[House Report 107-77]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



107th Congress                                             Rept. 107-77
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 1st Session                                                     Part 2

======================================================================







 
TO PERMIT AIR CARRIERS TO MEET AND DISCUSS THEIR SCHEDULES IN ORDER TO 
              REDUCE FLIGHT DELAYS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

                                _______
                                

 June 28, 2001.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

 Mr. Sensenbrenner, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted the 
                               following

                              R E P O R T

                        [To accompany H.R. 1407]

      [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

    The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred the 
bill (H.R. 1407) to amend title 49, United States Code, to 
permit air carriers to meet and discuss their schedules in 
order to reduce flight delays, and for other purposes, having 
considered the same, reports favorably thereon with amendments 
and recommends that the bill as amended do pass.

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page
The Amendment....................................................     2
Purpose and Summary..............................................     3
Background and Need for the Legislation..........................     3
 A.  Background.......................................................3
 B.  The Sensenbrenner Amendment......................................4
 C.  The First Conyers Amendment......................................5
 D.  The Second Conyers Amendment.....................................5
 E.  Jurisdictional Issues............................................6
Hearings.........................................................     6
Committee Consideration..........................................     6
Vote of the Committee............................................     6
Committee Oversight Findings.....................................     6
Performance Goals and Objectives.................................     7
New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures........................     7
Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate........................     7
Constitutional Authority Statement...............................     8
Section-by-Section Analysis......................................     8
Agency Views.....................................................    11
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported............    12
Markup Transcript................................................    13

    The amendments are as follows:
    Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the 
following:

SECTION 1. AIR CARRIER DISCUSSIONS RELATING TO FLIGHT SCHEDULING TO 
                    REDUCE DELAYS.

    (a) Request.--An air carrier may file with the Attorney General a 
request for authority to discuss with one or more other air carriers or 
foreign air carriers agreements or cooperative arrangements relating to 
limiting flights at an airport during a time period that the Attorney 
General determines that scheduled air transportation exceeds the 
capacity of the airport. The purpose of the discussion shall be to 
reduce delays at the airport during such time period.
    (b) Approval.--Notwithstanding the antitrust laws, the Attorney 
General shall approve a request filed under this section if the 
Attorney General finds that the discussions requested will facilitate 
voluntary adjustments in air carrier schedules that could lead to a 
substantial reduction in travel delays and improvement of air 
transportation service to the public and will not substantially lessen 
competition or tend to create a monopoly. The Attorney General may 
impose such terms and conditions to an approval under this section as 
the Attorney General determines are necessary to protect the public 
interest and to carry out the objectives of this section.
    (c) Notice.--Before a discussion may be held under this section, 
the Attorney General shall provide at least 3 days notice of the 
proposed discussion to all air carriers and foreign air carriers that 
are providing service or seeking to provide service to the airport that 
will be the subject of such discussion.
    (d) Monitoring.--The Attorney General or a representative of the 
Attorney General shall attend and monitor any discussion or other 
effort to enter into an agreement or cooperative arrangement under this 
section.
    (e) Discussions Open to Public.--A discussion held under this 
section shall be open to the public.

SEC. 2. AIR CARRIER AGREEMENTS RELATING TO FLIGHT SCHEDULING.

    (a) Request.--An air carrier may file with the Attorney General a 
request for approval of an agreement or cooperative arrangement 
relating to interstate air transportation, and any modification of such 
an agreement or arrangement, reached as a result of a discussion held 
under section 1.
    (b) Approval.--Notwithstanding the antitrust laws, and subject to 
subsection (c), the Attorney General shall approve an agreement, 
arrangement, or modification for which a request is filed under this 
section if the Attorney General finds that the agreement, arrangement, 
or modification is not adverse to the public interest, is necessary to 
reduce air travel delays, and will not substantially lessen competition 
or tend to create a monopoly and that a substantial reduction in such 
delays cannot be achieved by any other immediately available means.
    (c) Unanimous Agreement Among Carriers Required.--The Attorney 
General may approve an agreement, arrangement, or modification for 
which a request is filed under this section only if the Attorney 
General finds that each air carrier and foreign air carrier providing 
service or seeking to provide service to the airport that is the 
subject of the agreement, arrangement, or modification has agreed to 
the agreement, arrangement, or modification.
    (d) Terms and Conditions.--The Attorney General may impose such 
terms and conditions on an agreement, arrangement, or modification for 
which a request is filed under this section as the Attorney General 
determines are necessary to protect the public interest and air service 
to an airport that has less than .25 percent of the total annual 
boardings in the United States.

SEC. 3. LIMITATIONS.

    (a) Rates, Fares, Charges, and In-Flight Services.--The 
participants in a discussion approved under section 1 may not discuss 
or enter into an agreement or cooperative arrangement regarding rates, 
fares, charges, or in-flight services.
    (b) City Pairs.--The participants in a discussion approved under 
section 1 may not discuss particular city pairs or submit to another 
air carrier or foreign air carrier information concerning their 
proposed service or schedules in a fashion that indicates the city 
pairs involved.

SEC. 4. CONSULTATION WITH SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION.

    In making a determination whether to approve a request under 
section 1, or an agreement, arrangement, or modification under section 
2, the Attorney General shall consider any comments of the Secretary of 
Transportation.

SEC. 5. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act, the following definitions apply:
            (1) Air carrier, airport, air transportation, foreign air 
        carrier, and interstate air transportation.--The terms ``air 
        carrier'', ``airport'', ``air transportation'', ``foreign air 
        carrier'', and ``interstate air transportation'' have the 
        meanings such terms have under section 40102 of title 49, 
        United States Code.
            (2) Antitrust laws.--The term ``antitrust laws'' has the 
        meaning such term has under section 41308(a) of title 49, 
        United States Code.

SEC. 6. TERMINATION.

    (a) Approval of Agreements.--The Attorney General may not approve 
an agreement, arrangement, or modification under section 2 after 
October 26, 2003.
    (b) Expiration of Agreements.--An agreement, arrangement, or 
modification approved by the Attorney General under section 2 may 
continue in effect until October 26, 2004, or an earlier date 
determined by the Attorney General.

    Amend the title so as to read:

      A bill to permit air carriers to meet and discuss their schedules 
in order to reduce flight delays, and for other purposes.

                          Purpose and Summary

    H.R. 1407, as reported by the Committee on the Judiciary, 
provides an antitrust exemption to airlines to conduct joint 
discussions for the purpose of limiting flights to reduce 
congestion and delay. Such discussions may only be conducted 
with close Department of Justice scrutiny, and any agreements 
must receive Department of Justice approval.

                Background and Need for the Legislation

                             A. Background

    Everyone who flies regularly knows the frustration of 
airline delays and cancellations. Demand for flights has 
exploded while the capacity of airports and the air traffic 
control system has remained largely stagnant. Thus, the growing 
number of flights that consumers demand increasingly strains 
the system thereby causing delays and cancellations. We will 
continue to face that strain, particularly on bad weather days, 
until we increase the capacity of the system. Despite that 
unalterable fact, some believe that a temporary antitrust 
immunity can provide short term relief. The Committee believes 
that if such discussions are to be attempted, they must be 
carefully monitored by the Antitrust Division of the Department 
of Justice.
    The idea is not a new one, and it does not have a track 
record of great success. Efforts to provide antitrust immunity 
for airlines to discuss scheduling date back to at least 1968. 
In that year, airline congestion had reached crisis 
proportions, particularly in the so-called ``Golden Triangle'' 
between Washington, New York, and Chicago. Acting under its 
authority to grant antitrust immunity to airline agreements, 
the Civil Aeronautics Board authorized discussions among the 
airlines to reduce this congestion. CAB Orders 68-7-138 and 68-
8-30. See also Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-
726, Sec. Sec. 412, 414, 72 Stat. 731, 770 (1958) (granting 
authority to CAB to confer antitrust immunity on airline 
agreements).
    These talks led to two developments. First, the airlines 
agreed to create a voluntary scheduling agreement. The CAB 
approved the agreement and gave it antitrust immunity. CAB 
Order 68-12-11. Second, the Federal Aviation Administration 
created the high-density or slot rule which limited the number 
of flights per hour at four major airports: Washington's Ronald 
Reagan National, New York's LaGuardia and JFK, and Chicago's 
O'Hare. 33 Fed. Reg. 17896. See 14 C.F.R. Sec. 93.121. Under 
their voluntary scheduling agreement, the airlines agreed how 
they would allocate the slots at these airports.
    As an aside, it should be noted that last year's AIR 21 Act 
phases out the slot rule over time. Wendell H. Ford Aviation 
Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century, Pub. L. No. 
106-181, Sec. 231, 114 Stat. 61, 106 (2000). It is ironic that 
many of the same observers who last year wanted to eliminate 
the slot rule now seek to reinstate it through private 
discussions.
    Returning to the situation in the late 1960's and the 
1970's, from the perspective of the airlines, the airlines' 
voluntary agreement as to how to allocate slots worked fairly 
well for several years. Then, in 1978, Congress deregulated the 
airline industry. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 
95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978). Deregulation led to a large 
number of new competitors, many of whom were demanding slots 
thereby putting increasing stress on the voluntary scheduling 
agreement. Finally, the situation came to a head in 1980 when 
New York Air wanted to begin shuttle service between Washington 
and New York. It demanded 20 slots at peak hours to offer the 
service. The voluntary agreement was not able to accommodate 
this demand, and the process fell apart.
    In 1984, the CAB tried to reinstitute the process by 
granting Eastern Airlines's request for authority to conduct 
discussions. CAB Order 84-8-129. Those efforts made limited 
progress. The Civil Aeronautics Board ceased to exist on 
January 1, 1985. Its antitrust immunity authority was 
transferred to the Department of Transportation to expire on 
January 1, 1989. See Civil Aeronautics Board Sunset Act of 
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-443, Sec. 3, 98 Stat. 1703 (1984).
    After the 1984 effort, the FAA decided to allow airlines to 
buy and sell slots issuing that rule in December 1985. 50 Fed. 
Reg. 52180 (December 20, 1985). That system remains in effect 
today although as noted above the slot system is being phased 
out under the AIR 21 Act. With its new antitrust authority, the 
Department made one last attempt to grant immunity in 1987. DOT 
Orders 87-1-54, 87-3-39, and 87-5-82. The antitrust immunity 
expired in 1989, and no further attempts have been made to 
revive these discussions.
    All agree that our airline delay problems can only be 
solved by increasing the capacity of the system. Airlines 
schedule flights at particular times because their customers 
want to fly at those times. Indeed, the Committee understands 
that although the airlines are not opposed to this bill, they 
did not seek it either. This bill is, at best, going to provide 
minimal short term relief. Its proponents do not argue 
otherwise. On the other hand, the bill has a number of 
safeguards in it to prevent any competitive harm. With the 
Committee's insertion of the Justice Department as the watchdog 
over these discussions, these safeguards are now sufficient. 
The Committee believes the bill is likely to have little 
effect, but also likely to cause little harm.

