[House Report 107-454]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                 Union Calendar No. 269
107th Congress                                                   Report
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 2d Session                                                     107-454




  May 14, 2002.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed


   Mr. Burton, from the Committee on Government Reform submitted the 

                             SECOND REPORT

    On March 14, 2002, the Committee on Government Reform 
approved and adopted a report entitled ``Justice Undone: 
Clemency Decisions in the Clinton White House.'' The chairman 
was directed to transmit a copy to the Speaker of the House.


                 Appendix I.--Committee Correspondence

                   Appendix II.--Committee Subpoenas

       Appendix III.--Marc Rich and Pincus Green Pardon Petition


    On his last day in office, President Clinton issued 140 
pardons and 36 commutations. Several were controversial, 
particularly the pardon of Marc Rich, and prompted criticism 
from across the political spectrum. Some of the most vocal 
critics were those who had been strong supporters and often 
defenders of President Clinton. For example, Sen. Charles 
Schumer said, ``There can be no justification in pardoning a 
fugitive from justice. Pardoning a fugitive stands our justice 
system on its head and makes a mockery of it.'' \1\ Rep. Barney 
Frank likewise said, ``It was a real betrayal by Bill Clinton 
of all who had been strongly supportive of him to do something 
this unjustified. It was contemptuous.'' \2\
    \1\ U.S. Attorney: Was Clinton Bribed? Feds Hunting for Link 
Between Rich Pardon and Campaign Contributions, Chicago Sun-Times (Feb. 
15, 2001).
    \2\ E.J. Dionne Jr., And the Gifts that Keep on Giving, Washington 
Post (Feb. 6, 2001).
    These sentiments were echoed by the Democratic members of 
this Committee. Rep. Henry Waxman said, ``The Rich pardon is 
bad precedent. It appears to set a double standard for the 
wealthy and powerful. And it is an end run around the judicial 
process.'' \3\ At a Committee hearing on the Marc Rich pardon, 
Rep. Elijah Cummings expressed the view of many members when he 
    \3\ House Committee on Government Reform, Hearings on the 
Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich, 37, 107th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (Feb. 8, and Mar. 1, 2001) (hereinafter ``Pardon 
Hearings, Day One or Day Two'').

        It's one thing to go to trial. It's one thing to stay 
        here and face the music. It's one thing to be found not 
        guilty. It's a whole other thing, in my opinion, when 
        somebody, because they have the money, can go outside 
        the country and evade the system. I tell you it really 
        concerns me because my constituents have a major 
        problem with that, and I do, too.\4\
    \4\ Id. at 164-65.

    Chairman Burton could have chosen to build upon this 
consensus. He could have conducted a focused and bipartisan 
inquiry, issued a report that set out the facts for the public, 
and avoided the partisanship that has hampered this Committee's 
work over the past five years.\5\ Unfortunately, he chose to do 
the opposite.
    \5\ See Minority Staff Report, House Committee on Government 
Reform, Unsubstantiated Allegations of Wrongdoing Involving the Clinton 
Administration (March 2001) (Exhibit 1).
    The Committee's investigation continued more than a year 
after Republican congressional leaders themselves acknowledged 
it should have ended. In an interview broadcast nationally on 
March 10, 2001, House Speaker Dennis Hastert said, ``I think, 
probably from my point of view, about all that information 
[that] is going to come out, has come out'' and ``I think this 
is kind of winding down on its own.'' \6\ Senator Trent Lott, 
then Majority Leader, expressed similar sentiments, stating: 
``I'd be inclined to move on.'' \7\
    \6\ Hastert Backs Off Pardon Probe, Chicago Tribune (Mar. 11, 
2001); see Letter from Rep. Henry Waxman to Chairman Dan Burton (Mar. 
15, 2001) (Exhibit 2).
    \7\ Hastert Backs Off Pardon Probe, Chicago Tribune (Mar. 11, 
    Rather than wind down the investigation, Chairman Burton 
chose to expand its scope. What began in January 2001 as an 
inquiry into the pardon of Marc Rich rapidly multiplied to 
include dozens of other requests for executive clemency. The 
majority report states that ``the Committee limited its 
investigation to pardons and commutations where there was no 
credible explanation for the grant of clemency, and where there 
was an appearance of impropriety relating to inappropriate 
access or corruption.'' \8\ But as reflected in its voluminous 
report, the majority not only investigated requests for 
clemency that President Clinton chose to grant, it investigated 
requests that President Clinton denied.\9\ The majority also 
devoted great attention to requests for clemency that were 
pondered but never even submitted to the Justice Department or 
the White House for consideration.\10\ It even examined 
unsuccessful efforts by Roger Clinton, the President's half-
brother, to assist a federal inmate in his petition for parole; 
\11\ Roger Clinton's purported role in unsuccessful efforts by 
the head of an association to obtain the Secretary of 
Transportation as a speaker for a symposium; \12\ and Roger 
Clinton's apparent acceptance of fees to lobby the 
Administration to ease Cuban travel restrictions.\13\
    \8\ Majority Report, Introduction, at 3.
    \9\ For example, the majority devotes an entire chapter of its 
report to efforts by Roger Clinton to obtain clemency for others, even 
though none of the people Roger Clinton recommended for clemency ever 
received it from President Clinton. See Majority Report, Chapter Two, 
at 709-831.
    \10\ For example, the majority report devotes great attention to 
allegations that Roger Clinton participated in a scheme to sell a 
pardon to Garland Lincecum, a petition for whom was apparently never 
submitted to the Justice Department or White House. See Majority 
Report, Chapter Two, at 777-798. These allegations have been denied by 
Roger Clinton. Swindle is Reported to Use the Name of Roger Clinton, 
New York Times (June 21, 2001).
    \11\ Majority Report, Chapter Two, at 731-776.
    \12\ Id. at 725-31.
    \13\ Id. at 723-25.
    As part of this far-flung enterprise, Chairman Burton 
unilaterally issued 153 subpoenas and requests for documents. 
Of these, fewer than one-third included requests for records 
relating to the pardon of Marc Rich. The remainder focused on 
members of President Clinton's family. Seventy-five related to 
Roger Clinton, twenty-three related to Hugh Rodham, and eight 
related to Tony Rodham. In response to these requests for 
documents, private parties and government agencies produced 
nearly 25,000 pages of documents.
    In the end, the majority's investigation sheds little new 
light. It is primarily a collection of unsupported and 
irresponsible statements. The majority report repeatedly 
suggests that corruption by President Clinton or his 
Administration may explain the Rich pardon. For example, the 
majority states that notes of a conversation between President 
Clinton and former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak ``raise[] 
the possibility that either Barak or Clinton acted on the Rich 
matter because of some promise of future financial return.'' 
\14\ And the majority accuses President Clinton of making 
``false and misleading statements.'' \15\
    \14\ Majority Report, Executive Summary, at 6.
    \15\ Majority Report, Chapter One, at 258.
    The majority also makes serious allegations of wrongdoing 
against other Administration officials. Most notably, the 
majority accuses Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder of 
deliberately cutting out other Justice Department officials in 
an effort to assist with the Rich petition.\16\ It suggests, 
moreover, that Mr. Holder did this because he believed Jack 
Quinn could help him become Attorney General in a possible Gore 
    \16\ Id. at 213.
    \17\ Id. at 214.
    There is a critical difference, however, between bad 
judgment and the corruption the majority hints at--but never 
establishes--in its report. The Rich pardon is indisputably a 
case of bad judgment. As wealthy fugitives, Marc Rich and his 
associate Pincus Green did not deserve the pardons they 
received from President Clinton. But it is equally evident that 
the sprawling record assembled by the Committee does not 
support the allegation that President Clinton or any other 
Administration official was bribed or otherwise corrupted.
    Early in the investigation, former White House Chief of 
Staff John Podesta, former White House Counsel Beth Nolan, and 
former Deputy White House Counsel Bruce Lindsey appeared before 
the Committee to explain the decision-making behind the Rich 
pardon. Each of these eyewitnesses testified that while they 
disagreed with the President's decision, they believed that he 
made a decision based on his evaluation of the merits and had 
no reason to believe that a quid pro quo or any other improper 
consideration influenced his exercise of the pardon power.\18\ 
There is nothing in the record before the Committee that 
contradicts this testimony.
    \18\ E.g., Pardon Hearings, Day Two, at 318, 328, 335, 337.
    In reality, what happened was that in the waning hours of 
the Administration, the process broke down, and President 
Clinton and other officials exercised poor judgment. Beth Nolan 
explained that in late 1999 or early 2000, President Clinton 
told her that he ``wanted to exercise the pardon power more 
than he had in the past, that he felt he hadn't exercised it 
fully, and he wanted to be sure that we had a process in place 
to be sure that pardons moved quickly through the process.'' 
\19\ Ms. Nolan communicated the President's instructions to 
speed up the review process to the Deputy Attorney General and 
the Justice Department's Pardon Attorney in several meetings 
beginning in early 2000.
    \19\ Id. at 100.
    As Ms. Nolan testified, however, these efforts produced 
``no movement.'' \20\ She testified that by the fall of 2000, 
the Pardon Attorney had indicated that he would not process any 
more pardon applications.\21\ But despite this development, 
President Clinton insisted on exercising his prerogative to 
receive and consider requests for clemency, even up until his 
last day in office. Under these circumstances, and working 
against the clock, the White House and Justice Department 
officials responsible for assisting the President could not and 
did not conduct a full and appropriate review of every 
    \20\ Id. at 102.
    \21\ Id. at 342.
    The Marc Rich pardon was an outgrowth of this flawed 
procedure. It was the product of a rushed and one-sided 
process, and it reflected deeply flawed judgment by the 
President. It was not, however, the criminal conspiracy that 
the majority insinuates.
    Article II, section 2 of the Constitution grants the 
President ``Power to grant reprieves and pardons for offences 
against the United States, except in cases of impeachment.'' 
The Framers of the Constitution intentionally vested the pardon 
power in one person who would have sole discretion to make 
decisions and bear full responsibility for the 
consequences.\22\ In 1788, Alexander Hamilton explained why it 
should be so:
    \22\ Despite the existence of guidelines on the subject, such as 
those set out in Title 28 of the Code of Federal Regulations, the 
clemency power is reserved exclusively to the President under the 
Constitution. It cannot be constrained by any executive branch 
regulations or by the judgments of any of the President's subordinates. 
Indeed, even the majority acknowledges this point. Majority Report, 
Introduction, at 29. The clemency power also cannot be constrained by 
Congress. The Supreme Court has made clear that the power ``flows from 
the Constitution alone, not from any legislative enactments, and that 
it cannot be modified, abridged, or diminished by the Congress.'' 
Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 268 (1974). For this reason, some 
observers have questioned the power of Congress even to investigate the 
President's clemency decisions. For example, Stanley Brand, who served 
as General Counsel to the House of Representatives from 1976 to 1984, 
opined that the pardon controversy was not a subject ``on which 
legislation could be had'' and was therefore a matter outside the 
bounds of legitimate congressional inquiry. See Stanley M. Brand, A 
Pardon Probe: It's None of Congress's Business, Washington Post (Feb. 
28, 2001).

        Humanity and good policy conspire to dictate that the 
        benign prerogative of pardoning should be as little as 
        possible fettered or embarrassed. . . . As the sense of 
        responsibility is always strongest in proportion as it 
        undivided, it may be inferred that a single man would 
        be most ready to attend to the force of those motives, 
        which might plead for a mitigation of the rigor of the 
        law, and least apt to yield to considerations, which 
        were calculated to shelter a fit object of its 
    \23\ The Federalist No. 74, at 377 (Alexander Hamilton) (Gary Wills 
ed., 1982).

    As the person entrusted with the pardon power, President 
Clinton should bear the full responsibility and the brunt of 
the criticism for disarray in the clemency review process and 
for his controversial decisions. This criticism has properly 
been widespread and vociferous. As one commentator noted, 
President Clinton's ``truly remarkable achievement was in 
creating a consensus against himself with his pardon of March 
Rich.'' \24\
    \24\ E.J. Dionne Jr., And the Gifts that Keep on Giving, Washington 
Post (Feb. 6, 2001).
    Unfortunately, as with the Committee's past investigations 
of the Clinton Administration, the majority's report goes too 
far. The report does not recite facts and draw reasonable 
conclusions. Instead, the report intersperses suppositions with 
facts and draws every possible inference against President 
Clinton, those who assisted him in making clemency decisions, 
and individuals who advocated clemency for others. Moreover, 
the report unfairly questions the motives and integrity of 
individuals, and makes numerous unsubstantiated allegations of 
    The following discussion summarizes some of the major 
allegations involving President Clinton in the majority report 
and then compares them to the facts in the record before the 

 Allegation: It is possible that President Clinton 
``acted on the Rich matter because of some promise of future 
financial return.'' \25\
    \25\ Majority Report, Executive Summary, at 6.

    The Facts: The majority, interpreting a gap in notes of a 
conversation between President Clinton and former Israeli Prime 
Minister Ehud Barak, suggests that President Clinton pardoned 
Marc Rich on the promise of future financial return, a federal 
felony. The majority report states:

        Barak had met with Rich personally, and told Clinton 
        that the Rich pardon ``could be important . . . not 
        just financially, but he helped Mossad on more than one 
        case.'' Barak's statement raises the possibility that 
        either Barak or Clinton acted on the Rich matter 
        because of some promise of future financial return.\26\
    \26\ Id.

    As the majority report later acknowledges, these 
typewritten notes specify that there is a gap in the note 
taking, and the reference may relate to Mr. Rich's past 
financial support for the State of Israel.\27\ The majority has 
not and cannot cite to any evidence that President Clinton 
acted on the Rich matter because he expected a financial 
benefit. The majority's innuendo is irresponsible and 
contradicted by the overwhelming evidence before the Committee.
    \27\ Majority Report, Chapter One, at 227.

