dodd.  He sent an e-mail in February to your Chief 
of Staff that tried to alert your assistant that you were 
probably going to have trouble getting the language cleared 
that you wanted to include, and suggested alternative language, 
at that time, to him. Your assistant, Mr. Fleitz, pressed to 
have the language sent out for clearance. So Mr. Westermann did 
so, at the suggestion of your Chief of Staff. The submission to 
the Intelligence Committee made clear the language that you 
wanted cleared. It was also--contained Mr. Westermann's 
suggested alternative language. Now, all due respect, how is 
that going behind your back?
    Mr. Bolton.  You know, Senator, a lot of the material 
that's in the----
    Senator Dodd.  Well, am I correct in my assessment of what 
occurred, that he did send an e-mail?
    Mr. Bolton.  I don't--I don't know what the circumstances 
were. I've seen a lot of it, after the time. What I did was 
talk to Mr. Westermann's supervisor. I first called Mr. Ford. 
He was not in the office that day. I forget the reason why. 
Carl Ford, the Assistant Secretary, the head of the Bureau. I 
then asked to speak to Tom Fingar, who was the Principal Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of the Bureau, the senior career official. 
And I said, basically--I said, basically, ``What's going on 
here?'' And----
    Senator Dodd.  Did you call Mr. Westermann?
    Mr. Bolton.  I called--I called him to find--and he--and he 
basically said he had--he had sent something out into the 
clearance process without notifying us. So I put this to Mr. 
Fingar----
    Senator Dodd.  Well, you've made a statement he went behind 
your back.
    Mr. Bolton.  Yes, and----
    Senator Dodd.  Have you checked?
    Mr. Bolton.  I did. That's why I asked Mr. Fingar. I didn't 
know what the facts were. I asked Mr. Fingar, the senior career 
officer in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and he came 
back a couple of hours later with--he didn't know what the 
circumstances were, which is understandable, I think--but he 
came back to me a couple of hours later with an e-mail that 
said that Mr. Westermann's behavior was, quote, ``entirely 
inappropriate,'' close quote. He said--meaning--referring to 
INR--he said, quote, ``We screwed up,'' close quote. And he 
said, twice, ``It won't happen again.''
    Senator Dodd.  Let me--let me just--because I think that's 
important. You said that earlier. Mr. Brannigan, who is a staff 
member of the Chairman of this committee, had an interview with 
Mr. Fingar over the last several days, and let me quote Mr. 
Brannigan's question to Mr. Fingar regarding this very point.
    Mr. Brannigan, speaking now to Mr. Fingar, ``You said that 
what Mr. Westermann did was entirely within the procedure. He 
was never disciplined. It was perfectly normal. That the only 
failure of his was lack of prudence. And then there is the e-
mail to Mr. Bolton. You say it's entirely inappropriate, and we 
screwed up, and it won't happen again. That seems like a rather 
different assessment.''
    Mr. Fingar, responding to this question, in the last 72 
hours or so, ``Well, I knew I was dealing with somebody who was 
very upset,'' speaking about you, sir. ``I was trying to get 
the incident closed, which I didn't regard as a big deal. I 
knew John Bolton was mad. I assume when people are mad, they 
get over it, so I did lean over in the direction of, 'Sure, 
we'll take responsibility.' He thanked me for it. At least as 
far as I'm concerned in my dealings with Mr. Bolton, that 
closed it.''
    That's a different assessment. In fact, what Mr. Fingar is 
saying is that the reason he said what he did was because you 
were furious.
    Mr. Bolton.  Well, I think the--I mean, I basically thought 
the matter was closed when I got Mr. Fingar's e-mail saying, 
``It won't happen again.'' And I----
    Senator Dodd.  Well, then----
    Mr. Bolton.  --take his----
    Senator Dodd.  Let me move you forward.
    Mr. Bolton.  May I just add one point?
    Senator Dodd.  Yeah, go ahead.
    Mr. Bolton.  The comments Mr. Fingar made the day of the 
incident, I took to be his opinion at the time. And I think 
that's the relevant point in time to look at. But I ----
    Senator Dodd.  Yeah, well----
    Mr. Bolton.  --but I agree with his point--I agree with his 
concluding point.
    Senator Dodd.  Well, then Mr. Brannigan asked him again, 
``Were there any policies or procedures changed as a result of 
this incident?'' Answer: ``No.''
    Mr. Bolton.  Senator, I have no idea what INR's policies 
are. That's why we gave it to INR, and that's why I asked Mr. 
Fingar to look into it. And his response back to me was, what 
happened was entirely inappropriate----
    Senator Dodd.  Well, let me take----
    Mr. Bolton.  --and that they----
    Senator Dodd. --you seven months forward.
    Mr. Bolton.  --screwed up.
    Senator Dodd.  Let me take you to September 2000. That's 
February. So the matter's over with in February, in your mind. 
And yet in September of 2000, in a conversation that you had 
with--let me get the quote here if I can--here it is now, in 
September, with Mr. Neil Silver. Do you know who Mr. Neil 
Silver is?
    Mr. Bolton.  Yes, I do.
    Senator Dodd.  Right. He was the direct supervisor for Mr. 
Westermann.
    Mr. Bolton.  One level up, right?
    Senator Dodd.  Right. Okay? So, in September, seven months 
later, now, all right? Mr. Silver is in your office. All right? 
And, again, here--now, this is an interview done in the last 
few days here by the joint staff of this committee. September 
2002, I think. ``Neil told me that, at the end of the meeting 
that he had with Mr. Bolton, Mr. Bolton took him aside and, out 
of the blue, said, 'And that Westermann fellow, we really would 
like him removed from his portfolio, and transferred.'''
    Mr. Bolton.  This is Mr. Silver testifying?
    Senator Dodd.  Well, this is Mr. Westermann talking about 
his interview with Mr. Silver. By the way, that is also 
corroborated in other documents we have here, from this, right 
here. This is also included, if you will, in the Report on U.S. 
Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessment on 
Iraq, page 278, paragraph (u), the third paragraph on that 
page. The analyst said, ``Six months later, after the incident, 
with his new office director, met with the Under Secretary,'' 
speaking about yourself, ``the Under Secretary asked to have 
the analyst removed from his current worldwide chemical and 
biological weapons portfolio. The analyst said he was not 
removed from his portfolio and did not suffer any negative 
effects professionally.'' That's seven months later, Mr. 
Bolton.
    Mr. Bolton.  Yes. And have you interviewed Mr. Silver?
    Senator Dodd.  Not yet. We've tried to. We're going to try 
interview----
    Mr. Bolton.  My recollection is that, for some period of 
time----
    Senator Sarbanes.  You do think he should be interviewed, 
right?
    Mr. Bolton.  I have--absolutely.
    Senator Dodd.  Yeah.
    Senator Sarbanes.  Uh-huh.
    Mr. Bolton.  The--for some period of time, there had been a 
vacancy. Mr. Silver came in to be the office director, and he 
asked to come up to pay a courtesy call on me. I didn't ask for 
the meeting. And he wanted to come up and introduce himself. 
And I think my schedule was such that several months went by. 
But he came in September, and my recollection is that he said, 
you know, he hoped his office would work with the bureaus that 
reported to me, and asked if there had ever been any problems. 
And I thought, he had asked an honest question, I ought to give 
him an honest answer, which I did, and that----
    Senator Dodd.  So in September, it still bothered you.
    Mr. Bolton.  It was a--it was a one-on-one meeting. It was 
a courtesy call. He said, ``Have you ever had problems?'' And I 
said, ``Yes.''
    Senator Dodd.  Yeah.
    Senator Sarbanes.  And did you say----
    Mr. Bolton.  But I had done nothing----
    Senator Sarbanes. --did you say to him you thought 
Westermann should be removed?
    Mr. Bolton.  I thought he should be given other 
responsibilities. I do recall, very specifically, with Mr. 
Silver, since he had obviously had no contact with this episode 
before. I said, ``I wish Westermann no ill will. I'm not trying 
to affect him. I just have lost trust in him.''
    Senator Dodd.  Well, let me tell you we've talked in the 
last few days. Now, you've made the statement----
    The Chairman.  Let me just ask----
    Senator Dodd.  Let me just finish on this, if I can, Mr. 
Chairman.
    We've talked to Thomas Fingar, who is presently the 
Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research. 
We've talked to your Acting Chief of Staff, Mr. Fleitz. We have 
reports, at least, about the Neil Silver conversation. We've 
also spoken with Carl Ford. We've talked with Stuart Cohen, 
former Chair of the International Intelligence Council and the 
former boss of the nameless NIO. In every one of those 
instances, they claim, independently, that you asked for this 
man, Mr. Westermann, or this NIO, to be removed from their job. 
Every one of them have said this. These are your people, in 
some cases, who have said it. I'll quote 'em for you here.
    Mr. Bolton.  Senator, and that's one reason why I'd like 
all these transcripts to be released.
    Senator Dodd.  Well, I've asked unanimous consent they all 
be laid out there.
    Mr. Bolton.  So that the----
    Senator Dodd.  So I'm going to ask you once again, Did you 
ask for these two people to be removed from their jobs?
    Mr. Bolton.  No. I said that I wanted the--in the case of 
Mr. Westermann, that I had lost trust in him, and thought he 
should work on other accounts.
    Senator Dodd.  What other portfolio did he have?
    Mr. Bolton.  In the case within INR, I think they're----
    Senator Dodd.  What's his portfolio?
    Mr. Bolton.  A lot of----
    Senator Dodd.  What's his----
    Mr. Bolton.  I don't know what his portfolio was.
    Senator Dodd.  He has one portfolio, biological weapons and 
chemical weapons.
    Mr. Bolton.  If you say so, Senator. I don't--I don't know 
what his portfolio is.
    The Chairman.  All right. And the----
    Senator Dodd.  In the case----
    The Chairman.  --Chair would like to ask that we continue 
this, maybe, in the next round.
    And I'd like to recognize, now, Senator Allen.
    Senator Allen.  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And thank you, Mr. Bolton, for being here. And I look 
forward to all the questions, back and forth.
    Mr. Chairman, I have a statement I'd like to be made part 
of the record.
    The Chairman.  It will be made in part--made in the record 
in full.
    Senator Allen.  For those who are watching this hearing, 
you can cross-examine people in such a way that it makes it act 
as if it's something more than it is. The--I don't think all of 
this questions on these individuals, and e-mails, would matter 
if Members didn't have, really, a disagreement with you, let's 
say, on what really matters. You are--you have been appointed, 
or nominated, by the President to be our representative, the 
United States Representative to the United Nations. And I think 
we ought to focus on the big picture, and your record of 
performance on the big picture.
    Senator Chafee brought up the admirable leadership you 
provided in the Proliferation Security Initiative, which 
garnered 60 nations in this effort. And that is something that 
showed initiative on your part, obviously essential to get 
other countries involved in it, and I think that's part of your 
record of performance, which I find very salutary, that, as you 
talked in your opening statement about supporting freedom and 
democracy, we want to, in my view, advance freedom and justice 
and, obviously, our security, and when the United Nations can 
be helpful, they can be; if not, find a method--a way of doing 
it. And you have done that. As well as the G8 Summit, where you 
got other countries to match the United States' $1 billion in 
the Cooperative Threat Reduction, or Nunn-Lugar Program.
    You also played a central role in negotiating the Treaty of 
Moscow, which will reduce operationally-deployed nuclear 
weapons by two thirds. You also, in previous years, served in a 
variety of fronts, but one of the best things you did was--is 
get the United Nations to repeal that odious U.N. resolution 
that likened Zionism to racism. And that's why I think groups 
like B'nai Brith and others are supporting you, as well.
    You, I think, have the experience, you have the knowledge, 
you have the background and the right principles to come into 
the United Nations at this time. There's scandals right now. 
The Oil-for-Food scandal that I know Senator Coleman has just 
been a lead in the Senate in addressing. It is important that 
we have, for the United States, someone who will be advocating, 
forthrightly and honestly, the views of the American people. I 
guarantee you, the taxpayers out in the real world aren't so 
concerned about e-mails back and forth, and personnel 
disagreements, here, there, and the other; they care about 
what's going on with the money we're putting in the United 
Nations. Is the United Nations helpful for the advancement of 
freedom and justice? Can it be made into an organization more 
relevant to real people in the real world?
    And I think the President, in selecting you, Mr. Bolton, 
has selected the absolute perfect person. The fact that there 
has been controversy, the American people, they think that's 
probably good, because you'll bring a credibility to the United 
Nations that they sorely need. And I like the fact that you'll 
advocate our principles, you're not going to be seduced by 
empty, meaningless, courteous pontifications by international 
bureaucracies. And I like that. And that's important for the 
advancement of our ideals, and it--as well as for others in the 
world.
    Now, as has been discussed in a variety of ways, the United 
Nations--even Kofi Annan has put forward some recommendations 
to reform and bring greater efficiency to the United Nations. 
Let me ask you how you would prioritize many of these needed 
changes at the United Nations, and how do those relate to the 
interests of the United States?
    Mr. Bolton.  Well, many of the governance changes discussed 
previously--the Security Council, the reform of the Human 
Rights Commission--these are all things that need attention. 
But I think, in terms of the management side of reform, one of 
the aspects that we tried to emphasize in the first Bush 
administration, Bush 41, under the concept of ``unitary U.N.,'' 
was to avoid the duplication and overlap and waste of resources 
that existed in many of the U.N. specialized agencies, funds, 
and programs, where many different agencies are doing the same 
thing, and, in effect, duplicating work, and in a very 
inefficient way. And I think--and I don't want to anticipate 
questions that may come later, but the Oil-for-Food Program, as 
it has evolved, has taught us a lot, I think, about the culture 
of the bureaucracy at the U.N. And just as we've learned 
through the Silverman-Robb report, and others, about the 
culture of some of our practices on the intelligence side, I 
think Oil-for-Food has told us a lot about the culture of the 
bureaucracy at the U.N., and emphasized why management reform 
is needed there.
    And I think working with the other principal contributors 
in the Geneva group--this is the group of countries that 
supply, typically, more than one--each of them supplies, in the 
assessed budget, more than 1 percent of that budget--and 
working with other concerned countries, that this is a real 
moment of opportunity to eliminate waste and duplication and 
overlap in the U.N. system, and to concentrate on performance-
based evaluation for the services and the activities that the 
various U.N. agencies are involved in.
    Senator Allen.  Well, thank you. I'd--the American people 
would never tolerate that sort of fraud and abuse that was in 
the Oil-for-Food Program in our own government, nor should we 
tolerate it in any organization that we fund with the 
taxpayers' money. And I think the concept of accountability and 
measurement--or, you call it ``performance-based''--is very 
important. I think it--what gets measured, gets better. And to 
the extent that that can be done with the United Nations, 
that's helpful.
    Let me ask you this, since you worked on some of the 
proliferation issues. How do you envision the United States 
working with the United Nations, if possible, to realize a 
solution to the nuclear concerns that we have with North Korea, 
as well as with Iran?
    Mr. Bolton.  Well, on those two, specifically, when North 
Korea withdrew from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, we worked in 
the IAEA Board of Governors and got a unanimous agreement that 
the question of North Korea should be referred to the Security 
Council, as the IAEA statute provides. Now, the Council has not 
taken action on North Korea, because of the pendency of the 
Six-Party talks. But I think the fact that the Security Council 
is there as a possibility is an important point to make, not 
just to North Korea, but to other countries that would attempt 
to achieve weapons of mass destruction.
    In the case of Iran, we have worked hard, at the IAEA, to 
have the matter of Iran referred to the Security Council, 
because its pursuit of nuclear weapons, as North Korea's 
pursuit of nuclear weapons, amounts to a clear threat to 
international peace and security. And I think one of the 
important steps that Secretary Rice was able to make, in just 
her first couple of weeks on the job in providing certain 
commitments we made to the Europeans, was to receive, from the 
EU-3 in return, their very clear public statement in a report 
to their EU colleagues that they, too, would support a referral 
to the Security Council at an appropriate time if Iran did not 
make the strategic decision to give up nuclear weapons.
    I think that weapons of mass destruction and terrorism, and 
the confluence of those two things, are the biggest threat to 
international peace and security that the civilized community 
faces. And the Security Council should play a role in that. 
That's the position I've taken within the administration, 
within this--within this administration from the get-go.
    Senator Allen.  Well, thank you.
    Mr. Chairman, I appreciate those remarks, because I think 
that these are the issues that matter most with the United 
Nations and for our own security. It will be proliferation of 
arms, weapons of mass destruction, as well as nuclear 
proliferation.
    Your record is one that is exemplary in that area. Also, 
that of advocating freedom for all people, regardless of their 
background and culture, throughout the world, which I think can 
be very--where the United Nations could be very helpful. If 
they're not, then we have to find other approaches to doing so. 
And I think you've shown that, that capability.
    Finally, just to follow up--I think it was Senator Chafee, 
or maybe it was Senator Sarbanes--insofar as Taiwan joining the 
World Health Organization, you support Taiwan joining the World 
Health Organization?
    Mr. Bolton.  The administration's position has been to 
support Taiwan becoming an observer in the WHO.
    Senator Allen.  Right. Good. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Sarbanes.  Is that your position?
    Mr. Bolton.  Yes. I support that position.
    Senator Sarbanes.  I thought you supported their being a 
member.
    Mr. Bolton.  When I--as I said before, when I wrote, as a 
private citizen, during the 1990s, that's what I said. And when 
I wrote it then, I understood it. The President has made his 
policy on this very clear, and I support his policy.
    Senator Allen.  Reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman, I'd be, 
personally, happy if they were a member, but if we can have 
them as an observer, they certainly ought to be involved, 
especially with the SARS epidemic. They can be very, very 
helpful. And the fact that China is so paranoid about it should 
not be of any consequence when we're concerned about world 
health.
    The Chairman.  Thank you, Senator Allen.
    Senator Kerry?
    Senator Kerry.  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    With all due respect to Senator Allen, I just don't think 
that one can dismiss, or should dismiss, how one interprets 
intelligence and how one operates within a position of high 
responsibility as somehow not important to the American people. 
We've just come off the most massive intelligence failure in 
our history, and we recognize that there are serious questions 
still outstanding about the degree to which that intelligence 
was manipulated, or the degree to which a predetermined 
position determined the outcome of that intelligence. And so, 
it is vital to the security of the American people, whether or 
not Mr. Bolton, in his position, was party to the same kind of 
activities. And that's the question with respect to Mr. 
Westermann.
    The fact is that on September 18th, in 2004, the Bush 
administration using stringent standards--and I'm quoting from 
the New York Times--adopted, after the failure to find banned 
weapons in Iraq, conducted a new assessment of Cuba's 
biological weapons capacity, and concluded that it is no longer 
clear that Cuba has an active offensive big-weapons program. 
And so, that directly contradicted the position that Mr. Bolton 
took. And, in fact, Mr. Westermann, was correct. And I think 
the American people deserve to have people, who are correct, 
not fired, but rewarded.
    So that's what's at issue here. And it is in the interest 
of the American people to know that their intelligence is being 
properly sifted and vetted and listened to.
    Now, I don't think that's the only reason to have questions 
and doubts about this nomination. I want to make that clear. 
It's only one of the issues. It's not the prime issue in my 
mind. There are much more serious and significant issues.
    The ambassadorship to the United Nations is one of the most 
important, foremost diplomatic positions in the world today. 
And I think that it is critical that we have someone there who 
comes with both the respect for that institution and the 
reputation for diplomacy that is vital to American interests at 
this point in time.
    I think we need somebody who believes in the United 
Nations, despite its flaws, and believes in that diplomacy and 
negotiation, and has a track record of effectiveness. And that 
track record of effectiveness is what we need to measure here 
today.
    There are questions about Mr. Bolton's commitment to the 
United Nations, and his effectiveness. I'm not going to go in--
I'd like to ask unanimous consent that the full text of my 
opening statement be put in the record.
    The Chairman.  Put in the record in full.
    Senator Kerry.  But, you know, we've seen, certainly, some 
instance where, when Mr. Bolton wants to, he's effective. I 
think the PSI is a good effort, and I think there have been 
some positive advances for our country in that regard. But on 
two of the most critical proliferation issues facing us, both 
North Korea and Iran, Secretary Bolton opposed the idea of 
direct negotiations with each of these countries, even when our 
allies were asking us to do so. And that's an important part of 
the diplomatic effort that we're going to have to engage in, 
going forward.
    At a critical moment with North Korea, in a speech that he 
gave in Seoul, that he attacked Kim Jung-Il, whom we all 
attacked, we all dislike, we all recognize is, you know, 
someone we'd love to see removed or in a different--you know, 
not leading that country; but, on the other hand, at this 
critical moment, to almost 50 times in one speech personally 
vilify him, was to almost guarantee the outcome of the 
diplomatic effort that he was engaged in.
    In North Korea, I think Mr. Bolton deserves a lot of the 
credit for the abandonment of the efforts that the Clinton 
administration had made that effectively froze Pyongyang's 
plutonium program. Now, whatever you want to say about the 
cheating--and we all understood that that was probably going 
on, including Bill Perry, who was negotiating it at the time--
nevertheless, we knew where that plutonium was. We had 
inspectors in the reactor. We had television cameras in the 
reactor. Today, we don't.
    There's been a huge increase in the nuclear capacity of 
North Korea, on your watch. And the question, legitimately, 
ought to be asked why you ought to be rewarded to go to an 
increasingly important position, given that. In fact, Senator 
Domenici raised those questions. Threat reduction programs are 
spread over the Departments of State, Defense, and Energy. I'm 
not going to belabor the administration's refusal to heed the 
advice of the Baker-Cutler Commission to increase funding for 
threat reduction, but when the committee met last year to hear 
from Mr. Bolton about threat reduction, the fact is that 
there's been a failure to dispose of nearly 70 tons of 
plutonium. That's enough for thousands of weapons. Our 
colleague, Senator Domenici, said, at that hearing, quote, 
``Why a program of this much global importance should be 
blocked by something as basic as liability remains beyond me. 
I've been amazed that the leadership of the United States and 
Russia cannot resolve this issue. Failure to resolve this issue 
is simply not consistent with the urgency that the 
administration has attached to nuclear proliferation.''
    Senator Domenici took specific issue with Mr. Bolton's 
performance. He said, ``I submit that Mr. John Bolton, who has 
been assigned to negotiate this, has a very heavy 
responsibility, and I hate to say that I'm not sure, to this 
point, that he's up to it. If he doesn't think it's important 
enough to solve this issue of liability, then I submit that you 
ought to get somebody who can.''
    I also believe Mr. Bolton has made a selective reading of 
recent events. For instance, he frequently refers to the Libya 
model of counterproliferation. By his interpretation of events, 
a proliferating country makes a strategic decision on its own 
just to abandon nuclear weapons. And he suggests that that's 
what Iran and North Korea ought to do. Well, it would be 
wonderful if they did. But that's a distortion of the reality 
of what happened.
    The fact is that the Clinton administration and the British 
were long involved prior to this administration and engaged in 
a dialogue with Libya. Libya was prepared to move, some time 
ago. And the fact is that the Libyan model represented a 
willingness of the United Kingdom to engage in a patient, 
frank, and secret dialogue that ultimately resulted in their 
giving it up. And some people have suggested publicly that Mr. 
Bolton engaged in an effort to try to scuttle that particular 
initiative.
    So when you add the totality of statements made and beliefs 
about the United Nations, I think there are serious questions 
about the nomination.
    Mr. Bolton, let me just ask you, Is it fair to say that you 
really don't respect or believe in the institution of the 
United Nations?
    Mr. Bolton.  No, I think it's very inaccurate, and I'll 
just give you one example to show why it's not accurate. During 
the period, roughly, 1997 to 2000, I served, without 
compensation, as an assistant to former Secretary of State 
Baker, who, at that time, had been asked by Secretary General 
Annan to be his personal envoy for the Western Sahara. The U.N. 
peacekeeping force in the Western Sahara, MINURSO, which is--
it's a Spanish acronym--had been created during the first Bush 
administration, in the late spring or early summer of 1991, but 
had not been successful. And Secretary General Annan wanted to 
take advantage of Secretary Baker being out of office to see if 
he couldn't help resolve the matter. And Secretary Baker called 
me--I think it was in January of 1997--and asked if I would be 
willing to assist. He said, ``I'm going to do this pro bono, so 
if you want to help, you're going to have to do it pro bono, 
too.'' And I said that I would. And Secretary----
    Senator Kerry.  But that's--sorry, go ahead.
    Mr. Bolton.  Secretary Baker has just recently resigned his 
position; unfortunately, in my judgement. He devoted an awful 
lot of time to it.
    The reason I worked for him again, for the United Nations, 
for free was not because I ever expected to use it in a 
confirmation hearing, or because I expected anybody to give me 
a pat on the head; I did it because I thought that the U.N. 
peacekeeping operation in the Western Sahara could bring a 
resolution to the uncertainty of the status of that territory 
and get those tens of thousands of refugees who have been in 
the Sahara Desert for decades----
    Senator Kerry.  But my question to you----
    Mr. Bolton.  --back to their homeland.
    Senator Kerry. --is not----
    Mr. Bolton.  That's what I worked for.
    Senator Kerry.  My question to you is not whether or not 
you have selectively chosen, here and there. As I said a moment 
ago, there's a selectively to your approach, as there was, 
evidently, in your belief about the intelligence with respect 
to Cuba. When it serves a particular purpose, you adopt it; 
but, generically, over the long history, your writings, your 
comments, your public statements, your speeches, your 
interviews about the United Nations have been disdainful of it.
    I mean, you have said, ``There's no such thing as the 
United Nations.''
    You've said, ``There's an international community that 
occasionally can be led by the only real power in the world,'' 
and you point to the United States as essentially being the 
United Nations.
    You've said, ``If the U.N. Secretary building in New York 
lost ten stories, it wouldn't make a bit of difference.''
    You've said that you would have one permanent member of the 
Security Council, because that's the real reflection of the 
distribution of power in the world.
    You've said that you not only don't care about losing the 
General Assembly vote, but it actually--you see it as a ``make 
my day'' outcome.
    How do these statements reflect a respect for the United 
Nations and empower you to go there and have other people 
believe you're there to enhance it?
    Mr. Bolton.  Well, first, Senator, a lot of those 
statements are not accurate reflections of what I've said. 
Second----
    Senator Kerry.  You said them. Do you deny saying them?
    Mr. Bolton.  Yes. I can--I can think of several that are--
--
    Senator Kerry.  You didn't say those statements.
    Mr. Bolton.  --quoted out of context, and I'd be happy to 
address them. But my larger point is----
    Senator Kerry.  Well, they're direct quotes. They're right 
off tapes. There's--I mean, how is the context out of context?
    Mr. Bolton.  Well, for example, the last--I believe, the 
last one you mentioned had to do with the loss of the U.N. 
vote, which comes from an article that I wrote in the 1990s at 
a time when, under the U.N. financial regulations, U.S.----
    Senator Kerry.  But that's precisely what you wrote.
    Mr. Bolton.  Well, and----
    Senator Kerry.  I can quote the whole article for you.
    Mr. Bolton.  --and----
    Senator Kerry. --I have it here.
    Mr. Bolton.  I would like to put the whole article in the 
record, because, at the end of the article, what I say is, 
there is a solution to this problem of the U.S. arrearages that 
can result in the U.S. not losing its vote. And the solution, 
if I may just elaborate on it, was to take the very extensive 
in-kind contributions that the Department of Defense had made 
to U.N. peacekeeping operations beginning in the early 1990s, 
but for which we had not charged the United Nations, and, in 
effect, restate the books of the U.N. to reflect that reality. 
This is analogous to things that were done for China, Russia, 
and France, in circumstances over the years, to bring--to 
eliminate their contested arrearages account. So, in that case, 
I wasn't say it would ``make my day'' to lose the vote; I 
proposed a way to--so as not to lose the U.S. vote.
    Senator Kerry.  Well, we need to come back to this. My time 
is up.
    The Chairman.  Thank you very much, Senator Kerry.
    Now, the Chair would just like to outline the roadmap until 
we recess.
    Senator Sarbanes.  Another roadmap?
    The Chairman.  Exactly. [Laughter.]
    The Chairman.  This is the Bolton-hearing roadmap.
    Senator Sarbanes.  I'm not sure we can handle the roadmap 
we----
    The Chairman.  All right.
    Senator Sarbanes. --already have.
    The Chairman.  We will hear from Senator Coleman, in order, 
and then each of the four Democratic Senators who are here, 
because you've patiently waited for this period of time. And by 
12:30 or 12:40, we'll have been three hours in the hearing. 
Then we will commence again this afternoon with another round 
of ten-minute questioning.
    Senator Coleman?
    Senator Coleman.  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I really want to talk about U.N. reform. I'd like to get, 
if I can, kind of, the nitty-gritty of--but before I do, I want 
to just--kind of, for the purpose of clarifying the record, I 
want to go over a couple of things, just to make sure that I 
understand them.
    We've had a lot of discussion about Westermann. And, for 
some, the issue is whether you lost confidence in someone, and 
the ramifications of that. For others, it may be how one 
interprets intelligence. If I can just walk through it.
    As I understand, 2002, you were going to give a speech on 
weapons of mass destruction in countries on the terrorist list.
    Mr. Bolton.  That's correct.
    Senator Coleman.  And, at that point, was that the process 
is, if you're going to give a speech, you've got to run it 
through folks to make sure that it's--if there's classified 
information on that, that that's not in there; if anything has 
to be declassified--but you run it through a process, and part 
of that is intelligence services, including those within the 
State Department, get a chance to review that. Is that the way 
the process works?
    Senator Biden.  Will the Senator yield on an important 
point? The speech doesn't have to be reviewed, does it? Only 
the portions of the speech that cite intelligence----
    Mr. Bolton.  There are two--there are two issues here. The 
first is, in the case--can I say one thing first? This speech 
was not about Cuba. It was about a whole range of countries--
Libya, Syria, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. The question, in the 
case of Cuba, arose because the U.S. Government had not said 
anything publicly about Cuba's BW efforts in a number of years. 
There was classified information in various publications of the 
intelligence agencies that discussed that. So to say anything 
about Cuba, you have to--it was necessary to get agreement by 
the intelligence agencies----
    Senator Biden.  Right.
    Mr. Bolton.  --that they would declassify it. And this is--
this is, I want to say, is an entirely legitimate and important 
step, because the sensitivity of sources and methods that might 
be involved, particularly at a time, you know, when we just had 
the arrest and then confession of the spy, Ana Balen Montes, a 
Cuban spy--the intelligence agencies were going to be concerned 
that nobody say anything in an unclassified environment that 
would compromise sources and methods.
    And so, the first step, Senator, was, in the case of 
language about the Cuba BW situation, to see if there--frankly, 
if there was anything that the intelligence agencies would 
agree upon to say.
    Senator Coleman.  And your concern with Mr. Westermann was 
that, in his review of it, he offered his own views, he 
indicated INR does not concur, added some alternative language, 
and you found out about that after the fact?
    Mr. Bolton.  That's correct. That's what I thought was 
``behind my back.''
    Senator Coleman.  So you----
    Senator Biden.  Excuse me, if I can ask--this is--I'm not 
taking issue; I just want to make sure--I'd ask unanimous 
consent that this not be on the Senator's time--and that is, I 
want to make clear, Mr. Westermann did not have access to your 
whole speech, did he?
    Mr. Bolton.  The question at the time was the 
declassification. The whole speech was later cleared by the 
Bureau of Intelligence----
    Senator Biden.  That's not my----
    Mr. Bolton.  --and Research.
    Senator Biden. --question. I just--I'm not taking issue----
    Mr. Bolton.  The whole speech wasn't written then.
    Senator Biden.  No.
    Mr. Bolton.  It wasn't a speech then, basically.
    Senator Biden.  But if the process--it's really important 
we're all on the same page and understand the process, to give 
you a fair shake here--the process is, your staff sends to INR 
the portion of what you're considering saying about biological 
weapons relating to Cuba. They do not send the whole speech, 
right? It's just--it's--in fact, it was basically a paragraph, 
is that not correct?
    Mr. Bolton.  It was language taken from existing 
intelligence reports----
    Senator Biden.  Right.
    Mr. Bolton.  --put together. And this was----
    Senator Biden.  Right.
    Mr. Bolton.  --to be--the declassification procedures. This 
is then, in turn, sent to INR, which is----
    Senator Biden.  Gotcha.
    Mr. Bolton.  --the function within the State Department 
that deals with----
    Senator Biden.  Last interruption----
    Mr. Bolton.  --intelligence.
    Senator Biden. --Mr. Chairman. The only point I want to 
make is, there was--Mr. Westermann was not commenting on your 
speech; he did not have a copy of a speech. He had a copy of 
the material that had been gathered by the intelligence 
community relative to BW, biological weapons, in Cuba that you 
might or might not be attempting to use in a public way, and 
this had to be cleared, correct?
    Mr. Bolton.  No, no, no. I mean, had the language been 
declassified, that would have been the language used in the 
speech.
    Senator Biden.  No, I got it. But it wasn't.
    Mr. Bolton.  And so----
    Senator Biden.  That's the point.
    Mr. Bolton.  --it was--but the----
    Senator Biden.  It needed to be cleared, right?
    Mr. Bolton.  It needed--it's a two-step process. First was, 
the language had to be declassified. And, because of the 
sensitivity of intelligence----
    Senator Biden.  Right.
    Mr. Bolton.  --sources and methods, the--what was agreed to 
be declassified was the only intelligence material that I would 
use. So, in a sense, had they declassified what was derived 
from their own reports, that would have been what was in the 
speech.
    The Chairman.  Let me just say, now, that the Chair has 
felt these questions were relevant, but I'm hopeful that we can 
stay within our time limit. We're going to have more 
opportunities. And in fairness to each one of us, we ought to 
observe that.
    Back to Senator Coleman.
    Senator Coleman.  Thank you.
    Just to conclude, then. So, Westermann has this piece of 
this--does he send this request to other agencies with his own 
notations in it?
    Mr. Bolton.  That's my understanding.
    Senator Coleman.  And that--and you found out about that 
after the fact, and so you lost confidence in him.
    Mr. Bolton.  Yeah. I mean, occasionally there's--another 
way to have done this would be--it's not unheard of; it does 
happen once in awhile, for the State Department to have one 
view. If he had had a different--he could have come to my 
office, to my staff, and said, ``Look, let's work this out,'' 
and he didn't--that's what caused me to lose confidence----
    Senator Coleman.  This is not an issue of interpreting 
intelligence, is it?
    Mr. Bolton.  It has nothing to do with the substance of 
intelligence, the analysis, or anything--there's no substantive 
disagreement here.
    Senator Coleman.  And, in fact, as I understand it, the 
speech actually was supposed to be given on May 6th. It was 
ultimately given later. But the information in question, was 
that actually--that information the language delivered to the 
Foreign Relations Committee on March 19th----
    Mr. Bolton.  Essentially----
    Senator Coleman. --by Assistant Secretary of State Carl 
Ford?
    Mr. Bolton.  --essentially, exactly the same language, yes.
    Senator Coleman.  So, again, we're not talking about 
interpreting intelligence here.
    Mr. Bolton.  It's not a disagreement about the substance of 
the intelligence. In fact, when Assistant Secretary Ford 
testified again before this committee in June, he was--he said 
that the language in my speech--he said, ``That language was 
our language, the intelligence-community language, not his,'' 
meaning not mine.
    Senator Coleman.  Mr. Bolton--Secretary Bolton, is there 
any question--do you have any question whatsoever about your 
commitment to the mission of the United Nations in taking this 
position?
    Mr. Bolton.  Absolutely not.
    And to finish, in part, if I can, and answer to Senator 
Kerry, the consistent theme of my writings, consistent theme of 
my writings, is that for the U.N. to be effective, it requires 
American leadership. I say it over and over again. I deeply 
believe it.
    My criticisms during the 1990s were, in large measure, 
because of what I thought was the lack of effective American 
leadership.
    Senator Coleman.  And in terms of the U.N., itself, it's 
fair to say that it's legitimate to be disdainful of the United 
Nations action of comparing Zionism with racism.
    Mr. Bolton.  Yeah, I thought--I don't think there's any 
doubt, that is the greatest mistake the United Nations ever 
made. And I can tell you, it was very much my view, but also 
the view of Secretary Baker and President Bush 41, we wanted to 
repeal ``Zionism is racism'' because it was the right thing to 
do, to--it was--it needed to be expunged. But we also knew that 
many Americans, across the political spectrum, understood 
``Zionism is racism'' to be an emblem of the U.N. When they 
thought of the U.N., they thought ``Zionism is racisim.'' And 
repealing that resolution was a prerequisite to getting past 
the--in the minds of many Americans, the idea that the U.N. 
could be useful for anything. So it had a very important 
operational role, as well.
    Senator Coleman.  And, in fact, you know, as we kind of 
move to the present time, the Secretary General, himself, has 
said the U.N. needs reform. And I wanted to repeat what Senator 
Hagel said. I'm going to make the same comment. I strongly 
believe in the United Nations, but I think it's very legitimate 
to raise--to criticize the United Nations that has Libya, at 
one time, as the Chairman of the Human Rights Commission, or a 
Human Rights Commission that has Zimbabwe or the Sudan or Cuba, 
as part as the Human Rights Commission. They've been working 
the last couple of weeks, right now. And in 2005 we're finally 
hearing discussion from the Secretary General that maybe 
something--not ``maybe''--that something is wrong. Does--when 
Cuba or Zimbabwe or the Sudan are part of the Human Rights 
Commission, do you think that undermines the credibility of the 
United Nations?
    Mr. Bolton.  I do. And I thank Secretary General Annan 
does, as well. I don't think there can be any question about 
it. That's why we need reform.
    Senator Coleman.  And let me focus, in the time I have in 
this round, a little bit on Oil-for-Food. You made the comment 
that it taught us about the culture of the bureaucracy. And let 
me back it up. You have a scandal, and one could argue about 
the amount of dollars, but it's all in the B's, with billions, 
that Saddam was able to put in his pocket because the Oil-for-
Food Program was in effect. And it's pretty clear, from the 
first Volcker report, that Benon Sevon, who was in charge of 
the program, Kofi Annan's personal point person in charge of--
was on the take from Saddam Hussein. It's pretty clear, from 
the Volcker reports, that Secretary General's Chief of Staff 
destroyed three years' worth of documents. It's pretty clear 
from the OIOS audits that were done, that what you saw was 
massive mismanagement, massive mismanagement.
    You made the comment that it taught us about the culture of 
the bureaucracy of the United Nations. What did you mean by 
that?
    Mr. Bolton.  Well, I think--in terms of some of the 
specifics, I think it's important, from the administration 
perspective, that we wait for the final Volcker report, and we 
wait for the results of the investigations of all six of the--I 
think it's six congressional committees that are looking--that 
are looking into the matter. But I know, going back to my own 
time serving in the first President Bush's administration, that 
the potential of the United Nations is often sadly diluted by 
the encrustations of bureaucracy that have grown up over the 
years. And it's very important that, in order to be able to 
justify the large amounts that administrations every year 
request for Congress to appropriate, that we can make the case 
that we are acting to make the United Nations a more efficient 
and uncorrupt organization. And the United Nations, itself, is 
obviously concerned. The Deputy Secretary General Louise 
Frechette, said, a few weeks ago, ``We hope we never get 
another Oil-for-Food assignment.'' I, personally, disagree with 
that. There may come a time when we want the United Nations to 
undertake something like this.
    We had--in the first Bush administration, we imagined the 
Oil-for-Food Program, as set up under Resolution 706 and 712, 
as very different from the program that was actually carried 
out. Saddam Hussein rejected 706/712. If it had, it would have 
been an even larger U.N. operation, because we didn't want to 
have the distribution of humanitarian assistance inside Iraq, 
in Iraq hands. We wanted it in U.N. hands.
    But if you can't--if you don't have the basic support and 
belief that the United Nations will function in an uncorrupt 
and effective fashion in the Congress of the United States, 
we'll never have the opportunity to do something potentially 
even bigger than the Oil-for-Food Program. So this is--this, to 
me, is an urgent matter.
    Senator Coleman.  And reform really has to be in two parts. 
There's both the structural reform nature of the Security 
Council who's involved--who are the members--Human Rights 
Commission, other things like that--but then there's also the 
management side.
    I'm going to just read a list of areas where it would be--
it's clear to me that the U.N. has to improve: performance 
measurement, program management, procurement, evaluation, 
monitoring. Are there--can you respond to those? And are there 
things that are needed, in terms of a comprehensive management 
strategy that the U.N. should be looking at, or that we, in 
Congress, should be urging the U.N. to look at?
    Mr. Bolton.  Well, I think both of those are true. It think 
one thing that you might find interesting is, if you went back 
to the Thornburg report of 1993, when, again, the first 
President Bush persuaded former Attorney General Thornburg to 
become Under Secretary General for Management at the U.N. And 
after President Bush lost the '92 election, Dick Thornburg 
was--his one-year appointment was not extended. I guess that's 
the way I should put it. But before he left, he produced a 
report on his year experience at the U.N. and the kinds of 
management changes that he would recommend and that he would 
have endeavored to carry out, had he been there--had he been 
able to stay. And it makes for--it makes for good reading 
today.
    I'm not saying that there aren't good people at the U.N., 
who work hard. And, in fact, the current Under Secretary 
General for Management, Cathy Bertini, is an American citizen 
and a long-time friend of mine. She's worked herself to the 
bone. But it requires a sustained effort of a long period of 
time, and I am very optimistic that, with the Secretary 
General, himself, weighing in, we've got a major chance of 
success here.
    Senator Coleman.  I'd like to continue that discussion in 
the next round, and also talk about the role of Congress.
    Just one other thing for the record. There was a comment 
made that you didn't respond to. Is it your belief that, in the 
Clinton administration, that North Korea froze its nuclear 
development program?
    Mr. Bolton.  I think the evidence is overwhelming that, 
while the United States and others were, sort of, looking down 
a soda straw at the plutonium facility, the plutonium storage--
the spent-fuel storage and reactors at Yongbyon, the North 
Koreans had embarked on an aggressive procurement program to 
acquire uranium enrichment capability that would take them on a 
different road to nuclear weapons. And the intelligence is far 
from clear, there's much that we don't know. The only, I 
think--but one--the only real question is, How early in time 
did the North Koreans begin violating the agreed framework? 
It's something that we talked about in 2001, Senator Kerry, as 
you remember.
    Senator Kerry.  Yeah, let me just make clear, if I can 
insert, I didn't suggest they froze the nuclear program. I said 
the plutonium program. Everybody knew the uranium program was 
on the side.
    The Chairman.  Thank you very much, Senator Coleman.
    Senator Feingold?
    Senator Feingold.  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Secretary Bolton, in your testimony you indicate that, if 
confirmed, you will make it your objective to provide sustained 
and decisive leadership to create a stronger, better, more 
effective U.N. In the same spirit as Senator Kerry's opening 
remarks, I'm trying to square this idea with your past 
statements, which really do suggest that you view the U.N. as a 
deeply flawed institution. And I agree with you, with that part 
of your assessment. It can sometimes serve as a useful 
instrument for U.S. policy. But, otherwise, you appear to 
believe that the U.N. is, at best, irrelevant, and, at worst, 
harmful.
    Now, I believe that we cannot effectively fight the 
terrorist threat before us without a strong multinational 
commitment to doing so. I also believe that getting the rest of 
the world to invest in what is our top priority, fighting 
terrorism, means that we probably have to convince them that we 
are also invested in their top priorities, like fighting 
poverty, fighting poverty in the developing world. But you have 
suggested that the United States should engage with the United 
Nations only when our vital interests are at stake.
    Secretary Bolton, I think we have a vital interest, all of 
the time, in sustaining an effective institution where states 
can engage in the bargaining and the give and take necessary to 
sustain some sense of a shared global enterprise.
    My first question is sort of a case in point. I understand 
that just last week in a public discussion among various 
countries at the Commission on Human Rights, a United States 
delegate objected to some language in the annual torture 
resolution. In particular, the delegate objected to language 
stressing that, quote, ``Each state shall take effective 
measures to prevent acts of torture and other cruel, inhuman, 
or degrading treatment or punishment in any territory under its 
jurisdiction,'' unquote.
    The delegate argued that, while the United States has an 
obligation under the Torture Convention to take effective 
measures to prevent torture, there is no obligation, no 
obligation, to take effective measures to prevent cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment in the text of the treaty. 
Apparently, the Government of Pakistan was the only government 
present that actually supported this United States view.
    Do you believe that the United States delegate took an 
appropriate, or even accurate, position in this case?
    Mr. Bolton.  Well, Senator, my honest answer is, this is 
the first I've heard of it. I don't--I'd have to--I'd have to 
look at the words of the convention, and I'd have to understand 
what the nature of the debate was. And I will endeavor to do 
that and maybe try and get something over the lunch hour. I'm 
not----
    Senator Feingold.  Well----
    Mr. Bolton.  --I'm not familiar with the----
    Senator Feingold.  Secretary, I gave you the words. The 
words state, ``Each state shall take effective measures to 
prevent acts of torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment or punishment in any territory under its 
jurisdiction.'' Our delegate, our representative from the 
United States, did not adhere to that position. That's very 
simple and straightforward. It's not a language issue. I want 
you to tell me whether you believe that this is in the national 
security interest of the United States to take this kind of 
position.
    Mr. Bolton.  Senator, it's hard for me to believe that it 
is, but I think that--but that's my opinion, sitting here 
today.
    Senator Feingold.  Let me switch to another issue involving 
issues concerning the U.N. in the past. We recently observed 
the 11th anniversary of the start of the Rwandan genocide. Much 
has been written about the decisions made by U.S. policymakers 
in the spring of 1994, when the Rwandan genocide began. I'd 
like you to comment a bit, if you could, on the manner in which 
the United States chose to use its influence at the U.N. in 
response to the emerging crisis, and on the manner in which the 
U.N. reacted to developments in Rwanda in 1994. Do you think 
that the U.S. and U.N. policymakers made mistakes in their 
responses? What should they have done differently?
    Mr. Bolton.  Well, I think there were mistakes all around, 
both on the part of the member governments and on the part of 
the United Nations. And I think that this is a case where the 
fallacy of false concreteness applies with particular force. I 
don't think that this is something that the United Nations, 
alone, was responsible for. I think the member governments had 
to take that responsibility.
    Now, there is a lot of debate, and I've read articles on 
both sides about, logistically, when there was awareness of the 
genocide, what steps could have been taken, what our military 
could have done, that I think are unresolved. But, while there 
were clearly failures within the U.N. secretariat, I think that 
it's ultimately the Security Council that's responsible. The 
Security Council deployed the force into Rwanda, not the 
secretariat.
    Senator Feingold.  I want to pursue this more. I'm 
interested in how you think we should have done things 
differently. If you are confirmed, you would be at that 
Security Council.
    Mr. Bolton.  Yeah.
    Senator Feingold.  There are situations in Africa, at this 
moment, that some would argue--in fact, our previous Secretary 
of State referred to it as genocide. What would you have done 
differently? Give me some sense of what you would do in these 
currently situations differently to try to avoid this kind of 
disaster.
    Mr. Bolton.  Well, I think the question, if you look at the 
contrasting situations in Burundi and Rwanda at about the same 
time, the mission of Ould Abdullah, the former Foreign Minister 
of Mauritania, in Burundi, was actually much more successful in 
working the politics inside Burundi and preventing the kind of 
tragedy that occurred inside Rwanda.
    I don't think that the dispatch of a U.N. peacekeeping 
force, alone, is indicative of--necessarily, of success or 
failure. And I think, obviously, what happened inside Rwanda 
was a failure on multiple levels.
    Senator Feingold.  Let me try one more time. If you had 
been United States Ambassador to the U.N. at that time, knowing 
all that you know now, what action would you have taken?
    Mr. Bolton.  I'm not sure that I can honestly answer that, 
Senator, because we don't know, logistically, whether it would 
have been possible to do anything different than what the 
administration did at the time. It is--I think you have to ask 
the predicate question, What could have been done in the years 
beforehand that might have avoided the triggering of the 
genocide, itself? Once it started, as I say, there are serious 
people who argue that the bulk of the genocide was, and would 
have been, concluded before any outside presence could have 
been brought to bear. And I don't--I know there are 
disagreements with that. I think it's not something I have the 
capability to----
    Senator Feingold.  Mr. Secretary, in theory, you could be 
sitting at that table very soon. I must say, your answer is 
amazingly passive considering what happened ten years ago and 
what may be happening in Sudan at this point.
    Mr. Secretary, how do you think Secretary Powell's dramatic 
2003 presentation to the United Nations regarding Iraq's 
weapons-of-mass-destruction programs affected United States 
credibility at the U.N. and in the international community? And 
what lessons can we draw from that episode?
    Mr. Bolton.  Well, if I could just add one word on the 
earlier point, on Sudan, I think the administration has taken 
substantial effort. It was a very extensive diplomatic project 
to get the agreement between north and south that's now been 
signed, and the dispatch of the U.N. peacekeepers. And I think 
that's the kind of activity that was--that might have made the 
difference in Rwanda. It's very hard to go back and 
secondguess, especially given the information that people had 
at the time.
    In terms----
    Senator Feingold.  I don't--let me just say, I don't think 
our actions to date--this administration's actions with regard 
to Sudan rise to that level, or even approach the efforts that 
need to be taken. But if you'd answer the question regarding 
Secretary Powell?
    Mr. Bolton.  Well, I think, unquestionably, the failure to 
find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq has led some people to 
question our goodwill and our credibility. We have worked hard, 
in the case, for example, of Iran and North Korea, to assure 
other governments that the information that we have is the best 
that there is available. And I think that--for those who deal 
with weapons-of-mass-destruction issues, that there is an 
understanding that the circumstances, the threat that we see 
from North Korea and Iran, is as real as is humanly possibly to 
know. But I also agree with the Silverman-Robb Commission 
conclusion that there is too little that we know about North 
Korea and Iran. That absence of information doesn't make me 
feel more comfortable, however.
    Senator Feingold.  That's a general answer, but I want to 
know, specifically, your reaction to the spectacle of Secretary 
Powell having presented this incorrect information to the world 
at--in the United Nations, and what consequences that has had.
    Mr. Bolton.  I felt very sorry for him, after the fact. And 
I think it has had consequences. I think that there's no 
adverse consequences. There's no way of getting around it.
    Senator Feingold.  One more question. Are you arguing--back 
to the Darfur issue--are you arguing that the administration 
has taken any effective action to stop genocide in Darfur?
    Mr. Bolton.  Well, I think the actions that have been taken 
have focused largely on locking in the North-South Agreement. I 
think that's critical, because the--what's happening in Darfur 
is not a subset of the North-South dispute, but that North-
South dispute, as you know, went on for years and years and 
years. The question of the accountability of the government in 
Khartoum is critical, I think, to getting the situation in 
Darfur resolved, and it's why, contrary to what some have said, 
we did have, and pushed vigorously for, a mechanism to bring 
accountability. But we also pushed for the deployment of AU 
forces into the Darfur region, which was logistically the only 
option that we had available. And it would have been helpful, I 
think, if some of our colleagues on the Security Council had 
been more forthcoming on that score.
    But this is something that the President has been--paid 
very close personal attention to. It's a matter--it was a 
matter of highest priority for Secretary Powell, and it is for 
Secretary Rice.
    Senator Feingold.  I know my time's up, but let me just 
finish by saying, I happen to think that, as important as the 
North-South Agreement is with regard to Sudan, and it was very 
important that we focus on it, too often it's used as a reason 
not to address the Darfur issue, rather than as a foundation 
for dealing with it. So the notion that somehow this has been 
effective, in terms of putting in a situation to stop the 
genocide in Darfur, I think, is simply untrue.
    Mr. Bolton.  No, but I--if I could, I think I agree with 
you on that point, Senator. I'm not saying that working about--
worrying about the North-South situation is an excuse for not 
doing anything in Darfur. I'm saying that if the North-South 
Agreement were to come unstuck, we would lose the advantage of 
that agreement and make it even more difficult than it's been 
to do anything about Darfur.
    Senator Feingold.  Well, that's a red herring. I asked 
about whether we've taken any effective action with regard to 
Darfur, and you did not indicate that we had, so I'm taking 
that as a no.
    Mr. Bolton.  But, if I could, because I think--if I could 
just continue the answer--I think that we have worked, in the 
Security Council and diplomatically, and certainly applied 
pressure to the Government of Khartoum. It's one of the reasons 
why we wanted the resolution on sanctions adopted by the 
Security Council, and why the Council's decision to adopt that 
resolution was so important.
    I don't think we're satisfied. I don't want to leave the 
impression that we're satisfied that the situation has been 
addressed adequately. We've made some progress, but there is no 
dispute, Senator, that much more needs to be done.
    Senator Feingold.  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman.  Thank you, Senator Feingold.
    Senator Boxer?
    Senator Boxer.  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Dodd is right when he said that we don't often vote 
no. I, myself, went back to the record. I've voted no three 
times out of hundreds that have come through this committee, 
ambassadors and the rest, in the Bush administration. So this 
is a serious moment for a lot of us. And I know it's difficult 
for you, Mr. Bolton, but--but we are where we are.
    Mr. Chairman, I'm bewildered by this nomination, given the 
situation in the world, where the President has gone around the 
world to try to rebuild relationships, Secretary Rice has done 
that.
    Mr. Bolton, I respect your commitment to public service--I 
do--and the good things you've done, among a whole list of 
things that maybe I didn't think were as good as some. But I 
have spent the last month extensively reviewing your writings, 
your public statements about the United Nations. And my overall 
assessment, Mr. Bolton, is that you have nothing but disdain 
for the United Nations.
    Now, you can dance around it, you can run away from it, you 
can put perfume on it, but the bottom line is the bottom line. 
And I--as Senator Biden said in his opening, it's hard for me 
to know why you'd want to work at an institution that you said 
didn't even exist. You said, ``It doesn't even exist.'' And you 
want to work there.
    Now, there's a three-minute tape I would like to show, and 
use those three minutes of my time, because I think the 
American people need to see you away from this hearing, where 
you're parsing your words, and see you at this conference, 
where you were talking about the United Nations, Global 
Structures Convocation, Human Rights, Global Governance, and 
Strengthening the U.N. So I'd like us to watch that for the 
next three minutes and also make a point that I have all your 
whole statement here. They're brief. Everything you see here is 
not taken out of context at all. And I just think it's 
important for people to see this. So if we could roll that, it 
would be great. [Presentation of video:]
    Mr. Bolton [video]: Let me start off with what may seem a 
somewhat radical----
    Senator Boxer.  Louder, please.
    The Chairman.  Turn the volume up.
    Senator Boxer.  Louder.
    Mr. Bolton [video]: --if we could consider potential roles 
for the United Nations----
    Senator Boxer.  More.
    Senator Biden.  Get it all the way up.
    Mr. Bolton [video]: --that proposition is, there is no such 
thing as the United Nations. There is an organization, which is 
composed of member governments. It does have an entity called 
the Security Council, which is principally responsible for 
international peace and security under the charter. But there 
is no ``being'' out there called the ``United Nations.'' There 
is simply a group of member governments, who, if they have the 
political will every once in awhile to protect international 
peace and security, they're able to do it.
    The point that I want to leave with you in this very brief 
presentation is where I started, is that there is no United 
Nations. There is an international community that occasionally 
can be led by the only real power left in the world, and that's 
the United States, when it suits our interest and when we can 
get others to go along. And I think it would be a real mistake 
to count on the United Nations as if it's some disembodied 
entity out there that can function on its own. When the United 
States leaves, the United Nations will fall. When it suits our 
interest to do so, we will leave. When it does not suit our 
interest to do so, we will not. And I think that is the most 
important thing to carry away tonight.
    Second, if you think that there is any possibility in this 
country that a 51,000-person bureaucracy is going to be 
supported by most Americans, you'd better think again. The 
secretariat building in New York has 38 stories. If you lost 
ten stories today, it wouldn't make a bit of difference.
    The fact of the matter is that the international system 
that has grown up--and, again, I leave out the World Bank and 
the IMF, because I do think they're in a separate category--has 
been put into a position of hiring ineffective people who do 
ineffective things that have no real-world impact, and we pay 
25 percent of the budget.
    The League of Nations was a failure, because the United 
States did not participate. The United Nations would be a 
failure if the United States did not participate. And, in fact, 
I remember as vividly as if it were yesterday, right after Iraq 
invaded Kuwait, Jim Baker said to me, ``We're going not make 
this United Nations work. We're going to find out whether it's 
a League of Nations or the U.N.''
    And that's the fact. And if you don't like it, then I'm 
sorry. The United States makes the U.N. work, when it wants to 
work, and that is exactly the way it should be, because the 
only question--the only question for the United States is, 
What's our national interest? And if you don't like that, I'm 
sorry, but that is the fact. [End of video presentation.]
    Senator Boxer.  Mr. Chairman, the reason I wanted to show 
that is many-fold. First, I think there's a little bit of 
revisionist history going on here, in terms of the nominee's 
attitude toward the United Nations. I mean, I watch this, just 
as a human being, forget about the Senate part, and I see an 
anger, a hostility. Who would ever dream of saying, ``If ten 
floors of a building were to disappear''? I mean, I wonder if 
you thought about the fact that 1400-plus Americans work in 
that building, who chose to in that building because they 
believe it's a worthy thing to try and bring peace to the 
world?
    So I just feel that this nominee could do lots of other 
things for President Bush, I'm sure, and do them really well, 
but I don't see this. It just doesn't make sense.
    And I guess, you know, this comparison that Secretary Rice 
made when she endorsed you and announced your appointment, she 
compared you to Jeanne Kirkpatrick and Daniel Moynihan. And I'd 
like to show you this comparison and see whether you think some 
of the things you said were inappropriate, wrong, or whatever.
    This is what Dr. Rice said, ``Through history, some of our 
best ambassadors have been those with the strongest voices, 
ambassadors like Jeanne Kirkpatrick and Daniel Patrick 
Moynihan.''
    And this is what Jeanne Kirkpatrick said, in 1981, ``I do 
not think that one should ever seek confrontation. What I have 
every intention and hope of doing is to operate in a low-key, 
quiet, persuasive, and consensus-building way.''
    And this is what you say, ``The Secretariat building in New 
York has 38 stories. If you lost ten stories, it wouldn't make 
a bit of difference.'' You said, ``There is no United 
Nations.'' ``If we were redoing the Security Council, I'd have 
one permanent member, because that's the real reflection of the 
distribution of power in the world.''
    Now, do you disagree--now, do you disagree with the 
statements that you made?
    Mr. Bolton.  Well, the tape that you just showed, and some 
of those statements, come from a panel discussion--I think it 
was in 1994--before the World Federalists. The World 
Federalists believe in world government. And I do not.
    Senator Boxer.  I'm not interested in them. I'm interested 
in you.
    Mr. Bolton.  I was talking to that audience at the time, so 
that's what I'm trying to explain.
    Senator Boxer.  Well, you don't say different things to 
different audiences.
    Mr. Bolton.  I was--no, I don't. What many of the World 
Federalists believe is that the U.N. is the nascent world 
government coming into being. And I don't agree with that, 
either. So what I was trying to do to that audience of World 
Federalists was get their attention, and the comment about----
    Senator Boxer.  So you don't----
    Mr. Bolton.  --the ten stories was a way of saying there's 
not a bureaucracy in the world that can't be made leaner and 
more efficient. I was----
    Senator Boxer.  Well, that isn't----
    Mr. Bolton.  --trying to get their attention.
    Senator Boxer. --what you said. You said, ``It wouldn't be 
missed.'' We can look at--you know, what wouldn't be missed? 
Talk to us about that.
    Mr. Bolton.  I think a reduction in personnel is something 
that every manager and every government organization, every 
international organization should strive for, and that was the 
metaphor I was trying to come up with, as I say, to get their 
attention.
    The question about--as the--you cut off the middle of my 
presentation in your showing of----
    Senator Boxer.  Well, I asked----
    Mr. Bolton.  --the tape.
    Senator Boxer. --unanimous consent to put the entire 
statement in the record.
    Mr. Bolton.  I appreciate that.
    The concept that I was addressing there is the problem of 
false concreteness, where many people say, ``Well, the U.N. did 
that,'' or, ``The U.N. did that.'' ``The U.N. failed here,'' 
or, ``The U.N. succeeded here.'' And in the vast majority of 
cases, it's not a question of the U.N. qua U.N. succeeding or 
failing. It's a question of whether the member governments of 
the United Nations have made the correct decision. And that 
problem of false concreteness is something that I think is a 
very real problem. It's a----
    Senator Boxer.  Mr. Bolton, I don't mean--I don't mean to 
cut you off, but you're getting away from the point. I read 
everything in here. You didn't talk about there being--you need 
to fire certain people. You say, ``The point I want to leave 
with you in this very brief presentation is where I started, 
there is no United Nations. There is an international community 
that occasionally can be led by the only real power left in the 
world, and that's the United States, when it suits our interest 
and when--and when we can get others to go along. And I think 
it would be a real mistake to count on the U.N. as if it's some 
disembodied entity out there that can function.''
    Now, the point is, that's what you want to leave these 
people with, and we will put this in the record. So if this 
afternoon--I want to be fair to you. I honestly do. There is 
nothing in there that I believe would change, in any way, your 
main points here. But, you know, I'm looking over the building, 
the secretariat building. The 36th floor where the Office for 
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs is located, that is 
the office that coordinates U.N. assistance in response to 
emergencies, like the recent tsunami that devastated part of 
Asia. Maybe they have too many people working there? Should 
they maybe fire the receptionist who's not good, just like we 
could do that around here, or you could in your office? That 
wasn't the stuff of what you were talking about. You said, ``If 
there were ten floors gone.''
    And then I wonder if you were talking about the 31st floor, 
the U.N.'s Department for Disarmament Affairs, which works to 
strengthen the disarmament regimes with respect to weapons of 
mass destruction and promotes disarmament in the area of 
conventional weapons.
    I wonder if you were talking about the Office of the 
Special Representative for Children in Armed Conflict that 
works to stop the use of child soldiers.
    So the point is that what we saw here, I think, is the real 
John Bolton. You know, basically, this is who--what you 
believe. And for you to be going go the United Nations, when 
everyone knows you said these things, you know, ``Hi, I'm John 
Bolton. I've come to the U.N.'' It's a very tough thing for 
those at the other end. And I think it would be a very tough 
thing for you, when you put so much of your passion and your 
anger into bringing down this particular institution.
    Is my time up? I will save the rest. I'm sure you're 
delighted to know that.
    Thank you. [Laughter.]
    Mr. Bolton.  No, but I think that--the Chairman's very 
courteous decision at the beginning was that I could answer the 
question even if the red light was on, and I will just say, in 
25 words or less, the passage that you left out of the tape is 
my description of President Bush and Secretary Baker's very 
effective creation of the coalition after Saddam Hussein's 
invasion of Kuwait, in 1990, and their use of the Security 
Council to repel the invaders.
    Senator Boxer.  Well, if I----
    The Chairman.  The entire statement----
    Senator Boxer. --if I might say----
    The Chairman.  --will be put in the record.
    Senator Boxer. --everyone should read it. It has nothing to 
do with your--what you're leaving the people with. It is a 
small part of this. It is not the main body of this.
    The Chairman.  I thank the Senator.
    Senator Obama?
    Senator Obama.  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Bolton, thank you very much for appearing here. I know 
this is right before the break, so just bear with me.
    First of all, I'd like unanimous consent to place my 
written statement into the record.
    The Chairman.  It will be placed in full.
    Senator Obama.  You know, I was reflecting on the fact that 
some of the most distinguished Americans, Democrats and 
Republicans--Daniel Patrick Moynihan, George H.W. Bush, Henry 
Cabot Lodge--have served in the position to which you're now 
seeking confirmation. There's one particular person that I 
would like to mention, not only because he's an Illinoian, but 
because I think he speaks to how important this position can 
be, and that's Adlai Stevenson.
    I think some people may be aware of the fact that Adlai 
Stevenson served in this position during the Cuban Missile 
Crisis. And, as we all know, it was Stevenson's presentation to 
the U.N. Security Council that proved to the world that the 
Soviets were moving intermediate-range missiles into Cuba. He 
used charts and photos to build a compelling case, declared to 
Soviet Ambassador Zorin that he was prepared to wait until hell 
freezes over for Zorin's response to the U.S. charges.
    You know, what many people don't recall is that Stevenson's 
presentation came on the heels of what might be considered a 
substantial intelligence failure on the part of the U.S. 
Government. A year earlier, Stevenson had been misled by the 
White House and the CIA into publicly stating that the United 
States was not behind the Bay of Pigs invasion. And you 
probably are aware of the fact that Stevenson almost resigned 
over that incident.
    The reason I think that this is worth keeping mind is that, 
during the Cuban Missile Crisis, we were able to succeed 
diplomatically because of the stature and integrity of the 
Permanent Representative to the United Nations. In fact, 
President Kennedy said--I'm quoting here--``The integrity and 
credibility of Adlai Stevenson constitute one of our greatest 
national assets.'' And, as a result of that credibility, 
Stevenson was able to get tough, isolate the Soviets, be blunt, 
and convince the world that we were right.
    I, personally, think we're facing a similar situation today 
with the rest of the world questioning our intelligence 
capabilities and nuclear proliferation threats from Iran to 
North Korea that may require action by the Security Council. We 
have to be able to convince the world that we're right.
    And so, you know, we had occasion to meet in my office, and 
I very much appreciated our dialogue. You know, my overall 
impression is that you are extraordinarily capable, 
extraordinarily intelligent. And I have to say that most of the 
provocative statements that I've heard are ones that--some of 
them, I probably subscribe to; others, which, you know, I take 
as being part of an academic exercise or, you know, the process 
of speaking in panels. You're outside of government, you're 
speaking your mind. I don't hold each and every one of these 
statements against you. The overall portrait, though, is of 
someone who may not be in a position to do what Stevenson did, 
which is persuade the world that America is right, and not 
simply partisan.
    And I have to say, there's one quote in that tape that 
particularly disturbed me, and that was, ``subscribe to the 
notion that we will lead when it suits our interests,'' the 
implication being that when it's convenient for us to engage in 
the United Nations, we shall do so; and when it's not 
convenient, we won't. As I think Senator Feingold mentioned, if 
that ends up being the standard, then it's going to be pretty 
hard for us to gain the kind of cooperation that we need on 
important issues like the war on terror.
    But let me focus just on a couple of specific questions 
that may help clarify the record here.
    I thought that you made an interesting statement, one that 
I was--I actually wanted to get the precise transcript on--in 
your assessment of the Silverman-Robb report, because you said 
that the principal problem that you gleaned from the report was 
that reasonable hypotheses became hardened in the minds of 
certain administration analysts, intelligence officers, and so 
forth, that those then turned into presumptions that remained, 
despite the fact that they were not corroborated by hard facts. 
I don't have the precise statement in front of me, but I think 
that was a pretty accurate--I tried to write it down as fast as 
I can, because I thought it made a lot of sense. Would you say 
that's an accurate----
    Mr. Bolton.  I think that's a fair characterization.
    Senator Obama.  Okay. I think that the concern that--the 
concerns that have been raised with respect to these e-mails 
going back and forth and your relationship with Mr. Westermann 
and so forth is not a bunch of cheap shots. It's not 
bureaucratic infighting that we're trying to disclose. What--it 
has to do with whether this is an example exactly of what you 
said the Silverman-Robb report warns against, which is that you 
had a particular perspective, you had an intelligence analyst 
who was concerned that your perspective was not quite right, 
and that, in that context, you were interested in shading or 
shaping the analysis to fit your reasonable hypotheses. That's, 
I think, the reason that we're concerned. Applying your test, 
that we don't want our intelligence to be not corroborated by 
hard facts.
    And so, I understand that you're going to get the record of 
all the statements that have been made available. At this 
stage, since you haven't had a chance to review them all, I 
guess I would just ask you, If the record indicates that you 
were seeking to reject hard facts because they didn't neatly 
fit into a speech that you were making on behalf of the United 
States Government, is it fair to say that that would be 
something that this panel should be concerned about, and that 
that might undermine your capacity to be a credible advocate 
for the United States in the United Nations?
    Mr. Bolton.  Yeah, I think failure to pay attention to 
reality and facts, however unpleasant they are, is an extremely 
undesirable characteristic. In this case, I don't remember what 
the alternative formulation was. It was not anything having to 
do with the substance of whatever it was; it was the fact I 
didn't think I had been dealt with squarely.
    Senator Obama.  Fair enough. I just want to pinpoint, 
though--it may be that there's a dispute on the facts. But what 
I want to do is establish a common principle, which is that we 
want our intelligence analysts to give us information that's 
based on their best assessment of the facts, even if it doesn't 
fit our hypotheses. Is that a----
    Mr. Bolton.  I absolutely----
    Senator Obama. --fair principle?
    Mr. Bolton.  --I absolutely agree with that.
    Senator Obama.  And if we have a situation where the 
higher-ups in our foreign-policy community are squelching 
dissent--albeit internal--squelching dissent that might impede 
the American people from getting the best possible intelligence 
information to the people who are in decision-making positions, 
then that could potentially hamper our ability to fight the war 
on terrorism.
    Mr. Bolton.  We have to have the facts as they are, whether 
they're pleasant or not.
    Senator Obama.  Okay.
    Mr. Bolton.  There's simply no doubt about it.
    Senator Obama.  We don't have time before the break to make 
this determination. I think one of the things that we'll want 
to pursue, then, after the break, is whether that is, in fact, 
what happened here. My understanding is, you don't feel that's 
what happened here. I think some of the panel, based on the 
interviews we've seen, feels that it is what happened. But I 
just wanted to establish the principle that it would be 
troubling if we are discouraging analysts from giving us the 
best possible information.
    Let me just move to a couple of other points. I have to 
watch out for my time here.
    I want to talk to you a little bit about Iran, because 
that's obviously an area where, along with North Korea, we're 
going to have a lot of interest in making sure that the 
international community joins us in expressing concern and 
impeding the development of nuclear weapons there. What's your 
assessment, at this point, of our administration's position 
with respect to the European efforts of diplomacy with Iran and 
the fact that it appears, at least, that the President's made 
some contradictory statements with respect to whether or not we 
should be engaging in Iran?
    And, finally, just let me close the loop by saying, What do 
you think the Security Council's role in this overall process 
should be?
    Mr. Bolton.  Well, I think, from the outset of our focus on 
Iran, there has been agreement between the United States and 
the EU-3 on the overall objective. And that is to say, it was 
unacceptable for Iran to have a nuclear weapons capability. 
There had been, for the past year and a half, roughly, tactical 
disagreements between the EU-3 and the United States about how 
to proceed. There had also been discussions that we had 
conducted with Russia, in terms of the fueling or the Bushehr 
reactor in Iran, and discussions we've had with Japan and China 
on their interest in access to Iran oil and gas reserves. And 
one of the things that I think has troubled us from the outset 
on this is that Iran has split all of these different powers 
that I've mentioned, among which I think there really is broad 
agreement on the unacceptability of Iran achieving a nuclear-
weapons status.
    Now, it had been our view, and remains our view, that the 
Iranian effort to achieve nuclear weapons constitutes a threat 
to international peace and security, which is the triggering 
threshold for Security Council jurisdiction.
    What the President and Secretary Rice have accomplished in 
the past two months, I think, is a substantial closing of the 
tactical gap with the Europeans, and indirectly with the 
Russians, on that point. Having made a number of modifications 
in our position, we achieved from the European--the three 
European foreign ministers, I think, a pretty clear statement 
that utilization of the Security Council at some point in 
dealing with the Iranian nuclear-weapons program was something 
that they would be willing to undertake.
    The issue about the Security Council, from the outset, has 
been exactly what role it would have. And we have, over the 
course of the past year, roughly, exchanged thoughts with the 
three European countries, with Japan, with Russia, and with 
China, over how the Security Council might engage if the issue 
with Iran's nuclear-weapons program got on the Council's 
agenda. It was not a question simply of automatic resort to 
sanctions. There is a--I think, a large measure of additional 
sunlight and pressure that's brought to bear by having Iran to 
try and answer in the Security Council, and that's been one of 
the reasons why it's been our view that it needs to get to the 
Security Council at some point. That's why we've been pressing 
in the IAEA Board of Governors for that referral.
    Now, I think the ball is really in Iran's court at this 
point, that the Europeans have delivered the message about the 
what the President and the Secretary have said, they've made it 
clear that they need to see something from Iran, in terms of 
demonstrating that it's prepared to make the strategic decision 
to forego to the pursuit of nuclear weapons. I think there's 
some feeling that it's unlikely we will get a major substantive 
response from the Iranians before their elections in June. I 
don't know whether that's right or not. That's the feeling of 
many people. And that it may be that we're going to have to 
wait for some period of time after the elections.
    So, we may be in something of a period of indeterminancy, 
but I do think that the President and the Secretary have 
achieved a significant success in closing the tactical gap that 
existed.
    The Chairman.  Thank you very much.
    Senator Obama.  Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I'll 
seek to pursue this a little bit longer next round.
    The Chairman.  Thank you, sir.
    Senator Nelson?
    Senator Nelson.  Mr. Chairman, am I the only thing standing 
between us and lunch? [Laughter.]
    The Chairman.  Yes.
    Senator Nelson.  Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll be brief.
    Mr. Bolton, I'm sure we would agree that it is important 
for us, the United States of America, to have the best 
representative for America to represent the interests of the 
U.S. in the world body, the United Nations. And I think 
ambassadors such as Ambassador Negroponte and Ambassador--
former Senator John Danforth, were forceful and effective 
advocates of U.S. interests in the United Nations. And what I 
worry about in your confirmation is that your history of 
somewhat inflammatory rhetoric and your speaking style is going 
to create an incentive for other nations to oppose us at the 
U.N.
    Would you comment, please?
    Mr. Bolton.  Well, I hope that would not be true, Senator. 
I think--as I believe Senator Lugar said in his opening 
remarks, I think you have different styles of speaking, 
depending on different circumstances. In close, tense, hard 
negotiations, I think you're pursuing one approach. I think if 
you're trying to engage in public diplomacy, you may engage in 
another approach.
    You know, I can speak as a former Assistant Secretary of 
State for International Organizations. It's hardwired in me 
that the Permanent Representative in New York needs to follow 
instructions. And many of the statements that are made on the 
record in New York are actually written here in Washington, 
written and cleared around here in Washington. And I don't 
anticipate that's going to change.
    I think this is a heavy responsibility. I have no doubt 
about it. If confirmed, it would be a major task for me. But I 
think that, looking at the record that I've achieved in other 
diplomatic areas--in the negotiation of the Proliferation 
Security Initiative, the negotiation of the Treaty of Moscow 
that President Bush and President Putin signed in May of 2002, 
the successful withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, the repeal of 
the Zionism is Racism Resolution, the G8 Global Partnership, 
and other things--that that is a--that is an indication of what 
is possible in New York.
    Senator Nelson.  Well, let's talk about that. Your job, for 
the last four years, has been arms negotiator. What success can 
you point to with regard to those negotiations in one of the 
major interests of the United States? And that is the 
nonproliferation of North Korea?
    Mr. Bolton.  I think that the policy that the President has 
pursued to have the major regional powers surrounding North 
Korea engaged in what we now call the Six-Party talks, as 
opposed to having the United States engaged bilaterally with 
North Korea, is precisely the right way to go. We've been 
trying now for two years to persuade the North Koreans that no 
one accepts that they are to have nuclear weapons. The North 
Koreans have been refusing to negotiate. They have clearly not 
made the strategic choice to give up the pursuit of nuclear 
weapons. And, as I said a few moments ago, Secretary Rice, in 
her recent trip to Asia, I think, stressed, in China, South 
Korea, and Japan, the importance that we attach to getting 
North Korea back to the negotiating table.
    Senator Nelson.  Mr. Bolton, over the course of the last 
four years, has North Korea increased in its nuclear capability 
and/or increased its possession of nuclear warheads?
    Mr. Bolton.  There are some estimates to that effect, but I 
don't think we know for sure. The original estimate of North 
Korea having sufficient fissile material for one to two 
plutonium-based nuclear weapons was in, actually, 1991 to 1992, 
based on open sources. What we don't know is how many--how much 
fissile material for plutonium weapons they now may have, or 
whether any of it's been fashioned into weapons.
    The major development, I think, in the North Korea matter, 
the tectonic shift that occurred, came in the summer of 2002, 
when all of our intelligence agencies concluded that North 
Korea had been engaged, for some period of time, in a 
production scope procurement to acquire a uranium enrichment 
capability, given them a separate route to nuclear weapons. We 
don't know a lot about that, but it's a very troubling 
development, because a lot of this is simply--involves 
processes that we don't know much about. We don't know what the 
real North Korean capacity is. And that's one of the reasons 
why President Bush has made the Six-Party talks the priority 
that he's had, why he's had any number of discussions with the 
Chinese leadership about the importance of pursuing it.
    Senator Nelson.  And the Six-Party talks are stalled, and 
we are getting nowhere, and the nuclear clock continues to 
tick, and, increasingly, North Korea gains the capability as a 
nuclear power, and we've seen that they have already had a 
history of peddling any kind of weapons system. And if we keep 
going on and don't draw to a successful conclusion, whether it 
be Six-Party or one-on-one negotiations, it's not a very good 
result for the United States. What makes you think that the 
current policy will change the North Koreans' minds over the 
next four years?
    Mr. Bolton.  Senator, I don't disagree at all with your 
assessment of the North Koreans and their propensity to 
proliferate weapons and technology of weapons of mass 
destruction. That is one of the most disturbing aspects about 
that government. We know, already, that the revenues that they 
obtained from the proliferation of ballistic-missile 
technology, for example, they used to support their nuclear-
weapons program. So--and it was the North Korean activity, in 
large part, that led to the idea that became the Proliferation 
Security Initiative. That's why, over a year ago, I think, Dr. 
Rice was asked, ``How long do you anticipate the Six-Party 
talks will go on?'' And this was over a year ago. But she said, 
``As long as they're productive.''
    The real issue here, at the moment, is whether North Korea 
is going to come back to the table, because, obviously, if 
they're not there negotiating, we're not making much progress. 
And I don't--you know, I don't--there's no deadline or anything 
like that, but I also think it's manifest that if we are not 
making progress, at some point you have to look at other 
possibilities.
    We've been--I don't mean to run on this answer; I'd just 
say one more thing--we've been very grateful for the effort the 
Chinese have made to make the Six-Party talks effective. 
They're not the problem. The problem is North Korea.
    Senator Nelson.  I wanted you to run on, and I wasn't going 
to interrupt you, because I wanted to hear your answer as to 
why you think your job, as a negotiator, has been successful 
with regard to North Korea over the last four years.
    And, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the opportunity. 
And I told you I'd stay, not only within, but less than the 
allotted time.
    The Chairman.  Thank you, Senator.
    And the hearing is recessed until 2:00 p.m.
    [Whereupon, at 12:52 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

