[Senate Executive Report 108-6]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



108th Congress                                            Exec. Rpt.
 1st Session             SENATE                           108-6
======================================================================
 
     PROTOCOLS TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY OF 1949 ON ACCESSION OF 
 BULGARIA, ESTONIA, LATVIA, LITHUANIA, ROMANIA, SLOVAKIA, AND SLOVENIA

                                _______
                                

                 April 30, 2003.--Ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

          Mr. Lugar, from the Committee on Foreign Relations,
                        submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                   [To accompany Treaty Doc. 108-04]

    The Committee on Foreign Relations to which was referred 
the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on Accession 
of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and 
Slovenia, which were opened for signature at Brussels on March 
26, 2003, and signed on behalf of the United States of America 
and other parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, having 
considered the same, reports favorably thereon and recommends 
that the Senate give its advice and consent to ratification 
thereof subject to 9 declarations and 3 conditions as set forth 
in this report and the accompanying resolution of ratification.

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page

  I. The Future of NATO and the Enlargement of the Alliance...........2
 II. Qualifications of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, 
     Slovakia, and Slovenia for NATO membership.......................9
III. The Cost of NATO Enlargement....................................27
 IV. Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimates of NATO Enlargement..28
  V. NATO-Russia Relations...........................................41
 VI. The Balkan Wars.................................................43
VII. NATO Transformation.............................................43
VIII.Senate Action...................................................47

 IX. Resolution of Ratification......................................53
  X. Letter from Senate Armed Services Committee.....................64

       I. The Future of NATO and the Enlargement of the Alliance


   UNITED STATES MEMBERSHIP IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

    The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was 
established as an alliance of common defense among democratic 
and market oriented governments in North America and Western 
Europe on August 24, 1949, with the entry into force of the 
North Atlantic Treaty. Original members included the United 
States, Canada, and ten European countries emerging from the 
destruction of World War II (Great Britain, France, Belgium, 
the Netherlands, Portugal, Denmark, Norway, Luxembourg, Iceland 
and Italy). Subsequently, the Alliance has been enlarged on 
four separate occasions--to include Greece and Turkey in 1952, 
the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955, Spain in 1982, and 
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in 1999. NATO has been 
central to peace and stability in Europe for more than fifty 
years and provides the United States with an ongoing and direct 
leadership role in European security affairs.
    During the Cold War, NATO served as a bulwark against the 
threat of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact satellites. The 
U.S. strategic nuclear guarantee served as a deterrent to 
Soviet aggression, and U.S. conventional forces stationed in 
Europe, reaching over 300,000 at their peak, were evidence that 
the United States would meet its commitment to collective 
defense under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Since the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, NATO members have made 
significant cuts in their military forces, including a 
substantial reduction in U.S. forces stationed in Europe. Since 
1991, NATO has shifted from its Cold War strategy of mounting a 
massive, static defense against a significant military threat 
from a single direction. Instead, NATO's 1991 Strategic Concept 
revised the strategy to provide mobile response to diverse and 
multi-directional risks to the North Atlantic area. The 
Committee welcomes Secretary of State Colin L. Powell's 
statement about NATO's continuing relevance that he provided in 
testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee on April 29, 
2003. In explaining the continuing relevance of the Alliance 
and enduring transatlantic relationship, Secretary Powell 
stated that:

          For over half a century NATO was indispensable to 
        security on both sides of the Atlantic. That has not 
        changed. Today, the Alliance remains indispensable to 
        our security, and to meeting the security challenges in 
        a world of diverse threats, multiple challenges, and 
        unprecedented opportunities. The Alliance remains 
        crucial to the link that binds North America to Europe 
        and Europe to North America.

    At the 1999 Washington Summit, the NATO allies approved a 
new Strategic Concept to ``equip the Alliance for the security 
challenges and opportunities of the 21st century and to guide 
its future political and military development.'' In response to 
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and NATO's 
subsequent decision to invoke Article 5 of the Washington 
Treaty, the allies ``approved a comprehensive package of 
measures, based on NATO's [1999] Strategic Concept, to 
strengthen our ability to meet the challenges to the security 
of our forces, populations and territory, from wherever they 
may come,'' including ``. . . the threat posed by terrorism and 
by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their 
means of delivery.''
    And most recently, at the November 2002 Prague summit, NATO 
Heads of State committed the Alliance to transform NATO with 
new members, new capabilities and new relationships with its 
partners. The Alliance invited Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia to begin accession 
talks to join the Alliance and considered the membership of 
these seven countries as part of the Alliance's transforming 
role for the 21st century. The Alliance also defined part of 
its new mission as combating terrorism and the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction, matched by pledges to obtain the 
military capabilities to accomplish that mission.
    NATO first established a forum for constructive dialogue 
and cooperation with the Russian Federation in the Permanent 
Joint Council in 1997, and in 2002 established the NATO-Russia 
Council to provide a forum for strengthening peace and security 
in the Euro-Atlantic area, and where appropriate, consensus 
building, consultations and joint decisions. NATO has also 
forged a relationship with Ukraine in the NATO-Ukraine 
Commission. Within the guidelines of its Resolution of 
Ratification, as in 1998, the Committee supports these 
initiatives as a way to demonstrate the defensive and 
stabilizing intentions of NATO. Nonetheless, the core purpose 
of the Alliance must remain the defense of its members. In 
order to fulfill this purpose, the forces of Alliance members 
must remain capable of defending against a significant military 
threat, and all members of the Alliance must fully meet their 
commitments as defined at the Prague summit.
    During the Cold War, NATO played an important role. After 
two World Wars in the first half of the 20th century into which 
the United States was drawn, the close relationship among NATO 
members allowed countries to lay aside historical grievances 
and develop democratic traditions and market economies to the 
enormous benefit of themselves, their neighbors, and the United 
States. Under NATO's security umbrella, old enemies have not 
only been reconciled but now stand side by side as allies; 
national defense policies are coordinated; and, on a daily 
basis, consultation, joint planning, joint training and 
cooperation reinforce the trust and commitment to common 
principles that are the very essence of the Alliance.
    As Poland and Germany, and Hungary and Romania, and several 
other former antagonists in Central and Eastern Europe build 
constructive, friendly relations in the post-Cold War era, the 
stabilizing influence of NATO membership, and potential 
membership, is illustrated yet again. The defensive nature of 
the Alliance, the democratic nature of its decision-making, and 
membership based not upon force of arms or coercion, but the 
willing choice of democratic governments, are the central 
reasons that association with the Alliance, and even 
membership, is a foreign policy priority for many European 
nations previously denied the rights of self-determination, 
freedom, and democracy. And for this reason, no country in 
Europe, with the exception of Belarus, has objected to the 
enlargement of the Alliance. Russia appears to accept 
enlargement as inevitable and has put NATO-Russia and U.S.-
Russia relations in a broader context rather than making 
enlargement a focal point as it did in the 1990s. In December 
2001, NATO and Russian Foreign Ministers announced their 
intention to create a NATO-Russia Council, on the principle of 
``NATO at 20.'' In May 2002, NATO and Russian leaders meeting 
in Rome signed the ``NATO at 20'' agreement, in which Russia 
and NATO members participate as equals on certain issues. This 
new body replaces the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council.
    With NATO's continued importance to European stability, and 
a new mission, as defined in Prague, to combat terrorism and 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, matched by 
pledges to obtain the military capabilities to accomplish that 
mission, as in 1998, the Committee supports a continued United 
States commitment to, and leadership of, NATO. The Committee 
welcomes the strategic rationale for NATO that was provided by 
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Marc Grossman in 
testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee on April 8, 
2003. In explaining the continuing relevance and purpose of the 
Alliance, and in referring to comments earlier in the hearing 
by Senators Lugar and Biden, Secretary Grossman stated that:

          NATO [is] the central organizing agent for 
        transatlantic cooperation. It represents, as you both 
        said, not just a military alliance, but a political-
        military alliance, a community of common values and 
        shared commitments to democracy, free markets and the 
        rule of law. NATO is key to the defense of the United 
        States, and so therefore, as you both said, NATO must 
        continue to lead and to adapt. [The] NATO Prague summit 
        launched a transformation of NATO with a three-part 
        agenda: new members, new capabilities and new 
        relationships. The job you've given me today, Senator, 
        is to discuss enlargement, which is key to that 
        transformation.

              THE STRATEGIC RATIONALE FOR NATO ENLARGEMENT

    Notwithstanding the collapse of communism in most of Europe 
and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the United States and 
its allies face continuing threats to their stability and 
territorial integrity, including the potential, if lessened 
threat of the emergence of a hegemonic power in or around 
Europe, conflict stemming from ethnic and religious enmity, the 
revival of historic disputes, or the actions of undemocratic 
leaders. Furthermore, the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks 
in New York and Washington, DC heightened NATO's awareness of 
emerging capabilities to use and deliver weapons of mass 
destruction, as well as transnational threats such as 
terrorism, drug trafficking and organized crime that threaten 
both the new and old democracies in the transatlantic region. 
By providing a defense against many of these threats, NATO 
membership for Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, 
Slovakia and Slovenia will expand the area in Europe where 
peace and democracy are not only present, but secure.
    Through much of its history, Europe has seen many insecure 
and small powers, a few great powers, and far too many 
nationalist defense policies--a dangerous catalyst for 
collusion and conflagration. Twice in the last century these 
dynamics have pulled the United States into conflict on the 
European continent. With the enlargement of NATO, the United 
States and its allies have an opportunity to build a more 
stable Europe, to lock in that stability, and to replace the 
dynamics of confrontation and conflict with trust and 
cooperation. NATO membership will extend to Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia the 
institutions, practices, and traditions that have made NATO an 
effective military alliance for the last half century. This 
structure has proven that vital U.S. interests in Europe can be 
guaranteed by a stable architecture of security and cooperation 
based upon a common commitment to the defense of democracy.
    The Committee finds that the accession of Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia to 
NATO will make the Alliance stronger and more cohesive. Each of 
the seven countries is an established democracy with a growing 
market economy. Each shares the commitment to democracy that 
unites the transatlantic community. Their militaries are firmly 
under civilian control. In addition, these seven countries have 
proven themselves ready to bear a share of the burden in 
support of American and Allied interests beyond their borders. 
Each has contributed to the peacekeeping missions in the 
Balkans, and more recently, contributed to Operation Enduring 
Freedom in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom. All seven 
have contributed to the International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF) in Afghanistan and have pledged contributions for post-
conflict reconstruction of Iraq.
    NATO enlargement is not a reaction to any single event or 
threat; rather it is a strategic opportunity for the expansion 
of a zone of peace and democracy in a continent that is of 
vital interest to the United States. As in 1998, the view of 
the Committee is that this is the best way to minimize the 
possibility that U.S. troops will be called upon again to fight 
in a major war in Europe. The invasion or military 
destabilization of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia would threaten the stability of 
Europe, jeopardize vital United Sates national security 
interests, and would quite likely lead to the engagement of 
United States forces. NATO enlargement is a prudent step to 
ensure that this does not happen.

                        NATO'S STRATEGIC CONCEPT

    The Soviet Union's collapse in 1991 and the subsequent 
disarray of the Russian military have significantly reduced any 
immediate, conventional threat to Western Europe and the United 
States. Consequently, in 1991, NATO members agreed to their 
first Strategic Concept, reiterating the central importance of 
collective defense to the Alliance, but also noting that, with 
the emergence of independent democratic states in Central 
Europe, ``the political division of Europe that was the source 
of the military confrontation of the Cold War period has . . . 
been overcome.'' At the 1999 Washington Summit, the NATO allies 
approved a new Strategic Concept to ``equip the Alliance for 
the security challenges and opportunities of the 21st century 
and to guide its future political and military development.'' 
In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and 
NATO's subsequent decision to invoke Article 5 of the 
Washington Treaty, the allies ``approved a comprehensive 
package of measures, based on NATO's [1999] Strategic Concept, 
to strengthen our ability to meet the challenges to the 
security of our forces, populations and territory, from 
wherever they may come,'' including ``. . . the threat posed by 
terrorism and by the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and their means of delivery.''
    The Committee Resolution of Ratification declares that, in 
order for NATO to serve the security interests of the United 
States, the core purpose of NATO must remain the collective 
defense of the territory of all Alliance members but NATO must 
develop the capabilities to go beyond the treaty area to combat 
weapons of mass production proliferation and terrorism if 
necessary. With that focus, the Committee supports the 1999 
Strategic Concept's leaner approach to security for the post-
Cold War environment, provided that NATO's forces become more 
mobile and capable for high intensity conflict beyond the 
Treaty area.
    The Committee supports the 1999 Strategic Concept's 
realistic force adjustments to meet new threats to the 
territory of NATO. The Committee considers some positional 
forces to have continued importance as an element of static 
defense, but emphasizes the importance of more mobile, 
expeditionary forces. As in 1998, the Committee Resolution of 
Ratification declares that as NATO develops forces with 
enhanced flexibility and mobility, it must continue to pursue 
defense planning, command structures, and force goals first and 
foremost to meet the requirements of Article 5 of the North 
Atlantic Treaty. The 1999 Strategic Concept continues to 
provide guidance for the development of detailed policies and 
military plans. It examines the Alliance's strategic 
perspectives in the light of the evolving strategic environment 
and security challenges and risks, and reconfirms the 
importance of the transatlantic link and of maintaining the 
Alliance's military capabilities, and examines the role of 
other key elements in the Alliance's broad approach to 
stability and security, namely the European Security and 
Defense Identity; conflict prevention and crisis management; 
partnership, cooperation and dialogue; enlargement; and arms 
control, disarmament and non-proliferation. But in keeping with 
the Kyl amendment of 1998, NATO should develop forces for high-
intensity conflict to confront the threats of terrorism and 
proliferation. In 1998, Senator Kyl presented an amendment to 
the Resolution of Ratification for amendment of the North 
Atlantic Treaty to admit new countries to the Alliance. The 
amendment, which passed overwhelmingly, describes the principal 
threats to the Alliance as being the potential revival of a 
hostile Russia, ``rogue states and non-state actors'' that 
might develop weapons of mass destruction; terrorism; 
disruption of the flow of vital resources; and ethnic conflict.
    As in 1998, the Committee strongly advises the Executive 
Branch to consult extensively with the Senate before 
undertaking any interpretation, reinterpretation, expansion, or 
revision of NATO's 1999 Strategic Concept.
    Finally, as in 1998, the Committee finds that the Strategic 
Concept and burdensharing are inextricably linked. Because the 
United States is the leading military power in NATO and has 
force projection capabilities far superior to those of its 
allies, the costs associated with a mission to respond to 
diverse and multi-directional risks falls disproportionately 
upon the United States military. Active development of the 
Combined Joint Task Force concept, in which European forces 
would undertake some NATO missions on their own, with support 
from the United States, also will reduce the burden on the U.S. 
military. However, differences exist among Alliance members 
over the extent and purpose of such missions, and there is some 
question of how well the European allies can accomplish such 
new missions on their own, with only limited U.S. involvement.
    The current disparities between the United States and its 
NATO allies in transport, logistics, communications, and 
intelligence capabilities (made apparent in the first Persian 
Gulf War, in the Kosovo conflict, in the ongoing Balkans 
operations, and in Afghanistan) indicate that NATO is moving 
toward a two-tiered Alliance in which the United States and its 
NATO allies have vast differences in capabilities. The 
Committee notes, as it did in 1998, that in a February 1997 
report to Congress on the rationale, benefits, costs, and 
implications of NATO enlargement, the Department of Defense 
concluded that in order to prevent such disparities the current 
allies would have to spend some $8-10 billion for force 
modernization by the year 2010.
    At a NATO ministerial meeting in Reykjavik in May 2002, the 
allies agreed that they must be able ``to carry out the full 
range of . . . missions, . . . to field forces wherever they 
are needed, sustain operations over distance and time, and 
achieve their objectives.'' While not all member states have 
sufficiently mobile or appropriately trained forces for the 
current tasks in Afghanistan and Iraq, a number of allies have 
an intelligence capability, transport, medical units, and 
political influence that might assist in such conflicts.
    The Committee Resolution of Ratification requires a 
specific and detailed report on progress by members of the 
Alliance to meet their commitments in fulfilling force goals.

                        FUTURE NATO ENLARGEMENT

    Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty provides that NATO 
members, by unanimous agreement, may invite any other European 
state in a position to further the principles of the North 
Atlantic Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North 
Atlantic area. The Committee emphasizes, however, that in the 
process of considering the qualifications and purpose for the 
admission of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, 
Slovakia and Slovenia into NATO, the Committee did not state a 
view on when, or whether, the United States should invite any 
additional countries to join NATO. Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia have been invited by 
NATO members to join the Alliance. No other agreement or 
document should be construed otherwise.
    As in 1998, the Committee points out that the Executive 
Branch must first consult the Senate before inviting any new 
aspirant countries to join the Alliance. The proposed 
candidates must be able to fulfill the obligations and 
responsibilities of membership, and their inclusion must 
contribute to the overall political and strategic interests of 
the United States. The Executive Branch has stated its 
understanding of the need for consultation with the Senate.
    The Committee Resolution of Ratification reiterates that no 
action or agreement other than a consensus decision by the full 
membership of NATO, approved by the national procedures of each 
NATO member, including, in the case of the United States, the 
requirements of Article II, section 2, clause 2 of the 
Constitution of the United States (regarding the advice and 
consent of the Senate to the making of treaties), will 
constitute a security commitment pursuant to the North Atlantic 
Treaty.

                   SENATE ADVICE ON NATO ENLARGEMENT

    On October 24, 2001, Senator Jesse Helms introduced to the 
Committee the Freedom Consolidation Act (S. 1572), which 
reaffirms support for continued enlargement of the NATO; 
designates Slovakia for participation in PfP and states that it 
is eligible to receive certain security assistance under the 
NATO Participation Act of 1994; and authorizes specified 
amounts of security assistance for FY 2002 for Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. (an 
identical bill, H.R. 3167, was introduced in the House on the 
same day and passed on November 6, 2001). The Committee 
reported out the legislation on December 12, 2001. Cosponsors 
included Senators Durbin, Lieberman, Lott, Lugar and McCain. 
Unfortunately, consideration and passage could not be completed 
until the following year. The Senate took up S. 1572 again on 
May 16, 2002, and passed it the next day by a vote of 85-6. 
President Bush signed the bill into Public Law 107-187 on June 
10, 2002.
    An August 2002 report by the Republican staff of the 
Foreign Relations Committee recommended that Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia be invited to 
join NATO at the Prague summit if they continue to carry out 
political, economic and military reforms. The report stressed 
the importance of the Membership Action Plan (MAP) program 
during the ratification process in preventing backsliding on 
reforms among the invitees, and that the MAP process would also 
help to implement policies announced in Prague to fight the 
threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.
    NATO members preliminarily endorsed the expansion of the 
Alliance at a November 2002 summit in Prague, setting in motion 
a process to expand NATO for the fifth time since 1949. In the 
view of the Committee, the Executive Branch has consulted and 
sought the advice of the Senate, consistent with the 
requirements of Article II, section 2, clause 2 of the 
Constitution of the United States, as the membership of 
Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and 
Slovenia in NATO has been proposed and considered. Indeed, this 
consultation is a model of how the two branches should 
cooperate in exercising their treaty-making power.
    As is evident in the Senate Action portion of this report, 
the Bush Administration and the Senate have been in constant 
dialog on this policy for two years. NATO foreign ministers 
signed the protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty to admit 
Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and 
Slovenia on March 26, 2003. The President transmitted the 
protocols to the Senate on April 10, 2003 for Senate action.

                       LAST ROUND OF ENLARGEMENT

    During the Clinton Administration, the Senate debated and 
approved legislation in support of NATO enlargement in 1994, 
1995, and 1996. On July 25, 1996, by an 81-16 vote, the Senate 
approved legislation stating that:

          The admission to NATO of emerging democracies in 
        Central and Eastern Europe which are found to be in a 
        position to further the principles of the North 
        Atlantic Treaty would contribute to international peace 
        and contribute to the security of the region.

    Throughout 1996 and 1997 the Executive Branch worked 
closely with the Foreign Relations Committee as this policy was 
pursued in NATO. NATO foreign ministers signed the protocols to 
the North Atlantic Treaty to admit Poland, Hungary and the 
Czech Republic on December 16, 1997. President Clinton 
transmitted the protocols to the Senate on February 11, 1998 
for Senate action. On April 30, 1998, the Senate voted 80-19 in 
favor of admitting Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to 
NATO.

