[House Report 107-92]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

107th Congress                                             Rept. 107-92
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 1st Session                                                     Part 1


                            SUDAN PEACE ACT


  June 8, 2001.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed


Mr. Hyde, from the Committee on International Relations, submitted the 

                              R E P O R T

                        [To accompany H.R. 2052]

      [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

    The Committee on International Relations, to whom was 
referred the bill (H.R. 2052) to facilitate famine relief 
efforts and a comprehensive solution to the war in Sudan, 
having considered the same, reports favorably thereon without 
amendment and recommends that the bill do pass.

                           TABLE OF CONTENTS

Background and Purpose...........................................     1
Committee Oversight Findings.....................................     5
New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures........................     5
Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate........................     5
Performance Goals and Objectives.................................     7
Constitutional Authority Statement...............................     7
Section-by-Section Analysis and Discussion.......................     7
New Advisory Committees..........................................    10
Congressional Accountability Act.................................    11
Federal Mandates.................................................    11

                         Background and Purpose

    Sudan is suffering through the longest running civil war in 
the world. While the current stage of this conflict, being 
waged primarily between the National Islamic Front (NIF) or 
National Congress government and the Sudan People's Liberation 
Movement/Army (SPLM/A), based in southern Sudan, has run since 
1983, southern-based rebellion has surfaced in Sudan 
intermittently since 1955. The Sudan conflict has deep 
religious, cultural, regional, and economic roots.
    This conflict has caused human suffering in Sudan on a 
massive scale. It is estimated that more than two million 
Sudanese have died of war-related causes since 1983. More than 
three million Sudanese are internally displaced, with two 
million living in squatter areas of Khartoum. More than three 
million Sudanese will require emergency food aid this year, 
according to the World Food Program. Famine is a constant. 
Society in southern Sudan has been disrupted on a massive 
scale. The current fighting has contributed to a situation 
whereby millions of Sudanese lack access to basic health and 
education services. Estimates of adult illiteracy run as high 
as 90 percent in southern Sudan.
    Despite the fact that the most recent stage of the conflict 
has been flaring for twenty years, Sudan has gained greater 
prominence as a U.S. foreign policy concern in recent months. 
Many Members of Congress from both parties have taken a role in 
raising awareness of the magnitude of human suffering in Sudan. 
At a March 7, 2001 Committee hearing, U.S. Secretary of State 
Colin Powell suggested that Sudan is one of the greatest 
tragedies on the face of the earth. During his testimony, the 
Secretary made reference to the Administration's ongoing Sudan 
policy review. Secretary Powell recently traveled to Africa, 
where he consulted with African leaders about the crisis in 
Sudan. As of this writing, the Committee is awaiting the 
results of the Administration's Sudan policy review. Early 
signs indicate a strong Administration commitment to addressing 
the Sudan crisis.
    H.R. 2052, the Sudan Peace Act, which enjoys broad 
bipartisan support, condemns violations of human rights by all 
sides to the conflict. It also recognizes that the Sudanese 
Government and groups under its control bear by far the 
greatest responsibility for human rights violations. The NIF 
regularly blocks humanitarian relief efforts and bombs 
humanitarian and civilian centers. Southern Sudanese are 
victimized by slave raids, which this legislation recognizes as 
government-backed, as well as religious persecution, which is 
commonly believed to be the world's worst. Last year, the State 
Department again designated Sudan as a Country of Particular 
Concern due to Sudan's systematic and egregious violations of 
religious freedom. Sudanese forced into slavery are subject to 
all forms of physical abuse, including beatings and sexual 
abuse, as well as forced religious conversions. The Committee 
believes that U.S. policy should work toward a cease-fire, 
followed by negotiations among the parties. This bill notes 
that a resolution of this conflict would be best made through a 
peace process based on the Declaration of Principles reached 
among the parties in Nairobi, Kenya in 1994.
    A recent development which the Committee believes has the 
potential to alter fundamentally the Sudan conflict is the 
Government's exploitation of oil resources. Over the last 
several years, the China National Petroleum Company, Talisman 
Energy (Canada), Petronas (Malaysia), Lundin Oil (Sweden) and 
other non-U.S. companies have participated in developing oil 
fields, located primarily in southern Sudan. Currently 
producing some 200,000 barrels a day, Sudan has the potential 
to become a mid-size oil producer. Oil revenues--$300-$500 
million per year--have allowed the NIF to double its military 
expenditures, giving it the means to prosecute the war more 
aggressively. H.R. 2052 notes that the Government of Sudan has 
repeatedly stated that it intends to use the expected proceeds 
from future oil sales to increase the tempo and lethality of 
the war against areas outside of its control. While the full 
effect of oil development is uncertain, the NIF's claim that 
its development of Sudan's energy resources strengthens its 
hand are credible.
    These new oil revenues, and the NIF's efforts to displace 
Sudanese from oil production areas in the name of security 
(described by the U.K.-based Organization Christian Aid and 
others as ``scorched earth operations''), have led to actions 
against oil companies operating in Sudan. These activities were 
profiled at a March 28, 2001 hearing held jointly by the 
Subcommittee on Africa and the Subcommittee on International 
Operations and Human Rights. A Petro China (China National 
Petroleum Company subsidiary) IPO offered in the U.S. last year 
was targeted for protest by grassroots organizations, resulting 
in the offering raising only a fraction of anticipated 
revenues. Talisman Energy has been the target of a 
disinvestment campaign. The Committee concurs with the growing 
sense in the U.S. and elsewhere that oil operations at this 
point are part of the problem, not the solution, in Sudan.
    Congress has gone on record on several occasions over the 
last few years expressing concern over the strife and human 
suffering in Sudan. In 1999, the House of Representatives 
passed a resolution (H. Con. Res. 75) condemning the NIF for 
its ``genocidal war in southern Sudan.'' The Sudan Peace Act 
condemns the Government of Sudan in the strongest possible 
terms, finding that its acts constitute genocide as defined by 
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide. Among other provisions, the Sudan Peace Act:

