[House Report 108-415]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



108th Congress                                                   Report
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 2d Session                                                     108-415

======================================================================



 
              REPEAL OF SECTION 801 OF REVENUE ACT OF 1916

                                _______
                                

February 6, 2004.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

 Mr. Sensenbrenner, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted the 
                               following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                            DISSENTING VIEWS

                        [To accompany H.R. 1073]

      [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

    The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred the 
bill (H.R. 1073) to repeal section 801 of the Revenue Act of 
1916, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon 
without amendment and recommends that the bill do pass.

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page
Purpose and Summary..............................................     2
Background and Need for the Legislation..........................     2
Hearings.........................................................     6
Committee Consideration..........................................     6
Vote of the Committee............................................     6
Committee Oversight Findings.....................................     6
New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures........................     6
Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate........................     6
Performance Goals and Objectives.................................     7
Constitutional Authority Statement...............................     7
Section-by-Section Analysis and Discussion.......................     8
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported............     8
Markup Transcript................................................     9
Dissenting Views.................................................    15

                          Purpose and Summary

    H.R. 1073 repeals the Antidumping Act of 1916 as enacted in 
Section 801 of the Revenue Act of 1916.\1\ The 1916 Act has 
never formed the basis of a final ruling on the merits in any 
Federal case. Nonetheless, on September 26, 2000, the Dispute 
Settlement Body (``DSB'') of the World Trade Organization 
(``WTO'') held that the 1916 Act violated United States 
obligations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(``GATT'') 1994, the Antidumping Agreement, and the WTO 
Agreement.
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    \1\ Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, Sec. 801, 39 Stat. 756, 798-99 
(1916) (codified at 15 U.S.C. Sec. 72 (2003)).
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    Decisions by the WTO are not self-executing. As a result, 
on March 4, 2003, Chairman Sensenbrenner and Committee on Ways 
and Means Chairman Thomas introduced H.R. 1073 to bring the 
United States into conformity with these obligations by 
repealing the 1916 Act. H.R. 1073 does not affect legal claims 
filed after the WTO decision or pending before enactment of the 
legislation.\2\ In addition, H.R. 1073 does not disturb other 
existing antidumping remedies contained in U.S. trade law that 
were not affected by the WTO ruling. As a result, U.S. industry 
may continue to utilize the comprehensive and internationally-
compliant antidumping remedies enacted by the United States.
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    \2\ The Committee is aware of one pending case brought under the 
Antidumping Act of 1916: Goss International Corp. v. MAN Roland 
Druckmaschinen Aktiengensellschaft No. C00-0035 (N.D. Iowa). On 
December 4, 2003, a jury awarded Goss damages of $10.5 million from TKS 
(Tokyo Kikai Seisakusho), a Japanese printing press manufacturer named 
in the original suit for an alleged violation of the 1916 Act. TKS has 
filed motions to reverse the jury verdict and alternatively for a new 
trial.
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                Background and Need for the Legislation

                           HISTORICAL CONTEXT

    The 1916 Act was the first U.S. legislation designed to 
afford relief against foreign exporters who ``dumped'' their 
products into the U.S. market.\3\ In the aftermath of World War 
I, the 64th Congress passed the Act in anticipation of 
discriminatory pricing by foreign industries attempting to 
restore pre-World War I markets through predatory trade 
practices.\4\ Because the Act intended to place foreign 
commercial interests in the same position as domestic 
manufacturers ``with reference to unfair competition,'' the 
1916 Act is regarded as a hybrid between trade and antitrust 
law.\5\ This antitrust component forms the basis of the 
Committee's jurisdiction over H.R. 1073.
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    \3\ Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws, 3 Int'l Bus. & Law 
Series (West) at 15-1 (July, 1998).
    \4\ Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 
1190, 1219 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
    \5\ H.R. Rep. No. 64-922 at 9-10 (1916); see also Antidumping and 
Countervailing Duty Laws, supra note 3, at 15-1.
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    Under the 1916 Act, the importation of an article from a 
foreign country into the United States constitutes unlawful 
dumping if three elements are present. First, the price in the 
United States must be ``substantially less'' than the ``actual 
market price or wholesale price of such articles . . . in the 
principal markets of the country of their production.'' \6\ 
Second, the international price discrimination must be ``common 
and systematic.'' \7\ Third, the price discrimination must 
occur ``with the intent of destroying or injuring an industry 
in the United States, or preventing the establishment of an 
industry in the United States, or of restraining or 
monopolizing any part of trade and commerce in such articles in 
the United States.'' \8\ If any person is held to have violated 
all three elements, the 1916 Act provides for both criminal and 
civil penalties, including imprisonment of up to 1 year and 
treble damages.\9\
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    \6\ 15 U.S.C. Sec. 72 (2002).
    \7\ Id.
    \8\ Id.
    \9\ Id.
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                   SUBSEQUENT ANTIDUMPING LEGISLATION

    The significance of the 1916 Act was ``eclipsed in large 
part'' by subsequent antidumping legislation.\10\ Five years 
after passing the 1916 Act, Congress enacted the more 
comprehensive Antidumping Act of 1921 which was repealed by the 
Trade Agreements Act of 1979.\11\ Under the 1979 Act, Congress 
adopted a new antidumping law that now serves as the primary 
statute for U.S. industry to obtain relief from international 
price discrimination.\12\ These antidumping remedies remain 
unaffected by the September 26, 2000 WTO decision. As a result, 
U.S. industry may continue to avail itself of the more 
comprehensive and internationally-compliant antidumping 
remedies contained in the 1979 Act.
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    \10\ Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws, supra note 3, at 15-
2.
    \11\ Id.
    \12\ Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (1979).
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                 JUDICIAL CONSIDERATION OF THE 1916 ACT