  II. Qualfications of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, 
               Slovakia and Slovenia for NATO Menbership

    Countries in Central and Eastern Europe first gained 
institutional access to NATO in late 1991 through the North 
Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), a forum which includes all 
former Warsaw Pact members. At the January 1994 NATO summit, 
the Alliance launched the Partnership for Peace (PfP), a U.S. 
initiative designed to develop military cooperation among NATO 
members and interested countries in Europe. By August of that 
year, each of the seven aspirants had signed the PfP framework 
agreement. Since 1994, the seven nations have actively 
participated in PfP military exercises, which have provided 
their militaries the opportunity to work with NATO military 
headquarters, and alongside NATO allies, in the field, and have 
contributed to increasing the interoperability between 
prospective new members and the Alliance.
    However, while all PfP countries seek some degree of 
interoperability with NATO, not all of them desire NATO 
membership. At the April 1999 NATO summit in Washington, NATO 
leaders announced a Membership Action Plan (MAP) to provide 
``advice, assistance and practical support'' to countries 
seeking membership in the Alliance. Each NATO aspirant country 
submits an annual program on its preparations for possible 
future membership, and NATO provides feedback on aspirant 
countries' progress. All of the aspirants joined the MAP 
program and set Partnership Goals to help them prepare for NATO 
membership. In February 2002, U.S. Ambassador to NATO R. 
Nicholas Burns led an interagency team to visit Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, as 
well as Albania and Macedonia (which were not invited to join 
NATO at the Prague summit in November 2002) to assess their 
progress toward meeting NATO standards. He held detailed 
discussions with officials from these countries on their 
military reform efforts and their ability to contribute 
militarily to the Alliance. In July 2002, Ambassador Burns 
again led the interagency team to Riga for the V-10 summit, and 
in October 2002, he led the team to the aspirant countries to 
evaluate their progress. The Committee supports the 
Administration's assessment of the readiness of Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia to 
join NATO that was provided by Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
State Robert Bradtke in testimony before the Foreign Relations 
Committee on March 27, 2003. In explaining the Administration's 
engagement in working with the candidate countries to prepare 
for NATO membership, Secretary Bradtke stated that:

          We have held literally hundreds of meetings and 
        traveled thousands of miles to learn as much as we 
        could about the aspirant countries and to encourage 
        their preparations to join NATO. By issuing the 
        invitation at Prague to the seven countries we are 
        talking about today to join the Alliance, President 
        Bush and his fellow leaders signaled their belief that 
        these intensive efforts to promote and encourage reform 
        had been a success.
          Mr. Chairman, nothing has happened since Prague that 
        should cause us to question their judgment. The 
        evidence shows that all seven invitees have made an 
        enduring commitment to the core values of NATO and that 
        each is ready, both politically and militarily, to 
        contribute to the defense of the Alliance.
          . . . All of the countries, as you mentioned, Mr. 
        Chairman, are parliamentary democracies that have had 
        free and fair elections, that have open market 
        economies, and that respect the principles of free 
        speech and free press. All have taken steps to improve 
        governance by bolstering judicial independence and 
        adopting anti-corruption measures. All have improved 
        their protection of human rights, including minority 
        rights and civil liberties. And all have taken steps to 
        restitute property and to deal with complex and 
        difficult issues from the past.

    An important issue NATO countries confront is whether it is 
necessary for the new members to contribute substantially to 
NATO's collective defense or collective security functions in 
the near term. Indeed, many current NATO members need to 
upgrade their capabilities to carry out NATO's new missions. 
U.S. and NATO officials have dealt with this difficulty by 
urging aspirants to develop as quickly as possible specialized 
``niche'' capabilities that the Alliance needs most. NATO's key 
priority for both current and future members is to develop 
capabilities to strike terrorism and other threats anywhere in 
the world.
    After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, each of the 
seven aspirants declared its determination to act as an ally of 
the United States in the fight against terror. Since then, all 
seven countries have provided support for Operation Enduring 
Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, and have contributed to 
the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in 
Afghanistan. At a May 1, 2002 hearing of the Foreign Relations 
Committee, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Marc 
Grossman and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas 
Feith said that enlargement was needed to extend the zone of 
security and stability in Europe through the expansion of a 
united Euro-Atlantic community based on democratic values. 
Grossman asserted that enlargement was still relevant in the 
wake of the September 11 attacks because ``if we are to meet 
new threats to our security, we need to build the broadest and 
strongest coalition possible of countries that share our values 
and are able to act effectively with us.'' He noted that the 
aspirants declared their determination to act as allies of the 
United States in the fight against terror. Feith added that 
``an enlarged Alliance of democratic states with improved 
capabilities and interoperability, joint defense and 
operational planning, and realistic training will be better 
able to fulfill the Alliance's main purpose: to increase the 
security of its members and provide for the common defense 
against terrorism and other threats.''
    In considering the qualifications of the seven countries, 
the Committee has examined the degree to which each has 
satisfied the Membership Action Plan (MAP). The Committee 
believes that Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, 
Slovakia and Slovenia have overcome obstacles to their 
candidacies. And of the seven aspirants, the Baltic states have 
made the most progress in meeting MAP requirements.

                              BULGARIA \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ The facts and figures in Qualifications, section II, are based 
on several memoranda by Carl Ek, Paul Gallis and Steve Woehrel of the 
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division of the Congressional 
Research Service of The Library of Congress.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Democratic Reform

    Bulgaria is a parliamentary republic ruled by a 
democratically elected government. Bulgaria's process of reform 
since 1989 from communism to an open, market-oriented democracy 
accelerated after 1997. The Bulgarian government generally 
respects the human rights of its citizens, but has problems 
with rampant corruption, as well as trafficking in persons and 
drugs, and mistreatment of its Roma (Gypsy) minority. The 
government is working to reform the judicial system and has 
taken anti-corruption initiatives. Implementation of these 
reforms remains an issue.

Free Market Economy

    Bulgaria is a functioning market economy, and has made 
progress in privatization and structural reforms. Bulgaria's 
GDP was $13.6 billion in 2001 and $15.5 billion in 2002. The 
economy remains troubled by high unemployment, low living 
standards, and low levels of foreign investment. Economic 
priorities for the government include keeping tight controls 
over spending, completing delayed privatization, and combating 
corruption. The October 2002 European Commission report lauded 
Bulgaria's macroeconomic stability and progress in 
privatization and in structural reforms. Due to its late start 
in making economic reforms, however, it was not invited to join 
the European Union (EU) in December 2002, unlike all of the 
other candidate states, except Romania. EU leaders hold out 
hope that Bulgaria could reach its goal of achieving EU 
membership by 2007 if it continues its reforms.

Foreign Policy

    Bulgaria's primary foreign policy goals are membership in 
NATO and the European Union. Bulgaria is a member of the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and 
the Council of Europe and has been a member of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) since 1996.
    Located in an unstable region, Bulgaria has actively 
supported and, in some cases, led regional cooperation 
initiatives such as the Black Sea Economic Conference, regional 
summit and defense ministerial meetings, and the Stability Pact 
for Southeastern Europe. Bulgaria maintains favorable relations 
with its neighboring states.

Military Capabilities & Defense Issues

    In the last few years, the Bulgarian armed forces 
(comprising the army, navy, and air force) have embarked on a 
comprehensive reform and restructuring process focused on 
moving away from large, offensively-oriented and top-heavy 
structures and toward smaller, flexible, and NATO-compatible 
forces. The process of downsizing the armed forces, while 
important for cost savings in the long run, has imposed short-
term burdens on the budget, limiting available resources for 
modernization and training. Bulgaria plans to continue 
implementing its armed forces reform program and participating 
in international peace missions.
    Bulgaria has developed and adapted several plans for 
reforming the armed forces, including reducing the strength of 
the armed forces. The goal of the reforms is to achieve a small 
but combat-ready army. In 2002, Bulgaria's armed forces 
numbered 53,400, and by the end of 2003, it expects to reduce 
the armed forces to 46,500 with 8,281 professionals. Its ``Plan 
2004,'' which is based on recommendations included in a U.S. 
study on the Bulgarian armed forces, calls for the armed forces 
to be reduced to about 45,000 by 2004, with 25,447 in the army 
and 2,569 in the army reserves, 12,116 in the air force, and 
4,868 in the navy with 100,000 personnel in the reserves. The 
armed forces are being restructured into rapid reaction forces, 
main defense forces, territorial defense forces, and reserves. 
The term of conscription has been reduced to nine months, and 
the army will convert to a fully professional force by 2010. 
Other key reform priorities include increased interoperability 
with NATO in areas such as air defense, command and control, 
logistics, and training. Bulgaria signed a bilateral agreement 
with the United States on the destruction of its SS-23 SCUD, 
and FROG missiles. On October 31, 2002, Bulgaria announced that 
it had destroyed all of the missiles.
    Bulgaria's defense budget has been increasing since 1999, 
and it is committed to sustaining over 3.0% of GDP for defense 
spending. Most of the defense budget goes toward personnel 
costs. Bulgaria has active and reserve forces, but only the 
army has reserves in activity during peace time. Bulgaria also 
has paramilitary personnel serving as border guards, security 
police, or railway/construction troops. Bulgaria remains 
saddled with equipment from the Warsaw Pact era, with attendant 
high costs of maintenance and repair. Bulgaria has no immediate 
plans to purchase expensive Western fighter aircraft, and has 
decided instead to upgrade most of its fleet of MiG-29 tactical 
fighter aircraft.
    Bulgaria has participated in and hosted numerous NATO 
Partnership for Peace training exercises designed to improve 
interoperability with NATO forces. It has also participated in 
the Planning and Review Process under PfP, and agreed to work 
on Partnership Goals. Bulgaria participates in the NATO 
peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, contributed to 
Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and has deployed 
nuclear, biological and chemical decontamination units to ISAF 
in Afghanistan. On February 5, 2003, Bulgaria joined the V-10 
Statement on compelling Iraq to disarm, joined the coalition 
for the immediate disarmament of Iraq, and has indicated it 
will provide support for post-conflict and reconstruction in 
Iraq.
    Illicit arms sales is a problem throughout southeastern 
Europe, and the so-called Terem case in Bulgaria has raised 
many questions about its commitment to tackle the issue of grey 
arms. The Terem case involved the sale of dual-use materials 
that, according to some reports, could have ended up in Iraq. 
The U.S. brought it to the attention of the Bulgarian 
government, which acted swiftly to stop the sale of the illicit 
arms, fire officials, and initiate investigation and 
prosecutions with respect to the Terem case. At the time of 
this report, the investigation into the Terem case is 
continuing. The United States is assisting the Bulgarian 
government, with a view to helping it get a firmer grip on grey 
arms sales in general.
    Civilian Control of the Military & Oversight of 
Intelligence Agencies Under the Bulgarian constitution, the 
role of the armed forces is to guarantee the sovereignty, 
security, and independence of the country and to defend its 
territorial integrity. The President is commander-in-chief of 
the armed forces and appoints or dismisses the higher command 
of the armed forces. Civilian government and parliamentary 
authorities exercise administrative and budgetary control over 
the armed forces. As outlined in Plan 2004 and the MAP Annual 
National Programs, parliament has also adopted several other 
related laws and amendments to the Defense and Armed Forces 
Act.

Protection of Classified Information

    NATO has expressed concern to Bulgaria about its procedures 
for ensuring the security of classified information. It is the 
hope of the Committee that Bulgaria will continue to improve 
these procedures for ensuring the security of classified 
information. The Committee urges the Executive Branch to assist 
the Government of Bulgaria to swiftly bring its protection of 
classified information into conformity with NATO standards.

                                ESTONIA

Democratic Reform

    Estonia is a parliamentary democracy with a free market 
economy. It has held free and fair elections since the 
restoration of its independence in 1991. Estonia respects the 
human rights of its citizens, including the large ethnic 
Russian non-citizen community, and enjoys the rule of law. 
Problems exist in some areas, including the treatment of 
prisoners and the use of excessive force by police.

Free Market Economy

    Estonia is a functioning market economy. Estonia's GDP was 
$5.5 billion in 2001, and an estimated $6.3 billion in 2002. 
Many experts believe Estonia has one of the strongest records 
on economic reform in Central Europe. It has pursued sound 
fiscal and monetary policies and has privatized much of its 
economy; the private sector accounts for 75% of GDP, one of the 
highest percentages in the region. Unemployment is low, at 5.4% 
of the labor force in 2002. However, Estonia still needs to 
restructure its energy sector, including the oil shale 
industry. In 2002, the central government had a budget surplus 
of 1.9% of GDP and average consumer price inflation was 3.6%. 
However, Estonia suffers from a high current account deficit, 
which reached 12.4% of GDP in 2002. On April 16, 2003, Slovenia 
signed an accession agreement with the EU. It is expected to 
join the EU in 2004.

Foreign Policy

    Estonia is a member of the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe, NATO's PfP 
and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). It enjoys 
excellent relations with most of its neighbors, and has no 
ethnic or territorial disputes with them. It has very good ties 
with the Nordic countries, which are enshrined in a number of 
institutional frameworks. Links between Finland and Estonia are 
especially close. Estonia has also increased cooperation with 
Lithuania and Latvia in security, economic and political 
matters through the Baltic council, the Baltic Assembly and 
other intergovernmental organizations.
    Estonia's relations with Russia have been strained at 
times, but both countries have initialed a border agreement.

Military Capabilities & Defense Issues

    Estonia has about 7,200 men in its regular armed forces. In 
addition, it has about 8,300 men in the Defense League, a 
volunteer reserve force. Estonia's armed forces do not possess 
tanks or combat aircraft. It has 7 BRDM-2 reconnaissance 
vehicles, 32 armored personnel carriers, 19 105 mm artillery 
pieces, 44 81 mm mortars and 14 120 mm mortars. Estonia is 
building its armed forces around a light infantry brigade, 
supplemented by territorial defense troops. Estonia plans to 
have one battalion of this force equipped and trained by May 
2003. Estonia is concentrating its efforts on developing 
specialized capabilities in air surveillance and naval 
minesweeping.
    Estonia's defense spending in 2002 was about $125 million, 
or about 2.0% of Estonia GDP. Small in number, Estonia's armed 
forces can make a modest contribution to future NATO 
peacekeeping efforts, similar to that of smaller current NATO 
members.
    Baltic defense cooperation is an important part of 
Estonia's efforts to improve its qualifications for NATO 
membership. Estonia joins Latvia and Lithuania in a range of 
regional defense forces and institutions, along with Latvia and 
Lithuania, agreed to form a Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion with 
the help of NATO countries, which have supplied equipment and 
training for the force. BALTBAT has not been deployed as a 
whole unit, although parts of the force have participated in 
the NATO-led force in Bosnia. By 2005, each of the three states 
plans to create its own professional infantry battalions from 
BALTBAT, which will form the core of its armed forces. These 
forces would be able to engage in a full range of international 
deployments, as well as to contribute to the self-defense 
capabilities of the Baltic states.
    A Baltic naval squadron (BALTRON) is another joint Baltic 
military project. Since 1998, this five-vessel minesweeping 
unit has participated in exercises with NATO forces. A third 
important Baltic military program is BALTNET, a joint air 
surveillance network. BALTNET became operational in 2000, but 
it will need additional, more modern equipment before it will 
be full effective. It is planned that BALTNET will eventually 
be integrated in NATO's air defense system. Finally, the Baltic 
states have established a joint Baltic Defense College 
(BALTDEFCOL) in Tartu, Estonia. BALTDEFCOL educates staff 
officers from the three states in NATO-based staff procedures, 
defense planning and management.
    Estonia has made progress in achieving interoperability 
with NATO and from 1997-2002, had a company of soldiers serving 
as part of the Danish battalion of SFOR on several occasions, 
rotating with units from Latvia and Lithuania. A 22-man 
Estonian military police unit is deployed as part of an 
Italian-led Multinational Specialized Unit in KFOR in Kosovo. 
In February 2003, an Estonian infantry company was deployed to 
KFOR, where it will rotate with companies from Latvia and 
Lithuania. Estonia sent an explosives detection unit to assist 
Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan in July 2002. An 
ordinance disposal unit was assigned to the ISAF peacekeeping 
force in March 2003. On February 5, 2003, Estonia joined the V-
10 Statement on compelling Iraq to disarm and offered 
overflight and transit of U.S. coalition forces for Operation 
Iraqi Freedom.

Civilian control of the Military & Oversight of Intelligence Agencies

    Legal mechanisms exist in Estonia to guarantee civilian 
control of Estonia's military and intelligence services. The 
President of Estonia is the Supreme Commander of National 
Defense. He can declare war and issue mobilization orders in 
case of an attack against Estonia. He also appoints and 
dismisses the leadership of the armed forces, and approves 
officer promotions, on the proposal of the government and the 
commander of the regular armed forces. The parliament approves 
the defense budget as well as defense policy guidelines and 
priorities. The parliament also approves the nomination by the 
President of the commander of Estonia's armed forces. The 
Estonian defense minister, a civilian, exercises control over 
the development and organization of the armed forces through 
the commander of the Regular Armed Forces. The President of the 
Republic is commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and 
appoints top military officers.

                                 LATVIA

Democratic Reform

    Latvia is a parliamentary democracy that has held free and 
fair elections since it achieved full independence in 1991. 
Latvia has a democratic political system, the rule of law, 
respect for human rights and for the rights of minorities, 
including integrating the Russian-speaking minority. Latvia has 
problems with police brutality, an inefficient judiciary, poor 
prison conditions, and trafficking in women and children.

Free Market Economy

    Latvia has a functioning market economy. Its GDP was $7.6 
billion in 2001 and $8.4 billion in 2002. Average consumer 
price inflation was 1.8% and the unemployment rate was 7.6% in 
2002. Privatization in Latvia accelerated in early 2003, 
particularly in the banking sector. Latvia needs to privatize 
several companies in its vitally important energy sector, 
including the oil transit firm Ventspils Nafta, and the state 
energy company Latvenergo. Privatization of these firms has 
been hindered by a conflict with Russia, which is demanding a 
share of Ventspils Nafta, and by charges of corruption at 
Latvenergo. According to the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (EBRD), Latvia needs to make progress in 
improving transparency, corporate governance and fighting 
corruption. On April 16, 2003, Latvia signed an accession 
agreement with the EU. It is expected to join the European 
Union in 2004.

Foreign Policy

    Latvia is a member of the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe, NATO's PfP 
and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). It enjoys 
good relations with most of its neighbors and has increased 
cooperation with Estonia and Lithuania in security, economic 
and political matters through the Baltic Council, the Baltic 
Assembly and other inter-governmental organizations. While 
Latvia's relations with Russia have been difficult at times, 
Latvia and Russia have completed negotiations on a border 
agreement, but have yet to sign it.

Military Capabilities & Defense Issues

    Latvia has about 6,500 men in its active-duty armed forces, 
and 14,400 men in the National Guard reserves. It has 3 T-55 
tanks, 13 armored personnel carriers, 2 reconnaissance 
vehicles, 26 100 mm artillery pieces, as well as five 82 mm 
mortars and 26 120 mm mortars, and no combat aircraft. Latvia 
spent $144.4 million on defense in 2002, or 1.75% of GDP. In 
2003, It plans to increase defense spending to $184 million, or 
2.0% of GDP,, the informal target set by NATO for the applicant 
states. Small in number, Latvia's armed forces will provide a 
modest contribution to future NATO peacekeeping efforts, 
similar to that of smaller current NATO members.
    Latvia has had a company of soldiers serving as part of the 
Danish battalion of SFOR on several occasions, rotating with 
units from Estonia and Lithuania. Fifteen Latvian soldiers are 
deployed to KFOR in Kosovo. In March 2003, Latvia sent eight 
military medics to serve in the ISAF peacekeeping force in 
Afghanistan. On February 5, 2003, Latvia joined the V-10 
Statement on compelling Iraq to disarm. On March 20, 2003, the 
Latvian parliament passed a resolution supporting U.S. military 
action in Iraq. Latvia has contributed overflight and transit 
of U.S. and coalition forces to Operation Iraqi Freedom; and 
the Parliament has approved allowing forces to deploy to Iraq 
for peace operations.
    The main priorities of Latvia's defense policy are to 
enhance the country's ability to defend itself, develop 
interoperability with NATO, and participate in international 
peacekeeping efforts. In 2003, Latvia plans to equip and train 
a light infantry battalion that would form the core of the 
country's army as well as be fully capable of participation in 
NATO-led peacekeeping missions. Latvia also plans to train and 
equip three additional mobile reserve battalions.
    A key part of Latvia's cooperation with NATO is the effort 
of the three Baltic states to develop joint defense projects. 
In 1994, Latvia, along with Estonia and Lithuania, agreed to 
form a Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion with the help of NATO 
countries, which have supplied equipment and training for the 
force. BALTBAT has not been deployed as a whole unit, although 
parts of the force have participated in the NATO-led force in 
Bosnia. By 2005, each of the three states plans to create its 
own professional infantry battalion from BALTBAT, which will 
form the core of its armed forces. These forces would be able 
to engage in a full range of international deployments, as well 
as to contribute to the self-defense capabilities of the Baltic 
states.
    A Baltic naval squadron (BALTRON) is another joint Baltic 
military project. Since 1998, this five-vessel minesweeping 
unit has participated in exercises with NATO forces. A third 
important Baltic military program is BALTNET, a joint air 
surveillance network. BALTNET became operational in 2000, but 
it will need additional, more modern equipment before it will 
be fully effective. It is planned that BALTNET will eventually 
be integrated in NATO's air defense system. Finally, the Baltic 
states have established a joint Baltic Defense College 
(BALTDEFCOL) in Tartu, Estonia. BALTDEFCOL educates staff 
officers from the three states in NATO-based staff procedures, 
defense planning and management.
    At NATO's urging, Latvia is focusing its efforts on 
developing specialized capabilities in air surveillance (as 
part of BALTNET), military medics, explosive ordnance disposal 
experts, military police, and nuclear, chemical and biological 
decontamination units.

Civilian Control of the Military & Oversight of Intelligence Agencies

    Legal mechanisms exist to provide for civilian control of 
Latvia's military and intelligence services. The Latvian 
parliament adopts the defense budget and approves laws on 
national defense. The commander of Latvia's armed forces is 
subordinated to a civilian Minister of Defense.