         Requires companies with operations in Sudan 
        to disclose the nature of their Sudanese operations 
        before they are permitted to trade securities in U.S. 
        capital markets. This disclosure is to include the 
        nature of those operations and their relationship to 
        violations of religious freedom and other human rights 
        in Sudan. This disclosure is intended to be a tool in 
        alerting American investors, particularly those 
        considering energy sector investments, to the nature of 
        their potential investment. While this provision 
        applies to all business entities, American companies 
        and individuals are prohibited from operating in Sudan 
        by sweeping sanctions President Clinton imposed in 
        1997. The Committee notes that the Securities and 
        Exchange Commission is already moving to make 
        disclosure statements more readily available to the 
        investing public through electronic means. H.R. 2052's 
        requirement that the SEC publish and otherwise make 
        such disclosures public should include electronic 
         Urges the Administration to make available on 
        behalf of the National Democratic Alliance $10 million 
        dollars in previously appropriated funds. This funding 
        should be used to help build the civil society that has 
        been devastated in the South, and which is essential to 
        the region's long-term future. These funds cannot be 
        used for the provision of lethal aid.
         Requires the Administration to develop a 
        contingency plan to operate outside of Operation 
        Lifeline Sudan (OLS) in the event the Government of 
        Sudan imposes even a partial ban on OLS air transport 
        flights. OLS is a United Nations-sponsored humanitarian 
        aid consortium that has been manipulated by the 
        Government of Sudan (using its flight approval power) 
        to advance its war aims, leading to widespread death by 
        starvation and other causes. The U.S. is the largest 
        financial supporter of OLS. Since 1989, it has spent 
        more than $1.2 billion on humanitarian relief efforts 
        in Sudan, the bulk being funded through OLS. While the 
        required preparation of an alternative approach does 
        not itself constitute a rejection of OLS, it does 
        express the Committee's concern and increasing 
        impatience with the Sudanese government's ability to 
        manipulate this consortium. It is for this reason that 
        H.R. 2052 also expresses the sense that the President 
        should continue to increase the use of non-OLS agencies 
        in the distribution of relief supplies in southern 
        Sudan. Given the inherent shortcomings of OLS, 
        including the price in principle the U.S. and others 
        pay by acceding to the Government of Sudan's 
        manipulation of relief supplies, it is prudent to 
        develop a non-OLS contingency plan. In order to 
        facilitate the President's ability to allocate 
        resources quickly to where they will be most effective, 
        H.R. 2052 removes the standard reprogramming 
        limitations and congressional notification requirements 
        for resources currently budgeted for Operation Lifeline 
         Directs the Secretary of State to collect 
        information and report to Congress on incidents taking 
        place in Sudan that may constitute war crimes. The 
        Committee is concerned that the National Islamic Front 
        Government and possibly other parties have engaged in 
        heinous actions that may constitute war crimes, crimes 
        against humanity, genocide, or other violations of 
        international humanitarian law. There have been 
        widespread allegations of organized, government-
        supported militias raiding civilian villages, 
        slaughtering civilian males, enslaving children, and 
        raping women. Likewise, official government forces have 
        been involved in aerial bombardment of unarmed 
        civilians and civilian targets, including hospitals, 
        clinics, and schools. Though numerous non-official 
        reports exist regarding these incidents, the Committee 
        believes that the U.S. Government should provide an 
        official and more detailed account of these actions.
            The Committee expects that the Secretary will 
        provide a detailed description of the following: (1) 
        incidents of Government-supported militia slave raids, 
        including the number of persons killed or kidnaped 
        during the raid, the location of the raid, whether the 
        raid fits into a pattern of removal of populations from 
        certain geographic areas, and a general description of 
        what happens to persons enslaved, particularly whether 
        women and children are branded, gang raped, and forced 
        to accept particular religious precepts; (2) incidents 
        of aerial bombardment conducted by Sudanese Government 
        or other forces against civilians and civilian targets, 
        including how many people are killed or wounded in each 
        incident, the location of each bombing, and an analysis 
        of whether there is a pattern to such bombings (the 
        Committee recognizes that some of this information may 
        be contained in the report required by section 9); and 
        (3) forced conversions and torture in government-run 
        ``peace camps,'' where food is used as a method of 
        coercion. Although the Secretary of State has 
        discretion in determining how to administer the 
        collection of this information, the Committee believes 
        that the Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues and 
        the Ambassador's office should be closely involved.

