[Senate Executive Report 108-5]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
108th Congress Exec. Rpt.
SENATE
1st Session 108-5
======================================================================
THE JOINT CONVENTION ON THE SAFETY OF SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT AND ON THE
SAFETY OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT
_______
April 1, 2003.--Ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Lugar, from the Committee on Foreign Relations,
submitted the following
R E P O R T
[To accompany Treaty Doc. 106-48]
The Committee on Foreign Relations to which was referred
the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and
on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, having
considered the same, reports favorably thereon subject to 3
conditions set forth in this report and the accompanying
resolution of ratification and recommends that the Senate give
its advice and consent to ratification thereof.
CONTENTS
Page
I. Purpose..........................................................1
II. Summary of the Convention........................................2
III. Background.......................................................5
IV. Committee Action.................................................6
V. Article-by-Article Analysis......................................6
VI. Resolution of Ratification......................................17
VII. Administration Statements and Supplementary Material............20
I. Purpose
The Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management
and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management (the
Convention) was created to achieve a high level of nuclear
safety worldwide. This is to be accomplished through
international cooperation and the enhancement of the national
safety measures of the participating Contracting Parties (the
Parties). It is anticipated that there will be a thorough
examination of these national programs through an international
exchange of views, so that Parties can learn from each other's
solutions to common and individual safety problems. The process
is viewed as a mechanism for contributing to improving
worldwide safety measures against potential radiological
hazards, so as to protect current and future generations,
prevent accidents with radiological consequences, and mitigate
effects should such accidents occur. The promotion of stable
technical environments and regulatory systems in developing
countries will also aid these Parties in developing security
measures to prevent the theft of waste materials, thus
lessening the risk of their possible use in radiological
dispersal devices.
The creation of this Convention fulfills a commitment
outlined in the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS), which
entered into force on October 24, 1996, and to which the United
States became a Contracting Party on July 10, 1999. Subsection
(ix) of the CNS Preamble states that the Contracting Parties
affirm ``the need to begin promptly the development of an
international convention on the safety of radioactive waste
management as soon as the ongoing process to develop waste
management safety fundamentals has resulted in broad
international agreement.'' The CNS establishes a legal
obligation on the part of the Contracting Parties to apply
certain safety principles to the construction, operation, and
regulation of civilian nuclear power reactors. Together, the
Convention and the CNS formulate a joint mechanism to
strengthen the worldwide safety culture for the complementary
issues of nuclear power, spent nuclear fuel, and radioactive
waste.
The Convention is consistent with United States policy to
support safety as a top priority in the use of nuclear energy
worldwide, to promote safe operation of spent nuclear fuel
management and civilian nuclear waste management facilities,
and to encourage the implementation of radiation protection
principles. The pursuit of common strategies for the handling
of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste is compatible with
U.S. policy on climate change and the promotion of a
sustainable global environment. The Convention is a
particularly important complement to bilateral and multilateral
safety assistance programs, as it establishes a political
mechanism to encourage governments to support emerging
regulatory organizations and other entities responsible for the
promotion of a nuclear safety culture.
By becoming a Contracting Party to the Convention, the
United States will have the opportunity to review and benefit
from the experiences of other nations; promote and help
influence a stable technical environment, safety programs and
regulatory systems in developing countries; identify possible
areas for bilateral and multilateral technical and regulatory
cooperation; and minimize the threat of the malicious use of
radioactive waste, as may occur with disused sealed sources.
II. Summary of the Convention
Structured to parallel the Convention on Nuclear Safety
(CNS), the Convention establishes a series of broad commitments
with respect to the safe management of spent nuclear fuel and
radioactive waste resulting from civilian nuclear applications.
It also covers such issues as disused sealed sources no longer
needed, operational radiation protection, management of nuclear
facilities, decommissioning, emergency preparedness,
legislative and regulatory frameworks, and transboundary
movement. The Convention, along with the CNS, fosters a
constructive multilateral framework to increase safety and
security at nuclear facilities around the world.
As with the CNS, this Convention encourages broad
participation through its elaboration as an incentive process,
under which Parties take appropriate steps to bring their
activities into compliance with the obligations of the
Convention. The Convention does not delineate mandatory
standards the Parties must meet; instead, Parties are to take
``appropriate steps'' to bring their activities into compliance
with the obligations of the Convention. The goal is that over
time, through processes of self-improvement, acceptance of the
obligations under the Convention, and periodic reviews of their
Convention-related activities, all the Parties will attain a
higher level of safety in the management of their spent fuel
and radioactive waste.
Under the Convention, Parties will submit periodic national
reports on the steps that they are taking to implement the
obligations contained in the Convention. These reports will be
reviewed and discussed at Review Meetings of the Parties, at
which each Party will have an opportunity to discuss and seek
clarification of reports submitted by other Parties. Although
it is not reflected in the Convention text, the Parties are to
be organized into groups of five to seven countries. The United
States will be assigned to a group and will have the
opportunity to review national reports of other countries
assigned to this group. Parties can also request and comment on
the national reports of countries not in their review group
and, if they do so, may participate in meetings of the groups
to which those countries are assigned.
In response to questions for the record, the Administration
assured the Committee of its intent to look beyond the group to
which the United States is assigned:
The United States will request copies of all national
reports prepared for the review meeting under the Joint
Convention.
The United States has the right to request this
information under the Joint Convention, and it intends
to ask for this information.
We intend to ensure that the United States takes
advantage of the availability of information and the
opportunity to provide comments as appropriate.
The Committee recommends that the Senate require, in its
resolution of ratification for this Convention, that the
President certify that the United States will both request
copies of all national reports prepared for each review meeting
under the Convention and comment, in each review meeting, upon
aspects of safety significance in any report by a Contracting
Party that is receiving U.S. financial or technical assistance
relating to the improvement of its nuclear and radiological
safety and security practices. The Senate included a similar
condition in the CNS resolution of ratification, and the
Administration reports that the process of reviewing and
commenting on reports under the CNS has proved valuable. In
response to a question for the record, the Administration wrote
that this process enabled it:
. . . to identify key goals and objectives for the
safety and regulatory programs in States of the former
Soviet Union, such as Russia and Ukraine. The goals and
objectives will provide targets for assistance programs
to these countries. We also used the process to
determine that additional progress can be made in
nuclear regulatory oversight programs of Russia and the
Ukraine, and identified the nuclear regulatory programs
of China, Armenia, and Pakistan as warranting further
attention.
The Committee also recommends that the Senate include in
its resolution of ratification of the Convention a condition
ensuring that the legislative branch and the Comptroller
General of the United States will be given appropriate access
to information relating to the operation of the Convention. A
similar condition was included in the CNS resolution of
ratification.
The form and structure of the U.S. national report will be
closely modeled after that of the report submitted for the CNS.
As required under the Convention, the report will include,
inter alia, the U.S. legislative and regulatory framework,
spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste inventory data
(available from existing U.S. Government databases), and a
listing of existing and proposed Federal, State, and private
facilities.
The Convention does not include naturally occurring
radioactive material, unless a Party declares it as radioactive
waste for the purposes of the Convention. The Convention
applies to military radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel
only if and when such material is permanently transferred to
and managed within exclusively civilian programs. The
Convention contains provisions to ensure that national security
is not compromised and that Parties have absolute discretion as
to what information is reported on material from military
sources. In the United States, all military radioactive waste
and spent nuclear fuel is normally transferred to civilian
programs for disposal. The Convention, therefore, will not
affect ongoing U.S. military operations in any way. Classified
information will not be included in the U.S. national report,
and the Administration has assured the Committee, in response
to a question for the record, that ``[t]he Joint Convention
poses no threat to sensitive U.S. information or activities.
The United States will provide information in the national
report that is already publicly available.''
The Department of Energy (DOE) will be the lead agency for
preparation of the report, in coordination with the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC), the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), and the Department of State. DOE estimates the
annual cost for preparing the U.S. national report to be
approximately $200,000. Costs will be absorbed within the
existing DOE budget. Costs incurred by NRC are not expected to
be substantial and can be absorbed within the existing budget.
EPA also expects any costs to be minimal, and will absorb any
such costs within its existing budget. The review of reports
submitted by other Parties is expected to cost $6,000 per
report, and U.S. Agencies will strive to absorb those costs as
well within existing budgets.
As a Party to the Convention, one delegate (and any other
alternates, experts, or advisers as are deemed necessary) may
represent the U.S. Government. The U.S. Delegate will be a
representative of the Department of State. U.S. Alternate
Delegates will be representatives of DOE, NRC, and EPA. An
interagency working group has already been established for the
purpose of coordinating Convention activities.
The Administration believes that review of the national
reports and the prospect of bilateral cooperation will
strengthen the DOE's spent fuel and radioactive waste program.
Possible improvements would relate to the development of
technological alternatives to current stabilization, storage,
treatment, and disposal missions at the Department. However, no
changes are expected in the overall policy and strategy of the
Department's spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste programs.
NRC does not anticipate the need to make any significant
changes to its regulations as a result of the Convention.
Nonetheless, by providing a mechanism for receiving information
on other Parties' national programs through the constructive
exchange of national reports and reviews, the Convention will
support the Commission's continuing efforts to improve its own
regulatory program through self-assessment. The Convention is
not expected to have an effect on the regulatory program of
EPA.
Through meetings held with State and industry
representatives, the Administration determined that no
significant new burdens or unfunded mandates for States or
industry will result from the Convention. The Nuclear Energy
Institute wrote to the Committee to express its strong support
of U.S. ratification of the Convention, and the Administration
has assured the Committee that no firms or groups have warned
it that they will suffer in some way if this Convention is
ratified and implemented. Parallel consultations with the
United States Congress led the Administration to conclude that
no implementing legislation will be necessary for the United
States to comply with its obligations under the Convention.
An amendment to this Convention may be approved by
consensus at a review meeting or at an extraordinary meeting,
or referred, by a two-thirds vote of the Parties present and
voting, to a Diplomatic Conference that can adopt it either by
consensus or by a two-thirds vote of all the Parties. All
amendments shall be subject to national ratification or
acceptance processes, and shall enter into force (for ratifying
or accepting Parties only) 90 days after receipt of the
relevant instruments from two-thirds of the Parties. In
response to a question for the record, the Administration
confirmed its intent to submit to the Senate, for its advice
and consent to ratification, all amendments that the President
believes the United States should accept: ``It is important to
remember that the United States will not be bound by any
amendment unless the United States affirmatively accepts the
amendment with the advice and consent of the Senate.''
III. Background
In order to address the commitment contained in subsection
(ix) of the Preamble of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, a
Group of Experts was constituted from approximately fifty
countries to prepare a draft convention on spent nuclear fuel
and radioactive waste. From 1995 to 1997, the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) convened seven meetings of the
Group, in which the United States participated. A draft text
was completed in March 1997 and submitted for review by the
Board of Governors at its June 1997 meeting. The Board
subsequently authorized the Director-General to convene a
Diplomatic Conference at the IAEA headquarters in Vienna. The
Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on
the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management was adopted on
September 5, 1997. Secretary of Energy Pena signed the
Convention on that date, making the United States the first
country to do so.
On September 13, 2000, President Clinton submitted the
Convention to the United States Senate for its advice and
consent to ratification. The Convention was subsequently
referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
Pursuant to Article 40, the Convention entered into force
on June 18, 2001, the ninetieth day after the date of deposit
with the Depositary of the twenty-fifth instrument of
ratification, acceptance or approval, including the instruments
of fifteen States each having an operational nuclear power
plant. There are currently forty-two Signatories and thirty
Contracting Parties to the Convention, nineteen of which have
an operational nuclear power plant.
Article 29 of the Convention dictates that a preparatory
meeting is to be held not later than 6 months after entry into
force. In accordance, the Contracting Parties met in December
2001 and agreed upon the guidelines for the form and structure
of the national reports, the guidelines for the review process,
the Rules of Procedure, and the Financial Rules. The United
States, not having ratified the Convention, was not in
attendance.
The next organizational meeting of the Contracting Parties
is scheduled for April 7, 2003. Although the United States
cannot become a Contracting Party by that time, it expects to
participate in the meeting if the Convention has been ratified
by that date. The United States would be able to provide input
on the organization of the formal peer review meeting for the
safety programs of Contracting Parties, which is scheduled to
begin November 3, 2003.
IV. Committee Action
The Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management
and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management was referred
to the Committee on September 13, 2000.
The Committee received testimony on the Convention at a
hearing on March 19, 2003. The witness at the hearing was Mr.
Richard J. K. Stratford, Director of the Office of Nuclear
Energy Affairs in the Bureau of Nonproliferation at the
Department of State, who was the principal U.S. negotiator of
the Convention.
At a business meeting on April 1, 2003, the Committee
considered a draft resolution of ratification. After discussion
and debate, this resolution was approved by a vote of 19-0.