Protection of Classified Information

    NATO has expressed concern to Latvia about its procedures 
for ensuring the security of classified information. It is the 
hope of the Committee that Latvia will continue to improve 
these procedures for ensuring the security of classified 
information. The Committee urges the Executive Branch to assist 
the Government of Latvia to swiftly bring its protection of 
classified information into conformity with NATO standards, 
particularly its procedures for vetting individuals for access 
to the most sensitive materials.

                               LITHUANIA

Democratic Reform

    Lithuania is a parliamentary democracy, which has held free 
and fair elections since achieving independence in 1991. 
Lithuania has a democratic political system and respects the 
human rights of its citizens, including the rights of national 
minorities. Lithuania has an independent judiciary, but police 
brutality and corruption and poor prison conditions remain 
problems.

Free Market Economy

    Lithuania is a functioning market economy. Lithuania's GDP 
was $12 billion in 2001 and $13.9 billion in 2002. In 2002, 
average consumer price inflation was 0.3%, and unemployment was 
10.7%. In February 2003, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
praised Lithuania's stringent fiscal and monetary policies and 
its excellent macroeconomic performance. Lithuania has 
privatized most of its industries. However, several key sectors 
remain to be privatized, including the natural gas company 
Lietuvos Dujos (delayed due to protracted negotiations with the 
main bidder, the Russian gas giant Gazprom), the national 
airline, and the power distribution networks. The European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) notes that Lithuania 
has privatized its banking sector, but needs to bolster other 
parts of its financial sector, including the stock market and 
insurance companies. On April 16, 2003, Lithuania signed an 
accession agreement with the EU. It is expected to join the 
European Union in 2004.

Foreign Policy

    Lithuania is a member of the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe, NATO's PfP 
and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). It enjoys 
good relations with neighboring countries, and has no major 
territorial or ethnic disputes with them. Lithuania has 
increased cooperation with Estonia and Latvia in security, 
economic and political matters through the Baltic Council, the 
Baltic Assembly and other inter-governmental organizations. 
Lithuania has forged highly successful ties with Poland, a 
country with which Lithuania has historically had a complex and 
sometimes difficult relationship.
    Lithuania has a generally good relationship with Russia. 
Russia and Lithuania signed a border treaty in October 1997. 
While Russia no longer opposes Lithuania's membership in NATO, 
a point of contention is Kaliningrad, a Russian exclave in 
eastern Europe, which would be surrounded by NATO member states 
if Lithuania gained membership in the Alliance. NATO and Latvia 
have said that this issue should be resolved through the 
European Union. Lithuania currently permits Russian military 
traffic to transit Lithuania on its way to Kaliningrad.

Military Capabilities & Defense Issues

    Lithuania currently has about 6,900 men in its active-duty 
army. Lithuania possesses no tanks, combat aircraft or heavy 
artillery, and has 10 reconnaissance vehicles, 81 armored 
personnel carriers and 42 120 mm mortars.
    Lithuania is making the transition from a force based on 
territorial forces to one based more on professional, better-
equipped, rapidly-deployable ones. Lithuania is developing a 
Rapid Reaction Brigade that will form the core of its forces. 
This force, which will be composed of about 3,800 men in 
peacetime when it is completed by 2008, will be supplemented by 
territorial units, which are being reduced. When the Rapid 
Reaction Brigade is ready, Lithuania expects to provide a 
battalion-sized unit that can deploy with NATO forces overseas 
for combat missions.
    In 2001, Lithuania spent $230.2 million on defense, or 
about 1.96% GDP. In 2002, Lithuania increased its defense 
spending to 2% of GDP. Small in number, Lithuania's armed 
forces will provide a modest contribution to future NATO 
peacekeeping efforts, similar to that of smaller current NATO 
members.
    On a rotating basis, Lithuania contributes a company of 100 
personnel with the Danish contingent to SFOR and maintains 30 
Lithuanian soldiers in KFOR as part of a Polish battalion. 
Lithuania offered use of Lithuanian airspace and airfields and 
other support for Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, 
and in November 2002, the Lithuanian government sent 40 special 
forces soldiers to Afghanistan to assist U.S. and allied 
efforts, and these troops have participated in combat 
operations there. A team of Lithuanian military medics has also 
been deployed to ISAF in Afghanistan. On February 5, 2003, 
Lithuania joined the V-10 Statement on compelling Iraq to 
disarm, and on March 17 expressed support for the U.S. military 
campaign in Iraq. The Lithuanian parliament voted on March 25, 
2003 to deploy cargo handlers and medical personnel to support 
Operation Iraqi Freedom, and Lithuania has offered medical and 
logistic support to a post-war peacekeeping force in Iraq.
    Baltic defense cooperation is an important part of 
Lithuania's efforts to improve its qualifications for NATO 
membership. Along with Latvia and Estonia, agreed to form a 
Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion with the help of NATO countries, 
which have supplied equipment and training for the force. 
BALTBAT has not been deployed as a whole unit, although parts 
of the force have participated in the NATO-led force in Bosnia. 
By 2005, each of the three states plan to create its own 
professional infantry battalion from BALTBAT, which will form 
the core of its armed forces. These forces would be able to 
engage in a full range of international deployments, as well as 
to contribute to the self-defense capabilities of the Baltic 
states.
    The Baltic naval squadron (BALTRON) is another joint Baltic 
military project. Since 1998, this five-vessel minesweeping 
unit has participated in exercises with NATO forces. A third 
important Baltic military program is BALTNET, a joint air 
surveillance network. BALTNET became operational in 2000, but 
it will need additional, more modern equipment before it will 
be full effective. It is planned that BALTNET will eventually 
be integrated in NATO's air defense system. Finally, the Baltic 
states have established a joint Baltic Defense College 
(BALTDEFCOL) in Tartu, Estonia. BALTDEFCOL educates staff 
officers from the three states in NATO-based staff procedures, 
defense planning and management.
    At NATO's urging, Lithuania is attempting to develop 
specialized capabilities useful to the Alliance, such as air 
surveillance (as part of BALTNET), special forces, explosive 
ordnance disposal experts, and engineers.

Civilian Control of the Military & Oversight of Intelligence Agencies

    Legal mechanisms exist to guarantee civilian control of 
Lithuania's military and intelligence services. The President 
of Lithuania is the Supreme Commander of the Lithuanian Armed 
Forces. Lithuania's parliament approves the defense budget. The 
Defense Ministry prepares plans and budget requests and 
supervises their execution.

                                ROMANIA

Democratic Reform

    Romania is a constitutional democracy with a bicameral 
legislature. It has held four elections, deemed free and fair 
by outside observers, since the fall of communism. Romania's 
political life has been relatively stable since President Ion 
Iliescu and his Party of Social Democracy (PSD) were 
reinstalled in the 2000 elections. The PSD has ruled as a 
minority government, with the support of the ethnic Hungarian 
party.
    The Romanian government generally respects the rights of 
its citizens, and the situation of the ethnic Hungarian 
minority has improved considerably over the past years. 
Nonetheless, the Greater Romania Party, a xenophobic 
organization, continues to command the support of about one-
sixth of the electorate, and the notorious bias against ethnic 
Hungarians of a few local officials stands in opposition to the 
more enlightened policies of the national government. Other 
problems continue, such as police mistreatment of detainees, 
discrimination and violence against women, juvenile 
homelessness, and discrimination against religious minorities 
and its Roma (Gypsy) population. A major concern is corruption. 
Prime Minister Nastase has said that reduction of corruption is 
a top priority, and the government has initiated an anti-
corruption campaign.

Free Market Economy

    Over the last several years, Romania has continued to make 
progress towards being a functioning market economy. While GDP 
declined sharply during 1997-1999, it rose by 1.8% in 2000 and 
5.3% in 2001; the 2002 growth rate was 4.9%. Inflation, which 
averaged 45% in 1999 and 2000, dropped to 30.3% in 2001 and was 
about 18% at the end of 2002. Unemployment for 2002 is expected 
to be 8.3%. Romania has natural resources and may prosper with 
successful market-oriented reforms, including taxation, 
investment and privatization. Pervasive corruption has been a 
continuing problem in Romania, and the government has created a 
new National Anti-corruption Prosecutor's Office and has 
recently introduced a clutch of laws to combat graft. Foreign 
observers are watching for signs of aggressive implementation 
of the legislation once it is passed, as well as for continuing 
privatization of large-scale enterprises, especially in the 
financial and energy sectors.
    Romania continues to receive much-needed assistance from 
international organizations, including the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the European Union 
(EU). Romania is expected to join the EU in 2004.

Foreign Policy

    Romania is a member of the Council of Europe, as well as 
NATO's PfP and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). In 
2001, it was judged to have done an excellent job in the 
revolving chairmanship of the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
    Through a series of bilateral treaties and multilateral 
agreements, Romania has been seeking to normalize its relations 
with neighboring states and to increase regional cooperation. 
It has concluded agreements intended to improve relations with 
Hungary and Ukraine, and has signed treaties that address 
disputes with Bulgaria, former Yugoslavia and Slovakia. Romania 
has also been working in cooperation with Moldova, Turkey, 
Greece, and other countries in the region on matters affecting 
trade, security, the environment, and law enforcement.

Military Capabilities & Defense Issues

    In 1995, Romania started to take more active participation 
in the United Nations. It sent a battalion of troops and 
medical staff to Angola, and has military observers in Central 
Africa and the Persian Gulf, and has provided troops for the 
humanitarian assistance effort in Albania. It has participated 
in numerous NATO PfP exercises, and has contributed personnel 
to SFOR and KFOR. The Committee commends Romania's unusual 
airlift capability, as demonstrated in July 2002 when it used 
its own airlift to send a battalion to Operation Enduring 
Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan. As President Bush stated in his 
March 25, 2003 Report to Congress on the Enlargement of NATO, 
``In support of OEF, Romania used its own C-130 aircraft to 
self-deploy an infantry battalion of 400 troops, the `Red 
Scorpions,' to Kandahar, where the mission was recently 
extended until mid-2003.'' Since that Report, the ``Red 
Scorpions'' have been replaced by the ``Carpathian Hawks.'' For 
ISAF, the peace keeping mission in Afghanistan, Romania has 
deployed military police, personnel and troops. On February 5, 
2003, Romania joined the V-10 Statement on compelling Iraq to 
disarm, and offered the use of its territory for military 
action in Iraq. Romania has offered public support for all 
U.S.-led post-conflict and reconstruction initiatives in Iraq.
    Romania's 2002 defense budget was 2.38 % of GDP. The 
defense minister announced in October 2002 that the 2003 budget 
would allocate 2.3% of GDP to the military. Romania is doing 
well on military personnel reform; it has been reorganizing its 
military structure in accordance with Western standards, and 
has created a rapid reaction force. The force size was reduced 
to 121,693 in September 2002, with a goal of 75,000 by 2007. In 
addition, the top-heavy officer ranks are being culled. The 
Defense Ministry also intends to move toward a more 
professional military.
    Romania has been making progress in terms of NATO 
interoperability. It has been modernizing its military 
equipment and adding new weapons systems. Romania's MIG-21 
fighter aircraft are being upgraded, as are navy ships, 
communications facilities, and missile launching systems. 
Romania has been developing ``niche capabilities'' to offer 
NATO, including airlift, minesweeping, UAVs, counter-NBC 
warfare, mountain combat troops, and special forces. With 
relatively large armed forces, Romania has the potential of 
significant military contributions and could serve as a 
geostrategic partner.

Civilian Control of the Military & Oversight of Intelligence Agencies

    Romania has made progress in the area of civilian 
management of the military and intelligence services, though 
some problems remain from the Ceausescu era, including the 
presence of former Securitate officials in senior positions in 
the intelligence services, Romania has enacted legislation to 
ensure civilian control over the military and intelligence 
agencies--the 1991 constitution declares the president to be 
commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Romania has had a 
civilian defense minster since mid-1994, and has sought to 
consolidate civilian control since then.

                                SLOVAKIA

Democratic Reform

    Slovakia and the Czech Republic peacefully split from union 
in the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic in 1993. From a 
starting point generally equal to that of the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia's international standing quickly diminished during the 
controversial leadership of Vladimir Meciar and his party, the 
Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HzDS). In the 1998 
elections, a broad coalition of four opposition parties 
defeated Meciar's HzDS and its coalition partners, and Mikulas 
Dzurinda of the Slovak Democratic Coalition became Prime 
Minister. Meciar also lost to Rudolf Schuster in Slovakia's 
first direct presidential elections in May 1999.
    Slovakia's most recent parliamentary elections were held on 
September 20-21, 2002, shortly before the NATO Prague Summit. 
Meciar's party won a plurality, but was unable to attract 
coalition partners. Dzurinda's party finished second in the 
voting and teamed up with three center-right parties to form a 
government. During his first term in office, Dzurinda focused 
on accelerating economic reforms, consolidating democratic 
development, combating corruption, and advancing accession 
negotiations with the European Union.
    Slovakia has improved its human rights situation, but 
continues to have problems related to the treatment of its Roma 
(Gypsy) population in Slovakia. The government also passed 
amendments to its constitution that strengthened the judicial 
branch and constitutional court, facilitated public 
administration reform, and established an ombudsman's function 
for the public defense of citizens' rights.

Free Market Economy

    Slovakia is a functioning market economy able to cope with 
the competitive pressures of European Union (EU) membership and 
market forces in the EU in the near term. Slovakia's GDP rose 
by 3.3% in 2001, 4.4% in 2002, and the outlook for 2003 and 
beyond is favorable, buoyed by increasing foreign investment 
and domestic consumption. Inflation is expected to rise 
temporarily to nearly 8% in 2003, mainly as a result of the 
passage of needed reforms in fiscal policy. Unemployment in 
Slovakia is currently at 17.1% (below the 2002 level by 2.5%), 
but remains a serious concern for the government. Joblessness 
is concentrated mainly in rural areas and among Roma 
settlements. Corruption, particularly in public procurement, 
has been identified as a problem. On April 16, 2003, Slovakia 
signed an accession agreement with the EU.

Foreign Policy

    Slovakia was among the first countries to sign up for 
NATO's PfP program in 1994, and has since participated in 
numerous PfP exercises. Slovakia is a member of the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the 
Council of Europe, and the World Trade Organization (WTO). In 
December 2000, Slovakia also joined the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Slovakia consults 
regularly with its ``Visegrad partners'' (Poland, Hungary and 
the Czech Republic).

Military Capabilities & Defense Issues

    Since 1998, the Dzurinda government has given priority to 
reforming, restructuring, and developing the Slovak armed 
forces, ultimately to become fully compatible with NATO. The 
Slovak armed forces have been downsizing steadily, moving 
toward a smaller, more flexible, and less top-heavy force. In 
2002, the Slovak armed forces numbered about 26,200 troops, 
including 10,400 conscripts; 13,000 served in the army and 
10,200 in the air force. The government also has nearly 4,700 
paramilitary troops serving in internal security and civil 
defense capacities. Current reform and restructuring plans call 
for the Slovak armed forces to reduce its personnel strength to 
24,500 land force, air force, and civilian personnel by 2006. 
The term of conscription is currently 9 months. Compulsory 
military service is to be phased out as the army becomes fully 
professional by 2006.
    After several years of decline, defense spending has 
increased in the last few years. Slovakia's defense budget in 
2002 was $370 million, or about 1.89 GDP, most of which was 
designated for operations and support.
    Slovakia's military reform programs call for the gradual 
modernization of armed forces equipment to enhance 
interoperability and standardization. The Dzurinda government 
has adopted numerous armed forces reform programs that have 
subsequently been adapted to take into account feedback from 
the annual MAP process and a U.S. defense assessment from 2000. 
In early 2000, the armed forces general staff was integrated 
into the defense ministry. In early 2001, parliament approved a 
constitutional amendment to facilitate joining collective 
defense alliances. Later, the government adopted and parliament 
approved legislation on a national security strategy, a defense 
strategy, and a military strategy. Also in 2001, the government 
prepared a long-term defense review and planning process for 
the structure and development of the armed forces. The process 
resulted in a long-term reform plan referred to as Slovak 
Republic (SR) Force 2010, which aims to establish by the year 
2010 a small, well-equipped and trained armed force that is 
integrated into NATO military structures and capable of 
operating in allied military operations. SR Force 2010 calls 
for a streamlined force structure comprised of ground and air 
forces, a consolidated training and support element, and 
command and control through the integrated general staff and 
defense ministry.
    Slovakia has provided troops to SFOR and KFOR, and 
immediately offered support and granted overflight, landing and 
refueling rights to Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. 
It has also budgeted for and initiated preparation of an Afghan 
Assistance Program. On February 5, 2003, Slovakia joined the V-
10 Statement on compelling Iraq to disarm, and has contributed 
to Operation Iraqi Freedom. Slovakia has indicated that it will 
contribute to post-conflict and reconstruction in Iraq.

Civilian Control of the Military

    Under the Slovak constitution, the President is supreme 
commander of the armed forces and is able to declare a state of 
emergency in the republic. The Slovak parliament considers all 
defense-related acts and provides financial support for the 
armed services. The parliament has been active and engaged in 
developing and shaping defense policy. Civilian control was 
enhanced with the integration of the armed forces general staff 
into the defense ministry in 2000. The establishment of a new 
legal framework for national security issues and strategy and 
the role fo the armed forces has been a priority under the MAP 
process. In response, parliament passed by wide voting margins 
three major pieces of legislation in 2001 relating to national 
security, defense, and the armed forces.
    In December 2002, a Western media report severely 
criticized the Slovak Security Services for alleged 
undemocratic behavior, a charge which was vigorously denied by 
the Slovaks. The Committee urges the Executive Branch to work 
with the Government of Slovakia to assure that all remaining 
doubts about the activities of the Security Services are put to 
rest.

                                SLOVENIA

Democratic Reform

    Slovenia has a democratic political system. It is a 
parliamentary democracy and has held free and fair elections 
since winning independence from Yugoslavia in 1991. Slovenia 
has an independent judiciary, the rule of law, and respects the 
human rights of its citizens and minorities.

Free Market Economy

    Slovenia has a functioning market economy. Its GDP in 2001 
was $18.7 billion, and $21.7 billion in 2002. Average consumer 
price inflation was 7.5% in 2002, which Slovenia needs to 
reduce to be in line with European Union (EU) requirements. 
Slovenia is the wealthiest of the candidate states, with a per 
capita GDP of $9,500 in 2001, but has suffered from low foreign 
direct investment (FDI). However, Slovenia has liberalized 
capital flows since 1999. Net FDI has surged from $110 million 
in 2000 to an estimated $553 million in 2002, and after a slow 
start, Slovenia has accelerated privatization of its 
industries. In 2003 and 2004, it plans to sell off parts of 
Slovenian Steelworks, the oil company Nafta Lendava, stakes in 
the Port of Koper and Ljubljana airport, and other assets. 
According to the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD), Slovenia needs to make further progress in 
privatizing the financial sector. On April 16, 2003, Slovenia 
signed an accession agreement with the EU. It is expected to 
join the EU in 2004.

Foreign Policy

    Slovenia is a member of the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe, NATO's PfP 
and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the World Bank. Slovenia is a member of Central European 
Free Trade Area and the U.S.-sponsored Southeast European 
Cooperative Initiative. It participates in the Stability Pact 
for Southeastern Europe.
    Although Slovenia has had some political disputes with 
Italy and Croatia in the past, Slovenia has made progress in 
improving relations with its neighbors, and has demonstrated 
good faith in attempts to resolve outstanding issues.

Military Capabilities & Defense Issues

    Slovenia's armed forces are engaged in a reform and 
restructuring effort. At the time of Slovenia's declaration of 
independence in June 1991, Slovenia's armed forces consisted of 
territorial defense forces, somewhat similar in nature to U.S. 
National Guard units. In 2002, Slovenia decided to move rapidly 
toward wholly professional armed forces, to abolish 
conscription by 2004, and to step up efforts to recruit 
professional solders. The peacetime strength of Slovenia's 
armed forces in August 2002 was 5,346 men. This number is 
expected to rise to 6,300 troops by the end of 2004 and 7,900 
by 2008, all of whom will be professional soldiers. It is also 
working on a concept for volunteer reserve forces. Total 
wartime strength, including reserves, will be less than 18,000 
men. An important part of Slovenian army reform efforts has 
been the creation of ``reaction forces.'' These are composed of 
two battalions which can be deployed abroad within 30 days to 
conduct combat or peacekeeping operations. Slovenia is in the 
process of moving from a militia-based force to a professional 
one.
    Slovenia inherited a significant amount of the former 
Yugoslavia's weaponry, much of which is obsolete, including 
tanks, APCs and artillery. Aside from equipping the 
peacekeeping battalion, other procurement priorities for 
Slovenia are air defense, anti-armor weapons and NATO-
compatible communications systems. In 2000, U.S. military 
experts noted that Slovenia needed to better relate its 
procurement priorities to the country's overall national 
security strategy. In response, Slovenia has adopted or is 
currently working on a hierarchy of documents that will govern 
its defense planning. These include a new national security 
strategy, a national threat assessment, a long-term development 
plan for the armed forces, a document on force structure, and 
other documents. Slovenia has amended its Defense Law in order 
to make it easier for the Slovene government to send forces out 
of the country to assist an ally and permit the stationing of 
allied forces on Slovene territory.
    Although it plans to continue to make equipment purchases 
according to the priorities listed above, Slovenia does not 
plan to undertake major increases in such spending over the 
next few years, but will focus on maintenance of current 
stocks.
    Slovenia's 2001 defense spending was $274.5 million, about 
1.46% of Slovenia's GDP. Slovenia's defense spending in 2002 
amounted to about 1.5% of GDP. Slovenia plans to increase 
defense spending by 0.1% of GDP each year until it reaches 2% 
GDP by 2008. The Committee hopes that given Slovenia's position 
as the wealthiest of the post-communist countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe, it could accelerate this timetable.
    Slovenia is working hard to increase interoperability with 
NATO within PfP. It participates in the NATO/PfP Planning and 
Review Process and has adopted Partnership Goals, aimed at 
increasing its ability to participate in future operations with 
NATO. Small in number, Slovenia's armed forces will be able to 
make a modest contribution to future NATO peacekeeping efforts, 
similar to that of smaller current NATO members. Slovenia would 
also provide a strategic land link between current NATO members 
Italy and Hungary. Slovenia is providing troops and equipment 
to SFOR and KFOR. Slovenia granted overflight, landing and 
refueling rights to Operation Enduring Freedom, and has 
provided humanitarian and demining assistance to Afghanistan, 
as well as a police officer for training and assisting the 
Afghan Police. On February 5, 2003, Slovenia joined the V-10 
Statement on compelling Iraq to disarm, and has indicated its 
willingness to look for ways it could contribute to post-
conflict reconstruction in Iraq.

