[House Report 108-724]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



108th Congress                                            Rept. 108-724
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 2d Session                                                     Part VI
_______________________________________________________________________

                                     


                         9/11 RECOMMENDATIONS 
                           IMPLEMENTATION ACT

                               ----------                              

                          SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT

                                 of the

                       COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              to accompany

                                H.R. 10


                             together with

               DISSENTING AND ADDITIONAL DISSENTING VIEWS




               November 16, 2004.--Ordered to be printed
                9/11 RECOMMENDATIONS IMPLEMENTATION ACT


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108th Congress 
 2d Session             HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES          Rept. 108-724
                                                                Part VI
_______________________________________________________________________

                                     


                         9/11 RECOMMENDATIONS 
                           IMPLEMENTATION ACT

                               __________

                          SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT

                                 of the

                       COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              to accompany

                                H.R. 10


                             together with

               DISSENTING AND ADDITIONAL DISSENTING VIEWS




               November 16, 2004.--Ordered to be printed


108th Congress                                            Rept. 108-724
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 2d Session                                                     Part VI

======================================================================



 
                9/11 RECOMMENDATIONS IMPLEMENTATION ACT

                                _______
                                

               November 16, 2004.--Ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

 Mr. Sensenbrenner, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted the 
                               following

                          SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT

                             together with

               DISSENTING AND ADDITIONAL DISSENTING VIEWS

                         [To accompany H.R. 10]

      [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

  The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred the bill 
(H.R. 10) to provide for reform of the intelligence community, 
terrorism prevention and prosecution, border security, and 
international cooperation and coordination, and for other 
purposes, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon 
with an amendment and recommends that the bill as amended do 
pass.

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page
The Amendment....................................................     2
Purpose and Summary..............................................   163
Background and Need for the Legislation..........................   164
Amendments Adopted in Committee..................................   200
Hearings.........................................................   203
Committee Consideration..........................................   203
Vote of the Committee............................................   203
Committee Oversight Findings.....................................   213
New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures........................   213
Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate........................   213
Performance Goals and Objectives.................................   231
Constitutional Authority Statement...............................   231
Section-by-Section Analysis and Discussion.......................   231
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported............   245
Markup Transcript................................................   245
Dissenting Views.................................................   811
Additional Dissenting Views......................................   845

                             The Amendment

  The amendment is as follows:
  Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the 
following:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``9/11 Recommendations Implementation 
Act''.

SEC. 2. TABLE OF CONTENTS.

    The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

             TITLE I--REFORM OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Sec. 1001. Short title.

      Subtitle A--Establishment of National Intelligence Director

Sec. 1011. Reorganization and improvement of management of intelligence 
community.
Sec. 1012. Revised definition of national intelligence.
Sec. 1013. Joint procedures for operational coordination between 
Department of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 1014. Role of National Intelligence Director in appointment of 
certain officials responsible for intelligence-related activities.
Sec. 1015. Initial appointment of the National Intelligence Director.
Sec. 1016. Executive schedule matters.

   Subtitle B--National Counterterrorism Center and Civil Liberties 
                              Protections

Sec. 1021. National Counterterrorism Center.
Sec. 1022. Civil Liberties Protection Officer.

            Subtitle C--Joint Intelligence Community Council

Sec. 1031. Joint Intelligence Community Council.

         Subtitle D--Improvement of Human Intelligence (HUMINT)

Sec. 1041. Human intelligence as an increasingly critical component of 
the intelligence community.
Sec. 1042. Improvement of human intelligence capacity.

  Subtitle E--Improvement of Education for the Intelligence Community

Sec. 1051. Modification of obligated service requirements under 
National Security Education Program.
Sec. 1052. Improvements to the National Flagship Language Initiative.
Sec. 1053. Establishment of scholarship program for English language 
studies for heritage community citizens of the United States within the 
National Security Education Program.
Sec. 1054. Sense of Congress with respect to language and education for 
the intelligence community; reports.
Sec. 1055. Advancement of foreign languages critical to the 
intelligence community.
Sec. 1056. Pilot project for Civilian Linguist Reserve Corps.
Sec. 1057. Codification of establishment of the National Virtual 
Translation Center.
Sec. 1058. Report on recruitment and retention of qualified instructors 
of the Defense Language Institute.

     Subtitle F--Additional Improvements of Intelligence Activities

Sec. 1061. Permanent extension of Central Intelligence Agency Voluntary 
Separation Incentive Program.
Sec. 1062. National Security Agency Emerging Technologies Panel.

              Subtitle G--Conforming and Other Amendments

Sec. 1071. Conforming amendments relating to roles of National 
Intelligence Director and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 1072. Other conforming amendments
Sec. 1073. Elements of intelligence community under National Security 
Act of 1947.
Sec. 1074. Redesignation of National Foreign Intelligence Program as 
National Intelligence Program. 
Sec. 1075. Repeal of superseded authorities.
Sec. 1076. Clerical amendments to National Security Act of 1947.
Sec. 1077. Conforming amendments relating to prohibiting dual service 
of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 1078. Access to Inspector General protections.
Sec. 1079. General references.
Sec. 1080. Application of other laws.

   Subtitle H--Transfer, Termination, Transition and Other Provisions

Sec. 1091. Transfer of community management staff.
Sec. 1092. Transfer of terrorist threat integration center.
Sec. 1093. Termination of positions of Assistant Directors of Central 
Intelligence.
Sec. 1094. Implementation plan.
Sec. 1095. Transitional authorities.
Sec. 1096. Effective dates.

             TITLE II--TERRORISM PREVENTION AND PROSECUTION

     Subtitle A--Individual Terrorists as Agents of Foreign Powers

Sec. 2001. Presumption that certain non-United States persons engaging 
in international terrorism are agents of foreign powers for purposes of 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.

       Subtitle B--Stop Terrorist and Military Hoaxes Act of 2004

Sec. 2021. Short title.
Sec. 2022. Hoaxes and recovery costs.
Sec. 2023. Obstruction of justice and false statements in terrorism 
cases.
Sec. 2024. Clarification of definition.

 Subtitle C--Material Support to Terrorism Prohibition Enhancement Act 
                                of 2004

Sec. 2041. Short title.
Sec. 2042. Receiving military-type training from a foreign terrorist 
organization.
Sec. 2043. Providing material support to terrorism.
Sec. 2044. Financing of terrorism.

Subtitle D--Weapons of Mass Destruction Prohibition Improvement Act of 
                                  2004

Sec. 2051. Short title.
Sec. 2052. Weapons of mass destruction.
Sec. 2053. Participation in nuclear and weapons of mass destruction 
threats to the United States.
Sec. 2054. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Sec. 2055. Sense of Congress regarding international 
counterproliferation efforts.
Sec. 2056. Removal of potential nuclear weapons materials from 
vulnerable sites worldwide.

          Subtitle E--Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing

   Chapter 1--Funding to Combat Financial Crimes Including Terrorist 
                               Financing

Sec. 2101. Additional authorization for FinCEN.
Sec. 2102. Money laundering and financial crimes strategy 
reauthorization.

   Chapter 2--Enforcement Tools to Combat Financial Crimes Including 
                          Terrorist Financing

   Subchapter A--Money laundering abatement and financial antiterrorism 
                          technical corrections

Sec. 2111. Short title.
Sec. 2112. Technical corrections to Public Law 107-56.
Sec. 2113. Technical corrections to other provisions of law.
Sec. 2114. Repeal of review.
Sec. 2115. Effective date.

                Subchapter B--Additional enforcement tools

Sec. 2121. Bureau of Engraving and Printing security printing.
Sec. 2122. Conduct in aid of counterfeiting.

             Subtitle F--Criminal History Background Checks

Sec. 2141. Short title.
Sec. 2142. Criminal history background checks.
Sec. 2143. Protect Act.
Sec. 2144. Reviews of criminal records of applicants for private 
security officer employment.
Sec. 2145. Task force on clearinghouse for IAFIS criminal history 
records.

Subtitle G--Protection of United States Aviation System from Terrorist 
                                Attacks

Sec. 2171. Provision for the use of biometric or other technology.
Sec. 2172. Transportation security strategic planning.
Sec. 2173. Next generation airline passenger prescreening.
Sec. 2174. Deployment and use of explosive detection equipment at 
airport screening checkpoints.
Sec. 2175. Pilot program to evaluate use of blast-resistant cargo and 
baggage containers.
Sec. 2176. Air cargo screening technology.
Sec. 2177. Airport checkpoint screening explosive detection.
Sec. 2178. Next generation security checkpoint.
Sec. 2179. Penalty for failure to secure cockpit door.
Sec. 2180. Federal air marshal anonymity.
Sec. 2181. Federal law enforcement counterterrorism training.
Sec. 2182. Federal flight deck officer weapon carriage pilot program.
Sec. 2183. Registered traveler program.
Sec. 2184. Wireless communication.
Sec. 2185. Secondary flight deck barriers.
Sec. 2186. Extension.
Sec. 2187. Perimeter Security.
Sec. 2188. Extremely hazardous materials transportation security.
Sec. 2189. Definitions.

                       Subtitle H--Other Matters

Sec. 2191. Grand jury information sharing.
Sec. 2192. Interoperable law enforcement and intelligence data system.
Sec. 2193. Improvement of intelligence capabilities of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation.
Sec. 2194. Nuclear facility threats.
Sec. 2195. Authorization and Change of COPS Program to single Grant 
Program.

                       Subtitle I--Police Badges

Sec. 2201. Short title.
Sec. 2202. Police badges.

            TITLE III--BORDER SECURITY AND TERRORIST TRAVEL

        Subtitle A--Immigration Reform in the National Interest

                     Chapter 1--General Provisions

Sec. 3001. Eliminating the ``Western Hemisphere'' exception for 
citizens.
Sec. 3002. Modification of waiver authority with respect to 
documentation requirements for nationals of foreign contiguous 
territories and adjacent islands.
Sec. 3003. Increase in full-time border patrol agents.
Sec. 3004. Increase in full-time immigration and customs enforcement 
investigators.
Sec. 3005. Alien identification standards.
Sec. 3006. Expedited removal.
Sec. 3007. Preventing terrorists from obtaining asylum.
Sec. 3008. Revocation of visas and other travel documentation.
Sec. 3009. Judicial review of orders of removal.

    Chapter 2--Deportation of Terrorists and Supporters of Terrorism

Sec. 3031. Expanded inapplicability of restriction on removal.
Sec. 3032. Exception to restriction on removal for terrorists and 
criminals.
Sec. 3033. Additional removal authorities.

            Chapter 3--Preventing Commercial Alien Smuggling

Sec. 3041. Bringing in and harboring certain aliens.

                Subtitle B--Identity Management Security

    Chapter 1--Improved Security for Drivers' Licenses and Personal 
                          Identification Cards

Sec. 3051. Definitions.
Sec. 3052. Minimum document requirements and issuance standards for 
Federal recognition.
Sec. 3053. Linking of databases.
Sec. 3054. Trafficking in authentication features for use in false 
identification documents.
Sec. 3055. Grants to States.
Sec. 3056. Authority.

          Chapter 2--Improved Security for Birth Certificates

Sec. 3061. Definitions.
Sec. 3062. Applicability of minimum standards to local governments.
Sec. 3063. Minimum standards for Federal recognition.
Sec. 3064. Establishment of electronic birth and death registration 
systems.
Sec. 3065. Electronic verification of vital events.
Sec. 3066. Grants to States.
Sec. 3067. Authority.

Chapter 3--Measures To Enhance Privacy and Integrity of Social Security 
                            Account Numbers

Sec. 3071. Prohibition of the display of social security account 
numbers on driver's licenses or motor vehicle registrations.
Sec. 3072. Independent verification of birth records provided in 
support of applications for social security account numbers.
Sec. 3073. Enumeration at birth.
Sec. 3074. Study relating to use of photographic identification in 
connection with applications for benefits, social security account 
numbers, and social security cards.
Sec. 3075. Restrictions on issuance of multiple replacement social 
security cards.
Sec. 3076. Study relating to modification of the social security 
account numbering system to show work authorization status.

                 Subtitle C--Targeting Terrorist Travel

Sec. 3081. Studies on machine-readable passports and travel history 
database.
Sec. 3082. Expanded preinspection at foreign airports.
Sec. 3083. Immigration security initiative.
Sec. 3084. Responsibilities and functions of consular officers.
Sec. 3085. Increase in penalties for fraud and related activity.
Sec. 3086. Criminal penalty for false claim to citizenship.
Sec. 3087. Antiterrorism assistance training of the Department of 
State.
Sec. 3088. International agreements to track and curtail terrorist 
travel through the use of fraudulently obtained documents.
Sec. 3089. International standards for translation of names into the 
Roman alphabet for international travel documents and name-based 
watchlist systems.
Sec. 3090. Biometric entry and exit data system.
Sec. 3091. Biometric entry-exit screening system.
Sec. 3092. Enhanced responsibilities of the Coordinator for 
Counterterrorism.
Sec. 3093. Establishment of Office of Visa and Passport Security in the 
Department of State.

                      Subtitle D--Terrorist Travel

Sec. 3101. Information sharing and coordination.
Sec. 3102. Terrorist travel program.
Sec. 3103. Training program.
Sec. 3104. Technology acquisition and dissemination plan.

               Subtitle E--Maritime Security Requirements

Sec. 3111. Deadlines for implementation of maritime security 
requirements.

          TITLE IV--INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND COORDINATION

         Subtitle A--Attack Terrorists and Their Organizations

        Chapter 1--Provisions Relating to Terrorist Sanctuaries

Sec. 4001. United States policy on terrorist sanctuaries.
Sec. 4002. Reports on terrorist sanctuaries.
Sec. 4003. Amendments to existing law to include terrorist sanctuaries.

                      Chapter 2--Other Provisions

Sec. 4011. Appointments to fill vacancies in Arms Control and 
Nonproliferation Advisory Board.
Sec. 4012. Review of United States policy on proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction and control of strategic weapons.
Sec. 4013. International agreements to interdict acts of international 
terrorism.
Sec. 4014. Effective Coalition approach toward detention and humane 
treatment of captured terrorists.
Sec. 4015. Sense of Congress and report regarding counter-drug efforts 
in Afghanistan.

         Subtitle B--Prevent the Continued Growth of Terrorism

               Chapter 1--United States Public Diplomacy

Sec. 4021. Annual review and assessment of public diplomacy strategy.
Sec. 4022. Public diplomacy training.
Sec. 4023. Promoting direct exchanges with Muslim countries.
Sec. 4024. Public diplomacy required for promotion in Foreign Service.

            Chapter 2--United States Multilateral Diplomacy

Sec. 4031. Purpose.
Sec. 4032. Support and expansion of democracy caucus.
Sec. 4033. Leadership and membership of international organizations.
Sec. 4034. Increased training in multilateral diplomacy.
Sec. 4035. Implementation and establishment of Office on Multilateral 
Negotiations.

                      Chapter 3--Other Provisions

Sec. 4041. Pilot program to provide grants to American-sponsored 
schools in predominantly Muslim countries to provide scholarships.
Sec. 4042. Enhancing free and independent media.
Sec. 4043. Combating biased or false foreign media coverage of the 
United States.
Sec. 4044. Report on broadcast outreach strategy.
Sec. 4045. Office relocation.
Sec. 4046. Strengthening the Community of Democracies for Muslim 
countries.

  Subtitle C--Reform of Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations

Sec. 4051. Designation of foreign terrorist organizations.
Sec. 4052. Inclusion in annual Department of State country reports on 
terrorism of information on terrorist groups that seek weapons of mass 
destruction and groups that have been designated as foreign terrorist 
organizations.

     Subtitle D--Afghanistan Freedom Support Act Amendments of 2004

Sec. 4061. Short title.
Sec. 4062. Coordination of assistance for Afghanistan.
Sec. 4063. General provisions relating to the Afghanistan Freedom 
Support Act of 2002.
Sec. 4064. Rule of law and related issues.
Sec. 4065. Monitoring of assistance.
Sec. 4066. United States policy to support disarmament of private 
militias and to support expansion of international peacekeeping and 
security operations in Afghanistan.
Sec. 4067. Efforts to expand international peacekeeping and security 
operations in Afghanistan.
Sec. 4068. Provisions relating to counternarcotics efforts in 
Afghanistan.
Sec. 4069. Additional amendments to the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act 
of 2002.
Sec. 4070. Repeal.

      Subtitle E--Provisions Relating to Saudi Arabia and Pakistan

Sec. 4081. New United States strategy for relationship with Saudi 
Arabia.
Sec. 4082. United States commitment to the future of Pakistan.
Sec. 4083. Extension of Pakistan waivers.

                    Subtitle F--Oversight Provisions

Sec. 4091. Case-Zablocki Act requirements.

  Subtitle G--Additional Protections of United States Aviation System 
                         from Terrorist Attacks

Sec. 4101. International agreements to allow maximum deployment of 
Federal flight deck officers.
Sec. 4102. Federal air marshal training.
Sec. 4103. Man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS).

Subtitle H--Improving International Standards and Cooperation to Fight 
                          Terrorist Financing

Sec. 4111. Sense of the Congress regarding success in multilateral 
organizations.
Sec. 4112. Expanded reporting requirement for the Secretary of the 
Treasury.
Sec. 4113. International Terrorist Finance Coordinating Council.
Sec. 4114. Definitions.

                   TITLE V--GOVERNMENT RESTRUCTURING

      Subtitle A--Faster and Smarter Funding for First Responders

Sec. 5001. Short title.
Sec. 5002. Findings.
Sec. 5003. Faster and smarter funding for first responders.
Sec. 5004. Modification of homeland security advisory system.
Sec. 5005. Coordination of industry efforts.
Sec. 5006. Superseded provision.
Sec. 5007. Sense of Congress regarding interoperable communications.
Sec. 5008. Sense of Congress regarding citizen corps councils.
Sec. 5009. Study regarding nationwide emergency notification system.
Sec. 5010. Required coordination.

            Subtitle B--Government Reorganization Authority

Sec. 5021. Authorization of intelligence community reorganization 
plans.
Sec. 5022. Authority to enter into contracts and issue Federal loan 
guarantees.

   Subtitle C--Restructuring Relating to the Department of Homeland 
                  Security and Congressional Oversight

Sec. 5025. Responsibilities of Counternarcotics Office.
Sec. 5026. Use of counternarcotics enforcement activities in certain 
employee performance appraisals.
Sec. 5027. Sense of the House of Representatives on addressing homeland 
security for the American people.

            Subtitle D--Improvements to Information Security

Sec. 5031. Amendments to Clinger-Cohen provisions to enhance agency 
planning for information security needs.

             Subtitle E--Personnel Management Improvements

                 Chapter 1--Appointments Process Reform

Sec. 5041. Appointments to national security positions.
Sec. 5042. Presidential inaugural transitions.
Sec. 5043. Public financial disclosure for the intelligence community.
Sec. 5044. Reduction of positions requiring appointment with Senate 
confirmation.
Sec. 5045. Effective dates.

       Chapter 2--Federal Bureau of Investigation Revitalization

Sec. 5051. Mandatory separation age.
Sec. 5052. Retention and relocation bonuses.
Sec. 5053. Federal Bureau of Investigation Reserve Service.
Sec. 5054. Critical positions in the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
intelligence directorate.

                    Chapter 3--Management Authority

Sec. 5061. Management authority.

              Subtitle F--Security Clearance Modernization

Sec. 5071. Definitions.
Sec. 5072. Security clearance and investigative programs oversight and 
administration.
Sec. 5073. Reciprocity of security clearance and access determinations.
Sec. 5074. Establishment of national database .
Sec. 5075. Use of available technology in clearance investigations.
Sec. 5076. Reduction in length of personnel security clearance process.
Sec. 5077. Security clearances for presidential transition.
Sec. 5078. Reports.

              Subtitle G--Emergency Financial Preparedness

Sec. 5081. Delegation authority of the Secretary of the Treasury.
Sec. 5082. Extension of emergency order authority of the securities and 
exchange commission.
Sec. 5083. Parallel authority of the Secretary of the Treasury with 
respect to government securities.

                       Subtitle H--Other Matters

                       Chapter 1--Privacy Matters

Sec. 5091. Requirement that agency rulemaking take into consideration 
impacts on individual privacy.
Sec. 5092. Chief privacy officers for agencies with law enforcement or 
anti-terrorism functions.
Sec. 5093. Data-mining report.
Sec. 5094. Privacy and civil liberties oversight board.

            Chapter 2--Mutual Aid and Litigation Management

Sec. 5101. Short title.
Sec. 5102. Mutual aid authorized.
Sec. 5103. Litigation management agreements.
Sec. 5104. Additional provisions.
Sec. 5105. Definitions.

                    Chapter 3--Miscellaneous Matters

Sec. 5131. Enhancement of public safety communications 
interoperability.
Sec. 5132. Sense of Congress regarding the incident command system.
Sec. 5133. Sense of Congress regarding United States Northern Command 
plans and strategies.

             TITLE I--REFORM OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

SEC. 1001. SHORT TITLE.

    This title may be cited as the ``National Security Intelligence 
Improvement Act of 2004''.

      Subtitle A--Establishment of National Intelligence Director

SEC. 1011. REORGANIZATION AND IMPROVEMENT OF MANAGEMENT OF INTELLIGENCE 
                    COMMUNITY.

    (a) In General.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by striking sections 102 through 104 and 
inserting the following new sections:
                    ``national intelligence director
    ``Sec. 102. (a) National Intelligence Director.--(1) There is a 
National Intelligence Director who shall be appointed by the President, 
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
    ``(2) The National Intelligence Director shall not be located 
within the Executive Office of the President.
    ``(b) Principal Responsibility.--Subject to the authority, 
direction, and control of the President, the National Intelligence 
Director shall--
            ``(1) serve as head of the intelligence community;
            ``(2) act as the principal adviser to the President, to the 
        National Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council 
        for intelligence matters related to the national security; and
            ``(3) through the heads of the departments containing 
        elements of the intelligence community, and the Central 
        Intelligence Agency, manage and oversee the execution of the 
        National Intelligence Program and direct the National 
        Intelligence Program.
    ``(c) Prohibition on Dual Service.--The individual serving in the 
position of National Intelligence Director shall not, while so serving, 
also serve as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency or as the 
head of any other element of the intelligence community.
    ``responsibilities and authorities of the national intelligence 
                                director
    ``Sec. 102A. (a) Provision of Intelligence.--(1) Under the 
direction of the President, the National Intelligence Director shall be 
responsible for ensuring that national intelligence is provided--
            ``(A) to the President;
            ``(B) to the heads of departments and agencies of the 
        executive branch;
            ``(C) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and 
        senior military commanders;
            ``(D) where appropriate, to the Senate and House of 
        Representatives and the committees thereof; and
            ``(E) to such other persons as the National Intelligence 
        Director determines to be appropriate.
    ``(2) Such national intelligence should be timely, objective, 
independent of political considerations, and based upon all sources 
available to the intelligence community and other appropriate entities.
    ``(b) Access to Intelligence.--To the extent approved by the 
President, the National Intelligence Director shall have access to all 
national intelligence and intelligence related to the national security 
which is collected by any Federal department, agency, or other entity, 
except as otherwise provided by law or, as appropriate, under 
guidelines agreed upon by the Attorney General and the National 
Intelligence Director.
    ``(c) Budget Authorities.--(1)(A) The National Intelligence 
Director shall develop and present to the President on an annual basis 
a budget for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the 
United States.
    ``(B) In carrying out subparagraph (A) for any fiscal year for the 
components of the budget that comprise the National Intelligence 
Program, the National Intelligence Director shall provide guidance to 
the heads of departments containing elements of the intelligence 
community, and to the heads of the elements of the intelligence 
community, for development of budget inputs to the National 
Intelligence Director.
    ``(2)(A) The National Intelligence Director shall participate in 
the development by the Secretary of Defense of the annual budgets for 
the Joint Military Intelligence Program and for Tactical Intelligence 
and Related Activities.
    ``(B) The National Intelligence Director shall provide guidance for 
the development of the annual budget for each element of the 
intelligence community that is not within the National Intelligence 
Program.
    ``(3) In carrying out paragraphs (1) and (2), the National 
Intelligence Director may, as appropriate, obtain the advice of the 
Joint Intelligence Community Council.
    ``(4) The National Intelligence Director shall ensure the effective 
execution of the annual budget for intelligence and intelligence-
related activities.
    ``(5)(A) The National Intelligence Director shall facilitate the 
management and execution of funds appropriated for the National 
Intelligence Program.
    ``(B) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in receiving 
funds pursuant to relevant appropriations Acts for the National 
Intelligence Program, the Office of Management and Budget shall 
apportion funds appropriated for the National Intelligence Program to 
the National Intelligence Director for allocation to the elements of 
the intelligence community through the host executive departments that 
manage programs and activities that are part of the National 
Intelligence Program.
    ``(C) The National Intelligence Director shall monitor the 
implementation and execution of the National Intelligence Program by 
the heads of the elements of the intelligence community that manage 
programs and activities that are part of the National Intelligence 
Program, which may include audits and evaluations, as necessary and 
feasible.
    ``(6) Apportionment and allotment of funds under this subsection 
shall be subject to chapter 13 and section 1517 of title 31, United 
States Code, and the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act 
of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 621 et seq.).
    ``(7)(A) The National Intelligence Director shall provide a 
quarterly report, beginning April 1, 2005, and ending April 1, 2007, to 
the President and the Congress regarding implementation of this 
section.
    ``(B) The National Intelligence Director shall report to the 
President and the Congress not later than 5 days after learning of any 
instance in which a departmental comptroller acts in a manner 
inconsistent with the law (including permanent statutes, authorization 
Acts, and appropriations Acts), or the direction of the National 
Intelligence Director, in carrying out the National Intelligence 
Program.
    ``(d) Role of National Intelligence Director in Reprogramming.--(1) 
No funds made available under the National Intelligence Program may be 
transferred or reprogrammed without the prior approval of the National 
Intelligence Director, except in accordance with procedures prescribed 
by the National Intelligence Director.
    ``(2) The Secretary of Defense shall consult with the National 
Intelligence Director before transferring or reprogramming funds made 
available under the Joint Military Intelligence Program.
    ``(e) Transfer of Funds or Personnel Within National Intelligence 
Program.--(1) In addition to any other authorities available under law 
for such purposes, the National Intelligence Director, with the 
approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget--
            ``(A) may transfer funds appropriated for a program within 
        the National Intelligence Program to another such program; and
            ``(B) in accordance with procedures to be developed by the 
        National Intelligence Director and the heads of the departments 
        and agencies concerned, may transfer personnel authorized for 
        an element of the intelligence community to another such 
        element for periods up to one year.
    ``(2) The amounts available for transfer in the National 
Intelligence Program in any given fiscal year, and the terms and 
conditions governing such transfers, are subject to the provisions of 
annual appropriations Acts and this subsection.
    ``(3)(A) A transfer of funds or personnel may be made under this 
subsection only if--
            ``(i) the funds or personnel are being transferred to an 
        activity that is a higher priority intelligence activity;
            ``(ii) the need for funds or personnel for such activity is 
        based on unforeseen requirements;
            ``(iii) the transfer does not involve a transfer of funds 
        to the Reserve for Contingencies of the Central Intelligence 
        Agency;
            ``(iv) in the case of a transfer of funds, the transfer 
        results in a cumulative transfer of funds out of any department 
        or agency, as appropriate, funded in the National Intelligence 
        Program in a single fiscal year--
                    ``(I) that is less than $100,000,000, and
                    ``(II) that is less than 5 percent of amounts 
                available to a department or agency under the National 
                Intelligence Program; and
            ``(v) the transfer does not terminate a program.
    ``(B) A transfer may be made without regard to a limitation set 
forth in clause (iv) or (v) of subparagraph (A) if the transfer has the 
concurrence of the head of the department or agency involved. The 
authority to provide such concurrence may only be delegated by the head 
of the department or agency involved to the deputy of such officer.
    ``(4) Funds transferred under this subsection shall remain 
available for the same period as the appropriations account to which 
transferred.
    ``(5) Any transfer of funds under this subsection shall be carried 
out in accordance with existing procedures applicable to reprogramming 
notifications for the appropriate congressional committees. Any 
proposed transfer for which notice is given to the appropriate 
congressional committees shall be accompanied by a report explaining 
the nature of the proposed transfer and how it satisfies the 
requirements of this subsection. In addition, the congressional 
intelligence committees shall be promptly notified of any transfer of 
funds made pursuant to this subsection in any case in which the 
transfer would not have otherwise required reprogramming notification 
under procedures in effect as of the date of the enactment of this 
subsection.
    ``(6)(A) The National Intelligence Director shall promptly submit 
to--
            ``(i) the congressional intelligence committees,
            ``(ii) in the case of the transfer of personnel to or from 
        the Department of Defense, the Committee on Armed Services of 
        the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
        Representatives, and
            ``(iii) in the case of the transfer of personnel to or from 
        the Department of Justice, to the Committees on the Judiciary 
        of the Senate and the House of Representatives,
a report on any transfer of personnel made pursuant to this subsection.
    ``(B) The Director shall include in any such report an explanation 
of the nature of the transfer and how it satisfies the requirements of 
this subsection.
    ``(f) Tasking and Other Authorities.--(1)(A) The National 
Intelligence Director shall--
            ``(i) develop collection objectives, priorities, and 
        guidance for the intelligence community to ensure timely and 
        effective collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination 
        (including access by users to collected data consistent with 
        applicable law and, as appropriate, the guidelines referred to 
        in subsection (b) and analytic products generated by or within 
        the intelligence community) of national intelligence;
            ``(ii) determine and establish requirements and priorities 
        for, and manage and direct the tasking of, collection, 
        analysis, production, and dissemination of national 
        intelligence by elements of the intelligence community, 
        including--
                    ``(I) approving requirements for collection and 
                analysis, and
                    ``(II) resolving conflicts in collection 
                requirements and in the tasking of national collection 
                assets of the elements of the intelligence community; 
                and
            ``(iii) provide advisory tasking to intelligence elements 
        of those agencies and departments not within the National 
        Intelligence Program.
    ``(B) The authority of the National Intelligence Director under 
subparagraph (A) shall not apply--
            ``(i) insofar as the President so directs;
            ``(ii) with respect to clause (ii) of subparagraph (A), 
        insofar as the Secretary of Defense exercises tasking authority 
        under plans or arrangements agreed upon by the Secretary of 
        Defense and the National Intelligence Director; or
            ``(iii) to the direct dissemination of information to State 
        government and local government officials and private sector 
        entities pursuant to sections 201 and 892 of the Homeland 
        Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121, 482).
    ``(2) The National Intelligence Director shall oversee the National 
Counterterrorism Center and may establish such other national 
intelligence centers as the Director determines necessary.
    ``(3)(A) The National Intelligence Director shall prescribe 
community-wide personnel policies that--
            ``(i) facilitate assignments across community elements and 
        to the intelligence centers;
            ``(ii) establish overarching standards for intelligence 
        education and training; and
            ``(iii) promote the most effective analysis and collection 
        of intelligence by ensuring a diverse workforce, including the 
        recruitment and training of women, minorities, and individuals 
        with diverse, ethnic, and linguistic backgrounds.
    ``(B) In developing the policies prescribed under subparagraph (A), 
the National Intelligence Director shall consult with the heads of the 
departments containing the elements of the intelligence community.
    ``(C) Policies prescribed under subparagraph (A) shall not be 
inconsistent with the personnel policies otherwise applicable to 
members of the uniformed services.
    ``(4) The National Intelligence Director shall ensure compliance 
with the Constitution and laws of the United States by the Central 
Intelligence Agency and shall ensure such compliance by other elements 
of the intelligence community through the host executive departments 
that manage the programs and activities that are part of the National 
Intelligence Program.
    ``(5) The National Intelligence Director shall ensure the 
elimination of waste and unnecessary duplication within the 
intelligence community.
    ``(6) The National Intelligence Director shall perform such other 
functions as the President may direct.
Nothing in this Act shall be construed as affecting the role of the 
Department of Justice or the Attorney General with respect to 
applications under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.
    ``(g) Intelligence Information Sharing.--(1) The National 
Intelligence Director shall have principal authority to ensure maximum 
availability of and access to intelligence information within the 
intelligence community consistent with national security requirements. 
The National Intelligence Director shall--
            ``(A) establish uniform security standards and procedures;
            ``(B) establish common information technology standards, 
        protocols, and interfaces;
            ``(C) ensure development of information technology systems 
        that include multi-level security and intelligence integration 
        capabilities; and
            ``(D) establish policies and procedures to resolve 
        conflicts between the need to share intelligence information 
        and the need to protect intelligence sources and methods.
    ``(2) The President shall ensure that the National Intelligence 
Director has all necessary support and authorities to fully and 
effectively implement paragraph (1).
    ``(3) Except as otherwise directed by the President or with the 
specific written agreement of the head of the department or agency in 
question, a Federal agency or official shall not be considered to have 
met any obligation to provide any information, report, assessment, or 
other material (including unevaluated intelligence information) to that 
department or agency solely by virtue of having provided that 
information, report, assessment, or other material to the National 
Intelligence Director or the National Counterterrorism Center.
    ``(4) Not later than February 1 of each year, the National 
Intelligence Director shall submit to the President and to the Congress 
an annual report that identifies any statute, regulation, policy, or 
practice that the Director believes impedes the ability of the Director 
to fully and effectively implement paragraph (1).
    ``(h) Analysis.--(1) The National Intelligence Director shall 
ensure that all elements of the intelligence community strive for the 
most accurate analysis of intelligence derived from all sources to 
support national security needs.
    ``(2) The National Intelligence Director shall ensure that 
intelligence analysis generally receives the highest priority when 
distributing resources within the intelligence community and shall 
carry out duties under this subsection in a manner that--
            ``(A) develops all-source analysis techniques;
            ``(B) ensures competitive analysis;
            ``(C) ensures that differences in judgment are fully 
        considered and brought to the attention of policymakers; and
            ``(D) builds relationships between intelligence collectors 
        and analysts to facilitate greater understanding of the needs 
        of analysts.
    ``(i) Protection of Intelligence Sources and Methods.--(1) In order 
to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized 
disclosure and, consistent with that protection, to maximize the 
dissemination of intelligence, the National Intelligence Director shall 
establish and implement guidelines for the intelligence community for 
the following purposes:
            ``(A) Classification of information.
            ``(B) Access to and dissemination of intelligence, both in 
        final form and in the form when initially gathered.
            ``(C) Preparation of intelligence products in such a way 
        that source information is removed to allow for dissemination 
        at the lowest level of classification possible or in 
        unclassified form to the extent practicable.
    ``(2) The Director may only delegate a duty or authority given the 
Director under this subsection to the Deputy National Intelligence 
Director.
    ``(j) Uniform Procedures for Sensitive Compartmented Information.--
The President, acting through the National Intelligence Director, 
shall--
            ``(1) establish uniform standards and procedures for the 
        grant of access to sensitive compartmented information to any 
        officer or employee of any agency or department of the United 
        States and to employees of contractors of those agencies or 
        departments;
            ``(2) ensure the consistent implementation of those 
        standards and procedures throughout such agencies and 
        departments;
            ``(3) ensure that security clearances granted by individual 
        elements of the intelligence community are recognized by all 
        elements of the intelligence community, and under contracts 
        entered into by those agencies; and
            ``(4) ensure that the process for investigation and 
        adjudication of an application for access to sensitive 
        compartmented information is performed in the most expeditious 
        manner possible consistent with applicable standards for 
        national security.
    ``(k) Coordination With Foreign Governments.--Under the direction 
of the President and in a manner consistent with section 207 of the 
Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C. 3927), the National Intelligence 
Director shall oversee the coordination of the relationships between 
elements of the intelligence community and the intelligence or security 
services of foreign governments on all matters involving intelligence 
related to the national security or involving intelligence acquired 
through clandestine means.
    ``(l) Enhanced Personnel Management.--(1)(A) The National 
Intelligence Director shall, under regulations prescribed by the 
Director, provide incentives for personnel of elements of the 
intelligence community to serve--
            ``(i) on the staff of the National Intelligence Director;
            ``(ii) on the staff of the national intelligence centers;
            ``(iii) on the staff of the National Counterterrorism 
        Center; and
            ``(iv) in other positions in support of the intelligence 
        community management functions of the Director.
    ``(B) Incentives under subparagraph (A) may include financial 
incentives, bonuses, and such other awards and incentives as the 
Director considers appropriate.
    ``(2)(A) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the personnel 
of an element of the intelligence community who are assigned or 
detailed under paragraph (1)(A) to service under the National 
Intelligence Director shall be promoted at rates equivalent to or 
better than personnel of such element who are not so assigned or 
detailed.
    ``(B) The Director may prescribe regulations to carry out this 
section.
    ``(3)(A) The National Intelligence Director shall prescribe 
mechanisms to facilitate the rotation of personnel of the intelligence 
community through various elements of the intelligence community in the 
course of their careers in order to facilitate the widest possible 
understanding by such personnel of the variety of intelligence 
requirements, methods, users, and capabilities.
    ``(B) The mechanisms prescribed under subparagraph (A) may include 
the following:
            ``(i) The establishment of special occupational categories 
        involving service, over the course of a career, in more than 
        one element of the intelligence community.
            ``(ii) The provision of rewards for service in positions 
        undertaking analysis and planning of operations involving two 
        or more elements of the intelligence community.
            ``(iii) The establishment of requirements for education, 
        training, service, and evaluation that involve service in more 
        than one element of the intelligence community.
    ``(C) It is the sense of Congress that the mechanisms prescribed 
under this subsection should, to the extent practical, seek to 
duplicate for civilian personnel within the intelligence community the 
joint officer management policies established by chapter 38 of title 
10, United States Code, and the other amendments made by title IV of 
the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 
(Public Law 99-433).
    ``(4)(A) This subsection shall not apply with respect to personnel 
of the elements of the intelligence community who are members of the 
uniformed services or law enforcement officers (as that term is defined 
in section 5541(3) of title 5, United States Code).
    ``(B) Assignment to the Office of the National Intelligence 
Director of commissioned officers of the Armed Forces shall be 
considered a joint-duty assignment for purposes of the joint officer 
management policies prescribed by chapter 38 of title 10, United States 
Code, and other provisions of that title.
    ``(m) Additional Authority With Respect to Personnel.--(1) In 
addition to the authorities under subsection (f)(3), the National 
Intelligence Director may exercise with respect to the personnel of the 
Office of the National Intelligence Director any authority of the 
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency with respect to the 
personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency under the Central 
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.), and other 
applicable provisions of law, as of the date of the enactment of this 
subsection to the same extent, and subject to the same conditions and 
limitations, that the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency may 
exercise such authority with respect to personnel of the Central 
Intelligence Agency.
    ``(2) Employees and applicants for employment of the Office of the 
National Intelligence Director shall have the same rights and 
protections under the Office of the National Intelligence Director as 
employees of the Central Intelligence Agency have under the Central 
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, and other applicable provisions of 
law, as of the date of the enactment of this subsection.
    ``(n) Acquisition Authorities.--(1) In carrying out the 
responsibilities and authorities under this section, the National 
Intelligence Director may exercise the acquisition authorities referred 
to in the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et 
seq.).
    ``(2) For the purpose of the exercise of any authority referred to 
in paragraph (1), a reference to the head of an agency shall be deemed 
to be a reference to the National Intelligence Director or the Deputy 
National Intelligence Director.
    ``(3)(A) Any determination or decision to be made under an 
authority referred to in paragraph (1) by the head of an agency may be 
made with respect to individual purchases and contracts or with respect 
to classes of purchases or contracts, and shall be final.
    ``(B) Except as provided in subparagraph (C), the National 
Intelligence Director or the Deputy National Intelligence Director may, 
in such official's discretion, delegate to any officer or other 
official of the Office of the National Intelligence Director any 
authority to make a determination or decision as the head of the agency 
under an authority referred to in paragraph (1).
    ``(C) The limitations and conditions set forth in section 3(d) of 
the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403c(d)) shall 
apply to the exercise by the National Intelligence Director of an 
authority referred to in paragraph (1).
    ``(D) Each determination or decision required by an authority 
referred to in the second sentence of section 3(d) of the Central 
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 shall be based upon written findings 
made by the official making such determination or decision, which 
findings shall be final and shall be available within the Office of the 
National Intelligence Director for a period of at least six years 
following the date of such determination or decision.
    ``(o) Consideration of Views of Elements of the Intelligence 
Community.--In carrying out the duties and responsibilities under this 
section, the National Intelligence Director shall take into account the 
views of a head of a department containing an element of the 
intelligence community and of the Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency.
             ``office of the national intelligence director
    ``Sec. 103. (a) Establishment of Office; Function.--(1) There is an 
Office of the National Intelligence Director. The Office of the 
National Intelligence Director shall not be located within the 
Executive Office of the President.
    ``(2) The function of the Office is to assist the National 
Intelligence Director in carrying out the duties and responsibilities 
of the Director under this Act and to carry out such other duties as 
may be prescribed by the President or by law.
    ``(3) Any authority, power, or function vested by law in any 
officer, employee, or part of the Office of the National Intelligence 
Director is vested in, or may be exercised by, the National 
Intelligence Director.
    ``(4) Exemptions, exceptions, and exclusions for the Central 
Intelligence Agency or for personnel, resources, or activities of such 
Agency from otherwise applicable laws, other than the exception 
contained in section 104A(c)(1) shall apply in the same manner to the 
Office of the National Intelligence Director and the personnel, 
resources, or activities of such Office.
    ``(b) Office of National Intelligence Director.--(1) The Office of 
the National Intelligence Director is composed of the following:
            ``(A) The National Intelligence Director.
            ``(B) The Deputy National Intelligence Director.
            ``(C) The Deputy National Intelligence Director for 
        Operations.
            ``(D) The Deputy National Intelligence Director for 
        Community Management and Resources.
            ``(E) The Associate National Intelligence Director for 
        Military Support.
            ``(F) The Associate National Intelligence Director for 
        Domestic Security.
            ``(G) The Associate National Intelligence Director for 
        Diplomatic Affairs.
            ``(H) The National Intelligence Council.
            ``(I) The General Counsel to the National Intelligence 
        Director.
            ``(J) Such other offices and officials as may be 
        established by law or the National Intelligence Director may 
        establish or designate in the Office.
    ``(2) To assist the National Intelligence Director in fulfilling 
the duties and responsibilities of the Director, the Director shall 
employ and utilize in the Office of the National Intelligence Director 
a staff having expertise in matters relating to such duties and 
responsibilities and may establish permanent positions and appropriate 
rates of pay with respect to such staff.
    ``(c) Deputy National Intelligence Director.--(1) There is a Deputy 
National Intelligence Director who shall be appointed by the President, 
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
    ``(2) The Deputy National Intelligence Director shall assist the 
National Intelligence Director in carrying out the responsibilities of 
the National Intelligence Director under this Act.
    ``(3) The Deputy National Intelligence Director shall act for, and 
exercise the powers of, the National Intelligence Director during the 
absence or disability of the National Intelligence Director or during a 
vacancy in the position of the National Intelligence Director.
    ``(4) The Deputy National Intelligence Director takes precedence in 
the Office of the National Intelligence Director immediately after the 
National Intelligence Director.
    ``(d) Deputy National Intelligence Director for Operations.--(1) 
There is a Deputy National Intelligence Director for Operations.
    ``(2) The Deputy National Intelligence Director for Operations 
shall--
            ``(A) assist the National Intelligence Director in all 
        aspects of intelligence operations, including intelligence 
        tasking, requirements, collection, and analysis;
            ``(B) assist the National Intelligence Director in 
        overseeing the national intelligence centers; and
            ``(C) perform such other duties and exercise such powers as 
        National Intelligence Director may prescribe.
    ``(e) Deputy National Intelligence Director for Community 
Management and Resources.--(1) There is a Deputy National Intelligence 
Director for Community Management and Resources.
    ``(2) The Deputy National Intelligence Director for Community 
Management and Resources shall--
            ``(A) assist the National Intelligence Director in all 
        aspects of management and resources, including administration, 
        budgeting, information security, personnel, training, and 
        programmatic functions; and
            ``(B) perform such other duties and exercise such powers as 
        the National Intelligence Director may prescribe.
    ``(f) Associate National Intelligence Director for Military 
Support.--(1) There is an Associate National Intelligence Director for 
Military Support who shall be appointed by the National Intelligence 
Director, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense.
    ``(2) The Associate National Intelligence Director for Military 
Support shall--
            ``(A) ensure that the intelligence needs of the Department 
        of Defense are met; and
            ``(B) perform such other duties and exercise such powers as 
        the National Intelligence Director may prescribe.
    ``(g) Associate National Intelligence Director for Domestic 
Security.--(1) There is an Associate National Intelligence Director for 
Domestic Security who shall be appointed by the National Intelligence 
Director in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of 
Homeland Security.
    ``(2) The Associate National Intelligence Director for Domestic 
Security shall--
            ``(A) ensure that the intelligence needs of the Department 
        of Justice, the Department of Homeland Security, and other 
        relevant executive departments and agencies are met; and
            ``(B) perform such other duties and exercise such powers as 
        the National Intelligence Director may prescribe, except that 
        the National Intelligence Director may not make such officer 
        responsible for disseminating any domestic or homeland security 
        information to State government or local government officials 
        or any private sector entity.
    ``(h) Associate National Intelligence Director for Diplomatic 
Affairs.--(1) There is an Associate National Intelligence Director for 
Diplomatic Affairs who shall be appointed by the National Intelligence 
Director in consultation with the Secretary of State.
    ``(2) The Associate National Intelligence Director for Diplomatic 
Affairs shall--
            ``(A) ensure that the intelligence needs of the Department 
        of State are met; and
            ``(B) perform such other duties and exercise such powers as 
        the National Intelligence Director may prescribe.
    ``(i) Military Status of Director and Deputy Directors.--(1) Not 
more than one of the individuals serving in the positions specified in 
paragraph (2) may be a commissioned officer of the Armed Forces in 
active status.
    ``(2) The positions referred to in this paragraph are the 
following:
            ``(A) The National Intelligence Director.
            ``(B) The Deputy National Intelligence Director.
    ``(3) It is the sense of Congress that, under ordinary 
circumstances, it is desirable that one of the individuals serving in 
the positions specified in paragraph (2)--
            ``(A) be a commissioned officer of the Armed Forces, in 
        active status; or
            ``(B) have, by training or experience, an appreciation of 
        military intelligence activities and requirements.
    ``(4) A commissioned officer of the Armed Forces, while serving in 
a position specified in paragraph (2)--
            ``(A) shall not be subject to supervision or control by the 
        Secretary of Defense or by any officer or employee of the 
        Department of Defense;
            ``(B) shall not exercise, by reason of the officer's status 
        as a commissioned officer, any supervision or control with 
        respect to any of the military or civilian personnel of the 
        Department of Defense except as otherwise authorized by law; 
        and
            ``(C) shall not be counted against the numbers and 
        percentages of commissioned officers of the rank and grade of 
        such officer authorized for the military department of that 
        officer.
    ``(5) Except as provided in subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph 
(4), the appointment of an officer of the Armed Forces to a position 
specified in paragraph (2) shall not affect the status, position, rank, 
or grade of such officer in the Armed Forces, or any emolument, 
perquisite, right, privilege, or benefit incident to or arising out of 
such status, position, rank, or grade.
    ``(6) A commissioned officer of the Armed Forces on active duty who 
is appointed to a position specified in paragraph (2), while serving in 
such position and while remaining on active duty, shall continue to 
receive military pay and allowances and shall not receive the pay 
prescribed for such position. Funds from which such pay and allowances 
are paid shall be reimbursed from funds available to the National 
Intelligence Director.
    ``(j) National Intelligence Council.--(1) Within the Office of the 
Deputy National Intelligence Director for Operations, there is a 
National Intelligence Council.
    ``(2)(A) The National Intelligence Council shall be composed of 
senior analysts within the intelligence community and substantive 
experts from the public and private sector, who shall be appointed by 
and report to the Deputy National Intelligence Director for Operations.
    ``(B) The Director shall prescribe appropriate security 
requirements for personnel appointed from the private sector as a 
condition of service on the Council, or as contractors of the Council 
or employees of such contractors, to ensure the protection of 
intelligence sources and methods while avoiding, wherever possible, 
unduly intrusive requirements which the Director considers to be 
unnecessary for this purpose.
    ``(3) The National Intelligence Council shall--
            ``(A) produce national intelligence estimates for the 
        United States Government, which shall include as a part of such 
        estimates in their entirety, alternative views, if any, held by 
        elements of the intelligence community;
            ``(B) evaluate community-wide collection and production of 
        intelligence by the intelligence community and the requirements 
        and resources of such collection and production; and
            ``(C) otherwise assist the National Intelligence Director 
        in carrying out the responsibility of the National Intelligence 
        Director to provide national intelligence.
    ``(4) Within their respective areas of expertise and under the 
direction of the Deputy National Intelligence Director for Operations, 
the members of the National Intelligence Council shall constitute the 
senior intelligence advisers of the intelligence community for purposes 
of representing the views of the intelligence community within the 
United States Government.
    ``(5) Subject to the direction and control of the Deputy National 
Intelligence Director for Operations, the National Intelligence Council 
may carry out its responsibilities under this section by contract, 
including contracts for substantive experts necessary to assist the 
Council with particular assessments under this subsection.
    ``(6) The Deputy National Intelligence Director for Operations 
shall make available to the National Intelligence Council such 
personnel as may be necessary to permit the Council to carry out its 
responsibilities under this section.
    ``(7) The heads of the elements of the intelligence community 
shall, as appropriate, furnish such support to the National 
Intelligence Council, including the preparation of intelligence 
analyses, as may be required by the National Intelligence Director.
    ``(k) General Counsel to the National Intelligence Director.--(1) 
There is a General Counsel to the National Intelligence Director.
    ``(2) The individual serving in the position of General Counsel to 
the National Intelligence Director may not, while so serving, also 
serve as the General Counsel of any other agency or department of the 
United States.
    ``(3) The General Counsel to the National Intelligence Director is 
the chief legal officer for the National Intelligence Director.
    ``(4) The General Counsel to the National Intelligence Director 
shall perform such functions as the National Intelligence Director may 
prescribe.
    ``(l) Intelligence Community Information Technology Officer.--(1) 
There is an Intelligence Community Information Technology Officer who 
shall be appointed by the National Intelligence Director.
    ``(2) The mission of the Intelligence Community Information 
Technology Officer is to assist the National Intelligence Director in 
ensuring the sharing of information in the fullest and most prompt 
manner between and among elements of the intelligence community 
consistent with section 102A(g).
    ``(3) The Intelligence Community Information Technology Officer 
shall--
            ``(A) assist the Deputy National Intelligence Director for 
        Community Management and Resources in developing and 
        implementing an integrated information technology network;
            ``(B) develop an enterprise architecture for the 
        intelligence community and assist the Deputy National 
        Intelligence Director for Community Management and Resources in 
        ensuring that elements of the intelligence community comply 
        with such architecture;
            ``(C) have procurement approval authority over all 
        enterprise architecture-related information technology items 
        funded in the National Intelligence Program;
            ``(D) ensure that all such elements have the most direct 
        and continuous electronic access to all information (including 
        unevaluated intelligence consistent with existing laws and the 
        guidelines referred to in section 102A(b)) necessary for 
        appropriately cleared analysts to conduct comprehensive all-
        source analysis and for appropriately cleared policymakers to 
        perform their duties--
                    ``(i) directly, in the case of the elements of the 
                intelligence community within the National Intelligence 
                Program, and
                    ``(ii) in conjunction with the Secretary of Defense 
                and other applicable heads of departments with 
                intelligence elements outside the National Intelligence 
                Program;
            ``(E) review and provide recommendations to the Deputy 
        National Intelligence Director for Community Management and 
        Resources on National Intelligence Program budget requests for 
        information technology and national security systems;
            ``(F) assist the Deputy National Intelligence Director for 
        Community Management and Resources in promulgating and 
        enforcing standards on information technology and national 
        security systems that apply throughout the elements of the 
        intelligence community;
            ``(G) ensure that within and between the elements of the 
        National Intelligence Program, duplicative and unnecessary 
        information technology and national security systems are 
        eliminated; and
            ``(H) pursuant to the direction of the National 
        Intelligence Director, consult with the Director of the Office 
        of Management and Budget to ensure that the Office of the 
        National Intelligence Director coordinates and complies with 
        national security requirements consistent with applicable law, 
        Executive orders, and guidance; and
            ``(I) perform such other duties with respect to the 
        information systems and information technology of the Office of 
        the National Intelligence Director as may be prescribed by the 
        Deputy National Intelligence Director for Community Management 
        and Resources or specified by law.
                     ``central intelligence agency
    ``Sec. 104. (a) Central Intelligence Agency.--There is a Central 
Intelligence Agency.
    ``(b) Function.--The function of the Central Intelligence Agency is 
to assist the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in carrying 
out the responsibilities specified in section 104A(c).
             ``director of the central intelligence agency
    ``Sec. 104A. (a) Director of Central Intelligence Agency.--There is 
a Director of the Central Intelligence Agency who shall be appointed by 
the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The 
Director shall be under the authority, direction, and control of the 
National Intelligence Director, except as otherwise determined by the 
President.
    ``(b) Duties.--In the capacity as Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency 
shall--
            ``(1) carry out the responsibilities specified in 
        subsection (c); and
            ``(2) serve as the head of the Central Intelligence Agency.
    ``(c) Responsibilities.--The Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency shall--
            ``(1) collect intelligence through human sources and by 
        other appropriate means, except that the Director of the 
        Central Intelligence Agency shall have no police, subpoena, or 
        law enforcement powers or internal security functions;
            ``(2) provide overall direction for the collection of 
        national intelligence overseas or outside of the United States 
        through human sources by elements of the intelligence community 
        authorized to undertake such collection and, in coordination 
        with other agencies of the Government which are authorized to 
        undertake such collection, ensure that the most effective use 
        is made of resources and that the risks to the United States 
        and those involved in such collection are minimized;
            ``(3) correlate and evaluate intelligence related to the 
        national security and provide appropriate dissemination of such 
        intelligence;
            ``(4) perform such additional services as are of common 
        concern to the elements of the intelligence community, which 
        services the National Intelligence Director determines can be 
        more efficiently accomplished centrally; and
            ``(5) perform such other functions and duties related to 
        intelligence affecting the national security as the President 
        or the National Intelligence Director may direct.
    ``(d) Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.--There is 
a Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency who shall be 
appointed by the President. The Deputy Director shall perform such 
functions as the Director may prescribe and shall perform the duties of 
the Director during the Director's absence or disability or during a 
vacancy in the position of the Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency.
    ``(e) Termination of Employment of CIA Employees.--(1) 
Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, the Director of the 
Central Intelligence Agency may, in the discretion of the Director, 
terminate the employment of any officer or employee of the Central 
Intelligence Agency whenever the Director considers the termination of 
employment of such officer or employee necessary or advisable in the 
interests of the United States.
    ``(2) Any termination of employment of an officer or employee under 
paragraph (1) shall not affect the right of the officer or employee to 
seek or accept employment in any other department, agency, or element 
of the United States Government if declared eligible for such 
employment by the Office of Personnel Management.''.
    (b) First Director.--(1) When the Senate receives the nomination of 
a person for the initial appointment by the President for the position 
of National Intelligence Director, it shall consider and dispose of 
such nomination within a period of 30 legislative days.
    (2) If the Senate does not dispose of such nomination referred to 
in paragraph (1) within such period--
            (A) Senate confirmation is not required; and
            (B) the appointment of such nominee as National 
        Intelligence Director takes effect upon administration of the 
        oath of office.
    (3) For the purposes of this subsection, the term ``legislative 
day'' means a day on which the Senate is in session.

SEC. 1012. REVISED DEFINITION OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.

    Paragraph (5) of section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
U.S.C. 401a) is amended to read as follows:
            ``(5) The terms `national intelligence' and `intelligence 
        related to national security' refer to all intelligence, 
        regardless of the source from which derived and including 
        information gathered within or outside the United States, 
        that--
                    ``(A) pertains, as determined consistent with any 
                guidance issued by the President, to more than one 
                United States Government agency; and
                    ``(B) that involves--
                            ``(i) threats to the United States, its 
                        people, property, or interests;
                            ``(ii) the development, proliferation, or 
                        use of weapons of mass destruction; or
                            ``(iii) any other matter bearing on United 
                        States national or homeland security.''.

SEC. 1013. JOINT PROCEDURES FOR OPERATIONAL COORDINATION BETWEEN 
                    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 
                    AGENCY.

    (a) Development of Procedures.--The National Intelligence Director, 
in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the 
Central Intelligence Agency, shall develop joint procedures to be used 
by the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency to 
improve the coordination and deconfliction of operations that involve 
elements of both the Armed Forces and the Central Intelligence Agency 
consistent with national security and the protection of human 
intelligence sources and methods. Those procedures shall, at a minimum, 
provide the following:
            (1) Methods by which the Director of the Central 
        Intelligence Agency and the Secretary of Defense can improve 
        communication and coordination in the planning, execution, and 
        sustainment of operations, including, as a minimum--
                    (A) information exchange between senior officials 
                of the Central Intelligence Agency and senior officers 
                and officials of the Department of Defense when 
                planning for such an operation commences by either 
                organization; and
                    (B) exchange of information between the Secretary 
                and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to 
                ensure that senior operational officials in both the 
                Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence 
                Agency have knowledge of the existence of the ongoing 
                operations of the other.
            (2) When appropriate, in cases where the Department of 
        Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency are conducting 
        separate missions in the same geographical area, mutual 
        agreement on the tactical and strategic objectives for the 
        region and a clear delineation of operational responsibilities 
        to prevent conflict and duplication of effort.
    (b) Implementation Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of the Act, the National Intelligence Director shall 
submit to the congressional defense committees (as defined in section 
101 of title 10, United States Code) and the congressional intelligence 
committees (as defined in section 3(7) of the National Security Act of 
1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(7))) a report describing the procedures 
established pursuant to subsection (a) and the status of the 
implementation of those procedures.

SEC. 1014. ROLE OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR IN APPOINTMENT OF 
                    CERTAIN OFFICIALS RESPONSIBLE FOR INTELLIGENCE-
                    RELATED ACTIVITIES.

    Section 106 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-6) 
is amended by striking all after the heading and inserting the 
following:
    ``(a) Recommendation of NID in Certain Appointments.--(1) In the 
event of a vacancy in a position referred to in paragraph (2), the 
National Intelligence Director shall recommend to the President an 
individual for nomination to fill the vacancy.
    ``(2) Paragraph (1) applies to the following positions:
            ``(A) The Deputy National Intelligence Director.
            ``(B) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
    ``(b) Concurrence of NID in Appointments to Positions in the 
Intelligence Community.--(1) In the event of a vacancy in a position 
referred to in paragraph (2), the head of the department or agency 
having jurisdiction over the position shall obtain the concurrence of 
the National Intelligence Director before appointing an individual to 
fill the vacancy or recommending to the President an individual to be 
nominated to fill the vacancy. If the Director does not concur in the 
recommendation, the head of the department or agency concerned may not 
fill the vacancy or make the recommendation to the President (as the 
case may be).
    ``(2) Paragraph (1) applies to the following positions:
            ``(A) The Director of the National Security Agency.
            ``(B) The Director of the National Reconnaissance Office.
            ``(C) The Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence 
        Agency.
    ``(c) Consultation With National Intelligence Director in Certain 
Positions.--(1) In the event of a vacancy in a position referred to in 
paragraph (2), the head of the department or agency having jurisdiction 
over the position shall consult with the National Intelligence Director 
before appointing an individual to fill the vacancy or recommending to 
the President an individual to be nominated to fill the vacancy.
    ``(2) Paragraph (1) applies to the following positions:
            ``(A) The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
            ``(B) The Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and 
        Research.
            ``(C) The Director of the Office of Intelligence of the 
        Department of Energy.
            ``(D) The Director of the Office of Counterintelligence of 
        the Department of Energy.
            ``(E) The Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis 
        of the Department of the Treasury.
            ``(F) The Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence of 
        the Federal Bureau of Investigation or that officer's 
        successor.
            ``(G) The Under Secretary of Homeland Security for 
        Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection.
            ``(H) The Deputy Assistant Commandant of the Coast Guard 
        for Intelligence.

SEC. 1015. INITIAL APPOINTMENT OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR.

    (a) Initial Appointment of the National Intelligence Director.--
Notwithstanding section 102(a)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947, 
as added by section 1011(a), the individual serving as the Director of 
Central Intelligence on the date immediately preceding the date of the 
enactment of this Act may, at the discretion of the President, become 
the National Intelligence Director as of the date of the enactment of 
this Act.
    (b) General References.--(1) Any reference to the Director of 
Central Intelligence in the Director's capacity as the head of the 
intelligence community in any law, regulation, document, paper, or 
other record of the United States shall be deemed to be a reference to 
the National Intelligence Director.
    (2) Any reference to the Director of Central Intelligence in the 
Director's capacity as the head of the Central Intelligence Agency in 
any law, regulation, document, paper, or other record of the United 
States shall be deemed to be a reference to the Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency.
    (3) Any reference to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence in 
the Deputy Director's capacity as deputy to the head of the 
intelligence community in any law, regulation, document, paper, or 
other record of the United States shall be deemed to be a reference to 
the Deputy National Intelligence Director.
    (4) Any reference to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence 
for Community Management in any law, regulation, document, paper, or 
other record of the United States shall be deemed to be a reference to 
the Deputy National Intelligence Director for Community Management and 
Resources.

SEC. 1016. EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE MATTERS.

    (a) Executive Schedule Level I.--Section 5312 of title 5, United 
States Code, is amended by adding the end the following new item:
            ``National Intelligence Director.''.
    (b) Executive Schedule Level II.--Section 5313 of title 5, United 
States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new items:
            ``Deputy National Intelligence Director.
            ``Director of the National Counterterrorism Center.''.
    (c) Executive Schedule Level IV.--Section 5315 of title 5, United 
States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to the Assistant 
Directors of Central Intelligence.

   Subtitle B--National Counterterrorism Center and Civil Liberties 
                              Protections

SEC. 1021. NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER.

    (a) In General.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new 
section:
                   ``national counterterrorism center
    ``Sec. 119. (a) Establishment of Center.--There is within the 
Office of the National Intelligence Director a National 
Counterterrorism Center.
    ``(b) Director of National Counterterrorism Center.--There is a 
Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, who shall be the head 
of the National Counterterrorism Center, who shall be appointed by 
National Intelligence Director.
    ``(c) Supervision.--The Director of the National Counterterrorism 
Center shall report to the National Intelligence Director on--
            ``(1) the budget and programs of the National 
        Counterterrorism Center;
            ``(2) the activities of the Directorate of Intelligence of 
        the National Counterterrorism Center under subsection (h);
            ``(3) the conduct of intelligence operations implemented by 
        other elements of the intelligence community; and
            ``(4) the planning and progress of joint counterterrorism 
        operations (other than intelligence operations).
The National Intelligence Director shall carry out this section through 
the Deputy National Intelligence Director for Operations.
    ``(d) Primary Missions.--The primary missions of the National 
Counterterrorism Center shall be as follows:
            ``(1) To serve as the primary organization in the United 
        States Government for analyzing and integrating all 
        intelligence possessed or acquired by the United States 
        Government pertaining to terrorism and counterterrorism, 
        excepting intelligence pertaining exclusively to domestic 
        counterterrorism.
            ``(2) To conduct strategic operational planning for 
        counterterrorism activities, integrating all instruments of 
        national power, including diplomatic, financial, military, 
        intelligence, homeland security, and law enforcement activities 
        within and among agencies.
            ``(3) To support operational responsibilities assigned to 
        lead agencies for counterterrorism activities by ensuring that 
        such agencies have access to and receive intelligence needed to 
        accomplish their assigned activities.
            ``(4) To ensure that agencies, as appropriate, have access 
        to and receive all-source intelligence support needed to 
        execute their counterterrorism plans or perform independent, 
        alternative analysis.
    ``(e) Domestic Counterterrorism Intelligence.--(1) The Center may, 
consistent with applicable law, the direction of the President, and the 
guidelines referred to in section 102A(b), receive intelligence 
pertaining exclusively to domestic counterterrorism from any Federal, 
State, or local government or other source necessary to fulfill its 
responsibilities and retain and disseminate such intelligence.
    ``(2) Any agency authorized to conduct counterterrorism activities 
may request information from the Center to assist it in its 
responsibilities, consistent with applicable law and the guidelines 
referred to in section 102A(b).
    ``(f) Duties and Responsibilities of Director.--The Director of the 
National Counterterrorism Center shall--
            ``(1) serve as the principal adviser to the National 
        Intelligence Director on intelligence operations relating to 
        counterterrorism;
            ``(2) provide strategic guidance and plans for the civilian 
        and military counterterrorism efforts of the United States 
        Government and for the effective integration of 
        counterterrorism intelligence and operations across agency 
        boundaries, both inside and outside the United States;
            ``(3) advise the National Intelligence Director on the 
        extent to which the counterterrorism program recommendations 
        and budget proposals of the departments, agencies, and elements 
        of the United States Government conform to the priorities 
        established by the President;
            ``(4) disseminate terrorism information, including current 
        terrorism threat analysis, to the President, the Vice 
        President, the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Homeland 
        Security, the Attorney General, the Director of the Central 
        Intelligence Agency, and other officials of the executive 
        branch as appropriate, and to the appropriate committees of 
        Congress;
            ``(5) support the Department of Justice and the Department 
        of Homeland Security, and other appropriate agencies, in 
        fulfillment of their responsibilities to disseminate terrorism 
        information, consistent with applicable law, guidelines 
        referred to in section 102A(b), Executive Orders and other 
        Presidential guidance, to State and local government officials, 
        and other entities, and coordinate dissemination of terrorism 
        information to foreign governments as approved by the National 
        Intelligence Director;
            ``(6) consistent with priorities approved by the President, 
        assist the National Intelligence Director in establishing 
        requirements for the intelligence community for the collection 
        of terrorism information; and
            ``(7) perform such other duties as the National 
        Intelligence Director may prescribe or are prescribed by law.
    ``(g) Limitation.--The Director of the National Counterterrorism 
Center may not direct the execution of counterterrorism operations.
    ``(h) Resolution of Disputes.--The National Intelligence Director 
shall resolve disagreements between the National Counterterrorism 
Center and the head of a department, agency, or element of the United 
States Government on designations, assignments, plans, or 
responsibilities. The head of such a department, agency, or element may 
appeal the resolution of the disagreement by the National Intelligence 
Director to the President.
    ``(i) Directorate of Intelligence.--The Director of the National 
Counterterrorism Center shall establish and maintain within the 
National Counterterrorism Center a Directorate of Intelligence which 
shall have primary responsibility within the United States Government 
for analysis of terrorism and terrorist organizations (except for 
purely domestic terrorism and domestic terrorist organizations) from 
all sources of intelligence, whether collected inside or outside the 
United States.
    ``(j) Directorate of Strategic Planning.--The Director of the 
National Counterterrorism Center shall establish and maintain within 
the National Counterterrorism Center a Directorate of Strategic 
Planning which shall provide strategic guidance and plans for 
counterterrorism operations conducted by the United States 
Government.''.
    (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections for the National 
Security Act of 1947 is amended by inserting after the item relating to 
section 118 the following new item:

``Sec. 119. National Counterterrorism Center.''.

SEC. 1022. CIVIL LIBERTIES PROTECTION OFFICER.

    (a) Civil Liberties Protection Officer.--(1) Within the Office of 
the National Intelligence Director, there is a Civil Liberties 
Protection Officer who shall be appointed by the National Intelligence 
Director.
    (2) The Civil Liberties Protection Officer shall report directly to 
the National Intelligence Director.
    (b) Duties.--The Civil Liberties Protection Officer shall--
            (1) ensure that the protection of civil liberties and 
        privacy is appropriately incorporated in the policies and 
        procedures developed for and implemented by the Office of the 
        National Intelligence Director and the elements of the 
        intelligence community within the National Intelligence 
        Program;
            (2) oversee compliance by the Office and the National 
        Intelligence Director with requirements under the Constitution 
        and all laws, regulations, Executive orders, and implementing 
        guidelines relating to civil liberties and privacy;
            (3) review and assess complaints and other information 
        indicating possible abuses of civil liberties and privacy in 
        the administration of the programs and operations of the Office 
        and the National Intelligence Director and, as appropriate, 
        investigate any such complaint or information;
            (4) ensure that the use of technologies sustain, and do not 
        erode, privacy protections relating to the use, collection, and 
        disclosure of personal information;
            (5) ensure that personal information contained in a system 
        of records subject to section 552a of title 5, United States 
        Code (popularly referred to as the `Privacy Act'), is handled 
        in full compliance with fair information practices as set out 
        in that section;
            (6) conduct privacy impact assessments when appropriate or 
        as required by law; and
            (7) perform such other duties as may be prescribed by the 
        National Intelligence Director or specified by law.
    (c) Use of Agency Inspectors General.--When appropriate, the Civil 
Liberties Protection Officer may refer complaints to the Office of 
Inspector General having responsibility for the affected element of the 
department or agency of the intelligence community to conduct an 
investigation under paragraph (3) of subsection (b).

            Subtitle C--Joint Intelligence Community Council

SEC. 1031. JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY COUNCIL.

    (a) Establishment.--(1) There is hereby established a Joint 
Intelligence Community Council.
    (b) Functions.--(1) The Joint Intelligence Community Council shall 
provide advice to the National Intelligence Director as appropriate.
    (2) The National Intelligence Director shall consult with the Joint 
Intelligence Community Council in developing guidance for the 
development of the annual National Intelligence Program budget.
    (c) Membership.--The Joint Intelligence Community Council shall 
consist of the following:
            (1) The National Intelligence Director, who shall chair the 
        Council.
            (2) The Secretary of State.
            (3) The Secretary of the Treasury.
            (4) The Secretary of Defense.
            (5) The Attorney General.
            (6) The Secretary of Energy.
            (7) The Secretary of Homeland Security.
            (8) Such other officials of the executive branch as the 
        President may designate.

         Subtitle D--Improvement of Human Intelligence (HUMINT)

SEC. 1041. HUMAN INTELLIGENCE AS AN INCREASINGLY CRITICAL COMPONENT OF 
                    THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

    It is a sense of Congress that--
            (1) the human intelligence officers of the intelligence 
        community have performed admirably and honorably in the face of 
        great personal dangers;
            (2) during an extended period of unprecedented investment 
        and improvements in technical collection means, the human 
        intelligence capabilities of the United States have not 
        received the necessary and commensurate priorities;
            (3) human intelligence is becoming an increasingly 
        important capability to provide information on the asymmetric 
        threats to the national security of the United States;
            (4) the continued development and improvement of a robust 
        and empowered and flexible human intelligence work force is 
        critical to identifying, understanding, and countering the 
        plans and intentions of the adversaries of the United States; 
        and
            (5) an increased emphasis on, and resources applied to, 
        enhancing the depth and breadth of human intelligence 
        capabilities of the United States intelligence community must 
        be among the top priorities of the National Intelligence 
        Director.

SEC. 1042. IMPROVEMENT OF HUMAN INTELLIGENCE CAPACITY.

    Not later than 6 months after the date of the enactment of this 
Act, the National Intelligence Director shall submit to Congress a 
report on existing human intelligence (HUMINT) capacity which shall 
include a plan to implement changes, as necessary, to accelerate 
improvements to, and increase the capacity of, HUMINT across the 
intelligence community.

  Subtitle E--Improvement of Education for the Intelligence Community

SEC. 1051. MODIFICATION OF OBLIGATED SERVICE REQUIREMENTS UNDER 
                    NATIONAL SECURITY EDUCATION PROGRAM.

    (a) In General.--(1) Subsection (b)(2) of section 802 of the David 
L. Boren National Security Education Act of 1991 (50 U.S.C. 1902) is 
amended to read as follows:
            ``(2) will meet the requirements for obligated service 
        described in subsection (j); and''.
    (2) Such section is further amended by adding at the end the 
following new subsection:
    ``(j) Requirements for Obligated Service in the Government.--(1) 
Each recipient of a scholarship or a fellowship under the program shall 
work in a specified national security position. In this subsection, the 
term `specified national security position' means a position of a 
department or agency of the United States that the Secretary certifies 
is appropriate to use the unique language and region expertise acquired 
by the recipient pursuant to the study for which scholarship or 
fellowship assistance (as the case may be) was provided under the 
program.
    ``(2) Each such recipient shall commence work in a specified 
national security position as soon as practicable but in no case later 
than two years after the completion by the recipient of the study for 
which scholarship or fellowship assistance (as the case may be) was 
provided under the program.
    ``(3) Each such recipient shall work in a specified national 
security position for a period specified by the Secretary, which period 
shall include--
            ``(A) in the case of a recipient of a scholarship, one year 
        of service for each year, or portion thereof, for which such 
        scholarship assistance was provided, and
            ``(B) in the case of a recipient of a fellowship, not less 
        than one nor more than three years for each year, or portion 
        thereof, for which such fellowship assistance was provided.
    ``(4) Recipients shall seek specified national security positions 
as follows:
            ``(A) In the Department of Defense or in any element of the 
        intelligence community.
            ``(B) In the Department of State or in the Department of 
        Homeland Security, if the recipient demonstrates to the 
        Secretary that no position is available in the Department of 
        Defense or in any element of the intelligence community.
            ``(C) In any other Federal department or agency not 
        referred to in subparagraphs (A) and (B), if the recipient 
        demonstrates to the Secretary that no position is available in 
        a Federal department or agency specified in such paragraphs.''.
    (b) Regulations.--The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe 
regulations to carry out subsection (j) of section 802 of the David L. 
Boren National Security Education Act of 1991, as added by subsection 
(a). In prescribing such regulations, the Secretary shall establish 
standards that recipients of scholarship and fellowship assistance 
under the program under section 802 of the David L. Boren National 
Security Education Act of 1991 are required to demonstrate in order to 
satisfy the requirement of a good faith effort to gain employment as 
required under such subsection.
    (c) Applicability.--(1) The amendments made by subsection (a) shall 
apply with respect to service agreements entered into under the David 
L. Boren National Security Education Act of 1991 on or after the date 
of the enactment of this Act.
    (2) The amendments made by subsection (a) shall not affect the 
force, validity, or terms of any service agreement entered into under 
the David L. Boren National Security Education Act of 1991 before the 
date of the enactment of this Act that is in force as of that date.

SEC. 1052. IMPROVEMENTS TO THE NATIONAL FLAGSHIP LANGUAGE INITIATIVE.

    (a) Increase in Annual Authorization of Appropriations.--(1) Title 
VIII of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1992 (Public 
Law 102-183; 105 Stat. 1271), as amended by section 311(c) of the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103-
178; 107 Stat. 2037) and by section 333(b) of the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 
2397), is amended in subsection (a) of section 811 by striking ``there 
is authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary for each fiscal year, 
beginning with fiscal year 2003, $10,000,000,'' and inserting ``there 
is authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary for each of fiscal 
years 2003 and 2004, $10,000,000, and for fiscal year 2005 and each 
subsequent fiscal year, $12,000,000,''.
    (2) Subsection (b) of such section is amended by inserting ``for 
fiscal years 2003 and 2004 only'' after ``authorization of 
appropriations under subsection (a)''.
    (b) Requirement for Employment Agreements.--(1) Section 802(i) of 
the David L. Boren National Security Education Act of 1991 (50 U.S.C. 
1902(i)) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
    ``(5)(A) In the case of an undergraduate or graduate student that 
participates in training in programs under paragraph (1), the student 
shall enter into an agreement described in subsection (b), other than 
such a student who has entered into such an agreement pursuant to 
subparagraph (A)(ii) or (B)(ii) of section 802(a)(1).
    ``(B) In the case of an employee of an agency or department of the 
Federal Government that participates in training in programs under 
paragraph (1), the employee shall agree in writing--
            ``(i) to continue in the service of the agency or 
        department of the Federal Government employing the employee for 
        the period of such training;
            ``(ii) to continue in the service of such agency or 
        department employing the employee following completion of such 
        training for a period of two years for each year, or part of 
        the year, of such training;
            ``(iii) to reimburse the United States for the total cost 
        of such training (excluding the employee's pay and allowances) 
        provided to the employee if, before the completion by the 
        employee of the training, the employment of the employee by the 
        agency or department is terminated due to misconduct by the 
        employee or by the employee voluntarily; and
            ``(iv) to reimburse the United States if, after completing 
        such training, the employment of the employee by the agency or 
        department is terminated either by the agency or department due 
        to misconduct by the employee or by the employee voluntarily, 
        before the completion by the employee of the period of service 
        required in clause (ii), in an amount that bears the same ratio 
        to the total cost of the training (excluding the employee's pay 
        and allowances) provided to the employee as the unserved 
        portion of such period of service bears to the total period of 
        service under clause (ii).
    ``(C) Subject to subparagraph (D), the obligation to reimburse the 
United States under an agreement under subparagraph (A) is for all 
purposes a debt owing the United States.
    ``(D) The head of an element of the intelligence community may 
release an employee, in whole or in part, from the obligation to 
reimburse the United States under an agreement under subparagraph (A) 
when, in the discretion of the head of the element, the head of the 
element determines that equity or the interests of the United States so 
require.''.
    (2) The amendment made by paragraph (1) shall apply to training 
that begins on or after the date that is 90 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act.
    (c) Increase in the Number of Participating Educational 
Institutions.--The Secretary of Defense shall take such steps as the 
Secretary determines will increase the number of qualified educational 
institutions that receive grants under the National Flagship Language 
Initiative to establish, operate, or improve activities designed to 
train students in programs in a range of disciplines to achieve 
advanced levels of proficiency in those foreign languages that the 
Secretary identifies as being the most critical in the interests of the 
national security of the United States.
    (d) Clarification of Authority to Support Studies Abroad.--
Educational institutions that receive grants under the National 
Flagship Language Initiative may support students who pursue total 
immersion foreign language studies overseas of foreign languages that 
are critical to the national security of the United States.

SEC. 1053. ESTABLISHMENT OF SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM FOR ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
                    STUDIES FOR HERITAGE COMMUNITY CITIZENS OF THE 
                    UNITED STATES WITHIN THE NATIONAL SECURITY 
                    EDUCATION PROGRAM.

    (a) Scholarship Program for English Language Studies for Heritage 
Community Citizens of the United States.--(1) Subsection (a)(1) of 
section 802 of the David L. Boren National Security Education Act of 
1991 (50 U.S.C. 1902) is amended--
            (A) by striking ``and'' at the end of subparagraph (C);
            (B) by striking the period at the end of subparagraph (D) 
        and inserting ``; and''; and
            (C) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
                    ``(E) awarding scholarships to students who--
                            ``(i) are United States citizens who--
                                    ``(I) are native speakers (commonly 
                                referred to as heritage community 
                                residents) of a foreign language that 
                                is identified as critical to the 
                                national security interests of the 
                                United States who should be actively 
                                recruited for employment by Federal 
                                security agencies with a need for 
                                linguists; and
                                    ``(II) are not proficient at a 
                                professional level in the English 
                                language with respect to reading, 
                                writing, and interpersonal skills 
                                required to carry out the national 
                                security interests of the United 
                                States, as determined by the Secretary,
                        to enable such students to pursue English 
                        language studies at an institution of higher 
                        education of the United States to attain 
                        proficiency in those skills; and
                            ``(ii) enter into an agreement to work in a 
                        national security position or work in the field 
                        of education in the area of study for which the 
                        scholarship was awarded in a similar manner (as 
                        determined by the Secretary) as agreements 
                        entered into pursuant to subsection 
                        (b)(2)(A).''.
    (2) The matter following subsection (a)(2) of such section is 
amended--
            (A) in the first sentence, by inserting ``or for the 
        scholarship program under paragraph (1)(E)'' after ``under 
        paragraph (1)(D) for the National Flagship Language Initiative 
        described in subsection (i)''; and
            (B) by adding at the end the following: ``For the 
        authorization of appropriations for the scholarship program 
        under paragraph (1)(E), see section 812.''.
    (3) Section 803(d)(4)(E) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1903(d)(4)(E)) is 
amended by inserting before the period the following: ``and section 
802(a)(1)(E) (relating to scholarship programs for advanced English 
language studies by heritage community residents)''.
    (b) Funding.--The David L. Boren National Security Education Act of 
1991 (50 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the 
following new section:

``SEC. 812. FUNDING FOR SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM FOR CERTAIN HERITAGE 
                    COMMUNITY RESIDENTS.

    ``There is authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary for each 
fiscal year, beginning with fiscal year 2005, $4,000,000, to carry out 
the scholarship programs for English language studies by certain 
heritage community residents under section 802(a)(1)(E).

SEC. 1054. SENSE OF CONGRESS WITH RESPECT TO LANGUAGE AND EDUCATION FOR 
                    THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY; REPORTS.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that there 
should be within the Office of the National Intelligence Director a 
senior official responsible to assist the National Intelligence 
Director in carrying out the Director's responsibilities for 
establishing policies and procedure for foreign language education and 
training of the intelligence community. The duties of such official 
should include the following:
            (1) Overseeing and coordinating requirements for foreign 
        language education and training of the intelligence community.
            (2) Establishing policy, standards, and priorities relating 
        to such requirements.
            (3) Identifying languages that are critical to the 
        capability of the intelligence community to carry out national 
        security activities of the United States.
            (4) Monitoring the allocation of resources for foreign 
        language education and training in order to ensure the 
        requirements of the intelligence community with respect to 
        foreign language proficiency are met.
    (b) Reports.--Not later than one year after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the National Intelligence Director shall submit 
to Congress the following reports:
            (1) A report that identifies--
                    (A) skills and processes involved in learning a 
                foreign language; and
                    (B) characteristics and teaching techniques that 
                are most effective in teaching foreign languages.
            (2)(A) A report that identifies foreign language heritage 
        communities, particularly such communities that include 
        speakers of languages that are critical to the national 
        security of the United States.
            (B) For purposes of subparagraph (A), the term ``foreign 
        language heritage community'' means a community of residents or 
        citizens of the United States--
                    (i) who are native speakers of, or who have fluency 
                in, a foreign language; and
                    (ii) who should be actively recruited for 
                employment by Federal security agencies with a need for 
                linguists.
            (3) A report on--
                    (A) the estimated cost of establishing a program 
                under which the heads of elements of the intelligence 
                community agree to repay employees of the intelligence 
                community for any student loan taken out by that 
                employee for the study of foreign languages critical 
                for the national security of the United States; and
                    (B) the effectiveness of such a program in 
                recruiting and retaining highly qualified personnel in 
                the intelligence community.

SEC. 1055. ADVANCEMENT OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES CRITICAL TO THE 
                    INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

    (a) In General.--Title X of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
U.S.C.) is amended--
            (1) by inserting before section 1001 (50 U.S.C. 441g) the 
        following:

                ``Subtitle A--Science and Technology'';

        and
            (2) by adding at the end the following new subtitles:

                ``Subtitle B--Foreign Languages Program

     ``program on advancement of foreign languages critical to the 
                         intelligence community
    ``Sec. 1011. (a) Establishment of Program.--The Secretary of 
Defense and the National Intelligence Director may jointly establish a 
program to advance foreign languages skills in languages that are 
critical to the capability of the intelligence community to carry out 
national security activities of the United States (hereinafter in this 
subtitle referred to as the `Foreign Languages Program').
    ``(b) Identification of Requisite Actions.--In order to carry out 
the Foreign Languages Program, the Secretary of Defense and the 
National Intelligence Director shall jointly determine actions required 
to improve the education of personnel in the intelligence community in 
foreign languages that are critical to the capability of the 
intelligence community to carry out national security activities of the 
United States to meet the long-term intelligence needs of the United 
States.
                        ``education partnerships
    ``Sec. 1012. (a) In General.--In carrying out the Foreign Languages 
Program, the head of a department or agency containing an element of an 
intelligence community entity may enter into one or more education 
partnership agreements with educational institutions in the United 
States in order to encourage and enhance the study of foreign languages 
that are critical to the capability of the intelligence community to 
carry out national security activities of the United States in 
educational institutions.
    ``(b) Assistance Provided Under Educational Partnership 
Agreements.--Under an educational partnership agreement entered into 
with an educational institution pursuant to this section, the head of 
an element of an intelligence community entity may provide the 
following assistance to the educational institution:
            ``(1) The loan of equipment and instructional materials of 
        the element of the intelligence community entity to the 
        educational institution for any purpose and duration that the 
        head determines to be appropriate.
            ``(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law relating 
        to transfers of surplus property, the transfer to the 
        educational institution of any computer equipment, or other 
        equipment, that is--
                    ``(A) commonly used by educational institutions;
                    ``(B) surplus to the needs of the entity; and
                    ``(C) determined by the head of the element to be 
                appropriate for support of such agreement.
            ``(3) The provision of dedicated personnel to the 
        educational institution--
                    ``(A) to teach courses in foreign languages that 
                are critical to the capability of the intelligence 
                community to carry out national security activities of 
                the United States; or
                    ``(B) to assist in the development of such courses 
                and materials for the institution.
            ``(4) The involvement of faculty and students of the 
        educational institution in research projects of the element of 
        the intelligence community entity.
            ``(5) Cooperation with the educational institution in 
        developing a program under which students receive academic 
        credit at the educational institution for work on research 
        projects of the element of the intelligence community entity.
            ``(6) The provision of academic and career advice and 
        assistance to students of the educational institution.
            ``(7) The provision of cash awards and other items that the 
        head of the element of the intelligence community entity 
        determines to be appropriate.
                          ``voluntary services
    ``Sec. 1013. (a) Authority To Accept Services.--Notwithstanding 
section 1342 of title 31, United States Code, and subject to subsection 
(b), the Foreign Languages Program under section 1011 shall include 
authority for the head of an element of an intelligence community 
entity to accept from any individual who is dedicated personnel (as 
defined in section 1016(3)) voluntary services in support of the 
activities authorized by this subtitle.
    ``(b) Requirements and Limitations.--(1) In accepting voluntary 
services from an individual under subsection (a), the head of the 
element shall--
            ``(A) supervise the individual to the same extent as the 
        head of the element would supervise a compensated employee of 
        that element providing similar services; and
            ``(B) ensure that the individual is licensed, privileged, 
        has appropriate educational or experiential credentials, or is 
        otherwise qualified under applicable law or regulations to 
        provide such services.
    ``(2) In accepting voluntary services from an individual under 
subsection (a), the head of an element of the intelligence community 
entity may not--
            ``(A) place the individual in a policymaking position, or 
        other position performing inherently government functions; or
            ``(B) compensate the individual for the provision of such 
        services.
    ``(c) Authority To Recruit and Train Individuals Providing 
Services.--The head of an element of an intelligence community entity 
may recruit and train individuals to provide voluntary services 
accepted under subsection (a).
    ``(d) Status of Individuals Providing Services.--(1) Subject to 
paragraph (2), while providing voluntary services accepted under 
subsection (a) or receiving training under subsection (c), an 
individual shall be considered to be an employee of the Federal 
Government only for purposes of the following provisions of law:
            ``(A) Section 552a of title 5, United States Code (relating 
        to maintenance of records on individuals).
            ``(B) Chapter 11 of title 18, United States Code (relating 
        to conflicts of interest).
    ``(2)(A) With respect to voluntary services accepted under 
paragraph (1) provided by an individual that are within the scope of 
the services so accepted, the individual is deemed to be a volunteer of 
a governmental entity or nonprofit institution for purposes of the 
Volunteer Protection Act of 1997 (42 U.S.C. 14501 et seq.).
    ``(B) In the case of any claim against such an individual with 
respect to the provision of such services, section 4(d) of such Act (42 
U.S.C. 14503(d)) shall not apply.
    ``(3) Acceptance of voluntary services under this section shall 
have no bearing on the issuance or renewal of a security clearance.
    ``(e) Reimbursement of Incidental Expenses.--(1) The head of an 
element of the intelligence community entity may reimburse an 
individual for incidental expenses incurred by the individual in 
providing voluntary services accepted under subsection (a). The head of 
an element of the intelligence community entity shall determine which 
expenses are eligible for reimbursement under this subsection.
    ``(2) Reimbursement under paragraph (1) may be made from 
appropriated or nonappropriated funds.
    ``(f) Authority To Install Equipment.--(1) The head of an element 
of the intelligence community may install telephone lines and any 
necessary telecommunication equipment in the private residences of 
individuals who provide voluntary services accepted under subsection 
(a).
    ``(2) The head of an element of the intelligence community may pay 
the charges incurred for the use of equipment installed under paragraph 
(1) for authorized purposes.
    ``(3) Notwithstanding section 1348 of title 31, United States Code, 
the head of an element of the intelligence community entity may use 
appropriated funds or nonappropriated funds of the element in carrying 
out this subsection.
                             ``regulations
    ``Sec. 1014. (a) In General.--The Secretary of Defense and the 
National Intelligence Director jointly shall promulgate regulations 
necessary to carry out the Foreign Languages Program authorized under 
this subtitle.
    ``(b) Elements of the Intelligence Community.--Each head of an 
element of an intelligence community entity shall prescribe regulations 
to carry out sections 1012 and 1013 with respect to that element 
including the following:
            ``(1) Procedures to be utilized for the acceptance of 
        voluntary services under section 1013.
            ``(2) Procedures and requirements relating to the 
        installation of equipment under section 1013(g).
                             ``definitions
    ``Sec. 1015. In this subtitle:
            ``(1) The term `intelligence community entity' means an 
        agency, office, bureau, or element referred to in subparagraphs 
        (B) through (K) of section 3(4).
            ``(2) The term `educational institution' means--
                    ``(A) a local educational agency (as that term is 
                defined in section 9101(26) of the Elementary and 
                Secondary Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 7801(26))),
                    ``(B) an institution of higher education (as 
                defined in section 102 of the Higher Education Act of 
                1965 (20 U.S.C. 1002) other than institutions referred 
                to in subsection (a)(1)(C) of such section), or
                    ``(C) any other nonprofit institution that provides 
                instruction of foreign languages in languages that are 
                critical to the capability of the intelligence 
                community to carry out national security activities of 
                the United States.
            ``(3) The term `dedicated personnel' means employees of the 
        intelligence community and private citizens (including former 
        civilian employees of the Federal Government who have been 
        voluntarily separated, and members of the United States Armed 
        Forces who have been honorably discharged or generally 
        discharged under honorable circumstances, and rehired on a 
        voluntary basis specifically to perform the activities 
        authorized under this subtitle).

             ``Subtitle C--Additional Education Provisions

 ``assignment of intelligence community personnel as language students
    ``Sec. 1021. (a) In General.--(1) The National Intelligence 
Director, acting through the heads of the elements of the intelligence 
community, may provide for the assignment of military and civilian 
personnel described in paragraph (2) as students at accredited 
professional, technical, or other institutions of higher education for 
training at the graduate or undergraduate level in foreign languages 
required for the conduct of duties and responsibilities of such 
positions.
    ``(2) Personnel referred to in paragraph (1) are personnel of the 
elements of the intelligence community who serve in analysts positions 
in such elements and who require foreign language expertise required 
for the conduct of duties and responsibilities of such positions.
    ``(b) Authority for Reimbursement of Costs of Tuition and 
Training.--(1) The Director may reimburse an employee assigned under 
subsection (a) for the total cost of the training described in 
subsection (a), including costs of educational and supplementary 
reading materials.
    ``(2) The authority under paragraph (1) shall apply to employees 
who are assigned on a full-time or part-time basis.
    ``(3) Reimbursement under paragraph (1) may be made from 
appropriated or nonappropriated funds.
    ``(c) Relationship to Compensation as an Analyst.--Reimbursement 
under this section to an employee who is an analyst is in addition to 
any benefits, allowances, travels, or other compensation the employee 
is entitled to by reason of serving in such an analyst position.''.
    (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents for the National 
Security Act of 1947 is amended by striking the item relating to 
section 1001 and inserting the following new items:

                  ``Subtitle A--Science and Technology

``Sec. 1001. Scholarships and work-study for pursuit of graduate 
degrees in science and technology.

                ``Subtitle B--Foreign Languages Program

``Sec. 1011. Program on advancement of foreign languages critical to 
the intelligence community.
``Sec. 1012. Education partnerships.
``Sec. 1013. Voluntary services.
``Sec. 1014. Regulations.
``Sec. 1015. Definitions.

             ``Subtitle C--Additional Education Provisions

``Sec. 1021. Assignment of intelligence community personnel as language 
students.''.

SEC. 1056. PILOT PROJECT FOR CIVILIAN LINGUIST RESERVE CORPS.

    (a) Pilot Project.--The National Intelligence Director shall 
conduct a pilot project to establish a Civilian Linguist Reserve Corps 
comprised of United States citizens with advanced levels of proficiency 
in foreign languages who would be available upon a call of the 
President to perform such service or duties with respect to such 
foreign languages in the Federal Government as the President may 
specify.
    (b) Conduct of Project.--Taking into account the findings and 
recommendations contained in the report required under section 325 of 
the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 
107-306; 116 Stat. 2393), in conducting the pilot project under 
subsection (a) the National Intelligence Director shall--
            (1) identify several foreign languages that are critical 
        for the national security of the United States;
            (2) identify United States citizens with advanced levels of 
        proficiency in those foreign languages who would be available 
        to perform the services and duties referred to in subsection 
        (a); and
            (3) implement a call for the performance of such services 
        and duties.
    (c) Duration of Project.--The pilot project under subsection (a) 
shall be conducted for a three-year period.
    (d) Authority To Enter Into Contracts.--The National Intelligence 
Director may enter into contracts with appropriate agencies or entities 
to carry out the pilot project under subsection (a).
    (e) Reports.--(1) The National Intelligence Director shall submit 
to Congress an initial and a final report on the pilot project 
conducted under subsection (a).
    (2) Each report required under paragraph (1) shall contain 
information on the operation of the pilot project, the success of the 
pilot project in carrying out the objectives of the establishment of a 
Civilian Linguist Reserve Corps, and recommendations for the 
continuation or expansion of the pilot project.
    (3) The final report shall be submitted not later than 6 months 
after the completion of the project.
    (f) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be 
appropriated to the National Intelligence Director such sums as are 
necessary for each of fiscal years 2005, 2006, and 2007 in order to 
carry out the pilot project under subsection (a).

SEC. 1057. CODIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NATIONAL VIRTUAL 
                    TRANSLATION CENTER.

    (a) In General.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
U.S.C. 402 et seq.), as amended by section 1021(a), is further amended 
by adding at the end the following new section:
                 ``national virtual translation center
    ``Sec. 120. (a) In General.--There is an element of the 
intelligence community known as the National Virtual Translation Center 
under the direction of the National Intelligence Director.
    ``(b) Function.--The National Virtual Translation Center shall 
provide for timely and accurate translations of foreign intelligence 
for all other elements of the intelligence community.
    ``(c) Facilitating Access to Translations.--In order to minimize 
the need for a central facility for the National Virtual Translation 
Center, the Center shall--
            ``(1) use state-of-the-art communications technology;
            ``(2) integrate existing translation capabilities in the 
        intelligence community; and
            ``(3) use remote-connection capacities.
    ``(d) Use of Secure Facilities.--Personnel of the National Virtual 
Translation Center may carry out duties of the Center at any location 
that--
            ``(1) has been certified as a secure facility by an agency 
        or department of the United States; and
            ``(2) the National Intelligence Director determines to be 
        appropriate for such purpose.''.
    (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections for that Act, as 
amended by section 1021(b), is further amended by inserting after the 
item relating to section 119 the following new item:

``Sec. 120. National Virtual Translation Center.''.

SEC. 1058. REPORT ON RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION OF QUALIFIED INSTRUCTORS 
                    OF THE DEFENSE LANGUAGE INSTITUTE.

    (a) Study.--The Secretary of Defense shall conduct a study on 
methods to improve the recruitment and retention of qualified foreign 
language instructors at the Foreign Language Center of the Defense 
Language Institute. In conducting the study, the Secretary shall 
consider, in the case of a foreign language instructor who is an alien, 
to expeditiously adjust the status of the alien from a temporary status 
to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.
    (b) Report.--(1) Not later than one year after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees a report on the study conducted 
under subsection (a), and shall include in that report recommendations 
for such changes in legislation and regulation as the Secretary 
determines to be appropriate.
    (2) Definition.--In this subsection, the term ``appropriate 
congressional committees'' means the following:
            (A) The Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee 
        on Armed Services of the Senate.
            (B) The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the 
        Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives.

     Subtitle F--Additional Improvements of Intelligence Activities

SEC. 1061. PERMANENT EXTENSION OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY VOLUNTARY 
                    SEPARATION INCENTIVE PROGRAM.

    (a) Extension of Program.--Section 2 of the Central Intelligence 
Agency Voluntary Separation Pay Act (50 U.S.C. 403-4 note) is amended--
            (1) by striking subsection (f); and
            (2) by redesignating subsections (g) and (h) as subsections 
        (f) and (g), respectively.
    (b) Termination of Funds Remittance Requirement.--(1) Section 2 of 
such Act (50 U.S.C. 403-4 note) is further amended by striking 
subsection (i).
    (2) Section 4(a)(2)(B)(ii) of the Federal Workforce Restructuring 
Act of 1994 (5 U.S.C. 8331 note) is amended by striking ``, or section 
2 of the Central Intelligence Agency Voluntary Separation Pay Act 
(Public Law 103-36; 107 Stat. 104)''.

SEC. 1062. NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES PANEL.

    The National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is 
amended by adding at the end the following new section:
    ``Sec. 19. (a) There is established the National Security Agency 
Emerging Technologies Panel. The panel is a standing panel of the 
National Security Agency. The panel shall be appointed by, and shall 
report directly to, the Director.
    ``(b) The National Security Agency Emerging Technologies Panel 
shall study and assess, and periodically advise the Director on, the 
research, development, and application of existing and emerging science 
and technology advances, advances on encryption, and other topics.
    ``(c) The Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) shall not 
apply with respect to the National Security Agency Emerging 
Technologies Panel.''.

              Subtitle G--Conforming and Other Amendments

SEC. 1071. CONFORMING AMENDMENTS RELATING TO ROLES OF NATIONAL 
                    INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR AND DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL 
                    INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

    (a) National Security Act of 1947.--(1) The National Security Act 
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by striking ``Director of 
Central Intelligence'' each place it appears in the following 
provisions and inserting ``National Intelligence Director'':
            (A) Section 3(5)(B) (50 U.S.C. 401a(5)(B)).
            (B) Section 101(h)(2)(A) (50 U.S.C. 402(h)(2)(A)).
            (C) Section 101(h)(5) (50 U.S.C. 402(h)(5)).
            (D) Section 101(i)(2)(A) (50 U.S.C. 402(i)(2)(A)).
            (E) Section 101(j) (50 U.S.C. 402(j)).
            (F) Section 105(a) (50 U.S.C. 403-5(a)).
            (G) Section 105(b)(6)(A) (50 U.S.C. 403-5(b)(6)(A)).
            (H) Section 105B(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 403-5b(a)(1)).
            (I) Section 105B(b) (50 U.S.C. 403-5b(b)), the first place 
        it appears.
            (J) Section 110(b) (50 U.S.C. 404e(b)).
            (K) Section 110(c) (50 U.S.C. 404e(c)).
            (L) Section 112(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 404g(a)(1)).
            (M) Section 112(d)(1) (50 U.S.C. 404g(d)(1)).
            (N) Section 113(b)(2)(A) (50 U.S.C. 404h(b)(2)(A)).
            (O) Section 114(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 404i(a)(1)).
            (P) Section 114(b)(1) (50 U.S.C. 404i(b)(1)).
            (R) Section 115(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 404j(a)(1)).
            (S) Section 115(b) (50 U.S.C. 404j(b)).
            (T) Section 115(c)(1)(B) (50 U.S.C. 404j(c)(1)(B)).
            (U) Section 116(a) (50 U.S.C. 404k(a)).
            (V) Section 117(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 404l(a)(1)).
            (W) Section 303(a) (50 U.S.C. 405(a)), both places it 
        appears.
            (X) Section 501(d) (50 U.S.C. 413(d)).
            (Y) Section 502(a) (50 U.S.C. 413a(a)).
            (Z) Section 502(c) (50 U.S.C. 413a(c)).
            (AA) Section 503(b) (50 U.S.C. 413b(b)).
            (BB) Section 504(a)(3)(C) (50 U.S.C. 414(a)(3)(C)).
            (CC) Section 504(d)(2) (50 U.S.C. 414(d)(2)).
            (DD) Section 506A(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 415a-1(a)(1)).
            (EE) Section 603(a) (50 U.S.C. 423(a)).
            (FF) Section 702(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 432(a)(1)).
            (GG) Section 702(a)(6)(B)(viii) (50 U.S.C. 
        432(a)(6)(B)(viii)).
            (HH) Section 702(b)(1) (50 U.S.C. 432(b)(1)), both places 
        it appears.
            (II) Section 703(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 432a(a)(1)).
            (JJ) Section 703(a)(6)(B)(viii) (50 U.S.C. 
        432a(a)(6)(B)(viii)).
            (KK) Section 703(b)(1) (50 U.S.C. 432a(b)(1)), both places 
        it appears.
            (LL) Section 704(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 432b(a)(1)).
            (MM) Section 704(f)(2)(H) (50 U.S.C. 432b(f)(2)(H)).
            (NN) Section 704(g)(1)) (50 U.S.C. 432b(g)(1)), both places 
        it appears.
            (OO) Section 1001(a) (50 U.S.C. 441g(a)).
            (PP) Section 1102(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 442a(a)(1)).
            (QQ) Section 1102(b)(1) (50 U.S.C. 442a(b)(1)).
            (RR) Section 1102(c)(1) (50 U.S.C. 442a(c)(1)).
            (SS) Section 1102(d) (50 U.S.C. 442a(d)).
    (2) That Act is further amended by striking ``of Central 
Intelligence'' each place it appears in the following provisions:
            (A) Section 105(a)(2) (50 U.S.C. 403-5(a)(2)).
            (B) Section 105B(a)(2) (50 U.S.C. 403-5b(a)(2)).
            (C) Section 105B(b) (50 U.S.C. 403-5b(b)), the second place 
        it appears.
    (3) That Act is further amended by striking ``Director'' each place 
it appears in the following provisions and inserting ``National 
Intelligence Director'':
            (A) Section 114(c) (50 U.S.C. 404i(c)).
            (B) Section 116(b) (50 U.S.C. 404k(b)).
            (C) Section 1001(b) (50 U.S.C. 441g(b)).
            (C) Section 1001(c) (50 U.S.C. 441g(c)), the first place it 
        appears.
            (D) Section 1001(d)(1)(B) (50 U.S.C. 441g(d)(1)(B)).
            (E) Section 1001(e) (50 U.S.C. 441g(e)), the first place it 
        appears.
    (4) Section 114A of that Act (50 U.S.C. 404i-1) is amended by 
striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``National 
Intelligence Director, the Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency''
    (5) Section 504(a)(2) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 414(a)(2)) is amended 
by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting 
``Director of the Central Intelligence Agency''.
    (6) Section 701 of that Act (50 U.S.C. 431) is amended--
            (A) in subsection (a), by striking ``Operational files of 
        the Central Intelligence Agency may be exempted by the Director 
        of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``The Director of the 
        Central Intelligence Agency, with the coordination of the 
        National Intelligence Director, may exempt operational files of 
        the Central Intelligence Agency''; and
            (B) in subsection (g)(1), by striking ``Director of Central 
        Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of the Central 
        Intelligence Agency and the National Intelligence Director''.
    (7) The heading for section 114 of that Act (50 U.S.C. 404i) is 
amended to read as follows:
 ``additional annual reports from the national intelligence director''.
    (b) Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949.--(1) The Central 
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.) is amended by 
striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' each place it appears in 
the following provisions and inserting ``National Intelligence 
Director'':
            (A) Section 6 (50 U.S.C. 403g).
            (B) Section 17(f) (50 U.S.C. 403q(f)), both places it 
        appears.
    (2) That Act is further amended by striking ``of Central 
Intelligence'' in each of the following provisions:
            (A) Section 2 (50 U.S.C. 403b).
            (A) Section 16(c)(1)(B) (50 U.S.C. 403p(c)(1)(B)).
            (B) Section 17(d)(1) (50 U.S.C. 403q(d)(1)).
            (C) Section 20(c) (50 U.S.C. 403t(c)).
    (3) That Act is further amended by striking ``Director of Central 
Intelligence'' each place it appears in the following provisions and 
inserting ``Director of the Central Intelligence Agency'':
            (A) Section 14(b) (50 U.S.C. 403n(b)).
            (B) Section 16(b)(2) (50 U.S.C. 403p(b)(2)).
            (C) Section 16(b)(3) (50 U.S.C. 403p(b)(3)), both places it 
        appears.
            (D) Section 21(g)(1) (50 U.S.C. 403u(g)(1)).
            (E) Section 21(g)(2) (50 U.S.C. 403u(g)(2)).
    (c) Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act.--Section 101 of the 
Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2001) is amended 
by striking paragraph (2) and inserting the following new paragraph 
(2):
            ``(2) Director.--The term `Director' means the Director of 
        the Central Intelligence Agency.''.
    (d) CIA Voluntary Separation Pay Act.--Subsection (a)(1) of section 
2 of the Central Intelligence Agency Voluntary Separation Pay Act (50 
U.S.C. 2001 note) is amended to read as follows:
            ``(1) the term `Director' means the Director of the Central 
        Intelligence Agency;''.
    (e) Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.--(1) The Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is 
amended by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' each place it 
appears and inserting ``National Intelligence Director''.
    (f) Classified Information Procedures Act.--Section 9(a) of the 
Classified Information Procedures Act (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended by 
striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``National 
Intelligence Director''.
    (g) Intelligence Authorization Acts.--
            (1) Public law 103-359.--Section 811(c)(6)(C) of the 
        Counterintelligence and Security Enhancements Act of 1994 
        (title VIII of Public Law 103-359) is amended by striking 
        ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``National 
        Intelligence Director''.
            (2) Public law 107-306.--(A) The Intelligence Authorization 
        Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306) is amended by 
        striking ``Director of Central Intelligence, acting as the head 
        of the intelligence community,'' each place it appears in the 
        following provisions and inserting ``National Intelligence 
        Director'':
                    (i) Section 313(a) (50 U.S.C. 404n(a)).
                    (ii) Section 343(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 404n-2(a)(1))
            (B) That Act is further amended by striking ``Director of 
        Central Intelligence'' each place it appears in the following 
        provisions and inserting ``National Intelligence Director'':
                    (i) Section 902(a)(2) (50 U.S.C. 402b(a)(2)).
                    (ii) Section 904(e)(4) (50 U.S.C. 402c(e)(4)).
                    (iii) Section 904(e)(5) (50 U.S.C. 402c(e)(5)).
                    (iv) Section 904(h) (50 U.S.C. 402c(h)), each place 
                it appears.
                    (v) Section 904(m) (50 U.S.C. 402c(m)).
            (C) Section 341 of that Act (50 U.S.C. 404n-1) is amended 
        by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence, acting as the 
        head of the intelligence community, shall establish in the 
        Central Intelligence Agency'' and inserting ``National 
        Intelligence Director shall establish within the Central 
        Intelligence Agency''.
            (D) Section 352(b) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 404-3 note) is 
        amended by striking ``Director'' and inserting ``National 
        Intelligence Director''.
            (3) Public law 108-177.--(A) The Intelligence Authorization 
        Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-177) is amended by 
        striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' each place it 
        appears in the following provisions and inserting ``National 
        Intelligence Director'':
                    (i) Section 317(a) (50 U.S.C. 403-3 note).
                    (ii) Section 317(h)(1).
                    (iii) Section 318(a) (50 U.S.C. 441g note).
                    (iv) Section 319(b) (50 U.S.C. 403 note).
                    (v) Section 341(b) (28 U.S.C. 519 note).
                    (vi) Section 357(a) (50 U.S.C. 403 note).
                    (vii) Section 504(a) (117 Stat. 2634), both places 
                it appears.
            (B) Section 319(f)(2) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 403 note) is 
        amended by striking ``Director'' the first place it appears and 
        inserting ``National Intelligence Director''.
            (C) Section 404 of that Act (18 U.S.C. 4124 note) is 
        amended by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and 
        inserting ``Director of the Central Intelligence Agency''.

SEC. 1072. OTHER CONFORMING AMENDMENTS

    (a) National Security Act of 1947.--(1) Section 101(j) of the 
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402(j)) is amended by striking 
``Deputy Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Deputy 
National Intelligence Director''.
    (2) Section 112(d)(1) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 404g(d)(1)) is amended 
by striking ``section 103(c)(6) of this Act'' and inserting ``section 
102A(g) of this Act''.
    (3) Section 116(b) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 404k(b)) is amended by 
striking ``to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, or with 
respect to employees of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director 
may delegate such authority to the Deputy Director for Operations'' and 
inserting ``to the Deputy National Intelligence Director, or with 
respect to employees of the Central Intelligence Agency, to the 
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency''.
    (4) Section 506A(b)(1) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 415a-1(b)(1)) is 
amended by striking ``Office of the Deputy Director of Central 
Intelligence'' and inserting ``Office of the National Intelligence 
Director''.
    (5) Section 701(c)(3) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 431(c)(3)) is amended 
by striking ``Office of the Director of Central Intelligence'' and 
inserting ``Office of the National Intelligence Director''.
    (6) Section 1001(b) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 441g(b)) is amended by 
striking ``Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for 
Administration'' and inserting ``Office of the National Intelligence 
Director''.
    (b) Central Intelligence Act of 1949.--Section 6 of the Central 
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403g) is amended by striking 
``section 103(c)(7) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
403-3(c)(7))'' and inserting ``section 102A(g) of the National Security 
Act of 1947''.
    (c) Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act.--Section 201(c) of 
the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2011(c)) is 
amended by striking ``paragraph (6) of section 103(c) of the National 
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)) that the Director of Central 
Intelligence'' and inserting ``section 102A(g) of the National Security 
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(1)) that the National Intelligence 
Director''.
    (d) Intelligence Authorization Acts.--
            (1) Public law 107-306.--(A) Section 343(c) of the 
        Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 
        107-306; 50 U.S.C. 404n-2(c)) is amended by striking ``section 
        103(c)(6) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-
        3((c)(6))'' and inserting ``section 102A(g) of the National 
        Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(1))''.
            (B) Section 904 of that Act (50 U.S.C. 402c) is amended--
                    (i) in subsection (c), by striking ``Office of the 
                Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting 
                ``Office of the National Intelligence Director''; and
                    (ii) in subsection (l), by striking ``Office of the 
                Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting 
                ``Office of the National Intelligence Director''.
            (2) Public law 108-177.--Section 317 of the Intelligence 
        Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-177; 50 
        U.S.C. 403-3 note) is amended--
                    (A) in subsection (g), by striking ``Assistant 
                Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis and 
                Production'' and inserting ``Deputy National 
                Intelligence Director''; and
                    (B) in subsection (h)(2)(C), by striking 
                ``Assistant Director'' and inserting ``Deputy National 
                Intelligence Director''.

SEC. 1073. ELEMENTS OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY UNDER NATIONAL SECURITY 
                    ACT OF 1947.

    Paragraph (4) of section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
U.S.C. 401a) is amended to read as follows:
            ``(4) The term `intelligence community' includes the 
        following:
                    ``(A) The Office of the National Intelligence 
                Director.
                    ``(B) The Central Intelligence Agency.
                    ``(C) The National Security Agency.
                    ``(D) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
                    ``(E) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
                    ``(F) The National Reconnaissance Office.
                    ``(G) Other offices within the Department of 
                Defense for the collection of specialized national 
                intelligence through reconnaissance programs.
                    ``(H) The intelligence elements of the Army, the 
                Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, the Federal 
                Bureau of Investigation, and the Department of Energy.
                    ``(I) The Bureau of Intelligence and Research of 
                the Department of State.
                    ``(J) The Office of Intelligence and Analysis of 
                the Department of the Treasury.
                    ``(K) The elements of the Department of Homeland 
                Security concerned with the analysis of intelligence 
                information, including the Office of Intelligence of 
                the Coast Guard.
                    ``(L) Such other elements of any other department 
                or agency as may be designated by the President, or 
                designated jointly by the National Intelligence 
                Director and the head of the department or agency 
                concerned, as an element of the intelligence 
                community.''.

SEC. 1074. REDESIGNATION OF NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM AS 
                    NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.

    (a) Redesignation.--Paragraph (6) of section 3 of the National 
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a) is amended by striking 
``Foreign''.
    (b) Conforming Amendments.--(1) Section 506(a) of the National 
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 415a(a)) is amended by striking 
``National Foreign Intelligence Program'' and inserting ``National 
Intelligence Program''.
    (2) Section 17(f) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 
(50 U.S.C. 403q(f)) is amended by striking ``National Foreign 
Intelligence Program'' and inserting ``National Intelligence Program''.
    (c) Heading Amendment.--The heading of section 506 of that Act is 
amended by striking ``foreign''.

SEC. 1075. REPEAL OF SUPERSEDED AUTHORITIES.

    (a) Appointment of Certain Intelligence Officials.--Section 106 of 
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-6) is repealed.
    (b) Collection Tasking Authority.--Section 111 of the National 
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404f) is repealed.

SEC. 1076. CLERICAL AMENDMENTS TO NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947.

    The table of contents for the National Security Act of 1947 is 
amended--
            (1) by striking the items relating to sections 102 through 
        104 and inserting the following new items:

``Sec. 102. National Intelligence Director.
``Sec. 102A. Responsibilities and authorities of National Intelligence 
Director.
``Sec. 103. Office of the National Intelligence Director.
``Sec. 104. Central Intelligence Agency.
``Sec. 104A. Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.''; and
            (2) by striking the item relating to section 114 and 
        inserting the following new item:

``Sec. 114. Additional annual reports from the National Intelligence 
Director.'';
            and
            (3) by striking the item relating to section 506 and 
        inserting the following new item:

``Sec. 506. Specificity of National Intelligence Program budget amounts 
for counterterrorism, counterproliferation, counternarcotics, and 
counterintelligence''.

SEC. 1077. CONFORMING AMENDMENTS RELATING TO PROHIBITING DUAL SERVICE 
                    OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

    Section 1 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 
403a) is amended--
            (1) by redesignating paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) as 
        paragraphs (1), (2), and (3), respectively; and
            (2) by striking paragraph (2), as so redesignated, and 
        inserting the following new paragraph (2):
    ``(2) `Director' means the Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency; and''.

SEC. 1078. ACCESS TO INSPECTOR GENERAL PROTECTIONS.

    Section 17(a)(1) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 
U.S.C. 403q(a)(1)) is amended by inserting before the semicolon at the 
end the following: ``and to programs and operations of the Office of 
the National Intelligence Director''.

SEC. 1079. GENERAL REFERENCES.

    (a) Director of Central Intelligence as Head of Intelligence 
Community.--Any reference to the Director of Central Intelligence or 
the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in the Director's 
capacity as the head of the intelligence community in any law, 
regulation, document, paper, or other record of the United States shall 
be deemed to be a reference to the National Intelligence Director.
    (b) Director of Central Intelligence as Head of CIA.--Any reference 
to the Director of Central Intelligence or the Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency in the Director's capacity as the head of the 
Central Intelligence Agency in any law, regulation, document, paper, or 
other record of the United States shall be deemed to be a reference to 
the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
    (c) Community Management Staff.--Any reference to the Community 
Management Staff in any law, regulation, document, paper, or other 
record of the United States shall be deemed to be a reference to the 
staff of the Office of the National Intelligence Director.

SEC. 1080. APPLICATION OF OTHER LAWS.

    (a) Political Service of Personnel.--Section 7323(b)(2)(B)(i) of 
title 5, United States Code, is amended--
            (1) in subclause (XII), by striking ``or'' at the end; and
            (2) by inserting after subclause (XIII) the following new 
        subclause:
                    ``(XIV) the Office of the National Intelligence 
                Director; or''.
    (b) Deletion of Information About Foreign Gifts.--Section 
7342(f)(4) of title 5, United States Code, is amended--
            (1) by inserting ``(A)'' after ``(4)'';
            (2) in subparagraph (A), as so designated, by striking 
        ``the Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``the 
        Director of the Central Intelligence Agency''; and
            (3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
    ``(B) In transmitting such listings for the Office of the National 
Intelligence Director, the National Intelligence Director may delete 
the information described in subparagraphs (A) and (C) of paragraphs 
(2) and (3) if the Director certifies in writing to the Secretary of 
State that the publication of such information could adversely affect 
United States intelligence sources.''.
    (c) Exemption from Financial Disclosures.--Section 105(a)(1) of the 
Ethics in Government Act (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended by inserting ``the 
Office of the National Intelligence Director,'' before ``the Central 
Intelligence Agency''.

   Subtitle H--Transfer, Termination, Transition and Other Provisions

SEC. 1091. TRANSFER OF COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT STAFF.

    (a) Transfer.--There shall be transferred to the Office of the 
National Intelligence Director the staff of the Community Management 
Staff as of the date of the enactment of this Act, including all 
functions and activities discharged by the Community Management Staff 
as of that date.
    (b) Administration.--The National Intelligence Director shall 
administer the Community Management Staff after the date of the 
enactment of this Act as a component of the Office of the National 
Intelligence Director under section 103(b) of the National Security Act 
of 1947, as amended by section 1011(a).

SEC. 1092. TRANSFER OF TERRORIST THREAT INTEGRATION CENTER.

    (a) Transfer.--There shall be transferred to the National 
Counterterrorism Center the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC), 
including all functions and activities discharged by the Terrorist 
Threat Integration Center as of the date of the enactment of this Act.
    (b) Administration.--The Director of the National Counterterrorism 
Center shall administer the Terrorist Threat Integration Center after 
the date of the enactment of this Act as a component of the Directorate 
of Intelligence of the National Counterterrorism Center under section 
119(i) of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by section 
1021(a).

SEC. 1093. TERMINATION OF POSITIONS OF ASSISTANT DIRECTORS OF CENTRAL 
                    INTELLIGENCE.

    (a) Termination.--The positions within the Central Intelligence 
Agency referred to in subsection (b) are hereby abolished.
    (b) Covered Positions.--The positions within the Central 
Intelligence Agency referred to in this subsection are as follows:
            (1) The Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for 
        Collection.
            (2) The Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for 
        Analysis and Production.
            (3) The Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for 
        Administration.

SEC. 1094. IMPLEMENTATION PLAN.

    (a) Submission of Plan.--The President shall transmit to Congress a 
plan for the implementation of this title and the amendments made by 
this title. The plan shall address, at a minimum, the following:
            (1) The transfer of personnel, assets, and obligations to 
        the National Intelligence Director pursuant to this title.
            (2) Any consolidation, reorganization, or streamlining of 
        activities transferred to the National Intelligence Director 
        pursuant to this title.
            (3) The establishment of offices within the Office of the 
        National Intelligence Director to implement the duties and 
        responsibilities of the National Intelligence Director as 
        described in this title.
            (4) Specification of any proposed disposition of property, 
        facilities, contracts, records, and other assets and 
        obligations to be transferred to the National Intelligence 
        Director.
            (5) Recommendations for additional legislative or 
        administrative action as the Director considers appropriate.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the 
permanent location for the headquarters for the Office of the National 
Intelligence Director, should be at a location other than the George 
Bush Center for Intelligence in Langley, Virginia.

SEC. 1095. TRANSITIONAL AUTHORITIES.

    Upon the request of the National Intelligence Director, the head of 
any executive agency may, on a reimbursable basis, provide services or 
detail personnel to the National Intelligence Director.

SEC. 1096. EFFECTIVE DATES.

    (a) In General.--Except as otherwise expressly provided in this 
Act, this title and the amendments made by this title shall take effect 
on the date of the enactment of this Act.
    (b) Specific Effective Dates.--(1)(A) Not later than 60 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the National Intelligence 
Director shall first appoint individuals to positions within the Office 
of the National Intelligence Director.
    (B) Subparagraph (A) shall not apply with respect to the Deputy 
National Intelligence Director.
    (2) Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this 
Act, the President shall transmit to Congress the implementation plan 
required under section 1904.
    (3) Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this 
Act, the National Intelligence Director shall prescribe regulations, 
policies, procedures, standards, and guidelines required under section 
102A of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by section 
1011(a).

             TITLE II--TERRORISM PREVENTION AND PROSECUTION

     Subtitle A--Individual Terrorists as Agents of Foreign Powers

SEC. 2001. PRESUMPTION THAT CERTAIN NON-UNITED STATES PERSONS ENGAGING 
                    IN INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM ARE AGENTS OF FOREIGN 
                    POWERS FOR PURPOSES OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE 
                    SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978.

    (a) Presumption.--(1) The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 101 
the following new section:
``presumption of treatment of certain non-united states persons engaged 
         in international terrorism as agents of foreign powers
    ``Sec. 101A. Upon application by the Federal official applying for 
an order under this Act, the court may presume that a non-United States 
person who is knowingly engaged in sabotage or international terrorism, 
or activities that are in preparation therefor, is an agent of a 
foreign power under section 101(b)(2)(C).''.
    (2) The table of contents for that Act is amended by inserting 
after the item relating to section 101 the following new item:

``Sec. 101A. Presumption of treatment of certain non-United States 
persons engaged in international terrorism as agents of foreign 
powers.''.
    (b) Sunset.--The amendments made by subsection (a) shall be subject 
to the sunset provision in section 224 of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 
(Public Law 107-56; 115 Stat. 295), including the exception provided in 
subsection (b) of such section 224.

       Subtitle B--Stop Terrorist and Military Hoaxes Act of 2004

SEC. 2021. SHORT TITLE.

    This subtitle may be cited as the ``Stop Terrorist and Military 
Hoaxes Act of 2004''.

SEC. 2022. HOAXES AND RECOVERY COSTS.

    (a) Prohibition on Hoaxes.--Chapter 47 of title 18, United States 
Code, is amended by inserting after section 1037 the following:

``Sec. 1038. False information and hoaxes

    ``(a) Criminal Violation.--
            ``(1) In general.--Whoever engages in any conduct with 
        intent to convey false or misleading information under 
        circumstances where such information may reasonably be believed 
        and where such information indicates that an activity has 
        taken, is taking, or will take place that would constitute a 
        violation of chapter 2, 10, 11B, 39, 40, 44, 111, or 113B of 
        this title, section 236 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 
        U.S.C. 2284), or section 46502, the second sentence of section 
        46504, section 46505 (b)(3) or (c), section 46506 if homicide 
        or attempted homicide is involved, or section 60123(b) of title 
        49 shall--
                    ``(A) be fined under this title or imprisoned not 
                more than 5 years, or both;
                    ``(B) if serious bodily injury results, be fined 
                under this title or imprisoned not more than 25 years, 
                or both; and
                    ``(C) if death results, be fined under this title 
                or imprisoned for any number of years up to life, or 
                both.
            ``(2) Armed forces.--Whoever, without lawful authority, 
        makes a false statement, with intent to convey false or 
        misleading information, about the death, injury, capture, or 
        disappearance of a member of the Armed Forces of the United 
        States during a war or armed conflict in which the United 
        States is engaged, shall--
                    ``(A) be fined under this title or imprisoned not 
                more than 5 years, or both;
                    ``(B) if serious bodily injury results, be fined 
                under this title or imprisoned not more than 25 years, 
                or both; and
                    ``(C) if death results, be fined under this title 
                or imprisoned for any number of years up to life, or 
                both.
    ``(b) Civil Action.--Whoever knowingly engages in any conduct with 
intent to convey false or misleading information under circumstances 
where such information may reasonably be believed and where such 
information indicates that an activity has taken, is taking, or will 
take place that would constitute a violation of chapter 2, 10, 11B, 39, 
40, 44, 111, or 113B of this title, section 236 of the Atomic Energy 
Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2284), or section 46502, the second sentence of 
section 46504, section 46505 (b)(3) or (c), section 46506 if homicide 
or attempted homicide is involved, or section 60123(b) of title 49 is 
liable in a civil action to any party incurring expenses incident to 
any emergency or investigative response to that conduct, for those 
expenses.
    ``(c) Reimbursement.--
            ``(1) In general.--The court, in imposing a sentence on a 
        defendant who has been convicted of an offense under subsection 
        (a), shall order the defendant to reimburse any state or local 
        government, or private not-for-profit organization that 
        provides fire or rescue service incurring expenses incident to 
        any emergency or investigative response to that conduct, for 
        those expenses.
            ``(2) Liability.--A person ordered to make reimbursement 
        under this subsection shall be jointly and severally liable for 
        such expenses with each other person, if any, who is ordered to 
        make reimbursement under this subsection for the same expenses.
            ``(3) Civil judgment.--An order of reimbursement under this 
        subsection shall, for the purposes of enforcement, be treated 
        as a civil judgment.
    ``(d) Activities of Law Enforcement.--This section does not 
prohibit any lawfully authorized investigative, protective, or 
intelligence activity of a law enforcement agency of the United States, 
a State, or political subdivision of a State, or of an intelligence 
agency of the United States.''.
    (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections as the beginning of 
chapter 47 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding after 
the item for section 1037 the following:

``1038. False information and hoaxes.''.

SEC. 2023. OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE AND FALSE STATEMENTS IN TERRORISM 
                    CASES.

    (a) Enhanced Penalty.--Section 1001(a) and the third undesignated 
paragraph of section 1505 of title 18, United States Code, are amended 
by striking ``be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 
years, or both'' and inserting ``be fined under this title, imprisoned 
not more than 5 years or, if the matter relates to international or 
domestic terrorism (as defined in section 2331), imprisoned not more 
than 10 years, or both''.
    (b) Sentencing Guidelines.--Not later than 30 days of the enactment 
of this section, the United States Sentencing Commission shall amend 
the Sentencing Guidelines to provide for an increased offense level for 
an offense under sections 1001(a) and 1505 of title 18, United States 
Code, if the offense involves a matter relating to international or 
domestic terrorism, as defined in section 2331 of such title.

SEC. 2024. CLARIFICATION OF DEFINITION.

    Section 1958 of title 18, United States Code, is amended--
            (1) in subsection (a), by striking ``facility in'' and 
        inserting ``facility of''; and
            (2) in subsection (b)(2), by inserting ``or foreign'' after 
        ``interstate''.

 Subtitle C--Material Support to Terrorism Prohibition Enhancement Act 
                                of 2004

SEC. 2041. SHORT TITLE.

    This subtitle may be cited as the ``Material Support to Terrorism 
Prohibition Enhancement Act of 2004''.

SEC. 2042. RECEIVING MILITARY-TYPE TRAINING FROM A FOREIGN TERRORIST 
                    ORGANIZATION.

    Chapter 113B of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding 
after section 2339C the following new section:

``Sec. 2339D. Receiving military-type training from a foreign terrorist 
                    organization

    ``(a) Offense.--Whoever knowingly receives military-type training 
from or on behalf of any organization designated at the time of the 
training by the Secretary of State under section 219(a)(1) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act as a foreign terrorist organization 
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for ten years, or both. 
To violate this subsection, a person must have knowledge that the 
organization is a designated terrorist organization (as defined in 
subsection (c)(4)), that the organization has engaged or engages in 
terrorist activity (as defined in section 212 of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act), or that the organization has engaged or engages in 
terrorism (as defined in section 140(d)(2) of the Foreign Relations 
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989).
    ``(b) Extraterritorial Jurisdiction.--There is extraterritorial 
Federal jurisdiction over an offense under this section. There is 
jurisdiction over an offense under subsection (a) if--
            ``(1) an offender is a national of the United States (as 
        defined in 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and Nationality Act) 
        or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the 
        United States (as defined in section 101(a)(20) of the 
        Immigration and Nationality Act);
            ``(2) an offender is a stateless person whose habitual 
        residence is in the United States;
            ``(3) after the conduct required for the offense occurs an 
        offender is brought into or found in the United States, even if 
        the conduct required for the offense occurs outside the United 
        States;
            ``(4) the offense occurs in whole or in part within the 
        United States;
            ``(5) the offense occurs in or affects interstate or 
        foreign commerce;
            ``(6) an offender aids or abets any person over whom 
        jurisdiction exists under this paragraph in committing an 
        offense under subsection (a) or conspires with any person over 
        whom jurisdiction exists under this paragraph to commit an 
        offense under subsection (a).
    ``(c) Definitions.--As used in this section--
            ``(1) the term `military-type training' includes training 
        in means or methods that can cause death or serious bodily 
        injury, destroy or damage property, or disrupt services to 
        critical infrastructure, or training on the use, storage, 
        production, or assembly of any explosive, firearm or other 
        weapon, including any weapon of mass destruction (as defined in 
        section 2232a(c)(2));
            ``(2) the term `serious bodily injury' has the meaning 
        given that term in section 1365(h)(3);
            ``(3) the term `critical infrastructure' means systems and 
        assets vital to national defense, national security, economic 
        security, public health or safety including both regional and 
        national infrastructure. Critical infrastructure may be 
        publicly or privately owned; examples of critical 
        infrastructure include gas and oil production, storage, or 
        delivery systems, water supply systems, telecommunications 
        networks, electrical power generation or delivery systems, 
        financing and banking systems, emergency services (including 
        medical, police, fire, and rescue services), and transportation 
        systems and services (including highways, mass transit, 
        airlines, and airports); and
            ``(4) the term `foreign terrorist organization' means an 
        organization designated as a terrorist organization under 
        section 219(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.''.

SEC. 2043. PROVIDING MATERIAL SUPPORT TO TERRORISM.

    (a) Additions to Offense of Providing Material Support to 
Terrorists.--Section 2339A(a) of title 18, United States Code, is 
amended--
            (1) by designating the first sentence as paragraph (1);
            (2) by designating the second sentence as paragraph (3);
            (3) by inserting after paragraph (1) as so designated by 
        this subsection the following:
            ``(2) (A) Whoever in a circumstance described in 
        subparagraph (B) provides material support or resources or 
        conceals or disguises the nature, location, source, or 
        ownership of material support or resources, knowing or 
        intending that they are to be used in preparation for, or in 
        carrying out, an act of international or domestic terrorism (as 
        defined in section 2331), or in preparation for, or in carrying 
        out, the concealment or escape from the commission of any such 
        act, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be punished as 
        provided under paragraph (1) for an offense under that 
        paragraph.
            ``(B) The circumstances referred to in subparagraph (A) are 
        any of the following:
                    ``(i) The offense occurs in or affects interstate 
                or foreign commerce.
                    ``(ii) The act of terrorism is an act of 
                international or domestic terrorism that violates the 
                criminal law of the United States.
                    ``(iii) The act of terrorism is an act of domestic 
                terrorism that appears to be intended to influence the 
                policy, or affect the conduct, of the Government of the 
                United States or a foreign government.
                    ``(iv) An offender, acting within the United States 
                or outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United 
                States, is a national of the United States (as defined 
                in section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and 
                Nationality Act, an alien lawfully admitted for 
                permanent residence in the United States (as defined in 
                section 101(a)(20) of the Immigration and Nationality 
                Act , or a stateless person whose habitual residence is 
                in the United States, and the act of terrorism is an 
                act of international terrorism that appears to be 
                intended to influence the policy, or affect the 
                conduct, of the Government of the United States or a 
                foreign government.
                    ``(v) An offender, acting within the United States, 
                is an alien, and the act of terrorism is an act of 
                international terrorism that appears to be intended to 
                influence the policy, or affect the conduct, of the 
                Government of the United States or a foreign 
                government.
                    ``(vi) An offender, acting outside the territorial 
                jurisdiction of the United States, is an alien and the 
                act of terrorism is an act of international terrorism 
                that appears to be intended to influence the policy of, 
                or affect the conduct of, the Government of the United 
                States.
                    ``(vii) An offender aids or abets any person over 
                whom jurisdiction exists under this paragraph in 
                committing an offense under this paragraph or conspires 
                with any person over whom jurisdiction exists under 
                this paragraph to commit an offense under this 
                paragraph.''; and
            (4) by inserting ``act or'' after ``underlying''.
    (b) Definitions.--Section 2339A(b) of title 18, United States Code, 
is amended--
            (1) by striking ``In this'' and inserting ``(1) In this'';
            (2) by inserting ``any property, tangible or intangible, or 
        service, including'' after ``means'';
            (3) by inserting ``(one or more individuals who may be or 
        include oneself)'' after ``personnel'';
            (4) by inserting ``and'' before ``transportation'';
            (5) by striking ``and other physical assets''; and
            (6) by adding at the end the following:
    ``(2) As used in this subsection, the term `training' means 
instruction or teaching designed to impart a specific skill, as opposed 
to general knowledge, and the term `expert advice or assistance' means 
advice or assistance derived from scientific, technical or other 
specialized knowledge.''.
    (c) Addition to Offense of Providing Material Support to Terrorist 
Organizations.--Section 2339B(a)(1) of title 18, United States Code, is 
amended--
            (1) by striking ``, within the United States or subject to 
        the jurisdiction of the United States,'' and inserting ``in a 
        circumstance described in paragraph (2)'' ; and
            (2) by adding at the end the following: ``To violate this 
        paragraph, a person must have knowledge that the organization 
        is a designated terrorist organization (as defined in 
        subsection (g)(6)), that the organization has engaged or 
        engages in terrorist activity (as defined in section 
        212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, or that 
        the organization has engaged or engages in terrorism (as 
        defined in section 140(d)(2) of the Foreign Relations 
        Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989.''.
    (d) Federal Authority.--Section 2339B(d) of title 18 is amended--
            (1) by inserting ``(1)'' before ``There''; and
            (2) by adding at the end the following:
    ``(2) The circumstances referred to in paragraph (1) are any of the 
following:
            ``(A) An offender is a national of the United States (as 
        defined in section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and 
        Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(22)) or an alien lawfully 
        admitted for permanent residence in the United States (as 
        defined in section 101(a)(20) of the Immigration and 
        Nationality Act.
            ``(B) An offender is a stateless person whose habitual 
        residence is in the United States.
            ``(C) After the conduct required for the offense occurs an 
        offender is brought into or found in the United States, even if 
        the conduct required for the offense occurs outside the United 
        States.
            ``(D) The offense occurs in whole or in part within the 
        United States.
            ``(E) The offense occurs in or affects interstate or 
        foreign commerce.
            ``(F) An offender aids or abets any person over whom 
        jurisdiction exists under this paragraph in committing an 
        offense under subsection (a) or conspires with any person over 
        whom jurisdiction exists under this paragraph to commit an 
        offense under subsection (a).''.
    (e) Definition.--Paragraph (4) of section 2339B(g) of title 18, 
United States Code, is amended to read as follows:
            ``(4) the term `material support or resources' has the same 
        meaning given that term in section 2339A;''.
    (f) Additional Provisions.--Section 2339B of title 18, United 
States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
    ``(h) Provision of Personnel.--No person may be prosecuted under 
this section in connection with the term `personnel' unless that person 
has knowingly provided, attempted to provide, or conspired to provide a 
foreign terrorist organization with one or more individuals (who may be 
or include himself) to work under that terrorist organization's 
direction or control or to organize, manage, supervise, or otherwise 
direct the operation of that organization. Individuals who act entirely 
independently of the foreign terrorist organization to advance its 
goals or objectives shall not be considered to be working under the 
foreign terrorist organization's direction and control.
    ``(i) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be 
construed or applied so as to abridge the exercise of rights guaranteed 
under the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.''.

SEC. 2044. FINANCING OF TERRORISM.

    (a) Financing Terrorism.--Section 2339c(c)(2) of title 18, United 
States Code, is amended--
            (1) by striking ``, resources, or funds'' and inserting 
        ``or resources, or any funds or proceeds of such funds'';
            (2) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``were provided'' and 
        inserting ``are to be provided, or knowing that the support or 
        resources were provided,''; and
            (3) in subparagraph (B)--
                    (A) by striking ``or any proceeds of such funds''; 
                and
                    (B) by striking ``were provided or collected'' and 
                inserting ``are to be provided or collected, or knowing 
                that the funds were provided or collected,''.
    (b) Definitions.--Section 2339c(e) of title 18, United States Code, 
is amended--
            (1) by striking ``and'' at the end of paragraph (12);
            (2) by redesignating paragraph (13) as paragraph (14); and
            (3) by inserting after paragraph (12) the following:
            ``(13) the term `material support or resources' has the 
        same meaning given that term in section 2339B(g)(4) of this 
        title; and''.

Subtitle D--Weapons of Mass Destruction Prohibition Improvement Act of 
                                  2004

SEC. 2051. SHORT TITLE.

    This subtitle may be cited as the ``Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Prohibition Improvement Act of 2004''.

SEC. 2052. WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.

    (a) Expansion of Jurisdictional Bases and Scope.--Section 2332a of 
title 18, United States Code, is amended--
            (1) so that paragraph (2) of subsection (a) reads as 
        follows:
            ``(2) against any person or property within the United 
        States, and
                    ``(A) the mail or any facility of interstate or 
                foreign commerce is used in furtherance of the offense;
                    ``(B) such property is used in interstate or 
                foreign commerce or in an activity that affects 
                interstate or foreign commerce;
                    ``(C) any perpetrator travels in or causes another 
                to travel in interstate or foreign commerce in 
                furtherance of the offense; or
                    ``(D) the offense, or the results of the offense, 
                affect interstate or foreign commerce, or, in the case 
                of a threat, attempt, or conspiracy, would have 
                affected interstate or foreign commerce;'';
            (2) in paragraph (3) of subsection (a), by striking the 
        comma at the end and inserting ``; or'';
            (3) in subsection (a), by adding the following at the end:
            ``(4) against any property within the United States that is 
        owned, leased, or used by a foreign government,'';
            (4) at the end of subsection (c)(1), by striking``and'';
            (5) in subsection (c)(2), by striking the period at the end 
        and inserting ``; and''; and
            (6) in subsection (c), by adding at the end the following:
            ``(3) the term `property' includes all real and personal 
        property.''.
    (b) Restoration of the Coverage of Chemical Weapons.--Section 2332a 
of title 18, United States Code, as amended by subsection (a), is 
further amended--
            (1) in the section heading, by striking ``certain'';
            (2) in subsection (a), by striking ``(other than a chemical 
        weapon as that term is defined in section 229F)''; and
            (3) in subsection (b), by striking ``(other than a chemical 
        weapon (as that term is defined in section 229F))''.
    (c) Expansion of Categories of Restricted Persons Subject to 
Prohibitions Relating to Select Agents.--Section 175b(d)(2) of title 
18, United States Code, is amended--
            (1) in subparagraph (G) by--
                    (A) inserting ``(i)'' after ``(G)'';
                    (B) inserting ``, or (ii) acts for or on behalf of, 
                or operates subject to the direction or control of, a 
                government or official of a country described in this 
                subparagraph'' after ``terrorism''; and
                    (C) striking ``or'' after the semicolon.
            (2) in subparagraph (H) by striking the period and 
        inserting ``; or''; and
            (3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
                    ``(I) is a member of, acts for or on behalf of, or 
                operates subject to the direction or control of, a 
                terrorist organization as defined in section 
                212(a)(3)(B)(vi) of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
                (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)).''.
    (d) Conforming Amendment to Regulations.--
            (1) Section 175b(a)(1) of title 18, United States Code, is 
        amended by striking ``as a select agent in Appendix A'' and all 
        that follows and inserting the following: ``as a non-overlap or 
        overlap select biological agent or toxin in sections 73.4 and 
        73.5 of title 42, Code of Federal Regulations, pursuant to 
        section 351A of the Public Health Service Act, and is not 
        excluded under sections 73.4 and 73.5 or exempted under section 
        73.6 of title 42, Code of Federal Regulations.''.
            (2) The amendment made by paragraph (1) shall take effect 
        at the same time that sections 73.4, 73.5, and 73.6 of title 
        42, Code of Federal Regulations, become effective.
    (e) Enhancing Prosecution of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Offenses.--Section 1961(1)(B) of title 18, United States Code, is 
amended by adding at the end the following: ``sections 175-178 
(relating to biological weapons), sections 229-229F (relating to 
chemical weapons), section 831 (relating to nuclear materials),''.

SEC. 2053. PARTICIPATION IN NUCLEAR AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 
                    THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES.

    (a) Section 57(b) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 
2077(b)) is amended by striking ``in the production of any special 
nuclear material'' and inserting ``or participate in the development or 
production of any special nuclear material or atomic weapon''.
    (b) Title 18, United States Code, is amended--
            (1) in the table of sections at the beginning of chapter 
        39, by inserting after the item relating to section 831 the 
        following:

``832. Participation in nuclear and weapons of mass destruction threats 
to the United States.'';
            (2) by inserting after section 831 the following:

``Sec. 832. Participation in nuclear and weapons of mass destruction 
                    threats to the United States

    ``(a) Whoever, within the United States or subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States, willfully participates in or 
provides material support or resources (as defined in section 2339A) to 
a nuclear weapons program or other weapons of mass destruction program 
of a foreign terrorist power, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall 
be imprisoned for not more than 20 years.
    ``(b) There is extraterritorial Federal jurisdiction over an 
offense under this section.
    ``(c) Whoever without lawful authority develops, possesses, or 
attempts or conspires to develop or possess a radiological weapon, or 
threatens to use or uses a radiological weapon against any person 
within the United States, or a national of the United States while such 
national is outside the United States or against any property that is 
owned, leased, funded or used by the United States, whether that 
property is within or outside the United States, shall be imprisoned 
for any term of years or for life, and if death results, shall be 
punished by death or imprisoned for any term of years or for life.
    ``(d) As used in this section--
            ``(1) `nuclear weapons program' means a program or plan for 
        the development, acquisition, or production of any nuclear 
        weapon or weapons;
            ``(2) `weapons of mass destruction program' means a program 
        or plan for the development, acquisition, or production of any 
        weapon or weapons of mass destruction (as defined in section 
        2332a(c));
            ``(3) `foreign terrorist power' means a terrorist 
        organization designated under section 219 of the Immigration 
        and Nationality Act, or a state sponsor of terrorism designated 
        under section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 or 
        section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961; and
            ``(4) `nuclear weapon' means any weapon that contains or 
        uses nuclear material as defined in section 831(f)(1).''; and
            (3) in section 2332b(g)(5)(B)(i), by inserting after 
        ``nuclear materials),'' the following: ``832 (relating to 
        participation in nuclear and weapons of mass destruction 
        threats to the United States)''.

SEC. 2054. PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.

    (a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Congress makes 
the following findings:
            (1) Al Qaeda has tried to acquire or make weapons of mass 
        destruction since 1994 or earlier.
            (2) The United States doubtless would be a prime target for 
        use of any such weapon by al Qaeda.
            (3) Although the United States Government has redoubled its 
        international commitments to supporting the programs for 
        Cooperative Threat Reduction and other nonproliferation 
        assistance programs, nonproliferation experts continue to 
        express deep concern about the United States Government's 
        commitment and approach to securing the weapons of mass 
        destruction and related highly dangerous materials that are 
        still scattered among Russia and other countries of the former 
        Soviet Union.
            (4) The cost of increased investment in the prevention of 
        proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related 
        dangerous materials is greatly outweighed by the potentially 
        catastrophic cost to the United States of use of weapons of 
        mass destruction or related dangerous materials by the 
        terrorists who are so eager to acquire them.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) maximum effort to prevent the proliferation of weapons 
        of mass destruction, wherever such proliferation may occur, is 
        warranted; and
            (2) the programs of the United States Government to prevent 
        or counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
        including the Proliferation Security Initiative, the programs 
        for Cooperative Threat Reduction, and other nonproliferation 
        assistance programs, should be expanded, improved, and better 
        funded to address the global dimensions of the proliferation 
        threat.
    (c) Requirement for Strategy.--Not later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to 
Congress--
            (1) a strategy for expanding and strengthening the 
        Proliferation Security Initiative, the programs for Cooperative 
        Threat Reduction, and other nonproliferation assistance 
        programs; and
            (2) an estimate of the funding necessary to execute that 
        strategy.
    (d) Report on Reforming the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program 
and Other Non-proliferation Assistance Programs.--Not later than 180 
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall 
submit to Congress a report evaluating whether the United States could 
more effectively address the global threat of nuclear proliferation 
by--
            (1) establishing a central coordinator for the programs for 
        Cooperative Threat Reduction;
            (2) eliminating the requirement that the President spend no 
        more than $50,000,000 annually on programs for Cooperative 
        Threat Reduction and other non-proliferation assistance 
        programs carried out outside the former Soviet Union; or
            (3) repealing the provisions of the Soviet Nuclear Threat 
        Reduction Act of 1991 (22 U.S.C. 2551 note) that place 
        conditions on assistance to the former Soviet Union unrelated 
        to bilateral cooperation on weapons dismantlement.

SEC. 2055. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING INTERNATIONAL 
                    COUNTERPROLIFERATION EFFORTS.

    It is the sense of Congress that the United States should work with 
the international community to develop laws and an international legal 
regime with universal jurisdiction to enable the interdiction of 
nuclear material and technology, and the capture, interdiction, and 
prosecution of individuals or entities involved in the smuggling or 
transfer of nuclear material or technology to any state in the world 
where they do not fully disclose the nature of their nuclear program.

SEC. 2056. REMOVAL OF POTENTIAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS MATERIALS FROM 
                    VULNERABLE SITES WORLDWIDE.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that removing 
potential nuclear weapons materials from vulnerable sites around the 
world would reduce the possibility that such materials could fall into 
the hands of al Qaeda or other groups and states hostile to the United 
States, and should be a top priority for achieving the national 
security of the United States. Several actions may be taken to reduce 
the risk that nuclear weapons materials may end up in terrorist hands, 
including--
            (1) transporting such materials from such sites to secure 
        facilities;
            (2) providing interim security upgrades for such materials 
        pending their removal from their current sites;
            (3) managing such materials after their arrival at secure 
        facilities;
            (4) purchasing such materials;
            (5) converting such sites to the use of low-enriched 
        uranium fuels;
            (6) assisting in the closure and decommissioning of such 
        sites;
            (7) providing incentives to facilitate the removal of such 
        materials from vulnerable facilities;
            (8) arranging for the shipment of potential nuclear weapons 
        materials to the United States, or to other countries willing 
        to accept such materials and able to provide high levels of 
        security for such materials, and dispose of such materials, in 
        order to ensure that United States national security objectives 
        are accomplished as quickly and effectively as possible; and
            (9) providing funds to upgrade security and accounting at 
        sites where potential nuclear weapons materials will remain for 
        an extended period in order to ensure that such materials are 
        secure against plausible potential threats, and will remain so 
        in the future.
    (b) Report.--
            (1) Not later than 30 days after the submittal to Congress 
        of the budget of the President for fiscal year 2006 pursuant to 
        section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, the 
        administration shall submit to Congress a report that includes 
        the following:
                    (A) A list of the sites determined to be of the 
                highest priorities for removal of potential nuclear 
                weapons materials, based on the quantity and 
                attractiveness of such materials at such sites and the 
                risk of theft or diversion of such materials for 
                weapons purposes.
                    (B) An inventory of all sites worldwide where 
                highly-enriched uranium or separated plutonium is 
                located, including, to the extent practicable, a 
                prioritized assessment of the terrorism and 
                proliferation risk posed by such materials at each such 
                site, based on the quantity of such materials, the 
                attractiveness of such materials for use in nuclear 
                weapons, the current level of security and accounting 
                for such materials, and the level of threat (including 
                the effects of terrorist or criminal activity and the 
                pay and morale of personnel and guards) in the country 
                or region where such sites are located.
                    (C) A strategic plan, including measurable 
                milestones and metrics.
                    (D) An estimate of the funds required to secure 
                these materials.
                    (E) The recommendations of the Administration on 
                whether any further legislative actions or 
                international agreements are necessary to facilitate 
                the accomplishment of the objective.
            (2) The report shall be submitted in unclassified form, but 
        may include a classified annex.
    (c) Potential Nuclear Weapons Material Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``potential nuclear weapons material'' means plutonium, 
highly-enriched uranium, or other material capable of sustaining an 
explosive nuclear chain reaction, including irradiated materials if the 
radiation field from such materials is not sufficient to prevent the 
theft and use of such materials for an explosive nuclear chain 
reaction.

          Subtitle E--Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing

   CHAPTER 1--FUNDING TO COMBAT FINANCIAL CRIMES INCLUDING TERRORIST 
                               FINANCING

SEC. 2101. ADDITIONAL AUTHORIZATION FOR FINCEN.

    Subsection  (d) of section 310 of title 31, United States Code, is 
amended--
            (1) by striking ``appropriations.--There are authorized'' 
        and inserting ``Appropriations.--
            ``(1) In general.--There are authorized''; and
            (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
            ``(2) Authorization for funding key technological 
        improvements in mission-critical fincen systems.--There are 
        authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2005 the 
        following amounts, which are authorized to remain available 
        until expended:
                    ``(A) BSA direct.--For technological improvements 
                to provide authorized law enforcement and financial 
                regulatory agencies with Web-based access to FinCEN 
                data, to fully develop and implement the highly secure 
                network required under section 362 of Public Law 107-56 
                to expedite the filing of, and reduce the filing costs 
                for, financial institution reports, including 
                suspicious activity reports, collected by FinCEN under 
                chapter 53 and related provisions of law, and enable 
                FinCEN to immediately alert financial institutions 
                about suspicious activities that warrant immediate and 
                enhanced scrutiny, and to provide and upgrade advanced 
                information-sharing technologies to materially improve 
                the Government's ability to exploit the information in 
                the FinCEN databanks $16,500,000.
                    ``(B) Advanced analytical technologies.--To provide 
                advanced analytical tools needed to ensure that the 
                data collected by FinCEN under chapter 53 and related 
                provisions of law are utilized fully and appropriately 
                in safeguarding financial institutions and supporting 
                the war on terrorism, $5,000,000.
                    ``(C) Data networking modernization.--To improve 
                the telecommunications infrastructure to support the 
                improved capabilities of the FinCEN systems, 
                $3,000,000.
                    ``(D) Enhanced compliance capability.--To improve 
                the effectiveness of the Office of Compliance in 
                FinCEN, $3,000,000.
                    ``(E) Detection and prevention of financial crimes 
                and terrorism.--To provide development of, and training 
                in the use of, technology to detect and prevent 
                financial crimes and terrorism within and without the 
                United States, $8,000,000.''.

SEC. 2102. MONEY LAUNDERING AND FINANCIAL CRIMES STRATEGY 
                    REAUTHORIZATION.

    (a) Program.--Section 5341(a)(2) of title 31, United States Code, 
is amended by striking ``and 2003,'' and inserting ``2003, and 2005,''.
    (b) Reauthorization of Appropriations.--Section 5355 of title 31, 
United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:


 
 
 
``Fiscal year 2004....................................      $15,000,000
Fiscal year 2005......................................   $15,000,000''.

   CHAPTER 2--ENFORCEMENT TOOLS TO COMBAT FINANCIAL CRIMES INCLUDING 
                          TERRORIST FINANCING

 Subchapter A--Money Laundering Abatement and Financial Antiterrorism 
                         Technical Corrections

SEC. 2111. SHORT TITLE.

    This subtitle may be cited as the ``Money Laundering Abatement and 
Financial Antiterrorism Technical Corrections Act of 2004''.

SEC. 2112. TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS TO PUBLIC LAW 107-56.

    (a) The heading of title III of Public Law 107-56 is amended to 
read as follows:

  ``TITLE III--INTERNATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING ABATEMENT AND FINANCIAL 
                      ANTITERRORISM ACT OF 2001''.

    (b) The table of contents of Public Law 107-56 is amended by 
striking the item relating to title III and inserting the following new 
item:

  ``TITLE III--INTERNATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING ABATEMENT AND FINANCIAL 
                      ANTITERRORISM ACT OF 2001''.

    (c) Section 302 of Public Law 107-56 is amended--
            (1) in subsection (a)(4), by striking the comma after 
        ``movement of criminal funds'';
            (2) in subsection (b)(7), by inserting ``or types of 
        accounts'' after ``classes of international transactions''; and
            (3) in subsection (b)(10), by striking ``subchapters II and 
        III'' and inserting ``subchapter II''.
    (d) Section 303(a) of Public Law 107-56 is amended by striking 
``Anti-Terrorist Financing Act'' and inserting ``Financial 
Antiterrorism Act''.
    (e) The heading for section 311 of Public Law 107-56 is amended by 
striking ``or international transactions'' and 
inserting ``international transactions, or types 
of accounts''.
    (f) Section 314 of Public Law 107-56 is amended--
            (1) in paragraph (1)--
                    (A) by inserting a comma after ``organizations 
                engaged in''; and
                    (B) by inserting a comma after ``credible evidence 
                of engaging in'';
            (2) in paragraph (2)(A)--
                    (A) by striking ``and'' after ``nongovernmental 
                organizations,''; and
                    (B) by inserting a comma after ``unwittingly 
                involved in such finances'';
            (3) in paragraph (3)(A)--
                    (A) by striking ``to monitor accounts of'' and 
                inserting ``monitor accounts of,''; and
                    (B) by striking the comma after ``organizations 
                identified''; and
            (4) in paragraph (3)(B), by inserting ``financial'' after 
        ``size, and nature of the''.
    (g) Section 321 of Public Law 107-56 is amended by striking 
``5312(2)'' and inserting ``5312(a)(2)''.
    (h) Section 325 of Public Law 107-56 is amended by striking ``as 
amended by section 202 of this title,'' and inserting ``as amended by 
section 352,''.
    (i) Subsections (a)(2) and (b)(2) of section 327 of Public Law 107-
56 are each amended by inserting a period after ``December 31, 2001'' 
and striking all that follows through the period at the end of each 
such subsection.
    (j) Section 356(c)(4) of Public Law 107-56 is amended by striking 
``or business or other grantor trust'' and inserting ``, business 
trust, or other grantor trust''.
    (k) Section 358(e) of Public Law 107-56 is amended--
            (1) by striking ``Section 123(a)'' and inserting ``That 
        portion of section 123(a)'';
            (2) by striking ``is amended to read'' and inserting ``that 
        precedes paragraph (1) of such section is amended to read''; 
        and
            (3) by striking ``.'.'' at the end of such section and 
        inserting ``--' ''.
    (l) Section 360 of Public Law 107-56 is amended--
            (1) in subsection (a), by inserting ``the'' after 
        ``utilization of the funds of''; and
            (2) in subsection (b), by striking ``at such institutions'' 
        and inserting ``at such institution''.
    (m) Section 362(a)(1) of Public Law 107-56 is amended by striking 
``subchapter II or III'' and inserting ``subchapter II''.
    (n) Section 365 of Public Law 107-56 is amended --
            (1) by redesignating the 2nd of the 2 subsections 
        designated as subsection (c) (relating to a clerical amendment) 
        as subsection (d); and
            (2) by redesignating subsection (f) as subsection (e).
    (o) Section 365(d) of Public Law 107-56 (as so redesignated by 
subsection (n) of this section) is amended by striking ``section 5332 
(as added by section 112 of this title)'' and inserting ``section 
5330''.