                           AFTERNOON SESSION

    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m. in room 
SH-216, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar, 
chairman of the committee, presiding.
    Present: Senators Lugar, Chafee, Allen, Coleman, Sununu, 
Sarbanes, Dodd, Kerry, Feingold, Boxer, Nelson, and Obama.
    Also present: Senator John Warner.
    The Chairman.  This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee is called, again, to order. Secretary Bolton, it may 
have been a lapse on my part this morning, but there have been 
requests that you be a sworn witness, so if you would rise now, 
I would like to swear you in.
    Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing 
but the truth, so help you God?
    Mr. Bolton.  I do.
    The Chairman.  I thank you, sir.
    We will commence another round of ten minutes for each 
Senator, and I will begin now and ask the clerk to start the 
clock running on these questions.

     STATEMENT OF JOHN R. BOLTON, UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE, 
                      DEPARTMENT OF STATE

    The Chairman.  Secretary Bolton, do you believe that U.N. 
reforms should include a look at the internal structures of the 
United Nations to see whether there are opportunities to 
streamline them and their procedures? There are five 
committees, for example, that report to the General Assembly. 
The suggestion has been made that, perhaps, the second and 
third committees--those that deal with economic and social 
issues on the one hand, and social and humanitarian and 
cultural matters on the other--might be combined and that's a 
more obvious choice, perhaps, but have you given thought, 
getting into the nitty gritty details of the U.N. structure, 
during this time the Secretary General has called for a general 
reform, and you've mentioned specifically this morning Security 
Council reform, I ask if the committees or other structural 
situations you would like to lay before us in laying down this 
record today?
    Mr. Bolton.  Mr. Chairman, this is really, I think, a very 
important point about internal U.N. procedures. You know, the 
Charter sets up the Economic and Social Council as one of the 
principle organs of the United Nations, along with the General 
Assembly, the Security Council and the Trusteeship Council. The 
Economic and Social Council, or ECOSOC as it's called, has 
oversight responsibility for all the U.N. specialized agencies, 
or at least the principle specialized agencies that deal with 
economic and humanitarian affairs. So, that you have a 
situation where the work of the second and third committees of 
the General Assembly, in very large measure--not entirely, but 
in very large measure--overlaps what ECOSOC does. And as with 
all of the six principle committees of the General Assembly, 
the second and third committees are committees of the whole, so 
that the--all 191 members--are involved in their work. I think 
a question of what to do with the, first, the overlap between 
the responsibility, the second and third committees is 
important to take a look at, and then second, to see what might 
be possible with respect to ECOSOC. In the first Bush 
Administration, we made an effort to revive ECOSOC that I'd 
have to say was only partially successful, at best.
    That's one example. Another example would be the fourth 
committee of the General Assembly, which deals with special 
political and decolonization questions. Decolonization is not 
exactly a major topic of debate these days, and one would have 
to ask whether the fourth committee, in its present form, 
should not be reviewed as well.
    Mr. Chairman.  I thank you for those constructive 
suggestions, and I know maybe other members will want to follow 
up in that area of reform.
    Let me comment that I appreciated your response to the 
senior Senator from Maryland, Senator Sarbanes, on the Law of 
the Sea issue. It is one that I have raised with you prior to 
the hearing, in which you have given extensive answers that are 
not identical, certainly follow very much what the Secretary of 
State has given to the Committee in her testimony. And my 
question, more recently, the Council for the State Department, 
specifically, I raise the Law of the Sea question in the 
context of this hearing because some critics of the Law of the 
Sea have contended that--in the event that we ratify the 
treaty--our sovereignty would be compromised, that we would, in 
fact, become part of a United Nations organization that, in 
fact, taxes might be levied on the United States through the 
United Nations, through the Seabed Commission, or through other 
aspects of this. And, in essence, that the Law of the Sea 
situation embroils us in the sort of world governments business 
that you were discussing this morning, as opposed to 
facilitating our military--as we've heard testimony from the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations, and, for 
that matter, specific endorsement of the President of the 
United States who asked us to ratify that treaty as one of five 
treaties that he felt was especially important.
    I mention all of this in preface to ask from your own 
experience as a person involved in the United Nations or from 
the outside, in the State Department or so forth, do you see 
any potential entanglement of the United States with the Law of 
the Sea Treaty, and loss of sovereignty to the U.N. or to any 
other world body?
    Mr. Bolton.  No, I don't see that the Law of the Sea Treaty 
implicates the United Nations in any material respect, and 
those that have gone over the question of the seabed conclude 
that there's no risk of taxation or anything like that. As I 
say, my own review--and that of the bureaus that report to me--
was on the importance that our military attached to it. I will 
say, perhaps one related point--a number of people have asked 
about the relationship of the Law of the Sea Treaty to the 
Proliferation Security Initiative--and you know, I don't think 
that if the Senate were to ratify the Law of the Sea Treaty and 
it were to, the President were to make the Treaty, that it 
would have any negative impact whatever on PSI. One of the 
things that PSI's Statement of Interdiction Principles says 
that there clearly is that any actions taken pursuant to PSI 
would be done in accordance with existing national and 
international authority. And of course, all of our other core 
group members of PSI are states party to the Law of the Sea 
Treaty, we would not ask them, obviously, to do anything that 
would violate their obligations, so in effect we built that 
into the PSI base, as it were.
    The Chairman.  I appreciate the question, the Committee is 
continuing to pursue the Law of the Sea Treaty, because of the 
request of our Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of 
Defense. There are a lot of other reasons to do so, obviously, 
in terms of our international cooperation, as well as our 
fishing industry, and others who have testified, but in terms 
of national defense--and that is what we're talking about 
today, and I say security and international relations--I wanted 
to raise the question, I thank you for your responses.
    Let me ask, in the event that the United States takes issue 
with the United Nations--from time to time there are motions 
that come before the Senate, indeed we did not have a chance to 
dispose of these amendments last week, and the State Department 
authorization which may or may not have been an appropriate 
time to do so--but there were amendments suggesting reduction 
of dues to the U.N., or generally, a reduction of our support 
altogether. What is your view as you hear arguments about the 
dues reduction? Dues withholding, impounding and so forth? Can 
you give us any overall view? You must have thought about the 
problem of finance, our responsibilities, either pro or con, in 
terms of whether we do more or less.
    Mr. Bolton.  I think that as a general proposition, the 
United States should pay its assessed contributions. I think 
that's what the expectation is. During the first Bush 
Administration, President Bush followed through on President 
Reagan's commitment to repay the arrearage that had been built 
up in the 1980's over a five year period at the rate of 20 
percent a year, which we were not entirely successful in doing 
for a variety of reasons, but that was the position we took, 
and I supported that internally.
    At the same time, there have been circumstances--and again, 
I recur to the first President Bush Administration where the 
financial issue has been important--and I can think, 
specifically, of the case in 1989 when the PLO was trying to 
become a member of the World Health Organization, as the WHO 
charter requires statehood as a precondition, the PLO was, in 
effect, trying to create facts on the ground, and Secretary 
Baker, we were in pretty tough shape. I have to say, Mr. 
Chairman, the PLO was basically winning that fight and we were 
basically losing, just before the World Health Assembly in May 
of 1989, Secretary Baker issued a statement at the time that 
said if any U.N. body changed the status of the PLO, he would 
recommend to the President that we withhold our assessments. 
And, obviously, Secretary Baker would not have made such a 
statement unless he had conferred with his boss. That was 
dispositive in convincing the members of the World Health 
Assembly not to admit the PLO, and in fact, we achieved both of 
our objectives--we kept the PLO from achieving state status, 
but we also avoided having to cut our assessments--which I 
think almost certainly would have happened if we had failed 
diplomatically, and Congress had responded.
    The Chairman.  I thank you for those responses.
    I now turn to my distinguished colleague, Senator Biden, 
for his round of questions.
    Senator Biden.  Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I would suggest 
that Mr. Bolton be sworn.
    The Chairman.  He had been sworn.
    Senator Biden.  Oh, he has been, great, thank you very, 
very much. I apologize for my being late and not knowing that.
    Let me make two comments, if I may, at the outset.
    Senator Sarbanes.  Was he sworn at the outset of the 
hearing?
    The Chairman.  He was sworn about fifteen minutes ago.
    Senator Sarbanes.  Presumably, though, that covers the 
morning's testimony as well?
    The Chairman.  Yes.
    Senator Biden.  Let me say at the outset--with regard to 
the Intelligence Committee having already investigated these 
matters about whether or not pressure was put upon, or 
attempted to be put upon, as alleged, on government officials 
who, with whom the nominee has thought either went behind his 
back or went around him, or just simply disagreed with him--the 
Intelligence Committee did not look at that. What the 
Intelligence Committee did, they started to look at that, and 
when they were assured that had nothing to do with Iraq--it had 
to do with Cuba--they ceased their investigation. And so, our 
staff--yours and mine--went to the Intelligence Committee, got 
the Intelligence Committee records. Now that does not mean that 
the allegations made subsequently are true or not true, it just 
means it was not--was not, emphasized--was not thoroughly 
investigated by the Intelligence Committee. So, we're not 
repeating, we're not repeating work that has already been done, 
that's the first point that I'd like to make.
    The second point I'd like to make is that there are--as we 
mentioned this morning--at least one witness that we have not 
had an opportunity, because he's been out of the country to 
have majority or minority staff interview him, and that--as we 
mentioned this morning--that it would be essential that we have 
that in order to give, as well, Mr. Bolton the opportunity to 
either corroborate or disagree with whatever Mr. Silver would 
say, and I have not--nor has anybody to the best of my 
knowledge--spoken to Mr. Silver. And there are, there is at 
least one other witness that I'm aware of that we have not had 
an opportunity to interview. I'm assuming we get to interview 
these people very quickly, and now that Mr. Silver's being made 
available, hopefully that can be done today, but until those 
witnesses have been interviewed, there will be no possibility--
in my view--to end the hearing. I expect we can do that--if 
they're made available today and tomorrow--to do that in a 
timely fashion, because these interviews have all taken place 
just since you intervened, Mr. Chairman, last Thursday. And, as 
evidence of the fact that we're not trying to slow anything up, 
they were done during the weekend, and they were briefed during 
the weekend, and we're not even fully--the entire Committee 
staff hasn't been, I mean the entire membership of the 
Committee--has not had the opportunity to read all of that, and 
we have yet to agree to go forward. So there's no attempt to 
slow this up, I just want to make it clear. There's at least 
one, and probably two additional witnesses staff must 
interview.
    And if I can, I'd like to take three minutes, Mr. Chairman, 
to kind of lay out what our collective concern is here. And 
that is, to review, a very serious matter. Namely that Mr. 
Bolton, the allegation is, sought to have intelligence analysts 
removed from their positions--not fired--removed from their 
positions. And the obvious reason for that is, we saw how 
intelligence was--at least alleged--to have been not fully 
vented during the Iraq, the lead up to the war in Iraq; we've 
seen how it has been, was fundamentally flawed, and there were 
no weapons of mass destruction, and there is a--stating this 
bluntly, Mr. Bolton--a concern that your ideological 
predisposition relating to some of these issues is one that has 
clouded your judgment. That's what we're talking about here, 
and that's what we're investigating.
    And this is what we know from interviews thus far. We know 
that in--I say we know, we believe based on interviews that 
were conducted--that February of '02, Mr. Bolton summoned a 
line analyst from the Bureau of Intelligence and Research into 
his office, and according to this analyst, Mr. Bolton got quite 
angry and red in the face. Mr. Bolton berated him for allegedly 
taking action to rewrite language for a speech he wanted to 
give that had been transmitted to the CIA for clearance by the 
Intelligence Community. Then it's alleged Mr. Bolton threw him 
out of his office and summoned his boss, the acting Assistant 
Secretary. We know that Mr. Bolton--it was stated to us--that 
Mr. Bolton then asked the Assistant Secretary, Mr. Fingar, to 
remove the analyst from his position. We know that some days 
later--when he returned from being out of office--Mr. Bolton 
asked the Assistant Secretary, Carl Ford, who's Fingar's boss, 
to remove the analyst from his position. We know that several 
months later Mr. Bolton, once again, asked the new Office 
Director in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the 
State Department, to remove the analyst from his position. We 
know from the interviews that sometime in the summer of '02, 
Mr. Bolton got into his automobile and drove out to CIA 
headquarters. He had an appointment with Stewart Cohen, then 
the acting Chairman of the National Intelligence Council. We 
know from Mr. Cohen that Mr. Bolton asked him to remove the 
National Intelligence Officer for Latin America from his 
position. The dispute here is whether Mr. Bolton was asked by 
Mr. Cohen--well, I won't get into that now. And we know this 
much--Mr. Bolton deserves an opportunity to be heard in these 
matters, and we have a responsibility to review them. As I said 
earlier, the idea that government officials might be suppressed 
from dissenting views in intelligence matters is a very, very 
serious matter in these days.
    Fortunately, neither of the two men who are alleged to have 
been asked to be removed from the position by Mr. Bolton, 
neither of them were removed, their bosses protected them from 
the attempted intervention, but there is a danger that such 
action can cause a chilling effect, an effect that may ripple 
across the Intelligence Community, and thereby contribute to 
the politicizing of intelligence.
    No, I want to also make it clear who Mr. Westermann is, the 
fellow we're talking about. Now, I realize we only have ten 
minutes here, I hope we are able to expand the rounds so that 
we can have some continuity in this pursuit. Mr. Westermann is 
a senior analyst from the State Department's Bureau of 
Intelligence and Research. He served 23 years in the United 
States Navy as a combat officer, with an intelligence 
subspeciality. Several tours made use of his subspecialty 
including two as an Arms Controller, inspecting the Soviet 
Union. His last tours were on detail with the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency, the State Department Bureau of Non-
Proliferation, and then INR. He retired from the Navy in 2000 
with a rank of Lieutenant Commander, was hired by INR as a GS-
14 analyst, the top grade for any analyst, in January of 2001. 
He got every within-grade pay raise for which he was eligible 
and received outstanding job performance evaluation during ever 
year of his employment at the Department of State. He's 
received numerous awards during his tenure as a Navy officer 
and at the State Department. He received an Honorable Discharge 
from the Navy, and he was awarded the Defense Superior Service 
Medal from the Secretary of Defense, for exceptionally 
meritorious serve in the United States Navy. He served under 
hostile fire, and he's been responsible for men's lives. He was 
hand-selected by Jack Daley, Vice-Commander of the--Commandant 
of the Marine Corps--to serve as his assistant and also serve 
as Special Assistant to Ambassador Ralph Rowe, the Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency. He received meritorious honor award 
from the Department of State, as well as awards for his work on 
terrorism, his involvement in the operation Iraqi Freedom, and 
for his efforts to combat proliferation throughout the world.
    It is unusual for me to read this background. But 
obviously, there is a question here of credibility, and I want 
to make sure that we're not talking about some new bureaucrat, 
hired on by a department. This is a man with a distinguished, 
distinguished background.
    And the same in Tom Fingar, his boss, on Westermann, he 
has--according to the Assistant Secretary of State this 
morning, let me read for the record what Mr. Fingar says about 
Mr. Westermann. Question of staff, ``Did INR keep Mr. 
Westermann on the account because you had confidence in his 
ability to perform the job?'' Fingar, ``Yes.'' Staff, ``So, 
there was nothing about the incident in February when Bolton 
tried to have Westermann removed from his job that caused INR 
management to lose confidence in Mr. Westermann as an analyst, 
or in his integrity as an employee of the State Department?'' 
Fingar, ``None whatsoever.'' Staff, ``Do you have the 
impression of how Mr. Westermann is regarded both by his 
colleagues, within INR, and by his colleagues in the larger 
Intelligence Community with whom he interacts.'' Fingar, ``By 
everything I know, he's highly regarded. Certainly the NIO, the 
National Intelligence Officer, for Strategic Systems who then 
picked up the WMD account, Bob Walpole, pled with me, twisted 
my arm, over an extended period, for me to persuade 
Christian,'' that's Westermann, ``to accept the invitation that 
he had been extended, that had been extended to Westermann, to 
become the Deputy National Intelligence Office for BW/CW.'' 
Staff, ``Is it fair to say that it was an offer that would be 
made only to someone who is held in high esteem by the National 
Intelligence Officer?'' Fingar, ``Absolutely. The position 
would have been the Intelligence Community's ranking analyst on 
CBW.''
    I realize my time is up, but I'm going to come back at the 
appropriate time, Mr. Chairman, and go into some considerable 
detail as to what appeared to be different interpretations, and 
different assertions relative to what Mr. Westermann did, and 
the reason why, one of the reasons asserted by Mr. Bolton as to 
why he lost confidence, is accurate, and what he did, or didn't 
do, after he reached the conclusion he no longer had confidence 
in Mr. Westermann, and the NIO Officer whose name we cannot 
reveal because he is in a covered position right now, I'm also, 
I'm going to speak to that as well.
    I'm sorry to take this preliminary time to lay this out, 
but I want to make it clear. The two men of three that we are 
talking about here, are men who have impeccable reputations, 
and have made assertions fundamentally at odds with what Mr. 
Bolton is saying, based upon the testimony taken by staff, to 
the best of my knowledge and recollection as made available to 
me by staff. I thank you.
    Mr. Chairman.  I thank you, Senator.
    Senator Chafee.
    Senator Chafee.  I thank you, Mr. Chairman. Maybe I'll 
yield some of my time to have Mr. Bolton at least respond in 
some way to Senator Biden before I ask a question.
    Mr. Bolton.  Thank you, Senator, go ahead. I'll try to 
respond to your questions, I'm sure Senator Biden will ask me 
again.
    Senator Chafee.  I'll give you the opportunity one more 
time----
    Mr. Bolton.  Okay, well then, I'll just say one thing. 
Thank you, by the way.
    The report from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 
on pages 277 to 279 covers the Westermann question, and I'll 
just quote from the conclusion of the Senate Select Committee 
on Intelligence, who was dealing with stories about five 
individuals, one of whom was Mr. Westermann, and the SSCI said, 
``None of these individuals provided any information to the 
Committee that showed that policy makers had attempted to 
coerce, influence or pressure analysts to change their analysis 
or that any intelligence analyst changed their intelligence 
judgments as a result of political pressure.''
    Senator Biden.  Will the Senator yield for a brief comment?
    Senator Chafee.  A brief comment, yes.
    Senator Biden.  The Select Committee on Intelligence 
possesses only a handful of documents, they interviewed only 
the INR analyst, Mr. Westermann, the Select Committee did not 
interview the analysts's supervisor, or people under the 
Secretary's office. They did not review any original documents 
from the Department except two electronic messages sent to the 
Select Committee by a member of Undersecretary Bolton's staff 
as a part of a process for a fact-checking of a draft report. 
And the staff of the SSCI itself, agrees that their review is 
limited for the simple reason that the main focus of their 
effort was prewar intelligence about Iraq.
    Mr. Bolton.  If you'll give me one more chance to respond, 
that's why I said this morning: Let's make all this public. 
Let's put all these interviews, let's put everything out. I'm 
ready.
    Senator Biden.  I agree. I would ask unanimous consent we 
do that.
    The Chairman.  Unanimous consent is granted, given the fact 
that obviously the Committee would not wish to declassify 
material, we would exempt those persons and those documents 
that have classification. But those things that are a part of 
the open----
    Senator Boxer.  Mr. Chairman, Mr. Chairman, on this point--
--
    Senator Dodd.  Some of those documents came up here 
``unclassified'' and have now been stamped ``classified.'' So, 
some of the very--we would have to go back in, we'd have to 
look at some of these things that go back and trace this a 
little bit to make sure we're not excluding documents from the 
record that otherwise would have been allowed a few days ago.
    The Chairman.  I would respond to the member by saying the 
members who are cleared and staff who are cleared would be able 
to examine those documents, but the request was for general 
public publication, and I'm indicating those documents that are 
not classified would be published.
    Mr. Bolton.  If we could go beyond that, I think there's 
some of the classified documents I would see to have 
declassified, frankly.
    Senator Biden.  It should be. It should be. There are State 
Department documents, you could help us in that regard by 
contacting the State Department, and we have no authority to 
declassify documents they send to us classified. We can, 
immediately, and with your permission, Mr. Chairman, release 
the transcript of and the notes on all the interviews conducted 
by each of the individuals we have interviewed. We can so that. 
But we cannot declassify memos sent to us, or documents sent to 
us by the State Department, that they marked classified.
    Senator Dodd.  Let the record show these were unclassified 
documents until we made the request.
    Senator Boxer.  Mr. Chairman, parliamentary inquiry, if I 
might?
    The Chairman.  Yes?
    Senator Boxer.  I'm just trying to get a word in because 
Mr. Bolton, to his credit, says he wants everything on the 
table. That means we need some time here to interview some of 
the folks that are deeply involved before we have a vote on 
this nominee, and I'm just saying I hope that, as you work with 
our ranking member here, you will allow us that opportunity, 
because there are a couple of people--one is in New York--it's 
hard to get to these people, but since Mr. Bolton himself says 
it all should be on the table, I think we all agree we're going 
to need a little time to--not a lot of time--just to find a 
couple of these people who feel that they have been in a 
situation where pressure was put upon them by Mr. Bolton, and 
we need to question them.
    The Chairman.  Well, the Senator makes an excellent point. 
Let me just say from the standpoint of the Chair that we have 
attempted to move as expeditiously as possible to make 
available, not only to Senators, Senator's staffs and that 
would be members of staffs who are not part of the official 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Republicans, Democrats. Mr. 
Bolton has been available. I'm hopeful that Senators have some 
sense of reason about this because we clearly could get into a 
study period----
    Senator Boxer.  No, I know.
    The Chairman  [continuing]. That was extensive, and I think 
in fairness to the President, who needs to have an Ambassador 
to the U.N., to our witness today who aspires to that position, 
and to the American people who anticipate that we ought to be 
doing our job. I appreciate there have been extenuating 
circumstances of the very important funeral services for John 
Paul II, which has led to our initial postponement of the 
hearing which would have occurred last Thursday, until today. 
We have another hearing tomorrow for Carl Ford, which I 
gather--because of the nature of the witness--will be back into 
these issues which are circulating today. So, I would hope that 
members would avail themselves at least to the calendar day 
today and tomorrow to exhaust whatever their curiosity might 
be. But I'm hopeful we can pursue, at least, a decision. I 
think that's very important. And I think most of the American 
public anticipates that we will do that.
    Senator Biden.  On that point, Mr. Chairman, I want to make 
it clear. The best of our knowledge is only two witnesses we 
have had to interview, they are both in the employ of the State 
Department, they're both able to be made available by the State 
Department. My staff tells me the one, Mr. Silver, whose name 
has already been invoked, is not available until tomorrow 
afternoon, we have been under the assumption--we're prepared, 
I'm not taking issue with that, but just so you know--it's not 
us delaying that. We thought it would be today, it won't be 
until tomorrow, and there's one other witness--who I'd rather 
not name at the moment--we let Mr. Bolton and you know, I'm not 
sure whether he is under cover or not, I don't think he is, but 
I don't want to make a mistake, who is a State Department 
employee as well. They are the only two witnesses at this 
moment, to the best of my knowledge that the minority is 
seeking to interview, and they're both within the employ of the 
State Department, I think both are in country, if I'm not 
mistaken.
    Senator Dodd.  Just one caveat again, there's a third one, 
Mr. Chairman, who would be someone who is under cover, and it 
would be highly inappropriate for that individual to testify in 
a public setting, but has expressed a willingness to testify if 
he is so directed, in a closed session.
    Senator Biden.  Two different issues, I don't want to 
confuse this, Mr. Chairman. One, is interviews that have not 
taken place yet; two, is additional witnesses among those were 
interviewed who may or may not be asked to call or Secretary 
Bolton may or may not wish to have called. The State Department 
may conclude they want Mr. Silver called, because he 
corroborates what Mr. Bolton said. We may ask Mr. Silver to be 
called if, in fact, he says what he think he is going to say, 
but don't know. And so, but right now, the only two additional 
witnesses seeking to be interviewed by the minority are both 
State Department employees. And among those who have been 
interviewed it is possible, although there is no plan at this 
moment, to ask that one of them testify as Mr. Ford is testify. 
That could all be done immediately, it could be done quickly, 
this is not next week, or two weeks or three weeks down the 
road. This is all able to be wrapped up very clearly, and Mr. 
Bolton's answer to much of what we have--when we get a chance 
to go through it--may satisfy us there's no need to call 
anymore witnesses.
    The Chairman.  Well, everyone has had discussion for the 
moment of the situation, and let me just indicate that I think 
we'll want to consult with all members of the Committee, I've 
attempted to be as accommodating as I could for requests that 
are coming, but I would just have to say to Senators--and I'm 
one of these Senators--having read all the material that has 
thus far been exhumed, 150 pages from the State Department, 
additional measure from the CIA, the interviews with these five 
people, and maybe six--that I am not impressed with the gravity 
that is being suggested. Now, I appreciate an important 
argument is being made, namely the Iraq failure of 
intelligence, and the question of whether this activity by Mr. 
Bolton a while back shows some manifestations of something that 
was very, very serious, Iraq. But, that is a matter of judgment 
of Senators, so we will all read everything, we will try to get 
the people as rapidly as possible, but at some point, we're 
going o try to bring this to conclusion, and so I hope the 
members understand that, that there is a disagreement over how 
grave the alleged offense may have been, and finally--even if 
it was substantial--whether that would influence the Senators' 
vote for or against Mr. Bolton.
    So, we will try to make available all of the record that is 
not classified, we will try to make available the classified 
persons and/or materials as rapidly as possible. I know Mr. 
Bolton and the State Department will cooperate in attempting to 
expedite that situation. And we know we have ahead of us, 
still, questions this afternoon, and then another hearing 
tomorrow.
    Having said that, we're back to Senator Chafee, to reclaim 
him time.
    Senator Chafee.  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    But continuing on the same theme--maybe you could detach 
yourself, if possible, from this furor about influence over 
individuals and the threatening of their positions, if you 
could detach yourself--how serious are these accusations? What 
do you think, in the abstract?
    Mr. Bolton.  I think, fundamentally, there's nothing there. 
The issue here has nothing to do with intelligence analysis, 
has nothing to do with the substantive positions taken by 
either of the two individuals in question, has nothing to do 
with whether they agree or disagree with me on what I said 
about Cuba's BW efforts--it has nothing to do with the 
political construct about, the allegations about political 
pressure on analysts dealing with Iraq, it has nothing to do 
with that at all. It has to do with a question of 
straightforward behavior, and open and honest dealings. And, 
you know, as I said earlier this morning--when you lose trust 
and confidence in somebody in a professional environment--it's 
a problem, especially when it's in the intelligence area. I 
didn't see to have these people fired, I didn't seek to have 
discipline imposed on them, I said, ``I've lost trust in 
them,'' and are there other portfolios they could follow, it 
wasn't anything to me that I followed at great length, I made 
my point and I moved on.
    If I can just address on thing that we referred to, this 
other analyst at the CIA whom I'll try and call ``Mr. Smith'' 
here, I hope I can keep that straight, you know, the other 
analyst, ``Mr. Smith,'' I'd never even heard of him, I didn't 
know who he was until after the Heritage speech. When I heard 
that somehow he was saying he hadn't been involved in the 
clearance process, as a member of the National Intelligence 
Council--as I say, I'd never heard of this individual, I didn't 
know his name, I frankly didn't understand what the National 
Intelligence Council did. I checked with the CIA and they said 
they had, indeed, they had cleared the speech with the National 
Intelligence Officer for Science and Technology, who has 
cognizance over biological warfare issues, and therefore was 
the right NIO to clear. When I heard all of these things, and I 
said, ``I'm a State Department person, I don't fully 
understand, I want to go out and talk to the gentleman,'' who 
at that point was the Chairman or maybe it was the Acting 
Chairman of the National Intelligence Council and find out what 
this instrument was. So, I went out to basically pay a courtesy 
call on Mr. Cohen, and it's true--as Senator Biden has found 
out--that I drove my own car out there, I have to make a 
confession here, the CIA is sort of more or less on the way 
home for me, and from time to time when I've gone out there I 
have driven my own car, I've had my meetings and then, I hate 
to say this, but I left and went home, I didn't go back to my 
office. So, I went out to pay a courtesy call, and my 
recollection was that the bulk of the meeting was composed of 
Mr. Cohen explaining to me what the NIC did, and told me what 
their publications were and how it had been created, and gave 
me some background on it.
    I also knew that in the weeks and months previous thereto, 
dealing with this ``Mr. Smith,'' Otto Reich, who is the 
Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, 
had told me and told other he had very grave problems with Mr. 
Smith, on a range of issues--Cuba BW being one of the least of 
his concerns. And dealing, not just with Cuba, but with other 
matters--and that he had told Mr. Cohen, he thought--he was not 
satisfied with Mr. Smith's performance. And I think I said to 
Mr. Cohen, Stewart Cohen, in the course of the conversation, 
that based on what I had seen in my limited area, that I agreed 
with them. And that was it, I had one part of one conversation 
with one person, one time on Mr. Smith, and that was it, I let 
it go.
    Senator Chafee.  I'll try and rephrase my question. If you 
remove yourself, the personal involvement, and the facts of 
personally being involved in this incident, incidents, I think 
the accusation from your opponents is that you're trying to 
influence people to try to change their assessments, which they 
didn't believe--to change their assessment, essentially 
falsifying evidence with the threat to their job, but do you 
see it that way, and how serious do you feel these accusations 
are? Not to you personally, but just as someone that's applying 
to be the Ambassador to whatever, in this case, the United 
Nations, but it could be for any promotion.
    Mr. Bolton.  I think that is part of the allegation, it's 
false, I have never----
    Senator Chafee.  How serious? If it were true.
    Mr. Bolton  [continuing]. Tried to do that. I think it's, 
intelligence analysts should give their honest assessment, I 
have tried in four years in this job--in fact that's something 
that I've seen in the press--I've tried in four years in this 
job to get as much intelligence as I could from as many 
different sources as I could. I brought in, from the CIA, and 
put on my staff, an intelligence analyst, precisely so that I 
would have better access to the broader Intelligence Community. 
I welcome--I probably met dozens, scores, maybe hundreds of 
intelligence analysts in the course of my four years; I've got 
out to NSA, I've gone out to CIA, I've met with people involved 
and intelligence activities at the Los Alamos and Sandia and 
Lawrence Livermore laboratories, I've talked to them in my 
office--I welcome the interchange, I respect the positions they 
take, I think it's critically important to the formation of 
American Foreign Policy, and I've never tried to change 
anybody's position through any kind of improper influence or 
pressure, that's not my style. My style is to say, ``Here's 
what I think, what do you think?''
    Senator Chafee.  Okay, thank you. I'll change tacks a 
little bit, in the morning session you--I believe, correct me 
if I'm wrong--said you didn't necessarily criticize the United 
Nations through the years, it's been our role, the United 
States' role, do I have that right?
    Mr. Bolton.  Yes, that's correct.
    Senator Chafee.  And then said we did not exhibit good 
leadership in the nineties, do I have that right?
    Mr. Bolton.  That's correct.
    Senator Chafee.  Can you be more specific about failure 
through the nineties?
    Mr. Bolton.  Senator, through roughly the late 1980's, I 
think it is fair to say that the Security Council was grid 
locked by the Cold War. In fact, grid locked almost from its 
formation in 1945.
    In the mid and late-10980s, as what was called ``new 
thinking'' developed in Soviet foreign policy, the possibility 
that that grid lock could be broken in the Security Council 
began to be apparent. And it was--as is almost always the case 
in the Security Council--what became possible there was a 
reflection of changes in the larger geostrategic environment, 
so that in the Soviet Union, as I say, new thinking was 
beginning to play out and policy makers began to look at their 
foreign policy through the interests of the Soviet Union, as 
opposed to the prism of Communist philosophy. And, they began 
to say, ``What exactly are our interests, from a Soviet point 
of view, in Angola? Why, exactly, are we subsidizing Cuba, 
through the barter of oil at well below market prices? What is 
this,'' and, to be candid, ``What is this from a Russian point 
of view that's really involved here?'' So that in the late-
1980s, a number of new peace keeping operations became possible 
in areas that had been cockpits of Cold War conflict, and I can 
think specifically of the case of the link between Namibia and 
Angola. Whereby very effective diplomacy of the United States 
and others--myself not involved, I should say--we were able to 
work out in Angola the withdrawal of Cuban forces, and a--the 
first election, the first free and fair election in Namibia on 
a multiracial basis. This was an example of the Soviet Union--
as it was still there, through Russia--playing out a normal 
nation's foreign policy. And the real test of that occurred at 
the time of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, when I remember 
distinctly Jim Baker, I think, was hunting in Mongolia, and 
instead of coming home, he went to Moscow, and he and 
Shevardnadze worked out a very important statement in 
opposition to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait that was the 
fundamental basis for the cooperation between the Soviet Union, 
as it was still then, and the United States in the Security 
Council. It was the first, really, major manifestation of the 
end of Security Council grid lock after the Cold War, and the 
whole series of Iraq-related resolutions in the Council. It was 
a very optimistic time, and I think I mentioned earlier, we set 
up other peacekeeping operations--MINURSO in the Western Sahara 
in the late spring/early summer of 1991--and I think this 
optimism was misread by many people, unfortunately, to believe 
that somehow the United Nations was back in 1945, and that a 
lot of the constraints that, unfortunately, still existed, had 
disappeared. And that, that led to the United Nations being put 
into a lot of situation where, frankly, there was no clear 
political resolution in sight, member governments didn't 
provide adequate support, the United Nations didn't have 
adequate guidance, and it did not contribute to a resolution of 
threats to international peace and security.
    In many respects, the handing over of these kinds of 
disputes to the U.N. was a way for some policy makers to say, 
``That's off my plate,'' and I think it was dereliction in the 
responsibility of member governments to do that. And it led to, 
what many people called, failures by the United Nations. That's 
why--I come back to my point about false concreteness--there's 
failures by member governments. And not directly due to 
mistakes by the Secretariat, but by policies that the member 
governments have created.
    I think now we've got a--both the opportunity and the 
responsibility--in a way, I can see almost going back to the 
days right after the successful resolutions in Iraq in the 
early 1990's, and seeing if we can't avoid the mistakes that 
were made. It's always easy in hindsight to see the mistakes, 
we should at least try to benefit from them--that, at least, is 
the attitude that President Bush brings to this question about 
how to move the U.N. forward.
    Senator Chafee.  Thank you very much.
     The Chairman.  Thank you very much, Senator Chafee.
    Senator Dodd.
    Senator Dodd.  Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me--again, 
if I can--Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you, first of all, for 
your comments this afternoon on how we ought to proceed, I 
think all of us here have no problem with that whatsoever, this 
is not a delaying tactic at all, but really trying to get to 
the bottom of issues, and I----
    Senator Biden.  By the way, if we wish to delay, under 
Senate rules we could call for the hearing to end right now. 
Because the Senate's in session, you can't go two hours beyond 
the Senate's in session. I offer that as evidence of the fact 
that we have no desire to delay this.
    Senator Dodd.  I think you for that, I'll agree with that. 
Secondly, I want to thank you for your statement this morning, 
your opening statement, Mr. Chairman, as always, just 
excellent. And ones that I couldn't agreement with more--I 
think, your closing words here because I think they, in a 
sense, go to the heart of what our colleague from Illinois 
raised with his questions at the end of the session this 
morning about this particular point, it's causing some of us to 
have some real concerns about. And that is the--and I quote 
from your opening comments here this morning--``diplomatic 
speech by any high-ranking administration official has policy 
consequences. It should never be undertaken simply to score 
some international debating points to appeal to U.S. public 
opinion, or to validate a personal point of view.'' And you 
quoted President Kennedy, once saying, you quoted him, ``The 
purpose of foreign policy is not to provide an outlet for our 
own sentiments, or hopes, or indignation. It is to shape events 
in the real world,'' end of quote. It's an excellent statement 
to have as we talk about the subject matter. So, I want to make 
that statement again.
    The point is, there's nothing at all wrong, for any 
official--Mr. Bolton, or anyone else, for that matter--to stand 
up and give a speech, and say what they believe to be the case. 
I believe, in this particular case, the issue was about Cuba at 
the time, I believe, that Cuba has biological weapons--has 
every right in the world to do that--you may disagree with it. 
The problem occurs when a Mr. Bolton, or anyone else in the 
government gets up and says what the U.S. believes. And you go 
to the Intelligence Community to get corroboration. And that's 
what this is really all about. And, let me, just so that it's 
on the record, I'll ask unanimous consent that this language be 
included in the record. What Mr. Bolton wanted to say, in 
February of 2002, is the following, ``The analysts,'' that's 
the Senate Intelligence Committee Report, excuse me, this is 
the proposed cleared text from the Senate Intelligence 
Committee.
    Senator Biden.  That's the actual language from the Senate 
Intelligence Committee looking into this matter, in their 
report. This is what they said.
    Senator Dodd.  The sentence would say, ``The United States 
believes that Cuba has a developmental offensive biological 
warfare program and is providing assistance to other rogue 
state programs.'' The text also call for international 
observers.
    What was approved, what Mr. Westermann suggested, he said, 
is ``The United States believes that Cuba,''--that was the, 
ultimately approved, this was what was ultimately approved. 
What was ultimately approved was, that ``Cuba has, at least, a 
limited offensive biological warfare research and development 
effort. Cuba has provided dual-use biotechnology to other rogue 
states. We're concerned that such technology could support BW 
programs in those states. We call on Cuba to cease all 
biological applicable cooperation with rogue states, and to 
comply fully with all of its obligations under the Biological 
Weapons Convention,'' end of quote. And there are various--it 
may not sound like a big difference to those who have just 
heard this--but there are significant differences.
    One is, of course, what the U.S. believes, and that's the 
important point here. And the salient differences are one, 
limited, the word limited, which is not insignificant; 
``research and development,'' instead of ``developmental 
program,'' which would have implied a far more structured 
activity; ``Cuba has provided dual-use technology that could 
support BW programs,'' that's a carefully caveated phrase, 
obviously. Rather than just ``providing assistance to other 
rogue states,'' and it deleted any reference to inspections 
that the U.S. government believes it would be ineffective, and 
does not warrant a greater precedent for inspections there. So, 
there is a difference, a significant difference, that's 
important to note.
    Let me say also as well, I think some of my colleagues may 
have made this point as well. If this were a one-time event, 
you might be upset about it, but I don't think it would 
warrant, necessarily, taking the time of this confirmation out 
of the confirmation process. All of us have been in situations 
where staff or others have said or done things that we've 
disagreed with, and we might have said or done things in 
retrospect that were probably not terribly wise. The question 
is, is there a pattern here, Mr. Bolton? And that's what's 
worried many of us here. And so that's why we raise these 
issues.
    Again, this morning, we're quoting here, I'm quoting from 
these interviews that occurred just a few days ago. Mr. Fleitz, 
``All I can remember, and this is from Mr. Bolton,'' I'm 
quoting him now, ``is that he spoke to Mr. Fingar to express 
his concern over what happened, and said that Mr. Westermann 
had lost his confidence, and he should have been given a new 
portfolio.'' Mr. Fleitz again, ``When Silver was there, Bolton 
relayed the fact that he had lost confidence in Mr. Westermann, 
and asked that he be given a different portfolio.'' That's in 
September. Mr. Fingar, I mentioned this morning, is Assistant 
Secretary for State, for INR, again, being interviewed, 
``Bolton said that he wanted Westermann taken off his 
accounts.'' He said, that is, Fingar said, ``He's our chemical 
weapons/biological weapons specialist, that is what he does. He 
expressed again,'' Mr. Fingar speaking, Mr. Bolton says, ``He 
expressed again, as I remember it, that he was the President's 
appointee, and he could say what he wanted.'' End of quote, Mr. 
Fingar. Let me add here, I'm going to ask you whether or not 
you recall saying this at all, but Mr. Fingar, when asked, Mr. 
Fingar what Mr. Bolton had to say about Mr. Westermann, Mr. 
Fingar said, and I quote him again in the interview several 
days ago, ``That he was the President's,'' talking about you, 
``that he was the President's appointee, that he had every 
right to say what he believed, that he wasn't going to be told 
what he could say by a mid-level INR munchkin analyst.'' End of 
quote.
    Again, then there's several others here, it just seems to 
me here, you've got a number of people now who believe that 
you're, you were so upset with what Mr. Westermann was doing, 
that you wanted him removed, and that's my concern--even if you 
were right about the substance, in this case, it's not the 
case, I think it ultimately proved that the INR's assessment 
was a more appropriate assessment on what Cuba's situation 
was--but even if you were right and they were wrong, the point 
that Senator Obama made this morning, the point the Chairman 
made in his opening comments--it is deeply disturbing to me in 
the environment we're in, where it is so important for us who 
sit on this side of the table, for those of you who sit on the 
side of the table you're on--that we have factual information 
coming from our Intelligence Community. And if, at any point, 
we begin to suspect that that information is being tailored to 
serve, what Senator Lugar talked about this morning, a personal 
point of view, then I think it's dangerous. And that's why 
we're spending so much time on this.
    Mr. Bolton.  May I respond?
    Senator Dodd.  Absolutely.
    Mr. Bolton.  Senator, he wasn't straight with me. And 
that's what I expressed----
    Senator Dodd.  This is good, but tell me about the process 
in this, now I understand the process, you tell me where I'm 
wrong. That your office says to them, ``This is what we want to 
say, the three sentences,'' and then, then, it would come back 
to Mr. Westermann anyway, at some point, to make a 
determination as to whether or not that was right or not. 
Where's the backstabbing here? If, in fact, in sends the 
language he would suggest to you, how is that backstabbing you?
    Mr. Bolton.  Senator, I don't know the ins and outs of the 
process, I don't pretend to, it is what staff does, I'm not an 
expert on it. That's why, as I said this morning, and I don't 
really have anything to add to what I said this morning, but 
it's why I went to Mr. Fingar and said, ``What's going on 
here?'' And at the time, the day of the incident, Mr. Fingar 
said that Westermann's behavior was, ``entirely 
inappropriate,'' he said, ``we screwed up,'' and he said, 
twice, ``it won't happen again.'' That's, I didn't try to have 
Mr. Westermann removed----
    Senator Dodd.  Do you recall saying that to Mr. Fingar? 
That you were the President's appointee, that you had every 
right to say what you wanted to?
    Mr. Bolton.  I don't, no, I don't recall the conversation 
in any substance, what I wanted to know was what, what exactly 
happened. I wanted to know why this process was happening the 
way it was, I wanted to hear from somebody at the top of INR, 
and that's what Mr. Fingar said back to me. But I did not, 
look, I didn't try to have disciplinary action imposed on 
Westermann, I just didn't feel that he had been straight with 
me, and I don't know what INR did, apparently they didn't do 
anything, and I haven't complained about it since then. I made 
my point, and moved on.
    Senator Biden.  Will the Senator yield? Mr. Secretary, you 
say you don't know this clearance process for a speech, after 
all these years?
    Mr. Bolton.  I don't, no, no, no. What I said was, that, I 
thought what Senator Dodd was asking was, who had done what to 
whom at the staff level, and I don't know, no, I don't know 
that----
     Senator Biden.  I thought you were asking how something 
gets cleared in a speech. You send it to your guy at INR, the 
INR guy then sends it to the CIA, the CIA then circulates it 
throughout the entire Intelligence Community.
    Mr. Bolton.  Right.
    Senator Biden.  Each of those people, including the guy who 
heads up INR, get back to them and say, ``this is good, or bad, 
or indifferent,'' then it gets back to you. That's the process, 
right?
    Mr. Bolton.  I think, as I've learned now, that's what the 
process is, it's also possible because INR is part of the State 
Department that INR could have--at a staff level--come to us 
first before they had done that. I thought that he had gone 
behind my back, that's why I asked Mr. Fingar, and I thought 
Mr. Fingar's response that the behavior was entirely 
inappropriate supported----
    Senator Dodd.  You heard, you know what Mr. Fingar says 
today?
    Mr. Bolton.  I knew what he said at the time.
    Senator Dodd.  But most recently you know what he said, we 
went over that this morning, let me tell you what Mr. 
Westermann said, because he was asked by the Committee in the 
last couple of days. He's quoting again, he said, ``He's,'' 
meaning by that you, Mr. Bolton, ``was quite upset that I had 
objected, and he wanted to know what right I had trying to 
change an Undersecretary's language, and what he would say, or 
not say, on something like that. And I tried to explain to him 
a little bit of the same thing about the process and how we 
clear language, and I guess he wasn't really in a mood to 
listen. And he was quite angry, and basically told me that I 
had no right to do that. He got very red in the face, and 
shaking his finger at me, and explained to me that I was acting 
way beyond my position, and for someone who worked for him. I 
told him I didn't work for him.'' He goes on to talk about 
waving your finger at him and so forth. His recollection is not 
you saying to him ``you went around my back, you should have 
come to me,'' and so forth, which I think they did in the e-
mail exchange, but his point is, you didn't say that, you said 
he had no right to correct your language, you were the 
Undersecretary, he's just a mid-level analyst. Who's he to be 
telling a Presidential appointee what to say?
    Mr. Bolton.  That's why I called Mr. Fingar.
    Senator Dodd.  But did you say this or not?
    Mr. Bolton.  I don't recall saying that, what I recall 
saying is that he was out of line and that he had gone behind 
my back and I said, ``I don't care if you disagree with me, I 
just think you shouldn't do it behind my back.''
    Senator Dodd.  Well, let me ask you again about the, 
because, as I say, if this were one event, you know, I'll be 
the first one to tell you, you probably shouldn't have done 
this, but I wouldn't spend thirty seconds on this issue. But 
what concerns me is that there's the second incident that we 
have involving the ``Mr. Smith,'' as you've called him, our 
unnamed intelligence officer.
    The Chairman.  Would you summarize this?
    Senator Dodd.  I'm sorry. Well just, again, you know, the 
question arises because, again, we've had testimony from this 
individual, from people at the agency that, in fact, you, you 
and Otto Reich both went out to the Agency and raised the issue 
about whether or not this individual was going to be removed as 
an intelligence officer for Latin America, did that or not, 
happen?
    Mr. Bolton.  I went out to the Agency to meet with Mr. 
Cohen to get a, an understanding of what the NIC was, and to 
follow up on trying to get a better understanding of what the 
clearance process was, and I mentioned--as I said before--that 
I had lost confidence in Mr. Smith, and that I knew Otto Reich 
had been out there before on a much larger series of concerns, 
I can't really speak to those concerns, because they weren't in 
my area of responsibility.
     The Chairman.  Well, thank you very much.
    Senator Dodd.  Well, Mr. Chairman, just so the record is 
clear, Mr. Cohen was visited by Otto Reich at the office, 
Friday afternoon in 2002, Reich wanted to make the case for 
removing the NIO from Latin America from his position, he 
presented two lines of argument and said he was speaking, not 
only on his own behalf, but on behalf of Mr. Bolton. Mr. Reich 
has said this again in public, publications, that that was what 
he was there for. A week later, Mr. Bolton called and asked to 
meet Mr. Cohen as well, traveled to the Agency on his way home 
or whatever, the case is here, Cohen did not recall specifics, 
but believed his intent was clear. This is Mr. Cohen, now, I 
mean, this is all these people lining up here. At some point 
you've got to say, ``This is not enemies of yours that are 
doing this,'' Mr. Cohen said intent was clear, namely, he 
wanted the NIO removed. Cohen described both meetings as 
``amicable.'' But you wanted him removed. That's what worries 
me. Exactly the point Barack Obama made about credible 
intelligence, the point the Chairman made in his opening 
comments. It's a significant issue, this--in all due respect to 
the Chairman--I think this is the most profound question. I, 
frankly, kind of agree with a lot of your statements about the 
United Nations, candidly. I think you've been on the mark with 
many of them. I might disagree with some of the rhetoric you've 
used, but I don't have a substantive problem with that. My 
problem is this: we're suffering terribly when the Senate, we 
sent the Secretary of State to the United Nations to make a 
case for the presence of weapons of mass destruction, it was 
wrong. Terrible information. We were damaged terribly by that. 
If this is true that you tried to remove an analyst because you 
disagreed with their conclusions about this, that is going to 
hurt us further at the--that's my concern.
    Mr. Bolton.  If I could just say, I have never done 
anything in connection with any analyst's views. Nothing.
    Senator Dodd.  Thank you.
    The Chairman.  Thank you, Senator Dodd.
    Senator Allen.
    Senator Allen.  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Bolton, a lot of this has gotten off to this tangent of 
this speech, and I find it interesting this fascination of the 
process of speech composition. But I do like to have it somehow 
relevant to the major issues that you will address as 
Ambassador to the United Nations, and I have a hard time 
determining how this has anything to do with advancing freedom 
and Democracy, Senator Dodd mentioned he agreed with all of 
your statements, your advocacy, your characterization--maybe he 
doesn't like some of the adjectives, I like adjectives, I like 
your adjectives as well, that you used--but regardless, the 
issue is stopping proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
the issues are reducing Russian nuclear warheads, advancing 
freedom, and of course, efficiency and accountability in the 
United Nations. And trying to figure out once--and I'm glad to 
hear that we're going to read all this testimony, and I hope 
it's done quickly so that we're not off on too long of a detour 
off the main track here, and I think that we shouldn't be 
slowing up a vote on a tangential issue, at best--I'm trying to 
discern the essence of this concern, and it seems to me that at 
the end of the day, it's going to come down to, and Senator 
Biden who I have a great deal of respect for, is talking about 
whether it clouds your judgment or not, and the question of 
credibility, and I think it's probably going to come down to 
differing interpretations of your loss of confidence, or trust, 
in some of these individuals, and you're saying you never tried 
to have them change positions, but you lose confidence in 
people. I think all of us, from time to time, may have that, 
realized that some people who are advising us, you say, ``Wait 
a second, this isn't researched properly,'' and that's normal. 
I'm wondering how much it really matters. Now, all it's gotten 
down to, and I hate to get into it, but seeing how this 
tangent, or this issue, is important to some members on this 
Committee--the issue is Cuba's biological capabilities, and how 
they might be transferring it to rogue states. It would be 
helpful to say which rogue states these are, because I remember 
we had a briefing on it, and it was, it wasn't absolutely 
clear, but we knew they had biological weapon capability, and 
they had, actually, a fairly good bio/tech infrastructure in 
Cuba. And then the question wasn't just the biological and the 
pharmaceuticals, but which ones of those could be dual-use, and 
which countries, which are also countries which are on the 
State Department's list of those that are sponsors of state 
terrorism, which were involved.
    Now, so you can through all of that, and which states we're 
concerned about, but ultimately, would you characterize--in 
your view--the difference between what you were proffering, as 
to whether or not that could be stated, versus what was an 
approved statement. And, granted, there were some 
qualifications, Senator Dodd said that there's a qualification 
here, there, but in essence, was there all that much of a 
difference from what you wanted to say, I know there's a lot of 
questions in there, but I just wanted to allow you to give your 
point of view of this particular detour.
    Mr. Bolton.  I think that the main point was that we 
realized in late 2001, as I say, within a couple of months 
after September the 11th, that the United States government had 
not said anything publically about Cuba's BW effort in some 
time, and that, in the wake of September the 11th, where the 
terrorist attacks has awakened all of us, unfortunately, to how 
much danger we were in, and how much it would have been worse 
if the terrorists used biological, chemical or nuclear weapons, 
we had to have a discussion--a public discussion--in the United 
States about the nature of the threat that we faced. And I 
wouldn't have been surprised, frankly, if the Intelligence 
Community had said, ``We're not going to agree to declassify 
anything about Cuba,'' because the nature of the sources and 
methods was potentially so sensitive that it was simply too 
risky to do. And this was all in the context of the arrest and 
then confession and conviction of Ana Belan Montes, a Cuban 
spy, who had been the senior Cuba analyst in the Defense 
Intelligence Agency, and it's a frightening thing when you 
think about it, what she could have been transmitting back to 
Cuba and what--and I'll just say this in an abstract sense, if 
somebody knows, some other country knows a little bit about 
what we know, their ability to conduct denial and deception 
activities increases remarkably. So, I felt it was important to 
discuss this issue, and based on what the Intelligence 
Community had already written, we started a process to see what 
would come out. And I was satisfied with the end result--
Senator Dodd quoted a series of differences, I don't recall, I 
didn't really, frankly, get into the back and forth, it was 
done at the staff level--but I felt that the language that I 
used, which turned out to be--I felt the language I used on the 
Cuba BW effort was about right. And it turned out that----
    Senator Allen.  Are you talking about the--Senator Dodd 
quoted the language which was approved, which I assume that you 
espoused in this speech, is that right?
    Mr. Bolton.  That's correct, yeah.
    Senator Dodd.  If the Senator would yield--I quoted the 
language that Mr. Bolton wanted to use, and what was approved, 
and what the differences were between what he wanted to say, 
and what was actually approved to be said, and the difference 
is significant.
    Senator Dodd.  I'm going to ask Mr. Bolton to say, and 
there may be--whether you want to call them nuance differences, 
or qualitative difference, or significance--I would like you to 
share with us whether you think that what was ultimately 
approved, which I assumed is what you said in your speech, I 
don't think there's any question in that regard, but how would 
you characterize the differences in what was approved, versus 
what you had proffered as a general concept to include as part 
of the speech?
    Mr. Bolton.  Well, this was sort of a moving process, and 
I'm not sure exactly where it was, but I was content to have, I 
wanted to say what was accurate. I didn't want to go through 
what we're going through now, and that's why we went through 
this extensive clearance process, and I'll tell you--the thing 
that probably I'll never forget all of this--when I gave this 
speech at the Heritage Foundation and it got attention the next 
day, I talked about a lot of other countries, Cuba was what got 
attention, but I was sitting, reading the morning Washington 
Post the day after the speech, reading through the story about 
the speech, and I came to the very last paragraph, and what it 
says is, ``As it happens, Bolton was not the first official to 
make a public statement on the subject. Carl W. Ford, Jr., 
Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, 
used identical language in March 19 Congressional testimony, 
that largely went unnoticed.'' So, that's the language we're 
talking about, it was used several times by a number of 
different people, Assistant Secretary Reich, I think, used it, 
I used it, Assistant Secretary Ford----
    Senator Kerry.  Which language? Can we get that clarified?
    Senator Allen.  There's the language that--fair enough--
it's the language that we're referring to as again, similar to 
what Senator Dodd----
    Mr. Bolton.  It's essentially the same, right? It's 
essentially the same.
    Senator Allen.  And, do you find that to be--how would you 
describe the difference between what you said in that speech--
which apparently was the same as what others had said in 
previous speeches, folks just pay attention when you speak, 
folks listen--which is good, we expect them to in the United 
Nations. Especially when you're representing Americans, but how 
would you characterize the difference from what your inquiry 
was, or your proffered language, versus what was approved?
    Mr. Bolton.  I think that there were some language changes, 
but that basically what we were, what was eventually cleared 
was to make the point that Cuba had a research and development 
effort. And I think that was the point to be made, and I was 
happy to be able to make it.
    Senator Allen.  Do you see any reason why this discussion 
on crafting speeches and the process of speeches will have any 
impact on your ability to assist and lead the United Nations to 
greater reforms and efficiency, or stopping the proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction?
    Mr. Bolton.  I don't think it will have any impact one way 
or the other, to tell you the truth, the process of clearances 
is an important process, and I think when you're speaking on 
behalf of the United States, you should speak with all of the 
equities in the government covered, that's what we tried to do 
in this speech, that's what I've tried to do in all of my 
speeches.
    Senator Allen.  Well, I think we all will, and in fact, any 
intelligence we receive, regardless of party, in the future 
we're going to all look at it with greater scrutiny after the 
information and decisions made on evidence before the military 
action in Iraq. But I agree with you, I don't see where this 
nuance difference in crafting a speech, stating the same things 
that have been stated by others, will have any impact 
whatsoever on your ability to lead this country, and lead also, 
the United Nations toward greater reforms while representing 
our values and principles.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman.  Thank you very much, Senator Allen.
    Senator Kerry.