                     B. The Sensenbrenner Amendment

    At the markup, Chairman Sensenbrenner offered an amendment 
which made several relatively minor amendments to the bill. 
First, the bill as reported by the Transportation Committee 
provides that a representative from the Department of 
Transportation would have to monitor airline discussions. The 
Sensenbrenner amendment provides for a Department of Justice 
monitor as well.
    Second, the bill as reported by the Transportation 
Committee provides that notice of a meeting would be sent to 
all airlines currently providing service to an airport. The 
Sensenbrenner amendment also requires that notice be sent to 
airlines that are seeking to provide service at an airport so 
that new entrants are not squeezed out.
    Third, the bill as reported by the Transportation Committee 
provides that the Department of Transportation may not approve 
an agreement unless it meets several standards. The 
Sensenbrenner amendment adds the requirement that any agreement 
be unanimous among all of the airlines providing service or 
seeking to provide service to an airport. Again, this will 
prevent smaller or new entrant airlines from being squeezed 
out.
    Fourth, the bill as reported by the Transportation 
Committee provides that the authority of the bill will expire 
on September 30, 2003 and that agreements reached can continue 
after that time at the discretion of the Secretary. At the 
Transportation Committee hearing, the Air Transport Association 
suggested that this date be moved to October 26, 2003--the date 
on which the country switches from daylight saving time to 
standard time--because that is when the airlines make their 
major seasonal schedule change. The Sensenbrenner amendment 
provides for the October 26 expiration date and puts a 1-year 
limit on the continuation of agreements after the expiration 
date.
    The Committee adopted the Sensenbrenner amendment by voice 
vote.

                     C. The First Conyers Amendment

    At the markup, Ranking Member Conyers offered two 
amendments. The first Conyers amendment struck all references 
to title 49 and made the bill a freestanding new law. This 
amendment struck out the antitrust exemption because it was 
part of title 49. Pursuant to the staff's authority to make 
technical and conforming changes, certain terms that are 
defined in title 49 and would have applied absent this change 
were added to the freestanding law. The Committee adopted the 
first Conyers amendment by voice vote.

                    D. The Second Conyers Amendment

    The second Conyers amendment made several important 
substantive changes to the bill. First, it struck all 
references to the Secretary of Transportation and inserted in 
lieu thereof the Attorney General. Second, it added new 
language requiring the Attorney General to consult with the 
Secretary of Transportation concerning decisions to approve 
discussions or agreements. Third, it added back the antitrust 
exemption that was struck in the first Conyers amendment by 
inserting the phrase ``[n]otwithstanding the antitrust laws'' 
in the appropriate places. Finally, it added an antitrust 
standard--``will not substantially lessen competition or tend 
to create a monopoly''--to the other standards that the 
Attorney General considers when deciding whether to allow 
discussions and to approve agreements. The Committee adopted 
the second Conyers amendment on a voice vote.

                        E. Jurisdictional Issues

    The Committee also wishes to note that it strongly 
disagrees with the Speaker's decision to refer this bill solely 
to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure at 
introduction. Chairman Sensenbrenner believes that the bill 
should have been referred primarily to this Committee with a 
secondary referral to the Committee on Transportation and 
Infrastructure. He set forth these views at length in a May 9, 
2001 letter to Speaker Hastert, and they are summarized briefly 
here.
    First, based on the specific provisions of H.R. 1407, 
Chairman Sensenbrenner believes that the fundamental purpose of 
this bill is to provide the antitrust exemption. The conduct 
that the bill authorizes represents a classic per se violation 
of the antitrust laws--competitors joining together to limit 
supply. Without the antitrust exemption, none of the airlines 
would engage in these discussions. Thus, the antitrust 
exemption could stand alone without the regulatory provisions, 
but the regulatory provisions could not stand alone without the 
antitrust exemption. In other words, the antitrust exemption is 
a condition precedent for any airline meetings regulated by the 
bill.
    Second, Chairman Sensenbrenner believes that the most 
relevant historical precedents are the recent efforts to repeal 
the antitrust exemption for ocean carriers, H.R. 3138 in the 
106th Congress and H.R. 1253 in the 107th Congress. These bills 
are the opposite of this bill. Rather than creating an 
antitrust exemption that is specific to a particular industry, 
they repeal one. Both were referred to the Committee on the 
Judiciary primarily and the Committee on Transportation and 
Infrastructure secondarily. Chairman Sensenbrenner believes 
that for jurisdictional purposes the two cases are the same. 
For these reasons and the others set forth in his letter to the 
Speaker, he believes that H.R. 1407 should have been referred 
primarily to this Committee at introduction.

                                Hearings

    The Committee held no hearings on H.R. 1407 because it is a 
relatively simple bill and because the Committee received a 
sequential referral with a short time limit.

                        Committee Consideration

    On June 20, 2001, the Committee met in open session and 
ordered favorably reported the bill H.R. 1407 with an amendment 
by a voice vote, a quorum being present.

                         Vote of the Committee

    During the Committee's consideration of H.R. 1407, it took 
no rollcall votes. The Sensenbrenner amendment, the first 
Conyers amendment, and the second Conyers amendment passed on 
voice votes. The Sensenbrenner motion to order the bill 
reported favorably with an amendment passed by a voice vote.

                      Committee Oversight Findings

    In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules 
of the House of Representatives, the Committee reports that the 
findings and recommendations of the Committee, based on 
oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of rule X of the 
Rules of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in the 
descriptive portions of this report.

                    Performance Goals and Objectives

    H.R. 1407 does not authorize funding. Therefore, clause 
3(c)(4) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House is inapplicable.

               New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures

    Clause 3(c)(2) of House Rule XIII is inapplicable because 
this legislation does not provide new budgetary authority or 
increased tax expenditures.

               Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate

    In compliance with clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules 
of the House of Representatives, the Committee sets forth, with 
respect to the bill, H.R. 1407, the following estimate and 
comparison prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget 
Office under section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 
1974:

                                     U.S. Congress,
                               Congressional Budget Office,
                                     Washington, DC, June 22, 2001.
Hon. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chairman,
Committee on the Judiciary,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has 
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 1407, a bill to 
permit air carriers to meet and discuss their schedules in 
order to reduce flight delays, and for other purposes.
    If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be 
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Mark Hadley, 
who can be reached at 226-2860.
            Sincerely,
                                  Dan L. Crippen, Director.