Civilian Control of the Military & Oversight of Intelligence Agencies

    Legal mechanisms exist in Slovenia to provide for civilian 
control of the military and intelligence services. According to 
the Slovenian constitution, the National Assembly approves the 
defense budget and conducts oversight of military and 
intelligence programs. The Slovenian defense minister, a 
civilian, exercises control over the development and 
organization of the armed forces through the General Staff. The 
President of Slovenia is commander-in-chief of the armed 
forces, and appoints top military officers.

                   III. The Cost of NATO Enlargement


                             BACKGROUND \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ The Cost of NATO Enlargement, section III, is based on a 
Memorandum by Carl Ek of the Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade 
Division of the Congressional Research Service.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The cost of NATO enlargement was an important, and at times 
contentious, issue during the last round of enlargement, when 
the Alliance was considering membership of Poland, Hungary and 
the Czech Republic. NATO had taken in new members several times 
since its creation in 1949, but this round was different for 
two reasons: less than a decade earlier, the countries under 
consideration had belonged to the Warsaw Pact; and they were, 
for the most part, weaker economically than earlier new 
entrants.
    After NATO's 1997 Madrid Summit, during which Poland, 
Hungary and the Czech Republic were invited to begin accession 
negotiations, three major budget estimates--ranging to more 
than $100 billion--were prepared, but the need for large 
outlays failed to materialize. In fact, the cost of bringing in 
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic appears to have been 
relatively modest. The budget issue has almost disappeared 
during discussions of the current round of enlargement--even 
though some of the current invitees, particularly Romania and 
Bulgaria, are even less economically developed than the three 
former communist countries brought in during the last round.
    After their admission to NATO, Poland, Hungary and the 
Czech Republic began making payments into NATO's three common 
budgets and the prorated contributions of the other member 
states fell accordingly. The total U.S. share dropped by 
approximately 1%.

                          CURRENT ENVIRONMENT

    Since the admission of Poland, Hungary and the Czech 
Republic, NATO has moved even further away from the Cold War 
concept of maintaining a static defensive force--heavy ground 
forces prepared to repel a large-scale armored attack. The 
Committee notes, however, that although the conventional threat 
may have faded and new threats have emerged, were a 
conventional threat to emerge, the cost to NATO would be 
substantial regardless. As the September 11, 2001 terrorist 
attacks demonstrated, non-state actors such as al-Qaeda may 
seek to conduct asymmetric warfare on NATO member states. The 
Committee believes that the threat of weapons of mass 
destruction is a growing concern for the United States and its 
allies, and commends the Alliance's pledge at the Prague Summit 
to strengthen its ability to meet the challenges to the 
security of NATO forces, populations and territory, from 
wherever they may come, and to ``go out of area'' to fight 
terrorism and proliferation and to develop more mobile 
capabilities.

                     NEW MEMBER COST CONSIDERATIONS

    The seven countries currently under consideration for 
membership present a different set of issues militarily than 
did the last round of new members. The two largest countries, 
Romania and Bulgaria, are much less affluent than Hungary, 
Poland, and the Czech Republic, and will therefore need to 
stretch out their procurement. On the other hand, the three 
Baltic states were left with virtually no armed forces after 
the Soviets withdrew.
    Since 1999, the United States and many of the NATO allies 
have participated in wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. 
These conflicts have pointed up the need for greater troop and 
asset mobility as well as the value of new capabilities, such 
as having special operations forces working in concert with 
aircraft capable of delivering precision-guided munitions. The 
MAP process in effect compels the invitees to take specific 
steps to reform and upgrade their militaries. The new states 
have also been strongly encouraged to commit to maintaining 
their defense spending at or near 2% GDP--a level higher than 
that of several current allies.
    Rather than dollars and cents, policymakers have been 
focusing this time around on military capabilities; emphasis is 
being placed not on how long it will take for new members to 
become interoperable with current NATO members, but rather on 
what their militaries are able to offer. To complement the NATO 
Response Force, and ensure that it has the proper tools to 
conduct a range of operations, the Alliance at its last summit 
approved the Prague Capabilities Commitment, under which 
members obligate themselves to acquire specific military 
assets. The seven countries that have been invited to join have 
already begun developing ``niche'' capabilities that NATO can 
draw on to fulfill its new missions. There is also a growing 
recognition of the value of having countries pool their 
resources to develop big-ticket procurement items such as 
strategic airlift.

 IV. Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimates of NATO Enlargement \3\

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ The information in section IV is taken directly from an April 
28, 2003 report by the Congressional Budget Office entitled ``Cost 
Implications of Implementing the March 26, 2003, NATO Accession 
Protocols.''

                                     U.S. Congress,
                               Congressional Budget Office,
                                                    April 28, 2003.

Honorable Richard G. Lugar, Chairman,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate,
Washington, DC.

    Dear Mr. Chairman:

    In response to your request, the Congressional Budget 
Office has prepared the attached report on the costs associated 
with ratifying the protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 
1949 on the accession of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia to the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (Treaty Document 108-4). CBO estimates that 
integrating those seven countries into NATO would cost the 19 
current NATO members about $2.7 billion dollars over the 2004-
2013 period; the U.S. share of that amount would be about $650 
million and would be subject to appropriation action. In 
addition, the seven prospective NATO members could incur 
significant costs to upgrade and modernize their militaries. 
The United States might help those countries in that process 
through the use of foreign military financing and other 
assistance. However, such assistance would be discretionary and 
would probably not be significantly larger than current levels 
of aid to those countries. CBO does not anticipate any direct 
spending to result from the ratification of the protocols.
    If you would like further information about this analysis, 
we would be pleased to provide it. The CBO staff contacts are 
Matthew Schmit (in the Budget Analysis Division), and Robie 
Samanta Roy (in the National Security Division).

            Sincerely,
                             Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Director.

[Attachment.]

 Cost Implications of Implementing the March 26, 2003, NATO Accession 
                               Protocols


                        SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION

    On March 26, 2003, the United States and the other 18 
members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) signed 
Protocols of Accession. Once ratified by the governments of the 
19 NATO members, those protocols would allow seven more 
countries--Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, 
Slovakia, and Slovenia--to join the alliance.\1\ The original 
North Atlantic Treaty was signed in 1949 by 12 countries. Since 
then, seven other members have joined NATO, on four separate 
occasions: Greece and Turkey in 1952; the Federal Republic of 
Germany in 1955; Spain in 1982; and, most recently, Poland, 
Hungary, and the Czech Republic in 1999.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Those seven countries were formally invited to join NATO at the 
Prague summit in November 2002.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Member countries bear the direct costs of maintaining the 
alliance through the contributions that all of them make to 
NATO's three common budgets--the civil, military, and 
infrastructure budgets. Those budgets fund NATO headquarters 
activities as well as common infrastructure projects needed to 
maintain interoperability between the forces of the member 
nations. Each member is obligated to pay a prenegotiated share 
of the common budgets. Last year, those three budgets together 
totaled about $1.7 billion; the U.S. share of that amount was 
just under 27 percent, or $442 million.
    On the basis of data from NATO and the Department of 
Defense (DOD), the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates 
that admitting the seven prospective members into NATO would 
increase overall costs associated with the common budgets for 
the 19 current NATO members by about $2.7 billion over the 
2004-2013 period. The U.S. share of those costs would total 
about $650 million over 10 years (assuming appropriation of the 
necessary amounts)--or about 12 percent more than the United 
States would otherwise spend to support NATO's common budgets 
over that period.
    Besides costs, another important consideration in enlarging 
NATO is whether the seven prospective members could meet their 
obligations to the alliance to provide certain military 
capabilities (obligations commonly referred to as 
burdensharing). Those obligations include such things as 
providing a certain level of air-defense capability and being 
able to deploy military forces rapidly during crises. Although 
NATO members agree in principle to meet all burdensharing 
obligations, each country's military programs and level of 
defense spending are generally left to the country's 
discretion. Each member's funding depends to a great extent on 
its long-term military modernization strategy and overall 
economic situation. One indirect measure of burdensharing is 
the percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) that a member 
nation allocates to defense. By that measure, each of the seven 
prospective members already funds, or is planning to fund, 
defense at or near the average level of current NATO countries.
    In recent years, the United States has attempted to help 
new members modernize their militaries by providing them with 
grants and loans to purchase military hardware and training. 
Such assistance is not required, however, and would be subject 
to the annual authorization and appropriation process of the 
U.S. Congress.

                         NATO'S COMMON BUDGETS

    Generally speaking, each NATO member is responsible for the 
costs associated with maintaining and operating its military 
forces, even when those forces operate under NATO's command 
structure. However, certain common costs--such as those 
associated with headquarters staff and command-and-control 
capabilities--are financed through the alliance's three common 
budgets:

   The civil budget ($174 million in 2002), which pays 
        the cost of NATO's civil headquarters and personnel in 
        Brussels;

   The military budget ($790 million in 2002), which 
        funds the alliance's military headquarters and 
        activities (including the Supreme Headquarters Allied 
        Powers Europe in Mons, Belgium), the NATO Airborne 
        Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) program, and the NATO 
        command structure for peace keeping activities in 
        Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo; and

   The infrastructure budget ($693 million in 2002)--
        also known as the NATO Security Investment Program 
        (NSIP)--which underwrites the costs of common support 
        facilities, including command, control, communications, 
        and intelligence facilities; transportation; storage 
        facilities; and investments in airfields, fuel 
        pipelines, harbors, and navigational aids.

    Taken together, NATO's common budgets totaled almost $1.7 
billion in 2002 (see Table 1). The United States paid nearly 27 
percent of that amount, or $442 million. The share that each 
member pays of each budget is determined by consensus among the 
members and is periodically renegotiated, particularly when new 
members join the alliance. The U.S. share of the civil and 
military budgets has remained fairly constant at around 25 
percent since those budgets were established in 1951. Member 
contributions to the NSIP are more variable, since shares are 
frequently adjusted to take into account the location and 
national importance of individual infrastructure projects.
    Within the U.S. Federal budget, contributions to the three 
NATO common budgets are provided through three separate 
appropriations each year. The U.S. contribution to NATO's civil 
budget is made from the ``Contributions to International 
Organizations'' account in budget function 150 (international 
affairs), which is funded through annual appropriations to the 
Department of State. Similarly, the U.S. contribution to NATO's 
military budget is made through the ``Operations and 
Maintenance, Army'' account in the annual Department of Defense 
appropriation act; and the U.S. contribution to the NSIP is 
made through a specific appropriation in the annual military 
construction appropriation act.


                                             TABLE 1.--ALLIED CONTRIBUTIONS TO NATO'S COMMON BUDGETS IN 2002
                                                                [In millions of dollars]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                       \1\ Military                                                       Percentage of
                                                      Civil Budget    Budget (Minus      \1\ AEW&C      Infrastructure       Total          Total NATO
                                                                          AEW&C)          Program       Budget (NSIP)                         Budget
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Belgium...........................................             4.8             16.2              8.2             27.9             57.1              3.4
Canada............................................             9.3             30.0             23.0             25.6             87.9              5.3
Czech Republic....................................             1.6              5.2                0              6.8             13.6              0.8
Denmark...........................................             2.6              9.6              4.9             22.6             39.7              2.4
France............................................            26.8             47.8                0             37.2            111.8              6.7
Germany...........................................            27.1             89.5             68.5            152.0            337.1             20.3
Greece............................................             0.7              2.2              1.5              7.1             11.5              0.7
Hungary...........................................             1.1              3.8                0              4.9              9.8              0.6
Iceland...........................................             0.1              0.2                0                0              0.3              (*)
Italy.............................................            10.0             34.4             17.7             59.2            121.3              7.3
Luxembourg........................................             0.1              0.5              0.3              1.3              2.2              0.1
Netherlands.......................................             4.8             16.2              9.1             31.1             61.2              3.7
Norway............................................             1.9              6.7              3.6             19.2             31.4              1.9
Poland............................................             4.3             14.4                0             18.7             37.4              2.3
Portugal..........................................             1.1              3.7              1.7              2.6              9.1              0.5
Spain.............................................             6.1             20.4              8.8             24.8             60.1              3.6
Turkey............................................             2.8              9.2              4.0              7.6             23.6              1.4
United Kingdom....................................            30.1             93.3              0.2             76.8            200.4             12.1
United States.....................................            39.1            134.1            101.1            167.7            442.0             26.7
                                                   -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total.........................................           174.4            537.4            252.6            693.1          1,657.5            100.0
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Department of Defense.
Note: AEW&C = Airborne Early Warning and Control; NSIP = NATO Security Investment Program; (*) = between zero and 0.05 percent.
\1\ NATO's Airborne Early Warning and Control program is part of the military budget. However, it is shown separately here because not all countries
  contribute to the program, and therefore it has different sharing percentages.


       COST IMPLICATIONS OF THE LATEST ROUND OF NATO ENLARGEMENT

    Adding new members to NATO could affect costs to the United 
States in several ways. First, it would allow current NATO 
members, including the United States, to spread the costs of 
the common NATO budgets over more countries. Second, 
integrating the new members into NATO's military command 
structure would require up-front costs. Most of those costs 
would be eligible for funding from NATO's common budgets and 
therefore would increase costs for current members. Third, the 
United States might choose to assist the new member countries 
in modernizing and upgrading their military capabilities.

Impact on the U.S. Share of the Common Budgets

    CBO estimates that adding the seven new members to NATO 
would most likely reduce the cost share that each country pays 
to support the three common budgets but the impact of that 
reduction would be insignificant in percentage terms. When 
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic joined the alliance in 
1999, the U.S. share of the common budgets declined slightly--
from 28.5 percent overall in 1997 to 26.7 percent in 2002. In 
that instance, the new members' cost shares were established by 
NATO's Senior Resource Board and were largely based on each 
country's GDP. Together, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech 
Republic currently pay about 3.7 percent of NATO's common 
budgets.
    CBO does not expect the U.S. share of the common budgets to 
decline significantly with the addition of the seven 
prospective members. Those countries have a combined gross 
domestic product that is about 40 percent of the total GDP of 
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Assuming that the 
seven new members would together contribute about 40 percent of 
what Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic now pay, CBO 
estimates that their combined share would amount to about 1.5 
percent of the common budgets. In that case, the resulting 
reduction in the U.S. share would probably be about 0.4 
percent.
    That reduction in the United States' cost share would not 
necessarily reduce U.S. payments to the common budgets, 
however. The reason is that the costs of those budgets, 
especially the NSIP budget, would most likely increase if the 
seven new members joined NATO. In other words, the slightly 
smaller percentage share of a larger base amount would probably 
require current NATO members to contribute more than they do 
now.


    TABLE 2.--ESTIMATED COST TO THE NATO COMMON BUDGETS OF ADMITTING THE SEVEN NEW MEMBERS IDENTIFIED IN THE
                                             PROTOCOLS OF ACCESSION
                                            [In millions of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                             Ten-Year Total (2004-2013)
                                                                   ---------------------------------------------
                                                                                            Estimated Additional
                                                                    Estimated NATO Budget        Costs from
                                                                     Without Enlargement        Enlargement
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Security Investment Program.......................................                $7,950                 $2,750
Military Budget...................................................                 6,500                    200
AEW&C Program.....................................................                 3,050                      0
Civil Budget......................................................                 2,100                  (\1\)
                                                                   ---------------------------------------------
  Subtotal........................................................                19,550                  2,950
Contributions from the Seven New Members..........................                  n.a.                   -300
                                                                   ---------------------------------------------
    Total Cost to Current NATO Members............................                19,550                  2,650
Memorandum:
Cost to the United States.........................................                 5,250                \2\ 650
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Congressional Budget Office.
Notes: The seven prospective members identified in the accession protocols are Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia,
  Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

AEW&C = Airborne Early Warning and Control; n.a. = not applicable.

\1\ In addition to costs to the Security Investment Program and military budget, there would be costs to the
  civil budget. However, those costs would be insignificant and would be offset by the new members' financial
  contributions to that budget.

\2\ Includes the costs of integrating the seven new members into NATO as well as savings from the reduction in
  the U.S. cost share of the common budgets.


Estimated Increase in Costs to the Common Budgets

    As was the case with the 1999 round of NATO enlargement, 
CBO expects that if Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia joined the alliance, the costs 
associated with the three common budgets would increase. (For a 
discussion of the costs associated with the 1999 enlargement, 
see the appendix.) Admitting those seven countries would cost 
the 19 current NATO members an additional $2.7 billion in all 
during the 2004-2013 period, CBO estimates. The increase in 
costs to the United States would be $650 million, or about 24 
percent of the additional expense to current members (see Table 
2).
    To estimate the costs of incorporating the seven 
prospective members, CBO assumed that their infrastructure 
requirements--such as upgrades to airfields, port facilities, 
and air-defense radars--would be analogous to the requirements 
that NATO identified for the three countries that joined the 
alliance in 1999. CBO's estimate of the costs of those 
requirements is based on information contained in cost 
estimates prepared by NATO's Senior Resource Board in 1997 for 
the 1999 round of NATO enlargement (adjusted for inflation) as 
well as on data provided by DOD. Although the costs and 
assumptions in the 1997 estimates are several years old, they 
represent NATO's only official statement about the minimum 
infrastructure that new members require to achieve the goals of 
the NATO defense strategy. (The details of those requirements 
are classified.) CBO compared the cost factors in the 1997 
estimates with actual costs to date and concluded that they 
provide a reasonable basis for projecting future costs.
    On the basis of those assumptions, CBO estimates that the 
total cost of integrating the seven new members into NATO would 
be about $3 billion over the 2004-2013 period. The new members 
would begin paying a share of the common budgets--about $300 
million over 10 years, CBO estimates--leaving a net cost to the 
19 current members of about $2.7 billion.
    Under NATO's current membership, the NSIP and military 
budgets (not including the NATO AEW&C program) would cost about 
$14.4 billion over the 2004-2013 period, CBO estimates (see 
Table 2). The U.S. share of that amount would be about 24.5 
percent, or $3.5 billion.\2\ Integrating seven new members into 
NATO would raise the costs of those budgets to about $17.4 
billion over 10 years. With the seven new members making 
contributions to the common budgets, the shares that NATO's 
current members pay would decline in percentage terms. In the 
case of the United States, CBO estimates that its share of the 
NSIP and military budgets would drop by about 0.4 percentage 
points, to 24.1 percent. Thus, the United States would 
contribute about $4.2 billion to NATO's NSIP and military 
budgets over the 2004-2013 period--about $650 million more than 
it would pay without enlargement.\3\ That sum represents an 
increase of roughly 18 percent over what the United States 
would other wise contribute to the NSIP and military budgets 
(excluding the AEW&C program) during that period and a roughly 
12 percent increase over what the United States would 
contribute to the entire NATO budget.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ The United States' overall cost share (just under 27 percent) 
is higher than the shares that the United States pays to the NSIP and 
military budgets because of the larger share that it contributes to the 
NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control program (about 40 percent). 
That program is technically part of the military budget, but not all 
member nations contribute to it, which is why this analysis treats it 
separately. The three NATO members admitted in 1999 do not contribute 
to that program, and CBO assumes that the same would be true for the 
seven prospective members.
    \3\ Enlargement would also increase some costs for NATO's civil 
budget. However, the net effect of those costs would be insignificant; 
thus, they are not included in this analysis.
    \4\ CBO estimates that without enlargement, U.S. contributions to 
all of NATO's common budgets (including the NSIP, civil budget, 
military budget, and the AEW&C portion of the military budget) would 
total $5.2 billion over the 2004-2013 period. With enlargement, those 
contributions would total $5.9 billion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    CBO's estimate is very similar to the preliminary estimate 
that the Administration released on March 25, 2003, in its 
report to the Congress on the seven new members' status and 
eligibility to meet NATO obligations. In that report, the 
Administration estimated that the additional cost to the common 
budgets from this round of NATO enlargement would total about 
$2.6 billion over 10 years (in 2002 dollars) and that the U.S. 
share of that increase would amount to about $584 million. When 
converted from current dollars into 2002 dollars, CBO's 
estimate of costs to the NATO common budgets (before 
contributions from new members) is about $2.5 billion. The 
similarity between those estimates is not unexpected since the 
Administration and CBO used the same sources of data and 
similar methods in preparing their estimates. CBO's estimate of 
the U.S. share of that cost, about $600 million in 2002 
dollars, is also similar to an estimate by DOD.