SEC. 2113. TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS TO OTHER PROVISIONS OF LAW.

    (a) Section 310(c) of title 31, United States Code, is amended by 
striking ``the Network'' each place such term appears and inserting 
``FinCEN''.
    (b) Section 5312(a)(3)(C) of title 31, United States Code, is 
amended by striking ``sections 5333 and 5316'' and inserting ``sections 
5316 and 5331''.
    (c) Section 5318(i) of title 31, United States Code, is amended--
            (1) in paragraph (3)(B), by inserting a comma after 
        ``foreign political figure'' the 2nd place such term appears; 
        and
            (2) in the heading of paragraph (4), by striking 
        ``Definition'' and inserting ``Definitions''.
    (d) Section 5318(k)(1)(B) of title 31, United States Code, is 
amended by striking ``section 5318A(f)(1)(B)'' and inserting ``section 
5318A(e)(1)(B)''.
    (e) The heading for section 5318A of title 31, United States Code, 
is amended to read as follows:

``Sec. 5318A Special measures for jurisdictions, financial 
                    institutions, international transactions, or types 
                    of accounts of primary money laundering concern''.

    (f) Section 5318A of title 31, United States Code, is amended--
            (1) in subsection (a)(4)(A), by striking ``, as defined in 
        section 3 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act,'' and inserting 
        `` (as defined in section 3 of the Federal Deposit Insurance 
        Act)'';
            (2) in subsection (a)(4)(B)(iii), by striking ``or class of 
        transactions'' and inserting ``class of transactions, or type 
        of account'';
            (3) in subsection (b)(1)(A), by striking ``or class of 
        transactions to be'' and inserting ``class of transactions, or 
        type of account to be''; and
            (4) in subsection (e)(3), by inserting ``or subsection (i) 
        or (j) of section 5318'' after ``identification of individuals 
        under this section''.
    (g) Section 5324(b) of title 31, United States Code, is amended by 
striking ``5333'' each place such term appears and inserting ``5331''.
    (h) Section 5332 of title 31, United States Code, is amended--
            (1) in subsection (b)(2), by striking ``, subject to 
        subsection (d) of this section''; and
            (2) in subsection (c)(1), by striking ``, subject to 
        subsection (d) of this section,''.
    (i) The table of sections for subchapter II of chapter 53 of title 
31, United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to 
section 5318A and inserting the following new item:

``5318A. Special measures for jurisdictions, financial institutions, 
international transactions, or types of accounts of primary money 
laundering concern.''.
    (j) Section 18(w)(3) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 
U.S.C. 1828(w)(3)) is amended by inserting a comma after ``agent of 
such institution''.
    (k) Section 21(a)(2) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 
U.S.C. 1829b(a)(2)) is amended by striking ``recognizes that'' and 
inserting ``recognizing that''.
    (l) Section 626(e) of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 
1681v(e)) is amended by striking ``governmental agency'' and inserting 
``government agency''.

SEC. 2114. REPEAL OF REVIEW.

    Title III of Public Law 107-56 is amended by striking section 303 
(31 U.S.C. 5311 note).

SEC. 2115. EFFECTIVE DATE.

    The amendments made by this subtitle to Public Law 107-56, the 
United States Code, the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, and any other 
provision of law shall take effect as if such amendments had been 
included in Public Law 107-56, as of the date of the enactment of such 
Public Law, and no amendment made by such Public Law that is 
inconsistent with an amendment made by this subtitle shall be deemed to 
have taken effect.

               Subchapter B--Additional Enforcement Tools

SEC. 2121. BUREAU OF ENGRAVING AND PRINTING SECURITY PRINTING.

    (a) Production of Documents.--Section 5114(a) of title 31, United 
States Code (relating to engraving and printing currency and security 
documents), is amended--
            (1) by striking ``(a) The Secretary of the Treasury'' and 
        inserting:
    ``(a) Authority to Engrave and Print.--
            ``(1) In general.--The Secretary of the Treasury''; and
            (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:
            ``(2) Engraving and printing for other governments.--The 
        Secretary of the Treasury may produce currency, postage stamps, 
        and other security documents for foreign governments if--
                    ``(A) the Secretary of the Treasury determines that 
                such production will not interfere with engraving and 
                printing needs of the United States; and
                    ``(B) the Secretary of State determines that such 
                production would be consistent with the foreign policy 
                of the United States.
            ``(3) Procurement guidelines.--Articles, material, and 
        supplies procured for use in the production of currency, 
        postage stamps, and other security documents for foreign 
        governments pursuant to paragraph (2) shall be treated in the 
        same manner as articles, material, and supplies procured for 
        public use within the United States for purposes of title III 
        of the Act of March 3, 1933 (41 U.S.C. 10a et seq.; commonly 
        referred to as the Buy American Act).''.
    (b) Reimbursement.--Section 5143 of title 31, United States Code 
(relating to payment for services of the Bureau of Engraving and 
Printing), is amended--
            (1) in the first sentence, by inserting ``or to a foreign 
        government under section 5114'' after ``agency'';
            (2) in the second sentence, by inserting ``and other'' 
        after ``including administrative''; and
            (3) in the last sentence, by inserting ``, and the 
        Secretary shall take such action, in coordination with the 
        Secretary of State, as may be appropriate to ensure prompt 
        payment by a foreign government of any invoice or statement of 
        account submitted by the Secretary with respect to services 
        rendered under section 5114'' before the period at the end.

SEC. 2122. CONDUCT IN AID OF COUNTERFEITING.

    (a) In General.--Section 474(a) of title 18, United States Code, is 
amended by inserting after the paragraph beginning ``Whoever has in his 
control, custody, or possession any plate'' the following:
    `` Whoever, with intent to defraud, has in his custody, control, or 
possession any material that can be used to make, alter, forge or 
counterfeit any obligations and other securities of the United States 
or any part of such securities and obligations, except under the 
authority of the Secretary of the Treasury; or''.
    (b) Foreign Obligations and Securities.--Section 481 of title 18, 
United States Code, is amended by inserting after the paragraph 
beginning ``Whoever, with intent to defraud'' the following:
    `` Whoever, with intent to defraud, has in his custody, control, or 
possession any material that can be used to make, alter, forge or 
counterfeit any obligation or other security of any foreign government, 
bank or corporation; or''.
    (c) Counterfeit Acts.--Section 470 of title 18, United States Code, 
is amended by striking ``or 474'' and inserting ``474, or 474A''.
    (d) Materials Used in Counterfeiting.--Section 474A(b) of title 18, 
United States Code, is amended by striking ``any essentially 
identical'' and inserting ``any thing or material made after or in the 
similitude of any''.

             Subtitle F--Criminal History Background Checks

SEC. 2141. SHORT TITLE.

    This subtitle may be cited as the ``Criminal History Access Means 
Protection of Infrastructures and Our Nation Act''.

SEC. 2142. CRIMINAL HISTORY BACKGROUND CHECKS.

    (a) In General.--Section 534 of title 28, United States Code, is 
amended by adding at the end the following:
    ``(f)(1) Under rules prescribed by the Attorney General, the 
Attorney General shall, within 60 days after the date of enactment, 
initiate a pilot program to establish and maintain a system for 
providing to an employer criminal history information that--
            ``(A) is in the possession of the Attorney General; and
            ``(B) is requested by an employer as part of an employee 
        criminal history investigation that has been authorized by the 
        State where the employee works or where the employer has their 
        principal place of business;
in order to ensure that a prospective employee is suitable for certain 
employment positions.
    ``(2) The Attorney General shall require that an employer seeking 
criminal history information of an employee request such information 
and submit fingerprints or other biometric identifiers as approved by 
the Attorney General to provide a positive and reliable identification 
of such prospective employee.
    ``(3) The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation may 
require an employer to pay a reasonable fee for such information.
    ``(4) Upon receipt of fingerprints or other biometric identifiers, 
the Attorney General shall conduct an Integrated Fingerprint 
Identification System of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (IAFIS) 
check and provide the results of such check to the requester.
    ``(5) As used in this subsection,
            ``(A) the term `criminal history information' and `criminal 
        history records' includes----
                    ``(i) an identifying description of the individual 
                to whom it pertains;
                    ``(ii) notations of arrests, detentions, 
                indictments, or other formal criminal charges 
                pertaining to such individual; and
                    ``(iii) any disposition to a notation revealed in 
                subparagraph (B), including acquittal, sentencing, 
                correctional supervision, or release.
            ``(B) the term `Integrated Automated Fingerprint 
        Identification System of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
        (IAFIS)' means the national depository for fingerprint, 
        biometric, and criminal history information, through which 
        fingerprints are processed electronically.
    ``(6) Nothing in this subsection shall preclude the Attorney 
General from authorizing or requiring criminal history record checks on 
individuals employed or seeking employment in positions vital to the 
Nation's critical infrastructure or key resources as those terms are 
defined in section 1016(e) of Public Law 107-56 (42 U.S.C. 5195c(e)) 
and section 2(9) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 
101(9)), if pursuant to a law or executive order.''.
    (b) Report to Congress.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 60 days after the 
        conclusion of the pilot program, the Attorney General shall 
        report to the appropriate committees of Congress regarding all 
        statutory requirements for criminal history record checks that 
        are required to be conducted by the Department of Justice or 
        any of its components.
            (2) Identification of information.--The Attorney General 
        shall identify the number of records requested, including the 
        type of information requested, usage of different terms and 
        definitions regarding criminal history information, and the 
        variation in fees charged for such information and who pays 
        such fees.
            (3) Recommendations.--The Attorney General shall make 
        recommendations for consolidating the existing procedures into 
        a unified procedure consistent with that provided in section 
        534(f) of title 28, United States Code, as amended by this 
        subtitle. In making the recommendations to Congress, the 
        Attorney General shall consider--
                    (A) the effectiveness of utilizing commercially 
                available databases as a supplement to IAFIS criminal 
                history information checks;
                    (B) the effectiveness of utilizing State databases 
                as a supplement to IAFIS criminal history information 
                checks;
                    (C) any feasibility studies by the Department of 
                Justice of the FBI's resources and structure to 
                establish a system to provide criminal history 
                information; and
                    (D) privacy rights and other employee protections 
                to include employee consent, access to the records used 
                if employment was denied, an appeal mechanism, and 
                penalties for misuse of the information.

SEC. 2143. PROTECT ACT.

    Public law 108-21 is amended--
            (1) in section 108(a)(2)(A) by striking ``an 18 month'' and 
        inserting ``a 30-month''; and
            (2) in section 108(a)(3)(A) by striking ``an 18-month'' and 
        inserting ``a 30-month''.

SEC. 2144. REVIEWS OF CRIMINAL RECORDS OF APPLICANTS FOR PRIVATE 
                    SECURITY OFFICER EMPLOYMENT.

    (a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the ``Private 
Security Officer Employment Authorization Act of 2004''.
    (b) Findings.--Congress finds that--
            (1) employment of private security officers in the United 
        States is growing rapidly;
            (2) private security officers function as an adjunct to, 
        but not a replacement for, public law enforcement by helping to 
        reduce and prevent crime;
            (3) such private security officers protect individuals, 
        property, and proprietary information, and provide protection 
        to such diverse operations as banks, hospitals, research and 
        development centers, manufacturing facilities, defense and 
        aerospace contractors, high technology businesses, nuclear 
        power plants, chemical companies, oil and gas refineries, 
        airports, communication facilities and operations, office 
        complexes, schools, residential properties, apartment 
        complexes, gated communities, and others;
            (4) sworn law enforcement officers provide significant 
        services to the citizens of the United States in its public 
        areas, and are supplemented by private security officers;
            (5) the threat of additional terrorist attacks requires 
        cooperation between public and private sectors and demands 
        professional, reliable, and responsible security officers for 
        the protection of people, facilities, and institutions;
            (6) the trend in the Nation toward growth in such security 
        services has accelerated rapidly;
            (7) such growth makes available more public sector law 
        enforcement officers to combat serious and violent crimes, 
        including terrorism;
            (8) the American public deserves the employment of 
        qualified, well-trained private security personnel as an 
        adjunct to sworn law enforcement officers; and
            (9) private security officers and applicants for private 
        security officer positions should be thoroughly screen and 
        trained.
    (c) Definitions.--In this Act:
            (1) Employee.--The term ``employee'' includes both a 
        current employee and an applicant for employment as a private 
        security officer.
            (2) Authorized employer.--The term ``authorized employer'' 
        means any person that--
                    (A) employs private security officers; and
                    (B) is authorized by regulations promulgated by the 
                Attorney General to request a criminal history record 
                information search of an employee through a State 
                identification bureau pursuant to this section.
            (3) Private security officer.--The term ``private security 
        officer'--
                    (A) means an individual other than an employee of a 
                Federal, State, or local government, whose primary duty 
                is to perform security services, full- or part-time, 
                for consideration, whether armed or unarmed and in 
                uniform or plain clothes (except for services excluded 
                from coverage under this Act if the Attorney General 
                determines by regulation that such exclusion would 
                serve the public interest); but
                    (B) does not include--
                            (i) employees whose duties are primarily 
                        internal audit or credit functions;
                            (ii) employees of electronic security 
                        system companies acting as technicians or 
                        monitors; or
                            (iii) employees whose duties primarily 
                        involve the secure movement of prisoners.
            (4) Security services.--The term ``security services'' 
        means acts to protect people or property as defined by 
        regulations promulgated by the Attorney General.
            (5) State identification bureau.--The term ``State 
        identification bureau'' means the State entity designated by 
        the Attorney General for the submission and receipt of criminal 
        history record information.
    (d) Criminal History Record Information Search.--
            (1) In general.--
                    (A) Submission of fingerprints.--An authorized 
                employer may submit to the State identification bureau 
                of a participating State, fingerprints or other means 
                of positive identification, as determined by the 
                Attorney General, of an employee of such employer for 
                purposes of a criminal history record information 
                search pursuant to this Act.
                    (B) Employee rights.--
                            (i) Permission.--An authorized employer 
                        shall obtain written consent from an employee 
                        to submit to the State identification bureau of 
                        a participating State the request to search the 
                        criminal history record information of the 
                        employee under this Act.
                            (ii) Access.--An authorized employer shall 
                        provide to the employee confidential access to 
                        any information relating to the employee 
                        received by the authorized employer pursuant to 
                        this Act.
                    (C) Providing information to the state 
                identification bureau.--Upon receipt of a request for a 
                criminal history record information search from an 
                authorized employer pursuant to this Act, submitted 
                through the State identification bureau of a 
                participating State, the Attorney General shall--
                            (i) search the appropriate records of the 
                        Criminal Justice Information Services Division 
                        of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; and
                            (ii) promptly provide any resulting 
                        identification and criminal history record 
                        information to the submitting State 
                        identification bureau requesting the 
                        information.
                    (D) Use of information.--
                            (i) In general.--Upon receipt of the 
                        criminal history record information from the 
                        Attorney General by the State identification 
                        bureau, the information shall be used only as 
                        provided in clause (ii).
                            (ii) Terms.--In the case of--
                                    (I) a participating State that has 
                                no State standards for qualification to 
                                be a private security officer, the 
                                State shall notify an authorized 
                                employer as to the fact of whether an 
                                employee has been--
                                            (aa) convicted of a felony, 
                                        an offense involving dishonesty 
                                        or a false statement if the 
                                        conviction occurred during the 
                                        previous 10 years, or an 
                                        offense involving the use or 
                                        attempted use of physical force 
                                        against the person of another 
                                        if the conviction occurred 
                                        during the previous 10 years; 
                                        or
                                            (bb) charged with a 
                                        criminal felony for which there 
                                        has been no resolution during 
                                        the preceding 365 days; or
                                    (II) a participating State that has 
                                State standards for qualification to be 
                                a private security officer, the State 
                                shall use the information received 
                                pursuant to this Act in applying the 
                                State standards and shall only notify 
                                the employer of the results of the 
                                application of the State standards.
                    (E) Frequency of requests.--An authorized employer 
                may request a criminal history record information 
                search for an employee only once every 12 months of 
                continuous employment by that employee unless the 
                authorized employer has good cause to submit additional 
                requests.
            (2) Regulations.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
        enactment of this Act, the Attorney General shall issue such 
        final or interim final regulations as may be necessary to carry 
        out this Act, including--
                    (A) measures relating to the security, 
                confidentiality, accuracy, use, submission, 
                dissemination, destruction of information and audits, 
                and record keeping;
                    (B) standards for qualification as an authorized 
                employer; and
                    (C) the imposition of reasonable fees necessary for 
                conducting the background checks.
            (3) Criminal penalties for use of information.--Whoever 
        knowingly and intentionally uses any information obtained 
        pursuant to this Act other than for the purpose of determining 
        the suitability of an individual for employment as a private 
        security officer shall be fined under title 18, United States 
        Code, or imprisoned for not more than 2 years, or both.
            (4) User fees.--
                    (A) In general.--The Director of the Federal Bureau 
                of Investigation may--
                            (i) collect fees to process background 
                        checks provided for by this Act; and
                            (ii) establish such fees at a level to 
                        include an additional amount to defray expenses 
                        for the automation of fingerprint 
                        identification and criminal justice information 
                        services and associated costs.
                    (B) Limitations.--Any fee collected under this 
                subsection--
                            (i) shall, consistent with Public Law 101-
                        515 and Public Law 104-99, be credited to the 
                        appropriation to be used for salaries and other 
                        expenses incurred through providing the 
                        services described in such Public Laws and in 
                        subparagraph (A);
                            (ii) shall be available for expenditure 
                        only to pay the costs of such activities and 
                        services; and
                            (iii) shall remain available until 
                        expended.
                    (C) State costs.--Nothing in this Act shall be 
                construed as restricting the right of a State to assess 
                a reasonable fee on an authorized employer for the 
                costs to the State of administering this Act.
            (5) State opt out.--A State may decline to participate in 
        the background check system authorized by this Act by enacting 
        a law or issuing an order by the Governor (if consistent with 
        State law) providing that the State is declining to participate 
        pursuant to this subsection.

SEC. 2145. TASK FORCE ON CLEARINGHOUSE FOR IAFIS CRIMINAL HISTORY 
                    RECORDS.

    Not later than 60 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the 
Attorney General shall establish a task force to examine the 
establishment of a national clearinghouse to process IAFIS criminal 
history record requests received directly from employers providing 
private security guard services with respect to critical infrastructure 
(as defined in section 1016(e) of Public Law 107-56 (42 U.S.C. 
5195c(e))) and other private security guard services. Members of this 
task force shall include representatives of the Department of Justice 
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in consultation with 
representatives of the security guard industry. Not later than 90 days 
after the establishment of the task force, the Attorney General shall 
submit to Congress a report outlining how the national clearinghouse 
shall be established, and specifying a date certain (within one year of 
the enactment of this Act) by which the national clearinghouse will 
begin operations.

Subtitle G--Protection of United States Aviation System From Terrorist 
                                Attacks

SEC. 2171. PROVISION FOR THE USE OF BIOMETRIC OR OTHER TECHNOLOGY.

    (a) Use of Biometric Technology.--Section 44903(h) of title 49, 
United States Code, is amended--
            (1) in paragraph (4)(E) by striking ``may provide for'' and 
        inserting ``shall issue, not later than 120 days after the date 
        of enactment of paragraph (5), guidance for''; and
            (2) by adding at the end the following:
            ``(5) Use of biometric technology in airport access control 
        systems.--In issuing guidance under paragraph (4)(E), the 
        Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security (Transportation 
        Security Administration), in consultation with the Attorney 
        General, representatives of the aviation industry, the 
        biometrics industry, and the National Institute of Standards 
        and Technology, shall establish, at a minimum--
                    ``(A) comprehensive technical and operational 
                system requirements and performance standards for the 
                use of biometrics in airport access control systems 
                (including airport perimeter access control systems) to 
                ensure that the biometric systems are effective, 
                reliable, and secure;
                    ``(B) a list of products and vendors that meet such 
                requirements and standards;
                    ``(C) procedures for implementing biometric 
                systems--
                            ``(i) to ensure that individuals do not use 
                        an assumed identity to enroll in a biometric 
                        system; and
                            ``(ii) to resolve failures to enroll, false 
                        matches, and false non-matches; and
                    ``(D) best practices for incorporating biometric 
                technology into airport access control systems in the 
                most effective manner, including a process to best 
                utilize existing airport access control systems, 
                facilities, and equipment and existing data networks 
                connecting airports.
            ``(6) Use of biometric technology for law enforcement 
        officer travel.--
                    ``(A) In general.--Not later than 120 days after 
                the date of enactment of this paragraph, the Assistant 
                Secretary in consultation with the Attorney General 
                shall--
                            ``(i) establish a law enforcement officer 
                        travel credential that incorporates biometrics 
                        and is uniform across all Federal, State, and 
                        local government law enforcement agencies;
                            ``(ii) establish a process by which the 
                        travel credential will be used to verify the 
                        identity of a Federal, State, or local 
                        government law enforcement officer seeking to 
                        carry a weapon on board an aircraft, without 
                        unnecessarily disclosing to the public that the 
                        individual is a law enforcement officer;
                            ``(iii) establish procedures--
                                    ``(I) to ensure that only Federal, 
                                State, and local government law 
                                enforcement officers are issued the 
                                travel credential;
                                    ``(II) to resolve failures to 
                                enroll, false matches, and false non-
                                matches relating to use of the travel 
                                credential; and
                                    ``(III) to invalidate any travel 
                                credential that is lost, stolen, or no 
                                longer authorized for use;
                            ``(iv) begin issuance of the travel 
                        credential to each Federal, State, and local 
                        government law enforcement officer authorized 
                        by the Assistant Secretary to carry a weapon on 
                        board an aircraft; and
                            ``(v) take such other actions with respect 
                        to the travel credential as the Secretary 
                        considers appropriate.
                    ``(B) Funding.--There are authorized to be 
                appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out 
                this paragraph.
            ``(7) Definitions.--In this subsection, the following 
        definitions apply:
                    ``(A) Biometric information.--The term `biometric 
                information' means the distinct physical or behavioral 
                characteristics that are used for identification, or 
                verification of the identity, of an individual.
                    ``(B) Biometrics.--The term `biometrics' means a 
                technology that enables the automated identification, 
                or verification of the identity, of an individual based 
                on biometric information.
                    ``(C) Failure to enroll.--The term `failure to 
                enroll' means the inability of an individual to enroll 
                in a biometric system due to an insufficiently 
                distinctive biometric sample, the lack of a body part 
                necessary to provide the biometric sample, a system 
                design that makes it difficult to provide consistent 
                biometric information, or other factors.
                    ``(D) False match.--The term `false match' means 
                the incorrect matching of one individual's biometric 
                information to another individual's biometric 
                information by a biometric system.
                    ``(E) False non-match.--The term `false non-match' 
                means the rejection of a valid identity by a biometric 
                system.
                    ``(F) Secure area of an airport.--The term `secure 
                area of an airport' means the sterile area and the 
                Secure Identification Display Area of an airport (as 
                such terms are defined in section 1540.5 of title 49, 
                Code of Federal Regulations, or any successor 
                regulation to such section).''.
    (b) Funding for Use of Biometric Technology in Airport Access 
Control Systems.--
            (1) Grant authority.--Section 44923(a)(4) of title 49, 
        United States Code, is amended--
                    (A) by striking ``and'' at the end of paragraph 
                (3);
                    (B) by redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph 
                (5); and
                    (C) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following:
            ``(4) for projects to implement biometric technologies in 
        accordance with guidance issued under section 44903(h)(4)(E); 
        and''.
            (2) Authorization of appropriations.--Section 44923(i)(1) 
        of such title is amended by striking ``$250,000,000 for each of 
        fiscal years 2004 through 2007'' and inserting ``$250,000,000 
        for fiscal year 2004, $345,000,000 for fiscal year 2005, and 
        $250,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2006 and 2007''.

SEC. 2172. TRANSPORTATION SECURITY STRATEGIC PLANNING.

    Section 44904 of title 49, United States Code, is amended--
            (1) by redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (e); and
            (2) by inserting after subsection (b) the following:
    ``(c) Transportation Security Strategic Planning.--
            ``(1) In general.--The Secretary of Homeland Security in 
        consultation with the Attorney General, shall prepare and 
        update, as needed, a transportation sector specific plan and 
        transportation modal security plans in accordance with this 
        section.
            ``(2) Contents.--At a minimum, the modal security plan for 
        aviation prepared under paragraph (1) shall--
                    ``(A) set risk-based priorities for defending 
                aviation assets;
                    ``(B) select the most practical and cost-effective 
                methods for defending aviation assets;
                    ``(C) assign roles and missions to Federal, State, 
                regional, and local authorities and to stakeholders;
                    ``(D) establish a damage mitigation and recovery 
                plan for the aviation system in the event of a 
                terrorist attack; and
                    ``(E) include a threat matrix document that 
                outlines each threat to the United States civil 
                aviation system and the corresponding layers of 
                security in place to address such threat.
            ``(3) Reports.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
        enactment of the subsection and annually thereafter, the 
        Secretary shall submit to the Committee on Transportation and 
        Infrastructure and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House 
        of Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
        Transportation of the Senate a report containing the plans 
        prepared under paragraph (1), including any updates to the 
        plans. The report may be submitted in a classified format.
    ``(d) Operational Criteria.--Not later than 90 days after the date 
of submission of the report under subsection (c)(3), the Assistant 
Secretary of Homeland Security (Transportation Security Administration) 
in consultation with the Attorney General shall issue operational 
criteria to protect airport infrastructure and operations against the 
threats identified in the plans prepared under subsection (c)(1) and 
shall approve best practices guidelines for airport assets.''.

SEC. 2173. NEXT GENERATION AIRLINE PASSENGER PRESCREENING.

    (a) In General.--Section 44903(j)(2) of title 49, United States 
Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
                    ``(C) Next generation airline passenger 
                prescreening.--
                            ``(i) Commencement of testing.--Not later 
                        than November 1, 2004, the Assistant Secretary 
                        of Homeland Security (Transportation Security 
                        Administration), or the designee of the 
                        Assistant Secretary, shall commence testing of 
                        a next generation passenger prescreening system 
                        that will allow the Department of Homeland 
                        Security to assume the performance of comparing 
                        passenger name records to the automatic 
                        selectee and no fly lists, utilizing all 
                        appropriate records in the consolidated and 
                        integrated terrorist watchlist maintained by 
                        the Federal Government.
                            ``(ii) Assumption of function.--Not later 
                        than 180 days after completion of testing under 
                        clause (i), the Assistant Secretary, or the 
                        designee of the Assistant Secretary, shall 
                        assume the performance of the passenger 
                        prescreening function of comparing passenger 
                        name records to the automatic selectee and no 
                        fly lists and utilize all appropriate records 
                        in the consolidated and integrated terrorist 
                        watchlist maintained by the Federal Government 
                        in performing that function.
                            ``(iii) Requirements.--In assuming 
                        performance of the function under clause (i), 
                        the Assistant Secretary shall--
                                    ``(I) establish a procedure to 
                                enable airline passengers, who are 
                                delayed or prohibited from boarding a 
                                flight because the next generation 
                                passenger prescreening system 
                                determined that they might pose a 
                                security threat, to appeal such 
                                determination and correct information 
                                contained in the system;
                                    ``(II) ensure that Federal 
                                Government databases that will be used 
                                to establish the identity of a 
                                passenger under the system will not 
                                produce a large number of false 
                                positives;
                                    ``(III) establish an internal 
                                oversight board to oversee and monitor 
                                the manner in which the system is being 
                                implemented;
                                    ``(IV) establish sufficient 
                                operational safeguards to reduce the 
                                opportunities for abuse;
                                    ``(V) implement substantial 
                                security measures to protect the system 
                                from unauthorized access;
                                    ``(VI) adopt policies establishing 
                                effective oversight of the use and 
                                operation of the system; and
                                    ``(VII) ensure that there are no 
                                specific privacy concerns with the 
                                technological architecture of the 
                                system.
                            ``(iv) Passenger name records.--Not later 
                        than 60 days after the completion of the 
                        testing of the next generation passenger 
                        prescreening system, the Assistant Secretary 
                        shall require air carriers to supply to the 
                        Assistant Secretary the passenger name records 
                        needed to begin implementing the next 
                        generation passenger prescreening system.
                    ``(D) Screening of employees against watchlist.--
                The Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security 
                (Transportation Security Administration), in 
                coordination with the Secretary of Transportation and 
                the Administrator of the Federal Aviation 
                Administration, shall ensure that individuals are 
                screened against all appropriate records in the 
                consolidated and integrated terrorist watchlist 
                maintained by the Federal Government before--
                            ``(i) being certificated by the Federal 
                        Aviation Administration;
                            ``(ii) being issued a credential for access 
                        to the secure area of an airport; or
                            ``(iii) being issued a credential for 
                        access to the air operations area (as defined 
                        in section 1540.5 of title 49, Code of Federal 
                        Regulations, or any successor regulation to 
                        such section) of an airport.
                    ``(E) Appeal procedures.--The Assistant Secretary 
                shall establish a timely and fair process for 
                individuals identified as a threat under subparagraph 
                (D) to appeal the determination and correct any 
                erroneous information.
                    ``(F) Definition.--In this paragraph, the term 
                `secure area of an airport' means the sterile area and 
                the Secure Identification Display Area of an airport 
                (as such terms are defined in section 1540.5 of title 
                49, Code of Federal Regulations, or any successor 
                regulation to such section).''.
    (b) GAO Report.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date on 
        which the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security 
        (Transportation Security Administration) assumes performance of 
        the passenger prescreening function under section 
        44903(j)(2)(C)(ii) of title 49, United States Code, the 
        Comptroller General shall submit to the appropriate 
        congressional committees a report on the assumption of such 
        function. The report may be submitted in a classified format.
            (2) Contents.--The report under paragraph (1) shall 
        address--
                    (A) whether a system exists in the next generation 
                passenger prescreening system whereby aviation 
                passengers, determined to pose a threat and either 
                delayed or prohibited from boarding their scheduled 
                flights by the Transportation Security Administration, 
                may appeal such a decision and correct erroneous 
                information;
                    (B) the sufficiency of identifying information 
                contained in passenger name records and any government 
                databases for ensuring that a large number of false 
                positives will not result under the next generation 
                passenger prescreening system in a significant number 
                of passengers being treated as a threat mistakenly or 
                in security resources being diverted;
                    (C) whether the Transportation Security 
                Administration stress tested the next generation 
                passenger prescreening system;
                    (D) whether an internal oversight board has been 
                established in the Department of Homeland Security to 
                monitor the next generation passenger prescreening 
                system;
                    (E) whether sufficient operational safeguards have 
                been established to prevent the opportunities for abuse 
                of the system;
                    (F) whether substantial security measures are in 
                place to protect the passenger prescreening database 
                from unauthorized access;
                    (G) whether policies have been adopted for the 
                effective oversight of the use and operation of the 
                system;
                    (H) whether specific privacy concerns still exist 
                with the system; and
                    (I) whether appropriate life cycle cost estimates 
                have been developed, and a benefit and cost analysis 
                has been performed, for the system.

SEC. 2174. DEPLOYMENT AND USE OF EXPLOSIVE DETECTION EQUIPMENT AT 
                    AIRPORT SCREENING CHECKPOINTS.

    (a) Nonmetallic Weapons and Explosives.--In order to improve 
security, the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security (Transportation 
Security Administration) shall give priority to developing, testing, 
improving, and deploying technology at screening checkpoints at 
airports that will detect nonmetallic weapons and explosives on the 
person of individuals, in their clothing, or in their carry-on baggage 
or personal property and shall ensure that the equipment alone, or as 
part of an integrated system, can detect under realistic operating 
conditions the types of nonmetallic weapons and explosives that 
terrorists would likely try to smuggle aboard an air carrier aircraft.
    (b) Strategic Plan for Deployment and Use of Explosive Detection 
Equipment at Airport Screening Checkpoints.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
        enactment of this Act, the Assistant Secretary shall transmit 
        to the appropriate congressional committees a strategic plan to 
        promote the optimal utilization and deployment of explosive 
        detection systems at airports to screen individuals and their 
        carry-on baggage or personal property, including walk-through 
        explosive detection portals, document scanners, shoe scanners, 
        and any other explosive detection equipment for use at a 
        screening checkpoint. The plan may be transmitted in a 
        classified format.
            (2) Contents.--The strategic plan shall include 
        descriptions of the operational applications of explosive 
        detection equipment at airport screening checkpoints, a 
        deployment schedule and quantities of equipment needed to 
        implement the plan, and funding needs for implementation of the 
        plan, including a financing plan that provides for leveraging 
        non-Federal funding.

SEC. 2175. PILOT PROGRAM TO EVALUATE USE OF BLAST-RESISTANT CARGO AND 
                    BAGGAGE CONTAINERS.

    (a) In General.--Beginning not later than 180 days after the date 
of enactment of this Act, the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security 
(Transportation Security Administration) shall carry out a pilot 
program to evaluate the use of blast-resistant containers for cargo and 
baggage on passenger aircraft to minimize the potential effects of 
detonation of an explosive device.
    (b) Incentives for Participation in Pilot Program.--
            (1) In general.--As part of the pilot program, the 
        Assistant Secretary shall provide incentives to air carriers to 
        volunteer to test the use of blast-resistant containers for 
        cargo and baggage on passenger aircraft.
            (2) Applications.--To volunteer to participate in the 
        incentive program, an air carrier shall submit to the Assistant 
        Secretary an application that is in such form and contains such 
        information as the Assistant Secretary requires.
            (3) Types of assistance.--Assistance provided by the 
        Assistant Secretary to air carriers that volunteer to 
        participate in the pilot program shall include the use of 
        blast-resistant containers and financial assistance to cover 
        increased costs to the carriers associated with the use and 
        maintenance of the containers, including increased fuel costs.
    (c) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of enactment of 
this Act, the Assistant Secretary shall submit to appropriate 
congressional committees a report on the results of the pilot program.
    (d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be 
appropriated to carry out this section $2,000,000. Such sums shall 
remain available until expended.

SEC. 2176. AIR CARGO SCREENING TECHNOLOGY.

    The Transportation Security Administration shall develop technology 
to better identify, track, and screen air cargo.

SEC. 2177. AIRPORT CHECKPOINT SCREENING EXPLOSIVE DETECTION.

    Section 44940 of title 49, United States Code, is amended by adding 
at the end the following:
    ``(i) Checkpoint Screening Security Fund.--
            ``(1) Establishment.--There is established in the 
        Department of Homeland Security a fund to be known as the 
        `Checkpoint Screening Security Fund'.
            ``(2) Deposits.--In each of fiscal years 2005 and 2006, 
        after amounts are made available under section 44923(h), the 
        next $30,000,000 derived from fees received under subsection 
        (a)(1) shall be available to be deposited in the Fund.
            ``(3) Fees.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall 
        impose the fee authorized by subsection (a)(1) so as to collect 
        at least $30,000,000 in each of fiscal years 2005 and 2006 for 
        deposit into the Fund.
            ``(4) Availability of amounts.--Amounts in the Fund shall 
        be available for the purchase, deployment, and installation of 
        equipment to improve the ability of security screening 
        personnel at screening checkpoints to detect explosives.''.

SEC. 2178. NEXT GENERATION SECURITY CHECKPOINT.

    (a) Pilot Program.--The Transportation Security Administration 
shall develop, not later than 120 days after the date of enactment of 
this Act, and conduct a pilot program to test, integrate, and deploy 
next generation security checkpoint screening technology at not less 
than 5 airports in the United States.
    (b) Human Factor Studies.-- The Administration shall conduct human 
factors studies to improve screener performance as part of the pilot 
program under subsection (a).

SEC. 2179. PENALTY FOR FAILURE TO SECURE COCKPIT DOOR.

    (a) Civil Penalty.--Section 46301(a) of title 49, United States 
Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
            ``(6) Penalty for failure to secure flight deck door.--Any 
        person holding a part 119 certificate under part of title 14, 
        Code of Federal Regulations, is liable to the Government for a 
        civil penalty of not more than $25,000 for each violation, by 
        the pilot in command of an aircraft owned or operated by such 
        person, of any Federal regulation that requires that the flight 
        deck door be closed and locked when the aircraft is being 
        operated.''.
    (b) Technical Corrections.--
            (1) Compromise and setoff for false information.--Section 
        46302(b) of such title is amended by striking ``Secretary of 
        Transportation'' and inserting ``Secretary of the Department of 
        Homeland Security and, for a violation relating to section 
        46504, the Secretary of Transportation,''.
            (2) Carrying a weapon.--Section 46303 of such title is 
        amended--
                    (A) in subsection (b) by striking ``Secretary of 
                Transportation'' and inserting ``Secretary of Homeland 
                Security''; and
                    (B) in subsection (c)(2) by striking ``Under 
                Secretary of Transportation for Security'' and 
                inserting ``Secretary of Homeland Security''.
            (3) Administrative imposition of penalties.--Section 
        46301(d) of such title is amended--
                    (A) in the first sentence of paragraph (2) by 
                striking ``46302, 46303,'' and inserting ``46302 (for a 
                violation relating to section 46504),''; and
                    (B) in the second sentence of paragraph (2)--
                            (i) by striking ``Under Secretary of 
                        Transportation for Security'' and inserting 
                        ``Secretary of Homeland Security''; and
                            (ii) by striking ``44909)'' and inserting 
                        ``44909), 46302 (except for a violation 
                        relating to section 46504), 46303,'';
                    (C) in each of paragraphs (2), (3), and (4) by 
                striking ``Under Secretary or'' and inserting 
                ``Secretary of Homeland Security''; and
                    (D) in paragraph (4)(A) by moving clauses (i), 
                (ii), and (iii) 2 ems to the left.

SEC. 2180. FEDERAL AIR MARSHAL ANONYMITY.

    The Director of the Federal Air Marshal Service of the Department 
of Homeland Security shall continue to develop operational initiatives 
to protect the anonymity of Federal air marshals.

SEC. 2181. FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT COUNTERTERRORISM TRAINING.

    (a) The Assistant Secretary for Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
and the Director of Federal Air Marshal Service of the Department of 
Homeland Security, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of 
Homeland Security (Transportation Security Administration), shall make 
available appropriate in-flight counterterrorism and weapons handling 
procedures and tactics training to Federal law enforcement officers who 
fly while on duty.
    (b) The Assistant Secretary for Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
and the Director of Federal Air Marshal Service of the Department of 
Homeland Security, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of 
Homeland Security (Transportation Security Administration), shall 
ensure that Transportation Security Administration screeners and 
Federal Air Marshals receive training in identifying fraudulent 
identification documents, including fraudulent or expired Visas and 
Passports. Such training shall also be made available to other Federal 
law enforcement agencies and local law enforcement agencies located in 
border states.

SEC. 2182. FEDERAL FLIGHT DECK OFFICER WEAPON CARRIAGE PILOT PROGRAM.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment 
of this Act, the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security 
(Transportation Security Administration), with the concurrence of the 
Attorney General, shall implement a pilot program to allow pilots 
participating in the Federal flight deck officer program to transport 
their firearms on their persons. The Assistant Secretary, in 
consultation with the Attorney General, may prescribe any training, 
equipment, or procedures including procedures for reporting of missing, 
lost or stolen firearms, that the Assistant Secretary determines 
necessary to ensure safety and maximize weapon retention.
    (b) Review.--Not later than 1 year after the date of initiation of 
the pilot program, the Assistant Secretary shall conduct a review of 
the safety record of the pilot program and transmit a report on the 
results of the review to the appropriate congressional committees.
    (c) Option.--If the Assistant Secretary as part of the review under 
subsection (b) determines that the safety level obtained under the 
pilot program is comparable to the safety level determined under 
existing methods of pilots carrying firearms on aircraft, the Assistant 
Secretary shall allow all pilots participating in the Federal flight 
deck officer program the option of carrying their firearm on their 
person subject to such requirements as the Assistant Secretary 
determines appropriate.

SEC. 2183. REGISTERED TRAVELER PROGRAM.

    The Transportation Security Administration shall expedite 
implementation of the registered traveler program.

SEC. 2184. WIRELESS COMMUNICATION.

    (a) Study.--The Transportation Security Administration, in 
consultation with the Federal Aviation Administration, shall conduct a 
study to determine the viability of providing devices or methods, 
including wireless methods, to enable a flight crew to discreetly 
notify the pilot in the case of a security breach or safety issue 
occurring in the cabin.
    (b) Matters to Be Considered.--In conducting the study, the 
Transportation Security Administration and the Federal Aviation 
Administration shall consider technology that is readily available and 
can be quickly integrated and customized for use aboard aircraft for 
flight crew communication.
    (c) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of 
this Act, the Transportation Security Administration shall submit to 
the appropriate congressional committees a report on the results of the 
study.

SEC. 2185. SECONDARY FLIGHT DECK BARRIERS.

    Not later than 6 months after the date of enactment of this Act, 
the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security (Transportation Security 
Administration) shall transmit to the appropriate congressional 
committees a report on the costs and benefits associated with the use 
of secondary flight deck barriers and whether the use of such barriers 
should be mandated for all air carriers. The Assistant Secretary may 
transmit the report in a classified format.

SEC. 2186. EXTENSION.

    Section 48301(a) of title 49, United States Code, is amended by 
striking ``and 2005'' and inserting ``2005, and 2006''.

SEC. 2187. PERIMETER SECURITY.

    (a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of 
this Act, the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security (Transportation 
Security Administration), in consultation with airport operators and 
law enforcement authorities, shall develop and submit to the 
appropriate congressional committee a report on airport perimeter 
security. The report may be submitted in a classified format.
    (b) Contents.--The report shall include--
            (1) an examination of the feasibility of access control 
        technologies and procedures, including the use of biometrics 
        and other methods of positively identifying individuals prior 
        to entry into secure areas of airports, and provide best 
        practices for enhanced perimeter access control techniques; and
            (2) an assessment of the feasibility of physically 
        screening all individuals prior to entry into secure areas of 
        an airport and additional methods for strengthening the 
        background vetting process for all individuals credentialed to 
        gain access to secure areas of airports.

SEC. 2188. EXTREMELY HAZARDOUS MATERIALS TRANSPORTATION SECURITY.

    (a) Rulemaking.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
        enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in 
        consultation with the Attorney General and the heads of other 
        appropriate Federal, State, and local government entities, 
        security experts, representatives of the hazardous materials 
        shipping industry and labor unions representing persons who 
        work in the hazardous materials shipping industry, and other 
        interested persons, shall issue, after notice and opportunity 
        for public comment, regulations concerning the shipping of 
        extremely hazardous materials.
            (2) Purposes of regulations.--The regulations shall be 
        consistent, to the extent the Secretary determines appropriate, 
        with and not duplicative of other Federal regulations and 
        international agreements relating to the shipping of extremely 
        hazardous materials and shall require--
                    (A) physical security measures for such shipments, 
                such as the use of passive secondary containment of 
                tanker valves, additional security force personnel, and 
                surveillance technologies and barriers;
                    (B) concerned Federal, State, and local law 
                enforcement authorities (including, if applicable, 
                transit, railroad, or port authority police agencies) 
                to be informed before an extremely hazardous material 
                is transported within, through, or near an area of 
                concern;
                    (C) coordination with Federal, State, and local law 
                enforcement authorities to create response plans for a 
                terrorist attack on a shipment of extremely hazardous 
                materials;
                    (D) the use of currently available technologies and 
                systems to ensure effective and immediate communication 
                between transporters of extremely hazardous materials, 
                law enforcement authorities and first responders;
                    (E) comprehensive and appropriate training in the 
                area of extremely hazardous materials transportation 
                security for all individuals who transport, load, 
                unload, or are otherwise involved in the shipping of 
                extremely hazardous materials or who would respond to 
                an accident or incident involving a shipment of 
                extremely hazardous material or would have to repair 
                transportation equipment and facilities in the event of 
                such an accident or incident; and
                    (F) for the transportation of extremely hazardous 
                materials through or near an area of concern, the 
                Secretary to determine whether or not the 
                transportation could be made by one or more alternate 
                routes at lower security risk and, if the Secretary 
                determines the transportation could be made by an 
                alternate route, the use of such alternate route, 
                except when the origination or destination of the 
                shipment is located within the area of concern.
    (b) Judicial Relief.--A person (other than an individual) who 
transports, loads, unloads, or is otherwise involved in the shipping of 
hazardous materials and violates or fails to comply with a regulation 
issued by the Secretary under subsection (a) may be subject, in a civil 
action brought in United States district court, for each shipment with 
respect to which the violation occurs--
            (1) to an order for injunctive relief; or
            (2) to a civil penalty of not more than $100,000.
    (c) Administrative Penalties.--
            (1) Penalty orders.--The Secretary may issue an order 
        imposing an administrative penalty of not more than $1,000,000 
        for failure by a person (other than an individual) who 
        transports, loads, unloads, or is otherwise involved in the 
        shipping of hazardous materials to comply with a regulation 
        issued by the Secretary under subsection (a).
            (2) Notice and hearing.--Before issuing an order described 
        in paragraph (1), the Secretary shall provide to the person 
        against whom the penalty is to be assessed--
                    (A) written notice of the proposed order; and
                    (B) the opportunity to request, not later than 30 
                days after the date on which the person receives the 
                notice, a hearing on the proposed order.
            (3) Procedures.--The Secretary may issue regulations 
        establishing procedures for administrative hearings and 
        appropriate review of penalties issued under this subsection, 
        including necessary deadlines.
    (d) Whistleblower Protection.--
            (1) In general.--No person involved in the shipping of 
        extremely hazardous materials may be discharged, demoted, 
        suspended, threatened, harassed, or in any other manner 
        discriminated against because of any lawful act done by the 
        person--
                    (A) to provide information, cause information to be 
                provided, or otherwise assist in an investigation 
                regarding any conduct which the person reasonably 
                believes constitutes a violation of any law, rule or 
                regulation related to the security of shipments of 
                extremely hazardous materials, or any other threat to 
                the security of shipments of extremely hazardous 
                materials, when the information or assistance is 
                provided to or the investigation is conducted by--
                            (i) a Federal regulatory or law enforcement 
                        agency;
                            (ii) any Member of Congress or any 
                        committee of Congress; or
                            (iii) a person with supervisory authority 
                        over the person (or such other person who has 
                        the authority to investigate, discover, or 
                        terminate misconduct); or
                    (B) to file, cause to be filed, testify, 
                participate in, or otherwise assist in a proceeding or 
                action filed or about to be filed relating to a 
                violation of any law, rule or regulation related to the 
                security of shipments of extremely hazardous materials 
                or any other threat to the security of shipments of 
                extremely hazardous materials.
                    (C) to refuse to violate or assist in the violation 
                of any law, rule, or regulation related to the security 
                of shipments of extremely hazardous materials.
            (2) Enforcement action.--
                    (A) In general.--A person who alleges discharge or 
                other discrimination by any person in violation of 
                paragraph (1) may seek relief under paragraph (3), by--
                            (i) filing a complaint with the Secretary 
                        of Labor; or
                            (ii) if the Secretary has not issued a 
                        final decision within 180 days of the filing of 
                        the complaint and there is no showing that such 
                        delay is due to the bad faith of the claimant, 
                        bringing an action at law or equity for de novo 
                        review in the appropriate district court of the 
                        United States, which shall have jurisdiction 
                        over such an action without regard to the 
                        amount in controversy.
                    (B) Procedure.--
                            (i) In general.-- An action under 
                        subparagraph (A)(i) shall be governed under the 
                        rules and procedures set forth in section 
                        42121(b) of title 49, United States Code.
                            (ii) Exception.--Notification made under 
                        section 42121(b)(1) of title 49, United States 
                        Code, shall be made to the person named in the 
                        complaint and to the person's employer.
                            (iii) Burdens of proof.--An action brought 
                        under subparagraph (A)(ii) shall be governed by 
                        the legal burdens of proof set forth in section 
                        42121(b) of title 49, United States Code.
                            (iv) Statute of limitations.--An action 
                        under subparagraph (A) shall be commenced not 
                        later than 90 days after the date on which the 
                        violation occurs.
            (3) Remedies.--
                    (A) In general.--A person prevailing in any action 
                under paragraph (2)(A) shall be entitled to all relief 
                necessary to make the person whole.
                    (B) Compensatory damages.--Relief for any action 
                under subparagraph (A) shall include--
                            (i) reinstatement with the same seniority 
                        status that the person would have had, but for 
                        the discrimination;
                            (ii) the amount of any back pay, with 
                        interest; and
                            (iii) compensation for any special damages 
                        sustained as a result of the discrimination, 
                        including litigation costs, expert witness 
                        fees, and reasonable attorney fees.
            (4) Rights retained by person.--Nothing in this subsection 
        shall be deemed to diminish the rights, privileges, or remedies 
        of any person under any Federal or State law, or under any 
        collective bargaining agreement.
    (e) Definitions.--In this section, the following definitions apply:
            (1) Extremely hazardous material.--The term ``extremely 
        hazardous material'' means--
                    (A) a material that is toxic by inhalation;
                    (B) a material that is extremely flammable;
                    (C) a material that is highly explosive; and
                    (D) any other material designated by the Secretary 
                to be extremely hazardous.
            (2) Area of concern.--The term ``area of concern'' means an 
        area that the Secretary determines could pose a particular 
        interest to terrorists.

SEC. 2189. DEFINITIONS.

    In this title, the following definitions apply:
            (1) Appropriate congressional committee.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means the Committee on 
        Transportation and Infrastructure and the Committee on the 
        Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Committee on 
        Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate.
            (2) Air carrier.--The term ``air carrier'' has the meaning 
        such term has under section 40102 of title 49, United States 
        Code.
            (3) Secure area of an airport.--The term ``secure area of 
        an airport'' means the sterile area and the Secure 
        Identification Display Area of an airport (as such terms are 
        defined in section 1540.5 of title 49, Code of Federal 
        Regulations, or any successor regulation to such section).

                       Subtitle H--Other Matters

SEC. 2191. GRAND JURY INFORMATION SHARING.

    (a) Rule Amendments.--Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure is amended--
            (1) in paragraph (3)--
                    (A) in subparagraph (A)(ii), by striking ``or state 
                subdivision or of an Indian tribe'' and inserting ``, 
                state subdivision, Indian tribe, or foreign 
                government'';
                    (B) in subparagraph (D)--
                            (i) by inserting after the first sentence 
                        the following: ``An attorney for the government 
                        may also disclose any grand-jury matter 
                        involving a threat of actual or potential 
                        attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign 
                        power or an agent of a foreign power, domestic 
                        or international sabotage, domestic or 
                        international terrorism, or clandestine 
                        intelligence gathering activities by an 
                        intelligence service or network of a foreign 
                        power or by an agent of a foreign power, within 
                        the United States or elsewhere, to any 
                        appropriate Federal, State, state subdivision, 
                        Indian tribal, or foreign government official 
                        for the purpose of preventing or responding to 
                        such a threat.''; and
                            (ii) in clause (i)--
                                    (I) by striking ``federal''; and
                                    (II) by adding at the end the 
                                following: ``Any State, state 
                                subdivision, Indian tribal, or foreign 
                                government official who receives 
                                information under Rule 6(e)(3)(D) may 
                                use the information only consistent 
                                with such guidelines as the Attorney 
                                General and the National Intelligence 
                                Director shall jointly issue.''; and
                    (C) in subparagraph (E)--
                            (i) by redesignating clauses (iii) and (iv) 
                        as clauses (iv) and (v), respectively;
                            (ii) by inserting after clause (ii) the 
                        following:
                            ``(iii) at the request of the government, 
                        when sought by a foreign court or prosecutor 
                        for use in an official criminal 
                        investigation;''; and
                            (iii) in clause (iv), as redesignated--
                                    (I) by striking ``state or Indian 
                                tribal'' and inserting ``State, Indian 
                                tribal, or foreign''; and
                                    (II) by striking ``or Indian tribal 
                                official'' and inserting ``Indian 
                                tribal, or foreign government 
                                official''; and
            (2) in paragraph (7), by inserting ``, or of guidelines 
        jointly issued by the Attorney General and Director of Central 
        Intelligence pursuant to Rule 6,'' after ``Rule 6''.
    (b) Conforming Amendment.--Section 203(c) of Public Law 107-56 (18 
U.S.C. 2517 note) is amended by striking ``Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i)(V) and 
(VI)'' and inserting ``Rule 6(e)(3)(D)''.

SEC. 2192. INTEROPERABLE LAW ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLIGENCE DATA SYSTEM.

    (a) Findings.--The Congress finds as follows:
            (1) The interoperable electronic data system know as the 
        ``Chimera system'', and required to be developed and 
        implemented by section 202(a)(2) of the Enhanced Border 
        Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (8 U.S.C. 
        1722(a)(2)), has not in any way been implemented.
            (2) Little progress has been made since the enactment of 
        such Act with regard to establishing a process to connect 
        existing trusted systems operated independently by the 
        respective intelligence agencies.
            (3) It is advisable, therefore, to assign such 
        responsibility to the National Intelligence Director.
            (4) The National Intelligence Director should, pursuant to 
        the amendments made by subsection (c), begin systems planning 
        immediately upon assuming office to deliver an interim system 
        not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this 
        Act, and to deliver the fully functional Chimera system not 
        later than September 11, 2007.
            (5) Both the interim system, and the fully functional 
        Chimera system, should be designed so that intelligence 
        officers, Federal law enforcement agencies (as defined in 
        section 2 of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1701)), operational counter-
        terror support center personnel, consular officers, and 
        Department of Homeland Security enforcement officers have 
        access to them.
    (b) Purposes.--The purposes of this section are as follows:
            (1) To provide the National Intelligence Director with the 
        necessary authority and resources to establish both an interim 
        data system and, subsequently, a fully functional Chimera 
        system, to collect and share intelligence and operational 
        information with the intelligence community (as defined in 
        section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
        401a(4)).
            (2) To require the National Intelligence Director to 
        establish a state-of-the-art Chimera system with both biometric 
        identification and linguistic capabilities satisfying the best 
        technology standards.
            (3) To ensure that the National Intelligence Center will 
        have a fully functional capability, not later than September 
        11, 2007, for interoperable data and intelligence exchange with 
        the agencies of the intelligence community (as so defined).
    (c) Amendments.--
            (1) In general.--Title II of the Enhanced Border Security 
        and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (8 U.S.C. 1721 et seq.) is 
        amended--
                    (A) in section 202(a)--
                            (i) by amending paragraphs (1) and (2) to 
                        read as follows:
            ``(1) Interim interoperable intelligence data exchange 
        system.--Not later than 1 year after assuming office, the 
        National Intelligence Director shall establish an interim 
        interoperable intelligence data exchange system that will 
        connect the data systems operated independently by the entities 
        in the intelligence community and by the National 
        Counterterrorism Center, so as to permit automated data 
        exchange among all of these entities. Immediately upon assuming 
        office, the National Intelligence Director shall begin the 
        plans necessary to establish such interim system.
            ``(2) Chimera system.--Not later than September 11, 2007, 
        the National Intelligence Director shall establish a fully 
        functional interoperable law enforcement and intelligence 
        electronic data system within the National Counterterrorism 
        Center to provide immediate access to information in databases 
        of Federal law enforcement agencies and the intelligence 
        community that is necessary to identify terrorists, and 
        organizations and individuals that support terrorism. The 
        system established under this paragraph shall referred to as 
        the `Chimera system'. '';
                            (ii) in paragraph (3)--
                                    (I) by striking ``President'' and 
                                inserting ``National Intelligence 
                                Director''; and
                                    (II) by striking ``the data 
                                system'' and inserting ``the interim 
                                system described in paragraph (1) and 
                                the Chimera system described in 
                                paragraph (2)'';
                            (iii) in paragraph (4)(A), by striking 
                        ``The data system'' and all that follows 
                        through ``(2),'' and inserting ``The interim 
                        system described in paragraph (1) and the 
                        Chimera system described in paragraph (2)'';
                            (iv) in paragraph (5)--
                                    (I) in the matter preceding 
                                subparagraph (A), by striking ``data 
                                system under this subsection'' and 
                                inserting ``Chimera system described in 
                                paragraph (2)'';
                                    (II) in subparagraph (B), by 
                                striking ``and'' at the end;
                                    (III) in subparagraph (C), by 
                                striking the period at the end and 
                                inserting ``; and''; and
                                    (IV) by adding at the end the 
                                following:
                    ``(D) to any Federal law enforcement or 
                intelligence officer authorized to assist in the 
                investigation, identification, or prosecution of 
                terrorists, alleged terrorists, individuals supporting 
                terrorist activities, and individuals alleged to 
                support terrorist activities. ''; and
                            (v) in paragraph (6)--
                                    (I) by striking ``President'' and 
                                inserting ``National Intelligence 
                                Director'';
                                    (II) by striking ``the data 
                                system'' and all that follows through 
                                ``(2),'' and inserting ``the interim 
                                system described in paragraph (1) and 
                                the Chimera system described in 
                                paragraph (2)'';
                    (B) in section 202(b)--
                            (i) in paragraph (1), by striking ``The 
                        interoperable'' and all that follows through 
                        ``subsection (a)'' and inserting ``the Chimera 
                        system described in subsection (a)(2)'';
                            (ii) in paragraph (2), by striking 
                        ``interoperable electronic database'' and 
                        inserting ``Chimera system described in 
                        subsection (a)(2)''; and
                            (iii) by amending paragraph (4) to read as 
                        follows:
            ``(4) Interim reports.--Not later than 6 months after 
        assuming office, the National Intelligence Director shall 
        submit a report to the appropriate committees of Congress on 
        the progress in implementing each requirement of this 
        section.'';
                    (C) in section 204--
                            (i) by striking ``Attorney General'' each 
                        place such term appears and inserting 
                        ``National Intelligence Director'';
                            (ii) in subsection (d)(1), by striking 
                        ``Attorney General's'' and inserting ``National 
                        Intelligence Director's''; and
                    (D) by striking section 203 and redesignating 
                section 204 as section 203.
            (2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents for the 
        Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (8 
        U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) is amended--
                    (A) by striking the item relating to section 203; 
                and
                    (B) by redesignating the item relating to section 
                204 as relating to section 203.

SEC. 2193. IMPROVEMENT OF INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES OF THE FEDERAL 
                    BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.

    (a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States and to meet the 
intelligence needs of the United States, Congress makes the following 
findings:
            (1) The Federal Bureau of Investigation has made 
        significant progress in improving its intelligence 
        capabilities.
            (2) The Federal Bureau of Investigation must further 
        enhance and fully institutionalize its ability to prevent, 
        preempt, and disrupt terrorist threats to our homeland, our 
        people, our allies, and our interests.
            (3) The Federal Bureau of Investigation must collect, 
        process, share, and disseminate, to the greatest extent 
        permitted by applicable law, to the President, the Vice 
        President, and other officials in the Executive Branch, all 
        terrorism information and other information necessary to 
        safeguard our people and advance our national and homeland 
        security interests.
            (4) The Federal Bureau of Investigation must move towards 
        full and seamless coordination and cooperation with all other 
        elements of the Intelligence Community, including full 
        participation in, and support to, the National Counterterrorism 
        Center.
            (5) The Federal Bureau of Investigation must strengthen its 
        pivotal role in coordination and cooperation with Federal, 
        State, tribal, and local law enforcement agencies to ensure the 
        necessary sharing of information for counterterrorism and 
        criminal law enforcement purposes.
            (6) The Federal Bureau of Investigation must perform its 
        vital intelligence functions in a manner consistent with both 
        with national intelligence priorities and respect for privacy 
        and other civil liberties under the Constitution and laws of 
        the United States.
    (b) Improvement of Intelligence Capabilities.--The Director of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation shall establish a comprehensive 
intelligence program for--
            (1) intelligence analysis, including recruitment and hiring 
        of analysts, analyst training, priorities and status for 
        analysis, and analysis performance measures;
            (2) intelligence production, including product standards, 
        production priorities, information sharing and dissemination, 
        and customer satisfaction measures;
            (3) production of intelligence that is responsive to 
        national intelligence requirements and priorities, including 
        measures of the degree to which each FBI headquarters and field 
        component is collecting and providing such intelligence;
            (4) intelligence sources, including source validation, new 
        source development, and performance measures;
            (5) field intelligence operations, including staffing and 
        infrastructure, management processes, priorities, and 
        performance measures;
            (6) full and seamless coordination and cooperation with the 
        other components of the Intelligence Community, consistent with 
        their responsibilities; and
            (7) sharing of FBI intelligence and information across 
        Federal, state, and local governments, with the private sector, 
        and with foreign partners as provided by law or by guidelines 
        of the Attorney General.
    (c) Intelligence Directorate.--The Director of the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation shall establish an Intelligence Directorate within the 
FBI. The Intelligence Directorate shall have the authority to manage 
and direct the intelligence operations of all FBI headquarters and 
field components. The Intelligence Directorate shall have 
responsibility for all components and functions of the FBI necessary 
for--
            (1) oversight of FBI field intelligence operations;
            (2) FBI human source development and management;
            (3) FBI collection against nationally-determined 
        intelligence requirements;
            (4) language services;
            (5) strategic analysis;
            (6) intelligence program and budget management; and
            (7) the intelligence workforce.
    (d) National Security Workforce.--The Director of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation shall establish a specialized, integrated 
intelligence cadre composed of Special Agents, analysts, linguists, and 
surveillance specialists in a manner which creates and sustains within 
the FBI a workforce with substantial expertise in, and commitment to, 
the intelligence mission of the FBI. The Director shall--
            (1) ensure that these FBI employees may make their career, 
        including promotion to the most senior positions in the FBI, 
        within this career track;
            (2) establish intelligence cadre requirements for--
                    (A) training;
                    (B) career development and certification;
                    (C) recruitment, hiring, and selection;
                    (D) integrating field intelligence teams; and
                    (E) senior level field management;
            (3) establish intelligence officer certification 
        requirements, including requirements for training courses and 
        assignments to other intelligence, national security, or 
        homeland security components of the Executive branch, in order 
        to advance to senior operational management positions in the 
        FBI;
            (4) ensure that the FBI's recruitment and training program 
        enhances its ability to attract individuals with educational 
        and professional backgrounds in intelligence, international 
        relations, language, technology, and other skills relevant to 
        the intelligence mission of the FBI;
            (5) ensure that all Special Agents and analysts employed by 
        the FBI after the date of the enactment of this Act shall 
        receive basic training in both criminal justice matters and 
        intelligence matters;
            (6) ensure that all Special Agents employed by the FBI 
        after the date of the enactment of this Act, to the maximum 
        extent practicable, be given an opportunity to undergo, during 
        their early service with the FBI, meaningful assignments in 
        criminal justice matters and in intelligence matters;
            (7) ensure that, to the maximum extent practical, Special 
        Agents who specialize in intelligence are afforded the 
        opportunity to work on intelligence matters over the remainder 
        of their career with the FBI; and
            (8) ensure that, to the maximum extent practical, analysts 
        are afforded FBI training and career opportunities commensurate 
        with the training and career opportunities afforded analysts in 
        other elements of the intelligence community.
    (e) Field Office Matters.--The Director of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation shall take appropriate actions to ensure the integration 
of analysis, Special Agents, linguists, and surveillance personnel in 
FBI field intelligence components and to provide effective leadership 
and infrastructure to support FBI field intelligence components. The 
Director shall--
            (1) ensure that each FBI field office has an official at 
        the level of Assistant Special Agent in Charge or higher with 
        responsibility for the FBI field intelligence component; and
            (2) to the extent practicable, provide for such expansion 
        of special compartmented information facilities in FBI field 
        offices as is necessary to ensure the discharge by the field 
        intelligence components of the national security and criminal 
        intelligence mission of the FBI.
    (g) Budget Matters.--The Director of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation shall, in consultation with the Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget, modify the budget structure of the FBI in order 
to organize the budget according to its four main programs as follows:
            (1) Intelligence.
            (2) Counterterrorism and counterintelligence.
            (3) Criminal enterprise/Federal crimes.
            (4) Criminal justice services.
    (h) Reports.--
            (1)(A) Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
        enactment of this Act, and every twelve months thereafter, the 
        Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall submit to 
        Congress a report on the progress made as of the date of such 
        report in carrying out the requirements of this section.
            (B) The Director shall include in the first report required 
        by subparagraph (A) an estimate of the resources required to 
        complete the expansion of special compartmented information 
        facilities to carry out the intelligence mission of FBI field 
        intelligence components.
            (2) In each annual report required by paragraph (1)(A) the 
        director shall include--
                    (A) a report on the progress made by each FBI field 
                office during the period covered by such review in 
                addressing FBI and national intelligence priorities;
                    (B) a report assessing the qualifications, status, 
                and roles of analysts at FBI headquarters and in FBI 
                field offices; and
                    (C) a report on the progress of the FBI in 
                implementing information-sharing principles.
            (3) A report required by this subsection shall be 
        submitted--
                    (A) to each committee of Congress that has 
                jurisdiction over the subject matter of such report; 
                and
                    (B) in unclassified form, but may include a 
                classified annex.

SEC. 2194. NUCLEAR FACILITY THREATS.

    (a) Study.--The President, in consultation with the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission and other appropriate Federal, State, and local 
agencies and private entities, shall conduct a study to identify the 
types of threats that pose an appreciable risk to the security of the 
various classes of facilities licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Such study shall take 
into account, but not be limited to--
            (1) the events of September 11, 2001;
            (2) an assessment of physical, cyber, biochemical, and 
        other terrorist threats;
            (3) the potential for attack on facilities by multiple 
        coordinated teams of a large number of individuals;
            (4) the potential for assistance in an attack from several 
        persons employed at the facility;
            (5) the potential for suicide attacks;
            (6) the potential for water-based and air-based threats;
            (7) the potential use of explosive devices of considerable 
        size and other modern weaponry;
            (8) the potential for attacks by persons with a 
        sophisticated knowledge of facility operations;
            (9) the potential for fires, especially fires of long 
        duration; and
            (10) the potential for attacks on spent fuel shipments by 
        multiple coordinated teams of a large number of individuals.
    (b) Summary and Classification Report.--Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall 
transmit to the Congress and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission a 
report--
            (1) summarizing the types of threats identified under 
        subsection (a); and
            (2) classifying each type of threat identified under 
        subsection (a), in accordance with existing laws and 
        regulations, as either--
                    (A) involving attacks and destructive acts, 
                including sabotage, directed against the facility by an 
                enemy of the United States, whether a foreign 
                government or other person, or otherwise falling under 
                the responsibilities of the Federal Government; or
                    (B) involving the type of risks that Nuclear 
                Regulatory Commission licensees should be responsible 
                for guarding against.
    (c) Federal Action Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date 
on which a report is transmitted under subsection (b), the President 
shall transmit to the Congress a report on actions taken, or to be 
taken, to address the types of threats identified under subsection 
(b)(2)(A). Such report may include a classified annex as appropriate.
    (d) Regulations.--Not later than 270 days after the date on which a 
report is transmitted under subsection (b), the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission shall issue regulations, including changes to the design 
basis threat, to ensure that licensees address the threats identified 
under subsection (b)(2)(B).
    (e) Physical Security Program.--The Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
shall establish an operational safeguards response evaluation program 
that ensures that the physical protection capability and operational 
safeguards response for sensitive nuclear facilities, as determined by 
the Commission consistent with the protection of public health and the 
common defense and security, shall be tested periodically through 
Commission designed, observed, and evaluated force-on-force exercises 
to determine whether the ability to defeat the design basis threat is 
being maintained. The exercises shall be conducted by a mock terrorist 
team consisting of Commission personnel with advanced knowledge of 
special weapons and tactics comparable to special operations forces of 
the Armed Forces. For purposes of this subsection, the term ``sensitive 
nuclear facilities'' includes at a minimum commercial nuclear power 
plants, including associated spent fuel storage facilities, spent fuel 
storage pools and dry cask storage at closed reactors, independent 
spent fuel storage facilities and geologic repository operations areas, 
category I fuel cycle facilities, and gaseous diffusion plants. There 
are authorized to be appropriated to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
$3,000,000 for the purposes of carrying out this subsection.
    (f) Control of Information.--In carrying out this section, the 
President and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission shall control the 
dissemination of restricted data, safeguards information, and other 
classified national security information in a manner so as to ensure 
the common defense and security, consistent with chapter 12 of the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

SEC. 2195. AUTHORIZATION AND CHANGE OF COPS PROGRAM TO SINGLE GRANT 
                    PROGRAM.

    (a) In General.--Section 1701 of title I of the Omnibus Crime 
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. 3796dd) is amended--
            (1) by amending subsection (a) to read as follows:
    ``(a) Grant Authorization.--The Attorney General shall carry out a 
single grant program under which the Attorney General makes grants to 
States, units of local government, Indian tribal governments, other 
public and private entities, and multi-jurisdictional or regional 
consortia for the purposes described in subsection (b).'';
            (2) by striking subsections (b) and (c);
            (3) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (b), and 
        in that subsection--
                    (A) by striking ``Additional Grant Projects.--
                Grants made under subsection (a) may include programs, 
                projects, and other activities to--'' and inserting 
                ``Uses of Grant Amounts.--The purposes for which grants 
                made under subsection (a) may be made are--'';
                    (B) by redesignating paragraphs (1) through (12) as 
                paragraphs (6) through (17), respectively;
                    (C) by inserting before paragraph (5) (as so 
                redesignated) the following new paragraphs:
            ``(1) rehire law enforcement officers who have been laid 
        off as a result of State and local budget reductions for 
        deployment in community-oriented policing;
            ``(2) hire and train new, additional career law enforcement 
        officers for deployment in community-oriented policing across 
        the Nation;
            ``(3) procure equipment, technology, or support systems, or 
        pay overtime, to increase the number of officers deployed in 
        community-oriented policing;
            ``(4) improve security at schools and on school grounds in 
        the jurisdiction of the grantee through--
                    ``(A) placement and use of metal detectors, locks, 
                lighting, and other deterrent measures;
                    ``(B) security assessments;
                    ``(C) security training of personnel and students;
                    ``(D) coordination with local law enforcement; and
                    ``(E) any other measure that, in the determination 
                of the Attorney General, may provide a significant 
                improvement in security;
            ``(5) pay for officers hired to perform intelligence, anti-
        terror, or homeland security duties exclusively;''; and
                    (D) by amending paragraph (9) (as so redesignated) 
                to read as follows:
            ``(8) develop new technologies, including interoperable 
        communications technologies, modernized criminal record 
        technology, and forensic technology, to assist State and local 
        law enforcement agencies in reorienting the emphasis of their 
        activities from reacting to crime to preventing crime and to 
        train law enforcement officers to use such technologies;'';
            (4) by redesignating subsections (e) through (k) as 
        subsections (c) through (i), respectively;
            (5) in subsection (c) (as so redesignated) by striking 
        ``subsection (i)'' and inserting ``subsection (g)''; and
            (6) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
    ``(j) Matching Funds for School Security Grants.--Notwithstanding 
subsection (i), in the case of a grant under subsection (a) for the 
purposes described in subsection (b)(4)--
            ``(1) the portion of the costs of a program provided by 
        that grant may not exceed 50 percent;
            ``(2) any funds appropriated by Congress for the activities 
        of any agency of an Indian tribal government or the Bureau of 
        Indian Affairs performing law enforcement functions on any 
        Indian lands may be used to provide the non-Federal share of a 
        matching requirement funded under this subsection; and
            ``(3) the Attorney General may provide, in the guidelines 
        implementing this section, for the requirement of paragraph (1) 
        to be waived or altered in the case of a recipient with a 
        financial need for such a waiver or alteration.''.
    (b) Conforming Amendment.--Section 1702 of title I of such Act (42 
U.S.C. 3796dd-1) is amended in subsection (d)(2) by striking ``section 
1701(d)'' and inserting ``section 1701(b)''.
    (c) Authorization of Appropriations.--Section 1001(a)(11) of title 
I of such Act (42 U.S.C. 3793(a)(11)) is amended--
            (1) in subparagraph (A) by striking clause (i) and all that 
        follows through the period at the end and inserting the 
        following:
            ``(i) $1,007,624,000 for fiscal year 2005;
            ``(ii) $1,027,176,000 for fiscal year 2006; and
            ``(iii) $1,047,119,000 for fiscal year 2007.''; and
            (2) in subparagraph (B)--
                    (A) by striking ``section 1701(f)'' and inserting 
                ``section 1701(d)''; and
                    (B) by striking the third sentence.

                       Subtitle I--Police Badges

SEC. 2201. SHORT TITLE.

    This subtitle may be cited as the ``Badge Security Enhancement Act 
of 2004'' .

SEC. 2202. POLICE BADGES.

    Section 716 of title 18, United States Code, is amended in 
subsection (b)--
            (1) by striking paragraphs (2) and (4); and
            (2) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (2).

            TITLE III--BORDER SECURITY AND TERRORIST TRAVEL

        Subtitle A--Immigration Reform in the National Interest

                     CHAPTER 1--GENERAL PROVISIONS

SEC. 3001. ELIMINATING THE ``WESTERN HEMISPHERE'' EXCEPTION FOR 
                    CITIZENS.

    (a) In General.--
            (1) In general.--Section 215(b) of the Immigration and 
        Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1185(b)) is amended to read as 
        follows:
    ``(b)(1) Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, it shall 
be unlawful for any citizen of the United States to depart from or 
enter, or attempt to depart from or enter, the United States unless the 
citizen bears a valid United States passport.
    ``(2) Subject to such limitations and exceptions as the President 
may authorize and prescribe, the President may waive the application of 
paragraph (1) in the case of a citizen departing the United States to, 
or entering the United States from, foreign contiguous territory.
    ``(3) The President, if waiving the application of paragraph (1) 
pursuant to paragraph (2), shall require citizens departing the United 
States to, or entering the United States from, foreign contiguous 
territory to bear a document (or combination of documents) designated 
by the Secretary of Homeland Security under paragraph (4).
    ``(4) The Secretary of Homeland Security--
            ``(A) shall designate documents that are sufficient to 
        denote identity and citizenship in the United States such that 
        they may be used, either individually or in conjunction with 
        another document, to establish that the bearer is a citizen or 
        national of the United States for purposes of lawfully 
        departing from or entering the United States; and
            ``(B) shall publish a list of those documents in the 
        Federal Register.
    ``(5) A document may not be designated under paragraph (4) (whether 
alone or in combination with other documents) unless the Secretary of 
Homeland Security determines that the document--
            ``(A) may be relied upon for the purposes of this 
        subsection; and
            ``(B) may not be issued to an alien unlawfully present in 
        the United States.''.
            (2) Effective date.--The amendment made by paragraph (1) 
        shall take effect on October 1, 2006.
    (b) Interim Rule.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 60 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security--
                    (A) shall designate documents that are sufficient 
                to denote identity and citizenship in the United States 
                such that they may be used, either individually or in 
                conjunction with another document, to establish that 
                the bearer is a citizen or national of the United 
                States for purposes of lawfully departing from or 
                entering the United States; and
                    (B) shall publish a list of those documents in the 
                Federal Register.
            (2) Limitation on presidential authority.--Beginning on the 
        date that is 90 days after the publication described in 
        paragraph (1)(B), the President, notwithstanding section 215(b) 
        of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1185(b)), may 
        not exercise the President's authority under such section so as 
        to permit any citizen of the United States to depart from or 
        enter, or attempt to depart from or enter, the United States 
        from any country other than foreign contiguous territory, 
        unless the citizen bears a document (or combination of 
        documents) designated under paragraph (1)(A).
            (3) Criteria for designation.--A document may not be 
        designated under paragraph (1)(A) (whether alone or in 
        combination with other documents) unless the Secretary of 
        Homeland Security determines that the document--
                    (A) may be relied upon for the purposes of this 
                subsection; and
                    (B) may not be issued to an alien unlawfully 
                present in the United States.
            (4) Effective date.--This subsection shall take effect on 
        the date of the enactment of this Act and shall cease to be 
        effective on September 30, 2006.

SEC. 3002. MODIFICATION OF WAIVER AUTHORITY WITH RESPECT TO 
                    DOCUMENTATION REQUIREMENTS FOR NATIONALS OF FOREIGN 
                    CONTIGUOUS TERRITORIES AND ADJACENT ISLANDS.

    (a) In General.--Section 212(d)(4) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.1182(d)(4)) is amended--
            (1) by striking ``Attorney General'' and inserting 
        ``Secretary of Homeland Security'';
            (2) by striking ``on the basis of reciprocity'' and all 
        that follows through ``or (C)''; and
            (3) by adding at the end the following:
        ``Either or both of the requirements of such paragraph may also 
        be waived by the Secretary of Homeland Security and the 
        Secretary of State, acting jointly and on the basis of 
        reciprocity, with respect to nationals of foreign contiguous 
        territory or of adjacent islands, but only if such nationals 
        are required, in order to be admitted into the United States, 
        to be in possession of identification deemed by the Secretary 
        of Homeland Security to be secure.''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall 
take effect on December 31, 2006.

SEC. 3003. INCREASE IN FULL-TIME BORDER PATROL AGENTS.

    The Secretary of Homeland Security, in each of fiscal years 2006 
through 2010, shall increase by not less than 2,000 the number of 
positions for full-time active-duty border patrol agents within the 
Department of Homeland Security above the number of such positions for 
which funds were allotted for the preceding fiscal year.

SEC. 3004. INCREASE IN FULL-TIME IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT 
                    INVESTIGATORS.

    The Secretary of Homeland Security, in each of fiscal years 2006 
through 2010, shall increase by not less than 800 the number of 
positions for full-time active-duty investigators within the Department 
of Homeland Security investigating violations of immigration laws (as 
defined in section 101(a)(17) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 
U.S.C. 1101(a)(17)) above the number of such positions for which funds 
were allotted for the preceding fiscal year. At least half of these 
additional investigators shall be designated to investigate potential 
violations of section 274A of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 
U.S.C 1324a). Each State shall be allotted at least 3 of these 
additional investigators.

SEC. 3005. ALIEN IDENTIFICATION STANDARDS.

    Section 211 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1181) 
is amended by adding at the end the following:
    ``(d) For purposes of establishing identity to any Federal 
employee, an alien present in the United States may present any 
document issued by the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland 
Security under the authority of one of the immigration laws (as defined 
in section 101(a)(17)), or an unexpired lawfully issued foreign 
passport. Subject to the limitations and exceptions in immigration laws 
(as defined in section 101(a)(17) of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(17)), no other document may be presented for 
those purposes.''.

SEC. 3006. EXPEDITED REMOVAL.

    Section 235(b)(1)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 
U.S.C. 1225(b)(1)(A)) is amended by striking clauses (i) through (iii) 
and inserting the following:
                            ``(i) In general.--If an immigration 
                        officer determines that an alien (other than an 
                        alien described in subparagraph (F)) who is 
                        arriving in the United States, or who has not 
                        been admitted or paroled into the United States 
                        and has not been physically present in the 
                        United States continuously for the 5-year 
                        period immediately prior to the date of the 
                        determination of inadmissibility under this 
                        paragraph, is inadmissible under section 
                        212(a)(6)(C) or 212(a)(7), the officer shall 
                        order the alien removed from the United States 
                        without further hearing or review, unless--
                                    ``(I) the alien has been charged 
                                with a crime, is in criminal 
                                proceedings, or is serving a criminal 
                                sentence; or
                                    ``(II) the alien indicates an 
                                intention to apply for asylum under 
                                section 208 or a fear of persecution 
                                and the officer determines that the 
                                alien has been physically present in 
                                the United States for less than 1 year.
                            ``(ii) Claims for asylum.--If an 
                        immigration officer determines that an alien 
                        (other than an alien described in subparagraph 
                        (F)) who is arriving in the United States, or 
                        who has not been admitted or paroled into the 
                        United States and has not been physically 
                        present in the United States continuously for 
                        the 5-year period immediately prior to the date 
                        of the determination of inadmissibility under 
                        this paragraph, is inadmissible under section 
                        212(a)(6)(C) or 212(a)(7), and the alien 
                        indicates either an intention to apply for 
                        asylum under section 208 or a fear of 
                        persecution, the officer shall refer the alien 
                        for an interview by an asylum officer under 
                        subparagraph (B) if the officer determines that 
                        the alien has been physically present in the 
                        United States for less than 1 year.''.

SEC. 3007. PREVENTING TERRORISTS FROM OBTAINING ASYLUM.

    (a) Conditions for Granting Asylum.--Section 208(b) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1158(b)) is amended--
            (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``The Attorney General'' 
        and inserting the following:
                    ``(A) Eligibility.--The Secretary of Homeland 
                Security or the Attorney General''; and
            (2) by adding at the end the following:
                    ``(B) Burden of proof.--The burden of proof is on 
                the applicant to establish that the applicant is a 
                refugee within the meaning of section 101(a)(42)(A). To 
                establish that the applicant is a refugee within the 
                meaning of this Act, the applicant must establish that 
                race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular 
                social group, or political opinion was or will be the 
                central motive for persecuting the applicant. The 
                testimony of the applicant may be sufficient to sustain 
                such burden without corroboration, but only if it is 
                credible, is persuasive, and refers to specific facts 
                that demonstrate that the applicant is a refugee. Where 
                the trier of fact finds that it is reasonable to expect 
                corroborating evidence for certain alleged facts 
                pertaining to the specifics of the applicant's claim, 
                such evidence must be provided unless a reasonable 
                explanation is given as to why such information is not 
                provided. The credibility determination of the trier of 
                fact may be based, in addition to other factors, on the 
                demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the applicant or 
                witness, the consistency between the applicant's or 
                witness's written and oral statements, whether or not 
                under oath, made at any time to any officer, agent, or 
                employee of the United States, the internal consistency 
                of each such statement, the consistency of such 
                statements with the country conditions in the country 
                from which the applicant claims asylum (as presented by 
                the Department of State) and any inaccuracies or 
                falsehoods in such statements. These factors may be 
                considered individually or cumulatively.''.
    (b) Standard of Review for Orders of Removal.--Section 242(b)(4) of 
the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1252(b)(4)) is amended by 
adding after subparagraph (D) the following flush language: ``No court 
shall reverse a determination made by an adjudicator with respect to 
the availability of corroborating evidence as described in section 
208(b)(1)(B), unless the court finds that a reasonable adjudicator is 
compelled to conclude that such corroborating evidence is 
unavailable.''.
    (c) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (b) shall 
take effect upon the date of enactment of this Act and shall apply to 
cases in which the final administrative removal order was issued 
before, on, or after the date of enactment of this Act.

SEC. 3008. REVOCATION OF VISAS AND OTHER TRAVEL DOCUMENTATION.

    (a) Limitation on Review.--Section 221(i) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1201(i)) is amended by adding at the end the 
following: ``There shall be no means of administrative or judicial 
review of a revocation under this subsection, and no court or other 
person otherwise shall have jurisdiction to consider any claim 
challenging the validity of such a revocation.''.
    (b) Classes of Deportable Aliens.--Section 237(a)(1)(B) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(B)) is amended by 
striking ``United States is'' and inserting the following: ``United 
States, or whose nonimmigrant visa (or other documentation authorizing 
admission into the United States as a nonimmigrant) has been revoked 
under section 221(i), is''.
    (c) Revocation of Petitions.--Section 205 of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1155) is amended--
            (1) by striking ``Attorney General'' and inserting 
        ``Secretary of Homeland Security''; and
            (2) by striking the final two sentences.
    (d) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall take 
effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and shall apply to 
revocations under sections 205 and 221(i) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act made before, on, or after such date.

SEC. 3009. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ORDERS OF REMOVAL.

    (a) In General.--Section 242 of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(8 U.S.C. 1252) is amended--
            (1) in subsection (a)--
                    (A) in paragraph (2)--
                            (i) in subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C), by 
                        inserting ``(statutory and nonstatutory), 
                        including section 2241 of title 28, United 
                        States Code, or any other habeas corpus 
                        provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of title 
                        28, United States Code'' after 
                        ``Notwithstanding any other provision of law''; 
                        and
                            (ii) by adding at the end the following:
                    ``(D) Judicial review of certain legal claims.--
                Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed as 
                precluding consideration by the circuit courts of 
                appeals of constitutional claims or pure questions of 
                law raised upon petitions for review filed in 
                accordance with this section. Notwithstanding any other 
                provision of law (statutory and nonstatutory), 
                including section 2241 of title 28, United States Code, 
                or, except as provided in subsection (e), any other 
                habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of 
                title 28, United States Code, such petitions for review 
                shall be the sole and exclusive means of raising any 
                and all claims with respect to orders of removal 
                entered or issued under any provision of this Act.''; 
                and
                    (B) by adding at the end the following:
            ``(4) Claims under the united nations convention.--
        Notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory and 
        nonstatutory), including section 2241 of title 28, United 
        States Code, or any other habeas corpus provision, and sections 
        1361 and 1651 of title 28, United States Code, a petition for 
        review by the circuit courts of appeals filed in accordance 
        with this section is the sole and exclusive means of judicial 
        review of claims arising under the United Nations Convention 
        Against Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading 
        Treatment or Punishment.
            ``(5) Exclusive means of review.--The judicial review 
        specified in this subsection shall be the sole and exclusive 
        means for review by any court of an order of removal entered or 
        issued under any provision of this Act. For purposes of this 
        title, in every provision that limits or eliminates judicial 
        review or jurisdiction to review, the terms `judicial review' 
        and `jurisdiction to review' include habeas corpus review 
        pursuant to section 2241 of title 28, United States Code, or 
        any other habeas corpus provision, sections 1361 and 1651 of 
        title 28, United States Code, and review pursuant to any other 
        provision of law.'';
            (2) in subsection (b)--
                    (A) in paragraph (3)(B), by inserting ``pursuant to 
                subsection (f)'' after ``unless''; and
                    (B) in paragraph (9), by adding at the end the 
                following: ``Except as otherwise provided in this 
                subsection, no court shall have jurisdiction, by habeas 
                corpus under section 2241 of title 28, United States 
                Code, or any other habeas corpus provision, by section 
                1361 or 1651 of title 28, United States Code, or by any 
                other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), to 
                hear any cause or claim subject to these consolidation 
                provisions.'';
            (3) in subsection (f)(2), by inserting ``or stay, by 
        temporary or permanent order, including stays pending judicial 
        review,'' after ``no court shall enjoin''; and
            (4) in subsection (g), by inserting ``(statutory and 
        nonstatutory), including section 2241 of title 28, United 
        States Code, or any other habeas corpus provision, and sections 
        1361 and 1651 of title 28, United States Code'' after 
        ``notwithstanding any other provision of law''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsection (a) shall 
take effect upon the date of enactment of this Act and shall apply to 
cases in which the final administrative removal order was issued 
before, on, or after the date of enactment of this Act.

    CHAPTER 2--DEPORTATION OF TERRORISTS AND SUPPORTERS OF TERRORISM

SEC. 3031. EXPANDED INAPPLICABILITY OF RESTRICTION ON REMOVAL.

    (a) In General.--Section 241(b)(3)(B) (8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3)(B)) is 
amended--
            (1) in the matter preceding clause (i), by striking 
        ``section 237(a)(4)(D)'' and inserting ``paragraph (4)(B) or 
        (4)(D) of section 237(a)''; and
            (2) in clause (iii), by striking ``or'';
            (3) in clause (iv), by striking the period and inserting 
        ``; or'' ;
            (4) by inserting after clause (iv) and following:
                            ``(v) the alien is described in subclause 
                        (I), (II), (III), (IV), or (VI) of section 
                        212(a)(3)(B)(i) or section 237(a)(4)(B), 
                        unless, in the case only of an alien described 
                        in subclause (IV) of section 212(a)(3)(B)(i), 
                        the Secretary of Homeland Security determines, 
                        in the Secretary's discretion, that there are 
                        not reasonable grounds for regarding the alien 
                        as a danger to the security of the United 
                        States.''; and
            (5) by striking the last sentence.
    (b) Exceptions.--Section 208(b)(2)(A)(v) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(2)(A)(v)) is amended--
            (1) by striking ``inadmissible under'' each place such term 
        appears and inserting ``described in''; and
            (2) by striking ``removable under''.
    (c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall take 
effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and shall apply to--
            (1) removal proceedings instituted before, on, or after the 
        date of the enactment of this Act; and
            (2) acts and conditions constituting a ground for 
        inadmissibility or removal occurring or existing before, on, or 
        after such date.

SEC. 3032. EXCEPTION TO RESTRICTION ON REMOVAL FOR TERRORISTS AND 
                    CRIMINALS.

    (a) Regulations.--
            (1) Revision deadline.--Not later than 120 days after the 
        date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland 
        Security shall revise the regulations prescribed by the 
        Secretary to implement the United Nations Convention Against 
        Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
        Treatment or Punishment, done at New York on December 10, 1984.
            (2) Exclusion of certain aliens.--The revision--
                    (A) shall exclude from the protection of such 
                regulations aliens described in section 241(b)(3)(B) of 
                the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 
                1231(b)(3)(B)) (as amended by this title), including 
                rendering such aliens ineligible for withholding or 
                deferral of removal under the Convention; and
                    (B) shall ensure that the revised regulations 
                operate so as to--
                            (i) allow for the reopening of 
                        determinations made under the regulations 
                        before the effective date of the revision; and
                            (ii) apply to acts and conditions 
                        constituting a ground for ineligibility for the 
                        protection of such regulations, as revised, 
                        regardless of when such acts or conditions 
                        occurred.
            (3) Burden of proof.--The revision shall also ensure that 
        the burden of proof is on the applicant for withholding or 
        deferral of removal under the Convention to establish by clear 
        and convincing evidence that he or she would be tortured if 
        removed to the proposed country of removal.
    (b) Judicial Review.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
no court shall have jurisdiction to review the regulations adopted to 
implement this section, and nothing in this section shall be construed 
as providing any court jurisdiction to consider or review claims raised 
under the Convention or this section, except as part of the review of a 
final order of removal pursuant to section 242 of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1252).

SEC. 3033. ADDITIONAL REMOVAL AUTHORITIES.

    (a) In General.--Section 241(b) of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act (8 U.S.C. 1231(b)) is amended--
            (1) in paragraph (1)--
                    (A) in each of subparagraphs (A) and (B), by 
                striking the period at the end and inserting ``unless, 
                in the opinion of the Secretary of Homeland Security, 
                removing the alien to such country would be prejudicial 
                to the United States.''; and
                    (B) by amending subparagraph (C) to read as 
                follows:
                    ``(C) Alternative countries.--If the alien is not 
                removed to a country designated in subparagraph (A) or 
                (B), the Secretary of Homeland Security shall remove 
                the alien to--
                            ``(i) the country of which the alien is a 
                        citizen, subject, or national, where the alien 
                        was born, or where the alien has a residence, 
                        unless the country physically prevents the 
                        alien from entering the country upon the 
                        alien's removal there; or
                            ``(ii) any country whose government will 
                        accept the alien into that country.''; and
            (2) in paragraph (2)--
                    (A) by striking ``Attorney General'' each place 
                such term appears and inserting ``Secretary of Homeland 
                Security'';
                    (B) by amending subparagraph (D) to read as 
                follows:
                    ``(D) Alternative countries.--If the alien is not 
                removed to a country designated under subparagraph 
                (A)(i), the Secretary of Homeland Security shall remove 
                the alien to a country of which the alien is a subject, 
                national, or citizen, or where the alien has a 
                residence, unless--
                            ``(i) such country physically prevents the 
                        alien from entering the country upon the 
                        alien's removal there; or
                            ``(ii) in the opinion of the Secretary of 
                        Homeland Security, removing the alien to the 
                        country would be prejudicial to the United 
                        States.''; and
                    (C) by amending subparagraph (E)(vii) to read as 
                follows:
                            ``(vii) Any country whose government will 
                        accept the alien into that country.''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsection (a) shall 
take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and shall apply to 
any deportation, exclusion, or removal on or after such date pursuant 
to any deportation, exclusion, or removal order, regardless of whether 
such order is administratively final before, on, or after such date.

            CHAPTER 3--PREVENTING COMMERCIAL ALIEN SMUGGLING

SEC. 3041. BRINGING IN AND HARBORING CERTAIN ALIENS.

    (a) Criminal Penalties.--Section 274(a) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1324(a)) is amended by adding at the end the 
following:
    ``(4) In the case of a person who has brought aliens into the 
United States in violation of this subsection, the sentence otherwise 
provided for may be increased by up to 10 years if--
            ``(A) the offense was part of an ongoing commercial 
        organization or enterprise;
            ``(B) aliens were transported in groups of 10 or more;
            ``(C) aliens were transported in a manner that endangered 
        their lives; or
            ``(D) the aliens presented a life-threatening health risk 
        to people in the United States.''.
    (b) Outreach Program.--Section 274 of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1324), as amended by subsection (a), is 
further amended by adding at the end the following:
    ``(f) Outreach Program.--The Secretary of Homeland Security, in 
consultation as appropriate with the Attorney General and the Secretary 
of State, shall develop and implement an outreach program to educate 
the public in the United States and abroad about the penalties for 
bringing in and harboring aliens in violation of this section.

                Subtitle B--Identity Management Security

    CHAPTER 1--IMPROVED SECURITY FOR DRIVERS' LICENSES AND PERSONAL 
                          IDENTIFICATION CARDS

SEC. 3051. DEFINITIONS.

    In this chapter, the following definitions apply:
            (1) Driver's license.--The term ``driver's license'' means 
        a motor vehicle operator's license, as defined in section 30301 
        of title 49, United States Code.
            (2) Identification card.--The term ``identification card'' 
        means a personal identification card, as defined in section 
        1028(d) of title 18, United States Code, issued by a State.
            (3) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary 
        of Homeland Security.
            (4) State.--The term ``State'' means a State of the United 
        States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin 
        Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the Northern Mariana Islands, 
        the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, and any other 
        territory or possession of the United States.

SEC. 3052. MINIMUM DOCUMENT REQUIREMENTS AND ISSUANCE STANDARDS FOR 
                    FEDERAL RECOGNITION.

    (a) Minimum Standards for Federal Use.--
            (1) In general.--Beginning 3 years after the date of 
        enactment of this Act, a Federal agency may not accept, for any 
        official purpose, a driver's license or identification card 
        issued by a State to any person unless the State is meeting the 
        requirements of this section.
            (2) State certifications.--The Secretary shall determine 
        whether a State is meeting the requirements of this section 
        based on certifications made by the State to the Secretary. 
        Such certifications shall be made at such times and in such 
        manner as the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of 
        Transportation, may prescribe by regulation.
    (b) Minimum Document Requirements.--To meet the requirements of 
this section, a State shall include, at a minimum, the following 
information and features on each driver's license and identification 
card issued to a person by the State:
            (1) The person's full legal name.
            (2) The person's date of birth.
            (3) The person's gender.
            (4) The person's driver license or identification card 
        number.
            (5) A photograph of the person.
            (6) The person's address of principal residence.
            (7) The person's signature.
            (8) Physical security features designed to prevent 
        tampering, counterfeiting, or duplication of the document for 
        fraudulent purposes.
            (9) A common machine-readable technology, with defined 
        minimum data elements.
    (c) Minimum Issuance Standards.--
            (1) In general.--To meet the requirements of this section, 
        a State shall require, at a minimum, presentation and 
        verification of the following information before issuing a 
        driver's license or identification card to a person:
                    (A) A photo identity document, except that a non-
                photo identity document is acceptable if it includes 
                both the person's full legal name and date of birth.
                    (B) Documentation showing the person's date of 
                birth.
                    (C) Proof of the person's social security account 
                number or verification that the person is not eligible 
                for a social security account number.
                    (D) Documentation showing the person's name and 
                address of principal residence.
            (2) Verification of documents.--To meet the requirements of 
        this section, a State shall implement the following procedures:
                    (A) Before issuing a driver's license or 
                identification card to a person, the State shall 
                verify, with the issuing agency, the issuance, 
                validity, and completeness of each document required to 
                be presented by the person under paragraph (1).
                    (B) The State shall not accept any foreign 
                document, other than an official passport, to satisfy a 
                requirement of paragraph (1).
    (d) Other Requirements.--To meet the requirements of this section, 
a State shall adopt the following practices in the issuance of drivers' 
licenses and identification cards:
            (1) Employ technology to capture digital images of identity 
        source documents so that the images can be retained in 
        electronic storage in a transferable format.
            (2) Retain paper copies of source documents for a minimum 
        of 7 years or images of source documents presented for a 
        minimum of 10 years.
            (3) Subject each person applying for a driver's license or 
        identification card to mandatory facial image capture.
            (4) Establish an effective procedure to confirm or verify a 
        renewing applicant's information.
            (5) Confirm with the Social Security Administration a 
        social security account number presented by a person using the 
        full social security account number. In the event that a social 
        security account number is already registered to or associated 
        with another person to which any State has issued a driver's 
        license or identification card, the State shall resolve the 
        discrepancy and take appropriate action.
            (6) Refuse to issue a driver's license or identification 
        card to a person holding a driver's license issued by another 
        State without confirmation that the person is terminating or 
        has terminated the driver's license.
            (7) Ensure the physical security of locations where 
        drivers' licenses and identification cards are produced and the 
        security of document materials and papers from which drivers' 
        licenses and identification cards are produced.
            (8) Subject all persons authorized to manufacture or 
        produce drivers' licenses and identification cards to 
        appropriate security clearance requirements.
            (9) Establish fraudulent document recognition training 
        programs for appropriate employees engaged in the issuance of 
        drivers' licenses and identification cards.

SEC. 3053. LINKING OF DATABASES.

    (a) In General.--To be eligible to receive any grant or other type 
of financial assistance made available under this subtitle, a State 
shall participate in the interstate compact regarding sharing of driver 
license data, known as the ``Driver License Agreement'', in order to 
provide electronic access by a State to information contained in the 
motor vehicle databases of all other States.
    (b) Requirements for Information.--A State motor vehicle database 
shall contain, at a minimum, the following information:
            (1) All data fields printed on drivers' licenses and 
        identification cards issued by the State.
            (2) Motor vehicle drivers' histories, including motor 
        vehicle violations, suspensions, and points on licenses.

SEC. 3054. TRAFFICKING IN AUTHENTICATION FEATURES FOR USE IN FALSE 
                    IDENTIFICATION DOCUMENTS.

    Section 1028(a)(8) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by 
striking ``false authentication features'' and inserting ``false or 
actual authentication features''.

SEC. 3055. GRANTS TO STATES.

    (a) In General.--The Secretary may make grants to a State to assist 
the State in conforming to the minimum standards set forth in this 
chapter.
    (b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be 
appropriated to the Secretary for each of the fiscal years 2005 through 
2009 such sums as may be necessary to carry out this chapter.

SEC. 3056. AUTHORITY.

    (a) Participation of Secretary of Transportation and States.--All 
authority to issue regulations, certify standards, and issue grants 
under this chapter shall be carried out by the Secretary, in 
consultation with the Secretary of Transportation and the States.
    (b) Extensions of Deadlines.--The Secretary may grant to a State an 
extension of time to meet the requirements of section 3052(a)(1) if the 
State provides adequate justification for noncompliance.

          CHAPTER 2--IMPROVED SECURITY FOR BIRTH CERTIFICATES

SEC. 3061. DEFINITIONS.

    (a) Applicability of Definitions.--Except as otherwise specifically 
provided, the definitions contained in section 3051 apply to this 
chapter.
    (b) Other Definitions.--In this chapter, the following definitions 
apply:
            (1) Birth certificate.--The term ``birth certificate'' 
        means a certificate of birth--
                    (A) for an individual (regardless of where born)--
                            (i) who is a citizen or national of the 
                        United States at birth; and
                            (ii) whose birth is registered in the 
                        United States; and
                    (B) that--
                            (i) is issued by a Federal, State, or local 
                        government agency or authorized custodian of 
                        record and produced from birth records 
                        maintained by such agency or custodian of 
                        record; or
                            (ii) is an authenticated copy, issued by a 
                        Federal, State, or local government agency or 
                        authorized custodian of record, of an original 
                        certificate of birth issued by such agency or 
                        custodian of record.
            (2) Registrant.--The term ``registrant'' means, with 
        respect to a birth certificate, the person whose birth is 
        registered on the certificate.
            (3) State.--The term ``State'' shall have the meaning given 
        such term in section 3051; except that New York City shall be 
        treated as a State separate from New York.

SEC. 3062. APPLICABILITY OF MINIMUM STANDARDS TO LOCAL GOVERNMENTS.

    The minimum standards in this chapter applicable to birth 
certificates issued by a State shall also apply to birth certificates 
issued by a local government in the State. It shall be the 
responsibility of the State to ensure that local governments in the 
State comply with the minimum standards.

SEC. 3063. MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR FEDERAL RECOGNITION.

    (a) Minimum Standards for Federal Use.--
            (1) In general.--Beginning 3 years after the date of 
        enactment of this Act, a Federal agency may not accept, for any 
        official purpose, a birth certificate issued by a State to any 
        person unless the State is meeting the requirements of this 
        section.
            (2) State certifications.--The Secretary shall determine 
        whether a State is meeting the requirements of this section 
        based on certifications made by the State to the Secretary. 
        Such certifications shall be made at such times and in such 
        manner as the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of 
        Health and Human Services, may prescribe by regulation.
    (b) Minimum Document Standards.--To meet the requirements of this 
section, a State shall include, on each birth certificate issued to a 
person by the State, the use of safety paper, the seal of the issuing 
custodian of record, and such other features as the Secretary may 
determine necessary to prevent tampering, counterfeiting, and otherwise 
duplicating the birth certificate for fraudulent purposes. The 
Secretary may not require a single design to which birth certificates 
issued by all States must conform.
    (c) Minimum Issuance Standards.--
            (1) In general.--To meet the requirements of this section, 
        a State shall require and verify the following information from 
        the requestor before issuing an authenticated copy of a birth 
        certificate:
                    (A) The name on the birth certificate.
                    (B) The date and location of the birth.
                    (C) The mother's maiden name.
                    (D) Substantial proof of the requestor's identity.
            (2) Issuance to persons not named on birth certificate.--To 
        meet the requirements of this section, in the case of a request 
        by a person who is not named on the birth certificate, a State 
        must require the presentation of legal authorization to request 
        the birth certificate before issuance.
            (3) Issuance to family members.--Not later than one year 
        after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary, in 
        consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human Services 
        and the States, shall establish minimum standards for issuance 
        of a birth certificate to specific family members, their 
        authorized representatives, and others who demonstrate that the 
        certificate is needed for the protection of the requestor's 
        personal or property rights.
            (4) Waivers.--A State may waive the requirements set forth 
        in subparagraphs (A) through (C) of subsection (c)(1) in 
        exceptional circumstances, such as the incapacitation of the 
        registrant.
            (5) Applications by electronic means.--To meet the 
        requirements of this section, for applications by electronic 
        means, through the mail or by phone or fax, a State shall 
        employ third party verification, or equivalent verification, of 
        the identity of the requestor.
            (6) Verification of documents.--To meet the requirements of 
        this section, a State shall verify the documents used to 
        provide proof of identity of the requestor.
    (d) Other Requirements.--To meet the requirements of this section, 
a State shall adopt, at a minimum, the following practices in the 
issuance and administration of birth certificates:
            (1) Establish and implement minimum building security 
        standards for State and local vital record offices.
            (2) Restrict public access to birth certificates and 
        information gathered in the issuance process to ensure that 
        access is restricted to entities with which the State has a 
        binding privacy protection agreement.
            (3) Subject all persons with access to vital records to 
        appropriate security clearance requirements.
            (4) Establish fraudulent document recognition training 
        programs for appropriate employees engaged in the issuance 
        process.
            (5) Establish and implement internal operating system 
        standards for paper and for electronic systems.
            (6) Establish a central database that can provide 
        interoperative data exchange with other States and with Federal 
        agencies, subject to privacy restrictions and confirmation of 
        the authority and identity of the requestor.
            (7) Ensure that birth and death records are matched in a 
        comprehensive and timely manner, and that all electronic birth 
        records and paper birth certificates of decedents are marked 
        ``deceased''.
            (8) Cooperate with the Secretary in the implementation of 
        electronic verification of vital events under section 3065.

SEC. 3064. ESTABLISHMENT OF ELECTRONIC BIRTH AND DEATH REGISTRATION 
                    SYSTEMS.

    In consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human Services and 
the Commissioner of Social Security, the Secretary shall take the 
following actions:
            (1) Work with the States to establish a common data set and 
        common data exchange protocol for electronic birth registration 
        systems and death registration systems.
            (2) Coordinate requirements for such systems to align with 
        a national model.
            (3) Ensure that fraud prevention is built into the design 
        of electronic vital registration systems in the collection of 
        vital event data, the issuance of birth certificates, and the 
        exchange of data among government agencies.
            (4) Ensure that electronic systems for issuing birth 
        certificates, in the form of printed abstracts of birth records 
        or digitized images, employ a common format of the certified 
        copy, so that those requiring such documents can quickly 
        confirm their validity.
            (5) Establish uniform field requirements for State birth 
        registries.
            (6) Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of 
        this Act, establish a process with the Department of Defense 
        that will result in the sharing of data, with the States and 
        the Social Security Administration, regarding deaths of United 
        States military personnel and the birth and death of their 
        dependents.
            (7) Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of 
        this Act, establish a process with the Department of State to 
        improve registration, notification, and the sharing of data 
        with the States and the Social Security Administration, 
        regarding births and deaths of United States citizens abroad.
            (8) Not later than 3 years after the date of establishment 
        of databases provided for under this section, require States to 
        record and retain electronic records of pertinent 
        identification information collected from requestors who are 
        not the registrants.
            (9) Not later than 6 months after the date of enactment of 
        this Act, submit to Congress, a report on whether there is a 
        need for Federal laws to address penalties for fraud and misuse 
        of vital records and whether violations are sufficiently 
        enforced.

SEC. 3065. ELECTRONIC VERIFICATION OF VITAL EVENTS.

    (a) Lead Agency.--The Secretary shall lead the implementation of 
electronic verification of a person's birth and death.
    (b) Regulations.--In carrying out subsection (a), the Secretary 
shall issue regulations to establish a means by which authorized 
Federal and State agency users with a single interface will be able to 
generate an electronic query to any participating vital records 
jurisdiction throughout the Nation to verify the contents of a paper 
birth certificate. Pursuant to the regulations, an electronic response 
from the participating vital records jurisdiction as to whether there 
is a birth record in their database that matches the paper birth 
certificate will be returned to the user, along with an indication if 
the matching birth record has been flagged ``deceased''. The 
regulations shall take effect not later than 5 years after the date of 
enactment of this Act.

SEC. 3066. GRANTS TO STATES.

    (a) In General.--The Secretary may make grants to a State to assist 
the State in conforming to the minimum standards set forth in this 
chapter.
    (b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be 
appropriated to the Secretary for each of the fiscal years 2005 through 
2009 such sums as may be necessary to carry out this chapter.

SEC. 3067. AUTHORITY.

    (a) Participation With Federal Agencies and States.--All authority 
to issue regulations, certify standards, and issue grants under this 
chapter shall be carried out by the Secretary, with the concurrence of 
the Secretary of Health and Human Services and in consultation with 
State vital statistics offices and appropriate Federal agencies.
    (b) Extensions of Deadlines.--The Secretary may grant to a State an 
extension of time to meet the requirements of section 3063(a)(1) if the 
State provides adequate justification for noncompliance.

Chapter 3--Measures To Enhance Privacy and Integrity of Social Security 
                            Account Numbers

SEC. 3071. PROHIBITION OF THE DISPLAY OF SOCIAL SECURITY ACCOUNT 
                    NUMBERS ON DRIVER'S LICENSES OR MOTOR VEHICLE 
                    REGISTRATIONS.

    (a) In General.--Section 205(c)(2)(C)(vi) of the Social Security 
Act (42 U.S.C. 405(c)(2)(C)(vi)) is amended--
            (1) by inserting ``(I)'' after ``(vi)''; and
            (2) by adding at the end the following new subclause:
    ``(II) Any State or political subdivision thereof (and any person 
acting as an agent of such an agency or instrumentality), in the 
administration of any driver's license or motor vehicle registration 
law within its jurisdiction, may not display a social security account 
number issued by the Commissioner of Social Security (or any derivative 
of such number) on any driver's license or motor vehicle registration 
or any other document issued by such State or political subdivision to 
an individual for purposes of identification of such individual or 
include on any such license, registration, or other document a magnetic 
strip, bar code, or other means of communication which conveys such 
number (or derivative thereof).''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall 
apply with respect to licenses, registrations, and other documents 
issued or reissued after 1 year after the date of the enactment of this 
Act.

SEC. 3072. INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION OF BIRTH RECORDS PROVIDED IN 
                    SUPPORT OF APPLICATIONS FOR SOCIAL SECURITY ACCOUNT 
                    NUMBERS.

    (a) Applications for Social Security Account Numbers.--Section 
205(c)(2)(B)(ii) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 
405(c)(2)(B)(ii)) is amended--
            (1) by inserting ``(I)'' after ``(ii)''; and
            (2) by adding at the end the following new subclause:
    ``(II) With respect to an application for a social security account 
number for an individual, other than for purposes of enumeration at 
birth, the Commissioner shall require independent verification of any 
birth record provided by the applicant in support of the application. 
The Commissioner may provide by regulation for reasonable exceptions 
from the requirement for independent verification under this subclause 
in any case in which the Commissioner determines there is minimal 
opportunity for fraud.''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall 
apply with respect to applications filed after 270 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act.
    (c) Study Regarding Applications for Replacement Social Security 
Cards.--
            (1) In general.--As soon as practicable after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Commissioner of Social Security 
        shall undertake a study to test the feasibility and cost 
        effectiveness of verifying all identification documents 
        submitted by an applicant for a replacement social security 
        card. As part of such study, the Commissioner shall determine 
        the feasibility of, and the costs associated with, the 
        development of appropriate electronic processes for third party 
        verification of any such identification documents which are 
        issued by agencies and instrumentalities of the Federal 
        Government and of the States (and political subdivisions 
        thereof).
            (2) Report.--Not later than 2 years after the date of the 
        enactment of this Act, the Commissioner shall report to the 
        Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives and 
        the Committee on Finance of the Senate regarding the results of 
        the study undertaken under paragraph (1). Such report shall 
        contain such recommendations for legislative changes as the 
        Commissioner considers necessary to implement needed 
        improvements in the process for verifying identification 
        documents submitted by applicants for replacement social 
        security cards.

SEC. 3073. ENUMERATION AT BIRTH.

    (a) Improvement of Application Process.--
            (1) In general.--As soon as practicable after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Commissioner of Social Security 
        shall undertake to make improvements to the enumeration at 
        birth program for the issuance of social security account 
        numbers to newborns. Such improvements shall be designed to 
        prevent--
                    (A) the assignment of social security account 
                numbers to unnamed children;
                    (B) the issuance of more than 1 social security 
                account number to the same child; and
                    (C) other opportunities for fraudulently obtaining 
                a social security account number.
            (2) Report to the congress.--Not later than 1 year after 
        the date of the enactment of this Act, the Commissioner shall 
        transmit to each House of the Congress a report specifying in 
        detail the extent to which the improvements required under 
        paragraph (1) have been made.
    (b) Study Regarding Process for Enumeration at Birth.--
            (1) In general.--As soon as practicable after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Commissioner of Social Security 
        shall undertake a study to determine the most efficient options 
        for ensuring the integrity of the process for enumeration at 
        birth. Such study shall include an examination of available 
        methods for reconciling hospital birth records with birth 
        registrations submitted to agencies of States and political 
        subdivisions thereof and with information provided to the 
        Commissioner as part of the process for enumeration at birth.
            (2) Report.--Not later than 18 months after the date of the 
        enactment of this Act, the Commissioner shall report to the 
        Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives and 
        the Committee on Finance of the Senate regarding the results of 
        the study undertaken under paragraph (1). Such report shall 
        contain such recommendations for legislative changes as the 
        Commissioner considers necessary to implement needed 
        improvements in the process for enumeration at birth.

SEC. 3074. STUDY RELATING TO USE OF PHOTOGRAPHIC IDENTIFICATION IN 
                    CONNECTION WITH APPLICATIONS FOR BENEFITS, SOCIAL 
                    SECURITY ACCOUNT NUMBERS, AND SOCIAL SECURITY 
                    CARDS.

    (a) In General.--As soon as practicable after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Commissioner of Social Security shall 
undertake a study to--
            (1) determine the best method of requiring and obtaining 
        photographic identification of applicants for old-age, 
        survivors, and disability insurance benefits under title II of 
        the Social Security Act, for a social security account number, 
        or for a replacement social security card, and of providing for 
        reasonable exceptions to any requirement for photographic 
        identification of such applicants that may be necessary to 
        promote efficient and effective administration of such title, 
        and
            (2) evaluate the benefits and costs of instituting such a 
        requirement for photographic identification, including the 
        degree to which the security and integrity of the old-age, 
        survivors, and disability insurance program would be enhanced.
    (b) Report.--Not later than 18 months after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Commissioner shall report to the Committee 
on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives and the Committee on 
Finance of the Senate regarding the results of the study undertaken 
under subsection (a). Such report shall contain such recommendations 
for legislative changes as the Commissioner considers necessary 
relating to requirements for photographic identification of applicants 
described in subsection (a).

SEC. 3075. RESTRICTIONS ON ISSUANCE OF MULTIPLE REPLACEMENT SOCIAL 
                    SECURITY CARDS.

    (a) In General.--Section 205(c)(2)(G) of the Social Security Act 
(42 U.S.C. 405(c)(2)(G)) is amended by adding at the end the following 
new sentence: ``The Commissioner shall restrict the issuance of 
multiple replacement social security cards to any individual to 3 per 
year and to 10 for the life of the individual, except in any case in 
which the Commissioner determines there is minimal opportunity for 
fraud.''.
    (b) Regulations and Effective Date.--The Commissioner of Social 
Security shall issue regulations under the amendment made by subsection 
(a) not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act. 
Systems controls developed by the Commissioner pursuant to such 
amendment shall take effect upon the earlier of the issuance of such 
regulations or the end of such 1-year period.

SEC. 3076. STUDY RELATING TO MODIFICATION OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY 
                    ACCOUNT NUMBERING SYSTEM TO SHOW WORK AUTHORIZATION 
                    STATUS.

    (a) In General.--As soon as practicable after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Commissioner of Social Security, in 
consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall undertake a 
study to examine the best method of modifying the social security 
account number assigned to individuals who--
            (1) are not citizens of the United States,
            (2) have not been admitted for permanent residence, and
            (3) are not authorized by the Secretary of Homeland 
        Security to work in the United States, or are so authorized 
        subject to one or more restrictions,
so as to include an indication of such lack of authorization to work or 
such restrictions on such an authorization.
    (b) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, the Commissioner shall report to the Committee on Ways and 
Means of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Finance of 
the Senate regarding the results of the study undertaken under this 
section. Such report shall include the Commissioner's recommendations 
of feasible options for modifying the social security account number in 
the manner described in subsection (a).

                 Subtitle C--Targeting Terrorist Travel

SEC. 3081. STUDIES ON MACHINE-READABLE PASSPORTS AND TRAVEL HISTORY 
                    DATABASE.

    (a) In General.--Not later than May 31, 2005, the Comptroller 
General of the United States, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary 
of Homeland Security each shall submit to the Committees on the 
Judiciary of the House of Representatives and of the Senate, the 
Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives, 
and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate the results of a 
separate study on the subjects described in subsection (c).
    (b) Study.--The study submitted by the Secretary of State under 
subsection (a) shall be completed by the Office of Visa and Passport 
Control of the Department of State, in coordination with the 
appropriate officials of the Department of Homeland Security.
    (c) Contents.--The studies described in subsection (a) shall 
examine the feasibility, cost, potential benefits, and relative 
importance to the objectives of tracking suspected terrorists' travel, 
and apprehending suspected terrorists, of each of the following:
            (1) Requiring nationals of all countries to present 
        machine-readable, tamper-resistant passports that incorporate 
        biometric and document authentication identifiers.
            (2) Creation of a database containing information on the 
        lifetime travel history of each foreign national or United 
        States citizen who might seek to enter the United States or 
        another country at any time, in order that border and visa 
        issuance officials may ascertain the travel history of a 
        prospective entrant by means other than a passport.
    (d) Incentives.--The studies described in subsection (a) shall also 
make recommendations on incentives that might be offered to encourage 
foreign nations to participate in the initiatives described in 
paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (c).

SEC. 3082. EXPANDED PREINSPECTION AT FOREIGN AIRPORTS.

    (a) In General.--Section 235A(a)(4) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1225(a)(4)) is amended--
            (1) by striking ``October 31, 2000,'' and inserting 
        ``January 1, 2008,'';
            (2) by striking ``5 additional'' and inserting ``up to 25 
        additional'';
            (3) by striking ``number of aliens'' and inserting ``number 
        of inadmissible aliens, especially aliens who are potential 
        terrorists,'';
            (4) by striking ``who are inadmissible to the United 
        States.'' and inserting a period; and
            (5) by striking ``Attorney General'' each place such term 
        appears and inserting ``Secretary of Homeland Security''.
    (b) Report.--Not later than June 30, 2006, the Secretary of 
Homeland Security and the Secretary of State shall report to the 
Committees on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and of the 
Senate, the Committee on International Relations of the House of 
Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate 
on the progress being made in implementing the amendments made by 
subsection (a).
    (c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be 
appropriated to the Secretary of Homeland Security to carry out the 
amendments made by subsection (a)--
            (1) $24,000,000 for fiscal year 2005;
            (2) $48,000,000 for fiscal year 2006; and
            (3) $97,000,000 for fiscal year 2007.

SEC. 3083. IMMIGRATION SECURITY INITIATIVE.

    (a) In General.--Section 235A(b) of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act (8 U.S.C. 1225(b)) is amended--
            (1) in the subsection heading, by inserting ``and 
        Immigration Security Initiative'' after ``Program''; and
            (2) by adding at the end the following:
``Beginning not later than December 31, 2006, the number of airports 
selected for an assignment under this subsection shall be at least 
50.''.
    (b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be 
appropriated to the Secretary of Homeland Security to carry out the 
amendments made by subsection (a)--
            (1) $25,000,000 for fiscal year 2005;
            (2) $40,000,000 for fiscal year 2006; and
            (3) $40,000,000 for fiscal year 2007.

SEC. 3084. RESPONSIBILITIES AND FUNCTIONS OF CONSULAR OFFICERS.

    (a) Increased Number of Consular Officers.--The Secretary of State, 
in each of fiscal years 2006 through 2009, may increase by 150 the 
number of positions for consular officers above the number of such 
positions for which funds were allotted for the preceding fiscal year.
    (b) Limitation on Use of Foreign Nationals for Nonimmigrant Visa 
Screening.--Section 222(d) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 
U.S.C. 1202(d)) is amended by adding at the end the following:
``All nonimmigrant visa applications shall be reviewed and adjudicated 
by a consular officer.''.
    (c) Training for Consular Officers in Detection of Fraudulent 
Documents.--Section 305(a) of the Enhanced Border Security and Visa 
Entry Reform Act of 2002 (8 U.S.C. 1734(a)) is amended by adding at the 
end the following: ``As part of the consular training provided to such 
officers by the Secretary of State, such officers shall also receive 
training in detecting fraudulent documents and general document 
forensics and shall be required as part of such training to work with 
immigration officers conducting inspections of applicants for admission 
into the United States at ports of entry.''.
    (d) Assignment of Anti-Fraud Specialists.--
            (1) Survey regarding document fraud.--The Secretary of 
        State, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security, 
        shall conduct a survey of each diplomatic and consular post at 
        which visas are issued to assess the extent to which fraudulent 
        documents are presented by visa applicants to consular officers 
        at such posts.
            (2) Placement of specialist.--Not later than July 31, 2005, 
        the Secretary shall, in coordination with the Secretary of 
        Homeland Security, identify 100 of such posts that experience 
        the greatest frequency of presentation of fraudulent documents 
        by visa applicants. The Secretary shall place in each such post 
        at least one full-time anti-fraud specialist employed by the 
        Department of State to assist the consular officers at each 
        such post in the detection of such fraud.

SEC. 3085. INCREASE IN PENALTIES FOR FRAUD AND RELATED ACTIVITY.

    Section 1028 of title 18, United States Code, relating to penalties 
for fraud and related activity in connection with identification 
documents and information, is amended--
            (1) in subsection (b)(1)(A)(i), by striking ``issued by or 
        under the authority of the United States'' and inserting the 
        following: ``as described in subsection (d)'';
            (2) in subsection (b)(2), by striking ``three years'' and 
        inserting ``six years'';
            (3) in subsection (b)(3), by striking ``20 years'' and 
        inserting ``25 years'';
            (4) in subsection (b)(4), by striking ``25 years'' and 
        inserting ``30 years''; and
            (5) in subsection (c)(1), by inserting after ``United 
        States'' the following: ``Government, a State, political 
        subdivision of a State, a foreign government, political 
        subdivision of a foreign government, an international 
        governmental or an international quasi-governmental 
        organization,''.

SEC. 3086. CRIMINAL PENALTY FOR FALSE CLAIM TO CITIZENSHIP.

    Section 1015 of title 18, United States Code, is amended--
            (1) by striking the dash at the end of subsection (f) and 
        inserting ``; or''; and
            (2) by inserting after subsection (f) the following:
    ``(g) Whoever knowingly makes any false statement or claim that he 
is a citizen of the United States in order to enter into, or remain in, 
the United States--''.

SEC. 3087. ANTITERRORISM ASSISTANCE TRAINING OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 
                    STATE.

    (a) Limitation.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the 
Secretary of State shall ensure, subject to subsection (b), that the 
Antiterrorism Assistance Training (ATA) program of the Department of 
State (or any successor or related program) under chapter 8 of part II 
of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2349aa et seq.) (or 
other relevant provisions of law) is carried out primarily to provide 
training to host nation security services for the specific purpose of 
ensuring the physical security and safety of United States Government 
facilities and personnel abroad (as well as foreign dignitaries and 
training related to the protection of such dignitaries), including 
security detail training and offenses related to passport or visa 
fraud.
    (b) Exception.--The limitation contained in subsection (a) shall 
not apply, and the Secretary of State may expand the ATA program to 
include other types of antiterrorism assistance training, if the 
Secretary first obtains the approval of the Attorney General and 
provides written notification of such proposed expansion to the 
appropriate congressional committees.
    (c) Definition.--In this section, the term ``appropriate 
congressional committees'' means--
            (1) the Committee on International Relations and the 
        Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on 
        the Judiciary of the Senate.

SEC. 3088. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS TO TRACK AND CURTAIL TERRORIST 
                    TRAVEL THROUGH THE USE OF FRAUDULENTLY OBTAINED 
                    DOCUMENTS.

    (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
            (1) International terrorists travel across international 
        borders to raise funds, recruit members, train for operations, 
        escape capture, communicate, and plan and carry out attacks.
            (2) The international terrorists who planned and carried 
        out the attack on the World Trade Center on February 26, 1993, 
        the attack on the embassies of the United States in Kenya and 
        Tanzania on August 7, 1998, the attack on the USS Cole on 
        October 12, 2000, and the attack on the World Trade Center and 
        the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, traveled across 
        international borders to plan and carry out these attacks.
            (3) The international terrorists who planned other attacks 
        on the United States, including the plot to bomb New York City 
        landmarks in 1993, the plot to bomb the New York City subway in 
        1997, and the millennium plot to bomb Los Angeles International 
        Airport on December 31, 1999, traveled across international 
        borders to plan and carry out these attacks.
            (4) Many of the international terrorists who planned and 
        carried out large-scale attacks against foreign targets, 
        including the attack in Bali, Indonesia, on October 11, 2002, 
        and the attack in Madrid, Spain, on March 11, 2004, traveled 
        across international borders to plan and carry out these 
        attacks.
            (5) Throughout the 1990s, international terrorists, 
        including those involved in the attack on the World Trade 
        Center on February 26, 1993, the plot to bomb New York City 
        landmarks in 1993, and the millennium plot to bomb Los Angeles 
        International Airport on December 31, 1999, traveled on 
        fraudulent passports and often had more than one passport.
            (6) Two of the September 11, 2001, hijackers were carrying 
        passports that had been manipulated in a fraudulent manner and 
        several other hijackers whose passports did not survive the 
        attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon were likely to 
        have carried passports that were similarly manipulated.
            (7) The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the 
        United States, (commonly referred to as the 9/11 Commission), 
        stated that ``Targeting travel is at least as powerful a weapon 
        against terrorists as targeting their money.''.
    (b) International Agreements to Track and Curtail Terrorist 
Travel.--
            (1) International agreement on lost, stolen, or falsified 
        documents.--The President shall lead efforts to track and 
        curtail the travel of terrorists by supporting the drafting, 
        adoption, and implementation of international agreements, and 
        by supporting the expansion of existing international 
        agreements, to track and stop international travel by 
        terrorists and other criminals through the use of lost, stolen, 
        or falsified documents to augment existing United Nations and 
        other international anti-terrorism efforts.
            (2) Contents of international agreement.--The President 
        shall seek, in the appropriate fora, the drafting, adoption, 
        and implementation of an effective international agreement 
        requiring--
                    (A) the establishment of a system to share 
                information on lost, stolen, and fraudulent passports 
                and other travel documents for the purposes of 
                preventing the undetected travel of persons using such 
                passports and other travel documents that were obtained 
                improperly;
                    (B) the establishment and implementation of a real-
                time verification system of passports and other travel 
                documents with issuing authorities;
                    (C) the assumption of an obligation by countries 
                that are parties to the agreement to share with 
                officials at ports of entry in any such country 
                information relating to lost, stolen, and fraudulent 
                passports and other travel documents;
                    (D) the assumption of an obligation by countries 
                that are parties to the agreement--
                            (i) to criminalize--
                                    (I) the falsification or 
                                counterfeiting of travel documents or 
                                breeder documents for any purpose;
                                    (II) the use or attempted use of 
                                false documents to obtain a visa or 
                                cross a border for any purpose;
                                    (III) the possession of tools or 
                                implements used to falsify or 
                                counterfeit such documents;
                                    (IV) the trafficking in false or 
                                stolen travel documents and breeder 
                                documents for any purpose;
                                    (V) the facilitation of travel by a 
                                terrorist; and
                                    (VI) attempts to commit, including 
                                conspiracies to commit, the crimes 
                                specified above;
                            (ii) to impose significant penalties so as 
                        to appropriately punish violations and 
                        effectively deter these crimes; and
                            (iii) to limit the issuance of citizenship 
                        papers, passports, identification documents, 
                        and the like to persons whose identity is 
                        proven to the issuing authority, who have a 
                        bona fide entitlement to or need for such 
                        documents, and who are not issued such 
                        documents principally on account of a 
                        disproportional payment made by them or on 
                        their behalf to the issuing authority;
                    (E) the provision of technical assistance to State 
                Parties to help them meet their obligations under the 
                convention;
                    (F) the establishment and implementation of a 
                system of self-assessments and peer reviews to examine 
                the degree of compliance with the convention; and
                    (G) an agreement that would permit immigration and 
                border officials to confiscate a lost, stolen, or 
                falsified passport at ports of entry and permit the 
                traveler to return to the sending country without being 
                in possession of the lost, stolen, or falsified 
                passport, and for the detention and investigation of 
                such traveler upon the return of the traveler to the 
                sending country.
            (3) International civil aviation organization.--The United 
        States shall lead efforts to track and curtail the travel of 
        terrorists by supporting efforts at the International Civil 
        Aviation Organization to continue to strengthen the security 
        features of passports and other travel documents.
    (c) Report.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than one year after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, and at least annually thereafter, 
        the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
        committees a report on progress toward achieving the goals 
        described in subsection (b).
            (2) Termination.--Paragraph (1) shall cease to be effective 
        when the President certifies to the Committee on International 
        Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on 
        Foreign Relations of the Senate that the goals described in 
        subsection (b) have been fully achieved.

SEC. 3089. INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS FOR TRANSLATION OF NAMES INTO THE 
                    ROMAN ALPHABET FOR INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL DOCUMENTS 
                    AND NAME-BASED WATCHLIST SYSTEMS.

    (a) Findings.--Congress finds that--
            (1) the current lack of a single convention for translating 
        Arabic names enabled some of the 19 hijackers of aircraft used 
        in the terrorist attacks against the United States that 
        occurred on September 11, 2001, to vary the spelling of their 
        names to defeat name-based terrorist watchlist systems and to 
        make more difficult any potential efforts to locate them; and
            (2) although the development and utilization of terrorist 
        watchlist systems using biometric identifiers will be helpful, 
        the full development and utilization of such systems will take 
        several years, and name-based terrorist watchlist systems will 
        always be useful.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the 
President should seek to enter into an international agreement to 
modernize and improve standards for the translation of names into the 
Roman alphabet in order to ensure one common spelling for such names 
for international travel documents and name-based watchlist systems.

SEC. 3090. BIOMETRIC ENTRY AND EXIT DATA SYSTEM.

    (a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Congress finds 
that completing a biometric entry and exit data system as expeditiously 
as possible is an essential investment in efforts to protect the United 
States by preventing the entry of terrorists.
    (b) Plan and Report.--
            (1) Development of plan.--The Secretary of Homeland 
        Security shall develop a plan to accelerate the full 
        implementation of an automated biometric entry and exit data 
        system required by applicable sections of--
                    (A) the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
                Responsibility Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-208);
                    (B) the Immigration and Naturalization Service Data 
                Management Improvement Act of 2000 (Public Law 106-
                205);
                    (C) the Visa Waiver Permanent Program Act (Public 
                Law 106-396);
                    (D) the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry 
                Reform Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-173); and
                    (E) the Uniting and Strengthening America by 
                Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
                Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (Public Law 107-56).
            (2) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
        enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit a report to 
        Congress on the plan developed under paragraph (1), which shall 
        contain--
                    (A) a description of the current functionality of 
                the entry and exit data system, including--
                            (i) a listing of ports of entry with 
                        biometric entry data systems in use and whether 
                        such screening systems are located at primary 
                        or secondary inspection areas;
                            (ii) a listing of ports of entry with 
                        biometric exit data systems in use;
                            (iii) a listing of databases and data 
                        systems with which the automated entry and exit 
                        data system are interoperable;
                            (iv) a description of--
                                    (I) identified deficiencies 
                                concerning the accuracy or integrity of 
                                the information contained in the entry 
                                and exit data system;
                                    (II) identified deficiencies 
                                concerning technology associated with 
                                processing individuals through the 
                                system; and
                                    (III) programs or policies planned 
                                or implemented to correct problems 
                                identified in subclause (I) or (II); 
                                and
                            (v) an assessment of the effectiveness of 
                        the entry and exit data system in fulfilling 
                        its intended purposes, including preventing 
                        terrorists from entering the United States;
                    (B) a description of factors relevant to the 
                accelerated implementation of the biometric entry and 
                exit system, including--
                            (i) the earliest date on which the 
                        Secretary estimates that full implementation of 
                        the biometric entry and exit data system can be 
                        completed;
                            (ii) the actions the Secretary will take to 
                        accelerate the full implementation of the 
                        biometric entry and exit data system at all 
                        ports of entry through which all aliens must 
                        pass that are legally required to do so; and
                            (iii) the resources and authorities 
                        required to enable the Secretary to meet the 
                        implementation date described in clause (i);
                    (C) a description of any improvements needed in the 
                information technology employed for the entry and exit 
                data system; and
                    (D) a description of plans for improved or added 
                interoperability with any other databases or data 
                systems.
    (c) Integration Requirement.--Not later than 2 years after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall integrate the 
biometric entry and exit data system with all databases and data 
systems maintained by the United States Citizenship and Immigration 
Services that process or contain information on aliens.
    (d) Maintaining Accuracy and Integrity of Entry and Exit Data 
System.--
            (1) In general.--The Secretary, in consultation with other 
        appropriate agencies, shall establish rules, guidelines, 
        policies, and operating and auditing procedures for collecting, 
        removing, and updating data maintained in, and adding 
        information to, the entry and exit data system, and databases 
        and data systems linked to the entry and exit data system, that 
        ensure the accuracy and integrity of the data.
            (2) Requirements.--The rules, guidelines, policies, and 
        procedures established under paragraph (1) shall--
                    (A) incorporate a simple and timely method for--
                            (i) correcting errors; and
                            (ii) clarifying information known to cause 
                        false hits or misidentification errors; and
                    (B) include procedures for individuals to seek 
                corrections of data contained in the data systems.
    (e) Expediting Registered Travelers Across International Borders.--
            (1) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National 
        Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 
        Congress finds that--
                    (A) expediting the travel of previously screened 
                and known travelers across the borders of the United 
                States should be a high priority; and
                    (B) the process of expediting known travelers 
                across the border can permit inspectors to better focus 
                on identifying terrorists attempting to enter the 
                United States.
            (2) Definition.--The term ``registered traveler program'' 
        means any program designed to expedite the travel of previously 
        screened and known travelers across the borders of the United 
        States.
            (3) Registered travel plan.--
                    (A) In general.--As soon as is practicable, the 
                Secretary shall develop and implement a plan to 
                expedite the processing of registered travelers who 
                enter and exit the United States through a single 
                registered traveler program.
                    (B) Integration.--The registered traveler program 
                developed under this paragraph shall be integrated into 
                the automated biometric entry and exit data system 
                described in this section.
                    (C) Review and evaluation.--In developing the 
                program under this paragraph, the Secretary shall--
                            (i) review existing programs or pilot 
                        projects designed to expedite the travel of 
                        registered travelers across the borders of the 
                        United States;
                            (ii) evaluate the effectiveness of the 
                        programs described in clause (i), the costs 
                        associated with such programs, and the costs to 
                        travelers to join such programs; and
                            (iii) increase research and development 
                        efforts to accelerate the development and 
                        implementation of a single registered traveler 
                        program.
            (4) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the 
        enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to the 
        Congress a report describing the Department's progress on the 
        development and implementation of the plan required by this 
        subsection.
    (f) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be 
appropriated to the Secretary, for each of the fiscal years 2005 
through 2009, such sums as may be necessary to carry out the provisions 
of this section.

SEC. 3091. BIOMETRIC ENTRY-EXIT SCREENING SYSTEM.

    (a) Integrated Biometric Entry-Exit Screening System.--With respect 
to the biometric entry/exit data system referred to in subsections (a) 
and (b), such systems shall--
            (1) Ensure that the system's tracking capabilities 
        encompass data related to all immigration benefits processing, 
        including visa applications with the Department of State, 
        immigration related filings with the Department of Labor, cases 
        pending before the Executive Office for Immigration review, and 
        matters pending or under investigation before the Department of 
        Homeland Security.
            (2) Utilize a biometric based identity number tied to an 
        applicant's biometric algorithm established under the entry/
        exit system to track all immigration related matters concerning 
        the applicant.
            (3) Provide that all information about an applicant's 
        immigration related history, including entry/exit history, can 
        be queried through electronic means. Database access and usage 
        guidelines shall include stringent safeguards to prevent misuse 
        of data.
            (4) Provide real time updates to the database described in 
        paragraph (3) including pertinent data from all agencies 
        referenced in paragraph (1).
            (5) Limit access to the database described in paragraph (4) 
        (and any other database used for tracking immigration related 
        processing and/or entry/exit) to personnel explicitly 
        authorized to do so, and that any such access may be 
        ascertained by authorized persons by review of the person's 
        access authorization code or number.
            (6) Provide continuing education in counterterrorism 
        techniques, tools, and methods for all Federal personnel 
        employed in the evaluation of immigration documents and 
        immigration-related policy.
    (b) Entry-Exit System Goals.--The Department of Homeland Security 
shall continue to implement the system described in subsections (a) and 
(b), in such a way that it fulfills the following goals:
            (1) Serves as a vital counterterrorism tool.
            (2) Screens travelers efficiently and in a welcoming 
        manner.
            (3) Provides inspectors and related personnel with adequate 
        real-time information.
            (4) Ensures flexibility of training and security protocols 
        to most effectively comply with security mandates.
            (5) Integrates relevant databases and plans for database 
        modifications to address volume increase and database usage.
            (6) Improves database search capacities by utilizing 
        language algorithms to detect alternate names.
    (c) Dedicated Specialists and Front Line Personnel Training.--In 
implementing the provisions of subsections (a), (b), and (c), the 
Department of Homeland Security and the Department of State shall--
            (1) develop cross-training programs that focus on the scope 
        and procedures of the entry/exit system;
            (2) provide extensive community outreach and education on 
        the entry/exit system procedures;
            (3) provide clear and consistent eligibility guidelines for 
        applicants in low-risk traveler programs; and
            (4) establish ongoing training modules on immigration law 
        to improve adjudications at our ports of entry, consulates, and 
        embassies.
    (d) Information Accuracy Standards.--
            (1) Any information placed in the entry/exit database shall 
        be entered by authorized officers in compliance with 
        established procedures, as set forth in section 407 of this 
        Act, that guarantee the identification of the person making the 
        database entry.
            (2) The Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of 
        State, and the Attorney General, after consultation with 
        directors of the relevant intelligence agencies, shall 
        standardize the information and data collected from foreign 
        nationals as well as the procedures utilized to collect such 
        data to ensure that the information is consistent and of value 
        to officials accessing that data across multiple agencies.
    (e) Accessibility.--The Secretary of Homeland Security, the 
Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the head of any other 
department or agency that possesses authority to enter data related to 
the immigration status of foreign nationals, including lawful permanent 
resident aliens, or where such information could serve to impede lawful 
admission of United States citizens to the United States, shall each 
establish guidelines related to data entry procedures. Such guidelines 
shall--
            (1) strictly limit the agency personnel authorized to enter 
        data into the system;
            (2) identify classes of information to be designated as 
        temporary or permanent entries, with corresponding expiration 
        dates for temporary entries; and
            (3) identify classes of prejudicial information requiring 
        additional authority of supervisory personnel prior to entry.
    (f) System Adaptability.--
            (1) Each agency authorized to enter data related to the 
        immigration status of any persons identified in subsection (b) 
        above shall develop and implement system protocols to--
                    (A) correct erroneous data entries in a timely and 
                effective manner;
                    (B) clarify information known to cause false hits 
                or misidentification errors; and
                    (C) update all relevant information that is 
                dispositive to the adjudicatory or admission process.
            (2) The President or agency director so designated by the 
        President shall establish a clearinghouse bureau as part of the 
        Department of Homeland Security to centralize and streamline 
        the process through which members of the public can seek 
        corrections to erroneous or inaccurate information related to 
        immigration status, or which otherwise impedes lawful admission 
        to the United States contained in agency databases. Such 
        process shall include specific time schedules for reviewing 
        data correction requests, rendering decisions on such requests, 
        and implementing appropriate corrective action in a timely 
        manner.
    (g) Training.--Agency personnel authorized to enter data pursuant 
to subsection (b)(1) shall undergo extensive training in immigration 
law and procedure.
    (h) Implementation Audit.--The Secretary of the Department of 
Homeland Security shall issue a report to Congress within 6 months of 
enactment of this Act that details activities undertaken to date to 
develop an entry-exit system, areas in which the system currently does 
not achieve the mandates set forth by this section, and the funding, 
infrastructure, technology and other factors needed to complete the 
system, as well as a detailed time frame in which the completion of the 
system will be achieved.
    (i) Reports.--
            (1) The Secretaries of the Departments of State and 
        Homeland Security jointly shall report biannually to Congress 
        on: Current infrastructure and staffing at each port of entry 
        and each consular post, numbers of immigrant and nonimmigrant 
        visas issued, specify the numbers of individuals subject to 
        expedited removal at the ports of entry as well as within 100 
        miles of the United States border, the plan for enhanced 
        database review at entry, the number of suspected terrorists 
        and criminals intercepted utilizing the entry/exit system and 
        the moneys spent in the preceding fiscal year to achieve the 
        mandates of this section, areas in which they failed to achieve 
        these mandates, and the steps they are taking to address these 
        deficiencies. For ports of entry, similar information shall be 
        provided including the number of I-94s issued, immigrant visa 
        admissions made, and nonimmigrant admissions.
            (2) No later than 120 days after enactment of this Act, the 
        Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of State, 
        after consultation with the Director of the National Institute 
        of Standards and Technology and the Commission on Interoperable 
        Data Sharing, shall issue a report addressing the following 
        areas:
                    (A) The status of agency compliance with the 
                mandates set forth in section 202 (``Interoperable Law 
                Enforcement and Intelligence Data System with Name-
                Matching Capacity and Training'') of the Enhanced 
                Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act (Public Law 
                107-173).
                    (B) The status of agency compliance with section 
                201(c)(3) (``Protections Regarding Information and Uses 
                Thereof'') of the Enhanced Border Security and Visa 
                Entry Reform Act (Public Law 107-173).
            (3) No later than 1 year after enactment of this Act, the 
        Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of State, the 
        Attorney General, and the head of any other department or 
        agency bound by the mandates in this Act, shall issue both 
        individual status reports and a joint status report detailing 
        compliance with each mandate contained in this section.
    (j) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be 
appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out this section.

SEC. 3092. ENHANCED RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE COORDINATOR FOR 
                    COUNTERTERRORISM.

    (a) Declaration of United States Policy.--Congress declares that it 
shall be the policy of the United States to--
            (1) make combating terrorist travel and those who assist 
        them a priority for the United States counterterrorism policy; 
        and
            (2) ensure that the information relating to individuals who 
        help facilitate terrorist travel by creating false passports, 
        visas, documents used to obtain such travel documents, and 
        other documents are fully shared within the United States 
        Government and, to the extent possible, with and from foreign 
        governments, in order to initiate United States and foreign 
        prosecutions of such individuals.
    (b) Amendment.--Section 1(e)(2) of the State Department Basic 
Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2651a(e)(2)) is amended by adding at 
the end the following:
                    ``(C) Additional duties relating to terrorist 
                travel.--In addition to the principal duties of the 
                Coordinator described in subparagraph (B), the 
                Coordinator shall analyze methods used by terrorists to 
                travel internationally, develop policies with respect 
                to curtailing terrorist travel, and coordinate such 
                policies with the appropriate bureaus and other 
                entities of the Department of State, other United 
                States Government agencies, the Human Trafficking and 
                Smuggling Center, and foreign governments.''.

SEC. 3093. ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICE OF VISA AND PASSPORT SECURITY IN THE 
                    DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

    (a) Establishment.--There is established within the Bureau of 
Diplomatic Security of the Department of State an Office of Visa and 
Passport Security (in this section referred to as the ``Office'').
    (b) Head of Office.--
            (1) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
        law, the head of the Office shall be an individual who shall 
        have the rank and status of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 
        for Diplomatic Security (in this section referred to as the 
        ``Deputy Assistant Secretary'').
            (2) Recruitment.--The Under Secretary of State for 
        Management shall chose the Deputy Assistant Secretary from 
        among individuals who are Diplomatic Security Agents.
            (3) Qualifications.--The Diplomatic Security Agent chosen 
        to serve as the Deputy Assistant Secretary shall have expertise 
        and experience in investigating and prosecuting visa and 
        passport fraud.
    (c) Duties.--
            (1) Preparation of strategic plan.--
                    (A) In general.--The Deputy Assistant Secretary, in 
                coordination with the appropriate officials of the 
                Department of Homeland Security, shall ensure the 
                preparation of a strategic plan to target and disrupt 
                individuals and organizations at home and in foreign 
                countries that are involved in the fraudulent 
                production, distribution, use, or other similar 
                activity--
                            (i) of a United States visa or United 
                        States passport;
                            (ii) of documents intended to help 
                        fraudulently procure a United States visa or 
                        United States passport, or other documents 
                        intended to gain unlawful entry into the United 
                        States; or
                            (iii) of passports and visas issued by 
                        foreign countries intended to gain unlawful 
                        entry into the United States.
                    (B) Emphasis.--Such plan shall--
                            (i) focus particular emphasis on 
                        individuals and organizations that may have 
                        links to domestic terrorist organizations or 
                        foreign terrorist organizations (as such term 
                        is defined in Section 219 of the Immigration 
                        and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189));
                            (ii) require the development of a strategic 
                        training course under the Antiterrorism 
                        Assistance Training (ATA) program of the 
                        Department of State (or any successor or 
                        related program) under chapter 8 of part II of 
                        the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 
                        2349aa et seq.) (or other relevant provisions 
                        of law) to train participants in the 
                        identification of fraudulent documents and the 
                        forensic detection of such documents which may 
                        be used to obtain unlawful entry into the 
                        United States; and
                            (iii) determine the benefits and costs of 
                        providing technical assistance to foreign 
                        governments to ensure the security of 
                        passports, visas, and related documents and to 
                        investigate, arrest, and prosecute individuals 
                        who facilitate travel by the creation of false 
                        passports and visas, documents to obtain such 
                        passports and visas, and other types of travel 
                        documents.
            (2) Duties of office.--The Office shall have the following 
        duties:
                    (A) Analysis of methods.--Analyze methods used by 
                terrorists to travel internationally, particularly the 
                use of false or altered travel documents to illegally 
                enter foreign countries and the United States, and 
                advise the Bureau of Consular Affairs on changes to the 
                visa issuance process that could combat such methods, 
                including the introduction of new technologies into 
                such process.
                    (B) Identification of individuals and documents.--
                Identify, in cooperation with the Human Trafficking and 
                Smuggling Center, individuals who facilitate travel by 
                the creation of false passports and visas, documents 
                used to obtain such passports and visas, and other 
                types of travel documents, and ensure that the 
                appropriate agency is notified for further 
                investigation and prosecution or, in the case of such 
                individuals abroad for which no further investigation 
                or prosecution is initiated, ensure that all 
                appropriate information is shared with foreign 
                governments in order to facilitate investigation, 
                arrest, and prosecution of such individuals.
                    (C) Identification of foreign countries needing 
                assistance.--Identify foreign countries that need 
                technical assistance, such as law reform, 
                administrative reform, prosecutorial training, or 
                assistance to police and other investigative services, 
                to ensure passport, visa, and related document security 
                and to investigate, arrest, and prosecute individuals 
                who facilitate travel by the creation of false 
                passports and visas, documents used to obtain such 
                passports and visas, and other types of travel 
                documents.
                    (D) Inspection of applications.--Randomly inspect 
                visa and passport applications for accuracy, 
                efficiency, and fraud, especially at high terrorist 
                threat posts, in order to prevent a recurrence of the 
                issuance of visas to those who submit incomplete, 
                fraudulent, or otherwise irregular or incomplete 
                applications.
            (3) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
        enactment of this Act, the Deputy Assistant Secretary shall 
        submit to Congress a report containing--
                    (A) a description of the strategic plan prepared 
                under paragraph (1); and
                    (B) an evaluation of the feasibility of 
                establishing civil service positions in field offices 
                of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security to investigate 
                visa and passport fraud, including an evaluation of 
                whether to allow diplomatic security agents to convert 
                to civil service officers to fill such positions.

                      Subtitle D--Terrorist Travel

SEC. 3101. INFORMATION SHARING AND COORDINATION.

    The Secretary of Homeland Security shall establish a mechanism to--
            (1) ensure the coordination and dissemination of terrorist 
        travel intelligence and operational information among the 
        appropriate agencies within the Department of Homeland 
        Security, including the Bureau of Customs and Border 
        Protection, the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 
        the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, the 
        Transportation Security Administration, the Coast Guard, and 
        other agencies as directed by the Secretary; and
            (2) ensure the sharing of terrorist travel intelligence and 
        operational information with the Department of State, the 
        National Counterterrorism Center, and other appropriate Federal 
        agencies.

SEC. 3102. TERRORIST TRAVEL PROGRAM.

    The Secretary of Homeland Security shall establish a program to--
            (1) analyze and utilize information and intelligence 
        regarding terrorist travel tactics, patterns, trends, and 
        practices; and
            (2) disseminate that information to all front-line 
        Department of Homeland Security personnel who are at ports of 
        entry or between ports of entry, to immigration benefits 
        offices, and, in coordination with the Secretary of State, to 
        appropriate individuals at United States embassies and 
        consulates.

SEC. 3103. TRAINING PROGRAM.

    (a) Review, Evaluation, and Revision of Existing Training 
Programs.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall--
            (1) review and evaluate the training currently provided to 
        Department of Homeland Security personnel and, in consultation 
        with the Secretary of State, relevant Department of State 
        personnel with respect to travel and identity documents, and 
        techniques, patterns, and trends associated with terrorist 
        travel; and
            (2) develop and implement a revised training program for 
        border, immigration, and consular officials in order to teach 
        such officials how to effectively detect, intercept, and 
        disrupt terrorist travel.
    (b) Required Topics of Revised Programs.--The training program 
developed under subsection (a)(2) shall include training in the 
following areas:
            (1) Methods for identifying fraudulent and genuine travel 
        documents.
            (2) Methods for detecting terrorist indicators on travel 
        documents and other relevant identity documents.
            (3) Recognizing travel patterns, tactics, and behaviors 
        exhibited by terrorists.
            (4) Effectively utilizing information contained in 
        databases and data systems available to the Department of 
        Homeland Security.
            (5) Other topics determined to be appropriate by the 
        Secretary of Homeland Security in consultation with the 
        Secretary of State or the National Intelligence Director.

SEC. 3104. TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION AND DISSEMINATION PLAN.

    (a) Plan Required.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in 
consultation with the Secretary of State, shall submit to the Congress 
a plan to ensure that the Department of Homeland Security and the 
Department of State acquire and deploy, to all consulates, ports of 
entry, and immigration benefits offices, technologies that facilitate 
document authentication and the detection of potential terrorist 
indicators on travel documents.
    (b) Interoperability Requirement.--To the extent possible, 
technologies to be acquired and deployed under the plan shall be 
compatible with current systems used by the Department of Homeland 
Security to detect and identify fraudulent documents and genuine 
documents.
    (c) Passport Screening.--The plan shall address the feasibility of 
using such technologies to screen passports submitted for 
identification purposes to a United States consular, border, or 
immigration official.

               Subtitle E--Maritime Security Requirements

SEC. 3111. DEADLINES FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF MARITIME SECURITY 
                    REQUIREMENTS.

    (a) National Maritime Transportation Security Plan.--Section 
70103(a) of the 46, United States Code, is amended by striking ``The 
Secretary'' and inserting ``Not later than December 31, 2004, the 
Secretary''.
    (b) Facility and Vessel Vulnerability Assessments.--Section 
70102(b)(1) of the 46, United States Code, is amended by striking ``, 
the Secretary'' and inserting ``and by not later than December 31, 
2004, the Secretary''.
    (c) Transportation Security Card Regulations.--Section 70105(a) of 
the 46, United States Code, is amended by striking ``The Secretary'' 
and inserting ``Not later than December 31, 2004, the Secretary''.

          TITLE IV--INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND COORDINATION

         Subtitle A--Attack Terrorists and Their Organizations

        CHAPTER 1--PROVISIONS RELATING TO TERRORIST SANCTUARIES

SEC. 4001. UNITED STATES POLICY ON TERRORIST SANCTUARIES.

    It is the sense of Congress that it should be the policy of the 
United States--
            (1) to identify and prioritize foreign countries that are 
        or that could be used as terrorist sanctuaries;
            (2) to assess current United States resources being 
        provided to such foreign countries;
            (3) to develop and implement a coordinated strategy to 
        prevent terrorists from using such foreign countries as 
        sanctuaries; and
            (4) to work in bilateral and multilateral fora to prevent 
        foreign countries from being used as terrorist sanctuaries.

SEC. 4002. REPORTS ON TERRORIST SANCTUARIES.

    (a) Initial Report.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit to 
        Congress a report that describes a strategy for addressing and, 
        where possible, eliminating terrorist sanctuaries.
            (2) Content.--The report required under this subsection 
        shall include the following:
                    (A) A list that prioritizes each actual and 
                potential terrorist sanctuary and a description of 
                activities in the actual and potential sanctuaries.
                    (B) An outline of strategies for preventing the use 
                of, disrupting, or ending the use of such sanctuaries.
                    (C) A detailed description of efforts, including an 
                assessment of successes and setbacks, by the United 
                States to work with other countries in bilateral and 
                multilateral fora to address or eliminate each actual 
                or potential terrorist sanctuary and disrupt or 
                eliminate the security provided to terrorists by each 
                such sanctuary.
                    (D) A description of long-term goals and actions 
                designed to reduce the conditions that allow the 
                formation of terrorist sanctuaries.
    (b) Subsequent Reports.--
            (1) Requirement of reports.--Section 140(a)(1) of the 
        Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 
        (22 U.S.C. 2656f(a)(1)) is amended--
                    (A) by striking ``(1)'' and inserting ``(1)(A)'';
                    (B) by redesignating subparagraphs (A) through (C) 
                as clauses (i) through (iii), respectively;
                    (C) in subparagraph (A)(iii) (as redesignated), by 
                adding ``and'' at the end; and
                    (D) by adding at the end the following:
            ``(B) detailed assessments with respect to each foreign 
        country whose territory is being used or could potentially be 
        used as a sanctuary for terrorists or terrorist 
        organizations;''.
            (2) Provisions to be included in report.--Section 140(b) of 
        such Act (22 U.S.C. 2656f(b)) is amended--
                    (A) in paragraph (1)--
                            (i) in the matter preceding subparagraph 
                        (A), by striking ``subsection (a)(1)'' and 
                        inserting ``subsection (a)(1)(A)''; and
                            (ii) by striking ``and'' at the end;
                    (B) by redesignating paragraph (2) as paragraph 
                (3);
                    (C) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following:
            ``(2) with respect to subsection (a)(1)(B)--
                    ``(A) the extent of knowledge by the government of 
                the country with respect to terrorist activities in the 
                territory of the country; and
                    ``(B) the actions by the country--
                            ``(i) to eliminate each terrorist sanctuary 
                        in the territory of the country;
                            ``(ii) to cooperate with United States 
                        antiterrorism efforts; and
                            ``(iii) to prevent the proliferation of and 
                        trafficking in weapons of mass destruction in 
                        and through the territory of the country;'';
                    (D) by striking the period at the end of paragraph 
                (3) (as redesignated) and inserting a semicolon; and
                    (E) by inserting after paragraph (3) (as 
                redesignated) the following:
            ``(4) a strategy for addressing and, where possible, 
        eliminating terrorist sanctuaries that shall include--
                    ``(A) a description of actual and potential 
                terrorist sanctuaries, together with an assessment of 
                the priorities of addressing and eliminating such 
                sanctuaries;
                    ``(B) an outline of strategies for disrupting or 
                eliminating the security provided to terrorists by such 
                sanctuaries;
                    ``(C) a description of efforts by the United States 
                to work with other countries in bilateral and 
                multilateral fora to address or eliminate actual or 
                potential terrorist sanctuaries and disrupt or 
                eliminate the security provided to terrorists by such 
                sanctuaries; and
                    ``(D) a description of long-term goals and actions 
                designed to reduce the conditions that allow the 
                formation of terrorist sanctuaries;
            ``(5) an update of the information contained in the report 
        required to be transmitted to Congress pursuant to section 
        4002(a)(2) of the 9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act;
            ``(6) to the extent practicable, complete statistical 
        information on the number of individuals, including United 
        States citizens and dual nationals, killed, injured, or 
        kidnapped by each terrorist group during the preceding calendar 
        year; and
            ``(7) an analysis, as appropriate, relating to trends in 
        international terrorism, including changes in technology used, 
        methods and targets of attacks, demographic information on 
        terrorists, and other appropriate information.''.
            (3) Definitions.--Section 140(d) of such Act (22 U.S.C. 
        2656f(d)) is amended--
                    (A) in paragraph (2), by striking ``and'' at the 
                end;
                    (B) in paragraph (3), by striking the period at the 
                end and inserting a semicolon; and
                    (C) by adding at the end the following:
            ``(4) the term `territory' and `territory of the country' 
        means the land, waters, and airspace of the country; and
            ``(5) the term `terrorist sanctuary' or `sanctuary' means 
        an area in the territory of a country that is used by a 
        terrorist group with the express or implied consent of the 
        government of the country--
                    ``(A) to carry out terrorist activities, including 
                training, fundraising, financing, recruitment, and 
                education activities; or
                    ``(B) to provide transit through the country.''.
            (4) Effective date.--The amendments made by paragraphs (1), 
        (2), and (3) apply with respect to the report required to be 
        transmitted under section 140 of the Foreign Relations 
        Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, by April 30, 
        2006, and by April 30 of each subsequent year.

