House Report 108-724 - 9/11 RECOMMENDATIONS IMPLEMENTATION ACT

[House Report 108-724]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

108th Congress Rept. 108-724
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
2d Session Part 5

======================================================================

9/11 RECOMMENDATIONS IMPLEMENTATION ACT

_______

October 5, 2004.--Ordered to be printed

_______

Mr. Sensenbrenner, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted the
following

R E P O R T

together with

DISSENTING AND ADDITIONAL DISSENTING VIEWS

[To accompany H.R. 10]

[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred the bill
(H.R. 10) to provide for reform of the intelligence community,
terrorism prevention and prosecution, border security, and
international cooperation and coordination, and for other
purposes, having considered the same, report favorably thereon
with an amendment and recommend that the bill as amended do
pass.

The amendment is as follows:
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the
following:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ``9/11 Recommendations Implementation
Act''.

SEC. 2. TABLE OF CONTENTS.

The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

TITLE I--REFORM OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Sec. 1001. Short title.

Subtitle A--Establishment of National Intelligence Director

Sec. 1011. Reorganization and improvement of management of intelligence
community.
Sec. 1012. Revised definition of national intelligence.
Sec. 1013. Joint procedures for operational coordination between
Department of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 1014. Role of National Intelligence Director in appointment of
certain officials responsible for intelligence-related activities.
Sec. 1015. Initial appointment of the National Intelligence Director.
Sec. 1016. Executive schedule matters.

Subtitle B--National Counterterrorism Center and Civil Liberties
Protections

Sec. 1021. National Counterterrorism Center.
Sec. 1022. Civil Liberties Protection Officer.

Subtitle C--Joint Intelligence Community Council

Sec. 1031. Joint Intelligence Community Council.

Subtitle D--Improvement of Human Intelligence (HUMINT)

Sec. 1041. Human intelligence as an increasingly critical component of
the intelligence community.
Sec. 1042. Improvement of human intelligence capacity.

Subtitle E--Improvement of Education for the Intelligence Community

Sec. 1051. Modification of obligated service requirements under
National Security Education Program.
Sec. 1052. Improvements to the National Flagship Language Initiative.
Sec. 1053. Establishment of scholarship program for English language
studies for heritage community citizens of the United States within the
National Security Education Program.
Sec. 1054. Sense of Congress with respect to language and education for
the intelligence community; reports.
Sec. 1055. Advancement of foreign languages critical to the
intelligence community.
Sec. 1056. Pilot project for Civilian Linguist Reserve Corps.
Sec. 1057. Codification of establishment of the National Virtual
Translation Center.
Sec. 1058. Report on recruitment and retention of qualified instructors
of the Defense Language Institute.

Subtitle F--Additional Improvements of Intelligence Activities

Sec. 1061. Permanent extension of Central Intelligence Agency Voluntary
Separation Incentive Program.
Sec. 1062. National Security Agency Emerging Technologies Panel.

Subtitle G--Conforming and Other Amendments

Sec. 1071. Conforming amendments relating to roles of National
Intelligence Director and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 1072. Other conforming amendments
Sec. 1073. Elements of intelligence community under National Security
Act of 1947.
Sec. 1074. Redesignation of National Foreign Intelligence Program as
National Intelligence Program.
Sec. 1075. Repeal of superseded authorities.
Sec. 1076. Clerical amendments to National Security Act of 1947.
Sec. 1077. Conforming amendments relating to prohibiting dual service
of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 1078. Access to Inspector General protections.
Sec. 1079. General references.
Sec. 1080. Application of other laws.

Subtitle H--Transfer, Termination, Transition and Other Provisions

Sec. 1091. Transfer of community management staff.
Sec. 1092. Transfer of terrorist threat integration center.
Sec. 1093. Termination of positions of Assistant Directors of Central
Intelligence.
Sec. 1094. Implementation plan.
Sec. 1095. Transitional authorities.
Sec. 1096. Effective dates.

TITLE II--TERRORISM PREVENTION AND PROSECUTION

Subtitle A--Individual Terrorists as Agents of Foreign Powers

Sec. 2001. Presumption that certain non-United States persons engaging
in international terrorism are agents of foreign powers for purposes of
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.

Subtitle B--Stop Terrorist and Military Hoaxes Act of 2004

Sec. 2021. Short title.
Sec. 2022. Hoaxes and recovery costs.
Sec. 2023. Obstruction of justice and false statements in terrorism
cases.
Sec. 2024. Clarification of definition.

Subtitle C--Material Support to Terrorism Prohibition Enhancement Act
of 2004

Sec. 2041. Short title.
Sec. 2042. Receiving military-type training from a foreign terrorist
organization.
Sec. 2043. Providing material support to terrorism.
Sec. 2044. Financing of terrorism.

Subtitle D--Weapons of Mass Destruction Prohibition Improvement Act of
2004

Sec. 2051. Short title.
Sec. 2052. Weapons of mass destruction.
Sec. 2053. Participation in nuclear and weapons of mass destruction
threats to the United States.
Sec. 2054. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Sec. 2055. Sense of Congress regarding international
counterproliferation efforts.
Sec. 2056. Removal of potential nuclear weapons materials from
vulnerable sites worldwide.

Subtitle E--Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing

Chapter 1--Funding to Combat Financial Crimes Including Terrorist
Financing

Sec. 2101. Additional authorization for FinCEN.
Sec. 2102. Money laundering and financial crimes strategy
reauthorization.

Chapter 2--Enforcement Tools to Combat Financial Crimes Including
Terrorist Financing

Subchapter A--Money laundering abatement and financial antiterrorism
technical corrections

Sec. 2111. Short title.
Sec. 2112. Technical corrections to Public Law 107-56.
Sec. 2113. Technical corrections to other provisions of law.
Sec. 2114. Repeal of review.
Sec. 2115. Effective date.

Subchapter B--Additional enforcement tools

Sec. 2121. Bureau of Engraving and Printing security printing.
Sec. 2122. Conduct in aid of counterfeiting.

Subtitle F--Criminal History Background Checks

Sec. 2141. Short title.
Sec. 2142. Criminal history background checks.
Sec. 2143. Protect Act.
Sec. 2144. Reviews of criminal records of applicants for private
security officer employment.
Sec. 2145. Task force on clearinghouse for IAFIS criminal history
records.

Subtitle G--Protection of United States Aviation System from Terrorist
Attacks

Sec. 2171. Provision for the use of biometric or other technology.
Sec. 2172. Transportation security strategic planning.
Sec. 2173. Next generation airline passenger prescreening.
Sec. 2174. Deployment and use of explosive detection equipment at
airport screening checkpoints.
Sec. 2175. Pilot program to evaluate use of blast-resistant cargo and
baggage containers.
Sec. 2176. Air cargo screening technology.
Sec. 2177. Airport checkpoint screening explosive detection.
Sec. 2178. Next generation security checkpoint.
Sec. 2179. Penalty for failure to secure cockpit door.
Sec. 2180. Federal air marshal anonymity.
Sec. 2181. Federal law enforcement counterterrorism training.
Sec. 2182. Federal flight deck officer weapon carriage pilot program.
Sec. 2183. Registered traveler program.
Sec. 2184. Wireless communication.
Sec. 2185. Secondary flight deck barriers.
Sec. 2186. Extension.
Sec. 2187. Perimeter Security.
Sec. 2188. Extremely hazardous materials transportation security.
Sec. 2189. Definitions.

Subtitle H--Other Matters

Sec. 2191. Grand jury information sharing.
Sec. 2192. Interoperable law enforcement and intelligence data system.
Sec. 2193. Improvement of intelligence capabilities of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation.
Sec. 2194. Nuclear facility threats.
Sec. 2195. Authorization and Change of COPS Program to single Grant
Program.

Subtitle I--Police Badges

Sec. 2201. Short title.
Sec. 2202. Police badges.

TITLE III--BORDER SECURITY AND TERRORIST TRAVEL

Subtitle A--Immigration Reform in the National Interest

Chapter 1--General Provisions

Sec. 3001. Eliminating the ``Western Hemisphere'' exception for
citizens.
Sec. 3002. Modification of waiver authority with respect to
documentation requirements for nationals of foreign contiguous
territories and adjacent islands.
Sec. 3003. Increase in full-time border patrol agents.
Sec. 3004. Increase in full-time immigration and customs enforcement
investigators.
Sec. 3005. Alien identification standards.
Sec. 3006. Expedited removal.
Sec. 3007. Preventing terrorists from obtaining asylum.
Sec. 3008. Revocation of visas and other travel documentation.
Sec. 3009. Judicial review of orders of removal.

Chapter 2--Deportation of Terrorists and Supporters of Terrorism

Sec. 3031. Expanded inapplicability of restriction on removal.
Sec. 3032. Exception to restriction on removal for terrorists and
criminals.
Sec. 3033. Additional removal authorities.

Chapter 3--Preventing Commercial Alien Smuggling

Sec. 3041. Bringing in and harboring certain aliens.

Subtitle B--Identity Management Security

Chapter 1--Improved Security for Drivers' Licenses and Personal
Identification Cards

Sec. 3051. Definitions.
Sec. 3052. Minimum document requirements and issuance standards for
Federal recognition.
Sec. 3053. Linking of databases.
Sec. 3054. Trafficking in authentication features for use in false
identification documents.
Sec. 3055. Grants to States.
Sec. 3056. Authority.

Chapter 2--Improved Security for Birth Certificates

Sec. 3061. Definitions.
Sec. 3062. Applicability of minimum standards to local governments.
Sec. 3063. Minimum standards for Federal recognition.
Sec. 3064. Establishment of electronic birth and death registration
systems.
Sec. 3065. Electronic verification of vital events.
Sec. 3066. Grants to States.
Sec. 3067. Authority.

Chapter 3--Measures To Enhance Privacy and Integrity of Social Security
Account Numbers

Sec. 3071. Prohibition of the display of social security account
numbers on driver's licenses or motor vehicle registrations.
Sec. 3072. Independent verification of birth records provided in
support of applications for social security account numbers.
Sec. 3073. Enumeration at birth.
Sec. 3074. Study relating to use of photographic identification in
connection with applications for benefits, social security account
numbers, and social security cards.
Sec. 3075. Restrictions on issuance of multiple replacement social
security cards.
Sec. 3076. Study relating to modification of the social security
account numbering system to show work authorization status.

Subtitle C--Targeting Terrorist Travel

Sec. 3081. Studies on machine-readable passports and travel history
database.
Sec. 3082. Expanded preinspection at foreign airports.
Sec. 3083. Immigration security initiative.
Sec. 3084. Responsibilities and functions of consular officers.
Sec. 3085. Increase in penalties for fraud and related activity.
Sec. 3086. Criminal penalty for false claim to citizenship.
Sec. 3087. Antiterrorism assistance training of the Department of
State.
Sec. 3088. International agreements to track and curtail terrorist
travel through the use of fraudulently obtained documents.
Sec. 3089. International standards for translation of names into the
Roman alphabet for international travel documents and name-based
watchlist systems.
Sec. 3090. Biometric entry and exit data system.
Sec. 3091. Biometric entry-exit screening system.
Sec. 3092. Enhanced responsibilities of the Coordinator for
Counterterrorism.
Sec. 3093. Establishment of Office of Visa and Passport Security in the
Department of State.

Subtitle D--Terrorist Travel

Sec. 3101. Information sharing and coordination.
Sec. 3102. Terrorist travel program.
Sec. 3103. Training program.
Sec. 3104. Technology acquisition and dissemination plan.

Subtitle E--Maritime Security Requirements

Sec. 3111. Deadlines for implementation of maritime security
requirements.

TITLE IV--INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND COORDINATION

Subtitle A--Attack Terrorists and Their Organizations

Chapter 1--Provisions Relating to Terrorist Sanctuaries

Sec. 4001. United States policy on terrorist sanctuaries.
Sec. 4002. Reports on terrorist sanctuaries.
Sec. 4003. Amendments to existing law to include terrorist sanctuaries.

Chapter 2--Other Provisions

Sec. 4011. Appointments to fill vacancies in Arms Control and
Nonproliferation Advisory Board.
Sec. 4012. Review of United States policy on proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction and control of strategic weapons.
Sec. 4013. International agreements to interdict acts of international
terrorism.
Sec. 4014. Effective Coalition approach toward detention and humane
treatment of captured terrorists.
Sec. 4015. Sense of Congress and report regarding counter-drug efforts
in Afghanistan.

Subtitle B--Prevent the Continued Growth of Terrorism

Chapter 1--United States Public Diplomacy

Sec. 4021. Annual review and assessment of public diplomacy strategy.
Sec. 4022. Public diplomacy training.
Sec. 4023. Promoting direct exchanges with Muslim countries.
Sec. 4024. Public diplomacy required for promotion in Foreign Service.

Chapter 2--United States Multilateral Diplomacy

Sec. 4031. Purpose.
Sec. 4032. Support and expansion of democracy caucus.
Sec. 4033. Leadership and membership of international organizations.
Sec. 4034. Increased training in multilateral diplomacy.
Sec. 4035. Implementation and establishment of Office on Multilateral
Negotiations.

Chapter 3--Other Provisions

Sec. 4041. Pilot program to provide grants to American-sponsored
schools in predominantly Muslim countries to provide scholarships.
Sec. 4042. Enhancing free and independent media.
Sec. 4043. Combating biased or false foreign media coverage of the
United States.
Sec. 4044. Report on broadcast outreach strategy.
Sec. 4045. Office relocation.
Sec. 4046. Strengthening the Community of Democracies for Muslim
countries.

Subtitle C--Reform of Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations

Sec. 4051. Designation of foreign terrorist organizations.
Sec. 4052. Inclusion in annual Department of State country reports on
terrorism of information on terrorist groups that seek weapons of mass
destruction and groups that have been designated as foreign terrorist
organizations.

Subtitle D--Afghanistan Freedom Support Act Amendments of 2004

Sec. 4061. Short title.
Sec. 4062. Coordination of assistance for Afghanistan.
Sec. 4063. General provisions relating to the Afghanistan Freedom
Support Act of 2002.
Sec. 4064. Rule of law and related issues.
Sec. 4065. Monitoring of assistance.
Sec. 4066. United States policy to support disarmament of private
militias and to support expansion of international peacekeeping and
security operations in Afghanistan.
Sec. 4067. Efforts to expand international peacekeeping and security
operations in Afghanistan.
Sec. 4068. Provisions relating to counternarcotics efforts in
Afghanistan.
Sec. 4069. Additional amendments to the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act
of 2002.
Sec. 4070. Repeal.

Subtitle E--Provisions Relating to Saudi Arabia and Pakistan

Sec. 4081. New United States strategy for relationship with Saudi
Arabia.
Sec. 4082. United States commitment to the future of Pakistan.
Sec. 4083. Extension of Pakistan waivers.

Subtitle F--Oversight Provisions

Sec. 4091. Case-Zablocki Act requirements.

Subtitle G--Additional Protections of United States Aviation System
from Terrorist Attacks

Sec. 4101. International agreements to allow maximum deployment of
Federal flight deck officers.
Sec. 4102. Federal air marshal training.
Sec. 4103. Man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS).

Subtitle H--Improving International Standards and Cooperation to Fight
Terrorist Financing

Sec. 4111. Sense of the Congress regarding success in multilateral
organizations.
Sec. 4112. Expanded reporting requirement for the Secretary of the
Treasury.
Sec. 4113. International Terrorist Finance Coordinating Council.
Sec. 4114. Definitions.

TITLE V--GOVERNMENT RESTRUCTURING

Subtitle A--Faster and Smarter Funding for First Responders

Sec. 5001. Short title.
Sec. 5002. Findings.
Sec. 5003. Faster and smarter funding for first responders.
Sec. 5004. Modification of homeland security advisory system.
Sec. 5005. Coordination of industry efforts.
Sec. 5006. Superseded provision.
Sec. 5007. Sense of Congress regarding interoperable communications.
Sec. 5008. Sense of Congress regarding citizen corps councils.
Sec. 5009. Study regarding nationwide emergency notification system.
Sec. 5010. Required coordination.

Subtitle B--Government Reorganization Authority

Sec. 5021. Authorization of intelligence community reorganization
plans.
Sec. 5022. Authority to enter into contracts and issue Federal loan
guarantees.

Subtitle C--Restructuring Relating to the Department of Homeland
Security and Congressional Oversight

Sec. 5025. Responsibilities of Counternarcotics Office.
Sec. 5026. Use of counternarcotics enforcement activities in certain
employee performance appraisals.
Sec. 5027. Sense of the House of Representatives on addressing homeland
security for the American people.

Subtitle D--Improvements to Information Security

Sec. 5031. Amendments to Clinger-Cohen provisions to enhance agency
planning for information security needs.

Subtitle E--Personnel Management Improvements

Chapter 1--Appointments Process Reform

Sec. 5041. Appointments to national security positions.
Sec. 5042. Presidential inaugural transitions.
Sec. 5043. Public financial disclosure for the intelligence community.
Sec. 5044. Reduction of positions requiring appointment with Senate
confirmation.
Sec. 5045. Effective dates.

Chapter 2--Federal Bureau of Investigation Revitalization

Sec. 5051. Mandatory separation age.
Sec. 5052. Retention and relocation bonuses.
Sec. 5053. Federal Bureau of Investigation Reserve Service.
Sec. 5054. Critical positions in the Federal Bureau of Investigation
intelligence directorate.

Chapter 3--Management Authority

Sec. 5061. Management authority.

Subtitle F--Security Clearance Modernization

Sec. 5071. Definitions.
Sec. 5072. Security clearance and investigative programs oversight and
administration.
Sec. 5073. Reciprocity of security clearance and access determinations.
Sec. 5074. Establishment of national database .
Sec. 5075. Use of available technology in clearance investigations.
Sec. 5076. Reduction in length of personnel security clearance process.
Sec. 5077. Security clearances for presidential transition.
Sec. 5078. Reports.

Subtitle G--Emergency Financial Preparedness

Sec. 5081. Delegation authority of the Secretary of the Treasury.
Sec. 5082. Extension of emergency order authority of the securities and
exchange commission.
Sec. 5083. Parallel authority of the Secretary of the Treasury with
respect to government securities.

Subtitle H--Other Matters

Chapter 1--Privacy Matters

Sec. 5091. Requirement that agency rulemaking take into consideration
impacts on individual privacy.
Sec. 5092. Chief privacy officers for agencies with law enforcement or
anti-terrorism functions.
Sec. 5093. Data-mining report.
Sec. 5094. Privacy and civil liberties oversight board.

Chapter 2--Mutual Aid and Litigation Management

Sec. 5101. Short title.
Sec. 5102. Mutual aid authorized.
Sec. 5103. Litigation management agreements.
Sec. 5104. Additional provisions.
Sec. 5105. Definitions.

Chapter 3--Miscellaneous Matters

Sec. 5131. Enhancement of public safety communications
interoperability.
Sec. 5132. Sense of Congress regarding the incident command system.
Sec. 5133. Sense of Congress regarding United States Northern Command
plans and strategies.

TITLE I--REFORM OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

SEC. 1001. SHORT TITLE.

This title may be cited as the ``National Security Intelligence
Improvement Act of 2004''.

Subtitle A--Establishment of National Intelligence Director

SEC. 1011. REORGANIZATION AND IMPROVEMENT OF MANAGEMENT OF INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY.

(a) In General.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by striking sections 102 through 104 and
inserting the following new sections:
``national intelligence director
``Sec. 102. (a) National Intelligence Director.--(1) There is a
National Intelligence Director who shall be appointed by the President,
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
``(2) The National Intelligence Director shall not be located within
the Executive Office of the President.
``(b) Principal Responsibility.--Subject to the authority, direction,
and control of the President, the National Intelligence Director
shall--
``(1) serve as head of the intelligence community;
``(2) act as the principal adviser to the President, to the
National Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council
for intelligence matters related to the national security; and
``(3) through the heads of the departments containing
elements of the intelligence community, and the Central
Intelligence Agency, manage and oversee the execution of the
National Intelligence Program and direct the National
Intelligence Program.
``(c) Prohibition on Dual Service.--The individual serving in the
position of National Intelligence Director shall not, while so serving,
also serve as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency or as the
head of any other element of the intelligence community.
``responsibilities and authorities of the national intelligence
director
``Sec. 102A. (a) Provision of Intelligence.--(1) Under the direction
of the President, the National Intelligence Director shall be
responsible for ensuring that national intelligence is provided--
``(A) to the President;
``(B) to the heads of departments and agencies of the
executive branch;
``(C) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and senior
military commanders;
``(D) where appropriate, to the Senate and House of
Representatives and the committees thereof; and
``(E) to such other persons as the National Intelligence
Director determines to be appropriate.
``(2) Such national intelligence should be timely, objective,
independent of political considerations, and based upon all sources
available to the intelligence community and other appropriate entities.
``(b) Access to Intelligence.--To the extent approved by the
President, the National Intelligence Director shall have access to all
national intelligence and intelligence related to the national security
which is collected by any Federal department, agency, or other entity,
except as otherwise provided by law or, as appropriate, under
guidelines agreed upon by the Attorney General and the National
Intelligence Director.
``(c) Budget Authorities.--(1)(A) The National Intelligence Director
shall develop and present to the President on an annual basis a budget
for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United
States.
``(B) In carrying out subparagraph (A) for any fiscal year for the
components of the budget that comprise the National Intelligence
Program, the National Intelligence Director shall provide guidance to
the heads of departments containing elements of the intelligence
community, and to the heads of the elements of the intelligence
community, for development of budget inputs to the National
Intelligence Director.
``(2)(A) The National Intelligence Director shall participate in the
development by the Secretary of Defense of the annual budgets for the
Joint Military Intelligence Program and for Tactical Intelligence and
Related Activities.
``(B) The National Intelligence Director shall provide guidance for
the development of the annual budget for each element of the
intelligence community that is not within the National Intelligence
Program.
``(3) In carrying out paragraphs (1) and (2), the National
Intelligence Director may, as appropriate, obtain the advice of the
Joint Intelligence Community Council.
``(4) The National Intelligence Director shall ensure the effective
execution of the annual budget for intelligence and intelligence-
related activities.
``(5)(A) The National Intelligence Director shall facilitate the
management and execution of funds appropriated for the National
Intelligence Program.
``(B) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in receiving funds
pursuant to relevant appropriations Acts for the National Intelligence
Program, the Office of Management and Budget shall apportion funds
appropriated for the National Intelligence Program to the National
Intelligence Director for allocation to the elements of the
intelligence community through the host executive departments that
manage programs and activities that are part of the National
Intelligence Program.
``(C) The National Intelligence Director shall monitor the
implementation and execution of the National Intelligence Program by
the heads of the elements of the intelligence community that manage
programs and activities that are part of the National Intelligence
Program, which may include audits and evaluations, as necessary and
feasible.
``(6) Apportionment and allotment of funds under this subsection
shall be subject to chapter 13 and section 1517 of title 31, United
States Code, and the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act
of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 621 et seq.).
``(7)(A) The National Intelligence Director shall provide a quarterly
report, beginning April 1, 2005, and ending April 1, 2007, to the
President and the Congress regarding implementation of this section.
``(B) The National Intelligence Director shall report to the
President and the Congress not later than 5 days after learning of any
instance in which a departmental comptroller acts in a manner
inconsistent with the law (including permanent statutes, authorization
Acts, and appropriations Acts), or the direction of the National
Intelligence Director, in carrying out the National Intelligence
Program.
``(d) Role of National Intelligence Director in Reprogramming.--(1)
No funds made available under the National Intelligence Program may be
transferred or reprogrammed without the prior approval of the National
Intelligence Director, except in accordance with procedures prescribed
by the National Intelligence Director.
``(2) The Secretary of Defense shall consult with the National
Intelligence Director before transferring or reprogramming funds made
available under the Joint Military Intelligence Program.
``(e) Transfer of Funds or Personnel Within National Intelligence
Program.--(1) In addition to any other authorities available under law
for such purposes, the National Intelligence Director, with the
approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget--
``(A) may transfer funds appropriated for a program within
the National Intelligence Program to another such program; and
``(B) in accordance with procedures to be developed by the
National Intelligence Director and the heads of the departments
and agencies concerned, may transfer personnel authorized for
an element of the intelligence community to another such
element for periods up to one year.
``(2) The amounts available for transfer in the National Intelligence
Program in any given fiscal year, and the terms and conditions
governing such transfers, are subject to the provisions of annual
appropriations Acts and this subsection.
``(3)(A) A transfer of funds or personnel may be made under this
subsection only if--
``(i) the funds or personnel are being transferred to an
activity that is a higher priority intelligence activity;
``(ii) the need for funds or personnel for such activity is
based on unforeseen requirements;
``(iii) the transfer does not involve a transfer of funds to
the Reserve for Contingencies of the Central Intelligence
Agency;
``(iv) in the case of a transfer of funds, the transfer
results in a cumulative transfer of funds out of any department
or agency, as appropriate, funded in the National Intelligence
Program in a single fiscal year--
``(I) that is less than $100,000,000, and
``(II) that is less than 5 percent of amounts
available to a department or agency under the National
Intelligence Program; and
``(v) the transfer does not terminate a program.
``(B) A transfer may be made without regard to a limitation set forth
in clause (iv) or (v) of subparagraph (A) if the transfer has the
concurrence of the head of the department or agency involved. The
authority to provide such concurrence may only be delegated by the head
of the department or agency involved to the deputy of such officer.
``(4) Funds transferred under this subsection shall remain available
for the same period as the appropriations account to which transferred.
``(5) Any transfer of funds under this subsection shall be carried
out in accordance with existing procedures applicable to reprogramming
notifications for the appropriate congressional committees. Any
proposed transfer for which notice is given to the appropriate
congressional committees shall be accompanied by a report explaining
the nature of the proposed transfer and how it satisfies the
requirements of this subsection. In addition, the congressional
intelligence committees shall be promptly notified of any transfer of
funds made pursuant to this subsection in any case in which the
transfer would not have otherwise required reprogramming notification
under procedures in effect as of the date of the enactment of this
subsection.
``(6)(A) The National Intelligence Director shall promptly submit
to--
``(i) the congressional intelligence committees,
``(ii) in the case of the transfer of personnel to or from
the Department of Defense, the Committee on Armed Services of
the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives, and
``(iii) in the case of the transfer of personnel to or from
the Department of Justice, to the Committees on the Judiciary
of the Senate and the House of Representatives,
a report on any transfer of personnel made pursuant to this subsection.
``(B) The Director shall include in any such report an explanation of
the nature of the transfer and how it satisfies the requirements of
this subsection.
``(f) Tasking and Other Authorities.--(1)(A) The National
Intelligence Director shall--
``(i) develop collection objectives, priorities, and guidance
for the intelligence community to ensure timely and effective
collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination (including
access by users to collected data consistent with applicable
law and, as appropriate, the guidelines referred to in
subsection (b) and analytic products generated by or within the
intelligence community) of national intelligence;
``(ii) determine and establish requirements and priorities
for, and manage and direct the tasking of, collection,
analysis, production, and dissemination of national
intelligence by elements of the intelligence community,
including--
``(I) approving requirements for collection and
analysis, and
``(II) resolving conflicts in collection requirements
and in the tasking of national collection assets of the
elements of the intelligence community; and
``(iii) provide advisory tasking to intelligence elements of
those agencies and departments not within the National
Intelligence Program.
``(B) The authority of the National Intelligence Director under
subparagraph (A) shall not apply--
``(i) insofar as the President so directs;
``(ii) with respect to clause (ii) of subparagraph (A),
insofar as the Secretary of Defense exercises tasking authority
under plans or arrangements agreed upon by the Secretary of
Defense and the National Intelligence Director; or
``(iii) to the direct dissemination of information to State
government and local government officials and private sector
entities pursuant to sections 201 and 892 of the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121, 482).
``(2) The National Intelligence Director shall oversee the National
Counterterrorism Center and may establish such other national
intelligence centers as the Director determines necessary.
``(3)(A) The National Intelligence Director shall prescribe
community-wide personnel policies that--
``(i) facilitate assignments across community elements and to
the intelligence centers;
``(ii) establish overarching standards for intelligence
education and training; and
``(iii) promote the most effective analysis and collection of
intelligence by ensuring a diverse workforce, including the
recruitment and training of women, minorities, and individuals
with diverse, ethnic, and linguistic backgrounds.
``(B) In developing the policies prescribed under subparagraph (A),
the National Intelligence Director shall consult with the heads of the
departments containing the elements of the intelligence community.
``(C) Policies prescribed under subparagraph (A) shall not be
inconsistent with the personnel policies otherwise applicable to
members of the uniformed services.
``(4) The National Intelligence Director shall ensure compliance with
the Constitution and laws of the United States by the Central
Intelligence Agency and shall ensure such compliance by other elements
of the intelligence community through the host executive departments
that manage the programs and activities that are part of the National
Intelligence Program.
``(5) The National Intelligence Director shall ensure the elimination
of waste and unnecessary duplication within the intelligence community.
``(6) The National Intelligence Director shall perform such other
functions as the President may direct.
Nothing in this Act shall be construed as affecting the role of the
Department of Justice or the Attorney General with respect to
applications under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.
``(g) Intelligence Information Sharing.--(1) The National
Intelligence Director shall have principal authority to ensure maximum
availability of and access to intelligence information within the
intelligence community consistent with national security requirements.
The National Intelligence Director shall--
``(A) establish uniform security standards and procedures;
``(B) establish common information technology standards,
protocols, and interfaces;
``(C) ensure development of information technology systems
that include multi-level security and intelligence integration
capabilities; and
``(D) establish policies and procedures to resolve conflicts
between the need to share intelligence information and the need
to protect intelligence sources and methods.
``(2) The President shall ensure that the National Intelligence
Director has all necessary support and authorities to fully and
effectively implement paragraph (1).
``(3) Except as otherwise directed by the President or with the
specific written agreement of the head of the department or agency in
question, a Federal agency or official shall not be considered to have
met any obligation to provide any information, report, assessment, or
other material (including unevaluated intelligence information) to that
department or agency solely by virtue of having provided that
information, report, assessment, or other material to the National
Intelligence Director or the National Counterterrorism Center.
``(4) Not later than February 1 of each year, the National
Intelligence Director shall submit to the President and to the Congress
an annual report that identifies any statute, regulation, policy, or
practice that the Director believes impedes the ability of the Director
to fully and effectively implement paragraph (1).
``(h) Analysis.--(1) The National Intelligence Director shall ensure
that all elements of the intelligence community strive for the most
accurate analysis of intelligence derived from all sources to support
national security needs.
``(2) The National Intelligence Director shall ensure that
intelligence analysis generally receives the highest priority when
distributing resources within the intelligence community and shall
carry out duties under this subsection in a manner that--
``(A) develops all-source analysis techniques;
``(B) ensures competitive analysis;
``(C) ensures that differences in judgment are fully
considered and brought to the attention of policymakers; and
``(D) builds relationships between intelligence collectors
and analysts to facilitate greater understanding of the needs
of analysts.
``(i) Protection of Intelligence Sources and Methods.--(1) In order
to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized
disclosure and, consistent with that protection, to maximize the
dissemination of intelligence, the National Intelligence Director shall
establish and implement guidelines for the intelligence community for
the following purposes:
``(A) Classification of information.
``(B) Access to and dissemination of intelligence, both in
final form and in the form when initially gathered.
``(C) Preparation of intelligence products in such a way that
source information is removed to allow for dissemination at the
lowest level of classification possible or in unclassified form
to the extent practicable.
``(2) The Director may only delegate a duty or authority given the
Director under this subsection to the Deputy National Intelligence
Director.
``(j) Uniform Procedures for Sensitive Compartmented Information.--
The President, acting through the National Intelligence Director,
shall--
``(1) establish uniform standards and procedures for the
grant of access to sensitive compartmented information to any
officer or employee of any agency or department of the United
States and to employees of contractors of those agencies or
departments;
``(2) ensure the consistent implementation of those standards
and procedures throughout such agencies and departments;
``(3) ensure that security clearances granted by individual
elements of the intelligence community are recognized by all
elements of the intelligence community, and under contracts
entered into by those agencies; and
``(4) ensure that the process for investigation and
adjudication of an application for access to sensitive
compartmented information is performed in the most expeditious
manner possible consistent with applicable standards for
national security.
``(k) Coordination With Foreign Governments.--Under the direction of
the President and in a manner consistent with section 207 of the
Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C. 3927), the National Intelligence
Director shall oversee the coordination of the relationships between
elements of the intelligence community and the intelligence or security
services of foreign governments on all matters involving intelligence
related to the national security or involving intelligence acquired
through clandestine means.
``(l) Enhanced Personnel Management.--(1)(A) The National
Intelligence Director shall, under regulations prescribed by the
Director, provide incentives for personnel of elements of the
intelligence community to serve--
``(i) on the staff of the National Intelligence Director;
``(ii) on the staff of the national intelligence centers;
``(iii) on the staff of the National Counterterrorism Center;
and
``(iv) in other positions in support of the intelligence
community management functions of the Director.
``(B) Incentives under subparagraph (A) may include financial
incentives, bonuses, and such other awards and incentives as the
Director considers appropriate.
``(2)(A) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the personnel of
an element of the intelligence community who are assigned or detailed
under paragraph (1)(A) to service under the National Intelligence
Director shall be promoted at rates equivalent to or better than
personnel of such element who are not so assigned or detailed.
``(B) The Director may prescribe regulations to carry out this
section.
``(3)(A) The National Intelligence Director shall prescribe
mechanisms to facilitate the rotation of personnel of the intelligence
community through various elements of the intelligence community in the
course of their careers in order to facilitate the widest possible
understanding by such personnel of the variety of intelligence
requirements, methods, users, and capabilities.
``(B) The mechanisms prescribed under subparagraph (A) may include
the following:
``(i) The establishment of special occupational categories
involving service, over the course of a career, in more than
one element of the intelligence community.
``(ii) The provision of rewards for service in positions
undertaking analysis and planning of operations involving two
or more elements of the intelligence community.
``(iii) The establishment of requirements for education,
training, service, and evaluation that involve service in more
than one element of the intelligence community.
``(C) It is the sense of Congress that the mechanisms prescribed
under this subsection should, to the extent practical, seek to
duplicate for civilian personnel within the intelligence community the
joint officer management policies established by chapter 38 of title
10, United States Code, and the other amendments made by title IV of
the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986
(Public Law 99-433).
``(4)(A) This subsection shall not apply with respect to personnel of
the elements of the intelligence community who are members of the
uniformed services or law enforcement officers (as that term is defined
in section 5541(3) of title 5, United States Code).
``(B) Assignment to the Office of the National Intelligence Director
of commissioned officers of the Armed Forces shall be considered a
joint-duty assignment for purposes of the joint officer management
policies prescribed by chapter 38 of title 10, United States Code, and
other provisions of that title.
``(m) Additional Authority With Respect to Personnel.--(1) In
addition to the authorities under subsection (f)(3), the National
Intelligence Director may exercise with respect to the personnel of the
Office of the National Intelligence Director any authority of the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency with respect to the
personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency under the Central
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.), and other
applicable provisions of law, as of the date of the enactment of this
subsection to the same extent, and subject to the same conditions and
limitations, that the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency may
exercise such authority with respect to personnel of the Central
Intelligence Agency.
``(2) Employees and applicants for employment of the Office of the
National Intelligence Director shall have the same rights and
protections under the Office of the National Intelligence Director as
employees of the Central Intelligence Agency have under the Central
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, and other applicable provisions of
law, as of the date of the enactment of this subsection.
``(n) Acquisition Authorities.--(1) In carrying out the
responsibilities and authorities under this section, the National
Intelligence Director may exercise the acquisition authorities referred
to in the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et
seq.).
``(2) For the purpose of the exercise of any authority referred to in
paragraph (1), a reference to the head of an agency shall be deemed to
be a reference to the National Intelligence Director or the Deputy
National Intelligence Director.
``(3)(A) Any determination or decision to be made under an authority
referred to in paragraph (1) by the head of an agency may be made with
respect to individual purchases and contracts or with respect to
classes of purchases or contracts, and shall be final.
``(B) Except as provided in subparagraph (C), the National
Intelligence Director or the Deputy National Intelligence Director may,
in such official's discretion, delegate to any officer or other
official of the Office of the National Intelligence Director any
authority to make a determination or decision as the head of the agency
under an authority referred to in paragraph (1).
``(C) The limitations and conditions set forth in section 3(d) of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403c(d)) shall apply
to the exercise by the National Intelligence Director of an authority
referred to in paragraph (1).
``(D) Each determination or decision required by an authority
referred to in the second sentence of section 3(d) of the Central
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 shall be based upon written findings
made by the official making such determination or decision, which
findings shall be final and shall be available within the Office of the
National Intelligence Director for a period of at least six years
following the date of such determination or decision.
``(o) Consideration of Views of Elements of the Intelligence
Community.--In carrying out the duties and responsibilities under this
section, the National Intelligence Director shall take into account the
views of a head of a department containing an element of the
intelligence community and of the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency.
``office of the national intelligence director
``Sec. 103. (a) Establishment of Office; Function.--(1) There is an
Office of the National Intelligence Director. The Office of the
National Intelligence Director shall not be located within the
Executive Office of the President.
``(2) The function of the Office is to assist the National
Intelligence Director in carrying out the duties and responsibilities
of the Director under this Act and to carry out such other duties as
may be prescribed by the President or by law.
``(3) Any authority, power, or function vested by law in any officer,
employee, or part of the Office of the National Intelligence Director
is vested in, or may be exercised by, the National Intelligence
Director.
``(4) Exemptions, exceptions, and exclusions for the Central
Intelligence Agency or for personnel, resources, or activities of such
Agency from otherwise applicable laws, other than the exception
contained in section 104A(c)(1) shall apply in the same manner to the
Office of the National Intelligence Director and the personnel,
resources, or activities of such Office.
``(b) Office of National Intelligence Director.--(1) The Office of
the National Intelligence Director is composed of the following:
``(A) The National Intelligence Director.
``(B) The Deputy National Intelligence Director.
``(C) The Deputy National Intelligence Director for
Operations.
``(D) The Deputy National Intelligence Director for Community
Management and Resources.
``(E) The Associate National Intelligence Director for
Military Support.
``(F) The Associate National Intelligence Director for
Domestic Security.
``(G) The Associate National Intelligence Director for
Diplomatic Affairs.
``(H) The National Intelligence Council.
``(I) The General Counsel to the National Intelligence
Director.
``(J) Such other offices and officials as may be established
by law or the National Intelligence Director may establish or
designate in the Office.
``(2) To assist the National Intelligence Director in fulfilling the
duties and responsibilities of the Director, the Director shall employ
and utilize in the Office of the National Intelligence Director a staff
having expertise in matters relating to such duties and
responsibilities and may establish permanent positions and appropriate
rates of pay with respect to such staff.
``(c) Deputy National Intelligence Director.--(1) There is a Deputy
National Intelligence Director who shall be appointed by the President,
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
``(2) The Deputy National Intelligence Director shall assist the
National Intelligence Director in carrying out the responsibilities of
the National Intelligence Director under this Act.
``(3) The Deputy National Intelligence Director shall act for, and
exercise the powers of, the National Intelligence Director during the
absence or disability of the National Intelligence Director or during a
vacancy in the position of the National Intelligence Director.
``(4) The Deputy National Intelligence Director takes precedence in
the Office of the National Intelligence Director immediately after the
National Intelligence Director.
``(d) Deputy National Intelligence Director for Operations.--(1)
There is a Deputy National Intelligence Director for Operations.
``(2) The Deputy National Intelligence Director for Operations
shall--
``(A) assist the National Intelligence Director in all
aspects of intelligence operations, including intelligence
tasking, requirements, collection, and analysis;
``(B) assist the National Intelligence Director in overseeing
the national intelligence centers; and
``(C) perform such other duties and exercise such powers as
National Intelligence Director may prescribe.
``(e) Deputy National Intelligence Director for Community Management
and Resources.--(1) There is a Deputy National Intelligence Director
for Community Management and Resources.
``(2) The Deputy National Intelligence Director for Community
Management and Resources shall--
``(A) assist the National Intelligence Director in all
aspects of management and resources, including administration,
budgeting, information security, personnel, training, and
programmatic functions; and
``(B) perform such other duties and exercise such powers as
the National Intelligence Director may prescribe.
``(f) Associate National Intelligence Director for Military
Support.--(1) There is an Associate National Intelligence Director for
Military Support who shall be appointed by the National Intelligence
Director, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense.
``(2) The Associate National Intelligence Director for Military
Support shall--
``(A) ensure that the intelligence needs of the Department of
Defense are met; and
``(B) perform such other duties and exercise such powers as
the National Intelligence Director may prescribe.
``(g) Associate National Intelligence Director for Domestic
Security.--(1) There is an Associate National Intelligence Director for
Domestic Security who shall be appointed by the National Intelligence
Director in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of
Homeland Security.
``(2) The Associate National Intelligence Director for Domestic
Security shall--
``(A) ensure that the intelligence needs of the Department of
Justice, the Department of Homeland Security, and other
relevant executive departments and agencies are met; and
``(B) perform such other duties and exercise such powers as
the National Intelligence Director may prescribe, except that
the National Intelligence Director may not make such officer
responsible for disseminating any domestic or homeland security
information to State government or local government officials
or any private sector entity.
``(h) Associate National Intelligence Director for Diplomatic
Affairs.--(1) There is an Associate National Intelligence Director for
Diplomatic Affairs who shall be appointed by the National Intelligence
Director in consultation with the Secretary of State.
``(2) The Associate National Intelligence Director for Diplomatic
Affairs shall--
``(A) ensure that the intelligence needs of the Department of
State are met; and
``(B) perform such other duties and exercise such powers as
the National Intelligence Director may prescribe.
``(i) Military Status of Director and Deputy Directors.--(1) Not more
than one of the individuals serving in the positions specified in
paragraph (2) may be a commissioned officer of the Armed Forces in
active status.
``(2) The positions referred to in this paragraph are the following:
``(A) The National Intelligence Director.
``(B) The Deputy National Intelligence Director.
``(3) It is the sense of Congress that, under ordinary circumstances,
it is desirable that one of the individuals serving in the positions
specified in paragraph (2)--
``(A) be a commissioned officer of the Armed Forces, in
active status; or
``(B) have, by training or experience, an appreciation of
military intelligence activities and requirements.
``(4) A commissioned officer of the Armed Forces, while serving in a
position specified in paragraph (2)--
``(A) shall not be subject to supervision or control by the
Secretary of Defense or by any officer or employee of the
Department of Defense;
``(B) shall not exercise, by reason of the officer's status
as a commissioned officer, any supervision or control with
respect to any of the military or civilian personnel of the
Department of Defense except as otherwise authorized by law;
and
``(C) shall not be counted against the numbers and
percentages of commissioned officers of the rank and grade of
such officer authorized for the military department of that
officer.
``(5) Except as provided in subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (4),
the appointment of an officer of the Armed Forces to a position
specified in paragraph (2) shall not affect the status, position, rank,
or grade of such officer in the Armed Forces, or any emolument,
perquisite, right, privilege, or benefit incident to or arising out of
such status, position, rank, or grade.
``(6) A commissioned officer of the Armed Forces on active duty who
is appointed to a position specified in paragraph (2), while serving in
such position and while remaining on active duty, shall continue to
receive military pay and allowances and shall not receive the pay
prescribed for such position. Funds from which such pay and allowances
are paid shall be reimbursed from funds available to the National
Intelligence Director.
``(j) National Intelligence Council.--(1) Within the Office of the
Deputy National Intelligence Director for Operations, there is a
National Intelligence Council.
``(2)(A) The National Intelligence Council shall be composed of
senior analysts within the intelligence community and substantive
experts from the public and private sector, who shall be appointed by
and report to the Deputy National Intelligence Director for Operations.
``(B) The Director shall prescribe appropriate security requirements
for personnel appointed from the private sector as a condition of
service on the Council, or as contractors of the Council or employees
of such contractors, to ensure the protection of intelligence sources
and methods while avoiding, wherever possible, unduly intrusive
requirements which the Director considers to be unnecessary for this
purpose.
``(3) The National Intelligence Council shall--
``(A) produce national intelligence estimates for the United
States Government, which shall include as a part of such
estimates in their entirety, alternative views, if any, held by
elements of the intelligence community;
``(B) evaluate community-wide collection and production of
intelligence by the intelligence community and the requirements
and resources of such collection and production; and
``(C) otherwise assist the National Intelligence Director in
carrying out the responsibility of the National Intelligence
Director to provide national intelligence.
``(4) Within their respective areas of expertise and under the
direction of the Deputy National Intelligence Director for Operations,
the members of the National Intelligence Council shall constitute the
senior intelligence advisers of the intelligence community for purposes
of representing the views of the intelligence community within the
United States Government.
``(5) Subject to the direction and control of the Deputy National
Intelligence Director for Operations, the National Intelligence Council
may carry out its responsibilities under this section by contract,
including contracts for substantive experts necessary to assist the
Council with particular assessments under this subsection.
``(6) The Deputy National Intelligence Director for Operations shall
make available to the National Intelligence Council such personnel as
may be necessary to permit the Council to carry out its
responsibilities under this section.
``(7) The heads of the elements of the intelligence community shall,
as appropriate, furnish such support to the National Intelligence
Council, including the preparation of intelligence analyses, as may be
required by the National Intelligence Director.
``(k) General Counsel to the National Intelligence Director.--(1)
There is a General Counsel to the National Intelligence Director.
``(2) The individual serving in the position of General Counsel to
the National Intelligence Director may not, while so serving, also
serve as the General Counsel of any other agency or department of the
United States.
``(3) The General Counsel to the National Intelligence Director is
the chief legal officer for the National Intelligence Director.
``(4) The General Counsel to the National Intelligence Director shall
perform such functions as the National Intelligence Director may
prescribe.
``(l) Intelligence Community Information Technology Officer.--(1)
There is an Intelligence Community Information Technology Officer who
shall be appointed by the National Intelligence Director.
``(2) The mission of the Intelligence Community Information
Technology Officer is to assist the National Intelligence Director in
ensuring the sharing of information in the fullest and most prompt
manner between and among elements of the intelligence community
consistent with section 102A(g).
``(3) The Intelligence Community Information Technology Officer
shall--
``(A) assist the Deputy National Intelligence Director for
Community Management and Resources in developing and
implementing an integrated information technology network;
``(B) develop an enterprise architecture for the intelligence
community and assist the Deputy National Intelligence Director
for Community Management and Resources in ensuring that
elements of the intelligence community comply with such
architecture;
``(C) have procurement approval authority over all enterprise
architecture-related information technology items funded in the
National Intelligence Program;
``(D) ensure that all such elements have the most direct and
continuous electronic access to all information (including
unevaluated intelligence consistent with existing laws and the
guidelines referred to in section 102A(b)) necessary for
appropriately cleared analysts to conduct comprehensive all-
source analysis and for appropriately cleared policymakers to
perform their duties--
``(i) directly, in the case of the elements of the
intelligence community within the National Intelligence
Program, and
``(ii) in conjunction with the Secretary of Defense
and other applicable heads of departments with
intelligence elements outside the National Intelligence
Program;
``(E) review and provide recommendations to the Deputy
National Intelligence Director for Community Management and
Resources on National Intelligence Program budget requests for
information technology and national security systems;
``(F) assist the Deputy National Intelligence Director for
Community Management and Resources in promulgating and
enforcing standards on information technology and national
security systems that apply throughout the elements of the
intelligence community;
``(G) ensure that within and between the elements of the
National Intelligence Program, duplicative and unnecessary
information technology and national security systems are
eliminated; and
``(H) pursuant to the direction of the National Intelligence
Director, consult with the Director of the Office of Management
and Budget to ensure that the Office of the National
Intelligence Director coordinates and complies with national
security requirements consistent with applicable law, Executive
orders, and guidance; and
``(I) perform such other duties with respect to the
information systems and information technology of the Office of
the National Intelligence Director as may be prescribed by the
Deputy National Intelligence Director for Community Management
and Resources or specified by law.
``central intelligence agency
``Sec. 104. (a) Central Intelligence Agency.--There is a Central
Intelligence Agency.
``(b) Function.--The function of the Central Intelligence Agency is
to assist the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in carrying
out the responsibilities specified in section 104A(c).
``director of the central intelligence agency
``Sec. 104A. (a) Director of Central Intelligence Agency.--There is a
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency who shall be appointed by
the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The
Director shall be under the authority, direction, and control of the
National Intelligence Director, except as otherwise determined by the
President.
``(b) Duties.--In the capacity as Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
shall--
``(1) carry out the responsibilities specified in subsection
(c); and
``(2) serve as the head of the Central Intelligence Agency.
``(c) Responsibilities.--The Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency shall--
``(1) collect intelligence through human sources and by other
appropriate means, except that the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency shall have no police, subpoena, or law
enforcement powers or internal security functions;
``(2) provide overall direction for the collection of
national intelligence overseas or outside of the United States
through human sources by elements of the intelligence community
authorized to undertake such collection and, in coordination
with other agencies of the Government which are authorized to
undertake such collection, ensure that the most effective use
is made of resources and that the risks to the United States
and those involved in such collection are minimized;
``(3) correlate and evaluate intelligence related to the
national security and provide appropriate dissemination of such
intelligence;
``(4) perform such additional services as are of common
concern to the elements of the intelligence community, which
services the National Intelligence Director determines can be
more efficiently accomplished centrally; and
``(5) perform such other functions and duties related to
intelligence affecting the national security as the President
or the National Intelligence Director may direct.
``(d) Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.--There is a
Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency who shall be
appointed by the President. The Deputy Director shall perform such
functions as the Director may prescribe and shall perform the duties of
the Director during the Director's absence or disability or during a
vacancy in the position of the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency.
``(e) Termination of Employment of CIA Employees.--(1)
Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency may, in the discretion of the Director,
terminate the employment of any officer or employee of the Central
Intelligence Agency whenever the Director considers the termination of
employment of such officer or employee necessary or advisable in the
interests of the United States.
``(2) Any termination of employment of an officer or employee under
paragraph (1) shall not affect the right of the officer or employee to
seek or accept employment in any other department, agency, or element
of the United States Government if declared eligible for such
employment by the Office of Personnel Management.''.
(b) First Director.--(1) When the Senate receives the nomination of a
person for the initial appointment by the President for the position of
National Intelligence Director, it shall consider and dispose of such
nomination within a period of 30 legislative days.
(2) If the Senate does not dispose of such nomination referred to in
paragraph (1) within such period--
(A) Senate confirmation is not required; and
(B) the appointment of such nominee as National Intelligence
Director takes effect upon administration of the oath of
office.
(3) For the purposes of this subsection, the term ``legislative day''
means a day on which the Senate is in session.

SEC. 1012. REVISED DEFINITION OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.

Paragraph (5) of section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 401a) is amended to read as follows:
``(5) The terms `national intelligence' and `intelligence
related to national security' refer to all intelligence,
regardless of the source from which derived and including
information gathered within or outside the United States,
that--
``(A) pertains, as determined consistent with any
guidance issued by the President, to more than one
United States Government agency; and
``(B) that involves--
``(i) threats to the United States, its
people, property, or interests;
``(ii) the development, proliferation, or use
of weapons of mass destruction; or
``(iii) any other matter bearing on United
States national or homeland security.''.

SEC. 1013. JOINT PROCEDURES FOR OPERATIONAL COORDINATION BETWEEN
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY.

(a) Development of Procedures.--The National Intelligence Director,
in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency, shall develop joint procedures to be used
by the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency to
improve the coordination and deconfliction of operations that involve
elements of both the Armed Forces and the Central Intelligence Agency
consistent with national security and the protection of human
intelligence sources and methods. Those procedures shall, at a minimum,
provide the following:
(1) Methods by which the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency and the Secretary of Defense can improve communication
and coordination in the planning, execution, and sustainment of
operations, including, as a minimum--
(A) information exchange between senior officials of
the Central Intelligence Agency and senior officers and
officials of the Department of Defense when planning
for such an operation commences by either organization;
and
(B) exchange of information between the Secretary and
the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to
ensure that senior operational officials in both the
Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence
Agency have knowledge of the existence of the ongoing
operations of the other.
(2) When appropriate, in cases where the Department of
Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency are conducting
separate missions in the same geographical area, mutual
agreement on the tactical and strategic objectives for the
region and a clear delineation of operational responsibilities
to prevent conflict and duplication of effort.
(b) Implementation Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of the Act, the National Intelligence Director shall
submit to the congressional defense committees (as defined in section
101 of title 10, United States Code) and the congressional intelligence
committees (as defined in section 3(7) of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(7))) a report describing the procedures
established pursuant to subsection (a) and the status of the
implementation of those procedures.

SEC. 1014. ROLE OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR IN APPOINTMENT OF
CERTAIN OFFICIALS RESPONSIBLE FOR INTELLIGENCE-
RELATED ACTIVITIES.

Section 106 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-6) is
amended by striking all after the heading and inserting the following:
``(a) Recommendation of NID in Certain Appointments.--(1) In the
event of a vacancy in a position referred to in paragraph (2), the
National Intelligence Director shall recommend to the President an
individual for nomination to fill the vacancy.
``(2) Paragraph (1) applies to the following positions:
``(A) The Deputy National Intelligence Director.
``(B) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
``(b) Concurrence of NID in Appointments to Positions in the
Intelligence Community.--(1) In the event of a vacancy in a position
referred to in paragraph (2), the head of the department or agency
having jurisdiction over the position shall obtain the concurrence of
the National Intelligence Director before appointing an individual to
fill the vacancy or recommending to the President an individual to be
nominated to fill the vacancy. If the Director does not concur in the
recommendation, the head of the department or agency concerned may not
fill the vacancy or make the recommendation to the President (as the
case may be).
``(2) Paragraph (1) applies to the following positions:
``(A) The Director of the National Security Agency.
``(B) The Director of the National Reconnaissance Office.
``(C) The Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency.
``(c) Consultation With National Intelligence Director in Certain
Positions.--(1) In the event of a vacancy in a position referred to in
paragraph (2), the head of the department or agency having jurisdiction
over the position shall consult with the National Intelligence Director
before appointing an individual to fill the vacancy or recommending to
the President an individual to be nominated to fill the vacancy.
``(2) Paragraph (1) applies to the following positions:
``(A) The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
``(B) The Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and
Research.
``(C) The Director of the Office of Intelligence of the
Department of Energy.
``(D) The Director of the Office of Counterintelligence of
the Department of Energy.
``(E) The Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis
of the Department of the Treasury.
``(F) The Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation or that officer's
successor.
``(G) The Under Secretary of Homeland Security for
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection.
``(H) The Deputy Assistant Commandant of the Coast Guard for
Intelligence.

SEC. 1015. INITIAL APPOINTMENT OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR.

(a) Initial Appointment of the National Intelligence Director.--
Notwithstanding section 102(a)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947,
as added by section 1011(a), the individual serving as the Director of
Central Intelligence on the date immediately preceding the date of the
enactment of this Act may, at the discretion of the President, become
the National Intelligence Director as of the date of the enactment of
this Act.
(b) General References.--(1) Any reference to the Director of Central
Intelligence in the Director's capacity as the head of the intelligence
community in any law, regulation, document, paper, or other record of
the United States shall be deemed to be a reference to the National
Intelligence Director.
(2) Any reference to the Director of Central Intelligence in the
Director's capacity as the head of the Central Intelligence Agency in
any law, regulation, document, paper, or other record of the United
States shall be deemed to be a reference to the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency.
(3) Any reference to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence in
the Deputy Director's capacity as deputy to the head of the
intelligence community in any law, regulation, document, paper, or
other record of the United States shall be deemed to be a reference to
the Deputy National Intelligence Director.
(4) Any reference to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for
Community Management in any law, regulation, document, paper, or other
record of the United States shall be deemed to be a reference to the
Deputy National Intelligence Director for Community Management and
Resources.

SEC. 1016. EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE MATTERS.

(a) Executive Schedule Level I.--Section 5312 of title 5, United
States Code, is amended by adding the end the following new item:
``National Intelligence Director.''.
(b) Executive Schedule Level II.--Section 5313 of title 5, United
States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new items:
``Deputy National Intelligence Director.
``Director of the National Counterterrorism Center.''.
(c) Executive Schedule Level IV.--Section 5315 of title 5, United
States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to the Assistant
Directors of Central Intelligence.

Subtitle B--National Counterterrorism Center and Civil Liberties
Protections

SEC. 1021. NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER.

(a) In General.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new
section:
``national counterterrorism center
``Sec. 119. (a) Establishment of Center.--There is within the Office
of the National Intelligence Director a National Counterterrorism
Center.
``(b) Director of National Counterterrorism Center.--There is a
Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, who shall be the head
of the National Counterterrorism Center, who shall be appointed by
National Intelligence Director.
``(c) Supervision.--The Director of the National Counterterrorism
Center shall report to the National Intelligence Director on--
``(1) the budget and programs of the National
Counterterrorism Center;
``(2) the activities of the Directorate of Intelligence of
the National Counterterrorism Center under subsection (h);
``(3) the conduct of intelligence operations implemented by
other elements of the intelligence community; and
``(4) the planning and progress of joint counterterrorism
operations (other than intelligence operations).
The National Intelligence Director shall carry out this section through
the Deputy National Intelligence Director for Operations.
``(d) Primary Missions.--The primary missions of the National
Counterterrorism Center shall be as follows:
``(1) To serve as the primary organization in the United
States Government for analyzing and integrating all
intelligence possessed or acquired by the United States
Government pertaining to terrorism and counterterrorism,
excepting intelligence pertaining exclusively to domestic
counterterrorism.
``(2) To conduct strategic operational planning for
counterterrorism activities, integrating all instruments of
national power, including diplomatic, financial, military,
intelligence, homeland security, and law enforcement activities
within and among agencies.
``(3) To support operational responsibilities assigned to
lead agencies for counterterrorism activities by ensuring that
such agencies have access to and receive intelligence needed to
accomplish their assigned activities.
``(4) To ensure that agencies, as appropriate, have access to
and receive all-source intelligence support needed to execute
their counterterrorism plans or perform independent,
alternative analysis.
``(e) Domestic Counterterrorism Intelligence.--(1) The Center may,
consistent with applicable law, the direction of the President, and the
guidelines referred to in section 102A(b), receive intelligence
pertaining exclusively to domestic counterterrorism from any Federal,
State, or local government or other source necessary to fulfill its
responsibilities and retain and disseminate such intelligence.
``(2) Any agency authorized to conduct counterterrorism activities
may request information from the Center to assist it in its
responsibilities, consistent with applicable law and the guidelines
referred to in section 102A(b).
``(f) Duties and Responsibilities of Director.--The Director of the
National Counterterrorism Center shall--
``(1) serve as the principal adviser to the National
Intelligence Director on intelligence operations relating to
counterterrorism;
``(2) provide strategic guidance and plans for the civilian
and military counterterrorism efforts of the United States
Government and for the effective integration of
counterterrorism intelligence and operations across agency
boundaries, both inside and outside the United States;
``(3) advise the National Intelligence Director on the extent
to which the counterterrorism program recommendations and
budget proposals of the departments, agencies, and elements of
the United States Government conform to the priorities
established by the President;
``(4) disseminate terrorism information, including current
terrorism threat analysis, to the President, the Vice
President, the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Homeland
Security, the Attorney General, the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, and other officials of the executive
branch as appropriate, and to the appropriate committees of
Congress;
``(5) support the Department of Justice and the Department of
Homeland Security, and other appropriate agencies, in
fulfillment of their responsibilities to disseminate terrorism
information, consistent with applicable law, guidelines
referred to in section 102A(b), Executive Orders and other
Presidential guidance, to State and local government officials,
and other entities, and coordinate dissemination of terrorism
information to foreign governments as approved by the National
Intelligence Director;
``(6) consistent with priorities approved by the President,
assist the National Intelligence Director in establishing
requirements for the intelligence community for the collection
of terrorism information; and
``(7) perform such other duties as the National Intelligence
Director may prescribe or are prescribed by law.
``(g) Limitation.--The Director of the National Counterterrorism
Center may not direct the execution of counterterrorism operations.
``(h) Resolution of Disputes.--The National Intelligence Director
shall resolve disagreements between the National Counterterrorism
Center and the head of a department, agency, or element of the United
States Government on designations, assignments, plans, or
responsibilities. The head of such a department, agency, or element may
appeal the resolution of the disagreement by the National Intelligence
Director to the President.
``(i) Directorate of Intelligence.--The Director of the National
Counterterrorism Center shall establish and maintain within the
National Counterterrorism Center a Directorate of Intelligence which
shall have primary responsibility within the United States Government
for analysis of terrorism and terrorist organizations (except for
purely domestic terrorism and domestic terrorist organizations) from
all sources of intelligence, whether collected inside or outside the
United States.
``(j) Directorate of Strategic Planning.--The Director of the
National Counterterrorism Center shall establish and maintain within
the National Counterterrorism Center a Directorate of Strategic
Planning which shall provide strategic guidance and plans for
counterterrorism operations conducted by the United States
Government.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections for the National
Security Act of 1947 is amended by inserting after the item relating to
section 118 the following new item:

``Sec. 119. National Counterterrorism Center.''.

SEC. 1022. CIVIL LIBERTIES PROTECTION OFFICER.

(a) Civil Liberties Protection Officer.--(1) Within the Office of the
National Intelligence Director, there is a Civil Liberties Protection
Officer who shall be appointed by the National Intelligence Director.
(2) The Civil Liberties Protection Officer shall report directly to
the National Intelligence Director.
(b) Duties.--The Civil Liberties Protection Officer shall--
(1) ensure that the protection of civil liberties and privacy
is appropriately incorporated in the policies and procedures
developed for and implemented by the Office of the National
Intelligence Director and the elements of the intelligence
community within the National Intelligence Program;
(2) oversee compliance by the Office and the National
Intelligence Director with requirements under the Constitution
and all laws, regulations, Executive orders, and implementing
guidelines relating to civil liberties and privacy;
(3) review and assess complaints and other information
indicating possible abuses of civil liberties and privacy in
the administration of the programs and operations of the Office
and the National Intelligence Director and, as appropriate,
investigate any such complaint or information;
(4) ensure that the use of technologies sustain, and do not
erode, privacy protections relating to the use, collection, and
disclosure of personal information;
(5) ensure that personal information contained in a system of
records subject to section 552a of title 5, United States Code
(popularly referred to as the `Privacy Act'), is handled in
full compliance with fair information practices as set out in
that section;
(6) conduct privacy impact assessments when appropriate or as
required by law; and
(7) perform such other duties as may be prescribed by the
National Intelligence Director or specified by law.
(c) Use of Agency Inspectors General.--When appropriate, the Civil
Liberties Protection Officer may refer complaints to the Office of
Inspector General having responsibility for the affected element of the
department or agency of the intelligence community to conduct an
investigation under paragraph (3) of subsection (b).

Subtitle C--Joint Intelligence Community Council

SEC. 1031. JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY COUNCIL.

(a) Establishment.--(1) There is hereby established a Joint
Intelligence Community Council.
(b) Functions.--(1) The Joint Intelligence Community Council shall
provide advice to the National Intelligence Director as appropriate.
(2) The National Intelligence Director shall consult with the Joint
Intelligence Community Council in developing guidance for the
development of the annual National Intelligence Program budget.
(c) Membership.--The Joint Intelligence Community Council shall
consist of the following:
(1) The National Intelligence Director, who shall chair the
Council.
(2) The Secretary of State.
(3) The Secretary of the Treasury.
(4) The Secretary of Defense.
(5) The Attorney General.
(6) The Secretary of Energy.
(7) The Secretary of Homeland Security.
(8) Such other officials of the executive branch as the
President may designate.

Subtitle D--Improvement of Human Intelligence (HUMINT)

SEC. 1041. HUMAN INTELLIGENCE AS AN INCREASINGLY CRITICAL COMPONENT OF
THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

It is a sense of Congress that--
(1) the human intelligence officers of the intelligence
community have performed admirably and honorably in the face of
great personal dangers;
(2) during an extended period of unprecedented investment and
improvements in technical collection means, the human
intelligence capabilities of the United States have not
received the necessary and commensurate priorities;
(3) human intelligence is becoming an increasingly important
capability to provide information on the asymmetric threats to
the national security of the United States;
(4) the continued development and improvement of a robust and
empowered and flexible human intelligence work force is
critical to identifying, understanding, and countering the
plans and intentions of the adversaries of the United States;
and
(5) an increased emphasis on, and resources applied to,
enhancing the depth and breadth of human intelligence
capabilities of the United States intelligence community must
be among the top priorities of the National Intelligence
Director.

SEC. 1042. IMPROVEMENT OF HUMAN INTELLIGENCE CAPACITY.

Not later than 6 months after the date of the enactment of this Act,
the National Intelligence Director shall submit to Congress a report on
existing human intelligence (HUMINT) capacity which shall include a
plan to implement changes, as necessary, to accelerate improvements to,
and increase the capacity of, HUMINT across the intelligence community.

Subtitle E--Improvement of Education for the Intelligence Community

SEC. 1051. MODIFICATION OF OBLIGATED SERVICE REQUIREMENTS UNDER
NATIONAL SECURITY EDUCATION PROGRAM.

(a) In General.--(1) Subsection (b)(2) of section 802 of the David L.
Boren National Security Education Act of 1991 (50 U.S.C. 1902) is
amended to read as follows:
``(2) will meet the requirements for obligated service
described in subsection (j); and''.
(2) Such section is further amended by adding at the end the
following new subsection:
``(j) Requirements for Obligated Service in the Government.--(1) Each
recipient of a scholarship or a fellowship under the program shall work
in a specified national security position. In this subsection, the term
`specified national security position' means a position of a department
or agency of the United States that the Secretary certifies is
appropriate to use the unique language and region expertise acquired by
the recipient pursuant to the study for which scholarship or fellowship
assistance (as the case may be) was provided under the program.
``(2) Each such recipient shall commence work in a specified national
security position as soon as practicable but in no case later than two
years after the completion by the recipient of the study for which
scholarship or fellowship assistance (as the case may be) was provided
under the program.
``(3) Each such recipient shall work in a specified national security
position for a period specified by the Secretary, which period shall
include--
``(A) in the case of a recipient of a scholarship, one year
of service for each year, or portion thereof, for which such
scholarship assistance was provided, and
``(B) in the case of a recipient of a fellowship, not less
than one nor more than three years for each year, or portion
thereof, for which such fellowship assistance was provided.
``(4) Recipients shall seek specified national security positions as
follows:
``(A) In the Department of Defense or in any element of the
intelligence community.
``(B) In the Department of State or in the Department of
Homeland Security, if the recipient demonstrates to the
Secretary that no position is available in the Department of
Defense or in any element of the intelligence community.
``(C) In any other Federal department or agency not referred
to in subparagraphs (A) and (B), if the recipient demonstrates
to the Secretary that no position is available in a Federal
department or agency specified in such paragraphs.''.
(b) Regulations.--The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe
regulations to carry out subsection (j) of section 802 of the David L.
Boren National Security Education Act of 1991, as added by subsection
(a). In prescribing such regulations, the Secretary shall establish
standards that recipients of scholarship and fellowship assistance
under the program under section 802 of the David L. Boren National
Security Education Act of 1991 are required to demonstrate in order to
satisfy the requirement of a good faith effort to gain employment as
required under such subsection.
(c) Applicability.--(1) The amendments made by subsection (a) shall
apply with respect to service agreements entered into under the David
L. Boren National Security Education Act of 1991 on or after the date
of the enactment of this Act.
(2) The amendments made by subsection (a) shall not affect the force,
validity, or terms of any service agreement entered into under the
David L. Boren National Security Education Act of 1991 before the date
of the enactment of this Act that is in force as of that date.

SEC. 1052. IMPROVEMENTS TO THE NATIONAL FLAGSHIP LANGUAGE INITIATIVE.

(a) Increase in Annual Authorization of Appropriations.--(1) Title
VIII of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1992 (Public
Law 102-183; 105 Stat. 1271), as amended by section 311(c) of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103-
178; 107 Stat. 2037) and by section 333(b) of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat.
2397), is amended in subsection (a) of section 811 by striking ``there
is authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary for each fiscal year,
beginning with fiscal year 2003, $10,000,000,'' and inserting ``there
is authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary for each of fiscal
years 2003 and 2004, $10,000,000, and for fiscal year 2005 and each
subsequent fiscal year, $12,000,000,''.
(2) Subsection (b) of such section is amended by inserting ``for
fiscal years 2003 and 2004 only'' after ``authorization of
appropriations under subsection (a)''.
(b) Requirement for Employment Agreements.--(1) Section 802(i) of the
David L. Boren National Security Education Act of 1991 (50 U.S.C.
1902(i)) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(5)(A) In the case of an undergraduate or graduate student that
participates in training in programs under paragraph (1), the student
shall enter into an agreement described in subsection (b), other than
such a student who has entered into such an agreement pursuant to
subparagraph (A)(ii) or (B)(ii) of section 802(a)(1).
``(B) In the case of an employee of an agency or department of the
Federal Government that participates in training in programs under
paragraph (1), the employee shall agree in writing--
``(i) to continue in the service of the agency or department
of the Federal Government employing the employee for the period
of such training;
``(ii) to continue in the service of such agency or
department employing the employee following completion of such
training for a period of two years for each year, or part of
the year, of such training;
``(iii) to reimburse the United States for the total cost of
such training (excluding the employee's pay and allowances)
provided to the employee if, before the completion by the
employee of the training, the employment of the employee by the
agency or department is terminated due to misconduct by the
employee or by the employee voluntarily; and
``(iv) to reimburse the United States if, after completing
such training, the employment of the employee by the agency or
department is terminated either by the agency or department due
to misconduct by the employee or by the employee voluntarily,
before the completion by the employee of the period of service
required in clause (ii), in an amount that bears the same ratio
to the total cost of the training (excluding the employee's pay
and allowances) provided to the employee as the unserved
portion of such period of service bears to the total period of
service under clause (ii).
``(C) Subject to subparagraph (D), the obligation to reimburse the
United States under an agreement under subparagraph (A) is for all
purposes a debt owing the United States.
``(D) The head of an element of the intelligence community may
release an employee, in whole or in part, from the obligation to
reimburse the United States under an agreement under subparagraph (A)
when, in the discretion of the head of the element, the head of the
element determines that equity or the interests of the United States so
require.''.
(2) The amendment made by paragraph (1) shall apply to training that
begins on or after the date that is 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act.
(c) Increase in the Number of Participating Educational
Institutions.--The Secretary of Defense shall take such steps as the
Secretary determines will increase the number of qualified educational
institutions that receive grants under the National Flagship Language
Initiative to establish, operate, or improve activities designed to
train students in programs in a range of disciplines to achieve
advanced levels of proficiency in those foreign languages that the
Secretary identifies as being the most critical in the interests of the
national security of the United States.
(d) Clarification of Authority to Support Studies Abroad.--
Educational institutions that receive grants under the National
Flagship Language Initiative may support students who pursue total
immersion foreign language studies overseas of foreign languages that
are critical to the national security of the United States.

SEC. 1053. ESTABLISHMENT OF SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM FOR ENGLISH LANGUAGE
STUDIES FOR HERITAGE COMMUNITY CITIZENS OF THE
UNITED STATES WITHIN THE NATIONAL SECURITY
EDUCATION PROGRAM.

(a) Scholarship Program for English Language Studies for Heritage
Community Citizens of the United States.--(1) Subsection (a)(1) of
section 802 of the David L. Boren National Security Education Act of
1991 (50 U.S.C. 1902) is amended--
(A) by striking ``and'' at the end of subparagraph (C);
(B) by striking the period at the end of subparagraph (D) and
inserting ``; and''; and
(C) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
``(E) awarding scholarships to students who--
``(i) are United States citizens who--
``(I) are native speakers (commonly
referred to as heritage community
residents) of a foreign language that
is identified as critical to the
national security interests of the
United States who should be actively
recruited for employment by Federal
security agencies with a need for
linguists; and
``(II) are not proficient at a
professional level in the English
language with respect to reading,
writing, and interpersonal skills
required to carry out the national
security interests of the United
States, as determined by the Secretary,
to enable such students to pursue English
language studies at an institution of higher
education of the United States to attain
proficiency in those skills; and
``(ii) enter into an agreement to work in a
national security position or work in the field
of education in the area of study for which the
scholarship was awarded in a similar manner (as
determined by the Secretary) as agreements
entered into pursuant to subsection
(b)(2)(A).''.
(2) The matter following subsection (a)(2) of such section is
amended--
(A) in the first sentence, by inserting ``or for the
scholarship program under paragraph (1)(E)'' after ``under
paragraph (1)(D) for the National Flagship Language Initiative
described in subsection (i)''; and
(B) by adding at the end the following: ``For the
authorization of appropriations for the scholarship program
under paragraph (1)(E), see section 812.''.
(3) Section 803(d)(4)(E) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1903(d)(4)(E)) is
amended by inserting before the period the following: ``and section
802(a)(1)(E) (relating to scholarship programs for advanced English
language studies by heritage community residents)''.
(b) Funding.--The David L. Boren National Security Education Act of
1991 (50 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the
following new section:

``SEC. 812. FUNDING FOR SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM FOR CERTAIN HERITAGE
COMMUNITY RESIDENTS.

``There is authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary for each
fiscal year, beginning with fiscal year 2005, $4,000,000, to carry out
the scholarship programs for English language studies by certain
heritage community residents under section 802(a)(1)(E).

SEC. 1054. SENSE OF CONGRESS WITH RESPECT TO LANGUAGE AND EDUCATION FOR
THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY; REPORTS.

(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that there should
be within the Office of the National Intelligence Director a senior
official responsible to assist the National Intelligence Director in
carrying out the Director's responsibilities for establishing policies
and procedure for foreign language education and training of the
intelligence community. The duties of such official should include the
following:
(1) Overseeing and coordinating requirements for foreign
language education and training of the intelligence community.
(2) Establishing policy, standards, and priorities relating
to such requirements.
(3) Identifying languages that are critical to the capability
of the intelligence community to carry out national security
activities of the United States.
(4) Monitoring the allocation of resources for foreign
language education and training in order to ensure the
requirements of the intelligence community with respect to
foreign language proficiency are met.
(b) Reports.--Not later than one year after the date of the enactment
of this Act, the National Intelligence Director shall submit to
Congress the following reports:
(1) A report that identifies--
(A) skills and processes involved in learning a
foreign language; and
(B) characteristics and teaching techniques that are
most effective in teaching foreign languages.
(2)(A) A report that identifies foreign language heritage
communities, particularly such communities that include
speakers of languages that are critical to the national
security of the United States.
(B) For purposes of subparagraph (A), the term ``foreign
language heritage community'' means a community of residents or
citizens of the United States--
(i) who are native speakers of, or who have fluency
in, a foreign language; and
(ii) who should be actively recruited for employment
by Federal security agencies with a need for linguists.
(3) A report on--
(A) the estimated cost of establishing a program
under which the heads of elements of the intelligence
community agree to repay employees of the intelligence
community for any student loan taken out by that
employee for the study of foreign languages critical
for the national security of the United States; and
(B) the effectiveness of such a program in recruiting
and retaining highly qualified personnel in the
intelligence community.

SEC. 1055. ADVANCEMENT OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES CRITICAL TO THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

(a) In General.--Title X of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C.) is amended--
(1) by inserting before section 1001 (50 U.S.C. 441g) the
following:

``Subtitle A--Science and Technology'';

and
(2) by adding at the end the following new subtitles:

``Subtitle B--Foreign Languages Program

``program on advancement of foreign languages critical to the
intelligence community
``Sec. 1011. (a) Establishment of Program.--The Secretary of Defense
and the National Intelligence Director may jointly establish a program
to advance foreign languages skills in languages that are critical to
the capability of the intelligence community to carry out national
security activities of the United States (hereinafter in this subtitle
referred to as the `Foreign Languages Program').
``(b) Identification of Requisite Actions.--In order to carry out the
Foreign Languages Program, the Secretary of Defense and the National
Intelligence Director shall jointly determine actions required to
improve the education of personnel in the intelligence community in
foreign languages that are critical to the capability of the
intelligence community to carry out national security activities of the
United States to meet the long-term intelligence needs of the United
States.
``education partnerships
``Sec. 1012. (a) In General.--In carrying out the Foreign Languages
Program, the head of a department or agency containing an element of an
intelligence community entity may enter into one or more education
partnership agreements with educational institutions in the United
States in order to encourage and enhance the study of foreign languages
that are critical to the capability of the intelligence community to
carry out national security activities of the United States in
educational institutions.
``(b) Assistance Provided Under Educational Partnership Agreements.--
Under an educational partnership agreement entered into with an
educational institution pursuant to this section, the head of an
element of an intelligence community entity may provide the following
assistance to the educational institution:
``(1) The loan of equipment and instructional materials of
the element of the intelligence community entity to the
educational institution for any purpose and duration that the
head determines to be appropriate.
``(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law relating to
transfers of surplus property, the transfer to the educational
institution of any computer equipment, or other equipment, that
is--
``(A) commonly used by educational institutions;
``(B) surplus to the needs of the entity; and
``(C) determined by the head of the element to be
appropriate for support of such agreement.
``(3) The provision of dedicated personnel to the educational
institution--
``(A) to teach courses in foreign languages that are
critical to the capability of the intelligence
community to carry out national security activities of
the United States; or
``(B) to assist in the development of such courses
and materials for the institution.
``(4) The involvement of faculty and students of the
educational institution in research projects of the element of
the intelligence community entity.
``(5) Cooperation with the educational institution in
developing a program under which students receive academic
credit at the educational institution for work on research
projects of the element of the intelligence community entity.
``(6) The provision of academic and career advice and
assistance to students of the educational institution.
``(7) The provision of cash awards and other items that the
head of the element of the intelligence community entity
determines to be appropriate.
``voluntary services
``Sec. 1013. (a) Authority To Accept Services.--Notwithstanding
section 1342 of title 31, United States Code, and subject to subsection
(b), the Foreign Languages Program under section 1011 shall include
authority for the head of an element of an intelligence community
entity to accept from any individual who is dedicated personnel (as
defined in section 1016(3)) voluntary services in support of the
activities authorized by this subtitle.
``(b) Requirements and Limitations.--(1) In accepting voluntary
services from an individual under subsection (a), the head of the
element shall--
``(A) supervise the individual to the same extent as the head
of the element would supervise a compensated employee of that
element providing similar services; and
``(B) ensure that the individual is licensed, privileged, has
appropriate educational or experiential credentials, or is
otherwise qualified under applicable law or regulations to
provide such services.
``(2) In accepting voluntary services from an individual under
subsection (a), the head of an element of the intelligence community
entity may not--
``(A) place the individual in a policymaking position, or
other position performing inherently government functions; or
``(B) compensate the individual for the provision of such
services.
``(c) Authority To Recruit and Train Individuals Providing
Services.--The head of an element of an intelligence community entity
may recruit and train individuals to provide voluntary services
accepted under subsection (a).
``(d) Status of Individuals Providing Services.--(1) Subject to
paragraph (2), while providing voluntary services accepted under
subsection (a) or receiving training under subsection (c), an
individual shall be considered to be an employee of the Federal
Government only for purposes of the following provisions of law:
``(A) Section 552a of title 5, United States Code (relating
to maintenance of records on individuals).
``(B) Chapter 11 of title 18, United States Code (relating to
conflicts of interest).
``(2)(A) With respect to voluntary services accepted under paragraph
(1) provided by an individual that are within the scope of the services
so accepted, the individual is deemed to be a volunteer of a
governmental entity or nonprofit institution for purposes of the
Volunteer Protection Act of 1997 (42 U.S.C. 14501 et seq.).
``(B) In the case of any claim against such an individual with
respect to the provision of such services, section 4(d) of such Act (42
U.S.C. 14503(d)) shall not apply.
``(3) Acceptance of voluntary services under this section shall have
no bearing on the issuance or renewal of a security clearance.
``(e) Reimbursement of Incidental Expenses.--(1) The head of an
element of the intelligence community entity may reimburse an
individual for incidental expenses incurred by the individual in
providing voluntary services accepted under subsection (a). The head of
an element of the intelligence community entity shall determine which
expenses are eligible for reimbursement under this subsection.
``(2) Reimbursement under paragraph (1) may be made from appropriated
or nonappropriated funds.
``(f) Authority To Install Equipment.--(1) The head of an element of
the intelligence community may install telephone lines and any
necessary telecommunication equipment in the private residences of
individuals who provide voluntary services accepted under subsection
(a).
``(2) The head of an element of the intelligence community may pay
the charges incurred for the use of equipment installed under paragraph
(1) for authorized purposes.
``(3) Notwithstanding section 1348 of title 31, United States Code,
the head of an element of the intelligence community entity may use
appropriated funds or nonappropriated funds of the element in carrying
out this subsection.
``regulations
``Sec. 1014. (a) In General.--The Secretary of Defense and the
National Intelligence Director jointly shall promulgate regulations
necessary to carry out the Foreign Languages Program authorized under
this subtitle.
``(b) Elements of the Intelligence Community.--Each head of an
element of an intelligence community entity shall prescribe regulations
to carry out sections 1012 and 1013 with respect to that element
including the following:
``(1) Procedures to be utilized for the acceptance of
voluntary services under section 1013.
``(2) Procedures and requirements relating to the
installation of equipment under section 1013(g).
``definitions
``Sec. 1015. In this subtitle:
``(1) The term `intelligence community entity' means an
agency, office, bureau, or element referred to in subparagraphs
(B) through (K) of section 3(4).
``(2) The term `educational institution' means--
``(A) a local educational agency (as that term is
defined in section 9101(26) of the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 7801(26))),
``(B) an institution of higher education (as defined
in section 102 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20
U.S.C. 1002) other than institutions referred to in
subsection (a)(1)(C) of such section), or
``(C) any other nonprofit institution that provides
instruction of foreign languages in languages that are
critical to the capability of the intelligence
community to carry out national security activities of
the United States.
``(3) The term `dedicated personnel' means employees of the
intelligence community and private citizens (including former
civilian employees of the Federal Government who have been
voluntarily separated, and members of the United States Armed
Forces who have been honorably discharged or generally
discharged under honorable circumstances, and rehired on a
voluntary basis specifically to perform the activities
authorized under this subtitle).

``Subtitle C--Additional Education Provisions

``assignment of intelligence community personnel as language students
``Sec. 1021. (a) In General.--(1) The National Intelligence Director,
acting through the heads of the elements of the intelligence community,
may provide for the assignment of military and civilian personnel
described in paragraph (2) as students at accredited professional,
technical, or other institutions of higher education for training at
the graduate or undergraduate level in foreign languages required for
the conduct of duties and responsibilities of such positions.
``(2) Personnel referred to in paragraph (1) are personnel of the
elements of the intelligence community who serve in analysts positions
in such elements and who require foreign language expertise required
for the conduct of duties and responsibilities of such positions.
``(b) Authority for Reimbursement of Costs of Tuition and Training.--
(1) The Director may reimburse an employee assigned under subsection
(a) for the total cost of the training described in subsection (a),
including costs of educational and supplementary reading materials.
``(2) The authority under paragraph (1) shall apply to employees who
are assigned on a full-time or part-time basis.
``(3) Reimbursement under paragraph (1) may be made from appropriated
or nonappropriated funds.
``(c) Relationship to Compensation as an Analyst.--Reimbursement
under this section to an employee who is an analyst is in addition to
any benefits, allowances, travels, or other compensation the employee
is entitled to by reason of serving in such an analyst position.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents for the National
Security Act of 1947 is amended by striking the item relating to
section 1001 and inserting the following new items:

``Subtitle A--Science and Technology

``Sec. 1001. Scholarships and work-study for pursuit of graduate
degrees in science and technology.

``Subtitle B--Foreign Languages Program

``Sec. 1011. Program on advancement of foreign languages critical to
the intelligence community.
``Sec. 1012. Education partnerships.
``Sec. 1013. Voluntary services.
``Sec. 1014. Regulations.
``Sec. 1015. Definitions.

``Subtitle C--Additional Education Provisions

``Sec. 1021. Assignment of intelligence community personnel as language
students.''.

SEC. 1056. PILOT PROJECT FOR CIVILIAN LINGUIST RESERVE CORPS.

(a) Pilot Project.--The National Intelligence Director shall conduct
a pilot project to establish a Civilian Linguist Reserve Corps
comprised of United States citizens with advanced levels of proficiency
in foreign languages who would be available upon a call of the
President to perform such service or duties with respect to such
foreign languages in the Federal Government as the President may
specify.
(b) Conduct of Project.--Taking into account the findings and
recommendations contained in the report required under section 325 of
the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law
107-306; 116 Stat. 2393), in conducting the pilot project under
subsection (a) the National Intelligence Director shall--
(1) identify several foreign languages that are critical for
the national security of the United States;
(2) identify United States citizens with advanced levels of
proficiency in those foreign languages who would be available
to perform the services and duties referred to in subsection
(a); and
(3) implement a call for the performance of such services and
duties.
(c) Duration of Project.--The pilot project under subsection (a)
shall be conducted for a three-year period.
(d) Authority To Enter Into Contracts.--The National Intelligence
Director may enter into contracts with appropriate agencies or entities
to carry out the pilot project under subsection (a).
(e) Reports.--(1) The National Intelligence Director shall submit to
Congress an initial and a final report on the pilot project conducted
under subsection (a).
(2) Each report required under paragraph (1) shall contain
information on the operation of the pilot project, the success of the
pilot project in carrying out the objectives of the establishment of a
Civilian Linguist Reserve Corps, and recommendations for the
continuation or expansion of the pilot project.
(3) The final report shall be submitted not later than 6 months after
the completion of the project.
(f) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be
appropriated to the National Intelligence Director such sums as are
necessary for each of fiscal years 2005, 2006, and 2007 in order to
carry out the pilot project under subsection (a).

SEC. 1057. CODIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NATIONAL VIRTUAL
TRANSLATION CENTER.

(a) In General.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 402 et seq.), as amended by section 1021(a), is further amended
by adding at the end the following new section:
``national virtual translation center
``Sec. 120. (a) In General.--There is an element of the intelligence
community known as the National Virtual Translation Center under the
direction of the National Intelligence Director.
``(b) Function.--The National Virtual Translation Center shall
provide for timely and accurate translations of foreign intelligence
for all other elements of the intelligence community.
``(c) Facilitating Access to Translations.--In order to minimize the
need for a central facility for the National Virtual Translation
Center, the Center shall--
``(1) use state-of-the-art communications technology;
``(2) integrate existing translation capabilities in the
intelligence community; and
``(3) use remote-connection capacities.
``(d) Use of Secure Facilities.--Personnel of the National Virtual
Translation Center may carry out duties of the Center at any location
that--
``(1) has been certified as a secure facility by an agency or
department of the United States; and
``(2) the National Intelligence Director determines to be
appropriate for such purpose.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections for that Act, as
amended by section 1021(b), is further amended by inserting after the
item relating to section 119 the following new item:

``Sec. 120. National Virtual Translation Center.''.

SEC. 1058. REPORT ON RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION OF QUALIFIED INSTRUCTORS
OF THE DEFENSE LANGUAGE INSTITUTE.

(a) Study.--The Secretary of Defense shall conduct a study on methods
to improve the recruitment and retention of qualified foreign language
instructors at the Foreign Language Center of the Defense Language
Institute. In conducting the study, the Secretary shall consider, in
the case of a foreign language instructor who is an alien, to
expeditiously adjust the status of the alien from a temporary status to
that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.
(b) Report.--(1) Not later than one year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report on the study conducted
under subsection (a), and shall include in that report recommendations
for such changes in legislation and regulation as the Secretary
determines to be appropriate.
(2) Definition.--In this subsection, the term ``appropriate
congressional committees'' means the following:
(A) The Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on
Armed Services of the Senate.
(B) The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the
Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives.

Subtitle F--Additional Improvements of Intelligence Activities

SEC. 1061. PERMANENT EXTENSION OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY VOLUNTARY
SEPARATION INCENTIVE PROGRAM.

(a) Extension of Program.--Section 2 of the Central Intelligence
Agency Voluntary Separation Pay Act (50 U.S.C. 403-4 note) is amended--
(1) by striking subsection (f); and
(2) by redesignating subsections (g) and (h) as subsections
(f) and (g), respectively.
(b) Termination of Funds Remittance Requirement.--(1) Section 2 of
such Act (50 U.S.C. 403-4 note) is further amended by striking
subsection (i).
(2) Section 4(a)(2)(B)(ii) of the Federal Workforce Restructuring Act
of 1994 (5 U.S.C. 8331 note) is amended by striking ``, or section 2 of
the Central Intelligence Agency Voluntary Separation Pay Act (Public
Law 103-36; 107 Stat. 104)''.

SEC. 1062. NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES PANEL.

The National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is
amended by adding at the end the following new section:
``Sec. 19. (a) There is established the National Security Agency
Emerging Technologies Panel. The panel is a standing panel of the
National Security Agency. The panel shall be appointed by, and shall
report directly to, the Director.
``(b) The National Security Agency Emerging Technologies Panel shall
study and assess, and periodically advise the Director on, the
research, development, and application of existing and emerging science
and technology advances, advances on encryption, and other topics.
``(c) The Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) shall not
apply with respect to the National Security Agency Emerging
Technologies Panel.''.

Subtitle G--Conforming and Other Amendments

SEC. 1071. CONFORMING AMENDMENTS RELATING TO ROLES OF NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR AND DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

(a) National Security Act of 1947.--(1) The National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by striking ``Director of
Central Intelligence'' each place it appears in the following
provisions and inserting ``National Intelligence Director'':
(A) Section 3(5)(B) (50 U.S.C. 401a(5)(B)).
(B) Section 101(h)(2)(A) (50 U.S.C. 402(h)(2)(A)).
(C) Section 101(h)(5) (50 U.S.C. 402(h)(5)).
(D) Section 101(i)(2)(A) (50 U.S.C. 402(i)(2)(A)).
(E) Section 101(j) (50 U.S.C. 402(j)).
(F) Section 105(a) (50 U.S.C. 403-5(a)).
(G) Section 105(b)(6)(A) (50 U.S.C. 403-5(b)(6)(A)).
(H) Section 105B(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 403-5b(a)(1)).
(I) Section 105B(b) (50 U.S.C. 403-5b(b)), the first place it
appears.
(J) Section 110(b) (50 U.S.C. 404e(b)).
(K) Section 110(c) (50 U.S.C. 404e(c)).
(L) Section 112(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 404g(a)(1)).
(M) Section 112(d)(1) (50 U.S.C. 404g(d)(1)).
(N) Section 113(b)(2)(A) (50 U.S.C. 404h(b)(2)(A)).
(O) Section 114(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 404i(a)(1)).
(P) Section 114(b)(1) (50 U.S.C. 404i(b)(1)).
(R) Section 115(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 404j(a)(1)).
(S) Section 115(b) (50 U.S.C. 404j(b)).
(T) Section 115(c)(1)(B) (50 U.S.C. 404j(c)(1)(B)).
(U) Section 116(a) (50 U.S.C. 404k(a)).
(V) Section 117(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 404l(a)(1)).
(W) Section 303(a) (50 U.S.C. 405(a)), both places it
appears.
(X) Section 501(d) (50 U.S.C. 413(d)).
(Y) Section 502(a) (50 U.S.C. 413a(a)).
(Z) Section 502(c) (50 U.S.C. 413a(c)).
(AA) Section 503(b) (50 U.S.C. 413b(b)).
(BB) Section 504(a)(3)(C) (50 U.S.C. 414(a)(3)(C)).
(CC) Section 504(d)(2) (50 U.S.C. 414(d)(2)).
(DD) Section 506A(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 415a-1(a)(1)).
(EE) Section 603(a) (50 U.S.C. 423(a)).
(FF) Section 702(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 432(a)(1)).
(GG) Section 702(a)(6)(B)(viii) (50 U.S.C.
432(a)(6)(B)(viii)).
(HH) Section 702(b)(1) (50 U.S.C. 432(b)(1)), both places it
appears.
(II) Section 703(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 432a(a)(1)).
(JJ) Section 703(a)(6)(B)(viii) (50 U.S.C.
432a(a)(6)(B)(viii)).
(KK) Section 703(b)(1) (50 U.S.C. 432a(b)(1)), both places it
appears.
(LL) Section 704(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 432b(a)(1)).
(MM) Section 704(f)(2)(H) (50 U.S.C. 432b(f)(2)(H)).
(NN) Section 704(g)(1)) (50 U.S.C. 432b(g)(1)), both places
it appears.
(OO) Section 1001(a) (50 U.S.C. 441g(a)).
(PP) Section 1102(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 442a(a)(1)).
(QQ) Section 1102(b)(1) (50 U.S.C. 442a(b)(1)).
(RR) Section 1102(c)(1) (50 U.S.C. 442a(c)(1)).
(SS) Section 1102(d) (50 U.S.C. 442a(d)).
(2) That Act is further amended by striking ``of Central
Intelligence'' each place it appears in the following provisions:
(A) Section 105(a)(2) (50 U.S.C. 403-5(a)(2)).
(B) Section 105B(a)(2) (50 U.S.C. 403-5b(a)(2)).
(C) Section 105B(b) (50 U.S.C. 403-5b(b)), the second place
it appears.
(3) That Act is further amended by striking ``Director'' each place
it appears in the following provisions and inserting ``National
Intelligence Director'':
(A) Section 114(c) (50 U.S.C. 404i(c)).
(B) Section 116(b) (50 U.S.C. 404k(b)).
(C) Section 1001(b) (50 U.S.C. 441g(b)).
(C) Section 1001(c) (50 U.S.C. 441g(c)), the first place it
appears.
(D) Section 1001(d)(1)(B) (50 U.S.C. 441g(d)(1)(B)).
(E) Section 1001(e) (50 U.S.C. 441g(e)), the first place it
appears.
(4) Section 114A of that Act (50 U.S.C. 404i-1) is amended by
striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``National
Intelligence Director, the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency''
(5) Section 504(a)(2) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 414(a)(2)) is amended by
striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director
of the Central Intelligence Agency''.
(6) Section 701 of that Act (50 U.S.C. 431) is amended--
(A) in subsection (a), by striking ``Operational files of the
Central Intelligence Agency may be exempted by the Director of
Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``The Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency, with the coordination of the
National Intelligence Director, may exempt operational files of
the Central Intelligence Agency''; and
(B) in subsection (g)(1), by striking ``Director of Central
Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency and the National Intelligence Director''.
(7) The heading for section 114 of that Act (50 U.S.C. 404i) is
amended to read as follows:
``additional annual reports from the national intelligence director''.
(b) Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949.--(1) The Central
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.) is amended by
striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' each place it appears in
the following provisions and inserting ``National Intelligence
Director'':
(A) Section 6 (50 U.S.C. 403g).
(B) Section 17(f) (50 U.S.C. 403q(f)), both places it
appears.
(2) That Act is further amended by striking ``of Central
Intelligence'' in each of the following provisions:
(A) Section 2 (50 U.S.C. 403b).
(A) Section 16(c)(1)(B) (50 U.S.C. 403p(c)(1)(B)).
(B) Section 17(d)(1) (50 U.S.C. 403q(d)(1)).
(C) Section 20(c) (50 U.S.C. 403t(c)).
(3) That Act is further amended by striking ``Director of Central
Intelligence'' each place it appears in the following provisions and
inserting ``Director of the Central Intelligence Agency'':
(A) Section 14(b) (50 U.S.C. 403n(b)).
(B) Section 16(b)(2) (50 U.S.C. 403p(b)(2)).
(C) Section 16(b)(3) (50 U.S.C. 403p(b)(3)), both places it
appears.
(D) Section 21(g)(1) (50 U.S.C. 403u(g)(1)).
(E) Section 21(g)(2) (50 U.S.C. 403u(g)(2)).
(c) Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act.--Section 101 of the
Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2001) is amended
by striking paragraph (2) and inserting the following new paragraph
(2):
``(2) Director.--The term `Director' means the Director of
the Central Intelligence Agency.''.
(d) CIA Voluntary Separation Pay Act.--Subsection (a)(1) of section 2
of the Central Intelligence Agency Voluntary Separation Pay Act (50
U.S.C. 2001 note) is amended to read as follows:
``(1) the term `Director' means the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency;''.
(e) Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.--(1) The Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is
amended by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' each place it
appears and inserting ``National Intelligence Director''.
(f) Classified Information Procedures Act.--Section 9(a) of the
Classified Information Procedures Act (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended by
striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``National
Intelligence Director''.
(g) Intelligence Authorization Acts.--
(1) Public law 103-359.--Section 811(c)(6)(C) of the
Counterintelligence and Security Enhancements Act of 1994
(title VIII of Public Law 103-359) is amended by striking
``Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``National
Intelligence Director''.
(2) Public law 107-306.--(A) The Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306) is amended by
striking ``Director of Central Intelligence, acting as the head
of the intelligence community,'' each place it appears in the
following provisions and inserting ``National Intelligence
Director'':
(i) Section 313(a) (50 U.S.C. 404n(a)).
(ii) Section 343(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 404n-2(a)(1))
(B) That Act is further amended by striking ``Director of
Central Intelligence'' each place it appears in the following
provisions and inserting ``National Intelligence Director'':
(i) Section 902(a)(2) (50 U.S.C. 402b(a)(2)).
(ii) Section 904(e)(4) (50 U.S.C. 402c(e)(4)).
(iii) Section 904(e)(5) (50 U.S.C. 402c(e)(5)).
(iv) Section 904(h) (50 U.S.C. 402c(h)), each place
it appears.
(v) Section 904(m) (50 U.S.C. 402c(m)).
(C) Section 341 of that Act (50 U.S.C. 404n-1) is amended by
striking ``Director of Central Intelligence, acting as the head
of the intelligence community, shall establish in the Central
Intelligence Agency'' and inserting ``National Intelligence
Director shall establish within the Central Intelligence
Agency''.
(D) Section 352(b) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 404-3 note) is
amended by striking ``Director'' and inserting ``National
Intelligence Director''.
(3) Public law 108-177.--(A) The Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-177) is amended by
striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' each place it
appears in the following provisions and inserting ``National
Intelligence Director'':
(i) Section 317(a) (50 U.S.C. 403-3 note).
(ii) Section 317(h)(1).
(iii) Section 318(a) (50 U.S.C. 441g note).
(iv) Section 319(b) (50 U.S.C. 403 note).
(v) Section 341(b) (28 U.S.C. 519 note).
(vi) Section 357(a) (50 U.S.C. 403 note).
(vii) Section 504(a) (117 Stat. 2634), both places it
appears.
(B) Section 319(f)(2) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 403 note) is
amended by striking ``Director'' the first place it appears and
inserting ``National Intelligence Director''.
(C) Section 404 of that Act (18 U.S.C. 4124 note) is amended
by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting
``Director of the Central Intelligence Agency''.

SEC. 1072. OTHER CONFORMING AMENDMENTS

(a) National Security Act of 1947.--(1) Section 101(j) of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402(j)) is amended by striking
``Deputy Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Deputy
National Intelligence Director''.
(2) Section 112(d)(1) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 404g(d)(1)) is amended
by striking ``section 103(c)(6) of this Act'' and inserting ``section
102A(g) of this Act''.
(3) Section 116(b) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 404k(b)) is amended by
striking ``to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, or with
respect to employees of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director
may delegate such authority to the Deputy Director for Operations'' and
inserting ``to the Deputy National Intelligence Director, or with
respect to employees of the Central Intelligence Agency, to the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency''.
(4) Section 506A(b)(1) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 415a-1(b)(1)) is
amended by striking ``Office of the Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence'' and inserting ``Office of the National Intelligence
Director''.
(5) Section 701(c)(3) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 431(c)(3)) is amended by
striking ``Office of the Director of Central Intelligence'' and
inserting ``Office of the National Intelligence Director''.
(6) Section 1001(b) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 441g(b)) is amended by
striking ``Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for
Administration'' and inserting ``Office of the National Intelligence
Director''.
(b) Central Intelligence Act of 1949.--Section 6 of the Central
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403g) is amended by striking
``section 103(c)(7) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
403-3(c)(7))'' and inserting ``section 102A(g) of the National Security
Act of 1947''.
(c) Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act.--Section 201(c) of
the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2011(c)) is
amended by striking ``paragraph (6) of section 103(c) of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)) that the Director of Central
Intelligence'' and inserting ``section 102A(g) of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(1)) that the National Intelligence
Director''.
(d) Intelligence Authorization Acts.--
(1) Public law 107-306.--(A) Section 343(c) of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law
107-306; 50 U.S.C. 404n-2(c)) is amended by striking ``section
103(c)(6) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-
3((c)(6))'' and inserting ``section 102A(g) of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(1))''.
(B) Section 904 of that Act (50 U.S.C. 402c) is amended--
(i) in subsection (c), by striking ``Office of the
Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting
``Office of the National Intelligence Director''; and
(ii) in subsection (l), by striking ``Office of the
Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting
``Office of the National Intelligence Director''.
(2) Public law 108-177.--Section 317 of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-177; 50
U.S.C. 403-3 note) is amended--
(A) in subsection (g), by striking ``Assistant
Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis and
Production'' and inserting ``Deputy National
Intelligence Director''; and
(B) in subsection (h)(2)(C), by striking ``Assistant
Director'' and inserting ``Deputy National Intelligence
Director''.

SEC. 1073. ELEMENTS OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY UNDER NATIONAL SECURITY
ACT OF 1947.

Paragraph (4) of section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 401a) is amended to read as follows:
``(4) The term `intelligence community' includes the
following:
``(A) The Office of the National Intelligence
Director.
``(B) The Central Intelligence Agency.
``(C) The National Security Agency.
``(D) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
``(E) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
``(F) The National Reconnaissance Office.
``(G) Other offices within the Department of Defense
for the collection of specialized national intelligence
through reconnaissance programs.
``(H) The intelligence elements of the Army, the
Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, and the Department of Energy.
``(I) The Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the
Department of State.
``(J) The Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the
Department of the Treasury.
``(K) The elements of the Department of Homeland
Security concerned with the analysis of intelligence
information, including the Office of Intelligence of
the Coast Guard.
``(L) Such other elements of any other department or
agency as may be designated by the President, or
designated jointly by the National Intelligence
Director and the head of the department or agency
concerned, as an element of the intelligence
community.''.

SEC. 1074. REDESIGNATION OF NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM AS
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.

(a) Redesignation.--Paragraph (6) of section 3 of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a) is amended by striking
``Foreign''.
(b) Conforming Amendments.--(1) Section 506(a) of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 415a(a)) is amended by striking
``National Foreign Intelligence Program'' and inserting ``National
Intelligence Program''.
(2) Section 17(f) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C. 403q(f)) is amended by striking ``National Foreign Intelligence
Program'' and inserting ``National Intelligence Program''.
(c) Heading Amendment.--The heading of section 506 of that Act is
amended by striking ``foreign''.

SEC. 1075. REPEAL OF SUPERSEDED AUTHORITIES.

(a) Appointment of Certain Intelligence Officials.--Section 106 of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-6) is repealed.
(b) Collection Tasking Authority.--Section 111 of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404f) is repealed.

SEC. 1076. CLERICAL AMENDMENTS TO NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947.

The table of contents for the National Security Act of 1947 is
amended--
(1) by striking the items relating to sections 102 through
104 and inserting the following new items:

``Sec. 102. National Intelligence Director.
``Sec. 102A. Responsibilities and authorities of National Intelligence
Director.
``Sec. 103. Office of the National Intelligence Director.
``Sec. 104. Central Intelligence Agency.
``Sec. 104A. Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.''; and
(2) by striking the item relating to section 114 and
inserting the following new item:

``Sec. 114. Additional annual reports from the National Intelligence
Director.'';
and
(3) by striking the item relating to section 506 and
inserting the following new item:

``Sec. 506. Specificity of National Intelligence Program budget amounts
for counterterrorism, counterproliferation, counternarcotics, and
counterintelligence''.

