[House Report 108-558]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
108th Congress Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
2d Session 108-558
======================================================================
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005
_______
June 21, 2004.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Goss, from the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
submitted the following
R E P O R T
together with
MINORITY VIEWS
[To accompany H.R. 4548]
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, to whom was
referred the bill (H.R. 4548) to authorize appropriations for
fiscal year 2005 for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the United States Government, the Community
Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes,
having considered the same, report favorably thereon with an
amendment and recommend that the bill as amended do pass.
CONTENTS
Page
Purpose.......................................................... 14
Overall Perspective on the Intelligence Budget and Committee
Intent......................................................... 15
Scope of Committee Review........................................ 16
Committee Findings and Recommendations........................... 16
Section-by-Section Analysis of the Bill as Reported.............. 40
Title I--Intelligence Activities............................. 40
Section 101--Authorization of Appropriations............. 40
Section 102--Classified Schedule of Authorizations....... 40
Section 103--Personnel Ceiling Adjustments............... 40
Section 104--Community Management Account................ 41
Title II--Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and
Disability System.......................................... 41
Section 201--Authorization of Appropriations............. 41
Title III--General Provisions................................ 41
Section 301--Increase in Employee Compensation and
Benefits Authorized by Law............................. 41
Section 302--Restriction on Conduct of Intelligence
Activities............................................. 41
Section 303--Assistant Director of Central Intelligence
For Information Management............................. 41
Title IV--Central Intelligence Agency........................ 42
Section 401--Permanent Extension of Central Intelligence
Agency Voluntary Separation Incentive Program.......... 42
Title V--Department of Defense Intelligence Activities....... 42
Section 501--National Security Agency Emerging
Technologies Panel..................................... 42
Title VI--Education.......................................... 42
Subtitle A--National Security Education Program.............. 42
Section 601--Provision for Annual Funding................ 42
Section 602--Modification of Obligated Service
Requirements Under the National Security Education
Program................................................ 43
Section 603--Improvements to the National Flagship
Language Initiative.................................... 43
Section 604--Establishment of Scholarship Program for
English Language Studies for Heritage Community
Citizens of the United States Within the National
Security Education Program............................. 43
Subtitle B--Improvement in Intelligence Community Foreign
Language Skills............................................ 43
Section 611--Assistant Director of Central Intelligence
for Language and Education............................. 43
Section 612--Requirement for Foreign Language Proficiency
for Advancement to Certain Senior Level Positions in
the Intelligence Community............................. 44
Section 613--Advancement of Foreign Languages Critical to
the Intelligence Community............................. 44
Section 614--Pilot Project for Civilian Linguist Reserve
Corps.................................................. 44
Section 615--Codification of Establishment of the
National Virtual Translation Center.................... 44
Section 616--Report on Recruitment and Retention of
Qualified Instructors of the Defense Language Institute 45
Committee Position............................................... 45
Correspondence With Other Committees Regarding Particular
Provisions..................................................... 48
Letter From Chairman Hunter to Chairman Goss................. 48
Letter From Chairman Goss to Chairman Hunter................. 49
Letter From Chairman Boehner to Chairman Goss................ 49
Letter From Chairman Goss to Chairman Boehner................ 50
Oversight Findings and Recommendations........................... 50
Fiscal Year Cost Projections..................................... 51
Congressional Budget Office Estimates............................ 51
Committee Cost Estimates......................................... 54
Specific Constitutional Authority for Congressional Enactment of
This Legislation............................................... 54
Changes to Existing Law.......................................... 54
Minority Views................................................... 69
The amendment is as follows:
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the
following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as
follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified schedule of authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Intelligence Community Management Account.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by
law.
Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 303. Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Information
Management.
TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Sec. 401. Permanent extension of Central Intelligence Agency voluntary
separation incentive program.
TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Sec. 501. National Security Agency Emerging Technologies Panel.
TITLE VI--EDUCATION
Subtitle A--National Security Education Program
Sec. 601. Provision for annual funding.
Sec. 602. Modification of obligated service requirements under the
National Security Education Program.
Sec. 603. Improvements to the National Flagship Language Initiative.
Sec. 604. Establishment of scholarship program for English language
studies for heritage community citizens of the United States within the
National Security Education Program.
Subtitle B--Improvement in Intelligence Community Foreign Language
Skills
Sec. 611. Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Language and
Education.
Sec. 612. Requirement for foreign language proficiency for advancement
to certain senior level positions in the intelligence community.
Sec. 613. Advancement of foreign languages critical to the intelligence
community.
Sec. 614. Pilot project for Civilian Linguist Reserve Corps.
Sec. 615. Codification of establishment of the National Virtual
Translation Center.
Sec. 616. Report on recruitment and retention of qualified instructors
of the Defense Language Institute.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2005
for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities
of the following elements of the United States Government:
(1) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(2) The Department of Defense.
(3) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(4) The National Security Agency.
(5) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy,
and the Department of the Air Force.
(6) The Department of State.
(7) The Department of the Treasury.
(8) The Department of Energy.
(9) The Department of Justice.
(10) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(11) The National Reconnaissance Office.
(12) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
(13) The Coast Guard.
(14) The Department of Homeland Security.
SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.
(a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The amounts
authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and the authorized
personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2005, for the conduct of the
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the elements listed
in such section, are those specified in the classified Schedule of
Authorizations prepared to accompany the bill H.R. 4548 of the One
Hundred Eighth Congress.
(b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.--The
Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the Committees on
Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and to the
President. The President shall provide for suitable distribution of the
Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the
executive branch.
SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.
(a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the Director of
the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of Central
Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess
of the number authorized for fiscal year 2005 under section 102 when
the Director of Central Intelligence determines that such action is
necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions.
(b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of Central
Intelligence shall notify promptly the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee
on Intelligence of the Senate whenever the Director exercises the
authority granted by this section.
SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the
Director of Central Intelligence for fiscal year 2005 the sum of
$318,395,000. Within such amount, funds identified in the classified
Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for advanced
research and development shall remain available until September 30,
2006.
(b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the
Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of Central
Intelligence are authorized 310 full-time personnel as of September 30,
2005. Personnel serving in such elements may be permanent employees of
the Intelligence Community Management Account or personnel detailed
from other elements of the United States Government.
(c) Classified Authorizations.--
(1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to amounts
authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community
Management Account by subsection (a), there are also authorized
to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management
Account for fiscal year 2005 such additional amounts as are
specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred
to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts for research and
development shall remain available until September 30, 2006.
(2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the personnel
authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Intelligence
Community Management Account as of September 30, 2005, there
are also authorized such additional personnel for such elements
as of that date as are specified in the classified Schedule of
Authorizations.
(d) Reimbursement.--Except as provided in section 113 of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h), during fiscal year 2005 any
officer or employee of the United States or a member of the Armed
Forces who is detailed to the staff of the Intelligence Community
Management Account from another element of the United States Government
shall be detailed on a reimbursable basis, except that any such
officer, employee, or member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis
for a period of less than one year for the performance of temporary
functions as required by the Director of Central Intelligence.
(e) National Drug Intelligence Center.--
(1) In general.--Of the amount authorized to be appropriated
in subsection (a), $29,811,000 shall be available for the
National Drug Intelligence Center. Within such amount, funds
provided for research, development, testing, and evaluation
purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2006, and
funds provided for procurement purposes shall remain available
until September 30, 2007.
(2) Transfer of funds.--The Director of Central Intelligence
shall transfer to the Attorney General funds available for the
National Drug Intelligence Center under paragraph (1). The
Attorney General shall utilize funds so transferred for the
activities of the National Drug Intelligence Center.
(3) Limitation.--Amounts available for the National Drug
Intelligence Center may not be used in contravention of the
provisions of section 103(d)(1) of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(d)(1)).
(4) Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
the Attorney General shall retain full authority over the
operations of the National Drug Intelligence Center.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 2005 the sum of
$239,400,000.
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY
LAW.
Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement,
and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in
such compensation or benefits authorized by law.
SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed
to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity
which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of
the United States.
SEC. 303. ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE FOR INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT.
(a) Establishment of Position Within the Office of the Director of
Central Intelligence.--Subsection (e)(2) of section 102 of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403) is amended--
(1) by striking subparagraph (G); and
(2) by inserting after subparagraph (F) the following new
subparagraph (G):
``(G) The Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for
Information Management.''.
(b) Duties.--Section 102 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 403) is amended--
(1) by striking subsection (h); and
(2) by inserting after subsection (g) the following new
subsection (h):
``(h) Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Information
Management.--(1) To assist the Director of Central Intelligence in
carrying out the Director's responsibilities under this Act, there
shall be an Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Information
Management who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate. The Assistant Director of Central
Intelligence for Information Management is the chief information
officer of the intelligence community.
``(2) Subject to the direction of the Director of Central
Intelligence, the Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for
Information Management shall--
``(A) manage activities relating to the information
technology infrastructure and enterprise architecture
requirements of the intelligence community;
``(B) have procurement approval authority over all
information technology items related to the enterprise
architectures of all intelligence community components;
``(C) direct and manage all information technology-related
procurement for the intelligence community; and
``(D) ensure that all expenditures for information technology
and research and development activities are consistent with the
intelligence community enterprise architecture and the strategy
of the Director of Central Intelligence for such architecture.
``(3) An individual serving in the position of Assistant Director of
Central Intelligence for Information Management may not, while so
serving, serve as the chief information officer of any other agency or
department, or component thereof, of the United States.''.
(c) References.--Any reference to the Assistant Director of Central
Intelligence for Administration in any law, regulation, document,
paper, or other record of the United States shall be deemed to be a
reference to the Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for
Information Management.
TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SEC. 401. PERMANENT EXTENSION OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY VOLUNTARY
SEPARATION INCENTIVE PROGRAM.
(a) Extension of Program.--Section 2 of the Central Intelligence
Agency Voluntary Separation Pay Act (50 U.S.C. 403-4 note) is amended--
(1) by striking subsection (f); and
(2) by redesignating subsections (g) and (h) as subsections
(f) and (g), respectively.
(b) Termination of Funds Remittance Requirement.--(1) Section 2 of
such Act (50 U.S.C. 403-4 note) is further amended by striking
subsection (i).
(2) Section 4(a)(2)(B)(ii) of the Federal Workforce Restructuring Act
of 1994 (5 U.S.C. 8331 note) is amended by striking ``, or section 2 of
the Central Intelligence Agency Voluntary Separation Pay Act (Public
Law 103-36; 107 Stat. 104)''.
TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 501. NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES PANEL.
The National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is
amended by adding at the end the following new section:
``Sec. 19. (a) There is established the National Security Agency
Emerging Technologies Panel. The panel is a standing panel of the
National Security Agency. The panel shall be appointed by, and shall
report directly to, the Director.
``(b) The National Security Agency Emerging Technologies Panel shall
study and assess, and periodically advise the Director on, the
research, development, and application of existing and emerging science
and technology advances, advances on encryption, and other topics.
``(c) The Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) shall not
apply with respect to the National Security Agency Emerging
Technologies Panel.''.
TITLE VI--EDUCATION
Subtitle A--National Security Education Program
SEC. 601. PROVISION FOR ANNUAL FUNDING.
(a) In General.--Title VIII of the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1992 (Public Law 102-183; 105 Stat. 1271), as amended by
section 311(c) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1994 (Public Law 103-178; 107 Stat. 2037), is amended by adding at the
end of section 810 the following new subsection:
``(c) Funding From Intelligence Community Management Account for
Fiscal Years Beginning With Fiscal Year 2005.--In addition to amounts
that may be made available to the Secretary under the Fund for a fiscal
year, the Director of Central Intelligence shall transfer to the
Secretary from amounts appropriated for the Intelligence Community
Management Account for each fiscal year, beginning with fiscal year
2005, $8,000,000, to carry out the scholarship, fellowship, and grant
programs under subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C), respectively, of
section 802(a)(1).''.
(b) Conforming Amendment.--Section 802(a)(2) of such Act (50 U.S.C.
1902(a)(2)) is amended in the matter preceding subparagraph (A) by
inserting ``or from a transfer under section 810(c)'' after ``National
Security Education Trust Fund''.
SEC. 602. MODIFICATION OF OBLIGATED SERVICE REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE
NATIONAL SECURITY EDUCATION PROGRAM.
(a) In General.--Subsection (b)(2) of section 802 of title VIII of
the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1992 (Public Law
102-183; 105 Stat. 1273), as amended by section 925(a) of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-136; 117
Stat. 1578), is amended by striking subparagraphs (A) and (B), and
inserting the following:
``(A) in the case of a recipient of a scholarship, as
soon as practicable but in no case later than three
years after the completion by the recipient of the
study for which scholarship assistance was provided
under the program, the recipient shall work for a
period of one year--
``(i) in a national security position that
the Secretary certifies is appropriate to use
the unique language and region expertise
acquired by the recipient pursuant to such
study in the Department of Defense, in any
element of the intelligence community, in the
Department of Homeland Security, or in the
Department of State; or
``(ii) in such a position in any other
Federal department or agency not referred to in
clause (i) if the recipient demonstrates to the
Secretary that no position is available in a
Federal department or agency specified in
clause (i); or
``(B) in the case of a recipient of a fellowship, as
soon as practicable but in no case later than two years
after the completion by the recipient of the study for
which fellowship assistance was provided under the
program, the recipient shall work for a period equal to
the duration of assistance provided under the program,
but in no case less than one year--
``(i) in a position described in subparagraph
(A)(i) that the Secretary certifies is
appropriate to use the unique language and
region expertise acquired by the recipient
pursuant to such study; or
``(ii) in such a position in any other
Federal department or agency not referred to in
clause (i) if the recipient demonstrates to the
Secretary that no position is available in a
Federal department or agency specified in
clause (i); and''.
(b) Regulations.--The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe
regulations to carry out the amendment made by subsection (a). In
prescribing such regulations, the Secretary shall establish standards
that recipients of scholarship and fellowship assistance under the
program under such section 802 are required to demonstrate to satisfy
the requirement of a good faith effort to gain employment as required
under subparagraphs (A) and (B) of subsection (b)(2) of such section.
(c) Applicability.--(1) The amendment made by subsection (a) shall
apply with respect to service agreements entered into under the David
L. Boren National Security Education Act of 1991 on or after the date
of the enactment of this Act.
(2) The amendment made by subsection (a) shall not affect the force,
validity, or terms of any service agreement entered into under the
David L. Boren National Security Education Act of 1991 before the date
of the enactment of this Act that is in force as of that date.
SEC. 603. IMPROVEMENTS TO THE NATIONAL FLAGSHIP LANGUAGE INITIATIVE.
(a) Increase in Annual Funding.--Title VIII of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1992 (Public Law 102-183; 105 Stat.
1271), as amended by section 311(c) of the Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103-178; 107 Stat. 2037) and by
section 333(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2003 (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2397), is amended by striking
section 811 and inserting the following new section 811:
``SEC. 811. FUNDING FOR THE NATIONAL FLAGSHIP LANGUAGE INITIATIVE.
``(a) Authorization of Appropriations for Fiscal Years 2003 and
2004.--In addition to amounts that may be made available to the
Secretary under the Fund for a fiscal year, there is authorized to be
appropriated to the Secretary for each fiscal year, beginning with
fiscal year 2003, $10,000,000, to carry out the grant program for the
National Flagship Language Initiative under section 802(a)(1)(D).
``(b) Funding From Intelligence Community Management Account for
Fiscal Years Beginning With Fiscal Year 2005.--In addition to amounts
that may be made available to the Secretary under the Fund for a fiscal
year, the Director of Central Intelligence shall transfer to the
Secretary from amounts appropriated for the Intelligence Community
Management Account for each fiscal year, beginning with fiscal year
2005, $12,000,000, to carry out the grant program for the National
Flagship Language Initiative under section 802(a)(1)(D).
``(c) Availability of Appropriated Funds.--Amounts made available
under this section shall remain available until expended.''.
(b) Requirement for Employment Agreements.--(1) Section 802(i) of the
David L. Boren National Security Education Act of 1991 (50 U.S.C.
1902(i)) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(5)(A) In the case of an undergraduate or graduate student that
participates in training in programs under paragraph (1), the student
shall enter into an agreement described in subsection (b), other than
such a student who has entered into such an agreement pursuant to
subparagraph (A)(ii) or (B)(ii) of section 802(a)(1).
``(B) In the case of an employee of an agency or department of the
Federal Government that participates in training in programs under
paragraph (1), the employee shall agree in writing--
``(i) to continue in the service of the agency or department
of the Federal Government employing the employee for the period
of such training;
``(ii) to continue in the service of such agency or
department employing the employee following completion of such
training for a period of two years for each year, or part of
the year, of such training;
``(iii) to reimburse the United States for the total cost of
such training (excluding the employee's pay and allowances)
provided to the employee if, before the completion by the
employee of the training, the employment of the employee by the
agency or department is terminated due to misconduct by the
employee or by the employee voluntarily; and
``(iv) to reimburse the United States if, after completing
such training, the employment of the employee by the agency or
department is terminated either by the agency or department due
to misconduct by the employee or by the employee voluntarily,
before the completion by the employee of the period of service
required in clause (ii), in an amount that bears the same ratio
to the total cost of the training (excluding the employee's pay
and allowances) provided to the employee as the unserved
portion of such period of service bears to the total period of
service under clause (ii).
``(C) Subject to subparagraph (D), the obligation to reimburse the
United States under an agreement under subparagraph (A) is for all
purposes a debt owing the United States.
``(D) The head of an element of the intelligence community may
release an employee, in whole or in part, from the obligation to
reimburse the United States under an agreement under subparagraph (A)
when, in the discretion of the head of the element, the head of the
element determines that equity or the interests of the United States so
require.''.
(2) The amendment made by paragraph (1) shall apply to training that
begins on or after the date that is 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act.
(c) Increase in the Number of Participating Educational
Institutions.--The Secretary of Defense shall take such steps as the
Secretary determines will increase the number of qualified educational
institutions that receive grants under the National Flagship Language
Initiative to establish, operate, or improve activities designed to
train students in programs in a range of disciplines to achieve
advanced levels of proficiency in those foreign languages that the
Secretary identifies as being the most critical in the interests of the
national security of the United States.
(d) Clarification of Authority to Support Studies Abroad.--
Educational institutions that receive grants under the National
Flagship Language Initiative may support students who pursue total
immersion foreign language studies overseas of foreign languages that
are critical to the national security of the United States.
SEC. 604. ESTABLISHMENT OF SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM FOR ENGLISH LANGUAGE
STUDIES FOR HERITAGE COMMUNITY CITIZENS OF THE
UNITED STATES WITHIN THE NATIONAL SECURITY
EDUCATION PROGRAM.
(a) Scholarship Program for English Language Studies for Heritage
Community Citizens of the United States.--(1) Subsection (a)(1) of
section 802 of the David L. Boren National Security Education Act of
1991 (50 U.S.C. 1902) is amended--
(A) by striking ``and'' at the end of subparagraph (C);
(B) by striking the period at the end of subparagraph (D) and
inserting ``; and''; and
(C) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
``(E) awarding scholarships to students who--
``(i) are United States citizens who--
``(I) are native speakers (commonly
referred to as heritage community
residents) of a foreign language that
is identified as critical to the
national security interests of the
United States who should be actively
recruited for employment by Federal
security agencies with a need for
linguists; and
``(II) are not proficient at a
professional level in the English
language with respect to reading,
writing, and interpersonal skills
required to carry out the national
security interests of the United
States, as determined by the Secretary,
to enable such students to pursue English
language studies at an institution of higher
education of the United States to attain
proficiency in those skills; and
``(ii) enter into an agreement to work in a
national security position or work in the field
of education in the area of study for which the
scholarship was awarded in a similar manner (as
determined by the Secretary) as agreements
entered into pursuant to subsection
(b)(2)(A).''.
(2) The matter following subsection (a)(2) of such section is
amended--
(A) in the first sentence, by inserting ``or for the
scholarship program under paragraph (1)(E)'' after ``under
paragraph (1)(D) for the National Flagship Language Initiative
described in subsection (i)''; and
(B) by adding at the end the following: ``For the
authorization of appropriations for the scholarship program
under paragraph (1)(E), see section 812.''.
(3) Section 803(d)(4)(E) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1903(d)(4)(E)) is
amended by inserting before the period the following: ``and section
802(a)(1)(E) (relating to scholarship programs for advanced English
language studies by heritage community residents)''.
(b) Funding.--The David L. Boren National Security Education Act of
1991 (50 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the
following new section:
``SEC. 812. FUNDING FOR SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM FOR CERTAIN HERITAGE
COMMUNITY RESIDENTS.
``(a) Funding From Intelligence Community Management Account.--In
addition to amounts that may be made available to the Secretary under
the Fund for a fiscal year, the Director of Central Intelligence shall
transfer to the Secretary from amounts appropriated for the
Intelligence Community Management Account for each fiscal year,
beginning with fiscal year 2005, $4,000,000, to carry out the
scholarship programs for English language studies by certain heritage
community residents under section 802(a)(1)(E).
``(b) Availability of Funds.--Amounts made available under subsection
(a) shall remain available until expended.''.
Subtitle B--Improvement in Intelligence Community Foreign Language
Skills
SEC. 611. ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE FOR LANGUAGE AND
EDUCATION.
(a) In General.--Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 403) is amended--
(1) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(i) Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Language and
Education.--(1) To assist the Director of Central Intelligence in
carrying out the Director's responsibilities under this Act, there
shall be an Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Language and
Education who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate.
``(2) The Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Language and
Education shall carry out the following duties:
``(A) Overseeing and coordinating requirements for foreign
language education and training of the intelligence community.
``(B) Establishing policy, standards, and priorities relating
to such requirements.