 Allegation: President Clinton ``may be attempting to 
use former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak's interest in the 
Rich matter as a cover for his own motivations for granting the 
Rich pardon.'' \28\
    \28\ Id. at 103.

    The Facts: President Clinton, in an op-ed published in the 
New York Times, explained that one of the reasons he granted 
Marc Rich a pardon was because former high-ranking Israeli 
officials and Jewish community leaders had urged the 
pardon.\29\ The majority disputes this explanation and 
concludes that President Clinton was simply using Prime 
Minister Barak's interest as pretext. As explanation, the 
majority states: ``An examination of the transcripts of the 
calls [between President Clinton and Prime Minister Barak] 
shows that Barak did not make a particularly impassioned plea 
for Rich.'' \30\ The majority offers no other support for its 
unsubstantiated conclusion.
    \29\ See William Jefferson Clinton, My Reasons for the Pardons, New 
York Times (Feb. 18, 2001).
    \30\ Majority Report, Chapter One, at 103.
 Allegation: President Clinton has failed to offer a 
full accounting of his decision to issue the Marc Rich and 
Pincus Green pardons.\31\
    \31\ Id. at 105.

    The Facts: With the possible exception of President Gerald 
Ford, who personally testified before the House Judiciary 
Committee about his pardon of Richard Nixon, no President has 
given a more complete accounting of a clemency decision than 
has President Clinton on his decision to pardon Marc Rich and 
Pincus Green.
    As the majority notes in its report, President Clinton took 
the extraordinary step of waiving all executive privilege 
claims with respect to the testimony of former White House 
officials.\32\ He allowed his most senior advisors and lawyers 
to testify before this Committee, not only with respect to the 
Rich pardon, but other requests for clemency as well. John 
Podesta, President Clinton's former Chief of Staff, Beth Nolan, 
the former Counsel to the President, and Bruce Lindsey, 
Assistant and Deputy Counsel to the President, all answered 
detailed questions for more than six and half hours about their 
deliberative process, confidential internal communications, and 
personal recommendations to the President.\33\ Moreover, 
President Clinton waived executive privilege and allowed 
Committee staff to review the raw notes of conversations he had 
with another head of state, former Prime Minister Ehud Barak. 
The Committee would never have been able to obtain such 
detailed information about the clemency decisions without the 
willing cooperation of President Clinton.\34\
    \32\ Majority Report, Introduction, at 38.
    \33\ Pardon Hearings, Day Two, at 279-437.
    \34\ Attempting to contrast the explanation offered by President 
Clinton, the majority cites with approval a ``full accounting'' 
published by President Bush to explain his 1992 pardon of Caspar 
Weinberger and others involved in the Iran-Contra matter. See Majority 
Report, Introduction, at 25. President Bush's explanation, however, 
does little more than identify Mr. Weinberger as ``a true American 
patriot,'' note the length of various investigations into the Iran-
Contra Affair, and criticize the ``criminalization of policy 
decisions.'' See Proclamation 6518, 57 Fed. Reg. 62145 (Dec. 24, 1992). 
Unlike President Clinton's published explanation, see infra note 35 and 
accompanying text, President Bush's explanation made no attempt to 
address the criminal conduct alleged against Mr. Weinberger and gave no 
substantive explanation as to why he believed a pardon was justified.
    In addition to making his former staff available for 
interrogation, President Clinton published a written 
explanation for his pardons of Marc Rich and Pincus Green.\35\ 
He laid out several reasons for the pardons that he understood 
to be true at the time: (1) He understood that oil companies 
that had structured transactions like Mr. Rich and Mr. Green 
had been sued civilly rather than prosecuted criminally; (2) he 
was told that in 1985, the Energy Department had found in a 
related case that the manner in which Mr. Rich's companies had 
accounted for the transactions at issue was proper; (3) two 
highly regarded tax experts concluded that the companies had 
adhered to the tax law; (4) the companies had paid 
approximately $200 million in fines, penalties, and taxes to 
resolve the case; (5) in 1989, the Justice Department rejected 
the use of racketeering statutes in tax cases, such as the case 
against Mr. Rich and Mr. Green; (6) he understood that the 
Deputy Attorney General was ``neutral, leaning for'' the 
pardons; (7) the case was reviewed and advocated by his former 
White House Counsel Jack Quinn and three distinguished 
Republican lawyers: Leonard Garment, William Bradford Reynolds, 
and Lewis Libby; \36\ and (8) most importantly, former high-
ranking Israeli officials and Jewish community leaders had 
urged the pardon.\37\
    \35\ William Jefferson Clinton, My Reasons for the Pardons, New 
York Times (Feb. 18, 2001).
    \36\ As the majority notes in its report, an initial draft of the 
statement incorrectly stated that the ``applications were reviewed and 
advocated'' by Mr. Garment, Mr. Reynolds, and Mr. Libby. (See Majority 
Report, Chapter One, at 261). President Clinton's representatives 
notified the New York Times of the mistake, which corrected the piece 
in most printed editions and published a correction. (See Editors' 
Note, New York Times (Feb. 19, 2001).)
    \37\ William Jefferson Clinton, My Reasons for the Pardons, New 
York Times (Feb. 18, 2001).

 Allegation: President Clinton's written explanation 
for the Marc Rich pardon is ``rife with false and misleading 
statements.'' \38\
    \38\ Majority Report, Chapter One, at 258.

    The Facts: In its report, the majority dismisses President 
Clinton's explanation, reaching the inflammatory conclusion 
that ``it was rife with false and misleading statements'' and 
left the Committee ``wondering what the President's true 
motivations were.'' \39\ While the majority may legitimately 
question the merit of President Clinton's decision, its report 
provides no basis for the claim that his explanation was not 
    \39\ Id. at 258, 262.
    Lawyers not involved in the pardon effort, such as Harvard 
Law School Professor Alan Dershowitz, supported President 
Clinton's decision.\40\ In addition, one prominent Bush 
Administration official who testified before the Committee--
Lewis ``Scooter'' Libby--agreed with most of the reasons given 
by President Clinton for the pardons.\41\ Mr. Libby represented 
Marc Rich before his decision to seek a pardon and now serves 
as Chief of Staff to Vice President Cheney. Testifying after 
two former federal prosecutors laid out the strength of their 
case against Mr. Rich, Mr. Libby flatly stated: ``I believe 
that the Southern District of New York misconstrued the facts 
and the law, and looking at all of the evidence of the defense 
he had not violated the tax laws.'' \42\ Mr. Libby testified, 
moreover, that if he had been asked to pursue a pardon during 
his representation of Mr. Rich, he could have put together a 
strong and defensible case for clemency.\43\
    \40\ Letter from Alan M. Dershowitz to Mike Tirone, Producer, 
Hardball With Chris Matthews (Jan. 25, 2001) (Exhibit 3).
    \41\ Pardon Hearings, Day 2, at 477-78.
    \42\ Id. at 485.
    \43\ Id. at 522.
    The fact that lawyers like Mr. Libby believe Mr. Rich had a 
defensible case for a pardon does not make the President's 
decision right. But it does indicate that it was possible for 
the President to reach the decision he did without being 
corrupt or deceptive.

 Allegation: President Clinton ``encouraged Roger 
Clinton to capitalize on their relationship.'' \44\
    \44\ Majority Report, Chapter Two, at 709.

    The Facts: In its report, the majority states as a 
``finding of the Committee'' that ``President Clinton 
encouraged Roger Clinton to capitalize on their relationship'' 
and that he ``instructed Roger Clinton to use his connections 
to the Administration to gain financial advantage.'' \45\ The 
majority makes similar allegations elsewhere in this chapter. 
For example, it states:
    \45\ Id.

        Roger Clinton repeatedly treated his relationship to 
        President Clinton as a commodity to be sold to the 
        highest bidder. . . . Roger Clinton's behavior was 
        unseemly at best, but it is even more troubling that 
        the President himself appears to have instigated and 
        encouraged his behavior.\46\
    \46\ Id. at 717.

    The majority's sole basis for this finding is a statement 
made by a lawyer representing former Arkansas State Senator 
George Locke. The majority apparently heard this statement from 
the lawyer, who had purportedly heard it from Mr. Locke. Mr. 
Locke had purportedly heard it from Roger Clinton. Roger 
Clinton, in turn, had purportedly heard it from President 
Clinton.\47\ Mr. Locke, on whose credibility the majority 
primarily relies, had been convicted of cocaine-related charges 
and served time in prison with Roger Clinton. The unreliability 
of this triple hearsay should be self-evident.
    \47\ Id. at 709, 719.
    The majority devotes 120 pages to Roger Clinton's apparent 
efforts to influence various decisions by the President and 
other executive branch officials. It is telling that the 
evidence before the Committee shows that he failed in each and 
every instance to obtain the result that he sought.


    President Clinton is not the only individual who is the 
target of unsubstantiated allegations in the majority report. 
The following discussion addresses unsubstantiated allegations 
involving other individuals.

 Allegation: Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder 
deliberately assisted Jack Quinn with the Rich petition,\48\ 
worked with Jack Quinn to cut the Justice Department out of the 
process,\49\ and probably did so out of a desire to become 
Attorney General in a possible Gore Administration.\50\
    \48\ Majority Report, Chapter One, at 213.
    \49\ Majority Report, Executive Summary, at 6.
    \50\ Majority Report, Chapter One, at 214.

    The Facts: Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder gave 
ambiguously worded and ill-considered advice to the White House 
on the Rich pardon petition without knowing all of the facts 
and without involving others in the Justice Department. 
Contrary to the majority's assertions, however, Mr. Holder was 
never in league with advocates seeking a pardon for Marc Rich 
and never sought to help them ``circumvent'' the Justice 
Department. Moreover, the majority's suggestion that Mr. Holder 
acted out of a desire to become Attorney General is 
    \51\ The majority also contends that Jack Quinn ``circumvented'' 
the Justice Department by limiting his contact on the pardon petition 
to Eric Holder. This makes no sense, as Mr. Holder served as Deputy 
Attorney General, the Justice Department official second in rank only 
to the Attorney General.
    The majority repeatedly exaggerates evidence received by 
the Committee in an attempt to show a conspiracy between Mr. 
Holder and Mr. Quinn. For example, the majority suggests that 
Mr. Holder purposefully steered Marc Rich to Jack Quinn. 
According to the majority report:

        Quinn was hired after a recommendation from Deputy 
        Attorney General Eric Holder. Gershon Kekst, who worked 
        for Marc Rich on the pardon matter, asked Holder for a 
        recommendation of how to settle a criminal matter with 
        the Justice Department. Holder recommended that he hire 
        a Washington lawyer ``who knows the process, he comes 
        to me, and we work it out.'' Holder then explicitly 
        recommended the hiring of Jack Quinn.\52\
    \52\ Majority Report, Executive Summary, at 3. In its report, the 
majority attributes the following statement to Mr. Holder as though it 
was a direct quote: ``Holder told Kekst that such a person should `hire 
a lawyer who knows the process, he comes to me, and we work it out.' '' 
Majority Report, Chapter One, at 101. The minority staff notes of Mr. 
Kekst's interview do not reflect any mention of the words, ``he comes 
to me, and we work it out.'' Even if Mr. Kekst did use those or similar 
words to describe Mr. Holder's statement, his recollection is more than 
two years old, and he certainly did not purport to remember Mr. 
Holder's exact words.

    To reach the conclusion that Mr. Holder ``recommended'' Mr. 
Quinn to Mr. Kekst, the majority ascribes great significance to 
a chance social encounter in late 1998 between Mr. Holder and 
Mr. Kekst, who had never before met. According to Mr. Kekst, he 
found himself seated next to Mr. Holder at a large corporate 
event. After Mr. Holder indicated that he ``worked at Main 
Justice,'' Mr. Kekst recalled asking him general questions 
about the system of accountability at the Department of Justice 
and, in particular, to whom U.S. Attorneys were responsible. 
Mr. Holder apparently responded that they were accountable to 
him; that was his job. He recalls asking Mr. Holder what a 
person would do if he believed he was the victim of an 
overzealous prosecutor. Mr. Kekst said that Mr. Holder 
suggested hiring a lawyer in Washington, D.C., who knows the 
process. He recalled that Mr. Holder then spotted Jack Quinn 
and said words to the effect of, ``There is Jack Quinn, someone 
like that.'' According to Mr. Kekst, Marc Rich's name never 
came up in the conversation.\53\
    \53\ Joint Interview of Gershon Kekst (March 15, 2001).
    The majority also exaggerates the significance of Mr. 
Holder's attempt to facilitate a meeting between prosecutors in 
the Southern District of New York and lawyers representing Mr. 
Rich. The majority writes that ``Holder had worked with Quinn 
during the previous year to try to force the Southern District 
of New York to sit down and meet with Quinn about settling the 
charges against Rich.'' \54\ The majority goes on to say that 
``Holder had a basically sympathetic view of the Rich case.'' 
\55\ In his hearing testimony, Mr. Holder acknowledged 
receiving the request from Mr. Quinn and asking a career 
Justice Department official on his staff to look into the 
matter. He explained that the prosecutors in New York declined 
the meeting and said that neither he nor anyone on his staff 
ever pressed them to have the meeting.\56\ Mr. Holder further 
    \54\ Majority Report, Chapter One, at 208.
    \55\ Id.
    \56\ Pardon Hearings, Day One, at 193.