SEC. 1077. CONFORMING AMENDMENTS RELATING TO PROHIBITING DUAL SERVICE
OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

Section 1 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C.
403a) is amended--
(1) by redesignating paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) as
paragraphs (1), (2), and (3), respectively; and
(2) by striking paragraph (2), as so redesignated, and
inserting the following new paragraph (2):
``(2) `Director' means the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency; and''.

SEC. 1078. ACCESS TO INSPECTOR GENERAL PROTECTIONS.

Section 17(a)(1) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C. 403q(a)(1)) is amended by inserting before the semicolon at the
end the following: ``and to programs and operations of the Office of
the National Intelligence Director''.

SEC. 1079. GENERAL REFERENCES.

(a) Director of Central Intelligence as Head of Intelligence
Community.--Any reference to the Director of Central Intelligence or
the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in the Director's
capacity as the head of the intelligence community in any law,
regulation, document, paper, or other record of the United States shall
be deemed to be a reference to the National Intelligence Director.
(b) Director of Central Intelligence as Head of CIA.--Any reference
to the Director of Central Intelligence or the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency in the Director's capacity as the head of the
Central Intelligence Agency in any law, regulation, document, paper, or
other record of the United States shall be deemed to be a reference to
the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
(c) Community Management Staff.--Any reference to the Community
Management Staff in any law, regulation, document, paper, or other
record of the United States shall be deemed to be a reference to the
staff of the Office of the National Intelligence Director.

SEC. 1080. APPLICATION OF OTHER LAWS.

(a) Political Service of Personnel.--Section 7323(b)(2)(B)(i) of
title 5, United States Code, is amended--
(1) in subclause (XII), by striking ``or'' at the end; and
(2) by inserting after subclause (XIII) the following new
subclause:
``(XIV) the Office of the National Intelligence
Director; or''.
(b) Deletion of Information About Foreign Gifts.--Section 7342(f)(4)
of title 5, United States Code, is amended--
(1) by inserting ``(A)'' after ``(4)'';
(2) in subparagraph (A), as so designated, by striking ``the
Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``the Director
of the Central Intelligence Agency''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
``(B) In transmitting such listings for the Office of the National
Intelligence Director, the National Intelligence Director may delete
the information described in subparagraphs (A) and (C) of paragraphs
(2) and (3) if the Director certifies in writing to the Secretary of
State that the publication of such information could adversely affect
United States intelligence sources.''.
(c) Exemption from Financial Disclosures.--Section 105(a)(1) of the
Ethics in Government Act (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended by inserting ``the
Office of the National Intelligence Director,'' before ``the Central
Intelligence Agency''.

Subtitle H--Transfer, Termination, Transition and Other Provisions

SEC. 1091. TRANSFER OF COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT STAFF.

(a) Transfer.--There shall be transferred to the Office of the
National Intelligence Director the staff of the Community Management
Staff as of the date of the enactment of this Act, including all
functions and activities discharged by the Community Management Staff
as of that date.
(b) Administration.--The National Intelligence Director shall
administer the Community Management Staff after the date of the
enactment of this Act as a component of the Office of the National
Intelligence Director under section 103(b) of the National Security Act
of 1947, as amended by section 1011(a).

SEC. 1092. TRANSFER OF TERRORIST THREAT INTEGRATION CENTER.

(a) Transfer.--There shall be transferred to the National
Counterterrorism Center the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC),
including all functions and activities discharged by the Terrorist
Threat Integration Center as of the date of the enactment of this Act.
(b) Administration.--The Director of the National Counterterrorism
Center shall administer the Terrorist Threat Integration Center after
the date of the enactment of this Act as a component of the Directorate
of Intelligence of the National Counterterrorism Center under section
119(i) of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by section
1021(a).

SEC. 1093. TERMINATION OF POSITIONS OF ASSISTANT DIRECTORS OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.

(a) Termination.--The positions within the Central Intelligence
Agency referred to in subsection (b) are hereby abolished.
(b) Covered Positions.--The positions within the Central Intelligence
Agency referred to in this subsection are as follows:
(1) The Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for
Collection.
(2) The Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for
Analysis and Production.
(3) The Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for
Administration.

SEC. 1094. IMPLEMENTATION PLAN.

(a) Submission of Plan.--The President shall transmit to Congress a
plan for the implementation of this title and the amendments made by
this title. The plan shall address, at a minimum, the following:
(1) The transfer of personnel, assets, and obligations to the
National Intelligence Director pursuant to this title.
(2) Any consolidation, reorganization, or streamlining of
activities transferred to the National Intelligence Director
pursuant to this title.
(3) The establishment of offices within the Office of the
National Intelligence Director to implement the duties and
responsibilities of the National Intelligence Director as
described in this title.
(4) Specification of any proposed disposition of property,
facilities, contracts, records, and other assets and
obligations to be transferred to the National Intelligence
Director.
(5) Recommendations for additional legislative or
administrative action as the Director considers appropriate.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the
permanent location for the headquarters for the Office of the National
Intelligence Director, should be at a location other than the George
Bush Center for Intelligence in Langley, Virginia.

SEC. 1095. TRANSITIONAL AUTHORITIES.

Upon the request of the National Intelligence Director, the head of
any executive agency may, on a reimbursable basis, provide services or
detail personnel to the National Intelligence Director.

SEC. 1096. EFFECTIVE DATES.

(a) In General.--Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act,
this title and the amendments made by this title shall take effect on
the date of the enactment of this Act.
(b) Specific Effective Dates.--(1)(A) Not later than 60 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the National Intelligence
Director shall first appoint individuals to positions within the Office
of the National Intelligence Director.
(B) Subparagraph (A) shall not apply with respect to the Deputy
National Intelligence Director.
(2) Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, the President shall transmit to Congress the implementation plan
required under section 1904.
(3) Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this
Act, the National Intelligence Director shall prescribe regulations,
policies, procedures, standards, and guidelines required under section
102A of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by section
1011(a).

TITLE II--TERRORISM PREVENTION AND PROSECUTION

Subtitle A--Individual Terrorists as Agents of Foreign Powers

SEC. 2001. PRESUMPTION THAT CERTAIN NON-UNITED STATES PERSONS ENGAGING
IN INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM ARE AGENTS OF FOREIGN
POWERS FOR PURPOSES OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978.

(a) Presumption.--(1) The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 101
the following new section:
``presumption of treatment of certain non-united states persons engaged
in international terrorism as agents of foreign powers
``Sec. 101A. Upon application by the Federal official applying for an
order under this Act, the court may presume that a non-United States
person who is knowingly engaged in sabotage or international terrorism,
or activities that are in preparation therefor, is an agent of a
foreign power under section 101(b)(2)(C).''.
(2) The table of contents for that Act is amended by inserting after
the item relating to section 101 the following new item:

``Sec. 101A. Presumption of treatment of certain non-United States
persons engaged in international terrorism as agents of foreign
powers.''.
(b) Sunset.--The amendments made by subsection (a) shall be subject
to the sunset provision in section 224 of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001
(Public Law 107-56; 115 Stat. 295), including the exception provided in
subsection (b) of such section 224.

Subtitle B--Stop Terrorist and Military Hoaxes Act of 2004

SEC. 2021. SHORT TITLE.

This subtitle may be cited as the ``Stop Terrorist and Military
Hoaxes Act of 2004''.

SEC. 2022. HOAXES AND RECOVERY COSTS.

(a) Prohibition on Hoaxes.--Chapter 47 of title 18, United States
Code, is amended by inserting after section 1037 the following:

``Sec. 1038. False information and hoaxes

``(a) Criminal Violation.--
``(1) In general.--Whoever engages in any conduct with intent
to convey false or misleading information under circumstances
where such information may reasonably be believed and where
such information indicates that an activity has taken, is
taking, or will take place that would constitute a violation of
chapter 2, 10, 11B, 39, 40, 44, 111, or 113B of this title,
section 236 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2284),
or section 46502, the second sentence of section 46504, section
46505 (b)(3) or (c), section 46506 if homicide or attempted
homicide is involved, or section 60123(b) of title 49 shall--
``(A) be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than 5 years, or both;
``(B) if serious bodily injury results, be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than 25 years,
or both; and
``(C) if death results, be fined under this title or
imprisoned for any number of years up to life, or both.
``(2) Armed forces.--Whoever, without lawful authority, makes
a false statement, with intent to convey false or misleading
information, about the death, injury, capture, or disappearance
of a member of the Armed Forces of the United States during a
war or armed conflict in which the United States is engaged,
shall--
``(A) be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than 5 years, or both;
``(B) if serious bodily injury results, be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than 25 years,
or both; and
``(C) if death results, be fined under this title or
imprisoned for any number of years up to life, or both.
``(b) Civil Action.--Whoever knowingly engages in any conduct with
intent to convey false or misleading information under circumstances
where such information may reasonably be believed and where such
information indicates that an activity has taken, is taking, or will
take place that would constitute a violation of chapter 2, 10, 11B, 39,
40, 44, 111, or 113B of this title, section 236 of the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2284), or section 46502, the second sentence of
section 46504, section 46505 (b)(3) or (c), section 46506 if homicide
or attempted homicide is involved, or section 60123(b) of title 49 is
liable in a civil action to any party incurring expenses incident to
any emergency or investigative response to that conduct, for those
expenses.
``(c) Reimbursement.--
``(1) In general.--The court, in imposing a sentence on a
defendant who has been convicted of an offense under subsection
(a), shall order the defendant to reimburse any state or local
government, or private not-for-profit organization that
provides fire or rescue service incurring expenses incident to
any emergency or investigative response to that conduct, for
those expenses.
``(2) Liability.--A person ordered to make reimbursement
under this subsection shall be jointly and severally liable for
such expenses with each other person, if any, who is ordered to
make reimbursement under this subsection for the same expenses.
``(3) Civil judgment.--An order of reimbursement under this
subsection shall, for the purposes of enforcement, be treated
as a civil judgment.
``(d) Activities of Law Enforcement.--This section does not prohibit
any lawfully authorized investigative, protective, or intelligence
activity of a law enforcement agency of the United States, a State, or
political subdivision of a State, or of an intelligence agency of the
United States.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections as the beginning of
chapter 47 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding after
the item for section 1037 the following:

``1038. False information and hoaxes.''.

SEC. 2023. OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE AND FALSE STATEMENTS IN TERRORISM
CASES.

(a) Enhanced Penalty.--Section 1001(a) and the third undesignated
paragraph of section 1505 of title 18, United States Code, are amended
by striking ``be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5
years, or both'' and inserting ``be fined under this title, imprisoned
not more than 5 years or, if the matter relates to international or
domestic terrorism (as defined in section 2331), imprisoned not more
than 10 years, or both''.
(b) Sentencing Guidelines.--Not later than 30 days of the enactment
of this section, the United States Sentencing Commission shall amend
the Sentencing Guidelines to provide for an increased offense level for
an offense under sections 1001(a) and 1505 of title 18, United States
Code, if the offense involves a matter relating to international or
domestic terrorism, as defined in section 2331 of such title.

SEC. 2024. CLARIFICATION OF DEFINITION.

Section 1958 of title 18, United States Code, is amended--
(1) in subsection (a), by striking ``facility in'' and
inserting ``facility of''; and
(2) in subsection (b)(2), by inserting ``or foreign'' after
``interstate''.

Subtitle C--Material Support to Terrorism Prohibition Enhancement Act
of 2004

SEC. 2041. SHORT TITLE.

This subtitle may be cited as the ``Material Support to Terrorism
Prohibition Enhancement Act of 2004''.

SEC. 2042. RECEIVING MILITARY-TYPE TRAINING FROM A FOREIGN TERRORIST
ORGANIZATION.

Chapter 113B of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding
after section 2339C the following new section:

``Sec. 2339D. Receiving military-type training from a foreign terrorist
organization

``(a) Offense.--Whoever knowingly receives military-type training
from or on behalf of any organization designated at the time of the
training by the Secretary of State under section 219(a)(1) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act as a foreign terrorist organization
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for ten years, or both.
To violate this subsection, a person must have knowledge that the
organization is a designated terrorist organization (as defined in
subsection (c)(4)), that the organization has engaged or engages in
terrorist activity (as defined in section 212 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act), or that the organization has engaged or engages in
terrorism (as defined in section 140(d)(2) of the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989).
``(b) Extraterritorial Jurisdiction.--There is extraterritorial
Federal jurisdiction over an offense under this section. There is
jurisdiction over an offense under subsection (a) if--
``(1) an offender is a national of the United States (as
defined in 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and Nationality Act)
or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the
United States (as defined in section 101(a)(20) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act);
``(2) an offender is a stateless person whose habitual
residence is in the United States;
``(3) after the conduct required for the offense occurs an
offender is brought into or found in the United States, even if
the conduct required for the offense occurs outside the United
States;
``(4) the offense occurs in whole or in part within the
United States;
``(5) the offense occurs in or affects interstate or foreign
commerce;
``(6) an offender aids or abets any person over whom
jurisdiction exists under this paragraph in committing an
offense under subsection (a) or conspires with any person over
whom jurisdiction exists under this paragraph to commit an
offense under subsection (a).
``(c) Definitions.--As used in this section--
``(1) the term `military-type training' includes training in
means or methods that can cause death or serious bodily injury,
destroy or damage property, or disrupt services to critical
infrastructure, or training on the use, storage, production, or
assembly of any explosive, firearm or other weapon, including
any weapon of mass destruction (as defined in section
2232a(c)(2));
``(2) the term `serious bodily injury' has the meaning given
that term in section 1365(h)(3);
``(3) the term `critical infrastructure' means systems and
assets vital to national defense, national security, economic
security, public health or safety including both regional and
national infrastructure. Critical infrastructure may be
publicly or privately owned; examples of critical
infrastructure include gas and oil production, storage, or
delivery systems, water supply systems, telecommunications
networks, electrical power generation or delivery systems,
financing and banking systems, emergency services (including
medical, police, fire, and rescue services), and transportation
systems and services (including highways, mass transit,
airlines, and airports); and
``(4) the term `foreign terrorist organization' means an
organization designated as a terrorist organization under
section 219(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.''.

SEC. 2043. PROVIDING MATERIAL SUPPORT TO TERRORISM.

(a) Additions to Offense of Providing Material Support to
Terrorists.--Section 2339A(a) of title 18, United States Code, is
amended--
(1) by designating the first sentence as paragraph (1);
(2) by designating the second sentence as paragraph (3);
(3) by inserting after paragraph (1) as so designated by this
subsection the following:
``(2) (A) Whoever in a circumstance described in subparagraph
(B) provides material support or resources or conceals or
disguises the nature, location, source, or ownership of
material support or resources, knowing or intending that they
are to be used in preparation for, or in carrying out, an act
of international or domestic terrorism (as defined in section
2331), or in preparation for, or in carrying out, the
concealment or escape from the commission of any such act, or
attempts or conspires to do so, shall be punished as provided
under paragraph (1) for an offense under that paragraph.
``(B) The circumstances referred to in subparagraph (A) are
any of the following:
``(i) The offense occurs in or affects interstate or
foreign commerce.
``(ii) The act of terrorism is an act of
international or domestic terrorism that violates the
criminal law of the United States.
``(iii) The act of terrorism is an act of domestic
terrorism that appears to be intended to influence the
policy, or affect the conduct, of the Government of the
United States or a foreign government.
``(iv) An offender, acting within the United States
or outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States, is a national of the United States (as defined
in section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, an alien lawfully admitted for
permanent residence in the United States (as defined in
section 101(a)(20) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act , or a stateless person whose habitual residence is
in the United States, and the act of terrorism is an
act of international terrorism that appears to be
intended to influence the policy, or affect the
conduct, of the Government of the United States or a
foreign government.
``(v) An offender, acting within the United States,
is an alien, and the act of terrorism is an act of
international terrorism that appears to be intended to
influence the policy, or affect the conduct, of the
Government of the United States or a foreign
government.
``(vi) An offender, acting outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States, is an alien and the
act of terrorism is an act of international terrorism
that appears to be intended to influence the policy of,
or affect the conduct of, the Government of the United
States.
``(vii) An offender aids or abets any person over
whom jurisdiction exists under this paragraph in
committing an offense under this paragraph or conspires
with any person over whom jurisdiction exists under
this paragraph to commit an offense under this
paragraph.''; and
(4) by inserting ``act or'' after ``underlying''.
(b) Definitions.--Section 2339A(b) of title 18, United States Code,
is amended--
(1) by striking ``In this'' and inserting ``(1) In this'';
(2) by inserting ``any property, tangible or intangible, or
service, including'' after ``means'';
(3) by inserting ``(one or more individuals who may be or
include oneself)'' after ``personnel'';
(4) by inserting ``and'' before ``transportation'';
(5) by striking ``and other physical assets''; and
(6) by adding at the end the following:
``(2) As used in this subsection, the term `training' means
instruction or teaching designed to impart a specific skill, as opposed
to general knowledge, and the term `expert advice or assistance' means
advice or assistance derived from scientific, technical or other
specialized knowledge.''.
(c) Addition to Offense of Providing Material Support to Terrorist
Organizations.--Section 2339B(a)(1) of title 18, United States Code, is
amended--
(1) by striking ``, within the United States or subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States,'' and inserting ``in a
circumstance described in paragraph (2)'' ; and
(2) by adding at the end the following: ``To violate this
paragraph, a person must have knowledge that the organization
is a designated terrorist organization (as defined in
subsection (g)(6)), that the organization has engaged or
engages in terrorist activity (as defined in section
212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, or that
the organization has engaged or engages in terrorism (as
defined in section 140(d)(2) of the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989.''.
(d) Federal Authority.--Section 2339B(d) of title 18 is amended--
(1) by inserting ``(1)'' before ``There''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``(2) The circumstances referred to in paragraph (1) are any of the
following:
``(A) An offender is a national of the United States (as
defined in section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(22)) or an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence in the United States (as
defined in section 101(a)(20) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act.
``(B) An offender is a stateless person whose habitual
residence is in the United States.
``(C) After the conduct required for the offense occurs an
offender is brought into or found in the United States, even if
the conduct required for the offense occurs outside the United
States.
``(D) The offense occurs in whole or in part within the
United States.
``(E) The offense occurs in or affects interstate or foreign
commerce.
``(F) An offender aids or abets any person over whom
jurisdiction exists under this paragraph in committing an
offense under subsection (a) or conspires with any person over
whom jurisdiction exists under this paragraph to commit an
offense under subsection (a).''.
(e) Definition.--Paragraph (4) of section 2339B(g) of title 18,
United States Code, is amended to read as follows:
``(4) the term `material support or resources' has the same
meaning given that term in section 2339A;''.
(f) Additional Provisions.--Section 2339B of title 18, United States
Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
``(h) Provision of Personnel.--No person may be prosecuted under this
section in connection with the term `personnel' unless that person has
knowingly provided, attempted to provide, or conspired to provide a
foreign terrorist organization with one or more individuals (who may be
or include himself) to work under that terrorist organization's
direction or control or to organize, manage, supervise, or otherwise
direct the operation of that organization. Individuals who act entirely
independently of the foreign terrorist organization to advance its
goals or objectives shall not be considered to be working under the
foreign terrorist organization's direction and control.
``(i) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be
construed or applied so as to abridge the exercise of rights guaranteed
under the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.''.

SEC. 2044. FINANCING OF TERRORISM.

(a) Financing Terrorism.--Section 2339c(c)(2) of title 18, United
States Code, is amended--
(1) by striking ``, resources, or funds'' and inserting ``or
resources, or any funds or proceeds of such funds'';
(2) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``were provided'' and
inserting ``are to be provided, or knowing that the support or
resources were provided,''; and
(3) in subparagraph (B)--
(A) by striking ``or any proceeds of such funds'';
and
(B) by striking ``were provided or collected'' and
inserting ``are to be provided or collected, or knowing
that the funds were provided or collected,''.
(b) Definitions.--Section 2339c(e) of title 18, United States Code,
is amended--
(1) by striking ``and'' at the end of paragraph (12);
(2) by redesignating paragraph (13) as paragraph (14); and
(3) by inserting after paragraph (12) the following:
``(13) the term `material support or resources' has the same
meaning given that term in section 2339B(g)(4) of this title;
and''.

Subtitle D--Weapons of Mass Destruction Prohibition Improvement Act of
2004

SEC. 2051. SHORT TITLE.

This subtitle may be cited as the ``Weapons of Mass Destruction
Prohibition Improvement Act of 2004''.

SEC. 2052. WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.

(a) Expansion of Jurisdictional Bases and Scope.--Section 2332a of
title 18, United States Code, is amended--
(1) so that paragraph (2) of subsection (a) reads as follows:
``(2) against any person or property within the United
States, and
``(A) the mail or any facility of interstate or
foreign commerce is used in furtherance of the offense;
``(B) such property is used in interstate or foreign
commerce or in an activity that affects interstate or
foreign commerce;
``(C) any perpetrator travels in or causes another to
travel in interstate or foreign commerce in furtherance
of the offense; or
``(D) the offense, or the results of the offense,
affect interstate or foreign commerce, or, in the case
of a threat, attempt, or conspiracy, would have
affected interstate or foreign commerce;'';
(2) in paragraph (3) of subsection (a), by striking the comma
at the end and inserting ``; or'';
(3) in subsection (a), by adding the following at the end:
``(4) against any property within the United States that is
owned, leased, or used by a foreign government,'';
(4) at the end of subsection (c)(1), by striking``and'';
(5) in subsection (c)(2), by striking the period at the end
and inserting ``; and''; and
(6) in subsection (c), by adding at the end the following:
``(3) the term `property' includes all real and personal
property.''.
(b) Restoration of the Coverage of Chemical Weapons.--Section 2332a
of title 18, United States Code, as amended by subsection (a), is
further amended--
(1) in the section heading, by striking ``certain'';
(2) in subsection (a), by striking ``(other than a chemical
weapon as that term is defined in section 229F)''; and
(3) in subsection (b), by striking ``(other than a chemical
weapon (as that term is defined in section 229F))''.
(c) Expansion of Categories of Restricted Persons Subject to
Prohibitions Relating to Select Agents.--Section 175b(d)(2) of title
18, United States Code, is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (G) by--
(A) inserting ``(i)'' after ``(G)'';
(B) inserting ``, or (ii) acts for or on behalf of,
or operates subject to the direction or control of, a
government or official of a country described in this
subparagraph'' after ``terrorism''; and
(C) striking ``or'' after the semicolon.
(2) in subparagraph (H) by striking the period and inserting
``; or''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
``(I) is a member of, acts for or on behalf of, or
operates subject to the direction or control of, a
terrorist organization as defined in section
212(a)(3)(B)(vi) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)).''.
(d) Conforming Amendment to Regulations.--
(1) Section 175b(a)(1) of title 18, United States Code, is
amended by striking ``as a select agent in Appendix A'' and all
that follows and inserting the following: ``as a non-overlap or
overlap select biological agent or toxin in sections 73.4 and
73.5 of title 42, Code of Federal Regulations, pursuant to
section 351A of the Public Health Service Act, and is not
excluded under sections 73.4 and 73.5 or exempted under section
73.6 of title 42, Code of Federal Regulations.''.
(2) The amendment made by paragraph (1) shall take effect at
the same time that sections 73.4, 73.5, and 73.6 of title 42,
Code of Federal Regulations, become effective.
(e) Enhancing Prosecution of Weapons of Mass Destruction Offenses.--
Section 1961(1)(B) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by
adding at the end the following: ``sections 175-178 (relating to
biological weapons), sections 229-229F (relating to chemical weapons),
section 831 (relating to nuclear materials),''.

SEC. 2053. PARTICIPATION IN NUCLEAR AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES.

(a) Section 57(b) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C.
2077(b)) is amended by striking ``in the production of any special
nuclear material'' and inserting ``or participate in the development or
production of any special nuclear material or atomic weapon''.
(b) Title 18, United States Code, is amended--
(1) in the table of sections at the beginning of chapter 39,
by inserting after the item relating to section 831 the
following:

``832. Participation in nuclear and weapons of mass destruction threats
to the United States.'';
(2) by inserting after section 831 the following:

``Sec. 832. Participation in nuclear and weapons of mass destruction
threats to the United States

``(a) Whoever, within the United States or subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States, willfully participates in or
provides material support or resources (as defined in section 2339A) to
a nuclear weapons program or other weapons of mass destruction program
of a foreign terrorist power, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall
be imprisoned for not more than 20 years.
``(b) There is extraterritorial Federal jurisdiction over an offense
under this section.
``(c) Whoever without lawful authority develops, possesses, or
attempts or conspires to develop or possess a radiological weapon, or
threatens to use or uses a radiological weapon against any person
within the United States, or a national of the United States while such
national is outside the United States or against any property that is
owned, leased, funded or used by the United States, whether that
property is within or outside the United States, shall be imprisoned
for any term of years or for life, and if death results, shall be
punished by death or imprisoned for any term of years or for life.
``(d) As used in this section--
``(1) `nuclear weapons program' means a program or plan for
the development, acquisition, or production of any nuclear
weapon or weapons;
``(2) `weapons of mass destruction program' means a program
or plan for the development, acquisition, or production of any
weapon or weapons of mass destruction (as defined in section
2332a(c));
``(3) `foreign terrorist power' means a terrorist
organization designated under section 219 of the Immigration
and Nationality Act, or a state sponsor of terrorism designated
under section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 or
section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961; and
``(4) `nuclear weapon' means any weapon that contains or uses
nuclear material as defined in section 831(f)(1).''; and
(3) in section 2332b(g)(5)(B)(i), by inserting after
``nuclear materials),'' the following: ``832 (relating to
participation in nuclear and weapons of mass destruction
threats to the United States)''.

SEC. 2054. PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.

(a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National Commission
on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Congress makes the
following findings:
(1) Al Qaeda has tried to acquire or make weapons of mass
destruction since 1994 or earlier.
(2) The United States doubtless would be a prime target for
use of any such weapon by al Qaeda.
(3) Although the United States Government has redoubled its
international commitments to supporting the programs for
Cooperative Threat Reduction and other nonproliferation
assistance programs, nonproliferation experts continue to
express deep concern about the United States Government's
commitment and approach to securing the weapons of mass
destruction and related highly dangerous materials that are
still scattered among Russia and other countries of the former
Soviet Union.
(4) The cost of increased investment in the prevention of
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related
dangerous materials is greatly outweighed by the potentially
catastrophic cost to the United States of use of weapons of
mass destruction or related dangerous materials by the
terrorists who are so eager to acquire them.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) maximum effort to prevent the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, wherever such proliferation may occur, is
warranted; and
(2) the programs of the United States Government to prevent
or counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
including the Proliferation Security Initiative, the programs
for Cooperative Threat Reduction, and other nonproliferation
assistance programs, should be expanded, improved, and better
funded to address the global dimensions of the proliferation
threat.
(c) Requirement for Strategy.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress--
(1) a strategy for expanding and strengthening the
Proliferation Security Initiative, the programs for Cooperative
Threat Reduction, and other nonproliferation assistance
programs; and
(2) an estimate of the funding necessary to execute that
strategy.
(d) Report on Reforming the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and
Other Non-proliferation Assistance Programs.--Not later than 180 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit
to Congress a report evaluating whether the United States could more
effectively address the global threat of nuclear proliferation by--
(1) establishing a central coordinator for the programs for
Cooperative Threat Reduction;
(2) eliminating the requirement that the President spend no
more than $50,000,000 annually on programs for Cooperative
Threat Reduction and other non-proliferation assistance
programs carried out outside the former Soviet Union; or
(3) repealing the provisions of the Soviet Nuclear Threat
Reduction Act of 1991 (22 U.S.C. 2551 note) that place
conditions on assistance to the former Soviet Union unrelated
to bilateral cooperation on weapons dismantlement.

SEC. 2055. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING INTERNATIONAL
COUNTERPROLIFERATION EFFORTS.

It is the sense of Congress that the United States should work with
the international community to develop laws and an international legal
regime with universal jurisdiction to enable the interdiction of
nuclear material and technology, and the capture, interdiction, and
prosecution of individuals or entities involved in the smuggling or
transfer of nuclear material or technology to any state in the world
where they do not fully disclose the nature of their nuclear program.

SEC. 2056. REMOVAL OF POTENTIAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS MATERIALS FROM
VULNERABLE SITES WORLDWIDE.

(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that removing
potential nuclear weapons materials from vulnerable sites around the
world would reduce the possibility that such materials could fall into
the hands of al Qaeda or other groups and states hostile to the United
States, and should be a top priority for achieving the national
security of the United States. Several actions may be taken to reduce
the risk that nuclear weapons materials may end up in terrorist hands,
including--
(1) transporting such materials from such sites to secure
facilities;
(2) providing interim security upgrades for such materials
pending their removal from their current sites;
(3) managing such materials after their arrival at secure
facilities;
(4) purchasing such materials;
(5) converting such sites to the use of low-enriched uranium
fuels;
(6) assisting in the closure and decommissioning of such
sites;
(7) providing incentives to facilitate the removal of such
materials from vulnerable facilities;
(8) arranging for the shipment of potential nuclear weapons
materials to the United States, or to other countries willing
to accept such materials and able to provide high levels of
security for such materials, and dispose of such materials, in
order to ensure that United States national security objectives
are accomplished as quickly and effectively as possible; and
(9) providing funds to upgrade security and accounting at
sites where potential nuclear weapons materials will remain for
an extended period in order to ensure that such materials are
secure against plausible potential threats, and will remain so
in the future.
(b) Report.--
(1) Not later than 30 days after the submittal to Congress of
the budget of the President for fiscal year 2006 pursuant to
section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, the
administration shall submit to Congress a report that includes
the following:
(A) A list of the sites determined to be of the
highest priorities for removal of potential nuclear
weapons materials, based on the quantity and
attractiveness of such materials at such sites and the
risk of theft or diversion of such materials for
weapons purposes.
(B) An inventory of all sites worldwide where highly-
enriched uranium or separated plutonium is located,
including, to the extent practicable, a prioritized
assessment of the terrorism and proliferation risk
posed by such materials at each such site, based on the
quantity of such materials, the attractiveness of such
materials for use in nuclear weapons, the current level
of security and accounting for such materials, and the
level of threat (including the effects of terrorist or
criminal activity and the pay and morale of personnel
and guards) in the country or region where such sites
are located.
(C) A strategic plan, including measurable milestones
and metrics.
(D) An estimate of the funds required to secure these
materials.
(E) The recommendations of the Administration on
whether any further legislative actions or
international agreements are necessary to facilitate
the accomplishment of the objective.
(2) The report shall be submitted in unclassified form, but
may include a classified annex.
(c) Potential Nuclear Weapons Material Defined.--In this section, the
term ``potential nuclear weapons material'' means plutonium, highly-
enriched uranium, or other material capable of sustaining an explosive
nuclear chain reaction, including irradiated materials if the radiation
field from such materials is not sufficient to prevent the theft and
use of such materials for an explosive nuclear chain reaction.

Subtitle E--Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing

CHAPTER 1--FUNDING TO COMBAT FINANCIAL CRIMES INCLUDING TERRORIST
FINANCING

SEC. 2101. ADDITIONAL AUTHORIZATION FOR FINCEN.

Subsection (d) of section 310 of title 31, United States Code, is
amended--
(1) by striking ``appropriations.--There are authorized'' and
inserting ``Appropriations.--
``(1) In general.--There are authorized''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(2) Authorization for funding key technological
improvements in mission-critical fincen systems.--There are
authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2005 the
following amounts, which are authorized to remain available
until expended:
``(A) BSA direct.--For technological improvements to
provide authorized law enforcement and financial
regulatory agencies with Web-based access to FinCEN
data, to fully develop and implement the highly secure
network required under section 362 of Public Law 107-56
to expedite the filing of, and reduce the filing costs
for, financial institution reports, including
suspicious activity reports, collected by FinCEN under
chapter 53 and related provisions of law, and enable
FinCEN to immediately alert financial institutions
about suspicious activities that warrant immediate and
enhanced scrutiny, and to provide and upgrade advanced
information-sharing technologies to materially improve
the Government's ability to exploit the information in
the FinCEN databanks $16,500,000.
``(B) Advanced analytical technologies.--To provide
advanced analytical tools needed to ensure that the
data collected by FinCEN under chapter 53 and related
provisions of law are utilized fully and appropriately
in safeguarding financial institutions and supporting
the war on terrorism, $5,000,000.
``(C) Data networking modernization.--To improve the
telecommunications infrastructure to support the
improved capabilities of the FinCEN systems,
$3,000,000.
``(D) Enhanced compliance capability.--To improve the
effectiveness of the Office of Compliance in FinCEN,
$3,000,000.
``(E) Detection and prevention of financial crimes
and terrorism.--To provide development of, and training
in the use of, technology to detect and prevent
financial crimes and terrorism within and without the
United States, $8,000,000.''.

SEC. 2102. MONEY LAUNDERING AND FINANCIAL CRIMES STRATEGY
REAUTHORIZATION.

(a) Program.--Section 5341(a)(2) of title 31, United States Code, is
amended by striking ``and 2003,'' and inserting ``2003, and 2005,''.
(b) Reauthorization of Appropriations.--Section 5355 of title 31,
United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

``Fiscal year 2004.................................... $15,000,000
Fiscal year 2005...................................... $15,000,000''.

CHAPTER 2--ENFORCEMENT TOOLS TO COMBAT FINANCIAL CRIMES INCLUDING
TERRORIST FINANCING

Subchapter A--Money Laundering Abatement and Financial Antiterrorism
Technical Corrections

SEC. 2111. SHORT TITLE.

This subtitle may be cited as the ``Money Laundering Abatement and
Financial Antiterrorism Technical Corrections Act of 2004''.

SEC. 2112. TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS TO PUBLIC LAW 107-56.

(a) The heading of title III of Public Law 107-56 is amended to read
as follows:

``TITLE III--INTERNATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING ABATEMENT AND FINANCIAL
ANTITERRORISM ACT OF 2001''.

(b) The table of contents of Public Law 107-56 is amended by striking
the item relating to title III and inserting the following new item:

``TITLE III--INTERNATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING ABATEMENT AND FINANCIAL
ANTITERRORISM ACT OF 2001''.

(c) Section 302 of Public Law 107-56 is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)(4), by striking the comma after
``movement of criminal funds'';
(2) in subsection (b)(7), by inserting ``or types of
accounts'' after ``classes of international transactions''; and
(3) in subsection (b)(10), by striking ``subchapters II and
III'' and inserting ``subchapter II''.
(d) Section 303(a) of Public Law 107-56 is amended by striking
``Anti-Terrorist Financing Act'' and inserting ``Financial
Antiterrorism Act''.
(e) The heading for section 311 of Public Law 107-56 is amended by
striking ``OR INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS'' and inserting
``INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS, OR TYPES OF ACCOUNTS''.
(f) Section 314 of Public Law 107-56 is amended--
(1) in paragraph (1)--
(A) by inserting a comma after ``organizations
engaged in''; and
(B) by inserting a comma after ``credible evidence of
engaging in'';
(2) in paragraph (2)(A)--
(A) by striking ``and'' after ``nongovernmental
organizations,''; and
(B) by inserting a comma after ``unwittingly involved
in such finances'';
(3) in paragraph (3)(A)--
(A) by striking ``to monitor accounts of'' and
inserting ``monitor accounts of,''; and
(B) by striking the comma after ``organizations
identified''; and
(4) in paragraph (3)(B), by inserting ``financial'' after
``size, and nature of the''.
(g) Section 321 of Public Law 107-56 is amended by striking
``5312(2)'' and inserting ``5312(a)(2)''.
(h) Section 325 of Public Law 107-56 is amended by striking ``as
amended by section 202 of this title,'' and inserting ``as amended by
section 352,''.
(i) Subsections (a)(2) and (b)(2) of section 327 of Public Law 107-56
are each amended by inserting a period after ``December 31, 2001'' and
striking all that follows through the period at the end of each such
subsection.
(j) Section 356(c)(4) of Public Law 107-56 is amended by striking
``or business or other grantor trust'' and inserting ``, business
trust, or other grantor trust''.
(k) Section 358(e) of Public Law 107-56 is amended--
(1) by striking ``Section 123(a)'' and inserting ``That
portion of section 123(a)'';
(2) by striking ``is amended to read'' and inserting ``that
precedes paragraph (1) of such section is amended to read'';
and
(3) by striking ``.'.'' at the end of such section and
inserting ``--' ''.
(l) Section 360 of Public Law 107-56 is amended--
(1) in subsection (a), by inserting ``the'' after
``utilization of the funds of''; and
(2) in subsection (b), by striking ``at such institutions''
and inserting ``at such institution''.
(m) Section 362(a)(1) of Public Law 107-56 is amended by striking
``subchapter II or III'' and inserting ``subchapter II''.
(n) Section 365 of Public Law 107-56 is amended --
(1) by redesignating the 2nd of the 2 subsections designated
as subsection (c) (relating to a clerical amendment) as
subsection (d); and
(2) by redesignating subsection (f) as subsection (e).
(o) Section 365(d) of Public Law 107-56 (as so redesignated by
subsection (n) of this section) is amended by striking ``section 5332
(as added by section 112 of this title)'' and inserting ``section
5330''.

SEC. 2113. TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS TO OTHER PROVISIONS OF LAW.

(a) Section 310(c) of title 31, United States Code, is amended by
striking ``the Network'' each place such term appears and inserting
``FinCEN''.
(b) Section 5312(a)(3)(C) of title 31, United States Code, is amended
by striking ``sections 5333 and 5316'' and inserting ``sections 5316
and 5331''.
(c) Section 5318(i) of title 31, United States Code, is amended--
(1) in paragraph (3)(B), by inserting a comma after ``foreign
political figure'' the 2nd place such term appears; and
(2) in the heading of paragraph (4), by striking
``Definition'' and inserting ``Definitions''.
(d) Section 5318(k)(1)(B) of title 31, United States Code, is amended
by striking ``section 5318A(f)(1)(B)'' and inserting ``section
5318A(e)(1)(B)''.
(e) The heading for section 5318A of title 31, United States Code, is
amended to read as follows:

``Sec. 5318A Special measures for jurisdictions, financial
institutions, international transactions, or types
of accounts of primary money laundering concern''.

(f) Section 5318A of title 31, United States Code, is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)(4)(A), by striking ``, as defined in
section 3 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act,'' and inserting
`` (as defined in section 3 of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Act)'';
(2) in subsection (a)(4)(B)(iii), by striking ``or class of
transactions'' and inserting ``class of transactions, or type
of account'';
(3) in subsection (b)(1)(A), by striking ``or class of
transactions to be'' and inserting ``class of transactions, or
type of account to be''; and
(4) in subsection (e)(3), by inserting ``or subsection (i) or
(j) of section 5318'' after ``identification of individuals
under this section''.
(g) Section 5324(b) of title 31, United States Code, is amended by
striking ``5333'' each place such term appears and inserting ``5331''.
(h) Section 5332 of title 31, United States Code, is amended--
(1) in subsection (b)(2), by striking ``, subject to
subsection (d) of this section''; and
(2) in subsection (c)(1), by striking ``, subject to
subsection (d) of this section,''.
(i) The table of sections for subchapter II of chapter 53 of title
31, United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to
section 5318A and inserting the following new item:

``5318A. Special measures for jurisdictions, financial institutions,
international transactions, or types of accounts of primary money
laundering concern.''.
(j) Section 18(w)(3) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C.
1828(w)(3)) is amended by inserting a comma after ``agent of such
institution''.
(k) Section 21(a)(2) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C.
1829b(a)(2)) is amended by striking ``recognizes that'' and inserting
``recognizing that''.
(l) Section 626(e) of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C.
1681v(e)) is amended by striking ``governmental agency'' and inserting
``government agency''.

SEC. 2114. REPEAL OF REVIEW.

Title III of Public Law 107-56 is amended by striking section 303 (31
U.S.C. 5311 note).

SEC. 2115. EFFECTIVE DATE.

The amendments made by this subtitle to Public Law 107-56, the United
States Code, the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, and any other provision
of law shall take effect as if such amendments had been included in
Public Law 107-56, as of the date of the enactment of such Public Law,
and no amendment made by such Public Law that is inconsistent with an
amendment made by this subtitle shall be deemed to have taken effect.

Subchapter B--Additional Enforcement Tools

SEC. 2121. BUREAU OF ENGRAVING AND PRINTING SECURITY PRINTING.

(a) Production of Documents.--Section 5114(a) of title 31, United
States Code (relating to engraving and printing currency and security
documents), is amended--
(1) by striking ``(a) The Secretary of the Treasury'' and
inserting:
``(a) Authority to Engrave and Print.--
``(1) In general.--The Secretary of the Treasury''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:
``(2) Engraving and printing for other governments.--The
Secretary of the Treasury may produce currency, postage stamps,
and other security documents for foreign governments if--
``(A) the Secretary of the Treasury determines that
such production will not interfere with engraving and
printing needs of the United States; and
``(B) the Secretary of State determines that such
production would be consistent with the foreign policy
of the United States.
``(3) Procurement guidelines.--Articles, material, and
supplies procured for use in the production of currency,
postage stamps, and other security documents for foreign
governments pursuant to paragraph (2) shall be treated in the
same manner as articles, material, and supplies procured for
public use within the United States for purposes of title III
of the Act of March 3, 1933 (41 U.S.C. 10a et seq.; commonly
referred to as the Buy American Act).''.
(b) Reimbursement.--Section 5143 of title 31, United States Code
(relating to payment for services of the Bureau of Engraving and
Printing), is amended--
(1) in the first sentence, by inserting ``or to a foreign
government under section 5114'' after ``agency'';
(2) in the second sentence, by inserting ``and other'' after
``including administrative''; and
(3) in the last sentence, by inserting ``, and the Secretary
shall take such action, in coordination with the Secretary of
State, as may be appropriate to ensure prompt payment by a
foreign government of any invoice or statement of account
submitted by the Secretary with respect to services rendered
under section 5114'' before the period at the end.

SEC. 2122. CONDUCT IN AID OF COUNTERFEITING.

(a) In General.--Section 474(a) of title 18, United States Code, is
amended by inserting after the paragraph beginning ``Whoever has in his
control, custody, or possession any plate'' the following:
`` Whoever, with intent to defraud, has in his custody, control, or
possession any material that can be used to make, alter, forge or
counterfeit any obligations and other securities of the United States
or any part of such securities and obligations, except under the
authority of the Secretary of the Treasury; or''.
(b) Foreign Obligations and Securities.--Section 481 of title 18,
United States Code, is amended by inserting after the paragraph
beginning ``Whoever, with intent to defraud'' the following:
`` Whoever, with intent to defraud, has in his custody, control, or
possession any material that can be used to make, alter, forge or
counterfeit any obligation or other security of any foreign government,
bank or corporation; or''.
(c) Counterfeit Acts.--Section 470 of title 18, United States Code,
is amended by striking ``or 474'' and inserting ``474, or 474A''.
(d) Materials Used in Counterfeiting.--Section 474A(b) of title 18,
United States Code, is amended by striking ``any essentially
identical'' and inserting ``any thing or material made after or in the
similitude of any''.

Subtitle F--Criminal History Background Checks

SEC. 2141. SHORT TITLE.

This subtitle may be cited as the ``Criminal History Access Means
Protection of Infrastructures and Our Nation Act''.

SEC. 2142. CRIMINAL HISTORY BACKGROUND CHECKS.

(a) In General.--Section 534 of title 28, United States Code, is
amended by adding at the end the following:
``(f)(1) Under rules prescribed by the Attorney General, the Attorney
General shall, within 60 days after the date of enactment, initiate a
pilot program to establish and maintain a system for providing to an
employer criminal history information that--
``(A) is in the possession of the Attorney General; and
``(B) is requested by an employer as part of an employee
criminal history investigation that has been authorized by the
State where the employee works or where the employer has their
principal place of business;
in order to ensure that a prospective employee is suitable for certain
employment positions.
``(2) The Attorney General shall require that an employer seeking
criminal history information of an employee request such information
and submit fingerprints or other biometric identifiers as approved by
the Attorney General to provide a positive and reliable identification
of such prospective employee.
``(3) The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation may require
an employer to pay a reasonable fee for such information.
``(4) Upon receipt of fingerprints or other biometric identifiers,
the Attorney General shall conduct an Integrated Fingerprint
Identification System of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (IAFIS)
check and provide the results of such check to the requester.
``(5) As used in this subsection,
``(A) the term `criminal history information' and `criminal
history records' includes----
``(i) an identifying description of the individual to
whom it pertains;
``(ii) notations of arrests, detentions, indictments,
or other formal criminal charges pertaining to such
individual; and
``(iii) any disposition to a notation revealed in
subparagraph (B), including acquittal, sentencing,
correctional supervision, or release.
``(B) the term `Integrated Automated Fingerprint
Identification System of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(IAFIS)' means the national depository for fingerprint,
biometric, and criminal history information, through which
fingerprints are processed electronically.
``(6) Nothing in this subsection shall preclude the Attorney General
from authorizing or requiring criminal history record checks on
individuals employed or seeking employment in positions vital to the
Nation's critical infrastructure or key resources as those terms are
defined in section 1016(e) of Public Law 107-56 (42 U.S.C. 5195c(e))
and section 2(9) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C.
101(9)), if pursuant to a law or executive order.''.
(b) Report to Congress.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 60 days after the conclusion
of the pilot program, the Attorney General shall report to the
appropriate committees of Congress regarding all statutory
requirements for criminal history record checks that are
required to be conducted by the Department of Justice or any of
its components.
(2) Identification of information.--The Attorney General
shall identify the number of records requested, including the
type of information requested, usage of different terms and
definitions regarding criminal history information, and the
variation in fees charged for such information and who pays
such fees.
(3) Recommendations.--The Attorney General shall make
recommendations for consolidating the existing procedures into
a unified procedure consistent with that provided in section
534(f) of title 28, United States Code, as amended by this
subtitle. In making the recommendations to Congress, the
Attorney General shall consider--
(A) the effectiveness of utilizing commercially
available databases as a supplement to IAFIS criminal
history information checks;
(B) the effectiveness of utilizing State databases as
a supplement to IAFIS criminal history information
checks;
(C) any feasibility studies by the Department of
Justice of the FBI's resources and structure to
establish a system to provide criminal history
information; and
(D) privacy rights and other employee protections to
include employee consent, access to the records used if
employment was denied, an appeal mechanism, and
penalties for misuse of the information.

SEC. 2143. PROTECT ACT.

Public law 108-21 is amended--
(1) in section 108(a)(2)(A) by striking ``an 18 month'' and
inserting ``a 30-month''; and
(2) in section 108(a)(3)(A) by striking ``an 18-month'' and
inserting ``a 30-month''.

SEC. 2144. REVIEWS OF CRIMINAL RECORDS OF APPLICANTS FOR PRIVATE
SECURITY OFFICER EMPLOYMENT.

(a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the ``Private Security
Officer Employment Authorization Act of 2004''.
(b) Findings.--Congress finds that--
(1) employment of private security officers in the United
States is growing rapidly;
(2) private security officers function as an adjunct to, but
not a replacement for, public law enforcement by helping to
reduce and prevent crime;
(3) such private security officers protect individuals,
property, and proprietary information, and provide protection
to such diverse operations as banks, hospitals, research and
development centers, manufacturing facilities, defense and
aerospace contractors, high technology businesses, nuclear
power plants, chemical companies, oil and gas refineries,
airports, communication facilities and operations, office
complexes, schools, residential properties, apartment
complexes, gated communities, and others;
(4) sworn law enforcement officers provide significant
services to the citizens of the United States in its public
areas, and are supplemented by private security officers;
(5) the threat of additional terrorist attacks requires
cooperation between public and private sectors and demands
professional, reliable, and responsible security officers for
the protection of people, facilities, and institutions;
(6) the trend in the Nation toward growth in such security
services has accelerated rapidly;
(7) such growth makes available more public sector law
enforcement officers to combat serious and violent crimes,
including terrorism;
(8) the American public deserves the employment of qualified,
well-trained private security personnel as an adjunct to sworn
law enforcement officers; and
(9) private security officers and applicants for private
security officer positions should be thoroughly screen and
trained.
(c) Definitions.--In this Act:
(1) Employee.--The term ``employee'' includes both a current
employee and an applicant for employment as a private security
officer.
(2) Authorized employer.--The term ``authorized employer''
means any person that--
(A) employs private security officers; and
(B) is authorized by regulations promulgated by the
Attorney General to request a criminal history record
information search of an employee through a State
identification bureau pursuant to this section.
(3) Private security officer.--The term ``private security
officer'--
(A) means an individual other than an employee of a
Federal, State, or local government, whose primary duty
is to perform security services, full- or part-time,
for consideration, whether armed or unarmed and in
uniform or plain clothes (except for services excluded
from coverage under this Act if the Attorney General
determines by regulation that such exclusion would
serve the public interest); but
(B) does not include--
(i) employees whose duties are primarily
internal audit or credit functions;
(ii) employees of electronic security system
companies acting as technicians or monitors; or
(iii) employees whose duties primarily
involve the secure movement of prisoners.
(4) Security services.--The term ``security services'' means
acts to protect people or property as defined by regulations
promulgated by the Attorney General.
(5) State identification bureau.--The term ``State
identification bureau'' means the State entity designated by
the Attorney General for the submission and receipt of criminal
history record information.
(d) Criminal History Record Information Search.--
(1) In general.--
(A) Submission of fingerprints.--An authorized
employer may submit to the State identification bureau
of a participating State, fingerprints or other means
of positive identification, as determined by the
Attorney General, of an employee of such employer for
purposes of a criminal history record information
search pursuant to this Act.
(B) Employee rights.--
(i) Permission.--An authorized employer shall
obtain written consent from an employee to
submit to the State identification bureau of a
participating State the request to search the
criminal history record information of the
employee under this Act.
(ii) Access.--An authorized employer shall
provide to the employee confidential access to
any information relating to the employee
received by the authorized employer pursuant to
this Act.
(C) Providing information to the state identification
bureau.--Upon receipt of a request for a criminal
history record information search from an authorized
employer pursuant to this Act, submitted through the
State identification bureau of a participating State,
the Attorney General shall--
(i) search the appropriate records of the
Criminal Justice Information Services Division
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; and
(ii) promptly provide any resulting
identification and criminal history record
information to the submitting State
identification bureau requesting the
information.
(D) Use of information.--
(i) In general.--Upon receipt of the criminal
history record information from the Attorney
General by the State identification bureau, the
information shall be used only as provided in
clause (ii).
(ii) Terms.--In the case of--
(I) a participating State that has no
State standards for qualification to be
a private security officer, the State
shall notify an authorized employer as
to the fact of whether an employee has
been--
(aa) convicted of a felony,
an offense involving dishonesty
or a false statement if the
conviction occurred during the
previous 10 years, or an
offense involving the use or
attempted use of physical force
against the person of another
if the conviction occurred
during the previous 10 years;
or
(bb) charged with a criminal
felony for which there has been
no resolution during the
preceding 365 days; or
(II) a participating State that has
State standards for qualification to be
a private security officer, the State
shall use the information received
pursuant to this Act in applying the
State standards and shall only notify
the employer of the results of the
application of the State standards.
(E) Frequency of requests.--An authorized employer
may request a criminal history record information
search for an employee only once every 12 months of
continuous employment by that employee unless the
authorized employer has good cause to submit additional
requests.
(2) Regulations.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Attorney General shall issue such
final or interim final regulations as may be necessary to carry
out this Act, including--
(A) measures relating to the security,
confidentiality, accuracy, use, submission,
dissemination, destruction of information and audits,
and record keeping;
(B) standards for qualification as an authorized
employer; and
(C) the imposition of reasonable fees necessary for
conducting the background checks.
(3) Criminal penalties for use of information.--Whoever
knowingly and intentionally uses any information obtained
pursuant to this Act other than for the purpose of determining
the suitability of an individual for employment as a private
security officer shall be fined under title 18, United States
Code, or imprisoned for not more than 2 years, or both.
(4) User fees.--
(A) In general.--The Director of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation may--
(i) collect fees to process background checks
provided for by this Act; and
(ii) establish such fees at a level to
include an additional amount to defray expenses
for the automation of fingerprint
identification and criminal justice information
services and associated costs.
(B) Limitations.--Any fee collected under this
subsection--
(i) shall, consistent with Public Law 101-515
and Public Law 104-99, be credited to the
appropriation to be used for salaries and other
expenses incurred through providing the
services described in such Public Laws and in
subparagraph (A);
(ii) shall be available for expenditure only
to pay the costs of such activities and
services; and
(iii) shall remain available until expended.
(C) State costs.--Nothing in this Act shall be
construed as restricting the right of a State to assess
a reasonable fee on an authorized employer for the
costs to the State of administering this Act.
(5) State opt out.--A State may decline to participate in the
background check system authorized by this Act by enacting a
law or issuing an order by the Governor (if consistent with
State law) providing that the State is declining to participate
pursuant to this subsection.

SEC. 2145. TASK FORCE ON CLEARINGHOUSE FOR IAFIS CRIMINAL HISTORY
RECORDS.

Not later than 60 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the
Attorney General shall establish a task force to examine the
establishment of a national clearinghouse to process IAFIS criminal
history record requests received directly from employers providing
private security guard services with respect to critical infrastructure
(as defined in section 1016(e) of Public Law 107-56 (42 U.S.C.
5195c(e))) and other private security guard services. Members of this
task force shall include representatives of the Department of Justice
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in consultation with
representatives of the security guard industry. Not later than 90 days
after the establishment of the task force, the Attorney General shall
submit to Congress a report outlining how the national clearinghouse
shall be established, and specifying a date certain (within one year of
the enactment of this Act) by which the national clearinghouse will
begin operations.

Subtitle G--Protection of United States Aviation System From Terrorist
Attacks

SEC. 2171. PROVISION FOR THE USE OF BIOMETRIC OR OTHER TECHNOLOGY.

(a) Use of Biometric Technology.--Section 44903(h) of title 49,
United States Code, is amended--
(1) in paragraph (4)(E) by striking ``may provide for'' and
inserting ``shall issue, not later than 120 days after the date
of enactment of paragraph (5), guidance for''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``(5) Use of biometric technology in airport access control
systems.--In issuing guidance under paragraph (4)(E), the
Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security (Transportation
Security Administration), in consultation with the Attorney
General, representatives of the aviation industry, the
biometrics industry, and the National Institute of Standards
and Technology, shall establish, at a minimum--
``(A) comprehensive technical and operational system
requirements and performance standards for the use of
biometrics in airport access control systems (including
airport perimeter access control systems) to ensure
that the biometric systems are effective, reliable, and
secure;
``(B) a list of products and vendors that meet such
requirements and standards;
``(C) procedures for implementing biometric systems--
``(i) to ensure that individuals do not use
an assumed identity to enroll in a biometric
system; and
``(ii) to resolve failures to enroll, false
matches, and false non-matches; and
``(D) best practices for incorporating biometric
technology into airport access control systems in the
most effective manner, including a process to best
utilize existing airport access control systems,
facilities, and equipment and existing data networks
connecting airports.
``(6) Use of biometric technology for law enforcement officer
travel.--
``(A) In general.--Not later than 120 days after the
date of enactment of this paragraph, the Assistant
Secretary in consultation with the Attorney General
shall--
``(i) establish a law enforcement officer
travel credential that incorporates biometrics
and is uniform across all Federal, State, and
local government law enforcement agencies;
``(ii) establish a process by which the
travel credential will be used to verify the
identity of a Federal, State, or local
government law enforcement officer seeking to
carry a weapon on board an aircraft, without
unnecessarily disclosing to the public that the
individual is a law enforcement officer;
``(iii) establish procedures--
``(I) to ensure that only Federal,
State, and local government law
enforcement officers are issued the
travel credential;
``(II) to resolve failures to enroll,
false matches, and false non-matches
relating to use of the travel
credential; and
``(III) to invalidate any travel
credential that is lost, stolen, or no
longer authorized for use;
``(iv) begin issuance of the travel
credential to each Federal, State, and local
government law enforcement officer authorized
by the Assistant Secretary to carry a weapon on
board an aircraft; and
``(v) take such other actions with respect to
the travel credential as the Secretary
considers appropriate.
``(B) Funding.--There are authorized to be
appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out
this paragraph.
``(7) Definitions.--In this subsection, the following
definitions apply:
``(A) Biometric information.--The term `biometric
information' means the distinct physical or behavioral
characteristics that are used for identification, or
verification of the identity, of an individual.
``(B) Biometrics.--The term `biometrics' means a
technology that enables the automated identification,
or verification of the identity, of an individual based
on biometric information.
``(C) Failure to enroll.--The term `failure to
enroll' means the inability of an individual to enroll
in a biometric system due to an insufficiently
distinctive biometric sample, the lack of a body part
necessary to provide the biometric sample, a system
design that makes it difficult to provide consistent
biometric information, or other factors.
``(D) False match.--The term `false match' means the
incorrect matching of one individual's biometric
information to another individual's biometric
information by a biometric system.
``(E) False non-match.--The term `false non-match'
means the rejection of a valid identity by a biometric
system.
``(F) Secure area of an airport.--The term `secure
area of an airport' means the sterile area and the
Secure Identification Display Area of an airport (as
such terms are defined in section 1540.5 of title 49,
Code of Federal Regulations, or any successor
regulation to such section).''.
(b) Funding for Use of Biometric Technology in Airport Access Control
Systems.--
(1) Grant authority.--Section 44923(a)(4) of title 49, United
States Code, is amended--
(A) by striking ``and'' at the end of paragraph (3);
(B) by redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph (5);
and
(C) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following:
``(4) for projects to implement biometric technologies in
accordance with guidance issued under section 44903(h)(4)(E);
and''.
(2) Authorization of appropriations.--Section 44923(i)(1) of
such title is amended by striking ``$250,000,000 for each of
fiscal years 2004 through 2007'' and inserting ``$250,000,000
for fiscal year 2004, $345,000,000 for fiscal year 2005, and
$250,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2006 and 2007''.

SEC. 2172. TRANSPORTATION SECURITY STRATEGIC PLANNING.

Section 44904 of title 49, United States Code, is amended--
(1) by redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (e); and
(2) by inserting after subsection (b) the following:
``(c) Transportation Security Strategic Planning.--
``(1) In general.--The Secretary of Homeland Security in
consultation with the Attorney General, shall prepare and
update, as needed, a transportation sector specific plan and
transportation modal security plans in accordance with this
section.
``(2) Contents.--At a minimum, the modal security plan for
aviation prepared under paragraph (1) shall--
``(A) set risk-based priorities for defending
aviation assets;
``(B) select the most practical and cost-effective
methods for defending aviation assets;
``(C) assign roles and missions to Federal, State,
regional, and local authorities and to stakeholders;
``(D) establish a damage mitigation and recovery plan
for the aviation system in the event of a terrorist
attack; and
``(E) include a threat matrix document that outlines
each threat to the United States civil aviation system
and the corresponding layers of security in place to
address such threat.
``(3) Reports.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
enactment of the subsection and annually thereafter, the
Secretary shall submit to the Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House
of Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation of the Senate a report containing the plans
prepared under paragraph (1), including any updates to the
plans. The report may be submitted in a classified format.
``(d) Operational Criteria.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
submission of the report under subsection (c)(3), the Assistant
Secretary of Homeland Security (Transportation Security Administration)
in consultation with the Attorney General shall issue operational
criteria to protect airport infrastructure and operations against the
threats identified in the plans prepared under subsection (c)(1) and
shall approve best practices guidelines for airport assets.''.

SEC. 2173. NEXT GENERATION AIRLINE PASSENGER PRESCREENING.

(a) In General.--Section 44903(j)(2) of title 49, United States Code,
is amended by adding at the end the following:
``(C) Next generation airline passenger
prescreening.--
``(i) Commencement of testing.--Not later
than November 1, 2004, the Assistant Secretary
of Homeland Security (Transportation Security
Administration), or the designee of the
Assistant Secretary, shall commence testing of
a next generation passenger prescreening system
that will allow the Department of Homeland
Security to assume the performance of comparing
passenger name records to the automatic
selectee and no fly lists, utilizing all
appropriate records in the consolidated and
integrated terrorist watchlist maintained by
the Federal Government.
``(ii) Assumption of function.--Not later
than 180 days after completion of testing under
clause (i), the Assistant Secretary, or the
designee of the Assistant Secretary, shall
assume the performance of the passenger
prescreening function of comparing passenger
name records to the automatic selectee and no
fly lists and utilize all appropriate records
in the consolidated and integrated terrorist
watchlist maintained by the Federal Government
in performing that function.
``(iii) Requirements.--In assuming
performance of the function under clause (i),
the Assistant Secretary shall--
``(I) establish a procedure to enable
airline passengers, who are delayed or
prohibited from boarding a flight
because the next generation passenger
prescreening system determined that
they might pose a security threat, to
appeal such determination and correct
information contained in the system;
``(II) ensure that Federal Government
databases that will be used to
establish the identity of a passenger
under the system will not produce a
large number of false positives;
``(III) establish an internal
oversight board to oversee and monitor
the manner in which the system is being
implemented;
``(IV) establish sufficient
operational safeguards to reduce the
opportunities for abuse;
``(V) implement substantial security
measures to protect the system from
unauthorized access;
``(VI) adopt policies establishing
effective oversight of the use and
operation of the system; and
``(VII) ensure that there are no
specific privacy concerns with the
technological architecture of the
system.
``(iv) Passenger name records.--Not later
than 60 days after the completion of the
testing of the next generation passenger
prescreening system, the Assistant Secretary
shall require air carriers to supply to the
Assistant Secretary the passenger name records
needed to begin implementing the next
generation passenger prescreening system.
``(D) Screening of employees against watchlist.--The
Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security
(Transportation Security Administration), in
coordination with the Secretary of Transportation and
the Administrator of the Federal Aviation
Administration, shall ensure that individuals are
screened against all appropriate records in the
consolidated and integrated terrorist watchlist
maintained by the Federal Government before--
``(i) being certificated by the Federal
Aviation Administration;
``(ii) being issued a credential for access
to the secure area of an airport; or
``(iii) being issued a credential for access
to the air operations area (as defined in
section 1540.5 of title 49, Code of Federal
Regulations, or any successor regulation to
such section) of an airport.
``(E) Appeal procedures.--The Assistant Secretary
shall establish a timely and fair process for
individuals identified as a threat under subparagraph
(D) to appeal the determination and correct any
erroneous information.
``(F) Definition.--In this paragraph, the term
`secure area of an airport' means the sterile area and
the Secure Identification Display Area of an airport
(as such terms are defined in section 1540.5 of title
49, Code of Federal Regulations, or any successor
regulation to such section).''.
(b) GAO Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date on
which the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security
(Transportation Security Administration) assumes performance of
the passenger prescreening function under section
44903(j)(2)(C)(ii) of title 49, United States Code, the
Comptroller General shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report on the assumption of such
function. The report may be submitted in a classified format.
(2) Contents.--The report under paragraph (1) shall address--
(A) whether a system exists in the next generation
passenger prescreening system whereby aviation
passengers, determined to pose a threat and either
delayed or prohibited from boarding their scheduled
flights by the Transportation Security Administration,
may appeal such a decision and correct erroneous
information;
(B) the sufficiency of identifying information
contained in passenger name records and any government
databases for ensuring that a large number of false
positives will not result under the next generation
passenger prescreening system in a significant number
of passengers being treated as a threat mistakenly or
in security resources being diverted;
(C) whether the Transportation Security
Administration stress tested the next generation
passenger prescreening system;
(D) whether an internal oversight board has been
established in the Department of Homeland Security to
monitor the next generation passenger prescreening
system;
(E) whether sufficient operational safeguards have
been established to prevent the opportunities for abuse
of the system;
(F) whether substantial security measures are in
place to protect the passenger prescreening database
from unauthorized access;
(G) whether policies have been adopted for the
effective oversight of the use and operation of the
system;
(H) whether specific privacy concerns still exist
with the system; and
(I) whether appropriate life cycle cost estimates
have been developed, and a benefit and cost analysis
has been performed, for the system.

SEC. 2174. DEPLOYMENT AND USE OF EXPLOSIVE DETECTION EQUIPMENT AT
AIRPORT SCREENING CHECKPOINTS.

(a) Nonmetallic Weapons and Explosives.--In order to improve
security, the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security (Transportation
Security Administration) shall give priority to developing, testing,
improving, and deploying technology at screening checkpoints at
airports that will detect nonmetallic weapons and explosives on the
person of individuals, in their clothing, or in their carry-on baggage
or personal property and shall ensure that the equipment alone, or as
part of an integrated system, can detect under realistic operating
conditions the types of nonmetallic weapons and explosives that
terrorists would likely try to smuggle aboard an air carrier aircraft.
(b) Strategic Plan for Deployment and Use of Explosive Detection
Equipment at Airport Screening Checkpoints.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Assistant Secretary shall transmit
to the appropriate congressional committees a strategic plan to
promote the optimal utilization and deployment of explosive
detection systems at airports to screen individuals and their
carry-on baggage or personal property, including walk-through
explosive detection portals, document scanners, shoe scanners,
and any other explosive detection equipment for use at a
screening checkpoint. The plan may be transmitted in a
classified format.
(2) Contents.--The strategic plan shall include descriptions
of the operational applications of explosive detection
equipment at airport screening checkpoints, a deployment
schedule and quantities of equipment needed to implement the
plan, and funding needs for implementation of the plan,
including a financing plan that provides for leveraging non-
Federal funding.

SEC. 2175. PILOT PROGRAM TO EVALUATE USE OF BLAST-RESISTANT CARGO AND
BAGGAGE CONTAINERS.

(a) In General.--Beginning not later than 180 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security
(Transportation Security Administration) shall carry out a pilot
program to evaluate the use of blast-resistant containers for cargo and
baggage on passenger aircraft to minimize the potential effects of
detonation of an explosive device.
(b) Incentives for Participation in Pilot Program.--
(1) In general.--As part of the pilot program, the Assistant
Secretary shall provide incentives to air carriers to volunteer
to test the use of blast-resistant containers for cargo and
baggage on passenger aircraft.
(2) Applications.--To volunteer to participate in the
incentive program, an air carrier shall submit to the Assistant
Secretary an application that is in such form and contains such
information as the Assistant Secretary requires.
(3) Types of assistance.--Assistance provided by the
Assistant Secretary to air carriers that volunteer to
participate in the pilot program shall include the use of
blast-resistant containers and financial assistance to cover
increased costs to the carriers associated with the use and
maintenance of the containers, including increased fuel costs.
(c) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of enactment of
this Act, the Assistant Secretary shall submit to appropriate
congressional committees a report on the results of the pilot program.
(d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be
appropriated to carry out this section $2,000,000. Such sums shall
remain available until expended.

SEC. 2176. AIR CARGO SCREENING TECHNOLOGY.

The Transportation Security Administration shall develop technology
to better identify, track, and screen air cargo.

SEC. 2177. AIRPORT CHECKPOINT SCREENING EXPLOSIVE DETECTION.

Section 44940 of title 49, United States Code, is amended by adding
at the end the following:
``(i) Checkpoint Screening Security Fund.--
``(1) Establishment.--There is established in the Department
of Homeland Security a fund to be known as the `Checkpoint
Screening Security Fund'.
``(2) Deposits.--In each of fiscal years 2005 and 2006, after
amounts are made available under section 44923(h), the next
$30,000,000 derived from fees received under subsection (a)(1)
shall be available to be deposited in the Fund.
``(3) Fees.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall impose
the fee authorized by subsection (a)(1) so as to collect at
least $30,000,000 in each of fiscal years 2005 and 2006 for
deposit into the Fund.
``(4) Availability of amounts.--Amounts in the Fund shall be
available for the purchase, deployment, and installation of
equipment to improve the ability of security screening
personnel at screening checkpoints to detect explosives.''.

SEC. 2178. NEXT GENERATION SECURITY CHECKPOINT.

(a) Pilot Program.--The Transportation Security Administration shall
develop, not later than 120 days after the date of enactment of this
Act, and conduct a pilot program to test, integrate, and deploy next
generation security checkpoint screening technology at not less than 5
airports in the United States.
(b) Human Factor Studies.-- The Administration shall conduct human
factors studies to improve screener performance as part of the pilot
program under subsection (a).

SEC. 2179. PENALTY FOR FAILURE TO SECURE COCKPIT DOOR.

(a) Civil Penalty.--Section 46301(a) of title 49, United States Code,
is amended by adding at the end the following:
``(6) Penalty for failure to secure flight deck door.--Any
person holding a part 119 certificate under part of title 14,
Code of Federal Regulations, is liable to the Government for a
civil penalty of not more than $25,000 for each violation, by
the pilot in command of an aircraft owned or operated by such
person, of any Federal regulation that requires that the flight
deck door be closed and locked when the aircraft is being
operated.''.
(b) Technical Corrections.--
(1) Compromise and setoff for false information.--Section
46302(b) of such title is amended by striking ``Secretary of
Transportation'' and inserting ``Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security and, for a violation relating to section
46504, the Secretary of Transportation,''.
(2) Carrying a weapon.--Section 46303 of such title is
amended--
(A) in subsection (b) by striking ``Secretary of
Transportation'' and inserting ``Secretary of Homeland
Security''; and
(B) in subsection (c)(2) by striking ``Under
Secretary of Transportation for Security'' and
inserting ``Secretary of Homeland Security''.
(3) Administrative imposition of penalties.--Section 46301(d)
of such title is amended--
(A) in the first sentence of paragraph (2) by
striking ``46302, 46303,'' and inserting ``46302 (for a
violation relating to section 46504),''; and
(B) in the second sentence of paragraph (2)--
(i) by striking ``Under Secretary of
Transportation for Security'' and inserting
``Secretary of Homeland Security''; and
(ii) by striking ``44909)'' and inserting
``44909), 46302 (except for a violation
relating to section 46504), 46303,'';
(C) in each of paragraphs (2), (3), and (4) by
striking ``Under Secretary or'' and inserting
``Secretary of Homeland Security''; and
(D) in paragraph (4)(A) by moving clauses (i), (ii),
and (iii) 2 ems to the left.

SEC. 2180. FEDERAL AIR MARSHAL ANONYMITY.

The Director of the Federal Air Marshal Service of the Department of
Homeland Security shall continue to develop operational initiatives to
protect the anonymity of Federal air marshals.

SEC. 2181. FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT COUNTERTERRORISM TRAINING.

(a) The Assistant Secretary for Immigration and Customs Enforcement
and the Director of Federal Air Marshal Service of the Department of
Homeland Security, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of
Homeland Security (Transportation Security Administration), shall make
available appropriate in-flight counterterrorism and weapons handling
procedures and tactics training to Federal law enforcement officers who
fly while on duty.
(b) The Assistant Secretary for Immigration and Customs Enforcement
and the Director of Federal Air Marshal Service of the Department of
Homeland Security, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of
Homeland Security (Transportation Security Administration), shall
ensure that Transportation Security Administration screeners and
Federal Air Marshals receive training in identifying fraudulent
identification documents, including fraudulent or expired Visas and
Passports. Such training shall also be made available to other Federal
law enforcement agencies and local law enforcement agencies located in
border states.

SEC. 2182. FEDERAL FLIGHT DECK OFFICER WEAPON CARRIAGE PILOT PROGRAM.

(a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment
of this Act, the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security
(Transportation Security Administration), with the concurrence of the
Attorney General, shall implement a pilot program to allow pilots
participating in the Federal flight deck officer program to transport
their firearms on their persons. The Assistant Secretary, in
consultation with the Attorney General, may prescribe any training,
equipment, or procedures including procedures for reporting of missing,
lost or stolen firearms, that the Assistant Secretary determines
necessary to ensure safety and maximize weapon retention.
(b) Review.--Not later than 1 year after the date of initiation of
the pilot program, the Assistant Secretary shall conduct a review of
the safety record of the pilot program and transmit a report on the
results of the review to the appropriate congressional committees.
(c) Option.--If the Assistant Secretary as part of the review under
subsection (b) determines that the safety level obtained under the
pilot program is comparable to the safety level determined under
existing methods of pilots carrying firearms on aircraft, the Assistant
Secretary shall allow all pilots participating in the Federal flight
deck officer program the option of carrying their firearm on their
person subject to such requirements as the Assistant Secretary
determines appropriate.

SEC. 2183. REGISTERED TRAVELER PROGRAM.

The Transportation Security Administration shall expedite
implementation of the registered traveler program.

SEC. 2184. WIRELESS COMMUNICATION.

(a) Study.--The Transportation Security Administration, in
consultation with the Federal Aviation Administration, shall conduct a
study to determine the viability of providing devices or methods,
including wireless methods, to enable a flight crew to discreetly
notify the pilot in the case of a security breach or safety issue
occurring in the cabin.
(b) Matters to Be Considered.--In conducting the study, the
Transportation Security Administration and the Federal Aviation
Administration shall consider technology that is readily available and
can be quickly integrated and customized for use aboard aircraft for
flight crew communication.
(c) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of
this Act, the Transportation Security Administration shall submit to
the appropriate congressional committees a report on the results of the
study.

SEC. 2185. SECONDARY FLIGHT DECK BARRIERS.

Not later than 6 months after the date of enactment of this Act, the
Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security (Transportation Security
Administration) shall transmit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report on the costs and benefits associated with the use
of secondary flight deck barriers and whether the use of such barriers
should be mandated for all air carriers. The Assistant Secretary may
transmit the report in a classified format.

SEC. 2186. EXTENSION.

Section 48301(a) of title 49, United States Code, is amended by
striking ``and 2005'' and inserting ``2005, and 2006''.

SEC. 2187. PERIMETER SECURITY.

(a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of
this Act, the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security (Transportation
Security Administration), in consultation with airport operators and
law enforcement authorities, shall develop and submit to the
appropriate congressional committee a report on airport perimeter
security. The report may be submitted in a classified format.
(b) Contents.--The report shall include--
(1) an examination of the feasibility of access control
technologies and procedures, including the use of biometrics
and other methods of positively identifying individuals prior
to entry into secure areas of airports, and provide best
practices for enhanced perimeter access control techniques; and
(2) an assessment of the feasibility of physically screening
all individuals prior to entry into secure areas of an airport
and additional methods for strengthening the background vetting
process for all individuals credentialed to gain access to
secure areas of airports.

SEC. 2188. EXTREMELY HAZARDOUS MATERIALS TRANSPORTATION SECURITY.

(a) Rulemaking.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in
consultation with the Attorney General and the heads of other
appropriate Federal, State, and local government entities,
security experts, representatives of the hazardous materials
shipping industry and labor unions representing persons who
work in the hazardous materials shipping industry, and other
interested persons, shall issue, after notice and opportunity
for public comment, regulations concerning the shipping of
extremely hazardous materials.
(2) Purposes of regulations.--The regulations shall be
consistent, to the extent the Secretary determines appropriate,
with and not duplicative of other Federal regulations and
international agreements relating to the shipping of extremely
hazardous materials and shall require--
(A) physical security measures for such shipments,
such as the use of passive secondary containment of
tanker valves, additional security force personnel, and
surveillance technologies and barriers;
(B) concerned Federal, State, and local law
enforcement authorities (including, if applicable,
transit, railroad, or port authority police agencies)
to be informed before an extremely hazardous material
is transported within, through, or near an area of
concern;
(C) coordination with Federal, State, and local law
enforcement authorities to create response plans for a
terrorist attack on a shipment of extremely hazardous
materials;
(D) the use of currently available technologies and
systems to ensure effective and immediate communication
between transporters of extremely hazardous materials,
law enforcement authorities and first responders;
(E) comprehensive and appropriate training in the
area of extremely hazardous materials transportation
security for all individuals who transport, load,
unload, or are otherwise involved in the shipping of
extremely hazardous materials or who would respond to
an accident or incident involving a shipment of
extremely hazardous material or would have to repair
transportation equipment and facilities in the event of
such an accident or incident; and
(F) for the transportation of extremely hazardous
materials through or near an area of concern, the
Secretary to determine whether or not the
transportation could be made by one or more alternate
routes at lower security risk and, if the Secretary
determines the transportation could be made by an
alternate route, the use of such alternate route,
except when the origination or destination of the
shipment is located within the area of concern.
(b) Judicial Relief.--A person (other than an individual) who
transports, loads, unloads, or is otherwise involved in the shipping of
hazardous materials and violates or fails to comply with a regulation
issued by the Secretary under subsection (a) may be subject, in a civil
action brought in United States district court, for each shipment with
respect to which the violation occurs--
(1) to an order for injunctive relief; or
(2) to a civil penalty of not more than $100,000.
(c) Administrative Penalties.--
(1) Penalty orders.--The Secretary may issue an order
imposing an administrative penalty of not more than $1,000,000
for failure by a person (other than an individual) who
transports, loads, unloads, or is otherwise involved in the
shipping of hazardous materials to comply with a regulation
issued by the Secretary under subsection (a).
(2) Notice and hearing.--Before issuing an order described in
paragraph (1), the Secretary shall provide to the person
against whom the penalty is to be assessed--
(A) written notice of the proposed order; and
(B) the opportunity to request, not later than 30
days after the date on which the person receives the
notice, a hearing on the proposed order.
(3) Procedures.--The Secretary may issue regulations
establishing procedures for administrative hearings and
appropriate review of penalties issued under this subsection,
including necessary deadlines.
(d) Whistleblower Protection.--
(1) In general.--No person involved in the shipping of
extremely hazardous materials may be discharged, demoted,
suspended, threatened, harassed, or in any other manner
discriminated against because of any lawful act done by the
person--
(A) to provide information, cause information to be
provided, or otherwise assist in an investigation
regarding any conduct which the person reasonably
believes constitutes a violation of any law, rule or
regulation related to the security of shipments of
extremely hazardous materials, or any other threat to
the security of shipments of extremely hazardous
materials, when the information or assistance is
provided to or the investigation is conducted by--
(i) a Federal regulatory or law enforcement
agency;
(ii) any Member of Congress or any committee
of Congress; or
(iii) a person with supervisory authority
over the person (or such other person who has
the authority to investigate, discover, or
terminate misconduct); or
(B) to file, cause to be filed, testify, participate
in, or otherwise assist in a proceeding or action filed
or about to be filed relating to a violation of any
law, rule or regulation related to the security of
shipments of extremely hazardous materials or any other
threat to the security of shipments of extremely
hazardous materials.
(C) to refuse to violate or assist in the violation
of any law, rule, or regulation related to the security
of shipments of extremely hazardous materials.
(2) Enforcement action.--
(A) In general.--A person who alleges discharge or
other discrimination by any person in violation of
paragraph (1) may seek relief under paragraph (3), by--
(i) filing a complaint with the Secretary of
Labor; or
(ii) if the Secretary has not issued a final
decision within 180 days of the filing of the
complaint and there is no showing that such
delay is due to the bad faith of the claimant,
bringing an action at law or equity for de novo
review in the appropriate district court of the
United States, which shall have jurisdiction
over such an action without regard to the
amount in controversy.
(B) Procedure.--
(i) In general.-- An action under
subparagraph (A)(i) shall be governed under the
rules and procedures set forth in section
42121(b) of title 49, United States Code.
(ii) Exception.--Notification made under
section 42121(b)(1) of title 49, United States
Code, shall be made to the person named in the
complaint and to the person's employer.
(iii) Burdens of proof.--An action brought
under subparagraph (A)(ii) shall be governed by
the legal burdens of proof set forth in section
42121(b) of title 49, United States Code.
(iv) Statute of limitations.--An action under
subparagraph (A) shall be commenced not later
than 90 days after the date on which the
violation occurs.
(3) Remedies.--
(A) In general.--A person prevailing in any action
under paragraph (2)(A) shall be entitled to all relief
necessary to make the person whole.
(B) Compensatory damages.--Relief for any action
under subparagraph (A) shall include--
(i) reinstatement with the same seniority
status that the person would have had, but for
the discrimination;
(ii) the amount of any back pay, with
interest; and
(iii) compensation for any special damages
sustained as a result of the discrimination,
including litigation costs, expert witness
fees, and reasonable attorney fees.
(4) Rights retained by person.--Nothing in this subsection
shall be deemed to diminish the rights, privileges, or remedies
of any person under any Federal or State law, or under any
collective bargaining agreement.
(e) Definitions.--In this section, the following definitions apply:
(1) Extremely hazardous material.--The term ``extremely
hazardous material'' means--
(A) a material that is toxic by inhalation;
(B) a material that is extremely flammable;
(C) a material that is highly explosive; and
(D) any other material designated by the Secretary to
be extremely hazardous.
(2) Area of concern.--The term ``area of concern'' means an
area that the Secretary determines could pose a particular
interest to terrorists.

SEC. 2189. DEFINITIONS.

In this title, the following definitions apply:
(1) Appropriate congressional committee.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means the Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure and the Committee on the
Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate.
(2) Air carrier.--The term ``air carrier'' has the meaning
such term has under section 40102 of title 49, United States
Code.
(3) Secure area of an airport.--The term ``secure area of an
airport'' means the sterile area and the Secure Identification
Display Area of an airport (as such terms are defined in
section 1540.5 of title 49, Code of Federal Regulations, or any
successor regulation to such section).

Subtitle H--Other Matters

SEC. 2191. GRAND JURY INFORMATION SHARING.

(a) Rule Amendments.--Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure is amended--
(1) in paragraph (3)--
(A) in subparagraph (A)(ii), by striking ``or state
subdivision or of an Indian tribe'' and inserting ``,
state subdivision, Indian tribe, or foreign
government'';
(B) in subparagraph (D)--
(i) by inserting after the first sentence the
following: ``An attorney for the government may
also disclose any grand-jury matter involving a
threat of actual or potential attack or other
grave hostile acts of a foreign power or an
agent of a foreign power, domestic or
international sabotage, domestic or
international terrorism, or clandestine
intelligence gathering activities by an
intelligence service or network of a foreign
power or by an agent of a foreign power, within
the United States or elsewhere, to any
appropriate Federal, State, state subdivision,
Indian tribal, or foreign government official
for the purpose of preventing or responding to
such a threat.''; and
(ii) in clause (i)--
(I) by striking ``federal''; and
(II) by adding at the end the
following: ``Any State, state
subdivision, Indian tribal, or foreign
government official who receives
information under Rule 6(e)(3)(D) may
use the information only consistent
with such guidelines as the Attorney
General and the National Intelligence
Director shall jointly issue.''; and
(C) in subparagraph (E)--
(i) by redesignating clauses (iii) and (iv)
as clauses (iv) and (v), respectively;
(ii) by inserting after clause (ii) the
following:
``(iii) at the request of the government,
when sought by a foreign court or prosecutor
for use in an official criminal
investigation;''; and
(iii) in clause (iv), as redesignated--
(I) by striking ``state or Indian
tribal'' and inserting ``State, Indian
tribal, or foreign''; and
(II) by striking ``or Indian tribal
official'' and inserting ``Indian
tribal, or foreign government
official''; and
(2) in paragraph (7), by inserting ``, or of guidelines
jointly issued by the Attorney General and Director of Central
Intelligence pursuant to Rule 6,'' after ``Rule 6''.
(b) Conforming Amendment.--Section 203(c) of Public Law 107-56 (18
U.S.C. 2517 note) is amended by striking ``Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i)(V) and
(VI)'' and inserting ``Rule 6(e)(3)(D)''.

SEC. 2192. INTEROPERABLE LAW ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLIGENCE DATA SYSTEM.

(a) Findings.--The Congress finds as follows:
(1) The interoperable electronic data system know as the
``Chimera system'', and required to be developed and
implemented by section 202(a)(2) of the Enhanced Border
Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (8 U.S.C.
1722(a)(2)), has not in any way been implemented.
(2) Little progress has been made since the enactment of such
Act with regard to establishing a process to connect existing
trusted systems operated independently by the respective
intelligence agencies.
(3) It is advisable, therefore, to assign such responsibility
to the National Intelligence Director.
(4) The National Intelligence Director should, pursuant to
the amendments made by subsection (c), begin systems planning
immediately upon assuming office to deliver an interim system
not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this
Act, and to deliver the fully functional Chimera system not
later than September 11, 2007.
(5) Both the interim system, and the fully functional Chimera
system, should be designed so that intelligence officers,
Federal law enforcement agencies (as defined in section 2 of
such Act (8 U.S.C. 1701)), operational counter-terror support
center personnel, consular officers, and Department of Homeland
Security enforcement officers have access to them.
(b) Purposes.--The purposes of this section are as follows:
(1) To provide the National Intelligence Director with the
necessary authority and resources to establish both an interim
data system and, subsequently, a fully functional Chimera
system, to collect and share intelligence and operational
information with the intelligence community (as defined in
section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
401a(4)).
(2) To require the National Intelligence Director to
establish a state-of-the-art Chimera system with both biometric
identification and linguistic capabilities satisfying the best
technology standards.
(3) To ensure that the National Intelligence Center will have
a fully functional capability, not later than September 11,
2007, for interoperable data and intelligence exchange with the
agencies of the intelligence community (as so defined).
(c) Amendments.--
(1) In general.--Title II of the Enhanced Border Security and
Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (8 U.S.C. 1721 et seq.) is
amended--
(A) in section 202(a)--
(i) by amending paragraphs (1) and (2) to
read as follows:
``(1) Interim interoperable intelligence data exchange
system.--Not later than 1 year after assuming office, the
National Intelligence Director shall establish an interim
interoperable intelligence data exchange system that will
connect the data systems operated independently by the entities
in the intelligence community and by the National
Counterterrorism Center, so as to permit automated data
exchange among all of these entities. Immediately upon assuming
office, the National Intelligence Director shall begin the
plans necessary to establish such interim system.
``(2) Chimera system.--Not later than September 11, 2007, the
National Intelligence Director shall establish a fully
functional interoperable law enforcement and intelligence
electronic data system within the National Counterterrorism
Center to provide immediate access to information in databases
of Federal law enforcement agencies and the intelligence
community that is necessary to identify terrorists, and
organizations and individuals that support terrorism. The
system established under this paragraph shall referred to as
the `Chimera system'. '';
(ii) in paragraph (3)--
(I) by striking ``President'' and
inserting ``National Intelligence
Director''; and
(II) by striking ``the data system''
and inserting ``the interim system
described in paragraph (1) and the
Chimera system described in paragraph
(2)'';
(iii) in paragraph (4)(A), by striking ``The
data system'' and all that follows through
``(2),'' and inserting ``The interim system
described in paragraph (1) and the Chimera
system described in paragraph (2)'';
(iv) in paragraph (5)--
(I) in the matter preceding
subparagraph (A), by striking ``data
system under this subsection'' and
inserting ``Chimera system described in
paragraph (2)'';
(II) in subparagraph (B), by striking
``and'' at the end;
(III) in subparagraph (C), by
striking the period at the end and
inserting ``; and''; and
(IV) by adding at the end the
following:
``(D) to any Federal law enforcement or intelligence
officer authorized to assist in the investigation,
identification, or prosecution of terrorists, alleged
terrorists, individuals supporting terrorist
activities, and individuals alleged to support
terrorist activities. ''; and
(v) in paragraph (6)--
(I) by striking ``President'' and
inserting ``National Intelligence
Director'';
(II) by striking ``the data system''
and all that follows through ``(2),''
and inserting ``the interim system
described in paragraph (1) and the
Chimera system described in paragraph
(2)'';
(B) in section 202(b)--
(i) in paragraph (1), by striking ``The
interoperable'' and all that follows through
``subsection (a)'' and inserting ``the Chimera
system described in subsection (a)(2)'';
(ii) in paragraph (2), by striking
``interoperable electronic database'' and
inserting ``Chimera system described in
subsection (a)(2)''; and
(iii) by amending paragraph (4) to read as
follows:
``(4) Interim reports.--Not later than 6 months after
assuming office, the National Intelligence Director shall
submit a report to the appropriate committees of Congress on
the progress in implementing each requirement of this
section.'';
(C) in section 204--
(i) by striking ``Attorney General'' each
place such term appears and inserting
``National Intelligence Director'';
(ii) in subsection (d)(1), by striking
``Attorney General's'' and inserting ``National
Intelligence Director's''; and
(D) by striking section 203 and redesignating section
204 as section 203.
(2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents for the
Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (8
U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) is amended--
(A) by striking the item relating to section 203; and
(B) by redesignating the item relating to section 204
as relating to section 203.

SEC. 2193. IMPROVEMENT OF INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES OF THE FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.

(a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National Commission
on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States and to meet the
intelligence needs of the United States, Congress makes the following
findings:
(1) The Federal Bureau of Investigation has made significant
progress in improving its intelligence capabilities.
(2) The Federal Bureau of Investigation must further enhance
and fully institutionalize its ability to prevent, preempt, and
disrupt terrorist threats to our homeland, our people, our
allies, and our interests.
(3) The Federal Bureau of Investigation must collect,
process, share, and disseminate, to the greatest extent
permitted by applicable law, to the President, the Vice
President, and other officials in the Executive Branch, all
terrorism information and other information necessary to
safeguard our people and advance our national and homeland
security interests.
(4) The Federal Bureau of Investigation must move towards
full and seamless coordination and cooperation with all other
elements of the Intelligence Community, including full
participation in, and support to, the National Counterterrorism
Center.
(5) The Federal Bureau of Investigation must strengthen its
pivotal role in coordination and cooperation with Federal,
State, tribal, and local law enforcement agencies to ensure the
necessary sharing of information for counterterrorism and
criminal law enforcement purposes.
(6) The Federal Bureau of Investigation must perform its
vital intelligence functions in a manner consistent with both
with national intelligence priorities and respect for privacy
and other civil liberties under the Constitution and laws of
the United States.
(b) Improvement of Intelligence Capabilities.--The Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation shall establish a comprehensive
intelligence program for--
(1) intelligence analysis, including recruitment and hiring
of analysts, analyst training, priorities and status for
analysis, and analysis performance measures;
(2) intelligence production, including product standards,
production priorities, information sharing and dissemination,
and customer satisfaction measures;
(3) production of intelligence that is responsive to national
intelligence requirements and priorities, including measures of
the degree to which each FBI headquarters and field component
is collecting and providing such intelligence;
(4) intelligence sources, including source validation, new
source development, and performance measures;
(5) field intelligence operations, including staffing and
infrastructure, management processes, priorities, and
performance measures;
(6) full and seamless coordination and cooperation with the
other components of the Intelligence Community, consistent with
their responsibilities; and
(7) sharing of FBI intelligence and information across
Federal, state, and local governments, with the private sector,
and with foreign partners as provided by law or by guidelines
of the Attorney General.
(c) Intelligence Directorate.--The Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation shall establish an Intelligence Directorate within the
FBI. The Intelligence Directorate shall have the authority to manage
and direct the intelligence operations of all FBI headquarters and
field components. The Intelligence Directorate shall have
responsibility for all components and functions of the FBI necessary
for--
(1) oversight of FBI field intelligence operations;
(2) FBI human source development and management;
(3) FBI collection against nationally-determined intelligence
requirements;
(4) language services;
(5) strategic analysis;
(6) intelligence program and budget management; and
(7) the intelligence workforce.
(d) National Security Workforce.--The Director of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation shall establish a specialized, integrated intelligence
cadre composed of Special Agents, analysts, linguists, and surveillance
specialists in a manner which creates and sustains within the FBI a
workforce with substantial expertise in, and commitment to, the
intelligence mission of the FBI. The Director shall--
(1) ensure that these FBI employees may make their career,
including promotion to the most senior positions in the FBI,
within this career track;
(2) establish intelligence cadre requirements for--
(A) training;
(B) career development and certification;
(C) recruitment, hiring, and selection;
(D) integrating field intelligence teams; and
(E) senior level field management;
(3) establish intelligence officer certification
requirements, including requirements for training courses and
assignments to other intelligence, national security, or
homeland security components of the Executive branch, in order
to advance to senior operational management positions in the
FBI;
(4) ensure that the FBI's recruitment and training program
enhances its ability to attract individuals with educational
and professional backgrounds in intelligence, international
relations, language, technology, and other skills relevant to
the intelligence mission of the FBI;
(5) ensure that all Special Agents and analysts employed by
the FBI after the date of the enactment of this Act shall
receive basic training in both criminal justice matters and
intelligence matters;
(6) ensure that all Special Agents employed by the FBI after
the date of the enactment of this Act, to the maximum extent
practicable, be given an opportunity to undergo, during their
early service with the FBI, meaningful assignments in criminal
justice matters and in intelligence matters;
(7) ensure that, to the maximum extent practical, Special
Agents who specialize in intelligence are afforded the
opportunity to work on intelligence matters over the remainder
of their career with the FBI; and
(8) ensure that, to the maximum extent practical, analysts
are afforded FBI training and career opportunities commensurate
with the training and career opportunities afforded analysts in
other elements of the intelligence community.
(e) Field Office Matters.--The Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation shall take appropriate actions to ensure the integration
of analysis, Special Agents, linguists, and surveillance personnel in
FBI field intelligence components and to provide effective leadership
and infrastructure to support FBI field intelligence components. The
Director shall--
(1) ensure that each FBI field office has an official at the
level of Assistant Special Agent in Charge or higher with
responsibility for the FBI field intelligence component; and
(2) to the extent practicable, provide for such expansion of
special compartmented information facilities in FBI field
offices as is necessary to ensure the discharge by the field
intelligence components of the national security and criminal
intelligence mission of the FBI.
(g) Budget Matters.--The Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation shall, in consultation with the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget, modify the budget structure of the FBI in order
to organize the budget according to its four main programs as follows:
(1) Intelligence.
(2) Counterterrorism and counterintelligence.
(3) Criminal enterprise/Federal crimes.
(4) Criminal justice services.
(h) Reports.--
(1)(A) Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and every twelve months thereafter, the
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall submit to
Congress a report on the progress made as of the date of such
report in carrying out the requirements of this section.
(B) The Director shall include in the first report required
by subparagraph (A) an estimate of the resources required to
complete the expansion of special compartmented information
facilities to carry out the intelligence mission of FBI field
intelligence components.
(2) In each annual report required by paragraph (1)(A) the
director shall include--
(A) a report on the progress made by each FBI field
office during the period covered by such review in
addressing FBI and national intelligence priorities;
(B) a report assessing the qualifications, status,
and roles of analysts at FBI headquarters and in FBI
field offices; and
(C) a report on the progress of the FBI in
implementing information-sharing principles.
(3) A report required by this subsection shall be submitted--
(A) to each committee of Congress that has
jurisdiction over the subject matter of such report;
and
(B) in unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex.

SEC. 2194. NUCLEAR FACILITY THREATS.

(a) Study.--The President, in consultation with the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission and other appropriate Federal, State, and local
agencies and private entities, shall conduct a study to identify the
types of threats that pose an appreciable risk to the security of the
various classes of facilities licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Such study shall take
into account, but not be limited to--
(1) the events of September 11, 2001;
(2) an assessment of physical, cyber, biochemical, and other
terrorist threats;
(3) the potential for attack on facilities by multiple
coordinated teams of a large number of individuals;
(4) the potential for assistance in an attack from several
persons employed at the facility;
(5) the potential for suicide attacks;
(6) the potential for water-based and air-based threats;
(7) the potential use of explosive devices of considerable
size and other modern weaponry;
(8) the potential for attacks by persons with a sophisticated
knowledge of facility operations;
(9) the potential for fires, especially fires of long
duration; and
(10) the potential for attacks on spent fuel shipments by
multiple coordinated teams of a large number of individuals.
(b) Summary and Classification Report.--Not later than 180 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit to
the Congress and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission a report--
(1) summarizing the types of threats identified under
subsection (a); and
(2) classifying each type of threat identified under
subsection (a), in accordance with existing laws and
regulations, as either--
(A) involving attacks and destructive acts, including
sabotage, directed against the facility by an enemy of
the United States, whether a foreign government or
other person, or otherwise falling under the
responsibilities of the Federal Government; or
(B) involving the type of risks that Nuclear
Regulatory Commission licensees should be responsible
for guarding against.
(c) Federal Action Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date on
which a report is transmitted under subsection (b), the President shall
transmit to the Congress a report on actions taken, or to be taken, to
address the types of threats identified under subsection (b)(2)(A).
Such report may include a classified annex as appropriate.
(d) Regulations.--Not later than 270 days after the date on which a
report is transmitted under subsection (b), the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission shall issue regulations, including changes to the design
basis threat, to ensure that licensees address the threats identified
under subsection (b)(2)(B).
(e) Physical Security Program.--The Nuclear Regulatory Commission
shall establish an operational safeguards response evaluation program
that ensures that the physical protection capability and operational
safeguards response for sensitive nuclear facilities, as determined by
the Commission consistent with the protection of public health and the
common defense and security, shall be tested periodically through
Commission designed, observed, and evaluated force-on-force exercises
to determine whether the ability to defeat the design basis threat is
being maintained. The exercises shall be conducted by a mock terrorist
team consisting of Commission personnel with advanced knowledge of
special weapons and tactics comparable to special operations forces of
the Armed Forces. For purposes of this subsection, the term ``sensitive
nuclear facilities'' includes at a minimum commercial nuclear power
plants, including associated spent fuel storage facilities, spent fuel
storage pools and dry cask storage at closed reactors, independent
spent fuel storage facilities and geologic repository operations areas,
category I fuel cycle facilities, and gaseous diffusion plants. There
are authorized to be appropriated to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
$3,000,000 for the purposes of carrying out this subsection.
(f) Control of Information.--In carrying out this section, the
President and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission shall control the
dissemination of restricted data, safeguards information, and other
classified national security information in a manner so as to ensure
the common defense and security, consistent with chapter 12 of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

SEC. 2195. AUTHORIZATION AND CHANGE OF COPS PROGRAM TO SINGLE GRANT
PROGRAM.

(a) In General.--Section 1701 of title I of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. 3796dd) is amended--
(1) by amending subsection (a) to read as follows:
``(a) Grant Authorization.--The Attorney General shall carry out a
single grant program under which the Attorney General makes grants to
States, units of local government, Indian tribal governments, other
public and private entities, and multi-jurisdictional or regional
consortia for the purposes described in subsection (b).'';
(2) by striking subsections (b) and (c);
(3) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (b), and in
that subsection--
(A) by striking ``Additional Grant Projects.--Grants
made under subsection (a) may include programs,
projects, and other activities to--'' and inserting
``Uses of Grant Amounts.--The purposes for which grants
made under subsection (a) may be made are--'';
(B) by redesignating paragraphs (1) through (12) as
paragraphs (6) through (17), respectively;
(C) by inserting before paragraph (5) (as so
redesignated) the following new paragraphs:
``(1) rehire law enforcement officers who have been laid off
as a result of State and local budget reductions for deployment
in community-oriented policing;
``(2) hire and train new, additional career law enforcement
officers for deployment in community-oriented policing across
the Nation;
``(3) procure equipment, technology, or support systems, or
pay overtime, to increase the number of officers deployed in
community-oriented policing;
``(4) improve security at schools and on school grounds in
the jurisdiction of the grantee through--
``(A) placement and use of metal detectors, locks,
lighting, and other deterrent measures;
``(B) security assessments;
``(C) security training of personnel and students;
``(D) coordination with local law enforcement; and
``(E) any other measure that, in the determination of
the Attorney General, may provide a significant
improvement in security;
``(5) pay for officers hired to perform intelligence, anti-
terror, or homeland security duties exclusively;''; and
(D) by amending paragraph (9) (as so redesignated) to
read as follows:
``(8) develop new technologies, including interoperable
communications technologies, modernized criminal record
technology, and forensic technology, to assist State and local
law enforcement agencies in reorienting the emphasis of their
activities from reacting to crime to preventing crime and to
train law enforcement officers to use such technologies;'';
(4) by redesignating subsections (e) through (k) as
subsections (c) through (i), respectively;
(5) in subsection (c) (as so redesignated) by striking
``subsection (i)'' and inserting ``subsection (g)''; and
(6) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(j) Matching Funds for School Security Grants.--Notwithstanding
subsection (i), in the case of a grant under subsection (a) for the
purposes described in subsection (b)(4)--
``(1) the portion of the costs of a program provided by that
grant may not exceed 50 percent;
``(2) any funds appropriated by Congress for the activities
of any agency of an Indian tribal government or the Bureau of
Indian Affairs performing law enforcement functions on any
Indian lands may be used to provide the non-Federal share of a
matching requirement funded under this subsection; and
``(3) the Attorney General may provide, in the guidelines
implementing this section, for the requirement of paragraph (1)
to be waived or altered in the case of a recipient with a
financial need for such a waiver or alteration.''.
(b) Conforming Amendment.--Section 1702 of title I of such Act (42
U.S.C. 3796dd-1) is amended in subsection (d)(2) by striking ``section
1701(d)'' and inserting ``section 1701(b)''.
(c) Authorization of Appropriations.--Section 1001(a)(11) of title I
of such Act (42 U.S.C. 3793(a)(11)) is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (A) by striking clause (i) and all that
follows through the period at the end and inserting the
following:
``(i) $1,007,624,000 for fiscal year 2005;
``(ii) $1,027,176,000 for fiscal year 2006; and
``(iii) $1,047,119,000 for fiscal year 2007.''; and
(2) in subparagraph (B)--
(A) by striking ``section 1701(f)'' and inserting
``section 1701(d)''; and
(B) by striking the third sentence.

Subtitle I--Police Badges

SEC. 2201. SHORT TITLE.

This subtitle may be cited as the ``Badge Security Enhancement Act of
2004'' .

SEC. 2202. POLICE BADGES.

Section 716 of title 18, United States Code, is amended in subsection
(b)--
(1) by striking paragraphs (2) and (4); and
(2) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (2).

TITLE III--BORDER SECURITY AND TERRORIST TRAVEL

Subtitle A--Immigration Reform in the National Interest

CHAPTER 1--GENERAL PROVISIONS

SEC. 3001. ELIMINATING THE ``WESTERN HEMISPHERE'' EXCEPTION FOR
CITIZENS.

(a) In General.--
(1) In general.--Section 215(b) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1185(b)) is amended to read as
follows:
``(b)(1) Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, it shall be
unlawful for any citizen of the United States to depart from or enter,
or attempt to depart from or enter, the United States unless the
citizen bears a valid United States passport.
``(2) Subject to such limitations and exceptions as the President may
authorize and prescribe, the President may waive the application of
paragraph (1) in the case of a citizen departing the United States to,
or entering the United States from, foreign contiguous territory.
``(3) The President, if waiving the application of paragraph (1)
pursuant to paragraph (2), shall require citizens departing the United
States to, or entering the United States from, foreign contiguous
territory to bear a document (or combination of documents) designated
by the Secretary of Homeland Security under paragraph (4).
``(4) The Secretary of Homeland Security--
``(A) shall designate documents that are sufficient to denote
identity and citizenship in the United States such that they
may be used, either individually or in conjunction with another
document, to establish that the bearer is a citizen or national
of the United States for purposes of lawfully departing from or
entering the United States; and
``(B) shall publish a list of those documents in the Federal
Register.
``(5) A document may not be designated under paragraph (4) (whether
alone or in combination with other documents) unless the Secretary of
Homeland Security determines that the document--
``(A) may be relied upon for the purposes of this subsection;
and
``(B) may not be issued to an alien unlawfully present in the
United States.''.
(2) Effective date.--The amendment made by paragraph (1)
shall take effect on October 1, 2006.
(b) Interim Rule.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security--
(A) shall designate documents that are sufficient to
denote identity and citizenship in the United States
such that they may be used, either individually or in
conjunction with another document, to establish that
the bearer is a citizen or national of the United
States for purposes of lawfully departing from or
entering the United States; and
(B) shall publish a list of those documents in the
Federal Register.
(2) Limitation on presidential authority.--Beginning on the
date that is 90 days after the publication described in
paragraph (1)(B), the President, notwithstanding section 215(b)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1185(b)), may
not exercise the President's authority under such section so as
to permit any citizen of the United States to depart from or
enter, or attempt to depart from or enter, the United States
from any country other than foreign contiguous territory,
unless the citizen bears a document (or combination of
documents) designated under paragraph (1)(A).
(3) Criteria for designation.--A document may not be
designated under paragraph (1)(A) (whether alone or in
combination with other documents) unless the Secretary of
Homeland Security determines that the document--
(A) may be relied upon for the purposes of this
subsection; and
(B) may not be issued to an alien unlawfully present
in the United States.
(4) Effective date.--This subsection shall take effect on the
date of the enactment of this Act and shall cease to be
effective on September 30, 2006.