    Judicial consideration of the 1916 Act is quite limited for 
a statute that has been in existence for nearly 88 years. The 
relative lack of precedent prompted a Pennsylvania district 
court in 1980 to note that ``this opinion [regarding the 1916 
Act] and order not only involve an issue which is of first 
impression, but also involve an Act which despite its venerable 
age . . . is virtually a statute of first impression.'' \13\ 
U.S. companies aggrieved by predatory dumping have been 
reluctant to pursue a cause of action based on the 1916 Act 
since no plaintiff has ever succeeded with such a claim.\14\
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    \13\ Zenith Radio Corp., 494 F. Supp. 1190 at 1243.
    \14\ Note, Rethinking the 1916 Antidumping Act, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 
1555, 1556 n. 7 (1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In contrast to other antidumping remedies, a plaintiff who 
seeks relief under the 1916 Act must first demonstrate that the 
defendant had the requisite intent to destroy, injure, prevent, 
restrain or monopolize the U.S. market when importing the 
relevant product.\15\ The 1916 Act's requirement of actual 
intent--instead of actual injury--permits a defendant to claim 
that ``any price differentials are cost-justified or 
attributable to other reasonable commercial considerations.'' 
\16\ In addition, no prima facie standards exist which might 
shift the burden of proof to the defendant upon the 
establishment of a threshold case.\17\ The elevated standard of 
proof required to obtain judicial relief under the 1916 Act has 
greatly limited its application in court.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ Id. at 1556.
    \16\ Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws, supra note 3, at 15-
9.
    \17\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Despite the judicial track record of the 1916 Act, U.S. 
companies have increasingly pursued causes of action under the 
1916 Act in the last twenty years. The most recent and heavily 
publicized cases involve the U.S. steel industry's pursuit of 
antidumping relief during the 1998 steel import crisis. 
Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corporation filed a case in 1998 
against nine U.S. subsidiaries of European and Japanese steel 
companies.\18\ The case was never fully adjudicated because WHX 
Corp., the owner of Wheeling-Pitt, ``reached out-of-court 
settlements with several of the European traders'' and withdrew 
all remaining lawsuits.\19\ While the 1916 Antidumping Act has 
yet to be the basis for a final judicial victory, the 
settlements with WHX Corp. were steep enough to concern the 
European Union (EU) and Japan about the future use of the 1916 
Act as a ``potential form of blackmail.'' \20\
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    \18\ Nancy E. Kelly, WTO Report Challenges 1916 U.S. Act, American 
Metal Market, Dec. 23, 1999, at 1.
    \19\ Id.
    \20\ Steel Importer Settles With Wheeling-Pittsburgh in 1916 Case, 
Inside US Trade, Feb. 26, 1999, Vol. 17, No. 8 at 17.
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                  WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION INVOLVEMENT

    Primarily in response to the WHX Corp. settlements, the EU 
and Japan filed separate WTO complaints alleging that the 1916 
Act was inconsistent with provisions in GATT 1994, the 
Antidumping Agreement of the Uruguay Round, and the WTO 
Agreement.\21\ Two WTO panels held the 1916 Act inconsistent 
with international trade obligations and the WTO Appellate Body 
affirmed their findings in a combined decision on August 28, 
2000. The Appellate Body's recommendations and rulings were 
subsequently adopted by the Dispute Settlement Board of the WTO 
on September 26, 2000.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\ Id.
    \22\ United States--Antidumping Act of 1916, Report of the 
Appellate Body, WT/DS136/AB/R (Aug. 28, 2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The WTO concluded that the 1916 Antidumping Act was 
inconsistent with: Article VI:1 and Article VI:2 of the GATT 
1994; Articles 1, 4, 5.1, 5.2, 5.4, 5.5, 18 and 18.4 of the 
Antidumping Agreement; and Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement. 
Article VI:1 and Article VI:2 of GATT 1994 require that U.S. 
antidumping laws provide exclusively for the material injury 
test set forth under Article VI and allow only the 
implementation of antidumping duties as a remedy for illegal 
dumping.\23\ The WTO panel concluded that the 1916 Act fails to 
require actual injury and provides for treble damages and 
potential imprisonment in violation of international 
obligations. The WTO panel held that the 1916 Act was 
substantively inconsistent with both the Antidumping Agreement 
and GATT 1994, and procedurally defective with respect to the 
Act's judicial standing and notice provisions. To the extent 
that the 1916 Act was found to violate any part of GATT 1994, 
the United States was held to be in violation of Article XVI:4 
of the WTO Agreement.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\ Id.
    \24\ Id. Specifically, the Panel held that Article VI.2 of GATT 
1994 provides that in order to offset or prevent dumping, a WTO Member 
may levy on any dumped product an antidumping duty not greater in 
amount than the margin of dumping involved with that product.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    At the Dispute Settlement Body meeting of October 23, 2000, 
the United States Trade Representative (``USTR'') stated that 
the U.S. intended to implement the DSB's recommendations and 
rulings. The U.S. also stated that it required a reasonable 
amount of time for implementation. An arbitrator determined 
that a ``reasonable time'' in this case would be until July 26, 
2001. However, the DSB extended the ``reasonable period'' of 
time until December 31, 2001, or the end of the first session 
of the 107th Congress, whichever came first.
    During the 107th Congress, House Ways and Means Committee 
Chairman Thomas introduced H.R. 3557 to repeal the 1916 Act and 
render it inapplicable to pending and future cases. No further 
legislative action was taken before the end of the ``reasonable 
time period.'' In response to this delay, the EU and Japan 
requested authorization from the WTO to suspend concessions 
pursuant to Article 22.2 of the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding on January 7, 2002. Both parties proposed that 
the WTO allow them to enact their own legislation mirroring the 
1916 Act. Several countries have expressed concern that this 
retaliatory approach would result in an ``arms buildup of 
protectionist measures.'' \25\ The U.S. objected to the 
proposal and the DSB again referred the matter to arbitration.
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    \25\ EU, Japan Agree to Give U.S. More Time To Comply With 1916 
Act, Copyright Rulings, Daily Rep. for Exec., Jan. 22, 2002 at A3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    U.S. negotiations with the EU and Japan have led to the 
suspension of the arbitration process until June 30, 2002. The 
EU and Japan warned, however, that the arbitration proceeding 
would reactivate at the request of either party if no 
substantial progress was made. Since that time, no formal 
request has been made by either the EU or Japan. However, both 
the EU and USTR have continued to informally press for action 
on this measure. In late February of this year, the EU moved 
closer to retaliating against the United States for not 
repealing the 1916 Act.\26\ In congressional testimony on March 
5, 2003, USTR Ambassador Zoellick urged Congress to ``live up 
to its obligations under WTO rules'' by repealing the 1916 
Act.\27\ On December 18, 2003, the EU Council approved a 
regulation that bans the recognition and application of 
decisions taken under the 1916 Act within EU countries. The 
regulation also allows EU-based companies and citizens to claim 
damages (with interest) for any penalties associated with its 
application.\28\
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    \26\ Tobias Buch & Guy De Jonquieres, EU List US Exports for 
Possible Trade Sanctions, Fin. Times, Feb. 27, 2003 at 11; see also 
Lamy Warns Washington on WTO Panels, Eur. Rep., March 12, 2003.
    \27\ Administration Trade Agenda, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of 
Robert Zoellick, United States Trade Representative).
    \28\ Aid to European Companies Faced with Complaints from America, 
Agence Eur., Dec. 18, 2003.
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             H.R. 1073-- PROSPECTIVE LEGISLATIVE COMPLIANCE