        We simply deferred to them [the Southern District of 
        New York prosecutors] because it was their case. In 
        candor, if I were making the decision as the U.S. 
        Attorney, I probably would have held a meeting. In my 
        view, the government--and the cause of justice--often 
        gains from hearing about the flaws, real or imagined, 
        cited by defense counsel in a criminal case. But my 
        only goal was to ensure that the request was fully 
    \57\ Id.

    The majority has no evidence to support its assertion that 
Mr. Holder ``tried to force'' prosecutors to meet with Mr. 
Quinn or was sympathetic to anything other than Mr. Quinn's 
effort to set up a meeting with the prosecutors.
    The evidence before the Committee also does not prove the 
majority's accusation that Mr. Holder worked with Mr. Quinn to 
cut other Justice Department officials out of the pardon review 
process. In retrospect, it is clear that Mr. Holder should have 
done more to include other Justice Department officials in the 
review process. Indeed, Mr. Holder conceded as much during his 
testimony.\58\ This mistake in judgment is not evidence of 
    \58\ See id. at 192.
    The majority points to a November 18, 2001, e-mail message 
as proof of a conspiracy between Mr. Holder and Mr. Quinn. The 
subject line of the message reads, ``eric.'' \59\ The text of 
the message reads: ``spoke to him last evening. he says go 
straight to wh. also says timing is good. we shd get in soon. 
will elab when we speak.'' \60\ Neither Mr. Quinn nor Mr. 
Holder testified about this message, however. Indeed, as the 
majority itself acknowledges, it is unclear that ``eric'' even 
refers to Eric Holder.\61\
    \59\ Majority Report, Chapter One, at 213; Majority Exhibit 146.
    \60\ E-mail from Jack Quinn to Kathleen Behan, Arnold & Porter, et 
al. (Nov. 18, 2000) (Majority Exhibit 146).
    \61\ See Majority Report, Chapter One, at 213.
    Assuming the e-mail accurately reflects the words of Mr. 
Holder, it shows that he advised Mr. Quinn to submit the pardon 
petition directly to the White House. But this is not proof of 
wrongdoing. As Beth Nolan testified, the Pardon Attorney in the 
Justice Department had indicated by then that he would not 
process any more pardon applications,\62\ while the President 
was continuing to accept clemency applications at the White 
House.\63\ Advising Mr. Quinn of these facts is not criminal 
behavior, and it is consistent with Mr. Holder's expectation 
that Justice Department officials would be consulted even if 
Mr. Quinn submitted the petition directly to the White 
House.\64\ It is certainly more plausible than the conspiracy 
suggested in the majority's report.
    \62\ Pardon Hearings, Day Two, at 342.
    \63\ See id.
    \64\ Mr. Holder testified that he believed the Justice Department 
would have an opportunity to review and consider a pardon petition, 
even if it was submitted directly to the White House. Pardon Hearings, 
Day One, at 193. The White House Counsel's office consulted frequently 
with the Justice Department Pardon Attorney, and did so until the end 
of the Administration. See, e.g., Pardon Hearings, Day Two, at 355. 
Indeed, toward the end of the Clinton Administration, Mr. Holder asked 
that the White House Counsel's office keep his office informed whenever 
it needed information from the Office of the Pardon Attorney so that 
his office could keep track. Joint Interview of Meredith Cabe, former 
Associate Counsel to the President (Mar. 16, 2001). This was normal 
procedure, as the Deputy Attorney General is the designated Justice 
Department liaison to the White House. See U.S. Attorney's Manual 
Sec. 1-2.102(D).
    Finally, the majority suggests that Mr. Holder helped with 
the Rich petition out of a desire to be appointed Attorney 
General in a Gore Administration. The majority report states:

        At the time when Holder made the decision to assist 
        Quinn, there was still a realistic possibility of Vice 
        President Gore winning the election. As an influential 
        friend of Vice President Gore, Jack Quinn would be in a 
        key position to assist Holder's chances of becoming 
        Attorney General. While this may not have been Holder's 
        sole motivation in aiding Quinn, it was likely a 
        powerful motivation for Holder.\65\
    \65\ Majority Report, Chapter One, at 214.

    This speculation is completely implausible. At the time 
when it was still possible for Al Gore to be President, the 
most Mr. Holder did was attempt to facilitate a meeting with 
prosecutors in New York and talk to Mr. Quinn about submitting 
the pardon petition directly to the White House. He did nothing 
to support the Rich petition until he gave an opinion to Beth 
Nolan on January 19, 2001. This was the last full day of the 
Clinton Administration, and his chances of becoming Attorney 
General were nil. As the second ranking official in the Justice 
Department, Mr. Holder could have given powerful support to the 
Rich petition long before January 19, while the Presidential 
election was still in doubt. The evidence before the Committee 
shows that he did nothing of the sort.
    Mr. Holder exercised poor judgment when he told Beth Nolan 
on January 19 that he was neutral, leaning toward favorable on 
the Rich petition, if there was a foreign policy benefit to be 
gained. As he acknowledged, he knew little about the case 
against Marc Rich.\66\ He was not in a position to give any 
recommendation on the petition, even if there was a foreign 
policy benefit. Mr. Holder publicly expressed regret about 
this, testifying that he wished he had ensured the Justice 
Department was more fully informed and involved in the pardon 
process.\67\ He also acknowledged that if he had known 
everything about the case that he later came to know, he would 
not have given his opinion.\68\
    \66\ Pardon Hearings, Day One, at 192.
    \67\ Id.
    \68\ Id. at 194-95, 233.

 Allegation: Jack Quinn and other lawyers 
representing Marc Rich made arguments that were ``false and 
misleading'' \69\ and ``fraudulent.'' \70\
    \69\ Majority Report, Chapter One, at 133.
    \70\ Id. at 212.

    The Facts: The majority repeatedly and inappropriately 
disparages the lawyers involved in the Rich pardon effort, 
accusing them of dishonesty and deception. The majority bases 
such remarks solely on its disagreement with the legal 
arguments advanced in the Rich pardon petition.
    Mr. Quinn and other lawyers representing Mr. Rich were 
carrying out their duty of zealous advocacy on behalf of their 
client. The bar rules of the District of Columbia, which govern 
the professional conduct of lawyers in this jurisdiction, 
impose an obligation of diligence and zeal within the bounds of 
the law.\71\ This rule provides that ``[a] lawyer shall not 
intentionally--[f]ail to seek the lawful objectives of a client 
through reasonably available means'' or ``prejudice or damage 
the client during the course of the professional 
relationship.'' \72\ A lawyer who fails to adhere to this duty 
is subject to discipline, including suspension or disbarment 
from the practice of law.
    \71\ District of Columbia Rule of Professional Responsibility 1.3.
    \72\ Id.
    President Clinton and members of his staff were well aware 
that Mr. Quinn was acting as an advocate. Bruce Lindsey even 
told President Clinton that ``he should consider Mr. Quinn in 
this to be an advocate on one side and not his advisor, and 
that Jack had a client.'' \73\ In keeping with his professional 
responsibilities as a lawyer, Mr. Quinn had an obligation not 
only to advocate the pardon, but to do so in a manner that 
would not prejudice his client's interests. He had no 
obligation to point out the weaknesses in Mr. Rich's case. The 
responsibility to marshal the full array of facts and arguments 
against the petition belonged to the government officials 
involved in the decisional process.
    \73\ Pardon Hearings, Day Two, at 145.
    It is revealing to contrast the majority's treatment of Mr. 
Quinn, who is a Democratic lawyer, with its treatment of 
Scooter Libby, a Republican lawyer who also represented Mr. 
Rich. The majority castigates Mr. Quinn for his representation 
of Mr. Rich and contends that he made fraudulent arguments.\74\ 
Mr. Libby is hardly mentioned, and the majority takes great 
pains to point out that he didn't work on the pardon 
effort.\75\ But in fact, Mr. Libby represented Mr. Rich far 
longer than did Mr. Quinn, and he instructed Mr. Quinn on the 
facts of the case and on controversial arguments later used in 
the Rich pardon petition.\76\ Moreover, Mr. Libby chose to 
represent Mr. Rich--and to accept enormous legal fees from 
him--despite his personal conviction that he was a traitor to 
the United States.\77\
    \74\ See, e.g., Majority Report, Chapter One, at 212.
    \75\ See id. at 132.
    \76\ See Pardon Hearings, Day One, at 123.
    \77\ Pardon Hearings, Day Two, at 491.

 Allegation: When Jack Quinn filed the Marc Rich 
petition with the White House and contacted White House staff 
regarding the pardon, he violated ethical rules set out in 
Executive Order 12834.\78\
    \78\ Majority Report, Chapter One, at 102.

    The Facts: The majority contends that Mr. Quinn violated 
Executive Order 12834, which prohibits, for a period of five 
years, a former executive branch employee from lobbying his or 
her former agency (including the Executive Office of the 
President). The majority asserts that because Mr. Quinn left 
the White House in February 1997, his contacts with respect to 
the Marc Rich pardon were prohibited by the order.
    Although the executive order arguably should extend to 
contacts related to executive clemency, it is not clear that it 
does so. In fact, Chairman Burton indicated that the Committee 
was exploring legislation to close the ``loophole'' in the 
executive order.\79\
    \79\ House Committee on Government Reform, Committee Meeting (Mar. 
14, 2002).
    The executive order identifies six exceptions to the 
proscribed lobbying activity. The second exception expressly 
allows ``communicating or appearing with regard to a judicial 
proceeding.'' \80\ The majority contends that because the 
clemency power is wielded by the executive, not the legislative 
branch, it cannot be a judicial proceeding. The majority's 
interpretation, however, is not supported by the language of 
the executive order. To fall within the ambit of the exception, 
Mr. Quinn's efforts needed to be ``with regard to'' a judicial 
proceeding.\81\ The criminal case pending against Mr. Rich in 
New York arguably constituted such a judicial proceeding. The 
President's decision to grant Mr. Rich a pardon resolved the 
criminal indictment and ended that proceeding. Mr. Quinn's 
contacts with the White House appear to fall within the 
exception and to be permissible.
    \80\ Exec. Order 12834, 58 Fed. Reg. 5,911 (1993).
    \81\ The word ``regard'' is commonly defined as ``to refer or 
relate to; concern.'' See Random House Webster's College Dictionary, 
1094 (2nd ed. 1997); American Heritage College Dictionary, 1149 (3rd 
ed. 1997).
    The majority also asserts that its conclusion is supported 
by the opinion of a U.S. District Court judge, who found that 
Mr. Quinn acted as a lobbyist and was not hired because he was 
a lawyer.\82\ The court's opinion in that case, however, 
related to the attorney-client privilege and work product 
doctrine, and it did not address the scope of lobbying as it is 
defined in the executive order. It does not support the 
majority's contention that Mr. Quinn violated the ethics ban.
    \82\ Majority Report, Chapter One, at 218 (citing In re Grand Jury 
Subpoenas, No. M11-189 DC (S.D.N.Y. 2001).)
    As the majority notes in its report, White House Counsel 
Beth Nolan raised the issue of the executive order with Mr. 
Quinn.\83\ Ms. Nolan appropriately asked an associate counsel 
on her staff to look independently at the question. The 
associate counsel concurred with Mr. Quinn's interpretation of 
the rule and concluded that his work was permissible.\84\
    \83\ Majority Report, Chapter One, at 216.
    \84\ Pardon Hearings, Day Two, at 324.

 Allegation: It is likely that Jack Quinn attempted 
to mislead the public and the Committee when he claimed that he 
did not expect to be paid for his work on the Rich pardon.\85\
    \85\ Majority Report, Chapter One, at 143.

    The Facts: The majority mischaracterizes Jack Quinn's 
testimony in an effort to show that he lied to the Committee 
about his compensation from Marc Rich. For example, the 
majority states: ``Quinn has taken the incredible position that 
he did not expect to be paid for any of his work on the Rich 
case after he left Arnold & Porter'' and ``[i]t is impossible 
to believe that Jack Quinn did his work on the Rich pardon out 
of the goodness of his heart, on a pro bono basis.'' \86\ Mr. 
Quinn never said that he did not expect to be paid for any of 
his work on the Rich case after he left Arnold & Porter, or 
that he was working on a pro bono basis. Rather, he said that 
he discussed the matter with Robert Fink, another lawyer for 
Marc Rich, and came to the conclusion that he would not be paid 
additional fees for his work to obtain a pardon. As the 
majority notes in its own report, Mr. Quinn testified:
    \86\ Majority Report, Chapter One, at 138.

        After leaving Arnold & Porter, I did consider and 
        discuss with Mr. Fink whether we should have a new 
        arrangement. I came to the conclusion that, 
        particularly because of the fact that we were 
        unsuccessful in achieving a resolution of this at the 
        Southern District, and because I didn't think, frankly, 
        there would be that much more additional time in it, 
        and because I believed that the earlier payments had 
        been fair and reasonable, that I would see this through 
        to the end simply on the basis of the fees we had been 
    \87\ Pardon Hearings, Day One, at 242.

    In his testimony, Mr. Quinn further said that he had not 
accepted payments after leaving Arnold & Porter for his work to 
obtain a pardon, nor would he accept any such payments in the 
future.\88\ Mr. Quinn said, however, that he would accept 
payment from Mr. Rich to reimburse him for expenses he incurred 
in connection with the pardon controversy.\89\ And he said that 
he would accept additional fees for services other than for his 
efforts to win Marc Rich a pardon. He testified:
    \88\ Id. at 242, 266.
    \89\ Id. at 266.

        Well, look, I don't think it would be fair to ask me to 
        commit never to accept moneys from him. As I've said to 
        you, if I do work that justifies my billing him for it, 
        I will do so. I expect to be reimbursed for the 
        expenses I'm put to in connection this. Those are the 
        only moneys I anticipate receiving from him.\90\
    \90\ Id.