SEC. 4003. AMENDMENTS TO EXISTING LAW TO INCLUDE TERRORIST SANCTUARIES.

    (a) Amendments.--Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 
1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)) is amended--
            (1) in paragraph (1)--
                    (A) by redesignating subparagraph (B) as 
                subparagraph (C); and
                    (B) by inserting after subparagraph (A) the 
                following:
            ``(B) Any part of the territory of the country is being 
        used as a sanctuary for terrorists or terrorist 
        organizations.'';
            (2) in paragraph (3), by striking ``paragraph (1)(A)'' and 
        inserting ``subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (1)'';
            (3) by redesignating paragraph (5) as paragraph (6);
            (4) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following:
    ``(5) A determination made by the Secretary of State under 
paragraph (1)(B) may not be rescinded unless the President submits to 
the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the chairman of the 
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and the chairman of 
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate before the proposed 
rescission would take effect a report certifying that the government of 
the country concerned --
            ``(A) is taking concrete, verifiable steps to eliminate 
        each terrorist sanctuary in the territory of the country;
            ``(B) is cooperating with United States antiterrorism 
        efforts; and
            ``(C) is taking all appropriate actions to prevent the 
        proliferation of and trafficking in weapons of mass destruction 
        in and through the territory of the country.''; and
            (5) by inserting after paragraph (6) (as redesignated) the 
        following:
    ``(7) In this subsection--
            ``(A) the term `territory of the country' means the land, 
        waters, and airspace of the country; and
            ``(B) the term `terrorist sanctuary' or `sanctuary' means 
        an area in the territory of a country that is used by a 
        terrorist group with the express or implied consent of the 
        government of the country--
                    ``(i) to carry out terrorist activities, including 
                training, fundraising, financing, recruitment, and 
                education activities; or
                    ``(ii) to provide transit through the country.''.
    (b) Implementation.--The President shall implement the amendments 
made by subsection (a) by exercising the authorities the President has 
under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 
et seq.).

                      CHAPTER 2--OTHER PROVISIONS

SEC. 4011. APPOINTMENTS TO FILL VACANCIES IN ARMS CONTROL AND 
                    NONPROLIFERATION ADVISORY BOARD.

    (a) Requirement.--Not later than December 31, 2004, the Secretary 
of State shall appoint individuals to the Arms Control and 
Nonproliferation Advisory Board to fill all vacancies in the membership 
of the Board that exist on the date of the enactment of this Act.
    (b) Consultation.--Appointments to the Board under subsection (a) 
shall be made in consultation with the Committee on International 
Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign 
Relations of the Senate.

SEC. 4012. REVIEW OF UNITED STATES POLICY ON PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS 
                    OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND CONTROL OF STRATEGIC 
                    WEAPONS.

    (a) Review.--
            (1) In general.--The Undersecretary of State for Arms 
        Control and International Security shall instruct the Arms 
        Control and Nonproliferation Advisory Board (in this section 
        referred to as the ``Advisory Board'') to carry out a review of 
        existing policies of the United States relating to the 
        proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the control of 
        strategic weapons.
            (2) Components.--The review required under this subsection 
        shall contain at a minimum the following:
                    (A) An identification of all major deficiencies in 
                existing United States policies relating to the 
                proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the 
                control of strategic weapons.
                    (B) Proposals that contain a range of options that 
                if implemented would adequately address any significant 
                threat deriving from the deficiencies in existing 
                United States policies described in subparagraph (A).
    (b) Reports.--
            (1) Interim report.--Not later than June 15, 2005, the 
        Advisory Board shall prepare and submit to the Undersecretary 
        of State for Arms Control and International Security an interim 
        report that contains the initial results of the review carried 
        out pursuant to subsection (a).
            (2) Final report.--Not later than December 1, 2005, the 
        Advisory Board shall prepare and submit to the Undersecretary 
        of State for Arms Control and International Security, and to 
        the Committee on International Relations of the House of 
        Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
        Senate, a final report that contains the comprehensive results 
        of the review carried out pursuant to subsection (a).
    (c) Experts and Consultants.-- In carrying out this section, the 
Advisory Board may procure temporary and intermittent services of 
experts and consultants, including experts and consultants from 
nongovernmental organizations, under section 3109(b) of title 5, United 
States Code.
    (d) Funding and Other Resources.--The Secretary of State shall 
provide to the Advisory Board an appropriate amount of funding and 
other resources to enable the Advisory Board to carry out this section.

SEC. 4013. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS TO INTERDICT ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL 
                    TERRORISM.

    Section 1(e)(2) of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 
1956 (22 U.S.C. 2651a(e)(2)), as amended by section 3091(b), is further 
amended by adding at the end the following:
                    ``(D) Additional duties relating to international 
                agreements to interdict acts of international 
                terrorism.--
                            ``(i) In general.--In addition to the 
                        principal duties of the Coordinator described 
                        in subparagraph (B), the Coordinator, in 
                        consultation with relevant United States 
                        Government agencies, shall seek to negotiate on 
                        a bilateral basis international agreements 
                        under which parties to an agreement work in 
                        partnership to address and interdict acts of 
                        international terrorism.
                            ``(ii) Terms of international agreement.--
                        It is the sense of Congress that--
                                    ``(I) each party to an 
                                international agreement referred to in 
                                clause (i)--
                                            ``(aa) should be in full 
                                        compliance with United Nations 
                                        Security Council Resolution 
                                        1373 (September 28, 2001), 
                                        other appropriate international 
                                        agreements relating to 
                                        antiterrorism measures, and 
                                        such other appropriate criteria 
                                        relating to antiterrorism 
                                        measures;
                                            ``(bb) should sign and 
                                        adhere to a `Counterterrorism 
                                        Pledge' and a list of 
                                        `Interdiction Principles', to 
                                        be determined by the parties to 
                                        the agreement;
                                            ``(cc) should identify 
                                        assets and agree to 
                                        multilateral efforts that 
                                        maximizes the country's 
                                        strengths and resources to 
                                        address and interdict acts of 
                                        international terrorism or the 
                                        financing of such acts;
                                            ``(dd) should agree to 
                                        joint training exercises among 
                                        the other parties to the 
                                        agreement; and
                                            ``(ee) should agree to the 
                                        negotiation and implementation 
                                        of other relevant international 
                                        agreements and consensus-based 
                                        international standards; and
                                    ``(II) an international agreement 
                                referred to in clause (i) should 
                                contain provisions that require the 
                                parties to the agreement--
                                            ``(aa) to identify regions 
                                        throughout the world that are 
                                        emerging terrorist threats;
                                            ``(bb) to establish 
                                        terrorism interdiction centers 
                                        in such regions and other 
                                        regions, as appropriate;
                                            ``(cc) to deploy terrorism 
                                        prevention teams to such 
                                        regions, including United 
                                        States-led teams; and
                                            ``(dd) to integrate 
                                        intelligence, military, and law 
                                        enforcement personnel from 
                                        countries that are parties to 
                                        the agreement in order to work 
                                        directly with the regional 
                                        centers described in item (bb) 
                                        and regional teams described in 
                                        item (cc).''.

SEC. 4014. EFFECTIVE COALITION APPROACH TOWARD DETENTION AND HUMANE 
                    TREATMENT OF CAPTURED TERRORISTS.

    It is the sense of Congress that the President should pursue by all 
appropriate diplomatic means with countries that are participating in 
the Coalition to fight terrorism the development of an effective 
approach toward the detention and humane treatment of captured 
terrorists. The effective approach referred to in this section may, as 
appropriate, draw on Article 3 of the Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War, done at Geneva on August 12, 1949 (6 UST 
3316).

SEC. 4015. SENSE OF CONGRESS AND REPORT REGARDING COUNTER-DRUG EFFORTS 
                    IN AFGHANISTAN.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the President should make the substantial reduction of 
        illegal drug production and trafficking in Afghanistan a 
        priority in the Global War on Terrorism;
            (2) the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the 
        Secretary of State, Attorney General, and the heads of other 
        appropriate Federal agencies, should expand cooperation with 
        the Government of Afghanistan and international organizations 
        involved in counter-drug activities to assist in providing a 
        secure environment for counter-drug personnel in Afghanistan; 
        and
            (3) the United States, in conjunction with the Government 
        of Afghanistan and coalition partners, should undertake 
        additional efforts to reduce illegal drug trafficking and 
        related activities that provide financial support for terrorist 
        organizations in Afghanistan and neighboring countries.
    (b) Report Required.--(1) The Secretary of Defense and the 
Secretary of State shall jointly prepare a report that describes--
            (A) the progress made towards substantially reducing poppy 
        cultivation and heroin production capabilities in Afghanistan; 
        and
            (B) the extent to which profits from illegal drug activity 
        in Afghanistan are used to financially support terrorist 
        organizations and groups seeking to undermine the Government of 
        Afghanistan.
    (2) The report required by this subsection shall be submitted to 
Congress not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of 
this Act.

         Subtitle B--Prevent the Continued Growth of Terrorism

               CHAPTER 1--UNITED STATES PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

SEC. 4021. ANNUAL REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY STRATEGY.

    (a) In General.--The Secretary of State, in coordination with all 
appropriate Federal agencies, shall submit to the Committee on 
International Relations of the House of Representatives and the 
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate an annual assessment of 
the impact of public diplomacy efforts on target audiences. Each 
assessment shall review the United States public diplomacy strategy 
worldwide and by region, including an examination of the allocation of 
resources and an evaluation and assessment of the progress in, and 
barriers to, achieving the goals set forth under previous plans 
submitted under this section. Not later than March 15 of every year, 
the Secretary shall submit the assessment required by this subsection.
    (b) Further Action.-- On the basis of such review, the Secretary, 
in coordination with all appropriate Federal agencies, shall submit, as 
part of the annual budget submission, a public diplomacy strategy plan 
which specifies goals, agency responsibilities, and necessary resources 
and mechanisms for achieving such goals during the next fiscal year. 
The plan may be submitted in classified form.

SEC. 4022. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY TRAINING.

    (a) Statement of Policy.--It should be the policy of the United 
States:
            (1) The Foreign Service should recruit individuals with 
        expertise and professional experience in public diplomacy.
            (2) United States chiefs of mission should have a prominent 
        role in the formulation of public diplomacy strategies for the 
        countries and regions to which they are assigned and should be 
        accountable for the operation and success of public diplomacy 
        efforts at their posts.
            (3) Initial and subsequent training of Foreign Service 
        officers should be enhanced to include information and training 
        on public diplomacy and the tools and technology of mass 
        communication.
    (b) Personnel.--
            (1) Qualifications.--In the recruitment, training, and 
        assignment of members of the Foreign Service, the Secretary of 
        State shall emphasize the importance of public diplomacy and 
        applicable skills and techniques. The Secretary shall consider 
        the priority recruitment into the Foreign Service, at middle-
        level entry, of individuals with expertise and professional 
        experience in public diplomacy, mass communications, or 
        journalism. The Secretary shall give special consideration to 
        individuals with language facility and experience in particular 
        countries and regions.
            (2) Languages of special interest.--The Secretary of State 
        shall seek to increase the number of Foreign Service officers 
        proficient in languages spoken in predominantly Muslim 
        countries. Such increase shall be accomplished through the 
        recruitment of new officers and incentives for officers in 
        service.

SEC. 4023. PROMOTING DIRECT EXCHANGES WITH MUSLIM COUNTRIES.

    (a) Declaration of Policy.--Congress declares that the United 
States should commit to a long-term and sustainable investment in 
promoting engagement with people of all levels of society in countries 
with predominantly Muslim populations, particularly with youth and 
those who influence youth. Such an investment should make use of the 
talents and resources in the private sector and should include programs 
to increase the number of people who can be exposed to the United 
States and its fundamental ideas and values in order to dispel 
misconceptions. Such programs should include youth exchange programs, 
young ambassadors programs, international visitor programs, academic 
and cultural exchange programs, American Corner programs, library 
programs, journalist exchange programs, sister city programs, and other 
programs related to people-to-people diplomacy.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United 
States should significantly increase its investment in the people-to-
people programs described in subsection (a).

SEC. 4024. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY REQUIRED FOR PROMOTION IN FOREIGN SERVICE.

    (a) In General.--Section 603(b) of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 
(22 U.S.C. 4003(b)) is amended by adding at the end the following new 
sentences: ``The precepts for such selection boards shall also consider 
whether the member of the Service or the member of the Senior Foreign 
Service, as the case may be, has served in at least one position in 
which the primary responsibility of such member was related to public 
diplomacy. A member may not be promoted into or within the Senior 
Foreign Service if such member has not served in at least one such 
position.''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall 
take effect on January 1, 2009.

            CHAPTER 2--UNITED STATES MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY

SEC. 4031. PURPOSE.

    It is the purpose of this chapter to strengthen United States 
leadership and effectiveness at international organizations and 
multilateral institutions.

SEC. 4032. SUPPORT AND EXPANSION OF DEMOCRACY CAUCUS.

    (a) In General.--The President, acting through the Secretary of 
State and the relevant United States chiefs of mission, shall--
            (1) continue to strongly support and seek to expand the 
        work of the democracy caucus at the United Nations General 
        Assembly and the United Nations Human Rights Commission; and
            (2) seek to establish a democracy caucus at the United 
        Nations Conference on Disarmament and at other broad-based 
        international organizations.
    (b) Purposes of the Caucus.--A democracy caucus at an international 
organization should--
            (1) forge common positions, including, as appropriate, at 
        the ministerial level, on matters of concern before the 
        organization and work within and across regional lines to 
        promote agreed positions;
            (2) work to revise an increasingly outmoded system of 
        membership selection, regional voting, and decision making; and
            (3) establish a rotational leadership agreement to provide 
        member countries an opportunity, for a set period of time, to 
        serve as the designated president of the caucus, responsible 
        for serving as its voice in each organization.

SEC. 4033. LEADERSHIP AND MEMBERSHIP OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.

    (a) United States Policy.--The President, acting through the 
Secretary of State and the relevant United States chiefs of mission, 
shall use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States to--
            (1) where appropriate, reform the criteria for leadership 
        and, in appropriate cases, for membership, at all United 
        Nations bodies and at other international organizations and 
        multilateral institutions to which the United States is a 
        member so as to exclude countries that violate the principles 
        of the specific organization;
            (2) make it a policy of the United Nations and other 
        international organizations and multilateral institutions of 
        which the United States is a member that a member country may 
        not stand in nomination for membership or in nomination or in 
        rotation for a leadership position in such bodies if the member 
        country is subject to sanctions imposed by the United Nations 
        Security Council; and
            (3) work to ensure that no member country stand in 
        nomination for membership, or in nomination or in rotation for 
        a leadership position in such organizations, or for membership 
        on the United Nations Security Council, if the member country 
        is subject to a determination under section 6(j)(1)(A) of the 
        Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 
        2405(j)(1)(A)), section 620A(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act 
        of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371(a)), or section 40(d) of the Arms 
        Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780(d)).
    (b) Report to Congress.--Not later than 15 days after a country 
subject to a determination under one or more of the provisions of law 
specified in subsection (a)(3) is selected for membership or a 
leadership post in an international organization of which the United 
States is a member or for membership on the United Nations Security 
Council, the Secretary of State shall submit to the Committee on 
International Relations of the House of Representatives and the 
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report on any steps 
taken pursuant to subsection (a)(3).

SEC. 4034. INCREASED TRAINING IN MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY.

    (a) Training Programs.--Section 708 of the Foreign Service Act of 
1980 (22 U.S.C. 4028) is amended by adding at the end the following new 
subsection:
    ``(c) Training in Multilateral Diplomacy.--
            ``(1) In general.--The Secretary shall establish a series 
        of training courses for officers of the Service, including 
        appropriate chiefs of mission, on the conduct of diplomacy at 
        international organizations and other multilateral institutions 
        and at broad-based multilateral negotiations of international 
        instruments.
            ``(2) Particular programs.--The Secretary shall ensure that 
        the training described in paragraph (1) is provided at various 
        stages of the career of members of the service. In particular, 
        the Secretary shall ensure that after January 1, 2006--
                    ``(A) officers of the Service receive training on 
                the conduct of diplomacy at international organizations 
                and other multilateral institutions and at broad-based 
                multilateral negotiations of international instruments 
                as part of their training upon entry into the Service; 
                and
                    ``(B) officers of the Service, including chiefs of 
                mission, who are assigned to United States missions 
                representing the United States to international 
                organizations and other multilateral institutions or 
                who are assigned in Washington, D.C., to positions that 
                have as their primary responsibility formulation of 
                policy towards such organizations and institutions or 
                towards participation in broad-based multilateral 
                negotiations of international instruments, receive 
                specialized training in the areas described in 
                paragraph (1) prior to beginning of service for such 
                assignment or, if receiving such training at that time 
                is not practical, within the first year of beginning 
                such assignment.''.
    (b) Training for Civil Service Employees.--The Secretary shall 
ensure that employees of the Department of State who are members of the 
civil service and who are assigned to positions described in section 
708(c) of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (as amended by subsection 
(a)) receive training described in such section.
    (c) Conforming Amendments.--Section 708 of such Act is further 
amended--
            (1) in subsection (a), by striking ``(a) The'' and 
        inserting ``(a) Training on Human Rights.--The''; and
            (2) in subsection (b), by striking ``(b) The'' and 
        inserting ``(b) Training on Refugee Law and Religious 
        Persecution.--The''.

SEC. 4035. IMPLEMENTATION AND ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICE ON MULTILATERAL 
                    NEGOTIATIONS.

    (a) Establishment of Office.--The Secretary of State is authorized 
to establish, within the Bureau of International Organizational 
Affairs, an Office on Multilateral Negotiations to be headed by a 
Special Representative for Multilateral Negotiations (in this section 
referred to as the ``Special Representative'').
    (b) Appointment.--The Special Representative shall be appointed by 
the President and shall have the rank of Ambassador-at-Large. At the 
discretion of the President another official at the Department may 
serve as the Special Representative.
    (c) Staffing.--The Special Representative shall have a staff of 
Foreign Service and civil service officers skilled in multilateral 
diplomacy.
    (d) Duties.--The Special Representative shall have the following 
responsibilities:
            (1) In general.--The primary responsibility of the Special 
        Representative shall be to assist in the organization of, and 
        preparation for, United States participation in multilateral 
        negotiations, including advocacy efforts undertaken by the 
        Department of State and other United States Government 
        agencies.
            (2) Consultations.--The Special Representative shall 
        consult with Congress, international organizations, 
        nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector on 
        matters affecting multilateral negotiations.
            (3) Advisory role.--The Special Representative shall advise 
        the Assistant Secretary for International Organizational 
        Affairs and, as appropriate, the Secretary of State, regarding 
        advocacy at international organizations, multilateral 
        institutions, and negotiations, and shall make recommendations 
        regarding--
                    (A) effective strategies (and tactics) to achieve 
                United States policy objectives at multilateral 
                negotiations;
                    (B) the need for and timing of high level 
                intervention by the President, the Secretary of State, 
                the Deputy Secretary of State, and other United States 
                officials to secure support from key foreign government 
                officials for United States positions at such 
                organizations, institutions, and negotiations; and
                    (C) the composition of United States delegations to 
                multilateral negotiations.
            (4) Annual diplomatic missions of multilateral issues.--The 
        Special Representative, in coordination with the Assistant 
        Secretary for International Organizational Affairs, shall 
        organize annual diplomatic missions to appropriate foreign 
        countries to conduct consultations between principal officers 
        responsible for advising the Secretary of State on 
        international organizations and high-level representatives of 
        the governments of such foreign countries to promote the United 
        States agenda at the United Nations General Assembly and other 
        key international fora (such as the United Nations Human Rights 
        Commission).
            (5) Leadership and membership of international 
        organizations.--The Special Representative, in coordination 
        with the Assistant Secretary of International Organizational 
        Affairs, shall direct the efforts of the United States to 
        reform the criteria for leadership of and membership in 
        international organizations as described in section 4033.
            (6) Participation in multilateral negotiations.--The 
        Secretary of State may direct the Special Representative to 
        serve as a member of a United States delegation to any 
        multilateral negotiation.

                      CHAPTER 3--OTHER PROVISIONS

SEC. 4041. PILOT PROGRAM TO PROVIDE GRANTS TO AMERICAN-SPONSORED 
                    SCHOOLS IN PREDOMINANTLY MUSLIM COUNTRIES TO 
                    PROVIDE SCHOLARSHIPS.

    (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
            (1) During the 2003-2004 school year, the Office of 
        Overseas Schools of the Department of State is financially 
        assisting 189 elementary and secondary schools in foreign 
        countries.
            (2) American-sponsored elementary and secondary schools are 
        located in more than 20 countries with significant Muslim 
        populations in the Near East, Africa, South Asia, Central Asia, 
        and East Asia.
            (3) American-sponsored elementary and secondary schools 
        provide an American-style education in English, with curricula 
        that typically include an emphasis on the development of 
        critical thinking and analytical skills.
    (b) Purpose.--The United States has an interest in increasing the 
level of financial support provided to American-sponsored elementary 
and secondary schools in predominantly Muslim countries, in order to--
            (1) increase the number of students in such countries who 
        attend such schools;
            (2) increase the number of young people who may thereby 
        gain at any early age an appreciation for the culture, society, 
        and history of the United States; and
            (3) increase the number of young people who may thereby 
        improve their proficiency in the English language.
    (c) Pilot Program Authorized.--The Secretary of State, acting 
through the Director of the Office of Overseas Schools of the 
Department of State, may conduct a pilot program to make grants to 
American-sponsored elementary and secondary schools in predominantly 
Muslim countries for the purpose of providing full or partial merit-
based scholarships to students from lower- and middle-income families 
of such countries to attend such schools.
    (d) Determination of Eligible Students.--For purposes of expending 
grant funds, an American-sponsored elementary and secondary school that 
receives a grant under subsection (c) is authorized to establish 
criteria to be implemented by such school to determine what constitutes 
lower- and middle-income families in the country (or region of the 
country, if regional variations in income levels in the country are 
significant) in which such school is located.
    (e) Restriction on Use of Funds.--Amounts appropriated to the 
Secretary of State pursuant to the authorization of appropriations in 
subsection (h) shall be used for the sole purpose of making grants 
under this section, and may not be used for the administration of the 
Office of Overseas Schools of the Department of State or for any other 
activity of the Office.
    (f) Voluntary Participation.--Nothing in this section shall be 
construed to require participation in the pilot program by an American-
sponsored elementary or secondary school in a predominantly Muslim 
country.
    (g) Report.--Not later than April 15, 2006, the Secretary shall 
submit to the Committee on International Relations of the House of 
Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a 
report on the pilot program. The report shall assess the success of the 
program, examine any obstacles encountered in its implementation, and 
address whether it should be continued, and if so, provide 
recommendations to increase its effectiveness.
    (h) Funding.--There are authorized to be appropriated to the 
Secretary of State such sums as may be necessary for each of fiscal 
years 2005, 2006, and 2007 to carry out this section.

SEC. 4042. ENHANCING FREE AND INDEPENDENT MEDIA.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) Freedom of speech and freedom of the press are 
        fundamental human rights.
            (2) The United States has a national interest in promoting 
        these freedoms by supporting free media abroad, which is 
        essential to the development of free and democratic societies 
        consistent with our own.
            (3) Free media is undermined, endangered, or nonexistent in 
        many repressive and transitional societies around the world, 
        including in Eurasia, Africa, and the Middle East.
            (4) Individuals lacking access to a plurality of free media 
        are vulnerable to misinformation and propaganda and are 
        potentially more likely to adopt anti-American views.
            (5) Foreign governments have a responsibility to actively 
        and publicly discourage and rebut unprofessional and unethical 
        media while respecting journalistic integrity and editorial 
        independence.
    (b) Statements of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United 
States, acting through the Secretary of State, to--
            (1) ensure that the promotion of press freedoms and free 
        media worldwide is a priority of United States foreign policy 
        and an integral component of United States public diplomacy;
            (2) respect the journalistic integrity and editorial 
        independence of free media worldwide; and
            (3) ensure that widely accepted standards for professional 
        and ethical journalistic and editorial practices are employed 
        when assessing international media.
    (c) Grants to Private Sector Group to Establish Media Network.--
            (1) In general.--Grants made available to the National 
        Endowment for Democracy (NED) pursuant to paragraph (3) shall 
        be used by NED to provide funding to a private sector group to 
        establish and manage a free and independent media network in 
        accordance with paragraph (2).
            (2) Purpose.--The purpose of the network shall be to 
        provide an effective forum to convene a broad range of 
        individuals, organizations, and governmental participants 
        involved in journalistic activities and the development of free 
        and independent media to--
                    (A) fund a clearinghouse to collect and share 
                information concerning international media development 
                and training;
                    (B) improve research in the field of media 
                assistance and program evaluation to better inform 
                decisions regarding funding and program design for 
                government and private donors;
                    (C) explore the most appropriate use of existing 
                means to more effectively encourage the involvement of 
                the private sector in the field of media assistance; 
                and
                    (D) identify effective methods for the development 
                of a free and independent media in societies in 
                transition.
            (3) Funding.--For grants made by the Department of State to 
        NED as authorized by the National Endowment for Democracy Act 
        (Pub. L. 98-164, 97 Stat. 1039), there are authorized to be 
        appropriated to the Secretary of State such sums as may be 
        necessary for each of fiscal years 2005, 2006, and 2007 to 
        carry out this section.

SEC. 4043. COMBATING BIASED OR FALSE FOREIGN MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE 
                    UNITED STATES.

    (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
            (1) Biased or false media coverage of the United States and 
        its allies is a significant factor encouraging terrorist acts 
        against the people of the United States.
            (2) Public diplomacy efforts designed to encourage an 
        accurate understanding of the people of the United States and 
        the policies of the United States are unlikely to succeed if 
        foreign publics are subjected to unrelenting biased or false 
        local media coverage of the United States.
            (3) Where freedom of the press exists in foreign countries 
        the United States can combat biased or false media coverage by 
        responding in the foreign media or by communicating directly to 
        foreign publics in such countries.
            (4) Foreign governments which encourage biased or false 
        media coverage of the United States bear a significant degree 
        of responsibility for creating a climate within which terrorism 
        can flourish. Such governments are responsible for encouraging 
        biased or false media coverage if they--
                    (A) issue direct or indirect instructions to the 
                media to publish biased or false information regarding 
                the United States;
                    (B) make deliberately biased or false charges 
                expecting that such charges will be disseminated; or
                    (C) so severely constrain the ability of the media 
                to express criticism of any such government that one of 
                the few means of political expression available is 
                criticism of the United States.
    (b) Statements of Policy.--
            (1) Foreign governments.--It shall be the policy of the 
        United States to regard foreign governments as knowingly 
        engaged in unfriendly acts toward the United States if such 
        governments--
                    (A) instruct their state-owned or influenced media 
                to include content that is anti-American or prejudicial 
                to the foreign and security policies of the United 
                States; or
                    (B) make deliberately false charges regarding the 
                United States or permit false or biased charges against 
                the United States to be made while constraining normal 
                political discourse.
            (2) Seeking media access; responding to false charges.--It 
        shall be the policy of the United States to--
                    (A) seek access to the media in foreign countries 
                on terms no less favorable than those afforded any 
                other foreign entity or on terms available to the 
                foreign country in the United States; and
                    (B) combat biased or false media coverage in 
                foreign countries of the United States and its allies 
                by responding in the foreign media or by communicating 
                directly to foreign publics.
    (c) Responsibilities Regarding Biased or False Media Coverage.--
            (1) Secretary of state.--The Secretary of State shall 
        instruct chiefs of mission to report on and combat biased or 
        false media coverage originating in or received in foreign 
        countries to which such chiefs are posted. Based on such 
        reports and other information available to the Secretary, the 
        Secretary shall prioritize efforts to combat such media 
        coverage, giving special attention to audiences where fostering 
        popular opposition to terrorism is most important and such 
        media coverage is most prevalent.
            (2) Chiefs of mission.--Chiefs of mission shall have the 
        following responsibilities:
                    (A) Chiefs of mission shall give strong priority to 
                combatting biased or false media reports in foreign 
                countries to which such chiefs are posted regarding the 
                United States.
                    (B) Chiefs of mission posted to foreign countries 
                in which freedom of the press exists shall inform the 
                governments of such countries of the policies of the 
                United States regarding biased or false media coverage 
                of the United States, and shall make strong efforts to 
                persuade such governments to change policies that 
                encourage such media coverage.
    (d) Reports.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act and at least annually thereafter until January 1, 
2015, the Secretary shall submit to the Committee on International 
Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign 
Relations of the Senate a report regarding the major themes of biased 
or false media coverage of the United States in foreign countries, the 
actions taken to persuade foreign governments to change policies that 
encourage such media coverage (and the results of such actions), and 
any other actions taken to combat such media coverage in foreign 
countries.

SEC. 4044. REPORT ON BROADCAST OUTREACH STRATEGY.

    (a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit to the Committee on 
International Relations of the House of Representatives and the 
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report on the strategy 
of the United States to expand its outreach to foreign Muslim audiences 
through broadcast media.
    (b) Content.--The report required under subsection (a) shall 
contain the following:
            (1) An assessment of the Broadcasting Board of Governors 
        and the public diplomacy activities of the Department of State 
        with respect to outreach to foreign Muslim audiences through 
        broadcast media.
            (2) An outline of recommended actions that the United 
        States should take to more regularly and comprehensively 
        present a United States point of view through indigenous 
        broadcast media in countries with sizeable Muslim populations, 
        including increasing appearances by United States Government 
        officials, experts, and citizens.
            (3) An assessment of potential incentives for, and costs 
        associated with, encouraging United States broadcasters to dub 
        or subtitle into Arabic and other relevant languages their news 
        and public affairs programs broadcast in Muslim countries in 
        order to present those programs to a much broader Muslim 
        audience than is currently reached.
            (4) An assessment of providing a training program in media 
        and press affairs for members of the Foreign Service.

SEC. 4045. OFFICE RELOCATION.

    As soon as practicable after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
the Secretary of State shall take such actions as are necessary to 
consolidate within the Harry S. Truman Building all offices of the 
Department of State that are responsible for the conduct of public 
diplomacy, including the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs.

SEC. 4046. STRENGTHENING THE COMMUNITY OF DEMOCRACIES FOR MUSLIM 
                    COUNTRIES.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United 
States--
            (1) should work with the Community of Democracies to 
        discuss, develop, and refine policies and assistance programs 
        to support and promote political, economic, judicial, 
        educational, and social reforms in Muslim countries;
            (2) should, as part of that effort, secure support to 
        require countries seeking membership in the Community of 
        Democracies to be in full compliance with the Community's 
        criteria for participation, as established by the Community's 
        Convening Group, should work to ensure that the criteria are 
        part of a legally binding document, and should urge other donor 
        countries to use compliance with the criteria as a basis for 
        determining diplomatic and economic relations (including 
        assistance programs) with such participating countries; and
            (3) should seek support for international contributions to 
        the Community of Democracies and should seek authority for the 
        Community's Convening Group to oversee adherence and compliance 
        of participating countries with the criteria.
    (b) Middle East Partnership Initiative and Broader Middle East and 
North Africa Initiative .--Amounts made available to carry out the 
Middle East Partnership Initiative and the Broader Middle East and 
North Africa Initiative may be made available to the Community of 
Democracies in order to strengthen and expand its work with Muslim 
countries.
    (c) Report.--The Secretary of State shall include in the annual 
report entitled ``Supporting Human Rights and Democracy: The U.S. 
Record'' a description of efforts by the Community of Democracies to 
support and promote political, economic, judicial, educational, and 
social reforms in Muslim countries and the extent to which such 
countries meet the criteria for participation in the Community of 
Democracies.

  Subtitle C--Reform of Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations

SEC. 4051. DESIGNATION OF FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS.

    (a) Period of Designation.--Section 219(a)(4) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189(a)(4)) is amended--
            (1) in subparagraph (A)--
                    (A) by striking ``Subject to paragraphs (5) and 
                (6), a'' and inserting ``A''; and
                    (B) by striking ``for a period of 2 years beginning 
                on the effective date of the designation under 
                paragraph (2)(B)'' and inserting ``until revoked under 
                paragraph (5) or (6) or set aside pursuant to 
                subsection (c)'';
            (2) by striking subparagraph (B) and inserting the 
        following:
                    ``(B) Review of designation upon petition.--
                            ``(i) In general.--The Secretary shall 
                        review the designation of a foreign terrorist 
                        organization under the procedures set forth in 
                        clauses (iii) and (iv) if the designated 
                        organization files a petition for revocation 
                        within the petition period described in clause 
                        (ii).
                            ``(ii) Petition period.--For purposes of 
                        clause (i)--
                                    ``(I) if the designated 
                                organization has not previously filed a 
                                petition for revocation under this 
                                subparagraph, the petition period 
                                begins 2 years after the date on which 
                                the designation was made; or
                                    ``(II) if the designated 
                                organization has previously filed a 
                                petition for revocation under this 
                                subparagraph, the petition period 
                                begins 2 years after the date of the 
                                determination made under clause (iv) on 
                                that petition.
                            ``(iii) Procedures.--Any foreign terrorist 
                        organization that submits a petition for 
                        revocation under this subparagraph must provide 
                        evidence in that petition that the relevant 
                        circumstances described in paragraph (1) have 
                        changed in such a manner as to warrant 
                        revocation with respect to the organization.
                            ``(iv) Determination.--
                                    ``(I) In general.--Not later than 
                                180 days after receiving a petition for 
                                revocation submitted under this 
                                subparagraph, the Secretary shall make 
                                a determination as to such revocation.
                                    ``(II) Classified information.--The 
                                Secretary may consider classified 
                                information in making a determination 
                                in response to a petition for 
                                revocation. Classified information 
                                shall not be subject to disclosure for 
                                such time as it remains classified, 
                                except that such information may be 
                                disclosed to a court ex parte and in 
                                camera for purposes of judicial review 
                                under subsection (c).
                                    ``(III) Publication of 
                                determination.--A determination made by 
                                the Secretary under this clause shall 
                                be published in the Federal Register.
                                    ``(IV) Procedures.--Any revocation 
                                by the Secretary shall be made in 
                                accordance with paragraph (6).''; and
            (3) by adding at the end the following:
                    ``(C) Other review of designation.--
                            ``(i) In general.--If in a 6-year period no 
                        review has taken place under subparagraph (B), 
                        the Secretary shall review the designation of 
                        the foreign terrorist organization in order to 
                        determine whether such designation should be 
                        revoked pursuant to paragraph (6).
                            ``(ii) Procedures.--If a review does not 
                        take place pursuant to subparagraph (B) in 
                        response to a petition for revocation that is 
                        filed in accordance with that subparagraph, 
                        then the review shall be conducted pursuant to 
                        procedures established by the Secretary. The 
                        results of such review and the applicable 
                        procedures shall not be reviewable in any 
                        court.
                            ``(iii) Publication of results of review.--
                        The Secretary shall publish any determination 
                        made pursuant to this subparagraph in the 
                        Federal Register.''.
    (b) Aliases.--Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 
U.S.C. 1189) is amended--
            (1) by redesignating subsections (b) and (c) as subsections 
        (c) and (d), respectively; and
            (2) by inserting after subsection (a) the following new 
        subsection (b):
    ``(b) Amendments to a Designation.--
            ``(1) In general.--The Secretary may amend a designation 
        under this subsection if the Secretary finds that the 
        organization has changed its name, adopted a new alias, 
        dissolved and then reconstituted itself under a different name 
        or names, or merged with another organization.
            ``(2) Procedure.--Amendments made to a designation in 
        accordance with paragraph (1) shall be effective upon 
        publication in the Federal Register. Subparagraphs (B) and (C) 
        of subsection (a)(2) shall apply to an amended designation upon 
        such publication. Paragraphs (2)(A)(i), (4), (5), (6), (7), and 
        (8) of subsection (a) shall also apply to an amended 
        designation.
            ``(3) Administrative record.--The administrative record 
        shall be corrected to include the amendments as well as any 
        additional relevant information that supports those amendments.
            ``(4) Classified information.--The Secretary may consider 
        classified information in amending a designation in accordance 
        with this subsection. Classified information shall not be 
        subject to disclosure for such time as it remains classified, 
        except that such information may be disclosed to a court ex 
        parte and in camera for purposes of judicial review under 
        subsection (c).''.
    (c) Technical and Conforming Amendments.--Section 219 of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189) is amended--
            (1) in subsection (a)--
                    (A) in paragraph (3)(B), by striking ``subsection 
                (b)'' and inserting ``subsection (c)'';
                    (B) in paragraph (6)(A)--
                            (i) in the matter preceding clause (i), by 
                        striking ``or a redesignation made under 
                        paragraph (4)(B)'' and inserting ``at any time, 
                        and shall revoke a designation upon completion 
                        of a review conducted pursuant to subparagraphs 
                        (B) and (C) of paragraph (4)''; and
                            (ii) in clause (i), by striking ``or 
                        redesignation'';
                    (C) in paragraph (7), by striking ``, or the 
                revocation of a redesignation under paragraph (6),''; 
                and
                    (D) in paragraph (8)--
                            (i) by striking ``, or if a redesignation 
                        under this subsection has become effective 
                        under paragraph (4)(B),''; and
                            (ii) by striking ``or redesignation''; and
            (2) in subsection (c), as so redesignated--
                    (A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``of the 
                designation in the Federal Register,'' and all that 
                follows through ``review of the designation'' and 
                inserting ``in the Federal Register of a designation, 
                an amended designation, or a determination in response 
                to a petition for revocation, the designated 
                organization may seek judicial review'';
                    (B) in paragraph (2), by inserting ``, amended 
                designation, or determination in response to a petition 
                for revocation'' after ``designation'';
                    (C) in paragraph (3), by inserting ``, amended 
                designation, or determination in response to a petition 
                for revocation'' after ``designation''; and
                    (D) in paragraph (4), by inserting ``, amended 
                designation, or determination in response to a petition 
                for revocation'' after ``designation'' each place that 
                term appears.
    (d) Savings Provision.--For purposes of applying section 219 of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act on or after the date of enactment of 
this Act, the term ``designation'', as used in that section, includes 
all redesignations made pursuant to section 219(a)(4)(B) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189(a)(4)(B)) prior to the 
date of enactment of this Act, and such redesignations shall continue 
to be effective until revoked as provided in paragraph (5) or (6) of 
section 219(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 
1189(a)).

SEC. 4052. INCLUSION IN ANNUAL DEPARTMENT OF STATE COUNTRY REPORTS ON 
                    TERRORISM OF INFORMATION ON TERRORIST GROUPS THAT 
                    SEEK WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND GROUPS THAT 
                    HAVE BEEN DESIGNATED AS FOREIGN TERRORIST 
                    ORGANIZATIONS.

    (a) Inclusion in Reports.--Section 140 of the Foreign Relations 
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (22 U.S.C. 2656f) is 
amended--
            (1) in subsection (a)(2)--
                    (A) by inserting ``any terrorist group known to 
                have obtained or developed, or to have attempted to 
                obtain or develop, weapons of mass destruction,'' after 
                ``during the preceding five years,''; and
                    (B) by inserting ``any group designated by the 
                Secretary as a foreign terrorist organization under 
                section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 
                U.S.C. 1189),'' after ``Export Administration Act of 
                1979,'';
            (2) in subsection (b)(1)(C)(iii), by striking ``and'' at 
        the end;
            (3) in subsection (b)(1)(C)--
                    (A) by redesignating clause (iv) as clause (v); and
                    (B) by inserting after clause (iii) the following 
                new clause:
                            ``(iv) providing weapons of mass 
                        destruction, or assistance in obtaining or 
                        developing such weapons, to terrorists or 
                        terrorist groups; and''; and
            (4) in subsection (b)(3) (as redesignated by section 
        4002(b)(2)(B) of this Act)--
                    (A) by redesignating subparagraphs (C), (D), and 
                (E) as (D), (E), and (F), respectively; and
                    (B) by inserting after subparagraph (B) the 
                following new subparagraph:
                    ``(C) efforts by those groups to obtain or develop 
                weapons of mass destruction;''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsection (a) shall 
apply beginning with the first report under section 140 of the Foreign 
Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (22 U.S.C. 
2656f), submitted more than one year after the date of the enactment of 
this Act.

     Subtitle D--Afghanistan Freedom Support Act Amendments of 2004

SEC. 4061. SHORT TITLE.

    This subtitle may be cited as the ``Afghanistan Freedom Support Act 
Amendments of 2004''.

SEC. 4062. COORDINATION OF ASSISTANCE FOR AFGHANISTAN.

    (a) Findings.--Congress finds that--
            (1) the Final Report of the National Commission on 
        Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States criticized the 
        provision of United States assistance to Afghanistan for being 
        too inflexible; and
            (2) the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 (Public Law 
        107-327; 22 U.S.C. 7501 et seq.) contains provisions that 
        provide for flexibility in the provision of assistance for 
        Afghanistan and are not subject to the requirements of typical 
        foreign assistance programs and provide for the designation of 
        a coordinator to oversee United States assistance for 
        Afghanistan.
    (b) Designation of Coordinator.--Section 104(a) of the Afghanistan 
Freedom Support Act of 2002 (22 U.S.C. 7514(a)) is amended in the 
matter preceding paragraph (1) by striking ``is strongly urged to'' and 
inserting ``shall''.
    (c) Other Matters.--Section 104 of such Act (22 U.S.C. 7514) is 
amended by adding at the end the following:
    ``(c) Program Plan.--The coordinator designated under subsection 
(a) shall annually submit to the Committees on International Relations 
and Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Committees 
on Foreign Relations and Appropriations of the Senate the 
Administration's plan for assistance to Afghanistan together with a 
description of such assistance in prior years.
    ``(d) Coordination With International Community.--The coordinator 
designated under subsection (a) shall work with the international 
community, including multilateral organizations and international 
financial institutions, and the Government of Afghanistan to ensure 
that assistance to Afghanistan is implemented in a coherent, 
consistent, and efficient manner to prevent duplication and waste.''.

SEC. 4063. GENERAL PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE AFGHANISTAN FREEDOM 
                    SUPPORT ACT OF 2002.

    (a) Assistance to Promote Economic, Political and Social 
Development.--
            (1) Declaration of policy.--Congress reaffirms the 
        authorities contained in title I of the Afghanistan Freedom 
        Support Act of 2002 (22 U.S.C. 7501 et seq.; relating to 
        economic and democratic development assistance for 
        Afghanistan).
            (2) Provision of assistance.--Section 103(a) of such Act 
        (22 U.S.C. 7513(a)) is amended in the matter preceding 
        paragraph (1) by striking ``section 512 of Public Law 107-115 
        or any other similar'' and inserting ``any other''.
    (b) Declarations of Policy.--Congress makes the following 
declarations:
            (1) The United States reaffirms the support that it and 
        other countries expressed for the report entitled ``Securing 
        Afghanistan's Future'' in their Berlin Declaration of April 
        2004. The United States should help enable the growth needed to 
        create an economically sustainable Afghanistan capable of the 
        poverty reduction and social development foreseen in the 
        report.
            (2) The United States supports the parliamentary elections 
        to be held in Afghanistan by April 2005 and will help ensure 
        that such elections are not undermined by warlords or narcotics 
        traffickers.
            (3)(A) The United States continues to urge North Atlantic 
        Treaty Organization members and other friendly countries to 
        make much greater military contributions toward securing the 
        peace in Afghanistan.
            (B) The United States should continue to lead in the 
        security domain by, among other things, providing logistical 
        support to facilitate those contributions.
            (C) In coordination with the Government of Afghanistan, the 
        United States should urge others, and act itself, to increase 
        efforts to promote disarmament, demobilization, and 
        reintegration efforts, to enhance counternarcotics activities, 
        to expand deployments of Provincial Reconstruction Teams, and 
        to increase training of Afghanistan's National Army and its 
        police and border security forces.
    (c) Long-Term Strategy.--
            (1) Strategy.--Title III of such Act (22 U.S.C. 7551 et 
        seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:

``SEC. 304 FORMULATION OF LONG-TERM STRATEGY FOR AFGHANISTAN.

    ``(a) Strategy.--
            ``(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
        of the enactment of the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act 
        Amendments of 2004, the President shall formulate and transmit 
        to the Committee on International Relations of the House of 
        Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
        Senate a 5-year strategy for Afghanistan that includes specific 
        and measurable goals, timeframes for accomplishing such goals, 
        and specific resource levels necessary for accomplishing such 
        goals for addressing the long-term development and security 
        needs of Afghanistan, including sectors such as agriculture and 
        irrigation, parliamentary and democratic development, the 
        judicial system and rule of law, human rights, education, 
        health, telecommunications, electricity, women's rights, 
        counternarcotics, police, border security, anti-corruption, and 
        other law-enforcement activities.
            ``(2) Additional requirement.--The strategy shall also 
        delineate responsibilities for achieving such goals and 
        identify and address possible external factors that could 
        significantly affect the achievement of such goals.
    ``(b) Implementation.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the 
transmission of the strategy required by subsection (a), the Secretary 
of State, the Administrator of the United States Agency for 
International Development, and the Secretary of Defense shall submit to 
the Committee on International Relations of the House of 
Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a 
written 5-year action plan to implement the strategy developed pursuant 
to subsection (a). Such action plan shall include a description and 
schedule of the program evaluations that will monitor progress toward 
achieving the goals described in subsection (a).
    ``(c) Review.--The Secretary of State, the Administrator of the 
United States Agency for International Development, and the Secretary 
of Defense shall carry out an annual review of the strategy required by 
subsection (a) and the action plan required by subsection (b).
    ``(d) Monitoring.--The report required by section 206(c)(2) of this 
Act shall include--
            ``(1) a description of progress toward implementation of 
        both the strategy required by subsection (a) and the action 
        plan required by subsection (b); and
            ``(2) a description of any changes to the strategy or 
        action plan since the date of the submission of the last report 
        required by such section.''.
            (2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents for such Act 
        (22 U.S.C. 7501 note) is amended by adding after the item 
        relating to section 303 the following:

``Sec. 304. Formulation of long-term strategy for Afghanistan.''.

SEC. 4064. RULE OF LAW AND RELATED ISSUES.

    Section 103(a)(5)(A) of the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 
(22 U.S.C. 7513(a)(5)(A)) is amended--
            (1) in clause (v), to read as follows:
                            ``(v) support for the activities of the 
                        Government of Afghanistan to develop modern 
                        legal codes and court rules, to provide for the 
                        creation of legal assistance programs, and 
                        other initiatives to promote the rule of law in 
                        Afghanistan;'';
            (2) in clause (xii), to read as follows:
                            ``(xii) support for the effective 
                        administration of justice at the national, 
                        regional, and local levels, including programs 
                        to improve penal institutions and the 
                        rehabilitation of prisoners, to establish a 
                        responsible and community-based police force, 
                        and to rehabilitate or construct courthouses 
                        and detention facilities;''; and
            (3) in clause (xiii), by striking ``and'' at the end;
            (4) in clause (xiv), by striking the period at the end and 
        inserting ``; and''; and
            (5) by adding at the end the following:
                            ``(xv) assistance for the protection of 
                        Afghanistan's culture, history, and national 
                        identity, including with the rehabilitation of 
                        Afghanistan's museums and sites of cultural 
                        significance.''.

SEC. 4065. MONITORING OF ASSISTANCE.

    Section 108 of the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 (22 
U.S.C. 7518) is amended by adding at the end the following:
    ``(c) Monitoring of Assistance for Afghanistan.--
            ``(1) Report.--Not later than January 15, 2005, and every 
        six months thereafter, the Secretary of State, in consultation 
        with the Administrator for the United States Agency for 
        International Development, shall submit to the Committee on 
        International Relations of the House of Representatives and the 
        Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report on the 
        obligations and expenditures of United States assistance for 
        Afghanistan from all United States Government agencies.
            ``(2) Submission of information for report.--The head of 
        each United States Government agency referred to in paragraph 
        (1) shall provide on a timely basis to the Secretary of State 
        such information as the Secretary may reasonably require to 
        allow the Secretary to prepare and submit the report required 
        by such paragraph.''.

SEC. 4066. UNITED STATES POLICY TO SUPPORT DISARMAMENT OF PRIVATE 
                    MILITIAS AND TO SUPPORT EXPANSION OF INTERNATIONAL 
                    PEACEKEEPING AND SECURITY OPERATIONS IN 
                    AFGHANISTAN.

    (a) Disarmament of Private Militias.--Section 103 of the 
Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 (22 U.S.C. 7513) is amended by 
adding at the end the following:
    ``(d) United States Policy Relating to Disarmament of Private 
Militias.--
            ``(1) In general.--It shall be the policy of the United 
        States to take immediate steps to provide active support for 
        the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of armed 
        soldiers, particularly child soldiers, in Afghanistan, in close 
        consultation with the President of Afghanistan.
            ``(2) Report.--The report required by section 206(c)(2) of 
        this Act shall include a description of the progress to 
        implement paragraph (1).''.
    (b) International Peacekeeping and Security Operations.--Section 
103 of such Act (22 U.S.C. 7513(d)), as amended by subsection (a), is 
further amended by adding at the end the following:
    ``(e) United States Policy Relating to International Peacekeeping 
and Security Operations.--It shall be the policy of the United States 
to make every effort to support the expansion of international 
peacekeeping and security operations in Afghanistan in order to--
            ``(1) increase the area in which security is provided and 
        undertake vital tasks related to promoting security, such as 
        disarming warlords, militias, and irregulars, and disrupting 
        opium production; and
            ``(2) safeguard highways in order to allow the free flow of 
        commerce and to allow material assistance to the people of 
        Afghanistan, and aid personnel in Afghanistan, to move more 
        freely.''.

SEC. 4067. EFFORTS TO EXPAND INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING AND SECURITY 
                    OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN.

    Section 206(d)(1) of the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 
(22 U.S.C. 7536(d)(1)) is amended to read as follows:
            ``(1) Efforts to expand international peacekeeping and 
        security operations in afghanistan.--
                    ``(A) Efforts.--The President shall encourage, and, 
                as authorized by law, enable other countries to 
                actively participate in expanded international 
                peacekeeping and security operations in Afghanistan, 
                especially through the provision of military personnel 
                for extended periods of time.
                    ``(B) Reports.--The President shall prepare and 
                transmit to the Committee on International Relations of 
                the House of Representatives and the Committee on 
                Foreign Relations of the Senate a report on efforts 
                carried out pursuant to subparagraph (A). The first 
                report under this subparagraph shall be transmitted not 
                later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of 
                the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act Amendments of 2004 
                and subsequent reports shall be transmitted every six 
                months thereafter and may be included in the report 
                required by section 206(c)(2) of this Act.''.

SEC. 4068. PROVISIONS RELATING TO COUNTERNARCOTICS EFFORTS IN 
                    AFGHANISTAN.

    (a) Counternarcotics Efforts.--The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act 
of 2002 (22 U.S.C. 7501 et seq.) is amended--
            (1) by redesignating--
                    (A) title III as title IV; and
                    (B) sections 301 through 304 as sections 401 
                through 404, respectively; and
            (2) by inserting after title II the following:

    ``TITLE III--PROVISIONS RELATING TO COUNTERNARCOTICS EFFORTS IN 
                              AFGHANISTAN

``SEC. 301. ASSISTANCE FOR COUNTERNARCOTICS EFFORTS.

    ``In addition to programs established pursuant to section 103(a)(3) 
of this Act or other similar programs, the President is authorized and 
encouraged to implement specific initiatives to assist in the 
eradication of poppy cultivation and the disruption of heroin 
production in Afghanistan, such as--
            ``(1) promoting alternatives to poppy cultivation, 
        including the introduction of high value crops that are 
        suitable for export and the provision of appropriate technical 
        assistance and credit mechanisms for farmers;
            ``(2) enhancing the ability of farmers to bring legitimate 
        agricultural goods to market;
            ``(3) notwithstanding section 660 of the Foreign Assistance 
        Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2420), assistance, including nonlethal 
        equipment, training (including training in internationally 
        recognized standards of human rights, the rule of law, anti-
        corruption, and the promotion of civilian police roles that 
        support democracy), and payments, during fiscal years 2006 
        through 2008, for salaries for special counternarcotics police 
        and supporting units;
            ``(4) training the Afghan National Army in counternarcotics 
        activities; and
            ``(5) creating special counternarcotics courts, 
        prosecutors, and places of incarceration.''.
    (b) Clerical Amendments.--The table of contents for such Act (22 
U.S.C. 7501 note) is amended--
            (1) by redesignating--
                    (A) the item relating to title III as the item 
                relating to title IV; and
                    (B) the items relating to sections 301 through 304 
                as the items relating to sections 401 through 404; and
            (2) by inserting after the items relating to title II the 
        following:

    ``TITLE III--PROVISIONS RELATING TO COUNTERNARCOTICS EFFORTS IN 
                              AFGHANISTAN

``Sec. 301. Assistance for counternarcotics efforts.''.

SEC. 4069. ADDITIONAL AMENDMENTS TO THE AFGHANISTAN FREEDOM SUPPORT ACT 
                    OF 2002.

    (a) Technical Amendment.--Section 103(a)(7)(A)(xii) of the 
Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 (22 U.S.C. 7513(a)(7)(A)(xii)) 
is amended by striking ``National'' and inserting ``Afghan 
Independent''.
    (b) Reporting Requirement.--Section 206(c)(2) of such Act (22 
U.S.C. 7536(c)(2)) is amended in the matter preceding subparagraph (A) 
by striking ``2007'' and inserting ``2012''.

SEC. 4070. REPEAL.

    Section 620D of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2374; 
relating to prohibition on assistance to Afghanistan) is hereby 
repealed.

      Subtitle E--Provisions Relating to Saudi Arabia and Pakistan

SEC. 4081. NEW UNITED STATES STRATEGY FOR RELATIONSHIP WITH SAUDI 
                    ARABIA.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the 
relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia should include 
a more robust dialogue between the people and Government of the United 
States and the people and Government of Saudi Arabia in order to 
provide for a reevaluation of, and improvements to, the relationship by 
both sides.
    (b) Report.--
            (1) In general.-- Not later than one year after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit to the 
        Committee on International Relations of the House of 
        Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
        Senate a strategy for collaboration with the people and 
        Government of Saudi Arabia on subjects of mutual interest and 
        importance to the United States.
            (2) Contents.--The strategy required under paragraph (1) 
        shall include the following provisions:
                    (A) A framework for security cooperation in the 
                fight against terrorism, with special reference to 
                combating terrorist financing and an examination of the 
                origins of modern terrorism.
                    (B) A framework for political and economic reform 
                in Saudi Arabia and throughout the Middle East.
                    (C) An examination of steps that should be taken to 
                reverse the trend toward extremism in Saudi Arabia and 
                other Muslim countries and throughout the Middle East.
                    (D) A framework for promoting greater tolerance and 
                respect for cultural and religious diversity in Saudi 
                Arabia and throughout the Middle East.

SEC. 4082. UNITED STATES COMMITMENT TO THE FUTURE OF PAKISTAN.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United 
States should, over a long-term period, help to ensure a promising, 
stable, and secure future for Pakistan, and should in particular 
provide assistance to encourage and enable Pakistan--
            (1) to continue and improve upon its commitment to 
        combating extremists;
            (2) to seek to resolve any outstanding difficulties with 
        its neighbors and other countries in its region;
            (3) to continue to make efforts to fully control its 
        territory and borders;
            (4) to progress towards becoming a more effective and 
        participatory democracy;
            (5) to participate more vigorously in the global 
        marketplace and to continue to modernize its economy;
            (6) to take all necessary steps to halt the spread of 
        weapons of mass destruction;
            (7) to continue to reform its education system; and
            (8) to, in other ways, implement a general strategy of 
        moderation.
    (b) Strategy.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit to Congress a 
detailed proposed strategy for the future, long-term, engagement of the 
United States with Pakistan.

SEC. 4083. EXTENSION OF PAKISTAN WAIVERS.

     The Act entitled ``An Act to authorize the President to exercise 
waivers of foreign assistance restrictions with respect to Pakistan 
through September 30, 2003, and for other purposes'', approved October 
27, 2001 (Public Law 107-57; 115 Stat. 403), as amended by section 2213 
of the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for 
the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004 (Public Law 108-106; 
117 Stat. 1232), is further amended--
            (1) in section 1(b)--
                    (A) in the heading, by striking ``Fiscal Year 
                2004'' and inserting ``Fiscal Years 2005 and 2006''; 
                and
                    (B) in paragraph (1), by striking ``2004'' and 
                inserting ``2005 or 2006'';
            (2) in section 3(2), by striking ``and 2004,'' and 
        inserting ``2004, 2005, and 2006''; and
            (3) in section 6, by striking ``2004'' and inserting 
        ``2006''.

                    Subtitle F--Oversight Provisions

SEC. 4091. CASE-ZABLOCKI ACT REQUIREMENTS.

    (a) Availability of Treaties and International Agreements.--Section 
112a of title 1, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end 
the following:
    ``(d) The Secretary of State shall cause to be published in slip 
form or otherwise made publicly available through the Internet website 
of the Department of State each treaty or international agreement 
proposed to be published in the compilation entitled `United States 
Treaties and Other International Agreements' not later than 180 days 
after the date on which the treaty or agreement enters into force.''.
    (b) Transmission to Congress.--Section 112b(a) of title 1, United 
States Code (commonly referred to as the ``Case-Zablocki Act''), is 
amended--
            (1) in the first sentence, by striking ``has entered into 
        force'' and inserting ``has been signed or entered into 
        force''; and
            (2) in the second sentence, by striking ``Committee on 
        Foreign Affairs'' and inserting ``Committee on International 
        Relations''.
    (c) Report.--Section 112b of title 1, United States Code, is 
amended--
            (1) by redesignating subsections (d) and (e) as subsections 
        (e) and (f), respectively; and
            (2) by inserting after subsection (c) the following:
    ``(d)(1) The Secretary of State shall submit to Congress on an 
annual basis a report that contains an index of all international 
agreements (including oral agreements), listed by country, date, title, 
and summary of each such agreement (including a description of the 
duration of activities under the agreement and the agreement itself), 
that the United States--
            ``(A) has signed, proclaimed, or with reference to which 
        any other final formality has been executed, or that has been 
        extended or otherwise modified, during the preceding calendar 
        year; and
            ``(B) has not been published, or is not proposed to be 
        published, in the compilation entitled `United States Treaties 
        and Other International Agreements'.
    ``(2) The report described in paragraph (1) may be submitted in 
classified form.''.
    (d) Determination of International Agreement.--Subsection (e) of 
section 112b of title 1, United States Code, (as redesignated) is 
amended--
            (1) by striking ``(e) The Secretary of State'' and 
        inserting ``(e)(1) Subject to paragraph (2), the Secretary of 
        State''; and
            (2) by adding at the end the following:
    ``(2)(A) An arrangement shall constitute an international agreement 
within the meaning of this section (other than subsection (c) of this 
section) irrespective of the duration of activities under the 
arrangement or the arrangement itself.
    ``(B) Arrangements that constitute an international agreement 
within the meaning of this section (other than subsection (c) of this 
section) include, but are not limited to, the following:
            ``(i) A bilateral or multilateral counterterrorism 
        agreement.
            ``(ii) A bilateral agreement with a country that is subject 
        to a determination under section 6(j)(1)(A) of the Export 
        Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)(1)(A)), 
        section 620A(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 
        U.S.C. 2371(a)), or section 40(d) of the Arms Export Control 
        Act (22 U.S.C. 2780(d)).''.
    (e) Enforcement of Requirements.--Section 139(b) of the Foreign 
Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 is amended to 
read as follows:
    ``(b) Effective Date.--Subsection (a) shall take effect 60 days 
after the date of the enactment of the 9/11 Recommendations 
Implementation Act and shall apply during fiscal years 2005, 2006, and 
2007.''.

  Subtitle G--Additional Protections of United States Aviation System 
                         from Terrorist Attacks

SEC. 4101. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS TO ALLOW MAXIMUM DEPLOYMENT OF 
                    FEDERAL FLIGHT DECK OFFICERS.

    The President is encouraged to pursue aggressively international 
agreements with foreign governments to allow the maximum deployment of 
Federal air marshals and Federal flight deck officers on international 
flights.

SEC. 4102. FEDERAL AIR MARSHAL TRAINING.

    Section 44917 of title 49, United States Code, is amended by adding 
at the end the following:
    ``(d) Training for Foreign Law Enforcement Personnel.--
            ``(1) In general.--The Assistant Secretary for Immigration 
        and Customs Enforcement of the Department of Homeland Security, 
        after consultation with the Secretary of State, may direct the 
        Federal Air Marshal Service to provide appropriate air marshal 
        training to law enforcement personnel of foreign countries.
            ``(2) Watchlist screening.--The Federal Air Marshal Service 
        may only provide appropriate air marshal training to law 
        enforcement personnel of foreign countries after comparing the 
        identifying information and records of law enforcement 
        personnel of foreign countries against appropriate records in 
        the consolidated and integrated terrorist watchlists of the 
        Federal Government.
            ``(3) Fees.--The Assistant Secretary shall establish 
        reasonable fees and charges to pay expenses incurred in 
        carrying out this subsection. Funds collected under this 
        subsection shall be credited to the account in the Treasury 
        from which the expenses were incurred and shall be available to 
        the Assistant Secretary for purposes for which amounts in such 
        account are available.''.

SEC. 4103. MAN-PORTABLE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS (MANPADS).

    (a) United States Policy on Nonproliferation and Export Control.--
            (1) To limit availability and transfer of manpads.--The 
        President shall pursue, on an urgent basis, further strong 
        international diplomatic and cooperative efforts, including 
        bilateral and multilateral treaties, in the appropriate forum 
        to limit the availability, transfer, and proliferation of 
        MANPADSs worldwide.
            (2) To limit the proliferation of manpads.--The President 
        is encouraged to seek to enter into agreements with the 
        governments of foreign countries that, at a minimum, would--
                    (A) prohibit the entry into force of a MANPADS 
                manufacturing license agreement and MANPADS co-
                production agreement, other than the entry into force 
                of a manufacturing license or co-production agreement 
                with a country that is party to such an agreement;
                    (B) prohibit, except pursuant to transfers between 
                governments, the export of a MANPADS, including any 
                component, part, accessory, or attachment thereof, 
                without an individual validated license; and
                    (C) prohibit the reexport or retransfer of a 
                MANPADS, including any component, part, accessory, or 
                attachment thereof, to a third person, organization, or 
                government unless the written consent of the government 
                that approved the original export or transfer is first 
                obtained.
            (3) To achieve destruction of manpads.--The President 
        should continue to pursue further strong international 
        diplomatic and cooperative efforts, including bilateral and 
        multilateral treaties, in the appropriate forum to assure the 
        destruction of excess, obsolete, and illicit stocks of MANPADSs 
        worldwide.
            (4) Reporting and briefing requirement.--
                    (A) President's report.--Not later than 180 days 
                after the date of enactment of this Act, the President 
                shall transmit to the appropriate congressional 
                committees a report that contains a detailed 
                description of the status of diplomatic efforts under 
                paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) and of efforts by the 
                appropriate United States agencies to comply with the 
                recommendations of the General Accounting Office set 
                forth in its report GAO-04-519, entitled 
                ``Nonproliferation: Further Improvements Needed in U.S. 
                Efforts to Counter Threats from Man-Portable Air 
                Defense Systems''.
                    (B) Annual briefings.--Annually after the date of 
                submission of the report under subparagraph (A) and 
                until completion of the diplomatic and compliance 
                efforts referred to in subparagraph (A), the Secretary 
                of State shall brief the appropriate congressional 
                committees on the status of such efforts.
    (b) FAA Airworthiness Certification of Missile Defense Systems for 
Commercial Aircraft.--
            (1) In general.--As soon as practicable, but not later than 
        the date of completion of Phase II of the Department of 
        Homeland Security's counter-man-portable air defense system 
        (MANPADS) development and demonstration program, the 
        Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration shall 
        establish a process for conducting airworthiness and safety 
        certification of missile defense systems for commercial 
        aircraft certified as effective and functional by the 
        Department of Homeland Security. The process shall require a 
        certification by the Administrator that such systems can be 
        safely integrated into aircraft systems and ensure 
        airworthiness and aircraft system integrity.
            (2) Certification acceptance.--Under the process, the 
        Administrator shall accept the certification of the Department 
        of Homeland Security that a missile defense system is effective 
        and functional to defend commercial aircraft against MANPADSs.
            (3) Expeditious certification.--Under the process, the 
        Administrator shall expedite the airworthiness and safety 
        certification of missile defense systems for commercial 
        aircraft certified by the Department of Homeland Security.
            (4) Reports.--Not later than 90 days after the first 
        airworthiness and safety certification for a missile defense 
        system for commercial aircraft is issued by the Administrator, 
        and annually thereafter until December 31, 2008, the Federal 
        Aviation Administration shall transmit to the Committee on 
        Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of 
        Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
        Transportation of the Senate a report that contains a detailed 
        description of each airworthiness and safety certification 
        issued for a missile defense system for commercial aircraft.
    (c) Programs to Reduce MANPADS.--
            (1) In general.--The President is encouraged to pursue 
        strong programs to reduce the number of MANPADSs worldwide so 
        that fewer MANPADSs will be available for trade, proliferation, 
        and sale.
            (2) Reporting and briefing requirements.--Not later than 
        180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the President 
        shall transmit to the appropriate congressional committees a 
        report that contains a detailed description of the status of 
        the programs being pursued under subsection (a). Annually 
        thereafter until the programs are no longer needed, the 
        Secretary of State shall brief the appropriate congressional 
        committees on the status of programs.
            (3) Funding.--There are authorized to be appropriated such 
        sums as may be necessary to carry out this section.
    (d) MANPADS Vulnerability Assessments Report.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than one year after the date of 
        enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall 
        transmit to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 
        of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, 
        Science, and Transportation of the Senate a report describing 
        the Department of Homeland Security's plans to secure airports 
        and the aircraft arriving and departing from airports against 
        MANPADSs attacks.
            (2) Matters to be addressed.--The Secretary's report shall 
        address, at a minimum, the following:
                    (A) The status of the Department's efforts to 
                conduct MANPADSs vulnerability assessments at United 
                States airports at which the Department is conducting 
                assessments.
                    (B) How intelligence is shared between the United 
                States intelligence agencies and Federal, State, and 
                local law enforcement to address the MANPADS threat and 
                potential ways to improve such intelligence sharing.
                    (C) Contingency plans that the Department has 
                developed in the event that it receives intelligence 
                indicating a high threat of a MANPADS attack on 
                aircraft at or near United States airports.
                    (D) The feasibility and effectiveness of 
                implementing public education and neighborhood watch 
                programs in areas surrounding United States airports in 
                cases in which intelligence reports indicate there is a 
                high risk of MANPADS attacks on aircraft.
                    (E) Any other issues that the Secretary deems 
                relevant.
            (3) Format.--The report required by this subsection may be 
        submitted in a classified format.
    (e) Definitions.--In this section, the following definitions apply:
            (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
                    (A) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee 
                on International Relations, and the Committee on 
                Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of 
                Representatives; and
                    (B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee 
                on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Commerce, 
                Science, and Transportation of the Senate.
            (2) MANPADS.--The term ``MANPADS'' means--
                    (A) a surface-to-air missile system designed to be 
                man-portable and carried and fired by a single 
                individual; and
                    (B) any other surface-to-air missile system 
                designed to be operated and fired by more than one 
                individual acting as a crew and portable by several 
                individuals.

Subtitle H--Improving International Standards and Cooperation to Fight 
                          Terrorist Financing

SEC. 4111. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS REGARDING SUCCESS IN MULTILATERAL 
                    ORGANIZATIONS.

    (a) Commendation.--The Congress commends the Secretary of the 
Treasury for success and leadership in establishing international 
standards for fighting terrorist finance through multilateral 
organizations, including the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) at the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the 
International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development, and the regional multilateral development banks.
    (b) Policy Guidance.--The Congress encourages the Secretary of the 
Treasury to direct the United States Executive Director at each 
international financial institution to use the voice and vote of the 
United States to urge the institution, and encourages the Secretary of 
the Treasury to use the voice and vote of the United States in other 
multilateral financial policymaking bodies, to--
            (1) provide funding for the implementation of FATF anti-
        money laundering and anti-terrorist financing standards; and
            (2) promote economic development in the Middle East.

SEC. 4112. EXPANDED REPORTING REQUIREMENT FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE 
                    TREASURY.

    (a) In General.--Section 1701(b) of the International Financial 
Institutions Act (22 U.S.C. 262r(b)) is amended--
            (1) by striking ``and'' at the end of paragraph (10); and
            (2) by redesignating paragraph (11) as paragraph (12) and 
        inserting after paragraph (10) the following:
            ``(11) an assessment of--
                    ``(A) the progress made by the International 
                Terrorist Finance Coordinating Council in developing 
                policies to be pursued with the international financial 
                institutions and other multilateral financial 
                policymaking bodies regarding anti-terrorist financing 
                initiatives;
                    ``(B) the progress made by the United States in 
                negotiations with the international financial 
                institutions and other multilateral financial 
                policymaking bodies to set common anti-terrorist 
                financing standards;
                    ``(C) the extent to which the international 
                financial institutions and other multilateral financial 
                policymaking bodies have adopted anti-terrorist 
                financing standards advocated by the United States; and
                    ``(D) whether and how the international financial 
                institutions are contributing to the fight against the 
                financing of terrorist activities; and''.
    (b) Other Multilateral Policymaking Bodies Defined.--Section 
1701(c) of such Act (22 U.S.C. 262r(c)) is amended by adding at the end 
the following:
            ``(5) Other multilateral financial policymaking bodies.--
        The term `other multilateral financial policymaking bodies' 
        means--
                    ``(A) the Financial Action Task Force at the 
                Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development;
                    ``(B) the international network of financial 
                intelligence units known as the `Egmont Group';
                    ``(C) the United States, Canada, the United 
                Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Russia, 
                when meeting as the Group of Eight; and
                    ``(D) any other multilateral financial policymaking 
                group in which the Secretary of the Treasury represents 
                the United States.''.

SEC. 4113. INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST FINANCE COORDINATING COUNCIL.

    (a) Establishment.--The Secretary of the Treasury shall establish 
and convene an interagency council, to be known as the ``International 
Terrorist Finance Coordinating Council'' (in this section referred to 
as the ``Council''), which shall advise the Secretary on policies to be 
pursued by the United States at meetings of the international financial 
institutions and other multilateral financial policymaking bodies, 
regarding the development of international anti-terrorist financing 
standards.
    (b) Meetings.--
            (1) Attendees.--
                    (A) General attendees.--The Secretary of the 
                Treasury (or a representative of the Secretary of the 
                Treasury) and the Secretary of State (or a 
                representative of the Secretary of State) shall attend 
                each Council meeting.
                    (B) Other attendees.--The Secretary of the Treasury 
                shall determine which other officers of the Federal 
                Government shall attend a Council meeting, on the basis 
                of the issues to be raised for consideration at the 
                meeting. The Secretary shall include in the meeting 
                representatives from all relevant Federal agencies with 
                authority to address the issues.
            (2) Schedule.--Not less frequently than annually, the 
        Secretary of the Treasury shall convene Council meetings at 
        such times as the Secretary deems appropriate, based on the 
        notice, schedule, and agenda items of the international 
        financial institutions and other multilateral financial 
        policymaking bodies.

SEC. 4114. DEFINITIONS.

    In this subtitle:
            (1) International financial institutions.--The term 
        ``international financial institutions'' has the meaning given 
        in section 1701(c)(2) of the International Financial 
        Institutions Act.
            (2) Other multilateral financial policymaking bodies.--The 
        term ``other multilateral financial policymaking bodies'' 
        means--
                    (A) the Financial Action Task Force at the 
                Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development;
                    (B) the international network of financial 
                intelligence units known as the ``Egmont Group'';
                    (C) the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, 
                France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Russia, when meeting 
                as the Group of Eight; and
                    (D) any other multilateral financial policymaking 
                group in which the Secretary of the Treasury represents 
                the United States.

                   TITLE V--GOVERNMENT RESTRUCTURING

      Subtitle A--Faster and Smarter Funding for First Responders

SEC. 5001. SHORT TITLE.

    This subtitle may be cited as the ``Faster and Smarter Funding for 
First Responders Act of 2004''.

SEC. 5002. FINDINGS.

    The Congress finds the following:
            (1) In order to achieve its objective of minimizing the 
        damage, and assisting in the recovery, from terrorist attacks, 
        the Department of Homeland Security must play a leading role in 
        assisting communities to reach the level of preparedness they 
        need to respond to a terrorist attack.
            (2) First responder funding is not reaching the men and 
        women of our Nation's first response teams quickly enough, and 
        sometimes not at all.
            (3) To reform the current bureaucratic process so that 
        homeland security dollars reach the first responders who need 
        it most, it is necessary to clarify and consolidate the 
        authority and procedures of the Department of Homeland Security 
        that support first responders.
            (4) Ensuring adequate resources for the new national 
        mission of homeland security, without degrading the ability to 
        address effectively other types of major disasters and 
        emergencies, requires a discrete and separate grant making 
        process for homeland security funds for first response to 
        terrorist acts, on the one hand, and for first responder 
        programs designed to meet pre-September 11 priorities, on the 
        other.
            (5) While a discrete homeland security grant making process 
        is necessary to ensure proper focus on the unique aspects of 
        terrorism prevention, preparedness, and response, it is 
        essential that State and local strategies for utilizing such 
        grants be integrated, to the greatest extent practicable, with 
        existing State and local emergency management plans.
            (6) Homeland security grants to first responders must be 
        based on the best intelligence concerning the capabilities and 
        intentions of our terrorist enemies, and that intelligence must 
        be used to target resources to the Nation's greatest threats, 
        vulnerabilities, and consequences.
            (7) The Nation's first response capabilities will be 
        improved by sharing resources, training, planning, personnel, 
        and equipment among neighboring jurisdictions through mutual 
        aid agreements and regional cooperation. Such regional 
        cooperation should be supported, where appropriate, through 
        direct grants from the Department of Homeland Security.
            (8) An essential prerequisite to achieving the Nation's 
        homeland security objectives for first responders is the 
        establishment of well-defined national goals for terrorism 
        preparedness. These goals should delineate the essential 
        capabilities that every jurisdiction in the United States 
        should possess or to which it should have access.
            (9) A national determination of essential capabilities is 
        needed to identify levels of State and local government 
        terrorism preparedness, to determine the nature and extent of 
        State and local first responder needs, to identify the human 
        and financial resources required to fulfill them, and to direct 
        funding to meet those needs and to measure preparedness levels 
        on a national scale.
            (10) To facilitate progress in achieving, maintaining, and 
        enhancing essential capabilities for State and local first 
        responders, the Department of Homeland Security should seek to 
        allocate homeland security funding for first responders to meet 
        nationwide needs.
            (11) Private sector resources and citizen volunteers can 
        perform critical functions in assisting in preventing and 
        responding to terrorist attacks, and should be integrated into 
        State and local planning efforts to ensure that their 
        capabilities and roles are understood, so as to provide 
        enhanced State and local operational capability and surge 
        capacity.
            (12) Public-private partnerships, such as the partnerships 
        between the Business Executives for National Security and the 
        States of New Jersey and Georgia, can be useful to identify and 
        coordinate private sector support for State and local first 
        responders. Such models should be expanded to cover all States 
        and territories.
            (13) An important aspect of essential capabilities is 
        measurability, so that it is possible to determine how prepared 
        a State or local government is now, and what additional steps 
        it needs to take, in order to respond to acts of terrorism.
            (14) The Department of Homeland Security should establish, 
        publish, and regularly update national voluntary consensus 
        standards for both equipment and training, in cooperation with 
        both public and private sector standard setting organizations, 
        to assist State and local governments in obtaining the 
        equipment and training to attain the essential capabilities for 
        first response to acts of terrorism, and to ensure that first 
        responder funds are spent wisely.

SEC. 5003. FASTER AND SMARTER FUNDING FOR FIRST RESPONDERS.

    (a) In General.--The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-
296; 6 U.S.C. 361 et seq.) is amended--
            (1) in section 1(b) in the table of contents by adding at 
        the end the following:

              ``TITLE XVIII--FUNDING FOR FIRST RESPONDERS

        ``Sec. 1801. Definitions.
        ``Sec. 1802. Faster and smarter funding for first responders.
        ``Sec. 1803. Essential capabilities for first responders.
        ``Sec. 1804. Task Force on Essential Capabilities for First 
                        Responders.
        ``Sec. 1805. Covered grant eligibility and criteria.
        ``Sec. 1806. Use of funds and accountability requirements.
        ``Sec. 1807. National standards for first responder equipment 
                        and training.''; and
            (2) by adding at the end the following:

              ``TITLE XVIII--FUNDING FOR FIRST RESPONDERS

``SEC. 1801. DEFINITIONS.

    ``In this title:
            ``(1) Board.--The term `Board' means the First Responder 
        Grants Board established under section 1805(f).
            ``(2) Covered grant.--The term `covered grant' means any 
        grant to which this title applies under section 1802.
            ``(3) Directly eligible tribe.--The term `directly eligible 
        tribe' means any Indian tribe or consortium of Indian tribes 
        that--
                    ``(A) meets the criteria for inclusion in the 
                qualified applicant pool for Self-Governance that are 
                set forth in section 402(c) of the Indian Self-
                Determination and Education Assistance Act (25 U.S.C. 
                458bb(c));
                    ``(B) employs at least 10 full-time personnel in a 
                law enforcement or emergency response agency with the 
                capacity to respond to calls for law enforcement or 
                emergency services; and
                    ``(C)(i) is located on, or within 5 miles of, an 
                international border or waterway;
                    ``(ii) is located within 5 miles of a facility 
                within a critical infrastructure sector identified in 
                section 1803(c)(2);
                    ``(iii) is located within or contiguous to one of 
                the 50 largest metropolitan statistical areas in the 
                United States; or
                    ``(iv) has more than 1,000 square miles of Indian 
                country, as that term is defined in section 1151 of 
                title 18, United States Code.
            ``(4) Elevations in the threat alert level.--The term 
        `elevations in the threat alert level' means any designation 
        (including those that are less than national in scope) that 
        raises the homeland security threat level to either the highest 
        or second highest threat level under the Homeland Security 
        Advisory System referred to in section 201(d)(7).
            ``(5) Emergency preparedness.--The term `emergency 
        preparedness' shall have the same meaning that term has under 
        section 602 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and 
        Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5195a).
            ``(6) Essential capabilities.--The term `essential 
        capabilities' means the levels, availability, and competence of 
        emergency personnel, planning, training, and equipment across a 
        variety of disciplines needed to effectively and efficiently 
        prevent, prepare for, and respond to acts of terrorism 
        consistent with established practices.
            ``(7) First responder.--The term `first responder' shall 
        have the same meaning as the term `emergency response 
        provider'.
            ``(8) Indian tribe.--The term `Indian tribe' means any 
        Indian tribe, band, nation, or other organized group or 
        community, including any Alaskan Native village or regional or 
        village corporation as defined in or established pursuant to 
        the Alaskan Native Claims Settlement Act (43 U.S.C. 1601 et 
        seq.), which is recognized as eligible for the special programs 
        and services provided by the United States to Indians because 
        of their status as Indians.
            ``(9) Region.--The term `region' means--
                    ``(A) any geographic area consisting of all or 
                parts of 2 or more contiguous States, counties, 
                municipalities, or other local governments that have a 
                combined population of at least 1,650,000 or have an 
                area of not less than 20,000 square miles, and that, 
                for purposes of an application for a covered grant, is 
                represented by 1 or more governments or governmental 
                agencies within such geographic area, and that is 
                established by law or by agreement of 2 or more such 
                governments or governmental agencies in a mutual aid 
                agreement; or
                    ``(B) any other combination of contiguous local 
                government units (including such a combination 
                established by law or agreement of two or more 
                governments or governmental agencies in a mutual aid 
                agreement) that is formally certified by the Secretary 
                as a region for purposes of this Act with the consent 
                of--
                            ``(i) the State or States in which they are 
                        located, including a multi-State entity 
                        established by a compact between two or more 
                        States; and
                            ``(ii) the incorporated municipalities, 
                        counties, and parishes that they encompass.
            ``(10) Task force.--The term `Task Force' means the Task 
        Force on Essential Capabilities for First Responders 
        established under section 1804.

``SEC. 1802. FASTER AND SMARTER FUNDING FOR FIRST RESPONDERS.

    ``(a) Covered Grants.--This title applies to grants provided by the 
Department to States, regions, or directly eligible tribes for the 
primary purpose of improving the ability of first responders to 
prevent, prepare for, respond to, or mitigate threatened or actual 
terrorist attacks, especially those involving weapons of mass 
destruction, administered under the following:
            ``(1) State homeland security grant program.--The State 
        Homeland Security Grant Program of the Department, or any 
        successor to such grant program.
            ``(2) Urban area security initiative.--The Urban Area 
        Security Initiative of the Department, or any successor to such 
        grant program.
            ``(3) Law enforcement terrorism prevention program.--The 
        Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program of the Department, 
        or any successor to such grant program.
            ``(4) Citizen corps program.--The Citizen Corps Program of 
        the Department, or any successor to such grant program.
    ``(b) Excluded Programs.--This title does not apply to or otherwise 
affect the following Federal grant programs or any grant under such a 
program:
            ``(1) Nondepartment programs.--Any Federal grant program 
        that is not administered by the Department.
            ``(2) Fire grant programs.--The fire grant programs 
        authorized by sections 33 and 34 of the Federal Fire Prevention 
        and Control Act of 1974 (15 U.S.C. 2229, 2229a).
            ``(3) Emergency management planning and assistance account 
        grants.--The Emergency Management Performance Grant program and 
        the Urban Search and Rescue Grants program authorized by title 
        VI of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency 
        Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5195 et seq.); the Departments of 
        Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and 
        Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, 2000 (113 Stat. 1047 
        et seq.); and the Earthquake Hazards Reduction Act of 1977 (42 
        U.S.C. 7701 et seq.).

``SEC. 1803. ESSENTIAL CAPABILITIES FOR FIRST RESPONDERS.

    ``(a) Establishment of Essential Capabilities.--
            ``(1) In general.--For purposes of covered grants, the 
        Secretary shall establish clearly defined essential 
        capabilities for State and local government preparedness for 
        terrorism, in consultation with--
                    ``(A) the Task Force on Essential Capabilities for 
                First Responders established under section 1804;
                    ``(B) the Under Secretaries for Emergency 
                Preparedness and Response, Border and Transportation 
                Security, Information Analysis and Infrastructure 
                Protection, and Science and Technology, and the 
                Director of the Office for Domestic Preparedness;
                    ``(C) the Secretary of Health and Human Services;
                    ``(D) other appropriate Federal agencies;
                    ``(E) State and local first responder agencies and 
                officials; and
                    ``(F) consensus-based standard making organizations 
                responsible for setting standards relevant to the first 
                responder community.
            ``(2) Deadlines.--The Secretary shall--
                    ``(A) establish essential capabilities under 
                paragraph (1) within 30 days after receipt of the 
                report under section 1804(b); and
                    ``(B) regularly update such essential capabilities 
                as necessary, but not less than every 3 years.
            ``(3) Provision of essential capabilities.--The Secretary 
        shall ensure that a detailed description of the essential 
        capabilities established under paragraph (1) is provided 
        promptly to the States and to the Congress. The States shall 
        make the essential capabilities available as necessary and 
        appropriate to local governments within their jurisdictions.
    ``(b) Objectives.--The Secretary shall ensure that essential 
capabilities established under subsection (a)(1) meet the following 
objectives:
            ``(1) Specificity.--The determination of essential 
        capabilities specifically shall describe the training, 
        planning, personnel, and equipment that different types of 
        communities in the Nation should possess, or to which they 
        should have access, in order to meet the Department's goals for 
        terrorism preparedness based upon--
                    ``(A) the most current risk assessment available by 
                the Directorate for Information Analysis and 
                Infrastructure Protection of the threats of terrorism 
                against the United States;
                    ``(B) the types of threats, vulnerabilities, 
                geography, size, and other factors that the Secretary 
                has determined to be applicable to each different type 
                of community; and
                    ``(C) the principles of regional coordination and 
                mutual aid among State and local governments.
            ``(2) Flexibility.--The establishment of essential 
        capabilities shall be sufficiently flexible to allow State and 
        local government officials to set priorities based on 
        particular needs, while reaching nationally determined 
        terrorism preparedness levels within a specified time period.
            ``(3) Measurability.--The establishment of essential 
        capabilities shall be designed to enable measurement of 
        progress towards specific terrorism preparedness goals.
            ``(4) Comprehensiveness.--The determination of essential 
        capabilities for terrorism preparedness shall be made within 
        the context of a comprehensive State emergency management 
        system.
    ``(c) Factors To Be Considered.--
            ``(1) In general.--In establishing essential capabilities 
        under subsection (a)(1), the Secretary specifically shall 
        consider the variables of threat, vulnerability, and 
        consequences with respect to the Nation's population (including 
        transient commuting and tourist populations) and critical 
        infrastructure. Such consideration shall be based upon the most 
        current risk assessment available by the Directorate for 
        Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection of the 
        threats of terrorism against the United States.
            ``(2) Critical infrastructure sectors.--The Secretary 
        specifically shall consider threats of terrorism against the 
        following critical infrastructure sectors in all areas of the 
        Nation, urban and rural:
                    ``(A) Agriculture.
                    ``(B) Banking and finance.
                    ``(C) Chemical industries.
                    ``(D) The defense industrial base.
                    ``(E) Emergency services.
                    ``(F) Energy.
                    ``(G) Food.
                    ``(H) Government.
                    ``(I) Postal and shipping.
                    ``(J) Public health.
                    ``(K) Information and telecommunications networks.
                    ``(L) Transportation.
                    ``(M) Water.
        The order in which the critical infrastructure sectors are 
        listed in this paragraph shall not be construed as an order of 
        priority for consideration of the importance of such sectors.
            ``(3) Types of threat.--The Secretary specifically shall 
        consider the following types of threat to the critical 
        infrastructure sectors described in paragraph (2), and to 
        populations in all areas of the Nation, urban and rural:
                    ``(A) Biological threats.
                    ``(B) Nuclear threats.
                    ``(C) Radiological threats.
                    ``(D) Incendiary threats.
                    ``(E) Chemical threats.
                    ``(F) Explosives.
                    ``(G) Suicide bombers.
                    ``(H) Cyber threats.
                    ``(I) Any other threats based on proximity to 
                specific past acts of terrorism or the known activity 
                of any terrorist group.
        The order in which the types of threat are listed in this 
        paragraph shall not be construed as an order of priority for 
        consideration of the importance of such threats.
            ``(4) Consideration of additional factors.--In establishing 
        essential capabilities under subsection (a)(1), the Secretary 
        shall take into account any other specific threat to a 
        population (including a transient commuting or tourist 
        population) or critical infrastructure sector that the 
        Secretary has determined to exist.

``SEC. 1804. TASK FORCE ON ESSENTIAL CAPABILITIES FOR FIRST RESPONDERS.

    ``(a) Establishment.--To assist the Secretary in establishing 
essential capabilities under section 1803(a)(1), the Secretary shall 
establish an advisory body pursuant to section 871(a) not later than 60 
days after the date of the enactment of this section, which shall be 
known as the Task Force on Essential Capabilities for First Responders.
    ``(b) Report.--
            ``(1) In general.--The Task Force shall submit to the 
        Secretary, not later than 9 months after its establishment by 
        the Secretary under subsection (a) and every 3 years 
        thereafter, a report on its recommendations for essential 
        capabilities for preparedness for terrorism.
            ``(2) Contents.--The report shall--
                    ``(A) include a priority ranking of essential 
                capabilities in order to provide guidance to the 
                Secretary and to the Congress on determining the 
                appropriate allocation of, and funding levels for, 
                first responder needs;
                    ``(B) set forth a methodology by which any State or 
                local government will be able to determine the extent 
                to which it possesses or has access to the essential 
                capabilities that States and local governments having 
                similar risks should obtain;
                    ``(C) describe the availability of national 
                voluntary consensus standards, and whether there is a 
                need for new national voluntary consensus standards, 
                with respect to first responder training and equipment;
                    ``(D) include such additional matters as the 
                Secretary may specify in order to further the terrorism 
                preparedness capabilities of first responders; and
                    ``(E) include such revisions to the contents of 
                past reports as are necessary to take into account 
                changes in the most current risk assessment available 
                by the Directorate for Information Analysis and 
                Infrastructure Protection or other relevant information 
                as determined by the Secretary.
            ``(3) Consistency with federal working group.--The Task 
        Force shall ensure that its recommendations for essential 
        capabilities are, to the extent feasible, consistent with any 
        preparedness goals or recommendations of the Federal working 
        group established under section 319F(a) of the Public Health 
        Service Act (42 U.S.C. 247d-6(a)).
            ``(4) Comprehensiveness.--The Task Force shall ensure that 
        its recommendations regarding essential capabilities for 
        terrorism preparedness are made within the context of a 
        comprehensive State emergency management system.
            ``(5) Prior measures.--The Task Force shall ensure that its 
        recommendations regarding essential capabilities for terrorism 
        preparedness take into account any capabilities that State or 
        local officials have determined to be essential and have 
        undertaken since September 11, 2001, to prevent or prepare for 
        terrorist attacks.
    ``(c) Membership.--
            ``(1) In general.--The Task Force shall consist of 25 
        members appointed by the Secretary, and shall, to the extent 
        practicable, represent a geographic and substantive cross 
        section of governmental and nongovernmental first responder 
        disciplines from the State and local levels, including as 
        appropriate--
                    ``(A) members selected from the emergency response 
                field, including fire service and law enforcement, 
                hazardous materials response, emergency medical 
                services, and emergency management personnel (including 
                public works personnel routinely engaged in emergency 
                response);
                    ``(B) health scientists, emergency and inpatient 
                medical providers, and public health professionals, 
                including experts in emergency health care response to 
                chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 
                terrorism, and experts in providing mental health care 
                during emergency response operations;
                    ``(C) experts from Federal, State, and local 
                governments, and the private sector, representing 
                standards-setting organizations, including 
                representation from the voluntary consensus codes and 
                standards development community, particularly those 
                with expertise in first responder disciplines; and
                    ``(D) State and local officials with expertise in 
                terrorism preparedness, subject to the condition that 
                if any such official is an elected official 
                representing one of the two major political parties, an 
                equal number of elected officials shall be selected 
                from each such party.
            ``(2) Coordination with the department of health and health 
        services.--In the selection of members of the Task Force who 
        are health professionals, including emergency medical 
        professionals, the Secretary shall coordinate the selection 
        with the Secretary of Health and Human Services.
            ``(3) Ex officio members.--The Secretary and the Secretary 
        of Health and Human Services shall each designate one or more 
        officers of their respective Departments to serve as ex officio 
        members of the Task Force. One of the ex officio members from 
        the Department of Homeland Security shall be the designated 
        officer of the Federal Government for purposes of subsection 
        (e) of section 10 of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 App. 
        U.S.C.).
    ``(d) Applicability of Federal Advisory Committee Act.--
Notwithstanding section 871(a), the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 
U.S.C. App.), including subsections (a), (b), and (d) of section 10 of 
such Act, and section 552b(c) of title 5, United States Code, shall 
apply to the Task Force.

``SEC. 1805. COVERED GRANT ELIGIBILITY AND CRITERIA.

    ``(a) Grant Eligibility.--Any State, region, or directly eligible 
tribe shall be eligible to apply for a covered grant.
    ``(b) Grant Criteria.--In awarding covered grants, the Secretary 
shall assist States and local governments in achieving, maintaining, 
and enhancing the essential capabilities for first responders 
established by the Secretary under section 1803.
    ``(c) State Homeland Security Plans.--
            ``(1) Submission of plans.--The Secretary shall require 
        that any State applying to the Secretary for a covered grant 
        must submit to the Secretary a 3-year State homeland security 
        plan that--
                    ``(A) demonstrates the extent to which the State 
                has achieved the essential capabilities that apply to 
                the State;
                    ``(B) demonstrates the needs of the State necessary 
                to achieve, maintain, or enhance the essential 
                capabilities that apply to the State;
                    ``(C) includes a prioritization of such needs based 
                on threat, vulnerability, and consequence assessment 
                factors applicable to the State;
                    ``(D) describes how the State intends--
                            ``(i) to address such needs at the city, 
                        county, regional, tribal, State, and interstate 
                        level, including a precise description of any 
                        regional structure the State has established 
                        for the purpose of organizing homeland security 
                        preparedness activities funded by covered 
                        grants;
                            ``(ii) to use all Federal, State, and local 
                        resources available for the purpose of 
                        addressing such needs; and
                            ``(iii) to give particular emphasis to 
                        regional planning and cooperation, including 
                        the activities of multijurisdictional planning 
                        agencies governed by local officials, both 
                        within its jurisdictional borders and with 
                        neighboring States;
                    ``(E) is developed in consultation with and subject 
                to appropriate comment by local governments within the 
                State; and
                    ``(F) with respect to the emergency preparedness of 
                first responders, addresses the unique aspects of 
                terrorism as part of a comprehensive State emergency 
                management plan.
            ``(2) Approval by secretary.--The Secretary may not award 
        any covered grant to a State unless the Secretary has approved 
        the applicable State homeland security plan.
    ``(d) Consistency With State Plans.--The Secretary shall ensure 
that each covered grant is used to supplement and support, in a 
consistent and coordinated manner, the applicable State homeland 
security plan or plans.
    ``(e) Application for Grant.--
            ``(1) In general.--Except as otherwise provided in this 
        subsection, any State, region, or directly eligible tribe may 
        apply for a covered grant by submitting to the Secretary an 
        application at such time, in such manner, and containing such 
        information as is required under this subsection, or as the 
        Secretary may reasonably require.
            ``(2) Deadlines for applications and awards.--All 
        applications for covered grants must be submitted at such time 
        as the Secretary may reasonably require for the fiscal year for 
        which they are submitted. The Secretary shall award covered 
        grants pursuant to all approved applications for such fiscal 
        year as soon as practicable, but not later than March 1 of such 
        year.
            ``(3) Availability of funds.--All funds awarded by the 
        Secretary under covered grants in a fiscal year shall be 
        available for obligation through the end of the subsequent 
        fiscal year.
            ``(4) Minimum contents of application.--The Secretary shall 
        require that each applicant include in its application, at a 
        minimum--
                    ``(A) the purpose for which the applicant seeks 
                covered grant funds and the reasons why the applicant 
                needs the covered grant to meet the essential 
                capabilities for terrorism preparedness within the 
                State, region, or directly eligible tribe to which the 
                application pertains;
                    ``(B) a description of how, by reference to the 
                applicable State homeland security plan or plans under 
                subsection (c), the allocation of grant funding 
                proposed in the application, including, where 
                applicable, the amount not passed through under section 
                1806(g)(1), would assist in fulfilling the essential 
                capabilities specified in such plan or plans;
                    ``(C) a statement of whether a mutual aid agreement 
                applies to the use of all or any portion of the covered 
                grant funds;
                    ``(D) if the applicant is a State, a description of 
                how the State plans to allocate the covered grant funds 
                to regions, local governments, and Indian tribes;
                    ``(E) if the applicant is a region--
                            ``(i) a precise geographical description of 
                        the region and a specification of all 
                        participating and nonparticipating local 
                        governments within the geographical area 
                        comprising that region;
                            ``(ii) a specification of what governmental 
                        entity within the region will administer the 
                        expenditure of funds under the covered grant; 
                        and
                            ``(iii) a designation of a specific 
                        individual to serve as regional liaison;
                    ``(F) a capital budget showing how the applicant 
                intends to allocate and expend the covered grant funds;
                    ``(G) if the applicant is a directly eligible 
                tribe, a designation of a specific individual to serve 
                as the tribal liaison; and
                    ``(H) a statement of how the applicant intends to 
                meet the matching requirement, if any, that applies 
                under section 1806(g)(2).
            ``(5) Regional applications.--
                    ``(A) Relationship to state applications.--A 
                regional application--
                            ``(i) shall be coordinated with an 
                        application submitted by the State or States of 
                        which such region is a part;
                            ``(ii) shall supplement and avoid 
                        duplication with such State application; and
                            ``(iii) shall address the unique regional 
                        aspects of such region's terrorism preparedness 
                        needs beyond those provided for in the 
                        application of such State or States.
                    ``(B) State review and submission.--To ensure the 
                consistency required under subsection (d) and the 
                coordination required under subparagraph (A) of this 
                paragraph, an applicant that is a region must submit 
                its application to each State of which any part is 
                included in the region for review and concurrence prior 
                to the submission of such application to the Secretary. 
                The regional application shall be transmitted to the 
                Secretary through each such State within 30 days of its 
                receipt, unless the Governor of such a State notifies 
                the Secretary, in writing, that such regional 
                application is inconsistent with the State's homeland 
                security plan and provides an explanation of the 
                reasons therefor.
                    ``(C) Distribution of regional awards.--If the 
                Secretary approves a regional application, then the 
                Secretary shall distribute a regional award to the 
                State or States submitting the applicable regional 
                application under subparagraph (B), and each such State 
                shall, not later than the end of the 45-day period 
                beginning on the date after receiving a regional award, 
                pass through to the region all covered grant funds or 
                resources purchased with such funds, except those funds 
                necessary for the State to carry out its 
                responsibilities with respect to such regional 
                application; Provided That, in no such case shall the 
                State or States pass through to the region less than 80 
                percent of the regional award.
                    ``(D) Certifications regarding distribution of 
                grant funds to regions.--Any State that receives a 
                regional award under subparagraph (C) shall certify to 
                the Secretary, by not later than 30 days after the 
                expiration of the period described in subparagraph (C) 
                with respect to the grant, that the State has made 
                available to the region the required funds and 
                resources in accordance with subparagraph (C).
                    ``(E) Direct payments to regions.--If any State 
                fails to pass through a regional award to a region as 
                required by subparagraph (C) within 45 days after 
                receiving such award and does not request or receive an 
                extension of such period under section 1806(h)(2), the 
                region may petition the Secretary to receive directly 
                the portion of the regional award that is required to 
                be passed through to such region under subparagraph 
                (C).
                    ``(F) Regional liaisons.--A regional liaison 
                designated under paragraph (4)(E)(iii) shall--
                            ``(i) coordinate with Federal, State, 
                        local, regional, and private officials within 
                        the region concerning terrorism preparedness;
                            ``(ii) develop a process for receiving 
                        input from Federal, State, local, regional, and 
                        private sector officials within the region to 
                        assist in the development of the regional 
                        application and to improve the region's access 
                        to covered grants; and
                            ``(iii) administer, in consultation with 
                        State, local, regional, and private officials 
                        within the region, covered grants awarded to 
                        the region.
            ``(6) Tribal applications.--
                    ``(A) Submission to the state or states.--To ensure 
                the consistency required under subsection (d), an 
                applicant that is a directly eligible tribe must submit 
                its application to each State within the boundaries of 
                which any part of such tribe is located for direct 
                submission to the Department along with the application 
                of such State or States.
                    ``(B) Opportunity for state comment.--Before 
                awarding any covered grant to a directly eligible 
                tribe, the Secretary shall provide an opportunity to 
                each State within the boundaries of which any part of 
                such tribe is located to comment to the Secretary on 
                the consistency of the tribe's application with the 
                State's homeland security plan. Any such comments shall 
                be submitted to the Secretary concurrently with the 
                submission of the State and tribal applications.
                    ``(C) Final authority.--The Secretary shall have 
                final authority to determine the consistency of any 
                application of a directly eligible tribe with the 
                applicable State homeland security plan or plans, and 
                to approve any application of such tribe. The Secretary 
                shall notify each State within the boundaries of which 
                any part of such tribe is located of the approval of an 
                application by such tribe.
                    ``(D) Tribal liaison.--A tribal liaison designated 
                under paragraph (4)(G) shall--
                            ``(i) coordinate with Federal, State, 
                        local, regional, and private officials 
                        concerning terrorism preparedness;
                            ``(ii) develop a process for receiving 
                        input from Federal, State, local, regional, and 
                        private sector officials to assist in the 
                        development of the application of such tribe 
                        and to improve the tribe's access to covered 
                        grants; and
                            ``(iii) administer, in consultation with 
                        State, local, regional, and private officials, 
                        covered grants awarded to such tribe.
                    ``(E) Limitation on the number of direct grants.--
                The Secretary may make covered grants directly to not 
                more than 20 directly eligible tribes per fiscal year.
                    ``(F) Tribes not receiving direct grants.--An 
                Indian tribe that does not receive a grant directly 
                under this section is eligible to receive funds under a 
                covered grant from the State or States within the 
                boundaries of which any part of such tribe is located, 
                consistent with the homeland security plan of the State 
                as described in subsection (c). If a State fails to 
                comply with section 1806(g)(1), the tribe may request 
                payment under section 1806(h)(3) in the same manner as 
                a local government.
            ``(7) Equipment standards.--If an applicant for a covered 
        grant proposes to upgrade or purchase, with assistance provided 
        under the grant, new equipment or systems that do not meet or 
        exceed any applicable national voluntary consensus standards 
        established by the Secretary under section 1807(a), the 
        applicant shall include in the application an explanation of 
        why such equipment or systems will serve the needs of the 
        applicant better than equipment or systems that meet or exceed 
        such standards.
    ``(f) First Responder Grants Board.--
            ``(1) Establishment of board.--The Secretary shall 
        establish a First Responder Grants Board, consisting of--
                    ``(A) the Secretary;
                    ``(B) the Under Secretary for Emergency 
                Preparedness and Response;
                    ``(C) the Under Secretary for Border and 
                Transportation Security;
                    ``(D) the Under Secretary for Information Analysis 
                and Infrastructure Protection;
                    ``(E) the Under Secretary for Science and 
                Technology; and
                    ``(F) the Director of the Office for Domestic 
                Preparedness.
            ``(2) Chairman.--
                    ``(A) In general.--The Secretary shall be the 
                Chairman of the Board.
                    ``(B) Exercise of authorities by deputy 
                secretary.--The Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security 
                may exercise the authorities of the Chairman, if the 
                Secretary so directs.
            ``(3) Ranking of grant applications.--
                    ``(A) Prioritization of grants.--The Board--
                            ``(i) shall evaluate and annually 
                        prioritize all pending applications for covered 
                        grants based upon the degree to which they 
                        would, by achieving, maintaining, or enhancing 
                        the essential capabilities of the applicants on 
                        a nationwide basis, lessen the threat to, 
                        vulnerability of, and consequences for persons 
                        and critical infrastructure; and
                            ``(ii) in evaluating the threat to persons 
                        and critical infrastructure for purposes of 
                        prioritizing covered grants, shall give greater 
                        weight to threats of terrorism based on their 
                        specificity and credibility, including any 
                        pattern of repetition.
                    ``(B) Minimum amounts.--After evaluating and 
                prioritizing grant applications under subparagraph (A), 
                the Board shall ensure that, for each fiscal year--
                            ``(i) each of the States, other than the 
                        Virgin Islands, American Samoa, Guam, and the 
                        Northern Mariana Islands, that has an approved 
                        State homeland security plan receives no less 
                        than 0.25 percent of the funds available for 
                        covered grants for that fiscal year for 
                        purposes of implementing its homeland security 
                        plan in accordance with the prioritization of 
                        needs under subsection (c)(1)(C);
                            ``(ii) each of the States, other than the 
                        Virgin Islands, American Samoa, Guam, and the 
                        Northern Mariana Islands, that has an approved 
                        State homeland security plan and that meets one 
                        or both of the additional high-risk qualifying 
                        criteria under subparagraph (C) receives no 
                        less than 0.45 percent of the funds available 
                        for covered grants for that fiscal year for 
                        purposes of implementing its homeland security 
                        plan in accordance with the prioritization of 
                        needs under subsection (c)(1)(C);
                            ``(iii) the Virgin Islands, American Samoa, 
                        Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands each 
                        receives no less than 0.08 percent of the funds 
                        available for covered grants for that fiscal 
                        year for purposes of implementing its approved 
                        State homeland security plan in accordance with 
                        the prioritization of needs under subsection 
                        (c)(1)(C); and
                            ``(iv) directly eligible tribes 
                        collectively receive no less than 0.08 percent 
                        of the funds available for covered grants for 
                        such fiscal year for purposes of addressing the 
                        needs identified in the applications of such 
                        tribes, consistent with the homeland security 
                        plan of each State within the boundaries of 
                        which any part of any such tribe is located, 
                        except that this clause shall not apply with 
                        respect to funds available for a fiscal year if 
                        the Secretary receives less than 5 applications 
                        for such fiscal year from such tribes under 
                        subsection (e)(6)(A) or does not approve at 
                        least one such application.
                    ``(C) Additional high-risk qualifying criteria.--
                For purposes of subparagraph (B)(ii), additional high-
                risk qualifying criteria consist of--
                            ``(i) having a significant international 
                        land border; or
                            ``(ii) adjoining a body of water within 
                        North America through which an international 
                        boundary line extends.
            ``(4) Effect of regional awards on state minimum.--Any 
        regional award, or portion thereof, provided to a State under 
        subsection (e)(5)(C) shall not be considered in calculating the 
        minimum State award under paragraph (3)(B) of this subsection.
            ``(5) Functions of under secretaries.--The Under 
        Secretaries referred to in paragraph (1) shall seek to ensure 
        that the relevant expertise and input of the staff of their 
        directorates are available to and considered by the Board.

``SEC. 1806. USE OF FUNDS AND ACCOUNTABILITY REQUIREMENTS.

    ``(a) In General.--A covered grant may be used for--
            ``(1) purchasing or upgrading equipment, including computer 
        software, to enhance terrorism preparedness and response;
            ``(2) exercises to strengthen terrorism preparedness and 
        response;
            ``(3) training for prevention (including detection) of, 
        preparedness for, or response to attacks involving weapons of 
        mass destruction, including training in the use of equipment 
        and computer software;
            ``(4) developing or updating response plans;
            ``(5) establishing or enhancing mechanisms for sharing 
        terrorism threat information;
            ``(6) systems architecture and engineering, program 
        planning and management, strategy formulation and strategic 
        planning, life-cycle systems design, product and technology 
        evaluation, and prototype development for terrorism 
        preparedness and response purposes;
            ``(7) additional personnel costs resulting from--
                    ``(A) elevations in the threat alert level of the 
                Homeland Security Advisory System by the Secretary, or 
                a similar elevation in threat alert level issued by a 
                State, region, or local government with the approval of 
                the Secretary;
                    ``(B) travel to and participation in exercises and 
                training in the use of equipment and on prevention 
                activities;
                    ``(C) the temporary replacement of personnel during 
                any period of travel to and participation in exercises 
                and training in the use of equipment and on prevention 
                activities; and
                    ``(D) personnel engaged exclusively in 
                counterterrorism and intelligence activities 
                notwithstanding the date such personnel were hired;
            ``(8) the costs of equipment (including software) required 
        to receive, transmit, handle, and store classified information;
            ``(9) protecting critical infrastructure against potential 
        attack by the addition of barriers, fences, gates, and other 
        such devices, except that the cost of such measures may not 
        exceed the greater of--
                    ``(A) $1,000,000 per project; or
                    ``(B) such greater amount as may be approved by the 
                Secretary, which may not exceed 10 percent of the total 
                amount of the covered grant;
            ``(10) the costs of commercially available interoperable 
        communications equipment (which, where applicable, is based on 
        national, voluntary consensus standards) that the Secretary, in 
        consultation with the Chairman of the Federal Communications 
        Commission, deems best suited to facilitate interoperability, 
        coordination, and integration between and among emergency 
        communications systems, and that complies with prevailing grant 
        guidance of the Department for interoperable communications;
            ``(11) educational curricula development for first 
        responders to ensure that they are prepared for terrorist 
        attacks;
            ``(12) training and exercises to assist public elementary 
        and secondary schools in developing and implementing programs 
        to instruct students regarding age-appropriate skills to 
        prepare for and respond to an act of terrorism;
            ``(13) paying of administrative expenses directly related 
        to administration of the grant, except that such expenses may 
        not exceed 3 percent of the amount of the grant;
            ``(14) reimbursement for overtime and other fixed costs 
        incurred for homeland security purposes after September 11, 
        2001; and
            ``(15) other appropriate activities as determined by the 
        Secretary.
    ``(b) Prohibited Uses.--Funds provided as a covered grant may not 
be used--
            ``(1) to supplant State or local funds;
            ``(2) to construct buildings or other physical facilities;
            ``(3) to acquire land; or
            ``(4) for any State or local government cost sharing 
        contribution.
    ``(c) Multiple-Purpose Funds.--Nothing in this section shall be 
construed to preclude State and local governments from using covered 
grant funds in a manner that also enhances first responder preparedness 
for emergencies and disasters unrelated to acts of terrorism, if such 
use assists such governments in achieving essential capabilities for 
terrorism preparedness established by the Secretary under section 1803.
    ``(d) Reimbursement of Costs.--In addition to the activities 
described in subsection (a), a covered grant may be used to provide a 
reasonable stipend to paid-on-call or volunteer first responders who 
are not otherwise compensated for travel to or participation in 
training covered by this section. Any such reimbursement shall not be 
considered compensation for purposes of rendering such a first 
responder an employee under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 
U.S.C. 201 et seq.).
    ``(e) Assistance Requirement.--The Secretary may not request that 
equipment paid for, wholly or in part, with funds provided as a covered 
grant be made available for responding to emergencies in surrounding 
States, regions, and localities, unless the Secretary undertakes to pay 
the costs directly attributable to transporting and operating such 
equipment during such response.
    ``(f) Flexibility in Unspent Homeland Security Grant Funds.--Upon 
request by the recipient of a covered grant, the Secretary may 
authorize the grantee to transfer all or part of funds provided as the 
covered grant from uses specified in the grant agreement to other uses 
authorized under this section, if the Secretary determines that such 
transfer is in the interests of homeland security.
    ``(g) State, Regional, and Tribal Responsibilities.--
            ``(1) Pass-through.--The Secretary shall require a 
        recipient of a covered grant that is a State to obligate or 
        otherwise make available to local governments, first 
        responders, and other local groups, to the extent required 
        under the State homeland security plan or plans specified in 
        the application for the grant, not less than 80 percent of the 
        grant funds, resources purchased with the grant funds having a 
        value equal to at least 80 percent of the amount of the grant, 
        or a combination thereof, by not later than the end of the 45-
        day period beginning on the date the grant recipient receives 
        the grant funds.
            ``(2) Cost sharing.--
                    ``(A) In general.--The Federal share of the costs 
                of an activity carried out with a covered grant to a 
                State, region, or directly eligible tribe awarded after 
                the 2-year period beginning on the date of the 
                enactment of this section shall not exceed 75 percent.
                    ``(B) Interim rule.--The Federal share of the costs 
                of an activity carried out with a covered grant awarded 
                before the end of the 2-year period beginning on the 
                date of the enactment of this section shall be 100 
                percent.
                    ``(C) In-kind matching.--Each recipient of a 
                covered grant may meet the matching requirement under 
                subparagraph (A) by making in-kind contributions of 
                goods or services that are directly linked with the 
                purpose for which the grant is made, including, but not 
                limited to, any necessary personnel overtime, 
                contractor services, administrative costs, equipment 
                fuel and maintenance, and rental space.
            ``(3) Certifications regarding distribution of grant funds 
        to local governments.--Any State that receives a covered grant 
        shall certify to the Secretary, by not later than 30 days after 
        the expiration of the period described in paragraph (1) with 
        respect to the grant, that the State has made available for 
        expenditure by local governments, first responders, and other 
        local groups the required amount of grant funds pursuant to 
        paragraph (1).
            ``(4) Quarterly report on homeland security spending.--The 
        Federal share described in paragraph (2)(A) may be increased by 
        up to 2 percent for any State, region, or directly eligible 
        tribe that, not later than 30 days after the end of each fiscal 
        quarter, submits to the Secretary a report on that fiscal 
        quarter. Each such report must include, for each recipient of a 
        covered grant or a pass-through under paragraph (1)--
                    ``(A) the amount obligated to that recipient in 
                that quarter;
                    ``(B) the amount expended by that recipient in that 
                quarter; and
                    ``(C) a summary description of the items purchased 
                by such recipient with such amount.
            ``(5) Annual report on homeland security spending.--Each 
        recipient of a covered grant shall submit an annual report to 
        the Secretary not later than 60 days after the end of each 
        fiscal year. Each recipient of a covered grant that is a region 
        must simultaneously submit its report to each State of which 
        any part is included in the region. Each recipient of a covered 
        grant that is a directly eligible tribe must simultaneously 
        submit its report to each State within the boundaries of which 
        any part of such tribe is located. Each report must include the 
        following:
                    ``(A) The amount, ultimate recipients, and dates of 
                receipt of all funds received under the grant during 
                the previous fiscal year.
                    ``(B) The amount and the dates of disbursements of 
                all such funds expended in compliance with paragraph 
                (1) or pursuant to mutual aid agreements or other 
                sharing arrangements that apply within the State, 
                region, or directly eligible tribe, as applicable, 
                during the previous fiscal year.
                    ``(C) How the funds were utilized by each ultimate 
                recipient or beneficiary during the preceding fiscal 
                year.
                    ``(D) The extent to which essential capabilities 
                identified in the applicable State homeland security 
                plan or plans were achieved, maintained, or enhanced as 
                the result of the expenditure of grant funds during the 
                preceding fiscal year.
                    ``(E) The extent to which essential capabilities 
                identified in the applicable State homeland security 
                plan or plans remain unmet.
            ``(6) Inclusion of restricted annexes.--A recipient of a 
        covered grant may submit to the Secretary an annex to the 
        annual report under paragraph (5) that is subject to 
        appropriate handling restrictions, if the recipient believes 
        that discussion in the report of unmet needs would reveal 
        sensitive but unclassified information.
            ``(7) Provision of reports.--The Secretary shall ensure 
        that each annual report under paragraph (5) is provided to the 
        Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response and the 
        Director of the Office for Domestic Preparedness.
    ``(h) Incentives to Efficient Administration of Homeland Security 
Grants.--
            ``(1) Penalties for delay in passing through local share.--
        If a recipient of a covered grant that is a State fails to pass 
        through to local governments, first responders, and other local 
        groups funds or resources required by subsection (g)(1) within 
        45 days after receiving funds under the grant, the Secretary 
        may--
                    ``(A) reduce grant payments to the grant recipient 
                from the portion of grant funds that is not required to 
                be passed through under subsection (g)(1);
                    ``(B) terminate payment of funds under the grant to 
                the recipient, and transfer the appropriate portion of 
                those funds directly to local first responders that 
                were intended to receive funding under that grant; or
                    ``(C) impose additional restrictions or burdens on 
                the recipient's use of funds under the grant, which may 
                include--
                            ``(i) prohibiting use of such funds to pay 
                        the grant recipient's grant-related overtime or 
                        other expenses;
                            ``(ii) requiring the grant recipient to 
                        distribute to local government beneficiaries 
                        all or a portion of grant funds that are not 
                        required to be passed through under subsection 
                        (g)(1); or
                            ``(iii) for each day that the grant 
                        recipient fails to pass through funds or 
                        resources in accordance with subsection (g)(1), 
                        reducing grant payments to the grant recipient 
                        from the portion of grant funds that is not 
                        required to be passed through under subsection 
                        (g)(1), except that the total amount of such 
                        reduction may not exceed 20 percent of the 
                        total amount of the grant.
            ``(2) Extension of period.--The Governor of a State may 
        request in writing that the Secretary extend the 45-day period 
        under section 1805(e)(5)(E) or paragraph (1) for an additional 
        15-day period. The Secretary may approve such a request, and 
        may extend such period for additional 15-day periods, if the 
        Secretary determines that the resulting delay in providing 
        grant funding to the local government entities that will 
        receive funding under the grant will not have a significant 
        detrimental impact on such entities' terrorism preparedness 
        efforts.
            ``(3) Provision of non-local share to local government.--
                    ``(A) In general.--The Secretary may upon request 
                by a local government pay to the local government a 
                portion of the amount of a covered grant awarded to a 
                State in which the local government is located, if--
                            ``(i) the local government will use the 
                        amount paid to expedite planned enhancements to 
                        its terrorism preparedness as described in any 
                        applicable State homeland security plan or 
                        plans;
                            ``(ii) the State has failed to pass through 
                        funds or resources in accordance with 
                        subsection (g)(1); and
                            ``(iii) the local government complies with 
                        subparagraphs (B) and (C).
                    ``(B) Showing required.--To receive a payment under 
                this paragraph, a local government must demonstrate 
                that--
                            ``(i) it is identified explicitly as an 
                        ultimate recipient or intended beneficiary in 
                        the approved grant application;
                            ``(ii) it was intended by the grantee to 
                        receive a severable portion of the overall 
                        grant for a specific purpose that is identified 
                        in the grant application;
                            ``(iii) it petitioned the grantee for the 
                        funds or resources after expiration of the 
                        period within which the funds or resources were 
                        required to be passed through under subsection 
                        (g)(1); and
                            ``(iv) it did not receive the portion of 
                        the overall grant that was earmarked or 
                        designated for its use or benefit.
                    ``(C) Effect of payment.--Payment of grant funds to 
                a local government under this paragraph--
                            ``(i) shall not affect any payment to 
                        another local government under this paragraph; 
                        and
                            ``(ii) shall not prejudice consideration of 
                        a request for payment under this paragraph that 
                        is submitted by another local government.
                    ``(D) Deadline for action by secretary.--The 
                Secretary shall approve or disapprove each request for 
                payment under this paragraph by not later than 15 days 
                after the date the request is received by the 
                Department.
    ``(i) Reports to Congress.--The Secretary shall submit an annual 
report to the Congress by December 31 of each year--
            ``(1) describing in detail the amount of Federal funds 
        provided as covered grants that were directed to each State, 
        region, and directly eligible tribe in the preceding fiscal 
        year;
            ``(2) containing information on the use of such grant funds 
        by grantees; and
            ``(3) describing--
                    ``(A) the Nation's progress in achieving, 
                maintaining, and enhancing the essential capabilities 
                established under section 1803(a) as a result of the 
                expenditure of covered grant funds during the preceding 
                fiscal year; and
                    ``(B) an estimate of the amount of expenditures 
                required to attain across the United States the 
                essential capabilities established under section 
                1803(a).

``SEC. 1807. NATIONAL STANDARDS FOR FIRST RESPONDER EQUIPMENT AND 
                    TRAINING.

    ``(a) Equipment Standards.--
            ``(1) In general.--The Secretary, in consultation with the 
        Under Secretaries for Emergency Preparedness and Response and 
        Science and Technology and the Director of the Office for 
        Domestic Preparedness, shall, not later than 6 months after the 
        date of enactment of this section, support the development of, 
        promulgate, and update as necessary national voluntary 
        consensus standards for the performance, use, and validation of 
        first responder equipment for purposes of section 1805(e)(7). 
        Such standards--
                    ``(A) shall be, to the maximum extent practicable, 
                consistent with any existing voluntary consensus 
                standards;
                    ``(B) shall take into account, as appropriate, new 
                types of terrorism threats that may not have been 
                contemplated when such existing standards were 
                developed;
                    ``(C) shall be focused on maximizing 
                interoperability, interchangeability, durability, 
                flexibility, efficiency, efficacy, portability, 
                sustainability, and safety; and
                    ``(D) shall cover all appropriate uses of the 
                equipment.
            ``(2) Required categories.--In carrying out paragraph (1), 
        the Secretary shall specifically consider the following 
        categories of first responder equipment:
                    ``(A) Thermal imaging equipment.
                    ``(B) Radiation detection and analysis equipment.
                    ``(C) Biological detection and analysis equipment.
                    ``(D) Chemical detection and analysis equipment.
                    ``(E) Decontamination and sterilization equipment.
                    ``(F) Personal protective equipment, including 
                garments, boots, gloves, and hoods and other protective 
                clothing.
                    ``(G) Respiratory protection equipment.
                    ``(H) Interoperable communications, including 
                wireless and wireline voice, video, and data networks.
                    ``(I) Explosive mitigation devices and explosive 
                detection and analysis equipment.
                    ``(J) Containment vessels.
                    ``(K) Contaminant-resistant vehicles.
                    ``(L) Such other equipment for which the Secretary 
                determines that national voluntary consensus standards 
                would be appropriate.
    ``(b) Training Standards.--
            ``(1) In general.--The Secretary, in consultation with the 
        Under Secretaries for Emergency Preparedness and Response and 
        Science and Technology and the Director of the Office for 
        Domestic Preparedness, shall support the development of, 
        promulgate, and regularly update as necessary national 
        voluntary consensus standards for first responder training 
        carried out with amounts provided under covered grant programs, 
        that will enable State and local government first responders to 
        achieve optimal levels of terrorism preparedness as quickly as 
        practicable. Such standards shall give priority to providing 
        training to--
                    ``(A) enable first responders to prevent, prepare 
                for, respond to, and mitigate terrorist threats, 
                including threats from chemical, biological, nuclear, 
                and radiological weapons and explosive devices capable 
                of inflicting significant human casualties; and
                    ``(B) familiarize first responders with the proper 
                use of equipment, including software, developed 
                pursuant to the standards established under subsection 
                (a).
            ``(2) Required categories.--In carrying out paragraph (1), 
        the Secretary specifically shall include the following 
        categories of first responder activities:
                    ``(A) Regional planning.
                    ``(B) Joint exercises.
                    ``(C) Intelligence collection, analysis, and 
                sharing.
                    ``(D) Emergency notification of affected 
                populations.
                    ``(E) Detection of biological, nuclear, 
                radiological, and chemical weapons of mass destruction.
                    ``(F) Such other activities for which the Secretary 
                determines that national voluntary consensus training 
                standards would be appropriate.
            ``(3) Consistency.--In carrying out this subsection, the 
        Secretary shall ensure that such training standards are 
        consistent with the principles of emergency preparedness for 
        all hazards.
    ``(c) Consultation With Standards Organizations.--In establishing 
national voluntary consensus standards for first responder equipment 
and training under this section, the Secretary shall consult with 
relevant public and private sector groups, including--
            ``(1) the National Institute of Standards and Technology;
            ``(2) the National Fire Protection Association;
            ``(3) the National Association of County and City Health 
        Officials;
            ``(4) the Association of State and Territorial Health 
        Officials;
            ``(5) the American National Standards Institute;
            ``(6) the National Institute of Justice;
            ``(7) the Inter-Agency Board for Equipment Standardization 
        and Interoperability;
            ``(8) the National Public Health Performance Standards 
        Program;
            ``(9) the National Institute for Occupational Safety and 
        Health;
            ``(10) ASTM International;
            ``(11) the International Safety Equipment Association;
            ``(12) the Emergency Management Accreditation Program; and
            ``(13) to the extent the Secretary considers appropriate, 
        other national voluntary consensus standards development 
        organizations, other interested Federal, State, and local 
        agencies, and other interested persons.
    ``(d) Coordination With Secretary of HHS.--In establishing any 
national voluntary consensus standards under this section for first 
responder equipment or training that involve or relate to health 
professionals, including emergency medical professionals, the Secretary 
shall coordinate activities under this section with the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services.''.
    (b) Definition of Emergency Response Providers.--Paragraph (6) of 
section 2 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296; 6 
U.S.C. 101(6)) is amended by striking ``includes'' and all that follows 
and inserting ``includes Federal, State, and local governmental and 
nongovernmental emergency public safety, law enforcement, fire, 
emergency response, emergency medical (including hospital emergency 
facilities), and related personnel, organizations, agencies, and 
authorities.''.
    (c) Temporary Limitations on Application.--
            (1) 1-year delay in application.--The following provisions 
        of title XVIII of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended 
        by subsection (a), shall not apply during the 1-year period 
        beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act:
                    (A) Subsections (b), (c), and (e)(4)(A) and (B) of 
                section 1805.
                    (B) In section 1805(f)(3)(A), the phrase ``, by 
                enhancing the essential capabilities of the 
                applicants,''.
            (2) 2-year delay in application.--The following provisions 
        of title XVIII of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended 
        by subsection (a), shall not apply during the 2-year period 
        beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act:
            (A) Subparagraphs (D) and (E) of section 1806(g)(5).
            (B) Section 1806(i)(3).

SEC. 5004. MODIFICATION OF HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY SYSTEM.

    (a) In General.--Subtitle A of title II of the Homeland Security 
Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296; 6 U.S.C. 121 et seq.) is amended by 
adding at the end the following:

``SEC. 203. HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY SYSTEM.

    ``(a) In General.--The Secretary shall revise the Homeland Security 
Advisory System referred to in section 201(d)(7) to require that any 
designation of a threat level or other warning shall be accompanied by 
a designation of the geographic regions or economic sectors to which 
the designation applies.
    ``(b) Reports.--The Secretary shall report to the Congress annually 
by not later than December 31 each year regarding the geographic 
region-specific warnings and economic sector-specific warnings issued 
during the preceding fiscal year under the Homeland Security Advisory 
System referred to in section 201(d)(7), and the bases for such 
warnings. The report shall be submitted in unclassified form and may, 
as necessary, include a classified annex.''.
    (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in section 1(b) of 
the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101 et seq.) is amended by 
inserting after the item relating to section 202 the following:

``203. Homeland Security Advisory System.''.

SEC. 5005. COORDINATION OF INDUSTRY EFFORTS.

    Section 102(f) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 
107-296; 6 U.S.C. 112(f)) is amended by striking ``and'' after the 
semicolon at the end of paragraph (6), by striking the period at the 
end of paragraph (7) and inserting ``; and'', and by adding at the end 
the following:
            ``(8) coordinating industry efforts, with respect to 
        functions of the Department of Homeland Security, to identify 
        private sector resources and capabilities that could be 
        effective in supplementing Federal, State, and local government 
        agency efforts to prevent or respond to a terrorist attack.''.

SEC. 5006. SUPERSEDED PROVISION.

    This subtitle supersedes section 1014 of Public Law 107-56.

SEC. 5007. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING INTEROPERABLE COMMUNICATIONS.

    (a) Finding.--The Congress finds that--
            (1) many first responders working in the same jurisdiction 
        or in different jurisdictions cannot effectively and 
        efficiently communicate with one another; and
            (2) their inability to do so threatens the public's safety 
        and may result in unnecessary loss of lives and property.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of the Congress that 
interoperable emergency communications systems and radios should 
continue to be deployed as soon as practicable for use by the first 
responder community, and that upgraded and new digital communications 
systems and new digital radios must meet prevailing national, voluntary 
consensus standards for interoperability.

SEC. 5008. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING CITIZEN CORPS COUNCILS.

    (a) Finding.--The Congress finds that Citizen Corps councils help 
to enhance local citizen participation in terrorism preparedness by 
coordinating multiple Citizen Corps programs, developing community 
action plans, assessing possible threats, and identifying local 
resources.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of the Congress that 
individual Citizen Corps councils should seek to enhance the 
preparedness and response capabilities of all organizations 
participating in the councils, including by providing funding to as 
many of their participating organizations as practicable to promote 
local terrorism preparedness programs.

SEC. 5009. STUDY REGARDING NATIONWIDE EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION SYSTEM.

    (a) Study.--The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation 
with the heads of other appropriate Federal agencies and 
representatives of providers and participants in the telecommunications 
industry, shall conduct a study to determine whether it is cost-
effective, efficient, and feasible to establish and implement an 
emergency telephonic alert notification system that will--
            (1) alert persons in the United States of imminent or 
        current hazardous events caused by acts of terrorism; and
            (2) provide information to individuals regarding 
        appropriate measures that may be undertaken to alleviate or 
        minimize threats to their safety and welfare posed by such 
        events.
    (b) Technologies to Consider.--In conducting the study, the 
Secretary shall consider the use of the telephone, wireless 
communications, and other existing communications networks to provide 
such notification.
    (c) Report.--Not later than 9 months after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to the Congress a 
report regarding the conclusions of the study.

SEC. 5010. REQUIRED COORDINATION.

    The Secretary of Homeland Security shall ensure that there is 
effective and ongoing coordination of Federal efforts to prevent, 
prepare for, and respond to acts of terrorism and other major disasters 
and emergencies among the divisions of the Department of Homeland 
Security, including the Directorate of Emergency Preparedness and 
Response and the Office for State and Local Government Coordination and 
Preparedness.

            Subtitle B--Government Reorganization Authority

SEC. 5021. AUTHORIZATION OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY REORGANIZATION 
                    PLANS.

    (a) Reorganization Plans.--Section 903(a)(2) of title 5, United 
States Code, is amended to read as follows:
            ``(2) the abolition of all or a part of the functions of an 
        agency;''.
    (b) Repeal of Limitations.--Section 905 of title 5, United States 
Code, is amended to read as follows:

``Sec. 905. Limitation on authority.

    ``The authority to submit reorganization plans under this chapter 
is limited to the following organizational units:
            ``(1) The Office of the National Intelligence Director.
            ``(2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
            ``(3) The National Security Agency.
            ``(4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
            ``(5) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
            ``(6) The National Reconnaissance Office.
            ``(7) Other offices within the Department of Defense for 
        the collection of specialized national intelligence through 
        reconnaissance programs.
            ``(8) The intelligence elements of the Army, the Navy, the 
        Air Force, the Marine Corps, the Federal Bureau of 
        Investigation, and the Department of Energy.
            ``(9) The Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the 
        Department of State.
            ``(10) The Office of Intelligence Analysis of the 
        Department of Treasury.
            ``(11) The elements of the Department of Homeland Security 
        concerned with the analysis of intelligence information, 
        including the Office of Intelligence of the Coast Guard.
            ``(12) Such other elements of any other department or 
        agency as may be designated by the President, or designated 
        jointly by the National Intelligence Director and the head of 
        the department or agency concerned, as an element of the 
        intelligence community.''.
    (c) Reorganization Plans.--903(a) of title 5, United States Code, 
is amended--
            (1) in paragraph (5), by striking ``or'' after the 
        semicolon;
            (2) in paragraph (6), by striking the period and inserting 
        ``; or''; and
            (3) by inserting after paragraph (6) the following:
            ``(7) the creation of an agency.''.
    (d) Application of Chapter.--Chapter 9 of title 5, United States 
Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

``Sec. 913. Application of chapter

    ``This chapter shall apply to any reorganization plan transmitted 
to Congress in accordance with section 903(b) on or after the date of 
enactment of this section.''.
    (e) Technical and Conforming Amendments.--
            (1) Table of sections.--The table of sections for chapter 9 
        of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding after the 
        item relating to section 912 the following:

``913. Application of chapter.''.
            (2) References.--Chapter 9 of title 5, United States Code, 
        is amended--
                    (A) in section 908(1), by striking ``on or before 
                December 31, 1984''; and (B) in section 910, by 
                striking ``Government Operations'' each place it 
                appears and inserting ``Government Reform''.
            (3) Date modification.--Section 909 of title 5, United 
        States Code, is amended in the first sentence by striking 
        ``19'' and inserting ``20''.

SEC. 5022. AUTHORITY TO ENTER INTO CONTRACTS AND ISSUE FEDERAL LOAN 
                    GUARANTEES.

    (a) Finding.--Congress finds that there is a public interest in 
protecting high-risk nonprofit organizations from international 
terrorist attacks that would disrupt the vital services such 
organizations provide to the people of the United States and threaten 
the lives and well-being of United States citizens who operate, 
utilize, and live or work in proximity to such organizations.
    (b) Purposes.--The purposes of this section are to--
            (1) establish within the Department of Homeland Security a 
        program to protect United States citizens at or near high-risk 
        nonprofit organizations from international terrorist attacks 
        through loan guarantees and Federal contracts for security 
        enhancements and technical assistance;
            (2) establish a program within the Department of Homeland 
        Security to provide grants to local governments to assist with 
        incremental costs associated with law enforcement in areas in 
        which there are a high concentration of high-risk nonprofit 
        organizations vulnerable to international terrorist attacks; 
        and
            (3) establish an Office of Community Relations and Civic 
        Affairs within the Department of Homeland Security to focus on 
        security needs of high-risk nonprofit organizations with 
        respect to international terrorist threats.
    (c) Authority.--The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101 et 
seq.), as amended by this Act, is further amended by adding at the end 
the following:

      ``TITLE XIX--PROTECTION OF CITIZENS AT HIGH-RISK NONPROFIT 
                             ORGANIZATIONS

``SEC. 1901. DEFINITIONS.

    `` In this title:
            ``(1) Contract.--The term `contract' means a contract 
        between the Federal Government and a contractor selected from 
        the list of certified contractors to perform security 
        enhancements or provide technical assistance approved by the 
        Secretary under this title.
            ``(2) Favorable repayment terms.--The term `favorable 
        repayment terms' means the repayment terms of loans offered to 
        nonprofit organizations under this title that--
                    ``(A) are determined by the Secretary, in 
                consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, to be 
                favorable under current market conditions;
                    ``(B) have interest rates at least 1 full 
                percentage point below the market rate; and
                    ``(C) provide for repayment over a term not less 
                than 25 years.
            ``(3) Nonprofit organization.--The term `nonprofit 
        organization' means an organization that--
                    ``(A) is described under section 501(c)(3) of the 
                Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and exempt from taxation 
                under section 501(a) of such Code; and
                    ``(B) is designated by the Secretary under section 
                1903(a).
            ``(4) Security enhancements.--The term `security 
        enhancements'--
                    ``(A) means the purchase and installation of 
                security equipment in real property (including 
                buildings and improvements), owned or leased by a 
                nonprofit organization, specifically in response to the 
                risk of attack at a nonprofit organization by an 
                international terrorist organization;
                    ``(B) includes software security measures; and
                    ``(C) does not include enhancements that would 
                otherwise have been reasonably necessary due to 
                nonterrorist threats.
            ``(5) Technical assistance.--The term `technical 
        assistance'--
                    ``(A) means guidance, assessment, recommendations, 
                and any other provision of information or expertise 
                which assists nonprofit organizations in--
                            ``(i) identifying security needs;
                            ``(ii) purchasing and installing security 
                        enhancements;
                            ``(iii) training employees to use and 
                        maintain security enhancements; or
                            ``(iv) training employees to recognize and 
                        respond to international terrorist threats; and
                    ``(B) does not include technical assistance that 
                would otherwise have been reasonably necessary due to 
                nonterrorist threats.

``SEC. 1902. AUTHORITY TO ENTER INTO CONTRACTS AND ISSUE FEDERAL LOAN 
                    GUARANTEES.

    ``(a) In General.--The Secretary may--
            ``(1) enter into contracts with certified contractors for 
        security enhancements and technical assistance for nonprofit 
        organizations; and
            ``(2) issue Federal loan guarantees to financial 
        institutions in connection with loans made by such institutions 
        to nonprofit organizations for security enhancements and 
        technical assistance.
    ``(b) Loans.--The Secretary may guarantee loans under this title--
            ``(1) only to the extent provided for in advance by 
        appropriations Acts; and
            ``(2) only to the extent such loans have favorable 
        repayment terms.

``SEC. 1903. ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA.

    ``(a) In General.--The Secretary shall designate nonprofit 
organizations as high-risk nonprofit organizations eligible for 
contracts or loans under this title based on the vulnerability of the 
specific site of the nonprofit organization to international terrorist 
attacks.
    ``(b) Vulnerability Determination.--In determining vulnerability to 
international terrorist attacks and eligibility for security 
enhancements or technical assistance under this title, the Secretary 
shall consider--
            ``(1) threats of international terrorist organizations (as 
        designated by the State Department) against any group of United 
        States citizens who operate or are the principal beneficiaries 
        or users of the nonprofit organization;
            ``(2) prior attacks, within or outside the United States, 
        by international terrorist organizations against the nonprofit 
        organization or entities associated with or similarly situated 
        as the nonprofit organization;
            ``(3) the symbolic value of the site as a highly recognized 
        United States cultural or historical institution that renders 
        the site a possible target of international terrorism;
            ``(4) the role of the nonprofit organization in responding 
        to international terrorist attacks; and
            ``(5) any recommendations of the applicable State Homeland 
        Security Authority established under section 1906 or Federal, 
        State, and local law enforcement authorities.
    ``(c) Documentation.--In order to be eligible for security 
enhancements, technical assistance or loan guarantees under this title, 
the nonprofit organization shall provide the Secretary with 
documentation that--
            ``(1) the nonprofit organization hosted a gathering of at 
        least 100 or more persons at least once each month at the 
        nonprofit organization site during the preceding 12 months; or
            ``(2) the nonprofit organization provides services to at 
        least 500 persons each year at the nonprofit organization site.
    ``(d) Technical Assistance Organizations.--If 2 or more nonprofit 
organizations establish another nonprofit organization to provide 
technical assistance, that established organization shall be eligible 
to receive security enhancements and technical assistance under this 
title based upon the collective risk of the nonprofit organizations it 
serves.

``SEC. 1904. USE OF LOAN GUARANTEES.

    ``Funds borrowed from lending institutions, which are guaranteed by 
the Federal Government under this title, may be used for technical 
assistance and security enhancements.

``SEC. 1905. NONPROFIT ORGANIZATION APPLICATIONS.

    ``(a) In General.--A nonprofit organization desiring assistance 
under this title shall submit a separate application for each specific 
site needing security enhancements or technical assistance.
    ``(b) Content.--Each application shall include--
            ``(1) a detailed request for security enhancements and 
        technical assistance, from a list of approved enhancements and 
        assistance issued by the Secretary under this title;
            ``(2) a description of the intended uses of funds to be 
        borrowed under Federal loan guarantees; and
            ``(3) such other information as the Secretary shall 
        require.
    ``(c) Joint Application.--Two or more nonprofit organizations 
located on contiguous sites may submit a joint application.

``SEC. 1906. REVIEW BY STATE HOMELAND SECURITY AUTHORITIES.

    ``(a) Establishment of State Homeland Security Authorities.--In 
accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary, each State may 
establish a State Homeland Security Authority to carry out this title.
    ``(b) Applications.--
            ``(1) Submission.--Applications shall be submitted to the 
        applicable State Homeland Security Authority.
            ``(2) Evaluation.--After consultation with Federal, State, 
        and local law enforcement authorities, the State Homeland 
        Security Authority shall evaluate all applications using the 
        criteria under section 1903 and transmit all qualifying 
        applications to the Secretary ranked by severity of risk of 
        international terrorist attack.
            ``(3) Appeal.--An applicant may appeal the finding that an 
        application is not a qualifying application to the Secretary 
        under procedures that the Secretary shall issue by regulation 
        not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this 
        title.

``SEC. 1907. SECURITY ENHANCEMENT AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE CONTRACTS 
                    AND LOAN GUARANTEES.

    ``(a) In General.--Upon receipt of the applications, the Secretary 
shall select applications for execution of security enhancement and 
technical assistance contracts, or issuance of loan guarantees, giving 
preference to the nonprofit organizations determined to be at greatest 
risk of international terrorist attack based on criteria under section 
1903.
    ``(b) Security Enhancements and Technical Assistance; Followed by 
Loan Guarantees.--The Secretary shall execute security enhancement and 
technical assistance contracts for the highest priority applicants 
until available funds are expended, after which loan guarantees shall 
be made available for additional applicants determined to be at high 
risk, up to the authorized amount of loan guarantees. The Secretary may 
provide with respect to a single application a combination of such 
contracts and loan guarantees.
    ``(c) Joint Applications.--Special preference shall be given to 
joint applications submitted on behalf of multiple nonprofit 
organizations located in contiguous settings.
    ``(d) Maximizing Available Funds.--Subject to subsection (b), the 
Secretary shall execute security enhancement and technical assistance 
contracts in such amounts as to maximize the number of high-risk 
applicants nationwide receiving assistance under this title.
    ``(e) Applicant Notification.--Upon selecting a nonprofit 
organization for assistance under this title, the Secretary shall 
notify the nonprofit organization that the Federal Government is 
prepared to enter into a contract with certified contractors to install 
specified security enhancements or provide specified technical 
assistance at the site of the nonprofit organization.
    ``(f) Certified Contractors.--
            ``(1) In general.--Upon receiving a notification under 
        subsection (e), the nonprofit organization shall select a 
        certified contractor to perform the specified security 
        enhancements, from a list of certified contractors issued and 
        maintained by the Secretary under subsection (j).
            ``(2) List.--The list referred to in paragraph (1) shall be 
        comprised of contractors selected on the basis of--
                    ``(A) technical expertise;
                    ``(B) performance record including quality and 
                timeliness of work performed;
                    ``(C) adequacy of employee criminal background 
                checks; and
                    ``(D) price competitiveness.
            ``(3) Other certified contractors.--The Secretary shall 
        include on the list of certified contractors additional 
        contractors selected by senior officials at State Homeland 
        Security Authorities and the chief executives of county and 
        other local jurisdictions. Such additional certified 
        contractors shall be selected on the basis of the criteria 
        under paragraph (2).
    ``(g) Ensuring the Availability of Contractors.--If the list of 
certified contractors under this section does not include any 
contractors who can begin work on the security enhancements or 
technical assistance within 60 days after applicant notification, the 
nonprofit organization may submit a contractor not currently on the 
list to the Secretary for the Secretary's review. If the Secretary does 
not include the submitted contractor on the list of certified 
contractors within 60 days after the submission and does not place an 
alternative contractor on the list within the same time period (who 
would be available to begin the specified work within that 60-day 
period), the Secretary shall immediately place the submitted contractor 
on the list of certified contractors and such contractor shall remain 
on such list until--
            ``(1) the specified work is completed; or
            ``(2) the Secretary can show cause why such contractor may 
        not retain certification, with such determinations subject to 
        review by the Comptroller General of the United States.
    ``(h) Contracts.--Upon selecting a certified contractor to provide 
security enhancements and technical assistance approved by the 
Secretary under this title, the nonprofit organization shall notify the 
Secretary of such selection. The Secretary shall deliver a contract to 
such contractor within 10 business days after such notification.
    ``(i) Contracts for Additional Work or Upgrades.--A nonprofit 
organization, using its own funds, may enter into an additional 
contract with the certified contractor, for additional or upgraded 
security enhancements or technical assistance. Such additional 
contracts shall be separate contracts between the nonprofit 
organization and the contractor.
    ``(j) Expediting Assistance.--In order to expedite assistance to 
nonprofit organizations, the Secretary shall--
            ``(1) compile a list of approved technical assistance and 
        security enhancement activities within 45 days after the date 
        of enactment of this title;
            ``(2) publish in the Federal Register within 60 days after 
        such date of enactment a request for contractors to submit 
        applications to be placed on the list of certified contractors 
        under this section;
            ``(3) after consultation with the Secretary of the 
        Treasury, publish in the Federal Register within 60 days after 
        such date of enactment, prescribe regulations setting forth the 
        conditions under which loan guarantees shall be issued under 
        this title, including application procedures, expeditious 
        review of applications, underwriting criteria, assignment of 
        loan guarantees, modifications, commercial validity, defaults, 
        and fees; and
            ``(4) publish in the Federal Register within 120 days after 
        such date of enactment (and every 30 days thereafter) a list of 
        certified contractors, including those selected by State 
        Homeland Security Authorities, county, and local officials, 
        with coverage of all 50 States, the District of Columbia, and 
        the territories.

``SEC. 1908. LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE GRANTS.

    ``(a) In General.--The Secretary may provide grants to units of 
local government to offset incremental costs associated with law 
enforcement in areas where there is a high concentration of nonprofit 
organizations.
    ``(b) Use.--Grant funds received under this section may be used 
only for personnel costs or for equipment needs specifically related to 
such incremental costs.
    ``(c) Maximization of Impact.--The Secretary shall award grants in 
such amounts as to maximize the impact of available funds in protecting 
nonprofit organizations nationwide from international terrorist 
attacks.

``SEC. 1909. OFFICE OF COMMUNITY RELATIONS AND CIVIC AFFAIRS.

    ``(a) In General.--There is established within the Department, the 
Office of Community Relations and Civic Affairs to administer grant 
programs for nonprofit organizations and local law enforcement 
assistance.
    ``(b) Additional Responsibilities.--The Office of Community 
Relations and Civic Affairs shall--
            ``(1) coordinate community relations efforts of the 
        Department;
            ``(2) serve as the official liaison of the Secretary to the 
        nonprofit, human and social services, and faith-based 
        communities; and
            ``(3) assist in coordinating the needs of those communities 
        with the Citizen Corps program.

``SEC. 1910. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS AND LOAN GUARANTEES.

    ``(a) Nonprofit Organizations Program.--There are authorized to be 
appropriated to the Department to carry out the nonprofit organization 
program under this title, $100,000,000 for fiscal year 2005 and such 
sums as may be necessary for fiscal years 2006 and 2007.
    ``(b) Local Law Enforcement Assistance Grants.--There are 
authorized to be appropriated to the Department for local law 
enforcement assistance grants under section 1908, $50,000,000 for 
fiscal year 2005 and such sums as may be necessary for fiscal years 
2006 and 2007.
    ``(c) Office of Community Relations and Civic Affairs.--There are 
authorized to be appropriated to the Department for the Office of 
Community Relations and Civic Affairs under section 1909, $5,000,000 
for fiscal year 2005 and such sums as may be necessary for fiscal years 
2006 and 2007.
    ``(d) Loan Guarantees.--
            ``(1) Authorization of appropriations.--There are 
        authorized to be appropriated in each of fiscal years 2005, 
        2006, and 2007, such amounts as may be required under the 
        Federal Credit Act with respect to Federal loan guarantees 
        authorized by this title, which shall remain available until 
        expended.
            ``(2) Limitation.--The aggregate value of all loans for 
        which loan guarantees are issued under this title by the 
        Secretary may not exceed $250,000,000 in each of fiscal years 
        2005, 2006, and 2007.''.
    (d) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents under section 1(b) 
of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101(b)) is amended by 
adding at the end the following:

      ``TITLE XIX--PROTECTION OF CITIZENS AT HIGH-RISK NONPROFIT 
                             ORGANIZATIONS

``Sec. 1901. Definitions.
``Sec. 1902. Authority to enter into contracts and issue Federal loan 
                            guarantees.
``Sec. 1903. Eligibility criteria.
``Sec. 1904. Use of loan guarantees.
``Sec. 1905. Nonprofit organization applications.
``Sec. 1906. Review by State Homeland Security Authorities.
``Sec. 1907. Security enhancement and technical assistance contracts 
                            and loan guarantees.
``Sec. 1908. Local law enforcement assistance grants.
``Sec. 1909. Office of Community Relations and Civic Affairs.
``Sec. 1910. Authorization of appropriations and loan guarantees.''.

   Subtitle C--Restructuring Relating to the Department of Homeland 
                  Security and Congressional Oversight

SEC. 5025. RESPONSIBILITIES OF COUNTERNARCOTICS OFFICE.

    (a) Amendment.--Section 878 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 
U.S.C. 458) is amended to read as follows:

``SEC. 878. OFFICE OF COUNTERNARCOTICS ENFORCEMENT.

    ``(a) Office.--There shall be in the Department an Office of 
Counternarcotics Enforcement, which shall be headed by a Director 
appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the 
Senate.
    ``(b) Assignment of Personnel.--(1) The Secretary shall assign to 
the Office permanent staff and other appropriate personnel detailed 
from other subdivisions of the Department to carry out responsibilities 
under this section.
    ``(2) The Secretary shall designate senior employees from each 
appropriate subdivision of the Department that has significant 
counternarcotics responsibilities to act as a liaison between that 
subdivision and the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement.
    ``(c) Limitation on Concurrent Employment.--Except as provided in 
subsection (d), the Director of the Office of Counternarcotics 
Enforcement shall not be employed by, assigned to, or serve as the head 
of, any other branch of the Federal Government, any State or local 
government, or any subdivision of the Department other than the Office 
of Counternarcotics Enforcement.
    ``(d) Eligibility To Serve as the United States Interdiction 
Coordinator.--The Director of the Office of Counternarcotics 
Enforcement may be appointed as the United States Interdiction 
Coordinator by the Director of the Office of National Drug Control 
Policy, and shall be the only person at the Department eligible to be 
so appointed.
    ``(e) Responsibilities.--The Secretary shall direct the Director of 
the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement--
            ``(1) to coordinate policy and operations within the 
        Department, between the Department and other Federal 
        departments and agencies, and between the Department and State 
        and local agencies with respect to stopping the entry of 
        illegal drugs into the United States;
            ``(2) to ensure the adequacy of resources within the 
        Department for stopping the entry of illegal drugs into the 
        United States;
            ``(3) to recommend the appropriate financial and personnel 
        resources necessary to help the Department better fulfill its 
        responsibility to stop the entry of illegal drugs into the 
        United States;
            ``(4) within the JTTF construct to track and sever 
        connections between illegal drug trafficking and terrorism; and
            ``(5) to be a representative of the Department on all task 
        forces, committees, or other entities whose purpose is to 
        coordinate the counternarcotics enforcement activities of the 
        Department and other Federal, state or local agencies.
    ``(f) Reports to Congress.--
            ``(1) Annual budget review.--The Director of the Office of 
        Counternarcotics Enforcement shall, not later than 30 days 
        after the submission by the President to Congress of any 
        request for expenditures for the Department, submit to the 
        Committees on Appropriations and the authorizing committees of 
        jurisdiction of the House of Representatives and the Senate a 
        review and evaluation of such request. The review and 
        evaluation shall--
                    ``(A) identify any request or subpart of any 
                request that affects or may affect the counternarcotics 
                activities of the Department or any of its 
                subdivisions, or that affects the ability of the 
                Department or any subdivision of the Department to meet 
                its responsibility to stop the entry of illegal drugs 
                into the United States;
                    ``(B) describe with particularity how such 
                requested funds would be or could be expended in 
                furtherance of counternarcotics activities; and
                    ``(C) compare such requests with requests for 
                expenditures and amounts appropriated by Congress in 
                the previous fiscal year.
            ``(2) Evaluation of counternarcotics activities.--The 
        Director of the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement shall, 
        not later than February 1 of each year, submit to the 
        Committees on Appropriations and the authorizing committees of 
        jurisdiction of the House of Representatives and the Senate a 
        review and evaluation of the counternarcotics activities of the 
        Department for the previous fiscal year. The review and 
        evaluation shall--
                    ``(A) describe the counternarcotics activities of 
                the Department and each subdivision of the Department 
                (whether individually or in cooperation with other 
                subdivisions of the Department, or in cooperation with 
                other branches of the Federal Government or with State 
                or local agencies), including the methods, procedures, 
                and systems (including computer systems) for 
                collecting, analyzing, sharing, and disseminating 
                information concerning narcotics activity within the 
                Department and between the Department and other 
                Federal, State, and local agencies;
                    ``(B) describe the results of those activities, 
                using quantifiable data whenever possible;
                    ``(C) state whether those activities were 
                sufficient to meet the responsibility of the Department 
                to stop the entry of illegal drugs into the United 
                States, including a description of the performance 
                measures of effectiveness that were used in making that 
                determination; and
                    ``(D) recommend, where appropriate, changes to 
                those activities to improve the performance of the 
                Department in meeting its responsibility to stop the 
                entry of illegal drugs into the United States.
            ``(3) Classified or law enforcement sensitive 
        information.--Any content of a review and evaluation described 
        in the reports required in this subsection that involves 
        information classified under criteria established by an 
        Executive order, or whose public disclosure, as determined by 
        the Secretary, would be detrimental to the law enforcement or 
        national security activities of the Department or any other 
        Federal, State, or local agency, shall be presented to Congress 
        separately from the rest of the review and evaluation.''.
    (b) Conforming Amendment.--Section 103(a) of the Homeland Security 
Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 113(a)) is amended--
            (1) by redesignating paragraphs (8) and (9) as paragraphs 
        (9) and (10), respectively; and
            (2) by inserting after paragraph (7) the following new 
        paragraph (8):
            ``(8) A Director of the Office of Counternarcotics 
        Enforcement.''.
    (c) Authorization of Appropriations.--Of the amounts appropriated 
for the Department of Homeland Security for Departmental management and 
operations for fiscal year 2005, there is authorized up to $6,000,000 
to carry out section 878 of the Department of Homeland Security Act of 
2002 (as amended by this section).

SEC. 5026. USE OF COUNTERNARCOTICS ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES IN CERTAIN 
                    EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE APPRAISALS.

    (a) In General.--Subtitle E of title VIII of the Homeland Security 
Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 411 and following) is amended by adding at the 
end the following:

``SEC. 843. USE OF COUNTERNARCOTICS ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES IN CERTAIN 
                    EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE APPRAISALS.

    ``(a) In General.--Each subdivision of the Department that is a 
National Drug Control Program Agency shall include as one of the 
criteria in its performance appraisal system, for each employee 
directly or indirectly involved in the enforcement of Federal, State, 
or local narcotics laws, the performance of that employee with respect 
to the enforcement of Federal, State, or local narcotics laws, relying 
to the greatest extent practicable on objective performance measures, 
including--
            ``(1) the contribution of that employee to seizures of 
        narcotics and arrests of violators of Federal, State, or local 
        narcotics laws; and
            ``(2) the degree to which that employee cooperated with or 
        contributed to the efforts of other employees, either within 
        the Department or other Federal, State, or local agencies, in 
        counternarcotics enforcement.
    ``(b) Definitions.--For purposes of this section--
            ``(1) the term `National Drug Control Program Agency' 
        means--
                    ``(A) a National Drug Control Program Agency, as 
                defined in section 702(7) of the Office of National 
                Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act of 1998 (as 
                last in effect); and
                    ``(B) any subdivision of the Department that has a 
                significant counternarcotics responsibility, as 
                determined by--
                            ``(i) the counternarcotics officer, 
                        appointed under section 878; or
                            ``(ii) if applicable, the counternarcotics 
                        officer's successor in function (as determined 
                        by the Secretary); and
            ``(2) the term `performance appraisal system' means a 
        system under which periodic appraisals of job performance of 
        employees are made, whether under chapter 43 of title 5, United 
        States Code, or otherwise.''.
    (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents for the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002 is amended by inserting after the item relating to 
section 842 the following:

``Sec. 843. Use of counternarcotics enforcement activities in certain 
employee performance appraisals.''.