Enclosure

cc:
        Honorable John Conyers Jr.
        Ranking Member

H.R. 1407--A bill to permit air carriers to meet and discuss their 
        schedules in order to reduce flight delays, and for other 
        purposes.
    H.R. 1407 would exempt air carriers from antitrust laws 
through October 26, 2004, under certain conditions. Under the 
bill, air carriers could cooperate to limit flights at airports 
where scheduled flights exceed capacity if the Attorney General 
determines that such agreements would reduce travel delays and 
improve service to the public without lessening competition or 
tending to create a monopoly. H.R. 1407 would require that a 
representative of the Department of Justice (DOJ) monitor 
discussions among airlines for this purpose, and that any 
discussions be open to the public. The bill would not allow air 
carriers to discuss fares, services, or the city pairs involved 
with such flights. Finally, the bill would require the Attorney 
General to consider comments of the Secretary of Transportation 
before approving an agreement.
    Based on information from DOJ and the Department of 
Transportation, CBO estimates that the annual cost of 
monitoring discussions between air carriers would be negligible 
and subject to the availability of appropriated funds. H.R. 
1407 would not affect direct spending or receipts; therefore, 
pay-as-you-go procedures do not apply. H.R. 1407 contains no 
intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in the 
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and would impose no costs on 
State, local, or tribal governments.
    On May 18, 2001, CBO transmitted a cost estimate for H.R. 
1407, as ordered reported by the House Committee on 
Transportation and Infrastructure on May 16, 2001. That version 
of the bill would require representatives of the Department of 
Transportation to monitor discussions among airlines and also 
would result in negligible costs.
    The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Mark Hadley, who 
can be reached at 226-2860. This estimate was approved by 
Robert A. Sunshine, Assistant Director for Budget Analysis.

                   Constitutional Authority Statement

    Pursuant to clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 
House of Representatives, the Committee finds the authority for 
this legislation in article I, section 8 of the Constitution.

               Section-by-Section Analysis and Discussion

    The following section by section analysis describes H.R. 
1407 as reported by the Committee on the Judiciary.
    Section 1. Air Carrier Discussions Relating to Flight 
Scheduling to Reduce Delays. Subsection 1(a) allows air 
carriers to file a request with the Attorney General to discuss 
with other air carriers and foreign air carriers agreements to 
limit flights at airports during time periods when the 
Secretary determines that flights exceed the capacity of the 
airport. Subsection 1(b) requires that, notwithstanding the 
antitrust laws, the Attorney General shall approve a request 
under Sec. 1(a) if he finds that the discussions will 
facilitate voluntary adjustments that could lead to a 
substantial reduction in travel delays and improvement of 
service to the public. The Attorney General may impose 
conditions on the approval. Subsection 1(c) provides that the 
Attorney General shall provide 3 days notice of the proposed 
discussion to all air carriers and foreign air carriers that 
are providing service or seeking to provide service to the 
airport that will be the subject of the discussion. Subsection 
1(d) provides that the Attorney General or his representative 
shall attend and monitor a discussion under this subsection. 
Subsection 1(e) provides that any discussions held under this 
section shall be open to the public.
    Section 2. Air Carrier Agreements Relating to Flight 
Scheduling. Subsection 2(a) provides that an air carrier may 
file with the Attorney General a request to approve an 
agreement, arrangement, or modification reached as a result of 
a discussion under Sec. 1. Subsection 2(b) provides that, 
notwithstanding the antitrust laws, the Attorney General shall 
approve a request under subsection 2(a) if he finds that the 
agreement or modification is not adverse to the public 
interest; is necessary to reduce air travel delays; and will 
not substantially lessen competition or tend to create a 
monopoly; and that a substantial reduction in such delays 
cannot be achieved by any other immediately available means.
    Subsection 2(c) provides that the Attorney General may 
approve an agreement, arrangement, or modification under Sec. 2 
only if there is unanimous consent among each air carrier or 
foreign air carrier providing service or seeking to provide 
service to the affected airport.
    Subsection 2(d) provides that the Attorney General may 
impose conditions on approval of a request under Sec. 2 to 
protect the public interest and to protect air service to small 
airports.
    Section 3. Limitations. Subsection 3(a) provides that the 
participants in a discussion under Sec. 1 may not discuss or 
agree on rates, fares, charges, or in-flight services.
    Subsection 3(b) provides that the participants in a 
discussion under Sec. 1 may not discuss particular city pairs 
or discuss schedules in a fashion that indicates the city pairs 
involved.
    Section 4. Consultation with Secretary of Transportation. 
Section 4 provides that in making a determination whether to 
approve a request to conduct discussions under Sec. 1 or a 
request for approval of an agreement, arrangement, or 
modification under Sec. 2, the Attorney General shall consider 
any comments of the Secretary of Transportation.
    Section 5. Definitions. Pursuant to the staff authority to 
make technical and conforming changes, Sec. 5 was added to 
reinsert certain title 49 definitions that were lost when the 
first Conyers amendment deleted the references to title 49. 
Subsection 5(1) provides that the terms ``air carrier,'' 
``airport,'' ``air transportation,'' ``foreign air carrier,'' 
and ``interstate air transportation'' have the meanings such 
terms have under 49 U.S.C. Sec. 40102. Subsection 5(2) provides 
that the term ``antitrust laws'' has the meaning that such term 
has under 49 U.S.C. Sec. 41308(a).
    Section 6. Termination. Subsection 6(a) provides that the 
Attorney General may not approve an agreement, arrangement, or 
modification under Sec. 2 after October 26, 2003. Subsection 
6(b) provides that an agreement, arrangement, or modification 
approved under Sec. 2 may remain in effect until October 26, 
2004 or an earlier date determined by the Attorney General.
    Title. The title of the bill is amended to read as follows: 
``A bill to permit air carriers to meet and discuss their 
schedules in order to reduce flight delays, and for other 
purposes.''
    The following section by section analysis describes H.R. 
1407 as reported by the Committee on Transportation and 
Infrastructure.
    Section 1. Scheduling Committees, Discussions, and 
Agreements. Subsection 1(a) of H.R. 1407 creates a new section 
Sec. 40129 of title 49 of the U.S. Code. Subsection (a)(1) of 
the new Sec. 40129 allows air carriers to file a request with 
the Secretary of Transportation to discuss with other air 
carriers and foreign air carriers agreements to limit flights 
at airports during time periods when the Secretary determines 
that flights exceed the capacity of the airport.
    Subsection (a)(2) of the new Sec. 40129 requires the 
Secretary to approve a request under (a)(1) if he finds that 
the discussions will facilitate voluntary adjustments that 
could lead to a substantial reduction in travel delays and 
improvement of service to the public. The Secretary may impose 
conditions on the approval.
    Subsection (a)(3) of the new Sec. 40129 provides that the 
Secretary shall provide 3 days notice of the proposed 
discussion to all air carriers and foreign air carriers that 
are providing service to the airport that will be the subject 
of the discussion.
    Subsection (a)(4) of the new Sec. 40129 provides that the 
Secretary or his representative shall attend and monitor a 
discussion under this subsection.
    Subsection (a)(5) of the new Sec. 40129 provides that any 
discussions held under this section shall be open to the 
public.
    Subsection (b)(1) of the new Sec. 40129 provides that an 
air carrier may file with the Secretary a request to approve an 
agreement or a modification of an agreement reached as a result 
of a discussion under subsection (a).
    Subsection (b)(2) of the new Sec. 40129 provides that the 
Secretary shall approve a request under subsection (b)(1) if he 
finds that the agreement or modification is not adverse to the 
public interest; is necessary to reduce air travel delays; and 
that a substantial reduction in such delays cannot be achieved 
by any other immediately available means.
    Subsection (b)(3) of the new Sec. 40129 provides that the 
Secretary may impose conditions on approval of a request under 
subsection (b)(1) to protect the public interest and to protect 
air service to small airports.
    Subsection (c)(1) of the new Sec. 40129 provides that the 
participants in a discussion under this section may not discuss 
or agree on rates, fares, charges, or in-flight services.
    Subsection (c)(2) of the new Sec. 40129 provides that the 
participants in a discussion under this section may not discuss 
particular city pairs or discuss schedules in a fashion that 
indicates the city pairs involved.
    Subsection (d) of the new Sec. 40129 provides that the 
section shall cease to be in effect after September 30, 2003, 
but that existing agreements on that date may remain in force 
at the discretion of the Secretary.
    Subsection 1(b) of H.R. 1407 contains a conforming 
amendment to amend the table of contents of the code to reflect 
the new Sec. 40129.
    Section 2. Limited Exemption from the Antitrust Laws. 
Section 2 of H.R. 1407 inserts the new Sec. 40129 into the list 
of sections included in an existing antitrust exemption in 49 
U.S.C. Sec. 41308. Under Sec. 41308(b), the Secretary may grant 
antitrust immunity for some agreements. Under Sec. 41308(c), he 
is required to grant antitrust immunity if he makes certain 
findings. Section 40129 is inserted into both provisions. Thus, 
under Sec. 41308(c), the Secretary must grant antitrust 
immunity to a Sec. 40129 agreement if he finds that it ``is not 
adverse to the public interest and is necessary to reduce air 
travel delays and that a substantial reduction in such delays 
cannot be achieved by any other immediately available means'' 
as provided in new Sec. 40129(b)(2). Because the Secretary 
``shall'' approve any agreement if he makes these findings and 
there is no other mechanism for approval, the operation of 
Sec. 41308(c) will require him to grant antitrust immunity to 
any agreement that he approves. In short, every agreement 
reached and approved under this bill will receive antitrust 
immunity.