    Senator Kerry.  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Let me make it clear that this language that's being 
referred to, that other people have said, is the approved 
language. That's what Carl Ford said, the approved language. 
Carl Ford did not say what you were proposing to say, which was 
corrected by the review process. Now, a moment ago you said, 
the reason that you did the corrective process was to avoid all 
of this. That's not accurate. The reason you did the corrective 
process is because it's standard operating procedure that 
anything that involves intelligence that is to be spoken by a 
national public official, goes to the Intelligence Community 
for review, correct? It's normal procedure, correct?
    Mr. Bolton.  If it involved intelligence, yes.
    Senator Kerry.  The clearance procedure----
     Mr. Bolton  [continuing]. Is much broader than just 
clearance in the Intelligence Community.
    Senator Kerry.  I understand that. But this paragraph by 
normal operating procedure of the department, had to go and be 
cleared, correct?
    Mr. Bolton.  Let me try and separate, we've got two 
different things that's being, that are being talked about 
here. The first was that the language that we talked about had 
to be declassified. Now, had it then, once declassified, then--
--
    Senator Kerry.  What I'm getting to is the judgment, the 
substance, the assessment.
    Mr. Bolton.  Right.
    Senator Kerry.  You were proposing to say the words, ``A 
developmental, offensive, biological warfare program,'' and 
``is providing assistance to other rogue state programs,'' 
implying that the developmental offensive biological warfare 
program was developmental--not research--but developmental, and 
being provided to other rogue state programs. Now, 
substantively, the analyst who worked with you disagreed with 
you, and you knew that. You knew that ahead of time. In fact, 
your own staff Chief Fleitz, in the interview with the 
Committee, said very clearly that--I think I have it hear--
right here. You summoned Mr. Westermann to your office on 
February 12, after you learned that he'd expressed INR's 
objection to parts of what you wanted to say. And Mr. Fleitz, 
who is your Chief of Staff, requested that Mr. Westermann bring 
his comment, along with the original language that you 
proposed, up to your office, and he did so. And Fleitz said, I 
quote Fleitz, ``Well, I sent an e-mail to Mr. Westermann, as I 
had said, and when he came up to the front office, I had 
instructions from Mr. Bolton to bring him into Mr. Bolton's 
office, and Christian went into Mr. Bolton's office, and I 
accompanied him. And Mr. Bolton looked at the e-mail, or the 
document, and he said something like, `What gives? What did you 
do?' But he didn't defend what he did, he argued on the 
substance of what we had asked to be declassified.'' So it was 
not procedural, as you said this morning. He disagreed with you 
on the substance of what you were saying, correct?
    Mr. Bolton.  Let me just say, I----
    Senator Kerry.  Is that correct or isn't it?
    Mr. Bolton.  I don't remember the conversation, what I 
remember was----
    Senator Kerry.  You don't remember whether he disagreed 
with you on the substance?
    Mr. Bolton.  I don't remember enough about the 
conversation----
    Senator Kerry.  Well, how can you say that it wasn't 
substantive, then, that it was procedural, if you don't 
remember.
    Mr. Bolton.  I think it was procedural. For me, he had----
    Senator Kerry.  What do you mean, for you it was 
procedural? Either it involved substance, or it doesn't.
    Mr. Bolton.  For me it was procedural.
    Senator Kerry.  I see. The substance of whether or not Cuba 
had a developmental program, versus the substance of whether 
it's research and how they're helping rogue states is 
procedural, not substantive?
    Mr. Bolton.  The process that I was concerned about was to 
get an honest assessment within the Intelligence Community of 
what could be declassified, and I felt that by the method that 
Westermann had used, he was not being straightforward with me. 
That's why I, I wanted to be sure, that's why I called Mr. 
Fingar.
    Senator Kerry.  Mr. Bolton, let me go to that right now. 
Well, that's really at the heart of this. You're smarter than 
that. And you know what substance is, you know what process is. 
What you didn't like was the fact that he disagreed with you.
    Mr. Bolton.  Simply not true, Senator.
    Senator Kerry.  Well, let's get to that. On February 10th, 
this is when this took place. And your Chief of Staff is the 
one who asked him to go get the clearance. He was following the 
normal standard procedure as requested by your Chief of Staff, 
and you already knew he disagreed with you.
    Mr. Bolton.  I did not----
    Senator Kerry.  But he'd expressed that.
    Mr. Bolton.  I had no idea.
    Senator Kerry.  He then followed the instructions of your 
Chief of Staff, now your Chief of Staff said it was necessary 
to do it in a hurry. Now, if he follows procedure, he sends it 
over to INR for clearance. INR's going to come back, to the 
CIA, excuse me. And they're going to come back to him and 
request his opinion. He simply sent his opinion along at the 
same time, knowing that they would come back to him, in order 
to expedite your request. Now, he did nothing that was outside 
of the normal procedures of the State Department and of the 
clearance process.
    Mr. Bolton.  Mr. Fingar, at the time, said what he had done 
was entirely inappropriate.
    Senator Kerry.  Why was it inappropriate?
    Mr. Bolton.  I went to, first I called Carl Ford, the 
Assistant Secretary, and----
    Senator Kerry.  What was inappropriate about putting his 
opinion that he was going to be asked for anyway?
    Mr. Bolton.  Then I called Mr. Fingar to say, ``What is 
going on here, can you explain this to me?'' And I recall Tom 
saying, basically, ``I don't know anything about it,'' 
basically, ``I'll check and get back to you,'' and later in the 
day, he sent me an e-mail that said, ``We screwed up, 
Westermann's behavior was entirely inappropriate,'' and he said 
twice, it won't happen again.
    Senator Kerry.  Well, let me just say that the formal 
process of the State Department is that when there is a 
proposed text, if it is derived from intelligence information, 
it gets submitted to the State INR bureau and that was done. 
The INR then sends the proposed text to the demarche 
coordinator in WINPAC, which is the DCI's Weapons Intelligence 
Non-Proliferation and Arms Control Intelligence Center, that's 
what he did. WINPAC then sends the proposed text to over a 
dozen Intelligence Community offices, one of which would have 
been Mr. Westermann, for his opinion, only he sent it right up 
front, including any relevant National Intelligence Officers 
for their review and clearance. The Intelligence Community 
considered whether the proposed would expose sensitive 
intelligence sources and methods, and whether, if it cites U.S. 
intelligence, it is consistent with U.S. intelligence analysis.
    Now, this is not a one-time incident. Which is what 
disturbs us.
    Senator Biden.  Would the Senator yield--the whole 
Intelligence Community reached the same conclusion.
    Senator Kerry.  The whole Intelligence Community came to 
the same conclusion as Mr. Westermann, a 23-year veteran of the 
Navy, who had no other purpose here except to be accurate. And 
you, and this will come up more, were not in accord with this 
judgment.
    Now, subsequent to that, you said this morning, that you 
had this one confrontation with him, and you dropped the 
matter. This was February. But, in fact, with the Mr. Smith/NIO 
officer, you had another confrontation on this issue of 
intelligence, why? Because the speech that you wound up giving 
to the Heritage Foundation caused a stir, Senator Dodd was 
going to have a hearing, in the process you sent that speech 
around, or you were planning a statement that was going to be 
made to the Committee, you sent that statement around to the 
various Intelligence Community entities to get it cleared, and 
it couldn't get cleared. Because you were making statements in 
that testimony that were not in accord with the judgments of 
the Intelligence Community. In the end, you didn't appear, and 
the hearing didn't take place, because the Secretary didn't 
allow your appearance, I believe, and subsequent to that, in 
July, you didn't let it drop, you in fact, went out there in 
your own car, and expressed your displeasure with the 
Intelligence Community that wouldn't ratify your judgments 
which were, in effect, wrong. Now, that's an accurate 
reflection of a timetable and a sequence of events here, is it 
not?
    Mr. Bolton.  It is not.
    Senator Kerry.  Well, tell me where we're wrong. You didn't 
go out in July? Let's just review it. Did you go out in July, 
in your car?
    Mr. Bolton.  I don't recall when I met with Mr. Cohen.
    enator Kerry.  If I tell you it was, in fact, in July, 
would you accept that?
    Mr. Bolton.  I don't have any reason to accept it or reject 
it, I just don't know.
    Senator Kerry.  Maybe you could check your calendar, but 
for the purposes of this, we'll say it is July and I believe 
the record will show it is July. Now, the purpose of going out 
there was to complain, which you did, did you not----
    Mr. Bolton.  That was not the purpose.
    Senator Kerry.  Well, it's what you did.
    Mr. Bolton.  The purpose of the meeting with Mr. Cohen was 
a courtesy call on him in his capacity as Chairman----
    Senator Kerry.  But you hadn't let the matter drop, it was 
in your head, and you raised your displeasure with the 
Intelligence judgments, correct?
    Mr. Bolton.  I wanted to find out more about what the NIC 
was, because I didn't, I had never encountered it before.
    Senator Kerry.  Well, could you tell me, and the Committee, 
what the process issue was, then, that you were unhappy with? 
Particularly with the NIO officer? What was his process 
violation?
    Mr. Bolton.  Mr. Smith had said that the speech was not 
cleared by him. And I didn't know who Mr. Smith was. So, I 
talked to the person who was at the head of WINPAC, and I said, 
probably something like, ``What's the National Intelligence 
Council?'' And he said, ``That's who it is, you ought to come 
out and talk to him.'' And I said, ``Did you clear the speech 
with the National Intelligence Council?'' And he said, ``Yes, 
in fact, we did. We cleared it with the National Intelligence 
Officer who has cognizance over BW programs worldwide, the 
National Intelligence Officer for Science and Technology. And 
this is a case where we sent this thing out to INR and out to 
the Intelligence Community, I didn't ask anybody in particular 
to clear it, I didn't know who was supposed to clear it. We 
wanted INR to perform its function of liaison with the 
Intelligence Community, and we thought they had, and then 
somebody else raises his hand and says, ``Hey, I didn't clear 
that speech.'' So, I wanted to find out what the purpose was.
    If I could just mention one other point here, on the 
question of whether or not I testified. I'd like to, I think 
you've got this, I'd offer it for the record if you don't have 
it, a letter to Senator Dodd from Secretary Powell, dated July 
23, 2002, it says, ``Dear Senator Dodd, This is a follow up to 
our conversation after a June 5 briefing on my recently 
completed Moscow trip. At that time I acknowledged your 
concerns on Cuba and bioterrorism. My decision to send 
Assistant Secretary Ford to testify was based on the purpose of 
the hearing as expressed in your letter, and in my judgment 
regarding the most appropriate witness for the purposes of your 
hearing, which focused on intelligence findings. At that time, 
I agreed to make Undersecretary Bolton available, to discuss 
separately, the policy implications behind Cuba's biological 
capabilities. Undersecretary Bolton stands ready to appear 
before the Foreign Relations Committee for this purpose. The 
Department puts a high value on its relationship with the 
Committee, and will work to accommodate your oversight 
responsibilities. We look forward to working with you, and 
other members of the Committee. Sincerely, Colin L. Powell.''
    Senator Kerry.  I respect the letter, but it doesn't do 
anything to address the fact that the Intelligence Community 
did not, and would not, clear the testimony that you proposed.
    Mr. Bolton.  May I then quote Assistant Secretary Ford's 
testimony at the June hearing, and he is addressing the 
question of how is it that he used the words that turned out to 
be in my speech. So, I will quote Assistant Secretary Ford----
    Senator Kerry.  But that doesn't----
    Mr. Bolton.  This goes directly to your question, Senator. 
``Mr. Ford, the history of the words on BW in that speech were, 
as I understand it, Secretary Bolton invited the Intelligence 
Community to provide him with some words that he could use in a 
speech on BW. He was very careful, I think, not to suggest 
words to the Community for clearance, he asked them, 'What do 
you think? What do you say?' So that they came up with the 
lines in the speech, and presented those back to INR to take 
back to Secretary Bolton for his use. As I understand it, his 
speech was postponed. I wasn't aware of this. I had a 
requirement on short notice to come up and brief the Committee 
on CW/BW worldwide. Apparently those words that had been 
approved for Mr. Bolton were picked up by my staff to insert in 
my presentation to the full Committee, and so that I then 
presented that information that had been cleared by the IC. 
When it came time for Mr. Bolton to give his speech a month or 
two later, he then took the same language that had been 
approved earlier by the Community, and stuck it into his 
Heritage speech. But those words were our words, the 
Intelligence Community's words, not his.''
    Senator Kerry.  There's no question about that, nobody is, 
Mr. Chairman, nobody even questions that. That is one of the 
great sidesteps of all time. I asked you about your testimony 
before Senator Dodd, whether or not it was cleared. You still 
haven't answered it, it was not cleared, was it?
    Mr. Bolton.  The testimony was never finished, I----
    Senator Kerry.  But it was never cleared, that's why it 
wasn't finished.
    Mr. Bolton.  I'm not sure I ever saw a draft of it.
    The Chairman.  Well, thank you very much, Senator Kerry----
    Senator Kerry.  Oh, what about Cohen, what did you say to 
Mr. Cohen?
    Mr. Bolton.  I said--as I testified earlier--that I went 
out to see Mr. Cohen to pay a courtesy call on him, to get a 
better understanding of the National Intelligence Council, I 
won't----
    Senator Kerry.  Well, what did you did say to him about the 
personnel that you wanted removed?
    Mr. Bolton.  I said, I was aware that Assistant Secretary 
Reich had been out to see him a short period before that, and 
that Assistant Secretary Reich had very substantial concerns 
with Mr. Smith, and what I said was, that in my dealings with 
him I had, his behavior was unprofessional, and that I had lost 
confidence in him and supported Mr. Reich.
    Senator Kerry.  Well, let me just say, Mr. Cohen says he 
didn't recall many of the specifics of the Bolton meeting, but 
believed his intent was clear, namely that he wanted the NIO 
removed. That's Mr. Cohen's recollection.
    Mr. Bolton.  My recollection is that I--as I've just----
    Senator Kerry.  And your Chief of Staff said the same 
thing.
    Mr. Bolton.  As I've just said, that his behavior had been 
unprofessional and that I'd lost confidence in him.
    The Chairman.  Gentlemen, we can sit here----
    Mr. Bolton.  I'm sorry, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Kerry.  May I just take one moment? Thirty seconds, 
Mr. Chairman. This is reading from Mr. Fleitz's interview, 
where he said, ``Did Otto Reich share his belief that Fulton 
Armstrong should be removed from his position? The answer is 
yes. Did John Bolton share that view?'' Mr. Fleitz said, 
``Yes.''
    Mr. Bolton.  As I said, I had lost confidence in Mr. Smith, 
and I conveyed that. I thought that was the honest thing to do.
    Senator Kerry.  You lost confidence because you didn't 
agree with him.
    Mr. Bolton.  No, absolutely not, Senator, confidence 
because he was claiming a process foul that was inaccurate and 
untrue.
    Senator Allen.  Mr. Chairman, when I was asking Mr. Bolton 
what was the difference from what he was proposing to talk 
about insofar as Cuba, and their biological capabilities with 
rogue states. And Senator Kerry said, we all agreed on what he 
said, what was the difference, and you characterized it as 
``not much of a difference.'' What you're trying to do is just 
point out that concern, and wanted to have approved language. 
You characterized answers to my question that there really 
wasn't much of a difference in what you wanted to say, or 
proffered as a concept, versus what was actually enunciated in 
the Heritage Foundation speech, isn't that correct?
    Mr. Bolton.  I think that's basically correct.
    Senator Biden.  Mr. Chairman, it's important, the facts 
here. Let's say, the Select Committee on Intelligence, 
reporting on the U.S. Intelligence Community's prewar 
intelligence assessment on Iraq, the very report that Mr. 
Bolton quoted, is saying they had cleared, they had 
investigated this issue on page 277 said, ``The analyst,'' 
referring to Mr. Westermann, ``The analyst told the Senator 
Intelligence Committee,'' this is a quote from the report by 
our Intelligence Committee, ``The analyst,'' Mr. Westermann, 
told the Senate Intelligence Committee staff, that ``the text 
of the Undersecretary's speech contained a sentence which said 
the U.S., not Mr. Bolton, the U.S. believed that Cuba has a 
developmental offensive biological warfare program, and is 
providing assistance to other rogue state programs. The text 
also called for international observers of Cuba's biological 
facilities.'' End of quote. That is fundamentally different 
than what got cleared. What got cleared was ``The United States 
believes that Cuba has a limited offensive biological warfare 
research and development effort. Cuba has provided dual-use 
biotechnology to other rogue states.'' Very different than 
saying it has provided offensive biological warfare program, 
and is providing assistance to other states. Fundamentally 
different.
    Senator Allen.  Dual-use means dual-use.
    Senator Boxer.  Computers could be called dual-use, you 
know that, Senator. We work on that all the time, there's big 
difference.
    Senator Biden.  The Intelligence Committee paragraph 
reference I would ask be placed in the record at this point, as 
well as the language that was ultimately approved to be able to 
be used by Mr. Bolton in his speech.
    The Chairman.  Both will be put in the record.
    The Chair would just observe, the Chair has heard this 
language at least four times, at least that amount. So, fair 
enough, so we proceed on to Senator Coleman.
    Senator Coleman.  Thank you, thank you Mr. Chair. I will 
spend about three minutes on this, and seven on the work I hope 
you're going to be doing, that any ambassador to the United 
Nations has to be doing.
    I do want to say that I appreciate and respect the 
sensitivity of all my colleagues on this issue. The reality is, 
when Colin Powell testifies before the United Nations and talks 
about biological weapons and other things, and they're not 
there--that hurts all of us. And so, what you're facing, 
Secretary, is a great, legitimate sensitivity on these issues. 
But then you've got to get past that and say, ``So, what do we 
have?'' And, number one, you've said it again and again, did 
you threaten any analyst because of their views? The answer to 
that has been ``No.''
    Mr. Bolton.  No.
    Senator Coleman.  Consistently. What you have here is a 
question of process. You're concerned about the process being 
that the INR, this analyst sent it out and it had his comments 
in there, he had alternative language in there, he had a number 
of things in there, you didn't see that, it then went out to 
the Intelligence Community, came back to you, and you 
questioned that process. And you were angry about that. Is that 
fair to say?
    Mr. Bolton.  I was concerned about that, that's exactly 
right.
    Senator Coleman.  So, what we have is a, and the other 
issue is the issue of pattern. As a former prosecutor, I know 
about patterns, what you have here is you have two incidences 
where you were upset with analysts, but in each instance you're 
saying it was not over substance, it was over process. They had 
different substance than you, but your issue was process, is 
that correct?
    Mr. Bolton.  Precisely.
    Senator Coleman.  So, in the end, it's management style.
    Mr. Bolton.  Precisely.
    Senator Coleman.  And the question that we have to decide 
in casting our vote is management style, it's going to move us 
one way or the other.
    Let me get to the other issue, because I think it's 
important. My colleague, Senator Obama, raised an important 
question, but I don't think it's the question, at least, that I 
want, that I think we have to answer, the U.S. has to answer. 
He talked about, in this wonderful history of United Nations 
ambassadors and I believe he said something to the effect of, 
``We have to convince the world we are right,'' the importance 
of having the credibility and the stature to do that, the 
integrity to do that. I really think that the question is that 
the U.N. has to convince the American public and the world that 
it's credible. That's the issue right now. Credibility of the 
United Nations. And whether it's Oil-for-Food, and the 56 U.N. 
audits that talked about the millions, the millions that were 
ripped off from the, the hundreds of millions from the Iraqi 
people, the billions that Saddam put into his own pocket, 
whether it's the sex abuse--brutal, horrible sex abuse in the 
Congo, child rape, prostitution--and whether the U.N. acted 
quickly enough to deal with that. Whether it's sexual 
harassment, and the question of whether the U.N. acted quickly 
enough, and in fact, in that instance, originally those 
allegations, the individual who was eventually removed, 
originally his position was supported by the Secretary General, 
and only after the world press brought it to everyone's 
attention, was there reversal. And so I would maintain that the 
question is and the challenge that I'm going to ask you is what 
are you going to do and what should we do to help the U.N. 
continue, if you are in a position where its credibility is 
restored. What I'm looking at, and I think something that you 
have here, is a culture of impunity. If we're not a community 
for Benon Sevan, white washing of U.N. officials accused of 
sexual harassment, U.N. peace keepers accused of abusing women 
and girls, can only be held accountable by their own 
government. So, my question for you is, help me understand what 
is it that the U.N. has to do to regain credibility, and then 
what is it that we in Congress, what is our responsibility? 
What is our opportunity to turn this around so that we have a 
credible organization that can be a partner in dealing with 
international crisis and dealing with peacekeeping.
    Mr. Bolton.  I think it's a very difficult undertaking to 
try and change a organizational bureaucratic culture. It's 
probably one of the most difficult managerial tasks you can 
undertake, but I referred earlier today to Dick Thornberg's 
report at the end of his year as Undersecretary General for 
management, and one of the things that he tried to do with the 
very strong support of the first President Bush, was create in 
the United Nations system an effective analog to what we call 
``Inspectors General'' in the federal government. It was a 
concept that was completely foreign to the United Nations at 
the time, although there were outside auditors in existence, 
there was nothing really like the IG system as we have it. Now, 
ultimately in the early 1990's an office was set up, the 
Internal Oversight Office. It did not have the kind of 
independence and support that our statutory Inspectors General 
do in this country, and if you read the, I think in both 
interim reports by the Volcker Investigative Commission, you'll 
see criticisms by the Volcker Commission of the lack of 
independence, lack of support for the internal investigative 
office, and the general lack of independence of internal audit 
functions, which is closely related, although somewhat more 
limited, to the broader mandate that IG's have. I really think 
that this is sort of the tangible, concrete reform that we can, 
that we should be looking at to enhance the sense of 
responsibility that I think most U.N. employees have. I think 
that most want to do the right thing, if they knew what the 
right things was, but having an effective IG is certainly, I 
can say as a government official myself, having an IG out there 
is a very important tool, I think it would serve us well in the 
United Nations, that's the kind of thing we've got, that 
suggestion, as I recall in the late 1980's and the early 1990's 
came largely from Congress, because of Congress's experience in 
the years before that of creating a statutory IG system, but I 
think that's an example of something both the Congress, that's 
an idea that came from Congress, and from other sources too, 
but that we were then not as successful as we should have been 
in getting implemented, that's something to look at right now.
    Senator Coleman.  And I'm sure that Congress is going to be 
involved in this discussion, we've got a big stake in this, I 
mean, the IOS you're talking about, they don't have independent 
budgetary authority. They're dependent on the folks who they 
investigate to get their budget authority. Benon Sevan was able 
to stop the IOS from submitting reports to the Security 
Council. We don't have, there aren't ethical guidelines in 
terms of, in the issue of procurement, either for the procurers 
or the contractors, there are not a series of guidelines, there 
aren't a whole range of kind of basic stuff that we would 
insist, that in Congress we would insist that is happening. And 
I know the Secretary General has raised these issues, and I 
applaud him for that, the question is, how do you get it done? 
And what do we do to keep the pressure on to make sure it gets 
done?
    Mr. Bolton.  I have one other suggestion on that, and I 
know I've raised this with a number of you when I've met with 
you in preparation for this hearing, and that is, based on my 
experiences as Assistant Secretary for International 
Organizations during the first Bush Administration, I really 
think that there's an enormous benefit to getting elected 
officials, American elected officials, up to New York, to talk 
to senior officials in the Secretariat, talk to ambassadors 
from some of the other countries, you know, we have a 
tradition, alternating between the House and the Senate that, 
on a bipartisan basis, two members of Congress are part of the 
delegation to the U.N. every year, and five years ago, Senator 
Helms took the Committee for, what I believe--correct me if I'm 
wrong--the first hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee ever outside of Washington. So, if I get confirmed 
here, and I can persuade the Chairman, that might be something, 
and I also think having members go up there--I think it's 
important for U.N. Secretariat officials to hear from elected 
Americans, people like yourselves who are responsible to actual 
voters--I think it's a very salutary experience, and I think it 
would be a big help to me in my job if I get confirmed, 
frankly.
    Senator Coleman.  I would hope, Mr. Secretary, that my 
colleagues would have their staff look at the 56 audit reports 
that were released by the ILC. Management failings extending 
every basic management skill needed to effectively manage a 
program, achieve the program's results. Failings included 
budget planning, execution, coordination, strategic planning, 
communication, procurement, inventory, controlled cash 
management, accounting for assets, documents justifying 
expenditures, information technology, human resource 
management. I think the job is almost overwhelming, it needs to 
be done, though, and we need a strong voice. And we need 
someone, and I applaud you for this, we need someone who has 
raised some of these concerns, who has been critical of the 
United Nations in the past, but has a commitment, then, to 
working with this organization so that it is lifted up, and 
then in the end has the kind of transparency and accountability 
and credibility that is needed if it is to be a partner with 
us, to work with us to deal with some of the challenges in the 
world today.
    Mr. Bolton.  I think that's the President's clear 
intention.
    Senator Coleman.  Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman.  Thank you very much, Senator Coleman.
    Senator Boxer.
    Senator Boxer.  Yes, Mr. Chairman, Senator Coleman, you're 
very eloquent, and it would be great to lift up the United 
Nations, it's tough to do it if you think it doesn't exist. So, 
that's what I'm trying to grapple with. You know, Senator 
Allen, you said that we're taking a detour here as we go into 
these questions about the pressure put on independent 
intelligence analysts when you don't like the answer you get 
from them. I think it's quite central to this particular 
nominee. Mr. Bolton, you seem to be the only person involved, 
because we have testimony here from several people, who is 
minimizing what you did to Mr. Westermann. Who, as Senator 
Biden has pointed out--and he did it in detail--is a real hero. 
Serving this country under fire in Iraqi Freedom, 23 years in 
the Navy, etc. Now, maybe you were unaware of his bio when you 
called him a ``mid-level INR munchkin,'' but maybe you should 
apologize to him at this point. Calling a war hero who served 
23 years, who was under fire, referring to him in that fashion, 
I just think that's outrageous.
    Now, that in itself, it's unfortunate, but it's certainly 
not enough to disqualify you. But I think what is enough to 
disqualify you from this position is that, it seems that there 
is a pattern, when you can't get the answers that you want, 
because you want to build a case, I think of an imminent threat 
against America by a country you think is an imminent threat, 
but the intelligence officials don't agree with you, then you 
seek retribution and you get very upset, and then when we ask 
you about it, instead of just coming out with it, and saying, 
``God, I was frustrated! You know, I thought I had the 
information, I thought it was documented,'' you tell us, ``No, 
it had nothing to do with that. It was procedural,'' and the 
words you used, ``he wasn't,'' Mr. Westermann ``wasn't 
straightforward with me.'' And then we find out, that in fact 
what Mr. Westermann did, was completely appropriate. And that 
what he's supposed to do is send out your words for comment, 
and he expedited the process, and then when you found out that 
it was, in essence, a turn-down, and whatever Senator Allen 
says, is a huge difference between dual-use and actually giving 
people help with the program--it's like night and day. I worked 
on that with, I think, the good Senator, on making sure that, 
for example, that our computers can still be exported, because 
sometimes they accuse of in the State Department that they're 
``dual-use.'' But what happened is, you went absolutely wild. 
This is what Mr. Westermann said, ``He was quite upset that I 
had objected, and he wanted to know what right I had trying to 
change an Undersecretary's language. And what he would say, or 
not say, or something like that, and I tried to explain to him 
a little bit of the same thing, about the process of how we 
clear language, and I guess he really wasn't in the mood to 
listen, and he was quite angry, and basically told me I had no 
right to do that. He got very red in the face and shaking his 
finger at me, and explained to me that I was acting way beyond 
my position and for someone that worked for him. I told him I 
didn't work for him, I worked for Mr. Ford,'' and it goes on 
and other people come forward and corroborate this story, and 
then we have the Mr. Smith story where you just happened to get 
in your car and drive out, by happenstance, raise the subject 
when we know Mr. Reich had already spoken for you on Mr. Smith 
in a previous occasion. So, there is a pattern here, which is 
very disturbing, which is why we're going to try to get some 
more people here to keep on putting the puzzle together. 
Frankly, if you had just ponged up and said, ``You know, I was 
angry, I was upset, I wanted to make a much stronger case 
against Cuba, and I think they bent over backwards and weren't 
fair to me,'' I would have more respect. But trying to say it's 
some kind of process, it's upsetting.
    Mr. Chairman, I can't concentrate. Senator Biden, I'm sorry 
to interrupt you, I can't make this case. But I want to move on 
because, again, Secretary Rice, in her strong endorsement of 
you, compared you to Jean Kirkpatrick and compared you to 
Senator Moynihan, and I want to take you through this. Again, I 
say ``No comparison.'' Jean Kirkpatrick said, ``U.N. votes 
matter, because they effect widely held views about perceptions 
of power, about effectiveness and about legitimacy.'' And, 
here's your quote in the Washington Times. ``Many Republicans 
in Congress, and perhaps a majority, not only do not care about 
losing the General Assembly vote, but actually see it as a 
'make my day' outcome.''
    I think there's a big difference here between Jean 
Kirkpatrick who say that U.N. votes matter, and yours who say, 
when we lose it, it's a 'make my day' outcome. It sounds a 
little bit like ``bring it on'' and we know what happened after 
that.
    Mr. Bolton.  I think we're actually talking here, Dr. 
Kirkpatrick is talking about the circumstance that she faced in 
the early 1980's at the United Nations when following the 
adoption of ``Zionism is Racism'' resolution in 1975, there 
were--really throughout the 70's--but in the years after that 
as well, the attitude in, among many policy makers in 
Washington of a sort of, I'll use the colloquial, ``Boys will 
be boys,'' in New York, and that the votes in the General 
Assembly didn't matter. She, I think, quite correctly, argued--
and it was really American policy throughout the Reagan and 
Bush Administrations--to take these votes very seriously.
    The point I was making in the passage you've quoted there--
which we also discussed earlier today--was that there were some 
people in Congress, the argument was we were about to lose our 
vote in the General Assembly, because under the U.N.'s 
financial regulations, we were about to fall two years in 
arrears. And some people were saying we had to pay up the full 
assessment, even though many in Congress were not satisfied, or 
we'd lose the vote in the General Assembly. What I said there 
was, that's not very appealing to many people in Congress that 
I know, that would be a situation that would just further 
affirm their lack of desire to participate in the U.N. and I 
didn't want that to happen, and I propose----
    Senator Boxer.  I'm sorry to cut you off, but my time is a-
wastin' here. You know, what you're doing is saying, ``Yeah, I 
said that, but I meant about one specific thing,'' you know, 
you don't say that here, and Jean Kirkpatrick doesn't say that 
here, so let me move on to another quote, because I think this 
comparison was made by Dr. Rice and I don't think anything 
could be further than the truth. I've got a lot of these. This 
one is, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, ``International law can 
actually enhance the national security of the United States.'' 
You've been compared to him, this is what you say, ``It is a 
big mistake for us to grant any validity to international law, 
even when it may seem in our short-term interest to do so, 
because, over the long term, the goal of those who think that 
international law really means anything, are those who want to 
constrict the United States.'' So, do you see a difference here 
between the two statements: ``International law can actually 
enhance the national security,'' and yours that international 
law really constricts the United States.
    Mr. Bolton.  I think there is a difference, I will say that 
Senator Moynihan was somebody with whom I was fortunate to have 
a number of conversations after my confirmation to the IO job, 
which he helped expedite, and we had a number of conversations, 
really, literally, in the months before he died on the 
international criminal court where I think his view and mine 
were actually the same, but on the this subject, I think he had 
a different view.
    Senator Boxer.  Okay, that's fair, good, because I want to 
ask you about some of these international laws here, since you 
say, you make this sweeping statement that they constrict. Here 
are some examples of international law, and I wonder if you can 
tell us if you feel that they constrict us, or whether they 
actually are good things, and if you don't know about them, 
I've got some details on them.
    Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide. Do you think that's a law we should be a party to? An 
international law that we should be a party to?
    Mr. Bolton.  Absolutely, and you know, of course, Senator, 
we're dualist countries, so the terms of the Convention on 
Genocide were enacted as positive law by Congress.
    Senator Boxer.  So, you agree with that and so you do 
believe in this case that international law does not constrict 
us.
    Mr. Bolton.  In this case, the terms of the Convention on 
Genocide were enacted by Congress as positive law, since we are 
a dualist country.
    Senator Boxer.  So you believe that this particular law 
does not constrict us.
    Mr. Bolton.  No, I favor this one.
    Senator Boxer.  You do not think it constricts us.
    Mr. Bolton.  Right.
    Senator Boxer.  So, your broad statement was overly broad. 
How about the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons?
    Mr. Bolton.  I support that.
     Senator Boxer.  And you don't think that international law 
constricts us?
     Mr. Bolton.  You know, if I could just make the 
philosophical statement here, that this issue of what 
international law amounts to is something that legal theorists 
have talked about, I wrote about it in Advaine, in Law Review 
articles and others, the fact is that this is something legal 
theorists will debate for a long time, they've been debating it 
for centuries already. I acknowledge in my capacity as an 
American official that the United States does, and should, 
follow international law. The question of whether international 
law is law in the same sense as municipal law is a 
philosophical question I've written on, I've given my opinion, 
I think you've all got the articles, that's not the same as 
what we're talking about here, which is concrete.
     Senator Boxer.  I don't know anyone who thinks that it's 
the same as municipal law, but I think what I think----
    Mr. Bolton.  ``Municipal law'' is the term of art used for 
``National law.'' National law versus international law.
    Senator Boxer.  Yes, I understand. But, what I wanted to 
say to you is this: You've been compared to Ambassador 
Moynihan, you have said different things on international law, 
and you've said you disagree with him on international law, so 
we have a list here, we'll come back to it later, but the first 
two, you would agree, we should be a party to, and it doesn't 
constrict us, so your statement that you made was overly broad.
    Mr. Bolton.  I never said we shouldn't agree in bilateral 
or multilateral treaties that are in America's interest. And 
the first, well, the sign just got taken down, but the first 
three or four that I was able to read, I support all of them.
    Senator Boxer.  Good.
    The Chairman.  Senator Boxer, you----
    Senator Boxer.  I'll just end with the quote, ``It's a big 
mistake for us to grant any validity to international law, even 
when it may seem in our short term interest to do so, because 
over the long run, the goal of those who think that 
international law really means anything, are those who want to 
constrict the United States.'' And I'm glad to hear that you 
agree with some of those, at least, that I had up on the chart, 
because I wouldn't want you to think that I, for example, are 
trying to constrict the United States, America, because I 
support those treaties as well. Thank you.
    Mr. Bolton.  And I have said and written that the United 
States should honor the treaty obligations that it undertakes.
    Senator Boxer.  Thank you.
    The Chairman.  Thank you very much, Senator Boxer.
    Senator Nelson.
    Senator Nelson.  Mr. Chairman, I'm going to defer to 
Senator Obama, he's been sitting here patiently, so if you'd 
come to me after him.
    The Chairman.  Very well, Senator Obama.
    Senator Obama.  Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Let me just pick up on a point that was made by my 
colleague from Minnesota, his suggestion that the question is 
not whether the world believers we're right on these issues. In 
the first Gulf War, we had to convince nation after nation to 
help the U.S. put boots on the ground, Senator Baker and his 
team were able to convince the world that we were right with 
respect to repelling Saddam Hussein from Kuwait, and that 
capacity to do so made our soldiers safer, reduced the burden 
on our taxpayers, so I'm just curious as to whether you would 
endorse the notion that in military actions that we take across 
the world, we don't need the world's approval in order to 
protect our interests, but that putting together coalitions, 
effective coalitions, can be helpful and serve our national 
security interests.
    Mr. Bolton.  Absolutely.
    Senator Obama.  The second point I guess I want to make, is 
that I am, like Senator Dodd, I think, who mentioned this 
earlier, am actually with you on seeing what we can do to 
reform the bureaucracy of the U.N., and some of the litany of 
wrongs that Senator Coleman listed have to be addressed. And I 
look forward to seeing how the State Department and the 
permanent representative to the United Nations can do so. But I 
just want to make clear, you've made quite a bit of hay about 
the notion that the United Nations is really just a building, 
and it's member states that have to be held accountable for how 
we function. That isn't to say that we don't correct internal 
bureaucratic bungling on the part of United Nations officials, 
but that there's a false concreteness when we say, ``The United 
Nations is responsible for this,'' or responsible for that, but 
in fact, it's whether the member nations are willing to commit 
to certain courses of action that makes the U.N. effective or 
not effective, is that an accurate assessment?
    Mr. Bolton.  Right, actually it was Senator Clinton who 
used the building metaphor in her speech at Verekunda, I 
didn't----
    Senator Obama.  Fair enough. But you understand, it's the 
same point.
    Mr. Bolton.  It's the same point, yes.
    Senator Obama.  I just think it's important that, as we go 
forward in terms of these reforms, I think it would be fair to 
say that we don't want to apply false concreteness when it 
comes to the Oil-for-Food program, and sort of suggest that 
somehow it's the United Nations as an institution as opposed to 
its member states that are entirely responsible for the flaws 
of that, it makes more sense for us to examine our relationship 
with the member nations as well as our own actions to figure 
out how we're holding the behavior of what we call the United 
Nations responsible for failures in the field. Would that be an 
accurate statement?
    Mr. Bolton.  Yeah, I agree with that entirely, the point I 
was trying to make earlier, perhaps not clearly, is that the 
original Oil-for-Food program, during the first Bush 
Administration, was embodied in Resolution 706 and 712, and it 
kind of played a very intrusive U.N. presence throughout Iraq 
in terms of the distribution of supplies.
    Senator Obama.  Right.
    Mr. Bolton.  Saddam Hussein rejected that.
     Obama.  Right.
    Mr. Bolton.  And, in fact, the program went through a 
number of iterations in the Security Council which Saddam 
repeatedly rejected until he finally found a version that he 
liked. And I think that the fact that he finally found a 
version he thought he could exploit, could only be, the 
responsibility for that--the responsibility for the 
consequences of that--can only be laid at the doorstep of the 
member governments of the Security Council.
    Senator Obama.  On the Security Council. Fair enough. We 
actually agree on that.
    Let me move on. I'm going to read a statement in the 
newspaper, now this is unsubstantiated, I want you to have the 
opportunity to respond to it, this is from July 15, 2003, 
Knight-Ridder Newspapers, ``In a new dispute over interpreting 
intelligence data, the CIA and other agencies objected 
vigorously to a Bush Administration assessment of the threat of 
Syria's weapons of mass destruction that was to be presented 
today on Capitol Hill. After the objections, the planned 
testimony of Undersecretary of State John R. Bolton, a leading 
Administration hawk, was delayed until September. U.S. 
officials told Knight-Ridder that Bolton was prepared to tell 
members of the House of Representatives International Relations 
Subcommittee that serious development of biological, chemical 
and nuclear weapons had progressed to such a point that they 
posed a threat to stability in the region. The CIA and other 
intelligence agencies said that assessment was exaggerated.'' 
And then, further down it says, ``Bolton's planned remarks 
caused a 'revolt' among intelligence experts, who thought they 
inflated the progress Syria has made in their weapons program, 
said a U.S. official who wasn't from the CIA, but was involved 
in the dispute.''
    Now, first of all, this is unsubstantiated, so I want to 
give you a brief opportunity to respond, be mindful, though, 
that I'm sure you want to go home, your poor wife, I'm sure, 
wants to go home after all this, so if you can keep responses 
relatively brief.
     Mr. Bolton.  I was invited to give both classified and 
unclassified testimony to a Subcommittee of the House, drafts 
were prepared--and I should say as is often the case, and was 
in part in the case in other speeches--I hadn't even seen the 
draft. I had been traveling, when I came back I found that I 
had a conflict, I had been assigned to go to a Deputy's 
Committee meeting at the White House, there were a lot of 
disagreements about the speech, it was clear to me that more 
work needed to be done on it. I called Congresswoman Iliana 
Rose-Light on and said, ``Look, I'm going to, on my own hook, 
cancel this. We need more time,'' schedules were such that with 
the August recess, we couldn't reschedule it until September, 
and that's what was done.
    Senator Obama.  Okay. The reason I say this--let me try to 
put in context some of the questioning that at least has been 
coming from this other side of the aisle. My colleague from 
Minnesota suggested this is a dispute about management style. 
Let me reiterate, I don't think it's a dispute about management 
style. What I think is of concern, is that--to the extent that 
you have a strong set of opinions, I'd call it an ideology, but 
I think that is, you know, sort of a loaded term--so let's say 
you have a strong set of opinions about foeign policy. That 
you've been on the lecture circuit delivering to the 
International Community as well as to think tanks, etc. You're 
not seeking a position of power in which every utterance you 
make matters. To the extent that there is a pattern in which 
you are pushing the envelope on your take on the world, and 
seeking to have intelligence matters conform to your views, 
then we agreed this morning that that is not good for America's 
national security. There are two instances that we know of in 
which, although you say that you did not want to have these 
people fired, it seems to me that we're playing semantics here, 
because you did suggest that they be redeployed. The proverbial 
``station them in Antarctica.'' There are at least two 
circumstances where there was a dispute, now you say that it 
was about process, but what it appears from the record is that 
they did not breach any process, they just did not do it 
exactly the way you wanted, partly because--it seems as if--
there was a substantive disagreement, and you felt that they 
were challenging your substantive assessments. You now have an 
article here, where at least--again, I haven't interviewed 
these people personally--but there is substantial evidence 
indicating that perhaps you had a more aggressive view about 
Syria's capabilities and that the CIA had to reign you in. 
There are example with respect to Libya in which you make 
statements saying that the reason that Libya gave up its WMD 
program was because of the tough actions in Iraq, although 
there were assessments that indicate that, in fact, diplomacy 
served a critical function in that regard. Although you say you 
don't do carrots, actually it turns out that there were some 
carrots applied there that made a difference.
    And so the concern, I think, that I have--I'm all for U.N. 
reform, but I'm also making sure that we have sufficient 
credibility in the world that when our troops are deployed 
around the world that they've got support and that when we are 
spending enormous sums to bring about some semblance of order 
in disruptive areas of the world, that we've got other people 
also willing to pick up some of the tab. And that, it strikes 
me, would be an important function that you would play as this 
permanent representative to the United Nations.
    Now, I know that was a mouthful, and I apologize for that, 
this is one of the problems with, you know, you're sitting here 
for three hours you think of all kinds of things to say.
    Mr. Bolton.  I've thought of a few things myself.
    Senator Obama.  I'm sure you did. (Laughter.)
    Senator Obama.  That's what I figured. And I think you are 
probably wise enough--out of all the things you were thinking 
about ----
    Mr. Bolton.  They were much more learned than ----
     Senator Obama.  So, let me just go to this particular 
point. Moving forward, with respect to assessments of threats 
in Syria or North Korea, or Iran, we can't afford to cry wolf. 
We've got to be able to--when we say that there's a threat--
people have to believe us. Am I wrong to think that this kind 
of potential overstating after what happened in Iraq, after 
Colin Powell's presentation before the United Nations, etc., 
may hamper our ability to protect our national security.
    Mr. Bolton.  Well, I think, Senator, the test is what 
language is finally approved. In the case of the Syria speech, 
it needed a lot of work, it wasn't ready. And the, one of the 
consequences of the clearance process is to take drafts and 
turn them into an acceptable final product. And as I say, I saw 
that there was a lot of disagreement both in the classified and 
the unclassified version, we had a small problem, and we were 
proposing to tell the House International Relations Committee 
intelligence that had not been briefed to the House 
Intelligence Committee and the Senate Committee, that was a 
problem, but the speech wasn't ready, and I put it off. And I 
think that was the right thing to do, and I think that the 
final product, the speech, the testimony, the unclassified 
testimony and the classified testimony that I finally gave, was 
broadly accepted. And that's part of, that's inherent in the 
nature of government. And I think it's a--it can be 
frustrating, to say the least--but it's a necessary process, 
and I have submitted to it throughout my tenure in this job, 
and I think ----
    Senator Obama.  Although, in at least two circumstances, 
you were unhappy with it to the effect that you might have been 
taking it out on somebody else.
    Mr. Bolton.  No.
    Senator Obama.  Let me just make this point, and you know, 
I don't mean to cut you off here, I'm assuming I'm out of time 
here, Mr. Chairman. Poor Mr. Chairman, he's nodding. But, at 
minimum what happened in these circumstances was that you, a 
powerful person in the Administration expressed sufficient 
displeasure about lower ranking analysts that their superiors 
felt that you were trying to get rid of them. Now, that may 
have been unintended on your part, it may have been 
miscommunication on your part, but we have testimony indicating 
that at minimum, you sent a signal that was interpreted as, 
these guys are out of bounds, and I'd like to see them removed. 
That strikes me as contrary to the very statement that you just 
made which is these clearance processes are necessary--
frustrating, but necessary--parts of the process. And the 
reason that I think that this side of the aisle is belaboring 
this point is that as we move forward with respect to Iran, 
North Korea and other threats involving weapons of mass 
destruction and terrorist activity, if we gild the lily and 
overstate our case, that can--over the long term--undermine our 
effectiveness and actually threaten troops overseas as well as 
the safety of people here at home.
    Mr. Bolton.  I absolutely agree that we do not want to 
overstate the case, and I want to say again, as strongly as I 
know how, that the two cases we've been talking about were 
cases of what I considered to be unprofessional behavior. There 
are, as many on the panel would no doubt say, a lot of people 
in the State Department who disagree with me on a lot of 
issues. That's never been something that I have found 
troubling, or been unwilling to discuss. But my approach to 
business and professional matters is, I hope, imperfect, but I 
hope is open and above-board. And that's the way I try and 
treat people, and when that behavior is not reciprocated, I'm 
troubled by it.
    Senator Obama.  Well, I appreciate your appearing before 
this confirmation, I wish I had more time, as I'm sure all of 
the other members do. Thank you very much.
    The Chairman.  Thank you very much, Senator Obama. Let me 
just make note, I've informed the distinguished ranking member 
that Mr. Neil Silver will meet with staff the day after the 
hearing, the court reporter, and another individual in question 
will be available by phone immediately thereafter. I mention 
that in response to requests and we will try to fulfill those 
today.
    Let me just indicate that, Senator Sarbanes, you have 
seniority at this point, I will recognize you, unless you wish 
to yield to Senator Nelson, but in any event, the two of you 
will be recognized to complete this round.
    Senator Sarbanes.  Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Bolton, a number of people have called for the 
resignation of the Secretary General of the United Nations, 
including--in fact--some members of the Congress. Do you have 
an opinion on that question?
    Mr. Bolton.  Yes, that is not the position of the 
Administration, as Secretary Rice and others have said, we have 
been working with the Secretary General, I think in terms of 
the allegations that have been out there on the Oil-for-Food 
program, that we've said that we should wait for the final 
report of the Volcker Commission and the outcome of the 
Congressional investigations.
    Senator Sarbanes.  And is that your view as well?
    Mr. Bolton.  Yes, it is.
    Senator Sarbanes.  Was it your view before the 
Administration took a position?
    Mr. Bolton.  Yes, it was.
    Senator Sarbanes.  Now, the U.N. was founded 60 years ago 
this spring. What mistakes were made in the founding of the 
U.N.--you've been a sharp critic of it--where did those who 
founded it 60 years ago go wrong?
    Mr. Bolton.  Well, I have less to fault with the framers of 
the U.N. charter than with the direction that--in many cases--
the Organization has taken since then. The effort, originally 
understood by Roosevelt and Churchill and others, was to 
recreate in the post-World War environment, the kind of United 
Nations decision making that existed during World War II, 
indeed the very name--United Nations--comes from the term 
applied to the victorious powers in World War II. If you want 
to call it a mistake--and I wouldn't call it a mistake--they 
wrote the Charter, Chapter 7, in particular, the way they 
thought best, it grid locked, within a matter of years, 
afterwards, because of the Cold War. That's why, in years since 
then, much of the Charter has been inoperative.
    The question now, and this was addressed both by the high 
level panel, and by the Secretary General, is whether and to 
what extent as part of U.N. reform, U.N. Charter revision needs 
to be a part of that process, and that is a, it's obviously 
required if we're going to change the permanent membership of 
the Security Council, there are other suggestions as well. 
That's a pretty weighty undertaking if we decide to go ahead 
with them.
    Senator Sarbanes.  Now some have said in response to 
criticisms that have been made about the United Nations, that 
if we didn't have a United Nations, we would have to invent 
one. Suggesting that the world needs such an institution. 
What's your view on that?
    Mr. Bolton.  I think that makes a lot of sense.
    Senator Sarbanes.  Now, in China, over the weekend, it's 
reported that they're having significant demonstrations--in 
fact, in some instances they've called them, I think, riots--
and one of the things they're demonstrating about, apparently, 
is the proposal or the suggestions that are being made that 
Japan should play a bigger role in the U.N. It after all is 
playing quite an enhanced financial role in the U.N. What's 
your view on that question?
    Mr. Bolton.  Well, the subject of changing the composition 
of the permanent membership has been around in one form or 
another for many years--it's been the subject of active 
conversation for at least the past fifteen years, since Japan 
made a very strong move in the early 1990's to get permanent 
membership--now there are a number of other countries that have 
sought to get permanent membership as well, and it's been a 
politic very actively in New York and capitals around the 
world. It's going to be politically, very difficult to make any 
change in the composition of the permanent membership, and the 
things that were going on in China over the weekend combine 
them, I'd say, with some public statements made by senior 
Chinese officials, certainly don't indicate a very positive 
attitude towards Japan's aspirations for a permanent seat, and 
I'd have to say, given our strong support for a Japanese 
permanent seat that this is going to make a very complex 
situation even more complex.
    Senator Sarbanes.  But, am I to understand that you have 
enunciated the view on occasions that the only country that 
ought to be a permanent member given the power realities of the 
world, is the United States?
    Mr. Bolton.  I think what I was trying to say at that point 
is that there are a lot of factors that are suggested for why 
one country or another should be a permanent member of the 
Council, and if you look at the--what I was saying was--if you 
look solely at the issue of power in the world, in a cliche 
probably everybody in this room has used of the U.S. being the 
sole remaining super power, under that theory, that there would 
be only one permanent member. Obviously, I understand that 
there are five permanent members, and the question is, are we 
going to leave it at those five, or are we going to change it? 
I regard that as a serious question, the Administration is 
taking very responsibly and seriously, I think, the obligation 
of looking at that issue.
    Senator Sarbanes.  Does changing that encompass changing 
the number downwards as well as upwards? Maybe even downwards 
to one? The United States?
    Mr. Bolton.  No, it does not.
    Senator Sarbanes.  I'd like to pursue this international 
law issue, and it's been touched on by others. In an article 
for the Chicago Journal, International Law in 2000, you stated 
that efforts to create an international system of laws and 
codes of conduct are ``belittling our popular sovereignty and 
constitutionalism and restricting both our domestic and our 
international policy flexibility and power.''
    Am I to read that to mean that you think the body of 
international law that's been developed since World War II--
take for instance as it relates to human rights--has been a 
mistake, and that moving down this path of making some 
commitment to international law is the wrong path? Senator 
Moynihan, I might note, was quite committed to the concept of 
international law, and sought to develop it in many ways in 
both his tenure at the United Nations and his service here in 
the United States Senate.
    Mr. Bolton.  I believe that there's no question that the 
United States should comply with its international obligations, 
there is a centuries' old philosophical debate about the 
meaning of law and whether municipal law and international law 
are really, whether they really cover the same ground. The 
issue--I think--turns principally on the notion of what 
constitutes binding obligations for a country. I think 
democratic theory and sound constitutional principles from our 
perspective require that law that bind American citizens be 
decided upon by our constitutional officials--the Congress, and 
the President. Not derived by abstract discussions in academic 
circles and international bodies.
    Senator Sarbanes.  But if we approve a treaty, doesn't that 
represent a decision by the Congress under our constitutional 
system?
    Mr. Bolton.  It does, and that is binding on the United 
States, as I've written.
    Senator Sarbanes.  And do you think we should develop such 
systems of treaties?
    Mr. Bolton.  I think that when they're in the national 
interest of the United States that that can be an appropriate 
way to proceed.
    Senator Sarbanes.  What constitutes the national interest 
of the United States?
    Mr. Bolton.  Well, I think that's one of the central issues 
that we can debate. If you look at the ABM Treaty of 1972, for 
example, that was a bilateral treaty, it ha been in force since 
1972, many people believe that the treaty reflected an outdated 
strategic relationship with the Soviet Union and then the 
Russian Federation, and that it inhibited the ability of the 
United States to defend itself. President Bush campaigned on 
that as part of his platform in 2000, and many on the other 
hand, opposed withdrawing from the ABM Treaty, their argument 
was that if the United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty that 
the entire fabric of arms control treaties that existed would 
collapse. The President did not agree with that, we were, we 
tried to work with the Russians so that we could mutually move 
beyond the ABM Treaty, but fundamentally we had concluded that 
in order to develop a limited national missile defense system, 
we had to become free of the constraints of the treaty. And 
although we worked with the Russians to try to get them to 
agree to mutually withdraw--when we were unable to do that, the 
President exercised his authority under the ABM Treaty--and 
gave notice of withdrawal.
    I think the ABM Treaty was a treaty that did not serve the 
national interests of the United States, and that's why the 
President withdrew.
    Senator Sarbanes.  Well, do you generally hold the view 
that since treaties might well constrain our freedom of action, 
and since we're now clearly the single-most powerful country in 
the world, that as a general proposition we should be very 
skeptical about entering into treaties, because they 
circumscribe, or limit, our freedom of action?
    Mr. Bolton.  I think you have to take each treaty on its 
own basis, I don't have a theological view about it, I think 
it's a practical question.
     Sarbanes.  And is the practical question that you're 
answering the degree of constraint that it places upon the 
United States?
    Mr. Bolton.  No, I think there are other factors that come 
into play, for example, the Treat of Moscow, that President 
Bush and President Putin signed in May of 2002 ratified 
unanimously by the Senate provided for the reduction in 
operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads by two-thirds 
over a ten year period. I think that was a treaty that was 
clearly in the interest of the United States to sign.
    Senator Sarbanes.  What about a general view that a system 
of treaties that constrains the ability of others to act would 
be of benefit to the United States. That, while we might be 
constrained in certain instances by treaty arrangements in 
terms of having our power limited, there's a benefit that flows 
to us by constructing such an international system because of 
the constraints and restraints that it places upon others. And 
it, therefore, contributes to making the international 
environment a more ``rule of law'' environment. Is that 
something to be sought after?
    Mr. Bolton.  I think that as an abstract proposition that 
might be true, I think you'd have to look at the specifics of 
the treaty to determine the specifics of whatever system or 
treaty you might be talking about to know whether it applies in 
fact.
    Senator Sarbanes.  I think one final question, I think you 
said earlier in the testimony that your views and those of 
Senator Moynihan's on the international criminal court, or the 
ICC were similar?
    Mr. Bolton.  I had conversations with him before he died, 
where I don't want to leave the impression that our views were 
identical, but I know that he had read several articles that 
I'd written and he shared many of the concerns I had written 
about. He called me up to mention that.
    Senator Sarbanes.  He did send a letter, signed a letter, 
along with a number of members, to President Clinton at the end 
of 2000, urging the President to sign the treaty for the 
International Criminal Court, and I think your view was that 
the happiest day of your life was when the U.S. withdrew, is 
that correct?
    Mr. Bolton.  Right, he called me after signing that letter, 
it was literally, and it was literally within a few weeks 
before he died.
    Senator Sarbanes.  Well, I have no way to question that, do 
I?
    Mr. Bolton.  Sadly.
    Senator Sarbanes.  I do have his letter which directly 
contradicts that, but you would say that he had a, if not a 
death bed conversion, a switch of position, is that right?
    Mr. Bolton.  I think what he had, what he had done was look 
at some of the concerns and had, my recollection was that he 
was preparing an article at the time, and had wanted to talk 
about it, and had read one or more of my articles.
    Senator Sarbanes.  He also said that it was outrageous that 
we hadn't paid our U.N. dues, calling us one of the world's 
biggest deadbeats. But you disagreed with that position, I take 
it.
    Mr. Bolton.  No, I testified earlier today, Senator, that 
during the first Bush Administration, we followed a policy that 
President Reagan had articulated at the end of his 
Administration to repay the arrearage that had built up during 
the 1980's, and in the late 1990's, I certainly supported the 
Helms-Biden legislation that was intended to find a way through 
the arrearage question.
    The Chairman.  That will need to all, I think we need to 
conclude.
    Senator Nelson.
    Senator Nelson.  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Bolton, according to a Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence Report on page 277, in reference to this big 
dispute here that we've been talking about, the process and the 