V. Article-by-Article Analysis
JOINT CONVENTION ON THE SAFETY OF SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT AND ON THE
SAFETY OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT
The Preamble describes the concerns underlying the
Convention, recognizing that the operation of nuclear power
plants generate spent fuel and radioactive waste, and that
other applications of nuclear technology generate waste.
Cognizant of the importance to the international community of
ensuring well regulated and environmentally sound management
practices for spent fuel and radioactive waste, the Parties
acknowledge that the same safety objectives apply both to spent
fuel and radioactive waste management and state their desire to
promote an effective nuclear safety culture world wide.
Recognizing that ultimate responsibility for defining its own
fuel cycle policies rests with the State, Parties recognize
that some States consider spent fuel a valuable resource that
may be reprocessed, while others elect to dispose of it. The
Preamble notes that the Parties are mindful of the needs of
developing countries and States with economies in transition
and the need to assist them, in the fulfillment of their rights
and obligations set out in the Convention. The Parties also
express the desirability of strengthening the international
system of transboundary movement and affirm the importance of
international cooperation for the enhancement of nuclear safety
through bilateral and multilateral mechanisms and this
incentive Convention.
Article 1 sets forth the objectives of the Convention,
which are to: (1) achieve and maintain a high level of nuclear
safety worldwide in spent fuel and radioactive waste management
through the enhancement of national measures and international
cooperation, including where appropriate, safety-related
technical cooperation; (2) ensure that during all stages of
spent fuel and radioactive waste management there are effective
defenses against potential radiological hazards so that
individuals, society, and the environment are protected from
harmful effects of ionizing radiation, now and in the future;
and (3) prevent accidents with radiological consequences, and
mitigate such consequences should they occur during any stage
of management.
Article 2 contains 21 definitions for the Convention.
Particular attention is drawn to the following definitions:
``discharges'' means planned and controlled releases into the
environment, as a legitimate practice, within limits authorized
by the regulatory body, of liquid or gaseous radioactive
materials that originate from regulated nuclear facilities
during normal operation; ``disposal'' means the appropriate
facility without the intention of retrieval; ``license'' means
any authorization, permission or certification granted by a
regulatory body to carry out any activity related to the
management of spent fuel or of radioactive waste; a ``nuclear
facility'' means a civilian facility and its associated land,
buildings, and equipment in which radioactive materials are
produced, processed, used, handled, stored, or disposed of on
such a scale that consideration of safety is required;
``radioactive waste'' means radioactive material in gaseous,
liquid, or solid form for which no further use is foreseen by
the Party or by a natural or legal person whose decision is
accepted by the Party, and which is controlled as radioactive
waste by a regulatory body under the legislative and regulatory
framework of the Party; a ``regulatory body'' for each Party
means any body or bodies given the legal authority by that
Party to regulate any aspect of the safety of spent fuel or
radioactive waste management including the granting of
licenses; ``sealed source'' means radioactive material that is
permanently sealed in a capsule or closely bonded and in a
solid form, excluding reactor fuel elements; ``spent fuel''
means nuclear fuel that has been irradiated in and permanently
removed from a reactor core; ``State of destination'' means a
State to which a transboundary movement is planned or takes
place; a ``State of origin'' means a State from which a
transboundary movement is planned to be initiated or is
initiated; a ``State of transit'' means any State, other than a
State of origin or destination, through whose internal waters,
inland waterways, or land territory a transboundary movement is
planned or takes place.
Article 3 specifies that the Convention's scope is to apply
to the safety of spent fuel management when the spent fuel
results from the operation of civilian nuclear reactors. It
also applies to the safety of radioactive waste management when
radioactive waste results from civilian applications. Unless
otherwise declared by the Party, military or defense program
spent fuel or radioactive waste is not covered under the
Convention, unless such materials are permanently transferred
to and managed exclusively within civilian programs. Nor does
it apply to fuel held at reprocessing facilities as part of a
reprocessing activity unless the party declares reprocessing to
be part of spent fuel management, or waste containing only
naturally occurring radioactive materials that do not originate
from the fuel cycle unless it constitutes a disused sealed
source (understood to be old or new sources no longer in use or
which are not intended to be used) or it is declared as
radioactive waste for the purposes of this Convention by the
Party. The Convention also applies to discharges as defined in
Article 2 and as provided for in Articles 4, 7, 11, 14, 24, and
26.
Articles 4 to 10 address the safety of spent fuel. Article
4 requires each Party to take appropriate steps to ensure that
at all stages of spent fuel management, individuals, society,
and the environment are adequately protected against
radiological hazards. Without identifying specific steps the
Parties should take, and thus leaving such steps to each
Party's discretion, the Convention enumerates seven goals of
these steps:
(i) ensure that criticality and removal of residual
heat generated during spent fuel management are
adequately addressed;
(ii) ensure that the generation of radioactive waste
associated with spent fuel management is kept to the
minimum practicable consistent with the type of fuel
cycle policy adopted;
(iii) take into account interdependencies among the
different steps in spent fuel management;
(iv) provide for effective protection of individuals,
society, and the environment, by applying at the
national level suitable protective methods as approved
by the regulatory body, in the framework of its
national legislation which has due regard to
internationally endorsed criteria and standards;
(v) take into account the biological, chemical, and
other hazards that may be associated with spent fuel
management;
(vi) strive to avoid actions that impose reasonably
predictable impacts on future generations greater than
those permitted for the current generation;
(vii) aim to avoid imposing undue burdens on future
generations.
Article 5 requires each Party to take the appropriate steps
to review the safety of any existing spent fuel management
facility and to ensure that, if necessary, all reasonably
practicable improvements are made to upgrade facility safety.
Article 6 addresses the siting of spent fuel management
facilities. Parties are required to take the appropriate steps
to ensure that procedures are established and implemented for a
proposed spent fuel management facility: to evaluate all
relevant site-related factors likely to affect the safety of
the facility during its operating lifetime; to evaluate the
likely safety impact of a proposed facility on individuals,
society, and the environment; and to make such information
public. Each Party must also take the steps to ensure that
appropriate procedures are established and implemented, to
consult Parties in the vicinity of a proposed facility likely
to be affected by that facility and provide to them, upon
request, general data to evaluate and assess the likely safety
impact of the facility upon their own territory, and to ensure
that these facilities do not have unacceptable effects on other
Parties by following the general safety requirements of Article
4.
Article 7 sets forth obligations associated with the design
and construction of a spent fuel management facility. Each
Party is to take appropriate steps to ensure that the design
and construction of a facility provides for suitable measures
to limit possible radiation effects on individuals, society,
and the environment, including those from discharges or
uncontrolled releases. Each Party must also take the
appropriate measures to ensure that experience, testing, or
analysis support technologies incorporated in the design and
construction of such a facility. Conceptual plans and, as
necessary, technical provisions for decommissioning must be
taken into account at the design stage.
Article 8 obligates each Party to take the appropriate
steps to ensure that systematic safety and environmental
assessments appropriate to the hazard presented by the facility
and covering its operating lifetime are carried out before the
construction of a spent fuel management facility. These
assessments must be documented and subsequently updated when
deemed necessary before the operation of the facility.
Addressing the safety of operation of spent fuel management
facilities, Article 9 requires each Party to take the
appropriate steps to ensure that the license to operate a
facility is based on the assessments specified in Article 8 and
is conditions on a commissioning program demonstrating that the
facility, as constructed, is consistent with design and safety
requirements. Parties must also take appropriate measures to
ensure that operational limits and conditions derived from the
Article 8 safety assessments, tests, and operational experience
are defined, and revised as necessary. Operation, maintenance,
monitoring, inspection, and testing of spent fuel facilities
are to be conducted in accordance with established procedures.
Under subparagraphs (iv) and (v) of Article 9, Parties must
also take appropriate steps to ensure that engineering and
technical support is available in all safety-related fields
throughout the operating lifetime of the facility, and that
incidents significant to safety are reported to the regulatory
body in a timely manner by the holder of the relevant license.
Subparagraph (vi) obligates Parties to take appropriate steps
to establish programs to collect and analyze relevant operating
data. They must also ensure that conclusions of the analysis
are acted upon where appropriate. Lastly, Parties are required
under subparagraph (vii) to ensure decommissioning plans for a
spent fuel management facility are prepared and updated, as
necessary, using information obtained during the operating
lifetime of the facility, and reviewed by the regulatory body.
Under Article 10, if a Party, pursuant to its own
legislative and regulatory framework, has designated spent fuel
for disposal, the disposal of such spent fuel must be in
accordance with the Convention obligations relating to the
disposal of radioactive waste (Articles 11 to 17).
Articles 11 to 17 address the safety of radioactive waste
management. Article 11 requires Parties to take the appropriate
steps to ensure that at all stages of radioactive waste
management individuals, society, and the environment are
adequately protected against radiological and other hazards.
These steps must:
(i) ensure that criticality and removal of residual
heat generated during radioactive waste management are
adequately addressed;
(ii) ensure that the generation of radioactive waste
is kept to the minimum practicable;
(iii) take into account interdependencies among the
different steps in radioactive waste management;
(iv) provide for effective protection of individuals,
society, and the environment, by applying at the
national level suitable protective methods as approved
by the regulatory body, in the framework of its
national legislation which has due regard to
internationally endorsed criteria and standards;
(v) take into account the biological, chemical, and
other hazards that may be associated with radioactive
waste management;
(vi) strive to avoid actions that impose reasonably
predicable impacts on future generations greater than
those permitted for the current generation;
(vii) aim to avoid imposing undue burdens on future
generations.
Under Article 12, each Party is in due course to take the
appropriate steps to review the safety of radioactive waste
management facilities existing at the time the Convention
enters into force for that Party. All reasonably practicable
improvements are to be made to upgrade the safety of the
facility. Article 12 also requires that the results of past
practices be reviewed to determine whether any intervention is
needed for reasons of radiation protection, bearing in mind
that the reduction in detriment resulting from the reduction in
dose should be sufficient to justify the harm and the costs,
including the social costs, of the intervention.
Article 13 addresses the siting of radioactive waste
management facilities. Parties are required to take the
appropriate steps to ensure that procedures are established and
implemented for a proposed management facility to evaluate (1)
all relevant site-related factors likely to affect the safety
of the facility during its operating lifetime as well as that
of a disposal facility after closure, and (2) the likely safety
impact of a proposed facility on individuals, society, and the
environment, and to make information on the safety of such a
facility public.
Each Party must also take the appropriate steps to ensure
that procedures are established and implemented for consulting
Parties in the vicinity of a proposed facility likely to be
affected by that facility and providing to them, upon their
request, general data to evaluate the likely safety impact of
the facility upon their own territory. Parties must also take
the appropriate steps to ensure that such facilities do not
have unacceptable effects on other Parties by being sited in
accordance with the general safety requirements of Article 11.
Article 14 addresses the design and construction of
radioactive waste management facilities. This article obligates
a Party to take appropriate steps to ensure that the design and
construction of a facility provides for suitable measures to
limit possible radiation impacts on individuals, society, and
the environment, including discharges or uncontrolled releases.
Conceptional plans and, as necessary, technical provisions for
the decommissioning and closure of the facility must also be
taken into account at the design stage. Each Party must also
take appropriate steps to ensure that experience, testing, or
analysis supports technologies incorporated in the design stage
and construction of a management facility.
Article 15 obligates each Party to take measures to ensure
that systematic safety and environmental assessments,
appropriate to the hazard presented by the radioactive waste
management facility covering its lifetime, are carried out
before the construction of the facility. Similar assessments
must also be carried out before construction for the period
following closure. In addition, the results of such assessments
must be evaluated against criteria established by the
appropriate regulatory body. Before the operation of a
radioactive waste management facility, updated and detailed
versions of the safety assessment and of the environmental
assessment must be prepared when deemed necessary to complement
the assessments referred to above.
Article 16 concerns the operational safety of radioactive
waste management facilities. It requires each Party to take the
appropriate steps to ensure that the license to operate the
facility is based upon the safety assessments specified in
Article 15, conditioned on a commissioning program, that
demonstrates the facility, as constructed, is consistent with
design and safety requirements. Parties must also institute
measures to ensure that operational limits and conditions
derived from the Article 15 safety analysis, tests, and
operational experience are defined, and revised as necessary,
for identifying safe boundaries for operation. The operation,
maintenance, monitoring, inspection, and testing of radioactive
waste management facilities are to be conducted in accordance
with approved procedures, and the results thus obtained used to
verify and to review the validity of assumptions made and to
update the assessments as specified in Article 15 for the
period after closure.
Under subparagraphs of Article 16, Parties must also take
appropriate steps to ensure that engineering and technical
support is available in all safety-related fields throughout
the operating lifetime of the facility, that incidents
significant to safety are reported in a timely manner by the
license holder to the regulatory body, and that procedures for
characterization and segregation of radioactive waste are
applied. Subparagraph (vii) obligates Parties to take
appropriate steps to establish programs to collect and analyze
relevant operating data and that they ensure that conclusions
of the analysis are acted upon, where appropriate. Parties are
required under subparagraphs (viii) and (ix), to ensure
decommissioning and closure plans for radioactive management
facilities and disposal facilities, respectively, are prepared
and updated, as necessary, using information obtained during
the operating lifetime of the facility. The regulatory body
must also review these plans.
