[House Report 107-771]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



107th Congress                                                   Report
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 2d Session                                                     107-771

======================================================================
                                     


                              R E P O R T

                                 OF THE

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                                   ON

                               H.R. 5132

                             together with

                            ADDITIONAL VIEWS

      [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

                                     


                                     

November 4, 2002.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed


                   HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                      One Hundred Seventh Congress

                      BOB STUMP, Arizona, Chairman
DUNCAN HUNTER, California            IKE SKELTON, Missouri
JAMES V. HANSEN, Utah                JOHN M. SPRATT, Jr., South 
CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania                Carolina
JOEL HEFLEY, Colorado                SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas
JIM SAXTON, New Jersey               LANE EVANS, Illinois
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York             GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi
TERRY EVERETT, Alabama               NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland         MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts
HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON,           ROBERT A. UNDERWOOD, Guam
    California                       ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
J.C. WATTS, Jr., Oklahoma            SILVESTRE REYES, Texas
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas                TOM ALLEN, Maine
JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana          VICTOR F. SNYDER, Arkansas
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia             JIM TURNER, Texas
VAN HILLEARY, Tennessee              ADAM SMITH, Washington
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina      LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina       JAMES H. MALONEY, Connecticut
JIM RYUN, Kansas                     MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
BOB RILEY, Alabama                   CIRO D. RODRIGUEZ, Texas
JIM GIBBONS, Nevada                  CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina          ELLEN TAUSCHER, California
HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico           ROBERT BRADY, Pennsylvania
KEN CALVERT, California              ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey
ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut             BARON P. HILL, Indiana
ANDER CRENSHAW, Florida              MIKE THOMPSON, California
MARK STEVEN KIRK, Illinois           JOHN B. LARSON, Connecticut
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia               SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia          JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri               RICK LARSEN, Washington
RANDY FORBES, Virginia
JEFF MILLER, Florida
JOE WILSON, South Carolina
                    Robert S. Rangel, Staff Director


                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

Purpose and Background...........................................     1
Legislative History..............................................     2
Section-by-Section Analysis......................................     2
  Section 1--Findings Concerning Fiscal Year 2003 End Strengths 
    Needed for the Armed Forces to Fight the War on Terrorism....     2
  Section 2--Sense of Congress...................................     3
Committee Position...............................................     3
Fiscal Data......................................................     3
  Congressional Budget Office Estimate...........................     3
  Committee Cost Estimate........................................     4
Oversight Findings...............................................     4
Constitutional Authority Statement...............................     5
Statement of Federal Mandates....................................     5
Record Vote......................................................     5
Additional Views of John M. McHugh...............................     6


107th Congress                                                   Report
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 2d Session                                                     107-771

======================================================================



 
 EXPRESSING THE SENSE OF CONGRESS CONCERNING THE FISCAL YEAR 2003 END 
  STRENGTHS NEEDED FOR THE ARMED FORCES TO FIGHT THE WAR ON TERRORISM

                                _______
                                

November 4, 2002.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

    Mr. Stump, from the Committee on Armed Services, submitted the 
                               following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                            ADDITIONAL VIEWS

                        [To accompany H.R. 5132]

      [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

    The Committee on Armed Services, to whom was referred the 
bill (H.R. 5132) to express the sense of Congress concerning 
the fiscal year 2003 end strengths needed for the Armed Forces 
to fight the War on Terrorism, having considered the same, 
report favorably thereon with an amendment and recommend that 
the bill as amended do pass.
    The amendment (stated in terms of the page and line numbers 
of the introduced bill) is as follows:
    Page 5, beginning on line 5, strike ``so long as the Nation 
is at war against terrorism''.