SEC. 3002. MODIFICATION OF WAIVER AUTHORITY WITH RESPECT TO
DOCUMENTATION REQUIREMENTS FOR NATIONALS OF FOREIGN
CONTIGUOUS TERRITORIES AND ADJACENT ISLANDS.

(a) In General.--Section 212(d)(4) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act (8 U.S.C.1182(d)(4)) is amended--
(1) by striking ``Attorney General'' and inserting
``Secretary of Homeland Security'';
(2) by striking ``on the basis of reciprocity'' and all that
follows through ``or (C)''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
``Either or both of the requirements of such paragraph may also
be waived by the Secretary of Homeland Security and the
Secretary of State, acting jointly and on the basis of
reciprocity, with respect to nationals of foreign contiguous
territory or of adjacent islands, but only if such nationals
are required, in order to be admitted into the United States,
to be in possession of identification deemed by the Secretary
of Homeland Security to be secure.''.
(b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall take
effect on December 31, 2006.

SEC. 3003. INCREASE IN FULL-TIME BORDER PATROL AGENTS.

The Secretary of Homeland Security, in each of fiscal years 2006
through 2010, shall increase by not less than 2,000 the number of
positions for full-time active-duty border patrol agents within the
Department of Homeland Security above the number of such positions for
which funds were allotted for the preceding fiscal year.

SEC. 3004. INCREASE IN FULL-TIME IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT
INVESTIGATORS.

The Secretary of Homeland Security, in each of fiscal years 2006
through 2010, shall increase by not less than 800 the number of
positions for full-time active-duty investigators within the Department
of Homeland Security investigating violations of immigration laws (as
defined in section 101(a)(17) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8
U.S.C. 1101(a)(17)) above the number of such positions for which funds
were allotted for the preceding fiscal year. At least half of these
additional investigators shall be designated to investigate potential
violations of section 274A of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8
U.S.C 1324a). Each State shall be allotted at least 3 of these
additional investigators.

SEC. 3005. ALIEN IDENTIFICATION STANDARDS.

Section 211 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1181) is
amended by adding at the end the following:
``(d) For purposes of establishing identity to any Federal employee,
an alien present in the United States may present any document issued
by the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security under the
authority of one of the immigration laws (as defined in section
101(a)(17)), or an unexpired lawfully issued foreign passport. Subject
to the limitations and exceptions in immigration laws (as defined in
section 101(a)(17) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.
1101(a)(17)), no other document may be presented for those purposes.''.

SEC. 3006. EXPEDITED REMOVAL.

Section 235(b)(1)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.
1225(b)(1)(A)) is amended by striking clauses (i) through (iii) and
inserting the following:
``(i) In general.--If an immigration officer
determines that an alien (other than an alien
described in subparagraph (F)) who is arriving
in the United States, or who has not been
admitted or paroled into the United States and
has not been physically present in the United
States continuously for the 5-year period
immediately prior to the date of the
determination of inadmissibility under this
paragraph, is inadmissible under section
212(a)(6)(C) or 212(a)(7), the officer shall
order the alien removed from the United States
without further hearing or review, unless--
``(I) the alien has been charged with
a crime, is in criminal proceedings, or
is serving a criminal sentence; or
``(II) the alien indicates an
intention to apply for asylum under
section 208 or a fear of persecution
and the officer determines that the
alien has been physically present in
the United States for less than 1 year.
``(ii) Claims for asylum.--If an immigration
officer determines that an alien (other than an
alien described in subparagraph (F)) who is
arriving in the United States, or who has not
been admitted or paroled into the United States
and has not been physically present in the
United States continuously for the 5-year
period immediately prior to the date of the
determination of inadmissibility under this
paragraph, is inadmissible under section
212(a)(6)(C) or 212(a)(7), and the alien
indicates either an intention to apply for
asylum under section 208 or a fear of
persecution, the officer shall refer the alien
for an interview by an asylum officer under
subparagraph (B) if the officer determines that
the alien has been physically present in the
United States for less than 1 year.''.

SEC. 3007. PREVENTING TERRORISTS FROM OBTAINING ASYLUM.

(a) Conditions for Granting Asylum.--Section 208(b) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1158(b)) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``The Attorney General''
and inserting the following:
``(A) Eligibility.--The Secretary of Homeland
Security or the Attorney General''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``(B) Burden of proof.--The burden of proof is on the
applicant to establish that the applicant is a refugee
within the meaning of section 101(a)(42)(A). To
establish that the applicant is a refugee within the
meaning of this Act, the applicant must establish that
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion was or will be the
central motive for persecuting the applicant. The
testimony of the applicant may be sufficient to sustain
such burden without corroboration, but only if it is
credible, is persuasive, and refers to specific facts
that demonstrate that the applicant is a refugee. Where
the trier of fact finds that it is reasonable to expect
corroborating evidence for certain alleged facts
pertaining to the specifics of the applicant's claim,
such evidence must be provided unless a reasonable
explanation is given as to why such information is not
provided. The credibility determination of the trier of
fact may be based, in addition to other factors, on the
demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the applicant or
witness, the consistency between the applicant's or
witness's written and oral statements, whether or not
under oath, made at any time to any officer, agent, or
employee of the United States, the internal consistency
of each such statement, the consistency of such
statements with the country conditions in the country
from which the applicant claims asylum (as presented by
the Department of State) and any inaccuracies or
falsehoods in such statements. These factors may be
considered individually or cumulatively.''.
(b) Standard of Review for Orders of Removal.--Section 242(b)(4) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1252(b)(4)) is amended by
adding after subparagraph (D) the following flush language: ``No court
shall reverse a determination made by an adjudicator with respect to
the availability of corroborating evidence as described in section
208(b)(1)(B), unless the court finds that a reasonable adjudicator is
compelled to conclude that such corroborating evidence is
unavailable.''.
(c) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (b) shall take
effect upon the date of enactment of this Act and shall apply to cases
in which the final administrative removal order was issued before, on,
or after the date of enactment of this Act.

SEC. 3008. REVOCATION OF VISAS AND OTHER TRAVEL DOCUMENTATION.

(a) Limitation on Review.--Section 221(i) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1201(i)) is amended by adding at the end the
following: ``There shall be no means of administrative or judicial
review of a revocation under this subsection, and no court or other
person otherwise shall have jurisdiction to consider any claim
challenging the validity of such a revocation.''.
(b) Classes of Deportable Aliens.--Section 237(a)(1)(B) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(B)) is amended by
striking ``United States is'' and inserting the following: ``United
States, or whose nonimmigrant visa (or other documentation authorizing
admission into the United States as a nonimmigrant) has been revoked
under section 221(i), is''.
(c) Revocation of Petitions.--Section 205 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1155) is amended--
(1) by striking ``Attorney General'' and inserting
``Secretary of Homeland Security''; and
(2) by striking the final two sentences.
(d) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall take
effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and shall apply to
revocations under sections 205 and 221(i) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act made before, on, or after such date.

SEC. 3009. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ORDERS OF REMOVAL.

(a) In General.--Section 242 of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(8 U.S.C. 1252) is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)--
(A) in paragraph (2)--
(i) in subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C), by
inserting ``(statutory and nonstatutory),
including section 2241 of title 28, United
States Code, or any other habeas corpus
provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of title
28, United States Code'' after
``Notwithstanding any other provision of law'';
and
(ii) by adding at the end the following:
``(D) Judicial review of certain legal claims.--
Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed as
precluding consideration by the circuit courts of
appeals of constitutional claims or pure questions of
law raised upon petitions for review filed in
accordance with this section. Notwithstanding any other
provision of law (statutory and nonstatutory),
including section 2241 of title 28, United States Code,
or, except as provided in subsection (e), any other
habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of
title 28, United States Code, such petitions for review
shall be the sole and exclusive means of raising any
and all claims with respect to orders of removal
entered or issued under any provision of this Act.'';
and
(B) by adding at the end the following:
``(4) Claims under the united nations convention.--
Notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory and
nonstatutory), including section 2241 of title 28, United
States Code, or any other habeas corpus provision, and sections
1361 and 1651 of title 28, United States Code, a petition for
review by the circuit courts of appeals filed in accordance
with this section is the sole and exclusive means of judicial
review of claims arising under the United Nations Convention
Against Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment.
``(5) Exclusive means of review.--The judicial review
specified in this subsection shall be the sole and exclusive
means for review by any court of an order of removal entered or
issued under any provision of this Act. For purposes of this
title, in every provision that limits or eliminates judicial
review or jurisdiction to review, the terms `judicial review'
and `jurisdiction to review' include habeas corpus review
pursuant to section 2241 of title 28, United States Code, or
any other habeas corpus provision, sections 1361 and 1651 of
title 28, United States Code, and review pursuant to any other
provision of law.'';
(2) in subsection (b)--
(A) in paragraph (3)(B), by inserting ``pursuant to
subsection (f)'' after ``unless''; and
(B) in paragraph (9), by adding at the end the
following: ``Except as otherwise provided in this
subsection, no court shall have jurisdiction, by habeas
corpus under section 2241 of title 28, United States
Code, or any other habeas corpus provision, by section
1361 or 1651 of title 28, United States Code, or by any
other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), to
hear any cause or claim subject to these consolidation
provisions.'';
(3) in subsection (f)(2), by inserting ``or stay, by
temporary or permanent order, including stays pending judicial
review,'' after ``no court shall enjoin''; and
(4) in subsection (g), by inserting ``(statutory and
nonstatutory), including section 2241 of title 28, United
States Code, or any other habeas corpus provision, and sections
1361 and 1651 of title 28, United States Code'' after
``notwithstanding any other provision of law''.
(b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsection (a) shall take
effect upon the date of enactment of this Act and shall apply to cases
in which the final administrative removal order was issued before, on,
or after the date of enactment of this Act.

CHAPTER 2--DEPORTATION OF TERRORISTS AND SUPPORTERS OF TERRORISM

SEC. 3031. EXPANDED INAPPLICABILITY OF RESTRICTION ON REMOVAL.

(a) In General.--Section 241(b)(3)(B) (8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3)(B)) is
amended--
(1) in the matter preceding clause (i), by striking ``section
237(a)(4)(D)'' and inserting ``paragraph (4)(B) or (4)(D) of
section 237(a)''; and
(2) in clause (iii), by striking ``or'';
(3) in clause (iv), by striking the period and inserting ``;
or'' ;
(4) by inserting after clause (iv) and following:
``(v) the alien is described in subclause
(I), (II), (III), (IV), or (VI) of section
212(a)(3)(B)(i) or section 237(a)(4)(B),
unless, in the case only of an alien described
in subclause (IV) of section 212(a)(3)(B)(i),
the Secretary of Homeland Security determines,
in the Secretary's discretion, that there are
not reasonable grounds for regarding the alien
as a danger to the security of the United
States.''; and
(5) by striking the last sentence.
(b) Exceptions.--Section 208(b)(2)(A)(v) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(2)(A)(v)) is amended--
(1) by striking ``inadmissible under'' each place such term
appears and inserting ``described in''; and
(2) by striking ``removable under''.
(c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall take
effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and shall apply to--
(1) removal proceedings instituted before, on, or after the
date of the enactment of this Act; and
(2) acts and conditions constituting a ground for
inadmissibility or removal occurring or existing before, on, or
after such date.

SEC. 3032. EXCEPTION TO RESTRICTION ON REMOVAL FOR TERRORISTS AND
CRIMINALS.

(a) Regulations.--
(1) Revision deadline.--Not later than 120 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland
Security shall revise the regulations prescribed by the
Secretary to implement the United Nations Convention Against
Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, done at New York on December 10, 1984.
(2) Exclusion of certain aliens.--The revision--
(A) shall exclude from the protection of such
regulations aliens described in section 241(b)(3)(B) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.
1231(b)(3)(B)) (as amended by this title), including
rendering such aliens ineligible for withholding or
deferral of removal under the Convention; and
(B) shall ensure that the revised regulations operate
so as to--
(i) allow for the reopening of determinations
made under the regulations before the effective
date of the revision; and
(ii) apply to acts and conditions
constituting a ground for ineligibility for the
protection of such regulations, as revised,
regardless of when such acts or conditions
occurred.
(3) Burden of proof.--The revision shall also ensure that the
burden of proof is on the applicant for withholding or deferral
of removal under the Convention to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that he or she would be tortured if removed
to the proposed country of removal.
(b) Judicial Review.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no
court shall have jurisdiction to review the regulations adopted to
implement this section, and nothing in this section shall be construed
as providing any court jurisdiction to consider or review claims raised
under the Convention or this section, except as part of the review of a
final order of removal pursuant to section 242 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1252).

SEC. 3033. ADDITIONAL REMOVAL AUTHORITIES.

(a) In General.--Section 241(b) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act (8 U.S.C. 1231(b)) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (1)--
(A) in each of subparagraphs (A) and (B), by striking
the period at the end and inserting ``unless, in the
opinion of the Secretary of Homeland Security, removing
the alien to such country would be prejudicial to the
United States.''; and
(B) by amending subparagraph (C) to read as follows:
``(C) Alternative countries.--If the alien is not
removed to a country designated in subparagraph (A) or
(B), the Secretary of Homeland Security shall remove
the alien to--
``(i) the country of which the alien is a
citizen, subject, or national, where the alien
was born, or where the alien has a residence,
unless the country physically prevents the
alien from entering the country upon the
alien's removal there; or
``(ii) any country whose government will
accept the alien into that country.''; and
(2) in paragraph (2)--
(A) by striking ``Attorney General'' each place such
term appears and inserting ``Secretary of Homeland
Security'';
(B) by amending subparagraph (D) to read as follows:
``(D) Alternative countries.--If the alien is not
removed to a country designated under subparagraph
(A)(i), the Secretary of Homeland Security shall remove
the alien to a country of which the alien is a subject,
national, or citizen, or where the alien has a
residence, unless--
``(i) such country physically prevents the
alien from entering the country upon the
alien's removal there; or
``(ii) in the opinion of the Secretary of
Homeland Security, removing the alien to the
country would be prejudicial to the United
States.''; and
(C) by amending subparagraph (E)(vii) to read as
follows:
``(vii) Any country whose government will
accept the alien into that country.''.
(b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsection (a) shall take
effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and shall apply to any
deportation, exclusion, or removal on or after such date pursuant to
any deportation, exclusion, or removal order, regardless of whether
such order is administratively final before, on, or after such date.

CHAPTER 3--PREVENTING COMMERCIAL ALIEN SMUGGLING

SEC. 3041. BRINGING IN AND HARBORING CERTAIN ALIENS.

(a) Criminal Penalties.--Section 274(a) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1324(a)) is amended by adding at the end the
following:
``(4) In the case of a person who has brought aliens into the United
States in violation of this subsection, the sentence otherwise provided
for may be increased by up to 10 years if--
``(A) the offense was part of an ongoing commercial
organization or enterprise;
``(B) aliens were transported in groups of 10 or more;
``(C) aliens were transported in a manner that endangered
their lives; or
``(D) the aliens presented a life-threatening health risk to
people in the United States.''.
(b) Outreach Program.--Section 274 of the Immigration and Nationality
Act (8 U.S.C. 1324), as amended by subsection (a), is further amended
by adding at the end the following:
``(f) Outreach Program.--The Secretary of Homeland Security, in
consultation as appropriate with the Attorney General and the Secretary
of State, shall develop and implement an outreach program to educate
the public in the United States and abroad about the penalties for
bringing in and harboring aliens in violation of this section.

Subtitle B--Identity Management Security

CHAPTER 1--IMPROVED SECURITY FOR DRIVERS' LICENSES AND PERSONAL
IDENTIFICATION CARDS

SEC. 3051. DEFINITIONS.

In this chapter, the following definitions apply:
(1) Driver's license.--The term ``driver's license'' means a
motor vehicle operator's license, as defined in section 30301
of title 49, United States Code.
(2) Identification card.--The term ``identification card''
means a personal identification card, as defined in section
1028(d) of title 18, United States Code, issued by a State.
(3) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary of
Homeland Security.
(4) State.--The term ``State'' means a State of the United
States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin
Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the Northern Mariana Islands,
the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, and any other
territory or possession of the United States.

SEC. 3052. MINIMUM DOCUMENT REQUIREMENTS AND ISSUANCE STANDARDS FOR
FEDERAL RECOGNITION.

(a) Minimum Standards for Federal Use.--
(1) In general.--Beginning 3 years after the date of
enactment of this Act, a Federal agency may not accept, for any
official purpose, a driver's license or identification card
issued by a State to any person unless the State is meeting the
requirements of this section.
(2) State certifications.--The Secretary shall determine
whether a State is meeting the requirements of this section
based on certifications made by the State to the Secretary.
Such certifications shall be made at such times and in such
manner as the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of
Transportation, may prescribe by regulation.
(b) Minimum Document Requirements.--To meet the requirements of this
section, a State shall include, at a minimum, the following information
and features on each driver's license and identification card issued to
a person by the State:
(1) The person's full legal name.
(2) The person's date of birth.
(3) The person's gender.
(4) The person's driver license or identification card
number.
(5) A photograph of the person.
(6) The person's address of principal residence.
(7) The person's signature.
(8) Physical security features designed to prevent tampering,
counterfeiting, or duplication of the document for fraudulent
purposes.
(9) A common machine-readable technology, with defined
minimum data elements.
(c) Minimum Issuance Standards.--
(1) In general.--To meet the requirements of this section, a
State shall require, at a minimum, presentation and
verification of the following information before issuing a
driver's license or identification card to a person:
(A) A photo identity document, except that a non-
photo identity document is acceptable if it includes
both the person's full legal name and date of birth.
(B) Documentation showing the person's date of birth.
(C) Proof of the person's social security account
number or verification that the person is not eligible
for a social security account number.
(D) Documentation showing the person's name and
address of principal residence.
(2) Verification of documents.--To meet the requirements of
this section, a State shall implement the following procedures:
(A) Before issuing a driver's license or
identification card to a person, the State shall
verify, with the issuing agency, the issuance,
validity, and completeness of each document required to
be presented by the person under paragraph (1).
(B) The State shall not accept any foreign document,
other than an official passport, to satisfy a
requirement of paragraph (1).
(d) Other Requirements.--To meet the requirements of this section, a
State shall adopt the following practices in the issuance of drivers'
licenses and identification cards:
(1) Employ technology to capture digital images of identity
source documents so that the images can be retained in
electronic storage in a transferable format.
(2) Retain paper copies of source documents for a minimum of
7 years or images of source documents presented for a minimum
of 10 years.
(3) Subject each person applying for a driver's license or
identification card to mandatory facial image capture.
(4) Establish an effective procedure to confirm or verify a
renewing applicant's information.
(5) Confirm with the Social Security Administration a social
security account number presented by a person using the full
social security account number. In the event that a social
security account number is already registered to or associated
with another person to which any State has issued a driver's
license or identification card, the State shall resolve the
discrepancy and take appropriate action.
(6) Refuse to issue a driver's license or identification card
to a person holding a driver's license issued by another State
without confirmation that the person is terminating or has
terminated the driver's license.
(7) Ensure the physical security of locations where drivers'
licenses and identification cards are produced and the security
of document materials and papers from which drivers' licenses
and identification cards are produced.
(8) Subject all persons authorized to manufacture or produce
drivers' licenses and identification cards to appropriate
security clearance requirements.
(9) Establish fraudulent document recognition training
programs for appropriate employees engaged in the issuance of
drivers' licenses and identification cards.

SEC. 3053. LINKING OF DATABASES.

(a) In General.--To be eligible to receive any grant or other type of
financial assistance made available under this subtitle, a State shall
participate in the interstate compact regarding sharing of driver
license data, known as the ``Driver License Agreement'', in order to
provide electronic access by a State to information contained in the
motor vehicle databases of all other States.
(b) Requirements for Information.--A State motor vehicle database
shall contain, at a minimum, the following information:
(1) All data fields printed on drivers' licenses and
identification cards issued by the State.
(2) Motor vehicle drivers' histories, including motor vehicle
violations, suspensions, and points on licenses.

SEC. 3054. TRAFFICKING IN AUTHENTICATION FEATURES FOR USE IN FALSE
IDENTIFICATION DOCUMENTS.

Section 1028(a)(8) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by
striking ``false authentication features'' and inserting ``false or
actual authentication features''.

SEC. 3055. GRANTS TO STATES.

(a) In General.--The Secretary may make grants to a State to assist
the State in conforming to the minimum standards set forth in this
chapter.
(b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be
appropriated to the Secretary for each of the fiscal years 2005 through
2009 such sums as may be necessary to carry out this chapter.

SEC. 3056. AUTHORITY.

(a) Participation of Secretary of Transportation and States.--All
authority to issue regulations, certify standards, and issue grants
under this chapter shall be carried out by the Secretary, in
consultation with the Secretary of Transportation and the States.
(b) Extensions of Deadlines.--The Secretary may grant to a State an
extension of time to meet the requirements of section 3052(a)(1) if the
State provides adequate justification for noncompliance.

CHAPTER 2--IMPROVED SECURITY FOR BIRTH CERTIFICATES

SEC. 3061. DEFINITIONS.

(a) Applicability of Definitions.--Except as otherwise specifically
provided, the definitions contained in section 3051 apply to this
chapter.
(b) Other Definitions.--In this chapter, the following definitions
apply:
(1) Birth certificate.--The term ``birth certificate'' means
a certificate of birth--
(A) for an individual (regardless of where born)--
(i) who is a citizen or national of the
United States at birth; and
(ii) whose birth is registered in the United
States; and
(B) that--
(i) is issued by a Federal, State, or local
government agency or authorized custodian of
record and produced from birth records
maintained by such agency or custodian of
record; or
(ii) is an authenticated copy, issued by a
Federal, State, or local government agency or
authorized custodian of record, of an original
certificate of birth issued by such agency or
custodian of record.
(2) Registrant.--The term ``registrant'' means, with respect
to a birth certificate, the person whose birth is registered on
the certificate.
(3) State.--The term ``State'' shall have the meaning given
such term in section 3051; except that New York City shall be
treated as a State separate from New York.

SEC. 3062. APPLICABILITY OF MINIMUM STANDARDS TO LOCAL GOVERNMENTS.

The minimum standards in this chapter applicable to birth
certificates issued by a State shall also apply to birth certificates
issued by a local government in the State. It shall be the
responsibility of the State to ensure that local governments in the
State comply with the minimum standards.

SEC. 3063. MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR FEDERAL RECOGNITION.

(a) Minimum Standards for Federal Use.--
(1) In general.--Beginning 3 years after the date of
enactment of this Act, a Federal agency may not accept, for any
official purpose, a birth certificate issued by a State to any
person unless the State is meeting the requirements of this
section.
(2) State certifications.--The Secretary shall determine
whether a State is meeting the requirements of this section
based on certifications made by the State to the Secretary.
Such certifications shall be made at such times and in such
manner as the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of
Health and Human Services, may prescribe by regulation.
(b) Minimum Document Standards.--To meet the requirements of this
section, a State shall include, on each birth certificate issued to a
person by the State, the use of safety paper, the seal of the issuing
custodian of record, and such other features as the Secretary may
determine necessary to prevent tampering, counterfeiting, and otherwise
duplicating the birth certificate for fraudulent purposes. The
Secretary may not require a single design to which birth certificates
issued by all States must conform.
(c) Minimum Issuance Standards.--
(1) In general.--To meet the requirements of this section, a
State shall require and verify the following information from
the requestor before issuing an authenticated copy of a birth
certificate:
(A) The name on the birth certificate.
(B) The date and location of the birth.
(C) The mother's maiden name.
(D) Substantial proof of the requestor's identity.
(2) Issuance to persons not named on birth certificate.--To
meet the requirements of this section, in the case of a request
by a person who is not named on the birth certificate, a State
must require the presentation of legal authorization to request
the birth certificate before issuance.
(3) Issuance to family members.--Not later than one year
after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary, in
consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human Services
and the States, shall establish minimum standards for issuance
of a birth certificate to specific family members, their
authorized representatives, and others who demonstrate that the
certificate is needed for the protection of the requestor's
personal or property rights.
(4) Waivers.--A State may waive the requirements set forth in
subparagraphs (A) through (C) of subsection (c)(1) in
exceptional circumstances, such as the incapacitation of the
registrant.
(5) Applications by electronic means.--To meet the
requirements of this section, for applications by electronic
means, through the mail or by phone or fax, a State shall
employ third party verification, or equivalent verification, of
the identity of the requestor.
(6) Verification of documents.--To meet the requirements of
this section, a State shall verify the documents used to
provide proof of identity of the requestor.
(d) Other Requirements.--To meet the requirements of this section, a
State shall adopt, at a minimum, the following practices in the
issuance and administration of birth certificates:
(1) Establish and implement minimum building security
standards for State and local vital record offices.
(2) Restrict public access to birth certificates and
information gathered in the issuance process to ensure that
access is restricted to entities with which the State has a
binding privacy protection agreement.
(3) Subject all persons with access to vital records to
appropriate security clearance requirements.
(4) Establish fraudulent document recognition training
programs for appropriate employees engaged in the issuance
process.
(5) Establish and implement internal operating system
standards for paper and for electronic systems.
(6) Establish a central database that can provide
interoperative data exchange with other States and with Federal
agencies, subject to privacy restrictions and confirmation of
the authority and identity of the requestor.
(7) Ensure that birth and death records are matched in a
comprehensive and timely manner, and that all electronic birth
records and paper birth certificates of decedents are marked
``deceased''.
(8) Cooperate with the Secretary in the implementation of
electronic verification of vital events under section 3065.

SEC. 3064. ESTABLISHMENT OF ELECTRONIC BIRTH AND DEATH REGISTRATION
SYSTEMS.

In consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human Services and
the Commissioner of Social Security, the Secretary shall take the
following actions:
(1) Work with the States to establish a common data set and
common data exchange protocol for electronic birth registration
systems and death registration systems.
(2) Coordinate requirements for such systems to align with a
national model.
(3) Ensure that fraud prevention is built into the design of
electronic vital registration systems in the collection of
vital event data, the issuance of birth certificates, and the
exchange of data among government agencies.
(4) Ensure that electronic systems for issuing birth
certificates, in the form of printed abstracts of birth records
or digitized images, employ a common format of the certified
copy, so that those requiring such documents can quickly
confirm their validity.
(5) Establish uniform field requirements for State birth
registries.
(6) Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this
Act, establish a process with the Department of Defense that
will result in the sharing of data, with the States and the
Social Security Administration, regarding deaths of United
States military personnel and the birth and death of their
dependents.
(7) Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this
Act, establish a process with the Department of State to
improve registration, notification, and the sharing of data
with the States and the Social Security Administration,
regarding births and deaths of United States citizens abroad.
(8) Not later than 3 years after the date of establishment of
databases provided for under this section, require States to
record and retain electronic records of pertinent
identification information collected from requestors who are
not the registrants.
(9) Not later than 6 months after the date of enactment of
this Act, submit to Congress, a report on whether there is a
need for Federal laws to address penalties for fraud and misuse
of vital records and whether violations are sufficiently
enforced.

SEC. 3065. ELECTRONIC VERIFICATION OF VITAL EVENTS.

(a) Lead Agency.--The Secretary shall lead the implementation of
electronic verification of a person's birth and death.
(b) Regulations.--In carrying out subsection (a), the Secretary shall
issue regulations to establish a means by which authorized Federal and
State agency users with a single interface will be able to generate an
electronic query to any participating vital records jurisdiction
throughout the Nation to verify the contents of a paper birth
certificate. Pursuant to the regulations, an electronic response from
the participating vital records jurisdiction as to whether there is a
birth record in their database that matches the paper birth certificate
will be returned to the user, along with an indication if the matching
birth record has been flagged ``deceased''. The regulations shall take
effect not later than 5 years after the date of enactment of this Act.

SEC. 3066. GRANTS TO STATES.

SEC. 3067. AUTHORITY.

(a) Participation With Federal Agencies and States.--All authority to
issue regulations, certify standards, and issue grants under this
chapter shall be carried out by the Secretary, with the concurrence of
the Secretary of Health and Human Services and in consultation with
State vital statistics offices and appropriate Federal agencies.
(b) Extensions of Deadlines.--The Secretary may grant to a State an
extension of time to meet the requirements of section 3063(a)(1) if the
State provides adequate justification for noncompliance.

Chapter 3--Measures To Enhance Privacy and Integrity of Social Security
Account Numbers

SEC. 3071. PROHIBITION OF THE DISPLAY OF SOCIAL SECURITY ACCOUNT
NUMBERS ON DRIVER'S LICENSES OR MOTOR VEHICLE
REGISTRATIONS.

(a) In General.--Section 205(c)(2)(C)(vi) of the Social Security Act
(42 U.S.C. 405(c)(2)(C)(vi)) is amended--
(1) by inserting ``(I)'' after ``(vi)''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new subclause:
``(II) Any State or political subdivision thereof (and any person
acting as an agent of such an agency or instrumentality), in the
administration of any driver's license or motor vehicle registration
law within its jurisdiction, may not display a social security account
number issued by the Commissioner of Social Security (or any derivative
of such number) on any driver's license or motor vehicle registration
or any other document issued by such State or political subdivision to
an individual for purposes of identification of such individual or
include on any such license, registration, or other document a magnetic
strip, bar code, or other means of communication which conveys such
number (or derivative thereof).''.
(b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall apply
with respect to licenses, registrations, and other documents issued or
reissued after 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 3072. INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION OF BIRTH RECORDS PROVIDED IN
SUPPORT OF APPLICATIONS FOR SOCIAL SECURITY ACCOUNT
NUMBERS.

(a) Applications for Social Security Account Numbers.--Section
205(c)(2)(B)(ii) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C.
405(c)(2)(B)(ii)) is amended--
(1) by inserting ``(I)'' after ``(ii)''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new subclause:
``(II) With respect to an application for a social security account
number for an individual, other than for purposes of enumeration at
birth, the Commissioner shall require independent verification of any
birth record provided by the applicant in support of the application.
The Commissioner may provide by regulation for reasonable exceptions
from the requirement for independent verification under this subclause
in any case in which the Commissioner determines there is minimal
opportunity for fraud.''.
(b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall apply
with respect to applications filed after 270 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act.
(c) Study Regarding Applications for Replacement Social Security
Cards.--
(1) In general.--As soon as practicable after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Commissioner of Social Security
shall undertake a study to test the feasibility and cost
effectiveness of verifying all identification documents
submitted by an applicant for a replacement social security
card. As part of such study, the Commissioner shall determine
the feasibility of, and the costs associated with, the
development of appropriate electronic processes for third party
verification of any such identification documents which are
issued by agencies and instrumentalities of the Federal
Government and of the States (and political subdivisions
thereof).
(2) Report.--Not later than 2 years after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Commissioner shall report to the
Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives and
the Committee on Finance of the Senate regarding the results of
the study undertaken under paragraph (1). Such report shall
contain such recommendations for legislative changes as the
Commissioner considers necessary to implement needed
improvements in the process for verifying identification
documents submitted by applicants for replacement social
security cards.

SEC. 3073. ENUMERATION AT BIRTH.

(a) Improvement of Application Process.--
(1) In general.--As soon as practicable after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Commissioner of Social Security
shall undertake to make improvements to the enumeration at
birth program for the issuance of social security account
numbers to newborns. Such improvements shall be designed to
prevent--
(A) the assignment of social security account numbers
to unnamed children;
(B) the issuance of more than 1 social security
account number to the same child; and
(C) other opportunities for fraudulently obtaining a
social security account number.
(2) Report to the congress.--Not later than 1 year after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Commissioner shall
transmit to each House of the Congress a report specifying in
detail the extent to which the improvements required under
paragraph (1) have been made.
(b) Study Regarding Process for Enumeration at Birth.--
(1) In general.--As soon as practicable after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Commissioner of Social Security
shall undertake a study to determine the most efficient options
for ensuring the integrity of the process for enumeration at
birth. Such study shall include an examination of available
methods for reconciling hospital birth records with birth
registrations submitted to agencies of States and political
subdivisions thereof and with information provided to the
Commissioner as part of the process for enumeration at birth.
(2) Report.--Not later than 18 months after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Commissioner shall report to the
Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives and
the Committee on Finance of the Senate regarding the results of
the study undertaken under paragraph (1). Such report shall
contain such recommendations for legislative changes as the
Commissioner considers necessary to implement needed
improvements in the process for enumeration at birth.

SEC. 3074. STUDY RELATING TO USE OF PHOTOGRAPHIC IDENTIFICATION IN
CONNECTION WITH APPLICATIONS FOR BENEFITS, SOCIAL
SECURITY ACCOUNT NUMBERS, AND SOCIAL SECURITY
CARDS.

(a) In General.--As soon as practicable after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Commissioner of Social Security shall
undertake a study to--
(1) determine the best method of requiring and obtaining
photographic identification of applicants for old-age,
survivors, and disability insurance benefits under title II of
the Social Security Act, for a social security account number,
or for a replacement social security card, and of providing for
reasonable exceptions to any requirement for photographic
identification of such applicants that may be necessary to
promote efficient and effective administration of such title,
and
(2) evaluate the benefits and costs of instituting such a
requirement for photographic identification, including the
degree to which the security and integrity of the old-age,
survivors, and disability insurance program would be enhanced.
(b) Report.--Not later than 18 months after the date of the enactment
of this Act, the Commissioner shall report to the Committee on Ways and
Means of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Finance of
the Senate regarding the results of the study undertaken under
subsection (a). Such report shall contain such recommendations for
legislative changes as the Commissioner considers necessary relating to
requirements for photographic identification of applicants described in
subsection (a).

SEC. 3075. RESTRICTIONS ON ISSUANCE OF MULTIPLE REPLACEMENT SOCIAL
SECURITY CARDS.

(a) In General.--Section 205(c)(2)(G) of the Social Security Act (42
U.S.C. 405(c)(2)(G)) is amended by adding at the end the following new
sentence: ``The Commissioner shall restrict the issuance of multiple
replacement social security cards to any individual to 3 per year and
to 10 for the life of the individual, except in any case in which the
Commissioner determines there is minimal opportunity for fraud.''.
(b) Regulations and Effective Date.--The Commissioner of Social
Security shall issue regulations under the amendment made by subsection
(a) not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act.
Systems controls developed by the Commissioner pursuant to such
amendment shall take effect upon the earlier of the issuance of such
regulations or the end of such 1-year period.

SEC. 3076. STUDY RELATING TO MODIFICATION OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY
ACCOUNT NUMBERING SYSTEM TO SHOW WORK AUTHORIZATION
STATUS.

(a) In General.--As soon as practicable after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Commissioner of Social Security, in
consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall undertake a
study to examine the best method of modifying the social security
account number assigned to individuals who--
(1) are not citizens of the United States,
(2) have not been admitted for permanent residence, and
(3) are not authorized by the Secretary of Homeland Security
to work in the United States, or are so authorized subject to
one or more restrictions,
so as to include an indication of such lack of authorization to work or
such restrictions on such an authorization.
(b) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Commissioner shall report to the Committee on Ways and
Means of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Finance of
the Senate regarding the results of the study undertaken under this
section. Such report shall include the Commissioner's recommendations
of feasible options for modifying the social security account number in
the manner described in subsection (a).

Subtitle C--Targeting Terrorist Travel

SEC. 3081. STUDIES ON MACHINE-READABLE PASSPORTS AND TRAVEL HISTORY
DATABASE.

(a) In General.--Not later than May 31, 2005, the Comptroller General
of the United States, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of
Homeland Security each shall submit to the Committees on the Judiciary
of the House of Representatives and of the Senate, the Committee on
International Relations of the House of Representatives, and the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate the results of a separate
study on the subjects described in subsection (c).
(b) Study.--The study submitted by the Secretary of State under
subsection (a) shall be completed by the Office of Visa and Passport
Control of the Department of State, in coordination with the
appropriate officials of the Department of Homeland Security.
(c) Contents.--The studies described in subsection (a) shall examine
the feasibility, cost, potential benefits, and relative importance to
the objectives of tracking suspected terrorists' travel, and
apprehending suspected terrorists, of each of the following:
(1) Requiring nationals of all countries to present machine-
readable, tamper-resistant passports that incorporate biometric
and document authentication identifiers.
(2) Creation of a database containing information on the
lifetime travel history of each foreign national or United
States citizen who might seek to enter the United States or
another country at any time, in order that border and visa
issuance officials may ascertain the travel history of a
prospective entrant by means other than a passport.
(d) Incentives.--The studies described in subsection (a) shall also
make recommendations on incentives that might be offered to encourage
foreign nations to participate in the initiatives described in
paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (c).

SEC. 3082. EXPANDED PREINSPECTION AT FOREIGN AIRPORTS.

(a) In General.--Section 235A(a)(4) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1225(a)(4)) is amended--
(1) by striking ``October 31, 2000,'' and inserting ``January
1, 2008,'';
(2) by striking ``5 additional'' and inserting ``up to 25
additional'';
(3) by striking ``number of aliens'' and inserting ``number
of inadmissible aliens, especially aliens who are potential
terrorists,'';
(4) by striking ``who are inadmissible to the United
States.'' and inserting a period; and
(5) by striking ``Attorney General'' each place such term
appears and inserting ``Secretary of Homeland Security''.
(b) Report.--Not later than June 30, 2006, the Secretary of Homeland
Security and the Secretary of State shall report to the Committees on
the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and of the Senate, the
Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives,
and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate on the progress
being made in implementing the amendments made by subsection (a).
(c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be
appropriated to the Secretary of Homeland Security to carry out the
amendments made by subsection (a)--
(1) $24,000,000 for fiscal year 2005;
(2) $48,000,000 for fiscal year 2006; and
(3) $97,000,000 for fiscal year 2007.

SEC. 3083. IMMIGRATION SECURITY INITIATIVE.

(a) In General.--Section 235A(b) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act (8 U.S.C. 1225(b)) is amended--
(1) in the subsection heading, by inserting ``and Immigration
Security Initiative'' after ``Program''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``Beginning not later than December 31, 2006, the number of airports
selected for an assignment under this subsection shall be at least
50.''.
(b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be
appropriated to the Secretary of Homeland Security to carry out the
amendments made by subsection (a)--
(1) $25,000,000 for fiscal year 2005;
(2) $40,000,000 for fiscal year 2006; and
(3) $40,000,000 for fiscal year 2007.

SEC. 3084. RESPONSIBILITIES AND FUNCTIONS OF CONSULAR OFFICERS.

(a) Increased Number of Consular Officers.--The Secretary of State,
in each of fiscal years 2006 through 2009, may increase by 150 the
number of positions for consular officers above the number of such
positions for which funds were allotted for the preceding fiscal year.
(b) Limitation on Use of Foreign Nationals for Nonimmigrant Visa
Screening.--Section 222(d) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8
U.S.C. 1202(d)) is amended by adding at the end the following:
``All nonimmigrant visa applications shall be reviewed and adjudicated
by a consular officer.''.
(c) Training for Consular Officers in Detection of Fraudulent
Documents.--Section 305(a) of the Enhanced Border Security and Visa
Entry Reform Act of 2002 (8 U.S.C. 1734(a)) is amended by adding at the
end the following: ``As part of the consular training provided to such
officers by the Secretary of State, such officers shall also receive
training in detecting fraudulent documents and general document
forensics and shall be required as part of such training to work with
immigration officers conducting inspections of applicants for admission
into the United States at ports of entry.''.
(d) Assignment of Anti-Fraud Specialists.--
(1) Survey regarding document fraud.--The Secretary of State,
in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall
conduct a survey of each diplomatic and consular post at which
visas are issued to assess the extent to which fraudulent
documents are presented by visa applicants to consular officers
at such posts.
(2) Placement of specialist.--Not later than July 31, 2005,
the Secretary shall, in coordination with the Secretary of
Homeland Security, identify 100 of such posts that experience
the greatest frequency of presentation of fraudulent documents
by visa applicants. The Secretary shall place in each such post
at least one full-time anti-fraud specialist employed by the
Department of State to assist the consular officers at each
such post in the detection of such fraud.

SEC. 3085. INCREASE IN PENALTIES FOR FRAUD AND RELATED ACTIVITY.

Section 1028 of title 18, United States Code, relating to penalties
for fraud and related activity in connection with identification
documents and information, is amended--
(1) in subsection (b)(1)(A)(i), by striking ``issued by or
under the authority of the United States'' and inserting the
following: ``as described in subsection (d)'';
(2) in subsection (b)(2), by striking ``three years'' and
inserting ``six years'';
(3) in subsection (b)(3), by striking ``20 years'' and
inserting ``25 years'';
(4) in subsection (b)(4), by striking ``25 years'' and
inserting ``30 years''; and
(5) in subsection (c)(1), by inserting after ``United
States'' the following: ``Government, a State, political
subdivision of a State, a foreign government, political
subdivision of a foreign government, an international
governmental or an international quasi-governmental
organization,''.

SEC. 3086. CRIMINAL PENALTY FOR FALSE CLAIM TO CITIZENSHIP.

Section 1015 of title 18, United States Code, is amended--
(1) by striking the dash at the end of subsection (f) and
inserting ``; or''; and
(2) by inserting after subsection (f) the following:
``(g) Whoever knowingly makes any false statement or claim that he is
a citizen of the United States in order to enter into, or remain in,
the United States--''.

SEC. 3087. ANTITERRORISM ASSISTANCE TRAINING OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
STATE.

(a) Limitation.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the
Secretary of State shall ensure, subject to subsection (b), that the
Antiterrorism Assistance Training (ATA) program of the Department of
State (or any successor or related program) under chapter 8 of part II
of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2349aa et seq.) (or
other relevant provisions of law) is carried out primarily to provide
training to host nation security services for the specific purpose of
ensuring the physical security and safety of United States Government
facilities and personnel abroad (as well as foreign dignitaries and
training related to the protection of such dignitaries), including
security detail training and offenses related to passport or visa
fraud.
(b) Exception.--The limitation contained in subsection (a) shall not
apply, and the Secretary of State may expand the ATA program to include
other types of antiterrorism assistance training, if the Secretary
first obtains the approval of the Attorney General and provides written
notification of such proposed expansion to the appropriate
congressional committees.
(c) Definition.--In this section, the term ``appropriate
congressional committees'' means--
(1) the Committee on International Relations and the
Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on
the Judiciary of the Senate.

SEC. 3088. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS TO TRACK AND CURTAIL TERRORIST
TRAVEL THROUGH THE USE OF FRAUDULENTLY OBTAINED
DOCUMENTS.

(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) International terrorists travel across international
borders to raise funds, recruit members, train for operations,
escape capture, communicate, and plan and carry out attacks.
(2) The international terrorists who planned and carried out
the attack on the World Trade Center on February 26, 1993, the
attack on the embassies of the United States in Kenya and
Tanzania on August 7, 1998, the attack on the USS Cole on
October 12, 2000, and the attack on the World Trade Center and
the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, traveled across
international borders to plan and carry out these attacks.
(3) The international terrorists who planned other attacks on
the United States, including the plot to bomb New York City
landmarks in 1993, the plot to bomb the New York City subway in
1997, and the millennium plot to bomb Los Angeles International
Airport on December 31, 1999, traveled across international
borders to plan and carry out these attacks.
(4) Many of the international terrorists who planned and
carried out large-scale attacks against foreign targets,
including the attack in Bali, Indonesia, on October 11, 2002,
and the attack in Madrid, Spain, on March 11, 2004, traveled
across international borders to plan and carry out these
attacks.
(5) Throughout the 1990s, international terrorists, including
those involved in the attack on the World Trade Center on
February 26, 1993, the plot to bomb New York City landmarks in
1993, and the millennium plot to bomb Los Angeles International
Airport on December 31, 1999, traveled on fraudulent passports
and often had more than one passport.
(6) Two of the September 11, 2001, hijackers were carrying
passports that had been manipulated in a fraudulent manner and
several other hijackers whose passports did not survive the
attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon were likely to
have carried passports that were similarly manipulated.
(7) The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the
United States, (commonly referred to as the 9/11 Commission),
stated that ``Targeting travel is at least as powerful a weapon
against terrorists as targeting their money.''.
(b) International Agreements to Track and Curtail Terrorist Travel.--
(1) International agreement on lost, stolen, or falsified
documents.--The President shall lead efforts to track and
curtail the travel of terrorists by supporting the drafting,
adoption, and implementation of international agreements, and
by supporting the expansion of existing international
agreements, to track and stop international travel by
terrorists and other criminals through the use of lost, stolen,
or falsified documents to augment existing United Nations and
other international anti-terrorism efforts.
(2) Contents of international agreement.--The President shall
seek, in the appropriate fora, the drafting, adoption, and
implementation of an effective international agreement
requiring--
(A) the establishment of a system to share
information on lost, stolen, and fraudulent passports
and other travel documents for the purposes of
preventing the undetected travel of persons using such
passports and other travel documents that were obtained
improperly;
(B) the establishment and implementation of a real-
time verification system of passports and other travel
documents with issuing authorities;
(C) the assumption of an obligation by countries that
are parties to the agreement to share with officials at
ports of entry in any such country information relating
to lost, stolen, and fraudulent passports and other
travel documents;
(D) the assumption of an obligation by countries that
are parties to the agreement--
(i) to criminalize--
(I) the falsification or
counterfeiting of travel documents or
breeder documents for any purpose;
(II) the use or attempted use of
false documents to obtain a visa or
cross a border for any purpose;
(III) the possession of tools or
implements used to falsify or
counterfeit such documents;
(IV) the trafficking in false or
stolen travel documents and breeder
documents for any purpose;
(V) the facilitation of travel by a
terrorist; and
(VI) attempts to commit, including
conspiracies to commit, the crimes
specified above;
(ii) to impose significant penalties so as to
appropriately punish violations and effectively
deter these crimes; and
(iii) to limit the issuance of citizenship
papers, passports, identification documents,
and the like to persons whose identity is
proven to the issuing authority, who have a
bona fide entitlement to or need for such
documents, and who are not issued such
documents principally on account of a
disproportional payment made by them or on
their behalf to the issuing authority;
(E) the provision of technical assistance to State
Parties to help them meet their obligations under the
convention;
(F) the establishment and implementation of a system
of self-assessments and peer reviews to examine the
degree of compliance with the convention; and
(G) an agreement that would permit immigration and
border officials to confiscate a lost, stolen, or
falsified passport at ports of entry and permit the
traveler to return to the sending country without being
in possession of the lost, stolen, or falsified
passport, and for the detention and investigation of
such traveler upon the return of the traveler to the
sending country.
(3) International civil aviation organization.--The United
States shall lead efforts to track and curtail the travel of
terrorists by supporting efforts at the International Civil
Aviation Organization to continue to strengthen the security
features of passports and other travel documents.
(c) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than one year after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and at least annually thereafter,
the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report on progress toward achieving the goals
described in subsection (b).
(2) Termination.--Paragraph (1) shall cease to be effective
when the President certifies to the Committee on International
Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate that the goals described in
subsection (b) have been fully achieved.

SEC. 3089. INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS FOR TRANSLATION OF NAMES INTO THE
ROMAN ALPHABET FOR INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL DOCUMENTS
AND NAME-BASED WATCHLIST SYSTEMS.

(a) Findings.--Congress finds that--
(1) the current lack of a single convention for translating
Arabic names enabled some of the 19 hijackers of aircraft used
in the terrorist attacks against the United States that
occurred on September 11, 2001, to vary the spelling of their
names to defeat name-based terrorist watchlist systems and to
make more difficult any potential efforts to locate them; and
(2) although the development and utilization of terrorist
watchlist systems using biometric identifiers will be helpful,
the full development and utilization of such systems will take
several years, and name-based terrorist watchlist systems will
always be useful.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the
President should seek to enter into an international agreement to
modernize and improve standards for the translation of names into the
Roman alphabet in order to ensure one common spelling for such names
for international travel documents and name-based watchlist systems.

SEC. 3090. BIOMETRIC ENTRY AND EXIT DATA SYSTEM.

(a) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National Commission
on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Congress finds that
completing a biometric entry and exit data system as expeditiously as
possible is an essential investment in efforts to protect the United
States by preventing the entry of terrorists.
(b) Plan and Report.--
(1) Development of plan.--The Secretary of Homeland Security
shall develop a plan to accelerate the full implementation of
an automated biometric entry and exit data system required by
applicable sections of--
(A) the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-208);
(B) the Immigration and Naturalization Service Data
Management Improvement Act of 2000 (Public Law 106-
205);
(C) the Visa Waiver Permanent Program Act (Public Law
106-396);
(D) the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry
Reform Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-173); and
(E) the Uniting and Strengthening America by
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (Public Law 107-56).
(2) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit a report to
Congress on the plan developed under paragraph (1), which shall
contain--
(A) a description of the current functionality of the
entry and exit data system, including--
(i) a listing of ports of entry with
biometric entry data systems in use and whether
such screening systems are located at primary
or secondary inspection areas;
(ii) a listing of ports of entry with
biometric exit data systems in use;
(iii) a listing of databases and data systems
with which the automated entry and exit data
system are interoperable;
(iv) a description of--
(I) identified deficiencies
concerning the accuracy or integrity of
the information contained in the entry
and exit data system;
(II) identified deficiencies
concerning technology associated with
processing individuals through the
system; and
(III) programs or policies planned or
implemented to correct problems
identified in subclause (I) or (II);
and
(v) an assessment of the effectiveness of the
entry and exit data system in fulfilling its
intended purposes, including preventing
terrorists from entering the United States;
(B) a description of factors relevant to the
accelerated implementation of the biometric entry and
exit system, including--
(i) the earliest date on which the Secretary
estimates that full implementation of the
biometric entry and exit data system can be
completed;
(ii) the actions the Secretary will take to
accelerate the full implementation of the
biometric entry and exit data system at all
ports of entry through which all aliens must
pass that are legally required to do so; and
(iii) the resources and authorities required
to enable the Secretary to meet the
implementation date described in clause (i);
(C) a description of any improvements needed in the
information technology employed for the entry and exit
data system; and
(D) a description of plans for improved or added
interoperability with any other databases or data
systems.
(c) Integration Requirement.--Not later than 2 years after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall integrate the
biometric entry and exit data system with all databases and data
systems maintained by the United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services that process or contain information on aliens.
(d) Maintaining Accuracy and Integrity of Entry and Exit Data
System.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary, in consultation with other
appropriate agencies, shall establish rules, guidelines,
policies, and operating and auditing procedures for collecting,
removing, and updating data maintained in, and adding
information to, the entry and exit data system, and databases
and data systems linked to the entry and exit data system, that
ensure the accuracy and integrity of the data.
(2) Requirements.--The rules, guidelines, policies, and
procedures established under paragraph (1) shall--
(A) incorporate a simple and timely method for--
(i) correcting errors; and
(ii) clarifying information known to cause
false hits or misidentification errors; and
(B) include procedures for individuals to seek
corrections of data contained in the data systems.
(e) Expediting Registered Travelers Across International Borders.--
(1) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,
Congress finds that--
(A) expediting the travel of previously screened and
known travelers across the borders of the United States
should be a high priority; and
(B) the process of expediting known travelers across
the border can permit inspectors to better focus on
identifying terrorists attempting to enter the United
States.
(2) Definition.--The term ``registered traveler program''
means any program designed to expedite the travel of previously
screened and known travelers across the borders of the United
States.
(3) Registered travel plan.--
(A) In general.--As soon as is practicable, the
Secretary shall develop and implement a plan to
expedite the processing of registered travelers who
enter and exit the United States through a single
registered traveler program.
(B) Integration.--The registered traveler program
developed under this paragraph shall be integrated into
the automated biometric entry and exit data system
described in this section.
(C) Review and evaluation.--In developing the program
under this paragraph, the Secretary shall--
(i) review existing programs or pilot
projects designed to expedite the travel of
registered travelers across the borders of the
United States;
(ii) evaluate the effectiveness of the
programs described in clause (i), the costs
associated with such programs, and the costs to
travelers to join such programs; and
(iii) increase research and development
efforts to accelerate the development and
implementation of a single registered traveler
program.
(4) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to the
Congress a report describing the Department's progress on the
development and implementation of the plan required by this
subsection.
(f) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be
appropriated to the Secretary, for each of the fiscal years 2005
through 2009, such sums as may be necessary to carry out the provisions
of this section.

SEC. 3091. BIOMETRIC ENTRY-EXIT SCREENING SYSTEM.

(a) Integrated Biometric Entry-Exit Screening System.--With respect
to the biometric entry/exit data system referred to in subsections (a)
and (b), such systems shall--
(1) Ensure that the system's tracking capabilities encompass
data related to all immigration benefits processing, including
visa applications with the Department of State, immigration
related filings with the Department of Labor, cases pending
before the Executive Office for Immigration review, and matters
pending or under investigation before the Department of
Homeland Security.
(2) Utilize a biometric based identity number tied to an
applicant's biometric algorithm established under the entry/
exit system to track all immigration related matters concerning
the applicant.
(3) Provide that all information about an applicant's
immigration related history, including entry/exit history, can
be queried through electronic means. Database access and usage
guidelines shall include stringent safeguards to prevent misuse
of data.
(4) Provide real time updates to the database described in
paragraph (3) including pertinent data from all agencies
referenced in paragraph (1).
(5) Limit access to the database described in paragraph (4)
(and any other database used for tracking immigration related
processing and/or entry/exit) to personnel explicitly
authorized to do so, and that any such access may be
ascertained by authorized persons by review of the person's
access authorization code or number.
(6) Provide continuing education in counterterrorism
techniques, tools, and methods for all Federal personnel
employed in the evaluation of immigration documents and
immigration-related policy.
(b) Entry-Exit System Goals.--The Department of Homeland Security
shall continue to implement the system described in subsections (a) and
(b), in such a way that it fulfills the following goals:
(1) Serves as a vital counterterrorism tool.
(2) Screens travelers efficiently and in a welcoming manner.
(3) Provides inspectors and related personnel with adequate
real-time information.
(4) Ensures flexibility of training and security protocols to
most effectively comply with security mandates.
(5) Integrates relevant databases and plans for database
modifications to address volume increase and database usage.
(6) Improves database search capacities by utilizing language
algorithms to detect alternate names.
(c) Dedicated Specialists and Front Line Personnel Training.--In
implementing the provisions of subsections (a), (b), and (c), the
Department of Homeland Security and the Department of State shall--
(1) develop cross-training programs that focus on the scope
and procedures of the entry/exit system;
(2) provide extensive community outreach and education on the
entry/exit system procedures;
(3) provide clear and consistent eligibility guidelines for
applicants in low-risk traveler programs; and
(4) establish ongoing training modules on immigration law to
improve adjudications at our ports of entry, consulates, and
embassies.
(d) Information Accuracy Standards.--
(1) Any information placed in the entry/exit database shall
be entered by authorized officers in compliance with
established procedures, as set forth in section 407 of this
Act, that guarantee the identification of the person making the
database entry.
(2) The Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of
State, and the Attorney General, after consultation with
directors of the relevant intelligence agencies, shall
standardize the information and data collected from foreign
nationals as well as the procedures utilized to collect such
data to ensure that the information is consistent and of value
to officials accessing that data across multiple agencies.
(e) Accessibility.--The Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary
of State, the Attorney General, and the head of any other department or
agency that possesses authority to enter data related to the
immigration status of foreign nationals, including lawful permanent
resident aliens, or where such information could serve to impede lawful
admission of United States citizens to the United States, shall each
establish guidelines related to data entry procedures. Such guidelines
shall--
(1) strictly limit the agency personnel authorized to enter
data into the system;
(2) identify classes of information to be designated as
temporary or permanent entries, with corresponding expiration
dates for temporary entries; and
(3) identify classes of prejudicial information requiring
additional authority of supervisory personnel prior to entry.
(f) System Adaptability.--
(1) Each agency authorized to enter data related to the
immigration status of any persons identified in subsection (b)
above shall develop and implement system protocols to--
(A) correct erroneous data entries in a timely and
effective manner;
(B) clarify information known to cause false hits or
misidentification errors; and
(C) update all relevant information that is
dispositive to the adjudicatory or admission process.
(2) The President or agency director so designated by the
President shall establish a clearinghouse bureau as part of the
Department of Homeland Security to centralize and streamline
the process through which members of the public can seek
corrections to erroneous or inaccurate information related to
immigration status, or which otherwise impedes lawful admission
to the United States contained in agency databases. Such
process shall include specific time schedules for reviewing
data correction requests, rendering decisions on such requests,
and implementing appropriate corrective action in a timely
manner.
(g) Training.--Agency personnel authorized to enter data pursuant to
subsection (b)(1) shall undergo extensive training in immigration law
and procedure.
(h) Implementation Audit.--The Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security shall issue a report to Congress within 6 months of
enactment of this Act that details activities undertaken to date to
develop an entry-exit system, areas in which the system currently does
not achieve the mandates set forth by this section, and the funding,
infrastructure, technology and other factors needed to complete the
system, as well as a detailed time frame in which the completion of the
system will be achieved.
(i) Reports.--
(1) The Secretaries of the Departments of State and Homeland
Security jointly shall report biannually to Congress on:
Current infrastructure and staffing at each port of entry and
each consular post, numbers of immigrant and nonimmigrant visas
issued, specify the numbers of individuals subject to expedited
removal at the ports of entry as well as within 100 miles of
the United States border, the plan for enhanced database review
at entry, the number of suspected terrorists and criminals
intercepted utilizing the entry/exit system and the moneys
spent in the preceding fiscal year to achieve the mandates of
this section, areas in which they failed to achieve these
mandates, and the steps they are taking to address these
deficiencies. For ports of entry, similar information shall be
provided including the number of I-94s issued, immigrant visa
admissions made, and nonimmigrant admissions.
(2) No later than 120 days after enactment of this Act, the
Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of State,
after consultation with the Director of the National Institute
of Standards and Technology and the Commission on Interoperable
Data Sharing, shall issue a report addressing the following
areas:
(A) The status of agency compliance with the mandates
set forth in section 202 (``Interoperable Law
Enforcement and Intelligence Data System with Name-
Matching Capacity and Training'') of the Enhanced
Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act (Public Law
107-173).
(B) The status of agency compliance with section
201(c)(3) (``Protections Regarding Information and Uses
Thereof'') of the Enhanced Border Security and Visa
Entry Reform Act (Public Law 107-173).
(3) No later than 1 year after enactment of this Act, the
Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of State, the
Attorney General, and the head of any other department or
agency bound by the mandates in this Act, shall issue both
individual status reports and a joint status report detailing
compliance with each mandate contained in this section.
(j) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be
appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out this section.

SEC. 3092. ENHANCED RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE COORDINATOR FOR
COUNTERTERRORISM.

(a) Declaration of United States Policy.--Congress declares that it
shall be the policy of the United States to--
(1) make combating terrorist travel and those who assist them
a priority for the United States counterterrorism policy; and
(2) ensure that the information relating to individuals who
help facilitate terrorist travel by creating false passports,
visas, documents used to obtain such travel documents, and
other documents are fully shared within the United States
Government and, to the extent possible, with and from foreign
governments, in order to initiate United States and foreign
prosecutions of such individuals.
(b) Amendment.--Section 1(e)(2) of the State Department Basic
Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2651a(e)(2)) is amended by adding at
the end the following:
``(C) Additional duties relating to terrorist
travel.--In addition to the principal duties of the
Coordinator described in subparagraph (B), the
Coordinator shall analyze methods used by terrorists to
travel internationally, develop policies with respect
to curtailing terrorist travel, and coordinate such
policies with the appropriate bureaus and other
entities of the Department of State, other United
States Government agencies, the Human Trafficking and
Smuggling Center, and foreign governments.''.

SEC. 3093. ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICE OF VISA AND PASSPORT SECURITY IN THE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

(a) Establishment.--There is established within the Bureau of
Diplomatic Security of the Department of State an Office of Visa and
Passport Security (in this section referred to as the ``Office'').
(b) Head of Office.--
(1) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
the head of the Office shall be an individual who shall have
the rank and status of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Diplomatic Security (in this section referred to as the
``Deputy Assistant Secretary'').
(2) Recruitment.--The Under Secretary of State for Management
shall chose the Deputy Assistant Secretary from among
individuals who are Diplomatic Security Agents.
(3) Qualifications.--The Diplomatic Security Agent chosen to
serve as the Deputy Assistant Secretary shall have expertise
and experience in investigating and prosecuting visa and
passport fraud.
(c) Duties.--
(1) Preparation of strategic plan.--
(A) In general.--The Deputy Assistant Secretary, in
coordination with the appropriate officials of the
Department of Homeland Security, shall ensure the
preparation of a strategic plan to target and disrupt
individuals and organizations at home and in foreign
countries that are involved in the fraudulent
production, distribution, use, or other similar
activity--
(i) of a United States visa or United States
passport;
(ii) of documents intended to help
fraudulently procure a United States visa or
United States passport, or other documents
intended to gain unlawful entry into the United
States; or
(iii) of passports and visas issued by
foreign countries intended to gain unlawful
entry into the United States.
(B) Emphasis.--Such plan shall--
(i) focus particular emphasis on individuals
and organizations that may have links to
domestic terrorist organizations or foreign
terrorist organizations (as such term is
defined in Section 219 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189));
(ii) require the development of a strategic
training course under the Antiterrorism
Assistance Training (ATA) program of the
Department of State (or any successor or
related program) under chapter 8 of part II of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
2349aa et seq.) (or other relevant provisions
of law) to train participants in the
identification of fraudulent documents and the
forensic detection of such documents which may
be used to obtain unlawful entry into the
United States; and
(iii) determine the benefits and costs of
providing technical assistance to foreign
governments to ensure the security of
passports, visas, and related documents and to
investigate, arrest, and prosecute individuals
who facilitate travel by the creation of false
passports and visas, documents to obtain such
passports and visas, and other types of travel
documents.
(2) Duties of office.--The Office shall have the following
duties:
(A) Analysis of methods.--Analyze methods used by
terrorists to travel internationally, particularly the
use of false or altered travel documents to illegally
enter foreign countries and the United States, and
advise the Bureau of Consular Affairs on changes to the
visa issuance process that could combat such methods,
including the introduction of new technologies into
such process.
(B) Identification of individuals and documents.--
Identify, in cooperation with the Human Trafficking and
Smuggling Center, individuals who facilitate travel by
the creation of false passports and visas, documents
used to obtain such passports and visas, and other
types of travel documents, and ensure that the
appropriate agency is notified for further
investigation and prosecution or, in the case of such
individuals abroad for which no further investigation
or prosecution is initiated, ensure that all
appropriate information is shared with foreign
governments in order to facilitate investigation,
arrest, and prosecution of such individuals.
(C) Identification of foreign countries needing
assistance.--Identify foreign countries that need
technical assistance, such as law reform,
administrative reform, prosecutorial training, or
assistance to police and other investigative services,
to ensure passport, visa, and related document security
and to investigate, arrest, and prosecute individuals
who facilitate travel by the creation of false
passports and visas, documents used to obtain such
passports and visas, and other types of travel
documents.
(D) Inspection of applications.--Randomly inspect
visa and passport applications for accuracy,
efficiency, and fraud, especially at high terrorist
threat posts, in order to prevent a recurrence of the
issuance of visas to those who submit incomplete,
fraudulent, or otherwise irregular or incomplete
applications.
(3) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Deputy Assistant Secretary shall
submit to Congress a report containing--
(A) a description of the strategic plan prepared
under paragraph (1); and
(B) an evaluation of the feasibility of establishing
civil service positions in field offices of the Bureau
of Diplomatic Security to investigate visa and passport
fraud, including an evaluation of whether to allow
diplomatic security agents to convert to civil service
officers to fill such positions.

Subtitle D--Terrorist Travel

SEC. 3101. INFORMATION SHARING AND COORDINATION.

The Secretary of Homeland Security shall establish a mechanism to--
(1) ensure the coordination and dissemination of terrorist
travel intelligence and operational information among the
appropriate agencies within the Department of Homeland
Security, including the Bureau of Customs and Border
Protection, the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, the
Transportation Security Administration, the Coast Guard, and
other agencies as directed by the Secretary; and
(2) ensure the sharing of terrorist travel intelligence and
operational information with the Department of State, the
National Counterterrorism Center, and other appropriate Federal
agencies.

SEC. 3102. TERRORIST TRAVEL PROGRAM.

The Secretary of Homeland Security shall establish a program to--
(1) analyze and utilize information and intelligence
regarding terrorist travel tactics, patterns, trends, and
practices; and
(2) disseminate that information to all front-line Department
of Homeland Security personnel who are at ports of entry or
between ports of entry, to immigration benefits offices, and,
in coordination with the Secretary of State, to appropriate
individuals at United States embassies and consulates.

SEC. 3103. TRAINING PROGRAM.

(a) Review, Evaluation, and Revision of Existing Training Programs.--
The Secretary of Homeland Security shall--
(1) review and evaluate the training currently provided to
Department of Homeland Security personnel and, in consultation
with the Secretary of State, relevant Department of State
personnel with respect to travel and identity documents, and
techniques, patterns, and trends associated with terrorist
travel; and
(2) develop and implement a revised training program for
border, immigration, and consular officials in order to teach
such officials how to effectively detect, intercept, and
disrupt terrorist travel.
(b) Required Topics of Revised Programs.--The training program
developed under subsection (a)(2) shall include training in the
following areas:
(1) Methods for identifying fraudulent and genuine travel
documents.
(2) Methods for detecting terrorist indicators on travel
documents and other relevant identity documents.
(3) Recognizing travel patterns, tactics, and behaviors
exhibited by terrorists.
(4) Effectively utilizing information contained in databases
and data systems available to the Department of Homeland
Security.
(5) Other topics determined to be appropriate by the
Secretary of Homeland Security in consultation with the
Secretary of State or the National Intelligence Director.

SEC. 3104. TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION AND DISSEMINATION PLAN.

(a) Plan Required.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in
consultation with the Secretary of State, shall submit to the Congress
a plan to ensure that the Department of Homeland Security and the
Department of State acquire and deploy, to all consulates, ports of
entry, and immigration benefits offices, technologies that facilitate
document authentication and the detection of potential terrorist
indicators on travel documents.
(b) Interoperability Requirement.--To the extent possible,
technologies to be acquired and deployed under the plan shall be
compatible with current systems used by the Department of Homeland
Security to detect and identify fraudulent documents and genuine
documents.
(c) Passport Screening.--The plan shall address the feasibility of
using such technologies to screen passports submitted for
identification purposes to a United States consular, border, or
immigration official.

Subtitle E--Maritime Security Requirements

SEC. 3111. DEADLINES FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF MARITIME SECURITY
REQUIREMENTS.

(a) National Maritime Transportation Security Plan.--Section 70103(a)
of the 46, United States Code, is amended by striking ``The Secretary''
and inserting ``Not later than December 31, 2004, the Secretary''.
(b) Facility and Vessel Vulnerability Assessments.--Section
70102(b)(1) of the 46, United States Code, is amended by striking ``,
the Secretary'' and inserting ``and by not later than December 31,
2004, the Secretary''.
(c) Transportation Security Card Regulations.--Section 70105(a) of
the 46, United States Code, is amended by striking ``The Secretary''
and inserting ``Not later than December 31, 2004, the Secretary''.

TITLE IV--INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND COORDINATION

Subtitle A--Attack Terrorists and Their Organizations

CHAPTER 1--PROVISIONS RELATING TO TERRORIST SANCTUARIES

SEC. 4001. UNITED STATES POLICY ON TERRORIST SANCTUARIES.

It is the sense of Congress that it should be the policy of the
United States--
(1) to identify and prioritize foreign countries that are or
that could be used as terrorist sanctuaries;
(2) to assess current United States resources being provided
to such foreign countries;
(3) to develop and implement a coordinated strategy to
prevent terrorists from using such foreign countries as
sanctuaries; and
(4) to work in bilateral and multilateral fora to prevent
foreign countries from being used as terrorist sanctuaries.

SEC. 4002. REPORTS ON TERRORIST SANCTUARIES.

(a) Initial Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit to Congress
a report that describes a strategy for addressing and, where
possible, eliminating terrorist sanctuaries.
(2) Content.--The report required under this subsection shall
include the following:
(A) A list that prioritizes each actual and potential
terrorist sanctuary and a description of activities in
the actual and potential sanctuaries.
(B) An outline of strategies for preventing the use
of, disrupting, or ending the use of such sanctuaries.
(C) A detailed description of efforts, including an
assessment of successes and setbacks, by the United
States to work with other countries in bilateral and
multilateral fora to address or eliminate each actual
or potential terrorist sanctuary and disrupt or
eliminate the security provided to terrorists by each
such sanctuary.
(D) A description of long-term goals and actions
designed to reduce the conditions that allow the
formation of terrorist sanctuaries.
(b) Subsequent Reports.--
(1) Requirement of reports.--Section 140(a)(1) of the Foreign
Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (22
U.S.C. 2656f(a)(1)) is amended--
(A) by striking ``(1)'' and inserting ``(1)(A)'';
(B) by redesignating subparagraphs (A) through (C) as
clauses (i) through (iii), respectively;
(C) in subparagraph (A)(iii) (as redesignated), by
adding ``and'' at the end; and
(D) by adding at the end the following:
``(B) detailed assessments with respect to each foreign
country whose territory is being used or could potentially be
used as a sanctuary for terrorists or terrorist
organizations;''.
(2) Provisions to be included in report.--Section 140(b) of
such Act (22 U.S.C. 2656f(b)) is amended--
(A) in paragraph (1)--
(i) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A),
by striking ``subsection (a)(1)'' and inserting
``subsection (a)(1)(A)''; and
(ii) by striking ``and'' at the end;
(B) by redesignating paragraph (2) as paragraph (3);
(C) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following:
``(2) with respect to subsection (a)(1)(B)--
``(A) the extent of knowledge by the government of
the country with respect to terrorist activities in the
territory of the country; and
``(B) the actions by the country--
``(i) to eliminate each terrorist sanctuary
in the territory of the country;
``(ii) to cooperate with United States
antiterrorism efforts; and
``(iii) to prevent the proliferation of and
trafficking in weapons of mass destruction in
and through the territory of the country;'';
(D) by striking the period at the end of paragraph
(3) (as redesignated) and inserting a semicolon; and
(E) by inserting after paragraph (3) (as
redesignated) the following:
``(4) a strategy for addressing and, where possible,
eliminating terrorist sanctuaries that shall include--
``(A) a description of actual and potential terrorist
sanctuaries, together with an assessment of the
priorities of addressing and eliminating such
sanctuaries;
``(B) an outline of strategies for disrupting or
eliminating the security provided to terrorists by such
sanctuaries;
``(C) a description of efforts by the United States
to work with other countries in bilateral and
multilateral fora to address or eliminate actual or
potential terrorist sanctuaries and disrupt or
eliminate the security provided to terrorists by such
sanctuaries; and
``(D) a description of long-term goals and actions
designed to reduce the conditions that allow the
formation of terrorist sanctuaries;
``(5) an update of the information contained in the report
required to be transmitted to Congress pursuant to section
4002(a)(2) of the 9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act;
``(6) to the extent practicable, complete statistical
information on the number of individuals, including United
States citizens and dual nationals, killed, injured, or
kidnapped by each terrorist group during the preceding calendar
year; and
``(7) an analysis, as appropriate, relating to trends in
international terrorism, including changes in technology used,
methods and targets of attacks, demographic information on
terrorists, and other appropriate information.''.
(3) Definitions.--Section 140(d) of such Act (22 U.S.C.
2656f(d)) is amended--
(A) in paragraph (2), by striking ``and'' at the end;
(B) in paragraph (3), by striking the period at the
end and inserting a semicolon; and
(C) by adding at the end the following:
``(4) the term `territory' and `territory of the country'
means the land, waters, and airspace of the country; and
``(5) the term `terrorist sanctuary' or `sanctuary' means an
area in the territory of a country that is used by a terrorist
group with the express or implied consent of the government of
the country--
``(A) to carry out terrorist activities, including
training, fundraising, financing, recruitment, and
education activities; or
``(B) to provide transit through the country.''.
(4) Effective date.--The amendments made by paragraphs (1),
(2), and (3) apply with respect to the report required to be
transmitted under section 140 of the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, by April 30,
2006, and by April 30 of each subsequent year.

SEC. 4003. AMENDMENTS TO EXISTING LAW TO INCLUDE TERRORIST SANCTUARIES.

(a) Amendments.--Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of
1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (1)--
(A) by redesignating subparagraph (B) as subparagraph
(C); and
(B) by inserting after subparagraph (A) the
following:
``(B) Any part of the territory of the country is being used
as a sanctuary for terrorists or terrorist organizations.'';
(2) in paragraph (3), by striking ``paragraph (1)(A)'' and
inserting ``subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (1)'';
(3) by redesignating paragraph (5) as paragraph (6);
(4) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following:
``(5) A determination made by the Secretary of State under paragraph
(1)(B) may not be rescinded unless the President submits to the Speaker
of the House of Representatives and the chairman of the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and the chairman of the Committee
on Foreign Relations of the Senate before the proposed rescission would
take effect a report certifying that the government of the country
concerned --
``(A) is taking concrete, verifiable steps to eliminate each
terrorist sanctuary in the territory of the country;
``(B) is cooperating with United States antiterrorism
efforts; and
``(C) is taking all appropriate actions to prevent the
proliferation of and trafficking in weapons of mass destruction
in and through the territory of the country.''; and
(5) by inserting after paragraph (6) (as redesignated) the
following:
``(7) In this subsection--
``(A) the term `territory of the country' means the land,
waters, and airspace of the country; and
``(B) the term `terrorist sanctuary' or `sanctuary' means an
area in the territory of a country that is used by a terrorist
group with the express or implied consent of the government of
the country--
``(i) to carry out terrorist activities, including
training, fundraising, financing, recruitment, and
education activities; or
``(ii) to provide transit through the country.''.
(b) Implementation.--The President shall implement the amendments
made by subsection (a) by exercising the authorities the President has
under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701
et seq.).

CHAPTER 2--OTHER PROVISIONS

SEC. 4011. APPOINTMENTS TO FILL VACANCIES IN ARMS CONTROL AND
NONPROLIFERATION ADVISORY BOARD.

(a) Requirement.--Not later than December 31, 2004, the Secretary of
State shall appoint individuals to the Arms Control and
Nonproliferation Advisory Board to fill all vacancies in the membership
of the Board that exist on the date of the enactment of this Act.
(b) Consultation.--Appointments to the Board under subsection (a)
shall be made in consultation with the Committee on International
Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate.

SEC. 4012. REVIEW OF UNITED STATES POLICY ON PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS
OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND CONTROL OF STRATEGIC
WEAPONS.

(a) Review.--
(1) In general.--The Undersecretary of State for Arms Control
and International Security shall instruct the Arms Control and
Nonproliferation Advisory Board (in this section referred to as
the ``Advisory Board'') to carry out a review of existing
policies of the United States relating to the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and the control of strategic
weapons.
(2) Components.--The review required under this subsection
shall contain at a minimum the following:
(A) An identification of all major deficiencies in
existing United States policies relating to the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the
control of strategic weapons.
(B) Proposals that contain a range of options that if
implemented would adequately address any significant
threat deriving from the deficiencies in existing
United States policies described in subparagraph (A).
(b) Reports.--
(1) Interim report.--Not later than June 15, 2005, the
Advisory Board shall prepare and submit to the Undersecretary
of State for Arms Control and International Security an interim
report that contains the initial results of the review carried
out pursuant to subsection (a).
(2) Final report.--Not later than December 1, 2005, the
Advisory Board shall prepare and submit to the Undersecretary
of State for Arms Control and International Security, and to
the Committee on International Relations of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate, a final report that contains the comprehensive results
of the review carried out pursuant to subsection (a).
(c) Experts and Consultants.-- In carrying out this section, the
Advisory Board may procure temporary and intermittent services of
experts and consultants, including experts and consultants from
nongovernmental organizations, under section 3109(b) of title 5, United
States Code.
(d) Funding and Other Resources.--The Secretary of State shall
provide to the Advisory Board an appropriate amount of funding and
other resources to enable the Advisory Board to carry out this section.

SEC. 4013. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS TO INTERDICT ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM.

Section 1(e)(2) of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956
(22 U.S.C. 2651a(e)(2)), as amended by section 3091(b), is further
amended by adding at the end the following:
``(D) Additional duties relating to international
agreements to interdict acts of international
terrorism.--
``(i) In general.--In addition to the
principal duties of the Coordinator described
in subparagraph (B), the Coordinator, in
consultation with relevant United States
Government agencies, shall seek to negotiate on
a bilateral basis international agreements
under which parties to an agreement work in
partnership to address and interdict acts of
international terrorism.
``(ii) Terms of international agreement.--It
is the sense of Congress that--
``(I) each party to an international
agreement referred to in clause (i)--
``(aa) should be in full
compliance with United Nations
Security Council Resolution
1373 (September 28, 2001),
other appropriate international
agreements relating to
antiterrorism measures, and
such other appropriate criteria
relating to antiterrorism
measures;
``(bb) should sign and adhere
to a `Counterterrorism Pledge'
and a list of `Interdiction
Principles', to be determined
by the parties to the
agreement;
``(cc) should identify assets
and agree to multilateral
efforts that maximizes the
country's strengths and
resources to address and
interdict acts of international
terrorism or the financing of
such acts;
``(dd) should agree to joint
training exercises among the
other parties to the agreement;
and
``(ee) should agree to the
negotiation and implementation
of other relevant international
agreements and consensus-based
international standards; and
``(II) an international agreement
referred to in clause (i) should
contain provisions that require the
parties to the agreement--
``(aa) to identify regions
throughout the world that are
emerging terrorist threats;
``(bb) to establish terrorism
interdiction centers in such
regions and other regions, as
appropriate;
``(cc) to deploy terrorism
prevention teams to such
regions, including United
States-led teams; and
``(dd) to integrate
intelligence, military, and law
enforcement personnel from
countries that are parties to
the agreement in order to work
directly with the regional
centers described in item (bb)
and regional teams described in
item (cc).''.

SEC. 4014. EFFECTIVE COALITION APPROACH TOWARD DETENTION AND HUMANE
TREATMENT OF CAPTURED TERRORISTS.

It is the sense of Congress that the President should pursue by all
appropriate diplomatic means with countries that are participating in
the Coalition to fight terrorism the development of an effective
approach toward the detention and humane treatment of captured
terrorists. The effective approach referred to in this section may, as
appropriate, draw on Article 3 of the Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, done at Geneva on August 12, 1949 (6 UST
3316).

SEC. 4015. SENSE OF CONGRESS AND REPORT REGARDING COUNTER-DRUG EFFORTS
IN AFGHANISTAN.

(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the President should make the substantial reduction of
illegal drug production and trafficking in Afghanistan a
priority in the Global War on Terrorism;
(2) the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the
Secretary of State, Attorney General, and the heads of other
appropriate Federal agencies, should expand cooperation with
the Government of Afghanistan and international organizations
involved in counter-drug activities to assist in providing a
secure environment for counter-drug personnel in Afghanistan;
and
(3) the United States, in conjunction with the Government of
Afghanistan and coalition partners, should undertake additional
efforts to reduce illegal drug trafficking and related
activities that provide financial support for terrorist
organizations in Afghanistan and neighboring countries.
(b) Report Required.--(1) The Secretary of Defense and the Secretary
of State shall jointly prepare a report that describes--
(A) the progress made towards substantially reducing poppy
cultivation and heroin production capabilities in Afghanistan;
and
(B) the extent to which profits from illegal drug activity in
Afghanistan are used to financially support terrorist
organizations and groups seeking to undermine the Government of
Afghanistan.
(2) The report required by this subsection shall be submitted to
Congress not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act.

Subtitle B--Prevent the Continued Growth of Terrorism

CHAPTER 1--UNITED STATES PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

SEC. 4021. ANNUAL REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY STRATEGY.

(a) In General.--The Secretary of State, in coordination with all
appropriate Federal agencies, shall submit to the Committee on
International Relations of the House of Representatives and the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate an annual assessment of
the impact of public diplomacy efforts on target audiences. Each
assessment shall review the United States public diplomacy strategy
worldwide and by region, including an examination of the allocation of
resources and an evaluation and assessment of the progress in, and
barriers to, achieving the goals set forth under previous plans
submitted under this section. Not later than March 15 of every year,
the Secretary shall submit the assessment required by this subsection.
(b) Further Action.-- On the basis of such review, the Secretary, in
coordination with all appropriate Federal agencies, shall submit, as
part of the annual budget submission, a public diplomacy strategy plan
which specifies goals, agency responsibilities, and necessary resources
and mechanisms for achieving such goals during the next fiscal year.
The plan may be submitted in classified form.

SEC. 4022. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY TRAINING.

(a) Statement of Policy.--It should be the policy of the United
States:
(1) The Foreign Service should recruit individuals with
expertise and professional experience in public diplomacy.
(2) United States chiefs of mission should have a prominent
role in the formulation of public diplomacy strategies for the
countries and regions to which they are assigned and should be
accountable for the operation and success of public diplomacy
efforts at their posts.
(3) Initial and subsequent training of Foreign Service
officers should be enhanced to include information and training
on public diplomacy and the tools and technology of mass
communication.
(b) Personnel.--
(1) Qualifications.--In the recruitment, training, and
assignment of members of the Foreign Service, the Secretary of
State shall emphasize the importance of public diplomacy and
applicable skills and techniques. The Secretary shall consider
the priority recruitment into the Foreign Service, at middle-
level entry, of individuals with expertise and professional
experience in public diplomacy, mass communications, or
journalism. The Secretary shall give special consideration to
individuals with language facility and experience in particular
countries and regions.
(2) Languages of special interest.--The Secretary of State
shall seek to increase the number of Foreign Service officers
proficient in languages spoken in predominantly Muslim
countries. Such increase shall be accomplished through the
recruitment of new officers and incentives for officers in
service.

SEC. 4023. PROMOTING DIRECT EXCHANGES WITH MUSLIM COUNTRIES.

(a) Declaration of Policy.--Congress declares that the United States
should commit to a long-term and sustainable investment in promoting
engagement with people of all levels of society in countries with
predominantly Muslim populations, particularly with youth and those who
influence youth. Such an investment should make use of the talents and
resources in the private sector and should include programs to increase
the number of people who can be exposed to the United States and its
fundamental ideas and values in order to dispel misconceptions. Such
programs should include youth exchange programs, young ambassadors
programs, international visitor programs, academic and cultural
exchange programs, American Corner programs, library programs,
journalist exchange programs, sister city programs, and other programs
related to people-to-people diplomacy.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United
States should significantly increase its investment in the people-to-
people programs described in subsection (a).

SEC. 4024. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY REQUIRED FOR PROMOTION IN FOREIGN SERVICE.

(a) In General.--Section 603(b) of the Foreign Service Act of 1980
(22 U.S.C. 4003(b)) is amended by adding at the end the following new
sentences: ``The precepts for such selection boards shall also consider
whether the member of the Service or the member of the Senior Foreign
Service, as the case may be, has served in at least one position in
which the primary responsibility of such member was related to public
diplomacy. A member may not be promoted into or within the Senior
Foreign Service if such member has not served in at least one such
position.''.
(b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall take
effect on January 1, 2009.

CHAPTER 2--UNITED STATES MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY

SEC. 4031. PURPOSE.

It is the purpose of this chapter to strengthen United States
leadership and effectiveness at international organizations and
multilateral institutions.

SEC. 4032. SUPPORT AND EXPANSION OF DEMOCRACY CAUCUS.

(a) In General.--The President, acting through the Secretary of State
and the relevant United States chiefs of mission, shall--
(1) continue to strongly support and seek to expand the work
of the democracy caucus at the United Nations General Assembly
and the United Nations Human Rights Commission; and
(2) seek to establish a democracy caucus at the United
Nations Conference on Disarmament and at other broad-based
international organizations.
(b) Purposes of the Caucus.--A democracy caucus at an international
organization should--
(1) forge common positions, including, as appropriate, at the
ministerial level, on matters of concern before the
organization and work within and across regional lines to
promote agreed positions;
(2) work to revise an increasingly outmoded system of
membership selection, regional voting, and decision making; and
(3) establish a rotational leadership agreement to provide
member countries an opportunity, for a set period of time, to
serve as the designated president of the caucus, responsible
for serving as its voice in each organization.

SEC. 4033. LEADERSHIP AND MEMBERSHIP OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.

(a) United States Policy.--The President, acting through the
Secretary of State and the relevant United States chiefs of mission,
shall use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States to--
(1) where appropriate, reform the criteria for leadership
and, in appropriate cases, for membership, at all United
Nations bodies and at other international organizations and
multilateral institutions to which the United States is a
member so as to exclude countries that violate the principles
of the specific organization;
(2) make it a policy of the United Nations and other
international organizations and multilateral institutions of
which the United States is a member that a member country may
not stand in nomination for membership or in nomination or in
rotation for a leadership position in such bodies if the member
country is subject to sanctions imposed by the United Nations
Security Council; and
(3) work to ensure that no member country stand in nomination
for membership, or in nomination or in rotation for a
leadership position in such organizations, or for membership on
the United Nations Security Council, if the member country is
subject to a determination under section 6(j)(1)(A) of the
Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App.
2405(j)(1)(A)), section 620A(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371(a)), or section 40(d) of the Arms
Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780(d)).
(b) Report to Congress.--Not later than 15 days after a country
subject to a determination under one or more of the provisions of law
specified in subsection (a)(3) is selected for membership or a
leadership post in an international organization of which the United
States is a member or for membership on the United Nations Security
Council, the Secretary of State shall submit to the Committee on
International Relations of the House of Representatives and the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report on any steps
taken pursuant to subsection (a)(3).

SEC. 4034. INCREASED TRAINING IN MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY.

(a) Training Programs.--Section 708 of the Foreign Service Act of
1980 (22 U.S.C. 4028) is amended by adding at the end the following new
subsection:
``(c) Training in Multilateral Diplomacy.--
``(1) In general.--The Secretary shall establish a series of
training courses for officers of the Service, including
appropriate chiefs of mission, on the conduct of diplomacy at
international organizations and other multilateral institutions
and at broad-based multilateral negotiations of international
instruments.
``(2) Particular programs.--The Secretary shall ensure that
the training described in paragraph (1) is provided at various
stages of the career of members of the service. In particular,
the Secretary shall ensure that after January 1, 2006--
``(A) officers of the Service receive training on the
conduct of diplomacy at international organizations and
other multilateral institutions and at broad-based
multilateral negotiations of international instruments
as part of their training upon entry into the Service;
and
``(B) officers of the Service, including chiefs of
mission, who are assigned to United States missions
representing the United States to international
organizations and other multilateral institutions or
who are assigned in Washington, D.C., to positions that
have as their primary responsibility formulation of
policy towards such organizations and institutions or
towards participation in broad-based multilateral
negotiations of international instruments, receive
specialized training in the areas described in
paragraph (1) prior to beginning of service for such
assignment or, if receiving such training at that time
is not practical, within the first year of beginning
such assignment.''.
(b) Training for Civil Service Employees.--The Secretary shall ensure
that employees of the Department of State who are members of the civil
service and who are assigned to positions described in section 708(c)
of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (as amended by subsection (a))
receive training described in such section.
(c) Conforming Amendments.--Section 708 of such Act is further
amended--
(1) in subsection (a), by striking ``(a) The'' and inserting
``(a) Training on Human Rights.--The''; and
(2) in subsection (b), by striking ``(b) The'' and inserting
``(b) Training on Refugee Law and Religious Persecution.--
The''.

SEC. 4035. IMPLEMENTATION AND ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICE ON MULTILATERAL
NEGOTIATIONS.

(a) Establishment of Office.--The Secretary of State is authorized to
establish, within the Bureau of International Organizational Affairs,
an Office on Multilateral Negotiations to be headed by a Special
Representative for Multilateral Negotiations (in this section referred
to as the ``Special Representative'').
(b) Appointment.--The Special Representative shall be appointed by
the President and shall have the rank of Ambassador-at-Large. At the
discretion of the President another official at the Department may
serve as the Special Representative.
(c) Staffing.--The Special Representative shall have a staff of
Foreign Service and civil service officers skilled in multilateral
diplomacy.
(d) Duties.--The Special Representative shall have the following
responsibilities:
(1) In general.--The primary responsibility of the Special
Representative shall be to assist in the organization of, and
preparation for, United States participation in multilateral
negotiations, including advocacy efforts undertaken by the
Department of State and other United States Government
agencies.
(2) Consultations.--The Special Representative shall consult
with Congress, international organizations, nongovernmental
organizations, and the private sector on matters affecting
multilateral negotiations.
(3) Advisory role.--The Special Representative shall advise
the Assistant Secretary for International Organizational
Affairs and, as appropriate, the Secretary of State, regarding
advocacy at international organizations, multilateral
institutions, and negotiations, and shall make recommendations
regarding--
(A) effective strategies (and tactics) to achieve
United States policy objectives at multilateral
negotiations;
(B) the need for and timing of high level
intervention by the President, the Secretary of State,
the Deputy Secretary of State, and other United States
officials to secure support from key foreign government
officials for United States positions at such
organizations, institutions, and negotiations; and
(C) the composition of United States delegations to
multilateral negotiations.
(4) Annual diplomatic missions of multilateral issues.--The
Special Representative, in coordination with the Assistant
Secretary for International Organizational Affairs, shall
organize annual diplomatic missions to appropriate foreign
countries to conduct consultations between principal officers
responsible for advising the Secretary of State on
international organizations and high-level representatives of
the governments of such foreign countries to promote the United
States agenda at the United Nations General Assembly and other
key international fora (such as the United Nations Human Rights
Commission).
(5) Leadership and membership of international
organizations.--The Special Representative, in coordination
with the Assistant Secretary of International Organizational
Affairs, shall direct the efforts of the United States to
reform the criteria for leadership of and membership in
international organizations as described in section 4033.
(6) Participation in multilateral negotiations.--The
Secretary of State may direct the Special Representative to
serve as a member of a United States delegation to any
multilateral negotiation.

CHAPTER 3--OTHER PROVISIONS

SEC. 4041. PILOT PROGRAM TO PROVIDE GRANTS TO AMERICAN-SPONSORED
SCHOOLS IN PREDOMINANTLY MUSLIM COUNTRIES TO
PROVIDE SCHOLARSHIPS.

(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) During the 2003-2004 school year, the Office of Overseas
Schools of the Department of State is financially assisting 189
elementary and secondary schools in foreign countries.
(2) American-sponsored elementary and secondary schools are
located in more than 20 countries with significant Muslim
populations in the Near East, Africa, South Asia, Central Asia,
and East Asia.
(3) American-sponsored elementary and secondary schools
provide an American-style education in English, with curricula
that typically include an emphasis on the development of
critical thinking and analytical skills.
(b) Purpose.--The United States has an interest in increasing the
level of financial support provided to American-sponsored elementary
and secondary schools in predominantly Muslim countries, in order to--
(1) increase the number of students in such countries who
attend such schools;
(2) increase the number of young people who may thereby gain
at any early age an appreciation for the culture, society, and
history of the United States; and
(3) increase the number of young people who may thereby
improve their proficiency in the English language.
(c) Pilot Program Authorized.--The Secretary of State, acting through
the Director of the Office of Overseas Schools of the Department of
State, may conduct a pilot program to make grants to American-sponsored
elementary and secondary schools in predominantly Muslim countries for
the purpose of providing full or partial merit-based scholarships to
students from lower- and middle-income families of such countries to
attend such schools.
(d) Determination of Eligible Students.--For purposes of expending
grant funds, an American-sponsored elementary and secondary school that
receives a grant under subsection (c) is authorized to establish
criteria to be implemented by such school to determine what constitutes
lower- and middle-income families in the country (or region of the
country, if regional variations in income levels in the country are
significant) in which such school is located.
(e) Restriction on Use of Funds.--Amounts appropriated to the
Secretary of State pursuant to the authorization of appropriations in
subsection (h) shall be used for the sole purpose of making grants
under this section, and may not be used for the administration of the
Office of Overseas Schools of the Department of State or for any other
activity of the Office.
(f) Voluntary Participation.--Nothing in this section shall be
construed to require participation in the pilot program by an American-
sponsored elementary or secondary school in a predominantly Muslim
country.
(g) Report.--Not later than April 15, 2006, the Secretary shall
submit to the Committee on International Relations of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a
report on the pilot program. The report shall assess the success of the
program, examine any obstacles encountered in its implementation, and
address whether it should be continued, and if so, provide
recommendations to increase its effectiveness.
(h) Funding.--There are authorized to be appropriated to the
Secretary of State such sums as may be necessary for each of fiscal
years 2005, 2006, and 2007 to carry out this section.

SEC. 4042. ENHANCING FREE AND INDEPENDENT MEDIA.

(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Freedom of speech and freedom of the press are
fundamental human rights.
(2) The United States has a national interest in promoting
these freedoms by supporting free media abroad, which is
essential to the development of free and democratic societies
consistent with our own.
(3) Free media is undermined, endangered, or nonexistent in
many repressive and transitional societies around the world,
including in Eurasia, Africa, and the Middle East.
(4) Individuals lacking access to a plurality of free media
are vulnerable to misinformation and propaganda and are
potentially more likely to adopt anti-American views.
(5) Foreign governments have a responsibility to actively and
publicly discourage and rebut unprofessional and unethical
media while respecting journalistic integrity and editorial
independence.
(b) Statements of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United
States, acting through the Secretary of State, to--
(1) ensure that the promotion of press freedoms and free
media worldwide is a priority of United States foreign policy
and an integral component of United States public diplomacy;
(2) respect the journalistic integrity and editorial
independence of free media worldwide; and
(3) ensure that widely accepted standards for professional
and ethical journalistic and editorial practices are employed
when assessing international media.
(c) Grants to Private Sector Group to Establish Media Network.--
(1) In general.--Grants made available to the National
Endowment for Democracy (NED) pursuant to paragraph (3) shall
be used by NED to provide funding to a private sector group to
establish and manage a free and independent media network in
accordance with paragraph (2).
(2) Purpose.--The purpose of the network shall be to provide
an effective forum to convene a broad range of individuals,
organizations, and governmental participants involved in
journalistic activities and the development of free and
independent media to--
(A) fund a clearinghouse to collect and share
information concerning international media development
and training;
(B) improve research in the field of media assistance
and program evaluation to better inform decisions
regarding funding and program design for government and
private donors;
(C) explore the most appropriate use of existing
means to more effectively encourage the involvement of
the private sector in the field of media assistance;
and
(D) identify effective methods for the development of
a free and independent media in societies in
transition.
(3) Funding.--For grants made by the Department of State to
NED as authorized by the National Endowment for Democracy Act
(Pub. L. 98-164, 97 Stat. 1039), there are authorized to be
appropriated to the Secretary of State such sums as may be
necessary for each of fiscal years 2005, 2006, and 2007 to
carry out this section.

SEC. 4043. COMBATING BIASED OR FALSE FOREIGN MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE
UNITED STATES.

(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) Biased or false media coverage of the United States and
its allies is a significant factor encouraging terrorist acts
against the people of the United States.
(2) Public diplomacy efforts designed to encourage an
accurate understanding of the people of the United States and
the policies of the United States are unlikely to succeed if
foreign publics are subjected to unrelenting biased or false
local media coverage of the United States.
(3) Where freedom of the press exists in foreign countries
the United States can combat biased or false media coverage by
responding in the foreign media or by communicating directly to
foreign publics in such countries.
(4) Foreign governments which encourage biased or false media
coverage of the United States bear a significant degree of
responsibility for creating a climate within which terrorism
can flourish. Such governments are responsible for encouraging
biased or false media coverage if they--
(A) issue direct or indirect instructions to the
media to publish biased or false information regarding
the United States;
(B) make deliberately biased or false charges
expecting that such charges will be disseminated; or
(C) so severely constrain the ability of the media to
express criticism of any such government that one of
the few means of political expression available is
criticism of the United States.
(b) Statements of Policy.--
(1) Foreign governments.--It shall be the policy of the
United States to regard foreign governments as knowingly
engaged in unfriendly acts toward the United States if such
governments--
(A) instruct their state-owned or influenced media to
include content that is anti-American or prejudicial to
the foreign and security policies of the United States;
or
(B) make deliberately false charges regarding the
United States or permit false or biased charges against
the United States to be made while constraining normal
political discourse.
(2) Seeking media access; responding to false charges.--It
shall be the policy of the United States to--
(A) seek access to the media in foreign countries on
terms no less favorable than those afforded any other
foreign entity or on terms available to the foreign
country in the United States; and
(B) combat biased or false media coverage in foreign
countries of the United States and its allies by
responding in the foreign media or by communicating
directly to foreign publics.
(c) Responsibilities Regarding Biased or False Media Coverage.--
(1) Secretary of state.--The Secretary of State shall
instruct chiefs of mission to report on and combat biased or
false media coverage originating in or received in foreign
countries to which such chiefs are posted. Based on such
reports and other information available to the Secretary, the
Secretary shall prioritize efforts to combat such media
coverage, giving special attention to audiences where fostering
popular opposition to terrorism is most important and such
media coverage is most prevalent.
(2) Chiefs of mission.--Chiefs of mission shall have the
following responsibilities:
(A) Chiefs of mission shall give strong priority to
combatting biased or false media reports in foreign
countries to which such chiefs are posted regarding the
United States.
(B) Chiefs of mission posted to foreign countries in
which freedom of the press exists shall inform the
governments of such countries of the policies of the
United States regarding biased or false media coverage
of the United States, and shall make strong efforts to
persuade such governments to change policies that
encourage such media coverage.
(d) Reports.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act and at least annually thereafter until January 1, 2015, the
Secretary shall submit to the Committee on International Relations of
the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of
the Senate a report regarding the major themes of biased or false media
coverage of the United States in foreign countries, the actions taken
to persuade foreign governments to change policies that encourage such
media coverage (and the results of such actions), and any other actions
taken to combat such media coverage in foreign countries.

SEC. 4044. REPORT ON BROADCAST OUTREACH STRATEGY.

(a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act, the President shall transmit to the Committee on
International Relations of the House of Representatives and the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report on the strategy
of the United States to expand its outreach to foreign Muslim audiences
through broadcast media.
(b) Content.--The report required under subsection (a) shall contain
the following:
(1) An assessment of the Broadcasting Board of Governors and
the public diplomacy activities of the Department of State with
respect to outreach to foreign Muslim audiences through
broadcast media.
(2) An outline of recommended actions that the United States
should take to more regularly and comprehensively present a
United States point of view through indigenous broadcast media
in countries with sizeable Muslim populations, including
increasing appearances by United States Government officials,
experts, and citizens.
(3) An assessment of potential incentives for, and costs
associated with, encouraging United States broadcasters to dub
or subtitle into Arabic and other relevant languages their news
and public affairs programs broadcast in Muslim countries in
order to present those programs to a much broader Muslim
audience than is currently reached.
(4) An assessment of providing a training program in media
and press affairs for members of the Foreign Service.

SEC. 4045. OFFICE RELOCATION.

As soon as practicable after the date of the enactment of this Act,
the Secretary of State shall take such actions as are necessary to
consolidate within the Harry S. Truman Building all offices of the
Department of State that are responsible for the conduct of public
diplomacy, including the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs.

SEC. 4046. STRENGTHENING THE COMMUNITY OF DEMOCRACIES FOR MUSLIM
COUNTRIES.

(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United
States--
(1) should work with the Community of Democracies to discuss,
develop, and refine policies and assistance programs to support
and promote political, economic, judicial, educational, and
social reforms in Muslim countries;
(2) should, as part of that effort, secure support to require
countries seeking membership in the Community of Democracies to
be in full compliance with the Community's criteria for
participation, as established by the Community's Convening
Group, should work to ensure that the criteria are part of a
legally binding document, and should urge other donor countries
to use compliance with the criteria as a basis for determining
diplomatic and economic relations (including assistance
programs) with such participating countries; and
(3) should seek support for international contributions to
the Community of Democracies and should seek authority for the
Community's Convening Group to oversee adherence and compliance
of participating countries with the criteria.
(b) Middle East Partnership Initiative and Broader Middle East and
North Africa Initiative .--Amounts made available to carry out the
Middle East Partnership Initiative and the Broader Middle East and
North Africa Initiative may be made available to the Community of
Democracies in order to strengthen and expand its work with Muslim
countries.
(c) Report.--The Secretary of State shall include in the annual
report entitled ``Supporting Human Rights and Democracy: The U.S.
Record'' a description of efforts by the Community of Democracies to
support and promote political, economic, judicial, educational, and
social reforms in Muslim countries and the extent to which such
countries meet the criteria for participation in the Community of
Democracies.

Subtitle C--Reform of Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations

SEC. 4051. DESIGNATION OF FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS.