    The majority claims that the testimony of Mr. Fink 
contradicts Mr. Quinn. As the majority notes in its report, Mr. 
Fink testified that he believed Mr. Rich and Mr. Quinn would 
come to a fair fee arrangement that was consistent with his 
normal fee arrangements and communicated that to Mr. Quinn in 
November 2000.\91\ It does not appear from any of the evidence 
before the Committee, however, that Mr. Quinn ever concluded an 
agreement on fees for the pardon effort. Mr. Quinn could have 
concluded that he would not receive any additional fees for 
that work.
    \91\ Majority Report, Chapter One, at 142.
    The Committee has no evidence that Mr. Quinn accepted 
additional fees from Mr. Rich for his efforts to obtain a 
pardon. Mr. Quinn made no promise that he would not accept fees 
for work separate from his efforts to obtain a pardon or to 
reimburse him for expenses he incurred in connection with the 
pardon scandal. The Committee has no basis upon which to 
conclude that Mr. Quinn misled the Committee.

 Allegation: Denise Rich's and Beth Dozoretz's 
contributions, efforts to help with the Marc Rich pardon, and 
their decision to invoke their Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self incrimination raise ``the indelible appearance of 
impropriety.'' \92\
    \92\ Id. at 181, 186.

    The Facts: In its report, the majority acknowledges that it 
was unable to substantiate the allegation that Denise Rich or 
Beth Dozoretz improperly or illegally influenced President 
Clinton's decision to grant a pardon to Marc Rich. The majority 
nevertheless states that their actions create ``the indelible 
appearance of impropriety.'' \93\ The majority bases this 
conclusion on the political contributions of Ms. Rich and Ms. 
Dozoretz, their lawful efforts to assist with the Marc Rich 
pardon effort, and their decision to invoke their 
constitutional right against self-incrimination before this 
    \93\ Id.
    The testimony of Ms. Rich and Ms. Dozoretz would have 
helped the Committee determine the truth, and their decision to 
assert their Fifth Amendment rights was a setback to the 
Committee's efforts. The majority is wrong, however, to draw 
adverse inferences about Ms. Rich and Ms. Dozoretz from their 
assertion of their constitutional privilege. The Supreme Court 
has repeatedly stated that a witness's assertion of the 
privilege against self-incrimination does not give rise to an 
inference of guilt. Calling the privilege ``an important 
advance in the development of our liberty,'' the Court has 
explained that ``[t]oo many, even those who should be better 
advised, view this privilege as a shelter for wrongdoers. They 
too readily assume that those who invoke it are either guilty 
of a crime or commit perjury in claiming the privilege.'' \94\
    \94\ Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 426 (1956).
    As the majority acknowledges in its own report, the 
Committee could have compelled Ms. Rich's and Ms. Dozoretz's 
testimony by conferring a grant of immunity from prosecution. 
The majority elected not to pursue that option. The majority 
should not seek to establish by innuendo allegations of 
wrongdoing that it could not establish by the evidence.

 Allegation: Marie Ragghianti, the Chief of Staff of 
the U.S. Parole Commission, hindered an FBI investigation into 
Roger Clinton's contacts with commissioners and Commission 
staff and may have been trying to protect Roger Clinton.\95\
    \95\ Majority Report, Chapter Two, at 711, 759.

    The Facts: The majority report devotes over 40 pages to 
Roger Clinton's unsuccessful efforts to assist a federal 
inmate, Rosario Gambino, in an application for parole before 
the U.S. Parole Commission (USPC).\96\ The majority also 
discusses Mr. Gambino's unsuccessful application for executive 
    \96\ Id. at 731-776.
    \97\ Id. at 773.
    As is detailed in the majority report, Roger Clinton 
contacted commissioners and staff of the USPC numerous times to 
discuss Mr. Gambino's request for parole. While Roger Clinton's 
repeated contacts proved to be a nuisance to these officials, 
the contacts did not violate any law or regulation.\98\ 
Moreover, U.S. Parole Commission officials were aware of the 
appearance of improper political influence in its proceedings. 
Out of an abundance of caution, Commission officials attempted 
to discontinue further contacts with Roger Clinton.\99\ The 
USPC even created a policy ``restrict[ing] the ability of 
Commission staff from engaging in any continued series of calls 
or discussions on official matters that are not in the context 
of an agency proceeding,'' which it communicated in writing to 
Roger Clinton.\100\
    \98\ See Joint Interview of Michael Stover (July, 17, 2001); see 
also Letter from Elaine J. Mittleman to Chairman Dan Burton (Apr. 3, 
2002) (Exhibit 4).
    \99\ Joint Interview of Michael Stover (July 17, 2001); Joint 
Interview of Marie Ragghianti (July 27, 2001).
    \100\ Letter from Marie Ragghianti (Oct. 26, 1998) (Exhibit 5); 
Joint Interview of Michael Stover (July 17, 2001).
    For reasons that are not entirely clear from the 
Committee's evidence, the FBI took steps to investigate Roger 
Clinton's contacts with the USPC. As part of this effort, the 
FBI proposed a sting operation whereby a Commission employee 
would set up a meeting with Roger Clinton at a nearby hotel 
restaurant and introduce Roger Clinton to an FBI agent posing 
as a USPC official.\101\ The FBI also apparently proposed that 
the Commission employee wear a body wire to record the 
conversation with Roger Clinton.\102\ Marie Ragghianti, the 
Chief of Staff of the USPC at the time, was uncomfortable with 
the proposal and rejected it. Ms. Ragghianti explained that the 
Commission did not conduct meetings in restaurants, and she 
said that she thought the FBI's proposed arrangements would be 
unprofessional and would put the commission in bad light. She 
explained further that the agency could accommodate the FBI in 
ways other than the proposed sting and maintain 
    \101\ Joint Interview of Marie Ragghianti (July 27, 2001).
    \102\ Id.
    After the Commissioners considered the matter, the USPC did 
permit the FBI to place a hidden microphone under the desk of a 
USPC employee, who agreed to meet with Roger Clinton.\103\ 
According to this employee, Tom Kowalski, the FBI proposed that 
he ask leading questions to draw out Roger Clinton, but Mr. 
Kowalski did not feel comfortable with that approach.\104\ Mr. 
Kowalski recalls that he had a half-hour meeting with Roger 
Clinton, but Mr. Clinton made no incriminating comments.\105\ 
The FBI's investigation then apparently ended.\106\
    \103\ Joint Interview of Tom Kowalski (July 27, 2001).
    \104\ Id.
    \105\ Id.
    \106\ See Joint Interview of Michael Stover (July 17, 2001).
    In its report, the majority alleges that Ms. Ragghianti 
hindered the FBI investigation and may have done so to protect 
Roger Clinton.\107\ But the evidence before the Committee shows 
only that Ms. Ragghianti exercised her judgment on the 
appropriateness of a proposed sting operation. Although the 
majority may disagree with her judgment, there is no evidence 
that her decision was based on factors other than her 
evaluation of the interests of the USPC. The majority's 
suggestion that she acted to protect Roger Clinton is unfair 
    \107\ Majority Report, Chapter Two, at 711, 759.

 Allegation: Hugh Rodham told the White House that 
First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton was aware of the clemency 
petition of Carlos Vignali and that his commutation was ``very 
important to her.'' Either the First Lady was aware of the 
petition and approved of Mr. Rodham's lobbying efforts or Hugh 
Rodham lied regarding the First Lady's knowledge.\108\
    \108\ Majority Report, Chapter Three, at 1264-65.

    The Facts: The majority alleges that Hugh Rodham told the 
White House that First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton was aware of 
his efforts to lobby for clemency for Carlos Vignali and that 
his commutation was ``very important to her.'' The majority 
then concludes that because both have denied discussing Mr. 
Vignali's petition, either one or the other lied.\109\
    \109\ See id. at 1678-79.
    The majority bases its contention primarily on one phone 
message from a former White House staff member. The phone 
message is an undated, handwritten note on White House 
stationary that reads:

        Hugh says this is very important to him and the First 
        Lady as well as others.

        Sheriff Baca from LA is more than happy to speak with 
        you about him but is uncomfortable writing a letter 
        offering his full support.\110\
    \110\ Handwritten note by Dawn Woolen, Assistant to Deputy Counsel 
to the President Bruce Lindey (Majority Exhibit 22).

    Committee staff also conducted a joint interview of the 
author of the note, Dawn Woolen, who served as an assistant to 
Bruce Lindsey in the White House. When asked about this note 
and what Mr. Rodham told her on the phone, Ms. Woolen responded 
that she had no independent recollection of the conversation 
and that she usually paraphrased phone messages.\111\ Asked to 
interpret the meaning of the word ``this'' in the phrase ``this 
is important,'' Ms. Woolen speculated that it meant the message 
concerning the Vignali commutation.\112\
    \111\ Joint Interview of Dawn Woolen (Sept. 25, 2001).
    \112\ Id.
    The majority sought to interview Mr. Rodham about the 
issue. But Mr. Rodham's attorney informed the Committee that 
Mr. Rodham would not testify because Mr. Rodham was constrained 
from revealing his client's confidences by the bar rules of the 
District of Columbia.\113\ The majority did not seek to 
interview Senator Clinton.
    \113\ Letter from Nancy Luque to Chairman Dan Burton (Mar. 14, 
2002) (attaching District of Columbia Rule of Professional 
Responsibility 1.6) (Exhibit 6).
    These fragmentary facts do raise questions about what Mr. 
Rodham may have said to Ms. Woolen. But they are wholly 
insufficient to support the definitive conclusions that the 
majority seeks to draw.
    Despite widespread consensus that the Marc Rich pardon and 
other last-minute grants of clemency were unjustified, Chairman 
Burton conducted a far-flung and partisan investigation. The 
majority report reflects this approach. The report does not 
recite facts and draw reasonable conclusions. Rather, it mixes 
facts with suppositions, unfairly questions the motives and 
integrity of the individuals involved, and makes numerous 
unsupported allegations of wrongdoing. The Committee's 
extensive investigation uncovered a clemency process in 
disarray at the end of the Clinton Administration and poor 
judgment. The majority's insinuation of corruption and serious 
wrongdoing in the pardon process, however, is unsubstantiated 
and wrong.\114\
    \114\ A number of individuals wrote to Chairman Burton to protest 
the manner in which the majority conducted its investigation and 
aspects of the majority report. Those which were copied to the minority 
are attached at Exhibits 4, 6, and 7.
                                   Hon. Henry A. Waxman.
                                   Hon. Tom Lantos.
                                   Hon. Major R. Owens.
                                   Hon. Edolphus Towns.
                                   Hon. Paul E. Kanjorski.
                                   Hon. Patsy T. Mink.
                                   Hon. Bernard Sanders.
                                   Hon. Eleanor Holmes Norton.
                                   Hon. Elijah E. Cummings.
                                   Hon. Hon. Dennis J. Kucinich.
                                   Hon. Danny K. Davis.
                                   Hon. Thomas H. Allen.
                                   Hon. Janice D. Schakowsky.
                                   Hon. Diane E. Watson.

    [Exhibits referred to follow:]



    A number of important events have transpired since the 
Committee approved the report on March 14, 2002. First, former 
President Clinton granted an interview to Newsweek magazine in 
which he purported to address some of the issues discussed in 
the Committee's report. As discussed below, almost every 
statement made by former President Clinton is either false or 
misleading. It remains deeply troubling that the former 
President is relying on deception and half-truths rather than 
squarely addressing the numerous questions raised by his 
eleventh-hour clemency grants.
    Also in the month since the approval of the report, a 
number of parties mentioned in the report, or their counsel, 
have provided the Committee with letters responding to the 
report. The Committee received letters from Peter Kadzik, Hugh 
Rodham, Los Angeles County Sheriff Leroy Baca, and Marie 
Ragghianti disputing various aspects of the Committee's report 
pertaining to them. I found all of these complaints uniformly 
without merit and have responded to them directly. Furthermore, 
in each case, I have been disturbed by the lengths to which 
these individuals have gone to distort the record of their 
involvement in these cases.
    The Committee also received documents from Jack Quinn in 
response to a subpoena issued by the Committee shortly before 
the report was issued. These documents relate to Quinn's 
efforts to receive payment from Rich even after he pledged that 
he would not accept payment for his work on the Rich pardon. 
The documents indicate that after the Committee's hearings, 
Quinn and Rich entered into a $300,000 retainer agreement to 
compensate Quinn for his time and expenses in responding to the 
various investigations and inquiries into the Rich pardon. 
However, Quinn withheld additional documents related to other 
legal work for Rich, asserting attorney-client and work product 
privileges and claiming that the work was unrelated to the 
    The Committee also received a number of critically 
important documents from Marie Ragghianti, the former Chief of 
Staff to the U.S. Parole Commission. Committee staff initially 
asked Ragghianti to provide the Committee with any documents 
she had about the Clinton-Gambino matter in an interview in 
July 2001. Ragghianti indicated that she would search her files 
and provide any documents that she located. Ragghianti provided 
no records to the Committee for the next eight months. Then, 
after having her counsel prepare a letter complaining about the 
Committee's report, she attached a number of documents 
previously withheld from the Committee. Accordingly, the 
Committee issued a subpoena to Ragghianti for all of her 
documents about Roger Clinton or Rosario Gambino, and 
Ragghianti provided the Committee with relevant documents 
retained in her personal possession. The documents contained 
important new facts that bolster the report's conclusions and 
undermine Ragghianti's criticisms.


    After the Committee's report was released, former President 
Clinton conducted an interview with Newsweek in which he 
purported to respond to the concerns raised by some of his 
grants of clemency. The President's comments are noteworthy in 
that they contain a number of false statements and baseless 
accusations. The relevant portion of the interview reads as 

        Question: How low [emotionally] did you go in the 
        months just after you left?