                         PURPOSE AND BACKGROUND

    The purpose of H.R. 5132 is to express the sense of 
Congress that, in light of the global war against terrorism: 
(1) the increases in military personnel end strengths 
recommended by the Senate and House of Representatives in their 
respective versions of the National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2003 are appropriate and justified; (2) the 
President and Secretary of Defense should not reduce end 
strengths; and (3) the President should support the recommended 
end strength increases.
    H.R. 5132 is a direct outgrowth of the committee's long-
standing concerns about the inadequacy of the force structure 
and strength of the Armed Forces for carrying out the national 
military strategy, while also trying to sustain their long-term 
readiness and viability. Such concerns predate the September 
11, 2001, commencement of the Nation's global war on terrorism. 
For example, committee initiatives led to the establishment of 
minimum end strength levels for each of the military services 
in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, 
Public Law 104-106. More recently, a majority of committee 
Members in an August 2001 letter expressed to the Secretary of 
Defense their strong opposition to any effort to reduce Army 
force structure. Since the terrorist attack on the United 
States of September 11, 2001, the extent and scope of 
operations undertaken by the Armed Forces in the global war on 
terrorism, the impact of new missions related to Homeland 
Defense, and the testimony of senior U.S. military commanders 
have convinced the committee that additional military forces 
and strength will be required to adequately carry out the 
missions assigned to our Armed Forces. In addition, the 
committee became concerned that military manpower reductions 
were being considered within the Department of Defense as part 
of the department's overall transformation efforts. As a 
result, the committee recommended and the House of 
Representatives adopted, in H.R. 4546, the Bob Stump National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal year 2003, increases in 
active duty end strength totaling more than 10,300 above the 
budget request. The Senate also adopted active end strength 
increases totaling 12,000 more than the budget request as part 
of S. 2514, its version of the National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2003.

                          LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

    H.R. 5132 was introduced on July 16, 2002 and was referred 
to the Committee on Armed Services. On July 18, 2002 the 
Committee on Armed Services held a mark-up session to consider 
H.R. 5132. The committee adopted the bill with an amendment and 
reported the same favorably by voice vote.

                      SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS

    The following is a section-by-section analysis of those 
sections of H.R. 5132 amended by the Armed Services Committee.

Section 1--Findings concerning fiscal year 2003 end strengths needed 
        for the Armed Forces to fight the war on terrorism

    This section presents the Congressional findings in support 
of H.R. 5132. Among those findings are that: (1) Prior to 
September 11, 2001, the uniformed chiefs of the Armed Forces 
testified that they did not have sufficient military personnel 
to carry out all their operational requirements, and that since 
September 11, 2001, senior operational commanders have 
testified that the war on terrorism has further highlighted the 
insufficiency of the Armed Forces to meet operational 
requirements; (2) The war on terrorism has become global in 
scope, requiring not only thousands of active duty personnel 
but also the mobilization of more than 80,000 reservists; (3) 
The President has repeatedly stated that the war on terrorism 
will continue for some time; (4) Prosecuting the war on 
terrorism will require, among other things, increased 
expenditures for military personnel, and in recognition of that 
both the House and Senate versions of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 increased the 
authorizations for military end strength above the levels 
requested by the President; and (5) Press reports indicate that 
the Secretary of Defense has under consideration substantial 
reductions in military end strengths.

Section 2--Sense of Congress

    This section would express the Sense of Congress that: (1) 
the increases in military personnel end strengths recommended 
by the Senate and House of Representatives in their respective 
versions of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2003 are appropriate and justified; (2) the President and 
Secretary of Defense should not reduce end strengths; and (3) 
the President should support such increased end strengths.

                           COMMITTEE POSITION

    On July 18, 2002, the Committee on Armed Services ordered 
H.R. 5132, as amended, reported to the House with a favorable 
recommendation by voice vote, a quorum being present.

                              FISCAL DATA

    Pursuant to clause 3(d)(2)(A) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, the committee attempted to 
ascertain annual outlays resulting from the bill during fiscal 
year 2003 and the four following fiscal years. The results of 
such efforts are reflected in the cost estimate prepared by the 
Director of the Congressional Budget Office under section 402 
of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, which is included in 
this report pursuant to clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the 
Rules of the House.

                  CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE ESTIMATE

    In compliance with clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules 
of the House of Representatives, the cost estimate prepared by 
the Congressional Budget Office and submitted pursuant to 
section 402(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 is as 
follows:

                                                     July 19, 2002.
Hon. Bob Stump,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has 
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 5132, a bill to 
express the sense of Congress concerning the fiscal year 2003 
end strengths needed for the Armed Forces to fight the War on 
Terrorism.
    The CBO staff contact is Matthew Schmit. If you wish 
further details on this estimate, we will be pleased to provide 
them.
            Sincerely,
                                            Dan L. Crippen,
                                                          Director.