    Several factors strongly favor prospective compliance with 
the WTO's August 28, 2000 decision. First, WTO decisions are 
not self-executing. Rather, they require the affirmative assent 
of Congress. Automatic adherence to WTO decisions undermines 
the legislative prerogative of Congress and the sovereignty of 
the United States. Second, the justification for repealing the 
1916 Act is to bring the United States into compliance with its 
present WTO obligations: if WTO compliance does not require 
retroactive repeal, then conforming legislation should not 
extend to retroactive repeal. Third, both the Administration 
and Congress have consistently taken the position that 
retroactive repeal is not necessary to ensure compliance with 
our WTO obligations in all cases, particularly those pertaining 
to U.S. trade remedy laws.
    For example, the Joint Report of the U.S. Senate Committee 
on Finance, Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, 
and Committee on Government Affairs which accompanied 
legislation implementing the Uruguay Round Agreements Act 
explicitly states that compliance with WTO panels in trade 
remedy cases applies prospectively only. The Joint Report 
concludes that prospective application ``is consistent with the 
general principle in the GATT, and in the future WTO, that 
panel decisions do not have retroactive effect.'' \29\ In 
addition, Article 19.1 of the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Understanding states only that ``(w)here a panel or the 
Appellate Body concludes that a measure is inconsistent with a 
covered agreement, it shall recommend that the Member concerned 
bring the measure into conformity with that Agreement.'' \30\
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    \29\ See ``Joint Report of the Committee on Finance, Committee on 
Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry, and Committee on Governmental 
Affairs of the United States Senate to accompany the Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act,'' S. 2467, S. Rep. No. 412, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 225 
(1994).
    \30\ Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Apr. 15, 1994, the Legal Texts: the Results of the Uruguay Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations 4 (1999), 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 
1144 (1994).
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                                Hearings

    No hearings were held in the Committee on the Judiciary on 
H.R. 1073.

                        Committee Consideration

    On January 21, 2003, the Committee met in open session and 
ordered favorably reported the bill H.R. 1073 by a voice vote, 
a quorum being present.

                         Vote of the Committee

    In compliance with clause 3(b) of Rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, the Committee notes that there 
were no recorded votes during its consideration of H.R. 1073.

                      Committee Oversight Findings

    In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of Rule XIII of the Rules 
of the House of Representatives, the Committee reports that the 
findings and recommendations of the Committee, based on 
oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of Rule X of the 
Rules of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in the 
descriptive portions of this report.

               New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures

    Clause 3(c)(2) of Rule XIII of the Rules of the House of 
Representatives is inapplicable because this legislation does 
not provide new budgetary authority or increased tax 
expenditures.

               Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate

    In compliance with clause 3(c)(3) of Rule XIII of the Rules 
of the House of Representatives, the Committee sets forth, with 
respect to H.R. 1073, the following estimate and comparison 
prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office 
under section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974:

                                     U.S. Congress,
                               Congressional Budget Office,
                                  Washington, DC, February 5, 2004.
Hon. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chairman,
Committee on the Judiciary,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has 
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 1073, a bill to 
repeal section 801 of the Revenue Act of 1916.
    If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be 
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Annabelle 
Bartsch, who can be reached at 226-2680.
            Sincerely,
                                       Douglas Holtz-Eakin.

Enclosure

cc:
        Honorable John Conyers, Jr.
        Ranking Member
H.R. 1073--A bill to repeal section 801 of the Revenue Act of 1916.
    H.R. 1073 would repeal section 801 of the Revenue Act of 
1916, which prohibits foreign firms from dumping goods in the 
United States and subjects violators to both civil and criminal 
penalties. A good is considered to be dumped if a foreign firm 
sells it for less in the U.S. market than the firm does in its 
home market. Based on information from the U.S. International 
Trade Commission, CBO expects that enacting H.R. 1073 would 
have no effect on Federal revenues or spending. Currently, U.S. 
industries may seek relief from dumping under legislation 
enacted subsequent to the 1916 law, so repealing section 801 
would affect neither the ability to seek such relief nor the 
collection of any resulting monetary penalties.
    H.R. 1073 contains no private-sector or intergovernmental 
mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, and 
would impose no costs on State, local, or tribal governments.
    This estimate was approved by G. Thomas Woodward, Assistant 
Director for Tax Analysis, and Robert A. Sunshine, Assistant 
Director for Budget Analysis. The CBO staff contact for the 
estimate is Annabelle Bartsch, who may be reached at 226-2680.