    The Committee recognizes that without a resolution to the 
underlying conflict, human suffering in Sudan will continue to 
mount. The Committee is under no illusions that the Sudan 
crisis is easily resolvable. The development of oil may very 
well be a complicating factor in forging peace, as it is with 
other African conflicts. What the Committee does expect is a 
determined and sustained Administration effort at achieving a 
just peace in Sudan. A successful diplomatic effort will 
require forging a common multilateral approach toward Sudan, 
which the SPA encourages. The Administration will be forced to 
cope with the NIF, which is complicated by it being officially 
classified as a state sponsor of terrorism. The SPA is intended 
to bolster Administration efforts by bringing attention to 
Sudan, addressing shortcomings in the delivery of humanitarian 
relief, and providing tools to the Administration, and the 
American public, to attempt to end the massive suffering of the 
Sudanese people.

                      Committee Oversight Findings

    In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules 
of the House of Representatives, the Committee reports that the 
findings and recommendations of the Committee, based on 
oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of rule X of the 
Rules of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in the 
descriptive portions of this report.

               New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures

    Clause 3(c)(2) of House Rule XIII is inapplicable because 
this legislation does not provide new budgetary authority or 
increased tax expenditures.

               Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate

    In compliance with clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules 
of the House of Representatives, the Committee sets forth, with 
respect to the bill, H.R. 2052, the following estimate and 
comparison prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget 
Office under section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 

                                     U.S. Congress,
                               Congressional Budget Office,
                                      Washington, DC, June 7, 2001.
Hon. Henry J. Hyde, Chairman,
Committee on International Relations,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has 
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 2052, the Sudan 
Peace Act.
    If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be 
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contacts are Joseph C. 
Whitehill (for federal costs), who can be reached at 226-2840, 
and Paige Piper/Bach (for the private-sector impact), who can 
be reached at 226-2940.
                                  Dan L. Crippen, Director.