H.R. 5132--A bill to express the sense of Congress concerning the 
        fiscal year 2003 end strengths needed for the Armed Forces to 
        fight the War on Terrorism

    CBO estimates that enacting H.R. 5132 would have no impact 
on the federal budget. Because the bill would not affect direct 
spending or receipts, pay-as-you-go procedures would not apply. 
H.R. 5132 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector 
mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and 
would impose no costs on state, local, or tribal governments.
    H.R. 5132 would express the sense of the Congress that the 
increases in end-strength authorizations for the armed forces 
for fiscal year 2003 recommended by the Senate and House of 
Representatives in their respective versions of the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 are wholly 
appropriate and justified by the increased missions and tempo 
of operations associated with prosecution of the war against 
terrorism. In addition, the bill would express the sense of the 
Congress that the President and the Secretary of Defense should 
not reduce, or seek to reduce, the number of members of the 
armed forces, and that the President should support the 
increase in end-strength levels for the armed forces 
recommended by the Senate and House of Representatives for 
fiscal year 2003 because of the demands of the war against 
terrorism.
    The determination of end strengths for the armed forces 
will affect spending by the Department of Defense, but this 
legislation would neither authorize nor fund any particular end 
strength. Rather, it affirms Congress's support for end 
strengths specified in the defense authorization bill. Hence, 
H.R. 5132, by itself, would have no budgetary impact.
    The CBO staff contact is Matthew Schmit. This estimate was 
approved by Peter H. Fontaine, Deputy Assistant Director for 
Budget Analysis.

                        COMMITTEE COST ESTIMATE

    Pursuant to clause 3(d) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 
House of Representatives, the committee generally concurs with 
the estimate contained in the report of the Congressional 
Budget Office.

                           OVERSIGHT FINDINGS

    With respect to clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, this legislation results from 
hearings and other oversight activities conducted by the 
committee pursuant to clause 2(b)(1) of rule X.
    With respect to clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives and section 308(a)(1) of the 
Congressional Budget Act of 1974, this legislation does not 
include any new spending or credit authority, nor does it 
provide for any increase or decrease in tax revenues or 
expenditures. The fiscal features of this legislation are 
addressed in the estimate prepared by the Director of the 
Congressional Budget Office under section 402 of the 
Congressional Budget Act of 1974.
    With respect to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, the committee has not received a 
report from the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight 
pertaining to the subject matter of H.R. 5132.

                   CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY STATEMENT

    Pursuant to clause 3 (d)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, the committee finds the authority 
for this legislation in Article I, section 8 of the United 
States Constitution.

                     STATEMENT OF FEDERAL MANDATES

    Pursuant to section 423 of Public Law 104-4, this 
legislation contains no federal mandates with respect to state, 
local, and tribal governments, nor with respect to the private 
sector. Similarly, the bill provides no unfunded federal 
intergovernmental mandates.

                              RECORD VOTE

    In accordance with clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, the committee notes that no roll 
call votes were taken with respect to H.R. 5132.
    The committee ordered H.R. 5132, as amended, reported to 
the House with a favorable recommendation by a voice vote, a 
quorum being present.

             ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF CONGRESSMAN JOHN M. McHUGH