``(C) Identifying languages that are critical to the
capability of the intelligence community to carry out national
security activities of the United States.
``(D) Monitoring the allocation of resources for foreign
language education and training in order to ensure the
requirements of the intelligence community with respect to
foreign language proficiency are met.'';
(2) in subsection (d)(2) by adding at the end the following:
``(E) Through the Assistant Director of Central Intelligence
for Language and Education, ensuring the foreign language
education and training requirements of the intelligence
community are met.''; and
(3) in subsection (e)(2)--
(A) by redesignating subparagraph (H) as subparagraph
(I); and
(B) by inserting after subparagraph (G) the following
new subparagraph (H):
``(H) The Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for
Education and Language.''.
(b) Reports.--Not later than 1 year after the date on which the
Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Language and Education
is first appointed under section 102(i) of the National Security Act of
1947, as added by subsection (a), the Assistant Director shall submit
to Congress the following reports:
(1) A report that identifies--
(A) skills and processes involved in learning a
foreign language; and
(B) characteristics and teaching techniques that are
most effective in teaching foreign languages.
(2)(A) A report that identifies foreign language heritage
communities, particularly such communities that include
speakers of languages that are critical to the national
security of the United States.
(B) For purposes of subparagraph (A), the term ``foreign
language heritage community'' means a community of residents or
citizens of the United States--
(i) who are native speakers of, or who have fluency
in, a foreign language; and
(ii) who should be actively recruited for employment
by Federal security agencies with a need for linguists.
(3) A report on--
(A) the estimated cost of establishing a program
under which the heads of elements of the intelligence
community agree to repay employees of the intelligence
community for any student loan taken out by that
employee for the study of foreign languages critical
for the national security of the United States; and
(B) the effectiveness of such a program in recruiting
and retaining highly qualified personnel in the
intelligence community.
SEC. 612. REQUIREMENT FOR FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY FOR ADVANCEMENT
TO CERTAIN SENIOR LEVEL POSITIONS IN THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) In General.--Section 104 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 403-4) is amended by adding at the end the following new
subsection:
``(i) Requirement for Foreign Language Proficiency for Certain Senior
Level Positions in the Central Intelligence Agency.--(1) An individual
may not be appointed to a position in the Senior Intelligence Service
in the Directorate of Intelligence or the Directorate of Operations of
the Central Intelligence Agency unless the Director of Central
Intelligence determines that the individual--
``(A) has been certified as having a professional speaking
and reading proficiency in a foreign language, such proficiency
being at least level 3 on the Interagency Language Roundtable
Language Skills Level or commensurate proficiency level on such
other indicator of proficiency as the Director determines to be
appropriate; and
``(B) is able to effectively communicate the priorities of
the United States and exercise influence in that foreign
language.
``(2) The Director shall carry out this subsection through the
Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Language and
Education.''.
(b) Conforming Amendment.--Subsection (i) of section 102 of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403), as added by section
611(a), is amended in paragraph (2) by adding at the end the following
new subparagraph:
``(E) Making determinations under section 104(i).''.
(c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall apply
with respect to appointments made on or after the date that is one year
after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(d) Report on Exceptions.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall
submit to Congress a report that identifies positions within the Senior
Intelligence Service in the Directorate of Intelligence or the
Directorate of Operations of the Central Intelligence Agency that
should be exempt from the requirements of section 104(i) of the
National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a), and that
includes the rationale for the exemption of each such position
identified by the Director.
SEC. 613. ADVANCEMENT OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES CRITICAL TO THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY.
(a) In General.--Title X of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. is amended--
(1) by inserting before section 1001 (50 U.S.C. 441g) the
following:
``Subtitle A--Science and Technology''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new subtitles:
``Subtitle B--Foreign Languages Program
``program on advancement of foreign languages critical to the
intelligence community
``Sec. 1011. (a) Establishment of Program.--The Secretary of Defense
and the Director of Central Intelligence may jointly establish a
program to advance foreign languages skills in languages that are
critical to the capability of the intelligence community to carry out
national security activities of the United States (hereinafter in this
subtitle referred to as the `Foreign Languages Program').
``(b) Identification of Requisite Actions.--In order to carry out the
Foreign Languages Program, the Secretary of Defense and the Director of
Central Intelligence shall jointly determine actions required to
improve the education of personnel in the intelligence community in
foreign languages that are critical to the capability of the
intelligence community to carry out national security activities of the
United States to meet the long-term intelligence needs of the United
States.
``education partnerships
``Sec. 1012. (a) In General.--In carrying out the Foreign Languages
Program, the head of an element of an intelligence community entity may
enter into one or more education partnership agreements with
educational institutions in the United States in order to encourage and
enhance the study of foreign languages that are critical to the
capability of the intelligence community to carry out national security
activities of the United States in educational institutions.
``(b) Assistance Provided Under Educational Partnership Agreements.--
Under an educational partnership agreement entered into with an
educational institution pursuant to this section, the head of an
element of an intelligence community entity may provide the following
assistance to the educational institution:
``(1) The loan of equipment and instructional materials of
the element of the intelligence community entity to the
educational institution for any purpose and duration that the
head determines to be appropriate.
``(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law relating to
transfers of surplus property, the transfer to the educational
institution of any computer equipment, or other equipment, that
is--
``(A) commonly used by educational institutions;
``(B) surplus to the needs of the entity; and
``(C) determined by the head of the element to be
appropriate for support of such agreement.
``(3) The provision of dedicated personnel to the educational
institution--
``(A) to teach courses in foreign languages that are
critical to the capability of the intelligence
community to carry out national security activities of
the United States; or
``(B) to assist in the development of such courses
and materials for the institution.
``(4) The involvement of faculty and students of the
educational institution in research projects of the element of
the intelligence community entity.
``(5) Cooperation with the educational institution in
developing a program under which students receive academic
credit at the educational institution for work on research
projects of the element of the intelligence community entity.
``(6) The provision of academic and career advice and
assistance to students of the educational institution.
``(7) The provision of cash awards and other items that the
head of the element of the intelligence community entity
determines to be appropriate.
``voluntary services
``Sec. 1013. (a) Authority To Accept Services.--Notwithstanding
section 1342 of title 31, United States Code, and subject to subsection
(b), the Foreign Languages Program under section 1011 shall include
authority for the head of an element of an intelligence community
entity to accept from any individual who is dedicated personnel (as
defined in section 1016(3)) voluntary services in support of the
activities authorized by this subtitle.
``(b) Requirements and Limitations.--(1) In accepting voluntary
services from an individual under subsection (a), the head of the
element shall--
``(A) supervise the individual to the same extent as the head
of the element would supervise a compensated employee of that
element providing similar services; and
``(B) ensure that the individual is licensed, privileged, has
appropriate educational or experiential credentials, or is
otherwise qualified under applicable law or regulations to
provide such services.
``(2) In accepting voluntary services from an individual under
subsection (a), the head of an element of the intelligence community
entity may not--
``(A) place the individual in a policymaking position, or
other position performing inherently government functions; or
``(B) except as provided in subsection (e), compensate the
individual for the provision of such services.
``(c) Authority To Recruit and Train Individuals Providing
Services.--The head of an element of an intelligence community entity
may recruit and train individuals to provide voluntary services
accepted under subsection (a).
``(d) Status of Individuals Providing Services.--(1) Subject to
paragraph (2), while providing voluntary services accepted under
subsection (a) or receiving training under subsection (c), an
individual shall be considered to be an employee of the Federal
Government only for purposes of the following provisions of law:
``(A) Subchapter I of chapter 81 of title 5, United States
Code (relating to compensation for work-related injuries).
``(B) Section 552a of title 5, United States Code (relating
to maintenance of records on individuals).
``(C) Chapter 11 of title 18, United States Code (relating to
conflicts of interest).
``(2)(A) With respect to voluntary services accepted under paragraph
(1) provided by an individual that are within the scope of the services
so accepted, the individual is deemed to be a volunteer of a
governmental entity or nonprofit institution for purposes of the
Volunteer Protection Act of 1997 (42 U.S.C. 14501 et seq.).
``(B) In the case of any claim against such an individual with
respect to the provision of such services, section 4(d) of such Act (42
U.S.C. 14503(d)) shall not apply.
``(3) Acceptance of voluntary services under this section shall have
no bearing on the issuance or renewal of a security clearance.
``(e) Compensation for Work-Related Injuries.--For purposes of
determining the compensation for work-related injuries payable under
chapter 81 of title 5, United States Code, to an individual providing
voluntary services accepted under subsection (a), the monthly pay of
the individual for such services is deemed to be equal to the amount
determined by multiplying--
``(1) the average monthly number of hours that the individual
provided the services, by
``(2) the minimum wage determined in accordance with section
6(a)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C.
206(a)(1)).
``(f) Reimbursement of Incidental Expenses.--(1) The head of an
element of the intelligence community entity may reimburse an
individual for incidental expenses incurred by the individual in
providing voluntary services accepted under subsection (a). The head of
an element of the intelligence community entity shall determine which
expenses are eligible for reimbursement under this subsection.
``(2) Reimbursement under paragraph (1) may be made from appropriated
or nonappropriated funds.
``(g) Authority To Install Equipment.--(1) The head of an element of
the intelligence community may install telephone lines and any
necessary telecommunication equipment in the private residences of
individuals who provide voluntary services accepted under subsection
(a).
``(2) The head of an element of the intelligence community may pay
the charges incurred for the use of equipment installed under paragraph
(1) for authorized purposes.
``(3) Notwithstanding section 1348 of title 31, United States Code,
the head of an element of the intelligence community entity may use
appropriated funds or nonappropriated funds of the element in carrying
out this subsection.
``regulations
``Sec. 1014. (a) In General.--The Secretary of Defense and the
Director of Central Intelligence jointly shall promulgate regulations
necessary to carry out the Foreign Languages Program authorized under
this subtitle.
``(b) Elements of the Intelligence Community.--Each head of an
element of an intelligence community entity shall prescribe regulations
to carry out sections 1012 and 1013 with respect to that element
including the following:
``(1) Procedures to be utilized for the acceptance of
voluntary services under section 1013.
``(2) Procedures and requirements relating to the
installation of equipment under section 1013(g).
``definitions
``Sec. 1015. In this subtitle:
``(1) The term `intelligence community entity' means an
agency, office, bureau, or element referred to in subparagraphs
(B) through (K) of section 3(4).
``(2) The term `educational institution' means--
``(A) a local educational agency (as that term is
defined in section 9101(26) of the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 7801(26))),
``(B) an institution of higher education (as defined
in section 102 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20
U.S.C. 1002) other than institutions referred to in
subsection (a)(1)(C) of such section), or
``(C) any other nonprofit institution that provides
instruction of foreign languages in languages that are
critical to the capability of the intelligence
community to carry out national security activities of
the United States.
``(3) The term `dedicated personnel' means employees of the
intelligence community and private citizens (including former
civilian employees of the Federal Government who have been
voluntarily separated, and members of the United States Armed
Forces who have been honorably discharged or generally
discharged under honorable circumstances, and rehired on a
voluntary basis specifically to perform the activities
authorized under this subtitle).
``Subtitle C--Additional Education Provisions
``assignment of intelligence community personnel as language students
``Sec. 1021. (a) In General.--The Director of Central Intelligence,
acting through the heads of the elements of the intelligence community,
may assign employees of such elements in analyst positions requiring
foreign language expertise as students at accredited professional,
technical, or other institutions of higher education for training at
the graduate or undergraduate level in foreign languages required for
the conduct of duties and responsibilities of such positions.
``(b) Authority for Reimbursement of Costs of Tuition and Training.--
(1) The Director may reimburse an employee assigned under subsection
(a) for the total cost of the training described in subsection (a),
including costs of educational and supplementary reading materials.
``(2) The authority under paragraph (1) shall apply to employees who
are assigned on a full-time or part-time basis.
``(3) Reimbursement under paragraph (1) may be made from appropriated
or nonappropriated funds.
``(c) Relationship to Compensation As an Analyst.--Reimbursement
under this section to an employee who is an analyst is in addition to
any benefits, allowances, travels, or other compensation the employee
is entitled to by reason of serving in such an analyst position.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents for the National
Security Act of 1947 is amended by striking the item relating to
section 1001 and inserting the following new items:
``Subtitle A--Science and Technology
``Sec. 1001. Scholarships and work-study for pursuit of graduate
degrees in science and technology.
``Subtitle B--Foreign Languages Program
``Sec. 1011. Program on advancement of foreign languages critical to
the intelligence community.
``Sec. 1012. Education partnerships.
``Sec. 1013. Voluntary services.
``Sec. 1014. Regulations.
``Sec. 1015. Definitions.
``Subtitle C--Additional Education Provisions
``Sec. 1021. Assignment of intelligence community personnel as language
students.''.
SEC. 614. PILOT PROJECT FOR CIVILIAN LINGUIST RESERVE CORPS.
(a) Pilot Project.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall
conduct a pilot project to establish a Civilian Linguist Reserve Corps
comprised of United States citizens with advanced levels of proficiency
in foreign languages who would be available upon a call of the
President to perform such service or duties with respect to such
foreign languages in the Federal Government as the President may
specify.
(b) Conduct of Project.--Taking into account the findings and
recommendations contained in the report required under section 325 of
the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law
107-306; 116 Stat. 2393), in conducting the pilot project under
subsection (a) the Director of Central Intelligence shall--
(1) identify several foreign languages that are critical for
the national security of the United States;
(2) identify United States citizens with advanced levels of
proficiency in those foreign languages who would be available
to perform the services and duties referred to in subsection
(a); and
(3) implement a call for the performance of such services and
duties.
(c) Duration of Project.--The pilot project under subsection (a)
shall be conducted for a three-year period.
(d) Authority To Enter Into Contracts.--The Director of Central
Intelligence may enter into contracts with appropriate agencies or
entities to carry out the pilot project under subsection (a).
(e) Reports.--(1) The Director of Central Intelligence shall submit
to Congress an initial and a final report on the pilot project
conducted under subsection (a).
(2) Each report required under paragraph (1) shall contain
information on the operation of the pilot project, the success of the
pilot project in carrying out the objectives of the establishment of a
Civilian Linguist Reserve Corps, and recommendations for the
continuation or expansion of the pilot project.
(3) The final report shall be submitted not later than 6 months after
the completion of the project.
(f) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be
appropriated to the Director of Central Intelligence for each of fiscal
years 2005, 2006, and 2007 in order to carry out the pilot project
under subsection (a) such sums as are specified in the classified
Schedule of Authorizations referred to section 102.
SEC. 615. CODIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NATIONAL VIRTUAL
TRANSLATION CENTER.
(a) In General.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new
section:
``national virtual translation center
``Sec. 119. (a) In General.--There is an element of the intelligence
community known as the National Virtual Translation Center under the
direction of the Director of Central Intelligence.
``(b) Function.--The National Virtual Translation Center shall
provide for timely and accurate translations of foreign intelligence
for all other elements of the intelligence community.
``(c) Facilitating Access to Translations.--In order to minimize the
need for a central facility for the National Virtual Translation
Center, the Center shall--
``(1) use state-of-the-art communications technology;
``(2) integrate existing translation capabilities in the
intelligence community; and
``(3) use remote-connection capacities.
``(d) Use of Secure Facilities.--Personnel of the National Virtual
Translation Center may carry out duties of the Center at any location
that--
``(1) has been certified as a secure facility by an agency or
department of the United States; and
``(2) the Director of Central Intelligence determines to be
appropriate for such purpose.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections for that Act is
amended by inserting after the item relating to section 118 the
following new item:
``Sec. 119. National Virtual Translation Center.''.
SEC. 616. REPORT ON RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION OF QUALIFIED INSTRUCTORS
OF THE DEFENSE LANGUAGE INSTITUTE.
(a) Study.--The Secretary of Defense shall conduct a study on methods
to improve the recruitment and retention of qualified foreign language
instructors at the Foreign Language Center of the Defense Language
Institute. In conducting the study, the Secretary shall consider, in
the case of a foreign language instructor who is an alien, to
expeditiously adjust the status of the alien from a temporary status to
that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.
(b) Report.--(1) Not later than one year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report on the study conducted
under subsection (a), and shall include in that report recommendations
for such changes in legislation and regulation as the Secretary
determines to be appropriate.
(2) Definition.--In this subsection, the term ``appropriate
congressional committees'' means the following:
(A) The Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on
Armed Services of the Senate.
(B) The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the
Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives.
Purpose
The bill would:
(1) Authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2005 for
(a) the intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the U.S. Government, (b) the Community
Management Account, and (c) the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability System;
(2) Authorize the personnel ceilings on September 30,
2005 for the intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the U.S. Government and permit the
Director of Central Intelligence to authorize civilian
personnel ceilings in Fiscal Year 2005 for any
intelligence element, with the approval of the Director
of the Office of Management and Budget;
(3) Authorize $239.4 million for the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund
(CIARDS) in order to fully fund the accruing cost of
retirement benefits for individuals in the Civil
Service Retirement System, CIARDS, and other federal
retirement systems;
(4) Amend the National Security Act of 1947 to
establish an Assistant Director of Central Intelligence
for Information Management to serve as the Chief
Information Officer of the intelligence community and
to manage the activities relating to the information
technology infrastructure and enterprise architecture
requirements of the intelligence community;
(5) Amend the Central Intelligence Agency Voluntary
Separation Pay Act by repealing the September 30, 2005,
termination date, thus providing the CIA with permanent
authority to offer incentives to encourage separation
restructuring;
(6) Establish the National Security Agency Emerging
Technologies Panel to periodically advise the Director
of NSA on existing and emerging science and technology
advances and other topics;
(7) Increase the effectiveness of the National
Security Education Program (NSEP) by authorizing
funding to support scholarships, fellowships and
grants, increasing repayment options for recipients of
scholarships and fellowships, expanding the National
Flagship Language Initiative, and by establishing a
English language scholarship program for members of
heritage communities in the United States; and
(8) Improve the foreign language capabilities of the
intelligence community by establishing the position of
Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Language
and Education, requiring that individuals appointed to
the Senior Intelligence Service possess a foreign
language proficiency, directing the establishment of
partnerships with educational institutions to advance
foreign language skills, and by authorizing a three-
year pilot study on establishing a Civilian Language
Reserve Corps.
Overall Perspective on the Intelligence Budget and Committee Intent
The classified annex to this public report includes the
classified Schedule of Authorizations and its associated
language. The Committee views the classified annex as an
integral part of this legislation. The classified annex
contains a thorough discussion of all budget issues considered
by the Committee, which underlies the funding authorization
found in the classified Schedule of Authorizations. The
Committee intends that all intelligence programs discussed in
the classified annex to this report be conducted in accord with
the guidance and limitations set forth as associate language
therein. The classified Schedule is incorporated directly into
this legislation by virtue of section 102 of the bill. The
classified annex is available for review by all Members of the
House of Representatives, subject to the requirements of clause
13 of rule XXIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives,
and rule 13 of the Rules of Procedure for the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence.
Scope of Committee Review
U.S. intelligence and intelligence-related activities under
the jurisdiction of the Committee include the National Foreign
Intelligence Program (NFIP), the Tactical Intelligence and
Related Activities (TIARA), and the Joint Military Intelligence
Program (JMIP) of the Department of Defense.
The NFIP consists of all programs of the Central
Intelligence Agency, as well as those national foreign
intelligence, intelligence related, and/or counterintelligence
programs conducted by: (1) the Department of Defense; (2) the
Defense Intelligence Agency; (3) the National Security Agency;
(4) the National Reconnaissance Office; (5) the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; (6) the Departments of the
Army, Navy, and Air Force; (7) the Department of State; (8) the
Department of the Treasury; (9) the Department of Energy; (10)
the Department of Justice; (11) the Federal Bureau of
Investigation; (12) the Department of Homeland Security; and
(13) the U.S. Coast Guard. The Committee has exclusive
legislative, authorizing and oversight jurisdiction of these
programs.
The Department of Defense TIARA are a diverse array of
reconnaissance and target acquisition programs that are a
functional part of the basic military force structure and
provide direct information support to military operations.
TIARA, as defined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
Secretary of Defense, include those military intelligence
activities outside the General Defense Intelligence Program
that respond to the needs of military commanders for
operational support information, as well as to national
command, control, and intelligence requirements. The Committee
on Armed Services in the House of Representatives shares
oversight and authorizing jurisdiction of the programs
comprising TIARA with the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence.
The JMIP was established in 1995 to provide integrated
program management of defense intelligence elements that
support defense-wide or theater-level consumers. Included
within JMIP are aggregations created for management efficiency
and characterized by similarity, either in intelligence
discipline (e.g., Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Imagery
Intelligence (IMINT)), or function (e.g., satellite support,
aerial reconnaissance). The following aggregations are included
in the JMIP: (1) the Defense Cryptologic Program (DCP); (2) the
Defense Imagery and Mapping Program (DIMAP); (3) the Defense
General Intelligence Applications Program (DGIAP), which itself
includes (a) the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Program
(DARP), (b) the Defense Intelligence Tactical Program (DITP),
(c) the Defense Intelligence Special Technologies Program
(DISTP), (d) the Defense Intelligence Counterdrug Program
(DICP), and (e) the Defense Space Reconnaissance Program
(DSRP). As with TIARA programs, the Committee on Armed Services
in the House of Representatives shares oversight and
authorizing jurisdiction of the programs comprising the JMIP
with the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
Committee Findings and Recommendations
The Committee completed its review of the President's
fiscal year 2005 budget request, carrying out its annual
responsibility to prepare an authorization based on close
examination of intelligence programs and proposed expenditures.