SEC. 5027. SENSE OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON ADDRESSING HOMELAND 
                    SECURITY FOR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

    (a) Findings.--The House of Representatives finds that--
            (1) the House of Representatives created a Select Committee 
        on Homeland Security at the start of the 108th Congress to 
        provide for vigorous congressional oversight for the 
        implementation and operation of the Department of Homeland 
        Security;
            (2) the House of Representatives also charged the Select 
        Committee on Homeland Security, including its Subcommittee on 
        Rules, with undertaking a thorough and complete study of the 
        operation and implementation of the rules of the House, 
        including the rule governing committee jurisdiction, with 
        respect to the issue of homeland security and to make their 
        recommendations to the Committee on Rules;
            (3) on February 11, 2003, the Committee on Appropriations 
        of the House of Representatives created a new Subcommittee on 
        Homeland Security with jurisdiction over the Transportation 
        Security Administration, the Coast Guard, and other entities 
        within the Department of Homeland Security to help address the 
        integration of the Department of Homeland Security's 22 legacy 
        agencies; and
            (4) during the 108th Congress, the House of Representatives 
        has taken several steps to help ensure its continuity in the 
        event of a terrorist attack, including--
                    (A) adopting H.R. 2844, the Continuity of 
                Representation Act, a bill to require States to hold 
                expedited special elections to fill vacancies in the 
                House of Representatives not later than 45 days after 
                the vacancy is announced by the Speaker in 
                extraordinary circumstances;
                    (B) granting authority for joint-leadership recalls 
                from a period of adjournment to an alternate place;
                    (C) allowing for anticipatory consent with the 
                Senate to assemble in an alternate place;
                    (D) establishing the requirement that the Speaker 
                submit to the Clerk a list of Members in the order in 
                which each shall act as Speaker pro tempore in the case 
                of a vacancy in the Office of Speaker (including 
                physical inability of the Speaker to discharge his 
                duties) until the election of a Speaker or a Speaker 
                pro tempore, exercising such authorities of the Speaker 
                as may be necessary and appropriate to that end;
                    (E) granting authority for the Speaker to declare 
                an emergency recess of the House subject to the call of 
                the Chair when notified of an imminent threat to the 
                safety of the House;
                    (F) granting authority for the Speaker, during any 
                recess or adjournment of not more than three days, in 
                consultation with the Minority Leader, to postpone the 
                time for reconvening or to reconvene before the time 
                previously appointed solely to declare the House in 
                recess, in each case within the constitutional three-
                day limit;
                    (G) establishing the authority for the Speaker to 
                convene the House in an alternate place within the seat 
                of Government; and
                    (H) codifying the long-standing practice that the 
                death, resignation, expulsion, disqualification, or 
                removal of a Member results in an adjustment of the 
                quorum of the House, which the Speaker shall announce 
                to the House and which shall not be subject to appeal.
    (b) Sense of the House.--It is the sense of the House of 
Representatives that the Committee on Rules should act upon the 
recommendations provided by the Select Committee on Homeland Security, 
and other committees of existing jurisdiction, regarding the 
jurisdiction over proposed legislation, messages, petitions, memorials 
and other matters relating to homeland security prior to or at the 
start of the 109th Congress.

            Subtitle D--Improvements to Information Security

SEC. 5031. AMENDMENTS TO CLINGER-COHEN PROVISIONS TO ENHANCE AGENCY 
                    PLANNING FOR INFORMATION SECURITY NEEDS.

    Chapter 113 of title 40, United States Code, is amended--
            (1) in section 11302(b), by inserting ``security,'' after 
        ``use,'';
            (2) in section 11302(c), by inserting ``, including 
        information security risks,'' after ``risks'' both places it 
        appears;
            (3) in section 11312(b)(1), by striking ``information 
        technology investments'' and inserting ``investments in 
        information technology (including information security 
        needs)''; and
            (4) in section 11315(b)(2), by inserting ``, secure,'' 
        after ``sound''.

             Subtitle E--Personnel Management Improvements

                 CHAPTER 1--APPOINTMENTS PROCESS REFORM

SEC. 5041. APPOINTMENTS TO NATIONAL SECURITY POSITIONS.

    (a) Definition of National Security Position.--For purposes of this 
section, the term ``national security position'' shall include--
            (1) those positions that involve activities of the United 
        States Government that are concerned with the protection of the 
        Nation from foreign aggression, terrorism, or espionage, 
        including development of defense plans or policies, 
        intelligence or counterintelligence activities, and related 
        activities concerned with the preservation of military strength 
        of the United States and protection of the homeland; and
            (2) positions that require regular use of, or access to, 
        classified information.
    (b) Publication in the Federal Register.--Not later than 60 days 
after the effective date of this section, the Director of the Office of 
Personnel Management shall publish in the Federal Register a list of 
offices that constitute national security positions under section (a) 
for which Senate confirmation is required by law, and the Director 
shall revise such list from time to time as appropriate.
    (c) Presidential Appointments.--(1) With respect to appointment of 
individuals to offices identified under section (b) and listed in 
sections 5315 or 5316 of title 5, United States Code, which shall arise 
after the publication of the list required by section (b), and 
notwithstanding any other provision of law, the advice and consent of 
the Senate shall not be required, but rather such appointment shall be 
made by the President alone.
    (2) With respect to appointment of individuals to offices 
identified under section (b) and listed in sections 5313 or 5314 of 
title 5, United States Code, which shall arise after the publication of 
the list required by section (b), and notwithstanding any other 
provision of law, the advice and consent of the Senate shall be 
required, except that if 30 legislative days shall have expired from 
the date on which a nomination is submitted to the Senate without a 
confirmation vote occurring in the Senate, such appointment shall be 
made by the President alone.
    (3) For the purposes of this subsection, the term ``legislative 
day'' means a day on which the Senate is in session.

SEC. 5042. PRESIDENTIAL INAUGURAL TRANSITIONS.

    Subsections (a) and (b) of section 3349a of title 5, United States 
Code, are amended to read as follows:
    ``(a) As used in this section--
            ``(1) the term `inauguration day' means the date on which 
        any person swears or affirms the oath of office as President; 
        and
            ``(2) the term `specified national security position' shall 
        mean not more than 20 positions requiring Senate confirmation, 
        not to include more than 3 heads of Executive Departments, 
        which are designated by the President on or after an 
        inauguration day as positions for which the duties involve 
        substantial responsibility for national security.
    ``(b) With respect to any vacancy that exists during the 60-day 
period beginning on an inauguration day, except where the person 
swearing or affirming the oath of office was the President on the date 
preceding the date of swearing or affirming such oath of office, the 
210-day period under section 3346 or 3348 shall be deemed to begin on 
the later of the date occurring--
            ``(1) 90 days after such transitional inauguration day; or
            ``(2) 90 days after the date on which the vacancy occurs.
    ``(c) With respect to any vacancy in any specified national 
security position that exists during the 60-day period beginning on an 
inauguration day, the requirements of subparagraphs (A) and (B) of 
section 3345(a)(3) shall not apply.''.

SEC. 5043. PUBLIC FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE FOR THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

    (a) In General.--The Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. 
App.) is amended by inserting before title IV the following:

 ``TITLE III--INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS

``SEC. 301. PERSONS REQUIRED TO FILE.

    ``(a) Within 30 days of assuming the position of an officer or 
employee described in subsection (e), an individual shall file a report 
containing the information described in section 302(b) unless the 
individual has left another position described in subsection (e) within 
30 days prior to assuming such new position or has already filed a 
report under this title with respect to nomination for the new position 
or as a candidate for the position.
    ``(b)(1) Within 5 days of the transmittal by the President to the 
Senate of the nomination of an individual to a position in the 
executive branch, appointment to which requires the advice and consent 
of the Senate, such individual shall file a report containing the 
information described in section 302(b). Such individual shall, not 
later than the date of the first hearing to consider the nomination of 
such individual, make current the report filed pursuant to this 
paragraph by filing the information required by section 302(a)(1)(A) 
with respect to income and honoraria received as of the date which 
occurs 5 days before the date of such hearing. Nothing in this Act 
shall prevent any congressional committee from requesting, as a 
condition of confirmation, any additional financial information from 
any Presidential nominee whose nomination has been referred to that 
committee.
    ``(2) An individual whom the President or the President-elect has 
publicly announced he intends to nominate to a position may file the 
report required by paragraph (1) at any time after that public 
announcement, but not later than is required under the first sentence 
of such paragraph.
    ``(c) Any individual who is an officer or employee described in 
subsection (e) during any calendar year and performs the duties of his 
position or office for a period in excess of 60 days in that calendar 
year shall file on or before May 15 of the succeeding year a report 
containing the information described in section 302(a).
    ``(d) Any individual who occupies a position described in 
subsection (e) shall, on or before the 30th day after termination of 
employment in such position, file a report containing the information 
described in section 302(a) covering the preceding calendar year if the 
report required by subsection (c) has not been filed and covering the 
portion of the calendar year in which such termination occurs up to the 
date the individual left such office or position, unless such 
individual has accepted employment in or takes the oath of office for 
another position described in subsection (e) or section 101(f).
    ``(e) The officers and employees referred to in subsections (a), 
(c), and (d) are those employed in or under--
            ``(1) the Office of the National Intelligence Director; or
            ``(2) an element of the intelligence community, as defined 
        in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
        401a(4)).
    ``(f)(1) Reasonable extensions of time for filing any report may be 
granted under procedures prescribed by the Office of Government Ethics, 
but the total of such extensions shall not exceed 90 days.
    ``(2)(A) In the case of an individual who is serving in the Armed 
Forces, or serving in support of the Armed Forces, in an area while 
that area is designated by the President by Executive order as a combat 
zone for purposes of section 112 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, 
the date for the filing of any report shall be extended so that the 
date is 180 days after the later of--
                    ``(i) the last day of the individual's service in 
                such area during such designated period; or
                    ``(ii) the last day of the individual's 
                hospitalization as a result of injury received or 
                disease contracted while serving in such area.
    ``(B) The Office of Government Ethics, in consultation with the 
Secretary of Defense, may prescribe procedures under this paragraph.
    ``(g) The Director of the Office of Government Ethics may grant a 
publicly available request for a waiver of any reporting requirement 
under this title with respect to an individual if the Director 
determines that--
            ``(1) such individual is not a full-time employee of the 
        Government;
            ``(2) such individual is able to provide special services 
        needed by the Government;
            ``(3) it is unlikely that such individual's outside 
        employment or financial interests will create a conflict of 
        interest; and
            ``(4) public financial disclosure by such individual is not 
        necessary in the circumstances.
    ``(h)(1) The Director of the Office of Government Ethics may 
establish procedures under which an incoming individual can take 
actions to avoid conflicts of interest while in office if the 
individual has holdings or other financial interests that raise 
conflict concerns.
    ``(2) The actions referenced in paragraph (1) may include, but are 
not limited to, signed agreements with the individual's employing 
agency, the establishment of blind trusts, or requirements for 
divesting interests or holdings while in office.

``SEC. 302. CONTENTS OF REPORTS.

    ``(a) Each report filed pursuant to section 301 (c) and (d) shall 
include a full and complete statement with respect to the following:
            ``(1)(A) The source, description, and category of value of 
        income (other than income referred to in subparagraph (B)) from 
        any source (other than from current employment by the United 
        States Government), received during the preceding calendar 
        year, aggregating more than $500 in value, except that 
        honoraria received during Government service by an officer or 
        employee shall include, in addition to the source, the exact 
        amount and the date it was received.
            ``(B) The source and description of investment income which 
        may include but is not limited to dividends, rents, interest, 
        and capital gains, received during the preceding calendar year 
        which exceeds $500 in amount or value.
            ``(C) The categories for reporting the amount for income 
        covered in subparagraphs (A) and (B) are--
                    ``(i) greater than $500 but not more than $20,000;
                    ``(ii) greater than $20,000 but not more than 
                $100,000;
                    ``(iii) greater than $100,000 but not more than 
                $1,000,000;
                    ``(iv) greater than $1,000,000 but not more than 
                $2,500,000; and
                    ``(v) greater than $2,500,000.
            ``(2)(A) The identity of the source, a brief description, 
        and the value of all gifts aggregating more than the minimal 
        value as established by section 7342(a)(5) of title 5, United 
        States Code, or $250, whichever is greater, received from any 
        source other than a relative of the reporting individual during 
        the preceding calendar year, except that any food, lodging, or 
        entertainment received as personal hospitality of an individual 
        need not be reported, and any gift with a fair market value of 
        $100 or less, as adjusted at the same time and by the same 
        percentage as the minimal value is adjusted, need not be 
        aggregated for purposes of this subparagraph.
            ``(B) The identity of the source and a brief description 
        (including dates of travel and nature of expenses provided) of 
        reimbursements received from any source aggregating more than 
        the minimal value as established by section 7342(a)(5) of title 
        5, United States Code, or $250, whichever is greater and 
        received during the preceding calendar year.
            ``(3) The identity and category of value of any interest in 
        property held during the preceding calendar year in a trade or 
        business, or for investment or the production of income, which 
        has a fair market value which exceeds $5,000 as of the close of 
        the preceding calendar year, excluding any personal liability 
        owed to the reporting individual by a spouse, or by a parent, 
        brother, sister, or child of the reporting individual or of the 
        reporting individual's spouse, or any deposit accounts 
        aggregating $100,000 or less in a financial institution, or any 
        Federal Government securities aggregating $100,000 or less.
            ``(4) The identity and category of value of the total 
        liabilities owed to any creditor other than a spouse, or a 
        parent, brother, sister, or child of the reporting individual 
        or of the reporting individual's spouse which exceed $20,000 at 
        any time during the preceding calendar year, excluding--
                    ``(A) any mortgage secured by real property which 
                is a personal residence of the reporting individual or 
                his spouse; and
                    ``(B) any loan secured by a personal motor vehicle, 
                household furniture, or appliances, which loan does not 
                exceed the purchase price of the item which secures it.
        With respect to revolving charge accounts, only those with an 
        outstanding liability which exceeds $20,000 as of the close of 
        the preceding calendar year need be reported under this 
        paragraph. Notwithstanding the preceding sentence, individuals 
        required to file pursuant to section 301(b) shall also report 
        the aggregate sum of the outstanding balances of all revolving 
        charge accounts as of any date that is within 30 days of the 
        date of filing if the aggregate sum of those balances exceeds 
        $20,000.
            ``(5) Except as provided in this paragraph, a brief 
        description of any real property, other than property used 
        solely as a personal residence of the reporting individual or 
        his spouse, or stocks, bonds, commodities futures, and other 
        forms of securities, if--
                    ``(A) purchased, sold, or exchanged during the 
                preceding calendar year;
                    ``(B) the value of the transaction exceeded $5,000; 
                and
                    ``(C) the property or security is not already 
                required to be reported as a source of income pursuant 
                to paragraph (1)(B) or as an asset pursuant to 
                paragraph (3).
            ``(6)(A) The identity of all positions held on or before 
        the date of filing during the current calendar year (and, for 
        the first report filed by an individual, during the 1-year 
        period preceding such calendar year) as an officer, director, 
        trustee, partner, proprietor, representative, employee, or 
        consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or 
        other business enterprise, any nonprofit organization, any 
        labor organization, or any educational or other institution 
        other than the United States Government. This subparagraph 
        shall not require the reporting of positions held in any 
        religious, social, fraternal, or political entity and positions 
        solely of an honorary nature.
            ``(B) If any person, other than a person reported as a 
        source of income under paragraph (1)(A) or the United States 
        Government, paid a nonelected reporting individual compensation 
        in excess of $25,000 in the calendar year in which, or the 
        calendar year prior to the calendar year in which, the 
        individual files his first report under this title, the 
        individual shall include in the report--
                    ``(i) the identity of each source of such 
                compensation; and
                    ``(ii) a brief description of the nature of the 
                duties performed or services rendered by the reporting 
                individual for each such source.
The preceding sentence shall not require any individual to include in 
such report any information which is considered confidential as a 
result of a privileged relationship, established by law, between such 
individual and any person or any information which the person for whom 
the services are provided has a reasonable expectation of privacy, nor 
shall it require an individual to report any information with respect 
to any person for whom services were provided by any firm or 
association of which such individual was a member, partner, or employee 
unless such individual was directly involved in the provision of such 
services.
            ``(7) A description of parties to and terms of any 
        agreement or arrangement with respect to (A) future employment; 
        (B) a leave of absence during the period of the reporting 
        individual's Government service; (C) continuation of payments 
        by a former employer other than the United States Government; 
        and (D) continuing participation in an employee welfare or 
        benefit plan maintained by a former employer. The description 
        of any formal agreement for future employment shall include the 
        date on which that agreement was entered into.
            ``(8) The category of the total cash value of any interest 
        of the reporting individual in a qualified blind trust.
    ``(b)(1) Each report filed pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) of 
section 301 shall include a full and complete statement with respect to 
the information required by--
            ``(A) paragraphs (1) and (6) of subsection (a) for the year 
        of filing and the preceding calendar year,
            ``(B) paragraphs (3) and (4) of subsection (a) as of the 
        date specified in the report but which is less than 31 days 
        before the filing date, and
            ``(C) paragraph (7) of subsection (a) as of the filing date 
        but for periods described in such paragraph.
    ``(2)(A) In lieu of filling out 1 or more schedules of a financial 
disclosure form, an individual may supply the required information in 
an alternative format, pursuant to either rules adopted by the Office 
of Government Ethics or pursuant to a specific written determination by 
the Director of the Office of Government Ethics for a reporting 
individual.
    ``(B) In lieu of indicating the category of amount or value of any 
item contained in any report filed under this title, a reporting 
individual may indicate the exact dollar amount of such item.
    ``(c)(1) In the case of any individual referred to in section 
301(c), the Office of Government Ethics may by regulation require a 
reporting period to include any period in which the individual served 
as an officer or employee described in section 301(e) and the period 
would not otherwise be covered by any public report filed pursuant to 
this title.
    ``(2) In the case of any individual referred to in section 301(d), 
any reference to the preceding calendar year shall be considered also 
to include that part of the calendar year of filing up to the date of 
the termination of employment.
    ``(d)(1) The categories for reporting the amount or value of the 
items covered in subsection (a)(3) are--
            ``(A) greater than $5,000 but not more than $15,000;
            ``(B) greater than $15,000 but not more than $100,000;
            ``(C) greater than $100,000 but not more than $1,000,000;
            ``(D) greater than $1,000,000 but not more than $2,500,000; 
        and
            ``(E) greater than $2,500,000.
    ``(2) For the purposes of subsection (a)(3) if the current value of 
an interest in real property (or an interest in a real estate 
partnership) is not ascertainable without an appraisal, an individual 
may list (A) the date of purchase and the purchase price of the 
interest in the real property, or (B) the assessed value of the real 
property for tax purposes, adjusted to reflect the market value of the 
property used for the assessment if the assessed value is computed at 
less than 100 percent of such market value, but such individual shall 
include in his report a full and complete description of the method 
used to determine such assessed value, instead of specifying a category 
of value pursuant to paragraph (1). If the current value of any other 
item required to be reported under subsection (a)(3) is not 
ascertainable without an appraisal, such individual may list the book 
value of a corporation whose stock is not publicly traded, the net 
worth of a business partnership, the equity value of an individually 
owned business, or with respect to other holdings, any recognized 
indication of value, but such individual shall include in his report a 
full and complete description of the method used in determining such 
value. In lieu of any value referred to in the preceding sentence, an 
individual may list the assessed value of the item for tax purposes, 
adjusted to reflect the market value of the item used for the 
assessment if the assessed value is computed at less than 100 percent 
of such market value, but a full and complete description of the method 
used in determining such assessed value shall be included in the 
report.
    ``(3) The categories for reporting the amount or value of the items 
covered in paragraphs (4) and (8) of subsection (a) are--
            ``(A) greater than $20,000 but not more than $100,000;
            ``(B) greater than $100,000 but not more than $500,000;
            ``(C) greater than $500,000 but not more than $1,000,000; 
        and
            ``(D) greater than $1,000,000.
    ``(e)(1) Except as provided in subparagraph (F), each report 
required by section 301 shall also contain information listed in 
paragraphs (1) through (5) of subsection (a) respecting the spouse or 
dependent child of the reporting individual as follows:
            ``(A) The sources of earned income earned by a spouse 
        including honoraria which exceed $500 except that, with respect 
        to earned income if the spouse is self-employed in business or 
        a profession, only the nature of such business or profession 
        need be reported.
            ``(B) All information required to be reported in subsection 
        (a)(1)(B) with respect to investment income derived by a spouse 
        or dependent child.
            ``(C) In the case of any gifts received by a spouse or 
        dependent child which are not received totally independent of 
        the relationship of the spouse or dependent child to the 
        reporting individual, the identity of the source and a brief 
        description of gifts of transportation, lodging, food, or 
        entertainment and a brief description and the value of other 
        gifts.
            ``(D) In the case of any reimbursements received by a 
        spouse or dependent child which are not received totally 
        independent of the relationship of the spouse or dependent 
        child to the reporting individual, the identity of the source 
        and a brief description of each such reimbursement.
            ``(E) In the case of items described in paragraphs (3) 
        through (5) of subsection (a), all information required to be 
        reported under these paragraphs other than items which the 
        reporting individual certifies (i) represent the spouse's or 
        dependent child's sole financial interest or responsibility and 
        which the reporting individual has no knowledge of, (ii) are 
        not in any way, past or present, derived from the income, 
        assets, or activities of the reporting individual, and (iii) 
        that he neither derives, nor expects to derive, any financial 
        or economic benefit.
            ``(F) Reports required by subsections (a), (b), and (c) of 
        section 301 shall, with respect to the spouse and dependent 
        child of the reporting individual, only contain information 
        listed in paragraphs (1), (3), and (4) of subsection (a).
    ``(2) No report shall be required with respect to a spouse living 
separate and apart from the reporting individual with the intention of 
terminating the marriage or providing for permanent separation, or with 
respect to any income or obligations of an individual arising from the 
dissolution of his marriage or the permanent separation from his 
spouse.
    ``(f)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), each reporting 
individual shall report the information required to be reported 
pursuant to subsections (a), (b), and (c) with respect to the holdings 
of and the income from a trust or other financial arrangement from 
which income is received by, or with respect to which a beneficial 
interest in principal or income is held by, such individual, his 
spouse, or any dependent child.
    ``(2) A reporting individual need not report the holdings of or the 
source of income from any of the holdings of--
            ``(A) any qualified blind trust (as defined in paragraph 
        (3));
            ``(B) a trust--
                    ``(i) which was not created directly by such 
                individual, his spouse, or any dependent child, and
                    ``(ii) the holdings or sources of income of which 
                such individual, his spouse, and any dependent child 
                have no knowledge; or
            ``(C) an entity described under the provisions of paragraph 
        (8), but such individual shall report the category of the 
        amount of income received by him, his spouse, or any dependent 
        child from the entity under subsection (a)(1)(B).
    ``(3) For purposes of this subsection, the term `qualified blind 
trust' includes any trust in which a reporting individual, his spouse, 
or any minor or dependent child has a beneficial interest in the 
principal or income, and which meets the following requirements:
            ``(A)(i) The trustee of the trust and any other entity 
        designated in the trust instrument to perform fiduciary duties 
        is a financial institution, an attorney, a certified public 
        accountant, a broker, or an investment advisor who--
                    ``(I) is independent of and not associated with any 
                interested party so that the trustee or other person 
                cannot be controlled or influenced in the 
                administration of the trust by any interested party;
                    ``(II) is not and has not been an employee of or 
                affiliated with any interested party and is not a 
                partner of, or involved in any joint venture or other 
                investment with, any interested party; and
                    ``(III) is not a relative of any interested party.
            ``(ii) Any officer or employee of a trustee or other entity 
        who is involved in the management or control of the trust--
                    ``(I) is independent of and not associated with any 
                interested party so that such officer or employee 
                cannot be controlled or influenced in the 
                administration of the trust by any interested party;
                    ``(II) is not a partner of, or involved in any 
                joint venture or other investment with, any interested 
                party; and
                    ``(III) is not a relative of any interested party.
            ``(B) Any asset transferred to the trust by an interested 
        party is free of any restriction with respect to its transfer 
        or sale unless such restriction is expressly approved by the 
        Office of Government Ethics.
            ``(C) The trust instrument which establishes the trust 
        provides that--
                    ``(i) except to the extent provided in subparagraph 
                (B), the trustee in the exercise of his authority and 
                discretion to manage and control the assets of the 
                trust shall not consult or notify any interested party;
                    ``(ii) the trust shall not contain any asset the 
                holding of which by an interested party is prohibited 
                by any law or regulation;
                    ``(iii) the trustee shall promptly notify the 
                reporting individual and the Office of Government 
                Ethics when the holdings of any particular asset 
                transferred to the trust by any interested party are 
                disposed of or when the value of such holding is less 
                than $1,000;
                    ``(iv) the trust tax return shall be prepared by 
                the trustee or his designee, and such return and any 
                information relating thereto (other than the trust 
                income summarized in appropriate categories necessary 
                to complete an interested party's tax return), shall 
                not be disclosed to any interested party;
                    ``(v) an interested party shall not receive any 
                report on the holdings and sources of income of the 
                trust, except a report at the end of each calendar 
                quarter with respect to the total cash value of the 
                interest of the interested party in the trust or the 
                net income or loss of the trust or any reports 
                necessary to enable the interested party to complete an 
                individual tax return required by law or to provide the 
                information required by subsection (a)(1) of this 
                section, but such report shall not identify any asset 
                or holding;
                    ``(vi) except for communications which solely 
                consist of requests for distributions of cash or other 
                unspecified assets of the trust, there shall be no 
                direct or indirect communication between the trustee 
                and an interested party with respect to the trust 
                unless such communication is in writing and unless it 
                relates only (I) to the general financial interest and 
                needs of the interested party (including, but not 
                limited to, an interest in maximizing income or long-
                term capital gain), (II) to the notification of the 
                trustee of a law or regulation subsequently applicable 
                to the reporting individual which prohibits the 
                interested party from holding an asset, which 
                notification directs that the asset not be held by the 
                trust, or (III) to directions to the trustee to sell 
                all of an asset initially placed in the trust by an 
                interested party which in the determination of the 
                reporting individual creates a conflict of interest or 
                the appearance thereof due to the subsequent assumption 
                of duties by the reporting individual (but nothing 
                herein shall require any such direction); and
                    ``(vii) the interested parties shall make no effort 
                to obtain information with respect to the holdings of 
                the trust, including obtaining a copy of any trust tax 
                return filed or any information relating thereto except 
                as otherwise provided in this subsection.
            ``(D) The proposed trust instrument and the proposed 
        trustee is approved by the Office of Government Ethics.
            ``(E) For purposes of this subsection, `interested party' 
        means a reporting individual, his spouse, and any minor or 
        dependent child; `broker' has the meaning set forth in section 
        3(a)(4) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 
        78c(a)(4)); and `investment adviser' includes any investment 
        adviser who, as determined under regulations prescribed by the 
        supervising ethics office, is generally involved in his role as 
        such an adviser in the management or control of trusts.
    ``(4)(A) An asset placed in a trust by an interested party shall be 
considered a financial interest of the reporting individual, for the 
purposes of any applicable conflict of interest statutes, regulations, 
or rules of the Federal Government (including section 208 of title 18, 
United States Code), until such time as the reporting individual is 
notified by the trustee that such asset has been disposed of, or has a 
value of less than $1,000.
    ``(B)(i) The provisions of subparagraph (A) shall not apply with 
respect to a trust created for the benefit of a reporting individual, 
or the spouse, dependent child, or minor child of such a person, if the 
Office of Government Ethics finds that--
            ``(I) the assets placed in the trust consist of a well-
        diversified portfolio of readily marketable securities;
            ``(II) none of the assets consist of securities of entities 
        having substantial activities in the area of the reporting 
        individual's primary area of responsibility;
            ``(III) the trust instrument prohibits the trustee, 
        notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (3)(C) (iii) and 
        (iv), from making public or informing any interested party of 
        the sale of any securities;
            ``(IV) the trustee is given power of attorney, 
        notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (3)(C)(v), to 
        prepare on behalf of any interested party the personal income 
        tax returns and similar returns which may contain information 
        relating to the trust; and
            ``(V) except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, the 
        trust instrument provides (or in the case of a trust which by 
        its terms does not permit amendment, the trustee, the reporting 
        individual, and any other interested party agree in writing) 
        that the trust shall be administered in accordance with the 
        requirements of this subsection and the trustee of such trust 
        meets the requirements of paragraph (3)(A).
    ``(ii) In any instance covered by subparagraph (B) in which the 
reporting individual is an individual whose nomination is being 
considered by a congressional committee, the reporting individual shall 
inform the congressional committee considering his nomination before or 
during the period of such individual's confirmation hearing of his 
intention to comply with this paragraph.
    ``(5)(A) The reporting individual shall, within 30 days after a 
qualified blind trust is approved by the Office of Government Ethics, 
file with such office a copy of--
            ``(i) the executed trust instrument of such trust (other 
        than those provisions which relate to the testamentary 
        disposition of the trust assets), and
            ``(ii) a list of the assets which were transferred to such 
        trust, including the category of value of each asset as 
        determined under subsection (d).
This subparagraph shall not apply with respect to a trust meeting the 
requirements for being considered a qualified blind trust under 
paragraph (7).
    ``(B) The reporting individual shall, within 30 days of 
transferring an asset (other than cash) to a previously established 
qualified blind trust, notify the Office of Government Ethics of the 
identity of each such asset and the category of value of each asset as 
determined under subsection (d) of this section.
    ``(C) Within 30 days of the dissolution of a qualified blind trust, 
a reporting individual shall notify the Office of Government Ethics of 
such dissolution.
    ``(D) Documents filed under subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C) and the 
lists provided by the trustee of assets placed in the trust by an 
interested party which have been sold shall be made available to the 
public in the same manner as a report is made available under section 
305 and the provisions of that section shall apply with respect to such 
documents and lists.
    ``(E) A copy of each written communication with respect to the 
trust under paragraph (3)(C)(vi) shall be filed by the person 
initiating the communication with the Office of Government Ethics 
within 5 days of the date of the communication.
    ``(6)(A) A trustee of a qualified blind trust shall not knowingly 
and willfully, or negligently, (i) disclose any information to an 
interested party with respect to such trust that may not be disclosed 
under paragraph (3); (ii) acquire any holding the ownership of which is 
prohibited by the trust instrument; (iii) solicit advice from any 
interested party with respect to such trust, which solicitation is 
prohibited by paragraph (3) or the trust agreement; or (iv) fail to 
file any document required by this subsection.
    ``(B) A reporting individual shall not knowingly and willfully, or 
negligently, (i) solicit or receive any information with respect to a 
qualified blind trust of which he is an interested party that may not 
be disclosed under paragraph (3)(C) or (ii) fail to file any document 
required by this subsection.
    ``(C)(i) The Attorney General may bring a civil action in any 
appropriate United States district court against any individual who 
knowingly and willfully violates the provisions of subparagraph (A) or 
(B). The court in which such action is brought may assess against such 
individual a civil penalty in any amount not to exceed $10,000.
    ``(ii) The Attorney General may bring a civil action in any 
appropriate United States district court against any individual who 
negligently violates the provisions of subparagraph (A) or (B). The 
court in which such action is brought may assess against such 
individual a civil penalty in any amount not to exceed $5,000.
    ``(7) Any trust may be considered to be a qualified blind trust 
if--
            ``(A) the trust instrument is amended to comply with the 
        requirements of paragraph (3) or, in the case of a trust 
        instrument which does not by its terms permit amendment, the 
        trustee, the reporting individual, and any other interested 
        party agree in writing that the trust shall be administered in 
        accordance with the requirements of this subsection and the 
        trustee of such trust meets the requirements of paragraph 
        (3)(A); except that in the case of any interested party who is 
        a dependent child, a parent or guardian of such child may 
        execute the agreement referred to in this subparagraph;
            ``(B) a copy of the trust instrument (except testamentary 
        provisions) and a copy of the agreement referred to in 
        subparagraph (A), and a list of the assets held by the trust at 
        the time of approval by the Office of Government Ethics, 
        including the category of value of each asset as determined 
        under subsection (d), are filed with such office and made 
        available to the public as provided under paragraph (5)(D); and
            ``(C) the Director of the Office of Government Ethics 
        determines that approval of the trust arrangement as a 
        qualified blind trust is in the particular case appropriate to 
        assure compliance with applicable laws and regulations.
    ``(8) A reporting individual shall not be required to report the 
financial interests held by a widely held investment fund (whether such 
fund is a mutual fund, regulated investment company, pension or 
deferred compensation plan, or other investment fund), if--
            ``(A)(i) the fund is publicly traded; or
            ``(ii) the assets of the fund are widely diversified; and
            ``(B) the reporting individual neither exercises control 
        over nor has the ability to exercise control over the financial 
        interests held by the fund.
    ``(9)(A)(i) A reporting individual described in subsection (a) or 
(b) of section 301 shall not be required to report the holdings or 
sources of income of any trust or investment fund where--
            ``(I) reporting would result in the disclosure of assets or 
        sources of income of another person whose interests are not 
        required to be reported by the reporting individual under this 
        title;
            ``(II) the disclosure of such assets and sources of income 
        is prohibited by contract or the assets and sources of income 
        are not otherwise publicly available; and
            ``(III) the reporting individual has executed a written 
        ethics agreement which contains a general description of the 
        trust or investment fund and a commitment to divest the 
        interest in the trust or investment fund not later than 90 days 
        after the date of the agreement.
    ``(ii) An agreement described under clause (i)(III) shall be 
attached to the public financial disclosure which would otherwise 
include a listing of the holdings or sources of income from this trust 
or investment fund.
    ``(B)(i) The provisions of subparagraph (A) shall apply to an 
individual described in subsection (c) or (d) of section 301 if--
            ``(I) the interest in the trust or investment fund is 
        acquired involuntarily during the period to be covered by the 
        report, such as through marriage or inheritance, and
            ``(II) for an individual described in subsection (c), the 
        individual executes a written ethics agreement containing a 
        commitment to divest the interest no later than 90 days after 
        the date on which the report is due.
    ``(ii) An agreement described under clause (i)(II) shall be 
attached to the public financial disclosure which would otherwise 
include a listing of the holdings or sources of income from this trust 
or investment fund.
    ``(iii) Failure to divest within the time specified or after an 
extension granted by the Director of the Office of Government Ethics 
for good cause shown shall result in an immediate requirement to report 
as specified in paragraph (1).
    ``(g) Political campaign funds, including campaign receipts and 
expenditures, need not be included in any report filed pursuant to this 
title.
    ``(h) A report filed pursuant to subsection (a), (c), or (d) of 
section 301 need not contain the information described in subparagraphs 
(A), (B), and (C) of subsection (a)(2) with respect to gifts and 
reimbursements received in a period when the reporting individual was 
not an officer or employee of the Federal Government.
    ``(i) A reporting individual shall not be required under this title 
to report--
            ``(1) financial interests in or income derived from--
                    ``(A) any retirement system under title 5, United 
                States Code (including the Thrift Savings Plan under 
                subchapter III of chapter 84 of such title); or
                    ``(B) any other retirement system maintained by the 
                United States for officers or employees of the United 
                States, including the President, or for members of the 
                uniformed services; or
            ``(2) benefits received under the Social Security Act (42 
        U.S.C. 301 et seq.).
    ``(j)(1) Every month, each designated agency ethics officer shall 
submit to the Office of Government Ethics notification of any waiver of 
criminal conflict of interest laws granted to any individual in the 
preceding month with respect to a filing under this title that is not 
confidential.
    ``(2) Every month, the Office of Government Ethics shall make 
publicly available on the Internet--
            ``(A) all notifications of waivers submitted under 
        paragraph (1) in the preceding month; and
            ``(B) notification of all waivers granted by the Office of 
        Government Ethics in the preceding month.
    ``(k) A full copy of any waiver of criminal conflict of interest 
laws granted shall be included with any filing required under this 
title with respect to the year in which the waiver is granted.
    ``(l) The Office of Government Ethics shall provide upon request 
any waiver on file for which notice has been published.

``SEC. 303. FILING OF REPORTS.

    ``(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, the reports 
required under this title shall be filed by the reporting individual 
with the designated agency ethics official at the agency by which he is 
employed (or in the case of an individual described in section 301(d), 
was employed) or in which he will serve. The date any report is 
received (and the date of receipt of any supplemental report) shall be 
noted on such report by such official.
    ``(b) Reports required to be filed under this title by the Director 
of the Office of Government Ethics shall be filed in the Office of 
Government Ethics and, immediately after being filed, shall be made 
available to the public in accordance with this title.
    ``(c) Reports required of members of the uniformed services shall 
be filed with the Secretary concerned.
    ``(d) The Office of Government Ethics shall develop and make 
available forms for reporting the information required by this title.

``SEC. 304. FAILURE TO FILE OR FILING FALSE REPORTS.

    ``(a) The Attorney General may bring a civil action in any 
appropriate United States district court against any individual who 
knowingly and willfully falsifies or who knowingly and willfully fails 
to file or report any information that such individual is required to 
report pursuant to section 302. The court in which such action is 
brought may assess against such individual a civil penalty in any 
amount, not to exceed $10,000.
    ``(b) The head of each agency, each Secretary concerned, or the 
Director of the Office of Government Ethics, as the case may be, shall 
refer to the Attorney General the name of any individual which such 
official has reasonable cause to believe has willfully failed to file a 
report or has willfully falsified or willfully failed to file 
information required to be reported.
    ``(c) The President, the Vice President, the Secretary concerned, 
or the head of each agency may take any appropriate personnel or other 
action in accordance with applicable law or regulation against any 
individual failing to file a report or falsifying or failing to report 
information required to be reported.
    ``(d)(1) Any individual who files a report required to be filed 
under this title more than 30 days after the later of--
            ``(A) the date such report is required to be filed pursuant 
        to the provisions of this title and the rules and regulations 
        promulgated thereunder; or
            ``(B) if a filing extension is granted to such individual 
        under section 301(g), the last day of the filing extension 
        period, shall, at the direction of and pursuant to regulations 
        issued by the Office of Government Ethics, pay a filing fee of 
        $500. All such fees shall be deposited in the miscellaneous 
        receipts of the Treasury. The authority under this paragraph to 
        direct the payment of a filing fee may be delegated by the 
        Office of Government Ethics to other agencies in the executive 
        branch.
    ``(2) The Office of Government Ethics may waive the filing fee 
under this subsection for good cause shown.

``SEC. 305. CUSTODY OF AND PUBLIC ACCESS TO REPORTS.

    ``Any report filed with or transmitted to an agency or the Office 
of Government Ethics pursuant to this title shall be retained by such 
agency or Office, as the case may be, for a period of 6 years after 
receipt of the report. After such 6-year period the report shall be 
destroyed unless needed in an ongoing investigation, except that in the 
case of an individual who filed the report pursuant to section 301(b) 
and was not subsequently confirmed by the Senate, such reports shall be 
destroyed 1 year after the individual is no longer under consideration 
by the Senate, unless needed in an ongoing investigation.

``SEC. 306. REVIEW OF REPORTS.

    ``(a) Each designated agency ethics official or Secretary concerned 
shall make provisions to ensure that each report filed with him under 
this title is reviewed within 60 days after the date of such filing, 
except that the Director of the Office of Government Ethics shall 
review only those reports required to be transmitted to him under this 
title within 60 days after the date of transmittal.
    ``(b)(1) If after reviewing any report under subsection (a), the 
Director of the Office of Government Ethics, the Secretary concerned, 
or the designated agency ethics official, as the case may be, is of the 
opinion that on the basis of information contained in such report the 
individual submitting such report is in compliance with applicable laws 
and regulations, he shall state such opinion on the report, and shall 
sign such report.
    ``(2) If the Director of the Office of Government Ethics, the 
Secretary concerned, or the designated agency ethics official after 
reviewing any report under subsection (a)--
            ``(A) believes additional information is required to be 
        submitted to complete the form or to perform a conflict of 
        interest analysis, he shall notify the individual submitting 
        such report what additional information is required and the 
        time by which it must be submitted, or
            ``(B) is of the opinion, on the basis of information 
        submitted, that the individual is not in compliance with 
        applicable laws and regulations, he shall notify the 
        individual, afford a reasonable opportunity for a written or 
        oral response, and after consideration of such response, reach 
        an opinion as to whether or not, on the basis of information 
        submitted, the individual is in compliance with such laws and 
        regulations.
    ``(3) If the Director of the Office of Government Ethics, the 
Secretary concerned, or the designated agency ethics official reaches 
an opinion under paragraph (2)(B) that an individual is not in 
compliance with applicable laws and regulations, the official shall 
notify the individual of that opinion and, after an opportunity for 
personal consultation (if practicable), determine and notify the 
individual of which steps, if any, would in the opinion of such 
official be appropriate for assuring compliance with such laws and 
regulations and the date by which such steps should be taken. Such 
steps may include, as appropriate--
            ``(A) divestiture,
            ``(B) restitution,
            ``(C) the establishment of a blind trust,
            ``(D) request for an exemption under section 208(b) of 
        title 18, United States Code, or
            ``(E) voluntary request for transfer, reassignment, 
        limitation of duties, or resignation.
The use of any such steps shall be in accordance with such rules or 
regulations as the Office of Government Ethics may prescribe.
    ``(4) If steps for assuring compliance with applicable laws and 
regulations are not taken by the date set under paragraph (3) by a 
member of the Foreign Service or the uniformed services, the Secretary 
concerned shall take appropriate action.
    ``(5) If steps for assuring compliance with applicable laws and 
regulations are not taken by the date set under paragraph (3) by any 
other officer or employee, the matter shall be referred to the head of 
the appropriate agency for appropriate action.
    ``(6) The Office of Government Ethics may render advisory opinions 
interpreting this title. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
the individual to whom a public advisory opinion is rendered in 
accordance with this paragraph, and any other individual covered by 
this title who is involved in a fact situation which is 
indistinguishable in all material aspects, and who acts in good faith 
in accordance with the provisions and findings of such advisory opinion 
shall not, as a result of such act, be subject to any penalty or 
sanction provided by this title.

``SEC. 307. CONFIDENTIAL REPORTS AND OTHER ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS.

    ``(a)(1) The Office of Government Ethics may require officers and 
employees of the executive branch (including special Government 
employees as defined in section 202 of title 18, United States Code) to 
file confidential financial disclosure reports, in such form as it may 
prescribe. The information required to be reported under this 
subsection by the officers and employees of any department or agency 
listed in section 301(e) shall be set forth in rules or regulations 
prescribed by the Office of Government Ethics, and may be less 
extensive than otherwise required by this title, or more extensive when 
determined by the Office of Government Ethics to be necessary and 
appropriate in light of sections 202 through 209 of title 18, United 
States Code, regulations promulgated thereunder, or the authorized 
activities of such officers or employees. Any individual required to 
file a report pursuant to section 301 shall not be required to file a 
confidential report pursuant to this subsection, except with respect to 
information which is more extensive than information otherwise required 
by this title. Section 305 shall not apply with respect to any such 
report.
    ``(2) Any information required to be provided by an individual 
under this subsection shall be confidential and shall not be disclosed 
to the public.
    ``(3) Nothing in this subsection exempts any individual otherwise 
covered by the requirement to file a public financial disclosure report 
under this title from such requirement.
    ``(b) The provisions of this title requiring the reporting of 
information shall supersede any general requirement under any other 
provision of law or regulation with respect to the reporting of 
information required for purposes of preventing conflicts of interest 
or apparent conflicts of interest. Such provisions of this title shall 
not supersede the requirements of section 7342 of title 5, United 
States Code.
    ``(c) Nothing in this Act requiring reporting of information shall 
be deemed to authorize the receipt of income, gifts, or reimbursements; 
the holding of assets, liabilities, or positions; or the participation 
in transactions that are prohibited by law, Executive order, rule, or 
regulation.

``SEC. 308. AUTHORITY OF COMPTROLLER GENERAL.

    ``The Comptroller General shall have access to financial disclosure 
reports filed under this title for the purposes of carrying out his 
statutory responsibilities.

``SEC. 309. DEFINITIONS.

    ``For the purposes of this title--
            ``(1) the term `dependent child' means, when used with 
        respect to any reporting individual, any individual who is a 
        son, daughter, stepson, or stepdaughter and who--
                    ``(A) is unmarried and under age 21 and is living 
                in the household of such reporting individual; or
                    ``(B) is a dependent of such reporting individual 
                within the meaning of section 152 of the Internal 
                Revenue Code of 1986 (26 U.S.C. 152);
            ``(2) the term `designated agency ethics official' means an 
        officer or employee who is designated to administer the 
        provisions of this title within an agency;
            ``(3) the term `executive branch' includes--
                    ``(A) each Executive agency (as defined in section 
                105 of title 5, United States Code), other than the 
                General Accounting Office; and
                    ``(B) any other entity or administrative unit in 
                the executive branch;
            ``(4) the term `gift' means a payment, advance, 
        forbearance, rendering, or deposit of money, or any thing of 
        value, unless consideration of equal or greater value is 
        received by the donor, but does not include--
                    ``(A) bequests and other forms of inheritance;
                    ``(B) suitable mementos of a function honoring the 
                reporting individual;
                    ``(C) food, lodging, transportation, and 
                entertainment provided by a foreign government within a 
                foreign country or by the United States Government, the 
                District of Columbia, or a State or local government or 
                political subdivision thereof;
                    ``(D) food and beverages which are not consumed in 
                connection with a gift of overnight lodging;
                    ``(E) communications to the offices of a reporting 
                individual, including subscriptions to newspapers and 
                periodicals; or
                    ``(F) items that are accepted pursuant to or are 
                required to be reported by the reporting individual 
                under section 7342 of title 5, United States Code.
            ``(5) the term `honorarium' means a payment of money or 
        anything of value for an appearance, speech, or article;
            ``(6) the term `income' means all income from whatever 
        source derived, including but not limited to the following 
        items: compensation for services, including fees, commissions, 
        and similar items; gross income derived from business (and net 
        income if the individual elects to include it); gains derived 
        from dealings in property; interest; rents; royalties; prizes 
        and awards; dividends; annuities; income from life insurance 
        and endowment contracts; pensions; income from discharge of 
        indebtedness; distributive share of partnership income; and 
        income from an interest in an estate or trust;
            ``(7) the term `personal hospitality of any individual' 
        means hospitality extended for a nonbusiness purpose by an 
        individual, not a corporation or organization, at the personal 
        residence of that individual or his family or on property or 
        facilities owned by that individual or his family;
            ``(8) the term `reimbursement' means any payment or other 
        thing of value received by the reporting individual, other than 
        gifts, to cover travel-related expenses of such individual 
        other than those which are--
                    ``(A) provided by the United States Government, the 
                District of Columbia, or a State or local government or 
                political subdivision thereof;
                    ``(B) required to be reported by the reporting 
                individual under section 7342 of title 5, United States 
                Code; or
                    ``(C) required to be reported under section 304 of 
                the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 
                434);
            ``(9) the term `relative' means an individual who is 
        related to the reporting individual, as father, mother, son, 
        daughter, brother, sister, uncle, aunt, great aunt, great 
        uncle, first cousin, nephew, niece, husband, wife, grandfather, 
        grandmother, grandson, granddaughter, father-in-law, mother-in-
        law, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, brother-in-law, sister-in-
        law, stepfather, stepmother, stepson, stepdaughter, 
        stepbrother, stepsister, half brother, half sister, or who is 
        the grandfather or grandmother of the spouse of the reporting 
        individual, and shall be deemed to include the fiance or 
        fiancee of the reporting individual;
            ``(10) the term `Secretary concerned' has the meaning set 
        forth in section 101(a)(9) of title 10, United States Code; and
            ``(11) the term `value' means a good faith estimate of the 
        dollar value if the exact value is neither known nor easily 
        obtainable by the reporting individual.

``SEC. 310. NOTICE OF ACTIONS TAKEN TO COMPLY WITH ETHICS AGREEMENTS.

    ``(a) In any case in which an individual agrees with that 
individual's designated agency ethics official, the Office of 
Government Ethics, or a Senate confirmation committee, to take any 
action to comply with this Act or any other law or regulation governing 
conflicts of interest of, or establishing standards of conduct 
applicable with respect to, officers or employees of the Government, 
that individual shall notify in writing the designated agency ethics 
official, the Office of Government Ethics, or the appropriate committee 
of the Senate, as the case may be, of any action taken by the 
individual pursuant to that agreement. Such notification shall be made 
not later than the date specified in the agreement by which action by 
the individual must be taken, or not later than 3 months after the date 
of the agreement, if no date for action is so specified. If all actions 
agreed to have not been completed by the date of this notification, 
such notification shall continue on a monthly basis thereafter until 
the individual has met the terms of the agreement.
    ``(b) If an agreement described in subsection (a) requires that the 
individual recuse himself or herself from particular categories of 
agency or other official action, the individual shall reduce to writing 
those subjects regarding which the recusal agreement will apply and the 
process by which it will be determined whether the individual must 
recuse himself or herself in a specific instance. An individual shall 
be considered to have complied with the requirements of subsection (a) 
with respect to such recusal agreement if such individual files a copy 
of the document setting forth the information described in the 
preceding sentence with such individual's designated agency ethics 
official or the Office of Government Ethics within the time prescribed 
in the penultimate sentence of subsection (a).

``SEC. 311. ADMINISTRATION OF PROVISIONS.

    ``The Office of Government Ethics shall issue regulations, develop 
forms, and provide such guidance as is necessary to implement and 
interpret this title.''.
    (b) Exemption From Public Access to Financial Disclosures.--Section 
105(a)(1) of such Act is amended by inserting ``the Office of the 
National Intelligence Director,'' before ``the Central Intelligence 
Agency''.
    (c) Conforming Amendment.--Section 101(f) of such Act is amended--
            (1) in paragraph (12), by striking the period at the end 
        and inserting a semicolon; and
            (2) by adding at the end the following:
``but do not include any officer or employee of any department or 
agency listed in section 301(e).''.

SEC. 5044. REDUCTION OF POSITIONS REQUIRING APPOINTMENT WITH SENATE 
                    CONFIRMATION.

    (a) Definition.--In this section, the term ``agency'' means an 
Executive agency, as defined under section 105 of title 5, United 
States Code.
    (b) Reduction Plan.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
        enactment of this Act, the head of each agency shall submit a 
        Presidential appointment reduction plan to--
                    (A) the President;
                    (B) the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the 
                Senate; and
                    (C) the Committee on Government Reform of the House 
                of Representatives.
            (2) Content.--The plan under this subsection shall provide 
        for the reduction of--
                    (A) the number of positions within that agency that 
                require an appointment by the President, by and with 
                the advice and consent of the Senate; and
                    (B) the number of levels of such positions within 
                that agency.

SEC. 5045. EFFECTIVE DATES.

    (a) Section 5043.--
            (1) In general.--Subject to paragraph (2), the amendments 
        made by section 5043 shall take effect on January 1 of the year 
        following the year in which occurs the date of enactment of 
        this Act.
            (2) Later date.--If this Act is enacted on or after July 1 
        of a year, the amendments made by section 301 shall take effect 
        on July 1 of the following year.
    (b) Section 5044.--Section 5044 shall take effect on the date of 
enactment of this Act.

       CHAPTER 2--FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION REVITALIZATION

SEC. 5051. MANDATORY SEPARATION AGE.

    (a) Civil Service Retirement System.--Section 8335(b) of title 5, 
United States Code, is amended--
            (1) by striking ``(b)'' and inserting ``(b)(1)''; and
            (2) by adding at the end the following:
    ``(2) In the case of employees of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, the second sentence of paragraph (1) shall be applied by 
substituting `65 years of age' for `60 years of age'. The authority to 
grant exemptions in accordance with the preceding sentence shall cease 
to be available after December 31, 2009.''.
    (b) Federal Employees' Retirement System.--Section 8425(b) of title 
5, United States Code, is amended--
            (1) by striking ``(b)'' and inserting ``(b)(1)''; and
            (2) by adding at the end the following:
    ``(2) In the case of employees of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, the second sentence of paragraph (1) shall be applied by 
substituting `65 years of age' for `60 years of age'. The authority to 
grant exemptions in accordance with the preceding sentence shall cease 
to be available after December 31, 2009.''.

SEC. 5052. RETENTION AND RELOCATION BONUSES.

    (a) In General.--Subchapter IV of chapter 57 of title 5, United 
States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

``Sec. 5759. Retention and relocation bonuses for the Federal Bureau of 
                    Investigation

    ``(a) Authority.--The Director of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, after consultation with the Director of the Office of 
Personnel Management, may pay, on a case-by-case basis, a bonus under 
this section to an employee of the Bureau if--
            ``(1)(A) the unusually high or unique qualifications of the 
        employee or a special need of the Bureau for the employee's 
        services makes it essential to retain the employee; and
            ``(B) the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
        determines that, in the absence of such a bonus, the employee 
        would be likely to leave--
                    ``(i) the Federal service; or
                    ``(ii) for a different position in the Federal 
                service; or
            ``(2) the individual is transferred to a different 
        geographic area with a higher cost of living (as determined by 
        the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation).
    ``(b) Service Agreement.--Payment of a bonus under this section is 
contingent upon the employee entering into a written service agreement 
with the Bureau to complete a period of service with the Bureau. Such 
agreement shall include--
            ``(1) the period of service the individual shall be 
        required to complete in return for the bonus; and
            ``(2) the conditions under which the agreement may be 
        terminated before the agreed-upon service period has been 
        completed, and the effect of the termination.
    ``(c) Limitation on Authority.--A bonus paid under this section may 
not exceed 50 percent of the employee's basic pay.
    ``(d) Impact on Basic Pay.--A retention bonus is not part of the 
basic pay of an employee for any purpose.
    ``(e) Termination of Authority.--The authority to grant bonuses 
under this section shall cease to be available after December 31, 
2009.''.
    (b) Clerical Amendment.--The analysis for chapter 57 of title 5, 
United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

``5759. Retention and relocation bonuses for the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation.''.

SEC. 5053. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION RESERVE SERVICE.

    (a) In General.--Chapter 35 of title 5, United States Code, is 
amended by adding at the end the following:

  ``SUBCHAPTER VII--RETENTION OF RETIRED SPECIALIZED EMPLOYEES AT THE 
                    FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

``Sec. 3598. Federal Bureau of Investigation Reserve Service

    ``(a) Establishment.--The Director of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation may provide for the establishment and training of a 
Federal Bureau of Investigation Reserve Service (hereinafter in this 
section referred to as the `FBI Reserve Service') for temporary 
reemployment of employees in the Bureau during periods of emergency, as 
determined by the Director.
    ``(b) Membership.--Membership in the FBI Reserve Service shall be 
limited to individuals who previously served as full-time employees of 
the Bureau.
    ``(c) Annuitants.--If an individual receiving an annuity from the 
Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund on the basis of such 
individual's service becomes temporarily reemployed pursuant to this 
section, such annuity shall not be discontinued thereby. An individual 
so reemployed shall not be considered an employee for the purposes of 
chapter 83 or 84.
    ``(d) No Impact on Bureau Personnel Ceiling.--FBI Reserve Service 
members reemployed on a temporary basis pursuant to this section shall 
not count against any personnel ceiling applicable to the Bureau.
    ``(e) Expenses.--The Director may provide members of the FBI 
Reserve Service transportation and per diem in lieu of subsistence, in 
accordance with applicable provisions of this title, for the purpose of 
participating in any training that relates to service as a member of 
the FBI Reserve Service.
    ``(f) Limitation on Membership.--Membership of the FBI Reserve 
Service is not to exceed 500 members at any given time.''.
    (b) Clerical Amendment.--The analysis for chapter 35 of title 5, 
United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

   ``SUBCHAPTER VII--RETENTION OF RETIRED SPECIALIZED EMPLOYEES AT THE 
                     FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

``3598. Federal Bureau of Investigation Reserve Service.''.

SEC. 5054. CRITICAL POSITIONS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 
                    INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE.

    Section 5377(a)(2) of title 5, United States Code, is amended--
            (1) by striking ``and'' at the end of subparagraph (E);
            (2) by striking the period at the end of subparagraph (F) 
        and inserting ``; and''; and
            (3) by inserting after subparagraph (F) the following:
                    ``(G) a position at the Federal Bureau of 
                Investigation, the primary duties and responsibilities 
                of which relate to intelligence functions (as 
                determined by the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
                Investigation).''.

                    CHAPTER 3--MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY

SEC. 5061. MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY.

    (a) Management Authority.--Section 7103(b)(1)(A) of title 5, United 
States Code, is amended by adding ``homeland security,'' after 
``investigative,''.
    (b) Exclusionary Authority.--Section 842 of the Homeland Security 
Act (Public Law 107-296; 6 U.S.C. 412) is repealed.

              Subtitle F--Security Clearance Modernization

SEC. 5071. DEFINITIONS.

    In this subtitle:
            (1) The term ``Director'' means the National Intelligence 
        Director.
            (2) The term ``agency'' means--
                    (A) an executive agency, as defined in section 105 
                of title 5, United States Code;
                    (B) a military department, as defined in section 
                102 of title 5, United States Code; and
                    (C) elements of the intelligence community, as 
                defined in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 
                1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).
            (3) The term ``authorized investigative agency'' means an 
        agency authorized by law, regulation or direction of the 
        Director to conduct a counterintelligence investigation or 
        investigation of persons who are proposed for access to 
        classified information to ascertain whether such persons 
        satisfy the criteria for obtaining and retaining access to such 
        information.
            (4) The term ``authorized adjudicative agency'' means an 
        agency authorized by law, regulation or direction of the 
        Director to determine eligibility for access to classified 
        information in accordance with Executive Order 12968.
            (5) The term ``highly sensitive program'' means--
                    (A) a government program designated as a Special 
                Access Program (as defined by section 4.1(h) of 
                Executive Order 12958); and
                    (B) a government program that applies restrictions 
                required for--
                            (i) Restricted Data (as defined by section 
                        11 y. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 
                        U.S.C. 2014(y)); or
                            (ii) other information commonly referred to 
                        as ``Sensitive Compartmented Information''.
            (6) The term ``current investigation file'' means, with 
        respect to a security clearance, a file on an investigation or 
        adjudication that has been conducted during--
                    (A) the 5-year period beginning on the date the 
                security clearance was granted, in the case of a Top 
                Secret Clearance, or the date access was granted to a 
                highly sensitive program;
                    (B) the 10-year period beginning on the date the 
                security clearance was granted in the case of a Secret 
                Clearance; and
                    (C) the 15-year period beginning on the date the 
                security clearance was granted in the case of a 
                Confidential Clearance.
            (7) The term ``personnel security investigation'' means any 
        investigation required for the purpose of determining the 
        eligibility of any military, civilian, or government contractor 
        personnel to access classified information.
            (8) The term ``periodic reinvestigations'' means--
                    (A) investigations conducted for the purpose of 
                updating a previously completed background 
                investigation--
                            (i) every five years in the case of a Top 
                        Secret Clearance or access to a highly 
                        sensitive program;
                            (ii) every 10 years in the case of a Secret 
                        Clearance; and
                            (iii) every 15 years in the case of a 
                        Confidential Clearance;
                    (B) on-going investigations to identify personnel 
                security risks as they develop, pursuant to section 
                105(c).
            (9) The term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
                    (A) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
                and the Committees on Armed Services, Judiciary, and 
                Government Reform of the House of Representatives; and
                    (B) the Select Committee on Intelligence and the 
                Committees on Armed Services, Judiciary, and 
                Governmental Affairs of the Senate.

SEC. 5072. SECURITY CLEARANCE AND INVESTIGATIVE PROGRAMS OVERSIGHT AND 
                    ADMINISTRATION.

    The Deputy National Intelligence Director for Community Management 
and Resources shall have responsibility for the following:
            (1) Directing day-to-day oversight of investigations and 
        adjudications for personnel security clearances to highly 
        sensitive programs throughout the Federal Government.
            (2) Developing and implementing uniform and consistent 
        policies and procedures to ensure the effective, efficient, and 
        timely completion of security clearances and determinations for 
        access to highly sensitive programs, including the 
        standardization of security questionnaires, financial 
        disclosure requirements for security clearance applicants, and 
        polygraph policies and procedures.
            (3) Serving as the final authority to designate an 
        authorized investigative agency or authorized adjudicative 
        agency pursuant to section 5074(d).
            (4) Ensuring reciprocal recognition of access to classified 
        information among agencies, including acting as the final 
        authority to arbitrate and resolve disputes involving the 
        reciprocity of security clearances and access to highly 
        sensitive programs.
            (5) Ensuring, to the maximum extent practicable, that 
        sufficient resources are available in each agency to achieve 
        clearance and investigative program goals.
            (6) Reviewing and coordinating the development of tools and 
        techniques for enhancing the conduct of investigations and 
        granting of clearances.

SEC. 5073. RECIPROCITY OF SECURITY CLEARANCE AND ACCESS DETERMINATIONS.

    (a) Requirement for Reciprocity.--(1) All security clearance 
background investigations and determinations completed by an authorized 
investigative agency or authorized adjudicative agency shall be 
accepted by all agencies.
    (2) All security clearance background investigations initiated by 
an authorized investigative agency shall be transferable to any other 
authorized investigative agency.
    (b) Prohibition on Establishing Additional Requirements.--(1) An 
authorized investigative agency or authorized adjudicative agency may 
not establish additional investigative or adjudicative requirements 
(other than requirements for the conduct of a polygraph examination) 
that exceed requirements specified in Executive Orders establishing 
security requirements for access to classified information.
    (2) Notwithstanding the paragraph (1), the Director may establish 
additional requirements as needed for national security purposes.
    (c) Prohibition on Duplicative Investigations.--An authorized 
investigative agency or authorized adjudicative agency may not conduct 
an investigation for purposes of determining whether to grant a 
security clearance to an individual where a current investigation or 
clearance of equal level already exists or has been granted by another 
authorized adjudicative agency.

SEC. 5074. ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONAL DATABASE .

    (a) Establishment.--Not later than 12 months after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Director of the Office of Personnel 
Management, in cooperation with the Director, shall establish, and 
begin operating and maintaining, an integrated, secure, national 
database into which appropriate data relevant to the granting, denial, 
or revocation of a security clearance or access pertaining to military, 
civilian, or government contractor personnel shall be entered from all 
authorized investigative and adjudicative agencies.
    (b) Integration.--The national database established under 
subsection (a) shall function to integrate information from existing 
Federal clearance tracking systems from other authorized investigative 
and adjudicative agencies into a single consolidated database.
    (c) Requirement to Check Database.--Each authorized investigative 
or adjudicative agency shall check the national database established 
under subsection (a) to determine whether an individual the agency has 
identified as requiring a security clearance has already been granted 
or denied a security clearance, or has had a security clearance 
revoked, by any other authorized investigative or adjudicative agency.
    (d) Certification of Authorized Investigative Agencies or 
Authorized Adjudicative Agencies.--The Director shall evaluate the 
extent to which an agency is submitting information to, and requesting 
information from, the national database established under subsection 
(a) as part of a determination of whether to certify the agency as an 
authorized investigative agency or authorized adjudicative agency.
    (e) Exclusion of Certain Intelligence Operatives.--The Director may 
authorize an agency to withhold information about certain individuals 
from the database established under subsection (a) if the Director 
determines it is necessary for national security purposes.
    (f) Compliance.--The Director shall establish a review procedure by 
which agencies can seek review of actions required under section 5073.
    (g) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated such sums as may be necessary for fiscal year 2005 and 
each subsequent fiscal year for the implementation, maintenance and 
operation of the database established in subsection (a).

SEC. 5075. USE OF AVAILABLE TECHNOLOGY IN CLEARANCE INVESTIGATIONS.

    (a) Investigations.--Not later than 12 months after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, each authorized investigative agency that 
conducts personnel security clearance investigations shall use, to the 
maximum extent practicable, available information technology and 
databases to expedite investigative processes and to verify standard 
information submitted as part of an application for a security 
clearance.
    (b) Interim Clearance.--If the application of an applicant for an 
interim clearance has been processed using the technology under 
subsection (a), the interim clearances for the applicant at the secret, 
top secret, and special access program levels may be granted before the 
completion of the appropriate investigation. Any request to process an 
interim clearance shall be given priority, and the authority granting 
the interim clearance shall ensure that final adjudication on the 
application is made within 90 days after the initial clearance is 
granted.
    (c) On-Going Monitoring of Individuals With Security Clearances.--
(1) Authorized investigative agencies and authorized adjudicative 
agencies shall establish procedures for the regular, ongoing 
verification of personnel with security clearances in effect for 
continued access to classified information. Such procedures shall 
include the use of available technology to detect, on a regularly 
recurring basis, any issues of concern that may arise involving such 
personnel and such access.
    (2) Such regularly recurring verification may be used as a basis 
for terminating a security clearance or access and shall be used in 
periodic reinvestigations to address emerging threats and adverse 
events associated with individuals with security clearances in effect 
to the maximum extent practicable.
    (3) If the Director certifies that the national security of the 
United States is not harmed by the discontinuation of periodic 
reinvestigations, the regularly recurring verification under this 
section may replace periodic reinvestigations.

SEC. 5076. REDUCTION IN LENGTH OF PERSONNEL SECURITY CLEARANCE PROCESS.

    (a) 60-Day Period for Determination on Clearances.--Each authorized 
adjudicative agency shall make a determination on an application for a 
personnel security clearance within 60 days after the date of receipt 
of the completed application for a security clearance by an authorized 
investigative agency. The 60-day period shall include--
            (1) a period of not longer than 40 days to complete the 
        investigative phase of the clearance review; and
            (2) a period of not longer than 20 days to complete the 
        adjudicative phase of the clearance review.
    (b) Effective Date and Phase-in.--
            (1) Effective date.--Subsection (a) shall take effect 5 
        years after the date of the enactment of this Act.
            (2) Phase-in.--During the period beginning on a date not 
        later than 2 years after the date after the enactment of this 
        Act and ending on the date on which subsection (a) takes effect 
        as specified in paragraph (1), each authorized adjudicative 
        agency shall make a determination on an application for a 
        personnel security clearance pursuant to this title within 120 
        days after the date of receipt of the application for a 
        security clearance by an authorized investigative agency. The 
        120-day period shall include--
                    (A) a period of not longer than 90 days to complete 
                the investigative phase of the clearance review; and
                    (B) a period of not longer than 30 days to complete 
                the adjudicative phase of the clearance review.

SEC. 5077. SECURITY CLEARANCES FOR PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION.

    (a) Candidates for National Security Positions.--(1) The President-
elect shall submit to the Director the names of candidates for high-
level national security positions, for positions at the level of under 
secretary of executive departments and above, as soon as possible after 
the date of the general elections held to determine the electors of 
President and Vice President under section 1 or 2 of title 3, United 
States Code.
    (2) The Director shall be responsible for the expeditious 
completion of the background investigations necessary to provide 
appropriate security clearances to the individuals who are candidates 
described under paragraph (1) before the date of the inauguration of 
the President-elect as President and the inauguration of the Vice-
President-elect as Vice President.
    (b) Security Clearances for Transition Team Members.--(1) In this 
section, the term ``major party'' has the meaning provided under 
section 9002(6) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.
    (2) Each major party candidate for President, except a candidate 
who is the incumbent President, shall submit, before the date of the 
general presidential election, requests for security clearances for 
prospective transition team members who will have a need for access to 
classified information to carry out their responsibilities as members 
of the President-elect's transition team.
    (3) Necessary background investigations and eligibility 
determinations to permit appropriate prospective transition team 
members to have access to classified information shall be completed, to 
the fullest extent practicable, by the day after the date of the 
general presidential election.

SEC. 5078. REPORTS.

    Not later than February 15, 2006, and annually thereafter through 
2016, the Director shall submit to the appropriate committees of 
Congress a report on the progress made during the preceding year toward 
meeting the requirements specified in this Act. The report shall 
include--
            (1) the periods of time required by the authorized 
        investigative agencies and authorized adjudicative agencies 
        during the year covered by the report for conducting 
        investigations, adjudicating cases, and granting clearances, 
        from date of submission to ultimate disposition and 
        notification to the subject and the subject's employer;
            (2) a discussion of any impediments to the smooth and 
        timely functioning of the implementation of this title; and
            (3) such other information or recommendations as the Deputy 
        Director deems appropriate.

              Subtitle G--Emergency Financial Preparedness

SEC. 5081. DELEGATION AUTHORITY OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

    Subsection (d) of section 306 of title 31, United States Code, is 
amended by inserting ``or employee'' after ``another officer''.

SEC. 5082. EXTENSION OF EMERGENCY ORDER AUTHORITY OF THE SECURITIES AND 
                    EXCHANGE COMMISSION.

    (a) Extension of Authority.--Paragraph (2) of section 12(k) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78l(k)(2)) is amended to 
read as follows:
            ``(2) Emergency orders.--(A) The Commission, in an 
        emergency, may by order summarily take such action to alter, 
        supplement, suspend, or impose requirements or restrictions 
        with respect to any matter or action subject to regulation by 
        the Commission or a self-regulatory organization under the 
        securities laws, as the Commission determines is necessary in 
        the public interest and for the protection of investors--
                    ``(i) to maintain or restore fair and orderly 
                securities markets (other than markets in exempted 
                securities);
                    ``(ii) to ensure prompt, accurate, and safe 
                clearance and settlement of transactions in securities 
                (other than exempted securities); or
                    ``(iii) to reduce, eliminate, or prevent the 
                substantial disruption by the emergency of (I) 
                securities markets (other than markets in exempted 
                securities), investment companies, or any other 
                significant portion or segment of such markets, or (II) 
                the transmission or processing of securities 
                transactions (other than transactions in exempted 
                securities).
            ``(B) An order of the Commission under this paragraph (2) 
        shall continue in effect for the period specified by the 
        Commission, and may be extended. Except as provided in 
        subparagraph (C), the Commission's action may not continue in 
        effect for more than 30 business days, including extensions.
            ``(C) An order of the Commission under this paragraph (2) 
        may be extended to continue in effect for more than 30 business 
        days if, at the time of the extension, the Commission finds 
        that the emergency still exists and determines that the 
        continuation of the order beyond 30 business days is necessary 
        in the public interest and for the protection of investors to 
        attain an objective described in clause (i), (ii), or (iii) of 
        subparagraph (A). In no event shall an order of the Commission 
        under this paragraph (2) continue in effect for more than 90 
        calendar days.
            ``(D) If the actions described in subparagraph (A) involve 
        a security futures product, the Commission shall consult with 
        and consider the views of the Commodity Futures Trading 
        Commission. In exercising its authority under this paragraph, 
        the Commission shall not be required to comply with the 
        provisions of section 553 of title 5, United States Code, or 
        with the provisions of section 19(c) of this title.
            ``(E) Notwithstanding the exclusion of exempted securities 
        (and markets therein) from the Commission's authority under 
        subparagraph (A), the Commission may use such authority to take 
        action to alter, supplement, suspend, or impose requirements or 
        restrictions with respect to clearing agencies for transactions 
        in such exempted securities. In taking any action under this 
        subparagraph, the Commission shall consult with and consider 
        the views of the Secretary of the Treasury.''.
    (b) Consultation; Definition of Emergency.--Section 12(k) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78l(k)) is further amended 
by striking paragraph (6) and inserting the following:
            ``(6) Consultation.--Prior to taking any action described 
        in paragraph (1)(B), the Commission shall consult with and 
        consider the views of the Secretary of the Treasury, Board of 
        Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the Commodity 
        Futures Trading Commission, unless such consultation is 
        impracticable in light of the emergency.
            ``(7) Definitions.--
                    ``(A) Emergency.--For purposes of this subsection, 
                the term `emergency' means--
                            ``(i) a major market disturbance 
                        characterized by or constituting--
                                    ``(I) sudden and excessive 
                                fluctuations of securities prices 
                                generally, or a substantial threat 
                                thereof, that threaten fair and orderly 
                                markets; or
                                    ``(II) a substantial disruption of 
                                the safe or efficient operation of the 
                                national system for clearance and 
                                settlement of transactions in 
                                securities, or a substantial threat 
                                thereof; or
                            ``(ii) a major disturbance that 
                        substantially disrupts, or threatens to 
                        substantially disrupt--
                                    ``(I) the functioning of securities 
                                markets, investment companies, or any 
                                other significant portion or segment of 
                                the securities markets; or
                                    ``(II) the transmission or 
                                processing of securities transactions.
                    ``(B) Securities laws.--Notwithstanding section 
                3(a)(47), for purposes of this subsection, the term 
                `securities laws' does not include the Public Utility 
                Holding Company Act of 1935 (15 U.S.C. 79a et seq.).''.

SEC. 5083. PARALLEL AUTHORITY OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY WITH 
                    RESPECT TO GOVERNMENT SECURITIES.

    Section 15C of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78o-
5) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
    ``(h) Emergency Authority.--The Secretary may by order take any 
action with respect to a matter or action subject to regulation by the 
Secretary under this section, or the rules of the Secretary thereunder, 
involving a government security or a market therein (or significant 
portion or segment of that market), that the Commission may take under 
section 12(k)(2) of this title with respect to transactions in 
securities (other than exempted securities) or a market therein (or 
significant portion or segment of that market).''.

                       Subtitle H--Other Matters

                       Chapter 1--Privacy Matters

SEC. 5091. REQUIREMENT THAT AGENCY RULEMAKING TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION 
                    IMPACTS ON INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY.

    (a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the ``Federal Agency 
Protection of Privacy Act of 2004''.
    (b) In General.--Title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding 
after section 553 the following new section:

``Sec. 553a. Privacy impact assessment in rulemaking

    ``(a) Initial Privacy Impact Assessment.--
            ``(1) In general.--Whenever an agency is required by 
        section 553 of this title, or any other law, to publish a 
        general notice of proposed rulemaking for a proposed rule, or 
        publishes a notice of proposed rulemaking for an interpretative 
        rule involving the internal revenue laws of the United States, 
        and such rule or proposed rulemaking pertains to the 
        collection, maintenance, use, or disclosure of personally 
        identifiable information from 10 or more individuals, other 
        than agencies, instrumentalities, or employees of the Federal 
        government, the agency shall prepare and make available for 
        public comment an initial privacy impact assessment that 
        describes the impact of the proposed rule on the privacy of 
        individuals. Such assessment or a summary thereof shall be 
        signed by the senior agency official with primary 
        responsibility for privacy policy and be published in the 
        Federal Register at the time of the publication of a general 
        notice of proposed rulemaking for the rule.
            ``(2) Contents.--Each initial privacy impact assessment 
        required under this subsection shall contain the following:
                    ``(A) A description and analysis of the extent to 
                which the proposed rule will impact the privacy 
                interests of individuals, including the extent to which 
                the proposed rule--
                            ``(i) provides notice of the collection of 
                        personally identifiable information, and 
                        specifies what personally identifiable 
                        information is to be collected and how it is to 
                        be collected, maintained, used, and disclosed;
                            ``(ii) allows access to such information by 
                        the person to whom the personally identifiable 
                        information pertains and provides an 
                        opportunity to correct inaccuracies;
                            ``(iii) prevents such information, which is 
                        collected for one purpose, from being used for 
                        another purpose; and
                            ``(iv) provides security for such 
                        information.
                    ``(B) A description of any significant alternatives 
                to the proposed rule which accomplish the stated 
                objectives of applicable statutes and which minimize 
                any significant privacy impact of the proposed rule on 
                individuals.
    ``(b) Final Privacy Impact Assessment.--
            ``(1) In general.--Whenever an agency promulgates a final 
        rule under section 553 of this title, after being required by 
        that section or any other law to publish a general notice of 
        proposed rulemaking, or promulgates a final interpretative rule 
        involving the internal revenue laws of the United States, and 
        such rule or proposed rulemaking pertains to the collection, 
        maintenance, use, or disclosure of personally identifiable 
        information from 10 or more individuals, other than agencies, 
        instrumentalities, or employees of the Federal government, the 
        agency shall prepare a final privacy impact assessment, signed 
        by the senior agency official with primary responsibility for 
        privacy policy.
            ``(2) Contents.--Each final privacy impact assessment 
        required under this subsection shall contain the following:
                    ``(A) A description and analysis of the extent to 
                which the final rule will impact the privacy interests 
                of individuals, including the extent to which such 
                rule--
                            ``(i) provides notice of the collection of 
                        personally identifiable information, and 
                        specifies what personally identifiable 
                        information is to be collected and how it is to 
                        be collected, maintained, used, and disclosed;
                            ``(ii) allows access to such information by 
                        the person to whom the personally identifiable 
                        information pertains and provides an 
                        opportunity to correct inaccuracies;
                            ``(iii) prevents such information, which is 
                        collected for one purpose, from being used for 
                        another purpose; and
                            ``(iv) provides security for such 
                        information.
                    ``(B) A summary of any significant issues raised by 
                the public comments in response to the initial privacy 
                impact assessment, a summary of the analysis of the 
                agency of such issues, and a statement of any changes 
                made in such rule as a result of such issues.
                    ``(C) A description of the steps the agency has 
                taken to minimize the significant privacy impact on 
                individuals consistent with the stated objectives of 
                applicable statutes, including a statement of the 
                factual, policy, and legal reasons for selecting the 
                alternative adopted in the final rule and why each one 
                of the other significant alternatives to the rule 
                considered by the agency which affect the privacy 
                interests of individuals was rejected.
            ``(3) Availability to public.--The agency shall make copies 
        of the final privacy impact assessment available to members of 
        the public and shall publish in the Federal Register such 
        assessment or a summary thereof.
    ``(c) Waivers.--
            ``(1) Emergencies.--An agency head may waive or delay the 
        completion of some or all of the requirements of subsections 
        (a) and (b) to the same extent as the agency head may, under 
        section 608, waive or delay the completion of some or all of 
        the requirements of sections 603 and 604, respectively.
            ``(2) National security.--An agency head may, for national 
        security reasons, or to protect from disclosure classified 
        information, confidential commercial information, or 
        information the disclosure of which may adversely affect a law 
        enforcement effort, waive or delay the completion of some or 
        all of the following requirements:
                    ``(A) The requirement of subsection (a)(1) to make 
                an assessment available for public comment.
                    ``(B) The requirement of subsection (a)(1) to have 
                an assessment or summary thereof published in the 
                Federal Register.
                    ``(C) The requirements of subsection (b)(3).
    ``(d) Procedures for Gathering Comments.--When any rule is 
promulgated which may have a significant privacy impact on individuals, 
or a privacy impact on a substantial number of individuals, the head of 
the agency promulgating the rule or the official of the agency with 
statutory responsibility for the promulgation of the rule shall assure 
that individuals have been given an opportunity to participate in the 
rulemaking for the rule through techniques such as--
            ``(1) the inclusion in an advance notice of proposed 
        rulemaking, if issued, of a statement that the proposed rule 
        may have a significant privacy impact on individuals, or a 
        privacy impact on a substantial number of individuals;
            ``(2) the publication of a general notice of proposed 
        rulemaking in publications of national circulation likely to be 
        obtained by individuals;
            ``(3) the direct notification of interested individuals;
            ``(4) the conduct of open conferences or public hearings 
        concerning the rule for individuals, including soliciting and 
        receiving comments over computer networks; and
            ``(5) the adoption or modification of agency procedural 
        rules to reduce the cost or complexity of participation in the 
        rulemaking by individuals.
    ``(e) Periodic Review of Rules.--
            ``(1) In general.--Each agency shall carry out a periodic 
        review of the rules promulgated by the agency that have a 
        significant privacy impact on individuals, or a privacy impact 
        on a substantial number of individuals. Under such periodic 
        review, the agency shall determine, for each such rule, whether 
        the rule can be amended or rescinded in a manner that minimizes 
        any such impact while remaining in accordance with applicable 
        statutes. For each such determination, the agency shall 
        consider the following factors:
                    ``(A) The continued need for the rule.
                    ``(B) The nature of complaints or comments received 
                from the public concerning the rule.
                    ``(C) The complexity of the rule.
                    ``(D) The extent to which the rule overlaps, 
                duplicates, or conflicts with other Federal rules, and, 
                to the extent feasible, with State and local 
                governmental rules.
                    ``(E) The length of time since the rule was last 
                reviewed under this subsection.
                    ``(F) The degree to which technology, economic 
                conditions, or other factors have changed in the area 
                affected by the rule since the rule was last reviewed 
                under this subsection.
            ``(2) Plan required.--Each agency shall carry out the 
        periodic review required by paragraph (1) in accordance with a 
        plan published by such agency in the Federal Register. Each 
        such plan shall provide for the review under this subsection of 
        each rule promulgated by the agency not later than 10 years 
        after the date on which such rule was published as the final 
        rule and, thereafter, not later than 10 years after the date on 
        which such rule was last reviewed under this subsection. The 
        agency may amend such plan at any time by publishing the 
        revision in the Federal Register.
            ``(3) Annual publication.--Each year, each agency shall 
        publish in the Federal Register a list of the rules to be 
        reviewed by such agency under this subsection during the 
        following year. The list shall include a brief description of 
        each such rule and the need for and legal basis of such rule 
        and shall invite public comment upon the determination to be 
        made under this subsection with respect to such rule.
    ``(f) Judicial Review.--
            ``(1) In general.--For any rule subject to this section, an 
        individual who is adversely affected or aggrieved by final 
        agency action is entitled to judicial review of agency 
        compliance with the requirements of subsections (b) and (c) in 
        accordance with chapter 7. Agency compliance with subsection 
        (d) shall be judicially reviewable in connection with judicial 
        review of subsection (b).
            ``(2) Jurisdiction.--Each court having jurisdiction to 
        review such rule for compliance with section 553, or under any 
        other provision of law, shall have jurisdiction to review any 
        claims of noncompliance with subsections (b) and (c) in 
        accordance with chapter 7. Agency compliance with subsection 
        (d) shall be judicially reviewable in connection with judicial 
        review of subsection (b).
            ``(3) Limitations.--
                    ``(A) An individual may seek such review during the 
                period beginning on the date of final agency action and 
                ending 1 year later, except that where a provision of 
                law requires that an action challenging a final agency 
                action be commenced before the expiration of 1 year, 
                such lesser period shall apply to an action for 
                judicial review under this subsection.
                    ``(B) In the case where an agency delays the 
                issuance of a final privacy impact assessment pursuant 
                to subsection (c), an action for judicial review under 
                this section shall be filed not later than--
                            ``(i) 1 year after the date the assessment 
                        is made available to the public; or
                            ``(ii) where a provision of law requires 
                        that an action challenging a final agency 
                        regulation be commenced before the expiration 
                        of the 1-year period, the number of days 
                        specified in such provision of law that is 
                        after the date the assessment is made available 
                        to the public.
            ``(4) Relief.--In granting any relief in an action under 
        this subsection, the court shall order the agency to take 
        corrective action consistent with this section and chapter 7, 
        including, but not limited to--
                    ``(A) remanding the rule to the agency; and
                    ``(B) deferring the enforcement of the rule against 
                individuals, unless the court finds that continued 
                enforcement of the rule is in the public interest.
            ``(5) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this subsection 
        shall be construed to limit the authority of any court to stay 
        the effective date of any rule or provision thereof under any 
        other provision of law or to grant any other relief in addition 
        to the requirements of this subsection.
            ``(6) Record of agency action.--In an action for the 
        judicial review of a rule, the privacy impact assessment for 
        such rule, including an assessment prepared or corrected 
        pursuant to paragraph (4), shall constitute part of the entire 
        record of agency action in connection with such review.
            ``(7) Exclusivity.--Compliance or noncompliance by an 
        agency with the provisions of this section shall be subject to 
        judicial review only in accordance with this subsection.
            ``(8) Savings clause.--Nothing in this subsection bars 
        judicial review of any other impact statement or similar 
        assessment required by any other law if judicial review of such 
        statement or assessment is otherwise permitted by law.
    ``(g) Definition.--For purposes of this section, the term 
`personally identifiable information' means information that can be 
used to identify an individual, including such individual's name, 
address, telephone number, photograph, social security number or other 
identifying information. It includes information about such 
individual's medical or financial condition.''.
    (c) Periodic Review Transition Provisions.--
            (1) Initial plan.--For each agency, the plan required by 
        subsection (e) of section 553a of title 5, United States Code 
        (as added by subsection (a)), shall be published not later than 
        180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
            (2) In the case of a rule promulgated by an agency before 
        the date of the enactment of this Act, such plan shall provide 
        for the periodic review of such rule before the expiration of 
        the 10-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of 
        this Act. For any such rule, the head of the agency may provide 
        for a 1-year extension of such period if the head of the 
        agency, before the expiration of the period, certifies in a 
        statement published in the Federal Register that reviewing such 
        rule before the expiration of the period is not feasible. The 
        head of the agency may provide for additional 1-year extensions 
        of the period pursuant to the preceding sentence, but in no 
        event may the period exceed 15 years.
    (d) Congressional Review.--Section 801(a)(1)(B) of title 5, United 
States Code, is amended--
            (1) by redesignating clauses (iii) and (iv) as clauses (iv) 
        and (v), respectively; and
            (2) by inserting after clause (ii) the following new 
        clause:
            ``(iii) the agency's actions relevant to section 553a;''.
    (e) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the beginning of 
chapter 5 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding after 
the item relating to section 553 the following new item:

553a. Privacy impact assessment in rulemaking.''.

SEC. 5092. CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICERS FOR AGENCIES WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT OR 
                    ANTI-TERRORISM FUNCTIONS.

    (a) In General.--There shall be within each Federal agency with law 
enforcement or anti-terrorism functions a chief privacy officer, who 
shall have primary responsibility within that agency for privacy 
policy. The agency chief privacy officer shall be designated by the 
head of the agency.
    (b) Responsibilities.--The responsibilities of each agency chief 
privacy officer shall include--
            (1) ensuring that the use of technologies sustains, and 
        does not erode, privacy protections relating to the use, 
        collection, and disclosure of personally identifiable 
        information;
            (2) ensuring that personally identifiable information 
        contained in systems of records is handled in full compliance 
        with fair information practices as set out in section 552a of 
        title 5, United States Code;
            (3) evaluating legislative and regulatory proposals 
        involving collection, use, and disclosure of personally 
        identifiable information by the Federal Government;
            (4) conducting a privacy impact assessment of proposed 
        rules of the agency on the privacy of personally identifiable 
        information, including the type of personally identifiable 
        information collected and the number of people affected;
            (5) preparing and submitting a report to Congress on an 
        annual basis on activities of the agency that affect privacy, 
        including complaints of privacy violations, implementation of 
        section 552a of title 5, United States Code, internal controls, 
        and other relevant matters;
            (6) ensuring that the agency protects personally 
        identifiable information and information systems from 
        unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, 
        or destruction in order to provide--
                    (A) integrity, which means guarding against 
                improper information modification or destruction, and 
                includes ensuring information nonrepudiation and 
                authenticity;
                    (B) confidentially, which means preserving 
                authorized restrictions on access and disclosure, 
                including means for protecting personal privacy and 
                proprietary information;
                    (C) availability, which means ensuring timely and 
                reliable access to and use of that information; and
                    (D) authentication, which means utilizing digital 
                credentials to assure the identity of users and 
                validate their access; and
            (7) advising the head of the agency and the Director of the 
        Office of Management and Budget on information security and 
        privacy issues pertaining to Federal Government information 
        systems.

SEC. 5093. DATA-MINING REPORT.

    (a) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) Data-mining.--The term ``data-mining'' means a query or 
        search or other analysis of 1 or more electronic databases, 
        where--
                    (A) at least 1 of the databases was obtained from 
                or remains under the control of a non-Federal entity, 
                or the information was acquired initially by another 
                department or agency of the Federal Government for 
                purposes other than intelligence or law enforcement;
                    (B) the search does not use a specific individual's 
                personal identifiers to acquire information concerning 
                that individual; and
                    (C) a department or agency of the Federal 
                Government is conducting the query or search or other 
                analysis to find a pattern indicating terrorist or 
                other criminal activity.
            (2) Database.--The term ``database'' does not include 
        telephone directories, information publicly available via the 
        Internet or available by any other means to any member of the 
        public without payment of a fee, or databases of judicial and 
        administrative opinions.
    (b) Reports on Data-Mining Activities.--
            (1) Requirement for report.--The head of each department or 
        agency of the Federal Government that is engaged in any 
        activity to use or develop data-mining technology shall each 
        submit a public report to Congress on all such activities of 
        the department or agency under the jurisdiction of that 
        official.
            (2) Content of report.--A report submitted under paragraph 
        (1) shall include, for each activity to use or develop data-
        mining technology that is required to be covered by the report, 
        the following information:
                    (A) A thorough description of the data-mining 
                technology and the data that will be used.
                    (B) A thorough discussion of the plans for the use 
                of such technology and the target dates for the 
                deployment of the data-mining technology.
                    (C) An assessment of the likely efficacy of the 
                data-mining technology in providing accurate and 
                valuable information consistent with the stated plans 
                for the use of the technology.
                    (D) An assessment of the likely impact of the 
                implementation of the data-mining technology on privacy 
                and civil liberties.
                    (E) A list and analysis of the laws and regulations 
                that govern the information to be collected, reviewed, 
                gathered, and analyzed with the data-mining technology 
                and a description of any modifications of such laws 
                that will be required to use the information in the 
                manner proposed under such program.
                    (F) A thorough discussion of the policies, 
                procedures, and guidelines that are to be developed and 
                applied in the use of such technology for data-mining 
                in order to--
                            (i) protect the privacy and due process 
                        rights of individuals; and
                            (ii) ensure that only accurate information 
                        is collected and used.
                    (G) A thorough discussion of the procedures 
                allowing individuals whose personal information will be 
                used in the data-mining technology to be informed of 
                the use of their personal information and what 
                procedures are in place to allow for individuals to opt 
                out of the technology, and, if no such procedures are 
                in place, a thorough explanation as to why not.
                    (H) Any necessary classified information in an 
                annex that shall be available to the Committee on 
                Governmental Affairs, the Committee on the Judiciary, 
                and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and 
                the Committee on Homeland Security, the Committee on 
                the Judiciary, and the Committee on Appropriations of 
                the House of Representatives.
            (3) Time for report.--Each report required under paragraph 
        (1) shall be--
                    (A) submitted not later than 90 days after the date 
                of the enactment of this Act; and
                    (B) updated once a year and include any new data-
                mining technologies.

SEC. 5094. PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD.

    (a) In General.--There is established within the Executive Branch 
an Independent Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (referred to 
in this section as the ``Board'').
    (b) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Congress makes 
the following findings:
            (1) In conducting the war on terrorism, the Government may 
        need additional powers and may need to enhance the use of its 
        existing powers.
            (2) This shift of power and authority to the Government 
        calls for an enhanced system of checks and balances to protect 
        the precious liberties that are vital to our way of life and to 
        ensure that the Government uses its powers for the purposes for 
        which the powers were given.
    (c) Purpose.--The Board shall--
            (1) analyze and review actions the Executive Branch takes 
        to protect the Nation from terrorism as such actions pertain to 
        privacy or civil liberties; and
            (2) ensure that privacy and civil liberties concerns are 
        appropriately considered in the development and implementation 
        of laws, regulations, and policies related to efforts to 
        protect the Nation against terrorism.
    (d) Functions.--
            (1) Advice and counsel on policy development and 
        implementation.--The Board shall--
                    (A) review the privacy and civil liberties 
                implications of proposed legislation, regulations, and 
                policies related to efforts to protect the Nation from 
                terrorism, including the development and adoption of 
                information sharing guidelines under section 892 of the 
                Homeland Security Act;
                    (B) review the privacy and civil liberties 
                implications of the implementation of new and existing 
                legislation, regulations, and policies related to 
                efforts to protect the Nation from terrorism, including 
                the implementation of information sharing guidelines 
                under section 892 of the Homeland Security Act;
                    (C) advise the President and Federal executive 
                departments and agencies to ensure that privacy and 
                civil liberties are appropriately considered in the 
                development and implementation of such legislation, 
                regulations, policies, and guidelines; and
                    (D) in providing advice on proposals to retain or 
                enhance a particular governmental power, consider 
                whether the executive department or agency has 
                explained--
                            (i) that the power actually materially 
                        enhances security; and
                            (ii) that there is adequate supervision of 
                        the executive's use of the power to ensure 
                        protection of privacy and civil liberties.
            (2) Oversight.--The Board shall continually review--
                    (A) the regulations, policies, and procedures and 
                the implementation of the regulations, policies, 
                procedures, and related laws of Federal executive 
                departments and agencies to ensure that privacy and 
                civil liberties are protected;
                    (B) the information sharing practices of Federal 
                executive departments and agencies to determine whether 
                they appropriately protect privacy and civil liberties 
                and adhere to the information sharing guidelines 
                promulgated under section 892 of the Homeland Security 
                Act and to other governing laws, regulations, and 
                policies regarding privacy and civil liberties; and
                    (C) other actions by the Executive Branch related 
                to efforts to protect the Nation from terrorism to 
                determine whether such actions--
                            (i) appropriately protect privacy and civil 
                        liberties; and
                            (ii) are consistent with governing laws, 
                        regulations, and policies regarding privacy and 
                        civil liberties.
            (3) Relationship with privacy officers.--The Board shall--
                    (A) review and assess reports and other information 
                from privacy officers described in section 5092;
                    (B) when appropriate, make recommendations to such 
                privacy officers regarding their activities; and
                    (C) when appropriate, coordinate the activities of 
                such privacy officers on relevant interagency matters.
            (4) Testimony.--The Members of the Board shall appear and 
        testify before Congress upon request.
    (e) Reports.--
            (1) In general.--The Board shall--
                    (A) receive and review reports from privacy and 
                civil liberties officers described in section 
                5092(b)(5); and
                    (B) periodically submit, not less than 
                semiannually, reports to Congress and the President.
            (2) Contents.--Not less than 2 reports submitted each year 
        under paragraph (1)(B) shall include--
                    (A) a description of the major activities of the 
                Board during the relevant period; and
                    (B) information on the findings, conclusions, and 
                recommendations of the Board resulting from its advice 
                and oversight functions under subsection (d).
    (f) Informing the Public.--The Board shall hold public hearings, 
release public reports, and otherwise inform the public of its 
activities, as appropriate and in a manner consistent with the 
protection of classified information, applicable law, and national 
security.
    (g) Access to Information.--
            (1) Authorization.--If determined by the Board to be 
        necessary to carry out its responsibilities under this section, 
        the Board may--
                    (A) secure directly from any Federal executive 
                department or agency, or any Federal officer or 
                employee, all relevant records, reports, audits, 
                reviews, documents, papers, or recommendations, 
                including classified information consistent with 
                applicable law;
                    (B) interview, take statements from, or take public 
                testimony from personnel of any Federal executive 
                department or agency or any Federal officer or 
                employee; and
                    (C) request information or assistance from any 
                State, tribal, or local government.
            (2) Obtaining official information.--
                    (A) Requirement to furnish.--Except as provided in 
                subparagraph (B), if the Board submits a request to a 
                Federal department or agency for information necessary 
                to enable the Board to carry out this section, the head 
                of such department or agency shall furnish that 
                information to the Board.
                    (B) Exception for national security.--If the 
                National Intelligence Director, in consultation with 
                the Attorney General, determines that it is necessary 
                to withhold requested information from disclosure to 
                protect the national security interests of the United 
                States, the department or agency head shall not furnish 
                that information to the Board.
    (h) Membership.--
            (1) Members.--The Board shall be composed of a chairman and 
        4 additional members, who shall be appointed by the President, 
        by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
            (2) Political affiliation.--Not more than 3 members of the 
        Board shall be of the same political party.
            (3) Qualifications.--Members of the Board shall be selected 
        solely on the basis of their professional qualifications, 
        achievements, public stature, and relevant experience, and 
        without regard to political affiliation. Members of the Board 
        shall also have extensive experience in the areas of privacy 
        and civil rights and liberties.
            (4) Incompatible office.--An individual appointed to the 
        Board may not, while serving on the Board, be an elected 
        official, an officer, or an employee of the Federal Government, 
        other than in the capacity as a member of the Board.
            (5) Term.--Each member of the Board shall serve a term of 
        six years, except that--
                    (A) a member appointed to a term of office after 
                the commencement of such term may serve under such 
                appointment only for the remainder of such term;
                    (B) upon the expiration of the term of office of a 
                member, the member shall continue to serve until the 
                member's successor has been appointed and qualified, 
                except that no member may serve under this 
                subparagraph--
                            (i) for more than 60 days when Congress is 
                        in session unless a nomination to fill the 
                        vacancy shall have been submitted to the 
                        Senate; or
                            (ii) after the adjournment sine die of the 
                        session of the Senate in which such nomination 
                        is submitted; and
                    (C) the members initially appointed under this 
                subsection shall serve terms of two, three, four, five, 
                and six years, respectively, from the effective date of 
                this Act, with the term of each such member to be 
                designated by the President.
    (i) Quorum and Meetings.--After its initial meeting, the Board 
shall meet upon the call of the chairman or a majority of its members. 
Three members of the Board shall constitute a quorum.
    (j) Compensation and Travel Expenses.--
            (1) Compensation.--
                    (A) Chairman.--The chairman shall be compensated at 
                a rate equal to the daily equivalent of the annual rate 
                of basic pay in effect for a position at level III of 
                the Executive Schedule under section 5314 of title 5, 
                United States Code, for each day during which the 
                chairman is engaged in the actual performance of the 
                duties of the Board.
                    (B) Members.--Each member of the Board shall be 
                compensated at a rate equal to the daily equivalent of 
                the annual rate of basic pay in effect for a position 
                at level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 
                5315 of title 5, United States Code, for each day 
                during which that member is engaged in the actual 
                performance of the duties of the Board.
            (2) Travel expenses.--Members of the Board shall be allowed 
        travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, at 
        rates authorized for persons employed intermittently by the 
        Government under section 5703(b) of title 5, United States 
        Code, while away from their homes or regular places of business 
        in the performance of services for the Board.
    (k) Staff.--
            (1) Appointment and compensation.--The Chairman, in 
        accordance with rules agreed upon by the Board, shall appoint 
        and fix the compensation of an executive director and such 
        other personnel as may be necessary to enable the Board to 
        carry out its functions, without regard to the provisions of 
        title 5, United States Code, governing appointments in the 
        competitive service, and without regard to the provisions of 
        chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of such title 
        relating to classification and General Schedule pay rates, 
        except that no rate of pay fixed under this subsection may 
        exceed the equivalent of that payable for a position at level V 
        of the Executive Schedule under section 5316 of title 5, United 
        States Code.
            (2) Detailees.--Any Federal employee may be detailed to the 
        Board without reimbursement from the Board, and such detailee 
        shall retain the rights, status, and privileges of the 
        detailee's regular employment without interruption.
            (3) Consultant services.--The Board may procure the 
        temporary or intermittent services of experts and consultants 
        in accordance with section 3109 of title 5, United States Code, 
        at rates that do not exceed the daily rate paid a person 
        occupying a position at level IV of the Executive Schedule 
        under section 5315 of such title.
    (l) Security Clearances.--The appropriate Federal executive 
departments and agencies shall cooperate with the Board to 
expeditiously provide the Board members and staff with appropriate 
security clearances to the extent possible under existing procedures 
and requirements, except that no person shall be provided with access 
to classified information under this section without the appropriate 
security clearances.
    (m) Treatment as Agency, not as Advisory Committee.--The Board--
            (1) is an agency (as defined in section 551(1) of title 5, 
        United States Code); and
            (2) is not an advisory committee (as defined in section 
        3(2) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.)).
    (n) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be 
appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out this section.

            CHAPTER 2--MUTUAL AID AND LITIGATION MANAGEMENT

SEC. 5101. SHORT TITLE.

    This chapter may be cited as the ``Mutual Aid and Litigation 
Management Authorization Act of 2004''.

SEC. 5102. MUTUAL AID AUTHORIZED.

    (a) Authorization to Enter Into Agreements.--
            (1) In general.--The authorized representative of a State, 
        locality, or the Federal Government may enter into an 
        interstate mutual aid agreement or a mutual aid agreement with 
        the Federal Government on behalf of the State, locality, or 
        Federal Government under which, at the request of any party to 
        the agreement, the other party to the agreement may--
                    (A) provide law enforcement, fire, rescue, 
                emergency health and medical services, transportation, 
                communications, public works and engineering, mass 
                care, and resource support in an emergency or public 
                service event occurring in the jurisdiction of the 
                requesting party;
                    (B) provide other services to prepare for, 
                mitigate, manage, respond to, or recover from an 
                emergency or public service event occurring in the 
                jurisdiction of the requesting party; and
                    (C) participate in training events occurring in the 
                jurisdiction of the requesting party.
    (b) Liability and Actions at Law.--
            (1) Liability.--A responding party or its officers or 
        employees shall be liable on account of any act or omission 
        occurring while providing assistance or participating in a 
        training event in the jurisdiction of a requesting party under 
        a mutual aid agreement (including any act or omission arising 
        from the maintenance or use of any equipment, facilities, or 
        supplies in connection therewith), but only to the extent 
        permitted under and in accordance with the laws and procedures 
        of the State of the responding party and subject to this 
        chapter.
            (2) Jurisdiction of courts.--
                    (A) In general.--Subject to subparagraph (B) and 
                section 5103, any action brought against a responding 
                party or its officers or employees on account of an act 
                or omission described in subsection (b)(1) may be 
                brought only under the laws and procedures of the State 
                of the responding party and only in the State courts or 
                United States District Courts located therein.
                    (B) United states as party.--If the United States 
                is the party against whom an action described in 
                paragraph (1) is brought, the action may be brought 
                only in a United States District Court.
    (c) Workers' Compensation and Death Benefits.--
            (1) Payment of benefits.--A responding party shall provide 
        for the payment of workers' compensation and death benefits 
        with respect to officers or employees of the party who sustain 
        injuries or are killed while providing assistance or 
        participating in a training event under a mutual aid agreement 
        in the same manner and on the same terms as if the injury or 
        death were sustained within the jurisdiction of the responding 
        party.
            (2) Liability for benefits.--No party shall be liable under 
        the law of any State other than its own (or, in the case of the 
        Federal Government, under any law other than Federal law) for 
        the payment of workers' compensation and death benefits with 
        respect to injured officers or employees of the party who 
        sustain injuries or are killed while providing assistance or 
        participating in a training event under a mutual aid agreement.
    (d) Licenses and Permits.--Whenever any person holds a license, 
certificate, or other permit issued by any responding party evidencing 
the meeting of qualifications for professional, mechanical, or other 
skills, such person will be deemed licensed, certified, or permitted by 
the requesting party to provide assistance involving such skill under a 
mutual aid agreement.
    (e) Scope.--Except to the extent provided in this section, the 
rights and responsibilities of the parties to a mutual aid agreement 
shall be as described in the mutual aid agreement.
    (f) Effect on Other Agreements.--Nothing in this section precludes 
any party from entering into supplementary mutual aid agreements with 
fewer than all the parties, or with another, or affects any other 
agreements already in force among any parties to such an agreement, 
including the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) under 
Public Law 104-321.
    (g) Federal Government.--Nothing in this section may be construed 
to limit any other expressed or implied authority of any entity of the 
Federal Government to enter into mutual aid agreements.
    (h) Consistency With State Law.--A party may enter into a mutual 
aid agreement under this chapter only insofar as the agreement is in 
accord with State law.

SEC. 5103. LITIGATION MANAGEMENT AGREEMENTS.

    (a) Authorization to Enter Into Litigation Management Agreements.--
The authorized representative of a State or locality may enter into a 
litigation management agreement on behalf of the State or locality. 
Such litigation management agreements may provide that all claims 
against such Emergency Response Providers arising out of, relating to, 
or resulting from an act of terrorism when Emergency Response Providers 
from more than 1 State have acted in defense against, in response to, 
or recovery from such act shall be governed by the following 
provisions.
    (b) Federal Cause of Action.--
            (1) In general.--There shall exist a Federal cause of 
        action for claims against Emergency Response Providers arising 
        out of, relating to, or resulting from an act of terrorism when 
        Emergency Response Providers from more than 1 State have acted 
        in defense against, in response to, or recovery from such act. 
        As determined by the parties to a litigation management 
        agreement, the substantive law for decision in any such action 
        shall be--
                    (A) derived from the law, including choice of law 
                principles, of the State in which such acts of 
                terrorism occurred, unless such law is inconsistent 
                with or preempted by Federal law; or
                    (B) derived from the choice of law principles 
                agreed to by the parties to a litigation management 
                agreement as described in the litigation management 
                agreement, unless such principles are inconsistent with 
                or preempted by Federal law.
            (2) Jurisdiction.--Such appropriate district court of the 
        United States shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction 
        over all actions for any claim against Emergency Response 
        Providers for loss of property, personal injury, or death 
        arising out of, relating to, or resulting from an act of 
        terrorism when Emergency Response Providers from more than 1 
        State have acted in defense against, in response to, or 
        recovery from an act of terrorism.
            (3) Special rules.--In an action brought for damages that 
        is governed by a litigation management agreement, the following 
        provisions apply:
                    (A) Punitive damages.--No punitive damages intended 
                to punish or deter, exemplary damages, or other damages 
                not intended to compensate a plaintiff for actual 
                losses may be awarded, nor shall any party be liable 
                for interest prior to the judgment.
                    (B) Collateral sources.--Any recovery by a 
                plaintiff in an action governed by a litigation 
                management agreement shall be reduced by the amount of 
                collateral source compensation, if any, that the 
                plaintiff has received or is entitled to receive as a 
                result of such acts of terrorism.
            (4) Exclusions.--Nothing in this section shall in any way 
        limit the ability of any person to seek any form of recovery 
        from any person, government, or other entity that--
                    (A) attempts to commit, knowingly participates in, 
                aids and abets, or commits any act of terrorism, or any 
                criminal act related to or resulting from such act of 
                terrorism; or
                    (B) participates in a conspiracy to commit any such 
                act of terrorism or any such criminal act.

SEC. 5104. ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS.

    (a) No Abrogation of Other Immunities.--Nothing in this chapter 
shall abrogate any other immunities from liability that any party may 
have under any other State or Federal law.
    (b) Exception for Certain Federal Law Enforcement Activities.--A 
mutual aid agreement or a litigation management agreement may not apply 
to law enforcement security operations at special events of national 
significance under section 3056(e) of title 18, United States Code, or 
to other law enforcement functions of the United States Secret Service.
    (c) Secret Service.--Section 3056 of title 18, United States Code, 
is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
    ``(g) The Secret Service shall be maintained as a distinct entity 
within the Department of Homeland Security and shall not be merged with 
any other department function. All personnel and operational elements 
of the United States Secret Service shall report to the Director of the 
Secret Service, who shall report directly to the Secretary of Homeland 
Security without being required to report through any other official of 
the Department.''.

SEC. 5105. DEFINITIONS.

    For purposes of this chapter, the following definitions apply:
            (1) Authorized representative.--The term ``authorized 
        representative'' means--
                    (A) in the case of the Federal Government, any 
                individual designated by the President with respect to 
                the executive branch, the Chief Justice of the United 
                States with respect to the judicial branch, or the 
                President pro Tempore of the Senate and Speaker of the 
                House of Representatives with respect to the Congress, 
                or their designees, to enter into a mutual aid 
                agreement;
                    (B) in the case of a locality, the official 
                designated by law to declare an emergency in and for 
                the locality, or the official's designee;
                    (C) in the case of a State, the Governor or the 
                Governor's designee.
            (2) Emergency.--The term ``emergency'' means a major 
        disaster or emergency declared by the President, or a State of 
        Emergency declared by an authorized representative of a State 
        or locality, in response to which assistance may be provided 
        under a mutual aid agreement.
            (3) Emergency response provider.--The term ``Emergency 
        Response Provider'' means State or local emergency public 
        safety, law enforcement, emergency response, emergency medical 
        (including hospital emergency facilities), and related 
        personnel, agencies, and authorities that are a party to a 
        litigation management agreement.
            (4) Employee.--The term ``employee'' means, with respect to 
        a party to a mutual aid agreement, the employees of the party, 
        including its agents or authorized volunteers, who are 
        committed to provide assistance under the agreement.
            (5) Litigation management agreement.--The term ``litigation 
        management agreement'' means an agreement entered into pursuant 
        to the authority granted under section 5103.
            (6) Locality.--The term ``locality'' means a county, city, 
        or town.
            (7) Mutual aid agreement.--The term ``mutual aid 
        agreement'' means an agreement entered into pursuant to the 
        authority granted under section 5102.
            (8) Public service event.--The term ``public service 
        event'' means any undeclared emergency, incident, or situation 
        in preparation for or response to which assistance may be 
        provided under a mutual aid agreement.
            (9) Requesting party.--The term ``requesting party'' means, 
        with respect to a mutual aid agreement, the party in whose 
        jurisdiction assistance is provided, or a training event is 
        held, under the agreement.
            (10) Responding party.--The term ``responding party'' 
        means, with respect to a mutual aid agreement, the party 
        providing assistance, or participating in a training event, 
        under the agreement, but does not include the requesting party.
            (11) State.--The term ``State'' includes each of the 
        several States of the United States, the District of Columbia, 
        the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, 
        American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana 
        Islands, and any other territory or possession of the United 
        States, and any political subdivision of any such place.
            (12) Training event.--The term ``training event'' means an 
        emergency and public service event-related exercise, test, or 
        other activity using equipment and personnel to prepare for or 
        simulate performance of any aspect of the giving or receiving 
        of assistance during emergencies or public service events, but 
        does not include an actual emergency or public service event.

                    Chapter 3--Miscellaneous Matters

SEC. 5131. ENHANCEMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY COMMUNICATIONS 
                    INTEROPERABILITY.

    (a) Coordination of Public Safety Interoperable Communications 
Programs.--
            (1) Program.--The Secretary of Homeland Security, in 
        consultation with the Secretary of Commerce and the Chairman of 
        the Federal Communications Commission, shall establish a 
        program to enhance public safety interoperable communications 
        at all levels of government. Such program shall--
                    (A) establish a comprehensive national approach to 
                achieving public safety interoperable communications;
                    (B) coordinate with other Federal agencies in 
                carrying out subparagraph (A);
                    (C) develop, in consultation with other appropriate 
                Federal agencies and State and local authorities, 
                appropriate minimum capabilities for communications 
                interoperability for Federal, State, and local public 
                safety agencies;
                    (D) accelerate, in consultation with other Federal 
                agencies, including the National Institute of Standards 
                and Technology, the private sector, and nationally 
                recognized standards organizations as appropriate, the 
                development of national voluntary consensus standards 
                for public safety interoperable communications;
                    (E) encourage the development and implementation of 
                flexible and open architectures, with appropriate 
                levels of security, for short-term and long-term 
                solutions to public safety communications 
                interoperability;
                    (F) assist other Federal agencies in identifying 
                priorities for research, development, and testing and 
                evaluation with regard to public safety interoperable 
                communications;
                    (G) identify priorities within the Department of 
                Homeland Security for research, development, and 
                testing and evaluation with regard to public safety 
                interoperable communications;
                    (H) establish coordinated guidance for Federal 
                grant programs for public safety interoperable 
                communications;
                    (I) provide technical assistance to State and local 
                public safety agencies regarding planning, acquisition 
                strategies, interoperability architectures, training, 
                and other functions necessary to achieve public safety 
                communications interoperability;
                    (J) develop and disseminate best practices to 
                improve public safety communications interoperability; 
                and
                    (K) develop appropriate performance measures and 
                milestones to systematically measure the Nation's 
                progress towards achieving public safety communications 
                interoperability, including the development of national 
                voluntary consensus standards.
            (2) Office for interoperability and compatibility.--
                    (A) Establishment of office.--The Secretary may 
                establish an Office for Interoperability and 
                Compatibility to carry out this subsection.
                    (B) Functions.--If the Secretary establishes such 
                office, the Secretary shall, through such office--
                            (i) carry out Department of Homeland 
                        Security responsibilities and authorities 
                        relating to the SAFECOM Program; and
                            (ii) carry out subsection (c) (relating to 
                        rapid interoperable communications capabilities 
                        for high risk jurisdictions).
            (3) Applicability of federal advisory committee act.--The 
        Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) shall not apply 
        to advisory groups established and maintained by the Secretary 
        for purposes of carrying out this subsection.
    (b) Report.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall report to the Congress on 
Department of Homeland Security plans for accelerating the development 
of national voluntary consensus standards for public safety 
interoperable communications, a schedule of milestones for such 
development, and achievements of such development.
    (c) Rapid Interoperable Communications Capabilities for High Risk 
Jurisdictions.--The Secretary, in consultation with other relevant 
Federal, State, and local government agencies, shall provide technical, 
training, and other assistance as appropriate to support the rapid 
establishment of consistent, secure, and effective interoperable 
communications capabilities for emergency response providers in 
jurisdictions determined by the Secretary to be at consistently high 
levels of risk of terrorist attack.
    (d) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) Interoperable communications.--The term ``interoperable 
        communications'' means the ability of emergency response 
        providers and relevant Federal, State, and local government 
        agencies to communicate with each other as necessary, through a 
        dedicated public safety network utilizing information 
        technology systems and radio communications systems, and to 
        exchange voice, data, or video with one another on demand, in 
        real time, as necessary.
            (2) Emergency response providers.--The term ``emergency 
        response providers'' has the meaning that term has under 
        section 2 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101)
    (e) Clarification of Responsibility for Interoperable 
Communications.--
            (1) Under secretary for emergency preparedness and 
        response.--Section 502(7) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 
        (6 U.S.C. 312(7)) is amended--
                    (A) by striking ``developing comprehensive programs 
                for developing interoperative communications 
                technology, and''; and
                    (B) by striking ``such'' and inserting 
                ``interoperable communications''.
            (2) Office for domestic preparedness.--Section 430(c) of 
        such Act (6 U.S.C. 238(c)) is amended--
                    (A) in paragraph (7) by striking ``and'' after the 
                semicolon;
                    (B) in paragraph (8) by striking the period and 
                inserting ``; and''; and
                    (C) by adding at the end the following:
            ``(9) helping to ensure the acquisition of interoperable 
        communication technology by State and local governments and 
        emergency response providers.''.

SEC. 5132. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM.

    (a) Findings.--The Congress finds that--
            (1) in Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5, the 
        President directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to 
        develop an incident command system to be known as the National 
        Incident Management System (NIMS), and directed all Federal 
        agencies to make the adoption of NIMS a condition for the 
        receipt of Federal emergency preparedness assistance by States, 
        territories, tribes, and local governments beginning in fiscal 
        year 2005;
            (2) in March 2004, the Secretary of Homeland Security 
        established NIMS, which provides a unified structural framework 
        for Federal, State, territorial, tribal, and local governments 
        to ensure coordination of command, operations, planning, 
        logistics, finance, and administration during emergencies 
        involving multiple jurisdictions or agencies; and
            (3) the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the 
        United States strongly supports the adoption of NIMS by 
        emergency response agencies nationwide, and the decision by the 
        President to condition Federal emergency preparedness 
        assistance upon the adoption of NIMS.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of the Congress that all 
levels of government should adopt NIMS, and that the regular use of and 
training in NIMS by States, territories, tribes, and local governments 
should be a condition for receiving Federal preparedness assistance.

SEC. 5133. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND 
                    PLANS AND STRATEGIES.

    It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of Defense should 
regularly assess the adequacy of United States Northern Command's plans 
and strategies with a view to ensuring that the United States Northern 
Command is prepared to respond effectively to all military and 
paramilitary threats within the United States.

                          Purpose and Summary

    The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 took the lives 
of more than 3,000 Americans and represented the most 
catastrophic terrorist attack on the United States in its 
history. The terrorists exploited deficiencies in America's law 
enforcement, immigration, and intelligence agencies which 
limited the dissemination of information that might have 
protected the nation against the attack. In the wake of the 
attacks, the Committee has conducted 39 hearings and markups to 
examine proposals to remedy legislative, procedural, and 
structural vulnerabilities to terrorism in our nation's 
immigration system. The Committee has also conducted 46 
hearings and markups to strengthen federal law enforcement and 
antiterrorism efforts, and it has taken firm steps to ensure 
that security efforts do not transgress cherished civil 
liberties. Furthermore, the Committee has conducted rigorous 
oversight of antiterrorism reform efforts at the Department of 
Justice, and acted with bipartisan dispatch to enact 
antiterrorism legislation including the USA PATRIOT Act and the 
Homeland Security Act.
    On November 27, 2002, President Bush signed legislation 
creating the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the 
United States (``9/11 Commission'' or ``Commission''). The 
Commission's principal responsibility was to examine and report 
on the facts and causes relating to the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001, and to suggest measures to better secure 
the nation. On July 22, 2004, the Commission delivered its 
unanimous recommendations to Congress. During August and 
September, 2004, a variety of congressional committees held 
hearings on the recommendations. On September 29, 2004, Speaker 
Hastert introduced H.R. 10, the ``9/11 Recommendations 
Implementation Act,'' to provide legislative substance to the 
Commission's recommendations.
    The legislation consists of five titles entitled: Reform of 
the Intelligence Community; Terrorism Prevention and 
Prosecution; Border Security and Terrorist Travel; 
International Cooperation and Coordination; and Government 
Restructuring. Several provisions within the legislation fall 
within the jurisdiction of the Committee on the Judiciary.
    The creation of a National Intelligence Director and the 
establishment of a National Counterterrorism Center in Title I 
of H.R. 10 are key reforms that will help ensure that the wall 
of separation dividing intelligence and law enforcement is 
never again exploited to revisit terrorist attacks upon the 
United States. Section 1112 codifies ongoing efforts of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation to assess and prevent 
terrorists attacks before they occur.
    In Title II, Sec. Sec. 2001, 2021-2024, 2041-2044, and 
2051-2053 contain important provisions that enhance penalties 
for terrorism hoaxes, increase penalties for supporting, 
financing, or cooperating with terrorist organizations, and 
expand the scope of laws that prohibit the shipment or use of 
weapons of mass destruction. Sections 2101 and 2102 provide 
additional funding to combat terrorist financing, and 
Sec. Sec. 2171-2173 enhance the use of biometric technology to 
reduce terrorist threats against air travel.
    Title III of the legislation contains important provisions 
to enhance border security and reduce opportunities for 
terrorists to enter and stay in the United States. Section 3001 
implements a Commission recommendation requiring Americans 
returning from travel in the Western Hemisphere to possess 
passports. Section 3002 requires Canadians seeking entry into 
the United States to present a passport or other secure 
identification. Section 3003 authorizes 2,000 new Border Patrol 
agents for each of the next five years. Section 3004 authorizes 
800 additional ICE investigators for each of the next five 
years. Section 3005 reduces the risk of identify and document 
fraud, and Sec. Sec. 3006-3009 and 3031-33 provide for the 
expedited removal of illegal aliens, limit asylum abuse by 
terrorists, and streamline the removal of terrorists and other 
criminal aliens. Nearly every one of these provisions reflect 
Commission recommendations. Many of them arise from legislation 
proposed by the Judiciary Committee.
    The legislation contains key provisions that safeguard the 
civil liberties of all Americans. Specifically, Sec. 1022 
establishes a civil liberties protection officer to ensure that 
civil liberties and privacy protections are incorporated in the 
policies implemented by the National Intelligence Director. 
Modeled on legislation originally introduced by Constitution 
Subcommittee Chairman Chabot, Sec. 5091 requires federal 
agencies to prepare a privacy impact analysis for proposed and 
final rules during the rulemaking process. Finally, Sec. 5092 
directs the head of each Federal agency with law enforcement or 
antiterrorism functions to appoint a chief privacy officer to 
protect against privacy abuses.
    In short, H.R. 10 reflects a careful, thoughtful, and 
principled response to the 9/11 Commission's bipartisan Report 
and staff report, and it provides additional tools and 
resources needed to fight and win the war on terror.

                Background and Need for the Legislation


    THE EVENTS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 AND THE CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE

Summary of Key Legislation Enacted Into Law Following the Attacks of 
        September 11, 2001

    The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the 
Pentagon took more than 3,000 lives, caused approximately $100 
billion in economic losses, triggered U.S. military 
intervention in Afghanistan to topple the Taliban regime, and 
led to passage of a historic overhaul of federal law 
enforcement policies and priorities culminating in the 
enactment of the USA PATRIOTAct.\1\ These events also led to 
House passage of legislation to tighten security at America's 
airports,\2\ reform the airport security screening process,\3\ abolish 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service,\4\ improve wireless 911 
emergency response services,\5\ improve oil and gas pipeline safety 
research,\6\ enhance border security,\7\ and establish the Department 
of Homeland Security.\8\ Other antiterrorism legislation Congress 
enacted in the wake of these attacks includes: the Enhanced Border 
Security and Visa Reform Act,\9\ the Antiterrorism Explosives Act,\10\ 
the Terrorist Bombing Convention Implementation Act,\11\ the Terrorism 
Risk Insurance Act,\12\ and the Homeland Security Information Act.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat 272 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.) (2001).
    \2\ ``Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act,'' 
Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 230 (2001).
    \3\ ``Aviation and Transportation Security Act,'' Pub. L. No. 107-
56, 115 Stat 597 (codified as amended in 49 U.S.C.) (2001).
    \4\ H.R. 3231, the ``Barbara Jordan Immigration Reform and 
Accountability Act,'' 107th Congress (2002), (passed the House of 
Representatives, April 25, 2002).
    \5\ H.R. 2898, The ``E-911 Implementation Act of 2003,'' 108th 
Congress (2003), (passed the House of Representatives, October 14, 
2003).
    \6\ Pub. L. No. 107-355, 116 Stat 2985 (codified as amended in 49 
U.S.C.) (2002).
    \7\ ``Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002,'' 
Pub. L. No. 107-173, 116 Stat 543 (2002).
    \8\ Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat 2135 (codified as amended in 6 
U.S.C.) (2002).
    \9\ Pub. L. No. 107-173, 116 Stat 42 (codified as amended in 8 
U.S.C.) (2002).
    \10\ H.R. 4864, the ``Anti-Terrorism Explosives Act,'' 107th 
Congress (2002), enacted as part of the Homeland Security Act.
    \11\ Pub. L. No. 107-197, 116 Stat 72 (codified as amended in 18 
U.S.C.) (2002).
    \12\ Pub. L. No. 107-297, 116 Stat 2322 (codified as amended in 15 
U.S.C.) (2002).
    \13\ H.R. 4930, the ``Homeland Security Information Sharing and 
Analysis Enhancement Act of 2004,'' 108th Congress (2004), enacted as 
part of the Homeland Security Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Principal Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary Responding to 
        the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001

    In addition to these legislative initiatives, the House 
Committee on the Judiciary has conducted nearly 100 hearings to 
better protect the American people against terrorist attacks 
since September 11, 2001. Many of these hearings examined 
legislative initiatives contained in H.R. 10.

Strengthening Border Security to Reduce the Risk of Terrorist Attacks

    The Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and 
Claims has focused special attention on the legislative, 
procedural, and technological vulnerabilities in our nation's 
immigration system to identify and remedy them. Since the 
attacks, the Subcommittee has conducted thirty-nine hearings on 
immigration matters. Among the most critical of these are 
hearings entitled: ``Pushing the Border Out on Alien Smuggling: 
New Tools and Intelligence Initiatives''; ``US-VISIT: A Down 
Payment on Homeland Security''; ``Funding for Immigration in 
the President's 2005 Budget''; ``War on Terrorism: Immigration 
Enforcement Since September 11, 2001''; ``Department of 
Homeland Security Transition: Bureau of Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement''; ``Immigrant Student Tracking: Implementation and 
Proposed Modification''; ``The Immigration and Naturalization 
Service's Interactions with Hesham Mohamed Ali Hedayet''; ``The 
Role of Immigration in the Department of Homeland Security''; 
``The Risk to Homeland Security From Identity Fraud and 
Identity Theft''; ``The INS's March 2002 Notification of 
Approval of Change of Status for Pilot Training for Terrorist 
Hijackers Mohammed Atta and Marwan Al-Shehhi''; ``the 
Implications of Transnational Terrorism for the Visa Waiver 
Program''; and ``Using Information Technology to Secure 
America's Borders.'' Before 9/11, the Subcommittee also focused 
on terrorist infiltration into the United States, including an 
oversight hearing on ``Terrorist Threats to the United 
States.''

Restructuring Federal Law Enforcement and Enhancing Criminal Penalties 
        to Reduce the Risk of Terrorist Attacks

    Since 9/11, the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and 
Homeland Security has held thirty-four hearings on law 
enforcement matters. Among the most important of these are 
hearings entitled: ``Law Enforcement Efforts Within the 
Department of Homeland Security;'' ``Homeland Security--the 
Balance Between Crisis and Consequence Management through 
Training and Assistance (Review of Legislative Proposals)''; 
``Terrorism and War-Time Hoaxes''; ``The Proposal to Create a 
Department of Homeland Security''; ``The Risk to Homeland 
Security From Identity Fraud and Identity Theft''; the 
``Antiterrorism Explosives Act of 2002''; the ``Homeland 
Security Information Sharing Act''; the ``Cyber Security 
Enhancement Act''; ``Implementation Legislation for the 
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist 
Bombings and the International Convention for the Suppression 
of the Financing of Terrorism''; and the ``Anti-Hoax Terrorism 
Act of 2001.'' The Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and 
Intellectual Property also conducted a hearing to examine links 
between organized crime, terrorism, and intellectual property 
theft.
    In addition to these hearings, the Crime Subcommittee, in 
the spirit of cooperation, has held a joint hearing with the 
Select Committee on Homeland Security on the Terrorism Threat 
Integration Center (``TTIC''); jointly sent letters with post-
hearing questions to the relevantagencies on the implementation 
of TTIC, and conducted a joint hearing on the integration of terrorism 
watchlists at the Terrorism Screening Center.
    The Committee on the Judiciary has also conducted oversight 
through other means. It has sent two major oversight letters to 
the Attorney General on the implementation of the USA PATRIOT 
Act. These letters were aimed at ensuring that the Department 
of Justice maintains a proper balance between security and 
civil liberties in implementing the Act. The Committee has also 
closely monitored the activities of the Department of Homeland 
Security (``DHS'') recently sending letters to the Directors of 
Immigration Customs Enforcement (``ICE'') and the Federal 
Protective Service regarding their law enforcement missions at 
the Department of Homeland Security.
    In addition, the Committee has requested several General 
Accounting Office (``GAO'') reports in this area including: 
``Combating Terrorism: Funding Data Reported to Congress Should 
be Improved''; ``Social Security Administration: Disclosure 
Policy for Law Enforcement Allows Information Sharing, But SSA 
Needs to Ensure Consistent Application''; and ``Firearms 
Control: Federal Agencies Have Firearms Controls, But Could 
Strengthen Controls in Key Areas''.
    In the law enforcement and law enforcement training area, 
the Crime Subcommittee held a joint hearing with a subcommittee 
of the Select Committee on Homeland Security on consolidating 
terrorist watch lists. The Subcommittee held a hearing and 
markup on H.R. 2934, a bill to expand the death penalty to 
additional acts of terrorism. The full committee reported that 
bill on June 23, 2004. The Subcommittee held a hearing on H.R. 
3179, a bill to enhance law enforcement powers in stopping 
terrorism. The Subcommittee has been working closely with the 
Select Committee on Homeland Security on H.R. 3266, a bill to 
improve grants to first responders, which the full committee 
reported On June 16, 2004. Finally, the Committee is working 
closely with the Select Committee on yet to be introduced 
legislation to reauthorize the Department of Homeland Security.

Privacy, Civil Liberties, and the Conduct of the War on Terrorism

    The Committee on the Judiciary has conducted a number of 
hearings to ensure that civil liberties are preserved in the 
nation's war against terrorism. The USA Patriot Act contained 
several sunset provisions, many of which are set to expire next 
year. In addition, the full committee has conducted rigorous 
oversight of DOJ's efforts against terrorism and its 
implementation of the USA Patriot Act. The Subcommittee on 
Commercial and Administrative Law and the Subcommittee on the 
Constitution conducted a hearing entitled ``Civil Liberties in 
the Hands of the Government Post-September 11, 2001: 
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission and the U.S. Department 
of Defense Technology and Privacy Advisory Committee.'' A 
similar joint hearing examined `` `The Defense of Privacy Act' 
and Privacy in the Hands of the Government.'' In addition, the 
Subcommittee on the Constitution held a hearing entitled 
``Anti-Terrorism Investigations and the Fourth Amendment After 
September 11: Where and When Can the Government Go to Prevent 
Terrorist Attacks?'' Finally, the Commercial and Administrative 
Law held a hearing entitled: ``Administrative Law, Adjudicatory 
Issues, and Privacy Ramifications of Creating a Department of 
Homeland Security.''

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States

            Mission and Members of the Commission
    On November 27, 2002, President George W. Bush signed 
legislation creating the National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks Upon the United States.\14\ The Commission's principal 
responsibility was to ``examine and report upon the facts and 
causes relating to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001,'' with respect to intelligence and law enforcement 
agencies, diplomacy, immigration and border control, the flow 
of assets to terrorist organizations, commercial aviation, and 
the role of congressional oversight and resource allocation, 
among other matters, and to suggest ``corrective measures that 
can be taken to prevent acts of terrorism.'' \15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. 
No. 107-306, Title VI, 116 Stat. 2383, 2408-13 (2002).
    \15\ Id. at Sec. Sec. 602(1), (5), 604.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Members of the Commission included: Thomas Kean (Chair), 
Republican, former Governor of New Jersey; Lee H. Hamilton 
(Vice Chair), Democrat, former U.S. Representative from the 9th 
District of Indiana; Richard Ben-Veniste, Democrat, attorney, 
former chief of the Watergate Task Force of the Watergate 
Special Prosecutor's Office; Fred F. Fielding, Republican, 
attorney, former Counsel to President Reagan; Jamie Gorelick, 
Democrat, former Deputy Attorney General in the Clinton 
Administration; Slade Gorton, Republican, former Senator from 
Washington; Bob Kerrey, Democrat, former Senator from Nebraska; 
John F. Lehman, Republican, former Secretary of the Navy in the 
Reagan Administration; Timothy J. Roemer, Democrat, former U.S. 
Representative from the 3rd District of Indiana; James R. 
Thompson, Republican, former Governor of Illinois.
    Over the course of its approximately 20-month existence, 
the Commission reviewed more than 2.5 million pages of 
documents and interviewed more than 1,200 individuals in 
tencountries. It held 19 days of hearings and received public testimony 
from 160 witnesses.\16\ Present and former government officials 
testified before the Commission, including: Colin Powell, United States 
Secretary of State; Richard Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State; 
Madeleine Albright, former Secretary of State; Donald H. Rumsfeld, 
Secretary of Defense; Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense; 
William Cohen, former Secretary of Defense; Condoleezza Rice, National 
Security Advisor to the President; Sandy Berger, former National 
Security Advisor; Richard Clarke, former counterterrorism official for 
Presidents George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush; Vice 
President Dick Cheney; former President Bill Clinton, and former Vice 
President Al Gore.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ 9/11 Commission Report, supra note 12, at xv.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Report of the Commission
    Pursuant to its statutory mandate, the Commission submitted 
its final report and unanimous recommendations to Congress and 
the President on July 22, 2004.\17\ The 567-page report 
provides a detailed chronicle of the events leading up to the 
September 11th attacks. The paperback version of the report has 
since become a ``national bestseller, a first for such a 
commission report.'' \18\ As part of its analysis of these 
events, the Commission identified ``fault lines within our 
government--between foreign and domestic intelligence, and 
between and within agencies.'' \19\ The Commission also cited 
``pervasive problems of managing and sharing information across 
a large and unwieldy government that had been built in a 
different era to confront different dangers.'' \20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\ Press Release, 9/11 Commission, 9/11 Commission Releases 
Unanimous Final Report--Calls for Quick Action on Recommendations to 
Prevent Future Attacks (July 22, 2004), at http://www.9-
11commission.gov/press/pr_2004-07-22.pdf.
    \18\ Jim VandeHei, 9/11 Panel Roiling Campaign Platforms, Wash. 
Post, Aug. 9, 2004, at A1.
    \19\ 9/11 Commission Report, supra note 12, at xvi.
    \20\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        H.R. 10, THE ``9/11 RECOMMENDATIONS IMPLEMENTATION ACT''

    On September 29, 2004, Speaker Hastert introduced H.R. 10, 
the ``9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act'' which reflects 
the bipartisan recommendations of the Commission. The 
legislation consists of five titles: Reform of the Intelligence 
Community; Terrorism Prevention and Prosecution; Border 
Security and Terrorist Travel; International Cooperation and 
Coordination; and Government Restructuring.

 Summary of Principal Provisions of H.R. 10 Within the Jurisdiction of 
                  the Committee on the Judiciary \21\

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\ This section contains a summary of principal provisions of 
H.R. 10 within the jurisdiction of the Committee; it does not comprise 
an exhaustive list of provisions of H.R. 10 within the jurisdiction of 
the Committee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

             TITLE I--REFORM OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY


Section 1011. Reorganization and improvement of management of 
        intelligence community

    Section 1011 replaces sections 102 through 104 of Title I 
of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et. seq.) 
with new sections 102, 102A, 103, 103A, 104 and 104A. New 
section 102 replaces the Director of Central Intelligence 
(``DCI'') with a National Intelligence Director (``NID'') as 
recommended by the Commission. The NID will be appointed by the 
President and confirmed by the Senate, and will serve as the 
head of the intelligence community. The NID may not 
simultaneously serve as the DCI or as the head of any other 
element of the intelligence community. This section also 
establishes a clear chain of command to ensure that while the 
NID will manage and oversee the Intelligence Community, the NID 
will do this through the heads of the Departments containing 
the elements of the intelligence community. The Committee 
supports the language requiring the NID to work through the 
heads of the Departments to ensure accountability and 
responsibility through a clear chain of command.
    New Sec. 102A sets out the responsibilities and authorities 
of the NID. This section provides that the NID shall have 
access to all national intelligence and intelligence related to 
the national security, except as otherwise provided by law or 
guidelines agreed upon by the Attorney General and the NID. The 
NID will develop and present the annual budget for the National 
Intelligence Program (``NIP''). The NID must report to the 
Committees on Judiciary, Intelligence, and Armed Services on 
any transfer of personnel relative to the Committees' 
jurisdiction. Additionally, this section requires the NID to 
ensure that the Intelligence Community through the Host 
Departments that contain the elements of the Intelligence 
Community comply with the Constitution and the laws of the 
United States. At the Committee's recommendation, H.R. 10 
contains a provision clarifying that nothing in this Act shall 
be construed as affecting the role of the Department of Justice 
or the Attorney General with respect to applications under the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.
    New Sec. 103 establishes the Office of the NID to assist 
the Director in the performance of his or her duties. This 
section establishes specific responsibilities for a number of 
Deputies and Associates to assist the NID. The Associate 
National Intelligence Director for Domestic Security is to 
ensure that the intelligence needs of the Department of Justice 
and other relevant executive branch agencies are met. At the 
same time, the language restricts this position from 
disseminating domestic or homeland security information to 
State and local government officials and the private sector.
    New Sec. 104 establishes that the DCI shall assist the NID. 
These responsibilities include:(1) collecting intelligence 
through human sources and by other appropriate means, except that the 
DCI shall have no police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers or 
internal security functions; and (2) providing overall direction for 
the collection of national intelligence overseas or outside of the 
United States through human sources by elements of the intelligence 
community authorized to undertake such collection and, in coordination 
with other agencies of the Government which are authorized to undertake 
such collection, ensuring that the most effective use is made of 
resources and that the risks to the United States and those involved in 
such collection are minimized. The Manager's Amendment reported by the 
Committee inserted the qualifying phrase ``overseas or outside the 
United States'' to clarify that the CIA's collection authority is not 
domestic. The Committee also supported the continued limitation that 
the CIA shall not have police, subpoena, or other law enforcement 
powers.

Section 1012. Revised definition of national intelligence

    This section defines ``national intelligence'' and 
``intelligence related to national security'' to refer to all 
intelligence, regardless of source, and to include information 
collected both domestically and overseas, that involves threats 
to the United States, its people, property or interests; the 
development or use of weapons of mass destruction; or any other 
matter bearing on the national or homeland security of the 
Untied States.

Section 1014. Role of the National Intelligence Director in appointment 
        of certain officials responsible for intelligence-related 
        activities

    This section amends Sec. 106 of the National Security Act 
to authorize the NID to recommend to the President individuals 
for appointment as the Deputy NID and the DCI. The section also 
allows the NID to concur with the Secretary of Defense in the 
selection of the head of the National Security Agency, National 
Reconnaissance Office, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence 
Agency. The NID shall consult, under this section on the 
selection for the positions of the Defense Intelligence Agency, 
Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, 
Director of the Office of Intelligence of the Department of 
Energy, Director of the Office of Counterintelligence of the 
Department of Energy, Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and 
Analysis of the Department of Treasury, Executive Assistant 
Director for the Intelligence of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (``FBI'') or successor, Undersecretary of 
Homeland Security for Information Analysis and Infrastructure 
Protection, and the Deputy Assistant Commandant of the Coast 
Guard for Intelligence. Due to an ongoing restructuring at the 
FBI, the Committee added the phrase ``or that officer's 
successor'' to cover any new intelligence office at the FBI.
    The bill also establishes the new National Counterterrorism 
Center and provides authority to establish other national 
intelligence centers (``NICs''). The NID shall also have 
authority to select appointees for some intelligence positions 
and consult with Congress in the selection of others. 
(Sec. Sec. 1001-1016).

Section 1021. National Counterterrorism Center

    The Commission's Report ``recommend[ed] the establishment 
of a National Counterterrorism Center, built on the foundation 
of the existing Terrorist Threat Integration Center (``TTIC''). 
Breaking the older mold of national government organization, 
this NCTC should be a center for joint operational planning and 
joint intelligence, staffed by personnel from the various 
agencies. The head of the NCTC should have authority to 
evaluate the performance of the people assigned to the 
Center.'' Commission Report at 403. Section 1021 establishes 
the National Counterterrorism Center (``NCTC''), which will be 
the primary organization for analyzing and integrating all 
intelligence possessed or acquired by the U.S.--except for 
intelligence pertaining exclusively to domestic 
counterterrorism. The NCTC will also support the Department of 
Justice, Department of Homeland Security, and other agencies in 
fulfillment of their responsibilities to disseminate terrorism 
information consistent with the law and guidelines agreed to by 
the Attorney General and the NID. The Committee added the 
reference to the AG guidelines in the Manager's Amendment.

Section 1022. Civil Liberties Protection Officer

    Section 1022 requires the NID to appoint a Civil Liberties 
Protection Officer (``CLPO'') who would be responsible for 
ensuring that civil liberties and privacy protections are 
appropriately incorporated in the policies and procedures 
developed and implemented by the Office of the NID (``ONID''). 
In addition, the CLPO must: (1) oversee compliance by the ONID 
and the NID with the Constitution and all laws, regulations, 
executive orders and implementing guidelines relating to civil 
liberties and privacy; (2) review and assess complaints and 
other information indicating possible civil liberties or 
privacy abuses; (3) ensure that the utilization of technologies 
sustain privacy protections regarding the use, collection, and 
disclosure of personal information; (4) ensure that personal 
information contained in a system of records (as defined in the 
Privacy Act) is handled in full compliance with the Act's fair 
information practices; (5) conduct privacy impact assessments 
when appropriate or required by law; and (6) perform such other 
duties as prescribed by the NID or required by law. Section 
1022 authorizes the CLPO to refer complaints of civil liberties 
or privacy abuse to the appropriate Office of Inspector General 
responsible for the intelligence community department or agency 
to investigate. This provision reflects the following 
Commission recommendation: ``At this time of increased and 
consolidated government authority, there should be a board 
within the executive branch to oversee adherence to the 
guidelines we recommend and the commitment the government makes 
to defend our civil liberties.'' (Commission Report at 395).

Section 1031. Joint Intelligence Community Council

    This section establishes the Joint Intelligence Community 
Council which will provide advice to the NID from the various 
heads of the Departments that contain elements of the 
Intelligence Community, including the Attorney General.

             TITLE II--TERRORISM PREVENTION AND PROSECUTION


Section 2001. Individual Terrorists as Agents of Foreign Powers

    The Commission suggests on page 54 of its Report that 
terrorism can be conducted by those who are acting alone and 
not depending on al Qaeda or other terrorist organizations as a 
source of funding but as a source of inspiration. The Report 
found that the premise behind the government's efforts here--
that terrorist operations need a financial support network--may 
itself be outdated. The effort to find, track, and stop 
terrorist money presumes that it is being sent from a central 
source or group of identifiable sources. Some terrorist 
operations do not rely on outside sources of money, and cells 
may now be self-funding, either through legitimate employment 
or through low-level criminal activity. Terrorist groups only 
remotely affiliated with al Qaeda pose a significant threat of 
mass casualty attacks. Our terrorist-financing efforts can do 
little to stop them, as there is no ``central command'' from 
which the money flowed, as in the 9/11 attacks.
    Section 2001 of the bill as introduced addresses the lone 
terrorist acting on inspiration rather than affiliation. When 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (``FISA'') was 
enacted in the 1970s, terrorists usually were members of 
distinct, hierarchical terror groups. Today, the ``lone wolfs'' 
often are not formal members of any group. Instead, they are 
part of a loosely organized movement, such as Jihad Against 
America, and act alone. FISA authority should be updated to 
reflect this new threat. This section amends 50 U.S.C. 
Sec. 1801(b)(1) by adding new subparagraph C. Section 
1801(b)(1) defines ``Agent of a foreign power'' for any person 
other than a United States person, who:
          (A) acts in the United States as an officer or 
        employee of a foreign power, or as a member of a 
        foreign power as defined in subsection (a)(4) of this 
        section;
          (B) acts for or on behalf of a foreign power which 
        engages in clandestine intelligence activities in the 
        United States contrary to the interests of the United 
        States, when the circumstances of such person's 
        presence in the United States indicate that such person 
        may engage in such activities in the United States, or 
        when such person knowingly aids or abets any person in 
        the conduct of such activities or knowingly conspires 
        with any person to engage in such activities;
    The definition is used to determine the target of a 
surveillance under FISA. Section 4 adds new subparagraph C to 
the definition, which states ``engages in international 
terrorism or activities in preparation therefor.'' This new 
definition reaches unaffiliated individuals who engage in 
international terrorism, i.e. ``lone wolf'' terrorists. 
Specifically, the language expands the FISA definition of 
``agent of a foreign power'' to include a presumption that all 
non-U.S. persons who engage in international terrorism meet the 
definition of an agent of a foreign power.
    This section as introduced does not change the requirement 
for a judicial finding of probable cause that the target is an 
agent of a foreign power. (See Sec. 1805(a)(3) and (b)) The new 
definition requires that for a non-U.S. person to be found to 
be an agent of a foreign power that person must be engaged in 
international terrorism. Thus, under the probable cause 
requirement currently in law and the new definition in this 
section--before a judge can issue a FISA order for 
surveillance--there must be a showing of probable cause that 
the person is engaged or preparing to engage in international 
terrorism.
    At markup, the Committee adopted by voice vote a Berman 
amendment that substantially changed this section. The Berman 
amendment adds a new section to the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act of 1978. It allows the court to assume that a 
non-U.S. person who is engaged in terrorism is an agent of a 
foreign power under the Act.

Sections 2021-2024. Stop Terrorist and Military Hoaxes Act of 2004

    The Commission Report found that ``hard choices must be 
made in allocating limited resources,'' and that ``terrorists 
should perceive that potential targets are defended'' (See 
Commission Report at 391). Further, the Commission found that 
``throughout the government, nothing has been harder for 
officials * * * than to set priorities, making hard choices in 
allocating limited resources'' (See Commission Report at 395). 
In furtherance of this finding, this subtitle creates criminal 
and civil penalties for whoever engages in any conduct, with 
intent to convey false or misleading information, that concerns 
an activity which would constitute such crimes as those 
relating to: Explosives; firearms; destruction of vessels; 
terrorism; sabotage of nuclear facilities; aircraft piracy; a 
dangerous weapon to assault flight crew members and attendants; 
explosives on an aircraft; homicide or attempted homicide or 
damaging or destroying facilities. The subtitle also prohibits 
making a false statement with intent to convey false or 
misleading information about the death, injury, capture, or 
disappearance of a member of the U.S. armed forces during a war 
or armed conflict in which the United States is engaged. 
Additionally, the bill increases penalties from not more than 5 
years to not more than 10 years for making false statements, 
and obstructing justice, if the subject matter relates to 
international or domestic terrorism.

Sections 2041-2044. Material Support to Terrorism Prohibition 
        Enhancement Act of 2004

    The Commission Report noted on page 68 that as early as 
December 1993, a team of al Qaeda operatives had begun casing 
targets in Nairobi for future attacks. It was led by Ali 
Mohamed, a former Egyptian army officer who had moved to the 
United States in the mid-1980s, enlisted in the U.S. Army, and 
became an instructor at Fort Bragg. He had provided guidance 
and training to extremists at the Farouq mosque in Brooklyn, 
including some who were subsequently convicted in the February 
1993 attack on the World Trade Center. Additionally, as the 
report states on page 365, terrorism financing is a part of 
providing material support to terrorists. Material support may 
also consist of training.
    Section 2042 establishes a new crime of material support 
for terrorism for knowingly receiving military training from a 
foreign terrorist organization. The section requires that any 
person charged under this section must have knowledge that the 
organization is a terrorist organization. It also defines the 
term ``military-type training.'' The section provides for 
extraterritorial federal jurisdiction over an offense under 
this section.

Section 2043. Providing Material Support to Terrorism

    The 9/11 Commission Report noted on pages 365-66 that ``a 
complex international terrorist operation aimed at launching a 
catastrophic attack cannot be mounted by just anyone in any 
place. Such operations appear to require (among others):
          1. Time, space, and ability to perform competent 
        planning and staff work;
          2. Opportunity and space to recruit, train, and 
        select operatives with the needed skills and 
        dedication, providing the time and structure required 
        to socialize them into the terrorist cause, judge their 
        trustworthiness, and hone their skills;
          3. A logistics network able to securely manage the 
        travel of operatives, move money, and transport 
        resources (like explosives) where they need to go; and
          4. Access, in the case of certain weapons, to the 
        special materials needed for a nuclear, chemical, 
        radiological, or biological attack.
    The Commission on page 215 noted that it was ``unlikely'' 
that two of the 9/11 hijackers, ``Hazmi and Mihdhar--neither of 
whom, in contrast to the Hamburg group, had any prior exposure 
to life in the West--would have come to the United States 
without arranging to receive assistance from one or more 
individuals informed in advance of their arrival.'' It further 
noted, that ``our inability to ascertain the activities of 
Hazmi and Mihdhar during their first two weeks in the United 
States may reflect al Qaeda tradecraft designed to protect the 
identity of anyone who may have assisted them during that 
period.'' Without this material support structure in place, the 
two hijackers would have unlikely been able to sustain an 
existence without raising suspicions or feeling lost in an 
unfamiliar environment.
    Section 2043 expands the crime of material support to 
terrorists to include any act of international or domestic 
terrorism and require that any person charged under this 
section must have knowledge that the organization is a 
terrorist organization. It also more clearly defines the term 
material support.

Section 2044. Financing of Terrorism

    This section amends 18 USC Sec. 2339C so that those who 
raise funds for terrorism can be prosecuted prior to the funds 
being transmitted to terrorist organizations.

Sections 2051-2053. Weapons of Mass Destruction Prohibition Improvement 
        Act of 2004

    The Commission Report states ``that al Qaeda has tried to 
acquire or make weapons of mass destruction for at least ten 
years. There is no doubt the United States would be a prime 
target. Preventing the proliferation of these weapons warrants 
a maximum effort--by strengthening counter proliferation 
efforts, * * * '' (See Commission Report at 381) Section 2052 
amends 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2332a(a)(2), which makes it a crime for a 
person to use a weapon of mass destruction (other than a 
chemical weapon) against any person within the U.S., and the 
result of such use affects interstate and foreign commerce. 
This legislation would expand the coverage of the target to 
include property. The bill would also expand Federal 
jurisdiction by covering the use of mail or any facility of 
interstate or foreign commerce for the attack, by the property 
being used for interstate or foreign commerce, and when the 
perpetrator travels or causes another to travel in interstate 
or foreign commerce in furtherance of the offense. This section 
would also expand coverage to include the use of a chemical 
weapon.

Section 2101-2102. Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing

    The Commission Report found that: ``vigorous efforts to 
track terrorist financing must remain front and center in U.S. 
counterterrorism efforts. The government has recognized that 
information about terrorist money helps us to understand their 
networks, search them out, and disrupt their operations. These 
efforts have worked. The death or capture of several important 
facilitators has decreased the amount of money available to al 
Qaeda and has increased its costs and difficulty in raising and 
moving that money. Captures have additionally provided a 
windfall of intelligence.'' (See Commission Report at 382)
    This section authorizes funding for the Department of 
Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (``FinCEN''). 
It provides funding for the following: (1) key technological 
improvements in FinCEN systems providing authorized law 
enforcement agencies with Web-based access to FinCEN data; (2) 
expedited filing of suspicious activity reports with the 
ability to immediately alert financial institutions about 
suspicious activities; (3) provision of informationsharing 
technologies to improve the Government's ability to exploit the 
information in the FinCEN databases; and (4) provision of training in 
the use of technologies available to detect and prevent financial 
crimes and terrorism.

Sections 2141-2146. Criminal History Background Checks

    The Commission Report states that ``secure identification 
should begin in the United States * * * at many entry points to 
vulnerable facilities * * * sources of identification are the 
last opportunity to ensure that people are who they say they 
are and to check whether they are terrorists.'' (See Commission 
Report at 390) The Report also states that ``the private sector 
controls 85 percent of the critical infrastructure in the 
nation * * * the `first' first responders will almost certainly 
be civilians'' (See Commission Report at 398) In furtherance of 
these findings, this subtitle addresses the issue of criminal 
history records as they relate to background investigations.
    This subtitle requires the Attorney General to initiate, 
establish, and maintain a system for providing employers with 
criminal history information if the information is requested as 
part of an employee background check that is authorized by the 
State where the employee works or where the employer has its 
principal place of business. This subtitle also gives the 
Attorney General flexibility, based on real time terror 
concerns, to mandate criminal history record checks for certain 
types of employment that involve positions vital to the 
nation's infrastructure or key resources. This subtitle also 
establishes a mechanism for private security officer employers 
to request criminal history records as part of a background 
investigation and establishes a task force to examine the 
creation of a clearinghouse to facilitate criminal record 
request exchanges involving applicants for security officer 
employment.
    This section would allow a standardized approach to the 
numerous requests from groups that want or need access to these 
records. A piecemeal approach has evolved as the various bills 
that authorize these go to different committees for 
consideration and, when passed, end up in different sections of 
the code. Some of the groups that have legislation enacted for 
their individual industries include: banking, parimutuel 
wagering, securities, aviation, hazardous materials 
transportation, nuclear energy, Indian gambiing, nursing and 
home health care, and public housing.
    There are several other industries and groups that are 
seeking authority to request a check of these records as part 
of their applicant screening process. This section sets up a 
standard process with uniform procedures, definitions, fee 
structures where practical, and reasonable safeguards to 
protect privacy and employee rights. A reporting requirement 
under this section seeks to identify all statutory requirements 
that already require the Department of Justice to perform some 
type of record check, the type of information requested, and 
any variances that exist in terms, definitions, and fees 
charged. The amendment offered by Mrs. Blackburn, which was 
adopted, makes this a pilot study and establishes specific 
criteria to be addressed in the report that is required, 
including the effectiveness of using commercially available 
data bases as part of criminal history information checks. The 
Committee intends that this study last for 180 days.
    Section 2143 amends Public Law 108-21 extending from 18 
months to 30 months, the duration of existing pilot programs 
for volunteer groups to obtain national and state criminal 
history background checks.
    Section 2144 was added by the Blackburn amendment. It is 
the text of S.1743, the ``Private Security Officer Employment 
Authorization Act,'' which passed the Senate by unanimous 
consent at the end of 2003, and was the topic of a legislative 
hearing on March 30th, 2004, before the Subcommittee on Crime, 
Terrorism, and Homeland Security. This section makes findings 
as to the important role that private security officers play 
and stresses the importance of thoroughly screening and 
training officers. This section establishes a mechanism for 
authorized employers of security guards to request criminal 
history background checks using existing State identification 
bureaus. The criteria for disqualification mirror existing 
state criteria and where a state has no criteria for such 
employment, this section provides general disqualifiers. A 
state may decline to participate in the program established by 
this section.
    Section 2145, created by the Blackburn amendment, 
establishes a task force to examine the establishment of a 
national clearinghouse to process criminal history record 
requests from employers providing private security guard 
services. The Committee intends that the clearinghouse 
described in Sec. 2145 shall only process criminal history 
record requests pertaining to employees or prospective 
employees of the private security guard service making the 
request pursuant to that section.

Section 2191. Grand jury information sharing

    The Commission recommended on page 417 of its report that 
``Information procedures should provide incentives for sharing, 
to restore a better balance between security and shared 
knowledge. On page 355, the report listed several examples of 
failures of information sharing before the September 11th 
attacks. In January 2001: the CIA did not inform the FBI that a 
source had identified Khallad, or Tawfiq bin Attash, a major 
figure in the October 2000 bombing of the USS Cole, as having 
attended the meeting in Kuala Lumpur with Khalid al Mihdhar. In 
May 2001: a CIA official did not notify the FBI about Mihd-
har's U.S. visa, Hazmi's U.S. travel, or Khallad's having 
attended the Kuala Lumpur meeting. In June 2001: FBI and CIA 
officials did not ensure that all relevant information 
regarding the Kuala Lumpurmeeting was shared with the Cole 
investigators at the June 11 meeting. In August 2001: the FBI did not 
recognize the significance of the information regarding Mihdhar and 
Hazmi's possible arrival in the United States and thus did not take 
adequate action to share information, assign resources, and give 
sufficient priority to the search. Also in August 2001: FBI 
headquarters did not recognize the significance of the information 
regarding Moussaoui's training and beliefs and thus did not take 
adequate action to share information.
    Along with the 9/11 attacks, the growth of transnational 
threats against the United States has increased the need for 
intelligence and law enforcement agencies to cooperate and 
share intelligence and law enforcement information. Executive 
Order 12333 (1981) states: ``Timely and accurate information 
about the activities, capabilities, plans, and intentions of 
foreign powers, organizations, and persons and their agents, is 
essential to the national security of the United States. All 
reasonable and lawful means must be used to ensure that the 
United States will receive the best intelligence available.''
    Section 895 of the USA PATRIOT Act was an effort to allow 
sharing of grand jury information in limited circumstanes. It 
was subsequently affected by a rule change by the Supreme 
Court. According to the Historical Notes of the Federal 
Criminal Code and Rules on page 51, ``Section 895 of Pub. L. 
No. 107-296, which purported to amend subdivision (e) of this 
rule, failed to take into account the amendment of this rule by 
Order of the Supreme Court of the United States dated April 29, 
2002, effective December 1, 2002, and was therefore incapable 
of execution.'' This section makes the technical changes to 
address the rule change and ensure that the intent of Congress 
is carried through to improve information sharing.