(a) Period of Designation.--Section 219(a)(4) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189(a)(4)) is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (A)--
(A) by striking ``Subject to paragraphs (5) and (6),
a'' and inserting ``A''; and
(B) by striking ``for a period of 2 years beginning
on the effective date of the designation under
paragraph (2)(B)'' and inserting ``until revoked under
paragraph (5) or (6) or set aside pursuant to
subsection (c)'';
(2) by striking subparagraph (B) and inserting the following:
``(B) Review of designation upon petition.--
``(i) In general.--The Secretary shall review
the designation of a foreign terrorist
organization under the procedures set forth in
clauses (iii) and (iv) if the designated
organization files a petition for revocation
within the petition period described in clause
(ii).
``(ii) Petition period.--For purposes of
clause (i)--
``(I) if the designated organization
has not previously filed a petition for
revocation under this subparagraph, the
petition period begins 2 years after
the date on which the designation was
made; or
``(II) if the designated organization
has previously filed a petition for
revocation under this subparagraph, the
petition period begins 2 years after
the date of the determination made
under clause (iv) on that petition.
``(iii) Procedures.--Any foreign terrorist
organization that submits a petition for
revocation under this subparagraph must provide
evidence in that petition that the relevant
circumstances described in paragraph (1) have
changed in such a manner as to warrant
revocation with respect to the organization.
``(iv) Determination.--
``(I) In general.--Not later than 180
days after receiving a petition for
revocation submitted under this
subparagraph, the Secretary shall make
a determination as to such revocation.
``(II) Classified information.--The
Secretary may consider classified
information in making a determination
in response to a petition for
revocation. Classified information
shall not be subject to disclosure for
such time as it remains classified,
except that such information may be
disclosed to a court ex parte and in
camera for purposes of judicial review
under subsection (c).
``(III) Publication of
determination.--A determination made by
the Secretary under this clause shall
be published in the Federal Register.
``(IV) Procedures.--Any revocation by
the Secretary shall be made in
accordance with paragraph (6).''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
``(C) Other review of designation.--
``(i) In general.--If in a 6-year period no
review has taken place under subparagraph (B),
the Secretary shall review the designation of
the foreign terrorist organization in order to
determine whether such designation should be
revoked pursuant to paragraph (6).
``(ii) Procedures.--If a review does not take
place pursuant to subparagraph (B) in response
to a petition for revocation that is filed in
accordance with that subparagraph, then the
review shall be conducted pursuant to
procedures established by the Secretary. The
results of such review and the applicable
procedures shall not be reviewable in any
court.
``(iii) Publication of results of review.--
The Secretary shall publish any determination
made pursuant to this subparagraph in the
Federal Register.''.
(b) Aliases.--Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8
U.S.C. 1189) is amended--
(1) by redesignating subsections (b) and (c) as subsections
(c) and (d), respectively; and
(2) by inserting after subsection (a) the following new
subsection (b):
``(b) Amendments to a Designation.--
``(1) In general.--The Secretary may amend a designation
under this subsection if the Secretary finds that the
organization has changed its name, adopted a new alias,
dissolved and then reconstituted itself under a different name
or names, or merged with another organization.
``(2) Procedure.--Amendments made to a designation in
accordance with paragraph (1) shall be effective upon
publication in the Federal Register. Subparagraphs (B) and (C)
of subsection (a)(2) shall apply to an amended designation upon
such publication. Paragraphs (2)(A)(i), (4), (5), (6), (7), and
(8) of subsection (a) shall also apply to an amended
designation.
``(3) Administrative record.--The administrative record shall
be corrected to include the amendments as well as any
additional relevant information that supports those amendments.
``(4) Classified information.--The Secretary may consider
classified information in amending a designation in accordance
with this subsection. Classified information shall not be
subject to disclosure for such time as it remains classified,
except that such information may be disclosed to a court ex
parte and in camera for purposes of judicial review under
subsection (c).''.
(c) Technical and Conforming Amendments.--Section 219 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189) is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)--
(A) in paragraph (3)(B), by striking ``subsection
(b)'' and inserting ``subsection (c)'';
(B) in paragraph (6)(A)--
(i) in the matter preceding clause (i), by
striking ``or a redesignation made under
paragraph (4)(B)'' and inserting ``at any time,
and shall revoke a designation upon completion
of a review conducted pursuant to subparagraphs
(B) and (C) of paragraph (4)''; and
(ii) in clause (i), by striking ``or
redesignation'';
(C) in paragraph (7), by striking ``, or the
revocation of a redesignation under paragraph (6),'';
and
(D) in paragraph (8)--
(i) by striking ``, or if a redesignation
under this subsection has become effective
under paragraph (4)(B),''; and
(ii) by striking ``or redesignation''; and
(2) in subsection (c), as so redesignated--
(A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``of the
designation in the Federal Register,'' and all that
follows through ``review of the designation'' and
inserting ``in the Federal Register of a designation,
an amended designation, or a determination in response
to a petition for revocation, the designated
organization may seek judicial review'';
(B) in paragraph (2), by inserting ``, amended
designation, or determination in response to a petition
for revocation'' after ``designation'';
(C) in paragraph (3), by inserting ``, amended
designation, or determination in response to a petition
for revocation'' after ``designation''; and
(D) in paragraph (4), by inserting ``, amended
designation, or determination in response to a petition
for revocation'' after ``designation'' each place that
term appears.
(d) Savings Provision.--For purposes of applying section 219 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act on or after the date of enactment of
this Act, the term ``designation'', as used in that section, includes
all redesignations made pursuant to section 219(a)(4)(B) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189(a)(4)(B)) prior to the
date of enactment of this Act, and such redesignations shall continue
to be effective until revoked as provided in paragraph (5) or (6) of
section 219(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.
1189(a)).

SEC. 4052. INCLUSION IN ANNUAL DEPARTMENT OF STATE COUNTRY REPORTS ON
TERRORISM OF INFORMATION ON TERRORIST GROUPS THAT
SEEK WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND GROUPS THAT
HAVE BEEN DESIGNATED AS FOREIGN TERRORIST
ORGANIZATIONS.

(a) Inclusion in Reports.--Section 140 of the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (22 U.S.C. 2656f) is
amended--
(1) in subsection (a)(2)--
(A) by inserting ``any terrorist group known to have
obtained or developed, or to have attempted to obtain
or develop, weapons of mass destruction,'' after
``during the preceding five years,''; and
(B) by inserting ``any group designated by the
Secretary as a foreign terrorist organization under
section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8
U.S.C. 1189),'' after ``Export Administration Act of
1979,'';
(2) in subsection (b)(1)(C)(iii), by striking ``and'' at the
end;
(3) in subsection (b)(1)(C)--
(A) by redesignating clause (iv) as clause (v); and
(B) by inserting after clause (iii) the following new
clause:
``(iv) providing weapons of mass destruction,
or assistance in obtaining or developing such
weapons, to terrorists or terrorist groups;
and''; and
(4) in subsection (b)(3) (as redesignated by section
4002(b)(2)(B) of this Act)--
(A) by redesignating subparagraphs (C), (D), and (E)
as (D), (E), and (F), respectively; and
(B) by inserting after subparagraph (B) the following
new subparagraph:
``(C) efforts by those groups to obtain or develop
weapons of mass destruction;''.
(b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsection (a) shall
apply beginning with the first report under section 140 of the Foreign
Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (22 U.S.C.
2656f), submitted more than one year after the date of the enactment of
this Act.

Subtitle D--Afghanistan Freedom Support Act Amendments of 2004

SEC. 4061. SHORT TITLE.

This subtitle may be cited as the ``Afghanistan Freedom Support Act
Amendments of 2004''.

SEC. 4062. COORDINATION OF ASSISTANCE FOR AFGHANISTAN.

(a) Findings.--Congress finds that--
(1) the Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States criticized the provision of
United States assistance to Afghanistan for being too
inflexible; and
(2) the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 (Public Law
107-327; 22 U.S.C. 7501 et seq.) contains provisions that
provide for flexibility in the provision of assistance for
Afghanistan and are not subject to the requirements of typical
foreign assistance programs and provide for the designation of
a coordinator to oversee United States assistance for
Afghanistan.
(b) Designation of Coordinator.--Section 104(a) of the Afghanistan
Freedom Support Act of 2002 (22 U.S.C. 7514(a)) is amended in the
matter preceding paragraph (1) by striking ``is strongly urged to'' and
inserting ``shall''.
(c) Other Matters.--Section 104 of such Act (22 U.S.C. 7514) is
amended by adding at the end the following:
``(c) Program Plan.--The coordinator designated under subsection (a)
shall annually submit to the Committees on International Relations and
Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Committees on
Foreign Relations and Appropriations of the Senate the Administration's
plan for assistance to Afghanistan together with a description of such
assistance in prior years.
``(d) Coordination With International Community.--The coordinator
designated under subsection (a) shall work with the international
community, including multilateral organizations and international
financial institutions, and the Government of Afghanistan to ensure
that assistance to Afghanistan is implemented in a coherent,
consistent, and efficient manner to prevent duplication and waste.''.

SEC. 4063. GENERAL PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE AFGHANISTAN FREEDOM
SUPPORT ACT OF 2002.

(a) Assistance to Promote Economic, Political and Social
Development.--
(1) Declaration of policy.--Congress reaffirms the
authorities contained in title I of the Afghanistan Freedom
Support Act of 2002 (22 U.S.C. 7501 et seq.; relating to
economic and democratic development assistance for
Afghanistan).
(2) Provision of assistance.--Section 103(a) of such Act (22
U.S.C. 7513(a)) is amended in the matter preceding paragraph
(1) by striking ``section 512 of Public Law 107-115 or any
other similar'' and inserting ``any other''.
(b) Declarations of Policy.--Congress makes the following
declarations:
(1) The United States reaffirms the support that it and other
countries expressed for the report entitled ``Securing
Afghanistan's Future'' in their Berlin Declaration of April
2004. The United States should help enable the growth needed to
create an economically sustainable Afghanistan capable of the
poverty reduction and social development foreseen in the
report.
(2) The United States supports the parliamentary elections to
be held in Afghanistan by April 2005 and will help ensure that
such elections are not undermined by warlords or narcotics
traffickers.
(3)(A) The United States continues to urge North Atlantic
Treaty Organization members and other friendly countries to
make much greater military contributions toward securing the
peace in Afghanistan.
(B) The United States should continue to lead in the security
domain by, among other things, providing logistical support to
facilitate those contributions.
(C) In coordination with the Government of Afghanistan, the
United States should urge others, and act itself, to increase
efforts to promote disarmament, demobilization, and
reintegration efforts, to enhance counternarcotics activities,
to expand deployments of Provincial Reconstruction Teams, and
to increase training of Afghanistan's National Army and its
police and border security forces.
(c) Long-Term Strategy.--
(1) Strategy.--Title III of such Act (22 U.S.C. 7551 et seq.)
is amended by adding at the end the following:

``SEC. 304 FORMULATION OF LONG-TERM STRATEGY FOR AFGHANISTAN.

``(a) Strategy.--
``(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act Amendments
of 2004, the President shall formulate and transmit to the
Committee on International Relations of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate a 5-year strategy for Afghanistan that includes specific
and measurable goals, timeframes for accomplishing such goals,
and specific resource levels necessary for accomplishing such
goals for addressing the long-term development and security
needs of Afghanistan, including sectors such as agriculture and
irrigation, parliamentary and democratic development, the
judicial system and rule of law, human rights, education,
health, telecommunications, electricity, women's rights,
counternarcotics, police, border security, anti-corruption, and
other law-enforcement activities.
``(2) Additional requirement.--The strategy shall also
delineate responsibilities for achieving such goals and
identify and address possible external factors that could
significantly affect the achievement of such goals.
``(b) Implementation.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the
transmission of the strategy required by subsection (a), the Secretary
of State, the Administrator of the United States Agency for
International Development, and the Secretary of Defense shall submit to
the Committee on International Relations of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a
written 5-year action plan to implement the strategy developed pursuant
to subsection (a). Such action plan shall include a description and
schedule of the program evaluations that will monitor progress toward
achieving the goals described in subsection (a).
``(c) Review.--The Secretary of State, the Administrator of the
United States Agency for International Development, and the Secretary
of Defense shall carry out an annual review of the strategy required by
subsection (a) and the action plan required by subsection (b).
``(d) Monitoring.--The report required by section 206(c)(2) of this
Act shall include--
``(1) a description of progress toward implementation of both
the strategy required by subsection (a) and the action plan
required by subsection (b); and
``(2) a description of any changes to the strategy or action
plan since the date of the submission of the last report
required by such section.''.
(2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents for such Act
(22 U.S.C. 7501 note) is amended by adding after the item
relating to section 303 the following:

``Sec. 304. Formulation of long-term strategy for Afghanistan.''.

SEC. 4064. RULE OF LAW AND RELATED ISSUES.

Section 103(a)(5)(A) of the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002
(22 U.S.C. 7513(a)(5)(A)) is amended--
(1) in clause (v), to read as follows:
``(v) support for the activities of the
Government of Afghanistan to develop modern
legal codes and court rules, to provide for the
creation of legal assistance programs, and
other initiatives to promote the rule of law in
Afghanistan;'';
(2) in clause (xii), to read as follows:
``(xii) support for the effective
administration of justice at the national,
regional, and local levels, including programs
to improve penal institutions and the
rehabilitation of prisoners, to establish a
responsible and community-based police force,
and to rehabilitate or construct courthouses
and detention facilities;''; and
(3) in clause (xiii), by striking ``and'' at the end;
(4) in clause (xiv), by striking the period at the end and
inserting ``; and''; and
(5) by adding at the end the following:
``(xv) assistance for the protection of
Afghanistan's culture, history, and national
identity, including with the rehabilitation of
Afghanistan's museums and sites of cultural
significance.''.

SEC. 4065. MONITORING OF ASSISTANCE.

Section 108 of the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 (22 U.S.C.
7518) is amended by adding at the end the following:
``(c) Monitoring of Assistance for Afghanistan.--
``(1) Report.--Not later than January 15, 2005, and every six
months thereafter, the Secretary of State, in consultation with
the Administrator for the United States Agency for
International Development, shall submit to the Committee on
International Relations of the House of Representatives and the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report on the
obligations and expenditures of United States assistance for
Afghanistan from all United States Government agencies.
``(2) Submission of information for report.--The head of each
United States Government agency referred to in paragraph (1)
shall provide on a timely basis to the Secretary of State such
information as the Secretary may reasonably require to allow
the Secretary to prepare and submit the report required by such
paragraph.''.

SEC. 4066. UNITED STATES POLICY TO SUPPORT DISARMAMENT OF PRIVATE
MILITIAS AND TO SUPPORT EXPANSION OF INTERNATIONAL
PEACEKEEPING AND SECURITY OPERATIONS IN
AFGHANISTAN.

(a) Disarmament of Private Militias.--Section 103 of the Afghanistan
Freedom Support Act of 2002 (22 U.S.C. 7513) is amended by adding at
the end the following:
``(d) United States Policy Relating to Disarmament of Private
Militias.--
``(1) In general.--It shall be the policy of the United
States to take immediate steps to provide active support for
the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of armed
soldiers, particularly child soldiers, in Afghanistan, in close
consultation with the President of Afghanistan.
``(2) Report.--The report required by section 206(c)(2) of
this Act shall include a description of the progress to
implement paragraph (1).''.
(b) International Peacekeeping and Security Operations.--Section 103
of such Act (22 U.S.C. 7513(d)), as amended by subsection (a), is
further amended by adding at the end the following:
``(e) United States Policy Relating to International Peacekeeping and
Security Operations.--It shall be the policy of the United States to
make every effort to support the expansion of international
peacekeeping and security operations in Afghanistan in order to--
``(1) increase the area in which security is provided and
undertake vital tasks related to promoting security, such as
disarming warlords, militias, and irregulars, and disrupting
opium production; and
``(2) safeguard highways in order to allow the free flow of
commerce and to allow material assistance to the people of
Afghanistan, and aid personnel in Afghanistan, to move more
freely.''.

SEC. 4067. EFFORTS TO EXPAND INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING AND SECURITY
OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN.

Section 206(d)(1) of the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 (22
U.S.C. 7536(d)(1)) is amended to read as follows:
``(1) Efforts to expand international peacekeeping and
security operations in afghanistan.--
``(A) Efforts.--The President shall encourage, and,
as authorized by law, enable other countries to
actively participate in expanded international
peacekeeping and security operations in Afghanistan,
especially through the provision of military personnel
for extended periods of time.
``(B) Reports.--The President shall prepare and
transmit to the Committee on International Relations of
the House of Representatives and the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate a report on efforts
carried out pursuant to subparagraph (A). The first
report under this subparagraph shall be transmitted not
later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of
the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act Amendments of 2004
and subsequent reports shall be transmitted every six
months thereafter and may be included in the report
required by section 206(c)(2) of this Act.''.

SEC. 4068. PROVISIONS RELATING TO COUNTERNARCOTICS EFFORTS IN
AFGHANISTAN.

(a) Counternarcotics Efforts.--The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of
2002 (22 U.S.C. 7501 et seq.) is amended--
(1) by redesignating--
(A) title III as title IV; and
(B) sections 301 through 304 as sections 401 through
404, respectively; and
(2) by inserting after title II the following:

``TITLE III--PROVISIONS RELATING TO COUNTERNARCOTICS EFFORTS IN
AFGHANISTAN

``SEC. 301. ASSISTANCE FOR COUNTERNARCOTICS EFFORTS.

``In addition to programs established pursuant to section 103(a)(3)
of this Act or other similar programs, the President is authorized and
encouraged to implement specific initiatives to assist in the
eradication of poppy cultivation and the disruption of heroin
production in Afghanistan, such as--
``(1) promoting alternatives to poppy cultivation, including
the introduction of high value crops that are suitable for
export and the provision of appropriate technical assistance
and credit mechanisms for farmers;
``(2) enhancing the ability of farmers to bring legitimate
agricultural goods to market;
``(3) notwithstanding section 660 of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2420), assistance, including nonlethal
equipment, training (including training in internationally
recognized standards of human rights, the rule of law, anti-
corruption, and the promotion of civilian police roles that
support democracy), and payments, during fiscal years 2006
through 2008, for salaries for special counternarcotics police
and supporting units;
``(4) training the Afghan National Army in counternarcotics
activities; and
``(5) creating special counternarcotics courts, prosecutors,
and places of incarceration.''.
(b) Clerical Amendments.--The table of contents for such Act (22
U.S.C. 7501 note) is amended--
(1) by redesignating--
(A) the item relating to title III as the item
relating to title IV; and
(B) the items relating to sections 301 through 304 as
the items relating to sections 401 through 404; and
(2) by inserting after the items relating to title II the
following:

``TITLE III--PROVISIONS RELATING TO COUNTERNARCOTICS EFFORTS IN
AFGHANISTAN

``Sec. 301. Assistance for counternarcotics efforts.''.

SEC. 4069. ADDITIONAL AMENDMENTS TO THE AFGHANISTAN FREEDOM SUPPORT ACT
OF 2002.

(a) Technical Amendment.--Section 103(a)(7)(A)(xii) of the
Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 (22 U.S.C. 7513(a)(7)(A)(xii))
is amended by striking ``National'' and inserting ``Afghan
Independent''.
(b) Reporting Requirement.--Section 206(c)(2) of such Act (22 U.S.C.
7536(c)(2)) is amended in the matter preceding subparagraph (A) by
striking ``2007'' and inserting ``2012''.

SEC. 4070. REPEAL.

Section 620D of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2374;
relating to prohibition on assistance to Afghanistan) is hereby
repealed.

Subtitle E--Provisions Relating to Saudi Arabia and Pakistan

SEC. 4081. NEW UNITED STATES STRATEGY FOR RELATIONSHIP WITH SAUDI
ARABIA.

(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the
relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia should include
a more robust dialogue between the people and Government of the United
States and the people and Government of Saudi Arabia in order to
provide for a reevaluation of, and improvements to, the relationship by
both sides.
(b) Report.--
(1) In general.-- Not later than one year after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit to the
Committee on International Relations of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate a strategy for collaboration with the people and
Government of Saudi Arabia on subjects of mutual interest and
importance to the United States.
(2) Contents.--The strategy required under paragraph (1)
shall include the following provisions:
(A) A framework for security cooperation in the fight
against terrorism, with special reference to combating
terrorist financing and an examination of the origins
of modern terrorism.
(B) A framework for political and economic reform in
Saudi Arabia and throughout the Middle East.
(C) An examination of steps that should be taken to
reverse the trend toward extremism in Saudi Arabia and
other Muslim countries and throughout the Middle East.
(D) A framework for promoting greater tolerance and
respect for cultural and religious diversity in Saudi
Arabia and throughout the Middle East.

SEC. 4082. UNITED STATES COMMITMENT TO THE FUTURE OF PAKISTAN.

(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United
States should, over a long-term period, help to ensure a promising,
stable, and secure future for Pakistan, and should in particular
provide assistance to encourage and enable Pakistan--
(1) to continue and improve upon its commitment to combating
extremists;
(2) to seek to resolve any outstanding difficulties with its
neighbors and other countries in its region;
(3) to continue to make efforts to fully control its
territory and borders;
(4) to progress towards becoming a more effective and
participatory democracy;
(5) to participate more vigorously in the global marketplace
and to continue to modernize its economy;
(6) to take all necessary steps to halt the spread of weapons
of mass destruction;
(7) to continue to reform its education system; and
(8) to, in other ways, implement a general strategy of
moderation.
(b) Strategy.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit to Congress a
detailed proposed strategy for the future, long-term, engagement of the
United States with Pakistan.

SEC. 4083. EXTENSION OF PAKISTAN WAIVERS.

The Act entitled ``An Act to authorize the President to exercise
waivers of foreign assistance restrictions with respect to Pakistan
through September 30, 2003, and for other purposes'', approved October
27, 2001 (Public Law 107-57; 115 Stat. 403), as amended by section 2213
of the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for
the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004 (Public Law 108-106;
117 Stat. 1232), is further amended--
(1) in section 1(b)--
(A) in the heading, by striking ``Fiscal Year 2004''
and inserting ``Fiscal Years 2005 and 2006''; and
(B) in paragraph (1), by striking ``2004'' and
inserting ``2005 or 2006'';
(2) in section 3(2), by striking ``and 2004,'' and inserting
``2004, 2005, and 2006''; and
(3) in section 6, by striking ``2004'' and inserting
``2006''.

Subtitle F--Oversight Provisions

SEC. 4091. CASE-ZABLOCKI ACT REQUIREMENTS.

(a) Availability of Treaties and International Agreements.--Section
112a of title 1, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end
the following:
``(d) The Secretary of State shall cause to be published in slip form
or otherwise made publicly available through the Internet website of
the Department of State each treaty or international agreement proposed
to be published in the compilation entitled `United States Treaties and
Other International Agreements' not later than 180 days after the date
on which the treaty or agreement enters into force.''.
(b) Transmission to Congress.--Section 112b(a) of title 1, United
States Code (commonly referred to as the ``Case-Zablocki Act''), is
amended--
(1) in the first sentence, by striking ``has entered into
force'' and inserting ``has been signed or entered into
force''; and
(2) in the second sentence, by striking ``Committee on
Foreign Affairs'' and inserting ``Committee on International
Relations''.
(c) Report.--Section 112b of title 1, United States Code, is
amended--
(1) by redesignating subsections (d) and (e) as subsections
(e) and (f), respectively; and
(2) by inserting after subsection (c) the following:
``(d)(1) The Secretary of State shall submit to Congress on an annual
basis a report that contains an index of all international agreements
(including oral agreements), listed by country, date, title, and
summary of each such agreement (including a description of the duration
of activities under the agreement and the agreement itself), that the
United States--
``(A) has signed, proclaimed, or with reference to which any
other final formality has been executed, or that has been
extended or otherwise modified, during the preceding calendar
year; and
``(B) has not been published, or is not proposed to be
published, in the compilation entitled `United States Treaties
and Other International Agreements'.
``(2) The report described in paragraph (1) may be submitted in
classified form.''.
(d) Determination of International Agreement.--Subsection (e) of
section 112b of title 1, United States Code, (as redesignated) is
amended--
(1) by striking ``(e) The Secretary of State'' and inserting
``(e)(1) Subject to paragraph (2), the Secretary of State'';
and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``(2)(A) An arrangement shall constitute an international agreement
within the meaning of this section (other than subsection (c) of this
section) irrespective of the duration of activities under the
arrangement or the arrangement itself.
``(B) Arrangements that constitute an international agreement within
the meaning of this section (other than subsection (c) of this section)
include, but are not limited to, the following:
``(i) A bilateral or multilateral counterterrorism agreement.
``(ii) A bilateral agreement with a country that is subject
to a determination under section 6(j)(1)(A) of the Export
Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)(1)(A)),
section 620A(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22
U.S.C. 2371(a)), or section 40(d) of the Arms Export Control
Act (22 U.S.C. 2780(d)).''.
(e) Enforcement of Requirements.--Section 139(b) of the Foreign
Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 is amended to
read as follows:
``(b) Effective Date.--Subsection (a) shall take effect 60 days after
the date of the enactment of the 9/11 Recommendations Implementation
Act and shall apply during fiscal years 2005, 2006, and 2007.''.

Subtitle G--Additional Protections of United States Aviation System
from Terrorist Attacks

SEC. 4101. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS TO ALLOW MAXIMUM DEPLOYMENT OF
FEDERAL FLIGHT DECK OFFICERS.

The President is encouraged to pursue aggressively international
agreements with foreign governments to allow the maximum deployment of
Federal air marshals and Federal flight deck officers on international
flights.

SEC. 4102. FEDERAL AIR MARSHAL TRAINING.

Section 44917 of title 49, United States Code, is amended by adding
at the end the following:
``(d) Training for Foreign Law Enforcement Personnel.--
``(1) In general.--The Assistant Secretary for Immigration
and Customs Enforcement of the Department of Homeland Security,
after consultation with the Secretary of State, may direct the
Federal Air Marshal Service to provide appropriate air marshal
training to law enforcement personnel of foreign countries.
``(2) Watchlist screening.--The Federal Air Marshal Service
may only provide appropriate air marshal training to law
enforcement personnel of foreign countries after comparing the
identifying information and records of law enforcement
personnel of foreign countries against appropriate records in
the consolidated and integrated terrorist watchlists of the
Federal Government.
``(3) Fees.--The Assistant Secretary shall establish
reasonable fees and charges to pay expenses incurred in
carrying out this subsection. Funds collected under this
subsection shall be credited to the account in the Treasury
from which the expenses were incurred and shall be available to
the Assistant Secretary for purposes for which amounts in such
account are available.''.

SEC. 4103. MAN-PORTABLE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS (MANPADS).

(a) United States Policy on Nonproliferation and Export Control.--
(1) To limit availability and transfer of manpads.--The
President shall pursue, on an urgent basis, further strong
international diplomatic and cooperative efforts, including
bilateral and multilateral treaties, in the appropriate forum
to limit the availability, transfer, and proliferation of
MANPADSs worldwide.
(2) To limit the proliferation of manpads.--The President is
encouraged to seek to enter into agreements with the
governments of foreign countries that, at a minimum, would--
(A) prohibit the entry into force of a MANPADS
manufacturing license agreement and MANPADS co-
production agreement, other than the entry into force
of a manufacturing license or co-production agreement
with a country that is party to such an agreement;
(B) prohibit, except pursuant to transfers between
governments, the export of a MANPADS, including any
component, part, accessory, or attachment thereof,
without an individual validated license; and
(C) prohibit the reexport or retransfer of a MANPADS,
including any component, part, accessory, or attachment
thereof, to a third person, organization, or government
unless the written consent of the government that
approved the original export or transfer is first
obtained.
(3) To achieve destruction of manpads.--The President should
continue to pursue further strong international diplomatic and
cooperative efforts, including bilateral and multilateral
treaties, in the appropriate forum to assure the destruction of
excess, obsolete, and illicit stocks of MANPADSs worldwide.
(4) Reporting and briefing requirement.--
(A) President's report.--Not later than 180 days
after the date of enactment of this Act, the President
shall transmit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report that contains a detailed
description of the status of diplomatic efforts under
paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) and of efforts by the
appropriate United States agencies to comply with the
recommendations of the General Accounting Office set
forth in its report GAO-04-519, entitled
``Nonproliferation: Further Improvements Needed in U.S.
Efforts to Counter Threats from Man-Portable Air
Defense Systems''.
(B) Annual briefings.--Annually after the date of
submission of the report under subparagraph (A) and
until completion of the diplomatic and compliance
efforts referred to in subparagraph (A), the Secretary
of State shall brief the appropriate congressional
committees on the status of such efforts.
(b) FAA Airworthiness Certification of Missile Defense Systems for
Commercial Aircraft.--
(1) In general.--As soon as practicable, but not later than
the date of completion of Phase II of the Department of
Homeland Security's counter-man-portable air defense system
(MANPADS) development and demonstration program, the
Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration shall
establish a process for conducting airworthiness and safety
certification of missile defense systems for commercial
aircraft certified as effective and functional by the
Department of Homeland Security. The process shall require a
certification by the Administrator that such systems can be
safely integrated into aircraft systems and ensure
airworthiness and aircraft system integrity.
(2) Certification acceptance.--Under the process, the
Administrator shall accept the certification of the Department
of Homeland Security that a missile defense system is effective
and functional to defend commercial aircraft against MANPADSs.
(3) Expeditious certification.--Under the process, the
Administrator shall expedite the airworthiness and safety
certification of missile defense systems for commercial
aircraft certified by the Department of Homeland Security.
(4) Reports.--Not later than 90 days after the first
airworthiness and safety certification for a missile defense
system for commercial aircraft is issued by the Administrator,
and annually thereafter until December 31, 2008, the Federal
Aviation Administration shall transmit to the Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation of the Senate a report that contains a detailed
description of each airworthiness and safety certification
issued for a missile defense system for commercial aircraft.
(c) Programs to Reduce MANPADS.--
(1) In general.--The President is encouraged to pursue strong
programs to reduce the number of MANPADSs worldwide so that
fewer MANPADSs will be available for trade, proliferation, and
sale.
(2) Reporting and briefing requirements.--Not later than 180
days after the date of enactment of this Act, the President
shall transmit to the appropriate congressional committees a
report that contains a detailed description of the status of
the programs being pursued under subsection (a). Annually
thereafter until the programs are no longer needed, the
Secretary of State shall brief the appropriate congressional
committees on the status of programs.
(3) Funding.--There are authorized to be appropriated such
sums as may be necessary to carry out this section.
(d) MANPADS Vulnerability Assessments Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than one year after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall
transmit to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation of the Senate a report describing
the Department of Homeland Security's plans to secure airports
and the aircraft arriving and departing from airports against
MANPADSs attacks.
(2) Matters to be addressed.--The Secretary's report shall
address, at a minimum, the following:
(A) The status of the Department's efforts to conduct
MANPADSs vulnerability assessments at United States
airports at which the Department is conducting
assessments.
(B) How intelligence is shared between the United
States intelligence agencies and Federal, State, and
local law enforcement to address the MANPADS threat and
potential ways to improve such intelligence sharing.
(C) Contingency plans that the Department has
developed in the event that it receives intelligence
indicating a high threat of a MANPADS attack on
aircraft at or near United States airports.
(D) The feasibility and effectiveness of implementing
public education and neighborhood watch programs in
areas surrounding United States airports in cases in
which intelligence reports indicate there is a high
risk of MANPADS attacks on aircraft.
(E) Any other issues that the Secretary deems
relevant.
(3) Format.--The report required by this subsection may be
submitted in a classified format.
(e) Definitions.--In this section, the following definitions apply:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
International Relations, and the Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of
Representatives; and
(B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation of the Senate.
(2) MANPADS.--The term ``MANPADS'' means--
(A) a surface-to-air missile system designed to be
man-portable and carried and fired by a single
individual; and
(B) any other surface-to-air missile system designed
to be operated and fired by more than one individual
acting as a crew and portable by several individuals.

Subtitle H--Improving International Standards and Cooperation to Fight
Terrorist Financing

SEC. 4111. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS REGARDING SUCCESS IN MULTILATERAL
ORGANIZATIONS.

(a) Commendation.--The Congress commends the Secretary of the
Treasury for success and leadership in establishing international
standards for fighting terrorist finance through multilateral
organizations, including the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) at the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the
International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development, and the regional multilateral development banks.
(b) Policy Guidance.--The Congress encourages the Secretary of the
Treasury to direct the United States Executive Director at each
international financial institution to use the voice and vote of the
United States to urge the institution, and encourages the Secretary of
the Treasury to use the voice and vote of the United States in other
multilateral financial policymaking bodies, to--
(1) provide funding for the implementation of FATF anti-money
laundering and anti-terrorist financing standards; and
(2) promote economic development in the Middle East.

SEC. 4112. EXPANDED REPORTING REQUIREMENT FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE
TREASURY.

(a) In General.--Section 1701(b) of the International Financial
Institutions Act (22 U.S.C. 262r(b)) is amended--
(1) by striking ``and'' at the end of paragraph (10); and
(2) by redesignating paragraph (11) as paragraph (12) and
inserting after paragraph (10) the following:
``(11) an assessment of--
``(A) the progress made by the International
Terrorist Finance Coordinating Council in developing
policies to be pursued with the international financial
institutions and other multilateral financial
policymaking bodies regarding anti-terrorist financing
initiatives;
``(B) the progress made by the United States in
negotiations with the international financial
institutions and other multilateral financial
policymaking bodies to set common anti-terrorist
financing standards;
``(C) the extent to which the international financial
institutions and other multilateral financial
policymaking bodies have adopted anti-terrorist
financing standards advocated by the United States; and
``(D) whether and how the international financial
institutions are contributing to the fight against the
financing of terrorist activities; and''.
(b) Other Multilateral Policymaking Bodies Defined.--Section 1701(c)
of such Act (22 U.S.C. 262r(c)) is amended by adding at the end the
following:
``(5) Other multilateral financial policymaking bodies.--The
term `other multilateral financial policymaking bodies' means--
``(A) the Financial Action Task Force at the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development;
``(B) the international network of financial
intelligence units known as the `Egmont Group';
``(C) the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Russia, when meeting
as the Group of Eight; and
``(D) any other multilateral financial policymaking
group in which the Secretary of the Treasury represents
the United States.''.

SEC. 4113. INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST FINANCE COORDINATING COUNCIL.

(a) Establishment.--The Secretary of the Treasury shall establish and
convene an interagency council, to be known as the ``International
Terrorist Finance Coordinating Council'' (in this section referred to
as the ``Council''), which shall advise the Secretary on policies to be
pursued by the United States at meetings of the international financial
institutions and other multilateral financial policymaking bodies,
regarding the development of international anti-terrorist financing
standards.
(b) Meetings.--
(1) Attendees.--
(A) General attendees.--The Secretary of the Treasury
(or a representative of the Secretary of the Treasury)
and the Secretary of State (or a representative of the
Secretary of State) shall attend each Council meeting.
(B) Other attendees.--The Secretary of the Treasury
shall determine which other officers of the Federal
Government shall attend a Council meeting, on the basis
of the issues to be raised for consideration at the
meeting. The Secretary shall include in the meeting
representatives from all relevant Federal agencies with
authority to address the issues.
(2) Schedule.--Not less frequently than annually, the
Secretary of the Treasury shall convene Council meetings at
such times as the Secretary deems appropriate, based on the
notice, schedule, and agenda items of the international
financial institutions and other multilateral financial
policymaking bodies.

SEC. 4114. DEFINITIONS.

In this subtitle:
(1) International financial institutions.--The term
``international financial institutions'' has the meaning given
in section 1701(c)(2) of the International Financial
Institutions Act.
(2) Other multilateral financial policymaking bodies.--The
term ``other multilateral financial policymaking bodies''
means--
(A) the Financial Action Task Force at the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development;
(B) the international network of financial
intelligence units known as the ``Egmont Group'';
(C) the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Russia, when meeting
as the Group of Eight; and
(D) any other multilateral financial policymaking
group in which the Secretary of the Treasury represents
the United States.

TITLE V--GOVERNMENT RESTRUCTURING

Subtitle A--Faster and Smarter Funding for First Responders

SEC. 5001. SHORT TITLE.

This subtitle may be cited as the ``Faster and Smarter Funding for
First Responders Act of 2004''.

SEC. 5002. FINDINGS.

The Congress finds the following:
(1) In order to achieve its objective of minimizing the
damage, and assisting in the recovery, from terrorist attacks,
the Department of Homeland Security must play a leading role in
assisting communities to reach the level of preparedness they
need to respond to a terrorist attack.
(2) First responder funding is not reaching the men and women
of our Nation's first response teams quickly enough, and
sometimes not at all.
(3) To reform the current bureaucratic process so that
homeland security dollars reach the first responders who need
it most, it is necessary to clarify and consolidate the
authority and procedures of the Department of Homeland Security
that support first responders.
(4) Ensuring adequate resources for the new national mission
of homeland security, without degrading the ability to address
effectively other types of major disasters and emergencies,
requires a discrete and separate grant making process for
homeland security funds for first response to terrorist acts,
on the one hand, and for first responder programs designed to
meet pre-September 11 priorities, on the other.
(5) While a discrete homeland security grant making process
is necessary to ensure proper focus on the unique aspects of
terrorism prevention, preparedness, and response, it is
essential that State and local strategies for utilizing such
grants be integrated, to the greatest extent practicable, with
existing State and local emergency management plans.
(6) Homeland security grants to first responders must be
based on the best intelligence concerning the capabilities and
intentions of our terrorist enemies, and that intelligence must
be used to target resources to the Nation's greatest threats,
vulnerabilities, and consequences.
(7) The Nation's first response capabilities will be improved
by sharing resources, training, planning, personnel, and
equipment among neighboring jurisdictions through mutual aid
agreements and regional cooperation. Such regional cooperation
should be supported, where appropriate, through direct grants
from the Department of Homeland Security.
(8) An essential prerequisite to achieving the Nation's
homeland security objectives for first responders is the
establishment of well-defined national goals for terrorism
preparedness. These goals should delineate the essential
capabilities that every jurisdiction in the United States
should possess or to which it should have access.
(9) A national determination of essential capabilities is
needed to identify levels of State and local government
terrorism preparedness, to determine the nature and extent of
State and local first responder needs, to identify the human
and financial resources required to fulfill them, and to direct
funding to meet those needs and to measure preparedness levels
on a national scale.
(10) To facilitate progress in achieving, maintaining, and
enhancing essential capabilities for State and local first
responders, the Department of Homeland Security should seek to
allocate homeland security funding for first responders to meet
nationwide needs.
(11) Private sector resources and citizen volunteers can
perform critical functions in assisting in preventing and
responding to terrorist attacks, and should be integrated into
State and local planning efforts to ensure that their
capabilities and roles are understood, so as to provide
enhanced State and local operational capability and surge
capacity.
(12) Public-private partnerships, such as the partnerships
between the Business Executives for National Security and the
States of New Jersey and Georgia, can be useful to identify and
coordinate private sector support for State and local first
responders. Such models should be expanded to cover all States
and territories.
(13) An important aspect of essential capabilities is
measurability, so that it is possible to determine how prepared
a State or local government is now, and what additional steps
it needs to take, in order to respond to acts of terrorism.
(14) The Department of Homeland Security should establish,
publish, and regularly update national voluntary consensus
standards for both equipment and training, in cooperation with
both public and private sector standard setting organizations,
to assist State and local governments in obtaining the
equipment and training to attain the essential capabilities for
first response to acts of terrorism, and to ensure that first
responder funds are spent wisely.

SEC. 5003. FASTER AND SMARTER FUNDING FOR FIRST RESPONDERS.

(a) In General.--The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-
296; 6 U.S.C. 361 et seq.) is amended--
(1) in section 1(b) in the table of contents by adding at the
end the following:

``TITLE XVIII--FUNDING FOR FIRST RESPONDERS

``Sec. 1801. Definitions.
``Sec. 1802. Faster and smarter funding for first responders.
``Sec. 1803. Essential capabilities for first responders.
``Sec. 1804. Task Force on Essential Capabilities for First
Responders.
``Sec. 1805. Covered grant eligibility and criteria.
``Sec. 1806. Use of funds and accountability requirements.
``Sec. 1807. National standards for first responder equipment
and training.''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:

``TITLE XVIII--FUNDING FOR FIRST RESPONDERS

``SEC. 1801. DEFINITIONS.

``In this title:
``(1) Board.--The term `Board' means the First Responder
Grants Board established under section 1805(f).
``(2) Covered grant.--The term `covered grant' means any
grant to which this title applies under section 1802.
``(3) Directly eligible tribe.--The term `directly eligible
tribe' means any Indian tribe or consortium of Indian tribes
that--
``(A) meets the criteria for inclusion in the
qualified applicant pool for Self-Governance that are
set forth in section 402(c) of the Indian Self-
Determination and Education Assistance Act (25 U.S.C.
458bb(c));
``(B) employs at least 10 full-time personnel in a
law enforcement or emergency response agency with the
capacity to respond to calls for law enforcement or
emergency services; and
``(C)(i) is located on, or within 5 miles of, an
international border or waterway;
``(ii) is located within 5 miles of a facility within
a critical infrastructure sector identified in section
1803(c)(2);
``(iii) is located within or contiguous to one of the
50 largest metropolitan statistical areas in the United
States; or
``(iv) has more than 1,000 square miles of Indian
country, as that term is defined in section 1151 of
title 18, United States Code.
``(4) Elevations in the threat alert level.--The term
`elevations in the threat alert level' means any designation
(including those that are less than national in scope) that
raises the homeland security threat level to either the highest
or second highest threat level under the Homeland Security
Advisory System referred to in section 201(d)(7).
``(5) Emergency preparedness.--The term `emergency
preparedness' shall have the same meaning that term has under
section 602 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5195a).
``(6) Essential capabilities.--The term `essential
capabilities' means the levels, availability, and competence of
emergency personnel, planning, training, and equipment across a
variety of disciplines needed to effectively and efficiently
prevent, prepare for, and respond to acts of terrorism
consistent with established practices.
``(7) First responder.--The term `first responder' shall have
the same meaning as the term `emergency response provider'.
``(8) Indian tribe.--The term `Indian tribe' means any Indian
tribe, band, nation, or other organized group or community,
including any Alaskan Native village or regional or village
corporation as defined in or established pursuant to the
Alaskan Native Claims Settlement Act (43 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.),
which is recognized as eligible for the special programs and
services provided by the United States to Indians because of
their status as Indians.
``(9) Region.--The term `region' means--
``(A) any geographic area consisting of all or parts
of 2 or more contiguous States, counties,
municipalities, or other local governments that have a
combined population of at least 1,650,000 or have an
area of not less than 20,000 square miles, and that,
for purposes of an application for a covered grant, is
represented by 1 or more governments or governmental
agencies within such geographic area, and that is
established by law or by agreement of 2 or more such
governments or governmental agencies in a mutual aid
agreement; or
``(B) any other combination of contiguous local
government units (including such a combination
established by law or agreement of two or more
governments or governmental agencies in a mutual aid
agreement) that is formally certified by the Secretary
as a region for purposes of this Act with the consent
of--
``(i) the State or States in which they are
located, including a multi-State entity
established by a compact between two or more
States; and
``(ii) the incorporated municipalities,
counties, and parishes that they encompass.
``(10) Task force.--The term `Task Force' means the Task
Force on Essential Capabilities for First Responders
established under section 1804.

``SEC. 1802. FASTER AND SMARTER FUNDING FOR FIRST RESPONDERS.

``(a) Covered Grants.--This title applies to grants provided by the
Department to States, regions, or directly eligible tribes for the
primary purpose of improving the ability of first responders to
prevent, prepare for, respond to, or mitigate threatened or actual
terrorist attacks, especially those involving weapons of mass
destruction, administered under the following:
``(1) State homeland security grant program.--The State
Homeland Security Grant Program of the Department, or any
successor to such grant program.
``(2) Urban area security initiative.--The Urban Area
Security Initiative of the Department, or any successor to such
grant program.
``(3) Law enforcement terrorism prevention program.--The Law
Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program of the Department, or
any successor to such grant program.
``(4) Citizen corps program.--The Citizen Corps Program of
the Department, or any successor to such grant program.
``(b) Excluded Programs.--This title does not apply to or otherwise
affect the following Federal grant programs or any grant under such a
program:
``(1) Nondepartment programs.--Any Federal grant program that
is not administered by the Department.
``(2) Fire grant programs.--The fire grant programs
authorized by sections 33 and 34 of the Federal Fire Prevention
and Control Act of 1974 (15 U.S.C. 2229, 2229a).
``(3) Emergency management planning and assistance account
grants.--The Emergency Management Performance Grant program and
the Urban Search and Rescue Grants program authorized by title
VI of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5195 et seq.); the Departments of
Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and
Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, 2000 (113 Stat. 1047
et seq.); and the Earthquake Hazards Reduction Act of 1977 (42
U.S.C. 7701 et seq.).

``SEC. 1803. ESSENTIAL CAPABILITIES FOR FIRST RESPONDERS.

``(a) Establishment of Essential Capabilities.--
``(1) In general.--For purposes of covered grants, the
Secretary shall establish clearly defined essential
capabilities for State and local government preparedness for
terrorism, in consultation with--
``(A) the Task Force on Essential Capabilities for
First Responders established under section 1804;
``(B) the Under Secretaries for Emergency
Preparedness and Response, Border and Transportation
Security, Information Analysis and Infrastructure
Protection, and Science and Technology, and the
Director of the Office for Domestic Preparedness;
``(C) the Secretary of Health and Human Services;
``(D) other appropriate Federal agencies;
``(E) State and local first responder agencies and
officials; and
``(F) consensus-based standard making organizations
responsible for setting standards relevant to the first
responder community.
``(2) Deadlines.--The Secretary shall--
``(A) establish essential capabilities under
paragraph (1) within 30 days after receipt of the
report under section 1804(b); and
``(B) regularly update such essential capabilities as
necessary, but not less than every 3 years.
``(3) Provision of essential capabilities.--The Secretary
shall ensure that a detailed description of the essential
capabilities established under paragraph (1) is provided
promptly to the States and to the Congress. The States shall
make the essential capabilities available as necessary and
appropriate to local governments within their jurisdictions.
``(b) Objectives.--The Secretary shall ensure that essential
capabilities established under subsection (a)(1) meet the following
objectives:
``(1) Specificity.--The determination of essential
capabilities specifically shall describe the training,
planning, personnel, and equipment that different types of
communities in the Nation should possess, or to which they
should have access, in order to meet the Department's goals for
terrorism preparedness based upon--
``(A) the most current risk assessment available by
the Directorate for Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection of the threats of terrorism
against the United States;
``(B) the types of threats, vulnerabilities,
geography, size, and other factors that the Secretary
has determined to be applicable to each different type
of community; and
``(C) the principles of regional coordination and
mutual aid among State and local governments.
``(2) Flexibility.--The establishment of essential
capabilities shall be sufficiently flexible to allow State and
local government officials to set priorities based on
particular needs, while reaching nationally determined
terrorism preparedness levels within a specified time period.
``(3) Measurability.--The establishment of essential
capabilities shall be designed to enable measurement of
progress towards specific terrorism preparedness goals.
``(4) Comprehensiveness.--The determination of essential
capabilities for terrorism preparedness shall be made within
the context of a comprehensive State emergency management
system.
``(c) Factors To Be Considered.--
``(1) In general.--In establishing essential capabilities
under subsection (a)(1), the Secretary specifically shall
consider the variables of threat, vulnerability, and
consequences with respect to the Nation's population (including
transient commuting and tourist populations) and critical
infrastructure. Such consideration shall be based upon the most
current risk assessment available by the Directorate for
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection of the
threats of terrorism against the United States.
``(2) Critical infrastructure sectors.--The Secretary
specifically shall consider threats of terrorism against the
following critical infrastructure sectors in all areas of the
Nation, urban and rural:
``(A) Agriculture.
``(B) Banking and finance.
``(C) Chemical industries.
``(D) The defense industrial base.
``(E) Emergency services.
``(F) Energy.
``(G) Food.
``(H) Government.
``(I) Postal and shipping.
``(J) Public health.
``(K) Information and telecommunications networks.
``(L) Transportation.
``(M) Water.
The order in which the critical infrastructure sectors are
listed in this paragraph shall not be construed as an order of
priority for consideration of the importance of such sectors.
``(3) Types of threat.--The Secretary specifically shall
consider the following types of threat to the critical
infrastructure sectors described in paragraph (2), and to
populations in all areas of the Nation, urban and rural:
``(A) Biological threats.
``(B) Nuclear threats.
``(C) Radiological threats.
``(D) Incendiary threats.
``(E) Chemical threats.
``(F) Explosives.
``(G) Suicide bombers.
``(H) Cyber threats.
``(I) Any other threats based on proximity to
specific past acts of terrorism or the known activity
of any terrorist group.
The order in which the types of threat are listed in this
paragraph shall not be construed as an order of priority for
consideration of the importance of such threats.
``(4) Consideration of additional factors.--In establishing
essential capabilities under subsection (a)(1), the Secretary
shall take into account any other specific threat to a
population (including a transient commuting or tourist
population) or critical infrastructure sector that the
Secretary has determined to exist.

``SEC. 1804. TASK FORCE ON ESSENTIAL CAPABILITIES FOR FIRST RESPONDERS.

``(a) Establishment.--To assist the Secretary in establishing
essential capabilities under section 1803(a)(1), the Secretary shall
establish an advisory body pursuant to section 871(a) not later than 60
days after the date of the enactment of this section, which shall be
known as the Task Force on Essential Capabilities for First Responders.
``(b) Report.--
``(1) In general.--The Task Force shall submit to the
Secretary, not later than 9 months after its establishment by
the Secretary under subsection (a) and every 3 years
thereafter, a report on its recommendations for essential
capabilities for preparedness for terrorism.
``(2) Contents.--The report shall--
``(A) include a priority ranking of essential
capabilities in order to provide guidance to the
Secretary and to the Congress on determining the
appropriate allocation of, and funding levels for,
first responder needs;
``(B) set forth a methodology by which any State or
local government will be able to determine the extent
to which it possesses or has access to the essential
capabilities that States and local governments having
similar risks should obtain;
``(C) describe the availability of national voluntary
consensus standards, and whether there is a need for
new national voluntary consensus standards, with
respect to first responder training and equipment;
``(D) include such additional matters as the
Secretary may specify in order to further the terrorism
preparedness capabilities of first responders; and
``(E) include such revisions to the contents of past
reports as are necessary to take into account changes
in the most current risk assessment available by the
Directorate for Information Analysis and Infrastructure
Protection or other relevant information as determined
by the Secretary.
``(3) Consistency with federal working group.--The Task Force
shall ensure that its recommendations for essential
capabilities are, to the extent feasible, consistent with any
preparedness goals or recommendations of the Federal working
group established under section 319F(a) of the Public Health
Service Act (42 U.S.C. 247d-6(a)).
``(4) Comprehensiveness.--The Task Force shall ensure that
its recommendations regarding essential capabilities for
terrorism preparedness are made within the context of a
comprehensive State emergency management system.
``(5) Prior measures.--The Task Force shall ensure that its
recommendations regarding essential capabilities for terrorism
preparedness take into account any capabilities that State or
local officials have determined to be essential and have
undertaken since September 11, 2001, to prevent or prepare for
terrorist attacks.
``(c) Membership.--
``(1) In general.--The Task Force shall consist of 25 members
appointed by the Secretary, and shall, to the extent
practicable, represent a geographic and substantive cross
section of governmental and nongovernmental first responder
disciplines from the State and local levels, including as
appropriate--
``(A) members selected from the emergency response
field, including fire service and law enforcement,
hazardous materials response, emergency medical
services, and emergency management personnel (including
public works personnel routinely engaged in emergency
response);
``(B) health scientists, emergency and inpatient
medical providers, and public health professionals,
including experts in emergency health care response to
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
terrorism, and experts in providing mental health care
during emergency response operations;
``(C) experts from Federal, State, and local
governments, and the private sector, representing
standards-setting organizations, including
representation from the voluntary consensus codes and
standards development community, particularly those
with expertise in first responder disciplines; and
``(D) State and local officials with expertise in
terrorism preparedness, subject to the condition that
if any such official is an elected official
representing one of the two major political parties, an
equal number of elected officials shall be selected
from each such party.
``(2) Coordination with the department of health and health
services.--In the selection of members of the Task Force who
are health professionals, including emergency medical
professionals, the Secretary shall coordinate the selection
with the Secretary of Health and Human Services.
``(3) Ex officio members.--The Secretary and the Secretary of
Health and Human Services shall each designate one or more
officers of their respective Departments to serve as ex officio
members of the Task Force. One of the ex officio members from
the Department of Homeland Security shall be the designated
officer of the Federal Government for purposes of subsection
(e) of section 10 of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 App.
U.S.C.).
``(d) Applicability of Federal Advisory Committee Act.--
Notwithstanding section 871(a), the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5
U.S.C. App.), including subsections (a), (b), and (d) of section 10 of
such Act, and section 552b(c) of title 5, United States Code, shall
apply to the Task Force.

``SEC. 1805. COVERED GRANT ELIGIBILITY AND CRITERIA.

``(a) Grant Eligibility.--Any State, region, or directly eligible
tribe shall be eligible to apply for a covered grant.
``(b) Grant Criteria.--In awarding covered grants, the Secretary
shall assist States and local governments in achieving, maintaining,
and enhancing the essential capabilities for first responders
established by the Secretary under section 1803.
``(c) State Homeland Security Plans.--
``(1) Submission of plans.--The Secretary shall require that
any State applying to the Secretary for a covered grant must
submit to the Secretary a 3-year State homeland security plan
that--
``(A) demonstrates the extent to which the State has
achieved the essential capabilities that apply to the
State;
``(B) demonstrates the needs of the State necessary
to achieve, maintain, or enhance the essential
capabilities that apply to the State;
``(C) includes a prioritization of such needs based
on threat, vulnerability, and consequence assessment
factors applicable to the State;
``(D) describes how the State intends--
``(i) to address such needs at the city,
county, regional, tribal, State, and interstate
level, including a precise description of any
regional structure the State has established
for the purpose of organizing homeland security
preparedness activities funded by covered
grants;
``(ii) to use all Federal, State, and local
resources available for the purpose of
addressing such needs; and
``(iii) to give particular emphasis to
regional planning and cooperation, including
the activities of multijurisdictional planning
agencies governed by local officials, both
within its jurisdictional borders and with
neighboring States;
``(E) is developed in consultation with and subject
to appropriate comment by local governments within the
State; and
``(F) with respect to the emergency preparedness of
first responders, addresses the unique aspects of
terrorism as part of a comprehensive State emergency
management plan.
``(2) Approval by secretary.--The Secretary may not award any
covered grant to a State unless the Secretary has approved the
applicable State homeland security plan.
``(d) Consistency With State Plans.--The Secretary shall ensure that
each covered grant is used to supplement and support, in a consistent
and coordinated manner, the applicable State homeland security plan or
plans.
``(e) Application for Grant.--
``(1) In general.--Except as otherwise provided in this
subsection, any State, region, or directly eligible tribe may
apply for a covered grant by submitting to the Secretary an
application at such time, in such manner, and containing such
information as is required under this subsection, or as the
Secretary may reasonably require.
``(2) Deadlines for applications and awards.--All
applications for covered grants must be submitted at such time
as the Secretary may reasonably require for the fiscal year for
which they are submitted. The Secretary shall award covered
grants pursuant to all approved applications for such fiscal
year as soon as practicable, but not later than March 1 of such
year.
``(3) Availability of funds.--All funds awarded by the
Secretary under covered grants in a fiscal year shall be
available for obligation through the end of the subsequent
fiscal year.
``(4) Minimum contents of application.--The Secretary shall
require that each applicant include in its application, at a
minimum--
``(A) the purpose for which the applicant seeks
covered grant funds and the reasons why the applicant
needs the covered grant to meet the essential
capabilities for terrorism preparedness within the
State, region, or directly eligible tribe to which the
application pertains;
``(B) a description of how, by reference to the
applicable State homeland security plan or plans under
subsection (c), the allocation of grant funding
proposed in the application, including, where
applicable, the amount not passed through under section
1806(g)(1), would assist in fulfilling the essential
capabilities specified in such plan or plans;
``(C) a statement of whether a mutual aid agreement
applies to the use of all or any portion of the covered
grant funds;
``(D) if the applicant is a State, a description of
how the State plans to allocate the covered grant funds
to regions, local governments, and Indian tribes;
``(E) if the applicant is a region--
``(i) a precise geographical description of
the region and a specification of all
participating and nonparticipating local
governments within the geographical area
comprising that region;
``(ii) a specification of what governmental
entity within the region will administer the
expenditure of funds under the covered grant;
and
``(iii) a designation of a specific
individual to serve as regional liaison;
``(F) a capital budget showing how the applicant
intends to allocate and expend the covered grant funds;
``(G) if the applicant is a directly eligible tribe,
a designation of a specific individual to serve as the
tribal liaison; and
``(H) a statement of how the applicant intends to
meet the matching requirement, if any, that applies
under section 1806(g)(2).
``(5) Regional applications.--
``(A) Relationship to state applications.--A regional
application--
``(i) shall be coordinated with an
application submitted by the State or States of
which such region is a part;
``(ii) shall supplement and avoid duplication
with such State application; and
``(iii) shall address the unique regional
aspects of such region's terrorism preparedness
needs beyond those provided for in the
application of such State or States.
``(B) State review and submission.--To ensure the
consistency required under subsection (d) and the
coordination required under subparagraph (A) of this
paragraph, an applicant that is a region must submit
its application to each State of which any part is
included in the region for review and concurrence prior
to the submission of such application to the Secretary.
The regional application shall be transmitted to the
Secretary through each such State within 30 days of its
receipt, unless the Governor of such a State notifies
the Secretary, in writing, that such regional
application is inconsistent with the State's homeland
security plan and provides an explanation of the
reasons therefor.
``(C) Distribution of regional awards.--If the
Secretary approves a regional application, then the
Secretary shall distribute a regional award to the
State or States submitting the applicable regional
application under subparagraph (B), and each such State
shall, not later than the end of the 45-day period
beginning on the date after receiving a regional award,
pass through to the region all covered grant funds or
resources purchased with such funds, except those funds
necessary for the State to carry out its
responsibilities with respect to such regional
application; Provided That, in no such case shall the
State or States pass through to the region less than 80
percent of the regional award.
``(D) Certifications regarding distribution of grant
funds to regions.--Any State that receives a regional
award under subparagraph (C) shall certify to the
Secretary, by not later than 30 days after the
expiration of the period described in subparagraph (C)
with respect to the grant, that the State has made
available to the region the required funds and
resources in accordance with subparagraph (C).
``(E) Direct payments to regions.--If any State fails
to pass through a regional award to a region as
required by subparagraph (C) within 45 days after
receiving such award and does not request or receive an
extension of such period under section 1806(h)(2), the
region may petition the Secretary to receive directly
the portion of the regional award that is required to
be passed through to such region under subparagraph
(C).
``(F) Regional liaisons.--A regional liaison
designated under paragraph (4)(E)(iii) shall--
``(i) coordinate with Federal, State, local,
regional, and private officials within the
region concerning terrorism preparedness;
``(ii) develop a process for receiving input
from Federal, State, local, regional, and
private sector officials within the region to
assist in the development of the regional
application and to improve the region's access
to covered grants; and
``(iii) administer, in consultation with
State, local, regional, and private officials
within the region, covered grants awarded to
the region.
``(6) Tribal applications.--
``(A) Submission to the state or states.--To ensure
the consistency required under subsection (d), an
applicant that is a directly eligible tribe must submit
its application to each State within the boundaries of
which any part of such tribe is located for direct
submission to the Department along with the application
of such State or States.
``(B) Opportunity for state comment.--Before awarding
any covered grant to a directly eligible tribe, the
Secretary shall provide an opportunity to each State
within the boundaries of which any part of such tribe
is located to comment to the Secretary on the
consistency of the tribe's application with the State's
homeland security plan. Any such comments shall be
submitted to the Secretary concurrently with the
submission of the State and tribal applications.
``(C) Final authority.--The Secretary shall have
final authority to determine the consistency of any
application of a directly eligible tribe with the
applicable State homeland security plan or plans, and
to approve any application of such tribe. The Secretary
shall notify each State within the boundaries of which
any part of such tribe is located of the approval of an
application by such tribe.
``(D) Tribal liaison.--A tribal liaison designated
under paragraph (4)(G) shall--
``(i) coordinate with Federal, State, local,
regional, and private officials concerning
terrorism preparedness;
``(ii) develop a process for receiving input
from Federal, State, local, regional, and
private sector officials to assist in the
development of the application of such tribe
and to improve the tribe's access to covered
grants; and
``(iii) administer, in consultation with
State, local, regional, and private officials,
covered grants awarded to such tribe.
``(E) Limitation on the number of direct grants.--The
Secretary may make covered grants directly to not more
than 20 directly eligible tribes per fiscal year.
``(F) Tribes not receiving direct grants.--An Indian
tribe that does not receive a grant directly under this
section is eligible to receive funds under a covered
grant from the State or States within the boundaries of
which any part of such tribe is located, consistent
with the homeland security plan of the State as
described in subsection (c). If a State fails to comply
with section 1806(g)(1), the tribe may request payment
under section 1806(h)(3) in the same manner as a local
government.
``(7) Equipment standards.--If an applicant for a covered
grant proposes to upgrade or purchase, with assistance provided
under the grant, new equipment or systems that do not meet or
exceed any applicable national voluntary consensus standards
established by the Secretary under section 1807(a), the
applicant shall include in the application an explanation of
why such equipment or systems will serve the needs of the
applicant better than equipment or systems that meet or exceed
such standards.
``(f) First Responder Grants Board.--
``(1) Establishment of board.--The Secretary shall establish
a First Responder Grants Board, consisting of--
``(A) the Secretary;
``(B) the Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness
and Response;
``(C) the Under Secretary for Border and
Transportation Security;
``(D) the Under Secretary for Information Analysis
and Infrastructure Protection;
``(E) the Under Secretary for Science and Technology;
and
``(F) the Director of the Office for Domestic
Preparedness.
``(2) Chairman.--
``(A) In general.--The Secretary shall be the
Chairman of the Board.
``(B) Exercise of authorities by deputy secretary.--
The Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security may exercise
the authorities of the Chairman, if the Secretary so
directs.
``(3) Ranking of grant applications.--
``(A) Prioritization of grants.--The Board--
``(i) shall evaluate and annually prioritize
all pending applications for covered grants
based upon the degree to which they would, by
achieving, maintaining, or enhancing the
essential capabilities of the applicants on a
nationwide basis, lessen the threat to,
vulnerability of, and consequences for persons
and critical infrastructure; and
``(ii) in evaluating the threat to persons
and critical infrastructure for purposes of
prioritizing covered grants, shall give greater
weight to threats of terrorism based on their
specificity and credibility, including any
pattern of repetition.
``(B) Minimum amounts.--After evaluating and
prioritizing grant applications under subparagraph (A),
the Board shall ensure that, for each fiscal year--
``(i) each of the States, other than the
Virgin Islands, American Samoa, Guam, and the
Northern Mariana Islands, that has an approved
State homeland security plan receives no less
than 0.25 percent of the funds available for
covered grants for that fiscal year for
purposes of implementing its homeland security
plan in accordance with the prioritization of
needs under subsection (c)(1)(C);
``(ii) each of the States, other than the
Virgin Islands, American Samoa, Guam, and the
Northern Mariana Islands, that has an approved
State homeland security plan and that meets one
or both of the additional high-risk qualifying
criteria under subparagraph (C) receives no
less than 0.45 percent of the funds available
for covered grants for that fiscal year for
purposes of implementing its homeland security
plan in accordance with the prioritization of
needs under subsection (c)(1)(C);
``(iii) the Virgin Islands, American Samoa,
Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands each
receives no less than 0.08 percent of the funds
available for covered grants for that fiscal
year for purposes of implementing its approved
State homeland security plan in accordance with
the prioritization of needs under subsection
(c)(1)(C); and
``(iv) directly eligible tribes collectively
receive no less than 0.08 percent of the funds
available for covered grants for such fiscal
year for purposes of addressing the needs
identified in the applications of such tribes,
consistent with the homeland security plan of
each State within the boundaries of which any
part of any such tribe is located, except that
this clause shall not apply with respect to
funds available for a fiscal year if the
Secretary receives less than 5 applications for
such fiscal year from such tribes under
subsection (e)(6)(A) or does not approve at
least one such application.
``(C) Additional high-risk qualifying criteria.--For
purposes of subparagraph (B)(ii), additional high-risk
qualifying criteria consist of--
``(i) having a significant international land
border; or
``(ii) adjoining a body of water within North
America through which an international boundary
line extends.
``(4) Effect of regional awards on state minimum.--Any
regional award, or portion thereof, provided to a State under
subsection (e)(5)(C) shall not be considered in calculating the
minimum State award under paragraph (3)(B) of this subsection.
``(5) Functions of under secretaries.--The Under Secretaries
referred to in paragraph (1) shall seek to ensure that the
relevant expertise and input of the staff of their directorates
are available to and considered by the Board.

``SEC. 1806. USE OF FUNDS AND ACCOUNTABILITY REQUIREMENTS.

``(a) In General.--A covered grant may be used for--
``(1) purchasing or upgrading equipment, including computer
software, to enhance terrorism preparedness and response;
``(2) exercises to strengthen terrorism preparedness and
response;
``(3) training for prevention (including detection) of,
preparedness for, or response to attacks involving weapons of
mass destruction, including training in the use of equipment
and computer software;
``(4) developing or updating response plans;
``(5) establishing or enhancing mechanisms for sharing
terrorism threat information;
``(6) systems architecture and engineering, program planning
and management, strategy formulation and strategic planning,
life-cycle systems design, product and technology evaluation,
and prototype development for terrorism preparedness and
response purposes;
``(7) additional personnel costs resulting from--
``(A) elevations in the threat alert level of the
Homeland Security Advisory System by the Secretary, or
a similar elevation in threat alert level issued by a
State, region, or local government with the approval of
the Secretary;
``(B) travel to and participation in exercises and
training in the use of equipment and on prevention
activities;
``(C) the temporary replacement of personnel during
any period of travel to and participation in exercises
and training in the use of equipment and on prevention
activities; and
``(D) personnel engaged exclusively in
counterterrorism and intelligence activities
notwithstanding the date such personnel were hired;
``(8) the costs of equipment (including software) required to
receive, transmit, handle, and store classified information;
``(9) protecting critical infrastructure against potential
attack by the addition of barriers, fences, gates, and other
such devices, except that the cost of such measures may not
exceed the greater of--
``(A) $1,000,000 per project; or
``(B) such greater amount as may be approved by the
Secretary, which may not exceed 10 percent of the total
amount of the covered grant;
``(10) the costs of commercially available interoperable
communications equipment (which, where applicable, is based on
national, voluntary consensus standards) that the Secretary, in
consultation with the Chairman of the Federal Communications
Commission, deems best suited to facilitate interoperability,
coordination, and integration between and among emergency
communications systems, and that complies with prevailing grant
guidance of the Department for interoperable communications;
``(11) educational curricula development for first responders
to ensure that they are prepared for terrorist attacks;
``(12) training and exercises to assist public elementary and
secondary schools in developing and implementing programs to
instruct students regarding age-appropriate skills to prepare
for and respond to an act of terrorism;
``(13) paying of administrative expenses directly related to
administration of the grant, except that such expenses may not
exceed 3 percent of the amount of the grant;
``(14) reimbursement for overtime and other fixed costs
incurred for homeland security purposes after September 11,
2001; and
``(15) other appropriate activities as determined by the
Secretary.
``(b) Prohibited Uses.--Funds provided as a covered grant may not be
used--
``(1) to supplant State or local funds;
``(2) to construct buildings or other physical facilities;
``(3) to acquire land; or
``(4) for any State or local government cost sharing
contribution.
``(c) Multiple-Purpose Funds.--Nothing in this section shall be
construed to preclude State and local governments from using covered
grant funds in a manner that also enhances first responder preparedness
for emergencies and disasters unrelated to acts of terrorism, if such
use assists such governments in achieving essential capabilities for
terrorism preparedness established by the Secretary under section 1803.
``(d) Reimbursement of Costs.--In addition to the activities
described in subsection (a), a covered grant may be used to provide a
reasonable stipend to paid-on-call or volunteer first responders who
are not otherwise compensated for travel to or participation in
training covered by this section. Any such reimbursement shall not be
considered compensation for purposes of rendering such a first
responder an employee under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29
U.S.C. 201 et seq.).
``(e) Assistance Requirement.--The Secretary may not request that
equipment paid for, wholly or in part, with funds provided as a covered
grant be made available for responding to emergencies in surrounding
States, regions, and localities, unless the Secretary undertakes to pay
the costs directly attributable to transporting and operating such
equipment during such response.
``(f) Flexibility in Unspent Homeland Security Grant Funds.--Upon
request by the recipient of a covered grant, the Secretary may
authorize the grantee to transfer all or part of funds provided as the
covered grant from uses specified in the grant agreement to other uses
authorized under this section, if the Secretary determines that such
transfer is in the interests of homeland security.
``(g) State, Regional, and Tribal Responsibilities.--
``(1) Pass-through.--The Secretary shall require a recipient
of a covered grant that is a State to obligate or otherwise
make available to local governments, first responders, and
other local groups, to the extent required under the State
homeland security plan or plans specified in the application
for the grant, not less than 80 percent of the grant funds,
resources purchased with the grant funds having a value equal
to at least 80 percent of the amount of the grant, or a
combination thereof, by not later than the end of the 45-day
period beginning on the date the grant recipient receives the
grant funds.
``(2) Cost sharing.--
``(A) In general.--The Federal share of the costs of
an activity carried out with a covered grant to a
State, region, or directly eligible tribe awarded after
the 2-year period beginning on the date of the
enactment of this section shall not exceed 75 percent.
``(B) Interim rule.--The Federal share of the costs
of an activity carried out with a covered grant awarded
before the end of the 2-year period beginning on the
date of the enactment of this section shall be 100
percent.
``(C) In-kind matching.--Each recipient of a covered
grant may meet the matching requirement under
subparagraph (A) by making in-kind contributions of
goods or services that are directly linked with the
purpose for which the grant is made, including, but not
limited to, any necessary personnel overtime,
contractor services, administrative costs, equipment
fuel and maintenance, and rental space.
``(3) Certifications regarding distribution of grant funds to
local governments.--Any State that receives a covered grant
shall certify to the Secretary, by not later than 30 days after
the expiration of the period described in paragraph (1) with
respect to the grant, that the State has made available for
expenditure by local governments, first responders, and other
local groups the required amount of grant funds pursuant to
paragraph (1).
``(4) Quarterly report on homeland security spending.--The
Federal share described in paragraph (2)(A) may be increased by
up to 2 percent for any State, region, or directly eligible
tribe that, not later than 30 days after the end of each fiscal
quarter, submits to the Secretary a report on that fiscal
quarter. Each such report must include, for each recipient of a
covered grant or a pass-through under paragraph (1)--
``(A) the amount obligated to that recipient in that
quarter;
``(B) the amount expended by that recipient in that
quarter; and
``(C) a summary description of the items purchased by
such recipient with such amount.
``(5) Annual report on homeland security spending.--Each
recipient of a covered grant shall submit an annual report to
the Secretary not later than 60 days after the end of each
fiscal year. Each recipient of a covered grant that is a region
must simultaneously submit its report to each State of which
any part is included in the region. Each recipient of a covered
grant that is a directly eligible tribe must simultaneously
submit its report to each State within the boundaries of which
any part of such tribe is located. Each report must include the
following:
``(A) The amount, ultimate recipients, and dates of
receipt of all funds received under the grant during
the previous fiscal year.
``(B) The amount and the dates of disbursements of
all such funds expended in compliance with paragraph
(1) or pursuant to mutual aid agreements or other
sharing arrangements that apply within the State,
region, or directly eligible tribe, as applicable,
during the previous fiscal year.
``(C) How the funds were utilized by each ultimate
recipient or beneficiary during the preceding fiscal
year.
``(D) The extent to which essential capabilities
identified in the applicable State homeland security
plan or plans were achieved, maintained, or enhanced as
the result of the expenditure of grant funds during the
preceding fiscal year.
``(E) The extent to which essential capabilities
identified in the applicable State homeland security
plan or plans remain unmet.
``(6) Inclusion of restricted annexes.--A recipient of a
covered grant may submit to the Secretary an annex to the
annual report under paragraph (5) that is subject to
appropriate handling restrictions, if the recipient believes
that discussion in the report of unmet needs would reveal
sensitive but unclassified information.
``(7) Provision of reports.--The Secretary shall ensure that
each annual report under paragraph (5) is provided to the Under
Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response and the
Director of the Office for Domestic Preparedness.
``(h) Incentives to Efficient Administration of Homeland Security
Grants.--
``(1) Penalties for delay in passing through local share.--If
a recipient of a covered grant that is a State fails to pass
through to local governments, first responders, and other local
groups funds or resources required by subsection (g)(1) within
45 days after receiving funds under the grant, the Secretary
may--
``(A) reduce grant payments to the grant recipient
from the portion of grant funds that is not required to
be passed through under subsection (g)(1);
``(B) terminate payment of funds under the grant to
the recipient, and transfer the appropriate portion of
those funds directly to local first responders that
were intended to receive funding under that grant; or
``(C) impose additional restrictions or burdens on
the recipient's use of funds under the grant, which may
include--
``(i) prohibiting use of such funds to pay
the grant recipient's grant-related overtime or
other expenses;
``(ii) requiring the grant recipient to
distribute to local government beneficiaries
all or a portion of grant funds that are not
required to be passed through under subsection
(g)(1); or
``(iii) for each day that the grant recipient
fails to pass through funds or resources in
accordance with subsection (g)(1), reducing
grant payments to the grant recipient from the
portion of grant funds that is not required to
be passed through under subsection (g)(1),
except that the total amount of such reduction
may not exceed 20 percent of the total amount
of the grant.
``(2) Extension of period.--The Governor of a State may
request in writing that the Secretary extend the 45-day period
under section 1805(e)(5)(E) or paragraph (1) for an additional
15-day period. The Secretary may approve such a request, and
may extend such period for additional 15-day periods, if the
Secretary determines that the resulting delay in providing
grant funding to the local government entities that will
receive funding under the grant will not have a significant
detrimental impact on such entities' terrorism preparedness
efforts.
``(3) Provision of non-local share to local government.--
``(A) In general.--The Secretary may upon request by
a local government pay to the local government a
portion of the amount of a covered grant awarded to a
State in which the local government is located, if--
``(i) the local government will use the
amount paid to expedite planned enhancements to
its terrorism preparedness as described in any
applicable State homeland security plan or
plans;
``(ii) the State has failed to pass through
funds or resources in accordance with
subsection (g)(1); and
``(iii) the local government complies with
subparagraphs (B) and (C).
``(B) Showing required.--To receive a payment under
this paragraph, a local government must demonstrate
that--
``(i) it is identified explicitly as an
ultimate recipient or intended beneficiary in
the approved grant application;
``(ii) it was intended by the grantee to
receive a severable portion of the overall
grant for a specific purpose that is identified
in the grant application;
``(iii) it petitioned the grantee for the
funds or resources after expiration of the
period within which the funds or resources were
required to be passed through under subsection
(g)(1); and
``(iv) it did not receive the portion of the
overall grant that was earmarked or designated
for its use or benefit.
``(C) Effect of payment.--Payment of grant funds to a
local government under this paragraph--
``(i) shall not affect any payment to another
local government under this paragraph; and
``(ii) shall not prejudice consideration of a
request for payment under this paragraph that
is submitted by another local government.
``(D) Deadline for action by secretary.--The
Secretary shall approve or disapprove each request for
payment under this paragraph by not later than 15 days
after the date the request is received by the
Department.
``(i) Reports to Congress.--The Secretary shall submit an annual
report to the Congress by December 31 of each year--
``(1) describing in detail the amount of Federal funds
provided as covered grants that were directed to each State,
region, and directly eligible tribe in the preceding fiscal
year;
``(2) containing information on the use of such grant funds
by grantees; and
``(3) describing--
``(A) the Nation's progress in achieving,
maintaining, and enhancing the essential capabilities
established under section 1803(a) as a result of the
expenditure of covered grant funds during the preceding
fiscal year; and
``(B) an estimate of the amount of expenditures
required to attain across the United States the
essential capabilities established under section
1803(a).

``SEC. 1807. NATIONAL STANDARDS FOR FIRST RESPONDER EQUIPMENT AND
TRAINING.

``(a) Equipment Standards.--
``(1) In general.--The Secretary, in consultation with the
Under Secretaries for Emergency Preparedness and Response and
Science and Technology and the Director of the Office for
Domestic Preparedness, shall, not later than 6 months after the
date of enactment of this section, support the development of,
promulgate, and update as necessary national voluntary
consensus standards for the performance, use, and validation of
first responder equipment for purposes of section 1805(e)(7).
Such standards--
``(A) shall be, to the maximum extent practicable,
consistent with any existing voluntary consensus
standards;
``(B) shall take into account, as appropriate, new
types of terrorism threats that may not have been
contemplated when such existing standards were
developed;
``(C) shall be focused on maximizing
interoperability, interchangeability, durability,
flexibility, efficiency, efficacy, portability,
sustainability, and safety; and
``(D) shall cover all appropriate uses of the
equipment.
``(2) Required categories.--In carrying out paragraph (1),
the Secretary shall specifically consider the following
categories of first responder equipment:
``(A) Thermal imaging equipment.
``(B) Radiation detection and analysis equipment.
``(C) Biological detection and analysis equipment.
``(D) Chemical detection and analysis equipment.
``(E) Decontamination and sterilization equipment.
``(F) Personal protective equipment, including
garments, boots, gloves, and hoods and other protective
clothing.
``(G) Respiratory protection equipment.
``(H) Interoperable communications, including
wireless and wireline voice, video, and data networks.
``(I) Explosive mitigation devices and explosive
detection and analysis equipment.
``(J) Containment vessels.
``(K) Contaminant-resistant vehicles.
``(L) Such other equipment for which the Secretary
determines that national voluntary consensus standards
would be appropriate.
``(b) Training Standards.--
``(1) In general.--The Secretary, in consultation with the
Under Secretaries for Emergency Preparedness and Response and
Science and Technology and the Director of the Office for
Domestic Preparedness, shall support the development of,
promulgate, and regularly update as necessary national
voluntary consensus standards for first responder training
carried out with amounts provided under covered grant programs,
that will enable State and local government first responders to
achieve optimal levels of terrorism preparedness as quickly as
practicable. Such standards shall give priority to providing
training to--
``(A) enable first responders to prevent, prepare
for, respond to, and mitigate terrorist threats,
including threats from chemical, biological, nuclear,
and radiological weapons and explosive devices capable
of inflicting significant human casualties; and
``(B) familiarize first responders with the proper
use of equipment, including software, developed
pursuant to the standards established under subsection
(a).
``(2) Required categories.--In carrying out paragraph (1),
the Secretary specifically shall include the following
categories of first responder activities:
``(A) Regional planning.
``(B) Joint exercises.
``(C) Intelligence collection, analysis, and sharing.
``(D) Emergency notification of affected populations.
``(E) Detection of biological, nuclear, radiological,
and chemical weapons of mass destruction.
``(F) Such other activities for which the Secretary
determines that national voluntary consensus training
standards would be appropriate.
``(3) Consistency.--In carrying out this subsection, the
Secretary shall ensure that such training standards are
consistent with the principles of emergency preparedness for
all hazards.
``(c) Consultation With Standards Organizations.--In establishing
national voluntary consensus standards for first responder equipment
and training under this section, the Secretary shall consult with
relevant public and private sector groups, including--
``(1) the National Institute of Standards and Technology;
``(2) the National Fire Protection Association;
``(3) the National Association of County and City Health
Officials;
``(4) the Association of State and Territorial Health
Officials;
``(5) the American National Standards Institute;
``(6) the National Institute of Justice;
``(7) the Inter-Agency Board for Equipment Standardization
and Interoperability;
``(8) the National Public Health Performance Standards
Program;
``(9) the National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health;
``(10) ASTM International;
``(11) the International Safety Equipment Association;
``(12) the Emergency Management Accreditation Program; and
``(13) to the extent the Secretary considers appropriate,
other national voluntary consensus standards development
organizations, other interested Federal, State, and local
agencies, and other interested persons.
``(d) Coordination With Secretary of HHS.--In establishing any
national voluntary consensus standards under this section for first
responder equipment or training that involve or relate to health
professionals, including emergency medical professionals, the Secretary
shall coordinate activities under this section with the Secretary of
Health and Human Services.''.
(b) Definition of Emergency Response Providers.--Paragraph (6) of
section 2 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296; 6
U.S.C. 101(6)) is amended by striking ``includes'' and all that follows
and inserting ``includes Federal, State, and local governmental and
nongovernmental emergency public safety, law enforcement, fire,
emergency response, emergency medical (including hospital emergency
facilities), and related personnel, organizations, agencies, and
authorities.''.
(c) Temporary Limitations on Application.--
(1) 1-year delay in application.--The following provisions of
title XVIII of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended by
subsection (a), shall not apply during the 1-year period
beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act:
(A) Subsections (b), (c), and (e)(4)(A) and (B) of
section 1805.
(B) In section 1805(f)(3)(A), the phrase ``, by
enhancing the essential capabilities of the
applicants,''.
(2) 2-year delay in application.--The following provisions of
title XVIII of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended by
subsection (a), shall not apply during the 2-year period
beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act:
(A) Subparagraphs (D) and (E) of section 1806(g)(5).
(B) Section 1806(i)(3).

SEC. 5004. MODIFICATION OF HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY SYSTEM.

(a) In General.--Subtitle A of title II of the Homeland Security Act
of 2002 (Public Law 107-296; 6 U.S.C. 121 et seq.) is amended by adding
at the end the following:

``SEC. 203. HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY SYSTEM.

``(a) In General.--The Secretary shall revise the Homeland Security
Advisory System referred to in section 201(d)(7) to require that any
designation of a threat level or other warning shall be accompanied by
a designation of the geographic regions or economic sectors to which
the designation applies.
``(b) Reports.--The Secretary shall report to the Congress annually
by not later than December 31 each year regarding the geographic
region-specific warnings and economic sector-specific warnings issued
during the preceding fiscal year under the Homeland Security Advisory
System referred to in section 201(d)(7), and the bases for such
warnings. The report shall be submitted in unclassified form and may,
as necessary, include a classified annex.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in section 1(b) of the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101 et seq.) is amended by
inserting after the item relating to section 202 the following:

``203. Homeland Security Advisory System.''.

SEC. 5005. COORDINATION OF INDUSTRY EFFORTS.

Section 102(f) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-
296; 6 U.S.C. 112(f)) is amended by striking ``and'' after the
semicolon at the end of paragraph (6), by striking the period at the
end of paragraph (7) and inserting ``; and'', and by adding at the end
the following:
``(8) coordinating industry efforts, with respect to
functions of the Department of Homeland Security, to identify
private sector resources and capabilities that could be
effective in supplementing Federal, State, and local government
agency efforts to prevent or respond to a terrorist attack.''.

SEC. 5006. SUPERSEDED PROVISION.

This subtitle supersedes section 1014 of Public Law 107-56.

SEC. 5007. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING INTEROPERABLE COMMUNICATIONS.

(a) Finding.--The Congress finds that--
(1) many first responders working in the same jurisdiction or
in different jurisdictions cannot effectively and efficiently
communicate with one another; and
(2) their inability to do so threatens the public's safety
and may result in unnecessary loss of lives and property.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of the Congress that
interoperable emergency communications systems and radios should
continue to be deployed as soon as practicable for use by the first
responder community, and that upgraded and new digital communications
systems and new digital radios must meet prevailing national, voluntary
consensus standards for interoperability.

SEC. 5008. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING CITIZEN CORPS COUNCILS.

(a) Finding.--The Congress finds that Citizen Corps councils help to
enhance local citizen participation in terrorism preparedness by
coordinating multiple Citizen Corps programs, developing community
action plans, assessing possible threats, and identifying local
resources.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of the Congress that
individual Citizen Corps councils should seek to enhance the
preparedness and response capabilities of all organizations
participating in the councils, including by providing funding to as
many of their participating organizations as practicable to promote
local terrorism preparedness programs.

SEC. 5009. STUDY REGARDING NATIONWIDE EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION SYSTEM.

(a) Study.--The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with
the heads of other appropriate Federal agencies and representatives of
providers and participants in the telecommunications industry, shall
conduct a study to determine whether it is cost-effective, efficient,
and feasible to establish and implement an emergency telephonic alert
notification system that will--
(1) alert persons in the United States of imminent or current
hazardous events caused by acts of terrorism; and
(2) provide information to individuals regarding appropriate
measures that may be undertaken to alleviate or minimize
threats to their safety and welfare posed by such events.
(b) Technologies to Consider.--In conducting the study, the Secretary
shall consider the use of the telephone, wireless communications, and
other existing communications networks to provide such notification.
(c) Report.--Not later than 9 months after the date of the enactment
of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to the Congress a report
regarding the conclusions of the study.

SEC. 5010. REQUIRED COORDINATION.

The Secretary of Homeland Security shall ensure that there is
effective and ongoing coordination of Federal efforts to prevent,
prepare for, and respond to acts of terrorism and other major disasters
and emergencies among the divisions of the Department of Homeland
Security, including the Directorate of Emergency Preparedness and
Response and the Office for State and Local Government Coordination and
Preparedness.

Subtitle B--Government Reorganization Authority

SEC. 5021. AUTHORIZATION OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY REORGANIZATION
PLANS.

(a) Reorganization Plans.--Section 903(a)(2) of title 5, United
States Code, is amended to read as follows:
``(2) the abolition of all or a part of the functions of an
agency;''.
(b) Repeal of Limitations.--Section 905 of title 5, United States
Code, is amended to read as follows:

``Sec. 905. Limitation on authority.

``The authority to submit reorganization plans under this chapter is
limited to the following organizational units:
``(1) The Office of the National Intelligence Director.
``(2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
``(3) The National Security Agency.
``(4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
``(5) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
``(6) The National Reconnaissance Office.
``(7) Other offices within the Department of Defense for the
collection of specialized national intelligence through
reconnaissance programs.
``(8) The intelligence elements of the Army, the Navy, the
Air Force, the Marine Corps, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, and the Department of Energy.
``(9) The Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the
Department of State.
``(10) The Office of Intelligence Analysis of the Department
of Treasury.
``(11) The elements of the Department of Homeland Security
concerned with the analysis of intelligence information,
including the Office of Intelligence of the Coast Guard.
``(12) Such other elements of any other department or agency
as may be designated by the President, or designated jointly by
the National Intelligence Director and the head of the
department or agency concerned, as an element of the
intelligence community.''.
(c) Reorganization Plans.--903(a) of title 5, United States Code, is
amended--
(1) in paragraph (5), by striking ``or'' after the semicolon;
(2) in paragraph (6), by striking the period and inserting
``; or''; and
(3) by inserting after paragraph (6) the following:
``(7) the creation of an agency.''.
(d) Application of Chapter.--Chapter 9 of title 5, United States
Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

``Sec. 913. Application of chapter

``This chapter shall apply to any reorganization plan transmitted to
Congress in accordance with section 903(b) on or after the date of
enactment of this section.''.
(e) Technical and Conforming Amendments.--
(1) Table of sections.--The table of sections for chapter 9
of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding after the
item relating to section 912 the following:

``913. Application of chapter.''.
(2) References.--Chapter 9 of title 5, United States Code, is
amended--
(A) in section 908(1), by striking ``on or before
December 31, 1984''; and (B) in section 910, by
striking ``Government Operations'' each place it
appears and inserting ``Government Reform''.
(3) Date modification.--Section 909 of title 5, United States
Code, is amended in the first sentence by striking ``19'' and
inserting ``20''.

SEC. 5022. AUTHORITY TO ENTER INTO CONTRACTS AND ISSUE FEDERAL LOAN
GUARANTEES.

(a) Finding.--Congress finds that there is a public interest in
protecting high-risk nonprofit organizations from international
terrorist attacks that would disrupt the vital services such
organizations provide to the people of the United States and threaten
the lives and well-being of United States citizens who operate,
utilize, and live or work in proximity to such organizations.
(b) Purposes.--The purposes of this section are to--
(1) establish within the Department of Homeland Security a
program to protect United States citizens at or near high-risk
nonprofit organizations from international terrorist attacks
through loan guarantees and Federal contracts for security
enhancements and technical assistance;
(2) establish a program within the Department of Homeland
Security to provide grants to local governments to assist with
incremental costs associated with law enforcement in areas in
which there are a high concentration of high-risk nonprofit
organizations vulnerable to international terrorist attacks;
and
(3) establish an Office of Community Relations and Civic
Affairs within the Department of Homeland Security to focus on
security needs of high-risk nonprofit organizations with
respect to international terrorist threats.
(c) Authority.--The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101 et
seq.), as amended by this Act, is further amended by adding at the end
the following:

``TITLE XIX--PROTECTION OF CITIZENS AT HIGH-RISK NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS

``SEC. 1901. DEFINITIONS.

`` In this title:
``(1) Contract.--The term `contract' means a contract between
the Federal Government and a contractor selected from the list
of certified contractors to perform security enhancements or
provide technical assistance approved by the Secretary under
this title.
``(2) Favorable repayment terms.--The term `favorable
repayment terms' means the repayment terms of loans offered to
nonprofit organizations under this title that--
``(A) are determined by the Secretary, in
consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, to be
favorable under current market conditions;
``(B) have interest rates at least 1 full percentage
point below the market rate; and
``(C) provide for repayment over a term not less than
25 years.
``(3) Nonprofit organization.--The term `nonprofit
organization' means an organization that--
``(A) is described under section 501(c)(3) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and exempt from taxation
under section 501(a) of such Code; and
``(B) is designated by the Secretary under section
1903(a).
``(4) Security enhancements.--The term `security
enhancements'--
``(A) means the purchase and installation of security
equipment in real property (including buildings and
improvements), owned or leased by a nonprofit
organization, specifically in response to the risk of
attack at a nonprofit organization by an international
terrorist organization;
``(B) includes software security measures; and
``(C) does not include enhancements that would
otherwise have been reasonably necessary due to
nonterrorist threats.
``(5) Technical assistance.--The term `technical
assistance'--
``(A) means guidance, assessment, recommendations,
and any other provision of information or expertise
which assists nonprofit organizations in--
``(i) identifying security needs;
``(ii) purchasing and installing security
enhancements;
``(iii) training employees to use and
maintain security enhancements; or
``(iv) training employees to recognize and
respond to international terrorist threats; and
``(B) does not include technical assistance that
would otherwise have been reasonably necessary due to
nonterrorist threats.

``SEC. 1902. AUTHORITY TO ENTER INTO CONTRACTS AND ISSUE FEDERAL LOAN
GUARANTEES.

``(a) In General.--The Secretary may--
``(1) enter into contracts with certified contractors for
security enhancements and technical assistance for nonprofit
organizations; and
``(2) issue Federal loan guarantees to financial institutions
in connection with loans made by such institutions to nonprofit
organizations for security enhancements and technical
assistance.
``(b) Loans.--The Secretary may guarantee loans under this title--
``(1) only to the extent provided for in advance by
appropriations Acts; and
``(2) only to the extent such loans have favorable repayment
terms.

``SEC. 1903. ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA.

``(a) In General.--The Secretary shall designate nonprofit
organizations as high-risk nonprofit organizations eligible for
contracts or loans under this title based on the vulnerability of the
specific site of the nonprofit organization to international terrorist
attacks.
``(b) Vulnerability Determination.--In determining vulnerability to
international terrorist attacks and eligibility for security
enhancements or technical assistance under this title, the Secretary
shall consider--
``(1) threats of international terrorist organizations (as
designated by the State Department) against any group of United
States citizens who operate or are the principal beneficiaries
or users of the nonprofit organization;
``(2) prior attacks, within or outside the United States, by
international terrorist organizations against the nonprofit
organization or entities associated with or similarly situated
as the nonprofit organization;
``(3) the symbolic value of the site as a highly recognized
United States cultural or historical institution that renders
the site a possible target of international terrorism;
``(4) the role of the nonprofit organization in responding to
international terrorist attacks; and
``(5) any recommendations of the applicable State Homeland
Security Authority established under section 1906 or Federal,
State, and local law enforcement authorities.
``(c) Documentation.--In order to be eligible for security
enhancements, technical assistance or loan guarantees under this title,
the nonprofit organization shall provide the Secretary with
documentation that--
``(1) the nonprofit organization hosted a gathering of at
least 100 or more persons at least once each month at the
nonprofit organization site during the preceding 12 months; or
``(2) the nonprofit organization provides services to at
least 500 persons each year at the nonprofit organization site.
``(d) Technical Assistance Organizations.--If 2 or more nonprofit
organizations establish another nonprofit organization to provide
technical assistance, that established organization shall be eligible
to receive security enhancements and technical assistance under this
title based upon the collective risk of the nonprofit organizations it
serves.

``SEC. 1904. USE OF LOAN GUARANTEES.

``Funds borrowed from lending institutions, which are guaranteed by
the Federal Government under this title, may be used for technical
assistance and security enhancements.

``SEC. 1905. NONPROFIT ORGANIZATION APPLICATIONS.

``(a) In General.--A nonprofit organization desiring assistance under
this title shall submit a separate application for each specific site
needing security enhancements or technical assistance.
``(b) Content.--Each application shall include--
``(1) a detailed request for security enhancements and
technical assistance, from a list of approved enhancements and
assistance issued by the Secretary under this title;
``(2) a description of the intended uses of funds to be
borrowed under Federal loan guarantees; and
``(3) such other information as the Secretary shall require.
``(c) Joint Application.--Two or more nonprofit organizations located
on contiguous sites may submit a joint application.

``SEC. 1906. REVIEW BY STATE HOMELAND SECURITY AUTHORITIES.

``(a) Establishment of State Homeland Security Authorities.--In
accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary, each State may
establish a State Homeland Security Authority to carry out this title.
``(b) Applications.--
``(1) Submission.--Applications shall be submitted to the
applicable State Homeland Security Authority.
``(2) Evaluation.--After consultation with Federal, State,
and local law enforcement authorities, the State Homeland
Security Authority shall evaluate all applications using the
criteria under section 1903 and transmit all qualifying
applications to the Secretary ranked by severity of risk of
international terrorist attack.
``(3) Appeal.--An applicant may appeal the finding that an
application is not a qualifying application to the Secretary
under procedures that the Secretary shall issue by regulation
not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this
title.

``SEC. 1907. SECURITY ENHANCEMENT AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE CONTRACTS
AND LOAN GUARANTEES.

``(a) In General.--Upon receipt of the applications, the Secretary
shall select applications for execution of security enhancement and
technical assistance contracts, or issuance of loan guarantees, giving
preference to the nonprofit organizations determined to be at greatest
risk of international terrorist attack based on criteria under section
1903.
``(b) Security Enhancements and Technical Assistance; Followed by
Loan Guarantees.--The Secretary shall execute security enhancement and
technical assistance contracts for the highest priority applicants
until available funds are expended, after which loan guarantees shall
be made available for additional applicants determined to be at high
risk, up to the authorized amount of loan guarantees. The Secretary may
provide with respect to a single application a combination of such
contracts and loan guarantees.
``(c) Joint Applications.--Special preference shall be given to joint
applications submitted on behalf of multiple nonprofit organizations
located in contiguous settings.
``(d) Maximizing Available Funds.--Subject to subsection (b), the
Secretary shall execute security enhancement and technical assistance
contracts in such amounts as to maximize the number of high-risk
applicants nationwide receiving assistance under this title.
``(e) Applicant Notification.--Upon selecting a nonprofit
organization for assistance under this title, the Secretary shall
notify the nonprofit organization that the Federal Government is
prepared to enter into a contract with certified contractors to install
specified security enhancements or provide specified technical
assistance at the site of the nonprofit organization.
``(f) Certified Contractors.--
``(1) In general.--Upon receiving a notification under
subsection (e), the nonprofit organization shall select a
certified contractor to perform the specified security
enhancements, from a list of certified contractors issued and
maintained by the Secretary under subsection (j).
``(2) List.--The list referred to in paragraph (1) shall be
comprised of contractors selected on the basis of--
``(A) technical expertise;
``(B) performance record including quality and
timeliness of work performed;
``(C) adequacy of employee criminal background
checks; and
``(D) price competitiveness.
``(3) Other certified contractors.--The Secretary shall
include on the list of certified contractors additional
contractors selected by senior officials at State Homeland
Security Authorities and the chief executives of county and
other local jurisdictions. Such additional certified
contractors shall be selected on the basis of the criteria
under paragraph (2).
``(g) Ensuring the Availability of Contractors.--If the list of
certified contractors under this section does not include any
contractors who can begin work on the security enhancements or
technical assistance within 60 days after applicant notification, the
nonprofit organization may submit a contractor not currently on the
list to the Secretary for the Secretary's review. If the Secretary does
not include the submitted contractor on the list of certified
contractors within 60 days after the submission and does not place an
alternative contractor on the list within the same time period (who
would be available to begin the specified work within that 60-day
period), the Secretary shall immediately place the submitted contractor
on the list of certified contractors and such contractor shall remain
on such list until--
``(1) the specified work is completed; or
``(2) the Secretary can show cause why such contractor may
not retain certification, with such determinations subject to
review by the Comptroller General of the United States.
``(h) Contracts.--Upon selecting a certified contractor to provide
security enhancements and technical assistance approved by the
Secretary under this title, the nonprofit organization shall notify the
Secretary of such selection. The Secretary shall deliver a contract to
such contractor within 10 business days after such notification.
``(i) Contracts for Additional Work or Upgrades.--A nonprofit
organization, using its own funds, may enter into an additional
contract with the certified contractor, for additional or upgraded
security enhancements or technical assistance. Such additional
contracts shall be separate contracts between the nonprofit
organization and the contractor.
``(j) Expediting Assistance.--In order to expedite assistance to
nonprofit organizations, the Secretary shall--
``(1) compile a list of approved technical assistance and
security enhancement activities within 45 days after the date
of enactment of this title;
``(2) publish in the Federal Register within 60 days after
such date of enactment a request for contractors to submit
applications to be placed on the list of certified contractors
under this section;
``(3) after consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury,
publish in the Federal Register within 60 days after such date
of enactment, prescribe regulations setting forth the
conditions under which loan guarantees shall be issued under
this title, including application procedures, expeditious
review of applications, underwriting criteria, assignment of
loan guarantees, modifications, commercial validity, defaults,
and fees; and
``(4) publish in the Federal Register within 120 days after
such date of enactment (and every 30 days thereafter) a list of
certified contractors, including those selected by State
Homeland Security Authorities, county, and local officials,
with coverage of all 50 States, the District of Columbia, and
the territories.

``SEC. 1908. LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE GRANTS.

``(a) In General.--The Secretary may provide grants to units of local
government to offset incremental costs associated with law enforcement
in areas where there is a high concentration of nonprofit
organizations.
``(b) Use.--Grant funds received under this section may be used only
for personnel costs or for equipment needs specifically related to such
incremental costs.
``(c) Maximization of Impact.--The Secretary shall award grants in
such amounts as to maximize the impact of available funds in protecting
nonprofit organizations nationwide from international terrorist
attacks.

``SEC. 1909. OFFICE OF COMMUNITY RELATIONS AND CIVIC AFFAIRS.

``(a) In General.--There is established within the Department, the
Office of Community Relations and Civic Affairs to administer grant
programs for nonprofit organizations and local law enforcement
assistance.
``(b) Additional Responsibilities.--The Office of Community Relations
and Civic Affairs shall--
``(1) coordinate community relations efforts of the
Department;
``(2) serve as the official liaison of the Secretary to the
nonprofit, human and social services, and faith-based
communities; and
``(3) assist in coordinating the needs of those communities
with the Citizen Corps program.

``SEC. 1910. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS AND LOAN GUARANTEES.

``(a) Nonprofit Organizations Program.--There are authorized to be
appropriated to the Department to carry out the nonprofit organization
program under this title, $100,000,000 for fiscal year 2005 and such
sums as may be necessary for fiscal years 2006 and 2007.
``(b) Local Law Enforcement Assistance Grants.--There are authorized
to be appropriated to the Department for local law enforcement
assistance grants under section 1908, $50,000,000 for fiscal year 2005
and such sums as may be necessary for fiscal years 2006 and 2007.
``(c) Office of Community Relations and Civic Affairs.--There are
authorized to be appropriated to the Department for the Office of
Community Relations and Civic Affairs under section 1909, $5,000,000
for fiscal year 2005 and such sums as may be necessary for fiscal years
2006 and 2007.
``(d) Loan Guarantees.--
``(1) Authorization of appropriations.--There are authorized
to be appropriated in each of fiscal years 2005, 2006, and
2007, such amounts as may be required under the Federal Credit
Act with respect to Federal loan guarantees authorized by this
title, which shall remain available until expended.
``(2) Limitation.--The aggregate value of all loans for which
loan guarantees are issued under this title by the Secretary
may not exceed $250,000,000 in each of fiscal years 2005, 2006,
and 2007.''.
(d) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents under section 1(b) of
the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101(b)) is amended by
adding at the end the following:

``TITLE XIX--PROTECTION OF CITIZENS AT HIGH-RISK NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS

``Sec. 1901. Definitions.
``Sec. 1902. Authority to enter into contracts and issue Federal loan
guarantees.
``Sec. 1903. Eligibility criteria.
``Sec. 1904. Use of loan guarantees.
``Sec. 1905. Nonprofit organization applications.
``Sec. 1906. Review by State Homeland Security Authorities.
``Sec. 1907. Security enhancement and technical assistance contracts
and loan guarantees.
``Sec. 1908. Local law enforcement assistance grants.
``Sec. 1909. Office of Community Relations and Civic Affairs.
``Sec. 1910. Authorization of appropriations and loan guarantees.''.

Subtitle C--Restructuring Relating to the Department of Homeland
Security and Congressional Oversight

SEC. 5025. RESPONSIBILITIES OF COUNTERNARCOTICS OFFICE.

(a) Amendment.--Section 878 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6
U.S.C. 458) is amended to read as follows:

``SEC. 878. OFFICE OF COUNTERNARCOTICS ENFORCEMENT.

``(a) Office.--There shall be in the Department an Office of
Counternarcotics Enforcement, which shall be headed by a Director
appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate.
``(b) Assignment of Personnel.--(1) The Secretary shall assign to the
Office permanent staff and other appropriate personnel detailed from
other subdivisions of the Department to carry out responsibilities
under this section.
``(2) The Secretary shall designate senior employees from each
appropriate subdivision of the Department that has significant
counternarcotics responsibilities to act as a liaison between that
subdivision and the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement.
``(c) Limitation on Concurrent Employment.--Except as provided in
subsection (d), the Director of the Office of Counternarcotics
Enforcement shall not be employed by, assigned to, or serve as the head
of, any other branch of the Federal Government, any State or local
government, or any subdivision of the Department other than the Office
of Counternarcotics Enforcement.
``(d) Eligibility To Serve as the United States Interdiction
Coordinator.--The Director of the Office of Counternarcotics
Enforcement may be appointed as the United States Interdiction
Coordinator by the Director of the Office of National Drug Control
Policy, and shall be the only person at the Department eligible to be
so appointed.
``(e) Responsibilities.--The Secretary shall direct the Director of
the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement--
``(1) to coordinate policy and operations within the
Department, between the Department and other Federal
departments and agencies, and between the Department and State
and local agencies with respect to stopping the entry of
illegal drugs into the United States;
``(2) to ensure the adequacy of resources within the
Department for stopping the entry of illegal drugs into the
United States;
``(3) to recommend the appropriate financial and personnel
resources necessary to help the Department better fulfill its
responsibility to stop the entry of illegal drugs into the
United States;
``(4) within the JTTF construct to track and sever
connections between illegal drug trafficking and terrorism; and
``(5) to be a representative of the Department on all task
forces, committees, or other entities whose purpose is to
coordinate the counternarcotics enforcement activities of the
Department and other Federal, state or local agencies.
``(f) Reports to Congress.--
``(1) Annual budget review.--The Director of the Office of
Counternarcotics Enforcement shall, not later than 30 days
after the submission by the President to Congress of any
request for expenditures for the Department, submit to the
Committees on Appropriations and the authorizing committees of
jurisdiction of the House of Representatives and the Senate a
review and evaluation of such request. The review and
evaluation shall--
``(A) identify any request or subpart of any request
that affects or may affect the counternarcotics
activities of the Department or any of its
subdivisions, or that affects the ability of the
Department or any subdivision of the Department to meet
its responsibility to stop the entry of illegal drugs
into the United States;
``(B) describe with particularity how such requested
funds would be or could be expended in furtherance of
counternarcotics activities; and
``(C) compare such requests with requests for
expenditures and amounts appropriated by Congress in
the previous fiscal year.
``(2) Evaluation of counternarcotics activities.--The
Director of the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement shall,
not later than February 1 of each year, submit to the
Committees on Appropriations and the authorizing committees of
jurisdiction of the House of Representatives and the Senate a
review and evaluation of the counternarcotics activities of the
Department for the previous fiscal year. The review and
evaluation shall--
``(A) describe the counternarcotics activities of the
Department and each subdivision of the Department
(whether individually or in cooperation with other
subdivisions of the Department, or in cooperation with
other branches of the Federal Government or with State
or local agencies), including the methods, procedures,
and systems (including computer systems) for
collecting, analyzing, sharing, and disseminating
information concerning narcotics activity within the
Department and between the Department and other
Federal, State, and local agencies;
``(B) describe the results of those activities, using
quantifiable data whenever possible;
``(C) state whether those activities were sufficient
to meet the responsibility of the Department to stop
the entry of illegal drugs into the United States,
including a description of the performance measures of
effectiveness that were used in making that
determination; and
``(D) recommend, where appropriate, changes to those
activities to improve the performance of the Department
in meeting its responsibility to stop the entry of
illegal drugs into the United States.
``(3) Classified or law enforcement sensitive information.--
Any content of a review and evaluation described in the reports
required in this subsection that involves information
classified under criteria established by an Executive order, or
whose public disclosure, as determined by the Secretary, would
be detrimental to the law enforcement or national security
activities of the Department or any other Federal, State, or
local agency, shall be presented to Congress separately from
the rest of the review and evaluation.''.
(b) Conforming Amendment.--Section 103(a) of the Homeland Security
Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 113(a)) is amended--
(1) by redesignating paragraphs (8) and (9) as paragraphs (9)
and (10), respectively; and
(2) by inserting after paragraph (7) the following new
paragraph (8):
``(8) A Director of the Office of Counternarcotics
Enforcement.''.
(c) Authorization of Appropriations.--Of the amounts appropriated for
the Department of Homeland Security for Departmental management and
operations for fiscal year 2005, there is authorized up to $6,000,000
to carry out section 878 of the Department of Homeland Security Act of
2002 (as amended by this section).