        Clinton: I was just angry that after I worked so hard 
        and after all that money had been spent proving that I 
        never did anything wrong for money, that I'd get mugged 
        one more time on the way out the door. People are free 
        to say that they disagreed with this or that part of 
        the decisions I made, but there wasn't a shred of 
        evidence that it had been done for any improper motive. 
        In fact, there is a lot of evidence to the contrary. I 
        thought there was a little bit of a double standard in 
        the way I was treated, to put it mildly. And I still 

        Question: If you had to do it all over again, would you 
        pardon Marc Rich?

        Clinton: Probably not, just for the politics. It was 
        terrible politics. It wasn't worth the damage to my 
        reputation. But that doesn't mean the attacks were 
        true. The fact that his ex-wife--I didn't think they 
        got along--was for it and had contributed to my library 
        had nothing to do with it. I did it for three reasons. 
        Number one, the Justice Department said they were no 
        longer opposed and they were really for it. Had I not 
        granted it, it would have been the only one they wanted 
        publicly that [I] didn't grant. Number two, he waived 
        his statute-of-limitations defenses so we can get lots 
        of money from him [in a civil suit, if Rich returns to 
        the United States]. Justice Ginsburg's husband--the tax 
        expert--said he wasn't guilty. And the Justice 
        Department under President Reagan said he was wrongly 
        indicted in the first place. [A claim former Reagan 
        officials deny.] The third thing is, I received a 
        request from the government of Israel. They wanted him 
        and [Jonathan] Pollard, and I considered Pollard an 
        unrepentant spy and I didn't think I could pardon him. 
        And I wanted to do something to support the peace 
        process. Furthermore, [Rich's] main lawyer was Vice 
        President Cheney's chief of staff [Lewis Libby] and 
        they [conservative critics] tried to hide that.

        Question: Do you think you were a little more open to 
        the argument, from personal experience, that 
        prosecutors are not infallible?

        Clinton: Absolutely, I do. I do think that I was more 
        vulnerable--look, I don't know Marc Rich and wouldn't 
        know him if he walked in the door there. I was very 
        sensitive to prosecutorial abuse because I had seen it. 
        I don't know that anyone is 100 percent aware of his 
        motives. I don't think that's all bad for a president 
        to be sensitive to any kind of abuse of power.

        Question: But Rich was a fugitive. . .

        Clinton: Look, I'm not justifying the fugitive status. 
        But if we can get a couple of hundred million dollars, 
        whatever it is he allegedly owes, is it in the 
        interests of the United States to recover from him the 
        way we recovered from other people who violated these 
        oil-pricing schemes?

        Question: Your brother and brother-in-law were 
        basically selling access to you.

        Clinton: I still don't know what the facts are, except 
        that the evidence is I didn't grant anything [my 
        brother] asked me to grant. I had no idea that [my 
        brother-in-law] was involved in those two cases. Had I 
        known it, I would have turned them down. I was just 
        surprised and disappointed.

        Question: It wasn't a great [year] for you, was it?

        Clinton: Well, Buddy dying was by far the worst 
    \1\ Jonathan Alter, Life is Fleeting, Man, Newsweek, Apr. 8, 2002, 
at 42.

President Clinton's interview is so replete with false and 
misleading statements that it is necessary to respond line-by-

 ``I was just angry that after I worked so hard and 
after all that money had been spent proving that I never did 
anything wrong for money, that I'd get mugged one more time on 
the way out the door.''

   By this comment, President Clinton suggests that the 
investigations into the Rich and Green pardons were a last-
minute mugging perpetrated upon him by some sort of right-wing 
cabal. However, there was a widespread consensus that the 
Committee's investigation of President Clinton's clemency 
grants was justified. The following comments from Democratic 
Members of Congress and mainstream media outlets show that the 
Committee's investigation was justified and widely supported:

   Representative Eleanor Holmes Norton observed at the 
business meeting at which the report was approved, ``[t]he 
investigation was not only warranted; I believe that the 
investigation has already served an important purpose. It is 
impossible for me to believe that any person contemplating 
running for President of the United States or who gets that 
office will again participate in the kind of pardon activity 
that went on at the end of the Clinton Administration.'' \2\
    \2\ Business Meeting, Comm. on Govt. Reform, Mar. 14, 2002, at 76.

   The New York Times editorialized that ``even [the 
President's] closest Democratic allies, people who stuck by him 
in other dark hours, are expressing doubts and dismay. As 
Senator Herb Kohl, a Wisconsin Democrat, put it, `There 
probably isn't one person across the country today who is 
familiar with this case who doesn't think that it's a question 
of power, connection, money.' Clinton said he would be willing 
to cooperate `with any appropriate inquiry.' That would 
certainly be helpful. Despite the desire expressed by President 
Bush and others to close the book on Clinton's presidency, 
there is still a strong and legitimate interest in getting to 
the bottom of this insupportable pardon.'' \3\
    \3\ A New Front in the Pardon Investigation, N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 
2001, at A18.

   Former Democratic Mayor Jerry Brown observed, ``If you're 
asking about pardons, the president can give any pardon he 
wants. That's in the constitution. But that doesn't stop people 
from looking into it to see was there money exchanged or was 
there influence . . . that wasn't appropriate. And that's 
certainly a legitimate subject for investigation.'' \4\
    \4\ The O'Reilly Factor (Fox News television broadcast, Jan. 31, 

   At a hearing on the Rich pardon, Senator Russell Feingold 
stated that ``I do believe that legitimate questions have been 
raised about the pardon of Marc Rich, in particular, and for 
me, as for many Senators and many Americans, suspicions about 
this pardon arise from the fact that Marc Rich's ex-wife, 
Denise Rich, was a large donor to the Democratic Party--not 
just a large donor, a huge donor. . . . [Denise Rich's 
contributions to the Democratic Party] can't help but raise 
some questions about this pardon.'' \5\
    \5\ ``President Clinton's Eleventh Hour Pardons,'' Hearing Before 
the Senate Judiciary Comm., 107th Cong. 13 (Feb. 14, 2001).

   The Sunday Herald reported that ``die-hard loyalists like 
James Carville are admitting the inquiries are `legitimate' 
while Massachusetts Congressman Barney Frank, one of Clinton's 
fiercest defenders during the Lewinsky scandal is telling 
anyone who'll listen that he's `through with the Clintons.' '' 
    \6\ Marion McKeone, The Day Hillary Turned Her Back on Bill, Sunday 
Herald, Feb. 25, 2001, at 17.

 ``People are free to say that they disagreed with 
this or that part of the decisions I made, but there wasn't a 
shred of evidence that it had been done for any improper 
motive. In fact, there is a lot of evidence to the contrary.''

   Rather than directly deny wrongdoing and candidly answer 
questions about his decisions in the Rich case, it seems that 
the former President is attempting to establish a standard 
under which he can be criticized only where criminal wrongdoing 
can be established. Former President Clinton's basic assertion 
that there was not a ``shred of evidence'' of improper motive 
is incorrect. The Marc Rich pardon is replete with evidence 
that a number of the major actors had improper motives. The 
first and most obvious piece of evidence is that the four major 
players in the Marc Rich case--Marc Rich, Pincus Green, Denise 
Rich, and Beth Dozoretz--have refused to discuss their 
involvement in the case, with two of them relying on their 
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The two 
people closest to President Clinton who lobbied him on the Rich 
and Green pardons--Denise Rich and Beth Dozoretz--have refused 
to testify about their discussions with the President without a 
grant of prosecutorial immunity. The consistent refusal of key 
witnesses to answer questions certainly raises concerns about 
their motives.

   Similarly, it is unclear what the former President is 
referring to when he suggests that there is ``a lot of evidence 
to the contrary'' that there was improper motive. The clear 
factual record established by the report demonstrates that 
there was no reasonable explanation for the Marc Rich and 
Pincus Green pardons. All of the explanations offered to date 
by the President are factually inaccurate or totally 

 Question: ``If you had to do it all over again, 
would you pardon Marc Rich?'' Clinton: ``Probably not, just for 
the politics. It was terrible politics. It wasn't worth the 
damage to my reputation.''

   This is one of the most shocking statements made by 
President Clinton. After all of the evidence demonstrating that 
Marc Rich and Pincus Green were large-scale criminals, 
fugitives from justice, and traitors to their country, the 
President can only bring himself to say that he ``probably'' 
would not grant the pardons again, ``just for the politics,'' 
because it was not ``worth the damage to my reputation.'' It 
apparently does not concern the President that he has pardoned 
two of the largest tax cheats and most wanted international 
fugitives in U.S. history. It apparently is not a matter of 
concern that a man who traded oil with (and thus has 
financially supported) terrorist regimes ranging from Ayatollah 
Khomeini's Iran to Saddam Hussein's Iraq has escaped any 
punishment from the U.S. legal system. President Clinton is 
apparently unconcerned that a man who attempted to renounce his 
citizenship to escape the law and was described as a 
``traitor'' by his own attorney is now free to return to the 
United States. President Clinton is apparently not troubled 
that he has undermined U.S. efforts to apprehend criminals 
abroad by pardoning two of the FBI's most wanted fugitives.

   The one thing that does bother President Clinton, however, 
is the damage to his own reputation. During his terms in 
office, President Clinton demonstrated time and again his 
tendency to elevate his own interests above the interests of 
the United States. Yet, his insistence on discussing the Rich 
pardon only in terms of its impact on himself still manages to 
demonstrate a breathtaking level of hubris. Perhaps most 
important, it apparently is of no consequence to the former 
President that the Rich and Green pardons send the unambiguous 
message that there are two separate systems of justice: one for 
the rich and one for the poor.

 ``I did it for three reasons. Number one, the 
Justice Department said they were no longer opposed and they 
were really for it. Had I not granted it, it would have been 
the only one they wanted publicly that [I] didn't grant.''

   The former President's claim that the ``Justice 
Department'' was ``really for'' the Rich pardon is factually 
incorrect. Apart from informal contacts with Deputy Attorney 
General Eric Holder, the Justice Department was never informed 
that the Rich pardon was even being considered until the middle 
of the night on January 19-20, 2001, after the decision had 
been made to grant the pardon. At that point, Associate White 
House Counsel Meredith Cabe informed Pardon Attorney Roger 
Adams that Rich and Green were going to receive pardons and 
asked Adams to conduct an NCIC background check on them. Before 
that telephone call, only Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder 
had any knowledge that the Rich pardon was being considered. 
Holder had known that the Rich pardon was being considered 
since November 2000 but had failed to inform anyone else in the 
Justice Department of that fact. None of the relevant 
components of the Justice Department that would have been able 
to provide an educated opinion--the prosecutors in the Southern 
District of New York, the Office of the Pardon Attorney, the 
FBI, and the U.S. Marshals Service--were ever asked to provide 
their opinion about the case. Therefore, it is highly 
misleading to say that the ``Justice Department'' was for the 
Rich pardon and completely false to claim that the Justice 
Department ``publicly'' supported it.

   Eric Holder, of course, did privately inform White House 
Counsel Beth Nolan that he was ``neutral, leaning towards'' the 
Rich pardon. In the context of the unrelenting opposition to 
the pardon expressed by White House staff, this was effectively 
a statement of support. However, Holder had never consulted 
with anyone else at the Justice Department about the Rich 
pardon, and the mere fact that the Rich case was under 
consideration for a grant of clemency was kept completely 
secret until the pardons were granted on January 20, 2001. At 
no time before or after the pardon did any Justice Department 
official express public support for the pardon.

 ``Number two, he waived his statute-of-limitations 
defenses so we can get lots of money from him [in a civil suit, 
if Rich returns to the United States.]''

   As explained in the report, President Clinton was 
completely wrong in thinking that he somehow obtained a 
valuable concession when he asked Jack Quinn to have Rich waive 
his statute of limitations defenses in exchange for the pardon. 
Marc Rich did not have a statute of limitations defense to 
waive. As the relevant statutes make perfectly clear, an 
individual who has fled the country is not entitled to use the 
expiration of the statute of limitations as an affirmative 
defense. In addition, it is highly unlikely that there was ever 
any civil liability relating to the 1983 charges against Rich 
and Green personally. Given that their companies already 
discharged the corporate liability in a 1984 plea agreement, it 
is even more unlikely that any personal financial liability 
would remain enforceable today. Finally, Rich has always been 
willing to pay hundreds of millions of dollars to avoid 
criminal liability. Rather than winning some concession on 
behalf of the U.S. government, President Clinton gave Marc Rich 
exactly what he had wanted since 1983.
 ``And the Justice Department under President Reagan 
said he was wrongly indicted in the first place.''

   This claim by the former President is a complete 
fabrication. The Justice Department has never made a statement 
that even remotely resembles the claim made by President 
Clinton. The Justice Department consistently defended the Rich 
and Green indictment during the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton 
Administrations. While it is not surprising that President 
Clinton would make false statements to excuse his conduct, it 
is surprising that he would make claims that are so obviously 

 ``The third thing is, I received a request from the 
government of Israel. They wanted him and [Jonathan] Pollard, 
and I considered Pollard an unrepentant spy and I didn't think 
I could pardon him. And I wanted to do something to support the 
peace process.''

   This familiar argument is addressed thoroughly in the 
Committee's report. First, the President has overstated the 
extent to which the Israeli government was pushing for the Rich 
pardon. The transcripts of the conversations between President 
Clinton and Prime Minister Barak in the report make it clear 
that Barak did not push the President on the Rich issue. More 
importantly, at no point did Prime Minister Barak suggest that 
the Rich pardon would have a role in the Middle East peace 
process. Indeed, there is no indication that Marc Rich is a 
significant player in the Middle East peace process or that his 
pardon has had any role in the process. Even President 
Clinton's own Middle East envoy, Dennis Ross, stated that Rich 
``was not a factor in the Middle East talks.'' \7\
    \7\ James Risen and Alison Leigh Cowan, U.S. Diplomats Turned Aside 
Israeli Push on Rich's Behalf, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 2001, at A1.