Article 17 sets forth the conditions for closure of a
disposal facility, including record keeping (location, design,
and inventory), and active or passive institutional controls.
Parties are to take the appropriate steps to ensure that after
closure, and during any period of active institutional
controls, if an unplanned release of radioactive materials into
the environment is detected, intervention measures are
implemented, if necessary.
Articles 18 to 26 address the Convention's General Safety
Provisions. Article 18 requires each Party to take, within the
framework of its national law, the legislative, regulatory, and
administrative measures, and other steps necessary, to
implement its obligations under the Convention.
Under Article 19, each Party is obligated to establish and
maintain a legislative and regulatory framework to govern the
safety of spent fuel and radioactive waste management. The
framework must provide for the establishment of applicable
national safety requirements and regulations for radiation
safety; a system of licensing; the prohibition of the operation
of facilities without a license; a system of institutional
control, regulatory inspection; documentation and reporting;
the enforcement of regulations and the terms of licenses; and a
clear allocation of responsibilities of bodies involved. When
considering whether to regulate radioactive materials as
radioactive waste, Parties must take due account of the
objectives of the Convention.
Article 20 requires each Party to establish or designate a
regulatory body entrusted with the implementation of the
legislative and regulatory framework created under Article 19,
to provide that body with adequate authority, competence,
financial and human resources, and to ensure its effective
independence in the performance of regulatory functions.
Under Article 21, each Party is obligated to ensure that
the prime responsibility for the safety of spent fuel and
radioactive waste management rests with the holder of the
relevance license and to take the appropriate steps to ensure
that each license holder meets its responsibility. If there is
no such license holder, the responsibility rests with the Party
having jurisdiction over spent fuel or radioactive waste.
Article 22 requires each Party to take the appropriate
steps to ensure that qualified staff are available, as needed,
for safety-related activities during the operating lifetime of
a spent fuel and radioactive waste management facility. This
Article also requires that appropriate steps be taken to ensure
that adequate financial resources are available to support the
safety of facilities during their operating lifetime, for
decommissioning, and for institutional controls and monitoring
arrangements following closure of a disposal facility for
whatever period deemed necessary.
Under Article 23, each Party must take the appropriate
steps to ensure that safety quality assurance programs are
established and implemented.
Article 24 requires Parties to take the appropriate steps
to ensure that during the operating lifetime of a spent fuel or
radioactive waste management facility, the radiation exposure
of the workers and the public caused by the facility shall be
kept as low as reasonably achievable and that no individual
shall be exposed in normal situations to radiation doses
exceeding prescribed national dose limits with due regard to
internationally endorsed standards on radiation protection.
This Article also obligates each Party to take the appropriate
steps to prevent unplanned or uncontrolled releases of
radioactive material into the environment. Each Party must also
take the appropriate steps to ensure that during the operating
lifetime of a regulated nuclear facility, in the event that an
unplanned or uncontrolled release of radioactive materials into
the environment occurs, appropriate corrective measures are
implemented to control the release and mitigate its effects.
Under Article 25, each Party must ensure that before and
during operation of a spent fuel or radioactive waste
management facility, there are appropriate on-site and, if
necessary, off-site emergency plans covering the activities to
be carried out in the event of an emergency. Emergency plans
are to be routinely tested, and each Party must take
appropriate steps for the preparation and testing of emergency
plans for its territory insofar as it is likely to be affected
in the event of a radiological emergency at a facility in the
vicinity of its territory.
With respect to safe decommissioning, under Article 26,
each Party is to take appropriate steps to ensure that
qualified staff and adequate financial resources are available,
the radiation protection principles in Article 24 are applied,
emergency preparedness provisions in Article 25 are applied,
and records important to decommissioning are kept.
Under Article 27, each Party involved in transboundary
movement is to ensure that such movement is undertaken in a
manner consistent with this Convention and relevant binding
international instruments. In this connection, Parties
undertake to take appropriate steps, to ensure authorized
transboundary movement only with prior notification and consent
of the State of destination. Under international law,
notification to or authorization of coastal States is not
required for passage through territorial seas and exclusive
economic zones (EEZs); as a result prior notification of a
State of transit is not required. Movement through States of
transit is subject to those international obligations, which
are relevant to the particular modes of transport utilized
(e.g. IAEA Standards on the Safety of the Transport of
Radioactive Materials). A Party which is a State of destination
must consent to a transboundary movement only if it has the
administrative and technical capacity, as well as the
regulatory structure, needed to manage the spent fuel or the
radioactive waste in a manner consistent with the Convention. A
Party, which is a State of origin, must authorize a
transboundary movement only if it can satisfy itself in
accordance with the consent of the State of destination that
the State of destination requirements are met prior to
transboundary movement. A Party which is a State of origin must
take the appropriate steps to permit re-entry into its
territory, if a transboundary movement is not or cannot be
completed in conformity with this Article, unless an
alternative safe arrangement can be made.
Article 27 also prohibits Parties from licensing the
shipment of spent fuel or radioactive waste to a destination
south of latitude 60 degrees South (the Antarctic region) for
storage or disposal. This Article further provides that nothing
in the Convention prejudices or affects: (1) the exercise, by
ships and aircraft of all States, of maritime, river, and air
navigation rights and freedoms, as provided for in
international law; (2) rights of a Party to which radioactive
waste is exported for processing to return, or provide for the
return of, the radioactive waste and other products after
treatment to the State of origin; (3) the right of a Party to
export its spent fuel for reprocessing; and (4) rights of a
Party to which spent fuel is exported for reprocessing to
return, or provide for the return of, radioactive waste and
other products resulting from reprocessing operations to the
State of origin.
Article 28 requires that each Party, within the framework
of its national law, take steps to ensure that the possession,
remanufacturing or disposal of disused sealed sources takes
place in a safe manner and to allow for reentry for disposal,
if in the framework of its national law, it has accepted that
they be returned to a manufacturer qualified to receive and
possess the disused sealed sources.
Articles 29, 30, and 31 establish timetables for meetings
of the Parties. Article 29 provides for a Preparatory Meeting
to be held not later than 6 months after the date of entry into
force of this Convention. At that meeting, Contracting Parties
will establish a date for the first Review Meeting, to be held
not later than 30 months after the date of entry into force,
and prepare and adopt Rules of Procedure and Financial Rules.
Guidelines are to be established regarding the form and
structure of the national reports, a date of submission of such
reports, and the process for reviewing reports. Article 29
allows any State or regional organization of an integration or
other nature which ratifies, accepts, approves, accedes to or
confirms this Convention and for which the Convention is not
yet in force may attend the preparatory meeting as if it were a
Party to the Convention.
Article 30 provides for Review Meetings of the Parties for
the purpose of reviewing the national reports submitted
pursuant to Article 32. At these meetings, each Party is to
have a reasonable opportunity to discuss and seek clarification
of the national reports submitted by others. At each Review
Meeting, the Parties must also determine the date for the
succeeding Review Meeting, at an interval of no more than 3
years and, if appropriate, amend by consensus the Rules of
Procedure and the Financial Rules.
Article 31 specifies that Extraordinary Meetings of the
Parties shall be held only if agreed to by a majority of the
Parties present and voting at a meeting, or at the timely
written request of a Party, to the other Parties and the
Secretariat, which is supported by a majority of the Parties.
Article 32 obligates each Party to submit for review, prior
to each Article 30 Review Meeting, a report on the measures it
has taken to implement its obligations under the Convention.
Reports must address or include the following:
(i) spent fuel management policy;
(ii) spent fuel management practices;
(iii) radioactive waste management policy;
(iv) radioactive waste mangement practices;
(v) criteria used to define and categorize
radioactive waste;
(vi) a list of spent fuel management facilities
subject to this Convention, their location, main
purpose, and essential features;
(vii) an inventory of spent fuel that is subject to
this Convention and that is being held in storage and
of that which has been disposed of and, if available,
information on its mass and its total activity;
(viii) a list of radioactive waste management
facilities subject to this Convention, their location,
main purpose and essential features;
(ix) an inventory of radioactive waste that is
subject to this Convention that is being held in
storage at radioactive waste management and nuclear
fuel cycle facilities, has been disposed of, or has
resulted from past practices, including available
information such as volume or mass, activity, and
specific radionuclides;
(x) a list of nuclear facilities in the process of
being decommissioned and the status of decommissioning
activities at those facilities.
Article 33 provides that each Party must attend meetings of
the Parties and be represented at such meetings by one
delegate, and by alternates, experts, and advisers as it deems
necessary. Parties may, by consensus, invite
intergoverernmental organizations to attend, as observers, any
meetings or specific sessions thereof, who are competent in
matters relating to the Convention, provided they accept in
writing the provisions of Article 36.
Under Article 34, summary reports addressing the issues
discussed and conclusions reached during a meeting are to be
adopted by the Parties by consensus and made available to the
public.
Article 35 specifies that the languages of meetings in the
Parties are Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, and
Spanish, unless otherwise provided in the Rules of Procedure
(Article 29). Reports may be prepared in the national language
of the submitting Party, or in a single designated language
agreed upon in the Rules of Procedure, although in the former
case the Party must also provide a translation into the
designated language.
Article 36 provides that the Convention does not affect the
rights and obligations of the Parties under their own laws to
protect information from disclosure. Information is defined to
include, inter alia, personal data, information protected by
intellectual property rights or industrial or commercial
confidentiality, and information relating to national security
and physical protection of nuclear materials. When, in the
context of the Convention, a Party provides information
identified by it as protected, such information is to be used
only for the purposes for which it has been provided and its
confidentiality is to be respected. Similarly, the contents of
discussions of national reports held at Review Meetings are to
be kept confidential.
With respect to information relating to spent fuel or
radioactive waste falling within the scope of this convention
by virtue of paragraph 3 of Article 3, Article 36 provides for
exclusive discretion of a concerned Party to decide: (1)
whether such information is classified or otherwise controlled
to preclude release; (2) whether to provide such information in
the context of the Convention; and (3) what conditions of
confidentiality are attached to such information if it is
provided in the context of the Convention.
Under Article 37, the Secretariat functions for meetings of
the Parties under the Convention are to be provided by the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The IAEA is to pay
the costs of performing these functions out of its regular
budget. The Secretariat's duties are to convene, prepare, and
service the meetings of the Parties, and transmit to the
Parties information received or prepared under the Convention.
Article 38 addresses dispute resolution. In the event of a
disagreement between Parties concerning the interpretation or
application of the Convention, the Parties must consult within
the framework of a meeting of the Parties with a view to
resolving the disagreement by consensus. If those consultations
do not resolve the disagreement, then Article 38 provides that
recourse can be made to the mediation, conciliation, and
arbitration mechanisms provided for in international law,
including the rules and practices prevailing within the IAEA.
During the Diplomatic Conference in 1997 that considered and
adopted the Convention, it was made clear during the
discussions leading to the adoption of the final text of
Article 38 that the words ``recourse can be made'' were
deliberately chosen to avoid any implication that the dispute
resolution mechanisms referred to in the Article were
mandatory. Thus, Article 38 does not commit the United States
to binding mediation, conciliation, or arbitration.
As provided in Article 39, the Convention was opened for
signature by all States at the Headquarters of the IAEA in
Vienna on September 29, 1997. After the Convention has entered
into force, it is to be open for accession. Under this Article,
regional organizations constituted by sovereign States and with
competence in respect of negotiation, conclusion, and
application of international agreements in matters covered by
this Convention may become Parties to the Convention. In
matters within their competence, which shall be detailed in a
declaration communicated to the Convention's depositary, such
organizations may exercise the rights and fulfill the
responsibilities of the Convention on their own behalf, but do
not have any vote additional to those of their member States.
Article 40 provides that the Convention will enter into
force on the ninetieth day after the date of deposit with the
Depositary of the twenty-fifth instrument of ratification,
acceptance or approval, including the instruments of fifteen
States each having an operational nuclear power plant. It will
enter into force for each additional adhering State or regional
organization on the ninetieth day after the date of deposit
with the Depositary of the appropriate instrument by such a
State or organization.
Procedures for amendment of the Convention are included in
Article 41. Under Article 41, any Party may propose an
amendment to this Convention. Proposed amendments must be
considered at a Review Meeting or at an Extraordinary Meeting.