                    Performance Goals and Objectives

    H.R. 1073 does not authorize funding. Therefore, clause 
3(c)(4) of Rule XIII of the Rules of the House of 
Representatives is inapplicable.

                   Constitutional Authority Statement

    Pursuant to clause 3(d)(1) of Rule XIII of the Rules of the 
House of Representatives, the Committee finds the authority for 
this legislation in article I, section 8 of the Constitution.

               Section-by-Section Analysis and Discussion

Section 1. Repeal of Antidumping Provisions Under the Act of September 
        8, 1916
    This section repeals the Antidumping Act of 1916 (Section 
801 of the Act of September 9, 1916) which allows both criminal 
and civil penalties for persons importing articles into the 
United States at a price substantially less than actual market 
price and with the predatory intent to injure U.S. industry.
            Section 1(b). Effective Date.
    This section states that the repeal of section 801 of the 
Act of September 9, 1916 shall not affect any legal action 
commenced before or pending on the date of enactment of this 
bill.

         Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported

    In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by 
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law 
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets):

              SECTION 801 OF THE ACT OF SEPTEMBER 8, 1916

  CHAP. 463.--AN ACT to increase the revenue, and for other purposes.

    [Sec. 801. That it shall be unlawful for any person 
importing or assisting in importing any articles from any 
foreign country into the United States, commonly and 
systematically to import, sell or cause to be imported or sold 
such articles within the United States at a price substantially 
less than the actual market value or wholesale price of such 
articles, at the time of exportation to the United States, in 
the principal markets of the country of their production, or of 
other foreign countries to which they are commonly exported, 
after adding to such market value or wholesale price, freight, 
duty, and other charges and expenses necessarily incident to 
the importation and sale thereof in the United States: 
Provided, That such act or acts be done with the intent of 
destroying or injuring an industry in the United States, or of 
preventing the establishment of an industry in the United 
States, or of restraining or monopolizing any part of trade and 
commerce in such articles in the United States.
    [Any person who violates or combines or conspires with any 
other person to violate this section is guilty of a 
misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by a 
fine not exceeding $5,000, or imprisonment not exceeding one 
year, or both, in the discretion of the court.
    [Any person injured in his business or property by reason 
of any violation of, or combination or conspiracy to violate, 
this section, may sue therefor in the district court of the 
United States for the district in which the defendant resides 
or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in 
controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages sustained, 
and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's 
fee.
    [The foregoing provisions shall not be construed to deprive 
the proper State courts of jurisdiction in actions for damages 
thereunder.]

                           Markup Transcript



                            BUSINESS MEETING

                      WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 28, 2004

                  House of Representatives,
                                Committee on the Judiciary,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m., in 
Room 2141, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. F. James 
Sensenbrenner, Jr. [Chairman of the Committee] presiding.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The Committee will be in order. A 
working quorum is present.
    Pursuant to notice, I now call up the bill H.R. 1073, ``to 
repeal Section 801 of the Revenue Act of 1916'' for purposes of 
markup, and move its favorable recommendation to the House. 
Without objection, the bill will be considered as read and open 
for amendment at any point.
    [The bill, H.R. 1073, follows:]
      
      

  


      
      

  


    Chairman Sensenbrenner. I have a lengthy statement which I 
will summarize; and without objection, all Members will be able 
to include opening statements in the record.
    This bill repeals a provision of the Revenue Act that was 
declared by the World Trade Organization appellate body to be 
in violation of United States international trade agreements. 
It is important to note that this law, which was passed in 
1916, has never been utilized to obtain a final judgment on the 
merits in any Federal court. I will stress that this 
legislation, in no way, affects the ability of American 
industry to seek anti-dumping relief under anti-dumping laws 
contained in more comprehensive anti-dumping legislation, such 
as the Trade Act of 1979. So it does allow U.S. litigants to 
continue to utilize their existing anti-dumping remedies. The 
bill also is only applicable prospectively, so anyone that does 
have a cause of action under the Revenue Act of 1916 as of the 
date of enactment of this bill will continue to have that cause 
of action preserved.
    I yield back the balance of my time, and recognize the 
gentleman from Michigan.
    Mr. Conyers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and my colleagues.
    This is a measure which we have not had the benefit of a 
hearing; it has not been through any Subcommittee, nor has the 
full Committee ever discussed it before now, and so you would 
have to assume that this is a very trivial matter before us 
that does not warrant the regular process. But I view our 
responsibility to more carefully examine the measures that lie 
within our jurisdiction.
    Now, the measure we are talking about is a law that has 
been in existence since 1916 and has had numerous judicial 
interpretations. And so if what we are doing here today is 
considering its repeal, it would seem that there at least ought 
to be a hearing to give some of us who may not hold themselves 
out as experts on this subject the ability to understand what 
it is we are doing and why. So, I would hope that--well, maybe 
there is some reason that we have to operate so expeditiously. 
If there is, I have not heard that, either. Well, we are just 
starting the hearing. Maybe it will come out in a little while. 
So somewhere along the line I am going to--since we are trying 
to get to the floor, we ought to figure out how and what, under 
what circumstances we can take this matter more thoroughly 
under consideration. Our schedules aren't awfully heavy in 
January or February, so I guess the bottom line is, what is the 
rush?
    Now, the repeal of this law. Question: Will it have a 
detrimental effect on American jobs, or will it have a 
beneficial effect upon American jobs? If anybody can help me 
with that. I just raise it as a question, I have not researched 
this, so I would be happy to yield to anybody for some 
enlightenment about that. Jobs happens to be one of the big 
issues in the year 2004 in which we have national elections, 
because the economy is the second most important issue, 
according to the polls examining what the American people think 
is important, and how they will be judging those of us and 
candidates in other races.
    So I ask the question, is it helpful or hurtful? What we 
are purporting to do here is to empower companies to bring 
private anti-trust suits against foreign companies that import 
their goods into our country at below-market prices. And, as a 
matter of fact, the law has been used on several occasions 
recently that have resulted in large settlements and judgments 
favoring the United States and our workers. Now, if we take 
away the ability to bring these actions, what does that signal?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman's time has expired. 
Without objection, all Members may insert opening statements 
into the record. At this point, are there amendments? If there 
are no amendments, a reporting quorum is not present. Without 
objection, the previous question is ordered on the motion to 
report the bill, and a vote will be taken once a reporting 
quorum is present.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    A reporting quorum being present, the question now is on 
the motion to report the bill H.R. 1073 favorably. All in favor 
will say aye. Opposed no. The ayes appear to have it. The ayes 
have it. And the motion to report favorably is agreed to. 
Without objection, the Chairman is authorized to move to go to 
conference pursuit to House rules. Without objection, the staff 
is directed to make any technical and conforming changes, that 
all Members will be given 2 days as provided by the rules in 
which to submit additional dissenting, supplemental, or 
minority views.
                            Dissenting Views