        Honorable Tom Lantos
        Ranking Democratic Member
H.R. 2052--Sudan Peace Act.
    H.R. 2052 would condemn slavery and human rights abuses in 
Sudan, require disclosure statements from any entity engaged in 
commercial activity in Sudan, authorize the Secretary of State 
to support the peace process in Sudan, and require the 
President to devise a contingency plan for delivering aid to 
Sudan. CBO estimates that enacting H.R. 2052 would have no 
significant budgetary impact. The act would not affect direct 
spending or revenues; therefore, pay-as-you-go procedures would 
not apply.
    Each year the United States provides nearly $190 million in 
assistance to the people of Sudan through various emergency 
food-aid, disaster assistance, refugee assistance, and 
development assistance programs. The provisions of H.R. 2052 
would not substantially expand the Administration's authority 
to provide such assistance. CBO estimates that spending on 
those emergency and humanitarian programs would continue at 
current levels.
    The bill contains several reporting and contingency 
planning requirements that would not affect the State 
Department's workload significantly. Based on information from 
the department, CBO estimates that enacting H.R. 2052 would 
increase the agency's spending by less than $500,000 annually, 
assuming the availability of appropriated funds.
    H.R. 2052 would impose a private-sector mandate as defined 
by the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) on entities engaged 
in commercial activities in Sudan. The bill would require 
disclosure of business activities in Sudan prior to an entity 
trading its securities in any capital market in the United 
States. Currently, under the President's Executive Order (E.O. 
13067), trade with Sudan is prohibited except for importation 
of gum arabic in raw form. According to government sources, the 
number of companies affected by the bill would be limited. 
Further, the cost to disclose information about business 
activities in Sudan to the Securities and Exchange Commission 
would be minimal. CBO estimates, therefore, that the direct 
cost of the mandate would fall below the annual threshold 
established by UMRA for private-sector mandates ($113 million 
in 2001, adjusted annually for inflation).
    H.R. 2052 contains no intergovernmental mandates as defined 
in UMRA and would not affect the budgets of state, local, or 
tribal governments.
    The CBO staff contact for federal costs is Joseph C. 
Whitehill, who can be reached at 226-2840. The CBO staff 
contact for private-sector mandates is Paige Piper/Bach, who 
can be reached at 226-2940. This estimate was approved by Peter 
H. Fontaine, Deputy Assistant Director for Budget Analysis.

                    Performance Goals and Objectives

    The goals and objectives of this legislation are to 
encourage an end to the war in Sudan and improve international 
capabilities to provide humanitarian assistance there.

                   Constitutional Authority Statement

    The Committee finds the authority for this legislation in 
Article I, section 8, clause 18 of the Constitution.