 ``Furthermore, [Rich's] main lawyer was Vice 
President Cheney's chief of staff [Lewis Libby] and they 
[conservative critics] tried to hide that.''

   It is true that Libby represented Marc Rich before he 
sought a pardon. However, it is telling that Clinton attempts 
to shift the focus to Libby given that his own White House 
Counsel, Jack Quinn, was so deeply involved in the pardon 
effort. Certainly, Libby's work on the Rich case raises none of 
the concerns raised by Jack Quinn's representation. After all, 
it was Jack Quinn, not Lewis Libby, who lobbied his former 
subordinates in the White House counsel's office on behalf of 
Marc Rich. It was Jack Quinn, not Lewis Libby, who likely 
violated ethical standards by lobbying his former colleagues. 
Finally, it was Jack Quinn, not Lewis Libby, who obtained the 
pardons for Marc Rich and Pincus Green.

   Moreover, President Clinton's claim that anyone tried to 
``hide'' Libby's representation of Rich is nonsense. Libby 
voluntarily testified before the Committee and answered every 
question put to him. If anything, former President Clinton has 
repeatedly attempted to distort Libby's representation of Marc 
Rich. When he wrote his infamous column defending the Rich 
pardon, President Clinton initially wrote that ``the [pardon] 
applications were reviewed and advocated'' by three prominent 
Republican attorneys: Leonard Garment, William Bradford 
Reynolds, and Lewis Libby.\8\ This claim was completely false, 
as Libby, Garment, and Reynolds had absolutely no involvement 
in the pardon effort and had never reviewed, much less 
advocated, the Rich pardon. The President's staff corrected the 
column so that later editions of the New York Times stated that 
Libby, Garment, and Reynolds had ``reviewed and advocated'' the 
``case for the pardons.'' \9\ Even the corrected version of the 
former President's column was misleading and intentionally 
overstated their involvement in the Rich case.
    \8\ Editors' Note, N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 2001, at A15.
    \9\ William J. Clinton, My Reasons for the Pardons, N.Y. Times, 
Feb. 18, 2001.

   The former President fails to note that, while Libby deemed 
Rich a traitor, Libby had absolutely no involvement in the 
pardon process. This is a crucial distinction that should not 
be glossed over. Even a traitor is entitled to a legal defense, 
and therefore, agreeing to represent one is defensible. 
However, pardoning an unrepentant traitor is indefensible.

 ``I was very sensitive to prosecutorial abuse 
because I had seen it. I don't know that anyone is 100 percent 
aware of his motives. I don't think that's all bad for a 
president to be sensitive to any kind of abuse of power.''

   The former President's suggestion that Marc Rich was a 
victim of ``prosecutorial abuse'' is insulting to the numerous 
career Justice Department prosecutors who worked on the Marc 
Rich case. Marc Rich and Pincus Green were indicted after a 
painstaking investigation and after the Department obtained 
extensive documentary and testimonial evidence against Rich and 
Green. The Rich and Green case was reviewed by a number of 
prosecutors at Main Justice and the Southern District of New 
York, both Republicans and Democrats. President Clinton 
appointed one of these men to a federal judgeship and another 
became a high-level official at his Justice Department. It is 
implausible to think that these dozens of prosecutors engaged 
in systematic prosecutorial abuse against Marc Rich and Pincus 
Green for almost twenty years and that only Bill Clinton, over 
the objections of his own staff, was able to detect it. More 
important, it is telling that the former President would hear 
only from friends of Rich or his paid advocates. It displays a 
contempt for law enforcement and the Central Intelligence 
Agency that he would not even consider their views before 
accepting those of Rich's highly paid mouthpieces.

 ``Look, I'm not justifying the fugitive status. But 
if we can get a couple of hundred million dollars, whatever it 
is he allegedly owes, is it in the interests of the United 
States to recover from him the way we recovered from other 
people who violated these oil-pricing schemes?''

   When the President of the United States pardons two 
unrepentant fugitives from justice, it is difficult to 
comprehend how he is not ``justifying the fugitive status.'' He 
is sending the message that the United States is willing to 
grant the ultimate form of official forgiveness to two people 
who opted to flee the country and renounce their citizenship 
rather than face their legal responsibilities in a court of 
law. A series of experienced prosecutors in three different 
administrations decided that it was more important to send the 
message that the United States took its laws seriously than to 
collect a bit more money in the federal treasury. President 
Clinton should have followed their lead. Rather than reward 
billionaire fugitives by pardoning them and unsuccessfully 
attempting to fine them a ``couple of hundred million 
dollars,'' he should have supported the professionals who had 
been working the case for nearly two decades by soliciting and 
listening to their advice.

 Question: ``Your brother and brother-in-law were 
basically selling access to you.'' Clinton: ``I still don't 
know what the facts are, except that the evidence is I didn't 
grant anything [my brother] asked me to grant.''

   It is extraordinary that the President would claim that he 
does not ``know what the facts are'' regarding the clemency 
lobbying efforts of Roger Clinton, Hugh Rodham, and Tony 
Rodham. If it mattered to him, he could have asked his 
relatives the relevant questions. Moreover, there is 
substantial evidence that Roger Clinton discussed the cases of 
Rosario Gambino, Steven Griggs, Jay McKernan, and a number of 
other individuals with President Clinton. Similarly, there is 
evidence that Tony Rodham discussed Edgar and Vonna Jo Gregory 
with the President. President Clinton has never disclosed the 
content of those discussions, other than to repeat his 
representation that none of them successfully obtained grants 
of clemency. However, the President's answer fails to address 
the many questions about his knowledge and possible approval of 
Roger Clinton's efforts to sell his access to the President.

 ``I had no idea that [my brother-in-law] was 
involved in those two cases. Had I known it, I would have 
turned them down. I was just surprised and disappointed.''