                              Agency Views

    The Committee received the following information about H.R. 
1407 from the Department of Justice:

                        U.S. Department of Justice,
                             Office of Legislative Affairs,
                                     Washington, DC, June 19, 2001.
Hon. F. James Sensenbrenner, Chairman,
Committee on the Judiciary,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: This letter provides the views of the 
Department of Justice on H.R. 1407 as reported by the Committee 
on Transportation and Infrastructure.
    This legislation would grant antitrust immunity to 
competing airlines to permit them to coordinate scheduled 
flight arrivals and departures. While the Department 
understands the concerns over airport congestion and flight 
delays, we have concerns about this legislation in its current 
form.
    In the face of strong public concern about competitive 
problems in the airline industry, this legislation is likely to 
exacerbate those problems, resulting in diminished service and 
higher prices for the traveling public. Indeed, the proposed 
exemption would cover conduct that is considered so harmful to 
competition as to likely be deemed per se unlawful under the 
antitrust laws.
    Scheduling is a critical element of competition among air 
carriers. Carriers compete to offer flights at convenient 
times, especially for business passengers who pay significantly 
higher fares. For 1-day trips, business passengers prefer 
early-morning outbound flights and end-of-day return flights. 
They also prefer carriers with a substantial number of flight 
frequencies in the city-pair market, to give them flexibility 
to change flights on short notice when necessary. Both these 
factors can lead to airport congestion during peak travel 
times.
    If legislation is enacted permitting carriers to coordinate 
reductions in output, they will predictably endeavor to do so 
in the manner most profitable to themselves. It should be 
expected that each carrier will hold out for agreements that 
maximize its ability to obtain, exert, or protect its market 
power in its ``home'' or ``hub'' airports--and they would have 
little incentive to do otherwise. By their nature, output-
limiting agreements among competitors result in inflated 
prices. In the current hub-and-spoke system, where most hub 
airports are dominated by a few carriers at most and a 
particular city-pair market is often more important to one 
carrier than to another, carriers will have a strong incentive 
to make anticompetitive ``trades'' where each agrees to reduce 
service in markets important to the others. And they can 
accomplish this without overtly doing so.
    Experience shows that this concern is well-founded. Almost 
10 years ago, the Department sued the major airlines for using 
their electronic tariff publishing system to negotiate similar 
``trades'' on fares. That is, one carrier proposed fare 
increases in markets important to another carrier, in exchange 
for the other carrier making fare increases in markets 
important to the first carrier. Having condemned such 
coordinated fare increases, it would be ironic to permit 
coordinated output reductions, which can be just as harmful to 
consumers.
    Further, once the exemption is created it will be difficult 
to avoid ``spill-over'' cartel effects. And if carriers do 
begin to collaborate on other factors on which they should be 
competing, the antitrust immunity will make it more difficult 
for the Department to prosecute such conduct. Thus, the 
proposed exemption could effectively immunize a broad range of 
harmful anticompetitive conduct even beyond the legislation's 
intended focus.
    Although the bill's authors have included provisions 
attempting to protect the public against anticompetitive abuse, 
we believe these provisions will prove an inadequate substitute 
for the antitrust laws. Merely prohibiting discussions of fares 
or specific city pairs cannot begin to capture all the complex 
ways carriers can potentially interact to achieve 
anticompetitive ends behind the shield of an antitrust 
exemption. And subjecting these agreements to approval by 
Secretary of Transportation would simply turn us back in the 
dangerous direction of fare and route regulation reminiscent of 
the regime Congress wisely rejected two decades ago--due to its 
inherent difficulty, uncertainty, and costs to the economy--in 
favor of relying on competition.
    In short, this legislation, as currently drafted, could 
result in anticompetitive behavior. We believe that there may 
be available to Congress remedies that do not conflict with the 
enforcement of the antitrust laws.
    Thank you for the opportunity to present our views. Please 
do not hesitate to call upon us if we may be of additional 
assistance. The Office of Management and Budget has advised us 
that from the perspective of the Administration's program, 
there is no objection to submission of this letter.
            Sincerely,
              Daniel J. Bryant, Assistant Attorney General.

cc:
        The Honorable John Conyers, Jr.
        The Honorable Don Young
        The Honorable James L. Oberstar

         Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported

    The bill, as reported by this committee, does not make any 
changes to existing law. The bill, as reported by the Committee 
on Transportation and Infrastructure, does make changes to 
existing law, which are shown in the report filed on the bill 
by that committee (Rept. 107-77, Part 1).

                           Markup Transcript



                            BUSINESS MEETING

                        WEDNESDAY, JUNE 20, 2001

                  House of Representatives,
                                Committee on the Judiciary,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:07 a.m., in 
Room 2141, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. F. James 
Sensenbrenner [Chairman of the Committee] presiding.
    Next on the agenda, pursuant to notice, I now call up the 
bill H.R. 1407, as reported by the Committee on Transportation 
and Infrastructure for purposes of markup, and move its 
favorable recommendation to the House.
    [H.R. 1407 follows:]
    
    
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection, the bill will be 
considered as read and open for amendment at any point. The 
Chair recognizes himself for 5 minutes.
    H.R. 1407 provides an antitrust exemption to the airlines 
to allow them to conduct joint discussions to limit flights and 
reduce delays and cancellations. Like everyone else who flies, 
I would like to reduce delays and cancellations. However, I 
believe the solution is to provide more airport capacity. I am 
skeptical that this bill will work, but I believe that it has 
enough safeguards so that it is unlikely to do much harm 
either. I do have an amendment that makes some minor tweaks to 
the bill and will have more to say on that in a moment.
    At this time, I recognize the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. 
Conyers, for an opening statement.
    Mr. Conyers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your 
accommodations based on my schedule, and I also want to thank 
you for protecting the Committee's jurisdiction in connection 
with H.R. 1407, the ``Airline Delay Reduction Act,'' something 
which probably every citizen in the country would support the 
title of, but the problem is that the matter was referred 
solely to the Transportation Committee, despite the fact that 
it provides for an exemption to antitrust laws. And you have 
worked tirelessly to secure a sequential referral and are doing 
everything possible to restore the Committee's jurisdiction as 
the bill moves along.
    Now, I have certain reluctances about a new antitrust 
exemption for the airline industry. It's not that I don't trust 
them, but here we are confronted with a situation that would be 
administered, an antitrust exemption to be administered by the 
Department of Transportation, which at last observation, I 
haven't noticed much antitrust expertise over there, and it's--
it's the impression of my staff working with me on this that 
the bill misses the real problem and focuses on a solution that 
may lead to fewer flights and higher fares.
    Now, the last thing the airline industry needs is less 
competition, which is another thing it seems that this bill 
would move toward. And so, as things currently stand, the 
competitive balance of the industry is in a state of 
dysfunction.
    Now, since the deregulation took place 20 years ago, we 
have gone from a highly competitive structure to an oligopoly. 
Most of this has occurred under the watch of the Department of 
Transportation, as scores of airline mergers, too numerous to 
mention, have been hastily approved. The three top airlines--
United, American, and Delta--control nearly 60 percent of the 
United States' air traffic, and experts predict that that could 
rise to as high as 90 percent in the, in the near future. This 
is a speculation.
    Now, consumers, as usual, have been left out in the cold. 
Delays are on the increase, service is on the decline, and 
prices are as high as ever. Fares are particularly outrageous 
from the so-called hub airports, at which I've had some 
experience, where consumers pay an average of 41 percent higher 
fares than nonhub airports. And so in this context, it's hard 
to believe that an antitrust exemption, which allows the 
airlines to come together to reduce flights, will lead to the 
inevitable increase in prices. And even if it didn't, I'm not 
sure if I would be happy about them being given permission to 
meet about anything at this point.
    I would submit that what consumers need is more vigorous 
antitrust enforcement not new antitrust exemptions. And, to my 
surprise, the Bush Department of Justice appears to agree with 
me, opposing this measure because it is likely to lead to 
diminished service and higher prices.
    I also have some reluctances about the measure because it 
will do little to deal with the problem of flight delays. The 
vice president of the Air Transport Association, James Casey, 
has admitted that only 11 percent of all delays were 
attributable to terminal area volume. What it means is that, at 
best, this bill won't even touch the real cause of 90 percent 
of the delays.
    If we want to do something about airline delays, and I'm 
sure everyone does, we need to authorize more funds for airport 
improvements and airport infrastructure. We need to improve and 
enhance the Federal Aviation Administration, which has been 
reeling ever since the Government laid off all of the air 
traffic controllers in 1981. I suggest to the Transportation 
Committee that they might look at making changes to the 
transportation law before they result to the antitrust law for 
solutions.
    And I thank the Chairman, and I yield to----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Conyers. Okay.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection, all Members may 
place opening statements in the record at this point.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. And the Chair has an amendment at 
the desk, and the clerk will report the amendment.
    The Clerk. Amendment to the Committee Print to H.R. 1407 
offered by Mr. Sensenbrenner.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Would you pull the mike up closer, 
please.
    The Clerk. Amendment to the Committee Print to H.R. 1407 
offered by Mr. Sensenbrenner. Page 3----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. And without objection, the 
amendment is considered as read and open for amendment at any 
point.
    [The amendment follows:]