    We cannot support this effort to repeal the 1916 
Antidumping Act,\1\ which empowers companies to bring private 
antitrust suits against foreign companies that import their 
goods at below-market prices. We object to repealing a law that 
has been on the books for over 85 years in the absence of a 
single hearing--either legislative or oversight. We object to 
repealing a law that protects U.S. jobs and trade at a time 
when job growth continues to lag and our trade deficit expands. 
We object to acting as a rubber stamp for the World Trade 
Organization, setting bad precedent that sends a signal to 
other nations that they can harass the United States with 
frivolous cases. And we object to the hypocrisy of hastily 
repealing this law when there are other laws on our books that 
have been held in violation of our WTO obligations that we have 
not tried to repeal.
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    \1\ Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, Sec. 801, 39 Stat. 756, 798-99 
(1916) (codified at 15 U.S.C. Sec. 72 (2002)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                             I. BACKGROUND

    H.R. 1073 repeals the Antidumping Act of 1916 as enacted in 
Section 801 of the Act of 1916. The Antidumping Act allows both 
criminal and civil penalties for persons importing articles 
into the United States at a price substantially less than 
actual market price and with the predatory intent to injure 
American industry. On September 26, 2000, the Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
held that the Antidumping Act of 1916 violated United States 
obligations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) 1994, the Antidumping Agreement, and the WTO Agreement.
    The 1916 Antidumping Act was the first piece of U.S. 
legislation designed to afford relief against foreign exporters 
who dumped their products into the U.S. market.\2\ In the 
aftermath of World War I, Congress passed the Act in 
anticipation of discriminatory pricing by foreign industries 
attempting to restore pre-WWI markets.\3\ The Act intended to 
place foreign competitors in the same position as domestic 
manufacturers ``with reference to unfair competition.'' \4\ In 
this regard, the Act is interpreted as a hybrid between trade 
and antitrust law.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws, 3 Int'l Bus. & Law 
Series (West) at 15-1 (July, 1998).
    \3\ Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 
1190,1219 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
    \4\ H.R. Rep. No. 64-922 at 9-10 (1916).
    \5\ Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws, supra note 3, at 15-
1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Under the Antidumping Act of 1916, the importation of an 
article from a foreign country into the United States 
constitutes unlawful dumping if three elements are met. First, 
the price in the United States must be ``substantially less'' 
than the ``actual market price or wholesale price of such 
articles . . . in the principal markets of the country of their 
production.'' \6\ Second, the international price 
discrimination must be ``common and systematic.'' \7\ Third, 
the price discrimination must occur with the intent of 
destroying, injuring, preventing, restraining, or monopolizing 
``any part of trade and commerce in such articles in the United 
States.'' \8\ If any person is held to have violated all three 
elements, the 1916 Antidumping Act allows for the 
implementation of both criminal and civil penalties, including 
imprisonment and treble damages.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ 15 U.S.C. Sec. 72 (2002).
    \7\ Id.
    \8\ Id.
    \9\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Five years after passage of the original legislation, 
Congress passed the more comprehensive Antidumping Act of 1921, 
which later was repealed by the Trade Agreements Act of 
1979.\10\ Under the 1979 Act, Congress adopted a new 
antidumping law, 19 U.S.C. Sec. 1673, that now serves as the 
primary statute under which U.S. industry obtains relief from 
international price discrimination. The Act used today does not 
contain a ``predatory intent'' standard; if it is shown that 
goods are sold below normal value and there is injury to an 
industry, penalty duties are assessed at the border. However, 
unlike the 1916 Act, there is no private right of action. 
Rather, the entire domestic industry that claims to be harmed 
by the dumping files a petition with the International Trade 
Commission and the Commerce Department. If both entities reach 
an affirmative decision that dumping has occurred, an order is 
issued for the penalties.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The major obstacle for success under the 1916 Act has been 
the burden of proving the injurious intent of the defendant 
importer.\11\ Plaintiffs have historically had a difficult time 
establishing that the defendants had the requisite intent to 
destroy, injure, prevent, restrain or monopolize the U.S. 
market with regards to the imported product. A requirement of 
actual intent--instead of actual injury--allows an importer the 
defense that ``any price differentials are cost justified or 
attributable to other reasonable commercial considerations.'' 
\12\ In addition, no prima facie standards exist which might 