The text of any proposed amendment must be communicated by the
Depositary to the Parties at least 90 days before the meeting
for which it is submitted for consideration. The Parties may
adopt the proposed amendment by consensus, or, in the absence
of consensus, provided that at least one half of the Parties
are present at the time of voting, may decide, by a two-thirds
majority vote of the Parties present and voting, to submit the
proposed amendment to a Diplomatic Conference. The Conference
shall make every effort to ensure that amendments are adopted
by consensus. However, should that not be possible, amendments
are adopted by a two-thirds majority of all Parties. All
amendments are subject to ratification, acceptance, approval or
confirmation by the Parties and shall enter into force for
those Parties having satisfied or otherwise accepted the
amendment 90 days after two-thirds of the Parties have
deposited instruments of acceptance. Amendments will only enter
into force for other Parties 90 days after that Party has
deposited its relevant instruments accepting the amendment.
Under Article 42, a Party may denounce the Convention by
written notification to the Depositary, effective one year
following the Depositary's receipt of the notification or at
such later date as specified in the notification.
Under Article 43, the IAEA Director General is the
Depositary of the Convention, charged with the duty of
notifying all Parties of signatures and deposits of instruments
in accordance with Article 39; the date on which the Convention
enters into force; notifications of denunciation under Article
42; and proposed amendments under Article 41.
Under Article 44 the original of the Convention, of which
the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Spanish
texts are equally authentic, must be deposited with the
Depositary.
VI. Resolution of Ratification
The resolution of ratification, with its conditions, is as
follows:
Resolved (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring
therein),
SECTION 1. SENATE ADVICE AND CONSENT SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS.
The Senate advises and consents to the ratification of the
Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on
the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, done at Vienna on
September 5, 1997 (Treaty Document 106-48), subject to the
conditions of section 2.
SEC. 2. CONDITIONS.
The advice and consent of the Senate to ratification of the
Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the
Safety of Radioactive Waste Management is subject to the
following conditions, which shall be binding upon the
President:
(1) Commitment to request and review reports.--Not
later than 45 days after the deposit of the United
States instrument of ratification, the President shall
certify to the appropriate committees of Congress that
the United States will:
(A) request copies of all national reports
submitted pursuant to Article 32 of the
Convention; and
(B) comment in each review meeting held
pursuant to Article 30 of the Convention
(including each meeting of a subgroup) upon
aspects of safety significance in any report
submitted pursuant to Article 32 of the
Convention by a Contracting Party that is
receiving United States financial or technical
assistance relating to the improvement of its
nuclear and radiological safety and security
practices.
(2) Complete review of information by the legislative
branch of government.--
(A) Understanding.--The United States
understands that neither Article 36 nor any
other provision of the Convention shall be
construed as limiting the access of the
legislative branch of the United States
Government to any information relating to the
operation of the Convention, including access
to information described in Article 36 of the
Convention.
(B) Protection of information.--The Senate
understands that the confidentiality of
information provided by other Contracting
Parties that is properly identified as
protected pursuant to Article 36 of the
Convention will be respected.
(C) Certification.--Not later than 45 days
after the deposit of the United States
instrument of ratification, the President shall
certify to the appropriate committees of
Congress that the Comptroller General of the
United States shall be given full and complete
access to--
(i) all information in the possession
of the United States Government
specifically relating to the operation
of the Convention that is submitted by
any other Contracting Party pursuant to
Article 32 of the Convention, including
any report or document; and
(ii) information specifically
relating to any review or analysis by
any department, agency, or other entity
of the United States, or any official
thereof, undertaken pursuant to Article
30 of the Convention, of any report or
document submitted by any other
Contracting Party.
(D) Reports to congress.--Upon the request of
the chairman of either of the appropriate
committees of Congress, the President shall
submit to the respective committee an
unclassified report, and a classified annex as
appropriate, detailing--
(i) how the objective of a high level
of nuclear and radiological safety and
security has been furthered by the
operation of the Convention;
(ii) with respect to the operation of
the Convention on an Article-by-Article
basis--
(I) the situation addressed
in the Article of the
Convention;
(II) the results achieved
under the Convention in
implementing the relevant
obligation under that Article
of the Convention; and
(III) the plans and measures
for corrective action on both a
national and international
level to achieve further
progress in implementing the
relevant obligation under that
Article of the Convention; and
(iii) on a country-by-country basis,
for each Contracting Party that is
receiving United States financial or
technical assistance relating to
nuclear or radiological safety or
security improvement--
(I) a list of all nuclear
facilities within the country,
including those installations
operating, closed, and planned,
and an identification of those
nuclear facilities where
significant corrective action
is found necessary by
assessment;
(II) a review of all safety
or security assessments
performed and the results of
those assessments for existing
nuclear facilities;
(III) a review of the safety
and security of each nuclear
facility using facility-
specific data and analysis
showing trends of safety or
security significance and
illustrated by particular
issues at each facility;
(IV) a review of the position
of the country as to the
further operation of each
nuclear facility in the
country;
(V) an evaluation of the
adequacy and effectiveness of
the national legislative and
regulatory framework in place
in the country, including an
assessment of the licensing
system, inspection, assessment,
and enforcement procedures
governing the safety and
security of nuclear facilities;
(VI) a description of the
country's on-site and off-site
emergency preparedness; and
(VII) the amount of financial
and technical assistance
relating to nuclear or
radiological safety or security
improvement expended as of the
date of the report by the
United States, including, to
the extent feasible, an
itemization by nuclear
facility, and the amount
intended for expenditure by the
United States on each such
facility in the future.
(3) Treaty interpretation.--The Senate reaffirms
condition (8) of the resolution of ratification of the
Document Agreed Among the States Parties to the Treaty
on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) of
November 19, 1990 (adopted at Vienna on May 31, 1996),
approved by the Senate on May 14, 1997, relating to
condition (1) of the resolution of ratification of the
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty,
approved by the Senate on May 27, 1988.
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.
As used in this resolution:
(1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term
``appropriate committees of Congress'' means the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the
Committee on International Relations of the House of
Representatives.
(2) Contracting party.--The term ``Contracting
Party'' means any nation that is a party to the
Convention.
(3) Convention.--The term ``Convention'' means the
Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and
on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, done at
Vienna on September 5, 1997 (Treaty Document 106-48).
(4) Nuclear facility.--The term ``nuclear facility''
has the meaning given the term in Article 2(f) of the
Convention.
(5) United states instrument of ratification.--The
term ``United States instrument of ratification'' means
the instrument of ratification of the United States of
the Convention.
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VII. Administration Statements and Supplementary Material
WRITTEN STATEMENT OF MR. RICHARD J. K. STRATFORD, SENATE FOREIGN
RELATIONS COMMITTEE HEARING OF MARCH 19, 2003
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee I appreciate this
opportunity to discuss with you the importance of timely Senate
action on the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel
Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management.
We greatly appreciate your scheduling a hearing on this
important Convention. On September 13, 2000, the prior
Administration sent the Joint Convention to the Senate for
advice and consent. This Administration fully supports the
Joint Convention and also desires your advice and consent to
the ratification of the Convention, so that the United States
can participate in worldwide efforts to ensure the safety of
spent fuel and radioactive waste management for the benefit of
current and future generations. A favorable action at this time
is necessary, so that the United States can join the Parties as
they gather this year to implement the Joint Convention.
Otherwise we will be excluded from the process.
The Joint Convention is a companion convention to the
Convention on Nuclear Safety to which the Senate gave its
advice and consent on March 25, 1999, and which entered into
force for the United States on July 10, 1999. With the United
States' participation, the Convention on Nuclear Safety is
successfully raising the level of nuclear safety at civilian
nuclear power plants throughout the world. It is the goal of
the Joint Convention to extend similar efforts to spent nuclear
fuel and waste management facilities.
The objectives of the Joint Convention are to achieve and
maintain a high level of nuclear safety worldwide in spent
nuclear fuel and radioactive waste management through the
enhancement of national measures and international cooperation,
to ensure that at all stages of spent fuel and radioactive
waste management there are effective safety measures against
potential radiological hazards so that current and future
generations are protected, to prevent accidents with
radiological consequences and to mitigate effects should such
accidents occur.
The United States played a key role in developing the Joint
Convention, and ratification will ensure our continued
leadership in its worldwide implementation. The Joint
Convention was adopted by a Diplomatic Conference convened by
the International Atomic Energy Agency in September 1997. The
United States was the first nation to sign the Joint
Convention, when the U.S. Secretary of Energy signed it at the
International Atomic Energy Agency's General Conference on
September 29, 1997. To date, 42 nations have signed the Joint
Convention, of which 30 nations have become Parties to it. The
Joint Convention entered into force on June 18, 2001, after the
requisite 25 nations became Parties, including at least 15
nations that had an operational nuclear power plant. The
following nations are currently Parties to the Joint
Convention: Argentina, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria,
Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Republic of Korea, Latvia,
Luxembourg, Morocco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, and
United Kingdom. In addition to the United States, the following
nations have signed the treaty, but have yet to ratify, accept,
or approve it: Australia, Brazil, Estonia, Indonesia, Italy,
Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Lithuania, Peru, Philippines, and the
Russian Federation.
The Joint Convention is important to U.S. foreign policy.
It supports safety as the top priority in use of nuclear power
worldwide. It promotes the safe operation of spent nuclear fuel
and radioactive waste management facilities and the application
of radiation protection principles. It is an incentive
convention that was carefully drafted to encourage
participation by countries, such as the Newly Independent
States and Central and Eastern European countries, so that they
can adhere to the Joint Convention even as they develop their
domestic infrastructure. The Joint Convention provides a
mechanism for the United States to continue to work with other
countries to promote objectives, consistent with U.S. policies
and the U.S. legislative and regulatory framework, that ensure
the safety of spent fuel and radioactive waste management for
the benefit of current and future generations. By becoming a
Party to the Joint Convention, the United States will have an
opportunity to: review and benefit from the experience of other
nations, promote and help influence a stable technical
environment, safety programs, and regulatory system in
developing countries; identify possible areas for bilateral and
multilateral technical and regulatory cooperation; and
strengthen the worldwide safety culture, including the
management of radioactive waste, to minimize the threat of the
malicious use of radioactive waste, as may occur with disused
sealed sources.
Based on the successful format of the Convention on Nuclear
Safety, the Joint Convention establishes a series of broad
commitments with respect to the safe management of spent
nuclear fuel and radioactive waste without prescribing specific
or mandatory standards for its Parties. Parties to the Joint
Convention are required to take appropriate steps to bring
their activities into compliance with the Convention's general
obligations related to the safety of spent fuel and radioactive
waste management. However, the specific steps that Parties
should take are not prescribed but are left to each Party's
discretion. In addition, the Joint Convention adopts a review
process similar to that established in the Convention on
Nuclear Safety to apply to spent nuclear fuel and radioactive
waste management activities. Each Party is obligated to prepare
a national report covering the scope of the Joint Convention
and subject it to review by other Parties. Such review has
proven very successful for implementation of the Convention on
Nuclear Safety.
The Joint Convention applies to spent nuclear fuel
resulting from operation of civilian nuclear reactors,
radioactive waste from civilian applications, and disused
radioactive sealed sources. For such material, the Joint
Convention seeks to ensure safety is a consideration in
virtually all aspects, including the legislative and regulatory
framework, operational radiation protection, management of
nuclear facilities, decommissioning, emergency preparedness,
and transport between nations. The Joint Convention does not
apply to naturally occurring radioactive materials, unless the
Party declares this material as waste for purposes of the Joint
Convention.
The Joint Convention does not apply to military radioactive
waste or military spent nuclear fuel unless the Contracting
Party declares it as waste for purposes of the Convention. The
Joint Convention does apply to military radioactive waste or
military spent nuclear fuel that is permanently transferred to
and managed within exclusively civilian programs. In this way,
the Joint Convention ensures that national security is not
compromised and Parties have absolute discretion as to what
information is reported from military sources. In the United
States, military radioactive waste is disposed of at U.S.
Department of Energy facilities, and military spent nuclear
fuel will eventually be disposed of in a Department of Energy
geologic repository along with civilian spent fuel and defense
high-level waste. The U.S. national report will cover the
military radioactive waste that has been transferred to an
exclusively civilian program, and will not cover military spent
nuclear fuel that has not been transferred to and managed
within exclusively civilian programs. The Joint Convention will
not affect U.S. military operations in any way, nor will
classified information be included in the U.S. national report.
The Joint Convention is non-controversial and has broad
support from U.S. industry groups and U.S. States. It has the
full support of the Department of State, the Department of
Energy, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission. There is no overlap or duplication of
efforts with any other international convention or agreement.
In addition to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Joint
Convention is complementary to the Basel Convention on the
Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Waste and their
Disposal and the London Convention on the Prevention of Marine
Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter.
As a Party to the Joint Convention, the United States would
be represented by a delegate, a representative of the
Department of State, with alternate delegates from the
Department of Energy, the Environmental Protection Agency, and
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Consistent with its foreign
policy responsibilities, the State Department will lead U.S.
representation at meetings of the Parties and coordinate
activities with Congress. The Department of Energy is the lead
agency responsible for collection of information and
preparation of the U.S. national report and technical
coordination with the other agencies, including review of other
Parties' national reports. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission
and the Environmental Protection Agency will provide
information on the regulatory perspectives in the U.S. national
report and will participate in reviews of other Parties'
national reports. An interagency working group has been
established to coordinate Joint Convention activities.