    
    
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The Chair recognizes himself for 5 
minutes, and won't use it.
    My amendment makes several minor changes to the bill that I 
believe will provide even more protection against potential 
harms to competition.
    First, the bill currently provides that a representative 
from the Department of Transportation would have to monitor the 
airline discussions, and my amendment would provide for a 
Department of Justice monitor as well.
    Second, the bill currently provides that notice of a 
meeting would be sent to all airlines currently providing 
service to an airport. My amendment would also require that 
this notice also be sent to airlines that are seeking to 
provide service to that airport so that new entrants are not 
squeezed out.
    Third, the bill currently provides that the DOT may not 
approve an agreement unless it meets several standards. My 
amendment would add the requirement that any agreement be 
unanimous among all airlines providing service or seeking to 
provide service to an airport. Again, this will prevent smaller 
or new-entrant airlines from being squeezed out, and my fear 
is, is that without this feature, the big ones would get 
together and eat up the competition that was provided by the 
smaller ones and the new starts.
    Fourth, and finally, the bill currently provides that the 
authority of this bill will expire on September 30, 2003, and 
that agreements reached can continue after that time, at the 
discretion of the Secretary. At the Transportation Committee 
hearing, the Air Transport Association suggested that this date 
be moved to October 26, 2003, the date on which the country 
changes from daylight savings time to standard time in the fall 
because that's when the airlines make their major seasonal 
schedule change. This, to me, seems to be a reasonable 
accommodation.
    Finally, my amendment puts a 1-year limit on the 
continuation of agreements after the expiration date, whereas, 
the Transportation Committee bill makes them unlimited.
    So, in sum, none of these changes are major, but I do think 
they add to the competitive protections of the bill.
    [The prepared statement of Chairman Sensenbrenner follows:]
     Prepared Statement of the Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, a 
         Representative in Congress From the State of Wisconsin
    H.R. 1407 provides an antitrust exemption to the airlines to allow 
them to conduct joint discussions to limit flights and reduce delays 
and cancellations. Like everyone else who flies, I would like to reduce 
delays and cancellations. However, I believe the solution is to provide 
more airport capacity. I am skeptical that this bill will work, but I 
believe that it has enough safeguards so that it is unlikely to do much 
harm either. I do have an amendment that makes some minor tweaks to the 
bill, and I will have more to say on that in a moment.
    My amendment makes several minor changes to the bill that I believe 
will provide even more protection against potential harms to 
competition.
    First, the bill currently provides that a representative from the 
Department of Transportation would have to monitor airline discussions, 
and my amendment would provide for a Department of Justice monitor as 
well.
    Second, the bill currently provides that notice of a meeting would 
be sent to all airlines currently providing service to an airport. My 
amendment would also require that notice be sent to airlines that are 
seeking to provide service at an airport so that new entrants are not 
squeezed out.
    Third, the bill currently provides that the Department of 
Transportation may not approve an agreement unless it meets several 
standards. My amendment would add the requirement that any agreement be 
unanimous among all of the airlines providing service or seeking to 
provide service to an airport. Again, this will prevent smaller or new 
entrant airlines from being squeezed out.
    Fourth, the bill currently provides that the authority of the bill 
will expire on September 30, 2003 and that agreements reached can 
continue after that time at the discretion of the Secretary. At the 
Transportation Committee hearing, the Air Transport Association 
suggested that this date be moved to October 26, 2003--the date on 
which we switch from daylight saving time to standard time--because 
that is when the airlines make their major seasonal schedule change. 
That seems to me a reasonable accommodation. Finally, my amendment puts 
a one-year limit on the continuation of agreements after the expiration 
date.
    So, in sum, none of these changes are major, but I do think that 
they add to the competitive protections in the bill.

    Mr. Conyers. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. I yield to the gentleman from 
Michigan.
    Mr. Conyers. I'm pleased to support the amendment.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Conyers follows:]
Prepared Statement of the Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative 
                 in Congress From the State of Michigan
    At the outset, I want to thank the Chairman and his staff for their 
diligent work in protecting our committee's jurisdiction on this 
matter. When this bill was introduced, it was referred solely to the 
Transportation Committee, despite the fact that it provides for an 
exemption from the antitrust laws.
    This was clearly and utterly erroneous, and Chairman Sensenbrenner 
informed the Parliamentarian of that fact in no uncertain terms. The 
Chairman secured a sequential referral, and I am hopeful that we will 
fully restore the Committee's jurisdiction as this bill moves along.
    It should come as no surprise to the Members that I vigorously 
oppose a new antitrust exemption for the airline industry, particularly 
one that is administered by the Department of Transportation, which has 
no antitrust expertise. This bill misses the real problem and instead 
focuses on a phony solution that will lead to fewer flights and higher 
fares.
    The last thing the airline industry needs is less competition, 
which is what this bill would clearly lead to. As things currently 
stand, the competitive balance of the industry is in a state of total 
dysfunction.
    Since deregulation first took effect 20 years ago, we have gone 
from a highly competitive structure to an oligopoly. Most of this has 
occurred under the Department of Transportation's watch, as scores of 
airline mergers were hastily approved. The top three airlines--United, 
American, and Delta--control almost 60% of U.S. air traffic, and 
experts predict that could rise to near 90% in the near future.
    Consumers have been left totally out in the cold. Delays are on the 
increase, service is in decline, and prices are higher than ever. Fares 
are particularly outrageous from so-called ``hub airports,'' where 
consumers pay an average of 41% higher fares than non-hub airports.
    In this context, does any one seriously believe that an antitrust 
exemption which allows the airlines to come together to reduce flights 
will do anything but further increase prices? I would submit that what 
consumers need is more vigorous antitrust enforcement, not new 
antitrust exemptions.
    And guess what--the Bush Justice Department agrees with me, 
opposing this bill because it is likely to lead to ``diminished 
service'' and ``higher prices.''
    I also oppose the bill because it will do little to deal with the 
problem of flight delays. James Casey, the Vice President of the Air 
Transport Association has admitted, and I quote, ``only 11 percent of 
all delays were attributable to terminal area volume.'' That means that 
at best this bill won't even touch the real cause of the delays in 90% 
of the cases.
    If we want to really do something about airline delays we need to 
authorize more funds for airport improvements and airport 
infrastructure. We need to improve and enhance the Federal Aeronautics 
Administration, which has been reeling ever since our government laid 
off all of the air traffic controllers in 1981. I would suggest to the 
Transportation Committee that they ought to look at making changes to 
the transportation law before they resort to the antitrust law for 
solutions.
    I was pleased to learn that the Department of Justice had done the 
right thing and opposed this bill. I hope this Committee will join the 
Department in either fixing this bill, or voting it down.