shift the burden of proof to the defendant upon the 
establishment of a threshold case.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ Id. at 1556.
    \12\ Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws, supra note 2, at 15-
9.
    \13\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Despite its judicial track record, U.S. companies have 
increasingly pursued causes of action under the 1916 Act in the 
last twenty years. The most recent and heavily publicized cases 
involve the U.S. steel industry's pursuit of antidumping relief 
during the 1998 steel import crisis. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel 
Corporation filed a case in 1998 against nine U.S. subsidiaries 
of European and Japanese steel companies.\14\ The case was 
never fully adjudicated because WHX Corp., the owner of 
Wheeling-Pitt, ``reached out-of-court settlements with several 
of the European traders'' and withdrew all remaining 
lawsuits.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ Nancy E. Kelly, WTO Report Challenges 1916 U.S. Act, American 
Metal Market, Dec. 23, 1999, at 1.
    \15\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Another case worth noting was brought by AK Steel Corp. in 
the Southern District of Ohio in 2001. In that suit, AK Steel 
alleged that Usinor, a French company, illegally interfered 
with AK Steel's bare and hot dip aluminum coated stainless 
steel business, which produces products for automotive exhaust 
systems.\16\ While this case was pending in the district court, 
AK Steel survived a motion to dismiss filed by the defendant, 
thus indicating the court's determination that AK Steel had 
pleaded a cause of action under the 1916 Act, including the 
element of intent. However, that suit settled recently.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ Press Release, AK Steel Files Antitrust Suit Against French 
Steel Company Usinor, S.A., Oct. 19, 2001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The only 1916 Act case now pending is an Iowa case in which 
a jury found $10.5 million in actual damages against a Japanese 
company on December 3, 2003 (since the 1916 Act calls for 
treble damages, this means an award of $31.5 million). The 
company has filed post-trial motions, and is likely to appeal. 
This is the first jury award or criminal penalty in the 88-year 
history of the Act.
    Primarily in response to the WHX Corp. settlements, the EC 
and Japan filed separate WTO complaints about the 1916 
antidumping law, alleging that it is inconsistent with 
provisions in GATT 1994, the Antidumping Agreement of the 
Uruguay Round, and the WTO Agreement.\17\ Two WTO panels 
considered the allegations and the WTO Appellate Body affirmed 
their findings against the 1916 antidumping law in a combined 
decision on August 28, 2000. The Appellate Body's 
recommendations and rulings were subsequently adopted by the 
Dispute Settlement Board of the WTO on September 26, 2000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In response, on January 7, 2002, the EC and Japan requested 
authorization from the WTO to suspend concessions pursuant to 
Article 22.2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding. Both 
parties proposed that the WTO allow them to enact their own 
legislation mirroring the 1916 Antidumping statute. Several 
countries expressed their misgivings with the approach taken by 
the EC and Japan, fearful that such a reaction may result in an 
``arms buildup of protectionist measures.'' \18\ The U.S. 
objected to the proposal and DSB referred the matter to 
arbitration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\ EU, Japan Agree to Give U.S. More Time To Comply With 1916 
Act, Copyright Rulings, Daily Report for Executives, Jan. 22, 2002 at 
A3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On March 4, 2003, Chairman Sensenbrenner introduced H.R. 
1073. Senator Grassley introduced a companion bill on the 
Senate side, S. 1155.\19\ The three parties agreed to suspend 
the arbitration in light of this legislation, to allow the 
United States to continue to work for the passage of a bill 
repealing the Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ S. 1080, introduced in the Senate by Senators Hatch and Leahy, 
is retroactive. Retroactive repeal is not required by WTO practice or 
precedent, and it has been argued that it would set a bad precedent for 
other WTO disputes (like the Foreign Sales Corporation tax dispute, and 
the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset/Byrd Amendment dispute). 
Apparently, Senators Hatch and Leahy introduced the retroactive bill at 
the request of the Bush Administration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The EC (but not Japan) reactivated the arbitration on 
September 19, 2003. The arbitrator is scheduled to issue its 
award early in 2004. Assuming the arbitrator concludes that the 
EC has suffered harm, the EC could retaliate in a manner 
consistent with the Iowa case jury award once the DSB meets to 
authorize the retaliation.
    On December 15, 2003, the EC Council approved a 
``blocking'' regulation to prevent enforcement of 1916 Act 
judgments in EC courts. The regulation also provides EC 
companies with a right to recover any costs incurred in 1916 
Act litigation. Conceivably, EC defendants in past 1916 Act 
litigation, such as the Wisconsin and Ohio cases, could recover 
attorneys' fees.