Section 2192. Interoperable Law Enforcement and Intelligence Data 
        System

    The Commission Report described both the immensity of 
government information, but also how the U.S. government has a 
weak system for processing and using what it has. In no place 
is there greater resistance to information sharing and to any 
kind of interconnectivity among data systems than within the 
Intelligence Community. For example, the Report states that 
``undistributed NSA information * * * would have helped 
identify Nawaf al Hazmi in January 2000.'' (See Commission 
Report at 417) The problem is that, three years later, the 
intelligence agencies stubbornly maintain the set of parallel 
information system smokestacks that have existed for decades.
    The Commission also proposed that ``information be shared 
horizontally, across new networks that transcend individual 
agencies, ``and explained that the ``current system is 
structured on an old mainframe, or hub-and-spoke, concept. In 
this older approach, each agency has its own database. Agency 
users send information to the database and then can retrieve it 
from the database.'' (See Commission Report at 418) It proposed 
instead a ``decentralized network model,'' the concept behind 
much of the information revolution also shares data 
horizontally. Agencies would still have their own databases, 
but those databases would be searchable across agency lines. In 
this system, secrets are protected through the design of the 
network and an `information rights management' approach that 
controls access to the data, not access to the whole network''. 
(See Commission Report at 418) The Commission recommended that 
``The president should lead the government-wide effort to bring 
the major national security institutions into the information 
revolution * * * [he] should coordinate the resolution of the 
legal, policy, and technical issues across agencies to create a 
``trusted information network.'' (See Commission Report at 418)
    Section 2192 provides a clear direction to the NID to end 
that approach and clear deadlines for accomplishing a 
horizontal system. It takes a system that Congress already 
authorized for the successors to the INS in the Enhanced Border 
Security Act of 2001--which has not been implemented--and moves 
it to the National Intelligence Center. Specifically, this 
provision establishes requirements for the NID to establish an 
interim system for horizontal information exchange within the 
intelligence community to become operational immediately. This 
is to be followed by a fully functional interoperable system to 
``truly'' establish interoperable data and information exchange 
within a trusted information network by 2007. Due to the 
complexity of this endeavor, as well as the urgency for 
completion of both the interim system and the full system, a 
special authority is granted to hire people capable of 
establishing both systems. Requirements for the systems align 
with the Commission's recommended ``need to share'' 
intelligence with intelligence officers, law enforcement and 
operational counterterror personnel, consular officers, and DHS 
border security officers.

Section 2193. The Improvement of Intelligence Capabilities of the 
        Federal Bureau of Investigation

    This section codifies the recommendations of the Commission 
as they relate to the FBI's intelligence capabilities. These 
recommendations are largely reforms that have already been 
implemented, or are about to be implemented, at the FBI. In its 
Report, the Commission recommends that the FBI's shift to 
preventing terrorism must survive the tenure of the current 
Director. This section avoids past shortcomings by the Bureau 
in its efforts to transform itself to address transnational 
security concern.

            TITLE III--BORDER SECURITY AND TERRORIST TRAVEL


        Subtitle A. Immigration Reform in the National Interest


Section 3001. Verification of Returning Citizens

    Regulations implementing the Immigration and Nationality 
Act (``INA'') allow U.S. citizens to reenter the U.S. from 
countries in the Western Hemisphere (other than Cuba) without 
passports.\22\ The risks of this so-called ``Western Hemisphere 
exception'' have become all too obvious. A May 2003 hearing by 
the Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims 
examined D.C. sniper John Muhammad's smuggling activities 
between the Caribbean and the United States and revealed 
significant weaknesses in the admission process resulting from 
the exception. Muhammad was able to make his living by 
providing false American identification documents such as 
driver's licenses and birth certificates to aliens seeking to 
impersonate U.S. citizens and get through U.S. ports-of-entry. 
The GAO performed two investigations of this process, one for 
the Senate Finance Committee in January 2003, and another for 
the Immigration Subcommittee in May 2003.\23\ In January, GAO 
agents crossed into the U.S. by presenting counterfeit state 
identification documents with false names (or no documents at 
all) from Canada, Mexico, and Jamaica. After briefing DHS on 
what it had done, and using the same documents, inspectors re-
entered from Barbados unimpeded in May.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\ See Sec. 215(b) of the INA.
    \23\ See John Allen Muhammad, Document Fraud, and the Western 
Hemisphere Passport Exception: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On 
Immigration, Border Security and Claims of the House Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 108th Cong., at 31 (testimony of Robert Cramer, Managing 
Director, Office of Special Investigations, U.S. General Accounting 
Office) (2003).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    It is no wonder that the Commission found that ``Americans 
should not be exempt from carrying biometric passports or 
otherwise enabling their identities to be securely verified 
when they enter the United States * * *.'' \24\ Section 3001 
would require that by October 2006, all U.S. citizens returning 
from Western Hemisphere countries other than Canada and Mexico 
must present U.S. passports. In the interim, U.S. citizens 
would have to present a document designated by the Secretary of 
DHS. For U.S. citizens returning from Canada and Mexico, the 
Secretary of DHS would have to designate documents that are 
sufficiently secure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\ Commission Report at 388.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Section 3002. Documents Required by Aliens from Contiguous Countries

    Foreign visitors usually need passports or U.S. visas or 
border crossing cards to enter the U.S. However, the INA allows 
the Administration to waive this requirement for nationals of 
contiguous countries--which it has done for Canadians.\25\ 
Therefore, U.S. inspectors at northern ports-of-entry can allow 
persons identifying themselves as Canadians and not looking 
``suspicious'' to enter the U.S. without having to show any 
documents whatsoever. Non-Canadians entering the U.S. without 
any documents by claiming to be Canadian and Canadians on 
terrorist watchlists not being identified at the border because 
they do not have to provide documents are obvious security 
concerns.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \25\ See INA Sec. 212(d)(4)(B).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    There have been a disturbing number of cases of terrorists 
trying to enter the U.S. from Canada. Most notoriously, on 
December 14, 1999, the U.S. Customs Service arrested Algerian 
Ahmed Ressam at Port Angeles, Washington. Ressam was on his way 
to carry out the ``Millenium Plot'' and detonate a bomb at Los 
Angeles's international airport. He was found with 
nitroglycerin and other bomb-making equipment in his car. A 
former counter-terrorism chief for the CIA stated that his 
interception was ``pure luck.''
    The National Post of Canada reported in June 2002 that:

          New allegations that a man behind the deadly bombing 
        of a Tunisian synagogue belonged to a Montreal-based 
        al-Qaeda cell show that Canada must do more to combat 
        violent extremists, critics charged. * * * Nizar Ben 
        Muhammed Nasr Nawar, 24, was under surveillance by 
        Canadian intelligence agents for weeks but managed to 
        slip away to his native country and set off a bomb that 
        killed 19 people, including 12 German tourists. There 
        is no word on whether Nawar, who told his family he was 
        going to study at a Montreal school for travel agents, 
        was part of a wave of 1,300 young Tunisian men who came 
        to Canada in 1999 and 2000 on a student exchange. More 
        than 100 of them have since disappeared without a 
        trace.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\ Tom Blackwell, Bombing Link Brings Call for Crackdown: 
Synagogue Killer Slipped through Net While in Canada, National Post, 
June 10, 2002, at A4.

    Unfortunately, it has been clear for some time that 
Canadian immigration policy poses a risk to U.S. national 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
security. The Boston Globe reported in February 2002 that:

          [Canada] has emerged as an important fund-raising and 
        staging ground for Al Qaeda soldiers. * * * For Al 
        Qaeda, the Canadian center of choice is Montreal * * * 
        although terrorist plotters and long-term ``sleepers'' 
        have also made nests in Toronto and Vancouver, the 
        country's two other major urban areas, according to 
        terrorist specialists and investigators. ``Montreal is 
        a world-class hub of Islamist terrorist activity,'' 
        said David Harris, former chief of strategic planning 
        at the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service, the 
        nation's spy service. * * * Noting the city's proximity 
        to the United States and its large Muslim population, 
        into which an Islamic militant bent on concealment can 
        easily blend, Harris * * * said: ``For a group that 
        thinks of the US as the Great Satan, what better 
        staging city for reconnaissance and operations?'' * * * 
        [I]ntelligence officials, anti-terrorist agents, 
        federal police, and diplomats confirmed in recent 
        interviews and background briefings that Al Qaeda and 
        other terrorist groups have a significant presence in 
        Canada. * * * Of most concern is the strong possibility 
        that undetected Al Qaeda sleeper cells exist in Canada, 
        awaiting the signal to attack American targets. * * * 
        [S]cores of suspected Al Qaeda loyalists * * * have 
        exploited Canada's liberal immigration standards and 
        notoriously lax refugee rules to establish safe havens 
        in the country that * * * still offers the easiest 
        international access to the United States. * * * 
        [C]ritics say the Chretien government is ignoring the 
        most basic reason why Canada has become a sanctuary for 
        international terrorists--immigration policies that 
        bring more than 250,000 new people a year into the 
        country with very little screening and loose rules that 
        allow even suspected terrorists to reside for years in 
        the country (collecting welfare, national health 
        benefits, and housing allowances) simply by claiming to 
        be refugees.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \27\ Colin Nickerson, U.S. Wary of ``Time Bombs'' Waiting to Strike 
from North, Boston Globe, February 4, 2002, at A12.

    The 9/11 Commission found that ``Americans should not be 
exempt from carrying biometric passports or otherwise enabling 
their identities to be securely verified when they enter the 
United States, nor should Canadians or Mexicans. * * *'' \28\ 
The bill would require that by the beginning of 2007, aliens 
claiming to be Canadian who seek to enter the U.S. must present 
a passport or other secure identification.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \28\ Commission Report at 388 (emphasis added).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Section 3003. Strengthening the Border Patrol

    The 9/11 Commission found that ``[i]t is elemental to 
border security to know who is coming into the country. * * * 
We must * * * be able to monitor and respond to entrances 
between our ports of entry. * * * The challenge for national 
security in an age of terrorism is to preventthe * * * people 
who may pose overwhelming risks from entering * * * the U.S. 
undetected.'' \29\ The Commission's staff report on ``9/11 and 
Terrorist Travel'' found that ``[t]here is also evidence that 
terrorists used human smugglers to sneak across borders.'' \30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \29\ Id. at 383, 390.
    \30\ 9/11 and Terrorist Travel: Staff Report of the National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States at 59 (2004).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Commission and its staff were right. Because it is easy 
for aliens to illegally cross our borders, it is also 
relatively easy for terrorists to enter. Periodic reports of 
large numbers of Middle Eastern nationals crossing the southern 
border were verified by the recent release of Border Patrol 
data showing that from last October through this June, 44,614 
non-Mexican aliens were caught trying to cross the northern or 
southern borders--including eight from Afghanistan, six from 
Algeria, 13 from Egypt, 20 from Indonesia, 10 from Iran, 55 
from Israel, 122 from Pakistan, six from Saudi Arabia, six from 
Syria, 22 from Turkey, and two from Yemen. A South African 
woman alleged to be on a terrorist watch list recently 
indicated that she had crossed the border illegally from 
Mexico.
    By the mid 1990s, our southwest border was in a state of 
crisis. The transit routes most heavily used for illegal aliens 
were in the San Diego corridor. It had become a sieve where 
illegal aliens from Mexico entered en masse and unhindered. The 
Border Patrol in El Paso, Texas, then developed ``Operation 
Hold the Line'' and placed agents directly on the border. This 
deterrent dramatically reduced illegal crossings, cutting crime 
in border communities and winning the praise of the public. The 
INS adopted the Hold-the-Line strategy in San Diego under the 
moniker of ``Operation Gatekeeper'', and it came to believe 
that Gatekeeper was one of its most successful border control 
initiatives ever, bringing law and order to the San Diego 
border.
    Despite the successes of Hold-the-Line and Gatekeeper, 
overall illegal entries across our borders have not decreased 
because there are not enough agents to duplicate the strategy 
across the southwest border. Illegal aliens now resort to 
difficult but lightly patrolled routes across rugged terrain in 
California and Arizona. Professor Frank Bean of the University 
of Texas found that approximately 16,000 Border Patrol agents 
would be required to duplicate the Hold-the-Line strategy 
across the entire southwestern border. This is the number of 
agents America needs to control our southwestern border. Given 
the need to also bolster resources along the northern border, 
Border Patrol strength should optimally be at least doubled 
from its current level of about 11,000. The bill therefore 
authorizes an increase in the Border Patrol of 2,000 agents a 
year for each of the next five years.

Section 3004. Increase in Immigration Enforcement Investigators

    The Commission's staff found repeatedly that the lack of 
enforcement of our immigration laws in the interior of the U.S. 
facilitated terrorism. The staff reported that ``abuse of the 
immigration system and a lack of interior immigration 
enforcement were unwittingly working together to support 
terrorist activity.'' \31\ Further, ``[t]he first problem 
encountered by those concerned about terrorists was an almost 
complete lack of enforcement resources. [No one] ever provided 
the support needed for INS enforcement agents to find, detain, 
and remove illegal aliens, including those with terrorist 
associations.'' \32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \31\ Id. at 46.
    \32\ Id. at 95.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Even if we were to completely seal our borders, that would 
not be enough to control illegal immigration. Between one-third 
and one-half of the resident illegal alien population came to 
the U.S. legally on temporary visas and simply never left. 
Interior enforcement is a crucial component of immigration law 
enforcement. In addition to tracking down illegal aliens 
(including those who do make it past the border), interior 
investigators also play a crucial role in the location and 
deportation of criminal aliens and aliens who skip out on 
deportation orders. But the Commission's staff found that 
``[t]he budget for interior enforcement remained static in the 
face of an overwhelming number of immigrants outside the legal 
framework'' and that ``[t]he INS's difficulty in locating 
absconders is consistent with the difficulty generally faced 
[in locating] aliens inside our country.'' \33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \33\ Id. at 143 and 156.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ICE only has about 2,000 investigators nationwide, a number 
that all agree is woefully inadequate to protect the borders 
against terrorist infiltration. Enforcement of employer 
sanctions has all but been abandoned. Arrests on job sites have 
declined from over 8,000 in 1992 to 451 in 2002, and final 
orders levying fines on employers for immigration law 
violations fell from over 1,000 in 1992 to 13 in 2002. Until we 
eliminate the ``job magnet'' we will never successfully control 
illegal immigration.
    There are some 400,000 alien ``absconders,'' aliens who 
have been ordered removed from the U.S. and who have ignored 
those orders and remained in the country. Of those, 80,000 have 
criminal records. Although ICE has deployed 18 Fugitive 
Operations teams to arrest those aliens, the teams cannot 
accomplish the task on their own. A recent report stated that 
the San Diego team ``with more than 550 apprehensions ranks 
near the top of the 22 cities where Homeland Security agents 
have caught fugitives since October 2003.'' If each team were 
to arrest 600 aliens per year, it would take more than 37 years 
to apprehend the outstanding absconders, even if no other 
aliens were to evade removal. It would take more than seven 
yearsfor these teams to arrest just the criminal absconders.
    The bill would increase the number of ICE investigators 
enforcing our immigration laws by 800 a year for each of the 
next five years. One half of the new investigators would be 
dedicated to enforcing employer sanctions and removing illegal 
aliens from the workplace. Section 3005. Prevention of Improper 
Use of Foreign Identification Documents.
    The Commission noted that ``[i]n their travels, terrorists 
use * * * identity fraud.'' \34\ It wrote that ``[a] 
fundamental problem * * * is the lack of standardized 
information in `feeder' documents used in identifying 
individuals [and that f]raud in identification documents is no 
longer just a problem of theft. At many entry points to 
vulnerable facilities, including gates for boarding aircraft, 
sources of identification are the last opportunity to ensure 
that people are who they say they are and to check whether they 
are terrorists.'' \35\ The Commission went on to say that 
``[o]nce inside the country, [aliens] may seek another form of 
identification and try to enter a government or private 
facility.'' \36\ It found that ``today, a terrorist can defeat 
the link to electronic records by tossing away an old passport 
and slightly altering the name in the new one.'' \37\ The staff 
of the Commission found that ``[terrorists] relied on a wide 
variety of fraudulent documents * * *.'' \38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \34\ 9/11 Commission Report at 384.
    \35\ Id. at 386, 390.
    \36\ Id. at 385.
    \37\ Id. at 389.
    \38\ 9/11 and Terrorist Travel at 46.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Since early 2002, the Mexican government has been promoting 
its consular identification card, called the ``matricula 
consular,'' for acceptance in the United States. Acceptance of 
the cards encourages illegal immigration to the United States. 
The only aliens in the U.S. who need additional identification 
documents, other than passports and U.S.-government issued 
documents, are those illegally here.
    Also, as the then-Assistant Director of the FBI's Office of 
Intelligence, Steve McCraw, told the Immigration Subcommittee 
in June 2003, the matricula consular is vulnerable to fraud 
because the issuance standards are low, the Mexican government 
does not monitor the cards' issuance, and it is also vulnerable 
to forgery.\39\ Mr. McCraw concluded that domestic acceptance 
of matricula cards in the United States poses a law enforcement 
and national security risk.\40\ He stated that the criminal 
threat stems from the fact that matriculas ``can be a perfect 
breeder document for establishing a false identity,'' which can 
facilitate a wide range of crimes, including money 
laundering.\41\ He told of individuals who were arrested with 
multiple matriculas, each with the same photo but different 
names, some of whom had matching driver's licenses.\42\ He 
concluded that the terrorist threat posed by these cards that 
is the ``most worrisome'' to the FBI: ``[t]he ability of 
foreign nationals to use [consular cards] to create a well-
documented, but fictitious, identity in the United States 
provides an opportunity for terrorists to move freely within 
the United States without triggering name-based watch lists 
that are disseminated to local police officers.'' \43\ Nor is 
the danger posed by those documents only as ``breeder 
documents'' for other documentation--notwithstanding their 
vulnerability to fraud and abuse, consular ID cards can be 
presented to board an airliner.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \39\ See Consular Identification Cards: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
On Immigration, Border Security and Claims of the House Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 108th Cong., at 109-12 (2003).
    \40\ Id. at 112.
    \41\ Id. at 111.
    \42\ Id.
    \43\ Id. at 112.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The bill would bar all federal employees from accepting 
identification cards presented by aliens other than a document 
issued by the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland 
Security under the authority of the immigration laws, or an 
unexpired foreign passport. Section 3006. Expedited Removal for 
Illegal Aliens.
    By the mid-1990s, tens of thousands of aliens were arriving 
at U.S. airports each year without valid documents and making 
meritless asylum claims, knowing that they would be released 
into the community pending asylum hearings because of a lack of 
detention space. Few were ever heard from again. In response, 
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
of 1996 (``IIRIRA'') created the mechanism of ``expedited 
removal.'' \44\ Under expedited removal, a DHS officer at a 
port-of-entry can immediately return an alien lacking proper 
documents to the country of origin unless the alien asks for 
asylum and can establish a ``credible fear'' of persecution. By 
fiscal year 2003, the INS was making over 43,000 expedited 
removals per year and our airports were no longer being 
deluged.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \44\ See INA 235(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    IIRIRA provided the Administration with the authority to 
use expedited removal in the case of any alien who had entered 
the U.S. illegally and had not been present here for two 
years.\45\ Until recently, the INS and DHS never made use of 
this power, a fact that amazed the staff of the 9/11 
Commission. The staff stated that:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \45\ See INA 235(b)(1)(A)(iii).

          Despite th[e success of expedited removal at our 
        airports], the INS never expanded expedited removal to 
        include persons attempting to enter illegally across 
        the expansive physical borders between ports of entry. 
        As a result, it was not used against Gazi Ibrahim Abu 
        Mezer, who was able to stay in the United States 
        despite being apprehended three times for illegal 
        entries along the Canadian border. He later became 
        known as the ``Brooklyn Bomber'' for his plan to blow 
        up the Atlantic Avenue subway in Brooklyn.\46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \46\ 9/11 and Terrorist Travel at 97 (footnotes omitted).

    Recently, the Administration has taken a tentative step 
towards using expedited removal along the southern border 
because of the large numbers of non-Mexican aliens who have 
been caught by the Border Patrol and then released into the 
United States because of a lack of detention space.
    Aliens who have crossed the border illegally should be 
subject to expedited exclusion. These aliens, if they have been 
in the U.S. less than ten years, have no right to seek 
cancellation of removal. Unless they are making a claim of 
asylum and can show a credible fear of persecution, there is no 
reason not to subject them to expedited removal. Otherwise, the 
present ``revolving door'' will continue to spin. We will catch 
illegal aliens and promptly release them, hoping they will 
appear for their immigration court hearing months hence. DOJ's 
Inspector General found that the INS was only able to remove 
13% of nondetained aliens with final orders of removal, and 
only 6% of nondetained aliens from state sponsors of terrorism 
who had final removal orders.\47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \47\ U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, 
Evaluation and Inspections Division, The Immigration and Naturalization 
Service's Removal of Aliens Issued Final Orders (I-2003-004) at i, ii 
(2003).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The bill would require DHS to use expedited removal in the 
case of all aliens who have entered the U.S. illegally and have 
not been present here for five years. Given changes to the INA 
that Congress made in 1996 that amended the entry doctrine and 
ended the distinctions between exclusion and deportation 
hearings, it is questionable whether aliens who entered 
illegally would have any due process rights beyond the minimal 
rights of an arriving alien seeking admission to the U.S. 
Assuming that those aliens do, however, the procedures 
specified in section 3006 would satisfy due process. That these 
procedures do not require immigration court consideration does 
not violate due process, nor do they necessarily make the risk 
of an erroneous deprivation of removal any more likely than 
would immigration court procedures.
    In evaluating whether procedures in any case satisfy due 
process, the court must consider the interest at stake for the 
alien, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the interest 
through the procedures used as well as the probable value of 
additional or different procedural safeguards, and the interest 
of the government in using the current procedures rather than 
additional or different procedures.\48\ The aliens affected by 
this section have an interest in not being removed. Those 
aliens' interests are limited, however, by the paucity of their 
ties to the United States. In particular, the only aliens who 
would be impacted by this provision are those who have so few 
ties (and have been here less than five years) that they are 
entitled to no immigration benefits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \48\ See Landon v. Plascencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    No precedent suggests that to satisfy due process, an alien 
must be placed into removal proceedings before an immigration 
judge under Sec. 240 of the INA, as opposed to having the 
opportunity to explain to an immigration officer within DHS 
that he or she is not inadmissible under one of the grounds for 
expedited removal. As the Supreme Court held in one of the 
seminal cases in immigration law:

          This court has never held, nor must we now be 
        understood as holding, that administrative officers, 
        when executing the provisions of a statute involving 
        the liberty of persons, may disregard the fundamental 
        principles that inhere in ``due process of law'' as 
        understood at the time of the adoption of the 
        Constitution. One of these principles is that no person 
        shall be deprived of his liberty without opportunity, 
        at some time, to be heard, before such officers, in 
        respect of the matters upon which that liberty 
        depends--not necessarily an opportunity upon a regular, 
        set occasion, and according to the forms of judicial 
        procedure, but one that will secure the prompt, 
        vigorous action contemplated by Congress, and at the 
        same time be appropriate to the nature of the case upon 
        which such officers are required to act.\49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \49\ Yamatayo v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1903) (emphasis 
added).

    In fact, until the (regulatory) creation of the Executive 
Office for Immigration Review in 1983, immigration judges were 
a part of the former INS, the agency charged with the alien's 
removal. In implementing the expedited removal provisions in 
IIRIRA, INS recognized the interests of aliens facing removal, 
and drafted its procedures to protect those interests.\50\ 
Those procedures effectively ensure that aliens are not 
erroneously removed thereunder: ``All officers should be 
especially careful to exercise objectivity and professionalism 
when refusing admission to aliens under this [expedited 
removal] provision. Because of the sensitivity of the program 
and the potential consequences of a summary removal, you must 
take special care to ensure that the basic rights of all aliens 
are preserved * * *. Since a removal order under this process 
is subject to very limited review, you must be absolutely 
certain that all required procedures have been adhered to and 
that the alien has understood the proceedings against him or 
her. * * * All officers should be aware of precedent decisions 
and policies relating to the relevant grounds of 
inadmissibility. * * * [I]t is important that * * * any 
expedited removal be justifiable and non-arbitrary.\51\ The 
Committee believes that the procedures adopted under this 
provision will have similar protections.\52\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \50\ See generally AILA v. Reno, 18 F. Supp.2d 38, 43-44 (D.D.C. 
1998).
    \51\ Id. at 43 (quoting the INS Inspector's Field Manual, ch. 
17.15(a), (b)).
    \52\ The alien's rights in expedited removal would be further 
protected by the alien's access to seek review in habeas proceedings. 
See INA Sec. 242(e).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The government's interest in the efficient enforcement of 
the immigration laws, on the other hand, is weighty, 
particularly given the findings of the Commission and its 
report. As the Commission found: ``had the immigration system 
set a higher bar for determining whether individuals are who or 
what they claim to be--and ensuring routine consequences for 
violations--it could potentially have excluded, removed, or 
come into further contact with several hijackers who did not 
appear to meet the terms for admitting short-term visitors.'' 
\53\ Further, as the Supreme Court has found, ``it must weigh 
heavily in the balance that control over matters of immigration 
is a sovereign prerogative, largely within the control of the 
executive and the legislature.'' \54\ Given these facts, the 
procedures described in the bill satisfy the due process for 
aliens who entered the U.S. illegally (such aliens having 
extremely limited due process rights). Section 3007. Limit 
Asylum Abuse by Terrorists.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \53\ Commission Rewport at 384; see also id. at 390 (``It is 
elemental to bordere security to know who is coming into our country. 
We must also be able to * * * respond to entrances between our ports of 
entry.'').
    \54\ Plascencia, 459 U.S. at 34.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Terrorists are not supposed to receive asylum,\55\ but many 
have tried. The Commission's staff report on ``9/11 and 
Terrorist Travel'' found that ``a number of terrorists * * * 
abused the asylum system'' \56\ and that ``[o]nce terrorists 
had entered the U.S., their next challenges was to find a way 
to remain here. Their primary method was immigration fraud * * 
* [concoct]ing bogus political asylum stories when they arrived 
* * *.'' \57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \55\ See INA Sec. 208(b)(2)(A)(v).
    \56\ 9/11 and Terrorist Travel at 99.
    \57\ Id. at 47.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Unfortunately, examples abound. In 1993, Mir Aimal Kansi 
murdered two CIA employees at CIA headquarters and Ramzi Yousef 
masterminded the first World Trade Center attack while free 
after applying for asylum. In the same year, Sheik Umar Abd ar-
Rahman plotted to bomb New York City landmarks after he applied 
for asylum. Just weeks ago, Shahawar Matin Siraj was arrested 
in New York City for plotting to bomb a subway station. Siraj 
was free after applying for asylum.
    Asylum fraud is endemic. The staff of the 9/11 Commission 
found that ``the asylum system did not detect or deter 
fraudulent applicants.'' \58\ ``Snakeheads'' and other alien 
smugglers have succeeded in providing the aliens they are 
smuggling into the U.S. with extensive coaching and ``cheat 
sheets'' on what claims to make to get asylum. Successful ploys 
are quickly duplicated. The Commission staff found that ``the 
asylum system did not detect or deter fraudulent applicants.'' 
\59\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \58\ Id. at 86.
    \59\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As a result, the number of aliens--mostly illegal aliens 
seeking any way to avoid deportation--who have applied for and 
have been granted asylum has skyrocketed in recent years. From 
1990 to 2003, the number of aliens granted asylum by asylum 
officers has increased by 173% and the number of aliens granted 
asylum by immigration judges increased by 377%. The percentage 
of cases approved by asylum officers has increased by 93%, and 
the percentage approved by immigration judges has increased by 
61%. When both asylum officers and immigration judges are taken 
into account, well over half of all asylum applications are now 
being approved. The total number of aliens granted asylum hit 
almost 37,000 in 2002 and almost 29,000 in 2003, a 240 percent 
increase from 1990 to 2003.
    Ninth Circuit precedent makes it difficult for immigration 
judges to deny fraudulent asylum applications by terrorists or 
simply by scam artists. In recent decisions, the Ninth Circuit 
has failed to give deference to the adverse credibility 
determinations of immigration judges in asylum cases. It is 
well accepted that the initial trier of fact is in the best 
position to assess the credibility of a witness who appears 
before him. The Supreme Court has held that ``[t]o reverse the 
BIA finding, [the reviewing court] must find that the evidence 
not only supports the conclusion, but compels it.'' \60\ 
Despite these rules, however, the Ninth Circuit has adopted a 
body of circuit law that relieves the applicant of his burden 
of proof in asylum cases and allows the court to substitute its 
own views about contested record evidence for reasonable 
determinations of immigration judges or the BIA: ``the majority 
resolves every ambiguity in favor of [the asylum applicant], 
whereas [the correct] standard of review requires us to resolve 
every ambiguity in favor of the decision-maker below.'' \61\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \60\ INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 n.1 (1992).
    \61\ Cardenas v. INS, No. 01-70557, 2002 WL 1286076, at *6 (9th 
Cir. June 12, 2002) (Graber, J. dissenting).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The court essentially prevents immigration judges from 
making adverse credibility determinations by limiting to the 
point of a nullity the factors (such as inconsistencies and 
demeanor observations) that the immigration judge can consider 
in finding an alien incredible.\62\ For example, it has held 
that an immigration judge could not take into account, when 
determining whether an alien's allegations of police beatings 
were credible, the alien's inconsistent testimony about when 
and where he was beaten.\63\ It has ruled that the BIA could 
not draw inferences from the ```disjointed[ness] and 
``incoherence''' of the applicant's testimony, speculating that 
those features of the testimony ``were possibly the result of 
mistranslation or miscommunication.'' \64\ It ignores the rule 
that ``[i]f a witness lies on any point, now matter how 
irrelevant it may at first appear * * * the witness's 
credibility is tenuous at best, and the entire testimony can be 
discredited.'' \65\ It ruled that an applicant's failure to 
mention family-planning issues in his 1995 asylum application, 
and his statement in 1995 that he was unmarried, failed to cast 
doubt upon respondent's testimony in the second asylum 
proceeding that he was married and his wife was pregnant when 
he fled China in 1995, and that he fled because he was being 
pursued by family-planning officials.\66\ It treats each 
inconsistency or gap in an applicants evidence as an isolated 
defect, rather than considering them cumulatively.\67\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \62\ See e.g., Singh v. INS, 292 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 2002); Bandari 
v. INS, 227 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2000); Shah v. INS, 220 F.3d 1062 (9th 
Cir. 2000); Abovian v. INS, 219 F.3d 972 (9th Cir. 2000), reh'g denied, 
257 F.3d 971 (9th Cir. 2001).
    \63\ See Bandari, 227 F.3d at 1165-66.
    \64\ See Abovian, 219 F.3d at 979 (quoting Akinmade v. INS, 196 
F.3d 951, 956 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
    \65\ See, e.g., Jeffrey Kestler, Questioning Techniques and Tactics 
Sec. 1.22 (3d ed. 1999).
    \66\ See INS v. Yi Quan Chen, 266 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 2001).
    \67\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Other Courts of Appeals adhere to more reasonable rules, 
for example that an asylum applicant has to provide 
``convincing reasons'' for inconsistency in his evidence,\68\ 
that the court should review the collective significance of 
inconsistencies,\69\ and that an asylum applicant's not 
remembering the details of his father's kidnaping was ``the 
very stuff of legitimate impeachment.'' \70\ Given that 
government attorneys are barred from asking the foreign 
government about the facts regarding the asylum claimants,\71\ 
about the only evidence available to the government on which to 
deny an asylum application is the perceived credibility of the 
applicant. If a criminal jury can sentence a criminal defendant 
to life imprisonment or execution based on adverse credibility 
determinations, certainly an immigration judge can deny an 
alien asylum on this basis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \68\ See Mansour v. INS, 230 F.3d 902, 906 (7th Cir. 2000).
    \69\ See Chun v. INS, 40 F.3d 76, 78-79 (5th Cir. 1994).
    \70\ See Bojorques-Villanueva v. INS, 194 F.3d 14, 17 (1st Cir. 
1999).
    \71\ See 8 C.F.R. Sec. 208.6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In 1988, the Ninth Circuit created a disturbing precedent 
that has made it easier for suspected terrorists to apply for 
and receive asylum. It held that punishment inflicted on 
account of perceived membership in an armed group may 
constitute persecution on account of the political opinion of 
that armed group, a doctrine known as ``imputed political 
opinion.'' \72\ Thus, aliens who have been arrested in the 
United States for suspicion of affiliation with terrorist 
organizations argue that the foreign government believes that 
they are members of a terrorist organization. Some have 
received asylum because of a fear of persecution if returned 
because of an affiliation with these groups.\73\ Of course, the 
court has to rule that the foreign government ``mistakenly'' 
believes the asylum applicant is a terrorist because terrorists 
are barred from receiving asylum. As a member of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals has found:

    \72\ See Blanco-Lopez v. INS, 858 F. 2d 531 (9th Cir. 1988).
    \73\ See, e.g., Singh v. Ilchert, 63 F. 3d 1501 (9th Cir. 1995).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          It would appear that the Ninth Circuit holds the 
        entirely novel view that the violent overthrow of a 
        democratically elected government is a ``political 
        opinion'' like any other and that no government may 
        object to its expression. If a guerilla organization 
        arose in this country aimed at the violent overthrow of 
        the Federal Government through a program of murder of 
        government and law enforcement officials and federal 
        judges, it would appear that governmental suppression 
        of this organization would be an act of persecution in 
        the Ninth Circuit. After all, if that court could find 
        that [a government] ``persecuted [the asylum applicant] 
        because it believed him to be a guerrilla,'' then it is 
        clear that ``being'' a guerrilla is somehow a form of 
        ``political opinion,'' regardless of the actual 
        objectives of the guerrillas and their methods. If this 
        is so, then that court could not logically object to 
        the murder of federal judges by ``guerrillas'' who are 
        only acting out their ``political opinion,'' whether it 
        be a form of Marxism or ``Aryan supremacy'' * * * [I]f 
        * * * ``being'' a guerrilla is the acting out of a 
        political opinions that policemen should be killed * * 
        * then so is the view that Jews should be killed 
        because they are believed to control the world, or that 
        federal judges should be murdered because they are 
        considered an instrument of repression of Caucasian 
        Christians. * * * ``Being'' a guerrilla is not a form 
        of political opinion. ``Being'' a guerilla means being 
        engaged in acts of violence and illegality. I know of 
        no legal principle or form of logic that states that 
        ``being'' engaged in such acts automatically transforms 
        the ``political opinions'' that drive those acts into a 
        form of political opinions protected by United States 
        law. * * * One faces the remarkable possibility under 
        [the Ninth Circuit doctrine] that the more egregious 
        the act and the greater the outrage, the higher the 
        probability of being granted asylum, on the ground that 
        claimed police mistreatment will be on ``account of 
        political opinion,'' not human failings, vengeance, or 
        anger provoked by the extremist's acts.\74\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \74\ Matter of R-, 20 I. & N. 621, 636-37 (1992) (M. Heilman, 
concurring).

    This section would overturn this precedent of the Ninth 
Circuit. It would reassert that the burden of proof in an 
asylum case is on the applicant and that the testimony of the 
applicant may be sufficient to sustain such burden without 
corroboration, but only if it is credible, is persuasive, and 
refers to specific facts that demonstrate that the applicant is 
a refugee. Where it is reasonable that an applicant would 
present corroborating evidence, such evidence must be provided 
unless a reasonable explanation is given as to why such 
information is not provided. No court shall reverse a 
determination made by an immigration judge or BIA with respect 
to the availability of corroborating evidence unless the court 
finds that a reasonable adjudicator is compelled to conclude 
that such corroborating evidence is unavailable.
    This section also provides a non-exhaustive list of factors 
that an immigration judge can consider in assessing 
credibility, such as the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of 
the applicant or witness, the consistency between the 
applicant's or witness's written and oral statements, whether 
or not under oath, made at any time to any officer, agent, or 
employee of the United States, the internal consistency of each 
such statement, the consistency of such statements with the 
country conditions in the country from which the applicant 
claims asylum, as presented by the Department of State, and any 
inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements. Finally, aliens 
who allege they will be persecuted because of terrorist ties 
will not longer be presumed to fear persecution on account of 
political opinion. Rather, the section requires such that such 
applicant establish that race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion 
was or will be the central motive for their claimed 
persecution.

Section 3008. Revocation of Visas

    The INA allows the State Department to revoke visas after 
they have been issued. \75\ Revocation is problematic, however, 
when the alien has entered the U.S. by the time the visa has 
been revoked because there is no provision that allows DHS to 
remove an alien whose visa has been revoked. If DHS has 
information that establishes that the alien is otherwise 
removable (such as for a crime, or illness), it will place the 
alien in removal proceedings on those grounds. However, DHS 
bears the burden of proof in deportation proceedings, and if 
the agency cannot prove that the alien is deportable, it must 
allow the alien to remain until the alien's period of 
authorized admission ends.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \75\ See INA Sec. 221(i).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This policy is a particular problem in terrorism cases 
because information linking an alien to terrorism is often 
classified, and classified information cannot be used to prove 
deportability. In October 2002, GAO reported that the State 
Department had revoked 105 visas that had been erroneously 
issued to aliens about whom there were questions about possible 
terror ties before their background checks had been completed. 
The GAO found that immigration agents did not attempt to track 
down those aliens whose visas had been revoked because of the 
difficulty in removing those aliens from the United States.\76\ 
The bill would respond to this problem by allowing the 
government to deport a nonimmigrant alien whose visa has been 
revoked. The section will prevent an alien whose visa has been 
revoked to challenge the underlying revocation in court, where 
the government might again be placed in a position of either 
exposing its sources or permitting a potentially dangerous 
alien to remain in the U.S.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \76\ See U.S. General Accounting Office, Border Security: New 
Policies and Procedures Are Needed to Fill Gaps in the Visa Revocation 
Process (GAO-03-798) at 5 (2003).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The bill also addresses a similar loophole that would 
prevent DHS from revoking a nonimmigrant visa petition that has 
been granted for an alien in the U.S., even before that alien 
has received the visa. Currently, DHS cannot revoke a petition 
even if it appears that the alien may not be eligible for the 
visa, even if the petition was fraudulent and submitted by an 
alien terrorist. The bill would delete archaic language that 
was added to the INA decades ago, when travel to the U.S. was 
long and laborious, and when adjustment of status, a legal 
fiction by which aliens in the U.S. are treated as if they had 
reentered in a new legal status, was rare.

Section 3009. Streamlined Removal Process

    The staff of the 9/11mission wrote that:

          In many cases, the act of filing for an immigration 
        benefit sufficed to permit the alien to remain in the 
        country until the petition was adjudicated. Terrorists 
        were free to conduct surveillance, coordinate 
        operations, obtain and receive funding, go to school 
        and learn English, make contacts in the U.S., acquire 
        necessary materials, and execute an attack [and that] 
        immigration cases against suspected terrorists were 
        often mired for years in bureaucratic struggles over 
        alien rights and the adequacy of evidence.\77\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \77\ 9/11 and Terrorist Travel at 98, 143.

    In 1996, Congress attempted to streamline the judicial 
review of immigration orders entered against aliens who have 
committed serious crimes in the U.S. IIRIRA sought to eliminate 
judicial review of immigration orders for most criminals, 
recognizing that criminal aliens had received a full measure of 
due process in their criminal cases and immigration 
proceedings, and that additional review typically only delayed 
their inevitable removal as criminals were statutorily barred 
from most forms of immigration relief.\78\ IIRIRA also limited 
the judicial review of discretionary relief issues for all 
aliens, on the basis that the law committed such matters to the 
judgment of the Attorney General.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \78\ See Sec. 306 of Pub L. No. 104-208.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Because the 1996 reforms lacked express language precluding 
district court review, however, the Supreme Court has read the 
provision to give aliens judicial review possibilities other 
than, or in addition to, the review \79\ specified in the 
immigration laws. As Justice Scalia stated in dissent:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \79\ See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001).

          The Court has therefore succeeded in perverting a 
        statutory scheme designed to expedite the removal of 
        criminal aliens into one that now affords them more 
        opportunities for (and layers of) judicial review (and 
        hence more opportunities for delay) than are afforded 
        non-criminal aliens--and more than were afforded 
        criminal aliens prior to the enactment of IIRIRA. This 
        outcome speaks for itself; no Congress ever imagined 
        it.\80\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \80\ Id. at 335 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

The result of this judicial activism has been a dramatic 
increase in the volume of immigration cases filed in the 
federal courts and continued delay and inefficiency in securing 
final judgment in immigration matters.
    Consistent with the settled principle that petitions for 
review should be the ``sole and exclusive'' means of judicial 
review for aliens challenging their removal, the bill 
streamlines immigration review while protecting an alien's 
right to review by an independent judiciary. For criminal 
aliens and aliens who are not permanent residents, review would 
be only in the circuit court and the scope of review would be 
limited to: (1) whether the individual is an alien; (2)whether 
he is deportable under the INA; (3) whether he was ordered removed 
under the INA; and (4) whether he meets the criteria for withholding of 
removal or Torture Convention protection. For non-criminal lawful 
permanent resident aliens, review would be only in the circuit court 
and would be available for all non-discretionary determinations. This 
assures that every alien may obtain review of his or her final order of 
removal in the courts of appeals. Under this provision, criminal aliens 
would have the opportunity for circuit court review of constitutional 
claims and pure questions of law. These provisions are fully consistent 
with both the Supreme Court's decision in St. Cyr and settled 
jurisprudence regarding the availability of habeas corpus. These 
reforms will ensure that aliens will have a day in court, but that 
criminals will not be able to delay their lawful removal from the 
United States.

Sections 3031-32. No Bar to Removal for Terrorists and Criminal Aliens

    Legislation implementing the Convention Against Torture was 
enacted in 1998.\81\ The Convention ensures that human rights 
violators and others engaged in torture are brought to justice 
and details the process for extradition, detention, criminal 
prosecution, and victim compensation. The Convention also 
prohibits the return of an alien to a country where there are 
substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in 
danger of being tortured. When the Senate passed the 
implementing legislation, it stated that ``to the maximum 
extent consistent with the obligations of the United States 
under the Convention * * * the [INS] regulations * * * shall 
exclude from the protection of such regulations aliens 
described in section 241(b)(3)(B) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act.'' What kinds of aliens are so described? 
Aliens who have engaged in Nazi persecution or genocide, aliens 
who have engaged in terrorist activity, aliens who have been 
convicted of particularly serious crimes and are thus a danger 
to the community of the U.S., aliens who committed serious 
crimes outside the U.S., and aliens who there are reasonable 
grounds to believe are a danger to the security of the U.S. 
This makes perfect sense. After all, the same aliens are barred 
under the INA from receiving asylum.\82\ The Justice 
Department, however, clearly disobeyed Congress's instructions 
in writing the regulations creating relief from deportation 
under the Convention.\83\ The regulations did not exclude such 
dangerous individuals from relief from deportation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \81\ See the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, 
Pub. L. No. 105-277, div. G., Sec. 2242 (1998).
    \82\ See INA Sec. 208(b)(2).
    \83\ See 8 C.F.R. Sec. 208.16-18.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Immigration Subcommittee conducted a hearing in July 
2003 on the effect of the INS regulations.\84\ From March 1999 
through August 2002, immigration judges granted hundreds of 
criminal aliens relief from deportation under the 
Convention.\85\ This included two murderers that we know of, 
one who killed a spectator at a Gambian soccer game and one who 
was implicated in a mob-related quintuple homicide in 
Uzbekistan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \84\ See Immigration Relief Under the Convention Against Torture 
for Serious Criminals and Human Rights Violators: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. On Immigration, Border Security and Claims of the House Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003).
    \85\ See letter from William E. Moschella, Assistant Attorney 
General, U.S. Department of Justice, to Chairman F. James 
Sensenbrenner, Jr. (July 7, 2003).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The danger posed by the requirement that these aliens be 
allowed to remain in the U.S. was increased exponentially by 
the 2001 Supreme Court decision of Zadvydas v. Davis,\86\ in 
which the Court made clear that it would strike down as 
unconstitutional the indefinite detention by DHS of aliens with 
removal orders whose countries will not take them back, except 
in the most narrow of circumstances.\87\ Based on this 
decision, DOJ decided that it had no choice but to release back 
onto the streets those criminal aliens who had received 
protection under the Convention. By the time of the hearing in 
July of 2003, approximately 500 criminal aliens who had 
received relief under the Convention had been released into 
American communities \88\--including the murderer from 
Uzbekistan. The Gambian murderer might also have been released, 
but he decided to return home to Gambia voluntarily.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \86\ 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
    \87\ ``We have upheld preventive detention based on dangerousness 
only when limited to specially dangerous individuals * * *. Neither do 
we consider terrorism or other special circumstances where special 
arguments might be made for forms of preventive detention and for 
heightened deference to the judgments of the political branches with 
respect to matters of national security.'' Id. at 690-91, 696 (emphasis 
added).
    \88\ See Immigration Relief Under the Convention Against Torture at 
2 (statement of John Hostettler, Chairman of the Subcommittee on 
Immigration, Border Security and Claims).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Committee discovered at the hearing that even a Nazi 
war criminal had sought to avoid deportation through the 
Convention.\89\ Terrorists have received relief from removal 
under the Convention Against Torture, including an alien 
involved in the assassination of Anwar Sadat.\90\ Days ago, a 
suspected al Qaeda operative made claim under the Convention to 
forestall deportation.\91\ Osama Bin Laden himself could 
probably frustrate deportation by making a Convention claim--
since the more heinous a person's actions, the more likely that 
he might be subject to torture in his home country.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \89\ See id. at 15 (statement of Eli Rosenbaum, Director, Office of 
Special Investigations, U.S. Department of Justice).
    \90\ See Soliman v. U.S., 296 F. 3d 1237 (11th Cir. 2002).
    \91\ See Stephen Dyer, Inmate Fights to Stay in U.S., York Beacon 
Journal, Sept. 22, 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The bill would make the Convention regulations adhere to 
the intent of Congress. 1Aliens who have engaged in Nazi 
persecution or genocide, terrorist aliens, aliens who have been 
convicted of particularly serious crimes and are thus a danger 
to the community of theU.S., aliens who committed serious 
crimes outside the U.S., and aliens for whom there are reasonable 
grounds to believe are a danger to the security of the U.S. would not 
be allowed to frustrate their deportations and be released onto the 
streets of our communities.

Section 3033. Removal of Aliens

    At the present time, an arriving alien turned back at the 
border is removed to the country from which he came to the 
U.S., or to his country of citizenship or nationality.\92\ 
Aliens deported after admission are allowed to designate a 
country of removal, but the Attorney General can disregard the 
designation if that country refuses to accept the alien or if 
removal would be prejudicial to the U.S.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \92\ See INA Sec. 241.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The current removal provisions have been used by certain 
aliens to block DHS from removing them to countries that have 
no governments to formally accept them. In particular, DHS is 
prevented by court order from sending aliens back to 
Somalia.\93\ Under the court's ruling, DHS may not remove any 
criminal alien back to Somalia, regardless of the severity of 
the offense or the danger that the alien poses. More 
importantly, however, DHS cannot remove any terrorist aliens to 
that country. In December 2001, Secretary of State Colin Powell 
stated that ``some bin Laden followers are holed up [in 
Somalia], taking advantage of the absence of a functioning 
government,'' and Joint Chiefs Chairman Richard Myers also 
stated that month that the U.S. has ``strong indications 
Somalia is linked to Osama Bin Laden.'' \94\ A further 
indication of the terror threat posed by Somalia is that Al-
Ittihad, which President Bush named in his September 23, 2001, 
executive order blocking property of, and prohibiting 
transactions with, terrorist groups, operates in the 
country.\95\ Moreover, a rule that aliens cannot be returned to 
countries that have no government to accept them will encourage 
illegal immigration from those countries, and will encourage 
other aliens to fraudulently say that they are nationals of one 
of those countries, to avoid removal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \93\ See e.g., Ali v. Ashcroft, 346 F. 3d 873 (9th Cir. 2003).
    \94\ Ted Dagne, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress: 
Africa and the War on Terrorism at 13 (2002).
    \95\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The section would move the authority for designating a 
country of removal to the Secretary of DHS, and give the 
Secretary more power to remove an alien to a specific country. 
It would also allow the Secretary to remove an alien to a 
country of which the alien is a citizen or national unless the 
country prevents the alien from entering. This would give the 
Secretary the flexibility not to return an alien to a place 
where the alien would be free to engage in terrorist 
activities.

Section 3041. Bringing in and Harboring Certain Aliens

    The Commission staff reported ``[t]here is also evidence 
that terrorists used human smugglers to sneak across borders.'' 
\96\ The bill would increase criminal penalties for alien 
smuggling and require the Secretary of DHS to develop and 
implement an outreach program to educate the public in the U.S. 
and abroad about the penalties for illegally bringing in and 
harboring aliens.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \96\ 9/11 and Terrorist Travel at 59.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Section 3081. Studies on Worldwide Machine-Readable Passports and 
        Worldwide Travel History Database

    The Commission recommended that ``[t]he Department of 
Homeland Security, properly supported by the Congress, should 
complete, as quickly as possible a biometric entry-exit 
screening system, including a single system for speeding 
qualified travelers.'' \97\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \97\ 9/11 Commission Report at 389.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This section requires the Department of State's Office of 
Visa and Passport Control and the GAO each to conduct a study 
on the feasibility, cost, and benefits of: (1) requiring all 
passports to be machine-readable, tamper-resistant and with 
biometric identifiers; and (2) the creation of a database 
containing a record of all entry and exit information so that 
border and consular officials may ascertain the travel history 
of the visitor or a prospective entrant. This requirement would 
allow consular officers and immigration inspectors to ascertain 
the travel history of any U.S. citizen or foreign visitor 
seeking to enter the U.S., even if that entrant has a new 
passport.

Section 3082. Expanded Pre-inspection at Foreign Airports

    In addition to recommending that DHS complete a biometric 
entry-exit screening system, the Commission stated that:

          The U.S. government cannot meet its own obligations 
        to the American people to prevent the entry of 
        terrorists without a major effort to collaborate with 
        other governments. We should do more to exchange 
        terrorist information with trusted allies, and raise 
        U.S. and global border security standards for travel 
        and border crossing over the medium and long term 
        through extensive international cooperation.\98\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \98\ Id. at 390.

    Currently, DHS inspects passengers who are traveling to the 
U.S. at 14 foreign airports instead of inspecting them at ports 
of entry in the U.S. The bill would expand this program to 
include up to an additional 25 airports. In addition, the 
current selection criteria for pre-inspection locations are 
based on reducing the number of aliens who arrive to the U.S. 
who areinadmissible. Section 3082 states that the selection 
criteria should also include the objective of preventing the entry of 
potential terrorists. The additional locations should be operational by 
January 1, 2008.

Section 3083. Immigration Security Initiative

    The Immigration Security Initiative is a DHS operated 
program that assists airline personnel at foreign airports in 
identifying fraudulent travel documents. The program's 
objective is to identify passengers, including potential 
terrorists, who seek to enter the U.S. using fraudulent 
documents, prior to these passengers being allowed to board 
flights for the U.S. Currently, the program is in place in only 
two foreign airports. This section expands the program to at 
least 50 foreign airports by December 31, 2006.

Section 3084. Responsibilities and Functions of Consular Officers

    This section improves the operation of U.S. consular 
offices in preventing the entry of terrorists. First, it 
increases the number of consular officers by 150 per year for 
fiscal years 2006 through 2009. Second, it places limitations 
on the use of foreign nationals to screen nonimmigrant visa 
applicants by stating that all applications shall be reviewed 
and adjudicated by a U.S. consular officer. Third, it requires 
that the training program for consular officers include 
training in detecting fraudulent documents and working directly 
with DHS immigration inspectors at ports of entry. This 
requirement is needed because consular officers currently do 
not train directly with immigration inspectors to learn all of 
the elements of our screening system as part of their training 
regimen. Lastly, this section requires the Secretary of State 
to place antifraud specialists in the one hundred posts that 
have the greatest frequency of presentation of fraudulent 
documents.

Section 3085. Increase in Penalties for Fraud and Related Activity

    This section amends 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1028 to increase 
penalties for the possession and transfer of fraudulent 
government identification documents, including fraudulent U.S., 
state, and foreign government documents. The Commission 
recommended: ``The Department of Homeland Security, properly 
supported by the Congress, should complete, as quickly as 
possible a biometric entry-exit screening system, including a 
single system for speeding qualified travelers.'' Commission 
Report at 389. ``The U.S. government cannot meet its own 
obligations to the American people to prevent the entry of 
terrorists without a major effort to collaborate with other 
governments. We should do more to exchange terrorist 
information with trusted allies, and raise U.S. and global 
border security standards for travel and border crossing over 
the medium and long term through extensive international 
cooperation'' Id. at 390.

Section 3086. Criminal Penalty for False Claim to Citizenship

    This section would make it a violation of law to make a 
false claim of citizenship in order to enter or remain in the 
United States. This also follows the Commission's 
recommendation regarding a biometric entry-exit screening 
system.

Section 3090. Biometric Entry and Exit Data System

    As noted above, the Commission recommended a biometric 
entry-exit screening system.'' \99\ This section calls on the 
Secretary of DHS to develop a plan to accelerate the full 
implementation of the requirement of an automated entry and 
exit data system at U.S. ports of entry. The section also calls 
for the Secretary of DHS to implement a plan to expedite the 
processing of registered travelers at ports of entry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \99\ Id. at 389.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                   TITLE V--GOVERNMENT RESTRUCTURING


Sections 5001-5010. Faster and Smarter Funding for First Responders

    This section implements the Commission's recommendations 
regarding first responder funding. Specifically, 
Sec. Sec. 5001-10 fully incorporate H.R. 3266, the ``Faster and 
Smarter Funding for First Responders Act,'' which follows the 
Commission's recommendations concerning the delivery of Federal 
homeland security assistance to state and local governments. 
The Commission recommended that: ``Homeland Security assistance 
should be based strictly on an assessment of risks and 
vulnerabilities.''
    This section recognizes the need to address our greatest 
risks and vulnerabilities first, and then work down from there. 
This section does so in several important respects. First, it 
requires DHS to allocate homeland security assistance funds to 
states or regions based upon the degree to which such an 
allocation would lessen the threat to, vulnerability of, and 
consequences for persons and critical infrastructure. Second, 
it reduces the current state minimum and restructures the 
allocation process. Under the current system, none of the funds 
available under the State Homeland Security Grant Program are 
allocated on the basis of risk. Instead, each state first 
receives a base amount equal to 0.75 percent of the total, and 
then an additional amount based solely on population. Under 
this section, in contrast, DHS must first allocate all funds 
based on risk, and then provide, if necessary, additional funds 
to those States, territories, or certain Indian tribes that 
have not met a significantly reduced minimum threshold of 
funding. Under this scheme, 99% of the money will be allocated 
strictly on the basis of risk.
    In 2001, the Committee on the Judiciary, through the 
enactment of the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act, authorized the Office for 
Domestic Preparedness in DOJ to provide State grants that 
enhance the capability of State and local jurisdictions to 
prepare for and respond to terrorist acts. The Committee on the 
Judiciary changed the name of this office to the Office 
ofDomestic Preparedness in Public Law 107-273, the ``21st Century 
Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act,'' and further 
authorized the ODP. The ODP was transferred from the Department of 
Justice to the Department of Homeland Security in H.R. 5005, the 
``Homeland Security Act,'' which became Public Law 107-296 on November 
25, 2002.

Section 5051-5054. Federal Bureau of Investigation Revitalization

    The Commission found that the FBI has made significant 
progress in improving its intelligence capabilities but 
recognized that the FBI Director himself recognizes that there 
is much to do. The Commission made a specific recommendation 
that embodies the vision of FBI Director Mueller regarding the 
needs to broaden recruitment efforts, retain experience, and to 
facilitate a trend towards specialization rather than the 
Bureau's historical model of generalization. ``A specialized 
and integrated national security workforce should be 
established at the FBI consisting of agents, analysts, 
linguists, and surveillance specialists who are recruited, 
trained, rewarded, and retained to ensure the development of a 
culture imbued with a deep expertise in intelligence and 
national security'' 9/11 Commission Report at 425-426. This 
section implements by giving the Director a variety of tools to 
retain employees with special skills.

Section 5091. Requirement that Agency Rulemaking Take Into 
        Consideration Impacts on Individual Privacy

    This section requires the President to consider the privacy 
impact of federal regulations. It reflects the following 
Commission recommendation: ``As the President determines the 
guidelines for information sharing among government agencies 
and by those agencies with the private sector, he should 
safeguard the privacy of individuals about whom information is 
shared.'' Commission Report at 394. Section 5091 requires a 
federal agency to prepare a privacy impact analysis for 
proposed and final rules and to include this analysis in the 
notice for public comment issued in conjunction with the 
publication of such rules. This requirement is similar to other 
analyses that agencies currently conduct, such as those 
required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act and the E-Government 
Act of 2002. While Sec. 5091 makes no substantive demands on 
federal agencies with respect to privacy, it is intended to 
ensure that federal agencies safeguard personally identifiable 
information by requiring these agencies to consider the privacy 
implications presented by the collection, use, dissemination, 
and protection of such information. Section 5091 consists of 
the text of H.R. 338, the ``Federal Agency Protection of 
Privacy Act,'' a noncontroversial, bipartisan bill that passed 
by voice vote in the last Congress.

Section 5092. Chief Privacy Officers for Agencies with Law Enforcement 
        or Anti-terrorism Functions

    Section 5092 directs the head of each Federal agency with 
law enforcement or anti-terrorism functions to appoint a chief 
privacy officer with primary responsibility within that agency 
for privacy policy. The provision requires the chief privacy 
officer to ensure that personally identifiable information is 
protected and to file annual reports with Congress on the 
agency's activities that affect privacy, including complaints 
of privacy violations. Section 5092 is largely premised on 
legislation establishing the first statutorily mandated privacy 
officer, which was included in the Homeland Security Act of 
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, Sec. 222, 116 Stat. 2135, 2155 
(2002), and pending bipartisan legislation reauthorizing DOJ, 
H.R. 3036, 108th Cong. Sec. 305 (2004). Section 5092 reflects 
the Commission's recommendation on privacy noted above.

Sections 5101-5105, Mutual Aid and Litigation Management Authorization 
        Act of 2004

    The Commission Report included the recommendation that 
``Congress should pass legislation to remedy the long-standing 
indemnification and liability impediments to the provision of 
public safety mutual aid * * * where applicable throughout the 
nation'' Commission Report at 397. Sections 5101-5105 reflect 
this recommendation.
    These mutual aid provisions allow states, if they so 
choose, to enter into mutual aid agreements to provide mutual 
aid in response to emergencies. They allow party states' first 
responders to carry with them into other states the liability 
regime of their home states. The mutual aid provisions also 
provide that the workers' compensation and death benefits of 
first responders who answer calls in other party states, and 
the home state rules that govern them, also follow them into 
other states. These sections also provide that whenever any 
person holds a certificate issued by a responding party that 
evidences the meeting of professional standards, such person 
shall be deemed so certified by the requesting party to provide 
assistance under the mutual agreement. The litigation 
management provisions allows states to enter into ``litigation 
management agreements'' in which they could agree that, in the 
event first responders from several states respond to a 
terrorist attack in another state, they could exercise certain 
options and agree on the liability regime that would apply in 
that circumstance to claims brought against first responders 
and arising out of terrorist attacks, including putting any 
such claims in federal court, a ban on punitive damages, and a 
collateral source offset rule.

Sections 5041-5045, Appointments Process Reform

    The Commission recommendations include the recommendation 
to ``minimize as much as possible the disruption of national 
security policymaking during the change of administrations by 
accelerating the process for national security appointments'' 
Commission Report at 422. This section responds to this 
recommendation in three ways. First, Sec. 5041would reduce the 
number of national security positions that are subject to Senate 
confirmation. National Security Positions are defined as positions 
``concerned with the protection of the Nation from foreign aggression, 
terrorism, or espionage * * * that require regular use of, or access 
to, classified information.'' This will include some positions at DOJ 
and the FBI.
    Those National Security Positions that are classified at 
Executive Levels IV and V (5 USC 5315 or 5316) would be 
appointed by the President directly, without Senate 
confirmation. This would include, among others, the assistant 
attorneys general at DOJ. Those National Security Positions 
that are classified at Executive Levels II and III (5 USC 5313 
or 5314) are still appointed by the President and subject to 
Senate confirmation. However, if the Senate does not vote on 
confirmation within 30 days after the president submits the 
nomination, the appointment shall be made by the president 
alone. Positions covered by this provision include, among 
others, the deputy attorney general, the solicitor general, and 
the director of the FBI. In addition to these national security 
appointments, agencies are required under Sec. 5044 to submit a 
plan for reducing the number of presidential appointments that 
require Senate confirmation.
    Second, Sec. 5042 extends the length of time that a newly 
inaugurated President can appoint an acting officer to fulfill 
the duties of a job performed by someone whose confirmation is 
required by the Senate. It also removes certain qualifications 
in current law relating to those acting officers, provided that 
the office they are filling is one of 20 ``specified national 
security positions.''
    Finally, Sec. 5043 streamlines the financial reporting 
process for intelligence personnel. It substantially reduces 
the amount of detail that appointees must provide regarding 
their sources of income, assets and liability. For example, 
this section reduces the number of income reporting categories 
from eleven to five. It also streamlines income reporting for 
spouses and dependants. It is believed that these reductions 
still provide the level of detail necessary for the Office of 
Government Ethics to determine whether conflicts of interest 
exist.

                    Amendments Adopted in Committee

    The Committee adopted several amendments to H.R. 10 that 
are included within its overall amendment in the nature of a 
substitute.
    A manager's amendment offered by Chairman Sensenbrenner and 
adopted by voice vote makes various technical and other changes 
to the legislation. As introduced, H.R. 10 provided the CIA 
with overall direction for the collection of national 
intelligence through human sources. The amendment preserves and 
reiterates the congressional prohibition on domestic human 
intelligence activities undertaken by the CIA. CIA direction 
and coordination of FBI human intelligence within the U.S. is 
inconsistent with the long-standing 1947 National Security Act 
ban on CIA law enforcement powers and internal security 
functions. The amendment also requires the Secretary of DHS to 
consult with the Attorney General regarding various new 
security procedures for airports and aviation contained in the 
bill and requires that reports on the use of these procedures 
be provided to the Judiciary Committee.
    The Sensenbrenner amendment further requires the Assistant 
Secretary for ICE and the Director of Federal Air Marshal 
Service of DHS, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of 
Homeland Security, ensure that Transportation Security 
Administration screeners and Federal Air Marshals receive 
training in identifying fraudulent identification documents, 
including fraudulent or expired visas and passports, and allows 
such training to be made available to other federal law 
enforcement agencies and local law enforcement agencies located 
in border states. The Committee reported by voice vote a second 
degree amendment to the Sensenbrenner amendment offered by Mr. 
Scott to strike sense of Congress language relating to the 
Transportation Security Administration examining passenger 
records for violent criminals and out standing warrants.
    The Committee adopted by voice vote an amendment offered by 
Mr. Schiff that seeks to prevent the proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction by expanding, improving and increasing 
funding for current non-proliferation programs including the 
Proliferation Security Initiative, programs for Cooperative 
Threat Reduction, and other non proliferation programs. The 
President is directed to submit to Congress no later than 180 
days after the date of the enactment of this Act a non-
proliferation strategy.
    The Committee adopted by voice vote an amendment offered by 
Mr. Nadler to require the Secretary of DHS, in consultation 
with the Attorney General and appropriate federal, state, and 
local government agencies, as well as security experts and 
other interested persons, to issue regulations concerning the 
shipment of extremely hazardous materials not later than 180 
days after the enactment of the legislation.
    The Committee adopted by voice vote an amendment by Mr. 
Schiff that provides that whoever develops, possesses, or 
attempts or conspires to develop or possess radiological 
weapons be imprisoned for any term or for life. The amendment 
specifies that if persons or property of the U.S. or a national 
of the U.S. are threatened with these weapons in the U.S. or 
abroad they are also subject to a prison term for any term of 
years or for life; if death is a result of this violation, then 
the punishment may be death.
    The Committee adopted by voice vote an amendment offered by 
Mr. Delahunt that requires the head of each department or 
agency of the federal government that is engaged in any 
activity to use or develop data mining technology to submit a 
public report to Congress on all such activities of the 
department or agency under the jurisdiction of that official. 
Thisamendment establishes criteria for the content of the 
report and requires that it be submitted within 90 days after enactment 
of this legislation and requires that it be updated each year.
    The Committee adopted by voice vote an amendment by Mr. 
Schiff that provides that the U.S. work with the international 
community to develop an international legal regime to enable 
the interdiction of nuclear material and technology.
    The Committee adopted by voice vote an amendment by Mr. 
Weiner that reauthorizes the COPS program as a single grant 
program with several purposes including to hire officers to 
perform intelligence, antiterrorism, or homeland security 
duties exclusively. This language is similar to language that 
the Committee adopted and the House passed as part of H.R. 
3036, the DOJ reauthorization bill.
    The Committee adopted by voice vote an amendment offered by 
Ms. Lofgren to establish an Integrated Biometric Entry-Exit 
Screening System with respect to the biometric entry/exit data 
system. It ensures that this biometric database is accessible 
to all persons processing immigration benefits, including visa 
applications with the Department of State, immigration-related 
filings with the Department of Labor, cases pending before the 
Exeuctive Office for Immigration Review, and matters pending or 
under investigation before DHS.
    The Committee adopted by voice vote an amendment offered by 
Mr. Schiff expressing the sense of Congress that removing 
potential nuclear weapons materials from vulnerable sites 
around the world reduces the risk of terrorist attack and 
delineating several actions to reduce the threat of terrorist 
acquisition of nuclear materials. The amendment further 
requires, no later than 30 days after the submission of the 
President's FY 2006 budget, a report to Congress that lists 
where highly-enriched uranium or separated plutonium is located 
worldwide, a strategic plan to reduce the threat of this 
material falling into terrorist hands, an estimate of the funds 
required to secure these materials, and recommendations 
concerning the need for further legislation or international 
agreements to secure these nuclear sites.
    The Committee adopted by voice vote an amendment offered by 
Mr. Nadler to authorize the Secretary of DHS to provide $100 
million in security assistance to 501(c)(3) organizations that 
demonstrate they are at high risk of a terrorist attack based 
upon: Specific threats of international terrorist 
organizations; prior attacks against similarly situated 
organizations by international terrorists; the vulnerability of 
the specific site; the symbolic value of the site as a highly 
recognized American institution; or the role of the institution 
in responding to terrorist attacks. After the funds have been 
expended for the highest risk institutions, federal loan 
guarantees would be available to make loans available on 
favorable terms. Funds would be administered by a new office in 
the Department dedicated to working with high-risk non-profits.
    The Committee adopted by voice vote an amendment offered by 
Mr. Weiner that would permit an applicant to use first 
responder grants to pay for personnel engaged in 
counterterrorism and intelligence activities, regardless of the 
date such persons were hired. This allows reimbursement for 
personnel costs to be retroactive. The Committee also adopted 
by voice vote an amendment offered by Mr. Weiner to provide 
reimbursement for overtime and other fixed costs incurred for 
homeland security purposes after September 11, 2001.
    The Committee adopted by voice vote an amendment offered by 
Ms. Blackburn that establishes a pilot study to examine 
specific topics to be addressed in a report from the Attorney 
General, to identify current procedures already in place, and 
to make recommendations for consolidation and standardization 
of employee criminal background checks. The amendment requires 
the study to consider the utilization of commercial databases, 
state databases, any feasibility studies, and privacy rights 
and other employee protections. The amendment also adds to the 
bill the text of S.1743, the ``Private Security Officer 
Employment Authorization Act'' which passed the Senate by 
unanimous consent at the end of 2003.
    The Committee adopted by voice vote an amendment by Mr. 
Berman that adds a new section to the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act of 1978. It allows the court to assume that a 
non-U.S. person who is engaged in terrorism is an agent of a 
foreign power under the Act.
    The Committee adopted by voice vote an amendment offered by 
Mr. Schiff that amends the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organization Act by adding crimes having to do with weapons of 
mass destruction to the list of specified unlawful activities 
that serve as predicates for the money laundering statute.
    The Committee adopted by voice vote an amendment by Ms. 
Jackson Lee to increase criminal penalties for alien smuggling, 
provide visas to smuggled aliens who cooperate with law 
enforcement officials, provide rewards to such aliens, and 
require the Secretary of DHS to develop an outreach program to 
educate the public about the penalties for alien smuggling. The 
Committee adopted by voice vote a second degree amendment 
offered by Mr. Hostettler to limit the provisions to the 
increase in criminal penalties and the establishment of the 
outreach program.
    An amendment offered by Chairman Sensenbrenner to establish 
a Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board to provide advice 
and counsel on policy development and implementation as it 
pertains to privacy and civil liberties implications of 
executive branch actions, proposed legislation, regulations, 
and policies related to efforts to protect the nation from 
terrorism passed the Committee by a recorded vote of 19-15. The 
Chairman's amendment was a complete substitute for an amendment 
offered by Mr. Watt that would have provided fora similar Board 
with broad administrative subpoena power and provided nearly unlimited 
authority to analyze all aspects of the nation's war on terrorism.
    The Committee adopted by voice vote an amendment offered by 
Mr. Weiner that eliminates defenses in the current fake badge 
law.

                                Hearings

    The Committee on the Judiciary held two hearings to 
specifically consider the recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission. On August 20, 2004, the Subcommittee on Commercial 
and Administrative Law and the Subcommittee on the Constitution 
held a joint hearing entitled: ``Privacy and Civil Liberties in 
the Hands of the Government Post-September 11, 2001: 
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission and the U.S. Department 
of Defense Technology and Privacy Advisory Committee.'' The 
following witnesses testified: Lee Hamilton, Vice Chair, 9/11 
Commission; Slade Gorton, Commissioner, 9/11 Commission; John 
Marsh, Jr., Member, Technology and Privacy Advisory Committee; 
and Nuala O'Connor Kelly, Privacy Officer, Department of 
Homeland Security.
    On August 23, 2004, the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, 
and Homeland Security held a hearing entitled: ``Oversight 
Hearing on Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission.'' The 
following witnesses testified: Christopher Kojm, Deputy 
Executive Director, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
Upon the United States; John S. Pistole, Executive Assistant 
Director, Counterterrorism Division, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation; John O. Brennan, Director, Terrorist Threat 
Integration Center; and Gregory T. Nojeim, Associate Director, 
American Civil Liberties Union.

                        Committee Consideration

    On September 30, 2004, the Committee met in open session 
and ordered favorably reported the bill H.R. 10, with an 
amendment, by a recorded vote of 19 to 12, a quorum being 
present.

                         Vote of the Committee

    In compliance with clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, the Committee notes that the 
following roll call votes occurred during the Committee's 
consideration of H.R. 10.
    Rollcall No. 1: Subject: Nadler Amendment (Minimum Amounts) 
to H.R. 10. By a rollcall vote of 15 yeas to 18 nays, the 
amendment was defeated.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                            Ayes       Nays     Present
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MR. HYDE...............................  .........         X   .........
MR. COBLE..............................  .........         X   .........
MR. SMITH..............................  .........         X   .........
MR. GALLEGLY...........................  .........         X   .........
MR. GOODLATTE..........................  .........         X   .........
MR. CHABOT.............................  .........         X   .........
MR. JENKINS............................  .........         X   .........
MR. CANNON.............................  .........  .........  .........
MR. BACHUS.............................  .........         X   .........
MR. HOSTETTLER.........................  .........         X   .........
MR. GREEN..............................  .........         X   .........
MR. KELLER.............................         X   .........  .........
MS. HART...............................  .........         X   .........
MR. FLAKE..............................  .........         X   .........
MR. PENCE..............................  .........  .........  .........
MR. FORBES.............................  .........         X   .........
MR. KING...............................  .........  .........  .........
MR. CARTER.............................  .........         X   .........
MR. FEENEY.............................  .........         X   .........
MRS. BLACKBURN.........................  .........         X   .........
MR. CONYERS............................         X   .........  .........
MR. BERMAN.............................         X   .........  .........
MR. BOUCHER............................  .........  .........  .........
MR. NADLER.............................         X   .........  .........
MR. SCOTT..............................         X   .........  .........
MR. WATT...............................         X   .........  .........
MS. LOFGREN............................         X   .........  .........
MS. JACKSON LEE........................         X   .........  .........
MS. WATERS.............................         X   .........  .........
MR. MEEHAN.............................         X   .........  .........
MR. DELAHUNT...........................         X   .........  .........
MR. WEXLER.............................         X   .........  .........
MS. BALDWIN............................  .........         X   .........
MR. WEINER.............................         X   .........  .........
MR. SCHIFF.............................         X   .........  .........
MS. SANCHEZ............................         X   .........  .........
MR. SENSENBRENNER, CHAIRMAN............  .........         X   .........
                                        --------------------------------
      TOTAL............................        15         18   .........
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Rollcall No. 2: Subject: Jackson Lee Amendment 
(Verification of Documents) to H.R. 10. By a rollcall vote of 
15 yeas to 20 nays, the amendment was defeated.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                            Ayes       Nays     Present
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MR. HYDE...............................  .........         X   .........
MR. COBLE..............................  .........         X   .........
MR. SMITH..............................  .........         X   .........
MR. GALLEGLY...........................  .........         X   .........
MR. GOODLATTE..........................  .........         X   .........
MR. CHABOT.............................  .........         X   .........
MR. JENKINS............................  .........         X   .........
MR. CANNON.............................  .........  .........  .........
MR. BACHUS.............................  .........         X   .........
MR. HOSTETTLER.........................  .........         X   .........
MR. GREEN..............................  .........         X   .........
MR. KELLER.............................  .........         X   .........
MS. HART...............................  .........         X   .........
MR. FLAKE..............................  .........         X   .........
MR. PENCE..............................  .........         X   .........
MR. FORBES.............................  .........         X   .........
MR. KING...............................  .........         X   .........
MR. CARTER.............................  .........         X   .........
MR. FEENEY.............................  .........         X   .........
MRS. BLACKBURN.........................  .........         X   .........
MR. CONYERS............................         X   .........  .........
MR. BERMAN.............................         X   .........  .........
MR. BOUCHER............................  .........  .........  .........
MR. NADLER.............................         X   .........  .........
MR. SCOTT..............................         X   .........  .........
MR. WATT...............................         X   .........  .........
MS. LOFGREN............................         X   .........  .........
MS. JACKSON LEE........................         X   .........  .........
MS. WATERS.............................         X   .........  .........
MR. MEEHAN.............................         X   .........  .........
MR. DELAHUNT...........................         X   .........  .........
MR. WEXLER.............................         X   .........  .........
MS. BALDWIN............................         X   .........  .........
MR. WEINER.............................         X   .........  .........
MR. SCHIFF.............................         X   .........  .........
MS. SANCHEZ............................         X   .........  .........
MR. SENSENBRENNER, CHAIRMAN............  .........         X   .........
                                        --------------------------------
      TOTAL............................        15         20   .........
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Rollcall No. 3: Subject: Berman/Delahunt Amendment 
(Limitation on Closed Immigration Hearings) to H.R. 10. By a 
rollcall vote of 15 yeas to 20 nays, the amendment was 
defeated.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                            Ayes       Nays     Present
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MR. HYDE...............................  .........         X   .........
MR. COBLE..............................  .........         X   .........
MR. SMITH..............................  .........         X   .........
MR. GALLEGLY...........................  .........         X   .........
MR. GOODLATTE..........................  .........         X   .........
MR. CHABOT.............................  .........         X   .........
MR. JENKINS............................  .........         X   .........
MR. CANNON.............................  .........  .........  .........
MR. BACHUS.............................  .........         X   .........
MR. HOSTETTLER.........................  .........         X   .........
MR. GREEN..............................  .........         X   .........
MR. KELLER.............................  .........         X   .........
MS. HART...............................  .........         X   .........
MR. FLAKE..............................  .........         X   .........
MR. PENCE..............................  .........         X   .........
MR. FORBES.............................  .........         X   .........
MR. KING...............................  .........         X   .........
MR. CARTER.............................  .........         X   .........
MR. FEENEY.............................  .........         X   .........
MRS. BLACKBURN.........................  .........         X   .........
MR. CONYERS............................         X   .........  .........
MR. BERMAN.............................         X   .........  .........
MR. BOUCHER............................  .........  .........  .........
MR. NADLER.............................         X   .........  .........
MR. SCOTT..............................         X   .........  .........
MR. WATT...............................         X   .........  .........
MS. LOFGREN............................         X   .........  .........
MS. JACKSON LEE........................         X   .........  .........
MS. WATERS.............................         X   .........  .........
MR. MEEHAN.............................         X   .........  .........
MR. DELAHUNT...........................         X   .........  .........
MR. WEXLER.............................         X   .........  .........
MS. BALDWIN............................         X   .........  .........
MR. WEINER.............................         X   .........  .........
MR. SCHIFF.............................         X   .........  .........
MS. SANCHEZ............................         X   .........  .........
MR. SENSENBRENNER, CHAIRMAN............  .........         X   .........
                                        --------------------------------
      TOTAL............................        15         20   .........
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Rollcall No. 4: Subject: Conyers Amendment in the nature of 
a substitute to H.R. 10. By a rollcall vote of 15 yeas to 20 
nays, the amendment was defeated.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                            Ayes       Nays     Present
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MR. HYDE...............................  .........         X   .........
MR. COBLE..............................  .........         X   .........
MR. SMITH..............................  .........         X   .........
MR. GALLEGLY...........................  .........         X   .........
MR. GOODLATTE..........................  .........         X   .........
MR. CHABOT.............................  .........         X   .........
MR. JENKINS............................  .........         X   .........
MR. CANNON.............................  .........  .........  .........
MR. BACHUS.............................  .........         X   .........
MR. HOSTETTLER.........................  .........         X   .........
MR. GREEN..............................  .........         X   .........
MR. KELLER.............................  .........         X   .........
MS. HART...............................  .........         X   .........
MR. FLAKE..............................  .........         X   .........
MR. PENCE..............................  .........         X   .........
MR. FORBES.............................  .........         X   .........
MR. KING...............................  .........         X   .........
MR. CARTER.............................  .........         X   .........
MR. FEENEY.............................  .........         X   .........
MRS. BLACKBURN.........................  .........         X   .........
MR. CONYERS............................         X   .........  .........
MR. BERMAN.............................         X   .........  .........
MR. BOUCHER............................  .........  .........  .........
MR. NADLER.............................         X   .........  .........
MR. SCOTT..............................         X   .........  .........
MR. WATT...............................         X   .........  .........
MS. LOFGREN............................         X   .........  .........
MS. JACKSON LEE........................         X   .........  .........
MS. WATERS.............................         X   .........  .........
MR. MEEHAN.............................         X   .........  .........
MR. DELAHUNT...........................         X   .........  .........
MR. WEXLER.............................         X   .........  .........
MS. BALDWIN............................         X   .........  .........
MR. WEINER.............................         X   .........  .........
MR. SCHIFF.............................         X   .........  .........
MS. SANCHEZ............................         X   .........  .........
MR. SENSENBRENNER, CHAIRMAN............  .........         X   .........
                                        --------------------------------
      TOTAL............................        15         20   .........
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Rollcall No. 5: Subject: Nadler amendment (Whistle Blower) 
to H.R. 10. By a rollcall vote of 15 yeas to 20 nays, the 
amendment was defeated.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                            Ayes       Nays     Present
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MR. HYDE...............................  .........         X   .........
MR. COBLE..............................  .........         X   .........
MR. SMITH..............................  .........         X   .........
MR. GALLEGLY...........................  .........         X   .........
MR. GOODLATTE..........................  .........         X   .........
MR. CHABOT.............................  .........         X   .........
MR. JENKINS............................  .........         X   .........
MR. CANNON.............................  .........  .........  .........
MR. BACHUS.............................  .........         X   .........
MR. HOSTETTLER.........................  .........         X   .........
MR. GREEN..............................  .........         X   .........
MR. KELLER.............................  .........         X   .........
MS. HART...............................  .........         X   .........
MR. FLAKE..............................  .........         X   .........
MR. PENCE..............................  .........         X   .........
MR. FORBES.............................  .........         X   .........
MR. KING...............................  .........         X   .........
MR. CARTER.............................  .........         X   .........
MR. FEENEY.............................  .........         X   .........
MRS. BLACKBURN.........................  .........         X   .........
MR. CONYERS............................         X   .........  .........
MR. BERMAN.............................         X   .........  .........
MR. BOUCHER............................  .........  .........  .........
MR. NADLER.............................         X   .........  .........
MR. SCOTT..............................         X   .........  .........
MR. WATT...............................         X   .........  .........
MS. LOFGREN............................         X   .........  .........
MS. JACKSON LEE........................         X   .........  .........
MS. WATERS.............................         X   .........  .........
MR. MEEHAN.............................         X   .........  .........
MR. DELAHUNT...........................         X   .........  .........
MR. WEXLER.............................         X   .........  .........
MS. BALDWIN............................         X   .........  .........
MR. WEINER.............................         X   .........  .........
MR. SCHIFF.............................         X   .........  .........
MS. SANCHEZ............................         X   .........  .........
MR. SENSENBRENNER, CHAIRMAN............  .........         X   .........
                                        --------------------------------
      TOTAL............................        15         20   .........
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Rollcall No. 6: Subject: Jackson Lee amendment (Restriction 
on Airline Screening for Terrorists and Criminals) to H.R. 10. 
By a rollcall vote of 12 yeas, 17 nays, and 1 pass, the 
amendment was defeated.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                            Ayes       Nays     Present
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MR. HYDE...............................  .........  .........  .........
MR. COBLE..............................  .........         X   .........
MR. SMITH..............................  .........         X   .........
MR. GALLEGLY...........................  .........  .........  .........
MR. GOODLATTE..........................  .........         X   .........
MR. CHABOT.............................  .........         X   .........
MR. JENKINS............................  .........         X   .........
MR. CANNON.............................  .........  .........  .........
MR. BACHUS.............................  .........         X   .........
MR. HOSTETTLER.........................  .........         X   .........
MR. GREEN..............................  .........         X   .........
MR. KELLER.............................  .........         X   .........
MS. HART...............................  .........         X   .........
MR. FLAKE..............................  .........         X   .........
MR. PENCE..............................  .........  .........  .........
MR. FORBES.............................  .........         X   .........
MR. KING...............................  .........         X   .........
MR. CARTER.............................  .........         X   .........
MR. FEENEY.............................  .........         X   .........
MRS. BLACKBURN.........................  .........         X   .........
MR. CONYERS............................         X   .........  .........
MR. BERMAN.............................         X   .........  .........
MR. BOUCHER............................  .........  .........  .........
MR. NADLER.............................         X   .........  .........
MR. SCOTT..............................         X   .........  .........
MR. WATT...............................         X   .........  .........
MS. LOFGREN............................         X   .........  .........
MS. JACKSON LEE........................         X   .........  .........
MS. WATERS.............................         X   .........  .........
MR. MEEHAN.............................         X   .........  .........
MR. DELAHUNT...........................  .........  .........  .........
MR. WEXLER.............................  .........  .........  .........
MS. BALDWIN............................         X   .........  .........
MR. WEINER.............................         X   .........  .........
MR. SCHIFF.............................  .........  .........      PASS
MS. SANCHEZ............................         X   .........  .........
MR. SENSENBRENNER, CHAIRMAN............  .........         X   .........
                                        --------------------------------
      TOTAL............................        12         17     1 PASS
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Rollcall No. 7: Subject: Jackson Lee amendment (Convention 
Against Torture) to H.R. 10. By a rollcall vote of 12 yeas, 18 
nays, and 1 pass, the amendment was defeated.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                            Ayes       Nays     Present
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MR. HYDE...............................  .........  .........  .........
MR. COBLE..............................  .........         X   .........
MR. SMITH..............................  .........         X   .........
MR. GALLEGLY...........................  .........         X   .........
MR. GOODLATTE..........................  .........         X   .........
MR. CHABOT.............................  .........         X   .........
MR. JENKINS............................  .........         X   .........
MR. CANNON.............................  .........  .........  .........
MR. BACHUS.............................  .........         X   .........
MR. HOSTETTLER.........................  .........         X   .........
MR. GREEN..............................  .........         X   .........
MR. KELLER.............................  .........         X   .........
MS. HART...............................  .........         X   .........
MR. FLAKE..............................  .........         X   .........
MR. PENCE..............................  .........  .........  .........
MR. FORBES.............................  .........         X   .........
MR. KING...............................  .........         X   .........
MR. CARTER.............................  .........         X   .........
MR. FEENEY.............................  .........         X   .........
MRS. BLACKBURN.........................  .........         X   .........
MR. CONYERS............................         X   .........  .........
MR. BERMAN.............................         X   .........  .........
MR. BOUCHER............................  .........  .........  .........
MR. NADLER.............................         X   .........  .........
MR. SCOTT..............................         X   .........  .........
MR. WATT...............................         X   .........  .........
MS. LOFGREN............................         X   .........  .........
MS. JACKSON LEE........................         X   .........  .........
MS. WATERS.............................         X   .........  .........
MR. MEEHAN.............................         X   .........  .........
MR. DELAHUNT...........................  .........  .........  .........
MR. WEXLER.............................  .........  .........  .........
MS. BALDWIN............................         X   .........  .........
MR. WEINER.............................         X   .........  .........
MR. SCHIFF.............................  .........  .........      PASS
MS. SANCHEZ............................         X   .........  .........
MR. SENSENBRENNER, CHAIRMAN............  .........         X   .........
                                        --------------------------------
      TOTAL............................        12         18     1 pass
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Rollcall No. 8: Subject: Sensenbrenner amendment to the 
Watt amendment (Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board) to 
H.R. 10. By a rollcall vote of 19 yeas, to 15 nays, the 
amendment was agreed to.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                            Ayes       Nays     Present
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MR. HYDE...............................  .........  .........  .........
MR. COBLE..............................         X   .........  .........
MR. SMITH..............................         X   .........  .........
MR. GALLEGLY...........................         X   .........  .........
MR. GOODLATTE..........................         X   .........  .........
MR. CHABOT.............................         X   .........  .........
MR. JENKINS............................         X   .........  .........
MR. CANNON.............................  .........  .........  .........
MR. BACHUS.............................         X   .........  .........
MR. HOSTETTLER.........................         X   .........  .........
MR. GREEN..............................         X   .........  .........
MR. KELLER.............................         X   .........  .........
MS. HART...............................         X   .........  .........
MR. FLAKE..............................         X   .........  .........
MR. PENCE..............................         X   .........  .........
MR. FORBES.............................         X   .........  .........
MR. KING...............................         X   .........  .........
MR. CARTER.............................         X   .........  .........
MR. FEENEY.............................         X   .........  .........
MRS. BLACKBURN.........................         X   .........  .........
MR. CONYERS............................  .........         X   .........
MR. BERMAN.............................  .........         X   .........
MR. BOUCHER............................  .........  .........  .........
MR. NADLER.............................  .........         X   .........
MR. SCOTT..............................  .........         X   .........
MR. WATT...............................  .........         X   .........
MS. LOFGREN............................  .........         X   .........
MS. JACKSON LEE........................  .........         X   .........
MS. WATERS.............................  .........         X   .........
MR. MEEHAN.............................  .........         X   .........
MR. DELAHUNT...........................  .........         X   .........
MR. WEXLER.............................  .........         X   .........
MS. BALDWIN............................  .........         X   .........
MR. WEINER.............................  .........         X   .........
MR. SCHIFF.............................  .........         X   .........
MS. SANCHEZ............................  .........         X   .........
MR. SENSENBRENNER, CHAIRMAN............         X   .........  .........
                                        --------------------------------
      TOTAL............................        19         15   .........
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Rollcall No. 9: Subject: Sanchez amendment (ID Security) to 
H.R. 10. By a rollcall vote of 12 yeas, 19 nays, the amendment 
was defeated.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                            Ayes       Nays     Present
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MR. HYDE...............................  .........  .........  .........
MR. COBLE..............................  .........         X   .........
MR. SMITH..............................  .........         X   .........
MR. GALLEGLY...........................  .........         X   .........
MR. GOODLATTE..........................  .........         X   .........
MR. CHABOT.............................  .........         X   .........
MR. JENKINS............................  .........         X   .........
MR. CANNON.............................  .........  .........  .........
MR. BACHUS.............................  .........         X   .........
MR. HOSTETTLER.........................  .........         X   .........
MR. GREEN..............................  .........         X   .........
MR. KELLER.............................  .........         X   .........
MS. HART...............................  .........         X   .........
MR. FLAKE..............................  .........         X   .........
MR. PENCE..............................  .........         X   .........
MR. FORBES.............................  .........         X   .........
MR. KING...............................  .........         X   .........
MR. CARTER.............................  .........         X   .........
MR. FEENEY.............................  .........         X   .........
MRS. BLACKBURN.........................  .........         X   .........
MR. CONYERS............................         X   .........  .........
MR. BERMAN.............................  .........  .........  .........
MR. BOUCHER............................  .........  .........  .........
MR. NADLER.............................         X   .........  .........
MR. SCOTT..............................         X   .........  .........
MR. WATT...............................         X   .........  .........
MS. LOFGREN............................         X   .........  .........
MS. JACKSON LEE........................         X   .........  .........
MS. WATERS.............................         X   .........  .........
MR. MEEHAN.............................         X   .........  .........
MR. DELAHUNT...........................  .........  .........  .........
MR. WEXLER.............................         X   .........  .........
MS. BALDWIN............................         X   .........  .........
MR. WEINER.............................         X   .........  .........
MR. SCHIFF.............................  .........  .........  .........
MS. SANCHEZ............................         X   .........  .........
MR. SENSENBRENNER, CHAIRMAN............  .........         X   .........
                                        --------------------------------
      TOTAL............................        12         19   .........
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Rollcall No. 10: Subject: Weiner amendment (Covered Grants) 
to H.R. 10. By a rollcall vote of 12 yeas, 19 nays, the 
amendment was defeated.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                            Ayes       Nays     Present
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MR. HYDE...............................  .........  .........  .........
MR. COBLE..............................  .........         X   .........
MR. SMITH..............................  .........         X   .........
MR. GALLEGLY...........................  .........         X   .........
MR. GOODLATTE..........................  .........         X   .........
MR. CHABOT.............................  .........         X   .........
MR. JENKINS............................  .........         X   .........
MR. CANNON.............................  .........  .........  .........
MR. BACHUS.............................  .........         X   .........
MR. HOSTETTLER.........................  .........         X   .........
MR. GREEN..............................  .........         X   .........
MR. KELLER.............................  .........         X   .........
MS. HART...............................  .........         X   .........
MR. FLAKE..............................  .........         X   .........
MR. PENCE..............................  .........         X   .........
MR. FORBES.............................  .........         X   .........
MR. KING...............................  .........         X   .........
MR. CARTER.............................  .........         X   .........
MR. FEENEY.............................  .........         X   .........
MRS. BLACKBURN.........................  .........         X   .........
MR. CONYERS............................         X   .........  .........
MR. BERMAN.............................  .........  .........  .........
MR. BOUCHER............................  .........  .........  .........
MR. NADLER.............................         X   .........  .........
MR. SCOTT..............................         X   .........  .........
MR. WATT...............................         X   .........  .........
MS. LOFGREN............................         X   .........  .........
MS. JACKSON LEE........................         X   .........  .........
MS. WATERS.............................         X   .........  .........
MR. MEEHAN.............................         X   .........  .........
MR. DELAHUNT...........................  .........  .........  .........
MR. WEXLER.............................         X   .........  .........
MS. BALDWIN............................         X   .........  .........
MR. WEINER.............................         X   .........  .........
MR. SCHIFF.............................  .........  .........  .........
MS. SANCHEZ............................         X   .........  .........
MR. SENSENBRENNER, CHAIRMAN............  .........         X   .........
                                        --------------------------------
      TOTAL............................        12         19   .........
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Rollcall No. 11: Subject: Watt amendment (intentional 
misconduct) to H.R. 10. By a rollcall vote of 12 yeas, 19 nays, 
the amendment was defeated.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                            Ayes       Nays     Present
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MR. HYDE...............................  .........  .........  .........
MR. COBLE..............................  .........         X   .........
MR. SMITH..............................  .........         X   .........
MR. GALLEGLY...........................  .........         X   .........
MR. GOODLATTE..........................  .........         X   .........
MR. CHABOT.............................  .........         X   .........
MR. JENKINS............................  .........         X   .........
MR. CANNON.............................  .........  .........  .........
MR. BACHUS.............................  .........         X   .........
MR. HOSTETTLER.........................  .........         X   .........
MR. GREEN..............................  .........         X   .........
MR. KELLER.............................  .........         X   .........
MS. HART...............................  .........         X   .........
MR. FLAKE..............................  .........         X   .........
MR. PENCE..............................  .........         X   .........
MR. FORBES.............................  .........         X   .........
MR. KING...............................  .........         X   .........
MR. CARTER.............................  .........         X   .........
MR. FEENEY.............................  .........         X   .........
MRS. BLACKBURN.........................  .........         X   .........
MR. CONYERS............................         X   .........  .........
MR. BERMAN.............................  .........  .........  .........
MR. BOUCHER............................  .........  .........  .........
MR. NADLER.............................         X   .........  .........
MR. SCOTT..............................         X   .........  .........
MR. WATT...............................         X   .........  .........
MS. LOFGREN............................         X   .........  .........
MS. JACKSON LEE........................         X   .........  .........
MS. WATERS.............................         X   .........  .........
MR. MEEHAN.............................         X   .........  .........
MR. DELAHUNT...........................  .........  .........  .........
MR. WEXLER.............................         X   .........  .........
MS. BALDWIN............................         X   .........  .........
MR. WEINER.............................         X   .........  .........
MR. SCHIFF.............................  .........  .........  .........
MS. SANCHEZ............................         X   .........  .........
MR. SENSENBRENNER, CHAIRMAN............  .........         X   .........
                                        --------------------------------
      TOTAL............................        12         19   .........
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Rollcall No. 12: Subject: Scott amendment (Litigation 
Management agreements) to H.R. 10. By a roll call vote of 12 
yeas, 19 nays, the amendment was defeated.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                            Ayes       Nays     Present
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MR. HYDE...............................  .........  .........  .........
MR. COBLE..............................  .........         X   .........
MR. SMITH..............................  .........         X   .........
MR. GALLEGLY...........................  .........         X   .........
MR. GOODLATTE..........................  .........         X   .........
MR. CHABOT.............................  .........         X   .........
MR. JENKINS............................  .........         X   .........
MR. CANNON.............................  .........  .........  .........
MR. BACHUS.............................  .........         X   .........
MR. HOSTETTLER.........................  .........         X   .........
MR. GREEN..............................  .........         X   .........
MR. KELLER.............................  .........         X   .........
MS. HART...............................  .........         X   .........
MR. FLAKE..............................  .........         X   .........
MR. PENCE..............................  .........         X   .........
MR. FORBES.............................  .........         X   .........
MR. KING...............................  .........         X   .........
MR. CARTER.............................  .........         X   .........
MR. FEENEY.............................  .........         X   .........
MRS. BLACKBURN.........................  .........         X   .........
MR. CONYERS............................         X   .........  .........
MR. BERMAN.............................  .........  .........  .........
MR. BOUCHER............................  .........  .........  .........
MR. NADLER.............................         X   .........  .........
MR. SCOTT..............................         X   .........  .........
MR. WATT...............................         X   .........  .........
MS. LOFGREN............................         X   .........  .........
MS. JACKSON LEE........................         X   .........  .........
MS. WATERS.............................         X   .........  .........
MR. MEEHAN.............................         X   .........  .........
MR. DELAHUNT...........................  .........  .........  .........
MR. WEXLER.............................         X   .........  .........
MS. BALDWIN............................         X   .........  .........
MR. WEINER.............................         X   .........  .........
MR. SCHIFF.............................  .........  .........  .........
MS. SANCHEZ............................         X   .........  .........
MR. SENSENBRENNER, CHAIRMAN............  .........         X   .........
                                        --------------------------------
      TOTAL............................        12         19   .........
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Rollcall No. 13: Subject: Jackson Lee amendment (Criminal 
History Information Checks) to H.R. 10. By a rollcall vote of 
12 yeas, 19 nays, the amendment was defeated.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                            Ayes       Nays     Present
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MR. HYDE...............................  .........  .........  .........
MR. COBLE..............................  .........         X   .........
MR. SMITH..............................  .........         X   .........
MR. GALLEGLY...........................  .........         X   .........
MR. GOODLATTE..........................  .........         X   .........
MR. CHABOT.............................  .........         X   .........
MR. JENKINS............................  .........         X   .........
MR. CANNON.............................  .........  .........  .........
MR. BACHUS.............................  .........         X   .........
MR. HOSTETTLER.........................  .........         X   .........
MR. GREEN..............................  .........         X   .........
MR. KELLER.............................  .........         X   .........
MS. HART...............................  .........         X   .........
MR. FLAKE..............................  .........         X   .........
MR. PENCE..............................  .........         X   .........
MR. FORBES.............................  .........         X   .........
MR. KING...............................  .........         X   .........
MR. CARTER.............................  .........         X   .........
MR. FEENEY.............................  .........         X   .........
MRS. BLACKBURN.........................  .........         X   .........
MR. CONYERS............................         X   .........  .........
MR. BERMAN.............................  .........  .........  .........
MR. BOUCHER............................  .........  .........  .........
MR. NADLER.............................         X   .........  .........
MR. SCOTT..............................  .........         X   .........
MR. WATT...............................         X   .........  .........
MS. LOFGREN............................         X   .........  .........
MS. JACKSON LEE........................         X   .........  .........
MS. WATERS.............................         X   .........  .........
MR. MEEHAN.............................         X   .........  .........
MR. DELAHUNT...........................  .........  .........  .........
MR. WEXLER.............................         X   .........  .........
MS. BALDWIN............................         X   .........  .........
MR. WEINER.............................         X   .........  .........
MR. SCHIFF.............................  .........  .........  .........
MS. SANCHEZ............................         X   .........  .........
MR. SENSENBRENNER, CHAIRMAN............  .........         X   .........
                                        --------------------------------
      TOTAL............................        11         20   .........
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Rollcall No. 14: Subject: Motion to report H.R. 10, as 
amended. By a rollcall vote of 19 yeas to 12 nays, the motion 
was agreed to.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                            Ayes       Nays     Present
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MR. HYDE...............................  .........  .........  .........
MR. COBLE..............................         X   .........  .........
MR. SMITH..............................         X   .........  .........
MR. GALLEGLY...........................         X   .........  .........
MR. GOODLATTE..........................         X   .........  .........
MR. CHABOT.............................         X   .........  .........
MR. JENKINS............................         X   .........  .........
MR. CANNON.............................  .........  .........  .........
MR. BACHUS.............................         X   .........  .........
MR. HOSTETTLER.........................         X   .........  .........
MR. GREEN..............................         X   .........  .........
MR. KELLER.............................         X   .........  .........
MS. HART...............................         X   .........  .........
MR. FLAKE..............................         X   .........  .........
MR. PENCE..............................         X   .........  .........
MR. FORBES.............................         X   .........  .........
MR. KING...............................         X   .........  .........
MR. CARTER.............................         X   .........  .........
MR. FEENEY.............................         X   .........  .........
MRS. BLACKBURN.........................  .........  .........  .........
MR. CONYERS............................  .........         X   .........
MR. BERMAN.............................  .........  .........  .........
MR. BOUCHER............................  .........  .........  .........
MR. NADLER.............................  .........         X   .........
MR. SCOTT..............................  .........         X   .........
MR. WATT...............................  .........         X   .........
MS. LOFGREN............................  .........         X   .........
MS. JACKSON LEE........................  .........         X   .........
MS. WATERS.............................  .........         X   .........
MR. MEEHAN.............................  .........         X   .........
MR. DELAHUNT...........................  .........  .........  .........
MR. WEXLER.............................  .........         X   .........
MS. BALDWIN............................  .........         X   .........
MR. WEINER.............................  .........         X   .........
MR. SCHIFF.............................         X   .........  .........
MS. SANCHEZ............................         s          X   .........
MR. SENSENBRENNER, CHAIRMAN............         X   .........  .........
                                        --------------------------------
      TOTAL............................        19         12
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                      Committee Oversight Findings

    In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules 
of the House of Representatives, the Committee reports that the 
findings and recommendations of the Committee, based on 
oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of rule X of the 
Rules of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in the 
descriptive portions of this report.

               New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures

    Clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of 
Representatives is inapplicable because this legislation does 
not provide new budgetary authority or increased tax 
expenditures.

              Congressional Budget Office of Cost Estimate

    In compliance with clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules 
of the House of Representatives, the Committee sets forth, with 
respect to the bill, H.R. 10, the following estimate and 
comparison prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget 
Office under section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 
1974:

                                                   October 5, 2004.
Hon. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.,
Chairman Committee on the Judiciary,
House of Representatives, Washinton, DC
    Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has 
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 10, the 9/11 
Recommendations Implementation Act.
    If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be 
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Mark 
Grabowicz.
            Sincerely,
                                       Douglas Holtz-Eakin,
                                                          Director.
    Enclosure.

H.R. 10--9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act

    Summary. H.R. 10 would affect the intelligence community, 
terrorism prevention and prosecution, and border security, as 
well as international cooperation and coordination. Title I 
would establish an Office of the National Intelligence Director 
(NID) to manage and oversee intelligence activities of the U.S. 
government, including foreign intelligence and 
counterintelligence activities. The legislation would transfer 
some existing intelligence organizations to that office and 
would establish a National Counterterrorism Center and one or 
more national intelligence centers within the Office of the 
NID. Title II would authorize funding for law enforcement, 
counterterrorism activities, and programs related to aviation 
safety. Title III would increase the number of agents 
performing border security and immigration functions, improve 
the security of identity documents such as driver's licenses, 
and increase the number of consular officers within the 
Department of State. Title IV would authorize funds for a 
number of international cooperation programs. Finally, title V 
would reauthorize and restructure several homeland security 
programs.
    CBO estimates that implementing H.R. 10 would cost about 
$800 million in 2005 and $17.5 billion over the 2005-2009 
period, assuming appropriation of the specified and estimated 
amounts. That total does not include possible additional costs 
associated with implementing provisions dealing with the 
creation of an interoperable data system for exchanging law 
enforcement and intelligence data or the establishment of a 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reserve service because 
CBO does not have sufficient information to estimate those 
costs at this time. With regard to the FBI reserve service, CBO 
cannot predict when a national emergency would occur, but 
expects that costs for the proposed reserve service would 
likely be insignificant in most years.
    The bill also contains provisions that would decrease 
direct spending. In particular, it would establish a fund 
within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to enhance 
efforts to detect explosives at security checkpoints in 
airports; authorize the collection and spending of $30 million 
a year of fees from airline passengers in 2005 and 2006 for 
that purpose; allow the Director of the FBI to waive the 
mandatory retirement requirement for agents until age 65; and 
extend indefinitely the authority of the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) to offer incentive payments to employees who 
voluntarily retire or resign. CBO estimates that enacting those 
provisions would decrease direct spending by about $25 million 
in 2005, $4 million over the 2005-2009 period, and $2 million 
over the 2005-2014 period. The estimate of direct spending does 
not include the effects of extending the authority of the CIA 
to offer incentive payments to employees who voluntarily retire 
or resign because the data needed to prepare such an estimate 
are classified. Enacting H.R. 10 would not affect receipts.
    H.R. 10 contains several intergovernmental mandates as 
defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA). CBO 
estimates that those mandates, in aggregate, would impose costs 
on state, local, and tribal governments totaling more than $600 
million over fiscal years 2005 through 2009. CBO estimates that 
the costs in at least one of those years would exceed the 
threshold established in UMRA ($60 million in 2004, adjusted 
annually for inflation). The bill would authorize 
appropriations for grants to states to cover such costs.
    H.R. 10 would impose private-sector mandates as defined in 
UMRA on shippers of hazardous materials and licensees of 
nuclear facilities. Because the impact of two of the mandates 
would depend on future actions of the Department of Homeland 
Security and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for which 
information currently is not available, CBO cannot determine 
whether the costs to the private sector would exceed the annual 
threshold for private-sector mandates ($120 million in 2004, 
adjusted annually for inflation).
    Estimated cost to the Federal Government: The estimated 
budgetary impact of H.R. 10 is summarized in Table 1. The costs 
of this legislation fall within budget functions 050 (national 
defense), 400 (transportation), 450 (community and regional 
development), 550 (health), 750 (administration of justice), 
and 800 (general government).
    Basis of Estimate: Most of H.R. 10's effects on the federal 
budget would be subject to appropriation of amounts necessary 
to implement the bill. For this estimate, CBO assumes that the 
bill will be enacted by the end of the calendar year, that all 
such amounts will be appropriated near the start of each fiscal 
year, and that outlays will follow historical patterns for 
similar activities.

  TABLE 1. BUDGETARY IMPACT OF H.R. 10, THE 9/11 RECOMMENDATIONS IMPLEMENTATION ACT, AS ORDERED REPORTED BY THE
                                        HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                    By Fiscal Year, in Millions of Dollars--
                                                               -------------------------------------------------
                                                                  2005      2006      2007      2008      2009
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                CHANGES IN SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION \1\
 
Estimated Authorization Level.................................     2,311     6,223     2,559     4,700     5,264
Estimated Outlays.............................................       798     4,950     3,004     4,062     4,670
 
                                         CHANGES IN DIRECT SPENDING \2\
 
Estimated Budget Authority....................................         *         *         *         *         *
Estimated Outlays.............................................       -25       -12        19        10        5
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: * = Between zero and -$500,000.
\1\ These amounts do not include the costs of section 2192 because CBO cannot estimate such costs at this time.
  The amounts also exclude the costs associated with establishing a reserve service within the Federal Bureau of
  Investigation. Any such costs would be insignificant in most years, and CBO has no basis for predicting when a
  national emergency would occur.
\2\ These amounts do not include the costs of section 1061 because the data needed to prepare an estimate are
  classified.

Spending Subject to Appropriation

    H.R. 10 contains provisions that would affect the 
intelligence community, terrorism prevention and prosecution, 
and border security, as well as international cooperation and 
coordination. Table 2 presents CBO's estimates of the cost of 
those provisions. In total, we estimate that implementing H.R. 
10 would cost $17.5 billion over the 2005-2009 period, assuming 
appropriation of the specified and estimated amounts. That 
total does not include the possible additional costs associated 
with implementing provisions dealing with the creation of an 
interoperable data system for exchanging law enforcement and 
intelligence data or the establishment of an FBI reserve 
service because CBO does not have sufficient information to 
estimate those costs at this time. With regard to the FBI 
reserve service, CBO cannot predict when a national emergency 
would occur, but expects that costs for the proposed reserve 
service would likely be insignificant in most years.

 TABLE 2. ESTIMATED CHANGES IN SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION UNDER H.R. 10 AS ORDERED REPORTED BY THE HOUSE
                                           COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                    By fiscal year, in millions of dollars--
                                                               -------------------------------------------------
                                                                  2005      2006      2007      2008      2009
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reform the Intelligence Community:
    Estimated Authorization Level.............................        40       235        75        90        70
    Estimated Outlays.........................................        30        60       110       145       140
Combating Financial Crimes:
    Authorization Level.......................................        51         0         0         0         0
    Estimated Outlays.........................................        36        15         0         0         0
Aviation Security:
    Estimated Authorization Level.............................       528     4,343       330         0         0
    Estimated Outlays.........................................       238     3,666       957       340         0
Improve Intelligence Capabilities of the FBI:
  Estimated Authorization Level...............................         4         5         6         7         8
    Estimated Outlays.........................................         3         5         6         8         8
Security for Nuclear Facilities:
    Estimated Authorization Level.............................         1         2         2         2         2
    Estimated Outlays.........................................        -2         4         2         2         2
Community-Oriented Policing Services:
    Authorization Level.......................................     1,008     1,027     1,047         0         0
    Estimated Outlays.........................................        22       528        40       671       364
Increase the Number of Border Patrol and Immigration Agents:
    Estimated Authorization Level.............................         0       174       526       981     1,451
    Estimated Outlays.........................................         0       165       509       958     1,427
Grants to Improve Security of Driver's Licenses:
    Estimated Authorization Level.............................        80        30        30        10        10
    Estimated Outlays.........................................        80        30        30        10        10
New Standards for Issuance of Birth and Death Certificates:
    Estimated Authorization Level.............................       330        20        30        40        50
    Estimated Outlays.........................................        70       150       160        35        45
Expand Immigration Services at Foreign Airports:
    Authorization Level.......................................        49        88       137         0         0
    Estimated Outlays.........................................        39        80       127        28         0
Increase the Number of Consular Officers:
    Estimated Authorization Level.............................         0        33        62        93       125
    Estimated Outlays.........................................         0        27        54        84       115
Reform International Cooperation and Coordination:
    Estimated Authorization Level.............................        17        17        17         7         7
    Estimated Outlays.........................................         7        15        17        15         9
First-Responder Grants:
    Estimated Authorization Level.............................         0         0         0     3,314     3,381
    Estimate Outlays..........................................         0         0         0     1,491     2,350
Security for Nonprofit Organizations:
    Estimated Authorization Level.............................       168       168       168         0         0
    Estimated Outlays.........................................        45       128       168       123        40
Counternarcotics Office:
    Estimated Authorization Level.............................         6         6         6         6         6
    Estimated Outlays.........................................         4         6         6         6         6
Security Clearance Modernization:
    Estimated Authorization Level.............................        23        68       116       143       147
    Estimated Outlays.........................................        21        64       111       140       147
Public Safety Communications Interoperability:
    Estimated Authorization Level.............................         6         6         6         6         6
    Estimated Outlays.........................................         5         6         6         6         6
Total Changes\1\:
    Estimated Authorization Level.............................     2,311     6,223     2,559     4,700     5,264
    Estimated Outlays.........................................       798     4,950     3,004     4,062    4,670
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ These amounts do not include the costs of section 2192 because CBO cannot estimate such costs at this time.
  The amounts also exclude the costs associated with establishing a reserve service within the Federal Bureau of
  Investigation. Any such costs would be insignificant in most years, and CBO has no basis for predicting when a
  national emergency would occur.
 
Note: FBI = Federal Bureau of Investigation.

    Reform the Intelligence Community. Title I would reform the 
intelligence community by establishing the position of National 
Intelligence Director and an Office of the National 
Intelligence Director to manage and oversee intelligence 
activities of the U.S. government,including foreign 
intelligence and counterintelligence activities. The legislation also 
would transfer some existing organizations, specifically the Office of 
the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management 
and the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC), to that office and 
would establish a National Counterterrorism Center and one or more 
national intelligence centers within the Office of the NID. The bill 
would expand language training within the intelligence community and 
authorize additional scholarships for new recruits. Finally, the 
legislation would establish a civilian linguist reserve corps.
    CBO estimates that implementing title I and other 
provisions relating to the intelligence community would cost 
about $490 million over the 2005-2009 period (see Table 3). 
These costs are in addition to those that would be incurred 
under current law by the Office of the Deputy Director of 
Central Intelligence for Community Management and the Terrorist 
Threat Integration Center. The estimated costs include expenses 
to establish, house, and administer the new Office of the 
National Intelligence Director and implement other specified 
programs, such as improving training programs and establishing 
a scholarship program.

 TABLE 3. ESTIMATED CHANGES IN SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION FOR REFORMING THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY UNDER
                       H.R. 10 AS ORDERED REPORTED BY THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                    By fiscal year, in millions of dollars--
                                                               -------------------------------------------------
                                                                  2005      2006      2007      2008      2009
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Create the Office of the National Intelligence Director:
    Estimated Authorization Level.............................        15       210        50        80        60
    Estimated Outlays.........................................        10        35        80       135       130
Other Program Authorizations:
    Estimated Authorization Level.............................        25        25        25        10        10
    Estimated Outlays.........................................        20        25        25        10        10
Total Changes:
    Estimated Authorization Level.............................        40       235        75        90        70
    Estimated Outlays.........................................        30        60       110       145       140
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Create the Office of the National Intelligence Director. 
CBO estimates that establishing, housing, and administering the 
Office of the NID would cost about $390 million over the 2005-
2009 period.
    The bill would transfer the Office of the Deputy Director 
of Central Intelligence for Community Management (identified as 
the Intelligence Community Management Account within the 
budget) and the TTIC to the Office of the NID.
    The Intelligence Community Management Account (ICMA) was 
established by Congressional direction to provide resources 
that directly support the Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency and the intelligence community as a whole in 
coordinating cross-program activities. Because part of its 
budget is classified, CBO does not know the overall size of 
this organization. Unclassified budgets for the ICMA indicate 
that the office has a staff of about 300 people who develop the 
National Foreign Intelligence Program budget, oversee research 
and development activities, and develop intelligence plans and 
requirements, but the Congress also authorizes and appropriates 
funds for additional staff in the classified portion of the 
intelligence budget.
    Similarly, CBO has no budget information on the TTIC, but 
public information released by the White House indicates that 
the center opened in May 2003 with a staff of about 60 people 
working alongside the counterterrorism offices of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation and the CIA. That same information 
indicates that the Administration expects to eventually staff 
the TTIC with between 200 and 300 people to serve as the hub 
for all intelligence regarding terrorist threats.
    CBO expects that the NID would require staff to perform its 
authorized functions in addition to the staff transferred from 
the ICMA and the planned staff for the TTIC. Because much of 
the detailed information regarding the organization, staffing 
levels, and budgets of the intelligence community are 
classified at a level above clearances held by CBO employees, 
CBO has used information about staff requirements from similar 
organizations within the Department of Defense (DoD), the 
Department of Homeland Security, and other federal agencies to 
attempt to estimate the number of additional staff that might 
be needed by the NID. Based on that analysis, CBO estimates 
that the NID might need to hire around 300 new staff, including 
appointees such as principal and deputy directors, key managers 
such as a general counsel, a civil liberties protection 
officer, personnel to perform administrative functions such as 
policy development and budget and finance activities, and 
personnel for the National Counterterrorism Center and one or 
more national intelligence centers. CBO expects that many of 
these new hires would be staff transferred from other 
organizations within the intelligence community but that those 
other organizations would eventually fill many of the vacated 
positions within their organizations over about a four year 
period following enactment of this legislation.
    Based on information about the staffing levels and costs 
for the administrative offices of the Department of Defense, 
the Department of Homeland Security, and other agencies, 
CBOestimates that the personnel and related expenses to provide 
centralized leadership, coordination, and support and analytical 
services for the Office of the National Intelligence Director would 
eventually cost around $45 million annually, but that costs would be 
much lower in the first few years as positions are filled. CBO 
estimates that such costs would be minimal in the first year and total 
about $130 million over the 2005-2009 period.
    Section 1094 would express the sense of the Congress that 
the permanent location of the NID headquarters be at a location 
other than the George Bush Center for Intelligence in Langley, 
Virginia. For this estimate, CBO assumes that the Director's 
office and associated staff would occupy the space currently 
used by the Intelligence Community Management staff until 
fiscal year 2007. Starting in 2007, CBO assumes that the office 
would move to new office space in a building owned by the 
General Services Administration (GSA) until a new building can 
be built for its use. CBO estimates that initially GSA would 
need to renovate and furnish office space for the NID staff. 
(After 2009, CBO expects that these positions would be 
relocated to the new permanent NID headquarters.) CBO estimates 
that the GSA rental payments would reach about $20 million a 
year and total about $40 million over the 2007-2009 period. 
Additional costs to purchase computers, network equipment, and 
supplies in the first few years following the relocation into 
the GSA-owned building also would be significant. CBO estimates 
that those costs would total $30 million over the 2007-2009 
period.
    CBO assumes that GSA would construct a new building on land 
already owned by the federal government to serve as the 
headquarters for the Office of the NID. Based on information 
provided by GSA about recent federal office building projects, 
CBO estimates that planning and design of the new headquarters 
would cost $15 million over the 2005-2006 period, and that 
constructing the facility to house NID employees would cost 
about $175 million over the 2006-2009 period. (An additional 
$20 million in spending would occur in 2010 to complete 
construction of the new building.) CBO assumes that the 
headquarters would be located on property already owned by the 
federal government in the Washington, D.C. area. If GSA had to 
buy land for the building site, costs would be higher. CBO 
assumes that construction of the new facility would not start 
until sometime in late 2006 and would be completed after 2009. 
Therefore, CBO estimates that no costs associated with 
furnishing, equipping, and maintaining the new space would be 
incurred during the 2005-2009 period nor would there be costs 
to relocate NID staff from the interim offices to the new 
headquarters over that period.
    Other Program Authorizations. Title I also would authorize 
the President and the NID to initiate or enhance several 
programs within the intelligence community. Based on 
information from the Administration and on the costs of other 
similar efforts, CBO estimates that those efforts would cost 
about $20 million in 2005 and total around $90 million over the 
2005-2009 period, subject to appropriation of the specified and 
estimated amounts.
           Section 1052 would authorize the 
        appropriation of an additional $2 million a year to 
        carry out the grant program for the National Flagship 
        Language Initiative, which was established to improve 
        higher education in foreign languages that the 
        Secretary of Defense has identified as critical to the 
        interests of the national security of the United 
        States. CBO estimates that implementing this section 
        would cost $10 million over the 2005-2009 period, 
        assuming appropriation of the specified amounts.
           Section 1053 would establish a new 
        scholarship program within the National Security 
        Education Trust Fund. The scholarships would be 
        available to students who are U.S. citizens and are 
        native speakers of a foreign language that is 
        identified as critical to the national security 
        interests of the United States. The scholarships would 
        enable those students to pursue English language 
        studies at an institution of higher education in the 
        United States to attain proficiency in those skills. 
        The bill would authorize the appropriation of $4 
        million a year starting in 2005 for these scholarships. 
        CBO estimates that the costs for the scholarship 
        program would total about $20 million over the 2005-
        2009 period, assuming appropriation of the specified 
        amounts.
           Section 1055 would establish a program 
        operated jointly by the NID and the Department of 
        Defense to advance foreign language skills in languages 
        that are critical to the capability of the intelligence 
        community to carry out national security activities. 
        Under this provision, personnel from the intelligence 
        community could be reimbursed for the total cost of 
        tuition and training in foreign language studies 
        undertaken at educational institutions that have 
        entered into educational partnerships with the U.S. 
        government. In addition, federal agencies would be 
        allowed to provide financial assistance to those 
        educational institutions, including the loan of 
        equipment and instructional materials. CBO has no 
        specific information about how this joint NID/DoD 
        program would be implemented. Assuming that 
        participation levels would be similar to those for 
        another foreign language program offered within the 
        National Security Education Trust Fund, CBO estimates 
        that the new program would cost about $1 million a 
        year.
           Section 1056 would allow the NID to 
        establish a civilian linguist reserve corps consisting 
        of U.S. citizens with advanced levels of proficiency in 
        foreign languages. CBO assumes that members of the 
        reserve corps would receive pay, transportation, and 
        per diem when performing work for the federal 
        government as requested by the President. The pilot 
        project would be conducted for a three-year period, 
        starting in 2005. Based on information provided by the 
        staff of the National Security Education Program, CBO 
        expects that the reserve corps would consist of about 
        150 people at any given time and cost about $50 million 
        over the 2005-2007 period.
           Section 1062 would establish an Emerging 
        Technologies Panel within the National Security Agency 
        to advise the NID on the research, development, and 
        application of existing and emerging science and 
        technology advances, advances in encryption, and other 
        topics. Based on the budgets of other advisory panels, 
        CBO estimates that the costs to operate this panel 
        would be about $1 million in 2005 and would total $10 
        million over the 2005-2009 period.
    Combating Financial Crimes. Sections 2101 and 2102 would 
authorize the appropriation of $51 million for fiscal year 2005 
for the Financial Crimes Enforcement Center to improve its 
computer systems and to assist states and localities in 
combating financial crimes. CBO estimates that this provision 
would result in outlays of $36 million in 2005 and $15 million 
in 2006, assuming appropriation of the specified amount.
    Aviation Security. Title II would authorize the 
appropriation of the funds necessary to continue aviation 
security programs in 2006 and to deploy explosive-detection 
equipment at airport check points. Based on information from 
DHS and current funding levels, CBO estimates that title II 
would authorize the appropriation of about $5.2 billion over 
the 2005-2007 period for aviation security programs 
administered by DHS. We estimate that most of that amount--
roughly $4 billion--would be authorized to be appropriated in 
fiscal year 2006 for ongoing programs administered by the 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and for the 
federal air marshals. (That estimate is net of almost $2 
billion in offsetting collections from passenger and air-
carrier fees that we assume will continue to be collected by 
DHS in 2006 to partly offset the cost of aviation security 
programs in that year.) This estimate also includes almost $1 
billion over the 2005-2007 period for installing explosive-
detection equipment at airport screening checkpoints and $70 
million in 2005 for programs to better control access to 
airports, improve passenger screening, and train federal law 
enforcement officials in certain counterterrorism measures. In 
addition, title II would specifically authorize the 
appropriation of $95 million in 2005 for security projects at 
airports and $2 million for a pilot program to test technology 
to reduce the threat of explosions of baggage and cargo on 
commercial flights. Assuming appropriation of the specified and 
estimated amounts, CBO estimates that implementing all of these 
provisions would cost $238 million in 2005 and $5.2 billion 
over the 2005-2009 period.
    Improve the Intelligence Capabilities of the FBI. Section 
2193 would direct the FBI to continue to improve the 
intelligence capabilities of the bureau and to develop and 
maintain a national intelligence workforce within the FBI. 
Today, the FBI spends about $30 million on counterterrorism 
training. Since 2002, more than 1,500 agents have been added to 
the bureau's staff to meet its counterterrorism mission, an 
increase of about 20 percent. In addition, since the events of 
September 11, 2001, the FBI has partnered with other 
intelligence agencies to provide training in counterterrorism 
and counterintelligence to its staff, and it plans to increase 
that training in the future. CBO assumes that implementation of 
this bill would require the agency to conduct more extensive 
training than is currently planned. Based on information from 
the bureau, we estimate that this additional training would 
cost $3 million in 2005 and almost $30 million over the 2005-
2009 period, assuming appropriation of the necessary amounts.
    Interoperable Law Enforcement and Intelligence Data System. 
Under the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 
2002 (Public Law 107-173), the Administration is required to 
integrate all law enforcement data into an interoperable 
electronic data system known as the Chimera system. However, 
the act did not establish a firm date by which the 
Administration must deploy a fully operational Chimera system. 
Section 2192 would transfer the responsibility for this 
activity to the NID. The provision would direct the NID to 
design a state-of-the-art Chimera system with both biometric 
identification and linguistic capabilities satisfying the best 
technology standards, and to deliver a fully operational system 
by September 11, 2007, for use by the intelligence community, 
federal law enforcement agencies, and counterterrorism 
personnel to collect and share information. Although CBO 
believes that establishing a firm deadline for the operational 
system would likely result in increased discretionary spending 
in the near term, CBO does not have sufficient information to 
estimate that increase at this time. Absent information as to 
whether this transfer would result in changes to the system, 
CBO also cannot estimate whether any long-term costs would 
result from this transfer.
    Security for Nuclear Facilities. Section 2194 of the bill 
would require the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to study 
several types of threats to the nation's nuclear facilities, 
update the rules regarding the types of threats nuclear 
facilities should be able to deflect, and undertake force-on-
force exercises regularly to maintain nuclear facilities' 
readiness to defend against attacks. Although the bill would 
authorize $3 million for such purposes, based on information 
from the NRC, CBO estimates that the provision would have a 
gross cost of $7 million in 2005 and $22 million over the 2005-
2009 period. However, the NRC has the authority to offset a 
substantial portion of its annual appropriation with fees 
charged to the facilities it regulates. Accounting for such 
collections, CBO estimates that implementing those provisions 
would result in a net cost of $9 million over the 2005-2009 
period.
    Community-Oriented Policing Services (COPS). Section 2195 
would authorize the appropriation of just over $1 billion for 
each of fiscal years 2005 through 2007 for the Community-
Oriented Policing Services (COPS) program. Assuming 
appropriation of the specified amounts, CBO estimates this 
provision would cost about $2.5 billion over the 2005-2009 
period.
    Increase the Number of Border Patrol and Immigration 
Agents. Sections 3003 and 3004 would direct DHS to increase the 
number of border patrol agents by 2,000 per year and thenumber 
of investigators of immigration violations by 800 each year over the 
2006-2010 period. Implementing this provision would increase the number 
of federal agents by 14,000 by 2010. Assuming appropriation of the 
necessary amounts, CBO estimates that this provision would cost $165 
million in fiscal year 2006 and $3.1 billion over the 2006-2009 period.
    Grants to Improve the Security of Driver's Licenses. 
Section 3055 would authorize the appropriation of such sums as 
necessary for fiscal years 2005 through 2009 for DHS to make 
grants to states to cover the costs of improving the security 
of driver's licenses as required by the bill. Based on 
information from states and from the American Association of 
Motor Vehicle Administrators (AAMVA), CBO estimates that 
implementing this provision would cost $80 million in 2005 and 
$160 million over the 2005-2009 period, assuming appropriation 
of the necessary amounts.
    New Standards for Issuance of Birth and Death Certificates. 
Sections 3062 and 3063 would require new federal standards 
governing the issuance and management of birth certificates 
recognized by the federal government. Section 3064 would 
require the establishment of a uniform electronic birth and 
death registration system, and section 3065 would extend that 
system to allow electronic verification of vital records.
    Maintaining birth and death records has long been a 
function of state governments. The Secretary of Health and 
Human Services, acting through the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC), currently works with states to compile 
birth and death data for epidemiological studies. H.R. 10 would 
authorize the Secretary to expand that cooperation to the 
formal linking of birth and death records for purposes of 
preventing fraud and other government uses. The bill also would 
authorize the appropriation of such sums as may be necessary 
for these activities, including grants to states to comply with 
these new requirements.
    Based on information from the CDC and the National 
Association for Public Health Statistics and Information 
Systems, CBO estimates that implementing the new security 
standards and building the electronic system of vital records 
would cost $460 million over the 2005-2009 period, assuming 
appropriation of the necessary amounts. That cost would be for 
grants to states to meet the new federal requirements. Of these 
amounts, $70 million in 2005 and $330 million over the 2005-
2009 period would cover start-up costs, including digitalizing 
old birth and death certificates, building electronic systems 
for reporting deaths in some states, upgrading security 
arrangements, and acquiring computer infrastructure. CBO 
estimates that operating the new system for vital records over 
the 2006-2009 period would cost $130 million. We expect that 
the system would be fully operational in 2009, at which point 
annual operating costs would total $50 million.
    Expand Immigration Services at Foreign Airports. Sections 
3082 and 3083 would authorize the appropriation of $49 million 
for 2005, $88 million for 2006, and $137 million for 2007 for 
DHS to expand preinspection services and immigration security 
at foreign airports. CBO estimates that implementing this 
provision would cost $274 million over the 2005-2009 period, 
assuming appropriation of the specified amounts.
    Increase the Number of Consular Officers. Section 3084 
would authorize the Secretary of State to increase the number 
of consular officers by 150 each year over the number allotted 
in the previous year during the 2006-2009 period. It also would 
authorize the Secretary to provide additional training to 
consular officers in the detection of fraudulent documents 
presented by applicants for admission into the United States. 
Based on the average cost of training and stationing consular 
officers overseas, CBO estimates that implementing the 
provision would cost $27 million in 2006 and $280 million over 
the 2006-2009 period.
    Reform International Cooperation and Coordination. Title IV 
would require the President to produce numerous reports, 
express the sense of the Congress on many issues, and urge the 
President to seek agreements with other countries to improve 
cooperation in the global fight against terrorist 
organizations. The title also would authorize some additional 
spending. Subtitle D, the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act 
Amendments of 2004, would authorize additional rule-of-law, 
disarmament, and counternarcotics activities in Afghanistan by 
the U.S. Department of State, but would not increase the 
overall authorization of appropriations above the $425 million 
authorized for each of fiscal years 2005 and 2006 in current 
law.
    Title IV contains three indefinite authorizations of 
appropriations and other provisions that CBO estimates would 
cost $7 million in 2005 and $63 million over the 2005-2009 
period, assuming appropriation of the necessary amounts. In the 
cases where the same provision has been included in other bills 
at specified authorization levels, CBO used that authorization 
level for this estimate. CBO assumes that spending for these 
programs will follow the historical pattern of similar 
programs.
           Section 4041 would authorize the 
        appropriation of such sums as may be necessary in 2005, 
        2006, and 2007 to provide grants to American-sponsored 
        schools in predominately Muslim countries to provide 
        scholarships to students from lower- and middle-income 
        families of those countries. H.R. 4303, the American 
        Education Promotion Act, as ordered reported by the 
        House Committee on International Relations on June 24, 
        2004, would authorize the appropriation of $5 million 
        each year for such grants. That amount is included in 
        this estimate.
           Section 4042 would authorize the 
        appropriation of such sums as may be necessary in 2005, 
        2006, and 2007 for grants by the National Endowment for 
        Democracy toenhance free and independent media 
worldwide. H.R. 1950, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal 
Years 2004 and 2005, as reported by the House Committee on 
International Relations on May 16, 2003, would have authorized $15 
million for such grants. CBO assumes the amount would be provided in 
three equal installments over the three-year period.
           Section 4103 would authorize the 
        appropriation of such sums as may be necessary for 
        programs to reduce the number of shoulder-fired 
        missiles. For the purpose of the estimate, CBO assumed 
        the appropriation of $5 million each year, an amount 
        similar to the cost of other programs for reducing the 
        availability of small arms.
           Section 4035 would establish within the 
        Department of State an Office on Multilateral 
        Negotiations. In our estimate for H.R. 4053, the United 
        States International Leadership Act of 2004, as ordered 
        reported by the House Committee on International 
        Relations on March 31, 2004, CBO estimated that 
        establishing and operating an Office on Multilateral 
        Negotiations would cost $2 million a year.
           Sections 4011 and 4012 would require the 
        Secretary of State to fill vacancies on the Arms 
        Control and Nonproliferation Advisory Board and to 
        provide resources to procure the services of experts 
        and consultants. Based on the cost of other advisory 
        boards, CBO estimates that implementing these sections 
        would cost less than $200,000 a year.
    First-Responder Grants. Subtitle A of title V would 
authorize funding for grants to state and local governments for 
staff and equipment to respond to acts of terrorism and natural 
disasters. It would authorize the Secretary of the Department 
of Homeland Security to change the criteria used to distribute 
funding for four existing first-responder grant programs--the 
State Homeland Security, the Urban Area Security Initiative, 
the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention, and the Citizen Corps 
grant programs. Assuming appropriation of the necessary funds, 
CBO estimates that implementing this subtitle would cost $3.8 
billion over the 2008-2009 period.
    Almost $10 billion has been appropriated for first-
responder grants since fiscal year 2003, including about $3 
billion in fiscal year 2004. The Office of Domestic 
Preparedness (within DHS) derives its primary authority to 
distribute grants to states and localities to prepare and 
respond to terrorism from the USA Patriot Act (Public Law 107-
56). That law authorized the appropriation of such sums as 
necessary for first-responder grants through fiscal year 2007. 
This subtitle would supersede this authority for first-
responder grants in the Patriot Act and continue the 
authorization to appropriate such sums as necessary after 2007.
    For this estimate, CBO assumes that the amount in CBO's 
baseline--$3.3 billion--would be appropriated for first-
responder grants in 2008 and that 2009 funding levels for 
first-responder grants would continue at that level, adjusted 
for anticipated inflation.
    Security for Nonprofit Organizations. Section 5022 would 
authorize the appropriation of $100 million for 2005 and such 
sums as are necessary in 2006 and 2007 for DHS to contract with 
appropriate companies to improve security at those 501(c)3 
nonprofit organizations that are determined to be most 
vulnerable to potential terrorist attacks. In addition, the 
bill would establish a new loan guarantee program for all 
nonprofit organizations that might need additional security 
enhancements to protect them from terrorist attacks. CBO 
estimates that this program would cost about $40 million over 
the 2005-2009 period. H.R. 10 also would authorize the 
appropriation of $50 million for 2005 and such sums as are 
necessary for 2006 and 2007 for grants to local law enforcement 
agencies to offset costs associated with increased security in 
areas with a high concentration of nonprofit organizations. 
Finally, the bill would authorize the appropriation of $5 
million in 2005 and such sums as necessary in 2006 and 2007 for 
a new Office of Community Relations and Civic Affairs to 
administer the new security program for nonprofit organizations 
among other duties. Assuming appropriation of the necessary 
amounts, CBO estimates that implementing those provisions would 
cost $504 million over the 2005-2009 period.
    Counternarcotics Office. Section 5021 would authorize the 
appropriation of $6 million in fiscal year 2005 to strengthen 
the authority of the Counternarcotics Officer at DHS. Under the 
bill, the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement would be 
responsible for coordinating policies and federal operations 
aimed at preventing the entry of illegal drugs into the United 
States. DHS currently has a Counternarcotics Officer within the 
Chief of Staff's office. According to that office, the 
Counternarcotics Office is working with limited authority to 
coordinate the agency's anti-drug effort. Assuming the 
appropriation of the necessary amounts to continue this effort 
over the next five years, CBO estimates that implementing this 
provision would cost $28 million over the 2005-2009 period.
    FBI Reserve Service. Section 5053 would allow the FBI to 
establish a reserve service consisting of former employees of 
the FBI who would be eligible for temporary reemployment during 
a period of national emergency. Under the bill, the total 
number of personnel in this reserve service could not exceed 
500 individuals. Members of the reserve service would receive 
reimbursement for transportation and per diem expenses when 
participating in any training, and members who are retired 
federal employees would be allowed to collect both pay and 
retirement benefits during their period of reemployment. CBO 
cannot predict when a national emergency might occur, so no 
costs are included in this estimate for activating the proposed 
FBI Reserve Service. In most years, CBO expects that the cost 
associated with the reserve service would be insignificant--
mostly covering limitedtraining time, per diem, and 
transportation expenses. In an emergency, if all members of the reserve 
corps were reemployed for six months, the costs would total about $25 
million.
    Security Clearance Modernization. Beginning five years 
after enactment of this bill, section 5076 would require the 
Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to achieve a 60-day 
turnaround period for all security clearances requested by 
federal agencies. Currently, OPM anticipates that by the fall 
of 2005 the typical turnaround period for security clearances 
will be approximately 120 days. Based on information from OPM, 
CBO expects that approximately 1,700 new investigators would 
have to be hired over the next three years to meet the 60-day 
standard. With an average annual cost of about $80,000 per 
investigator, and assuming the appropriation of the necessary 
amounts, CBO estimates that this provision would cost $483 
million over the 2005-2009 period.
    Interoperability of Public Safety Communications. Section 
5131 would establish a program within DHS to provide assistance 
and training to enhance the interoperability of public safety 
communication among federal, state, and local governments in 
high-risk jurisdictions. DHS currently conducts activities to 
enhance communications; however, according to that office, it 
is working with limited funds and legal authority. Based on 
information from DHS, CBO estimates that implementing this 
section would cost $29 million over the 2005-2009 period.

Direct Spending

    The bill contains provisions that would decrease direct 
spending (see Table 4). CBO estimates that enacting those 
provisions would decrease direct spending by about $25 million 
in 2005, $4 million over the 2005-2009 period, and $2 million 
over the 2005-2014 period. The estimate of direct spending does 
not include spending associated with extending the authority of 
the CIA to offer incentive payments to employees who 
voluntarily retire or resign because the data needed to prepare 
such an estimate are classified.

  TABLE 4. CHANGES IN DIRECT SPENDING UNDER H.R. 10 AS ORDERED REPORTED BY THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
                                                       \1\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                     By fiscal year, in millions of dollars--
                                 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   2005    2006    2007    2008    2009    2010    2011    2012    2013    2014
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Estimated Budget Authority......       *       *       *       *       *       *       *       *       *       *
Estimated Outlays...............     -25     -12      19      10       5       3       *       *       *      *
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ These amounts do not include the costs of section 1061 because the data needed to prepare an estimate are
  classified.
Note: * = Between zero and -$500,000.

    Authority to Offer Incentive Payments to Employees of the 
CIA Who Voluntarily Resign or Retire. Section 1061 would extend 
indefinitely the authority of the CIA to offer incentive 
payments to employees who voluntarily retire or resign. Under 
current law, this authority would expire on September 30, 2005. 
This section also would eliminate the requirement that the CIA 
make a deposit to the Civil Service Retirement and Disability 
Fund equal to 15 percent of final pay for each employee who 
accepts an incentive payment. Extending authority to offer 
incentive payments to these employees could increase outlays 
from the Civil Service Retirement System in the near term, 
although those amounts would be offset by reduced retirement 
payments in later years. CBO cannot provide an estimate of the 
direct spending effects because the data needed for such an 
estimate are classified.
    Aviation Security. Section 2177 would establish a fund 
within DHS to enhance efforts to detect explosives at security 
checkpoints in airports. The bill would authorize the 
collection and spending of $30 million a year of fees from 
airline passengers in 2005 and 2006.
    The cost of the new program would be offset by fee 
collections authorized under the bill. TSA already collects a 
$2.50 fee from airline passengers each time they board an 
aircraft (with a maximum of $5.00 per one-way trip). Under 
current law, such fees may be collected only to the extent 
provided for in advance in appropriations acts, and income from 
those fees is recorded as an offset to appropriated spending. 
H.R. 10 would require TSA to collect up to $30 million a year 
from passengers without appropriation action. Under H.R. 10, we 
estimate that the agency would collect that amount each year. 
Because H.R. 10 would cause such fees to be used to finance the 
activities related to explosives detection at airport 
checkpoints, such fees would not be available to reduce the 
costs of other TSA spending. In other words, the collections 
under H.R. 10 would lead to a reduction in the amount of fees 
recorded as offsets to appropriated spending--essentially 
changing some discretionary offsetting collections into 
mandatory offsetting receipts.
    Based on historical spending patterns for similar 
activities, CBO estimates that fees collected under this 
provision would exceed the amounts actually spent for 
explosives detection for the next few years. Hence, we estimate 
that enacting section 2177 would reduce net direct spending by 
$37 million in 2005 and 2006, but would increase net direct 
spending in later years and have no net impact on the budget 
over the 2005-2014 period.
    Increased Fines for New Federal Crimes. Several sections in 
title II would establish new federal crimes for offenses 
relating to the commission of terrorist acts. Because those 
prosecuted and convicted under the bill could be subject to 
fines, the federal government might collect additional fines if 
the legislation is enacted. Criminal fines are deposited as 
receipts in the Crime Victims Fund and later spent. CBO expects 
any additional revenues and direct spending under the bill 
would be negligible because of the small number of cases 
involved.
    Authority to Waive Separation Age Requirement for FBI 
Agents. Section 5051 would provide the FBI with the ability to 
allow agents to remain at the agency beyond the age of 60. 
Under current law, FBI agents are required to retire at age 57, 
although the agency's director may waive that requirement until 
the agent turns 60. This section would allow the director to 
waive the mandatory retirement requirement until age 65. This 
authority would last though the end of 2009, at which time the 
waiver authority would revert to current law. Information 
provided by the FBI indicates that the agency issues waivers to 
between 25 and 75 employees annually. By expanding the current 
waiver authority, CBO expects the bill would cause some FBI 
employees to retire later than they otherwise would have. We 
anticipate this would cause retirement annuities to fall in the 
near term, and to increase after the expanded waiver authority 
expires in 2009. CBO estimates this section would reduce direct 
spending for retirement benefits by less than $500,000 in 2005 
and by a total of $2 million over the 2005-2014 period.
    Estimated impact on state, local, and tribal governments: 
H.R. 10 contains several intergovernmental mandates as defined 
in UMRA. The major mandates would require state, local, and 
tribal governments to significantly change the way they process 
and issue driver's licenses, identification cards, and birth 
and death certificates. The costs to state, local, and tribal 
governments would depend on federal regulations that are yet to 
be developed. However, based on information from state 
agencies, CBO estimates that, in aggregate, the 
intergovernmental mandates in the bill would impose costs on 
state, local, and tribal governments totaling more than $600 
million over fiscal years 2005 through 2009. CBO estimates that 
the costs in at least one of those years would exceed the 
threshold established in UMRA ($60 million in 2004, adjusted 
annually for inflation). The bill would authorize 
appropriations for grants to states to cover such costs.

Intergovernmental Mandates with Significant Costs

    Driver's Licenses. H.R. 10 would effectively require state 
agencies that issue driver's licenses to comply with new 
standards for producing, verifying, and ensuring the security 
of driver's licenses and identification cards. Those provisions 
would be effective three years after the bill's enactment. CBO 
considers these standards to be mandates because any driver's 
licenses issued after that time would be invalid for federal 
identification purposes unless they met those requirements.
    Based on information from AAMVA and other groups 
representing state and local governments, CBO expects that 
states would face significant additional costs to administer 
the new system. Specifically, state licensing agencies would be 
required to verify, with the issuing agency, each document 
presented as proof of identification and residency. Agencies 
such as the Social Security Administration currently charge a 
fee for each verification, and assuming that other agencies 
would charge similar fees, states would incur ongoing costs as 
well as one-time costs to upgrade computer systems to meet 
those requirements. States also would face significant costs to 
upgrade computer systems to digitize and store electronic 
copies of all source documents and to create and maintain the 
Driver's License Agreement, an interstate database to share 
driver information. Finally, certain states that do not 
currently require background checks for certain employees would 
face additional costs to complete those checks.
    CBO assumes that states would begin to establish procedures 
for complying with those standards in 2005, the year following 
the bill's enactment; we estimate that they would incur 
additional costs totaling $80 million during that first year 
and another $80 million over fiscal years 2006 through 2009.
    Issuance and Verification of Vital Statistics Information. 
H.R. 10 would impose several intergovernmental mandates with 
significant costs on state, local, and tribal agencies that 
issue birth and death certificates. Those agencies would 
effectively be required to print birth certificates on safety 
paper to establish a central database of vital information and 
to ensure that certain employees have security clearances. 
Those provisions also would be effective three years after the 
bill's enactment. Certificates issued after that would be 
invalid for certain purposes unless they met those 
requirements. We estimate that state, local, and tribal 
governments would face additional costs to comply with those 
requirements totaling more than $70 million in 2005 and almost 
$400 million over fiscal years 2006 through 2009. Most of those 
costs would be for upgrading computer software and hardware and 
for staff time to convert existing paper records into 
electronic records. Those are mostly one-time costs that would 
be incurred over the five-year period.
    Security Assistance to Certain Nonprofit Organizations. 
This bill also would require state agencies responsible for 
homeland security to coordinate a program to provide security 
assistance to certain nonprofit organizations. The bill would 
authorize to be appropriated $100 million in fiscal years 2005 
through 2007 to fund those grants, but no funds would be 
authorized to cover the costs states would incur for 
administering the program. According to representatives from 
state government, the administrative costs for similar 
assistance programs tend to equal about 3 percent to 5 percent 
of the monetary value of the assistance provided. Based on that 
information, CBO estimates that the cost for state governments 
to coordinate this program would total no more than $5 million 
annually.

Mandates with No Significant Costs

    The bill also contains several other intergovern-mental 
mandates, but CBO expects that they would probably not impose 
significant additional costs on state, local, or tribal 
governments. Specifically, the bill would:
           Require state identification bureaus to 
        coordinate background checks on current and potential 
        security officers for private companies and the FBI. 
        States that find the workload or the associated costs 
        too burdensome could, through legislation, opt out of 
        the program.
           Require certain nuclear facilities to take 
        steps to protect against specific threats. The Nuclear 
        Regulatory Commission would be required to promulgate 
        regulations and until they are finalized, CBO cannot 
        estimate the total costs of complying with those new 
        requirements. Because few of the affected facilities 
        are publicly owned, however, the total costs for those 
        facilities would likely be small.
           Require state licensing agencies to include 
        minimum features on all driver's license and 
        identification cards, including full legal name, date 
        of birth, gender, driver's license or identification 
        number, photo, legal address, physical security 
        features, and machine-readable technology. According to 
        AAMVA, all states currently include those minimum 
        features on licenses.
           Require state agencies to meet minimum 
        standards before issuing driver's licenses, including 
        documenting the individual's name, date of birth, 
        address, and proof of Social Security number. While 
        states currently set their own standards for such 
        information, all states currently require at least this 
        minimum documentation.
           Require states to maintain a database of 
        driver information; require states to implement 
        training classes for employees to identify fraudulent 
        documents; and require documents and supplies to be 
        securely stored. According to state officials, all 
        states currently comply with those requirements.
           Require offices that maintain vital 
        information to comply with requirements for securing 
        their buildings. Based on information from 
        representatives of state offices of vital statistics, 
        CBO believes that most offices already would be in 
        compliance, assuming that the Secretary of the 
        Department of Homeland Security would establish minimum 
        security requirements in any event.
           Require that state and local governments 
        limit access to birth and death certificates. Fourteen 
        states currently allow public access to those records, 
        but CBO estimates that they would incur no additional 
        costs to limit access.
           Prohibit states from accepting any foreign 
        document, other than an official passport, for 
        identification purposes for the issuance of driver's 
        licenses. Currently, at least 10 states accept 
        identification cards issued by foreign governments, 
        such as the ``matricula consular'' issued by Mexico. 
        This prohibition would preempt state authority.
           Require states to resolve any discrepancies 
        that arise from verifying Social Security numbers, 
        though the language is unclear as to what specific 
        actions would be required. Currently, at least two 
        states prohibit their employees from enforcing 
        immigration laws, and many of those discrepancies may 
        be related to immigration. This requirement might 
        preempt those state laws.
           Prohibit states from displaying Social 
        Security numbers on driver's licenses or from including 
        Social Security numbers (SSNs) in bar codes, magnetic 
        strips, or similar devices. CBO has found few instances 
        where states used SSNs as identifiers on licenses or 
        coded SSNs in some other manner on the license.
           Require all law enforcement officers who are 
        armed, including state and local personnel, to have a 
        standardized credential when traveling on aircraft. CBO 
        assumes TSA would establish and issue such credentials.
    Estimated Impact on the Private Sector: H.R. 10 would 
impose private-sector mandates as defined in UMRA on shippers 
of hazardous materials and licensees of nuclear facilities. 
Because the impact of two of the mandates would depend on 
future actions of the Department of Homeland Security and the 
NRC for which information currently is not available, CBO 
cannot determine whether the costs to the private sector would 
exceed the annual threshold for private-sector mandates ($120 
million in 2004, adjusted annually for inflation).
    The bill would require the Secretary of Homeland Security 
to issue regulations to increase the security of the shipment 
of extremely hazardous materials as defined in the bill. The 
bill would also require the NRC to issue regulations to ensure 
that its licensees address security threats to be identified by 
the NRC. At this time, there is no basis for predicting the 
scope of those future regulations. Therefore, CBO cannot 
estimate the cost of those mandates.
    In addition, the bill would prohibit shippers of extremely 
hazardous materials from discharging or discriminating against 
any employee who provides information or assists in an 
investigation regarding a violation of any law related to the 
security of shipments of extremely hazardous materials. Such a 
prohibition would constitute a private-sector mandate under 
UMRA. Under current law, employees are protected if they report 
any safety issues. Because compliance with these broader 
whistle-blower protections would involve only a small 
adjustment in administrative procedures, CBO estimates that 
those shippers would incur only minimal additional costs.
    Previous CBO estimates: On October 4, 2004, CBO transmitted 
cost estimates for H.R. 10 as ordered reported by the House 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on September 29, 
2004, and as ordered reported by the House Committee on Armed 
Services on September 29, 2004. On October 5, 2005, CBO also 
transmitted cost estimates for H.R. 10 as reported by the House 
Committee on Financial Services on October 5, 2004, and as 
ordered reported by the House Committee on Government Reform on 
September 29, 2004. The legislation approved by the House 
Committee on the Judiciary authorizes funding for the security 
of nuclear facilities, and nonprofit organizations, and for the 
COPS program. Differences in the estimated costs reflect 
differences among the three bills.
    On September 24, 2004, CBO transmitted a cost estimate for 
S. 2840, the National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, as 
reported by the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs. Both 
bills would create a new Office of the National Intelligence 
Director and reform certain aspects of the intelligence 
community. H.R. 10 also would reform terrorism prevention and 
prosecution, border security, and international cooperation and 
coordination activities--areas not addressed by S. 2840. 
Differences in the estimated costs reflect differences between 
the two bills.
    Estimate prepared by: Federal Costs: Intelligence Programs: 
Raymond J. Hall; Homeland Security: Megan Carroll and Julie 
Middleton; Justice: Mark Grabowicz; Vital Records: J. Timothy 
Gronniger; International Programs: Joseph C. Whitehill; and 
General Government: Matthew Pickford. Impact on State, Local, 
and Tribal Governments: Melissa Merrell. Impact on the Private 
Sector: Chad Goldberg and Jean Talarico.
    Estimate approved by: Robert A. Sunshine, Assistant 
Director for Budget Analysis.

                    Performance Goals and Objectives

    The Committee states that pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of 
rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, H.R. 10 
reduces the risk of terrorist attack against the United States 
by implementing many of the bipartisan recommendations of the 
National Commission to Investigate Terrorist Attacks Upon the 
United States.

                   Constitutional Authority Statement

    Pursuant to clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 
House of Representatives, the Committee finds the authority for 
this legislation in article I, Sec. 8 of the Constitution.

               Section-by-Section Analysis and Discussion

    The following discussion describes the portions of the bill 
as reported by the Committee on the Judiciary that fall within 
its jurisdiction.\100\ The Committee understands that a section 
by section analysis of the entire bill will be included in the 
report of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \100\ This section contains a summary of the principal provisions 
of H.R. 10 within the jurisdiction of the Committee; it does not 
comprise an exhaustive list of provisions of H.R. 10 within the 
jurisdiction of the Committee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

             TITLE I--REFORM OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY


Section 1001. Short title

    This section names this title the ``National Intelligence 
Improvement Act of 2004.''

Section 1011. Reorganization and improvement of management of the 
        intelligence community

    This section Act replaces Sec. Sec. 102-04 of Title I of 
the National Security Act with the following new Sec. Sec. 102, 
102A, 103, 103A, 104 and 104A. New Sec. 102 replaces the DCI 
with a National Intelligence Director (``NID''). The NID will 
be Presidentially appointed and Senate confirmed and serve as 
the head of the intelligence community. It prohibits the NID 
from simultaneously serving as the Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency or as the head of any other element of the 
intelligence community.
    New Sec. 102A sets out the responsibilities and authorities 
of the NID. This section provides that the NID shall have 
access to all national intelligence and intelligence related to 
the national security, except as otherwise provided by law or 
guidelines agreed upon by the Attorney General and the NID. The 
NID will develop and present the annual budget for the National 
Intelligence Program (NIP). The NID must report to the 
Committees on Judiciary, Intelligence, and Armed Services a 
report of any transfer of personnel relative to the Committees' 
jurisdiction.
    New Sec. 103 establishes the Office of the NID to assist 
the Director in the performance of his or her duties. This 
section establishes specific responsibilities for a number of 
Deputies and Associates to assist the NID.
    New Sec. 104 establishes that the DCI shall assist the NID. 
His responsibilities include to: (1) collect intelligence 
through human sources and by other appropriate means, except 
that the DCI shall have no police, subpoena, or law enforcement 
powers or internal security functions; and (2) provide overall 
direction for the collection of national intelligence overseas 
or outside of the United States through human sources by 
elements of the intelligence community authorized to undertake 
such collection and, in coordination with other agencies of the 
Government which are authorized to undertake such collection, 
ensure that the most effective use is made of resources and 
that the risks to the United States and those involved in such 
collection are minimized. The manager's amendment reported by 
the Committee inserted the qualifying phrase ``overseas or 
outside the United States'' to clarify that the CIA's 
collection authority is not domestic. The Committee also 
supported the continued limitation that the CIA shall not have 
police, subpoena or other law enforcement powers.

Section 1012. Revised definition of national intelligence

    This section defines national intelligence and intelligence 
related to national security to refer to all intelligence, 
regardless of source and including information collected both 
domestically and overseas that involves threats to the U.S., 
its people, property or interest; the development or use of 
weapons of mass destruction; or any other matter bearing on the 
U.S. national or homeland security.

Section 1014. Role of the National Intelligence Director in appointment 
        of certain officials responsible for intelligence-related 
        activities

    This section amends Sec. 106 of the National Security Act 
to authorize the NID to recommend to the President individuals 
for appointment as the Deputy NID and the Director of the CIA. 
The section also allows the NID to concur with the Secretary of 
Defense in the selection of the head of the National Security 
Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, and the National 
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. The NID shall consult, under 
this section on the selection for the positions of the Defense 
Intelligence Agency, Assistant Secretary of State for 
Intelligence and Research, Director of the Office of 
Intelligence of the Department of Energy, Director of the 
Office of Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy, 
Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis of the 
Department of Treasury, Executive Assistant Director for the 
Intelligence of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) or 
successor, Undersecretary of Homeland Security for Information 
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection, and the Deputy 
Assistant Commandant of the Coast Guard for Intelligence.

Section 1021. National Counterterrorism Center

    Section 1021 establishes the National Counterterrorism 
Center, which will be the primary organization for analyzing 
and integrating all intelligence possessed or acquired by the 
U.S.--except for intelligence pertaining exclusively to 
domestic counterterrorism. The NCTC will also support DOJ, DHS, 
and other agencies in fulfillment of their responsibilities 
todisseminate terrorism information consistent with the law and 
guidelines agreed to by the AG and the NID. The Committee added the 
reference AG guidelines in the manager's amendment.