   The President's denials of any knowledge that Hugh Rodham 
was involved on behalf of Carlos Vignali and Glenn Braswell 
should be viewed with some skepticism, given the inaccuracy of 
his other claims in this interview. However, even if the 
President's statements are true, they fail to address the 
obvious question of how individuals as undeserving as Vignali 
and Braswell received clemency. Moreover, the President did not 
address the refusal of Hugh Rodham to return more than $150,000 
to the Vignalis. In February 2001, the President and First Lady 
demanded that Hugh Rodham return the $434,000 he was paid by 
Vignali and Braswell. Yet, Rodham returned only $280,000, 
keeping $154,000 of these fees.
A. Comments by Marc Rich attorney Peter Kadzik
    On March 13, 2002, Peter Kadzik, an attorney with Dickstein 
Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky, wrote to ``correct the factual 
inaccuracies'' in the Committee's report.\10\ Specifically, 
Kadzik took issue with the description of the Committee's 
efforts to obtain his testimony for the March 1, 2001, hearing 
regarding the Rich pardon. As described in the report, Kadzik 
boarded a plane for California despite the fact that the 
Committee had requested his testimony and, in fact, intended to 
issue a subpoena for his attendance at the hearing. Kadzik 
departed for California, apparently believing that the 
Committee would not be willing to force him to return to 
testify at the hearing. Kadzik was served a subpoena by a 
United States Marshal when he exited the plane and returned the 
same day so that he could testify at the hearing.
    \10\ See Letter from Peter Kadzik, Partner, Dickstein Shapiro Morin 
& Oshinsky, to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. 
Reform (Mar. 13, 2002) (Exhibit 1).
    The central claim in Kadzik's letter of March 13, 2002, is 
that ``at no point before I boarded an airplane to California 
on February 28, 2001, did any member of the Committee's staff 
inform me or any attorney with my firm that the Committee would 
subpoena me to attend the hearing.'' As I have explained in my 
response to Kadzik's letter, his claim is utterly false.\11\ 
Between the time that Committee staff received notice on the 
evening of February 27, 2001, that Kadzik was declining to 
testify voluntarily and his departure for California at 11:00 
a.m. on February 28, 2001, there were at least three separate 
communications between Committee staff and Kadzik's attorneys. 
First, Committee staff called his attorneys on the evening of 
February 27 to inform them that Kadzik would be required to 
attend the hearing. Then, on the morning of February 28, 2001, 
one of Kadzik's attorneys informed Committee staff that he was 
unable to accept service of a subpoena for Kadzik. Then, at 
9:29 a.m. on February 28, Committee staff again informed one of 
Kadzik's attorneys that the Committee was issuing a subpoena 
for his attendance at the hearing and asked for Kadzik's flight 
number so that he could be served. It is troubling that Peter 
Kadzik would make a false assertion that is so easily 
    \11\ See Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on 
Govt. Reform, to Peter Kadzik, Partner, Dickstein Shapiro Morin & 
Oshinsky (Mar. 15, 2002) (Exhibit 2).
B. Comments by Hugh Rodham
    On March 14, 2002, Nancy Luque, counsel for Hugh Rodham, 
sent a letter complaining about a number of conclusions in the 
Committee's report.\12\ I have sent a response to Luque which 
refutes the claims in her letter.\13\ Luque's letter makes a 
number of inaccurate statements and baseless assertions. For 
example, she objects to the report's conclusion that Rodham 
extended only ``partial cooperation'' to the Committee. Yet, 
Luque acknowledges that Rodham refused to discuss a number of 
issues relating to the Vignali case with the Committee and 
refused to participate in an interview with Committee staff. As 
detailed in my response of April 16, 2002, Luque's other 
objections are as baseless as her claim that Rodham fully 
cooperated with the Committee.
    \12\ Letter from Nancy Luque, Partner, Reed Smith, to the Honorable 
Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Mar. 14, 2002) (Exhibit 
    \13\ Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. 
Reform, to Nancy Luque, Partner, Reed Smith (Apr. 16, 2002) (Exhibit 
C. Comments by former Parole Commission Chief of Staff Marie Ragghianti
    On April 3, 2002, Elaine Mittleman, counsel for Marie 
Ragghianti, wrote the Committee to complain about the way the 
report portrayed Ragghianti's reaction to Roger Clinton's 
contacts with the U.S. Parole Commission on behalf of Rosario 
Gambino and the subsequent FBI investigation.\14\ The bulk of 
the letter consists of quotations from the report which are 
presented in isolation and labeled conclusory, subjective, or 
an unwarranted assumption. In their original context, however, 
these excerpts are sound conclusions amply supported by 
citations to evidence. I responded extensively to her 
mischaracterizations in a letter to Mittleman on April 11, 
    \14\ Letter from Elaine J. Mittleman, Counsel for Marie Ragghianti, 
to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Apr. 3, 
2002) (Exhibit 5).
    \15\ Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. 
Reform, to Elaine J. Mittleman, Counsel for Marie Ragghianti (Apr. 11, 
2002) (Exhibit 6).
    The most important factual claim in Mittleman's letter is 
that the report confuses the chronology of various FBI requests 
for Parole Commission assistance in its investigation of Roger 
Clinton. She disputes that the FBI's first request was to have 
a Parole Commission staff member introduce Roger Clinton to an 
undercover agent posing as another Commission staff member. In 
an effort to defend Ragghianti's opposition to this plan, which 
the report correctly identifies as the FBI's first plan, 
Mittleman claims that it was actually the FBI's ``third or 
fourth'' proposal. She argues that this purported factual error 
in the report obscures Ragghianti's true and legitimate motives 
for opposing the plan. Ironically, however, Mittleman attached 
documents to her letter that undermine her claim and support 
the report's chronology.\16\ Many of the documents attached to 
Mittleman's letter had never before been produced to the 
Committee, prompting staff to inquire whether Ragghianti 
retained other documents in her personal possession relevant to 
the investigation of the Clinton-Gambino matter. After 
receiving representations that she did have additional relevant 
documents, the Committee notified Mittleman that the Committee 
would issue a subpoena to Ragghianti. Before receiving the 
subpoena, Ragghianti faxed 113 pages of documents to the 
Committee, most of which had not been produced by the Parole 
Commission. Those documents provided important new evidence and 
are discussed further below in Section IV. Despite requests, 
neither Mittleman nor Ragghianti has provided a written 
certification that the 113-page fax contained every document 
responsive to the subpoena.
    \16\ Id. at 7-8.
    In addition to seeking additional documents from 
Ragghianti, I posed five questions to her regarding the 
recently produced documents.\17\ The questions were aimed at 
obtaining information about when Ragghianti first located the 
documents she recently produced, whether the Parole Commission 
could have produced the same documents, and why Ragghianti 
retained these documents in her personal possession after 
leaving the Commission. Rather than fully cooperate with the 
Committee by answering the questions candidly and forthrightly, 
Ragghianti provided a non-responsive submission through her 
counsel that quarreled with the questions rather than answering 
them. For example, in reply to the question, ``When did you 
locate the documents responsive to the subpoena,'' Mittleman 
wrote, ``[t]his question implies that there was an outstanding 
document request for the documents responsive to the 
subpoena.'' \18\ Of course, regardless of whether the question 
implies what she claims, the reply does not even approach an 
answer to the question. Similarly, in response to two other 
questions about whether the newly produced documents had come 
from Commission files, Mittleman merely complained that the 
questions were not explicitly limited to Ragghianti's personal 
knowledge and did not ``identify what files are considered to 
be `Parole Commission files.' '' \19\ That Ragghianti cannot 
provide information of which she is unaware is simply an 
obvious truism that needs no explicit reference. Moreover, 
``Commission files'' are, as anyone can deduce with minimal 
thought, files that were located in the Parole Commission 
offices and were produced in the course of Parole Commission 
business. This sort of hairsplitting appears to be nothing more 
than a fig leaf to cover Ragghianti's obvious unwillingness to 
answer the questions posed. Why she is unwilling to cooperate 
fully with the Committee's investigation is unclear, but it may 
be related to the reason she was unwilling to cooperate fully 
with the FBI's investigation, which is discussed further below.
    \17\ Id. at 1-2.
    \18\ Letter from Elaine J. Mittleman, Counsel for Marie Ragghianti, 
to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform 2-3 (Apr. 
15, 2002) (Exhibit 7).
    \19\ Id.
D. Comments by Los Angeles County Sheriff Leroy Baca
    On April 4, 2002, Steven Madison, counsel for Los Angeles 
County Sheriff Baca, submitted a lengthy letter complaining 
about the Committee report.\20\ The report took issue with 
Sheriff Baca's role in the Vignali commutation, finding that he 
had a close relationship with Horacio Vignali based on 
Vignali's large financial contributions to Baca's campaigns. 
This relationship resulted in a conversation between Sheriff 
Baca and the White House in which he supported the commutation 
of Carlos Vignali. The report found Sheriff Baca's efforts on 
behalf of the Vignalis especially troubling because there were 
numerous law enforcement reports containing allegations that 
Horacio Vignali was involved in trafficking illegal drugs and, 
in fact, served as the source of cocaine for his son. The 
Committee was concerned with Sheriff Baca's failure to conduct 
any due diligence before he called the White House and his 
apparent ignorance of the serious allegations against Horacio 
    \20\ Letter from Steven G. Madison, Partner, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart 
Oliver & Hedges, to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. 
Reform (Apr. 4, 2002) (Exhibit 8).
    Sheriff Baca made three main complaints about the report. 
First, he claimed that Committee procedures were unfair. 
Second, he claimed that he actually opposed clemency for Carlos 
Vignali. Third, the Sheriff suggested that he was unable to 
conduct any due diligence that would have led to the discovery 
of the allegations against Horacio Vignali. Each of the 
Sheriff's complaints is without merit, and I have responded to 
the complaints fully in a letter to Sheriff Baca's 
    \21\ Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. 
Reform, to Steven G. Madison, Partner, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart Oliver & 
Hedges (Apr. 12, 2002) (Exhibit 9).
    In my reply to Sheriff Baca, I posed a number of questions 
regarding his response to the Committee's report. His letter 
made it appear that the Sheriff somehow obtained certain draft 
pages of the report, which Committee staff had shared with a 
California law enforcement official to ensure that the report's 
discussion of the allegations against Horacio Vignali did not 
endanger any confidential informants. It appears that his 
discovery of these draft pages of the report led Sheriff Baca 
to return the political contributions he received from Horacio 
Vignali. Among other questions, I asked the Sheriff to explain 
how he learned that the Committee was going to discuss the 
allegations against Horacio Vignali in the report and how much 
of Vignali's money he had returned. Sheriff Baca has refused to 
answer these questions by the proscribed deadline. Therefore, I 
must conclude that he is now refusing to cooperate with the 
Committee's inquiry. I find his refusal to cooperate with a 
Congressional investigation almost as disturbing as his refusal 
to accept responsibility for his role in the Vignali clemency 
matter or his advocacy on behalf of an alleged drug dealer.
E. Public Comments by the Bush White House
    While the Committee did not receive a direct response to 
its report from the Bush White House, a spokeswoman for the 
White House did provide a statement about it to The New York 
Times. Anne Womack responded to the report's criticism of the 
Bush Administration for failing to produce documents related to 
the Rosario Gambino matter, the release of which former 
President Clinton did not even seek to block. Womack said that 
``some unproduced files were highly sensitive and had yet to be 
formally requested by the Committee.'' \22\ Anyone familiar 
with facts in this case would not have made that statement in 
good faith. The Committee ``formally requested'' in writing 
Gambino-related records from the National Archives. On March 8, 
2001, the Committee requested ``all records relating to any 
requests for clemency made by . . . Roger Clinton on behalf of 
any individual.'' On June 18, 2001, the Committee requested 
``all records relating to the consideration of an executive 
grant of clemency for Rosario Gambino.'' Contrary to Womack's 
claim, there were actually not one but two formal, written 
requests that covered the documents in question.
    \22\ Alison Leigh Cowan, Panel Says Top Justice Dept. Aide Held 
Information on Rich's Pardon, N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 2002, at A23.
    Moreover, the National Archives acknowledged these requests 
in writing. On August 2, 2001, the Archives said--in what it 
called its ``final response'' to our June 18th request--that 
``[p]ursuant to your prior discussions with the White House 
Counsel's Office, we are not providing four responsive 
[Gambino-related] documents . . . that contain internal 
Government deliberations.'' It is clear, however, that the 
requests were legally proper in form and should have been 
complied with. The Committee requested the records by letter 
rather than subpoena because a subpoena was unnecessary. Under 
the Presidential Records Act, the Committee has statutory 
authority to have access to the records of a previous 
administration through the National Archives and without a 
    \23\ 44 U.S.C. Sec. 2205(2)(c).
    The report left unresolved two issues regarding Jack 
Quinn's financial relationship with Marc Rich: (1) did Quinn 
expect Rich to pay him for his work on the pardon after leaving 
Arnold & Porter and (2) did Rich pay Quinn after the pardons 
were issued.\24\ These questions were initially prompted by 
Jack Quinn's unbelievable claim that he worked on the Rich 
pardon without any expectation of payment and by the belated 
production of records that had been withheld from the Committee 
on claims of attorney-client and work product privileges for 
over a year. The records were produced in the aftermath of a 
court decision finding that those privilege claims were 
invalid. With regard to the first issue, the report detailed 
several newly produced e-mails indicating that Quinn was 
negotiating a retainer agreement with Marc Rich just before he 
began working on the pardon request. However, both Jack Quinn 
and Robert Fink refused to be interviewed regarding these e-
mails. With regard to the second issue, some of the newly 
produced e-mails also indicated that, after the Committee's 
hearings, Quinn sought to enter a retainer agreement with Rich. 
Given Quinn's statements to the Committee that he would not 
accept any money from Rich for his work on the pardon effort, 
the mention of a post-pardon retainer agreement raised further 
questions. Once again, however, Quinn refused to be interviewed 
about these e-mails.
    \24\ See generally, Chapter One, Section II.D., ``Quinn's Fee 
    Since Quinn refused requests for a voluntary interview, the 
Committee issued a document subpoena to him on March 6, 2002, 
in an attempt to obtain some clarification of his financial 
arrangements with Marc Rich. On April 15, 2002, Quinn's 
attorneys produced a set of responsive documents and also 
provided a log of documents being withheld on claims of 
attorney work product and attorney-client privileges.\25\ All 
of the withheld documents are described as ``Privileged 
communication concerning work for Marc Rich unrelated to 
efforts to obtain Pardon.'' \26\ It appears, therefore, that 
Quinn is engaged in additional legal work for Rich on other 
matters. Obviously, however, due to the assertions of privilege 
and Quinn's refusal to be interviewed, the precise nature of 
that work and the total size of Rich's payments to Quinn remain 
    \25\ Letter from Victoria Toensing, Partner, diGenova & Toensing, 
to David Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Apr. 15, 
2002) (Exhibit 10).
    \26\ Id.
    The documents that were produced, however, may explain some 
of the e-mails regarding negotiations to enter a retainer 
agreement after the Committee's hearings on the Rich matter. 
Rich and Quinn apparently entered into a retainer and 
indemnification agreement sometime around March 6, 2001.\27\ 
The agreement called for a payment by Marc Rich of $300,000 to 
retain Quinn to represent Rich ``in connection with legal 
proceedings arising out of (but not in connection with efforts 
to secure) his pardon.'' \28\ Under the terms of the agreement, 
Quinn provided Rich with monthly invoices detailing his time 
and expenses due to undertaking ``unexpected additional legal 
work in defense of your pardon'' to be drawn against the 
$300,000 retainer.\29\ The agreement also retroactively covered 
Quinn's time and expenses, dating back to January 22, 2001. For 
January through March 2001, Quinn billed and received from Rich 
at least $128,100.\30\ Throughout the rest of 2001, Quinn 
billed another $97,240.\31\
    \27\ Jack Quinn Document Production JQC 00070-71 (Letter from Jack 
Quinn to Marc Rich (Mar. 6, 2001)) (Exhibit 11).
    \28\ Id.
    \29\ Id.
    \30\ Jack Quinn Document Production (2001 Billing Records for Marc 
Rich) (Exhibit 12).
    \31\ Id. at JQC 00107.
    Although these documents provide a slightly better 
understanding of Quinn's fee arrangements with Rich, they do 
not explain Quinn's claim to have worked on the Rich pardon on 
a pro bono basis. Despite the evidence discussed in the report 
of detailed negotiations on a retainer agreement in the summer 
of 2000, Quinn refuses to answer any questions about the 
matter, apparently standing by his earlier claims that no 
agreement on his compensation was made before the pardons were 
granted. Moreover, the documents Quinn produced in April 2002 
fail to resolve the issues raised by the e-mails regarding 
retainer discussions in 2000. The documents do explain the 
terms under which Quinn was reimbursed for his time, legal 
fees, and expenses incurred in 2001 as a result of the various 
investigations of the Rich pardon by Congressional committees 
and a New York grand jury. However, questions remain unanswered 
about the nature and extent of his other ``unrelated'' legal 
work for Rich due to his assertions of attorney-client 
privilege and his outright refusal to be interviewed by the 
Committee. Without Quinn's full cooperation, the complete 
picture of his financial relationship with Marc Rich remains 
    On April 9, 2002, former U.S. Parole Commission Chief of 
Staff Marie Ragghianti faxed to the Committee 113 pages of 
documents that had been in her personal possession since she 
left the Commission.\32\ Most of the documents had not been 
previously provided to the Committee by the Parole Commission 
despite the fact that they appear to have been created in the 
course of Commission business. Therefore, copies should have 
been retained in Parole Commission files. Many of the documents 
provide a contemporaneous record of Ragghianti's opinion of the 
unfolding FBI investigation and thus shed new light on her 
motivations for opposing to full cooperation with the FBI. As a 
result, a new picture emerges, one that is less flattering to 
Ragghianti than the original.
    \32\ Fax from Elaine J. Mittleman, Counsel for Marie Ragghianti, to 
the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Apr. 9, 
2002) (Exhibit 13).
A. Factual Disputes Resolved by Newly Produced Documents
            1. Ragghianti's Knowledge of Roger Clinton's Initial 
                    Attempts to Influence the Commission
    The newly produced documents resolve two factual disputes. 
As discussed in my response to Ragghianti's counsel, one of the 
newly produced documents resolves a conflict between statements 
to Committee staff by Ragghianti and General Counsel Michael 
Stover.\33\ Stover said he had provided a 1996 memo to 
Ragghianti about his first and only contact with Roger 
Clinton.\34\ The memo, quoted extensively in the report, 
illustrated Roger Clinton's crude attempt to exert political 
pressure on Stover. Roger Clinton was attempting to arrange an 
improper meeting with a Commissioner to discuss the Gambino 
case. Clinton pressured Stover to arrange the meeting through 
repeated references to his brother's authority as President, 
explaining that President Clinton had suggested that Roger meet 
with a Commissioner. Stover said he had provided the document 
to Ragghianti, who had not been employed by the Commission in 
1996, in an attempt to inform her of Clinton's past misconduct 
and dissuade her from meeting with Roger Clinton in the future. 
Marie Ragghianti, however, denied she had ever seen the memo 
until her July 2001 interview with Committee staff. \35\ Her 
denial appears to be false, given her own words in a document 
recently produced to the Committee. The document is a 1998 
draft e-mail from Ragghianti to deputy ethics officer Sharon 
Gervasoni. In it Ragghianti writes, ``I suppose you are 
referring to my statement that I felt that Michael [Stover] had 
been `gratuitously rude' to Roger [Clinton]--an inference I 
made based on a memo that I believe Michael S. wrote in a memo 
[sic] for the file[.]'' \36\ This statement establishes that 
Ragghianti had indeed seen the memo before and that it was the 
basis for her opinion about Stover having been ``gratuitously 
rude'' to Clinton. This evidence also contradicts her earlier 
claim that the basis of her statement about Stover being rude 
was something Chairman Michael Gaines had told her.
    \33\ Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. 
Reform, to Elaine J. Mittleman, Counsel for Marie Ragghianti n.1 (Apr. 
11, 2002) (Exhibit 6).
    \34\ Chapter Two, Exhibit 42.
    \35\ See Chapter Two, n.230 and accompanying text.
    \36\ Marie Ragghianti Document Production (Draft e-mail from Marie 
Ragghianti, Chief of Staff, Parole Commission, to Sharon Gervasoni, 
Deputy Designated Agency Ethics Officer, Parole Commission (Sept. 23, 
1998)) (Exhibit 14).
    Ragghianti unequivocally denied she had ever seen the 
Stover memo. She said she was certain that if she had ever seen 
it, she would have remembered it.\37\ Moreover, absent 
knowledge of Clinton's prior inappropriate efforts to exert 
political pressure, it would be somewhat understandable for 
staff to meet with him like any other member of the public. 
Accordingly, her denial that she ever saw the memo made the 
defense of her meetings with Clinton more plausible. Given 
these newly produced records, however, it appears that she was 
fully aware of Clinton's prior misconduct and, therefore, 
should have declined further meetings with him. Additionally, 
other conflicts between her versions of events and Stover's 
version of events should now be viewed in a new light, given 
Ragghianti's diminished credibility.
    \37\ Chapter Two, n.230.
            2. The Chronology of the FBI Requests for Assistance from 
                    the Commission
    As the report explains, Ragghianti refused to grant the 
FBI's first request for assistance from the Commission: to have 
Tom Kowalski introduce Roger Clinton to an undercover agent 
posing as a Commission staffer at a meeting in a local 
restaurant. The report criticizes Ragghianti for opposing the 
undercover agent plan. In her response, Ragghianti's lawyer 
defended Ragghianti's opposition by claiming that the report 
had confused the chronology and thus misunderstood Ragghianti's 
motive. In Ragghianti's version of events, the undercover agent 
plan was not the FBI's first request but its ``third or 
fourth,'' \38\ and her motive for opposing it was merely a 
legitimate concern that the Commissioners had not approved it. 
Ragghianti claimed she was put in an awkward position. The 
Commissioners had instructed her not to discuss the FBI's 
investigation with them any further due to concerns that they 
might have to recuse themselves from making a decision in the 
Gambino case. Therefore, according to Ragghianti, when the FBI 
``revised'' its request to include a restaurant meeting and an 
undercover agent, she could not approve the plan because she 
could neither seek guidance from the Commissioners nor allow 
involvement beyond what they had approved.
    \38\ Letter from Elaine J. Mittleman, Counsel for Marie Ragghianti, 
to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform 13 (Apr. 
3, 2002) (Exhibit 5).
    The documents Ragghianti produced, however, contradict 
nearly every aspect of her story and provide further evidence 
for the report's contention that the undercover agent plan was 
the first proposed by FBI. Moreover, the documents also provide 
new evidence that, in fact, the Commissioners had approved the 
undercover agent plan. Thus, in opposing it, Ragghianti was not 
carrying out the will of the Commissioners, but thwarting it. 
One document contradicting Ragghianti's story was attached to 
Mittleman's April 3, 2002, letter and is discussed in my 
reply.\39\ Other documents produced on April 9, 2002, also 
undercut her story. For example, in Ragghianti's typewritten 
notes of a March 22, 1999, meeting with deputy ethics officer 
Sharon Gervasoni, she writes:
    \39\ Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. 
Reform, to Elaine J. Mittleman, Counsel for Marie Ragghianti 7-8 (Apr. 
11, 2002) (Exhibit 6).