    Chairman Sensenbrenner. If there are further--I yield back 
the balance of my time.
    The gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Frank.
    Mr. Frank. Mr. Chairman, I don't object to what's in the 
amendment----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Frank.--but I did want to respond, particularly in your 
opening statement when you said you thought, in addition to 
expressing your very thoughtful skepticism about this 
particular approach, you said there were other approaches, and 
you, Mr. Chairman, said airport runway construction was your 
preferred mode. I think that's undoubtedly a reasonable thing 
to do in some places. I do not think it is in the major 
metropolitan area that I represent.
    And I want to say we should have on the record, and my--
part of my problem with this bill is that it approaches this 
very difficult problem of congestion, exacerbated by the 
congenital refusal of airlines to ever tell anybody the truth 
about anything. I have never met a profession so addicted to 
lying. Every one of us has had a situation of arriving, being 
told by their equipment that the plane is about to take off, 
only to learn later that it is not.
    And apparently they have made technological advances which 
they don't own up to. They have autonomous equipment. They have 
self-programming boards. Apparently, the boards that tell you 
what time the planes are leaving program themselves. No human 
being is ever involved in putting these false times up there. 
They apparently just auto-generate themselves, and it is a very 
clever form of technology, which I wish they would put to more 
social uses.
    But there are a couple of other things they could be doing 
that they're not doing. One, they could tell the truth. I think 
what we need is a Passenger's Bill of Rights. We need to get 
the information. Many of the troubles are not their fault, but 
it is their fault that they are not more honest about it, and 
that complicates people's lives unfairly.
    Secondly, I believe that we should be requiring them to 
engage in better scheduling through the pricing policies of the 
airports. Airports can do a great deal. The notion that the 
biggest plane in the world and the smallest plane in the world 
should have equal access at all times of day or with only 
slight differentials, I think causes a lot of the problem. So I 
believe that there are some very significant approaches that 
should be taken, both for the protection of consumer rights and 
to encourage the use of the market mechanism of pricing to 
better deal with congestion. And my skepticism about this bill 
is based, in part, on the bill itself, but also on the notion 
that with all of the things that could be done to improve 
airline travel, the only one we do is to give an antitrust 
exemption to the airlines. This is not the fault of this 
Committee because the other issues are not within our 
jurisdiction, but I am very, very unhappy at the notion that 
our--this Congress's sole response will be to make their lives 
a little bit easier with an airline antitrust exemption, which 
the Justice Department, as the gentleman from Michigan has 
pointed out, appears not to want to see happen and not to 
address either the Passengers' Bill of Rights or the very 
important issue of how to use the market mechanism to compel a 
more rational scheduling.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Ms. Waters. Mr. Chairman----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The question is on the amendment--
--
    Ms. Waters. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner.--that the Chair has offered.
    The gentleman from New York?
    Mr. Nadler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a question to 
you, a real concern about this amendment. I thoroughly--I 
thoroughly approve of what you're trying to do, but I'm just 
wondering if one of the provisions here will work or will work 
backwards.
    We, obviously, the point of the bill is to facilitate an 
agreement among air carriers so that one carrier doesn't hog, 
you know, so that they don't schedule 50 flights for a time 
period when they can only accommodate physically 25 flights, 
and that makes sense.
    You are concerned, and properly so, that this exemption 
from the antitrust doesn't--isn't used to shut out the smaller 
airlines or new entrants, and I agree with you. My question is 
with your amendment, where you say any such time agreement 
would have to be agreed to by every airline. Couldn't that, 
assuming we enacted that, what would stop the big guy, 
Continental, that dominates a given airport from blocking an 
agreement that might help the smaller guys? I mean, why--why do 
you think it would work to the advantage of the smaller guys, 
as opposed to both ways, depending on----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. If the gentleman would yield, if 
there is a huge plug-up in an airport, such as Continental 
dominating the Newark Airport, it is to the advantage of 
Continental's competitive situation to get their planes out on 
time because any time there are huge delays at any hub airport, 
it has a domino effect, you know, and the consequence is spread 
out all throughout the country, where these planes are supposed 
to fly to. So Continental, at the Newark Airport, if they want 
to avail themselves of this, has, you know, a great incentive 
to be able to get the other airlines to have an agreement.
    The flip side of that is that it's usually the smaller 
airlines that are the low-cost airlines. And once they enter a 
market, like Southwest entering a market, you know, they drive 
down the fares to all of the places that they fly if you're 
flying on a big carrier. And without giving what essentially is 
a veto power for the smaller and generally low-cost airlines, 
the biggies could get together and say, ``Well, you're, you're 
running a small-cost airline, Mr. Nadler. We've got a great 
time slot for you at 2 a.m., you know, and good luck getting 
enough people to go buy tickets so that you'd be able to make a 
profit for coming in there.''
    Mr. Nadler. Reclaiming my time now, aren't these--don't 
these agreements, in order to be binding on the little guy, 
have to be agreed to by the little guy under the terms of the 
bill?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The answer to the question is, no, 
because under the Transportation Committee bill, the three big 
guys, you know, could get together, you know, and divide up the 
time slots and then use their, you know, marketing power to be 
able to browbeat whichever governmental entity owns the airport 
to say, ``Okay. You know, give us the good time slot and give 
them the bad ones.''
    Mr. Nadler. Reclaiming my time. The Chairman is very 
persuasive, and logical, and has convinced me.
    Ms. Waters. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. I'll quit while I'm ahead. 
[Laughter.]
    Ms. Waters. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. For what purpose does the gentleman 
from--the gentlewoman from California, Ms. Waters----
    Ms. Waters. Strike the last word.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Recognized for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Waters. Thank you very much.
    I am going to support your amendment for a number of 
reasons. First of all, I think it's very important for us to 
understand that we must be a bit more assertive in dealing with 
the problems of the airlines. Whether it is delays or air 
quality or service, we have really got to get more involved 
because the travelers and the citizens of this country are 
being almost victimized by the practices of many of these 
airlines.
    Mr. Chairman, I support this, and I'm not concerned about 
any discussions of antitrust concerns that some people have 
identified as possible problems with the bill, but, Mr. 
Chairman, I have an amendment that's going to come up. I'm not 
going to talk about it now except to say this is not simply a 
problem of airlines getting together to discuss scheduling so 
that they can arrange the best schedules to accommodate all of 
the carriers. This is about capacity of many of these airports. 
They simply can't do any better because the airports are 
overused. We need to have more regional responses to the 
problems of overcrowding, to the problems of delays.
    And just as you're moving here in a small way to force them 
to have to get together and talk about their schedules, we're 
going to have to do that, and forcing the airports to get 
together to talk about regional responses to some of these 
problems. So I'm pleased that you're moving in this direction. 
I support it, and I'm going to have an amendment that's 
somewhat similar to this coming up a little bit later.
    I would yield back the balance of my time.
    Ms. Lofgren. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. For what purpose does the other 
gentlewoman from California seek the----
    Ms. Lofgren. To strike the last word.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentlewoman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Ms. Lofgren. I was interested to find the letter from the 
Department of Justice, dated June 19th. You know, the prior 
administration used to annoy the heck out of me because they'd 
always get their letters in at the last minute, and it's good 
to see that that tradition carries on under the new 
administration.
    But I will say that, although I had been very interested in 
the bill earlier, the points made by the Department of Justice 
are persuasive ones, and I appreciate getting their letter and 
getting their analysis. The question I have for the Chairman is 
whether the Department of Justice has had an opportunity to 
review his amendment and whether, in their judgment, the 
amendment resolves the issue which----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Would the gentlewoman yield?
    Ms. Lofgren. I certainly would yield.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. I am informed by my staff that 
there have been staff discussions with the Department of 
Justice, but that the Department of Justice has not expressed 
an opinion on my amendment.
    You know, let me say that, you know, I agree with, you 
know, all of these concerns that this bill misses the mark. And 
as you know, there was not a joint referral to this Committee. 
We had to argue with the parliamentarian to get it here because 
of the antitrust exemption. You know, it seems to me that here 
you are preaching to the choir, but in the Rules Committee and 
on the floor, you might be preaching to the heathen. 
[Laughter.]
    Ms. Lofgren. Reclaiming my time, if I may, the--I do very 
much appreciate the vigorous advocacy that the Chairman has 
displayed over the rightful jurisdiction of this Committee, and 
I think all of the Members on both sides of the aisle have that 
appreciation and support the effort, but the question is as to 
the content. On page 2, the Department of Justice talks about 
the issue of trades and the development of cartels that would 
be permitted under the underlying bill.
    And looking at the amendment, and I credit the Chairman for 
trying to address these issues, and I do not assign any 
improper or unhealthy or unuseful motives to the amendment, but 
I'm not sure that the amendment actually will prevent the 
spillover cartel effects outlined by the Department of Justice 
in their letter. And I just wanted to raise this question: If 
the Chairman thinks that the amendment would prevent that 
adverse result, in what way would it prevent that adverse 
result?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Would the gentlewoman yield?
    Ms. Lofgren. I certainly would.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The answer to your question is, no, 
I don't think it would prevent the spillover cartels. You know, 
I am just trying to improve what I believe is a very flawed 
bill----
    Ms. Lofgren. Right.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner.--in a way that is germane and in a 
way that we will not continue the jurisdictional hissy fit that 
the parliamentarian's omission has caused. I think that the 
gentlewoman's concerns are very valid ones. I would just urge 
her to allow us to send this bill over to the Rules Committee 
with a minor stamp on it that is very clearly germane, and we 
can then fight the good fight and try to make it a little bit 
more relevant and effective later on.
    Mr. Frank. Would the gentlelady yield?
    Ms. Lofgren. I certainly will.
    Mr. Frank. I think you're strategically correct. Since, as 
he puts it, we will have to go to the floor and preach to the 
heathens, maybe we could get a grant from the faith-based 
initiative to enhance our activity. [Laughter.]
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. If the gentleman can yield, he can 
send his application to the White House, where I'm sure it will 
be favorably considered.
    Ms. Lofgren. I'm sure it will. And having understood that 
we will be making that application, I yield back the balance of 
my time.
    Mr. Weiner. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. For what purpose does the gentleman 
from New York, Mr. Weiner, seek recognition?
    Mr. Weiner. I just would move to strike the last word, for 
the purpose of asking----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Weiner.--you, Mr. Chairman, a question.
    First of all, let me just echo what some have said here. I 
think that the efforts that the Chairman has made to ensure the 
jurisdiction of the Committee are most appreciated and 
laudable.
    I'm a little bit concerned about the element of the 
substitute that requires unanimous consent for any of these 
scheduling changes to be approved. And what I would be 
concerned about is a small, in my district, at LaGuardia, a 
small airline that wants to, for example, get additional access 
to gates or is concerned about the way their parking is being 
assigned or essentially wants to be deleterious in some way 
will be able to throw a wrench into any negotiations by simply 
exercising their right to object under this.
    Is there--now, it seems to me that there might be some 
small airlines or there might be a bigger airline who just has 
a bone to pick over the past negotiations and says, ``Forget 
it. We're just going to bollix up the work on everything.'' Is 
there any way, I mean, I guess you've obviously given a great 
deal of thought to this, do you have some reservations that 
that might be the effect of the unanimous consent requirement?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. If the gentleman would yield----
    Mr. Weiner. I would gladly yield.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The answer is, no, I don't. And 
probably the most successful small airline that came about in 
the first wave of deregulation is the Wisconsin airline called 
Midwest Express that flies into LaGuardia several times a day. 
You know, I'll be honest, I have talked to the CEO of Midwest 
Express, and he is concerned that without the unanimous consent 
agreement, you know, the biggies can stick them at 2 a.m. time 
slots and take away any leverage he has in preventing his 
gates, you know, from being, you know, a 3-mile hike out to the 
end of the pier, to the detriment of the passengers that wish 
to buy tickets on that plane.
    So I think that the way this is drafted is that it gives a 
bigger advantage to the big airlines--or to the small airlines, 
when the big airlines need to do something to prevent the 
domino effect of a meltdown from rippling out all throughout 
their system as the planes that are flying out of an airline or 
an airport that has had one of these gridlocks has on the 
planes that they are planning on sending out all throughout the 
country.
    Mr. Weiner. Well, if I could just reclaim my time.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Yes.
    Mr. Weiner. In fact, under the bill, U.S. Air, for example, 
and United can have negotiations about their own timing of 
slots. It would not impact Northwest at all, theoretically, but 
theoretically they could----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Well, if the gentleman would yield, 
at an airport like LaGuardia, where there are--where it is 
slotted, and there are few airports around the country--very 
few airports around the country, LaGuardia is one of them, 
without the unanimous consent, the biggies could grab all of 
the good time slots and leave the little ones, including the 
cut-rate carriers, with the times that are not conducive to 
selling tickets. And once the little ones get into those types 
of time slots, then the impact of cut-rate airlines reducing 
the biggies fares is reduced significantly.
    Mr. Weiner. Well, just reclaiming the last moments of my 
time, but the way I understand the base bill, if U.S. Air has 
an 8:05 and United has an 8:05, they can negotiate to have one 
go 8:00 and one go 8:15. It doesn't impact on Northwest's 2 
o'clock in any way. Like they can't force Northwest to go at 
9:00 if they're not part of those negotiations. That's the way 
I understand the base bill.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Well, and, you know, why would 
Northwest or anybody else object to having a spread-out of 15 
minutes between the United flight and the U.S. Air flight?
    Mr. Weiner. Well, we're going to, I mean, under the--and 
I'm inclined to vote in favor of this, I mean, my concern would 
be, well, Midwest Express says, ``I have a 3 o'clock that I 
sell based on the idea that people never leave on time at 8 
o'clock. I fill that flight. I do very well with that flight 
because I prey on the weaknesses of the other guys. Why do I 
want them to fix their weaknesses?''
    All of that being said, I mean, I think it's something that 
will play out in the wash, but I think it's some cause for 
concern, but I yield back my time.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. For what purpose does the gentleman 
from North Carolina, Mr. Watt, seek recognition?
    Mr. Watt. I move to strike the last word.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Watt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to join others 
who applaud the Chairman for insisting on the Committee's 
prerogatives to review this bill and to express support for the 
Chairman's amendment, but very severe concerns that the 
amendment seems to be kind of grabbing a hold to a runaway 
train and doesn't go anywhere near addressing a number of the 
problems with the bill.
    Let me ask a question about the first part of the 
Chairman's amendment, Mr. Chairman, if I may. The monitoring 
part, is there some precedent for this kind of language in any 
other situation?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. If the gentleman would yield----
    Mr. Watt. I'd be happy to yield.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner.--the answer is, not to my 
knowledge. But the base bill has a representative of DOT 
monitoring these negotiations. If we're dealing with antitrust, 
it seems to me we ought to have somebody who knows something 
about antitrust, and that's the DOJ----
    Mr. Watt. I absolutely agree with the Chairman, but I'm 
just--I guess the concern I have is we have the regulators, the 
reviewers or anybody from the Federal Government in the room 
monitoring discussions that could be very easily inappropriate 
discussions----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Well, if the gentleman will yield 
further, where this bill will have an impact, if any--I'll 
qualify that--is at airports where the FAA controls slots right 
now because there is so much demand to fly in there. I'm 
talking about airports like Washington National, like 
LaGuardia, O'Hare, L.A. So the FAA has got its finger on the 
slots to begin with, and----
    Mr. Watt. Why wouldn't it have implications in Charlotte, 
where there's not slotting? I mean, we have a major problem 
with managing flight arrivals and departures. Why wouldn't this 
bill have the same kind of----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Sir, isn't Charlotte kind of a one-
carrier town?
    Mr. Watt. It is, but there are several other carriers who 
are trying to get in, and they are subject to the same kind of 
discussions that this bill would provide for.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The answer is that this bill would 
be very helpful to the other carriers because, with the 
amendment, they have a seat at the table, even if they aren't 
in there yet because they're applying to get in there. Whereas, 
with the Transportation Committee bill, if an airline is not 
going into Charlotte, they don't get a seat at the table until 
they actually have their plane land on the ground there.
    Mr. Watt. Let me just ask the Chairman a more direct 
question. Is the Chairman concerned about--and this is not a 
second-guessing of the Chairman's amendment, understand I 
support the Chairman's amendment. I think my concerns are about 
the base bill--is the Chairman concerned about the Department 
of Justice's concerns expressed at the bottom of page 1 and the 
top of page 2 of this letter?
    I mean, it seems to me that airlines, even in the absence 
of this sanctioning that we are giving them to talk, have used, 
according to the first full paragraph on page 2 of the 
Department of Justice's letter, ``the Department sued the major 
airlines for using their electronic tariff publishing system to 
negotiate'' and advantage themselves on fares----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Would the gentleman further yield?
    Mr. Watt. Yes.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Of course, the Chairman is 
concerned about that. However, the Chairman plays with the 
cards that he is dealt, and the cards that we were dealt on 
this one aren't very good cards. I would, also----
    Mr. Watt. So the gentleman would understand if I voted for 
his amendment and against the bill then.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. I would not be upset with you at 
all on that. The point I would like to make is that if you read 
Congress Daily, as I do upon occasion, 2 weeks ago, right after 
we got this sequential, the Chairman of the Transportation 
Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee chastised us for 
not dealing with this very important issue and said if we 
didn't do it, he would stick this, the unamended version, in 
the Transportation Appropriations bill and get it protected by 
the rules.
    Mr. Watt. Sounds like I was right, that the Chairman has a 
way--has a hold to a runaway train.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. No, it's a runaway plane.
    Mr. Watt. Plane, I'm sorry. [Laughter.]
    Mr. Watt. That's even worse, I guess. I yield back.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman's time has expired.
    The question is on the adoption of the amendment offered by 
the chair.
    Those in favor will signify by saying aye.
    Those opposed, no.
    The ayes appear to have it, and the ayes have it, and the 
amendment is agreed to.
    Mr. Conyers. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. For what purpose does the gentleman 
from Michigan seek recognition?
    Mr. Conyers. I have a, well, now two amendments at the 
desk, and I'd like to call up the first one, please.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report the first 
amendment.
    The Clerk. Amendment to the Committee Print to H.R. 1407 
offered by Mr. Conyers.
    Mr. Conyers. I ask unanimous consent the amendment be 
considered as read.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection, so ordered.
    [The amendment follows:]