The Committee, and in some cases, its component subcommittees,
held 14 budget-related hearings covering all major intelligence
programs within the National Foreign Intelligence Program, the
Joint Military Intelligence Program, and the Tactical
Intelligence and Related Activities accounts, and also covering
functional capabilities, such as human intelligence, analysis,
counterintelligence, counternarcotics, and counterterrorism.
As always, the Committee's legislative and budgetary
actions are based on more than these budget-specific hearings.
The actions taken in this bill are the result of the
Committee's ongoing, rigorous oversight of the U.S.
Intelligence Community. This oversight activity includes scores
of Committee and subcommittee hearings on intelligence
capabilities, strategies, plans, and challenges each year. In
addition, the Committee Members and staff undertake hundreds of
briefings and site visits annually.
Deserving of particular note is the time and attention the
Committee has devoted to the in-depth study of three broad
topics in particular. Over the past year, the Committee has
conducted exhaustive reviews of: Intelligence Community
language capabilities, all facets of the performance of the
U.S. Intelligence Community on Iraq prior to the successful
Operation Iraqi Freedom, and the interrogation and treatment of
detainees in Iraq and other locations of the Global War on
Terrorism (GWOT).
The Committee holds in highest regard the work accomplished
by U.S. intelligence officers across the globe. Amid great
sacrifice and intense conditions, the men and women of the
Intelligence Community continue to perform their missions with
great energy, and an enormous devotion to duty. The Committee
commends these officers for their professionalism, integrity
and perseverance, often in the most difficult of circumstances.
The freedom and security of our great nation relies on their
success.
Intelligence has been, rightly, recognized as a critical
weapon in the GWOT. Resources for--and demands on--the U.S.
Intelligence Community have increased dramatically in the two
and three-quarters years since the attacks of September 11,
2001. This increase is even more dramatic when one takes into
consideration the depth of the cutbacks, underinvestment, and
the near fatal loss of political support for the IC in the last
administration. Yet, looking at the Community as a whole, the
Committee finds continuing gaps in capabilities and fundamental
flaws in the management of resources and personnel. To the
extent that these concerns may be outlined in an unclassified
manner, the Committee has addressed them in the ``Areas of
Special Interest'' section immediately following. A complete
discussion of the Committee's oversight findings and
recommendations is contained in the classified annex to this
report.
This legislation, along with its accompanying report and
classified annex, contains the Committee's specific
recommendations about where the U.S. IntelligenceCommunity
should be heading, how it can posture itself for strategic superiority,
and how the fiscal year 2005 intelligence budget should be invested.
The classified schedule of authorizations includes the intelligence
portion of the Contingent Emergency Reserve (CER), which the Committee
views as an integral part of the fiscal year 2005 budget. Funds in the
CER have been requested to address the high intelligence operations
tempo in the GWOT--including Afghanistan and Iraq--and related areas.
The Committee applauds the President for taking this major
step towards ending the practice--begun in earlier
administrations--of funding critical operational intelligence
and military requirements via supplemental appropriations.
Funding by supplemental is a practice the Committee has
addressed in great detail in past reports. Suffice to say, the
Committee believes it should end.
In addition to a substantial enhancement for funding
critical intelligence priorities related to the GWOT, H.R.
4548:
Increases investment in U.S. HUMINT (human
intelligence) capabilities;
Improves Intelligence analysis, coverage and
depth;
Strengthens Intelligence Community language
capabilities across the board though both improved
legislative authorities and additional investment;
Improves the structure and management of the
disparate elements of the intelligence community's
information technology systems; and
Bolsters U.S. counterintelligence resources
and capabilities.
The Committee reported this legislation favorably. For the
first time in at least ten years there were dissenting votes as
the bill was reported from Committee. And, not just a few.
Indeed, despite the positive expression of support for the bill
in the classified version of the Minority Views, the eight
Minority Members of the Committee who were present at the mark
up voted against the ``Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2005.'' This was a bit startling given the
thorough, bipartisan staff preparation for the mark up. In a
marked departure from past practice, a number of the amendments
offered by the Minority, however, were not shared on a
bipartisan basis before the mark up. Taken as a group, the
Minority amendments added nothing helpful to the bill or to the
range of issues in which the HPSCI is already engaged.
Apparently, the Minority may be unaware that the Senate
version of this bill is close to the House version, though
slightly less generous in its funding levels. That bill was
supported unanimously by both Majority and Minority. That the
HPSCI Minority voted to deny the legal authorization to carry
out the intelligence work during wartime, while trying to say
they support the work of the IC, appears to be excessively
contorted. It is noted that the unclassified Minority Views
reserves expression of support for the work of the men and
women of the Intelligence Community until the penultimate
sentence of their views.
MARK UP
Closed Session
Notwithstanding the Minority's statements to the contrary,
the specifics of the mark up discussion are sealed solely
because there was substantial discussion of highly classified
programs and intelligence information throughout the course of
the proceeding. Indeed, discussion and debate on the
legislative provisions alone, and amendments thereto, took
approximately 3 hours. These included classified discussions
related to the IC's national security need for improved
language capabilities; how the IC is performing in the GWOT,
particularly the IC's performance in Iraq and Afghanistan; and
the need to improve or increase the IC's HUMINT analysis, and
technical collection capabilities. It is useful, however, to
review the areas of dispute that arose during the Committee's
consideration of this legislation. During the course of this
consideration, Minority Members offered seven amendments.
MINORITY AMENDMENTS OFFERED AT MARK UP
The Global War on Terrorism
Mr. Peterson, Mr. Boswell, and Mr. Cramer offered two
amendments, the first to the statutory language and the second
to the classified schedule of authorizations, which sought to
double the total amount the Committee recommended for
authorization in the Contingent Emergency Reserve (CER). Both
of these amendments were defeated.
The Committee has spoken repeatedly against the practice of
funding important intelligence capabilities via supplemental
appropriations, and has been wary of that practice.
As stated above, the Committee believes that President Bush
has taken a giant stride towards ending this practice through
his CER request. Although some supplemental funds will probably
be required before the end of fiscal year 2005, due to the
uncertain requirements of war, requesting a significant portion
of operations tempo funding up front through the CER is a vast
improvement over past practice. The Committee has specifically
authorized these funds in those areas the Committee believes
are the most critical to win a global--emphasis on global--war
on terror.
It is important to understand that the CER level in this
legislation has been fully coordinated with the House Armed
Services Committee and the House Appropriations Committee. In
other words, this is real money.
Unfortunately, the funding level sought by the Peterson/
Boswell amendments was not real money. It had not been
coordinated with the HASC. It does not have dollars in
Appropriations to back it up. So, had either amendment been
approved, the funding in it would have been hollow. In other
words, the amendments were nothing more than empty gestures.
``Hollow'' funding is something the Committee makes every
attempt to avoid. The Committee did not approve the Peterson/
Boswell/Cramer amendments because in the view of the majority
of its Members they were likely do more harm than good to the
Intelligence Community.
Finally, the Committee notes that the same eight Minority
Members who supported the two Peterson/Boswell/Cramer
amendments unanimously opposed a later amendment offered by Mr.
Gibbons to transfer a large sum of (real) money, in the
hundreds of millions of dollars, from a long-term research and
development project to provide additional operations tempo
reserves for the GWOT.
It is relevant, also, to note that 5 Minority Members of
the Committee voted in October 2003 against the $87 billion
GWOT Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 108-106).
Document Request--Detainees in the GWOT
Mr. Reyes offered an amendment to withhold or fence one-
quarter of all funds authorized in the bill for the Central
Intelligence Agency Program, the General Defense Intelligence
Program, the Joint Military Intelligence Program, and the
Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities program until the
Committee receives various documents relating to the detention
and interrogation of detainees in the GWOT.
The majority of the Committee Members believe that this
amendment would have placed an absurdly high percentage of U.S.
intelligence funding--dollars that all agree are absolutely
critical to the GWOT--on hold pending a routine document
request. It was the view of the Committee that this was a petty
action masquerading as a grand gesture.
Document requests are normally handled through routine
Committee business--that is, through staff work and official
requests from the Chairman. In fact, several categories of the
documents sought through this amendment have in fact been
recently requested through a letter from Chairman Goss and
Ranking Minority Member Harman:
House of Representatives,
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC, June 1, 2004.
Hon. Donald H. Rumsfeld,
Secretary of Defense, The Pentagon,
Washington, DC.
Dear Secretary Rumsfeld: On June 11, 2004, we will hear
testimony from Administration officials regarding the critical
need for interrogation in the Global War on Terrorism. This
hearing, originally scheduled for June 10 (see attached), will
provide the Administration an opportunity to explain the
policies underlying interrogation activities, the legal
framework within which those activities are permitted to take
place, and the value to our national security as a result of
such interrogation. In anticipation of this hearing, the
Committee requests that the Department provide the following
documents, for the benefit of the Members, no later that 48
hours before the time of the hearing, which is scheduled to
being at 9:00 on June 11.
Any orders concerning interrogation and
counter-resistance policies for Iraq;
Any orders relating to the control and
operating procedures of Abu Ghraib;
Any orders concerning interrogation policies
and operating procedures for Guantanamo Bay;
Any interrogation-derived reports from Abu
Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay from June 1, 2003 to present.
Additionally, we have been advised that the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) does not permit sharing of
its reports and their related documents to legislative bodies
of any country. For this reason, we understand, Brigadier
General Karpinski's response to the ICRC of December 24, 2003,
has not yet been made available to the Committee. We would
request that you consider Section 502 of the National Security
Act of 1947 when considering your obligation to the ICRC.
Please advise us of the status of this continuing request.
Sincerely,
Porter J. Goss,
Chairman.
Jane Harman,
Ranking Democrat.
The Committee has no reason to believe that this request
will not be honored.
Indeed, we have received good cooperation to date from the
DOD and the CIA on information related to detainees and
interrogation. The Committee has been aggressive in seeking
this information, holding 5 full committee meetings so far (and
a sixth hearing--the most substantial planned to date--was only
postponed because the government was closed to observe the
state funeral for President Ronald Reagan on that day). It has
been rescheduled for July 13, 2004. In addition, we have held
multiple high-level briefings for staff and individual
Committee Members.
Likewise, the Committee has already received thousands of
pages of documents, including:
The Miller Report
The Ryder Report
The Taguba Report--the full report with
annexes; and
The official interrogation field manual.
The Committee staff has been briefed extensively on the
approved interrogation authorities, as well as the value of
detainee interrogation in the GWOT. Terrorist plots have been
disrupted as a result. Similarly, high value targets have been
apprehended and detained through information gained by
appropriate methods of interrogation.
In fact, the bipartisan Committee staff was briefed within
the last two weeks that many--if not all--of the prisoners in
the Abu Ghraib abuse scandal were not even the subjects of
intelligence interrogation. They were rapists, murderers,
prison rioters, deviant individuals, and other hardened
criminals. While that fact does not mitigate the abuses caused
by a few, it does make it seem like less of an intelligence
matter and more of a military police matter.
For these reasons, the Committee rejected the Reyes
Amendment.
Document Request--Ahmed Chalabi
Ms. Eshoo offered an amendment to withhold or fence all
funds (100%) for the office of the Undersecretary of Defense
for Intelligence (USDI) until the Committee receives a ``full
accounting'' of the relationship between DOD and Mr. Ahmed
Chalabi from January 2001 through May 2004, as well as specific
intelligence documents and the names of intelligence sources.
The Committee notes that DOD (including DIA) has been
forthcoming in providing information on these matters.
Documents continue to come into the Committee as requested.
Members continue to receive briefings on the matter. In fact,
the day just prior to mark-up Members had the opportunity to
hear from executive branch officials on these and related
matters. The detailed information provided at that briefing, in
addition to all of DOD's other efforts to keep the Committee
informed, provided a sufficient basis for the Majority to
conclude that all of the information available on this subject
has been made available to the Committee. All of this
information is in addition to the more than twenty volumes of
information and intelligence reporting the Committee has
received in the course of its Iraq intelligence review.
For these reasons, and because the majority of Committee
Members viewed the amendment as heavy-handed and unnecessary,
it was rejected by the Committee.
Intelligence Community Restructuring
The Ranking Minority Member offered, as an amendment, her
Intelligence Community restructuring legislation (H.R. 4104),
which was introduced in the House on April 1st.
The amendment would have created a Director of National
Intelligence (DNI) as a superstructure above the existing
Intelligence Community. The Office of the DNI would have
created an additional layer of bureaucracy. In addition, the
amendment would have required nearly all senior management in
the Office of the DNI to be Presidential appointees, subject to
Senate confirmation. The Committee believes that this new
bureaucratic super-structure would only widen the gap between
analysts, operations officers and senior management; and create
new inefficiencies in the flow of information. Additionally,
the Committee is of the firm view that less political
influence, not more, is needed in the Intelligence Community.
Moreover, her amendment would serve to create confusing lines
of authority and could be read as subjugating the Intelligence
Community to the DOD. This is not a direction the Committee
Majority wished to go.
The Ranking Minority Member's amendment would not address
the key issue of providing a logical source of budget authority
for the Intelligence Community. In fact, the amendment avoids
providing the DNI more budget authority than the Director of
Central Intelligence currently enjoys. Similarly, it satisfies
none of the Joint Intelligence Committee's recommendations
except with respect to DNI.
Although an argument has been advanced that her legislation
would breakdown the information ``stovepipes'' in the
Intelligence Community, the Committee does not assess that this
is the case. The Committee believes just the opposite is true.
Finally, the Committee notes that H.R. 4104, introduced on
April 1, 2004, was introduced by the Minority Membership of the
Committee, without any engagement of the Majority Membership
prior to its introduction. The Committee has held no hearings
on the legislation.
The Chairman and ten other Members of the Committee
introduced legislation asserting their vision to improve the
management of the Intelligence Community (H.R. 4584), the
Directing Community Integration Act.'' The Committee intends to
take up the issue of Intelligence Community management and
structure in the near future. H.R. 4584 is not incorporated in
the bill reported by the Committee.
The Committee rejected the Ranking Minority Member's
amendment because it would create an additional layer of
bureaucracy over the Intelligence Community, would fail to
address critical needs such as improved budget authority for
the head of the Intelligence Community, would not meet its
stated goal of breaking down information stovepipes, and for a
host of other issues that would most properly be addressed
through Committee hearings and briefings.
Language Program
Mr. Holt offered an amendment to amend Mr. Bereuter's
amendment, which was offered to provide increased intelligence
community language capabilities through several different types
of programs. Mr. Bereuter had introduced his amendment as two
separate bills in the House prior to mark-up (H.R. 4573 and
H.R. 4574). Mr. Holt sought to expand Mr. Bereuter's proposals
in a way that would have complicated the jurisdictional aspects
of the legislation. Additionally, Mr. Holt's amendments took a
different approach to that being advanced by the Committee on
Education and the Workforce. Based on these grounds, the
Majority rejected the amendment offered by Mr. Holt.
Classified Program
Mr. Cramer offered an amendment to adjust the funding level
for a classified program. The Majority disagreed with Mr.
Cramer's arguments on the matter and rejected the amendment.
AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST
In the following several pages, the Committee highlights
areas of concern that it believes must be addressed with a high
priority by the Director of Central Intelligence, (DCI) as the
leader of the Intelligence Community, if intelligence
sufficient to protect our national security is to be obtained
and provided to policy makers. The Committee places particular
emphasis on issues that impact the Intelligence Community as a
whole or that involve several various programs.
Global Human Intelligence Collection
All is not well in the world of clandestine human
intelligence collection (HUMINT). The DCI himself has stated
that five more years will be needed to build a viable HUMINT
capability. The Committee, in the strongest possible terms,
asserts that the Directorate of Operations (DO) needs fixing.
For too long the CIA has been ignoring its core mission
activities. There is a dysfunctional denial of any need for
corrective action. The CIA must collect against all types of
targets needed to gain the insights into plans and intentions
of our adversaries, be they terrorist, political, economic,
military, in nature. Countering the threat from terrorism is,
of course, and should be, at the top of CIA's list of
collection priorities, but the Central Intelligence Agency must
continue to be much more than just the ``Central
Counterterrorism Agency'' if America is to be truly secure,
prosperous, and free.
The Committee has placed in the classified annex of this
intelligence authorization its comprehensive analysis of what
specifically is not right with the way the Directorate of
Operations is being and has been managed. The Committee also
assesses that the consequences of continued CIA mismanagement
of the HUMINT mission are significant. Replete throughout this
analysis, which includes specific recommendations for
corrective action, are footnoted references to similar
criticisms made by this Committee in the classified annexes of
past intelligence authorization bills stretching back well
before the 9/11 terrorist attacks. So, this is not new
territory for the Committee. CIA has officially registered its
strong objection to the Committee's exhaustively researched
conclusions, which were reached over the course of years of
close oversight and informed by hundreds of meetings and
continuous dialogue with experienced CIA field operatives and
Headquarters officials. That none of it could be made
unclassified is unfortunate.
The Committee respects the authority of the DCI to make
classification decisions and will, of course, abide by his
ruling in this matter. After years of trying to convince,
suggest, urge, entice, cajole, and pressure CIA to make wide-
reaching changes to the way it conducts its HUMINT mission,
however, CIA, in the Committee's view, continues down a road
leading over a proverbial cliff. The damage to the HUMINT
mission through its misallocation and redirection of resources,
poor prioritization of objectives, micromanagement of field
operations, and a continued political aversion to operational
risk is, in the Committee's judgment, significant and could
likely be long-lasting. Immediate and far-reaching changes can
still reverse some of the worst factors eroding its
capabilities, however. If the CIA continues to ignore the
experience of many of its best, brightest, and most experienced
officers, and continues to equate criticism from within and
without--especially from its oversight committees--as
commentary unworthy even of consideration, no matter how
constructive, informed, and well-meaning that criticism may be,
they do so at their peril. The DO will become nothing more than
a stilted bureaucracy incapable of even the slightest bit of
success. The nimble, flexible, core-mission oriented enterprise
the DO once was, is becoming just a fleeting memory. With each
passing day, it becomes harder to resurrect. The Committee
highlights, with concern, the fact that it only took a year or
two in the mid-1990's to decimate the capabilities of the CIA,
that we are now in the 8th year of rebuild, and still we are
more than 5 years away from being healthy. This is tragic. It
should never happen again.
The Committee believes that the DO's difficulties are
manifest in the discussion on Iraq's WMD. The analysts have
taken a significant amount of criticism on the issue. It is
imperative to point out, however, that the analysts do not
collect the information they analyze. They simply take what is
available and reach educated assessments. It is incumbent on
the DO and other areas of the IC collection community to gather
the information that will present a more complete picture.
There was an insufficiency of the right amount of information
available on this topic for the analysts. The U.S. cannot
afford to be in such a position.
The State of the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence (DI)
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the United
States on September 11, 2001, the CIA's Directorate of
Intelligence has experienced dramatic personnel shifts and a
rapid increase in the demand for both its analysts and work
product. The DI, much like the CIA's clandestine arm, the
Directorate of Operations, suffered from disinvestments
resulting from the so-called ``peace dividend'' of the 1990's.
It was not until the World Trade Center and Pentagon were
struck that senior DI management began to realize just how
desperate the need is for an expanded and experienced analytic
cadre.
DI analysts have earned a reputation in the Intelligence
Community for being highly educated, well trained, motivated,
and capable of handling demanding and fast moving assignments.
As a result, with the expansion of the terrorist mission, DI
analysts are in demand across the Intelligence Community, and
in line with the CIA's ``can-do'' attitude has committed
significant numbers of DI analysts to other organizations and
posts. The CIA's analytic cadre, much like its covert
counterpart in the DO, toil quietly, without significant
praise, seldom ever to tell of success publicly, but sharply
criticized for the least inaccuracy. The Committee notes the
hard-working and dedicated rank-and-file professionals that
provide the link between collection and truth and add value to
raw data for policymakers.
The Committee notes four developments that, if not
adequately addressed in the near-term, will work together to
seriously undermine and degrade the relevance of the DI and its
critically important products at a time when they are needed
most by consumers. The first factor--the unsustainable surges
in DI personnel to cover crisis issues withoutadequate back-
filling--may be the easiest of the four problems to address. Aggressive
new hiring is helping to mitigate this problem, but in the interim,
overall DI expertise is declining, as new analysts need substantial
training and on-the-job learning of their accounts. While there may be
a strong temptation to surge these analysts to meet new crisis needs,
it is important that this not be done prematurely or so haphazardly
that it creates more problems than it seeks to solve. DI analysts must
be allowed to develop true expertise. The DI must not be permitted to
become an organization of generalists. Longer assignments on specific
countries, regions, or issues--once discouraged by DI management
concerned about analytic ``clientitis''--should be strongly encouraged.
This is, in the Committee's view, a major way to reverse permanently
the trend towards widening global analytic gaps. Analytic depth can be
more about skills than about numbers of bodies.
The second major DI problem area concerns the culture of
analytic risk aversion, begun long before 9/11, but fostered
through the continued perception on the part of the rank-and-
file that senior DI managers do not want risk taking--however
calculated, caveated, and warranted--and that they will not
stand by an analyst who has made the wrong prediction. With
some exceptions, the DI has become more focused on coordinated
judgments that are often so caveated that they are of little
use to consumers who are searching for some form of clarity in
the very gray world of finished intelligence reporting. While
clarity will not always be possible, analysts should be
encouraged to be more forward leaning and to push the analytic
envelope whenever possible, lest consumers turn more and more--
as they have in recent years--to uncorroborated single-source
HUMINT or SIGINT reports to inform their decisions. Creating an
environment of some stability for analysts to develop adequate
expertise will be an essential part of breaking the DI's risk
averse culture, lest risk-taking become a reckless rather than
calculated process.