The United States has taken the initial steps to prepare a
national report in anticipation of becoming a Contracting
Party. We do not envision any changes in our regulatory
programs resulting from the Joint Convention. However, it is
likely that information received through the constructive
review and information exchange with other nations will help
with our continuous improvement process.
During the national report preparation process, the
Department of Energy will use existing information so that
there is no burden on governmental or commercial spent-fuel and
waste management activities. The report will follow a format
arrived at by consensus of the Parties. The Department of
Energy will utilize information from existing sources, e.g.,
Spent Nuclear Fuel Database, Central Internet Database,
Manifest Information Management System, and commercial spent
fuel information available from the Office of Civilian
Radioactive Waste Management.
From December 10-14, 2001, the Joint Convention Parties
convened a meeting in Vienna, Austria, to take the first steps
in the reporting process. The United States was not in
attendance because we had not ratified the Convention. During
this meeting the Contracting Parties reached consensus on the
procedures, report preparation schedule, report format, and
review process details.
An organizational meeting of the Parties is scheduled for
April 7, 2003. This meeting is significant because it will
determine the makeup of the review groups and the selection of
a meeting Chairman and review group Chairmen. The first Review
Meeting is scheduled to take place November 3, 2003. We
anticipate that the Parties will be organized into subgroups of
five to seven nations. Members of the subgroups will exchange
reports for review and have an opportunity to ask questions and
request clarification during the subgroup meetings. The process
will allow written questions and comments to be made on all
national reports, whether in the assigned subgroup or not,
prior to the review meetings. Results of the subgroup meetings
will be reported to a plenary review meeting, at which time all
Parties will have an opportunity to further discuss the
national reports. The plenary meeting will develop a summary
review report for public release, addressing the issues
discussed and conclusions reached without providing details
from national reports or review debates. Following completion
of this process, the next review meeting will be held within 3
years.
Let me next address the amount of resources required and
availability of reports. Costs incurred once every 3 years may
be considered to fall into three categories: (1) preparation of
the U.S. national report, (2) preparation and participation by
the four agencies in organizational and review meetings, and
(3) review and analysis of other national reports. We expect to
absorb these costs within each agency's budget and that
expenditure will occur on a 3-year cycle.
With regard to availability of information, the United
States will receive national reports from members of the review
subgroup and any other reports it requests. We will request a
copy of all national reports be provided to the United States.
Reports provided by Parties will be available to the Committee
and General Accounting Office subject to any confidentiality
conditions expressed by the Parties. Once submitted, the U.S.
national report will be publicly available.
The Parties to the Joint Convention are proceeding with the
process of preparing national reports for the first review
meeting. The Administration seeks advice and consent to the
Joint Convention so that the United States can participate
fully with the other Contracting Parties to accomplish the
goals of this Convention. An organizational meeting of the
Parties is scheduled for April 7, 2003. Although the United
States cannot become a Party by that time, it expects to
participate in the meeting if it has ratified the Joint
Convention by that date. We are eager to continue the important
U.S. role in promoting safety in worldwide spent nuclear fuel
and radioactive waste management activities by fully
participating in this process.
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Joint
Convention, and let me introduce my colleagues from the
Department of Energy, Environmental Protection Agency, and
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, who are here with me to answer
any questions that you may have.
------
Interagency-Cleared Questions and Answers on the Convention, March 19,
2003
I. PURPOSE
Question 1. What is the purpose of the Waste Convention?
Answer. The purpose of the Waste Convention on the Safety
of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste
Management (Waste Convention) is to achieve a high level of
safety worldwide in spent fuel and radioactive waste
management. This is to be accomplished through the enhancement
of national measures and international cooperation. It is
anticipated that there will be a thorough examination of
national programs through an exchange of views, so that
Contracting Parties can learn from each other's solutions to
common and individual safety problems. The process is viewed as
a mechanism for contributing to improving worldwide safety.
Question 2. Is there a relationship between the purpose of
the Waste Convention and the Convention on Nuclear Safety
(CNS)?
Answer. Yes. The CNS, which establishes a legal obligation
on the part of the Contracting Parties to apply certain safety
principles to the construction, operation, and regulation of
civilian nuclear power reactors, contains a preambular
statement affirming a commitment by Parties to develop a
similar convention on the safe management of radioactive waste.
Together, the Waste Convention and the CNS formulate a joint
mechanism to strengthen the worldwide safety culture.
Both Conventions are consistent with U.S. policy. The
United States became a Contracting Party to the CNS on July 10,
1999 and signed the Waste Convention on September 29, 1997.
II. SCOPE
Question 3. What is the scope of the Waste Convention?
Answer. The Waste Convention applies to the safety of spent
fuel and radioactive waste management resulting from civilian
nuclear applications. It also covers such issues as radioactive
waste management resulting from civil applications; disused
sealed sources no longer needed; operational radiation
protection; management of nuclear facilities; decommissioning;
emergency preparedness; legislative and regulatory frameworks;
and transboundary movement. It does not include naturally
occurring radioactive materials (NORM), unless a Contracting
Party declares it as radioactive waste for the purposes of the
Waste Convention.
Question 4. Does the Waste Convention apply to military
radioactive waste or spent nuclear fuel?
Answer. The Waste Convention does not apply to a
Contracting Party's military radioactive waste or spent nuclear
fuel unless the Contracting Party declares it as spent nuclear
fuel or radioactive waste for the purposes of the Convention.
The Waste Convention would apply to military radioactive waste
and spent nuclear fuel if and when such material is permanently
transferred to and managed within exclusively civilian
programs. The Waste Convention contains provisions to ensure
that national security is not compromised and that States have
absolute discretion as to what information is reported on
material from military sources.
In the United States, all military radioactive waste and
spent nuclear fuel is normally transferred to civilian programs
for disposal. The Waste Convention will not, however, affect
ongoing U.S. military operations in any way, nor will
classified information be covered in the U.S. national report.
Question 5. Does the Waste Convention lay out international
standards Contracting Parties must meet?
Answer. No. The Waste Convention in and of itself does not
delineate standards the Contracting Parties must meet.
Contracting Parties are required to take ``appropriate steps''
to ensure safe management of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive
waste and to report on their activities as described within the
articles of the Waste Convention.
Question 6. What are the obligations of Waste Convention
Contracting Parties with respect to internationally endorsed
standards and criteria?
Answer. The Waste Convention obligates Contracting Parties
to consider internationally endorsed standards and criteria,
however a Contracting Party is not bound by them in setting
national protective methods and radiation standards which will
govern even as to transboundary effects.
Question 7. What are the Waste Conventions obligations with
respect to transportation and how do they relate to the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Code of Practice on
International Movement of Radioactive Waste?
Answer. Waste Convention obligations regarding
transboundary movement are a restatement of relevant provisions
of the non-legally-binding IAEA Code of Practice on
International Movement of Radioactive Waste.
Question 8. What are the implications of Article 27,
Transboundary Movement, for:
1(v): a Contracting Party which is a State of origin
shall take the appropriate steps to permit re-entry
into its territory, if a transboundary movement is not
or cannot be completed in conformity with this Article,
unless an alternative safe arrangement can be made.''
Answer. A State of origin must take the appropriate steps
to permit re-entry of a shipment that cannot be completed
unless other safe arrangements can be made. This avoids
situations of stranded shipments. The Convention recognizes
that any State has the right to ban foreign radioactive waste
and spent fuel import into its territory.
``3(ii): . . . a Contracting Party to which
radioactive waste is exported for processing to return,
or provide for the return of, the radioactive waste and
other products after treatment to the State of
origin;''
Answer. The Convention does nothing to prejudice or affect
the rights of the Contracting Party to return wastes to their
State of origin.
``3(iii): . . . a Contracting Party to export its
spent fuel for reprocessing;''
Answer. The Waste Convention does nothing to prejudice or
affect this right. For U.S. origin fuel, other countries are
required, under the terms of the applicable Agreement for
Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation with the United States, to seek
the consent of the United States prior to the export for
reprocessing of any U.S.-obligated spend fuel. The Waste
Convention has no effect upon these U.S. legal requirements nor
does it affect U.S. consent rights under Agreements for
Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation.
Most international or regional facility proposals focus on
the nuclear program in Taiwan and the Republic of Korea as
potential customers. Switzerland and Japan have also been
mentioned. The United States has retransfer consent rights on
all the spent fuel on Taiwan and much of the spent fuel in the
ROK. The United States also has certain consent rights over
much of the fuel in Switzerland and Japan.
Question 9. Does the Waste Convention's obligation to
minimize radioactive waste generation limit a Contracting
Party's nuclear fuel cycle options?
Answer. No. Contracting Party obligations under the Waste
Convention do not limit a Contracting Party's nuclear fuel
cycle options or decisions to opt for higher enrichment or
increased fuel burn up, even if options selected may generate
more waste than other available options. The Convention
explicitly states that this obligation is to keep the
generation of wastes to the minimum practicable, consistent
with the type of fuel cycle policy adopted.
Question 10. Does the Waste Convention obligate a
Contracting Party to obtain views, approval, or permission on
the safety impacts of other Contracting Parties in the vicinity
of a proposed spent fuel or radioactive waste facility?
Answer. No. Although Contracting Parties in the vicinity of
a proposed spent nuclear fuel or radioactive waste facility
should be consulted, and thus would have an opportunity to
provide their views on the facility's likely safety impact,
there is no requirement to obtain their views, approval or
permission on the likely safety impact of a nearby proposed
facility.
III. IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS
Question 11. What are U.S. obligations under the terms of
the Waste Convention?
Answer. Structured similarly to the Convention on Nuclear
Safety, the Waste Convention identifies a range of issues with
respect to the safe management of spent nuclear fuel and
radioactive waste and Contracting Parties commit to take
appropriate steps to address such issues. The specific steps to
be taken are left to each Contracting Party's discretion. In
addition, as a Contracting Party to the Convention, the United
States is obligated to submit a national report and participate
in the review meetings on measures taken to meet Waste
Convention commitments by the United States and other
countries.
Question 12. Who represents the United States at the Review
meetings of the Contracting Parties?
Answer. As a Contracting Party to the Convention, the
United States would be represented by one delegate and any
other alternates, experts, advisers, or observers as the United
States deems necessary.
The U.S. delegate would be a representative of the
Department of State.
U.S. Alternate delegates would be representatives of
the Department of Energy (DOE), the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC), and the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA).
Experts and advisers may possibly be invited to be
part of the U.S. delegation if determined to be needed.
It is a possible, but not likely, that this could
include representatives from Non-Government
Organizations (NGO), industry, or utilities as
appropriate. Intergovernmental organizations may, as
appropriate, be invited to attend a meeting or session
as an observer.
Question 13. The Convention entered into force June 18,
2001, 90 days after adherence by 25 signatories, including 15
which have an operational nuclear power plant. According to
Article 29, a preparatory meeting is to be held not later than
6 months after entry into force. Has a meeting been held and
did the United States attend?
Answer. Yes, a preparatory meeting was held in December
2001. The United States, not having ratified the Convention,
was not in attendance. An organizational meeting of the
Contracting Parties is scheduled for April 7, 2003. Although
the United States cannot become a Contracting Party by that
time, it expects to participate in the meeting if it has
ratified the Waste Convention before that date. The United
States would need to be a Contracting Party to review national
reports of other States and participate in the November 2003
review meetings.
Question 14. What happened at the preparatory meeting?
Answer. In December 2001, the Contracting Parties met and
agreed upon the guidelines for the form and structure of
national reports; the guidelines for the review process; Rules
of Procedure and Financial Rules.
Question 15. What role do U.S. Agencies and Departments
play in the Waste Convention process?
Answer. The Departments of State and Energy, the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) all have responsibilities in support of U.S.
participation in the Waste Convention process:
U.S. Department of State
The State Department's foreign policy
responsibilities include representation of the United
States to, and conducting negotiations with, other
countries and international organizations. These
responsibilities also include strengthening
Congressional and public understanding of, and support
for, the goals, objectives, and approaches of the
President and the Secretary in the area of foreign
policy. International peaceful nuclear cooperation
policy is primarily a foreign affairs issue. For that
reason, the State Department's function, in
implementation of the Waste Convention, is to lead the
U.S. delegation at meetings of the Contracting Parties.