         II. PREVIOUS LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS TO AMEND THE 1916 ACT

    As recently as 1993 there were several major efforts to 
strengthen the 1916 Act. This flurry of legislative activity 
resulted from the fact that recent case law made it somewhat 
difficult to establish a predatory pricing claim under 
traditional antitrust law. Although the Supreme Court has not 
laid down specific guidelines on the appropriate cost standard 
for determining predatory conduct, in 1975 Professors Areeda 
and Turner proposed that only prices below ``reasonably 
anticipated marginal cost'' be deemed predatory \20\ (because 
marginal price is difficult to measure, average variable cost 
is often used as its surrogate). In its 1992 report on 
antitrust/trade legislation, the ABA Antitrust Section asserted 
that most circuits have adopted some close variant of the 
Areeda & Turner test.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\ Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices under 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 697 (1975).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Senators Metzenbaum and Grassley introduced S. 99, the 
``International Fair Competition Act of 1993'' on January 21, 
1993.\21\ S. 99 would have amended the 1916 Act by codifying 
the average total cost pricing standard for establishing a 
predatory pricing antitrust claim against a foreign firm 
enjoying a protected market. S. 99 was an effort to overcome 
perceived deficiencies with regard to antitrust actions brought 
against foreign firms engaged in anticompetitive below-cost 
pricing. The Senate Judiciary Committee Report on predecessor 
legislation, S. 2610, noted that when the 1916 Act was adopted, 
it was intended to serve as a foreign counterpart to the price 
discrimination prohibitions in the Clayton Act. The report went 
on to note that the 1916 Act has not proved to be a viable 
response to unfair foreign competition (in large part because 
of difficulties in proving intent), nor have the other 
antitrust laws or the trade laws. The report asserted that 
deficiencies in our antitrust laws help account for the demise 
of our domestic electronics industry (as illustrated in the 
Supreme Court's Matsushita \22\ decision), and noted that a 
number of other key U.S. industries are currently exposed to 
unfair foreign competition. In his testimony before the 
Subcommittee in a 1993 hearing on international competition in 
the steel industry, Lloyd Constantine, a renowned antitrust 
expert, indicated that he had drafted an initial version of S. 
99. He argued that the bill's special antitrust standards were 
warranted because of unique mechanisms for foreign firms 
engaging in predatory pricing and price discrimination 
practices through the use of a closed foreign home market and 
an open U.S. market.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\ S. 99 was cosponsored by Senators Grassley, Simon and Brown, 
and was identical to S. 2610, compromise legislation approved by the 
Senate Judiciary Committee by voice vote on July 30, 1992, and reported 
September 16, 1992. A similar bill, H.R. 5348, was introduced by Mr. 
Bryant (and cosponsored by Messrs Fish, Mazzoli, Synar and Glickman) in 
the 102nd Congress on June 9, 1992.
    \22\ Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio 
Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Senator Specter introduced S. 332 on February 4, 1993.\23\ 
The legislation would have amended the 1916 Act to create a 
civil action patterned on the antidumping law. The bill would 
have permitted injunctive relief (or, in the event such relief 
is inadequate, a single damage action) against any person who 
imports or sells within the U.S. an article manufactured or 
produced in a foreign country where: (i) the article is 
imported or sold at less than the foreign market value or 
constructed value of the article (as such terms are defined in 
the antidumping laws); and (ii) the importation or sale (A) 
causes or threatens material injury to industry or labor in the 
U.S. or (B) prevents the establishment or modernization of any 
industry in the U.S.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\ S. 332 was similar to S. 2508, legislation that was favorably 
reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee by voice vote on August 12, 
1992.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    S. 332 would also have eased a number of other potential 
obstacles to litigation under the 1916 Act including, inter 
alia (i) incorporating the 1916 Act within the Clayton Act 
definition of the antitrust laws,\24\ (ii) allowing the 
plaintiff to use final determinations by the Commerce 
Department and the ITC in dumping proceedings as prima facie 
evidence of below cost pricing and material injury, (iii) 
requiring foreign exporters to appoint a U.S. agent for service 
of process purposes, and (iv) authorizing the court to enjoin 
imports until the defendant complies with a discovery request. 
The bill also would have amended the 1916 Act to prohibit the 
importation of subsidized foreign goods and amended Title 28 of 
the U.S. Code to create a private right of action for customs 
fraud.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\ While cross-referencing the 1916 Act in the Clayton Act may 
have clarified the applicability of certain aspects of the antitrust 
laws (such as the availability of injunctive relief and the ability to 
use governmental judgments and decrees as prima facie evidence in 
private suits), it would also have subjected the 1916 Act to certain 
defense-oriented antitrust jurisprudence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Finally, legislation introduced by Senator Danforth in 1980 
\25\ would have amended the 1916 Act to shift the burden of 
proof to the defendant once the plaintiff has made a prima 
facie showing that good are being sold in the U.S. at less than 
the foreign market value. (A similar statutory shifting of 
burden of proof is employed for price discrimination actions 
under Section 2 of the Clayton Act, and was utilized in the 
Specter bill.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \25\ S. 223, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                             III. ARGUMENTS