The Committee recognizes that the DI is suffering from the
difficult combination of vastly increasing requirements and too
few bodies to service them. Strong DI leadership, however, with
a demonstrated commitment to calculated risk-taking and to the
true expertise building that must come with it, would begin to
bridge the gap between where DI personnel numbers are now and
the time when adequate help arrives. With the CIA's analysis on
Iraq being widely criticized, DI leaders simply cannot afford
to sit on their heels. If analysts decided to give up on risk-
taking entirely, the national security interests of the country
will suffer. This cannot be permitted to happen.
The third major problem area was also clearly evident to
the Committee as a problem in the years before 9/11 and
appeared in the form of criticial classified report language in
past intelligence authorizations. This is the continuing
overemphasis by senior DI managers on current intelligence
reporting instead of on the longer-term, predictive, strategic
intelligence forecasting that was once the strength of the DI
and the staple of the DI's avid consumer base. The explosion of
all form of open-source reporting, combined with technology for
transmitting news across the globe in near-real time makes it
nearly impossible for DI analysts to keep up. Instead of
``chasing CNN,'' as the Committee has observed in the past, the
DI should be devoting much more of its resources to doing the
kind of all-source, in-depth analysis that cannot, and is not,
being done elsewhere in government or through media outlets.
The DI will always have to leave some capability in place to
make sure that its judgments about overnight developments in
the world's hot spots are rapidly provided to consumers each
day via tried and tested means, such as daily publications,
spot reports, and briefings, for example. But, analysts have
complained for years, and the Committee has heard the message
loud and clear, that the preference of senior DI managers for
current intelligence and opportunities to brief such product to
high-level consumers far outstripped the DI's capacity to be
useful. More importantly, such DI priorities damaged the DI's
base of expertise by squandering scarce analytic resources that
could be put to better use helping the more sophisticated line-
consumers understand better what was behind the facade of the
daily or hourly news reports. The crisis atmosphere post-9/11
has indeed generated more interest in rapid analytic judgments
to address fast-moving situations, but the DI needs to play to
its strengths and fill a badly needed function of giving the
consumer a much higher degree of education than the ``sound-
bite'' analysis currently being emphasized. These are the types
of priorities to be set by the DI's top manager. The Committee
continues to disagree with the rationale for the continuing
trend towards current intelligence at the expense of nearly
every other form of the discipline.
Finally, the Committee remains concerned that senior DI
managers still do not have the ability to drive collection
priorities, despite past Committee exhortations about the
urgency of fixing this problem, and the CIA's own stated goals.
A number of analytic judgments on Iraq have so far been found
to be inconsistent with the facts on the ground. While
intelligence analysis seldom, if ever, provides a 100 percent
accurate picture, deficiencies were largely the result of years
of inadequate or insufficient HUMINT collection, and extensive
and ingrained denial and deception tactics that defeated
technical collection efforts. Analysts had little actual ground
truth with which to work. The Committee now finds the DO overly
focused on a few priority targets, leaving analysts once again
reliant on the media and other mostly open or insufficiently
validated sources of information with which to make its key
judgments. Given the recent performance on Iraq, the Committee
believes that senior DI management should play a stronger role
in determining collection priorities and advocating the need
for global coverage.
CIA Compensation Reform Program
The Committee remains unconvinced and increasingly
skeptical that the Pay for Performance (PFP) compensation
reform program currently proposed by Agency leadership is the
best, most appropriate pay system for the men and women of the
CIA. It should be noted that the Committee is supportive of the
President's vision regarding the need to change our government-
wide pay system.
The Committee supports the design, development, and
implementation of a reformed compensation plan for employees of
the CIA. The Committee continues to have serious reservations,
however, about the business model and assumptions uponwhich the
CIA's proposed PFP system is based. The CIA is a unique Federal entity
with vastly different jobs, many of which are not, and cannot, be
preformed in the private sector. The Committee believes that it is a
mistake to assume that money is the most significant employee motivator
in the intelligence ``business.'' While financial compensation plays an
important role in employment, it is not the sole motivating factor for
many employees at CIA, nor should it be. CIA attracts the country's
best and brightest, not for financial reward, but rather for the
espirit d'corps, mission, and tradecraft that are unique to CIA.
The Committee, nonetheless, supports the notion of
rewarding superior performers with increased pay. In addition
to the issues noted above, the Committee remains concerned
about the difficulty the Agency has had to date in projecting
the actual costs of implementation and administration of the
proposed program. These concerns were magnified by the results
of the congressionally mandated compensation reform pilot
program. The actual costs of the pilot program exceeded those
projected by almost 20%, and the performance model did not
produce the expected disparity between superior and mediocre
performers. In fact, at the direction of senior Agency
leadership, this 20 % overage was added to the program at its
conclusion to enhance the delineation between higher and lower
levels of performance. Inexplicably, notwithstanding these
known deficiencies, the pilot program was touted by Agency
management as a great success and a resounding affirmation of
the proposed compensation reform system. The Committee notes
with displeasure that Agency employees apparently were never
told of the failures of the performance model and the resulting
need for the infusion of these additional funds.
The Committee believes that greater improvement in
communication between Agency leadership, employees, and
Congress must occur before the proposed compensation reform
plan is further implemented. When CIA seniors were questioned
about certain materials provided by CIA that did not contain
any known negative references regarding PFP, they claimed
providing such data was not their responsibility, but rather
that of lower ranking Agency personnel, and that they did not
know why the information was never relayed to employees or to
the Committee. The Committee is disappointed with what could be
perceived as a callous indifference on the part of some CIA
seniors of the impact such fundamental changes in the CIA's pay
structure will have on Agency personnel and the continued
unwillingness of some CIA seniors to engage in meaningful
dialogue on this issue.
As noted above, and notwithstanding the foregoing, the
Committee remains optimistic that an effective and well-managed
effort to reform the compensation system at CIA is possible,
although this will require significant modifications to the
current plan, at a minimum. The Committee is encouraged by the
willingness of the Office of Personnel and Management (OPM) to
assist Agency senior leadership in their efforts to manage this
process and address the concerns of CIA employees. The
Committee has been advised that OPM and CIA will execute a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that clearly delineates their
respective responsibilities with respect to this effort, and
the Committee expects CIA to ensure this MOU is executed in a
timely fashion. The intent of the MOU is to provide a
cooperative framework within which OPM and CIA can work, with
all interested stakeholders, to design, develop, implement, and
communicate to CIA employees a reformed compensation system,
and the Committee expects CIA to work with OPM in a manner
consistent with this stated intent. Moreover, the Committee
expects that as part of the OPM-CIA partnership, the question
of whether the current plan needs to be replaced by an entirely
new and better constructed plan will be seriously and
expeditiously addressed.
The Committee directs that the DCI will regularly advise,
in intervals of no less than every three months, the Committee
of developments in the process of reviewing, revising, or
replacing the current reform plan, and fences all non-personnel
services funds associated with the implementation of the
proposed PFP system, including employee conversions,
information technologies, pay tool and compensation design, and
related training, until the DCI certifies, in writing to the
intelligence committees that CIA has complied with the
following requirements:
1. An MOU is executed by and between the OPM and CIA that
ensures that CIA will:
Work cooperatively with OPM to design and
implement all elements of a new compensation system at
CIA;
Invite OPM to all briefings on compensation
reform for Members and Committees of Congress and
Staff;
Allow OPM such access and lines of
communication as necessary for it to administer a
process for truly anonymous CIA employee comment on
elements of a new compensation system and the process
by which it will be adopted;
Work with OPM to develop a compensation
reform process timeline that will ensure adequate
employee and stakeholder input and feedback on all
elements of compensation reform and allows for
incremental stages of reform;
Work with OPM to extend the timeline where
appropriate to meet legitimate concerns of employees
and other stakeholders; and
Work with OPM to monitor and address
employee concerns over system credibility.
2. Another, more objective and completely ``blind'' survey
of employee opinion on all of the key aspects of the PFP system
is conducted through the auspices of or in conjunction with OPM
as a replacement for the CIA's poorly designed and badly
administered survey performed by a contractor firm that was a
stakeholder in the initial reform plan. CIA's efforts, while in
technical compliance with the letter of the Congress's
corresponding CDA in the ``Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2004,'' certainly did not adhere to the spirit of
that Congressional direction.
3. The following reports, outlined below, are completed and
delivered in writing, signed personally by the DCI, to the
intelligence committees of the House and Senate not later than
180 days after enactment of this provision:
(i) Management of the PFP System. This report shall detail
the management processes the DCI has instituted and plans to
institute to manage the implementation and administration of a
PFP system. Specifically, this report shall delineate the
process by which the DCI plans to select, train, certify, and
evaluate the performance of pay pool managers, as well as the
processes by, and regularity, with which these managers will
communicate with Agency employees regarding all aspects of the
proposed PFP system.
(ii) Cost of Implementation and Administration of
Compensation Reform. This report shall detail all current and
projected costs relating to the implementation and
administration of the compensation reform program.
Specifically, this report shall delineate all personal and non-
personal services funds expended in the implementation and
administration of compensation reform to date, to include, but
not limited to, the following activities: performance
management program and compensation implementation; IT systems
development and deployment; training program development and
implementation; surveys and focus groups; and communications.
Additionally, this report shall detail the projected costs of
the implementation and administration of compensation reform
Agency-wide from FY06 through FY10.
(iii) Pilot Program Web Application. This report shall
explain the process by which the Pilot Program web application
was designed and developed. Additionally, this report shall
include an assessment of the performance of the web application
throughout the duration of the pilot program. This assessment
shall be conducted in accordance with associated industry
``best practices'' and the Carnegie Mellon Capability and
Maturity Model guiding principles. The report shall also detail
the technological specifications of the current application
baseline, as well as any information collected during the
development and testing phases of the current baseline. The
report shall evaluate the full technological impact a web
application of this magnitude will have on the Agency's
technological infrastructure. This evaluation shall include,
but is not limited to, the impact to the Agency's network
backbone, common application environment, and systems
engineering and application maintenance workforce. Finally,
this report shall include a cost estimate for the follow-on PFP
tool application testing, development and deployment.
National Reconnaissance Office
The Committee is concerned about the amount of time and
attention that the National Reconnaissance Office's (NRO)
Director is available to provide to the NRO and the viability
of its budget to sustain the number of programs underway.
A recent IG report described the various responsibilities
that the NRO Director has in addition to those he has as
Undersecretary of the Air Force and as Acquisition Executive.
While the benefits that accrue to the national security space
programs as a whole that result from combining these positions
may be positive, the Committee is concerned that it comes at an
expense to the NRO, which plays a significant role in our IC
and national security apparatus. The Committee will seek to
understand how the needs of the Air Force space programs can be
met while ensuring a more balanced or appropriate amount of
time and attention can be provided to the NRO.
The Committee recommendation is to continue the strong
support for the 2005 funding request, but it has concerns about
the viability and affordability into the future. At a time when
the organization has struggled to fund adequately its current
programs, it is embarking on a number of ambitious new
capabilities. The future years' budget does not appear to be
capable of sustaining it all. Moreover, some programs are
likely to need additional time that will further exacerbate the
fiscal viability. The Committee believes that the space systems
provided by the NRO are an essential part of a comprehensive
intelligence architecture and that either the budget should be
capable of sustaining its programs or it should not start new
programs.
Intelligence Community Language Capabilities
The core function of the Intelligence Community (IC) is the
gathering of foreign intelligence vital to the national
security of the United States. To perform effectively this
mission, and to ensure that the information acquired is indeed
accurate, our nation must have sufficient numbers of
intelligence professionals who are proficient in foreign
languages. Fluency in a foreign language must not be considered
a highly specializedtechnical skill possessed only by the few.
Rather, proficiency in language should be a core capability for
virtually all intelligence officers. The Committee has long been
concerned that the IC lacks a strategy to ensure that an adequate
supply of skilled linguists will be available in the event of their
need. This is particularly true of critical languages such as Arabic,
Russian, Chinese, Korean, Japanese, Farsi/Persian, and Pashtu.
The Committee held a series of hearings on the issue of
language capabilities in the IC, visited language institutions
utilized by the IC, and solicited the views of leading
academicians in the field of language and linguistics.
The Committee found that significant strides have been
taken to improve the IC's language capabilities, particularly
since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Initial
steps have been taken in areas such as strategic planning of
language requirements, increasing basic and applied research
into the teaching of language and culture, augmenting existing
Federal training programs, and broadening reservoir of
linguists from which the IC might draw. The Committee would
note that many of these initiatives are in response to
congressional action. Nonetheless, the efforts by the
Administration are to be commended, and, when taken together go
a long way toward addressing the nation's need for expertise in
critical languages. As correctly noted by Dr. Richard Brecht,
Executive Director of the Center for Advanced Study of
Language, these initiatives ``represent some of the finest
policy, planning, and program implementation on behalf of
language in the history of the United States.''
While the Executive branch has begun to address concerns
about critical language capabilities, the Committee found that
much remains to be done. In particular, the Committee noted the
absence of a single individual in the IC responsible for
languages. There is no single individual tasked with developing
a comprehensive, collaborative, and cohesive solution to the
IC's language problem. In the absence of a single voice for
language within the IC, each component has the ability to
develop their own standards and set their own funding
priorities. The Committee concluded that an essential component
of any solution would be the creation of an Assistant Director
of Central Intelligence for Language and Education.
The Committee strongly approves the policy that has been
adopted by the Foreign Service, wherein foreign language
capability is an integral component during consideration for
promotion. Indeed, the Department of State's Employee
Evaluation Report (EER) forms establish specific language
criteria that must be met for promotion. For entry into the
ranks of the Senior Foreign Service, individuals are expected
to demonstrate full mastery of written communication in a
foreign language, be able to effectively argue complex policy
issues, and be able to adeptly discern the innermost meanings
and nuances of messages that others convey. These are exactly
the skills necessary for the collection of foreign
intelligence. The Committee concludes that the most effective
method of establishing the primacy of language skills is to
require similar language skills for individuals being elevated
into the ranks of the Senior Intelligence Service. One year
after enactment of this Act, all individuals promoted to the
Senior Intelligence Service shall be required to demonstrate
proficiency in a foreign language at the 3/3 level or higher.
The Committee understands that there are certain senior level
positions, such as those requiring advanced scientific or
computer expertise, which may not require language skills. If
there is a SIS position that should be exempted because of the
nature of the specific responsibilities of the position, the
Director should advise the Committee and request an exemption
for that specific position. The Committee intends to be
judicious in the granting of such exemptions.
The Committee grants the authority to establish a program
dedicated to the advancement of foreign languages critical to
the IC. Under this program, the Director is authorized to enter
into partnerships with educational institutions and to assign
dedicated personnel and enlist volunteers to advance such
partnerships. The Committee recommends that Concordia Language
Villages would serve as an appropriate partnership, as would
the SCOLA, and the Monterey Institute.
In the ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2003,'' the Committee tasked a report on the concept of a
Civilian Linguist Reserve Corps. The report recommended moving
forward with a three-year pilot program to establish a viable
Corps. The Committee authorizes funds to implement the
recommendations of this report.
The Committee concluded that the National Security
Education Program (NSEP), which was created in the Boren
Amendment to the ``Intelligence Authorization Act of Fiscal
Year 1992,'' has been and remains one of the most effective
tools to recruit highly qualified linguists for service in the
field of national security. This program provides scholarships,
grants, and fellowships for advance language and cultural
training in return for service in a specified national security
capacity. This program has operated on a trust fund, but the
inclusion of additional expanded responsibilities has almost
exhausted the fund. Provision of an annual authorization is the
most effective method of ensuring continued funding. The
Committee believes the Community Management Account of the DCI
is the appropriate vehicle to provide such authorizations.
Assessing the Terrorist Target
The terrorism target transcends both our foreign
intelligence and judicial systems. The IC was established to
collect, assess, and disseminate foreign intelligence, prior to
any adverse action or event. The judicial system investigates
and administers justice after the law is broken.
The judicial and intelligence systems evolved almost
independently over the last half-century. Terrorism challenges
both systems and demands that the two work together.
The IC in fiscal year 2005 has requested a significant
increase in funds for analysis with a substantial portion of
these funds focused on assessing the terrorist target. In
addition, the Executive Branch has begun to realign previously
stovepiped organizations and analytic bodies to improve
communication and information sharing for homelandsecurity
purposes. The Committee notes the significant role the Terrorist Threat
Integration Center (TTIC) has played in moving the IC to reduce
barriers to communication and Department-specific cultures. However,
the Committee notes that the proliferation of counterterrorism
divisions, task forces, and other organizations may create additional
stovepipes. This is counter to the need to move information in a timely
and efficient manner to those who need it most.
Since September 11, 2001, the Federal Government has
realigned resources to create the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS). Specifically P.L. 107-296 directed DHS to
develop analytic capabilities to assess terrorist threats to
the homeland and to disseminate that information to State,
local, and private sector officials. The Terrorist Screening
Center (TSC) has also been created within the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), to consolidate more than a dozen
``watchlists'' and to provide one-stop shopping for authorities
when individuals of concern are detained by police, boarding an
aircraft, or entering the United States, among other actions
that might provide an opportunity to learn more about that
person. The Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC), largely
staffed by Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) personnel, acts to
fuse the IC's analytic capabilities on terrorism. The FBI has
established 84 Joint Terrorism Task Forces across the country
to better communicate with state and local law enforcement
communities. The Committee believes that these efforts have
produced positive results.
The Committee notes the spirit of cooperation among all
agencies and all levels of government. All share the common
goal of thwarting terrorists. Taken as a whole, however, the
resources available are not yet sufficient to claim victory.
Significant cultural, technologic, legal, and mission barriers
also remain in place preventing the ultimate level of synergy
needed to swiftly assess terror threats, successfully defeat
those threats, and ultimately win the war on terrorism.
Mission requirements and responsibilities between the TTIC
and the DCI's Counter Terrorist Center (CTC), and specifically
the Office of Terrorism Analysis (OTA), remain vague and must
be further delineated. The FBI, while improving its analytic
cadre, has yet to fully utilize this resource and completely
shift the mentality of its agent corps from prosecution to
prevention. The Department of Homeland Security's Office of
Information Analysis (IA), while making outstanding progress in
a complex and challenging environment, remains in its infancy,
heavily dependent on contract support for its analytic
capabilities and unable to fully assume the responsibilities
expected of it. The Defense Intelligence Agency has established
the Joint Intelligence Task Force-Counterterrorism to address
the global force protection mission associated with the
terrorist threat. It is not clear, however, how this entity
will interact with the myriad ``CT'' elements already existing
throughout the IC and the military.
The Committee expects the IC to develop a professional
terrorism analysis career track by providing a baseline level
of training for intelligence analysts who will be responsible
for assessing terrorist targets. This training should include
courses on culture, language, politics, and an understanding of
the ``religious'' extremist fundamentalism associated with
Middle Eastern and Arab terrorist groups which can provide the
appropriate texture for sophisticated analysis. Additional
areas of training should focus on illicit financial, arms, and
narcotics networks to understand terrorist logistics, as well
as the psychology, motivation, and application of propaganda in
motivating terrorist activity. Finally, rotations by terrorism
analysts outside their home components or organizations should
be encouraged and rewarded as necessary steps for developing
greater expertise and understanding of both terrorism and other
U.S. government departments assessing terrorism.
The Committee encourages improved communication among IC
analysts covering similar accounts with the frequent exchange
of contact information, such as email and phone numbers, as
well as the organization of events such as analytic roundtable
discussions at the office level among analysts from the FBI,
CIA, TTIC, DIA, and the Department of Homeland Security's IA.
Such roundtable discussions could focus on such things as
baseline assessments of specific terrorist groups' ability,
targets, methods of operations and targeting. The Committee
encourages the DCI, the Director of the FBI, and the Secretary
of Homeland Security to promote such informal discussions and
outreach among analysts throughout the IC.
Information Sharing
Among the most critical elements to the successful fusion
of terrorism related intelligence is the rapid and seamless
movement of terrorism data across multi-layered security
enterprises. One of the top-level IC-wide dilemmas is to design
and deploy a solution for access to multiple ``networks'' at a
``one user workstation.'' The follow-on, and more complex
challenge will be the systems engineering intricacies
associated with designing an enterprise application framework
to share data across domains within the IC. The Committee
supports the current IT efforts underway in support of seeking
solutions to this IC-wide issue, and encourages the IC CIOs to
formulate a unified plan for creating a sound framework for
sharing terrorism related data across all IC enterprises within
this larger enterprise. In other words, the Committee expects
the DCI to develop an IC-wide, Enterprise Architecture. For
this reason, the Committee adopted a legislative provision to
create the office of ADCI/Info management, who shall serve as
the ICCIO.
The Committee notes the distinct difference evolving
between terrorist and terrorist threat related information and
traditional foreign intelligence. Terrorism-related
intelligence needs to be shared and distributed to far more
individuals and entities than traditional foreign intelligence
that relates to the internal plans and intentions of a
sovereign nation. Publicly available information, or law
enforcement information, is often disseminated through separate
stovepipes. The Committee encourages the DCI, in consultation
with the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, and the
Secretary of Homeland Security, to examine the classification
methods and processes associated with terrorist and terrorist-
threat information. The Committee is interested in the
viability of a system providing this information to those who
need it to protect the Homeland. But, the Committee understands
the need to do so in a manner that protects sources and
methods. Additionally, it is important that such a system
include a mechanism that immediatelydenotes that the
information was in fact distributed within the IC, as well as law
enforcement communities, including at the State and local levels, and
to appropriate sector authorities.
The Committee directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to
provide quarterly briefings to the Committee on these various
challenges and the status of all policies associated with the
integration and coordination of intelligence and law
enforcement personnel, selected analytic products, procedures,
and policies. Specifically, these briefings should address the
country's efforts to effectively and efficiently organize its
counterterrorism resources and the division of responsibility
among these resources, as well as actions and policies to share
sensitive information throughout the analytic community.