analyst and so forth, I want to get to the substance of this 
whole dispute. And in that report, they refer to your speech, 
this is the May '02 speech, the Heritage lectures, the Heritage 
Foundation. The analyst told the Senate Intelligence Committee 
staff that the text of your speech contained a sentence that 
said, ``The U.S. believes that Cuba has a developmental 
offensive biological warfare program, and is providing 
assistance to other rogue state programs.'' The text also 
called for international observers of Cuba's biological 
facilities.
    Do you believe that Cuba has, or had in 2002, offensive 
biological weapons development program?
    Mr. Bolton.  What we believed at the time was the sentence 
that actually appeared in the text of the Heritage statement, 
which I would be happy to read, and in Assistant Secretary 
Ford's testimony, and indeed, Assistant Secretary Ford said 
later that he believed, in testimony before this Committee, 
that the evidence for that proposition was substantial.
    Senator Nelson.  So did you believe that Cuba was providing 
biological weapons assistance to rogue nations?
    Mr. Bolton.  I think there was intelligence that tended to 
suggest that, but the point of giving this to the Intelligence 
Community to clear was to make sure that the statement was 
accurate. Because there was no point, from my perspective, in 
saying something that was no accurate. So, changes were made, 
I'm sure this drafting process went on for--at the staff 
level--for a long time, and the language that was ultimately 
cleared was the language that was used.
    Senator Nelson.  And, of course, that's the whole dispute 
here, is whether or not there was pressure put on the analysts 
from your initial view.
    Mr. Bolton.  No, it was not.
    Senator Nelson.  That was not your initial view.
    Mr. Bolton.  That was not the issue that turned on, that we 
were discussing, which occurred back in February when I thought 
the analyst had not been straightforward with me on a process 
point.
    Senator Nelson.  Until the CIA gave their input into the 
question of offensive biological weapons, did you believe that 
there was an offensive biological weapons developmental program 
in Cuba?
    Mr. Bolton.  I wasn't sure from the intelligence I read, 
where different intelligence agencies had different views, what 
the consensus of the Community would be. And that's not 
unusual, and not only is it not unusual, I don't think it's a 
bad thing. I think the Silberman-Robb Report makes it clear 
that one of the problems we have with intelligence is with the 
analytical process of intelligence is agencies not being 
competitive enough in their viewpoints, and it's not something 
that policy makers get involved in, and I didn't get involved 
in this. We kept, we gave, the staff-level people were putting 
language forward, other people were giving alternative 
formulations, and it was being worked out. It was not me 
staking out a position, it was speech writers trying to write a 
speech.
    Senator Nelson.  Well, we're going to have a chance to 
cross-examine that fellow tomorrow, and one of the questions 
that we're going to ask him is, what was the text that was 
submitted? And, according to this Senate Select Committee 
Intelligence Report, on page 277, it was as I just stated.
    Mr. Bolton.  I think there were many drafts of it, Senator, 
and you know, that's the nature of speech drafting in the 
government. I think what a public official is responsible for, 
is what he actually testifies.
    Senator Nelson.  Well, what ultimately came out that was 
scrubbed, was softened. ``The United States believes that Cuba 
has at least a limited offensive biological warfare research 
and development effort,'' ``Cuba has provided dual-use 
biotechnology to other rogue states. We are concerned that such 
technology could support BW programs in those states.'' Is this 
an issue that we should be concerned about, in your opinion?
    Mr. Bolton.  About the Cuban BW effort as described there? 
Yes, I did think it was something that we should be concerned 
about. And that was the best judgment that the Intelligence 
Community had as of that time.
    Senator Nelson.  Well, then what is the U.S. government 
doing about it?
    Mr. Bolton.  Part of the problem at that time that the U.S. 
government was involved in, was it was still dealing with the 
question of what the Cuba spy, Ana Belan Montes, had done to 
undercut our efforts to understand better what the Cubans were 
up to. And my point in raising this was--as I said--in the wake 
of September the 11th, I felt that it was responsible to have a 
discussion about BW/CW and nuclear threats that we faced, 
because part of what was important here was building public 
understanding, but our efforts, what we said was that we called 
on Cuba to cease all BW-applicable cooperation with rogue 
states, and to fully comply with all of its obligations under 
the biological weapons convention.
    Senator Nelson.  Have we called for international weapons 
inspectors?
    Mr. Bolton.  We have not, no. Not in Cuba under the, the 
BWC doesn't provide for that.
    Senator Nelson.  Well, have you had consideration of taking 
the issue to the Security Council to seek sanctions?
    Mr. Bolton.  No, that was never discussed. The issue of 
what Cuba was doing here, was not the same as saying that we 
could say with any degree of conclusiveness that Cuba had 
biological weapons, which some press reports said I said, but 
which I didn't, or anything that would give us a basis to go to 
the Security Council.
    Senator Nelson.  Have we intercepted, or disrupted any 
transfers of the dual-use biotechnology to other rogue states 
from Cuba?
    Mr. Bolton.  I'm not aware that we have.
    Senator Nelson.  Have we, as a policy of the 
Administration, have we urged our allies to use their influence 
to get Cuba to give up this biological weapons capability?
    Mr. Bolton.  I know we have discussed it with them, and 
it's a subject that when we have consultations on proliferation 
matters, comes up in the conversations, yes.
    Senator Nelson.  Well, in what way, since you raised this 
issue nearly three years ago, this very important issue, in 
what way has it become a priority since it was raised by you in 
this speech to the Heritage Foundation.
    Mr. Bolton.  Well, I think we've done we felt was within 
the limits of our ability to do. And there are some things that 
there are a lot of assessments of countries that have 
clandestine chemical and biological weapons programs or efforts 
underway that there's not a lot we can do about it, because 
they are, for biological warfare in particular, these are all 
inherently dual-use operations. So that operationally, there 
isn't much we can do.
    But I think what we have tried to do, and this goes back to 
the point I made earlier about the Biological Weapons 
Convention Review Conference in November/December 2001, where 
one of the things we wanted to do is to highlight the problem 
of noncompliance with the BWC. That there were a number of 
states that were parties to it, that participated in all of the 
conferences, and that we very strongly felt were violating the 
treaty. So that part of what we were trying to do is build 
international diplomatic pressure on those countries to comply 
with the obligations under the convention that they had 
undertaken.
    Senator Nelson.  In the process do you realize you shook up 
a bunch of my constituents? We're only 90 miles from Cuba.
    Mr. Bolton.  Yes, and I had conversations with Congressman 
Lincoln Biaz Bilart, and Congresswoman Iliana Rose-Light on who 
both thanked me for raising the issue, which was something they 
had been concerned about previously, indeed.
    Senator Nelson.  And you say there is very little we can do 
about it, which is what you just said. That's a scary 
admission.
    Mr. Bolton.  Well, I think there have also been continuing 
evaluations of the program and what the evidence is. Part of 
the concern is that Cuba has a very sophisticated biotech and 
pharmaceutical industry, and given what I said before about the 
inherently dual-use nature of biological warfare, that is a 
problem that's endemic in a country that has that kind of 
capability.
    Senator Nelson.  I think, Mr. Chairman, I would conclude by 
saying that when there is the tendency to step over the line 
with an inflammatory statement, it's troubling to overstate a 
threat. And, in my experience here in the Senate, that's one of 
the examples of what got us into trouble in Iraq, by a threat 
being overstated. Mr. Chairman, I'll conclude.
    I'm curious, has Secretary Powell and Secretary Armitage, 
have they endorsed you?
    Mr. Bolton.  I haven't asked them to endorse me. Secretary 
Powell sent me a congratulatory e-mail, ``On to the Waldorf,'' 
it said.
    Senator Nelson.  So, that sounds like an endorsement.
    Mr. Bolton.  Well, I wrote him back and said, ``Thanks very 
much.''
    Senator Nelson.  Thank you.
    The Chairman.  Thank you very much, Mr. Nelson.
    Let me just indicate that we've completed the second round, 
we're about to commence the third round, but before we do so, 
I'd like to recognize the fact that we've been joined by the 
distinguished Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, John 
Warner, who will give a brief greeting to our nominee.
    Senator Warner.  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    It had been my intention to introduce our distinguished 
nominee last week, but of course, the need to reschedule today, 
and I had long-term plans to travel in my state, so I 
apologize, but the Chairman very thoughtfully put my statement 
into the record.
    I've had a great and long interest in the United Nations. I 
think I'm the only serving member of the Senate now that served 
in Korea under the United Nations flag in the winter of 1951-
1952 in the Marines. And that was my introduction, and I'm very 
proud of my association, although modest it may have been, with 
the U.N. at that time. And in the ensuing years, I've had many 
opportunities to visit, I remember very well, Mr. Chairman, 
going up with Senator Helms. He asked me to accompany him when 
he went up to establish a truce of some sort, and get the dues 
in order.
    But, anyway, I feel it's an organization that has played 
very important roles in the history of our nation with a half 
century that I've known it, and that it can become--and I hope 
will become--a much stronger organization, because there are 
many purposes that it, and it alone, can serve, in the cause of 
human freedom, and mankind, and human rights. So, as I said in 
my statement, I wish you the best, and you have my support, 
strong support, in your confirmation process.
    I thank the Chair.
    The Chairman.  Well, we thank the Chairman of the Armed 
Services Committee, it's a privilege for Senator Biden and for 
me to work with you and Senator Levin. We have many common 
interests and important goals to work on together. Thank you 
for coming.
    Senator Warner.  I might note that in that winter, I think 
the distinguished Senator from Rhode Island, his father was 
there. We often, reminisced many times, he also was in the 
Marines.
    The Chairman.  Let me just suggest that this course of 
action, we're going to have two roll call votes of the Senate 
the first commencing at 5:30, as it's the Chair's estimate that 
that is likely to take about a half an hour, and that another 
vote will be occurring at about 6:00 p.m. Therefore, I would 
suggest that we would go until 5:30, recommence the round if we 
have not completed it, at 6:15.
    Now, in the event that you, Secretary Bolton, would like a 
short recess before then, fair enough. Otherwise we will 
proceed until 5:30. And you will know at that point that there 
is forty-five minutes of surcease.
    Mr. Bolton.  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman.  Let me just say that in this round I will 
not ask questions and I will yield to my colleague, Senator 
Chafee for the first Republican questions.
    Senator Chafee.  I'll pass, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman.  He passes, I'll yield then to Senator Biden.
    Senator Biden.  Thank you very much.
    Again, we've been focusing a lot on, and it's confusing, at 
least I think it's confusing, I was going to say ``who struck 
John?'' but that's a inappropriate phrase, who said what to 
whom, when and how and whether you used undue or inappropriate 
pressure on people just doing their job, and again, just to re-
recap here, what anybody has in their minds, at least speaking 
for myself, is the debate over aluminum tubes, and whether they 
were for gas centrifuge systems, and the assertions by the Vice 
President that there had been a reconstitution of a nuclear 
program in Iraq, and so on and so forth, and it turns out at 
the end of the day, the Intelligence Community was far from 
unified in any of that.
    And so that's the context in which there's a lot of concern 
here. And also that you are a very bright, straight-forward and 
have very clear views about what you think about most of the 
rest of the world, and have never been reluctant to state it, 
nor should you be.
    For whatever the reasons that you sought the change in 
assignment, not to penalize, just to get both Mr. Westermann 
and Mr. Smith off your watch, for whatever the reasons, the 
facts are that their superiors, in every case, in the case of 
Mr. Westermann going all the way up to the Secretary of State, 
said ``No, we think you're doing a find job, we're keeping him 
right where he is.'' Mr. Westermann's immediate boss, Mr. 
Westermann's working with the man that I'm told is going to 
testify tomorrow, I'm told he took it from there up to the 
Deputy Secretary of State, that was taken to the Secretary of 
State, they all said, ``Nope, he didn't do anything wrong, he 
did his job, and he's doing his job in an excellent manner.'' 
And so, for whatever your motive, whether it was loss of faith, 
or whatever, the conclusion of your superiors was, he should 
stay right where he was, is that correct?
    Mr. Bolton.  Well, I'm not aware of all of the background, 
I made my point about him, and I didn't press it. There were a 
couple of conversations, I wrote no memos on the subject--if I 
had been determined to get something done, I think I probably 
knew how to do it--but I wasn't, I made my point, I had lost 
trust and confidence in the fellow, and there it was.
    Senator Biden.  And you made that known, though, right? You 
made it known to him, did you make it known--you made it known 
to Mr.--the guy testifying tomorrow--Ford, Mr. Ford's 
assistant, you made it known to them and they concluded, for 
whatever else they wrote to you, he stayed right in place. 
Right?
    Mr. Bolton.  I felt from what Mr. Fingar had written to me 
that Mr. Westermann's behavior was entirely inappropriate, that 
we screwed up, that it won't happen again, I had made my point.
    Senator Biden.  I got that, but he stayed right where he 
was, right? You made your point, but he didn't move, right?
    Mr. Bolton.  That's correct, and that's fine.
    Senator Biden.  And, so one of the things that seems, maybe 
I'm--it's been so long since I've done this, but--it seems to 
me this is all about, it comes down to me whether or not your 
motive was that you lost confidence because they went around 
your back, or your motive in wanting them move was because they 
disagreed with you on substance. You say you lost confidence 
because, paraphrasing, they went behind your back, it had 
nothing to do with the substantive differences that may have 
existed relating to intelligence analysis in Cuba, and to me, a 
lot rests in that question. So that I make sure I understand 
this, I'm going to try to recount, and you interrupt me if I 
say anything that you think is inaccurate.
    Mr. Bolton.  I dare not interrupt.
    Senator Biden.  No, no. For real, because this is getting 
late in the day, and we're not nearly as tired as you because 
you've had to go nonstop, we just go everything thirty minutes 
or so, but everybody has said that old joke, ``My job is to 
speak and yours is to listen, if you finish your job before I 
finish mine, raise your hand, we all go home.''
    Mr. Bolton.  Why don't you go ahead and give your side of 
it, and I'll take notes, that's the easiest thing.
    Senator Biden.  Let me tell you what I think has happened 
here, factually. For whatever reason, somewhere around February 
11th, your Chief of Staff contacts the INR guy, who happens to 
be Mr. Westermann, and says, ``Can you clear these several 
sentences?'' I'm assuming that the reason you wanted them 
cleared is because they were part of, considered to be put in a 
speech or some public statement you were going to make, 
otherwise, I assume there would be no need to have them 
cleared, if you weren't going to say anything outside the 
building.
    Then there is this back and forth, whether or not Mr. 
Westermann when he did what is his job, passed those comments 
on to, from INR to the CIA or the Director of Intelligence, and 
an office within that building, that he--instead of waiting to 
be asked for them, what do you think?--he attached his 
comments, saying that he didn't think the way you were seeking 
the three sentences he got should not be used. As a matter of 
fact, I'm told that even before he did that, he sent approved 
language to your Chief of Staff, even before he sent anything 
off to the Central Intelligence Organization, for those average 
Americans listening.
    But your Chief of Staff said, ``No, send it on, we need an 
answer, and we need it quickly, as to whether or not we can use 
it as we have characterized, as we, the way we have written 
this.'' And there's the back and forth, and the back comes 
language that is referenced in the Intelligence Committee 
Report, that's different than the language that you initially 
wanted to use, but that you subsequently used. As a matter of 
fact, Mr. Ford, in March, coming up to testify before a 
committee in this Senate, he used the exact language, even 
before you did, that had been approved, these three sentences.
    Now, then along comes the speech that you make at the 
Heritage Foundation on May the 6th. That speech includes those 
three sentences, as approved, but a lot more. A lot more about 
other countries than Cuba, and more about Cuba, including 
whether or not we should be looking at how accurate the 
intelligence assessments were, based on the fact that we found 
a Cuban spy. You referenced this spy, it had been uncovered, in 
your Heritage Foundation speech, among other things relating to 
Cuba that were not the three sentences that had been approved.
    So now, we now find ourselves in the position where, after 
you make that speech, in preparation for testimony, before 
Senator Dodd's subcommittee, Mr. Smith doesn't give testimony, 
but is debriefed in a closed hearing about the Cuba speech. And 
he says, not in a public hearing, but to the staff of Mr. Dodd, 
or whoever the subcommittee chair was that Mr. Helms' staff. 
Pardon me? You were chair, but Mr. Helms' staff also was heard, 
what Mr. Smith had to say. What Mr. Smith said was, in addition 
to the three lines that have been, that we've discussed so much 
here, and that the Chairman doesn't want read again, I don't 
blame him, there are other things in the Bolton Heritage 
Foundation speech that had been given roughly a month later, or 
earlier, that were not cleared.
    Then, the next day you were going to come and testify, and 
the testimony you were going to give, it is asserted, before 
the subcommittee of Mr. Dodd, was also not cleared. But you 
never gave it because the Secretary of State said you're not 
available to testify.
    In this same time frame, between the time you gave the 
speech on May the 6th at the Heritage Foundation, and the time 
that Mr. Smith talked with Mr. Dodd's subcommittee, an 
interesting thing happened. The Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency, the CIA, sends out an internal assessment 
that goes to policy makers and other intelligence people, 
reaffirming their conclusions about Cuba's BWI and chemical 
weapons efforts. Which is at odds with parts of the speech that 
you made to the Heritage Foundation on May 6th.
    I am told that one of Senator Helms' staff picked up the 
phone after the meeting with Senator Dodd's subcommittee, and 
says, ``Mr. Smith is saying Mr. Bolton's speech to the Heritage 
Foundation was never cleared.'' So two things, maybe related or 
unrelated, happen in the same time frame, that come to your 
attention. One, all of the policy makers related to Cuba and 
all of the Intelligence Agency gets a reaffirmation of the 
judgments made about Cuba's chemical and biological weapons 
program, that you are implicitly criticizing in your speech on 
May the 6th, and Mr. Smith says your speech on May the 6th 
never was cleared.
    The next thing we're aware of that happens, is you make a 
courtesy call to the CIA, and you speak with Mr. Cohen. And you 
say it was just a courtesy call, and in the process, in the 
midst of that courtesy call, Mr. Cohen says, basically, 
``Anything else on your mind?'' And you say, ``Yeah, Reich is 
right, this guy Smith should not be doing this job,'' or 
something to that effect.
    And so, it seems to me that you had a substantive motive 
for both dealing with Mr. Westermann and Mr. Smith as you did. 
Because it was a little embarrassing, wasn't it? That the CIA 
after your Heritage Foundation speech reasserts to the whole 
community and the policy makers, ``Hey, we stand by what we've 
been saying, and this is what we've been saying.'' They never 
reference your speech on May the 6, but it's sort of the 
spontaneity of this reaffirmation coming up is--in my thirty-
two years here, and being on the Intelligence Committee for ten 
of them, is not something they often reaffirm, unless there's 
other incidences that occur that put in question their 
assessment. And then you have Mr. Cohen saying he had no doubt 
that one of the reasons you were seeing him was to deal with 
Mr. Smith, and so it seems to me that you had a, I'm not 
suggesting an immoral or illegal, but you had a motive in that 
you had both Mr. Westermann and Mr. Smith taking issue with not 
only the language you had, and you used, but the veracity of 
it, the implication that would be drawn by a reasonable person 
from it. Such as, the Undersecretary's speech contained a 
sentence which said the U.S. believes Cuba has developmental 
offensive biological programs, and is providing assistance to 
rogue state programs. That's substantively different than, 
``we're concerned that such technology, dual technology could 
support BW programs in those states.''
    And in addition to that you have, I can understand why you 
might be upset with Mr. Smith, because he says to Mr. Dodd's 
committee, ``Hey, Bolton's speech was never cleared.'' And your 
explanation is two-fold. One, it wasn't about policy, it was 
about the method they used to express their disagreement with 
me, or the language or the speech or what I was intending to 
say or do; and secondly, the part that's confusing me the most, 
John, as experienced a bureaucrat, using your own language, you 
said, ``If you wanted to deal with him, you knew had to do it, 
you never wrote a memorandum, but if you wanted to, you 
would,'' but you seem to be devoid of any knowledge of how 
these kinds of speeches were cleared in the past for your 
predecessor, for your successor, for whoever that will be, for 
everybody. And you said, ``Well, I just didn't know and I was 
going out to find out from the new guy on the block at the CIA 
to find out how this process worked.''
    To be blunt with you, I find it, it takes a leap of 
imagination for me to believe you didn't know how it worked, b) 
that this was strictly a procedural disagreement you had with 
these men, and toward that end, and in the interest of time, if 
you'd let me, if my colleagues would yield me a little bit of 
time, and their time so we won't take anybody else's--I don't 
understand. I have a few just, basic questions, about when in 
fact, you knew what, and who you asked. You know, did you 
summon the guy heading up INR into your office to tell him how 
dissatisfied you were? Did you tell him that he didn't go 
through the right channels? Did you ask for him to be removed 
from your portfolio? Did you talk with Otto Reich before you 
went to see Cohen on your drive home for the casual visits. I 
mean, what are--explain to me why my reading of your motive is 
not accurate?
    The Chairman.  Please respond, and then we will proceed to 
Senator Coleman.
    Mr. Bolton.  I think I've answered, essentially, all of 
those questions before, and I don't have a better way to answer 
than I answered before so I would, as Cap Weinberger used to 
say, ``If I said any more I'd simply be repeating myself,'' 
I'll just incorporate my previous answers into this answer. 
There is one new question that, or two new points I think 
you've raised. First, who cleared the speech? And let me say, 
it's unequivocal, and you have it in the documents that were 
produced, INR cleared the speech. INR cleared the speech, and 
the CIA cleared the speech. Now, who else in the Intelligence 
Community cleared it, didn't clear it, should have cleared it, 
I don't know. That's why we leave it to the Intelligence 
Community. You know, much of your commentary has been 
unwarranted or impermissible policy making influence on the 
Intelligence Community. Okay?
    Senator Biden.  It sure seems that way.
    Mr. Bolton.  So, what we did was, this speech, other 
speeches that contain intelligence-related information, you 
give it to them, and it's up to them to decide who to clear. 
But it came back, and it's not disputed. INR cleared the 
speech, and CIA cleared the speech.
    The other new point that you raised was did I talk to Otto 
Reich before I saw Mr. Cohen, and the answer to that is yes, I 
did. He--I think I mentioned this earlier--but Assistant 
Secretary Reich was responsible for all Western Hemisphere 
policy matters, and he was very concerned about Mr. Smith. And 
he had heard about this question of the speech and came and 
talked to me about it, and he said he was going to go out and 
speak to the pertinent people out in the Intelligence 
Community, and he was going to let me know that, because he had 
known I had this problem. And I think it's fair to say that he 
felt pretty strongly about it.
    Senator Biden.  If you said, ``Leave it up to the 
Intelligence Community to determine it,'' why'd you get so mad 
at Westermann, then? Every single person in the Intelligence 
Community agreed with his assessment.
    Mr. Bolton.  I don't actually know whether that's accurate, 
or not accurate, what I was objecting to was that ----
    Senator Biden.  Why don't you know that, John? How could 
you not know that?
    Mr. Bolton.  He went behind my back, he sent out an ----
    Senator Biden.  How could you not know that?
     Mr. Bolton.  He sent, this was the day it happened, he 
sent out a document that says, ``INR does not concur with the 
language,'' and I said to myself, ``How does that happen?'' 
That's why I called Carl Ford, and with Carl out of the office, 
and I don't know why, I then asked for the next highest ranking 
person, who was Mr. Fingar, and I said, ``Could you check into 
this?'' And he did, and he said, ``Westermann's behavior was 
entirely inappropriate, we screwed up,'' and he said twice, 
``it won't happen again.''
    Senator Biden.  And that was the end of it for you?
    Mr. Bolton.  Well, I think, the conversation I had with 
Carl Ford, I think he came back into the office from wherever 
he was, and we talked about this, and I repeated, essentially, 
what I had said to Fingar.
    Senator Biden.  Did you mention it with Carl Ford, or did 
he come to see, to talk to you about it?
    Mr. Bolton.  I don't honestly remember, it may have been on 
the margins of one of the Secretary's 8:30 staff meetings, he 
may have been in my office after the meeting, I don't remember.
    Senator Biden.  Well, just let the record show that every 
other member of the Intelligence Community that reviewed the 
three sentences you want, concurred with INR, to the best of my 
knowledge, in the assessment that Mr. Westermann gave 
contemporaneously with sending on those comments.
    Mr. Bolton.  Here's the bottom line--I gave the language 
that was cleared by the Intelligence Community, I did not give 
other language.
    Senator Biden.  Bottom line is, did you try to get someone 
moved, that's the bottom line for me.
    The Chairman.  Senator Coleman.
    Senator Coleman.  Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me actually 
focus on a conversation responding to some concerns from my 
colleague from Illinois, and I do want to make it clear that I 
also believe putting together effective coalitions is in our 
interest, it absolutely is. My concern is that the ability of 
the U.N. to do that, the ability of the U.N. to do a 
peacekeeping effort, to do a sanctions effort, has certainly 
been undermined by some of the circumstances and the situations 
that we've seen--be it in the Congo with sexual abuse or be it 
Oil-for-Food--so that clearly, it is in our interest to put 
together coalitions. We must have a United Nations that has 
credibility. But one of the questions that was raised was 
concerns about false concreteness, when we say the U.N. is 
responsible, that in fact the responsibility goes to member 
states. And clearly, in looking at Oil-for-Food, for example, 
there's no doubt that member states made decisions--both in 
setting up a program and allowing things to happen, in blocking 
the effort to, at times, to contain the Oil-for-Food program as 
it was expanded, there were concerns that the United States and 
Britain had during that process--but I want to, my concern is I 
have these discussions, often times it seems to me the people 
pointing fingers at these abstract, these ``member states,'' 
without absolutely there being some real responsibility for 
individuals who are making actions. There is a U.N. 
bureaucracy, there is the Secretariat, they got $1.4 billion of 
Oil-for-Food money to oversee the Oil-for-Food program. And as 
you've noted in the past, one of the problems when you have a 
bureaucracy, they're not beholden to any democratic state, 
they're not beholden to any government. Benon Sevan who was 
overseeing the program, and who, in the Volcker Report, it's 
clear that he received what I would call bribes from Saddam, he 
lied to the investigators about the source of the money that he 
received--he lied about that, there's no question about that--
you have Saddam's Chief of Staff who shredded documents, you 
have Louise Frechette who, at one point in time when the IOS 
wanted to submit audits to member states, in fact, the IOS was 
stopped from doing that. So, I would hope it is your sense that 
there is some accountability for individuals in the 
organization, that it's not simply a responsibility for member 
states, and we somehow hold blameless those folks who are 
involved in overseeing, failing to manage fraud, abuse and 
mismanagement, who were involved, perhaps, in corruption 
themselves. When, in the instance of the Secretary General in 
the Volcker report didn't ``fully investigate'' conflicts of 
interests between the company Cotecna, and his son. Could you 
clarify that a little bit for me?
    Mr. Bolton.  I think there clearly are joint 
responsibilities here. The reason you have a Secretariat is to 
carry out the programs that the member states order. And, in 
fact, it is the responsibility in the first instance--the 
responsibility of the Security Council to set these programs, 
the Security Council or General Assembly--to set these programs 
up, and the Secretariat, then, to manage them. And, I think 
it's important when you talk about the Secretary General, 
Article 97 of the U.N. Charter says, referring to the Secretary 
General, ``He shall be the chief administrative officer of the 
organization.'' And I think what that shows is that the Charter 
intends that the Secretary General basically be a manager of 
programs, in this case reporting to the Security Council. So, 
the member states, obviously, can't be overseeing every single 
detail. What you need is political accountability from the 
member states, to the extent you can get it, and management 
accountability from the Secretariat, and what the Volcker 
Commission and others' investigations have shown is, I think, 
that there are some problems here that have been uncovered that 
clearly need to be pursued.
    Senator Coleman.  And my concern as a former mayor who has 
worked with a bureaucracy and knows how hard it is to make 
change. As I look at the United Nations, and I look at 191 
members, and the challenge, the great challenge of reform. 
Again, at both levels that we've talked about, one is certainly 
on the political structure, the nature of a Security Council, 
who serves on it--India, Brazil, Japan, do these have roles in 
the Security Council, the Human Rights Commission--but then 
also the organization itself, the bureaucracy, the auditing 
functions. And, clearly what we've seen in Oil-for-Food, simply 
being the one instance--but I presume many, many more if you 
look at the IOS audits--of lack of controls, of standards, of 
evaluations, of a whole range of basic management tools, an 
organization that we're putting in close to 25 percent of its 
operating budget. And I would hope as Ambassador that you would 
be as vigorous in focusing in on that bureaucracy, who, I 
think, deserves to have a system in which there is 
accountability and responsibility. And my fear was, as we 
talked about this kind of, this concept of false concreteness, 
and as we say, U.N. is responsible, that somehow, we end up 
holding no one responsible. And, in this instance, that's been 
my concern with the Secretary General. That ultimately the buck 
has to stop somewhere--and if it's your Chief of Staff who's 
shredding documents, if the person you appointed to oversee the 
program is on the take, if you've been out there advocating 
expansion of the program when Saddam was raking in billions 
from it for himself--that in the end if there isn't anybody 
that we hold responsible, then in the end we have this great 
diplomatic discussion and it doesn't serve the interest of 
reform, and credibility and accountability.
    Mr. Bolton.  My notion of false concreteness is the notion 
that the U.N. has some political decision making authority, 
independent of member governments, which I think is completely 
incorrect, but there's no false concreteness in looking at the 
Secretariat, they're the people who are carrying out the 
responsibilities; they are the people that have to be at the 
high management standards that I think are important to give 
the U.N. credibility in this country. As you say, to justify 
the appropriations Congress is annually called upon to make.
    Senator Coleman.  Just one last comment--I believe that the 
budget for the IOS is about 24 million, and I'm told that the 
budget for the Communications Office in the U.N. is about 160 
million. I would hope that you take a look at that and see if 
we can somehow refocus priorities.
    Mr. Bolton.  That's a good point.
    Senator Coleman.  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman.  Thank you, Senator. I thank the Senator also 
for his vigilance in hearings on Oil-for-Food, he has been 
vigorous in pursuing all aspects of that, as is evidenced by 
his questions. And, in the event you are confirmed, Secretary 
Bolton, hopefully you will work closely with the Senator's 
subcommittee.
    Mr. Bolton.  I will, indeed.
    The Chairman.  Senator Dodd?
    Senator Dodd.  Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Bolton, I 
appreciate your perseverence here, it's been a long day, and 
I'm sorry about going so long, but it's important to try to 
move this along, I appreciate the Chairman sticking with this.
    We've been over and over this, let me just tell you my 
concern again with the motive behind all of this. While others 
maybe think this is tangential, this question, I think it is so 
critically important because of my fear and worry that others 
will see this as an improper message about whether or not you 
can do this. As I see it--and we're going to hear from, I 
guess, one of these, maybe more, depending upon, Mr. Chairman, 
our success in getting a couple of these people before us ----
    The Chairman.  They're going to be here at 5:30.
    Senator Dodd.  I mean other witnesses tomorrow.
    The Chairman.  We have only Carl Ford.
    Senator Dodd.  His, if you're looking at this, Mr. Bolton, 
and again--can I see the response to Senator Biden's question 
this morning?--Senator Biden, at the very outset of this 
hearing--after Senator Lugar asked questions--when asked the 
question about whether or not, your recollection if you had 
ever sought to remove any intelligence analyst as a result of a 
difference of opinion, whether it was over substance or 
process. At least initially, your response was you may have, 
you couldn't really remember, but you were, as clear as you've 
become during the day long hearing here. Here's what I'm sort 
of confronted with as I look at this--and again, we're trying 
to decide--I've got Mr. Westermann and Mr. Smith. I don't know 
what their views are, Mr. Westermann serves 23 years in the 
Navy, by every account, highly qualified guy, I can't tell what 
his politics are or anything else, he's a defense intelligence 
analyst. Mr. Smith, I gather again, is a person highly 
regarded, a specialist on Latin American affairs at the 
Agency--let me just jump back, Mr. Chairman, here's the point--
Senator Biden asked the question, and Mr. Bolton's answer at 
that time was, ``I may have mentioned it to a couple of people, 
shrugged my shoulders and moved on.'' I mean, that's, whether 
or not you'd asked them to be removed from office, from their 
positions. Your Chief of Staff, Mr. Fleitz, Mr. Fingar--who's 
presently the head of INR--Mr. Cohen, who's on the National 
Intelligence Council, Mr. Ford, a former head of the INR, Mr. 
Silver we haven't heard from yet, I'm not sure what he's going 
to say--but here are people who agree with you, substantively, 
on issues, to the best of my knowledge, don't embrace any 
ideological difference of opinion--I'm hard-pressed to 
determine what motivation they would have for stating, as they 
have, that in their view, their impression was, that you wanted 
them removed. This isn't one person, this is five, six, seven 
people who we've talked to in the last several days, who said 
their impressions were that you, and the actions you took, were 
designed to change their portfolio, move them on, get them out 
of the positions they were in. So, I'm hard-pressed, as some 
would be, when you're talking and you ask yourself, ``What's 
behind this? Why would they do this?'' Who's this Mr. 
Westermann, that he would have an ax to grind with John Bolton? 
Who's this--why would your Chief of Staff, as he recounts what 
occurs here, why would he say that? Why would Mr. Ford--years 
of experience at the Central Intelligence Agency, or Mr. 
Fingar--why would they say these things? Why would Mr. Cohen 
say that when you come up, you have a nice, amicable 
conversation, you stopped off at the CIA when you got there, 
and when you were there, this was the thing you suggested, that 
you remove this guy, Mr. Smith. I'm just hard-pressed to 
understand what motivations these five, six, seven people would 
have to draw those conclusions. If it was one of them, or two 
of them, I would say, ``He said/she said,'' I think we can 
solve that. But, I've got on the one hand, five or six or seven 
people, with credible backgrounds, long experience in this 
area, professional individuals, who have no ax to grind with 
John Bolton, who--when asked these questions, not even under 
oath--offer this to our joint staff who interviewed them in the 
last few days. I'm sitting here trying to draw a conclusion. 
What is a person do when you're confronted with that now? If 
you don't think this is an important issue, then you don't 
care, and whether or not you put pressure or you suggest that 
whether or not you agree with that conclusion or not, I want to 
make that point. I'm not really as concerned about whether or 
not what they were writing or not writing was right or wrong--
that is important and I don't disregard it--but the more 
important question to me is what happens to someone--that I 
think you ought to encourage dissent; I think there are people 
who disagree with policy centers and I heard you say this, and 
I agree with you--there ought to be that debating side, so you 
get it right. So, no one's arguing about debate and dissent. 
The question is, what happens to you if you dissent? And if 
what happens to you when you dissent is that your job is on the 
line, then we need to put a stop to that. And I think you'll 
agree with that. And the question is, what I have here, what 
conclusion is one to draw when you have five, six, seven people 
who have no ax to grind, to take a view that, in fact you did 
try to have these people removed, and you tell me you didn't.
    Mr. Bolton.  Well, I think that the--your characterization 
of Mr. Fleitz's testimony is not accurate--but, let me try 
again to say what I felt. That, in the case of Mr. Westermann--
as I believe I said to him at the time--I don't care if you 
disagree with me, I just don't think you should do it behind my 
back. And, when there's a loss of trust and confidence in 
somebody in that kind of position, I just think it's better for 
everybody to reshuffle the deck. INR's a large bureau, the 
State Department is a large place, it's not a question of 
putting somebody out on the street, there's no question of that 
involved here, at all. And, in the case of ----
    Senator Dodd.  Let me just say on Mr. Fleitz, let me quote 
him, Mr. Fleitz's interview, page 50, lines ten and thirteen of 
the interview with Mr. Fleitz, and I'll just read these to you: 
``Mr. Fleitz:'' and I'm quoting, ``All I can remember--and this 
is from Mr. Bolton--is that he spoke to Mr. Fingar to express 
his concern over what had happened, and said that Mr. 
Westermann had lost his confidence, and should be given a new 
portfolio.'' Mr. Fleitz goes on, ``While Silver was there, 
Bolton relayed the fact that he had lost confidence in Mr. 
Westermann, and asked that he be given a different portfolio.'' 
Fleitz interview, page 48, lines 20 to 23. You know, get a new 
portfolio--we've all pretty much decided--is a euphemism for 
moving on, the guy only had one portfolio. So, here's a guy who 
says something you disagree with--and you're saying it's 
process, I understand that--but even if it's process, say you 
lost some confidence in him, you don't try to fire a person 
over that.
    Mr. Bolton.  I didn't try to fire him. I just felt that if 
he wasn't being straight in his dealings with me that he ought 
to have other responsibilities, and I've said that repeatedly, 
and I think that's what Mr. Fleitz is saying, don't you?
    Senator Dodd.  All right, well, I thank you. Let me just, 
one or two other little questions, and I'll be done, Mr. 
Chairman.
    Let me just ask you here, and I word this question--I want 
to read the question because I want to make sure I don't 
overstep a line here--and the question very simply, Mr. Bolton, 
and I want you to listen to the question carefully, you'll 
appreciate why I say that when I read the question. I want to 
know whether or not you requested to see NSA information about 
any other American officials.
    Mr. Bolton.  The answer to that is 'yes', on a number of 
occasions I can think of. The way--I'm not even sure I should 
say this in open forum, but I'll try and do it--the Privacy Act 
precludes naming names of Americans, even in the intercepts we 
get. Now, a lot of things that--people use titles and so on--
but there are occasions when an intercept comes in on 
something--it might involve a member of another nationality 
that also gets these intercepts, I might say--where it's 
important to find out who it is who's saying what to whom. And 
from time to time--on a couple of occasions maybe a few more--
I've asked to know the name of the person so I can better 
understand the intercept.
    Senator Dodd.  And that was the only motivation for that?
    Mr. Bolton.  Exactly.
    Senator Dodd.  I'll leave that one be. We may want--I don't 
know if we want to have a private session to maybe delve into 
that a little bit more, but I'll leave that, if we ever get to 
that point.
    And last, Mr. Chairman, I note--and again, I, it's sort of 
a unique, it's fairly unique, I'm trying to recall, I was 
asking staff if they could recall other such occasions--when 
all of us, I think, on this Committee received a letter dated 
March 29th, to each of us here, regarding this nomination of 
Mr. Bolton to the Ambassadorship of the United Nations. It goes 
on--about a page and a half, almost two pages--and it's signed 
by 62 former ambassadors, serving in Johnson, Nixon, Ford, 
Clinton, Reagan, Bush administrations, Eisenhower in some 
cases, going back--opposed to this nomination. Now, there may 
be other circumstances that's occurred, but it's fairly unique, 
in my regard, to have that many ambassadors, in that many 
different administrations--and I'd ask unanimous consent that 
this letter be included in the record.
    I full well know there were former Secretaries of State who 
have written in supporting this nomination, and if it hasn't 
been, I would ask unanimous consent that that letter be 
included.
    The Chairman.  Both letters will be in the record.
    Senator Dodd.  As I say, my staff can correct this, but I 
found this to be rather significant, that many people who have 
served as an ambassadorial rank would have such reservations 
about the nomination.
    And lastly, let me just say, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for 
giving us the opportunity to spend a little time on this thing, 
and if I'm wrong in raising these questions, then I will stand 
to be corrected, but I think, Mr. Bolton said earlier in 
response to Senator Obama, the question about the importance of 
this question. And while others may not think it is that 
important, I think you do--even though we disagree over what 
happened here--I was impressed over the fact in response to 
Barack Obama that it would pose a serious problem if, in fact--
there were a conflict here--and someone's job were put on the 
line because there was a disagreement over policy. Or over 
intelligence information. And, to that extent, I appreciate 
your willingness to say that, because I think it's important, 
too. And particularly, we've got younger people coming along, 
people in the intelligence analyst community, and it's 
important that they know that when they disagree, it's 
important they speak up. And they need to know that when they 
speak up, under proper circumstances, they should not have to 
worry about their job being on the line. And people who--if 
they, in fact, do propose threats--these people, in my view, 
should not be rewarded with high positions in office. So, I'll 
end on that particular note, Mr. Chairman, I thank you.
    Mr. Chairman.  I thank the Senator.
    Let me just comment that we're coming up to the vote, at 
5:30. If both Senators can restrict themselves to ten minutes, 
the Chair will extend this before going over to vote, 
otherwise, we'll return at 6:15.
    Senator Boxer.
    Senator Boxer.  I promise that I will.
    Mr. Bolton, we have gone on about this, these two 
incidents, because we really think they're very important, 
given the history of what happened in Iraq, the sensitivity of 
trying to illicit information to prove your thesis--as I think, 
Senator Obama was eloquent about that point--so, let me just 
wrap up my view on what I know today, and then tomorrow we'll 
know more, because we'll have some more--we're going to be 
interviewing a couple of people tonight, and then Mr. Ford will 
be there tomorrow, so we'll know more--but, here's where we are 
tonight.
    I think Senator Dodd is correct. If this was one person's 
word against another person's word it would be one thing. But 
what you have here is seven people disagreeing with you. We 
have--we talked to seven people, our staffs have, about the 
anger you exhibited toward these two independent intelligence 
analysts who didn't agree with you. You said you never wished 
them any professional harm and you cite, ``I didn't write a 
memo.'' Well, frankly, people wouldn't write a memo if they 
were trying to get someone fired, so I don't buy that as an 
argument, I've been around here a long time to know that's the 
last thing you're going to do is write a memo and have it 
appear on the front page of the Washington Post, so I just 
think it's important to go over who disagrees with you. Mr. 
Fleitz who, again, said--and we've got the quotes--``Mr. 
Westermann had lost Mr. Bolton's confidence because of the 
episode, and he wanted, he asked that,'' he meaning you, 
``asked that Mr. Westermann be given a different portfolio.'' 
Mr. Fingar, who is Mr. Westermann's boss, ``Bolton said he 
wanted Westermann taken off his accounts.'' He said, ``I said, 
'He's our CW/BW specialist, that's what he does. He expressed 
again, as I remember it, that he was a Presidential 
appointee,''' meaning you, and you, Mr. Bolton could say what 
you wanted. That's pretty tough stuff. So, then you have Mr. 
Westermann, himself, on this case, and tomorrow we'll hear from 
Mr. Ford, who's Mr. Fingar's boss, and he's going to confirm 
that, as I understand it, and then you have the case of Mr. 
Smith, who says that he was mistreated, Mr. Cohen who confirms 
it, and Mr. Reich who's visited Mr. Cohen, and said that he 
spoke for you, and wanted this guy out of there. So, we have 
seven, seven to one here. And it's very, very disturbing, and 
you know, we're going to pursue it, and if our colleagues think 
it's as important as we do, we'll see. We'll see where 
everything goes tomorrow.
    I wanted to ask you about a quote that you made in front of 
this Committee, on April 5, 2000 during a hearing on U.N. 
peacekeeping. You were asked by Senator Brownback how the 
United States would go about helping to create a civil society 
in some areas of Africa that have had difficulty stabilizing 
for lengthy periods of time. Your response was, and I quote, 
``I'm not sure that nation building as a policy is realistic. I 
would argue, in a very real sense, after 224 years we're still 
nation building in the United States. I think the main thing 
that the United States can do is not perceive from the 
admittedly idealistic, but fundamentally erroneous, notion that 
we can do things for societies that they have to do for 
themselves.''
    Now, I juxtapose this against a speech that was delivered 
by the President in May '04 to the Army War College where he 
says that they're going to continue rebuilding in Iraq. So, I 
wonder how you feel about Iraq, is that an example of nation 
building, and do you make an exception for Iraq? Or do you 
think we should set a goal to get out of there?
    Mr. Bolton.  I think the two statements are consistent, 
because I think the issue is whether it is possible for us to 
do things other than in the case Iraq where we've overthrown 
the existing government, hold a security reign in there for a 
period of time to give the Iraqis themselves, through the 
institutions that they've created, the ability to hold their 
own elections and get their own government.
    I do think that nation building is fundamentally the 
responsibility of the people who are building the nation, in 
the case of Iraq, the Iraqis, in the case of the United States, 
the Americans. And I think those two statements are consistent, 
and I think that's exactly the policy we've been trying to 
pursue, against the argument of some people who have said the 
United States has to remain in Iraq for a long, long time, the 
Iraqis can't handle themselves--we've rejected that. We've 
turned sovereignty back over to the Iraqis, even though many 
people said it's the wrong thing to do, we proceeded with the 
recent elections, even though many people said security 
conditions weren't right, the Iraqis are now moving towards 
writing their own constitution, I think all of that is exactly 
the right policy.
    Senator Boxer.  Well, as someone who wanted the elections 
to take place, let me just say, the President, when asked when 
we are leaving, says, ``As long as it takes.'' And I think 
that--I don't know, have you been to Iraq? Recently?
    Mr. Bolton.  I have not, no.
    Senator Boxer.  Have you ever been there, since the war?
    Mr. Bolton.  No.
    Senator Boxer.  Okay, well I just came back. We're doing a 
lot more than holding a security reign. We're doing a lot more. 
We've got a lot of State Department people there, and they're 
trying to help build that nation----
    Mr. Bolton.  Well, I think a lot of the people there----
    Senator Boxer.  They're in a compound now, they can't even 
go out into the Green Zone, so to describe what we're doing is 
holding a security reign, is really just out of the blue 
different from what's happening on the ground, I can tell you.
    Mr. Bolton.  I think a lot of the people there with the 
Agency for International Development that I served with very 
proudly for two and a half years, very proudly, doing things 
AID does very well, I think that's all to the good.
    Senator Boxer.  Right, well, I'm just saying--what we are 
doing cannot be in the remotest way described as holding the 
security reins. And I would tell you, it's way deeper than 
that, and way broader than that. And, I would encourage you, 
when you can, to go there, although I would say to you, it is 
not a very safe place to go. It is--seeing it with your own 
eyes, you could read about it, but it's really quite an 
experience. Thank you.
    I really don't have any more questions, aren't you happy 
about that?
    The Chairman.  Thank you, Senator.
    Senator Obama.
    Senator Obama.  Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. 
Bolton, thanks to your forbearance to your family and your 
staff, I know that this has been a long day.
    I appreciate, I want to make a comment, I appreciate 
Senator Coleman acknowledging my sense that there is a 
consensus, hopefully, on a bipartisan basis that coalition-
building to pursue our national interests is important, and 
that reforming the United Nations and making that an efficient 
operation that can effectuate policies that have been 
determined by the Security Council is also important. So, it's 
not an ``either/or'' proposition, but it's a ``both/and'' 
proposition. I think my initial response had to do with--what I 
thought was maybe a perception--that somehow one was more 
important than the other.
    The issue that I brought up, I guess, about your statements 
regarding false concreteness--which I recognize you were making 
in the context of a more academic forum--is simply this: That--
I'll actually agree with you, philosophically--that ultimately 
the United Nations is only as strong as its member nations' 
commitment to find mechanisms to work together around some 
common aims. That if nobody's, if none of the member nations 
are engaged or interested, then United Nations is just an 
excuse for a bunch of people to hang out in New York. If they 
are committed to it, than it can be a useful forum to 
accomplish goals that we can more easily accomplish 
collectively than we can individually. My concern, I think--and 
I think perhaps the concern of some of the other panel 
members--is that, that notion has to apply to the United States 
as well. And I think you'd agree with this. That the United 
Nations, that the United States has to be committed to the 
United Nations, and its success. We shouldn't romanticize what 
it can accomplish, we should never surrender sovereignty, we 
should preserve--at all costs--the notion that we can act 
unilaterally to pursue our international interests but--having 
said all of that--if we are dismissive or do not believe that 
the United Nations cannot get something accomplished, then it's 
probably not going to happen. I mean, in fact, that's entirely 
consistent with your previous statements, correct?
    Mr. Bolton.  I absolutely agree.
    Senator Obama.  Okay, so--and I would take it step further 
and say that--to the extent that we use language with respect 
to the United Nations that is dismissive--to the extent that we 
put up straw men that somehow the United Nations is going to 
try to take away our sovereignty, or that we're sacrificing our 
sovereignty to the United Nations--I'm not saying these are 
your statements--I'm suggesting that, but I think you're 
familiar that, there's that body of literature out there. There 
are black helicopter notions of the United Nations. To the 
extent that, that is the perception of U.S. attitudes towards 
the United Nations, ironically, I think it actually makes it 
more difficult to reform the United Nations. Because countries 
like a Libya or a Zimbabwe that are sitting on the Human Rights 
Commission can sort of say, ``Well, you don't have to listen to 
the U.S., because they don't believe in the United Nations 
anyway.'' Would that be a fair assessment in terms of, that we 
need to speak bluntly and tell the truth about the United 
Nations, and demand accountability and reform, but we do so 
more effectively if the countries, the other countries involved 
perceive that we actually are committed to making the process 
work?
    Mr. Bolton.  I think that's right, and I think that's why, 
in my writings, I've always tried to stress the importance of 
American leadership. Because I don't think you get to the 
larger point without sustained American involvement.
    Senator Obama.  Fair enough.
    Just one last point to sort of close the loop in this, 
then. American leadership and commitment to this process is 
absolutely necessary, would you also agree that part of 
American leadership has to also be to acknowledge and 
understand that other country's are going to have their own 
self interests, and that we can't walk away from the United 
Nations on every occasion where they do not simply tow the line 
with what we perceive to be, our self interest, i.e., that--I'm 
a little troubled by the language that says, ``We only involve 
ourselves when it suits us.'' Presumably leadership 
encompasses, not only those moments where it suits us to use 
the United Nations, but maybe when it suits others.
    Mr. Bolton.  I think all nations in the United Nations 
pursue their national interests, I think that----
    Senator Obama.  Appropriately so.
    Mr. Bolton.  I think that's entirely the right way to look 
at it. And I think our diplomacy in the United Nations should 
be to try and persuade others that our national interests are, 
more often than not, congruent that theirs. When I say ``when 
it suits us,'' I view the U.N. as one of several potential 
instruments for carrying out American foreign policy, and I was 
reacting against what I thought was the view of some of a 
reflexive resort to the United Nations, as opposed to what I've 
always viewed as a utilitarian calculation, a cost/benefit 
analysis of what instrument is best suited for carrying out the 
particular task at hand.
    Senator Obama.  Which makes perfect sense. What I'm 
concerned about is a reflexive attitude of dismissal towards 
the United Nations.
    Mr. Bolton.  I don't think you can have either one.
    Senator Obama.  It's a mirror image of that. And that's 
what I think concerns me.
    But let me just shift now, I only have a couple of more 
questions, Mr. Chairman. First, I'm looking forward to North 
Korea, Syria, Iran, countries we anticipate may be giving us 
problems in the future. I'm just going to read a quote. You 
delivered a speech in South Korea in which you singled out 
North Korean leader Kim Jong Il for ridicule, naming him some 
three times as ``dictator'' and rejecting what you called his 
``extortionist demands.'' Now, I agree, I don't know that 
there's going to be a dispute anywhere in this building about 
characterizing him as a dictator, but I guess what I'm 
wondering is, when you make statements in the context of us 
trying to put together Six Party Talks, I'm just wondering 
whether that's an example of the sort of tone that makes you a 
wonderful thinker on international affairs, but makes you ill-
suited for a particular position. And I'll preface this by 
saying this, I would hate to have my previous statements over 
the last 20 years picked apart on live TV, my wife does it to 
me sometimes--it's awful. But the problem is, the position that 
you're seeking, words matter. Every single utterance you make 
is speaking on behalf of U.S. interests. And so, I'm wondering 
whether this is, again, an example of a predisposition that may 
make this not a good fit.
    Mr. Bolton.  I think, to use that case specifically, as I 
think we've discussed----
    Senator Obama.  I'm just using this as an example.
    Mr. Bolton.  But the clearance of writing and clearance of 
speeches can sometimes be an arduous process, and so the timing 
of the speech had to do with the fact that I was going to be in 
Seoul, the people working on the Six Party Talks knew it was 
coming, they saw the speech as it evolved, and it went through 
many changes, and in fact, the night before I gave it our 
ambassador in South Korea reviewed it one last time and made a 
few more changes. But the timing was no surprise, everybody 
knew it was coming, and people thought it was a good thing to 
do to let the North Koreans know what our views were and also 
to communicate that in South Korea, and China and Japan. And 
the day of the speech, after it was given, our ambassador in 
South Korea said to me, ``Thanks for that speech, John. It will 
help us a lot out here.''
    Senator Obama.  Along those lines, though, as we think 
about North Korea and Iran--you've been quite critical of the 
previous Administration, prior to George Bush, I mean, you 
know, when you say the nineties, it just so happens that there 
was a Democrat in the White House, but, not to say that your 
assessment is entirely partisan--but it strikes me that things 
haven't gotten better with respect to North Korea and Iran, you 
say that this particular speech, or approach, was helpful. I'm 
trying to figure out, in what sense was it helpful? I mean, 
you've got a situation right now in which North Korea has 
acknowledged that it's developing nuclear weapons, it appears 
to have greater capacity now than it did several years ago. 
Iran appears to be pursuing nuclear weapons, and you can give 
me an assessment of what you think should be optimal policy, 
but I'm wondering--given the severity of your criticism in past 
Administrations--how is the Administration that you serve 
function better in this regard, and how does the language of 
the sort that I just used, improve the situation?
    Mr. Bolton.  Well, I think in the case of North Korea, what 
we discovered, what we concluded, what the Intelligence 
Community concluded in the summer of 2002, was that the 
situation in Korea had actually gotten much worse years before, 
because the agreed framework had been systematically violated 
by the North Koreans in a way that we didn't fully understand 
until the summer of 2002, and that the North Koreans had 
engaged in an extensive procurement program to create a uranium 
enrichment capability that would give them a separate route to 
nuclear weapons, the uranium route as opposed to the plutonium 
route. That presented us with a dramatically different 
situation than the one that people thought we had inherited, 
and therefore required the unfolding of the diplomatic strategy 
that has resulted in the Six Party Talks. Those talks are now 
stalled, there's no doubt about that, we're waiting for North 
Korea to come back to the table, and it was a major emphasis of 
Secretary Rice's recent trip to the region. But I think the 
advance in our Korea policy is we've made it clear to the North 
Koreans, this is not an issue between North Korea and the 
United States, their nuclear program is an issue between North 
Korea and the world. And the way they're going to have to deal 
with the ultimate end to that nuclear program is through the 
mechanism of the Six Party Talks--all of the countries in the 
region that are affected by it. In the case of Iran--I went 
through this earlier--but I think the effort we have to make 
and we've been trying to make, we've had different levels of 
success on, is to engage around the world--the Europeans, the 
Russians, the Japanese, the Chinese, and others--to continue to 
apply pressure on Iran to make it clear that their nuclear 
aspirations are never going to be met.
    The Chairman.  Will the Senator summarize? We're eleven 
minutes into the vote.
    Senator Obama.  I will, and I don't want anybody to miss a 
vote. I will summarize by saying, again, I appreciate the 
amount of time that you've taken. There was one last, very 
important issue that I'll sort of leave you with, maybe you can 
respond to it and then we can go vote.
    You made a distinction between peace enforcement and peace 
keeping. And I'm wondering how that plays out in a situation 
like Darfur? It strikes me that we have a difficult task in 
places in the world where you've got failed states, or you've 
got states that are exhibiting gross human rights violations, 
in the case of the Sudan, genocide on groups of people. We have 
limited resources, we can't do everything. It seems absolutely 
critical that the United Nations is involved in that process, 
and I'm wondering how your distinction between peace keeping 
and peace enforcement is helpful in helping us to discern 
whether it makes sense for us--either unilaterally or 
multilaterally--to go in, to build coalitions, to prevent these 
sort of gross human rights violations and to create what 
Senator Brownback talked about, which is some functioning 
structure for states that are failing where people that are 
just being terribly treated?
    Mr. Bolton.  The principle difference, and there are 
several, but the principle difference is that peace keeping 
implies no U.N. use of force, other than self-defense; whereas, 
peace enforcement envisages an active military role against one 
or more of the factions that are involved. I have not said that 
peace enforcement is illegitimate, but it is very different on 
the balance that you're weighing of the insertion of military 
force compared to used force, as opposed to force inserted for 
observation or disengagement purposes. And I have criticized 
what I thought was the too facile bridging of the very 
important military differences between the two kinds of 
operations, and that, in turn, is the kind of analysis you have 
to go through in determining what a U.N. military presence in 
the region like Darfur might be.
    Senator Obama.  Mr. Chairman, let me just state for the 
record--I apologize, but I think it's important to say--my 
understanding is, at least, that the procurement with respect 
to the uranium program was in 2001 and 2002. So----
    Mr. Bolton.  The evidence began to show that, that extended 
back into the late 1990's. We don't know how far back, but 
that's pretty clear, I think.
    Senator Obama.  Right. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, 
for your patience.
    The Chairman.  Thank you, Senator. I thank the witness for 
the forthcoming, comprehensive responses. The Committee is now 
adjourned, and this hearing is recessed.
    (Adjourned 5:40 p.m.) Q04
                                ------                                 
A I74ANNEX F