Other Potential Costs to the United States

    The United States could incur other costs related to the 
admission of new members to NATO. For example, in the past, the 
U.S. government has helped new NATO members upgrade their 
defense capabilities by providing them with grants and loans 
for military equipment, training, and participation in joint 
exercises. However, none of that assistance results from 
prenegotiated commitments or obligations made on behalf of the 
United States; it is provided through the annual Congressional 
authorization and appropriation process.
    The most common form of U.S. military assistance is grants 
from the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program. Over the 
past four years, the three newest NATO members--the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, and Poland--have received FMF grants worth a 
total of around $30 million a year, and the Administration has 
requested a similar amount for 2004 (see Table 3). In 
comparison, the seven NATO candidates have received a total of 
around $50 million a year in FMF grants. (Those amounts are 
comparable given the size of the two groups' militaries and 
populations.) Although the seven potential members have not yet 
joined NATO, they have been receiving grants through the Warsaw 
Initiative (which provides assistance to countries that 
participate in the Partnership for Peace program) at levels 
somewhat comparable to those of the three newest NATO members. 
Since the seven prospective members already receive similar 
amounts of FMF grants as the three NATO members admitted in 
1999, they might not receive a larger share of FMF resources 
once they joined NATO.


                 TABLE 3.--U.S. FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING GRANTS FOR THE THREE NEWEST MEMBERS OF NATO AND THE SEVEN PROSPECTIVE MENBERS
                                                                [In millions of dollars]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                           2000             2001             2002       2003 (Estimate)   2004 (Request)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                Members Admitted in 1999
Czech Republic.....................................................               6                9               10               11               10
Hungary............................................................               6                9               10               11               10
Poland.............................................................               8               12               12               13               12
                                                                    ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total..........................................................              20               30               32               35               32
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                 Seven New Members Identified in the Accession Protocols
Bulgaria...........................................................               5               14                9               10                9
Estonia............................................................               4                6                6                7                6
Latvia.............................................................               4                5                6                7                6
Lithuania..........................................................               4                7                7                8                7
Romania............................................................               6               17                9               10                9
Slovakia...........................................................               3               11                8                9                8
Slovenia...........................................................               2                6                4                5                4
                                                                    ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total..........................................................              28               65               48               55               49
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the U.S. Department of State.


    Foreign military financing can also take the form of loans, 
some of which can be substantial. For example, Poland recently 
finalized a $3.5 billion loan agreement with the U.S. 
government to help fund the purchase of 48 F-16 fighter 
aircraft from a U.S. manufacturer, and other NATO countries 
have received those types of loans in the past, although not 
frequently. Under the Federal Credit Reform Act, only the 
estimated net costs of such a loan need to be appropriated in 
advance. Those costs include the risk of nonpayment and any 
interest subsidy provided by the government. Whether such loans 
would be offered to the seven prospective NATO members would be 
a decision for the U.S. government.

                   ENLARGEMENT AND NATO BURDENSHARING

    In addition to the possible budgetary impact, another issue 
to consider in evaluating this round of enlargement is whether 
the seven prospective members of NATO could meet their 
burdensharing obligations to the alliance. In the NATO context, 
``burden sharing'' generally applies to the amount of spending 
and defense capability that each member country provides toward 
NATO's common defense. The overall level of NATO's collective 
defense is an issue that is discussed and debated among the 
members of the alliance, but it is not defined as a 
quantitative level of defense capability to be provided by each 
NATO country. Burdensharing has historically been an issue 
raised by the Congress as it seeks to understand whether the 
United States has been or is bearing an appropriate share of 
the burden of NATO membership.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ For a more complete discussion of the issue of NATO 
burdensharing, see Congressional Budget Office, NATO Burdensharing 
After Enlargement  (August 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Perhaps the most common indirect indicator of burdensharing 
is a country's defense spending, often expressed as a 
percentage of its GDP. Other standard measures include defense 
spending per capita and the proportion of the population in the 
military. Another potential measure, increasingly important 
today, is contributions to global multinational peacekeeping 
operations.
    On an unweighted average basis, NATO countries currently 
spend about 2 percent of their GDPs on defense (see Table 4). 
That average is slightly skewed by Greece and Turkey, which 
each spend more than 4 percent of their respective GDPs on 
defense, and by Iceland, which has no defense expenditures. 
(The United States is the third highest at 3.4 percent of GDP.) 
Without Greece, Turkey, and Iceland, the unweighted average for 
current NATO members would be 1.8 percent. Five of the seven 
prospective members are already at or above that average, and 
they have stated that they intend to maintain or increase their 
level of defense spending. The exceptions are Latvia and 
Slovenia, whose defense expenditures equal about 1.2 percent 
\6\ and 1.7 percent of GDP, respectively. However, both 
countries have indicated that they plan to increase defense 
expenditures in the near future. The Latvian parliament has 
approved spending at least 2 percent of GDP on defense through 
2008, and the Slovenian government has committed itself to 
boosting defense spending to 2 percent of GDP by 2008. It 
should be noted, however, that although defense spending as a 
percentage of GDP is comparable among the current and 
prospective members, the latter have much smaller GDPs.\7\ 
Thus, their defense spending is far lower in dollar and per 
capita terms.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ The Committee notes that, in 2002, Latvia spent 1.75 percent of 
GDP on defense and the Latvian Government has enacted a law to require 
that 2 percent of GDP be spent on defense beginning this year (2003).
    \7\ The total GDP of both the 1999 and 2003 NATO expansion 
countries is only 2.3 percent of the total GDP of the other NATO 
countries.

                                     TABLE 4.--MEASURES OF DEFENSE SPENDING FOR CURRENT AND PROSPECTIVE NATO MEMBERS
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                  Defense Spending   Defense Spending   Defense Spending
                                                               Population      GDP (Billions of     (Billions of     as a Percentage       per Capita
                                                               (Millions)          dollars)           dollars)            of GDP           (Dollars)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                         Members Admitted Between 1949 and 1982
Belgium..................................................              10.3                248                3.2                1.3                312
Canada...................................................              31.9                727                8.2                1.1                256
Denmark..................................................               5.4                175                2.7                1.5                502
France...................................................              59.8              1,418               35.5                2.5                594
Germany..................................................              83.3              1,987               29.4                1.5                353
Greece...................................................              10.6                132                5.8                4.4                542
Iceland..................................................               0.3                  8                  0                  0                  0
Italy....................................................              57.7              1,175               22.6                1.9                392
Luxembourg...............................................               0.4                 20                0.2                0.9                402
Netherlands..............................................              16.1                420                6.9                1.6                425
Norway...................................................               4.5                192                3.6                1.9                804
Portugal.................................................              10.1                121                2.8                2.3                273
Spain....................................................              40.1                643                7.7                1.2                193
Turkey...................................................              67.3                186                9.0                4.9                134
United Kingdom...........................................              59.8              1,549               36.8                2.4                616
United States............................................             280.6             10,430              350.9                3.4              1,251
                                                          ---------------------------------------------------------
    Total................................................             737.9             19,422              525.3                2.7                712
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                             1999 Round of NATO Enlargement
Czech Republic...........................................              10.3                 69                1.5                2.1                144
Hungary..................................................              10.1                 64                1.1                1.8                113
Poland...................................................              38.6                182                3.6                2.0                 93
                                                          ---------------------------------------------------------
    Total................................................              59.0                316                6.2                2.0                105
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                             2003 Round of NATO Enlargement
Bulgaria.................................................               7.6                 13                0.4                2.7                 47
Estonia..................................................               1.4                  8                0.2                2.0                111
Latvia...................................................               2.4                  7                0.1                1.2                 37
Lithuania................................................               3.6                 12                0.2                1.9                 64
Romania..................................................              22.3                 40                1.0                2.5                 44
Slovakia.................................................               5.4                 22                0.4                1.9                 75
Slovenia.................................................               1.9                 22                0.4                1.7                192
                                                          ---------------------------------------------------------
    Total................................................              44.6                124                2.6                2.1                 58
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Congressional Budget Office based on information from the Department of Defense; Central Intelligence Agency, ``The World Factbook, 2002''; and
  International Institute for Strategic Studies, ``The Military Balance, 2002-2003'' (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
Note: For the most part, the above data are current as of calendar year 2002. Where 2002 data were not available, data for 2000 or 2001 were used.


    The defense capabilities of the current and prospective 
NATO countries can also be compared using various broad 
measures, such as the total number of personnel in their armed 
services and the number of airfields they have with runways 
longer than 2.4 kilometers (7,600 feet). Airfields are a key 
asset for military operations, including NATO Airborne Early 
Warning and Control operations, air defense, forward basing, 
and troop entry and exit points. Other broad measures of 
capability include the percentage of conscripts in a military 
force, which gives an indication of the professional quality of 
the force, and the number of military personnel employed in 
global multinational peace support operations (see Table 5). 
(All of the prospective NATO members have contributed troops 
for such operations.)
    Comparing the seven prospective members with the three NATO 
countries admitted in 1999 shows similarities and differences. 
Although the total population of the seven prospective members 
is about 25 percent smaller than the total population of the 
three newest members, the number of people in their military 
forces is only 8 percent smaller. The military forces of the 
seven prospective members also have similar proportions of 
professional soldiers, with 49 percent of their forces being 
conscripts, compared with 52 percent for the members admitted 
in 1999. (However, those levels are generally higher than the 
number of conscripts employed by NATO members admitted before 
1999.) In addition, both sets of countries have roughly the 
same number of airfields with long runways. Overall, it appears 
that the seven prospective members would expand NATO's military 
forces by 6 percent and increase the number of airfields with 
long runways available to the alliance by 6 percent (and the 
number available in Europe by 13 percent).
    Each of the prospective NATO members has been asked to 
follow a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP), which lays out 
broad political, economic, defense, resource, security, and 
legal objectives. The MAP is not specific in defining what 
capabilities each country is expected to contribute, aside from 
calling on members to provide ``forces and capabilities for 
collective defense and other Alliance missions.'' However, each 
of the prospective members has certain specialized capabilities 
that NATO believes would contribute to the alliance (see Table 
6). Those capabilities include light infantry; special forces; 
units to defend against nuclear, biological, and chemical 
weapons; explosive ordinance disposal teams; military police; 
medical units; small naval units; limited airlift; and engineer 
or logistics units. In addition, Romania possesses unmanned 
aerial vehicles, and Slovakia has air-to-ground training 
ranges. Geographically, Bulgaria offers the Black Sea port of 
Burgas, and Slovakia connects the three most recent members, 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland.
    In short, from the perspective of burdensharing, the seven 
prospective members are committed to levels of defense spending 
that are equal to, or close to, the current NATO per-country 
average in terms of percentage of GDP. In addition, the 
military forces of those countries are relatively professional 
and could contribute some specialized capabilities that would 
enhance NATO's military mission.


                                TABLE 5.--BROAD MEASURES OF MILITARY CAPABILITY FOR CURRENT AND PRPSPECTIVE NATO MEMBERS
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                Military
                                                                     Active       as a       Active-     Conscripts  Number of   Percentage
                      Country                         Population    Military   Percentage     Force         as a       Troops   of Military   \1\ Number
                                                      (Millions)     Force         of       Conscripts   Percentage   Involved  Involved in  of Airports
                                                                  (Thousands)  Population  (Thousands)    of Force    in MPSOs     MPSOs
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                         Members Admitted Between 1949 and 1982
Belgium............................................        10.3           39          0.4           0            0         646         1.6           14
Canada.............................................        31.9           52          0.2           0            0       1,457         2.8           33
Denmark............................................         5.4           23          0.4           6           25         869         3.8            9
France.............................................        59.8          260          0.4           0            0       6,624         2.5           41
Germany............................................        83.3          296          0.4         107           36       6,841         2.3           65
Greece.............................................        10.6          178          1.7          98           55       1,382         0.8           21
Iceland............................................         0.3            0            0           0            0           0           0            1
Italy..............................................        57.7          217          0.4          70           32       6,295         2.9           39
Luxembourg.........................................         0.4            1          0.2           0            0          25         2.8            1
Netherlands........................................        16.1           50          0.3           0            0       1,348         2.7            9
Norway.............................................         4.5           27          0.6          15           57         994         3.7           14
Portugal...........................................        10.1           44          0.4           8           19       1,048         2.4           14
Spain..............................................        40.1          178          0.4           0            0       2,180         1.2           25
Turkey.............................................        67.3          515          0.8         391           76       2,731         0.5           46
United Kingdom.....................................        59.8          211          0.4           0            0       3,554         1.7           41
United States......................................       280.6        1,414          0.5           0            0       5,312         0.4          405
                                                    --------------------------            -------------             -----------             ------------
    Total..........................................       737.9        3,503          0.5         696           20      41,306         1.2          777
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                             1999 Round of NATO Enlargement
Czech Republic.....................................        10.3           50          0.5          25           51         604         1.2           11
Hungary............................................        10.1           33          0.3          23           69         668         2.0           10
Poland.............................................        38.6          163          0.4          81           50       1,575         1.0           32
                                                    --------------------------            -------------             -----------             ------------
    Total..........................................        59.0          246          0.4         129           52       2,847         1.2           53
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                             2003 Round of NATO Enlargement
Bulgaria...........................................         7.6           69          0.9          49           72          40         0.1           20
Estonia............................................         1.4            6          0.4           1           24           3         0.1            7
Latvia.............................................         2.4            6          0.2           2           29         112         2.0            7
Lithuania..........................................         3.6           14          0.4           4           31         125         0.9            2
Romania............................................        22.3           99          0.4          35           35         905         0.9           13
Slovakia...........................................         5.4           26          0.5          15           57         641         2.4            4
Slovenia...........................................         1.9            9          0.5           5           50          86         1.0            2
                                                    --------------------------            -------------             -----------             ------------
    Total..........................................        44.6          227          0.5         111           49       1,912         0.8           55
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Congressional Budget Office based on information from the Department of Defense; Central Intelligence Agency, ``The World Factbook, 2002''; and
  International Institute for Strategic Studies, ``The Military Balance, 2002-2003'' (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
Notes: MPSOs = multinational peace support operations. Numbers for population, troops in MPSOs, and airports reflect 2002 data. Numbers for active
  military personnel and conscripts reflect 2001 data.
 \1\ Specifically, the number of airports that have paved runways larger than 2.4 kilometers.



                                        TABLE 6.--SPECIALIZED MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF PROSPECTIVE NATO MEMEBERS
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                             Explosive
                                      Light        Special    NBC Defense    Ordinance     Military      Medical      Small      Limited     Engineer or
                                    Infantry       Forces        Units       Disposal       Police        Units       Naval      Airlift      Logistics
                                                                               Units                                  Units                     Units
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bulgaria........................  X             X             X            ............  ............  ...........  X          X            X
Estonia.........................  X             ............  ...........  X             X             ...........  .........  ...........  ............
Latvia..........................  X             X             ...........  X             X             X            .........  ...........  ............
Lithuania.......................  ............  X             ...........  ............  ............  X            .........  X            X
Romania.........................  X             X             ...........  ............  X             ...........  .........  X            ............
Slovakia........................  ............  X             X            ............  ............  ...........  .........  ...........  X
Slovenia........................  X             X             ...........  X             X             X            .........  X            ............
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Congressional Budget Office based on information from the Department of Defense.
Note: NBC = nuclear, biological, and chemical.


    APPENDIX: COST INSIGHTS FROM THE 1999 ROUND OF NATO ENLARGEMENT

    One method of estimating the impact on NATO's common 
budgets of admitting Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia into the alliance is to examine 
the estimated costs for the previous round of NATO enlargement. 
Those costs are estimated because the integration of Poland, 
Hungary, and the Czech Republic into the NATO infrastructure is 
still a work in progress, whose total cost will not be known 
for some time. NATO's Senior Resource Board (SRB) estimated in 
1997 that integrating Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic 
into NATO would increase the common budgets by about $1.5 
billion over 10 years. The board has not officially updated 
that estimate. But according to data provided by the Department 
of Defense (DOD) and NATO, it appears that spending to date is 
in line with previous estimates, although the final cost will 
be somewhat less than originally anticipated, around $1.2 
billion to $1.3 billion over the 1999-2008 period.
    The 1997 SRB estimate was based on an evaluation of the 
infrastructure projects that were identified as necessary to 
maintain a minimum level of military interoperability between 
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic and the other NATO 
members. Those projects had to be vital to the collective 
defense of all member nations to be deemed worthy of funding 
from the common budgets. The requirements were grouped and 
estimated in four categories:

   Consultation, command, and control (C3), which 
        includes projects to link the communications of the new 
        members' military headquarters into the NATO command 
        structure;

   Air defense, which involves integration into the 
        NATO Integrated Air Defense System as well as 
        procurement and operation of common radars;

   Infrastructure needed to transport reinforcements 
        and military supplies, which includes upgrades so that 
        ports and air bases can receive cargo ships and 
        aircraft from various member nations; and

   Training and exercises, which includes expenses 
        related to common NATO exercises.

    Through 2002, NATO had authorized about $497 million worth 
of commonly funded infrastructure projects in Poland, Hungary, 
and the Czech Republic through the NATO Security Investment 
Program (see the Table A-1). According to DOD, that $497 
million figure represents a best estimate of the final value of 
the authorized projects. Because funds for many of the larger 
infrastructure projects are provided incrementally, the final 
value will not be known for some time. So far, NATO has 
provided about $236 million for those projects through 2002 
(with the United States contributing about $52 million of that 
amount). On the basis of data from DOD and NATO on the total 
cost of the 1999 enlargement round, CBO expects that about $1 
billion in funding from the Security Investment Program will 
eventually be dedicated to projects in Poland, Hungary, and the 
Czech Republic.


            TABLE A-1.--ESTIMATED COSTS TO THE 19 CURRENT NATO MEMBERS FOR THE 1999 ENLARGEMENT ROUND
                                 [By calendar year, in millions of U.S. dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                       Actual
                                   -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                1999-2002    Future
                                       1999       2000       2001       2002               (Estimate)    Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Estimated Cost of Authorized              180         41        124        152        497         793      1,290
 Projects \1\.....................
Funding Provided to Date and               18         16         58        144        236       1,054      1,290
 Estimated Future Funding.........
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Department of Defense
\1\ Authorized projects reflect projects that have been approved by NATO for common funding. Many larger
  projects are funded incrementally or may be cancelled altogether on the basis of the changing security
  environment.


    Given the relatively large estimated 10-year cost of the 
1999 round of NATO en largement ($1.3 billion), one might have 
expected to see more funding committed for projects in those 
countries over the past few years than has actually been 
committed. There are several reasons why that has not been the 
case. First, the original 1997 SRB estimate projected that most 
of the costs would occur during the latter half of the 10-year 
period. Comparing actual funding to date with the SRB estimate 
shows that the year-by-year amounts are very similar, which 
implies that the bulk of funding is still to come. Second, some 
of the more expensive projects, such as radar installations and 
upgrades to port facilities, are only starting to be 
constructed, and significant funds will be authorized for them 
in coming years. It is also possible that the SRB's $1.3 
billion estimate may ultimately prove too high. Because the 
decision to proceed with commonly funded infrastructure 
projects is driven by financial resources as well as by the 
security environment that exists when funding decisions are 
made, it is possible that NATO could decide to reduce the 
requirements postulated in 1997. In that case, not only would 
the 1999 enlargement round cost less than originally 
anticipated but future rounds could cost less as well.