The Committee directs the DCI to provide to the
intelligence committees a report on the IC's evaluation and
decisions to implement the recommendations produced by the
Congressional Commission investigating the terrorist attacks in
the United States on September 11, 2001. This report is due
within 180 days after the Commission's recommendations are
released.
Counternarcotics/HUMINT Operations
Illicit drug use results in approximately 17,000 drug-
related deaths of Americans annually. Drugs are estimated to
cost the U.S. economy $160 billion annually in health care,
social, and criminal costs, among other assorted costs. Illicit
narcotics continue to constitute a clear and present danger to
U.S. national security, and the Committee remains convinced
that the IC should not lose its focus on the counternarcotics
mission despite its many counterterrorism (CT) and
counterproliferation (CP) requirements. In fact, the CT and CP
missions can and should better leverage resources currently
used for counternarcotics activities to help identify common
smuggling routes and illegal enterprises that could be used as
easily for smuggling WMD or terrorist infiltration, as for the
narcotics trade.
Further, the Committee encourages the DCI to allocate an
appropriate portion of resources being added in the fiscal year
2005 intelligence authorization to the CIA's Directorate of
Operations for non-Tier 0/1 unilateral operational activities
to further the CIA's counternarcotics mission in Latin America,
from where the greatest illicit narcotics threat to U.S.
interests originates.
Enterprise Architecture
Enterprise Architecture (EA) is the bonding element in
relation to Information Technology (IT) investment and strategy
initiatives. In fact, the Chief Information Officer (CIO)
Council in the executive branch subscribes to the fundamental
practice of fusing IT investment and strategy to an EA. The IC
CIO sits at the Federal CIO table and in that role should be
striving to adhere to, and influence, the EA government-wide
initiatives in this regard. The Committee understands that the
creation and implementation of an EA is not easy and certainly
will necessitate full support at all levels of the Intelligence
Community (IC) management structure.
Upon review, the Committee has determined that the process
for linking IT investment to a formal EA is lacking, if non-
existent at all layers of the IC. The Committee notes that in a
December 25, 2003 letter from the Executive Director for
Community Management to the HPSCI, it was noted that,
``Implementing the IC EA in accordance with OMB's Federal
Enterprise Architecture criteria is a significant challenge for
the IC primarily because of its federated nature. Through
ICSIS, we have been able to develop strong Community agreement
on the technical dimensions of the information-sharing portion
of the IC EA, and with that, growing consensus around the
business issues associated with a total IC Enterprise
Architecture.'' While consensus is a good first step, the
process for creating an executable and successful Enterprise
Architecture relies on a consistently managed and calculated
effort, with support and buy-in from the DCI and all IC agency
directors. While ICSIS is a valid design concept for IC-wide
Information Management, the Committee does not accept it as a
formal EA. Attempts to make correlations between it and a
formal EA will not produce the intended result as set forth by
OMB.
It is worth noting that a few of the IC agencies have made
attempts to produce detailed pictures of the ``as-is'' status
of their networks, applications, and IT processes. Some have
even gone as far as mapping the future state and strategy for
these components. These efforts have fallen short of adhering
to the documented processes set forth by the federal EA model;
however, by following a formal EA process, the Committee
believes that the IC could reap the benefits such an exercise
typically elicits. The Committee is fully aware that the IT
elements within the IC are difficult to document. We believe,
however, that implementation of an IC-wide EA would assist
measurably in joining the technical elements of the IC into a
more cohesive fabric.
Several components typically formalized as a ``future
state'' by an EA are currently being sought by the IC. All of
these separate programs, however, constitute items that would
typically be driven holistically from both agency-level EA's,
as well as one IC-wide EA. So long as the strategy of these
programs continues to be managed at the agency CIO level and
not coordinated at the IC CIO level, there will be a continued
lack of IC IT ``fusion'' in strategy. The Committee notes that
many of these longstanding efforts address the ``unique''
challenges at the agency level, and not the global IC level.
Without prescribing any one architecture, be it ``network-
centric,'' ``data-centric,'' or ``knowledge-centric,'' or any
other methodology, the Committee believes that there are
certain globally accepted linkages throughout the IC, and that
these should be the driving force behind devising an IC-wide
EA. As the Committee has stated in previous Authorization
bills, these ``linkages'' are often expressed in the form of
processes, data, and security.
The Committee believes that the IC would benefit greatly by
undertaking a formal IC-wide EA effort, as this process would
take these ``linkages'' and fuse them togetheracross the
community in the form of standard business, performance, data and
information, service component, and technical models. For this and
other reasons, in the legislative provisions, the Committee adopted
section 303, which creates an IC CIO separate from the CIA CIO.
Therefore, the Committee directs each agency CIO to provide a report to
the intelligence committees no later than 01 March, 2005, which
outlines the agency level plan for implementing EA before the end of
fiscal year 2006. In addition, the Committee directs the IC CIO, in
conjunction with each agency CIO, to draft the implementation plan for
an IC-wide EA, which will conform the agencies' EAs to the broader IC
strategy, within the same deadline. Standard COTS (Commercial-Off-the-
Shelf) software should be used in devising these preliminary documents.
JMIP/TIARA
Measurement and Signatures Intelligence
The Committee has been aggressive in funding for
exploration in the Measurements and Signatures Intelligence
(MASINT) sciences and applied research.
There are initiatives found throughout the IC and within
this bill that support such measures in basic and applied
science, research and development, and the technologies that
use MASINT concepts. It is the Committee's intent that the raw
scientific intelligence gained from these activities be
integrated into systems and programs, and into the more classic
intelligence disciplines for use operationally.
The committee is concerned, however, with the leadership
and direction of the MASINT community, and has again, put
fiscal attention toward a more collaborative effort for MASINT
through the MASINT Consortium. The MASINT Consortium, led by
the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), began in FY03 by
congressional directive to assemble the various entities across
all communities to explore basic and applied science research
as it relates to intelligence and the DOD. The Committee
believes that this is an IC required effort, and encourages the
advancement of basic and applied systems research within the
MASINT discipline.
The Committee recognizes that there are other efforts that
exist within the IC that are also attempting to consolidate and
lead MASINT activities and direction. The Committee strongly
encourages the DIA to include and embrace these efforts, assert
a strong community-wide leadership role, and apply the
culmination of all efforts community-wide.
Global Hawk SOUTHCOM Demonstration
The budget request contained $336.2 million in PE 35220F
for the Air Force Global Hawk high altitude endurance, unmanned
aerial vehicle (HAE/UAV) program. The committee notes that
section 221 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2001
(Public Law 106-398) directed the Secretary of Defense to
require and coordinate a concept demonstration of the Global
Hawk HAE/UAV. The purpose of the demonstration was to quickly
and efficiently demonstrate the capability of the Global Hawk
to operate in an airborne, air-surveillance mode, using
available, non-developmental technology in a counter-drug
surveillance scenario designed to replicate actual conditions
typically encountered in the performance of the counter-drug
surveillance mission of the U.S. Southern Command.
The Committee believes the Department has not met the
requirements of this Congressionally Directed Action.
The Committee has received the Air Force January 28, 2004
memorandum that states the directive will be met by utilizing
the HAE/UAV's existing ground target moving indicator (GMTI)
with surface search modes. The Committee notes that the
specific intent of section 221 is to provide an airborne air
surveillance alternative for U.S. Southern Command through a
concept demonstration performed under actual conditions in the
performance of counter-drug airborne surveillance missions.
Additionally, the Committee notes that the authorized funds
were to also pursue the initiation of concurrent development of
improved surveillance radar modes such as an airborne moving
target indicator (AMTI) capability, for this purpose.
The Global Hawk program office has briefed the Committee on
the present plan and condition to meet congressional intent of
the program. The Committee recognizes that although the Global
Hawk contract agreement and the Global Hawk Demo amendment to
agreement are separated, advances to the program cannot be.
Furthermore, the committee sees disparity in the contractor
obligated fees and government expenses, and does not view the
Air Force program office as economical or responsible in its
planning or execution of the amended contract. Specifically,
the Committee notes that with no demo performed, the Air Force
has expended 61% of the funds provided, and has obligated the
remaining budget. The committee finds this inefficient and
remiss, and can only conclude that $18.0 million worth of
progress in the Global Hawk program has been met through the
use of these funds, and has reduced the request accordingly.
The Committee directs, once again, that the Secretary of
Defense conduct a long endurance air-to-air radar surveillance
mission concept demonstration of the Global Hawk HAE/UAV that
meets the intent of section 221 of Public Law 106-945.
The Committee recommends $318.2 million in PE 35220F, a
reduction of $18.0 million based on the failure of the
Department to fulfill the CDA.
Distributed Common Ground System
The budget request contained a total of $734.5 million for
the DOD's Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS) program. DCGS
is a multi-service and agency program to enable existing
intelligence processing, exploitation and dissemination systems
to operate seamlessly across national and DOD architectures and
standards.
The Committee supports the recent decision of the military
service acquisition executives to integrate the common DCGS
integrated backbone (DIB), version 10.2 into each service
program as a common integrated DCGS architecture. The Committee
commends the services in coming together to work the challenges
of intelligence sharing, and views this as a leap towards
seamless information sharing.
The Committee is concerned, however, that the present DCGS
architecture within each of the military services is unique and
may not be able to properly network and provide critical,
timely information to the tactical users in the battle space.
The Committee believes the services must have an
overarching architecture that is well defined so DCGS may
operate across multiple domains to include ships at sea, Army
and Marine battalions on the move, and fixed sites for the Air
Force.
The committee also believes that the multiple systems that
run the DCGS were devised by organizational tradition, and not
to modern standards. The Committee is further concerned that
while the services perform analogous operations on each DCGS
system, they have not devised a coordinated strategy to merge
requirements, functionalities, and applications to support a
joint environment for users. The Committee recommends that the
Department coordinate service-centric requirements, use
commercial best practices to implement a systems' architecture,
maintain cost controls, leverage purchasing power, and
streamline development for the program.
The Committee believes the services must have a single,
converged architecture that is well defined to allow DCGS to
operate across multiple domains; including ships at sea; Army
and Marine battalions on the move; and fixed sites for the Air
Force.
In addition, the Committee notes that the Defense
intelligence community has an interest in the DOD's Global
Information Grid. Since DCGS is required to operate in both the
IC and DOD domains, the Committee believes there must be a
common approach for managing intelligence data over both
enterprise networks. Therefore, the committee encourages the IC
and the Department to work together to create and implement a
systems architecture that will allow users from both
communities to access information in a timely, accurate manner.
Additionally, the Committee is concerned that the DCGS is
unable to receive data from either the E8C Joint STARS radar
system or the RC-135 RIVET JOINT signals intelligence system,
and is unable to directly task the RQ-4 Global Hawk high-
altitude endurance unmanned aerial vehicle (HAE/UAV) for
imagery. The committee is concerned that the DCGS will not be
able to achieve its goals without this ability.
Accordingly, the Committee directs the Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence to report to the congressional defense
committees and intelligence committees detailing the
Department's DCGS integration plan to include tasking and
imagery downlinks for the E8C Joint STARS, RC-135 RIVET JOINT,
and RQ-4 Global Hawk systems by 01 March 2005.
Furthermore, the Committee directs the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Networking Information and Integration to report
to the congressional defense committees and intelligence
committees no later than 01 March 2005, as to how the two
communities plan to operate a network-centric, not service-
centric, DCGS across both the IC domain and the larger DOD IT
domain in the future.
Therefore, the Committee recommends the following for the
DCGS military service programs: $8.2 million for the Army, a
decrease of $1.4 million; $45.2 million for the Navy, a
decrease of $8.0 million, and $291.8 million for the Air Force,
a decrease of $28.5 million.
Information Dominance Center (IDC)
The budget request contained no funds for operations and
maintenance or research and development for the Army's
information dominance center (IDC) at Fort Belvoir, Virginia.
The IDC, a Headquarters' Department of the Army operations
support activity assigned to the U.S. Army Intelligence and
Security Command (INSCOM), provides multi-disciplinary
Information Operations (IO) support to the U.S. Army's
component and major commands. The IDC dedicates analysis and
technical support to deployed teams and the commands they
serve. These tailored analytical products are generated
frequently on a quick-response basis to meet a deployed team's
immediate needs. The IDC also monitors potential trouble spots
worldwide, preparing to support contingency operations with IO-
related products should the need arise. The IDC is a successful
model of operational horizontal integration, using high-
capacity communications links to access selected information
from a number of databases maintained by a number of other
commands, agencies, and organizations.
The Committee acknowledges that the IDC is one of the Army
Chief of Staff's unfunded priorities intelligence objectives.
The Committee supports the transformation efforts of the IDC
and the future plan to incorporate functions of the IDC into
the Army's Distributed Common Ground Systems (DCGS).
Therefore, the Committee has recommended additional funds
for this important program within the Army's Tactical
Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA) accounts, and
within the General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP).
Furthermore, the Committee expects to see the IDC fully funded
within the President's Budget Request for Army in fiscal year
2006.
Defense Language Institute/Foreign Language Center (DLI/FLC)
The budget request contained no funds for the Defense
Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLI/FLC) for
research and development.
The committee notes the ``National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2004'' (Public Law 108-46) recommended that
the Secretary of the Army establish a research and development
line, specifically focused on the latest technologies and
instructional methods in language and language learning that
are required by the DLI/FLC. The Committee is disappointed and
surprised that a budget request was not included in the fiscal
year 2005 budget request.
The Committee is very aware of the amplified demands within
DOD for increased student throughput and expanded off-campus
and distant learning sites. These current endeavors necessitate
innovative approaches in the instruction of foreign languages
and the educational processes to administer them. The Committee
applauds the progress of DLI/FLC's innovative practices in
meeting this challenge and supports the efforts in seeking new
methods in the teaching of foreign languages and language
learning technologies to meet the goals of DOD and the National
Security Agency (NSA).
Therefore the committee directs the Secretary of the Army
to establish a new research and development program in fiscal
year 2005 for the DLI/FLC, entitled, ``Defense Language
Institute, Foreign Language Center'' and recommends $5.0
million for this purpose.
Section-by-Section Analysis and Explanation
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Section 101 lists the United States Government departments,
agencies, and other elements for which the Act authorizes
appropriations for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities for fiscal year 2005.
Section 102 makes clear that the details of the amounts
authorized to be appropriated for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities and applicable personnel
ceilings covered under this title for fiscal year 2005 are
contained in a classified Schedule of Authorizations. The
Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the
Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of
Representatives and to the President.
Section 103 authorizes the Director of Central Intelligence
(DCI), with the approval of the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB), in fiscal year 2005 to authorize
employment of civilian personnel in excess of the personnel
ceilings applicable to the components of the Intelligence
Community under section 102. The DCI may exercise this
authority only if necessary to the performance of important
intelligence functions. Any exercise of this authority must be
reported to the intelligence committees of the Congress.
Section 104 authorizes appropriations for the Community
Management Account (CMA) of the DCI and sets the personnel end-
strength for the Intelligence Community Management Staff for
fiscal year 2005.
Subsection (a) authorizes appropriations of $318,395,000
for fiscal year 2005 for the activities of the CMA of the DCI.
Subsection (a) also authorizes funds identified for advanced
research and development to remain available for two years.
Subsection (b) authorizes 310 full-time personnel for
elements within the CMA for fiscal year 2005 and provides that
such personnel may be permanent employees of the CMA element or
detailed from other elements of the United States Government.
Subsection (c) authorizes additional appropriations and
personnel for the CMA as specified in the classified Schedule
of Authorizations and permits additional funding amounts for
research and development to remain available through September
30, 2006.
Subsection (d) requires that, except as provided in section
113 of the National Security Act of 1947, personnel from
another element of the United States Government be detailed to
an element of the CMA on a reimbursable basis, or for temporary
situations of less than one year on a non-reimbursable basis.
Subsection (e) authorizes $29,811,000 of the amount
authorized in subsection (a) to be made available for the
National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC). Subsection (e)
requires the DCI to transfer these funds to the Department of
Justice to be used for NDIC activities under the authority of
the Attorney General, and subject to section 103(d)(1) of the
National Security Act.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS
Section 201 authorizes appropriations in the amount of
$239,400,000 for fiscal year 2005 for the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability System (CIARDS).
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 301 provides that funds authorized to be
appropriated by this Act for salary, pay, retirement and other
benefits for federal employees may be increased by such
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for
increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law.
Section 302 provides that the authorization of
appropriations by the Act shall not be deemed to constitute
authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity that is
not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or laws of the
United States.
Section 303 amends the National Security Act of 1947 to
establish an Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for
Information Management who would serve as the Chief Information
Officer of the intelligence community. The Assistant Director
would be responsible for managing activities relating to the
information technology infrastructure and enterprise
architecture requirements of the intelligence community,
including information technology procurement and research and
development.
TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Section 401 amends the Central Intelligence Agency
Voluntary Separation Pay Act (VSPA) by repealing the otherwise
applicable September 30, 2005 termination date for the Central
Intelligence Agency's (CIA) authority under that statute. The
CIA has used its Voluntary Separation Incentive Program (VSIP)
authority over the past five years to restructure its workforce
in support of the DCI's overall strategic direction. This
section provides the CIA with permanent authority to offer
incentives to targeted groups of employees to encourage
separation from employment. Security considerations alsosupport
vesting the CIA with permanent authority to administer a CIA-specific
VSIP for all CIA officers and employees, whether in CIARDS, Civil
Service, or FERS. Section 401 also eliminates the 15 percent fee
previously required to be paid by the CIA pursuant to section 2(i) of
the VSPA. Section 401 also amends the Federal Workforce Restructuring
Act (FWRA) of 1994 by deleting payments made under VSPA from the
definition of voluntary separation incentive payments in the FWRA.
TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Section 501 amends the National Security Agency Act of 1959
to establish the National Security Agency's Emerging
Technologies Panel and grants it an exemption from the Federal
Advisory Committee Act (FACA). The topics considered by the
panel are almost exclusively classified and, accordingly, its
meetings are exempt from the general FACA requirement that
advisory board meetings be open to the public. In addition, the
panel's published minutes contain classified information and
are, therefore, not publicly available. The application of FACA
to an advisory panel that considers almost exclusively
classified information serves no significant purpose but
generates unnecessary administrative burdens, including
completing FACA procedures for closing each meeting. For this
reason, Congress has previously provided an exemption from FACA
for the advisory committees of the CIA and the science and
technology advisory panel of the FBI. Difficulties have arisen
in conducting joint activities among NSA, CIA, and FBI advisory
bodies because the CIA and FBI bodies are reluctant to engage
in meetings or other joint activities with the NSA panel when
it is obligated to follow administratively burdensome FACA
procedures prior to closing every meeting. Conversely, the NSA
panel has not found it necessary to meet or engage in other
joint activities with advisory bodies that are subject to FACA.
Exempting the NSA advisory panel from FACA procedures would
significantly facilitate its efficient and effective operation.
TITLE VI--EDUCATION
Subtitle A--National Security Education Program
Section 601 amends the David L. Boren National Security
Education Act of 1991 (Title VIII of the Intelligence
Authorization Act of 1992) to authorize an appropriation to the
Intelligence Community Management Account to support the
scholarship, fellowship and grant programs under the National
Security Education Program (NSEP). The Intelligence
Authorization Act of 1992 created the NSEP, along with the
National Security Education Trust Fund as a means of funding
the NSEP. That trust fund has been nearly depleted and an
appropriation of $8,000,000 is authorized for fiscal year 2005
to maintain the important education opportunities afforded by
the NSEP.
Section 602 amends the David L. Boren National Security
Education Act of 1991 to modify the service obligations for
recipients of NSEP scholarships and fellowships. The section
shortens the amount of time a recipient of an NSEP scholarship
or fellowship has to find federal employment as part of the
service agreement made in exchange for educational assistance.
Recipients of scholarships would be required to find federal
employment within three years after completion of their
studies, while recipients of fellowships would be required to
find federal employment within two years after completion of
their studies. Recipients of scholarships would be required to
serve in the federal government for a period of one year, while
recipients of fellowships would be required to serve in the
federal government for a period of time equal to the duration
of the assistance provided, but in no case less than one year.
The section also expands the number of federal agencies in
which a recipient may serve to include, in addition the
Department of Defense, any element of the intelligence
community, the Department of State, and the Department of
Homeland Security.
Section 603 amends the David L. Boren National Security
Education Act of 1991 to authorize an appropriation of
$12,000,000 for fiscal year 2005 to the Intelligence Community
Management Account for the expansion of the grant program for
institutions of higher education under the National Flagship
Language Initiative (NFLI). The section details certain service
obligations required for undergraduate and graduate students
and federal employees who receive training in programs under
the NFLI. The provision also seeks to increase the number of
qualified institutions that receive grants under the NFLI.
Section 604 amends the David L. Boren National Security
Education Act of 1991 to establish a scholarship program within
NSEP for English language studies for heritage community
citizens of the United States. The scholarship program is
designed to enable native speakers of languages that are
considered critical to the national security interests of the
United States to attain English language proficiency. The
ultimate goal is to increase the scholarship recipient's
English language proficiency to the level where a valuable
contribution can be made to the intelligence community. The
section establishes certain service obligations for work in a
national security position or in the field of education. The
section authorizes an appropriation of $4,000,000 for fiscal
year 2005 to the Intelligence Community Management Account to
establish the scholarship.
Subtitle B--Improvement in Intelligence Community Foreign Language
Skills
Section 611 amends the National Security Act of 1947 to
establish an Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for
Language and Education to oversee and coordinate the
requirements for foreign language education and training of the
intelligence community. The Assistant Director is charged with
identifying those languages that are critical to the ability of
the intelligence community to carry out national security
mission, as well as monitoring the allocation of resources for
foreign language education and training. The section also
requires the Assistant Director submit to Congress a number of
reports relating to the enhancement of the intelligence
community's language capabilities.
