[Senate Report 107-166]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
Calendar No. 430
107th Congress Report
SENATE
2d Session 107-166
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TO CLARIFY THE DEFINITION OF ``VEHICLE'' FOR PURPOSES OF CRIMINAL
PENALTIES RELATING TO TERRORIST ATTACKS AND OTHER ACTS OF VIOLENCE
AGAINST MASS TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS
_______
June 20, 2002.--Ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Leahy, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted the following
R E P O R T
[To accompany S. 2621]
To provide a definition of vehicle for purposes of criminal
penalties relating to terrorist attacks and other acts of
violence against mass transportation systems.
CONTENTS
Page
I. Purpose..........................................................1
II. Legislative history..............................................1
III. Discussion.......................................................2
IV. Vote of the Committee............................................3
V. Section-by-section analysis......................................3
VI. Cost estimate....................................................3
VII. Regulatory impact statement......................................3
VIII.Changes in existing law..........................................3
I. Purpose
The purpose of S. 2621 is to clarify the definition of
``vehicle'' for purposes of criminal penalties relating to
terrorist attacks and other acts of violence against mass
transportation systems.
II. Legislative History
On June 20, 2002, the Judiciary Committee met in executive
session and considered S. 2621, a bill introduced by Senator
Leahy on June 13, 2002, and co-sponsored by Senators Biden,
Hatch, and Schumer, to clarify that an airplane is a
``vehicle'' for purposes of terrorist and other violent acts
against mass transportation systems. A reporting quorum being
present, the bill was approved by voice vote and ordered
favorably reported to the Senate.
III. Discussion
On June 11, 2002, a U.S. District Judge in Boston dismissed
one of the nine charges against Richard Reid stemming from his
alleged attempt to detonate an explosive device in his shoe
while onboard an international flight from Paris to Miami on
December 22, 2001. The dismissed count charged defendant Reid
with violating section 1993 of title 18, United States Code, by
attempting to ``wreck, set fire to, and disable a mass
transportation vehicle.''
Section 1993 is a new criminal law that was added, as
section 801, to the USA PATRIOT Act to punish terrorist attacks
and other acts of violence against, inter alia, a ``mass
transportation'' vehicle or ferry, or against a passenger or
employee of a mass transportation provider. A similar provision
was originally part of S. 2783, the ``21st Century Law
Enforcement and Public Safety Act,'' introduced by Senator
Leahy in the 106th Congress in June, 2000 at the request of the
Clinton Administration.
The district court rejected defendant Reid's arguments to
dismiss the section 1993 charge on grounds that (1) the penalty
provision does not apply to an ``attempt,'' and (2) an airplane
is not engaged in ``mass transportation.'' ``Mass
transportation'' is defined in section 1993 by reference to the
``the meaning given to that term in section 5302(a)(7) of title
49, United States Code, except that the term shall include
schoolbus, charter and sightseeing transportation.''
Section 5302(a)(7), in turn, provides the following
definition: ``mass transportation'' means ``transportation by a
conveyance that provides regular and continuing general or
special transportation to the public, but does not include
schoolbus, charter or sightseeing transportation.'' The court
explained that ``commercial aircraft transport large numbers of
people every day'' and that the definition of ``mass
transportation'' ``when read in an ordinary or natural way,
encompasses aircraft of the kind at issue here.'' U.S. v. Reid,
(CR No. 02-10013, slip op. 10, 12 (D. MA, June 11, 2002).
Defendant Reid also argued that the section 1993 charge
should be dismissed because an airplane is not a ``vehicle.''
The court agreed, citing the fact that the term ``vehicle'' is
not defined in section 1993 and that the Dictionary Act, 1
U.S.C. Sec. 4, narrowly defines ``vehicle'' to include ``every
description of carriage or other artificial contrivance used,
or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on
land.'' Id. at 14. (emphasis in original opinion).
Notwithstanding common parlance that the term ``vehicle''
encompasses aircraft, the district court relied, e.g.,
McReynolds v. Municipal Court, 207 N.W. 792 (Iowa, 1973) on the
narrow definition in the Dictionary Act to conclude that an
aircraft is not a ``vehicle'' within the meaning of section
1993.
The new section 1993 was intended to provide broad federal
criminal jurisdiction over terrorist and violent acts against
all mass transportation systems, including bus services,
airplanes, railroads and other forms of transportation
available for public carriage. The more inclusive definition
would also cover cruise ships. Unfortunately terrorist attacks
against Americans is not a new threat. In 1985, four terrorists
brutally attacked the Achillo Lauro Cruise Ship. The
wheelchair-bound Leon Klinghoffer, a stroke victim, was shot
once in the head and once in the back by the terrorists who
then pushed him over the side of the ship into the
Mediterranean.
The bill the Committee reports today would add a definition
of ``vehicle'' to section 1993 and clarify the breadth of the
meaning of this term both in common parlance and under this new
criminal law to protect mass transportation systems.
Specifically, the bill would define this term to mean ``any
carriage or other contrivance used, or capable of being used,
as a means of transportation on land, water or through the
air.''
IV. Vote of the Committee
The Senate Committee on the Judiciary, with a quorum
present met on Thursday, June, 20, 2002 to consider the ``bill
to provide a definition of vehicle for purposes of criminal
penalties relating to terrorist attacks and other acts of
violence against mass transportation systems.'' The Committee
considered S. 2621 and approved the bill, by voice vote, with
no objection noted, and ordered the bill to be reported
favorably to the Senate, with a recommendation that the bill do
pass.
V. Section-by-Section Analysis
Section 1. Definition. Amends Section 1993(c) of title 18,
United States Code to define the term ``vehicle'' as ``any
carriage or other contrivance used, or capable of being used,
as a means of transportation on land, water, or through the
air.''
VI. Cost Estimate
Due to time constraints, the Congressional Budget Office
estimate was not included in the report. When received by the
Committee, it will appear in the Congressional Record at a
later time.
VII. Regulatory Impact Statement
In compliance with paragraph 11(b)(1), rule XXVI of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee, after due
consideration, concludes that S. 2621 will not have significant
regulatory impact.
VIII. Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported
In compliance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, changes in existing law made by
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new
matter is printed in italic, existing law in which no change is
proposed is shown in roman):
UNITED STATES CODE
* * * * * * *
TITLE 18--CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
PART I--CRIMES
CHAPTER 97--RAILROADS
* * * * * * *
Sec. 1993. Terrorist attacks and other acts of violence against mass
transportation systems
* * * * * * *
(c) Definitions.--In this section--
(1) the term ``biological agent'' has the meaning
given to that term in section 178(1) of this title;
(2) the term ``dangerous weapon'' has the meaning
given to that term in section 930 of this title;
(3) the term ``destructive device'' has the meaning
given to that term in section 921(a)(4) of this title;
(4) the term ``destructive substance'' has the
meaning given to that term in section 31 of this title;
(5) the term ``mass transportation'' has the meaning
given to that term in section 5302(a)(7) of title 49,
United States Code, except that the term shall include
schoolbus, charter, and sightseeing transportation;
(6) the term ``serious bodily injury'' has the
meaning given to that term in section 1365 of this
title;
(7) the term ``State'' has the meaning given to that
term in section 2266 of this title; [and]
(8) the term ``toxin'' has the meaning given to that
term in section 178(2) of this title[.]; and
(9) the term ``vehicle'' means any carriage or other
contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means
of transportation on land, water, or through the air.