                        V. NATO-Russia Relations

    The Committee does not find NATO enlargement and the 
development of a cooperative NATO-Russia relationship to be 
mutually exclusive. NATO enlargement and cooperative NATO-
Russian relations both have immense value for the United States 
and for the nations of Europe, if they are pursued properly. 
They are complementary and reinforcing objectives. The 
challenge for the United States, and for NATO, is to do both 
correctly. Toward this end, the Committee Resolution of 
Ratification supports NATO's policy to continue developing a 
constructive relationship with the Russian Federation as it 
pursues democratization, market reforms, and peaceful relations 
with its neighbors.
    The enlargement of NATO, a defensive alliance comprised of 
democratic nations, does not threaten any country in Europe. In 
the view of the Committee, all of Europe benefits from the 
existence of NATO, including Russia. The Committee finds that 
admitting Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, 
Slovakia and Slovenia into NATO will multiply this benefit, not 
only by securing seven countries that embrace democracy and 
free markets, but also by calling upon those countries to lead 
in the defense of democracy and stability in Central and 
Eastern Europe. In appreciation of this fact, democracies 
throughout Europe--including those that are not seeking NATO 
membership--have endorsed NATO's plans to extend its membership 
to Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and 
Slovenia.
    In comparison to the Russian government's caustic rhetoric 
during the last round of NATO enlargement, when the Alliance 
invited Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, Moscow's 
message has softened. It is possible that President Putin now 
views a unified front against terrorism, in part due to 
Moscow's ongoing conflict in Chechnya, as more important than 
potential divisions with the allies over enlargement. The 
Committee notes that the Russian Duma and much of Russia's 
military and intelligence bureaucracy remain adamantly opposed 
to enlargement, which they view as a U.S.-led effort to move a 
military alliance closer to their territory. As in 1998, the 
Committee rejects any suggestion that by enlarging, NATO is 
encroaching upon Russia's legitimate space and that any 
sovereign state in Europe is within any other country's sphere 
of influence. It is also the view of the Committee that the 
proposed NATO membership of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia is unrelated to 
recent disagreement over taking military action in Iraq, the 
brutal massacre of civilians in Chechnya, as well as ongoing 
transfers of Russian technology and weapons to rogue states.
    To provide a forum for confidence building and information 
exchange, NATO and Russia formalized consultative procedures in 
a document called the Founding Act, which was signed on May 27, 
1997. The Founding Act established a Permanent Joint Council 
(PJC) for NATO-Russia consultations. Four years later, in 
December 2001, NATO and Russian Foreign Ministers announced 
their intention to create a NATO-Russia Council, on the 
principle of ``NATO at 20.'' In May 2002, NATO and Russian 
leaders meeting in Rome signed the ``NATO at 20'' agreement, in 
which Russia and NATO members participate as equals on certain 
issues. This replaces the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. 
Spurred by the tragic events of September 11, 2001, this 
decision demonstrates the shared resolve to work closely 
together as equal partners in areas of common interest and to 
stand together against common threats and risks to security. 
The Committee Resolution of Ratification reiterates the 
outlines of the consultation and defense-related cooperation as 
set out in the NATO-Russia Council.
    The Committee notes that while there was a tendency during 
the last round of enlargement among opponents of NATO 
enlargement to lay every problem in the U.S.-Russia 
relationship--and every example of Russian misbehavior--at the 
doorstep of NATO enlargement, there have been few such examples 
during this round of enlargement. In the three years that 
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic have been NATO members, 
there have been no aggressive moves toward Russia, and Russia 
has seen that enlargement to Europe's east is not directed 
against Moscow's interests. Yet there are some concerns that 
the membership of the three Baltic states, which the Soviet 
Union illegally annexed in 1940 and occupied for a half-
century, will bring new problems along NATO's eastern edge. It 
is the view of the Committee that Russia should respect the 
NATO membership of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and perhaps 
even be motivated to improve relations with those countries.
    The enlargement of NATO would secure its members against 
domination by larger powers. Likewise, the ongoing development 
of a constructive relationship between NATO and Russia, as 
endorsed in the Committee Resolution of Ratification, may 
provide an avenue for Russia to contribute to the security and 
stability of Europe. The Committee notes that these goals are 
fully consistent with the effort the Alliance and Moscow are 
undertaking together to forge a new partnership through the 
NATO-Russia Council, designed to ensure that Russia is 
constructively and legitimately engaged in transatlantic 
affairs.

                          VI. The Balkan Wars

    In the last decade, NATO has been involved in major 
peacemaking and peacekeeping roles in the Balkans. The 
Alliance's first major involvement in operational peacekeeping 
was in Bosnia and Herzegovina, beginning in December 1995 with 
the Implementation Force (IFOR), and continuing from December 
1996 through today where NATO leads a peacekeeping mission, 
called the Stabilization Force (SFOR), that includes Partner 
countries and Russian troops. In 1996, the United States 
stationed about 16,500 troops in Bosnia, and roughly 6,000 
support personnel in Croatia, Hungary, and Italy. All NATO 
members contributed personnel, along with 18 non-NATO nations, 
for a total of about 54,000 peacekeeping troops. Since that 
time, the size of SFOR has been reduced to a force of about 
12,000 troops. The Committee recognizes that Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia continue to 
provide support for the SFOR operation. SFOR continues the 
mission of monitoring and enforcing the military aspects of the 
Dayton Peace accords--demilitarized zones and weapon 
containment. SFOR has also made some efforts to detain war 
crimes suspects, provide both logistical support for 
internationally monitored elections, and to give limited 
assistance for refugee resettlement.
    To the south, NATO forms the core of the international 
peacekeeping mission in Kosovo, called Kosovo Force (KFOR), in 
which some 46,000 military personnel from 39 countries are 
deployed. NATO intervened in Kosovo in the spring of 1999 to 
halt a humanitarian catastrophe and restore stability in a 
strategic region lying between Alliance member states. NATO 
action was underway during the Alliance's 50th Anniversary 
summit in Washington. The air campaign lasted 78 days during 
which more than 38,000 sorties were flown without a single 
Allied fatality. The Committee recognizes that Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia 
continue to provide support for the KFOR operation.

                        VII. NATO Transformation


                             PRAGUE SUMMIT

    At the November 2002 Prague summit, NATO Heads of State 
committed the Alliance to transform NATO with new members, new 
capabilities and new relationships with its partners. The 
Alliance invited Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, 
Slovakia and Slovenia to begin accession talks to join the 
Alliance and considered the membership of these seven countries 
as part of the Alliance's transforming role for the 21st 
century. In its Prague Summit Declaration, NATO stated that the 
Alliance will keep its door open ``to European democracies 
willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations 
of membership, in accordance with Article 10 of the Washington 
Treaty.'' The Committee commends the Administration's 
commitment to NATO's open door, which President George W. Bush 
articulated at his address to faculty and students of Warsaw 
University on June 15, 2001:

          All of Europe's new democracies, from the Baltic to 
        the Black Sea and all that lie between, should have the 
        same chance for security and freedom--and the same 
        chance to join the institutions of Europe--as Europe's 
        old democracies have.
          I believe in NATO membership for all of Europe's 
        democracies that seek it and are ready to share the 
        responsibilities that NATO brings. The question of 
        ``when'' may still be up for debate within NATO; the 
        question of ``whether'' should not be. As we plan to 
        enlarge NATO, no nation should be used as a pawn in the 
        agendas of others. We will not trade away the fate of 
        free European peoples. No more Munichs. No more Yaltas. 
        Let us tell all those who have struggled to build 
        democracy and free markets what we have told the Poles: 
        from now on, what you build, you keep. No one can take 
        away your freedom or your country.
          Next year, NATO's leaders will meet in Prague. The 
        United States will be prepared to make concrete, 
        historic decisions with its allies to advance NATO 
        enlargement. Poland and America share a vision. As we 
        plan the Prague Summit, we should not calculate how 
        little we can get away with, but how much we can do to 
        advance the cause of freedom.

    The Alliance also defined part of its new mission as 
combating terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, matched by pledges to obtain the military 
capabilities to accomplish that mission. Recalling the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the Alliance's 
subsequent decision to invoke Article 5 of the Washington 
Treaty, the Alliance approved a comprehensive package of 
measures, based on NATO's 1999 Strategic Concept, to strengthen 
its ability to meet the challenges to the security of NATO 
forces, populations and territory, from wherever they may come. 
The allies agreed to a communique that acknowledged in 
principle the need to go ``out of area'' to fight terrorism and 
proliferation and to develop more mobile combat capabilities.
    In order to carry out the full range of its missions, NATO 
decided to create a NATO Response Force (NRF) consisting of a 
technologically advanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable 
and sustainable force including land, sea and air elements 
ready to move quickly to wherever needed, as decided by the 
Council. NATO Heads of State also approved the Prague 
Capabilities Commitment (PCC) as part of the continuing 
Alliance effort to improve and develop new military 
capabilities for modern warfare in a high threat environment. 
In the view of the Committee, the NRF and PCC are vital 
components to NATO continuing to play a viable role in 
transatlantic security. The Alliance also endorsed the agreed 
military concept for defense against terrorism, which is part 
of a package of measures to strengthen NATO's capabilities in 
this area. The Committee notes that the Prague summit helped to 
reconfirm U.S.-European ties.
    In the view of the Committee, the transformation of NATO to 
meet new threats is at the center of its agenda. As U.S. 
Ambassador to NATO R. Nicholas Burns stated in his testimony 
before the Foreign Relations Committee on April 1, 2003:

          If NATO's past were centered in countering the Soviet 
        threat to western Europe, its future must be devoted to 
        meeting the greatest security challenge of this 
        generation and that is the toxic mix of terrorism and 
        weapons of mass destruction far from Europe's shores. 
        NATO needs to pivot from an inward focus on Europe, 
        which was necessary and appropriate during the Cold 
        War, to an outward focus on the arc of countries where 
        most of the threats are today, in the Middle East and 
        Central Asia.

    Ambassador Burns concluded that as NATO looks to the 
future, the United States and its allies have major challenges 
ahead. The Committee concurs with the six priorities for NATO 
as defined Ambassador Burns' testimony before the Foreign 
Relations Committee on April 8, 2003:

          First, we need to strengthen NATO's role in meeting 
        threats outside of Europe, thus our wish that NAO play 
        a larger role, as I have said, in Afghanistan and in 
        Iraq post-conflict.
          Second, we need to complete the transformation of the 
        military side of the alliance that we began at Prague--
        and Senator Voinovich was there with us at the Prague 
        summit--a new command structure, NATO Response Force, 
        asking the European allies to do more, to spend more 
        and to spend more wisely to create a better and 
        stronger military capability.
          Third, we will need to integrate these allies into 
        the alliance if the Senate gives its advice and 
        consent, and we need to keep our door open to future 
        enlargement in the years ahead as other European 
        countries seek membership and are capable of meeting 
        the obligations.
          Fourth, Senator Lugar, you mentioned Russia. Russia, 
        Ukraine, and the countries of Central Asia are on the 
        front lines of the war against terrorism. We have new 
        NATO relationships with them and we have to give them 
        our full support.
          Fifth, Senator Biden mentioned the issue of NATO and 
        the European Union. We have had some success. We now 
        have a new NATO-EU arrangement which allowed the EU to 
        take over yesterday NATO's peacekeeping mission in 
        Macedonia, which is a step forward, and we would like 
        to see the European Union continue to cooperate with 
        us, use NATO resources, not to build their own on their 
        own missions . . .
        Our sixth priority should be to maintain our 
        commitments that we have got in Bosnia and in Kosovo. 
        They are still commitments we have to meet ant there is 
        still a transition that has not been completed.

                            WAR ON TERRORISM

    The Committee commends the ambitious agenda NATO heads of 
state set out at Prague, and in particular the recognition that 
the Alliance must adapt and respond to the very ripe threats of 
terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, as clearly stated by 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for NATO and Europe Ian 
Brzezinski on April 8, 2003. In reviewing the principles that 
serve as the foundation for the Administration's support for 
enlargement and more broadly the United States' relationship 
with Europe, Secretary Brzezinski stated that:

          The second principle is that the United States and 
        Europe exist in the same global security environment. 
        Before them lie the same opportunities, challenges, and 
        dangers. Of the latter, none is more urgent and lethal 
        than the nexus of weapons of mass destruction, 
        terrorist organizations, and terrorist states. 
        Cooperation with Europe is vital to the global endeavor 
        under way to disrupt and destroy terrorist 
        organizations, their leadership, their communications, 
        and their sources of financial and material support.

    The Committee commends the Alliance's decision on September 
12, 2001, to invoke Article 5, the mutual defense clause of 
NATO's North Atlantic Treaty, in response to the terrorist 
attacks of September 11 on the United States. This action 
marked the first time that NATO has invoked Article 5. The war 
in Afghanistan, Operation Enduring Freedom, was not a NATO 
operation but did use some NATO assets and was under U.S. 
command. The peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan, called the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), is also not a 
NATO operation but NATO member states are taking leading roles 
in the force, which is keeping the peace in Kabul. ISAF has a 
U.N. mandate, but U.S. Central Command has ultimate authority 
over operations. NATO will take over formal command of ISAF in 
the second half of 2003. The United States is not contributing 
troops to ISAF but is supplying lift and intelligence, despite 
appeals from some allies and the interim Afghan government both 
to provide forces and to expand ISAF beyond Kabul. The 
Committee recognizes that Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia have contributed to the war in 
Afghanistan and to ISAF.
    Beginning in late 2002, the Alliance experienced sharp 
division over whether to use military force against Iraq should 
it fail to destroy stocks of weapons of mass destruction. In 
January 2003, Bush Administration officials applauded the 
decision of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, 
Slovakia and Slovenia to sign a letter that endorsed the U.S. 
position on Iraq. The Administration at the same time 
criticized France, Germany and Belgium for blocking NATO 
efforts to provide preliminary allied assistance to Turkey, in 
the event of an attack by Iraq. The failure to achieve 
consensus in the North Atlantic Council over how and whether to 
aid Turkey in the event of an attack by Iraq exposed serious 
divisions in the Alliance. But the Alliance persevered and 
successfully moved the vote on Turkey assistance to be taken in 
the Defense Planning Committee (DPC) at 18 (without France). 
The Committee commends the Alliance for working through this 
difficult period and supports NATO participation in post-war 
reconstruction Iraq. All seven of the candidate countries have 
indicated they would support NATO involvement in post-conflict 
Iraq.

                          VIII. Senate Action

    On March 26, 2003, in Brussels, Belgium, U.S. Ambassador to 
NATO R. Nicholas Burns, on behalf of the United States, signed 
the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on Accession 
of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and 
Slovenia. The Protocols were transmitted to the Senate and 
referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations on April 10, 
2003.
    The Committee held two public hearings in 1999; one public 
hearing in 2000; one public hearing in 2001; one public hearing 
in 2002; and five public hearings in 2003. Both Administration 
and private sector witness appeared at these hearings.

April 21, 1999

NATO's 50th Anniversary Summit

Hon. Jon Kyl, U.S. Senator (R-AZ)
Hon. Marc Grossman, Assistant Secretary of State for European 
        Affairs
Hon. Franklin D. Kramer, Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
        International Security Affairs

October 6, 1999

The Conduct of the NATO Air Campaign in Yugoslavia

Hon. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Counselor, Center for Strategic and 
        International Studies
Hon. William H. Taft, IV, Partner, Fried, Frank, Harris, 
        Shriver & Jacobson
Dr. Eliot Cohen, Professor and Director of Strategic Studies, 
        The School for Advanced International Studies, The 
        Johns Hopkins University

March 9, 2000

NATO and the EU's European Security and Defense Policy

Hon. Marc Grossman, Assistant Secretary of State for European 
        Affairs
Hon. Franklin D. Kramer, Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
        International Security Affairs
Dr. Jeffrey Gedmin, Resident Scholar, American Enterprise 
        Institute; and Executive Director, The New Atlantic 
        Initiative
Dr. F. Stephen Larrabee, Senior Staff Member, the RAND 
        Corporation
Hon. Robert E. Hunter, Senior Advisor, the RAND Corporation

February 27, 2001

State of the NATO Alliance

Gen. Wesley K. Clark, USA (Ret.), Former Supreme Allied 
        Commander Europe (SACEUR)
Dr. Jeffrey Gedmin, Resident Scholar, American Enterprise 
        Institute and Executive Director, New Atlantic 
        Initiative
Dr. Ronald D. Asmus, Senior Fellow, European Studies, Council 
        on Foreign Relations

May 1, 2002

The Future of NATO

Hon. Marc Grossman, Under Secretary of State for Political 
        Affairs
Hon. Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Gen. Wesley K. Clark, USA (Ret.), Former Supreme Allied 
        Commander Europe (SACEUR)
 Lt. Gen. William E. Odom, USA (Ret.), Former Director, 
        National Security Agency

March 27, 2003

NATO Enlargement: Qualifications & Contributions (Part I)

Robert Bradtke, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Europe 
        and Eurasian Affairs
Janet Bogue, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and 
        Eurasian Affairs
Heather Conley, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Europe 
        and Eurasian Affairs
Ian Brzezinski, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
        Europe and NATO

April 1, 2003

NATO Enlargement

Hon. R. Nicholas Burns, U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO
Dr. Ronald Asmus, Senior Transatlantic Fellow German Marshall 
        Fund
Mr. Bruce Jackson, President Project on Transitional 
        Democracies

April 3, 2003

NATO Enlargement: Qualifications & Contributions (Part II)

Dr. F. Stephen Larrabee, Senior Staff Member, the RAND 
        Corporation
Mr. Janusz Bugajski, Director, Eastern Europe Project, Center 
        for Strategic & International Studies
Dr. Jeff Simon, Senior Fellow, National Defense University

April 8, 2003

NATO Enlargement: New Members, New Missions and The Future of 
        NATO

Hon. Marc Grossman, Under Secretary of State for Political 
        Affairs
Gen. Wesley K. Clark, USA (Ret.), Former Supreme Allied 
        Commander Europe (SACEUR)
Mr. William Kristol, Editor, The Weekly Standard and Chairman, 
        Project for the New American Century

April 29, 2003

The Enlarged NATO: Mending Fences and Moving Forward on Iraq

Hon. Colin Powell, Secretary of State

    On October 24, 2001, Senator Jesse Helms introduced to the 
Committee the Freedom Consolidation Act (S. 1572), which 
reaffirms support for continued enlargement of the NATO; 
designates Slovakia for participation in PfP and states that it 
is eligible to receive certain security assistance under the 
NATO Participation Act of 1994; and authorizes specified 
amounts of security assistance for FY 2002 for Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. (an 
identical bill, H.R. 3167, was introduced in the House on the 
same day and passed on November 6, 2001). The Committee 
reported out the legislation on December 12, 2001. Cosponsors 
included Senators Durbin, Lieberman, Lott, Lugar and McCain. 
Unfortunately, consideration and passage could not be completed 
until the following year. The Senate took up S. 1572 again on 
May 16, 2002, and passed it the next day by a vote of 85-6. 
President Bush signed the bill into Public Law 107-187 on June 
10, 2002.
    On November 15, 2001, Senator Richard Lugar, ranking member 
of the Foreign Relations Committee, co-chaired a study group 
with Dr. Ronald D. Asmus, Senior Fellow at the Council on 
Foreign Relations, to provide a focal point for addressing NATO 
issues that cut across Senate committee and Administration 
jurisdictions to help bridge the gap between Capitol Hill and 
the White House. The study group enjoyed the participation of 
Senator Biden, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee; 
Senator Levin, Chairman of the Armed Services Committee; 
Senator Warner, Ranking Member of the Armed Services Committee; 
and Senator Graham, Chairman of the Intelligence Committees, 
and Administration officials from the State and Defense 
Departments, as well as the National Security Council, and 
former Administration officials. The group met six times: 
October 20, 2001, November 15, 2001, April 10, 2001, September 
10, 2001, December 10, 2001 and March 7, 2003.
    Other than Foreign Relations Committee action, the Senate 
Armed Services Committee since 1999 has held several hearings 
on NATO enlargement.
    At a markup on April 30, 2003, the Committee considered a 
Resolution of Ratification including 9 declarations and 3 
conditions. The Resolution was agreed to by a unanimous roll 
call vote of 19-0 by all members of the Committee.
    The conditions and declarations and the rationale for 
approving them are as follows:

Declaration 1: Reaffirmation that Membership in NATO Remains a Vital 
        National Security Interest of the United States.

    Declaration 1 reiterates that NATO membership is a vital 
national security interest for the United States. For more than 
fifty years, NATO has served as the preeminent organization to 
defend the territory of the countries in the North Atlantic 
area against all external threats. NATO prevailed in the task 
of ensuring the survival of democratic governments throughout 
the Cold War, NATO succeeded in maintaining the peace in 
disputes among NATO members, and NATO has established a process 
of cooperative planning that enhances the security of the 
United States and its allies while distributing the financial 
burden of defending the democracies of Europe and North America 
among the Allies.

Declaration 2: Strategic Rationale for NATO Enlargement

    Declaration 2 lays out the strategic rationale for the 
inclusion of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, 
Slovakia and Slovenia in NATO. NATO members have determined 
that, consistent with Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, 
Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and 
Slovenia are in a position to further the principles of the 
North Atlantic Treaty and to contribute to the security of the 
North Atlantic area. This step has been taken with the 
acknowledgment that, notwithstanding the collapse of communism 
in most of Europe, NATO allies continue to face threats to 
their stability and territorial integrity. These threats stem 
from the possibility of the emergence of a hegemonic power in 
or around Europe, resumed conflict caused by ethnic and 
religious enmity, or the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and increased terrorist activity in or around 
Europe. Extending NATO membership to Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia will strengthen NATO 
by extending the zone of security cooperation, serve as a 
deterrent to potential aggressors, and advance the interests of 
the United States and its NATO allies.

Declaration 3: Full Membership for New NATO Members

    Declaration 3 emphasizes that, upon completion of the 
accession process, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia will have all the rights, 
privileges, obligations, responsibilities, and protections that 
are afforded to all other NATO members. In particular, the 
Committee would view unfavorably any legally binding 
requirement arising from the adaptation talks of the Treaty on 
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) that would have the 
effect of constraining the ability of NATO to fulfill its 
Article 5 guarantee to new member states. This provision also 
endorses the political commitments made by NATO to the Russian 
Federation in the NATO-Russia Council, including pursuing 
cooperative anti-terrorism efforts, crisis management, non-
proliferation, arms control and confidence-building measures, 
theatre missile defense, search and rescue at sea, military-to-
military cooperation and defense reform, civil emergencies and 
new threats and challenges. This provision emphasizes that the 
NATO-Russia Council is not legally binding and cannot preclude 
any decisions made by the North Atlantic Council or NATO's 
Defense Planning Committee.

Declaration 4: The Importance of European Integration

    Declaration 4 emphasizes the important role that other 
European institutions such as the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, the European Union and the Council of 
Europe must play in advancing the political, economic, and 
social stability of Europe.

Declaration 5: Future Consideration of Candidates for Membership in 
        NATO

    Declaration 5 declares that Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia are the only 
countries in Europe that have been invited to join NATO, and 
that the consideration of future members in NATO provided for 
under Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty is subject to the 
requirement for the Senate's advice and consent under Article 
II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution. 
Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty provides for an open 
door to the admission into NATO of other European countries 
that are in a position to further the principles of the Treaty 
and that can contribute to the security of the North Atlantic 
area. The United States will not support any subsequent 
invitation for admission to NATO if the prospective member 
cannot fulfill the obligations and responsibilities of NATO 
membership in a manner that serves the overall political and 
strategic interests of the United States. The Senate emphasizes 
that no state will be invited to become a member of NATO unless 
the Executive Branch fulfills the Constitutional requirement 
for seeking the advice of the Senate, a consensus decision to 
proceed is reached in NATO, and ratification is achieved 
according to the national procedures of each NATO member, 
including the consent to ratification by the Senate.