Section 612 amends the National Security Act of 1947 to
establish a language proficiency requirement for those
individuals appointed to Senior Intelligence Service (SIS)
positions within the CIA's Directorate of Operations (DO) and
Directorate of Intelligence (DI). In order to be eligible for
promotion to SIS positions within the DO or DI, individuals
must be certified as having professional speaking and reading
proficiency of at least level 3 on the Interagency Language
Roundtable Language Skills Level or commensurate proficiency
indicator. The Director of Central Intelligence is tasked with
providing to Congress a report explaining which positions, if
any, should be exempt from this requirement.
Section 613 amends the National Security Act of 1947 to
authorize the Director of Central Intelligence and the
Secretary of Defense to establish a program to advance foreign
language skills in languages that are critical to the national
security interests of the United States. The section allows the
intelligence community to enter into educational partnership
agreements with educational institutions to encourage and
enhance the study of foreign languages. These partnership
agreements would allow the intelligence community to provide
educational institutions with loaned and surplus equipment,
personnel to teach courses and develop curriculum, academic and
career advice, and cash awards. The section also provides the
intelligence community with the authority to accept the
volunteer services of employees of the intelligence community
and private citizens in support of the partnership activities.
The section provides the intelligence community with the
authority to assign employees in analytical positions requiring
foreign language expertise to accredited institutions of higher
education for training in foreign languages.
Section 614 requires the Director of Central Intelligence
to conduct a pilot project to establish a Civilian Linguist
Reserve Corps (CLRC) comprised of United States citizens with
advanced levels of proficiency in foreign languages. These
individuals would be available to be called up to perform
federal service in areas relating to their language expertise.
The section authorizes an appropriation for the pilot project,
which will be conducted for a three-year period. In conducting
the pilot project, the Director of Central Intelligence is to
take into account the findings and recommendations contained in
the CLRC feasibility report, required by the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003.
Section 615 amends the National Security Act of 1947 to
require the National Virtual Translation Center (NVTC) to
minimize the need for a central translation facility. NVTC will
do this by utilizing state-of-the-art communications
technology, using remote-connection capabilities, and
integrating the existing translation capabilities of the
intelligence community. The personnel of NVTC will be allowed
to perform their translation function from any U.S. Government-
certified secure facility that the Director of Central
Intelligence determines to be appropriate for such purpose.
Section 616 requires the Secretary of Defense to conduct a
study on methods to improve the recruitment and retention of
qualified language instructors at the Foreign Language Center
at the Defense Language Institute. In preparing this report,
the Secretary is to consider, as a means of recruitment and
retention, providing permanent resident alien status to those
qualified language instructors who are in the United States in
a temporary status.
Committee Position and Recorded Votes Taken
Motion To Close
On June 16, 2004, in open session, a quorum being present,
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, by a recorded
vote of 9 ayes to 8 noes voted to close the Markup pursuant to
Rule 5 of the Rules of Procedure of the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence and Rules 10 and 11 of the Rules of
House of Representatives, because national security would be
endangered if the matters to be considered were disclosed.
On that vote, the Members present recorded their
votes as follows: Mr. Goss (Chairman)--aye; Mr.
Bereuter--aye; Mr. Boehlert--aye; Mr. Gibbons--aye; Mr.
LaHood--aye; Mr. Cunningham--aye; Mr. Hoekstra--aye;
Mr. Everett--aye; Mr. Collins--aye; Mrs. Harman--no;
Mr. Reyes--no; Mr. Boswell--no; Mr. Peterson--no; Mr.
Cramer--no; Ms. Eshoo--no; Mr. Holt--no; Mr.
Ruppersberger--no.
Closed Session
Chairman Goss offered an amendment in the nature of a
substitute to H.R. 4548, as introduced. The Committee adopted
the Goss amendment by a voice vote.
An amendment was offered by Mr. Bereuter, to which Mr. Holt
offered a second degree amendment that would have expanded the
authorities of certain programs contained in the Bereuter
amendment. The Committee rejected the Holt amendment by a vote
of 8 ayes to 11 noes.
On that vote, the Members present recorded their
votes as follows: Mr. Goss (Chairman)--no; Mr.
Bereuter--no; Mr. Boehlert--no; Mr. Gibbons--no; Mr.
LaHood--no; Mr. Cunningham--no; Mr. Hoekstra--no; Mr.
Burr--no; Mr. Everett--no; Mr. Gallegly--no; Mr.
Collins--no; Mrs. Harman--aye; Mr. Reyes--aye; Mr.
Boswell--aye; Mr. Peterson--aye; Mr. Cramer--aye; Ms.
Eshoo--aye; Mr. Holt--aye; Mr. Ruppersberger--aye.
On Mr. Bereuter's amendment to revise the funding mechanism
for scholarships, fellowships, and grants to institutions under
the National Security Education Program, and to improve the
foreign language capabilities of the Intelligence Community,
the Committee voted to adopt the amendment by voice vote.
On Mr. Peterson's amendment to Section 102 of the Goss
amendment in the nature of a substitute, previously adopted, to
increase funding levels contained in the schedule of
authorizations incorporated by reference therein, the Committee
rejected the amendment by a recorded vote of 8 ayes to 10 noes.
On that vote, the Members present recorded their
votes as follows: Mr. Goss (Chairman)--no; Mr.
Bereuter--no; Mr. Gibbons--no; Mr. LaHood--no; Mr.
Cunningham--no; Mr. Hoekstra--no; Mr. Burr--no; Mr.
Everett--no; Mr. Gallegly--no; Mr. Collins--no; Mrs.
Harman--aye; Mr. Reyes--aye; Mr. Boswell--aye; Mr.
Peterson--aye; Mr. Cramer--aye; Ms. Eshoo--aye; Mr.
Holt--aye; Mr. Ruppersberger--aye.
On Mr. Reyes' amendment to withhold 25% of authorized funds
for various intelligence programs until such time as the
Committee received certain documents relating to interrogation
practices, the Committee rejected the amendment by a vote of 8
ayes to 11 noes.
On that vote, the Members present recorded their
votes as follows: Mr. Goss (Chairman)--no; Mr.
Bereuter--no; Mr. Boehlert--no; Mr. Gibbons--no; Mr.
LaHood--no; Mr. Cunningham--no; Mr. Hoekstra--no; Mr.
Burr--no; Mr. Everett--no; Mr. Gallegly--no; Mr.
Collins--no; Mrs. Harman--aye; Mr. Reyes--aye; Mr.
Boswell--aye; Mr. Peterson--aye; Mr. Cramer--aye; Ms.
Eshoo--aye; Mr. Holt--aye; Mr. Ruppersberger--aye.
On Ms. Eshoo's amendment to withhold 100% of funds
authorized for certain intelligence related activities of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence until such time as
the Committee receives a report and documents relating to the
funding and activities of Ahmed Chalabi, the Committee rejected
the amendment by a vote of 8 ayes to 10 noes.
On that vote, the Members present recorded their
votes as follows: Mr. Goss (Chairman)--no; Mr.
Bereuter--no; Mr. Gibbons--no; Mr. LaHood--no; Mr.
Cunningham--no; Mr. Hoekstra--no; Mr. Burr--no; Mr.
Everett--no; Mr. Gallegly--no; Mr. Collins--no; Mrs.
Harman--aye; Mr. Reyes--aye; Mr. Boswell--aye; Mr.
Peterson--aye; Mr. Cramer--aye; Ms. Eshoo--aye; Mr.
Holt--aye; Mr. Ruppersberger--aye.
On Mrs. Harman's amendment to attach H.R. 4104 to the Goss
amendment in the nature of a substitute, previously adopted,
the Committee rejected the amendment by a vote of 8 ayes to 10
noes.
On that vote, the Members present recorded their
votes as follows: Mr. Goss (Chairman)--no; Mr.
Bereuter--no; Mr. Gibbons--no; Mr. LaHood--no; Mr.
Cunningham--no; Mr. Hoekstra--no; Mr. Burr--no; Mr.
Everett--no; Mr. Gallegly--no; Mr. Collins--no; Mrs.
Harman--aye; Mr. Reyes--aye; Mr. Boswell--aye; Mr.
Peterson--aye; Mr. Cramer--aye; Ms. Eshoo--aye; Mr.
Holt--aye; Mr. Ruppersberger--aye.
On Mr. Peterson's amendment to increase certain funding
levels in the classified schedule of authorizations, the
Committee rejected the amendment by a vote of 8 ayes to 10
noes.
On that vote, the Members present recorded their
votes as follows: Mr. Goss (Chairman)--no; Mr.
Bereuter--no; Mr. Gibbons--no; Mr. LaHood--no; Mr.
Cunningham--no; Mr. Hoekstra--no; Mr. Burr--no; Mr.
Everett--no; Mr. Gallegly--no; Mr. Collins--no; Mrs.
Harman--aye; Mr. Reyes--aye; Mr. Boswell--aye; Mr.
Peterson--aye; Mr. Cramer--aye; Ms. Eshoo--aye; Mr.
Holt--aye; Mr. Ruppersberger--aye.
On Mr. Cramer's amendment to modify the funding level for a
classified program in the classified schedule of
authorizations, the Committee rejected the amendment by a vote
of 9 ayes to 10 noes.
On that vote, the Members present recorded their
votes as follows: Mr. Goss (Chairman)--no; Mr.
Bereuter--aye; Mr. Boehlert--no; Mr. Gibbons--no; Mr.
LaHood--no; Mr. Cunningham--no; Mr. Hoekstra--no; Mr.
Burr--no; Mr. Everett--no; Mr. Gallegly--no; Mr.
Collins--no; Mrs. Harman--aye; Mr. Reyes--aye; Mr.
Boswell--aye; Mr. Peterson--aye; Mr. Cramer--aye; Ms.
Eshoo--aye; Mr. Holt--aye; Mr. Ruppersberger--aye.
On Mr. Gibbons' amendment to reduce funding for a research
and development program and transfer those funds to provide
additional resources to the DCI for sustained operations tempo
for prosecuting the Global War on Terrorism, the Committee
rejected the amendment by a vote of 8 ayes, 9 noes and 2 pass.
On that vote, the Members present recorded their
votes as follows: Mr. Goss (Chairman)--aye; Mr.
Bereuter--pass; Mr. Boehlert--aye; Mr. Gibbons--aye;
Mr. LaHood--aye; Mr. Cunningham--aye; Mr. Hoekstra--
aye; Mr. Burr--pass; Mr. Everett--no; Mr. Gallegly--
aye; Mr. Collins--aye; Mrs. Harman--no; Mr. Reyes--no;
Mr. Boswell--no; Mr. Peterson--no; Mr. Cramer--no; Ms.
Eshoo--no; Mr. Holt--no; Mr. Ruppersberger--no.
Open Session
On June 16, 2004, in open session, a quorum being present,
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, by a recorded
vote of 11 ayes to 8 noes, approved the bill, H.R. 4548, as
amended with an amendment in the nature of a substitute. By
that vote, the Committee ordered the bill reported favorably to
the House.
On that vote, the Members present recorded their
votes as follows: Mr. Goss (Chairman)--aye; Mr.
Bereuter--aye; Mr. Boehlert--aye; Mr. Gibbons--aye; Mr.
LaHood--aye; Mr. Cunningham--aye; Mr. Hoekstra--aye;
Mr. Burr--aye; Mr. Everett--aye; Mr. Gallegly--aye; Mr.
Collins--aye; Mrs. Harman--no; Mr. Reyes--no; Mr.
Boswell--no; Mr. Peterson--no; Mr. Cramer--no; Ms.
Eshoo--no; Mr. Holt--no; Mr. Ruppersberger--no.
Correspondence With Other Committees Regarding Particular Provisions
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Committee on Armed Services,
House of Representatives,
Washington, DC, June 18, 2004.
Hon. Porter Goss,
Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: I am writing to you concerning the
jurisdictional interest of the Committee on Armed Services in
matters being considered in H.R. 4548, a bill to authorize
appropriations for fiscal year 2005 for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the United States
Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for
other purposes.
Our Committee recognizes the importance of H.R. 4548 and
the need for the legislation to move expeditiously. Therefore,
while we have a valid claim to jurisdiction over a number of
provisions of the bill, I do not intend to request a sequential
referral. This, of course, is conditional on our mutual
understanding that nothing in this legislation or my decision
to forego a sequential referral waives, reduces or otherwise
affects the jurisdiction of the Committee on Armed Services.
The Committee on Armed Services also asks that you support
our request to be conferees on the provisions over which we
have jurisdiction during any House-Senate conference.
With best wishes.
Sincerely,
Duncan Hunter,
Chairman.
------
House of Representatives,
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC, June 18, 2004.
Hon. Duncan Hunter,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
Rayburn HOB, Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Hunter: Thank you for your letter of June 18,
2004, regarding H.R. 4548, the Intelligence Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2005. As you noted, elements of the bill as
reported fall within the Rule X jurisdiction of the Committee
on Armed Services. I will continue to work with you on these
sections and will support the Committee on Armed Services'
request to the Speaker for conferees on these provisions.
I appreciate your willingness to forgo consideration of the
bill and not request a sequential referral in the interests of
expediting consideration of the bill.
I acknowledge that by agreeing to waive consideration of
the bill, the Committee on Armed Services does not waive its
jurisdiction over the bill or any of the matters under your
jurisdiction. I will include a copy of your letter and this
response in our Committee's report on H.R. 4548 and the
Congressional Record during consideration of the legislation on
the House floor.
Thank you for your assistance in this matter.
Sincerely,
Porter J. Goss,
Chairman.
COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND THE WORKFORCE
Committee on Education and the Workforce,
House of Representatives,
Washington, DC, June 21, 2004.
Hon. Porter Goss,
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
Capitol, Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Goss: I am writing to confirm our mutual
understanding with respect to consideration of H.R. 4548,
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, which the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence ordered reported on
June 16, 2004. While this bill was referred solely to the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, your Committee
adopted provisions within the jurisdiction of the Committee on
Education and the Workforce, specifically those programs for
national security education now contained in the new Title VI,
Education.
Within Title VI, the Committee also included provisions
changing the application of the Federal Employees Compensation
Act (FECA) to contain volunteers, which the Congressional
Budget Office has indicated will increase mandatory spending
FECA. I thank you for working with me and for agreeing to offer
an amendment to the bill for the rule during the Committee on
Rules consideration of H.R. 4548. Since this amendment will
correct a mandatory spending problem, I will support your
request that this amendment be adopted as a self-executed
amendment to the rule for H.R. 4548.
With this understanding, I do not intend to delay
consideration of H.R. 4548, nor will I object to the scheduling
of this bill for consideration in the House of Representatives.
However, I do so only with the understanding that this
procedural route should not be construed to prejudice the
Committee on Education and the Workforce's jurisdictional
interest and prerogatives on these provisions or any other
similar legislation and will not be considered as precedent for
consideration of matters of jurisdictional interest to my
Committee in the future. Furthermore, should these or similar
provisions be considered in a conference with the Senate, I
would expect Members of the Committee on Education and the
Workforce be appointed to the conference committee on those
provisions.
Finally, I would ask that you include a copy of our
exchange of letters on this matter in your report to accompany
this bill. If you have questions regarding this matter, please
do not hesitate to call me. I thank you for your consideration.
Sincerely,
John A. Boehner,
Chairman.
------
House of Representatives,
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC, June 21, 2004.
Hon. John A. Boehner,
Chairman, Committee on Education and the Workforce,
Rayburn HOB, Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Boehner: Thank you for your letter of June
21, 2004, regarding H.R. 4548, the Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2005. As you noted, provisions of the bill
as reported fall within the Rule X jurisdiction of the
Committee on Education and Workforce. I will continue to work
with you on these sections. I understand that the bill includes
a provision changing the application of the Federal Employees
Compensation Act (FECA) to certain volunteers, and that the
Congressional Budget Office has indicated that this provision
would increase mandatory spending in FECA. I agree to offer an
amendment to the bill for the rule during the Committee on the
Rules consideration of H.R. 4548.
I appreciate your willingness to forgo consideration of the
bill and not request a sequential referral in the interests of
expediting consideration of the bill. I acknowledge that by
agreeing to waive consideration of the bill, the Committee on
Education and Workforce does not waive its jurisdiction over
the bill or any of the matters under your jurisdiction. In
addition, I will support the Committee on Education and
Workforce's request to the Speaker to name conferees to the
conference committee on these provisions.
I will include a copy of your letter and this response in
our Committee's report on H.R. 4548 and the Congressional
Record during consideration of the legislation on the House
floor.
Thank you for your assistance in this matter.
Sincerely,
Porter J. Goss,
Chairman.
Oversight Findings and Recommendations
With respect to clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, the Committee held 14 hearings
and briefings on the classified budgetary issues raised by H.R.
4548. Testimony was taken from senior officials of the Central
Intelligence Agency; the DCI's Community Management Staff; the
Department of Defense; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the
National Security Agency; the National Reconnaissance Office;
the National GeoSpatial-Intelligence Agency; the Departments of
the Army, Navy, and Air Force; the Department of State; the
Department of Treasury; the Department of Energy; the
Department of Justice; the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the
Department of Homeland Security; and the U.S. Coast Guard. Such
testimony related to the activities and plans of the
Intelligence Community covered by the provisions and
authorizations, both classified and unclassified, of the
``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005.'' The
bill, as reported by the Committee, reflects conclusions
reached by the Committee in light of this oversight activity.
Fiscal Year Cost Projections
The Committee has attempted, pursuant to clause 3(d)(2) of
rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, to
ascertain the outlays that will occur in fiscal year 2005 and
the five years following, if the amounts authorized are
appropriated. These estimates are contained in the classified
annex and are in accordance with those of the executive branch.
Congressional Budget Office Estimates
U.S. Congress,
Congressional Budget Office,
Washington, DC, June 21, 2004.
Hon. Porter J. Goss,
Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 4548, the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Matthew
Schmit.
Sincerely,
Elizabeth M. Robinson
(For Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Director).
Enclosure.
H.R. 4548--Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005
Summary: H.R. 4548 would authorize appropriations for
fiscal year 2005 for intelligence activities of the U.S.
Government, the Intelligence Community Management Account, and
the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability
System (CIARDS).
This estimate addresses only the unclassified portion of
the bill. On that limited basis, CBO estimates that
implementing certain provisions of the bill would cost $344
million over the 2005-2009 period, assuming appropriation of
the necessary funds. H.R. 4548 would affect direct spending,
but CBO cannot estimate those effects because the data needed
to prepare such an estimate are classified.
H.R. 4548 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector
mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA).
Some private or public educational institutions would benefit
from grant programs and appropriations authorized in this bill;
any costs incurred by those schools would be incurred
voluntarily.
Estimated cost to the Federal Government: The estimated
budgetary impact of the unclassified portions of H.R. 4548 is
shown in the following table. CBO cannot obtain the necessary
information to estimate the costs for the entire bill because
some parts are classified at a level above clearances held by
CBO employees. For purposes of this estimate, CBO assumes that
the bill will be enacted by October 1, 2004, and that the
necessary amounts will be appropriated for fiscal year 2005.
Estimated outlays are based on historical spending patterns.
The costs of this legislation fall within budget function 050
(national defense).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
By fiscal year, in millions of dollars--
--------------------------------------------
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHANGES IN SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION \1\
Intelligence Community Management Account:
Authorization Level............................................ 318 0 0 0 0
Estimated Outlays.............................................. 193 98 20 5 0
Foreign Language Initiatives:
Estimated Authorization Level.................................. 4 4 4 4 4
Estimated Outlays.............................................. 2 4 4 4 4
Emerging Technologies Panel:
Estimated Authorization Level.................................. 2 2 2 2 2
Estimated Outlays.............................................. 2 2 2 2 2
Total Changes:
Estimated Authorization Level.................................. 324 6 6 6 6
Estimated Outlays.............................................. 197 104 26 11 6
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ In addition to effects on spending subject to appropriation, H.R. 4548 would affect direct spending.
However, CBO cannot estimate those effects because the data needed to prepare an estimate are classified.
Basis of estimate
Spending subject to appropriation
H.R. 4548 would authorize the appropriation of $318 million
for the Intelligence Community Management Account, which funds
the coordination of programs, budget oversight, and management
of the intelligence agencies. That account received an
appropriation of $178 million for 2004. The bill would earmark
$30 million for the National Drug Intelligence Center and $24
million for education initiatives from the funds authorized for
the Intelligence Community Management Account. In addition to
the costs covered by the specified authorization, the bill
contains several new provisions, dealing with foreign language
training and an advisory panel, that CBO estimates would
require additional appropriations of $30 million over the 2005-
2009 period to implement. CBO estimates that implementing these
provisions would cost $344 million over the 2005-2009 period,
assuming appropriation of the specified and estimated amounts.
Foreign Language Initiatives. Section 613 would enhance the
authorities of the intelligence community to provide foreign
language training to its employees by allowing the Secretary of
Defense and Director of Central Intelligence to create a joint
Foreign Languages Program. Under this program, the intelligence
community would be allowed to enter into cooperative agreements
with educational institutions to develop and administer
instruction in foreign languages critical to national security
activities. The provision also would allow the Director of
Central Intelligence to reimburse employees for the cost of
foreign language materials and instruction at institutions of
higher education. The cost of both programs would depend on how
the agencies chose to implement each program and the number of
individuals involved. Absent information from the intelligence
community on how these programs would be implemented, CBO based
its estimate on the cost of programs within the Foreign Service
Institute and the Defense Foreign Language Institute that focus
on languages critical to the current Global War on Terrorism.