    
    
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. And the gentleman is recognized for 
5 minutes.
    Mr. Conyers. Thank you.
    The first amendment that I am now offering merely strikes 
at page 2, lines 3 through 7, to make this bill a freestanding 
amendment rather than an amendment to the transportation laws. 
Now, why?
    First of all, it helps establish our jurisdiction by 
pointedly bringing to the parliamentarian's attention that this 
is not something that automatically goes to the Transportation 
Committee. It sends a message to other Committees that we will 
protect the integrity of antitrust proposals and not allow them 
to be amended----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Will the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Conyers. Of course.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. I support the amendment. I think 
the gentleman from Michigan makes a very good point, and this 
may help the parliamentarian not to forget about us when the 
Transportation Committee deals with this issue again.
    Mr. Conyers. And so I urge the Members to support this 
first amendment. I return my time.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Is there further discussion on the 
Conyers No. 1?
    Hearing none, all of those in favor of agreeing to the 
amendment will signify by saying aye.
    Opposed, no.
    The ayes appear to have it. The ayes have it. The amendment 
is agreed to.
    Mr. Conyers. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. For what purpose does the gentleman 
from Michigan seek recognition?
    Mr. Conyers. Mr. Chairman, my second amendment I'd like to 
call up now.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report the 
amendment.
    The Clerk. Amendment to the Committee Print to H.R. 1407 
offered by Mr. Conyers. page 2, strikes lines 3 through 7. 
Strike the initial quotation marks each place they appear in 
the bill.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection, the amendment is 
considered as read.
    [The amendment follows:]
    