SEC. 5026. USE OF COUNTERNARCOTICS ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES IN CERTAIN
EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE APPRAISALS.

(a) In General.--Subtitle E of title VIII of the Homeland Security
Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 411 and following) is amended by adding at the
end the following:

``SEC. 843. USE OF COUNTERNARCOTICS ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES IN CERTAIN
EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE APPRAISALS.

``(a) In General.--Each subdivision of the Department that is a
National Drug Control Program Agency shall include as one of the
criteria in its performance appraisal system, for each employee
directly or indirectly involved in the enforcement of Federal, State,
or local narcotics laws, the performance of that employee with respect
to the enforcement of Federal, State, or local narcotics laws, relying
to the greatest extent practicable on objective performance measures,
including--
``(1) the contribution of that employee to seizures of
narcotics and arrests of violators of Federal, State, or local
narcotics laws; and
``(2) the degree to which that employee cooperated with or
contributed to the efforts of other employees, either within
the Department or other Federal, State, or local agencies, in
counternarcotics enforcement.
``(b) Definitions.--For purposes of this section--
``(1) the term `National Drug Control Program Agency' means--
``(A) a National Drug Control Program Agency, as
defined in section 702(7) of the Office of National
Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act of 1998 (as
last in effect); and
``(B) any subdivision of the Department that has a
significant counternarcotics responsibility, as
determined by--
``(i) the counternarcotics officer, appointed
under section 878; or
``(ii) if applicable, the counternarcotics
officer's successor in function (as determined
by the Secretary); and
``(2) the term `performance appraisal system' means a system
under which periodic appraisals of job performance of employees
are made, whether under chapter 43 of title 5, United States
Code, or otherwise.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents for the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 is amended by inserting after the item relating to
section 842 the following:

``Sec. 843. Use of counternarcotics enforcement activities in certain
employee performance appraisals.''.

SEC. 5027. SENSE OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON ADDRESSING HOMELAND
SECURITY FOR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

(a) Findings.--The House of Representatives finds that--
(1) the House of Representatives created a Select Committee
on Homeland Security at the start of the 108th Congress to
provide for vigorous congressional oversight for the
implementation and operation of the Department of Homeland
Security;
(2) the House of Representatives also charged the Select
Committee on Homeland Security, including its Subcommittee on
Rules, with undertaking a thorough and complete study of the
operation and implementation of the rules of the House,
including the rule governing committee jurisdiction, with
respect to the issue of homeland security and to make their
recommendations to the Committee on Rules;
(3) on February 11, 2003, the Committee on Appropriations of
the House of Representatives created a new Subcommittee on
Homeland Security with jurisdiction over the Transportation
Security Administration, the Coast Guard, and other entities
within the Department of Homeland Security to help address the
integration of the Department of Homeland Security's 22 legacy
agencies; and
(4) during the 108th Congress, the House of Representatives
has taken several steps to help ensure its continuity in the
event of a terrorist attack, including--
(A) adopting H.R. 2844, the Continuity of
Representation Act, a bill to require States to hold
expedited special elections to fill vacancies in the
House of Representatives not later than 45 days after
the vacancy is announced by the Speaker in
extraordinary circumstances;
(B) granting authority for joint-leadership recalls
from a period of adjournment to an alternate place;
(C) allowing for anticipatory consent with the Senate
to assemble in an alternate place;
(D) establishing the requirement that the Speaker
submit to the Clerk a list of Members in the order in
which each shall act as Speaker pro tempore in the case
of a vacancy in the Office of Speaker (including
physical inability of the Speaker to discharge his
duties) until the election of a Speaker or a Speaker
pro tempore, exercising such authorities of the Speaker
as may be necessary and appropriate to that end;
(E) granting authority for the Speaker to declare an
emergency recess of the House subject to the call of
the Chair when notified of an imminent threat to the
safety of the House;
(F) granting authority for the Speaker, during any
recess or adjournment of not more than three days, in
consultation with the Minority Leader, to postpone the
time for reconvening or to reconvene before the time
previously appointed solely to declare the House in
recess, in each case within the constitutional three-
day limit;
(G) establishing the authority for the Speaker to
convene the House in an alternate place within the seat
of Government; and
(H) codifying the long-standing practice that the
death, resignation, expulsion, disqualification, or
removal of a Member results in an adjustment of the
quorum of the House, which the Speaker shall announce
to the House and which shall not be subject to appeal.
(b) Sense of the House.--It is the sense of the House of
Representatives that the Committee on Rules should act upon the
recommendations provided by the Select Committee on Homeland Security,
and other committees of existing jurisdiction, regarding the
jurisdiction over proposed legislation, messages, petitions, memorials
and other matters relating to homeland security prior to or at the
start of the 109th Congress.

Subtitle D--Improvements to Information Security

SEC. 5031. AMENDMENTS TO CLINGER-COHEN PROVISIONS TO ENHANCE AGENCY
PLANNING FOR INFORMATION SECURITY NEEDS.

Chapter 113 of title 40, United States Code, is amended--
(1) in section 11302(b), by inserting ``security,'' after
``use,'';
(2) in section 11302(c), by inserting ``, including
information security risks,'' after ``risks'' both places it
appears;
(3) in section 11312(b)(1), by striking ``information
technology investments'' and inserting ``investments in
information technology (including information security
needs)''; and
(4) in section 11315(b)(2), by inserting ``, secure,'' after
``sound''.

Subtitle E--Personnel Management Improvements

CHAPTER 1--APPOINTMENTS PROCESS REFORM

SEC. 5041. APPOINTMENTS TO NATIONAL SECURITY POSITIONS.

(a) Definition of National Security Position.--For purposes of this
section, the term ``national security position'' shall include--
(1) those positions that involve activities of the United
States Government that are concerned with the protection of the
Nation from foreign aggression, terrorism, or espionage,
including development of defense plans or policies,
intelligence or counterintelligence activities, and related
activities concerned with the preservation of military strength
of the United States and protection of the homeland; and
(2) positions that require regular use of, or access to,
classified information.
(b) Publication in the Federal Register.--Not later than 60 days
after the effective date of this section, the Director of the Office of
Personnel Management shall publish in the Federal Register a list of
offices that constitute national security positions under section (a)
for which Senate confirmation is required by law, and the Director
shall revise such list from time to time as appropriate.
(c) Presidential Appointments.--(1) With respect to appointment of
individuals to offices identified under section (b) and listed in
sections 5315 or 5316 of title 5, United States Code, which shall arise
after the publication of the list required by section (b), and
notwithstanding any other provision of law, the advice and consent of
the Senate shall not be required, but rather such appointment shall be
made by the President alone.
(2) With respect to appointment of individuals to offices identified
under section (b) and listed in sections 5313 or 5314 of title 5,
United States Code, which shall arise after the publication of the list
required by section (b), and notwithstanding any other provision of
law, the advice and consent of the Senate shall be required, except
that if 30 legislative days shall have expired from the date on which a
nomination is submitted to the Senate without a confirmation vote
occurring in the Senate, such appointment shall be made by the
President alone.
(3) For the purposes of this subsection, the term ``legislative day''
means a day on which the Senate is in session.

SEC. 5042. PRESIDENTIAL INAUGURAL TRANSITIONS.

Subsections (a) and (b) of section 3349a of title 5, United States
Code, are amended to read as follows:
``(a) As used in this section--
``(1) the term `inauguration day' means the date on which any
person swears or affirms the oath of office as President; and
``(2) the term `specified national security position' shall
mean not more than 20 positions requiring Senate confirmation,
not to include more than 3 heads of Executive Departments,
which are designated by the President on or after an
inauguration day as positions for which the duties involve
substantial responsibility for national security.
``(b) With respect to any vacancy that exists during the 60-day
period beginning on an inauguration day, except where the person
swearing or affirming the oath of office was the President on the date
preceding the date of swearing or affirming such oath of office, the
210-day period under section 3346 or 3348 shall be deemed to begin on
the later of the date occurring--
``(1) 90 days after such transitional inauguration day; or
``(2) 90 days after the date on which the vacancy occurs.
``(c) With respect to any vacancy in any specified national security
position that exists during the 60-day period beginning on an
inauguration day, the requirements of subparagraphs (A) and (B) of
section 3345(a)(3) shall not apply.''.

SEC. 5043. PUBLIC FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE FOR THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

(a) In General.--The Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.)
is amended by inserting before title IV the following:

``TITLE III--INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS

``SEC. 301. PERSONS REQUIRED TO FILE.

``(a) Within 30 days of assuming the position of an officer or
employee described in subsection (e), an individual shall file a report
containing the information described in section 302(b) unless the
individual has left another position described in subsection (e) within
30 days prior to assuming such new position or has already filed a
report under this title with respect to nomination for the new position
or as a candidate for the position.
``(b)(1) Within 5 days of the transmittal by the President to the
Senate of the nomination of an individual to a position in the
executive branch, appointment to which requires the advice and consent
of the Senate, such individual shall file a report containing the
information described in section 302(b). Such individual shall, not
later than the date of the first hearing to consider the nomination of
such individual, make current the report filed pursuant to this
paragraph by filing the information required by section 302(a)(1)(A)
with respect to income and honoraria received as of the date which
occurs 5 days before the date of such hearing. Nothing in this Act
shall prevent any congressional committee from requesting, as a
condition of confirmation, any additional financial information from
any Presidential nominee whose nomination has been referred to that
committee.
``(2) An individual whom the President or the President-elect has
publicly announced he intends to nominate to a position may file the
report required by paragraph (1) at any time after that public
announcement, but not later than is required under the first sentence
of such paragraph.
``(c) Any individual who is an officer or employee described in
subsection (e) during any calendar year and performs the duties of his
position or office for a period in excess of 60 days in that calendar
year shall file on or before May 15 of the succeeding year a report
containing the information described in section 302(a).
``(d) Any individual who occupies a position described in subsection
(e) shall, on or before the 30th day after termination of employment in
such position, file a report containing the information described in
section 302(a) covering the preceding calendar year if the report
required by subsection (c) has not been filed and covering the portion
of the calendar year in which such termination occurs up to the date
the individual left such office or position, unless such individual has
accepted employment in or takes the oath of office for another position
described in subsection (e) or section 101(f).
``(e) The officers and employees referred to in subsections (a), (c),
and (d) are those employed in or under--
``(1) the Office of the National Intelligence Director; or
``(2) an element of the intelligence community, as defined in
section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
401a(4)).
``(f)(1) Reasonable extensions of time for filing any report may be
granted under procedures prescribed by the Office of Government Ethics,
but the total of such extensions shall not exceed 90 days.
``(2)(A) In the case of an individual who is serving in the Armed
Forces, or serving in support of the Armed Forces, in an area while
that area is designated by the President by Executive order as a combat
zone for purposes of section 112 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986,
the date for the filing of any report shall be extended so that the
date is 180 days after the later of--
``(i) the last day of the individual's service in
such area during such designated period; or
``(ii) the last day of the individual's
hospitalization as a result of injury received or
disease contracted while serving in such area.
``(B) The Office of Government Ethics, in consultation with the
Secretary of Defense, may prescribe procedures under this paragraph.
``(g) The Director of the Office of Government Ethics may grant a
publicly available request for a waiver of any reporting requirement
under this title with respect to an individual if the Director
determines that--
``(1) such individual is not a full-time employee of the
Government;
``(2) such individual is able to provide special services
needed by the Government;
``(3) it is unlikely that such individual's outside
employment or financial interests will create a conflict of
interest; and
``(4) public financial disclosure by such individual is not
necessary in the circumstances.
``(h)(1) The Director of the Office of Government Ethics may
establish procedures under which an incoming individual can take
actions to avoid conflicts of interest while in office if the
individual has holdings or other financial interests that raise
conflict concerns.
``(2) The actions referenced in paragraph (1) may include, but are
not limited to, signed agreements with the individual's employing
agency, the establishment of blind trusts, or requirements for
divesting interests or holdings while in office.

``SEC. 302. CONTENTS OF REPORTS.

``(a) Each report filed pursuant to section 301 (c) and (d) shall
include a full and complete statement with respect to the following:
``(1)(A) The source, description, and category of value of
income (other than income referred to in subparagraph (B)) from
any source (other than from current employment by the United
States Government), received during the preceding calendar
year, aggregating more than $500 in value, except that
honoraria received during Government service by an officer or
employee shall include, in addition to the source, the exact
amount and the date it was received.
``(B) The source and description of investment income which
may include but is not limited to dividends, rents, interest,
and capital gains, received during the preceding calendar year
which exceeds $500 in amount or value.
``(C) The categories for reporting the amount for income
covered in subparagraphs (A) and (B) are--
``(i) greater than $500 but not more than $20,000;
``(ii) greater than $20,000 but not more than
$100,000;
``(iii) greater than $100,000 but not more than
$1,000,000;
``(iv) greater than $1,000,000 but not more than
$2,500,000; and
``(v) greater than $2,500,000.
``(2)(A) The identity of the source, a brief description, and
the value of all gifts aggregating more than the minimal value
as established by section 7342(a)(5) of title 5, United States
Code, or $250, whichever is greater, received from any source
other than a relative of the reporting individual during the
preceding calendar year, except that any food, lodging, or
entertainment received as personal hospitality of an individual
need not be reported, and any gift with a fair market value of
$100 or less, as adjusted at the same time and by the same
percentage as the minimal value is adjusted, need not be
aggregated for purposes of this subparagraph.
``(B) The identity of the source and a brief description
(including dates of travel and nature of expenses provided) of
reimbursements received from any source aggregating more than
the minimal value as established by section 7342(a)(5) of title
5, United States Code, or $250, whichever is greater and
received during the preceding calendar year.
``(3) The identity and category of value of any interest in
property held during the preceding calendar year in a trade or
business, or for investment or the production of income, which
has a fair market value which exceeds $5,000 as of the close of
the preceding calendar year, excluding any personal liability
owed to the reporting individual by a spouse, or by a parent,
brother, sister, or child of the reporting individual or of the
reporting individual's spouse, or any deposit accounts
aggregating $100,000 or less in a financial institution, or any
Federal Government securities aggregating $100,000 or less.
``(4) The identity and category of value of the total
liabilities owed to any creditor other than a spouse, or a
parent, brother, sister, or child of the reporting individual
or of the reporting individual's spouse which exceed $20,000 at
any time during the preceding calendar year, excluding--
``(A) any mortgage secured by real property which is
a personal residence of the reporting individual or his
spouse; and
``(B) any loan secured by a personal motor vehicle,
household furniture, or appliances, which loan does not
exceed the purchase price of the item which secures it.
With respect to revolving charge accounts, only those with an
outstanding liability which exceeds $20,000 as of the close of
the preceding calendar year need be reported under this
paragraph. Notwithstanding the preceding sentence, individuals
required to file pursuant to section 301(b) shall also report
the aggregate sum of the outstanding balances of all revolving
charge accounts as of any date that is within 30 days of the
date of filing if the aggregate sum of those balances exceeds
$20,000.
``(5) Except as provided in this paragraph, a brief
description of any real property, other than property used
solely as a personal residence of the reporting individual or
his spouse, or stocks, bonds, commodities futures, and other
forms of securities, if--
``(A) purchased, sold, or exchanged during the
preceding calendar year;
``(B) the value of the transaction exceeded $5,000;
and
``(C) the property or security is not already
required to be reported as a source of income pursuant
to paragraph (1)(B) or as an asset pursuant to
paragraph (3).
``(6)(A) The identity of all positions held on or before the
date of filing during the current calendar year (and, for the
first report filed by an individual, during the 1-year period
preceding such calendar year) as an officer, director, trustee,
partner, proprietor, representative, employee, or consultant of
any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business
enterprise, any nonprofit organization, any labor organization,
or any educational or other institution other than the United
States Government. This subparagraph shall not require the
reporting of positions held in any religious, social,
fraternal, or political entity and positions solely of an
honorary nature.
``(B) If any person, other than a person reported as a source
of income under paragraph (1)(A) or the United States
Government, paid a nonelected reporting individual compensation
in excess of $25,000 in the calendar year in which, or the
calendar year prior to the calendar year in which, the
individual files his first report under this title, the
individual shall include in the report--
``(i) the identity of each source of such
compensation; and
``(ii) a brief description of the nature of the
duties performed or services rendered by the reporting
individual for each such source.
The preceding sentence shall not require any individual to include in
such report any information which is considered confidential as a
result of a privileged relationship, established by law, between such
individual and any person or any information which the person for whom
the services are provided has a reasonable expectation of privacy, nor
shall it require an individual to report any information with respect
to any person for whom services were provided by any firm or
association of which such individual was a member, partner, or employee
unless such individual was directly involved in the provision of such
services.
``(7) A description of parties to and terms of any agreement
or arrangement with respect to (A) future employment; (B) a
leave of absence during the period of the reporting
individual's Government service; (C) continuation of payments
by a former employer other than the United States Government;
and (D) continuing participation in an employee welfare or
benefit plan maintained by a former employer. The description
of any formal agreement for future employment shall include the
date on which that agreement was entered into.
``(8) The category of the total cash value of any interest of
the reporting individual in a qualified blind trust.
``(b)(1) Each report filed pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) of
section 301 shall include a full and complete statement with respect to
the information required by--
``(A) paragraphs (1) and (6) of subsection (a) for the year
of filing and the preceding calendar year,
``(B) paragraphs (3) and (4) of subsection (a) as of the date
specified in the report but which is less than 31 days before
the filing date, and
``(C) paragraph (7) of subsection (a) as of the filing date
but for periods described in such paragraph.
``(2)(A) In lieu of filling out 1 or more schedules of a financial
disclosure form, an individual may supply the required information in
an alternative format, pursuant to either rules adopted by the Office
of Government Ethics or pursuant to a specific written determination by
the Director of the Office of Government Ethics for a reporting
individual.
``(B) In lieu of indicating the category of amount or value of any
item contained in any report filed under this title, a reporting
individual may indicate the exact dollar amount of such item.
``(c)(1) In the case of any individual referred to in section 301(c),
the Office of Government Ethics may by regulation require a reporting
period to include any period in which the individual served as an
officer or employee described in section 301(e) and the period would
not otherwise be covered by any public report filed pursuant to this
title.
``(2) In the case of any individual referred to in section 301(d),
any reference to the preceding calendar year shall be considered also
to include that part of the calendar year of filing up to the date of
the termination of employment.
``(d)(1) The categories for reporting the amount or value of the
items covered in subsection (a)(3) are--
``(A) greater than $5,000 but not more than $15,000;
``(B) greater than $15,000 but not more than $100,000;
``(C) greater than $100,000 but not more than $1,000,000;
``(D) greater than $1,000,000 but not more than $2,500,000;
and
``(E) greater than $2,500,000.
``(2) For the purposes of subsection (a)(3) if the current value of
an interest in real property (or an interest in a real estate
partnership) is not ascertainable without an appraisal, an individual
may list (A) the date of purchase and the purchase price of the
interest in the real property, or (B) the assessed value of the real
property for tax purposes, adjusted to reflect the market value of the
property used for the assessment if the assessed value is computed at
less than 100 percent of such market value, but such individual shall
include in his report a full and complete description of the method
used to determine such assessed value, instead of specifying a category
of value pursuant to paragraph (1). If the current value of any other
item required to be reported under subsection (a)(3) is not
ascertainable without an appraisal, such individual may list the book
value of a corporation whose stock is not publicly traded, the net
worth of a business partnership, the equity value of an individually
owned business, or with respect to other holdings, any recognized
indication of value, but such individual shall include in his report a
full and complete description of the method used in determining such
value. In lieu of any value referred to in the preceding sentence, an
individual may list the assessed value of the item for tax purposes,
adjusted to reflect the market value of the item used for the
assessment if the assessed value is computed at less than 100 percent
of such market value, but a full and complete description of the method
used in determining such assessed value shall be included in the
report.
``(3) The categories for reporting the amount or value of the items
covered in paragraphs (4) and (8) of subsection (a) are--
``(A) greater than $20,000 but not more than $100,000;
``(B) greater than $100,000 but not more than $500,000;
``(C) greater than $500,000 but not more than $1,000,000; and
``(D) greater than $1,000,000.
``(e)(1) Except as provided in subparagraph (F), each report required
by section 301 shall also contain information listed in paragraphs (1)
through (5) of subsection (a) respecting the spouse or dependent child
of the reporting individual as follows:
``(A) The sources of earned income earned by a spouse
including honoraria which exceed $500 except that, with respect
to earned income if the spouse is self-employed in business or
a profession, only the nature of such business or profession
need be reported.
``(B) All information required to be reported in subsection
(a)(1)(B) with respect to investment income derived by a spouse
or dependent child.
``(C) In the case of any gifts received by a spouse or
dependent child which are not received totally independent of
the relationship of the spouse or dependent child to the
reporting individual, the identity of the source and a brief
description of gifts of transportation, lodging, food, or
entertainment and a brief description and the value of other
gifts.
``(D) In the case of any reimbursements received by a spouse
or dependent child which are not received totally independent
of the relationship of the spouse or dependent child to the
reporting individual, the identity of the source and a brief
description of each such reimbursement.
``(E) In the case of items described in paragraphs (3)
through (5) of subsection (a), all information required to be
reported under these paragraphs other than items which the
reporting individual certifies (i) represent the spouse's or
dependent child's sole financial interest or responsibility and
which the reporting individual has no knowledge of, (ii) are
not in any way, past or present, derived from the income,
assets, or activities of the reporting individual, and (iii)
that he neither derives, nor expects to derive, any financial
or economic benefit.
``(F) Reports required by subsections (a), (b), and (c) of
section 301 shall, with respect to the spouse and dependent
child of the reporting individual, only contain information
listed in paragraphs (1), (3), and (4) of subsection (a).
``(2) No report shall be required with respect to a spouse living
separate and apart from the reporting individual with the intention of
terminating the marriage or providing for permanent separation, or with
respect to any income or obligations of an individual arising from the
dissolution of his marriage or the permanent separation from his
spouse.
``(f)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), each reporting
individual shall report the information required to be reported
pursuant to subsections (a), (b), and (c) with respect to the holdings
of and the income from a trust or other financial arrangement from
which income is received by, or with respect to which a beneficial
interest in principal or income is held by, such individual, his
spouse, or any dependent child.
``(2) A reporting individual need not report the holdings of or the
source of income from any of the holdings of--
``(A) any qualified blind trust (as defined in paragraph
(3));
``(B) a trust--
``(i) which was not created directly by such
individual, his spouse, or any dependent child, and
``(ii) the holdings or sources of income of which
such individual, his spouse, and any dependent child
have no knowledge; or
``(C) an entity described under the provisions of paragraph
(8), but such individual shall report the category of the
amount of income received by him, his spouse, or any dependent
child from the entity under subsection (a)(1)(B).
``(3) For purposes of this subsection, the term `qualified blind
trust' includes any trust in which a reporting individual, his spouse,
or any minor or dependent child has a beneficial interest in the
principal or income, and which meets the following requirements:
``(A)(i) The trustee of the trust and any other entity
designated in the trust instrument to perform fiduciary duties
is a financial institution, an attorney, a certified public
accountant, a broker, or an investment advisor who--
``(I) is independent of and not associated with any
interested party so that the trustee or other person
cannot be controlled or influenced in the
administration of the trust by any interested party;
``(II) is not and has not been an employee of or
affiliated with any interested party and is not a
partner of, or involved in any joint venture or other
investment with, any interested party; and
``(III) is not a relative of any interested party.
``(ii) Any officer or employee of a trustee or other entity
who is involved in the management or control of the trust--
``(I) is independent of and not associated with any
interested party so that such officer or employee
cannot be controlled or influenced in the
administration of the trust by any interested party;
``(II) is not a partner of, or involved in any joint
venture or other investment with, any interested party;
and
``(III) is not a relative of any interested party.
``(B) Any asset transferred to the trust by an interested
party is free of any restriction with respect to its transfer
or sale unless such restriction is expressly approved by the
Office of Government Ethics.
``(C) The trust instrument which establishes the trust
provides that--
``(i) except to the extent provided in subparagraph
(B), the trustee in the exercise of his authority and
discretion to manage and control the assets of the
trust shall not consult or notify any interested party;
``(ii) the trust shall not contain any asset the
holding of which by an interested party is prohibited
by any law or regulation;
``(iii) the trustee shall promptly notify the
reporting individual and the Office of Government
Ethics when the holdings of any particular asset
transferred to the trust by any interested party are
disposed of or when the value of such holding is less
than $1,000;
``(iv) the trust tax return shall be prepared by the
trustee or his designee, and such return and any
information relating thereto (other than the trust
income summarized in appropriate categories necessary
to complete an interested party's tax return), shall
not be disclosed to any interested party;
``(v) an interested party shall not receive any
report on the holdings and sources of income of the
trust, except a report at the end of each calendar
quarter with respect to the total cash value of the
interest of the interested party in the trust or the
net income or loss of the trust or any reports
necessary to enable the interested party to complete an
individual tax return required by law or to provide the
information required by subsection (a)(1) of this
section, but such report shall not identify any asset
or holding;
``(vi) except for communications which solely consist
of requests for distributions of cash or other
unspecified assets of the trust, there shall be no
direct or indirect communication between the trustee
and an interested party with respect to the trust
unless such communication is in writing and unless it
relates only (I) to the general financial interest and
needs of the interested party (including, but not
limited to, an interest in maximizing income or long-
term capital gain), (II) to the notification of the
trustee of a law or regulation subsequently applicable
to the reporting individual which prohibits the
interested party from holding an asset, which
notification directs that the asset not be held by the
trust, or (III) to directions to the trustee to sell
all of an asset initially placed in the trust by an
interested party which in the determination of the
reporting individual creates a conflict of interest or
the appearance thereof due to the subsequent assumption
of duties by the reporting individual (but nothing
herein shall require any such direction); and
``(vii) the interested parties shall make no effort
to obtain information with respect to the holdings of
the trust, including obtaining a copy of any trust tax
return filed or any information relating thereto except
as otherwise provided in this subsection.
``(D) The proposed trust instrument and the proposed trustee
is approved by the Office of Government Ethics.
``(E) For purposes of this subsection, `interested party'
means a reporting individual, his spouse, and any minor or
dependent child; `broker' has the meaning set forth in section
3(a)(4) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.
78c(a)(4)); and `investment adviser' includes any investment
adviser who, as determined under regulations prescribed by the
supervising ethics office, is generally involved in his role as
such an adviser in the management or control of trusts.
``(4)(A) An asset placed in a trust by an interested party shall be
considered a financial interest of the reporting individual, for the
purposes of any applicable conflict of interest statutes, regulations,
or rules of the Federal Government (including section 208 of title 18,
United States Code), until such time as the reporting individual is
notified by the trustee that such asset has been disposed of, or has a
value of less than $1,000.
``(B)(i) The provisions of subparagraph (A) shall not apply with
respect to a trust created for the benefit of a reporting individual,
or the spouse, dependent child, or minor child of such a person, if the
Office of Government Ethics finds that--
``(I) the assets placed in the trust consist of a well-
diversified portfolio of readily marketable securities;
``(II) none of the assets consist of securities of entities
having substantial activities in the area of the reporting
individual's primary area of responsibility;
``(III) the trust instrument prohibits the trustee,
notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (3)(C) (iii) and
(iv), from making public or informing any interested party of
the sale of any securities;
``(IV) the trustee is given power of attorney,
notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (3)(C)(v), to
prepare on behalf of any interested party the personal income
tax returns and similar returns which may contain information
relating to the trust; and
``(V) except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, the
trust instrument provides (or in the case of a trust which by
its terms does not permit amendment, the trustee, the reporting
individual, and any other interested party agree in writing)
that the trust shall be administered in accordance with the
requirements of this subsection and the trustee of such trust
meets the requirements of paragraph (3)(A).
``(ii) In any instance covered by subparagraph (B) in which the
reporting individual is an individual whose nomination is being
considered by a congressional committee, the reporting individual shall
inform the congressional committee considering his nomination before or
during the period of such individual's confirmation hearing of his
intention to comply with this paragraph.
``(5)(A) The reporting individual shall, within 30 days after a
qualified blind trust is approved by the Office of Government Ethics,
file with such office a copy of--
``(i) the executed trust instrument of such trust (other than
those provisions which relate to the testamentary disposition
of the trust assets), and
``(ii) a list of the assets which were transferred to such
trust, including the category of value of each asset as
determined under subsection (d).
This subparagraph shall not apply with respect to a trust meeting the
requirements for being considered a qualified blind trust under
paragraph (7).
``(B) The reporting individual shall, within 30 days of transferring
an asset (other than cash) to a previously established qualified blind
trust, notify the Office of Government Ethics of the identity of each
such asset and the category of value of each asset as determined under
subsection (d) of this section.
``(C) Within 30 days of the dissolution of a qualified blind trust, a
reporting individual shall notify the Office of Government Ethics of
such dissolution.
``(D) Documents filed under subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C) and the
lists provided by the trustee of assets placed in the trust by an
interested party which have been sold shall be made available to the
public in the same manner as a report is made available under section
305 and the provisions of that section shall apply with respect to such
documents and lists.
``(E) A copy of each written communication with respect to the trust
under paragraph (3)(C)(vi) shall be filed by the person initiating the
communication with the Office of Government Ethics within 5 days of the
date of the communication.
``(6)(A) A trustee of a qualified blind trust shall not knowingly and
willfully, or negligently, (i) disclose any information to an
interested party with respect to such trust that may not be disclosed
under paragraph (3); (ii) acquire any holding the ownership of which is
prohibited by the trust instrument; (iii) solicit advice from any
interested party with respect to such trust, which solicitation is
prohibited by paragraph (3) or the trust agreement; or (iv) fail to
file any document required by this subsection.
``(B) A reporting individual shall not knowingly and willfully, or
negligently, (i) solicit or receive any information with respect to a
qualified blind trust of which he is an interested party that may not
be disclosed under paragraph (3)(C) or (ii) fail to file any document
required by this subsection.
``(C)(i) The Attorney General may bring a civil action in any
appropriate United States district court against any individual who
knowingly and willfully violates the provisions of subparagraph (A) or
(B). The court in which such action is brought may assess against such
individual a civil penalty in any amount not to exceed $10,000.
``(ii) The Attorney General may bring a civil action in any
appropriate United States district court against any individual who
negligently violates the provisions of subparagraph (A) or (B). The
court in which such action is brought may assess against such
individual a civil penalty in any amount not to exceed $5,000.
``(7) Any trust may be considered to be a qualified blind trust if--
``(A) the trust instrument is amended to comply with the
requirements of paragraph (3) or, in the case of a trust
instrument which does not by its terms permit amendment, the
trustee, the reporting individual, and any other interested
party agree in writing that the trust shall be administered in
accordance with the requirements of this subsection and the
trustee of such trust meets the requirements of paragraph
(3)(A); except that in the case of any interested party who is
a dependent child, a parent or guardian of such child may
execute the agreement referred to in this subparagraph;
``(B) a copy of the trust instrument (except testamentary
provisions) and a copy of the agreement referred to in
subparagraph (A), and a list of the assets held by the trust at
the time of approval by the Office of Government Ethics,
including the category of value of each asset as determined
under subsection (d), are filed with such office and made
available to the public as provided under paragraph (5)(D); and
``(C) the Director of the Office of Government Ethics
determines that approval of the trust arrangement as a
qualified blind trust is in the particular case appropriate to
assure compliance with applicable laws and regulations.
``(8) A reporting individual shall not be required to report the
financial interests held by a widely held investment fund (whether such
fund is a mutual fund, regulated investment company, pension or
deferred compensation plan, or other investment fund), if--
``(A)(i) the fund is publicly traded; or
``(ii) the assets of the fund are widely diversified; and
``(B) the reporting individual neither exercises control over
nor has the ability to exercise control over the financial
interests held by the fund.
``(9)(A)(i) A reporting individual described in subsection (a) or (b)
of section 301 shall not be required to report the holdings or sources
of income of any trust or investment fund where--
``(I) reporting would result in the disclosure of assets or
sources of income of another person whose interests are not
required to be reported by the reporting individual under this
title;
``(II) the disclosure of such assets and sources of income is
prohibited by contract or the assets and sources of income are
not otherwise publicly available; and
``(III) the reporting individual has executed a written
ethics agreement which contains a general description of the
trust or investment fund and a commitment to divest the
interest in the trust or investment fund not later than 90 days
after the date of the agreement.
``(ii) An agreement described under clause (i)(III) shall be attached
to the public financial disclosure which would otherwise include a
listing of the holdings or sources of income from this trust or
investment fund.
``(B)(i) The provisions of subparagraph (A) shall apply to an
individual described in subsection (c) or (d) of section 301 if--
``(I) the interest in the trust or investment fund is
acquired involuntarily during the period to be covered by the
report, such as through marriage or inheritance, and
``(II) for an individual described in subsection (c), the
individual executes a written ethics agreement containing a
commitment to divest the interest no later than 90 days after
the date on which the report is due.
``(ii) An agreement described under clause (i)(II) shall be attached
to the public financial disclosure which would otherwise include a
listing of the holdings or sources of income from this trust or
investment fund.
``(iii) Failure to divest within the time specified or after an
extension granted by the Director of the Office of Government Ethics
for good cause shown shall result in an immediate requirement to report
as specified in paragraph (1).
``(g) Political campaign funds, including campaign receipts and
expenditures, need not be included in any report filed pursuant to this
title.
``(h) A report filed pursuant to subsection (a), (c), or (d) of
section 301 need not contain the information described in subparagraphs
(A), (B), and (C) of subsection (a)(2) with respect to gifts and
reimbursements received in a period when the reporting individual was
not an officer or employee of the Federal Government.
``(i) A reporting individual shall not be required under this title
to report--
``(1) financial interests in or income derived from--
``(A) any retirement system under title 5, United
States Code (including the Thrift Savings Plan under
subchapter III of chapter 84 of such title); or
``(B) any other retirement system maintained by the
United States for officers or employees of the United
States, including the President, or for members of the
uniformed services; or
``(2) benefits received under the Social Security Act (42
U.S.C. 301 et seq.).
``(j)(1) Every month, each designated agency ethics officer shall
submit to the Office of Government Ethics notification of any waiver of
criminal conflict of interest laws granted to any individual in the
preceding month with respect to a filing under this title that is not
confidential.
``(2) Every month, the Office of Government Ethics shall make
publicly available on the Internet--
``(A) all notifications of waivers submitted under paragraph
(1) in the preceding month; and
``(B) notification of all waivers granted by the Office of
Government Ethics in the preceding month.
``(k) A full copy of any waiver of criminal conflict of interest laws
granted shall be included with any filing required under this title
with respect to the year in which the waiver is granted.
``(l) The Office of Government Ethics shall provide upon request any
waiver on file for which notice has been published.

``SEC. 303. FILING OF REPORTS.

``(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, the reports
required under this title shall be filed by the reporting individual
with the designated agency ethics official at the agency by which he is
employed (or in the case of an individual described in section 301(d),
was employed) or in which he will serve. The date any report is
received (and the date of receipt of any supplemental report) shall be
noted on such report by such official.
``(b) Reports required to be filed under this title by the Director
of the Office of Government Ethics shall be filed in the Office of
Government Ethics and, immediately after being filed, shall be made
available to the public in accordance with this title.
``(c) Reports required of members of the uniformed services shall be
filed with the Secretary concerned.
``(d) The Office of Government Ethics shall develop and make
available forms for reporting the information required by this title.

``SEC. 304. FAILURE TO FILE OR FILING FALSE REPORTS.

``(a) The Attorney General may bring a civil action in any
appropriate United States district court against any individual who
knowingly and willfully falsifies or who knowingly and willfully fails
to file or report any information that such individual is required to
report pursuant to section 302. The court in which such action is
brought may assess against such individual a civil penalty in any
amount, not to exceed $10,000.
``(b) The head of each agency, each Secretary concerned, or the
Director of the Office of Government Ethics, as the case may be, shall
refer to the Attorney General the name of any individual which such
official has reasonable cause to believe has willfully failed to file a
report or has willfully falsified or willfully failed to file
information required to be reported.
``(c) The President, the Vice President, the Secretary concerned, or
the head of each agency may take any appropriate personnel or other
action in accordance with applicable law or regulation against any
individual failing to file a report or falsifying or failing to report
information required to be reported.
``(d)(1) Any individual who files a report required to be filed under
this title more than 30 days after the later of--
``(A) the date such report is required to be filed pursuant
to the provisions of this title and the rules and regulations
promulgated thereunder; or
``(B) if a filing extension is granted to such individual
under section 301(g), the last day of the filing extension
period, shall, at the direction of and pursuant to regulations
issued by the Office of Government Ethics, pay a filing fee of
$500. All such fees shall be deposited in the miscellaneous
receipts of the Treasury. The authority under this paragraph to
direct the payment of a filing fee may be delegated by the
Office of Government Ethics to other agencies in the executive
branch.
``(2) The Office of Government Ethics may waive the filing fee under
this subsection for good cause shown.

``SEC. 305. CUSTODY OF AND PUBLIC ACCESS TO REPORTS.

``Any report filed with or transmitted to an agency or the Office of
Government Ethics pursuant to this title shall be retained by such
agency or Office, as the case may be, for a period of 6 years after
receipt of the report. After such 6-year period the report shall be
destroyed unless needed in an ongoing investigation, except that in the
case of an individual who filed the report pursuant to section 301(b)
and was not subsequently confirmed by the Senate, such reports shall be
destroyed 1 year after the individual is no longer under consideration
by the Senate, unless needed in an ongoing investigation.

``SEC. 306. REVIEW OF REPORTS.

``(a) Each designated agency ethics official or Secretary concerned
shall make provisions to ensure that each report filed with him under
this title is reviewed within 60 days after the date of such filing,
except that the Director of the Office of Government Ethics shall
review only those reports required to be transmitted to him under this
title within 60 days after the date of transmittal.
``(b)(1) If after reviewing any report under subsection (a), the
Director of the Office of Government Ethics, the Secretary concerned,
or the designated agency ethics official, as the case may be, is of the
opinion that on the basis of information contained in such report the
individual submitting such report is in compliance with applicable laws
and regulations, he shall state such opinion on the report, and shall
sign such report.
``(2) If the Director of the Office of Government Ethics, the
Secretary concerned, or the designated agency ethics official after
reviewing any report under subsection (a)--
``(A) believes additional information is required to be
submitted to complete the form or to perform a conflict of
interest analysis, he shall notify the individual submitting
such report what additional information is required and the
time by which it must be submitted, or
``(B) is of the opinion, on the basis of information
submitted, that the individual is not in compliance with
applicable laws and regulations, he shall notify the
individual, afford a reasonable opportunity for a written or
oral response, and after consideration of such response, reach
an opinion as to whether or not, on the basis of information
submitted, the individual is in compliance with such laws and
regulations.
``(3) If the Director of the Office of Government Ethics, the
Secretary concerned, or the designated agency ethics official reaches
an opinion under paragraph (2)(B) that an individual is not in
compliance with applicable laws and regulations, the official shall
notify the individual of that opinion and, after an opportunity for
personal consultation (if practicable), determine and notify the
individual of which steps, if any, would in the opinion of such
official be appropriate for assuring compliance with such laws and
regulations and the date by which such steps should be taken. Such
steps may include, as appropriate--
``(A) divestiture,
``(B) restitution,
``(C) the establishment of a blind trust,
``(D) request for an exemption under section 208(b) of title
18, United States Code, or
``(E) voluntary request for transfer, reassignment,
limitation of duties, or resignation.
The use of any such steps shall be in accordance with such rules or
regulations as the Office of Government Ethics may prescribe.
``(4) If steps for assuring compliance with applicable laws and
regulations are not taken by the date set under paragraph (3) by a
member of the Foreign Service or the uniformed services, the Secretary
concerned shall take appropriate action.
``(5) If steps for assuring compliance with applicable laws and
regulations are not taken by the date set under paragraph (3) by any
other officer or employee, the matter shall be referred to the head of
the appropriate agency for appropriate action.
``(6) The Office of Government Ethics may render advisory opinions
interpreting this title. Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
the individual to whom a public advisory opinion is rendered in
accordance with this paragraph, and any other individual covered by
this title who is involved in a fact situation which is
indistinguishable in all material aspects, and who acts in good faith
in accordance with the provisions and findings of such advisory opinion
shall not, as a result of such act, be subject to any penalty or
sanction provided by this title.

``SEC. 307. CONFIDENTIAL REPORTS AND OTHER ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS.

``(a)(1) The Office of Government Ethics may require officers and
employees of the executive branch (including special Government
employees as defined in section 202 of title 18, United States Code) to
file confidential financial disclosure reports, in such form as it may
prescribe. The information required to be reported under this
subsection by the officers and employees of any department or agency
listed in section 301(e) shall be set forth in rules or regulations
prescribed by the Office of Government Ethics, and may be less
extensive than otherwise required by this title, or more extensive when
determined by the Office of Government Ethics to be necessary and
appropriate in light of sections 202 through 209 of title 18, United
States Code, regulations promulgated thereunder, or the authorized
activities of such officers or employees. Any individual required to
file a report pursuant to section 301 shall not be required to file a
confidential report pursuant to this subsection, except with respect to
information which is more extensive than information otherwise required
by this title. Section 305 shall not apply with respect to any such
report.
``(2) Any information required to be provided by an individual under
this subsection shall be confidential and shall not be disclosed to the
public.
``(3) Nothing in this subsection exempts any individual otherwise
covered by the requirement to file a public financial disclosure report
under this title from such requirement.
``(b) The provisions of this title requiring the reporting of
information shall supersede any general requirement under any other
provision of law or regulation with respect to the reporting of
information required for purposes of preventing conflicts of interest
or apparent conflicts of interest. Such provisions of this title shall
not supersede the requirements of section 7342 of title 5, United
States Code.
``(c) Nothing in this Act requiring reporting of information shall be
deemed to authorize the receipt of income, gifts, or reimbursements;
the holding of assets, liabilities, or positions; or the participation
in transactions that are prohibited by law, Executive order, rule, or
regulation.

``SEC. 308. AUTHORITY OF COMPTROLLER GENERAL.

``The Comptroller General shall have access to financial disclosure
reports filed under this title for the purposes of carrying out his
statutory responsibilities.

``SEC. 309. DEFINITIONS.

``For the purposes of this title--
``(1) the term `dependent child' means, when used with
respect to any reporting individual, any individual who is a
son, daughter, stepson, or stepdaughter and who--
``(A) is unmarried and under age 21 and is living in
the household of such reporting individual; or
``(B) is a dependent of such reporting individual
within the meaning of section 152 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986 (26 U.S.C. 152);
``(2) the term `designated agency ethics official' means an
officer or employee who is designated to administer the
provisions of this title within an agency;
``(3) the term `executive branch' includes--
``(A) each Executive agency (as defined in section
105 of title 5, United States Code), other than the
General Accounting Office; and
``(B) any other entity or administrative unit in the
executive branch;
``(4) the term `gift' means a payment, advance, forbearance,
rendering, or deposit of money, or any thing of value, unless
consideration of equal or greater value is received by the
donor, but does not include--
``(A) bequests and other forms of inheritance;
``(B) suitable mementos of a function honoring the
reporting individual;
``(C) food, lodging, transportation, and
entertainment provided by a foreign government within a
foreign country or by the United States Government, the
District of Columbia, or a State or local government or
political subdivision thereof;
``(D) food and beverages which are not consumed in
connection with a gift of overnight lodging;
``(E) communications to the offices of a reporting
individual, including subscriptions to newspapers and
periodicals; or
``(F) items that are accepted pursuant to or are
required to be reported by the reporting individual
under section 7342 of title 5, United States Code.
``(5) the term `honorarium' means a payment of money or
anything of value for an appearance, speech, or article;
``(6) the term `income' means all income from whatever source
derived, including but not limited to the following items:
compensation for services, including fees, commissions, and
similar items; gross income derived from business (and net
income if the individual elects to include it); gains derived
from dealings in property; interest; rents; royalties; prizes
and awards; dividends; annuities; income from life insurance
and endowment contracts; pensions; income from discharge of
indebtedness; distributive share of partnership income; and
income from an interest in an estate or trust;
``(7) the term `personal hospitality of any individual' means
hospitality extended for a nonbusiness purpose by an
individual, not a corporation or organization, at the personal
residence of that individual or his family or on property or
facilities owned by that individual or his family;
``(8) the term `reimbursement' means any payment or other
thing of value received by the reporting individual, other than
gifts, to cover travel-related expenses of such individual
other than those which are--
``(A) provided by the United States Government, the
District of Columbia, or a State or local government or
political subdivision thereof;
``(B) required to be reported by the reporting
individual under section 7342 of title 5, United States
Code; or
``(C) required to be reported under section 304 of
the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C.
434);
``(9) the term `relative' means an individual who is related
to the reporting individual, as father, mother, son, daughter,
brother, sister, uncle, aunt, great aunt, great uncle, first
cousin, nephew, niece, husband, wife, grandfather, grandmother,
grandson, granddaughter, father-in-law, mother-in-law, son-in-
law, daughter-in-law, brother-in-law, sister-in-law,
stepfather, stepmother, stepson, stepdaughter, stepbrother,
stepsister, half brother, half sister, or who is the
grandfather or grandmother of the spouse of the reporting
individual, and shall be deemed to include the fiance or
fiancee of the reporting individual;
``(10) the term `Secretary concerned' has the meaning set
forth in section 101(a)(9) of title 10, United States Code; and
``(11) the term `value' means a good faith estimate of the
dollar value if the exact value is neither known nor easily
obtainable by the reporting individual.

``SEC. 310. NOTICE OF ACTIONS TAKEN TO COMPLY WITH ETHICS AGREEMENTS.

``(a) In any case in which an individual agrees with that
individual's designated agency ethics official, the Office of
Government Ethics, or a Senate confirmation committee, to take any
action to comply with this Act or any other law or regulation governing
conflicts of interest of, or establishing standards of conduct
applicable with respect to, officers or employees of the Government,
that individual shall notify in writing the designated agency ethics
official, the Office of Government Ethics, or the appropriate committee
of the Senate, as the case may be, of any action taken by the
individual pursuant to that agreement. Such notification shall be made
not later than the date specified in the agreement by which action by
the individual must be taken, or not later than 3 months after the date
of the agreement, if no date for action is so specified. If all actions
agreed to have not been completed by the date of this notification,
such notification shall continue on a monthly basis thereafter until
the individual has met the terms of the agreement.
``(b) If an agreement described in subsection (a) requires that the
individual recuse himself or herself from particular categories of
agency or other official action, the individual shall reduce to writing
those subjects regarding which the recusal agreement will apply and the
process by which it will be determined whether the individual must
recuse himself or herself in a specific instance. An individual shall
be considered to have complied with the requirements of subsection (a)
with respect to such recusal agreement if such individual files a copy
of the document setting forth the information described in the
preceding sentence with such individual's designated agency ethics
official or the Office of Government Ethics within the time prescribed
in the penultimate sentence of subsection (a).

``SEC. 311. ADMINISTRATION OF PROVISIONS.

``The Office of Government Ethics shall issue regulations, develop
forms, and provide such guidance as is necessary to implement and
interpret this title.''.
(b) Exemption From Public Access to Financial Disclosures.--Section
105(a)(1) of such Act is amended by inserting ``the Office of the
National Intelligence Director,'' before ``the Central Intelligence
Agency''.
(c) Conforming Amendment.--Section 101(f) of such Act is amended--
(1) in paragraph (12), by striking the period at the end and
inserting a semicolon; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``but do not include any officer or employee of any department or
agency listed in section 301(e).''.

SEC. 5044. REDUCTION OF POSITIONS REQUIRING APPOINTMENT WITH SENATE
CONFIRMATION.

(a) Definition.--In this section, the term ``agency'' means an
Executive agency, as defined under section 105 of title 5, United
States Code.
(b) Reduction Plan.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, the head of each agency shall submit a
Presidential appointment reduction plan to--
(A) the President;
(B) the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the
Senate; and
(C) the Committee on Government Reform of the House
of Representatives.
(2) Content.--The plan under this subsection shall provide
for the reduction of--
(A) the number of positions within that agency that
require an appointment by the President, by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate; and
(B) the number of levels of such positions within
that agency.

SEC. 5045. EFFECTIVE DATES.

(a) Section 5043.--
(1) In general.--Subject to paragraph (2), the amendments
made by section 5043 shall take effect on January 1 of the year
following the year in which occurs the date of enactment of
this Act.
(2) Later date.--If this Act is enacted on or after July 1 of
a year, the amendments made by section 301 shall take effect on
July 1 of the following year.
(b) Section 5044.--Section 5044 shall take effect on the date of
enactment of this Act.

CHAPTER 2--FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION REVITALIZATION

SEC. 5051. MANDATORY SEPARATION AGE.

(a) Civil Service Retirement System.--Section 8335(b) of title 5,
United States Code, is amended--
(1) by striking ``(b)'' and inserting ``(b)(1)''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``(2) In the case of employees of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the second sentence of paragraph (1) shall be applied by
substituting `65 years of age' for `60 years of age'. The authority to
grant exemptions in accordance with the preceding sentence shall cease
to be available after December 31, 2009.''.
(b) Federal Employees' Retirement System.--Section 8425(b) of title
5, United States Code, is amended--
(1) by striking ``(b)'' and inserting ``(b)(1)''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``(2) In the case of employees of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the second sentence of paragraph (1) shall be applied by
substituting `65 years of age' for `60 years of age'. The authority to
grant exemptions in accordance with the preceding sentence shall cease
to be available after December 31, 2009.''.

SEC. 5052. RETENTION AND RELOCATION BONUSES.

(a) In General.--Subchapter IV of chapter 57 of title 5, United
States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

``Sec. 5759. Retention and relocation bonuses for the Federal Bureau of
Investigation

``(a) Authority.--The Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, after consultation with the Director of the Office of
Personnel Management, may pay, on a case-by-case basis, a bonus under
this section to an employee of the Bureau if--
``(1)(A) the unusually high or unique qualifications of the
employee or a special need of the Bureau for the employee's
services makes it essential to retain the employee; and
``(B) the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
determines that, in the absence of such a bonus, the employee
would be likely to leave--
``(i) the Federal service; or
``(ii) for a different position in the Federal
service; or
``(2) the individual is transferred to a different geographic
area with a higher cost of living (as determined by the
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation).
``(b) Service Agreement.--Payment of a bonus under this section is
contingent upon the employee entering into a written service agreement
with the Bureau to complete a period of service with the Bureau. Such
agreement shall include--
``(1) the period of service the individual shall be required
to complete in return for the bonus; and
``(2) the conditions under which the agreement may be
terminated before the agreed-upon service period has been
completed, and the effect of the termination.
``(c) Limitation on Authority.--A bonus paid under this section may
not exceed 50 percent of the employee's basic pay.
``(d) Impact on Basic Pay.--A retention bonus is not part of the
basic pay of an employee for any purpose.
``(e) Termination of Authority.--The authority to grant bonuses under
this section shall cease to be available after December 31, 2009.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The analysis for chapter 57 of title 5,
United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

``5759. Retention and relocation bonuses for the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.''.

SEC. 5053. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION RESERVE SERVICE.

(a) In General.--Chapter 35 of title 5, United States Code, is
amended by adding at the end the following:

``SUBCHAPTER VII--RETENTION OF RETIRED SPECIALIZED EMPLOYEES AT THE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

``Sec. 3598. Federal Bureau of Investigation Reserve Service

``(a) Establishment.--The Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation may provide for the establishment and training of a
Federal Bureau of Investigation Reserve Service (hereinafter in this
section referred to as the `FBI Reserve Service') for temporary
reemployment of employees in the Bureau during periods of emergency, as
determined by the Director.
``(b) Membership.--Membership in the FBI Reserve Service shall be
limited to individuals who previously served as full-time employees of
the Bureau.
``(c) Annuitants.--If an individual receiving an annuity from the
Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund on the basis of such
individual's service becomes temporarily reemployed pursuant to this
section, such annuity shall not be discontinued thereby. An individual
so reemployed shall not be considered an employee for the purposes of
chapter 83 or 84.
``(d) No Impact on Bureau Personnel Ceiling.--FBI Reserve Service
members reemployed on a temporary basis pursuant to this section shall
not count against any personnel ceiling applicable to the Bureau.
``(e) Expenses.--The Director may provide members of the FBI Reserve
Service transportation and per diem in lieu of subsistence, in
accordance with applicable provisions of this title, for the purpose of
participating in any training that relates to service as a member of
the FBI Reserve Service.
``(f) Limitation on Membership.--Membership of the FBI Reserve
Service is not to exceed 500 members at any given time.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The analysis for chapter 35 of title 5,
United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

``SUBCHAPTER VII--RETENTION OF RETIRED SPECIALIZED EMPLOYEES AT THE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

``3598. Federal Bureau of Investigation Reserve Service.''.

SEC. 5054. CRITICAL POSITIONS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE.

Section 5377(a)(2) of title 5, United States Code, is amended--
(1) by striking ``and'' at the end of subparagraph (E);
(2) by striking the period at the end of subparagraph (F) and
inserting ``; and''; and
(3) by inserting after subparagraph (F) the following:
``(G) a position at the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the primary duties and responsibilities
of which relate to intelligence functions (as
determined by the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation).''.

CHAPTER 3--MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY

SEC. 5061. MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY.

(a) Management Authority.--Section 7103(b)(1)(A) of title 5, United
States Code, is amended by adding ``homeland security,'' after
``investigative,''.
(b) Exclusionary Authority.--Section 842 of the Homeland Security Act
(Public Law 107-296; 6 U.S.C. 412) is repealed.

Subtitle F--Security Clearance Modernization

SEC. 5071. DEFINITIONS.

In this subtitle:
(1) The term ``Director'' means the National Intelligence
Director.
(2) The term ``agency'' means--
(A) an executive agency, as defined in section 105 of
title 5, United States Code;
(B) a military department, as defined in section 102
of title 5, United States Code; and
(C) elements of the intelligence community, as
defined in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).
(3) The term ``authorized investigative agency'' means an
agency authorized by law, regulation or direction of the
Director to conduct a counterintelligence investigation or
investigation of persons who are proposed for access to
classified information to ascertain whether such persons
satisfy the criteria for obtaining and retaining access to such
information.
(4) The term ``authorized adjudicative agency'' means an
agency authorized by law, regulation or direction of the
Director to determine eligibility for access to classified
information in accordance with Executive Order 12968.
(5) The term ``highly sensitive program'' means--
(A) a government program designated as a Special
Access Program (as defined by section 4.1(h) of
Executive Order 12958); and
(B) a government program that applies restrictions
required for--
(i) Restricted Data (as defined by section 11
y. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C.
2014(y)); or
(ii) other information commonly referred to
as ``Sensitive Compartmented Information''.
(6) The term ``current investigation file'' means, with
respect to a security clearance, a file on an investigation or
adjudication that has been conducted during--
(A) the 5-year period beginning on the date the
security clearance was granted, in the case of a Top
Secret Clearance, or the date access was granted to a
highly sensitive program;
(B) the 10-year period beginning on the date the
security clearance was granted in the case of a Secret
Clearance; and
(C) the 15-year period beginning on the date the
security clearance was granted in the case of a
Confidential Clearance.
(7) The term ``personnel security investigation'' means any
investigation required for the purpose of determining the
eligibility of any military, civilian, or government contractor
personnel to access classified information.
(8) The term ``periodic reinvestigations'' means--
(A) investigations conducted for the purpose of
updating a previously completed background
investigation--
(i) every five years in the case of a Top
Secret Clearance or access to a highly
sensitive program;
(ii) every 10 years in the case of a Secret
Clearance; and
(iii) every 15 years in the case of a
Confidential Clearance;
(B) on-going investigations to identify personnel
security risks as they develop, pursuant to section
105(c).
(9) The term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(A) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
and the Committees on Armed Services, Judiciary, and
Government Reform of the House of Representatives; and
(B) the Select Committee on Intelligence and the
Committees on Armed Services, Judiciary, and
Governmental Affairs of the Senate.

SEC. 5072. SECURITY CLEARANCE AND INVESTIGATIVE PROGRAMS OVERSIGHT AND
ADMINISTRATION.

The Deputy National Intelligence Director for Community Management
and Resources shall have responsibility for the following:
(1) Directing day-to-day oversight of investigations and
adjudications for personnel security clearances to highly
sensitive programs throughout the Federal Government.
(2) Developing and implementing uniform and consistent
policies and procedures to ensure the effective, efficient, and
timely completion of security clearances and determinations for
access to highly sensitive programs, including the
standardization of security questionnaires, financial
disclosure requirements for security clearance applicants, and
polygraph policies and procedures.
(3) Serving as the final authority to designate an authorized
investigative agency or authorized adjudicative agency pursuant
to section 5074(d).
(4) Ensuring reciprocal recognition of access to classified
information among agencies, including acting as the final
authority to arbitrate and resolve disputes involving the
reciprocity of security clearances and access to highly
sensitive programs.
(5) Ensuring, to the maximum extent practicable, that
sufficient resources are available in each agency to achieve
clearance and investigative program goals.
(6) Reviewing and coordinating the development of tools and
techniques for enhancing the conduct of investigations and
granting of clearances.

SEC. 5073. RECIPROCITY OF SECURITY CLEARANCE AND ACCESS DETERMINATIONS.

(a) Requirement for Reciprocity.--(1) All security clearance
background investigations and determinations completed by an authorized
investigative agency or authorized adjudicative agency shall be
accepted by all agencies.
(2) All security clearance background investigations initiated by an
authorized investigative agency shall be transferable to any other
authorized investigative agency.
(b) Prohibition on Establishing Additional Requirements.--(1) An
authorized investigative agency or authorized adjudicative agency may
not establish additional investigative or adjudicative requirements
(other than requirements for the conduct of a polygraph examination)
that exceed requirements specified in Executive Orders establishing
security requirements for access to classified information.
(2) Notwithstanding the paragraph (1), the Director may establish
additional requirements as needed for national security purposes.
(c) Prohibition on Duplicative Investigations.--An authorized
investigative agency or authorized adjudicative agency may not conduct
an investigation for purposes of determining whether to grant a
security clearance to an individual where a current investigation or
clearance of equal level already exists or has been granted by another
authorized adjudicative agency.

SEC. 5074. ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONAL DATABASE .

(a) Establishment.--Not later than 12 months after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of the Office of Personnel
Management, in cooperation with the Director, shall establish, and
begin operating and maintaining, an integrated, secure, national
database into which appropriate data relevant to the granting, denial,
or revocation of a security clearance or access pertaining to military,
civilian, or government contractor personnel shall be entered from all
authorized investigative and adjudicative agencies.
(b) Integration.--The national database established under subsection
(a) shall function to integrate information from existing Federal
clearance tracking systems from other authorized investigative and
adjudicative agencies into a single consolidated database.
(c) Requirement to Check Database.--Each authorized investigative or
adjudicative agency shall check the national database established under
subsection (a) to determine whether an individual the agency has
identified as requiring a security clearance has already been granted
or denied a security clearance, or has had a security clearance
revoked, by any other authorized investigative or adjudicative agency.
(d) Certification of Authorized Investigative Agencies or Authorized
Adjudicative Agencies.--The Director shall evaluate the extent to which
an agency is submitting information to, and requesting information
from, the national database established under subsection (a) as part of
a determination of whether to certify the agency as an authorized
investigative agency or authorized adjudicative agency.
(e) Exclusion of Certain Intelligence Operatives.--The Director may
authorize an agency to withhold information about certain individuals
from the database established under subsection (a) if the Director
determines it is necessary for national security purposes.
(f) Compliance.--The Director shall establish a review procedure by
which agencies can seek review of actions required under section 5073.
(g) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated such sums as may be necessary for fiscal year 2005 and
each subsequent fiscal year for the implementation, maintenance and
operation of the database established in subsection (a).

SEC. 5075. USE OF AVAILABLE TECHNOLOGY IN CLEARANCE INVESTIGATIONS.

(a) Investigations.--Not later than 12 months after the date of the
enactment of this Act, each authorized investigative agency that
conducts personnel security clearance investigations shall use, to the
maximum extent practicable, available information technology and
databases to expedite investigative processes and to verify standard
information submitted as part of an application for a security
clearance.
(b) Interim Clearance.--If the application of an applicant for an
interim clearance has been processed using the technology under
subsection (a), the interim clearances for the applicant at the secret,
top secret, and special access program levels may be granted before the
completion of the appropriate investigation. Any request to process an
interim clearance shall be given priority, and the authority granting
the interim clearance shall ensure that final adjudication on the
application is made within 90 days after the initial clearance is
granted.
(c) On-Going Monitoring of Individuals With Security Clearances.--(1)
Authorized investigative agencies and authorized adjudicative agencies
shall establish procedures for the regular, ongoing verification of
personnel with security clearances in effect for continued access to
classified information. Such procedures shall include the use of
available technology to detect, on a regularly recurring basis, any
issues of concern that may arise involving such personnel and such
access.
(2) Such regularly recurring verification may be used as a basis for
terminating a security clearance or access and shall be used in
periodic reinvestigations to address emerging threats and adverse
events associated with individuals with security clearances in effect
to the maximum extent practicable.
(3) If the Director certifies that the national security of the
United States is not harmed by the discontinuation of periodic
reinvestigations, the regularly recurring verification under this
section may replace periodic reinvestigations.

SEC. 5076. REDUCTION IN LENGTH OF PERSONNEL SECURITY CLEARANCE PROCESS.

(a) 60-Day Period for Determination on Clearances.--Each authorized
adjudicative agency shall make a determination on an application for a
personnel security clearance within 60 days after the date of receipt
of the completed application for a security clearance by an authorized
investigative agency. The 60-day period shall include--
(1) a period of not longer than 40 days to complete the
investigative phase of the clearance review; and
(2) a period of not longer than 20 days to complete the
adjudicative phase of the clearance review.
(b) Effective Date and Phase-in.--
(1) Effective date.--Subsection (a) shall take effect 5 years
after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(2) Phase-in.--During the period beginning on a date not
later than 2 years after the date after the enactment of this
Act and ending on the date on which subsection (a) takes effect
as specified in paragraph (1), each authorized adjudicative
agency shall make a determination on an application for a
personnel security clearance pursuant to this title within 120
days after the date of receipt of the application for a
security clearance by an authorized investigative agency. The
120-day period shall include--
(A) a period of not longer than 90 days to complete
the investigative phase of the clearance review; and
(B) a period of not longer than 30 days to complete
the adjudicative phase of the clearance review.

SEC. 5077. SECURITY CLEARANCES FOR PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION.

(a) Candidates for National Security Positions.--(1) The President-
elect shall submit to the Director the names of candidates for high-
level national security positions, for positions at the level of under
secretary of executive departments and above, as soon as possible after
the date of the general elections held to determine the electors of
President and Vice President under section 1 or 2 of title 3, United
States Code.
(2) The Director shall be responsible for the expeditious completion
of the background investigations necessary to provide appropriate
security clearances to the individuals who are candidates described
under paragraph (1) before the date of the inauguration of the
President-elect as President and the inauguration of the Vice-
President-elect as Vice President.
(b) Security Clearances for Transition Team Members.--(1) In this
section, the term ``major party'' has the meaning provided under
section 9002(6) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.
(2) Each major party candidate for President, except a candidate who
is the incumbent President, shall submit, before the date of the
general presidential election, requests for security clearances for
prospective transition team members who will have a need for access to
classified information to carry out their responsibilities as members
of the President-elect's transition team.
(3) Necessary background investigations and eligibility
determinations to permit appropriate prospective transition team
members to have access to classified information shall be completed, to
the fullest extent practicable, by the day after the date of the
general presidential election.

SEC. 5078. REPORTS.

Not later than February 15, 2006, and annually thereafter through
2016, the Director shall submit to the appropriate committees of
Congress a report on the progress made during the preceding year toward
meeting the requirements specified in this Act. The report shall
include--
(1) the periods of time required by the authorized
investigative agencies and authorized adjudicative agencies
during the year covered by the report for conducting
investigations, adjudicating cases, and granting clearances,
from date of submission to ultimate disposition and
notification to the subject and the subject's employer;
(2) a discussion of any impediments to the smooth and timely
functioning of the implementation of this title; and
(3) such other information or recommendations as the Deputy
Director deems appropriate.

Subtitle G--Emergency Financial Preparedness

SEC. 5081. DELEGATION AUTHORITY OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

Subsection (d) of section 306 of title 31, United States Code, is
amended by inserting ``or employee'' after ``another officer''.

SEC. 5082. EXTENSION OF EMERGENCY ORDER AUTHORITY OF THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION.

(a) Extension of Authority.--Paragraph (2) of section 12(k) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78l(k)(2)) is amended to
read as follows:
``(2) Emergency orders.--(A) The Commission, in an emergency,
may by order summarily take such action to alter, supplement,
suspend, or impose requirements or restrictions with respect to
any matter or action subject to regulation by the Commission or
a self-regulatory organization under the securities laws, as
the Commission determines is necessary in the public interest
and for the protection of investors--
``(i) to maintain or restore fair and orderly
securities markets (other than markets in exempted
securities);
``(ii) to ensure prompt, accurate, and safe clearance
and settlement of transactions in securities (other
than exempted securities); or
``(iii) to reduce, eliminate, or prevent the
substantial disruption by the emergency of (I)
securities markets (other than markets in exempted
securities), investment companies, or any other
significant portion or segment of such markets, or (II)
the transmission or processing of securities
transactions (other than transactions in exempted
securities).
``(B) An order of the Commission under this paragraph (2)
shall continue in effect for the period specified by the
Commission, and may be extended. Except as provided in
subparagraph (C), the Commission's action may not continue in
effect for more than 30 business days, including extensions.
``(C) An order of the Commission under this paragraph (2) may
be extended to continue in effect for more than 30 business
days if, at the time of the extension, the Commission finds
that the emergency still exists and determines that the
continuation of the order beyond 30 business days is necessary
in the public interest and for the protection of investors to
attain an objective described in clause (i), (ii), or (iii) of
subparagraph (A). In no event shall an order of the Commission
under this paragraph (2) continue in effect for more than 90
calendar days.
``(D) If the actions described in subparagraph (A) involve a
security futures product, the Commission shall consult with and
consider the views of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.
In exercising its authority under this paragraph, the
Commission shall not be required to comply with the provisions
of section 553 of title 5, United States Code, or with the
provisions of section 19(c) of this title.
``(E) Notwithstanding the exclusion of exempted securities
(and markets therein) from the Commission's authority under
subparagraph (A), the Commission may use such authority to take
action to alter, supplement, suspend, or impose requirements or
restrictions with respect to clearing agencies for transactions
in such exempted securities. In taking any action under this
subparagraph, the Commission shall consult with and consider
the views of the Secretary of the Treasury.''.
(b) Consultation; Definition of Emergency.--Section 12(k) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78l(k)) is further amended
by striking paragraph (6) and inserting the following:
``(6) Consultation.--Prior to taking any action described in
paragraph (1)(B), the Commission shall consult with and
consider the views of the Secretary of the Treasury, Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission, unless such consultation is
impracticable in light of the emergency.
``(7) Definitions.--
``(A) Emergency.--For purposes of this subsection,
the term `emergency' means--
``(i) a major market disturbance
characterized by or constituting--
``(I) sudden and excessive
fluctuations of securities prices
generally, or a substantial threat
thereof, that threaten fair and orderly
markets; or
``(II) a substantial disruption of
the safe or efficient operation of the
national system for clearance and
settlement of transactions in
securities, or a substantial threat
thereof; or
``(ii) a major disturbance that substantially
disrupts, or threatens to substantially
disrupt--
``(I) the functioning of securities
markets, investment companies, or any
other significant portion or segment of
the securities markets; or
``(II) the transmission or processing
of securities transactions.
``(B) Securities laws.--Notwithstanding section
3(a)(47), for purposes of this subsection, the term
`securities laws' does not include the Public Utility
Holding Company Act of 1935 (15 U.S.C. 79a et seq.).''.

SEC. 5083. PARALLEL AUTHORITY OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY WITH
RESPECT TO GOVERNMENT SECURITIES.

Section 15C of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78o-5)
is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(h) Emergency Authority.--The Secretary may by order take any
action with respect to a matter or action subject to regulation by the
Secretary under this section, or the rules of the Secretary thereunder,
involving a government security or a market therein (or significant
portion or segment of that market), that the Commission may take under
section 12(k)(2) of this title with respect to transactions in
securities (other than exempted securities) or a market therein (or
significant portion or segment of that market).''.

Subtitle H--Other Matters

Chapter 1--Privacy Matters

SEC. 5091. REQUIREMENT THAT AGENCY RULEMAKING TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION
IMPACTS ON INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY.

(a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the ``Federal Agency
Protection of Privacy Act of 2004''.
(b) In General.--Title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding
after section 553 the following new section:

``Sec. 553a. Privacy impact assessment in rulemaking

``(a) Initial Privacy Impact Assessment.--
``(1) In general.--Whenever an agency is required by section
553 of this title, or any other law, to publish a general
notice of proposed rulemaking for a proposed rule, or publishes
a notice of proposed rulemaking for an interpretative rule
involving the internal revenue laws of the United States, and
such rule or proposed rulemaking pertains to the collection,
maintenance, use, or disclosure of personally identifiable
information from 10 or more individuals, other than agencies,
instrumentalities, or employees of the Federal government, the
agency shall prepare and make available for public comment an
initial privacy impact assessment that describes the impact of
the proposed rule on the privacy of individuals. Such
assessment or a summary thereof shall be signed by the senior
agency official with primary responsibility for privacy policy
and be published in the Federal Register at the time of the
publication of a general notice of proposed rulemaking for the
rule.
``(2) Contents.--Each initial privacy impact assessment
required under this subsection shall contain the following:
``(A) A description and analysis of the extent to
which the proposed rule will impact the privacy
interests of individuals, including the extent to which
the proposed rule--
``(i) provides notice of the collection of
personally identifiable information, and
specifies what personally identifiable
information is to be collected and how it is to
be collected, maintained, used, and disclosed;
``(ii) allows access to such information by
the person to whom the personally identifiable
information pertains and provides an
opportunity to correct inaccuracies;
``(iii) prevents such information, which is
collected for one purpose, from being used for
another purpose; and
``(iv) provides security for such
information.
``(B) A description of any significant alternatives
to the proposed rule which accomplish the stated
objectives of applicable statutes and which minimize
any significant privacy impact of the proposed rule on
individuals.
``(b) Final Privacy Impact Assessment.--
``(1) In general.--Whenever an agency promulgates a final
rule under section 553 of this title, after being required by
that section or any other law to publish a general notice of
proposed rulemaking, or promulgates a final interpretative rule
involving the internal revenue laws of the United States, and
such rule or proposed rulemaking pertains to the collection,
maintenance, use, or disclosure of personally identifiable
information from 10 or more individuals, other than agencies,
instrumentalities, or employees of the Federal government, the
agency shall prepare a final privacy impact assessment, signed
by the senior agency official with primary responsibility for
privacy policy.
``(2) Contents.--Each final privacy impact assessment
required under this subsection shall contain the following:
``(A) A description and analysis of the extent to
which the final rule will impact the privacy interests
of individuals, including the extent to which such
rule--
``(i) provides notice of the collection of
personally identifiable information, and
specifies what personally identifiable
information is to be collected and how it is to
be collected, maintained, used, and disclosed;
``(ii) allows access to such information by
the person to whom the personally identifiable
information pertains and provides an
opportunity to correct inaccuracies;
``(iii) prevents such information, which is
collected for one purpose, from being used for
another purpose; and
``(iv) provides security for such
information.
``(B) A summary of any significant issues raised by
the public comments in response to the initial privacy
impact assessment, a summary of the analysis of the
agency of such issues, and a statement of any changes
made in such rule as a result of such issues.
``(C) A description of the steps the agency has taken
to minimize the significant privacy impact on
individuals consistent with the stated objectives of
applicable statutes, including a statement of the
factual, policy, and legal reasons for selecting the
alternative adopted in the final rule and why each one
of the other significant alternatives to the rule
considered by the agency which affect the privacy
interests of individuals was rejected.
``(3) Availability to public.--The agency shall make copies
of the final privacy impact assessment available to members of
the public and shall publish in the Federal Register such
assessment or a summary thereof.
``(c) Waivers.--
``(1) Emergencies.--An agency head may waive or delay the
completion of some or all of the requirements of subsections
(a) and (b) to the same extent as the agency head may, under
section 608, waive or delay the completion of some or all of
the requirements of sections 603 and 604, respectively.
``(2) National security.--An agency head may, for national
security reasons, or to protect from disclosure classified
information, confidential commercial information, or
information the disclosure of which may adversely affect a law
enforcement effort, waive or delay the completion of some or
all of the following requirements:
``(A) The requirement of subsection (a)(1) to make an
assessment available for public comment.
``(B) The requirement of subsection (a)(1) to have an
assessment or summary thereof published in the Federal
Register.
``(C) The requirements of subsection (b)(3).
``(d) Procedures for Gathering Comments.--When any rule is
promulgated which may have a significant privacy impact on individuals,
or a privacy impact on a substantial number of individuals, the head of
the agency promulgating the rule or the official of the agency with
statutory responsibility for the promulgation of the rule shall assure
that individuals have been given an opportunity to participate in the
rulemaking for the rule through techniques such as--
``(1) the inclusion in an advance notice of proposed
rulemaking, if issued, of a statement that the proposed rule
may have a significant privacy impact on individuals, or a
privacy impact on a substantial number of individuals;
``(2) the publication of a general notice of proposed
rulemaking in publications of national circulation likely to be
obtained by individuals;
``(3) the direct notification of interested individuals;
``(4) the conduct of open conferences or public hearings
concerning the rule for individuals, including soliciting and
receiving comments over computer networks; and
``(5) the adoption or modification of agency procedural rules
to reduce the cost or complexity of participation in the
rulemaking by individuals.
``(e) Periodic Review of Rules.--
``(1) In general.--Each agency shall carry out a periodic
review of the rules promulgated by the agency that have a
significant privacy impact on individuals, or a privacy impact
on a substantial number of individuals. Under such periodic
review, the agency shall determine, for each such rule, whether
the rule can be amended or rescinded in a manner that minimizes
any such impact while remaining in accordance with applicable
statutes. For each such determination, the agency shall
consider the following factors:
``(A) The continued need for the rule.
``(B) The nature of complaints or comments received
from the public concerning the rule.
``(C) The complexity of the rule.
``(D) The extent to which the rule overlaps,
duplicates, or conflicts with other Federal rules, and,
to the extent feasible, with State and local
governmental rules.
``(E) The length of time since the rule was last
reviewed under this subsection.
``(F) The degree to which technology, economic
conditions, or other factors have changed in the area
affected by the rule since the rule was last reviewed
under this subsection.
``(2) Plan required.--Each agency shall carry out the
periodic review required by paragraph (1) in accordance with a
plan published by such agency in the Federal Register. Each
such plan shall provide for the review under this subsection of
each rule promulgated by the agency not later than 10 years
after the date on which such rule was published as the final
rule and, thereafter, not later than 10 years after the date on
which such rule was last reviewed under this subsection. The
agency may amend such plan at any time by publishing the
revision in the Federal Register.
``(3) Annual publication.--Each year, each agency shall
publish in the Federal Register a list of the rules to be
reviewed by such agency under this subsection during the
following year. The list shall include a brief description of
each such rule and the need for and legal basis of such rule
and shall invite public comment upon the determination to be
made under this subsection with respect to such rule.
``(f) Judicial Review.--
``(1) In general.--For any rule subject to this section, an
individual who is adversely affected or aggrieved by final
agency action is entitled to judicial review of agency
compliance with the requirements of subsections (b) and (c) in
accordance with chapter 7. Agency compliance with subsection
(d) shall be judicially reviewable in connection with judicial
review of subsection (b).
``(2) Jurisdiction.--Each court having jurisdiction to review
such rule for compliance with section 553, or under any other
provision of law, shall have jurisdiction to review any claims
of noncompliance with subsections (b) and (c) in accordance
with chapter 7. Agency compliance with subsection (d) shall be
judicially reviewable in connection with judicial review of
subsection (b).
``(3) Limitations.--
``(A) An individual may seek such review during the
period beginning on the date of final agency action and
ending 1 year later, except that where a provision of
law requires that an action challenging a final agency
action be commenced before the expiration of 1 year,
such lesser period shall apply to an action for
judicial review under this subsection.
``(B) In the case where an agency delays the issuance
of a final privacy impact assessment pursuant to
subsection (c), an action for judicial review under
this section shall be filed not later than--
``(i) 1 year after the date the assessment is
made available to the public; or
``(ii) where a provision of law requires that
an action challenging a final agency regulation
be commenced before the expiration of the 1-
year period, the number of days specified in
such provision of law that is after the date
the assessment is made available to the public.
``(4) Relief.--In granting any relief in an action under this
subsection, the court shall order the agency to take corrective
action consistent with this section and chapter 7, including,
but not limited to--
``(A) remanding the rule to the agency; and
``(B) deferring the enforcement of the rule against
individuals, unless the court finds that continued
enforcement of the rule is in the public interest.
``(5) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this subsection shall
be construed to limit the authority of any court to stay the
effective date of any rule or provision thereof under any other
provision of law or to grant any other relief in addition to
the requirements of this subsection.
``(6) Record of agency action.--In an action for the judicial
review of a rule, the privacy impact assessment for such rule,
including an assessment prepared or corrected pursuant to
paragraph (4), shall constitute part of the entire record of
agency action in connection with such review.
``(7) Exclusivity.--Compliance or noncompliance by an agency
with the provisions of this section shall be subject to
judicial review only in accordance with this subsection.
``(8) Savings clause.--Nothing in this subsection bars
judicial review of any other impact statement or similar
assessment required by any other law if judicial review of such
statement or assessment is otherwise permitted by law.
``(g) Definition.--For purposes of this section, the term `personally
identifiable information' means information that can be used to
identify an individual, including such individual's name, address,
telephone number, photograph, social security number or other
identifying information. It includes information about such
individual's medical or financial condition.''.
(c) Periodic Review Transition Provisions.--
(1) Initial plan.--For each agency, the plan required by
subsection (e) of section 553a of title 5, United States Code
(as added by subsection (a)), shall be published not later than
180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(2) In the case of a rule promulgated by an agency before the
date of the enactment of this Act, such plan shall provide for
the periodic review of such rule before the expiration of the
10-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of this
Act. For any such rule, the head of the agency may provide for
a 1-year extension of such period if the head of the agency,
before the expiration of the period, certifies in a statement
published in the Federal Register that reviewing such rule
before the expiration of the period is not feasible. The head
of the agency may provide for additional 1-year extensions of
the period pursuant to the preceding sentence, but in no event
may the period exceed 15 years.
(d) Congressional Review.--Section 801(a)(1)(B) of title 5, United
States Code, is amended--
(1) by redesignating clauses (iii) and (iv) as clauses (iv)
and (v), respectively; and
(2) by inserting after clause (ii) the following new clause:
``(iii) the agency's actions relevant to section 553a;''.
(e) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the beginning of
chapter 5 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding after
the item relating to section 553 the following new item:

553a. Privacy impact assessment in rulemaking.''.

SEC. 5092. CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICERS FOR AGENCIES WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT OR
ANTI-TERRORISM FUNCTIONS.

(a) In General.--There shall be within each Federal agency with law
enforcement or anti-terrorism functions a chief privacy officer, who
shall have primary responsibility within that agency for privacy
policy. The agency chief privacy officer shall be designated by the
head of the agency.
(b) Responsibilities.--The responsibilities of each agency chief
privacy officer shall include--
(1) ensuring that the use of technologies sustains, and does
not erode, privacy protections relating to the use, collection,
and disclosure of personally identifiable information;
(2) ensuring that personally identifiable information
contained in systems of records is handled in full compliance
with fair information practices as set out in section 552a of
title 5, United States Code;
(3) evaluating legislative and regulatory proposals involving
collection, use, and disclosure of personally identifiable
information by the Federal Government;
(4) conducting a privacy impact assessment of proposed rules
of the agency on the privacy of personally identifiable
information, including the type of personally identifiable
information collected and the number of people affected;
(5) preparing and submitting a report to Congress on an
annual basis on activities of the agency that affect privacy,
including complaints of privacy violations, implementation of
section 552a of title 5, United States Code, internal controls,
and other relevant matters;
(6) ensuring that the agency protects personally identifiable
information and information systems from unauthorized access,
use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction in
order to provide--
(A) integrity, which means guarding against improper
information modification or destruction, and includes
ensuring information nonrepudiation and authenticity;
(B) confidentially, which means preserving authorized
restrictions on access and disclosure, including means
for protecting personal privacy and proprietary
information;
(C) availability, which means ensuring timely and
reliable access to and use of that information; and
(D) authentication, which means utilizing digital
credentials to assure the identity of users and
validate their access; and
(7) advising the head of the agency and the Director of the
Office of Management and Budget on information security and
privacy issues pertaining to Federal Government information
systems.

SEC. 5093. DATA-MINING REPORT.

(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Data-mining.--The term ``data-mining'' means a query or
search or other analysis of 1 or more electronic databases,
where--
(A) at least 1 of the databases was obtained from or
remains under the control of a non-Federal entity, or
the information was acquired initially by another
department or agency of the Federal Government for
purposes other than intelligence or law enforcement;
(B) the search does not use a specific individual's
personal identifiers to acquire information concerning
that individual; and
(C) a department or agency of the Federal Government
is conducting the query or search or other analysis to
find a pattern indicating terrorist or other criminal
activity.
(2) Database.--The term ``database'' does not include
telephone directories, information publicly available via the
Internet or available by any other means to any member of the
public without payment of a fee, or databases of judicial and
administrative opinions.
(b) Reports on Data-Mining Activities.--
(1) Requirement for report.--The head of each department or
agency of the Federal Government that is engaged in any
activity to use or develop data-mining technology shall each
submit a public report to Congress on all such activities of
the department or agency under the jurisdiction of that
official.
(2) Content of report.--A report submitted under paragraph
(1) shall include, for each activity to use or develop data-
mining technology that is required to be covered by the report,
the following information:
(A) A thorough description of the data-mining
technology and the data that will be used.
(B) A thorough discussion of the plans for the use of
such technology and the target dates for the deployment
of the data-mining technology.
(C) An assessment of the likely efficacy of the data-
mining technology in providing accurate and valuable
information consistent with the stated plans for the
use of the technology.
(D) An assessment of the likely impact of the
implementation of the data-mining technology on privacy
and civil liberties.
(E) A list and analysis of the laws and regulations
that govern the information to be collected, reviewed,
gathered, and analyzed with the data-mining technology
and a description of any modifications of such laws
that will be required to use the information in the
manner proposed under such program.
(F) A thorough discussion of the policies,
procedures, and guidelines that are to be developed and
applied in the use of such technology for data-mining
in order to--
(i) protect the privacy and due process
rights of individuals; and
(ii) ensure that only accurate information is
collected and used.
(G) A thorough discussion of the procedures allowing
individuals whose personal information will be used in
the data-mining technology to be informed of the use of
their personal information and what procedures are in
place to allow for individuals to opt out of the
technology, and, if no such procedures are in place, a
thorough explanation as to why not.
(H) Any necessary classified information in an annex
that shall be available to the Committee on
Governmental Affairs, the Committee on the Judiciary,
and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and
the Committee on Homeland Security, the Committee on
the Judiciary, and the Committee on Appropriations of
the House of Representatives.
(3) Time for report.--Each report required under paragraph
(1) shall be--
(A) submitted not later than 90 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act; and
(B) updated once a year and include any new data-
mining technologies.

SEC. 5094. PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD.

(a) In General.--There is established within the Executive Branch an
Independent Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (referred to in
this section as the ``Board'').
(b) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National Commission
on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Congress makes the
following findings:
(1) In conducting the war on terrorism, the Government may
need additional powers and may need to enhance the use of its
existing powers.
(2) This shift of power and authority to the Government calls
for an enhanced system of checks and balances to protect the
precious liberties that are vital to our way of life and to
ensure that the Government uses its powers for the purposes for
which the powers were given.
(c) Purpose.--The Board shall--
(1) analyze and review actions the Executive Branch takes to
protect the Nation from terrorism as such actions pertain to
privacy or civil liberties; and
(2) ensure that privacy and civil liberties concerns are
appropriately considered in the development and implementation
of laws, regulations, and policies related to efforts to
protect the Nation against terrorism.
(d) Functions.--
(1) Advice and counsel on policy development and
implementation.--The Board shall--
(A) review the privacy and civil liberties
implications of proposed legislation, regulations, and
policies related to efforts to protect the Nation from
terrorism, including the development and adoption of
information sharing guidelines under section 892 of the
Homeland Security Act;
(B) review the privacy and civil liberties
implications of the implementation of new and existing
legislation, regulations, and policies related to
efforts to protect the Nation from terrorism, including
the implementation of information sharing guidelines
under section 892 of the Homeland Security Act;
(C) advise the President and Federal executive
departments and agencies to ensure that privacy and
civil liberties are appropriately considered in the
development and implementation of such legislation,
regulations, policies, and guidelines; and
(D) in providing advice on proposals to retain or
enhance a particular governmental power, consider
whether the executive department or agency has
explained--
(i) that the power actually materially
enhances security; and
(ii) that there is adequate supervision of
the executive's use of the power to ensure
protection of privacy and civil liberties.
(2) Oversight.--The Board shall continually review--
(A) the regulations, policies, and procedures and the
implementation of the regulations, policies,
procedures, and related laws of Federal executive
departments and agencies to ensure that privacy and
civil liberties are protected;
(B) the information sharing practices of Federal
executive departments and agencies to determine whether
they appropriately protect privacy and civil liberties
and adhere to the information sharing guidelines
promulgated under section 892 of the Homeland Security
Act and to other governing laws, regulations, and
policies regarding privacy and civil liberties; and
(C) other actions by the Executive Branch related to
efforts to protect the Nation from terrorism to
determine whether such actions--
(i) appropriately protect privacy and civil
liberties; and
(ii) are consistent with governing laws,
regulations, and policies regarding privacy and
civil liberties.
(3) Relationship with privacy officers.--The Board shall--
(A) review and assess reports and other information
from privacy officers described in section 5092;
(B) when appropriate, make recommendations to such
privacy officers regarding their activities; and
(C) when appropriate, coordinate the activities of
such privacy officers on relevant interagency matters.
(4) Testimony.--The Members of the Board shall appear and
testify before Congress upon request.
(e) Reports.--
(1) In general.--The Board shall--
(A) receive and review reports from privacy and civil
liberties officers described in section 5092(b)(5); and
(B) periodically submit, not less than semiannually,
reports to Congress and the President.
(2) Contents.--Not less than 2 reports submitted each year
under paragraph (1)(B) shall include--
(A) a description of the major activities of the
Board during the relevant period; and
(B) information on the findings, conclusions, and
recommendations of the Board resulting from its advice
and oversight functions under subsection (d).
(f) Informing the Public.--The Board shall hold public hearings,
release public reports, and otherwise inform the public of its
activities, as appropriate and in a manner consistent with the
protection of classified information, applicable law, and national
security.
(g) Access to Information.--
(1) Authorization.--If determined by the Board to be
necessary to carry out its responsibilities under this section,
the Board may--
(A) secure directly from any Federal executive
department or agency, or any Federal officer or
employee, all relevant records, reports, audits,
reviews, documents, papers, or recommendations,
including classified information consistent with
applicable law;
(B) interview, take statements from, or take public
testimony from personnel of any Federal executive
department or agency or any Federal officer or
employee; and
(C) request information or assistance from any State,
tribal, or local government.
(2) Obtaining official information.--
(A) Requirement to furnish.--Except as provided in
subparagraph (B), if the Board submits a request to a
Federal department or agency for information necessary
to enable the Board to carry out this section, the head
of such department or agency shall furnish that
information to the Board.
(B) Exception for national security.--If the National
Intelligence Director, in consultation with the
Attorney General, determines that it is necessary to
withhold requested information from disclosure to
protect the national security interests of the United
States, the department or agency head shall not furnish
that information to the Board.
(h) Membership.--
(1) Members.--The Board shall be composed of a chairman and 4
additional members, who shall be appointed by the President, by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
(2) Political affiliation.--Not more than 3 members of the
Board shall be of the same political party.
(3) Qualifications.--Members of the Board shall be selected
solely on the basis of their professional qualifications,
achievements, public stature, and relevant experience, and
without regard to political affiliation. Members of the Board
shall also have extensive experience in the areas of privacy
and civil rights and liberties.
(4) Incompatible office.--An individual appointed to the
Board may not, while serving on the Board, be an elected
official, an officer, or an employee of the Federal Government,
other than in the capacity as a member of the Board.-
(5) Term.--Each member of the Board shall serve a term of six
years, except that--
(A) a member appointed to a term of office after the
commencement of such term may serve under such
appointment only for the remainder of such term;--
(B) upon the expiration of the term of office of a
member, the member shall continue to serve until the
member's successor has been appointed and qualified,
except that no member may serve under this
subparagraph--
(i) for more than 60 days when Congress is in
session unless a nomination to fill the vacancy
shall have been submitted to the Senate; or
(ii) after the adjournment sine die of the
session of the Senate in which such nomination
is submitted; and
(C) the members initially appointed under this
subsection shall serve terms of two, three, four, five,
and six years, respectively, from the effective date of
this Act, with the term of each such member to be
designated by the President.
(i) Quorum and Meetings.--After its initial meeting, the Board shall
meet upon the call of the chairman or a majority of its members. Three
members of the Board shall constitute a quorum.
(j) Compensation and Travel Expenses.--
(1) Compensation.--
(A) Chairman.--The chairman shall be compensated at a
rate equal to the daily equivalent of the annual rate
of basic pay in effect for a position at level III of
the Executive Schedule under section 5314 of title 5,
United States Code, for each day during which the
chairman is engaged in the actual performance of the
duties of the Board.
(B) Members.--Each member of the Board shall be
compensated at a rate equal to the daily equivalent of
the annual rate of basic pay in effect for a position
at level IV of the Executive Schedule under section
5315 of title 5, United States Code, for each day
during which that member is engaged in the actual
performance of the duties of the Board.
(2) Travel expenses.--Members of the Board shall be allowed
travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, at
rates authorized for persons employed intermittently by the
Government under section 5703(b) of title 5, United States
Code, while away from their homes or regular places of business
in the performance of services for the Board.
(k) Staff.--
(1) Appointment and compensation.--The Chairman, in
accordance with rules agreed upon by the Board, shall appoint
and fix the compensation of an executive director and such
other personnel as may be necessary to enable the Board to
carry out its functions, without regard to the provisions of
title 5, United States Code, governing appointments in the
competitive service, and without regard to the provisions of
chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of such title
relating to classification and General Schedule pay rates,
except that no rate of pay fixed under this subsection may
exceed the equivalent of that payable for a position at level V
of the Executive Schedule under section 5316 of title 5, United
States Code.
(2) Detailees.--Any Federal employee may be detailed to the
Board without reimbursement from the Board, and such detailee
shall retain the rights, status, and privileges of the
detailee's regular employment without interruption.
(3) Consultant services.--The Board may procure the temporary
or intermittent services of experts and consultants in
accordance with section 3109 of title 5, United States Code, at
rates that do not exceed the daily rate paid a person occupying
a position at level IV of the Executive Schedule under section
5315 of such title.
(l) Security Clearances.--The appropriate Federal executive
departments and agencies shall cooperate with the Board to
expeditiously provide the Board members and staff with appropriate
security clearances to the extent possible under existing procedures
and requirements, except that no person shall be provided with access
to classified information under this section without the appropriate
security clearances.
(m) Treatment as Agency, not as Advisory Committee.--The Board--
(1) is an agency (as defined in section 551(1) of title 5,
United States Code); and
(2) is not an advisory committee (as defined in section 3(2)
of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.)).
(n) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be
appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out this section.

CHAPTER 2--MUTUAL AID AND LITIGATION MANAGEMENT

SEC. 5101. SHORT TITLE.

This chapter may be cited as the ``Mutual Aid and Litigation
Management Authorization Act of 2004''.

SEC. 5102. MUTUAL AID AUTHORIZED.

(a) Authorization to Enter Into Agreements.--
(1) In general.--The authorized representative of a State,
locality, or the Federal Government may enter into an
interstate mutual aid agreement or a mutual aid agreement with
the Federal Government on behalf of the State, locality, or
Federal Government under which, at the request of any party to
the agreement, the other party to the agreement may--
(A) provide law enforcement, fire, rescue, emergency
health and medical services, transportation,
communications, public works and engineering, mass
care, and resource support in an emergency or public
service event occurring in the jurisdiction of the
requesting party;
(B) provide other services to prepare for, mitigate,
manage, respond to, or recover from an emergency or
public service event occurring in the jurisdiction of
the requesting party; and
(C) participate in training events occurring in the
jurisdiction of the requesting party.
(b) Liability and Actions at Law.--
(1) Liability.--A responding party or its officers or
employees shall be liable on account of any act or omission
occurring while providing assistance or participating in a
training event in the jurisdiction of a requesting party under
a mutual aid agreement (including any act or omission arising
from the maintenance or use of any equipment, facilities, or
supplies in connection therewith), but only to the extent
permitted under and in accordance with the laws and procedures
of the State of the responding party and subject to this
chapter.
(2) Jurisdiction of courts.--
(A) In general.--Subject to subparagraph (B) and
section 5103, any action brought against a responding
party or its officers or employees on account of an act
or omission described in subsection (b)(1) may be
brought only under the laws and procedures of the State
of the responding party and only in the State courts or
United States District Courts located therein.
(B) United states as party.--If the United States is
the party against whom an action described in paragraph
(1) is brought, the action may be brought only in a
United States District Court.
(c) Workers' Compensation and Death Benefits.--
(1) Payment of benefits.--A responding party shall provide
for the payment of workers' compensation and death benefits
with respect to officers or employees of the party who sustain
injuries or are killed while providing assistance or
participating in a training event under a mutual aid agreement
in the same manner and on the same terms as if the injury or
death were sustained within the jurisdiction of the responding
party.
(2) Liability for benefits.--No party shall be liable under
the law of any State other than its own (or, in the case of the
Federal Government, under any law other than Federal law) for
the payment of workers' compensation and death benefits with
respect to injured officers or employees of the party who
sustain injuries or are killed while providing assistance or
participating in a training event under a mutual aid agreement.
(d) Licenses and Permits.--Whenever any person holds a license,
certificate, or other permit issued by any responding party evidencing
the meeting of qualifications for professional, mechanical, or other
skills, such person will be deemed licensed, certified, or permitted by
the requesting party to provide assistance involving such skill under a
mutual aid agreement.
(e) Scope.--Except to the extent provided in this section, the rights
and responsibilities of the parties to a mutual aid agreement shall be
as described in the mutual aid agreement.
(f) Effect on Other Agreements.--Nothing in this section precludes
any party from entering into supplementary mutual aid agreements with
fewer than all the parties, or with another, or affects any other
agreements already in force among any parties to such an agreement,
including the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) under
Public Law 104-321.
(g) Federal Government.--Nothing in this section may be construed to
limit any other expressed or implied authority of any entity of the
Federal Government to enter into mutual aid agreements.
(h) Consistency With State Law.--A party may enter into a mutual aid
agreement under this chapter only insofar as the agreement is in accord
with State law.

SEC. 5103. LITIGATION MANAGEMENT AGREEMENTS.

(a) Authorization to Enter Into Litigation Management Agreements.--
The authorized representative of a State or locality may enter into a
litigation management agreement on behalf of the State or locality.
Such litigation management agreements may provide that all claims
against such Emergency Response Providers arising out of, relating to,
or resulting from an act of terrorism when Emergency Response Providers
from more than 1 State have acted in defense against, in response to,
or recovery from such act shall be governed by the following
provisions.
(b) Federal Cause of Action.--
(1) In general.--There shall exist a Federal cause of action
for claims against Emergency Response Providers arising out of,
relating to, or resulting from an act of terrorism when
Emergency Response Providers from more than 1 State have acted
in defense against, in response to, or recovery from such act.
As determined by the parties to a litigation management
agreement, the substantive law for decision in any such action
shall be--
(A) derived from the law, including choice of law
principles, of the State in which such acts of
terrorism occurred, unless such law is inconsistent
with or preempted by Federal law; or
(B) derived from the choice of law principles agreed
to by the parties to a litigation management agreement
as described in the litigation management agreement,
unless such principles are inconsistent with or
preempted by Federal law.
(2) Jurisdiction.--Such appropriate district court of the
United States shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction
over all actions for any claim against Emergency Response
Providers for loss of property, personal injury, or death
arising out of, relating to, or resulting from an act of
terrorism when Emergency Response Providers from more than 1
State have acted in defense against, in response to, or
recovery from an act of terrorism.
(3) Special rules.--In an action brought for damages that is
governed by a litigation management agreement, the following
provisions apply:
(A) Punitive damages.--No punitive damages intended
to punish or deter, exemplary damages, or other damages
not intended to compensate a plaintiff for actual
losses may be awarded, nor shall any party be liable
for interest prior to the judgment.
(B) Collateral sources.--Any recovery by a plaintiff
in an action governed by a litigation management
agreement shall be reduced by the amount of collateral
source compensation, if any, that the plaintiff has
received or is entitled to receive as a result of such
acts of terrorism.
(4) Exclusions.--Nothing in this section shall in any way
limit the ability of any person to seek any form of recovery
from any person, government, or other entity that--
(A) attempts to commit, knowingly participates in,
aids and abets, or commits any act of terrorism, or any
criminal act related to or resulting from such act of
terrorism; or
(B) participates in a conspiracy to commit any such
act of terrorism or any such criminal act.

SEC. 5104. ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS.

(a) No Abrogation of Other Immunities.--Nothing in this chapter shall
abrogate any other immunities from liability that any party may have
under any other State or Federal law.
(b) Exception for Certain Federal Law Enforcement Activities.--A
mutual aid agreement or a litigation management agreement may not apply
to law enforcement security operations at special events of national
significance under section 3056(e) of title 18, United States Code, or
to other law enforcement functions of the United States Secret Service.
(c) Secret Service.--Section 3056 of title 18, United States Code, is
amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(g) The Secret Service shall be maintained as a distinct entity
within the Department of Homeland Security and shall not be merged with
any other department function. All personnel and operational elements
of the United States Secret Service shall report to the Director of the
Secret Service, who shall report directly to the Secretary of Homeland
Security without being required to report through any other official of
the Department.''.

SEC. 5105. DEFINITIONS.

For purposes of this chapter, the following definitions apply:
(1) Authorized representative.--The term ``authorized
representative'' means--
(A) in the case of the Federal Government, any
individual designated by the President with respect to
the executive branch, the Chief Justice of the United
States with respect to the judicial branch, or the
President pro Tempore of the Senate and Speaker of the
House of Representatives with respect to the Congress,
or their designees, to enter into a mutual aid
agreement;
(B) in the case of a locality, the official
designated by law to declare an emergency in and for
the locality, or the official's designee;
(C) in the case of a State, the Governor or the
Governor's designee.
(2) Emergency.--The term ``emergency'' means a major disaster
or emergency declared by the President, or a State of Emergency
declared by an authorized representative of a State or
locality, in response to which assistance may be provided under
a mutual aid agreement.
(3) Emergency response provider.--The term ``Emergency
Response Provider'' means State or local emergency public
safety, law enforcement, emergency response, emergency medical
(including hospital emergency facilities), and related
personnel, agencies, and authorities that are a party to a
litigation management agreement.
(4) Employee.--The term ``employee'' means, with respect to a
party to a mutual aid agreement, the employees of the party,
including its agents or authorized volunteers, who are
committed to provide assistance under the agreement.
(5) Litigation management agreement.--The term ``litigation
management agreement'' means an agreement entered into pursuant
to the authority granted under section 5103.
(6) Locality.--The term ``locality'' means a county, city, or
town.
(7) Mutual aid agreement.--The term ``mutual aid agreement''
means an agreement entered into pursuant to the authority
granted under section 5102.
(8) Public service event.--The term ``public service event''
means any undeclared emergency, incident, or situation in
preparation for or response to which assistance may be provided
under a mutual aid agreement.
(9) Requesting party.--The term ``requesting party'' means,
with respect to a mutual aid agreement, the party in whose
jurisdiction assistance is provided, or a training event is
held, under the agreement.
(10) Responding party.--The term ``responding party'' means,
with respect to a mutual aid agreement, the party providing
assistance, or participating in a training event, under the
agreement, but does not include the requesting party.
(11) State.--The term ``State'' includes each of the several
States of the United States, the District of Columbia, the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American
Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands,
and any other territory or possession of the United States, and
any political subdivision of any such place.
(12) Training event.--The term ``training event'' means an
emergency and public service event-related exercise, test, or
other activity using equipment and personnel to prepare for or
simulate performance of any aspect of the giving or receiving
of assistance during emergencies or public service events, but
does not include an actual emergency or public service event.

Chapter 3--Miscellaneous Matters

SEC. 5131. ENHANCEMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY COMMUNICATIONS
INTEROPERABILITY.