 List of Persons Interviewed by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
                                 Staff

                              ----------                               
c3,tp0,p8,10/11,g1,t1,i1,xs90,r50,xs60




 Frederick Fleitz DUnder Secretary Bolton's Chief of Staff DApril 7 & 
                                 May 5



     Christian Westermann DAnalyst in State Department's Bureau of 
            Intelligence and Research (INR) DApril 7 & May 4



Stuart Cohen DCIA--former Acting Head of National Intelligence Council 
                             DApril 8 & 29



 Thomas Fingar DThen INR Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary DApril 8



          ``Mr. Smith'' DFormer NIO for Latin America DApril 8



 Neil Silver DDirector of Strategic, Proliferation and Military Issues 
                       for INR DApril 11 & May 5



 Melody Townsel DFormer USAID contractor in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, hired 
                  by Black, Manafort, et al DApril 26



        Bharat Bharghava DIBTCI Employee based in USA DApril 27



         Charles Black DPrincipal of Black, Manafort DApril 27



    Alan Foley DCIA--former Director of CIA's Weapons Intelligence, 
      Nonproliferation and Arms Control Center (WINPAC) DApril 28



    Thomas Hubbard DFormer U.S. Ambassador to South Korea DApril 28



          Kirby Jones DWorked for Burson-Marsteller DApril 28


John Wolf DFormer Assistant Secretary for Non Proliferation (NP) DApril 
                                   28


       Ed Hullander DExecutive Vice President for IBTCI DApril 29


    Jayant Kalotra DPresident of International Business & Technical 
 Consultants, Inc. (IBTCI), Prime Contractor on Bishkek project DApril 
                                   29


 John McLaughlin DCIA--former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence 
                               DApril 29


   Uno Ramat DTownsel co-worker on USAID project in Bishkek DApril 29


 State Department Attorney DHandled Sanctions case at State Department 
                                 DMay 3


     William Taft, IV DFormer State Department Legal Adviser DMay 3


Matthew Freedman DTownsel's Supervisor, worked for Black, Manafort, et 
                             al DMay 4 & 6


           INR Supervisor DMr. Westermann's Supervisor DMay 4


   Paula DeSutter DAssistant Secretary of State for Verification and 
                         Compliance (VC) DMay 5


  Robert Hutchings DCIA--former head of National Intelligence Council 
                                 DMay 5


   Jamie Miscik DCIA--former Deputy Director for Intelligence DMay 5


  Stephen Rademacher DAssistant Secretary for Arms Control (AC) DMay 5


Lawrence Wilkerson DFormer Chief of Staff under Secretary Powell DMay 6


 Otto Reich DFormer Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs 
                               DMay 6 e A

                           IV. Minority Views


  MINORITY VIEWS OF SENATORS BIDEN, SARBANES, DODD, KERRY, FEINGOLD, 
   BOXER, NELSON AND OBAMA ON THE NOMINATION OF JOHN R. BOLTON TO BE 
           UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS

    On April 19, 2005, the Committee on Foreign Relations met 
to consider the nomination of Under Secretary of State John R. 
Bolton to be United States Representative to the United 
Nations. At that meeting, members of the committee raised 
concerns about the nominee and agreed unanimously to postpone 
further consideration of the nomination until after the 
Senate's next recess. The Chairman and Ranking member of the 
committee subsequently agreed that the committee would 
reconvene on May 12, 2005 to continue its consideration of the 
nomination.
    At the conclusion of the April 19 meeting and in 
anticipation of the next meeting, members instructed the 
committee staff to further examine the issues of concern 
regarding the nominee.
    The Republican and Democratic staffs conducted jointly more 
than 30 interviews of individuals with information relevant to 
the nomination. In addition, the minority requested documents 
from the State Department, the U.S. Agency for International 
Development and the Central Intelligence Agency. Many but not 
all of the requested documents were produced. The Democratic 
members also submitted written questions for the record to the 
nominee, who responded in writing.
    Our views on Mr. Bolton's fitness for service as U.S. 
Representative to the United Nations were formed on the basis 
of those interviews, documents and answers; interviews 
conducted by the committee staff prior to April 19; documents 
produced to the committee by the executive branch prior to 
April 19; answers to questions in writing provided to the 
committee by the nominee prior to April 19; hearing testimony 
to the committee by the nominee on April 11; hearing testimony 
to the committee by the Honorable Carl Ford on April 12; and 
research of public documents and media reports.
    Based on this record, we recommend that members of the 
Senate vote against John R. Bolton's nomination to be U.S. 
Representative to the United Nations. This report details why 
we have reached that conclusion.

                          I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A. The Failure to Produce Documents

    This report focuses on the fitness of the nominee to be 
United States Representative to the United Nations. But before 
getting to the merits, an important matter of separation of 
powers requires discussion. Despite repeated requests, the 
executive branch failed to produce to the committee documents 
directly relevant to its inquiry. These documents concern Mr. 
Bolton's requests to learn the identities of U.S. persons cited 
in intelligence intercepts and the preparation of testimony to 
Congress on Syria.
    The executive branch provided no compelling reason and 
cited no constitutionally-based rationale for its failure to 
produce these documents. The committee's failure to demand 
their production risks undermining Congress' authority as a co-
equal branch of government and shirking the committee's 
Constitutional responsibilities.

B. Disqualifying Patterns of Conduct

    In our judgment, four distinct patterns of conduct 
disqualify John Bolton for the post of U.N. ambassador: (1) Mr. 
Bolton repeatedly sought the removal of intelligence analysts 
who disagreed with him; (2) in preparing speeches and 
testimony, Mr. Bolton repeatedly tried to stretch intelligence 
to fit his views; (3) in his relations with colleagues and 
subordinates, Mr. Bolton repeatedly exhibited abusive behavior 
and intolerance for different views; and (4) Mr. Bolton 
repeatedly made misleading, disingenuous or non-responsive 
statements to the committee.

1. Mr. Bolton repeatedly sought the removal of intelligence analysts 
        who disagreed with him.

    Mr. Bolton sought to remove Christian Westermann, a State 
Department analyst in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research 
(INR) who disputed language Mr. Bolton tried to use about Cuba 
and biological weapons (which was Westermann's proper role as 
INR's representative in the inter-agency clearance process). 
Mr. Bolton sought his removal three times over a six-month 
period. Fortunately, all of Westermann's superiors rejected 
Bolton's efforts. The Secretary of State even took the 
extraordinary step of visiting the INR analysts to make clear 
his support for Mr. Westermann.
    Mr. Bolton sought to have removed from his portfolio the 
National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for Latin America, who told 
this committee that some of the views Mr. Bolton expressed 
about Cuba in a speech did not reflect the Intelligence 
Community assessment. Mr. Bolton and his staff discussed the 
NIO's removal over several months and Mr. Bolton personally 
traveled to the CIA to seek his removal, even though he had 
never met the officer and does not know whether he ever read 
his work. All of the NIO's superiors, including the Deputy 
Director of Central Intelligence, rejected Bolton's efforts.

2. In speeches and testimony, Mr. Bolton repeatedly sought to stretch 
        intelligence to fit his views.

    In the case of Cuba, Mr. Bolton sought repeatedly to 
exaggerate the Intelligence Community's views about Cuba's 
possible biological weapons activities and support for 
terrorism. This caused the CIA to take the extraordinary step 
of republishing the Intelligence Community's standing views on 
Cuba and BW in the Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, a daily 
publication for the policy community.
    In the case of Syria, in three instances over the course of 
a year, Mr. Bolton sought to inflate language about Syria's 
nuclear activities beyond what intelligence analysts regarded 
as accurate. The Chairman of the National Intelligence Council 
ordered his staff to resist these efforts. Mr. Bolton continued 
this effort as late as the summer of 2003, when it was becoming 
clear that intelligence about Iraq's WMD programs had been 
fundamentally wrong.
    Mr. Bolton's pattern of going beyond his brief on sensitive 
subjects in speeches that had not been properly cleared caused 
the Deputy Secretary of State to order Mr. Bolton not to give 
any testimony or speech that was not personally cleared by the 
Deputy Secretary or by the Chief of Staff to the Secretary of 
State. No other senior State Department official was subject to 
this restriction.

3. In his relations with colleagues and subordinates, Mr. Bolton 
        repeatedly exhibited abusive behavior and intolerance for 
        different views.

    In the case of Rexon Ryu, a highly regarded mid-level State 
Department officer, Mr. Bolton wrongly accused Ryu of 
purposefully withholding a document and, months later, denied 
him a significant new assignment. Ryu's immediate superior 
secured him an assignment away from Mr. Bolton's reach, and Ryu 
ultimately served the Deputy Secretary of State with 
distinction.
    In the cases of two unnamed State Department officers 
working in the Nonproliferation Bureau, Mr. Bolton sought their 
removal over policy differences. Their immediate superior 
refused to remove them. More generally, officers in the 
Nonproliferation Bureau ``felt undue pressure to conform to the 
views of [Mr. Bolton] versus the views they thought they could 
support,'' according to the former head of that bureau.
    In the case of a State Department lawyer, Mr. Bolton wanted 
him removed from a legal case based on a misunderstanding of a 
position the lawyer had taken. The State Department Legal 
Adviser and the Deputy Secretary of State insisted that the 
lawyer remain on the case, and the Deputy Secretary took the 
extraordinary step of sending Bolton a memo reminding him that 
the rules applied to him.

4. Mr. Bolton Gave Misleading Testimony to the Committee on Foreign 
        Relations

    In several respects, Mr. Bolton's testimony has been 
misleading and disingenuous: Q04
    Mr. Bolton told the committee that, after urging Acting 
Assistant Secretary Tom Fingar to change Christian Westermann's 
portfolio, ``I shrugged my shoulders and moved on.'' In fact, 
he tried again a few days later, and again several months 
later. Q02
    Mr. Bolton told the committee he pursued the removal of the 
NIO for Latin America only once, stating ``I had one part of 
one conversation with one person one time on Mr. Smith, and 
that was it, I let it go.'' In fact, getting rid of the NIO was 
under review by Mr. Bolton and his staff for several months and 
after Mr. Bolton traveled to the CIA to seek the NIO's removal, 
Mr. Bolton told his staff that ``he didn't want the matter to 
slip any further.'' Q02
    Mr. Bolton told the committee that he did not threaten or 
try to have analysts punished because of their policy views. In 
fact, several witnesses said he did just that. Q02
    Mr. Bolton told the committee that U.S. Ambassador to South 
Korea Thomas Hubbard approved and supported his July 2003 
speech in South Korea. In fact, Ambassador Hubbard himself 
contacted the committee to correct the record and to make clear 
that he had serious concerns about the speech which he conveyed 
to Mr. Bolton at the time. Q02
    Mr. Bolton told the committee that it was his decision to 
delay testifying on Syria. Larry Wilkerson (Chief of Staff to 
Secretary Powell) told the committee that the Deputy Secretary 
of State postponed Mr. Bolton's testimony because it did not 
reflect Administration policy on a sensitive issue at a 
sensitive time. Q02
    Mr. Bolton's supporters argue that none of this matters 
because no officers lost their jobs and because the speeches 
and testimony that Mr. Bolton actually delivered reflected the 
views of the Intelligence Community. In fact, at least one 
highly regarded officer was denied a career-enhancing 
assignment because of Mr. Bolton, and Mr. Bolton did make 
public statements on the most sensitive issues that over-
stepped Administration policy or were at odds with the views of 
the Intelligence Community. Q04
    But even if no officers had been penalized or unfounded 
statements made, Mr. Bolton's repeated efforts to remove 
intelligence analysts and to stretch the intelligence to fit 
his views had a profoundly negative impact. As Robert 
Hutchings, the former Chairman of the National Intelligence 
Council, put it: ``[W]hen policy officials come back repeatedly 
to push the same kinds of judgments, and push the Intelligence 
Community to confirm a particular set of judgments, it does 
have the effect of politicizing intelligence, because the so-
called `correct answer' becomes all too clear. . . . I think 
every judgment ought to be challenged and questioned. But . . . 
when it goes beyond that, to a search for a pretty clearly-
defined, pre-formed set of judgments, thenit turns into 
politicization. And . . . even when it's successfully resisted 
. . . it creates a climate of intimidation and a culture of 
conformity that is damaging.''
    In the wake of our intelligence failures in Iraq--including 
the misuse of intelligence by policy makers--Mr. Bolton's 
behavior should not be rewarded. With the prospect of 
intelligence challenges to come--including the need to convince 
other countries of the threat posed by North Korea and Iran--
Mr. Bolton's singular lack of credibility risks becoming a 
detriment to U.S. interests and security.

C. The Wrong Man for the Job

    By itself, Mr. Bolton's credibility problem on intelligence 
matters makes him the wrong man for the U.N. job at this 
critical time. His approach to problem solving, his disdain for 
the United Nations and international law and his failure to 
deliver results in the job he now holds fatally compound the 
problem.
    Mr. Bolton's supporters argue that his ``blunt style'' is 
what is needed at the United Nations, especially when it comes 
to the critical issue of U.N. reform. Yet many previous U.S. 
representatives who were well known for being straight 
talkers--including Ambassadors Holbrooke, Kirkpatrick and 
Moynihan--nonetheless enjoyed broad support and were easily 
confirmed. The strong opposition to or concerns expressed about 
Mr. Bolton--notably from many former officials in this 
administration--are exceptional. They reflect a widespread 
belief that Mr. Bolton's apparent contempt for opposing views, 
his unwillingness to listen and his inability to persuade make 
him particularly unsuited for this assignment at this time.
    Mr. Bolton's many inflammatory statements about the United 
Nations as an institution and the legitimacy of international 
law would also hinder his effectiveness in advancing U.S. 
interests. The United Nations is not a tool to be used ``when 
it suits our interest and when we can get others to go along,'' 
as Mr. Bolton has suggested, but rather an essential and 
ongoing forum for the advancement of United States foreign 
policy and national security interests. For better or worse, 
the U.N. Security Council makes decisions that affect 
international security and stability. For better or worse, it 
helps to determine whether the United States will have 
international support and allies or will be forced to undertake 
difficult missions on its own in the face of broad opposition. 
The United Nations offers us an opportunity to make our case to 
the world, to demonstrate international leadership and to share 
burdens we would otherwise carry alone. It is difficult to 
elicit support from other nations for issues that matter to the 
United States when our representatives show disdain for issues 
that matter to them.
    The job of the U.N. ambassador is occasionally to hold high 
the ``United States'' nameplate at the Security Council and 
denounce lies and hypocrisy. But day in and day out, it is ``to 
operate in a low key, quiet, persuasive and consensus building 
way'' to advance U.S. interests, in the words of former U.S. 
Ambassador to the U.N. Jeane Kirkpatrick. Mr. Bolton has proved 
himself incapable of operating in this manner.
    Finally, Mr. Bolton's supporters point to his 
effectiveness. We are told that he gets the job done. Yet even 
a cursory review of Mr. Bolton's record as Under Secretary of 
State for Arms Control and International Security suggests the 
opposite. Under Mr. Bolton's watch, North Korea--the most 
immediate threat to the United States in the area of 
nonproliferation--has become significantly more dangerous. The 
Bush Administration's most touted success in this area--the 
disarmament of Libya--came about because Mr. Bolton was kept 
off the case, not because he was on it.
    The President of the United States should be accorded 
deference in appointments to executive branch positions. But 
the advice and consent clause of the Constitution is there for 
a reason: to serve as a check against unqualified appointees or 
when appointments would harm the national interest. It is not 
in the interests of the United States to have Mr. Bolton 
represent our country at the United Nations. He should be 
rejected.

   II. FAILURE OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH TO PRODUCE REQUESTED DOCUMENTS

    During the course of the nomination proceedings, the 
executive branch has failed to provide adequate cooperation 
with the committee. This failure to cooperate is a serious 
challenge to the committee, and to the Senate's constitutional 
role to advise and consent to nominations. The full Senate 
should not proceed to consider the nomination until the 
requested materials are turned over.

The Committee's inquiry--and requests for information

    Within a week after the nomination was submitted to the 
Senate on March 17, the Ranking member, Senator Biden, 
requested that the State Department make available for 
interview by the committee staff several Department personnel 
with knowledge of an incident involving Mr. Bolton that 
occurred in 2002.\1\ The Department initially refused the 
request, asserting that the matter had been adequately reviewed 
by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in its review of 
the intelligence related to the war in Iraq.\2\  The committee 
staff then reviewed the Select Committee's records and 
interviewed the lead staff on that review, and determined that 
the Select Committee had not, in fact, thoroughly reviewed the 
matter.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Letter from Sen. Biden to Secretary Rice, Mar. 24, 2005.
    \2\ Letter from James P. Terry, Acting Assistant Secretary for 
Legislative Affairs, to Sen. Biden, Mar. 29, 2005.
    \3\ See letters from Sen. Biden to Secretary Rice, Mar. 31, 2005 
and Apr. 4, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    So Senator Biden renewed his request. Still, the State 
Department resisted.\4\ It was not until April 7, four days 
before the hearing with the nominee, when the Chairman, Senator 
Lugar, intervened, that the State Department finally responded 
to the request and provided access to four individuals, and 
began providing relevant documents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ See two letters from Matthew A. Reynolds, Assistant Secretary 
for Legislative Affairs, to Sen. Biden, dated Apr. 5, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    At the committee business meeting on April 19, the 
committee agreed to defer a vote on the nomination until after 
the May recess, and instructed the staff to investigate various 
allegations that had been made about the nominee. On April 29, 
acting on behalf of the minority, Senator Biden submitted 
additional document requests to the Department.\5\ The Chairman 
intervened to help again a few days later, but he also 
implicitly invited the Department to ignore part of the 
minority request, saying that some of it was ``extremely broad 
and may have marginal relevance to specific allegations.'' The 
letter then expressed hope that certain specific requests would 
be fulfilled, a list that omitted four parts of the minority 
request.\6\ The Department took the hint--and has failed to 
turn over some important materials, all related to preparation 
of speeches and testimony.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ Letter from Sen. Biden to Secretary Rice, Apr. 29, 2005.
    \6\ Letter from Sen. Lugar to Secretary Rice, May 4, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Even after the request was further narrowed--at the urging 
of the State Department--only a relatively small number of 
materials was provided. In rejecting the minority request, the 
Department proffered an extraordinary rationale: that it ``does 
not believe the requests to be specifically tied to issues 
being deliberated by the committee.'' \7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ Letter from Matthew A. Reynolds, Assistant Secretary for 
Legislative Affairs, to Sen. Lugar, May 6, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Thus, in the course of the committee's consideration of the 
nomination, the State Department made two related decisions to 
reject minority requests for information, both astounding in 
their own right. First, the Department responded only to the 
requests endorsed by the majority. Second, the executive branch 
decided for itself the issues that are relevant to the 
committee's review of nomination.
    This disregard for the rights of the minority is a marked 
departure from past practice, including in this Administration. 
In 2001, in connection with the nomination of John Negroponte 
for the UN post, the Democratic members (in the minority when 
the nomination was submitted) made substantial document 
requests, to which the Department of State provided full 
cooperation.
    The decision of the Department to decide for itself which 
issues are relevant is even more troubling, as the same 
rationale could well be applied to requests by the majority.

What is the Department withholding?

    During the course of the nomination, the committee reviewed 
the question of whether Mr. Bolton sought to stretch the 
intelligence. That is, to say things in public statements that 
the intelligence would not support and to keep going back at 
the intelligence community again and again to get the answers 
he wants, not the answers the facts support.
    The material withheld by the Department goes directly to 
this question, as it relates to the preparation of 
congressional testimony on Syria's weapons of mass destruction 
program in the summer and fall of 2003. The committee has 
already learned from interviews with intelligence officials 
that what Mr. Bolton initially wanted to say went far beyond 
what the intelligence would support.
    A related question connected to the Syria testimony is 
whether Mr. Bolton misled the committee when he testified that 
he hadn't seen the drafts of the testimony.
    Is the Administration hiding something by holding back 
these materials? Could it be that Mr. Bolton was, in fact, 
involved in the drafting of the testimony?