        I then recounted the events of Fri. afternoon, 
        beginning with [Tom Kowalski's] report that RC had 
        called him again, asking for an interview this week, 
        and Tom's subsequent call to [FBI Special Agent] Jackie 
        Dalrymple, his telling me afterward that they would be 
        setting up a callback (to Roger) on Sat. which would 
        result in a meeting at the Holiday Inn restaurant, 
        Tom's wearing a body bug, etc. I told her what the 
        original scenario had been (& also that I had 
        personally opposed it--but that the [Commissioners] had 
        voted 2 (for)-1 (abstention) that they would not oppose 
        the Bureau's plan for Tom to introduce one of their 
        agents as a member of our legal staff, etc.), and that 
        the original plan did not include Tom's wearing a body 
        bug. I also told her of my concerns that the Commission 
        had not been given good legal advice re: its conduct of 
        the entire affair, especially since [Michael Stover's] 
        & my Fri. conversation with [Chief of Staff to the 
        Deputy Attorney General Kevin Ohlsen and Associate 
        Deputy Attorney General David Margolis] suggested that 
        Margolis saw the Commission's responsibilities as I 
        did, & not as Michael [Stover] did.

                                 * * *

        I informed her that since Margolis's perception 
        appeared to match my own, as far as the Commission's 
        right to maintain its normal authority in directing its 
        employee in the conduct of USPC business (without fear 
        of obstruction accusations), I now felt that it was 
        appropriate to instruct Tom that he should conduct any 
        further business with Roger C. as he normally would, 
        and that this did not appear to include a meeting at a 
        local restaurant where he might introduce a Bureau 
        agent as a member of our legal staff.\40\
    \40\ Marie Ragghianti Document Production (Notes of Meeting with 
Sharon Gervasoni, Mar. 22, 1999) (Exhibit 15) (emphasis added).

This document provides further evidence that the FBI's original 
request was indeed to have an agent pose as a Commission 
staffer. Moreover, it establishes that the Commissioners had 
explicitly approved this plan by a vote of two-to-one and that, 
despite this explicit approval, Ragghianti instructed 
Commission staffer Tom Kowalski not to assist the FBI by 
introducing the undercover agent to Roger Clinton. Far from 
working conscientiously to implement the Commissioners' will as 
she has claimed, Ragghianti actually worked against it. She 
rationalized her determination to set aside the Commissioners' 
decision through a claim that the Commissioners ``had not been 
given good legal advice'' by the Commission's General Counsel, 
Michael Stover.\41\ Ragghianti replaced the Commissioners' 
judgment with her own and vetoed the FBI's original plan, which 
the Commission had explicitly authorized. Her actions suggest a 
level of opposition to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry not 
contemplated in the report. In light of this new evidence, 
perhaps the report's rather neutral assessment of her 
motivations (that at best she was not objective) is too 
    \41\ Id.
B. Ragghianti's Attitude Towards the FBI's Investigation of Roger 
    In reassessing Ragghianti's motivations, other newly 
produced documents are also useful in that they provide insight 
into Ragghianti's state of mind at the time of the FBI 
investigation. Several of the documents she recently produced 
contain her candid and contemporaneous thoughts about the 
unfolding FBI investigation in an emotionally laden, diary-like 
tone. They contain extraordinary expressions of affinity for 
Roger Clinton and a desire to inform the White House about the 
investigation. In one document, Ragghianti writes, ``I have 
felt guilty about not telling the WH, however, from what I've 
seen, it would be easy to be accused of obstructing justice if 
I did.'' \42\ As explained in my response to Ragghianti's 
attorney, it is disturbing that Ragghianti would not aspire to 
more than merely avoiding criminal obstruction. This statement 
illustrates that, remarkably, the only deterrence against her 
tipping-off the White House was indeed a fear of being held 
legally accountable if she did.
    \42\ Marie Ragghianti Document Production (Notes for the File, Jan. 
14, 1999) (Exhibit 16).
    Ragghianti's counsel has argued that Ragghianti ``worked 
diligently to facilitate the FBI investigation'' and that she 
objected only ``to the extent it did not interfere with or 
violate the Commission's normal conduct of business.'' The 
implication that Ragghianti's opposition to certain FBI 
requests was measured and limited is contradicted by a recently 
produced document in which Ragghianti described the 
circumstances leading to the recording of a conversation 
between Clinton and Tom Kowalski in Parole Commission offices. 
Her notes reflect that Ragghianti was against even this plan (a 
compromise from the FBI's original undercover agent plan). In 
discussing the FBI's compromise proposal with Tom Kowalski and 
Sharon Gervasoni, Ragghianti was reluctant to allow any 
surreptitious recording at all. Rather, she wanted Kowalski to 
simply place a recorder on the desk in front of Clinton. After 
being convinced by Kowalski and Gervasoni who made ``as strong 
a case as possible,'' she wrote, ``finally and agonizingly, I 
relented[.]'' \43\ She continued, ``I hardly slept that night, 
and came in Tuesday morning, determined to call Margolis to 
clarify whether he had meant we should record the interview 
with RC openly or surreptitiously.'' \44\ That Ragghianti would 
believe an open recording of Clinton would be of any benefit 
whatsoever to the FBI's investigation stretches credulity. 
According to her notes, Ragghianti did call Margolis, and he 
convinced her to allow the recording to occur. The argument he 
made that finally persuaded her, however, provides further 
insight into her motivations. She wrote:
    \43\ Marie Ragghianti Document Production (Notes of Meeting with 
Sharon Gervasoni, Mar. 22, 1999) (Exhibit 15).
    \44\ Id. This document also contains yet another confirmation that 
the chronology in the report is correct. Ragghianti wrote, ``[Michael 
Stover] had strongly supported the original plan (for Tom to introduce 
a Bureau agent as a member of our legal staff at a nearby restaurant, 
etc.)[.]'' Id. (emphasis added).

        A recording, [Margolis] said, made it less likely that 
        there would be any misunderstanding. He even said that 
        a recording might be ``fairer to RC''--in that it could 
        get the entire matter resolved as soon as possible. 
        (THIS got my attention, and rang true). He went on to 
        say that otherwise, the whole thing ``could linger 
        forever--or indefinitely.'' And down the road, he said, 
        who knows what may happen?

                                 * * *

        However, this discussion with him had persuaded me that 
        I really had no recourse but to allow the recording to 
        proceed, even though it made me very unhappy.\45\
    \45\ Id.

    On the morning the recording was to occur, Ragghianti 
appears to have interjected herself into the process by 
coaching Kowalski on how to behave during the meeting. Her 
objective in doing so appears to have been to prevent any 
unguarded discussion of the kind the FBI wished to record. 
Describing her visit to Kowalski's office just before Clinton's 
scheduled arrival, Ragghianti wrote:

        I was disconcerted to find Jackie & Kevin [the FBI 
        agents] in his office, because, as I've already said, I 
        had no idea that they would be monitoring the visit 
        with RC, installing microphones in the ceiling & desk, 
        etc. (I thought Tom would simply place one of our 
        little recorders in his desk drawer.) When I saw them, 
        I was not at all happy, but kept it to myself[.]

        I felt that they were waiting for me to leave, and I 
        was waiting for them to leave. But not wanting to do 
        anything hostile, I made a decision to just go ahead & 
        openly tell Tom what I had come to tell him, re: 
        opening his mtg. with RC by saying this would be their 
        last mtg., etc. & then referencing my October letter, 
        etc. I emphasized once more that he should conduct the 
        visit as he would normally conduct any interview, etc.

        Jackie then picked up a large black canvas shoulder bag 
        and said I'll go get the car & meet you (Kevin) out 
        front. I went out with her, but stopped at a nearby 
        office, killing time & waiting for Kevin to leave. He 
        didn't. Finally, I saw both Tom & Kevin standing at the 
        window, obviously watching for RC's arrival. At that 
        point, I went back into T's office, and said, ``Now 
        remember, Tom--business as usual!'' And he answered, in 
        a joking way (tho [sic] I knew he was serious), ``Yes 
        M'am!'' I then left, and went up to watch & wait for 
    \46\ Id.

Following Ragghianti's attempt to influence the content of the 
meeting, she goes on to describe her activities during and 
after the meeting. After describing Clinton's arrival and her 
observations of the agents' movements, Ragghianti wrote:

        It became increasingly clear that [the agents] must be 
        listening to the RC/Tom meeting from their car, & I was 
        distraught, but helpless. At that point, all I could do 
        was pray.

        After a seemingly interminable period of time, I 
        decided to go see what I could see of Tom's office. I 
        was so distraught that I absentmindedly went UP stairs 
        (to the roof) instead of DOWNstairs where Tom's office 
    \47\ Id.

In another document, Ragghianti describes her conversation with 
Kowalski. She wrote:

        Evidently, I arrived immediately following RC's exit, 
        and immediately prior to Kevin & Jackie's return--I 
        said, Tom--has he gone? And he said yes, he just left. 
        I said how'd it go & he said--it went great, he didn't 
        say anything out of line, it was just fine! I said 
        thank God, are you sure? And he said, yes, he just said 
        all the usual things--the things he's said before, and 
        he didn't say anything unusual--was exactly like we 
        thought it'd be. I was greatly relieved.\48\
    \48\ Marie Ragghianti Document Production (Notes of Conversation 
with Jackie Dalrymple and Kevin O'Connell, Special Agents, Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, and Tom Kowalski, Case Operations 
Administrator, Parole Commission, Mar. 23, 1999) (Exhibit 17).

    After the recording,\49\ Ragghianti was upset to learn that 
before the meeting between Kowalski and Clinton, the FBI agents 
had asked Kowalski to ``offer to set up Roger with `one of our 
analysts' by giving him a telephone number.'' \50\ Kowalski 
told Ragghianti he had not done it and that ``he figured they 
were probably annoyed.'' \51\ Ragghianti wrote, ``My private 
reaction was that I doubt they are as annoyed as I am at 
hearing that they asked for this, which was certainly not in 
the sphere of what they knew I had asked of Tom.'' \52\ 
Ragghianti's comment demonstrates the detailed level of control 
she insisted on having over the FBI's requests and her 
animosity toward any attempt by the agents to enhance the 
Commission's level of cooperation. Why should this request have 
annoyed Ragghianti? If her concerns were merely to minimize 
Commission involvement and insulate the integrity of its 
decisionmaking function, then nothing about the agents' request 
should have been annoying at all. Since it would have 
redirected future contacts with Roger Clinton to the FBI rather 
than to the Commission, it would actually have alleviated 
Ragghianti's purported concerns.
    \49\ As noted in the report, the Justice Department refused to 
produce to the Committee a transcript or a copy of the recorded 
meeting. However, Tom Kowalski did write a memo summarizing the meeting 
on the day it occurred, March 23, 1999. Curiously, this memo was not 
produced to the Committee by the Parole Commission but only recently by 
Marie Ragghianti. Marie Ragghianti Document Production (Memorandum from 
Thomas C. Kowalski to File, Mar. 23, 1999) (Exhibit 18).
    \50\ Marie Ragghianti Document Production (Notes of Meeting with 
Sharon Gervasoni, Mar. 22, 1999) (Exhibit 15).
    \51\ Id.
    \52\ Id.
    These new documents clearly demonstrate not only the 
factual inaccuracies of Ragghianti's response to the 
Committee's report but also her unusual predisposition against 
the FBI's legitimate requests and toward protecting Roger 
Clinton from the potential consequences of his advocacy for 
Rosario Gambino.
    [The exhibits referred to follow:]