(a) Coordination of Public Safety Interoperable Communications
Programs.--
(1) Program.--The Secretary of Homeland Security, in
consultation with the Secretary of Commerce and the Chairman of
the Federal Communications Commission, shall establish a
program to enhance public safety interoperable communications
at all levels of government. Such program shall--
(A) establish a comprehensive national approach to
achieving public safety interoperable communications;
(B) coordinate with other Federal agencies in
carrying out subparagraph (A);
(C) develop, in consultation with other appropriate
Federal agencies and State and local authorities,
appropriate minimum capabilities for communications
interoperability for Federal, State, and local public
safety agencies;
(D) accelerate, in consultation with other Federal
agencies, including the National Institute of Standards
and Technology, the private sector, and nationally
recognized standards organizations as appropriate, the
development of national voluntary consensus standards
for public safety interoperable communications;
(E) encourage the development and implementation of
flexible and open architectures, with appropriate
levels of security, for short-term and long-term
solutions to public safety communications
interoperability;
(F) assist other Federal agencies in identifying
priorities for research, development, and testing and
evaluation with regard to public safety interoperable
communications;
(G) identify priorities within the Department of
Homeland Security for research, development, and
testing and evaluation with regard to public safety
interoperable communications;
(H) establish coordinated guidance for Federal grant
programs for public safety interoperable
communications;
(I) provide technical assistance to State and local
public safety agencies regarding planning, acquisition
strategies, interoperability architectures, training,
and other functions necessary to achieve public safety
communications interoperability;
(J) develop and disseminate best practices to improve
public safety communications interoperability; and
(K) develop appropriate performance measures and
milestones to systematically measure the Nation's
progress towards achieving public safety communications
interoperability, including the development of national
voluntary consensus standards.
(2) Office for interoperability and compatibility.--
(A) Establishment of office.--The Secretary may
establish an Office for Interoperability and
Compatibility to carry out this subsection.
(B) Functions.--If the Secretary establishes such
office, the Secretary shall, through such office--
(i) carry out Department of Homeland Security
responsibilities and authorities relating to
the SAFECOM Program; and
(ii) carry out subsection (c) (relating to
rapid interoperable communications capabilities
for high risk jurisdictions).
(3) Applicability of federal advisory committee act.--The
Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) shall not apply
to advisory groups established and maintained by the Secretary
for purposes of carrying out this subsection.
(b) Report.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act, the Secretary shall report to the Congress on Department
of Homeland Security plans for accelerating the development of national
voluntary consensus standards for public safety interoperable
communications, a schedule of milestones for such development, and
achievements of such development.
(c) Rapid Interoperable Communications Capabilities for High Risk
Jurisdictions.--The Secretary, in consultation with other relevant
Federal, State, and local government agencies, shall provide technical,
training, and other assistance as appropriate to support the rapid
establishment of consistent, secure, and effective interoperable
communications capabilities for emergency response providers in
jurisdictions determined by the Secretary to be at consistently high
levels of risk of terrorist attack.
(d) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Interoperable communications.--The term ``interoperable
communications'' means the ability of emergency response
providers and relevant Federal, State, and local government
agencies to communicate with each other as necessary, through a
dedicated public safety network utilizing information
technology systems and radio communications systems, and to
exchange voice, data, or video with one another on demand, in
real time, as necessary.
(2) Emergency response providers.--The term ``emergency
response providers'' has the meaning that term has under
section 2 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101)
(e) Clarification of Responsibility for Interoperable
Communications.--
(1) Under secretary for emergency preparedness and
response.--Section 502(7) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002
(6 U.S.C. 312(7)) is amended--
(A) by striking ``developing comprehensive programs
for developing interoperative communications
technology, and''; and
(B) by striking ``such'' and inserting
``interoperable communications''.
(2) Office for domestic preparedness.--Section 430(c) of such
Act (6 U.S.C. 238(c)) is amended--
(A) in paragraph (7) by striking ``and'' after the
semicolon;
(B) in paragraph (8) by striking the period and
inserting ``; and''; and
(C) by adding at the end the following:
``(9) helping to ensure the acquisition of interoperable
communication technology by State and local governments and
emergency response providers.''.

SEC. 5132. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM.

(a) Findings.--The Congress finds that--
(1) in Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5, the
President directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to
develop an incident command system to be known as the National
Incident Management System (NIMS), and directed all Federal
agencies to make the adoption of NIMS a condition for the
receipt of Federal emergency preparedness assistance by States,
territories, tribes, and local governments beginning in fiscal
year 2005;
(2) in March 2004, the Secretary of Homeland Security
established NIMS, which provides a unified structural framework
for Federal, State, territorial, tribal, and local governments
to ensure coordination of command, operations, planning,
logistics, finance, and administration during emergencies
involving multiple jurisdictions or agencies; and
(3) the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the
United States strongly supports the adoption of NIMS by
emergency response agencies nationwide, and the decision by the
President to condition Federal emergency preparedness
assistance upon the adoption of NIMS.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of the Congress that all
levels of government should adopt NIMS, and that the regular use of and
training in NIMS by States, territories, tribes, and local governments
should be a condition for receiving Federal preparedness assistance.

SEC. 5133. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND
PLANS AND STRATEGIES.

It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of Defense should
regularly assess the adequacy of United States Northern Command's plans
and strategies with a view to ensuring that the United States Northern
Command is prepared to respond effectively to all military and
paramilitary threats within the United States.

Purpose and Summary

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 took the lives
of more than 3,000 Americans and represented the most
catastrophic terrorist attack on the United States in its
history. The terrorists exploited deficiencies in America's law
enforcement, immigration, and intelligence agencies which
limited the dissemination of information that might have
protected the nation against the attack. In the wake of the
attacks, the Committee has conducted 39 hearings and markups to
examine proposals to remedy legislative, procedural, and
structural vulnerabilities to terrorism in our nation's
immigration system. The Committee has also conducted 46
hearings and markups to strengthen federal law enforcement and
antiterrorism efforts, and it has taken firm steps to ensure
that security efforts do not transgress cherished civil
liberties. Furthermore, the Committee has conducted rigorous
oversight of antiterrorism reform efforts at the Department of
Justice, and acted with bipartisan dispatch to enact
antiterrorism legislation including the USA PATRIOT Act and the
Homeland Security Act.
On November 27, 2002, President Bush signed legislation
creating the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the
United States (``9/11 Commission'' or ``Commission''). The
Commission's principal responsibility was to examine and report
on the facts and causes relating to the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, and to suggest measures to better secure
the nation. On July 22, 2004, the Commission delivered its
unanimous recommendations to Congress. During August and
September, 2004, a variety of congressional committees held
hearings on the recommendations. On September 29, 2004, Speaker
Hastert introduced H.R. 10, the ``9/11 Recommendations
Implementation Act,'' to provide legislative substance to the
Commission's recommendations.
The legislation consists of five titles entitled: Reform of
the Intelligence Community; Terrorism Prevention and
Prosecution; Border Security and Terrorist Travel;
International Cooperation and Coordination; and Government
Restructuring. Several provisions within the legislation fall
within the jurisdiction of the Committee on the Judiciary.
The creation of a National Intelligence Director and the
establishment of a National Counterterrorism Center in Title I
of H.R. 10 are key reforms that will help ensure that the wall
of separation dividing intelligence and law enforcement is
never again exploited to revisit terrorist attacks upon the
United States. Section 1112 codifies ongoing efforts of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation to assess and prevent
terrorists attacks before they occur.
In Title II, Sec. Sec. 2001, 2021-2024, 2041-2044, and
2051-2053 contain important provisions that enhance penalties
for terrorism hoaxes, increase penalties for supporting,
financing, or cooperating with terrorist organizations, and
expand the scope of laws that prohibit the shipment or use of
weapons of mass destruction. Sections 2101 and 2102 provide
additional funding to combat terrorist financing, and
Sec. Sec. 2171-2173 enhance the use of biometric technology to
reduce terrorist threats against air travel.
Title III of the legislation contains important provisions
to enhance border security and reduce opportunities for
terrorists to enter and stay in the United States. Section 3001
implements a Commission recommendation requiring Americans
returning from travel in the Western Hemisphere to possess
passports. Section 3002 requires Canadians seeking entry into
the United States to present a passport or other secure
identification. Section 3003 authorizes 2,000 new Border Patrol
agents for each of the next five years. Section 3004 authorizes
800 additional ICE investigators for each of the next five
years. Section 3005 reduces the risk of identify and document
fraud, and Sec. Sec. 3006-3009 and 3031-33 provide for the
expedited removal of illegal aliens, limit asylum abuse by
terrorists, and streamline the removal of terrorists and other
criminal aliens. Nearly every one of these provisions reflect
Commission recommendations. Many of them arise from legislation
proposed by the Judiciary Committee.
The legislation contains key provisions that safeguard the
civil liberties of all Americans. Specifically, Sec. 1022
establishes a civil liberties protection officer to ensure that
civil liberties and privacy protections are incorporated in the
policies implemented by the National Intelligence Director.
Modeled on legislation originally introduced by Constitution
Subcommittee Chairman Chabot, Sec. 5091 requires federal
agencies to prepare a privacy impact analysis for proposed and
final rules during the rulemaking process. Finally, Sec. 5092
directs the head of each Federal agency with law enforcement or
antiterrorism functions to appoint a chief privacy officer to
protect against privacy abuses.
In short, H.R. 10 reflects a careful, thoughtful, and
principled response to the 9/11 Commission's bipartisan Report
and staff report, and it provides additional tools and
resources needed to fight and win the war on terror.

Background and Need for the Legislation

THE EVENTS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 AND THE CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE

Summary of Key Legislation Enacted Into Law Following the Attacks of
September 11, 2001

The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon took more than 3,000 lives, caused approximately $100
billion in economic losses, triggered U.S. military
intervention in Afghanistan to topple the Taliban regime, and
led to passage of a historic overhaul of federal law
enforcement policies and priorities culminating in the
enactment of the USA PATRIOTAct.\1\ These events also led to
House passage of legislation to tighten security at America's
airports,\2\ reform the airport security screening process,\3\ abolish
the Immigration and Naturalization Service,\4\ improve wireless 911
emergency response services,\5\ improve oil and gas pipeline safety
research,\6\ enhance border security,\7\ and establish the Department
of Homeland Security.\8\ Other antiterrorism legislation Congress
enacted in the wake of these attacks includes: the Enhanced Border
Security and Visa Reform Act,\9\ the Antiterrorism Explosives Act,\10\
the Terrorist Bombing Convention Implementation Act,\11\ the Terrorism
Risk Insurance Act,\12\ and the Homeland Security Information Act.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat 272 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.) (2001).
\2\ ``Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act,''
Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 230 (2001).
\3\ ``Aviation and Transportation Security Act,'' Pub. L. No. 107-
56, 115 Stat 597 (codified as amended in 49 U.S.C.) (2001).
\4\ H.R. 3231, the ``Barbara Jordan Immigration Reform and
Accountability Act,'' 107th Congress (2002), (passed the House of
Representatives, April 25, 2002).
\5\ H.R. 2898, The ``E-911 Implementation Act of 2003,'' 108th
Congress (2003), (passed the House of Representatives, October 14,
2003).
\6\ Pub. L. No. 107-355, 116 Stat 2985 (codified as amended in 49
U.S.C.) (2002).
\7\ ``Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002,''
Pub. L. No. 107-173, 116 Stat 543 (2002).
\8\ Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat 2135 (codified as amended in 6
U.S.C.) (2002).
\9\ Pub. L. No. 107-173, 116 Stat 42 (codified as amended in 8
U.S.C.) (2002).
\10\ H.R. 4864, the ``Anti-Terrorism Explosives Act,'' 107th
Congress (2002), enacted as part of the Homeland Security Act.
\11\ Pub. L. No. 107-197, 116 Stat 72 (codified as amended in 18
U.S.C.) (2002).
\12\ Pub. L. No. 107-297, 116 Stat 2322 (codified as amended in 15
U.S.C.) (2002).
\13\ H.R. 4930, the ``Homeland Security Information Sharing and
Analysis Enhancement Act of 2004,'' 108th Congress (2004), enacted as
part of the Homeland Security Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Principal Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary Responding to
the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001

In addition to these legislative initiatives, the House
Committee on the Judiciary has conducted nearly 100 hearings to
better protect the American people against terrorist attacks
since September 11, 2001. Many of these hearings examined
legislative initiatives contained in H.R. 10.

Strengthening Border Security to Reduce the Risk of Terrorist Attacks

The Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and
Claims has focused special attention on the legislative,
procedural, and technological vulnerabilities in our nation's
immigration system to identify and remedy them. Since the
attacks, the Subcommittee has conducted thirty-nine hearings on
immigration matters. Among the most critical of these are
hearings entitled: ``Pushing the Border Out on Alien Smuggling:
New Tools and Intelligence Initiatives''; ``US-VISIT: A Down
Payment on Homeland Security''; ``Funding for Immigration in
the President's 2005 Budget''; ``War on Terrorism: Immigration
Enforcement Since September 11, 2001''; ``Department of
Homeland Security Transition: Bureau of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement''; ``Immigrant Student Tracking: Implementation and
Proposed Modification''; ``The Immigration and Naturalization
Service's Interactions with Hesham Mohamed Ali Hedayet''; ``The
Role of Immigration in the Department of Homeland Security'';
``The Risk to Homeland Security From Identity Fraud and
Identity Theft''; ``The INS's March 2002 Notification of
Approval of Change of Status for Pilot Training for Terrorist
Hijackers Mohammed Atta and Marwan Al-Shehhi''; ``the
Implications of Transnational Terrorism for the Visa Waiver
Program''; and ``Using Information Technology to Secure
America's Borders.'' Before 9/11, the Subcommittee also focused
on terrorist infiltration into the United States, including an
oversight hearing on ``Terrorist Threats to the United
States.''

Restructuring Federal Law Enforcement and Enhancing Criminal Penalties
to Reduce the Risk of Terrorist Attacks

Since 9/11, the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and
Homeland Security has held thirty-four hearings on law
enforcement matters. Among the most important of these are
hearings entitled: ``Law Enforcement Efforts Within the
Department of Homeland Security;'' ``Homeland Security--the
Balance Between Crisis and Consequence Management through
Training and Assistance (Review of Legislative Proposals)'';
``Terrorism and War-Time Hoaxes''; ``The Proposal to Create a
Department of Homeland Security''; ``The Risk to Homeland
Security From Identity Fraud and Identity Theft''; the
``Antiterrorism Explosives Act of 2002''; the ``Homeland
Security Information Sharing Act''; the ``Cyber Security
Enhancement Act''; ``Implementation Legislation for the
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist
Bombings and the International Convention for the Suppression
of the Financing of Terrorism''; and the ``Anti-Hoax Terrorism
Act of 2001.'' The Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and
Intellectual Property also conducted a hearing to examine links
between organized crime, terrorism, and intellectual property
theft.
In addition to these hearings, the Crime Subcommittee, in
the spirit of cooperation, has held a joint hearing with the
Select Committee on Homeland Security on the Terrorism Threat
Integration Center (``TTIC''); jointly sent letters with post-
hearing questions to the relevantagencies on the implementation
of TTIC, and conducted a joint hearing on the integration of terrorism
watchlists at the Terrorism Screening Center.
The Committee on the Judiciary has also conducted oversight
through other means. It has sent two major oversight letters to
the Attorney General on the implementation of the USA PATRIOT
Act. These letters were aimed at ensuring that the Department
of Justice maintains a proper balance between security and
civil liberties in implementing the Act. The Committee has also
closely monitored the activities of the Department of Homeland
Security (``DHS'') recently sending letters to the Directors of
Immigration Customs Enforcement (``ICE'') and the Federal
Protective Service regarding their law enforcement missions at
the Department of Homeland Security.
In addition, the Committee has requested several General
Accounting Office (``GAO'') reports in this area including:
``Combating Terrorism: Funding Data Reported to Congress Should
be Improved''; ``Social Security Administration: Disclosure
Policy for Law Enforcement Allows Information Sharing, But SSA
Needs to Ensure Consistent Application''; and ``Firearms
Control: Federal Agencies Have Firearms Controls, But Could
Strengthen Controls in Key Areas''.
In the law enforcement and law enforcement training area,
the Crime Subcommittee held a joint hearing with a subcommittee
of the Select Committee on Homeland Security on consolidating
terrorist watch lists. The Subcommittee held a hearing and
markup on H.R. 2934, a bill to expand the death penalty to
additional acts of terrorism. The full committee reported that
bill on June 23, 2004. The Subcommittee held a hearing on H.R.
3179, a bill to enhance law enforcement powers in stopping
terrorism. The Subcommittee has been working closely with the
Select Committee on Homeland Security on H.R. 3266, a bill to
improve grants to first responders, which the full committee
reported On June 16, 2004. Finally, the Committee is working
closely with the Select Committee on yet to be introduced
legislation to reauthorize the Department of Homeland Security.

Privacy, Civil Liberties, and the Conduct of the War on Terrorism

The Committee on the Judiciary has conducted a number of
hearings to ensure that civil liberties are preserved in the
nation's war against terrorism. The USA Patriot Act contained
several sunset provisions, many of which are set to expire next
year. In addition, the full committee has conducted rigorous
oversight of DOJ's efforts against terrorism and its
implementation of the USA Patriot Act. The Subcommittee on
Commercial and Administrative Law and the Subcommittee on the
Constitution conducted a hearing entitled ``Civil Liberties in
the Hands of the Government Post-September 11, 2001:
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission and the U.S. Department
of Defense Technology and Privacy Advisory Committee.'' A
similar joint hearing examined `` `The Defense of Privacy Act'
and Privacy in the Hands of the Government.'' In addition, the
Subcommittee on the Constitution held a hearing entitled
``Anti-Terrorism Investigations and the Fourth Amendment After
September 11: Where and When Can the Government Go to Prevent
Terrorist Attacks?'' Finally, the Commercial and Administrative
Law held a hearing entitled: ``Administrative Law, Adjudicatory
Issues, and Privacy Ramifications of Creating a Department of
Homeland Security.''

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States

Mission and Members of the Commission
On November 27, 2002, President George W. Bush signed
legislation creating the National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States.\14\ The Commission's principal
responsibility was to ``examine and report upon the facts and
causes relating to the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001,'' with respect to intelligence and law enforcement
agencies, diplomacy, immigration and border control, the flow
of assets to terrorist organizations, commercial aviation, and
the role of congressional oversight and resource allocation,
among other matters, and to suggest ``corrective measures that
can be taken to prevent acts of terrorism.'' \15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L.
No. 107-306, Title VI, 116 Stat. 2383, 2408-13 (2002).
\15\ Id. at Sec. Sec. 602(1), (5), 604.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Members of the Commission included: Thomas Kean (Chair),
Republican, former Governor of New Jersey; Lee H. Hamilton
(Vice Chair), Democrat, former U.S. Representative from the 9th
District of Indiana; Richard Ben-Veniste, Democrat, attorney,
former chief of the Watergate Task Force of the Watergate
Special Prosecutor's Office; Fred F. Fielding, Republican,
attorney, former Counsel to President Reagan; Jamie Gorelick,
Democrat, former Deputy Attorney General in the Clinton
Administration; Slade Gorton, Republican, former Senator from
Washington; Bob Kerrey, Democrat, former Senator from Nebraska;
John F. Lehman, Republican, former Secretary of the Navy in the
Reagan Administration; Timothy J. Roemer, Democrat, former U.S.
Representative from the 3rd District of Indiana; James R.
Thompson, Republican, former Governor of Illinois.
Over the course of its approximately 20-month existence,
the Commission reviewed more than 2.5 million pages of
documents and interviewed more than 1,200 individuals in
tencountries. It held 19 days of hearings and received public testimony
from 160 witnesses.\16\ Present and former government officials
testified before the Commission, including: Colin Powell, United States
Secretary of State; Richard Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State;
Madeleine Albright, former Secretary of State; Donald H. Rumsfeld,
Secretary of Defense; Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense;
William Cohen, former Secretary of Defense; Condoleezza Rice, National
Security Advisor to the President; Sandy Berger, former National
Security Advisor; Richard Clarke, former counterterrorism official for
Presidents George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush; Vice
President Dick Cheney; former President Bill Clinton, and former Vice
President Al Gore.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ 9/11 Commission Report, supra note 12, at xv.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Report of the Commission
Pursuant to its statutory mandate, the Commission submitted
its final report and unanimous recommendations to Congress and
the President on July 22, 2004.\17\ The 567-page report
provides a detailed chronicle of the events leading up to the
September 11th attacks. The paperback version of the report has
since become a ``national bestseller, a first for such a
commission report.'' \18\ As part of its analysis of these
events, the Commission identified ``fault lines within our
government--between foreign and domestic intelligence, and
between and within agencies.'' \19\ The Commission also cited
``pervasive problems of managing and sharing information across
a large and unwieldy government that had been built in a
different era to confront different dangers.'' \20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ Press Release, 9/11 Commission, 9/11 Commission Releases
Unanimous Final Report--Calls for Quick Action on Recommendations to
Prevent Future Attacks (July 22, 2004), at http://www.9-
11commission.gov/press/pr_2004-07-22.pdf.
\18\ Jim VandeHei, 9/11 Panel Roiling Campaign Platforms, Wash.
Post, Aug. 9, 2004, at A1.
\19\ 9/11 Commission Report, supra note 12, at xvi.
\20\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

H.R. 10, THE ``9/11 RECOMMENDATIONS IMPLEMENTATION ACT''

On September 29, 2004, Speaker Hastert introduced H.R. 10,
the ``9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act'' which reflects
the bipartisan recommendations of the Commission. The
legislation consists of five titles: Reform of the Intelligence
Community; Terrorism Prevention and Prosecution; Border
Security and Terrorist Travel; International Cooperation and
Coordination; and Government Restructuring.

Summary of Principal Provisions of H.R. 10 Within the Jurisdiction of
the Committee on the Judiciary \21\

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ This section contains a summary of principal provisions of
H.R. 10 within the jurisdiction of the Committee; it does not comprise
an exhaustive list of provisions of H.R. 10 within the jurisdiction of
the Committee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

TITLE I--REFORM OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Section 1011. Reorganization and improvement of management of
intelligence community

Section 1011 replaces sections 102 through 104 of Title I
of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et. seq.)
with new sections 102, 102A, 103, 103A, 104 and 104A. New
section 102 replaces the Director of Central Intelligence
(``DCI'') with a National Intelligence Director (``NID'') as
recommended by the Commission. The NID will be appointed by the
President and confirmed by the Senate, and will serve as the
head of the intelligence community. The NID may not
simultaneously serve as the DCI or as the head of any other
element of the intelligence community. This section also
establishes a clear chain of command to ensure that while the
NID will manage and oversee the Intelligence Community, the NID
will do this through the heads of the Departments containing
the elements of the intelligence community. The Committee
supports the language requiring the NID to work through the
heads of the Departments to ensure accountability and
responsibility through a clear chain of command.
New Sec. 102A sets out the responsibilities and authorities
of the NID. This section provides that the NID shall have
access to all national intelligence and intelligence related to
the national security, except as otherwise provided by law or
guidelines agreed upon by the Attorney General and the NID. The
NID will develop and present the annual budget for the National
Intelligence Program (``NIP''). The NID must report to the
Committees on Judiciary, Intelligence, and Armed Services on
any transfer of personnel relative to the Committees'
jurisdiction. Additionally, this section requires the NID to
ensure that the Intelligence Community through the Host
Departments that contain the elements of the Intelligence
Community comply with the Constitution and the laws of the
United States. At the Committee's recommendation, H.R. 10
contains a provision clarifying that nothing in this Act shall
be construed as affecting the role of the Department of Justice
or the Attorney General with respect to applications under the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.
New Sec. 103 establishes the Office of the NID to assist
the Director in the performance of his or her duties. This
section establishes specific responsibilities for a number of
Deputies and Associates to assist the NID. The Associate
National Intelligence Director for Domestic Security is to
ensure that the intelligence needs of the Department of Justice
and other relevant executive branch agencies are met. At the
same time, the language restricts this position from
disseminating domestic or homeland security information to
State and local government officials and the private sector.
New Sec. 104 establishes that the DCI shall assist the NID.
These responsibilities include:(1) collecting intelligence
through human sources and by other appropriate means, except that the
DCI shall have no police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers or
internal security functions; and (2) providing overall direction for
the collection of national intelligence overseas or outside of the
United States through human sources by elements of the intelligence
community authorized to undertake such collection and, in coordination
with other agencies of the Government which are authorized to undertake
such collection, ensuring that the most effective use is made of
resources and that the risks to the United States and those involved in
such collection are minimized. The Manager's Amendment reported by the
Committee inserted the qualifying phrase ``overseas or outside the
United States'' to clarify that the CIA's collection authority is not
domestic. The Committee also supported the continued limitation that
the CIA shall not have police, subpoena, or other law enforcement
powers.

Section 1012. Revised definition of national intelligence

This section defines ``national intelligence'' and
``intelligence related to national security'' to refer to all
intelligence, regardless of source, and to include information
collected both domestically and overseas, that involves threats
to the United States, its people, property or interests; the
development or use of weapons of mass destruction; or any other
matter bearing on the national or homeland security of the
Untied States.

Section 1014. Role of the National Intelligence Director in appointment
of certain officials responsible for intelligence-related
activities

This section amends Sec. 106 of the National Security Act
to authorize the NID to recommend to the President individuals
for appointment as the Deputy NID and the DCI. The section also
allows the NID to concur with the Secretary of Defense in the
selection of the head of the National Security Agency, National
Reconnaissance Office, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency. The NID shall consult, under this section on the
selection for the positions of the Defense Intelligence Agency,
Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research,
Director of the Office of Intelligence of the Department of
Energy, Director of the Office of Counterintelligence of the
Department of Energy, Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and
Analysis of the Department of Treasury, Executive Assistant
Director for the Intelligence of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (``FBI'') or successor, Undersecretary of
Homeland Security for Information Analysis and Infrastructure
Protection, and the Deputy Assistant Commandant of the Coast
Guard for Intelligence. Due to an ongoing restructuring at the
FBI, the Committee added the phrase ``or that officer's
successor'' to cover any new intelligence office at the FBI.
The bill also establishes the new National Counterterrorism
Center and provides authority to establish other national
intelligence centers (``NICs''). The NID shall also have
authority to select appointees for some intelligence positions
and consult with Congress in the selection of others.
(Sec. Sec. 1001-1016).

Section 1021. National Counterterrorism Center

The Commission's Report ``recommend[ed] the establishment
of a National Counterterrorism Center, built on the foundation
of the existing Terrorist Threat Integration Center (``TTIC'').
Breaking the older mold of national government organization,
this NCTC should be a center for joint operational planning and
joint intelligence, staffed by personnel from the various
agencies. The head of the NCTC should have authority to
evaluate the performance of the people assigned to the
Center.'' Commission Report at 403. Section 1021 establishes
the National Counterterrorism Center (``NCTC''), which will be
the primary organization for analyzing and integrating all
intelligence possessed or acquired by the U.S.--except for
intelligence pertaining exclusively to domestic
counterterrorism. The NCTC will also support the Department of
Justice, Department of Homeland Security, and other agencies in
fulfillment of their responsibilities to disseminate terrorism
information consistent with the law and guidelines agreed to by
the Attorney General and the NID. The Committee added the
reference to the AG guidelines in the Manager's Amendment.

Section 1022. Civil Liberties Protection Officer

Section 1022 requires the NID to appoint a Civil Liberties
Protection Officer (``CLPO'') who would be responsible for
ensuring that civil liberties and privacy protections are
appropriately incorporated in the policies and procedures
developed and implemented by the Office of the NID (``ONID'').
In addition, the CLPO must: (1) oversee compliance by the ONID
and the NID with the Constitution and all laws, regulations,
executive orders and implementing guidelines relating to civil
liberties and privacy; (2) review and assess complaints and
other information indicating possible civil liberties or
privacy abuses; (3) ensure that the utilization of technologies
sustain privacy protections regarding the use, collection, and
disclosure of personal information; (4) ensure that personal
information contained in a system of records (as defined in the
Privacy Act) is handled in full compliance with the Act's fair
information practices; (5) conduct privacy impact assessments
when appropriate or required by law; and (6) perform such other
duties as prescribed by the NID or required by law. Section
1022 authorizes the CLPO to refer complaints of civil liberties
or privacy abuse to the appropriate Office of Inspector General
responsible for the intelligence community department or agency
to investigate. This provision reflects the following
Commission recommendation: ``At this time of increased and
consolidated government authority, there should be a board
within the executive branch to oversee adherence to the
guidelines we recommend and the commitment the government makes
to defend our civil liberties.'' (Commission Report at 395).

Section 1031. Joint Intelligence Community Council

This section establishes the Joint Intelligence Community
Council which will provide advice to the NID from the various
heads of the Departments that contain elements of the
Intelligence Community, including the Attorney General.

TITLE II--TERRORISM PREVENTION AND PROSECUTION

Section 2001. Individual Terrorists as Agents of Foreign Powers

The Commission suggests on page 54 of its Report that
terrorism can be conducted by those who are acting alone and
not depending on al Qaeda or other terrorist organizations as a
source of funding but as a source of inspiration. The Report
found that the premise behind the government's efforts here--
that terrorist operations need a financial support network--may
itself be outdated. The effort to find, track, and stop
terrorist money presumes that it is being sent from a central
source or group of identifiable sources. Some terrorist
operations do not rely on outside sources of money, and cells
may now be self-funding, either through legitimate employment
or through low-level criminal activity. Terrorist groups only
remotely affiliated with al Qaeda pose a significant threat of
mass casualty attacks. Our terrorist-financing efforts can do
little to stop them, as there is no ``central command'' from
which the money flowed, as in the 9/11 attacks.
Section 2001 of the bill as introduced addresses the lone
terrorist acting on inspiration rather than affiliation. When
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (``FISA'') was
enacted in the 1970s, terrorists usually were members of
distinct, hierarchical terror groups. Today, the ``lone wolfs''
often are not formal members of any group. Instead, they are
part of a loosely organized movement, such as Jihad Against
America, and act alone. FISA authority should be updated to
reflect this new threat. This section amends 50 U.S.C.
Sec. 1801(b)(1) by adding new subparagraph C. Section
1801(b)(1) defines ``Agent of a foreign power'' for any person
other than a United States person, who:
(A) acts in the United States as an officer or
employee of a foreign power, or as a member of a
foreign power as defined in subsection (a)(4) of this
section;
(B) acts for or on behalf of a foreign power which
engages in clandestine intelligence activities in the
United States contrary to the interests of the United
States, when the circumstances of such person's
presence in the United States indicate that such person
may engage in such activities in the United States, or
when such person knowingly aids or abets any person in
the conduct of such activities or knowingly conspires
with any person to engage in such activities;
The definition is used to determine the target of a
surveillance under FISA. Section 4 adds new subparagraph C to
the definition, which states ``engages in international
terrorism or activities in preparation therefor.'' This new
definition reaches unaffiliated individuals who engage in
international terrorism, i.e. ``lone wolf'' terrorists.
Specifically, the language expands the FISA definition of
``agent of a foreign power'' to include a presumption that all
non-U.S. persons who engage in international terrorism meet the
definition of an agent of a foreign power.
This section as introduced does not change the requirement
for a judicial finding of probable cause that the target is an
agent of a foreign power. (See Sec. 1805(a)(3) and (b)) The new
definition requires that for a non-U.S. person to be found to
be an agent of a foreign power that person must be engaged in
international terrorism. Thus, under the probable cause
requirement currently in law and the new definition in this
section--before a judge can issue a FISA order for
surveillance--there must be a showing of probable cause that
the person is engaged or preparing to engage in international
terrorism.
At markup, the Committee adopted by voice vote a Berman
amendment that substantially changed this section. The Berman
amendment adds a new section to the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978. It allows the court to assume that a
non-U.S. person who is engaged in terrorism is an agent of a
foreign power under the Act.

Sections 2021-2024. Stop Terrorist and Military Hoaxes Act of 2004

The Commission Report found that ``hard choices must be
made in allocating limited resources,'' and that ``terrorists
should perceive that potential targets are defended'' (See
Commission Report at 391). Further, the Commission found that
``throughout the government, nothing has been harder for
officials * * * than to set priorities, making hard choices in
allocating limited resources'' (See Commission Report at 395).
In furtherance of this finding, this subtitle creates criminal
and civil penalties for whoever engages in any conduct, with
intent to convey false or misleading information, that concerns
an activity which would constitute such crimes as those
relating to: Explosives; firearms; destruction of vessels;
terrorism; sabotage of nuclear facilities; aircraft piracy; a
dangerous weapon to assault flight crew members and attendants;
explosives on an aircraft; homicide or attempted homicide or
damaging or destroying facilities. The subtitle also prohibits
making a false statement with intent to convey false or
misleading information about the death, injury, capture, or
disappearance of a member of the U.S. armed forces during a war
or armed conflict in which the United States is engaged.
Additionally, the bill increases penalties from not more than 5
years to not more than 10 years for making false statements,
and obstructing justice, if the subject matter relates to
international or domestic terrorism.

Sections 2041-2044. Material Support to Terrorism Prohibition
Enhancement Act of 2004

The Commission Report noted on page 68 that as early as
December 1993, a team of al Qaeda operatives had begun casing
targets in Nairobi for future attacks. It was led by Ali
Mohamed, a former Egyptian army officer who had moved to the
United States in the mid-1980s, enlisted in the U.S. Army, and
became an instructor at Fort Bragg. He had provided guidance
and training to extremists at the Farouq mosque in Brooklyn,
including some who were subsequently convicted in the February
1993 attack on the World Trade Center. Additionally, as the
report states on page 365, terrorism financing is a part of
providing material support to terrorists. Material support may
also consist of training.
Section 2042 establishes a new crime of material support
for terrorism for knowingly receiving military training from a
foreign terrorist organization. The section requires that any
person charged under this section must have knowledge that the
organization is a terrorist organization. It also defines the
term ``military-type training.'' The section provides for
extraterritorial federal jurisdiction over an offense under
this section.

Section 2043. Providing Material Support to Terrorism

The 9/11 Commission Report noted on pages 365-66 that ``a
complex international terrorist operation aimed at launching a
catastrophic attack cannot be mounted by just anyone in any
place. Such operations appear to require (among others):
1. Time, space, and ability to perform competent
planning and staff work;
2. Opportunity and space to recruit, train, and
select operatives with the needed skills and
dedication, providing the time and structure required
to socialize them into the terrorist cause, judge their
trustworthiness, and hone their skills;
3. A logistics network able to securely manage the
travel of operatives, move money, and transport
resources (like explosives) where they need to go; and
4. Access, in the case of certain weapons, to the
special materials needed for a nuclear, chemical,
radiological, or biological attack.
The Commission on page 215 noted that it was ``unlikely''
that two of the 9/11 hijackers, ``Hazmi and Mihdhar--neither of
whom, in contrast to the Hamburg group, had any prior exposure
to life in the West--would have come to the United States
without arranging to receive assistance from one or more
individuals informed in advance of their arrival.'' It further
noted, that ``our inability to ascertain the activities of
Hazmi and Mihdhar during their first two weeks in the United
States may reflect al Qaeda tradecraft designed to protect the
identity of anyone who may have assisted them during that
period.'' Without this material support structure in place, the
two hijackers would have unlikely been able to sustain an
existence without raising suspicions or feeling lost in an
unfamiliar environment.
Section 2043 expands the crime of material support to
terrorists to include any act of international or domestic
terrorism and require that any person charged under this
section must have knowledge that the organization is a
terrorist organization. It also more clearly defines the term
material support.

Section 2044. Financing of Terrorism

This section amends 18 USC Sec. 2339C so that those who
raise funds for terrorism can be prosecuted prior to the funds
being transmitted to terrorist organizations.

Sections 2051-2053. Weapons of Mass Destruction Prohibition Improvement
Act of 2004

The Commission Report states ``that al Qaeda has tried to
acquire or make weapons of mass destruction for at least ten
years. There is no doubt the United States would be a prime
target. Preventing the proliferation of these weapons warrants
a maximum effort--by strengthening counter proliferation
efforts, * * * '' (See Commission Report at 381) Section 2052
amends 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2332a(a)(2), which makes it a crime for a
person to use a weapon of mass destruction (other than a
chemical weapon) against any person within the U.S., and the
result of such use affects interstate and foreign commerce.
This legislation would expand the coverage of the target to
include property. The bill would also expand Federal
jurisdiction by covering the use of mail or any facility of
interstate or foreign commerce for the attack, by the property
being used for interstate or foreign commerce, and when the
perpetrator travels or causes another to travel in interstate
or foreign commerce in furtherance of the offense. This section
would also expand coverage to include the use of a chemical
weapon.

Section 2101-2102. Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing

The Commission Report found that: ``vigorous efforts to
track terrorist financing must remain front and center in U.S.
counterterrorism efforts. The government has recognized that
information about terrorist money helps us to understand their
networks, search them out, and disrupt their operations. These
efforts have worked. The death or capture of several important
facilitators has decreased the amount of money available to al
Qaeda and has increased its costs and difficulty in raising and
moving that money. Captures have additionally provided a
windfall of intelligence.'' (See Commission Report at 382)
This section authorizes funding for the Department of
Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (``FinCEN'').
It provides funding for the following: (1) key technological
improvements in FinCEN systems providing authorized law
enforcement agencies with Web-based access to FinCEN data; (2)
expedited filing of suspicious activity reports with the
ability to immediately alert financial institutions about
suspicious activities; (3) provision of informationsharing
technologies to improve the Government's ability to exploit the
information in the FinCEN databases; and (4) provision of training in
the use of technologies available to detect and prevent financial
crimes and terrorism.

Sections 2141-2146. Criminal History Background Checks

The Commission Report states that ``secure identification
should begin in the United States * * * at many entry points to
vulnerable facilities * * * sources of identification are the
last opportunity to ensure that people are who they say they
are and to check whether they are terrorists.'' (See Commission
Report at 390) The Report also states that ``the private sector
controls 85 percent of the critical infrastructure in the
nation * * * the `first' first responders will almost certainly
be civilians'' (See Commission Report at 398) In furtherance of
these findings, this subtitle addresses the issue of criminal
history records as they relate to background investigations.
This subtitle requires the Attorney General to initiate,
establish, and maintain a system for providing employers with
criminal history information if the information is requested as
part of an employee background check that is authorized by the
State where the employee works or where the employer has its
principal place of business. This subtitle also gives the
Attorney General flexibility, based on real time terror
concerns, to mandate criminal history record checks for certain
types of employment that involve positions vital to the
nation's infrastructure or key resources. This subtitle also
establishes a mechanism for private security officer employers
to request criminal history records as part of a background
investigation and establishes a task force to examine the
creation of a clearinghouse to facilitate criminal record
request exchanges involving applicants for security officer
employment.
This section would allow a standardized approach to the
numerous requests from groups that want or need access to these
records. A piecemeal approach has evolved as the various bills
that authorize these go to different committees for
consideration and, when passed, end up in different sections of
the code. Some of the groups that have legislation enacted for
their individual industries include: banking, parimutuel
wagering, securities, aviation, hazardous materials
transportation, nuclear energy, Indian gambiing, nursing and
home health care, and public housing.
There are several other industries and groups that are
seeking authority to request a check of these records as part
of their applicant screening process. This section sets up a
standard process with uniform procedures, definitions, fee
structures where practical, and reasonable safeguards to
protect privacy and employee rights. A reporting requirement
under this section seeks to identify all statutory requirements
that already require the Department of Justice to perform some
type of record check, the type of information requested, and
any variances that exist in terms, definitions, and fees
charged. The amendment offered by Mrs. Blackburn, which was
adopted, makes this a pilot study and establishes specific
criteria to be addressed in the report that is required,
including the effectiveness of using commercially available
data bases as part of criminal history information checks. The
Committee intends that this study last for 180 days.
Section 2143 amends Public Law 108-21 extending from 18
months to 30 months, the duration of existing pilot programs
for volunteer groups to obtain national and state criminal
history background checks.
Section 2144 was added by the Blackburn amendment. It is
the text of S.1743, the ``Private Security Officer Employment
Authorization Act,'' which passed the Senate by unanimous
consent at the end of 2003, and was the topic of a legislative
hearing on March 30th, 2004, before the Subcommittee on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Security. This section makes findings
as to the important role that private security officers play
and stresses the importance of thoroughly screening and
training officers. This section establishes a mechanism for
authorized employers of security guards to request criminal
history background checks using existing State identification
bureaus. The criteria for disqualification mirror existing
state criteria and where a state has no criteria for such
employment, this section provides general disqualifiers. A
state may decline to participate in the program established by
this section.
Section 2145, created by the Blackburn amendment,
establishes a task force to examine the establishment of a
national clearinghouse to process criminal history record
requests from employers providing private security guard
services. The Committee intends that the clearinghouse
described in Sec. 2145 shall only process criminal history
record requests pertaining to employees or prospective
employees of the private security guard service making the
request pursuant to that section.

Section 2191. Grand jury information sharing

The Commission recommended on page 417 of its report that
``Information procedures should provide incentives for sharing,
to restore a better balance between security and shared
knowledge. On page 355, the report listed several examples of
failures of information sharing before the September 11th
attacks. In January 2001: the CIA did not inform the FBI that a
source had identified Khallad, or Tawfiq bin Attash, a major
figure in the October 2000 bombing of the USS Cole, as having
attended the meeting in Kuala Lumpur with Khalid al Mihdhar. In
May 2001: a CIA official did not notify the FBI about Mihd-
har's U.S. visa, Hazmi's U.S. travel, or Khallad's having
attended the Kuala Lumpur meeting. In June 2001: FBI and CIA
officials did not ensure that all relevant information
regarding the Kuala Lumpurmeeting was shared with the Cole
investigators at the June 11 meeting. In August 2001: the FBI did not
recognize the significance of the information regarding Mihdhar and
Hazmi's possible arrival in the United States and thus did not take
adequate action to share information, assign resources, and give
sufficient priority to the search. Also in August 2001: FBI
headquarters did not recognize the significance of the information
regarding Moussaoui's training and beliefs and thus did not take
adequate action to share information.
Along with the 9/11 attacks, the growth of transnational
threats against the United States has increased the need for
intelligence and law enforcement agencies to cooperate and
share intelligence and law enforcement information. Executive
Order 12333 (1981) states: ``Timely and accurate information
about the activities, capabilities, plans, and intentions of
foreign powers, organizations, and persons and their agents, is
essential to the national security of the United States. All
reasonable and lawful means must be used to ensure that the
United States will receive the best intelligence available.''
Section 895 of the USA PATRIOT Act was an effort to allow
sharing of grand jury information in limited circumstanes. It
was subsequently affected by a rule change by the Supreme
Court. According to the Historical Notes of the Federal
Criminal Code and Rules on page 51, ``Section 895 of Pub. L.
No. 107-296, which purported to amend subdivision (e) of this
rule, failed to take into account the amendment of this rule by
Order of the Supreme Court of the United States dated April 29,
2002, effective December 1, 2002, and was therefore incapable
of execution.'' This section makes the technical changes to
address the rule change and ensure that the intent of Congress
is carried through to improve information sharing.

Section 2192. Interoperable Law Enforcement and Intelligence Data
System

The Commission Report described both the immensity of
government information, but also how the U.S. government has a
weak system for processing and using what it has. In no place
is there greater resistance to information sharing and to any
kind of interconnectivity among data systems than within the
Intelligence Community. For example, the Report states that
``undistributed NSA information * * * would have helped
identify Nawaf al Hazmi in January 2000.'' (See Commission
Report at 417) The problem is that, three years later, the
intelligence agencies stubbornly maintain the set of parallel
information system smokestacks that have existed for decades.
The Commission also proposed that ``information be shared
horizontally, across new networks that transcend individual
agencies, ``and explained that the ``current system is
structured on an old mainframe, or hub-and-spoke, concept. In
this older approach, each agency has its own database. Agency
users send information to the database and then can retrieve it
from the database.'' (See Commission Report at 418) It proposed
instead a ``decentralized network model,'' the concept behind
much of the information revolution also shares data
horizontally. Agencies would still have their own databases,
but those databases would be searchable across agency lines. In
this system, secrets are protected through the design of the
network and an `information rights management' approach that
controls access to the data, not access to the whole network''.
(See Commission Report at 418) The Commission recommended that
``The president should lead the government-wide effort to bring
the major national security institutions into the information
revolution * * * [he] should coordinate the resolution of the
legal, policy, and technical issues across agencies to create a
``trusted information network.'' (See Commission Report at 418)
Section 2192 provides a clear direction to the NID to end
that approach and clear deadlines for accomplishing a
horizontal system. It takes a system that Congress already
authorized for the successors to the INS in the Enhanced Border
Security Act of 2001--which has not been implemented--and moves
it to the National Intelligence Center. Specifically, this
provision establishes requirements for the NID to establish an
interim system for horizontal information exchange within the
intelligence community to become operational immediately. This
is to be followed by a fully functional interoperable system to
``truly'' establish interoperable data and information exchange
within a trusted information network by 2007. Due to the
complexity of this endeavor, as well as the urgency for
completion of both the interim system and the full system, a
special authority is granted to hire people capable of
establishing both systems. Requirements for the systems align
with the Commission's recommended ``need to share''
intelligence with intelligence officers, law enforcement and
operational counterterror personnel, consular officers, and DHS
border security officers.

Section 2193. The Improvement of Intelligence Capabilities of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation

This section codifies the recommendations of the Commission
as they relate to the FBI's intelligence capabilities. These
recommendations are largely reforms that have already been
implemented, or are about to be implemented, at the FBI. In its
Report, the Commission recommends that the FBI's shift to
preventing terrorism must survive the tenure of the current
Director. This section avoids past shortcomings by the Bureau
in its efforts to transform itself to address transnational
security concern.

TITLE III--BORDER SECURITY AND TERRORIST TRAVEL

Subtitle A. Immigration Reform in the National Interest

Section 3001. Verification of Returning Citizens

Regulations implementing the Immigration and Nationality
Act (``INA'') allow U.S. citizens to reenter the U.S. from
countries in the Western Hemisphere (other than Cuba) without
passports.\22\ The risks of this so-called ``Western Hemisphere
exception'' have become all too obvious. A May 2003 hearing by
the Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims
examined D.C. sniper John Muhammad's smuggling activities
between the Caribbean and the United States and revealed
significant weaknesses in the admission process resulting from
the exception. Muhammad was able to make his living by
providing false American identification documents such as
driver's licenses and birth certificates to aliens seeking to
impersonate U.S. citizens and get through U.S. ports-of-entry.
The GAO performed two investigations of this process, one for
the Senate Finance Committee in January 2003, and another for
the Immigration Subcommittee in May 2003.\23\ In January, GAO
agents crossed into the U.S. by presenting counterfeit state
identification documents with false names (or no documents at
all) from Canada, Mexico, and Jamaica. After briefing DHS on
what it had done, and using the same documents, inspectors re-
entered from Barbados unimpeded in May.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ See Sec. 215(b) of the INA.
\23\ See John Allen Muhammad, Document Fraud, and the Western
Hemisphere Passport Exception: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On
Immigration, Border Security and Claims of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 108th Cong., at 31 (testimony of Robert Cramer, Managing
Director, Office of Special Investigations, U.S. General Accounting
Office) (2003).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is no wonder that the Commission found that ``Americans
should not be exempt from carrying biometric passports or
otherwise enabling their identities to be securely verified
when they enter the United States * * * .'' \24\ Section 3001
would require that by October 2006, all U.S. citizens returning
from Western Hemisphere countries other than Canada and Mexico
must present U.S. passports. In the interim, U.S. citizens
would have to present a document designated by the Secretary of
DHS. For U.S. citizens returning from Canada and Mexico, the
Secretary of DHS would have to designate documents that are
sufficiently secure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ Commission Report at 388.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Section 3002. Documents Required by Aliens from Contiguous Countries

Foreign visitors usually need passports or U.S. visas or
border crossing cards to enter the U.S. However, the INA allows
the Administration to waive this requirement for nationals of
contiguous countries--which it has done for Canadians.\25\
Therefore, U.S. inspectors at northern ports-of-entry can allow
persons identifying themselves as Canadians and not looking
``suspicious'' to enter the U.S. without having to show any
documents whatsoever. Non-Canadians entering the U.S. without
any documents by claiming to be Canadian and Canadians on
terrorist watchlists not being identified at the border because
they do not have to provide documents are obvious security
concerns.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ See INA Sec. 212(d)(4)(B).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There have been a disturbing number of cases of terrorists
trying to enter the U.S. from Canada. Most notoriously, on
December 14, 1999, the U.S. Customs Service arrested Algerian
Ahmed Ressam at Port Angeles, Washington. Ressam was on his way
to carry out the ``Millenium Plot'' and detonate a bomb at Los
Angeles's international airport. He was found with
nitroglycerin and other bomb-making equipment in his car. A
former counter-terrorism chief for the CIA stated that his
interception was ``pure luck.''
The National Post of Canada reported in June 2002 that:

New allegations that a man behind the deadly bombing
of a Tunisian synagogue belonged to a Montreal-based
al-Qaeda cell show that Canada must do more to combat
violent extremists, critics charged. * * * Nizar Ben
Muhammed Nasr Nawar, 24, was under surveillance by
Canadian intelligence agents for weeks but managed to
slip away to his native country and set off a bomb that
killed 19 people, including 12 German tourists. There
is no word on whether Nawar, who told his family he was
going to study at a Montreal school for travel agents,
was part of a wave of 1,300 young Tunisian men who came
to Canada in 1999 and 2000 on a student exchange. More
than 100 of them have since disappeared without a
trace.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ Tom Blackwell, Bombing Link Brings Call for Crackdown:
Synagogue Killer Slipped through Net While in Canada, National Post,
June 10, 2002, at A4.

Unfortunately, it has been clear for some time that
Canadian immigration policy poses a risk to U.S. national
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
security. The Boston Globe reported in February 2002 that:

[Canada] has emerged as an important fund-raising and
staging ground for Al Qaeda soldiers. * * * For Al
Qaeda, the Canadian center of choice is Montreal * * *
although terrorist plotters and long-term ``sleepers''
have also made nests in Toronto and Vancouver, the
country's two other major urban areas, according to
terrorist specialists and investigators. ``Montreal is
a world-class hub of Islamist terrorist activity,''
said David Harris, former chief of strategic planning
at the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service, the
nation's spy service. * * * Noting the city's proximity
to the United States and its large Muslim population,
into which an Islamic militant bent on concealment can
easily blend, Harris * * * said: ``For a group that
thinks of the US as the Great Satan, what better
staging city for reconnaissance and operations?'' * * *
[I]ntelligence officials, anti-terrorist agents,
federal police, and diplomats confirmed in recent
interviews and background briefings that Al Qaeda and
other terrorist groups have a significant presence in
Canada. * * * Of most concern is the strong possibility
that undetected Al Qaeda sleeper cells exist in Canada,
awaiting the signal to attack American targets. * * *
[S]cores of suspected Al Qaeda loyalists * * * have
exploited Canada's liberal immigration standards and
notoriously lax refugee rules to establish safe havens
in the country that * * * still offers the easiest
international access to the United States. * * *
[C]ritics say the Chretien government is ignoring the
most basic reason why Canada has become a sanctuary for
international terrorists--immigration policies that
bring more than 250,000 new people a year into the
country with very little screening and loose rules that
allow even suspected terrorists to reside for years in
the country (collecting welfare, national health
benefits, and housing allowances) simply by claiming to
be refugees.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ Colin Nickerson, U.S. Wary of ``Time Bombs'' Waiting to Strike
from North, Boston Globe, February 4, 2002, at A12.

The 9/11 Commission found that ``Americans should not be
exempt from carrying biometric passports or otherwise enabling
their identities to be securely verified when they enter the
United States, nor should Canadians or Mexicans. * * *'' \28\
The bill would require that by the beginning of 2007, aliens
claiming to be Canadian who seek to enter the U.S. must present
a passport or other secure identification.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ Commission Report at 388 (emphasis added).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Section 3003. Strengthening the Border Patrol

The 9/11 Commission found that ``[i]t is elemental to
border security to know who is coming into the country. * * *
We must * * * be able to monitor and respond to entrances
between our ports of entry. * * * The challenge for national
security in an age of terrorism is to preventthe * * * people
who may pose overwhelming risks from entering * * * the U.S.
undetected.'' \29\ The Commission's staff report on ``9/11 and
Terrorist Travel'' found that ``[t]here is also evidence that
terrorists used human smugglers to sneak across borders.'' \30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ Id. at 383, 390.
\30\ 9/11 and Terrorist Travel: Staff Report of the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States at 59 (2004).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission and its staff were right. Because it is easy
for aliens to illegally cross our borders, it is also
relatively easy for terrorists to enter. Periodic reports of
large numbers of Middle Eastern nationals crossing the southern
border were verified by the recent release of Border Patrol
data showing that from last October through this June, 44,614
non-Mexican aliens were caught trying to cross the northern or
southern borders--including eight from Afghanistan, six from
Algeria, 13 from Egypt, 20 from Indonesia, 10 from Iran, 55
from Israel, 122 from Pakistan, six from Saudi Arabia, six from
Syria, 22 from Turkey, and two from Yemen. A South African
woman alleged to be on a terrorist watch list recently
indicated that she had crossed the border illegally from
Mexico.
By the mid 1990s, our southwest border was in a state of
crisis. The transit routes most heavily used for illegal aliens
were in the San Diego corridor. It had become a sieve where
illegal aliens from Mexico entered en masse and unhindered. The
Border Patrol in El Paso, Texas, then developed ``Operation
Hold the Line'' and placed agents directly on the border. This
deterrent dramatically reduced illegal crossings, cutting crime
in border communities and winning the praise of the public. The
INS adopted the Hold-the-Line strategy in San Diego under the
moniker of ``Operation Gatekeeper'', and it came to believe
that Gatekeeper was one of its most successful border control
initiatives ever, bringing law and order to the San Diego
border.
Despite the successes of Hold-the-Line and Gatekeeper,
overall illegal entries across our borders have not decreased
because there are not enough agents to duplicate the strategy
across the southwest border. Illegal aliens now resort to
difficult but lightly patrolled routes across rugged terrain in
California and Arizona. Professor Frank Bean of the University
of Texas found that approximately 16,000 Border Patrol agents
would be required to duplicate the Hold-the-Line strategy
across the entire southwestern border. This is the number of
agents America needs to control our southwestern border. Given
the need to also bolster resources along the northern border,
Border Patrol strength should optimally be at least doubled
from its current level of about 11,000. The bill therefore
authorizes an increase in the Border Patrol of 2,000 agents a
year for each of the next five years.

Section 3004. Increase in Immigration Enforcement Investigators

The Commission's staff found repeatedly that the lack of
enforcement of our immigration laws in the interior of the U.S.
facilitated terrorism. The staff reported that ``abuse of the
immigration system and a lack of interior immigration
enforcement were unwittingly working together to support
terrorist activity.'' \31\ Further, ``[t]he first problem
encountered by those concerned about terrorists was an almost
complete lack of enforcement resources. [No one] ever provided
the support needed for INS enforcement agents to find, detain,
and remove illegal aliens, including those with terrorist
associations.'' \32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ Id. at 46.
\32\ Id. at 95.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Even if we were to completely seal our borders, that would
not be enough to control illegal immigration. Between one-third
and one-half of the resident illegal alien population came to
the U.S. legally on temporary visas and simply never left.
Interior enforcement is a crucial component of immigration law
enforcement. In addition to tracking down illegal aliens
(including those who do make it past the border), interior
investigators also play a crucial role in the location and
deportation of criminal aliens and aliens who skip out on
deportation orders. But the Commission's staff found that
``[t]he budget for interior enforcement remained static in the
face of an overwhelming number of immigrants outside the legal
framework'' and that ``[t]he INS's difficulty in locating
absconders is consistent with the difficulty generally faced
[in locating] aliens inside our country.'' \33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ Id. at 143 and 156.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ICE only has about 2,000 investigators nationwide, a number
that all agree is woefully inadequate to protect the borders
against terrorist infiltration. Enforcement of employer
sanctions has all but been abandoned. Arrests on job sites have
declined from over 8,000 in 1992 to 451 in 2002, and final
orders levying fines on employers for immigration law
violations fell from over 1,000 in 1992 to 13 in 2002. Until we
eliminate the ``job magnet'' we will never successfully control
illegal immigration.
There are some 400,000 alien ``absconders,'' aliens who
have been ordered removed from the U.S. and who have ignored
those orders and remained in the country. Of those, 80,000 have
criminal records. Although ICE has deployed 18 Fugitive
Operations teams to arrest those aliens, the teams cannot
accomplish the task on their own. A recent report stated that
the San Diego team ``with more than 550 apprehensions ranks
near the top of the 22 cities where Homeland Security agents
have caught fugitives since October 2003.'' If each team were
to arrest 600 aliens per year, it would take more than 37 years
to apprehend the outstanding absconders, even if no other
aliens were to evade removal. It would take more than seven
yearsfor these teams to arrest just the criminal absconders.
The bill would increase the number of ICE investigators
enforcing our immigration laws by 800 a year for each of the
next five years. One half of the new investigators would be
dedicated to enforcing employer sanctions and removing illegal
aliens from the workplace. Section 3005. Prevention of Improper
Use of Foreign Identification Documents.
The Commission noted that ``[i]n their travels, terrorists
use * * * identity fraud.'' \34\ It wrote that ``[a]
fundamental problem * * * is the lack of standardized
information in `feeder' documents used in identifying
individuals [and that f]raud in identification documents is no
longer just a problem of theft. At many entry points to
vulnerable facilities, including gates for boarding aircraft,
sources of identification are the last opportunity to ensure
that people are who they say they are and to check whether they
are terrorists.'' \35\ The Commission went on to say that
``[o]nce inside the country, [aliens] may seek another form of
identification and try to enter a government or private
facility.'' \36\ It found that ``today, a terrorist can defeat
the link to electronic records by tossing away an old passport
and slightly altering the name in the new one.'' \37\ The staff
of the Commission found that ``[terrorists] relied on a wide
variety of fraudulent documents * * *.'' \38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ 9/11 Commission Report at 384.
\35\ Id. at 386, 390.
\36\ Id. at 385.
\37\ Id. at 389.
\38\ 9/11 and Terrorist Travel at 46.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Since early 2002, the Mexican government has been promoting
its consular identification card, called the ``matricula
consular,'' for acceptance in the United States. Acceptance of
the cards encourages illegal immigration to the United States.
The only aliens in the U.S. who need additional identification
documents, other than passports and U.S.-government issued
documents, are those illegally here.
Also, as the then-Assistant Director of the FBI's Office of
Intelligence, Steve McCraw, told the Immigration Subcommittee
in June 2003, the matricula consular is vulnerable to fraud
because the issuance standards are low, the Mexican government
does not monitor the cards' issuance, and it is also vulnerable
to forgery.\39\ Mr. McCraw concluded that domestic acceptance
of matricula cards in the United States poses a law enforcement
and national security risk.\40\ He stated that the criminal
threat stems from the fact that matriculas ``can be a perfect
breeder document for establishing a false identity,'' which can
facilitate a wide range of crimes, including money
laundering.\41\ He told of individuals who were arrested with
multiple matriculas, each with the same photo but different
names, some of whom had matching driver's licenses.\42\ He
concluded that the terrorist threat posed by these cards that
is the ``most worrisome'' to the FBI: ``[t]he ability of
foreign nationals to use [consular cards] to create a well-
documented, but fictitious, identity in the United States
provides an opportunity for terrorists to move freely within
the United States without triggering name-based watch lists
that are disseminated to local police officers.'' \43\ Nor is
the danger posed by those documents only as ``breeder
documents'' for other documentation--notwithstanding their
vulnerability to fraud and abuse, consular ID cards can be
presented to board an airliner.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\ See Consular Identification Cards: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
On Immigration, Border Security and Claims of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 108th Cong., at 109-12 (2003).
\40\ Id. at 112.
\41\ Id. at 111.
\42\ Id.
\43\ Id. at 112.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The bill would bar all federal employees from accepting
identification cards presented by aliens other than a document
issued by the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland
Security under the authority of the immigration laws, or an
unexpired foreign passport. Section 3006. Expedited Removal for
Illegal Aliens.
By the mid-1990s, tens of thousands of aliens were arriving
at U.S. airports each year without valid documents and making
meritless asylum claims, knowing that they would be released
into the community pending asylum hearings because of a lack of
detention space. Few were ever heard from again. In response,
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
of 1996 (``IIRIRA'') created the mechanism of ``expedited
removal.'' \44\ Under expedited removal, a DHS officer at a
port-of-entry can immediately return an alien lacking proper
documents to the country of origin unless the alien asks for
asylum and can establish a ``credible fear'' of persecution. By
fiscal year 2003, the INS was making over 43,000 expedited
removals per year and our airports were no longer being
deluged.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\44\ See INA 235(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
IIRIRA provided the Administration with the authority to
use expedited removal in the case of any alien who had entered
the U.S. illegally and had not been present here for two
years.\45\ Until recently, the INS and DHS never made use of
this power, a fact that amazed the staff of the 9/11
Commission. The staff stated that:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\45\ See INA 235(b)(1)(A)(iii).

Despite th[e success of expedited removal at our
airports], the INS never expanded expedited removal to
include persons attempting to enter illegally across
the expansive physical borders between ports of entry.
As a result, it was not used against Gazi Ibrahim Abu
Mezer, who was able to stay in the United States
despite being apprehended three times for illegal
entries along the Canadian border. He later became
known as the ``Brooklyn Bomber'' for his plan to blow
up the Atlantic Avenue subway in Brooklyn.\46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\46\ 9/11 and Terrorist Travel at 97 (footnotes omitted).

Recently, the Administration has taken a tentative step
towards using expedited removal along the southern border
because of the large numbers of non-Mexican aliens who have
been caught by the Border Patrol and then released into the
United States because of a lack of detention space.
Aliens who have crossed the border illegally should be
subject to expedited exclusion. These aliens, if they have been
in the U.S. less than ten years, have no right to seek
cancellation of removal. Unless they are making a claim of
asylum and can show a credible fear of persecution, there is no
reason not to subject them to expedited removal. Otherwise, the
present ``revolving door'' will continue to spin. We will catch
illegal aliens and promptly release them, hoping they will
appear for their immigration court hearing months hence. DOJ's
Inspector General found that the INS was only able to remove
13% of nondetained aliens with final orders of removal, and
only 6% of nondetained aliens from state sponsors of terrorism
who had final removal orders.\47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\47\ U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General,
Evaluation and Inspections Division, The Immigration and Naturalization
Service's Removal of Aliens Issued Final Orders (I-2003-004) at i, ii
(2003).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The bill would require DHS to use expedited removal in the
case of all aliens who have entered the U.S. illegally and have
not been present here for five years. Given changes to the INA
that Congress made in 1996 that amended the entry doctrine and
ended the distinctions between exclusion and deportation
hearings, it is questionable whether aliens who entered
illegally would have any due process rights beyond the minimal
rights of an arriving alien seeking admission to the U.S.
Assuming that those aliens do, however, the procedures
specified in section 3006 would satisfy due process. That these
procedures do not require immigration court consideration does
not violate due process, nor do they necessarily make the risk
of an erroneous deprivation of removal any more likely than
would immigration court procedures.
In evaluating whether procedures in any case satisfy due
process, the court must consider the interest at stake for the
alien, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the interest
through the procedures used as well as the probable value of
additional or different procedural safeguards, and the interest
of the government in using the current procedures rather than
additional or different procedures.\48\ The aliens affected by
this section have an interest in not being removed. Those
aliens' interests are limited, however, by the paucity of their
ties to the United States. In particular, the only aliens who
would be impacted by this provision are those who have so few
ties (and have been here less than five years) that they are
entitled to no immigration benefits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\48\ See Landon v. Plascencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
No precedent suggests that to satisfy due process, an alien
must be placed into removal proceedings before an immigration
judge under Sec. 240 of the INA, as opposed to having the
opportunity to explain to an immigration officer within DHS
that he or she is not inadmissible under one of the grounds for
expedited removal. As the Supreme Court held in one of the
seminal cases in immigration law:

This court has never held, nor must we now be
understood as holding, that administrative officers,
when executing the provisions of a statute involving
the liberty of persons, may disregard the fundamental
principles that inhere in ``due process of law'' as
understood at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution. One of these principles is that no person
shall be deprived of his liberty without opportunity,
at some time, to be heard, before such officers, in
respect of the matters upon which that liberty
depends--not necessarily an opportunity upon a regular,
set occasion, and according to the forms of judicial
procedure, but one that will secure the prompt,
vigorous action contemplated by Congress, and at the
same time be appropriate to the nature of the case upon
which such officers are required to act.\49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\49\ Yamatayo v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1903) (emphasis
added).

In fact, until the (regulatory) creation of the Executive
Office for Immigration Review in 1983, immigration judges were
a part of the former INS, the agency charged with the alien's
removal. In implementing the expedited removal provisions in
IIRIRA, INS recognized the interests of aliens facing removal,
and drafted its procedures to protect those interests.\50\
Those procedures effectively ensure that aliens are not
erroneously removed thereunder: ``All officers should be
especially careful to exercise objectivity and professionalism
when refusing admission to aliens under this [expedited
removal] provision. Because of the sensitivity of the program
and the potential consequences of a summary removal, you must
take special care to ensure that the basic rights of all aliens
are preserved * * *. Since a removal order under this process
is subject to very limited review, you must be absolutely
certain that all required procedures have been adhered to and
that the alien has understood the proceedings against him or
her. * * * All officers should be aware of precedent decisions
and policies relating to the relevant grounds of
inadmissibility. * * * [I]t is important that * * * any
expedited removal be justifiable and non-arbitrary.\51\ The
Committee believes that the procedures adopted under this
provision will have similar protections.\52\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\50\ See generally AILA v. Reno, 18 F. Supp.2d 38, 43-44 (D.D.C.
1998).
\51\ Id. at 43 (quoting the INS Inspector's Field Manual, ch.
17.15(a), (b)).
\52\ The alien's rights in expedited removal would be further
protected by the alien's access to seek review in habeas proceedings.
See INA Sec. 242(e).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The government's interest in the efficient enforcement of
the immigration laws, on the other hand, is weighty,
particularly given the findings of the Commission and its
report. As the Commission found: ``had the immigration system
set a higher bar for determining whether individuals are who or
what they claim to be--and ensuring routine consequences for
violations--it could potentially have excluded, removed, or
come into further contact with several hijackers who did not
appear to meet the terms for admitting short-term visitors.''
\53\ Further, as the Supreme Court has found, ``it must weigh
heavily in the balance that control over matters of immigration
is a sovereign prerogative, largely within the control of the
executive and the legislature.'' \54\ Given these facts, the
procedures described in the bill satisfy the due process for
aliens who entered the U.S. illegally (such aliens having
extremely limited due process rights). Section 3007. Limit
Asylum Abuse by Terrorists.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\53\ Commission Rewport at 384; see also id. at 390 (``It is
elemental to bordere security to know who is coming into our country.
We must also be able to * * * respond to entrances between our ports of
entry.'').
\54\ Plascencia, 459 U.S. at 34.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Terrorists are not supposed to receive asylum,\55\ but many
have tried. The Commission's staff report on ``9/11 and
Terrorist Travel'' found that ``a number of terrorists * * *
abused the asylum system'' \56\ and that ``[o]nce terrorists
had entered the U.S., their next challenges was to find a way
to remain here. Their primary method was immigration fraud * *
* [concoct]ing bogus political asylum stories when they arrived
* * *.'' \57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\55\ See INA Sec. 208(b)(2)(A)(v).
\56\ 9/11 and Terrorist Travel at 99.
\57\ Id. at 47.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Unfortunately, examples abound. In 1993, Mir Aimal Kansi
murdered two CIA employees at CIA headquarters and Ramzi Yousef
masterminded the first World Trade Center attack while free
after applying for asylum. In the same year, Sheik Umar Abd ar-
Rahman plotted to bomb New York City landmarks after he applied
for asylum. Just weeks ago, Shahawar Matin Siraj was arrested
in New York City for plotting to bomb a subway station. Siraj
was free after applying for asylum.
Asylum fraud is endemic. The staff of the 9/11 Commission
found that ``the asylum system did not detect or deter
fraudulent applicants.'' \58\ ``Snakeheads'' and other alien
smugglers have succeeded in providing the aliens they are
smuggling into the U.S. with extensive coaching and ``cheat
sheets'' on what claims to make to get asylum. Successful ploys
are quickly duplicated. The Commission staff found that ``the
asylum system did not detect or deter fraudulent applicants.''
\59\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\58\ Id. at 86.
\59\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As a result, the number of aliens--mostly illegal aliens
seeking any way to avoid deportation--who have applied for and
have been granted asylum has skyrocketed in recent years. From
1990 to 2003, the number of aliens granted asylum by asylum
officers has increased by 173% and the number of aliens granted
asylum by immigration judges increased by 377%. The percentage
of cases approved by asylum officers has increased by 93%, and
the percentage approved by immigration judges has increased by
61%. When both asylum officers and immigration judges are taken
into account, well over half of all asylum applications are now
being approved. The total number of aliens granted asylum hit
almost 37,000 in 2002 and almost 29,000 in 2003, a 240 percent
increase from 1990 to 2003.
Ninth Circuit precedent makes it difficult for immigration
judges to deny fraudulent asylum applications by terrorists or
simply by scam artists. In recent decisions, the Ninth Circuit
has failed to give deference to the adverse credibility
determinations of immigration judges in asylum cases. It is
well accepted that the initial trier of fact is in the best
position to assess the credibility of a witness who appears
before him. The Supreme Court has held that ``[t]o reverse the
BIA finding, [the reviewing court] must find that the evidence
not only supports the conclusion, but compels it.'' \60\
Despite these rules, however, the Ninth Circuit has adopted a
body of circuit law that relieves the applicant of his burden
of proof in asylum cases and allows the court to substitute its
own views about contested record evidence for reasonable
determinations of immigration judges or the BIA: ``the majority
resolves every ambiguity in favor of [the asylum applicant],
whereas [the correct] standard of review requires us to resolve
every ambiguity in favor of the decision-maker below.'' \61\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\60\ INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 n.1 (1992).
\61\ Cardenas v. INS, No. 01-70557, 2002 WL 1286076, at *6 (9th
Cir. June 12, 2002) (Graber, J. dissenting).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The court essentially prevents immigration judges from
making adverse credibility determinations by limiting to the
point of a nullity the factors (such as inconsistencies and
demeanor observations) that the immigration judge can consider
in finding an alien incredible.\62\ For example, it has held
that an immigration judge could not take into account, when
determining whether an alien's allegations of police beatings
were credible, the alien's inconsistent testimony about when
and where he was beaten.\63\ It has ruled that the BIA could
not draw inferences from the ```disjointed[ness] and
``incoherence''' of the applicant's testimony, speculating that
those features of the testimony ``were possibly the result of
mistranslation or miscommunication.'' \64\ It ignores the rule
that ``[i]f a witness lies on any point, now matter how
irrelevant it may at first appear * * * the witness's
credibility is tenuous at best, and the entire testimony can be
discredited.'' \65\ It ruled that an applicant's failure to
mention family-planning issues in his 1995 asylum application,
and his statement in 1995 that he was unmarried, failed to cast
doubt upon respondent's testimony in the second asylum
proceeding that he was married and his wife was pregnant when
he fled China in 1995, and that he fled because he was being
pursued by family-planning officials.\66\ It treats each
inconsistency or gap in an applicants evidence as an isolated
defect, rather than considering them cumulatively.\67\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\62\ See e.g., Singh v. INS, 292 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 2002); Bandari
v. INS, 227 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2000); Shah v. INS, 220 F.3d 1062 (9th
Cir. 2000); Abovian v. INS, 219 F.3d 972 (9th Cir. 2000), reh'g denied,
257 F.3d 971 (9th Cir. 2001).
\63\ See Bandari, 227 F.3d at 1165-66.
\64\ See Abovian, 219 F.3d at 979 (quoting Akinmade v. INS, 196
F.3d 951, 956 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
\65\ See, e.g., Jeffrey Kestler, Questioning Techniques and Tactics
Sec. 1.22 (3d ed. 1999).
\66\ See INS v. Yi Quan Chen, 266 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 2001).
\67\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other Courts of Appeals adhere to more reasonable rules,
for example that an asylum applicant has to provide
``convincing reasons'' for inconsistency in his evidence,\68\
that the court should review the collective significance of
inconsistencies,\69\ and that an asylum applicant's not
remembering the details of his father's kidnaping was ``the
very stuff of legitimate impeachment.'' \70\ Given that
government attorneys are barred from asking the foreign
government about the facts regarding the asylum claimants,\71\
about the only evidence available to the government on which to
deny an asylum application is the perceived credibility of the
applicant. If a criminal jury can sentence a criminal defendant
to life imprisonment or execution based on adverse credibility
determinations, certainly an immigration judge can deny an
alien asylum on this basis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\68\ See Mansour v. INS, 230 F.3d 902, 906 (7th Cir. 2000).
\69\ See Chun v. INS, 40 F.3d 76, 78-79 (5th Cir. 1994).
\70\ See Bojorques-Villanueva v. INS, 194 F.3d 14, 17 (1st Cir.
1999).
\71\ See 8 C.F.R. Sec. 208.6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 1988, the Ninth Circuit created a disturbing precedent
that has made it easier for suspected terrorists to apply for
and receive asylum. It held that punishment inflicted on
account of perceived membership in an armed group may
constitute persecution on account of the political opinion of
that armed group, a doctrine known as ``imputed political
opinion.'' \72\ Thus, aliens who have been arrested in the
United States for suspicion of affiliation with terrorist
organizations argue that the foreign government believes that
they are members of a terrorist organization. Some have
received asylum because of a fear of persecution if returned
because of an affiliation with these groups.\73\ Of course, the
court has to rule that the foreign government ``mistakenly''
believes the asylum applicant is a terrorist because terrorists
are barred from receiving asylum. As a member of the Board of
Immigration Appeals has found:

\72\ See Blanco-Lopez v. INS, 858 F. 2d 531 (9th Cir. 1988).
\73\ See, e.g., Singh v. Ilchert, 63 F. 3d 1501 (9th Cir. 1995).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It would appear that the Ninth Circuit holds the
entirely novel view that the violent overthrow of a
democratically elected government is a ``political
opinion'' like any other and that no government may
object to its expression. If a guerilla organization
arose in this country aimed at the violent overthrow of
the Federal Government through a program of murder of
government and law enforcement officials and federal
judges, it would appear that governmental suppression
of this organization would be an act of persecution in
the Ninth Circuit. After all, if that court could find
that [a government] ``persecuted [the asylum applicant]
because it believed him to be a guerrilla,'' then it is
clear that ``being'' a guerrilla is somehow a form of
``political opinion,'' regardless of the actual
objectives of the guerrillas and their methods. If this
is so, then that court could not logically object to
the murder of federal judges by ``guerrillas'' who are
only acting out their ``political opinion,'' whether it
be a form of Marxism or ``Aryan supremacy'' * * * [I]f
* * * ``being'' a guerrilla is the acting out of a
political opinions that policemen should be killed * *
* then so is the view that Jews should be killed
because they are believed to control the world, or that
federal judges should be murdered because they are
considered an instrument of repression of Caucasian
Christians. * * * ``Being'' a guerrilla is not a form
of political opinion. ``Being'' a guerilla means being
engaged in acts of violence and illegality. I know of
no legal principle or form of logic that states that
``being'' engaged in such acts automatically transforms
the ``political opinions'' that drive those acts into a
form of political opinions protected by United States
law. * * * One faces the remarkable possibility under
[the Ninth Circuit doctrine] that the more egregious
the act and the greater the outrage, the higher the
probability of being granted asylum, on the ground that
claimed police mistreatment will be on ``account of
political opinion,'' not human failings, vengeance, or
anger provoked by the extremist's acts.\74\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\74\ Matter of R-, 20 I. & N. 621, 636-37 (1992) (M. Heilman,
concurring).

This section would overturn this precedent of the Ninth
Circuit. It would reassert that the burden of proof in an
asylum case is on the applicant and that the testimony of the
applicant may be sufficient to sustain such burden without
corroboration, but only if it is credible, is persuasive, and
refers to specific facts that demonstrate that the applicant is
a refugee. Where it is reasonable that an applicant would
present corroborating evidence, such evidence must be provided
unless a reasonable explanation is given as to why such
information is not provided. No court shall reverse a
determination made by an immigration judge or BIA with respect
to the availability of corroborating evidence unless the court
finds that a reasonable adjudicator is compelled to conclude
that such corroborating evidence is unavailable.
This section also provides a non-exhaustive list of factors
that an immigration judge can consider in assessing
credibility, such as the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of
the applicant or witness, the consistency between the
applicant's or witness's written and oral statements, whether
or not under oath, made at any time to any officer, agent, or
employee of the United States, the internal consistency of each
such statement, the consistency of such statements with the
country conditions in the country from which the applicant
claims asylum, as presented by the Department of State, and any
inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements. Finally, aliens
who allege they will be persecuted because of terrorist ties
will not longer be presumed to fear persecution on account of
political opinion. Rather, the section requires such that such
applicant establish that race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion
was or will be the central motive for their claimed
persecution.

Section 3008. Revocation of Visas

The INA allows the State Department to revoke visas after
they have been issued. \75\ Revocation is problematic, however,
when the alien has entered the U.S. by the time the visa has
been revoked because there is no provision that allows DHS to
remove an alien whose visa has been revoked. If DHS has
information that establishes that the alien is otherwise
removable (such as for a crime, or illness), it will place the
alien in removal proceedings on those grounds. However, DHS
bears the burden of proof in deportation proceedings, and if
the agency cannot prove that the alien is deportable, it must
allow the alien to remain until the alien's period of
authorized admission ends.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\75\ See INA Sec. 221(i).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This policy is a particular problem in terrorism cases
because information linking an alien to terrorism is often
classified, and classified information cannot be used to prove
deportability. In October 2002, GAO reported that the State
Department had revoked 105 visas that had been erroneously
issued to aliens about whom there were questions about possible
terror ties before their background checks had been completed.
The GAO found that immigration agents did not attempt to track
down those aliens whose visas had been revoked because of the
difficulty in removing those aliens from the United States.\76\
The bill would respond to this problem by allowing the
government to deport a nonimmigrant alien whose visa has been
revoked. The section will prevent an alien whose visa has been
revoked to challenge the underlying revocation in court, where
the government might again be placed in a position of either
exposing its sources or permitting a potentially dangerous
alien to remain in the U.S.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\76\ See U.S. General Accounting Office, Border Security: New
Policies and Procedures Are Needed to Fill Gaps in the Visa Revocation
Process (GAO-03-798) at 5 (2003).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The bill also addresses a similar loophole that would
prevent DHS from revoking a nonimmigrant visa petition that has
been granted for an alien in the U.S., even before that alien
has received the visa. Currently, DHS cannot revoke a petition
even if it appears that the alien may not be eligible for the
visa, even if the petition was fraudulent and submitted by an
alien terrorist. The bill would delete archaic language that
was added to the INA decades ago, when travel to the U.S. was
long and laborious, and when adjustment of status, a legal
fiction by which aliens in the U.S. are treated as if they had
reentered in a new legal status, was rare.

Section 3009. Streamlined Removal Process

The staff of the 9/11 Commission wrote that:

In many cases, the act of filing for an immigration
benefit sufficed to permit the alien to remain in the
country until the petition was adjudicated. Terrorists
were free to conduct surveillance, coordinate
operations, obtain and receive funding, go to school
and learn English, make contacts in the U.S., acquire
necessary materials, and execute an attack [and that]
immigration cases against suspected terrorists were
often mired for years in bureaucratic struggles over
alien rights and the adequacy of evidence.\77\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\77\ 9/11 and Terrorist Travel at 98, 143.

In 1996, Congress attempted to streamline the judicial
review of immigration orders entered against aliens who have
committed serious crimes in the U.S. IIRIRA sought to eliminate
judicial review of immigration orders for most criminals,
recognizing that criminal aliens had received a full measure of
due process in their criminal cases and immigration
proceedings, and that additional review typically only delayed
their inevitable removal as criminals were statutorily barred
from most forms of immigration relief.\78\ IIRIRA also limited
the judicial review of discretionary relief issues for all
aliens, on the basis that the law committed such matters to the
judgment of the Attorney General.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\78\ See Sec. 306 of Pub L. No. 104-208.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Because the 1996 reforms lacked express language precluding
district court review, however, the Supreme Court has read the
provision to give aliens judicial review possibilities other
than, or in addition to, the review \79\ specified in the
immigration laws. As Justice Scalia stated in dissent:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\79\ See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001).

The Court has therefore succeeded in perverting a
statutory scheme designed to expedite the removal of
criminal aliens into one that now affords them more
opportunities for (and layers of) judicial review (and
hence more opportunities for delay) than are afforded
non-criminal aliens--and more than were afforded
criminal aliens prior to the enactment of IIRIRA. This
outcome speaks for itself; no Congress ever imagined
it.\80\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\80\ Id. at 335 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

The result of this judicial activism has been a dramatic
increase in the volume of immigration cases filed in the
federal courts and continued delay and inefficiency in securing
final judgment in immigration matters.
Consistent with the settled principle that petitions for
review should be the ``sole and exclusive'' means of judicial
review for aliens challenging their removal, the bill
streamlines immigration review while protecting an alien's
right to review by an independent judiciary. For criminal
aliens and aliens who are not permanent residents, review would
be only in the circuit court and the scope of review would be
limited to: (1) whether the individual is an alien; (2)whether
he is deportable under the INA; (3) whether he was ordered removed
under the INA; and (4) whether he meets the criteria for withholding of
removal or Torture Convention protection. For non-criminal lawful
permanent resident aliens, review would be only in the circuit court
and would be available for all non-discretionary determinations. This
assures that every alien may obtain review of his or her final order of
removal in the courts of appeals. Under this provision, criminal aliens
would have the opportunity for circuit court review of constitutional
claims and pure questions of law. These provisions are fully consistent
with both the Supreme Court's decision in St. Cyr and settled
jurisprudence regarding the availability of habeas corpus. These
reforms will ensure that aliens will have a day in court, but that
criminals will not be able to delay their lawful removal from the
United States.

Sections 3031-32. No Bar to Removal for Terrorists and Criminal Aliens

Legislation implementing the Convention Against Torture was
enacted in 1998.\81\ The Convention ensures that human rights
violators and others engaged in torture are brought to justice
and details the process for extradition, detention, criminal
prosecution, and victim compensation. The Convention also
prohibits the return of an alien to a country where there are
substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in
danger of being tortured. When the Senate passed the
implementing legislation, it stated that ``to the maximum
extent consistent with the obligations of the United States
under the Convention * * * the [INS] regulations * * * shall
exclude from the protection of such regulations aliens
described in section 241(b)(3)(B) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act.'' What kinds of aliens are so described?
Aliens who have engaged in Nazi persecution or genocide, aliens
who have engaged in terrorist activity, aliens who have been
convicted of particularly serious crimes and are thus a danger
to the community of the U.S., aliens who committed serious
crimes outside the U.S., and aliens who there are reasonable
grounds to believe are a danger to the security of the U.S.
This makes perfect sense. After all, the same aliens are barred
under the INA from receiving asylum.\82\ The Justice
Department, however, clearly disobeyed Congress's instructions
in writing the regulations creating relief from deportation
under the Convention.\83\ The regulations did not exclude such
dangerous individuals from relief from deportation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\81\ See the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998,
Pub. L. No. 105-277, div. G., Sec. 2242 (1998).
\82\ See INA Sec. 208(b)(2).
\83\ See 8 C.F.R. Sec. 208.16-18.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Immigration Subcommittee conducted a hearing in July
2003 on the effect of the INS regulations.\84\ From March 1999
through August 2002, immigration judges granted hundreds of
criminal aliens relief from deportation under the
Convention.\85\ This included two murderers that we know of,
one who killed a spectator at a Gambian soccer game and one who
was implicated in a mob-related quintuple homicide in
Uzbekistan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\84\ See Immigration Relief Under the Convention Against Torture
for Serious Criminals and Human Rights Violators: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. On Immigration, Border Security and Claims of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003).
\85\ See letter from William E. Moschella, Assistant Attorney
General, U.S. Department of Justice, to Chairman F. James
Sensenbrenner, Jr. (July 7, 2003).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The danger posed by the requirement that these aliens be
allowed to remain in the U.S. was increased exponentially by
the 2001 Supreme Court decision of Zadvydas v. Davis,\86\ in
which the Court made clear that it would strike down as
unconstitutional the indefinite detention by DHS of aliens with
removal orders whose countries will not take them back, except
in the most narrow of circumstances.\87\ Based on this
decision, DOJ decided that it had no choice but to release back
onto the streets those criminal aliens who had received
protection under the Convention. By the time of the hearing in
July of 2003, approximately 500 criminal aliens who had
received relief under the Convention had been released into
American communities \88\--including the murderer from
Uzbekistan. The Gambian murderer might also have been released,
but he decided to return home to Gambia voluntarily.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\86\ 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
\87\ ``We have upheld preventive detention based on dangerousness
only when limited to specially dangerous individuals * * *. Neither do
we consider terrorism or other special circumstances where special
arguments might be made for forms of preventive detention and for
heightened deference to the judgments of the political branches with
respect to matters of national security.'' Id. at 690-91, 696 (emphasis
added).
\88\ See Immigration Relief Under the Convention Against Torture at
2 (statement of John Hostettler, Chairman of the Subcommittee on
Immigration, Border Security and Claims).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Committee discovered at the hearing that even a Nazi
war criminal had sought to avoid deportation through the
Convention.\89\ Terrorists have received relief from removal
under the Convention Against Torture, including an alien
involved in the assassination of Anwar Sadat.\90\ Days ago, a
suspected al Qaeda operative made claim under the Convention to
forestall deportation.\91\ Osama Bin Laden himself could
probably frustrate deportation by making a Convention claim--
since the more heinous a person's actions, the more likely that
he might be subject to torture in his home country.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\89\ See id. at 15 (statement of Eli Rosenbaum, Director, Office of
Special Investigations, U.S. Department of Justice).
\90\ See Soliman v. U.S., 296 F. 3d 1237 (11th Cir. 2002).
\91\ See Stephen Dyer, Inmate Fights to Stay in U.S., York Beacon
Journal, Sept. 22, 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The bill would make the Convention regulations adhere to
the intent of Congress. 1Aliens who have engaged in Nazi
persecution or genocide, terrorist aliens, aliens who have been
convicted of particularly serious crimes and are thus a danger
to the community of theU.S., aliens who committed serious
crimes outside the U.S., and aliens for whom there are reasonable
grounds to believe are a danger to the security of the U.S. would not
be allowed to frustrate their deportations and be released onto the
streets of our communities.

Section 3033. Removal of Aliens

At the present time, an arriving alien turned back at the
border is removed to the country from which he came to the
U.S., or to his country of citizenship or nationality.\92\
Aliens deported after admission are allowed to designate a
country of removal, but the Attorney General can disregard the
designation if that country refuses to accept the alien or if
removal would be prejudicial to the U.S.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\92\ See INA Sec. 241.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The current removal provisions have been used by certain
aliens to block DHS from removing them to countries that have
no governments to formally accept them. In particular, DHS is
prevented by court order from sending aliens back to
Somalia.\93\ Under the court's ruling, DHS may not remove any
criminal alien back to Somalia, regardless of the severity of
the offense or the danger that the alien poses. More
importantly, however, DHS cannot remove any terrorist aliens to
that country. In December 2001, Secretary of State Colin Powell
stated that ``some bin Laden followers are holed up [in
Somalia], taking advantage of the absence of a functioning
government,'' and Joint Chiefs Chairman Richard Myers also
stated that month that the U.S. has ``strong indications
Somalia is linked to Osama Bin Laden.'' \94\ A further
indication of the terror threat posed by Somalia is that Al-
Ittihad, which President Bush named in his September 23, 2001,
executive order blocking property of, and prohibiting
transactions with, terrorist groups, operates in the
country.\95\ Moreover, a rule that aliens cannot be returned to
countries that have no government to accept them will encourage
illegal immigration from those countries, and will encourage
other aliens to fraudulently say that they are nationals of one
of those countries, to avoid removal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\93\ See e.g., Ali v. Ashcroft, 346 F. 3d 873 (9th Cir. 2003).
\94\ Ted Dagne, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress:
Africa and the War on Terrorism at 13 (2002).
\95\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The section would move the authority for designating a
country of removal to the Secretary of DHS, and give the
Secretary more power to remove an alien to a specific country.
It would also allow the Secretary to remove an alien to a
country of which the alien is a citizen or national unless the
country prevents the alien from entering. This would give the
Secretary the flexibility not to return an alien to a place
where the alien would be free to engage in terrorist
activities.

Section 3041. Bringing in and Harboring Certain Aliens

The Commission staff reported ``[t]here is also evidence
that terrorists used human smugglers to sneak across borders.''
\96\ The bill would increase criminal penalties for alien
smuggling and require the Secretary of DHS to develop and
implement an outreach program to educate the public in the U.S.
and abroad about the penalties for illegally bringing in and
harboring aliens.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\96\ 9/11 and Terrorist Travel at 59.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Section 3081. Studies on Worldwide Machine-Readable Passports and
Worldwide Travel History Database

The Commission recommended that ``[t]he Department of
Homeland Security, properly supported by the Congress, should
complete, as quickly as possible a biometric entry-exit
screening system, including a single system for speeding
qualified travelers.'' \97\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\97\ 9/11 Commission Report at 389.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This section requires the Department of State's Office of
Visa and Passport Control and the GAO each to conduct a study
on the feasibility, cost, and benefits of: (1) requiring all
passports to be machine-readable, tamper-resistant and with
biometric identifiers; and (2) the creation of a database
containing a record of all entry and exit information so that
border and consular officials may ascertain the travel history
of the visitor or a prospective entrant. This requirement would
allow consular officers and immigration inspectors to ascertain
the travel history of any U.S. citizen or foreign visitor
seeking to enter the U.S., even if that entrant has a new
passport.

Section 3082. Expanded Pre-inspection at Foreign Airports

In addition to recommending that DHS complete a biometric
entry-exit screening system, the Commission stated that:

The U.S. government cannot meet its own obligations
to the American people to prevent the entry of
terrorists without a major effort to collaborate with
other governments. We should do more to exchange
terrorist information with trusted allies, and raise
U.S. and global border security standards for travel
and border crossing over the medium and long term
through extensive international cooperation.\98\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\98\ Id. at 390.

Currently, DHS inspects passengers who are traveling to the
U.S. at 14 foreign airports instead of inspecting them at ports
of entry in the U.S. The bill would expand this program to
include up to an additional 25 airports. In addition, the
current selection criteria for pre-inspection locations are
based on reducing the number of aliens who arrive to the U.S.
who areinadmissible. Section 3082 states that the selection
criteria should also include the objective of preventing the entry of
potential terrorists. The additional locations should be operational by
January 1, 2008.

Section 3083. Immigration Security Initiative

The Immigration Security Initiative is a DHS operated
program that assists airline personnel at foreign airports in
identifying fraudulent travel documents. The program's
objective is to identify passengers, including potential
terrorists, who seek to enter the U.S. using fraudulent
documents, prior to these passengers being allowed to board
flights for the U.S. Currently, the program is in place in only
two foreign airports. This section expands the program to at
least 50 foreign airports by December 31, 2006.

Section 3084. Responsibilities and Functions of Consular Officers

This section improves the operation of U.S. consular
offices in preventing the entry of terrorists. First, it
increases the number of consular officers by 150 per year for
fiscal years 2006 through 2009. Second, it places limitations
on the use of foreign nationals to screen nonimmigrant visa
applicants by stating that all applications shall be reviewed
and adjudicated by a U.S. consular officer. Third, it requires
that the training program for consular officers include
training in detecting fraudulent documents and working directly
with DHS immigration inspectors at ports of entry. This
requirement is needed because consular officers currently do
not train directly with immigration inspectors to learn all of
the elements of our screening system as part of their training
regimen. Lastly, this section requires the Secretary of State
to place antifraud specialists in the one hundred posts that
have the greatest frequency of presentation of fraudulent
documents.

Section 3085. Increase in Penalties for Fraud and Related Activity

This section amends 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1028 to increase
penalties for the possession and transfer of fraudulent
government identification documents, including fraudulent U.S.,
state, and foreign government documents. The Commission
recommended: ``The Department of Homeland Security, properly
supported by the Congress, should complete, as quickly as
possible a biometric entry-exit screening system, including a
single system for speeding qualified travelers.'' Commission
Report at 389. ``The U.S. government cannot meet its own
obligations to the American people to prevent the entry of
terrorists without a major effort to collaborate with other
governments. We should do more to exchange terrorist
information with trusted allies, and raise U.S. and global
border security standards for travel and border crossing over
the medium and long term through extensive international
cooperation'' Id. at 390.

Section 3086. Criminal Penalty for False Claim to Citizenship

This section would make it a violation of law to make a
false claim of citizenship in order to enter or remain in the
United States. This also follows the Commission's
recommendation regarding a biometric entry-exit screening
system.

Section 3090. Biometric Entry and Exit Data System

As noted above, the Commission recommended a biometric
entry-exit screening system.'' \99\ This section calls on the
Secretary of DHS to develop a plan to accelerate the full
implementation of the requirement of an automated entry and
exit data system at U.S. ports of entry. The section also calls
for the Secretary of DHS to implement a plan to expedite the
processing of registered travelers at ports of entry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\99\ Id. at 389.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

TITLE V--GOVERNMENT RESTRUCTURING

Sections 5001-5010. Faster and Smarter Funding for First Responders

This section implements the Commission's recommendations
regarding first responder funding. Specifically,
Sec. Sec. 5001-10 fully incorporate H.R. 3266, the ``Faster and
Smarter Funding for First Responders Act,'' which follows the
Commission's recommendations concerning the delivery of Federal
homeland security assistance to state and local governments.
The Commission recommended that: ``Homeland Security assistance
should be based strictly on an assessment of risks and
vulnerabilities.''
This section recognizes the need to address our greatest
risks and vulnerabilities first, and then work down from there.
This section does so in several important respects. First, it
requires DHS to allocate homeland security assistance funds to
states or regions based upon the degree to which such an
allocation would lessen the threat to, vulnerability of, and
consequences for persons and critical infrastructure. Second,
it reduces the current state minimum and restructures the
allocation process. Under the current system, none of the funds
available under the State Homeland Security Grant Program are
allocated on the basis of risk. Instead, each state first
receives a base amount equal to 0.75 percent of the total, and
then an additional amount based solely on population. Under
this section, in contrast, DHS must first allocate all funds
based on risk, and then provide, if necessary, additional funds
to those States, territories, or certain Indian tribes that
have not met a significantly reduced minimum threshold of
funding. Under this scheme, 99% of the money will be allocated
strictly on the basis of risk.
In 2001, the Committee on the Judiciary, through the
enactment of the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act, authorized the Office for
Domestic Preparedness in DOJ to provide State grants that
enhance the capability of State and local jurisdictions to
prepare for and respond to terrorist acts. The Committee on the
Judiciary changed the name of this office to the Office
ofDomestic Preparedness in Public Law 107-273, the ``21st Century
Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act,'' and further
authorized the ODP. The ODP was transferred from the Department of
Justice to the Department of Homeland Security in H.R. 5005, the
``Homeland Security Act,'' which became Public Law 107-296 on November
25, 2002.

Section 5051-5054. Federal Bureau of Investigation Revitalization

The Commission found that the FBI has made significant
progress in improving its intelligence capabilities but
recognized that the FBI Director himself recognizes that there
is much to do. The Commission made a specific recommendation
that embodies the vision of FBI Director Mueller regarding the
needs to broaden recruitment efforts, retain experience, and to
facilitate a trend towards specialization rather than the
Bureau's historical model of generalization. ``A specialized
and integrated national security workforce should be
established at the FBI consisting of agents, analysts,
linguists, and surveillance specialists who are recruited,
trained, rewarded, and retained to ensure the development of a
culture imbued with a deep expertise in intelligence and
national security'' 9/11 Commission Report at 425-426. This
section implements by giving the Director a variety of tools to
retain employees with special skills.

Section 5091. Requirement that Agency Rulemaking Take Into
Consideration Impacts on Individual Privacy

This section requires the President to consider the privacy
impact of federal regulations. It reflects the following
Commission recommendation: ``As the President determines the
guidelines for information sharing among government agencies
and by those agencies with the private sector, he should
safeguard the privacy of individuals about whom information is
shared.'' Commission Report at 394. Section 5091 requires a
federal agency to prepare a privacy impact analysis for
proposed and final rules and to include this analysis in the
notice for public comment issued in conjunction with the
publication of such rules. This requirement is similar to other
analyses that agencies currently conduct, such as those
required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act and the E-Government
Act of 2002. While Sec. 5091 makes no substantive demands on
federal agencies with respect to privacy, it is intended to
ensure that federal agencies safeguard personally identifiable
information by requiring these agencies to consider the privacy
implications presented by the collection, use, dissemination,
and protection of such information. Section 5091 consists of
the text of H.R. 338, the ``Federal Agency Protection of
Privacy Act,'' a noncontroversial, bipartisan bill that passed
by voice vote in the last Congress.

Section 5092. Chief Privacy Officers for Agencies with Law Enforcement
or Anti-terrorism Functions

Section 5092 directs the head of each Federal agency with
law enforcement or anti-terrorism functions to appoint a chief
privacy officer with primary responsibility within that agency
for privacy policy. The provision requires the chief privacy
officer to ensure that personally identifiable information is
protected and to file annual reports with Congress on the
agency's activities that affect privacy, including complaints
of privacy violations. Section 5092 is largely premised on
legislation establishing the first statutorily mandated privacy
officer, which was included in the Homeland Security Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, Sec. 222, 116 Stat. 2135, 2155
(2002), and pending bipartisan legislation reauthorizing DOJ,
H.R. 3036, 108th Cong. Sec. 305 (2004). Section 5092 reflects
the Commission's recommendation on privacy noted above.

Sections 5101-5105, Mutual Aid and Litigation Management Authorization
Act of 2004

The Commission Report included the recommendation that
``Congress should pass legislation to remedy the long-standing
indemnification and liability impediments to the provision of
public safety mutual aid * * * where applicable throughout the
nation'' Commission Report at 397. Sections 5101-5105 reflect
this recommendation.
These mutual aid provisions allow states, if they so
choose, to enter into mutual aid agreements to provide mutual
aid in response to emergencies. They allow party states' first
responders to carry with them into other states the liability
regime of their home states. The mutual aid provisions also
provide that the workers' compensation and death benefits of
first responders who answer calls in other party states, and
the home state rules that govern them, also follow them into
other states. These sections also provide that whenever any
person holds a certificate issued by a responding party that
evidences the meeting of professional standards, such person
shall be deemed so certified by the requesting party to provide
assistance under the mutual agreement. The litigation
management provisions allows states to enter into ``litigation
management agreements'' in which they could agree that, in the
event first responders from several states respond to a
terrorist attack in another state, they could exercise certain
options and agree on the liability regime that would apply in
that circumstance to claims brought against first responders
and arising out of terrorist attacks, including putting any
such claims in federal court, a ban on punitive damages, and a
collateral source offset rule.

Sections 5041-5045, Appointments Process Reform

The Commission recommendations include the recommendation
to ``minimize as much as possible the disruption of national
security policymaking during the change of administrations by
accelerating the process for national security appointments''
Commission Report at 422. This section responds to this
recommendation in three ways. First, Sec. 5041would reduce the
number of national security positions that are subject to Senate
confirmation. National Security Positions are defined as positions
``concerned with the protection of the Nation from foreign aggression,
terrorism, or espionage * * * that require regular use of, or access
to, classified information.'' This will include some positions at DOJ
and the FBI.
Those National Security Positions that are classified at
Executive Levels IV and V (5 USC 5315 or 5316) would be
appointed by the President directly, without Senate
confirmation. This would include, among others, the assistant
attorneys general at DOJ. Those National Security Positions
that are classified at Executive Levels II and III (5 USC 5313
or 5314) are still appointed by the President and subject to
Senate confirmation. However, if the Senate does not vote on
confirmation within 30 days after the president submits the
nomination, the appointment shall be made by the president
alone. Positions covered by this provision include, among
others, the deputy attorney general, the solicitor general, and
the director of the FBI. In addition to these national security
appointments, agencies are required under Sec. 5044 to submit a
plan for reducing the number of presidential appointments that
require Senate confirmation.
Second, Sec. 5042 extends the length of time that a newly
inaugurated President can appoint an acting officer to fulfill
the duties of a job performed by someone whose confirmation is
required by the Senate. It also removes certain qualifications
in current law relating to those acting officers, provided that
the office they are filling is one of 20 ``specified national
security positions.''
Finally, Sec. 5043 streamlines the financial reporting
process for intelligence personnel. It substantially reduces
the amount of detail that appointees must provide regarding
their sources of income, assets and liability. For example,
this section reduces the number of income reporting categories
from eleven to five. It also streamlines income reporting for
spouses and dependants. It is believed that these reductions
still provide the level of detail necessary for the Office of
Government Ethics to determine whether conflicts of interest
exist.

Amendments Adopted in Committee

The Committee adopted several amendments to H.R. 10 that
are included within its overall amendment in the nature of a
substitute.
A manager's amendment offered by Chairman Sensenbrenner and
adopted by voice vote makes various technical and other changes
to the legislation. As introduced, H.R. 10 provided the CIA
with overall direction for the collection of national
intelligence through human sources. The amendment preserves and
reiterates the congressional prohibition on domestic human
intelligence activities undertaken by the CIA. CIA direction
and coordination of FBI human intelligence within the U.S. is
inconsistent with the long-standing 1947 National Security Act
ban on CIA law enforcement powers and internal security
functions. The amendment also requires the Secretary of DHS to
consult with the Attorney General regarding various new
security procedures for airports and aviation contained in the
bill and requires that reports on the use of these procedures
be provided to the Judiciary Committee.
The Sensenbrenner amendment further requires the Assistant
Secretary for ICE and the Director of Federal Air Marshal
Service of DHS, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of
Homeland Security, ensure that Transportation Security
Administration screeners and Federal Air Marshals receive
training in identifying fraudulent identification documents,
including fraudulent or expired visas and passports, and allows
such training to be made available to other federal law
enforcement agencies and local law enforcement agencies located
in border states. The Committee reported by voice vote a second
degree amendment to the Sensenbrenner amendment offered by Mr.
Scott to strike sense of Congress language relating to the
Transportation Security Administration examining passenger
records for violent criminals and out standing warrants.
The Committee adopted by voice vote an amendment offered by
Mr. Schiff that seeks to prevent the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction by expanding, improving and increasing
funding for current non-proliferation programs including the
Proliferation Security Initiative, programs for Cooperative
Threat Reduction, and other non proliferation programs. The
President is directed to submit to Congress no later than 180
days after the date of the enactment of this Act a non-
proliferation strategy.
The Committee adopted by voice vote an amendment offered by
Mr. Nadler to require the Secretary of DHS, in consultation
with the Attorney General and appropriate federal, state, and
local government agencies, as well as security experts and
other interested persons, to issue regulations concerning the
shipment of extremely hazardous materials not later than 180
days after the enactment of the legislation.
The Committee adopted by voice vote an amendment by Mr.
Schiff that provides that whoever develops, possesses, or
attempts or conspires to develop or possess radiological
weapons be imprisoned for any term or for life. The amendment
specifies that if persons or property of the U.S. or a national
of the U.S. are threatened with these weapons in the U.S. or
abroad they are also subject to a prison term for any term of
years or for life; if death is a result of this violation, then
the punishment may be death.
The Committee adopted by voice vote an amendment offered by
Mr. Delahunt that requires the head of each department or
agency of the federal government that is engaged in any
activity to use or develop data mining technology to submit a
public report to Congress on all such activities of the
department or agency under the jurisdiction of that official.
Thisamendment establishes criteria for the content of the
report and requires that it be submitted within 90 days after enactment
of this legislation and requires that it be updated each year.
The Committee adopted by voice vote an amendment by Mr.
Schiff that provides that the U.S. work with the international
community to develop an international legal regime to enable
the interdiction of nuclear material and technology.
The Committee adopted by voice vote an amendment by Mr.
Weiner that reauthorizes the COPS program as a single grant
program with several purposes including to hire officers to
perform intelligence, antiterrorism, or homeland security
duties exclusively. This language is similar to language that
the Committee adopted and the House passed as part of H.R.
3036, the DOJ reauthorization bill.
The Committee adopted by voice vote an amendment offered by
Ms. Lofgren to establish an Integrated Biometric Entry-Exit
Screening System with respect to the biometric entry/exit data
system. It ensures that this biometric database is accessible
to all persons processing immigration benefits, including visa
applications with the Department of State, immigration-related
filings with the Department of Labor, cases pending before the
Exeuctive Office for Immigration Review, and matters pending or
under investigation before DHS.
The Committee adopted by voice vote an amendment offered by
Mr. Schiff expressing the sense of Congress that removing
potential nuclear weapons materials from vulnerable sites
around the world reduces the risk of terrorist attack and
delineating several actions to reduce the threat of terrorist
acquisition of nuclear materials. The amendment further
requires, no later than 30 days after the submission of the
President's FY 2006 budget, a report to Congress that lists
where highly-enriched uranium or separated plutonium is located
worldwide, a strategic plan to reduce the threat of this
material falling into terrorist hands, an estimate of the funds
required to secure these materials, and recommendations
concerning the need for further legislation or international
agreements to secure these nuclear sites.
The Committee adopted by voice vote an amendment offered by
Mr. Nadler to authorize the Secretary of DHS to provide $100
million in security assistance to 501(c)(3) organizations that
demonstrate they are at high risk of a terrorist attack based
upon: Specific threats of international terrorist
organizations; prior attacks against similarly situated
organizations by international terrorists; the vulnerability of
the specific site; the symbolic value of the site as a highly
recognized American institution; or the role of the institution
in responding to terrorist attacks. After the funds have been
expended for the highest risk institutions, federal loan
guarantees would be available to make loans available on
favorable terms. Funds would be administered by a new office in
the Department dedicated to working with high-risk non-profits.
The Committee adopted by voice vote an amendment offered by
Mr. Weiner that would permit an applicant to use first
responder grants to pay for personnel engaged in
counterterrorism and intelligence activities, regardless of the
date such persons were hired. This allows reimbursement for
personnel costs to be retroactive. The Committee also adopted
by voice vote an amendment offered by Mr. Weiner to provide
reimbursement for overtime and other fixed costs incurred for
homeland security purposes after September 11, 2001.
The Committee adopted by voice vote an amendment offered by
Ms. Blackburn that establishes a pilot study to examine
specific topics to be addressed in a report from the Attorney
General, to identify current procedures already in place, and
to make recommendations for consolidation and standardization
of employee criminal background checks. The amendment requires
the study to consider the utilization of commercial databases,
state databases, any feasibility studies, and privacy rights
and other employee protections. The amendment also adds to the
bill the text of S.1743, the ``Private Security Officer
Employment Authorization Act'' which passed the Senate by
unanimous consent at the end of 2003.
The Committee adopted by voice vote an amendment by Mr.
Berman that adds a new section to the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978. It allows the court to assume that a
non-U.S. person who is engaged in terrorism is an agent of a
foreign power under the Act.
The Committee adopted by voice vote an amendment offered by
Mr. Schiff that amends the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organization Act by adding crimes having to do with weapons of
mass destruction to the list of specified unlawful activities
that serve as predicates for the money laundering statute.
The Committee adopted by voice vote an amendment by Ms.
Jackson Lee to increase criminal penalties for alien smuggling,
provide visas to smuggled aliens who cooperate with law
enforcement officials, provide rewards to such aliens, and
require the Secretary of DHS to develop an outreach program to
educate the public about the penalties for alien smuggling. The
Committee adopted by voice vote a second degree amendment
offered by Mr. Hostettler to limit the provisions to the
increase in criminal penalties and the establishment of the
outreach program.
An amendment offered by Chairman Sensenbrenner to establish
a Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board to provide advice
and counsel on policy development and implementation as it
pertains to privacy and civil liberties implications of
executive branch actions, proposed legislation, regulations,
and policies related to efforts to protect the nation from
terrorism passed the Committee by a recorded vote of 19-15. The
Chairman's amendment was a complete substitute for an amendment
offered by Mr. Watt that would have provided fora similar Board
with broad administrative subpoena power and provided nearly unlimited
authority to analyze all aspects of the nation's war on terrorism.
The Committee adopted by voice vote an amendment offered by
Mr. Weiner that eliminates defenses in the current fake badge
law.