Also denied--NSA information

    Another government agency, the National Security Agency 
(NSA), has also failed to turn over relevant information. 
Specifically, the committee has requested information on 
instances when Mr. Bolton requested and received, on ten 
occasions, the identity of U.S. persons on an NSA intercept. On 
April 13, Senator Dodd first made a request for this 
information.\8\ By letter dated April 28, Senator Lugar also 
made a request for this information through the Intelligence 
Committee.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ Question for the record by Senator Dodd.
    \9\ Letter to Sens. Roberts and Rockefeller from Sen. Lugar, Apr. 
28, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Specifically, the Chairman asked Senators Roberts and 
Rockefeller to seek ``all information related to Mr. Bolton's 
requests and the responses thereto, including the unredacted 
contents of the documents in question . . .'' And the letter 
said that the Chairman was ``prepared to follow the guidance of 
the Select Committee'' with respect to the ``access and storage 
of such material, as well as the provisions under which such 
materials will be shared with members of the Committee on 
Foreign Relations.'' \10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In other words, the Chairman made clear his expectation 
that the NSA would provide all the information to the 
Intelligence Committee, which in turn would share it with this 
committee. On May 10, General Hayden, the Deputy Director of 
National Intelligence, briefed the Chairman and Vice Chairman 
of the Intelligence Committee. This committee was informed that 
Sens. Roberts and Rockefeller were not given the identities of 
the U.S. persons that Mr. Bolton requested and received. And as 
of the date of the committee's meeting on May 12, the Select 
Committee had provided no information on when or whether 
members of the Committee on Foreign Relations would be given 
access even to the information given to the Intelligence 
Committee.

A challenge to the constitutional process

    The integrity of the nomination process, and the Senate's 
constitutional role, are being challenged by the actions of 
executive branch agencies.
    Article II, Section II of the Constitution provides that 
``the President shall nominate, and by and with the advice and 
consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public 
ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all 
other officers of the United States.''
    The failure of the Administration to cooperate with this 
committee and the rationale offered for this failure--that the 
``Department does not believe these requests to be specifically 
tied to the issues being deliberated by the committee''--has no 
constitutional justification, and does damage to the standing 
and ability of this committee to perform its function of 
oversight and advice and consent.
    The Administration has asserted neither executive privilege 
nor any other constitutionally-based rationale for not 
cooperating with the committee. It has no right under past 
practices or under Constitutional theory to offer as a 
rationale that they do not believe the request to be 
``specifically tied to the issues being deliberated by the 
committee.''
    Under the doctrine of separation of powers, Congress is a 
co-equal branch of government, and it is within the Senate's 
power alone to decide what it thinks is relevant to its 
deliberations in the exercise of the advice and consent power.
    The Senate does not work for the President. No one is 
entitled to appointment to an office requiring advice and 
consent--unless they have the Senate's consent. Likewise, no 
President is entitled to approval of a nominee.
    By acquiescing in the executive branch's position, the 
committee has undermined its authority and shirked its 
constitutional responsibility.

       III. MR. BOLTON'S EFFORTS TO REMOVE INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS

A. Christian Westermann

    It is undisputed from the record that Mr. Bolton sought to 
have Christian Westermann, an analyst in the State Department's 
Bureau of Intelligence and Research, or INR, removed from his 
portfolio. Mr. Bolton did so after an incident that occurred in 
February 2002 regarding language about Cuba and biological 
weapons that Mr. Bolton's office sought to clear for use in a 
speech.
    During the nomination hearing, Mr. Bolton was asked on 
numerous occasions about the Westermann matter. He frequently 
avoided responding to direct questions, and tried to downplay 
the significance of what he had done. For example, early in the 
hearing, Senator Biden asked him whether he had ever asked 
``anyone to remove Mr. Westermann from [his] portfolio?'' 
Bolton tried to evade the question: Q04
          I think, as the interviews that your staff conducted 
        show--and that's one reason why I want to get them all 
        out in public--we believe Mr. Westermann had behaved in 
        an underhanded fashion. And I think I--as my assistant 
        mentioned to your staff, I said to him at the time, ``I 
        don't care if you disagree with me, just don't do it 
        behind my back.'' \11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Apr. 11, 
2005, am session, page 45. Hereafter cited as: ``Apr. 11 hearing, am 
session.'' Note: this citation and all following citations are in 
reference to the transcripts, e-mails and other documents available to 
the committee as of May 16, 2005. Q04 I21Senator Biden then interrupted 
him and repeated his question. Mr. Bolton responded: ``I mentioned it 
to Mr. Fingar. I may have mentioned it to one or two other people. But 
then I shrugged my shoulders, and I moved on.'' \12\
    \12\ Ibid., page 46.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The record indicates that, far from ``shrugging his 
shoulders'' and moving on, Mr. Bolton asked three different INR 
supervisors, over the course of several months, to remove Mr. 
Westermann from his portfolio.

Clearing three sentences on Cuba

    The incident began on February 8, 2002, when a senior aide 
to Mr. Bolton, Frederick Fleitz,\13\ contacted Mr. Westermann's 
office director, seeking his assistance in transmitting to the 
Intelligence Community for its review three sentences on Cuba 
and biological weapons. INR personnel needed to be involved in 
transmitting the information because they had the proper 
electronic mail capabilities to handle the highly classified 
material.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ Fleitz is a CIA analyst who has been on detail to Mr. Bolton's 
office since August 2001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Mr. Bolton was planning to give a broader speech in the 
near future; the sentences on Cuba were to be one small part of 
that speech, which would include other language on Cuba and in 
which Cuba would not be the main focus.\14\ The language sought 
to be cleared included a sentence saying that the United States 
believed that Cuba has a developmental, offensive biological 
warfare program and is providing assistance to other rogue 
state programs.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ Fleitz memorandum to [name redacted], ``Request to Clear Cuba 
BW Language for U/S Bolton speech,'' Feb. 8, 2002.
    \15\ Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, T3Report on the U.S. 
Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq,  July 
7, 2004, page 277.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The following Monday, February 11 (February 8 was a 
Friday), Mr. Westermann informed Mr. Fleitz that his language 
needed to be rewritten to ``reflect CIA-required formatting'' 
for circulation to the Intelligence Community (IC); Westermann 
also sought the serial numbers for the intelligence reports 
that Fleitz had used in writing the proposed language, in order 
to help the intelligence analysts examine the sources of the 
material.\16\ Fleitz replied that he did not have the serial 
numbers for the material, and added his view about the scope of 
the IC's responsibility: ``Mr. Bolton is simply asking that the 
IC permit him to publicly read the paragraph I gave you . . . 
the IC has to determine if this can be sanitized and if there 
is a sources and methods issue.'' \17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ Westermann to Fleitz e-mail, Feb. 11, 2002, 3:11 pm. 
Westermann's e-mail opens by saying that he would be ``happy to get the 
Cuba language out to CIA'' and closes with an invitation to Fleitz to 
come by his office so Westermann could provide the necessary assistance 
in formatting the request.
    \17\ Fleitz to Westermann e-mail, Feb. 11, 2002, 4:18 pm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The next day, Westermann sent to Fleitz talking points on 
the subject that had already been cleared by the IC, and again 
urged Fleitz to provide more specific citations.\18\ Later that 
morning, Fleitz sent Under Secretary Bolton an update. It 
indicated some possible disagreement with INR's views on the 
Cuba issue, reiterated the previously-expressed view that it is 
for policymakers to interpret Intelligence Community data, and 
perhaps presaged the conflict to come:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\ Westermann to Fleitz e-mail, Feb. 12, 2002, 9:00 am. Q04 I23  
INR is not happy about the Cuba request, but did submit it to CIA for 
clearance. Christian Westermann told me that the IC has already cleared 
(wimpy) language on Cuba and recently briefed it to the HIRC . . . I 
explained to Christian that it was a political judgment as to how to 
interpret this data and the IC should do as we asked and sanitize my 
language as long as sources and methods are not compromised. He 
strongly disagrees with us on this.''\19\
    \19\ Fleitz to Bolton e-mail, Feb. 12, 2002, 9:20 am. Q04 I21Later 
that day, Westermann transmitted the language to the ``demarche 
coordinator'' at WINPAC (the DCI's Weapons Intelligence, 
Nonproliferation and Arms Control Center) via classified e-mail. The 
demarche coordinator had the task of circulating the language to 
several people in the IC--including someone in INR--for clearance 
review. Westermann attached the Fleitz memo to his e-mail as a separate 
document. In the body of his e-mail message, Westermann added his own 
comment, which included a statement that ``INR does NOT concur with the 
use of the attached language,'' and proposed alternative language. It 
reads: ``Cuba has demonstrated that it is committed to developing a 
highly advanced biotechnology infrastructure and to arranging foreign 
collaboration with rogue states that could involve proliferation of 
dual-use technologies to countries assessed to have BW programs.'' \20\
    \20\ Westermann e-mail to CIA/WINPAC, Feb. 12, 2002 (time unknown).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Bolton summons Westermann

    At some point in mid-afternoon of February 12, Fleitz 
phoned Westermann or one of his superiors to inquire about the 
status of the request.\21\ Around the same time, or perhaps a 
few minutes earlier, Fleitz alerted Under Secretary Bolton of 
his concern about Westermann having sent alternative language 
to the IC coordinator; in turn, Mr. Bolton asked Fleitz for a 
copy of the language that INR had sent to CIA.\22\ Westermann 
replied to Mr. Fleitz by e-mail that he had sent the Fleitz 
memo ``intact to CIA for coordination through the IC for 
cleared language.'' \23\ Fleitz quickly answered: ``CIA says 
INR disputed the language Mr. Bolton wants to use and offered 
alternate language. Please bring my memo and this memo to T.'' 
\24\ Westermann responded a few minutes later that the language 
he had suggested was identical to language that INR had sent to 
Secretary Powell the previous October.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\ None of the witnesses recalls what occurred, but there is no 
paper record, so it is presumed that the request came by phone.
    \22\ Bolton to Fleitz e-mail, Feb. 12, 2002, 4:14 p.m.
    \23\ Westermann to Fleitz e-mail, Feb. 12, 2002, 4:23 pm.
    \24\ Fleitz to Westermann e-mail, Feb. 12, 2002, 4:25 pm. ``T'' is 
the State Department's letter designation for the office of Under 
Secretary Bolton.
    \25\ Westermann to Fleitz e-mail, Feb. 12, 2002, 4:35 pm. The text 
of the language sent to the Secretary was omitted in the e-mail 
produced by the Department.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Thus summoned by Fleitz, Mr. Westermann proceeded to Mr. 
Bolton's office, where he was ushered in to see the Under 
Secretary. Westermann testified that Bolton was ``quite upset 
that I had objected'' to his language and that Bolton wanted to 
know ``what right I had trying to change an Under Secretary's 
language.''\26\ Mr. Westermann tried to explain the clearance 
process to Mr. Bolton, who was not, by Westermann's account, 
``in a mood to listen.'' Westermann described Bolton as being 
``quite angry and basically told me that I had no right to do 
that. And he got very red in the face and shaking his finger at 
me and explained to me that I was acting way beyond my 
position.'' \27\ Mr. Fleitz says he witnessed the meeting, and 
stated that Mr. Bolton said something to the effect of ``How 
can I trust you? I've asked you to be neutral in a situation 
like this, and you're welcome to disagree with me, but not 
behind my back.'' \28\ Mr. Bolton then told Westermann to leave 
his office, and instructed him to send Tom Fingar, Acting 
Assistant Secretary for INR that day, to see him.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\ Interview of Christian Westermann by Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee staff, Apr. 7, 2005, page 103. Hereafter cited as: 
``Westermann interview, Apr. 7, 2005.''
    \27\ Ibid., page 103-page 104.
    \28\ Interview of Frederick Fleitz by Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee staff, Apr. 7, 2005, page 28. Hereafter cited as ``Fleitz 
interview, Apr. 7, 2005''
    \29\ Westermann interview, Apr. 7, 2005, page 104.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Bolton asks Fingar to remove Westermann

    Mr. Fingar testified that his office received a phone call 
indicating that Mr. Bolton wanted to see him. Fingar went to 
see Mr. Bolton, who was still angry; Bolton complained that 
``he was the President's appointee, that he had every right to 
say what he believed, that he wasn't going to be told what he 
could say by a mid-level INR munchkin analyst.'' \30\ Fingar 
testified that Mr. Bolton said he wanted Westermann ``taken off 
his accounts.'' Fingar protested that ``He's our CW/BW 
specialist, this is what he does,'' implying that there were no 
other accounts to which he could readily be assigned.\31\ Mr. 
Fingar asked Mr. Bolton for a chance to review the matter more 
closely.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \30\ Interview of Thomas Fingar by Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee staff, Apr. 8, 2005, page 10. Hereafter cited as ``Fingar 
interview.''
    \31\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    At the end of the day, having reviewed Westermann's 
actions, Fingar sent an e-mail to Mr. Bolton, as follows: Q04
          Sorry for the delay in responding . . . I looked at 
        what my guy sent to the IC and that won't happen again 
        . . . As I said, INR has no position on what you or any 
        principal choose to say; our only interests are to 
        ensure that IC sources and methods concerns are 
        satisfied and to ensure that policymakers know whether 
        we think what they propose to say is clearly supported, 
        unsupported, or pushing the evidence as evaluated by IC 
        analysts. My guy tried to flag for Fred [Fleitz] where 
        he thought the draft was going beyond the IC consensus 
        (as conveyed in a DIA-led briefing on the Hill) and he 
        should have stopped there rather than offering 
        alternative language in his e-mail seeking clearance 
        from the IC. Choice of the phrase ``does not concur'' 
        was entirely inappropriate; none of the underlying 
        intelligence comes from INR and we have no role 
        whatsoever in determining how you or any policymaker 
        says what you want to say beyond suggesting 
        alternatives that we think might be cleared more 
        readily than what has been drafted if time is of the 
        essence and the drafter asks for such advice. We 
        screwed up, but not for base reasons. It won't happen 
        again.'' \32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \32\ Fingar to Bolton e-mail, Feb. 12, 2002, 8:04 pm. Q04 I21Mr. 
Fingar testified that the apologetic e-mail was designed to calm down 
an angry Under Secretary: ``I was dealing with somebody who was very 
upset, I was trying to get the incident closed, which I didn't regard 
as a big deal. I knew John was mad. I assumed, when people are mad, 
they get over it. So, did I lean over in the direction of `Sure, we'll 
take responsibility?' '' \33\
    \33\ Fingar interview, page 19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Mr. Bolton testified that, after receiving the Fingar e-
mail the next day (Bolton replied with a short note of thanks 
the next morning), he ``basically thought the matter was 
closed.'' \34\ But the record demonstrates that he really 
didn't think the matter was closed, for he tried two more times 
to get Mr. Westermann moved off his accounts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \34\ Apr. 11 hearing, am session, page 85.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Bolton asks Carl Ford to remove Westermann

    A few days later, Carl Ford, the Assistant Secretary of 
State for INR, returned to work, where he was briefed on the 
incident by his deputy, Tom Fingar. News of the incident had 
``spread like wildfire'' in INR, and Ford indicated that, 
having been out of the office, he was probably the last to 
learn about it. \35\ That morning, he and Mr. Bolton had a 
heated confrontation about the Westermann matter in a State 
Department hallway following the Secretary's morning staff 
meeting of senior officials. Mr. Ford said that Mr. Bolton was 
``still fussing about what he could and couldn't say in the 
speech,'' \36\ and he asked Ford to take punitive action 
against Mr. Westermann:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \35\ Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Apr. 12, 
2005, page 27. Hereafter cited as: ``Apr. 12 hearing.''
    \36\ Ibid., page 23-page 24. Q04 I23  I remember going back to my 
office with the impression that I had been asked to fire the analyst. 
Now, whether the words were ``fire,'' whether that was ``re-assign,'' 
``get him away from me, I don't want to see him again,'' I don't 
remember, frankly, exactly what the words were. I do remember that I 
came away with the impression that I had just been asked to fire 
somebody in the Intelligence Community for doing, what I consider, 
their job.\37\
    \37\ Ibid., page 25-page 26. Q04 I21Ford objected not only to the 
attempt to fire the analyst, but to the improper action of screaming at 
a subordinate so far below him in the Department hierarchy: Q04
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Secretary Bolton chose to reach five or six levels 
        below him in the bureaucracy, bring an analyst into his 
        office, and give him a tongue lashing . . . he was so 
        far over the line that [it's] one of the sort of 
        memorable moments in my 30 plus-year career . . . There 
        are a lot of screamers that work in government, but you 
        don't pull somebody so low down in the bureaucracy that 
        they're completely defenseless. It's an 800 pound 
        gorilla devouring a banana.\38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \38\ Ibid., page 18-page 19. Q04 I21After the encounter with Mr. 
Bolton, Ford proceeded to the Secretary's office to inform Powell and 
Deputy Secretary Armitage of the incident. He testified that he told 
the Secretary that there was ``no way'' he was going to move the 
analyst simply because Bolton was upset. Both Powell and Armitage 
expressed support for Ford's position, and asked whether they needed to 
provide any assistance.\39\Ford told them he thought he had it under 
control, but that at some point he might want them to speak to the 
analysts directly to buck them up. Some time later, the Secretary did 
so, making a ``special point'' of going to INR to address a group of 
INR analysts. In the session, he singled out Westermann by name, and 
said to the other analysts (according to Ford's account) that he 
``wanted them to continue, in essence to speak truth to power.'' \40\
    \39\ Ibid., page 26.
    \40\ Ibid., page 27. Larry Wilkerson, Secretary Powell's Chief of 
Staff, also testified that the session with the INR analysts was not 
routine, but a special trip. Interview with Lawrence Wilkerson, May 6, 
2005, page 9-page 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Thus supported by the Secretary of State, Mr. Westermann 
presumably thought he could rest easy about his job security. 
But such thoughts were premature, because Mr. Bolton wasn't 
done seeking retribution.

Bolton tries to have Westermann removed a third time

    Later that summer--several months after the Westermann 
incident--Under Secretary Bolton attempted once again to seek 
Westermann's removal. A new office director in INR, Neil 
Silver, paid a courtesy call on Bolton, who used the 
opportunity to ask Silver to remove Westermann from his 
accounts. The testimony of the two men differed as to how the 
subject arose. Mr. Bolton says he raised the matter after 
Silver asked whether he had ``had any problems'' with the 
Bureau.\41\ Silver believes that Bolton raised it toward the 
end of the meeting, and that Silver may have asked Bolton 
whether there were ways that the Bureau ``could be more 
helpful.'' \42\ In either event, the record is clear that Mr. 
Bolton urged that Westermann be given a different assignment, 
as he conceded during the committee hearing:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \41\ Apr. 11 hearing, am session, page 88.
    \42\ Interview of Neil Silver by the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee staff, Apr. 11, 2005, page 5. Hereafter cited as: ``Silver 
interview, Apr. 11, 2005.'' Q04 I23  Senator Sarbanes.  --did you say 
to him [Silver] you thought Westermann should be removed?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Mr. Bolton.  I thought he [Westermann] should be 
        given other responsibilities.\43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \43\ Apr. 11 hearing, am session, page 88. Q04 I20Silver asked why 
Bolton had a problem with Westermann, but Bolton indicated that he 
didn't want to discuss it further.\44\
    \44\ Silver interview, Apr. 11, 2005, page 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Thus, far from having ``shrugged his shoulders and moved 
on,'' as he testified to the committee,\45\ Bolton was still 
seeking Westermann's removal months after the original 
incident.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \45\ Apr. 11 hearing, am session, page 46.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Was Under Secretary Bolton Complaining About Process or Substance?

    Under Secretary Bolton testified that Mr. Westermann ``went 
behind my back'' and as a result he ``lost confidence in him.'' 
The assertion is central to Mr. Bolton's account that his 
effort to seek Westermann's removal was not an effort to 
pressure an intelligence analyst, but merely a reaction to 
alleged ``unprofessional'' behavior. Frederick Fleitz, Mr. 
Bolton's aide, proffered much the same account, both in 
contemporaneous e-mails and in later interviews. But no other 
witness did so. Indeed, every witness from INR--from Westermann 
up to and including the Assistant Secretary--stated that 
Westermann did nothing irregular. This aspect of the issue is 
examined below.
    The crux of Bolton's allegation is that by sending his 
comments to CIA/WINPAC on Bolton's proposed Cuba language at 
the same time that he transmitted the language for Intelligence 
Community clearance, Mr. Westermann unfairly prejudiced the 
clearance process within the IC and thereby ``went behind 
[Bolton's] back.''
    The assertions by Under Secretary Bolton and Fleitz appear 
to be based on a lack of understanding of the clearance 
process. Carl Ford indicated that ``Secretary Bolton . . . 
wasn't very familiar with the procedures of the Intelligence 
Community [and] didn't seem all that interested in finding out 
more about it.'' \46\ Bolton himself admits to a certain degree 
of ignorance about the process, telling Senator Dodd that he 
had ``no idea what INR's policies [regarding clearances] are.'' 
\47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \46\ Apr. 12 hearing, page 31-page 32.
    \47\ Apr. 11 hearing, am session, page 85.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The clearance process

    As Mr. Fingar indicated in his e-mail to Mr. Bolton, there 
are two purposes to the clearance process: to protect sources 
and methods; and to ensure that what policymakers say T3on 
behalf of the U.S. government  is supported by the available 
intelligence. Put another way, policymakers need not seek IC 
clearance if they want to state their own personal judgments of 
intelligence information, but if they speak for the government 
on a matter related to intelligence judgments, or seek to 
represent what the Intelligence Community believes, the IC must 
provide clearance.
    Mr. Westermann's own role in this process was two-fold. 
First, he had a ministerial duty to transmit the Bolton 
language to the IC coordinator at the CIA. As the documentary 
record produced to the committee demonstrates, he did that by 
transmitting Mr. Fleitz's memo intact. Second, as the analyst 
in INR for biological and chemical weapons, he had a duty to 
provide INR's comments on the proposed language to the 
Intelligence Community coordinator.
    The latter process does not involve a debate between 
intelligence analysts (such as INR) and policymakers (such as 
Mr. Bolton). Rather, it is a debate that is conducted within 
the Intelligence Community alone.\48\ By design, Mr. Bolton's 
office was not in the loop on the debate. Mr. Westermann was 
thus under no obligation to share the comments on Bolton's 
language with Mr. Bolton or his staff. When he received the 
proposed language from Bolton's office, Westermann had a 
choice: to send his comments simultaneous with the Bolton 
language; or to wait until the IC coordinator circulated the 
language throughout the community. He chose the former.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \48\ Westermann interview, Apr. 7, 2005, page 98; page 100.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Doing so was consistent with INR practice, as was attested 
by INR supervisors who appeared before the committee or its 
staff. Former Assistant Secretary Carl Ford testified that ``we 
all agreed that he had been following the routine policies for 
dealing with speeches or questions of what you can and cannot 
say in an unclassified way from the Intelligence Community.'' 
\49\ Current Assistant Secretary Tom Fingar said that 
Westermann's action was not contrary to any policy or 
procedure. \50\ Westermann's immediate supervisor stated that 
the manner in which Westermann submitted the Bolton request 
``did not contravene any guidelines'' and that there are no 
``hard-and-fast rules as to when or how INR analysts articulate 
their view on the language that is being put into play at the 
request of a policy official,'' \51\ a view affirmed by current 
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Carol Rodley (who 
accompanied Mr. Westermann to his interview).\52\ Fingar also 
testified that Westermann was not admonished or disciplined for 
his actions, and that no new procedures were put in place as a 
result.\53\ The only critical opinion of Mr. Westermann's 
actions that came from INR management was that he was, at 
worst, insensitive to how he handled a clearance for such a 
senior official. \54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \49\ Apr. 12 hearing, page 30.
    \50\ Fingar interview, page 12.
    \51\ Interview of INR supervisor by Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee staff, May 4, 2005, page 2. Hereafter cited as: ``INR 
supervisor interview.'' See also Silver interview, Apr. 11, 2005, page 
18 (``there are no established procedures'' on clearance).
    \52\ Westermann interview, Apr. 7, 2005, page 90.
    \53\ Fingar interview, page 23.
    \54\ Ibid., page 7-page 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    It is worth noting, moreover, that three witnesses said 
that Mr. Bolton complained to them about the substance of Mr. 
Westermann's e-mail. Mr. Ford stated that ``several days after 
his confrontation with my analyst . . . he [Bolton] was still 
fussing about what he could and couldn't say in the speech.'' 
\55\ Ford also said that ``he was still fussing about not only 
the way the analyst had treated him but that he was not able to 
say what he wanted to say.'' \56\ Mr. Fingar testified that 
Bolton said, ``That he was the President's appointee, that he 
had every right to say what he believed, that he wasn't going 
to be told what he could say by a mid-level INR munchkin 
analyst.'' \57\ Mr. Westermann himself testified that Mr. 
Bolton was ``quite upset that I had objected'' to his language 
and that Bolton wanted to know ``what right I had trying to 
change an Under Secretary's language.'' \58\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \55\ Apr. 12 hearing, page 23-page 24.
    \56\ Ibid., page 31.
    \57\ Fingar interview, page 10.
    \58\ Westermann interview, Apr. 7, page 103.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Mr. Fleitz maintained that Mr. Westermann's e-mail confused 
the demarche coordinator, who was uncertain whether Mr. Bolton 
had backed off his proposed language. If so, a phone call 
sufficed to clear up any misunderstanding. The demarche 
coordinator sent Bolton's text around for comment, with Mr. 
Fleitz' arguments in favor of the language and without 
Westermann's comment. The rest of the Intelligence Community 
also objected to Bolton's proposed language and, by February 
21, new language was crafted and cleared.
    In sum, even if Mr. Bolton complained about the process 
used by Westermann--as he and Mr. Fleitz testified--there is 
ample evidence that Bolton was also angry about substance--he 
was mad that a mid-level analyst would dare to propose 
alternative language to his text.

Did Westermann lie?

    Mr. Fleitz made a serious allegation that Mr. Westermann 
lied to Mr. Fleitz in his e-mail to him stating that he sent 
his language to CIA ``intact.'' Specifically, Mr. Fleitz stated 
that ``Mr. Westermann lied when he told us that he had sent the 
language that Mr. Bolton wanted declassified to the Agency 
intact, and only with source citations. That was untrue.'' \59\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \59\ Fleitz interview, Apr. 7, 2005, page 38.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Fleitz' description of Westermann's e-mail is not precisely 
accurate. The text of Mr. Westermann's e-mail was as follows: 
``I sent your memo intact to CIA for coordination through the 
IC for cleared language. I added citations so they could 
reference the intel[ligence].'' \60\ There is nothing false in 
Westermann's e-mail to Fleitz. He T3had  e-mailed the Fleitz 
memo intact, and he T3had included  the source citations. If 
Westermann is guilty of anything, it is an act of omission: he 
did not tell Fleitz that he had also sent INR's comments on the 
Bolton language. But, as discussed above, he was under no 
obligation to do so, because that comment was part of a process 
that was internal to the Intelligence Community.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \60\ Westermann to Fleitz e-mail, Feb. 12, 2002, 4:23 pm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    It also bears emphasis that there is no evidence of the 
precise question posed to Westermann by Fleitz that resulted in 
Westermann sending his e-mail. Westermann appears to have been 
responding to a phone call or message from Fleitz, not an e-
mail, and there is no record as to what Fleitz said in his 
phone call or message. Thus, it is impossible to conclude that 
Westermann lied in his e-mail without knowing the question that 
prompted it.

Was there any harm done?

    Mr. Bolton's efforts to remove Mr. Westermann, a GS-14 
analyst, proved unsuccessful, because the INR management, as 
well as the top levels of the Department of State, backed Mr. 
Ford's refusal to do so. Westermann, a 23-year Navy veteran who 
has worked as a government intelligence analyst since retiring 
from the Navy, today retains his position as a chemical and 
biological weapons expert for INR. He testified that he has 
received numerous awards and continues to receive outstanding 
performance evaluations. In this respect, therefore, Mr. 
Westermann's career suffered no apparent damage.
    But Mr. Bolton's actions did have consequences. As Mr. Ford 
testified, the Westermann incident caused great concern in his 
bureau. He testified that analysts in INR ``were very 
negatively affected by this incident--they were scared.'' \61\ 
As a result, both he and the Secretary of State had to make a 
special effort to mitigate the damage. Ford testified that in 
the months following the Westermann incident, he and other INR 
managers tried to make the best of the bad situation by using 
the incident as a training vehicle--to explain to people how to 
handle a similar situation. \62\ Secretary Powell had to take 
time out of his schedule to make a special trip to speak to INR 
analysts and tell them that they should continue to ``speak 
truth to power.'' \63\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \61\ Apr. 12 hearing, page 40.
    \62\ Ibid.
    \63\ Ibid., page 26-page 27.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The renewed attempt to remove Westermann months after the 
incident also affected Westermann personally. He testified that 
it led him to ``double-think about what I was doing all the 
time so that I wasn't creating undue problems for me or for 
other people.'' \64\ And in an e-mail message to his 
supervisors, he lamented the continued ``personal attacks, 
harassment and impugning of his integrity,'' and indicated that 
it was affecting ``his work, his health, and his dedication to 
public service.'' \65\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \64\ Interview of Christian Westermann by Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee staff, May 4, 2005, page 5. Hereafter cited as: ``Westermann 
interview, May 4, 2005.''
    \65\ Westermann to Fingar and Silver e-mail, Sept. 23, 2002, 8:37 
am.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Former National Intelligence Officer for Latin America

    It is also undisputed that, in 2002, Mr. Bolton sought to 
have the National Intelligence Officer for Latin America (NIO) 
removed from his position. The NIO is no longer in that 
position, and is currently in a covered position overseas, and 
thus during the hearing the committee and Mr. Bolton took to 
calling him ``Mr. Smith.''
    Mr. Bolton conceded in testimony that he personally 
traveled to CIA headquarters for a meeting with a senior CIA 
official, during which he urged the removal of the NIO from his 
portfolio. Mr. Bolton sought to minimize, however, the 
intensity with which he pursued this goal by stating: ``And 
that was it, I had one part of one conversation with one 
person, one time on Mr. Smith and that was it, I let it go.'' 
\66\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \66\ Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Apr. 11 
2005, pm session, page 27-page 28. Hereafter cited as: ``Apr. 11, 2005 
hearing, pm session.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The record before the committee demonstrates that Mr. 
Bolton sought Mr. Smith's removal because of disagreements 
about intelligence, and that Mr. Bolton's testimony to this 
committee vastly understated the degree of his effort to do so.

The Heritage Foundation speech

    As described at length in section IV. B. below, on May 6, 
2002, Under Secretary Bolton gave a speech at the Heritage 
Foundation in Washington, DC. The speech, entitled ``Beyond the 
Axis of Evil,'' contained several paragraphs about Cuba, 
including three sentences that had been cleared by the 
Intelligence Community in February 2002: Q04
          The United States believes that Cuba has at least a 
        limited offensive biological warfare research and 
        development effort. Cuba has provided dual-use 
        biotechnology to other rogue states. We are concerned 
        that such technology could support BW programs in those 
        states. We call on Cuba to cease all BW-applicable 
        cooperation with rogue states and to fully comply with 
        all of its obligations under the Biological Weapons 
        Convention.'' \67\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \67\ John R. Bolton, ``Beyond the Axis of Evil: Additional Threats 
from Weapons of Mass Destruction,'' remarks to the Heritage Foundation, 
May 5, 2002. Hereafter cited as: ``Bolton speech, May 6, 2002.'' Q04 
I21The May 6 speech also contained controversial statements on Cuba and 
terrorism, and on the influence of a Cuban spy who had worked as a 
Defense Intelligence Agency analyst, which had not been circulated for 
clearance by the regional intelligence analysts who covered those 
issues. Press coverage the next day included comments by unnamed 
officials that the intelligence on Cuba and BW was ``broad and deep'' 
and that Cuba had experimented with anthrax and other dangerous 
pathogens.\68\
    \68\ Kralev, Nicholas, ``Havana pursues biological warfare; 
Technology given to rogue states,'' T3The Washington Times,  May 7, 
2002; Miller, Judith, ``Washington Accuses Cuba Of Germ-Warfare 
Research,'' T3The New York Times,  May 7, 2002; Slevin, Peter, ``Cuba 
Seeks Bioweapons, U.S. Says''; ``Cuban Spokesman Calls Arms Control 
Chief's Allegations a `Lie','' T3The Washington Post,  May 7, 2002.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Controversy ensued in public and within government councils 
about the strength of the evidence on Cuba's BW effort and 
whether the speech had been properly cleared throughout the 
Intelligence Community. On May 9, the CIA re-published its 
previous analytic conclusions in its daily Senior Executive 
Intelligence Brief (SEIB), implicitly reminding policy makers 
that it did not endorse everything that Bolton had said. The 
SEIB item provoked an angry reaction from Bolton.\69\ The NIO 
for Latin America had not reviewed the Cuba language in the 
speech, and said so to the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere 
Affairs of this committee in a closed briefing on June 4, 2002. 
Word of the briefing was relayed to Mr. Bolton's office. A 
rancorous internal debate also occurred in the same time period 
between Bolton's office and the Intelligence Community over 
preparation of congressional testimony on Cuba that Bolton was 
scheduled to give (but never did). CIA analysts, including the 
NIO for Latin America, objected to major points in the draft 
testimony, including parts of the testimony that had been used 
in the Heritage speech.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \69\ CIA e-mail, 5/13/02, 2:49 pm (``Fleitz reported that Bolton is 
quite angry at CIA; specifically, Bolton perceives our SEIB last week 
was intended to undercut his speech . . . '').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    By early June, Mr. Bolton and Otto Reich, the Assistant 
Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, were 
considering an effort to seek the removal of the NIO. On June 
7, an aide to Mr. Bolton circulated a draft letter from Mr. 
Bolton and Mr. Reich to the Director of Central 
Intelligence.\70\ The letter outlined alleged unprofessional 
behavior of the NIO, but also complained about his objections 
to Bolton's draft testimony. The draft letter to Mr. Tenet 
urged the immediate replacement of the NIO, and indicated that 
Mr. Bolton and Mr. Reich would take several measures on their 
own, including excluding the NIO from official meetings at the 
State Department and from official travel in the Western 
Hemisphere. A later e-mail from a colleague reports that he has 
discussed the matter with Mr. Bolton, who, he says, ``would 
prefer at this point to handle this in person with Tenet.'' 
\71\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \70\ State Department e-mail, June 7, 2002, 2:45 pm.
    \71\ State Department e-mail, June 7, 2002, 3:46 pm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In July 2002, Under Secretary Bolton traveled to CIA 
headquarters to meet with Stuart Cohen, the Acting Chairman of 
the National Intelligence Council (NIC). The appointment was 
described by Mr. Bolton as a ``courtesy call'' so he could 
learn more about the function of the National Intelligence 
Council, and he recalled that the ``bulk of the meeting'' 
involved Mr. Cohen explaining the functions of the NIC and 
``what their publications were and how it had been created.'' 
\72\ Mr. Bolton also stated as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \72\ Apr. 11 hearing, pm session, page 27. Talking points prepared 
for Mr. Bolton suggest a broader agenda for the meeting, and make no 
mention of the ``courtesy call'' aspect of the visit. They do mention 
concerns about the NIO. Q04 I23  I also knew that in the weeks and 
months previous thereto, dealing with this ``Mr. Smith,'' Otto Reich, 
who [was] the Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere 
Affairs, had told me and other[s] he had very grave problems with Mr. 
Smith on a range of issues. . . . And I think I said to Mr. Cohen . . . 
in the course of our conversation, that based upon what I had seen in 
my limited area, that I agreed with them. And that was it, I had one 
part of one conversation with one person, one time on Mr. Smith, and 
that was it, I let it go.\73\
    \73\ Ibid. Q04 I20Later in the hearing, Mr. Bolton said that ``in 
my dealings [with the NIO], his behavior was unprofessional,'' and 
therefore he had ``lost confidence in him.'' \74\
    \74\ Ibid., page 63.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Cohen did not recall many specifics of the Bolton meeting--
including whether Mr. Bolton had asked about the workings of 
the NIC--but believed his intent was clear that he wanted the 
NIO removed. \75\ ``I just don't recall the details of the 
meeting,'' Cohen said, ``other than the fact that there was a 
focus on Mr. Smith.'' \76\ After reviewing the matter, Cohen 
decided to retain the NIO in his position. He told the 
committee staff that he discussed the issue with John 
McLaughlin, then Deputy Director of Central Intelligence 
(DDCI), who agreed with Mr. Cohen that the NIO should not be 
removed from his position:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \75\ Democratic staff memorandum for the record, Apr. 10, 2005, 
regarding Apr. 8 telephone interview with Stuart Cohen.
    \76\ Interview with Stuart Cohen by Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee staff, Apr. 29, 2005, page 8-page 9. Hereafter cited as: 
``Cohen interview, Apr. 29, 2005.'' Q04 I23  Stu Cohen came to me . . . 
and said that I might be getting a call from John Bolton or Otto Reich, 
that they had serious disagreements with . . . the NIO's work, and they 
might call me and ask to have the NIO reassigned or moved. And I said 
to Stu, ``Well we're not going to do that, absolutely not. No way. End 
of story . . . I remember having a very strong reaction to it'' \77\
    \77\ Interview with John McLaughlin by Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee staff, Apr. 29, 2005, page 5-page 6. Hereafter cited as 
``McLaughlin interview.'' Q04 I21The effort to remove the NIO did not 
end with his meeting with Mr. Cohen, as Mr. Bolton stated. Over the 
course of the next three months, Mr. Bolton's and Mr. Reich's offices 
actively discussed their joint effort to seek the removal of the NIO. 
On July 25, 2002, a senior aide to Mr. Bolton told a senior aide to Mr. 
Reich that Mr. Bolton wanted to meet Mr. Reich to ``discuss the draft 
letter to CIA on our favorite subject'' and said that ``John doesn't 
want this to slip any further.'' \78\The next day, the same aide to Mr. 
Bolton e-mailed Mr. Reich and his aide a new draft of the letter, this 
time addressed to Mr. Cohen. It said that the draft was ``less hard-
hitting than the last and relies on John's tough talk with Cohen'' 
about the NIO.\79\The signature line of the letter included only Mr. 
Bolton's name. On September 27, 2002, the aide to Mr. Reich e-mailed 
the Bolton aide with yet another draft letter (also to Cohen), and said 
that Mr. Reich wanted to know whether Mr. Bolton would be interested in 
signing it. \80\On October 9, 2002, the aide to Bolton said that he 
would ask Mr. Bolton if he wanted to sign.\81\
    \78\ State Department e-mail, July 25, 2002, 1:37 pm.
    \79\ State Department e-mail, July 26, 2002, 1:51 pm.
    \80\ State Department e-mail, Sept. 27, 2002, 8:57 am.
    \81\ State Department e-mail, October 9, 2002, 4:25 am.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Mr. Frederick Fleitz, a senior aide to Mr. Bolton, also let 
it be known to a senior CIA official that Bolton wanted the NIO 
removed. In a routine phone call, Fleitz told Alan Foley, then 
head of WINPAC, that Mr. Bolton wanted the NIO fired (or words 
to that effect). Foley recalls being ``jarred'' by Fleitz' 
statement, because he was normally very discreet about Mr. 
Bolton's views, and that he realized that whatever the nature 
of the dispute between Mr. Bolton and the NIO, it was obviously 
becoming ``fairly acrimonious.'' \82\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \82\ Interview with Alan Foley by the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee staff, Apr. 28, 2005, page 11-page 12. Hereafter cited as: 
``Foley interview.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The evidence thus shows that Mr. Bolton didn't ``let it 
go'' after his meeting with Mr. Cohen, but rather he and his 
staff plotted to remove the NIO at least until early October. 
It is not known whether a letter was actually sent by Mr. 
Bolton and/or Mr. Reich, or received by Mr. Tenet or Mr. Cohen.

The significance of Bolton's actions

    As stated above, the Bolton effort to remove the NIO was 
rebuffed by senior CIA leadership, and the NIO remained in his 
position until the end of 2004. Mr. McLaughlin stated that no 
other policy maker made such a request during his tenure as 
DDCI, \83\ and explained why he rejected the requests from 
Bolton and Reich:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \83\ McLaughlin interview, page 8. Q04 I23  It's perfectly all 
right for a policymaker to express disagreement with an NIO or an 
analyst, and it's perfectly all right for them to . . . challenge their 
work vigorously. But I think it's different to then request, because of 
the disagreement, that the person be transferred. And--unless there is 
malfeasance involved here--and, in this case, I had high regard for the 
individual's work; therefore, I had a strong negative reaction to the 
suggestion about moving him.\84\
    \84\ Ibid., p. 9. Q04 I21Mr. Bolton's effort to remove the NIO for 
Latin America is particularly striking for several reasons: Q04
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   he had never met or spoken with the NIO; Q02
   he could not recall whether he had ever read any of 
        the NIO's work product; \85\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \85\ In answers to questions for the record submitted by Senator 
Biden, Mr. Bolton admitted that he had never met the NIO and did not 
know whether he had ever read any intelligence product prepared or 
coordinated by him. Q02 I14   the NIO worked in another agency; 
and Q02
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   the NIO did not work on Bolton's subject area of 
        arms control and nonproliferation. Q04
    This underscores the depth of Mr. Bolton's feelings 
regarding Cuba and his frustration whenever intelligence 
analysts sought to restrict what he could say on an issue.

                      IV. STRETCHING INTELLIGENCE

A. The Use and Abuse of Intelligence

    When a policy maker uses intelligence information in public 
statements, he faces certain limitations: he must not endanger 
sensitive intelligence sources and methods; he must not 
misstate intelligence information or conclusions; he must not 
attribute his own opinions to intelligence information or 
analysis, either explicitly or implicitly; and he must not 
defame U.S. intelligence agencies.
    Violating those standards undermines our intelligence 
agencies and harms the policy process. To go beyond these 
boundaries--to ``stretch'' intelligence--can lead to unwise, or 
even dangerous, policies. Q04
   If sensitive intelligence sources or methods are 
        disclosed or compromised, we may lose them. Those 
        losses can multiply, if people around the world come to 
        assume that U.S. intelligence cannot keep secrets. Q02
   If intelligence information or conclusions are 
        misstated, or if personal opinions are wrongly 
        attributed to intelligence information or analysis, 
        then the policy process is perverted. In addition, 
        others may disclose sensitive information in their 
        efforts to correct the misstatements. Q02
   If U.S. intelligence agencies are defamed, then 
        morale and recruitment--both of employees and of 
        clandestine sources--may suffer. Q04
    In the development of government policy, policy makers have 
been known to challenge intelligence analysts and the bases of 
their analytical judgments. Such challenges, in the abstract, 
are legitimate and, indeed, useful. So, too, do policy makers 
push the intelligence community to let them say things in 
public that will dramatize or reinforce the policy argument 
they are trying to make.
    But in blatant or repeated cases, the questioning of 
intelligence analysts can lead to politicization of 
intelligence. Intelligence agencies come to understand what 
answers the policy makers want. If they give in to the pressure 
to please, then the distortion of policy increases. Even if 
they resist that pressure, their morale and efficiency can be 
undermined and our country suffers.
    Carl Ford, former Assistant Secretary of State for 
Intelligence and Research, speaking of Under Secretary Bolton's 
attack on an INR analyst, told the committee: ``I don't take a 
lot of solace in the fact that in this particular case, it 
didn't turn into politicization. I can only give you my 
impressions, but I clearly believe that the analysts in INR 
were very negatively affected by this incident--they were 
scared.'' \86\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \86\ April 12 hearing, page 39-page 40.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Former Assistant Secretary Ford called politicization ``a 
team sport. It requires someone to pressure, and what I refer 
to as a `weasel' in the Intelligence Community to act 
inappropriately to that pressure.'' \87\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \87\ Ibid., page 39.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A somewhat different view was expressed by Dr. Robert 
Hutchings, former chief of the National Intelligence Council: 
Q04 I23  I think that this all goes to the issue of 
politicization and--you know, there's different forms of 
politicization. And I think when policy officials--and . . . 
I'm not singling out Mr. Bolton here--but when policy officials 
come back repeatedly to push the same kinds of judgments, and 
push the intelligence community to confirm a particular set of 
judgments, it does have the effect of politicizing 
intelligence, because the so-called ``correct answer'' becomes 
all too clear. And, you know, even when it's successfully 
resisted, it has an effect. Q02
          I think every judgment ought to be challenged and 
        questioned. But . . . when it goes beyond that, to a 
        search for a pretty clearly-defined, pre-formed set of 
        judgments, then it turns into politicization. And even, 
        as I said, even when it's resisted--and this is where I 
        think the WMD Commission Report didn't quite get it 
        right--even when it's successfully resisted, it doesn't 
        mean that there hasn't been an effect, because it 
        creates a climate of intimidation and a culture of 
        conformity that is damaging, . . .\88\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \88\Interview of Robert Hutchings by Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee staff, May 6, 2005, page 14-page 15. Hereafter cited as 
``Hutchings interview.'' Q04 I21The difference between these two views 
may be due to the fact that Ford was testifying about one attack on an 
analyst, while Hutchings was referring to the repeated efforts of Under 
Secretary Bolton to get the ``right'' answer from the Intelligence 
Community. Ford called Mr. Bolton a ``serial abuser'' of subordinates. 
Hutchings was warning about the risk of serial abuse of the process, 
and of the U.S. Intelligence Community as a whole.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    There are several ways to stretch intelligence. One is 
``cherry-picking,'' in which the policy maker focuses on a few 
bits of intelligence that support his point of view, while 
ignoring others that contradict it or call it into question. 
One form of ``cherry-picking'' that was evident in the issue of 
Cuba and biological weapons is to ignore the doubts that 
intelligence analysts have regarding the reliability of the 
information that U.S. intelligence has obtained.
    A second way to stretch intelligence is by ``gaming the 
system.'' In 2002, the clearance of some speeches was managed 
by the National Intelligence Council, while others went to 
WINPAC, the DCI's interagency Weapons Intelligence, 
Nonproliferation and Arms Control Center at CIA, which 
specialized in weapons-related issues. By sticking to the 
WINPAC route, a policy maker can sometimes avoid giving 
regional intelligence specialists a role in clearing language. 
A policy maker can also try to leave out the State Department's 
Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), by sending a speech 
only to policy bureaus for clearance. He can simply persist, 
through multiple rounds of drafting, sending out successive 
drafts that largely ignore the objections raised to the first 
one. Or he can grind the system down by imposing tight 
deadlines, or by writing his text on the fly and clearing it at 
the last minute by e-mail, perhaps at odd hours from half-way 
around the world.
    A third technique is intimidation. A policy maker, or his 
staff, can cite the importance of the person who wants to use 
the proposed language. He can try to change the rules of the 
clearance process, by repeatedly claiming that intelligence 
agencies have no right to object to language that misstates 
their conclusions, unless it would disclose sensitive sources 
or methods. Or he can bully analysts, or try to get them fired 
or reassigned.
    Under Secretary Bolton and his staff used all three of 
these techniques. They were only occasionally successful, but 
they kept trying. Both in the State Department and in the 
Intelligence Community, much effort had to be expended keeping 
Mr. Bolton on the strait and narrow, as well as tending to the 
individual people whom he tried to push around.