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)
Implementation of U.S. obligations under the Waste
Convention will be carried out primarily by the DOE as
the U.S. agency responsible for the safe storage,
treatment, and disposition of the majority of U.S.
high-level radioactive waste, as well as low-level
radioactive waste generated by DOE. DOE is responsible
for the cleanup of the legacy waste from the Cold War
era. In this respect, DOE will be responsible for the
preparation of the U.S. national report and the
representation of this information. DOE will also be
responsible, for working with other U.S. agencies, in
the proposal and strategy for U.S. participation in the
Waste Convention.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
The NRC has responsibility for regulating all
commercial spent fuel storage and all spent fuel and
high-level radioactive disposal activities. NRC and/or
Agreement States (i.e., States to which the NRC has
relinquished regulatory authority over certain nuclear
activities and facilities) also have responsibility for
regulating waste management for commercial low-level
radioactive waste. NRC's role in implementation of U.S.
obligations under the Waste Convention is to provide
information on the regulatory perspective for spent
nuclear fuel and radioactive waste management for the
U.S. national report.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
EPA establishes generally applicable environmental
standards for protection of the general environment
from radioactive material. In addition, EPA has
regulatory authority for storage, management, and
disposal of transuranic wastes at DOE's Waste Isolation
Pilot Plant (WIPP). EPA also is responsible for
implementation of the London Convention provisions
associated with prohibiting ocean dumping of
radioactive wastes. EPA's role in implementation of
U.S. commitments under the Waste Convention is to
provide information on the regulatory perspective for
transuranic waste management for the U.S. national
report.
IV. NATIONAL REPORTS AND THE CONVENTION PROCESS
Question 16. What is the process by which the Contracting
Parties to the Waste Convention will review national reports?
Answer. Contracting Parties are to submit national reports
addressing measures taken to implement the obligations of the
Convention, their relevant national policies and factual
information about their facilities and materials. The
Contracting Parties will hold meetings for the purpose of
reviewing national reports. The first review meeting is to be
held beginning November 3, 2003. The interval between review
meetings is not to exceed three years.
Question 17. How will the United States participate in the
review of national reports of other countries at the review
meeting?
Answer. As currently proposed, the Contracting Parties are
to be organized into subgroups of five to seven countries with
a Chairman, Vice-Chairman, and a Rapporteur. The United States
will be assigned to a group. Membership of each group will be
rotated from review meeting to review meeting. In subgroup
meetings, members will exchange national reports for the
purpose of conducting a detailed review. Each country will have
a reasonable opportunity to ask questions and request
clarification of reports submitted during meetings of the
subgroups. The Rapporteur will prepare a reporting document,
which will be used as the basis for a subgroup report to the
Plenary Session.
Question 18. Will the United States have an opportunity to
comment on national reports from countries not in the U.S.
assigned country subgroup?
Answer. Yes. A Contracting Party has additional
opportunities to comment on national reports of all other
Contracting Parties, by sending written comments and questions
before the review meeting, by attending the subgroup meeting in
which a particular report is discussed, and by addressing a
Plenary Session.
However, the United States must first become a Contracting
Party to be entitled to participate in the review of any
Contracting Party's national report, unless the IAEA and the
Contracting Party voluntarily permitted such a review.
The guidelines adopted at the preparatory meeting (December
2001) propose that the Contracting States should review all
country reports. The review process allows formal comment by
Contracting States on all reports, whether inside or outside
the reporting group.
Question 19. In the U.S. view, what countries have what
problems?
Answer. There is a wide range of problems and differences
between States party to the Waste Convention. Some emerging
nations have issues associated with lack of regulatory systems
and requirements. Laws and regulations need to be structured to
increase safety of spent fuel and radioactive waste management
if they do not exist. Not all countries have operational
nuclear power plants and spent fuel, their problems will focus
on waste management issues and disused sealed sources. Most
nations, including the United States, have difficulties siting
disposal facilities.
Question 20. Will any activity under the Waste Convention,
including U.S. advice or comments on other country national
reports through the review process provide a basis for any U.S.
liability?
Answer. It is unlikely that adherence to the Waste
Convention could provide a basis for United States government
liability. The Convention does not purport to affect
international nuclear liability. Under the Waste Convention,
the responsibility for safety of spent fuel or radioactive
waste management rests with the Contracting Party which has
jurisdiction over the spent fuel or over the radioactive waste.
The Waste Convention provides for no private right of action
and does not waive the sovereign immunity of Contracting
Parties.
Question 21. Under Article 32, Reporting, for 2(ii) an
inventory of spent fuel that is subject to this Convention and
that is being held in storage and of that which has been
disposed of. This inventory shall contain a description of the
material and, if available, give information on its mass and
its total activity; will the Russian Federation report include
spent fuel inventories?
Answer. Like the United States, the Russian Federation has
not yet become a Contracting Party. Once they complete their
ratification process and become a Contracting Party, the
Russian Federation will be subject to the terms of Article 32,
including the requirement to report its inventory of spent fuel
held in storage or disposed of. Article 32 would also apply to
any future regional or international repository in the Russian
Federation.
Question 22. Under Article 36, Confidentiality, what are
the implications for Congressional information interests?
Answer. Under the terms of Article 36, information will be
available, but its confidentiality is to be respected. The
Convention does not affect the rights and obligations of the
Contracting Parties, under their laws, to protect information
from disclosure. This includes a range from national security
to industrial property protection. The Contracting Party has
exclusive discretion to denote ``information'' as classified or
otherwise controlled. The Administration will make information
available to the fullest extent possible. The Convention on
Nuclear Safety (CNS) will serve to some extent as a paradigm
for implementation of the Waste Convention.
Question 23. Will there be a review meeting summary report?
Will it be available publicly?
Answer. Yes. Under Article 34 of the Waste Convention,
Contracting Parties are obligated to adopt by consensus, and
make available to the public, a summary report addressing the
issues discussed and the conclusions reached during the
meeting. However, no specific national report will be
identified, nor will details of debates be available. The
summary report is prepared from the subgroup Rapporteur
reports.
V. U.S. NATIONAL REPORT PROCESS
Question 24. What is the process by which the United States
will prepare a national report?
Answer. Each Contracting Party is required to submit a
national report for review on measures taken to meet its
commitments under the articles of the Waste Convention, prior
to the review meeting. The United States will follow the
guidelines for the form and structure of national reports
established by the Contracting Parties at the December 2001
preparatory meeting.
DOE will be the lead agency for preparation of the
U.S. national report in coordination with the NRC, EPA,
and the Department of State.
The U.S. national report form and structure will be
closely modeled after the U.S. national report
submitted for the Convention on Nuclear Safety,
although the Waste Convention elaborates on the content
of the report in more detail than the CNS. Appendices
to the Report will include detailed data tables.
Generic summary documents, standard DOE, NRC, and EPA
documents, and other appropriate documents and reports
will be cited by reference.
An interagency working group (IWG), The Executive
Steering Committee for the Convention on Spent Fuel and
Radioactive Waste Convention, chaired by the Department
of Energy, was established for the purpose of
coordinating U.S. Waste Convention activities in
anticipation of ratification and in preparation for the
review meetings. Other members include NRC, EPA, and
the Department of State.
Question 25. Will Agreement States and Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Compacts (Compacts are States that band
together with a plan to have one disposal facility per compact
in a selected host State) (Compacts), and others have an
opportunity to review and comment on the U.S. national report
prior to submittal?
Answer. No formal opportunity for Agreement State or Low-
Level Radioactive Waste Compact review and comment of the U.S.
national report is expected prior to submittal to the IAEA.
Likewise, there is no obligation for review or comment on the
part of any or all Agreement States or Compacts to contribute
or review the U.S. national report or the report of any other
Contracting Party.
Question 26. Will the Comptroller General and the General
Accounting Office have access to U.S. analyses and documents
prepared under the Waste Convention Process?
Answer. Yes. In accordance with the law.
Question 27. Once submitted, would the U.S. national report
be publicly available?
Answer. Yes. The U.S. national report will be made
available to the U.S. public.
Question 28. Will other Contracting Party national reports
be available to the U.S. public?
Answer. Contracting Parties are entitled to designate
certain information to be protected against public disclosure.
The United States must respect such confidentiality
designations. As a Contracting Party, the United States would
be entitled to receive national reports of all other
Contracting Parties. However, because of the enormity in the
quantity of documentation of national reports from all
Contracting Parties, reports for only those States
participating in a specific subgroup will be transmitted to
members of the group. Other reports will be provided by the
Secretariat upon request.
Following the first review under the Convention on Nuclear
Safety, many national reports were posted on the IAEA web site
and thus are publicly available. We anticipate a similar
practice to be implemented for national reports under the Waste
Convention.
VI. NATIONAL REPORT ELEMENTS
Question 29. What spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste
inventories will be included in the U.S. national report?
Answer. The U.S. national report inventory data, which will
be taken from currently available Federal Government databases,
is to cover spent nuclear fuel stored or disposed of and
radioactive waste stored at certain facilities or which has
been disposed of or has resulted from past practices.
Radioactive waste from hospitals, medical institutions,
research facilities and the like would be covered in the
inventory after shipment to a radioactive waste facility.
Specific waste materials included are to be itemized in the
report's inventory list.
Question 30. What specific spent nuclear fuel and
radioactive waste databases will be used as the source for
inventory data in the U.S. national report? Who maintains the
databases? What is the source of funding?
Answer. In preparing the U.S. national report, three
databases will be used as the source for identifying U.S.
inventory:
DOE Spent Nuclear Fuel Inventory (SNF). The National
Spent Nuclear Fuel Database is maintained at the Idaho
National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory
(INEEL), National Spent Fuel Program Office. The DOE
Office of Environmental Management funds the database.
Commercial SNF Inventory. Data on the commercial SNF
inventory will be obtained from the DOE Office of
Civilian Radioactive Waste Management's Environmental
Impact Statement (EIS) entitled, ``Geologic Repository
for the Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level
Radioactive Waste at Yucca Mountain, Nye County,
Nevada.'' The DOE Office of Civilian and Radioactive
Waste Management (OCRWM) funded the collection of
inventory data for this EIS. OCRWM funds the collection
of commercial SNF inventory information on a periodic
basis.
Commercial Low-Level Waste Disposal Volumes.
Commercial low-level waste disposal volumes are
collected by DOE through the Manifest Information
Management System. The DOE Office of Environmental
Management funds this program and collection of data.
DOE Low-Level Inventory. The DOE low-level inventory
is collected in DOE's Environmental Management
Corporate Database. This system is maintained and
funded by the DOE Office of Environmental Management.
The Office updates DOE's low-level radioactive waste
inventory every two years. Waste information is
collected annually.
Question 31. What facilities will be included in the
national report inventory?
Answer. The U.S. national report will cover existing and
proposed facilities, whether Federal, State, or private. The
report's list of sites identifies which types of sites are
included.
Question 32. How many spent fuel and waste management
facilities in the United States come under the Convention?
Answer. Numerous facilities in both commercial and
government sectors in the United States will be included in the
report under the Convention. In terms of sites where the
facilities are or will be located, there are:
Three existing low-level waste disposal sites
(Barnwell, Hanford, and Clive) and four closed low-
level waste disposal sites (Beatty, Sheffield, Maxey
Flats, and West Valley) in the commercial sector. Any
future Low-Level Radioactive Waste Compact site would
be included in the report under the Waste Convention.
Currently, there are 26 operating independent spent
fuel storage installations (ISFSI) in the United States
However, facilities within the controlled area at
operating reactors will not be included in the report.
Interim Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage facilities are
located at 21 commercial reactor sites, however
facilities within the perimeter at operating reactors
will not be included in the report.
DOE facilities located at 30 different sites across
the nation for government waste, including operating
and planned disposal facilities for transuranic (WIPP)
and low-level waste, treatment facilities, and storage
facilities.
Mill tailings sites include 39 under NRC
jurisdiction and 9 under Agreement States. There are 5-
10 Uranium/Thorium sites.
The planned Yucca Mountain high-level waste site and
any other site for commercial spent nuclear fuel.
Twenty-eight contaminated materials facility sites.
Question 33. Is a nuclear power reactor in decommissioning
to be included in the inventory of facilities?
Answer. Yes, the Joint Convention's Article 32.2(v)
specifies that the National Report is required to provide a
list of nuclear facilities (which include nuclear power
reactors) in the process of being decommissioned, as well as
the status of decommissioning activities at those facilities.
Question 34. Does the Convention include disused sealed
sources no longer needed?
Answer. Disused sealed sources no longer needed are covered
to the extent that they are disposed in a radioactive waste
facility and that a Contracting Party should permit reentry if
such a source is being returned to a manufacturer licensed to
receive and possess it. The Contracting Party should also have
a framework for safe management of disused sources. There is no
requirement that a source be registered or tracked throughout
its life cycle.
Question 35. Will the national reports include inventories
of disused sealed sources?
Answer. There is no specific requirement in the Waste
Convention to report inventories of disused sources. In some
countries, disused sealed sources may be included in their
waste inventories as waste. Those sources returned for re-
manufacturing would not be subject to the reporting
requirements, unless the Contracting Party voluntarily reported
such inventories. However, those disused sealed sources which
are to be disposed of would be considered radioactive waste and
should be reported under the radioactive waste inventory.