Hearings

The Committee on the Judiciary held two hearings to
specifically consider the recommendations of the 9/11
Commission. On August 20, 2004, the Subcommittee on Commercial
and Administrative Law and the Subcommittee on the Constitution
held a joint hearing entitled: ``Privacy and Civil Liberties in
the Hands of the Government Post-September 11, 2001:
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission and the U.S. Department
of Defense Technology and Privacy Advisory Committee.'' The
following witnesses testified: Lee Hamilton, Vice Chair, 9/11
Commission; Slade Gorton, Commissioner, 9/11 Commission; John
Marsh, Jr., Member, Technology and Privacy Advisory Committee;
and Nuala O'Connor Kelly, Privacy Officer, Department of
Homeland Security.
On August 23, 2004, the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism,
and Homeland Security held a hearing entitled: ``Oversight
Hearing on Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission.'' The
following witnesses testified: Christopher Kojm, Deputy
Executive Director, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
Upon the United States; John S. Pistole, Executive Assistant
Director, Counterterrorism Division, Federal Bureau of
Investigation; John O. Brennan, Director, Terrorist Threat
Integration Center; and Gregory T. Nojeim, Associate Director,
American Civil Liberties Union.

Committee Consideration

On September 30, 2004, the Committee met in open session
and ordered favorably reported the bill H.R. 10, with an
amendment, by a recorded vote of 19 to 12, a quorum being
present.

Vote of the Committee

In compliance with clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, the Committee notes that the
following roll call votes occurred during the Committee's
consideration of H.R. 10.
Rollcall No. 1: Subject: Nadler Amendment (Minimum Amounts)
to H.R. 10. By a rollcall vote of 15 yeas to 18 nays, the
amendment was defeated.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ayes Nays Present
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MR. HYDE............................... ......... X .........
MR. COBLE.............................. ......... X .........
MR. SMITH.............................. ......... X .........
MR. GALLEGLY........................... ......... X .........
MR. GOODLATTE.......................... ......... X .........
MR. CHABOT............................. ......... X .........
MR. JENKINS............................ ......... X .........
MR. CANNON............................. ......... ......... .........
MR. BACHUS............................. ......... X .........
MR. HOSTETTLER......................... ......... X .........
MR. GREEN.............................. ......... X .........
MR. KELLER............................. X ......... .........
MS. HART............................... ......... X .........
MR. FLAKE.............................. ......... X .........
MR. PENCE.............................. ......... ......... .........
MR. FORBES............................. ......... X .........
MR. KING............................... ......... ......... .........
MR. CARTER............................. ......... X .........
MR. FEENEY............................. ......... X .........
MRS. BLACKBURN......................... ......... X .........
MR. CONYERS............................ X ......... .........
MR. BERMAN............................. X ......... .........
MR. BOUCHER............................ ......... ......... .........
MR. NADLER............................. X ......... .........
MR. SCOTT.............................. X ......... .........
MR. WATT............................... X ......... .........
MS. LOFGREN............................ X ......... .........
MS. JACKSON LEE........................ X ......... .........
MS. WATERS............................. X ......... .........
MR. MEEHAN............................. X ......... .........
MR. DELAHUNT........................... X ......... .........
MR. WEXLER............................. X ......... .........
MS. BALDWIN............................ ......... X .........
MR. WEINER............................. X ......... .........
MR. SCHIFF............................. X ......... .........
MS. SANCHEZ............................ X ......... .........
MR. SENSENBRENNER, CHAIRMAN............ ......... X .........
--------------------------------
TOTAL............................ 15 18 .........
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Rollcall No. 2: Subject: Jackson Lee Amendment
(Verification of Documents) to H.R. 10. By a rollcall vote of
15 yeas to 20 nays, the amendment was defeated.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ayes Nays Present
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MR. HYDE............................... ......... X .........
MR. COBLE.............................. ......... X .........
MR. SMITH.............................. ......... X .........
MR. GALLEGLY........................... ......... X .........
MR. GOODLATTE.......................... ......... X .........
MR. CHABOT............................. ......... X .........
MR. JENKINS............................ ......... X .........
MR. CANNON............................. ......... ......... .........
MR. BACHUS............................. ......... X .........
MR. HOSTETTLER......................... ......... X .........
MR. GREEN.............................. ......... X .........
MR. KELLER............................. ......... X .........
MS. HART............................... ......... X .........
MR. FLAKE.............................. ......... X .........
MR. PENCE.............................. ......... X .........
MR. FORBES............................. ......... X .........
MR. KING............................... ......... X .........
MR. CARTER............................. ......... X .........
MR. FEENEY............................. ......... X .........
MRS. BLACKBURN......................... ......... X .........
MR. CONYERS............................ X ......... .........
MR. BERMAN............................. X ......... .........
MR. BOUCHER............................ ......... ......... .........
MR. NADLER............................. X ......... .........
MR. SCOTT.............................. X ......... .........
MR. WATT............................... X ......... .........
MS. LOFGREN............................ X ......... .........
MS. JACKSON LEE........................ X ......... .........
MS. WATERS............................. X ......... .........
MR. MEEHAN............................. X ......... .........
MR. DELAHUNT........................... X ......... .........
MR. WEXLER............................. X ......... .........
MS. BALDWIN............................ X ......... .........
MR. WEINER............................. X ......... .........
MR. SCHIFF............................. X ......... .........
MS. SANCHEZ............................ X ......... .........
MR. SENSENBRENNER, CHAIRMAN............ ......... X .........
--------------------------------
TOTAL............................ 15 20 .........
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Rollcall No. 3: Subject: Berman/Delahunt Amendment
(Limitation on Closed Immigration Hearings) to H.R. 10. By a
rollcall vote of 15 yeas to 20 nays, the amendment was
defeated.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ayes Nays Present
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MR. HYDE............................... ......... X .........
MR. COBLE.............................. ......... X .........
MR. SMITH.............................. ......... X .........
MR. GALLEGLY........................... ......... X .........
MR. GOODLATTE.......................... ......... X .........
MR. CHABOT............................. ......... X .........
MR. JENKINS............................ ......... X .........
MR. CANNON............................. ......... ......... .........
MR. BACHUS............................. ......... X .........
MR. HOSTETTLER......................... ......... X .........
MR. GREEN.............................. ......... X .........
MR. KELLER............................. ......... X .........
MS. HART............................... ......... X .........
MR. FLAKE.............................. ......... X .........
MR. PENCE.............................. ......... X .........
MR. FORBES............................. ......... X .........
MR. KING............................... ......... X .........
MR. CARTER............................. ......... X .........
MR. FEENEY............................. ......... X .........
MRS. BLACKBURN......................... ......... X .........
MR. CONYERS............................ X ......... .........
MR. BERMAN............................. X ......... .........
MR. BOUCHER............................ ......... ......... .........
MR. NADLER............................. X ......... .........
MR. SCOTT.............................. X ......... .........
MR. WATT............................... X ......... .........
MS. LOFGREN............................ X ......... .........
MS. JACKSON LEE........................ X ......... .........
MS. WATERS............................. X ......... .........
MR. MEEHAN............................. X ......... .........
MR. DELAHUNT........................... X ......... .........
MR. WEXLER............................. X ......... .........
MS. BALDWIN............................ X ......... .........
MR. WEINER............................. X ......... .........
MR. SCHIFF............................. X ......... .........
MS. SANCHEZ............................ X ......... .........
MR. SENSENBRENNER, CHAIRMAN............ ......... X .........
--------------------------------
TOTAL............................ 15 20 .........
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Rollcall No. 4: Subject: Conyers Amendment in the nature of
a substitute to H.R. 10. By a rollcall vote of 15 yeas to 20
nays, the amendment was defeated.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ayes Nays Present
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MR. HYDE............................... ......... X .........
MR. COBLE.............................. ......... X .........
MR. SMITH.............................. ......... X .........
MR. GALLEGLY........................... ......... X .........
MR. GOODLATTE.......................... ......... X .........
MR. CHABOT............................. ......... X .........
MR. JENKINS............................ ......... X .........
MR. CANNON............................. ......... ......... .........
MR. BACHUS............................. ......... X .........
MR. HOSTETTLER......................... ......... X .........
MR. GREEN.............................. ......... X .........
MR. KELLER............................. ......... X .........
MS. HART............................... ......... X .........
MR. FLAKE.............................. ......... X .........
MR. PENCE.............................. ......... X .........
MR. FORBES............................. ......... X .........
MR. KING............................... ......... X .........
MR. CARTER............................. ......... X .........
MR. FEENEY............................. ......... X .........
MRS. BLACKBURN......................... ......... X .........
MR. CONYERS............................ X ......... .........
MR. BERMAN............................. X ......... .........
MR. BOUCHER............................ ......... ......... .........
MR. NADLER............................. X ......... .........
MR. SCOTT.............................. X ......... .........
MR. WATT............................... X ......... .........
MS. LOFGREN............................ X ......... .........
MS. JACKSON LEE........................ X ......... .........
MS. WATERS............................. X ......... .........
MR. MEEHAN............................. X ......... .........
MR. DELAHUNT........................... X ......... .........
MR. WEXLER............................. X ......... .........
MS. BALDWIN............................ X ......... .........
MR. WEINER............................. X ......... .........
MR. SCHIFF............................. X ......... .........
MS. SANCHEZ............................ X ......... .........
MR. SENSENBRENNER, CHAIRMAN............ ......... X .........
--------------------------------
TOTAL............................ 15 20 .........
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Rollcall No. 5: Subject: Nadler amendment (Whistle Blower)
to H.R. 10. By a rollcall vote of 15 yeas to 20 nays, the
amendment was defeated.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ayes Nays Present
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MR. HYDE............................... ......... X .........
MR. COBLE.............................. ......... X .........
MR. SMITH.............................. ......... X .........
MR. GALLEGLY........................... ......... X .........
MR. GOODLATTE.......................... ......... X .........
MR. CHABOT............................. ......... X .........
MR. JENKINS............................ ......... X .........
MR. CANNON............................. ......... ......... .........
MR. BACHUS............................. ......... X .........
MR. HOSTETTLER......................... ......... X .........
MR. GREEN.............................. ......... X .........
MR. KELLER............................. ......... X .........
MS. HART............................... ......... X .........
MR. FLAKE.............................. ......... X .........
MR. PENCE.............................. ......... X .........
MR. FORBES............................. ......... X .........
MR. KING............................... ......... X .........
MR. CARTER............................. ......... X .........
MR. FEENEY............................. ......... X .........
MRS. BLACKBURN......................... ......... X .........
MR. CONYERS............................ X ......... .........
MR. BERMAN............................. X ......... .........
MR. BOUCHER............................ ......... ......... .........
MR. NADLER............................. X ......... .........
MR. SCOTT.............................. X ......... .........
MR. WATT............................... X ......... .........
MS. LOFGREN............................ X ......... .........
MS. JACKSON LEE........................ X ......... .........
MS. WATERS............................. X ......... .........
MR. MEEHAN............................. X ......... .........
MR. DELAHUNT........................... X ......... .........
MR. WEXLER............................. X ......... .........
MS. BALDWIN............................ X ......... .........
MR. WEINER............................. X ......... .........
MR. SCHIFF............................. X ......... .........
MS. SANCHEZ............................ X ......... .........
MR. SENSENBRENNER, CHAIRMAN............ ......... X .........
--------------------------------
TOTAL............................ 15 20 .........
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Rollcall No. 6: Subject: Jackson Lee amendment (Restriction
on Airline Screening for Terrorists and Criminals) to H.R. 10.
By a rollcall vote of 12 yeas, 17 nays, and 1 pass, the
amendment was defeated.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ayes Nays Present
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MR. HYDE............................... ......... ......... .........
MR. COBLE.............................. ......... X .........
MR. SMITH.............................. ......... X .........
MR. GALLEGLY........................... ......... ......... .........
MR. GOODLATTE.......................... ......... X .........
MR. CHABOT............................. ......... X .........
MR. JENKINS............................ ......... X .........
MR. CANNON............................. ......... ......... .........
MR. BACHUS............................. ......... X .........
MR. HOSTETTLER......................... ......... X .........
MR. GREEN.............................. ......... X .........
MR. KELLER............................. ......... X .........
MS. HART............................... ......... X .........
MR. FLAKE.............................. ......... X .........
MR. PENCE.............................. ......... ......... .........
MR. FORBES............................. ......... X .........
MR. KING............................... ......... X .........
MR. CARTER............................. ......... X .........
MR. FEENEY............................. ......... X .........
MRS. BLACKBURN......................... ......... X .........
MR. CONYERS............................ X ......... .........
MR. BERMAN............................. X ......... .........
MR. BOUCHER............................ ......... ......... .........
MR. NADLER............................. X ......... .........
MR. SCOTT.............................. X ......... .........
MR. WATT............................... X ......... .........
MS. LOFGREN............................ X ......... .........
MS. JACKSON LEE........................ X ......... .........
MS. WATERS............................. X ......... .........
MR. MEEHAN............................. X ......... .........
MR. DELAHUNT........................... ......... ......... .........
MR. WEXLER............................. ......... ......... .........
MS. BALDWIN............................ X ......... .........
MR. WEINER............................. X ......... .........
MR. SCHIFF............................. ......... ......... PASS
MS. SANCHEZ............................ X ......... .........
MR. SENSENBRENNER, CHAIRMAN............ ......... X .........
--------------------------------
TOTAL............................ 12 17 1 PASS
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Rollcall No. 7: Subject: Jackson Lee amendment (Convention
Against Torture) to H.R. 10. By a rollcall vote of 12 yeas, 18
nays, and 1 pass, the amendment was defeated.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ayes Nays Present
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MR. HYDE............................... ......... ......... .........
MR. COBLE.............................. ......... X .........
MR. SMITH.............................. ......... X .........
MR. GALLEGLY........................... ......... X .........
MR. GOODLATTE.......................... ......... X .........
MR. CHABOT............................. ......... X .........
MR. JENKINS............................ ......... X .........
MR. CANNON............................. ......... ......... .........
MR. BACHUS............................. ......... X .........
MR. HOSTETTLER......................... ......... X .........
MR. GREEN.............................. ......... X .........
MR. KELLER............................. ......... X .........
MS. HART............................... ......... X .........
MR. FLAKE.............................. ......... X .........
MR. PENCE.............................. ......... ......... .........
MR. FORBES............................. ......... X .........
MR. KING............................... ......... X .........
MR. CARTER............................. ......... X .........
MR. FEENEY............................. ......... X .........
MRS. BLACKBURN......................... ......... X .........
MR. CONYERS............................ X ......... .........
MR. BERMAN............................. X ......... .........
MR. BOUCHER............................ ......... ......... .........
MR. NADLER............................. X ......... .........
MR. SCOTT.............................. X ......... .........
MR. WATT............................... X ......... .........
MS. LOFGREN............................ X ......... .........
MS. JACKSON LEE........................ X ......... .........
MS. WATERS............................. X ......... .........
MR. MEEHAN............................. X ......... .........
MR. DELAHUNT........................... ......... ......... .........
MR. WEXLER............................. ......... ......... .........
MS. BALDWIN............................ X ......... .........
MR. WEINER............................. X ......... .........
MR. SCHIFF............................. ......... ......... PASS
MS. SANCHEZ............................ X ......... .........
MR. SENSENBRENNER, CHAIRMAN............ ......... X .........
--------------------------------
TOTAL............................ 12 18 1 pass
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Rollcall No. 8: Subject: Sensenbrenner amendment to the
Watt amendment (Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board) to
H.R. 10. By a rollcall vote of 19 yeas, to 15 nays, the
amendment was agreed to.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ayes Nays Present
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MR. HYDE............................... ......... ......... .........
MR. COBLE.............................. X ......... .........
MR. SMITH.............................. X ......... .........
MR. GALLEGLY........................... X ......... .........
MR. GOODLATTE.......................... X ......... .........
MR. CHABOT............................. X ......... .........
MR. JENKINS............................ X ......... .........
MR. CANNON............................. ......... ......... .........
MR. BACHUS............................. X ......... .........
MR. HOSTETTLER......................... X ......... .........
MR. GREEN.............................. X ......... .........
MR. KELLER............................. X ......... .........
MS. HART............................... X ......... .........
MR. FLAKE.............................. X ......... .........
MR. PENCE.............................. X ......... .........
MR. FORBES............................. X ......... .........
MR. KING............................... X ......... .........
MR. CARTER............................. X ......... .........
MR. FEENEY............................. X ......... .........
MRS. BLACKBURN......................... X ......... .........
MR. CONYERS............................ ......... X .........
MR. BERMAN............................. ......... X .........
MR. BOUCHER............................ ......... ......... .........
MR. NADLER............................. ......... X .........
MR. SCOTT.............................. ......... X .........
MR. WATT............................... ......... X .........
MS. LOFGREN............................ ......... X .........
MS. JACKSON LEE........................ ......... X .........
MS. WATERS............................. ......... X .........
MR. MEEHAN............................. ......... X .........
MR. DELAHUNT........................... ......... X .........
MR. WEXLER............................. ......... X .........
MS. BALDWIN............................ ......... X .........
MR. WEINER............................. ......... X .........
MR. SCHIFF............................. ......... X .........
MS. SANCHEZ............................ ......... X .........
MR. SENSENBRENNER, CHAIRMAN............ X ......... .........
--------------------------------
TOTAL............................ 19 15 .........
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Rollcall No. 9: Subject: Sanchez amendment (ID Security) to
H.R. 10. By a rollcall vote of 12 yeas, 19 nays, the amendment
was defeated.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ayes Nays Present
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MR. HYDE............................... ......... ......... .........
MR. COBLE.............................. ......... X .........
MR. SMITH.............................. ......... X .........
MR. GALLEGLY........................... ......... X .........
MR. GOODLATTE.......................... ......... X .........
MR. CHABOT............................. ......... X .........
MR. JENKINS............................ ......... X .........
MR. CANNON............................. ......... ......... .........
MR. BACHUS............................. ......... X .........
MR. HOSTETTLER......................... ......... X .........
MR. GREEN.............................. ......... X .........
MR. KELLER............................. ......... X .........
MS. HART............................... ......... X .........
MR. FLAKE.............................. ......... X .........
MR. PENCE.............................. ......... X .........
MR. FORBES............................. ......... X .........
MR. KING............................... ......... X .........
MR. CARTER............................. ......... X .........
MR. FEENEY............................. ......... X .........
MRS. BLACKBURN......................... ......... X .........
MR. CONYERS............................ X ......... .........
MR. BERMAN............................. ......... ......... .........
MR. BOUCHER............................ ......... ......... .........
MR. NADLER............................. X ......... .........
MR. SCOTT.............................. X ......... .........
MR. WATT............................... X ......... .........
MS. LOFGREN............................ X ......... .........
MS. JACKSON LEE........................ X ......... .........
MS. WATERS............................. X ......... .........
MR. MEEHAN............................. X ......... .........
MR. DELAHUNT........................... ......... ......... .........
MR. WEXLER............................. X ......... .........
MS. BALDWIN............................ X ......... .........
MR. WEINER............................. X ......... .........
MR. SCHIFF............................. ......... ......... .........
MS. SANCHEZ............................ X ......... .........
MR. SENSENBRENNER, CHAIRMAN............ ......... X .........
--------------------------------
TOTAL............................ 12 19 .........
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Rollcall No. 10: Subject: Weiner amendment (Covered Grants)
to H.R. 10. By a rollcall vote of 12 yeas, 19 nays, the
amendment was defeated.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ayes Nays Present
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MR. HYDE............................... ......... ......... .........
MR. COBLE.............................. ......... X .........
MR. SMITH.............................. ......... X .........
MR. GALLEGLY........................... ......... X .........
MR. GOODLATTE.......................... ......... X .........
MR. CHABOT............................. ......... X .........
MR. JENKINS............................ ......... X .........
MR. CANNON............................. ......... ......... .........
MR. BACHUS............................. ......... X .........
MR. HOSTETTLER......................... ......... X .........
MR. GREEN.............................. ......... X .........
MR. KELLER............................. ......... X .........
MS. HART............................... ......... X .........
MR. FLAKE.............................. ......... X .........
MR. PENCE.............................. ......... X .........
MR. FORBES............................. ......... X .........
MR. KING............................... ......... X .........
MR. CARTER............................. ......... X .........
MR. FEENEY............................. ......... X .........
MRS. BLACKBURN......................... ......... X .........
MR. CONYERS............................ X ......... .........
MR. BERMAN............................. ......... ......... .........
MR. BOUCHER............................ ......... ......... .........
MR. NADLER............................. X ......... .........
MR. SCOTT.............................. X ......... .........
MR. WATT............................... X ......... .........
MS. LOFGREN............................ X ......... .........
MS. JACKSON LEE........................ X ......... .........
MS. WATERS............................. X ......... .........
MR. MEEHAN............................. X ......... .........
MR. DELAHUNT........................... ......... ......... .........
MR. WEXLER............................. X ......... .........
MS. BALDWIN............................ X ......... .........
MR. WEINER............................. X ......... .........
MR. SCHIFF............................. ......... ......... .........
MS. SANCHEZ............................ X ......... .........
MR. SENSENBRENNER, CHAIRMAN............ ......... X .........
--------------------------------
TOTAL............................ 12 19 .........
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Rollcall No. 11: Subject: Watt amendment (intentional
misconduct) to H.R. 10. By a rollcall vote of 12 yeas, 19 nays,
the amendment was defeated.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ayes Nays Present
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MR. HYDE............................... ......... ......... .........
MR. COBLE.............................. ......... X .........
MR. SMITH.............................. ......... X .........
MR. GALLEGLY........................... ......... X .........
MR. GOODLATTE.......................... ......... X .........
MR. CHABOT............................. ......... X .........
MR. JENKINS............................ ......... X .........
MR. CANNON............................. ......... ......... .........
MR. BACHUS............................. ......... X .........
MR. HOSTETTLER......................... ......... X .........
MR. GREEN.............................. ......... X .........
MR. KELLER............................. ......... X .........
MS. HART............................... ......... X .........
MR. FLAKE.............................. ......... X .........
MR. PENCE.............................. ......... X .........
MR. FORBES............................. ......... X .........
MR. KING............................... ......... X .........
MR. CARTER............................. ......... X .........
MR. FEENEY............................. ......... X .........
MRS. BLACKBURN......................... ......... X .........
MR. CONYERS............................ X ......... .........
MR. BERMAN............................. ......... ......... .........
MR. BOUCHER............................ ......... ......... .........
MR. NADLER............................. X ......... .........
MR. SCOTT.............................. X ......... .........
MR. WATT............................... X ......... .........
MS. LOFGREN............................ X ......... .........
MS. JACKSON LEE........................ X ......... .........
MS. WATERS............................. X ......... .........
MR. MEEHAN............................. X ......... .........
MR. DELAHUNT........................... ......... ......... .........
MR. WEXLER............................. X ......... .........
MS. BALDWIN............................ X ......... .........
MR. WEINER............................. X ......... .........
MR. SCHIFF............................. ......... ......... .........
MS. SANCHEZ............................ X ......... .........
MR. SENSENBRENNER, CHAIRMAN............ ......... X .........
--------------------------------
TOTAL............................ 12 19 .........
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Rollcall No. 12: Subject: Scott amendment (Litigation
Management agreements) to H.R. 10. By a roll call vote of 12
yeas, 19 nays, the amendment was defeated.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ayes Nays Present
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MR. HYDE............................... ......... ......... .........
MR. COBLE.............................. ......... X .........
MR. SMITH.............................. ......... X .........
MR. GALLEGLY........................... ......... X .........
MR. GOODLATTE.......................... ......... X .........
MR. CHABOT............................. ......... X .........
MR. JENKINS............................ ......... X .........
MR. CANNON............................. ......... ......... .........
MR. BACHUS............................. ......... X .........
MR. HOSTETTLER......................... ......... X .........
MR. GREEN.............................. ......... X .........
MR. KELLER............................. ......... X .........
MS. HART............................... ......... X .........
MR. FLAKE.............................. ......... X .........
MR. PENCE.............................. ......... X .........
MR. FORBES............................. ......... X .........
MR. KING............................... ......... X .........
MR. CARTER............................. ......... X .........
MR. FEENEY............................. ......... X .........
MRS. BLACKBURN......................... ......... X .........
MR. CONYERS............................ X ......... .........
MR. BERMAN............................. ......... ......... .........
MR. BOUCHER............................ ......... ......... .........
MR. NADLER............................. X ......... .........
MR. SCOTT.............................. X ......... .........
MR. WATT............................... X ......... .........
MS. LOFGREN............................ X ......... .........
MS. JACKSON LEE........................ X ......... .........
MS. WATERS............................. X ......... .........
MR. MEEHAN............................. X ......... .........
MR. DELAHUNT........................... ......... ......... .........
MR. WEXLER............................. X ......... .........
MS. BALDWIN............................ X ......... .........
MR. WEINER............................. X ......... .........
MR. SCHIFF............................. ......... ......... .........
MS. SANCHEZ............................ X ......... .........
MR. SENSENBRENNER, CHAIRMAN............ ......... X .........
--------------------------------
TOTAL............................ 12 19 .........
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Rollcall No. 13: Subject: Jackson Lee amendment (Criminal
History Information Checks) to H.R. 10. By a rollcall vote of
12 yeas, 19 nays, the amendment was defeated.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ayes Nays Present
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MR. HYDE............................... ......... ......... .........
MR. COBLE.............................. ......... X .........
MR. SMITH.............................. ......... X .........
MR. GALLEGLY........................... ......... X .........
MR. GOODLATTE.......................... ......... X .........
MR. CHABOT............................. ......... X .........
MR. JENKINS............................ ......... X .........
MR. CANNON............................. ......... ......... .........
MR. BACHUS............................. ......... X .........
MR. HOSTETTLER......................... ......... X .........
MR. GREEN.............................. ......... X .........
MR. KELLER............................. ......... X .........
MS. HART............................... ......... X .........
MR. FLAKE.............................. ......... X .........
MR. PENCE.............................. ......... X .........
MR. FORBES............................. ......... X .........
MR. KING............................... ......... X .........
MR. CARTER............................. ......... X .........
MR. FEENEY............................. ......... X .........
MRS. BLACKBURN......................... ......... X .........
MR. CONYERS............................ X ......... .........
MR. BERMAN............................. ......... ......... .........
MR. BOUCHER............................ ......... ......... .........
MR. NADLER............................. X ......... .........
MR. SCOTT.............................. ......... X .........
MR. WATT............................... X ......... .........
MS. LOFGREN............................ X ......... .........
MS. JACKSON LEE........................ X ......... .........
MS. WATERS............................. X ......... .........
MR. MEEHAN............................. X ......... .........
MR. DELAHUNT........................... ......... ......... .........
MR. WEXLER............................. X ......... .........
MS. BALDWIN............................ X ......... .........
MR. WEINER............................. X ......... .........
MR. SCHIFF............................. ......... ......... .........
MS. SANCHEZ............................ X ......... .........
MR. SENSENBRENNER, CHAIRMAN............ ......... X .........
--------------------------------
TOTAL............................ 11 20 .........
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Rollcall No. 14: Subject: Motion to report H.R. 10, as
amended. By a rollcall vote of 19 yeas to 12 nays, the motion
was agreed to.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ayes Nays Present
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MR. HYDE............................... ......... ......... .........
MR. COBLE.............................. X ......... .........
MR. SMITH.............................. X ......... .........
MR. GALLEGLY........................... X ......... .........
MR. GOODLATTE.......................... X ......... .........
MR. CHABOT............................. X ......... .........
MR. JENKINS............................ X ......... .........
MR. CANNON............................. ......... ......... .........
MR. BACHUS............................. X ......... .........
MR. HOSTETTLER......................... X ......... .........
MR. GREEN.............................. X ......... .........
MR. KELLER............................. X ......... .........
MS. HART............................... X ......... .........
MR. FLAKE.............................. X ......... .........
MR. PENCE.............................. X ......... .........
MR. FORBES............................. X ......... .........
MR. KING............................... X ......... .........
MR. CARTER............................. X ......... .........
MR. FEENEY............................. X ......... .........
MRS. BLACKBURN......................... ......... ......... .........
MR. CONYERS............................ ......... X .........
MR. BERMAN............................. ......... ......... .........
MR. BOUCHER............................ ......... ......... .........
MR. NADLER............................. ......... X .........
MR. SCOTT.............................. ......... X .........
MR. WATT............................... ......... X .........
MS. LOFGREN............................ ......... X .........
MS. JACKSON LEE........................ ......... X .........
MS. WATERS............................. ......... X .........
MR. MEEHAN............................. ......... X .........
MR. DELAHUNT........................... ......... ......... .........
MR. WEXLER............................. ......... X .........
MS. BALDWIN............................ ......... X .........
MR. WEINER............................. ......... X .........
MR. SCHIFF............................. X ......... .........
MS. SANCHEZ............................ s X .........
MR. SENSENBRENNER, CHAIRMAN............ X ......... .........
--------------------------------
TOTAL............................ 19 12
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Committee Oversight Findings

In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules
of the House of Representatives, the Committee reports that the
findings and recommendations of the Committee, based on
oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of rule X of the
Rules of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in the
descriptive portions of this report.

New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures

Clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of
Representatives is inapplicable because this legislation does
not provide new budgetary authority or increased tax
expenditures.

Congressional Budget Office of Cost Estimate

In compliance with clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules
of the House of Representatives, the Committee sets forth, with
respect to the bill, H.R. 10, the following estimate and
comparison prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget
Office under section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of
1974:

October 5, 2004.
Hon. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.,
Chairman Committee on the Judiciary,
House of Representatives, Washinton, DC
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 10, the 9/11
Recommendations Implementation Act.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Mark
Grabowicz.
Sincerely,
Douglas Holtz-Eakin,
Director.
Enclosure.

H.R. 10--9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act

Summary. H.R. 10 would affect the intelligence community,
terrorism prevention and prosecution, and border security, as
well as international cooperation and coordination. Title I
would establish an Office of the National Intelligence Director
(NID) to manage and oversee intelligence activities of the U.S.
government, including foreign intelligence and
counterintelligence activities. The legislation would transfer
some existing intelligence organizations to that office and
would establish a National Counterterrorism Center and one or
more national intelligence centers within the Office of the
NID. Title II would authorize funding for law enforcement,
counterterrorism activities, and programs related to aviation
safety. Title III would increase the number of agents
performing border security and immigration functions, improve
the security of identity documents such as driver's licenses,
and increase the number of consular officers within the
Department of State. Title IV would authorize funds for a
number of international cooperation programs. Finally, title V
would reauthorize and restructure several homeland security
programs.
CBO estimates that implementing H.R. 10 would cost about
$800 million in 2005 and $17.5 billion over the 2005-2009
period, assuming appropriation of the specified and estimated
amounts. That total does not include possible additional costs
associated with implementing provisions dealing with the
creation of an interoperable data system for exchanging law
enforcement and intelligence data or the establishment of a
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reserve service because
CBO does not have sufficient information to estimate those
costs at this time. With regard to the FBI reserve service, CBO
cannot predict when a national emergency would occur, but
expects that costs for the proposed reserve service would
likely be insignificant in most years.
The bill also contains provisions that would decrease
direct spending. In particular, it would establish a fund
within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to enhance
efforts to detect explosives at security checkpoints in
airports; authorize the collection and spending of $30 million
a year of fees from airline passengers in 2005 and 2006 for
that purpose; allow the Director of the FBI to waive the
mandatory retirement requirement for agents until age 65; and
extend indefinitely the authority of the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) to offer incentive payments to employees who
voluntarily retire or resign. CBO estimates that enacting those
provisions would decrease direct spending by about $25 million
in 2005, $4 million over the 2005-2009 period, and $2 million
over the 2005-2014 period. The estimate of direct spending does
not include the effects of extending the authority of the CIA
to offer incentive payments to employees who voluntarily retire
or resign because the data needed to prepare such an estimate
are classified. Enacting H.R. 10 would not affect receipts.
H.R. 10 contains several intergovernmental mandates as
defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA). CBO
estimates that those mandates, in aggregate, would impose costs
on state, local, and tribal governments totaling more than $600
million over fiscal years 2005 through 2009. CBO estimates that
the costs in at least one of those years would exceed the
threshold established in UMRA ($60 million in 2004, adjusted
annually for inflation). The bill would authorize
appropriations for grants to states to cover such costs.
H.R. 10 would impose private-sector mandates as defined in
UMRA on shippers of hazardous materials and licensees of
nuclear facilities. Because the impact of two of the mandates
would depend on future actions of the Department of Homeland
Security and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for which
information currently is not available, CBO cannot determine
whether the costs to the private sector would exceed the annual
threshold for private-sector mandates ($120 million in 2004,
adjusted annually for inflation).
Estimated cost to the Federal Government: The estimated
budgetary impact of H.R. 10 is summarized in Table 1. The costs
of this legislation fall within budget functions 050 (national
defense), 400 (transportation), 450 (community and regional
development), 550 (health), 750 (administration of justice),
and 800 (general government).
Basis of Estimate: Most of H.R. 10's effects on the federal
budget would be subject to appropriation of amounts necessary
to implement the bill. For this estimate, CBO assumes that the
bill will be enacted by the end of the calendar year, that all
such amounts will be appropriated near the start of each fiscal
year, and that outlays will follow historical patterns for
similar activities.

TABLE 1. BUDGETARY IMPACT OF H.R. 10, THE 9/11 RECOMMENDATIONS IMPLEMENTATION ACT, AS ORDERED REPORTED BY THE
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
By Fiscal Year, in Millions of Dollars--
-------------------------------------------------
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHANGES IN SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION \1\

Estimated Authorization Level................................. 2,311 6,223 2,559 4,700 5,264
Estimated Outlays............................................. 798 4,950 3,004 4,062 4,670

CHANGES IN DIRECT SPENDING \2\

Estimated Budget Authority.................................... * * * * *
Estimated Outlays............................................. -25 -12 19 10 5
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: * = Between zero and -$500,000.
\1\ These amounts do not include the costs of section 2192 because CBO cannot estimate such costs at this time.
The amounts also exclude the costs associated with establishing a reserve service within the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. Any such costs would be insignificant in most years, and CBO has no basis for predicting when a
national emergency would occur.
\2\ These amounts do not include the costs of section 1061 because the data needed to prepare an estimate are
classified.

Spending Subject to Appropriation

H.R. 10 contains provisions that would affect the
intelligence community, terrorism prevention and prosecution,
and border security, as well as international cooperation and
coordination. Table 2 presents CBO's estimates of the cost of
those provisions. In total, we estimate that implementing H.R.
10 would cost $17.5 billion over the 2005-2009 period, assuming
appropriation of the specified and estimated amounts. That
total does not include the possible additional costs associated
with implementing provisions dealing with the creation of an
interoperable data system for exchanging law enforcement and
intelligence data or the establishment of an FBI reserve
service because CBO does not have sufficient information to
estimate those costs at this time. With regard to the FBI
reserve service, CBO cannot predict when a national emergency
would occur, but expects that costs for the proposed reserve
service would likely be insignificant in most years.

TABLE 2. ESTIMATED CHANGES IN SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION UNDER H.R. 10 AS ORDERED REPORTED BY THE HOUSE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
By fiscal year, in millions of dollars--
-------------------------------------------------
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reform the Intelligence Community:
Estimated Authorization Level............................. 40 235 75 90 70
Estimated Outlays......................................... 30 60 110 145 140
Combating Financial Crimes:
Authorization Level....................................... 51 0 0 0 0
Estimated Outlays......................................... 36 15 0 0 0
Aviation Security:
Estimated Authorization Level............................. 528 4,343 330 0 0
Estimated Outlays......................................... 238 3,666 957 340 0
Improve Intelligence Capabilities of the FBI:
Estimated Authorization Level............................... 4 5 6 7 8
Estimated Outlays......................................... 3 5 6 8 8
Security for Nuclear Facilities:
Estimated Authorization Level............................. 1 2 2 2 2
Estimated Outlays......................................... -2 4 2 2 2
Community-Oriented Policing Services:
Authorization Level....................................... 1,008 1,027 1,047 0 0
Estimated Outlays......................................... 22 528 40 671 364
Increase the Number of Border Patrol and Immigration Agents:
Estimated Authorization Level............................. 0 174 526 981 1,451
Estimated Outlays......................................... 0 165 509 958 1,427
Grants to Improve Security of Driver's Licenses:
Estimated Authorization Level............................. 80 30 30 10 10
Estimated Outlays......................................... 80 30 30 10 10
New Standards for Issuance of Birth and Death Certificates:
Estimated Authorization Level............................. 330 20 30 40 50
Estimated Outlays......................................... 70 150 160 35 45
Expand Immigration Services at Foreign Airports:
Authorization Level....................................... 49 88 137 0 0
Estimated Outlays......................................... 39 80 127 28 0
Increase the Number of Consular Officers:
Estimated Authorization Level............................. 0 33 62 93 125
Estimated Outlays......................................... 0 27 54 84 115
Reform International Cooperation and Coordination:
Estimated Authorization Level............................. 17 17 17 7 7
Estimated Outlays......................................... 7 15 17 15 9
First-Responder Grants:
Estimated Authorization Level............................. 0 0 0 3,314 3,381
Estimate Outlays.......................................... 0 0 0 1,491 2,350
Security for Nonprofit Organizations:
Estimated Authorization Level............................. 168 168 168 0 0
Estimated Outlays......................................... 45 128 168 123 40
Counternarcotics Office:
Estimated Authorization Level............................. 6 6 6 6 6
Estimated Outlays......................................... 4 6 6 6 6
Security Clearance Modernization:
Estimated Authorization Level............................. 23 68 116 143 147
Estimated Outlays......................................... 21 64 111 140 147
Public Safety Communications Interoperability:
Estimated Authorization Level............................. 6 6 6 6 6
Estimated Outlays......................................... 5 6 6 6 6
Total Changes\1\:
Estimated Authorization Level............................. 2,311 6,223 2,559 4,700 5,264
Estimated Outlays......................................... 798 4,950 3,004 4,062 4,670
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ These amounts do not include the costs of section 2192 because CBO cannot estimate such costs at this time.
The amounts also exclude the costs associated with establishing a reserve service within the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. Any such costs would be insignificant in most years, and CBO has no basis for predicting when a
national emergency would occur.

Note: FBI = Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Reform the Intelligence Community. Title I would reform the
intelligence community by establishing the position of National
Intelligence Director and an Office of the National
Intelligence Director to manage and oversee intelligence
activities of the U.S. government,including foreign
intelligence and counterintelligence activities. The legislation also
would transfer some existing organizations, specifically the Office of
the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management
and the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC), to that office and
would establish a National Counterterrorism Center and one or more
national intelligence centers within the Office of the NID. The bill
would expand language training within the intelligence community and
authorize additional scholarships for new recruits. Finally, the
legislation would establish a civilian linguist reserve corps.
CBO estimates that implementing title I and other
provisions relating to the intelligence community would cost
about $490 million over the 2005-2009 period (see Table 3).
These costs are in addition to those that would be incurred
under current law by the Office of the Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence for Community Management and the Terrorist
Threat Integration Center. The estimated costs include expenses
to establish, house, and administer the new Office of the
National Intelligence Director and implement other specified
programs, such as improving training programs and establishing
a scholarship program.

TABLE 3. ESTIMATED CHANGES IN SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION FOR REFORMING THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY UNDER
H.R. 10 AS ORDERED REPORTED BY THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
By fiscal year, in millions of dollars--
-------------------------------------------------
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Create the Office of the National Intelligence Director:
Estimated Authorization Level............................. 15 210 50 80 60
Estimated Outlays......................................... 10 35 80 135 130
Other Program Authorizations:
Estimated Authorization Level............................. 25 25 25 10 10
Estimated Outlays......................................... 20 25 25 10 10
Total Changes:
Estimated Authorization Level............................. 40 235 75 90 70
Estimated Outlays......................................... 30 60 110 145 140
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Create the Office of the National Intelligence Director.
CBO estimates that establishing, housing, and administering the
Office of the NID would cost about $390 million over the 2005-
2009 period.
The bill would transfer the Office of the Deputy Director
of Central Intelligence for Community Management (identified as
the Intelligence Community Management Account within the
budget) and the TTIC to the Office of the NID.
The Intelligence Community Management Account (ICMA) was
established by Congressional direction to provide resources
that directly support the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency and the intelligence community as a whole in
coordinating cross-program activities. Because part of its
budget is classified, CBO does not know the overall size of
this organization. Unclassified budgets for the ICMA indicate
that the office has a staff of about 300 people who develop the
National Foreign Intelligence Program budget, oversee research
and development activities, and develop intelligence plans and
requirements, but the Congress also authorizes and appropriates
funds for additional staff in the classified portion of the
intelligence budget.
Similarly, CBO has no budget information on the TTIC, but
public information released by the White House indicates that
the center opened in May 2003 with a staff of about 60 people
working alongside the counterterrorism offices of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and the CIA. That same information
indicates that the Administration expects to eventually staff
the TTIC with between 200 and 300 people to serve as the hub
for all intelligence regarding terrorist threats.
CBO expects that the NID would require staff to perform its
authorized functions in addition to the staff transferred from
the ICMA and the planned staff for the TTIC. Because much of
the detailed information regarding the organization, staffing
levels, and budgets of the intelligence community are
classified at a level above clearances held by CBO employees,
CBO has used information about staff requirements from similar
organizations within the Department of Defense (DoD), the
Department of Homeland Security, and other federal agencies to
attempt to estimate the number of additional staff that might
be needed by the NID. Based on that analysis, CBO estimates
that the NID might need to hire around 300 new staff, including
appointees such as principal and deputy directors, key managers
such as a general counsel, a civil liberties protection
officer, personnel to perform administrative functions such as
policy development and budget and finance activities, and
personnel for the National Counterterrorism Center and one or
more national intelligence centers. CBO expects that many of
these new hires would be staff transferred from other
organizations within the intelligence community but that those
other organizations would eventually fill many of the vacated
positions within their organizations over about a four year
period following enactment of this legislation.
Based on information about the staffing levels and costs
for the administrative offices of the Department of Defense,
the Department of Homeland Security, and other agencies,
CBOestimates that the personnel and related expenses to provide
centralized leadership, coordination, and support and analytical
services for the Office of the National Intelligence Director would
eventually cost around $45 million annually, but that costs would be
much lower in the first few years as positions are filled. CBO
estimates that such costs would be minimal in the first year and total
about $130 million over the 2005-2009 period.
Section 1094 would express the sense of the Congress that
the permanent location of the NID headquarters be at a location
other than the George Bush Center for Intelligence in Langley,
Virginia. For this estimate, CBO assumes that the Director's
office and associated staff would occupy the space currently
used by the Intelligence Community Management staff until
fiscal year 2007. Starting in 2007, CBO assumes that the office
would move to new office space in a building owned by the
General Services Administration (GSA) until a new building can
be built for its use. CBO estimates that initially GSA would
need to renovate and furnish office space for the NID staff.
(After 2009, CBO expects that these positions would be
relocated to the new permanent NID headquarters.) CBO estimates
that the GSA rental payments would reach about $20 million a
year and total about $40 million over the 2007-2009 period.
Additional costs to purchase computers, network equipment, and
supplies in the first few years following the relocation into
the GSA-owned building also would be significant. CBO estimates
that those costs would total $30 million over the 2007-2009
period.
CBO assumes that GSA would construct a new building on land
already owned by the federal government to serve as the
headquarters for the Office of the NID. Based on information
provided by GSA about recent federal office building projects,
CBO estimates that planning and design of the new headquarters
would cost $15 million over the 2005-2006 period, and that
constructing the facility to house NID employees would cost
about $175 million over the 2006-2009 period. (An additional
$20 million in spending would occur in 2010 to complete
construction of the new building.) CBO assumes that the
headquarters would be located on property already owned by the
federal government in the Washington, D.C. area. If GSA had to
buy land for the building site, costs would be higher. CBO
assumes that construction of the new facility would not start
until sometime in late 2006 and would be completed after 2009.
Therefore, CBO estimates that no costs associated with
furnishing, equipping, and maintaining the new space would be
incurred during the 2005-2009 period nor would there be costs
to relocate NID staff from the interim offices to the new
headquarters over that period.
Other Program Authorizations. Title I also would authorize
the President and the NID to initiate or enhance several
programs within the intelligence community. Based on
information from the Administration and on the costs of other
similar efforts, CBO estimates that those efforts would cost
about $20 million in 2005 and total around $90 million over the
2005-2009 period, subject to appropriation of the specified and
estimated amounts.
Section 1052 would authorize the
appropriation of an additional $2 million a year to
carry out the grant program for the National Flagship
Language Initiative, which was established to improve
higher education in foreign languages that the
Secretary of Defense has identified as critical to the
interests of the national security of the United
States. CBO estimates that implementing this section
would cost $10 million over the 2005-2009 period,
assuming appropriation of the specified amounts.
Section 1053 would establish a new
scholarship program within the National Security
Education Trust Fund. The scholarships would be
available to students who are U.S. citizens and are
native speakers of a foreign language that is
identified as critical to the national security
interests of the United States. The scholarships would
enable those students to pursue English language
studies at an institution of higher education in the
United States to attain proficiency in those skills.
The bill would authorize the appropriation of $4
million a year starting in 2005 for these scholarships.
CBO estimates that the costs for the scholarship
program would total about $20 million over the 2005-
2009 period, assuming appropriation of the specified
amounts.
Section 1055 would establish a program
operated jointly by the NID and the Department of
Defense to advance foreign language skills in languages
that are critical to the capability of the intelligence
community to carry out national security activities.
Under this provision, personnel from the intelligence
community could be reimbursed for the total cost of
tuition and training in foreign language studies
undertaken at educational institutions that have
entered into educational partnerships with the U.S.
government. In addition, federal agencies would be
allowed to provide financial assistance to those
educational institutions, including the loan of
equipment and instructional materials. CBO has no
specific information about how this joint NID/DoD
program would be implemented. Assuming that
participation levels would be similar to those for
another foreign language program offered within the
National Security Education Trust Fund, CBO estimates
that the new program would cost about $1 million a
year.
Section 1056 would allow the NID to
establish a civilian linguist reserve corps consisting
of U.S. citizens with advanced levels of proficiency in
foreign languages. CBO assumes that members of the
reserve corps would receive pay, transportation, and
per diem when performing work for the federal
government as requested by the President. The pilot
project would be conducted for a three-year period,
starting in 2005. Based on information provided by the
staff of the National Security Education Program, CBO
expects that the reserve corps would consist of about
150 people at any given time and cost about $50 million
over the 2005-2007 period.
Section 1062 would establish an Emerging
Technologies Panel within the National Security Agency
to advise the NID on the research, development, and
application of existing and emerging science and
technology advances, advances in encryption, and other
topics. Based on the budgets of other advisory panels,
CBO estimates that the costs to operate this panel
would be about $1 million in 2005 and would total $10
million over the 2005-2009 period.
Combating Financial Crimes. Sections 2101 and 2102 would
authorize the appropriation of $51 million for fiscal year 2005
for the Financial Crimes Enforcement Center to improve its
computer systems and to assist states and localities in
combating financial crimes. CBO estimates that this provision
would result in outlays of $36 million in 2005 and $15 million
in 2006, assuming appropriation of the specified amount.
Aviation Security. Title II would authorize the
appropriation of the funds necessary to continue aviation
security programs in 2006 and to deploy explosive-detection
equipment at airport check points. Based on information from
DHS and current funding levels, CBO estimates that title II
would authorize the appropriation of about $5.2 billion over
the 2005-2007 period for aviation security programs
administered by DHS. We estimate that most of that amount--
roughly $4 billion--would be authorized to be appropriated in
fiscal year 2006 for ongoing programs administered by the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and for the
federal air marshals. (That estimate is net of almost $2
billion in offsetting collections from passenger and air-
carrier fees that we assume will continue to be collected by
DHS in 2006 to partly offset the cost of aviation security
programs in that year.) This estimate also includes almost $1
billion over the 2005-2007 period for installing explosive-
detection equipment at airport screening checkpoints and $70
million in 2005 for programs to better control access to
airports, improve passenger screening, and train federal law
enforcement officials in certain counterterrorism measures. In
addition, title II would specifically authorize the
appropriation of $95 million in 2005 for security projects at
airports and $2 million for a pilot program to test technology
to reduce the threat of explosions of baggage and cargo on
commercial flights. Assuming appropriation of the specified and
estimated amounts, CBO estimates that implementing all of these
provisions would cost $238 million in 2005 and $5.2 billion
over the 2005-2009 period.
Improve the Intelligence Capabilities of the FBI. Section
2193 would direct the FBI to continue to improve the
intelligence capabilities of the bureau and to develop and
maintain a national intelligence workforce within the FBI.
Today, the FBI spends about $30 million on counterterrorism
training. Since 2002, more than 1,500 agents have been added to
the bureau's staff to meet its counterterrorism mission, an
increase of about 20 percent. In addition, since the events of
September 11, 2001, the FBI has partnered with other
intelligence agencies to provide training in counterterrorism
and counterintelligence to its staff, and it plans to increase
that training in the future. CBO assumes that implementation of
this bill would require the agency to conduct more extensive
training than is currently planned. Based on information from
the bureau, we estimate that this additional training would
cost $3 million in 2005 and almost $30 million over the 2005-
2009 period, assuming appropriation of the necessary amounts.
Interoperable Law Enforcement and Intelligence Data System.
Under the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of
2002 (Public Law 107-173), the Administration is required to
integrate all law enforcement data into an interoperable
electronic data system known as the Chimera system. However,
the act did not establish a firm date by which the
Administration must deploy a fully operational Chimera system.
Section 2192 would transfer the responsibility for this
activity to the NID. The provision would direct the NID to
design a state-of-the-art Chimera system with both biometric
identification and linguistic capabilities satisfying the best
technology standards, and to deliver a fully operational system
by September 11, 2007, for use by the intelligence community,
federal law enforcement agencies, and counterterrorism
personnel to collect and share information. Although CBO
believes that establishing a firm deadline for the operational
system would likely result in increased discretionary spending
in the near term, CBO does not have sufficient information to
estimate that increase at this time. Absent information as to
whether this transfer would result in changes to the system,
CBO also cannot estimate whether any long-term costs would
result from this transfer.
Security for Nuclear Facilities. Section 2194 of the bill
would require the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to study
several types of threats to the nation's nuclear facilities,
update the rules regarding the types of threats nuclear
facilities should be able to deflect, and undertake force-on-
force exercises regularly to maintain nuclear facilities'
readiness to defend against attacks. Although the bill would
authorize $3 million for such purposes, based on information
from the NRC, CBO estimates that the provision would have a
gross cost of $7 million in 2005 and $22 million over the 2005-
2009 period. However, the NRC has the authority to offset a
substantial portion of its annual appropriation with fees
charged to the facilities it regulates. Accounting for such
collections, CBO estimates that implementing those provisions
would result in a net cost of $9 million over the 2005-2009
period.
Community-Oriented Policing Services (COPS). Section 2195
would authorize the appropriation of just over $1 billion for
each of fiscal years 2005 through 2007 for the Community-
Oriented Policing Services (COPS) program. Assuming
appropriation of the specified amounts, CBO estimates this
provision would cost about $2.5 billion over the 2005-2009
period.
Increase the Number of Border Patrol and Immigration
Agents. Sections 3003 and 3004 would direct DHS to increase the
number of border patrol agents by 2,000 per year and thenumber
of investigators of immigration violations by 800 each year over the
2006-2010 period. Implementing this provision would increase the number
of federal agents by 14,000 by 2010. Assuming appropriation of the
necessary amounts, CBO estimates that this provision would cost $165
million in fiscal year 2006 and $3.1 billion over the 2006-2009 period.
Grants to Improve the Security of Driver's Licenses.
Section 3055 would authorize the appropriation of such sums as
necessary for fiscal years 2005 through 2009 for DHS to make
grants to states to cover the costs of improving the security
of driver's licenses as required by the bill. Based on
information from states and from the American Association of
Motor Vehicle Administrators (AAMVA), CBO estimates that
implementing this provision would cost $80 million in 2005 and
$160 million over the 2005-2009 period, assuming appropriation
of the necessary amounts.
New Standards for Issuance of Birth and Death Certificates.
Sections 3062 and 3063 would require new federal standards
governing the issuance and management of birth certificates
recognized by the federal government. Section 3064 would
require the establishment of a uniform electronic birth and
death registration system, and section 3065 would extend that
system to allow electronic verification of vital records.
Maintaining birth and death records has long been a
function of state governments. The Secretary of Health and
Human Services, acting through the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC), currently works with states to compile
birth and death data for epidemiological studies. H.R. 10 would
authorize the Secretary to expand that cooperation to the
formal linking of birth and death records for purposes of
preventing fraud and other government uses. The bill also would
authorize the appropriation of such sums as may be necessary
for these activities, including grants to states to comply with
these new requirements.
Based on information from the CDC and the National
Association for Public Health Statistics and Information
Systems, CBO estimates that implementing the new security
standards and building the electronic system of vital records
would cost $460 million over the 2005-2009 period, assuming
appropriation of the necessary amounts. That cost would be for
grants to states to meet the new federal requirements. Of these
amounts, $70 million in 2005 and $330 million over the 2005-
2009 period would cover start-up costs, including digitalizing
old birth and death certificates, building electronic systems
for reporting deaths in some states, upgrading security
arrangements, and acquiring computer infrastructure. CBO
estimates that operating the new system for vital records over
the 2006-2009 period would cost $130 million. We expect that
the system would be fully operational in 2009, at which point
annual operating costs would total $50 million.
Expand Immigration Services at Foreign Airports. Sections
3082 and 3083 would authorize the appropriation of $49 million
for 2005, $88 million for 2006, and $137 million for 2007 for
DHS to expand preinspection services and immigration security
at foreign airports. CBO estimates that implementing this
provision would cost $274 million over the 2005-2009 period,
assuming appropriation of the specified amounts.
Increase the Number of Consular Officers. Section 3084
would authorize the Secretary of State to increase the number
of consular officers by 150 each year over the number allotted
in the previous year during the 2006-2009 period. It also would
authorize the Secretary to provide additional training to
consular officers in the detection of fraudulent documents
presented by applicants for admission into the United States.
Based on the average cost of training and stationing consular
officers overseas, CBO estimates that implementing the
provision would cost $27 million in 2006 and $280 million over
the 2006-2009 period.
Reform International Cooperation and Coordination. Title IV
would require the President to produce numerous reports,
express the sense of the Congress on many issues, and urge the
President to seek agreements with other countries to improve
cooperation in the global fight against terrorist
organizations. The title also would authorize some additional
spending. Subtitle D, the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act
Amendments of 2004, would authorize additional rule-of-law,
disarmament, and counternarcotics activities in Afghanistan by
the U.S. Department of State, but would not increase the
overall authorization of appropriations above the $425 million
authorized for each of fiscal years 2005 and 2006 in current
law.
Title IV contains three indefinite authorizations of
appropriations and other provisions that CBO estimates would
cost $7 million in 2005 and $63 million over the 2005-2009
period, assuming appropriation of the necessary amounts. In the
cases where the same provision has been included in other bills
at specified authorization levels, CBO used that authorization
level for this estimate. CBO assumes that spending for these
programs will follow the historical pattern of similar
programs.
Section 4041 would authorize the
appropriation of such sums as may be necessary in 2005,
2006, and 2007 to provide grants to American-sponsored
schools in predominately Muslim countries to provide
scholarships to students from lower- and middle-income
families of those countries. H.R. 4303, the American
Education Promotion Act, as ordered reported by the
House Committee on International Relations on June 24,
2004, would authorize the appropriation of $5 million
each year for such grants. That amount is included in
this estimate.
Section 4042 would authorize the
appropriation of such sums as may be necessary in 2005,
2006, and 2007 for grants by the National Endowment for
Democracy toenhance free and independent media
worldwide. H.R. 1950, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal
Years 2004 and 2005, as reported by the House Committee on
International Relations on May 16, 2003, would have authorized $15
million for such grants. CBO assumes the amount would be provided in
three equal installments over the three-year period.
Section 4103 would authorize the
appropriation of such sums as may be necessary for
programs to reduce the number of shoulder-fired
missiles. For the purpose of the estimate, CBO assumed
the appropriation of $5 million each year, an amount
similar to the cost of other programs for reducing the
availability of small arms.
Section 4035 would establish within the
Department of State an Office on Multilateral
Negotiations. In our estimate for H.R. 4053, the United
States International Leadership Act of 2004, as ordered
reported by the House Committee on International
Relations on March 31, 2004, CBO estimated that
establishing and operating an Office on Multilateral
Negotiations would cost $2 million a year.
Sections 4011 and 4012 would require the
Secretary of State to fill vacancies on the Arms
Control and Nonproliferation Advisory Board and to
provide resources to procure the services of experts
and consultants. Based on the cost of other advisory
boards, CBO estimates that implementing these sections
would cost less than $200,000 a year.
First-Responder Grants. Subtitle A of title V would
authorize funding for grants to state and local governments for
staff and equipment to respond to acts of terrorism and natural
disasters. It would authorize the Secretary of the Department
of Homeland Security to change the criteria used to distribute
funding for four existing first-responder grant programs--the
State Homeland Security, the Urban Area Security Initiative,
the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention, and the Citizen Corps
grant programs. Assuming appropriation of the necessary funds,
CBO estimates that implementing this subtitle would cost $3.8
billion over the 2008-2009 period.
Almost $10 billion has been appropriated for first-
responder grants since fiscal year 2003, including about $3
billion in fiscal year 2004. The Office of Domestic
Preparedness (within DHS) derives its primary authority to
distribute grants to states and localities to prepare and
respond to terrorism from the USA Patriot Act (Public Law 107-
56). That law authorized the appropriation of such sums as
necessary for first-responder grants through fiscal year 2007.
This subtitle would supersede this authority for first-
responder grants in the Patriot Act and continue the
authorization to appropriate such sums as necessary after 2007.
For this estimate, CBO assumes that the amount in CBO's
baseline--$3.3 billion--would be appropriated for first-
responder grants in 2008 and that 2009 funding levels for
first-responder grants would continue at that level, adjusted
for anticipated inflation.
Security for Nonprofit Organizations. Section 5022 would
authorize the appropriation of $100 million for 2005 and such
sums as are necessary in 2006 and 2007 for DHS to contract with
appropriate companies to improve security at those 501(c)3
nonprofit organizations that are determined to be most
vulnerable to potential terrorist attacks. In addition, the
bill would establish a new loan guarantee program for all
nonprofit organizations that might need additional security
enhancements to protect them from terrorist attacks. CBO
estimates that this program would cost about $40 million over
the 2005-2009 period. H.R. 10 also would authorize the
appropriation of $50 million for 2005 and such sums as are
necessary for 2006 and 2007 for grants to local law enforcement
agencies to offset costs associated with increased security in
areas with a high concentration of nonprofit organizations.
Finally, the bill would authorize the appropriation of $5
million in 2005 and such sums as necessary in 2006 and 2007 for
a new Office of Community Relations and Civic Affairs to
administer the new security program for nonprofit organizations
among other duties. Assuming appropriation of the necessary
amounts, CBO estimates that implementing those provisions would
cost $504 million over the 2005-2009 period.
Counternarcotics Office. Section 5021 would authorize the
appropriation of $6 million in fiscal year 2005 to strengthen
the authority of the Counternarcotics Officer at DHS. Under the
bill, the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement would be
responsible for coordinating policies and federal operations
aimed at preventing the entry of illegal drugs into the United
States. DHS currently has a Counternarcotics Officer within the
Chief of Staff's office. According to that office, the
Counternarcotics Office is working with limited authority to
coordinate the agency's anti-drug effort. Assuming the
appropriation of the necessary amounts to continue this effort
over the next five years, CBO estimates that implementing this
provision would cost $28 million over the 2005-2009 period.
FBI Reserve Service. Section 5053 would allow the FBI to
establish a reserve service consisting of former employees of
the FBI who would be eligible for temporary reemployment during
a period of national emergency. Under the bill, the total
number of personnel in this reserve service could not exceed
500 individuals. Members of the reserve service would receive
reimbursement for transportation and per diem expenses when
participating in any training, and members who are retired
federal employees would be allowed to collect both pay and
retirement benefits during their period of reemployment. CBO
cannot predict when a national emergency might occur, so no
costs are included in this estimate for activating the proposed
FBI Reserve Service. In most years, CBO expects that the cost
associated with the reserve service would be insignificant--
mostly covering limitedtraining time, per diem, and
transportation expenses. In an emergency, if all members of the reserve
corps were reemployed for six months, the costs would total about $25
million.
Security Clearance Modernization. Beginning five years
after enactment of this bill, section 5076 would require the
Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to achieve a 60-day
turnaround period for all security clearances requested by
federal agencies. Currently, OPM anticipates that by the fall
of 2005 the typical turnaround period for security clearances
will be approximately 120 days. Based on information from OPM,
CBO expects that approximately 1,700 new investigators would
have to be hired over the next three years to meet the 60-day
standard. With an average annual cost of about $80,000 per
investigator, and assuming the appropriation of the necessary
amounts, CBO estimates that this provision would cost $483
million over the 2005-2009 period.
Interoperability of Public Safety Communications. Section
5131 would establish a program within DHS to provide assistance
and training to enhance the interoperability of public safety
communication among federal, state, and local governments in
high-risk jurisdictions. DHS currently conducts activities to
enhance communications; however, according to that office, it
is working with limited funds and legal authority. Based on
information from DHS, CBO estimates that implementing this
section would cost $29 million over the 2005-2009 period.

Direct Spending

The bill contains provisions that would decrease direct
spending (see Table 4). CBO estimates that enacting those
provisions would decrease direct spending by about $25 million
in 2005, $4 million over the 2005-2009 period, and $2 million
over the 2005-2014 period. The estimate of direct spending does
not include spending associated with extending the authority of
the CIA to offer incentive payments to employees who
voluntarily retire or resign because the data needed to prepare
such an estimate are classified.

TABLE 4. CHANGES IN DIRECT SPENDING UNDER H.R. 10 AS ORDERED REPORTED BY THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
\1\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
By fiscal year, in millions of dollars--
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Estimated Budget Authority...... * * * * * * * * * *
Estimated Outlays............... -25 -12 19 10 5 3 * * * *
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ These amounts do not include the costs of section 1061 because the data needed to prepare an estimate are
classified.
Note: * = Between zero and -$500,000.

Authority to Offer Incentive Payments to Employees of the
CIA Who Voluntarily Resign or Retire. Section 1061 would extend
indefinitely the authority of the CIA to offer incentive
payments to employees who voluntarily retire or resign. Under
current law, this authority would expire on September 30, 2005.
This section also would eliminate the requirement that the CIA
make a deposit to the Civil Service Retirement and Disability
Fund equal to 15 percent of final pay for each employee who
accepts an incentive payment. Extending authority to offer
incentive payments to these employees could increase outlays
from the Civil Service Retirement System in the near term,
although those amounts would be offset by reduced retirement
payments in later years. CBO cannot provide an estimate of the
direct spending effects because the data needed for such an
estimate are classified.
Aviation Security. Section 2177 would establish a fund
within DHS to enhance efforts to detect explosives at security
checkpoints in airports. The bill would authorize the
collection and spending of $30 million a year of fees from
airline passengers in 2005 and 2006.
The cost of the new program would be offset by fee
collections authorized under the bill. TSA already collects a
$2.50 fee from airline passengers each time they board an
aircraft (with a maximum of $5.00 per one-way trip). Under
current law, such fees may be collected only to the extent
provided for in advance in appropriations acts, and income from
those fees is recorded as an offset to appropriated spending.
H.R. 10 would require TSA to collect up to $30 million a year
from passengers without appropriation action. Under H.R. 10, we
estimate that the agency would collect that amount each year.
Because H.R. 10 would cause such fees to be used to finance the
activities related to explosives detection at airport
checkpoints, such fees would not be available to reduce the
costs of other TSA spending. In other words, the collections
under H.R. 10 would lead to a reduction in the amount of fees
recorded as offsets to appropriated spending--essentially
changing some discretionary offsetting collections into
mandatory offsetting receipts.
Based on historical spending patterns for similar
activities, CBO estimates that fees collected under this
provision would exceed the amounts actually spent for
explosives detection for the next few years. Hence, we estimate
that enacting section 2177 would reduce net direct spending by
$37 million in 2005 and 2006, but would increase net direct
spending in later years and have no net impact on the budget
over the 2005-2014 period.
Increased Fines for New Federal Crimes. Several sections in
title II would establish new federal crimes for offenses
relating to the commission of terrorist acts. Because those
prosecuted and convicted under the bill could be subject to
fines, the federal government might collect additional fines if
the legislation is enacted. Criminal fines are deposited as
receipts in the Crime Victims Fund and later spent. CBO expects
any additional revenues and direct spending under the bill
would be negligible because of the small number of cases
involved.
Authority to Waive Separation Age Requirement for FBI
Agents. Section 5051 would provide the FBI with the ability to
allow agents to remain at the agency beyond the age of 60.
Under current law, FBI agents are required to retire at age 57,
although the agency's director may waive that requirement until
the agent turns 60. This section would allow the director to
waive the mandatory retirement requirement until age 65. This
authority would last though the end of 2009, at which time the
waiver authority would revert to current law. Information
provided by the FBI indicates that the agency issues waivers to
between 25 and 75 employees annually. By expanding the current
waiver authority, CBO expects the bill would cause some FBI
employees to retire later than they otherwise would have. We
anticipate this would cause retirement annuities to fall in the
near term, and to increase after the expanded waiver authority
expires in 2009. CBO estimates this section would reduce direct
spending for retirement benefits by less than $500,000 in 2005
and by a total of $2 million over the 2005-2014 period.
Estimated impact on state, local, and tribal governments:
H.R. 10 contains several intergovernmental mandates as defined
in UMRA. The major mandates would require state, local, and
tribal governments to significantly change the way they process
and issue driver's licenses, identification cards, and birth
and death certificates. The costs to state, local, and tribal
governments would depend on federal regulations that are yet to
be developed. However, based on information from state
agencies, CBO estimates that, in aggregate, the
intergovernmental mandates in the bill would impose costs on
state, local, and tribal governments totaling more than $600
million over fiscal years 2005 through 2009. CBO estimates that
the costs in at least one of those years would exceed the
threshold established in UMRA ($60 million in 2004, adjusted
annually for inflation). The bill would authorize
appropriations for grants to states to cover such costs.

Intergovernmental Mandates with Significant Costs

Driver's Licenses. H.R. 10 would effectively require state
agencies that issue driver's licenses to comply with new
standards for producing, verifying, and ensuring the security
of driver's licenses and identification cards. Those provisions
would be effective three years after the bill's enactment. CBO
considers these standards to be mandates because any driver's
licenses issued after that time would be invalid for federal
identification purposes unless they met those requirements.
Based on information from AAMVA and other groups
representing state and local governments, CBO expects that
states would face significant additional costs to administer
the new system. Specifically, state licensing agencies would be
required to verify, with the issuing agency, each document
presented as proof of identification and residency. Agencies
such as the Social Security Administration currently charge a
fee for each verification, and assuming that other agencies
would charge similar fees, states would incur ongoing costs as
well as one-time costs to upgrade computer systems to meet
those requirements. States also would face significant costs to
upgrade computer systems to digitize and store electronic
copies of all source documents and to create and maintain the
Driver's License Agreement, an interstate database to share
driver information. Finally, certain states that do not
currently require background checks for certain employees would
face additional costs to complete those checks.
CBO assumes that states would begin to establish procedures
for complying with those standards in 2005, the year following
the bill's enactment; we estimate that they would incur
additional costs totaling $80 million during that first year
and another $80 million over fiscal years 2006 through 2009.
Issuance and Verification of Vital Statistics Information.
H.R. 10 would impose several intergovernmental mandates with
significant costs on state, local, and tribal agencies that
issue birth and death certificates. Those agencies would
effectively be required to print birth certificates on safety
paper to establish a central database of vital information and
to ensure that certain employees have security clearances.
Those provisions also would be effective three years after the
bill's enactment. Certificates issued after that would be
invalid for certain purposes unless they met those
requirements. We estimate that state, local, and tribal
governments would face additional costs to comply with those
requirements totaling more than $70 million in 2005 and almost
$400 million over fiscal years 2006 through 2009. Most of those
costs would be for upgrading computer software and hardware and
for staff time to convert existing paper records into
electronic records. Those are mostly one-time costs that would
be incurred over the five-year period.
Security Assistance to Certain Nonprofit Organizations.
This bill also would require state agencies responsible for
homeland security to coordinate a program to provide security
assistance to certain nonprofit organizations. The bill would
authorize to be appropriated $100 million in fiscal years 2005
through 2007 to fund those grants, but no funds would be
authorized to cover the costs states would incur for
administering the program. According to representatives from
state government, the administrative costs for similar
assistance programs tend to equal about 3 percent to 5 percent
of the monetary value of the assistance provided. Based on that
information, CBO estimates that the cost for state governments
to coordinate this program would total no more than $5 million
annually.

Mandates with No Significant Costs

The bill also contains several other intergovern-mental
mandates, but CBO expects that they would probably not impose
significant additional costs on state, local, or tribal
governments. Specifically, the bill would:
Require state identification bureaus to
coordinate background checks on current and potential
security officers for private companies and the FBI.
States that find the workload or the associated costs
too burdensome could, through legislation, opt out of
the program.
Require certain nuclear facilities to take
steps to protect against specific threats. The Nuclear
Regulatory Commission would be required to promulgate
regulations and until they are finalized, CBO cannot
estimate the total costs of complying with those new
requirements. Because few of the affected facilities
are publicly owned, however, the total costs for those
facilities would likely be small.
Require state licensing agencies to include
minimum features on all driver's license and
identification cards, including full legal name, date
of birth, gender, driver's license or identification
number, photo, legal address, physical security
features, and machine-readable technology. According to
AAMVA, all states currently include those minimum
features on licenses.
Require state agencies to meet minimum
standards before issuing driver's licenses, including
documenting the individual's name, date of birth,
address, and proof of Social Security number. While
states currently set their own standards for such
information, all states currently require at least this
minimum documentation.
Require states to maintain a database of
driver information; require states to implement
training classes for employees to identify fraudulent
documents; and require documents and supplies to be
securely stored. According to state officials, all
states currently comply with those requirements.
Require offices that maintain vital
information to comply with requirements for securing
their buildings. Based on information from
representatives of state offices of vital statistics,
CBO believes that most offices already would be in
compliance, assuming that the Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security would establish minimum
security requirements in any event.
Require that state and local governments
limit access to birth and death certificates. Fourteen
states currently allow public access to those records,
but CBO estimates that they would incur no additional
costs to limit access.
Prohibit states from accepting any foreign
document, other than an official passport, for
identification purposes for the issuance of driver's
licenses. Currently, at least 10 states accept
identification cards issued by foreign governments,
such as the ``matricula consular'' issued by Mexico.
This prohibition would preempt state authority.
Require states to resolve any discrepancies
that arise from verifying Social Security numbers,
though the language is unclear as to what specific
actions would be required. Currently, at least two
states prohibit their employees from enforcing
immigration laws, and many of those discrepancies may
be related to immigration. This requirement might
preempt those state laws.
Prohibit states from displaying Social
Security numbers on driver's licenses or from including
Social Security numbers (SSNs) in bar codes, magnetic
strips, or similar devices. CBO has found few instances
where states used SSNs as identifiers on licenses or
coded SSNs in some other manner on the license.
Require all law enforcement officers who are
armed, including state and local personnel, to have a
standardized credential when traveling on aircraft. CBO
assumes TSA would establish and issue such credentials.
Estimated Impact on the Private Sector: H.R. 10 would
impose private-sector mandates as defined in UMRA on shippers
of hazardous materials and licensees of nuclear facilities.
Because the impact of two of the mandates would depend on
future actions of the Department of Homeland Security and the
NRC for which information currently is not available, CBO
cannot determine whether the costs to the private sector would
exceed the annual threshold for private-sector mandates ($120
million in 2004, adjusted annually for inflation).
The bill would require the Secretary of Homeland Security
to issue regulations to increase the security of the shipment
of extremely hazardous materials as defined in the bill. The
bill would also require the NRC to issue regulations to ensure
that its licensees address security threats to be identified by
the NRC. At this time, there is no basis for predicting the
scope of those future regulations. Therefore, CBO cannot
estimate the cost of those mandates.
In addition, the bill would prohibit shippers of extremely
hazardous materials from discharging or discriminating against
any employee who provides information or assists in an
investigation regarding a violation of any law related to the
security of shipments of extremely hazardous materials. Such a
prohibition would constitute a private-sector mandate under
UMRA. Under current law, employees are protected if they report
any safety issues. Because compliance with these broader
whistle-blower protections would involve only a small
adjustment in administrative procedures, CBO estimates that
those shippers would incur only minimal additional costs.
Previous CBO estimates: On October 4, 2004, CBO transmitted
cost estimates for H.R. 10 as ordered reported by the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on September 29,
2004, and as ordered reported by the House Committee on Armed
Services on September 29, 2004. On October 5, 2005, CBO also
transmitted cost estimates for H.R. 10 as reported by the House
Committee on Financial Services on October 5, 2004, and as
ordered reported by the House Committee on Government Reform on
September 29, 2004. The legislation approved by the House
Committee on the Judiciary authorizes funding for the security
of nuclear facilities, and nonprofit organizations, and for the
COPS program. Differences in the estimated costs reflect
differences among the three bills.
On September 24, 2004, CBO transmitted a cost estimate for
S. 2840, the National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, as
reported by the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs. Both
bills would create a new Office of the National Intelligence
Director and reform certain aspects of the intelligence
community. H.R. 10 also would reform terrorism prevention and
prosecution, border security, and international cooperation and
coordination activities--areas not addressed by S. 2840.
Differences in the estimated costs reflect differences between
the two bills.
Estimate prepared by: Federal Costs: Intelligence Programs:
Raymond J. Hall; Homeland Security: Megan Carroll and Julie
Middleton; Justice: Mark Grabowicz; Vital Records: J. Timothy
Gronniger; International Programs: Joseph C. Whitehill; and
General Government: Matthew Pickford. Impact on State, Local,
and Tribal Governments: Melissa Merrell. Impact on the Private
Sector: Chad Goldberg and Jean Talarico.
Estimate approved by: Robert A. Sunshine, Assistant
Director for Budget Analysis.

Performance Goals and Objectives

The Committee states that pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of
rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, H.R. 10
reduces the risk of terrorist attack against the United States
by implementing many of the bipartisan recommendations of the
National Commission to Investigate Terrorist Attacks Upon the
United States.

Constitutional Authority Statement

Pursuant to clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the Committee finds the authority for
this legislation in article I, Sec. 8 of the Constitution.

Section-by-Section Analysis and Discussion

The following discussion describes the portions of the bill
as reported by the Committee on the Judiciary that fall within
its jurisdiction.\100\ The Committee understands that a section
by section analysis of the entire bill will be included in the
report of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
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\100\ This section contains a summary of the principal provisions
of H.R. 10 within the jurisdiction of the Committee; it does not
comprise an exhaustive list of provisions of H.R. 10 within the
jurisdiction of the Committee.
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TITLE I--REFORM OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Section 1001. Short title

This section names this title the ``National Intelligence
Improvement Act of 2004.''

Section 1011. Reorganization and improvement of management of the
intelligence community

This section Act replaces Sec. Sec. 102-04 of Title I of
the National Security Act with the following new Sec. Sec. 102,
102A, 103, 103A, 104 and 104A. New Sec. 102 replaces the DCI
with a National Intelligence Director (``NID''). The NID will
be Presidentially appointed and Senate confirmed and serve as
the head of the intelligence community. It prohibits the NID
from simultaneously serving as the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency or as the head of any other element of the
intelligence community.
New Sec. 102A sets out the responsibilities and authorities
of the NID. This section provides that the NID shall have
access to all national intelligence and intelligence related to
the national security, except as otherwise provided by law or
guidelines agreed upon by the Attorney General and the NID. The
NID will develop and present the annual budget for the National
Intelligence Program (NIP). The NID must report to the
Committees on Judiciary, Intelligence, and Armed Services a
report of any transfer of personnel relative to the Committees'
jurisdiction.
New Sec. 103 establishes the Office of the NID to assist
the Director in the performance of his or her duties. This
section establishes specific responsibilities for a number of
Deputies and Associates to assist the NID.
New Sec. 104 establishes that the DCI shall assist the NID.
His responsibilities include to: (1) collect intelligence
through human sources and by other appropriate means, except
that the DCI shall have no police, subpoena, or law enforcement
powers or internal security functions; and (2) provide overall
direction for the collection of national intelligence overseas
or outside of the United States through human sources by
elements of the intelligence community authorized to undertake
such collection and, in coordination with other agencies of the
Government which are authorized to undertake such collection,
ensure that the most effective use is made of resources and
that the risks to the United States and those involved in such
collection are minimized. The manager's amendment reported by
the Committee inserted the qualifying phrase ``overseas or
outside the United States'' to clarify that the CIA's
collection authority is not domestic. The Committee also
supported the continued limitation that the CIA shall not have
police, subpoena or other law enforcement powers.

Section 1012. Revised definition of national intelligence

This section defines national intelligence and intelligence
related to national security to refer to all intelligence,
regardless of source and including information collected both
domestically and overseas that involves threats to the U.S.,
its people, property or interest; the development or use of
weapons of mass destruction; or any other matter bearing on the
U.S. national or homeland security.

Section 1014. Role of the National Intelligence Director in appointment
of certain officials responsible for intelligence-related
activities

This section amends Sec. 106 of the National Security Act
to authorize the NID to recommend to the President individuals
for appointment as the Deputy NID and the Director of the CIA.
The section also allows the NID to concur with the Secretary of
Defense in the selection of the head of the National Security
Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, and the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. The NID shall consult, under
this section on the selection for the positions of the Defense
Intelligence Agency, Assistant Secretary of State for
Intelligence and Research, Director of the Office of
Intelligence of the Department of Energy, Director of the
Office of Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy,
Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis of the
Department of Treasury, Executive Assistant Director for the
Intelligence of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) or
successor, Undersecretary of Homeland Security for Information
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection, and the Deputy
Assistant Commandant of the Coast Guard for Intelligence.

Section 1021. National Counterterrorism Center

Section 1021 establishes the National Counterterrorism
Center, which will be the primary organization for analyzing
and integrating all intelligence possessed or acquired by the
U.S.--except for intelligence pertaining exclusively to
domestic counterterrorism. The NCTC will also support DOJ, DHS,
and other agencies in fulfillment of their responsibilities
todisseminate terrorism information consistent with the law and
guidelines agreed to by the AG and the NID. The Committee added the
reference AG guidelines in the manager's amendment.

Section 1022. Civil Liberties Protection Officer

Section 1022 requires the NID to appoint a Civil Liberties
Protection Officer (``CLPO'') who would be responsible for
ensuring that civil liberties and privacy protections are
appropriately incorporated in the policies and procedures
developed and implemented by the Office of the NID. In
addition, the CLPO must: (1) Oversee compliance by the ONID and
the NID with the Constitution and all laws, regulations,
executive orders and implementing guidelines relating to civil
liberties and privacy; (2) review and assess complaints and
other information indicating possible civil liberties or
privacy abuses; (3) ensure that the utilization of technologies
sustain privacy protections regarding the use, collection, and
disclosure of personal information; (4) ensure that personal
information contained in a system of records (as defined in the
Privacy Act) is handled in full compliance with the Act's fair
information practices; (5) conduct privacy impact assessments
when appropriate or required by law; and (6) perform such other
duties as prescribed by the NID or required by law. Section
1022 authorizes the CLPO to refer complaints of civil liberties
or privacy abuse to the appropriate Office of Inspector General
responsible for the intelligence community department or agency
to investigate.

Section 1031. Joint Intelligence Community Council

TITLE II--TERRORISM PREVENTION AND PROSECUTION

Section 2001. Individual Terrorists as Agents of Foreign Powers

This section now embodies the Berman amendment adopted at
Committee which adds a new section to the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978. It allows the court to assume that a
non-U.S. person who is engaged in terrorism is an agent of a
foreign power under the Act.

Sections 2021-2024, Stop Terrorist and Military Hoaxes Act of 2004.

These sections incorporate the Stop Terrorist and Military
Hoaxes Act of 2004. These sections create criminal and civil
penalties for whoever engages in any conduct, with intent to
convey false or misleading information, that concerns an
activity which would constitute such crimes as those relating
to explosives; firearms; destruction of vessels; terrorism;
sabotage of nuclear facilities; aircraft piracy; a dangerous
weapon to assault flight crew members and attendants;
explosives on an aircraft; homicide or attempted homicide or
damaging or destroying facilities. They also prohibit making a
false statement with intent to convey false or misleading
information about the death, injury, capture, or disappearance
of a member of the U.S. armed forces during a war or armed
conflict in which the United States is engaged. Additionally,
the bill increases penalties from not more than 5 years to not
more than 10 years for making false statements, and obstructing
justice, if the subject matter relates to international or
domestic terrorism.

Sections 2041-2044. Material Support to Terrorism Prohibition
Enhancement Act of 2004

Section 2042 adds a new crime of material support for
terrorism for knowingly receiving military training from a
foreign terrorist organization. The section requires that any
person charged under this section must have knowledge that the
organization is a terrorist organization. It also defines the
term military-type training. The section provides for
extraterritorial Federal jurisdiction over an offense under
this section.
Section 2043 expands the crime of material support to
terrorists to include any act of international or domestic
terrorism and require that any person charged under this
section must have knowledge that the organization is a
terrorist organization. It also more clearly defines the term
material support.

Section 2044 Financing of terrorism

This section amends 18 USC Sec. 2339C so that those who
raise funds for terrorism can be prosecuted prior to the funds
being transmitted to terrorist organizations.

Sections 2051-2053. Weapons of Mass Destruction Prohibition Improvement
Act of 2004

These sections would amend 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2332a(a)(2) which
makes it a crime for a person to use a weapon of mass
destruction (other than a chemical weapon) against any person
within the U.S. and the result of such use affects interstate
and foreign commerce. They would expand the coverage of the
target to include property. They would also expand when Federal
jurisdiction is affected by covering the use of mail or any
facility of interstate or foreign commerce for the attack, by
the property being used for interstate or foreign commerce, and
when the perpetrator travels or causes another to travel in
interstate or foreign commerce in furtherance of the offense.
This section would also expand coverage to include the use of a
chemical weapon.

Sections 2101-2102. Money laundering and terrorist financing

These sections authorize funding for the Department of
Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN). The
section provides funding for the following: (1) Key
technological improvements in FinCEN systems providing
authorized law enforcement agencies with Web-based access to
FinCEN data; (2) Expedited filing of suspicious activity
reports with the ability to immediately alert financial
institutions about suspicious activities; (3) Provision of
information sharing technologies to improve the Government's
ability to exploit the information in the FinCEN databases; and
(4) Provision of training in the use of technologies available
to detect and prevent financial crimes and terrorism.

Section 2122 Conduct in aid of counterfeiting

This section equates the possession of anti-counterfeiting
technology or components,with the intent that it be used in a
counterfeiting scheme with the actual act of counterfeiting.

Sections 2141-2142. Criminal history background checks

These sections address the issue of criminal history
records as they relate to background investigations. Section
2142 authorizes the Attorney General to establish and maintain
a system for providing employers with criminal history
information if the information is requested as part of an
employee background check that is authorized by the State where
the employee works or where the employer has their principal
place of business. These sections also give the Attorney
General flexibility, based on real-time terror concerns, to
mandate criminal history record checks for certain types of
employment that involve positions vital to the nation's
infrastructure or key resources. This section would allow for a
standardized approach to the numerous requests from groups that
want or need access to these records. A piecemeal approach has
evolved as the various bills that authorize criminal history
record checks these go to different committees for
consideration and if passed, end up in different sections of
the code.
The purpose of this section is to set up a standard process
with uniform procedures, definitions, fee structures where
practical, and reasonable safeguards to protect privacy and
employee rights. A reporting requirement under this section
seeks to identify all statutory requirements that already
require the Department of Justice to perform some type of
record check, the type of information requested, and any
variances that exist in terms, definitions, and fees charged.
The amendment offered by Mrs. Blackburn, which was adopted,
makes this a pilot study and establishes specific criteria to
be addressed in the report that is required, including the
effectiveness of using commercially available data bases as
part of criminal history information checks. It is the
intention of the Committee that this study last for 180 days.

Section 2143. Protect Act

This section amends Public Law No. 108-21, by extending the
duration of pilot programs for volunteer groups to obtain
national and State criminal history background checks from 18
months to 30 months.

Section 2144. Reviews of criminal records of applicants for private
security officer employment

This section was added by the Blackburn amendment. It is
the text of S.1743, the ``Private Security Officer Employment
Authorization Act'' which passed the Senate by unanimous
consent at the end of 2003. This section makes findings as to
the important role that private security officers play and
stresses the importance of thoroughly screening and training
officers. This section establishes a mechanism for authorized
employers of security guards to request criminal history
background checks using existing State identification bureaus.
Criteria for disqualification mirrors that of existing state
criteria and where a state has no criteria for such employment,
this section provides general disqualifiers. A State may
decline to participate in the program established by this
section.

Section 2145. Task force on clearinghouse for IAFIS criminal history
records

This section, created by the Blackburn amendment,
establishes a task force to examine the establishment of a
national clearinghouse to process criminal history record
requests from employers providing private security guard
services. It is the Committee's intent that the clearinghouse
described in section 2145 shall only process criminal history
record requests pertaining to employees or prospective
employees of the private security guard service making the
request pursuant to that section.

Section 2181. Federal law enforcement in-flight counterterrorism
training

This section directs ICE and the Federal Air Marshal
Service (in coordination with the Transportation Security
Administration) to make available appropriate in-flight
counterterrorism procedures and tactics training to Federal law
enforcement officers who fly while on duty.

Section 2182 Federal Flight Deck Officer Weapon Carriage Pilot Program

This section creates a Federal Flight Deck Officer
(``FFDO'') Weapon Carriage Pilot Program that will allow pilots
participating in the FFDO program to transport their firearms
on their persons. After one year, the section requires the TSA
to evaluate the safety record of the pilot program. It also
directs that only if the safety level obtained under the pilot
program is comparable to the safety level determined under
existing methods of pilots carrying firearms on aircraft,
should the TSA allow all pilots participating in the FFDO
Program the option of carrying their firearm on their person
(subject to such TSA requirements determined appropriate).

Section 2183. Registered Traveler Program

This section directs TSA to expedite implementation of the
registered traveler program.

Section 2191. Grand jury information sharing

Section 895 of Public L. No. 107-296, enacted on October
26, 2001, was subsequently affected by a rule change by the
Supreme Court. According to the Historical Notes of the Federal
Criminal Code and Rules on page 51, ``Section 895 of Pub. L.
No. 107-296, which purported to amend subdivision (e) of this
rule, failed to take into account the amendment of this rule by
Order of the Supreme Court of the United States dated April 29,
2002, effective December 1, 2002, and was therefore incapable
of execution.'' This section makes the technical changes to
address this rule change and ensures that the intent of
Congress to improve information sharing is carried through.

Section 2192. Interoperable Law Enforcement and Intelligence Data
System

Section 2192 enhances interoperability among law
enforcement and intelligence agencies and provides clear
direction to the NID to facilitate the implementation of a
horizontalsystem to enhance information sharing.

Section 2193. The improvement of intelligence capabilities of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation

This section codifies the recommendations of the Commission
as they relate to FBI intelligence capabilities. These
recommendations form the basis of reforms that have already
been implemented or are about to be implemented at the FBI.

TITLE III--BORDER SECURITY AND TERRORIST TRAVEL

Section 3001. Verification of returning citizens

The section would require that by October 2006 all U.S.
citizens returning from the Western Hemisphere other than
Canada and Mexico must present U.S. passports. In the interim,
U.S. citizens would have to present a document designated by
the Secretary of Homeland Security. For U.S. citizens returning
from Canada and Mexico, the Secretary of Homeland Security
would have to designate documents that are sufficiently secure.

Section 3002. Documents required by aliens from contiguous countries

The section would require that by the beginning of 2007,
aliens claiming to be Canadian who seek to enter the U.S. must
present a passport or other secure identification.

Section 3003. Strengthening the Border Patrol

The section would authorize an increase of 2,000 agents in
the Border Control agents a year for each of the next five
years.

Section 3004. More immigration investigators

The section would increase the number of ICE investigators
enforcing the immigration laws by 800 per year for each of the
next five years. One half of the new investigators would be
dedicated to enforcing employer sanctions and removing illegal
aliens from the workplace. At least three of these new
investigators each year must be assigned to each state.

Section 3005. Prevention of improper use of foreign identification

The section would bar all federal employees from accepting
identification cards presented by aliens other than documents
issued by the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland
Security under the authority of the immigration laws, or
unexpired foreign passports.

Section 3006. Expedited removal for illegal aliens

The section would require DHS to use expedited removal in
the case of all aliens who have entered the U.S. illegally and
have not been present here for five years.

Section 3007. Limit asylum abuse by terrorists

The section would clarify that the burden of proof is on
the applicant in an asylum case. The testimony of the applicant
may be sufficient to sustain such burden without corroboration,
but only if it is credible, persuasive, and refers to specific
facts that demonstrate that the applicant is a refugee. Where
it is reasonable that an applicant would present corroborating
evidence, such evidence must be provided unless a reasonable
explanation is given as to why such information is not
provided. No court shall reverse a determination made by an
immigration judge or BIA with respect to the availability of
corroborating evidence unless the court finds that a reasonable
adjudicator is compelled to conclude that such corroborating
evidence is unavailable.
The section would provide a nonexhaustive list of factors
that an immigration judge can consider in assessing
credibility, such as the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of
the applicant or witness, the consistency between the
applicant's or witness's written and oral statements, whether
or not under oath, made at any time to any officer, agent, or
employee of the United States, the internal consistency of each
such statement, the consistency of such statements with the
country conditions in the country from which the applicant
claims asylum, as presented by the Department of State, and any
inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements.
Finally, the section would overturn the doctrine of imputed
political opinions by requiring that an asylum applicant must
establish that race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion was or will be
the central motive for persecuting the applicant.

Section 3008. Revocation of visas

The section would allow the government to deport a
nonimmigrant alien whose visa has been revoked. It would also
allow DHS to revoke a nonimmigrant visa petition that has been
granted for an alien in the U.S.

Section 3009. Streamlined removal process

The section would modify the judicial review of removal
orders available to aliens as follows: for criminal aliens and
aliens who are not permanent residents, review would be only in
the circuit court and the scope of review would be limited to
(1) whether the individual is an alien, (2) whether he is
deportable under the Immigration Naturalization Act (``INA''),
(3) whether he was ordered to be removed under the INA, and (4)
whether he meets the criteria for withholding of removal or
Torture Convention protection. For non-criminal lawful
permanent resident aliens, review would only be in the circuit
court and would be available for all non-discretionary
determinations.

Sections 3031-3032. No bar to removal for terrorists and criminal
aliens

These sections would modify the regulations implementing
the Convention Against Torture by providing that aliens who
have engaged in Nazi persecution or genocide, terrorist aliens,
aliens who have been convicted of particularly serious crimes
and are thus a danger to the community of the U.S., aliens who
committed serious crimes outside the U.S., and aliens there are
reasonable grounds to believe are a danger to the security of
the U.S., would not be eligible for relief from removal.

Section 3033. Removal of aliens

This section would move the authority for designating a
country of removal to theSecretary of DHS, and give the
Secretary more power to remove an alien to a specific country. It would
also allow the Secretary to remove an alien to a country of which the
alien is a citizen or national unless the country prevents the alien
from entering.

Section 3041. Bringing in and harboring certain aliens

This section would increase criminal penalties for alien
smuggling and have the Secretary of DHS develop and implement
an outreach program to educate the public in the U.S. and
abroad about the penalties for illegally bringing in and
harboring aliens.

Section 3052. Minimum document requirements and issuance standards for
Federal recognition

This section requires that, for a state driver's license or
identification card to be acceptable for federal purposes,
States must certify to the Secretary of DHS, within 3 years,
that they have met specified standards for data elements,
source documents, and security. This section prohibits States
from providing a driver's license to an applicant holding a
driver's license issued by another State without confirmation
from the other State that the individual is terminating or has
terminated the driver's license

Section 3054. Trafficking in authentication features for use in false
identification documents

This section amends Title 18 to make it a federal crime to
traffic in or use security features designed to prevent
tampering, counterfeiting, or duplication of identity
documents.

Section 3081. Studies on worldwide machine-readable passports and
worldwide travel history database

The section would require the Department of State's Office
of Visa and Passport Control and the GAO to each conduct a
study on the feasibility, cost and benefits (in terms of
tracking terrorist travel and apprehending potential
terrorists) of: (1) requiring all passports to be machine-
readable, tamper-resistant and with biometric identifiers; and
(2) the creation of a database containing a record of all entry
and exit information so that border and consular officials may
ascertain the travel history of the visitor or a prospective
entrant. This requirement would allow consular officers and
immigration inspectors to ascertain the travel history of any
U.S. citizen or foreign visitor seeking to enter the United
States, even if that entrant has a new passport.

Section 3082. Expanded pre-inspection at foreign airports

Currently, DHS inspects passengers who are traveling to the
U.S. at 14 foreign airports instead of inspecting them at ports
of entry in the U.S. The section would expand this program to
include up to an additional 25 airports. In addition, the
current selection criteria for pre-inspection locations are
based on reducing the number of aliens who arrive to the United
States who are inadmissible. The section would provide that the
selection criteria should also include the objective of
preventing the entry of potential terrorists. The additional
locations should be operational by January 1, 2008.

Section 3083. Immigration security initiative

The Immigration Security Initiative is a DHS-operated
program that assists airline personnel at foreign airports in
identifying fraudulent travel documents. Currently, the program
is in place in only two foreign airports. The section expands
the program to at least 50 foreign airports by December 31,
2006.

Section 3084. Responsibilities and functions of consular officers

This section would increase the number of consular officers
by 150 per year for fiscal years 2006 to 2009, place
limitations on the use of foreign nationals to screen
nonimmigrant visa applicants by stating that all applications
shall be reviewed and adjudicated by a U.S. consular officer,
require that the training program for consular officers include
training in detecting fraudulent documents and working directly
with DHS immigration inspectors at ports of entry, and require
the Secretary of State to place anti-fraud specialists in the
one hundred posts that have the greatest frequency of
presentation of fraudulent documents.

Section 3085. Increase in penalties for fraud and related activity

This section amends 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1028 to increase
penalties for the possession and transfer of fraudulent
government identification documents, including fraudulent U.S.,
state, and foreign government documents.

Section 3086. Criminal penalty for false claim to citizenship

This section would make it a violation of law to make a
false claim of citizenship in order to enter or remain in the
United States.

Section 3088. International agreements to track and curtail terrorist
travel through the use of fraudulently obtained documents

This section requires the President to lead efforts to
reach international agreements to track and stop international
travel by terrorists through the use of lost, stolen or
falsified documents. The international agreements should
include the establishment of a system to share information on
lost, stolen and fraudulent passports and the sharing of this
information by governments with officials at ports of entry. In
addition, this section calls on the U.S. to continue to support
efforts at the International Civil Aviation Association to
strengthen the security features of passports and other travel
documents.

Section 3090. Biometric entry and exit data system

This section requires the Secretary of DHS to develop a
plan to accelerate the full implementation of the requirement
of an automated entry and exit data system at U.S. ports of
entry and to implement a plan to expedite the processing of
registered travelers at ports of entry.

Section 3091. Enhanced responsibilities of the Coordinator for
Counterterrorism

This section states that it shall be the policy of the U.S.
to make combating terrorist travel and those who assist them a
top priority for U.S. counter-terrorism policy. It also adds
additional responsibilities to the Coordinator for Counter-
terrorism at the StateDepartment (S/CT) so that the issues of
terrorist travel and facilitation are added to the portfolio of
responsibilities under S/CT.

Section 3092. Establishment of Office of Visa and Passport Security in
the Department of State

This section would establish an Office of Visa and Passport
Security within the Department of State. It would require the
development of a strategic plan in coordination with DHS to
target and disrupt individuals and organizations involved in
document fraud, raising the profile of these types of crimes
and their links to terrorism.

Section 3104. Technology acquisition and dissemination plan

This provision requires DHS to ensure the sharing of
terrorist travel intelligence and other information within the
many DHS elements and between DHS and other elements of the IC;
it also requires DHS to establish a program focused on
terrorist travel analysis, training, and technology deployment
for front-line border and consular personnel.

TITLE V--GOVERNMENT RESTRUCTURING

Sections 5001-5010. Faster and smarter funding for first responders

This section requires DHS to allocate homeland security
assistance funds to States or regions based upon the degree to
which they would lessen the threat to, vulnerability of, and
consequences for persons and critical infrastructure. Second,
it reduces the current State minimum and restructures the
allocation process. Under the current system, none of the funds
available under the State Homeland Security Grant Program are
allocated on the basis of risk. Instead, each State first
receives a base amount equal to 0.75 percent of the total, and
then an additional amount based solely on population. Under
these sections, in contrast, DHS must first allocate all funds
based on risk, and then provide, if necessary, additional funds
to those States, territories, or certain Indian tribes that
have not met a significantly reduced minimum threshold of
funding. Under this scheme, 99% of the money will be allocated
strictly on the basis of risk.

Section 5021. Government reorganization authority

The Committee added Section 5021, which is based on H.R.
4108, the ``High Risk Nonprofit Security Enhancement Act of
2004.'' This section would authorize the Secretary of Homeland
Security to provide $100 million in security assistance to
501(c)(3) organizations that demonstrate they are at a high
risk of a terrorist attack based upon specific threats of
international terrorist organizations; prior attacks against
similarly situated organizations by international terrorists;
the vulnerability of the specific site; the symbolic value of
the site as a highly recognized American institution; or the
role of the institution in responding to terrorist attacks.
After the funds have been expended for the highest risk
institutions, federal loan guarantees would be available to
make loans available on favorable terms. Funds would be
administered by a new office in the Department dedicated to
working with high-risk non-profits.

Sections 5041-5045. Appointments process reform

This section seeks to improve the Presidential appointment
process and allow a newly elected President to submit
nominations to the Senate for Presidential appointments to
National Security-related positions as expeditiously as
possible. The Presidential appointments process is
unnecessarily long, burdensome and complex.

Sections 5051-5054. Federal Bureau of Investigation revitalization

The Commission recommended that the FBI needed to develop a
specialized workforce with deep expertise in intelligence and
national security. Section 5051 adds 5 years to the mandatory
retirement age for certain employees. Section 5052 allows for
retention and relocation bonuses to be paid to employees with
unique skills or qualifications that would leave the service
but for such bonus. Section 5053 creates a ``reserve service''
that would call upon retired employees with specializations
that would create a ``surge capacity'' during times of
emergency. Section 5054 would give the FBI flexibility with pay
issues in staffing critical positions the new Intelligence
Directorate.

Section 5091. Requirement that agency rulemaking take into
consideration impacts on individual privacy

Section 5091 requires a federal agency to prepare a privacy
impact analysis for proposed and final rules and to include
this analysis in the notice for public comment issued in
conjunction with the publication of such rules.

Section 5092. Chief privacy officers for agencies with law enforcement
or anti-terrorism functions

Section 5093. Data mining

This section requires the head of each department or agency
of the federal government that is engaged in any activity to
use or develop data mining technology to submit a public report
to Congress on all such activities of the department or agency
under the jurisdiction of that official. This amendment
establishes criteria for the content of the report and requires
that it be submitted within 90 days after enactment of this
legislation and requires that it be updated each year.