CBO estimates the cost of implementing both new programs would
be about $4 million a year over the 2005-2009 period.
Emerging Technologies Panel. Section 501 would establish
the National Security Agency Emerging Technologies Panel to
advise the director of that agency on technological advances on
encryption and other topics. Based on the budgets of other
standing committees and advisory panels, CBO estimates the
administrative cost to operate this panel would total about $2
million a year over the 2005-2009 period.
Direct spending and revenues
Section 201 would authorize the appropriation of $239
million for CIARDS to cover retirement costs attributable to
military service and various unfunded liabilities. The
appropriation to CIARDS is considered mandatory, and the
authorization under this bill would be the same as assumed in
the CBO baseline. Thus, this estimate does not ascribe any
additional cost to that provision.
Section 401 would extend indefinitely the authority of the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to offer incentive payments
to employees who voluntarily retire or resign. Under current
law, this authority would expire on September 30, 2005. This
section also would eliminate the requirement that the CIA make
deposit to the Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund
equal to 15 percent of final pay for each employee who accepts
an incentive payment. Extending authority to offer incentive
payments to these employees could increase outlays from the
civil service retirement system in the near term, although
those amounts would be offset by reduced retirement payments in
later years. CBO cannot provide an estimate of the direct
spending effects because the data needed for such an estimate
are classified.
Intergovernmental and private-sector impact: This bill
contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as
defined in UMRA. The bill would authorize $8 million in fiscal
year 2005 for the National Security Education Program. Under
current law, colleges and universities receive one-third of
those funds to increase foreign language and regional programs.
The bill also would authorize the appropriation of $22 million
in fiscal year 2005 for the National Flagship Language
Initiative and encourage the participation of more schools in
the program. Finally, the bill would authorize loans and
transfers of equipment, instructional material, and cash awards
to schools through the Foreign Languages Program. Some private
or public schools would benefit from those programs; any costs
incurred by those schools would be incurred voluntarily.
Previous CBO estimate: On May 21, 2004, CBO transmitted a
cost estimate for the unclassified portion of S. 2386, the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, as
reported by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on May
5, 2004. The differences in the estimated costs reflect
differences in the bills. In particular, S. 2386 would
authorize $343 million for the Intelligence Community
Management Account, while H.R. 4548 would authorize $318
million for that account. H.R. 4548 also would authorize new
programs for foreign language training and an advisory panel,
which CBO estimates would require additional appropriations of
about $30 million over the 2005-2009 period.
Estimates prepared by: Federal Costs: Matthew Schmit.
Impact on State, Local, and Tribal Governments: Melissa
Merrell. Impact on the Private Sector: David Arthur.
Estimate approved by: Peter H. Fontaine, Deputy Assistant
Director for Budget Analysis.
Committee Cost Estimates
The Committee agrees with the estimate of the Congressional
Budget Office.
Specific Constitutional Authority for Congressional Enactment of This
Legislation
The intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the
United States government are carried out to support the
national security interests of the United States, to support
and assist the armed forces of the United States, and to
support the President in the execution of the foreign policy of
the United States.
Article 1, section 8 of the Constitution of the United
States provides, in pertinent part, that ``Congress shall have
power * * * to pay the debts and provide for the common defence
and general welfare of the United States; * * *''; ``to raise
and support Armies, * * *'' ``to provide and maintain a Navy; *
* *'' and ``to make all laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into execution * * * all other powers
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.''
Therefore, pursuant to such authority, Congress is
empowered to enact this legislation.
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported
In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new
matter is printed in italic, existing law in which no change is
proposed is shown in roman):
NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947
short title
That this Act may be cited as the ``National Security Act of
1947''.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Sec. 2. Declaration of policy.
* * * * * * *
Title I--Coordination for National Security
Sec. 101. National Security Council.
* * * * * * *
Sec. 119. National Virtual Translation Center.
* * * * * * *
TITLE X--EDUCATION IN SUPPORT OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
[Sec. 1001. Scholarships and work-study for pursuit of graduate degrees
in science and technology.]
Subtitle A--Science and Technology
Sec. 1001. Scholarships and work-study for pursuit of graduate degrees
in science and technology.
Subtitle B--Foreign Languages Program
Sec. 1011. Program on advancement of foreign languages critical to the
intelligence community.
Sec. 1012. Education partnerships.
Sec. 1013. Voluntary services.
Sec. 1014. Regulations.
Sec. 1015. Definitions.
Subtitle C--Additional Education Provisions
Sec. 1021. Assignment of intelligence community personnel as language
students.
* * * * * * *
TITLE I--COORDINATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
* * * * * * *
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Sec. 102. (a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(d) Duties of Deputy Directors.--(1)(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
(2) The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community
Management shall, subject to the direction of the Director of
Central Intelligence, be responsible for the following:
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
(E) Through the Assistant Director of Central
Intelligence for Language and Education, ensuring the
foreign language education and training requirements of
the intelligence community are met.
* * * * * * *
(e) Office of the Director of Central Intelligence.--(1) * *
*
(2) The Office of the Director of Central Intelligence is
composed of the following:
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
[(G) The Assistant Director of Central Intelligence
for Administration.]
(G) The Assistant Director of Central Intelligence
for Information Management.
(H) The Assistant Director of Central Intelligence
for Education and Language.
[(H)] (I) Such other offices and officials as may be
established by law or the Director of Central
Intelligence may establish or designate in the Office.
* * * * * * *
[(h) Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for
Administration.--(1) To assist the Director of Central
Intelligence in carrying out the Director's responsibilities
under this Act, there shall be an Assistant Director of Central
Intelligence for Administration who shall be appointed by the
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
[(2) The Assistant Director for Administration shall manage
such activities relating to the administration of the
intelligence community as the Director of Central Intelligence
shall require.]
(h) Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for
Information Management.--(1) To assist the Director of Central
Intelligence in carrying out the Director's responsibilities
under this Act, there shall be an Assistant Director of Central
Intelligence for Information Management who shall be appointed
by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate. The Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for
Information Management is the chief information officer of the
intelligence community.
(2) Subject to the direction of the Director of Central
Intelligence, the Assistant Director of Central Intelligence
for Information Management shall--
(A) manage activities relating to the information
technology infrastructure and enterprise architecture
requirements of the intelligence community;
(B) have procurement approval authority over all
information technology items related to the enterprise
architectures of all intelligence community components;
(C) direct and manage all information technology-
related procurement for the intelligence community; and
(D) ensure that all expenditures for information
technology and research and development activities are
consistent with the intelligence community enterprise
architecture and the strategy of the Director of
Central Intelligence for such architecture.
(3) An individual serving in the position of Assistant
Director of Central Intelligence for Information Management may
not, while so serving, serve as the chief information officer
of any other agency or department, or component thereof, of the
United States.
(i) Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Language
and Education.--(1) To assist the Director of Central
Intelligence in carrying out the Director's responsibilities
under this Act, there shall be an Assistant Director of Central
Intelligence for Language and Education who shall be appointed
by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate.
(2) The Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for
Language and Education shall carry out the following duties:
(A) Overseeing and coordinating requirements for
foreign language education and training of the
intelligence community.
(B) Establishing policy, standards, and priorities
relating to such requirements.
(C) Identifying languages that are critical to the
capability of the intelligence community to carry out
national security activities of the United States.
(D) Monitoring the allocation of resources for
foreign language education and training in order to
ensure the requirements of the intelligence community
with respect to foreign language proficiency are met.
(E) Making determinations under section 104(i).
* * * * * * *
AUTHORITIES OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Sec. 104. (a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(i) Requirement for Foreign Language Proficiency for Certain
Senior Level Positions in the Central Intelligence Agency.--(1)
An individual may not be appointed to a position in the Senior
Intelligence Service in the Directorate of Intelligence or the
Directorate of Operations of the Central Intelligence Agency
unless the Director of Central Intelligence determines that the
individual--
(A) has been certified as having a professional
speaking and reading proficiency in a foreign language,
such proficiency being at least level 3 on the
Interagency Language Roundtable Language Skills Level
or commensurate proficiency level on such other
indicator of proficiency as the Director determines to
be appropriate; and
(B) is able to effectively communicate the priorities
of the United States and exercise influence in that
foreign language.
(2) The Director shall carry out this subsection through the
Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Language and
Education.
* * * * * * *
NATIONAL VIRTUAL TRANSLATION CENTER
Sec. 119. (a) In General.--There is an element of the
intelligence community known as the National Virtual
Translation Center under the direction of the Director of
Central Intelligence.
(b) Function.--The National Virtual Translation Center shall
provide for timely and accurate translations of foreign
intelligence for all other elements of the intelligence
community.
(c) Facilitating Access to Translations.--In order to
minimize the need for a central facility for the National
Virtual Translation Center, the Center shall--
(1) use state-of-the-art communications technology;
(2) integrate existing translation capabilities in
the intelligence community; and
(3) use remote-connection capacities.
(d) Use of Secure Facilities.--Personnel of the National
Virtual Translation Center may carry out duties of the Center
at any location that--
(1) has been certified as a secure facility by an
agency or department of the United States; and
(2) the Director of Central Intelligence determines
to be appropriate for such purpose.
* * * * * * *
TITLE X--EDUCATION IN SUPPORT OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
Subtitle A--Science and Technology
* * * * * * *
Subtitle B--Foreign Languages Program
PROGRAM ON ADVANCEMENT OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES CRITICAL TO THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Sec. 1011. (a) Establishment of Program.--The Secretary of
Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence may jointly
establish a program to advance foreign languages skills in
languages that are critical to the capability of the
intelligence community to carry out national security
activities of the United States (hereinafter in this subtitle
referred to as the ``Foreign Languages Program'').
(b) Identification of Requisite Actions.--In order to carry
out the Foreign Languages Program, the Secretary of Defense and
the Director of Central Intelligence shall jointly determine
actions required to improve the education of personnel in the
intelligence community in foreign languages that are critical
to the capability of the intelligence community to carry out
national security activities of the United States to meet the
long-term intelligence needs of the United States.
EDUCATION PARTNERSHIPS
Sec. 1012. (a) In General.--In carrying out the Foreign
Languages Program, the head of an element of an intelligence
community entity may enter into one or more education
partnership agreements with educational institutions in the
United States in order to encourage and enhance the study of
foreign languages that are critical to the capability of the
intelligence community to carry out national security
activities of the United States in educational institutions.
(b) Assistance Provided Under Educational Partnership
Agreements.--Under an educational partnership agreement entered
into with an educational institution pursuant to this section,
the head of an element of an intelligence community entity may
provide the following assistance to the educational
institution:
(1) The loan of equipment and instructional materials
of the element of the intelligence community entity to
the educational institution for any purpose and
duration that the head determines to be appropriate.
(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law
relating to transfers of surplus property, the transfer
to the educational institution of any computer
equipment, or other equipment, that is--
(A) commonly used by educational
institutions;
(B) surplus to the needs of the entity; and
(C) determined by the head of the element to
be appropriate for support of such agreement.
(3) The provision of dedicated personnel to the
educational institution--
(A) to teach courses in foreign languages
that are critical to the capability of the
intelligence community to carry out national
security activities of the United States; or
(B) to assist in the development of such
courses and materials for the institution.
(4) The involvement of faculty and students of the
educational institution in research projects of the
element of the intelligence community entity.
(5) Cooperation with the educational institution in
developing a program under which students receive
academic credit at the educational institution for work
on research projects of the element of the intelligence
community entity.
(6) The provision of academic and career advice and
assistance to students of the educational institution.
(7) The provision of cash awards and other items that
the head of the element of the intelligence community
entity determines to be appropriate.
VOLUNTARY SERVICES
Sec. 1013. (a) Authority To Accept Services.--Notwithstanding
section 1342 of title 31, United States Code, and subject to
subsection (b), the Foreign Languages Program under section
1011 shall include authority for the head of an element of an
intelligence community entity to accept from any individual who
is dedicated personnel (as defined in section 1016(3))
voluntary services in support of the activities authorized by
this subtitle.
(b) Requirements and Limitations.--(1) In accepting voluntary
services from an individual under subsection (a), the head of
the element shall--
(A) supervise the individual to the same extent as
the head of the element would supervise a compensated
employee of that element providing similar services;
and
(B) ensure that the individual is licensed,
privileged, has appropriate educational or experiential
credentials, or is otherwise qualified under applicable
law or regulations to provide such services.
(2) In accepting voluntary services from an individual under
subsection (a), the head of an element of the intelligence
community entity may not--
(A) place the individual in a policymaking position,
or other position performing inherently government
functions; or
(B) except as provided in subsection (e), compensate
the individual for the provision of such services.
(c) Authority To Recruit and Train Individuals Providing
Services.--The head of an element of an intelligence community
entity may recruit and train individuals to provide voluntary
services accepted under subsection (a).
(d) Status of Individuals Providing Services.--(1) Subject to
paragraph (2), while providing voluntary services accepted
under subsection (a) or receiving training under subsection
(c), an individual shall be considered to be an employee of the
Federal Government only for purposes of the following
provisions of law:
(A) Subchapter I of chapter 81 of title 5, United
States Code (relating to compensation for work-related
injuries).
(B) Section 552a of title 5, United States Code
(relating to maintenance of records on individuals).
(C) Chapter 11 of title 18, United States Code
(relating to conflicts of interest).
(2)(A) With respect to voluntary services accepted under
paragraph (1) provided by an individual that are within the
scope of the services so accepted, the individual is deemed to
be a volunteer of a governmental entity or nonprofit
institution for purposes of the Volunteer Protection Act of
1997 (42 U.S.C. 14501 et seq.).
(B) In the case of any claim against such an individual with
respect to the provision of such services, section 4(d) of such
Act (42 U.S.C. 14503(d)) shall not apply.
(3) Acceptance of voluntary services under this section shall
have no bearing on the issuance or renewal of a security
clearance.
(e) Compensation for Work-Related Injuries.--For purposes of
determining the compensation for work-related injuries payable
under chapter 81 of title 5, United States Code, to an
individual providing voluntary services accepted under
subsection (a), the monthly pay of the individual for such
services is deemed to be equal to the amount determined by
multiplying--
(1) the average monthly number of hours that the
individual provided the services, by
(2) the minimum wage determined in accordance with
section 6(a)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
(29 U.S.C. 206(a)(1)).
(f) Reimbursement of Incidental Expenses.--(1) The head of an
element of the intelligence community entity may reimburse an
individual for incidental expenses incurred by the individual
in providing voluntary services accepted under subsection (a).
The head of an element of the intelligence community entity
shall determine which expenses are eligible for reimbursement
under this subsection.
(2) Reimbursement under paragraph (1) may be made from
appropriated or nonappropriated funds.
(g) Authority To Install Equipment.--(1) The head of an
element of the intelligence community may install telephone
lines and any necessary telecommunication equipment in the
private residences of individuals who provide voluntary
services accepted under subsection (a).
(2) The head of an element of the intelligence community may
pay the charges incurred for the use of equipment installed
under paragraph (1) for authorized purposes.
(3) Notwithstanding section 1348 of title 31, United States
Code, the head of an element of the intelligence community
entity may use appropriated funds or nonappropriated funds of
the element in carrying out this subsection.
REGULATIONS
Sec. 1014. (a) In General.--The Secretary of Defense and the
Director of Central Intelligence jointly shall promulgate
regulations necessary to carry out the Foreign Languages
Program authorized under this subtitle.
(b) Elements of the Intelligence Community.--Each head of an
element of an intelligence community entity shall prescribe
regulations to carry out sections 1012 and 1013 with respect to
that element including the following:
(1) Procedures to be utilized for the acceptance of
voluntary services under section 1013.
(2) Procedures and requirements relating to the
installation of equipment under section 1013(g).
DEFINITIONS
Sec. 1015. In this subtitle:
(1) The term ``intelligence community entity'' means
an agency, office, bureau, or element referred to in
subparagraphs (B) through (K) of section 3(4).
(2) The term ``educational institution'' means--
(A) a local educational agency (as that term
is defined in section 9101(26) of the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965
(20 U.S.C. 7801(26))),
(B) an institution of higher education (as
defined in section 102 of the Higher Education
Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1002) other than
institutions referred to in subsection
(a)(1)(C) of such section), or
(C) any other nonprofit institution that
provides instruction of foreign languages in
languages that are critical to the capability
of the intelligence community to carry out
national security activities of the United
States.
(3) The term ``dedicated personnel'' means employees
of the intelligence community and private citizens
(including former civilian employees of the Federal
Government who have been voluntarily separated, and
members of the United States Armed Forces who have been
honorably discharged or generally discharged under
honorable circumstances, and rehired on a voluntary
basis specifically to perform the activities authorized
under this subtitle).
Subtitle C--Additional Education Provisions
ASSIGNMENT OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PERSONNEL AS LANGUAGE STUDENTS
Sec. 1021. (a) In General.--The Director of Central
Intelligence, acting through the heads of the elements of the
intelligence community, may assign employees of such elements
in analyst positions requiring foreign language expertise as
students at accredited professional, technical, or other
institutions of higher education for training at the graduate
or undergraduate level in foreign languages required for the
conduct of duties and responsibilities of such positions.
(b) Authority for Reimbursement of Costs of Tuition and
Training.--(1) The Director may reimburse an employee assigned
under subsection (a) for the total cost of the training
described in subsection (a), including costs of educational and
supplementary reading materials.
(2) The authority under paragraph (1) shall apply to
employees who are assigned on a full-time or part-time basis.
(3) Reimbursement under paragraph (1) may be made from
appropriated or nonappropriated funds.
(c) Relationship to Compensation As an Analyst.--
Reimbursement under this section to an employee who is an
analyst is in addition to any benefits, allowances, travels, or
other compensation the employee is entitled to by reason of
serving in such an analyst position.
* * * * * * *
----------
SECTION 2 OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY VOLUNTARY SEPARATION PAY
ACT
SEC. 2. SEPARATION PAY.
(a) * * *
* * * * * * *
[(f) Termination.--No amount shall be payable under this
section based on any separation occurring after September 30,
2005.]
[(g)] (f) Regulations.--The Director shall prescribe such
regulations as may be necessary to carry out this section.
[(h)] (g) Reporting Requirements.--
(1) Offering notification.--The Director may not make
an offering of voluntary separation pay pursuant to
this section until 30 days after submitting to the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House
of Representatives and the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate a report describing the
occupational groups or geographic locations, or other
similar limitations or conditions, required by the
Director under subsection (d).
(2) Annual report.--At the end of each of the fiscal
years 1993 through 1997, the Director shall submit to
the President and the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the
Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate a report
on the effectiveness and costs of carrying out this
section.
[(i) Remittance of Funds.--The Director shall remit to the
Office of Personnel Management for deposit in the Treasury of
the United States to the credit of the Civil Service Retirement
and Disability Fund (in addition to any other payments which
the Director is required to make under subchapter III of
chapter 83 and subchapter II of chapter 84 of title 5, United
States Code), an amount equal to 15 percent of the final basic
pay of each employee who, in fiscal year 1998, 1999, 2000,
2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, or 2005, retires voluntarily under
section 8336, 8412, or 8414 of such title or resigns and to
whom a voluntary separation incentive payment has been or is to
be paid under this section. The remittance required by this
subsection shall be in lieu of any remittance required by
section 4(a) of the Federal Workforce Restructuring Act of 1994
(5 U.S.C. 8331 note).]
* * * * * * *
----------
SECTION 4 OF THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE RESTRUCTURING ACT OF 1994
SEC. 4. ADDITIONAL AGENCY CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE RETIREMENT FUND.
(a) Relating to Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995.--
(1) * * *
(2) Definitions.--For the purpose of this
subsection--
(A) * * *
(B) the term ``voluntary separation incentive
payment'' means--
(i) * * *
* * * * * * *
(ii) any separation pay under section
5597 of title 5, United States Code[,
or section 2 of the Central
Intelligence Agency Voluntary
Separation Pay Act (Public Law 103-36;
107 Stat. 104)].
* * * * * * *
----------
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY ACT OF 1959
* * * * * * *
Sec. 19. (a) There is established the National Security
Agency Emerging Technologies Panel. The panel is a standing
panel of the National Security Agency. The panel shall be
appointed by, and shall report directly to, the Director.
(b) The National Security Agency Emerging Technologies Panel
shall study and assess, and periodically advise the Director
on, the research, development, and application of existing and
emerging science and technology advances, advances on
encryption, and other topics.
(c) The Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) shall
not apply with respect to the National Security Agency Emerging
Technologies Panel.
----------
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1992
* * * * * * *
TITLE VIII--NATIONAL SECURITY SCHOLARSHIPS, FELLOWSHIPS, AND GRANTS
SEC. 801. SHORT TITLE, FINDINGS, AND PURPOSES.
(a) Short Title.--This title may be cited as the ``David L.
Boren National Security Education Act of 1991''.
* * * * * * *
SEC. 802. SCHOLARSHIP, FELLOWSHIP, AND GRANT PROGRAM.
(a) Program Required.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of Defense shall carry
out a program for--
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
(C) awarding grants to institutions of higher
education to enable such institutions to
establish, operate, or improve programs in
foreign languages, area studies,
counterproliferation studies, and other
international fields that are critical areas of
those disciplines (as determined under section
803(d)(4)(C)); [and]
(D) awarding grants to institutions of higher
education to carry out activities under the
National Flagship Language Initiative
(described in subsection (i))[.]; and
(E) awarding scholarships to students who--
(i) are United States citizens who--
(I) are native speakers
(commonly referred to as
heritage community residents)
of a foreign language that is
identified as critical to the
national security interests of
the United States who should be
actively recruited for
employment by Federal security
agencies with a need for
linguists; and
(II) are not proficient at a
professional level in the
English language with respect
to reading, writing, and
interpersonal skills required
to carry out the national
security interests of the
United States, as determined by
the Secretary,
to enable such students to pursue
English language studies at an
institution of higher education of the
United States to attain proficiency in
those skills; and
(ii) enter into an agreement to work
in a national security position or work
in the field of education in the area
of study for which the scholarship was
awarded in a similar manner (as
determined by the Secretary) as
agreements entered into pursuant to
subsection (b)(2)(A).