Section 1022. Civil Liberties Protection Officer

    Section 1022 requires the NID to appoint a Civil Liberties 
Protection Officer (``CLPO'') who would be responsible for 
ensuring that civil liberties and privacy protections are 
appropriately incorporated in the policies and procedures 
developed and implemented by the Office of the NID. In 
addition, the CLPO must: (1) Oversee compliance by the ONID and 
the NID with the Constitution and all laws, regulations, 
executive orders and implementing guidelines relating to civil 
liberties and privacy; (2) review and assess complaints and 
other information indicating possible civil liberties or 
privacy abuses; (3) ensure that the utilization of technologies 
sustain privacy protections regarding the use, collection, and 
disclosure of personal information; (4) ensure that personal 
information contained in a system of records (as defined in the 
Privacy Act) is handled in full compliance with the Act's fair 
information practices; (5) conduct privacy impact assessments 
when appropriate or required by law; and (6) perform such other 
duties as prescribed by the NID or required by law. Section 
1022 authorizes the CLPO to refer complaints of civil liberties 
or privacy abuse to the appropriate Office of Inspector General 
responsible for the intelligence community department or agency 
to investigate.

Section 1031. Joint Intelligence Community Council

    This section establishes the Joint Intelligence Community 
Council which will provide advice to the NID from the various 
heads of the Departments that contain elements of the 
Intelligence Community, including the Attorney General.

             TITLE II--TERRORISM PREVENTION AND PROSECUTION


Section 2001. Individual Terrorists as Agents of Foreign Powers

    This section now embodies the Berman amendment adopted at 
Committee which adds a new section to the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act of 1978. It allows the court to assume that a 
non-U.S. person who is engaged in terrorism is an agent of a 
foreign power under the Act.

Sections 2021-2024, Stop Terrorist and Military Hoaxes Act of 2004.

    These sections incorporate the Stop Terrorist and Military 
Hoaxes Act of 2004. These sections create criminal and civil 
penalties for whoever engages in any conduct, with intent to 
convey false or misleading information, that concerns an 
activity which would constitute such crimes as those relating 
to explosives; firearms; destruction of vessels; terrorism; 
sabotage of nuclear facilities; aircraft piracy; a dangerous 
weapon to assault flight crew members and attendants; 
explosives on an aircraft; homicide or attempted homicide or 
damaging or destroying facilities. They also prohibit making a 
false statement with intent to convey false or misleading 
information about the death, injury, capture, or disappearance 
of a member of the U.S. armed forces during a war or armed 
conflict in which the United States is engaged. Additionally, 
the bill increases penalties from not more than 5 years to not 
more than 10 years for making false statements, and obstructing 
justice, if the subject matter relates to international or 
domestic terrorism.

Sections 2041-2044. Material Support to Terrorism Prohibition 
        Enhancement Act of 2004

    Section 2042 adds a new crime of material support for 
terrorism for knowingly receiving military training from a 
foreign terrorist organization. The section requires that any 
person charged under this section must have knowledge that the 
organization is a terrorist organization. It also defines the 
term military-type training. The section provides for 
extraterritorial Federal jurisdiction over an offense under 
this section.
    Section 2043 expands the crime of material support to 
terrorists to include any act of international or domestic 
terrorism and require that any person charged under this 
section must have knowledge that the organization is a 
terrorist organization. It also more clearly defines the term 
material support.

Section 2044 Financing of terrorism

    This section amends 18 USC Sec. 2339C so that those who 
raise funds for terrorism can be prosecuted prior to the funds 
being transmitted to terrorist organizations.

Sections 2051-2053. Weapons of Mass Destruction Prohibition Improvement 
        Act of 2004

    These sections would amend 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2332a(a)(2) which 
makes it a crime for a person to use a weapon of mass 
destruction (other than a chemical weapon) against any person 
within the U.S. and the result of such use affects interstate 
and foreign commerce. They would expand the coverage of the 
target to include property. They would also expand when Federal 
jurisdiction is affected by covering the use of mail or any 
facility of interstate or foreign commerce for the attack, by 
the property being used for interstate or foreign commerce, and 
when the perpetrator travels or causes another to travel in 
interstate or foreign commerce in furtherance of the offense. 
This section would also expand coverage to include the use of a 
chemical weapon.

Sections 2101-2102. Money laundering and terrorist financing

    These sections authorize funding for the Department of 
Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN). The 
section provides funding for the following: (1) Key 
technological improvements in FinCEN systems providing 
authorized law enforcement agencies with Web-based access to 
FinCEN data; (2) Expedited filing of suspicious activity 
reports with the ability to immediately alert financial 
institutions about suspicious activities; (3) Provision of 
information sharing technologies to improve the Government's 
ability to exploit the information in the FinCEN databases; and 
(4) Provision of training in the use of technologies available 
to detect and prevent financial crimes and terrorism.

Section 2122 Conduct in aid of counterfeiting

    This section equates the possession of anti-counterfeiting 
technology or components,with the intent that it be used in a 
counterfeiting scheme with the actual act of counterfeiting.

Sections 2141-2142. Criminal history background checks

    These sections address the issue of criminal history 
records as they relate to background investigations. Section 
2142 authorizes the Attorney General to establish and maintain 
a system for providing employers with criminal history 
information if the information is requested as part of an 
employee background check that is authorized by the State where 
the employee works or where the employer has their principal 
place of business. These sections also give the Attorney 
General flexibility, based on real-time terror concerns, to 
mandate criminal history record checks for certain types of 
employment that involve positions vital to the nation's 
infrastructure or key resources. This section would allow for a 
standardized approach to the numerous requests from groups that 
want or need access to these records. A piecemeal approach has 
evolved as the various bills that authorize criminal history 
record checks these go to different committees for 
consideration and if passed, end up in different sections of 
the code.
    The purpose of this section is to set up a standard process 
with uniform procedures, definitions, fee structures where 
practical, and reasonable safeguards to protect privacy and 
employee rights. A reporting requirement under this section 
seeks to identify all statutory requirements that already 
require the Department of Justice to perform some type of 
record check, the type of information requested, and any 
variances that exist in terms, definitions, and fees charged. 
The amendment offered by Mrs. Blackburn, which was adopted, 
makes this a pilot study and establishes specific criteria to 
be addressed in the report that is required, including the 
effectiveness of using commercially available data bases as 
part of criminal history information checks. It is the 
intention of the Committee that this study last for 180 days.

Section 2143. Protect Act

    This section amends Public Law No. 108-21, by extending the 
duration of pilot programs for volunteer groups to obtain 
national and State criminal history background checks from 18 
months to 30 months.

Section 2144. Reviews of criminal records of applicants for private 
        security officer employment

    This section was added by the Blackburn amendment. It is 
the text of S.1743, the ``Private Security Officer Employment 
Authorization Act'' which passed the Senate by unanimous 
consent at the end of 2003. This section makes findings as to 
the important role that private security officers play and 
stresses the importance of thoroughly screening and training 
officers. This section establishes a mechanism for authorized 
employers of security guards to request criminal history 
background checks using existing State identification bureaus. 
Criteria for disqualification mirrors that of existing state 
criteria and where a state has no criteria for such employment, 
this section provides general disqualifiers. A State may 
decline to participate in the program established by this 
section.

Section 2145. Task force on clearinghouse for IAFIS criminal history 
        records

    This section, created by the Blackburn amendment, 
establishes a task force to examine the establishment of a 
national clearinghouse to process criminal history record 
requests from employers providing private security guard 
services. It is the Committee's intent that the clearinghouse 
described in section 2145 shall only process criminal history 
record requests pertaining to employees or prospective 
employees of the private security guard service making the 
request pursuant to that section.

Section 2181. Federal law enforcement in-flight counterterrorism 
        training

    This section directs ICE and the Federal Air Marshal 
Service (in coordination with the Transportation Security 
Administration) to make available appropriate in-flight 
counterterrorism procedures and tactics training to Federal law 
enforcement officers who fly while on duty.

Section 2182 Federal Flight Deck Officer Weapon Carriage Pilot Program

    This section creates a Federal Flight Deck Officer 
(``FFDO'') Weapon Carriage Pilot Program that will allow pilots 
participating in the FFDO program to transport their firearms 
on their persons. After one year, the section requires the TSA 
to evaluate the safety record of the pilot program. It also 
directs that only if the safety level obtained under the pilot 
program is comparable to the safety level determined under 
existing methods of pilots carrying firearms on aircraft, 
should the TSA allow all pilots participating in the FFDO 
Program the option of carrying their firearm on their person 
(subject to such TSA requirements determined appropriate).

Section 2183. Registered Traveler Program

    This section directs TSA to expedite implementation of the 
registered traveler program.

Section 2191. Grand jury information sharing

    Section 895 of Public L. No. 107-296, enacted on October 
26, 2001, was subsequently affected by a rule change by the 
Supreme Court. According to the Historical Notes of the Federal 
Criminal Code and Rules on page 51, ``Section 895 of Pub. L. 
No. 107-296, which purported to amend subdivision (e) of this 
rule, failed to take into account the amendment of this rule by 
Order of the Supreme Court of the United States dated April 29, 
2002, effective December 1, 2002, and was therefore incapable 
of execution.'' This section makes the technical changes to 
address this rule change and ensures that the intent of 
Congress to improve information sharing is carried through.

Section 2192. Interoperable Law Enforcement and Intelligence Data 
        System

    Section 2192 enhances interoperability among law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies and provides clear 
direction to the NID to facilitate the implementation of a 
horizontalsystem to enhance information sharing.

Section 2193. The improvement of intelligence capabilities of the 
        Federal Bureau of Investigation

    This section codifies the recommendations of the Commission 
as they relate to FBI intelligence capabilities. These 
recommendations form the basis of reforms that have already 
been implemented or are about to be implemented at the FBI.

            TITLE III--BORDER SECURITY AND TERRORIST TRAVEL


Section 3001. Verification of returning citizens

    The section would require that by October 2006 all U.S. 
citizens returning from the Western Hemisphere other than 
Canada and Mexico must present U.S. passports. In the interim, 
U.S. citizens would have to present a document designated by 
the Secretary of Homeland Security. For U.S. citizens returning 
from Canada and Mexico, the Secretary of Homeland Security 
would have to designate documents that are sufficiently secure.

Section 3002. Documents required by aliens from contiguous countries

    The section would require that by the beginning of 2007, 
aliens claiming to be Canadian who seek to enter the U.S. must 
present a passport or other secure identification.

Section 3003. Strengthening the Border Patrol

    The section would authorize an increase of 2,000 agents in 
the Border Control agents a year for each of the next five 
years.

Section 3004. More immigration investigators

    The section would increase the number of ICE investigators 
enforcing the immigration laws by 800 per year for each of the 
next five years. One half of the new investigators would be 
dedicated to enforcing employer sanctions and removing illegal 
aliens from the workplace. At least three of these new 
investigators each year must be assigned to each state.

Section 3005. Prevention of improper use of foreign identification

    The section would bar all federal employees from accepting 
identification cards presented by aliens other than documents 
issued by the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland 
Security under the authority of the immigration laws, or 
unexpired foreign passports.

Section 3006. Expedited removal for illegal aliens

    The section would require DHS to use expedited removal in 
the case of all aliens who have entered the U.S. illegally and 
have not been present here for five years.

Section 3007. Limit asylum abuse by terrorists

    The section would clarify that the burden of proof is on 
the applicant in an asylum case. The testimony of the applicant 
may be sufficient to sustain such burden without corroboration, 
but only if it is credible, persuasive, and refers to specific 
facts that demonstrate that the applicant is a refugee. Where 
it is reasonable that an applicant would present corroborating 
evidence, such evidence must be provided unless a reasonable 
explanation is given as to why such information is not 
provided. No court shall reverse a determination made by an 
immigration judge or BIA with respect to the availability of 
corroborating evidence unless the court finds that a reasonable 
adjudicator is compelled to conclude that such corroborating 
evidence is unavailable.
    The section would provide a nonexhaustive list of factors 
that an immigration judge can consider in assessing 
credibility, such as the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of 
the applicant or witness, the consistency between the 
applicant's or witness's written and oral statements, whether 
or not under oath, made at any time to any officer, agent, or 
employee of the United States, the internal consistency of each 
such statement, the consistency of such statements with the 
country conditions in the country from which the applicant 
claims asylum, as presented by the Department of State, and any 
inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements.
    Finally, the section would overturn the doctrine of imputed 
political opinions by requiring that an asylum applicant must 
establish that race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group, or political opinion was or will be 
the central motive for persecuting the applicant.

Section 3008. Revocation of visas

    The section would allow the government to deport a 
nonimmigrant alien whose visa has been revoked. It would also 
allow DHS to revoke a nonimmigrant visa petition that has been 
granted for an alien in the U.S.

Section 3009. Streamlined removal process

    The section would modify the judicial review of removal 
orders available to aliens as follows: for criminal aliens and 
aliens who are not permanent residents, review would be only in 
the circuit court and the scope of review would be limited to 
(1) whether the individual is an alien, (2) whether he is 
deportable under the Immigration Naturalization Act (``INA''), 
(3) whether he was ordered to be removed under the INA, and (4) 
whether he meets the criteria for withholding of removal or 
Torture Convention protection. For non-criminal lawful 
permanent resident aliens, review would only be in the circuit 
court and would be available for all non-discretionary 
determinations.

Sections 3031-3032. No bar to removal for terrorists and criminal 
        aliens

    These sections would modify the regulations implementing 
the Convention Against Torture by providing that aliens who 
have engaged in Nazi persecution or genocide, terrorist aliens, 
aliens who have been convicted of particularly serious crimes 
and are thus a danger to the community of the U.S., aliens who 
committed serious crimes outside the U.S., and aliens there are 
reasonable grounds to believe are a danger to the security of 
the U.S., would not be eligible for relief from removal.

Section 3033. Removal of aliens

    This section would move the authority for designating a 
country of removal to theSecretary of DHS, and give the 
Secretary more power to remove an alien to a specific country. It would 
also allow the Secretary to remove an alien to a country of which the 
alien is a citizen or national unless the country prevents the alien 
from entering.

Section 3041. Bringing in and harboring certain aliens

    This section would increase criminal penalties for alien 
smuggling and have the Secretary of DHS develop and implement 
an outreach program to educate the public in the U.S. and 
abroad about the penalties for illegally bringing in and 
harboring aliens.

Section 3052. Minimum document requirements and issuance standards for 
        Federal recognition

    This section requires that, for a state driver's license or 
identification card to be acceptable for federal purposes, 
States must certify to the Secretary of DHS, within 3 years, 
that they have met specified standards for data elements, 
source documents, and security. This section prohibits States 
from providing a driver's license to an applicant holding a 
driver's license issued by another State without confirmation 
from the other State that the individual is terminating or has 
terminated the driver's license

Section 3054. Trafficking in authentication features for use in false 
        identification documents

    This section amends Title 18 to make it a federal crime to 
traffic in or use security features designed to prevent 
tampering, counterfeiting, or duplication of identity 
documents.

Section 3081. Studies on worldwide machine-readable passports and 
        worldwide travel history database

    The section would require the Department of State's Office 
of Visa and Passport Control and the GAO to each conduct a 
study on the feasibility, cost and benefits (in terms of 
tracking terrorist travel and apprehending potential 
terrorists) of: (1) requiring all passports to be machine-
readable, tamper-resistant and with biometric identifiers; and 
(2) the creation of a database containing a record of all entry 
and exit information so that border and consular officials may 
ascertain the travel history of the visitor or a prospective 
entrant. This requirement would allow consular officers and 
immigration inspectors to ascertain the travel history of any 
U.S. citizen or foreign visitor seeking to enter the United 
States, even if that entrant has a new passport.

Section 3082. Expanded pre-inspection at foreign airports

    Currently, DHS inspects passengers who are traveling to the 
U.S. at 14 foreign airports instead of inspecting them at ports 
of entry in the U.S. The section would expand this program to 
include up to an additional 25 airports. In addition, the 
current selection criteria for pre-inspection locations are 
based on reducing the number of aliens who arrive to the United 
States who are inadmissible. The section would provide that the 
selection criteria should also include the objective of 
preventing the entry of potential terrorists. The additional 
locations should be operational by January 1, 2008.

Section 3083. Immigration security initiative

    The Immigration Security Initiative is a DHS-operated 
program that assists airline personnel at foreign airports in 
identifying fraudulent travel documents. Currently, the program 
is in place in only two foreign airports. The section expands 
the program to at least 50 foreign airports by December 31, 
2006.

Section 3084. Responsibilities and functions of consular officers

    This section would increase the number of consular officers 
by 150 per year for fiscal years 2006 to 2009, place 
limitations on the use of foreign nationals to screen 
nonimmigrant visa applicants by stating that all applications 
shall be reviewed and adjudicated by a U.S. consular officer, 
require that the training program for consular officers include 
training in detecting fraudulent documents and working directly 
with DHS immigration inspectors at ports of entry, and require 
the Secretary of State to place anti-fraud specialists in the 
one hundred posts that have the greatest frequency of 
presentation of fraudulent documents.

Section 3085. Increase in penalties for fraud and related activity

    This section amends 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1028 to increase 
penalties for the possession and transfer of fraudulent 
government identification documents, including fraudulent U.S., 
state, and foreign government documents.

Section 3086. Criminal penalty for false claim to citizenship

    This section would make it a violation of law to make a 
false claim of citizenship in order to enter or remain in the 
United States.

Section 3088. International agreements to track and curtail terrorist 
        travel through the use of fraudulently obtained documents

    This section requires the President to lead efforts to 
reach international agreements to track and stop international 
travel by terrorists through the use of lost, stolen or 
falsified documents. The international agreements should 
include the establishment of a system to share information on 
lost, stolen and fraudulent passports and the sharing of this 
information by governments with officials at ports of entry. In 
addition, this section calls on the U.S. to continue to support 
efforts at the International Civil Aviation Association to 
strengthen the security features of passports and other travel 
documents.

Section 3090. Biometric entry and exit data system

    This section requires the Secretary of DHS to develop a 
plan to accelerate the full implementation of the requirement 
of an automated entry and exit data system at U.S. ports of 
entry and to implement a plan to expedite the processing of 
registered travelers at ports of entry.

Section 3091. Enhanced responsibilities of the Coordinator for 
        Counterterrorism

    This section states that it shall be the policy of the U.S. 
to make combating terrorist travel and those who assist them a 
top priority for U.S. counter-terrorism policy. It also adds 
additional responsibilities to the Coordinator for Counter-
terrorism at the StateDepartment (S/CT) so that the issues of 
terrorist travel and facilitation are added to the portfolio of 
responsibilities under S/CT.

Section 3092. Establishment of Office of Visa and Passport Security in 
        the Department of State

    This section would establish an Office of Visa and Passport 
Security within the Department of State. It would require the 
development of a strategic plan in coordination with DHS to 
target and disrupt individuals and organizations involved in 
document fraud, raising the profile of these types of crimes 
and their links to terrorism.

Section 3104. Technology acquisition and dissemination plan

    This provision requires DHS to ensure the sharing of 
terrorist travel intelligence and other information within the 
many DHS elements and between DHS and other elements of the IC; 
it also requires DHS to establish a program focused on 
terrorist travel analysis, training, and technology deployment 
for front-line border and consular personnel.

                   TITLE V--GOVERNMENT RESTRUCTURING


Sections 5001-5010. Faster and smarter funding for first responders

    This section requires DHS to allocate homeland security 
assistance funds to States or regions based upon the degree to 
which they would lessen the threat to, vulnerability of, and 
consequences for persons and critical infrastructure. Second, 
it reduces the current State minimum and restructures the 
allocation process. Under the current system, none of the funds 
available under the State Homeland Security Grant Program are 
allocated on the basis of risk. Instead, each State first 
receives a base amount equal to 0.75 percent of the total, and 
then an additional amount based solely on population. Under 
these sections, in contrast, DHS must first allocate all funds 
based on risk, and then provide, if necessary, additional funds 
to those States, territories, or certain Indian tribes that 
have not met a significantly reduced minimum threshold of 
funding. Under this scheme, 99% of the money will be allocated 
strictly on the basis of risk.

Section 5021. Government reorganization authority

    The Committee added Section 5021, which is based on H.R. 
4108, the ``High Risk Nonprofit Security Enhancement Act of 
2004.'' This section would authorize the Secretary of Homeland 
Security to provide $100 million in security assistance to 
501(c)(3) organizations that demonstrate they are at a high 
risk of a terrorist attack based upon specific threats of 
international terrorist organizations; prior attacks against 
similarly situated organizations by international terrorists; 
the vulnerability of the specific site; the symbolic value of 
the site as a highly recognized American institution; or the 
role of the institution in responding to terrorist attacks. 
After the funds have been expended for the highest risk 
institutions, federal loan guarantees would be available to 
make loans available on favorable terms. Funds would be 
administered by a new office in the Department dedicated to 
working with high-risk non-profits.

Sections 5041-5045. Appointments process reform

    This section seeks to improve the Presidential appointment 
process and allow a newly elected President to submit 
nominations to the Senate for Presidential appointments to 
National Security-related positions as expeditiously as 
possible. The Presidential appointments process is 
unnecessarily long, burdensome and complex.

Sections 5051-5054. Federal Bureau of Investigation revitalization

    The Commission recommended that the FBI needed to develop a 
specialized workforce with deep expertise in intelligence and 
national security. Section 5051 adds 5 years to the mandatory 
retirement age for certain employees. Section 5052 allows for 
retention and relocation bonuses to be paid to employees with 
unique skills or qualifications that would leave the service 
but for such bonus. Section 5053 creates a ``reserve service'' 
that would call upon retired employees with specializations 
that would create a ``surge capacity'' during times of 
emergency. Section 5054 would give the FBI flexibility with pay 
issues in staffing critical positions the new Intelligence 
Directorate.

Section 5091. Requirement that agency rulemaking take into 
        consideration impacts on individual privacy

    Section 5091 requires a federal agency to prepare a privacy 
impact analysis for proposed and final rules and to include 
this analysis in the notice for public comment issued in 
conjunction with the publication of such rules.

Section 5092. Chief privacy officers for agencies with law enforcement 
        or anti-terrorism functions

    Section 5092 directs the head of each Federal agency with 
law enforcement or anti-terrorism functions to appoint a chief 
privacy officer with primary responsibility within that agency 
for privacy policy. The provision requires the chief privacy 
officer to ensure that personally identifiable information is 
protected and to file annual reports with Congress on the 
agency's activities that affect privacy, including complaints 
of privacy violations.

Section 5093. Data mining

    This section requires the head of each department or agency 
of the federal government that is engaged in any activity to 
use or develop data mining technology to submit a public report 
to Congress on all such activities of the department or agency 
under the jurisdiction of that official. This amendment 
establishes criteria for the content of the report and requires 
that it be submitted within 90 days after enactment of this 
legislation and requires that it be updated each year.

Section 5094. Privacy and civil liberties oversight board

    Section 5094 establishes an Independent Privacy and Civil 
Liberties Oversight Board in the Executive Branch of the 
Federal Government. The purpose of the Board is to: (1) analyze 
and review actions the Executive Branch takes to protect the 
Nation from terrorism as such actions pertain to privacy or 
civil liberties; and (2) ensure that privacy and civil 
liberties concerns are appropriately considered in the 
development and implementation of laws, regulations, and policies 
related to efforts to protect the Nation against terrorism. 
Specifically, the Board must review the privacy and civil liberties 
implications of legislation, regulations, and related matters and 
advise the Executive Branch regarding the need to ensure that privacy 
and civil liberties are appropriately considered in their development 
and implementation. With respect to providing advice on proposals to 
retain or enhance a particular governmental power, the Board must 
consider whether the executive department or agency has explained how 
the power actually materially enhances security and if there is 
adequate supervision of the Executive Branch's use of the power to 
ensure protection of privacy and civil liberties. The provision 
specifies the Board's oversight responsibilities with respect to 
information sharing activities of Federal agencies.
    The Board is comprised of a chairman and four members, all 
of whom are appointed by the President, by and with the advice 
and consent of the Senate. Not more than three members of the 
Board may be of the same political party. Board members are to 
be selected solely on the basis of their professional 
qualifications, achievements, public stature, and relevant 
experience, without regard to political affiliation, and have 
extensive experience in the areas of privacy and civil rights 
and liberties. A Board member may not, while serving on the 
Board, be an elected official, an officer, or an employee of 
the Federal Government, other than in the capacity as a member 
of the Board. Although initially appointed on a staggered 
basis, Board member is appointed for a six-year term.
    Section 5094 specifies that the Board must periodically 
submit, not less than semiannually, reports to Congress and the 
President that describe its major activities and information on 
the Board's findings, conclusions, and recommendations 
resulting from its advisory and oversight functions. Section 
5094 authorizes Board Members to testify before Congress. With 
respect to the public, section 5094 requires the Board to hold 
public hearings, release public reports, and otherwise inform 
the public of its activities, as appropriate and in a manner 
consistent with the protection of classified information, 
applicable law, and national security. Subject to an exception 
for national security, the provision requires a Federal 
department or agency to supply information upon request of the 
Board. Section 5094 specifies that the Board is an agency and 
not an advisory committee. In addition, the Board is authorized 
to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out 
this section.

Section 5101. Short title

    This section provides that this chapter may be cited as the 
``Mutual Aid and Litigation Management Authorization Act of 
2004.''

Section 5102. Mutual aid authorized

    The mutual aid provisions enable states to enter into 
mutual aid agreements to provide mutual aid in response to 
emergencies and to allow their first responders to carry with 
them into other states the liability regime of their home 
states. The mutual aid provisions also provide that, for 
parties to a mutual aid agreement, the worker's compensation 
and death benefits of first responders who answer calls in 
other party states, and the home state rules that govern them, 
also follow them into other states. The mutual aid provisions 
also provide that, for parties to a mutual aid agreement, 
whenever any person holds a certificate issued by a responding 
party that evidences the meeting of professional standards, 
such person shall be deemed so certified by the requesting 
party to provide assistance under the mutual aid agreement.

Section 5103. Litigation management agreements

    This section includes provisions that allow states to enter 
into ``litigation management agreements'' in which they could 
agree that, in the event first responders from several states 
respond to a terrorist attack in another state, they could 
decide on the liability regime that would apply in that 
circumstance to claims brought against their first responders, 
including putting any such claims in federal court, a ban on 
punitive damages, and a collateral source offset rule (that 
would prevent double recoveries for the same injury).

Section 5104. Additional provisions

    This section provides that nothing in this chapter 
abrogates any immunities from liability that any party may have 
under any other state or federal law. This section exempts law 
enforcement security operations at special events of national 
significance under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3056(e) or other law 
enforcement functions of the U.S. Secret Service. This section 
also provides that the Secret Service shall be maintained as a 
distinct entity within the Department of Homeland Security and 
shall not be merged with any other department function.

         Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported

    Because of the short time the Committee had to prepare this 
report and the length of the bill, the Office of the 
Legislative Counsel was not able to provide the Committee 
materials to comply with clause 3(e) of Rule XIII of the Rules 
of the House of Representatives.

                           Markup Transcript



                            BUSINESS MEETING

                     WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 29, 2004

                  House of Representatives,
                                Committee on the Judiciary,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m., in 
Room 2141, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. F. James 
Sensenbrenner, Jr. [Chairman of the Committee] presiding.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The Committee will be in order. A 
working quorum is present.
    Pursuant to notice I now call up the bill H.R. 10, the ``9/
11 Recommendations Implementation Act'' for purposes of markup 
and move its favorable recommendation to the House.
    Without objection, the bill will be considered as read and 
open for amendment at any point.
    [The text of H.R. 10, the ``9/11 Recommendations 
Implementation Act,'' can be found at: http://
www.congress.gov.:]
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The chair recognizes himself for 5 
minutes to explain the bill.
    The tragic events of September 11, 2001 forever altered our 
sense of invulnerability to terrorist attacks on American soil. 
The protection of the American people from foreign and domestic 
threats is the most important responsibility of Government and 
a central priority of the Judiciary Committee.
    In the last 3 years this Committee and Congress have taken 
action to strengthen the ability of law enforcement and the 
intelligence community to better protect the American people 
against future terrorist attacks, while enhancing the readiness 
and capability of our Nation's first responders. Since the 
attacks the Judiciary Committee has conducted 42 hearings and 
markups to examine and remedy legislative, procedural and 
structural vulnerabilities to terrorism in our Nation's 
immigration system. The Committee has also conducted 46 
hearings and markups to strengthen Federal law enforcement and 
antiterrorism efforts. The Committee has also taken firm steps 
to ensure that efforts to preserve the security of Americans do 
not transgress on other civil liberties Americans cherish.
    In November 2002 President Bush signed legislation creating 
the bipartisan National Commission of Terrorist Attacks Upon 
the United States. The Commission's mandate was as broad as it 
was ambitious, to, quote, ``Examine and report upon the facts 
and causes relating to the terrorist attacks of September 11 
and to suggest corrective measures that can be taken to prevent 
future acts of terrorism.''
    I supported the creation of this independent commission, 
and while its proceedings were not perfect, I am elated that 
the forcefulness and clarity of its recommendations were not 
diminished by the partisan division amongst the 9/11 
Commissioners.
    The purpose of today's markup is to consider H.R. 10, the 
``9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act,'' of which I am an 
original cosponsor. This bill reflects the findings of the 9/11 
Commission and provides the legislative substance necessary to 
give legislative force to the Commission's report. Although the 
bill was introduced last week, several provisions within the 
Committee's jurisdiction will be very familiar to members as it 
incorporates several bills that have been previously been 
considered by this Committee, and in some cases the full House.
    The legislation consists of five titles: Reform of the 
Intelligence Community, Terrorist Prevention and Prosecution, 
Border Security and Terrorist Travel, International Cooperation 
and Coordination, then Government Restructuring. Since an 
exhaustive recitation of all of H.R. 10's provisions within the 
Committee's jurisdiction would be too time consuming, a summary 
of its principle provisions must suffice.
    The creation of a National Intelligence Director and the 
establishment of a National Counterterrorism Center in Title I 
are key reforms that will help ensure that the wall of 
separation dividing the intelligence and law enforcement is 
never again exploited to inflict terrorist attacks upon the 
United States. Section 1112 codifies the FBI efforts to assess 
and prevent terrorist attacks before they occur. Sections 2001, 
2021 through 24, and 2041 through 44, and 2051 through 53, 
contain important provisions that enhance penalties for 
terrorism hoaxes, increase penalties for supporting, financing 
or cooperating with terrorist organizations, and expand the 
scope of laws that prohibit the shipment or use of weapons of 
mass destruction. Sections 2101 and 2102 provide additional 
funding to combat terrorism financing, while Sections 2171 
through 2173 enhance the use of biometric technology to reduce 
terrorist threats against air travel.
    Title III of the legislation contains important provisions 
to enhance border security and reduce opportunities for 
terrorists to enter and stay in the United States. Second 3001 
implements a Commission recommendation requiring that Americans 
returning from travel in the western hemisphere to possess 
passports. Section 3002 requires Canadians seeking entry into 
the United States to present a passport or other secure 
identification. Section 3003 authorizes 2,000 new border patrol 
agents for each of the next 5 years. Section 3004 authorizes 
800 additional immigration and customs enforcement 
investigators for each of the next 5 years. 3005 reduces the 
risk of identity and document fraud, while Sections 3006 
through 9 and 3031 through 33 provide for the expedited removal 
of illegal aliens, limit asylum abuse by terrorists, streamline 
the removal of terrorists and other criminal aliens.
    Nearly every one of these provisions reflect Commission 
recommendations in legislation introduced and formerly 
considered by the Committee.
    Finally, I am particularly pleased that this legislation 
contains key provisions that safeguard the privacy and civil 
liberties of all Americans. Specifically, Sections 1021 and 22 
establishes a privacy officer to ensure that civil liberties 
and privacy protections are incorporated in the policies 
implemented by the National Intelligence Director. Modeled on 
legislation originally introduced by Constitutional 
Subcommittee Chairman Chabot, Section 5091 requires Federal 
agencies to prepare a privacy impact analysis for proposed and 
final rules during the rulemaking process. Finally, Section 
5092 directs the head of each Federal agency with law 
enforcement or antiterrorism functions to appoint a chief 
privacy officer to protect against privacy abuses.
    The bill protects the security of the American people by 
better defending the United States against terrorist attacks. 
The legislation reflects careful, thoughtful and principled 
examination of the 9/11 Commission's bipartisan report in its 
staff report, and provides additional tools and resources to 
fight and win the war on terror.
    I now recognize the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Conyers.
    Mr. Conyers. Thank you, Chairman Sensenbrenner and members 
of the Committee. 9/11 was one of the most tragic events in our 
history, but it was also an event that brought us together. 
Members of Congress stood shoulder to shoulder on the steps of 
the Capitol singing ``God Bless America.'' Democrats in 
Congress united behind the President's efforts in the war on 
terror. This Committee of the Judiciary worked together to 
craft a version of the PATRIOT Act that passed unanimously.
    So from the outset, I want to thank the chairman for 
holding the markup because very few Committees in the House are 
doing what we're doing here today. We're following the regular 
order by allowing Committees to work their will on the bill, 
and I think it's a tribute to the chairman's faith in the 
legislative process that we're here today.
    But the process used to assemble the bill is different from 
the chairman's example. The 9/11 Commission reached across the 
partisan divide and came up with unanimous recommendations. 10 
members, 5 Democrats, 5 Republicans, held countless hearings 
and issued a well-written report with pretty reasonable 
recommendations. The Senate almost evenly split by Republicans 
and Democrats, have taken up a bill, bipartisan, authored by 
Senators McCain, Lieberman and Collins.
    Hoping the House would follow the example set by the 
Commission and by the Senate, the Democratic House leader asked 
the Speaker to work on a bill together, but instead we have 
before us a bill sponsored only by Republican Members of the 
Congress and drafted only with Republican input, and it's 
unfortunate that we've seen this same go-it-alone attitude that 
has been demonstrated time and time again in the House of 
Representatives.
    What we are doing here, whenever the majority has the 
choice of coming together, especially on the issue of national 
security, or bringing the Congress and the country together, 
they always choose to score political points. We saw it on the 
PATRIOT Act. We saw it on the Homeland Security Bill and now we 
see it again on the measure that is presently before us.
    We've heard over and over on the campaign trail this year 
that terrorism is not a law enforcement matter. Yet throughout 
this bill there are provisions that create additional criminal 
offenses for terrorism that are virtually identical to the 
existing Federal criminal code. Rather than providing more 
resources for Homeland Security, including safeguarding nuclear 
materials, this bill simply increases the penalties for threats 
involving weapons of mass destruction.
    I would like to throw more than just the book at al Qaeda, 
but after we have already been attacked by them, will adding 
penalties to existing legislation make us any safer? The 
measure before us increases the maximum penalty for a false 
statement in a terrorism case from 5 to 10 years. Is there a 
member on the Committee that thinks another 5 years in prison 
will act as a deterrent to a member of al Qaeda? This bill is a 
brew of extraneous anti-liberty proposals, long sought by the 
Attorney General John Ashcroft, and also these measures were 
long discredited by the Congress.
    Three examples. Section 3009 would decimate the due process 
rights of immigrants, forbidding the Federal courts from habeas 
corpus review of orders of removal. Section 3032 would place a 
keep-out sign on our borders for victims of torture, forcing 
the victims into the impossible position of proving they would 
be tortured in the future if they went back, and closing the 
courthouse door to any review of decisions that send them back 
to repressive regimes. The final example is that we follow an 
open door to a national identification card system, the 
instrument of most despotic regimes that have been known on the 
planet.
    So, ladies and gentlemen of the Committee, we have a number 
of amendments, and I hope that the spirit that prevailed on 
this Committee when we crafted the PATRIOT Act together will 
guide us on the decisions before us today.
    I thank the chairman.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection, all members' 
opening statements will be included in the record at this 
point.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Lofgren follows:]
 Prepared Statement of the Honorable Zoe Lofgren, a Representative in 
                 Congress From the State of California
    Mr. Chairman, today we are marking up a bill entitled, ``9/11 
Recommendations Implementation Act.'' Yet, upon closer examination of 
many of the provisions we have jurisdiction over, there are several 
provisions that implement absolutely no recommendations by the 
bipartisan, independent 9/11 Commission.
    If today we are supposed to be implementing the 9/11 Commission 
recommendations, why are we considering a bill with provisions to 
change our political asylum laws to make it more difficult for victims 
of human rights abuses to find safe refuge in the United States? Why 
are we expanding expedited removal to make it more difficult for people 
seeking protection from life threatening situations through political 
asylum in the U.S.? Why are we reviewing provisions to strip courts 
from reviewing orders of removal? Why does this bill contain provisions 
on tort reform?
    What do any of these provisions have to do with recommendations 
made by the 9/11 Commission?
    In those areas where this bill does attempt to implement the 9/11 
Commission recommendations, there are obvious weaknesses. More can be 
done to make the entry-exit program work through stronger provisions 
that implement biometric requirements and standards for all immigration 
purposes. More can be done to provide real-time access to all 
immigration files and information on individuals seeking entry into the 
U.S.
    It seems to me that this legislation before us today is another 
rendition of partisan politics and an attempt to disguise policies and 
legislation that normally would not be enacted because there just isn't 
enough support to get them through Congress. Once again, the leadership 
in this House is attempting to enact legislation under guise of the 
noble cloak of protecting the homeland and preventing terror, knowing 
full well that several provisions have nothing to do with it.
    The bipartisan, independent 9/11 Commission should not be used to 
enact the majority party's agenda, especially when the 9/11 Commission 
has not endorsed the bill. It is time for the Republican leadership in 
this House to take the 9/11 Commission seriously. Instead of this bill, 
we should be marking up a bill that truly implements the 9/11 
Commission recommendations, such as the bill introduced by Leader 
Pelosi or the Collins/Lieberman bill. Unlike the bill before us today, 
the Collins/Lieberman bill was worked out in a bipartisan fashion and 
has the support of the 9/11 Commission.
    It is time for the Republican leadership in this House to stop 
playing politics with our nation's security.

    [The prepared statement of Ms. Jackson Lee follows:]
       Prepared Statement of the Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a 
Representative in Congress From the State of Texas, and Ranking Member, 
        Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims
    Chairman Sensenbrenner and Ranking Member Conyers, the legislation 
that we have the privilege of marking up today will have to serve as 
the blueprint for this nation's ability to fight terrorism. Therefore, 
it is our duty to perform a comprehensive and earnest markup that 
leaves partisan politics and pre-election motives behind. Since this 
proposal was crafted without giving Democrats an adequate opportunity 
to provide input, it is clear that, while the September 11 Commission's 
(9/11 Commission) report recommendations are a bi-partisan product, 
H.R. 10 is not. Hence, this bill is the symbol of leadership that is 
guided by partisanship when it should be guided by the needs of the 
American people. This bill is the symbol of misplaced priorities.
    I serve on the House Select Committee on Homeland Security, and it 
troubles me that while that body received a referral for markup, the 
leadership has chosen not to schedule such a hearing. The very 
committee that would presumably hold the most jurisdiction over this 
matter has deferred its opportunity to make this legislation better. 
That does not sit well with my colleagues on this side of the aisle and 
it will not sit well with the families of the victims of 9/11--it will 
not sit well with the American people.
    Furthermore, while the September 11 Commission has set forth its 
bi-partisan suggestion for rebuilding and improvement, we cannot even 
move legislation that authorizes homeland security spending through a 
markup by the main committee of jurisdiction. These issues are 
indicative of a body that has its priorities misplaced.
    Now, we receive a 542-page proposal that makes a weak attempt at 
implementing the comprehensive recommendations made by the 9/11 
Commission. Again, it appears that this body's leadership has its 
priorities misplaced. The ``9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act'' 
fails to do what its name purports in several ways.
    The Commission, families of the victims, and Senate Members on both 
sides of the aisle agree that the bi-partisan Collins-Lieberman 
legislation currently under consideration by that body best reflects 
the Commission's recommendations. However, our Republican colleagues 
refuse to consider that bill and continually ignore the urgency that 
was conveyed by the Commission and the families of the victims.
    As Co-Chair of the Pakistan Caucus, I must commend the drafters for 
their inclusion of Section 4082, the Sense of Congress provision 
relating to the commitment to maintain and build upon our relationship 
with Pakistan to eradicate extremist groups and make positive efforts 
to fight global terrorism.
    Some of the areas of misplaced priorities include the following:
    Assistance to Afghanistan--The bill reaffirms provisions of the 
U.S.--Afghan Freedom Support Act that calls for the development of a 
long-term bi-lateral strategy to address that region's economic and 
security needs. However, H.R. 10 urges the United States to expand its 
assistance instead of making an authorization as does the Collins-
Lieberman proposal and the substitute that we will offer.
    Education in the Arab Nations--H.R. 10 only authorizes additional 
grants for existing U.S.-sponsored schools in the Arab nations and does 
not create new programs for public education in the Middle East. The 
Collins-Lieberman alternative as well as the substitute that we will 
offer, consistent with the 9/11 Commission's recommendations, 
authorizes monies for an International Youth Opportunity Fund that 
would support educational projects in Muslim countries that invest in 
public education.
    Protecting the Human Rights of Captured Terrorists--While this 
legislation, as drafted, provides a very weak ``Sense of Congress'' 
provision that calls for the development of an approach toward 
detention and humane treatment of captured terrorists; the Collins-
Lieberman alternative contains hortatory language that directs the 
government to treat captured terrorist in the same manner that the U.S. 
would demand that its troops be treated if similarly captured. 
Moreover, the alternative bill and our substitute amendment prohibit 
treatment of any prisoner in a manner inconsistent with the U.S. 
Constitution or other laws and treaties of the United States--
respecting international law principles.
    Protecting Individual Privacy in Information Sharing Systems--
Contrary to the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, H.R. 10, in 
creating ``chief privacy officers,'' fails to provide entities within 
the federal government to ensure that agencies working together are 
protecting individual rights or privacy. The Collins-Lieberman bill and 
the substitute amendment that we will offer, however, does include 
strong provisions to this effect.
    Civil Liberties Board--The Republican bill that we have before us 
completely fails to create a Civil Liberties Board or any type of 
Executive-level entity to ensure that civil liberties are protected. I 
will support the amendment offered by my colleagues to correct this 
omission.
    Making the Homeland Security Permanent--While the legislation 
before us simply contains a ``Sense of Congress'' provision that the 
Rules Committee should take up the recommendations of the Select 
Committee on Homeland Security as to how best to consolidate 
jurisdiction over homeland security matters, the Collins-Lieberman 
bill--as well as the substitute amendment that I will join the 
distinguished Ranking Member in offering today take the next step and 
provides that the 108th Congress shall not adjourn until each House of 
Congress has adopted changes in its rules to consolidate jurisdiction 
over homeland security matters in one committee.
    In addition to the gaps enumerated above, the tort reform 
provisions found in Section 5103 of this legislation amount to very bad 
public policy. This section allows states and localities, in the course 
of responding to an ``act of terrorism,'' to enter into litigation 
management agreements that would cover all claims arising out of, 
relating to, or resulting from an act of terrorism.
    The elimination of punitive damages within this scheme will allow 
negligent actors to escape liability for intentional misconduct--under 
the blanket of terrorism. Similarly, the elimination of the 
``collateral source rule'' within this section will allow wrongdoers to 
escape liability for a victim's injuries if there is a subrogee 
(insurance provider or employer who would pay). Under this bill, 
Section 5103 would apply to non-governmental entities such as 
hospitals, doctors, and nurses. This extension is unnecessary and 
overreaching. It is when we face the worst emergencies that we need the 
highest standards of care maintained the most!
    These provisions will not improve the responsiveness of providers 
and government actors. I oppose this provision, and I oppose the base 
bill. Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to stand against this proposal 
and continue to support the Collins-Lieberman legislation.
    I yield back.

    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Before going to amendments, let me 
advise the members, kind of a game plan for the Committee 
consideration of this legislation.
    Mr. Watt. Mr. Chairman, we can't hear you down here.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Okay. The Committee will be in 
order so everybody can hear.
    It is the intention of the leadership to bring this bill up 
on the floor next week, and that means that we will have to 
complete our Committee consideration this week on it. If we do 
not complete Committee consideration, we will simply be 
discharged and the bill will come up on the floor, which is a 
result that I don't think any member of the Committee desires.
    There are also a number of other Committees that are 
meeting on this legislation, and I realize that members who 
have multiple Committee assignments are conflicted on where 
they should be, so as a result, the chair will exercise, 
pursuant to Committee Rule 2(h)1, the authority to postpone 
votes on amendments, and the votes on the amendments will take 
place at 2:30 this afternoon or 30 minutes after the series of 
rollcalls that will occur somewhere in the 1:00 to 1:30 
timeframe, whichever is later. So we will come back this 
afternoon a half an hour after the last rollcall is completed 
or at 2:30, whichever is later. The votes that will be ruled 
from this morning will be taken.
    I also realize that there are a number of members that will 
wish to debate the Marriage Amendment tomorrow which is being 
brought to the floor, so the chair hopes that we will be able 
to accommodate those members, but it is going to require, in my 
opinion, some time in Committee tomorrow to finish up.
    The final nugget of information I'd like to share with the 
Committee is that there is a 50/50 chance that there will be no 
rollcall votes in the House floor on Friday, and thus I believe 
that gives all of us an incentive to finish this legislation 
and to send it to the floor tomorrow. So members should be 
advised accordingly that after we have the votes this 
afternoon, we will play it be ear, and the chair will give us 
much notice as possible on when the next series of roll votes 
will take place.
    Now, are there any amendments? And the chair has a 
manager's amendment which the clerk will report.
    The Clerk. Amendment to H.R. 10 offered by Mr. 
Sensenbrenner. In the table of contents in Section 2 of the 
bill, strike the items relating to Subtitles I and J of Title 
I. Page 45, line 26 insert ``overseas or outside of the United 
States''----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection the amendment is 
considered as read and the chair will recognize himself for 5 
minutes to explain the amendment.
    [The amendment of Mr. Sensenbrenner follows:]
      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The amendment makes various 
technical changes to the legislation and ensures that the 
expertise of members of this Committee and the Department of 
Justice, with regard to providing security for our country and 
balancing the needs of law enforcement with the needs to 
protect civil liberties will not be diminished. Specifically, 
in addition to the technical changes, my amendment makes the 
following changes.
    As the bill is currently written the CIA has overall 
direction for the collection of national intelligence through 
human sources. The CIA should not have the authority for 
domestic human intelligence collection activities conducted by 
the FBI. The amendment clarifies that the CIA should not be 
involved in the domestic arena. Under the bill is introduced 
the CIA can direct and coordinate FBI human intelligence 
activities within the United States. That is inconsistent with 
the longstanding 1947 National Security Act ban on CIA law 
enforcement powers in internal security functions.
    In addition, the amendment would require that the 
Department of Homeland Security consult with the Attorney 
General regarding various new security procedures for airports 
and aviation as contained in the bill, and require that reports 
on the use of these procedures be provided to the Judiciary 
Committee. The amendment also requires the Assistant Secretary 
for Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the Director of the 
Federal Air Marshal Service of the Department of Homeland 
Security, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of 
Homeland Security, to ensure that TSA screeners and Federal air 
marshals receive training in identifying fraudulent 
identification documents. This training would include 
fraudulent or expired visas and passports. Such training may 
also be made available to other Federal law enforcement 
agencies and local law enforcement agencies located in border 
States.
    Finally, the legislation adds sense of Congress language 
that the TSA should continue to examine airline passenger 
records for violent criminals and people with outstanding 
warrants.
    I believe that these amendments are an improvement to the 
legislation and will help the Committee to continue to provide 
expertise in fighting the war on terror, as well as to preserve 
its jurisdiction in these vital areas.
    The question----
    Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott.
    Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman, I have a second degree amendment.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report the second 
degree amendment.
    Mr. Scott. It's AM3001.
    The Clerk. Amendment to the amendment offered by Mr. 
Sensenbrenner, offered by Mr. Scott to H.R. 10. Page 3, strike 
the amendment to Subtitle G of Title II.
    [The second degree amendment of Mr. Scott follows:]
    
    
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, this 
language states that a sense of Congress that the 
Transportation Security Administration, TSA, shall continue to 
examine airline passenger records for violent criminals and 
people with outstanding warrants.
    Mr. Chairman, one of the things we heard from our hearing 
was that the list is already over inclusive. Senator Kennedy 
was denied boarding. Representative Lewis from Georgia has had 
trouble getting on the planes. It just--it is already over 
inclusive, and people with names similar to people who have had 
violent felonies anywhere in the country or outstanding 
warrants anywhere in the country will spend all their time 
explaining to TSA officials who they are, who they are not, and 
TSA officials would be diverted from terrorists who may in fact 
be a danger.
    I would hope that we would focus our resources on 
terrorists and not anybody with a criminal record or those with 
similar----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Will the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Scott. I yield.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The chair, in the interest of 
bipartisanship reluctantly agrees to the second degree 
amendment, and I would point out that the amendment strikes a 
sense of Congress provision that doesn't have the force of law. 
I would say that if anybody comes upon a person that has an 
outstanding warrant, whether it's a TSA screener at the airport 
or elsewhere, law enforcement is supposed to arrest that person 
pursuant to the warrant, and they would never get on the plane 
anyhow. Having Congress say that law enforcement's supposed to 
do their job on this, I think is redundant and we might as well 
get rid of a redundant expression of Congress because the law 
is the law anyhow.
    I thank the gentleman for yielding.
    The question is on the second degree amendment offered by 
the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott. Those in favor will say 
aye. Opposed no.
    The ayes appear to have it. The ayes have it. The second 
degree amendment is agreed to.
    Mr. Watt. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from North Carolina, 
Mr. Watt.
    Mr. Watt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I move to strike the 
last word.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Watt. I'm seeing if I can get another bipartisan 
agreement from the chair, and maybe an explanation--or maybe an 
explanation. On page 3 of the manager's amendment, the chair's 
amendment, there's a reference to page 175, line 21. Insert 
``in concurrence with the Attorney General'' before the word 
``shall.'' All of the other references throughout the 
chairman's amendment say ``in consultation with the Attorney 
General.'' It seems to me that there is a fairly substantial 
difference between in consultation with the Attorney General 
and in concurrence with the Attorney General.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Will the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Watt. Yes.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The reason that that's in the 
manager's amendment is deliberate because the manager's 
amendment deals with allowing pilots to carry guns on planes, 
and it is an amendment to the Federal firearms regulation, 
which have stayed in the Department of Justice rather than 
being placed in the Department of Homeland Security. So if the 
Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security who is in charge of 
the TSA decides to make a change relative to firearms policy, 
it seems to me that the Justice Department ought to be able to 
sign off on it and have the statutory authority to be able to 
change whatever the Department of Homeland Security decided to 
do. That's why the word ``concurrence'' is in there.
    Mr. Watt. So it is the chairman's intent to make--to give 
the Attorney General a veto in effect, not----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. If the gentleman will further 
yield, that is correct, because we're dealing with Federal 
firearms regulations.
    Mr. Watt. All right. I yield back. I appreciate the 
explanation.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The question is on the manager's 
amendment as amended by the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott. 
Those in favor will say aye. Opposed, no.
    The ayes appear to have it. The ayes have it, and the 
manager's amendment, as amended, is agreed to. Are there 
further amendments?
    Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from New York, Mr. 
Nadler.
    Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report the 
amendment.
    The Clerk. Amendment to H.R. 10 authored by Mr. Nadler. 
Page 393, strike line 3 and all that follows through page 395, 
line 17, and make appropriate conforming changes----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection the amendment is 
considered as read and the gentleman from New York is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
    [The amendment of Mr. Nadler follows:]
    
    
    Mr. Nadler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This bill incorporate 
some provisions of H.R. 3266, the Faster and Smarter Funding 
for First Responders Act, which would improve how homeland 
security grants are distributed to States and localities. When 
H.R. 3266 was considered by the Judiciary Committee last June, 
it included a provision guaranteeing a minimum funding level 
for each State of .45 percent of total funds available. I 
wanted to offer an amendment at that time to strike the State 
minimum completely, but agreed to lower the minimum to .25 in 
order to move the bill forward and achieve some improvements in 
how these grants are distributed.
    Despite our good faith efforts, H.R. 3266 remains stuck as 
different Committee chair people continue to try to raise the 
minimum for certain States arbitrarily without regard to the 
actual threat of terrorism. More importantly, since H.R. 3266 
was considered by the Judiciary Committee, the 9/11 Commission 
came out with its final report and recommended, and I quote, 
``that homeland security assistance should be based strictly on 
an assessment of risks and vulnerabilities. Every State and 
city needs to have some minimum infrastructure for emergency 
response, but Federal Homeland Security assistance should not 
remain a program for general revenue sharing. It should 
supplement State and local resources based on the risks or 
vulnerabilities that merit additional support. Congress should 
not use this money as a pork barrel,'' close quote.
    Unfortunately, the bill before us contains a two-tiered 
State minimum system of .25 percent for all States with border 
States, that is, the 18 or 19 States on the international 
border, getting .45 percent. It is time to make the legislation 
before us today consistent with the recommendations of the 
report of the 9/11 Commission. There are very real and known 
terrorist threats against specific targets in the United 
States, and these Homeland Security grant programs were created 
specifically to address those threats. Distributing terrorism 
response funding without regard to risk is not wise, it is not 
cost effective, it is not in the best interest of our homeland 
security.
    These resources should go where they are needed, where 
there is the greatest threat and risk of terrorism. They should 
not go--they should not be distributed based on a funding 
formula that does not take the risk of terrorism into account. 
These grants must be treated differently from other Federal 
formula grants. We cannot just spread the wealth equally across 
the Nation because not all areas of the country face the same 
risk.
    Therefore I am offering this amendment to strike, to 
eliminate the State minimums and to distribute these grants in 
a manner that addresses the highest priority threats and 
vulnerabilities of the Nation. This amendment carried forward 
the recommendation of the 9/11 Commission. It would offer the 
money based on a threat based analysis by the Secretary of 
Homeland Security by eliminating the State minimums. The fact 
is all our States have needs, but they do not have equal 
security needs. The money should go where the threat is 
highest, and we'll leave that judgment to the Secretary of the 
Department of Homeland Security.
    I think in the interest of the national security we should 
pass this amendment and make this bill consistent with the 
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. I urge my colleagues to 
adopt the amendment. I thank the chairman, and I yield back.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The chair recognizes himself for 5 
minutes in opposition to the amendment.
    The gentleman from New York is correct that we debated the 
issue of State minimum allocations during our sequential 
referral on H.R. 3266 which was the First Responder bill that 
was originally considered by the Select Committee on Homeland 
Security. The current State minimum is 0.75 percent, and when 
the Judiciary Committee reported out H.R. 3266, everybody, 
including my friend from New York who is offering this 
amendment, knew that this issue would be subject to further 
negotiation in order to be able to get something passed through 
both Houses and signed into law.
    The two-tier system, which the Nadler amendment proposes to 
strike out, basically undoes the result of this negotiation, 
and makes this bill much more difficult to pass, particularly 
in the other body where each State has the same number of 
Senators.
    I would point out that this issue was debated in the other 
body, and one of the issues before the other body was to reduce 
the current 0.75 percent State minimum, and even the junior 
Senator from New York realized that a State minimum was 
necessary in order to get the political support to get the 
legislation passed.
    I think the compromise that was worked out following this 
Committee's report with the two-tier system, where States that 
do have international borders have a 0.45 percent minimum, is 
an acceptable splitting of the difference, and helps improve 
the current formula. And I would point out that if no 
legislation passes, then what will happen is that the current 
law of 0.75 percent is maintained. This moves in a significant 
direction to improving how the formula is disbursed, and it is 
something that is practical and passable and I would urge the 
retention of that language in the bill and the rejection of the 
gentleman from New York's amendment.
    The gentleman from California, Mr. Berman.
    Mr. Berman. Move to strike the last word.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Berman. The chair makes a fairly compelling political 
case that this language is improvement over existing law, that 
the realities of the political composition of the Senate mean 
that we will never fully correspond the grants to the nature of 
the terrorist threat and come out with a law, and that for the 
sake of pocketing the improvement in the distribution of funds, 
we should take in mind the political realities of the situation 
and not--make the best, the enemy of something that's better 
and attainable.
    I'm wondering how he applies that logic to the inclusion in 
this legislation of a variety of changes that we have never 
discussed in a Committee with respect to specific provisions 
involving substantive law enforcement powers and immigration 
removal provisions that have never been heard or never been 
discussed, never the subject of separate bills, and for which 
the Senate has quite clearly communicated that insistence on 
this kind of substantive change in the context of a desire to 
implement the 9/11 Commission with provisions that the 9/11 
Commission never considered, never recommended, and has since 
that time, as the chair and vice chair have indicated, will be 
more likely to kill any legislation during this congressional 
session.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Will the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Berman. I'm wondering how he reconciles those two 
positions. I would be happy to yield.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The Committee has had 42 hearings 
and markups since 9/11 on immigration proposals and 46 hearings 
and markups on law enforcement proposals since 9/11, and I 
think that the whole gamut of proposals have been heard and 
have been debated by members of the Committee. The fact of the 
matter remains is that if all the 9/11 Commission 
recommendations that are enacted have to do with the 
restructuring on how intelligence is collected and 
disseminated, and we don't deal with law enforcement and 
immigration issues, we basically can peel off the back part of 
the 9/11 Commission recommendations and say that things are 
fine and we can do business as usual.
    Time Magazine just the last couple of weeks talked about 
our porous borders, and unless we figure out a way to plug our 
porous borders, you know, we're not going to be able to have a 
complete dealing with the 9/11 Commission report. I certainly 
can justify including immigration and law enforcement 
provisions in this, which we have debated almost ad nauseam. 
The time has come to do the right thing, and I think that most 
of the provisions of the bill do do the right thing.
    Mr. Berman. I yield to the gentleman from New York.
    Mr. Nadler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    First of all, I would suggest some of the immigration, some 
of the other provisions make sense. Some of them I'm not so 
sure of, and we should consider them, but we should consider 
them in a bill separately from this because this bill should be 
to implement the 9/11 Commission report, and it shouldn't get 
hung up on some of these other things, some of which may make 
sense and some of which may not. We should consider that 
separately.
    But secondly, the chairman's objection to my amendment, 
namely the political reality of getting it through the Senate, 
the Senate is the other body. We will have to go to conference 
with them. We will pass a bill that is not word for word 
identical with the bill they pass, obviously, we'll go to 
conference. If they don't like the fact that we don't have 
State minimums and they insist on it, we can conference that, 
but we will certainly come out with something closer to our 
position, closer to the position of the 9/11 Commission of 
distributing the money based on threat, not based on geography. 
If we start out with a no State minimum position, if we start 
out with a threat-based distribution instead of a geography 
based pork barrel distribution, as the 9/11 Commission 
recommended, we'll be in better position at the conference than 
if we yield before we even start negotiating with them.
    So the chairman may be correct that we have to compromise 
with the Senate eventually, but we should start with a strong 
position by passing my amendment, and not start by yielding the 
heart of it before we even negotiate with the Senate, and 
that's normally the way we operate.
    I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I yield back to 
him.
    Mr. Berman. I thank the gentleman's comments, and I have 
only added--the chairman simply isn't accurate when he 
indicates that we have had bills and hearings on each of the 
very many subjects in the law enforcement and immigration 
spheres of these bills that are presented by this bill that 
we're asked to act on in 2 days without witnesses, without a 
chance to even talk with the Justice Department and ask 
questions to them, without getting a description of the 
implications of these changes. It just isn't so. We haven't had 
a hearing on the question of eliminating the rights of torture 
victims to assert their claims prior to deportation. That has 
not been before this Committee. All of a sudden it appears in 
the context of this legislation.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman's time has expired. 
The question is on the----
    Mr. Watt. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. 
Watt.
    Mr. Watt. I move to strike the last word.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman's recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Watt. I'm going to support Mr. Nadler's amendment. It 
does seem to me as a political matter to bring votes to the 
bill you have to have the votes to pass the bill, but if the 
substance that everybody agrees is contrary to the politics, it 
seems to me that we ought be trying to do the right substantive 
thing, and if this bill were all about passing the bill and the 
politics of it, I agree with my friend from California that 
there are a number of issues in this bill that the politics 
suggest are there in an effort to prevent the bill from being 
passed.
    We had a long hearing in the Commercial and Administrative 
Law Subcommittee, at which virtually uniform opposition arose, 
bipartisan opposition arose to a national database or a 
national ID system which this bill now moves us heavily toward 
with a national database on driver's licenses. I think you're 
going to find that there is substantial opposition to that, so 
if this bill is about trying to find a political balance that 
will bring people to the bill, then I think there are a number 
of things here that are going to drive people away from the 
bill in addition to the absence of a State minimum.
    So I guess what I'm saying is we can either do politics or 
we can do substance, and if we're going to do one, let's do it. 
If we're going to do the other one, let's do it, but at least 
let's be consistent in what we're trying to do here. If this 
bill is all about politics, which I really do now believe that 
it is because it has very little to do with what the 9/11 
Commission has recommended and much, much more to do with an 
agenda which expands the PATRIOT Act, which limits judicial and 
administrative review of revoked visas, that provides 
exceptions to the UN Convention Against Torture, that creates a 
national database on driver's licenses, that fails to set up at 
this point at least the civil liberties board that the 9/11 
Commission was directly recommending, then I don't know where 
all of these things are coming from. They certainly are not 
coming out of the 9/11 Commission report.
    And at the end of the day everybody's going to be waving 
the flag saying we did what the 9/11 Commission suggested that 
we do, when in fact everybody will have played out their own 
separate agenda to get whatever they want in this bill, and if 
it goes down, then everybody will be blaming everybody else, 
and I guess our chairman will be saying, well, we made a great 
deal to bring votes to this bill because we put this provision 
that gave a minimum level of funding for grants, so we're 
buying people off in States that don't even have a security or 
a terrorism risk to try to bring people to the bill.
    So I think I'm going to opt in favor of substance rather 
than politics. I yield back.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman's time is expired.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. 
Jackson Lee.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I too 
rise in support of Mr. Nadler's initiative, and I think that we 
should be clear in this Committee not to mix apples and 
oranges, and that is to amass a massive opposition to the 
suggestion that the vulnerability test of terrorist attack is a 
more valid test than any other. I think that we should make it 
clear that this legislation does not undermine safety in cities 
that do not fall under that standard or cities or rural areas 
or counties that may not fall under that standard, because in 
passing Mr. Nadler's amendment, it does not eliminate the 
responsibility of the Federal Government to generally provide 
security. It doesn't eliminate the responsibility of the 
Federal Government to support an ongoing program that has been 
in jeopardy here in this Congress, the Cops on the Beat 
program. It doesn't eliminate the responsibility of the Federal 
Government to continue to infuse Justice Department dollars, 
security dollars into these local areas.
    And I think when we debate this and begin to think of 
Homeland Security dollars as general security monies going into 
local jurisdictions, we begin to think we're making one part of 
the country more unsafe than the other.
    This amendment speaks clearly to the idea that we 
understand vulnerability and we understand cities that have the 
highest propensity for terrorist attacks. Why would you 
jeopardize the whole of the United States by not allowing those 
cities to have the fullest of resources to be able to protect 
not only those parameters, but the Nation's parameters? When 
you protect those vulnerable cities, you protect the United 
States of America. Those cities fall throughout the States. 
They fall in the East Coast. They fall in the Midwest. They 
fall in places like Texas in particular. They fall in 
California. They fall all over because they have a particular 
vulnerability that draws the visibility that sometimes 
terrorists need.
    I can't imagine that we would not support this amendment. I 
also have a concern that has not yet been expressed, and I plan 
to provide an amendment on that subsequently as we move to the 
floor, and that is, the question of layers and layers and 
layers of bureaucracy before the monies can even get to the 
State. I recall the debate on 9/11nd the need for getting 
monies to New York, and I recall the long, delayed, protracted 
debate on that. In addition, I still raise the question whether 
New York ever got its full amount on the tragedy of 9/11.
    The same thing bears for translating dollars to the source. 
We use the State formula, and when you use the State formula, 
if you can believe it, in my State of Texas, you're sitting 
around months and months and months filling out application 
forms to the State government while they sit around months and 
months and months later trying to make decisions on who gets 
the money. The system is broken. We're not really facing the 
horrific challenge that we have, and let me just clearly say, 
since that was a pariah statement, no, America is not more safe 
in the backdrop of the capture of Saddam Hussein. We're glad 
he's captured, but it doesn't mean anything much to the United 
States of America and its safety of its people.
    And the 9/11 Commission made it very clear we need to do 
the work that really ensures America being safe. We're not 
doing that. Platitudes, sound bites, grandstanding, and of 
course, I welcome this legislative initiative, but it's clear 
that it's--chairman's mark doesn't have any input to relevance 
to the 9/11 Commission's report, none whatsoever. But the point 
is we're giving the impression to the American people that 
we're answering the questions, and we're not. We're not 
answering the questions or why TSA allowed a number of weapons 
to get through our airports. We're not answering the question 
of why the FBI is 120,000 hours behind in reviewing 
intelligence reports. We're not doing any of that. And we're 
certainly not making our cities safer that are vulnerable by 
giving the impression by not supporting Mr. Nadler's amendment 
that we're making America less secure. No, we're not. We still 
have the responsibility of making sure that crime doesn't 
proliferate on our cities, and we have the responsibility of 
securing America.
    This amendment deals with threats of terrorist acts, the 
vulnerabilities that go to the very core of survival in this 
Nation. I ask my colleagues to support this amendment, and I 
yield back.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The question is on the amendment 
offered by the gentleman from New York, Mr. Nadler. Those in 
favor will say aye. Opposed, no.
    The noes appear to have it.
    Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from New York.
    Mr. Nadler. I'm going to ask for a recorded vote.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. rollcall will be ordered pursuant 
to the chair's prior announcement and Committee Rule 2(h)1, 
further proceedings will be postponed.
    Are there further amendments? The gentlewoman from 
Tennessee Mrs. Blackburn.
    Mrs. Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have an 
amendment at the desk.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report the 
amendment.
    The Clerk. Amendment to H.R. 10, Title II, Subsection F, 
Section 2142, offered by Mrs. Blackburn. Page 97, line 21 after 
the word----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection, the amendment is 
considered as read and the gentlewoman will be recognized for 5 
minutes.
    [The amendment of Mrs. Blackburn follows:]
    
    
    Mrs. Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank 
you and Chairman Coble for your help in drafting this 
compromise.
    The amendment is twofold. First it directs that the 
Attorney General establish a task force to examine the issues 
surrounding the establishment of a national clearinghouse to 
process criminal history requests for the private security 
industry. Second, the amendment acknowledges that there is an 
immediate need for the private security industry to have access 
to criminal background information. And this amendment 
incorporates language from S. 1743, which passed the Senate by 
unanimous consent last year.
    This approach relies on the existing State identification 
bureau system because this industry is regulated at the State 
level in 40 States. It respects State laws where they exist, 
and only imposes a Federal standard for disqualifying criminal 
records when the State has no law on the subject. It also 
respects the right of a State to opt out of the system, 
although we would hope that no State would choose to do so. 
This approach has received the approval of State based 
organizations including the National Association of Attorneys 
General, and the International Association of Security and 
Investigative Regulators. Private security companies and their 
employees protect the vast majority of our Nation's critical 
infrastructure including our power plants, water treatment 
facilities and our telecommunications facilities. Knowing 
whether these individuals have a disqualifying background is 
critical to our national security and to our homeland security.
    The bill also respects the rights of the employees in the 
private security industry. It requires the consent of an 
employee or employment applicant, before the criminal history 
information check can be made. It restricts the determination 
that an employer receives to a finding of employability or not. 
It does not provide raw FBI criminal history information to 
employers. It requires an employer to provide the criminal 
history response it receives to the employee, and it contains 
criminal penalties for the misuse of any criminal history 
information.
    The bill has the approval of the two private security 
industry associations and was drafted to address the principal 
issues raised by the employee rights organizations.
    Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your help in this matter. I 
yield back and encourage adoption of the amendment.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The question is on the amendment 
offered by the gentlewoman from Tennessee, Mrs. Blackburn. 
Those in favor will say aye. Opposed, no.
    The ayes appear to have it. The ayes have it and the 
amendment is agreed to.
    Are there further amendments? Gentleman from North 
Carolina, Mr. Watt.
    Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Well, I'm----
    Mr. Nadler. I don't know if it's a point of order, but 
could I be recognized for a moment?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. For what purpose does the gentleman 
from New York seek recognition?
    Mr. Nadler. To make the comment, you know, we just 
postponed the vote pursuant to the chairman's announcement 
before. It seems to me the Committee's all here. We seem to be 
all here----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Some members of the Committee are 
not here, and the chair doesn't like telling all the members 
that there's going to be one game plan on how to vote and some 
of the members may have gone off to other Committee meetings or 
elsewhere, and then saying that we're going to have immediate 
votes after they have left.
    So the chair doesn't want to have an audible if they're 
relying on this.
    Are there further amendments? The gentleman from North 
Carolina, Mr. Watt.
    Mr. Watt. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk. 
It's the Watt/Nadler/Schiff amendment.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report the 
designated amendment.
    The Clerk. Amendment to H.R. 10, offered by Mr. Watt, Mr. 
Nadler and Mr. Schiff. At the appropriate place----
    Mr. Watt. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the 
amendment be considered as read.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection, so ordered. The 
gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
    [The amendment of Messrs. Watt, Nadler and Schiff follows:]
    
    
    Mr. Watt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The 9/11 Commission recommended, quote, ``that there should 
be a board within the Executive Branch to oversee adherence to 
the guidelines recommended by the Commission and the commitment 
that the Government makes to defend our civil liberties.'' The 
9/11 Commission also recommended that in the course of 
determining guidelines for information sharing among Government 
agencies within the private sector, the President, quote, 
``should safeguard the privacy of individuals about whom 
information is shared.''
    Finally, the Commission indicated that, quote: The burden 
of proof for retaining a particular government power should be 
on the executive to explain: (a) that the powers actually 
materially enhances security, and (b) that there is adequate 
supervision of the Executive's powers to ensure protection of 
civil liberties. Close quote.
    When considered as a whole, these recommendations call for 
a board to oversee adherence to presidential guidelines on 
information sharing that safeguard individual privacy and civil 
liberties, and adherence to guidelines on the continued use of 
powers in the name of security.
    This amendment establishes such an independent board within 
the Executive Branch. Last month, by Executive Order, President 
Bush created something similar by creating within the 
Department of Justice something called the President's Board on 
Safeguarding American Civil Liberties. That was under Executive 
Order 13353. This board is essentially an advisory board 
charged with advising the President on matters of civil 
liberties policy and possible violation of such policies by 
Federal officers. Therefore I believe that other proposals 
attempting to implement the recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission that have called for the creation of a board within 
the Executive Office of the President may overlap with or 
duplicate certain functions of the board established by this 
Executive Order, but it needs to be something that has more 
teeth to it and more independence.
    My amendment establishes the type of independent watchdog 
envisioned by the 9/11 Commission to oversee all Executive 
Branch policies taken in the name of security to ensure that 
civil liberties and privacy interests of American citizens are 
protected. The key features of this board would be that it 
would be bipartisan, it would have staggered membership of 5 
members, it would ensure balance of political affiliation, 
ensure that partisanship not influence the important work of 
the board, and I am delighted that Mr. Schiff and Mr. Nadler 
have joined in this amendment, and I hope that----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Will the gentleman from North 
Carolina yield?
    Mr. Watt. Happy to yield to the chair.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. This is the first time we have seen 
this amendment, and I know I speak for most of the members of 
the majority that we are not opposed to this amendment in 
principle, but there may have to be some perfecting 
modifications to be made to it before we can agree to it. If I 
can make the suggestion that the gentleman from North Carolina 
withdraw this amendment without prejudice so that perhaps we 
can work over the next hour or so to see if we can reach some 
kind of an agreement on it, we may get something out of it.
    Mr. Watt. Reclaiming my time, I'm happy to do that, but I 
offered to do that before I offered the amendment, and I 
thought the agreement was that I was going to offer the 
amendment, you were going to support it, and we were going to 
try to make the perfecting amendments between now and the time 
the bill got to the floor.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Well, I don't know----
    Mr. Watt. If the chairman prefers to do it the other way, I 
mean I want to be----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. I think it would be a much cleaner 
way of doing it. By setting this amendment aside without 
prejudice, trying to work something out, then perhaps bringing 
up a revised amendment that everybody can----
    Mr. Watt. I'm happy to do that. I'd rather do it on a 
bipartisan basis. I thought it was doing what I had been 
authorized to do, and empowered to do.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The amendment is withdrawn. Are 
there further amendments? The gentleman from California, Mr. 
Berman.
    Mr. Berman. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report the 
amendment.
    The Clerk. Amendment to H.R. 10 offered by Mr. Berman. 
Amend Section 2001, page 117, lines 5 through 11, to read as 
follows and to conform the table of contents accordingly. 
Section 2001----
    Mr. Berman. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the 
amendment be considered as read.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection, so ordered, and 
the gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
    [The amendment of Mr. Berman follows:]
      
      

  


      
      

  


    Mr. Berman. Mr. Chairman, I offer this amendment in the 
hopes that between now and the time from--as a result of the 
discussion of the amendment and the time between now and the 
rollcall on the amendment, the majority will come to see that 
this amendment is consistent and complementary and strengthens 
what the majority is trying to do.
    In Title II, Section 2001, the majority is seeking to allow 
FISA warrants against lone-wolf terrorists, and there are 
certainly--a non-citizen ``Unabomber'' for example, that 
situation. And it seems to me there is a legitimate concern 
here that we should be interested in fixing. This amendment 
would take a somewhat different approach for reasons that I 
think make it more likely that our effort will be upheld 
constitutionally and I'd like to explain why.
    Section 2001 of H.R. 10 would authorize FISA surveillance 
against non-U.S. persons with no showing that they are acting 
on behalf of a foreign terrorist organization or government, in 
other words, not an agent of a foreign power. The lower 
standard for surveillance in FISA is only consistent with the 
Fourth Amendment because it is limited to use against foreign 
powers and their agents.
    What this amendment would do is apply the PATRIOT Act 
sunset provision to the changes it makes in FISA. I agree with 
the goal, but I'm concerned that it will not be upheld by the 
courts. Federal law enforcement needs to have tools necessary 
to pursue so-called lone wolf terrorists. But we have to do it 
in a way that will not undermine potential criminal 
prosecutions that result from surveillance under FISA. We went 
to great lengths in the PATRIOT Act, and I supported that 
portion of the PATRIOT Act that broke down the laws that 
allowed information gathered under FISA surveillance to be 
shared with law enforcement. As written, Section 2001 requires 
only a showing or probable cause that the person is engaged 
in----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Will the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Berman. Yes.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. I am prepared to support this 
amendment because this is permissive and alternative, because 
it said, ``Upon application by a Federal official for a FISA 
order a court may presume that a non-United States person is 
knowingly engaged in sabotage or international terrorism.'' It 
doesn't have to presume it. It doesn't have to presume the 
opposite, but I think it would make it easier to get FISA 
warrants rather than a criminal warrant which requires a 
showing of probable cause. So I think this amendment is a 
helpful addition to the bill.
    Mr. Berman. I thank you, and I accept your acceptance, and 
urge its adoption, and will stop talking.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Well, if everybody else will stop 
talking, the question is on the adoption of the amendment 
offered by the gentleman from California, Mr. Berman. Those in 
favor will say aye. Opposed, no.
    The ayes appear to have it. The ayes have it and the 
amendment is agreed to.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Chairman, chairman.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Are there further amendments?
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from California, Mr. 
Schiff.
    Mr. Schiff. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment numbered 152 
at the desk.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report the 
amendment.
    The Clerk. Amendment to H.R. 10 offered by Mr. Schiff. At 
the end of Section 2052 in Subtitle D of Title II, add the 
following new subsection, E, Enhancing Prosecution----
    Mr. Schiff. Mr. Chairman, request the amendment be deemed 
as read.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection, so ordered, and 
the gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
    [The amendment of Mr. Schiff follows:]
    
    
    Mr. Schiff. Mr. Chairman, this is a simple amendment that 
would attempt to use the power of the RICO statute to attack 
the problem of weapons of mass destruction offenses. RICO has 
proved an invaluable tool for investigators and prosecutors to 
deal with a wide range of organized criminal activity from 
racketeering to drug crimes to a whole host of other offenses. 
Regrettably, we now need to be concerned about criminal 
enterprises dovetailing with efforts to develop weapons of mass 
destruction. If we can utilize the power of RICO to attack this 
problem to the length and breadth of jurisdiction of the United 
States in dealing with any kind of a criminal enterprise like--
--
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Would the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Schiff. Yes, I would be glad to yield.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. I'm prepared to accept this 
amendment as well because it does provide enhanced penalties 
for this type of activity.
    Mr. Schiff. Mr. Chairman, I thank you, and on that basis 
will yield back the balance of my time.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The question is on agreeing to the 
amendment offered by the gentleman from California, Mr. Schiff. 
Those in favor will say aye. Opposed, no.
    The ayes appear to have it. The ayes have it. The amendment 
is agreed to.
    Further amendments?
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. 
Jackson Lee.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. I have an amendment at the desk.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report the 
amendment.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. 275XML. I think it begins on page 220.
    The Clerk. Amendment to H.R. 10 offered by Ms. Jackson Lee 
of Texas. Page 220, strike lines 9 through 20 and insert the 
following: (2) Verification of Documents. To meet the 
requirements of this section----
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that 
the amendment be accepted as read.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Not accepted, but if it's 
considered as read----
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Considered as read.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection, so ordered.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. I'd love it to be accepted as read. I 
thought you wouldn't hear it.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Nice try. The gentlewoman's 
recognized for 5 minutes.
    [The amendment of Ms. Jackson Lee follows:]
    
    
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    The subsection of the 9/11 Recommendations Implementation 
Act would prohibit the States from accepting any foreign 
document other than an official passport to meet the 
documentary identification requirements for a State issued 
identification card or a driver's license.
    Recent estimates indicate that we have between 8 and 14 
million undocumented aliens in the United States. Subsection 
3052 would prevent many of them from getting driver's licenses. 
While I understand the arguments that undocumented aliens are 
here unlawfully, should not be accorded the privilege of having 
a driver's license, the analysis of the problem should not stop 
with that observation. The reality is that the undocumented 
aliens will drive even if they cannot get a driver's license, 
and they do not equal terrorists. As we well know, the 9/11 
terrorists came in with passports and visas and other 
documented information. For most people it is virtually 
impossible to survive in our society without a car. It is 
unrealistic to expect the undocumented aliens to give up and 
leave the country when they find out they cannot get a driver's 
license.
    In addition, this matter can be handled by the States as it 
has already been done. A driver's license is not just a 
privilege for the driver's benefit, it also serves State 
purposes. By licensing drivers the State can ensure that the 
drivers who receive licenses have acceptable driving skills, 
know traffic laws, and the liability insurance. In addition it 
is a form of documentation. In addition, registering and 
photographing all drivers helps the State to monitor the 
driving records along with many others.
    Traffic accidents are the leading cause of death for 
persons age 6 to 33 with more than 40,000 traffic fatalities 
each year. According to a study conducted by the AAA Foundation 
for Traffic Safety, unlicensed drivers are five times more 
likely to be in fatal crashes than drivers with valid license.
    I would also indicate that documentation in our new system 
of data collection allows us to be more safe because it 
provides another line of communication in terms of looking at 
individuals for any activities that may be jeopardizing the 
safety of the American people. Denying driver's licenses will 
not prevent terrorism. Proponents of restrictions on immigrants 
have linked driver's licenses to security concerns by pointing 
out that many of the 9/11 hijackers were able to obtain 
licensing. Requiring passports to obtain driver's licenses 
would not have prevented the hijackers from getting driver's 
licenses. They all had passports.
    This is not a means of safety. It is a means of creating 
more unsafe conditions. Documentation allows tracking and the 
driver's license exclusion does not assist in any manner. I 
would urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Jackson Lee follows:]
       Prepared Statement of the Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a 
Representative in Congress From the State of Texas, and Ranking Member, 
        Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims
    Subsection 3052(c)(2)(B) of the 9/11 Recommendations Implementation 
Act would prohibit the states from accepting any foreign document, 
other than an official passport, to meet the documentary identification 
requirements for a state issued identification card or a driver's 
license.
    Recent estimates indicate that we have between 8 and 14 million 
undocumented aliens in the United States. Subsection 3052(c)(2)(B) 
would prevent many of them from getting driver's licenses. While I 
understand the argument that undocumented aliens are here unlawfully 
and should not be accorded the privilege of having driver's license, 
the analysis of the problem should not stop with that observation. The 
reality is that the undocumented aliens will drive even if they cannot 
get driver's licenses. For most people, it is virtually impossible to 
survive in our society without a car, and it is unrealistic to expect 
the undocumented aliens to give up and leave the country when they find 
out they cannot get driver's licenses.
    A driver's license is not just a privilege for the driver's 
benefit. It also serves state purposes. By licensing drivers, the state 
can ensure that the drivers who receive licenses have acceptable 
driving skills, know traffic laws, and have liability insurance. In 
addition, registering and photographing all drivers helps the state to 
monitor driving records.
    Traffic accidents are the leading cause of death for persons aged 
six to 33, with more than 40 thousand traffic fatalities each year. 
According to a study conducted by the AAA Foundation for Traffic 
Safety, unlicenced drivers are five times more likely to be in fatal 
crashes than drivers with valid licenses.
    Denying driver's licenses will not prevent terrorism. Proponents of 
restrictions on immigrants have linked driver's licenses to security 
concerns by pointing out that many of the 9/11 hijackers were able to 
obtain licenses. Requiring passports to obtain a driver's license would 
not have prevented the hijackers from getting driver's licenses. They 
all had passports.
    I urge you to vote for this amendment to remove subsection 
3052(c)(2)(B) from the 9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act. Thank 
you.

    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The chair recognizes himself for 5 
minutes in opposition to the amendment.
    What this amendment does is it strikes the provision on 
page 220 of the bill that says that States shall not accept any 
foreign document other than an official passport to satisfy the 
requirement of paragraph 1, which relates to the verification 
of documents.
    One of the things that this Congress has attempted to do is 
to provide for more secure passports and visas, not only United 
States passports and visas issued to citizens of foreign 
countries coming here, but also to request biometric 
identifiers in passports that are issued by foreign countries 
for presentation to immigration inspectors of people who are 
entering into this country. Now, those are the most secure 
documents that are available and they are becoming much more 
secure as a result of the biometric identifier requirement 
kicking in now at the end of 2005.
    What the amendment of the gentlemwoman from Texas seeks to 
do is to state that a State, when it issues a driver's license 
to an applicant who is not a United States citizen, or a 
permanent resident who has got a green card that has been 
validly issued, can use any kind of real or alleged foreign 
identification other than a passport. I think that in order to 
make this process as secure as possible, given all of the other 
things that were done, is that the foreign citizens should be 
required to show a passport when getting a driver's license. 
That is much less likely to be forged than a document that 
perhaps many driver's license clerks are not familiar with when 
someone comes in and applies for a driver's license.
    I would urge the defeat of this amendment to allow the 
continuation of utilizing passports for foreigners who are 
applying for a driver's license, and yield back the balance of 
my time.
    Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. 
Scott.
    Mr. Scott. Move to strike the last word.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Scott. And I yield to the gentlelady from Texas.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the distinguished gentleman.
    We are in a Judiciary Committee hearing and so the normal 
response would be dealing with the security question, and I 
believe that is important. In my earlier remarks previously, I 
indicated that we do not cease the responsibility of protecting 
our communities just because the protection issue deals on the 
general protection of our communities versus terrorist threats 
to our communities.
    This response of the chairman does not respond to my issue 
of dealing with the rights of States to conduct and govern the 
ability to monitor traffic and provide licensing for those who 
utilize their particular communities' highways and byways. I 
don't believe that this amendment in any way will undermine 
security and protecting communities from terrorist threats. It 
allows a State to make an independent and unique decision. We 
already know that some States have already made their 
decisions, to the opposition to some of their constituents--but 
at least they have made it--governing and controlling their 
ability of those on the highways and byways.
    Does anyone think that these individuals will not drive 
anyway? Does anyone even have the slightest belief that that 
will occur? So now we're creating enhanced havoc by not 
providing the States the opportunity on this minimal 
documentation of individuals, which is to provide the driver's 
license scenario and to be able to use that document.
    So I would ask my colleagues to look at this on the other 
half of it. It provides more safety and security, particularly 
in the responsibilities of the State that manages their own 
administrative matters, particularly the idea of traffic and 
the ingress and egress and the utilization of the highways and 
byways within that.
    I would ask my colleagues to support this amendment. I 
yield back.
    Mr. Scott. And I yield back.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The question is on the Jackson Lee 
amendment.
    Those in favor will say aye?
    Opposed, no?
    The noes appear to have it.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. I ask for a rollcall vote.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. rollcall is ordered. Pursuant to 
the chair's prior announcement under Committee Rule 2(h)1, 
further proceedings on this amendment will be postponed.
    Are there further amendments?
    The gentleman from California, Mr. Schiff.
    Mr. Schiff. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment numbered 150 
at the desk.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report the 
amendment.
    The Clerk. Amendment to H.R. 10 offered by Mr. Schiff.
    At the appropriate place in subtitle D of title II, insert 
the following new section.
    Mr. Schiff. Mr. Chairman, I request that the amendment be 
deemed as read.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection, so ordered.
    The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
    [The amendment of Mr. Schiff follows:]
    
    
    Mr. Schiff. Mr. Chairman, Members, this is an amendment 
that addresses, I think, one of the most important points 
raised by the 9/11 Commission, and that is the necessity of 
trying to stem the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and 
in particular adopts some of the language from the McCain-
Lieberman bill in the Senate that expresses the sense of 
Congress that a maximum effort must be made to prevent the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, that our programs 
must be geared to addressing this threat, that we ought to 
strengthen the Proliferation Security Initiative of the 
President, that we ought to support and strengthen the 
cooperative Threat Reduction Program, as well as other 
nonproliferation assistance efforts.
    It calls for a report to Congress, no later than 180 days 
after the enactment of this act, on whether we can more 
effectively address the global threat of nuclear proliferation 
by establishing a coordinator for programs of cooperative 
threat reduction, by eliminating the ceiling on how much the 
President can spend annually on cooperative threat reduction 
programs and other nonproliferation assistance carried out 
outside the former Soviet Union----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Will the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Schiff. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. We'll be happy to accept this 
amendment.
    Mr. Schiff. Mr. Chairman, I thank you again and would yield 
back the balance of my time.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The question is on the amendment 
offered by the gentleman from California, Mr. Schiff.
    Those in favor will say aye?
    Opposed, no.
    The ayes appear to have it. The ayes have it. The amendment 
is agreed to.
    Are there further amendments?
    The gentleman from New York, Mr. Nadler.
    Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk--
--
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report the 
amendment.
    Mr. Nadler. Amendment 113.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Amendment 113.
    The Clerk. Amendment to H.R. 10 offered by Mr. Nadler.
    After Section 2187 of subtitle G of title II of the bill, 
insert the following and redesignate section 2188 as section 
2189 and conform the table of contents of the bill accordingly.
    Section 2188----
    Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent the 
amendment be considered as read.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection, so ordered.
    The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
    [The amendment of Mr. Nadler follows:]
      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


    Mr. Nadler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    This amendment is taken from amendments that Mr. Markey has 
introduced in the past to improve our national security by 
strengthening the protection of the transportation of hazardous 
materials and securing nuclear facilities.
    The 9/11 Commission recommends that we do more to secure 
our country from terrorist attacks, and I am concerned that 
this Administration and this Congress have not done enough to 
make our country safe. For more than 2 years I have been 
advocating that we should secure the loose weapons-grade 
nuclear material, that we should insist that every shipping 
container entering the United States be inspected, that we 
should protect our airlines from shoulder-fired missiles; but 
this has not been done. For more than a year I have been told 
by every security expert in the field that we must also harden 
our nuclear and chemical plants so they are not prime targets 
of terrorists.
    This amendment is a very modest step in the right 
direction, but it is very modest in its aims, and I hope that 
today, at least, we can come together and agree that more must 
be done to protect our nuclear facilities and to assure safer 
transportation of certain extremely hazardous materials that 
can have deadly effects should they become the target of 
terrorist attack.
    The section of this amendment on nuclear security simply 
directs DHS to assess the threat nuclear reactors face in light 
of the events of September 11, something that the critical 
infrastructure protection part of DHS should be doing anyway, 
and then inform both Congress and the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission what the Federal Government role should be in 
protecting these plants.
    According to Mr. Markey's office, who drafted a very 
similar amendment, the House has voted on this portion of the 
amendment at least twice before. It was contained--it was 
inserted, I should say, by vote of the House, into H.R. 60 
energy bill and also was included in Mr. Markey's successful 
motion to instruct conferees on the energy bill last fall. It 
is bipartisan consensus language that has been approved twice 
by the House, that represents a common-sense approach to the 
Homeland Security Department's role in ensuring the security of 
nuclear reactors. Since the energy bill does not seem to be 
going anywhere at the moment, it makes sense to adopt these 
important provisions here to make sure that we do what is right 
to protect our nuclear facilities from attack.
    Secondly, the amendment calls for physical security 
measures surrounding shipments of extremely hazardous 
materials, including extra security guards and surveillance 
technologies, prenotification of extremely hazardous materials 
shipments to local law enforcement authorities, coordination 
between Federal, State, and local authorities to create a 
response plan for a terrorist attack on an extremely hazardous 
materials shipment, the use of currently available technologies 
to ensure effective and immediate communication between 
shippers of extremely hazardous materials, law enforcement 
authorities and first responders, and rerouting of shipments of 
extremely hazardous materials that currently travel through 
areas of concern, as defined by the Secretary.
    Mr. Chairman, this amendment is very important. Enough 
chlorine gas is contained in rail tankers that are traveling a 
few blocks away from this building that we are sitting in right 
now as well, as through all of our districts, that would kill 
100,000 people in half an hour if one of them was punctured. 
That's a staggering thought, and I hope there will be no 
dissent about this amendment as a result of that remarkable 
fact. This was featured on an ABC News documentary showing 
these cars passing on a rail line, with the Capitol Dome in the 
background, about 2 weeks ago.
    The Department of Transportation has historically had 
jurisdiction over the transportation of hazardous materials. 
However, after September 11, Congress agreed the Department of 
Homeland Security had a role to play as well. That is why we 
set up at TSA to handle aviation security. That is why DHS is 
conducting a security assessment for DC area rail shipments. 
DHS is expected to draw from the extensive work already done by 
the Department of Transportation in the area of classifying 
hazardous materials.
    This amendment applies only to extremely hazardous 
materials, those that are toxic by inhalation, that are highly 
explosive, and are highly flammable. It would impact an 
extremely small percentage of hazardous shipments. It does not 
single out any mode of transportation. It applies to all 
shipments of extremely hazardous materials by rail, truck, or 
other mode.
    The rulemaking DHS is required to undertake explicitly 
calls for the input of all stakeholders, including other 
Federal, State, and local agencies, the industry, unions, and 
members of the public. Rerouting of shipments is required only 
when they go through areas of concern as designated by the 
Secretary, and only then when DHS finds that there is a safer 
route available.
    I urge the adoption of this amendment in order to make sure 
that DHS properly hardens our nuclear facilities--properly 
conducts a survey, I should say, of our nuclear facilities to 
harden them against terrorist attack and does the same with 
respect to shipments of extremely hazardous materials----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Nadler.--these extremely hazardous materials.
    I think the chairman and yield back.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. For what purpose does the gentleman 
from Texas, Mr. Smith, seek recognition?
    Mr. Smith. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Smith. Mr. Chairman, I have a couple of questions for 
the gentleman from New York if he would like to respond.
    On page 1 of your amendment under Section 2188, page 1----
    Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman, I can't hear the gentleman.
    Mr. Smith. I'm sorry. I'll talk more slowly as well.
    On the first page of your amendment, under Rulemaking (1) 
In General, you mention heads of other appropriate Federal, 
State, and local government entities. Would that include the 
Attorney General?
    Mr. Nadler. I believe it would.
    Mr. Smith. I assume it would.
    Mr. Nadler. It would.
    Mr. Smith. Okay. Okay, I'm being advised to ask you if you 
would be willing to specifically designate the Attorney 
General.
    Mr. Nadler. Sure.
    Mr. Smith. Okay, second question----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection, the amendment is 
so modified.
    Mr. Smith. On page 5----
    Mr. Nadler. With the proviso that doing that doesn't imply 
that other people are not included.
    Mr. Smith. Correct. Correct.
    On page 5 of the amendment, under (d) Whistleblower 
Protection, I have a couple of questions there as well.
    First of all, would this in any way alter the current 
whistleblower statute?
    Mr. Nadler. It's not my intention to alter the current 
whistleblower statute, and I believe that when this was passed 
by the House in the energy bill, no one thought that it would 
do so.
    Mr. Smith. Okay. Do you happen to know, and I don't--do you 
happen to know if the original whistleblower statute includes 
such words as you've used here, such as ``harassed''? I'm not 
aware----
    Mr. Nadler. I can't hear you. Such as what?
    Mr. Smith. ``Harassed.'' I'm not aware of where that word 
has been defined, and it could be fairly general and vague, and 
I'm not sure that's in the original whistleblower statute. I'm 
wondering if you know whether it is or not.
    Mr. Nadler. We believe--I'm advised by staff, by Committee 
minority staff, that that word is in the original statute.
    Mr. Smith. Okay. And once again, you believe that you are 
not in any way altering the current whistleblower statute?
    Mr. Nadler. I believe we're not. That's not the intent.
    Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My questions have been 
answered.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Texas will yield 
before yielding back.
    Mr. Smith. I will yield.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. With those answers I think we're 
prepared to accept the amendment.
    Mr. Nadler. Okay. As modified.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The question is agreeing to the 
amendment offered by the gentleman from New York, Mr. Nadler, 
as modified.
    Those in favor will say aye?
    Opposed, no?
    The ayes appear to have it. The ayes have it. The amendment 
is modified as agreed to.
    For what purpose does the gentleman from Michigan seek 
recognition?
    Mr. Conyers. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite 
number of words.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Conyers. I thank the chair. I commend the Committee on 
the dispatch with which they are taking up the amendments and 
merely take this opportunity to point out that in the Judiciary 
hearing room today are Mrs. Carrie Lemack [ph] of Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, who lost her mother in the American Airlines 
Flight 11, and Mrs. Mary Fetchitt [ph], who lost her 24-year-
old son. They are very deeply concerned about this bill. I'd 
just like them to stand up before I yield back the balance of 
my time.
    Thank you, ladies, for being with us. [Applause.]
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The chair joins the gentleman from 
Michigan in welcoming you both to the Committee.
    Are there further amendments?
    The gentleman from California, Mr. Berman.
    Mr. Berman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have an amendment at 
the desk.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report the 
amendment.
    The Clerk. Amendment to H.R. 10 offered by Mr. Berman of 
California and Mr. Delahunt of Massachusetts.
    Page 211, after line 13, insert the following, and amend 
the table of contents accordingly.
    Mr. Berman. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection, the amendment is 
considered as read and the gentleman from California is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
    [The amendment of Messrs. Berman and Delahunt follows:]
    
    
    Mr. Berman. Mr. Chairman, I offer this amendment, again, 
not to make a point but to hope that, after consideration of 
the discussion, the majority might find this amendment to be 
acceptable.
    After September 11, the chief immigration judge issued a 
directive that closed all immigration hearings involving 
special interest detainees or cases alleging links to 
terrorism, just a blanket closure. The state goal of this 
policy was to protect the privacy of the detainees and prevent 
information about our intelligence-gathering methods from 
getting out. I share those goals, but I think the chief 
immigration judge, Creppy--this is known as the Creppy 
directive--overreached in trying to achieve those goals.
    The amendment I offer simply would permit the Government to 
request hearings be closed on a case-by-case basis to achieve 
the same goals that the Creppy memo laid out. Hearings under my 
amendment with Mr. Delahunt could be closed for preserving the 
confidentiality of the immigrant, to prevent disclosure of 
classified information that threatens national security or 
public safety, or prevent the disclose of the identity of a 
confidential informant. In any of those situations, the 
Government simply has to ask the immigration judge to close the 
hearing.
    I would argue that in America, the assumption should not be 
that everything needs to be closed. Where the case is made that 
the hearing should be closed, the Government should have the 
authority to make that case and closure should follow if the 
case is made. But this blanket closure has created all kinds of 
problems not simply in the context of First Amendment interests 
of the press in covering such hearings, even where there is no 
national security confidentiality, public safety, or the 
confidentiality of the immigrant or concern of the immigrant 
who is being--they're seeking deportation for, but there's--so 
there's a public interest in terms of press coverage. And there 
is a family interest. In so many cases, these families have no 
idea what has happened. They have no ability to go to the 
hearing of their family member, who could be deported as a 
result of the hearing.
    A lot of unfairness and damage is done to all kinds of 
interests for no particular purpose. Where there is a purpose, 
we have to reach that balance and sometimes do something which 
the families of the detainee don't like or that even the press 
finds irritating.
    So I just substitute in this amendment the case-by-case, 
giving all the possible reasons that public interest would 
justify closing the hearing, for the Government to seek that 
closure, but get rid of the blanket closure of every single 
hearing that has existed since the 9/11 directive came out.
    That's the amendment.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. 
Hostettler.
    Mr. Hostettler. I thank the chairman and----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Hostettler.--move to strike the last word.
    I must strongly oppose this amendment, Mr. Chairman, for 
several reasons. The amendment would tie the court's and the 
Government's hands in closing removal hearings to protect 
national security.
    The main problem with this provision is that it too 
strictly limits the instances in which a hearing may be closed 
without the alien's permission. The bill only allows the 
Government to seek closure to protect against disclosure of 
classified information and the identity of a confidential 
informant. It is questionable but doubtful that a government 
attorney by law could disclose the identity of a confidential 
informant. It is clear, however, that Government officials are 
barred from disclosing classified information in a public 
removal proceeding. That information cannot even be disclosed 
to the alien respondents themselves. Thus, what would seem to 
be an exception to this amendment that the Government could use 
to protect the American people really gives no more protection 
than current law.
    By setting such a high standard for Government closure of a 
removal proceeding, this amendment fails to protect the 
interests that are at stake when the Government closes a 
removal hearing. One, to protect the alien from retribution in 
his home country following the U.S. Government's claim that the 
alien is a terrorist. Two, to protect the alien in his home 
country after the alien makes an asylum claim against that 
country. Three, to protect Government witnesses from abuse 
after testifying publicly against a possible alien terrorist or 
persecutor. And four, to protect Government investigations of 
suspected terrorists or persecutors.
    Instead, this amendment will endanger the American people 
by placing Government officials in the untenable position of 
having to decide between the protection of sensitive 
investigations or the removal of dangerous aliens. This is 
unfair to those who protect us daily.
    This amendment could also allow aliens to exploit the 
immigration system. Among other likely scenarios, this would 
allow an alien to create an asylum claim for himself as 
follows: The alien could refuse to request closure of the 
asylum case, which would then be open to the public. If the 
Government were to allege that the alien was a terrorist, the 
alien could allege that he, one, had been falsely accused and 
two, would be persecuted if returned because our Government had 
accused him in an open forum of being a terrorist. An alien in 
York, Pennsylvania, recently raised a similar claim.
    Even if the Government didn't allege that the alien was a 
terrorist, the alien could allege that he would be persecuted 
because his home government now knows that he applied for 
asylum. Such claims are not uncommon. Even if this claim were 
denied, the alien could appeal, lengthening his unlawful 
presence in the United States.
    For these reasons, Mr. Chairman, I would urge my colleagues 
to oppose the amendment.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Would the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Berman. Mr. Chairman? Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The time still belongs to the 
gentleman from Indiana.
    Mr. Berman. Will the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Hostettler. I yield back the balance of my time.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman?
    Mr. Berman. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. 
Jackson Lee.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. I'll be happy to yield a moment to Mr. 
Berman, and I'd like to use my time.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Does the gentlewoman strike the 
last word?
    Ms. Jackson Lee. I move to strike the last word.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentlewoman is now recognized 
for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. I yield to----
    Mr. Berman. Well, I listened, I heard, but I did not 
understand. There are three provisions here which allow--which 
give the Government the authority to close the hearing. One is 
to preserve the confidentiality of applications for asylum, 
which is, of course, the hypothetical that you seem to be so 
interested in. The terrorist claims he's an asylee, thereby 
getting the Government he would be sent to mad at him for 
alleging he has a fear of persecution, and thereby persecuting 
him. I think, by and large, an asylee is somebody who we 
protect from deportation back to the country where he will be 
persecuted. So I don't quite understand the argument.
    We allow three provisions--preventing the disclosure of the 
identity of a confidential informant. At every one of these 
hearings, an immigration judge is going to want to know what 
the informant was. The gentleman is making a case here that in 
immigration cases we should close everything because somebody 
who's a witness might be intimidated later, but in murder 
cases, rape cases, and every other case in the criminal justice 
system, where witnesses are always having to come forward and 
testify in open court about things that could be very damaging 
to them----
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Reclaiming my time.
    Mr. Berman.--in their own communities that none of this is 
of concern. There's no proportionality in the gentleman's 
arguments. The logic he makes is for closing every single case 
where anybody could be subject to any kind of shame, 
embarrassment, anger by people because that person chose to 
testify.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Reclaiming my time. And I will be happy to 
yield in just a moment. I want to add the fact that I think 
Congress has an obligation on this to make it clear that 
immigration courts should be open and the hearings should be 
open unless there is a strong justification for there not to be 
open hearings.
    I want to again remind my colleagues that none of these 
amendments take away the ability for us to secure America. And 
I am frightened to death that we are willing to scare Americans 
to the point that we are prepared to give up civil liberties 
and the rights that we have cherished and loved and the rights 
that Americans are known to pride themselves in, out of 
security. That's what's happened in America. We have gotten 
Americans so frightened that the minimal of opening immigration 
hearings, which, as we all know, immigrants do not equate to 
terrorism. And for what reason, I don't know why we would be 
saying that to allow open hearings is going to jeopardize the 
safety of Americans.
    And I believe that this amendment is a very positive 
amendment, because it has no opposition in the 9/11 Commission 
report, as I understand it. The criterion for the openness of 
an immigration hearing should be set by Congress, not by the 
chief immigration judge. So what the gentlemen, Mr. Berman and 
Mr. Delahunt, are attempting to do is just restore the fairness 
in the system, which has nothing to do with undermining 
security and finding terrorists.
    We went through this before some years ago, the whole 
question of secret evidence. Every Muslim then was being 
subjected to hearings on the basis of secret evidence. I don't 
know how many terrorists we caught with the rule of secret 
evidence, but I would venture to say there was limited success 
denying people's rights and utilizing secret evidence.
    This amendment simply allows for those in custody, already 
in custody, to have open hearings. Why we would discern that 
this is not something to do, I don't know, and I would simply 
ask my colleagues to support the idea of fairness in our system 
which allows us to represent ourselves as the defenders of the 
Constitution, or at least recognize that even in spite of or 
despite the fact that we are living in a different world, that 
we can have the kind of fairness that we need to have.
    So I would rise to support this amendment. And I'm not 
sure, Mr. Berman, are you seeking to have time?
    Mr. Berman. If you have the time.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. I would yield to the distinguished 
gentleman from California. I ask my colleagues to support it.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The time of the gentlewoman has 
expired.
    Mr. Delahunt. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Massachusetts, 
Mr. Delahunt.
    Mr. Delahunt. Yes, and I thank the chair.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Delahunt. You know, there was a Frenchman who in the--I 
think it was the mid-1800's, that traveled extensively 
throughout the United States and made the observation that 
America is great because America is good. And I would suggest 
that he reached that conclusion because throughout our history 
the concept of fairness, the concept of openness, the concept 
of justice and fair play and transparency has characterized us 
as a nation. And I'm concerned at a different level in terms of 
the direction that we are now finding ourselves taking.
    You know, there was a recent newspaper report that during 
the course of an interview with the individual who is at the 
National Archives indicated that he is responsible for 
ascertaining the number of classified information, the pieces 
of classified information that now are withheld from the 
American people. The numbers were staggering. The numbers were 
truly staggering. I'm profoundly concerned about the issue of 
secrecy in this Government today, because I think we're losing 
something.
    There have been a number of cases, I don't have them at my 
fingertips, in the aftermath of 9/11--individuals held in 
detention and then released and it was subsequently revealed 
that they were held improperly, that the evidence wasn't there, 
that it was a mistake. That's really what we're talking about. 
This week we heard from the Secretary of State, Colin Powell, 
that anti-Americanism is increasing in this country, 
particularly in the Islamic world. The numbers are shocking in 
terms of attitudes about America all over the world.
    I think it's time we went back to being America, where we 
reinvigorate those concepts of fairness and transparency and 
justice. Because we're losing something. And we're losing our 
claim, I would suggest to my colleagues, to a certain moral 
authority that we have justifiably earned during the course of 
our history, by virtue of becoming a Government that is 
obsessed with secrecy.
    That's why I join in this amendment with Mr. Berman. The 
mechanisms are there to address national security, 
confidentiality, all of the concerns that I think we all share 
on both sides of the aisle. I mean, I think that there ought to 
be some discretion other than just simply a blanket 
prohibition. It just doesn't make any sense.
    You know, as a nation, we can stand up and do the right 
thing, do the American thing, and still protect ourselves. As 
someone once said, you know, the Constitution is not a suicide 
pact. But the amendment put forth by the gentleman from 
California and myself creates the mechanisms to achieve those 
goals and at the same time restore those values that I think 
are especially American in terms of their genesis, in terms of 
our history.
    With that, I yield to the gentleman from California.
    Mr. Berman. After that, I----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. And the gentleman's time has 
expired.
    For what purpose does the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Smith, 
seek recognition?
    Mr. Smith. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Smith. Mr. Chairman, I am not sure that an unvetted 
amendment is the best vehicle to use to tell immigration judges 
how to run their court rooms.
    Having said that, I'll yield to the gentleman from Indiana, 
the chairman of the Immigration Subcommittee, Mr. Hostettler.
    Mr. Hostettler. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
    I would like to bring us back to the substance of the 
amendment. The amendment does not deal with Americans, as was 
earlier suggested. The amendment deals with immigration cases. 
And it is common today for immigration cases to be closed. In 
fact, all asylum proceedings and proceedings regarding 
inadmissibility of a particular applicant are closed today.
    In fact, the amendment seeks to--wittingly or not----
    Mr. Berman. Would the gentleman yield on that, on the 
question of that point? Will the gentleman just yield? On what 
basis do you say that all immigration----
    Mr. Hostettler. No, all asylum cases and all cases 
regarding inadmissibility are closed. Asylum cases. Not all 
immigration cases.
    Mr. Berman. Inadmissibility or asylum and inadmissibility?
    Mr. Hostettler. Asylum and inadmissibility.
    Mr. Berman. All inadminis--missibility cases----
    Mr. Hostettler. It's hard for me to say, too.
    Mr. Berman.--are now closed?
    Mr. Hostettler. Yes. Yes.
    Mr. Berman. At the request of?
    Mr. Hostettler. No, no, no, no. At the request of the 
Government, excuse me.
    And that's one thing that your amendment--reclaiming our 
time--the fact is that with regard to the confidentiality, is 
you add that it must be done with the consent of the alien. One 
of the points that the 9/11 Commission made is that this would 
allow the gaming of the immigration process. Because by opening 
up--an alien consenting or an alien requiring, essentially, as 
a result of your amendment, an alien requiring the open 
proceeding that is now closed, and an alien could make a case 
that they would be persecuted once they returned to the country 
that they----
    Mr. Berman. Would the gentleman yield for a question?
    Mr. Hostettler. I don't have the time. But your amendment 
asks to preserve the confidentiality of applications for 
asylum, withholding of removal, relief under the Convention 
Against Torture, all--and it names several others--with the 
consent of the alien. And the alien can in fact not allow the 
proceedings to be closed, and as a result of the open 
proceedings and all the microphones and pens and pads of the 
press published across the world, the alien could then make a 
very logical case that they would obtain persecution in the 
country which we are attempting to remove them to.
    Mr. Berman. Would the gentleman now yield for questions?
    Mr. Hostettler. I don't have the time. But that is some of 
several reasons why I oppose the amendment.
    I yield back the gentleman's time.
    Mr. Smith. And I yield the balance of my time, Mr. 
Chairman.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The question----
    Mr. Conyers. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. 
Conyers.
    Mr. Conyers. I rise to strike the last word----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Conyers.--and yield 1 minute to Mr. Berman.
    Mr. Berman. I'm advised--thank you for yielding, Mr. 
Ranking Member.
    I'm advised that the gentleman is simply inaccurate in 
saying those hearings are all now closed. The only blanket 
closure is as a result of the Creppy directive after 9/11, 
which closed all cases involving special circumstances. You've 
made an argument that some witness in an open hearing may not--
I mean, say a powerful figure gets arrested in this country and 
an American witness to the alleged crime. The powerful figure 
thinks he's innocent. And the witness says, God, I don't want 
to testify against that powerful figure, that congressman. I 
could be subject to retaliation. Let's make this a secret 
trial.
    We don't do that in this country. Even when powerful people 
could retaliate against potential witnesses. And the notion 
that that's an argument against this amendment really boggles 
my mind. We have very limited cases--B and C involving 
confidential informants and involving disclosure of classified 
information. The Government, not the alien, has the right to 
get the closed hearing. And in the case which can involve--
where it's in the asylee's interest or the victim of torture's 
interest to have it closed, they can get it closed or they can 
waive that and take the consequences of it not having closed.
    That's an appropriate delineation of logical reasons to 
overcome what should be the presumption, that our hearings in 
this country are generally open to the press, to the family, to 
interested parties. That's the way the country runs.
    Mr. Hostettler. Will the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Berman. For a question.
    Mr. Conyers. I thank the gentleman. It's my time. And the 
reason I'm returning it is that before we go to lunch I want to 
introduce an amendment in the nature of a substitute. So I 
return the balance of my time, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The question is on agreeing to the 
amendment offered by the gentleman from California, Mr. Berman, 
and the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Delahunt.
    Those in favor will say aye?
    Opposed, no.
    The noes appear to have it.
    Mr. Berman. A record vote, please?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. A record vote is ordered. Pursuant 
to the chair's prior announcement and Committee Rule 2(h)1, 
further proceedings on this amendment will be postponed.
    For what purpose does the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. 
Conyers, seek recognition?
    Mr. Conyers. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment in the 
nature of a substitute that I'd like to have reported.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report the 
amendment.
    The Clerk. Amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 
10 offered by Mr. Conyers.
    Mr. Conyers. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the 
amendment be considered as read.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection, so ordered.
    The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
    [The amendment in the nature of a substitute of Mr. Conyers 
follows:]
      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


    Mr. Conyers. Ladies and gentlemen of the Committee, I offer 
this amendment in the name of myself, Jerry Nadler, Robert 
Scott, Sheila Jackson Lee, William Delahunt, and Adam Schiff. 
And what it is, simply, is the same measures, bipartisan 
measures, S. 2774, introduced by Senators McCain and Lieberman 
in the Senate, and H.R. 5040, introduced by members Shays and 
Maloney in the House. There are more than 40 bipartisan 
sponsors in the House and the same measures have been reported 
by the Senate Intelligence Committee on a unanimous basis.
    Our substitute represents a truly comprehensive 9/11 reform 
bill. The approach outlined in this substitute has been 
endorsed by members of the 9/11 Commission and family members 
of the 9/11 victims.
    The substitute includes strong budgetary authority for the 
newly created National Intelligence Director, it protects civil 
liberties through the creation of a Civil Liberties Board, it 
targets terrorists traveling, and addresses the need for 
congressional reform as recommended by the 9/11 Commission.
    But most important, it's what is not in the substitute, 
namely, none of the extraneous law enforcement provisions, 
nothing that would call for the establishment of unfettered and 
unrestricted background checks on employees, nothing to punish 
innocent immigrant and asylum victims, nothing to involve new 
restrictions on legal liability, and no new national ID cards.
    All these provisions fall way outside the scope of the 
recommendations of the 9/11, and that's why we've left them out 
of the substitute.
    By adopting the substitute text for the markup we can 
basically guarantee the reform of the law enforcement, the 
intelligence community, and our Nation's needs which would 
become so important.
    Ladies and gentlemen, this, to me, is the heart of our 
debate today. I urge you to give this your careful 
consideration. I return any unused time, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The chair recognizes himself for 5 
minutes in opposition to the amendment in the nature of a 
substitute.
    The base bill provides clear legislative implementation of 
the 9/11 Commission recommendations. The Senate bill and the 
substitute do not. In the interest of being expeditiously 
considered in the other body, the Senate bill abdicates too 
much of the legislative branch's responsibility to the 
executive branch. The people's elected representatives should 
not punt to the bureaucracy on so many important issues.
    The base bill better protects Americans against future 
terrorist threats by incorporating several provisions to better 
secure America's borders against terrorist infiltration. The 
Senate bill and the substitute do not. Why the Senate bill and 
the substitute choose to ignore some of the most important 
findings of the 9/11 Commission and their staff about 
vulnerabilities in our immigration system exploited by 
terrorists, I can't say. And I remind everybody that at least 
15 of the 19 9/11 hijackers were illegally in the United States 
on September 11.
    The bill that is being considered by this Committee does 
something about these identified weaknesses and for that reason 
alone the bill we're considering today is superior to the 
Senate product and the substitute, and the amendment should be 
defeated.
    The base bill has integrated structural civil liberties 
protections, including a privacy officer to ensure that the 
National Intelligence Director adequately weighs the privacy 
implications of intelligence activities, and government-wide 
changes to Administrative Procedures Act to require the 
consideration of the privacy impact on all rulemaking and 
regulations. The Senate bill and the substitute have none of 
these provisions.
    H.R. 10 also creates privacy officers and other Federal law 
enforcement and antiterrorism agencies. The Senate bill and the 
substitute do not.
    The Senate bill and the substitute lack meaningful 
litigation management provisions to protect first responders 
against lawsuit abuse, particularly in the area of granting 
mutual aid.
    The Senate bill did not receive the consideration and 
deliberation that is being accorded to the base bill. It's 
largely the product of one Committee over there rather than the 
integrated product of several Committees with years of 
expertise in certain subject areas. In the House these standing 
Committees are being allowed to mark the bill up and make 
amendments to the bill, which we're doing today. The Senate is 
not allowing multiple Committees to even consider the bill. And 
the regular legislative process always results in a better 
product than something that does not go through the process 
that we're doing today.
    Furthermore, the Senate bill and the substitute is 
undergoing potential changes on the floor of the other body 
even as we speak. So this amendment is a snapshot in time of a 
bill. As introduced, it may be significantly different in the 
important respects from ultimately what is passed.
    I think that what we are doing is better in immigration, 
better in law enforcement, better in privacy protections, 
better in civil liberties protections than the Senate bill and 
the substitute, and thus I would urge the rejection of the 
substitute amendment.
    Mr. Coble. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from North Carolina, 
Mr. Coble.
    Mr. Coble. Move to strike the last word.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Coble. I will not require 5 minutes.
    I believe that if we lump homeland security and 
intelligence under one Committee, I have the fear that it may 
result in Judiciary not having jurisdiction. That's the fear I 
have. And of course we're famous for jealously protecting turf 
on this Hill, and I may be guilty of doing that in speaking in 
opposition. But that's the fear I have.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from New York, Mr. 
Nadler.
    Mr. Nadler. Thank you, Mr. Speaker. I rise in support of 
this amendment offered by Mr. Conyers and myself and a number 
of others.
    We should be enacting and passing, as I said before, the 
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. There are many other 
provisions in this bill which have no relations, and some a 
tangential relation, to the recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission. And some of those provisions--and frankly this is a 
massive bill; I'm still trying to assimilate some of these 
provisions and their implications--may be worthwhile, and some 
raise very serious civil liberties concerns.
    We should separate it out, enact the substitute that Mr. 
Conyers and others have just put before us, and separately hold 
hearings and properly vet and study, and perhaps enact, the 
other recommendations in this bill.
    As we learned or should have learned with the PATRIOT Act, 
many of whose provisions are fine and unexceptionable, some of 
whose provisions I think many people who voted for that bill 
now realize they wouldn't have had they really understood the 
implications, when you're dealing with civil liberties there's 
a sensible--sensitive, I should say, balancing test between 
national security and personal liberty. And it's the kind of 
balancing that we have to do carefully.
    And these provisions--this bill was first introduced on 
September 24th, which is to say 5 days ago. And we've been 
trying to scramble and understand them. These provisions, just 
as the provisions of the PATRIOT Act, should be published and 
disseminated to the law schools, to the civil liberties unions, 
to the district attorneys, to the friends of law enforcement, 
to all people who are interested across the country. We should 
get their comments. We should hold hearings. We should 
understand the implications. We should mark them up properly, 
not in haste, so that we do an intelligent job. And we should 
pass them in time, those that we chose to pass.
    To rush them through as part of the 9/11 bill so that if 
anybody decides that some of these provisions are obnoxious or 
are too destructive of civil liberties or aren't properly 
balanced, they must vote against the bill that will be painted 
as embodying the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission is 
wrong. You shouldn't put a Member of Congress in that position. 
You shouldn't put his constituents in that position.
    So, Mr. Conyers's amendment, which would say let's take the 
9/11 Commission recommendations and enact them and let's 
separately consider all these other things and separately 
consider them in a way that is deliberative, makes eminent 
sense, is in the best interests of both the national security 
of this country and the civil liberties of people of this 
country, which is what makes this country great. I urge the 
adoption of this substitute.
    I yield back.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. For what purpose does the gentleman 
from Indiana seek recognition?
    Mr. Hostettler. Move to strike the last word.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Will the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Hostettler. I yield to the chair.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    When the 9/11 Commission delivered its recommendations at 
the end of July, we heard a hue and cry saying that Congress 
should skip the August recess, that we should pass the 9/11 
Commission recommendations right away. During the August 
recess, this Committee had two hearings on 9/11 Commission 
recommendations. Granted, it did not relate to the actual text 
of legislation, but it did relate to the recommendations that 
were contained in the Commission's report. And there were other 
Committees that also considered various parts of the 9/11 
Commission's report within their respective jurisdiction.
    Now, after being told we ought to hurry up, we're being 
told we ought to slow matters down. Now, one of the things that 
I've been really insistent on in major legislation like this is 
using the regular Committee process. And that is what we're 
doing now. And there have been a number of amendments that have 
been adopted that have been offered by my friends on the other 
side of the aisle, and they were good amendments. That's how 
the process works.
    Should we adopt this amendment in the nature of a 
substitute, all that good work would be wiped out because I 
don't think that the text of those amendments are in the 
substitute that has been offered by the gentleman from 
Michigan, Mr. Conyers.
    I think that it is incumbent upon us to deal with as many 
of the 9/11 Commission recommendations as we possibly can 
before this Congress's life goes out of business and hopefully 
before we adjourn. What we're doing here today, I think, is 
reflective of the process that has worked so well for this 
country. When the time comes for us to make decisions, we're 
making decisions today in Committee; hopefully next week we'll 
make decisions on the floor; and if there is a conference 
Committee, that we can reconcile the differences between our 
passed bill and the Senate bill relatively promptly.
    But to say that we're rushing into this, I think, is really 
a misrepresentation because we have been working on this ever 
since the 9/11 Commission made its recommendations about 2 
months ago.
    I yield back to the gentleman from Indiana.
    Mr. Hostettler. I thank the chairman. And just speaking on 
the issues of immigration and border security, the substitute 
has virtually no provisions to ensure that terrorists do not 
enter the United States. The substitute displays a total lack 
of understanding of our immigration law and the ways in which 
the 9/11 hijackers and other alien terrorists have abused our 
immigration system to gain access to our country. But 
thankfully, the families of the victims of September 11, 2001, 
in a letter from 9/11 Families for a Secure America, understand 
the importance of reforming our immigration law when they said, 
``We are heartened by the inclusion in the bill of provisions 
that increase the numbers of Border Patrol and ICE''--or 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement--``agents.''
    They do that because they recognize that three of the 19 
hijackers were residing in the country illegally and that if we 
had had the resources in the former Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, INS, to find out why individuals had 
overstayed their visas, that in fact we might have been able to 
disrupt or completely foil September 11----
    Mr. Delahunt. Would the gentleman yield for a question?
    Mr. Hostettler.--taking place there.
    If I have time.
    The 9/11 Commission stated further, on page 390 of its 
report, that ``today more than nine million people are in the 
United States outside the legal immigration system. We must be 
able to monitor and respond to entrances by illegal aliens 
between our ports of entry.''
    As it is easy for aliens to illegally cross our borders, it 
would also be relatively easy for foreign terrorists to enter 
or stay in the United States as a result of overstaying legally 
obtained visas. Periodic reports of large numbers of nations 
from terrorist-supporting countries crossing the southern 
border were verified by the recent release of Border Patrol 
data showing that in just the period from last October through 
this June, 44,614 non-Mexican aliens were caught trying to 
cross the northern or southern borders, including many from the 
Middle East.
    Yet the substitute ignores this recommendation. The 
substitute doesn't provide vitally needed additional funding 
for Border Patrol agents. And they don't require expedited 
removal procedures against aliens caught trying to sneak into 
the U.S.
    The 9/11 Commission, in another location, stated on page 
388 of its report that, ``Americans should not be exempt from 
carrying biometric passports or otherwise enabling their 
identities to be securely verified when the enter the United 
States. Currently U.S. persons are exempt from carrying 
passports when returning from Canada, Mexico, and the 
Caribbean.'' Otherwise known as the Western Hemisphere 
exemption.
    D.C. sniper John Mohammad made a living by exploiting this 
exception and smuggling aliens pretending to be----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The time of the gentleman has 
expired.
    Mr. Delahunt. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Massachusetts, 
Mr. Delahunt.
    Mr. Delahunt. I was really taken aback----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Move to strike the last word?
    Mr. Delahunt. I move to strike the last word.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Delahunt. And I will yield to the gentlelady. But 
before I do, I'm listening to the gentleman from Indiana and I 
guess my question is what have we been doing since 2001? What 
have we been doing?
    Mr. Hostettler. Will the gentleman yield for an answer to 
his question?
    Mr. Delahunt. Yes, I will.
    Mr. Hostettler. Since early 2003, as chairman of the 
Immigration, Border Security, and Claims Subcommittee, we have 
been holding hearings on the impact of illegal and legal----
    Mr. Delahunt. Reclaiming my time. We've been holding 
hearings. That's what we've been doing. We've been holding 
hearings since 2003. The gentleman speaks to the lack of 
resources. But I remind the gentleman that it's the majority 
party that controls the House and the Senate and the White 
House. I guess the bottom line is we've done nothing, according 
to the gentleman from Indiana, since 2001 about closing our 
porous borders.
    With that, I will yield to the gentlelady from Texas.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the distinguished gentleman for 
his yielding. Might I join in supporting the amendment offered 
by our Ranking Member, myself, and a number of my colleagues.
    Let me just offer a point that has not been said again in 
this august room, and that is the fact this month, on September 
11, represents 3 years that the families of those who lost 
their lives or those who were injured have had to live with 
this tragedy and no action. I think it is appropriate to view 
this 9/11 Commission report as a large apology to the families 
that has not often been said for the failures of this 
Government. That is why this particular amendment is the 
amendment that should be passed. This Commission report 
responds to the failures of our Government.
    Let us be very honest about that. We failed. And everybody 
can talk about who was inside the Government or inside the 
United States or who was outside. The systems broke down. And 
the legislation that is offered by the underlying bill offered 
by the Republican chairs, full of extraneous issues dealing 
with immigration and law enforcement, they're important, but 
they're not important to deal with the parameters of our 
concern.
    One, this bill does not give budgetary authority to the 
intelligence director. It has a bunch of overlapping, I think, 
distractions and inability to get the job done. This bill does 
not deal with border security as we would like it, as 9/11 
suggested, and incorporate the US-VISIT program at all of the 
borders. It doesn't do that in the Republican bill. And it is 
that, because it doesn't have any input from anyone else.
    And so this bill clearly does not respond to the hard work 
that was done not only by the Commission but legislators. This 
bill--or the amendment of John Conyers has been legislated. It 
has brought in the ideas of individuals that understand civil 
liberties, that understand the importance of intelligence. The 
reason why those 9/11 terrorists were here is because our 
intelligence system broke down or somebody didn't listen to it. 
Because out in the West, the FBI had on their desks information 
regarding individuals going to pilot schools learning to take 
off and not land. That was in the United States of America. 
That's intelligence.
    And our counselor officers did not have the ability to deal 
with individuals that they were giving visas. We are fixing 
that. You're wasting time talking about this bill represents 
collective thought. It does not. The Commission report 
represents collective thought and it represents the thought of 
the 9/11 families who have generated America's views as to how 
we need to do this.
    And we are wasting time. You can put this bill at the desk 
of the House right now and pass it. This is a waste of time.
    And the only thing I would say is we will continue today 
with amendments when we can go forward and work forward-
thinking people and use the 9/11 Commission report as the 
basis. All of us have met with the 9/11 commissioners. All of 
us have. We have deliberated, we've analyzed, we've thought 
about it. The bill that's underlying is missing in elements 
that are crucial to the success of security for America.
    And I would suggest that out of an apology comes action and 
a commitment not to do it again. The 9/11 Commission report 
gives us the roadmap, and we legislatively can adopt that. Mr. 
Chairman, we can always go back to delayed hearings and markups 
for these extraneous ideas that are in this underlying bill 
dealing with immigration law enforcement. Right now, the 
apology should turn into----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The time of the gentlewoman has 
expired.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. I ask my colleagues to support it. I yield 
back.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The question----
    Mr. King. Mr. Chairman? Move to strike the last word.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Iowa, Mr. King, 
is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. King. I thank the chairman.
    I'd like to point out to this Committee that we have 9/11 
Commission recommendations. This is a commission, by my count, 
of 10 people. These 10 people did their best to sort this 
information out and make a recommendation to this Nation. We 
are not bound by any of those recommendations. The Commission 
are independent 10 minds, just like we are on this Committee 
here and all of us in the Congress, in the House and in the 
Senate.
    Yet those Commission reports do call for action. And we 
have been seeking to listen to the recommendations. The Conyers 
amendment in the nature of a substitute fails to provide 
specific implementation direction. The 9/11 Commission report 
calls for action. The chairman's called for action. We're here 
to provide action. We're not limited to the scope of the 9/11 
Commission. In fact, they had a responsibility to look at the 
entire security apparatus in the United States of America. 
That's what this bill seeks to do.
    I would yield to the gentleman from Indiana, Mr. 
Hostettler.
    Mr. Hostettler. I'd just like to add--I thank the gentleman 
for yielding--just to add a hearty amen to the notion that none 
of the members of the 9/11 Commission were elected from the 8th 
District of Indiana to determine what is necessary to keep the 
United States secure. We appreciate their work and their long 
hours and their recommendations, and we think that it's a 
natural base for legislation to make America more safe and more 
secure.
    And in fact, since September 11, 2001, there have been 
numerous hearings to determine what took place on September 11 
and to try to fix the problems. And we are going to take 
action. And when the Republican-controlled majority of the 
House of Representatives puts a bill forward that doubles the 
number of Border Patrol agents and triples the number of 
immigration special agents in order to keep America safe and 
secure, all of us will be more than happy to go to the people 
who elected us--once again, not the 9/11 Commission--to place 
into law the important policy as well as resources necessary to 
keep us secure.
    So, we have been deliberating. We apologize to the minority 
for deliberating on these very important issues. But as a 
result of those deliberations over the last 3 years, we have 
come to a conclusion that we need to enhance the policy and 
greatly increase the resources, especially the personnel 
resources----
    Mr. King. Would the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Hostettler.--necessary to keep this Nation safe so that 
9/11 does not repeat itself.
    Mr. King. Would the gentleman yield?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The time belongs to the gentleman 
from Iowa.
    Mr. Hostettler. And with that, Mr. Chairman, I ask for 
unanimous consent to insert into the record a letter from the 
9/11 Families for a Secure America that supports the base bill 
and, if I may, jealously once again add that calls for and says 
they are heartened by the inclusion in the bill of an increase 
in the number of Border Patrol and ICE agents to keep----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection, the letter will 
be----
    Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman? Would the gentleman yield for a 
question? Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The time belongs to the gentleman 
from Iowa.
    Mr. King. I'll yield back the balance of my time.
    Mr. Scott. Reserve the right to object on that add to----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Virginia 
reserves the right to object to putting the letter in the 
record.
    Mr. Scott. And I would just ask him to restate who the 
letter was from.
    Mr. Hostettler. If the gentleman will yield?
    Mr. Scott. I yield.
    Mr. Hostettler. The letter is from an organization called 
9/11 Families for a Secure America. And it has the name of the 
boards of directors of the 9/11 Families for a Secure America 
as----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Is there objection to including the 
letter in the record?
    Hearing none, so ordered.
    [The 9/11 Families for a Secure America letter follows:]
    
    
    Mr. Scott. Will the gentleman from Iowa yield?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Iowa has yielded 
back.
    The gentleman from New York, Mr. Weiner.
    Mr. Weiner. Move to strike the last word.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Weiner. The gentleman from Indiana gave the best 
explanation about why we should pass the base core 9/11 
principles as articulated in the amendment by the gentleman 
from Michigan. And that is that they were not elected. They 
were not setting out a political agenda one way or the other. 
They engaged in far better hearings than any Committee of this 
Congress did. They put together a far better report than ours. 
They looked at this thing from beginning to end. They had 
consensus support of this country. They had consensus report 
from the 9/11 families in their pursuit.
    Many people were very much opposed to that Commission being 
created. One of them is in the White House. Even the President 
came around and said this was a good thing. When it was done, 
it was uniformly praised. Anyone who reads that 9/11 Commission 
report sees how thorough it was, sees how balanced it was, sees 
how it spread blame where blame needed to be and put in a level 
of thoughtfulness to this that transcended politics. That's why 
it has the support in the country that it has.
    We are here in the waning moments of our session. A lot of 
the things that are in, Mr. Sensenbrenner, Mr. Cox, and 
amendments that we're offering today, have a great deal of 
value. But if we want to live up to the work of the 9/11 
Commission, we mustn't let another anniversary go by without 
acting on some of them.
    We're not saying you can't do things beyond it, but right 
now, right here, on the eve of our election, are we really 
going to go back to our constituents and say that because of 
legislative gridlock and election year, whatever, we're not 
going to take the recommendations in this report and implement 
them?
    Why don't we get what we can get now? It's something that 
has broad support in the Senate, something that I believe many 
of the recommendations that are in the report and in the 
language of Mr. Conyers's bill you would vote for almost all of 
them. All I heard you articulate was that there are other 
things that we can do. You bet there are, and I hope that we do 
them when President Kerry takes office.
    But the point that I'm making today is that we have a 
moment----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Would the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Weiner. Certainly, sir. [Laughter.]
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Will that be in 2009 or 2013? 
[Laughter.]
    Mr. Weiner. Point taken.
    But let us say this. I was one that was of the belief that 
when this report came out we should have returned from the 
Democratic convention, that we should have suspended our 
recess. We should have walked down here and said up or down. 
Some of us would vote no, some of us would vote yes, some of us 
would have caveats, but vote on them. Say that finally we have 
a package that has unified at least this bipartisan Commission.
    And what you say is the reason you oppose it, that they're 
not representing, they don't represent any element of the 
political spectrum, is exactly why we should try to do this. We 
are in a moment of extraordinarily fractured electorate with 
all kinds of different views about different issues. We have a 
50-50 country, a 50-50 Congress. But if there was consensus 
about anything in the last year, it was about the thoroughness 
of this report and about the wisdom of their recommendations.
    Can we not put aside political jousting for the moment? Can 
we not put aside our other things that we all think are great 
ideas, whether it be to keep things open or closed or have more 
cops or less cops, and pursue what's in this proposal? That's 
what Mr. Conyers is arguing. Let's try to get this done. 
President Bush stood up and said he thought the report was 
excellent. Members of both parties did. Well, now let's do it.
    How do we explain to the victims of September 11 that they 
have this gut-wrenching story that's been told to Congress with 
a whole section of what to do, and we not doing it because we 
want to add something else that we like or because they're not 
elected? I don't care who elected them. This is a work that 
provides for us the most thorough foundation for legislation 
you're going to find anywhere.
    And now Mr. Conyers is giving us a chance to vote on it up 
or down, the Senate's going to have a chance to vote on it up 
or down, and maybe lightning will strike. And in the moment of 
this political debate, when the country is saying, please, 
can't you guys get together on anything, we can use the searing 
memory of September 11, as articulated in this gut-wrenching 
report, as a basis for legislation.
    If we're able to do that, that will be a blessed day. And 
you say it will be a nonpartisan day and that none of the 
people who were elected, so be it. I will gladly say that this 
is a nonpartisan proposal, and that's a virtue, not a vice.
    Mr. Smith. Will the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Weiner. I'll be glad to yield whatever time I have 
left. [Applause.]
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. 
Smith.
    Mr. Smith. I move to strike the last word.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Smith. Mr. Chairman, I would like to refocus our 
attention on the text of the amendment in the nature of a 
substitute at hand. We have been discussing many important 
subjects here for the last few minutes, but sometimes I wonder 
if they're really relevant to what the debate should be on, and 
that is the underlying amendment in the nature of a substitute.
    Let's look, for example, at section 302, titled 
Reorganization of congressional jurisdiction. That section 
alone gives us three good reasons to oppose the underlying 
amendment.
    First of all, as the title suggests, this is really telling 
Congress, many in the majority party, how to organization 
Congress. That should be opposed because of that.
    Number two, it takes away the law enforcement jurisdiction 
of the Judiciary Committee, which we should all have an 
interest in, and gives it to a new Homeland Security and 
Intelligence Committee. We should oppose it for that reason as 
well.
    Thirdly, it tries to micromanage the Intelligence Committee 
by limiting both the membership and the ratio between the 
majority and the minority. That is a decision that should be 
left to the majority party and the majority party's leadership. 
We should not try to micromanage the membership of a specific 
Committee.
    So for those three reasons, Mr. Chairman, all of which deal 
with specific language in the underlying amendment, I would 
urge my colleagues to oppose the amendment in the nature of a 
substitute.
    I'll yield back the balance of my time.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The chair intends to keep the 
Committee in session until such time as we are able to vote on 
the substitute.
    For what purpose does the gentlewoman from California seek 
recognition?
    Ms. Waters. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Members. 
I move to strike the last word.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentlewoman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Ms. Waters. I had not intended to enter the debate because 
I think basically my colleagues on the opposite side of the 
aisle perhaps do not have the courage to defy the White House 
on this issue. As we know and we cannot forget, the President 
of the United States never wanted this 9/11 Commission. And he 
only supported the 9/11 Commission after it became very clear 
that there was a lot of support for it and he was being 
embarrassed in resisting it.
    This is the same commission where we had Condoleezza Rice 
discover or tell the world for the first time that she'd 
received a memorandum some days prior to, that pretty much 
described Osama bin Laden and his intentions. This is the same 
commission that the President was even reluctant to appear 
before and only did it if in fact he could be accompanied by 
Mr. Chaney.
    So we've had resistance about 9/11 from this Administration 
from day one. And it just pains me that my colleagues worked so 
hard and are working so hard today to try and convince the 
members on the opposite side of the aisle just to do the right 
thing, just to do the honorable thing, just to do the decent 
thing. Well, it's obvious that's not going to happen.
    So I think the record should be clear that this resistance 
didn't just start today. And you could take the 9/11 Commission 
report and you can tear it apart. And you can say things like 
my colleague just said, well, they're trying to tell Congress 
how to organize itself.
    I want to tell you, it doesn't hurt to get some 
recommendations from our citizens when you can't decide which 
Committee has jurisdiction over the subject matter and it's 
spread out all over this place and people can't even keep up 
with the various Committees and what they're saying and what 
they're doing. I don't think it's any kind of insult to have a 
suggestion by the citizens, the Commission members, that 
perhaps we should be organized in a different fashion.
    So I guess my word to Mr. Conyers is that this is a valiant 
attempt to bring before this Committee an opportunity for all 
of us just to do the decent thing and just support the 9/11 
Commission report. And again, they're not going to do it 
because I don't think they have the independence to do it. I 
don't think that there will be any members on the opposite side 
of the aisle that will have the courage to step up to the plate 
and defy what I think is a White House direction.
    So let the record reflect that this is a continuation of 
the same kind of resistance that we have seen from the 
beginning. And I commend you, Mr. Conyers, for making one more 
attempt to convince our colleagues on the opposite side of the 
aisle that we ought to adopt this Commission report, because so 
much work went into it, so much time went into it. And the 
effort was so good that it has been published in a way that all 
of America can share in the information.
    And I want you to know that even during the time of the 
Democratic convention, I went to Cambridge and joined with the 
mayor and we had a public reading of that report. We had a 
member of the legislature, we had some community groups and 
organizations, and we had the city council that was full of 
citizens who came to share with us in a public reading. And of 
course we wanted to encourage, and we will continue to 
encourage America to get together in our libraries, in our 
schools, in our social clubs, in our fraternities and 
sororities, and have public readings so that no matter what 
happens, no matter those in control of this Government, of the 
House and the Senate and the White House, even if they resist 
this, we want everyone to know what was in that report. And I 
will continue to encourage groups to get together and have 
public readings of the report.
    I yield back the balance of my time before my chairman 
tells me my time is up.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. It's up now. The time of the 
gentlewoman has expired.
    The question is on the amendment in the nature of a 
substitute offered by the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Conyers.
    Those in favor will say aye?
    Opposed, no?
    Mr. Conyers. May I ask for a record vote?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The noes appear to have it. A 
record vote is ordered. Pursuant to the chair's prior 
announcement and Committee Rule 2(h)1, further proceedings on 
this question will be postponed.
    This looks like a good time to break. The Committee will be 
in recess until 15 minutes after the end of the next series of 
rollcalls on the House floor. The Committee will vote on the 
postponed questions at either 2:30 p.m. or 30 minutes after the 
last rollcall has occurred, whichever is later.
    The Committee stands in recess.
    [Recess.]
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The Committee will be in order. A 
working quorum is present.
    When the Committee recessed several hours ago, a motion was 
pending to report the bill H.R. 10 favorably. And the bill was 
by unanimous consent considered as read and open for amendment 
at any point. There were a number of amendments that were 
offered and disposed of. There were four amendments where votes 
were postponed.
    Are there further amendments?
    Mr. Schiff. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from California, Mr. 
Schiff.
    Mr. Schiff. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk, 
158a.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report the 
amendment.
    The Clerk. Amendment to H.R. 10 offered by Mr. Schiff.
    Page 137, line 10, strike (b), insert the following, and 
renumber.
    Mr. Schiff. Mr. Chairman, I request unanimous consent that 
the amendment be deemed as read.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection, so ordered.
    The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
    [The amendment of Mr. Schiff follows:]
    
    
    Mr. Schiff. Mr. Chairman, existing law prohibits the theft 
of nuclear material or nuclear byproduct material or the 
threatened use of such material under 18 U.S.C. Section 831. 
Existing law also prohibits the use of a radiological weapon 
under 18 U.S.C. Section 2332a.
    The current bill in new section 832 prohibits assisting a 
foreign terrorist power with the use of a radiological weapon 
or a nuclear weapon or the development of such. But none of the 
existing law nor the present bill deals with the scenario where 
someone develops or possesses or attempts to do so a 
radiological weapon in this country or elsewhere, but doesn't 
go on to use the weapon or doesn't assist it with respect to a 
foreign terrorist power.
    I think it should be prohibited for someone to develop or 
possess or attempt to develop or possess a radiological weapon 
regardless with whether they actually go through and use it. We 
shouldn't require prosecutors to have to prove that the weapon 
was ultimately used or ultimately developed for a foreign 
power. The mere possession and development or conspiracy to do 
so should be enough.
    So this amendment would prohibit the development, 
possession, or attempted development or possession of a 
radiological weapon or the use of such a weapon, and provides 
appropriate penalties. And this will address a situation where 
you either have a Timothy McVeigh situation, where you have 
domestic terrorists at work, or you have a terrorist cell at 
work in this country or overseas that is--or in this country 
that is not affiliated necessarily with a foreign terrorist 
power and----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Will the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Schiff. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. I notice in your amendment that you 
strike the clause, There is extraterritorial Federal 
jurisdiction over an offense under this section, which is 
entitled, Participation in Nuclear and Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Threats to the United States.
    Is it the intention of your amendment to narrow the scope 
of the section in the existing bill, or not?
    Mr. Schiff. No, Mr. Chairman, and I would be more than 
willing to accept language to make that clear.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Would the gentleman be willing to 
accept a reinstatement of the statement that there is 
extraterritorial Federal jurisdiction?
    Mr. Schiff. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman. The design is to make 
jurisdiction as large and as long as we possibly can, not to 
limit----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Well, without objection and with 
the permission of the gentleman from California, the amendment 
will be modified to reinstate (b) There is extraterritorial 
Federal jurisdiction over an offense under this section. His 
section would be renumbered (c)--re-lettered (c), and the 
subsequent sections would be re-lettered accordingly. Is that 
okay?
    Mr. Schiff. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection the amendment is 
modified----
    Mr. Delahunt. Mr. Chairman? Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection the amendment is 
modified.
    Will the gentleman yield further?
    Mr. Schiff. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. With these modifications, the chair 
is prepared to accept the amendment.
    Mr. Delahunt. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The time is controlled by the 
gentleman from California.
    Mr. Schiff. I'd be delighted to yield to the gentleman from 
Massachusetts.
    Mr. Delahunt. I might be confused. Does this incorporate a 
mandatory death penalty sentence?
    Mr. Schiff. This provides that if death results from the 
use of the radiological weapon, that it shall be punished by 
death or imprisonment for a term of years or for life. So it 
provides that full range of penalties.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The question is on the amendment 
offered by the gentleman from California, Mr. Schiff.
    Those in favor will say aye?
    Opposed, no?
    The ayes appear to have it. The ayes have it and the 
amendment is agreed to.
    Are there further amendments?
    The gentleman from New York, Mr. Weiner.
    Mr. Weiner. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like to 
offer Weiner 150.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report the 
amendment.
    The Clerk. Mr.----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk doesn't have Weiner 150? 
Okay.
    Just by way of note, the chair intends to put the question 
on the four amendments that votes were postponed on at 3:20.
    Mr. Weiner. You don't have the badges? 150 I called it. Is 
it not there?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Are there further amendments?
    Mr. Weiner. Am I--I can't proceed?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk said that she----
    Mr. Weiner. We had sent it to the desk a couple of hours 
ago. Do you have another copy you can offer just for reading 
purposes?
    The Clerk. Amendment to H.R. 10 offered by Mr. Weiner of 
New York.
    At the end of title II, add the following:
    Mr. Weiner. Mr. Chairman, request unanimous consent to be 
considered as read.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Well, it would be helpful if the 
members could see the amendment.
    Mr. Weiner. Oh, yeah, yeah. That's true. Fire away.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will continue to read.
    The Clerk. Subtitle I--Police Badges.
    Section 2201, short title.
    This subtitle may be cited as the ``Badge Security 
Enhancement Act of 2004''.
    Section 2202. Police Badges.
    Security 716 of title 18, United States Code, is amended--
(1) in subsection (b)----
    (A) by striking paragraphs (2) and (4); and
    (B) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (2); and
    (2) by adding at the end the following:
    ``(d)(1) Whoever receives, in interstate or foreign 
commerce, a genuine police badge shall provide a certification 
of the intended use of that badge to the person or entity from 
which the badge is received.''
    ``(2) Whoever knowingly transfers or transports in 
interstate or foreign commerce, a genuine police badge shall 
notify the agency represented on the badge before doing so, if 
the agency represented on the badge continues to exist.''
    ``(3) The Attorney General shall, by rule made on the 
record, establish additional procedures for the transfer or 
transportation of genuine and counterfeit police badges in 
interstate or foreign commerce to assure that a genuine or 
counterfeit police badge is not acquired under false pretenses, 
and that the badge will be used or is intended to be used for a 
purpose described in subsection (b) but then diverted to 
illegal purposes. The rule made under this paragraph shall not 
prohibit or deter the use of counterfeit badges by law 
enforcement officers for legitimate law enforcement purposes.''
    ``(4) Whoever knowingly engages in conduct that violates 
paragraph (1) or (2), or a rule made under paragraph (3), shall 
be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 6 months, 
or both.''
    ``(5) This section shall not apply to the use of a genuine 
or counterfeit badge in the fictitious or historical visual 
depiction of either a public officer or employee.''
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    [The amendment of Mr. Weiner follows:]
      
      

  


      
      

  


    Mr. Weiner. Mr. Chairman, this is an amendment that would 
close a loophole that was identified shortly after we in 
Congress tried to close the loophole that allowed essentially 
for the sale of counterfeit badges, very realistic looking 
counterfeit badges, in 2000.
    In 2000, a law made it a Federal crime to transfer or 
transport or receive a counterfeit police badge. But it left 
four exemptions. One was as a memento in a collection or 
exhibit; two was for decorative purposes; three was for 
dramatic presentations, such as a film; and four--and this is 
the problem--for any other recreational purpose.
    Well, the effect of that law was, according to the GAO, to 
leave gaping holes in our security. In 2000, obviously before 
September 11, undercover agents were 100 percent successful, 
reading from a GAO report in 2000, 100 percent successful in 
penetrating 19 Federal sites and two commercial airports on the 
first attempt.
    The reason that we found that, you can now, on the 
Internet, very easily go onto a Web site and purchase an NYPD 
lieutenant's badge, a captain's badge, a sergeant badge, an FBI 
agent's badge. These are counterfeit inasmuch as they are real 
badges but they are made a millimeter or even less smaller than 
the actual one. You can do this right now if you want to go 
into our cloak room and try to do it.
    So what my bill does is it closes the loophole. It says if 
you're a collector you can still buy these badges, but they 
have to be encased in Lucite or some other protective thing so 
that you can't simply wear it. If you're going to buy it and 
say that you're just putting on a film or a production, you 
have to let the locality where you're doing the filming say, 
okay, this is a legitimate purpose for you to get these badges.
    And you have to affirmatively say these things. Right now, 
if you go onto a Web site that sells counterfeit badges, all 
you have to do is, when you click to order, the fine print says 
you certify you're not going to use this for any unlawful 
purpose. We, frankly, have found dozens of Web sites that you 
can go to to buy these badges.
    Nowadays, after this 2000 audit, obviously security has 
been enhanced a great deal. In more and more places you need 
forms of identification to gain access to sensitive locations. 
The time has never been more pressing for us to close these 
gaps in this law.
    Furthermore, local law enforcement is very supportive. 
There's an exemption in here--very often police officers, 
particularly in cities like mine, there's a very strong penalty 
if you lose your badge, so some of them go out and 
affirmatively get a counterfeit version of their own badge and 
carry that around with them. This clearly says that if you're a 
law enforcement agent, you're allowed to get, obviously, a 
badge because you're using it for law enforcement purposes.
    This is in keeping with the GAO recommendations on closing 
a loophole, the loopholes in legislation that we here wrote. If 
you consider it for a moment, making it illegal to possess a 
fake badge, but if there's an exemption if you have it ``for 
any other recreational purpose,'' the law is effectively 
meaningless.
    For those of you who are concerned about the effect on the 
collector's business, you'll still be able to get them and 
collect them, but you have to have them encased in some way for 
display so that they can't be easily worn or flashed at an 
airport.
    For those of you who are concerned that you might be 
somehow putting a crimp in LAPD and NYPD Blue or some other 
program, you're still going to be able to apply and get these 
badges so long as the local law enforcement agent knows that 
there are a bunch of fake badges out and around and they're 
being used for legitimate purposes.
    This closes a loophole that clearly exists in the law, and 
I would urge us to consider it favorably, particularly in the 
context of this bill where so many of the things we're doing to 
enhance security would be severely undermined if anyone can go 
out and buy an NYPD sergeant's badge at a moment's notice.
    I yield back my time and ask for a yes vote.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. I strike the last word.
    Part of this amendment is good and part of this amendment 
is unworkable. And I'd be happy to accept that part of the 
amendment that goes up through page 1, line 13, which would 
strike the argument as a defense to a prosecution that the 
badge is used for decorative purposes or any other recreational 
purpose--thus keeping in memento, collection, or exhibit and 
for dramatic presentations such as a theatrical film or 
television production. I think that striking the two things 
that I mentioned would tighten up this law. Remember, this is 
an affirmative defense to a prosecution.
    The other provisions, I think, are unworkable in that it 
requires the Attorney General by rule to establish some kind of 
a genuine authenticity of a badge--I think the AG has got 
better things to do than that; as well as having some type of a 
chain of title that, when there's a transfer of a badge, there 
is a statement that is made by the buyer that the badge will be 
used for a lawful purpose. Now, who's going to say that they're 
planning and using the badge for an unlawful purpose? A lot of 
these statements that would be made would end up being false on 
their face if somebody was attempting to use the badge for a 
criminal purpose.
    If the gentleman from New York is willing to modify his 
amendment, to strike out all of the material beginning on line 
14, page 1--beginning on line 14, page 1, ending at the end of 
the amendment, we'd be happy to accept it. But otherwise, I 
think we're making a promise that we're not going to be able to 
deliver on.
    I yield back the balance of my time.
    The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman 
from New York, Mr. Weiner.
    Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The other gentleman from New York, 
Mr. Nadler. For what purpose do you seek recognition?
    Mr. Nadler. I was just wondering, and I would yield to the 
gentleman from New York, Mr. Weiner----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Nadler.--to--oh, thank you. I strike the last word and 
I'm recognized for 5 minutes.
    I would yield to Mr. Weiner to--I was wondering if he was 
taking the chairman's suggestion on the amendment or not.
    Mr. Weiner. Well, I didn't have time or the ability to gain 
time. If you'll yield to me----
    Mr. Nadler. I yield to you.
    Mr. Weiner. I think that it is not really that difficult to 
work out the problems that you articulated. And I think the 
Attorney General should be aware, and there should be some 
certification when someone sells a badge on the Internet, as to 
its lawful use.
    However, in keeping with the chairman's kind offer, I will, 
if there's an opportune time, accept his suggestion that we 
amend this by simply striking the provisions that permitted--
just to make sure I understand this, and I don't know if I have 
this right--that permit this to be collected for a decorative 
purpose or any recreational purpose? Is that what (2) and (4) 
are?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Yes.
    Mr. Weiner. And leave the rest for another time.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection, the amendment is 
modified by striking all of the material after page 1, line 13 
in the amendment.
    Hearing no objection, so ordered.
    Will the gentleman yield back?
    Mr. Nadler. Yes, I yield back.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The question is on the amendment 
offered by the gentleman from New York, Mr. Weiner, as 
modified.
    Those in favor will say aye?
    Opposed, no?
    The ayes appear to have it. The ayes have it and the 
amendment as modified is agreed to.
    Are there further amendments that we can deal with in 10 
minutes before rollcall?
    Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from New York, Mr. 
Nadler.
    Mr. Nadler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I have an amendment at the desk designated--designated, 
let's see--MR.002.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report the 
amendment.
    The Clerk. Amendment to H.R. 10 offered by Mr. Nadler.
    Add at the end of title II the following:
    Subtitle I--Whistleblower Protection
    Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous the amendment be 
considered as read.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection, so ordered.
    The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
    [The amendment of Mr. Nadler follows:]
      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