B. Cuba and Biological Weapons--Heritage Foundation speech, February-
        May 2002

    On February 8, 2002, Under Secretary Bolton's office asked 
an INR analyst to send out for Intelligence Community clearance 
a draft paragraph on Cuba and biological weapons. The language 
was part of the process of preparing a speech that Mr. Bolton 
was to give in the near future.\89\ Mr. Bolton's personal 
attack on the INR analyst and his repeated requests to have the 
man reassigned are discussed in the section above on attempts 
to remove analysts. What are relevant to this section are, 
first, Mr. Bolton's views on the clearance process and, second, 
how he and his office tried to game the system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \89\ Fleitz memorandum to [name redacted]. ``Request to Clear Cuba 
BW Language for U/S Bolton speech,'' Feb. 8, 2002.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Under Secretary Bolton testified to the committee that he 
told the INR analyst, ``I don't care if you disagree with me, I 
just think you shouldn't do it behind my back.'' \90\ But 
others had different recollections. The INR analyst told 
committee staff that Bolton ``wanted to know what right I had 
trying to change an Under Secretary's language.'' \91\ Thomas 
Fingar, who was Acting Assistant Secretary for INR on that day, 
told committee staff that Bolton said, ``[t]hat he was the 
President's appointee, that he had every right to say what he 
believed, that he wasn't going to be told what he could say by 
a mid-level INR munchkin analyst.'' \92\ And former Assistant 
Secretary Ford testified that, ``several days after his 
confrontation with my analyst, . . . [Bolton] was still fussing 
about what he could and couldn't say in the speech.'' \93\ 
Bolton thus contested the idea that the Intelligence Community 
had any right to change his language, except to protect 
sensitive intelligence sources and methods.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \90\ Apr. 11 hearing, pm session, page 42.
    \91\ Westermann interview, Apr. 7, 2005, page 103.
    \92\ Fingar interview, page 10.
    \93\ Apr. 12 hearing. page 22-page 23.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    According to the INR analyst, the draft Bolton text 
``contained a sentence which said the U.S. believes that Cuba 
has a developmental, offensive biological warfare program and 
is providing assistance to other rogue state programs. The text 
also called for international observers of Cuba's biological 
facilities.'' \94\ The Intelligence Community's clearance 
coordinator circulated the proposed text and the arguments that 
Under Secretary Bolton's office had provided in favor of it. 
The coordinator asked agencies to ``review the suggested 
language . . . for accuracy and completeness, as well as for . 
. . sources and methods concerns.'' \95\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \94\ Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, T3Report on the U.S. 
Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq,  July 
7, 2004, page 277.
    \95\ WINPAC e-mail, Feb. 12, 2002, 6:33 pm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    After receiving comments from the Community, a CIA analyst 
e-mailed Under Secretary Bolton's office: ``Our intelligence 
information cannot support Bolton's message.'' The analyst also 
warned that a public speech ``will increase the likelihood that 
CIA information will come under scrutiny'' and added that CIA 
``could not support a public discussion of our information.'' 
\96\ The response from Bolton's office made clear that Bolton 
disagreed with the Intelligence Community's judgment: ``Bolton 
believes that State and CIA should have been including Cuba's 
BW program in reports to the Hill and in NIEs [National 
Intelligence Estimates] over the last few years.'' Bolton's 
office added that ``several heavy hitters are involved in this 
one, and they may choose to push ahead over objections from CIA 
and INR, . . . UNLESS there is a serious sources and methods 
concern.'' \97\ Thus, Bolton's office tried to force a change 
in the Intelligence Community judgment and threatened to ignore 
the Community's views on substantive intelligence issues.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \96\ WINPAC to Fleitz, attachment to e-mail, Feb. 21, 2002, 6:06 
am.
    \97\ Fleitz to WINPAC e-mail, Feb. 21, 2002, 6:06 am.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Intelligence Community provided a cleared text on Cuba 
and biological weapons on February 21. \98\ The cleared text 
added the word ``limited;'' changed ``developmental program'' 
(which would have implied a more structured activity) to 
``research and development effort;'' replaced ``provided 
assistance to other rogue state programs'' with ``provided 
dual-use biotechnology. . . . that . . . could support BW 
programs;'' and deleted any reference to inspections.\99\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \98\ Westermann to Fleitz e-mail, Feb. 21, 2002, 5:51 pm.
    \99\ Bolton speech, May 6, 2002.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    One day later, a senior Bolton staffer wrote, ``John wants 
his speech to include additional tough language about Cuba, but 
not material we will need to clear with CIA. (Cuban sponsorship 
of terrorism, for example.)'' \100\ It had taken only one 
experience with the clearance process for Bolton's office to 
start thinking about circumventing that process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \100\ Fleitz to [redacted name] e-mail, Feb. 22, 2002, 6:21 pm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On April 26, Under Secretary Bolton's office circulated for 
clearance a full text of a proposed May 6 speech to the 
Heritage Foundation. That text contained the cleared language 
on Cuba and biological weapons, but also additional language on 
Cuba. It was sent to policy bureaus and to WINPAC, but neither 
to INR nor to the National Intelligence Council. \101\ INR only 
found out about the new draft when two policy bureaus asked the 
weapons specialists in INR to comment on portions of the 
speech. WINPAC consulted the National Intelligence Officer 
(NIO) for Science and Technology on the text regarding Cuba and 
biological weapons. But the NIO for Latin America and INR's 
Latin American specialists never saw the additional Cuba 
language. \102\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \101\ Fleitz to [redacted name] e-mail, Apr. 26, 2002, 5:51 pm.
    \102\ INR supervisor to Fleitz e-mail, Apr. 30, 2002, 11:20 am; 
Assistant NIO/S&T to Stuart Cohen e-mail, June 3, 2002, 6:37 pm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This might not have mattered, had the additional language 
on Cuba not been controversial; but the Heritage Foundation 
speech, as delivered, was very controversial. It said: ``We 
know that Cuba is collaborating with other state sponsors of 
terror.'' It added that Fidel Castro ``continues to view terror 
as a legitimate tactic to further revolutionary objectives,'' 
and included a quotation that would later turn out to be of 
questionable origins. And it attacked a 1998 ``U.S. government 
report'' as ``unbalanced'' and cited Cuban spy Ana Belen Montes 
(who had been a Defense Intelligence Agency analyst at the 
time) as having ``had a hand in drafting'' the report.\103\ The 
next day, moreover, T3The Washington Times  reported: ``In a 
later interview, a senior administration official said 
Washington has gathered `broad and deep' evidence of Cuba's 
pursuit of such weapons but is `constrained' in what it can 
disclose publicly.'' \104\ We do not know who spoke to T3The 
Washington Times,  but Mr. Bolton reportedly did hold a 
question-and-answer session after his speech.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \103\ Bolton speech, May 6, 2002, page 5.
    \104\ ``Havana pursues biological warfare; Technology given to 
`rogue states','' T3The Washington Times,  May 7, 2002.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The reaction to Under Secretary Bolton's May 6 speech was 
substantial. News media reported that unnamed CIA personnel 
denied that Cuba had biological weapons (a statement that did 
not actually contradict Bolton's assertions). And on May 9, the 
CIA re-published its previous analytic conclusions in its daily 
Senior Executive Intelligence Brief (SEIB), implicitly 
reminding policy makers that it did not endorse everything that 
Bolton had said. \105\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \105\ CIA/DI/APLA analyst e-mail, May 13, 2002, 2:49 pm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    At a meeting with analysts on May 13, Under Secretary 
Bolton's office reported that he was ``quite angry at CIA,'' 
especially over the SEIB article and reported media leaks. His 
staff defended his remarks by citing a WINPAC paper that Bolton 
had read, but were told that the paper had not been coordinated 
with other intelligence agencies and had not been disseminated 
to policy makers ``because of serious reservations about the 
methodology used.'' \106\ Perhaps inadvertently, Bolton and his 
staff had ``cherry-picked'' an analysis that many intelligence 
analysts rejected.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \106\ CIA/DI/APLA analyst e-mail, May 13, 2002, 2:49 pm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Cuba and Biological Weapons, Again--May-June, 2002

    The smoke had barely cleared from the May 6 speech to the 
Heritage Foundation when Under Secretary Bolton's office began 
to seek clearance of draft public testimony that they indicated 
was to be given on June 5, 2002, before the Subcommittee on 
Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee (then chaired by Senator Dodd). The draft that 
Bolton's office sent to WINPAC in late May used nearly all of 
the Cuba language from his May 6 speech and added further 
information drawn from intelligence reports. INR got the draft 
on May 30, and a meeting with Bolton was scheduled for May 31 
to discuss the text.\107\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \107\ WINPAC e-mail, May 30, 2002, 10:12 am; INR to WINPAC e-mail, 
May 30, 2002.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In the wake of the Heritage Foundation speech, INR asked 
that regional analysts be involved in the clearance process for 
the draft testimony, along with the weapons specialists.\108\ 
The draft was shared with the NIO for Latin America, who then 
participated in the clearance process. This time, therefore, 
nobody was left out.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \108\ INR to WINPAC e-mail, May 30, 2002.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Under Secretary Bolton did not attend the May 31 meeting 
with intelligence analysts, but it was by all accounts a 
contentious affair. A CIA analyst later reported to the 
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) that ``Mr. Bolton had 
left instructions that we confine our comments to sources and 
methods issues or to substantive information that strengthened 
the Undersecretary's argumentation in the proposed testimony.'' 
\109\ This contradicted the Intelligence Community's 
traditional ``accuracy and completeness'' role in the clearance 
process. The purported Bolton instructions appear to have been 
disregarded, but they were a clear attempt to change the rules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \109\ CIA/DI/APLA memorandum, June 5, 2002, p. 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    At the May 31 meeting, a senior Bolton staffer complained 
(again) about press leaks\110\ and went on to say that the NIC 
had cleared the Heritage Foundation speech. When analysts 
explained how small a role the NIC had played in clearing that 
speech, the Bolton staffer reportedly said, ``we never clear 
things with the NIC.'' \111\ A few days later, the Bolton 
staffer called the Assistant NIO for S&T and said ``that Bolton 
is insisting that the NIC cleared on the Heritage Foundation 
speech.'' \112\ The NIO for Latin America felt that the Bolton 
staffer ``seemed confused about the basics of the coordination 
process,'' while the NIO for S&T and his assistant worried that 
Bolton was trying ``to deflect criticism that Bolton continues 
to receive from his own management as well as DOD and others.'' 
The NIO for Latin America felt that perhaps Bolton's staffer 
``had led his boss out on a long, weak, and very public limb--
much to the detriment of his boss, the administration, and the 
policies they support--and was desperate to blame someone 
else.'' \113\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \110\ Ibid.
    \111\ NIO/LA to ANIO/S&T e-mail, June 4, 2002, 3:00 pm.
    \112\ ANIO/S&T to NIO/LA e-mail attachment, June 4, 2002, 3:00 pm.
    \113\ NIO/LA to ANIO/S&T e-mail, June 4, 2002, 3:00 pm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The CIA analyst warned: ``The controversy on this issue 
will not end soon.'' CIA had ``a draft Defense Department 
document that seeks (reportedly at Undersecretary Bolton's 
request) to add Cuba to the State Department's 2001 
nonproliferation report.'' Thus, there was an apparently 
coordinated effort to change the Intelligence Community's 
judgment; the nonproliferation report, by law, had to be 
approved by the DCI. The CIA analyst added that a new draft of 
Bolton's testimony ``still contains fundamental flaws.'' \114\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \114\ CIA/DI/APLA memorandum, June 5, 2002, p. 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Meanwhile, on June 4, an analytic team led by the NIO for 
Latin America gave a closed briefing on Cuba and biological 
weapons to the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee. The analysts saw the briefing as 
non-controversial, but their analytic judgments apparently were 
at odds with Under Secretary Bolton's. \115\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \115\ CIA memorandum for the record, June 4, 2002; CIA/DI/APLA e-
mail, June 5, 2002, 8:40 am.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Another draft of Under Secretary Bolton's testimony was 
provided on June 3 and edited by the Intelligence Community on 
June 6. A senior analyst wrote ``that comments will be easy 
since he did not seem to take many of our comments from 5/31.'' 
\116\ Bolton's office was thus keeping the pressure on the 
Intelligence Community to clear as much of Bolton's text as 
possible.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \116\ NIO/LA e-mail attachment of June 6, 2002, 8:11 am.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    CIA, in turn, objected to major points in the draft 
testimony, including points from the Heritage Foundation speech 
that regional analysts had not been shown before it was 
cleared. The uncoordinated working paper that Bolton's office 
had cited on May 13 was now cited in the draft testimony, and 
CIA/APLA objected to any use of it. Regional analysts believed 
that the text ``misrepresents . . . judgments not only on BW 
but also on terrorism,'' and that it ``seems to impugn 
intelligence community efforts to follow the Cuban BW issue'' 
and ``implies that the Intelligence Community is trying to hide 
something from U.S. policymakers and the U.S. public.'' \117\ 
And analysts argued that references to the Ana Montes case 
could endanger sources and methods \118\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \117\ CIA/DI/APLA e-mail, June 6, 2002, 12:30 pm.
    \118\ NIO/LA e-mail and attached edited text, June 6, 2002, 3:31 
pm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Bolton's office then protested the unwillingness to clear 
language on the Ana Montes case, so the director of WINPAC 
weighed in by telling Bolton's staff that he supported the 
Intelligence Community view. \119\ Another draft text was 
provided by Bolton's office and edited by the Intelligence 
Community that day. Aside from the Montes issue, there were 
still concerns over previously unreleased information that Mr. 
Bolton wished to cite, over how to cite a questionable quote of 
Fidel Castro, and over whether Mr. Bolton could say that the 
Intelligence Community had ``provided'' any of his Heritage 
Foundation text. Several elements of that speech were no longer 
contained, however, in the draft testimony. \120\ Bolton's 
office responded by scheduling a June 12 meeting between the 
analysts and Bolton. \121\ Bolton's office indicated that the 
Acting Chairman of the NIC should attend. \122\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \119\ Foley to Fleitz e-mail, June 7, 2002, 10:35 am.
    \120\ INPAC e-mail, June 7, 2002, 1:41 pm.
    \121\ NIO/LA e-mail attachment, June 7, 2002, 5:46 pm.
    \122\ NIO/LA to Stuart Cohen e-mail, June 10, 2002, 3:58 pm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The June 12 meeting was cancelled at the last minute, but 
Under Secretary Bolton's office sent out a new draft of the 
testimony. The e-mail from his staff that accompanied the new 
draft said that the statements on Ana Montes to which analysts 
objected were being removed. But it also stated: Q04
          Mr. Bolton would like to take a different strategy on 
        the Cuba BW testimony that he hopes will smooth the 
        process for future IC [Intelligence Community] 
        clearances of documents like this. He suggests that INR 
        use the following boilerplate language in these types 
        of clearance requests:
          ``Thank you for the opportunity to review your 
        proposed testimony/speech. As you know, the IC does not 
        comment on policy or substantive matters, so me [sic: 
        we] express no views on those portions of your 
        testimony/speech. As to those matters involving 
        intelligence sources and methods . . . '' \123\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \123\ Fleitz to INR e-mail, June 12, 2002, 11:09 am. Q04 
I21Intelligence analysts had been trying to explain for some time that 
they did not take views (and therefore could not be asked to clear) on 
policy issues. But they could not agree to cede their role in clearing 
on substance, especially when intelligence information was invoked or 
implied, so the proposal from Bolton's office was politely rejected. 
\124\It stands, however, as an audacious attempt to change the rules.
    \124\ NIO/LA to INR e-mail, June 13, 2002, 3:44 pm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Intelligence Community also proposed a few further 
edits to lessen the implied confidence in the judgment that 
Cuba was developing biological weapons. \125\ Another Bolton 
draft was promised in late June, but it never materialized and 
the draft testimony was never used. The former Acting Chief of 
the National Intelligence Council summed up the affair by 
saying, ``It just seems to me that the clearance of the speech 
. . . was entirely too rancorous and too burdensome.'' \126\ 
The rancor continued, and this matter was reportedly one reason 
listed by Mr. Bolton for asking that the NIO for Latin America 
be relieved of his duties. \127\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \125\ Ibid.
    \126\ Cohen interview, Apr. 29, 2005, page 3.
    \127\ Democratic staff notes regarding Apr. 8, 2005 telephone 
interview with Stuart Cohen. Hereafter cited as: ``Cohen interview, 
Apr. 8, 2005.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. Syria and Nuclear Weapons--Heritage Foundation Speech, April-May 
        2002

    On April 19, 2002, a senior member of Under Secretary 
Bolton's staff asked the Intelligence Community to prepare 
unclassified language on Syria, to be included in the Heritage 
Foundation speech. He asked for language on biological weapons, 
chemical weapons, nuclear weapons and ballistic missile 
programs.\128\ In response, the Intelligence Community 
transmitted unclassified language drawn from previously 
published material.\129\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \128\ Fleitz to [redacted name] e-mail. Apr. 19, 2003, 9:03 am.
    \129\ [Redacted name] to Fleitz e-mail, Apr. 26, 2002, 4:22 pm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On April 29, Under Secretary Bolton's office circulated a 
draft of the Bolton speech to relevant policy bureaus within 
the State Department, noting that this draft contained an 
additional section on Syria. \130\ The INR bureau, although not 
asked to clear on any of the language in the speech, raised 
concerns that some ``tweaking'' had been done to the Syria and 
Libya text originally provided. INR also complained that it had 
been excluded from the speech review process, having received 
the draft from a policy bureau that had been asked to clear. 
\131\ An INR analyst raised concerns that the new language on 
Syria's possible interest in nuclear weapons technology was a 
``stretch,'' implying existence of a Syrian nuclear weapons 
program when such a conclusion had not, in fact, been reached 
by U.S. intelligence. \132\ Similar concerns were raised by 
another element of the Intelligence Community. \133\ Although 
INR provided revised language that could be used on this topic, 
Bolton did not use it, opting instead to refrain from any 
discussion of a potential Syrian nuclear weapons program in his 
speech. He did not give up on what he wanted to say, however, 
but rather saved it for another day.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \130\ Fleitz to [redacted name] e-mail, Apr. 29, 2002, 5:07 pm.
    \131\ [Redacted name] to Fleitz e-mail, Apr. 30, 2002, 11:20 am.
    \132\ [Redacted name] to Fleitz e-mail, Apr. 30, 2002, 8:39 am, 
forwarded to Fleitz Apr. 30, 2002, 10:03 am.
    \133\ Fleitz to [redacted name] e-mail, Apr. 30, 2002, 11:26 am.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

E. Syria and Nuclear Weapons, Again--HIRC testimony, June, July, 
        September, 2003

    Under Secretary Bolton testified before the House 
International Relations Committee in June 2003, and again in 
September, on Syrian efforts to develop WMD and ballistic 
missiles. On June 4, Bolton told the committee: ``As we have 
informed Congress, we are looking at Syria's nuclear program 
with growing concern and continue to monitor it for any signs 
of nuclear weapons intent.'' \134\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \134\ ``U.S. Nonproliferation Policy After Iraq.'' Hearing of the 
House International Relations Committee, June 4, 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This statement stand in contrast to a CIA assessment sent 
to the Congress just two months earlier, in April 2003, which 
was more cautious than Mr. Bolton's testimony. On the question 
of nuclear weapons, the report, noting that Syria and Russia 
had reached preliminary agreement on civilian nuclear 
cooperation, stated: ``In principle, broader access to Russian 
expertise provides opportunities for Syria to expand its 
indigenous capabilities, should it decide to pursue nuclear 
weapons.'' (The ``growing concern'' language used in Bolton's 
statement was later adopted in the DCI's report for the first 
half of 2003, which was released in November 2003. By November 
2004, however, the ``growing concern'' was reduced to 
``concern.'') \135\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \135\ Director of Central Intelligence, ``Unclassified Report to 
Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass 
Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30 
June 2002,'' April 2003, p. 8; ``Unclassified Report to Congress on the 
Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and 
Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June 2003,'' 
November 2003, p. 6; ``Unclassified Report to Congress on the 
Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and 
Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 2003,'' 
November 2004, p. 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On September 16, 2003, the Subcommittee on the Middle East 
and Central Asia of the House International Relations Committee 
held a hearing entitled ``Syria: Implications for U.S. Security 
and Regional Stability.'' Under Secretary Bolton was the only 
witness. Originally this testimony was to be given in July, but 
disagreements that emerged between Bolton's office and the 
Intelligence Community over the interpretation of intelligence 
data forced Bolton to postpone the testimony, according to 
Bolton's account. After a prolonged clearance process, the 
testimony that Bolton gave ultimately included language on 
Syria's WMD programs that was cleared by the Intelligence 
Community.
    According to contemporaneous press accounts about the 
postponed July testimony, the CIA and other agencies ``objected 
vigorously'' to the assessment of the threat of Syria's weapons 
of mass destruction that Bolton intended to present. U.S. 
officials told Knight Ridder Newspapers that Bolton was 
prepared to tell the subcommittee that Syria's development of 
biological, chemical and nuclear weapons had progressed to such 
a point that they posed a threat to stability in the region. 
The article went on to say that the CIA and other intelligence 
agencies ``said that assessment was exaggerated,'' that the 
planned testimony had caused a ``revolt'' within the 
Intelligence Community, and that the CIA's ``objections and 
comments alone ran to 35 to 40 pages'' according to one 
official. According to the article, an aide to Bolton said the 
testimony was postponed over a scheduling conflict, while 
others indicated it was because the dispute could not be solved 
immediately. \136\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \136\ Warren P. Strobel and Jonathan S. Landay, ``CIA: Assessment 
of Syria's Weapons of Mass Destruction Exaggerated,'' Knight Ridder/
Tribune News Service, July 15, 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    During Bolton's confirmation hearing last month, Senator 
Obama read excerpts from the above Knight Ridder article and 
asked Under Secretary Bolton to respond. Bolton said that 
``drafts were prepared--and I should say as is often the case, 
and was in part in the case in other speeches-- I hadn't even 
seen the draft. I had been traveling, when I came back I found 
that I had a conflict, I had been assigned to go to a Deputy's 
committee meeting at the White House. There were a lot of 
disagreements about the speech, it was clear to me that more 
work needed to be done on it.'' He stated further that he 
canceled the testimony, telling Congresswoman Ileana Ros-
Lehtinen, the subcommittee chair: ``Look, I'm going to, on my 
own hook, cancel this. We need more time.'' He said the hearing 
could not be rescheduled until September because of the August 
recess. \137\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \137\ Apr. 11 hearing, pm session, p. 87.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The committee staff interviewed four individuals who 
confirmed that there was a protracted dispute over Bolton's 
testimony to the Subcommittee. The first is an INR analyst 
whose name has not been made public, but who was involved in 
the clearance process for the Bolton testimony. The analyst 
stated that one issue, involving one of Syria's WMD-related 
programs, was a ``big sticking point.'' The question was 
whether the judgment in Bolton's draft was ``sustainable.'' 
This analyst described that judgment as ``an attempt to take a 
piece of data that was far from definitive and draw a 
conclusion.'' The analyst went on to say that the Intelligence 
Community had ``reservations'' about the information and how it 
was obtained, as well as the ``soundness of the science'' 
underlying it. The analyst indicated that Bolton's staff was 
``not happy'' about the language that came back from the 
Intelligence Community and that ``there was some effort at 
pushback.'' \138\ The analyst stated that ``ultimately'' the 
phraseology was removed and that the Intelligence Community was 
``comfortable'' with the final phrasing. When asked about this 
particular clearance process, the analyst stated that it was 
``fairly rare for this type of dynamic to play out.'' \139\ 
Once again, we see Bolton or his office engaging in the tactic 
of protracted drafts in an effort to get clearance for text 
that intelligence professionals felt went beyond the evidence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \138\ INR supervisor interview, page 12.
    \139\ Ibid., page 14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Jami Miscik, who served as CIA's Deputy Director for 
Intelligence from May 2002 to February 2005, also confirmed 
that there were concerns within the Intelligence Community 
about Mr. Bolton's proposed language. The committee's staff 
asked if she had followed ``any of the cases that arose 
regarding clearance of speech or testimony for policymakers.'' 
She responded that much of the process went on at a level that 
``usually didn't involve me,'' but described the kinds of 
situations in which she did become involved. The first was: 
``If it looked like it was going to be a contentious issue . . 
. '' She described the second as follows: ``And then sometimes 
there would be situations where it was really dragging out, it 
was really becoming problematic, and those are the ones that 
usually people would come up and, kind of, tell me about more 
than just a passing FYI kind of phone call.'' \140\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \140\ Interview of Jami Miscik by Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee staff, May 5, 2005, page 5. Hereafter cited as ``Miscik 
interview.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Ms. Miscik was asked if the latter category included cases 
involving testimony or speeches for Under Secretary Bolton. She 
replied: Q04
          Yeah. One of them, in particular, was the Syria 
        speech that he was going to give. And the Cuba speech--
        I don't remember as much before the speech as after the 
        speech was given [on May 6, 2002, to the Heritage 
        Foundation], where people were coming up to me, saying, 
        you know, ``This isn't what we--this isn't how we see 
        this information.'' And so, what that then led--or 
        [was] laid was kind of a predicate for when the Syria 
        one came along. People were approaching it very 
        cautiously, were concerned that there were going to be 
        problems. . . . [T]hey wrote a very extensive memo back 
        on the points that they had issues with or thought that 
        it went beyond what could be supported by the 
        intelligence.\141\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \141\ Ibid., page 6. Q04 I21Ms. Miscik further clarified that the 
memo had been prepared in connection with Bolton's proposed Syria 
testimony and that the ``concern and the action on . . . Syria came 
before the [testimony].'' When asked whether Bolton in the end used the 
language proposed by the Intelligence Community, Ms. Miscik said: ``I 
think it had been delayed--I think this is a--you know, turned into, 
instead of a couple-of-day process, a couple-of-week process. I think 
what ultimately was used was agreed to by the Intelligence Community.'' 
\142\
    \142\ Ibid., page 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Ms. Miscik testified that she did not ``have to get 
personally involved,'' but confirmed that the differences could 
not be resolved in time for the testimony to be given as 
originally planned: ``my memory could be faulty here, but there 
had been an original deadline that wasn't going to be met. This 
was not going to be resolved by then. Then there was an 
extension. I think the speech was postponed.'' \143\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \143\ Ibid., page 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Dr. Robert Hutchings, who served as the Chair of the 
National Intelligence Council from February 2003 through the 
end of January 2005, also spoke to the process involving 
Bolton's Syria testimony. Hutchings recalled: Q04
          The first version I saw struck me as going well 
        beyond what--where the evidence would legitimately take 
        us. And that was the judgement of the experts on my 
        staff, as well. So I said that, under these 
        circumstances, that we should not clear this kind of 
        testimony. \144\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \144\ Hutchings interview, page 9. Q04 I21Dr. Hutchings did not see 
every draft of the proposed Syria testimony, but was briefed on the 
continuing clearance process: ``I remember that--either seeing or being 
told that the next draft was pretty much the same as the first one, 
that there were some small changes, but that it was still problematic. 
That's the sort of a sense that I was getting. And I, again, said that 
we should not clear anything we're not--that contains intelligence 
judgements with which we are not comfortable.'' He did not recall the 
reported Syria memo, but did state that this case was ``perhaps 
particularly acute,'' and he knew of no case as protracted as this one. 
\145\
    \145\ Ibid., page 10-page 11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Dr. Hutchings went on to say that Under Secretary Bolton: 
``took isolated facts and made much more of them to build a 
case than I thought the intelligence warranted. It was a sort 
of cherry-picking of little factoids and little isolated bits 
that were drawn out to present the starkest possible case.'' 
\146\ (This is, of course, a pattern observed on the Cuba 
biological weapons issue, as well.) Hutchings indicated that he 
had no personal interactions with Bolton.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \146\ Ibid., p. 13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Finally, Mr. Larry Wilkerson, former Chief of Staff to 
Secretary of State Powell, contradicted Mr. Bolton's testimony 
regarding the reason why the June 2003 hearing was postponed: 
``My recollection is that the Deputy Secretary of State 
intervened and would not allow the testimony to take place.'' 
Mr. Wilkerson cited concerns regarding both the substance of 
Mr. Bolton's proposed testimony and its timing, while ``[t]here 
were some delicate negotiations going on.'' \147\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \147\ Interview of Lawrence Wilkerson by Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee staff, May 6, 2005, page 27. Hereafter cited as: ``Wilkerson 
interview.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

F. China WMD/WINPAC and INR

    In August 2002, Mr. Bolton's office threatened to limit the 
ability of INR to append its own opinions to products produced 
by other parts of the intelligence community, warning that the 
Under Secretary was considering establishing new arrangements 
for the dissemination of sensitive compartmented information 
within the State Department that would bypass INR, according to 
e-mails describing the incident and testimony from Fred Fleitz 
and Neil Silver.
    On August 29, 2002, INR circulated within the State 
Department a memorandum drafted by CIA's WINPAC concerning a 
recently-announced Chinese export control list. Bolton's office 
considered the memo ``a useful contribution to the debate on 
this issue,'' \148\ and suggested that Deputy Secretary 
Armitage's office request a copy of the memo from INR, 
according to a contemporaneous e-mail by a member of Mr. 
Bolton's staff.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \148\ Fleitz to Fingar e-mail, cc to Bolton and Silver, Aug. 30, 
2002, 11:33 am.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    INR transmitted the WINPAC memo to Deputy Secretary 
Armitage's office, as requested, but also attached its own 
brief memo on the subject, taking issue with elements of the 
WINPAC memo. The committee has requested both the original 
WINPAC memo and the INR rebuttal memo, but neither has been 
provided to the committee.
    The INR rebuttal was drafted by an analyst in the Office of 
Strategic, Proliferation, and Military Issues (SPM). On the 
morning of August 30, when a senior member of Bolton's staff 
learned that INR had attached its own memo to the WINPAC 
analysis, he personally visited the INR drafter and accused him 
of acting unprofessionally and making the Intelligence 
Community ``look bad,'' according to a contemporaneous e-mail 
account by the INR analyst. \149\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \149\ INR analyst to Silver e-mail, August 30, 2002, 9:54 am.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Bolton senior staffer then sent an e-mail to INR 
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Tom Fingar and SPM office 
director Neil Silver expressing Bolton's ``displeasure'' with 
INR's rebuttal and accusing INR of failing to follow 
``established dissemination procedures.'' \150\ The Bolton 
staffer wrote: ``T [letter designation of Bolton's office in 
the State Department] considers this a serious abuse of INR's 
liaison role, particularly since the INR rebuttal was not even 
a finished product, fully coordinated within INR proper.'' 
\151\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \150\ Fleitz to Fingar e-mail, cc to Bolton and Silver, Aug. 30, 
2002, 11:33 am.
    \151\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Bolton senior staffer likened the incident to the March 
2002 dispute over Cuba's biological weapons program, and warned 
that INR's actions, ``cannot help but undermine the bond of 
trust between T and INR.'' \152\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \152\ Fleitz to Fingar e-mail, cc to Bolton and Silver, Aug. 30, 
2002, 11:33 am.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Mr. Bolton was on foreign travel during this incident. 
Nonetheless, throughout his e-mail communication with INR, the 
senior staff member says that he is speaking ``on behalf of U/S 
Bolton,'' and repeatedly uses ``we'' to describe the views of 
Bolton's office.
    The committee staff interviewed Mr. Bolton's staff member, 
Silver, and another INR supervisor about the incident. The 
Bolton senior staffer said he had no recollection of visiting 
the INR analyst on the morning of August 30 and described his 
threatening e-mail as ``a fairly minor matter.'' \153\ His 
testimony is at odds with his use of the phrase, ``serious 
abuse of INR's liaison role'' in his contemporaneous e-mail. In 
his interview, the Bolton staffer said that INR should have 
consulted with CIA before drafting its own rebuttal ``as a 
courtesy, not as a requirement,'' \154\ again at odds with his 
contemporaneous assertion that INR had not followed 
``established dissemination procedures.'' The Bolton staffer 
said he did not pursue establishing a new channel for the 
dissemination of sensitive intelligence information by the 
Under Secretary's office.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \153\ Interview of Frederick Fleitz by Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee staff, May 5, 2005, page 3. Hereafter cited as ``Fleitz 
interview, May 5, 2005.''
    \154\ Ibid., page 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Neil Silver recalled that INR attached a brief comment to 
the WINPAC analysis. ``The fact that we had done what we had 
done was absolutely natural and appropriate.'' \155\ Silver 
described the practice as routine, and said that it applies to 
both finished intelligence (such as the WINPAC memo) and raw 
intelligence. Silver testified that he told Bolton's staff 
member that WINPAC had not consulted with INR in the drafting 
of their analysis, and that therefore INR did not think it was 
inappropriate for it to comment on the WINPAC memo without 
first consulting with CIA. The other INR supervisor could not 
recall any incident in 27 years at the State Department in 
which a policy official had expressed concern because INR had 
attached its own view to a product from another intelligence 
agency. \156\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \155\ Interview of Neil Silver by Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee staff, May 5, 2005, page 9. Hereafter cited as ``Silver 
interview, May 5, 2005.''
    \156\ INR supervisor interview, page 17.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                V. ABUSIVE BEHAVIOR TOWARD SUBORDINATES

    The United States Representative to the United Nations is 
more than the chief American diplomat to the world's leading 
international organization; he or she is also the leader of 
some 150 personnel, both Foreign Service and Civil Service. 
That person should have, among other things, strong leadership 
skills and the ability to manage and motivate people.
    Leadership and management skills at the State Department 
were a high priority during the first four years of the Bush 
Administration under Secretary of State Powell. Secretary 
Powell instituted a mandatory leadership and management 
training course at the Foreign Service Institute for senior 
officials. Secretary Powell and Deputy Secretary Armitage were 
known to instruct ambassadors departing Washington to assume 
their posts with a simple but important dictum: ``take care of 
our people.''
    In a recent cable to all State Department posts, Secretary 
of State Rice noted the importance of leadership skills in the 
selection of career candidates for Chief of Mission positions: 
Q04
          Special emphasis is placed on ensuring that officers 
        assigned to these senior positions meet the highest 
        standards of leadership needed in our Missions overseas 
        and in the Department. Those standards apply not only 
        to policy and formal management skills, but also to 
        interpersonal skills and qualities of personal 
        integrity required of our leaders.'' \157\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \157\ State 73770, April 21, 2005. Q04 I21Oddly, Secretary of State 
Rice has sought to downplay the significance of management skills in 
connection with the Bolton nomination. In an interview with CNN on 
April 20, 2005, the Secretary said, ``I think we make a mistake if 
suddenly comments about management style become part of the 
confirmation process.'' \158\
    \158\ Televised interview with Jill Dougherty, CNN, April 20, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The record gathered by the committee is replete with 
evidence of abusive behavior toward subordinates by Secretary 
Bolton, of retribution against subordinates for minor errors, 
and even of seeking dismissal or removal of personnel over 
policy views.

A. Testimony of Larry Wilkerson

    The former Chief of Staff to Secretary Powell, Larry 
Wilkerson, told the committee staff that Mr. Bolton was a 
``lousy leader'' who was ill-suited to the post of U.S. 
Representative to the United Nations because of the need to 
provide leadership to the roughly 150 government employees in 
the U.S. Mission to the UN. Mr. Wilkerson also indicated that 
Mr. Bolton was a frequent source of complaint by Department 
personnel: that is, that there was a regular stream of visitors 
to his office complaining about their treatment by Mr. Bolton: 
Q04
          Mr. Wilkerson.  Remember that process I told you 
        about whereby [people] came into my office and 
        unburdened themselves? Q02
          Ms. O'Connell.  So, it was often about Article 98s? 
        Q02
          Mr. Wilkerson.  On occasion. I won't say often, but 
        it was on occasion. It was more often on personnel 
        matters, especially when it came to John Bolton. Q02
          Ms. O'Connell.  Personnel matters. That--individuals 
        coming to complain about---- Q02
          Mr. Wilkerson.  Assistant secretaries, PDASs, acting 
        assistant secretaries coming into my office and telling 
        me, ``Can I sit down?''
          ``Sure, sit down. What's the problem?''
          ``I've got to leave here.''
          ``What's the problem?''
          ``Bolton.'' \159\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \159\ Wilkerson Interview, page 36-page 37.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Testimony of Carl Ford

    Former Assistant Secretary Carl Ford described Mr. Bolton 
as a ``quintessential kiss-up, kick-down sort of guy . . . But 
the fact is that he stands out, that he's got a bigger kick and 
it gets bigger and stronger the further down the bureaucracy 
he's kicking.'' \160\ ``I've never seen anybody quite like 
Secretary Bolton, [it] doesn't even come close. I don't have a 
second and third or fourth, in terms of the way that he abuses 
his power and authority with little people.'' \161\ Mr. Ford 
further stated his view that Mr. Bolton's action in the 
Westermann matter--in reaching five or six levels down in the 
bureaucracy and ``ream[ing] out somebody''--was 
``professionally unacceptable.'' \162\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \160\ Apr. 12 hearing, page 20.
    \161\ Ibid., p. 18.
    \162\ Ibid., p. 68.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    After Mr. Bolton and Mr. Ford had heated words about the 
Westermann matter, Mr. Ford says that Mr. Bolton ``chose to 
shun me''--in other words, refused to speak to him for the next 
year and a half. When Mr. Bolton did speak to Mr. Ford, it was 
in the final weeks of Mr. Ford's service, and after he had 
announced he was leaving the Department. Mr. Bolton asked Mr. 
Ford to do something (Mr. Ford could not recall the details of 
the specific matter). Ford said, ``if I could have done it, I 
would have . . . but for some reason I couldn't. And I told him 
I couldn't do it, and I thought the phone was just going to 
explode, and the only thing I remember him saying is, `I'm glad 
you're leaving.' And he slammed down the phone.'' \163\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \163\ Ibid., p. 54.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Individual Cases

    The committee has also examined several specific cases of 
individuals whom Mr. Bolton sought to punish or remove. The 
Westermann and Smith cases, described above, involve 
intelligence analysts. Cases involving policy officers are 
described below.

The Case of Rexon Ryu

    The Rexon Ryu matter came to the attention of the committee 
when it was first reported in T3The Washington Post  on April 
15, 2005. The committee staff interviewed Mr. John Wolf, the 
Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation from 2001 to 
2004, who supervised Mr. Ryu in 2003, when Mr. Ryu had an 
encounter with Mr. Bolton's office. The committee staff did not 
interview Mr. Ryu.
    Mr. Ryu is a Civil Service employee of the Department of 
State currently on detail to the office of Senator Hagel. He 
was described by former Assistant Secretary Wolf as a ``truly 
outstanding civil servant,'' and part of a ``circle of a 
handful of the best'' civil servants that Wolf had ever worked 
with during his 34-year career in the Foreign Service. \164\ 
Larry Wilkerson, former Chief of Staff to Secretary Powell, 
said: ``I know Rexon well. . . . Rexon is a brilliant young 
man, and was on my team to prepare the [Powell] presentation at 
the UN, and I, you know, spent two nights in the Waldorf 
Astoria, awake with him all night, fixing things. So, I know 
his competence.'' \165\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \164\ Interview of John Wolf by Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
staff, Apr. 28, 2005, page 6. Hereafter cited as ``Wolf interview.''
    \165\ Wilkerson interview, page 16-page 17.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In March 2003, on the eve of the war in Iraq, Frederick 
Fleitz, acting Chief of Staff to Mr. Bolton, asked Mr. Ryu for 
a copy of a draft cable sent to Washington by the U.S. mission 
to the United Nations. (The post was seeking instructions from 
Washington, and had e-mailed to Washington a draft cable; in 
essence, the post was suggesting to headquarters what the 
instructions should say.) Mr. Ryu told Mr. Fleitz he did not 
have the cable.
    Subsequently, Mr. Ryu circulated fairly widely within the 
Department a cable (perhaps a draft outgoing cable) that 
related to the UN inspection process in Iraq. Mr. Bolton's 
office was not provided a copy of the cable, but at least two 
bureaus working under him--the Bureau of Arms Control and the 
Bureau of Verification and Compliance--were. The Under 
Secretary's office, believing it was the same cable that Mr. 
Fleitz had sought from Ryu, then accused Mr. Ryu of duplicity 
or of having lied to them.
    Mr. Wolf testified that he believes that Mr. Bolton 
``actually called Rexon Ryu up to his office,'' but that Ryu 
never got there because he stopped in Wolf's office first. Mr. 
Wolf stated that he reviewed the matter and decided that, 
because the cable was given broad circulation (including to 
offices under Mr. Bolton), any error was inadvertent. \166\ 
Moreover, inasmuch as the Under Secretary's office would have 
ultimately had to approve the outgoing cable, it would have 
been impossible for Mr. Ryu to keep it from them.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \166\ Wolf interview, pages 4-6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Mr. Bolton apparently took a different view. Some nine 
months later, in December 2003, Mr. Bolton blocked Mr. Ryu's 
assignment as the point person in the Nonproliferation Bureau 
for the preparations for the Group of Eight (G-8) summit to be 
hosted by the United States in June 2004 at Sea Island, 
Georgia. Mr. Bolton's office passed word to the 
Nonproliferation Bureau that Mr. Bolton was ``not prepared to 
have Rexon Ryu as the Nonproliferation Bureau point of contact. 
It was reported to us that the Under Secretary felt that he had 
been duplicitous in his dealings with [the Under Secretary's 
office], and that he simply wouldn't accept him.'' \167\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \167\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Concerned that a brilliant young officer would be left 
manning an ``empty desk'' in the Nonproliferation Bureau 
because of the attitude of the Under Secretary, Mr. Wolf 
arranged for Mr. Ryu to be assigned to the Bureau of Near 
Eastern Affairs, and then to the office of Deputy Secretary 
Armitage, where he served until Mr. Armitage left the 
Department in February of this year. Mr. Ryu was then detailed 
to the office of Senator Hagel.
    Mr. Bolton, for his part, stated that the account in the 
Washington Post--relating to the staffing arrangements for U.S. 
participation in the G-8 Senior Group and Global Partnership 
was inaccurate: Q04
          After an experienced member of the Nonproliferation 
        Bureau staff who had been helping me was detailed 
        without consulting with me to another Bureau by NP and 
        replaced by a less experienced individual, I asked that 
        the original NP staffer be returned to NP to continue 
        to assist me given the importance of the initiative, my 
        direct role in negotiating it, and the active agenda 
        for the year given [the] U.S. hosting of the G-8 summit 
        in 2004.'' \168\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \168\ Answer to question for the record by Sen. Biden, April 11, 
2005. Q04 I20Mr. Bolton did not elaborate on how the T3Washington Post  
account is inaccurate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    To be sure, Mr. Bolton had a right to request that a 
different officer be assigned to an important matter he was 
handling directly. But it is fair to question why such a 
significant step would result from a seemingly inadvertent 
error committed nine months earlier by an exceptionally 
talented officer. Had Mr. Ryu's superiors not intervened to 
give him assignments away from the reach of Mr. Bolton, this 
personnel action could have derailed Mr. Ryu's career 
progression. The message to other officers is clear: one slip-
up with Mr. Bolton and he could take punitive action, even long 
after the event.

The case of an attorney in the Office of the Legal Adviser of the State 
        Department

    The committee reviewed a matter that occurred in October 
2004 involving an attorney working in the Office of the Legal 
Adviser. The staff interviewed the attorney as well as the 
former Legal Adviser, Will Taft. Mr. Bolton was asked a 
question for the record about the matter by Senator Biden.
    In mid-October 2004, Beston Chemical Corporation 
(``Beston''), a Texas firm, filed a lawsuit in federal district 
court in Louisiana against Secretary Powell. Beston sought an 
injunction preventing the U.S. government from seizing goods 
that it was importing from the People's Republic of China. The 
goods were facing seizure as a result of an import ban imposed 
by the State Department on September 20, 2004 on products sold 
by a Chinese firm, Xinshidai. The federal judge handling the 
case scheduled a status conference for October 20, 2004, and 
told the attorney for the government that she wanted a 
decision-maker available by telephone.
    The attorney assigned to the case in the State Department 
(whose name has been withheld from the public record at the 
request of the Department) prepared briefing materials for the 
Assistant U.S. Attorney in Louisiana handling the matter, and 
provided similar materials for Mr. Bolton. The briefing 
materials summarized the status of the case, the legal issues 
involved, and an issue that was still under discussion among 
the government lawyers and policy offices, namely whether a 
modification or waiver of the sanctions would be needed so as 
to permit safe handling of the goods, which involved 
explosives.
    Prior to the phone call, the State Department attorney was 
asked to go to Mr. Bolton's office to orally brief him. The 
attorney described the account:
          So I went up [to Bolton's office], pretty much 
        expecting to sort of do a pre-brief on the conference 
        call . . . and discuss some of the issues that we were 
        dealing with. When I went in, there were--I can't 
        remember if we all went in together or what, but there 
        were four of us in there in addition to Mr. Bolton, the 
        T staffer who had been involved plus two NP officials 
        or personnel. Mr. Bolton started off basically 
        complaining about my handling of the case, said that I 
        was off the case, and I wouldn't be participating any 
        more, that he was going to handle it directly. He said 
        that I had told [the] Justice [Department] . . . that 
        we had a weak case, and that I had told Justice that we 
        were still considering a waiver of the [sanctions] in 
        this case, and more generally said that I didn't like 
        sanctions, had never liked sanctions, and sort of 
        accusations of that nature.\169\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \169\ Interview of State Department attorney by Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee staff, May 3, 2005, page 13. Hereafter cited as 
``State Department attorney interview.'' Q04 I21When Mr. Bolton stated 
that he would handle the matter directly with Justice, the State 
Department attorney understood that Mr. Bolton did not want further 
assistance from the Office of the Legal Adviser. \170\Will Taft 
verified this impression, stating that the attorney said that Mr. 
Bolton had told Justice Department lawyers ``not to work with my 
attorney.'' \171\
    \170\ Ibid., page 27.
    \171\ Interview of Will Taft by Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
staff, May 3, 2005, page 3. Hereafter cited as ``Taft interview.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The attorney contends that Mr. Bolton's accusations were 
erroneous. He testified that, in fact, his memo stated that the 
government had a strong case. He also disputed Mr. Bolton's 
statement that he opposed sanctions. Finally, the attorney told 
Mr. Bolton that the State Department Legal Adviser would want 
Department attorneys to remain involved in the matter, given 
that the Secretary of State was the defendant. The attorney 
left the meeting at that point, because, he said, ``[t]here 
didn't seem to be anything more left to say.'' \172\ He then 
proceeded to the office of Mr. Taft, the Legal Adviser, to 
brief him on the incident. Mr. Taft told the attorney to remain 
on the case and to stay in touch with the Department of Justice 
on it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \172\ State Department attorney interview, page 27.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The following day, Mr. Taft informed Mr. Bolton, both 
orally and by e-mail, that the attorney would continue to 
handle the case. Mr. Taft described his encounter with Mr. 
Bolton, which occurred in the hallway after the Secretary's 
morning staff meeting, as ``not pleasant''.\173\ In an e-mail 
to the attorney, Mr. Taft described Mr. Bolton as ``still very 
hot'' and not wanting ``to know what the facts are about this 
incident.'' \174\ Mr. Bolton did not reply to Taft's e-mail to 
him, prompting Mr. Taft--apparently concerned that Mr. Bolton 
still had not accepted his view that State Department lawyers 
would remain on the case--to request the Deputy Secretary to 
reinforce the message. Deputy Secretary Armitage sent Mr. 
Bolton a memo (drafted by Taft) reminding him that the Legal 
Adviser's Office needed to handle the Department's litigation 
and [that Mr. Bolton] needed to coordinate with Taft's office. 
\175\ A copy of that memo, which is undated, was provided to 
the committee, but it has not been made available by the State 
Department for public release.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \173\ Taft interview, page 7.
    \174\ Taft to State Department attorney e-mail, October 21, 2004, 
9:22 am.
    \175\ Taft interview, page 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Although the attorney did not participate in the October 20 
conference call with the federal judge, he did continue to work 
on the case, as well as on other matters related to the Office 
of Under Secretary Bolton.
    Under Secretary Bolton concedes that he told the lawyer 
that he wanted to communicate ``directly with the DOJ 
litigators, not through him.'' He asserts that the Department 
of Justice had received erroneous information from the State 
Department lawyer, and says the he ``expressed my concern [to 
Mr. Taft] about apparent miscommunications about the status of 
the waiver'' of the sanctions. \176\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \176\ Answer to question for the record by Sen. Biden, April 11, 
2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Based on the record the committee has gathered, at worst 
there was a miscommunication between or among Mr. Bolton's 
office, the Department of Justice, and the Office of the Legal 
Adviser regarding the status of the legal case. Mr. Bolton's 
reaction to this minor error can only be described as extreme. 
He not only sought to remove the individual attorney from the 
case, he signaled that he did not want the Office of the Legal 
Adviser involved at all.
    As a former General Counsel of the U.S. Agency for 
International Development and a former Assistant Attorney 
General for the Civil Division, Mr. Bolton has significant 
experience in government litigation. He surely understood the 
need for the Department's legal office to be involved in any 
lawsuit related to the Department. If he had forgotten this 
requirement, the State Department's own internal regulations 
assigning roles and responsibilities among various offices 
(known as the Foreign Affairs Manual) would have reminded him: 
1 Foreign Affairs Manual 241.1(h) provides that the Legal 
Adviser ``assists the Justice Department in domestic litigation 
which involves the Department.''
    Yet in reaction to a minor error--if, indeed, the error was 
the fault of the lawyer, for the lawyer insists that a waiver 
was still under consideration in Mr. Bolton's office--Mr. 
Bolton sought to circumvent the established system for handling 
legal cases by dealing directly with the Justice Department, to 
the exclusion of State Department attorneys. Mr. Bolton's 
extraordinary action brought an extraordinary response: a memo 
from the Deputy Secretary of State reminding Mr. Bolton--who 
has over a decade of high-level government experience--that the 
rules applied to him. Mr. Taft stated that he reviewed the 
lawyer's advice and that ``[i]t seemed to me that his advice 
was sound. It was a little weird that also the advice was 
actually what the client seemed to want. So it was not 
difficult to say, there's something odd going on here, but 
let's just leave him on the case.'' \177\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \177\ Taft interview, page 14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Pressure to conform policy views to Mr. Bolton's; seeking removal of 
        two other officers

    Former Assistant Secretary of State Wolf described the 
process of producing memos for the Secretary, particularly on 
decisions on sanctions under nonproliferation laws, as ``long 
and arduous.'' He stated that Under Secretary Bolton ``tended 
to hold on to his own views strongly, and . . . tended not to 
be enthusiastic about alternative views.'' \178\ Mr. Wolf said, 
moreover, that ``it would be fair to say that some of the 
officers within my bureau complained that they felt undue 
pressure to conform to the views of the Under Secretary versus 
the views that they thought they could support.'' \179\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \178\ Wolf interview, page 36.
    \179\ Ibid., page 41
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Mr. Wolf added that on at least two occasions--in addition 
to the case of Mr. Ryu--Mr. Bolton sought to transfer or remove 
individuals in the Bureau of Nonproliferation because they were 
not ``providing diligent service.'' When asked whether this 
meant Mr. Bolton was complaining about their competence or 
their viewpoints, Mr. Wolf replied that it was the latter. 
\180\ Mr. Wolf declined to identify the officers in question. 
Their careers did not suffer, because Mr. Wolf resisted the 
pressure from Mr. Bolton.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \180\ Ibid., pages 51-56.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. Other matters: Melody Townsel

    A few days before the committee's business meeting on April 
19, the Democratic staff received an e-mail from Melody 
Townsel, a Dallas resident who alleged that 11 years ago, Mr. 
Bolton had chased her through the halls of a Russian hotel, 
shoving threatening letters under her door and shouting 
threats. She also charged that Mr. Bolton had attempted to 
malign her character by making false accusations against her to 
her colleagues, damaging her professional reputation. Ms. 
Townsel styled her e-mail an ``open letter'' to the committee, 
and it was given wide circulation in the press in the days 
before the April 19 meeting. her subsequent interview by the 
committee staff was consistent with the open letter.\181\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \181\ Interview of Melody Townsel by Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee staff, Apr. 26, 2005. Hereafter cited as: ``Townsel 
interview.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Townsel said these events occurred in August 1994 when she 
was working as a project director for Black, Manafort, Stone 
and Kelly, which was a subcontractor to International Business 
and Technical Consultants, Inc. (IBTCI) on a USAID contract in 
Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. At the time, Mr. Bolton was working as a 
consultant on another project for IBTCI. \182\ During a visit 
to Moscow, Ms. Townsel wrote a memo to USAID complaining about 
IBTCI's poor performance on the Kyrgyzstan contract. She 
alleges that the harassment and intimidation began as soon as 
Mr. Bolton, who was staying at the same Moscow hotel, became 
aware of the letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \182\ Melody Townsel was the ``Chief of Party'' (Team Leader) from 
January until October 1994 of a USAID-funded project to conduct public 
education on privatization initiatives in Kyrgyzstan. With a background 
in journalism and public relations, she was hired by Black, Manafort, 
Stone and Kelly, which was a subcontractor to International Business 
and Technical Consultants, Inc. (``IBTCI''). Black Manafort (``BLM'') 
and Burson-Marsteller (``BRM'') were both subsidiaries of Young & 
Rubicam/Sovero (``YRS''). IBTCI was at the time a minority-owned small 
business, and had been awarded several projects, known as ``task 
orders,'' under a broad USAID contract known as ``Omnibus I.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The committee staff investigated the allegations by 
interviewing several witnesses on the record and requesting 
documents from USAID, and two private contractors of AID, one 
of which employed Ms. Townsel. Dozens of other persons were 
contacted to ascertain whether they witnessed or recalled the 
alleged events.
    The investigation was not able to establish conclusively 
that the alleged events occurred. Eleven years have passed. 
Relevant documents no longer exist. Memories have faded. Some 
witnesses may have a reason not to come forward. What follows 
is a brief summary of what the committe has learned. What we do 
know is that Townsel and Bolton were in the same Moscow hotel 
for some period of time in August 1994, and they met there. And 
we do know that Bolton traveled to Bishkek in November 1994 
(not in August, as Townsel recalled) for his client, where he 
met some of Townsel's co-workers on the project.

Charge #1: While Melody Townsel was at the Aerostar Hotel in Moscow in 
        August 1994, John Bolton threw things at her, chased her down 
        the hallways, screamed at her, threatened her, and banged on 
        her door repeatedly.

    Through the spring and summer of 1994, Townsel complained 
repeatedly to her superiors at Black, Manafort, including 
Matthew Friedman and Charles Black, as well as to Indira 
Kalotra and Jay Kalotra at IBTCI, about serious cash flow and 
staffing problems. Her complaints are well documented, although 
there is disagreement over the extent to which IBTCI was to 
blame for their failure to be corrected.
    In July 2004, Townsel was invited by Kirby Jones of Burson-
Marstellar to participate in a conference in Moscow of all YRS 
expatriates based in the region. During the conference, Townsel 
told Jones about the problems she was experiencing in Bishkek, 
and Jones recommended that she document them in a memo. She did 
so, and then Jones forwarded the memo to USAID with his own 
cover letter on August 2, 1994. Neither Townsel's memo nor 
Jones' cover letter was shared with Townsel's superiors at 
Black, Manafort or with IBTCI beforehand, although Townsel told 
her immediate supervisor, Matthew Freedman, that she had 
delivered the letter and all parties were generally aware of 
the issues raised therein.
    After learning of the letter, Black, Manafort asked Townsel 
to remain in Moscow so that decisions could be made about how 
to proceed. At this point, Townsel moved to a less expensive 
hotel, the Aerostar, to await further instructions. IBTCI had 
offices in this same hotel, and Mr. Bolton was there working 
for IBTCI as a consultant on another project, known as 
``Healthy Russia 2000.''
    It is during this time period--when Townsel and Mr. Bolton 
were both at the Aerostar Hotel and Townsel had already ``blown 
the whistle'' against Mr. Bolton's employer--that Townsel 
alleges the harassment took place.
    The record is in conflict about the time period involved. 
Townsel's original letter to the committee said she was there, 
and the harassment extended for, ``nearly two weeks.'' In her 
interview, she indicated that the harassment went on for at 
least 10 days. According to records produced by IBTCI, Townsel 
wrote her memo on August 1, and it was forwarded to AID by 
Kirby Jones on August 2. Bolton checked out of the Aerostar 
Hotel on August 6. An internal IBTCI document also suggests 
that Bolton attended a meeting at USAID headquarters on August 
8.
    Townsel's account was cooroborated by Uno Ramat, then 
IBTCI's Creative Director, based in Bishkek. While Townsel was 
in Moscow, Ramat was acting director of the project, and thus 
they had daily phone conversations. He testified that she was 
``under a lot of stress,'' was calling him every night and 
sometimes several times a night, and was ``distressed about Mr. 
Bolton's behavior.'' Ramat said that Bolton was ``applying a 
lot of pressure to her to get off the project or shut up, and 
Melody was not cooperating, so the guy was chasing her around 
the hotel and beating on her door, throwing things at her, 
stuff like that.'' \183\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \183\ Interview of Uno Ramat by Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
staff, April 29, page 11. Hereafter cited as ``Ramat interview.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Committee staff were unable to locate any other individuals 
who specifically remembered hearing about a conflict between 
Bolton and Townsel. No one, however contests the fact that 
Bolton and Townsel were in the same hotel in Moscow in early 
August 1994, and Bolton admits he met her there. In response to 
questions for the record, Bolton said ``I recall being 
introduced to Ms. Townsel in the IBTCI Moscow office. I have no 
other recollection of any other interaction with her there or 
anywhere else.'' \184\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \184\ Answer to a question for the record by Senator Kerry, Apr. 
11, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    One other person interviewed, Joe Jareb, was not a witness 
to these events, but was told about them by Ms. Townsel a few 
months later. The two of them worked together on a USAID 
project in Kazakhstan, and Ms. Townsel described the incidents 
in conversation with Jareb. Thus, although not an eyewitness, 
Jareb provided further contrmporaneous corroboration of 
Townsel's account.
    Other witnesses who testified disputed Ms. Townsel's 
account. Jay Kalotra, President of IBTCI, said that ``Mr. 
Bolton was not engaged by our firm to have any contact with 
[Townsel] on any issue related to her activities in 
Kyrgyzstan.'' \185\ Edwin Hullander, then-Executive Vice 
President of IBTCI, and now a political appointee at USAID, 
said that `` . . . if that event had happened, according to the 
report--she said John chased her down the halls and threw 
things at her--if anything like that had happened at the 
Aerostar, the security people would have told my office about 
it.'' \186\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \185\ Letter to Senator Lugar, Apr. 18, 2005.
    \186\ Interview of Dr. Edwin L. Hullander by Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee staff, Apr. 29, 2005, page 58. Hereafter cited as: 
``Hullander interview.'' Q04 I21Charlie Black, a lead partner at 
Townsel's employer (Black, Manafort, Stone & Kelly), also expressed 
skepticism about Townsel's account:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
           . . . as often as [Townsel] complained or called 
        things to my attention, or to Freedman's attention--and 
        he was pretty loyal about reporting to me--if 
        something--a major incident like that had happened, I'm 
        almost certain I would have heard about it. . . . And, 
        second, just to add to the equation, for your 
        consideration, John Bolton has been a fairly good 
        personal friend of mine since the first Ronald Reagan 
        campaign, in 1976, and I'm pretty sure that if Bolton, 
        in representation of a client, had a problem with one 
        of my employees, I'm almost certain he would have 
        called me. He didn't. I never heard from him on 
        this.\187\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \187\ Interview of Charlie Black by Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee staff, Apr. 28, 2005, page 11-page 12. Hereafter cited as 
``Black interview.'' Q02
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Charge #2: While in Bishkek in the fall of 2004, John Bolton told IBTCI 
        staff, falsely, that Melody Townsel was under criminal 
        investigation for misuse of federal funds.