The IAEA has ongoing programs (Net-Enabled Waste Management
Data Base) in place for reporting disused sealed sources. Also,
the IAEA is in the process of revising the non-legally-binding
Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive
Sources to address security concerns raised in the wake of
September 11. The Code identifies activities important for
strengthening national controls on cradle-to-grave management
of radioactive sources. National registries of radioactive
sources is being considered as a possible addition to the Code.
Question 36. How does ratification of the Waste Convention
support U.S. efforts to minimize the threat of malicious use of
radioactive waste, such as disused sealed sources?
Answer. Article 28 of the Waste Convention, entitled
``Disused Sealed Sources'', commits Contracting Parties to the
Convention to take the appropriate steps to ensure that the
possession, re-manufacturing or disposal of disused sealed
sources, in the framework of national law, takes place in a
safe and secure manner. The Waste Convention offers an
opportunity for the United States, as a Contracting Party, to
review other nations' progress through national report reviews
and reviews. U.S. concerns about control and intentional misuse
of radioactive waste or disused sealed sources can be raised in
the context of the national report review meeting. In this way,
the United States can influence globally the safe management of
spent fuel and radioactive waste and urge nations to enact new
laws and controls on disused sealed sources, where they now do
not exist.
VII. U.S. PROGRAM EFFECTS
Question 37. Will the Waste Convention improve or
strengthen DOE's spent nuclear fuel and waste program? How or
Why not?
Answer. Yes. Review of the national reports and the
prospect of bilateral cooperation will strengthen DOE's spent
fuel and radioactive waste program. Lessons learned from other
countries both from how they manage their spent nuclear fuel
and their experiences in resolving common and individual safety
problems could be used to improve DOE's programs.
Question 38. Does DOE anticipate any changes in its spent
nuclear fuel or waste program in the near-term, long-term? What
is the anticipated nature of the changes?
Answer. No changes are expected in the policy and strategy
of DOE's spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste programs. Any
changes would be related to developing technological
alternatives to current stabilization, storage, treatment, and
disposal missions at DOE. Alternative technical solutions are
often needed to meet environmental compliance requirements and
to reduce the cost of operations.
Question 39. Will the Convention improve or strengthen
NRC's regulatory and licensing program? How or Why not?
Answer. The Waste Convention is not expected to result in
major changes to the NRC's regulatory program. Nonetheless, by
providing a mechanism for receiving information on other
national programs through the constructive exchange of national
reports and reviews, the Waste Convention will support the
NRC's own continuing efforts to improve its regulatory program
through self-assessment.
Question 40. Does NRC anticipate any changes in its
regulatory program for radioactive waste management and/or
spent nuclear fuel management in the near-term, long-term? What
is the anticipated nature of the changes?
Answer. The NRC does not anticipate the need to make any
significant changes to its regulations as a result of the Waste
Convention. Changes, if any, will be publicly vetted as part of
the NRC's rulemaking process.
Question 41. Will the Waste Convention improve or
strengthen EPA's regulatory program? How or Why not?
Answer. The Waste Convention is not expected to have an
effect on EPA's regulatory program.
Question 42. Does EPA anticipate any changes in its
regulatory program in the near-term, long-term? What is the
anticipated nature of the changes?
Answer. EPA does not anticipate any changes to its
regulatory program either in the near-term or the long-term.
VIII. POST 9-11 ISSUES
Question 43. Does the Waste Convention address security and
diversion from terrorist attacks?
Answer. No, the Waste Convention does not directly address
security and diversion from terrorist attacks. However, the
Convention, along with the CNS, does foster a constructive
multi-lateral framework to increase safety and security at
facilities throughout the world. It is an incentive convention
that addresses safety issues primarily associated with spent
nuclear fuel management and radioactive waste management.
Promoting a stable technical environment and regulatory systems
in developing countries through the Convention will assist
contracting States to increase security and diversion from
terrorist attacks.
IX. COSTS
Question 44. What costs are associated with participating
in the Waste Convention?
Answer. The costs to the United States as a Contracting
Party to the Waste Convention include:
Preparation of the U.S. national report every three
years
Reviewing national reports of other countries
U.S. delegation participation in the preparatory,
organizational, and review meetings.
Question 45. What are the anticipated costs for preparing
the U.S. national report? Will there be any additional costs to
licensees?
Answer:
For DOE, anticipated costs for preparing the U.S.
national report is estimated at $200,000 for FY-2003
and an estimated $200,000 incurred annually thereafter.
Costs will be absorbed within the existing DOE budget.
For NRC, costs to prepare information on the
commercial regulatory perspective for the national
report are not expected to be substantial and can be
absorbed within the existing budget. There are no
expected additional costs to licensees.
For EPA, costs are expected to be minimal and can be
absorbed within the existing budget. No additional
costs to licensees are anticipated.
Question 46. Under the NRC's regulatory regime Agreement
States subsume certain of the NRC's regulatory authority
subject to oversight. Will there be any additional costs to
Agreement States?
Answer. In countries having a federal system of government
such as the United States, States may carry out convention
provisions. For the United States there are no significant new
burdens or unfunded mandates for the Agreement States that are
anticipated to result from the Waste Convention.
Question 47. Under U.S. law, States are responsible for the
disposal of low-level radioactive waste and permitted to
formulate compacts for this purpose. Will there be any
additional costs to Low-Level Waste Compacts?
Answer. No additional costs are expected to States or Low
Level Waste Compacts, because the regulatory program to which
such entities are subject is not expected to change as a result
of the Convention.
Question 48. Will the DOE National Laboratories be involved
in preparing the U.S. national report? What are the anticipated
costs?
Answer. No. National Laboratories will not be involved in
preparation of the U.S. national report. There are no
anticipated costs.
Question 49. What is the total number of national reports
the United States anticipates it will review from the assigned
country subgroup process? What are the anticipated costs for
the United States to review and comment on national reports
within this group?
Answer. The United States as part of the country subgroup
will review five to seven reports within its group and others
of interest. Costs will be absorbed within existing agency
budgets.
Question 50. In addition to the national reports received
as part of the assigned country subgroup process; does the
United States anticipate requesting other national reports for
the purpose of review and comment? If yes, for what countries?
What is the anticipated additional cost?
Answer. Similar to its practice with respect to the CNS,
the United States will review national reports for all
countries which receive nuclear and radiation safety assistance
from the United States or for which it has special safety
concerns. The costs will be absorbed within existing agency
budgets.
Question 51. What are the anticipated costs for U.S.
representatives to participate in the meetings?
Answer. Representatives from the Department of State, DOE,
NRC, and EPA are attending all associated Waste Convention
meetings to be held at the IAEA headquarters office in Vienna.
The delegation will include up to 12 delegates, with associated
full-time equivalent (FTE), per diem and travel costs.
Question 52. Are representatives from DOE National
Laboratories, Agreement States, Low-Level Waste Compacts, or
the private sector anticipated to attend meetings of the
Contracting Parties as experts, advisors or observers? If part
of the U.S. delegation, how would such participation be funded?
Answer. No. Representatives from National Laboratories,
Agreement States, Low-Level Waste Compacts, and the private
sector are not expected to attend any meetings of the
Contracting Parties.
Question 53. Are there any costs for the United States if
it is not a Contracting Party?
Answer. Yes. The IAEA is the Secretariat for the
Contracting Parties, including preparing and servicing of the
meetings and transmitting information associated with the Waste
Convention. Cost for these Secretariat services are included in
the annual IAEA budget. The United States is obligated to pay
its annual IAEA membership assessment of 25% of the total IAEA
regular budget. Therefore whether or not the United States is a
Contracting Party to the Waste Convention, a portion of the
U.S. membership assessment will be used to fund Secretariat
services in support of the Convention.
X. BENEFITS
Question 54. How does the United States benefit from
participation as a Contracting Party to the Convention?
Answer. As a Contracting Party to the Convention, the
national report review process benefits the United States by
providing inter alia:
An opportunity to review the national spent nuclear
fuel and radioactive waste management programs of other
Contracting Parties and to benefit from their
experience;
A vehicle, through the drafting of the U.S. national
report, to help harmonize management and assessment
techniques used by DOE, NRC, and EPA's programs
associated with the safe management of spent nuclear
fuel and radioactive waste management;
An opportunity to promote a stable technical
environment and safe regulatory system in developing
countries, thereby supporting trade services and
products of U.S. companies;
A means to identify possible areas for bilateral and
multilateral technical and regulatory cooperation;
An opportunity to influence the development of
nuclear safety programs in other countries, through
international cooperation on the life cycle management
of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste; and
A means to help harmonize, in a nurturing forum,
international approaches to assessing and managing
risks and raising the target level of safety associated
with spent fuel and radioactive waste, thus
strengthening the worldwide safety culture.
Question 55. What are the benefits or value (direct/
indirect) of the Waste Convention to Agreement States and Low-
Level Radioactive Waste Compacts?
Answer. Improvements to the national regulatory program
from U.S. participation in the Convention will carry over to
benefit the individual U.S. States' and Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Compacts' regional regulatory programs.
Question 56. What are the benefits or value (direct/
indirect) to licensees, industry and utilities?
Answer. Through U.S. review of other Contracting Parties'
national reports, the United States benefits from lessons
learned and in the opportunities which it provides to identify
areas for trade in services and products, as well as bilateral
cooperation in technology development.
Question 57. The United States participated in the
Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS) second review process.
What benefits did the United States receive from
participation in the CNS review process?
Answer. As a result of participating in the second
CNS review meeting held in Vienna, Austria, April 15-
26, 2002, U. S. participants concluded that it was a
very important and effective venue for promoting
nuclear safety worldwide. Participation in reviews
provided wide-ranging benefits to the United States,
for example based on interactions with other CNS
Parties, the NRC will more closely examine the
potential benefits of performing periodic safety
reviews of licensed activities as part of its
regulatory program.
Has the CNS process been influential on other
nations' nuclear safety programs? How?
Answer. Most significantly and as noted during the
conduct of the second review meeting, the CNS process
has clearly influenced the safety and regulatory
programs in States of the former Soviet Union, such as
Russia and Ukraine, in positive ways. Assistance
programs in these countries are taking into
consideration key goals and objectives identified as
part of the CNS process. In addition, based on its
participation in the 2nd review meeting, the NRC has
also determined that additional progress can be made in
nuclear regulatory oversight programs of the Russian
Federation and Ukraine, and identified the programs of
China, Armenia, and Pakistan, as warranting further
attention.
In preparing the national report, each country must
demonstrate how it complies with the Articles of the
Convention. This exercise alone, documenting how the
Articles of the Convention are met, and submitting the
report for scrutiny by other Contracting Parties in an
international forum, exerts pressure on a Contracting
Party To improve its safety practices. But perhaps more
importantly is the review process itself where
countries must respond to the questions of other
Contracting Parties. Two examples will demonstrate how
the CNS review process influences signatory countries.
One of the major concerns addressed by the Articles of
the Convention is the independence of the regulatory
body. Many of the former Soviet Union and Eastern
European countries reported in their initial 1998 CNS
reports that their regulatory bodies were not
independent from organizations that promoted nuclear
power. However, because of the many questions that were
raised during the review process, most of these
countries reported significant progress in making their
regulatory bodies more independent in the 2001 reports,
with hopes to report further achievements on regulatory
independence in the 2004 reports. A second example
concerns the Russian Federation's schedule for
completing safety enhancements at many of its aging
nuclear power plants. The 1998 Russian Federation
report stated that many safety enhancements would be
performed but was vague on the enhancements to be
performed at specific plants and schedules for when
these enhancements would be completed. The 2001 report
provided very little detail as well. However, because
of the many written questions received from other
Contracting Parties during the review process, the
Russians provided a complete list of the enhancements
for each plant and the schedule for their completion
during its presentation at the 2002 CNS national report
review meeting.
XI. FOREIGN POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Question 58. Why is the Waste Convention important to U.S.
foreign policy interests?
Answer. The Waste Convention is consistent with U.S. policy
to support safety as a top priority in the use of nuclear
energy worldwide; to promote safe operation of spent nuclear
fuel management and civilian nuclear waste management
facilities and radiation protection principles. Pursuing common
strategies for the handling of spent nuclear fuel and
radioactive wastes are also harmonious with U.S. policy on
climate change and promoting a sustainable global environment.
The Waste Convention is a particularly important complement to
bilateral and multilateral safety assistance programs, because
it provides a crucial political mechanism to encourage
governments to support emerging regulatory organizations and
other entities responsible for nuclear safety culture.
Question 59. What consideration does the Waste Convention
give to the needs of developing countries and countries in
transition, particularly to the Newly Independent States (NIS)
and Central and Eastern European countries (CEE), to assist in
fulfillment of their rights and obligations?
Answer. The Waste Convention is a particularly important
complement to these bilateral and multilateral safety
assistance programs, because similar to the CNS it is an
incentive convention. This means that the Convention was
carefully drafted to encourage early participation by countries
such as the Newly Independent States and Central and Eastern
European countries, so that they can adhere without potentially
being in a state of non-compliance while they further develop
their domestic infrastructure. As such it provides a crucial
political mechanism to encourage such governments to become
Contracting Parties at an early date. It also provides a nexus
for technology transfer to assist developing countries to
better facilitate the transition to more effective regulatory
infrastructures and waste safety management strategies.