    Mr. Nadler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    This amendment would provide an insurance policy to the 
American people that any problems or wrongdoing at the FBI will 
come to light and that Congress, whose job it is to conduct 
oversight, will have all relevant information it needs to do 
its job.
    The amendment provides explicit whistleblower protections 
for employees of the FBI. In the other body, Senators Grassley 
and Leahy have been working on the same effort.
    Under current law, FBI employees have a separate but 
supposedly equal system in which the Agency itself reviews 
whistleblower reprisal claims internally. Not surprisingly, the 
Bureau has never found in one single occasion that it has 
engaged in illegal retaliation. That's quite a system. It's 
good to be the king.
    We do not allow people to sit as judges in their own cases 
in this country. We should not allow it what the security of 
our Nation is at stake.
    Why is this a national security issue? Because courageous 
whistleblowers, like FBI Agent Colleen Rowley, risk their 
careers and perhaps much more if they come forward to report 
problems at the Bureau.
    Everyone remembers Agent Rowley. She is the one who came 
forward with a 13-page memo to the Director detailing failings 
at the Bureau leading up to the catastrophe of 9/11. These 
revelations were the subject of numerous hearings and have 
informed the work of Congress ever since.
    As Agent Rowley said in her memo, the FBI operates in ``a 
climate of fear which has chilled aggressive law enforcement 
action.'' For example, when agents in the FBI's Minneapolis 
field office became frustrated with repeated foot-dragging at 
headquarters and turned to the CIA for help, they received 
reprimands from Bureau supervisors. We should reward that kind 
of courage. We need people to come forward with important 
information that could improve our law enforcement work.
    As the members of this Committee know all too well, we 
cannot always rely on the people at the top to be as candid 
about failings in their own agency as they should be. 
Whistleblowers sometimes are the only way we have to get the 
truth.
    If people do not believe that the law is on their side and 
if people reasonably believe they will have no protection if 
they tell the truth, then we will not be able to get the truth. 
In the face of the terrorist threat, we must have all the 
information that can possibly obtain and we must not let 
threats and intimidation of FBI employees prevent them from 
getting at the truth.
    And again, if Agent Rowley had been listened to--she was 
the one, remember, who came forward with the information about 
people taking flying--about people from other countries taking 
flying lessons. No one listened to her. She was the one that 
Senator Grassley had to specifically say to the Attorney 
General that he expected--he would be keeping an eye and wanted 
to make sure that there was no retaliation taken against Agent 
Rowley.
    Now, we have a whistleblower protection statute on the 
books. This amendment would simply extend that statute to cover 
the FBI. The FBI is the only Government agency exempt from the 
regular whistleblower statute. They have their own internal 
statute, which has never, ever operated because the FBI 
Director has to decide if he is or is not the villain in 
persecuting some whistleblower. And surprise--the FBI Director 
has never found himself to be the villain.
    We cannot allow this. If we want to make sure that if 
something--if there is incompetence, if there are terrible 
mistakes that endanger our security at the FBI, we depend on 
whistleblowers to come forward to the Attorney General, to the 
Special Counsel, to Congress and tell us what's going on.
    So what this amendment does is to increase the security of 
the American people, as Senator Grassley and Senator Leahy are 
urging in the other body, by making the FBI subject to the same 
whistleblower law, the same whistleblower protection law as 
every other agency and dispense with its own internal system 
that simply hasn't worked on one single occasion.
    So, Mr. Chairman, I urge the adoption of this amendment and 
I yield back the balance of my time.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The chair recognizes himself for 5 
minutes in opposition to the amendment.
    The amendment changes the existing whistleblower protection 
law that places the FBI under the Merit Systems Protection 
Board. The MSPB is an independent, quasi-judicial agency in the 
executive branch to hear and decide appeals for Federal 
employees under the Competitive Services regarding personnel 
action. The FBI as well as other intelligence agencies are not 
covered by the MSPB.
    The amendment should be opposed, as Congress has 
specifically excluded the FBI, the CIA, the Defense 
Intelligence Agency, the Central Imagery Office, and the NSA 
from this Board due to the classified and sensitive nature of 
their work and the fact that any employee may have access to 
such information.
    Furthermore, the existing statutory structure protects FBI 
employees without compromising sensitive law enforcement 
information or national security as it directs the President to 
provide protections for the FBI whistleblowers in a manner 
consistent with the applicable provisions of sections 1214 and 
1221 of this title.
    Furthermore, President Clinton delegated to the Attorney 
General his authority under section 2303(c) and the Attorney 
General subsequently issued regulations under which employees 
of the FBI could make protective disclosures under section 
2303, as well as a mechanism for the investigation of 
allegations of retaliation and for corrective action where 
warranted.
    The regulation and law provides balance between the 
protection of FBI employees and the protection of information 
that is law enforcement-sensitive or that is classified in the 
interests of national security.
    The events of September 11, as well as the FBI's central 
role in foreign counterintelligence and in investigating and 
disrupting domestic and international terrorism threats, has 
increased the FBI's intelligence functions dramatically. 
Accordingly, the rationale for the FBI's exclusion from the 
government-wide whistleblower statute has been strengthened and 
not diminished.
    The amendment should be opposed, and I yield back the 
balance of my time.
    The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman 
from New York, Mr. Nadler.
    Those in favor will say aye?
    Opposed, no?
    The noes appear to have it. The noes have it and the 
amendment----
    Mr. Weiner. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner.--the amendment is not agreed to.
    Mr. Berman. Mr. Chairman? Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Consideration will now--does the 
gentleman from New York want a rollcall on this amendment?
    Mr. Nadler. Yeah.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Okay. [Laughter.]
    Mr. Weiner. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The consideration will now resume 
of the five amendments for which votes have been postponed. 
Because the chair did not postpone the instant amendment by Mr. 
Nadler, the question first is on the Nadler amendment 
relative----
    Mr. Weiner. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The chair is putting the question, 
explaining what your voting on.
    The question is on agreement to the Nadler amendment 
relative to FBI whistleblower procedures.
    Those in favor of this Nadler amendment will, as your names 
are called, answer aye----
    Mr. Weiner. Mr. Chairman, point of order.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner.--opposed, no, and the clerk will 
call the roll.
    Mr. Weiner. Mr. Chairman, point of order.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman will state his point 
of order.
    Mr. Weiner. Mr. Chairman, given the previous announcements 
on the timing of the bill, could I ask unanimous consent that 
we withhold for 5 minutes to allow us to call three members who 
are not here, who were given reason to believe that at 3:05 the 
vote would be cast, just to make sure that they didn't see what 
was going on. I think----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Well, the chair announced that it 
would be at--the rolled votes would be at 3:20, which was 30 
minutes after the end of the last 5-minute rollcall. This vote 
is not a rolled vote. By the time we finish this rollcall, it 
will be 3:20.
    Mr. Weiner. Well, but Mr. Chairman, we were led to believe 
that there would be no votes until such time as the rolled 
votes were called. So just give us a few minutes to call our 
remaining members. There are only three members who are 
missing.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. What does the gentleman propose to 
do in the 3 minutes remaining?
    Mr. Weiner. Are there other amendments we can offer? We can 
have----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Okay, well, pursuant to the chair's 
prior announcement and pursuant to Committee Rule 2(h)1, the 
vote on the instant Nadler amendment will be postponed.
    For what purpose does the gentleman from California, Mr. 
Berman, seek recognition?
    Mr. Berman. Move to strike the last word, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Berman. In the debate earlier on the Berman-Delahunt 
amendment, which seeks to substitute for the blanket closure of 
asylum hearings in special cases a case-by-case adjudication of 
whether or not classified information, confidential sources, or 
the needs of the applicant require a closed hearing, the 
gentleman from Indiana, the chairman of the Subcommittee, 
asserted twice that at the present time all asylum hearings--
way beyond the Creppy directive--all asylum hearings, all 
hearings on admissibility are closed and so why open these?
    I am sure inadvertently and unintentionally the chairman 
was completely wrong about that, and I just think the Committee 
members should know that in fact INS regulations, now Homeland 
Security regulations, specify that except in select cases all 
such hearings are open. And I thought that the Committee should 
have the correct information in front of them before going to a 
vote.
    The amendment that we have offered, Mr. Delahunt and I, 
simply substitutes for the blanket closure of special-cases 
asylum hearings a case-by-case decision where the Government 
can say there is classified information that needs to be used, 
there are confidential informants that need to be used, or, in 
the case of the asylees, interest that torture or other kinds 
of things could come up if it's an open hearing.
    I yield back.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman yields back .
    It is now 3:20. Consideration will now resume on the five 
amendments that votes were postponed earlier in the day. The 
votes will be taken in the following order:
    First, the Nadler amendment striking State minimums for 
first responders grants.
    Second, the Jackson Lee amendment on verification of 
identification documents.
    Third, the Berman-Delahunt amendment on closed immigration 
hearings.
    Fourth, the Conyers substitute amendment, which is the text 
of the Senate bill.
    And fifth, the Nadler amendment on FBI whistleblower 
procedures.
    The question is on agreeing to the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from New York, Mr. Nadler, relating to striking State 
minimums for first responder grants.
    Those in favor will, as your names are called, answer aye; 
those opposed, no. The clerk will call the roll.
    The Clerk. Mr. Hyde?
    Mr. Hyde. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Hyde, no. Mr. Coble?
    Mr. Coble. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Coble, no. Mr. Smith?
    Mr. Smith. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Smith, no. Mr. Gallegly?
    Mr. Gallegly. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Gallegly, no. Mr. Goodlatte?
    Mr. Goodlatte. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Goodlatte, no. Mr. Chabot?
    Mr. Chabot. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chabot, no. Mr. Jenkins?
    Mr. Jenkins. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Jenkins, no. Mr. Cannon?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Bachus?
    Mr. Bachus. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Bachus, no. Mr. Hostettler?
    Mr. Hostettler. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Hostettler, no. Mr. Green?
    Mr. Green. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Green, no. Mr. Keller?
    Mr. Keller. Yes.
    The Clerk. Mr. Keller, aye. Ms. Hart?
    Ms. Hart. No.
    The Clerk. Ms. Hart, no. Mr. Flake?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Pence?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Forbes?
    Mr. Forbes. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Forbes, no. Mr. King?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Carter?
    Mr. Carter. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Carter, no. Mr. Feeney?
    Mr. Feeney. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Feeney, no. Mrs. Blackburn?
    Mrs. Blackburn. No.
    The Clerk. Mrs. Blackburn, no. Mr. Conyers?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Berman?
    Mr. Berman. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Berman, aye. Mr. Boucher?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Nadler?
    Mr. Nadler. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Nadler, aye. Mr. Scott?
    Mr. Scott. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Scott, aye. Mr. Watt?
    Mr. Watt. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Watt, aye. Ms. Lofgren?
    Ms. Lofgren. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Lofgren, aye. Ms. Jackson Lee?
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Jackson Lee, aye. Ms. Waters?
    Ms. Waters. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Waters, aye. Mr. Meehan?
    Mr. Meehan. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Meehan, aye. Mr. Delahunt?
    Mr. Delahunt. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Delahunt, aye. Mr. Wexler?
    Mr. Wexler. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Wexler, aye. Ms. Baldwin?
    Ms. Baldwin. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Baldwin, aye. Mr. Weiner?
    Mr. Weiner. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Weiner, aye. Mr. Schiff?
    Mr. Schiff. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Schiff, aye. Ms. Sanchez?
    Ms. Sanchez. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Sanchez, aye. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Members in the chamber who wish to 
cast or change their votes? The gentleman from Arizona, Mr. 
Flake?
    Mr. Flake. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Flake, no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. 
Conyers.
    Mr. Conyers. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Conyers, aye.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Further members in the chamber who 
wish to cast or change their votes? If not, the clerk will 
report.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, there are 16----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentlewoman from Wisconsin. You 
may change your vote if you wish.
    Ms. Baldwin. Aye to no.
    The Clerk. Ms. Baldwin, no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, there are 15 ayes and 18 noes.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. And the amendment is not agreed to.
    The question now is on agreeing to the amendment of the 
gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee, on verification of 
identification documents.
    Those in favor of the Jackson Lee amendment will, as your 
names are called, answer aye; those opposed, no. The clerk will 
call the roll.
    The Clerk. Mr. Hyde?
    Mr. Hyde. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Hyde, no. Mr. Coble?
    Mr. Coble. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Coble, no. Mr. Smith?
    Mr. Smith. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Smith, no. Mr. Gallegly?
    Mr. Gallegly. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Gallegly, no. Mr. Goodlatte?
    Mr. Goodlatte. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Goodlatte, no. Mr. Chabot?
    Mr. Chabot. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chabot, no. Mr. Jenkins?
    Mr. Jenkins. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Jenkins, no. Mr. Cannon?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Bachus?
    Mr. Bachus. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Bachus, no. Mr. Hostettler?
    Mr. Hostettler. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Hostettler, no. Mr. Green?
    Mr. Green. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Green, no. Mr. Keller?
    Mr. Keller. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Keller, no. Ms. Hart?
    Ms. Hart. No.
    The Clerk. Ms. Hart, no. Mr. Flake?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Pence?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Forbes?
    Mr. Forbes. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Forbes, no. Mr. King?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Carter?
    Mr. Carter. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Carter, no. Mr. Feeney?
    Mr. Feeney. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Feeney, no. Mrs. Blackburn?
    Mrs. Blackburn. No.
    The Clerk. Mrs. Blackburn, no. Mr. Conyers?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Berman?
    Mr. Berman. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Berman, aye. Mr. Boucher?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Nadler?
    Mr. Nadler. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Nadler, aye. Mr. Scott?
    Mr. Scott. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Scott, aye. Mr. Watt?
    Mr. Watt. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Watt, aye. Ms. Lofgren?
    Ms. Lofgren. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Lofgren, aye. Ms. Jackson Lee?
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Jackson Lee, aye. Ms. Waters?
    Ms. Waters. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Waters, aye. Mr. Meehan?
    Mr. Meehan. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Meehan, aye. Mr. Delahunt?
    Mr. Delahunt. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Delahunt, aye. Mr. Wexler?
    Mr. Wexler. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Wexler, aye. Ms. Baldwin?
    Ms. Baldwin. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Baldwin, aye. Mr. Weiner?
    Mr. Weiner. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Weiner, aye. Mr. Schiff?
    Mr. Schiff. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Schiff, aye. Ms. Sanchez?
    Ms. Sanchez. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Sanchez, aye. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Members in the chamber who wish to 
cast or change their votes? The gentleman from Arizona, Mr. 
Flake?
    Mr. Flake. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Flake, no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Further members in the chamber who 
wish to cast or change their vote?
    The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Conyers.
    Mr. Conyers. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Conyers, aye.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Further members who wish to cast or 
change their vote? If not, the clerk will report.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. 
Pence.
    Mr. Pence. No.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Indiana, say 
that again.
    Mr. Pence. No.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk didn't catch it.
    The Clerk. Mr. Pence, no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Iowa, Mr. King.
    Mr. King. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. King, no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, there are 20 ayes and 15 noes.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Is the clerk sure about that?
    The Clerk. I'm sorry, 15 ayes and 20 noes.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. And the amendment is not agreed to.
    The unfinished business is on agreeing on the amendment 
offered by the gentleman from California, Mr. Berman, and the 
gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Delahunt, on closed 
immigration hearings, on which further proceedings were 
postponed.
    Those in favor of the Berman-Delahunt amendment will, as 
your names are called, answer aye; those opposed, no. The clerk 
will call the roll.
    The Clerk. Mr. Hyde?
    Mr. Hyde. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Hyde, no. Mr. Coble?
    Mr. Coble. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Coble, no. Mr. Smith?
    Mr. Smith. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Smith, no. Mr. Gallegly?
    Mr. Gallegly. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Gallegly, no. Mr. Goodlatte?
    Mr. Goodlatte. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Goodlatte, no. Mr. Chabot?
    Mr. Chabot. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chabot, no. Mr. Jenkins?
    Mr. Jenkins. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Jenkins, no. Mr. Cannon?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Bachus?
    Mr. Bachus. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Bachus, no. Mr. Hostettler?
    Mr. Hostettler. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Hostettler, no. Mr. Green?
    Mr. Green. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Green, no. Mr. Keller?
    Mr. Keller. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Keller, no. Ms. Hart?
    Ms. Hart. No.
    The Clerk. Ms. Hart, no. Mr. Flake?
    Mr. Flake. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Flake, no. Mr. Pence?
    Mr. Pence. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Pence, no. Mr. Forbes?
    Mr. Forbes. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Forbes, no. Mr. King?
    Mr. King. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. King, no. Mr. Carter?
    Mr. Carter. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Carter, no. Mr. Feeney?
    Mr. Feeney. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Feeney, no. Mrs. Blackburn?
    Mrs. Blackburn. No.
    The Clerk. Mrs. Blackburn, no. Mr. Conyers?
    Mr. Conyers. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Conyers, aye. Mr. Berman?
    Mr. Berman. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Berman, aye. Mr. Boucher?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Nadler?
    Mr. Nadler. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Nadler, aye. Mr. Scott?
    Mr. Scott. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Scott, aye. Mr. Watt?
    Mr. Watt. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Watt, aye. Ms. Lofgren?
    Ms. Lofgren. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Lofgren, aye. Ms. Jackson Lee?
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Jackson Lee, aye. Ms. Waters?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Meehan?
    Mr. Meehan. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Meehan, aye. Mr. Delahunt?
    Mr. Delahunt. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Delahunt, aye. Mr. Wexler?
    Mr. Wexler. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Wexler, aye. Ms. Baldwin?
    Ms. Baldwin. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Baldwin, aye. Mr. Weiner?
    Mr. Weiner. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Weiner, aye. Mr. Schiff?
    Mr. Schiff. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Schiff, aye. Ms. Sanchez?
    Ms. Sanchez. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Sanchez, aye. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Are there members in the chamber 
who wish to cast or change their votes? The gentlewoman from 
California, Ms. Waters?
    Mr. Waters. The vote is aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Waters, aye.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Further members who wish to cast or 
change their votes? If not, the clerk will report.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, there are 15 ayes and 20 noes.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. And the amendment is not agreed to.
    The unfinished business is the amendment in the nature of a 
substitute, which is the text of the Senate bill, offered by 
the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Conyers, upon which further 
proceedings were postponed.
    Those in favor of the Conyers amendment in the nature of a 
substitute will, as your names are called, answer aye; those 
opposed, no. The clerk will call the roll.
    The Clerk. Mr. Hyde?
    Mr. Hyde. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Hyde, no. Mr. Coble?
    Mr. Coble. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Coble, no. Mr. Smith?
    Mr. Smith. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Smith, no. Mr. Gallegly?
    Mr. Gallegly. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Gallegly, no. Mr. Goodlatte?
    Mr. Goodlatte. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Goodlatte, no. Mr. Chabot?
    Mr. Chabot. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chabot, no. Mr. Jenkins?
    Mr. Jenkins. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Jenkins, no. Mr. Cannon?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Bachus?
    Mr. Bachus. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Bachus, no. Mr. Hostettler?
    Mr. Hostettler. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Hostettler, no. Mr. Green?
    Mr. Green. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Green, no. Mr. Keller?
    Mr. Keller. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Keller, no. Ms. Hart?
    Ms. Hart. No.
    The Clerk. Ms. Hart, no. Mr. Flake?
    Mr. Flake. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Flake, no. Mr. Pence?
    Mr. Pence. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Pence, no. Mr. Forbes?
    Mr. Forbes. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Forbes, no. Mr. King?
    Mr. King. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. King, no. Mr. Carter?
    Mr. Carter. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Carter, no. Mr. Feeney?
    Mr. Feeney. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Feeney, no. Mrs. Blackburn?
    Mrs. Blackburn. No.
    The Clerk. Mrs. Blackburn, no. Mr. Conyers?
    Mr. Conyers. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Conyers, aye. Mr. Berman?
    Mr. Berman. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Berman, aye. Mr. Boucher?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Nadler?
    Mr. Nadler. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Nadler, aye. Mr. Scott?
    Mr. Scott. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Scott, aye. Mr. Watt?
    Mr. Watt. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Watt, aye. Ms. Lofgren?
    Ms. Lofgren. With the victims of 9/11 in mind, aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Lofgren, aye. Ms. Jackson Lee?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Ms. Waters?
    Ms. Waters. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Waters, aye. Mr. Meehan?
    Mr. Meehan. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Meehan, aye. Mr. Delahunt?
    Mr. Delahunt. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Delahunt, aye. Mr. Wexler?
    Mr. Wexler. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Wexler, aye. Ms. Baldwin?
    Ms. Baldwin. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Baldwin, aye. Mr. Weiner?
    Mr. Weiner. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Weiner, aye. Mr. Schiff?
    Mr. Schiff. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Schiff, aye. Ms. Sanchez?
    Ms. Sanchez. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Sanchez, aye. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Further members in the chamber who 
wish to cast or change their votes? The gentlewoman from Texas.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Am I recorded?
    The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, Ms. Jackson Lee is not recorded.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Jackson Lee, aye.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Further members in the chamber who 
wish to cast or change their vote? If not, the clerk will 
report.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, there are 15 ayes and 20 noes.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. And the amendment is not agreed to.
    The unfinished business is the vote on the amendment 
offered by the gentleman from New York, Mr. Nadler, relating to 
whistleblower provisions on the FBI on which further 
proceedings were postponed. Those in favor of the Nadler 
amendment will, as your names are called, answer aye, those 
opposed, no, and the clerk will call the roll.
    The Clerk. Mr. Hyde?
    Mr. Hyde. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Hyde, no. Mr. Coble?
    Mr. Coble. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Coble, no. Mr. Smith?
    Mr. Smith. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Smith, no. Mr. Gallegly?
    Mr. Gallegly. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Gallegly, no. Mr. Goodlatte?
    Mr. Goodlatte. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Goodlatte, no. Mr. Chabot?
    Mr. Chabot. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chabot, no. Mr. Jenkins?
    Mr. Jenkins. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Jenkins, no. Mr. Cannon?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Bachus?
    Mr. Bachus. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Bachus, no. Mr. Hostettler?
    Mr. Hostettler. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Hostettler, no. Mr. Green?
    Mr. Green. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Green, no. Mr. Keller?
    Mr. Keller. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Keller, no. Ms. Hart?
    Ms. Hart. No.
    The Clerk. Ms. Hart, no. Mr. Flake?
    Mr. Flake. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Flake, no. Mr. Pence?
    Mr. Pence. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Pence, no. Mr. Forbes?
    Mr. Forbes. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Forbes, no. Mr. King?
    Mr. King. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. King, no. Mr. Carter?
    Mr. Carter. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Carter, no. Mr. Feeney?
    Mr. Feeney. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Feeney, no. Mrs. Blackburn?
    Mrs. Blackburn. No.
    The Clerk. Mrs. Blackburn, no. Mr. Conyers?
    Mr. Conyers. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Conyers, aye. Mr. Berman?
    Mr. Berman. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Boucher?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Nadler?
    Mr. Nadler. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Nadler, aye. Mr. Scott?
    Mr. Scott. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Scott, aye. Mr. Watt?
    Mr. Watt. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Watt, aye. Ms. Lofgren?
    Ms. Lofgren. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Lofgren, aye. Ms. Jackson Lee?
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Jackson Lee, aye. Ms. Waters?
    Ms. Waters. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Waters, aye. Mr. Meehan?
    Mr. Meehan. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Meehan, aye. Mr. Delahunt?
    Mr. Delahunt. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Delahunt, aye. Mr. Wexler?
    Mr. Wexler. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Wexler, aye. Ms. Baldwin?
    Ms. Baldwin. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Baldwin, aye. Mr. Weiner?
    Mr. Weiner. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Weiner, aye. Mr. Schiff?
    Mr. Schiff. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Schiff, aye. Ms. Sanchez?
    Ms. Sanchez. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Sanchez, aye. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Further members in the chamber who 
wish to cast or change their votes? If not, the clerk will 
report.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, there are 15 ayes and 20 noes.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. And the amendment is not agreed to.
    Before going to further amendments, let me state that it is 
the Chair's hope that we will be able to finish this bill 
today, and that will allow us time in the markup tomorrow to 
deal with the other bills on the markup schedule. And for 
tomorrow, should we finish the bill today, there are five 
relatively noncontroversial bills that the Chair would like to 
take up first and have the three controversial bills remaining 
on the markup be later on because I know many of the members 
wish to go to the floor to debate the marriage amendment.
    There will be two votes in about 5 to 15 minutes: a motion 
to recommit, which will be a 15-minute vote on the floor; and 
then a passage vote on the continuing resolution, which will be 
a 5-minute vote. I would like to ask the members to come back 
immediately after the second vote so that we can continue 
considering amendments and disposing of this bill. And the 
Chair will announce that, pursuant to the authority that he has 
under Committee Rule 2(h)(1), he will postpone votes on 
amendments until 5 o'clock. We do need to have a working quorum 
here to debate the amendments. The votes will come at 5 
o'clock, and hopefully there will not be that many amendments 
left after 5 o'clock. And I'd like to ask the members to stay 
around so that we can vote on reporting this bill once all of 
the amendments are disposed of. So that's----
    Mr. Berman. Would the chairman yield?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. I'm happy to yield to the gentleman 
from California.
    Mr. Berman. I wonder if the Chair--and I should preface it 
by saying my respect both for his intellect and his fairness in 
presiding over this Committee is deep and serious. But I'm 
wondering if he'd give us a little more to work with. As I 
understand it, the major reason for trying to finish this 
markup today is so that members of the Judiciary can be on the 
floor to participate in a constitutional amendment on same-sex 
marriage, an amendment which has already been defeated in the 
Senate and which every member of this Committee on the 
Democratic side is--or almost everyone is going to oppose. 
What's our motivation here?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The motivation to finish today or 
what?
    Mr. Berman. The motivation to finish today.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Well, the Chair would like to give 
the members time to go over to the floor tomorrow without being 
dragged back here to deal with the finishing up of this bill. 
And the Chair also would like at least to be able to deal with 
the five non-controversial bills that are also on today's 
markup calendar so we can get Committee reports filed on those 
bills and hopefully get them on the suspension calendar next 
week.
    Mr. Berman. Well, if the Chair--I mean, if the Chair would 
continue to yield, I'd just say that the importance of what 
we're doing here and this bill and the importance of--and I 
don't think any of us are trying to be dilatory, and I think 
the amendments all raise issues. But it so far exceeds in 
importance the idea of taking up a constitutional amendment--a 
constitutional amendment which is destined to fail and that 
everyone knows it's destined fail for no point other than a 
political point, to me the question of priorities is clearly in 
favor of doing this bill right.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Well, the answer to the question is 
that the decision having the marriage amendment being taken 
directly to the floor was not made by the chairman of this 
Committee, and the gentleman from California knows that. The 
Chair is trying to figure out a way to accommodate as many 
members as possible who wish to debate the marriage amendment, 
both pro and con, as well as to get our work done either today 
or tomorrow on the 9/11 Commission bill. And the Chair desires 
to do this right, and I think the Chair has run this markup in 
a way where we have not been partisan in many respects, and a 
number of amendments that have been offered by the minority 
party have been accepted.
    So we can only be in one place at one time. You know, if we 
don't get this bill done today, we're going to have to be here 
tomorrow because the chances of us having votes on Friday, I'm 
told, are less than 50/50. And if we're here tomorrow on the 9/
11 bill, then at least the five noncontroversial bills that are 
also on the markup calendar end up getting killed for this 
session.
    Mr. Delahunt. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the 
desk.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. For what purpose does the gentleman 
from Massachusetts seek recognition?
    Mr. Delahunt. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the 
desk.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report the 
amendment.
    While the clerk is doing that, I am told that the 
Intelligence Committee has also rolled its vote to 5 o'clock, 
so what I guess I'll say is that because there are some members 
of this Committee that also serve on the intelligence 
Committee, the Chair will amend his prior statement, and the 
votes on amendments will now be rolled until 5:30.
    The clerk will report the amendment.
    The Clerk. Amendment to H.R. 10 offered by Mr. Delahunt of 
Massachusetts. At the appropriate place in the bill, insert the 
following new section: Section. Data Mining Report----
    Mr. Delahunt. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that 
the bill----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection, so ordered.
    The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
    [The amendment of Mr. Delahunt follows:]
      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


    Mr. Delahunt. Mr. Chairman, this amendment, with whom I'm 
joined by my colleague from California, Mr. Berman, would 
achieve one of the clear recommendations of the September 11 
Commission. It's meant to restore a better balance between 
security and shared knowledge and to maintain critical 
safeguards on the privacy of the information shared. It would 
require that the Federal Government report back to Congress on 
the use of electric databases to share personal data regarding 
U.S. citizens. And hopefully this is an amendment which will be 
accepted. I have reviewed language that's been proffered to me 
by staff that I think makes it----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Would the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Delahunt. I yield. Since this amendment proposes a 
study on data mining and it is a matter of concern, we're 
prepared to accept this amendment.
    Mr. Delahunt. With that, I yield back.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The question is on the amendment 
offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Delahunt. 
Those in favor will say aye? Opposed, no.
    The ayes appear to have it. The ayes have it. The amendment 
is agreed to.
    Are there further amendments?
    Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from New York, Mr. 
Nadler.
    Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk, 
722xml.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report Nadler-
Sanchez 722xml.
    The Clerk. Amendment to H.R. 10 offered by Mr. Nadler and 
Ms. Sanchez. Strike Section 3009 and amend the table of 
contents accordingly.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    [The amendment of Mr. Nadler and Ms. Sanchez follows:]
    
    
    Mr. Nadler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Chairman, Section 3009 of this bill, which I would--
which this amendment would eliminate, would do several things, 
all of them unfair. First, it would eliminate stays of removal 
pending judicial review, allowing refugees who are claiming 
asylum to be returned to the persecution they fear while their 
cases are pending in Federal court. This provision has nothing 
to do with terrorism. It would be applicable to all immigration 
cases. It would have a particularly devastating impact on 
refugees and persons facing torture if they are deported.
    Under current law, anyone who needs a stay of deportation 
while he appeals his case to the Federal courts is already 
required to make a showing as to why he should get the stay of 
deportation, and he must include convincing the appeals court 
that there is merit to his appeal. Most courts that have 
considered this have held that a standard--that the standard 
for a temporary stay of removal after the 1996 Immigration Act 
should be the normal standard that courts apply for such stays 
in other kinds of cases based on some balance of the 
petitioner's likelihood of success on the merits, the 
irreparable injury he would suffer if denied a stay, whether 
the Government would suffer substantial injury from the 
granting of a stay, and public interest considerations.
    Under this bill, temporary stays of removal would be 
eliminated. The only remaining avenue for a Federal court to 
block a removal order would be through an injunction under 
Section 242(f) of the Act, requiring the petitioner to prove by 
clear and convincing evidence that the execution of the removal 
order would be prohibited as a matter of law. This is a higher 
standard than what most applicants are required or would be 
required to show in order to win the actual case. It would not 
protect refugees from deportation while they wait for a 
judicial review of their claims.
    In other words, a refugee who claims political asylum 
because of an actual and legitimate fear of persecution by 
reason of race, color, creed, national origin, political 
opinion, what have you, is deported, if he lost in front of the 
immigration officer, he's entitle to appeal to the courts. But 
this would say--and if he wants a stay of the deportation order 
while he appeals to the court, under current law he has to 
convince the court why a balance of the equities say he should 
get the stay. Under this bill, he could never get the stay. So 
first he gets deported, then he gets murdered, and then he can 
conduct his case in court to show why he should be un-murdered 
and brought back to this country. That does not make any sense, 
and it basically says that the immigration officer has final 
say and that the courts have no review.
    The second provision of this bill--of this provision that I 
would eliminate would bar several categories of appellants from 
review by the court of appeals altogether. It would preclude 
any Federal court review of any applicant--for any applicant 
for protection under the Convention Against Torture, to which 
this Government is a signatory, would be denied any Federal 
court appeal. Many of those affected by this measure would also 
be made ineligible for protection by Section 3302--3032, which 
is the next provision here. In other words, all these 
provisions in this section essentially say that once the 
department has determined, the administrative department has 
determined that they don't want to grant asylum, you can still 
appeal to court. But you cannot get a stay of the deportation 
order no matter how good your case, even if the case--even if 
the court thinks that they should grant a stay.
    It used to be you got an automatic stay pending judicial 
review. In 1996, we said you have to convince the court that 
there's a likelihood you'll succeed on the merits, that you'd 
be irreparably harmed if you were deported without waiting for 
the judicial review, that the Government probably was going to 
lose, and so forth.
    Now this would say you can never get the stay, and, 
frankly, that's unreasonable. And this has nothing to do with 
terrorism. This is all cases where people say--where people are 
claiming political asylum in refugee cases. And, again, it 
should not be in this 9/11 bill. And if we're going to make 
this drastic change so that people lose essentially all their 
rights to court review, we should do it after due 
consideration--and, frankly, we shouldn't do it. So I urge the 
adoption of the amendment and I yield back.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The time of the gentleman has 
expired. We now have two votes. The Committee will be recessed. 
Members should come back immediately after voting the second 
time to continue debate on the amendments, and votes on the 
amendments will be rolled until 5:30.
    The Committee stands recessed.
    [Recess.]
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The Committee will be in order.
    When the Committee recessed, pending was an amendment 
offered by the gentleman from New York, Mr. Nadler, to strike 
Section 3009 relating to judicial review of orders of removal.
    For what purpose does the gentleman from Indiana, Mr. 
Hostettler, seek recognition?
    Mr. Hostettler. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last 
word.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Hostettler. Mr. Chairman, I want to rise in opposition 
to the amendment to strike Section 3009. Section 3009 clarifies 
limitations on injunctive relief that Congress included in the 
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
passed in 1996. In that Act, we limited the authority of 
reviewing courts to enjoin removal. That limitation prohibited 
courts from enjoining removal unless the alien ``showed by 
clear and convincing evidence that the entry or execution of 
the removal order is prohibited as a matter of law.''
    In the Act, we also struck the provision that terminated 
judicial review once an alien departed the United States. Read 
together, these provisions make it clear that aliens must meet 
a high burden to receive injunctive relief, but if they fail to 
do so, they could continue their appeals from outside the 
United States.
    Reviewing courts, however, have circumvented the 
limitations on injunctions by granting instead stays. Section 
3009 of the underlying bill clarifies the limitations on 
injunctive relief by including stays in the consideration. It 
should be noted that this section does not eliminate stays. It 
simply sets the standards that an alien must meet to obtain a 
stay. Therefore, an asylum applicant can still enjoin removal 
by satisfying the injunctive standard we set in 1996, once 
again, clear and convincing evidence.
    It should also be remembered that all asylum applicants 
have at least two layers of review at the immigration court and 
board level even before they could seek judicial review. In 
summary, Section 3009 restores order to the judicial review of 
immigrant--immigration decisions to the benefit of the alien 
petitioners, the courts, and the fair and efficient 
administration and enforcement of our immigration laws. These 
reforms will ensure that aliens will have a day in court but 
that criminals will not be able to delay their lawful removal 
from the United States. These provisions are fully consistent 
with both the Supreme Court's decision and settled 
jurisprudence regarding the availability of habeas corpus. 
Accordingly, Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to oppose this 
amendment to Strike Section 3009, and I yield back the balance 
of my time.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentlewoman from California, 
Ms. Sanchez.
    Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I move to strike the 
last word.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentlewoman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Ms. Sanchez. I am opposed to this amendment that's been 
offered jointly with Mr. Nadler, and I wish to associate myself 
with his remarks. But I wish to point out that under--under the 
current H.R. 10 as currently written without the amendment, the 
removal order, the standard that would be required for the 
removal order which in most instances be a higher standard than 
what applicants would be required to show in order to win their 
actual immigration cases. And for folks that are seeking asylum 
or who are political refugees, the fact that they would be 
deported and sent back to their country of origin and not 
subject to judicial review means that the people who most--
would stand most to benefit from a stay pending their day in 
court would actually be sent back to conditions under which 
they were fleeing in the first place.
    So under--although we do need to revise our immigration 
laws and make sure that they are efficient, we shouldn't be 
undermining the very reasons for which they were written in the 
first place. And so as a result, I urge my colleagues to 
support the amendment and yield back the balance of my time.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The question is on the amendment 
offered by the gentleman from New York, Mr. Nadler. Those in 
favor will say aye? Opposed, no?
    The noes appear to have it. The noes have it, and the 
amendment is not agreed to.
    The gentleman from California, Mr. Schiff.
    Mr. Schiff. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk 
numbered 160.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report the 
amendment.
    The Clerk. Amendment to H.R. 10, offered by Mr. Schiff. At 
the appropriate place in subtitle D of Title II, insert the 
following new section----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection, the amendment is 
considered as read.
    The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
    [The amendment of Mr. Schiff follows:]
    
    
    Mr. Schiff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. On page 380 of the 9/
11 Commission Report, the Commission writes, in its section to 
strengthen counterproliferation efforts, that while efforts to 
shut down Libya's illegal nuclear program have been generally 
successful, Pakistan's illicit trade in the nuclear smuggling 
networks of Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan have revealed that 
the spread of nuclear weapons is a problem of global 
dimensions. Attempts to deal with Iran's nuclear program----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Would the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Schiff. Yes.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. I believe this amendment is a 
constructive addition to the bill and am prepared to support 
it.
    Mr. Schiff. Mr. Chairman, I won't talk you out of it, and I 
yield back the balance of my time.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is very wise.
    The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman 
from California, Mr. Schiff. Those in favor will say aye? 
Opposed, no?
    The ayes appear to have it. The ayes have it, and the 
amendment is agreed to.
    Are there further amendments? The gentlewoman from Texas, 
Ms. Jackson Lee.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. I have an amendment that is 274xml.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report the 
amendment.
    The Clerk. Amendment to H.R. 10, offered by Ms. Jackson Lee 
of Texas. Strike Section 3032 and conform provisions and amend 
the table of contents accordingly.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentlewoman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    [The amendment of Ms. Jackson Lee follows:]
    
    
    Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the chairman.
    I believe one of the issues that again points to the 
structure in which this bill was brought to this Committee, and 
as well presented to all of our Committees, was the fact that a 
lot of what was contained in the 9/11 Commission Report and 
ultimately the McCain-Lieberman bill and the Shays-Maloney bill 
was completely ignored. And a lot of the principles of the 
United States as well was completely ignored, and I would hope 
my colleagues would not equate the idea of the fairness of our 
original rules and our treaties and our Constitution as 
undermining, if you will, the idea of security.
    I heard recently from a reporter that works a lot on 
intelligence issues with one of our major newspapers, and, 
unfortunately, America has been frightened into giving up civil 
liberties and the respect for such on the basis of security. I 
would hope that we would be able to turn ourselves away to a 
more effective approach.
    Presently, Section 3032 of the 9/11 Recommendations 
Implementation Act would retroactively exclude classes of 
aliens from protection under the United Nations Convention 
Against Torture. It also would make it harder to establish 
eligibility for CAT relief. Instead of being able to make the 
present burden of proof, which is more likely than not, it 
would require applicants to prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that they would be tortured if they're deported to the 
country from which they are seeking.
    That section also would prohibit the Federal court 
challenges to a decision removing CAT protection under the new 
law, except as part of a review of a final order of removal.
    I believe we are better than that, and I believe that we 
can adhere to the Convention dealing with terror, the 
Convention Against terror--Torture, rather, and as well be 
safe. That Convention is a fundamental pillar of our human 
rights and national interest policy, and it prohibits our 
removal and extradition from processes from returning aliens to 
countries where they probably would be tortured. It is one of 
the four primary international human rights documents. It does 
not release those individuals, however, and allows them in 
essence to do a refiling, if you will, and as well to be 
detained here in the United States. It stands along with the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Genocide 
Convention as the cornerstone of our country's efforts to stop 
the most heinous forms of governmental oppression and abuse.
    Let me remind my colleagues that those who may be subject 
to this particular provision that is in the underlying bill may 
not have perpetrated any actual acts of terror. They may be 
claimed as terrorists for words that they have said, for those 
they have associated with, for maybe even their intention. So 
the idea that someone would have that they deserve whatever 
they get, they should be tortured because they perpetrated 
heinous acts, may not be true. They may only be detainees. They 
may only be under suspicion and then be suspected--or be 
subjected, rather, to the idea of returning to a place that 
would torture them.
    The Section 3032 exception would violate U.S. treaty 
obligations under the convention. Article III of the Convention 
forbids a state party from forcibly returning a person to a 
country when there are substantial grounds for believing that 
he would be in danger being subjected to torture. In ratifying 
the treaty, the U.S. Senate did not express any reservation, 
understanding a proviso that might exclude a person from the 
Article III prohibition. So why we are now engaging in that 
activity when, in fact, I believe we have other alternatives 
other than suggesting that these individuals would absolutely 
be sent to places where they might be tortured.
    I support this absolute prohibition on moral as well as 
legal grounds. We all know what torture can result in. It is 
horrendous and contrary to our ethical, spiritual, and 
democratic beliefs. It does not necessitate further safety of 
the American people, and that should be made very clear. We're 
all operating under this aura, this umbrella, this fear that we 
must do everything short of eliminating, I guess, the 
Constitution as it stands to provide for our security. No, I 
would argue vigorously that we need to improve our 
intelligence, the interoperability of our intelligence, the 
leadership of our intelligence, the investment in our 
intelligence. We must secure the borders, as we are attempting 
to do. We must provide enhanced authority--resources, rather, 
to Border Patrol agents and training. But I don't believe that 
we have to cut away at conventions that we've signed or the 
Constitution that we have signed.
    In the Davis case, 533 U.S. 678, the United States Supreme 
Court held that the detention provisions in the INA read in 
light of the Constitution's demands limit an alien's post-
removal period detention to a period reasonably necessary to 
bring about that alien's removal from the United States.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentlewoman's time----
    Ms. Jackson Lee. I would ask my colleagues to support this 
amendment in the idea of fairness and that we're able to 
balance security and safety.
    I yield back my time.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Jackson Lee follows:]
       Prepared Statement of the Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a 
Representative in Congress From the State of Texas, and Ranking Member, 
        Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims
    Section 3032 of the 9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act would 
retroactively exclude classes of aliens from protection under the 
United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT). It also would make it 
harder to establish eligibility for CAT relief. Instead of being able 
to meet the present burden of proof, which is ``more likely than not,'' 
it would require applicants to prove by ``clear and convincing 
evidence'' that they would be tortured if they are deported to the 
country from which they are seeking relief. Section 3032 also would 
prohibit federal court challenges to a decision removing CAT protection 
under the new law except as part of the review of a final order of 
removal.
    The Convention Against Torture is a fundamental pillar of our human 
rights and national interest policy. It prohibits our removal and 
extradition processes from returning aliens to countries where they 
probably would be tortured. It is one of the four primary international 
human rights documents. It stands, along with the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, and the Genocide Convention, as the cornerstone of our 
country's efforts to stop the most heinous forms of governmental 
oppression and abuse.
    The section 3032 exceptions would violate U.S. treaty obligations 
under the Convention. Article 3 of the Convention forbids a State Party 
from forcibly returning a person to a country when there are 
substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being 
subjected to torture. In ratifying the treaty, the U.S. Senate did not 
express any reservation, understanding, or proviso that might exclude a 
person from the Article 3 prohibition.
    I support this absolute prohibition on moral as well as legal 
grounds. Torture is so horrendous and so contrary to our ethical, 
spiritual, and democratic beliefs that it must absolutely be condemned 
and prohibited. Passing the section 3032 provisions would amount to 
legalizing the outsourcing of torture by the United States government. 
Even the most abhorrent individuals are entitled to invoke CAT 
protection to prevent being returned to torture in their home 
countries. Returning someone to a place where he or she would be 
tortured would sustain the kind of system in which violent 
authoritarian regimes exist. Such regimes feed on continued torture.
    In Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U. S. 678 (2001), the United States 
Supreme Court held that the detention provisions in the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, read in light of the Constitution's demands, limit an 
alien's post-removal-period detention to a period reasonably necessary 
to bring about that alien's removal from the United States. The Supreme 
Court found further that once removal is no longer reasonably 
foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized by statute--
except where special circumstances justify continued detention, such as 
when continued detention is necessary to protect the public.
    In response to that Supreme Court decision, the former Immigration 
and Naturalization Service promulgated regulations for determining the 
circumstances under which an alien may be held in custody beyond the 
statutory removal period. These regulations authorized the government 
to continue to detain aliens who present foreign policy concerns or 
national security and terrorism concerns, as well as individuals who 
are specially dangerous due to a mental condition or personality 
disorder, even though their removal is not likely in the reasonably 
foreseeable future.
    I want to emphasize that while the Convention prohibits sending 
them back to their home countries, the prohibition is country specific. 
It does not bar sending them to other countries. Also, although the 
grant of CAT protection is absolute, it is not permanent relief. It can 
be removed when the conditions in the home country change so as to 
eliminate the risk of torture.
    I also object to the change in the burden of proof that would 
require the applicant to prove by ``clear and convincing evidence'' 
that he will be tortured. This is an unrealistic requirement. The 
simple truth is that raising the standard to this level of certainty 
would result in sending people to countries where they will be 
tortured. Moreover, it would violate Article 3 of the Convention, which 
forbids a State Party from forcibly returning a person to a country 
where there are ``substantial grounds'' for believing that he would be 
in danger of being subjected to torture.
    Finally, I object to making such changes retroactively and 
prohibiting federal court review of CAT decisions unless it is part of 
the review of a final order of removal. Petitions for review of a 
removal order must be filed within 30 days. Changing the standards and 
applying the changes retroactively puts individuals who have already 
won CAT relief in the position of reproving their cases with evidence 
that may no longer exist. These same individuals are likely to find 
themselves with no opportunity for federal court review of adverse 
decisions, which would eliminate the checks and balances that are the 
fundamental component of our democracy. This cannot be justified where 
the consequence of a mistake could be subjecting a person to torture.
    I urge you to vote for my amendment to remove section 3032 from the 
9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act. Thank you.

    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. 
Hostettler.
    Mr. Hostettler. Move to strike the last word.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Hostettler. I thank the chairman.
    Mr. Chairman, I strongly oppose the amendment. The Senate 
passed legislation implementing the Convention Against Torture 
in 1998. The Convention is aimed at ensuring that human rights 
violators and others engaged in torture are brought to justice 
and details the process for extradition, detention, criminal 
prosecution, and victim compensation. The Convention also 
prohibits the return of an alien to a country where there are 
substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in 
danger of being tortured.
    When the Senate passed the implementing legislation, it 
stated that, ``To the maximum extent consistent with the 
obligations of the United States under the Convention, the INS 
regulations shall exclude from the protection of such 
regulations aliens described in Section 241(b)(3)(B) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act.''
    What kinds of aliens are so described? Aliens who have 
engaged in Nazi persecution or genocide; aliens who have 
engaged in terrorist activity; aliens who have been convicted 
of particularly serious crimes and are thus a danger to the 
community of the United States; aliens who committed serious 
crimes outside the U.S.; and aliens where there are reasonable 
grounds to believe are a danger to the security of the United 
States.
    This makes perfect sense. After all, the very same aliens 
are barred under the Immigration and Nationality Act from 
receiving asylum. But the Reno Justice Department clearly 
disobeyed the Senate's instructions in writing the regulations 
creating relief from deportation under the Convention. The 
regulations, amazingly, did not exclude such dangerous 
individuals from relief from deportation, ignoring the 
instructions of the Senate.
    The Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and 
Claims conducted a hearing in July of last year on the effect 
of the INS regulations. From March 1999 through August 2002, 
immigration judges granted hundreds of criminal aliens relief 
from deportation under the Convention. This included two 
murderers that we know of--one who killed a spectator at a 
Gambian soccer game, and one who was implicated in a Mob-
related quintuple homicide in Uzbekistan.
    I might note for the record as well that the gentleman from 
Gambia who originally requested relief from the Convention 
Against Torture got homesick and went back voluntarily to 
Gambia.
    But it is not bad enough that murderers and other criminal 
aliens cannot be deported. In the 2001 decision of Zadvydas v. 
Davis, the Supreme Court ruled that except for in the most 
narrow of circumstances, it is unconstitutional for INS to 
indefinitely detain aliens with deportation orders whose 
countries will not take them back. Based on this decision, the 
Justice Department decided that no choice but to release back 
into the streets those criminals, criminal aliens who had 
received protection under the Convention. By the time of the 
hearing in July 2003, approximately 500 criminal aliens who had 
received relief under the Convention had been released into 
American communities, including the murderer from Uzbekistan. 
The Gambian murderer might have also been released, but as I 
said earlier, he went home voluntarily.
    In the ensuing year, who knows how many more criminal 
aliens have been released? We discovered at the hearing that 
even a Nazi war criminal was seeking to avoid deportation 
through the Convention. Who knows when the first terrorist 
alien will be released?
    Days ago, a suspected al Qaeda operative made claim under 
the Convention to forestall his deportation. Osama bin Laden 
himself could probably frustrate deportation by making a claim 
on the Convention since the more heinous a person's actions, 
the more likely that he or she might be subject to torture in 
their home country.
    The Hastert bill would simply force the Convention 
regulations to adhere to the intent originally espoused by the 
Senate. Aliens who have engaged in Nazi persecution or 
genocide, terrorist aliens, aliens who have been convicted of 
particularly serious crimes and are thus a danger to the 
community of the United States, aliens who have committed 
serious crimes outside our country, and aliens that are 
reasonable grounds to believe are a danger to the security of 
the U.S. will not be allowed to frustrate their deportations 
and be released onto the streets of our communities as a result 
of the baseline bill.
    I yield back the balance of my time and ask my colleagues 
to oppose the amendment.
    Ms. Lofgren. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentlewoman from California, 
Ms. Lofgren.
    Ms. Lofgren. Mr. Chairman, I think the chairman of the 
Subcommittee has a serious misunderstanding of the amendment, 
and I would yield to the Ranking Member to further clarify.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the distinguished lady for her 
kindness, and I would say that there is a misunderstanding.
    First of all, my amendment is country specific and it 
allows for a refilement so that the individual could be 
deported to an alternative location. I've said often that this 
is a Nation of laws and immigrants, and immigration does not 
equate to terrorism. Many times the individuals detained have 
not perpetrated any act of violence, but they are detained on 
legitimate grounds. You are then going to violate the 
Convention Against Torture by sending these individuals off to 
a nation that perpetrates torture.
    We're not suggesting that these persons that may be under 
suspicion or may be here held for legitimate reasons should not 
then have the ability to be, if you will, subject to our laws 
that would provide them the punishment necessary to what they 
have done. But torture does not equate necessarily to that 
particular act. And, therefore, this is only saying that we 
should adhere to the Convention. This was not in the 9/11 
Commission Report and/or the legislation that really focuses on 
our safety and security. These are extraneous immigration 
provisions without any hearings or any vetting to know that 
this is necessary.
    I might also ask unanimous consent to put a letter 
submitted by Amnesty International, Human Rights First, and 
Human Rights Watch dated September 29, 2004, into the record. I 
ask unanimous consent for that.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection.
    [The letter follows:]
    
    
    Ms. Jackson Lee. I'd simply ask my colleagues to recognize 
what our responsibilities are. They're adding provisions both 
in terms of this provision and the one previously not accepted 
by this Committee, that was the Nadler-Sanchez provision, that 
simply asked for judicial review. We're trying to put in line 
some provisions of this legislation that came strictly from the 
Republican majority to put in line with really securing 
America, not, if you will, browbeating and--browbeating those 
individuals who may be simply under suspicion seems to be 
stretching it, and not providing any extra security and safety 
to those who are now frightened beyond speech. What we're doing 
is adding to the confusion. We're also undermining treaties and 
agreements that we've agreed to, and I'd ask my colleagues to 
support this amendment.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The time belongs to the gentlewoman 
from California.
    Ms. Lofgren. I'd yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from New York, Mr. 
Nadler.
    Mr. Nadler. Thank you, Mr. Speaker--Mr. Speaker? Mr. 
Chairman. I simply have two comments.
    Number one, the gentleman from Indiana gave us a long list 
of people who committed horrible crimes. I would simply point 
out that we're not talking about people who we know committed 
crimes. We're talking about people who are accused of having 
committed crimes, and maybe they did and maybe they didn't. And 
what we're seeking to do here is to say that while that is 
being determined, while it is determined if they're entitled to 
asylum, while it's determined if they're ineligible because 
they committed a crime or because they pose a risk to this 
country, or whatever, they shouldn't automatically be deported 
before that determination is made. It's a simple question of 
due process. You can't assume that everybody is guilty just 
because someone accused them of it. That should be elementary, 
and I regret that in this Congress it isn't.
    Secondly--secondly, what this provision that's sought to be 
repealed, this provision in this bill say is that--among other 
things, it says, ``Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
no court shall have jurisdiction to review the regulations 
adopted to implement this section.'' What this is saying is 
that the administrative officer has carte blanche, can ignore 
the United States Constitution, can ignore the law, can adopt 
any regulation he or she wants, and no one can challenge it in 
court.
    Now, I understand that the members of the majority don't 
trust the courts, even though most of the judges are now 
appointed by Republican Presidents, but you don't trust the 
courts. But do you trust any future bureaucrat in INS, or 
whatever we call INS these days? It seems to me that there 
ought to be some avenue for judicial review of bureaucratic 
decisions. And if you read Section 3033--32, which begins on 
page 213 of the bill, removals as such. And what this--what 
this amendment, as the Nadler-Sanchez amendment previously, 
seeks to do is to say, now, wait a minute--I don't think if 
anybody really read and looked at all these things carefully 
you'd have a lot of support for some of these provisions. I 
don't think most of the members of the majority here want to 
give carte blanche to any bureaucrat, who may be a Democrat in 
the future. You don't know. And he may want to ignore the law 
and may want to ignore the congressional intent, may want to 
ignore the Constitution. How can you say that no regulations 
that the bureaucrat puts out shall be reviewable in court by 
anybody?
    I think we should pass this amendment, and I yield back.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The question is on the amendment 
offered by the gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee. Those 
in favor will say aye? Opposed, no?
    The noes appear to have it.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. rollcall.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. rollcall is ordered. Pursuant to 
the Chair's prior announcement and Committee Rule 2(h)(1), 
further proceedings on the amendment will be postponed.
    Are there further amendments? The gentlewoman from Texas, 
Ms. Jackson Lee.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment 2--
excuse me. Amendment 278.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will read the amendment.
    The Clerk. Amendment to H.R. 10 offered by Ms. Jackson Lee 
of Texas. Page 62, after line 20 insert the following----
    Ms. Jackson Lee. I ask the amendment be considered as read, 
ask unanimous consent.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection so ordered. The 
gentlewoman is recognized for 5 minutes.
    [The amendment of Ms. Jackson Lee follows:]
      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


    Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the chairman very much. Again, I 
would hope that--I would have hoped that as we proceed, that we 
would certainly look to some of the provisions of the 9/11 
Commission and the emphasis that they put on balancing security 
with civil liberties. This amendment that I have would make the 
next generation airline passenger prescreening provision more 
effective while taking active measures to protect individual 
rights and liberties. The existing language in Subsection I of 
Section 2173 assigns a task of testing the next generation 
passenger prescreening system against automatic selectee and 
no-fly lists and records in the Consolidated and Integrated 
Terrorist Watch List maintained by the Federal Government 
through the Assistant Secretary designee. This is a very loose 
assignment of a very important task. Moreover, the duties of 
the Assistant Secretary would hardly allow for the time and 
effort that is necessary to perform the functions of this 
provision to address the needs of the American public.
    My amendment would assign this task rather to the Civil 
Liberties Protection Officer or designee thereof in 
consultation with the Assistant Secretary. Therefore, this 
amendment adds teeth to the existing provision in the area of 
personnel assignment. The Civil Liberties Protection Officer is 
the most appropriate personnel to perform this function, and 
its duties have been enumerated in Section 1022(b).
    Under the Jackson Lee amendment, under my amendment the 
civil liberties officer would assume performance of the 
passenger prescreening function of comparing passenger name 
records to the automatic selectee and no-fly list, and utilize 
all appropriate records and resources in the Consolidate and 
Integrated Terrorist Watch List maintained by the Federal 
Government.
    We have already seen a series of hearings that highlighted 
some of the ludicrousness of what has happened with these watch 
lists. We have heard representation by Senator Edward Kennedy 
in a hearing not long ago, and of course, John Lewis, known to 
many of us as a civil rights icon, likewise faced the brunt of 
this screening situation.
    We also note the 9/11 Commission, to its credit, was not 
unmindful of the importance of individual liberties and privacy 
and the necessity of respecting that on behalf of the values of 
the American people and our system of Government.
    This amendment is only a task assignment. It only allows us 
to be more efficient and more effective. It does not undermine 
any aspects of any of the underlying bills, including the 
amendment that was offered by John Conyers that did not pass, 
but was undermined by--that was submitted by John Conyers, does 
not undermine that particular focus either.
    This amendment simply gives a task to someone who I believe 
can do it much better, and that is the individual designated as 
the Civil Liberties Officer. I would ask my colleagues to 
support this because simply it represents tasks to do the job 
better and to comport with not only security but also civil 
liberties.
    I yield back.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The chair recognizes himself for 5 
minutes in opposition to the amendment.
    The current bill as written has adequate protections to 
protect civil liberties, and what the bill as it stands does is 
allows for a process for an individual to be removed from the 
no-fly list when the applicant has demonstrated that he or she 
is not a terrorist.
    What the Jackson Lee amendment does is allow a terrorist to 
institute a civil action against the Government when the agency 
makes a determination not to amend that individual's record, 
meaning the applicant asked the agency to review the record. If 
the agency reviews the record and says no, we've got to keep 
you on the no-fly list, then what the Jackson Lee amendment 
does is allow a suit against the Government, and the Government 
has to defend itself in court and probably have to disclose the 
reasons why someone was put on the no-fly list. Now, that's 
something that should not be made a matter of public record 
because it compromises intelligence sources. And this makes no 
difference if the terrorist or is innocent.
    Now, secondly, the amendment does thing that I think is not 
a good idea, and that is, is that it transfers this function 
from the Department of Homeland Security, which has 
jurisdiction over the Transportation Security Administration, 
to the National Intelligence Director Civil Liberties Office. 
The NID is supposed to be dealing with intelligence, and how it 
is collected and how it is implemented and who the intelligence 
is distributed to so that it can be effectively used. The NID's 
job is not to actually do the administration of the screening 
of who gets on an airplane and who does not get on the 
airplane.
    The Department of Homeland Security has a statutorily 
appointed privacy officer responsible for monitoring privacy 
ramifications of airline screening system. This officer is 
accountable to Congress. The amendment would require the NID 
Civil Liberties Officer to perform responsibilities that are 
not inherent to NID but to the Department of Homeland Security.
    And finally, the amendment strikes Section 2173, which 
includes more comprehensive protections to individuals then 
itemized in the amendment.
    For all these reasons, I believe that this amendment should 
be defeated, and yield back the balance of my time.
    Mr. Watt. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from North Carolina, 
Mr. Watt.
    Mr. Watt. Move to strike the last word.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Watt. I yield to the gentlelady from Texas.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the distinguished gentlemen. If we 
are really in the business of working a compromise, Mr. 
Chairman, the core provision we're willing to concede in order 
for this amendment to go forward. I would beg to differ as to 
whether or not we have placed this responsibility in an 
appropriate location. The transportation department deals with 
the issues of aviation and aviation security, as Homeland 
Security does. This person would be better tasked, having full 
information, in working closely on this no-fly list so that we 
can avoid violating the civil liberties and the civil rights of 
many of our traveling public who are within the United States.
    How would we like to have a complete logjam of the 
traveling public going to the counter and consistently being 
denied access to board because they have the wrong information. 
It is very difficult for the traveling public to access 
Government, or the public period. This particular officer and 
his staff or his staff and/or designees would provide that kind 
of safety net, if you will, and have the better skills to do 
so, and to move it more expeditiously, while being of course, 
paying a great deal of attention to detail.
    So I would argue that it is in the right place. It is an 
appropriate vehicle. It is certainly not in the Homeland 
Security Department for the very reason that we wanted to 
enhance the expertise of this civil liberties officer, and we 
wanted to make sure that their duties, or that their--that they 
had enough time and resources to be tasked to do this.
    I think that it makes for a better legislative initiative, 
and if we are here working to add substance to the underlying 
bill, then I think we can find ways to compromise. If that is 
not our intent, and to cast this bill as a single focus of one 
school of thought as opposed to being open-minded, then 
obviously we have no means of negotiation or compromise. But if 
we eliminated the core provision and allowed this officer to 
look at these aspects, I don't think that this would I any way 
undermine what we're trying to do in providing security and 
safety to the American public.
    And I yield back, yield back to the gentleman.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The time belongs to the gentleman 
from North Carolina.
    Mr. Watt. I yield back.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from New York, Mr. 
Nadler.
    Mr. Nadler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was intrigued by 
what you sort of said about people on the no-fly list. I've not 
really studied this amendment, but I gathered from what you 
said that you don't think that someone who says, gee, you know, 
goes to the airport, finds that he's on a no-fly list, appeals 
to the Government, the Government says no, we're right, you're 
wrong, we're going to keep you there. He shouldn't have any 
right to challenge the Government in court because maybe he 
really is a terrorist?
    What recourse does someone who is on the--or should someone 
who's on the no-fly list, who may need to fly for reasons of 
personal reasons or for business reasons, and the bureaucracy 
tells him, no, you're going to stay on the no-fly list. We're 
not going to tell you why you're on the no-fly list because 
that's secret information. What recourse does he have? And I'll 
yield. And what recourse should he have, or should that be a 
secret bureaucratic determination and he's helpless, he can 
never fly? Let's assume he's an American citizen. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. If the gentleman will yield?
    Mr. Nadler. Yes, I will.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. If a person's already been tried 
and convicted as a terrorist, he still has standing to sue 
under this amendment. And I guess my concern is, is that 
somebody's accused----
    Mr. Nadler.--that someone is tried and convicted?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Time belongs to the gentleman from 
New York.
    Mr. Nadler. Well, I thought we weren't talking only about 
people who were already tried and convicted. If we were, that's 
different.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Will the gentleman yield further?
    Mr. Nadler. Yes.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. I just point out that there's a 
great danger involved in the public disclosure of records. I 
understand that in the trial of the people who bombed the World 
Trade Center in 1993, the architect of the World Trade Center 
was required by the Government to testify in court that the 
twin towers were designed to withstand a direct hit by a 707 
aircraft. Well, guess what? That information ended up getting 
in the wrong hands, and there were two bigger aircraft with 
bigger fuel capacities that were ending up used in 9/11, and we 
saw the results of that. So there isn't a right to fly on a 
plane if someone is deemed to be a threat to the plane. They 
can ask to have the matter reviewed, but I don't think that the 
information that the Government used to make the determination 
that the person was a threat to the plane should have to come 
out and be on the public record, because believe me, it's going 
to be used against the security of everybody in this country 
who gets on a plane.
    Mr. Nadler. Reclaiming my time, the fact is obviously 
there's an interest in keeping material secret, but on the 
other hand what you're really saying is that again, a 
Government bureaucrat can bar anybody, not just someone 
convicted of a crime or a terrorist, anybody, because his name 
is similar to somebody else or whatever, from flying 
permanently, and there's no recourse at all.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. If the gentleman will yield?
    Mr. Nadler. Yes.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. the Department of Homeland Security 
has got an ombudsman to deal with these problems, and I think 
that within the DHS they have got adequate ways of reviewing 
issues such as whether Senator Kennedy or Representative Lewis 
ended up being erroneously put on a no-fly list.
    Mr. Nadler. Well, reclaiming my time, Senator Kennedy and 
Representative Lewis are rather well-known individuals and 
they're not going to have too much trouble showing the mistaken 
nature they're begin put on the fly list. I'm more concerned 
about John Q. Public, whom no one ever heard of, who's going to 
have a considerably harder time. And I've been fascinated by 
the fact--and I want to put terrorists away forever--but I'm 
fascinated by the fact that of 5,000 people who were arrested 3 
years ago, not one has been convicted of a crime yet, and Yaser 
Hamdi, whom the Justice Department of the United States said 
was such a threat that he couldn't get a trial, and he couldn't 
have the normal process of justice, when the Supreme Court said 
he had to have some rights, instead of giving him a trial or 
keeping him in jail, they suddenly discovered it wasn't so 
important and they said, go home to Saudi Arabia. Goodbye. Who 
needs you?
    So I lack such confidence in the department that I'm 
willing to surrender the normal due process protections that 
any American should have. I yield back.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Would the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Nadler. Yes, I yield to the gentlelady.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Quickly. You are right. First of all this 
is not a pool of convicted terrorists. This is American 
citizens and many others. And we're not publishing any list. I 
don't know what the chairman is saying. People are finding out 
that their names are on there, and as with Senator Kennedy, 
there was a confusion as to who he should even call to be able 
to lift himself off of the list so he could proceed in the 
normal business of representing his constituents.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The time----
    Ms. Jackson Lee. That's what we're asking for----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner.--of the gentleman has expired.
    Ms. Jackson Lee.--a designated person to be able----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The question is on the Jackson Lee 
amendment. Those in favor will say aye--the gentleman from 
Virginia, Mr. Scott.
    Mr. Scott. Move to strike the last word.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman's recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Scott. Yield to the gentleman from New York.
    Mr. Nadler. Thank you. I'll just take a moment. I find it 
disturbing that in this bill, in many different provisions of 
this bill and many different--the debate over many of the 
amendments, and generally on many other bills, what we're 
finding is that the majority seems to have complete and utter 
faith in the bureaucratic agencies of Government and no faith 
in the courts, and that they are willing, indeed, eager, to let 
the rights of Americans be totally determined by bureaucrats 
who may be prosecutors or members of the Department of Homeland 
Security or whoever, and restrict rights of appeal to the 
courts, that we can't trust the courts but we can trust our 
liberty and our freedom and our rights to fly and do a lot of 
other things, completely to the Executive Branch of Government. 
The Executive Branch, it seems to me the philosophy is should 
be a dictator. We don't want it to be overseen by the courts, 
and it seems to me that that's a very wrong path to travel 
down.
    And this bill, the way it's drafted, is traveling down that 
path in about a half a dozen different ways, and I think it's 
the wrong path. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Would the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Nadler. I yield back to him.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Would the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Scott. Yield to the gentlelady.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Simply in closing, the point that I think 
has been made by Mr. Nadler is quite accurate, and in the 
spirit of compromise I was hoping that we could at least get a 
civil liberties officer designated to be able to be the point 
person or reviewing some of the grievances of innocent 
travelers. I'm disappointed if we cannot at least get that 
compromise because again I refer back to two well-known 
personalities, but they are not--as I say, they should not be 
the crux of the problem. There are thousands of others who have 
no recourse other than to find out that their names are on a 
list. They have no designated person that can quickly review 
the documentation that may suggest that there is a problem. Why 
can't we, in the safety and security of this Nation, provide 
both a fairness system as well as the ability to secure 
Americans and those that travel within the United States?
    This is unfair. This legislation unnecessarily ignores many 
of the civil liberties and civil rights aspects of security, 
and I would hope my colleagues would see the value in 
supporting just an officer that clarifies the list and assist 
travelers, American citizens who have been caught up in this 
web of discrepancy? I yield back to the gentleman.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The time belongs to the gentleman 
from Virginia.
    Mr. Scott. I yield back.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The question is on the amendment 
offered by the gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee. Those 
in favor will say aye. Opposed, no.
    The noes appear to have it----
    Ms. Jackson Lee. rollcall.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. rollcall is ordered. Pursuant to 
the provisions of Committee Rule 2(h)1 and the chair's prior 
announcement, further proceedings on this amendment will be 
postponed.
    Are there further amendments?
    Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment that's being 
prepared.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Does the clerk have the amendment? 
The chair not following, the rules will--if there are no other 
amendments----
    Mr. Nadler. Well, we have----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from North Carolina, 
Mr. Watt.
    Mr. Watt. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report the 
amendment.
    Mr. Watt. It is the--that's not the one. It's the longer 
amendment. It's the Watt/Nadler/Schiff amendment.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Does the clerk have that amendment?
    The Clerk. Yes, sir.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report the 
amendment.
    The Clerk. Amendment to H.R. 10 offered by Mr. Watt, Mr. 
Nadler and Mr. Schiff. At the appropriate place in Subtitle H 
of Title V insert the following new section. Section, Privacy 
and Civil Liberties Oversight Board. A. In general there is 
established within the Executive Branch an independent Privacy 
and Civil Liberties Oversight Board----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection, the amendment is 
considered as read, and the gentleman's recognized for 5 
minutes.
    [The amendment of Messrs. Watt/Nadler/Schiff follows:]
    
    
    Mr. Watt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is the same 
amendment that 5\1/2\ hours ago I think I was offering. During 
that 5 hours I have been engaged in a process of negotiation. 
Unfortunately, I found at the end of the negotiation process, 
the only person that I was negotiating with was myself. While 
all the years I practiced law I found that the definition of a 
good compromise is one that nobody was happy with. When you're 
negotiating with your self and you get to a product that you 
are not happy with, that's a terrible condition to be in. So 
having made concessions in one, two, three, four, five, six, 
seven, eight, nine, ten, every area in which I was asked to 
make a concession with the exception of one, having conceded to 
the request of the people who said that they were trying to 
work out an agreement with me, and thinking that I had a 
compromise, I arrived at a point where I didn't have a 
compromise, so I went back to the original amendment that I 
started off with because all of the concessions that I had made 
were concessions that were painful to me. I didn't want to make 
them. I was making them in the interest of trying to reach some 
kind of conciliatory agreement and move the process forward. 
But I ain't much on negotiating with myself and then starting 
with the place that at the end of the negotiation, if I'm going 
to go down, I'd rather go down with my own amendment.
    And so here we are back where we were 5 hours ago with an 
amendment that we believe fairly represents what the 9/11 
Commission said we should have, which is a Civil Liberties 
Review Board within the Executive Branch to oversee adherence 
to the guidelines recommended, and to make sure that the 
Government also defends civil liberties, and I think this is 
close to, or a logical companion to what the President himself 
said he was doing, although I think this does it a lot more 
effectively, in an Executive Order, as I said this morning. 
Maybe I should read the same statement I read this morning to 
reemphasize the futility of the last 5 hours.
    My amendment would establish an independent watchdog 
envisioned by the 9/11 Commission to oversee all Executive 
Branch policies taken in the name of security and ensure that 
civil liberties and privacy interests of American citizens are 
protected. The key features of this board include a bipartisan 
staggered membership of 5 members, ensuring balance of 
political affiliation will ensure that partisanship not 
influence the important work of the board. In addition, 
staggered fixed terms further ensure that the board members 
have security and comfort in the knowledge that they will not 
be fired with a change in Administrations. I think that is the 
kind of independence we need. It is the kind of independence 
that the 9/11 Commission recommended.
    And I ask my colleagues on the Committee who say that they 
believe in having this board to agree to the amendment, and I 
yield back the balance of my time.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. I have a second-degree amendment to 
the amendment at the desk, and the clerk will report the 
amendment.
    The Clerk. Amendment by Mr. Sensenbrenner to the Watt 
amendment to H.R. 10. Strike ``At the appropriate place'' and 
all that follows and replace with the following:----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection----
    Mr. Watt. I object.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Okay. The clerk will read.
    The Clerk. At the appropriate place in Subtitle H of Title 
V insert the following new section:
    Section--Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board.
    (a) In General--There is established within the Executive 
Branch an independent Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight 
Board, referred to in this title as the ``Board.''
    (b) Findings--Consistent with the report of the National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 
Congress makes the following findings:
    (1) In conducting the war on terrorism the Government may 
need additional powers and may need to enhance the use of its 
existing powers.
    (2) This shift of power and authority to the Government 
calls for an enhanced system of checks and balances to protect 
the precious liberties that are vital to our way of life and to 
ensure that the Government uses its powers for the purposes for 
which the powers were given.
    (c) Purpose--The Board shall:
    (1) Analyze and review actions the Executive Branch----
    Mr. Watt. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the 
amendment be considered as read.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection.
    [The second degree amendment of Mr. Sensenbrenner follows:]
    
    
    Mr. Watt. I reserve the right to object.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Gentleman reserves the right to 
object.
    Mr. Watt. Perhaps if the chairman would explain--if I had 
been given the courtesy of a copy of the amendment, which we 
asked for prior to introducing our amendment, perhaps it 
wouldn't be necessary to go through this.
    But perhaps if the chairman could explain to us how this is 
different we could dispense with the reading, but otherwise, I 
mean I don't have any----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Will the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Watt. I'm happy to yield.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Under the rules the chair can 
recognize nobody including himself until the amendment is 
either completely read or the reading of the remainder of the 
amendment is waived.
    Mr. Watt. I'm operating under my reservation of right. I 
yield to the chairman if he wishes to explain. Otherwise, I 
object.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will continue to read.
    Mr. Nadler. Would the gentleman yield? Would the gentleman 
yield?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Objection is heard--for what 
purpose does the gentleman from New York seek recognition?
    Mr. Nadler. I ask unanimous consent, Mr. Chairman, that the 
gentleman from Virginia be permitted to ask the chairman a 
question, that the chairman be permitted to answer the 
question--I'm sorry--that the gentleman from North Carolina be 
permitted to ask the question, that the chairman be permitted 
to answer the question without reading the entire amendment and 
before the gentleman exercises his right to object to 
dispensing the reading of the amendment.
    Mr. Watt. Reserving the right to object.
    Mr. Nadler. I ask unanimous consent that we be able to 
get----
    Mr. Watt. Reserving the right to object.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from North Carolina 
reserves the right to object.
    Mr. Watt. And I'll yield to the chairman if he wishes to 
explain how this differs from the underlying amendment which is 
what I did originally. If we wish to expedite----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Will the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Watt. I have yielded to the chairman.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Okay. First, there were 8 items in 
the gentleman's amendment that we agreed to before the 
negotiations fell apart. Those 8 items are contained in my 
amendment to your amendment. I do have concerns that the board 
that the amendment creates would exist in addition to a similar 
board established by Executive Order last month. And also a 
civil liberties protection officer with the NID established by 
the base bill.
    As introduced, H.R. 10 also requires the appointment of 
privacy officers at other Federal agencies that perform law 
enforcement or antiterrorism functions, and the base bill 
requires Federal agencies to prepare privacy impact analyses of 
rules noticed for comment under the Administrative Procedure 
Act. The amendment gets rid of a couple of these redundancies. 
While I'm sympathetic to the goals of the amendment, I'm very 
strongly opposed to the provisions that give broad 
administrative----
    Mr. Watt. Is the chairman explaining the differences or is 
he----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Yes, I am.
    Mr. Watt. Or is he making a statement in support of----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Well, I'm trying to explain the 
differences. I have resisted efforts to provide broad 
administrative subpoena powers, and this amendment strikes the 
administrative subpoena powers that are contained in the 
gentleman's amendment.
    Basically, what I am attempting to do is to conform the 
gentleman's amendment to the provisions that are being adopted 
by the Intelligence Committee which does have significant 
Democratic support in that Committee, in order to minimize the 
differences relative to the Privacy and Civil Liberties Board--
--
    Mr. Watt. Are these differences, Mr. Chairman, or is this 
in support of your amendment?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Is there objection to waiving the 
reading?
    Mr. Watt. I object.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will continue to read.
    The Clerk.--the Nation from terrorism as such actions 
pertain to privacy of civil liberties; and
    (2) ensure that privacy and civil liberties concerns are 
appropriately considered in the development and implementation 
of laws, regulations and policies related to efforts to protect 
the Nation against terrorism.
    (d) Functions.
    (1) Advice and counsel on policy development and 
implementation. The Board shall:
    (a) review the privacy and civil liberties implications of 
proposed legislation, regulations and policies related to 
efforts to protect the Nation from terrorism, including the 
development and adoption of information sharing guidelines 
under Section 892 of the Homeland Security Act;
    (b) review the privacy and civil liberties implications of 
the implementation of new and existing legislation, regulations 
and policies related to efforts to protect the Nation from 
terrorism, including the implementation of information sharing 
guidelines under Section 892 of the Homeland Security Act;
    (c) advise the President and Federal executive departments 
and agencies to ensure that privacy and civil liberties are 
appropriately considered in the development and implementation 
of such legislation, regulation, policies and guidelines; and
    (d) in providing advice on proposals to retain or enhance 
particular governmental power, consider whether the executive 
department or agency has explained----
    (i) the power actually materially enhances security
    (ii) that there is adequate supervision of the executive's 
use of the power to ensure protection of privacy and civil 
liberties.
    (2) Oversight--The Board shall continually review----
    (A) the regulations, policies and procedures and the 
implementation of the regulations, policies, procedures and 
related laws of Federal executive departments and agencies to 
ensure that privacy and civil liberties are protected----
    Mr. Watt. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the 
amendment be considered as read.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection.
    Mr. Watt. Reserving the right to object.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from North Carolina 
reserves the right to object.
    Mr. Watt. I'm happy to yield to the chairman to explain the 
differences. Between the underlying amendment and this 
amendment by Mr. Sensenbrenner to Mr. Watt's amendment
    Mr. Nadler. Would the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Watt. I'm happy to yield to anybody who can do that.
    Mr. Nadler. I would ask the chairman if the basic 
difference between the chairman's second degree amendment and 
the underlying amendment is that the chairman's amendment would 
not grant the Civil Liberties Board administrative subpoena 
power while Mr. Watt's amendment would? Is that the basic 
difference?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. If the gentleman from North 
Carolina would yield, yes, and I can----
    Mr. Watt. I'm happy to yield to the chairman.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The answer to the gentleman from 
New York's question is yes. I also can state that there have 
been several additions to the text of the gentleman's amendment 
which I can enumerate. Will the gentleman yield further?
    Mr. Watt. I'm happy to yield to the chairman.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. First of all, on the first page 
relative to Subsection C, Purpose, C(1), my amendment adds ``as 
such actions pertain to privacy and civil liberties.'' In 
Subsection D(1)(a) we add the language, ``review of the privacy 
and civil liberties implications of proposed legislation.'' And 
Section E--excuse me--Section F, Informing the Public, we add 
at the end the words ``and national security.'' In Section 
G(2)(b) we add ``if the National Intelligence Director, in 
consultation with the Attorney General, determines that it's 
necessary to withhold information from disclosure.'' So the AG 
is--or the NID is required to consult with the AG on this 
subject.
    And it strikes the administrative subpoena provisions, and 
those are the basic differences.
    Mr. Watt. Reclaiming my time under my reservation, would it 
be fair to say that you have taken all of the things that I 
reluctantly agreed to in our negotiation and then started from 
there and added the one thing on which we disagree?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman----
    Mr. Watt. I withdraw my reservation and I withdraw my 
objection.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Is there objection? Okay. The chair 
recognizes himself for 5 minutes, and everything has been 
explained, and yields back the balance of his time.
    The question is on the second degree amendment offered by 
the chair to the Watt amendment. Those in favor will say aye. 
Opposed, no.
    The ayes appear to have it----
    Mr. Watt. Recorded vote.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Recorded vote is ordered. Pursuant 
to the chair's prior announcement and the provisions of 
Committee Rule 2(h)(1), further proceedings will be postponed.
    Are there further amendments? The gentleman from New York, 
Mr. Weiner.
    Mr. Weiner. Mr. Chairman, Weiner 154, Weiner 154.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report--the chair 
also announces that the vote on the underlying Watt amendment 
will also be postponed.
    Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman, a point of information.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Yes?
    Mr. Nadler. I'm confused. I thought we were about to take a 
vote on the chairman's second degree amendment.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Yes, but we can't proceed on 
further debate on the Watt amendment until we dispose of the 
chairman's second degree amendment.
    Mr. Nadler. And after we have a vote on the chairman's 
second degree amendment, we will return to debate on the Watt 
amendment?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Yes, that is the case.
    Mr. Nadler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report Weiner 154.
    The Clerk. Amendment to H.R. 10 offered by Mr Weiner. At 
the appropriate place in the bill insert the following new 
section: Section----
    Mr. Weiner. Request unanimous consent it be considered as 
read.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection, the gentleman's 
recognized for 5 minutes.
    [The amendment of Mr. Weiner follows:]
      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


    Mr. Weiner. Mr. Chairman, what I propose to do here is 
something very similar that the Committee did with the DNA 
legislation last week. It is to take the language that has been 
reported out of this Committee on COPs almost as is as we've 
all reported it and attaching it to this legislation. 
Hopefully, it will pressure the other body to finally act on 
the legislation that we've considered here, that Mr. Keller and 
others and yourself have crafted.
    The only change is in the bill we also explicitly say what 
is probably true of the bill even unamended, and that is that 
the COPs program here would allow local law enforcement to pay 
for the hiring of antiterrorism officials and it would also----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Would the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Weiner. Certainly.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The chair is prepared to accept the 
gentleman's amendment, and the Committee has already approved 
this amendment as a part of the DOJ reauthorization bill which 
seems to have fallen in the black hole about 3 blocks north of 
where we speak. So I would hope the Committee would approve 
this amendment.
    Mr. Weiner. I yield back my time.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The question's on the Weiner 
amendment. Those in favor will say aye. Opposed, no.
    The ayes appear to have it. The ayes have it, and the 
Weiner amendment is adopted.
    Are there further amendments?
    Ms. Lofgren. Mr. Chairman?
    Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from New York, Mr. 
Nadler.
    Mr. Nadler. I have an amendment at the desk designated 
725XML.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report the 
amendment.
    The Clerk. Amendment to H.R. 10 offered by Mr. Nadler. 
Strike Section 3007 and conform provisions and amend the table 
of contents accordingly.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman's recognized for 5 
minutes.
    [The amendment of Mr. Nadler follows:]
    
    
    Mr. Nadler. Thank you, Mr. Speaker--Mr. Chairman. I keep 
doing that.
    Mr. Chairman, this amendment would strike Section 3007, 
which is deceptively entitled Preventing Terrorists from 
Obtaining Asylum. In fact, terrorists, if we know they're 
terrorists, are already not entitled to asylum. What this 
section would do is to make it much harder for people facing 
real persecution in their home countries from having a fair 
opportunity to make their cases to claim asylum. This amendment 
has nothing to do with terrorism. It was not among the 
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, and it will result in 
our Nation sending victims of persecution back to their 
oppressors to be further persecuted.
    This section would require an asylum applicant to prove 
that his or her persecutor's central motive in persecuting her 
was or would be her race, religion, political opinion, 
nationality or membership in a particular social group. Under 
current law, if you want the asylum you have to prove that 
you're going to be persecuted or were persecuted because of 
race, religion, et cetera. But now you have to prove that the 
central motive in the persecution were one of these factors.
    The persecutor's main concern in most cases is harming the 
applicant, not explaining the reasons for their actions, and 
the applicant's main concern is and should be escaping this 
harm, not documenting the persecutor's psychological motive for 
it. This section would place an enormous and unnecessary burden 
on asylum seekers by requiring them to prove with unrealistic 
precision what is going on in the persecutor's mind.
    The standard also does not reflect the definition of 
refugee in the Immigration and Nationality Act. The authors of 
this section have conspicuously omitted from the right to 
asylum a person who has been or who may be subject to coercive 
family planning policies, for example, forced abortions. Since 
when did my friends on the other side of the aisle support 
forced abortions or we should send people back to undergo 
forced abortions? I'm pro-choice, so I am strongly opposed to 
forced abortions. Does anybody, whether they're pro-choice or 
not, disagree with that?
    This provision permits adjudicators to deny its applicants 
asylum because the applicants are unable to provide 
corroborating evidence of certain alleged facts pertaining to 
the specifics of their claim.
    Right now, under current law, the adjudicators and the 
courts that review it have the ability, when they judge it 
necessary or appropriate, to require corroborating evidence. 
But this makes it much harder to get asylum without the 
corroborating evidence, that this proportionally harms 
applicants who are detained and therefore unable to do what has 
to be done to get corroborating evidence, and who--or lack 
counsel.
    In addition, this provision seeks to constrain judicial 
review of a denial of asylum. They send applicants not having 
provided corroborating evidence. What are we expecting these 
people to do, get a note from Saddam Hussein's secret police?
    It also gives adjudicators broader leeway to deny 
applicants asylum based on factors such as their perceived 
demeanor and inconsistencies between, for example, their 
testimony before an immigration judge and their quote, 
``written and oral statements whether or not under oath made at 
any time to any officer, agent or employee of the United 
States,'' unquote. Now, asylum applicants, particularly 
survivors of torture such as rape or forced abortion or 
sterilization may not be comfortable telling this information 
to a uniformed male inspection officer in a secondary 
inspection area at the airport. Asylum applicants, in that 
setting, may not be provided with appropriate interpreters, and 
may understandably fear discussing their problems in their home 
countries in any detail until later in the process when it is 
made clear to them that they are not going to be sent back to 
their home countries without their claims being adequately 
heard.
    Several courts of appeal have emphasized that statements 
taken under such conditions are unreliable. This provision also 
limits judicial review to an extent--as do several other 
provisions of this bill--that virtually nullifies any judicial 
oversight over the actions of agency bureaucrats. It would be 
on this unreviewable basis that we would again send people to 
their deaths to forced abortions or forced sterilizations, to 
religious persecution, to gulags and to torture chambers.
    Is this someone's idea of victory in the war on terrorism, 
or is this simply a war on the victims of state terrorism?
    Mr. Chairman, in summary, people come here who are victims 
of some secret police, Saddam Hussein's secret police, the 
Shah's secret police, the Gestapo, the KGB, whatever it may be, 
and we are denying them, we are making it harder by this 
amendment for them to establish their case. They still have the 
burden of proof to establish it. We made it harder in the 
Immigration Act a few years ago but they still have the burden 
of proof to establish it. Now we're making it even harder to 
establish it, and we're saying that if the adjudicator, that 
is, the bureaucrat says no, it's almost impossible for a court 
to review that case. Why would we want to do this? This has no 
business in a bill on terrorism. This does not apply only to 
terrorists. It does not apply--it applies to anybody seeking 
asylum, and it is wrong and ought to be considered separately 
from this bill, and again, it was not one of the 
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Nadler. Therefore, Mr. Chairman, I urge the adoption of 
this amendment. I yield back.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The chair recognizes himself for 5 
minutes in opposition to the amendment.
    The chair would like to quote from the staff report of the 
9/11 Commission, which related to limit asylum abuse by 
terrorists. Once terrorists had entered the United States, 
their next challenge was to find a way to remain here. Their 
primary method was immigration fraud. For example, Yousef and 
Ajaj concocted bogus political asylum stories when they 
arrived. The asylum stories did not protect or--excuse me--the 
asylum system did not detect or deter fraudulent applicants. 
Terrorists in the 1990's, as well as the September 11 
hijackers, needed to find a way to stay. This could be 
accomplished legally by applying for asylum. A number of 
terrorists abused the asylum system. Thus Ajaj was able to file 
a political asylum claim after his arrest for involvement in 
the bombing of the World Trade Center. Rahman avoided being 
removed by filing an application for asylum the night after the 
attack on the World Trade Center. This was in the staff report 
at pages 47, 48, 49, 51, 86, 98 and 99.
    Now, the response to this in the staff report is Section 
3007, which the gentleman's amendment proposes to strike. This 
section provides a non-exhaustive list of factors that an 
immigration judge can consider in assessing the credibility of 
the applicant or a witness in an asylum case, such as demeanor, 
candor, responsiveness and consistency. The section would also 
require that an asylum applicant show that race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group or 
political opinion was or will be the central motive for 
persecuting the applicant in their country of origin.
    It seems to me that Section 3007 responds to the abuses 
that were cited int staff report by the 9/11 Commission, and 
that's why it should be kept in this bill and the amendment 
offered by the gentleman from New York should be defeated.
    I yield back to balance of my time.
    Mr. Berman. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from California, Mr. 
Berman.
    Mr. Berman. I move to strike the last word.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman's recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Berman. I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from New York.
    Mr. Nadler. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
    Mr. Chairman, asylum requests may indeed be abused. Our 
entire judicial system may indeed be abused. But we still 
maintain the theory at least of due process. How is it going to 
restrict--first of all, it was in the staff report. The staff 
report, I would also observe, said that the Bush administration 
could have prevented 9/11. Not everybody believes that. The 
staff report is not completely infallible. The 9/11 Commission, 
upon weighing the staff report and other competing 
considerations, did not recommend anything like this. How does 
saying that--the current law says that you have to establish 
that you're being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, et cetera? This says you have to establish that 
those reasons are the central motive. You're just making it 
harder to establish that the persecution for which you're 
claiming asylum is based on that. How that has anything to do 
with terrorism or preventing terrorism, I don't know.
    It also says that no court shall reverse a determination 
made by an adjudicator unless the court finds that a reasonable 
adjudicator is compelled to conclude. So in other words, the 
adjudicator has final say unless the court finds that no 
rational adjudicator could say this. What you're doing again is 
raising the bureaucrat's judgment above the court's judgment 
and restricting the court. Again, how does that protect us 
against a fraudulent claim of asylum unless you assume that 
bureaucrats are always right and courts are always wrong?
    Thirdly, the fact that terrorists may seek to abuse asylum 
to get into the country, the fact is that today when someone 
claims asylum, they're almost invariably kept in jail pending 
the adjudication of that asylum claim. Certainly, anybody 
suspected of terrorism or of being a terrorist, of wanting to 
come into the country for terrorist purposes is not going to be 
let out before his asylum claim is completely adjudicated. He's 
going to be in jail before he's found not to be a terrorist. 
[Technical problem with microphone]--in any event, and they're 
going to deport him, but until either he's found to be innocent 
and entitled to asylum or he's deported, he's going to be in 
jail. So how does this further protect us?
    What this provision really does is, using the concern about 
terrorism, further victimize real victims of terrorists abroad, 
of state terrorism, and send them back to their persecutors. 
Unless we think again that bureaucrats are always right and 
courts are always wrong, and anybody who is fleeing to the 
United States because they believe our offer of liberty should 
be treated improperly and just sent back in most cases, we 
should not be doing this, and certainly we should not be doing 
this in the 9/11 bill, when this wasn't part of their 
recommendation. We should be giving it a separate consideration 
where we can give it appropriate hearings and testimony and so 
forth.
    What's the rationale for leaving out, for example, where we 
said the applicant must establish race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, political opinion, why 
leave out gender? Why leave out the forced abortion or forced 
sterilization? Those are motives that the courts have 
recognized for asylum also. So I don't see this as a well-
considered provision. We ought not to rush it through as part 
of the 9/11 bill.
    It does not protect us because these people, anybody 
suspected of terrorism is going to remain in jail while this is 
being adjudicated, and we should not use the concern over 
terrorism to perpetrate or to enable to perpetrators of state 
terrorism abroad to have more victims.
    I thank the gentleman and I yield back to him.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The time belongs to the gentleman 
from California.
    The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman 
from New York, Mr. Nadler. Those in favor will say aye? 
Opposed, no?
    The noes appear to have it. The noes have it. The amendment 
is not agreed to.
    Ms. Lofgren. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The hour of 5:30 having arrived and 
pursuant to the chair's prior announcement, we will do the roll 
votes. If I can get a list of which one in which order I will 
announce which votes we will be taking.
    The unfinished business is the amendment by the gentlewoman 
from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee, on which the noes prevailed by a 
voice vote, and which further proceedings were postponed.
    This is the amendment that relates to the airline 
screening. Those in favor of the Jackson Lee amendment relating 
to airline screening, will as your names are called, answer 
aye; those opposed, no. And the clerk will call the roll.
    The Clerk. Mr. Hyde?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Coble?
    Mr. Coble. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Coble, no. Mr. Smith?
    Mr. Smith. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Smith, no. Mr. Gallegly?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Goodlatte?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Chabot?
    Mr. Chabot. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chabot, no. Mr. Jenkins?
    Mr. Jenkins. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Jenkins, no. Mr. Cannon?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Bachus?
    Mr. Bachus. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Bachus, no. Mr. Hostettler?
    Mr. Hostettler. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Hostettler, no. Mr. Green?
    Mr. Green. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Green, no. Mr. Keller?
    Mr. Keller. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Keller, no. Ms. Hart?
    Ms. Hart. No.
    The Clerk. Ms. Hart, no. Mr. Flake?
    Mr. Flake. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Flake, no. Mr. Pence?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Forbes?
    Mr. Forbes. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Forbes, no. Mr. King?
    Mr. King. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. King, no. Mr. Carter?
    Mr. Carter. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Carter, no. Mr. Feeney?
    Mr. Feeney. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Feeney, no. Mrs. Blackburn?
    Mrs. Blackburn. No.
    The Clerk. Mrs. Blackburn, no. Mr. Conyers?
    Mr. Conyers. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Conyers, aye. Mr. Berman?
    Mr. Berman. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Berman, aye. Mr. Boucher?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Nadler?
    Mr. Nadler. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Nadler, aye. Mr. Scott?
    Mr. Scott. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Scott, aye. Mr. Watt?
    Mr. Watt. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Watt, aye. Ms. Lofgren?
    Ms. Lofgren. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Lofgren, aye. Ms. Jackson Lee?
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Jackson Lee, aye. Ms. Waters?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Meehan?
    Mr. Meehan. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Meehan, aye. Mr. Delahunt?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Wexler?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Ms. Baldwin?
    Ms. Baldwin. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Baldwin, aye. Mr. Weiner?
    Mr. Weiner. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Weiner, aye. Mr. Schiff?
    Mr. Schiff. Pass.
    The Clerk. Mr. Schiff, passed. Ms. Sanchez?
    Ms. Sanchez. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Sanchez, aye. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Members in the chamber who wish to 
cast or change their votes? Gentlewoman from California, Ms. 
Waters?
    Ms. Waters. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Waters, aye.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Further members who wish to--the 
gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Goodlatte?
    Mr. Goodlatte. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Goodlatte, no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Further members in the chamber who 
wish to cast or change their vote? If not, the clerk will 
report.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, there are 12 ayes, 17 noes, and 1 
pass.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The amendment is not agreed.
    The unfinished business is a vote on an amendment by the 
gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee, striking Section 3032, 
which relates to applications under the convention against 
torture, on which the noes prevailed by a voice vote, and on 
which proceedings were postponed.
    Those in favor of the Jackson Lee amendment will as your 
names are called, answer aye; those opposed, no. And the clerk 
will call the roll.
    The Clerk. Mr. Hyde?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Coble?
    Mr. Coble. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Coble, no. Mr. Smith?
    Mr. Smith. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Smith, no. Mr. Gallegly?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Goodlatte?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Chabot?
    Mr. Chabot. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chabot, no. Mr. Jenkins?
    Mr. Jenkins. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Jenkins, no. Mr. Cannon?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Bachus?
    Mr. Bachus. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Bachus, no. Mr. Hostettler?
    Mr. Hostettler. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Hostettler, no. Mr. Green?
    Mr. Green. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Green, no. Mr. Keller?
    Mr. Keller. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Keller, no. Ms. Hart?
    Ms. Hart. No.
    The Clerk. Ms. Hart, no. Mr. Flake?
    Mr. Flake. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Flake, no. Mr. Pence?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Forbes?
    Mr. Forbes. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Forbes, no. Mr. King?
    Mr. King. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. King, no. Mr. Carter?
    Mr. Carter. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Carter, no. Mr. Feeney?
    Mr. Feeney. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Feeney, no. Mrs. Blackburn?
    Mrs. Blackburn. No.
    The Clerk. Mrs. Blackburn, no. Mr. Conyers?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Conyers, aye. Mr. Berman?
    Mr. Berman. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Berman, aye. Mr. Boucher?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Nadler?
    Mr. Nadler. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Nadler, aye. Mr. Scott?
    Mr. Scott. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Scott, aye. Mr. Watt?
    Mr. Watt. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Watt, aye. Ms. Lofgren?
    Ms. Lofgren. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Lofgren, aye. Ms. Jackson Lee?
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Jackson Lee, aye. Ms. Waters?
    Ms. Waters. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Waters, aye. Mr. Meehan?
    Mr. Meehan. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Meehan, aye. Mr. Delahunt?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Wexler?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Ms. Baldwin?
    Ms. Baldwin. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Baldwin, aye. Mr. Weiner?
    Mr. Weiner. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Weiner, aye. Mr. Schiff?
    Mr. Schiff. Pass.
    The Clerk. Mr. Schiff, pass. Ms. Sanchez?
    Ms. Sanchez. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Sanchez, aye. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Members in the chamber who wish to 
cast or change their votes? Gentleman from Virginia, Mr. 
Goodlatte?
    Mr. Goodlatte. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Goodlatte, no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Further members in the chamber who 
wish to cast or change their vote? The gentleman from Michigan, 
Mr. Conyers?
    Mr. Conyers. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Conyers, aye.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from California, Mr. 
Gallegly?
    Mr. Gallegly. I'm unrecorded? No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Gallegly, no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Further members who wish to cast or 
change their vote? If not, the clerk will report.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, there are 12 ayes, 18 noes and 1 
pass.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. And the amendment is not agreed to.
    The unfinished business is the vote on the second degree 
amendment by the Chair to the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Watt, on which the ayes 
prevailed by a voice vote, in which further proceedings were 
postponed. Those in favor of the Sensenbrenner amendment, 
second degree amendment to the Watt amendment, will as your 
names are called, answer aye; those opposed, no. And the clerk 
will call the roll.
    The Clerk. Mr. Hyde?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Coble?
    Mr. Coble. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Coble, aye. Mr. Smith?
    Mr. Smith. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Smith, aye. Mr. Gallegly?
    Mr. Gallegly. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Gallegly, aye. Mr. Goodlatte?
    Mr. Goodlatte. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Goodlatte, aye. Mr. Chabot?
    Mr. Chabot. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chabot, aye. Mr. Jenkins?
    Mr. Jenkins. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Jenkins, aye. Mr. Cannon?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Bachus?
    Mr. Bachus. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Bachus, aye. Mr. Hostettler?
    Mr. Hostettler. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Hostettler, aye. Mr. Green?
    Mr. Green. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Green, aye. Mr. Keller?
    Mr. Keller. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Keller, aye. Ms. Hart?
    Ms. Hart. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Hart, aye. Mr. Flake?
    Mr. Flake. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Flake, aye. Mr. Pence?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Forbes?
    Mr. Forbes. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Forbes, aye. Mr. King?
    Mr. King. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. King, aye. Mr. Carter?
    Mr. Carter. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Carter, aye. Mr. Feeney?
    Mr. Feeney. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Feeney, aye. Mrs. Blackburn?
    Mrs. Blackburn. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mrs. Blackburn, aye. Mr. Conyers?
    Mr. Conyers. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Conyers, no. Mr. Berman?
    Mr. Berman. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Berman, no. Mr. Boucher?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Nadler?
    Mr. Nadler. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Nadler, no. Mr. Scott?
    Mr. Scott. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Scott, no. Mr. Watt?
    Mr. Watt. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Watt, no. Ms. Lofgren?
    Ms. Lofgren. No.
    The Clerk. Ms. Lofgren, no. Ms. Jackson Lee?
    Ms. Jackson Lee. No.
    The Clerk. Ms. Jackson Lee, no. Ms. Waters?
    Ms. Waters. No.
    The Clerk. Ms. Waters, no. Mr. Meehan?
    Mr. Meehan. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Meehan, no. Mr. Delahunt?
    Mr. Delahunt. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Delahunt, no. Mr. Wexler?
    Mr. Wexler. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Wexler, no. Ms. Baldwin?
    Ms. Baldwin. No.
    The Clerk. Ms. Baldwin, no. Mr. Weiner?
    Mr. Weiner. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Weiner, no. Mr. Schiff?
    Mr. Schiff. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Schiff, no. Ms. Sanchez?
    Ms. Sanchez. No.
    The Clerk. Ms. Sanchez, no. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, Aye.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Are there further members in the 
chamber who wish to cast or change their vote? The gentleman 
from Indiana, Mr. Pence?
    Mr. Pence. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Pence, aye.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Further members who wish to cast or 
change their votes? If not, the clerk will report.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, there are 19 ayes and 15 noes.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. And the second degree amendment to 
the Watt amendment is agreed to.
    The question now----
    Mr. Watt. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. For what purpose does the gentleman 
from North Carolina seek recognition?
    Mr. Watt. Move to strike the last word.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The motion to strike the last word 
is not in order because the second degree amendment was a 
complete substitute, and consequently the question arises on 
the Watt amendment as amended by the second degree amendment.
    Mr. Watt. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. For what purpose does the gentleman 
from North Carolina seek recognition?
    Mr. Watt. I move to strike the last word.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. I am told by the parliamentarian 
that that motion is not in order because the substitute was 
adopted.
    Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. For what purpose does the gentleman 
from New York seek recognition?
    Mr. Nadler. Maybe this is a parliamentary inquiry. I'm not 
sure.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman will state the 
parliamentary inquiry.
    Mr. Nadler. I was under the impression that when there's a 
second degree amendment, if that is adopted, then debate is in 
order on the amendment as amended.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. When the second degree amendment is 
an amendment in the nature of a substitute of the first degree 
amendment, once the second degree amendment is agreed to, then 
the vote occurs on the base amendment as amended by the 
amendment in the nature of a substitute. The same is true will 
bills.
    Mr. Nadler. But Mr. Chairman----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. When a substitute is adopted, then 
there's no further debate.
    Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman, I would point out in that case 
that the amendment by Mr. Sensenbrenner to Mr. Watt's amendment 
does not state that it is a substitute amendment in the nature 
of a substitute. It simply says amendment.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The text of the amendment says, 
``Strike at the appropriate place and all that follows and 
replace with the following,'' so that is an amendment in the 
nature of a substitute because the second degree amendment 
which has been agreed to by the Committee completely replaces 
the text of the Watt amendment as originally offered.
    Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman, that being the case, it should be 
made clear that this is in the nature of a substitute so that 
people who desire to speak on the main amendment would have 
known that they should speak on the--at that point.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Well----
    Mr. Nadler. It was not clear, and I withheld comment on 
that at that point.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Well, the chair would respond by 
saying that the rules on what happens after complete 
substitutions have been taken, whether it's an amendment to a 
bill or whether it is an amendment in the nature of a 
substitute to an amendment, are quite clear, and that is, is 
that the only way to get further debate is by voting down 
whether it's a second degree amendment or an amendment in the 
nature of a substitute.
    Mr. Watt. Parliamentary inquiry.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman will state his 
parliamentary inquiry.
    Mr. Watt. I just want to point out to the chairman that the 
chairman may be technically right, the parliamentarian may be 
technically right, but Mr. Nadler specifically asked the 
chairman whether we would return to the Watt amendment after 
the vote, and the chairman specifically told Mr. Nadler that it 
would be in order to return.
    So if that's the way we are going play this game, we are 
going to be in for a long, long evening, and tomorrow.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The Chair will respond to the 
gentleman's parliamentary inquiry. Since I have become the 
chairman of this Committee, I have strictly enforced the rules, 
no matter which way they cut. And when the Chair made the 
statement that we would return to the Watt amendment after the 
second-degree amendment was voted upon, what the Chair would 
have done is if the second-degree amendment were rejected, then 
the original Watt amendment would be open to debate.
    With the second-degree amendment being adopted, there is a 
second question that is put on the adoption of the Watt 
amendment, as amended by the second-degree amendment, and that 
is the question that the Chair is attempting to put and that is 
done pursuant to the rules.
    Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. So the question is----
    Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from New York, Mr. 
Nadler, for what purpose do you seek recognition?
    Mr. Nadler. I would ask, in light of the fact that I 
specifically asked that--and maybe I misunderstood the chairman 
because I thought he meant we would come back to debate, that I 
withheld comment on it. I'd ask unanimous consent to make a 
brief comment on the amendment at this point.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. How long does the gentleman wish to 
be recognized for?
    Mr. Nadler. Less than a minute.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection----
    Mr. Chabot. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection, the gentleman 
will be recognized----
    Mr. Chabot. Reserving the right to object.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Ohio.
    Mr. Chabot. I have an inquiry, a parliamentary inquiry. If 
we allow 1 minute, does that open up the entire side to do that 
or are we talking about----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The only request that is pending is 
unanimous consent for the gentleman from New York to speak for 
1 minute.
    Does the gentleman withdraw his reservation?
    Without objection, the gentleman is recognized for 1 
minute.
    Mr. Nadler. I thank the chairman for his consideration.
    Mr. Chairman, this amendment seeks to implement one of the 
key recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, which recognized 
that with the greater powers to fight terrorism, there would be 
a need to take greater care to protect our fundamental 
liberties and the privacy of all Americans, and therefore 
recommended that we set up this Civil Liberties Board.
    Unfortunately, the bill as presented to us didn't have 
this, which is why Mr. Watt and Mr. Schiff offered this 
amendment. I regret that we have taken away the subpoena power 
that would have been in the amendment, had it gone forward as 
it is--I mean, as offered. But it is still a great improvement 
to the bill and therefore I support the amendment.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Does the gentleman from North Carolina wish to ask 
unanimous consent to----
    Mr. Watt. No, I don't wish to ask unanimous consent to do 
anything, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Okay. the question is on the Watt 
amendment, as amended by the second-degree amendment of the 
Chair. Those in favor will say aye. Opposed no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The ayes appear to have it. The 
ayes have it and the Watt amendment, as amended by the second-
degree amendment, is agreed to.
    The Chair now announces that we will continue on. Votes 
will be rolled until 7:30 tonight, so Members should make their 
plans accordingly.
    Are there further amendments?
    Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. 
Scott.
    Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have an amendment at 
the desk, UR 003.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report the 
amendment.
    The Clerk. Amendment to H.R. 10, offered by Mr. Scott: 
Strike Section 1078 on page 110 and insert the following----
    Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the 
amendment be considered as read.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection.
    [The amendment of Mr. Scott follows:]
      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


    Mr. Watt. I object, I object.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will read.
    The Clerk. ``Inspector General of the National Intelligence 
Authority. (A) Office of Inspector General of National 
Intelligence Authority. There is within the National 
Intelligence Authority an Office of the Inspector General of 
the National Intelligence Authority.''
    ``(B) Purpose. The purpose of the Office of the Inspector 
General of the National Intelligence Authority is to (1) create 
an objective and effective office appropriately accountable to 
Congress to initiate and conduct independent investigations''--
--
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Virginia.
    Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman, pursuant to our discussions, I 
withdraw the amendment.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The amendment is withdrawn.
    Are there further amendments?
    The gentleman from New York, Mr. Weiner.
    Mr. Weiner. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk. 
It is Weiner 155.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report the 
amendment.
    The Clerk. Amendment to H.R. 10, offered by Mr. Weiner: 
``Page 394, line 13''----
    Mr. Weiner. I ask unanimous consent that it be considered 
as read.
    Mr. Watt. I object.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Objection is heard. The clerk will 
read.
    The Clerk. ``strike 'and.' Page 395, line 3, strike the 
period and insert '; and.' Page 395, after line 3, insert the 
following: (v) at least 8.5 percent of funds available for 
covered grants for the fiscal year are provided under covered 
grants to jurisdictions that (1) have demonstrated a commitment 
to terrorism preparedness by taking significant action to 
prevent terrorism attacks since September 11, 2001, and (2) are 
consistently referenced in intelligence information as a 
terrorism target or have previously been the site of more than 
one terrorism attack for the purpose of implementing the 
applicable state homeland security plan in accordance with the 
prioritization of needs included in such plans.''
    ``Page 395, after line 12, insert the following''----
    Mr. Weiner. I ask unanimous consent it be considered as 
read.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection.
    Mr. Watt. Objection.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Objection is heard and the clerk 
will continue to read.
    Mr. Chabot. Mr. Chairman, parliamentary inquiry. Mr. 
Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman will state his 
parliamentary inquiry.
    Mr. Chabot. Would it be in order for the previous question 
to be moved at any time, Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The previous question lies at any 
time and can be approved by a majority vote.
    Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will continue to read.
    Mr. Weiner. She read the unfixed version.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Does the gentleman ask unanimous 
consent to withdraw this amendment and offer the correct one?
    Mr. Weiner. No, Mr. Chairman. We had actually had the 
correct one at the desk, but there are apparently two versions 
there and the wrong one was being read and I tried to interrupt 
the reading and so----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Okay. The amendment that the clerk 
was reading was withdrawn and the clerk will report the other 
amendment.
    Mr. Weiner. Oh, yes, that's--exactly, what he said.
    The Clerk. Amendment to H.R. 10 offered by Mr. Weiner: 
``Page 394, line 13, strike 'and.' Page 395, line 3, strike the 
period and insert '; and.' Page 395, after line 3, insert the 
following: (v) at least 8.5 percent of funds available for 
covered grants for the fiscal year provided under covered 
grants to each jurisdiction that (1) have demonstrated a 
commitment to terrorism preparedness by taking significant 
action to prevent terrorism attacks since September 11, 2001, 
and (2) are consistently referenced in intelligence information 
as a terrorism target or have previously been the site of more 
than one terrorism attack for the purpose of implementing the 
applicable state homeland security plan in accordance with the 
prioritization of needs included in such plans.''
    ``Page 395, after line 12, insert the following 'D. A 
hundred percent pass-through requirement. Notwithstanding the 
proviso in subsection (e)(5)(C) of this section, and Section 
1806(g)(1), the Secretary shall require a recipient of a 
covered grant awarded pursuant to clause 5 of subparagraph (b) 
to obligate or otherwise make available to local governments 
first responders and other local groups not less than a hundred 
percent of the grant funds, resources purchased with the grant 
funds having a value equal to at least a hundred percent of the 
amount of the grant or a combination thereof.''
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from New York is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
    [The amendment of Mr. Weiner follows:]
    
    
    Mr. Weiner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    This bill seeks to remedy something that the Speaker 
acknowledged was a problem, the 9/11 Commission acknowledged 
was a problem, many of those who visited New York for the 
Republican National Convention acknowledged as a problem. It is 
that New York, perhaps the highest of high-threat areas, has 
seen actually a diminishing amount of Homeland Security funds 
because of a mistake in the way that it is allocated.
    In 2003, New York City wound up getting about 5 percent of 
the Homeland Security pot. It wasn't enough. It was about $200 
million less than the city needed. In 2004, we in this Congress 
increased the amount of Homeland Security funds. New York 
actually got a smaller amount. How did that happen?
    It happened because the system of allocating funds allowed 
more and more and more cities to be eligible for the high-
threat, high-density urban area grants. The result was that 
while more money was being allocated, less was finding its way 
to the truly high-threat areas.
    Recently, we had a discussion in this Committee, and we've 
had it in other Committees, about whether the way to solve that 
problem is to eliminate the minimum guarantees for lower-threat 
states. We decided in this Committee by a vote not to do that, 
to keep a minimum guarantee of .25 percent for states, .45 
percent for border states.
    But it does not address the fundamental problem with the 
way Cox conceives his bill, and that is under the new way of 
doing it, it will not be a bifurcated system of formula money 
and high-threat money. All money would essentially be high-
threat money. So when all of the applications are submitted, 
they are going to be ranked.
    The problem that is endemic to the new bill is that you 
could conceivable have 300, 400, 500, 1,000 grants that are 
approved and those at the top get diluted to such a point that 
you are worse off than if you had just considered region or 
just considered minimum guarantees in and of themselves.
    This amendment seeks to protect New York. It seeks to take 
funds for New York, and it also addresses the needs of other 
localities that either are the subject--according to the bill, 
are consistently referenced in intelligence information as 
terrorism targets or have previously been the site of one 
terrorist attack. I realize in that construction, also, 
Virginia would get a minimum guarantee under this bill.
    The number that we've chosen is roughly--is 75 percent of 
what the Commissioner of New York City said that he needed in 
Federal aid. It's not all of it, and based on last year's 
number that would be 8.5 percent. This does not do anything to 
diminish the funds under the minimum guarantee. The minimum 
guarantee would still be protected.
    What this would do is provide funds for New York. It 
provides funds for the Washington-Virginia area. I think it 
actually, under the bill the way it has been conceived, will go 
to the state, so it would be the state of Virginia. And what it 
would do is address the problem without taking money out of 
anyone else's pot.
    There wasn't anyone who came to New York for the convention 
that didn't notice and didn't comment upon the phalanx of 
security that was there. And that hasn't changed all that much 
since the convention has ended. We recently had the United 
Nations General Assembly. Again, similar type of a ramp-up had 
to happen. We have Wall Street which has to be protected around 
the clock. And the idea that we have a diminishing amount of 
Homeland Security funds to protect New York is a serious, 
serious problem.
    On behalf of the Mayor of the City of New York, someone 
with whom I frequently disagree and will probably disagree with 
much more next year, this is--I make this appeal that this is a 
way to solve the problem that so many people have demonstrated 
the desire to solve without taking money out of anyone else's 
pot. And I would urge my colleagues in favor of it, and I yield 
back my time.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The Chair recognizes himself for 5 
minutes in opposition to the amendment.
    Earlier today, we heard an eloquent plea by the other 
Member from New York, who said either we ought to get rid of 
minimum guarantees at all and have all of the money be 
distributed according to some bureaucratic criteria. This 
amendment proposes to reinstate a minimum guarantee that 
definitely applies only to one city and might apply to two more 
metropolitan areas.
    The fact of the matter remains is that changing the current 
formula, which most people agree needs to be changed, is a very 
delicate issue because some states will lose and other states 
potentially gain. And if the object is to pass a bill that 
changes the formula, then we have to go along with the 
compromises that have been reached to get any formula change 
passed through both Houses and signed by the President.
    I certainly am sympathetic to the problems that New York 
City faces. I can say that I think this Congress has generously 
responded to the aftermath of 9/11 through specific 
appropriations that the Congress has made, as well as specific 
appropriations to New York City and Boston for the threat that 
was caused by the two conventions being held there and the 
like.
    This amendment, while very well-intentioned, in my opinion, 
goes too far. It undoes the very delicate agreement that has 
been reached and is going to end up, in my opinion, sinking any 
change in the formula. And the result will be that New York 
City will probably end up getting less money under the existing 
formula than under the compromise that is contained in the 
bill.
    I would urge a no vote on the amendment and yield back the 
balance of my time.
    Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. 
Scott.
    Mr. Scott. I move to strike the last word.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman, although the original amendment to 
focus the funds where they're most needed was defeated, I think 
this makes the same point that we need to focus the funds where 
they're needed, which is exactly what the amendment does. And I 
support the amendment and yield to the gentleman from New York.
    Mr. Weiner. I appreciate it, and I would say to the 
chairman what I'm trying to do is address exactly the point you 
yourself made during the debate on the minimum guarantee that 
the reason the minimum guarantee striking it is that you say to 
too many states we're taking away from your constituents. We 
don't seek to do that. We take the reasoning behind the minimum 
guarantee and simply extend it to the states that everyone 
agrees should have some base level of support.
    And I would say, with all deference to my good friend, the 
people of the state of New York and the city of New York are 
very grateful for the funds that were provided in the aftermath 
of September 11. But make no mistake, we have an ongoing 
security problem that exists, an ongoing homeland security 
problem that exists, and I haven't heard anyone dispute that. I 
mean, Mr. Hastert, when he was in New York promoting his book, 
acknowledged it. Chairman Cox acknowledged it. The only 
question was how you solve it.
    As far as the delicate balance that has been struck to make 
this happen, this amendment was not considered in the homeland 
security--this was the subject of negotiations going on with 
the Mayor and Mr. Cox, and the clock ticked and it expired. I 
think it is very important that we acknowledge that if we don't 
adjust the homeland security problems of the city that has 
Ground Zero, we can't call this bill a success. The present 
bill doesn't do it.
    And one further thing, Mr. Cox's formulation of saying 
let's rank things according to threat is going to make New York 
No. 1, no doubt about it. I think it's correct that this bill 
is going to have New York No. 1. It's going to have the 
Pentagon and Washington and LA near the top of the list. What 
difference does it make if you have 2,000 localities getting 
grants? What difference does it--it doesn't make all that much 
difference. If you wind up taking a larger and larger group of 
grantees, you wind up diminishing the amount that they get. 
That's why New York's share has been going down. Has our threat 
gone down? Certainly not. Have we gotten any assistance 
subsidizing this beyond this that has helped us somehow bridge 
the gap? Sure, we got some extra money for the conventions. Is 
it that much easier to protect the dignitaries of every 
country? President Bush was there for 3 days. It's always a 
constant problem in New York.
    And very honestly, I would say to my colleagues on the 
other side of the aisle, you saw the challenge that New York 
faced. You saw Mayor Bloomberg say to you that you don't have--
I mean certainly even if you don't pass this for me, you've got 
to have some sense of empathy for your Republican colleagues in 
New York who are telling you that you're shortchanging them. 
This is a way to fix it without taking any from your own 
constituents, and I see no reason why you wouldn't take--seize 
that opportunity. If you want to talk about how to do it, but 
there's nothing in the Cox bill, in this delicate balance 
that's been struck, under any version, that gives New York what 
it needs, and this is an opportunity to do it.
    Our desire not to upset the apple cart, Mr. Chairman, 
shouldn't stop us from doing good law here. We should try to 
address an outstanding problem that the base bill does not 
address. There is no consensus on how to deal with New York's 
problems. This is a novel way to do it. It's the first time 
it's been offered in Committee. It's the first time--Cox never 
considered it. Cox's own Committee isn't even considering his 
bill, if you can believe that, so it's not going to be offered 
there. This is our opportunity.
    So I would encourage my colleagues to vote on this based on 
the merits of it, not based on this sense of balance.
    Let me make a final point. You know what? I will eat this 
rostrum if our bill becomes the bill that we vote on on the 
floor. We are all in a process of laying down a series of 
markers, of protecting jurisdiction, of making sure that the 
bill that we report out reflects what we want it to do.
    If we're going to do that, we have two chances to do it. We 
can have one consistent bill, the base 9/11 bill. We've decided 
not to do that. The other thing to do is to take this bill and 
perfect it, and I think we should do that by voting yes on this 
amendment.
    Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman?
    Ms. Lofgren. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The other gentleman from New York, 
Mr. Nadler.
    Mr. Nadler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I commend the other 
gentleman from New York, Mr. Weiner, for this amendment. 
Clearly, everything we know, every bit of intelligence we get 
from the 9/11 Commission, from everywhere, from the chatter, 
the briefing we had downstairs a week ago, is that all the 
information we have is that the No. 1 target of the terrorists 
in New York is New York. I'm sorry. The No. 1 target of the 
terrorists in the United States is New York, and clearly, if we 
want to protect the American people, we have to protect--we 
have to have the money go where the threat is to some extent.
    Now, you talk about the politics of it. The politics of it, 
we've surrendered in this Committee. We've surrendered by 
having the State minimums. That should be enough of a surrender 
to the politics. But the fact is, we ought to at least have 
this amendment so the minimum percent goes to where the real 
threat is, not on the basis of geography but on the basis of 
where it is needed. No one disputes that that is where the No. 
1 threat is. There may be some very weird terrorist out there 
who really wants to destroy a cornfield in some midwestern 
State, but that's not the real threat. The real threat is New 
York. The real threat is Chicago, Washington, Los Angeles, but 
primarily New York. That's what the FBI is afraid of. That's 
what the CIA is afraid of. That's what the Homeland Security 
Department is afraid of, and that's where we ought to devote 
some of our resources.
    So this amendment, which takes 8\1/2\ percent for the most 
threatened jurisdictions is common sense and doesn't take away 
from the politics. We've conceded the politics by putting in 
all those State minimums, which have no justification other 
than the politics.
    So I urge the adoption of this amendment and I yield back.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The question----
    Ms. Lofgren. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentlewoman from California,
    Ms. Lofgren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I move to strike the 
last word.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentlewoman's recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Ms. Lofgren. I want to speak in favor of this amendment, 
and I listened carefully to the Chairman's comments and concern 
that we might not be able to achieve this beyond what is in the 
bill itself, and certainly we are both members of the Homeland 
Security Committee, and we have not had tremendous progress on 
that Committee, as the chairman knows. But I think we ought to 
stretch ourselves and adopt this amendment because certainly it 
would not necessarily be of benefit to my particular district, 
I think, in California, but it's what we should do as a 
country. We ought to direct our resources to the threats, and I 
think we all know that, and we know that New York is our prime 
target. There may be--Washington also. This is not an area, in 
my judgment, where we ought to allow political pragmatism, as 
valuable as that is, to get in the way of doing the right thing 
for our country and for the safety of our Nation.
    Therefore, I think that the gentleman from New York's 
amendment needs to be approved. Each one of us who has 
districts that will not receive funds, should be able to go 
home and look our constituent in the eye and say we did this 
because it's not pork, it's for the country, it's for the 
safety of the country, and I think that the citizens of America 
and our constituents will understand that that's the right 
thing. Not a single member of this Committee would be punished 
politically for doing that right thing.
    And so I would hope--I understand the chairman's savvy 
political advice, but I really think we need to move beyond 
that. I think we're better than that as a Committee, as a 
Congress and as a country, and I strongly urge that we support 
this amendment. It's the right thing to do, and I appreciate 
the gentleman allowing me to speak, and I yield back the 
balance of my time.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. For what purpose does the 
gentlewoman from Texas, Mr. Jackson Lee, seek recognition?
    Ms. Jackson Lee. To strike the last word.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentlewoman's recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me first of all thank Mr. Weiner for 
really defining the issue and narrowing the issue to I think 
the sensitivities that were reflected in the 9/11 Commission 
report.
    In the number of meetings that we had with the 
commissioners, individual commissioners from different cities, 
different regions of the Nation, they really focused on this 
question of vulnerabilities and the threat question, and they 
really, really, really insisted that we give some order to the 
resources being utilized or being put forward on behalf of this 
Government to secure America.
    The threat vulnerability question is a key element to its 
security. This one helps to narrow--this amendment, excuse me--
helps to narrow the determination even more. When I spoke 
earlier on the Nadler amendment I indicated for some reason we 
think that the Homeland Security resources are, if you will, 
safety resources, are the only safety resources that this 
Government has a responsibility of generating throughout the 
Nation. That is not the case. The Department of Justice has 
oversight over the DEA, the Drug Enforcement Agency, the U.S. 
Marshal Service, Federal Protective Service, Capitol Police, 
FBI, any number of law--Secret Service--law enforcement 
entities besides funding that's possible for local law 
enforcement authority.
    This funneling of dollars to where the threat is will not 
undermine general safety in our cities. I do think not funding 
cops on the beat will undermine it, but this will not do it. So 
I would hope the gentleman's amendment would be passed just for 
the very fact that it is really complicit with the research and 
the testimony that was gathered by the 9/11 Commission, makes 
it a far better offering, if you will, to ensuring that we are 
safe and ensuring that those highly-targeted areas can be truly 
made safe by the resources that are generated for that very 
purpose.
    With that, I yield back to the gentleman.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The question is on the amendment 
offered by the gentleman from New York, Mr. Weiner. Those in 
favor will say aye? Opposed, no?
    The noes appear to have it. The----
    Mr. Weiner. rollcall.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. A rollcall vote is ordered. 
Pursuant to the Chair's prior announcement and Committee Rule 
2(h)(1), further proceedings on this amendment will be 
postponed.
    Are there further amendments?
    Mr. Berman. Mr. Chairman?
    Ms. Lofgren. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from California, Mr. 
Berman.
    Mr. Berman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I move to strike the 
last word.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Berman. Actually, I have an amendment at the desk, and 
I would like to offer it.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report the 
amendment.
    Mr. Berman. Be recognized to speak on my amendment.
    The Clerk. Amendment to H.R. 10 offered by Mr. Berman: 
Strike Section 3006 and amend the table of contents 
accordingly.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    [The amendment of Mr. Berman follows:]
    
    
    Mr. Berman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    This amendment strikes Section 3006 and amends the table of 
contents accordingly. 3006 drastically expands the use of 
expedited removal. Expedited removal came into play in the 1996 
legislation that this Congress passed with people--for people 
who are entering the U.S. without inspection. Because this 
process represents a drastic limitation on due process, we 
built in some protections for special cases, like asylees, to 
avoid making irreversible and serious mistakes.
    This section presents many problems, but it has two major 
flaws. First, it ignores those careful exceptions for those who 
have legitimate claims to asylum. Second, it really has no 
logical place in this bill. This bill would deny the most basic 
simple protection for those with legitimate claims to asylum, 
the credible fear interview, and here, remember, I'm not 
talking about the long protracted asylum process. That 
interview which is used in expedited removal cases, which 
usually occurs within 24 hours after the person is picked up 
without appropriate documents, and where that employee of the 
agency determines whether, in fact, the gentleman has a 
credible fear and, therefore, should move into the asylum 
process. If the person making the claim has been in the U.S. 
for more than a year, then he no longer can even get that 
credible fear interview.
    In other words, if an inspector finds that someone has been 
here for more than a year and they claim that they have a 
credible fear of persecution that will come to them if they are 
sent home, this bill would allow that claim to be ignored and 
to avoid the credible fear interview.
    I assume that the basis for this provision is the 1-year 
filing section--deadline in Section 208(a)(2)(C). The problem 
is that there are exceptions to this deadline that are not 
accommodated in this bill. Circumstances change in countries in 
a year, and there are exceptional circumstances in which an 
individual could still be granted asylum, or other relief for 
that matter, for instance, withholding of removal or relief 
under the Convention Against Torture.
    But this raises a broader question for this section. What's 
it doing in this bill? I find it hard to believe that the 
people who drafted this legislation really think that by 
expanding expedited removal we will catch more terrorists 
trying to enter our country. Expedited removal is the last 
thing we want for terrorists trying to gain entry because 
essentially what it does is sends them out only to try to enter 
again somewhere else to engage in the act of terrorism that 
they are planning or have already engaged in somewhere else.
    This section is not about that. It's about wanting to 
broaden general immigration enforcement without due process. 
That may be the goal--that may be the goal for some, but I 
don't believe this is--this is clearly not a goal of the 9/11 
Commission, and this bill does not implement any of the 9/11 
Commission recommendations, this section. The danger of relying 
on expedited removal to catch terrorists is that it is about 
removal. We don't want to remove terrorists. We want to detain 
them. We want to interrogate them. We want to charge them, and 
we want to put them away. Expedited removal sends them home. If 
we want to step outside the Commission's recommendations, we 
should try to do so in a way that doesn't harm legitimate 
asylum seekers, many of whom are escaping the oppression of 
governments that sponsor the terrorists we're trying to stop. 
Section 3006 would allow genuine refugees who qualify for a 
statutory exception to the 1-year deadline to file for asylum, 
it would allow those refugees to be summarily deported without 
even the credible fear interview.
    I'm very sensitive to the notion of frivolous asylum 
applications. This was the whole logic behind setting up the 
credible fear interview. Have a quick 1-day interview with an 
officer of the Bureau where the individual can determine 
whether--can persuade that person that his claim is, in fact, 
based on a credible fear. And that interview is eliminated by 
virtue of this provision, a carefully crafted exception that 
was maintained by the majority in the 1996 law. This would 
allow--if we adopt 3006, it would allow refugees who are 
eligible for withholding of removal to be summarily deported 
with no opportunity to claim that protection in violation of 
our obligations under Article 33 of the Refugee Convention.
    I think we should strike this section, and I would urge the 
Committee to support the amendment.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman's time has expired. 
The Chair recognizes himself for 5 minutes in opposition to the 
amendment.
    By the mid-1990's, tens of thousands of aliens were 
arriving at U.S. airports each year without valid documents and 
making meritless asylum claims, knowing that they would be 
released into the community pending asylum hearings because of 
a lack of detention space. Few were ever heard from again.
    In response, the '96 law created a mechanism of expedited 
removal. Under expedited removal, a DHS officer at a port of 
entry can immediately return an alien lacking proper documents 
to his or her country of origin unless the alien asks for 
asylum and can establish at that time a credible fear of 
persecution. By fiscal year 2003, the INS was making over 
43,000 expedited removals per year, and our airports were no 
longer being deluged.
    The '96 Act provided the Administration with authority to 
utilize expedited removal in the case of any alien who had 
entered the U.S. illegally and had not been present here for 2 
years. Until recently, INS and DHS never made use of this 
power, which was a fact that amazed the staff of the 9/11 
Commission. Let me quote 9/11 and terrorist travel. ``Despite 
the success of expedited removal at our airports, the INS never 
expanded expedited removal to include persons attempting to 
enter illegally across the expansive physical borders between 
ports of entry. As a result, it was not being used against 
Ghazi Ibrahim Abul Mizir who was able to stay in the U.S. 
despite being apprehended three times for illegal entries along 
the Canadian border. He later became known as the Brooklyn 
Bomber for his plan to blow up the Atlantic Avenue subway in 
Brooklyn.''
    Recently, the Administration has taken a tentative step 
toward using expedited removal along the Southern border 
because of large numbers of non-Mexicans being caught by the 
Border Patrol and then released into the United States because 
of a lack of detention space. The recent release of Border 
Patrol data showed that just in the period from last October 
through this June, 44,614 non-Mexican aliens were caught trying 
to cross the Northern or Southern borders, including eight from 
Afghanistan, six from Algeria, 13 from Egypt, 20 from 
Indonesia, 10 from Iran, 55 from Israel, 122 from Pakistan, six 
from Saudi Arabia, six from Syria, 22 from Turkey, and two from 
Yemen.
    There is no good reason not to subject illegal aliens who 
have crossed the border illegally to expedited exclusion. These 
aliens, if they had been in the U.S. less than 10 years, have 
no right to seek cancellation of removal. Unless they are 
making a claim of asylum and can show a credible fear of 
persecution, there is no reason not to subject them to 
expedited removal. Otherwise, the present revolving door will 
continue to spin.
    We will catch illegal aliens and promptly release them, 
hoping that they'll appear for their immigration court hearing 
months hence. The Department of Justice's Office of Inspector 
General found last year that the INS was only able to remove 13 
percent of non-detained aliens with final orders of removal and 
only 6 percent of non-detained aliens from countries who are 
state sponsors of terrorism who had final removal orders. Our 
choices are stark: either to vastly increase immigration 
detention space and detain all illegal aliens that are 
apprehended, utilize expedited removal, or continue the present 
charade of catch and release. Our borders are leaky as sieve. 
When we do catch people who are illegally in the United States, 
there is no reason to expect them to show up in court when they 
are released into our society. And what this section does is to 
provide the means to provide expedited removal for those who 
are caught.
    I urge opposition to the amendment and yield back the 
balance of my time.
    The question is on the amendment----
    Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from New York, Mr. 
Nadler.
    Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Nadler. I think the last word is being awfully painful 
these days since we are striking it so often. But with that, 
I'll yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from 
California.
    Mr. Berman. I'd like to just react to the chairman's 
comments and throw out a possibility of an adjustment here. I'm 
not talking here against expedited removal. I am aware of the 
problems of the revolving door. I'm aware of the problem of 
frivolous asylum claims. And part of the whole process that we 
dealt with in 1996 was to set up this credible fear interview 
that's, as I understand it, held within around 24 hours to 48 
hours of the inspector's apprehension of the individual at a 
point of entry. And what I'm concerned most about is you've 
eliminated the exception, and we could adjust that with two 
amendments to strike existing provisions, if I could just turn 
your attention to page 203 of the bill, line 17.
    If you remove ``and the officer determined that the alien 
has been physically present in the United States for less than 
1 year,'' if you eliminate that, then at least that person gets 
the credible fear interview. If he hasn't made a case that he 
has a credible fear of persecution, he then goes into expedited 
removal and he is removed, and we are talking about a day or 
two.
    If you made the same change in 204, that same change 
repeats itself on page 204, lines 12 through 14. So at the very 
least, you would maintain the exceptions crafted in the 
original expedited removal statute with respect to asylees, so 
there is some screen that says that in a few of these cases 
there may be a true asylee who under our laws we're not 
supposed to be turning away. And we at least go through that 
credible interview process, not the long, exhaustive process 
where the person is released and never shows up for the hearing 
that's 8 months or a year later, or whenever the hearing is, 
and disappears into society but is held, and within 24 to 48 
hours gets that interview where he can try to make his case 
that he has a credible fear of persecution if returned to the 
foreign country.
    In other words, a little--just a little bit of balance 
here, a little safety valve. So I would ask, if the chairman 
were amenable, I would withdraw my amendment to strike this 
provision, and just get rid of those three lines, allowing that 
part of the process to continue.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. If the gentleman will yield, the 
Chair believes that the provisions in the base bill are good.
    Mr. Berman. In that case, the Chair does not--in that case, 
the gentleman doesn't agree to change his amendment.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Does the gentleman yield back, the 
gentleman from New York?
    Mr. Nadler. I yield back.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The question is on the amendment 
offered by the gentleman from California, Mr. Berman. Those in 
favor will say aye? Opposed, no?
    The noes appear to have it. The noes have it, and the 
amendment is not agreed to.
    Ms. Lofgren. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. For what purpose does the 
gentlewoman from California, Ms. Lofgren, seek recognition?
    Ms. Lofgren. I have an amendment at the desk.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report the 
amendment.
    The Clerk. Amendment to H.R. 10, offered by Ms. Lofgren: 
Insert the following at the end of Section 3090: ``Section 
3090. Biometric Entry-Exit Screening System''----
    Ms. Lofgren. I would ask unanimous consent that the reading 
of the amendment be waived.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentlewoman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    [The amendment of Ms. Lofgren follows:]
    
    
    Ms. Lofgren. Mr. Chairman, in the 9/11 Commission Report, 
the following recommendation was made: ``The Department of 
Homeland Security, properly supported by the Congress, should 
complete as quickly as possible a biometric entry-exit 
screening system, including a single system for speeding 
qualified travelers. It should be integrated with the system 
that provides benefits to foreigners seeking to say in the 
United States. Linking biometric passports to good data systems 
and decisionmaking is a fundamental goal.''
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Will the gentlewoman yield?
    Ms. Lofgren. I certainly will.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. I believe the gentlewoman has a 
very important and very constructive amendment, and it 
dovetails exactly with the biometric provisions that were 
contained in the Enhanced Visa and Border Security Act of 2002. 
The best way to prevent document fraud is through biometric 
identifiers, and the best way to make sure that those biometric 
identifiers are integrated with databases and watch lists is to 
have a statutory requirement of coordination, which the 
gentlewoman's amendment provides.
    This is a very good amendment, and I am happy to agree to 
it.
    Ms. Lofgren. With that, then I would thank the chairman and 
say that I think this fully implements the recommendation of 
the Commission, and I appreciate the chairman's support and 
yield back.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The question is on the amendment 
offered by the gentlewoman from California, Ms. Lofgren. Those 
in favor will say aye? Opposed, no?
    The ayes appear to have it. The ayes have it, and the 
amendment is agreed to.
    Mr. Watt. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Are there further amendments? The 
gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Watt.
    Mr. Watt. I have an amendment at the desk.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report the 
amendment.
    Mr. Watt. The last letters are XML.
    The Clerk. Amendment to H.R. 10, offered by Mr. Watt: 
Section 5103(b), strike paragraph (3), Section 5103----
    Mr. Watt. I ask unanimous consent the amendment be 
considered as read, unless somebody objects.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection, so ordered.
    The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
    [The amendment of Mr. Watt follows:]
    
    
    Mr. Watt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    This Section 5103 of the bill contains provisions that 
would be--that would allow States and localities to enter into 
litigation management agreements to handle all claims arising 
out of, relating to, or resulting from an act of terrorism. The 
problem with the provision is that it does not include an 
exemption for intentional misconduct, and the purpose of this 
amendment would be to correct what I believe and hope is an 
oversight by inserting a subsection (C) on page 531 of the bill 
that would cover intentional misconduct. Surely we are not 
trying to protect against intentional misconduct, and I would 
hope that that was not our intention. Hopefully it was just an 
oversight.
    So with that, I would ask my colleagues to support the 
amendment and yield back the balance of my time.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The Chair recognizes himself for 5 
minutes in opposition to the amendment.
    First, the provisions of this amendment would strike a 
direct response to the 9/11 Commission recommendation that 
states, ``Congress should pass legislation to remedy the 
longstanding liability impediments to the provision of public 
safety, mutual aid where applicable throughout the Nation.''
    Allowing punitive damages to be paid from State treasuries 
in cases in which first responders are sued by personal injury 
attorneys would set an offensive precedent of punishing State 
taxpayers for injuries caused by terrorists. To require State 
taxpayers to pay punitive damages for injuries caused by 
terrorists would be an obscene exercise in which American 
taxpayers are punished for the evil acts of foreign enemies.
    The Federal Tort Claims Act has long banned punitive 
damages against----
    Mr. Watt. Would the chairman yield briefly?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner.--the United States. I yield.
    Mr. Watt. I actually intended to strike that provision. 
Could I ask unanimous consent to take out the first part?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection, the amendment is 
modified.
    Mr. Watt. And leave the intentional part, which I hope the 
chairman won't object to.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection, the amendment is 
modified to delete that part that strikes paragraph (3) of 
Section 5103(b). But I still oppose the remaining part of the 
amendment because the intentional torts exception that the 
amendment would insert would give the keys to the State 
treasury on intentional torts to the personal injury bar, and I 
think that this would insert a loophole in these essential 
provisions large enough to drive a fire truck through.
    Here is the bottom line. The exception provision in the 
base bill is the same exception provision that was included 
both in the Airline Safety and Systems Stabilization Act, which 
passed the House by a vote of 356-54 and the Terrorism Risk 
Insurance Act, which passed the House 373-0. Anyone who votes 
for this amendment is voting to deviate from an overwhelming 
bipartisan policy in these two other areas.
    Let's get something straight. Our Nation's responders 
aren't the enemy. Vicious terrorists bent on killing as many 
innocent Americans as possible are the enemy. So I would hope 
that the amendment would be defeated. I don't think we want to 
deviate from the precedent in the two previous bills that have 
been passed, and I would strongly urge a no vote on the Watt 
amendment. I yield back the balance of my time.
    Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. 
Scott.
    Mr. Scott. Move to strike the last word.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman, the problem with not accepting--I 
didn't like the idea that you struck the first part of the 
amendment, but if the patron of the amendment wanted it that 
way, that's fine. But the problem with this situation is it 
covers more than the terrorist acts. You can have--this covers 
all claims, so if you have a terrorist attack, any health care 
provision or anything that happens after that would be as a 
result, and you could have some intentional misconduct that 
just happened to be--had just happened to occur on September 
11. You could have some of the most outrageous conduct. You 
could have some first--some hospital saying, well, we'll take 
white people first, black people get behind. They have adverse 
consequences. No punitive damages. You could have people just 
intentionally misconduct--it's intentional misconduct. Any 
claim. And I don't think we ought to--I mean, we're not talking 
about the terrorists. We're talking about health care 
provisions, intentional torts, no----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Well, will the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Scott. I yield.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The problem is that this section of 
the bill relates to State neutral aid agreements. Now, if 
something happens again in New York City, God forbid, and 
firefighters from New Jersey and Connecticut run across the 
bridge to help the New York Fire Department deal with the 
emergency, they're subject to New York law on their liability 
because any tortious act would occur in New York.
    Now, the thing is that unless you can have these agreements 
where the two States agree to what type of litigation 
management provisions are, one of the reactions when there is 
an emergency may be we cannot send our firefighters into New 
York State because New York law applies, and if they get sued 
for an action, whether it's intentional or otherwise, then the 
New Jersey State Treasury or the Connecticut State of Treasury 
or the City of Newark Treasury, and on and on, would end up 
being on the hook. You know, it ends up being in derogation of 
a mutual aid agreement which may very well be vital to make 
sure that there are proper personnel that would go across State 
lines or jurisdictional lines to be able to deal with an 
emergency.
    Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, we have never 
given immunity to intentional misconduct, reckless disregard--
criminal conduct I guess would be immune unless this amendment 
passes. I yield.
    Mr. Watt. I appreciate the gentleman yielding. It's not the 
agreements that we're objecting to. It is the waiving of 
immunity--providing immunity for intentional misconduct. And 
Mr. Scott is absolutely right. But let me postulate another 
example to you. Somebody--we get attacked, terrorist-attacked 
by what appears to be Muslims. Somebody is in an ambulance 
being taken to the hospital, one of us, the good people, who 
happens to be wearing a turban. And somebody says, you know, 
``I'm taking this out on every Muslim that I see tonight.'' 
That's exactly what we've been trying to discourage from 
happening.
    I don't have any problem with taking it out on the 
terrorists themselves, but somebody engaging in internal 
misconduct such as that would be covered by this provision. 
That is obscene and that's can be what the chairman is 
intending to have happen. We've never protected people against 
intentional misconduct. This is--somebody takes the--says, hey, 
this person has suffered too much, I'm just going to shoot him 
in the head, you know, I don't want him to suffer anymore. You 
know, that's--we can't condone that kind of conduct. That's 
intentional wrongdoing, and this bill would sanction that.
    So I just can't even imagine--I mean, I can understand why 
you want to do tort law. You want to do tort law on everything. 
That's why I took out the first provision, which Mr. Scott 
objected to. But I can't imagine that you're sitting here 
telling this Committee that you intend to protect people who 
have engaged in intentional criminal misconduct that--I can't 
believe that's what you intend.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman's time has expired.
    The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman 
from North Carolina, Mr. Watt. Those in favor will say aye? 
Opposed, no?
    The noes appear to have it. The----
    Mr. Watt. Mr. Chairman, I--you must have a hearing 
impairment. [Laughter.]
    Mr. Watt. I didn't hear anybody say no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The Chair will----
    Mr. Watt. I request a recorded vote.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Pursuant to the Chair's prior 
announcement and Committee Rule 2(h)(1), further proceedings 
will be postponed.
    Are there further amendments?
    Mr. Schiff. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from California, Mr. 
Schiff.
    Mr. Schiff. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report the 
amendment.
    Mr. Schiff. 154.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, I have two 154s.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Would the gentleman from California 
specify which 154 he wants?
    Mr. Schiff. Yes. It would be the briefer of the two 154s.
    The Clerk. Amendment to H.R. 10, offered by Mr. Schiff: 
Page 138, after line 7, insert the following: ``Section 2054, 
Removal of potential nuclear weapons--weapons materials from 
vulnerable sites worldwide''----
    Mr. Schiff. Mr. Chairman, I request that the amendment be 
deemed as read.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection, so ordered.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    [The amendment of Mr. Schiff follows:]
    
    
    Mr. Schiff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Probably the most chilling part of the 9/11 Commission 
Report dealt with the potential that terrorists would get a 
hole of nuclear weapons. In the report, the Commissioners 
wrote, ``The greatest danger of another catastrophic attack in 
the United States will material if the world's most dangerous 
terrorists acquire the world's most dangerous weapons. As we 
note in Chapter 2, al Qaeda has tried to acquire or make 
nuclear weapons for at least 10 years.''
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Will the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Schiff. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. I am happy to accept this 
amendment. I think it hits on a very valuable and vital point. 
I would make the observation that in the minds of the ever 
expanding jurisdiction of the Energy and Commerce Committee, 
they may have an objection to this. But if they want to object, 
they can object, and I think we should put this in the bill.
    Mr. Schiff. Mr. Chairman, I very much appreciate that, and 
the Energy and Commerce Committee declined to take up a hearing 
on the bill, and I appreciate the chairman's willingness to 
allow me to offer it. And with that, I will yield back the 
balance of my time.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The question is on the amendment 
offered by the gentleman from California, Mr. Schiff. Those in 
favor will say aye? Opposed, no?
    The ayes appear to have it. The ayes have it, and the 
amendment is agreed to.
    Are there further amendments? The gentleman from New York, 
Mr. Nadler.
    Mr. Nadler. Thank you. I have what I believe is my last 
amendment of the day at the desk.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report the last 
amendment.
    Mr. Nadler. At least my last amendment. I hope it's last 
amendment.
    The Clerk. Amendment to H.R. 10 offered by Mr. Nadler----
    Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the 
amendment----
    Mr. Watt. Reserving the right to object.
    Mr. Nadler.--be considered as read.
    Mr. Watt. Reserving the right to object. I just want to see 
it.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman reserves the right to 
object, and this relates to authority to enter into contracts 
and issue Federal loan guarantees. These are high-risk 
nonprofits. The Chair is prepared to accept this amendment if 
we are able to get to that point.
    Mr. Nadler. Well, in light of that, and since we have 
adopted this amendment on the 3266 earlier, I am--I applaud the 
Chair's comment, and I have no further comments.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Does the gentleman from North 
Carolina withdraw his reservation?
    Mr. Watt. I withdraw my reservation, but I wanted to be--
Mr. Scott wants to be recognized.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection, the amendment is 
considered as read.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. And the gentleman from Virginia is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
    [The amendment follows:]
    
    
    Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman, parliamentary inquiry.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from New York will 
state his parliamentary inquiry.
    Mr. Nadler. If there's going to be discussion on this bill, 
by not speaking at this point have I surrendered my ability to 
speak----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. No, the gentleman has not been 
recognized in support of his amendment.
    Mr. Nadler. Thank you.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Virginia is 
recognized.
    Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd just point out that 
as I read the amendment, it has constitutional problems because 
it appears to have direct funding to religious organizations.
    I yield back the balance of my time.
    Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from New York, Mr. 
Nadler?
    Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman, as the bill is--as the amendment, 
I should say, is written, it is designed to avoid that. There 
is no direct funding to pervasively sectarian institutions. The 
money is given to law enforcement for the purpose of securing 
the sites, and I urge the Committee to adopt the amendment, as 
it has done previously.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Does the gentleman yield back?
    Mr. Nadler. I yield.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The question is on agreeing to the 
amendment offered by the gentleman from New York, Mr. Nadler. 
Those in favor will say aye? Opposed, no?
    The ayes appear to have it. The ayes have it; the amendment 
is agreed to.
    Are there further amendments? The gentlewoman from Texas, 
Ms. Jackson Lee.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the chairman, and I have two 
amendments. I will offer the first one at this time, which is 
listed as Jackson Lee Amendment, and it says ``Strike Section 
2142.'' That's the amendment.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report the 
amendment.
    The Clerk. Amendment to H.R. 10 offered by Congresswoman 
Sheila Jackson Lee: Strike Section 2142(a).
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentlewoman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    [The amendment of Ms. Jackson Lee follows:]
    
    
    Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the chairman.
    I don't know where to start, Mr. Chairman, on this 
amendment because I'm sure that this has overwhelming support. 
But it also points to the issues that many of us have been 
raising about the straying away from the underpinnings of the 
9/11 Commission Report and really the intent of the 9/11 
Commission and the legislation offered by Lieberman and McCain 
and Shays and Maloney.
    This is Subtitle F, Criminal History Background Checks, 
really unrelated per se to the idea of securing America. None 
of us are here to open the doors to criminals fleeing from 
justice or to have those who would do harm in jobs where they 
would do harm by their criminal history. I think many of us are 
interested in the rehabilitation of those who have done a crime 
and paid the time. And so we look to having an opportunity 
after people have done their time to really rehabilitate them.
    This goes specifically to the idea of allowing employers to 
seek the criminal history background checks of individuals who 
they seek to employ. In particular, the language says that the 
Attorney General shall establish and maintain a system for 
providing to an employer criminal history information that is 
requested by an employer as part of an employee criminal 
history investigation that has been authorized by the State 
where the employee works or where the employer has their 
principal place of business.
    Mr. Chairman, and to the colleagues on this, this is not a 
terrorist provision. This is a matter that can really have an 
opportunity for us to be heard as to whether or not this is 
invasive and that this is overreach.
    I might also say that this smacks of--even though it is 
framed in the criminal context, I began to draw upon the kind 
of background checks and intimidation through the McCarthyism 
era, through the era of the black student movement, through the 
civil rights era when many of our civil rights leaders were 
intimidated by FBI checks and wiretapping.
    The question is: Is this a necessary component to secure 
America? I frankly believe it is not. My amendment would simply 
strike the language dealing with the pilot program and ask the 
GAO to study whether or not this is the appropriate vehicle by 
which we should proceed.
    Clearly, there are suggestions by this kind of pilot 
program, or inferences of civil liberties violations, civil 
rights violations, and the abuse by inviting the Attorney 
General into routine criminal history background checks. It 
does not say the person is a terrorist. It doesn't say the 
person is suspicious of terrorist activities. It's just simply 
someone coming to seek employment and, lo and behold, the heavy 
hand of the Federal Government begins to investigate and to 
provide information which might be provided on the State level 
in any manner.
    So I would simply ask my colleagues to be reminded that we 
have an obligation under the Constitution to be fair here. We 
have an obligation not to draw back on times when activists 
were intimidated, when people who were against wars were 
intimidated, when people who were charged with being communist 
who simply had a different view from this Government were being 
charged with communism and denied work, blackballed all over 
America. This is what this smacks of, and I would simply ask 
for a fairness vote. And I've heard my Republican friends talk 
about the overreach of the PATRIOT Act, the overreach of trying 
to find out what library books we're trying to read. Well, I 
believe that this is an overreach, and I would simply ask that 
in its overreach that my colleagues allow this provision of the 
pilot program to be stricken. It leaves the aspect of the 
report and it, I believe, answers the question of whether or 
not we're securing America.
    Let me conclude by saying that the 9/11 Commission did not 
recommend any aspect of this particular provision. The 9/11 
Commission was focused on what I believe we should be focused 
on: securing America, not overreaching and violating, I think, 
the rights of many citizens. There are no safeguards to protect 
the information that employers collect, and once biometric 
information is given to the Justice Department, what becomes of 
it? And this provision also has no safeguard for accuracy, and 
we have just seen with the Brandon Mayfield fiasco how easy it 
is to misidentify someone even though our criminal--even 
through our criminal databases. We've had to bring in DNA to 
eliminate those who were innocent, who claimed innocence----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentlewoman's time has expired.
    Mr. Chabot. Mr. Chairman?
    Ms. Jackson Lee.--but yet they were not--they were to given 
that right. So I would ask my colleagues to support this on 
behalf of fairness.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. 
Chabot.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. I yield back.
    Mr. Chabot. Move to strike the last word, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I won't take the whole 
5 minutes, but I would urge my colleagues to oppose this 
amendment because it strikes out this whole section, the 
section that recognizes the unique role that the security guard 
industry plays in critical infrastructure protection and the 
urgency of their need----
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Would the gentleman yield? This does not 
take away the----
    Mr. Chabot. I didn't yield. If I have sufficient time, I'll 
yield, but let me finish my statement, please. And the urgency 
of the need for those that are hiring these folks to know who 
it is that they're hiring. The vast majority of the Nation's 
critical infrastructure, including power plants and 
telecommunications facilities, are guarded by private security 
companies. Knowing whether the have a disqualifying background 
is critical to homeland security objectives.
    This section as introduced, and then amended by Mrs. 
Blackburn, was the result of a bipartisan cooperation and input 
from the private industry. It is a pilot program to examine how 
a system for facilitating criminal history record checks of the 
integrated--Automated Fingerprint Identification System could 
be implemented.
    The purpose of this is to proactively eliminate the need 
for groups or industries to have to seek legislation unique to 
their industry. In the case of security guards, it's taken over 
almost 7 years--or, excuse me, 11 years now. A hearing on this 
issue was held in March of this year, and the consistent theme 
from the witnesses was that the current piecemeal system is 
inefficient. The access to these records with sufficient 
safeguards should be broader. Companies, especially those in 
critical infrastructures, should know who they are hiring.
    So I would urge my colleagues to--and I will yield to the 
gentlelady.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. And I thank the gentleman very much. I 
appreciate what the gentleman has said, and I want to make it 
very clear. I agree with you. And we did not take out Mrs. 
Blackburn's provisions dealing with security guards. That 
remains. This is a section that is a pilot program, and Mrs. 
Blackburn's program of background checks for security guards 
remains. We are just very concerned in the language that we 
struck not to open the doors randomly, but the Blackburn 
security guard program is safe and secure. And I'd ask my 
colleague to consider the wiseness of this amendment and 
language to strike this random check on individuals that cannot 
be secured and cannot be checked.
    I thank the gentleman for yielding.
    Mr. Watt. Would the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Chabot. I yield back the balance--oh, excuse me. I'll 
yield.
    Mr. Watt. I'm just trying to find the provision that you 
are talking about that relates to security guards. This section 
that the amendment seems to be striking doesn't seem to me to 
make any reference to security guards. It's all about any 
employer, and it seems to be very, very broad and vague. So, 
new section--where is that? I'm just trying to figure out 
where.
    Mr. Chabot. This time I'll yield back the balance of my 
time.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Well, if the gentleman from Ohio 
will yield, the language that the gentleman from North Carolina 
is referring to I believe was added by the Blackburn amendment 
that was agreed to earlier today.
    Mr. Watt. But this is--she's strike 2142(a). Wasn't the 
Blackburn amendment to 2142(c)?
    Mr. Chabot. Mr. Chairman, could I suggest, if the gentleman 
and the gentlelady would agree, that we withhold this until we 
have a chance to get the staffs together and determine exactly 
what the changes have been made and----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Well, the way to do it is to 
withdraw the amendment without prejudice, and without 
objection, the amendment is withdrawn without prejudice to deal 
with this matter.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, I'd be happy to do it if we 
do it within the time frame to be able to submit it again 
before we close. Thank you.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The amendment is withdrawn without 
prejudice.
    Are there further amendments? The gentlewoman from Texas, 
Ms. Jackson Lee.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the distinguished chairman. Let me 
just quickly----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Does the gentlewoman have an 
amendment?
    Ms. Jackson Lee. I'm sorry, Mr. Chairman. I'm moving on 
because of the time. Yes, I do, and the amendment is 277.XML.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report the 
amendment.
    The Clerk. Amendment to H.R. 10, offered by Ms. Jackson Lee 
of Texas: Page 217, after line 5----
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, I ask that the amendment be 
considered as read.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection, so ordered.
    And the gentlewoman is recognized for 5 minutes.
    [The amendment of Ms. Jackson Lee follows:]
      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


      
      

  


    Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    One of the tasks that we have in this Committee, again, is 
to deal directly with the concept of terrorists and the 
penetration of such terrorists into the homeland. This 
amendment deals with the crisis that has appeared at our 
borders, a lot at the Southern border, but also at the Northern 
border, and that is alien smuggling. It provides for provisions 
that create penalties for those who would engage in alien 
smuggling and human trafficking, particularly in light of some 
of the new information that we've discovered about individuals 
penetrating our borders to the South who are coming through 
South America and may have some affiliations with terrorist 
organizations.
    This is to ensure that that does not happen by an outreach 
program. It is also a program that deals with incentives and 
rewards so that it is clear that we have the kind of support 
system for law enforcement to catch these smugglers.
    And I think the other important aspect is that this saves 
lives. We in Texas know very well what it is to lose 19 and 20 
people in a heated large 18-wheeler who were trying to come to 
this country, in this instance for economic opportunity. But 
the very vulnerabilities of utilizing massive interstate trucks 
to smuggle individuals into the country leaves us vulnerable to 
the idea of terrorists being smuggled over into the United 
States by land. And this deals specifically with that question 
by providing a number of incentives. I would ask my colleagues 
to support this amendment on the grounds that it saves lives 
and as well that it protects--or provides enhanced protection 
for those who would try to smuggle in individuals who would 
come here who are affiliated with terrorist activities and 
organizations.
    With that, I yield back my time.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. For what purpose does the gentleman 
from Indiana seek recognition?
    Mr. Hostettler. Mr. Chairman, I have a second degree 
amendment at the desk.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report the second 
degree amendment.
    The Clerk. Hostettler amendment to the Jackson Lee 
Amendment to H.R. 10: Strike line 3, page 1----
    Mr. Hostettler. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that 
the amendment be considered as read.
    Mr. Watt. Reserving the right to object.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. On the gentleman's reservation. 
This is not a long amendment, by the way.
    Mr. Watt. Is it a substitute?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. It is not a substitute.
    Mr. Watt. I'll withdraw.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection, the amendment is 
considered as read.
    The gentleman from Indiana is recognized for 5 minutes.
    [The amendment of Mr. Hostettler to Ms. Jackson Lee 
amendment follows:]


    Mr. Hostettler. Mr. Chairman, I agree with my colleague 
from Texas that commercial smuggling is among the most heinous 
of offenses. Smugglers exploit human hope and deal in human 
misery. The Immigration Subcommittee has been examining efforts 
to combat human smuggling along our Southwest border throughout 
this Congress. In the past 2 years, the Subcommittee has held 
two separate hearings on those efforts, and staff has met 
several times with officials from DHS and the Justice and State 
Departments to craft a response to those crimes. Our work on 
this subject is ongoing.
    While I applaud my colleague's efforts to provide tools to 
address this problem, I'm concerned that this amendment may do 
in balance more harm than good. This amendment would provide 
immigration benefits and rewards up to $100,000 to those who 
provide information about criminal alien smuggling enterprises. 
Most of the people who would have such information would fall 
into one or two categories: other alien smugglers or smuggled 
aliens. Providing benefits to either of those groups for 
information about smuggling may raise more issues than they 
resolve.
    Immigration benefits may assist an alien smuggler in 
carrying out the smuggler's own criminal enterprise. Money may 
be plowed back into the smuggler's business. Additionally, 
making money and immigration benefits available to smuggled 
aliens may actually encourage smuggling by creating a win-win 
situation for smuggled aliens. If they enter the country 
without detection, they are home free. If they are caught, they 
can apply for the benefits provided herein.
    Further, I'm not convinced that the availability of such 
benefits will not encourage aliens to demand those benefits in 
support for this testimony. Nor am I convinced that in 
providing such benefits the government would not diminish the 
value of the testimony as defense counsel argues that the alien 
witness has been paid for the witness' testimony. And that was 
pointed out in one of our hearings.
    Finally, I'm not sure that these additional authorities are 
needed. Aliens with information can be given advance parole, a 
legal status that will ensure that the alien is available to 
testify. Other benefits are available depending on the 
specifics of the alien's case.
    In summary, while law enforcement agents are always 
enthusiastic to receive additional tools, we need to make sure 
that the tools we provide are the right ones. One of those 
right tools, Mr. Chairman, is included in my colleague's 
amendment, and it is that tool that is the subject of my second 
degree amendment. The second degree amendment retains the 
portions of Ms. Jackson Lee's amendment that would enhance 
penalties for alien smuggling and create an outreach program to 
inform those who would seek material gain from alien smuggling 
that they would be serving a much longer time in Federal prison 
as a result of the efforts of my colleague from Texas.
    Mr. Chairman, I ask for my colleagues to support the second 
degree amendment and yield back the balance of----
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Would the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Hostettler. I yield to the gentlelady from Texas.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the gentleman very much for 
yielding.
    It is clear that we have at least common ground to the 
extent that we know that alien smuggling kills and it threatens 
the safety of the United States. I happen to believe very 
strongly that the idea of incentives as documented by the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, meaning the incentives of 
providing people with legal status who give information to 
inhibit this heinous act, as well as the reward system that has 
been documented by a number of Federal law enforcement agencies 
as having worked, makes this a stronger amendment. I am willing 
at this time to concede a portion of the amendment that I have 
and to accept the gentleman's second amendment on the basis 
that I will continue to offer the CASE Act, which is 
comprehensive and really speaks to the sincerity and the 
reality of making this work.
    In its limited fashion, it will serve minimally, I believe, 
but it will not draw the informants and others who can help us 
actually solve this heinous act of alien smuggling.
    In Texas, in Arizona, in other places along the border, we 
live with this on a daily basis. We need more than what the 
gentleman has offered, but I believe in the spirit of 
cooperation and the need to do something and give relief to the 
people who are suffering with the alien smuggling potential in 
that region, it is important to move forward, and I accept the 
gentleman's amendment.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Jackson Lee follows:]
       Prepared Statement of the Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a 
Representative in Congress From the State of Texas, and Ranking Member, 
        Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims
    This amendment would add the provisions of my Commercial Alien 
Smuggling Elimination Act of 2003 (the CASE Act), H.R. 2630, to Title 
III of the 9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act.
    Last year, 340 people died trying to cross the border. This must 
stop. The most effective way to stop large scale illegal immigration 
would be to establish a sensible immigration program. Several bills 
have been introduced that would make the necessary changes in our 
immigration laws, such as my Comprehensive Immigration Fairness Reform 
Act of 2004, H.R. 3918, but we cannot wait for major immigration reform 
to address this problem. We must act now to reduce the deaths. The CASE 
Act would do this by establishing a three-point program which was 
designed to facilitate the investigation and prosecution, or 
disruption, of commercial alien smuggling operations.
    The first point would be to provide incentives to encourage 
informants to step forward and assist the federal authorities who 
investigate alien smuggling operations. The Immigration and Nationality 
Act (INA) presently provides a nonimmigrant classification for aliens 
who assist the United States government with the investigation and 
prosecution of a criminal organization or a terrorist organization. My 
bill would establish a new, third category for aliens who assist the 
United States government with the investigation, disruption, or 
prosecution of commercial alien smuggling operations.
    S visas are not controversial. Senator Edward Kennedy introduced 
legislation (S. 1424) to establish permanent authority for the S visa 
program on September 13, 2001, two days after the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks. The Senate passed S. 1424 by unanimous consent that same day. 
The House passed S. 1424 by unanimous consent on September 15, 2001. On 
October 1, 2001, President Bush signed the bill into law as P.L. 107-
45.
    The S visa is a useful tool when it is needed, but it is not needed 
frequently. In FY 2002, only 42 S visas were issued to informants and 
37 to their family members. In FY 2003, only 30 S visas were issued to 
informants and 28 to their family members. In FY 2004, through May 13, 
2004, only 30 S visas have been issued to informants and 22 to their 
family members. This is not an immigration program. It is an 
accommodation to make it possible for the government to get information 
from informants.
    The new S visa classification in my bill would be offered to 
potential informants by the State Department and the Justice 
Department, in addition to the Homeland Security Department. Alien 
smuggling operates cross international lines. No single federal agency 
can deal with it.
    The bill also would establish a rewards program to assist in the 
elimination or disruption of commercial alien smuggling operations in 
which aliens are transported in groups of 10 or more, and where either 
the aliens are transported in a manner that endangers their lives or 
the smuggled aliens present a life-threatening health risk to people in 
the United States.
    This is not a controversial provision either. The rewards program 
in my bill is virtually the same as the one the State Department 
presently uses to obtain informants in cases involving terrorists. The 
State Department rewards program has been very successful. Perhaps the 
most famous example is the case in which a $30 million reward was given 
to individuals who had provided critical information which led to the 
location of Uday and Qusay Hussein. Rewards under the CASE Act 
provisions, however, would be much lower than $30 million. The 
Secretary of Homeland Security would have to personally approve any 
award exceeding $50,000.
    I am concerned about the safety of the people who become 
informants, so my bill also would establish a protection program that 
would be available to investigators and prosecutors using informants in 
connection with investigating, disrupting, or prosecuting commercial 
alien smuggling operations.
    The second point would be a penalty enhancement provision. In the 
case of a person who has been convicted of smuggling aliens into the 
United States, the sentencing judge would be able to increase the 
sentence by up to 10 years. This only would apply to cases in which the 
offense was part of ongoing commercial smuggling operations, the 
operations involved the transportation of aliens in groups of 10 or 
more, and either the aliens were transported in a manner that 
endangered their lives or the smuggled aliens presented a life-
threatening health risk to people in the United States.
    The third point would require the Secretary of Homeland Security to 
develop and implement a program to educate the public here and abroad 
about the penalties for smuggling aliens. The program also would 
distribute information about the financial rewards and the immigration 
benefits that would be available for assisting in the investigation, 
disruption, or prosecution of commercial alien smuggling operations.
    I urge you to vote for this amendment to add the provisions of the 
CASE Act to Title III of the 9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act. 
Thank you.