               Section-by-Section Analysis and Discussion

    To Facilitate Famine Relief Efforts and A Comprehensive 
Solution to the War in Sudan
Section 1--Short Title
    Section 1 cites the act as the ``Sudan Peace Act.''
Section 2--Findings.
    Section 2 makes 16 findings concerning human rights, 
humanitarian relief efforts, and the role of the U.S. in ending 
the conflict abuses in Sudan:
    Paragraph (1)--The Government of Sudan has intensified its 
attack on areas it does not control, which has caused 2,000,000 
deaths and has displaced over 4,000,000 people.
    Paragraph (2)--A permanent resolution to the war must 
protect human rights, make Sudan a self-sustaining nation, 
result from a viable, comprehensive, and internationally 
sponsored peace process that is immune to manipulation.
    Paragraph (3)--Continued reform in the humanitarian relief 
operations is an essential element in the effort to bring an 
end to the war.
    Paragraph (4)--It is vital that United States continue its 
    Paragraph (5)--Without legitimate civil authority and 
supporting institutions, the Sudanese people can not sustain 
themselves, nor can they establish a lasting peace.
    Paragraph (6)--By manipulating traditional tribal feuds to 
divide groups in the Southern areas outside its reach, the 
Sudanese government has managed to conquer those populations. 
Internationally sponsored reconciliation efforts provide an 
effective check against these divide-and-conquer tactics, which 
have inflicted much suffering.
    Paragraph (7)--Sudan employs militias, Popular Defense 
Forces, and other irregular units to raid and enslave opposing 
parties which are beyond the reach of the Government. Such 
tactics aim to insulate Sudan from international culpability.
    Paragraph (8)--Sudan has expressed a strong intention to 
channel proceeds from future oil sales into its military 
    Paragraph (9)--Sudan has systematically banned air 
transport relief flights to transform humanitarian relief 
efforts into a weapon against targeted groups. This 
orchestrated starvation tactic is meant to force opposition 
groups to capitulate areas outside Sudanese government control.
    Paragraph (10)--The Government of Sudan has committed acts 
of genocide as defined by the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
    Paragraph (11)--United States and other donors have played 
a significant role in addressing deficiencies in Operation 
Lifeline Sudan (OLS).
    Paragraph (12)--The pressing needs of select areas facing 
starvation have been addressed for now, but those outside the 
control of the Sudanese government remain in danger of extreme 
disruption of their ability to sustain themselves.
    Paragraph (13)--Peoples in the areas of the Nuba Mountains, 
Bahr al Ghazal, and the Upper Nile have been excluded 
completely from OLS distributions.
    Paragraph (14)--Current international relief efforts which 
have exceeded $1 million per day, focus on immediate food needs 
and are neither sustainable nor desirable.
    Paragraph (15)--Sudan's neighboring states of Ethiopia, 
Eritrea, and Uganda have not intervened in the conflict. This 
has hampered the ability of populations to defend themselves 
against attack from Sudanese government rebels.
    Paragraph (16)--The United States should use necessary 
pressure to exact a holistic conclusion to the war in Sudan 
that includes:

          (A) multilateral economic and diplomatic tools;
          (B) the facilitation or creation of viable, 
        democratic, civil authority in autonomous regions 
        beyond Sudanese government control;
          (C) people-to-people reconciliation mechanisms;
          (D) improved delivery systems for humanitarian 
        relief; and
          (E) international cooperation among United States and 
        its trading partners towards those ends.
Section 3--Definitions.
    Paragraph (1)--The Committee on International Relations in 
the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign 
Relations of the Senate are the appropriate congressional 
    Paragraph (2)--The Government of Sudan is the National 
Islamic Front government in Khartoum, Sudan.
    Paragraph (3)--OLS is the United Nations relief operation 
executed by UNICEF, the World Food Program, and participating 
relief organizations known as ``Operation Lifeline Sudan.''
Section 4--Condemnation of Slavery, Other Human Rights Abuses, and 
        Tactics of the Government of Sudan.
    Section 4 specifically condemns:
    Paragraph (1)(A)--Violations of human rights by all sides 
of the conflict;
    Paragraph (1)(B)--The overall human rights record of the 
Government of Sudan;
    Paragraph (1)(C)--The continuing slave trade, as tolerated 
and abetted by the government in Sudan;
    Paragraph (1)(D)--Government of Sudan sponsored invasions 
and enslavements in Bahr al Ghazal, the Nuba Mountains, and the 
Upper Nile and Blue Nile regions; and
    Paragraph (1)(E)--Aerial bombardment of civilian targets by 
the Government of Sudan.
    Paragraph (2)--This section also acknowledges that acts, 
such as raiding and enslaving people, are used by the 
Government of Sudan as tools for creating food shortages
Section 5--Use of Appropriated Funds.
    Section 5 urges the President to expend promptly on behalf 
of the anti-government National Democratic Alliance coalition 
the $10 million in Economic Support Funds appropriated for 
fiscal year 2001.
Section 6--Support for An Internationally Sanctioned Peace Process.
    Subsection (a)(1)--Finds that the greatest hope for a 
negotiated, peaceful settlement to the war in Sudan depends on 
a single, viable, internationally and regionally sanctioned 
peace process.
    Subsection (a)(2)--Finds that the resolution of the 
conflict should be based on the 1994 Declaration of Principles, 
reached in Nairobi, Kenya.
    Subsection (b)(1-3)--This section authorizes the Secretary 
of State to support with personnel and other resources the 
negotiations between the Government of Sudan and opposition 
forces as well as the implementation of any future peace 
Section 7--Multilateral Pressure on Combatants.
    Paragraphs (1-2)--This section encourages the President to 
urge the United Nations to review and revise the terms of 
Operation Lifeline Sudan for delivering humanitarian assistance 
to end the veto power of the Government of Sudan over OLS 
flights, to investigate the practice of slavery, and to sponsor 
a UN condemnation of the Government of Sudan when it subjects 
civilians to aerial bombardment.
Section 8--Disclosure of Business Activities in Sudan.
    Subsection (a)--This section outlines which activities 
businesses operating in Sudan must disclose. It prohibits any 
entity engaged in any commercial activity in Sudan from trading 
any of its securities (or depositary receipts with respect to 
its securities) in any capital market in the United States 
unless it has disclosed, in such form as the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) shall prescribe----