    After Townsel's memo was sent to USAID, Bolton was engaged 
as IBTCI's legal counsel. In November 1994, Bolton traveled to 
Bishkek to meet with IBTCI staff and review operations. There 
are differing recollections as to the dates of Bolton's trip 
(Townsel thought it occured in August) and who accompanied him, 
but all agree that Townsel was not in the office during 
Bolton's visit.
    Mr. Ramat stated that, during his visit to Bishkek, 
``[Bolton] told me and other expatriate staff that Melody was 
under investigation for misappropriating project funds, for 
fraud, and for theft of money.'' \188\ When Ramat challenged 
Bolton, he was rebuffed: ``He wasn't--he wasn't interested in 
what I had to say . . . he wasn't there to listen. He was there 
to accuse Melody . . . he basically was there to smear her 
reputation.'' \189\ Ramat described Bolton as ``very, very 
aggressive,'' and said that he ``terrorized the office`''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \188\ Ramat interview, page 18.
    \189\ Ibid, page 21-22. Q04 I23  He just, sort of, blew in, and he 
was very, very aggressive in his matter--manner. He was very blunt 
about his accusations about Melody, and, you know, the entire office 
knew them not to be true. I mean, everyone knew what the actual problem 
was. Melody was well-liked. We all knew that the accusations were 
false, and it destroyed the morale of the office.\190\
    \190\ Ibid, page 40. Q04 I21USAID's Acting Inspector General 
confirms that his office never investigated Melody Townsel, although it 
conducted numerous investigations of IBTCI in the years following 
Townsel's departure. There is no evidence that Townsel was ever under 
any other form of criminal investigation for her activities related to 
this project.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Bolton concedes that he traveled to Kyrgyzstan in November 
1994 and met with IBTCI staff ``to ascertain what Ms. Townsel 
had done or not done in Bishkek.'' \191\ He said he ``sought to 
ascertain how much damage Ms. Townsel's performance had caused 
to IBTCI's conduct of its project.'' He says he had other 
meetings with U.S. and Kyrgyz officials, other USAID 
contractors, and Kyrgyz businesses, ``also to repair the damage 
to IBTCI's reputation and effectiveness.'' He does not recall 
making any allegations that Ms. Townsel was under investigation 
for misuse of funds.\192\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \191\ Answer to question for the record by Sen. Kerry, Apr. 11, 
2005.
    \192\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

             VI. MISLEADING THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

    The record before the Committee demonstrates that Under 
Secretary Bolton did not live up to his reputation as a 
``straight-talker'' during his testimony to the Committee. He 
made several statements to the Committee that were contradicted 
by others, at odds with available evidence, and may be fairly 
described as misleading, disingenuous or non-responsive.

A. Mr. Bolton says he did not try to have INR analyst Christian 
        Westermann disciplined.

    Mr. Bolton insisted, on several occasions, that he did not 
try to have Christian Westermann, an analyst in the Bureau of 
Intelligence and Research (INR), removed from his position or 
disciplined. This testimony was contradicted by four other 
witnesses, including his Chief of Staff.
    Mr. Bolton's essential argument--that seeking to remove an 
officer from his portfolio does not constitute any effort to 
discipline or punish him--is too clever by half. Mr. Westermann 
was the State Department's lead analyst on chemical and 
biological weapons issues. Changing his portfolio would result 
in discarding years of experience and training, and force Mr. 
Westermann to either seek employment with another intelligence 
agency or be retrained for a new position in INR. Either way, 
it would have put Mr. Westermann's career at the State 
Department off its normal track.
    During the nomination hearing, Mr. Bolton said as follows: 
Q04
   ``I never sought to have Mr. Westermann fired, at 
        all. \193\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \193\ Apr. 11 hearing, am session, page 42. Q02
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   ``I, in no sense, sought to have any discipline 
        imposed on Mr. Westermann.'' \194\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \194\ Ibid, page 46. Q02
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   ``I didn't try to have Mr. Westermann removed--.'' 
        \195\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \195\ Apr. 11 hearing, pm session, page 39. Q02
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   ``But I did not, look, I didn't try to have 
        disciplinary action imposed on Westermann.'' \196\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \196\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Testimony contradicting Bolton's account

    Mr. Bolton's testimony was contradicted by four witnesses.
    Carl Ford, the former Assistant Secretary of State for 
Intelligence said: Q04
          I remember going back to my office with the 
        impression that I had been asked to fire the analyst. 
        Now, whether the words were ``fire,'' whether that was 
        ``reassign,'' ``get him away from me; I don't want to 
        see him again,'' I don't remember, frankly, exactly 
        what the words were. I do remember that I came away 
        with the impression that I'd just been asked to fire 
        somebody in the intelligence community for doing what I 
        considered their job.\197\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \197\ Apr. 12 hearing, page 26. Q04 I21Senator Obama later asked 
Mr. Ford whether he was ``quite certain'' that ``Mr. Bolton actively 
sought to have this gentleman removed from his position?'' Mr. Ford 
answered in the affirmative.\198\
    \198\ Ibid., page 58.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Testimony from other INR managers to whom Bolton spoke 
about Westermann provided similar accounts. Tom Fingar, at the 
time Mr. Ford's deputy, said that [Bolton] [s]aid that he 
wanted Westermann ``taken off his accounts.'' \199\ Neil 
Silver, an office director in INR, said that Mr. Bolton 
``asked, or indicated, that he would like me to consider having 
[Westermann] move to some other portfolio, something of--to 
that effect.'' \200\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \199\ Fingar interview, page 10.
    \200\ Silver interview, Apr. 11, 2005, p. 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Even Frederick Fleitz, an aide to Mr. Bolton, understood 
from his conversations with Mr. Bolton that he wanted 
Westermann removed: ``All I can remember, and this is from Mr. 
Bolton, is that he spoke [to Mr. Fingar] to express his concern 
over what happened, and said that Mr. Westermann had lost his 
confidence, and he should be given a new portfolio.'' \201\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \201\ Fleitz interview, Apr. 7, 2005, p. 51.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Mr. Bolton says he did not try to remove or discipline a CIA 
        employee.

    Mr. Bolton took great pains to leave the Committee with the 
impression that he made no effort to seek to discipline or to 
fire the National Intelligence Officer for Latin America. In 
response to Senator Chafee, he said ``I didn't see[k] to have 
these people fired, I didn't seek to have discipline imposed on 
them, I said, `I've lost trust in them,' and are there other 
portfolios they could follow, it wasn't anything to me that I 
followed at his great length, I made my point and I moved on.'' 
\202\ To the extent that he did concede speaking to the Acting 
Chairman of the National Intelligence Council about the NIO, 
Mr. Bolton said that his intervention was ``one part of one 
conversation with one person, one time . . . and that was it, I 
let it go.'' \203\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \202\ Apr. 11 hearing, pm session, page 26
    \203\ Ibid., page 27-page 28.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As with the case of Mr. Westermann, Bolton's effort to 
minimize the significance of his efforts is disingenuous. The 
NIO was a career officer who had developed expertise on Latin 
America; he held the senior Latin America intelligence analyst 
position in the U.S. government. Removing the NIO from his job, 
discarding years of experience and training, would have been a 
black mark on the officer's career; it certainly would not have 
been career enhancing.
    As discussed at length in Section III. B., above, it is 
clear that senior CIA officials believed that Bolton sought to 
remove the NIO. Likewise, the documentary evidence provided to 
the Committee confirms that Mr. Bolton and his staff actively 
discussed efforts to punish and remove the NIO for several 
months in the summer and fall of 2002. One State Department e-
mail states that Mr. Bolton planned to talk to Director of 
Central Intelligence George Tenet about the matter. Another 
indicates that Mr. Bolton had lost patience with the delay in 
seeking the removal of the NIO and that he did not ``want it to 
slip away further.'' Mr. Bolton's office worked over a four 
month period on proposed letters--that would be sent from Mr. 
Bolton and/or Assistant Secretary of State Otto Reich--to CIA 
officials to seek removal of the NIO. The letters contemplated 
blocking the NIO's access to the State and Defense Departments 
and his official travel in the Western Hemisphere (by blocking 
country clearance by U.S. embassies).
    Even Mr. Fleitz, the aide to Mr. Bolton, understood that 
Mr. Bolton believed the NIO should be given a different 
portfolio, and had ``at least one meeting with an Agency 
official where he relayed his concerns.'' \204\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \204\ Fleitz interview, Apr. 7, 2005, page 77.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Bolton says he did not threaten or try to have analysts punished 
        because of their views.

    Under Secretary Bolton claimed on several occasions that 
his disputes with members of the Intelligence Community were 
procedural in nature. In the cases of his disputes Christian 
Westermann and the NIO for Latin America, however, Mr. Bolton 
sought to have employees disciplined because of their analytic 
judgments, according to testimony from Ford, Fingar and 
Westermann as well as documentary evidence. Bolton's attempts 
to have analysts punished had consequences. Carl Ford stated: 
``I clearly believe that the analysts in INR were very 
negatively affected by this incident--they were scared. \205\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \205\ Apr. 12 hearing, page 39-page 40.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    During the nomination hearing, Mr. Bolton was adamant that 
his concerns about process, not substance: ``If I could just 
say, I have never done anything in connection with any 
analyst's views. Nothing.'' \206\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \206\ Apr. 11, pm session, page 44.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Yet other testimony shows that Mr. Bolton did attempt to 
have intelligence analysts and State Department employees 
disciplined because of their views, not merely because of 
process concerns. Examples of such testimony follows: Q04
          Mr. Westermann.  He was quite upset that I had 
        objected and he wanted to know what right I had trying 
        to change an Under Secretary's language.\207\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \207\ Westermann interview, Apr. 7, 2005, page 106. Q04 I23  Mr. 
Fingar.  That he was the President's appointee, that he had every right 
to say what he believed, that he wasn't going to be told what he could 
say by a mid-level INR munchkin analyst. \208\
    \208\ Fingar interview, page 10. Q04 I23  Mr. Ford.  And I infer 
from what I remember of my side of the conversation that at that point, 
which was several days after his confrontation with my analyst, that he 
was still fussing about what he could and couldn't say in the [Heritage 
Foundation] speech. Q04
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Senator Biden.  About the substance of what he could 
        and couldn't say. Q04 I23  Mr. Ford.  That's 
        correct.\209\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \209\ Apr. 12 hearing, page 23-page 24.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. Mr. Bolton led the Committee to believe that the U.S. Ambassador to 
        South Korea approved of his July 31, 2003, speech on North 
        Korea.

    In response to a question from Senator Chafee about his 
July 31, 2003 speech in Seoul, South Korea on the eve of the 
Six Party Talks, Under Secretary Bolton said ``And I can tell 
you what our Ambassador to South Korea, Tom Hubbard, said after 
the speech. He said, `Thanks a lot for that speech, John. It'll 
help us a lot out here.' '' \210\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \210\ Apr. 11 hearing, am session, page 72-73.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This assertion was specifically refuted by former 
Ambassador Hubbard, who took the initiative to call the 
Republican staff of the Committee the day after the April 11 
hearing to seek to correct the record. Hubbard made clear in 
testimony to the Committee that he strongly disagreed with the 
tone of Mr. Bolton's speech in Seoul and requested changes in 
the speech that were never made. He expressed concern that 
invective in the speech aimed at the leadership of North Korea 
could give them ``another excuse or pretext for not coming back 
to the table.'' \211\ He stated that Bolton had made minor 
changes in the speech that he had requested, and that any words 
of thanks related to those changes, not to the entire speech 
itself. He believed there should have been no doubt that Mr. 
Bolton disapproved of the tone of the speech. \212\ Hubbard 
said ``It's a gross exaggeration to elevate that to praise for 
the entire speech and approval of it'' \213\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \211\ Hubbard interview, page 14.
    \212\ Ibid., page 15-page 16.
    \213\ ``Testimony of UN Nominee is Disputed.'' Paul Richter and 
Sonni Efron, T3Los Angeles Times,  Apr. 22, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     VII. ATTITUDE TOWARD THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

    Mr. Bolton has a long history of making inflammatory 
remarks about the United Nations and international law. This 
record will undermine his ability to serve as an effective 
spokesperson and representative of the United States--and to 
advance the critical issue of U.N. reform. Among Mr. Bolton's 
more provocative statements are the following: Q04
   ``There is no such thing as the United Nations . . . 
        There is an international community, that occasionally 
        can be led by the only real power left in the world and 
        that is the United States, when it suits our interest 
        and when we can get others to go along.'' \214\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \214\ Global Structures Convocation, ``Human Rights, Global 
Governance & Strengthening the U.N,'' February 1994 panel discussion 
sponsored by the World Federalist Association and the Alliance for Our 
Common Future. Q02 I14   ``The Secretariat building in New York 
has 38 stories. If you lost 10 stories today, it wouldn't make a bit of 
difference.'' \215\
    \215\ Ibid. Q02 I14   ``If I were redoing the Security 
Council today, I'd have one permanent member because that's the real 
reflection of the distribution of power in the world: . . . the United 
States.''\216\
    \216\ Interview with Juan Williams, National Public Radio, June 6, 
2000 Q04
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Mr. Bolton has not only suggested that the U.S. stop paying 
its dues to the United Nations, but that assessed contributions 
be terminated as a mechanism of funding for U.N. activities. He 
has taken the radical view that ``while treaties may well be 
politically or even morally binding, they are not legally 
obligatory.'' \217\ Similarly, Mr. Bolton has written that: 
``UN supporters contend that the U.S. must [pay its UN dues] in 
order to meeting its `solemn legal obligations.' Failure to 
pay, they assert, is `illegal' under the `treaty commitment' 
the U.S. entered into by ratifying the UN Charter in 1945. This 
line of argument is flatly incorrect.'' \218\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \217\ ``The Global Prosecutors: Hunting War Criminals in the Name 
of Utopia,'' Foreign Affairs, Jan./Feb. 1999.
    \218\ ``U.S. Isn't Legally Obligated to Pay the UN.'' T3Wall Street 
Journal,  Nov. 17, 1997. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Mr. Bolton's controversial ideas were developed further in 
a chapter for T3Delusions of Grandeur: The United Nations and 
Global Intervention,  where Bolton wrote, ``We should . . . 
eliminate assessments altogether, moving toward a U.N. system 
that is funded entirely by purely voluntary contributions from 
the member governments . . . [which would] allow each 
government to judge for itself whether it was getting its 
money's worth from the UN and each of its component agencies. 
That would go a long way toward making the UN system responsive 
to the major contributors--especially to the United States, the 
largest contributor of all . . . And, if things were really 
bad, we should . . . withdraw from one or two agencies. That 
would really get their attention.''
    At his hearing, Mr. Bolton expressed no regret for these 
statements. In response to a question by Senator Boxer, he said 
that ``what I was trying to do to that audience of World 
Federalists was get their attention, and that comment about the 
ten stories was a way of saying there's not a bureaucracy in 
the world that can't be made leaner and more efficient.'' \219\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \219\ Apr. 11 hearing, am session, page 136-page 137.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Asked by Senator Sarbanes to explain his view that the 
Security Council ought to have only one member, Bolton said, 
``what I was saying was--if you look solely at the issue of 
power in the world, in a cliche probably everybody in this room 
has used of the U.S. being the sole remaining superpower, under 
that theory, that there would be only one permanent member.'' 
\220\ Although he agreed that ``the United States should comply 
with its international obligations,'' he continued to question 
whether international law constituted a binding obligation in 
the same way as municipal law.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \220\ Apr. 11 hearing, pm session, page 96-page 97.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    These strongly-held views and statements matter because 
they are likely to make Mr. Bolton less, and not more, 
effective as an advocate for U.S. interests at the United 
Nations--including the critical issue of U.N. reform. Whatever 
one's views of the United Nations and international law, the 
fact is that many countries around the world--including our 
closest allies--place value in both. It is difficult to secure 
the support of other nations for issues that matter to the 
United States if we show disdain for issues that matter to 
other nations. Such an approach undermines the national 
interest.
    The committee is unanimous in the view that the United 
Nations needs reform. There are numerous instances of waste, 
fraud and abuse, and some of its decisions, such as the 
election of egregious human rights violators to the Human 
Rights Commission, are unacceptable.
    The real work of U.N. reform is not done, however, through 
tough speeches. It is accomplished in the hallways and closed 
door meetings, building alliances and coalitions with 
governments that may disagree with the United States on other 
issues. It requires listening, flexibility, credibility, trust 
and patience--qualities sorely lacking in the nominee.
    Perhaps the best evidence that Mr. Bolton is not the man to 
advance UN reform is the fact that four days after the Bolton 
nomination was announced, Secretary Rice appointed someone else 
to handle the issue. On March 11, the Secretary appointed Dr. 
Shirin Tahir-Kheli to---- Q04
          serve as the Secretary's senior advisor and chief 
        interlocutor on United Nations reform. In collaboration 
        with the Assistant Secretary for International 
        Organizations, Dr. Tahir-Kheli will report directly to 
        the Secretary of State.
          She will engage the UN Secretary General and 
        Secretariat on UN reform efforts, including the High 
        Level Panel Report and the Report of the Secretary 
        General on Reform . . . [she] will coordinate within 
        the State Department and interagency community the U.S. 
        government's positions on UN reform.'' \221\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \221\ State Department press release, March 11, 2005. Q04 I21The 
press release makes no mention of Mr. Bolton, and, notably, the senior 
advisor will not report to Mr. Bolton. It is clear, then, that this is 
not about UN reform, it is about whether the appointment of Mr. Bolton 
is in the national interest.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Mr. Bolton has sometimes been compared to former 
Ambassadors Daniel Patrick Moynihan and Jeane Kirkpatrick. The 
comparison is flawed. Moynihan and Kirkpatrick were staunch 
defenders of U.S. interests and hard-headed advocates of U.S. 
positions. But each also had fundamental respect for the United 
Nations and understood the imperative for dialogue and 
diplomacy. Senator Moynihan was a strong advocate of treaties 
and international law. He also supported the International 
Court of Justice, which Mr. Bolton once called a ``travesty'' 
and a ``pretend court.'' \222\ Mrs. Kirkpatrick spoke 
eloquently of the need to approach the job of UN ambassador in 
a ``low-key, quiet, persuasive and consensus-building way'' 
\223\--an approach Mr. Bolton seems incapable of taking. As 
Ambassador Kirkpatrick put it, ``[John Bolton] may do 
diplomatic jobs for the U.S. government, but John is not a 
diplomat.'' \224\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \222\ ``The Promise and Perils of the Proposed International 
Criminal Court'', CATO Institute Forum, July 16, 1998.
    \223\ Confirmation hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, January 15, 1981.
    \224\ Christopher Marquis, ``Absent from the Korea Talks: Bush's 
Hard Liner'', T3The New York Times,  Sept. 2, 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

  VIII. A LACK OF RESULTS AS UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ARMS CONTROL

    Under Secretary Bolton's supporters have noted that many 
policy makers, including United States Senators, have been 
known to berate their staffs or opponents. Many famous persons 
have had famous tempers. Mr. Bolton is rightly applauded for 
having led the successful effort in 1991 to undo the UN General 
Assembly's 1975 resolution equating Zionism with racism. Does 
he have such a record of success in his more recent positions 
as to outweigh his demonstrated--and, in our judgment, 
disqualifying--negative qualities?
    We believe that Under Secretary Bolton's record in his 
current position is, unfortunately, decidedly mixed. On the 
positive side, he has worked to secure international support 
for President Bush's Proliferation Security Initiative. He has 
secured legal commitments from many countries (known as Article 
98 agreements) not to turn over American citizens to the 
International Criminal Court. He has also invoked sanctions 
against entities that engage in the proliferation of WMD 
technology.
    On the negative side, however, Mr. Bolton was personally 
responsible for the angry break-up of the conference that was 
considering how to improve the Biological Weapons Convention. 
\225\ His intense focus on securing Article 98 agreements has 
come at the expense of other U.S. interests. The increased 
number of sanctions imposed has arguably had little impact on 
the extent of WMD proliferation in the world. His reported 
personal attacks on IAEA Director General Mohammed ElBaradei 
outstrip U.S. policy (which is to oppose a third term for 
ElBaradei only because of a desire to establish term limits for 
that position) and threaten to leave the United States 
completely isolated on this issue. Finally, his reported 
failure to prepare properly for the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty (NPT) Review Conference now under way in New York may be 
contributing to further isolation of the United States, 
allowing NPT violators to avoid any coordinated international 
action to force compliance with the nonproliferation regime. 
\226\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \225\ Farah Stockman, ``Bolton's style cited in treaty impasse,'' 
T3Boston Globe,  May 3, 2005.
    \226\ See, e.g., ``The Proliferation Crisis,'' an editorial in 
T3The Washington Post,  May 4, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Perhaps most significantly, Under Secretary Bolton's 
approach has failed to prevent North Korea from becoming an 
even greater proliferation threat to U.S. security. North Korea 
is solely to blame for its repeated violations of its 
international obligations, but Mr. Bolton's response to those 
actions has been singularly ineffective. When Mr. Bolton became 
Under Secretary of State in 2001, North Korea was still a 
member of the NPT, it had 8,000 spent fuel rods under 
international seal, and it was preparing to resume talks with 
the United States; today North Korea has withdrawn from the 
NPT, the fuel rods have been reprocessed, and the Six-Party 
Talks are going nowhere. When Mr. Bolton became Under 
Secretary, North Korea was believed to have enough separated 
plutonium for one or two nuclear weapons; today, North Korea 
may have enough plutonium for 8-10 weapons and is probably 
downloading more fuel rods from its Yongbyon reactor to produce 
still more separated plutonium. When Mr. Bolton became Under 
Secretary, North Korea was thought to have a small, 
experimental, covert program to enrich uranium; today that 
program is still covert, but is thought to be much larger.
    Despite Mr. Bolton's concern for the enforcement of 
sanctions, North Korea has had to endure little or no 
punishment for its rejection of the world-wide nonproliferation 
regime. Despite Mr. Bolton's work to build the Proliferation 
Security Initiative, there is little confidence that the world 
can keep North Korea from covertly exporting fissile material, 
or even a nuclear device. Mr. Bolton's vituperation in 
describing North Korea's regime and its leader appeared to 
undermine, moreover, the stated U.S. policy of encouraging a 
diplomatic agreement that would end North Korea's nuclear 
weapons program. As noted earlier, U.S. Ambassador Thomas 
Hubbard was of the view that Bolton's July 31, 2003, speech in 
Seoul, South Korea, only ``gave the North Koreans . . . another 
excuse or pretext for not coming back to the table.'' \227\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \227\ Hubbard interview, page 14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The counter-example that the world hopes North Korea will 
follow is that of Libya, which agreed in December 2003 to 
renounce its WMD programs; to give up its chemical and nuclear 
weapons materials and equipment, as well as its long-range 
ballistic missiles; and to end its support for international 
terrorism. In return, the United States and the United Kingdom 
agreed to gradually eliminate sanctions against Libya and to 
integrate it once again in the family of nations. A former 
National Security Council staff member reported, however, that 
one key to the Libyan success was that Under Secretary Bolton 
was frozen out of the sensitive negotiations relating to the 
Lockerbie bombing and, later, leading to the December 2003 
U.S.-U.K.-Libya agreement. \228\ Mr. Bolton implicitly 
confirmed the latter part of that assertion in his answer to a 
question for the record from Senator Biden, when he stated: 
``My role in the Libya negotiations began in December 2003,'' 
i.e., after the agreement had been reached. \229\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \228\ Flynt Leverett, ``Why Libya Gave Up On The Bomb,'' T3The New 
York Times,  January 23, 2004.
    \229\ Answer to question for the record by Senator Biden, Apr. 11, 
2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The committee staff's lengthy inquiry into matters relating 
to Under Secretary Bolton's nomination was focused largely on 
his interactions with intelligence analysts and subordinates. 
Even so, the committee heard some critical appraisals of Mr. 
Bolton's work. Larry Wilkerson, former Chief of Staff to 
Secretary Powell, was especially forceful. On Article 98 
agreements: Q04
          Mr. Wilkerson.  I think one of the number-one 
        problems facing the country right now--and, you know, 
        I'm here because of my country, not because of anybody 
        else--is North Korea. I consider myself an expert on 
        the Koreas; on Northeast Asia, in general. I think Kim 
        Jong Il is going to test a nuclear weapon in the next 
        year. I think he's going to present it as [a] fait 
        accompli to the world. And I shudder to think what the 
        Japanese are going to do when that happens. And I 
        shudder to think what's going to happen to the balance 
        of power in Northeast Asia when that happens. So, when 
        people ignore diplomacy that is aimed at dealing with 
        that problem in order to push their pet rocks in other 
        areas, it bothers me, as a diplomat, and as a citizen 
        of this country.
          Ms. O'Connell.  Do you think that Mr. Bolton did that 
        with respect to Article 98?
          Mr. Wilkerson.  Absolutely. Let me tell you, 8:30 
        every morning--I rarely missed a meeting--Secretary 
        Powell convened the meeting, or Deputy Secretary 
        Armitage convened the meeting . . . and the only thing 
        Mr. Bolton talked about, primarily, at those meetings--
        he rarely said anything, but when he did say something, 
        it was about another Article 98 agreement having been 
        achieved. And, frankly, I used to sit there and think 
        to myself . . . --again, as a diplomat--``How much 
        damage are we doing to other relations as we achieve 
        this sort of baseball score on Article 98 agreements?'' 
        It was the same thing with nonproliferation.\230\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \230\ Wilkerson interview, page 31-page 32.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

On the IAEA Director General:

          In some instances, like, for example, Mohammed 
        ElBaradei, I would say, in my professional opinion 
        after 35-plus years in government, that Mr. Bolton 
        overstepped his bounds in his moves and gyrations to 
        try to keep Mohammed ElBaradei from being reappointed 
        as IAEA head. How--what do I mean by that? I mean, 
        going out of his way to badmouth him, to make sure that 
        everybody knew that the maximum power of the United 
        States would be brought to bear against them if he were 
        brought back in, that we would, you know, refrain from 
        ``no move, no action.'' \231\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \231\ Ibid., page 29-page 30. Q04 I21Mr. Wilkerson's summary 
impression of Under Secretary Bolton was:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          I differ from a lot of people in Washington, both 
        friend and foe of Under Secretary Bolton, as to his, 
        quote, ``brilliance,'' unquote. I didn't see it. I saw 
        a man who counted beans, who said, ``98'' [Article 98 
        agreements] today, ``99'' tomorrow, ``100'' the next 
        day, and had no willingness--and, in many cases, no 
        capacity--to understand the other things that were 
        happening around those beans. And that is just a recipe 
        for problems at the United Nations. \232\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \232\ Ibid., page 45. Q04 I21Mr. Wilkerson views are, to be sure, 
just one person's opinion. But he was uniquely situated to observe 
Under Secretary Bolton in action and to evaluate the effects of 
Bolton's actions. Sadly, his harsh reflections ring true.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Today, the NPT Review Conference continues to make little 
progress toward dealing with the crisis of confidence caused by 
North Korea's nuclear weapons program and Iran's probable 
nuclear weapons program. The United States, in turn, has shown 
much righteous anger, but far too little leadership, in its 
approach to the challenges posed bo those two states. A recent 
T3New York Times  editorial spoke of the Administration's lack 
of a policy in terms that we believe are equally applicable to 
Under Secretary Bolton: Q04
          Step by step North Korea and Iran are advancing their 
        capability to build nuclear weapons, and Washington 
        appears to have no clear strategy for stopping them. 
        Given how far along both countries already are in their 
        nuclear programs, neither can any longer simply be 
        coerced into turning back. The only strategy with any 
        real chance of success would offer strong positive 
        inducements for abandoning nuclear weapons development 
        backed up by universally agreed threats of total 
        economic and political isolation if bomb work 
        continued. Perversely, this is the one formula that the 
        Bush administration has refused to seriously consider . 
        . .
          Nobody likes rewarding tyrants and nuclear outlaws. 
        But refusing to deal with them, or standing aside while 
        other countries do all the offering, is not a very 
        serious solution to what is now an alarmingly serious 
        problem. The way things are now headed, it is only a 
        matter of time before both North Korea and Iran become 
        full-fledged nuclear weapons states. It's time to try a 
        different approach. \233\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \233\ ``Nukes Happen,'' editorial in the T3New York Times,  May 16, 
2005. Q04 I21We believe that the same is true regarding this 
nomination. It's time to try a different nominee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                              ----------                              


   Additional Material in Opposition to Mr. Bolton's Nomination S6602

                                                       May 9, 2005.
Hon. Richard G. Lugar,
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, DC.
Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
Ranking Member, Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, DC.
     Dear Senator Lugar and Senator Biden:  We have noted with 
appreciation the moves of President Bush at the beginning of 
his second term to improve U.S. relations with the countries of 
the European Union and of the United Nations. Maintaining these 
ties and the willingness of those countries to cooperate with 
the United States is essential to U.S. security.
    It is for this reason that we write you to express our 
concern over the nomination of John R. Bolton to be permanent 
representative of the United States at the United Nations. We 
urge you to reject that nomination.
    By virtue of service in the State Department, USAID and 
Justice Departments, John Bolton has the professional 
background needed for this position. But his past activities 
and statements dicate conclusively that he is the wrong man for 
this position at a time when the U.N. is entering a critically 
important phase of modernization, seeking to promote economic 
development and democratic reforms and searching for ways to 
cope better with proliferation crises and a spurt of natural 
disasters and internal conflicts.
    John Bolton has an exceptional record of opposition to 
efforts to enhance U.S. security through arms control. He led a 
campaign against ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test 
Ban Treaty. Today, the administration is pressing for 
development of new types of nuclear weapons. John Bolton 
blocked more extensive international agreement to limit sales 
of small arms, the main killer in internal wars. He led the 
fight to continue U.S. refusal to participate in the Ottawa 
Landmine Treaty. Today, the U.S. has joined Russia and China in 
insisting on the right to continue to deploy anti-personnel 
landmines. John Bolton crafted the U.S. withdrawal from the 
joint efforts of 40 countries to formulate a verification 
system for the Biological Weapons Convention and blocked 
continuation of these efforts in a period of increasing concern 
over potential terrorist use of these weapons and of terrorist 
access to the stocks of countries covertly producing these 
weapons. John Bolton's unsubstantiated claims that Cuba and 
Syria are working on biological weapons further discredited the 
effect of U.S. warnings and U.S. intelligence on weapons of 
mass destruction.
    John Bolton led the successful campaign for U.S. withdrawal 
from the treaty limiting missile defenses (ABM Treaty). The 
effects of this action included elimination of the sole treaty 
barrier to weaponization of space. In the face of decades of 
votes in the U.N. General Assembly calling for negotiation of a 
treaty to block deployment of weapons in space, he has blocked 
negotiation in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament of a treaty 
on this subject. The administration has repeatedly proposed 
programs calling for weapon deployment in space.
    As chief negotiator of the 2002 Moscow Treaty on 
withdrawing U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons from field 
deployment, John Bolton structured a treaty without its own 
verification regime without required progress reports from both 
sides, without the requirement to destroy warheads withdrawn 
from deployment, and without provision for negotiating 
continued reductions. Under his guidance, the State Department 
repudiated important consensus agreements reached in the year 
2000 Review Conference of the Nonproliferation Treaty and has 
even blocked the formulation of an agenda for the next review 
conference to be held in May 2005.
    Under John Bolton as Under Secretary for Arms Control and 
International Security, the State Department has continued to 
fail to resolve the impasse with Russia about the legal 
liability of U.S. personnel working with Russia on the security 
of the huge arsenal of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons 
of the former Soviet Union and has failed to accelerate 
measures aimed at the safety and security of this huge arsenal 
from theft, illegal sale and terrorist access.
    John Bolton's insistence that the U.N. is valuable only 
when it directly serves the United States, and that the most 
effective Security Council would be one where the U.S. is the 
only permanent member, will not help him to negotiate with 
representatives of the remaining 96% of humanity at a time when 
the U.N. is actively considering enlargement of the Security 
Council and steps to deal more effectively with failed states 
and to enhance the U.N.'s peacekeeping capability.
    John Bolton's work as a paid researcher for Taiwan, his 
idea that the U.S. should treat Taiwan as a sovereign state, 
and that it is fantasy to believe that China might respond with 
armed force to the secession of Taiwan do not attest to the 
balanced judgment of a possible U.S. permanent representative 
on the Security Council. China is emerging as a major world 
power and the Taiwan issue is becoming more acute.
    At a time when the U.N. is struggling to get an adequate 
grip on the genocidal killing in Darfur, Sudan, Mr. Bolton's 
skepticism about U.N. peacekeeping, about paying the U.N. dues 
that fund peacekeeping, and his leadership of the opposition to 
the International Criminal Court, originally proposed by the 
U.S. itself in order to prosecute human rights offenders, will 
all make it difficult for the U.S. to play an effective 
leadership role at a time when the U.N. itself and many member 
states are moving to improve U.N. capacity to deal with 
international problems.
    Given these past actions and statements, John R. Bolton 
cannot be an effective promoter of the U.S. national interest 
at the U.N.. We urge you to oppose his nomination.
            Sincerely, Q02
The Hon. Terrell E. Arnold, Former Deputy Director, Office of 
        Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State (Reagan), 
        Former U.S. Consul General, San Paulo, Brazil (Carter)
Ambassador (ret.) Harry G. Barnes, Jr., Former U.S. ambassador 
        to Romania, Chile, and India (Nixon, Ford, Reagan)
Ambassador (ret.) Robert L. Barry, Former U.S. ambassador to 
        Bulgaria and Indonesia (Reagan, Clinton), Former Deputy 
        Assistant Secretary of State for International 
        Organization Affairs (Carter), Former Deputy Assistant 
        Secretary of State for European Affairs (Carter)
Ambassador Josiah H. Beeman, Former U.S. ambassador to New 
        Zealand and Western Samoa (Clinton)
Ambassador (ret.) Maurice M. Bernbaum, Former U.S. ambassador 
        to Ecuador and Venezuela (Eisenhower, Johnson)
Ambassador (ret.) Jack R. Binns, Former U.S. ambassador to 
        Honduras (Carter, Reagan)
Ambassador (ret.) Richard J. Bloomfield, Former U.S. ambassador 
        to Ecuador and Portugal (Ford, Carter, Reagan)
Ambassador (ret.) Peter Bridges, Former U.S. ambassador to 
        Somalia (Reagan)
Ambassador George Bruno, Former U.S. ambassador to Belize 
        (Clinton)
Ambassador (ret.) Edward Brynn, Former U.S. ambassador to 
        Burkina Faso and Ghana (G.H.W. Bush, Clinton), Former 
        Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau 
        of African Affairs (Clinton)
Ambassador George Bunn, Former member of U.S. delegation to the 
        Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) negotiations (Johnson), 
        Former U.S. ambassador to the Geneva Disarmament 
        Conference (U.N.) (Johnson)
Ambassador (ret.) A. Peter Burleigh, Former Deputy Assistant 
        Secretary of State for the Near East and South Asia 
        (Reagan), Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 
        for Intelligence and Research (G.H.W. Bush), Former 
        Ambassador and Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism, 
        Department of State (G.H.W. Bush), Former Ambassador to 
        Sri Lanka and the Maldives (Clinton), Former Deputy 
        Assistant Secretary of State for Personnel (Clinton), 
        Former U.S. Deputy Permanent Representative to the U.N. 
        and Acting Permanent Representative to the U.N. 
        (Clinton)
Ambassador (ret.) Patricia M. Byrne, Former Deputy U.S. 
        Permanent Representative to the U.N. Security Council 
        (Reagan), Former U.S. ambassador to Mali and Burma 
        (Carter, Reagan)
Ambassador (ret.) James Cheek, Former U.S. ambassador to Sudan 
        and Argentina (G.H.W. Bush, Clinton)
Ambassador (ret.) Paul M. Cleveland, Former U.S. ambassador to 
        New Zealand and Western Samoa and Malaysia (Reagan, 
        G.H.W. Bush), Former U.S. representative to the Korean 
        Energy Development Organization (Clinton)
Ambassador (ret.) Carleton S. Coon, Former U.S. ambassador to 
        Nepal (Reagan)
Ambassador (ret.) Jane Coon, Former U.S. ambassador to 
        Bangladesh (Reagan)
Ambassador (ret.) James F. Creagan, Former U.S. ambassador to 
        Honduras (Clinton), Former U.S. Consul General, Sao 
        Paulo, Brazil (G.H.W. Bush)
Ambassador (ret.) T. Frank Crigler, Former U.S. ambassador to 
        Rwanda and Somalia (Ford, Reagan)
Ambassador (ret.) John H. Crimmins, Former U.S. ambassador to 
        the Dominican Republic and Brazil (Johnson, Nixon, 
        Ford)
Ambassador (ret.) Richard T. Davies (signed before he passed 
        away on March 30, 2005), Former U.S. ambassador to 
        Poland (Nixon, Ford, Carter)
Ambassador (ret.) John Gunther Dean, Former Deputy for CORDS, 
        Military Region 1, Vietnam (Nixon), Former U.S. 
        ambassador to Cambodia, Denmark, Lebanon, Thailand, 
        India (Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan)
Ambassador (ret.) Jonathan Dean, Former U.S. representative to 
        the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks, Vienna 
        (Carter)
Ambassador (ret.) Willard A. DePree, Former U.S. ambassador to 
        Mozambique and Bangladesh (Ford, Reagan, G.H.W. Bush)
Ambassador (ret.) Robert S. Dillon, Former U.S. ambassador to 
        Lebanon (Reagan), Former Deputy Commissioner General of 
        the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees 
        (UNRWA) (Reagan)
Ambassador (ret.) Donald B. Easum, Former U.S. ambassador to 
        Nigeria and Upper Volta (Burkina Faso) (Nixon, Ford, 
        Carter), Former Assistant Secretary of State for 
        African Affairs (Nixon, Ford)
Ambassador (ret.) William B. Edmondson, Former U.S. ambassador 
        to South Africa (Carter)
Ambassador (ret.) Nancy H. Ely-Raphel, Former U.S. ambassador 
        to Slovenia (Clinton)
Ambassador (ret.) James Bruce Engle, Former U.S. ambassador to 
        Dahomey (Nixon, Ford)
Ambassador (ret.) Richard K. Fox, Former U.S. ambassador to 
        Trinidad and Tobago (Carter)
Ambassador (ret.) Lincoln Gordon, Former U.S. ambassador to 
        Brazil (Kennedy, Johnson), Former Assistant Secretary 
        of State for Inter-American Affairs (Johnson)
Ambassador (ret.) Robert Grey, Jr., Former U.S. representative 
        to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva (Clinton)
Ambassador (ret.) Holsey Gates Handyside, Former U.S. 
        ambassador to Mauritania (Ford, Carter)
Ambassador (ret.) William C. Harrop, Former ambassador to 
        Israel, Kenya, and Zaire (Reagan, G.H.W. Bush, 
        Clinton), Former Inspector General, U.S. Department of 
        State (Nixon)
Ambassador (ret.) Samuel F. Hart, Former U.S. ambassador to 
        Ecuador (Reagan)
Ambassador (ret.) Arthur A. Hartman, Former U.S. ambassador to 
        France and the Soviet Union (Carter, Reagan), Former 
        Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs 
        (Nixon)
Ambassador Ulric Haynes, Jr., Former U.S. ambassador to Algeria 
        (Carter)
Ambassador Gerald B. Helman, Former U.S. ambassador to the 
        United Nations, Geneva (Carter)
Ambassador (ret.) Robert T. Hennemeyer, Former U.S. ambassador 
        to Gambia (Reagan)
Ambassador (ret.) H. Kenneth Hill, Former U.S. ambassador to 
        Bulgaria (G.H,W. Bush)
Ambassador (ret.) John L. Hirsch, Former U S. ambassador to 
        Sierra Leone (Clinton)
Ambassador (ret.) Lewis Hoffacker, Former U.S. ambassador to 
        Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea (Nixon)
Ambassador (ret.) H. Allen Holmes, Former U.S. ambassador to 
        Portugal (Reagan), Former Assistant Secretary of State 
        for Political-Military Affairs (Reagan), Assistant 
        Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low 
        Intensity Conflict (Clinton)
The Hon. Thomas L. Hughes, Former Director, Bureau of 
        Intelligence and Research (INR), Department of State 
        (Kennedy, Johnson)
Ambassador (ret.) Dennis Jett, Former U.S. ambassador to 
        Mozambique and Peru (Clinton)
Ambassador James A. Joseph, Former U.S. ambassador to South 
        Africa (Clinton)
Ambassador (ret.) Philip M. Kaiser, Former U.S. ambassador to 
        Senegal, Mauritania, Hungary, Austria (Kennedy, Carter)
Ambassador (ret.) Robert V. Keeley, Former U.S. Ambassador to 
        Mauritius, Zimbabwe, and Greece (Ford, Carter, Reagan), 
        Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African 
        Affairs (Carter)
Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., Former Deputy Director, U.S. Arms 
        Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) (Carter)
Ambassador (ret.) Andrew I. Killgore, Former U.S. ambassador to 
        Qatar (Carter)
Ambassador Henry L. Kimelman, Former U.S. ambassador to Haiti 
        (Carter)
Ambassador (ret.) Roger Kirk, Former U.S. ambassador to Somalia 
        and Romania (Nixon, Ford, Reagan)
Ambassador (ret.) Dennis H. Kux, Former U.S. ambassador to 
        Ivory Coast (Reagan)
Ambassador (ret.) James F. Leonard, Former Deputy U.S. 
        Permanent Representative to the United Nations (Ford, 
        Carter)
Ambassador (ret.) Samuel W. Lewis, Former Assistant Secretary 
        of State for International Organization Affairs (Ford), 
        Former Director of Policy Planning, State Department 
        (Clinton), Former ambassador to Israel (Carter, Reagan)
Ambassador (ret.) Princeton N. Lyman, Former Assistant 
        Secretary of State for International Organization 
        Affairs (Clinton), Director, Bureau of Refugee 
        Programs. U.S. Department of State (G.H.W. Bush), 
        Former U.S. ambassador to South Africa and Nigeria 
        (Reagan, G.H.W. Bush, Clinton)
Ambassador (ret.) David L. Mack, Former U.S. ambassador to the 
        United Arab Emirates (Reagan, (G.H.W. Bush)
Ambassador (ret.) Richard Cavins Matheron, Former U.S. 
        ambassador to Swaziland (Carter, Reagan)
Ambassador (ret.) Charles E. Marthinsen, Former U.S. ambassador 
        to Qatar (Carter, Reagan)
Jack Mendelsohn, Deputy Assistant Director of the Strategic 
        Programs Bureau, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 
        (ACDA) (Reagan), Senior ACDA representative on U.S. 
        START delegation (Reagan)
Ambassador Carol Moseley-Braun, Former U.S. ambassador to New 
        Zealand and Samoa (Clinton)
Ambassador (ret.) Ambler H. Moss Jr., Former U.S. ambassador to 
        Panama (Carter, Reagan), Former Member, U.S.-Panama 
        Consultative Committee (Carter, Reagan, Clinton)
Ambassador (ret.) Leonardo Neher, Former U.S. ambassador to 
        Burkina Faso (Reagan)
Ambassador (ret.) David D, Newsom, Former U.S. ambassador to 
        Libya, Indonesia, the Philippines (Johnson, Nixon, 
        Carter), Former Assistant Secretary of State for 
        African Affairs (Nixon), Former Undersecretary of State 
        for Political Affairs (Carter)
Ambassador (ret.) Donald R. Norland, Former U.S. ambassador to 
        the Netherlands, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, and 
        Chad (Johnson, Ford, Carter)
Ambassador (ret.) David Passage, Former U.S. ambassador to 
        Botswana (G.H.W. Bush)
Ambassador (ret.) Edward L. Peck, Former U.S. ambassador to 
        Iraq and Mauritania (Carter, Reagan)
Ambassador (ret.) Jack R. Perry, Former U.S. ambassador to 
        Bulgaria (Carter)
Ambassador (ret.) Christopher H. Phillips, Former Deputy U.S. 
        Permanent Representative to the U.N. (Nixon), Former 
        U.S. ambassador to Brunei (G.H.W. Bush)
Ambassador (ret.) Sol Polanaky, Former U.S. ambassador to 
        Bulgaria (Reagan, G.H.W. Bush)
Ambassador Stanley R. Resor, Former Secretary of the Army 
        (Johnson, Nixon), Former U.S. representative to the 
        Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks, Vienna 
        (Nixon, Ford, Carter)
Ambassador Nicholas A. Rey, Former U.S. ambassador to Poland 
        (Clinton)
John B. Rhinelander, Deputy Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of 
        State (Nixon), Legal Adviser to the U.S. Strategic Arms 
        Limitation Delegation (SALT I) (Nixon)
Ambassador (ret.) Stuart W, Rockwell, Former U.S. ambassador to 
        Morocco (Nixon)
Ambassador James R. Sasser, Former U.S. ambassador to the 
        People's Republic of China (Clinton)
Ambassador (ret.) Cynthia P. Schneider, Former U.S. ambassador 
        to The Netherlands (Clinton)
Ambassador (ret.) Talcott W. Seelye, Former U.S. ambassador to 
        Tunisia and Syria (Nixon, Ford, Carter)
The Hon. John Shattuck, Former Assistant Secretary of State for 
        Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (Clinton), Former 
        Chairman, Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on 
        Religious Freedom Abroad (Clinton), Former U.S. 
        ambassador to the Czech Republic (Clinton)
Ambassador (ret.) Thomas W. Simons, Jr., Former Deputy 
        Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian 
        Affairs (Reagan), Former U.S. ambassador to Pakistan 
        and Poland (G.H.W. Bush, Clinton)
Ambassador Richard Sklar, Former U.S. ambassador to the United 
        Nations for Management and Reform (Clinton)
Ambassador Robert Solwin Smith, Former U.S ambassador to Ivory 
        Coast (Nixon, Ford), Former Deputy and Acting Assistant 
        Secretary of State for Africa (Nixon), Former Deputy 
        Permanent Delegate to UNESCO (Truman, Eisenhower)
Ambassador (ret.) Carl Spielvogel, Former U.S. ambassador to 
        the Slovak Republic (Clinton)
Ambassador (ret.) Monteagle Stearns, Former U.S. ambassador to 
        Greece and Ivory Coast (Ford, Carter, Reagan), Former 
        Vice President, National Defense University (Carter)
Ambassador (ret.) Andrew L. Steigman, Former Ambassador to 
        Gabon, Sao Tome and Principe (Ford),
Ambassador (ret.) Michael Sterner, Former U.S. ambassador to 
        the United Arab Emirates (Nixon, Ford), Former Deputy 
        Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South 
        Asian Affairs (Carter)
Ambassador (ret) John Todd Stewart, Former U.S. ambassador to 
        Moldova (Clinton)
Ambassador (ret.) Richard W. Teare, Former U.S. ambassador to 
        Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu (Clinton)
Ambassador (ret.) Harry E.T. Thayer, Former U.S. ambassador to 
        Singapore (Carter, Reagan)
The Hon. Hans N. Tuch, Career Minister, U.S. Foreign Service, 
        USIA
Ambassador (ret.) Theresa A. Tull, Former U.S. ambassador to 
        Guyana and Brunei (Reagan, G.H.W. Bush, Clinton)
Ambassador William J. vanden Heuvel, Former Deputy U.S. 
        Permanent Representative to the United Nations 
        (Carter), Former U.S. representative to the United 
        Nations, Geneva (Carter)
Ambassador (ret.) Christopher van Hollen, Former Deputy 
        Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South 
        Asian Affairs (Nixon), Former U.S. ambassador to Sri 
        Lanka (Nixon, Ford)
Ambassador (ret.) Richard N. Viets, Former U.S. ambassador to 
        Tanzania and Jordan (Carter, Reagan)
Ambassador (ret.) Frederick Vreeland, Former U.S. ambassador to 
        Morocco (G.H.W. Bush), Former Deputy Assistant 
        Secretary of State for the Near East (G.H.W. Bush)
Ambassador (ret.) Lannon Walker, Former Principal Deputy 
        Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs 
        (Carter, Reagan), Former U.S. ambassador to Senegal, 
        Nigeria, and Ivory Coast (Reagan, G.H.W Bush, Clinton)
Ambassador (ret.) Alexander F. Watson, Former U.S. ambassador 
        to Peru (Reagan), Former Deputy Permanent 
        Representative to the United Nations (G.H.W. Bush), 
        Former Assistant Secretary of State for Western 
        Hemisphere Affairs (Clinton)
Ambassador (ret.) Melissa F. Wells, Former U.S. ambassador to 
        Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde, Mozambique, Zaire, 
        Estonia (Ford, Reagan, Carter, Clinton), Former U.S. 
        representative to the United Nations Economic and 
        Social Council (ECOSOC) (Carter)
Ambassador (ret.) Thomas C. Weston, Former Special Coordinator 
        for Cyprus (Clinton, G.W. Bush), Former Deputy 
        Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian 
        Affairs (Clinton)
Ambassador (ret.) Robert E. White, Former U.S. ambassador to 
        Paraguay and El Salvador (Carter), Former Deputy U.S. 
        Permanent Representative to the Organization of 
        American States (Ford)
Ambassador (ret.) James M. Wilson, Jr., Former Deputy Assistant 
        Secretary of State, East Asia and Pacific Affairs 
        (Nixon), Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian 
        Affairs, Department of State (Ford)
Ambassador (ret.) W. Howard Wriggins, Former U.S. ambassador to 
        Sri Lanka (Carter)
Ambassador (ret.) Kenneth S. Yalowitz, Former U.S. ambassador 
        to Belarus and Georgia (Clinton)
                                ------                                

                                                     April 22, 2005
The Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
U.S. Senate.
Washington, DC.
     Dear Senator Biden:  Knowing your commitment to truth and 
patriotism, I permit myself to write urging that the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee reject the nomination of a person 
as unworthy of your trust, and that of your colleagues, as John 
Bolton. In 1991, I had the honor of being a Deputy Assistant 
Secretary in the Department's Bureau of Near Eastern and South 
Asian Affairs with responsibilities that covered, inter alia, 
U.N. affairs. In this capacity I would meet with John Bolton 
when my Bureau's matters had to be discussed with the Bureau of 
International Organization Affairs of which he was Assistant 
Secretary. It was the only unpleasant part of my assignment--
and it was very unpleasant. He dealt with visitors to his 
office as if they were servants with whom he could be 
dismissive, curt and negative. He was well known for never 
being good-tempered or even well-mannered. He spoke of the U.N. 
as being the enemy, so that those in the Department who had to 
deal with him wondered why he had precisely that job. My 
experience bore out his anti-U.N. reputation. It is totally 
erroneous to speak of Bolton as a diplomat. My personal 
experience with him shows that there is no diplomatic bone in 
his body. Having had 9 years experience with the U.N. myself, 
my considered judgement is that he would do the U.S. terrible 
harm in the world body. In the U.S. Mission to the U.N., New 
York, from 1967 to 1971, I served under 5 fine U.S. ambassadors 
to the U.N. both Democrat and Republican. They were of 
different temperaments and qualities--but they all knew how to 
promote U.S. interests in the U.N. meetings and their contacts. 
For one thing they knew how to listen, something essential for 
the U.N. job which I found totally lacking in my dealings with 
Bolton.
    Bolton has none of the qualities needed for that job. On 
the contrary he has all the qualities needed to harm the image 
and objectives in the U.N. and its affiliated international 
organizations.
    If it is now U.S. policy not to reform the U.N. but to 
destroy it, Bolton is our man.
            Respectfully,
                                Frederick Vreeland,
  T3Retired Foreign Service Reserve Officer & Intelligence 
                                                   Officer,
                                 Former U.S. Ambassador to Morocco.
                                ------                                

                                 Judge Stephen M. Schwebel,
                                     Washington, DC, April 7, 2005.
Hon. Joseph Biden,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
     Dear Senator Biden:  Please permit me to set out my view 
that the Senate should decline to approve the nomination of Mr. 
John Bolton as Permanent Representative to the United Nations 
of the United States. That view is informed by my years of 
service in the Department of State as Assistant Legal Adviser 
for United Nations Affairs (1961-66), Deputy Legal Adviser 
(1974-81), and Judge of the International Court of Justice 
(1981-2000), having been President of that Court 1997-2000.
    Mr. Bolton Is on public record (as in an ``op/ed'' 
published in The Wall Street Journal) in maintaining that there 
is no legal obligation binding upon the United States to pay 
the financial assessments upon it as a U.N. Member. His 
position contravenes the U.N. Charter, a treaty binding upon 
the United States, which specifies: ``The expenses of the 
Organization shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by 
the General Assembly'' (Art. 17(2). In 1962, the International 
Court of Justice held--sustaining the argument of the United 
States, among other Members--that apportionment of expenses by 
the General Assembly creates the obligation of each Member to 
bear that part of the expenses apportioned to it.
    Mr. Botton however claims that, when the U.S. Congress 
enacts legislation determining payment of U.N. assessments by 
the United States, that legislation governs not oniy the United 
States but its international legal obligations. He maintains 
that that legislation frees the United States of any 
international legal obligation to pay its assessments.
    It follows from Mr. Bolton's position that any State can 
free itself of its international legal obligations by national 
enactment. That position runs counter to elemental principles 
of international law. The Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties provides that: ``Every treaty in force is binding upon 
the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith'' 
(Art. 26). It specifies that: ``A State party to a treaty may 
not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification 
for its failure to perform the treaty'' (Art. 27(1).
    In my view, a man who demonstrates such ignorance of, or 
contempt for, the international legal obligations of the United 
States, notably those under the United Nations Charter, is 
unsuited for service as the Permanent Representative of the 
United States to the United Nations.
            Yours sincerely,
                                               Stephen M. Schwebel.
                                ------                                

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