    Unlike many things in America today, the debate about 
military manpower does not easily divide itself between pre- 
and post-September 11, 2001 perspectives. Prior to the 
terrorist assault on our nation, the U.S. Armed Forces, already 
under resourced, understructured, and undermanned, were 
struggling to carry out the demanding missions the nation had 
assigned them. Following the start of the war on terrorism, 
those same forces now are challenged to both continue those 
pre-existing missions and to perform new, even more critical 
ones: Defending the homeland and prosecuting a war that is 
global in scope and, thus far, without foreseeable end.
    H.R. 5132 succinctly addresses this dilemma and the 
inescapable reality regarding the continuing inadequacies of 
current levels of military force structure and manpower. The 
resolution also challenges the apparent view of some within the 
Department of Defense that significant reductions in uniformed 
personnel in the middle of a war will somehow contribute to a 
more efficient, more effective, and transformed future 
military. I reject such a plan and fully support H.R. 5132, 
which not only opposes reductions to current military end 
strength, but also urges support for reasonable increases to 
active strength--some 10,000 to 12,000 personnel--as proposed 
by both the House and Senate in their respective defense 
authorization bills for fiscal year 2003.
    Prior to September 11, based on years of review, testimony 
and direct observation, the House Armed Services Committee 
understood very well the disturbing discrepancies and 
debilitating mismatches between a significantly reduced force 
structure and military personnel strength on the one hand, and 
the growing range of new, enduring missions, with an attendant 
increase in personnel and operations tempos on the other. One 
measure of the inadequacy of the active component forces to 
carry out the full range of their assigned peacetime operations 
is demonstrated by the fact that in each of the last several 
years, reservists have been required to serve more than 12 
million days on active duty--replacing the equivalent of more 
than 35,000 active duty personnel.
    In spite of such an environment, the Quadrennial Defense 
Review and other internal Department of Defense documents of 
that period somehow ignored this reality and concluded that 
significant manpower reductions should be made in the Armed 
Forces, thus exacerbating an already tenuous situation. Such 
cuts, it was apparently argued, were both permissible and 
required because technology promised a quantum increase in the 
operational capabilities and lethality of our military forces, 
and were necessary to finance the technological transformation 
of the services.
    In August 2001, specifically in reaction to reports that 
the Department of Defense was considering the elimination of 
two Army active duty divisions, 83 House members (including 34 
of 60 on this committee) expressed ``strong opposition'' to 
reductions in Army force structure.
    September 11 brought with it not only the added requirement 
for the military to fight a global war on terrorism, but also 
the need to address significant new force protection and anti-
terrorism homeland defense requirements within our borders. To 
meet these immediate requirements, the services today have more 
than 85,000 reservists on active duty, as well as thousands of 
other personnel involuntarily retained in service beyond their 
normal tour end through the implementation of so-called ``stop 
loss'' initiatives. Clearly, those reservists cannot stay on 
active duty indefinitely, and stop loss must end. Therefore, as 
the committee moved towards mark-up of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, the Army, Navy and Air 
Force identified their respective active duty manpower needs 
that were required beyond those strength levels requested by 
the budget. Ultimately, the House approved a good portion of 
those additional manpower figures the military services argued 
were required for fiscal year 2003. I believe the House acted 
judiciously and carefully in approving that increase--a growth 
of less than one percent in active end strength above the 
requested levels.
    Now, with no foreseeable end to the ongoing commitments and 
requirements for military forces and personnel, reports again 
have been heard of plans within the Department of Defense for 
significant active end strength reductions, totaling up to 
90,000 personnel.
    Such suggestions are not just simply unjustified, they are 
frightening. The demands placed upon our military both before 
and since the events of September 11 are too stark to be 
ignored any longer.
    The Secretary of Defense has taken the position that in the 
long term, no end strength increases are likely to be required. 
He has further stated that before any manpower increases are 
made, the services must prove that they have done everything 
within their ability to meet requirements from existing 
military personnel authorizations.
    I commend the Secretary for this hard-nosed business 
approach. Each service should, indeed, clearly define their 
needs for long-term growth in manpower requirements. Further, 
the demonstrated success of advanced technology on the 
battlefield undeniably underscores the need to pursue the 
promise that science and research have to offer. My concern, 
however, lies in the fact that, too often, arguments in support 
of transformation have invariably called for manpower 
reductions based solely upon the unfulfilled promise that 
technology, force enhancements, and other reforms will someday 
eliminate or reduce the need for structure and personnel. 
Moreover, given the range of reforms and reductions that each 
service has already experienced over the past decade, 
fundamental questions need to be asked about how much more so-
called manpower transformation can yet be wrung from the 
military services, especially if the current intensity and 
scope of the military operations does not abate significantly 
below pre-September 11 levels.
    I would urge the Secretary of Defense and others in the 
department to heed the unequivocal message of H.R. 5132: 
Manpower reductions do not constitute a feasible course of 
action to transform the military. Additional manpower, not 
less, will be required to sustain the Armed Forces through the 
global war on terrorism and beyond.
                                                    John M. McHugh.

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