    Mr. Hostettler. I thank the gentlelady for her cooperation 
and acceptance and once again commend her for the important 
work that she has done on this issue of alien smuggling and 
yield back the balance of my time.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The question is on agreeing to the 
Hostettler second degree amendment to the Jackson Lee 
amendment. Those in favor will say aye? Opposed, no?
    The ayes appear to have it. The ayes have it, and the 
second degree amendment to the amendment is agreed to.
    The question now is on the amendment offered by the 
gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee, as amended by the 
Hostettler amendment. Those in favor will say aye? Opposed, no?
    The ayes appear to have it. The ayes have it, and the 
amendment as amended is agreed to.
    Are there further amendments? The gentleman from Virginia, 
Mr. Scott.
    Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report the 
amendment.
    The Clerk. Amendment to H.R. 10 offered by Mr. Scott: 
Strike Section 2191 pertaining to grand jury----
    Mr. Scott. Wait a minute. That's not the right one. It's 
the one to Section 5103(b).
    The Clerk. Amendment to H.R. 10 offered by Mr. Scott of 
Virginia. Section 5103(b), strike paragraph (3). Page----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection, the amendment is 
considered as read and the gentleman's recognized for 5 
minutes.
    [The amendment of Mr. Scott follows:]
    
    
    Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Chairman, this attempts to strike the part that the 
gentleman from North Carolina withdrew for his amendment. It 
would strike three special rules, punitive damages and 
collateral sources. Punitive damages should be available to 
people who are not involved in--even if they weren't involved 
in the original terrorism, for the same normal rules of 
punitive damages, intentional, reckless disregard, I mean 
people ought to have the same rights as they've always had.
    The collateral source, deleting that provision would be a 
benefit to small businesses. Some small businesses or self-
insured businesses would find themselves in the incredible 
situation that they've got to pay for the damages first as a 
collateral source, and then someone who intentionally injured 
somebody gets the credit for that payment. It is just 
incredible that a small business that has agreed to pay the 
health benefits of somebody has got to pay for that before the 
insurance or anything else kicks in, and if somebody's put in a 
coma, they'll be paying for the rest of their life potentially, 
when there's insurance sitting up there, malpractice insurance 
or otherwise, and that just seems to me to be a ridiculous 
situation to put small businesses in.
    The other part of it, on page 533, line 24, we've immunized 
not only the public officials, but also hospitals and everybody 
else related. One reason to give the immunity for these 
Government agencies is to allow them to get into these 
agreements. There's no need to immunize private entities, and 
it's also, if you're going to immunize the State actors, the 
private sector people are not supervised by the State entity, 
so there's no case for the private ambulance and private 
hospitals to enjoy the immunity of the Government entities that 
you perhaps need. New Jersey won't help New York unless you 
give them immunity. Well, there's no need to immunize all the 
hospitals in the area in order to get that agreement. So 
there's no purpose to immunize them, so I would hope that we 
would maintain normal law as it is, and also I hope we'd get 
back the punitive damages and the collateral source as it 
traditionally has been.
    And I would yield back the balance of my time.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The chair recognizes himself for 5 
minutes in opposition to the amendment.
    We plowed this a little bit earlier with the earlier 
amendment. What I can say is that I don't think that there is 
any reason to state that in a mutual aid agreement between 
States or communities that privately contracted ambulance 
services that have been contracted for pursuant to the 
municipality or the State should be exempt--or should not be 
exempt, but that the Government sponsored ambulance services 
should be exempt.
    The other point that I would make on punitive damages is 
that this provision is enabling legislation. It allows the 
States to make an agreement that immunizes the parties from 
punitive damages. It does not mandate an immunization by 
Federal law. So basically what it does do is that it allows the 
States to decide whether or not the punitive damages are 
relevant, and I think that this is something we ought to allow 
the States to do.
    Urge defeat of the amendment and yield back the balance of 
my time.
    Mr. Watt. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from North Carolina, 
Mr. Watt.
    Mr. Watt. I move to strike the last word.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman's recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Watt. I won't take 5 minutes. I just want to make it 
clear that by striking this provision from my earlier amendment 
didn't--I didn't want to leave the impression that I don't Mr. 
Scott's amendment. I do. I was seeking to preserve in my 
amendment the absolutely most outrageous provision that would 
give immunity to people who intentionally engaged in torts. 
This is the second absolutely most outrageous.
    So I wanted to separate those two things so that it was 
clear that I was talking about the intentional misconduct, but 
I feel equally as strongly about this provision. There's no 
reason to put it in this bill. Nowhere is any of this stuff 
asked for by the 9/11 Commission report. And it just seems to 
me that at this point we're here piling on, putting all of our 
favorite tort reform, doing away with punitive damages, 
everything we can think of into a bill on the theory that 
people will vote for anything that sounds like it's resulted 
from the 9/11 Commission report.
    I just think that is a terrible thing for us to be doing 
rather than cutting to the heart of what the 9/11 Commission 
report was about, and I encourage my colleagues to support the 
Scott amendment, and yield back the balance of my time.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The question is on the amendment 
offered by the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott. Those in 
favor will say aye. Opposed, no.
    The noes appear to have it. The noes----
    Mr. Watt. Recorded vote, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Recorded vote is requested. 
Pursuant to the chair's prior announcement and Committee Rule 
2(h)(1), further proceedings will be postponed.
    Are there further amendments? The gentleman from New York, 
Mr. Weiner.
    Mr. Weiner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have two, and 
hopefully they will be brief. The first one I would like to 
pursue is 149, Weiner No. 149.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report the 
amendment.
    The Clerk. Amendment to H.R. 10 offered by Mr. Weiner. Page 
398----
    Mr. Weiner. Mr. Chairman, request unanimous consent that 
this be considered as read.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection and the gentleman 
is recognized for 5 minutes.
    [The amendment of Mr. Weiner follows:]
    
    
    Mr. Weiner. Mr. Chairman, included in the base bill is a 
list of things you're allowed to apply for funding for. It 
doesn't say you get funding for them, but they're things that 
you can put in your application that goes to this multi-person 
board. They're all ranked, and the top ones get reimbursement.
    What it does fail to do though is address the fact that in 
many of our districts there are antiterrorism things that are 
kind of under way now that started before the enactment of this 
bill that may have been fully funded before the enactment of 
this bill, in some cases represent the totality of the Homeland 
Security funds that are going to be needed. What this allows is 
that those expenditures also be permitted to be submitted.
    We heard testimony I think in the full Committee from a 
EMS--from a hospital emergency room director, who was talking 
about how Idaho had great demands. They had to have a special 
antiterrorism tent set up at their hospital. That expenditure 
is now done. According to this bill, they can't now take that 
program and ask for it to be reimbursed under this bill, even 
though it clearly would be eligible in every other case, and 
there are also some instances where there are projects that are 
going on that are ongoing. It is unclear under the bill whether 
they would be permitted as well.
    So this amendment allows States and regions to apply for 
things that have gone on in the antiterrorism, homeland 
security purposes after September 11 but before the enactment 
of this bill. I would say to stress to the chairman and to my 
colleagues this doesn't mean that you get the funding for it, 
and it doesn't mean the Department of Homeland Security or this 
panel might say we don't think this is a legitimate purpose, 
but it does allow you to go in and put the application in.
    It's important to New York, but I would argue that it's 
actually probably going to be far more important for areas that 
have fixed relatively knowable homeland security needs that 
they went in and filled. This gives them an opportunity to go 
do it. For example, if you're a small town that had one 
regional airport that they had to bolster, they would be now 
allowed----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Would the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Weiner. Yes, sir.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. I'm happy to accept the amendment. 
The gentleman's hit the nail on the head. You can always ask 
and you can always be told no, and this is permissive. So I 
guess getting back to a famous Supreme Court decision on 
another issue, there's no harm in asking.
    Mr. Weiner. I yield back the balance of my time.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The question is on the Weiner 
amendment. Those in favor will say aye. Opposed, no.
    The ayes appear to have it. The ayes have it. The amendment 
is agreed to.
    Further amendments? The gentleman from New York, Mr. 
Weiner.
    Mr. Weiner. Mr. Chairman, the second one--I'm sorry, it's 
153.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report the 
amendment.
    The Clerk. Amendment to H.R. 10 offered by Mr Weiner. Page 
397, strike ``and.'' After the semicolon at line 5----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection, the amendment is 
considered as read. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
    [The amendment of Mr. Weiner follows:]
    
    
    Mr. Weiner. Mr. Chairman, this seeks to address a similar 
thing on the personnel side. For police departments that have 
created, say, a counterterrorism office, a counterterrorism 
unit, have hired--have bomb sniffing dogs or----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Would the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Weiner. Yes, sir.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. I am happy to support this 
amendment, and hope that your dogs have good noses.
    Mr. Weiner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the 
balance of my time.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The question is on the adoption of 
the amendment by the gentleman from New York, Mr. Weiner. Those 
in favor will say aye. Opposed, no.
    The ayes appear to have it. The ayes have it. The amendment 
is agreed to.
    Are there further amendments? The gentlewomen from Texas, 
Ms. Jackson Lee.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, it's my understanding that 
we are offering again the Jackson Lee amendment in striking 
Section 2142, Section (A).
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report the amendment 
again.
    The Clerk. Amendment to H.R. 10 offered by Congresswoman 
Sheila Jackson Lee. Strike section 2142 (A).
    [The amendment of Ms. Jackson Lee follows:]
    
    
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you. It will be abbreviated. Just 
start out by making it very clear that my language does not 
interfere with the legitimate basis of, or premise that 
certainly security officers in various businesses should be 
secure, and certainly should have some background checks that 
ensure that. This is a totally separate amendment that calls 
for the study by the GAO of a pilot program rather than 
implementing in a random manner a pilot program that allows 
employers from around the Nation, without any legitimate basis, 
to seek a criminal history background check, when that could be 
done on a local basis or in some other forum.
    Again, I remind my colleagues that we're stepping very 
close to the atmosphere or the, if you will, the trend to 
violate the rights of individuals, innocent and others, and I 
would hope that they would consider this far-reaching, and 
having nothing to do with securing the homeland, and I'd ask my 
colleagues to support the simple striking of language that 
creates a pilot program with no basis, and really adhere to the 
Constitution and the Bill of Rights that gives us individual 
rights in the protection of that.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Chabot. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. 
Chabot.
    Mr. Chabot. Move to strike the last word.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman's recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll be brief as well. 
I continue to oppose this particular amendment. The pilot 
program that's referred to is to standardize the current system 
of Federal background checks. The Federal Government is 
currently conducting background checks for dozens of different 
private industries, from mentors to those who work in banks and 
on and on. There are different standards and different 
definitions, and different fee structures without any 
inconsideration to the FBI's resources or to civil liberties 
concerns.
    This pilot addresses that particular problem, and we should 
not strike the pilot program which is what this amendment does.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Will the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Chabot. Be happy to yield.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. I would refer the membership to the 
description of what the criminal history background checks 
information consists of, which is on the bottom of page 152 of 
the bill. It says: Criminal history information and criminal 
history records includes an identifying description of the 
individual to whom it pertains. Notations of arrests, 
detentions, indictment or other formal criminal charges 
pertaining to such individual, and any disposition to a 
notation received of this list, including acquittal, 
sentencing, correctional supervision, or release.
    Now, what we're talking about here is giving public record 
information to a perspective employer who needs to do a 
criminal background check pursuant to State law. So if State 
law requires a criminal background check, for example, of 
hiring somebody at a day care of a preschool facility, to make 
sure that they don't have any child abuse records, the Attorney 
General would be able to give that information because State 
law requires the prospective employer to do.
    So I don't have much of a privacy concern when you're 
dealing with public records, and that's what is being listed 
here.
    And I thank the gentleman from Ohio for yielding.
    Mr. Chabot. I yield back the balance of my time.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. 
Scott.
    Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman, the--I want to inquire, is the 
language that you just cited still in the bill after the 
amendment we adopted?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. If the gentleman will yield, yes.
    Mr. Scott. And it was my impression that we have 
significantly improved this section already by an amendment. I 
don't have that amendment before me. But we've already gone 
over that section once, is that right?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. That is correct.
    Mr. Scott. Yield back.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Would you yield?
    Mr. Scott. I'll yield to the gentlelady from Texas.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me--I think that we're not answering 
the question of concern. First of all, there's no guarantee for 
accuracy in this program. We have no information as to what 
happens to the thousands upon thousands of fingerprints of 
individuals taken and how they will be protected. And if the 
FBI needs more money, let's appropriate more money to do this 
right. Let's not recreate the FBI database program that already 
exists. Again, even with the program that they already have, we 
know that it is not sufficiently accurate.
    I just would remind individuals that we do have individual 
rights. We still have civil liberties. And whenever you broaden 
something and elevate it to a Federal Governmental stance, 
pilot program or not, you become an intruder. We want to be 
safe, but this criminal history has nothing to do with securing 
America. It has nothing to do with the 9/11 Commission report. 
What scares me is that it again becomes a whole wide can of 
worms, racial profiling, stigmatizing people who have already 
done their time inside, paid their time. So there seems to be 
no order to this, and I would just ask my colleagues to narrow 
it to the background checks that Mrs. Blackburn has offered 
with respect to security personnel. It does not need to be a 
general program, and if it does need to be fixed, then utilize 
it through the FBI program that's already not working as well.
    What happens to the fingerprints? If I could yield to the 
gentleman to ask that question, because it wasn't answered, 
yield to Mr. Chabot. Do you know what happens to the 
fingerprints?
    Mr. Chabot. I didn't hear the question. I'm sorry.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Do you know what happens to the 
fingerprints that will be collected and stored? Do the 
individuals who----
    Mr. Chabot. Will the gentlelady yield?
    Ms. Jackson Lee. I will. Do the individuals who sent them 
forth, will they be able to get them back?
    Mr. Chabot. Does the gentlelady yield?
    Ms. Jackson Lee. I would be happy to yield.
    Mr. Chabot. There are a number of programs that are already 
doing this right now. That's the whole purpose of the pilot 
program, is to coordinate them so it's done in a standard 
manner. And I think the gentlelady raises some legitimate 
concerns and that's why it's a pilot program, so that we can 
ultimately determine the best way to do this as oppose do the 
haphazard way that it's being done right now.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. I yield to the--let me reclaim my time--
well, it's your time, Mr. Scott's time. If I can, I ask do you 
know, under the pilot program, what would happen to those 
fingerprints of all of these individuals who would be subjected 
to the criminal history background check?
    Mr. Chabot. If the gentleman will yield, it's not been set 
up yet, so the details of this ultimately will be determined.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me just finish this sentence. There 
lies my angst and my concern, and that's why I am offering this 
amendment to strike the section, because we don't have any 
understanding of what's going to happen, and this is clearly an 
invasion of privacy and a disrespect of individual rights.
    I yield back to the gentleman.
    Mr. Scott. I yield back my time.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The question is on the Jackson Lee 
amendment. Those in favor will say aye. Opposed, no.
    The noes appear to have it. [Laughter.]
    Ms. Jackson Lee. That's the spirit of bipartisanship, Mr. 
Chairman.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The noes have it, and the 
amendment----
    Ms. Jackson Lee. I ask for a rollcall vote.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Okay. Pursuant to the chair's prior 
announcement and Committee Rule 2(h)(1).
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, can I ask how it was 
recorded?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The chair's left ear is getting 
deaf, so I didn't note how you were recorded. [Laughter.]
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. This vote will be postponed.
    Are there further amendments? The gentlewoman from 
California, Ms. Sanchez,
    Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have an amendment 
at the desk.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report the 
amendment.
    The Clerk. Amendment to H.R. 10 offered by Ms. Sanchez.
    Ms. Sanchez. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to 
consider the bill as--I mean the amendment as read.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection, the gentlewoman 
is recognized for 5 minutes.
    [The amendment of Ms. Sanchez follows:]
    
    
    Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I submitted this 
amendment, after a long day, because I think it comes 
dangerously close to creating a national identification card. 
While the September 11 Commission recommended that standards be 
set for driver's licenses, this bill goes far beyond that. It 
pushes unfunded mandates on the States by requiring a federally 
prescribed overhaul of State procedures for issuing driver's 
licenses and identification cards.
    As written, this bill would require State Departments of 
Motor Vehicles to verify the validity and completeness of each 
and every identification document used to prove identity. It 
also requires States to digitally store personally sensitive 
data without limiting how it will be used or by even providing 
guidance for its security. This bill even goes so far as to 
make the appearance of IDs uniform, a step that is eerily close 
to a national ID card.
    The States have a right to participate in determining how 
features for licenses and ID cards should be changed. Despite 
their expertise, however, they have not had input in the 
requirements of H.R. 10. My proposal would bring those who have 
a serious interest in implementation of uniform standards 
together. It would create a working group that would actually 
consult those who will have to live with the decisions that it 
makes. What a novel concept.
    That group, including Federal and State experts from the 
Department of Transportation, the Department of Homeland 
Security and State Motor Vehicle Departments, would carefully 
determine how best to undertake these major revisions. Once 
this group has put together recommendations, they will come 
back to Congress, and we then will be able to make a more 
reasoned decision.
    I urge my colleagues to vote yes on this amendment. It's 
important that our State IDs are reliable, but creating a 
national ID is not the answer. I yield back the remainder of my 
time.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. 
Smith.
    Mr. Smith. Mr. Chairman, I oppose the amendment.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Smith. Mr. Chairman, the amendment effectively dumbs 
down the requirements in H.R. 10 for the definitive 
identification of driver's license applicants, the most 
important element in the driver's license reforms included in 
H.R. 10. Language in the amendment clearly intends to strike 
the balance of the bill by adding general language that negates 
the ability of the States to actually implement common 
standards as well as to effectively neuter the standards 
setting provisions directed to the States. It has language to 
grandfather in many of the loose practices that led to the 
granting of driver's licenses to the 9/11 terrorists. In fact, 
among the 19 who flew into the World Trade Center Towers, they 
held more than 60 separate driver's licenses issued by States 
around the country.
    Under this amendment, it will be virtually impossible to 
verify that the holder of a driver's license is the same 
individual to whom the card was issued, whether data in the 
holder's records actually belongs to that individual or to 
someone else. So for the sake of our Nation's security, for the 
sake of a program that helps protect Americans, I would urge my 
colleagues to oppose this amendment.
    I'll yield back the balance of my time.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The question is on the amendment 
offered by----
    Mr. Weiner. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from New York, Mr. 
Weiner.
    Mr. Weiner. Mr. Chairman, I would just, in considering 
this, let us remember that there's another imperative here as 
well, and that is the imperative to protect people who are not 
immigrants, who do have legal driver's licenses, who have 
insurance, who are operating in their daily lives, but are 
endangered by the fact that too many people operate in this 
gray area of the law, and with that, I would yield to the 
gentlewoman from California.
    Ms. Sanchez. I would like to thank the gentleman for 
yielding.
    I think the bulk of this amendment basically says, let's 
bring in the stakeholders and let's let them have input on what 
should be the standards, the minimal standards for driver's 
licenses. Then with that information, it's brought back to 
Congress, and we're talking about people who have knowledge and 
who have to deal and live with the consequences of the ultimate 
decision making. So Congress ultimately will make the 
standards, but after appropriate and valid input from the 
people who have to live with those decisions and who work with 
driver's licenses on a day to day basis. So I don't see the 
harm in trying to bring in the actual people who have expertise 
in that area instead of Congress just blatantly adopting random 
minimum requirements. Let's get the people who use them and 
deal with them in to get their suggestions and recommendations 
so that we have valid minimal standards for all of the States 
in a uniform way.
    With that, I'll yield back to the gentleman from New York.
    Mr. Weiner. I yield back my time.
    Mr. Watt. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from North Carolina, 
Mr. Watt.
    Mr. Watt. Move to strike the last word.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Watt. I won't take 5 minutes. I just wanted to point 
out that we had a hearing in the Commercial and Administrative 
Law Subcommittee on this whole national identification process. 
And uniformly--and I wish my chairman, Mr. Cannon, was here to 
express this--but uniformly the people on the--members on that 
Subcommittee were extremely concerned about how this new 
identification system got implemented. And I think the 
underlying bill is well beyond what any of those people would 
have thought would have been a desirable place to be, and I 
think Ms. Sanchez's amendment gets us much, much closer to the 
appropriate balance. So I would certainly encourage my 
colleagues to support the amendment.
    I yield back.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. 
Hostettler.
    Mr. Hostettler. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last 
word.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman's recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Hostettler. Mr. Chairman, just in brief, I must admit 
that in the Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and 
Claims, we had held hearings where we have heard of the 
problems of the acceptance of documentation that has actually 
been issued by a foreign agent in the United States, namely, 
consular identification cards. We on the floor of the House of 
Representatives considered an amendment that would essentially 
disallow the acceptance of such documentation provided by a 
foreign agent--an agent of a foreign government in the United 
States to an alien. And the amendment was defeated that would 
disallow the use of that card issued by a foreign government as 
valid identification for, in this particular case, opening up a 
bank account.
    Now we are suggesting through this bill--and this is what 
troubles me--that while we can't stop foreign agents or their 
citizens of foreign countries from opening bank accounts with 
ID that is not safe and secure, according to testimony by folks 
such as the FBI, we are going to require that American citizens 
essentially come under the notion of an identification card 
that is uniform and requires certain information to be readily 
available to the United States Government on this.
    I am afraid that while, on one hand, we are saying as a 
body that we are going to allow foreign agents--we are going to 
allow citizens of foreign countries to use documentation given 
to them by a foreign agent, we are going to require citizens to 
come under a uniform identification process.
    Ms. Sanchez. Would the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Hostettler. I will yield to the gentlelady from 
California
    Ms. Sanchez. I must admit I'm a little perplexed where 
consular ID cards fits into the debate on this amendment, 
because potentially the working group could come up with the 
recommendation that consular ID cards are not a valid 
underlying form of ID for receiving a driver's license. What 
does----
    Mr. Hostettler. Reclaiming my time, reclaiming my time. I'm 
probably not making my point very clearly, but what I am saying 
is that on one hand we are allowing a document that has been 
testified time and time again, at least in our Subcommittee, as 
being not secure, we are allowing that from foreign nationals 
for valid identification, but we are going to require citizens 
of our individual States to come under a uniform----
    Mr. Weiner. Would the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Hostettler. I'm probably not making myself clear to the 
gentleman from New York either.
    Mr. Weiner. No. I just think--because either I'm 
misunderstanding your objection or I'm misunderstanding the 
gentlelady's--I don't believe that her amendment requires any 
form of identification to be the foundation for a driver's 
license.
    Mr. Hostettler. And reclaiming my time----
    Mr. Weiner. So you can pluck any one out of the air and 
critique it, but I don't think that's what she's suggesting.
    Mr. Hostettler. No. My concern is with the underlying bill, 
and I'm trying to make that point. Like I said, I'm not making 
a point necessarily about her amendment as much as I am making 
a point about the underlying bill to which her amendment 
speaks. So I yield back the balance of my time.
    Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. 
Scott.
    Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman's recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Scott. And I yield reluctantly to the gentleman from 
North Carolina.
    Mr. Watt. I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I 
appreciate it.
    I was trying to do an adequate job of summarizing what 
Representative Cannon's concerns were about this whole national 
ID card, and I couldn't do it in his--you know, Chris has been 
out and he's my chairman. So I wanted to make sure that we got 
in the record what he would probably say if he were here, so I 
want to read into the record what he said at the Subcommittee 
about this whole thing. I'm quoting directly from the 
transcript.
    He says, ``And I suspect that this Subcommittee, perhaps 
the Constitution Subcommittee in addition, is going to have a 
lot to say about how we at least approach that problem.'' He's 
talking about the national ID card problem. ``And I think that 
means a commission where people who are very thoughtful, who 
have significant background, and who are''--``people who are 
willing to say we don't necessarily need to federalize this 
process. And if we do federalize this process, it shouldn't 
just by the damn feds sucking information out of the local 
folks. It ought to be the local folks who get something back, 
and to do that, you ought to have some kind of protection, 
maybe an anonymizer. It may be a culture that existed at one 
time in the Federal Government. I am not sure that it is. It is 
vital to America and it is, I think, the cornerstone of what 
our grandchildren are going to enjoy or suffer in the future.''
    I am just making you all aware of what Mr. Cannon would 
say, my chairman of my Subcommittee would say if he were here.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman?
    Mr. Watt. I yield back to Mr. Scott.
    Mr. Scott. I yield back.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentlewoman from Texas has 
already spoken. The question----
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Not on this--on her amendment. I haven't 
spoken on her amendment. No, I have spoken on my amendment.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Didn't the gentlewoman from Texas 
speak after the gentleman from North Carolina was recognized?
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Not to my knowledge, Mr. Chairman. I was 
on my previous amendment.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Well, the Chair recognizes the 
gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee, for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I 
want to say that the gentlelady's amendment is very well 
thought out. If my colleagues would read it clearly, she's 
asking for a thoughtful working group to really discern what 
might be the most effective vehicle. The point that I--more 
effective vehicle for securing any kind of documentation, but 
particularly she relates to State-issued driver's license.
    But the one thing that I wanted to emphasize, whether it's 
the consulate identification cards--and before I left Texas 
this week, I visited with the consulate from Mexico in Texas in 
my congressional district and had an understanding of the 
curricular cards--the matricular cards, rather, that are 
utilized. These are not immigration documents that we have. 
These are documents that people can utilize to secure 
themselves, to make sure that they're not taken advantage of by 
being able to deposit funds in banks and to make sure that they 
are driving at least with a driver's license that suggests they 
have a minimal understanding of the rules of the road.
    So we are mixing apples and oranges, and I think the 
gentlelady is suggesting that let us find out how we can secure 
those documents, but she's also suggesting that we should be 
very careful of opening the door for a national ID card because 
the national ID card does not necessarily go only to 
immigrants. It will be going to those here in the United States 
who are citizens and, therefore, be another undermining of 
individual rights.
    I think we do need to study it more. Yes, we did have a 
commission some years ago. My predecessor was on that 
commission. We did not act quickly on those provisions at that 
time, and I think it is worthy of additional study. So I would 
hope that we would pass the gentlelady's amendment and be 
careful to suggest that any of these documents are immigration 
documents. They are not. They're only identification documents.
    I yield back.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The question is on the amendment 
offered by the gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. Jackson--or, excuse 
me, the gentlewoman from California, Ms. Sanchez. Those in 
favor will say aye. Opposed, no.
    The noes appear to have it. A rollcall is ordered, and 
we'll vote on this one right away. Those in favor of the 
Sanchez amendment will as your names are called answer aye, 
those opposed no, and the clerk will call the roll. Immediately 
after this rollcall, we will vote on the postponed amendments.
    The Clerk. Mr. Hyde?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Coble?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Smith?
    Mr. Smith. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Smith, no. Mr. Gallegly?
    Mr. Gallegly. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Gallegly, no. Mr. Goodlatte?
    Mr. Goodlatte. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Goodlatte, no. Mr. Chabot?
    Mr. Chabot. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chabot, no. Mr. Jenkins?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Cannon?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Bachus?
    Mr. Bachus. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Bachus, no. Mr. Hostettler?
    Mr. Hostettler. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Hostettler, no. Mr. Green?
    Mr. Green. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Green, no. Mr. Keller?
    Mr. Keller. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Keller, no. Ms. Hart?
    Ms. Hart. No.
    The Clerk. Ms. Hart, no. Mr. Flake?
    Mr. Flake. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Flake, no. Mr. Pence?
    Mr. Pence. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Pence, no. Mr. Forbes?
    Mr. Forbes. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Forbes, no. Mr. King?
    Mr. King. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. King, no. Mr. Carter?
    Mr. Carter. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Carter, no. Mr. Feeney?
    Mr. Feeney. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Feeney, no. Mrs. Blackburn?
    Mrs. Blackburn. No.
    The Clerk. Mrs. Blackburn, no. Mr. Conyers?
    Mr. Conyers. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Conyers, aye. Mr. Berman?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Boucher?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Nadler?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Scott?
    Mr. Scott. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Scott, aye. Mr. Watt?
    Mr. Watt. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Watt, aye. Ms. Lofgren?
    Ms. Lofgren. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Lofgren, aye. Ms. Jackson Lee?
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Jackson Lee, aye. Ms. Waters?
    Ms. Waters. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Waters, aye. Mr. Meehan?
    Mr. Meehan. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Meehan, aye. Mr. Delahunt?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Wexler?
    Mr. Wexler. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Wexler, aye. Ms. Baldwin?
    Ms. Baldwin. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Baldwin, aye. Mr. Weiner?
    Mr. Weiner. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Weiner, aye. Mr. Schiff?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Ms. Sanchez?
    Ms. Sanchez. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Sanchez, aye. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Members who wish to cast or change 
their vote? The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Coble.
    Mr. Coble. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Coble, no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. 
Jenkins.
    Mr. Jenkins. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Jenkins, no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from New York, Mr. 
Nadler.
    Mr. Nadler. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Nadler, aye.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Further members who wish to cast or 
change their vote? If not, the clerk will report.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, there are 12 ayes and 19 noes.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. And the amendment is not agreed to.
    Consideration will now resume for the amendments that the 
votes were postponed earlier today. The votes will be taken in 
the following order: first, an amendment by the gentleman from 
New York, Mr. Weiner, relating to a floor of 8.5 percent for 
grants to certain communities; second, an amendment by Mr. Watt 
relating to intentional misconduct of first responders; third, 
an amendment by Mr. Scott of Virginia relative to punitive 
damages and emergency response; and, last, an amendment by the 
gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee, relative to employer 
criminal history checks.
    The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the--
agreeing to the amendment offered by the gentleman from New 
York, Mr. Weiner, on which the noes prevailed by a voice vote 
earlier today. All those in favor of the Weiner amendment will 
as your names are called answer aye, those opposed no, and the 
clerk will call the roll.
    The Clerk. Mr. Hyde?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Coble?
    Mr. Coble. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Coble, no. Mr. Smith?
    Mr. Smith. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Smith, no. Mr. Gallegly?
    Mr. Gallegly. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Gallegly, no. Mr. Goodlatte?
    Mr. Goodlatte. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Goodlatte, no. Mr. Chabot?
    Mr. Chabot. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chabot, no. Mr. Jenkins?
    Mr. Jenkins. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Jenkins, no. Mr. Cannon?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Bachus?
    Mr. Bachus. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Bachus, no. Mr. Hostettler?
    Mr. Hostettler. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Hostettler, no. Mr. Green?
    Mr. Green. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Green, no. Mr. Keller?
    Mr. Keller. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Keller, no. Ms. Hart?
    Ms. Hart. No.
    The Clerk. Ms. Hart, no. Mr. Flake?
    Mr. Flake. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Flake, no. Mr. Pence?
    Mr. Pence. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Pence, no. Mr. Forbes?
    Mr. Forbes. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Forbes, no. Mr. King?
    Mr. King. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. King, no. Mr. Carter?
    Mr. Carter. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Carter, no. Mr. Feeney?
    Mr. Feeney. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Feeney, no. Mrs. Blackburn?
    Mrs. Blackburn. No.
    The Clerk. Mrs. Blackburn, no. Mr. Conyers?
    Mr. Conyers. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Conyers, aye. Mr. Berman?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Boucher?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Nadler?
    Mr. Nadler. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Nadler, aye. Mr. Scott?
    Mr. Scott. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Scott, aye. Mr. Watt?
    Mr. Watt. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Watt, aye. Ms. Lofgren?
    Ms. Lofgren. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Lofgren, aye. Ms. Jackson Lee?
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Jackson Lee, aye. Ms. Waters?
    Ms. Waters. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Waters, aye. Mr. Meehan?
    Mr. Meehan. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Meehan, aye. Mr. Delahunt?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Wexler?
    Mr. Wexler. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Wexler, aye. Ms. Baldwin?
    Ms. Baldwin. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Baldwin, aye. Mr. Weiner?
    Mr. Weiner. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Weiner, aye. Mr. Schiff?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Ms. Sanchez?
    Ms. Sanchez. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Sanchez, aye. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Members in the chamber who wish to 
cast or change their votes? If not, the clerk will report.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, there are 12 ayes and 19 noes.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. And the amendment is not agreed to.
    The question now occurs on agreeing to the amendment 
offered by the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Watt, 
relating to intentional misconduct on which the noes prevailed 
by a voice vote. Those in favor of the Watt amendment will as 
your names are called answer aye, those opposed no, and the 
clerk will call the roll.
    The Clerk. Mr. Hyde?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Coble?
    Mr. Coble. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Coble, no. Mr. Smith?
    Mr. Smith. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Smith, no. Mr. Gallegly?
    Mr. Gallegly. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Gallegly, no. Mr. Goodlatte?
    Mr. Goodlatte. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Goodlatte, no. Mr. Chabot?
    Mr. Chabot. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chabot, no. Mr. Jenkins?
    Mr. Jenkins. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Jenkins, no. Mr. Cannon?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Bachus?
    Mr. Bachus. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Bachus, no. Mr. Hostettler?
    Mr. Hostettler. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Hostettler, no. Mr. Green?
    Mr. Green. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Green, no. Mr. Keller?
    Mr. Keller. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Keller, no. Ms. Hart?
    Ms. Hart. No.
    The Clerk. Ms. Hart, no. Mr. Flake?
    Mr. Flake. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Flake, no. Mr. Pence?
    Mr. Pence. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Pence, no. Mr. Forbes?
    Mr. Forbes. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Forbes, no. Mr. King?
    Mr. King. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. King, no. Mr. Carter?
    Mr. Carter. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Carter, no. Mr. Feeney?
    Mr. Feeney. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Feeney, no. Mrs. Blackburn?
    Mrs. Blackburn. No.
    The Clerk. Mrs. Blackburn, no. Mr. Conyers?
    Mr. Conyers. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Conyers, aye. Mr. Berman?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Boucher?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Nadler?
    Mr. Nadler. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Nadler, aye. Mr. Scott?
    Mr. Scott. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Scott, aye. Mr. Watt?
    Mr. Watt. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Watt, aye. Ms. Lofgren?
    Ms. Lofgren. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Lofgren, aye. Ms. Jackson Lee?
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Jackson Lee, aye. Ms. Waters?
    Ms. Waters. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Waters, aye. Mr. Meehan?
    Mr. Meehan. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Meehan, aye. Mr. Delahunt?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Wexler?
    Mr. Wexler. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Wexler, aye. Ms. Baldwin?
    Ms. Baldwin. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Baldwin, aye. Mr. Weiner?
    Mr. Weiner. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Weiner, aye. Mr. Schiff?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Ms. Sanchez?
    Ms. Sanchez. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Sanchez, aye. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Members in the chamber who wish to 
cast or change their votes? If not, the clerk will report.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, there are 12 ayes and 19 noes.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. And the amendment is not agreed to.
    The question now occurs on agreeing to the amendment 
offered by the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott, relating to 
punitive damages and emergency responders upon which the noes 
prevailed by a voice vote. Those in favor of the Scott 
amendment will as your names are called answer aye, those 
opposed no; the clerk will call the roll.
    The Clerk. Mr. Hyde?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Coble?
    Mr. Coble. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Coble, no. Mr. Smith?
    Mr. Smith. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Smith, no. Mr. Gallegly?
    Mr. Gallegly. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Gallegly, no. Mr. Goodlatte?
    Mr. Goodlatte. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Goodlatte, no. Mr. Chabot?
    Mr. Chabot. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chabot, no. Mr. Jenkins?
    Mr. Jenkins. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Jenkins, no. Mr. Cannon?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Bachus?
    Mr. Bachus. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Bachus, no. Mr. Hostettler?
    Mr. Hostettler. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Hostettler, no. Mr. Green?
    Mr. Green. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Green, no. Mr. Keller?
    Mr. Keller. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Keller, no. Ms. Hart?
    Ms. Hart. No.
    The Clerk. Ms. Hart, no. Mr. Flake?
    Mr. Flake. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Flake, no. Mr. Pence?
    Mr. Pence. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Pence, no. Mr. Forbes?
    Mr. Forbes. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Forbes, no. Mr. King?
    Mr. King. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. King, no. Mr. Carter?
    Mr. Carter. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Carter, no. Mr. Feeney?
    Mr. Feeney. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Feeney, no. Mrs. Blackburn?
    Mrs. Blackburn. No.
    The Clerk. Mrs. Blackburn, no. Mr. Conyers?
    Mr. Conyers. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Conyers, aye. Mr. Berman?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Boucher?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Nadler?
    Mr. Nadler. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Nadler, aye. Mr. Scott?
    Mr. Scott. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Scott, aye. Mr. Watt?
    Mr. Watt. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Watt, aye. Ms. Lofgren?
    Ms. Lofgren. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Lofgren, aye. Ms. Jackson Lee?
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Jackson Lee, aye. Ms. Waters?
    Ms. Waters. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Waters, aye. Mr. Meehan?
    Mr. Meehan. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Meehan, aye. Mr. Delahunt?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Wexler?
    Mr. Wexler. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Wexler, aye. Ms. Baldwin?
    Ms. Baldwin. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Baldwin, aye. Mr. Weiner?
    Mr. Weiner. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Weiner, aye. Mr. Schiff?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Ms. Sanchez?
    Ms. Sanchez. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Sanchez, aye. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Members in the chamber who wish to 
cast or change their votes? If not, the clerk will report.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, there are 12 ayes and 19 noes.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. And the amendment is not agreed to.
    The question recurs on agreeing to the amendment of the 
gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee, relative to criminal 
background checks on which the noes prevailed by a voice vote. 
Those in favor of the Jackson Lee amendment will as your names 
called answer aye, those opposed no, and the clerk will call 
the roll.
    The Clerk. Mr. Hyde?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Coble?
    Mr. Coble. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Coble, no. Mr. Smith?
    Mr. Smith. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Smith, no. Mr. Gallegly?
    Mr. Gallegly. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Gallegly, no. Mr. Goodlatte?
    Mr. Goodlatte. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Goodlatte, no. Mr. Chabot?
    Mr. Chabot. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chabot, no. Mr. Jenkins?
    Mr. Jenkins. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Jenkins, no. Mr. Cannon?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Bachus?
    Mr. Bachus. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Bachus, no. Mr. Hostettler?
    Mr. Hostettler. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Hostettler, no. Mr. Green?
    Mr. Green. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Green, no. Mr. Keller?
    Mr. Keller. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Keller, no. Ms. Hart?
    Ms. Hart. No.
    The Clerk. Ms. Hart, no. Mr. Flake?
    Mr. Flake. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Flake, no. Mr. Pence?
    Mr. Pence. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Pence, no. Mr. Forbes?
    Mr. Forbes. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Forbes, no. Mr. King?
    Mr. King. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. King, no. Mr. Carter?
    Mr. Carter. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Carter, no. Mr. Feeney?
    Mr. Feeney. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Feeney, no. Mrs. Blackburn?
    Mrs. Blackburn. No.
    The Clerk. Mrs. Blackburn, no. Mr. Conyers?
    Mr. Conyers. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Conyers, aye. Mr. Berman?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Boucher?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Nadler?
    Mr. Nadler. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Nadler, aye. Mr. Scott?
    Mr. Scott. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Scott, no. Mr. Watt?
    Mr. Watt. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Watt, aye. Ms. Lofgren?
    Ms. Lofgren. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Lofgren, aye. Ms. Jackson Lee?
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Jackson Lee, aye. Ms. Waters?
    Ms. Waters. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Waters, aye. Mr. Meehan?
    Mr. Meehan. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Meehan, aye. Mr. Delahunt?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Wexler?
    Mr. Wexler. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Wexler, aye. Ms. Baldwin?
    Ms. Baldwin. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Baldwin, aye. Mr. Weiner?
    Mr. Weiner. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Weiner, aye. Mr. Schiff?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Ms. Sanchez?
    Ms. Sanchez. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Sanchez, aye. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Further members in the chamber who 
wish to cast or change their votes?
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentlewoman from Texas.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. I just want to make sure. How am I 
recorded?
    The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, Ms. Jackson Lee is recorded as an 
aye.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Anybody else? If not, the clerk 
will report.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, there are 11 ayes and 20 noes.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. And the amendment is not agreed to.
    Are there further amendments? If there are no further 
amendments, a reporting quorum is present. The question occurs 
on the motion to report the bill H.R. 10 favorably as amended. 
All those in favor will say aye. Opposed, no.
    The ayes appear to have it. A recorded vote is requested 
and will be ordered. Those in favor of reporting the bill H.R. 
10 favorably as amended will as your names are called answer 
aye, those opposed no, and the clerk will call the roll.
    The Clerk. Mr. Hyde?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Coble?
    Mr. Coble. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Coble, aye. Mr. Smith?
    Mr. Smith. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Smith, aye. Mr. Gallegly?
    Mr. Gallegly. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Gallegly, aye. Mr. Goodlatte?
    Mr. Goodlatte. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Goodlatte, aye. Mr. Chabot?
    Mr. Chabot. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chabot, aye. Mr. Jenkins?
    Mr. Jenkins. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Jenkins, aye. Mr. Cannon?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Bachus?
    Mr. Bachus. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Bachus, aye. Mr. Hostettler?
    Mr. Hostettler. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Hostettler, aye. Mr. Green?
    Mr. Green. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Green, aye. Mr. Keller?
    Mr. Keller. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Keller, aye. Ms. Hart?
    Ms. Hart. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Hart, aye. Mr. Flake?
    Mr. Flake. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Flake, aye. Mr. Pence?
    Mr. Pence. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Pence, aye. Mr. Forbes?
    Mr. Forbes. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Forbes, aye. Mr. King?
    Mr. King. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. King, aye. Mr. Carter?
    Mr. Carter. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Carter, aye. Mr. Feeney?
    Mr. Feeney. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Feeney, aye. Mrs. Blackburn?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Conyers?
    Mr. Conyers. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Conyers, no. Mr. Berman?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Boucher?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Nadler?
    Mr. Nadler. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Nadler, no. Mr. Scott?
    Mr. Scott. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Scott, no. Mr. Watt?
    Mr. Watt. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Watt, no. Ms. Lofgren?
    Ms. Lofgren. No.
    The Clerk. Ms. Lofgren, no. Ms. Jackson Lee?
    Ms. Jackson Lee. No.
    The Clerk. Ms. Jackson Lee, no. Ms. Waters?
    Ms. Waters. No.
    The Clerk. Ms. Waters, no. Mr. Meehan?
    Mr. Meehan. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Meehan, no. Mr. Delahunt?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Wexler?
    Mr. Wexler. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Wexler, no. Ms. Baldwin?
    Ms. Baldwin. No.
    The Clerk. Ms. Baldwin, no. Mr. Weiner?
    Mr. Weiner. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Weiner, no. Mr. Schiff?
    Mr. Schiff. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Schiff, aye. Ms. Sanchez?
    Ms. Sanchez. No.
    The Clerk. Ms. Sanchez, no. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, aye.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Any members in the chamber who wish 
to cast or change their votes? If not, the clerk will report.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, there are 19 ayes and 12 noes.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The ayes have it. The motion to 
report favorably is adopted. Without objection, the bill will 
be reported favorably to the House in the form of a single 
amendment in the nature of a substitute incorporating the 
amendments adopted here today. Without objection, the chairman 
is authorized to move to go to conference pursuant to House 
rules. Without objection, the staff is directed to make any 
technical and conforming changes, and all members will be given 
2 days, as provided by the House rules, in which to submit 
additional, dissenting, supplemental, or minority views.
    The Chair would like to thank the members, the staff, the 
court reporter, and the spectators for their patience in 
sitting through this marathon markup. Before adjourning the 
Committee, let me say we will be back at 10 o'clock tomorrow 
morning. There are other bills that are on the agenda, and what 
the Chair proposes to do is to work for a couple of hours and 
we'll adjust the agenda so that five noncontroversial bills 
will be at the top of the agenda, which are H.R. 4306, which 
provides for electronic verification of an individual's 
eligibility for employment; S. 1194, the Mentally Ill Offender 
Treatment and Crime Reduction Act; H.R. 3143, the International 
Consumer Protection Act; H.R. 4264, the Animal Fighting 
Prohibition Enforcement Act; and H.R. 4453, the Access to Rural 
Physicians Improvement Act.
    If we get done with these before the debate on the rule on 
the marriage amendment comes up, we will do the other three 
bills. If not, the Committee will be adjourned subject to the 
call of the Chair, and everybody will get plenty of notice if 
we can get to the other bills before the Congress adjourns.
    Thank you all for your patience. The Committee stands 
adjourned until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.
    [Whereupon, at 7:59 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
                            Dissenting Views

    While we support implementation of the recommendations of 
the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United 
States (``9/11 Commission''), we dissent from H.R. 10 because 
it does not accomplish that goal. The 9/11 Commission reached 
across the partisan divide and arrived at unanimous 
recommendations to improve the security of the United States. 
Ten members, five Democrats and five Republicans, held 
countless hearings and issued a well-written report with well-
reasoned recommendations.\1\ The Senate, almost evenly split 
between Republicans and Democrats, has taken up bipartisan 
legislation to implement those recommendations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United 
States, the 9/11 Commission Report (July 22, 2004) [hereinafter 9/11 
Commission Report].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    We had hoped the House would follow the example set by the 
Commission and by the Senate; instead, the Republican 
leadership has put before us this bill drafted only with 
Republican input and sponsored only by Republicans. 
Unfortunately, when Ranking Member John Conyers (D-MI) along 
with Reps. Jerrold Nadler (D-NY), Bobby Scott (D-VA), Sheila 
Jackson Lee (D-TX), William D. Delahunt (D-MA), and Adam Schiff 
(D-CA) reached across the aisle to offer the bipartisan Senate 
bill at the markup, it was rejected on a party-line basis.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Markup of H.R. 10, House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong., 
2d Sess. (Sept. 29, 2004) [hereinafter H.R. 10 Markup].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Because of the political nature by which it was drafted, it 
is no surprise that H.R. 10 is deeply flawed. First of all, it 
fails to incorporate numerous recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission that would significantly advance our national 
security. For instance, H.R. 10 does not include Commission 
recommendations to provide strong budgetary authority for the 
newly-created National Intelligence Director, protect civil 
liberties through the creation of an effective civil liberties 
board, or address the need for congressional reform. As a 
matter of fact, in its present form, H.R. 10 fails to implement 
the vast majority of the 9/11 Commission recommendations--of 
the Commission's forty-one recommendations only eleven are 
fully implemented, sixteen are not implemented at all and 
fourteen are incomplete.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ See Report Card on H.R. 10 prepared by Democratic Staff of the 
Select Committee on Homeland Security.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    At the same time, the legislation contains provisions not 
recommended by the Commission that would do little, if 
anything, to protect our homeland. Most notably, the 
legislation makes massive, anti-immigrant changes to our 
immigration laws (based in most cases on thin and tangential 
references in a Commission staff report that were not even 
included in the final report of the 9/11 Commission), and 
creates major new law enforcement and data programs that 
significantly impairs our civil rights and civil liberties.
    It is these very provisions that the 9/11 Commission has 
urged the House Republicans to drop from their legislative 
effort. The 9/11 Chairman stated recently that ``We're very 
respectfully suggesting that provisions which are controversial 
and are not part of our recommendations to make the American 
people safer perhaps ought to be part of another bill at 
another time.'' \4\ Vice Chairman Lee Hamilton specifically 
criticized the extraneous immigration provisions and stated, 
``we respectfully submit that consideration of controversial 
provisions at this late hour can harm our shared purpose of 
getting a good bill to the President before the 108th Congress 
adjourns.'' \5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ Jesse J. Holland, 9/11 Panel Urges House GOP to Drop Certain 
Parts of Bill, Assoc. Press, Sept. 30, 2004.
    \5\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    That is why H.R. 10, or provisions within it, are opposed 
not only by 9/11 Commission leaders \6\ and the White House \7\ 
but also organizations concerned with:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ Carl Hulse, 9/11 Commissioners Say Bill's Added Provisions are 
Harmful, N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 2004, at A13.
    \7\ Letter from Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, The 
White House, to Editors of the Washington Post (Oct. 1, 2004).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (1) state prerogatives (the National Governors 
        Association \8\ and the National Conference of State 
        Legislatures \9\ );
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ Letter from Raymond C. Scheppach, Executive Director, National 
Governors Association to the Honorable Thomas M. Davis, Chairman, and 
the Honorable Henry A. Waxman, Ranking Member, U.S. House Comm. on 
Government Reform (Sept. 29, 2004) [hereinafter NGA Letter].
    \9\ Letter from Maryland Delegate John Hurson, President of the 
National Conference of State Legislatures, and Illinois State Senator 
Steve Rauschenberger, President Elect of NCSL to the Honorable Thomas 
M. Davis, Chairman, and the Honorable Henry Waxman, Ranking Member, 
U.S. House Comm. on Government Reform (Sept. 28, 2004) [hereinafter 
NCSL Letter].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (2) the fair administration of justice (the American 
        Bar Association (``ABA''),\10\ the American Civil 
        Liberties Union (``ACLU''),\11\ the Association of the 
        Bar of the City of New York \12\ );
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ Statement of Robert J. Grey, Jr., President, American Bar 
Association (Sept. 30, 2004) [hereinafter ABA Statement].
    \11\ Letter from Timothy H. Edgar, Legislative Counsel, American 
Civil Liberties Union, to Interested Persons (Sept. 23, 2004) 
[hereinafter ACLU Letter].
    \12\ Statement of Association of the Bar of the City of New York 
Regarding H.R. 10 (Sept. 30, 2004) (``We urge the House not to enact 
H.R. 10 and to provide a reasonable opportunity for broad public debate 
on its recommendations before taking any action.'') [hereinafter ABCNY 
Statement].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (3) the rights of immigrants (ACORN; American-Arab 
        Anti-Discrimination Committee; American Jewish 
        Committee; American Immigration Lawyers Association 
        (``AILA''); Arab-American Institute; Center for 
        Community Change; Fair Immigration Reform Movement; 
        Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society; Lutheran Immigration and 
        Refugee Service; National Asian Pacific American Legal 
        Consortium (``NAPALC''); National Council of La Raza; 
        National Immigration Forum; Service Employees 
        International Union, AFL-CIO, CLC; and the Tahirih 
        Justice Center) \13\; and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ Letter from ACORN et al., to U.S. Representatives (Sept. 28, 
2004) [hereinafter Immigration Sign-On Letter].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          (4) adherence to international law (Amnesty 
        International, Human Rights First, Human Rights 
        Watch,\14\ and the United Nations High Commissioner for 
        Refugees \15\).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ Letter from Amnesty International, Human Rights First, and 
Human Rights Watch, to U.S. Representatives (Sept. 29, 2004) 
[hereinafter International Sign-On Letter].
    \15\ Letter from Kolude Doherty, Regional Representative, U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees, to the Honorable John Conyers, Jr., Ranking 
Member, U.S. House Comm. on the Judiciary (Sept. 29, 2004) [hereinafter 
UNHCR Letter].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

   I. The Immigration and Related Changes are Unfair, Unfounded, and 
                              Unnecessary

   A. THE LEGISLATION WOULD AUTHORIZE DEPORTATION TO COUNTRIES WHERE 
                       TORTURE IS LIKELY TO OCCUR

    A primary concern with this legislation is that it would 
require our government to outsource torture, make it difficult 
for aliens to seek refuge from torture, and violate our 
international obligations. Section 3032, which was not 
recommended by the 9/11 Commission and is not supported by the 
President,\16\ would retroactively exclude classes of aliens 
from protection under the United Nations Convention Against 
Torture (``CAT'') by permitting the Department of Homeland 
Security to remove to state sponsors of torture any alien it 
reasonably believes may be a danger to the United States. The 
Association of the Bar of the City of New York notes that this 
provision ``would * * * mandate the deportation of * * * an 
individual to a country even if it is certain that the 
individual would be tortured there.'' \17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ White House Letter:

        Yesterday's Washington Post inaccurately reported that 
      the Bush Administration supports a provision in the House 
      intelligence reform bill that would permit the deportation 
      of certain foreign nationals to countries where they are 
      likely to be tortured.
        The President did not propose and does not support this 
      provision. He has made clear that the United States stands 
      against and will not tolerate torture, and that the United 
      States remains committed to complying with its obligations 
      under the Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, 
      Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Consistent 
      with that treaty, the United States does not expel, return, 
      or extradite individuals to other countries where the 
      United States believes it is likely they will be tortured. 
      Id. (emphasis in original).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\ ABCNY Statement at 1-2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This provision also would make it more difficult to 
establish eligibility for CAT relief. Instead of being able to 
meet the present burden of proof, which is ``more likely than 
not,'' the bill would require applicants to prove by ``clear 
and convincing evidence'' that they would be tortured if they 
are deported to the country from which they are seeking relief. 
Section 3032 also would prohibit federal court challenges to a 
decision removing CAT protection under the new law except as 
part of the review of a final order of removal.
    The section 3032 exceptions permitting ``extraordinary 
rendition'' are in clear violation of our obligations under the 
Convention. Article 3 of the Convention absolutely forbids a 
State Party from forcibly returning any person to a country 
when there are substantial grounds for believing that the 
person would be in danger of being subjected to torture.\18\ In 
fact, no less an authority than the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees has written of its concern that ``the 
proposed exception to protection under the [CAT] will authorize 
the return of individuals to countries where they may suffer 
torture and will place the U.S. in violation of its 
international obligations.''\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\ It is worth noting that, in ratifying the treaty, the U.S. 
Senate did not express any reservation, understanding, or proviso that 
might exclude a person from the Article 3 prohibition. Moreover, while 
the Convention prohibits sending them back to their home countries, the 
prohibition is country specific. It does not bar sending them to other 
countries. Also, although the grant of CAT protection is absolute, it 
is not permanent relief. It can be removed when the conditions in the 
home country change so as to eliminate the risk of torture.
    \19\ UNHCR Letter at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Regardless of the applicability of the CAT, we believe an 
absolute prohibition on removal to torture-practicing nations 
is necessary on moral grounds, as well. Torture is so 
horrendous and so contrary to our ethical, spiritual, and 
democratic beliefs that it must be condemned and prohibited. 
Returning someone to a place where he or she would be tortured 
would sustain the kind of system in which violent authoritarian 
regimes exist. Passing the section 3032 provisions would amount 
to legalizing the outsourcing of torture by the United States 
government. The President of the American Bar Association 
further indicated that extraordinary rendition may endanger 
``American troops who may be detained by adversaries who may be 
disinclined to honor international obligations in light of the 
U.S. government's failure to honor its own.''\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\ ABA Statement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    We also object to the change in the burden of proof that 
would require the applicant to prove by ``clear and convincing 
evidence'' that he will be tortured. This is an unrealistic and 
unfair requirement. Raising the standard to this level of 
certainty would undoubtedly result in sending people to 
countries where they will be tortured. Moreover, it would 
violate Article 3 of the Convention, which forbids a State 
Party from forcibly returning a person to a country where there 
are ``substantial grounds'' for believing that he would be in 
danger of being subjected to torture.
    Finally, we object to making such changes retroactive and 
prohibiting federal court review of CAT decisions unless it is 
part of the review of a final order of removal. Current law 
requires that petitions for review of a removal order be filed 
within 30 days.\21\ Changing the standards and applying the 
changes retroactively puts individuals who have already won CAT 
relief in the position of reproving their cases with evidence 
that may no longer exist. These same individuals are likely to 
find themselves with no opportunity for federal court review of 
adverse decisions, which would eliminate the checks and 
balances that are the fundamental component of our democracy. 
This cannot be justified where the consequence of a mistake 
could be subjecting a person to torture.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\ U.S.C. Sec. 1252(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    These concerns are not merely hypothetical. In 2002, the 
United States deported Mr. Maher Arar, a Canadian-Syrian 
national, to Syria, a known state sponsor of torture.\22\ Mr. 
Arar, now in Canada, was apparently tortured during his ten 
months in Syria. In another instance, a Virginia couple is 
suing the United States seeking to have their son, Ahmed Abu 
Ali, returned to the United States from Saudi Arabia, where he 
was arrested in June 2003; in their petition, the couple argue 
that their son's situation is an example of extraordinary 
rendition.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\ Carlye Murphy, Va. Couple File Lawsuit to Free Their Son Held 
in Saudi Arabia, Wash. Post, July 29, 2004, at A8. Mr. Arar has sued 
the United States government for his ordeal.
    \23\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    It is important to note that prohibiting the removal of 
someone to state sponsors of torture does not mean that they 
must be released. The Supreme Court has held that people who 
receive CAT protection can be held in detention if they pose a 
danger to the United States.\24\ In response to the Court, the 
former Immigration and Naturalization Service promulgated 
regulations for determining the circumstances under which an 
alien may be held in custody beyond the statutory removal 
period.\25\ Pursuant to the Court's decision and the INS 
regulations, it is clear that removal to state sponsors of 
torture is not necessary to fight terrorism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\ In Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), the Supreme Court 
held that the detention provisions in the Immigration and Nationality 
Act, red in light of the Constitution's demands, limit an alien's post-
removal period detention to a period reasonably necessary to bring 
about the alien's removal from the United States. The Court found 
further that once removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable, 
continued detention is no longer authorized by statute except where 
special circumstances justify continued detention.
    \25\ 8 C.F.R. Sec. Sec. 208.16-208.18. These regulations authorized 
the government to continue to detain aliens who present foreign policy 
concerns or national security and terrorism concerns, as well as 
individuals who are specially dangerous due to a mental condition or 
personality disorder, even though their removal is not likely in the 
reasonably foreseeable future.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Convention Against Torture is a fundamental pillar of 
our human rights and national interest policy. It prohibits the 
government from establishing removal and extradition processes 
that would return aliens to countries where they would be 
tortured. It is one of the four primary international human 
rights documents. It stands, along with the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, and the Genocide Convention, as one 
of the cornerstones of our country's efforts to stop the most 
heinous forms of oppression and abuse. That is why we, and the 
leaders of the 9/11 Commission,\26\ oppose this egregious 
proposal to weaken our enforcement of it.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\ Carl Hulse, 9/11 Commissioners Say Bill's Added Provisions are 
Harmful, N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 2004, at A13 (``Commission leaders did not 
specify all of the House provisions that they considered problematic, 
though they singled out a proposal to allow suspected terrorists to be 
deported to nations where they could be tortured.'')
    \27\ The Majority rejected by a vote of 12-19 an amendment offered 
by Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee to strike section 3032.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

 B. The Legislation Would Hinder Efforts to Grant Asylum to Victims of 
                                Torture

    We oppose inclusion of section 3006 in H.R. 10 because it 
is not a part of the 9/11 Commission recommendations, and it 
would eviscerate protections built into the asylum process to 
ensure that the United States does not return genuine refugees 
to countries where they would face persecution and violate both 
the Refugee Convention and the Convention Against Torture. 
Section 3006 significantly expands the policy of expedited 
removal--a process that allows low-level immigration officials 
to remove undocumented foreigners without a hearing before an 
immigration judge. Before Congress has held hearings to assess 
the impact of this expansion of expedited removal, section 3006 
would push the Department of Homeland Security to expand 
expedited removal to apply to all undocumented foreigners 
anywhere in the country unless they have been present in the 
United States for more than five years.
    Under current law, expedited removal applies to non-
citizens arriving at an airport or land border with invalid 
travel documents, and allows an immigration officer to order 
them removed without further review unless they express a fear 
of persecution or torture. People who express a fear of 
persecution or torture are to be referred to an asylum officer 
for a ``credible fear'' interview, and must pass this interview 
in order to be eligible for asylum in the United States. The 
current statute also allows expedited removal to be applied to 
non-citizens who are found inside the United States without 
having been admitted or paroled and who cannot show that they 
have been here for more than two years. The current statute 
does not require such persons to be subjected to expedited 
removal, however, and gives the Secretary of Homeland Security 
the power to apply expedited removal to that group or to any 
sub-group of people within it. These existing provisions 
already place significant power in the hands of immigration 
officers whose decisions are not subject to formal 
administrative or judicial review.
    Section 3006 goes much further and would allow DHS to 
summarily deport genuine refugees who have been in the United 
States for over a year, even if they qualify for a statutory 
exception to the one-year deadline to file for asylum without 
having their cases heard.\28\ The expansion of expedited 
removal powers in section 3006 allows for summary deportation 
of immigrants who express a fear of persecution or an intent to 
apply for asylum but appear ineligible for asylum based on the 
one-year deadline. This bill ignores the fact that such 
applicants may fall under a statutory exception to the one-year 
deadline based on extraordinary circumstances or changed 
circumstances.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \28\ Section 208 of the Immigration and Nationality Act allows 
refugees present in the United States to file for asylum, but provides 
that they must do so within one year of their last arrival in the 
United States.
    \29\ A classic example of the latter would be where a person came 
to the United States as an economic migrant two years ago, but learned 
last month that following a coup in his country all his family had been 
killed due to their allegiance with the prior regime. This person's 
eligibility for an exception to the filing deadline needs to be 
considered by a trained asylum officer or an immigration judge. Under 
section 3006, it would never be considered at all.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Under section 3006, DHS would also summarily deport genuine 
refugees who are ineligible for asylum based on the one-year 
deadline but are eligible for withholding of removal under INA 
section 241(b)(3). Stripping refugees of the opportunity to 
claim that protection violates our obligations under Article 33 
of the Refugee Convention. This is because even asylum 
applicants who file more than one-year after arrival and cannot 
qualify for an exception to the one-year deadlines should 
remain eligible for withholding of removal if they can show 
that they are refugees and would face a probability of 
persecution if deported. Withholding of removal is the basic 
minimum form of protection through which the United States 
ensures its compliance with its obligation under international 
law not to return refugees to countries where their lives or 
freedom would be threatened. If an immigration officer thinks 
an intending asylum-seeker has been here for more than one year 
but less than five, section 3006 does not provide for any 
investigation or review of the person's eligibility for 
withholding.
    In addition to being a threat to relief for genuine 
refugees under asylum and withholding of removal, section 3006 
would allow the return under expedited removal of non-citizens 
determined to have been in the United States for less than five 
years who would face torture when deported. This section 
provides no means for persons subject to expedited removal who 
fear they will be tortured if they are deported to make an 
application for protection under the Convention Against 
Torture. The bill provides for referral to an asylum officer 
only for those who express an intention to apply for asylum or 
a fear of persecution. This omission sets the stage for very 
serious violations of the U.S.'s obligation under the CAT not 
to return people to countries where they would be tortured.
    This massive expansion of expedited removal would also be 
likely to affect even more people than it seeks to target, 
because it is difficult for a person who has just been arrested 
by an immigration officer unexpectedly to prove that he or she 
has been in the United States for more than five years, or for 
less than one year so as to qualify for referral to an asylum 
officer. Most people who are present in the U.S. without 
admission do not walk around with five years' worth of rent 
receipts in their pockets. In the asylum context, proving one's 
date of entry typically takes some time and effort, and 
involves gathering documentation and witnesses-none of which 
can be accomplished in an expedited removal proceeding.
    Finally, we do not believe that expanding the use of 
expedited removal in this way is the most efficient way to stop 
more terrorists trying to enter the United States. Expedited 
removal would not have stopped the terrorists who executed the 
9/11 attacks. Moreover, expedited removal is the last option we 
ought to want as a defense against terrorists trying to gain 
entry, because essentially what it does is sends them out only 
to try to enter again somewhere else. The danger of relying on 
expedited removal to catch terrorists is that its focus is 
removal. Suspected terrorists should not be removed; they 
should be interrogated and charged.
    Section 3007 is equally problematic. While current law 
already bars terrorists from seeking asylum, this section would 
allow genuine refugees to be denied asylum if they were unable 
to document relevant conditions in their countries through 
State Department reports, could not prove their persecutor's 
central motive for harming them, or had any inconsistencies 
between statements made to any U.S. government employees, 
whether written or oral and whether or not under oath, and 
there testimony before an immigration judge. There are key 
changes in this section that create insurmountable hurdles for 
individuals seeking safe haven in the United States.
    Section 3007 would require an asylum applicant to prove 
that her persecutor's central motive in persecuting her was or 
would be her race, religion, political opinion, nationality or 
membership in a particular social group. While committing 
torture, rape, beatings, and other abuses, persecutors do not 
always explain themselves clearly to their victims. This is why 
the Board of Immigration Appeals has ruled that asylum 
applicants are not required to show conclusively why 
persecution has or will occur.\30\ This bill would reverse that 
decision and place an enormous and unnecessary burden on asylum 
seekers by requiring them to prove with unrealistic precision 
what is going on in their persecutor's mind.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \30\ In Matter of S-P-, 21 I&N Dec. 486 (BIA 1996). The case 
involved a Sri Lankan who was tortured by his government purportedly to 
ascertain information about the identities of guerrillas and the 
location of camps, but also because of an unstated assumption by his 
torturers that his political views were antithetical to the government.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This section would permit adjudicators to deny asylum 
because the applicant is unable to provide corroborating 
evidence of ``certain alleged facts pertaining to the specifics 
of their claim.'' This disproportionately harms applicants who 
are detained and/or lack counsel. In addition, section 3007 
would bar judicial review of a denial of asylum based on an 
applicant's failure to provide corroborating evidence.
    Section 3007 also introduces new credibility grounds for 
denying asylum, saying that the applicant's ``demeanor'' and 
other highly subjective factors may be determining factors in 
assessing credibility. Demeanor is highly cultural and should 
not be relied on as heavily as evidence.\31\ Moreover, torture 
victims often have what mental health professionals call a 
``blank affect'' when recounting their experiences, a demeanor 
that an adjudicator might misinterpret as demonstrating lack of 
credibility.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \31\ In one culture, looking a judge in the eye would be 
interpreted as candor, while in another it would be interpreted as 
contempt; downcast eyes might be interpreted as respect for authority 
in one culture and evasiveness in another.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Additionally, it may be difficult for asylum applicants to 
recount their experiences, and even more troubling based upon 
the situation. Survivors of torture, such as rape, or forced 
abortion or sterilization may not be comfortable telling this 
information to a uniformed male inspection officer in an 
airport. Also, applicants in that setting may not be provided 
with appropriate interpreters. They may understandably fear 
discussing problems in their home countries in any detail until 
later in the process when it is made clear to them that they 
are not going to be sent back to their home countries without 
their claims being heard. Several courts of appeals even have 
emphasized that statements taken under such conditions are 
unreliable.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \32\ Fauyiza Kassindja, the young Togolese woman who fled female 
genital mutilation (FGM), would have been denied asylum under this 
standard with little chance of getting that determination reversed on 
appeal. Under current law, the Board of Immigration Appeals Appeals 
rightly reversed the Immigration Judge's credibility finding in her 
case, and that decision has helped protect other women fleeing FGM.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Section 3007 also allows asylum to be denied for lack of 
consistency, including with any statement the applicant made at 
any time to any U.S. official. In order to escape persecution 
and flee to safety, refugees sometimes need to misrepresent why 
they are leaving one country and entering another. For reasons 
of fear, desperation, confusion and trauma they often do not 
tell the full story or, necessarily, the accurate story. To use 
an applicant's first statement to any U.S. official to impeach 
his or her sworn testimony, no matter how well supported, is 
unreasonable and unfair.
    Furthermore, the Refugee Convention definition of a 
refugee, and its definitive interpretation in the United 
Nations High Commissioner For Refugees Handbook on Procedures 
and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 
Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of 
Refugees, do not require and in fact acknowledge that a person 
seeking refuge ``may not be aware of the reasons for the 
persecution feared.'' To meet the test that persecution be ``on 
account of'' one of the prohibited grounds, it is sufficient to 
show persecution is motivated in part by one of those grounds. 
Asking a refugee or asylum applicant to parse his persecutor's 
motivations so finely as to distill the central motive is 
asking asylum seekers to read the minds of their persecutors. 
Moreover, current Supreme Court case law interpreting the ``on 
account of'' requirement is already the strictest in the world 
without section 3007.
    Finally, section 3007 calls for consistency between the 
applicant's claim and country conditions in the country from 
which the applicant claims asylum ``as presented by the 
Department of State.'' This provision could be interpreted to 
exclude country conditions information from human rights 
organizations, journalists, and myriad other sources of 
relevant and reliable information that are not necessarily 
included in State Department country reports.Although the State 
Department country reports are usually well researched, they are not an 
exhaustive and unfailingly accurate source of documentation of all of 
the wide range of human rights violations around the world that can 
give rise to valid asylum claims. In addition, since these reports come 
out annually, they can not be relied upon for documentation of more 
recent events.
    The President has made many strong statements about his 
concern for the persecuted and America's role in creating a 
safe haven. On United Nations International Day in Support of 
Victims of Torture, he said:

        The United States reaffirms its commitment to the 
        worldwide elimination of torture. * * * The United 
        States will continue to take seriously the need to 
        question terrorists who have information that can save 
        lives. But we will not compromise the rule of law or 
        the values and principles that make us strong. Torture 
        is wrong no matter where it occurs, and the United 
        States will continue to lead the fight to eliminate it 
        everywhere.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \33\ The President, Statement on U.N. International Day in Support 
of Victims of Torture (June 26, 2004).

In no uncertain terms, sections 3006 and 3007 are inconsistent 
with the Bush Administration's statements on persecution and 
torture and will lead to obvious and clear hardship on innocent 
and deserving immigrants.\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \34\ The effect of sections 3006, 3007, and 3009 are best 
illustrated through an actual asylum petition that would have turned 
out quite differently had sections 3006, 3007, and 3009 been in place. 
The findings of fact by the appellate court recount that Olimpia Lazo-
Majano, a young Salvadoran mother of three, was 29, in 1981, when her 
husband fled El Salvador for political reasons. Ms. Lazo-Majano 
remained in El Salvador, working as a domestic. In mid-1982, Ms. Lazo-
Majano was hired by a sergeant in the Salvadoran armed forces named 
Rene Zuniga. After Ms. Lazo-Majano had been working for him for several 
weeks, Zuniga raped her at gun point. This began a period of abuse 
during which Zuniga beat Ms. Lazo-Majano, threatened her, tore up her 
identity card and forced her to eat it, dragged her by the hair in 
public, held hand grenades against her head, and threatened to bomb 
her. Ms. Lazo-Majano felt trapped and powerless to resist Zuniga, 
because he accused her of being a subversive and threatened that if she 
reported him or tried to resist him, he would denounce her or kill her 
as a subversive. Ms. Lazo-Majano believed him: she knew a teen-age boy 
who was believed to have been tortured and killed by the army, the 
husband of a neighbor had been taken away at night together with a 
group of other men and killed the preceding year, and numerous young 
girls who had been raped with impunity.
    In late 1982, Ms. Lazo-Majano escaped and fled to the United 
States, entering the country without inspection. Neither the 
Immigration Judge who heard her request for asylum nor the Board of 
Immigration Appeals doubted her credibility. But the Immigration Judge 
ordered her deported to El Salvador, and the BIA upheld that decision 
in 1985, on the grounds that ``such strictly personal actions do not 
constitute persecution within the meaning of the Act.'' Ms. Lazo-Majano 
appealed to the federal court of appeals. The court of appeals reversed 
the BIA, holding that Zuniga ``had his gun, his grenades, his bombs, 
his authority and his hold over Olimpia because he was a member'' of an 
army unrestrained by civilian control, that his cynical imputation to 
her of subversive political opinions, and the danger that he would kill 
her or have her killed on this basis, qualified her for asylum.
    In its decision, the court of appeals in this case noted reports 
that people being denied asylum and deported from the United States to 
El Salvador had been tortured and killed. Fortunately for Ms. Lazo-
Majano, her deportation was stayed pending the federal court's review. 
Under section 3009 of H.R. 10, however, the court could not have stayed 
Ms. Lazo-Majano's deportation unless she were able to show by ``clear 
and convincing evidence''--before briefing or argument in this legally 
complex asylum case--that execution of the deportation order would be 
``clearly contrary to law.'' This is a higher standard than she was 
required to meet to actually win her asylum case before the court of 
appeals. Under H.R. 10, Ms. Lazo-Majano would have been deported to El 
Salvador. The federal court's decision in her favor two years later 
would do nothing to protect her there.
    If section 3007 of H.R. 10 had been law, this case would almost 
certainly not have been decided in Ms. Lazo-Majano's favor. Section 
3007 would require her to establish that she was the wife of someone 
who fled the country for political reasons, that her persecutor 
attributed ``subversive'' political opinions to her, and that his 
desire to stamp out any resistance to his dominance over her as a man 
and an officer in the ruling army, were not only the motives of 
Zuniga's persecution, but that her political opinion was ``the central 
motive'' for the persecution. A dissenting judge on the court of 
appeals in this case took the view that Ms. Lazo-Majano was ``abused * 
* * purely for sexual, and clearly ego reasons'' and was therefore not 
eligible for asylum. If this case were decided under the rule of 
section 3007, that view would have prevailed.
    In fact, if H.R. 10 had been the law, Ms. Lazo-Majano would have 
been unlikely to have had her asylum claim heard at all--by anyone. 
Section 3006 expands expedited removal procedures to require the 
summary deportation, without hearing or review, of anyone who has not 
been admitted or paroled into the United States and (in the judgment of 
an immigration officer) has not been physically present in the United 
States continuously for the past five years. Ms. Lazo-Majano was 
present in the United States without admission when she was stopped by 
an immigration officer. Section 3006 provides that a person in this 
situation who indicates an intention to apply for asylum or a fear of 
persecution shall be referred to an asylum officer for a credible fear 
interview. Ms. Lazo-Majano would be allowed to apply for asylum if she 
was able to tell a uniformed Border Patrol officer (an uniformed and 
likely male officer) about her fears, but even if she felt safe enough 
to do that she would only be granted a credible fear interview if the 
officer determined that she had been present in the United States at 
that point for less than a year.
    In fact, Ms. Lazo-Majano had only been in the United States for a 
few months when she was stopped. But could she have proved that? She 
was an undocumented immigrant with no proof of her date of entry and 
probably very limited documentation of her life in this country. If she 
had in fact been in the U.S. for over a year, she might have been 
eligible for an exception to the one-year filing deadline for asylum 
claims--many refugees who have been through the kind of shattering, 
traumatic experiences she suffered arrive in the U.S. suffering from 
psychological and/or physical ills that make it impossible for them to 
file their claims timely. For many victims of rape and other forms of 
torture, the continuing feeling of shame and fear are so overwhelming 
that they may not be able to bring themselves to tell their stories to 
any other person--much less a U.S. government official--until they have 
gained some sense of security. People in this situation are often 
eligible for an exception to the filing deadline under INA section 
208(a)(2)(D). Section 3006 would prevent their claims from being heard. 
Regardless of her date of filing, Ms. Lazo-Majano would be eligible for 
withholding of removal under section 241(b)(3) of the INA, but section 
3006 makes no provision for application for withholding of removal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

  C. THE LEGISLATION UNFAIRLY AND UNCONSTITUTIONALLY LIMITS JUDICIAL 
                      REVIEW OF EXECUTIVE ACTIONS

    Section 3009 would eliminate virtually all federal court 
review of orders of deportation, including claims arising under 
the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Forms 
of Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Review 
of such orders would be limited to ``circuit courts of appeals 
of constitutional claims or pure questions of law raised upon 
petitions for review filed in accordance with this section.''
    The bill not only forecloses habeas corpus review in those 
cases where a ``petition for review'' is barred under section 
242(a)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act--it goes much 
further by redefining ``judicial review'' and ``jurisdiction to 
review'' throughout the INA to include review by habeas corpus. 
This is a radical departure in immigration law because it 
changes the longstanding, historical meaning of ``jurisdiction 
to review'' and ``judicial review''--``terms of art'' that have 
been long interpreted in immigration matters as distinct from 
review by writ of habeas corpus.\35\ This section would 
redefine the meaning of these terms to explicitly forbid access 
to the ``Great Writ'' for all claims where ``judicial review'' 
or ``jurisdiction to review'' is barred, dramatically altering 
at least thirteen separate provisions of the Immigration Act 
that affect agricultural workers, asylum petitioners, non-
immigrants and others. In these cases, habeas review must be 
available as a safety valve. The Constitution demands court 
review for all actions that affect the liberty of persons 
detained by the government.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \35\ INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 312 n.35 (2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    After barring these claims, the legislation explicitly bars 
the federal courthouse doors to any alternative appeal through 
the ``Great Writ'' of liberty. In so doing, the bill violates 
the Constitution, which provides that ``the Privilege of the 
Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not besuspended'' except in cases 
of ``Rebellion or Invasion.'' \36\ The Supreme Court has held that the 
Constitution requires any substitute remedy for habeas corpus to be 
``neither inadequate nor ineffective to test the legality of a person's 
detention.'' \37\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \36\ U.S. Const. art. I Sec. 9.
    \37\ Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 381 (1977).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This proposal ignores many of the other systemic problems 
that have led to necessary habeas litigation. The current 
system makes it very hard for many people to get any review, 
even if they have a strong claim. Factors negating meaningful 
review include the lack of access to counsel, detentions in 
remote areas, lack of notice on how to have a claim heard in 
court, exceedingly short time limitations to file petitions for 
review, no protection against deportation during the short time 
to file for review, and the government's use of hypertechnical 
arguments to defeat jurisdiction. These factors, plus the 1996 
legislation's effective elimination of discretionary relief by 
the agency, have forced people into habeas litigation. The 
Majority rejected an amendment offered by Rep. Nadler and Rep. 
Linda Sanchez (D-CA) to strike this objectionable proposal.

 D. THE LEGISLATION WOULD REGULATE FORMS OF IDENTIFICATION CONTRARY TO 
                 CONGRESSIONAL AND PRIVATE SECTOR VIEWS

    The legislation contains problematic provisions that would 
make it difficult for immigrants to carry identification and 
open bank accounts, and for states to regulate drivers. 
Considering that these measures would not help in the war on 
terror, it is not surprising that they were not recommended by 
the 9/11 Commission.
    First, section 3005 would prohibit federal employees from 
accepting any foreign identity document other than a 
passport.\38\ The underlying objective is to prevent Mexican 
immigrants from using Matricula Consular cards for 
identification. The Government of Mexico has been issuing 
Matriculas at their consulates around the world for more than 
130 years. The consulates do this to create an official record 
of its citizens in other countries. The Matricula is legal 
proof of registration with a consulate. This registration 
facilitates access to protection and consular services because 
the certificate is evidence of Mexican nationality. Last year 
alone, more than a million of these cards were issued to 
Mexican citizens living in the United States. It does not 
provide immigrant status of any kind, and it cannot be used for 
travel, employment, or driving in the United States or in 
Mexico. The Matricula only attests that a Mexican consulate has 
verified the individual's identity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \38\ The identity document issue would come up when aliens are 
required to present a foreign identity document to enter a federal 
building or to board an airplane at a United States airport. In 
addition, the Transportation Security Administration requires 
passengers to show an identification card before being admitted to the 
secured areas of an airport.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Matricula also has some non-consular uses. For 
instance, because it is an identification card, it provides 
Mexican nationals in the United States with access to banking 
services. Without an acceptable identification card, many 
Mexican nationals in this country cannot open checking or 
savings accounts or use any other banking services. The 
significance of this cannot be overstated; in 2003, Latino 
immigrants sent $38 billion to Latin America.\39\ Moreover, the 
U.S. banking industry has been supportive of the Matricula, 
planning to spend at least $8.5 billion through 2005 to attract 
Hispanic customers.\40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \39\ Dr. Manuel Orozco, Institute for the Study of International 
Migration, Georgetown Univ., Pew Hispanic Center Report: The Remittance 
Marketplace-Prices, Policy and Financial Institutions 15 (June 2004).
    \40\ Holders of the Matricula are more likely to use regulated 
financial institutions, such as banks or credit unions, than a money 
transmitting business such as Western Union or MoneyGram because the 
cost of making such transfers is much higher for the latter category.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The availability of banking services is a safety issue, as 
well. Because of perceptions that Latinos do not have bank 
accounts and thus carry large amounts of cash, Latinos are more 
likely to be victims of violent crime than any other racial or 
ethnic group. As a result of this problem, mayors across the 
country support the use of the Matricula to enable Latinos to 
use mainstream financial institutions and thus reduce crime and 
violence.\41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \41\ See Rachel L. Swarns, Old ID Card Gives New Status to Mexicans 
in U.S., N.Y. Times, Aug. 25, 2003, at A1 (``In June, the mayors of the 
Indians cities of Fort Wayne, East Chicago, Columbus and Indianapolis 
announced they would accept the Matricula card. In July the State of 
Indiana and the cities of Madison, Ind., and Cleveland and Columbus in 
Ohio recognized it. This month, Cincinnati followed suit. Officials say 
the move would be a boon to local economies, encouraging Mexican 
immigrants to pour money into banks and businesses. They also say 
immigrants with bank accounts will be less vulnerable to criminals who 
prey on people who carry cash or keep money at home.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Finally, the use of the Matricula for establishing bank 
accounts has been approved by our government. The USA PATRIOT 
Act requires regulations setting forth minimum standards for 
financial institutions that relate to the identification and 
verification of any person who applies to open an account.\42\ 
These regulations, promulgated by the U.S. Department of 
Treasury, permit banks to accept identification cards issued by 
foreign governments from customers opening new accounts, 
including the Matricula.\43\ Additionally, the House recently 
defeated another attempt to ban the use of the Matricula.\44\ 
Despite this clear support for the Matricula, opponents of the 
identification card are trying to achieve their objective 
indirectly by limiting which foreign documents can be accepted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \42\ Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate 
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) 
Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, Sec. 326, 115 Stat. 272, 317 (2001).
    \43\ See 31 C.F.R. Sec. 103.121 (2004).
    \44\ H.R. 5025, 108th Cong., 2d Sess. (2004). An amendment offered 
by Rep. Michael Oxley striking section 216, which prevented issuance of 
regulations regarding Matricula Consular cards, passed the House by a 
bipartisan vote of 222-177.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Section 3052 of the legislation is another thinly-veiled 
attempt to limit forms of acceptable identification. Subsection 
3052(c)(2)(B) would prohibit states from accepting any foreign 
document, other than an official passport, to meet the 
documentary identification requirements for a state-issued 
identification card (including a drivers' license).
    While proponents of this measure have linked driver's 
licenses to security concerns by pointing out that many of the 
9/11 hijackers were able to obtain licenses, we would note that 
making it more difficult to obtain a driver's licenses will not 
deter terrorism. Even requiring passports to obtain driver's 
licenses would not have prevented the 9/11 hijackers from 
getting driver's licenses; they all had passports.
    Beyond the ineffectiveness of the proposal, it also would 
serve to exclude millions of people from American society and 
hinder state efforts to regulate drivers. Recent estimates 
indicate that we have between eight and fourteen million 
undocumented aliens in the United States, many of whom may not 
have passports and would be prevented from obtaining licenses 
under the legislation. The reality is that in many parts of the 
country it is virtually impossible to survive in our society 
without a car, and it is unlikely that undocumented aliens will 
simply give up and leave the country when they learn they 
cannot obtain licenses.
    Moreover, a license is not just a privilege for the 
driver's benefit but also serves state purposes. By licensing 
drivers, the state can ensure that the drivers who receive 
licenses have acceptable driving skills, know traffic laws, and 
have liability insurance. In addition, registering and 
photographing all drivers helps the state to monitor driving 
records.
    Finally, denying access to licenses could pose a safety 
risk. Traffic accidents are the leading cause of death, with 
forty-four thousand traffic fatalities in 2002.\45\ According 
to a study conducted for the AAA Foundation for Traffic Safety, 
unlicensed drivers are five times more likely to be in fatal 
crashes than drivers with valid licenses.\46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \45\ National Safety Council, Injury Facts: Report on Injuries in 
America (2003).
    \46\ AAA Foundation for Traffic Safety, Unlicensed to Kill: The 
Sequel (Jan. 2003).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

 E. THE LEGISLATION CONTAINS OTHER OBJECTIONABLE PROVISIONS THAT WOULD 
  NOT ENHANCE SECURITY AND WERE NOT RECOMMENDED BY THE 9/11 COMMISSION

1. The legislation increases criminal penalties for false claims to 
        citizenship without any nexus to national security goals

    We object to section 3086, which imposes five years 
imprisonment for making false claims to citizenship for the 
purpose of entering or remaining in the United States. This is 
yet another example of the mean-spirited, anti-immigrant 
sentiment that pervades this bill. Many immigrants, both legal 
and undocumented, may make such a claim upon an encounter with 
a law enforcement or immigration official. We believe that a 
five year jail term for such a statement is unnecessary and 
very counterproductive. Federal law already exacts severe 
consequences on immigrants who make false claims to 
citizenship. There is no valid policy reason for making 
taxpayers bear the high cost of jailing an immigrant for five 
years for such a minor non-violent offense.
    Making a false claim to citizenship is already punishable 
under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Section 212 
makes an alien who falsely represents themself as a citizen 
inadmissible, and there is no waiver of the consequences of 
this offense.\47\ In addition, this offense constitutes a crime 
of moral turpitude and triggers removability from the country 
under section 237 of the INA.\48\ The INA makes a person who 
has committed a crime of moral turpitude subject to mandatory 
detention in jail, if they are convicted of a sentence of more 
than 1 year in prison.\49\ This immigration detention, which 
can last for years, normally follows the service of a criminal 
sentence in prison.
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    \47\ 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii).
    \48\ 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1227(a)(2)(A)(i).
    \49\ 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1226(c)(1)(B).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Section 3086 needlessly piles on additional jail time to an 
immigrant who already faces removal, with mandatory detention 
in many cases. Upon deportation, the immigrant would be barred 
from the United States for life.\50\ The consequences of one 
false statement, both to the immigrant and to their family, 
community and employer, are already severe. Adding a five year 
jail term to someone who is already subject to deportation, 
without possibility of return under our federal laws, is 
grossly excessive to the crime.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \50\ See Section 212 of the INA. An inadmissible person is not 
eligible to get a visa to return to the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Furthermore, the 9/11 Commission did not recommend the 
enhancement of this penalty, nor did it recommend anything 
remotely related to this policy. The Majority on this Committee 
justifies the inclusion of this policy \51\ in this bill by the 
Commission's recommendation that ``The Department of Homeland 
Security, properly supported by Congress, should complete, as 
quickly as possible, a biometric entry-exit screening system, 
including a single system for speeding qualified travelers.'' 
\52\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \51\ Memorandum from the Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., 
Chairman, U.S. House Comm. on the Judiciary to Members, U.S. House 
Comm. on the Judiciary 16 (Sept. 27, 2004) (regarding the Markup of 
H.R. 10, the ``9/11 Recommendation Implementation Act'' and other 
bills).
    \52\ 9/11 Commission Report at 389.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Jailing people for five years for claiming that they are 
U.S. citizens has nothing to do with a biometric entry-exit 
system, nor with speeding the transit of qualified travelers. 
There is no indication that a policy like this would catch 
terrorists trying to enter the country, or prevent a terrorist 
attack. In fact, none of the September 11th terrorists claimed 
U.S. citizenship to enter this country.
    This policy is simply an anti-immigrant provision designed 
to punish, jail and deport immigrants, especially those who are 
undocumented. It has no nexus to national security and is most 
likely to result in years of imprisonment followed by the 
eventual deportation of random immigrant workers. We object to 
this penalty, and certainly oppose its inclusion in this bill, 
which is supposed to be responding to the recommendations of 
the 9/11 Commission.

2. The legislation would hinder business and tourism travel throughout 
        the western hemisphere

    Another provision of the bill would hamper travel 
throughout the western hemisphere and cause chaos for 
businesses and national economies. Section 215(b) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act states that, unless otherwise 
provided, it is unlawful for U.S. citizens to depart from or 
enter the United States unless they bear a valid U.S. passport. 
By regulation, the Secretary of State has provided that U.S. 
citizens are excepted from this requirement when traveling 
directly between parts of the United States, and when traveling 
between the United States and any territory in North, South or 
Central America (i.e., the western hemisphere).\53\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \53\ 22 C.F.R. Sec. 53.2(a)-(b). Cuba is excluded from the western 
hemisphere exception. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Section 3001 of H.R. 10 would amend section 215(b) to 
invalidate the western hemisphere exception, thus requiring a 
passport to travel to and from currently exempted countries. It 
would permit the President to waive the passport requirement 
for travel to Canada and Mexico, but it would require such 
travelers to carry documents that the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services has designated as establishing U.S. citizenship 
for the travel purposes.\54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \54\ The Secretary would have 60 days to pass an interim rule and 
publish a list of qualifying documents in the Federal Register. As of 
90 days after that publication, the President would not be authorized 
to permit citizen arrivals or departures without the designated 
document or documents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As it is has been proposed, the measure would overburden 
passport processing operations and slow business and tourism 
travel to a halt. First, though it essentially would require 
the issuance of new passports for travelers to currently 
exempted countries, the legislation provides no funding to 
increase passport application processing. As such, the need for 
so many passports could result in severe backlogs and prevent 
people from taking needed trips. Further, it would have a 
particularly negative impact on the tourism industry of the 
Caribbean, which relies on U.S. travel of those without 
passports. For this reason, the provision would raise the ire 
of the travel industry and many businesses who would miss 
opportunities because they could not engage in last minute 
travel.\55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \55\ Another concern we expressed during the markup is that it does 
not limit the use of secret immigration proceedings. During the 
Committee markup, Reps. Howard Berman (D-CA) and Delahunt (D-MA) 
offered an amendment to set out guidelines for government closure of 
hearings in immigration court in response to the blanket closure of 
these hearings by the Chief Immigration Judge in the weeks following 
the September 11th attacks. We feel that this amendment falls squarely 
within the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. Specifically, the 
Commission recommended that: ``The burden of proof for retaining a 
particular governmental power should be on the executive, to explain 
(a) that the power actually materially enhances security and (b) that 
there is adequate supervision of the executive's use of the powers to 
ensure protection of civil liberties. If the power is granted, there 
must be adequate guidelines and oversight to properly confine its 
use.'' The amendment offered by Rep. Berman would have created 
guidelines for the use of the government's power to close hearings.
    On September 21, 2001, Chief Immigration Judge Michael J. Creppy 
issued a memorandum (``Creppy Directive'') implementing an order from 
the Attorney General to close certain immigration hearings. These cases 
were to be conducted completely in secret with ``no visitors, no family 
and no press.'' The mandate for secrecy even prohibited ``confirming or 
denying whether such a case is on the docket or scheduled for 
hearing.''
    It has been reported that the INS did not use classified 
information in any of these hearings. Instead the government has 
asserted that all purported terrorism-related proceedings need to 
remain closed in order to protect the privacy of the detainees and 
prevent information about government intelligence-gathering methods 
from reaching al Qaeda.
    The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan found 
that the order closing immigration hearings was unconstitutionally 
broad (Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 937 (E.D. Mich. 
2002), and the Federal Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 
Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002). In a 
separate case the U.S. District Court for New Jersey found the closures 
unconstitutional (New Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, 205 F. Supp. 2d. 
288 (D.N.J. 2002), but the Third Circuit reversed (New Jersey Media 
Group v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3rd Cir. 2002). The Supreme Court 
declined to hear the cases, effectively allowing the government to 
continue the process, at least within the geographic confines of the 
Third Circuit.
    Open proceedings, in judicial and quasi-judicial settings, protect 
individuals from arbitrary action and the public from sloppy decision-
making. Transparent proceedings are also important in maintaining 
public confidence in the fairness of government activities. There are 
clearly individual cases where proceedings should be closed to protect 
the safety of participants or national security. But the Creppy 
Directive allows the partial closing of proceedings based on the 
government's prerogative, without any showing of legitimate security 
needs.
    As of May 29, 2002, 611 individuals have been subject to one or 
more secret hearings. As noted, there is a split in the circuit that 
have considered the legality of these proceedings, and, in opposing 
review by the Supreme Court, the Justice Department announced it was 
reconsidering its policy. Brief for the Respondents in Opposition at 
13, North Jersey Media Group (No. 02-1289). But, in the absence of 
legislative action, there is nothing to prevent the Justice Department 
from conducting more secret immigration hearings in the future.
    The amendment offered by Mr. Berman responds to the 
Administration's decision to require blanket closure of immigration 
proceedings without any showing of legitimate security needs by the 
government. The amendment would have established a statutory 
presumption of openness for removal hearings while preserving the 
possibility that a hearing may be closed upon a specific showing of 
need. Namely, the amendment would create an exception that on a case-
by-case basis, hearings may be closed to preserve confidentiality of 
the immigrant (as in asylum adjudications or cases involving minors), 
to protect national security if classified information is involved, or 
to protect the identity of a confidential informant.
    During the markup, the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Immigration 
opposed the Democratic amendment claiming that ``it is common today for 
immigration cases to be closed. In fact, all asylum proceedings and 
proceedings regarding inadmissibility of a particular applicant are 
closed today.'' This statement is false. In making this argument, the 
Subcommittee Chairman's staff pointed to two sections of the Code of 
Federal Regulations stating that ``All hearings, other than exclusion 
hearings, shall be open to the public * * * '' (8 C.F.R. Sec. 1003.27) 
and ``Exclusion hearings shall be closed to the public.'' 8 C.F.R. 
Sec. 1240.32. These provisions apply only to exclusion hearings--
proceedings that commenced prior to April 1, 1997. The do not apply to 
all inadmissibility hearings, as the Subcommittee Chairman claimed. To 
the contrary, all asylum and removal proceedings are presumptively open 
to the public. There are limited exceptions. For example, hearings can 
be closed by the court when the proceeding involves an abused alien 
spouse or child or if information presented in the hearing is subject 
to a protective order.
    It is unfortunate that the Majority members of the Committee were 
misinformed by their Subcommittee Chairman. We would hope that without 
this misinformation, our colleagues would have joined us in reinstating 
a transparent and open system for our immigration hearings that 
provides safeguards to protect privacy, classified information, 
national security, and confidential informants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

II. The Legislation Would Authorize the Federal Government and Private 
       Employers to Intrude into the Everyday Lives of Americans


     A. THE LEGISLATION VIOLATES PRIVACY RIGHTS AND FEDERALISM BY 
  STANDARDIZING DRIVER'S LICENSES TO CREATE A NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION 
                                 CARD.

    We object to Title III, Subtitle B, Chapter 1, which 
provides new standards for drivers' licenses and identification 
cards.\56\ This provision goes far beyond the Commission's 
recommendations. It comes dangerously close to creating a 
national identification card system. It threatens American 
citizen's rights to privacy. It violates the tenets of 
federalism and forces unfunded mandates on the states. It 
excludes important stakeholders from the policy-making process 
and ignores state policy needs. It marginalizes immigrants in 
America, and ignores more reasonable alternatives for securing 
personal identification documents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \56\ Specifically, this language is found in Sections 3051 through 
3056. Although we oppose Chapter 1 of this Subtitle, we do not object 
to Section 3054, which makes it illegal to traffic actual document 
authentication features, in addition to false authentication features.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In its final report, the 9/11 Commission issued the 
following recommendation:

          Secure identification should begin in the United 
        States. The federal government should set standards for 
        the issuance of birth certificates and sources of 
        identification, such as drivers [sic] licenses. Fraud 
        in identification documents is no longer just a problem 
        of theft. At many entry points to vulnerable 
        facilities, including gates for boarding aircraft, 
        sources of identification are the last opportunity to 
        ensure that people are who they say they are and to 
        check whether they are terrorists.\57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \57\ 9/11 Commission Report at 390 (emphasis added).

    After discussing the importance of continuing to welcome 
immigrants and keeping track of who enters the country, the 
Report also noted, ``All but one of the 9/11 hijackers acquired 
some form of U.S. identification document, some by fraud.''\58\ 
The hijackers used licenses and IDs to rent cars, conduct other 
activities to enact their plan, and eventually board aircraft 
for the 9/11 attacks. Clearly, the Commission recommended the 
establishment of identification standards to ensure that 
terrorists could not traverse the country and conduct business 
transactions in furtherance of future domestic attack 
plans.\59\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \58\ Id.
    \59\ See comments of 9/11 Commission Vice Chair Lee Hamilton at 
Oversight Hearing on Privacy and Civil Liberties in the Hands of the 
Government Post-September 11: Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission 
and the U.S. Department of Defense Technology and Privacy Advisory 
Committee Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law of 
the House Committee on the Judiciary, 108th Cong., 2d Sess. 97 (``Just 
to let you know our concern here, all of these hijackers, except one, 
had U.S. identification. And what we are saying is that secure 
identification is very, very important in terms of counterterrorism. 
And we--we did not endorse a national ID * * * Keep in mind that these 
hijackers were extremely skillful in being able to find the gaps in our 
system. And we are trying to protect against that as best we can.'')
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The 9/11 Commission's recommendation is broad and gives 
Congress room to work with federal agencies and states to 
develop standards that can be applied nationwide. Yet this 
Chapter goes far beyond the Commission's recommendation that 
the federal government set standards for identification. It 
requires the states to overhaul their procedures for issuing 
driver's licenses and identification cards to meet Federally-
proscribed standards. It requires that states establish a 
database system for sharing all of the personal information and 
driving histories on license and ID card holders, though the 
Commission did not recommend any type of unified database for 
this data. The Commission did not suggest that the Federal 
government should interfere with states' prerogatives or the 
privacy rights of individuals.\60\ Nor was there a suggestion 
that Federal grants to the states should hinge on a shared 
database agreement as proposed in H.R. 10. This Chapter also 
forces states to bear all of the financial costs of these new 
standards by failing to fund these mandates. The proposal in 
H.R. 10 goes well beyond the Commission's recommendation and 
unnecessarily violates the privacy rights of citizens and 
residents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \60\ See Statement of Vice Chair Lee Hamilton and Commissioner 
Slade Gorton, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United 
States, Before the Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law 
and the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the House Committee on the 
Judiciary, p. 3. (August 20, 2004) [Hereinafter Hamilton and Gorton 
Statement]. (``Individual rights and liberties must be adequately 
protected in the administration of the significant powers that Congress 
has granted to executive branch agencies to protect national 
security.'')
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Section 3052 establishes minimum standards for Federal 
recognition of state-issued driver's licenses or identification 
cards. It requires, at a minimum, that the following 
information be included on the identity documents: full legal 
name; date of birth; gender; license or ID card number; photo; 
residential address; signature; security features to prevent 
fraudulent use or tampering; and a common machine-readable 
technology with defined minimum data elements.
    Section 3052 also spells out what forms of information and 
proof a state must require before issuing a license or ID: a 
photo identity document or alternative with legal name and date 
of birth; a document with date of birth; proof of social 
security account number; and a document with name and address 
of principal residence. The states must verify each document 
with the original issuing agency, and they are prohibited from 
accepting any foreign documents, except an official passport, 
for these purposes.
    Furthermore, section 3052 requires states to use digital 
technology, retain copies or images of documents; require 
facial image capture for driver's license issuance; establish a 
procedure to verify information for renewals; confirm the 
accuracy of social security numbers and take action if one is 
registered to another person; refuse to issue licenses 
withoutconfirmation that the applicant has terminated their license 
from another state; secure licensing facilities and employees 
authorized to manufacture or produce them; and establish fraudulent 
document recognition training.
    The National Governors Association ``strongly opposes'' 
these provisions in H.R. 10.\61\ They note that the bill was 
``drafted without any input from Governors'' and ``exclude[s] 
states from the standard-setting process despite states' 
historic roles as issuers of driver's licenses and other 
identification data.'' \62\ In their opinion, the bill ``would 
impose unworkable technological standards and verification 
procedures on states, many of which are well beyond the current 
capacity of even the federal government.'' They oppose the 
requirement that they share their state information with the 
federal government. In their view, this proposal would ``create 
financial, administrative and implementation problems by 
requiring state compliance with these unprecedented, federally-
imposed standards within a short timeframe.'' In addition, 
``the cost of implementing such standards for the 220 million 
driver's licenses issued by states represents a massive 
unfunded federal mandate.'' \63\ We agree with their assessment 
and share their concerns.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \61\ NGA Letter.
    \62\ Id.
    \63\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As written, this Chapter would require state departments of 
motor vehicles to verify each and every identification document 
used to prove identity, by confirming the document with the 
government agency or company that issued it. Without a well-
developed cooperative approach, this will become a bureaucratic 
nightmare that will be costly to the states and will cause 
substantial delays for citizens and residents. H.R. 10 also 
fails to provide any protections for the digital data it 
requires states to store digitally. There are no limits on how 
it may be used, nor is there any guidance for maintaining data 
security. This bill even goes as far to make the appearance of 
the IDs uniform--a step that is eerily close to a national ID 
card.
    The states have a right to participate in determining how 
features for licenses and ID cards should be changed. Despite 
their expertise, they had no role in developing the 
requirements in H.R. 10. In effect, this Chapter empowers the 
Federal government to usurp state control over licensing and 
identification and establishes the equivalent of a national 
identity card with different state names on them.
    Drivers' licenses are not simply identification documents. 
Their purpose is to ensure that people are safe drivers, who 
know the traffic laws and have defensive driving skills, before 
they drive on our roads and highways. Licensing also makes it 
possible for drivers to have liability insurance to protect 
other drivers on the road. The states should maintain their 
critical role in the issuance of licenses. Their obligation to 
ensure safety on their roads to protect their residents and 
visitors should not be ignored.
    Perhaps the objections raised by the National Conference of 
State Legislatures (``NCSL'') best enunciate the concerns we 
share with the states about the imposition of these standards 
and the obligation to share the data of state residents:

          These provisions show no respect for federalism. They 
        constitute egregious unfunded mandates dealing with 
        drivers' licenses, birth certificates, personal 
        identification cards and use of social security numbers 
        that are likely to impose billions in costs on states. 
        They preempt and undercut state legislative authority 
        through a federally-contrived rulemaking process. They 
        set a prescriptive framework for a national 
        identification card. They ignore efforts made in every 
        state to strengthen the integrity of drivers' licenses 
        issuance and verification. They surrender legislative 
        prerogative to federal agencies and bureaucrats without 
        the benefit of congressional oversight. They constitute 
        the groundwork for potentially compromising civil 
        liberties and individual privacy. They compel state 
        participation in compacts that are not recognized by 
        state lawmakers and elected officials. They reference a 
        federal grant process and funding of `sums as may be 
        necessary,' all in an environment of bulging federal 
        deficits and constraints on domestic discretionary 
        spending.\64\

    \64\ NCSL Letter. In addition to the provision on driver's licenses 
and state identification cards, the letter referred to provisions on 
birth certificates and social security data in Title III, Subtitle B, 
Chapters 1, 2, and Section 3071 of Chapter 3 from H.R. 10.

    Title III of H.R. 10 proposes a computerized national 
database of every American driver's license and state 
identification card under the guise of strengthening our 
homeland security. Section 3053 requires that states must agree 
to participate in an interstate compact for the electronic 
sharing of driver license data, known as the ``Driver License 
Agreement,'' in order to receive any grants or assistance under 
the bill. It requires state motor vehicle databases contain (1) 
all data fields printed on driver's licenses and identification 
cards issued by the state, and (2) motor vehicle drivers' 
histories, including motor vehicle violations, suspension, and 
points on licenses. A mega-datebase such as this one represents 
a perilous threat to our Constitutional rights. By forcing 
state governments to maintain and share files on almost every 
adult in the state, H.R. 10 will truly usher in the era of a 
``Big Brother'' government.
    Past efforts to establish a national ID card to identify 
and track U.S. residents have failed, due to the threats they 
pose to our liberty.\65\ H.R. 10 seeks to achieve that same 
purpose through the back door. Instead of creating a new 
national ID card, whose data would be held and monitored by the 
Federal government, this proposal standardizes state ID cards 
so that they achieve the same purpose. In this proposal, the 
states maintain the data, but they are forced to create a mega-
database whose data must be shared by all 50 states and the 
U.S. territories.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \65\ See Alison M. Smith, Congressional Research Service, National 
Identification Cards: Legal Issues, n. 1-3 (Jan. 3, 2003). Examples 
include the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1976, which stated, 
``Nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize, directly or 
indirectly, the issuance or use of national identification cards or the 
establishment of a national identification card.'' Pub. L. 94-571. 
Similarly, Rich Thornburg, Attorney General for President George Bush, 
ruled out identification cards for the use of guns in 1989, feeling 
that it was ``an infringement on rights of Americans.'' See Alison M. 
Smith, Congressional Research Service, National Identification Cards: 
Legal Issues n.2 (Jan. 3, 2003) (citing Ann Debroy, ``Thornburg Rules 
out Two Gun-Control Options,'' Wash. Post, June 29, 1989 at A 41). 
Finally, Representative Dick Armey has been quoted as saying ``[w]e 
didn't beat back the administration's plan to issue us all `health 
security cards' only to have Congress adopt an I.D. card to track down 
immigrants.'' Id. (citing William H. Minor, Identity Cards and 
Databases in Health Care: The Need for Federal Privacy Protections, 28 
Columb. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 253,273 (1995)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    There are no privacy limitations on the use of this 
data.\66\ The bill does not prevent the sharing of this 
information with other people, companies, Federal government 
agencies or foreign governments that may make inquiries. There 
are no systems for maintaining the datashare systems, ensuring 
the accuracy of the data, preventing fraud and tampering, 
making corrections, or filing complaints for inaccuracy or 
misuse of the data. Currently, some states do not even have 
accurate or complete databases. Not all states can verify 
whether or not a certain person has a valid driver's license 
from their state. Certainly the Federal government should not 
mandate linking up state databases when some states cannot 
provide reliable information about their license and ID 
holders.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \66\ See Hamilton and Gorton Statement, p.1 (``We also recognize 
that with the enhanced flow of information comes a need to establish 
guidelines and oversight to make sure that the privacy of our citizens 
and residents is respected and preserved.'')
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The lack of data safeguards ensures that the data will 
often be inaccurate and misused. There will be serious 
consequences for untold numbers of people who may miss flights, 
land in jail, fail to get benefits or be denied other 
opportunities due to database errors.
    As noted above, the system proposed in this Chapter will 
dangerously increase the Federal government's ability to 
monitor individuals. The data-sharing system is bound to be 
subject to unauthorized disclosures and leaks. During World War 
II, for example, supposedly sacrosanct census data was used to 
identify Japanese-Americans for internment.\67\ This mega-
database will be a tempting target for future legislation and 
policies. The FBI could use this database to identify certain 
immigrants or members of an ethnic group for ``voluntary 
interviews''.\68\ Collection agencies and states could 
erroneously identify people as unpaid debtors or child support 
evaders. People might be identified through the database 
because they criticized the President for U.S. involvement in a 
war or protested an international organization for the ills of 
globalization. The system is ripe for abuse and misuse that 
will violate people's rights to privacy, speech, and civil 
rights.\69\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \67\ H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 1, at 520 
(1996)
    \68\ For example, in late 2001 and 2002, the FBI conducted a 
program of ``voluntary interviews'' of over 5000 Muslim residents of 
the U.S., seeking information related to the September 11, 2001 attacks 
and terrorist threats to the United States. Similar interviews of Iraqi 
residents in the U.S. were conducted prior to the initiation of the war 
in Iraq in 2003.
    \69\ See Hamilton and Gorton Statement at 2 (``We did propose a 
general test to be applied to consideration of the renewal of other 
provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act, and we believe that principle should 
also be applied to other legislative and regulatory proposals that are 
designed to strengthen our security but that may impinge on individual 
rights. The test is a simple but important one: The burden of proof 
should be on the proponents of the measure to establish that the power 
or authority being sought would in fact materially enhance national 
security, and that there will be adequate supervision of the exercise 
of that power or authority top [sic] ensure protection of civil 
liberties. If the power is granted, there must be adequate guidelines 
and oversight to properly confine its use.'')
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Combined with other sections of H.R. 10 that prevent or 
limit the use of other forms of identification,\70\ track the 
movement of Americans in and out of the country,\71\ 
standardize state records for birth certificates, and set up 
computerized systems for state and federal sharing of birth and 
death records,\72\ the impact of this proposal for driver's 
licenses and state-issued ID cards is truly frightening.\73\ 
America would become a place where a person's every move, every 
encounter with state or federal governments from birth to 
death, would be tracked and monitored by those governments. 
H.R. 10 is a major leap forward in creating an all-intrusive 
``Big Brother'' government.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \70\ See H.R. 10 Sec. 3005.
    \71\ See id. Sec. 3001.
    \72\ See id. Sec. 3061.
    \73\ See NCSL Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Section 3055 empowers the Secretary of Homeland Security to 
make grants to the states to assist their efforts to conform to 
the minimum standards in this chapter. It authorizes such sums 
as may be necessary to carry out the Chapter from fiscal years 
2005 through 2009. However, there is no guarantee that these 
grants will be made to all states and territories, or that 
sufficient funds will be provided to cover the massive expenses 
of these reforms. Furthermore, the demand for state compliance 
is not contingent upon the provision of federal funding to meet 
the costs of these reforms. The result will likely be a large 
unfunded mandate upon the states.\74\ Yet many states continue 
to struggle financially as a result of other federal budget 
cuts in recent years. How will they pay for this plan? If these 
measures are needed for our national security, they should be 
paid for with federal funds. The burden of imposing and sharing 
these mandatory standards should not rest with the states.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \74\ See NGA Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Section 3056 gives the Secretary of Homeland Security the 
authority to make regulations, certify standards and issue 
grants under this title, in consultation with the Secretary of 
Transportation and the States. This gives ultimate authority to 
DHS, all but removing the Department of Transportation from the 
process, despite their authority over federal highways, their 
impact over State road and highway policy, and their experience 
working with states on road safety and licensing policies. At a 
minimum, the Secretary of Transportation should share the 
authority to implement this Chapter by making regulations, 
certifying standards and issuing grants in conjunction with the 
Secretary of Homeland Security. As discussed below, Rep. Linda 
Sanchez (D-CA) offered a substitute that would have achieved 
this balance. Under her proposal, the Secretaries of 
Transportation and Homeland Security would have joint authority 
to ensure that road safety policy was considered along with 
homeland security needs in creating and implementing these new 
standards.
    We would also note that this policy would leave citizens 
vulnerable to immigrant drivers on the roads without licenses. 
Many undocumented aliens who do not have passports are going to 
drive whether they have driver's licenses or not. Preventing 
the states from issuing driver's licenses to these aliens will 
result in a lot of untested, uninsured drivers on the roads. As 
a number of immigration organizations noted, ``Not only would 
these requirements grind to a halt the issuance of driver's 
licenses throughout the country, they also would lead to a de 
facto immigration status requirement. Such a result would 
severely undermine the law enforcement utility of the 
Department of Motor Vehicle databases by discouraging 
individuals from applying for licenses.'' \75\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \75\ Immigration Sign-On Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Rep. Sanchez did offer a Democratic substitute to this 
Chapter at the Full Committee mark-up that Republicans defeated 
in a 19 to 12 vote.\76\ Her proposal would have satisfied the 
recommendation of the 9-11 Commission, while bringing all those 
who have a serious interest in the implementation of standards 
together. She proposed creating a working group of federal and 
state experts who would carefully determine standards that 
would both ensure the security of driver's licenses and state 
identification cards and meet the policy needs of the States. 
This working group would include officials from the Department 
of Transportation, the Department of Homeland Security, and 
State motor vehicle departments. The working group would have 
reported their findings to Congress, allowing us to make a more 
reasoned decision that met the objectives of all stakeholders.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \76\ H.R. 10 Markup at 317-332.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Although the substitute amendment failed, Rep. Melvin L. 
Watt (D-NC) expressed bi-partisan concerns about how to improve 
driver's license security and the risks of imposing a national 
identification card:
          Mr. Watt: ``I just wanted to point out that we had a 
        hearing in the Commercial and Administrative Law 
        Subcommittee on this whole national identification 
        process. And uniformly--and I wish my Chairman Mr. 
        Cannon, was here to express this--but uniformly the 
        people on the--members on that subcommittee were 
        extremely concerned about how this new identification 
        system got implemented. And I think the underlying bill 
        is well beyond what any of those people would have 
        thought would have been a desirable place to be, and I 
        think Ms. Sanchez's amendment gets us much, much closer 
        to the appropriate balance.'' \77\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \77\ H.R. 10 Markup at 322.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Mr. Watt: Quoting Mr. Cannon from the subcommittee 
        transcript: `` `And I suspect that this subcommittee, 
        perhaps the Constitution subcommittee in addition, is 
        going to have a lot to say about how we at least 
        approach that problem.' He's talking about the national 
        ID card problem. `And I think that means a commission 
        where people who are very thoughtful, who have 
        significant background, and who are'--`people who are 
        willing to say we don't necessarily need to federalize 
        this process. And if we do federalize this process, it 
        shouldn't just be by the damn feds sucking information 
        out of local folks, It ought to be the local folks who 
        get something back, and to do that, you ought to have 
        some kind of protection, maybe an anonymizer. * * * It 
        is vital to America and it is, I think, the cornerstone 
        of what our grandchildren are going to enjoy or suffer 
        in the future.'' \78\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \78\ Id. at 326.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    We agree with the 9/11 Commission that drivers' licenses 
and identification cards should be secure and should not be 
easily obtainable by terrorists, as was the case before 
September 11, 2001. However, creating a national ID is not the 
answer. All of the States and relevant federal agencies should 
have a role in carefully constructing appropriate national 
standards. A rigid, federal mandate is unwise and places 
unreasonable expectations on the states. This is especially 
true when the federal mandate is not funded, as in this case.
    Most importantly, this proposal does not strike an 
appropriate balance between our rights to individual privacy 
and the federal government's responsibilities to enhance our 
national security. We can improve the screening of card 
applicants, enhance the security of the identification cards, 
and ensure that driver's meet safety tests. This can be done 
without violating individual privacy, creating a database with 
information on almost every U.S. resident, and increasing the 
number of dangerous, uninsured drivers on American roads and 
highways. It is our obligation to find the right balance. 
Rushing into a bad policy that establishes a ``Big Brother'' 
government database that will soon move beyond our control is 
not the answer. There is no evidence that the 9/11 Commission 
ever suggested or contemplated such a sweeping,overbroad policy 
to achieve the objective of securing domestic identification. 
Individual privacy must and can be protected while we improve our 
national security. Alternative reforms could successfully achieve this 
balance.

 B. THE LEGISLATION WOULD PROVIDE UNFETTERED ACCESS TO INACCURATE AND 
        INCOMPLETE CRIMINAL BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON EMPLOYEES

    The bill also would subject private citizens to widespread 
dissemination of any criminal history information, regardless 
of accuracy. As reported from the Committee, section 2142 
authorizes private employers to obtain background information, 
however inaccurate, on potential employees from the Attorney 
General. This program would undo the careful balance that 
exists between security needs and privacy interests and could 
lead to the dissemination of incorrect and private information.
    Under current law, the Attorney General is authorized to 
acquire, collect and classify information for the purpose of 
criminal identification and records, the identification of 
deceased individuals and the location of missing persons.\79\ 
This information may only be exchanged with federal government, 
the states, cities, and penal and other similar 
institutions.\80\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \79\ 28 U.S.C.Sec. 534.
    \80\ Id. Sec. 534(a)(4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Section 2142 would expand this authority significantly. It 
would create a pilot program that would empower private 
employers to access federal databases when such a search would 
be legal under state law. It requires the Attorney General to 
set up a system by which this information can be reliably 
accessed by fingerprint or other biometric identifiers. The 
search requester will be provided with an identifying 
description of the individual, and all available history on 
arrests, detentions, indictments or other formal charges. The 
requester also would receive any available dispositional 
information on the aforementioned, such as acquittal, 
sentencing, correctional supervision and release information. 
The Attorney General would then be required to submit a report 
regarding how a background program might be applied to the 
general public. Section 2142 also creates a program by which 
security guard companies may check potential employees' 
backgrounds.
    While we understand the need for ensuring the integrity of, 
this measure would not be of benefit in that regard. We believe 
that a study must proceed a actual program, not follow it. In 
the four months of its operation, the pilot program envisioned 
by the bill's proponents could collect information on countless 
innocent Americans. We cannot support such a program for many 
reasons.
    First, the program exceeds the scope of the 9/11 Commission 
report. It is unclear how this provision even relates to 
terrorism at all that it is not limited to those who work in 
national security-related positions or even those who work for 
the government. Plainly, there is no justification for allowing 
waitresses, accountants, cooks, and construction workers to be 
subjected to a federal background check through this bill. That 
is precisely whey states that allow discrimination based on 
criminal history require some nexus between the position and 
the relevance of one's criminal past. For example, many states 
regulate the employment only of those who work in law 
enforcement, or with the children or the elderly.\81\ To create 
a blanket check for people regardless of the sensitivity of 
their jobs muddies what this bill intends to do--prevent future 
terrorist attacks--and jeopardizes our privacy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \81\ Amy Hirsch, Center for Law and Social Policy, Every Door 
Closed: Barriers Facing Parents With Criminal Records 15 (2002).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Second, there are not safeguards to protect the information 
that employers collect and submit. The legislation contains no 
guidelines for what to do with information one it has been 
given to the Justice Department. It does not regulate what 
officials, public or private, would have access to it. Further, 
it does not provide whether the information is destroyed after 
the criminal history check or whether it remains in some new 
database of average Americans who have done nothing more than 
apply for a job. During the markup, the majority was forced to 
acknowledge that the legislation does not address these 
issues.\82\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \82\ H.R. 10 Markup.
    Rep. Jackson Lee (D-TX): ``I ask do you know, under the pilot 
program, what would happen to those fingerprints of all these 
individuals who would be subject to the criminal history background 
check?
    Rep. Steve Chabot (R-OH): ``It's not been set up yet, so the 
details of this ultimately will be determined.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Beyond our concerns about what the Justice Department would 
do with its new boon of personally-identifiable data, there are 
concerns about the lack of regulations for employers. Section 
2142 is silent about what employers are required to do to 
protect their employees' and applicants' sensitive information. 
There also are no provisions for ensuring that the background 
checks are actually being requested by bona fide employers 
instead of merely persons seeking private information on 
relatives or business competitors.
    Third, the provision has no safeguards for accuracy. The 
Brandon Mayfield fiasco \83\ demonstrates how easy it is to 
misidentify someone, even through our criminal and fingerprint 
databases. Despite this fact, the legislation does not require 
the database to have any level of accuracy before allowing 
information to be shared so that Mr. Mayfield's ordeal is not 
repeated. Beyond misidentification, it is possible that the 
files may be incomplete because they may not hold all of the 
dispositional information of how an arrest or charge was 
resolved. For this reason, the Justice Department should not 
disseminate arrest records until it can demonstrate that it 
also will disseminate acquittals, mistrials and those 
situations where charges were dropped.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \83\ The FBI held Brandon Mayfield for two weeks in connection with 
the Madrid train bombing. The FBI held Mr. Mayfield on the basis of a 
fingerprint on a bag with detonators near the bombing, despite the fact 
that the Spanish government had questioned the FBI's identification of 
Mr. Mayfield. The FBI eventually released and apologized to Mr. 
Mayfield for its mistake.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This provision invites unwarranted discrimination against 
those with criminal pasts. The Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission has found that discrimination on the basis of 
criminal history can very well be a violation of Title VII 
under a disparate impact theory, and should only be allowed 
when proven that it is a business necessity.\84\ It has further 
stated that arrest records can be particularly troublesome, and 
that an arrest absent a conviction should very rarely ever be a 
justification for not hiring an applicant.\85\ Finally, even 
the President has admitted the importance of integrating past 
offenders into our society, such as to reduce recidivism.\86\ 
The legislation's new criminal history checks will just invite 
more discrimination against those who have reformed their 
lives, those whose convictions are far in the past, even those 
who were arrested, but never convicted, of a crime, and make it 
harder for them to reintegrate into society.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \84\ Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Policy Statement on 
the Issue of Conviction Records Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 (Feb. 4, 1987).
    \85\ Policy Guidance on the Consideration of Arrest Records in 
Employment decisions Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
as amended, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e et seq. (Sept. 7, 1990).
    \86\ The President, State of the Union Address (Jan. 20, 2004) 
(``Tonight I ask you to consider another group of Americans in need of 
help. This year, some 600,000 inmates will be released from prison back 
into society. We know from long experience that if they can't find 
work, or a home, or help, they are much more likely to commit crime and 
return to prison. So tonight, I propose a four-year, $300 million 
prisoner re-entry initiative to expand job training and placement 
services, to provide transitional housing, and to help newly released 
prisoners get mentoring, including from faith-based groups. America is 
the land of second chance, and when the gates of the prison open, the 
path ahead should lead to a better life.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Finally, we would note there are no meaningful limitations 
whatsoever on the scope or duration of the pilot program. 
Ordinarily, when a pilot program of this magnitude is created, 
Congress will limit the program's geographic or other scope or 
duration. No such limitations are set forth in this 
legislation, effectively giving the Attorney General carte 
blanche authority to develop a program that could intrude on 
our civil liberties and privacy.
    While we support background checks for security guards we 
cannot support background checks for the myriad of other 
positions that have no security or terror relation whatsoever. 
To include such a measure in an anti-terrorism bill is 
misleading and jeopardizes what the 9/11 Commission recommended 
as real fixes for the terrorist threat. Unfortunately, the 
majority rejected an effort to limit the scope of the checks to 
security employees and to study the possibility of further 
expansion.\87\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \87\ By a vote of 11-20, an amendment by Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee 
(D-TX) to remove the pilot program was defeated. See H.R. 10 Markup.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

 C. THE LEGISLATION WOULD AUTHORIZE THE GENERATION OF TRAVEL DATABASES 
           AND SCREENING PROGRAMS WITHOUT REGARD TO ACCURACY

    Another concern with the legislation is that it would 
permit the development of travel databases and screening 
programs but would not ensure the integrity of those records. 
Section 2173 directs the Assistant Secretary of Homeland 
Security to begin testing a next generation passenger 
prescreening program, and directs the Secretary to establish 
procedures by which a person can appeal their position on a no-
fly list.
    While few can dispute the need for passenger screening, 
such measures must be done properly. At least hundreds, if not 
thousands, of airline passengers have complained to the 
Transportation Security Administration that their names 
incorrectly appear on TSA no-fly lists; in July 2004 alone, 
two-hundred and fifty people sought to have their names removed 
from such lists.\88\ We believe the ability to remove oneself 
from a no-fly list is such a basic right for every American 
that it should receive the government's highest attention.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \88\ Sara Kehaulani Goo, Hundreds Report Watch-List Trials, Wash. 
Post, Aug. 21, 2004, at A8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Unfortunately, the Department of Homeland Security has been 
operating the no-fly list for over two years since the attacks 
and has not seen fit to implement a process by which a 
passenger may remove his or her name.\89\ Two persons who have 
appeared on the list, Rep. John Lewis (D-GA) and Sen. Edward M. 
Kennedy (D-MA) attempted in vain to correct the problem; Rep. 
Lewis was able to avoid being flagged by adding his middle 
initial to travel bookings while Sen. Kennedy spent three weeks 
getting TSA officials to remove his name.\90\ This lack of 
commitment to civil liberties by the government begs the 
intervention of an independent body that is focused on more 
than just security.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \89\ The Transportation Security Administration, an agency within 
the Homeland Security Department, recently announced the testing phase 
of its new Secure Flight program. 69 Fed. Reg. 57,345 (Sept. 24, 2004). 
The notice makes only a vague reference that ``TSA will establish 
comprehensive passenger redress procedures and personal data and civil 
liberties protections for the Secure Flight program.'' Id.
    \90\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    It also is important that there be judicial review of the 
no-fly process, such that the public would have a means of 
challenging any unfavorable rulings by the government. H.R. 10 
however, does not permit review and leaves any challenges to be 
decided by the very organization that categorized the 
individual as a security risk in the first place. It has taken 
far too long for such a process to be implemented.
    To that end, Rep. Jackson Lee offered an amendment at the 
Committee markup that would have put the onus on the 
legislation's newly-created Civil Liberties Protection Officer 
to create this program.\91\ The amendment also would have 
ensured that no-fly list criteria would be based on reliable 
evidence that an individual is a known or suspected terrorist 
instead of on constitutionally-protected activity. Finally, the 
amendment would have provided a civil remedy to enforce the 
removal process in court. Unfortunately, the Majority rejected 
these widespread concerns and defeated the amendment.\92\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \91\ See H.R. 10 Markup.
    \92\ The amendment was defeated by a vote of 12-18.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Another provision in the bill, section 3081, contains 
shortcomings similar to those in section 2173. It directs the 
Secretary of State to study the feasibility of creating a 
database recording the lifetime travel history of U.S. citizens 
and foreign nationals. This provision goes far beyond the 
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission and unnecessarily 
intrudes on the privacy of Americans.
    In its final report, the 9/11 Commission wrote, ``Targeting 
travel is at least as powerful as a weapon against terrorists 
as targeting their money. The United States should combine 
terrorist travel intelligence, operations, and law enforcement 
in a strategy to intercept terrorists, find terrorist travel 
facilitators, and constrain terrorist mobility.\93\ Note that 
the Commission recommended targeting terrorist travel--not 
creating a master database of the travel history of innocent 
Americans. Contrary to this recommendation, the program in H.R. 
10 would generate a history of even non-terrorist travel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \93\ 9/11 Commission Report at 385.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    We have two primary concerns, and the first is for the 
privacy of all who use our commercial air space. The Majority 
has not explained how having a record of every flight that 
every American has ever taken will reduce the terrorist threat.
    Our second concern is that the program would collect 
information on everyone, regardless of whether they are a 
threat, or even suspicious, and the vast amount of data 
reflecting innocent behavior will obscure the truly threatening 
activity. As many advocacy groups have noted, refining the 
tracking process--not expanding it--will make preventing 
terrorist entry into the United States more efficient.\94\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \94\ Immigration Sign-On Letter at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. THE LEGISLATION FAILS TO ADEQUATELY CREATE A BOARD TO PROTECT CIVIL 
                               LIBERTIES

    We also believe the legislation fails to establish a civil 
liberties board that could adequately protect our rights. Chief 
among the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission was the 
establishment of a government wide watchdog to safeguard civil 
liberties. The Commission found that currently ``there is no 
office within the government whose job it is to look across the 
government at the actions we are taking to protect ourselves to 
ensure that liberty concerns are appropriately considered.'' 
\95\ The Commission recognized, however, that both ``the 
substantial new powers [vested] in the investigative agencies 
of the government'' \96\ by the USA PATRIOT Act, as well as its 
own recommendations calling ``for the government to increase 
its presence in our lives,'' \97\ require that ``should be a 
voice within the executive branch'' \98\ to address civil 
liberties concerns.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \95\ 9/11 Commission Report at 395.
    \96\ Id. at 394.
    \97\ Id. at 393.
    \98\ Id. at 395.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Surprisingly, H.R. 10 as introduced did not create a 
government wide civil liberties board. Instead, the bill only 
designated a single civil liberties officer for the 
intelligence community. To remedy this flagrant omission, Rep. 
Watt, along with Reps. Nadler and Schiff, offered an amendment 
that would have established a strong, independent, bipartisan 
agency within the executive branch.\99\ After hours of 
negotiation, the Chairman introduced a substitute amendment 
that represents the product of bipartisan compromise in all 
save one respect. The Chairman's amendment stripped the 
proposed board of administrative subpoena power.\100\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \99\ At the request of Chairman Sensenbrenner, Rep. Watt withdrew 
the amendment to negotiate the scope of the proposed Board's powers and 
the parameters of its access to relevant information.
    \100\ The authority to issue a subpoena in the Watt-Nadler-Schiff 
amendment is identical to that in S. 2774. The provision reads in 
pertinent part:

          (g) Access to Information.--
          (1) Authorization.--If determined by the Board to be 
        necessary to carry out its responsibilities under this section, 
        the Board may--
          (D) require, by subpoena, persons other than Federal 
        executive departments and agencies to produce any relevant 
        information, documents, reports, answers, records, accounts, 
        papers, and other documentary or testimonial evidence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Watt/Nadler/Schiff amendment imposed the additional requirement 
that subpoenas be issued only with the approval of a majority of the 
Board. A separate provision required voluntary compliance by Federal 
agencies with requests for information from the Board.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Although we believe that H.R. 10 as amended is improved by 
the establishment of a Civil Liberties Board, we are deeply 
concerned that without the necessary authority to receive and 
evaluate relevant data concerning the privacy and civil 
liberties implications of anti-terrorism efforts the Board will 
be nothing more than a toothless tiger. Even worse, we run the 
risk of not only creating a Board that is useless and 
ineffective, but one whose uninformed findings will 
nevertheless put forward the illusion of civil liberties 
oversight.
    The need to ensure that a Civil Liberties Board possesses 
adequate authority to perform its duties is reflected in each 
major bill introduced to implement the recommendations of the 
9/11 Commission. For example, the McCain/Lieberman bill, S. 
2774, establishes a five-member Privacy and Civil Liberties 
Oversight board within the Executive Office of the President 
(EOP).\101\ Similarly, S. 2845, the Collins/Lieberman bill also 
provides for the establishment of a five-member Privacy and 
Civil Liberties Oversight board within the EOP. Both bills 
contain a provision authorizing the Board to issue a subpoena 
when necessary to carry out its duties.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \101\ The Shays/Maloney companion bill, H.R. 5040 was introduced in 
the House and referred to 10 committees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The duties of a civil liberties board, as contemplated by 
the 9/11 Commission, makes access to information critical to 
its success. The civil liberties board is established to 
safeguard our constitutional freedoms as we develop new tools 
for gathering and sharing information to prevent and combat 
terrorism. In introducing S. 2774, Sen. McCain said:

          All of us who are concerned with threats to this 
        Nation's security also wish to ensure that our efforts 
        to protect Americans do not infringe on our civil 
        liberties. After all, giving up the way of life we have 
        fought so hard to defend is not an acceptable price for 
        greater security. We must find a way to balance the 
        two, and this is what this bill proposes to do. It 
        creates a Privacy and Civil Liberties Board * * * to 
        analyze * * * the enhanced security measures taken by 
        our government and to ensure that civil liberties are 
        appropriately considered as these policies are 
        developed.\102\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \102\ Congressional Record, S8866 (Sept. 7, 2004).

    The enhanced security authority vested in our government in 
the aftermath of 9/11 is unprecedented and necessarily broad. 
Virtually every postmortem evaluation of the incidents leading 
up to the terrorists attacks on September 11, 2001 has 
identified improvement in the government's ability to share 
information as the most urgent task to combat and prevent acts 
of terrorism in the future.\103\ As a result, key changes have 
been proposed and/or implemented to ease the flow of 
information among government entities at every level within the 
United States, the private sector, and certain foreign 
governments.\104\ In addition, the 9/11 Commission also made 
recommendations that would expand collaboration with and among 
government and the private sector.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \103\ See Markle Foundation, Task Force on National Security in the 
Information Age, Protecting America's Freedom in the Information Age 
(2002).
    \104\ Several of the provisions in the USA PATRIOT Act that are set 
to expire next year implicate privacy interests and civil liberties. 
For example, subsection 203(b) grants law enforcement officials 
authority to share electronic, wire, and oral interception information 
with intelligence, protective, immigration, national defense and 
national security officials. Subsection 203(d) allows the sharing of 
foreign intelligence and counterintelligence information as well. 
Others ease the burden on government to acquire personal information in 
the first instance. For example, section 209 relaxes the standard 
required by some courts prior to 9/11 for seizing voice mail messages. 
By treating voice mail like e-mail, section 209 permits its seizure by 
search warrant as opposed to the more demanding wiretap order 
previously held to apply. Similarly, sections 212 and 217 permit easier 
government access to electronic communications with the assistance of 
service providers.
    For example, existing programs designed in whole or in part to 
target terrorist travel include the Terrorism Information Awareness 
(TIA), the Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS), the 
Multi-State Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange (MATRIX) Pilot Project, 
and the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology 
program (US-VISIT). A recent Congressional Research Service report 
notes that ``[t]hese programs necessarily require enhanced information 
sharing by government agencies and the private sector, and are designed 
to assist the information needs of intelligence and national security. 
* * * [Nevertheless, w]hile the benefits from the use of advanced 
technologies for antiterrorism efforts are clear, the risks to 
individual privacy and the potential for abuse and harm to individual 
liberty by Government officials and employees deploying such 
technologies are equally established.'' Congressional Research Service, 
USA Patriot Act Sunset: Provisions That Expire on December 31, 2005 7 
(Aug. 2004).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Interestingly, almost simultaneously with the markup of 
H.R. 10, a U.S. District Court judge found the FBI's use of a 
``national security letter'' unconstitutional because it allows 
the FBI to demand customer information from Internet service 
providers without judicial oversight or public review. In the 
course of analyzing the constitutionality of the FBI's use of a 
national security letter (``NSL''), the court distinguished 
between NSL's and administrative subpoenas. ``Ordinary 
administrative subpoenas,'' the court observed, ``may be issued 
by most federal agencies, as authorized by the hundreds of 
applicable statutes in federal law.'' \105\ But, ``[u]nlike the 
NSL statutes, most administrative subpoena laws either contain 
no provision requiring secrecy, or allow only limited secrecy 
in special cases.'' \106\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \105\ Doe v. Ashcroft, 2004 WL 2185571 (S.D.N.Y.) (Sept. 28, 2004), 
at 8. ``For example, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) may issue 
subpoenas to investigate possible violations of the tax code, and the 
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) may issue subpoenas to investigate 
possible violations of the securities laws. More obscure examples 
include the Secretary of Commerce power to issue subpoenas in 
investigating and enforcing halibut fishing laws.'' Id. (citations 
omitted).
    \106\ Id. at 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Thus, at the same time a court determined that the 
government's use of information gathering tools 
unconstitutionally encroaches on the Bill of Rights, this 
Committee denies the civil liberties watchdog authority to 
obtain relevant information from those to whom such substantial 
power has been vested. This approach is flawed for several 
reasons. First and most important, one need only look to the 
experience of the very Commission from which the recommendation 
to establish a civil liberties board emanates; simply put, 
without its subpoena powers, which extended to the federal 
government, the 9/11 Commission could not have accomplished its 
charge.\107\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \107\ See 9/11 Commission Says U.S. Agencies Slow Its Inquiry, N.Y. 
Times, July 9, 2003; 9/11 Commission Could Subpoena Oval Office Files, 
N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 2003; Mayor Agrees to Allow Panel to Examine Sept. 
11 Records, N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Second, on August 27, 2004, the President issued Executive 
Order 13353, establishing the ``President's Board on 
Safeguarding Americans' Civil Liberties.'' The E.O. 13353 board 
clearly is an advisory board designed to assist the President 
and his Administration in developing and implementing homeland 
security functions that may have an impact on civil liberties. 
The board consists exclusively of Administration insiders and, 
while admirable, cannot perform the vitally important task of 
the government wide civil liberties board as conceived by the 
9/11 Commission. Yet, the Executive Order authorizes the 
President's board to ``obtain information and advice relating 
to the Policy from representatives of entities or individuals 
outside the executive branch of the Federal Government.'' 
Moreover, the Executive Order expressly authorizes the Board to 
``establish one or more committees that include individuals 
from outside the executive branch of the Federal Government * * 
* to advise the Board on specific issues * * * [and] carry out 
its functions separately from the Board.'' Ironically, H.R. 10 
as amended establishes a civil liberties board that has no 
designated authority to obtain any information from any person 
or entity outside the federal government. As such, the 
President's advisory board has broader authority to obtain 
information from the private sector than the civil liberties 
board.
    Finally, while Congress must ensure that the executive 
branch has the tools and resources necessary to protect the 
American people from further terrorists attacks, we must also 
ensure that the constitutional rights and liberties of all 
persons in the United States are not violated. The creation of 
a strong, oversight board consistent with that proposed by the 
9/11 Commission will go a long way in safeguarding those 
liberties. The new relationships that will be and have been 
forged between government and the private sector require 
parallel oversight authority to ensure that those relationships 
are properly tailored to reconcile the security of our nation 
and the liberty of our citizens. We believe that there must be 
a mechanism in place that permits the civil liberties board to 
exist as an effective check and balance. The administrative 
subpoena is essential to fulfill this objective.

  III. The Legislation Contains Civil Liability Provisions That Would 
            Harm Terror Victims and Fail To Enhance Security

    We also are concerned that the legislation contains 
numerous civil liability measures that would do little, if 
anything, to enhance our security; their only effect would be 
to diminish the rights of terror victims. Section 5103 allows 
states and localities to enter into litigation management 
agreements to handle all claims arising out of, relating to, or 
resulting from an act of terrorism. These agreements provide 
for a federal cause of action for claims against emergency 
response providers, and the federal court is to apply the law, 
including the choice of law principles, of the state in which 
the terrorist act occurred. This would be an acceptable 
response to terrorism-related injuries if the drafters had 
stopped there. Unfortunately, section 5103 overreaches by going 
outside the scope of the 9/11 Commission report to protect bad 
actors.
    First, section 5103, contrary to other immunity protections 
given to volunteers, protects emergency responders for 
intentional bad acts. Although language in this section 
specifically states that it does not apply to any person or 
government entity that knowingly commits either an act of 
terrorism or a criminal act related to or resulting from an act 
of terrorism, the bill's liability restrictions would apply to 
persons who commit intentional torts. For example, a nurse who 
decides that a victim's injuries are so serious that the 
patient would be better off dead than alive would be immune 
from liability if she deliberately administered a drug into an 
intravenous line that killed the victim. Similarly, an 
emergency responder who commits a hate crime or crime of 
violence in the immediate aftermath of a terrorist attack would 
face no accountability for her actions. Finally, if a 
firefighter or police officer responding to an emergency while 
intoxicated strikes and kills a pedestrian en route, this bill 
would insulate him from liability.
    The House consistently has rejected giving protections to 
intentional bad actors \108\ and that policy should not be 
abdicated just because an act of terrorism is involved. Most, 
if not all, intentional misconduct is criminal. To exempt 
criminal misconduct caused by terrorism from the scope of the 
bill's protection, but not other criminal misconduct, such as 
assault, battery, or vehicular homicide, is unprecedented and 
simply bad policy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \108\ For example, the Volunteer Protection Act, Pub. L. 105-19, 
protects volunteers from negligence claims, but allows them to be held 
accountable for intentional misconduct. According to House Report 105-
101, volunteers can only receive these protections if ``the harm was 
not caused by willful or criminal misconduct, gross negligence, 
reckless misconduct, or a conscious, flagrant indifference to the 
rights or safety of the individual harmed by the volunteer.'' Moreover, 
the House recently passed H.R. 1787, the ``Good Samaritan Volunteer 
Firefighter Assistance Act'' and H.R. 1084, the ``Volunteer Pilot 
Organization Protection Act.'' Neither of these Good Samaritan measures 
protects donors of firefighting equipment or volunteer pilot 
organizations who fly for the public benefit from intentional torts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    For example, just because a terrorist act occurred does not 
mean that responders should get away with reckless or 
intentional misconduct that causes injury, such as if a 
paramedic responding to a terrorism emergency recklessly gives 
a patient a drug to which the patient is allergic even though 
the patient is wearing a medical alert bracelet stating the 
allergy. In the case of an emergency room physician treating 
the pelvic injuries of a pregnant woman injured during a 
terrorist attack, the physician could sterilize her without her 
permission and be immune from punitive damages. The mere fact 
that an emergency worker is responding to an act of terrorism 
does not mean that the responder is entitled to commit criminal 
acts that jeopardize public safety and health.\109\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \109\ During the markup, Rep. Watt (D-NC) offered an amendment to 
remove intentional torts from the scope of section 5103 in order to 
keep this bill consistent with other measure providing liability 
protections. The Majority rejected the amendment by a vote of 12-19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The legislation aggravates this problem by reducing the 
compensation victims could recover. It first eliminates 
punitive damages. Although rarely awarded, punitive damages 
punish the wrongdoer for conscious, flagrant disregard for the 
health and safety of others and deter other bad actors from 
committing future bad acts. In the area of emergency medicine, 
emergency response personnel could be subject to punitive 
damages for intentionally failing to respond to an emergency, 
assaulting or sexually abusing a victim, or other criminal 
acts, including civil rights violations. It is very important 
to hold wrongdoers who act with the intention to harm 
accountable for the injuries that they cause. By both including 
intentional torts in the scope of these litigation management 
agreements and simultaneously eliminating the possibility of 
punitive damages, section 5103 delivers a one-two punch that 
makes it difficult, if not impossible, to deter criminal 
misconduct and ensure public safety.
    The bill further contains a collateral source provision 
also designed to reduce compensation.\110\ Essentially, this 
language would allow the wrongdoers to benefit from a victim's 
prudent investment of insurance. Why should a victim's health 
or life insurer pay for the victim's injuries before the 
wrongdoer pays even a dime? And, is it fair for the victim's 
employer to pay unemployment or disability benefits before the 
wrongdoer is held accountable? Wrongdoers should not profit 
from a victim's preparedness in planning for the unforeseen, 
and the wrongdoer should not be the last to be held responsible 
for a victim's injuries.
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    \110\ Section 5103 states that ``any recovery by a plaintiff * * * 
shall be reduced by the amount of collateral source compensation * * * 
that a plaintiff has received or its entitled to receive as a result of 
* * * [an] act[] of terrorism.
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    Indeed, it is somewhat shocking that this bill would 
require everyone other than the wrongdoer to pay for a victim's 
injuries. Under this language, one could even have the 
preposterous result of having the collateral sources--such as 
the victim's health insurer and the victim's employer--paying 
the entire amount of damages owed while the wrongdoer pays 
nothing. Similarly, this provision would shift the burden from 
the wrongdoer to the government if the victim receives 
Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security disability or retirement 
benefits, or any other type of government support. The Majority 
rejected Minority efforts to protect the rights of victims to 
be fully compensated for their injuries.\111\
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    \111\ An amendment by Rep. Bobby Scott (D-VA) to strike the 
punitive damage exception and the collateral source rule was defeated 
by a vote of 12-19.
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    The bill would appear to unconstitutionally extend tort 
immunity to non-governmental entities, giving private emergency 
response personnel, including private hospitals and their 
employees, liability protections.\112\ Interpreting the 
Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution, the Supreme Court has 
consistently held that the immunity given to federal and state 
governments cannot be easily transferred to private, non-
governmental actors. Extending such protection is subject to 
the principle of the Court's ``state-action doctrine'' (as well 
as the collateral doctrine of ``federal action'').\113\ Under 
the state-action doctrine, private entities must be actively 
supervised by the ``state'' in order for sovereign immunity to 
attach; it is not enough for a private actor, such as a private 
hospital or emergency room employee, to be certified or 
licensed by the state. In this case, the bill fails to ensure 
that only adequately supervised private entities receive 
immunity. Even though the immunity protection provided in H.R. 
10 to private actors are thus unconstitutional, the Majority 
defeated an attempt to strike it.\114\
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    \112\ Under section 5104, the definition of ``emergency response 
provider'' permits private, non-governmental entities to be parties to 
a litigation management agreement and thus receive the same liability 
protections as state or local government actors.
    \113\ California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, 
445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980) (quoting City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & 
Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410 (1978)) (the concept of sovereign immunity 
under our constitutional system dictates that the immunity policy must 
be `` `one that clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as 
state policy'; second, the policy must be `actively supervised by the 
State Itself.' ''). These cases illustrated the point in the context of 
Sherman Act antitrust suits. The Court examined whether private actors 
were acting as ``the state'' to a point sufficient to make their anti-
competitive conduct immune from the Sherman Act. Applying the above 
test, the Court determined that because the State was not actively 
involved in closely supervising the activities of the private actor, 
that actor could not be immune from federal law.
    \114\ An amendment by Rep. Scott to strike the broad grant of 
immunity was defeated by a vote of 12-19. This amendment was combined 
with an amendment to strike the limits on monetary recovery.
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    Unfortunately, the Majority rejected every attempt to 
correct the flaws in the litigation reform provisions of H.R. 
10. Taken together, these provisions will have no effect in 
reducing the Nation's susceptibility to terrorism; they do not 
secure our ports or make it easier to detain terrorists. These 
tort reform measures illustrate clearly the overreach of the 
Majority's so-called ``9/11 Commission Recommendations 
Implementation Act;'' the 9/11 Commission did not call for tort 
reform and neither should we.

                               Conclusion

    The attacks of September 11 were tragic events that brought 
the Nation together. Members of Congress stood shoulder to 
shoulder on the steps on the Capitol singing ``God Bless 
America.'' Democrats in Congress united behind the President's 
efforts in the war on terror. This Committee worked together to 
craft a version of the USA PATRIOT Act that passed unanimously.
    Unfortunately, where some saw an opportunity for national 
unity, others saw the opportunity for partisan political gain. 
Despite widespread public and congressional support for the 
unanimous and bipartisan recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission, the Republican leadership authored legislation that 
would subject persons to torture, eliminate the judicial review 
of executive branch actions, permit government intrusion into 
our daily lives, and divert compensation away from terror 
victims. Congress owes the American people better than this. 
For these reasons, we dissent.

                                   John Conyers, Jr.
                                   Howard L. Berman.
                                   Rick Boucher.
                                   Jerrold Nadler.
                                   Robert C. Scott.
                                   Melvin L. Watt.
                                   Zoe Lofgren.
                                   Sheila Jackson Lee.
                                   Maxine Waters.
                                   William D. Delahunt.
                                   Robert Wexler.
                                   Tammy Baldwin.
                                   Anthony D. Weiner.
                                   Linda T. Sanchez.

                      Additional Dissenting Views

    We dissent from H.R. 10 because we also believe the 
legislation demonstrably fails to provide the needed resources 
to combat and respond to terrorism.
    The 9/11 Commission could not have been any more clear 
about how homeland security assistance should be allocated: 
``Federal homeland security assistance should not remain a 
program for general revenue sharing. It should supplement state 
and local resources based on the risks or vulnerabilities that 
merit additional support. Congress should not use this money as 
a pork barrel.''
    After September 11th, the Bush administration set up two 
major programs to provide funding for local law enforcement 
agencies working to provide homeland security. The first of 
these programs, established for fiscal year 2003, is the State 
Homeland Security Grant program. In direct contradiction of the 
9/11 Commission's recommendation, 40% of these funds are 
distributed to states as ``minimum guarantees.'' The remainder 
is distributed not on the basis of threat, as recommended by 
the Commission, but rather on the basis of population. And just 
as the Commission complained, the result is that funding is not 
targeted to places like New York, Washington, Los Angeles, and 
other areas desperate for assistance.
    Because the State Homeland Security Grant Program does not 
distribute money on the basis of threat, Congress set up a 
separate stream of homeland security funding for local law 
enforcement targeted directly for urban areas. Originally 
called the ``high threat, high density'' program, and later 
entitled, the ``Urban Area Security Initiative,'' UASI provides 
funding based on a formula kept largely secret by the 
Department of Homeland Security. But because the Department of 
Homeland Security has decided to open up the program to more 
and more localities--initially only seven cities were eligible; 
at last count 80 cities and transportation agencies were 
receiving UASI funds--allocations for jurisdictions at the 
greatest risk have been shortchanged again.
    H.R. 3266, the bill written by the Select Committee on 
Homeland Security, took important strides in implementing the 
9/11 Commission's recommendations. It combined the two existing 
programs, eliminated the minimum guarantee, and ensured that 
funding would be distributed exclusively on the basis of 
threat. Incorporated as a part of the Republican 9/11 bill, 
H.R. 10, the Judiciary Committee veered away from the 
Commission's recommendations, even as Democrats made 
substantive improvements to the bill.
    Committee Democrats made the following improvements:
    Terrorism Cops eligible for funds. Under an amendment 
crafted by Rep. Anthony Weiner, Rep. Jerrold Nadler, and Rep. 
Nita Lowey, jurisdictions will be eligible to apply for federal 
funds to cover the salaries of police officers whose work is 
devoted exclusively to counterterrorism and intelligence.
    Past expenditures eligible for funds. Under an amendment 
authored by Rep. Anthony Weiner and Rep. Jerrold Nadler, 
jurisdictions will be eligible to apply for federal funds to 
recoup past homeland security expenditures not already covered 
by the federal government.
    Threat funding follows the threat. Under an amendment 
offered previously by Rep. Weiner and Rep. Nadler and included 
in the bill, the Department of Homeland Security will place the 
greatest emphasis on threat when disbursing homeland security 
funds. The current formula weighs population and infrastructure 
more heavily than threat, helping places like Wyoming, but 
hurting New York City.
    Fake police badges loophole closed. An amendment offered by 
Rep. Weiner closed a loophole in the law that bans the use and 
sale of fake police badges. Previous law allowed exceptions for 
people who used badges for ``decorative'' or ``recreational'' 
purposes. Rep. Weiner's amendment will strip those loopholes 
from the law.
    Additionally, Democrats were able to include language that 
authorizes the C.O.P.S. program. Like legislation included in 
this year's Department of Justice Reauthorization Bill, an 
amendment by Rep. Weiner reauthorizes the C.O.P.S. program 
through 2007, including language that would allow COPS funding 
to be used to pay for officers involved in religious, anti 
terror, or homeland security duties.
    Unfortunately, committee Republicans insisted on deviating 
from the 9/11 Commission's recommendation. Despite Chairman 
Cox's best efforts to reign in his colleagues, Republicans have 
boosted the minimum guarantee states receive to .25 for all 
states, and .45 for all states with an international border. 
Committee Republicans defeated an amendment by Rep. Nadler to 
return to the Commission's recommendation by striking the 
minimum. And then, in an effort simply to guarantee that high 
risk areas getting the funding they need, Rep. Weiner offered 
an amendment to add a minimum guarantee of 8.5%--as much as 
$289 million under the authorization included in the original 
Cox bill--for jurisdictions like New York that ``are 
consistently referenced in intelligence information as a 
terrorism target, or have previously been the site of more than 
one terrorism attack.'' That too was defeated by the committee 
Republicans.

                                   John Conyers, Jr.
                                   Howard L. Berman.
                                   Rick Boucher.
                                   Jerrold Nadler.
                                   Robert C. Scott.
                                   Zoe Lofgren.
                                   Sheila Jackson Lee.
                                   William D. Delahunt.
                                   Robert Wexler.
                                   Anthony D. Weiner.
                                   Linda T. Sanchez.

                                 
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