          Subsection (a)(1)--the nature and extent of that 
        commercial activity in Sudan including plans for 
        expansion or diversification;
          Subsection (a)(2)--all Sudanese government agencies 
        with which it is doing business;
          Subsection (a)(3)--the relationship of the commercial 
        activity to violations of human rights or religious 
        freedom; and
          Subsection (a)(4)--the contribution of proceeds 
        raised in U.S. capital markets will make to the 
        commercial activity in Sudan.
          Subsection (b)--directs the SEC to ensure that 
        disclosures are made available to the public.
          Subsection (c)--authorizes the President to exercise 
        his authorities under the International Emergency 
        Economic Powers Act to assist the SEC to carry out 
        these duties.
Section 9--Reporting Requirement.
    Section 9 directs the Secretary of State to prepare a 
detailed report regarding the conflict in Sudan and submit this 
report to the appropriate Committees of Congress within 6 
months after the enactment of this act and annually thereafter. 
The reports must include:
    Paragraph (1)--Sudan's financial resources for 
infrastructure and oil exploration;
    Paragraph (2)--the extent to which United States funding 
and involvement by American citizens contributed to these 
    Paragraph (3)--estimates on the extent of aerial 
bombardment; and
    Paragraph (4)--extent of obstruction or manipulation by the 
Government of Sudan in humanitarian relief operations.
Section 10--Continued Use of Non-OLS Organizations for Relief Efforts.
    Subsection (a)--Congress encourages the use of humanitarian 
aid agencies that are not part of the Operation Lifeline Sudan 
    Subsection (b)--The President is required to submit a 
report to the appropriate congressional committees within 90 
days after this act takes effect.
Section 11--Contingency Plan for Any Ban on Air Transport Relief 
    Subsection (a)--This section generally directs the 
President to develop a contingency plan for relief delivery if 
the Government of Sudan imposes a total, partial or incremental 
ban on OLS relief transport.
    Subsection (b)--This gives President the authority, 
notwithstanding any other provision of law, to reprogram as 
much as 100 percent of available OLS funds to carry out the 
plan, if necessary.
Section 12--Investigation of War Crimes.
    Subsection (a)--This section directs the Secretary of State 
to collect information and report to Congress about incidents 
which may constitute war crimes in Sudan.
    Subsection (b)--The Secretary of State shall submit any 
findings and determinations to the appropriate congressional 
committees within 6 months after this act passes, and annually 
    Subsection (c)--In gathering information and preparing the 
report, the Secretary of State must consult with relevant 

                        New Advisory Committees

    H.R. 2052 does not establish or authorize any new advisory 

                    Congressional Accountability Act

    H.R. 2052 does not apply to the legislative branch.

                            Federal Mandates

    H.R. 2052 provides no Federal mandates.