    
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. And the gentleman from Michigan is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Conyers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Originally, I start by asking unanimous consent to strike 
clause 1 of this amendment, which is the measure we have just 
taken care of.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection, the modification 
is agreed to.
    Mr. Conyers. Now, what we do in this provision, ladies and 
gentlemen, is to substitute the Attorney General for the 
Secretary of Transportation in each place of the existing bill. 
The Justice Department, not the Transportation Department, is 
the authority on competition and antitrust laws, and the 
Justice Department already has the authority to rule on airline 
mergers and other transportation antitrust disputes. And so I'm 
confident that the Antitrust Division will have no problem 
ruling on competition issues, as they relate to airline 
congestion.
    To the extent any specific air transportation expertise is 
needed to consider these issues, my amendment does provide the 
Secretary of Transportation with a consultative role. This is 
similar to the role that the Secretary now plays in airline 
mergers.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Will the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Conyers. Yes, sir.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. I'm happy to support this part of 
the amendment, too, and would urge that it be adopted.
    Mr. Conyers. I am surprised, and delighted, and pleased.
    In other words, what we're doing, Members of the Committee, 
is making a bill that may be unacceptable to most of us. We're 
giving--we're making it work, and I thank the Chairman for his 
support, and I ask that the rest of my statement be put in the 
record----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection.
    Mr. Conyers. And I return my time.
    [The statement of Mr. Conyers follows:]
Prepared Statement of the Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative 
                 in Congress From the State of Michigan
    My amendment makes three straightforward changes.
    First, the amendment makes the bill a freestanding law, rather than 
an amendment to the Transportation laws. This sends a message to other 
committees that we will protect the integrity of the antitrust laws and 
not allow them to be amended in unrelated vehicles. It will also help 
insure that any future changes or modifications to the law are referred 
to this committee, rather than tucked away in obscure reaches of the 
U.S. Code which are not readily apparent to the Parliamentarian. I 
believe that is the reason the Parliamentarian made a mistake on the 
initial referral.
    Second, we substitute the Attorney General for the Secretary of 
Transportation in each place in the bill. The Justice Department, not 
the Department of Transportation is the authority on competition and 
the antitrust laws. The Justice Department already has the authority to 
rule on airline mergers and other transportation antitrust disputes, 
and I am confident the antitrust division will have no problem ruling 
on competition issues as they relate to airline congestion. To the 
extent any specific air transportation expertise is needed to consider 
these issues, my amendment provides the Secretary of Transportation 
with a consultive role. This is similar to the role the Secretary now 
plays in airline mergers.
    Third, my amendment specifies an antitrust test for granting the 
exemption, rather than the more amorphous public interest standard in 
the underlying bill. The test in my amendment--``substantially lessen 
competition or tend to create a monopoly'' is drawn verbatim from the 
Clayton Act, and should not present any new or difficult 
interpretational issues for Antitrust Division. The proponents of this 
measure claim it will not harm consumers. There is only one way to make 
sure that is the case is to require a competitive antitrust review. 
Otherwise there will be risk that the consumer's interest in lower 
prices will be trumped by the airlines argument for less flights.
    My amendment is modest and straightforward and builds on the very 
worthwhile changes made in the Chairman's amendment. It restores the 
Committee's jurisdiction over the antitrust modifications. It restores 
the role of the Attorney General, and it provides an real antitrust 
test. I urge the Members to vote for protecting the consumers and 
protecting competition.

    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Is there further discussion on the 
second Conyers amendment?
    Hearing none, all of those in favor of the amendment 
signify by saying aye.
    Opposed, no.
    The ayes appear to have it. The ayes have it, and the 
second Conyers amendment is agreed to.
    For what purpose does the gentlewoman from California, Ms. 
Waters, seek recognition?
    Ms. Waters. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
    [The amendment follows:]
    
    
    Mr. Smith of Texas. Mr. Chairman, may I reserve a point of 
order?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. A point of order by the gentleman 
from Texas, Mr. Smith, is reserved, and the gentlewoman from 
California is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Waters. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Members.
    Today I offer an amendment to H.R. 1407 to deal with what I 
consider one of the most serious problems we have in the Los 
Angeles area with a severe impact on my district. We're all 
aware of the increase in passenger flights in recent years. 
Part of this is due to an increase in competition, which offers 
passengers more options and which also will drive down, 
perhaps, prices. However, many airports are more greatly 
affected by this increased passenger demand than are other 
airports. And when we rush to make flights available to more 
and more people, we must not forget the great effects those 
flights have on our passengers and our communities, everything 
from delays--which we're attempting to deal with today, Mr. 
Chairman, with your amendment--congestion, pollution, and 
disruption to the communities surrounding these airports.
    I'm offering an amendment out of strong concern with what's 
happening at the airport in my district. The Los Angeles World 
airports, the organization that controls Los Angeles 
International Airport, has proposed an expansion of that 
airport. And while I am well-aware of the benefits of new 
flights, I'm strongly opposed to any expansion of this land-
locked LAX.
    This attempted expansion is simply an expansion that is 
trying to squeeze into LAX a new runway to be able to 
accommodate more flights, despite the fact we don't have any 
more land there, we don't have any more capacity there. As a 
matter of fact, the disruption and the negative impact on the 
surrounding communities has become very severe. The schools 
under the flight path must stop many times during the day 
because they cannot hear, and they cannot discuss their lessons 
because of the noise that's produced by the ever-unending 
flights coming over those schools going right into the airport. 
The traffic congestion in some of the smaller cities around the 
airport is just unconscionable and cannot--cannot be supported 
any longer.
    I am asking that this amendment be adopted that would 
simply say--and, first, let me just say this: Currently, we are 
accommodating 68 million--we're at 68 million capacity, and 
they want to go to 80 million. They can go to 80 million. 
They're allowed by the Feds to go to 80 million, but they want 
to expand up to 90 million. As far back as 1998--and I don't 
have the most recent figures--we were accommodating like almost 
3,000 flights a day.
    The Environmental Impact Study is out, and it absolutely 
identifies that the communities near and around the airport 
will bear a higher burden of the impacts of the airport 
expansion. LAX is an environmental monster. It is already the 
single largest producer of smog-inducing pollution in Los 
Angeles County. Air quality in the area surrounding LAX will 
decrease as emissions from the airport increase with the growth 
in these activities.
    Every elected official in and around that airport is 
opposed to this expansion. Most of the Southern California 
elected officials, both Democrat and Republican, are opposed to 
this expansion.
    We are trying to force all of our airports to get together 
similar to the way you're talking about the airlines getting 
together to deal with delays, to talk about a regional 
response. We're not trying to stop air traffic. We're not 
trying to limit growth. We're just trying to rearrange it so 
that the region is involved in the polling rather than trying 
to simply squeeze more flights into this very land-locked area.
    So I am presenting this amendment that would simply say 
that LAX would not be able to expand beyond the allowable 
capacity that could take it from 68 million up to 80 million, 
but the expansion that is being requested to take it to 90 
million should not take place, and they should be encouraged by 
my amendment----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The time has expired.
    Does the gentleman from Texas insist upon his point of 
order?
    Mr. Smith of Texas. Yes, I do, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman will state his point 
of order.
    Mr. Smith of Texas. Mr. Chairman----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Please use the mike so the reporter 
can----
    Mr. Smith of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I believe that the 
gentlewoman from California's amendment is nongermane, and I'll 
stand on my point of order.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Does anybody wish to speak on the 
point of order?
    [No response.]
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The Chair is prepared to rule. One 
of the----
    Mr. Delahunt. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Massachusetts?
    Mr. Delahunt. Yeah, I move to strike the last word.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The question is confined to a 
discussion of the point of order. Does anybody wish to speak on 
the point of order?
    Ms. Waters. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I wish to speak on the point 
of order.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentlewoman from California.
    Ms. Waters. Mr. Chairman, I think that if the gentleman 
from Texas is going to insist on this point of order, he owes 
it to this Committee and the people from California, to me, and 
people from Southern California to at least discuss with us why 
he has better knowledge and understanding from Texas about what 
is happening in Los Angeles. What is the point of order?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Well, the question is, is that 
the--the gentleman from Texas makes a point of order that the 
amendment offered by the gentlewoman from California is not 
germane to the bill. One of the tests of germaneness is the 
jurisdiction of the Committee where the amendment would go to 
should it be a freestanding bill. This is clearly within the 
jurisdiction of the Committee on Transportation and 
Infrastructure, not of the Committee on the Judiciary, 
consequently, the Chair sustains the point of order.
    Are there further amendments to the bill?
    [No response.]
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Hearing none, the question is on 
reporting favorably the bill, as amended.
    Those in favor will signify by saying aye.
    Those opposed, no.
    The ayes appear to have it. The ayes have it, and the 
motion to report favorably is agreed to, and the Chair notes 
the presence of a reporting quorum.
    Without objection, the bill will be reported in the form of 
a single amendment in the nature of a substitute, reflecting 
the amendments agreed to by the Committee here today.
    Without objection, the staff will be authorized to make 
technical and conforming changes.
    Without objection, the Chair is authorized to go to 
conference, pursuant to House rules, and all Members will be 
given 2 days in which to file dissenting additional 
supplemental or minority views.

                                
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