Declaration 6: Partnership for Peace

    Declaration 6 expresses the Senate's support for the 
Partnership for Peace (PfP) between NATO members and the PfP 
countries, which complements NATO in maintaining and enhancing 
regional security. The Partnership also helps aspirant 
countries improve their military force capabilities and 
interoperability with NATO members.

Declaration 7: The NATO-Russia Council

    Declaration 7 reiterates Russia's role under the NATO-
Russia Council, as well as the firewalls between the 
deliberations of the North Atlantic Council and the NATO-Russia 
Council, to preserve the integrity of decision-making and the 
security of NATO. The Senate declares that the NATO-Russia 
Council provides an important forum for strengthening peace and 
security in the Euro-Atlantic area, and where appropriate, for 
consensus building, consultations, joint decisions, and joint 
actions.
    The Senate states that any discussions will be for 
explanatory, not decision-making purposes, and that these 
discussions will not extend to a level of detail that could in 
any way compromise the security of NATO. Within the NATO-Russia 
Council, the members of NATO and Russia work as equal partners 
in areas of common interest. But it is the understanding of the 
Senate that no issue will be discussed in the NATO-Russia 
Council until after NATO has reached consensus on its position. 
The Senate explicitly states that under no circumstances will 
the Russian Federation have a veto over NATO policy or any role 
in NATO decision-making under the auspices of the NATO-Russia 
Council.

Declaration 8: Compensation for Victims of the Holocaust and of 
        Communism

    Declaration 8 declares that Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia have implemented 
mechanisms for the compensation for property confiscated during 
the Holocaust and the communist era, and have expressed their 
openness and willingness to active dialogue, including with the 
United States, and with non-governmental organizations, on 
coming to grips with the past.

Declaration 9: Treaty Interpretation

    The Foreign Relations Committee has taken pains to maintain 
the constitutional role of the United States Senate in the 
treaty-making process. To that end, the resolution of 
ratification of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, 
approved by the Senate on May 27, 1998, included an important 
condition (1) that has been cited by reference in every 
subsequent resolution of ratification of an arms control 
treaty:
      (A) the United States shall interpret a treaty in 
accordance with the common understanding of the Treaty shared 
by the President and the Senate at the time the Senate gave its 
advice and consent to ratification;
      (B) Such common understanding is based on:
            (i) first, the text of the Treaty and the 
        provisions of this resolution of ratification; and
            (ii) second, the authoritative representations 
        which were provided by the President and his 
        representatives to the Senate and its Committees, in 
        seeking Senate consent to ratification, insofar as such 
        representations were directed to the meaning and legal 
        effect of the text of the Treaty;
      (C) the United States shall not agree to or adopt an 
interpretation different from that common understanding except 
pursuant to Senate advice and consent to a subsequent treaty or 
protocol, or the enactment of a statute; and
      (D) if, subsequent to ratification of the Treaty, a 
question arises as to the interpretation of a provision of the 
Treaty on which no common understanding was reached in 
accordance with paragraph (B), that provision shall be 
interpreted in accordance with applicable United States law.
    In 1997, a similarly important condition was added to the 
resolution of ratification of the Flank Document Agreement to 
the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, which condition 
has also been cited by reference in subsequent resolutions of 
ratification for arms control treaties:
    Nothing in condition (1) of the resolution of ratification 
of the INF Treaty, approved by the Senate on May 27, 1998, 
shall be construed as authorizing the President to obtain 
legislative approval for modifications or amendments to 
treaties through majority approval of both Houses.
    Each of these conditions applies to all treaties. For this 
reason, the Senate has not needed to restate them as conditions 
in subsequent resolutions of ratification. Rather, it has cited 
them by reference in declarations of its intent, as Declaration 
(1) does, so as to remind subsequent administrations of the 
continuing obligations imposed by the Senate's treaty-making 
role under the United States Constitution.

Condition 1: Cost, Benefits, Burden sharing, and Military Implications 
        of the Enlargement of NATO

    Condition 1 requires the President to reaffirm 
understandings on the cost, benefits, and military implications 
of NATO enlargement. Prior to depositing the instrument of 
ratification, the President is required to certify to the 
Senate that the inclusion of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia in NATO will not 
increase the United States' overall percentage share of the 
NATO common budget. Similarly, the President is required to 
certify that the United States is under no obligation to 
subsidize the national expenses necessary for Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia to 
meet those countries' NATO commitments, and that the membership 
of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and 
Slovenia in NATO will not detract in any way from the ability 
of the United States to meet its military commitments outside 
the North Atlantic area. This provision does not prohibit 
voluntary assistance programs by the United States such as the 
ongoing Warsaw Initiative.
    Condition 1 further directs the President to submit an 
annual report to the Senate during the three- year period 
following the entry into force of the protocols. The report is 
to include detailed information on the annual defense budgets 
of all NATO members, their contributions to the common budget 
and cost-sharing arrangements of NATO, and an itemization of 
costs incurred by the United States in support of Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia 
membership in NATO.

Condition 2: Reports on Intelligence Matters

    Condition 2 requires the President to submit a report to 
the Congressional intelligence committees on the progress of 
Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and 
Slovenia for the protection of intelligence sources and 
methods.

Condition 3: Accounting of Captured and Missing U.S. Personnel

    Condition 3 requires the President to certify to Congress 
that each of the governments of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia is fully cooperating 
with United States efforts to obtain the fullest possible 
accounting of captured and missing U.S. personnel from past 
military conflicts or Cold War incidents.

                     IX. Resolution of Ratification

  Resolved (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring 
therein),

SECTION 1. SENATE ADVICE AND CONSENT SUBJECT TO DECLARATIONS AND 
                    CONDITIONS.

  The Senate advises and consents to the ratification of the 
Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the Accession 
of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and 
Slovenia (as defined in section 4(6)), which were opened for 
signature at Brussels on March 26, 2003, and signed on behalf 
of the United States of America and other parties to the North 
Atlantic Treaty, subject to the declarations of section 2 and 
the conditions of section 3.

SEC. 2. DECLARATIONS.

  The advice and consent of the Senate to ratification of the 
Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the Accession 
of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and 
Slovenia is subject to the following declarations:
          (1) Reaffirmation that united states membership in 
        nato remains a vital national security interest of the 
        united states.--The Senate declares that--
                  (A) for more than 50 years the North Atlantic 
                Treaty Organization (NATO) has served as the 
                preeminent organization to defend the countries 
                in the North Atlantic area against all external 
                threats;
                  (B) through common action, the established 
                democracies of North America and Europe that 
                were joined in NATO persevered and prevailed in 
                the task of ensuring the survival of democratic 
                government in Europe and North America 
                throughout the Cold War;
                  (C) NATO enhances the security of the United 
                States by embedding European states in a 
                process of cooperative security planning, by 
                preventing the destabilizing re-nationalization 
                of European military policies, and by ensuring 
                an ongoing and direct leadership role for the 
                United States in European security affairs;
                  (D) the responsibility and financial burden 
                of defending the democracies of Europe and 
                North America can be more equitably shared 
                through an alliance in which specific 
                obligations and force goals are met by its 
                members;
                  (E) the security and prosperity of the United 
                States is enhanced by NATO's collective defense 
                against aggression that may threaten the 
                security of NATO members;
                  (F) with the advice and consent of the United 
                States Senate, Hungary, Poland, and the Czech 
                Republic became members of NATO on March 12, 
                1999;
                  (G) on May 17, 2002, the Senate adopted the 
                Freedom Consolidation Act of 2001 (S. 1572 of 
                the 107th Congress), and President George W. 
                Bush signed that bill into law on June 10, 
                2002, which ``reaffirms support for continued 
                enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty 
                Organization (NATO) Alliance; designates 
                Slovakia for participation in the Partnership 
                for Peace and eligible to receive certain 
                security assistance under the NATO 
                Participation Act of 1994; [and] authorizes 
                specified amounts of security assistance for 
                [fiscal year] 2002 for Estonia, Latvia, 
                Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and 
                Romania''; and
                  (H) United States membership in NATO remains 
                a vital national security interest of the 
                United States.
          (2) Strategic rationale for nato enlargement.--The 
        Senate finds that--
                  (A) notwithstanding the collapse of communism 
                in most of Europe and the dissolution of the 
                Soviet Union, the United States and its NATO 
                allies face threats to their stability and 
                territorial integrity;
                  (B) an attack against Bulgaria, Estonia, 
                Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, or 
                Slovenia, or their destabilization arising from 
                external subversion, would threaten the 
                stability of Europe and jeopardize vital United 
                States national security interests;
                  (C) Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
                Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia, having 
                established democratic governments and having 
                demonstrated a willingness to meet all 
                requirements of membership, including those 
                necessary to contribute to the defense of all 
                NATO members, are in a position to further the 
                principles of the North Atlantic Treaty and to 
                contribute to the security of the North 
                Atlantic area; and
                  (D) extending NATO membership to Bulgaria, 
                Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, 
                and Slovenia will strengthen NATO, enhance 
                security and stability in Central Europe, deter 
                potential aggressors, and advance the interests 
                of the United States and its NATO allies.
          (3) Full membership for new nato members.--The Senate 
        understands that Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
        Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia, in becoming NATO 
        members, will have all the rights, obligations, 
        responsibilities, and protections that are afforded to 
        all other NATO members.
          (4) The importance of european integration.--
                  (A) Sense of the senate.--It is the sense of 
                the Senate that--
                          (i) the central purpose of NATO is to 
                        provide for the collective defense of 
                        its members;
                          (ii) the Organization for Security 
                        and Cooperation in Europe is an 
                        institution for the promotion of 
                        democracy, the rule of law, crisis 
                        prevention, and post-conflict 
                        rehabilitation and, as such, is an 
                        essential forum for the discussion and 
                        resolution of political disputes among 
                        European members, Canada, and the 
                        United States; and
                          (iii) the European Union is an 
                        essential organization for the 
                        economic, political, and social 
                        integration of all qualified European 
                        countries into an undivided Europe.
                  (B) Policy of the united states.--The policy 
                of the United States is--
                          (i) to utilize fully the institutions 
                        of the Organization for Security and 
                        Cooperation in Europe to reach 
                        political solutions for disputes in 
                        Europe; and
                          (ii) to encourage actively the 
                        efforts of the European Union to 
                        continue to expand its membership, 
                        which will help to strengthen the 
                        democracies of Central and Eastern 
                        Europe.
          (5) Future consideration of candidates for membership 
        in nato.--
                  (A) Senate findings.--The Senate finds that--
                          (i) Article 10 of the North Atlantic 
                        Treaty provides that NATO members by 
                        unanimous agreement may invite the 
                        accession to the North Atlantic Treaty 
                        of any other European state in a 
                        position to further the principles of 
                        the North Atlantic Treaty and to 
                        contribute to the security of the North 
                        Atlantic area;
                          (ii) in its Prague Summit Declaration 
                        of November 21, 2002, NATO stated that 
                        the Alliance--
                                  (I)(aa) will keep its door 
                                open ``to European democracies 
                                willing and able to assume the 
                                responsibilities and 
                                obligations of membership, in 
                                accordance with Article 10 of 
                                the Washington Treaty'';
                                  (bb) will keep under review 
                                through the Membership Action 
                                Plan (MAP) the progress of 
                                those democracies, including 
                                Albania, Croatia, and the 
                                Former Yugoslav Republic of 
                                Macedonia, that seek NATO 
                                membership, and continue to use 
                                the MAP as the vehicle to 
                                measure progress in future 
                                rounds of NATO enlargement;
                                  (cc) will consider the MAP as 
                                a means for those nations that 
                                seek NATO membership to develop 
                                military capabilities to enable 
                                such nations to undertake 
                                operations ranging from 
                                peacekeeping to high-intensity 
                                conflict, and help aspirant 
                                countries achieve political 
                                reform that includes 
                                strengthened democratic 
                                structures and progress in 
                                curbing corruption;
                                  (dd) concurs that Bulgaria, 
                                Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
                                Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia 
                                have successfully used the MAP 
                                to address issues important to 
                                NATO membership; and
                                  (ee) maintains that the 
                                nations invited to join NATO at 
                                the Prague Summit ``will not be 
                                the last'';
                                  (II)(aa) in response to the 
                                terrorist attacks on September 
                                11, 2001, and its subsequent 
                                decision to invoke Article 5 of 
                                the Washington Treaty, will 
                                implement the approved 
                                ``comprehensive package of 
                                measures, based on NATO's 
                                Strategic Concept, to 
                                strengthen our ability to meet 
                                the challenges to the security 
                                of our forces, populations and 
                                territory, from wherever they 
                                may come''; and
                                  (bb) recognizes that the 
                                governments of Bulgaria, 
                                Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
                                Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia 
                                have successfully used the MAP 
                                to address important issues and 
                                have showed solidarity with the 
                                United States after the 
                                terrorist attacks on September 
                                11, 2001;
                                  (III) will create `` . . . a 
                                NATO Response Force (NRF) 
                                consisting of a technologically 
                                advanced, flexible, deployable, 
                                interoperable, and sustainable 
                                force including land, sea, and 
                                air elements ready to move 
                                quickly to wherever needed, as 
                                decided by the Council'';
                                  (IV) will streamline its 
                                ``military command 
                                arrangements'' for ``a leaner, 
                                more efficient, effective, and 
                                deployable command structure, 
                                with a view to meeting the 
                                operational requirements for 
                                the full range of Alliance 
                                missions'';
                                  (V) will ``approve the Prague 
                                Capabilities Commitment (PCC) 
                                as part of the continuing 
                                Alliance effort to improve and 
                                develop new military 
                                capabilities for modern warfare 
                                in a high threat environment''; 
                                and
                                  (VI) will ``examine options 
                                for addressing the increasing 
                                missile threat to Alliance 
                                territory, forces and 
                                populations centres'' and 
                                tackle the threat of weapons of 
                                mass destruction (WMD) by 
                                enhancing the role of the WMD 
                                Centre within the International 
                                Staff;
                          (iii) as stated in the Prague Summit 
                        Declaration, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, 
                        Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and 
                        Slovenia have ``demonstrated their 
                        commitment to the basic principles and 
                        values set out in the Washington 
                        Treaty, the ability to contribute to 
                        the Alliance's full range of missions 
                        including collective defence, and a 
                        firm commitment to contribute to 
                        stability and security, especially in 
                        regions of crisis and conflict'';
                          (iv) Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, 
                        Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and 
                        Slovenia have been acting as de facto 
                        NATO allies through their contributions 
                        and participation in peacekeeping 
                        operations in the Balkans, Operation 
                        Enduring Freedom, and the International 
                        Security Assistance Force (ISAF);
                          (v) Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, 
                        Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and 
                        Slovenia, together with Albania, 
                        Croatia, and the Former Yugoslav 
                        Republic of Macedonia, issued joint 
                        statements on November 21, 2002, and 
                        February 5, 2003, expressing their 
                        support for the international 
                        community's efforts to disarm Iraq; and
                          (vi) the United States will not 
                        support the accession to the North 
                        Atlantic Treaty of, or the invitation 
                        to begin accession talks with, any 
                        European state (other than Bulgaria, 
                        Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, 
                        Slovakia, and Slovenia), unless--
                                  (I) the President consults 
                                with the Senate consistent with 
                                Article II, section 2, clause 2 
                                of the Constitution of the 
                                United States (relating to the 
                                advice and consent of the 
                                Senate to the making of 
                                treaties); and
                                  (II) the prospective NATO 
                                member can fulfill the 
                                obligations and 
                                responsibilities of membership, 
                                and the inclusion of such state 
                                in NATO would serve the overall 
                                political and strategic 
                                interests of NATO and the 
                                United States.
                  (B) Requirement for consensus and 
                ratification.--The Senate declares that no 
                action or agreement other than a consensus 
                decision by the full membership of NATO, 
                approved by the national procedures of each 
                NATO member, including, in the case of the 
                United States, the requirements of Article II, 
                section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution of the 
                United States (relating to the advice and 
                consent of the Senate to the making of 
                treaties), will constitute a commitment to 
                collective defense and consultations pursuant 
                to Articles 4 and 5 of the North Atlantic 
                Treaty.
          (6) Partnership for peace.--The Senate declares 
        that--
                  (A)(i) the Partnership for Peace between NATO 
                members and the Partnership for Peace countries 
                is an important and enduring complement to NATO 
                in maintaining and enhancing regional security; 
                and
                  (ii) the Partnership for Peace has greatly 
                enhanced security and stability throughout the 
                Euro-Atlantic area, with Partnership for Peace 
                countries, especially countries that seek NATO 
                membership, and has encouraged them to 
                strengthen political dialogue with NATO allies 
                and to undertake all efforts to work with NATO 
                allies, as appropriate, in the planning, 
                conduct, and oversight of those activities and 
                projects in which they participate and to which 
                they contribute, including combating terrorism;
                  (B) the Partnership for Peace serves a 
                critical role in promoting common objectives of 
                NATO members and the Partnership for Peace 
                countries, including--
                          (i) increasing the transparency of 
                        national defense planning and budgeting 
                        processes;
                          (ii) ensuring democratic control of 
                        defense forces;
                          (iii) maintaining the capability and 
                        readiness of Partnership for Peace 
                        countries to contribute to operations 
                        of the United Nations and the 
                        Organization for Security and 
                        Cooperation in Europe;
                          (iv) developing cooperative military 
                        relations with NATO;
                          (v) enhancing the interoperability 
                        between forces of the Partnership for 
                        Peace countries and forces of NATO 
                        members; and
                          (vi) facilitating cooperation of NATO 
                        members with countries from Central 
                        Asia, the Caucasus, and eastern and 
                        southeastern Europe.
          (7) The nato-russia council.--The Senate declares 
        that--
                  (A) it is in the interest of the United 
                States for NATO to continue to develop a new 
                and constructive relationship with the Russian 
                Federation as the Russian Federation pursues 
                democratization, market reforms, and peaceful 
                relations with its neighbors; and
                  (B) the NATO-Russia Council, established by 
                the Heads of State and Government of NATO and 
                the Russian Federation on May 28, 2002, will--
                          (i) provide an important forum for 
                        strengthening peace and security in the 
                        Euro-Atlantic area, and where 
                        appropriate for consensus building, 
                        consultations, joint decisions, and 
                        joint actions;
                          (ii) permit the members of NATO and 
                        Russia to work as equal partners in 
                        areas of common interest;
                          (iii) participate in joint decisions 
                        and joint actions only after NATO 
                        members have consulted, in advance, 
                        among themselves about what degree any 
                        issue should be subject to the NATO-
                        Russia Council;
                          (iv) not provide the Russian 
                        Federation with a voice or veto in 
                        NATO's decisions or freedom of action 
                        through the North Atlantic Council, the 
                        Defense Planning Committee, or the 
                        Nuclear Planning Committee; and
                          (v) not provide the Russian 
                        Federation with a veto over NATO 
                        policy.
          (8) Compensation for victims of the holocaust and of 
        communism.--The Senate finds that--
                  (A) individuals and communal entities whose 
                property was seized during the Holocaust or the 
                communist period should receive appropriate 
                compensations;
                  (B) Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
                Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia have put in 
                place publicly declared mechanisms for 
                compensation for property confiscated during 
                the Holocaust and the communist era, including 
                the passage of statutes, and for the opening of 
                archives and public reckoning with the past;
                  (C) Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
                Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia have each 
                adjudicated and resolved numerous specific 
                claims for compensation for property 
                confiscated during the Holocaust or the 
                communist era over the past several years;
                  (D) Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
                Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia have each 
                established active historical commissions or 
                other bodies to study and report on their 
                government's and society's role in the 
                Holocaust or the communist era; and
                  (E) the governments of Bulgaria, Estonia, 
                Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and 
                Slovenia have made clear their openness to 
                active dialogue with other governments, 
                including the United States Government, and 
                with nongovernmental organizations, on coming 
                to grips with the past.
          (9) Treaty interpretation.--The Senate reaffirms 
        condition (8) of the resolution of ratification of the 
        Document Agreed Among the States Parties to the Treaty 
        on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) of 
        November 19, 1990 (adopted at Vienna on May 31, 1996), 
        approved by the Senate on May 14, 1997, relating to 
        condition (1) of the resolution of ratification of the 
        Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty approved 
        by the Senate on May 27, 1988.

SEC. 3. CONDITIONS.