Section 5094. Privacy and civil liberties oversight board

Section 5094 establishes an Independent Privacy and Civil
Liberties Oversight Board in the Executive Branch of the
Federal Government. The purpose of the Board is to: (1) analyze
and review actions the Executive Branch takes to protect the
Nation from terrorism as such actions pertain to privacy or
civil liberties; and (2) ensure that privacy and civil
liberties concerns are appropriately considered in the
development and implementation of laws, regulations, and policies
related to efforts to protect the Nation against terrorism.
Specifically, the Board must review the privacy and civil liberties
implications of legislation, regulations, and related matters and
advise the Executive Branch regarding the need to ensure that privacy
and civil liberties are appropriately considered in their development
and implementation. With respect to providing advice on proposals to
retain or enhance a particular governmental power, the Board must
consider whether the executive department or agency has explained how
the power actually materially enhances security and if there is
adequate supervision of the Executive Branch's use of the power to
ensure protection of privacy and civil liberties. The provision
specifies the Board's oversight responsibilities with respect to
information sharing activities of Federal agencies.
The Board is comprised of a chairman and four members, all
of whom are appointed by the President, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate. Not more than three members of the
Board may be of the same political party. Board members are to
be selected solely on the basis of their professional
qualifications, achievements, public stature, and relevant
experience, without regard to political affiliation, and have
extensive experience in the areas of privacy and civil rights
and liberties. A Board member may not, while serving on the
Board, be an elected official, an officer, or an employee of
the Federal Government, other than in the capacity as a member
of the Board. Although initially appointed on a staggered
basis, Board member is appointed for a six-year term.
Section 5094 specifies that the Board must periodically
submit, not less than semiannually, reports to Congress and the
President that describe its major activities and information on
the Board's findings, conclusions, and recommendations
resulting from its advisory and oversight functions. Section
5094 authorizes Board Members to testify before Congress. With
respect to the public, section 5094 requires the Board to hold
public hearings, release public reports, and otherwise inform
the public of its activities, as appropriate and in a manner
consistent with the protection of classified information,
applicable law, and national security. Subject to an exception
for national security, the provision requires a Federal
department or agency to supply information upon request of the
Board. Section 5094 specifies that the Board is an agency and
not an advisory committee. In addition, the Board is authorized
to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out
this section.

Section 5101. Short title

This section provides that this chapter may be cited as the
``Mutual Aid and Litigation Management Authorization Act of
2004.''

Section 5102. Mutual aid authorized

The mutual aid provisions enable states to enter into
mutual aid agreements to provide mutual aid in response to
emergencies and to allow their first responders to carry with
them into other states the liability regime of their home
states. The mutual aid provisions also provide that, for
parties to a mutual aid agreement, the worker's compensation
and death benefits of first responders who answer calls in
other party states, and the home state rules that govern them,
also follow them into other states. The mutual aid provisions
also provide that, for parties to a mutual aid agreement,
whenever any person holds a certificate issued by a responding
party that evidences the meeting of professional standards,
such person shall be deemed so certified by the requesting
party to provide assistance under the mutual aid agreement.

Section 5103. Litigation management agreements

This section includes provisions that allow states to enter
into ``litigation management agreements'' in which they could
agree that, in the event first responders from several states
respond to a terrorist attack in another state, they could
decide on the liability regime that would apply in that
circumstance to claims brought against their first responders,
including putting any such claims in federal court, a ban on
punitive damages, and a collateral source offset rule (that
would prevent double recoveries for the same injury).

Section 5104. Additional provisions

This section provides that nothing in this chapter
abrogates any immunities from liability that any party may have
under any other state or federal law. This section exempts law
enforcement security operations at special events of national
significance under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3056(e) or other law
enforcement functions of the U.S. Secret Service. This section
also provides that the Secret Service shall be maintained as a
distinct entity within the Department of Homeland Security and
shall not be merged with any other department function.

Changes in Existing Law by the Bill, as Reported

Because of the short time the Committee had to prepare this
report and the length of the bill, the Office of the
Legislative Counsel was not able to provide the Committee
materials to comply with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules
of the House of Representatives. The Committee is seeking
authority to file a supplemental report in which these
materials would be included.

Markup Transcript

Because of the short time the Committee had to prepare this
report and the length of the bill, the Committee was not able
to prepare a transcript of its markup of H.R. 10. The Committee
is seeking authority to file a supplemental report in which the
transcript would be included.

DISSENTING VIEWS

While we support implementation of the recommendations of
the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United
States (``9/11 Commission''), we dissent from H.R. 10 because
it does not accomplish that goal. The 9/11 Commission reached
across the partisan divide and arrived at unanimous
recommendations to improve the security of the United States.
Ten members, five Democrats and five Republicans, held
countless hearings and issued a well-written report with well-
reasoned recommendations. \1\ The Senate, almost evenly split
between Republicans and Democrats, has taken up bipartisan
legislation to implement those recommendations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United
States, the 9/11 Commission Report (July 22, 2004) [hereinafter 9/11
Commission Report].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We had hoped the House would follow the example set by the
Commission and by the Senate; instead, the Republican
leadership has put before us this bill drafted only with
Republican input and sponsored only by Republicans.
Unfortunately, when Ranking Member John Conyers (D-MI) along
with Reps. Jerrold Nadler (D-NY), Bobby Scott (D-VA), Sheila
Jackson Lee (D-TX), William D. Delahunt (D-MA), and Adam Schiff
(D-CA) reached across the aisle to offer the bipartisan Senate
bill at the markup, it was rejected on a party-line basis. \2\
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\2\ Markup of H.R. 10, House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong.,
2d Sess. (Sept. 29, 2004) [hereinafter H.R. 10 Markup].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Because of the political nature by which it was drafted, it
is no surprise that H.R. 10 is deeply flawed. First of all, it
fails to incorporate numerous recommendations of the 9/11
Commission that would significantly advance our national
security. For instance, H.R. 10 does not include Commission
recommendations to provide strong budgetary authority for the
newly-created National Intelligence Director, protect civil
liberties through the creation of an effective civil liberties
board, or address the need for congressional reform. As a
matter of fact, in its present form, H.R. 10 fails to implement
the vast majority of the 9/11 Commission recommendations--of
the Commission's forty-one recommendations only eleven are
fully implemented, sixteen are not implemented at all and
fourteen are incomplete. \3\
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\3\ See Report Card on H.R. 10 prepared by Democratic Staff of the
Select Committee on Homeland Security.
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At the same time, the legislation contains provisions not
recommended by the Commission that would do little, if
anything, to protect our homeland. Most notably, the
legislation makes massive, anti-immigrant changes to our
immigration laws (based in most cases on thin and tangential
references in a Commission staff report that were not even
included in the final report of the 9/11 Commission), and
creates major new law enforcement and data programs that
significantly impairs our civil rights and civil liberties.
It is these very provisions that the 9/11 Commission has
urged the House Republicans to drop from their legislative
effort. The 9/11 Chairman stated recently that ``We're very
respectfully suggesting that provisions which are controversial
and are not part of our recommendations to make the American
people safer perhaps ought to be part of another bill at
another time.'' \4\ Vice Chairman Lee Hamilton specifically
criticized the extraneous immigration provisions and stated,
``we respectfully submit that consideration of controversial
provisions at this late hour can harm our shared purpose of
getting a good bill to the President before the 108th Congress
adjourns.'' \5\
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\4\ Jesse J. Holland, 9/11 Panel Urges House GOP to Drop Certain
Parts of Bill, Assoc. Press, Sept. 30, 2004.
\5\ Id.
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That is why H.R. 10, or provisions within it, are opposed
not only by 9/11 Commission leaders \6\ and the White House \7\
but also organizations concerned with:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Carl Hulse, 9/11 Commissioners Say Bill's Added Provisions are
Harmful, N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 2004, at A13.
\7\ Letter from Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, The
White House, to Editors of the Washington Post (Oct. 1, 2004).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) state prerogatives (the National Governors
Association \8\ and the National Conference of State
Legislatures \9\ );
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Letter from Raymond C. Scheppach, Executive Director, National
Governors Association to the Honorable Thomas M. Davis, Chairman, and
the Honorable Henry A. Waxman, Ranking Member, U.S. House Comm. on
Government Reform (Sept. 29, 2004) [hereinafter NGA Letter].
\9\ Letter from Maryland Delegate John Hurson, President of the
National Conference of State Legislatures, and Illinois State Senator
Steve Rauschenberger, President Elect of NCSL to the Honorable Thomas
M. Davis, Chairman, and the Honorable Henry Waxman, Ranking Member,
U.S. House Comm. on Government Reform (Sept. 28, 2004) [hereinafter
NCSL Letter].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) the fair administration of justice (the American
Bar Association (``ABA''), \10\ the American Civil
Liberties Union (``ACLU''), \11\ the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York \12\ );
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\10\ Statement of Robert J. Grey, Jr., President, American Bar
Association (Sept. 30, 2004) [hereinafter ABA Statement].
\11\ Letter from Timothy H. Edgar, Legislative Counsel, American
Civil Liberties Union, to Interested Persons (Sept. 23, 2004)
[hereinafter ACLU Letter].
\12\ Statement of Association of the Bar of the City of New York
Regarding H.R. 10 (Sept. 30, 2004) (``We urge the House not to enact
H.R. 10 and to provide a reasonable opportunity for broad public debate
on its recommendations before taking any action.'') [hereinafter ABCNY
Statement].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(3) the rights of immigrants (ACORN; American-Arab
Anti-Discrimination Committee; American Jewish
Committee; American Immigration Lawyers Association
(``AILA''); Arab-American Institute; Center for
Community Change; Fair Immigration Reform Movement;
Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society; Lutheran Immigration and
Refugee Service; National Asian Pacific American Legal
Consortium (``NAPALC''); National Council of La Raza;
National Immigration Forum; Service Employees
International Union, AFL-CIO, CLC; and the Tahirih
Justice Center) \13\; and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Letter from ACORN et al., to U.S. Representatives (Sept. 28,
2004) [hereinafter Immigration Sign-On Letter].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(4) adherence to international law (Amnesty
International, Human Rights First, Human Rights Watch,
\14\ and the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees \15\).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Letter from Amnesty International, Human Rights First, and
Human Rights Watch, to U.S. Representatives (Sept. 29, 2004)
[hereinafter International Sign-On Letter].
\15\ Letter from Kolude Doherty, Regional Representative, U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees, to the Honorable John Conyers, Jr., Ranking
Member, U.S. House Comm. on the Judiciary (Sept. 29, 2004) [hereinafter
UNHCR Letter].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

I. The Immigration and Related Changes are Unfair, Unfounded, and
Unnecessary

A. THE LEGISLATION WOULD AUTHORIZE DEPORTATION TO COUNTRIES WHERE
TORTURE IS LIKELY TO OCCUR

A primary concern with this legislation is that it would
require our government to outsource torture, make it difficult
for aliens to seek refuge from torture, and violate our
international obligations. Section 3032, which was not
recommended by the 9/11 Commission and is not supported by the
President,\16\ would retroactively exclude classes of aliens
from protection under the United Nations Convention Against
Torture (``CAT'') by permitting the Department of Homeland
Security to remove to state sponsors of torture any alien it
reasonably believes may be a danger to the United States. The
Association of the Bar of the City of New York notes that this
provision ``would * * * mandate the deportation of * * * an
individual to a country even if it is certain that the
individual would be tortured there.'' \17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ White House Letter:

Yesterday's Washington Post inaccurately reported that
the Bush Administration supports a provision in the House
intelligence reform bill that would permit the deportation
of certain foreign nationals to countries where they are
likely to be tortured.
The President did not propose and does not support this
provision. He has made clear that the United States stands
against and will not tolerate torture, and that the United
States remains committed to complying with its obligations
under the Convention Against Torture and other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Consistent
with that treaty, the United States does not expel, return,
or extradite individuals to other countries where the
United States believes it is likely they will be tortured.
Id. (emphasis in original).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ ABCNY Statement at 1-2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This provision also would make it more difficult to
establish eligibility for CAT relief. Instead of being able to
meet the present burden of proof, which is ``more likely than
not,'' the bill would require applicants to prove by ``clear
and convincing evidence'' that they would be tortured if they
are deported to the country from which they are seeking relief.
Section 3032 also would prohibit federal court challenges to a
decision removing CAT protection under the new law except as
part of the review of a final order of removal.
The section 3032 exceptions permitting ``extraordinary
rendition'' are in clear violation of our obligations under the
Convention. Article 3 of the Convention absolutely forbids a
State Party from forcibly returning any person to a country
when there are substantial grounds for believing that the
person would be in danger of being subjected to torture.\18\ In
fact, no less an authority than the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees has written of its concern that ``the
proposed exception to protection under the [CAT] will authorize
the return of individuals to countries where they may suffer
torture and will place the U.S. in violation of its
international obligations.''\19\
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\18\ It is worth noting that, in ratifying the treaty, the U.S.
Senate did not express any reservation, understanding, or proviso that
might exclude a person from the Article 3 prohibition. Moreover, while
the Convention prohibits sending them back to their home countries, the
prohibition is country specific. It does not bar sending them to other
countries. Also, although the grant of CAT protection is absolute, it
is not permanent relief. It can be removed when the conditions in the
home country change so as to eliminate the risk of torture.
\19\ UNHCR Letter at 4.
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Regardless of the applicability of the CAT, we believe an
absolute prohibition on removal to torture-practicing nations
is necessary on moral grounds, as well. Torture is so
horrendous and so contrary to our ethical, spiritual, and
democratic beliefs that it must be condemned and prohibited.
Returning someone to a place where he or she would be tortured
would sustain the kind of system in which violent authoritarian
regimes exist. Passing the section 3032 provisions would amount
to legalizing the outsourcing of torture by the United States
government. The President of the American Bar Association
further indicated that extraordinary rendition may endanger
``American troops who may be detained by adversaries who may be
disinclined to honor international obligations in light of the
U.S. government's failure to honor its own.''\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ ABA Statement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We also object to the change in the burden of proof that
would require the applicant to prove by ``clear and convincing
evidence'' that he will be tortured. This is an unrealistic and
unfair requirement. Raising the standard to this level of
certainty would undoubtedly result in sending people to
countries where they will be tortured. Moreover, it would
violate Article 3 of the Convention, which forbids a State
Party from forcibly returning a person to a country where there
are ``substantial grounds'' for believing that he would be in
danger of being subjected to torture.
Finally, we object to making such changes retroactive and
prohibiting federal court review of CAT decisions unless it is
part of the review of a final order of removal. Current law
requires that petitions for review of a removal order be filed
within 30 days.\21\ Changing the standards and applying the
changes retroactively puts individuals who have already won CAT
relief in the position of reproving their cases with evidence
that may no longer exist. These same individuals are likely to
find themselves with no opportunity for federal court review of
adverse decisions, which would eliminate the checks and
balances that are the fundamental component of our democracy.
This cannot be justified where the consequence of a mistake
could be subjecting a person to torture.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ U.S.C. Sec. 1252(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These concerns are not merely hypothetical. In 2002, the
United States deported Mr. Maher Arar, a Canadian-Syrian
national, to Syria, a known state sponsor of torture.\22\ Mr.
Arar, now in Canada, was apparently tortured during his ten
months in Syria. In another instance, a Virginia couple is
suing the United States seeking to have their son, Ahmed Abu
Ali, returned to the United States from Saudi Arabia, where he
was arrested in June 2003; in their petition, the couple argue
that their son's situation is an example of extraordinary
rendition.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ Carlye Murphy, Va. Couple File Lawsuit to Free Their Son Held
in Saudi Arabia, Wash. Post, July 29, 2004, at A8. Mr. Arar has sued
the United States government for his ordeal.
\23\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is important to note that prohibiting the removal of
someone to state sponsors of torture does not mean that they
must be released. The Supreme Court has held that people who
receive CAT protection can be held in detention if they pose a
danger to the United States.\24\ In response to the Court, the
former Immigration and Naturalization Service promulgated
regulations for determining the circumstances under which an
alien may be held in custody beyond the statutory removal
period.\25\ Pursuant to the Court's decision and the INS
regulations, it is clear that removal to state sponsors of
torture is not necessary to fight terrorism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ In Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), the Supreme Court
held that the detention provisions in the Immigration and Nationality
Act, red in light of the Constitution's demands, limit an alien's post-
removal period detention to a period reasonably necessary to bring
about the alien's removal from the United States. The Court found
further that once removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable,
continued detention is no longer authorized by statute except where
special circumstances justify continued detention.
\25\ 8 C.F.R. Sec. Sec. 208.16-208.18. These regulations authorized
the government to continue to detain aliens who present foreign policy
concerns or national security and terrorism concerns, as well as
individuals who are specially dangerous due to a mental condition or
personality disorder, even though their removal is not likely in the
reasonably foreseeable future.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Convention Against Torture is a fundamental pillar of
our human rights and national interest policy. It prohibits the
government from establishing removal and extradition processes
that would return aliens to countries where they would be
tortured. It is one of the four primary international human
rights documents. It stands, along with the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, and the Genocide Convention, as one
of the cornerstones of our country's efforts to stop the most
heinous forms of oppressionand abuse. That is why we, and the
leaders of the 9/11 Commission,\26\ oppose this egregious proposal to
weaken our enforcement of it.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ Carl Hulse, 9/11 Commissioners Say Bill's Added Provisions are
Harmful, N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 2004, at A13 (``Commission leaders did not
specify all of the House provisions that they considered problematic,
though they singled out a proposal to allow suspected terrorists to be
deported to nations where they could be tortured.'')
\27\ The Majority rejected by a vote of 12-19 an amendment offered
by Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee to strike section 3032.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. The Legislation Would Hinder Efforts to Grant Asylum to Victims of
Torture

We oppose inclusion of section 3006 in H.R. 10 because it
is not a part of the 9/11 Commission recommendations, and it
would eviscerate protections built into the asylum process to
ensure that the United States does not return genuine refugees
to countries where they would face persecution and violate both
the Refugee Convention and the Convention Against Torture.
Section 3006 significantly expands the policy of expedited
removal--a process that allows low-level immigration officials
to remove undocumented foreigners without a hearing before an
immigration judge. Before Congress has held hearings to assess
the impact of this expansion of expedited removal, section 3006
would push the Department of Homeland Security to expand
expedited removal to apply to all undocumented foreigners
anywhere in the country unless they have been present in the
United States for more than five years.
Under current law, expedited removal applies to non-
citizens arriving at an airport or land border with invalid
travel documents, and allows an immigration officer to order
them removed without further review unless they express a fear
of persecution or torture. People who express a fear of
persecution or torture are to be referred to an asylum officer
for a ``credible fear'' interview, and must pass this interview
in order to be eligible for asylum in the United States. The
current statute also allows expedited removal to be applied to
non-citizens who are found inside the United States without
having been admitted or paroled and who cannot show that they
have been here for more than two years. The current statute
does not require such persons to be subjected to expedited
removal, however, and gives the Secretary of Homeland Security
the power to apply expedited removal to that group or to any
sub-group of people within it. These existing provisions
already place significant power in the hands of immigration
officers whose decisions are not subject to formal
administrative or judicial review.
Section 3006 goes much further and would allow DHS to
summarily deport genuine refugees who have been in the United
States for over a year, even if they qualify for a statutory
exception to the one-year deadline to file for asylum without
having their cases heard.\28\ The expansion of expedited
removal powers in section 3006 allows for summary deportation
of immigrants who express a fear of persecution or an intent to
apply for asylum but appear ineligible for asylum based on the
one-year deadline. This bill ignores the fact that such
applicants may fall under a statutory exception to the one-year
deadline based on extraordinary circumstances or changed
circumstances.\29\
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\28\ Section 208 of the Immigration and Nationality Act allows
refugees present in the United States to file for asylum, but provides
that they must do so within one year of their last arrival in the
United States.
\29\ A classic example of the latter would be where a person came
to the United States as an economic migrant two years ago, but learned
last month that following a coup in his country all his family had been
killed due to their allegiance with the prior regime. This person's
eligibility for an exception to the filing deadline needs to be
considered by a trained asylum officer or an immigration judge. Under
section 3006, it would never be considered at all.
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Under section 3006, DHS would also summarily deport genuine
refugees who are ineligible for asylum based on the one-year
deadline but are eligible for withholding of removal under INA
section 241(b)(3). Stripping refugees of the opportunity to
claim that protection violates our obligations under Article 33
of the Refugee Convention. This is because even asylum
applicants who file more than one-year after arrival and cannot
qualify for an exception to the one-year deadlines should
remain eligible for withholding of removal if they can show
that they are refugees and would face a probability of
persecution if deported. Withholding of removal is the basic
minimum form of protection through which the United States
ensures its compliance with its obligation under international
law not to return refugees to countries where their lives or
freedom would be threatened. If an immigration officer thinks
an intending asylum-seeker has been here for more than one year
but less than five, section 3006 does not provide for any
investigation or review of the person's eligibility for
withholding.
In addition to being a threat to relief for genuine
refugees under asylum and withholding of removal, section 3006
would allow the return under expedited removal of non-citizens
determined to have been in the United States for less than five
years who would face torture when deported. This section
provides no means for persons subject to expedited removal who
fear they will be tortured if they are deported to make an
application for protection under the Convention Against
Torture. The bill provides for referral to an asylum officer
only for those who express an intention to apply for asylum or
a fear of persecution. This omission sets the stage for very
serious violations of the U.S.'s obligation under the CAT not
to return people to countries where they would be tortured.
This massive expansion of expedited removal would also be
likely to affect even more people than it seeks to target,
because it is difficult for a person who has just been arrested
by an immigration officer unexpectedly to prove that he or she
has been in the United States for more than five years, or for
less than one year so as to qualify for referral to an asylum
officer. Most people who are present in the U.S. without
admission do not walk around with five years' worth of rent
receipts in their pockets. In the asylum context, proving one's
date of entry typically takes some time and effort, and
involves gathering documentation and witnesses-none of which
can be accomplished in an expedited removal proceeding.
Finally, we do not believe that expanding the use of
expedited removal in this way is the most efficient way to stop
more terrorists trying to enter the United States. Expedited
removal would not have stopped the terrorists who executed the
9/11 attacks. Moreover, expedited removal is the last option we
ought to want as a defense against terrorists trying to gain
entry, because essentially what it does is sends them out only
to try to enter again somewhere else. The danger of relying on
expedited removal to catch terrorists is that its focus is
removal. Suspected terrorists should not be removed; they
should be interrogated and charged.
Section 3007 is equally problematic. While current law
already bars terrorists from seeking asylum, this section would
allow genuine refugees to be denied asylum if they were unable
to document relevant conditions in their countries through
State Department reports, could not prove their persecutor's
central motive for harming them, or had any inconsistencies
between statements made to any U.S. government employees,
whether written or oral and whether or not under oath, and
there testimony before an immigration judge. There are key
changes in this section that create insurmountable hurdles for
individuals seeking safe haven in the United States.
Section 3007 would require an asylum applicant to prove
that her persecutor's central motive in persecuting her was or
would be her race, religion, political opinion, nationality or
membership in a particular social group. While committing
torture, rape, beatings, and other abuses, persecutors do not
always explain themselves clearly to their victims. This is why
the Board of Immigration Appeals has ruled that asylum
applicants are not required to show conclusively why
persecution has or will occur.\30\ This bill would reverse that
decision and place an enormous and unnecessary burden on asylum
seekers by requiring them to prove with unrealistic precision
what is going on in their persecutor's mind.
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\30\ In Matter of S-P-, 21 I&N Dec. 486 (BIA 1996). The case
involved a Sri Lankan who was tortured by his government purportedly to
ascertain information about the identities of guerrillas and the
location of camps, but also because of an unstated assumption by his
torturers that his political views were antithetical to the government.
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This section would permit adjudicators to deny asylum
because the applicant is unable to provide corroborating
evidence of ``certain alleged facts pertaining to the specifics
of their claim.'' This disproportionately harms applicants who
are detained and/or lack counsel. In addition, section 3007
would bar judicial review of a denial of asylum based on an
applicant's failure to provide corroborating evidence.
Section 3007 also introduces new credibility grounds for
denying asylum, saying that the applicant's ``demeanor'' and
other highly subjective factors may be determining factors in
assessing credibility. Demeanor is highly cultural and should
not be relied on as heavily as evidence.\31\ Moreover, torture
victims often have what mental health professionals call a
``blank affect'' when recounting their experiences, a demeanor
that an adjudicator might misinterpret as demonstrating lack of
credibility.
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\31\ In one culture, looking a judge in the eye would be
interpreted as candor, while in another it would be interpreted as
contempt; downcast eyes might be interpreted as respect for authority
in one culture and evasiveness in another.
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Additionally, it may be difficult for asylum applicants to
recount their experiences, and even more troubling based upon
the situation. Survivors of torture, such as rape, or forced
abortion or sterilization may not be comfortable telling this
information to a uniformed male inspection officer in an
airport. Also, applicants in that setting may not be provided
with appropriate interpreters. They may understandably fear
discussing problems in their home countries in any detail until
later in the process when it is made clear to them that they
are not going to be sent back to their home countries without
their claims being heard. Several courts of appeals even have
emphasized that statements taken under such conditions are
unreliable.\32\
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\32\ Fauyiza Kassindja, the young Togolese woman who fled female
genital mutilation (FGM), would have been denied asylum under this
standard with little chance of getting that determination reversed on
appeal. Under current law, the Board of Immigration Appeals Appeals
rightly reversed the Immigration Judge's credibility finding in her
case, and that decision has helped protect other women fleeing FGM.
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Section 3007 also allows asylum to be denied for lack of
consistency, including with any statement the applicant made at
any time to any U.S. official. In order to escape persecution
and flee to safety, refugees sometimes need to misrepresent why
they are leaving one country and entering another. For reasons
of fear, desperation, confusion and trauma they often do not
tell the full story or, necessarily, the accurate story. To use
an applicant's first statement to any U.S. official to impeach
his or her sworn testimony, no matter how well supported, is
unreasonable and unfair.
Furthermore, the Refugee Convention definition of a
refugee, and its definitive interpretation in the United
Nations High Commissioner For Refugees Handbook on Procedures
and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951
Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of
Refugees, do not require and in fact acknowledge that a person
seeking refuge ``may not be aware of the reasons for the
persecution feared.'' To meet the test that persecution be ``on
account of'' one of the prohibited grounds, it is sufficient to
show persecution is motivated in part by one of those grounds.
Asking a refugee or asylum applicant to parse his persecutor's
motivations so finely as to distill the central motive is
asking asylum seekers to read the minds of their persecutors.
Moreover, current Supreme Court case law interpreting the ``on
account of'' requirement is already the strictest in the world
without section 3007.
Finally, section 3007 calls for consistency between the
applicant's claim and country conditions in the country from
which the applicant claims asylum ``as presented by the
Department of State.'' This provision could be interpreted to
exclude country conditions information from human rights
organizations, journalists, and myriad other sources of
relevant and reliable information that are not necessarily
included in State Department country reports.Although the State
Department country reports are usually well researched, they are not an
exhaustive and unfailingly accurate source of documentation of all of
the wide range of human rights violations around the world that can
give rise to valid asylum claims. In addition, since these reports come
out annually, they can not be relied upon for documentation of more
recent events.
The President has made many strong statements about his
concern for the persecuted and America's role in creating a
safe haven. On United Nations International Day in Support of
Victims of Torture, he said:

The United States reaffirms its commitment to the
worldwide elimination of torture. * * * The United
States will continue to take seriously the need to
question terrorists who have information that can save
lives. But we will not compromise the rule of law or
the values and principles that make us strong. Torture
is wrong no matter where it occurs, and the United
States will continue to lead the fight to eliminate it
everywhere.\33\
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\33\ The President, Statement on U.N. International Day in Support
of Victims of Torture (June 26, 2004).

In no uncertain terms, sections 3006 and 3007 are inconsistent
with the Bush Administration's statements on persecution and
torture and will lead to obvious and clear hardship on innocent
and deserving immigrants.\34\
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\34\ The effect of sections 3006, 3007, and 3009 are best
illustrated through an actual asylum petition that would have turned
out quite differently had sections 3006, 3007, and 3009 been in place.
The findings of fact by the appellate court recount that Olimpia Lazo-
Majano, a young Salvadoran mother of three, was 29, in 1981, when her
husband fled El Salvador for political reasons. Ms. Lazo-Majano
remained in El Salvador, working as a domestic. In mid-1982, Ms. Lazo-
Majano was hired by a sergeant in the Salvadoran armed forces named
Rene Zuniga. After Ms. Lazo-Majano had been working for him for several
weeks, Zuniga raped her at gun point. This began a period of abuse
during which Zuniga beat Ms. Lazo-Majano, threatened her, tore up her
identity card and forced her to eat it, dragged her by the hair in
public, held hand grenades against her head, and threatened to bomb
her. Ms. Lazo-Majano felt trapped and powerless to resist Zuniga,
because he accused her of being a subversive and threatened that if she
reported him or tried to resist him, he would denounce her or kill her
as a subversive. Ms. Lazo-Majano believed him: she knew a teen-age boy
who was believed to have been tortured and killed by the army, the
husband of a neighbor had been taken away at night together with a
group of other men and killed the preceding year, and numerous young
girls who had been raped with impunity.
In late 1982, Ms. Lazo-Majano escaped and fled to the United
States, entering the country without inspection. Neither the
Immigration Judge who heard her request for asylum nor the Board of
Immigration Appeals doubted her credibility. But the Immigration Judge
ordered her deported to El Salvador, and the BIA upheld that decision
in 1985, on the grounds that ``such strictly personal actions do not
constitute persecution within the meaning of the Act.'' Ms. Lazo-Majano
appealed to the federal court of appeals. The court of appeals reversed
the BIA, holding that Zuniga ``had his gun, his grenades, his bombs,
his authority and his hold over Olimpia because he was a member'' of an
army unrestrained by civilian control, that his cynical imputation to
her of subversive political opinions, and the danger that he would kill
her or have her killed on this basis, qualified her for asylum.
In its decision, the court of appeals in this case noted reports
that people being denied asylum and deported from the United States to
El Salvador had been tortured and killed. Fortunately for Ms. Lazo-
Majano, her deportation was stayed pending the federal court's review.
Under section 3009 of H.R. 10, however, the court could not have stayed
Ms. Lazo-Majano's deportation unless she were able to show by ``clear
and convincing evidence''--before briefing or argument in this legally
complex asylum case--that execution of the deportation order would be
``clearly contrary to law.'' This is a higher standard than she was
required to meet to actually win her asylum case before the court of
appeals. Under H.R. 10, Ms. Lazo-Majano would have been deported to El
Salvador. The federal court's decision in her favor two years later
would do nothing to protect her there.
If section 3007 of H.R. 10 had been law, this case would almost
certainly not have been decided in Ms. Lazo-Majano's favor. Section
3007 would require her to establish that she was the wife of someone
who fled the country for political reasons, that her persecutor
attributed ``subversive'' political opinions to her, and that his
desire to stamp out any resistance to his dominance over her as a man
and an officer in the ruling army, were not only the motives of
Zuniga's persecution, but that her political opinion was ``the central
motive'' for the persecution. A dissenting judge on the court of
appeals in this case took the view that Ms. Lazo-Majano was ``abused *
* * purely for sexual, and clearly ego reasons'' and was therefore not
eligible for asylum. If this case were decided under the rule of
section 3007, that view would have prevailed.
In fact, if H.R. 10 had been the law, Ms. Lazo-Majano would have
been unlikely to have had her asylum claim heard at all--by anyone.
Section 3006 expands expedited removal procedures to require the
summary deportation, without hearing or review, of anyone who has not
been admitted or paroled into the United States and (in the judgment of
an immigration officer) has not been physically present in the United
States continuously for the past five years. Ms. Lazo-Majano was
present in the United States without admission when she was stopped by
an immigration officer. Section 3006 provides that a person in this
situation who indicates an intention to apply for asylum or a fear of
persecution shall be referred to an asylum officer for a credible fear
interview. Ms. Lazo-Majano would be allowed to apply for asylum if she
was able to tell a uniformed Border Patrol officer (an uniformed and
likely male officer) about her fears, but even if she felt safe enough
to do that she would only be granted a credible fear interview if the
officer determined that she had been present in the United States at
that point for less than a year.
In fact, Ms. Lazo-Majano had only been in the United States for a
few months when she was stopped. But could she have proved that? She
was an undocumented immigrant with no proof of her date of entry and
probably very limited documentation of her life in this country. If she
had in fact been in the U.S. for over a year, she might have been
eligible for an exception to the one-year filing deadline for asylum
claims--many refugees who have been through the kind of shattering,
traumatic experiences she suffered arrive in the U.S. suffering from
psychological and/or physical ills that make it impossible for them to
file their claims timely. For many victims of rape and other forms of
torture, the continuing feeling of shame and fear are so overwhelming
that they may not be able to bring themselves to tell their stories to
any other person--much less a U.S. government official--until they have
gained some sense of security. People in this situation are often
eligible for an exception to the filing deadline under INA section
208(a)(2)(D). Section 3006 would prevent their claims from being heard.
Regardless of her date of filing, Ms. Lazo-Majano would be eligible for
withholding of removal under section 241(b)(3) of the INA, but section
3006 makes no provision for application for withholding of removal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. THE LEGISLATION UNFAIRLY AND UNCONSTITUTIONALLY LIMITS JUDICIAL
REVIEW OF EXECUTIVE ACTIONS

Section 3009 would eliminate virtually all federal court
review of orders of deportation, including claims arising under
the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Forms
of Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Review
of such orders would be limited to ``circuit courts of appeals
of constitutional claims or pure questions of law raised upon
petitions for review filed in accordance with this section.''
The bill not only forecloses habeas corpus review in those
cases where a ``petition for review'' is barred under section
242(a)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act--it goes much
further by redefining ``judicial review'' and ``jurisdiction to
review'' throughout the INA to include review by habeas corpus.
This is a radical departure in immigration law because it
changes the longstanding, historical meaning of ``jurisdiction
to review'' and ``judicial review''--``terms of art'' that have
been long interpreted in immigration matters as distinct from
review by writ of habeas corpus.\35\ This section would
redefine the meaning of these terms to explicitly forbid access
to the ``Great Writ'' for all claims where ``judicial review''
or ``jurisdiction to review'' is barred, dramatically altering
at least thirteen separate provisions of the Immigration Act
that affect agricultural workers, asylum petitioners, non-
immigrants and others. In these cases, habeas review must be
available as a safety valve. The Constitution demands court
review for all actions that affect the liberty of persons
detained by the government.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 312 n.35 (2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After barring these claims, the legislation explicitly bars
the federal courthouse doors to any alternative appeal through
the ``Great Writ'' of liberty. In so doing, the bill violates
the Constitution, which provides that ``the Privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not besuspended'' except in cases
of ``Rebellion or Invasion.'' \36\ The Supreme Court has held that the
Constitution requires any substitute remedy for habeas corpus to be
``neither inadequate nor ineffective to test the legality of a person's
detention.'' \37\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ U.S. Const. art. I Sec. 9.
\37\ Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 381 (1977).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This proposal ignores many of the other systemic problems
that have led to necessary habeas litigation. The current
system makes it very hard for many people to get any review,
even if they have a strong claim. Factors negating meaningful
review include the lack of access to counsel, detentions in
remote areas, lack of notice on how to have a claim heard in
court, exceedingly short time limitations to file petitions for
review, no protection against deportation during the short time
to file for review, and the government's use of hypertechnical
arguments to defeat jurisdiction. These factors, plus the 1996
legislation's effective elimination of discretionary relief by
the agency, have forced people into habeas litigation. The
Majority rejected an amendment offered by Rep. Nadler and Rep.
Linda Sanchez (D-CA) to strike this objectionable proposal.

D. THE LEGISLATION WOULD REGULATE FORMS OF IDENTIFICATION CONTRARY TO
CONGRESSIONAL AND PRIVATE SECTOR VIEWS

The legislation contains problematic provisions that would
make it difficult for immigrants to carry identification and
open bank accounts, and for states to regulate drivers.
Considering that these measures would not help in the war on
terror, it is not surprising that they were not recommended by
the 9/11 Commission.
First, section 3005 would prohibit federal employees from
accepting any foreign identity document other than a
passport.\38\ The underlying objective is to prevent Mexican
immigrants from using Matricula Consular cards for
identification. The Government of Mexico has been issuing
Matriculas at their consulates around the world for more than
130 years. The consulates do this to create an official record
of its citizens in other countries. The Matricula is legal
proof of registration with a consulate. This registration
facilitates access to protection and consular services because
the certificate is evidence of Mexican nationality. Last year
alone, more than a million of these cards were issued to
Mexican citizens living in the United States. It does not
provide immigrant status of any kind, and it cannot be used for
travel, employment, or driving in the United States or in
Mexico. The Matricula only attests that a Mexican consulate has
verified the individual's identity.
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\38\ The identity document issue would come up when aliens are
required to present a foreign identity document to enter a federal
building or to board an airplane at a United States airport. In
addition, the Transportation Security Administration requires
passengers to show an identification card before being admitted to the
secured areas of an airport.
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The Matricula also has some non-consular uses. For
instance, because it is an identification card, it provides
Mexican nationals in the United States with access to banking
services. Without an acceptable identification card, many
Mexican nationals in this country cannot open checking or
savings accounts or use any other banking services. The
significance of this cannot be overstated; in 2003, Latino
immigrants sent $38 billion to Latin America.\39\ Moreover, the
U.S. banking industry has been supportive of the Matricula,
planning to spend at least $8.5 billion through 2005 to attract
Hispanic customers.\40\
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\39\ Dr. Manuel Orozco, Institute for the Study of International
Migration, Georgetown Univ., Pew Hispanic Center Report: The Remittance
Marketplace-Prices, Policy and Financial Institutions 15 (June 2004).
\40\ Holders of the Matricula are more likely to use regulated
financial institutions, such as banks or credit unions, than a money
transmitting business such as Western Union or MoneyGram because the
cost of making such transfers is much higher for the latter category.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The availability of banking services is a safety issue, as
well. Because of perceptions that Latinos do not have bank
accounts and thus carry large amounts of cash, Latinos are more
likely to be victims of violent crime than any other racial or
ethnic group. As a result of this problem, mayors across the
country support the use of the Matricula to enable Latinos to
use mainstream financial institutions and thus reduce crime and
violence.\41\
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\41\ See Rachel L. Swarns, Old ID Card Gives New Status to Mexicans
in U.S., N.Y. Times, Aug. 25, 2003, at A1 (``In June, the mayors of the
Indians cities of Fort Wayne, East Chicago, Columbus and Indianapolis
announced they would accept the Matricula card. In July the State of
Indiana and the cities of Madison, Ind., and Cleveland and Columbus in
Ohio recognized it. This month, Cincinnati followed suit. Officials say
the move would be a boon to local economies, encouraging Mexican
immigrants to pour money into banks and businesses. They also say
immigrants with bank accounts will be less vulnerable to criminals who
prey on people who carry cash or keep money at home.'').
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Finally, the use of the Matricula for establishing bank
accounts has been approved by our government. The USA PATRIOT
Act requires regulations setting forth minimum standards for
financial institutions that relate to the identification and
verification of any person who applies to open an account.\42\
These regulations, promulgated by the U.S. Department of
Treasury, permit banks to accept identification cards issued by
foreign governments from customers opening new accounts,
including the Matricula.\43\ Additionally, the House recently
defeated another attempt to ban the use of the Matricula.\44\
Despite this clear support for the Matricula, opponents of the
identification card are trying to achieve their objective
indirectly by limiting which foreign documents can be accepted.
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\42\ Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act)
Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, Sec. 326, 115 Stat. 272, 317 (2001).
\43\ See 31 C.F.R. Sec. 103.121 (2004).
\44\ H.R. 5025, 108th Cong., 2d Sess. (2004). An amendment offered
by Rep. Michael Oxley striking section 216, which prevented issuance of
regulations regarding Matricula Consular cards, passed the House by a
bipartisan vote of 222-177.
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Section 3052 of the legislation is another thinly-veiled
attempt to limit forms of acceptable identification. Subsection
3052(c)(2)(B) would prohibit states from accepting any foreign
document, other than an official passport, to meet the
documentary identification requirements for a state-issued
identification card (including a drivers' license).
While proponents of this measure have linked driver's
licenses to security concerns by pointing out that many of the
9/11 hijackers were able to obtain licenses, we would note that
making it more difficult to obtain a driver's licenses will not
deter terrorism. Even requiring passports to obtain driver's
licenses would not have prevented the 9/11 hijackers from
getting driver's licenses; they all had passports.
Beyond the ineffectiveness of the proposal, it also would
serve to exclude millions of people from American society and
hinder state efforts to regulate drivers. Recent estimates
indicate that we have between eight and fourteen million
undocumented aliens in the United States, many of whom may not
have passports and would be prevented from obtaining licenses
under the legislation. The reality is that in many parts of the
country it is virtually impossible to survive in our society
without a car, and it is unlikely that undocumented aliens will
simply give up and leave the country when they learn they
cannot obtain licenses.
Moreover, a license is not just a privilege for the
driver's benefit but also serves state purposes. By licensing
drivers, the state can ensure that the drivers who receive
licenses have acceptable driving skills, know traffic laws, and
have liability insurance. In addition, registering and
photographing all drivers helps the state to monitor driving
records.
Finally, denying access to licenses could pose a safety
risk. Traffic accidents are the leading cause of death, with
forty-four thousand traffic fatalities in 2002.\45\ According
to a study conducted for the AAA Foundation for Traffic Safety,
unlicensed drivers are five times more likely to be in fatal
crashes than drivers with valid licenses.\46\
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\45\ National Safety Council, Injury Facts: Report on Injuries in
America (2003).
\46\ AAA Foundation for Traffic Safety, Unlicensed to Kill: The
Sequel (Jan. 2003).
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E. THE LEGISLATION CONTAINS OTHER OBJECTIONABLE PROVISIONS THAT WOULD
NOT ENHANCE SECURITY AND WERE NOT RECOMMENDED BY THE 9/11 COMMISSION

1. The legislation increases criminal penalties for false claims to
citizenship without any nexus to national security goals

We object to section 3086, which imposes five years
imprisonment for making false claims to citizenship for the
purpose of entering or remaining in the United States. This is
yet another example of the mean-spirited, anti-immigrant
sentiment that pervades this bill. Many immigrants, both legal
and undocumented, may make such a claim upon an encounter with
a law enforcement or immigration official. We believe that a
five year jail term for such a statement is unnecessary and
very counterproductive. Federal law already exacts severe
consequences on immigrants who make false claims to
citizenship. There is no valid policy reason for making
taxpayers bear the high cost of jailing an immigrant for five
years for such a minor non-violent offense.
Making a false claim to citizenship is already punishable
under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Section 212
makes an alien who falsely represents themself as a citizen
inadmissible, and there is no waiver of the consequences of
this offense.\47\ In addition, this offense constitutes a crime
of moral turpitude and triggers removability from the country
under section 237 of the INA.\48\ The INA makes a person who
has committed a crime of moral turpitude subject to mandatory
detention in jail, if they are convicted of a sentence of more
than 1 year in prison.\49\ This immigration detention, which
can last for years, normally follows the service of a criminal
sentence in prison.
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\47\ 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii).
\48\ 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1227(a)(2)(A)(i).
\49\ 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1226(c)(1)(B).
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Section 3086 needlessly piles on additional jail time to an
immigrant who already faces removal, with mandatory detention
in many cases. Upon deportation, the immigrant would be barred
from the United States for life.\50\ The consequences of one
false statement, both to the immigrant and to their family,
community and employer, are already severe. Adding a five year
jail term to someone who is already subject to deportation,
without possibility of return under our federal laws, is
grossly excessive to the crime.
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\50\ See Section 212 of the INA. An inadmissible person is not
eligible to get a visa to return to the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Furthermore, the 9/11 Commission did not recommend the
enhancement of this penalty, nor did it recommend anything
remotely related to this policy. The Majority on this Committee
justifies the inclusion of this policy \51\ in this bill by the
Commission's recommendation that ``The Department of Homeland
Security, properly supported by Congress, should complete, as
quickly as possible, a biometric entry-exit screening system,
including a single system for speeding qualified travelers.''
\52\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\51\ Memorandum from the Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.,
Chairman, U.S. House Comm. on the Judiciary to Members, U.S. House
Comm. on the Judiciary 16 (Sept. 27, 2004) (regarding the Markup of
H.R. 10, the ``9/11 Recommendation Implementation Act'' and other
bills).
\52\ 9/11 Commission Report at 389.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jailing people for five years for claiming that they are
U.S. citizens has nothing to do with a biometric entry-exit
system, nor with speeding the transit of qualified travelers.
There is no indication that a policy like this would catch
terrorists trying to enter the country, or prevent a terrorist
attack. In fact, none of the September 11th terrorists claimed
U.S. citizenship to enter this country.
This policy is simply an anti-immigrant provision designed
to punish, jail and deport immigrants, especially those who are
undocumented. It has no nexus to national security and is most
likely to result in years of imprisonment followed by the
eventual deportation of random immigrant workers. We object to
this penalty, and certainly oppose its inclusion in this bill,
which is supposed to be responding to the recommendations of
the 9/11 Commission.

2. The legislation would hinder business and tourism travel throughout
the western hemisphere

Another provision of the bill would hamper travel
throughout the western hemisphere and cause chaos for
businesses and national economies. Section 215(b) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act states that, unless otherwise
provided, it is unlawful for U.S. citizens to depart from or
enter the United States unless they bear a valid U.S. passport.
By regulation, the Secretary of State has provided that U.S.
citizens are excepted from this requirement when traveling
directly between parts of the United States, and when traveling
between the United States and any territory in North, South or
Central America (i.e., the western hemisphere).\53\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\53\ 22 C.F.R. Sec. 53.2(a)-(b). Cuba is excluded from the western
hemisphere exception. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 3001 of H.R. 10 would amend section 215(b) to
invalidate the western hemisphere exception, thus requiring a
passport to travel to and from currently exempted countries. It
would permit the President to waive the passport requirement
for travel to Canada and Mexico, but it would require such
travelers to carry documents that the Secretary of Health and
Human Services has designated as establishing U.S. citizenship
for the travel purposes.\54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\54\ The Secretary would have 60 days to pass an interim rule and
publish a list of qualifying documents in the Federal Register. As of
90 days after that publication, the President would not be authorized
to permit citizen arrivals or departures without the designated
document or documents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As it is has been proposed, the measure would overburden
passport processing operations and slow business and tourism
travel to a halt. First, though it essentially would require
the issuance of new passports for travelers to currently
exempted countries, the legislation provides no funding to
increase passport application processing. As such, the need for
so many passports could result in severe backlogs and prevent
people from taking needed trips. Further, it would have a
particularly negative impact on the tourism industry of the
Caribbean, which relies on U.S. travel of those without
passports. For this reason, the provision would raise the ire
of the travel industry and many businesses who would miss
opportunities because they could not engage in last minute
travel.\55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\55\ Another concern we expressed during the markup is that it does
not limit the use of secret immigration proceedings. During the
Committee markup, Reps. Howard Berman (D-CA) and Delahunt (D-MA)
offered an amendment to set out guidelines for government closure of
hearings in immigration court in response to the blanket closure of
these hearings by the Chief Immigration Judge in the weeks following
the September 11th attacks. We feel that this amendment falls squarely
within the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. Specifically, the
Commission recommended that: ``The burden of proof for retaining a
particular governmental power should be on the executive, to explain
(a) that the power actually materially enhances security and (b) that
there is adequate supervision of the executive's use of the powers to
ensure protection of civil liberties. If the power is granted, there
must be adequate guidelines and oversight to properly confine its
use.'' The amendment offered by Rep. Berman would have created
guidelines for the use of the government's power to close hearings.
On September 21, 2001, Chief Immigration Judge Michael J. Creppy
issued a memorandum (``Creppy Directive'') implementing an order from
the Attorney General to close certain immigration hearings. These cases
were to be conducted completely in secret with ``no visitors, no family
and no press.'' The mandate for secrecy even prohibited ``confirming or
denying whether such a case is on the docket or scheduled for
hearing.''
It has been reported that the INS did not use classified
information in any of these hearings. Instead the government has
asserted that all purported terrorism-related proceedings need to
remain closed in order to protect the privacy of the detainees and
prevent information about government intelligence-gathering methods
from reaching al Qaeda.
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan found
that the order closing immigration hearings was unconstitutionally
broad (Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 937 (E.D. Mich.
2002), and the Federal Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002). In a
separate case the U.S. District Court for New Jersey found the closures
unconstitutional (New Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, 205 F. Supp. 2d.
288 (D.N.J. 2002), but the Third Circuit reversed (New Jersey Media
Group v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3rd Cir. 2002). The Supreme Court
declined to hear the cases, effectively allowing the government to
continue the process, at least within the geographic confines of the
Third Circuit.
Open proceedings, in judicial and quasi-judicial settings, protect
individuals from arbitrary action and the public from sloppy decision-
making. Transparent proceedings are also important in maintaining
public confidence in the fairness of government activities. There are
clearly individual cases where proceedings should be closed to protect
the safety of participants or national security. But the Creppy
Directive allows the partial closing of proceedings based on the
government's prerogative, without any showing of legitimate security
needs.
As of May 29, 2002, 611 individuals have been subject to one or
more secret hearings. As noted, there is a split in the circuit that
have considered the legality of these proceedings, and, in opposing
review by the Supreme Court, the Justice Department announced it was
reconsidering its policy. Brief for the Respondents in Opposition at
13, North Jersey Media Group (No. 02-1289). But, in the absence of
legislative action, there is nothing to prevent the Justice Department
from conducting more secret immigration hearings in the future.
The amendment offered by Mr. Berman responds to the
Administration's decision to require blanket closure of immigration
proceedings without any showing of legitimate security needs by the
government. The amendment would have established a statutory
presumption of openness for removal hearings while preserving the
possibility that a hearing may be closed upon a specific showing of
need. Namely, the amendment would create an exception that on a case-
by-case basis, hearings may be closed to preserve confidentiality of
the immigrant (as in asylum adjudications or cases involving minors),
to protect national security if classified information is involved, or
to protect the identity of a confidential informant.
During the markup, the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Immigration
opposed the Democratic amendment claiming that ``it is common today for
immigration cases to be closed. In fact, all asylum proceedings and
proceedings regarding inadmissibility of a particular applicant are
closed today.'' This statement is false. In making this argument, the
Subcommittee Chairman's staff pointed to two sections of the Code of
Federal Regulations stating that ``All hearings, other than exclusion
hearings, shall be open to the public * * * '' (8 C.F.R. Sec. 1003.27)
and ``Exclusion hearings shall be closed to the public.'' 8 C.F.R.
Sec. 1240.32. These provisions apply only to exclusion hearings--
proceedings that commenced prior to April 1, 1997. The do not apply to
all inadmissibility hearings, as the Subcommittee Chairman claimed. To
the contrary, all asylum and removal proceedings are presumptively open
to the public. There are limited exceptions. For example, hearings can
be closed by the court when the proceeding involves an abused alien
spouse or child or if information presented in the hearing is subject
to a protective order.
It is unfortunate that the Majority members of the Committee were
misinformed by their Subcommittee Chairman. We would hope that without
this misinformation, our colleagues would have joined us in reinstating
a transparent and open system for our immigration hearings that
provides safeguards to protect privacy, classified information,
national security, and confidential informants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

II. The Legislation Would Authorize the Federal Government and Private
Employers to Intrude into the Everyday Lives of Americans

A. THE LEGISLATION VIOLATES PRIVACY RIGHTS AND FEDERALISM BY
STANDARDIZING DRIVER'S LICENSES TO CREATE A NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION
CARD.

We object to Title III, Subtitle B, Chapter 1, which
provides new standards for drivers' licenses and identification
cards.\56\ This provision goes far beyond the Commission's
recommendations. It comes dangerously close to creating a
national identification card system. It threatens American
citizen's rights to privacy. It violates the tenets of
federalism and forces unfunded mandates on the states. It
excludes important stakeholders from the policy-making process
and ignores state policy needs. It marginalizes immigrants in
America, and ignores more reasonable alternatives for securing
personal identification documents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\56\ Specifically, this language is found in Sections 3051 through
3056. Although we oppose Chapter 1 of this Subtitle, we do not object
to Section 3054, which makes it illegal to traffic actual document
authentication features, in addition to false authentication features.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In its final report, the 9/11 Commission issued the
following recommendation:

Secure identification should begin in the United
States. The federal government should set standards for
the issuance of birth certificates and sources of
identification, such as drivers [sic] licenses. Fraud
in identification documents is no longer just a problem
of theft. At many entry points to vulnerable
facilities, including gates for boarding aircraft,
sources of identification are the last opportunity to
ensure that people are who they say they are and to
check whether they are terrorists.\57\

\57\ 9/11 Commission Report at 390 (emphasis added).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After discussing the importance of continuing to welcome
immigrants and keeping track of who enters the country, the
Report also noted, ``All but one of the 9/11 hijackers acquired
some form of U.S. identification document, some by fraud.''\58\
The hijackers used licenses and IDs to rent cars, conduct other
activities to enact their plan, and eventually board aircraft
for the 9/11 attacks. Clearly, the Commission recommended the
establishment of identification standards to ensure that
terrorists could not traverse the country and conduct business
transactions in furtherance of future domestic attack
plans.\59\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\58\ Id.
\59\ See comments of 9/11 Commission Vice Chair Lee Hamilton at
Oversight Hearing on Privacy and Civil Liberties in the Hands of the
Government Post-September 11: Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission
and the U.S. Department of Defense Technology and Privacy Advisory
Committee Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law of
the House Committee on the Judiciary, 108th Cong., 2d Sess. 97 (``Just
to let you know our concern here, all of these hijackers, except one,
had U.S. identification. And what we are saying is that secure
identification is very, very important in terms of counterterrorism.
And we--we did not endorse a national ID * * * Keep in mind that these
hijackers were extremely skillful in being able to find the gaps in our
system. And we are trying to protect against that as best we can.'')
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The 9/11 Commission's recommendation is broad and gives
Congress room to work with federal agencies and states to
develop standards that can be applied nationwide. Yet this
Chapter goes far beyond the Commission's recommendation that
the federal government set standards for identification. It
requires the states to overhaul their procedures for issuing
driver's licenses and identification cards to meet Federally-
proscribed standards. It requires that states establish a
database system for sharing all of the personal information and
driving histories on license and ID card holders, though the
Commission did not recommend any type of unified database for
this data. The Commission did not suggest that the Federal
government should interfere with states' prerogatives or the
privacy rights of individuals.\60\ Nor was there a suggestion
that Federal grants to the states should hinge on a shared
database agreement as proposed in H.R. 10. This Chapter also
forces states to bear all of the financial costs of these new
standards by failing to fund these mandates. The proposal in
H.R. 10 goes well beyond the Commission's recommendation and
unnecessarily violates the privacy rights of citizens and
residents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\60\ See Statement of Vice Chair Lee Hamilton and Commissioner
Slade Gorton, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United
States, Before the Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law
and the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the House Committee on the
Judiciary, p. 3. (August 20, 2004) [Hereinafter Hamilton and Gorton
Statement]. (``Individual rights and liberties must be adequately
protected in the administration of the significant powers that Congress
has granted to executive branch agencies to protect national
security.'')
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 3052 establishes minimum standards for Federal
recognition of state-issued driver's licenses or identification
cards. It requires, at a minimum, that the following
information be included on the identity documents: full legal
name; date of birth; gender; license or ID card number; photo;
residential address; signature; security features to prevent
fraudulent use or tampering; and a common machine-readable
technology with defined minimum data elements.
Section 3052 also spells out what forms of information and
proof a state must require before issuing a license or ID: a
photo identity document or alternative with legal name and date
of birth; a document with date of birth; proof of social
security account number; and a document with name and address
of principal residence. The states must verify each document
with the original issuing agency, and they are prohibited from
accepting any foreign documents, except an official passport,
for these purposes.
Furthermore, section 3052 requires states to use digital
technology, retain copies or images of documents; require
facial image capture for driver's license issuance; establish a
procedure to verify information for renewals; confirm the
accuracy of social security numbers and take action if one is
registered to another person; refuse to issue licenses
withoutconfirmation that the applicant has terminated their license
from another state; secure licensing facilities and employees
authorized to manufacture or produce them; and establish fraudulent
document recognition training.
The National Governors Association ``strongly opposes''
these provisions in H.R. 10.\61\ They note that the bill was
``drafted without any input from Governors'' and ``exclude[s]
states from the standard-setting process despite states'
historic roles as issuers of driver's licenses and other
identification data.'' \62\ In their opinion, the bill ``would
impose unworkable technological standards and verification
procedures on states, many of which are well beyond the current
capacity of even the federal government.'' They oppose the
requirement that they share their state information with the
federal government. In their view, this proposal would ``create
financial, administrative and implementation problems by
requiring state compliance with these unprecedented, federally-
imposed standards within a short timeframe.'' In addition,
``the cost of implementing such standards for the 220 million
driver's licenses issued by states represents a massive
unfunded federal mandate.'' \63\ We agree with their assessment
and share their concerns.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\61\ NGA Letter.
\62\ Id.
\63\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As written, this Chapter would require state departments of
motor vehicles to verify each and every identification document
used to prove identity, by confirming the document with the
government agency or company that issued it. Without a well-
developed cooperative approach, this will become a bureaucratic
nightmare that will be costly to the states and will cause
substantial delays for citizens and residents. H.R. 10 also
fails to provide any protections for the digital data it
requires states to store digitally. There are no limits on how
it may be used, nor is there any guidance for maintaining data
security. This bill even goes as far to make the appearance of
the IDs uniform--a step that is eerily close to a national ID
card.
The states have a right to participate in determining how
features for licenses and ID cards should be changed. Despite
their expertise, they had no role in developing the
requirements in H.R. 10. In effect, this Chapter empowers the
Federal government to usurp state control over licensing and
identification and establishes the equivalent of a national
identity card with different state names on them.
Drivers' licenses are not simply identification documents.
Their purpose is to ensure that people are safe drivers, who
know the traffic laws and have defensive driving skills, before
they drive on our roads and highways. Licensing also makes it
possible for drivers to have liability insurance to protect
other drivers on the road. The states should maintain their
critical role in the issuance of licenses. Their obligation to
ensure safety on their roads to protect their residents and
visitors should not be ignored.
Perhaps the objections raised by the National Conference of
State Legislatures (``NCSL'') best enunciate the concerns we
share with the states about the imposition of these standards
and the obligation to share the data of state residents:

These provisions show no respect for federalism. They
constitute egregious unfunded mandates dealing with
drivers' licenses, birth certificates, personal
identification cards and use of social security numbers
that are likely to impose billions in costs on states.
They preempt and undercut state legislative authority
through a federally-contrived rulemaking process. They
set a prescriptive framework for a national
identification card. They ignore efforts made in every
state to strengthen the integrity of drivers' licenses
issuance and verification. They surrender legislative
prerogative to federal agencies and bureaucrats without
the benefit of congressional oversight. They constitute
the groundwork for potentially compromising civil
liberties and individual privacy. They compel state
participation in compacts that are not recognized by
state lawmakers and elected officials. They reference a
federal grant process and funding of `sums as may be
necessary,' all in an environment of bulging federal
deficits and constraints on domestic discretionary
spending.\64\

\64\ NCSL Letter. In addition to the provision on driver's licenses
and state identification cards, the letter referred to provisions on
birth certificates and social security data in Title III, Subtitle B,
Chapters 1, 2, and Section 3071 of Chapter 3 from H.R. 10.

Title III of H.R. 10 proposes a computerized national
database of every American driver's license and state
identification card under the guise of strengthening our
homeland security. Section 3053 requires that states must agree
to participate in an interstate compact for the electronic
sharing of driver license data, known as the ``Driver License
Agreement,'' in order to receive any grants or assistance under
the bill. It requires state motor vehicle databases contain (1)
all data fields printed on driver's licenses and identification
cards issued by the state, and (2) motor vehicle drivers'
histories, including motor vehicle violations, suspension, and
points on licenses. A mega-datebase such as this one represents
a perilous threat to our Constitutional rights. By forcing
state governments to maintain and share files on almost every
adult in the state, H.R. 10 will truly usher in the era of a
``Big Brother'' government.
Past efforts to establish a national ID card to identify
and track U.S. residents have failed, due to the threats they
pose to our liberty.\65\ H.R. 10 seeks to achieve that same
purpose through the back door. Instead of creating a new
national ID card, whose data would be held and monitored by the
Federal government, this proposal standardizes state ID cards
so that they achieve the same purpose. In this proposal, the
states maintain the data, but they are forced to create a mega-
database whose data must be shared by all 50 states and the
U.S. territories.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\65\ See Alison M. Smith, Congressional Research Service, National
Identification Cards: Legal Issues, n. 1-3 (Jan. 3, 2003). Examples
include the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1976, which stated,
``Nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize, directly or
indirectly, the issuance or use of national identification cards or the
establishment of a national identification card.'' Pub. L. 94-571.
Similarly, Rich Thornburg, Attorney General for President George Bush,
ruled out identification cards for the use of guns in 1989, feeling
that it was ``an infringement on rights of Americans.'' See Alison M.
Smith, Congressional Research Service, National Identification Cards:
Legal Issues n.2 (Jan. 3, 2003) (citing Ann Debroy, ``Thornburg Rules
out Two Gun-Control Options,'' Wash. Post, June 29, 1989 at A 41).
Finally, Representative Dick Armey has been quoted as saying ``[w]e
didn't beat back the administration's plan to issue us all `health
security cards' only to have Congress adopt an I.D. card to track down
immigrants.'' Id. (citing William H. Minor, Identity Cards and
Databases in Health Care: The Need for Federal Privacy Protections, 28
Columb. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 253,273 (1995)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There are no privacy limitations on the use of this
data.\66\ The bill does not prevent the sharing of this
information with other people, companies, Federal government
agencies or foreign governments that may make inquiries. There
are no systems for maintaining the datashare systems, ensuring
the accuracy of the data, preventing fraud and tampering,
making corrections, or filing complaints for inaccuracy or
misuse of the data. Currently, some states do not even have
accurate or complete databases. Not all states can verify
whether or not a certain person has a valid driver's license
from their state. Certainly the Federal government should not
mandate linking up state databases when some states cannot
provide reliable information about their license and ID
holders.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\66\ See Hamilton and Gorton Statement, p.1 (``We also recognize
that with the enhanced flow of information comes a need to establish
guidelines and oversight to make sure that the privacy of our citizens
and residents is respected and preserved.'')
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The lack of data safeguards ensures that the data will
often be inaccurate and misused. There will be serious
consequences for untold numbers of people who may miss flights,
land in jail, fail to get benefits or be denied other
opportunities due to database errors.
As noted above, the system proposed in this Chapter will
dangerously increase the Federal government's ability to
monitor individuals. The data-sharing system is bound to be
subject to unauthorized disclosures and leaks. During World War
II, for example, supposedly sacrosanct census data was used to
identify Japanese-Americans for internment.\67\ This mega-
database will be a tempting target for future legislation and
policies. The FBI could use this database to identify certain
immigrants or members of an ethnic group for ``voluntary
interviews''.\68\ Collection agencies and states could
erroneously identify people as unpaid debtors or child support
evaders. People might be identified through the database
because they criticized the President for U.S. involvement in a
war or protested an international organization for the ills of
globalization. The system is ripe for abuse and misuse that
will violate people's rights to privacy, speech, and civil
rights.\69\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\67\ H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 1, at 520
(1996)
\68\ For example, in late 2001 and 2002, the FBI conducted a
program of ``voluntary interviews'' of over 5000 Muslim residents of
the U.S., seeking information related to the September 11, 2001 attacks
and terrorist threats to the United States. Similar interviews of Iraqi
residents in the U.S. were conducted prior to the initiation of the war
in Iraq in 2003.
\69\ See Hamilton and Gorton Statement at 2 (``We did propose a
general test to be applied to consideration of the renewal of other
provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act, and we believe that principle should
also be applied to other legislative and regulatory proposals that are
designed to strengthen our security but that may impinge on individual
rights. The test is a simple but important one: The burden of proof
should be on the proponents of the measure to establish that the power
or authority being sought would in fact materially enhance national
security, and that there will be adequate supervision of the exercise
of that power or authority top [sic] ensure protection of civil
liberties. If the power is granted, there must be adequate guidelines
and oversight to properly confine its use.'')
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Combined with other sections of H.R. 10 that prevent or
limit the use of other forms of identification,\70\ track the
movement of Americans in and out of the country,\71\
standardize state records for birth certificates, and set up
computerized systems for state and federal sharing of birth and
death records,\72\ the impact of this proposal for driver's
licenses and state-issued ID cards is truly frightening.\73\
America would become a place where a person's every move, every
encounter with state or federal governments from birth to
death, would be tracked and monitored by those governments.
H.R. 10 is a major leap forward in creating an all-intrusive
``Big Brother'' government.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\70\ See H.R. 10 Sec. 3005.
\71\ See id. Sec. 3001.
\72\ See id. Sec. 3061.
\73\ See NCSL Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 3055 empowers the Secretary of Homeland Security to
make grants to the states to assist their efforts to conform to
the minimum standards in this chapter. It authorizes such sums
as may be necessary to carry out the Chapter from fiscal years
2005 through 2009. However, there is no guarantee that these
grants will be made to all states and territories, or that
sufficient funds will be provided to cover the massive expenses
of these reforms. Furthermore, the demand for state compliance
is not contingent upon the provision of federal funding to meet
the costs of these reforms. The result will likely be a large
unfunded mandate upon the states.\74\ Yet many states continue
to struggle financially as a result of other federal budget
cuts in recent years. How will they pay for this plan? If these
measures are needed for our national security, they should be
paid for with federal funds. The burden of imposing and sharing
these mandatory standards should not rest with the states.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\74\ See NGA Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 3056 gives the Secretary of Homeland Security the
authority to make regulations, certify standards and issue
grants under this title, in consultation with the Secretary of
Transportation and the States. This gives ultimate authority to
DHS, all but removing the Department of Transportation from the
process, despite their authority over federal highways, their
impact over State road and highway policy, and their experience
working with states on road safety and licensing policies. At a
minimum, the Secretary of Transportation should share the
authority to implement this Chapter by making regulations,
certifying standards and issuing grants in conjunction with the
Secretary of Homeland Security. As discussed below, Rep. Linda
Sanchez (D-CA) offered a substitute that would have achieved
this balance. Under her proposal, the Secretaries of
Transportation and Homeland Security would have joint authority
to ensure that road safety policy was considered along with
homeland security needs in creating and implementing these new
standards.
We would also note that this policy would leave citizens
vulnerable to immigrant drivers on the roads without licenses.
Many undocumented aliens who do not have passports are going to
drive whether they have driver's licenses or not. Preventing
the states from issuing driver's licenses to these aliens will
result in a lot of untested, uninsured drivers on the roads. As
a number of immigration organizations noted, ``Not only would
these requirements grind to a halt the issuance of driver's
licenses throughout the country, they also would lead to a de
facto immigration status requirement. Such a result would
severely undermine the law enforcement utility of the
Department of Motor Vehicle databases by discouraging
individuals from applying for licenses.'' \75\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\75\ Immigration Sign-On Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rep. Sanchez did offer a Democratic substitute to this
Chapter at the Full Committee mark-up that Republicans defeated
in a 19 to 12 vote.\76\ Her proposal would have satisfied the
recommendation of the 9-11 Commission, while bringing all those
who have a serious interest in the implementation of standards
together. She proposed creating a working group of federal and
state experts who would carefully determine standards that
would both ensure the security of driver's licenses and state
identification cards and meet the policy needs of the States.
This working group would include officials from the Department
of Transportation, the Department of Homeland Security, and
State motor vehicle departments. The working group would have
reported their findings to Congress, allowing us to make a more
reasoned decision that met the objectives of all stakeholders.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\76\ H.R. 10 Markup at 317-332.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although the substitute amendment failed, Rep. Melvin L.
Watt (D-NC) expressed bi-partisan concerns about how to improve
driver's license security and the risks of imposing a national
identification card:
Mr. Watt: ``I just wanted to point out that we had a
hearing in the Commercial and Administrative Law
Subcommittee on this whole national identification
process. And uniformly--and I wish my Chairman Mr.
Cannon, was here to express this--but uniformly the
people on the--members on that subcommittee were
extremely concerned about how this new identification
system got implemented. And I think the underlying bill
is well beyond what any of those people would have
thought would have been a desirable place to be, and I
think Ms. Sanchez's amendment gets us much, much closer
to the appropriate balance.'' \77\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\77\ H.R. 10 Markup at 322.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Watt: Quoting Mr. Cannon from the subcommittee
transcript: `` `And I suspect that this subcommittee,
perhaps the Constitution subcommittee in addition, is
going to have a lot to say about how we at least
approach that problem.' He's talking about the national
ID card problem. `And I think that means a commission
where people who are very thoughtful, who have
significant background, and who are'--`people who are
willing to say we don't necessarily need to federalize
this process. And if we do federalize this process, it
shouldn't just be by the damn feds sucking information
out of local folks, It ought to be the local folks who
get something back, and to do that, you ought to have
some kind of protection, maybe an anonymizer. * * * It
is vital to America and it is, I think, the cornerstone
of what our grandchildren are going to enjoy or suffer
in the future.'' \78\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\78\ Id. at 326.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We agree with the 9/11 Commission that drivers' licenses
and identification cards should be secure and should not be
easily obtainable by terrorists, as was the case before
September 11, 2001. However, creating a national ID is not the
answer. All of the States and relevant federal agencies should
have a role in carefully constructing appropriate national
standards. A rigid, federal mandate is unwise and places
unreasonable expectations on the states. This is especially
true when the federal mandate is not funded, as in this case.
Most importantly, this proposal does not strike an
appropriate balance between our rights to individual privacy
and the federal government's responsibilities to enhance our
national security. We can improve the screening of card
applicants, enhance the security of the identification cards,
and ensure that driver's meet safety tests. This can be done
without violating individual privacy, creating a database with
information on almost every U.S. resident, and increasing the
number of dangerous, uninsured drivers on American roads and
highways. It is our obligation to find the right balance.
Rushing into a bad policy that establishes a ``Big Brother''
government database that will soon move beyond our control is
not the answer. There is no evidence that the 9/11 Commission
ever suggested or contemplated such a sweeping,overbroad policy
to achieve the objective of securing domestic identification.
Individual privacy must and can be protected while we improve our
national security. Alternative reforms could successfully achieve this
balance.

B. THE LEGISLATION WOULD PROVIDE UNFETTERED ACCESS TO INACCURATE AND
INCOMPLETE CRIMINAL BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON EMPLOYEES

The bill also would subject private citizens to widespread
dissemination of any criminal history information, regardless
of accuracy. As reported from the Committee, section 2142
authorizes private employers to obtain background information,
however inaccurate, on potential employees from the Attorney
General. This program would undo the careful balance that
exists between security needs and privacy interests and could
lead to the dissemination of incorrect and private information.
Under current law, the Attorney General is authorized to
acquire, collect and classify information for the purpose of
criminal identification and records, the identification of
deceased individuals and the location of missing persons.\79\
This information may only be exchanged with federal government,
the states, cities, and penal and other similar
institutions.\80\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\79\ 28 U.S.C.Sec. 534.
\80\ Id. Sec. 534(a)(4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 2142 would expand this authority significantly. It
would create a pilot program that would empower private
employers to access federal databases when such a search would
be legal under state law. It requires the Attorney General to
set up a system by which this information can be reliably
accessed by fingerprint or other biometric identifiers. The
search requester will be provided with an identifying
description of the individual, and all available history on
arrests, detentions, indictments or other formal charges. The
requester also would receive any available dispositional
information on the aforementioned, such as acquittal,
sentencing, correctional supervision and release information.
The Attorney General would then be required to submit a report
regarding how a background program might be applied to the
general public. Section 2142 also creates a program by which
security guard companies may check potential employees'
backgrounds.
While we understand the need for ensuring the integrity of,
this measure would not be of benefit in that regard. We believe
that a study must proceed a actual program, not follow it. In
the four months of its operation, the pilot program envisioned
by the bill's proponents could collect information on countless
innocent Americans. We cannot support such a program for many
reasons.
First, the program exceeds the scope of the 9/11 Commission
report. It is unclear how this provision even relates to
terrorism at all that it is not limited to those who work in
national security-related positions or even those who work for
the government. Plainly, there is no justification for allowing
waitresses, accountants, cooks, and construction workers to be
subjected to a federal background check through this bill. That
is precisely whey states that allow discrimination based on
criminal history require some nexus between the position and
the relevance of one's criminal past. For example, many states
regulate the employment only of those who work in law
enforcement, or with the children or the elderly.\81\ To create
a blanket check for people regardless of the sensitivity of
their jobs muddies what this bill intends to do--prevent future
terrorist attacks--and jeopardizes our privacy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\81\ Amy Hirsch, Center for Law and Social Policy, Every Door
Closed: Barriers Facing Parents With Criminal Records 15 (2002).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, there are not safeguards to protect the information
that employers collect and submit. The legislation contains no
guidelines for what to do with information one it has been
given to the Justice Department. It does not regulate what
officials, public or private, would have access to it. Further,
it does not provide whether the information is destroyed after
the criminal history check or whether it remains in some new
database of average Americans who have done nothing more than
apply for a job. During the markup, the majority was forced to
acknowledge that the legislation does not address these
issues.\82\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\82\ H.R. 10 Markup.
Rep. Jackson Lee (D-TX): ``I ask do you know, under the pilot
program, what would happen to those fingerprints of all these
individuals who would be subject to the criminal history background
check?
Rep. Steve Chabot (R-OH): ``It's not been set up yet, so the
details of this ultimately will be determined.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Beyond our concerns about what the Justice Department would
do with its new boon of personally-identifiable data, there are
concerns about the lack of regulations for employers. Section
2142 is silent about what employers are required to do to
protect their employees' and applicants' sensitive information.
There also are no provisions for ensuring that the background
checks are actually being requested by bona fide employers
instead of merely persons seeking private information on
relatives or business competitors.
Third, the provision has no safeguards for accuracy. The
Brandon Mayfield fiasco \83\ demonstrates how easy it is to
misidentify someone, even through our criminal and fingerprint
databases. Despite this fact, the legislation does not require
the database to have any level of accuracy before allowing
information to be shared so that Mr. Mayfield's ordeal is not
repeated. Beyond misidentification, it is possible that the
files may be incomplete because they may not hold all of the
dispositional information of how an arrest or charge was
resolved. For this reason, the Justice Department should not
disseminate arrest records until it can demonstrate that it
also will disseminate acquittals, mistrials and those
situations where charges were dropped.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\83\ The FBI held Brandon Mayfield for two weeks in connection with
the Madrid train bombing. The FBI held Mr. Mayfield on the basis of a
fingerprint on a bag with detonators near the bombing, despite the fact
that the Spanish government had questioned the FBI's identification of
Mr. Mayfield. The FBI eventually released and apologized to Mr.
Mayfield for its mistake.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This provision invites unwarranted discrimination against
those with criminal pasts. The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission has found that discrimination on the basis of
criminal history can very well be a violation of Title VII
under a disparate impact theory, and should only be allowed
when proven that it is a business necessity.\84\ It has further
stated that arrest records can be particularly troublesome, and
that an arrest absent a conviction should very rarely ever be a
justification for not hiring an applicant.\85\ Finally, even
the President has admitted the importance of integrating past
offenders into our society, such as to reduce recidivism.\86\
The legislation's new criminal history checks will just invite
more discrimination against those who have reformed their
lives, those whose convictions are far in the past, even those
who were arrested, but never convicted, of a crime, and make it
harder for them to reintegrate into society.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\84\ Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Policy Statement on
the Issue of Conviction Records Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 (Feb. 4, 1987).
\85\ Policy Guidance on the Consideration of Arrest Records in
Employment decisions Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
as amended, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e et seq. (Sept. 7, 1990).
\86\ The President, State of the Union Address (Jan. 20, 2004)
(``Tonight I ask you to consider another group of Americans in need of
help. This year, some 600,000 inmates will be released from prison back
into society. We know from long experience that if they can't find
work, or a home, or help, they are much more likely to commit crime and
return to prison. So tonight, I propose a four-year, $300 million
prisoner re-entry initiative to expand job training and placement
services, to provide transitional housing, and to help newly released
prisoners get mentoring, including from faith-based groups. America is
the land of second chance, and when the gates of the prison open, the
path ahead should lead to a better life.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, we would note there are no meaningful limitations
whatsoever on the scope or duration of the pilot program.
Ordinarily, when a pilot program of this magnitude is created,
Congress will limit the program's geographic or other scope or
duration. No such limitations are set forth in this
legislation, effectively giving the Attorney General carte
blanche authority to develop a program that could intrude on
our civil liberties and privacy.
While we support background checks for security guards we
cannot support background checks for the myriad of other
positions that have no security or terror relation whatsoever.
To include such a measure in an anti-terrorism bill is
misleading and jeopardizes what the 9/11 Commission recommended
as real fixes for the terrorist threat. Unfortunately, the
majority rejected an effort to limit the scope of the checks to
security employees and to study the possibility of further
expansion.\87\
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\87\ By a vote of 11-20, an amendment by Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee
(D-TX) to remove the pilot program was defeated. See H.R. 10 Markup.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. THE LEGISLATION WOULD AUTHORIZE THE GENERATION OF TRAVEL DATABASES
AND SCREENING PROGRAMS WITHOUT REGARD TO ACCURACY

Another concern with the legislation is that it would
permit the development of travel databases and screening
programs but would not ensure the integrity of those records.
Section 2173 directs the Assistant Secretary of Homeland
Security to begin testing a next generation passenger
prescreening program, and directs the Secretary to establish
procedures by which a person can appeal their position on a no-
fly list.
While few can dispute the need for passenger screening,
such measures must be done properly. At least hundreds, if not
thousands, of airline passengers have complained to the
Transportation Security Administration that their names
incorrectly appear on TSA no-fly lists; in July 2004 alone,
two-hundred and fifty people sought to have their names removed
from such lists.\88\ We believe the ability to remove oneself
from a no-fly list is such a basic right for every American
that it should receive the government's highest attention.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\88\ Sara Kehaulani Goo, Hundreds Report Watch-List Trials, Wash.
Post, Aug. 21, 2004, at A8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Unfortunately, the Department of Homeland Security has been
operating the no-fly list for over two years since the attacks
and has not seen fit to implement a process by which a
passenger may remove his or her name.\89\ Two persons who have
appeared on the list, Rep. John Lewis (D-GA) and Sen. Edward M.
Kennedy (D-MA) attempted in vain to correct the problem; Rep.
Lewis was able to avoid being flagged by adding his middle
initial to travel bookings while Sen. Kennedy spent three weeks
getting TSA officials to remove his name.\90\ This lack of
commitment to civil liberties by the government begs the
intervention of an independent body that is focused on more
than just security.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\89\ The Transportation Security Administration, an agency within
the Homeland Security Department, recently announced the testing phase
of its new Secure Flight program. 69 Fed. Reg. 57,345 (Sept. 24, 2004).
The notice makes only a vague reference that ``TSA will establish
comprehensive passenger redress procedures and personal data and civil
liberties protections for the Secure Flight program.'' Id.
\90\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It also is important that there be judicial review of the
no-fly process, such that the public would have a means of
challenging any unfavorable rulings by the government. H.R. 10
however, does not permit review and leaves any challenges to be
decided by the very organization that categorized the
individual as a security risk in the first place. It has taken
far too long for such a process to be implemented.
To that end, Rep. Jackson Lee offered an amendment at the
Committee markup that would have put the onus on the
legislation's newly-created Civil Liberties Protection Officer
to create this program.\91\ The amendment also would have
ensured that no-fly list criteria would be based on reliable
evidence that an individual is a known or suspected terrorist
instead of on constitutionally-protected activity. Finally, the
amendment would have provided a civil remedy to enforce the
removal process in court. Unfortunately, the Majority rejected
these widespread concerns and defeated the amendment.\92\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\91\ See H.R. 10 Markup.
\92\ The amendment was defeated by a vote of 12-18.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another provision in the bill, section 3081, contains
shortcomings similar to those in section 2173. It directs the
Secretary of State to study the feasibility of creating a
database recording the lifetime travel history of U.S. citizens
and foreign nationals. This provision goes far beyond the
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission and unnecessarily
intrudes on the privacy of Americans.
In its final report, the 9/11 Commission wrote, ``Targeting
travel is at least as powerful as a weapon against terrorists
as targeting their money. The United States should combine
terrorist travel intelligence, operations, and law enforcement
in a strategy to intercept terrorists, find terrorist travel
facilitators, and constrain terrorist mobility.\93\ Note that
the Commission recommended targeting terrorist travel--not
creating a master database of the travel history of innocent
Americans. Contrary to this recommendation, the program in H.R.
10 would generate a history of even non-terrorist travel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\93\ 9/11 Commission Report at 385.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We have two primary concerns, and the first is for the
privacy of all who use our commercial air space. The Majority
has not explained how having a record of every flight that
every American has ever taken will reduce the terrorist threat.
Our second concern is that the program would collect
information on everyone, regardless of whether they are a
threat, or even suspicious, and the vast amount of data
reflecting innocent behavior will obscure the truly threatening
activity. As many advocacy groups have noted, refining the
tracking process--not expanding it--will make preventing
terrorist entry into the United States more efficient.\94\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\94\ Immigration Sign-On Letter at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. THE LEGISLATION FAILS TO ADEQUATELY CREATE A BOARD TO PROTECT CIVIL
LIBERTIES

We also believe the legislation fails to establish a civil
liberties board that could adequately protect our rights. Chief
among the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission was the
establishment of a government wide watchdog to safeguard civil
liberties. The Commission found that currently ``there is no
office within the government whose job it is to look across the
government at the actions we are taking to protect ourselves to
ensure that liberty concerns are appropriately considered.''
\95\ The Commission recognized, however, that both ``the
substantial new powers [vested] in the investigative agencies
of the government'' \96\ by the USA PATRIOT Act, as well as its
own recommendations calling ``for the government to increase
its presence in our lives,'' \97\ require that ``should be a
voice within the executive branch'' \98\ to address civil
liberties concerns.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\95\ 9/11 Commission Report at 395.
\96\ Id. at 394.
\97\ Id. at 393.
\98\ Id. at 395.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Surprisingly, H.R. 10 as introduced did not create a
government wide civil liberties board. Instead, the bill only
designated a single civil liberties officer for the
intelligence community. To remedy this flagrant omission, Rep.
Watt, along with Reps. Nadler and Schiff, offered an amendment
that would have established a strong, independent, bipartisan
agency within the executive branch.\99\ After hours of
negotiation, the Chairman introduced a substitute amendment
that represents the product of bipartisan compromise in all
save one respect. The Chairman's amendment stripped the
proposed board of administrative subpoena power.\100\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\99\ At the request of Chairman Sensenbrenner, Rep. Watt withdrew
the amendment to negotiate the scope of the proposed Board's powers and
the parameters of its access to relevant information.
\100\ The authority to issue a subpoena in the Watt-Nadler-Schiff
amendment is identical to that in S. 2774. The provision reads in
pertinent part:

(g) Access to Information.--
(1) Authorization.--If determined by the Board to be
necessary to carry out its responsibilities under this section,
the Board may--
(D) require, by subpoena, persons other than Federal
executive departments and agencies to produce any relevant
information, documents, reports, answers, records, accounts,
papers, and other documentary or testimonial evidence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Watt/Nadler/Schiff amendment imposed the additional requirement
that subpoenas be issued only with the approval of a majority of the
Board. A separate provision required voluntary compliance by Federal
agencies with requests for information from the Board.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although we believe that H.R. 10 as amended is improved by
the establishment of a Civil Liberties Board, we are deeply
concerned that without the necessary authority to receive and
evaluate relevant data concerning the privacy and civil
liberties implications of anti-terrorism efforts the Board will
be nothing more than a toothless tiger. Even worse, we run the
risk of not only creating a Board that is useless and
ineffective, but one whose uninformed findings will
nevertheless put forward the illusion of civil liberties
oversight.
The need to ensure that a Civil Liberties Board possesses
adequate authority to perform its duties is reflected in each
major bill introduced to implement the recommendations of the
9/11 Commission. For example, the McCain/Lieberman bill, S.
2774, establishes a five-member Privacy and Civil Liberties
Oversight board within the Executive Office of the President
(EOP).\101\ Similarly, S. 2845, the Collins/Lieberman bill also
provides for the establishment of a five-member Privacy and
Civil Liberties Oversight board within the EOP. Both bills
contain a provision authorizing the Board to issue a subpoena
when necessary to carry out its duties.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\101\ The Shays/Maloney companion bill, H.R. 5040 was introduced in
the House and referred to 10 committees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The duties of a civil liberties board, as contemplated by
the 9/11 Commission, makes access to information critical to
its success. The civil liberties board is established to
safeguard our constitutional freedoms as we develop new tools
for gathering and sharing information to prevent and combat
terrorism. In introducing S. 2774, Sen. McCain said:

All of us who are concerned with threats to this
Nation's security also wish to ensure that our efforts
to protect Americans do not infringe on our civil
liberties. After all, giving up the way of life we have
fought so hard to defend is not an acceptable price for
greater security. We must find a way to balance the
two, and this is what this bill proposes to do. It
creates a Privacy and Civil Liberties Board * * * to
analyze * * * the enhanced security measures taken by
our government and to ensure that civil liberties are
appropriately considered as these policies are
developed.\102\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\102\ Congressional Record, S8866 (Sept. 7, 2004).

The enhanced security authority vested in our government in
the aftermath of 9/11 is unprecedented and necessarily broad.
Virtually every postmortem evaluation of the incidents leading
up to the terrorists attacks on September 11, 2001 has
identified improvement in the government's ability to share
information as the most urgent task to combat and prevent acts
of terrorism in the future.\103\ As a result, key changes have
been proposed and/or implemented to ease the flow of
information among government entities at every level within the
United States, the private sector, and certain foreign
governments.\104\ In addition, the 9/11 Commission also made
recommendations that would expand collaboration with and among
government and the private sector.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\103\ See Markle Foundation, Task Force on National Security in the
Information Age, Protecting America's Freedom in the Information Age
(2002).
\104\ Several of the provisions in the USA PATRIOT Act that are set
to expire next year implicate privacy interests and civil liberties.
For example, subsection 203(b) grants law enforcement officials
authority to share electronic, wire, and oral interception information
with intelligence, protective, immigration, national defense and
national security officials. Subsection 203(d) allows the sharing of
foreign intelligence and counterintelligence information as well.
Others ease the burden on government to acquire personal information in
the first instance. For example, section 209 relaxes the standard
required by some courts prior to 9/11 for seizing voice mail messages.
By treating voice mail like e-mail, section 209 permits its seizure by
search warrant as opposed to the more demanding wiretap order
previously held to apply. Similarly, sections 212 and 217 permit easier
government access to electronic communications with the assistance of
service providers.
For example, existing programs designed in whole or in part to
target terrorist travel include the Terrorism Information Awareness
(TIA), the Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS), the
Multi-State Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange (MATRIX) Pilot Project,
and the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology
program (US-VISIT). A recent Congressional Research Service report
notes that ``[t]hese programs necessarily require enhanced information
sharing by government agencies and the private sector, and are designed
to assist the information needs of intelligence and national security.
* * * [Nevertheless, w]hile the benefits from the use of advanced
technologies for antiterrorism efforts are clear, the risks to
individual privacy and the potential for abuse and harm to individual
liberty by Government officials and employees deploying such
technologies are equally established.'' Congressional Research Service,
USA Patriot Act Sunset: Provisions That Expire on December 31, 2005 7
(Aug. 2004).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Interestingly, almost simultaneously with the markup of
H.R. 10, a U.S. District Court judge found the FBI's use of a
``national security letter'' unconstitutional because it allows
the FBI to demand customer information from Internet service
providers without judicial oversight or public review. In the
course of analyzing the constitutionality of the FBI's use of a
national security letter (``NSL''), the court distinguished
between NSL's and administrative subpoenas. ``Ordinary
administrative subpoenas,'' the court observed, ``may be issued
by most federal agencies, as authorized by the hundreds of
applicable statutes in federal law.'' \105\ But, ``[u]nlike the
NSL statutes, most administrative subpoena laws either contain
no provision requiring secrecy, or allow only limited secrecy
in special cases.'' \106\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\105\ Doe v. Ashcroft, 2004 WL 2185571 (S.D.N.Y.) (Sept. 28, 2004),
at 8. ``For example, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) may issue
subpoenas to investigate possible violations of the tax code, and the
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) may issue subpoenas to investigate
possible violations of the securities laws. More obscure examples
include the Secretary of Commerce power to issue subpoenas in
investigating and enforcing halibut fishing laws.'' Id. (citations
omitted).
\106\ Id. at 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thus, at the same time a court determined that the
government's use of information gathering tools
unconstitutionally encroaches on the Bill of Rights, this
Committee denies the civil liberties watchdog authority to
obtain relevant information from those to whom such substantial
power has been vested. This approach is flawed for several
reasons. First and most important, one need only look to the
experience of the very Commission from which the recommendation
to establish a civil liberties board emanates; simply put,
without its subpoena powers, which extended to the federal
government, the 9/11 Commission could not have accomplished its
charge.\107\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\107\ See 9/11 Commission Says U.S. Agencies Slow Its Inquiry, N.Y.
Times, July 9, 2003; 9/11 Commission Could Subpoena Oval Office Files,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 2003; Mayor Agrees to Allow Panel to Examine Sept.
11 Records, N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, on August 27, 2004, the President issued Executive
Order 13353, establishing the ``President's Board on
Safeguarding Americans' Civil Liberties.'' The E.O. 13353 board
clearly is an advisory board designed to assist the President
and his Administration in developing and implementing homeland
security functions that may have an impact on civil liberties.
The board consists exclusively of Administration insiders and,
while admirable, cannot perform the vitally important task of
the government wide civil liberties board as conceived by the
9/11 Commission. Yet, the Executive Order authorizes the
President's board to ``obtain information and advice relating
to the Policy from representatives of entities or individuals
outside the executive branch of the Federal Government.''
Moreover, the Executive Order expressly authorizes the Board to
``establish one or more committees that include individuals
from outside the executive branch of the Federal Government * *
* to advise the Board on specific issues * * * [and] carry out
its functions separately from the Board.'' Ironically, H.R. 10
as amended establishes a civil liberties board that has no
designated authority to obtain any information from any person
or entity outside the federal government. As such, the
President's advisory board has broader authority to obtain
information from the private sector than the civil liberties
board.
Finally, while Congress must ensure that the executive
branch has the tools and resources necessary to protect the
American people from further terrorists attacks, we must also
ensure that the constitutional rights and liberties of all
persons in the United States are not violated. The creation of
a strong, oversight board consistent with that proposed by the
9/11 Commission will go a long way in safeguarding those
liberties. The new relationships that will be and have been
forged between government and the private sector require
parallel oversight authority to ensure that those relationships
are properly tailored to reconcile the security of our nation
and the liberty of our citizens. We believe that there must be
a mechanism in place that permits the civil liberties board to
exist as an effective check and balance. The administrative
subpoena is essential to fulfill this objective.

III. The Legislation Contains Civil Liability Provisions That Would
Harm Terror Victims and Fail To Enhance Security

We also are concerned that the legislation contains
numerous civil liability measures that would do little, if
anything, to enhance our security; their only effect would be
to diminish the rights of terror victims. Section 5103 allows
states and localities to enter into litigation management
agreements to handle all claims arising out of, relating to, or
resulting from an act of terrorism. These agreements provide
for a federal cause of action for claims against emergency
response providers, and the federal court is to apply the law,
including the choice of law principles, of the state in which
the terrorist act occurred. This would be an acceptable
response to terrorism-related injuries if the drafters had
stopped there. Unfortunately, section 5103 overreaches by going
outside the scope of the 9/11 Commission report to protect bad
actors.
First, section 5103, contrary to other immunity protections
given to volunteers, protects emergency responders for
intentional bad acts. Although language in this section
specifically states that it does not apply to any person or
government entity that knowingly commits either an act of
terrorism or a criminal act related to or resulting from an act
of terrorism, the bill's liability restrictions would apply to
persons who commit intentional torts. For example, a nurse who
decides that a victim's injuries are so serious that the
patient would be better off dead than alive would be immune
from liability if she deliberately administered a drug into an
intravenous line that killed the victim. Similarly, an
emergency responder who commits a hate crime or crime of
violence in the immediate aftermath of a terrorist attack would
face no accountability for her actions. Finally, if a
firefighter or police officer responding to an emergency while
intoxicated strikes and kills a pedestrian en route, this bill
would insulate him from liability.
The House consistently has rejected giving protections to
intentional bad actors \108\ and that policy should not be
abdicated just because an act of terrorism is involved. Most,
if not all, intentional misconduct is criminal. To exempt
criminal misconduct caused by terrorism from the scope of the
bill's protection, but not other criminal misconduct, such as
assault, battery, or vehicular homicide, is unprecedented and
simply bad policy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\108\ For example, the Volunteer Protection Act, Pub. L. 105-19,
protects volunteers from negligence claims, but allows them to be held
accountable for intentional misconduct. According to House Report 105-
101, volunteers can only receive these protections if ``the harm was
not caused by willful or criminal misconduct, gross negligence,
reckless misconduct, or a conscious, flagrant indifference to the
rights or safety of the individual harmed by the volunteer.'' Moreover,
the House recently passed H.R. 1787, the ``Good Samaritan Volunteer
Firefighter Assistance Act'' and H.R. 1084, the ``Volunteer Pilot
Organization Protection Act.'' Neither of these Good Samaritan measures
protects donors of firefighting equipment or volunteer pilot
organizations who fly for the public benefit from intentional torts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For example, just because a terrorist act occurred does not
mean that responders should get away with reckless or
intentional misconduct that causes injury, such as if a
paramedic responding to a terrorism emergency recklessly gives
a patient a drug to which the patient is allergic even though
the patient is wearing a medical alert bracelet stating the
allergy. In the case of an emergency room physician treating
the pelvic injuries of a pregnant woman injured during a
terrorist attack, the physician could sterilize her without her
permission and be immune from punitive damages. The mere fact
that an emergency worker is responding to an act of terrorism
does not mean that the responder is entitled to commit criminal
acts that jeopardize public safety and health.\109\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\109\ During the markup, Rep. Watt (D-NC) offered an amendment to
remove intentional torts from the scope of section 5103 in order to
keep this bill consistent with other measure providing liability
protections. The Majority rejected the amendment by a vote of 12-19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The legislation aggravates this problem by reducing the
compensation victims could recover. It first eliminates
punitive damages. Although rarely awarded, punitive damages
punish the wrongdoer for conscious, flagrant disregard for the
health and safety of others and deter other bad actors from
committing future bad acts. In the area of emergency medicine,
emergency response personnel could be subject to punitive
damages for intentionally failing to respond to an emergency,
assaulting or sexually abusing a victim, or other criminal
acts, including civil rights violations. It is very important
to hold wrongdoers who act with the intention to harm
accountable for the injuries that they cause. By both including
intentional torts in the scope of these litigation management
agreements and simultaneously eliminating the possibility of
punitive damages, section 5103 delivers a one-two punch that
makes it difficult, if not impossible, to deter criminal
misconduct and ensure public safety.
The bill further contains a collateral source provision
also designed to reduce compensation.\110\ Essentially, this
language would allow the wrongdoers to benefit from a victim's
prudent investment of insurance. Why should a victim's health
or life insurer pay for the victim's injuries before the
wrongdoer pays even a dime? And, is it fair for the victim's
employer to pay unemployment or disability benefits before the
wrongdoer is held accountable? Wrongdoers should not profit
from a victim's preparedness in planning for the unforeseen,
and the wrongdoer should not be the last to be held responsible
for a victim's injuries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\110\ Section 5103 states that ``any recovery by a plaintiff * * *
shall be reduced by the amount of collateral source compensation * * *
that a plaintiff has received or its entitled to receive as a result of
* * * [an] act[] of terrorism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Indeed, it is somewhat shocking that this bill would
require everyone other than the wrongdoer to pay for a victim's
injuries. Under this language, one could even have the
preposterous result of having the collateral sources--such as
the victim's health insurer and the victim's employer--paying
the entire amount of damages owed while the wrongdoer pays
nothing. Similarly, this provision would shift the burden from
the wrongdoer to the government if the victim receives
Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security disability or retirement
benefits, or any other type of government support. The Majority
rejected Minority efforts to protect the rights of victims to
be fully compensated for their injuries.\111\
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\111\ An amendment by Rep. Bobby Scott (D-VA) to strike the
punitive damage exception and the collateral source rule was defeated
by a vote of 12-19.
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The bill would appear to unconstitutionally extend tort
immunity to non-governmental entities, giving private emergency
response personnel, including private hospitals and their
employees, liability protections.\112\ Interpreting the
Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution, the Supreme Court has
consistently held that the immunity given to federal and state
governments cannot be easily transferred to private, non-
governmental actors. Extending such protection is subject to
the principle of the Court's ``state-action doctrine'' (as well
as the collateral doctrine of ``federal action'').\113\ Under
the state-action doctrine, private entities must be actively
supervised by the ``state'' in order for sovereign immunity to
attach; it is not enough for a private actor, such as a private
hospital or emergency room employee, to be certified or
licensed by the state. In this case, the bill fails to ensure
that only adequately supervised private entities receive
immunity. Even though the immunity protection provided in H.R.
10 to private actors are thus unconstitutional, the Majority
defeated an attempt to strike it.\114\
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\112\ Under section 5104, the definition of ``emergency response
provider'' permits private, non-governmental entities to be parties to
a litigation management agreement and thus receive the same liability
protections as state or local government actors.
\113\ California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum,
445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980) (quoting City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power &
Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410 (1978)) (the concept of sovereign immunity
under our constitutional system dictates that the immunity policy must
be `` `one that clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as
state policy'; second, the policy must be `actively supervised by the
State Itself.' ''). These cases illustrated the point in the context of
Sherman Act antitrust suits. The Court examined whether private actors
were acting as ``the state'' to a point sufficient to make their anti-
competitive conduct immune from the Sherman Act. Applying the above
test, the Court determined that because the State was not actively
involved in closely supervising the activities of the private actor,
that actor could not be immune from federal law.
\114\ An amendment by Rep. Scott to strike the broad grant of
immunity was defeated by a vote of 12-19. This amendment was combined
with an amendment to strike the limits on monetary recovery.
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Unfortunately, the Majority rejected every attempt to
correct the flaws in the litigation reform provisions of H.R.
10. Taken together, these provisions will have no effect in
reducing the Nation's susceptibility to terrorism; they do not
secure our ports or make it easier to detain terrorists. These
tort reform measures illustrate clearly the overreach of the
Majority's so-called ``9/11 Commission Recommendations
Implementation Act;'' the 9/11 Commission did not call for tort
reform and neither should we.

Conclusion

The attacks of September 11 were tragic events that brought
the Nation together. Members of Congress stood shoulder to
shoulder on the steps on the Capitol singing ``God Bless
America.'' Democrats in Congress united behind the President's
efforts in the war on terror. This Committee worked together to
craft a version of the USA PATRIOT Act that passed unanimously.
Unfortunately, where some saw an opportunity for national
unity, others saw the opportunity for partisan political gain.
Despite widespread public and congressional support for the
unanimous and bipartisan recommendations of the 9/11
Commission, the Republican leadership authored legislation that
would subject persons to torture, eliminate the judicial review
of executive branch actions, permit government intrusion into
our daily lives, and divert compensation away from terror
victims. Congress owes the American people better than this.
For these reasons, we dissent.

John Conyers, Jr.
Howard L. Berman.
Rick Boucher.
Jerrold Nadler.
Robert C. Scott.
Melvin L. Watt.
Zoe Lofgren.
Sheila Jackson Lee.
Maxine Waters.
William D. Delahunt.
Robert Wexler.
Tammy Baldwin.
Anthony D. Weiner.
Linda T. Sanchez.

ADDITIONAL DISSENTING VIEWS

We dissent from H.R. 10 because we also believe the
legislation demonstrably fails to provide the needed resources
to combat and respond to terrorism.
The 9/11 Commission could not have been any more clear
about how homeland security assistance should be allocated:
``Federal homeland security assistance should not remain a
program for general revenue sharing. It should supplement state
and local resources based on the risks or vulnerabilities that
merit additional support. Congress should not use this money as
a pork barrel.''
After September 11th, the Bush administration set up two
major programs to provide funding for local law enforcement
agencies working to provide homeland security. The first of
these programs, established for fiscal year 2003, is the State
Homeland Security Grant program. In direct contradiction of the
9/11 Commission's recommendation, 40% of these funds are
distributed to states as ``minimum guarantees.'' The remainder
is distributed not on the basis of threat, as recommended by
the Commission, but rather on the basis of population. And just
as the Commission complained, the result is that funding is not
targeted to places like New York, Washington, Los Angeles, and
other areas desperate for assistance.
Because the State Homeland Security Grant Program does not
distribute money on the basis of threat, Congress set up a
separate stream of homeland security funding for local law
enforcement targeted directly for urban areas. Originally
called the ``high threat, high density'' program, and later
entitled, the ``Urban Area Security Initiative,'' UASI provides
funding based on a formula kept largely secret by the
Department of Homeland Security. But because the Department of
Homeland Security has decided to open up the program to more
and more localities--initially only seven cities were eligible;
at last count 80 cities and transportation agencies were
receiving UASI funds--allocations for jurisdictions at the
greatest risk have been shortchanged again.
H.R. 3266, the bill written by the Select Committee on
Homeland Security, took important strides in implementing the
9/11 Commission's recommendations. It combined the two existing
programs, eliminated the minimum guarantee, and ensured that
funding would be distributed exclusively on the basis of
threat. Incorporated as a part of the Republican 9/11 bill,
H.R. 10, the Judiciary Committee veered away from the
Commission's recommendations, even as Democrats made
substantive improvements to the bill.
Committee Democrats made the following improvements:
Terrorism Cops eligible for funds. Under an amendment
crafted by Rep. Anthony Weiner, Rep. Jerrold Nadler, and Rep.
Nita Lowey, jurisdictions will be eligible to apply for federal
funds to cover the salaries of police officers whose work is
devoted exclusively to counterterrorism and intelligence.
Past expenditures eligible for funds. Under an amendment
authored by Rep. Anthony Weiner and Rep. Jerrold Nadler,
jurisdictions will be eligible to apply for federal funds to
recoup past homeland security expenditures not already covered
by the federal government.
Threat funding follows the threat. Under an amendment
offered previously by Rep. Weiner and Rep. Nadler and included
in the bill, the Department of Homeland Security will place the
greatest emphasis on threat when disbursing homeland security
funds. The current formula weighs population and infrastructure
more heavily than threat, helping places like Wyoming, but
hurting New York City.
Fake police badges loophole closed. An amendment offered by
Rep. Weiner closed a loophole in the law that bans the use and
sale of fake police badges. Previous law allowed exceptions for
people who used badges for ``decorative'' or ``recreational''
purposes. Rep. Weiner's amendment will strip those loopholes
from the law.
Additionally, Democrats were able to include language that
authorizes the C.O.P.S. program. Like legislation included in
this year's Department of Justice Reauthorization Bill, an
amendment by Rep. Weiner reauthorizes the C.O.P.S. program
through 2007, including language that would allow COPS funding
to be used to pay for officers involved in religious, anti
terror, or homeland security duties.
Unfortunately, committee Republicans insisted on deviating
from the 9/11 Commission's recommendation. Despite Chairman
Cox's best efforts to reign in his colleagues, Republicans have
boosted the minimum guarantee states receive to .25 for all
states, and .45 for all states with an international border.
Committee Republicans defeated an amendment by Rep. Nadler to
return to the Commission's recommendation by striking the
minimum. And then, in an effort simply to guarantee that high
risk areas getting the funding they need, Rep. Weiner offered
an amendment to add a minimum guarantee of 8.5%--as much as
$289 million under the authorization included in the original
Cox bill--for jurisdictions like New York that ``are
consistently referenced in intelligence information as a
terrorism target, or have previously been the site of more than
one terrorism attack.'' That too was defeated by the committee
Republicans.

John Conyers, Jr.
Howard L. Berman.
Rick Boucher.
Jerrold Nadler.
Robert C. Scott.
Zoe Lofgren.
Sheila Jackson Lee.
William D. Delahunt.
Robert Wexler.
Anthony D. Weiner.
Linda T. Sanchez.