Question 60. What goals and objectives does the United
States hope to achieve as a Contracting Party?
Answer. The Waste Convention reflects all of the U.S. goals
and objectives in the negotiations. The United States will
continue to work with other countries to promote objectives,
consistent with U.S. policies and legislative and regulatory
framework to:
Ensure commitment to the principles of a worldwide
safety culture, through the enhancement of national
measures and international cooperation.
Increase international understanding and develop
common philosophies on the storage, treatment, and
disposal of radioactive waste.
Take appropriate steps to ensure that during the
lifetime of a spent nuclear fuel or radioactive waste
management facility, radiation exposure is kept as low
as reasonably achievable.
Take appropriate steps to ensure no individual or
population is exposed to radiation which exceed
national standards.
Take appropriate measures to prevent unplanned or
uncontrolled releases of radioactive material into the
environment.
Assure appropriate corrective measures are
implemented to control unplanned or uncontrolled
releases and mitigate effects in the event of a
release.
Pursue common strategies for the handling of spent
nuclear fuel and radioactive wastes harmonious with
U.S. climate change policies and the promotion of a
sustainable global environment.
Maintain minimal cost to the United States for
carrying out Contracting Party obligations under the
Waste Convention.
Question 61. Has other international recognition been given
to the Waste Convention?
Answer. Yes. The Waste Convention is of high-level
importance to other foreign States many of which have signed
and/or ratified the Convention. The Convention also received
support at several of the G-7 Economic Summit meetings,
including mention in the 1997 Denver Summit Communique, in
addition to reaffirmation at the 1996 Moscow Nuclear Safety and
Security Summit. An International IAEA Waste Conference was
held in Cordoba, Spain in 2000, and a second in Vienna in 2002.
Question 62. What considerations does the Waste Convention
give to other international instruments, international law, and
other multilateral mechanisms?
Answer. The Waste Convention recalls the desirability of
strengthening the international control system and recognizes
principles laid out in international instruments, international
law, and multilateral mechanisms applying to radioactive waste
and spent fuel, including inter alia:
Basel Convention (1989) on the Control of
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Waste and their
Disposal;
Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by
Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (1972, as amended)
(London Convention on Ocean Dumping);
Convention on Nuclear Safety (1994);
Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear
Accident (l986);
Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear
Accident or Radiological Emergency (l986);
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear
Material (l979);
IAEA Code of Practice on Transboundary Movement of
Radioactive Waste (1989);
IAEA Safety Fundamentals, The Principles of
Radioactive Waste Management (l995);
International Standards relating to the Safety of
the Transport of Radioactive Materials;
International Basic Safety Standards for Protection
Against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of
Radiation Sources (l996); and
Rio de Janeiro (1992) UN Conference on Environment
and Development (Agenda Chapter 21, Chapter 22, Sound
Management of Radioactive Waste).
Question 63. Does the Convention overlap or duplicate any
other international Convention or Agreement?
Answer. No. The Waste Convention is complimentary to:
The Basel Convention (1989) on the Control of
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Waste and their
Disposal. Article 1 (3)) specifically excludes
radioactive wastes. This Article states: ``Wastes
which, as a result of being radioactive, are subject to
other international control systems, including
international instruments, applying specifically to
radioactive materials, are excluded from the scope of
the Convention.''
The Convention on Nuclear Safety (1996). The CNS
contains a preambular statement affirming the need for
a Waste Convention. Subsection (ix) states: ``Affirming
the need to begin promptly the development of an
international convention on the safety of radioactive
waste management as soon as the ongoing process to
develop waste management safety fundamentals has
resulted in broad international agreement.''
The London Convention on Ocean Dumping (1972, as
amended) prohibits the dumping of radioactive wastes.
Radioactive waste does not apply to wastes or other
materials containing de minimus (exempt) levels of
radioactive waste as defined by the IAEA and adopted by
the Contracting Parties.
------
Responses of Mr. Richard J. K. Stratford to Questions for the Record
from the hearing of March 19, 2003
Question 1. Mr. Stratford provided the Committee with a
very informative set of questions and answers regarding the
Joint Convention. This document states that the Joint
Convention ``contains provisions to ensure that national
security is not compromised and that States have absolute
discretion as to what information is reported on material from
military sources.'' The document goes on to state that the
Joint Convention ``will not . . . affect ongoing U.S. military
operations in any way, nor will classified information be
covered in the U.S. National Report.''
Were these questions and answers interagency-
approved?
Are the Department of Defense and the Department of
Energy confident that the Joint Convention poses no
threat to sensitive U.S. information or activities?
Answer:
Yes. The Department of Energy, the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission and the Environmental Protection
Agency participated in the drafting of the questions
and answers, and interagency approval of the final
version was obtained through the U.S. Office of
Management and Budget.
Yes. The Joint Convention poses no threat to
sensitive U.S. information or activities. The United
States will provide information in the national report
that is already publicly available. The Joint
Convention does not apply to military or defense
programs, with the exception of spent fuel and
radioactive waste permanently transferred to civilian
programs.
Question 2. Recently, the government of Iran indicated that
it intends to develop an indigenous capability to manufacture
nuclear reactor fuel and to reprocess spent fuel. While Iran
has not signed the Joint Convention, there is nothing to
prevent it from doing so. What is the risk that a country could
use technical advice and assistance, including nuclear safety
advice, to develop capabilities that were actually intended to
contribute to a nuclear weapons program--even though the
country might operate under IAEA safeguards until the decision
was made to commence the production of fissile material for
weapons purposes?
How will the Administration minimize the risk that
advice given under the Joint Convention will be used by
other countries to develop a ``full fuel cycle'' that
is really intended as part of a nuclear weapons
program?
Are there steps that the international community
should take to guard against such misuse of peaceful
nuclear assistance? If so, are there recommendations in
this regard that the Senate could usefully make in a
resolution of ratification of the Joint Convention?
Answer. The Joint Convention does not involve advice or
cooperation in sensitive areas of the nuclear fuel cycle. The
type of information that will be considered by the Contracting
Parties to the Joint Convention is not associated with nuclear
weapons development. Indeed, the information being presented in
the U.S. National Report is publicly accessible from U.S.
government and other public sites. No internal or security-
related information is being included in the U.S. National
Report being prepared by the U.S. Department of Energy, with
the assistance and cooperation of the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the
Department of State. In addition, any comments the United
States might have on other country's submissions would be
limited to non-sensitive information. We believe that one of
the benefits of the Joint Convention is that it operates on the
basis of transparency as it makes information on other
country's waste activities widely known. We see no need for the
Senate to take further action in this regard in the resolution
of ratification.
Question 3. Under the Joint Convention, country reports
will be reviewed by subgroups--and the United States will
receive only the reports of countries in its subgroup, unless
it asks for others as well. Will the United States ask for all
reports?
Is there any reason why the Senate should not
require this?
Answer. The United States will request copies of all
national reports prepared for the review meeting under the
Joint Convention.
The United States has the right to request this information
under the Joint Convention, and it intends to ask for this
information. We do not believe that this should be a
requirement in the resolution of ratification.
Question 4. In its resolution of ratification for the
Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Senate required that the
United States formally comment on every report from a country
that is a recipient of U.S. nuclear safety assistance. Under
that convention--and also under the Joint Convention--such a
formal comment is needed if the United States wants to attend
the subgroup discussion of that report and the country is not a
member of the same subgroup as the United States. Has the
United States benefited from commenting on such reports in the
Convention on Nuclear Safety?
Is there any reason why the Senate should not
require this approach to the Joint Convention as well?
Answer:
Yes. We used the CNS process to identify key goals
and objectives for the safety and regulatory programs
in States of the former Soviet Union, such as Russia
and Ukraine. The goals and objectives will provide
targets for assistance programs to these countries. We
also used the process to determine that additional
progress can be made in nuclear regulatory oversight
programs of Russia and the Ukraine, and identified the
nuclear regulatory programs of China, Armenia, and
Pakistan as warranting further attention.
We intend to ensure that the United States takes
advantage of the availability of information and the
opportunity to provide comments as appropriate. We do
not believe that this should be a requirement in the
resolution of ratification.
Question 5. The Department of State indicates, in its
questions and answers document, that the Department of Energy
will absorb the $200,000 cost of preparing the U.S. report
every few years and that the Department of State will absorb
the cost of sending a 6-person delegation to meetings under the
Convention. If we require the Executive branch to read and
comment on all country reports, or at least on all reports from
countries that receive U.S. nuclear safety assistance, will the
cost of preparing for ant attending meetings go up
substantially?
Will additional funds be needed for this, or will
you still be able to handle those costs under current
budget allocations?
Answer:
There will be additional preparation cost associated
with reviewing all national reports. We estimate the
cost at $6,000 per additional report. We do not
anticipate any additional costs for attending the
meetings, since we are planning to have coverage for
all the review subgroups.
We will strive to keep costs at a minimum and within
the current budget allocation.
Question 6. Article 41 of the Joint Convention (on
Amendments to the Convention) allows a meeting of the
Contracting Parties to adopt an amendment by consensus, or to
refer it to a Diplomatic Conference by a two-thirds vote of
those present and voting.
When the Senate considered an identical provision in the
Convention on Nuclear Safety, it required that the United
States cast a vote on each proposed amendment, and submit each
approved amendment to the Senate for its advice and consent to
ratification. This was done to avoid a situation in which the
Executive branch could refrain from voting on an amendment that
it knew the Senate would oppose, or refrain from submitting it
to the Senate, and still have it enter into effect for most of
the Contracting Parties. Do you see any serious problem with
our enacting similar language in the resolution on the Joint
Convention?
Under what circumstances might the United States not
want to vote on a proposed amendment?
Do you interpret the resolution of ratification for
he Convention on Nuclear Safety as preventing the
United States from allowing an amendment to be approved
by consensus? If so, is that the Administration's
concern?
Under what circumstances might the President not
want to submit an approved amendment to the Senate for
its advice and consent to ratification?
How would the Executive Branch handle a situation in
which most of the Contracting Parties supported an
amendment, but the United States did not? In that
situation, why not submit it to the Senate with a
recommendation to reject it?
Answer:
It is important to remember that the United States
will not be bound by any amendment unless the United
States affirmatively accepts the amendment with the
advice and consent of the Senate. Moreover, the single
vote of the United States is unlikely to be the sole
determinant of whether an amendment is adopted at a
Diplomatic Conference by a two-thirds vote, nor would
it prevent an amendment that has been adopted and
ratified by two-thirds of the Contracting Parties to
the Convention from entering into force for those
Contracting Parties. The U.S. representative's
affirmative or negative vote on an amendment and any
subsequent Senate action on that amendment cannot
prevent an amendment to the Convention on Nuclear
Safety from entering into force for those Contracting
Parties that have ratified the amendment, if two-thirds
of the Contracting Parties have done so. The condition
of the Senate's resolution of advice and consent to the
Convention on Nuclear Safety therefore does not achieve
the purpose stated here. Likewise, the inclusion of a
similar condition in the resolution on the Joint
Convention would not achieve the stated goal. By
requiring that the United States cast an affirmative or
negative vote on a proposed amendment, the Senate's
condition also forecloses the United States from
abstaining or absenting itself from a vote; both
actions are sometimes useful diplomatic tools.
Hypothetically, an abstention would be useful in a
situation in which the United States does not have a
compelling interest in the proposed amendment one way
or the other, but its vote would needlessly antagonize
the faction against which the United States would be
forced to vote--and when the United States might want
the support of that faction for or against a more
important provision.
We would consider associating the United States with
a consensus action as equivalent to an affirmative
vote. At a Diplomatic Conference, however, it is
sometimes desirable to be able to abstain or
deliberately be absent from a vote.
The President might not want to submit an approved
amendment to the Senate for advice and consent if the
United States had opposed its adoption or if the final
version of the amendment were considered inimical to
United States interests.
The Joint convention sets a very high standard--a
two-thirds majority vote--for the adoption of
amendments. In the unlikely case that an adopted
amendment that the United States opposes enters into
force for other Contracting Parties, the United States
would not be bound by that amendment without its
consent. We are unaware of a precedent for submitting a
treaty that the President opposes to the Senate for
rejection. The President has plenary authority not to
ratify an amendment he opposes.
Question 7. The Committee understands that the Nuclear
Energy Institute strongly recommends the expeditious
ratification of the Joint Convention. Have any other industry
groups endorsed ratification? Have any firms or groups warned
that they will suffer in some way if this Convention is
ratified and implemented?
Answer. Apart from the Nuclear Energy Institute's (NEI)
support for ratification (on behalf of the nuclear energy
industry), we are not aware of any other firms or groups taking
a position on this issue. None have warned that they will
suffer in some way if the Convention is ratified and
implemented.