  The advice and consent of the Senate to the ratification of 
the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the 
Accession of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, 
Slovakia, and Slovenia is subject to the following conditions, 
which shall be binding upon the President:
          (1) Costs, benefits, burden-sharing, and military 
        implications of the enlargement of nato.--
                  (A) Presidential certification.--Prior to the 
                deposit of the United States instrument of 
                ratification, the President shall certify to 
                the Senate that--
                          (i) the inclusion of Bulgaria, 
                        Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, 
                        Slovakia, and Slovenia in NATO will not 
                        have the effect of increasing the 
                        overall percentage share of the United 
                        States in the common budgets of NATO; 
                        and
                          (ii) the inclusion of Bulgaria, 
                        Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, 
                        Slovakia, and Slovenia in NATO does not 
                        detract from the ability of the United 
                        States to meet or to fund its military 
                        requirements outside the North Atlantic 
                        area.
                  (B) Annual reports.--Not later than April 1 
                of each year during the 3-year period following 
                the date of entry into force of the Protocols 
                to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the 
                Accession of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, 
                Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia, the 
                President shall submit to the appropriate 
                congressional committees a report, which may be 
                submitted in an unclassified and classified 
                form, and which shall contain the following 
                information:
                          (i) The amount contributed to the 
                        common budgets of NATO by each NATO 
                        member during the preceding calendar 
                        year.
                          (ii) The proportional share assigned 
                        to, and paid by, each NATO member under 
                        NATO's cost-sharing arrangements.
                          (iii) The national defense budget of 
                        each NATO member, the steps taken by 
                        each NATO member to meet NATO force 
                        goals, and the adequacy of the national 
                        defense budget of each NATO member in 
                        meeting common defense and security 
                        obligations.
                  (C) Reports on future enlargement of nato.--
                          (i) Reports prior to commencement of 
                        accession talks.-- Prior to any 
                        decision by the North Atlantic Council 
                        to invite any country (other than 
                        Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
                        Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia) to 
                        begin accession talks with NATO, the 
                        President shall submit to the 
                        appropriate congressional committees a 
                        detailed report regarding each country 
                        being actively considered for NATO 
                        membership, including--
                                  (I) an evaluation of how that 
                                country will further the 
                                principles of the North 
                                Atlantic Treaty and contribute 
                                to the security of the North 
                                Atlantic area;
                                  (II) an evaluation of the 
                                eligibility of that country for 
                                membership based on the 
                                principles and criteria 
                                identified by NATO and the 
                                United States, including the 
                                military readiness of that 
                                country;
                                  (III) an explanation of how 
                                an invitation to that country 
                                would affect the national 
                                security interests of the 
                                United States;
                                  (IV) a United States 
                                Government analysis of the 
                                common-funded military 
                                requirements and costs 
                                associated with integrating 
                                that country into NATO, and an 
                                analysis of the shares of those 
                                costs to be borne by NATO 
                                members, including the United 
                                States; and
                                  (V) a preliminary analysis of 
                                the implications for the United 
                                States defense budget and other 
                                United States budgets of 
                                integrating that country into 
                                NATO.
                          (ii) Updated reports prior to signing 
                        protocols of accession.--Prior to the 
                        signing of any protocol to the North 
                        Atlantic Treaty on the accession of any 
                        country, the President shall submit to 
                        the appropriate congressional 
                        committees a report, in classified and 
                        unclassified forms--
                                  (I) updating the information 
                                contained in the report 
                                required under clause (i) with 
                                respect to that country; and
                                  (II) including an analysis of 
                                that country's ability to meet 
                                the full range of the financial 
                                burdens of NATO membership, and 
                                the likely impact upon the 
                                military effectiveness of NATO 
                                of the country invited for 
                                accession talks, if the country 
                                were to be admitted to NATO.
                  (D) Review and reports by the general 
                accounting office.-- The Comptroller General of 
                the United States shall conduct a review and 
                assessment of the evaluations and analyses 
                contained in all reports submitted under 
                subparagraph (C) and, not later than 90 days 
                after the date of submission of any report 
                under subparagraph (C)(ii), shall submit a 
                report to the appropriate congressional 
                committees setting forth the assessment 
                resulting from that review.
          (2) Reports on intelligence matters.--
                  (A) Progress report.--Not later than January 
                1, 2004, the President shall submit a report to 
                the congressional intelligence committees on 
                the progress of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, 
                Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia in 
                satisfying the security sector and security 
                vetting requirements for membership in NATO.
                  (B) Reports regarding protection of 
                intelligence sources and methods.--Not later 
                than January 1, 2004, and again not later than 
                the date that is 90 days after the date of 
                accession to the North Atlantic Treaty by 
                Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, 
                Slovakia, and Slovenia, the Director of Central 
                Intelligence shall submit a detailed report to 
                the congressional intelligence committees--
                          (i) identifying the latest procedures 
                        and requirements established by 
                        Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
                        Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia for the 
                        protection of intelligence sources and 
                        methods; and
                          (ii) including an assessment of how 
                        the overall procedures and requirements 
                        of such countries for the protection of 
                        intelligence sources and methods 
                        compare with the procedures and 
                        requirements of other NATO members for 
                        the protection of intelligence sources 
                        and methods.
                  (C) Definitions.--In this paragraph:
                          (i) Congressional intelligence 
                        committees.--The term ``congressional 
                        intelligence committees'' means the 
                        Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
                        Senate and the Permanent Select 
                        Committee on Intelligence of the House 
                        of Representatives.
                          (ii) Date of accession to the north 
                        atlantic treaty by bulgaria, estonia, 
                        latvia, lithuania, romania, slovakia, 
                        and slovenia.--The term ``date of 
                        accession to the North Atlantic Treaty 
                        by Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, 
                        Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and 
                        Slovenia'' means the latest of the 
                        following dates:
                                  (I) The date on which 
                                Bulgaria accedes to the North 
                                Atlantic Treaty.
                                  (II) The date on which 
                                Estonia accedes to the North 
                                Atlantic Treaty.
                                  (III) The date on which 
                                Latvia accedes to the North 
                                Atlantic Treaty.
                                  (IV) The date on which 
                                Lithuania accedes to the North 
                                Atlantic Treaty.
                                  (V) The date on which Romania 
                                accedes to the North Atlantic 
                                Treaty.
                                  (VI) The date on which 
                                Slovakia accedes to the North 
                                Atlantic Treaty.
                                  (VII) The date on which 
                                Slovenia accedes to the North 
                                Atlantic Treaty.
          (3) Requirement of full cooperation with united 
        states efforts to obtain the fullest possible 
        accounting of captured and missing united states 
        personnel from past military conflicts or cold war 
        incidents.--Prior to the deposit of the United States 
        instrument of ratification, the President shall certify 
        to Congress that each of the governments of Bulgaria, 
        Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and 
        Slovenia are fully cooperating with United States 
        efforts to obtain the fullest possible accounting of 
        captured or missing United States personnel from past 
        military conflicts or Cold War incidents, to include--
                  (A) facilitating full access to relevant 
                archival material; and
                  (B) identifying individuals who may possess 
                knowledge relative to captured or missing 
                United States personnel, and encouraging such 
                individuals to speak with United States 
                Government officials.

SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS.

  In this resolution:
          (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means the 
        Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed 
        Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the 
        Senate and the Committee on International Relations, 
        the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on 
        Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
          (2) NATO.--The term ``NATO'' means the North Atlantic 
        Treaty Organization.
          (3) NATO members.--The term ``NATO members'' means 
        all countries that are parties to the North Atlantic 
        Treaty.
          (4) North atlantic area.--The term ``North Atlantic 
        area'' means the area covered by Article 6 of the North 
        Atlantic Treaty, as applied by the North Atlantic 
        Council.
          (5) North atlantic treaty.--The term ``North Atlantic 
        Treaty'' means the North Atlantic Treaty, signed at 
        Washington on April 4, 1949 (63 Stat. 2241; TIAS 1964), 
        as amended.
          (6) Protocols to the north atlantic treaty of 1949 on 
        the accession of bulgaria, estonia, latvia, lithuania, 
        romania, slovakia, and slovenia.--The term ``Protocols 
        to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the Accession 
        of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, 
        Slovakia, and Slovenia'' refers to the following 
        protocols transmitted by the President to the Senate on 
        April 10, 2003 (Treaty Document No. 108-4):
                  (A) The Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty 
                on the Accession of the Republic of Bulgaria, 
                signed at Brussels on March 26, 2003.
                  (B) The Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty 
                on the Accession of the Republic of Estonia, 
                signed at Brussels on March 26, 2003.
                  (C) The Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty 
                on the Accession of the Republic of Latvia, 
                signed at Brussels on March 26, 2003.
                  (D) The Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty 
                on the Accession of the Republic of Lithuania, 
                signed at Brussels on March 26, 2003.
                  (E) The Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty 
                on the Accession of the Republic of Romania, 
                signed at Brussels on March 26, 2003.
                  (F) The Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty 
                on the Accession of the Republic of Slovakia, 
                signed at Brussels on March 26, 2003.
                  (G) The Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty 
                on the Accession of the Republic of Slovenia, 
                signed at Brussels on March 26, 2003.
          (7) United states instrument of ratification.--The 
        term ``United States instrument of ratification'' means 
        the instrument of ratification of the United States of 
        the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on 
        the Accession of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
        Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.
          (8) Washington treaty.--The term ``Washington 
        Treaty'' means the North Atlantic Treaty, signed at 
        Washington on April 4, 1949 (63 Stat. 2241; TIAS 1964), 
        as amended.

             X. Letter From Senate Armed Services Committee


                              United States Senate,
                                  Armed Services Committee,
                                                    April 30, 2003.

Honorable Richard G. Lugar, Chairman
Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Ranking Member
Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate,
Washington, DC.

    Dear Senator Lugar and Senator Biden:

    Traditionally, the Senate Armed Services Committee has 
provided to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee its views on 
the military implications of national security treaties. We are 
writing to express our views concerning the military 
implications of the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 
1949 on Accession of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.
    While we support the enlargement of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) to include Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, we note that 
NATO is still in the process of defining its future role and 
mission in an international security environment which is very 
different from that which existed when NATO was founded in 
1949. We are concerned about how NATO will evolve and continue 
to function as an effective military organization in the 
future, and what the effect will be of further enlargement as 
NATO continues to adapt to a changing security environment. 
Therefore, we would like to suggest some items for inclusion in 
the resolution of ratification regarding these Protocols to 
address our concerns.
    The Senate Armed Services Committee has a long tradition of 
strong support for the NATO alliance, and has played an 
important role in the Senate's consideration of the North 
Atlantic Treaty and its subsequent amendments. In March and 
April 2003, the Armed Services Committee conducted two hearings 
on the future of NATO and on NATO enlargement. The 
Administration witnesses at these hearings have direct 
responsibility for national security issues and policies 
related to NATO and its proposed enlargement. These witnesses 
included Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul D. Wolfowitz; Vice 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Peter Pace, 
USMC; Supreme Allied Commander, Europe and Commander, U.S. 
European Command, General James L. Jones, Jr., USMC; Under 
Secretary of State for Political Affairs Marc I. Grossman; and 
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas J. Feith.
    The witnesses at the Armed Services Committee hearings 
unanimously supported ratification of the Protocols to the 
North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on Accession of Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
According to Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz in testimony before the 
Committee on April 10, 2003, ``As we look to the future of 
NATO, we might see its further enlargement in terms of two 
imperatives: moral and strategic. The moral imperative calls us 
to help new democracies, formerly subjected to the yoke of 
tyranny, consolidate and secure their own freedom and 
sovereignty. The strategic imperatives suggest that a united 
Europe of common values will help avoid the major wars as 
experienced in the 20th Century. A united Europe will be a 
better partner to the United States in dealing with world 
affairs. A united Europe will provide a context of security 
that will encourage reform in Ukraine and Russia. A Europe so 
united is revitalized by nations who've recently thrown off the 
yoke of authoritarianism by their fresh commitment to freedom 
and democracy through NATO's responsibilities. And further 
enlargement of NATO remains based on sound reform of any 
aspiring nation--including military reforms of national 
strategy, secure communications systems, upgrading airfields 
and ports to NATO standards, improved training, logistical 
support, personnel, and military spending at a minimum level of 
2% of gross domestic product.''
    While recognizing the moral and strategic imperatives 
stated by Secretary Wolfowitz, we note that NATO remains, first 
and foremost, a military alliance--the most successful military 
alliance in history. NATO's enlargement by seven additional 
nations--the largest enlargement in Alliance history--could 
have dramatic implications for NATO's ability to function as an 
effective military organization.
    Today, the threats to NATO member nations do not come from 
NATO's periphery. There is no Soviet Union or Warsaw Pact. The 
threats--such as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction--are transnational in nature, and they emanate 
from regions outside of Europe. This was recognized in the 
Strategic Concept adopted at the 50th Anniversary Summit held 
in Washington in 1999. The Strategic Concept envisioned ``out 
of area'' operations for NATO and specifically noted the 
emergence of non-traditional threats, including terrorism and 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
    To remain a viable military alliance, NATO must remain 
relevant to these current threats. More than a decade after the 
fall of the Berlin Wall, NATO remains an organization in 
transition. NATO faces political and technical challenges as it 
seeks to define its role for the future and simultaneously 
expand its membership.
    Although NATO faces very different threats today than it 
did in the past, we are mindful that the admission of seven 
additional nations into NATO would mean that the United States 
has made the commitment to treat an armed attack on any one of 
these seven as an attack on the United States--as called for by 
Article 5 of the NATO Treaty. This is a solemn commitment that 
we must not undertake lightly.
    At the Armed Services Committee hearings, Committee Members 
examined a number of key questions. First, will these seven 
nations enhance the military effectiveness of the alliance? How 
would their entry into NATO affect the growing ``capabilities 
gap'' between the United States and many of the other NATO 
members that NATO has been facing for years? Second, should 
NATO consider changing its operating procedures so that it is 
not, in all cases, bound to act by consensus? Third, does NATO 
need a process for suspending the membership of a nation that 
is no longer committed to upholding NATO's basic principles and 
values?
    The witnesses who appeared before our Committee testified 
to the efforts NATO is making to address the continuing problem 
of a capabilities and technology gap between the United States 
and many alliance members. The witnesses pointed to the 
decisions taken by NATO's leaders at the Prague Summit in 
November, 2002, to launch the Prague Capabilities Commitment 
and to create a NATO Response Force. Through the Prague 
Capabilities Commitment, NATO members agreed to spend smarter, 
pool their resources and pursue ``niche'' specializations. For 
example, Germany is leading a 10-nation consortium to acquire 
more airlift. The Netherlands is taking the lead on acquiring 
precision-guided missiles and smart bombs.
    The NATO Response Force is intended to enhance NATO's 
ability to undertake out-of-area military operations with 
capabilities relevant to today's threats. The Response Force is 
envisioned to be a highly-ready force of approximately 25,000 
troops with land, sea and air capability, deployable on short 
notice and able to carry out missions anywhere in the world. 
General James Jones, USMC, stated in testimony before the 
Committee on April 10, 2003, ``I believe that it is quite 
possible that within a very short period of time that the NATO 
Response Force will become a transformational capability that 
will finally take the Cold War force that NATO is and has been, 
composed of 2.3 million people under arms with a vast array of 
legacy systems that are in dire need of transformation and 
modernization, to become a more capable force that will be more 
useful to respond to the array of asymmetric threats that not 
only face the United States, but face all freedom-loving people 
who comprise the alliance.'' We share the view of our witnesses 
that NATO members must fulfill their commitments with respect 
to the Prague Capabilities Commitment and the NATO Response 
Force.
    Regarding the military capabilities of the prospective new 
members, we note the testimony of our witnesses that each 
prospective member is engaged in a process of military reform, 
upgrading its secure communication systems and facilities to 
NATO standards, improving training, logistical support, and 
personnel capabilities, and establishing military spending at a 
minimum level of 2 percent of gross domestic product. In 
addition, prospective members, similar to some current members, 
are being encouraged to focus on specific ``niche'' 
capabilities where they can achieve a high level of expertise 
and procure high quality equipment to make a substantial 
contribution to NATO's military capabilities overall. Some 
invitees already possess specialized capabilities that have 
served the alliance in the Balkan operations and in the global 
war on terrorism, including: special forces; nuclear, 
biological, and chemical defense; mountain fighting; and 
demining. Each of the seven invitees has provided direct 
military support for the global war on terrorism, acting as de 
facto allies by contributing transit and basing privileges, 
military and police forces, medical units, transport support to 
U.S. and coalition efforts, and/or overflight rights. Many of 
the invitees have participated in the International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, and contributed 
actively to NATO efforts to stabilize the Balkans.
    Two other issues that dominated the Committee's recent 
hearings on NATO were the so-called ``consensus rule'' by which 
NATO operates, and the question of whether NATO needs a process 
for suspending the membership of a nation that is no longer 
committed to upholding NATO's basic principles. With respect to 
the consensus rule, the recent divisive debate over planning 
for the defense of Turkey in the event of war with Iraq 
demonstrated that achieving consensus in NATO has become more 
difficult. Agreement was reached only by moving the discussion 
out of NATO's political body (the North Atlantic Council, or 
NAC) and into its Defense Planning Committee (DPC), in which 
France does not participate. Another example of this problem 
occurred with respect to NATO operations in Kosovo, when 
``command by committee'' hampered NATO's military leaders' 
ability to wage the most effective, rapidly responsive military 
campaign. Target lists, weapons used, and forces deployed were 
all subject to prior approval by all NATO governments. This 
slowed decision-making and constrained operations. Such 
difficulties in reaching consensus are occurring in part 
because respective NATO members have different views about 
today's threats and how best to respond to them. Achieving 
consensus is likely to become even more complex as NATO 
enlarges its membership. This consensus rule must be reexamined 
to ensure that NATO will remain an effective military 
organization.
    Regarding the issue of a suspension mechanism, some 
Committee members are concerned about the lack of a mechanism 
to suspend a NATO member if a member no longer complies with 
the fundamental tenets of NATO--democracy, individual liberty 
and the rule of law. This issued was examined at the 
Committee's recent NATO hearings.
    We have received a letter from Under Secretary of State 
Marc Grossman dated April 21, 2003, indicating that, as a 
result of the questions raised at our Committee's hearings, 
U.S. Ambassador to NATO Nicholas Burns raised the matters of 
the consensus rule and an expulsion mechanism with our NATO 
allies and NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson on April 8, 
2003. Secretary Grossman's letter stated that there was no 
support from NATO members for amending the Treaty on either the 
consensus rule or the question of expulsion. In this letter, 
Secretary Grossman underscored his belief, shared by Ambassador 
Burns, that the consensus rule works more in the U.S. favor 
than against it, and that compromise and persuasion, and use of 
the Defense Planning Committee, remain effective tools to 
enable NATO action today. The letter also asserted that NATO 
has ways other than expulsion to deal effectively with allies 
that ``go bad,'' for instance by isolating them or excluding 
them from sensitive NATO discussions. The matters were raised 
only informally so far and given the tremendous interest and 
lingering concerns about these two subjects expressed by 
virtually all of our Committee's members, we recommend the 
inclusion of the following conditions, which would require two 
reports, in the resolution of ratification for these Protocols:

Begin text of proposed conditions:

    The advice and consent of the Senate to the ratification of 
the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the 
Accession of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, 
Slovakia and Slovenia is subject to the following conditions, 
which shall be binding upon the President:

          (1) Report: Appropriate officials of the executive 
        branch of government shall place on the agenda of the 
        North Atlantic Council the issue of the consensus rule; 
        and
          Not later than 180 days after the date of adoption of 
        this resolution, the President shall submit to the 
        President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of 
        Representatives a report that: (1) describes the steps 
        the United States has taken to place the issue 
        described above on the agenda of the North Atlantic 
        Council; (2) describes the views of the President as 
        communicated by his representatives at the North 
        Atlantic Council on this issue; and (3) characterizes 
        the discussion of this issue in the North Atlantic 
        Council, including any decisions taken to modify the 
        consensus rule, or consider this issue further. The 
        report shall also address methods of streamlining 
        NATO's decision-making processes for conducting 
        military campaigns.
          (2) Report: Appropriate officials of the executive 
        branch of government shall place on the agenda of the 
        North Atlantic Council the issue of establishing a 
        process for suspending the membership of a nation that 
        is no longer upholding NATO principles; and
          Not later than 180 days after the date of adoption of 
        this resolution, the President shall submit to the 
        President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of 
        Representatives a report that: (1) describes the steps 
        the United States has taken to place the issue 
        described above on the agenda of the North Atlantic 
        Council; (2) describes the views of the President as 
        communicated by his representatives at the North 
        Atlantic Council on this issue; and (3) characterizes 
        the discussion of this issue in the North Atlantic 
        Council, including any decisions taken to establish a 
        process for suspending membership, or to consider this 
        issue further.

End text of proposed conditions.

    Finally, with respect to the anticipated costs to the 
United States associated with this proposed round of NATO 
enlargement, we note the Administration's estimate that, over 
ten years, U.S. NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP) costs 
will increase by $574 million, and U.S. NATO military budget 
costs will increase by $10 million. An estimate for the U.S. 
NATO civil budget costs is not currently available. The 
Committee has a long-standing concern about the costs of any 
proposed enlargement of NATO, and about how the military and 
financial burdens are shared among the NATO members. Condition 
2 (B) of the April 30, 1998, resolution of ratification of the 
Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on accession of 
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, contains an annual 
reporting requirement pertaining to the costs, benefits, 
burdensharing and military implications of the enlargement of 
NATO. We recommend that a similar reporting requirement be 
included in the resolution of ratification for this proposed 
round of NATO enlargement.
    Based on the hearings conducted by the Senate Armed 
Services Committee, and subsequent analysis, we believe the 
Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on Accession of 
Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and 
Slovenia advance the national security interests of the United 
States and deserve the Senate's support. We ask your 
consideration of our recommendations as you draft the 
resolution of ratification for these Protocols, and ask that 
this letter be included in the official report of your 
Committee's consideration of these Protocols. We appreciate the 
opportunity to share our views with you.

            Sincerely,
                                     John Warner, Chairman.

                                Carl Levin, Ranking Member.

                                   - 