    We oppose this legislation for several reasons.
    First, we object to repealing the law in the absence of a 
single legislative hearing. It is our duty and responsibility 
as legislators to carefully examine and consider the laws 
within our jurisdiction. Here we have a law that has been on 
the books since 1916, and has been subject to various legal and 
judicial interpretations. Surely the Committee on the Judiciary 
owes it to the American people to do better than to repeal a 
law under such rushed and expedited conditions.
    Second, repeal of this law could well have a detrimental 
effect on U.S. jobs. The Act empowers companies to bring 
private antitrust suits against foreign companies that import 
their goods at below-market prices. As a matter of fact, as 
noted above, the law has been used on several occasions 
recently that have resulted in significant settlements and 
legal judgments favoring U.S. companies and their workers. If 
we take away the ability to bring these actions, this sends the 
signal that foreign companies are free to dump their products 
without facing the risk of a private lawsuit.
    Third, acting in haste to repeal this Act sets a very poor 
precedent that we are willing to act as a rubber stamp for the 
World Trade Organization. The mere fact that the WTO says the 
U.S. is in violation of our WTO obligations does not mean that 
Congress should ignore its duty to gather the facts and do an 
analysis of the costs and benefits of having this statute on 
our books.
    It is important to note that there are a group of cases 
involving statutory provisions that not only fall well within 
any reasonable interpretation of our WTO obligations but, 
equally important, have no demonstrable negative trade effects 
on our trade partners. The most recent spate of cases--
including challenges to the 1916 Act and the Byrd 
Amendment,\26\ as well as Canada's challenge to the rules for 
refunding antidumping and countervailing duties--would seem to 
be an abuse of the dispute settlement system, and may well 
further weaken support for the WTO. In our view, our allies 
have little business dragging the United States through time-
consuming proceedings to pursue claims about measures that have 
little if any effect on actual trade. The dispute settlement 
system exists to help resolve actual commercial problems. The 
United States limits its use of the DS system on this basis, 
but other Members do not. The main point is that as a matter of 
principle, the United States should never simply bow to a 
decision from Geneva that the very existence of one of our 
statutes constitutes a breach, without the statute having been 
applied and applied in violation of America's commitments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\ The Byrd Amendment is a two-year-old trade law, officially 
known as the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000. It 
directs U.S. Customs to distribute duties collected as a result of 
antidumping and countervailing duty orders to domestic producers found 
to be injured by foreign dumping and subsidies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    At a minimum, rather than simply agreeing to unilaterally 
repeal the 1916 Act, we should attempt to receive some 
offsetting benefit out of it. For example, Senators Baucus and 
Craig have introduced a bill that would deduct the cost of 
countervailing duties in dumping cases (S. 219). Why are we not 
looking at some kind of pro-jobs concession in exchange for 
considering repeal of the 1916 Act?
    Finally, repealing the 1916 Act demonstrates the 
Administration's hypocrisy with respect to the U.S. trade 
policy. In addition to the 1916 Act, the WTO has ruled against 
the U.S. on two other U.S. statutes. In one, the European 
Commission, on behalf of the Government of Ireland, challenged 
two related sections of a U.S. copyright provision as a 
violation of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (``TRIPs''). The WTO found that 
one of the provisions, 17 U.S.C. Sec. 110(5)(B), violates the 
agreement by allowing certain businesses to play music without 
compensating songwriters. Section 110(5)(B) says it is not 
infringement of a copyright on a musical work for retail 
establishments of a certain size having a certain number of 
speakers or TV's to rebroadcast non-dramatic radio music unless 
they charge for it or rebroadcast to a public audience. The end 
result of the law is that songwriters do not get paid for music 
they write that is played in these businesses. The WTO ruled 
against the U.S. government on section 110(5)(B) on July 27, 
2000. For approximately three years, the WTO and the European 
Commission have urged the United States to repeal the law but 
have been unsuccessful.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \27\ Aside from repealing the law, there were three options 
available for the United States to come into compliance with its trade 
obligations: (1) Compensation: Congress could have complied by amending 
section 110(5)(B) so that bars and restaurants would have to pay some 
royalty for the right to invoke it; (2)Trade Concession: instead of 
complying and altering section 110(5)(B), the United States could have 
asked the European Commission to accept a trade concession (i.e., the 
United States could lower tariffs on European goods imported); (3) 
Unilateral Sanction: the United States could refuse to comply and the 
EC could invoke unilateral sanctions against the United States. This is 
what occurred; the United States paid $3.3 million to the European 
Commission. The payment was authorized to be made by the U.S. Trade 
Representative in a supplemental appropriations bill that became public 
law on April 16, 2003 (H.R. 1559).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The other involves a trademark dispute. In Havana Club 
Holdings, S.A. v. Galleon, S.A.,\28\ the Second Circuit held 
that a lawsuit could not go forth because the United States 
embargo against Cuba prevents marks appropriated by the Cuban 
government from being recognized.\29\ The court based its 
decision on what is commonly known as Section 211 of the 1998 
appropriations bill, passed at the behest of then-Senator 
Connie Mack (R-FL), which states that U.S. courts cannot 
enforce rights pertaining to appropriated goods from Cuba. The 
WTO has held that section 211 is in violation of the United 
States's international obligations under TRIPs. The WTO held 
that, while a law can say that U.S. courts cannot recognize 
assets linked to confiscated property, section 211 violates 
TRIPs because it is limited to assets from Cuba. Despite the 
fact that section 211 violates our international trade 
obligations, it has not been repealed.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \28\ 203 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2000).
    \29\ The lawsuit was a trademark infringement case. During its 
revolution, Cuba nationalized the Havana Club rum company from the 
Arechabala family. At the time, ``Havana Club'' had been registered as 
a trademark in the United States. Subsequent events led to two separate 
companies seeking to market Havana Club rum. Pernod Ricard, a French 
company, entered into a joint venture with the Cuban government to 
extend the registration of ``Havana Club'' in 180 countries, including 
the United States. In 1997, the Arechabala family sold its Havana Club 
assets to Bacardi, a Bermuda company with U.S. subsidiaries. 
Thereafter, Bacardi began to sell rum in the United States with the 
name ``Havana Club.'' Pernod sued Bacardi for trademark infringement.
    \30\ The main reason for this is the political situation associated 
with recognizing Cuban marks. It is generally understood that section 
211 remains in law because of the political issues surrounding trade 
with Cuba. Another solution would be for Congress to expand the law so 
it covers assets from every country. This has been rejected by 
trademark lawyers because it would open up U.S. trademark holders to 
disparate treatment in every other country.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                               CONCLUSION

    For all these reasons, we cannot support repealing the 1916 
Antidumping Act. In the 88-year history of the Act, there has 
been no showing that it has any negative trade effects on our 
trade partners. In some circumstances it may serve as a useful 
tool for U.S. companies that are harmed by predatory pricing by 
foreign companies, or at the very least as a warning to foreign 
companies that they cannot dump their products in the United 
States without consequence. Finally, Congress should not simply 
roll over and rubber stamp the WTO and the Bush Administration 
without holding even one legislative or oversight hearing.

                                   John Conyers, Jr.
                                   Melvin L. Watt.
                                   Sheila Jackson Lee.
                                   Maxine Waters.
                                   Tammy Baldwin.

                                