(2) Funding Allocations.--Of the amount available for
obligation out of the National Security Education Trust
Fund or from a transfer under section 810(c) for any
fiscal year for the purposes stated in paragraph (1),
the Secretary shall have a goal of allocating--
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
The funding allocation under this paragraph shall not
apply to grants under paragraph (1)(D) for the National
Flagship Language Initiative described in subsection
(i) or for the scholarship program under paragraph
(1)(E). For the authorization of appropriations for the
National Flagship Language Initiative, see section 811.
For the authorization of appropriations for the
scholarship program under paragraph (1)(E), see section
812.
* * * * * * *
(b) Service Agreement.--In awarding a scholarship or
fellowship under the program, the Secretary or contract
organization referred to in subsection (a)(4), as the case may
be, shall require a recipient of any fellowship, or any
scholarship to enter into an agreement that, in return for such
assistance, the recipient--
(1) * * *
(2) will--
[(A) in the case of a recipient of a
scholarship, after the recipient's completion
of the study for which scholarship assistance
was provided under the program, work in a
position in the Department of Defense or other
element of the intelligence community that is
certified by the Secretary as appropriate to
utilize the unique language and region
expertise acquired by the recipient pursuant to
such study for a period specified by the
Secretary, which period shall include one year
of service for each year, or portion thereof,
for which such scholarship assistance was
provided; or
[(B) in the case of a recipient of a
fellowship, after the recipient's completion of
the study for which the fellowship assistance
was provided under the program, work in a
position described in subparagraph (A) that is
certified by the Secretary as appropriate to
utilize the unique language and region
expertise acquired by the recipient pursuant to
such study for a period specified by the
Secretary, which period shall (at the
discretion of the Secretary) include not less
than one nor more than three years for each
year, or portion thereof, for which such
fellowship assistance was provided; and]
(A) in the case of a recipient of a
scholarship, as soon as practicable but in no
case later than three years after the
completion by the recipient of the study for
which scholarship assistance was provided under
the program, the recipient shall work for a
period of one year--
(i) in a national security position
that the Secretary certifies is
appropriate to use the unique language
and region expertise acquired by the
recipient pursuant to such study in the
Department of Defense, in any element
of the intelligence community, in the
Department of Homeland Security, or in
the Department of State; or
(ii) in such a position in any other
Federal department or agency not
referred to in clause (i) if the
recipient demonstrates to the Secretary
that no position is available in a
Federal department or agency specified
in clause (i); or
(B) in the case of a recipient of a
fellowship, as soon as practicable but in no
case later than two years after the completion
by the recipient of the study for which
fellowship assistance was provided under the
program, the recipient shall work for a period
equal to the duration of assistance provided
under the program, but in no case less than one
year--
(i) in a position described in
subparagraph (A)(i) that the Secretary
certifies is appropriate to use the
unique language and region expertise
acquired by the recipient pursuant to
such study; or
(ii) in such a position in any other
Federal department or agency not
referred to in clause (i) if the
recipient demonstrates to the Secretary
that no position is available in a
Federal department or agency specified
in clause (i); and
* * * * * * *
(i) National Flagship Language Initiative.--(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(5)(A) In the case of an undergraduate or graduate student
that participates in training in programs under paragraph (1),
the student shall enter into an agreement described in
subsection (b), other than such a student who has entered into
such an agreement pursuant to subparagraph (A)(ii) or (B)(ii)
of section 802(a)(1).
(B) In the case of an employee of an agency or department of
the Federal Government that participates in training in
programs under paragraph (1), the employee shall agree in
writing--
(i) to continue in the service of the agency or
department of the Federal Government employing the
employee for the period of such training;
(ii) to continue in the service of such agency or
department employing the employee following completion
of such training for a period of two years for each
year, or part of the year, of such training;
(iii) to reimburse the United States for the total
cost of such training (excluding the employee's pay and
allowances) provided to the employee if, before the
completion by the employee of the training, the
employment of the employee by the agency or department
is terminated due to misconduct by the employee or by
the employee voluntarily; and
(iv) to reimburse the United States if, after
completing such training, the employment of the
employee by the agency or department is terminated
either by the agency or department due to misconduct by
the employee or by the employee voluntarily, before the
completion by the employee of the period of service
required in clause (ii), in an amount that bears the
same ratio to the total cost of the training (excluding
the employee's pay and allowances) provided to the
employee as the unserved portion of such period of
service bears to the total period of service under
clause (ii).
(C) Subject to subparagraph (D), the obligation to reimburse
the United States under an agreement under subparagraph (A) is
for all purposes a debt owing the United States.
(D) The head of an element of the intelligence community may
release an employee, in whole or in part, from the obligation
to reimburse the United States under an agreement under
subparagraph (A) when, in the discretion of the head of the
element, the head of the element determines that equity or the
interests of the United States so require.
SEC. 803. NATIONAL SECURITY EDUCATION BOARD.
(a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(d) Functions.--The Board shall perform the following
functions:
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(4) After taking into account the annual analyses of
trends in language, international, area, and
counterproliferation studies under section 806(b)(1),
make recommendations to the Secretary regarding--
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
(E) which foreign languages are critical to
the national security interests of the United
States for purposes of section 802(a)(1)(D)
(relating to grants for the National Flagship
Language Initiative) and section 802(a)(1)(E)
(relating to scholarship programs for advanced
English language studies by heritage community
residents).
* * * * * * *
SEC. 810. FUNDING.
(a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(c) Funding From Intelligence Community Management Account
for Fiscal Years Beginning With Fiscal Year 2005.--In addition
to amounts that may be made available to the Secretary under
the Fund for a fiscal year, the Director of Central
Intelligence shall transfer to the Secretary from amounts
appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account
for each fiscal year, beginning with fiscal year 2005,
$8,000,000, to carry out the scholarship, fellowship, and grant
programs under subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C), respectively,
of section 802(a)(1).
[SEC. 811. ADDITIONAL ANNUAL AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
[(a) In General.--In addition to amounts that may be made
available to the Secretary under the Fund for a fiscal year,
there is authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary for
each fiscal year, beginning with fiscal year 2003, $10,000,000,
to carry out the grant program for the National Flagship
Language Initiative under section 802(a)(1)(D).
[(b) Availability of Appropriated Funds.--Amounts
appropriated pursuant to the authorization of appropriations
under subsection (a) shall remain available until expended.]
SEC. 811. FUNDING FOR THE NATIONAL FLAGSHIP LANGUAGE INITIATIVE.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations for Fiscal Years 2003 and
2004.--In addition to amounts that may be made available to the
Secretary under the Fund for a fiscal year, there is authorized
to be appropriated to the Secretary for each fiscal year,
beginning with fiscal year 2003, $10,000,000, to carry out the
grant program for the National Flagship Language Initiative
under section 802(a)(1)(D).
(b) Funding From Intelligence Community Management Account
for Fiscal Years Beginning With Fiscal Year 2005.--In addition
to amounts that may be made available to the Secretary under
the Fund for a fiscal year, the Director of Central
Intelligence shall transfer to the Secretary from amounts
appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account
for each fiscal year, beginning with fiscal year 2005,
$12,000,000, to carry out the grant program for the National
Flagship Language Initiative under section 802(a)(1)(D).
(c) Availability of Appropriated Funds.--Amounts made
available under this section shall remain available until
expended.
SEC. 812. FUNDING FOR SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM FOR CERTAIN HERITAGE
COMMUNITY RESIDENTS.
(a) Funding From Intelligence Community Management Account.--
In addition to amounts that may be made available to the
Secretary under the Fund for a fiscal year, the Director of
Central Intelligence shall transfer to the Secretary from
amounts appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management
Account for each fiscal year, beginning with fiscal year 2005,
$4,000,000, to carry out the scholarship programs for English
language studies by certain heritage community residents under
section 802(a)(1)(E).
(b) Availability of Funds.--Amounts made available under
subsection (a) shall remain available until expended.
* * * * * * *
MINORITY VIEWS
Our unanimous vote against favorably reporting this
authorization bill is intended to send an unmistakable message
that this bill needs to be stronger--we need stronger
intelligence and stronger oversight.
This was a difficult vote. For many of us, it was the first
time we had ever voted against an Intelligence Authorization
bill. We were compelled to this unprecedented decision by our
conviction that we simply cannot afford to shortchange
counterterrorism intelligence, fail to fix clearly identified
problems with intelligence, and ignore the trend toward less
and less effective oversight. Despite our best efforts, this
bill fails to address these critical issues.
We hope the Committee will work to include measures to
address these concerns and that we will be able to support a
stronger bipartisan bill on the house floor.
FULLY FUND INTELLIGENCE
The nation needs an intelligence authorization bill that
fully funds the Intelligence Community's requirements to fight
the war on terrorism.
The President's budget request covered just a fraction of
the Intelligence Community's counterterrorism requirements. For
example, it provided just 20% of the CIA's Counterterrorism
Center funding requirements.
After repeated bipartisan complaints from this Committee
about the lack of adequate funding, the Administration sent
down a request for supplemental funds to get through the first
quarter of the fiscal year. They say the rest of the funds will
be requested only after the November election.
Supplemental funding requests are not new. But what is
unprecedented is the degree to which the intelligence agencies
have been forced, particularly since September 11, to rely on
supplemental funding for core requirements. CIA's
Counterterrorism Center--the pointy end of the spear in the
Global War on Terrorism--has had to rely on late-in-the-year
supplemental requests for 80% of its funding needs.
Members on both sides of the aisle have roundly criticized
this growing practice of funding the Intelligence Community in
bits and pieces, rather than for a full fiscal year, the way
Congress is supposed to do it. Senior intelligence officials
have told the Committee that this practice makes it impossible
to plan, forcing them to ``rob Peter to pay Paul'' until the
additional funds arrive--potentially jeopardizing key
counterterrorism operations.
The nation's intelligence agencies have indicated with some
precision the additional amounts they will need this year to
fully fund counterterrorism efforts. It is likely that the
Intelligence Community will not receive the additional funds
until well into next year. So the bridge funds in the
Chairman's mark are a bridge too short.
Administration officials are on TV every week warning the
American public about another attack this summer. We simply
could not, in good conscience, go with ``business as usual''
and vote for a bill that provides less than one-third of what
the intelligence community needs to try to stop the next
attack.
The amendment offered by Representatives Peterson, Boswell,
and Cramer would have funded the counterterrorism needs of the
Intelligence Community at the full amount that is needed to
fight the war on terrorism. Unfortunately, our amendment was
rejected on a party-line vote.
STRENGTHEN OVERSIGHT
The American public expects this Committee not only to make
sure the Intelligence Community has the resources it needs to
safeguard our nation, but also to conduct rigorous oversight to
ensure that the activities the Intelligence Community
undertakes on behalf of all Americans are effective and
consistent with our national security interests and the rule of
law. Unfortunately, just as this bill fails to meet the
resource needs, it also fails to address serious oversight
problems.
Two oversight issues of particular importance are
determining what went wrong with regard to the abuse of
detainees and what was the true nature of the U.S. government's
relationship with Ahmed Chalabi.
Detainee Abuse
The pictures of abuse at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, which
were unknown to this committee until their public revelation on
60 Minutes, shocked all Americans. These despicable acts dealt
a stunning blow to our military effort in Iraq and to the
United States' image abroad, exposed U.S. soldiers and citizens
to retribution, and undermined our nation's moral authority
around the world. They also opened the door to a growing series
of revelations--almost entirely in the public media--about
broader issues related to detainee and interrogation policy.
These are issues that this Committee must address.
Interrogations are critical to gathering intelligence. They
are one way of generating dots that might lead the Intelligence
Community to the next terrorist plot. But adhering to the rule
of law and the principles that make our country a model to
which the Iraqi's and others should aspire are not only
essential to winning the battle against terrorism but they are
also essential to protecting our own soldiers should they fall
into enemy hands.
The abuses of Iraqi detainees at Abu Ghraib were
reprehensible. Equally stunning was the executive branch's
failure to inform this Committee of the abuses at Abu Ghraib.
Members of this Committee were in Baghdad in mid-February, just
when Major General Taguba was undertaking his investigation.
There was no mention of any problems.
There are numerous other examples of incidents and problems
that should have been brought forward to this Committee but
never were--until they were revealed in the media.
Witnesseshave been asked pointed questions. Members on both sides of
the aisle have urged them to be forthcoming. Yet, still we find a
shocking lack of candor.
Nor has the Committee received documents from the
Administration that are essential to understanding where
interrogations may have gone off track, including documents
that Defense Department representatives said they would
provide.
Representative Reyes offered an amendment that would have
fenced 25% of the funds authorized and appropriated for the
Central Intelligence Agency Program, the General Defense
Intelligence Program, the Joint Military Intelligence Program,
and the Army Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities
Program until the Committee receives all documents related to
the handling and treatment of detainees in Iraq, Afghanistan,
Guantanamo Bay, and elsewhere.
The funds this amendment would have fenced were substantial
but they would have been fully available to the agencies once
they provided the requested documents--all of which are in
their possession. It was intended to send a strong signal that
this Committee will follow the facts wherever they may lead and
that we are tired of being misled.
It is unfortunate that our effort to strengthen oversight
was defeated on a party-line vote.
USG Relationship With Ahmed Chalabi
In the case of Ahmed Chalabi, the Committee must find out
why the executive branch invested so much political and
financial capital in a man with such a checkered past.
The CIA terminated its relationship with him years ago
because it found him unreliable. The State Department couldn't
account for how he was spending the money it was giving him.
The Department of Defense felt compelled to go to extreme
lengths to ensure he and the Iraqi National Congress didn't
misspend the money it was giving him.
Mr. Chalabi has undermined U.S. national security in a
number of ways. For example, there are indications that he and
his associates led the Administration to believe the Iraqi
people would welcome U.S. soldiers as liberators. There are
also strong indications that he or his organization provided
false information on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction
programs prior to the war.
Members of this Committee have pushed hard for answers to
the many questions regarding this man's relationship with our
government. Last month, we learned that the government had
finally terminated its intelligence relationship with Chalabi's
Iraqi National Congress. However, we have yet to receive
satisfactory answers to all of our questions. This committee
must go to the bottom of this story.
Representative Eshoo offered an amendment that would have
prevented the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for
Intelligence from expending any funds until the Secretary of
Defense provided a full accounting of all contacts Department
of Defense (DoD) personnel and its contractors had with Ahmed
Chalabi and Chalabi's associates from January 2001 to May 2004,
as well as the information, sources and documents he and his
associates provided to DoD.
It is intended as a strong signal of his Committee's
determination to address counterintelligence concerns
aggressively. It is unfortunate that our effort to strengthen
oversight was defeated on a party-line vote.
TRANSPARENCY
In addition to strengthening oversight, we need to do a
better job of informing the American public about the oversight
that we conduct. Precisely because so much of our work, and
that of the Intelligence Community itself, must be cloaked in
secrecy, we should work hard to find ways to open up the
process whenever we can do so without jeopardizing classified
information. We can begin by marking up the legislative portion
of our bill, as this Committee did prior to the mid-90s, in
open session.
We do not have secret laws in this country. The legislative
provisions in our bill are a matter of public record. They are
openly debated on the floor of the House, and there is no
legitimate reason for debating and voting on them in a secret
session during Committee markup.
This is why we objected to the motion to close the
proceedings that was offered at the outset of the markup.
Instead, the Ranking Member urged that the Committee not move
into closed session until it had completed debate on the public
law provisions and turned to the classified portion of the
bill. Unfortunately, our effort to keep consideration of the
public part of the bill open was defeated along party lines.
In the coming year, we hope that this Committee will work
harder to communicate to the public about the work we do here.
For example, we should hold more open hearings. The few open
hearings held over the past year, on issues such as pre-war
intelligence on Iraq, civil liberties, diversity, and language
needs, were extremely useful and should be expanded in the
coming year.
LANGUAGE TRAINING
We are very pleased that the bill contains legislation
improving the support to foreign language programs assisting
the Intelligence Committee in its missions. An amendment was
offered by Representative Holt that we believe would have
strengthened this legislation by providing funding for language
training for intelligence officers with scientific,
engineering, and technical specialties. We believe this to be
particularly important given testimony by the former head of
the Iraq Survey Group, Dr. David Kay, that this was a
noticeable deficiency in his team. The amendment was defeated
on a party-line vote.
TRANSFORM THE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE
Unfortunately, this bill is silent on another critical
issue, as well: the need to transform intelligence from its
Cold War structure and mentality to meet today's challenges.
Our oversight activities examining the structure and
performance by the Intelligence Community since 9/11, including
the extensive investigation of the Joint House-Senate 9/11
Inquiry and reviews of the Intelligence Community's pre-war
intelligence on Iraq, have led the Minority to conclude that
amajor effort to improve the organization and effectiveness of the
Intelligence Community is urgently needed.
The stars are aligned for intelligence reform as never
before. Both sides of the aisle on this Committee and on the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) voted in favor
of crating a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) after
investigating the intelligence failures leading up to 9/11. The
SSCI is also likely to urge reform when it issues its report on
the intelligence failures on Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon
the United States (also known as the 9/11 Commission) is likely
to make far-reaching reform recommendations about intelligence
reform. The President, too, has stated that intelligence reform
needs to be considered.
This authorization bill should not be silent on the urgent
need for intelligence transformation. Reform is coming, and
this Committee ought to weigh in now and shape the outcome
rather than react to events. That is why Representative Harman
offered an amendment to make the Intelligence Transformation
Act (H.R. 4104), introduced on April 1, 2004, by all nine
Democratic members of this Committee, part of this bill.
Members on both sides of the aisle know the problems that
must be addressed in the Intelligence Community. The Director
of Central Intelligence (DCI) has not been an effective manage
of the Community. His time and attention is dominated by the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Today's Community is not a
``community'' but a collection of 15 different agencies each
operating independently. These agencies are still not networked
together, and cannot collaborate or share data electronically.
They work in stovepipes: We have at least three separate
strategies for every intelligence problem--one for human
intelligence, one for imagery, and one for signals
intelligence.
These are the same problems that plagued the military 20
years ago, when it was fighting an Army war, a Navy war, and an
Air Force war. In 1986, pushed by Congress in legislation known
as ``Goldwater-Nichols'', the military made a revolutionary
change and fixed their stovepipe problem. We need Goldwater-
Nichols for the Intelligence Community--integrated teams from
all disciplines, under unified command.
An essential cornerstone of successful reform is separating
the DCI from CIA--giving the intelligence leader the time, the
responsibility, and the accountability for managing the whole
community. A DCI tied to the CIA, even with a bigger
bureaucracy to run the Community, will still spend too much
time running the Directorate of Operations and will never be
viewed by the rest of the community as an honest broker--thus
the Director is doomed to fail. We need a separate head of the
Intelligence Community and we need to give that Intelligence
Community leader the structure and authorities the Director
needs--without creating a big new bureaucracy or a war with
DoD.
H.R. 4104 gives the DNI the authority to tell the
intelligence troops what they are going to do each day--just
like Central Command (CENTCOM) directs the operation of
military troops rather than the service chiefs. And this
tasking authority should be backed up by several measures that
strengthen the DCT's ability to move money around during the
fiscal year to enforce his directions.
H.R. 4104 also adopts the Goldwater-Nichols formula for
requiring joint assignments to break down cultural barriers and
improve the quality of the Community staff.
On information sharing, we borrow heavily from the
bipartisan Markle Foundation and many other studies that have
charted a path for us to network the Community--allowing a
virtual reorganization, rather than moving organizations
around--and new ways of doing business, as US business has
proven.
We remove other barriers to information sharing--currently
no agency accepts the clearances of any others, each agency
thinks it owns the data it holds, individual agency heads deny
access to ``outsiders'' to protect U.S. persons' privacy.
We give the DCI powerful new tools to manage the DoD
agencies by working jointly with Secretary of Defense--
eliminating the agencies' ability to play one against the other
to escape all control.
H.R. 4104 is a solid basis for beginning serious debate in
Congress and with the executive branch about intelligence
reform, and that is why it was extremely regrettable that our
amendment was defeated on a party-line vote.
Given the national security threats that continue to face
the United States, we hope the Committee is resolved to
undertaking thorough, rigorous and comprehensive consideration
on an urgent basis.
We look forward to assessing the recommendations of the 9/
11 Commission in this regard, and also to working with the
other committees of jurisdiction to address their points of
view regarding intelligence reorganization. We believe that,
barring unforeseen circumstances, we should be able to agree on
a reform package and include it in the conference report.
Certainly, the national security of the United States demands
our best efforts to do so, and indications are growing that the
Congress is unlikely to look favorably upon a well-informed,
broadly supported proposal for reform.
CONCLUSION
These minority views, along with additional minority views
in the classified annex related to classified programs, were
written based on the bill and report language presented to the
Members at the time of the Committee markup, since there was no
opportunity to review and respond to any changes made after
markup but before filing. However, we want to emphasize our
strong support for all of the programs and activities funded in
this bill that are so essential to effective intelligence
collection and analysis. We would be extremely disappointed to
see these programs undermined in any way.
Jane Harman.
Alcee L. Hastings.
Silvestre Reyes.
Leonard L. Boswell.
Collin C. Peterson.
Robert E. (Bud) Cramer, Jr.
Anna G. Eshoo.
Rush D. Holt.
C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger.