[House Report 107-454]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
Union Calendar No. 269
107th Congress Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
2d Session 107-454
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JUSTICE UNDONE: CLEMENCY DECISIONS IN THE CLINTON WHITE HOUSE
_______
May 14, 2002.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Burton, from the Committee on Government Reform submitted the
following
SECOND REPORT
On March 14, 2002, the Committee on Government Reform
approved and adopted a report entitled ``Justice Undone:
Clemency Decisions in the Clinton White House.'' The chairman
was directed to transmit a copy to the Speaker of the House.
CHAPTER THREE
HUGH RODHAM'S ROLE IN LOBBYING FOR GRANTS OF EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY
FINDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE
HUGH RODHAM'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE VIGNALI COMMUTATION
Vignali's clemency petition was false and misleading.
Carlos Vignali lied in his clemency petition. First,
he continued to maintain his innocence, despite overwhelming
evidence of his involvement in selling a substantial amount of
cocaine across state lines and a specific finding by the
sentencing judge that he lied at trial about his involvement in
a large drug distribution network. Second, Vignali claimed that
he was a first-time offender, despite the fact that he had a
prior criminal record. By not accepting responsibility for his
crime and lying about his background, he should not have been
eligible for executive clemency.
Vignali's supporters provided letters of support that were
false and misleading.
A key element of the campaign by Carlos Vignali and
his father Horacio, was a series of letters on Carlos' behalf
from prominent Los Angeles politicians. A number of these
letters contained misleading statements calculated to create
the impression that Carlos Vignali was innocent. The officials
who submitted letters included Representative Xavier Becerra,
Representative Esteban Torres, State Assembly Speaker Robert
Hertzberg, State Assembly Member Antonio Villaraigosa, State
Senator Richard Polanco, Los Angeles County Supervisor Gloria
Molina, Los Angeles City Councilmember Mike Hernandez, and
Cardinal Roger Mahony, Archbishop of Los Angeles.
Los Angeles County Sheriff Lee Baca provided critical support
for the Vignali commutation that was inappropriate, given his
position.
Sheriff Baca had a close relationship with Horacio
Vignali that was based on Vignali's political and financial
support for Baca. Sheriff Baca has known Horacio Vignali since
1991, and Vignali has been a key political supporter of Baca,
giving him at least $11,000 in contributions and raising
between $60,000-$70,000 more.
Sheriff Baca spoke with the White House in support
of the Vignali commutation. In January 2001, Baca received a
telephone call from Hugh Rodham in which Rodham told Baca that
he would get a call from the White House about Horacio Vignali.
Shortly thereafter, Baca received a call from White House staff
and spoke in support of Horacio Vignali. Based on Baca's
statements in this telephone call, White House staff clearly
and justifiably concluded that Baca supported the commutation
of Carlos Vignali's sentence.
Sheriff Baca continues to claim, without any basis,
that he did not support the Vignali commutation. Rather than
express regret for his role in the Vignali commutation, Sheriff
Baca maintains that he opposed the Vignali commutation and did
nothing that could have been interpreted as support for the
commutation. However, Sheriff Baca's supposed opposition to the
Vignali commutation does not square with the fact that: (1) he
drafted a letter that he believed Horacio Vignali would use in
the clemency effort and (2) when he was asked squarely by the
White House if the President should commute Vignali's prison
sentence, he stated that it was ``the President's decision to
make,'' rather than express his opposition. These facts, and
others outlined in this report, indicate that Sheriff Baca
wanted to support the Vignali commutation, but was afraid of
creating a paper record that would clearly indicate his
support.
Sheriff Baca's efforts on behalf of the Vignalis are
even more inappropriate given that there were extensive
allegations that Horacio Vignali, Carlos' father, was also
involved in illegal drug trafficking. It is inappropriate
enough for a senior law enforcement official like Baca to
support a grant of clemency for an unrepentant, large-scale
drug dealer like Carlos Vignali. However, when coupled with
credible allegations indicating that Horacio Vignali was a drug
dealer, and in fact was the source of cocaine supply for his
son, Baca's support of Horacio and Carlos Vignali is even more
inappropriate.
U.S. Attorney Alejandro Mayorkas provided critical support for
the Vignali commutation that was inappropriate, given his
position.
U.S. Attorney Alejandro Mayorkas called the White
House in support of the Vignali commutation. Mayorkas, the top
federal prosecutor in Los Angeles, was asked by Horacio Vignali
to call the White House in support of his son's clemency
petition. Mayorkas then called the White House about the
Vignali commutation. While Mayorkas does not recall the details
of his conversation, he now concedes that his call conveyed
support for the Vignali commutation.
Mayorkas supported the Vignali commutation despite
his ignorance of the facts of the case and his knowledge that
the prosecutors responsible for the Vignali case opposed
clemency. Before he called the White House, Mayorkas had spoken
twice with Todd Jones, the U.S. Attorney responsible for the
Vignali case. Jones told Mayorkas that Vignali was a ``major
player'' in drug trafficking, that he was ``bad news'' and that
Mayorkas should not ``go there'' when it came to Vignali.
Despite these warnings from a prosecutor who was intimately
familiar with the Vignali case, Mayorkas still called the White
House in support of the Vignali commutation.
Mayorkas' support for the Vignali commutation was
inappropriate. Mayorkas knew little about the Vignali case.
What he did know indicated that Carlos Vignali was an
unrepentant, large-scale criminal. These facts alone make his
support for the commutation, as a senior federal prosecutor,
totally inappropriate.
There are a number of allegations that both Horacio and Carlos
Vignali were involved in illegal drug trafficking.
There are allegations that, in addition to his son,
Horacio Vignali was involved in illegal drug trafficking, and
that Carlos Vignali was involved in drug trafficking far beyond
the conduct that led to his conviction in Minnesota. DEA
reports documenting these allegations include the following
statements:
``[Horacio Vignali] negotiated with ATF agents to sell
a machine gun and stated to them that he had also
smuggled heroin into the United States utilizing
automobiles.''
``[Redacted] has also purchased cocaine from Carlos
Vignali Jr. of Los Angeles . . . Vignali's father
Carlos Vignali aka `pops' owns a body shop, at 1260
Figueroa and is the source of supply for his son.''
``Carlos Horatio Vignali's role in [George Torres' drug
dealing] organization is relatively unknown at this
time. It is believed that Vignali functions as a
financial partner in the organization.''
These DEA reports are corroborated by law
enforcement personnel who indicate that they had received
information indicating that both Horacio and Carlos Vignali
were involved in large-scale drug trafficking. These charges
have never been formally made in court or substantiated by
physical evidence. However, the mere existence of such
allegations should have precluded senior law enforcement and
political officials from supporting a commutation for Carlos
Vignali on the strength of his father's reputation.
Nonetheless, it appears that no one checked with the DEA prior
to granting the commutation.
Hugh Rodham provided false and misleading information to the
White House in support of the Vignali commutation.
Hugh Rodham was paid $204,200 for his work on the
Vignali commutation. It appears that, in return for this money,
he worked part-time for two months gathering materials in
support of Vignali's case and making telephone calls to White
House staff. It appears that Rodham's payment in the Vignali
matter was contingent upon his success, as he received the
$200,000 payment on January 24, 2001, after President Clinton
granted clemency to Vignali.
Rodham repeatedly provided false information during
his communications with the White House. First, and most
importantly, Rodham told Bruce Lindsey that the trial attorney
who prosecuted Vignali supported the commutation. This was
completely false. Second, Rodham told Lindsey that Vignali was
a first-time offender when, in fact, he had two prior
convictions and two other arrests. Rodham also told Lindsey
that Vignali ``did not play a major role in the offense'' when,
in fact, Vignali was a major source of cocaine for the
Minnesota drug-dealing ring at issue in his case.
Hugh Rodham told the White House that First Lady Hillary Rodham
Clinton was aware of his lobbying efforts and that the Vignali
commutation was ``very important'' to her.
Hugh Rodham told White House staff that the Vignali
commutation was ``very important to him and the First Lady as
well as others.'' This statement is confirmed by the
independent recollection of the White House staffer who spoke
to Rodham as well as the note that she took contemporaneously.
Rodham's statement raises two possibilities: first, that the
First Lady was aware of and approved of Hugh Rodham's lobbying
efforts; or, second, that Hugh Rodham was lying to White House
staff regarding the First Lady's knowledge of his efforts.
The White House sought the opinion of powerful Los Angeles
political figures, but failed to consult with the prosecutors
or judge who understood the Vignali case.
White House staff engaged in telephone conversations
with a number of outside individuals regarding the Vignali
case--Hugh Rodham, Lee Baca, and Alejandro Mayorkas, none of
whom knew very much about the Vignali case. It appears that key
White House staff gave great weight to the input provided by
Rodham, Baca, and Mayorkas, even though they knew little about
the case and had mixed motives.
White House staff failed to reach out to the
prosecutors who had convicted Vignali or the judge who
sentenced him. White House staff justified their failure to
take this simple action by concluding that they knew that the
prosecutors and judge would object, so there was no need to
speak to them. However, if the White House had spoken to Todd
Jones, Denise Reilly, Andrew Dunne, or Judge David Doty, they
would have learned that Carlos Vignali: (1) was not a small-
time drug dealer; (2) was unrepentant about his criminal
activity; and (3) never cooperated with law enforcement by
telling them who supplied him cocaine.
The White House ignored the strenuous objections to the Vignali
commutation that were lodged by the Pardon Attorney.
The Pardon Attorney provided the White House with a
report that contained his recommendation against granting the
Vignali commutation. This report contained a number of powerful
arguments against the commutation, which were apparently
ignored by the White House. The existence of the Pardon
Attorney's report means that the White House cannot claim that
it was totally unaware that Vignali's arguments were completely
false. The White House knew that the Vignali clemency petition
had no merit, yet decided to grant the commutation anyway.
President Clinton's decision raises questions about why the
Vignali commutation was granted.
Rodham has apparently misled the public about returning to the
Vignalis those fees he received in connection with the clemency
and ignored former President and Senator Clinton's request that
he do so.
On February 21, 2001, at the request of former
President Clinton and Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton, Rodham
promised to return to Horacio Vignali the legal fees he
received in connection with the Vignali clemency. But, as of
June 2001, Rodham had apparently returned only about $50,000 of
the money that Horacio Vignali paid him. Rodham's attorney has
confirmed to Committee staff that Rodham has not returned any
additional amounts and has no plans to return the remaining
$154,000.
HUGH RODHAM'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE BRASWELL PARDON
Glenn Braswell was under investigation by multiple federal
agencies and several state attorneys general when the pardon
was granted.
Over the past two decades, Braswell has created a
dietary supplement empire using false advertising to mislead
consumers. After serving time in prison for mail fraud and tax
evasion in 1983, Braswell has continued to defraud consumers
about the benefits of his herbal remedies. In addition to
facing numerous lawsuits, Braswell's companies have been
investigated by the Internal Revenue Service, Federal Trade
Commission, Food and Drug Administration, and Better Business
Bureau.
Unsurprisingly, Braswell was under another criminal
investigation by federal prosecutors for a massive tax evasion
and money-laundering scheme when he was pardoned. Braswell's
petition bypassed the traditional route through the Justice
Department and went directly to the White House. If the FBI had
conducted a background investigation instead of the White
House, Braswell's petition would have been rejected quickly.
Braswell paid Hugh Rodham $230,000 for successfully obtaining
the pardon.
Braswell hired Rodham to support his pardon petition
for $230,000. For this price, Rodham claims he forwarded a
letter of support for Braswell to the White House Counsel's
Office and made a follow-up inquiry. According to Rodham, these
two actions were the extent of his role in the Braswell pardon.
Rodham refunded the $230,000 to Braswell after facing
widespread criticism from the media and members of both
political parties.
HUGH RODHAM'S EFFORTS TO OBTAIN CLEMENCY FOR THE LUMS
Gene and Nora Lum, prominent Democratic contributors and
fundraisers, were convicted of making illegal conduit
contributions and tax offenses.
In 1997, the Lums pleaded guilty to making $50,000
in illegal conduit contributions to the DNC. They were
sentenced to home detention, confinement in a halfway house and
a $30,000 fine. In August 1998, Gene Lum pleaded guilty to tax
fraud for filing tax returns claiming more than $7.1 million in
false deductions and was sentenced to two years imprisonment.
The Lums attempted to obtain executive clemency through Hugh
Rodham.
Hugh Rodham lobbied the White House as part of the
Lums' efforts but failed to secure them a grant of clemency. In
December 2000, Nora Lum called one of her husband's criminal
attorneys and asked him to send various documents to Hugh
Rodham at the White House. He did so. In early January 2001,
Rodham called Gene Lum's attorney again and asked him to resend
those documents directly to, among others, Meredith Cabe, an
associate White House counsel responsible for clemency matters.
Subsequently, Rodham telephoned Cabe and discussed the merits
of the Lums' pardon request. Cabe then told White House Counsel
Beth Nolan and Deputy White House Counsel Bruce Lindsey about
her discussion with Rodham. Both told Cabe that the Lums were
not going to receive clemency.
The Lums and Hugh Rodham have refused to cooperate with the
Committee's investigation.
Gene and Nora Lum have refused to cooperate with the
Committee's investigation. The Lums' daughter, Nicole (with
whom Hugh Rodham apparently had some sort of business
relationship), has likewise declined to be interviewed by the
Committee. Hugh Rodham has also refused to cooperate with the
Committee's request for an interview. Therefore, the Committee
is unable to obtain a full understanding of the Lums' efforts
to obtain executive clemency and Rodham's role in those
efforts.
INTRODUCTION
Unlike Roger Clinton, Hugh Rodham was highly successful in
leveraging his relationship with the President and First Lady
into lucrative work lobbying for grants of clemency. The
Committee is aware of three cases in which Hugh Rodham lobbied
the White House for grants of executive clemency: Carlos
Vignali, Glenn Braswell, and Gene and Nora Lum. Rodham was
successful in two of these cases and was paid over $430,000 for
his work.
Simply put, Rodham inappropriately used his access to the
White House to lobby for grants of clemency, which were not
deserved and would not have been granted but for his
intervention. Carlos Vignali was a supplier of cocaine to a
major drug-dealing ring in Minnesota who never admitted his
guilt or cooperated with law enforcement. Yet, because of Hugh
Rodham's efforts, he had his sentence cut from 15 to 5 years.
Glenn Braswell was a highly successful con artist who had his
earlier fraud conviction erased despite that he was under
active investigation for tax fraud at the time of the pardon.
The fact that Vignali and Braswell received clemency from
President Clinton through the efforts of Hugh Rodham undermines
public confidence in the President's exercise of the clemency
power and in the equality of our laws.
I. THE CARLOS VIGNALI COMMUTATION
A. The Case Against Carlos Vignali
On December 20, 1993, a federal grand jury in Minnesota
issued a 34-count indictment against 30 defendants. The
indictment resulted from the largest drug investigation in
Minnesota history.\1\ According to the indictment, Carlos
Vignali and his co-defendants sent large quantities of cocaine
to Minnesota by mail from California, converted it to crack,
and distributed it quickly on the street.\2\ Vignali was
indicted on one count of conspiring to distribute cocaine; two
counts of using facilities in interstate commerce with the
intent to promote a business enterprise involving narcotics;
and one count of illegally using a communication facility to
facilitate the distribution of cocaine.\3\ According to the
government, Vignali and his associates sold a kilogram of crack
a day as late as November 1993.\4\
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\1\ Superceding Indictment, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. Dec. 30,
1993) (Exhibit 1). See also Drug Ring Case Wrapped up with 2 Convicted,
1 Acquitted, Star Trib. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Dec. 13, 1994, at 2B.
\2\ Id; Superceding Indictment, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. Dec. 30,
1993) (Exhibit 1).
\3\ Id.
\4\ Drug Ring Case Wrapped up with 2 Convicted, 1 Acquitted, Star
Trib. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Dec. 13, 1994, at 2B.
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The investigation that resulted in Vignali's conviction
began locally with a probe of Gerald and Shirley Williams, who
were suspected of distributing cocaine.\5\ As the scope of the
investigation expanded, Minneapolis narcotics authorities
obtained the assistance of federal law enforcement agencies.\6\
Based on information obtained from confidential informants and
other sources, authorities initiated a court-ordered wiretap of
several residential and cellular telephones to monitor calls to
and from Gerald Williams regarding cocaine distribution.\7\
Many of the intercepted conversations to and from Williams'
residential and cellular telephones involved coded language and
had to be interpreted by investigating officers.\8\
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\5\ Telephone Interview with Tony Adams, Officer, Minneapolis
Police Department, 4th Precinct, Narcotics Division (Mar. 27, 2001).
\6\ Id.
\7\ Presentence Investigation, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. 1994) at
para. 33 (Exhibit 2) (incorporated into Judgment in a Criminal Case as
finding of fact).
\8\ Id.
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In the course of its wiretap surveillance, authorities
intercepted telephone conversations between Vignali and others
during which cocaine shipments to Minnesota were discussed.\9\
Authorities ultimately learned that Williams' original supplier
of cocaine in California was Dale Evans, who in turn obtained
his supply from Jonathan Gray and, later, Carlos Vignali.\10\
The evidence obtained in the investigation indicated a broad
level of involvement by Vignali in a multi-state conspiracy to
distribute cocaine.\11\ In that context, authorities discovered
that, in October 1993, Vignali sold a substantial quantity of
cocaine to Todd Hopson in Los Angeles for distribution in the
Minnesota area \12\ and supplied an additional six kilograms of
cocaine to Minnesota-area distributors through use of the mails
and the telephone.\13\
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\9\ Id.
\10\ Id. at para. 31.
\11\ Id. at para. 30, 31, 42, 45, 46, 49, 57, 58, 59, 66, 67, 68,
71. See also Telephone Interview with Todd Jones, U.S. Attorney for the
District of Minnesota, Department of Justice (May 2, 1001) (describing
evidence supporting finding of Vignali's broad level of involvement in
conspiracy). Before leaving the U.S. Attorney's Office, Jones obtained,
as the lead AUSA in the Vignali investigation, the court orders for the
wiretaps; represented the Government at suppression hearings; and
presented the case to the grand jury. In 1998, Jones returned as the
U.S. Attorney for the U.S. District of Minnesota.
\12\ Presentence Investigation, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. 1994) at
para. 68 (Exhibit 2) (incorporated into Judgment in a Criminal Case as
finding of fact).
\13\ Id. at para. 42.
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On November 9, 1993, Minnesota law enforcement executed
warrants on several individuals involved in the drug
conspiracy, including Dale Evans.\14\ Within Evans' home and
vehicles, law enforcement found an AK-47 assault rifle and
ammunition, a Desert Eagle pistol and ammunition, a Smith and
Wesson 9 millimeter pistol and loaded magazine, a bag
containing marijuana, pagers, addresses of other co-
conspirators, pictures of him and some of the other co-
conspirators target-shooting in California, and various other
items.\15\ Searches and arrests of other co-conspirators
likewise revealed large amounts of cash, cocaine and other
contraband, drug paraphernalia, guns, and ammunition.\16\ As a
result of these searches and arrests and with the assistance of
Los Angeles law enforcement, Carlos Vignali was arrested in Los
Angeles on May 6, 1994,\17\ and extradited to Minnesota for
trial.\18\
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\14\ Id. at para. 85, 87.
\15\ Id. at para. 87.
\16\ Id. at para. 85-101. See also Telephone Interview with Tony
Adams, Officer, Minneapolis Police Department, 4th Precinct, Narcotics
Division (Mar. 27, 2001).
\17\ Evans immediately cooperated with law enforcement. Id. He told
DEA that he worked for Vignali, a.k.a., ``C-Low'' and identified him
with a still-shot photograph of Vignali's appearance in a rap video.
\18\ Presentence Investigation, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. 1994) at
para. 102 (Exhibit 2). When he was arrested, Vignali stated that he
knew Gray but had not seen him for about a year; that Gray introduced
him to Evans, who was interested in possibly buying his townhouse; and
that no one had ever referred to him as ``C-Low.''
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Vignali's trial began on October 27, 1994. In his opening
statement to the jury, Vignali's defense attorney, Danny Davis,
repeatedly characterized the alleged drug conspiracy as ``a
black drug network'':
[T]he indictment that His Honor read for you--it is a
sensitive suggestion about the evidence in this case--
and I do it with complete deference to what the court
suggested earlier about drugs, and our sensitivities,
about race, and our sensitivities--but this conspiracy,
the evidence will show, really comes down to a black
drug dealing network. One by one those drug dealers,
that the prosecution has found it necessary to come in
and put on as witnesses, will make clear this is a
nationwide black drug-dealing network. You can't get
around it. Disabuse yourself that I am prejudiced when
I say that. It is a fact. My client is not [black].\19\
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\19\ Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. Oct. 27, 1994)
at 113-14.
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Counsel for the co-defendants thereupon moved for a mistrial:
Mr. Fenster [Counsel for Melvin Campbell]: [I]t is
offensive, what he is doing, and I think that just
because he is a defense counsel doesn't excuse him from
this kind of offensive behavior, and I think the
court--I don't know about a mistrial, maybe that is not
appropriate--I am not quite sure what to do, but I
think I will move for a mistrial. I think that kind of
presentation to the jury is so offensive to the fabric
of our law that it is impossible for the jury to now be
able to have a fair trial when he's painted the other
defendants in a black drug-dealing network. Certainly
the prosecution would have a mistrial if they did that.
Mr. Cascarano [Counsel for Todd Hopson]: I join in that
motion.
Mr. Gray [Counsel for Claude Oliver Phillips]: I join
in that motion and, if the court doesn't grant it, I
move to strike every word that Mr. Davis has said about
a black drug network around the nation. And, if he says
it again, I ask he be jailed. It is the worst conduct I
have seen by a defense lawyer in twenty-four years.
Mr. Cascarano: Your Honor, [what] Mr. Davis has done is
paint not only the three black defendants as not
clothed with the presumption of innocence, but what he
has done is he has painted them guilty by virtue of
their skin color.\20\
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\20\ Id. at 115-16.
The district court denied the motion for a mistrial.
However, it did caution the jury that the defendants' race
should play no role in its determination of their guilt or
innocence.\21\ Even though the court did not grant a mistrial,
Vignali's crude effort to play the race card against his
codefendants is highly troubling. Vignali's conduct, through
his counsel, is even more troubling when considered in light of
the fact that one of his supporters later claimed, without any
factual support, that Vignali was the victim of racial
prejudice at trial.
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\21\ On appeal, co-defendant Todd Hopson argued that those comments
made by Vignali's attorney were so prejudicial that he was entitled to
a new trial. U.S. v. Williams, 97 F.3d 240, 244 (8th Cir. 1996).
However, the appellate court found that Hopson failed to show
prejudice. In particular, the court observed that the jury's verdict
indicated that it declined any invitation to use race as a proxy for
guilt. In support of that view, the court cited the jury's acquittal of
co-defendant Claude Phillips, an African-American, and its conviction
of Vignali, a Hispanic, on three of four counts.
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At Vignali's trial, the government presented compelling
evidence showing that he conspired to traffic cocaine, aided
and abetted the mailing of at least two packages of cocaine
from California to Minnesota, and used the telephone to
facilitate the sale of cocaine. That evidence included the
testimony of various co-conspirators, including Dale Evans,
Gerald Williams, and Ronald Nunn. Evans testified that,
beginning in March 1993, he bought cocaine from Jonathan Gray
and typically mailed that cocaine to Gerald Williams in
Minnesota for distribution.\22\ Evans also testified that Gray
informed him in 1993 that he was obtaining his cocaine from
Vignali.\23\ Evans first met Vignali sometime during the summer
of 1993 when they discussed distributing cocaine and agreed on
prices.\24\
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\22\ Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. Nov. 16, 1994)
at 86.
\23\ Id. at 100.
\24\ Id. at 101.
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Evans also testified that Todd Hopson, one of the
Minneapolis-based cocaine distributors, flew to Los Angeles
around October 20, 1993, and met with Evans and Vignali, and
Vignali agreed to sell Hopson cocaine.\25\ Hopson, Evans, and a
friend of Evans then followed Vignali to an East Los Angeles
apartment where Hopson bought between $36,000 and $70,000 of
cocaine from Vignali.\26\ Evans testified that prior to leaving
Los Angeles for Minnesota, he made arrangements with Carlos
Vignali and Jonathan Gray to have an additional six kilograms
of cocaine sent to the residence of Todd Hopson's relative in
Minnesota.\27\
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\25\ Id. at 119.
\26\ Id. at 120-21.
\27\ Id. at 137-43. Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn.
Nov. 17, 1994) at 10-12 (Evans testifying that he planned with Ronald
Nunn to pick up Hopson and collect a parcel mailed by Vignali at the
residence of Hopson's relative in Egan, Minnesota).
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On October 21, 1993, officers conducted surveillance on
Evans, Ronald Nunn, and Todd Hopson.\28\ In the course of that
surveillance, officers observed Ronald Nunn picking up Evans at
Gerald Williams' apartment in Minneapolis.\29\ Nunn and Evans
then drove to Hopson's home in Apple Valley, Minnesota, picked
him up, and went to the drop-off location in Eagan,
Minnesota.\30\ They picked up a large parcel and returned with
it to the Apple Valley residence.\31\ Evans, Nunn, and Hopson
detected police surveillance while driving and attempted
evasive maneuvers.\32\ After Evans noticed that he was being
tailed by undercover surveillance, he paged Vignali and Gray in
Los Angeles from his cell phone with the emergency code
``911.'' After he had managed to shake off his pursuers, Evans
spoke with Gray and Vignali. They did not realize that their
conversation was being monitored by the police. Evans told
Vignali that ``[t]hey followed us all around.'' \33\ He further
stated that ``[w]e had to shake them, get them off, one in
front, back one came, parked down the street, waiting for us,
dog, undercrizzovers.'' \34\ Evans testified that by
``undercrizzovers'' he was referring to undercover police and
was conveying that he was being chased by the police.\35\ Evans
also told Vignali that he had to start ``busting u-turns'' to
evade the police.\36\ In response to Evans' report, Vignali
asked, ``Is that right? So everything's cool, though?'' \37\
Vignali later asked Evans, ``How long ago was this?'' \38\ As
Evans was continuing to talk to Vignali about the
``undercrizzovers,'' Vignali asked, ``Hey, but, you, you, you,
um, you made everything straight, right?'' \39\ Vignali also
asked, ``Don't you think you should be careful before you bust
a move?'' \40\ Evans responded, ``that's what I'm doing.'' \41\
Vignali later paged Evans to determine whether Evans was
arrested.
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\28\ Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. Nov. 14, 1994)
at 184-86 (testimony of Officer Tony Adams).
\29\ Id.
\30\ Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. Nov. 17, 1994)
at 16 (testimony of Dale Evans).
\31\ Id.
\32\ Id. at 14 (Evans testifying that Nunn detected undercover
police surveillance).
\33\ Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. Nov. 22, 1994)
at 51 (testimony of Dale Evans); Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali
(D. Minn. Nov. 29, 1994) at 204 (Vignali testifying that Evans paged
him ``911'').
\34\ Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. Nov. 22, 1994)
at 51.
\35\ Id. at 51, 56 (testifying that he later described to Vignali,
``They were following us, riding and shining'').
\36\ Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. Nov. 29, 1994)
at 276.
\37\ Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. Nov. 22, 1994)
at 51.
\38\ Id. at 52.
\39\ Id.
\40\ Id. at 53.
\41\ Id. at 54.
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At trial, Vignali contended that, during his conversation
with Evans, he did not know what Evans meant by
``undercrizzovers'' and that he was disoriented because Evans'
call had woken him.\42\ Vignali testified that he inferred only
that ``something was wrong'' with a $20,000 ``business loan''
that he supplied to Jonathan Gray \43\ and that Evans either
lost or someone stole that money.\44\ At trial, prosecutors
pointed out that Vignali's defense made no sense. Though he
claimed to be confused and ``freshly woken up,'' Vignali
cautioned his friend to ``be careful'' and asked if
``everything was cool.'' The trial transcript makes it clear
that Vignali's defense was implausible:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\ Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. Nov. 29, 1994)
at 204.
\43\ Vignali claimed that Gray had told him that he needed $20,000
for a short-term business deal involving Stacy Augmon and several other
professional basketball players. Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali
(D. Minn. Nov. 29, 1994) at 248-49 (cross examination of Carlos
Vignali); Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. Dec. 1, 1994)
at 39-40 (direct examination by Horacio Vignali); Transcript of Trial,
U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. Dec. 5, 1994) at 232 (closing argument of
Carlos Vignali).
According to Vignali, Gray assured him that he would get $25,000
back in a matter of days and that, if the deal fell through, Gray would
sell his Porsche to cover Vignali's losses. Transcript of Trial, U.S.
v. Vignali (D. Minn. Nov. 29, 1994) at 192-93. Vignali claimed that he
had $20,000 in cash to loan Gray because he had saved his allowance
since he was a young child and that the resulting stack of $100 bills,
which he had ironed and carefully stacked in his closet, represented
his ``life savings.'' See Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D.
Minn. Dec. 1, 1994) at 40-43. According to Vignali, Gray returned to
him the $20,000 and an additional $5,000. See Transcript of Trial, U.S.
v. Vignali (D. Minn. Nov. 29, 1994) at 188. Also, according to Vignali,
a second ``business loan'' was made when Vignali ``loaned'' Gray
$25,000, which, with $5,000 interest, resulted in the $30,000 referred
to on the tapes. Id. at 192-95, 273-75.
\44\ Id. at 173, 204, 259; Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D.
Minn. Dec. 5, 1994) at 232.
Dunne. I thought that you said, on direct examination,
that you didn't understand what he meant by under
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
crizzovers because you had just gotten up?
Vignali. Yes, he, he had just woken me up with the
page, sir.
Dunne. Okay. And you will agree with me, will you not,
that the time on this transcript [is 12:09 p.m.],
Minneapolis time? \45\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\45\ Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. Nov. 29, 1994)
at 269-70.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * *
Dunne. You say, when Dale gives you the explanation
about the under crizzovers . . . ``Is that right?''
Vignali. Yes.
Dunne. Do you say--you don't say to him, ``Dale what
are you talking about?''
Vignali. No.
Dunne. Okay. And you don't say, ``I don't understand
this?''
Vignali. No, sir. Bear in mind that I, I had just
freshly woken up.\46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\46\ Id. at 273.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * *
Dunne. Now you just said that the reason you called . .
. [was] that you were concerned about your money?
Vignali. Yes sir.
Dunne. Concerned enough to say Don't you think you
should be careful before you bust a move?
Vignali. Yes sir.
Dunne. But you don't ask him what the problem is?
Vignali. I, I have a little understanding that
something wrong is going on, but I'm not exactly sure,
he didn't make it clear to me.\47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\47\ Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. Nov. 30, 1994)
at 10-11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * *
Dunne. What do you mean, something is going wrong?
Vignali. I have no idea. I wasn't there.
Dunne. What did you think was going wrong with your
25,000 dollars?
Vignali. I have no idea.
Dunne. You have no idea?
Vignali. No, sir. I thought maybe, when he told me that
it was smashing, maybe something was following him
trying--maybe trying to carjack him or something, I
don't know--and then he was going to try to tell me,
Well I lost your money, or something. I was just
concerned about, in that aspect.\48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\48\ Id. at 12-13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * *
Dunne. Now let me ask you, during this phone
conversation where you are concerned about Dale's
busting a move with your 25,000 dollars because someone
might carjack him. Do you ever tell Dale: Dale, maybe
you should call the police if someone is trying to
carjack you?
Vignali. I, I didn't, again I will tell you I didn't
know exactly what was going on.
Dunne. But you thought somebody was trying to carjack
him?
Vignali. It was, it was the morning. I'm--my head--I
had just woken up, I wasn't--it--nothing was clear to
me, it never was clear to me.\49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\49\ Id. at 13.
Evans testified that he returned to California the day
after he escaped the undercover surveillance.\50\ But, before
returning to California, he mailed himself the money he
obtained for the cocaine.\51\ Evans told Vignali and Jonathan
Gray in intercepted telephone conversations that he would meet
with them to give them the money.\52\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\50\ Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. Nov. 17, 1994)
at 56.
\51\ Id. at 56.
\52\ Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. Nov. 14, 1994)
at 189, 193 (Officer Tony Adams); Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali
(D. Minn. Nov. 17, 1994) at 56-58 (Evans testifying that he received
money he mailed to himself in California and took about $80,000 or
$90,000 to Vignali and Gray at Vignali's house).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On October 26, 1993, agents tapped into a phone
conversation between Dale Evans and Gerald Williams regarding a
new shipment of cocaine, six kilograms sent from Los Angeles to
Ronald Nunn's Minnesota home.\53\ That shipment was intercepted
by postal inspectors on or about October 28, 1993.\54\ On
October 31, 1993, agents overheard a call between Williams,
Evans, and Carlos Vignali regarding the October 26th shipment.
Evans asked, ``Love [the cocaine shipment] never got there?''
\55\ Williams replied, ``no.'' \56\ Evans stated that they had
called the post office to see if the package had arrived.\57\
At that point, Vignali, who was apparently with Evans, got on
the telephone, said ``[t]his is the other end,'' and told
Williams to send somebody into the post office to find out
about the package.\58\ Vignali then said, ``We sent that right
down that day'' and told Williams to get on ``good horns [a
public telephone].'' \59\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\53\ Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali, (D. Minn. Nov. 22, 1994)
at 70 (Evans); Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. Nov. 17,
1994) at 59-60, 64-66 (Evans testifying to conversation). See also
Presentence Investigation, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. 1994) at para. 57-
58 (Exhibit 2).
\54\ Id. at para. 65.
\55\ Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. Nov. 22, 1994)
at 69. ``Love'' was the code word used by the conspirators to refer to
cocaine.
\56\ Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. Dec. 5, 1994)
at 164. See also Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. Nov.
22, 1994) at 66-68.
\57\ Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. Dec. 5, 1994)
at 164.
\58\ Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. Nov. 22, 1994)
at 70-71.
\59\ Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. Nov. 17, 1994)
at 68.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
During that conversation, a prospective 15-kilogram deal
was discussed.\60\ The parties conferred about whether the
quantity should be broken up into one or two kilogram shipments
or shipped all at once.\61\ They also discussed the prospect
that the buyers might not want to pay for the shipment up front
before obtaining all of their cocaine.\62\ They further
discussed having someone either drive the shipment from
California to Minnesota or having someone come down from
Minnesota to California.\63\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\60\ Id. at 75-76.
\61\ Id. at 76.
\62\ Id.
\63\ Id. at 76-77. That transaction appears not to have been
consummated.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In attempting to explain away these conversations, Vignali
argued that the money referred to ``life savings'' he
accumulated as a child from his father and ultimately ``lent''
to Jonathan Gray. Vignali supposedly lent Gray, who had been
recently released from jail for a crime Vignali knew nothing
about, a $20,000 ``business loan'' for a project which Vignali
also knew nothing about. This part of Vignali's story met with
skepticism from prosecutors:
Dunne. Now when you gave Jonathon [Gray] this 20,000
dollars for this loan . . . for this business
proposition or whatever, did he show you any kind of
contract?
Vignali. No, he didn't.
Dunne. Did he show you any kind of paperwork about this
business proposition?
Vignali. No, he did not.
Dunne. Did he have you sign anything to validate that
you were giving him 20,000 dollars in cash?
Vignali. No, sir.
* * *
Dunne. And do you recall how much money was in your
checking account at the time you had 20,000 dollars in
a safe in your house?
Vignali. No, I never, I never kept much money . . . in
the bank, I'm sorry.
Dunne. Well, when you have money in a bank you earn
interest. Right?
Vignali. If it is in your savings account, yes.
Dunne. Are you earning any interest on 20,000 dollars
in a safe in your house?
Vignali. No, but it is in my possession.\64\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\64\ Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. Nov. 29, 1994)
at 240, 243.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * *
Dunne. In 1992 you file an income tax return where you
declared your income was thirteen thousand nine hundred
nine dollars? . . . Now the 20,000 dollars that you had
in the closet at home, was that part of the thirteen
thousand dollars that you made in 1992?
Vignali. That was part of the money that I had
accumulated over my lifetime.
Dunne. Over your lifetime?
Vignali. Absolutely.
Dunne. Okay. And so all of your life savings you put in
. . . the closet in the townhome.\65\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\65\ Id. at 247-48.
Rather than refute the facts prosecutors had marshaled
against him, Vignali argued that the co-conspirators who
cooperated with law enforcement made ``sweetheart'' deals for
leniency. In particular, Vignali charged that Dale Evans had
falsely identified Vignali as his source of cocaine in
California because he wanted to conceal the involvement of his
family members and close associates in criminal activity.\66\
Nonetheless, the testimony of the cooperating co-conspirators
and law enforcement officers and the corroborating physical
evidence was overwhelming. The combination of evidence admitted
at trial showed beyond a reasonable doubt that Vignali supplied
significant quantities of cocaine from California for
distribution in Minnesota.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\66\ Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. Dec. 5, 1994)
at 232.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On December 12, 1994, Vignali was convicted of all the
crimes for which he was indicted, except one count of using
facilities in interstate commerce for the promotion of his drug
operation.\67\ All but one of the original thirty defendants in
the drug conspiracy either pleaded guilty or were
convicted.\68\ At sentencing, the probation office for the
federal district of Minnesota submitted to Judge David S. Doty
a pre-sentence report. This report recommended an imprisonment
range of 151 to 188 months for Vignali.\69\ In determining the
proper sentence under the federal sentencing guidelines, Judge
Doty found that Vignali was, in fact, a willing participant in
the shipment of cocaine to Minnesota on October 20, 1993.\70\
Judge Doty also found that Vignali was accountable for
distributing between five and fifteen kilograms of cocaine,
rather than the fifteen to fifty kilograms suggested in the
pre-sentence report.\71\ Vignali was sentenced to imprisonment
for 175 months, about 15 years, on July 17, 1995.\72\ On
January 20, 2001, President Clinton commuted Vignali's sentence
to time served.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\67\ Judgment in a Criminal Case, U.S. v. Vignali (D.Minn. July 17,
1995) (Exhibit 3).
\68\ Id. Claude Phillips, 50, of Memphis, Tennessee, was acquitted
of conspiring to distribute cocaine--the sole count against him in the
superceding indictment. Also convicted was Todd Hopson, 23, of Apple
Valley, Minnesota.
\69\ Id.
\70\ Id. Judge Doty also found that, in late October, co-defendant
Todd Hopson traveled to California and co-defendant Dale Evans arranged
for Hopson to buy additional quantities of cocaine from Vignali.
\71\ Id. Judge Doty did so by referring to the testimony of co-
defendant Dale Evans. According to Evans, Vignali may have been the
source of two packages of cocaine sent to Minnesota--one on October 21,
1993, and the other on October 28, 1993. Judge Doty noted that the
second package was, in fact, seized by law enforcement authorities and
found to have contained six kilograms of cocaine, and Evans testified
at trial that the first package contained four kilograms of cocaine.
However, Judge Doty found Evans' testimony regarding the sale of
additional quantities of cocaine by Vignali unpersuasive.
\72\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. Vignali's Efforts to Obtain Executive Clemency
As described below, 55-year old Horacio Carlos Vignali, a
successful Los Angeles-area businessman,\73\ apparently used
every tool at his disposal to see that his son would not fully
serve out his prison sentence. When attempts to have his son
released before sentencing and on appeal failed, Horacio, who
cultivated political contacts over time through substantial
campaign donations, fundraising activity,\74\ and civic
involvement, directed his considerable resources to a concerted
effort to lobby President Clinton for an eleventh hour pardon
of his son.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\73\ Horacio Vignali, who immigrated to the United States in 1962,
has owned several businesses, including parking lots, body shops, and
real estate. See Richard Serrano and Stephen Braun, Working the
American System, L.A. Times (L.A. Times Mag.) Apr. 29, 2001, at 10.
Apparently, Horacio Vignali has been financially successful and owns a
$9 million home in Pacific Palisades that apparently once belonged to
Sylvester Stallone. Id.
\74\ For example, Horacio Vignali has hosted several political
fundraisers, including outdoor barbecue fundraisers (for which he
became locally well known), and provided food for various political
events. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Initial Efforts to Reduce Vignali's Sentence
a. Contacts with Prosecutors in Minnesota
Efforts to reduce Carlos Vignali's sentence apparently
started soon after Vignali was convicted. According to
Assistant U.S. Attorney Andrew Dunne, who prosecuted Vignali in
Minneapolis, Vignali's political associates exerted ``a lot of
influence'' in Vignali's sentencing.\75\ Dunne explained that
he and the other prosecutors working on the case received
periodic calls from state representatives in California on
behalf of Carlos Vignali after the sentencing.\76\
Characterizing some of the calls as ``perhaps improper
influence,'' Dunne recalled that ``they wanted to know: Is
there anything that could be done to help reduce the
sentence?'' \77\ Denise Reilly, the lead government prosecutor
in the Vignali case, likewise confirmed that they ``would get
calls from different people--politically placed'' throughout
the course of the case.\78\ She characterized the input of
those who called ``odd,'' stating ``I don't know how they do
things in the rest of the country, but that isn't what we do in
Minnesota.'' \79\ Judge Reilly described the incoming calls as
inquiring, ``are you sure you know what you're doing?'' and
``are you sure that you have the right person?'' \80\ Judge
Reilly believed that the calls came from political officials in
Los Angeles.\81\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\75\ Richard A. Serrano and Stephen Braun, Drug Kingpin's Release
Adds to Clemency Uproar, L.A. Times, Feb. 11, 2001, at A1.
\76\ Id.
\77\ Id.
\78\ Telephone Interview with the Honorable Denise Reilly, Juvenile
Court Judge, 4th Judicial District of Minnesota (Hennepin County) (May
11, 2001).
\79\ Id.
\80\ Id.
\81\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
b. Vignali's Appeal
Carlos Vignali appealed his conviction immediately after
the verdict. Vignali appealed to the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals, claiming juror misconduct, witness perjury, improper
jury instruction, failure to grant a severance, and improper
exclusion of defense evidence. A unanimous appellate court
upheld Vignali's conviction, dismissing Vignali's arguments
with minimal discussion.\82\ In affirming the district court's
ruling, the appellate court agreed that ``there was
considerable evidence of Vignali's guilt.'' \83\ Vignali
subsequently sought habeas relief, asserting ineffectiveness of
counsel.\84\ This claim was also denied.\85\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\82\ U.S. v. Williams, 97 F.3d 240 (8th Cir. 1996).
\83\ Id. at 246.
\84\ NARA Document Production at 2 (Report to the President on
Proposed Denial of Executive Clemency for Carlos Anibal Vignali, Jr.
(Jan. 12, 2001)) (Exhibit 4).
\85\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
c. Letters to the White House and Justice
Department
Horacio Vignali was hard at work gathering political
support for his son's cause even before filing his son's
clemency petition. Vignali had a number of prominent California
politicians write letters to the White House in 1996,
requesting a ``review'' of Carlos Vignali's case. At least five
similarly phrased letters were sent to the White House ``Pardon
Secretary'' requesting an examination of the case.\86\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\86\ There is no position of ``Pardon Secretary'' at the White
House. It is not clear who received and reviewed these letters when
they were sent to the White House in 1996. However, the letters were
ultimately made part of the Vignali clemency file at the White House
Counsel's Office years later in 2000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The first letter, dated May 24, 1996, from California
Assembly Member Antonio Villaraigosa, stated, ``After reviewing
Mr. Vignali's case, I am convinced that he has been falsely
linked to a drug ring in Minneapolis, MN, and that his
conviction is a product of `guilt by association,' among other
factors.'' \87\ Villaraigosa noted that Carlos Vignali had no
prior record and that Vignali's ``military academy schooling
adds to his superior resume.'' \88\ Villaraigosa was apparently
unaware that Vignali both had a prior criminal record and had
dropped out of military school.\89\ Under those circumstances,
Villaraigosa's characterization of Vignali's resume as
``superior'' was, at best, hyperbole and, at worst, misleading.
Villaraigosa has since admitted that he did not independently
investigate the details of Carlos Vignali's case and regretted
not having done so.\90\ Villaraigosa stated, ``I was convinced
at the time . . . that his son was not a major player in this
drug ring. I made a mistake in not investigating.'' \91\
Villaraigosa stated that he was moved by Horacio Vignali's
emotional plea: ``It was a conversation between fathers as much
as anything. . . . He was very distraught.'' \92\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\87\ NARA Document Production (Letter from Antonio R. Villaraigosa,
Assembly Member, Forty-Fifth District, California Legislative Assembly,
to Pardon Secretary, the White House (May 24, 1996)) (Exhibit 5).
\88\ Id.
\89\ Presentence Investigation, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. 1994) at
para. 130 (Exhibit 2).
\90\ Mateo Gold, Vignali Case Casts Shadow over Mayor's Race, L.A.
Times, Feb. 28, 2001, at B1 (``I wrote that letter without talking to
prosecutors on the other end.'').
\91\ John Antczak, L.A. Heads Retract Support for Pardon, AP
Online, Feb. 13, 2001; See also Mateo Gold and Larry B. Stammer, 2 City
Leaders Say They Regret Helping Dealer; Clemency: Cardinal Mahony and
Politician Villaraigosa Say They Shouldn't Have Written on Behalf of a
Cocaine Convict They Had Never Even Met, L.A. Times, Feb. 13, 2001, at
A22.
\92\ Matea Gold and Larry B. Stammer, 2 City Leaders Say They
Regret Helping Dealer; Clemency: Cardinal Mahony and Politician
Villaraigosa Say They Shouldn't Have Written on Behalf of a Cocaine
Convict They Had Never Even Met, L.A. Times, Feb. 13, 2001, at A22. It
is widely believed that Villaraigosa's involvement in the Vignali
matter cost him his election as mayor of Los Angeles to Robert Hahn.
See, e.g., Beth Barrett, Villaraigosa's Refusal to Hit Back Cost Him--
Rival's Attack Went Unanswered, Daily News of L.A., June 7, 2001, at
N9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On May 28, 1996, Los Angeles City Councilman Richard
Alatorre wrote in support of Vignali:
It is difficult for me to understand why Mr. Vignali
received such an exorbitant sentence. It has been
pointed out that this may have been due to the fact
that his case was grouped together with a much larger
case involving the sale of drugs. Others contend that
it may have been because of his Latino background,
which I hope is not the case.\93\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\93\ NARA Document Production (Letter from Richard Alatorre,
Councilman, Fourteenth District, L.A. City Council, to Pardon
Secretary, the White House (May 28, 1996)) (Exhibit 6).
However, Alatorre was not fit to provide a character reference
for Vignali or anyone else. Throughout his extensive career in
Los Angeles politics, Alatorre was the subject of various
public corruption investigations, recently pleaded guilty to
federal tax evasion charges, and is himself a proven cocaine
user.\94\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\94\ Department of Justice Press Release No. 01-062, Former Los
Angeles City Councilman Richard Alatorre Charged with Tax Evasion for
Failing to Report Bribes; Defendant Agrees to Plead Guilty to Felony
Offense, U.S. Attorney's Office for the Central District of California,
Apr. 3, 2001. As a result of Alatorre's failing to report bribes, he
evaded the payment of at least $12,970 in federal income tax. In
addition to pleading guilty, Alatorre has agreed to file an amended
1996 federal income tax return and to pay any penalties and interest
assessed by the Internal Revenue Service.
Less than a year after being elected to the Los Angeles City
Council, Alatorre agreed to pay a record fine of more than $140,000 for
improperly financing his campaign for City Council with money he raised
as a state lawmaker. Rich Connell and Robert J. Lopez, Alatorre's Fall
Belies Early Promise, Achievements, L.A. Times, Jan. 17, 1999, at Al.
In 1988, Alatorre was fined for attempting to steer a $722,000 contract
to The East Los Angeles Community Union (``TELACU''), a firm that was
headed by a longtime friend. Earlier, TELACU had flown Alatorre to a
meeting at Lake Tahoe and paid him a $1,000 speaking fee.
When Alatorre was on the board of the Metropolitan Transportation
Authority (``MTA''), which administers Los Angeles' multibillion-dollar
subway and light rail system, Alatorre reportedly solicited
contributions of more than $500,000 from organizations with interests
before the MTA and the City Council for the benefit of a children's
charity he helped create. Rich Connell and Robert J. Lopez, Alatorre's
Fall Belies Early Promise, Achievements, L.A. Times, Jan. 17, 1999, at
Al; Robert J. Lopez and Rich Connell, MTA Probes Charities Promoted by
Alatorre, L.A. Times, July 7, 1997, at Al. That charity exclusively
hired Eventually Yours, an event-planning firm founded by Alatorre's
third wife, Angie, paying the firm tens of thousands of dollars in
fees. Ultimately, Alatorre was fined $8,000 by state and local watchdog
agencies for improperly intervening on behalf of the firm before a city
licensing agency. That was the maximum fine allowed under state and
local laws. Also, in the custody dispute described below, Alatorre
conceded to receiving a $13,200 loan (without a repayment plan) from
TELACU. At that time, Alatorre was also supporting a TELACU team for a
$65 million MTA subway contract and a TELACU partnership for a $2
million city development for a shopping center in his district.
The investigation of Eventually Yours broadened an earlier probe of
how another firm that was ranked last in competing for a lucrative
subway contract, but which Alatorre backed, came to be recommended for
that contract. Robert J. Lopez and Rich Connell, MTA Probes Charities
Promoted by Alatorre, L.A. Times, July 7, 1997, at Al. That controversy
resulted in the resignation of MTA's executive director, who selected
the team after it made a $20,000 donation to a golf tournament
benefiting a charity of which Alatorre was an honorary chairman.
Eventually Yours was also investigated by the California Attorney
General's Office for failing to account for hundreds of thousands of
dollars in charitable donations it helped raise. Robert J. Lopez and
Rich Connell, MTA Probes Charities Promoted by Alatorre, L.A. Times,
July 7, 1997, at Al. After repeated press inquiries for information
regarding the firm's five-year failure to account for certain
contributions, the firm's attorney stated that the firm's forte was in
staging ``spectacular'' events--not in faithfully tending to
administrative matters. In the course of its investigation, the State
Attorney General's Office received an inquiry from State Senator
Richard Polanco, generally well known to be an Alatorre ally. According
to a State Justice Department official, Polanco stated that he was
concerned about the pressure being brought to bear on the firm. The
official recounted that Polanco said he knew the people associated with
Eventually Yours to be upstanding and asked why they were targeted. In
response, Polanco was told that, because the investigation was pending,
he could be given no information about the matter. Robert J. Lopez and
Rich Connell, MTA Probes Charities Promoted by Alatorre, L.A. Times,
July 7, 1997, at Al.
In the course of a child custody dispute regarding his niece in
which Alatorre's competency to care for the girl was in controversy,
Superior Court Judge Henry W. Shatford found that ``Richard Alatorre's
credibility has been totally shredded as to his profound declaration
[that] he has been clean from the use of cocaine.'' Robert J. Lopez and
Rich Connell, Judge Says Test Shows Alatorre Is Using Cocaine, L.A.
Times, Sept. 30, 1998, at Al. Judge Shatford arrived at that finding
after Alatorre failed a surprise courthouse drug test. The judge
ordered the test after Alatorre repeatedly denied using cocaine with an
individual on whose behalf he aggressively helped obtain government
business. That individual was a waste hauler and demolition specialist
who pleaded guilty to possessing and intending to distribute heroin.
That individual has publicly stated that Alatorre has written him
letters of reference for public contracts, ``attesting to my
character.'' Alatorre publicly explained that the white powder his
former executive secretary testified to having seen on his nostrils and
clothes upon his return from business meetings might have been
dandruff, denture powder, or Doritos. Alatorre's former secretary also
testified that, following Alatorre's divorce from his second wife when
Alatorre was facing financial problems, he began mysteriously producing
wads of $100 bills. The secretary claimed that some of the money came
after meetings with businessmen and other supporters. After reviewing
financial records involving associates of Alatorre with government
business interests, Judge Shatford noted that Alatorre had
``questionable conflict of interest financial dealings as a city
councilman.'' Id. Ultimately, Judge Shatford stripped Alatorre of
guardianship of his niece and barred him from visiting with her until
he successfully completed a drug detoxification program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On July 22, 1996, State Senator Richard Polanco requested
that the White House ``carefully review'' the Vignali case and
stated that Vignali had ``no prior criminal record.'' \95\ On
July 26, 1996, Archbishop Roger Mahony, Cardinal of the
Archdiocese of Los Angeles, wrote to ``add [his] voice
recommending that all of the process, the law, and the facts in
this case be reviewed fully to determine if justice has been
achieved[.]'' \96\ Finally, Congressman Esteban Torres wrote to
Attorney General Reno complaining that Vignali was not
``individually tried before a jury of his peers'' and asking
that the Attorney General ``carefully review'' Vignali's
case.\97\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\95\ NARA Document Production (Letter from Richard Polanco, State
Senator, Twenty-Second District, California Legislature, to Pardon
Secretary, the White House (July 22, 1996)) (Exhibit 7).
\96\ NARA Document Production (Letter from Archbishop Roger Mahony,
Cardinal of the Archdiocese of Los Angeles, to Pardon Secretary, the
White House (July 26, 1996)) (Exhibit 8).
\97\ NARA Document Production (Letter from Esteban E. Torres,
Member of Congress, U.S. House of Representatives, to Janet Reno, U.S.
Attorney General, Department of Justice (July 3, 1996)) (Exhibit 9).
Congressman Torres also wrote to the warden of Vignali's prison in
Colorado, asking that Vignali be transferred to a prison closer to his
family in California. Stephen Braun, et. al, L.A. Politicians Urged
Pardon of Cocaine Dealer, L.A. Times, Feb. 12, 2001, at A1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Even these initial stages of lobbying for Carlos Vignali
involved a significant amount of misinformation. For example,
Villaraigosa, Alatorre, Polanco, and Torres all claimed in
their letters that Carlos Vignali had no prior criminal record.
In fact, Vignali had two prior criminal convictions for
fighting in a public place and vandalism and two prior arrests
for reckless driving and inflicting corporal injury on a
cohabitant.\98\ It is unclear whether the political figures
writing on Vignali's behalf were aware of Vignali's criminal
history and chose to disregard it or were misinformed by those
lobbying on Vignali's behalf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\98\ Presentence Investigation, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. 1994) at
para. 117, 118 (Exhibit 2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Los Angeles City Councilman Richard Alatorre's claims of
racial prejudice were similarly baseless. Alatorre claimed that
``others contend'' Vignali's sentence was the result of racial
prejudice. However, the Committee is unaware of any
allegations, other than Alatorre's own letter, that Vignali
received unfair treatment because of his ethnic background. In
fact, Vignali's attorney argued at trial that Vignali was
innocent because he was Hispanic and, therefore, could not have
been part of the ``black drug dealing network'' of his
codefendants. Indeed, Vignali's black codefendants appealed
their convictions on the basis of the potentially prejudicial
statements by Vignali's lawyer.\99\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\99\ U.S. v. Williams, 97 F.3d 240, 244 (8th Cir. 1996).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Vignali's Clemency Petition
After Carlos Vignali's appeal failed, the Vignali family
began to pursue a grant of executive clemency to get him out of
prison. Horacio Vignali initially reached out to Danny Davis,
Carlos' criminal defense lawyer, to assist with efforts to
obtain presidential clemency for him.\100\ However, Davis, who
represented Carlos Vignali at trial in Minnesota, declined
because he calculated the probability of obtaining clemency for
Carlos as ``a snowball in Hades.'' \101\ Sometime thereafter,
Horacio Vignali himself embarked on a campaign to obtain a
presidential grant of clemency for his son.\102\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\100\ Richard A. Serrano and Stephen Braun, Drug Kingpin's Release
Adds to Clemency Uproar, L.A. Times, Feb. 11, 2001.
\101\ Id.
\102\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Carlos Vignali's clemency petition was filed with the
Justice Department on August 24, 1998. Vignali's brief petition
laid out his reasons for seeking a commutation:
Vignali loaned $25,000 to a friend, which were [sic]
interpreted through slang taped telephone conversations
to involve the purchase of drugs. No drugs were seized
from Vignali, and he was convicted solely on the
testimony of a codefendant who received leniency. The
taped conversations did not mention either drugs or
money but were interpreted to have those subjects.
Vignali was tried in Minnesota where he had never been
or had any significant contacts with.
* * *
The sentence of 175 months for a 21 year old, first
time, nonviolent offender with no significant prior
record is unwarranted. Based solely on a $25,000 loan
to a friend, falsely interpreted telephone recordings,
and a codefendant's highly rewarded testimony, the
punishment does not fit the crime as proved. The
concept of holding minor players responsible for any
and all drugs of a conspiracy, irregardless of whether
that minor play [sic] had any knowledge or nexus with
those drugs, undermines the concept of fairness. No
drugs were introduced at trial as to Vignali, who never
visited Minneapolis where the case was tried, yet he
was held responsible for the drugs involved in a 30
defendant conspiracy, when he knew, at best, two
people. By the end of 1998, Vignali will have served,
with good time, almost five years, which is the
mandatory minimum for the drugs which could have been
bought with his loan.\103\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\103\ NARA Document Production (Petition for Commutation of
Sentence ) (Exhibit 10).
The Vignali clemency petition was a poorly drafted rehash of
issues that had been thoroughly addressed at trial and on
appeal. Unlike most successful clemency petitions, Vignali's
petition continued to maintain actual innocence. Yet, it failed
to present any new facts suggesting Vignali was indeed
innocent. These flaws were easily recognized when the petition
was reviewed by individuals familiar with the Vignali case. In
short, the pardon petition made a number of misleading
statements, including the following:
``Vignali loaned $25,000 to a friend, which were [sic]
interpreted through slang taped [sic] telephone conversations
to involve the purchase of drugs.'' Vignali's claim that he was
simply engaged in a business deal--not a drug deal--was
thoroughly disproved at trial. As described above, literally
dozens of pieces of evidence pointed to Vignali's involvement
in a drug deal, including the testimony of his co-conspirators,
wiretap evidence, and the actual proceeds of the drug deal. In
the course of reviewing Vignali's clemency application, the
White House was apparently not persuaded by Vignali's
explanation at trial. On the last page of a copy of the report
from the Justice Department's Pardon Attorney to President
Clinton declining to recommend Vignali's application for
clemency, a handwritten note by a White House staffer reads
``Need to XC for Bruce [Lindsey]. Definitely isn't simply
making a loan[.]'' \104\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\104\ NARA Document Production (Report to the President on Proposed
Denial of Executive Clemency for Carlos Anibal Vignali, Jr.) at 4
(Exhibit 4) (handwritten note on last page of Report).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
``[Vignali] was convicted solely on the testimony of a
codefendant who received leniency.'' As described above, the
testimony of several witnesses proved Vignali's role in the
conspiracy. The testimony of those witnesses was consistent
with and independently corroborated by wiretap interceptions of
communications among the co-conspirators, search warrant
evidence obtained from lawful searches of the co-defendant's
homes and drug stash houses, and visual police surveillance.
Thus, as the Eighth Circuit noted on direct appeal, Vignali's
conviction was supported by considerable evidence.
Agreements with defendants for cooperation in exchange for
leniency at sentencing are a widely-used tool used by
prosecutors to obtain evidence in criminal cases. Such
agreements are contemplated by the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines as a basis for downward departure from the
applicable guideline imprisonment range. Moreover, Vignali's
sentence was commuted to a term shorter than even those of
defendants who actually cooperated with the Government. This
makes the clemency decision particularly egregious.
``Vignali was tried in Minnesota where he had never been or
had any significant contacts with.'' This is a red herring.
Physical presence within the district where a criminal
defendant is to be tried has never been held to be a
requirement in determining venue. It is well-settled that the
appropriate focus for determining venue is the place of the
crime and that the inquiry into the place of the crime may
yield more than one appropriate venue or even a venue in which
the defendant has never set foot.\105\ In this case, Vignali
was charged with, among other things, aiding and abetting the
distribution of cocaine using facilities in interstate commerce
and conspiring to distribute cocaine. As described above, the
evidence that Vignali facilitated the interstate sale of
cocaine and conspired in Los Angeles to distribute cocaine in
Minnesota included testimony of cooperating co-defendants
(which was corroborated by wiretapped communications among the
co-conspirators), search warrant evidence, and visual police
surveillance. That evidence amply showed an interdependence
between Vignali and the Minnesota-area distributors. Therefore,
under prevailing case law, venue in the U.S. District of
Minnesota was clearly proper.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\105\ U.S. v. Cabrales, 524 U.S. 1 (1998); U.S. v. Stewart, 256
F.3d 231 (4th Cir. 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
``The sentence of 175 months for a 21-year old, first time,
nonviolent offender with no prior record is unwarranted.''
First, Vignali was not a ``first time, nonviolent offender.''
Vignali's counsel, Danny Davis, similarly misrepresented
Vignali's criminal record when he told the jury in closing
argument that Vignali had ``[n]o prior criminal record'' and
cited ``his unblemished past.'' \106\ Hugh Rodham, who was
retained to lobby the White House on Vignali's behalf, likewise
misrepresented Vignali's criminal record to the White House
Counsel's Office. In fact, Vignali had two prior convictions
and arrests. He was convicted in 1989 for fighting in a public
place and received a $183 fine. He was also convicted of
vandalism to which he pleaded no contest and received 12 months
probation and was ordered to pay restitution and complete 82
hours of community service work. In the course of his arrest
for vandalism, Vignali stated that he was associated with ``The
87th Street West Side Boys'' in Los Angeles.\107\ According to
police records, Vignali also admitted that he was a member of
the West Covina Mob.\108\ In 1988, Vignali was arrested for
reckless driving.\109\ Finally, Vignali was arrested in 1990
for inflicting corporal injury on a spouse/cohabitant, but that
case was dismissed. Second, Vignali's sentence reflected the
gravity of his participation in a large-scale conspiracy in
which he served as the source of cocaine. It also reflected
both Vignali's obstruction of justice in lying about his actual
role in the conspiracy before a judicial tribunal and his
obdurate refusal to accept any responsibility for his crimes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\106\ See Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. Dec. 5,
1994) at 229-30.
\107\ Presentence Investigation, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. 1994) at
para. 117, 118 (Exhibit 2).
\108\ Id. at para. 117-18.
\109\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
``No drugs were introduced at trial as to Vignali[.]''
Although this assertion appears to be true from the trial
record, the implication that Vignali's verdict is therefore
unsupported by sufficient evidence is misleading. In fact, the
appellate court noted that Vignali's verdict was well-supported
by the evidence admitted at trial. In sentencing Vignali under
the federal sentencing guidelines, the trial judge determined
how much cocaine was attributable to Vignali. Because the
parcels of cocaine attributable to Vignali had long since been
distributed or consumed, the judge looked to the testimony of
co-defendant Dale Evans. According to Evans, Vignali was the
source of two packages of cocaine sent to Minnesota, one on
October 21, 1993, and the other on or about October 28, 1993.
The judge found that Evans' testimony as to the amount of
cocaine in the second package was corroborated by the postal
inspector's seizure of the parcel and finding that it contained
six kilograms of cocaine. In contrast, the judge found that
Evans' uncorroborated testimony as to additional quantities of
cocaine was not reliable. Nonetheless, he found that Evans'
testimony was credible so as to establish that Vignali
knowingly participated in distributing cocaine on more than one
occasion. Given the strength of the available evidence, the
judge's determination that between five and fifteen kilograms
of cocaine were attributable to Vignali did not require the
physical presence of those parcels in court.
``[Vignali] was held responsible for the drugs involved in
a 30 defendant [sic] conspiracy, when he knew, at best, two
people.'' The evidence admitted at trial against Vignali showed
that he was a member of a large-scale drug conspiracy and
facilitated the distribution of cocaine in Minnesota by
supplying Dale Evans, Gerald Williams, and Todd Hopson with
significant quantities of cocaine from Los Angeles. As such,
Evans' association with the other members of the conspiracy was
irrelevant to any issue material to the government's case.
The facts prove that every substantive assertion in
Vignali's commutation petition was false and misleading. The
petition could have been easily refuted by anyone with a basic
familiarity with Vignali's underlying conviction. The question
then is how the White House came to believe that Carlos Vignali
deserved an executive grant of clemency.
3. Supporters of Vignali's Clemency Petition
In 2000, a number of prominent California politicians wrote
to the White House in support of Vignali's release. Some were
the same individuals who wrote to the White House on Vignali's
behalf four years earlier. In addition, a number of prominent
Californians called the White House and the Justice Department
to further press their arguments. The distortions of fact in
the Vignali clemency petition were repeated throughout the
campaign to win Vignali's release.
a. Letters of Support from Prominent California
Politicians
It appears that from the earliest stages of his efforts to
obtain a commutation for his son, Horacio Vignali attempted to
enlist the support of various state and federal politicians and
other prominent Californians. By the time that the White House
reviewed Vignali's clemency petition in January 2001, seven
different political figures had drafted letters to the White
House or Justice Department in support of Carlos Vignali's
petition. Horacio Vignali apparently used a number of different
tactics to convince these individuals to sign onto his cause.
Perhaps most significantly, Horacio Vignali became a major
political contributor to top federal, state, and local
officeholders after his son was convicted in 1994.\110\ This
made him a well-known figure in the Los Angeles political
community. Horacio Vignali contributed reportedly more than
$160,000 to state and federal office holders after his son was
incarcerated.\111\ He reportedly gave $25,000 to former
Governor Pete Wilson in 1994 and held a fundraiser for Governor
Gray Davis in 2000 that raised $75,000, including $25,900 from
himself.\112\ Horacio Vignali also reportedly gave $23,500 to
Davis before he became Governor \113\ and $35,000 to the
Democratic Party.\114\ In addition, he made large contributions
to a number of Los Angeles city and county officials and held
fundraisers and other political events at his Los Angeles
estate. While these contributions clearly gave Vignali the
access he needed to make his case to key political figures, it
is less clear why his case was received so positively. Most of
the politicians who endorsed Carlos Vignali's clemency petition
now admit that their actions were a mistake and claim that they
took the positions they did out of a misplaced sympathy for a
father who was deeply hurt by his son's imprisonment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\110\ Did Politics Sway Clinton to Free Drug Dealer, L.A. Times,
Feb. 13, 2001, at A8.
\111\ Mateo Gold and Larry B. Stammer, 2 City Leaders Say They
Regret Helping Dealer; Clemency: Cardinal Mahony and Politician
Villaraigosa Say They Shouldn't Have Written on Behalf of a Cocaine
Convict They Had Never Even Met, L.A. Times, Feb. 13, 2001, at 22; Rob
Morse, Still Have Bill to Kick Around, S.F. Chron., Feb. 14, 2001, at
A2; Dominic Berbeo, Hertzberg Had Part in Pardon Flap, Daily News of
L.A. (Valley Edition) Feb. 16, 2001, at N1.
\112\ Ted Rohrlich and Robert Lopez, Convict's Father a Wealthy,
Well-Liked Mediator on the L.A. Political Scene; Profile: Horacio
Carlos Vignali Has Donated Thousands Across Party Lines. He Puts
Emphasis on Strengthening the Latino Community, Aides Say, L.A. Times,
Feb. 13, 2001, at A23.
\113\ Id.
\114\ Dominic Berbeo, Hertzberg Had Part in Pardon Flap, Daily News
of L.A. (Valley Edition) Feb. 16, 2001, at N1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
i. Congressman Xavier Becerra
Congressman Becerra conceded that the Vignalis were not
members of his constituency but that Horacio had been a friend
and contributor of his for five years.\115\ The Vignalis have
donated at least $11,000 to Becerra's political action
committee, Leadership of Today and Tomorrow, between 1998 and
2001,\116\ $2,475 to Becerra's congressional campaigns, and
$3,500 to Becerra for the mayor's race.\117\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\115\ Id.
\116\ Id. Dominic Berbeo, Hertzberg Had Part in Pardon Flap, Daily
News of L.A. (Valley Edition) Feb. 16, 2001, at N1.
\117\ Id. Mateo Gold and Larry B. Stammer, 2 City Leaders Say They
Regret Helping Dealer; Clemency: Cardinal Mahony and Politician
Villaraigosa Say They Shouldn't Have Written on Behalf of a Cocaine
Convict They Had Never Even Met, L.A. Times, Feb. 13, 2001, at 22.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Congressman Becerra has explained to the press that he was
initially approached by Horacio Vignali and Congressman Esteban
Torres, who wanted to see if Becerra could assist the Vignali
family.\118\ After Horacio Vignali asked for Becerra's help,
Becerra called the U.S. Attorney for the Central District of
California, Alejandro Mayorkas.\119\ Becerra asked Mayorkas
about the case and whether a commutation could be granted.
Becerra recalls that Mayorkas looked into the case and called
him back a few days later, telling him that the conviction was
justified but that the sentence was too harsh.\120\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\118\ Id.
\119\ Richard A. Serrano and Stephen Braun, U.S. Attorney Pursued
Clemency Case, L.A. Times, Feb. 13, 2001, at A1.
\120\ Richard Serrano and Stephen Braun, Working the American
System, L.A. Times, Apr. 29, 2001, at A1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Becerra also called Pardon Attorney Roger Adams about the
Vignali case.\121\ Becerra apparently called Adams on October
13, 1998, asking about the procedures followed by the Office of
the Pardon Attorney. On October 14, 1998, Adams sent Becerra a
lengthy letter explaining the conditions under which the Office
of the Pardon Attorney considered cases for commutation. Adams
noted that ``commutation of sentence is usually recommended
only in exceptional circumstances, such as unwarranted
disparity or severity of sentence, the rendering of an
important service to the government not taken into account at
sentencing, or terminal illness. . . . Since President Clinton
has been in office, he has granted clemency only in three
commutation cases.'' \122\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\121\ Interview with Roger Adams, Pardon Attorney, Department of
Justice (Feb. 27, 2001). Mateo Gold and Larry B. Stammer, 2 City
Leaders Say They Regret Helping Dealer; Clemency: Cardinal Mahony and
Politician Villaraigosa Say They Shouldn't Have Written on Behalf of a
Cocaine Convict They Had Never Even Met, L.A. Times, Feb. 13, 2001, at
A22.
\122\ Justice Department Document Production Mayorkas 00029-30
(Letter from Roger Adams, Pardon Attorney, Department of Justice, to
Xavier Becerra, Member of Congress, U.S. House of Representatives (Oct.
14, 1998)) (Exhibit 11).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Becerra then drafted a letter to the White House in support
of Vignali. On November 21, 2000, Becerra wrote the following
to President Clinton:
[I write to] add my voice to those recommending a full
evaluation of this case to determine if justice has
been achieved in the case of Mr. Vignali. . . . In the
interest of redeeming the life of a young man, I
respectfully urge you to weigh a few factors in Mr.
Vignali's favor. Prior to Mr. Vignali's conviction, he
had no criminal record whatsoever. Although convicted
of drug possession and the illegal sale of drug
narcotics, his parents remain highly disturbed by a
variety of factors in play at Carlos' trial and believe
that when Carlos loaned money to a friend he
unwittingly became connected with the convicted
narcotics ring. It is my understanding that neither
drugs nor drug money was found in his possession.\123\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\123\ NARA Document Production (Letter from Xavier Becerra, Member
of Congress, U.S. House of Representatives, to President William J.
Clinton (Nov. 21, 2000)) (Exhibit 12).
After the commutation, Becerra explained his actions as
follows: ``Knowing that justice is not yet blind to color in
America and with time running out for the review of the Vignali
case, I added my voice to that of other community leaders . . .
asking for a review of the case.'' \124\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\124\ Mateo Gold and Larry B. Stammer, 2 City Leaders Say They
Regret Helping Dealer; Clemency: Cardinal Mahony and Politician
Villaraigosa Say They Shouldn't Have Written on Behalf of a Cocaine
Convict They Had Never Even Met, L.A. Times, Feb. 13, 2001, at A22.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Unlike others, Becerra has not apologized for his role in
the Vignali case. Rather, he has steadfastly maintained that he
did nothing wrong and did not even explicitly support Vignali's
clemency grant. Becerra stated that he wrote the letters to
urge the White House to make sure that justice had been served
in the Vignali case.\125\ He has said that he never
specifically asked President Clinton to commute Carlos
Vignali's sentence, despite the fact that he wrote about the
case and even called the White House on January 19, 2001, to
see where the case stood.\126\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\125\ Richard Serrano and Stephen Braun, Working the System, L.A.
Times, Apr. 29, 2001, at A1.
\126\ Id. Congressman Becerra's position should be contrasted with
that of former Associate White House Counsel Meredith Cabe, who
characterized the congressman's involvement as ``advocacy.'' Interview
with Meredith Cabe, former Associate Counsel to the President, the
White House (Mar. 16, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ii. Congressman Esteban Torres
In addition to his 1996 letters to the Justice Department
and the warden of Vignali's prison, Congressman Torres wrote to
the White House in support of Vignali's clemency request. In an
August 4, 1998, letter, Torres requested President Clinton's
``careful review and immediate consideration of approval of his
petition.'' \127\ It is unclear why Torres wrote on Vignali's
behalf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\127\ NARA Document Production (Letter from Esteban E. Torres,
Member of Congress, U.S. House of Representatives, to President William
J. Clinton (Aug. 4, 1998)) (Exhibit 13).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Congressman Torres' son-in-law, James Casso, apparently
became aware of the Vignali case while working as Congressman
Torres' district director. More importantly, after Congressman
Torres' retirement in 1999, Casso went into private practice as
an attorney and apparently maintained his contacts with the
Vignalis. In that capacity, Casso apparently played a
significant role in introducing the Vignalis to Hugh Rodham.
Unfortunately, Casso has declined to be interviewed by the
Committee about this matter.
iii. State Senator Richard Polanco
State Senator Richard Polanco, who wrote to the White House
``Pardon Secretary'' in 1996, wrote to the President once again
in 2000, specifically requesting a presidential grant of
clemency for Vignali. Polanco, who received $20,000 in
political contributions from Horacio Vignali throughout his
career,\128\ sent his letter to the White House on December 6,
2000. At the time, Polanco was the Chair of the Latino
Legislative Caucus and purported to write on behalf of the
Caucus:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\128\ Antonio Olivo and Tina Daunt, Speculation Swirls over Polanco
Exit from Race, L.A. Times, Mar. 11, 2001, at B1.
The Caucus respectfully requests you commute Mr.
Vignali's sentence and that he be released immediately.
We believe that Mr. Vignali was convicted despite the
fact that the criminal investigation did not reveal any
guns, drugs, or illegal money in Mr. Vignali's
possession. Mr. Vignali was a 22-year-old investor and
did not have any contacts demonstrating his involvement
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
in the sale or purchase of drugs.
* * *
Given the facts of the case and Mr. Vignali's conduct
during incarceration, the Caucus has investigated the
impact of Mr. Vignali's release. We are convinced that
Mr. Vignali will return to his family in southern
California. Mr. Vignali's family is a loving, embracing
family and is committed to supporting him.\129\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\129\ NARA Document Production (Letter from Senator Richard G.
Polanco, Senate Majority Leader, California State Senate, to President
William J. Clinton (Dec. 6, 2000)) (Exhibit 16).
It is not clear whether Polanco obtained the approval of
all 23 members of the California Latino Legislative Caucus
before he wrote the President on their behalf. However, it is
clear that Senator Polanco spread misleading information about
Carlos Vignali in his letter. Rather than being an investor in
a legitimate business enterprise, as suggested by Polanco,
Vignali was convicted by a jury of providing large amounts of
cocaine for distribution. His conviction was upheld by an
appellate court. As for the lack of contacts demonstrating his
involvement in the sale of drugs, as claimed by Polanco,
Vignali's own words, captured on government wiretaps, show that
he was part of a cocaine distribution conspiracy. Also of
interest is Senator Polanco's claim that the Latino caucus had
``investigated'' the impact of Vignali's release. Polanco has
not made it clear what steps he took to investigate the impact
of the commutation. Given the inaccuracies in Polanco's letter,
the Caucus' investigation appears to have been incomplete or,
more likely, nonexistent.
iv. Los Angeles County Supervisor Gloria
Molina
Unlike many other individuals who supported Vignali's bid
for clemency, Los Angeles County Supervisor Gloria Molina did
not receive political contributions from Horacio Vignali.
Rather, she came to know Horacio Vignali through her husband,
Ron Martinez, a Los Angeles affirmative action consultant.\130\
After receiving a ``constant barrage of requests'' from Horacio
to support his son's bid for clemency, Molina agreed to write
such a letter.\131\ In her December 20, 2000, letter, Molina
stated the following:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\130\ Ted Rohrlich, et. al, Molina, Hertzberg Wrote Letters for
Convict's Pardon, L.A. Times, Feb. 16, 2001, at B1.
\131\ Id.
While I usually do not write letters in support of
individuals I do not know personally, I am making this
request because I do know Mr. Vignali's family and have
reviewed his case carefully. What I have learned is
that Mr. Vignali is a young man who made a mistake in
his life and is immensely remorseful and has
demonstrated a genuine interest to re-join the
community.'' \132\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\132\ NARA Document Production (Letter from Gloria Molina,
Supervisor, 1st District, Board of Supervisors, County of Los Angeles,
to President William J. Clinton (Dec. 20, 2001)) (Exhibit 18) (cover
sheet reflecting transmission from Rodham to Lindsey, attached).
Molina also noted Vignali's good record in prison, where he
excelled in his work details and received a GED.\133\ It is
unclear how Molina came to the understanding that Carlos
Vignali was ``immensely remorseful'' for his actions. To the
contrary, Carlos and Horacio Vignali have steadily maintained
Carlos' innocence ever since his arrest in 1994, and Carlos, to
date, has never cooperated with authorities by revealing the
identities of his narcotics sources.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\133\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Molina's ignorance of the most basic aspect of the Vignali
case--whether Vignali claimed to be innocent or guilty of the
charges--seriously undermines her claim to have ``reviewed his
case carefully.'' It has also been reported that Molina shared
her draft letter of support with Horacio Vignali before it was
provided to the White House.\134\ Therefore, Horacio Vignali
was aware of the inaccuracies in the letter and still allowed
it to be presented to the White House. While Molina told
Horacio Vignali that her letter ``probably would do no good,''
\135\ it was provided to Bruce Lindsey the day after it was
written. Hugh Rodham faxed the Molina letter to Dawn Woollen,
Bruce Lindsey's assistant, on December 21, 2000, with a
notation stating, ``Dawn, enclosed please find a copy of the
letter we discussed.'' \136\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\134\ Richard Serrano and Stephen Braun, Clinton Brother-in-Law Was
Paid $400,000 to Help Win Clemencies, L.A. Times, Feb. 22, 2001, at A1.
\135\ Ted Rohrlich, et. al, Molina, Hertzberg Wrote Letters for
Convict's Pardon, L.A. Times, Feb. 16, 2001, at B1.
\136\ NARA Document Production (Fax Cover Sheet, Dec. 21, 2000)
(Exhibit 18) (all capitalization omitted).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Molina has not explicitly renounced her representations in
the Vignali case. She has, however, said that she will not
write any more letters like her Vignali letter because
prosecutors and judges know the facts better than political
figures like herself.\137\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\137\ Rene Sanchez, Powerful Supporters Retreat on Pardon, Wash.
Post, Feb. 24, 2001, at A6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
v. Los Angeles City Councilmember Mike
Hernandez
Horacio Vignali cultivated a close relationship with Los
Angeles City Councilmember Mike Hernandez, beginning with
Hernandez's 1993 campaign, to which Vignali contributed $2,500.
Vignali also hosted a day-long retreat at his estate for
Hernandez and his staff. On December 4, 2000, Hernandez wrote
to the President, asking him to ``strongly consider commuting
the sentence of Carlos A. Vignali[,] Jr.'' \138\ Hernandez
argued, ``Although convicted, you will hopefully note, that no
evidence was presented that Mr. Vignali had any involvement
with illegal narcotics prior to the last three months leading
up to his arrest.'' \139\ Hernandez also noted Vignali's
accomplishments in prison, including receiving his GED and
being named the prison's ``Student of the Year.'' \140\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\138\ NARA Document Production (Letter from Michael Hernandez,
Councilman, First Council District, City of Los Angeles, to President
William J. Clinton (Dec. 4, 2000)) (Exhibit 17).
\139\ Id.
\140\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hernandez's arguments were completely irrelevant as to
Vignali's suitability for a commutation. Even assuming
Hernandez was correct that Vignali was a large-scale drug
dealer for only three months, that hardly seems to be a
powerful argument in favor of executive clemency. Moreover,
Carlos Vignali was suspected by law enforcement authorities of
trafficking narcotics well before he was actually
arrested.\141\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\141\ See infra, section 4.a, California Law Enforcement and
Political Officials Supported Vignali's Clemency Petition Despite
Serious Allegations Against Horacio and Carlos Vignali--There Were
Extensive Allegations of Drug Trafficking Against Horacio Vignali and
Carlos Vignali.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The extent to which the White House relied on Hernandez's
letter is unclear. It is certain, though, that Hernandez was a
questionable source for any kind of character reference,
especially one involving drug charges. In August 21, 1997,
Hernandez was arrested and charged with one felony count of
cocaine possession.\142\ He subsequently posted $10,000 bond
and checked himself into a drug-treatment hospital.\143\
Hernandez ultimately pleaded guilty and entered a drug
diversionary program, which allowed him to complete his
rehabilitation and, upon successful completion, avoid the
felony conviction.\144\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\142\ Beth Shuster, Back from the Bottom, L.A. Times Mag., Feb. 6,
2000, at 10.
\143\ Michael Fleeman, He Just Said Yes--An Interview with L.A.
City Councilman Mike Hernandez, L.A. Times Mag., Jan. 1998.
\144\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
vi. Cardinal Roger Mahony
Cardinal Roger Mahony, the Archbishop of Los Angeles, also
wrote in support of Vignali. Given that the Cardinal was not a
political figure, his letter may have carried particular weight
with the White House. However, Cardinal Mahony's December 11,
2000, letter, like those of the political figures who supported
the Vignali clemency, was misleading. Mahony stated that
``prior to [Vignali's] conviction, he had no criminal record or
arrests.'' \145\ As described above, this claim was false.
Cardinal Mahony also stated that there were ``mitigating
factors'' in the Vignali case, such as the fact that ``neither
drugs nor drug money was found in Carlos Vignali Jr.'s
possession.'' \146\ Cardinal Mahony's recitation of these
irrelevant facts gives the impression that there was no
evidence linking Vignali to narcotics trafficking. To the
contrary, Vignali's fellow drug dealers testified against him,
and his voice was captured on intercepted telephone
conversations, discussing the shipment of cocaine to Minnesota.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\145\ NARA Document Production (Letter from Cardinal Roger Mahony,
Archbishop of Los Angeles, to President William J. Clinton (Dec. 11,
2000)) (Exhibit 19).
\146\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Cardinal has issued a statement accepting some
responsibility for his actions in the Vignali case. In
particular, he claimed, ``The purpose of the letter was to seek
a further review of the facts, the law and the processes used
in his case. I made it clear that I was incapable of making a
judgment about his guilt or innocence.'' \147\ However, the
Cardinal's letter did no such thing and even concluded that
``the granting of clemency to Carlos Vignali, Jr. is worthy of
your consideration. His relatives, a very respected, active and
well-known Latino family, are committed to assist Carlos, Jr.
to again become a contributing member of society.'' After the
public learned of Cardinal Mahony's role in the Vignali case,
the Cardinal conceded, ``Regardless of the merits of the case,
I made a serious mistake in writing to the president and I
broke my decades-long practice of never sending a letter on
behalf of any person whom I did not know personally. I
apologize for not following my own principles in this matter.''
\148\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\147\ Mateo Gold and Larry B. Stammer, 2 City Leaders Say They
Regret Helping Dealer; Clemency: Cardinal Mahony and Politician
Villaraigosa Say They Shouldn't Have Written on Behalf of a Cocaine
Convict They Had Never Even Met, L.A. Times, Feb. 13, 2001, at A22.
\148\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
b. Support from Los Angeles County Sheriff
Lee Baca
The White House has cited the support of Los Angeles County
Sheriff Lee Baca, along with the support of U.S. Attorney
Alejandro Mayorkas, as being instrumental to the President's
decision to grant clemency to Carlos Vignali. However, Baca has
publicly claimed that he did not support the grant of clemency
for Vignali but, rather, believed that he should serve out his
sentence.\149\ Yet, when Baca's actions in the Vignali case are
carefully examined, it is clear that he was close to Horacio
Vignali and took a number of actions that could be seen by the
White House as supporting a grant of clemency for Carlos
Vignali. In light of these facts, it is troubling that Baca has
refused to acknowledge the effect of his actions in the Vignali
matter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\149\ Beth Shuster, Baca Admits Call, Not Advocacy on Felon's
Clemency, L.A. Times, Feb. 23, 2001, at A1; Telephone Interview with
Leroy Baca, Sheriff, County of Los Angeles (June 22, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
i. Sheriff Baca's Relationship with the
Vignalis
Sheriff Baca met Horacio Vignali in 1991 through ``Latinos
for Riordan,'' a group which supported the election of Richard
Riordan as Mayor of Los Angeles.\150\ Beginning in 1993, Baca
and Horacio Vignali began having one-on-one contacts, including
lunches and other social meetings.\151\ Over the course of the
years that followed, Baca became friends with Horacio Vignali
and his wife, Luz, and even visited the Vignali home on five or
six occasions.\152\ Vignali became a major supporter of Baca.
Vignali contributed $11,000 to Baca's campaigns for Sheriff
between 1994 and 2001.\153\ Vignali also hosted three
fundraisers for Baca at the C&H Body Shop, each of which
raised, according to Baca, between $60,000 and $70,000 for his
campaign.\154\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\150\ Telephone Interview with Leroy Baca, Sheriff, County of Los
Angeles (June 22, 2001).
\151\ Id.
\152\ Id.
\153\ Id.
\154\ Id. As described below, the C&H Body Shop was the location of
a heroin trafficking arrest and was alleged to be a location where cars
were altered to facilitate the transportation of narcotics and drug
proceeds.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Baca first learned of Carlos Vignali's trouble with the law
through his own deputies. In 1994, detectives from his
narcotics bureau went to the C&H Body Shop to arrest Carlos
Vignali.\155\ Vignali had already been indicted in Minnesota,
and detectives had just been able to identify the person
previously known as ``C-Low'' on surveillance tapes as Carlos
Vignali. When the detectives went to the C&H Body Shop, Horacio
told them that Carlos Vignali was not there.\156\ After the
detectives left, Horacio called Baca to ask why the detectives
had been there and why they were looking for his son.\157\
Baca, who at the time was Chief of Field Operations for Region
II of the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Office,\158\ told
Horacio that he would look into the matter.\159\ Baca called
the detective who had been by the body shop and asked him why
he was looking for Carlos Vignali.\160\ The detective explained
the matter to Baca, and Baca called Horacio back and explained
that he should have his son meet with detectives at the body
shop. Baca made a point of not informing Horacio Vignali why
investigators were looking for Carlos and simply told Horacio
that he should have his son show up at the body shop to speak
to investigators.\161\ Shortly thereafter, Carlos did show up
at the body shop, and he was arrested.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\155\ Id.
\156\ Id.
\157\ Id.
\158\ Baca was elected Sheriff in November 1998, shortly after the
death of his predecessor, Sherman Block. Id.
\159\ Id.
\160\ Id.
\161\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After Carlos Vignali's arrest, Baca's information about the
Vignali case came from Horacio Vignali. Baca learned of Carlos'
conviction, and Horacio often mentioned his son's plight to
Baca when they spoke.\162\ Horacio Vignali told Baca that he
believed his son was innocent and that he was spending
significant sums in legal fees to appeal the conviction. Baca
claims that he consistently believed that Carlos Vignali was
guilty of the charges against him. He even claims to have had a
heated discussion with Horacio Vignali where he told him that
he believed that Carlos was guilty and responsible for his own
predicament.\163\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\162\ Id.
\163\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite Sheriff Baca's apparent lack of sympathy for
Carlos' situation, Horacio Vignali continued to mention Carlos
to Baca. In 1996, Horacio informed Baca that, because he was
afraid of flying, he was having difficulty visiting his son in
prison in Colorado.\164\ He asked for Baca's help in having
Carlos moved to a prison closer to the Vignali's home in Los
Angeles. On November 1, 1996, Baca wrote a letter to Vignali's
probation officer. In that letter, Baca argued that more
frequent contact between the Vignali family and Carlos would
help the family and Carlos deal with his imprisonment. Baca
also referred to Horacio Vignali's ``cooperation'' with the
Sheriff's Department:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\164\ Id.
Mr. Vignali, a highly respected businessman, cooperated
with the initial investigation that enabled Sheriff's
Department investigators to arrest his son for the
offenses he was convicted of. This level of cooperation
is rare and it reflects very highly on Mr. Vignali's
integrity. That is why I am writing this letter.\165\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\165\ Justice Department Document Production Mayorkas 00014 (Letter
from Leroy Baca, Sheriff, County of Los Angeles, to Joan L. White, U.S.
Probation Officer (Nov. 1, 1996)) (Exhibit 20).
However, Baca's glowing reference to Horacio's role in Carlos'
arrest is misleading. First, Baca seems to ignore the fact that
Horacio's first response after being contacted by Sheriff's
Department investigators who wanted to speak to his son was to
call his friend who was a chief in the Sheriff's Department. If
Horacio Vignali was truly trying to cooperate with law
enforcement, he would have told his son to meet with
investigators rather than contact his politically powerful
friend at the Sheriff's Department. More importantly, Baca
intentionally did not tell Horacio Vignali that the Sheriff's
Department intended to arrest Carlos. Rather, he told him only
that they wanted to speak to him. In this instance, it appears
that Sheriff Baca behaved professionally and appropriately.
However, to the extent that Baca's letter portrays a father who
knowingly participated in arrangements to have his son
arrested, it is misleading.
ii. Sheriff Baca's Involvement in the Vignali
Clemency Effort
In late 2000, Horacio Vignali again approached Sheriff
Baca, this time asking for his help in obtaining a grant of
clemency for Carlos. Horacio asked Baca to write a letter to
the President in support of the grant of clemency.\166\ Baca
recalls that Horacio showed him other letters of support he had
obtained, including one from Representative Becerra.\167\
Horacio also mentioned that Hugh Rodham was helping him obtain
a grant of clemency.\168\ However, Baca declined to write any
letter in support of Carlos Vignali's request for a
commutation.\169\ Baca informed Committee staff that he told
Horacio that his son was guilty and would not receive the
commutation that he wanted.\170\ Baca believes that Horacio was
upset by his refusal to write a letter regarding the
commutation request.\171\ After Baca had spoken with Horacio
Vignali, he began to reconsider his refusal to write a letter
and decided that he could write a general letter in support of
Horacio Vignali.\172\ He drafted such a letter, signed it, and
gave the original to Horacio Vignali.\173\ The letter drafted
by Baca did make a number of strong statements in support of
Horacio Vignali, but it did not mention Carlos at all:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\166\ Telephone Interview with Leroy Baca, Sheriff, County of Los
Angeles (June 22, 2001).
\167\ Id.
\168\ Id.
\169\ Id.
\170\ Id.
\171\ Id.
\172\ Id.
\173\ Id.
This letter will confirm my support for Mr. Carlos
Vignali, Sr., as a man of the highest integrity and
trustworthiness. I have known Mr. Vignali for many
years and have witnessed his consistent support of law
enforcement and especially the policing effort of the
Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. . . . I am
confident that Mr. Vignali will fulfill any commitment
he makes regarding any matter entrusted to him.\174\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\174\ NARA Document Production (Letter from Leroy Baca, Sheriff,
County of Los Angeles, to President William J. Clinton (Dec. 8, 2000))
(Exhibit 21).
After Horacio read the letter, he told Baca he did not believe
he could use the letter because it did not help his son.\175\
Indeed, Baca believes his letter was never forwarded to the
White House by Vignali.\176\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\175\ Telephone Interview with Leroy Baca, Sheriff, County of Los
Angeles (June 22, 2001).
\176\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After giving his letter to Horacio Vignali, Sheriff Baca
did not have any further involvement with the Vignali matter
until he received a phone call from Hugh Rodham in early
January 2001.\177\ Baca received a message from Rodham and
called the number Rodham left, which turned out to be the
number for the White House switchboard.\178\ Baca was then
connected with Rodham.\179\ Rodham told Baca that he was
working for Horacio Vignali and that Baca would be receiving a
telephone call from the White House Counsel's Office regarding
``Vignali, Sr.'' \180\ Baca claims he told Rodham he had
nothing to say about Carlos Vignali and believed Carlos
deserved whatever he got.\181\ But, Baca indicated he would
discuss Horacio Vignali with the Counsel's Office.\182\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\177\ Id.
\178\ Id.
\179\ Id.
\180\ Id.
\181\ Id.
\182\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Several days after Rodham's telephone call, Baca received a
message from someone else at the White House.\183\ Baca
returned the call to the man who had left the message, but,
when he asked for that person, he was transferred to a woman
who identified herself as an assistant of the man whom Baca
sought.\184\ It appears this woman was Dawn Woollen, assistant
to Deputy White House Counsel Bruce Lindsey.\185\ Woollen asked
Baca what he could tell her about Horacio Vignali.\186\ Baca
told Woollen ``nice things'' about Horacio Vignali,
particularly, that he was deeply devoted to his family and very
disturbed by his son's imprisonment.\187\ Woollen then asked
Baca whether President Clinton should commute Carlos Vignali's
prison sentence.\188\ According to Baca, he answered that he
was not familiar with the facts of the case and that it was the
President's decision to make.\189\ Woollen's recollection of
the call is significantly different. She remembers that Baca
``expressed support for the Vignali commutation'' but that he
was uncomfortable writing a letter in support of Vignali.\190\
According to Baca, he had no further involvement in the Vignali
case after his conversation with Woollen.\191\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\183\ Id.
\184\ Id.
\185\ Interview with Dawn Woollen, Administrative Assistant to
Deputy White House Counsel Bruce Lindsey, the White House (Sept. 25,
2001).
\186\ Telephone Interview with Leroy Baca, Sheriff, County of Los
Angeles (June 22, 2001).
\187\ Id.
\188\ Id.
\189\ Id.
\190\ Interview with Dawn Woollen, Administrative Assistant to
Deputy White House Counsel Bruce Lindsey, the White House (Sept. 25,
2001).
\191\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
iii. Conclusion
Sheriff Baca has maintained that he never supported a grant
of clemency for Carlos Vignali. Rather, Baca claims that he was
opposed to the commutation. After the pardon was granted, he
even made a public statement that ``I maintain and espouse a
policy that those persons convicted of a crime should serve
their full and complete sentence.'' \192\ Moreover, Sheriff
Baca has taken the position that it was not reasonable for the
White House to interpret his call as conveying support for the
commutation of Carlos Vignali's sentence.\193\ However, if the
account of Dawn Woollen, the assistant to Deputy White House
Counsel Bruce Lindsey, is accurate, Sheriff Baca's position is
disingenuous. In addition, Sheriff Baca took a number of
discrete actions that assisted the effort to get Carlos Vignali
out of prison. As such, the White House was justified in
believing that Baca supported a grant of clemency for Vignali.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\192\ Beth Shuster, Baca Admits Call, Not Advocacy on Felon's
Clemency, L.A. Times, Feb. 23, 2001 at A1.
\193\ Telephone Interview with Leroy Baca, Sheriff, County of Los
Angeles (June 22, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Baca knew or should have known that his actions would
assist the effort to get Carlos Vignali out of prison. When
Baca wrote a letter to President Clinton vouching for Horacio
Vignali's character, he knew that he was providing Vignali with
a letter that would be used to get Carlos Vignali out of
prison. When he agreed to speak with White House staff about
Horacio Vignali, he knew the only reason the White House wanted
to know about Horacio Vignali was that they were considering a
grant of clemency for Carlos Vignali. It is difficult to
conceive what Sheriff Baca thought he was doing if not
assisting in the effort to get Carlos Vignali out of prison.
Indeed, the White House interpreted Baca's call as supporting a
grant of clemency to Carlos Vignali. It appears that Sheriff
Baca's support for Vignali, together with that of U.S. Attorney
Alejandro Mayorkas (as described below), was instrumental to
the White House decision to grant clemency. At a Committee
hearing, Deputy White House Counsel Bruce Lindsey stated that
``the Los Angeles sheriff indicated he supported a
commutation.'' Lindsey also stated that:
I originally was probably negative. After the call from
the . . . sheriff of Los Angeles and our office reached
out to the U.S. attorney in Central District of
California and Los Angeles, I decided that given the
community support and their position that into the
county in which he would go to live, that they would be
aware of the crime situation, if you will, in their
community, and if they were not concerned about him
coming back to their community, that I thought it was
an appropriate commutation.\194\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\194\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Congress 387,
426 (Mar. 1, 2001).
Sheriff Baca has been careful to point out that in none of
his calls or letters did he expressly advocate support for a
grant of clemency for Carlos Vignali. Nonetheless, it is likely
that the careful language in the Sheriff's letters resulted
from his own desire to avoid creating evidence that he
supported the commutation rather than from any lack of desire
to help the Vignali family. Indeed, an internal White House
note confirms this view. The note indicates that Hugh Rodham
told Dawn Woollen that ``Sheriff Baca from LA is more than
happy to speak with you about [Vignali] but is uncomfortable
writing a letter offering his full support.'' \195\ This note
supports the conclusion that Sheriff Baca's actions had the
effect of assisting Horacio Vignali's effort to get his son out
of prison but did not want to create a paper trail showing that
he helped a convicted cocaine dealer get out of prison.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\195\ NARA Document Production (Note from Dawn Woollen, Secretary
to Deputy White House Counsel Bruce Lindsey, the White House, to Bruce
Lindsey, Deputy White House Counsel, the White House) (Exhibit 22)
(NARA cover sheet, reflecting that document came from Lindsey's file,
attached).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The most troubling aspect of Sheriff Baca's involvement is
his continued claims that he was opposed to the Vignali
commutation. In his public statements since the commutation and
his interview with Committee staff, Baca maintained that
Vignali was guilty and should not have had his sentence
commuted. Moreover, Sheriff Baca believes there was nothing
inappropriate about his role in the Vignali matter. However,
when Sheriff Baca was asked squarely by the White House
Counsel's Office whether the President should commute Vignali's
sentence, he said he was not familiar with the facts of the
case and it was a decision that only the President could make.
If Baca believed Vignali was guilty, as he claims to have, and
was opposed to a commutation, he should have shared his views
with the White House. It is troubling that Sheriff Baca would
make self-serving statements to the Committee and the press
that he was opposed to the commutation yet refused to express
meaningful opposition when given the opportunity.
Sheriff Baca's actions, which are troubling enough when
viewed in isolation, are even more troubling when considered in
light of two additional facts. First, Horacio Vignali was a
major financial supporter of Baca's campaign, contributing
$11,000 and raising tens of thousands of dollars more. Second,
as discussed below, law enforcement knew of numerous
allegations that Horacio Vignali himself was involved in
trafficking cocaine. Thus, the top law enforcement officer in
Los Angeles County supported a grant of clemency for a cocaine
trafficker, the son of a major financial supporter and alleged
narcotics trafficker. Sheriff Baca's involvement in the Vignali
matter was inexcusable, especially for a law enforcement
officer.
c. Support from U.S. Attorney Alejandro Mayorkas
As described below, the government attorneys who actually
convicted Vignali vehemently opposed the Vignali commutation.
In the face of this opposition, the intervention of Los
Angeles-area U.S. Attorney Alejandro Mayorkas is particularly
troubling. According to President Clinton's Deputy Counsel,
Bruce Lindsey, the White House Counsel's Office ``reached out''
to Mayorkas regarding Vignali's clemency petition.\196\ Why the
White House reached out to Mayorkas--who had no role in
prosecuting Vignali in Minneapolis--rather than to the federal
prosecutors who convicted Vignali is far from clear. Equally
unclear and of greater concern is why the White House gave
greater weight to Mayorkas' position than it did to the
strenuous objections of the U.S. Attorney's Office that
actually convicted Vignali and the Pardon Attorney's negative
recommendation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\196\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Congress 426
(Mar. 1, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
i. Mayorkas' Initial Exposure to the Vignali
Matter
Sometime in the first quarter of 1999, Mayorkas received a
call from Representative Xavier Becerra.\197\ During that
conversation, Becerra informed Mayorkas that he had received
information regarding an appeal of Carlos Vignali's
conviction.\198\ Becerra sent Mayorkas a copy of the brief and
asked him to look into the matter.\199\ Becerra attached to the
brief a few letters submitted by various community leaders in
support of Carlos Vignali's case.\200\ Because some of those
letters were addressed to a ``Pardon Secretary,'' Mayorkas
believes he assumed Carlos Vignali was seeking clemency.\201\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\197\ Telephone Interview with Alejandro Mayorkas, former U.S.
Attorney for the Central District of California, Department of Justice
(June 15, 2001).
\198\ Id.
\199\ Id. Mayorkas did not read the brief. After he received it, he
put it in a file.
\200\ Id.
\201\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to Mayorkas, he treated Congressman Becerra's
call as he did other inquiries from congressmen, which he
received frequently.\202\ In this case, he consulted Minnesota
U.S. Attorney Todd Jones, whose office tried the original case
against Vignali.\203\ In fact, Mayorkas called Jones
twice.\204\ In the first call, which occurred shortly after the
inquiry from Representative Becerra, Mayorkas called Jones to
obtain information on the status of Carlos Vignali's case.\205\
In response, Jones told Mayorkas that Carlos Vignali was ``a
major player'' in drug trafficking.\206\ Jones told Mayorkas,
``don't go there,'' when it came to Vignali--he was ``bad
news.'' \207\ Jones also told Mayorkas he should call Assistant
U.S. Attorney Andrew Dunne for further details regarding the
case.\208\ Mayorkas noted that he might have asked Jones during
the call if his office was interested in receiving Carlos
Vignali's cooperation, but he does not specifically
recall.\209\ Mayorkas relayed what he learned back to
Congressman Becerra.\210\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\202\ Id.
\203\ Id. Telephone Interview with Todd Jones, U.S. Attorney for
the District of Minnesota, Department of Justice (May 2, 2001); Power
of Words from High Places, L.A. Times, Feb. 14, 2001, at B10; Richard
A. Serrano and Stephen Braun, U.S. Attorney Pursued Clemency Case, L.A.
Times, Feb. 13, 2001, at A1. Jones believed that Mayorkas received
inquiries from Horacio Vignali and was reaching out to Jones to look
into Vignali's case. Telephone Interview with Todd Jones, U.S. Attorney
for the District of Minnesota, Department of Justice (May 2, 2001).
Specifically, Jones opined, ``Why [was Mayorkas calling him]? Because
the old man was calling him. Horacio was contacting [Mayorkas] and his
U.S. Attorney's Office seeking support for a commutation.'' Richard A.
Serrano and Stephen Braun, U.S. Attorney Pursued Clemency Case, L.A.
Times, Feb. 13, 2001, at A1.
\204\ Id. Telephone Interview with Todd Jones, U.S. Attorney for
the District of Minnesota, Department of Justice (May 2, 2001); Power
of Words from High Places, L.A. Times, Feb. 14, 2001, at B10; Richard
A. Serrano and Stephen Braun, U.S. Attorney Pursued Clemency Case, L.A.
Times, Feb. 13, 2001 at A1.
\205\ Telephone Interview with Alejandro Mayorkas, former U.S.
Attorney for the Central District of California, Department of Justice
(June 15, 2001); Telephone Interview with Todd Jones, U.S. Attorney for
the District of Minnesota, Department of Justice (May 2, 2001) (Jones
noting that December 2, 1999, is the likely date); Richard A. Serrano
and Stephen Braun, U.S. Attorney Pursued Clemency Case, L.A. Times,
Feb. 13, 2001 at A1.
\206\ Telephone Interview with Todd Jones, U.S. Attorney for the
District of Minnesota, Department of Justice (May 2, 2000).
\207\ Id. In an Interview with Committee staff, Mayorkas denies
having been told this. Also, Jones recalls that, during their
discussion, Mayorkas referred to Horacio Vignali as a ``player in the
community in Los Angeles, a pillar in the community.'' Richard A.
Serrano and Stephen Braun, U.S. Attorney Pursued Clemency Case, L.A.
Times, Feb. 13, 2001, at A1. See also Telephone Interview with Todd
Jones, U.S. Attorney for the District of Minnesota, Department of
Justice (May 2, 2001) (describing that Mayorkas also told Jones that
Horacio Vignali was ``a big guy in the community''). Mayorkas sternly
denies ever having told Jones that Horacio Vignali was a pillar--or
player--in the community. Telephone Interview with Alejandro Mayorkas,
former U.S. Attorney for the Central District of California, Department
of Justice (June 15, 2001). According to Mayorkas, he just does not
talk like that.
\208\ Telephone Interview with Todd Jones, U.S. Attorney for the
District of Minnesota, Department of Justice (May 2, 2001). Telephone
Interview with Alejandro Mayorkas, former U.S. Attorney for the Central
District of California, Department of Justice (June 15, 2001) (Mayorkas
stating that he recalls having been referred to a line attorney as well
as the general fact of their conversation but cannot specifically
recall what was discussed).
\209\ Id.
\210\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jones also referred Mayorkas to a line attorney who handled
the case for specifics regarding Carlos Vignali's
conviction.\211\ As described below, that line attorney was
probably Assistant U.S. Attorney Andrew Dunne, who tried the
government's case with former Assistant U.S. Attorney Denise
Reilly. Jones believes that Mayorkas may have followed up with
Dunne. Mayorkas cannot recall whether he spoke with Dunne but
believed that such a conversation may have taken place.
Unfortunately, the Committee was unable to interview Dunne to
confirm the conversation because of objections from the
Department of Justice. However, if such a conversation took
place, Mayorkas would have likely gained even more specific
information regarding the scope of Vignali's criminal activity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\211\ Id. Telephone Interview with Todd Jones, U.S. Attorney for
the District of Minnesota, Department of Justice (May 2, 2001) (Jones
noting that he referred Mayorkas to Dunne ``for the gory details'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After looking into the Vignali case for Representative
Becerra, Mayorkas actually met Horacio Vignali for the first
time. Over the next two years, Mayorkas would see Horacio
Vignali at various community events and at several one-on-one
meetings with Vignali. When Mayorkas saw Horacio Vignali,
Vignali would usually mention his son's case and tell Mayorkas
how much anguish he was suffering as a result of his son's
imprisonment. Sometime early in 1999, Horacio Vignali spoke to
Mayorkas about executive clemency.\212\ Mayorkas told Horacio
the only way he knew that Carlos' sentence could be reduced was
for him to cooperate with law enforcement and receive a
reduction of his sentence under Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 35.\213\ Mayorkas does not recall Horacio Vignali's
response to that comment.\214\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\212\ Telephone Interview with Alejandro Mayorkas, former U.S.
Attorney for the Central District of California, Department of Justice
(June 15, 2001).
\213\ Id.
\214\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ii. Mayorkas Calls the White House
In early January of 2001, Horacio Vignali called Mayorkas
and, noting that a petition for the commutation of his son's
sentence was pending, asked Mayorkas if he would call the White
House.\215\ During that conversation, Horacio Vignali stated
that other individuals, including Sheriff Baca and Archbishop
Mahoney, had made similar communications.\216\ After Horacio
Vignali's call, Mayorkas called the Justice Department to see
if it was proper for him to contact the White House regarding a
clemency matter in which he did not have a prosecutorial
role.\217\ The Justice Department referred Mayorkas to the
Office of the Pardon Attorney.\218\ Mayorkas spoke to an
unidentified female lawyer at the Pardon Attorney's Office and
asked if it was permissible for him to make a call to the White
House regarding clemency.\219\ Mayorkas recalls telling the
attorney that: (1) the case he intended to weigh in on was not
in his jurisdiction; (2) he did not know the defendant but knew
the parents; and (3) he intended only to speak to the integrity
of the parents.\220\ According to Mayorkas, the Office of the
Pardon Attorney permitted him to call the White House.\221\
Mayorkas noted that the attorney with whom he spoke did not
express the slightest reservation about his intention to call
the White House.\222\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\215\ Id.
\216\ Id.
\217\ Id.
\218\ Id.
\219\ Id.
\220\ Id.
\221\ Id.
\222\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Before calling the White House, Mayorkas called Minnesota
U.S. Attorney Todd Jones and informed him of his intention to
weigh in with the White House.\223\ Indeed, Jones also recalls
that Mayorkas initiated a second contact with him regarding the
Carlos Vignali matter and specifically asked him how he came
out on Vignali's clemency request.\224\ Jones told Mayorkas
that he opposed commutation of Vignali's sentence.\225\ He did
not recall whether Mayorkas indicated an intent to weigh in
with the White House but noted that the conversation was very
brief.\226\ Jones was troubled by Mayorkas' inquiries about the
Vignali case and his subsequent lobbying on behalf of Vignali,
believing that only the U.S. Attorney who prosecuted the case
should have been involved in recommending a grant of clemency
and that, if a prosecutor was not so involved, he should ``stay
the hell away from it.'' \227\ Jones remarked that if the roles
were reversed, he would never have weighed in on the Vignali
case.\228\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\223\ Id.
\224\ Telephone Interview with Todd Jones, U.S. Attorney for the
District of Minnesota, Department of Justice (May 2, 2001). See also
Richard A. Serrano and Stephen Braun, U.S. Attorney Pursued Clemency
Case, L.A. Times, Feb. 13, 2001, at A1.
\225\ Telephone Interview with Todd Jones, U.S. Attorney for the
District of Minnesota, Department of Justice (May 2, 2001); Telephone
Interview with Alejandro Mayorkas, former U.S. Attorney for the Central
District of California, Department of Justice (June 15, 2001).
\226\ Telephone Interview with Todd Jones, U.S. Attorney for the
District of Minnesota, Department of Justice (May 2, 2001); Richard A.
Serrano and Stephen Braun, U.S. Attorney Pursued Clemency Case, L.A.
Times, Feb. 13, 2001, at A1.
\227\ Telephone Interview with Todd Jones, U.S. Attorney for the
District of Minnesota, Department of Justice (May 2, 2001).
\228\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mayorkas then called Deputy White House Counsel Bruce
Lindsey.\229\ Mayorkas believes that Horacio Vignali suggested
he call Lindsey and provided him Lindsey's contact
information.\230\ Mayorkas' call was returned by Associate
White House Counsels Meredith Cabe and Eric Angel.\231\
Mayorkas indicated that Horacio Vignali had asked him to make
the call.\232\ Also, according to Mayorkas, he told Cabe and
Angel that he was not familiar with the facts of the case and
did not know the defendant but knew the parents to be good
people.\233\ In that conversation, he also noted that the
federal prosecutors in Minnesota who convicted Vignali opposed
commutation of Vignali's sentence.\234\ Mayorkas does not
recall having expressed support for Vignali's clemency request
during that call.\235\ But, he observed that the fact of his
call conveyed support for the commutation, noting, ``By virtue
of the fact of the phone call, there's no question that I
conveyed support for the commutation.'' \236\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\229\ Id.
\230\ Id.
\231\ Id. See also Telephone Interview with Meredith Cabe, former
Associate Counsel to the President, the White House (Mar. 16, 2001)
(corroborating that she and Angel spoke with Mayorkas); Interview with
Eric Angel, Associate Counsel to the President, the White House (Mar.
28, 2001) (corroborating that he and Cabe spoke with Mayorkas).
\232\ Telephone Interview with Alejandro Mayorkas, former U.S.
Attorney for the Central District of California, Department of Justice
(June 15, 2001).
\233\ Id.
\234\ Id.
\235\ Id.
\236\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mayorkas' belief, in hindsight, that his call to the White
House conveyed support for Vignali's clemency request was
correct. Statements of various staff members at the White House
involved in the clemency process indicated that they thought
that Mayorkas supported the commutation. Chief of Staff John
Podesta plainly believed that Mayorkas actually supported
commutation of Vignali's sentence.\237\ Also, in testimony
before the Committee, Deputy White House Counsel Bruce Lindsey
stated that Mayorkas, ``while saying he didn't know much about
the facts, felt like that the family was a good environment for
which [sic] Mr. Vignali would get the proper supervision.''
\238\ Associate White House Counsel Meredith Cabe likewise
confirmed that Mayorkas supported Vignali's petition, said he
thought well of the Vignali family, and believed that the
family would support Vignali after his release.\239\ According
to Cabe, Mayorkas explained his views in the Vignali case by
asserting that most drug sentences were disproportionate.\240\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\237\ Richard Serrano, L.A. Leaders' Support Cited in Decision to
Free Vignali, L.A. Times, Feb. 19, 2001, at A1.
\238\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Congress 387
(Mar. 1, 2001).
\239\ Interview with Meredith Cabe, former Associate Counsel to the
President, the White House (Mar. 16, 2001); Interview with Eric Angel,
former Associate Counsel to the President, the White House (Mar. 28,
2001).
\240\ Interview with Meredith Cabe, former Associate Counsel to the
President, the White House (Mar. 16, 2001); Interview with Eric Angel,
former Associate Counsel to the President, the White House (Mar. 28,
2001). Mayorkas strenuously denies having said this. Telephone
Interview with Alejandro Mayorkas, former U.S. Attorney for the Central
District of California, Department of Justice (June 15, 2001).
According to Mayorkas, he was never in a position to opine about the
appropriateness of Vignali's sentence. And, if he was asked whether he
holds that position now, the answer would be ``no.'' And, if one were
to ask whether he espoused that position then, his answer would be
``no.'' According to Mayorkas, ``Some sentences are too lenient. Others
are too harsh.'' But, regarding the term ``disproportionate'' as
relating to Vignali's sentence, Mayorkas stated that he ``never talked
like that.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
iii. Conclusion
Alejandro Mayorkas acted inappropriately in supporting the
commutation of Carlos Vignali's sentence. Mayorkas made three
major mistakes in the Vignali matter. First, Mayorkas should
have realized that by calling the White House regarding Horacio
Vignali, he was conveying support for the commutation of Carlos
Vignali's sentence. Mayorkas now understands that his call had
such an effect, but there is no reason that Mayorkas should not
have understood this simple fact when he called. Mayorkas
understood that the White House was considering the commutation
of Vignali's sentence. He knew that the only reason the White
House wanted to hear from him was so that it could evaluate
whether to grant the commutation. Therefore, when he provided a
positive character reference for Horacio Vignali, he should
have known it would have a positive effect on Carlos Vignali's
commutation petition.
Second, just as Mayorkas should have known the effect of
his actions, he should have known he was weighing in on a
matter about which he knew very little. Mayorkas was aware that
the prosecutor responsible for the Vignali case, Todd Jones,
was against the commutation. In fact, he pointed this fact out
to White House staff during his conversation with them.
However, Mayorkas should have also known that, as a U.S.
Attorney, he was providing confusing signals to the White
House. He should have realized he was abusing his office by
providing a character reference in a clemency case in which his
office had no involvement.
Finally, Mayorkas did not know Horacio Vignali well enough
to offer a character reference. Mayorkas' relationship with
Horacio Vignali consisted of seeing Vignali at various
community events and only two or three one-on-one meetings for
dinner or drinks. Mayorkas now concedes that he did not know
Vignali well enough to call the White House and provide a
character reference. But, Mayorkas' concession raises questions
as to why he made the call at all. Three possibilities are
apparent: first, that Mayorkas is simply an overly
compassionate person who provided help when he should not have;
second, that he wanted to help a well-connected, wealthy, and
politically powerful businessman; and third, that he felt
pressure to help Vignali because so many other Los Angeles
political figures were helping him. Most likely, Mayorkas
assisted Vignali out of a combination of all three of these
factors.
However, of all of the people who were involved in helping
Carlos Vignali, Mayorkas appears to have most clearly accepted
responsibility and apologized for his actions. After his
involvement in the Vignali matter came to light, Mayorkas
explained to his staff:
I called the White House counsel's office and informed
the office that I was not familiar with the facts of
the case, that the prosecuting U.S. attorney was
against the commutation, and that I was calling because
I knew the parents to be upstanding people. I
understand that my telephone call conveyed support for
the commutation. In hindsight, it was a mistake for me
to place that call [to the White House] and I am sorry
that I did so. I allowed my compassion for the parents
to interfere with my judgment.'' \241\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\241\ U.S. Attorney Apologizes for Role in Vignali Pardon, City
News Service, Feb. 23, 2001.
In addition, the responsibility for the Vignali commutation
cannot be pinned entirely on Mayorkas, as some White House
staff have attempted to do. In various settings, White House
staff have pointed to the involvement of Mayorkas, along with
Sheriff Baca, as being central to the President's
decisionmaking. Deputy White House Counsel Bruce Lindsey
testified that he changed his mind regarding the Vignali matter
after the White House heard from Baca and Mayorkas. Associate
White House Counsel Meredith Cabe stated that Mayorkas' opinion
was ``significant'' because ``very few prosecutors advocate
clemency in any form.'' But, the White House was not justified
in relying on the support offered by Baca or Mayorkas to any
determinative extent. While they both made statements that
amounted to support for Horacio Vignali, and as such, support
for the commutation, they both also made it clear that they
knew little about the case against Carlos Vignali. It appears
that the White House was looking for reasons justifying
commutation and as such used the support of Mayorkas and Baca
as a fig leaf to rationalize its decision.
4. California Law Enforcement and Political Officials
Supported Vignali's Clemency Petition Despite
Serious Allegations Against Horacio and Carlos
Vignali
a. There Were Extensive Allegations of Drug
Trafficking Against Both Horacio and Carlos
Vignali
The Committee has learned of numerous allegations made to
law enforcement as long as twenty-five years ago that Horacio
Vignali was involved in cocaine trafficking and other illegal
activity. The Committee has also discovered other allegations
that Carlos Vignali was involved in drug sales even more
extensive than those for which he was prosecuted in Minnesota.
Although the information the Committee obtained consists solely
of allegations against Horacio and Carlos Vignali, it is
extremely significant. These reports allege long-term criminal
activity on the part of Horacio Vignali, in particular, that
Horacio Vignali was involved in the cocaine trade and was the
source of supply for his son. Despite the availability of these
reports to Sheriff Baca and U.S. Attorney Mayorkas, both chose
not to exercise any due diligence before supporting Vignali's
clemency plea. Although the White House and the Justice
Department also had access to these reports, it apparently did
not consider them. Even though these serious allegations have
not been proven, the mere fact of their existence--without
additional information--should have ruled out the possibility
of executive clemency for Carlos Vignali. Instead, these
reports were never considered.
While the extensive DEA reports regarding Horacio and
Carlos Vignali are being made public only now, it appears that
suspicions about Horacio Vignali's role in drug trafficking
were widespread and well-known to law enforcement. In
interviews with Committee staff, Todd Jones and Denise Reilly,
who were responsible for the investigation and prosecution of
Carlos Vignali in Minnesota, both indicated they believed that
Carlos Vignali was not the ``end of the line'' and were aware
of the widespread belief among investigators that Horacio
Vignali was involved in drug trafficking with his son.\242\ Law
enforcement officers in California had even more detailed
knowledge regarding allegations against Horacio and Carlos
Vignali. According to a number of investigators working for
local law enforcement in Southern California, both Horacio and
Carlos Vignali had been the subjects of major drug
investigations.\243\ As the following reports indicate, a
number of law enforcement agencies apparently received credible
information indicating that Carlos and Horacio Vignali were
personally involved in large-scale drug dealing. These same
agencies also received allegations indicating that the Vignalis
were part of a large organized drug-dealing ring headed by
George Torres.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\242\ Telephone Interview with the Honorable Denise Reilly,
Juvenile Court Judge, 4th Judicial District of Minnesota (Hennepin
County) (May 11, 2001); Telephone Interview with Todd Jones, U.S.
Attorney for the District of Minnesota, Department of Justice (May 2,
2000).
\243\ In the course of its inquiry, the Committee has learned that
while the White House was reviewing Carlos Vignali's clemency petition,
Horacio Vignali and associates of Vignali were part of an Organized
Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (``OCDETF'') investigation in the Los
Angeles area. Various federal and California law enforcement agencies
were investigating Carlos and Horacio Vignali's involvement in
supplying narcotics before Carlos' conviction in Minneapolis and
Horacio Vignali's personal and business relationship with alleged
California drug figure George Torres. In this case, the OCDETF
investigation was being conducted by the federal government in
cooperation with various agencies of the California State Department of
Justice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The first series of reports indicates that there were
allegations of drug dealing against Horacio Vignali dating back
to 1976. Among those reports is a DEA-6, an internal
investigative report, which notes:
[Horacio] Carlos VIGNALI \244\--Co-owner of the C & H
Auto Body Shop. His drug relationship with the
[redacted] Organization is also unknown. VIGNALI
however is a close personal friend of [redacted]. In
November, 1975, he negotiated with ATF Agents to sell a
machine gun and stated to them that he had also
smuggled heroin into the United States utilizing
automobiles. Since current intelligence indicates that
the remainder of the [redacted] Family in Los Angeles,
[redacted] are still dealing in multi-kilogram
quantities of heroin, it is recommended that a grand
jury probe be initiated with the object of eliminating
the remaining [redacted] Organization in Los Angeles by
obtaining indictments on [redacted] possibly other
members of their organization such as [redacted]
[Horacio] Carlos VIGNALI, [redacted].\245\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\244\ The DEA report refers to ``Carlos Vignali,'' but it clearly
means Horacio Vignali, or ``Carlos Vignali, Sr.,'' as he is known to
many of his associates. The date of birth listed for Vignali, as well
as other personal information, appears to correspond to that of Horacio
Vignali.
\245\ DEA Document Production V-DEA-00009 (DEA-6-Internal
Investigative Report (Feb. 18, 1976)) (Exhibit 23).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A December 1, 1976, DEA report contains similar information:
[Horacio] Carlos VIGNAL [sic]--the [redacted]s used his
body shop in Los Angeles to take heroin out of the
drive shafts of vehicles brought into the United States
from Mexico.\246\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\246\ DEA Document Production V-DEA-00012 (DEA-6-Internal
Investigative Report (Dec. 1, 1976)) (Exhibit 24).
A more recent set of DEA reports contains additional
allegations that Horacio Vignali was involved in drug
trafficking. They also show that the DEA received information
indicating Horacio was involved in the drug trade with his son
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Carlos. A March 19, 1993, report states:
The ``traps'', (hidden compartments) were built into
the truck through Carlos VIGNALI Jr. for $5,000.00.
[Redacted] has also purchased cocaine from Carlos
VIGNALI Jr. of Los Angeles. . . . VIGNALI's father
Carlos VIGNALI aka ``pops'' owns a body shop, at 1260
Figueroa and is the source of supply for his son.\247\
. . . An associate of VIGNALI, Jorge TORRES aka ``G''
owns [NUMBERO UNO] Market on Jefferson St. in Los
Angeles. Across the street from the Market, TORRES
maintains a warehouse full of luxury vehicles and
tractor trailers used to transport cocaine. The
warehouse also has a penthouse complete with a casino
where TORRES and VIGNALI gamble. . . . Cocaine
purchased from VIGNALI Jr. went to [redacted] of
Shreveport, La.\248\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\247\ This information casts the following testimony from Horacio
Vignali at Carlos' trial in a new light: ``I treated him like my best
friend, my partner. Anything he needed, I would always provide for him.
Always. It doesn't matter. I always provided for him.'' See Transcript
of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. Dec. 1, 1994) at 297.
\248\ DEA Document Production (DEA-6-Internal Investigative Report
(Mar. 19, 1993)) (Exhibit 25).
The Committee has received additional information from a
DEA report that it is not releasing because it could identify
confidential informants.\249\ In this report, an informant
alleges, based on his direct knowledge, that Carlos Vignali
sold hundreds of kilograms of cocaine. Additionally, Vignali is
alleged to have stated that he had ties to the relative of a
prominent South American cocaine dealer. Like the other
information in the DEA reports, these allegations are unproven.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\249\ See DEA Document Production V-DEA-00028-29 (DEA-6-Internal
Investigative Report (Apr. 26, 1993)) (Exhibit 26). The Committee has
reviewed an unredacted copy of this report but is not releasing it for
the reason described above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to the reports listed above, two recent reports
indicate that the DEA received information linking Horacio
Vignali to a large-scale drug dealing organization headed by
George Torres.\250\ A September 25, 1997, DEA Case Initiation
Report describes the Torres organization:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\250\ At trial, Carlos Vignali conceded that Torres was a friend of
the family and, in particular, of his father. Transcript of Trial, U.S.
v. Vignali (D. Minn. Nov. 29, 1994) at 227. Carlos appears to have used
a variation of George Torres' name--``Charles Torres''--when he
subscribed for his pager. Because Carlos used that pager to communicate
with his coconspirators in trafficking cocaine, he used ``Charles
Torres'' to conceal his true identity.
[Torres' organization] has been in existence since the
middle 1980's when it was closely associated with the
[redacted] family in their drug trafficking. By the
early 1990's this group were [sic] transporting
approximately 1,800 kilograms of cocaine into the Los
Angels [sic] area from Mexico. At that time they were
smuggling the cocaine using the [redacted] TORRES's
tractor-trailer trucks, concealing the drugs inside
laundry detergent and jalapeno chilli [sic] cans.
[Redacted.] Since that time TORRES has continued to be
involved in drug trafficking and information shows that
his organization supply [sic] various drug trafficking
organizations throughout the United States. TORRES'
organization has used illicit profits derived from drug
trafficking to buy legitimate businesses and properties
throughout Los Angels [sic] and southern California. .
. . Investigators believe that the organization uses
these businesses to laundry [sic] its drug
proceeds.\251\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\251\ DEA Document Production V-DEA-00110 (DEA Case Initiation
Report (Sept. 25, 1997)) (Exhibit 27).
A September 16, 1998, DEA report about Torres reported the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
following:
To date, the investigation shows that the TORRES
organization is involved in the importation and
distribution of drugs throughout the United States.
Latest intelligence reveals that this group is
distributing approximately one hundred (100) kilograms
of cocaine per month. [Redacted.] George TORRES is the
head of this organization. TORRES' direct associates
include [redacted] Carlos Vignali. [Redacted] Carlos
Horatio [sic] VIGNALI's role in the organization is
relatively unknown at this time. It is believed that
VIGNALI functions as a financial partner in the
organization. VIGNALI has been involved in organizing
meetings between TORRES and individuals with extensive
criminal backgrounds.\252\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\252\ DEA Document Production (Case Initiation Report on the George
Torres Cocaine Trafficking Organization, Sept. 16, 1998) (Exhibit 28).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The report goes on to describe the scope of Torres' activities:
The TORRES organization has used its profits from drug
trafficking to purchase legitimate businesses and
properties throughout the Southern California area--The
grocery and wholesale business are cash intensive thus
making it easy to launder illicit funds through them.
In 1996, TORRES' businesses had sales of approximately
$50,000,000. Investigators believe that TORRES uses
these businesses, properties and vehicles to launder
his drug profits. Members of the TORRES organization
have been involved in various acts of violence. In
1996, TORRES was arrested for being a felon in
possession of a firearm. The Los Angeles Police
Department (LAPD) has named TORRES a suspect in two
murders. One involved a disgruntled employee and the
other involved the owner of a property adjacent to one
of TORRES' businesses. TORRES has been known to
intimidate and threaten others and in so doing likes to
portray himself as a Mafia member. He often uses his
associates to carry out these acts of
intimidation.\253\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\253\ Id.
This troubling report regarding Horacio Vignali and George
Torres was received just one month after Carlos Vignali applied
for executive clemency.
b. The Extensive Allegations Against Horacio
and Carlos Vignali Were Never Considered by
Sheriff Baca, U.S. Attorney Mayorkas, or the
Clinton White House
The allegations made against Horacio Vignali, Carlos
Vignali, and George Torres are serious. However, with respect
to the decision to commute the sentence of Carlos Vignali, the
key fact is that these allegations existed, and none of the
individuals involved in the clemency process conducted
sufficient due diligence to find these reports. Both Sheriff
Lee Baca and U.S. Attorney Alejandro Mayorkas, who made
supportive calls to the White House on the Vignalis' behalf,
had access to this information. In addition, the White House
should have been provided with this information as part of the
clemency process. However, it appears that Baca, Mayorkas, and
the White House were all unaware of the extensive allegations
against the Vignalis.
Committee staff asked Sheriff Baca whether he was aware of
any allegations that Horacio Vignali was involved in drug
trafficking. Baca replied that he was not aware of any such
allegations.\254\ Baca readily admitted that he would be the
person to know if there were any such allegations against
Vignali.\255\ Sheriff Baca was also asked if he was familiar
with George Torres. He stated that he knew Torres and ``know[s]
him to be a legitimate businessman.'' \256\ As he himself
conceded, Sheriff Baca, the top law enforcement officer in Los
Angeles County, should have known if a businessman of Horacio
Vignali's or George Torres' caliber was alleged to have been
involved in drug dealing.\257\ Therefore, it is troubling that
Baca is completely unaware of the allegations against Vignali
and Torres. It appears that rather than investigate these
allegations against Horacio Vignali and close down what might
have been a major conduit for drugs into the Los Angeles area,
Sheriff Baca maintained a warm relationship with Vignali and
vouched for him as a ``man of the highest integrity and
trustworthiness.'' Indeed, Baca held three fundraisers at
Vignali's C&H Body Shop, which itself was alleged to be a locus
for unloading drugs and outfitting vehicles for smuggling
drugs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\254\ Telephone Interview with Leroy Baca, Sheriff, County of Los
Angeles (June 22, 2001).
\255\ Id.
\256\ Id.
\257\ According to a November 10, 1992, DEA report, the gang
enforcement unit at the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department
discovered that a vehicle used by Carlos Vignali was registered to a
company that owned cars ``associated with various gangs.'' DEA Document
Production V-DEA-00024 (DEA-6, Report of Investigation, ``Carlos Anibal
Vignali,'' (Nov. 10, 1992)) (Exhibit 29).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Committee staff also asked Alejandro Mayorkas whether he
was aware of allegations that Horacio Vignali was involved in
drug trafficking.\258\ Mayorkas expressed great surprise that
Horacio Vignali was the subject of these kinds of
allegations.\259\ When informed of the allegations, Mayorkas
immediately stated that if he had been aware of the
allegations, he would have ruled out any possibility of
involvement in Carlos Vignali's clemency petition. Mayorkas
also confirmed that it would not have mattered to him that the
allegations against Horacio Vignali were not proven. Mayorkas
stated that ``an allegation is enough--the world consists of
the caught and the uncaught. Allegations alone would have
eliminated the possibility [of my involvement].'' \260\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\258\ Telephone Interview with Alejandro Mayorkas, former U.S.
Attorney for the Central District of California, Department of Justice
(June 15, 2001).
\259\ Id.
\260\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mayorkas conceded that he did not exercise any due
diligence regarding the Vignalis prior to his weighing in on
the clemency proceedings with the White House.\261\ In other
words, he did not consult his criminal chief or the head of his
narcotics division at the Los Angeles-area U.S. Attorney's
Office to determine whether his own office had an investigative
or prosecutorial interest in the Vignalis, which might have
conflicted with his assistance to the Vignalis.\262\ Mayorkas
explained that his failure to conduct due diligence resulted
from his belief that he was not supporting Carlos Vignali's
clemency petition. Since he did not view himself as providing
support for the grant of clemency, Mayorkas did not believe
that he needed to investigate Vignali's background. However
given what he knows in hindsight about the Vignalis and about
how his call to the White House was interpreted by White House
staff, Mayorkas conceded it was perhaps an error for him to
have taken his involvement in the clemency proceedings so
lightly.\263\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\261\ Id.
\262\ Id.
\263\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While Mayorkas' acceptance of responsibility is
commendable, his actions in this matter remain less than
commendable, especially for the top federal prosecutor in Los
Angeles. Mayorkas has explained that his actions in this matter
were motivated by his sympathy and compassion for a father who
appeared to be distraught by the imprisonment of his son.
Because he failed to conduct due diligence and look into
Horacio Vignali's background before contacting the White House,
Mayorkas ended up providing assistance to a man who was alleged
to be a drug dealer and the source of cocaine for his son. Like
Sheriff Baca, Mayorkas was a senior law enforcement official
charged with protecting his communities. By becoming involved
in the Vignali matter without being fully aware of the facts,
both did the public a profound disservice to the rule of law.
There is no indication that the White House was ever made
aware of the additional allegations against Horacio and Carlos
Vignali. Unlike many other last-minute pardons and
commutations, the Vignali commutation was filed with and
processed by the Justice Department. Although the Vignali
petition was filed with the Justice Department in August
1998,\264\ there is no indication that the Justice Department
discovered these allegations against Horacio and Carlos Vignali
during its background check. The memorandum prepared by the
Pardon Attorney, Roger Adams, for President Clinton makes no
mention of these allegations. There is also no indication that
they were provided to the White House in any other form.
However, it is possible that the White House would have learned
about these allegations if it had reached out to the prosecutor
who had tried Vignali's case or the judge who sentenced him.
Rather, they reached out to Horacio Vignali's friends and
associates in Los Angeles who knew little about the Vignali
case but were ready to provide a favorable reference.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\264\ NARA Document Production (Petition for Commutation of
Sentence) (Exhibit 10).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Therefore, the failure of the White House to receive this
information appears to be the result of the skewed, ad hoc
system set up by President Clinton to churn out pardons and
commutations in the waning days of his presidency. This was a
system that necessarily catered to the wealthy and the well-
connected. If White House staff had approached the Vignali
matter in a deliberate manner and had spoken to the individuals
who knew the most about Carlos Vignali's conviction, they
likely would have learned this information. While it is not
certain that this information regarding the drug dealing
allegations against Horacio and Carlos Vignali would have
changed President Clinton's mind, it clearly should have been
considered.
C. The White House's Review of Vignali's Clemency Request
Carlos Vignali's clemency petition was first filed with the
Justice Department in August 1998, but it first came under
serious consideration much later, in December 2000, when Hugh
Rodham was hired by the Vignali family and approached the White
House about a grant of clemency for Carlos Vignali. Rodham's
contacts with the White House started a process culminating in
the January 20, 2001, commutation of Vignali's sentence. The
process by which the White House considered the Vignali
petition was remarkable and disturbing for a number of reasons:
Hugh Rodham made a number of misrepresentations to
the White House regarding the Vignali matter. Nevertheless, the
White House continued to rely on his word and granted the
commutation he so desperately sought.
The White House sought input from a number of
Vignali's supporters yet never contacted the prosecutors who
tried the Vignali case or the judge who sentenced him.
The White House ignored the strenuous objections
lodged by the Pardon Attorney who had considered the position
of the prosecutors who tried the Vignali case.
The White House apparently relied heavily on letters
and statements of support by California politicians and law
enforcement figures despite the fact that they either misstated
the Vignali case or were completely unaware of the facts of the
case.
The White House has subsequently misstated the facts
of Vignali's case in an attempt to justify the unjustifiable.
1. Hugh Rodham's Hiring
In connection with its investigation, the Committee
requested that Hugh Rodham produce records to the Committee and
participate in an interview with Committee staff. Rodham
refused both requests, citing attorney-client privilege. Rodham
made a blanket invocation of the privilege even though the
privilege does not apply to the vast majority of Rodham's
activities. For example, Rodham's contacts with third parties,
like White House staff, are not covered by the attorney-client
privilege. Therefore, by using the attorney-client privilege to
avoid any inquiry from the Committee, Rodham is simply seeking
to avoid questions about his activities rather than to protect
any legitimately privileged information. Despite Rodham's
unreasonable invocation of privilege, the Committee was able to
piece together a number of Rodham's activities.
It appears that the Vignalis hired Rodham late in 2000.
According to Luis Valenzuela, a close friend of Horacio
Vignali,\265\ James Casso, the son-in-law and former district
director of former Congressman Esteban Torres, introduced
Horacio Vignali to Rodham sometime around October 2000.\266\ At
that time, Valenzuela attended a dinner at Barrangas restaurant
in Los Angeles where he met with Horacio Vignali, Casso,
Rodham, and three members of the Lum family.\267\ The Lums were
seeking presidential pardons through Hugh Rodham at that time,
and it is possible Rodham introduced the Lums to Horacio
Vignali as a way of marketing his services. After dinner, the
Lums left the restaurant, and Horacio Vignali discussed his
son's clemency matter with Rodham.\268\ At that point, Horacio
Vignali explained the background of his son's underlying
conviction and provided Rodham with a binder of materials
regarding his son.\269\ Rodham indicated that he would review
the matter, ``make some calls,'' and get back to Horacio
Vignali.\270\ For that initial consultation, Rodham charged
Horacio Vignali $4,200.\271\ Valenzuela was not privy to any
further meetings or discussions between Rodham and
Vignali.\272\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\265\ Valenzuela is a Los Angeles-area real estate executive and a
member of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus Institute.
\266\ Telephone Interview with Luis Valenzuela, Vice President, NAI
Capital Commercial Real Estate Services (Oct. 30, 2001). Presently,
Casso, who served as Congressman Torres' district director until
Torres' retirement in 1999 and unsuccessfully ran for Congress, is an
attorney with the Los Angeles firm of Alavarez-Glasman & Colvin.
\267\ Id. According to Valenzuela, Nora Lum, her sister, Kathy
Nojima, and her daughter, Nickie, attended the dinner. Because Gene Lum
was then in prison for a tax evasion conviction, he was apparently
unable to attend the dinner. According to Valenzuela, Casso might have
represented the Lums on various real estate matters. Gene and Nora Lum,
who operated an Oklahoma natural-gas pipeline company, received 10-
month sentences after pleading guilty in October 1997 to funneling
$50,000 in illegal contributions to the 1994 re-election campaign of
Senator Edward Kennedy and to an unsuccessful congressional campaign in
Oklahoma. Federal Document Clearing House, Department of Justice, New
Jersey Attorney Sentenced in Campaign Finance Case, Oct. 12, 2000
(summarizing Campaign Task Force prosecutions). They admitted making
the donations through ``straw donors,'' including their daughter and
Michael Brown, son of the late Commerce Secretary Ron Brown. The
fundraisers gave Michael Brown thousands of dollars in shareholder fees
and corporate perks, and Brown then gave the money to friends to give
to Kennedy's re-election campaign.
\268\ Telephone Interview with Luis Valenzuela, Vice President, NAI
Capital Commercial Real Estate Services (Oct. 30, 2001).
\269\ Id.
\270\ Id.
\271\ Id. See also City National Bank Document Production (Check
from Horacio C. and Luz C. Vignali to Rodham & Fine, P.A. for $4,200.00
(Nov. 22, 2000)) (Exhibit 30).
\272\ Telephone Interview with Luis Valenzuela, Vice President, NAI
Capital Commercial Real Estate Services (Oct. 30, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Due to the refusal of Horacio Vignali, Hugh Rodham, and
James Casso to cooperate with the Committee, little is known
about the agreement that was reached between Rodham and Vignali
after the Barrangas dinner. What is clear is that Rodham agreed
to help Carlos Vignali obtain a commutation from President
Clinton, and that Horacio Vignali agreed to pay $200,000 to
Rodham, contingent on Rodham's success in getting Carlos
Vignali out of prison.
Horacio Vignali paid Rodham on January 23, 2001, three days
after Carlos Vignali received his commutation. Vignali's bank
records make it appear that Vignali originally wrote a check
for $200,000 to Rodham & Fine, Rodham's law firm, but then
converted those funds into a cashier's check.\273\ That
cashier's check was purchased by Maria Cisneros, the office
manager for Horacio Vignali's Morvis Corvis Corporation.\274\
It is unknown whether Vignali altered his payment method at
Rodham's request. Hugh Rodham deposited the funds on January
24, 2001.\275\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\273\ See Turnberry Bank Document Production (Check from Horacio C.
and Luz C. Vignali to Rodham & Fine for $200,000 (Jan. 23, 2001))
(Exhibit 31); City National Bank Document Production (Application for
Cashier's Check (Jan. 23, 2001)) (Exhibit 32); First Union Document
Production (Deposit Slip and Cashier's Check for $200,000 (Jan. 26,
2001)) (Exhibit 33).
\274\ See City National Bank Document Production (Application for
Cashier's Check (Jan. 23, 2001)) (Exhibit 31); City National Bank
Document Production (Morvis Corvis Business Account Agreement (Mar. 5,
2001)) (Exhibit 34) (describing Maria Cisneros as ``office manager'').
\275\ First Union Document Production (Deposit Slip and Cashier's
Check for $200,000 (Jan. 26, 2001)) (Exhibit 33). In several contexts,
Valenzuela appears to have been involved in funding Horacio Vignali's
payment to Rodham. On January 12, 2001, Horacio Vignali wrote a check
for $200,000 to City National Bank. On the memo of that check, Vignali
noted ``CC: Luis Valenzuela.'' See City National Bank Document
Production (Exhibit 35). In a separate transaction, on January 26,
2001, a cashier's check for $200,000 was purchased, apparently on
Horacio Vignali's behalf, and made payable to Luis Valenzuela. See City
National Bank Document Production (Exhibit 36). It appears that the
check was later endorsed by Cisneros and ultimately deposited into
Horacio's personal account. Accordingly, it appears that Vignali
contemplated paying Valenzuela but changed his mind. See City National
Bank Document Production (Deposit Slip for $200,000 (Jan. 26, 2001))
(Exhibit 37). In an interview with Committee staff, Valenzuela did not
know that his name had been put on the checks until after it was done
and, in any case, never came into possession of any of the money.
Telephone Interview with Luis Valenzuela, Vice President, NAI Capital
Commercial Real Estate Services (Oct. 30, 2001). But, Valenzuela
speculated that his name appeared on both instruments because Vignali
probably intended for him to act as an escrow agent for the money if/
when Carlos Vignali was released. According to Valenzuela, this was
probably done ``so the representation could be made to [Hugh Rodham]
that the money was in escrow.'' Valenzuela believes that such a
representation was made only because ``[Horacio] is a very cautious
guy.'' Valenzuela believes that he was designated as an escrow agent
without having been notified only because he and Horacio are ``like
brothers.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
By December 2000, Hugh Rodham was apparently actively
working on Carlos Vignali's clemency petition. This is
evidenced by a December 9, 2000, letter to Rodham wherein
Horacio Vignali forwarded a number of letters of support for
Carlos Vignali.\276\ The letter begins, ``[p]ursuant to your
conversation with Jaime Casso, I am enclosing the testimonial
letters I have been able to secure as of today.'' \277\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\276\ NARA Document Production (Letter from Horacio Vignali to Hugh
Rodham (Dec. 9, 2000)) (Exhibit 14).
\277\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Hugh Rodham's Initial Approach to the White
House
In mid-December 2000, Rodham first approached Bruce Lindsey
regarding the Vignali case. It appears that Lindsey was
Rodham's main White House contact. Chief of Staff John Podesta
testified that he did not know Hugh Rodham was advocating
Carlos Vignali's petition. White House Counsel Beth Nolan
equivocated about her knowledge of Hugh Rodham's involvement.
Specifically, Nolan answered, ``I don't think I knew that, but
I may have known that.'' \278\ Lindsey explained his
interactions with Rodham in the Committee's March 1, 2001,
hearing:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\278\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Congress 412
(Mar. 1, 2001).
Mr. Rodham called to ask me to take a look at a
commutation application for Carlos Vignali, indicated
that he was a first-time offender, that his application
was supported by the Sheriff of Los Angeles County,
that it was supported by the U.S. Attorney in Los
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Angeles.
* * *
[H]e also told me it was supported by the trial
attorney who actually tried the case in Minnesota. That
turned out probably not to be correct.
* * *
[He] [t]old me it was supported by the U.S. Attorney in
Los Angeles, by the Sheriff of Los Angeles County, by
the Cardinal Archbishop Diocese and Archdiocese in Los
Angeles, Cardinal Mahoney, by several Congressmen,
former Congressmen, city council people. . . . I
indicated to him that it was--that he had served six
years approximately. I indicated to Mr. Rodham that
that was the kind of application the President actually
was interested in looking at. He was interested in
looking at first-time drug offenders who did not play
major roles in the crime and that we would take a look
at it.\279\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\279\ Id. at 361-62.
Based on Bruce Lindsey's testimony, in his initial
presentation to Lindsey, Rodham made a number of serious
misrepresentations. First, he claimed that Vignali was a first-
time offender. As described above, this is plainly false
because Vignali had two prior convictions and two other
arrests. In addition, Vignali was an admitted gang member.
Second, when Rodham told Lindsey that Vignali was a ``first-
time drug offender who did not play a major role in the
crime,'' Rodham misstated the case against Vignali. As
explained above, Vignali was a major source of cocaine and was
sentenced accordingly. Third, Rodham informed Lindsey that the
Vignali petition was ``supported by the trial attorney who
actually tried the case in Minnesota.'' While Lindsey could
bring himself only to concede that Rodham's statement was
``probably not correct,'' it is, in fact, utterly false.\280\
The only question is whether Rodham's lie was his own creation,
calculated to mislead the White House or whether he was fed the
lie by the Vignalis or others working on their behalf. Rodham's
lie regarding the position of the Minnesota U.S. Attorney's
office was no small matter. It was apparently passed on by
Lindsey to Meredith Cabe and Eric Angel, the White House
lawyers working on the pardon. Both noted they had originally
believed that the prosecutors supported the commutation and
then learned that their information was not accurate.\281\
Rodham's misinformation also found its way into White House
documents analyzing the Vignali matter. In a chart dated
January 9, 2001, a White House staffer stated that ``acc. to
representatives, U.S. Atty in Minneapolis (who prosecuted him)
supports [clemency.]'' \282\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\280\ There are only three possible prosecutors Rodham could have
been referring to: Todd Jones, Andrew Dunne, or Denise Reilly.
Committee staff interviewed Jones and Reilly, and they were strongly
opposed to the commutation. Committee staff were not able to interview
Dunne, but Jones informed Committee staff that Dunne helped him prepare
the Minnesota U.S. Attorney Office's formal opposition to the Vignali
commutation. Therefore, it is certain that he opposed the commutation
as well. It is clear now that no attorney involved in prosecuting
Vignali supported the commutation, and it was just as clear when Hugh
Rodham made his misrepresentation to the White House.
\281\ Interview with Meredith Cabe, former Associate Counsel to the
President, the White House (Mar. 16, 2001).
\282\ NARA Document Production (chart of former Associate White
House Counsel Eric Angel) at 6 (Exhibit 38).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After Lindsey spoke to Rodham, Lindsey referred the Vignali
matter to Meredith Cabe, the Associate White House Counsel
responsible for clemency issues. Cabe conducted a brief review
of the two-page clemency petition but did not read any of the
appendices submitted with the petition.\283\ Cabe also stated
that she frequently received materials from Lindsey regarding
the Vignali case.\284\ Presumably, Lindsey received these
materials from Hugh Rodham and other outsiders interested in
the Vignali case.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\283\ Interview with Meredith Cabe, former Associate Counsel to the
President, the White House (Mar. 16, 2001).
\284\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite Hugh Rodham's efforts to mislead, the White House
was able to obtain accurate information about Carlos Vignali.
Thanks to the Pardon Attorney, the White House learned that
Carlos Vignali had prior convictions and that the U.S. Attorney
in Minnesota opposed his commutation. However, it is surprising
that having caught Hugh Rodham providing patently false
information, the White House staff would go ahead and recommend
that Rodham's client receive a commutation anyway.
3. The Justice Department's Input on the Vignali Case
Long before the Vignali case was brought to the White
House's attention by Hugh Rodham, staff in the Justice
Department Pardon Attorney's office had been considering the
Vignali petition. The petition was initially filed with the
Department in August 1998. Some point after that date, the
Pardon Attorney's office conducted a background investigation
of Vignali. Such a report would typically involve contacts with
the prosecutors and FBI, a review of a report from the Bureau
of Prisons, the presentence report, and the judgment and
commitment order.\285\ In the fall of 2000, the Pardon Attorney
forwarded a draft report to the Deputy Attorney General
recommending the denial of Vignali's clemency petition. A staff
member of the Deputy Attorney General would typically review
the Pardon Attorney's recommendation and provide the Pardon
Attorney's recommendation and her own comments to the Deputy
Attorney General for his review. The Deputy Attorney General
could then sign off on the Pardon Attorney's recommendation and
provide it to the President for his consideration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\285\ Interview with Deborah Smolover, Associate Deputy Attorney
General, Department of Justice (Mar. 12, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, the usual Justice Department process was not
followed in the Vignali case. In November 2000, the White House
instructed the Deputy Attorney General's office to stop sending
recommendations for clemency denials to the President.\286\ The
White House told the Deputy Attorney General's office that it
was interested in favorable clemency recommendations,
specifically favorable pardon recommendations, and to place a
priority on forwarding such favorable recommendations to the
White House.\287\ As a result of this directive, the Deputy
Attorney General stopped forwarding to the White House negative
clemency recommendations prepared by the Pardon Attorney.\288\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\286\ Id.
\287\ Id.
\288\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This was almost the fate of the Pardon Attorney's report
regarding Carlos Vignali. At some point in the fall of 2000,
the Pardon Attorney prepared a report that strongly recommended
against the Vignali commutation.\289\ The report was forwarded
to the Deputy Attorney General's office, where it was reviewed
by Deborah Smolover, the Associate Deputy Attorney General
responsible for supervision of the Office of the Pardon
Attorney. Smolover stated that the Vignali report was not
signed off on by the Deputy Attorney General or forwarded to
the White House because it fell into the category of reports
that the White House staff had earlier said it did not want to
receive--negative clemency recommendations.\290\ However, after
an inquiry from the Pardon Attorney, Roger Adams, Smolover sent
the Vignali report back to Adams and told him that he could
sign off on the memo and send it to the White House.\291\ Adams
believed it was important for the Justice Department to be on
the record as opposed to the Vignali commutation, so he signed
the memo and sent it to the White House on January 12,
2001.\292\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\289\ Id.
\290\ Id.
\291\ Interview with Roger Adams, Pardon Attorney, Department of
Justice (Feb. 27, 2001).
\292\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The failure of the Deputy Attorney General to sign off on
the recommendation against the Vignali commutation is
disturbing. Deborah Smolover could not recall any cases other
than Vignali's where the Pardon Attorney, rather than the
Deputy Attorney General, signed off on a recommendation
memorandum.\293\ Moreover, she did not ascribe any significance
to the fact that Pardon Attorney Roger Adams, rather than Eric
Holder, signed it. However, Roger Adams stated that Holder
refused to sign two or three denial recommendations because he
``didn't want to sign any more denials.'' \294\ But, Smolover
stated that Holder would not have allowed Adams to send any
recommendation with which he did not agree to the White
House.\295\ In addition, Smolover could not offer any
reasonable explanation why Holder refused to sign the denial
recommendation at issue but allowed Adams to send it to the
White House under Adams' own signature. In the Marc Rich case,
Holder's actions made it clear that he was attempting to please
his superiors in the White House while trying to maintain some
credibility as a prosecutor serious about law and order. He
failed miserably in the Rich case, first by failing to warn
prosecutors that the Rich case was being considered and then by
taking the position that he was ``neutral, leaning towards
favorable'' on the pardon if it helped the Middle East peace
process. It appears that Holder took a similarly irresolute
position in the Vignali case--allowing his subordinate to
oppose the Vignali commutation while refusing to go on the
record against a commutation the President apparently wanted to
grant and the President's own brother-in-law supported.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\293\ Interview with Deborah Smolover, Associate Deputy Attorney
General, Department of Justice (Mar. 12, 2001).
\294\ Interview with Roger Adams, Pardon Attorney, Department of
Justice (Feb. 27, 2001).
\295\ Interview with Deborah Smolover, Associate Deputy Attorney
General, Department of Justice (Mar. 12, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The report recommending against the Vignali commutation was
an important one. For the first time, it made the White House
aware of a number of key facts in the Vignali case,\296\
including Vignali's role in the offense and the basis for his
sentencing. Adams pointed out that Vignali had two prior
convictions and two prior arrests and that he had not disclosed
the arrests on his petition, as was required. Adams included in
his report the opposition of the Minnesota U.S. Attorney's
Office:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\296\ NARA Document Production (Report to the President on Proposed
Denial of Executive Clemency for Carlos Anibal Vignali, Jr. (Jan. 12,
2001)) (Exhibit 4). Adams noted that ``Petitioner's defense counsel
used th[e] fact [that he was the sole Hispanic charged] to argue his
client's innocence to the jury, characterizing the case as involving a
`black drug dealing network,' and emphasizing that petitioner was not
black.''
United States Attorney B. Todd Jones strongly opposes
clemency for petitioner, noting that petitioner's
persistent claims of innocence are undermined by [the]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
strength of the evidence presented against him:
Th[e] testimony [of the cooperating
coconspirators] was consistent and
independently corroborated by Title III
wiretap interceptions, search warrant
evidence and police surveillance. The
evidence clearly established that
Carlos Vignali, Jr., was a member of
the charged drug conspiracy and
facilitated the distribution of
narcotics in the Twin Cities by
supplying Evans, Williams and Hopson
with substantial quantities of cocaine
from Los Angeles, California.
Mr. Jones noted that the two main cooperating
coconspirators, Williams and Evans, received sentences
of 180 months and 95 months respectively. He concluded
by stating:
The sentence imposed by Judge Doty
reflects the seriousness of the
defendant's role in a large scale
narcotics conspiracy as the California
source of cocaine to Evans, Williams,
and Hopson. To my knowledge Vignali has
refused to accept personal
responsibility for his criminal
activities and has never expressed
sincere remorse for his conduct. In
light of the exacting standards
generally applicable in pardon cases,
this case does not warrant such a
commutation.\297\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\297\ Id.
After quoting the Minnesota U.S. Attorney, Roger Adams offered
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
his position on the Vignali commutation:
In applying for clemency, petitioner has to a large
degree merely recycled arguments already rejected by
the jury and courts. He continues to deny his guilt,
and his petition contains misleading statements and
misstatements of fact. As for his allegation that he
has no connection to Minnesota, the jury convicted him
of the offense of supplying large quantities of cocaine
to distributors in that state. Moreover, his contention
that his sentence is excessive fails in light of the
sentencing record, which establishes that the district
court accorded him leniency in refusing to adopt two
enhancements recommended by the presentence report. For
all these reasons, I recommend that you deny his
petition.\298\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\298\ Id.
It appears that the Pardon Attorney's report had an impact
on the White House staff. Next to the portion of the report
discussing Judge Doty's sentence of Vignali, a White House
staffer wrote a note reading, ``He recommended other cases--was
he contacted?'' \299\ Apparently, members of the White House
staff were aware that Judge Doty recommended commutations for
Serena Nunn and Kim Willis, making his opposition to the
Vignali commutation even more significant. Despite this inquiry
from a White House staffer, Judge Doty was never contacted.
More importantly, at the end of Roger Adams' report, a White
House staffer wrote, ``Need to XC for Bruce. Definitely isn't
simply making a loan--& do we believe the gang thing? USA is
actually against--maybe we shd call & ck the recs we've been
told of?'' \300\ Apparently, the report dispelled any beliefs
the White House might have had regarding Carlos Vignali's story
that the $25,000 he had been paid was simply payback on a loan
he had made to friends. The notation ``USA is actually
against--maybe we shd call & ck the recs we've been told of''
indicates that the Adams report was the first clear enunciation
received by the White House that the Minnesota U.S. Attorney
was actually opposed to the commutation. It also indicates that
learning of this fact cast some doubt on other information that
had been shared with the White House, likely by Hugh Rodham.
Despite the clear doubts expressed by the White House staffer's
notes on the Adams memo, apparently little was done to follow
up on those doubts. The White House staff never followed up
with either the prosecutors or the judge in the Vignali case.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\299\ Id.
\300\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. The Final Decision on the Vignali Commutation
a. Contacts Between the White House and
Interested Parties
In addition to reviewing the Pardon Attorney's comments on
the Vignali commutation petition, White House staff contacted a
number of individuals regarding Vignali. First, Meredith Cabe
recalls that Representative Xavier Becerra was advocating for
the Vignali commutation. \301\ According to other White House
staff, Representative Becerra ``peppered'' the White House with
calls on Vignali's behalf.\302\ Together with her colleague
Eric Angel, Cabe also spoke to U.S. Attorney Alejandro
Mayorkas. According to Cabe, Mayorkas said he supported the
petition but admitted he was not familiar with the details of
the case.\303\ Cabe also recalls that Mayorkas stated that most
drug sentences were disproportionate and that this one likely
was as well.\304\ Eric Angel recalls that Mayorkas expressed
support for the Vignali family and opined that Carlos Vignali
would have a strong support network if he were released. Angel
also recalled that Mayorkas made general comments about the
length of Vignali's sentence and a statement to the effect that
``a lot of these sentences are too long and this one was long
too.'' \305\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\301\ Interview with Meredith Cabe, former Associate Counsel to the
President, the White House (Mar. 16, 2001).
\302\ Richard Serrano and Stephen Braun, Working the American
System, L.A. Times, Apr. 29, 2001, at A1.
\303\ Interview with Meredith Cabe, former Associate Counsel to the
President, the White House (Mar. 16, 2001).
\304\ Id.
\305\ Interview with Eric Angel, former Associate Counsel to the
President, the White House (Mar. 28, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In an interview with Committee staff, Dawn Woollen, Deputy
White House Counsel Bruce Lindsey's administrative assistant,
conceded that she wrote a note to Lindsey that indicated, among
other things, that ``Sheriff Baca from LA is more than happy to
speak with you about him but is uncomfortable writing a letter
offering his full support.'' \306\ According to Woollen, her
note reflected a telephone conversation with Hugh Rodham around
early January 2001.\307\ Within a week of having spoken with
Hugh Rodham, Woollen ``very briefly'' spoke to Sheriff Baca
about the Vignali matter.\308\ Originally, Sheriff Baca left a
telephone message for Lindsey, but, as per Lindsey's request,
Woollen returned Baca's call.\309\ During that conversation,
according to Woollen, Sheriff Baca ``expressed his support for
the Vignali commutation.'' \310\ According to Woollen, Baca
also told her he was uncomfortable writing a letter offering
his full support for the petition but did not say why.\311\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\306\ Interview with Dawn Woollen, Administrative Assistant to
Deputy White House Counsel Bruce Lindsey, the White House (Sept. 25,
2001). NARA Document Production (Handwritten Note from Woollen to
Lindsey) (Exhibit 22).
\307\ Interview with Dawn Woollen, Administrative Assistant to
Deputy White House Counsel Bruce Lindsey, the White House (Sept. 25,
2001).
\308\ Id. This conversation with Sheriff Baca was the witness' only
conversation with Sheriff Baca about the Vignali clemency matter.
\309\ Id.
\310\ Id. With Committee staff, Woollen was unequivocal about her
understanding about Baca's support for the petition. When asked by
Committee staff what the specific basis was for her understanding as to
Baca's position, Woollen replied, ``Sheriff Baca said that he supported
[the commutation].'' Woollen further stated that ``it was clear that
Sheriff Baca was supporting the commutation.''
\311\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Contrary to statements Baca has made to this Committee,
according to Woollen, at no point during his conversation with
her did he say that he was unfamiliar with the facts associated
with Vignali's clemency petition or cite any unfamiliarity with
the underlying conviction as a basis for not commenting on
Vignali's clemency petition.\312\ Finally, according to
Woollen, Sheriff Baca did not express any support for Carlos
Vignali's father or even mention the name ``Horacio.'' \313\
The degree to which Baca and Woolen disagree about the nature
of their conversation gives rise to serious concern.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\312\ Id.
\313\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite the general nature of the White House's discussions
with Mayorkas and Baca, their support has been described as
being important in the decision to grant clemency to Vignali.
Cabe understood the qualifications offered by Mayorkas but
still viewed his support as ``significant'' because ``few
prosecutors advocate clemency in any form.'' \314\ Similarly,
Bruce Lindsey stated:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\314\ Interview with Meredith Cabe, former Associate Counsel to the
President, the White House (Mar. 16, 2001).
I originally was probably negative. . . . But after I
received a call from the sheriff of Los Angeles and our
office reached out to the U.S. Attorney in the central
district of California and Los Angeles, I decided that
given the community support and their position that
into the county in which he would go to live, that they
would be aware of the crime situation, if you will, in
their community, and if they were not concerned about
him coming back to their community, that I thought it
was an appropriate commutation.\315\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\315\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Congress 426
(Mar. 1, 2001).
The White House's reliance on the support for the
commutation voiced by Baca and Mayorkas should be juxtaposed
against the fact that the White House made no attempt to speak
to the prosecutors or judge involved in the Vignali case. Judge
David Doty, who sentenced Vignali, has stated that he was
surprised by the commutation \316\ and that, if the White House
had contacted him, he would have argued against a commutation
for Vignali.\317\ Judge Doty believes Vignali was an unsuitable
candidate for clemency first because his sentence was
appropriate: ``Carlos deserved what he got . . . I hit him in
the middle, not in the low end. . . . And I didn't max him
out.'' \318\ Judge Doty also noted that Vignali was not a
small-time offender: ``[He] provided funds to the conspiracy,
provided places and was involved in the direct transfers. He
was a big player. He was one of the top two or three
defendants.'' \319\ Judge Doty also pointed out that Carlos
Vignali had never admitted his crime, noting that Vignali ``was
non-repentant.'' Even after I sentenced him, he claimed he had
been railroaded.'' \320\ Judge Doty's strong position against
the Vignali commutation is even more significant given his
longstanding opposition to mandatory minimum sentences for drug
offenses and his support for clemency for two other drug
offenders he had sentenced.\321\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\316\ Los Angeles Cardinal Regrets Role in Pardon, N.Y. Times, Feb.
13, 2001, at A26.
\317\ Drug Kingpin's Release Adds to Clemency Uproar, L.A. Times,
Feb. 11, 2001, at A1.
\318\ Bob von Sternberg and Pam Louwagie, Judge Who Sentenced
Dealer in Minnesota Questions Clemency, Star Trib. (Minneapolis, MN)
Feb. 15, 2001, at A1.
\319\ Richard Serrano and Stephen Braun, Vignali Case Built on
Informants, Wiretaps, L.A. Times, Feb. 15, 20001, at A1.
\320\ Richard Serrano and Stephen Braun, Drug Kingpin's Release
Adds to Clemency Uproar, L.A. Times, Feb. 11, 2001, at A1.
\321\ Bob von Sternberg and Pam Louwagie, Tale of a Prodigal
Father, Star Trib. (Minneapolis, MN) Feb. 18, 2001, at A1; Bob von
Sternberg and Pam Louwagie, Judge Who Sentenced Dealer in Minnesota
Questions Clemency, Star Trib. (Minneapolis, MN) Feb. 15, 2001, at A1.
Judge Doty wrote in support of grants of clemency for Serena Nunn and
Kim Allen Willis, two small-time drug offenders who had been sentenced
to 15 year terms in prison. Judge Doty as well as prosecutors and
investigators involved in the Nunn and Willis cases agreed that they
were truly low-level drug offenders who had been caught up in a larger
conspiracy and were suitable candidates for clemency.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Similarly, the White House never consulted the lawyers who
prosecuted Vignali. Meredith Cabe stated that she did not
consult with the prosecutors because the Justice Department had
already been in contact with them and their position on the
commutation was already clear. However, Cabe's explanation is
less than satisfactory. Just because the White House knew that
the prosecuting office opposed a grant of clemency for Vignali
did not eliminate the need to actually speak to the prosecutors
who had tried the case. If the White House staff had discussed
the grant of clemency with the U.S. Attorney or his staff, it
is possible that the prosecutors could have explained the scope
of Vignali's drug-dealing activities, his utter lack of
remorse, or the suspicions regarding his other drug-dealing
activities or those suspected of his father.
b. Contacts Between the White House and Hugh
Rodham
In the final days of the Clinton Administration, it appears
that Hugh Rodham had several contacts with White House staff
about the Vignali matter. Rodham spoke to Bruce Lindsey twice
more about Vignali after his initial conversation in December
2000 and Meredith Cabe once about Vignali. Rodham's counsel
described the two subsequent contacts with Bruce Lindsey as
follows: ``he subsequently submitted and discussed letters of
recommendation, and he made a final follow up inquiry.'' \322\
Meredith Cabe stated that Rodham called her about the Lums, for
whom Rodham had been requesting executive clemency, and brought
up Vignali.\323\ Cabe recalled that Rodham was concerned that
the White House was getting bad information about Vignali and
believed that someone had accused Vignali of being in a
gang.\324\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\322\ Letter from Nancy Luque, Counsel for Hugh Rodham, Reed Smith,
to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Feb. 28,
2001) at 2 (within Appendix I).
\323\ Interview with Meredith Cabe, former Associate Counsel to the
President, the White House (Mar. 16, 2001).
\324\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
No one on the White House staff has made it clear how
Rodham's lobbying was viewed by the President or his staff. In
their defense, White House staff have claimed that they never
figured out that Rodham represented Vignali or was receiving a
large fee from Vignali for his work. When questioned in a
Committee hearing, Lindsey was vague about whether the
President was informed about Rodham's role in the Vignali
matter:
Mr. LaTourette. I am interested in what took place in
front of the President, and the meeting that you
remember, Ms. Nolan, whether these guys were there or
weren't there, was the fact that Hugh Rodham was
advocating this position, or was advocating that Mr.
Vignali receive a pardon [or] commutation, was that
discussed in your presence? Was Hugh Rodham's name
invoked to the President of the United States in this
meeting?
Ms. Nolan. I don't know, Mr. LaTourette.
Mr. LaTourette. How about you, Mr. Lindsey?
Mr. Lindsey. I don't recall. I don't have a specific
memory of mentioning it. I wouldn't have hesitated to
mention it. I just don't recall.
Mr. LaTourette. You don't remember. How about you, Mr.
Podesta?
Mr. Podesta. With the caveat that I gave earlier, in
the meeting I was in where Vignali was discussed, Mr.
Rodham's name did not come up.\325\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\325\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Congress 412
(Mar. 1, 2001).
The hazy recollection of senior White House staff therefore
makes it impossible to know whether Rodham's name was invoked
in the discussions that White House staff had with the
President.
c. Hugh Rodham's Invocation of First Lady
Hillary Clinton
One critically important document makes it clear that, at a
minimum, Hugh Rodham invoked the First Lady's name in lobbying
for Vignali's commutation. That document, a note handwritten by
Dawn Woollen, the administrative assistant of Deputy White
House Counsel Bruce Lindsey, states, ``Hugh says this is very
important to him and the First Lady as well as others. Sheriff
Baca from LA is more than happy to speak with you about him but
is uncomfortable writing a letter offering his full support.''
\326\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\326\ NARA Document Production (Handwritten Note from Dawn Woollen,
Administrative Assistant to Deputy Chief of Staff Bruce Lindsey, the
White House, to Bruce Lindsey, Deputy Chief of Staff, the White House)
(Exhibit 22).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In an interview with Committee staff, Woollen recalled
having spoken with Hugh Rodham about the Vignali matter on at
least five occasions.\327\ After one such conversation, around
early January 2001, Woollen wrote the previously described note
to Lindsey.\328\ When presented with that note during her
interview with Committee staff, Woollen confirmed that the note
was accurate.\329\ But, independent of what she wrote on the
note, Woollen could not recall what Rodham said about the First
Lady's knowledge of the Vignali issue.\330\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\327\ Interview with Dawn Woollen, Administrative Assistant to
Deputy Chief of Staff Bruce Lindsey, the White House (Sept. 25, 2001).
All of those conversations took place over the phone. Id.
\328\ Id.
\329\ Id.
\330\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At the very least, Woollen's note reflects attempts by Hugh
Rodham to capitalize financially on his association with the
First Family by invoking his sister's support for the Vignali
petition without her knowledge. After Hugh Rodham's role in
clemency proceedings pending before President Clinton was
publicly disclosed, Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton asserted
that she ``knew nothing about [her] brother's involvement in
these pardons'' and that she ``did not have any involvement in
the pardons that were granted or not granted.'' \331\ In fact,
when Senator Clinton was asked by the media about pardons
President Clinton granted in the final hours of his
administration, she replied, ``I was very disturbed to learn
that my brother, Hugh Rodham, received fees in connection with
two clemency applications. . . . Hugh did not speak with me
about these applications.'' \332\ When asked about President
Clinton's last-minute pardons generally, she stated, ``you'll
have to talk with people who were involved in making them, and
that leaves me out.'' \333\ Indeed, according to Senator
Clinton, her involvement in pardon matters pending before the
President was limited to passing on ``envelopes'' that were
given to her.\334\ The Woollen note leaves only two
possibilities: (1) that Hugh Rodham indeed told Hillary Clinton
about his efforts on behalf of Carlos Vignali and that Hillary
Clinton was not being candid when she stated that Hugh did not
speak to her about Vignali; or (2) Hugh Rodham was lying when
he told Woollen that the Vignali case was ``very important'' to
the First Lady. The first possibility raises serious questions
about the conduct of the former First Lady, and the second
possibility raises serious questions about the conduct of Hugh
Rodham.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\331\ Sumana Chatterjee, Hillary Clinton Addresses Pardons
Involving Brother, Campaign Aide, Knight Ridder (Washington Bureau)
Feb. 23, 2001.
\332\ James V. Grimaldi and Peter Slevin, Hillary Clinton's Brother
Was Paid for Role in 2 Pardons, Wash. Post, Feb. 22, 2001, at A1.
\333\ Jackie Judd, Senator Hillary Clinton Answers Questions About
Her Brother's Involvement in Two Presidential Pardons, ABC World News
Tonight, Feb. 22, 2001.
\334\ Sumana Chatterjee, Hillary Clinton Addresses Pardons
Involving Brother, Campaign Aide, Knight Ridder (Washington Bureau)
Feb. 23, 2001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
d. The President's Decision to Grant the
Commutation
White House staff have been vague in describing the process
the Vignali commutation went through. Cabe indicated that staff
had a mixed opinion regarding the Vignali case until the end of
the process, when they were all in agreement to recommend
Vignali for a commutation.\335\ White House documents seem to
confirm vacillation in the White House's position on the
matter. One document about the Vignali case states, ``Lean
no,'' \336\ and another states, ``STAFF: mixed(?)'' \337\ Cabe
also indicated that Vignali was considered together with a
number of other drug cases in which the defendant had been
``oversentenced.'' \338\ Cabe recalls that others in this group
were Lau Ching Chin, Derek Curry, Peter Ninemire, and Loretta
De-Ann Kaufman.\339\ These parts of Cabe's recollection are
confirmed by documents. A chart of potential pardons and
commutations maintained by Associate White House Counsel Eric
Angel with the heading ``Disparate Sentencing Commutation
Cases'' includes Vignali's name with the notations:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\335\ Interview with Meredith Cabe, former Associate Counsel to the
President, the White House (Mar. 16, 2001).
\336\ NARA Document Production (chart of ``Disparate Sentencing
Commutation Cases'') at 21 (Exhibit 39).
\337\ NARA Document Production (alternate chart of ``Disparate
Sentencing Commutation Cases'' at 11 (Exhibit 40).
\338\ Interview with Meredith Cabe, former Associate Counsel to the
President, the White House (Mar. 16, 2001).
\339\ Id.
Arg is he is not guilty--loaned $25K to a friend, which
he args was falsely interpreted to be part of drug
conspiracy; aged 24 at time of offense, with no
significant criminal record; args he had minor role;
DOJ states that petitioner was supplier for major
cocaine distribution organization and has two 1989
convictions for fighting in public place and vandalism;
1990 arrest for corporal injury to spouse or
cohabitant, dismissed. DOJ says U.S. Attorney strongly
opposes. DOJ recommends denial.\340\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\340\ NARA Document Production (Exhibit 39).
A separate column of Angel's chart discusses who supported the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Vignali commutation:
Reps. Becerra, Torres ask for ``every consideration''
because parents are friends; Council of CA State
Legislators also ask for consideration; Archbishop of
LA supports; acc. To representatives, U.S. Atty in
Minnesota (who prosecuted him) supports; LA Sheriff Lee
Baca and LA US Atty Alejandro Mayorkas support; Maria
E[chaveste] has inquired.\341\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\341\ Id.
Given President Clinton's silence regarding his pardons and
commutations, it is impossible to know which factors led to his
decision to commute Vignali's sentence. Clearly, there were a
number of outside factors contributing to the President's
decision: a White House staff generally supportive of the
decision; pressure, including misleading statements, from Hugh
Rodham; and pressure from California political figures. On
January 20, 2001, President Clinton commuted Carlos Vignali's
sentence to time served, reducing his 15-year sentence to only
about 5 years.
5. The White House Has No Justification for the Vignali
Commutation
The process by which the President actually reached the
decision to grant the Vignali commutation is still a mystery.
Apparently, the President did not reach his decision to grant
the commutation until January 19, after a meeting with his
staff. Since the President has never answered questions about
the Vignali matter, the Committee has not been able to
determine which facts influenced his decisionmaking. The
President's failure to speak out on the Vignali matter leaves a
number of key questions unanswered:
To what extent did Hugh Rodham's
representation of Carlos Vignali play a role in the
President's decision to grant Vignali's commutation?
Did First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton
support the effort to obtain the Vignali commutation?
Did the President or the First Lady know
that Rodham was being paid $200,000 for obtaining the
Vignali commutation?
When did the President make the decision to
commute Vignali's sentence and why?
In the absence of answers to these questions, the Committee
must examine the arguments offered by the White House to
justify the Vignali commutation. These arguments, set forth
below, are all spurious.
``Vignali was a minor participant in a large drug
conspiracy.'' It appears that the White House based its
decision on the belief that Vignali was only a minor
participant in the Minnesota-area drug dealing scheme. As
Lindsey testified before the Committee:
I actually believe the judge made a specific finding
that [Carlos Vignali] was responsible for five to 15
kilos, which is I think 11 to 33 pounds. I think the
total amount of money he was involved with was $2,500--
$25,000 excuse me. So I don't think it is correct that
he was responsible for $800,000; and in fact, I believe
there was a specific finding that he was not. There was
also I believe a specific finding that he was not an
organizer, leader of the conspiracy.\342\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\342\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Congress 362
(Mar. 1, 2001).
In applying the federal sentencing guidelines to Vignali's
case, Judge Doty indeed attributed five to fifteen kilograms of
cocaine to Vignali, rather than the fifteen to fifty kilograms
suggested in the pre-sentence report.\343\ Judge Doty
nevertheless enhanced Vignali's offense level because he found
that Vignali committed perjury by denying that he was involved
in the distribution of cocaine.\344\ The judge also concluded
that Vignali's role as a supplier of cocaine tended to make him
more culpable than other co-defendants.\345\ These conclusions
led the judge to give Vignali a sentence on the upper end of
the guideline range.\346\ Therefore, Bruce Lindsey's heavy
reliance on Judge Doty's finding that Vignali was responsible
for only five to fifteen kilograms of cocaine appears highly
disingenuous. Indeed, Judge Doty sentenced Vignali to 175
months imprisonment despite his belief that the evidence
adduced at trial supported a finding that Vignali supplied
between five and fifteen kilograms of cocaine. Lindsey
completely ignored the judge's finding that Vignali perjured
himself when he denied any involvement in supplying narcotics.
For Lindsey to accept that Vignali was responsible for
supplying between five and fifteen kilograms of cocaine would
have required that Lindsey accept that Vignali perjured himself
at trial and refused to accept responsibility for what he had
done. It is difficult to believe that Lindsey would recommend
that such a person be granted executive clemency.\347\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\343\ Judgment in a Criminal Case, U.S. v. Vignali (D. Minn. July
17, 1995) (Exhibit 3).
\344\ Id.
\345\ Id.
\346\ Id.
\347\ Judge Doty was never contacted by the White House about
Vignali's clemency application. L.A. Cardinal Regrets Role in Pardon,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 2001, at A26; Richard A. Serrano and Stephen
Braun, Drug Kingpin's Release Adds to Clemency Uproar, L.A. Times, Feb.
11, 2001 at A1. Referring to the Vignali commutation, Judge Doty stated
``I have no idea why it happened, but we are all aghast.'' Los Angeles
Cardinal Regrets Role in Pardon, N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 2001 at A26.
According to Judge Doty, Carlos Vignali never acknowledged
responsibility or showed remorse for his crime, ``He was non-repentant.
. . . Even after I sentenced him, he claimed he had been railroaded.''
Richard A. Serrano and Stephen Braun, Drug Kingpin's Release Adds to
Clemency Uproar, L.A. Times, Feb. 11, 2001 at A1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The White House's reliance on Judge Doty's findings
regarding the amount of cocaine Vignali supplied was
irresponsible and misleading for another reason. The judge's
finding was a highly technical decision relating to the offense
level computed under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Under
those guidelines, a different base offense level is applied if
the offender supplies between 5 and 15 kilograms of cocaine
than if he deals between 15 and 50 kilograms of cocaine. When
deciding whether to grant Vignali's clemency request, one would
think the White House would be more interested in an evaluation
of who Vignali was and what he was doing in a generalized sense
than in trying to defeat a technical application of the
sentencing guidelines. If the White House had wanted such an
evaluation, it could have turned either to the Pardon
Attorney's recommendation or the submission of the U.S.
Attorney in Minnesota. In his submission, U.S. Attorney Todd
Jones explained that Vignali was involved in a far larger
network of drug dealing than that which was alleged in the case
against Vignali in Minnesota. As former U.S. Attorney Todd
Jones noted in an interview with the Committee, ``the fact the
Vignali was convicted as a Category 1 dope dealer doesn't mean
that he's innocent, just that he was smart.'' \348\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\348\ Telephone Interview with Todd Jones, Partner, Greene Espel
(May 2, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
``Vignali's sentence was disproportionate in comparison to
his co-conspirators.'' In testimony before the Committee and in
various public statements, the White House has argued that the
leniency granted to similarly situated codefendants provided a
basis for the President's grant of clemency to Carlos Vignali.
This position is wholly without merit. A number of Carlos
Vignali's co-conspirators received leniency because they,
unlike Vignali, cooperated with law enforcement. Vignali, on
the other hand, took his chances with the jury and lost,
receiving 175 months in prison. A brief review of the sentences
given to other major defendants in the Vignali case
demonstrates that Vignali's sentence was fair and
proportionate.
Gerald Williams: Williams was convicted of
conspiring to distribute cocaine. Judge Doty found that he was
the main distributor, organizer, and leader of the drug
conspiracy. The government recommended an imprisonment term of
360 months to life, but Williams received a sentence of 120
months. Judge Doty departed from guideline range because of
``substantial and valuable assistance'' Williams provided to
law enforcement in breaking up the distribution ring.
Dale Evans: Evans was convicted of conspiring to
distribute cocaine. Evans was a California source to
distributors in Minnesota. At trial, Evans testified that he
was sending an average of one to two kilos of cocaine to
Minnesota per week during 1993. Evans obtained that cocaine
from Jonathan Gray and Vignali. The government recommended an
imprisonment term of 135-168 months, but Evans received a
sentence of 95 months. Judge Doty departed from the guideline
range because Evans provided law enforcement with ``substantial
and valuable'' assistance in breaking up the ring.
Shirley Williams: Williams was convicted of
conspiring to distribute between 15 and 50 kilos of cocaine for
finding buyers of cocaine for her son, Gerald. The government
recommended a 151-188 month term of imprisonment, but Judge
Doty sentenced Williams to 75 months in jail. Judge Doty
ordered a downward departure because of the substantial
assistance Williams provided law enforcement.
Melvin Campbell: Melvin Campbell was convicted of
using a telephone to conspire in selling cocaine. Campbell was
another California source to distributors in Minnesota. He
distributed large amounts of cocaine and cocaine paste with
Shirley and Gerald Williams and cooked crack for distribution.
The government recommended imprisonment for 12-18 months, but
Judge Doty sentenced Campbell to 48 months. He ordered an
upward departure because of Campbell's significant involvement
in the conspiracy, the substantial amount of drugs he
distributed, and his criminal history.
Jonathan Gray: Jonathan Gray was convicted of
conspiring to distribute more than 5 kilos of cocaine. In 1993,
Gray and Vignali supplied cocaine from California to Dale Evans
in Minnesota. The government recommended 151-188 months in
jail, and Judge Doty sentenced Gray to 170 months. Gray was the
defendant most similarly situated to Vignali as he was a
California source of cocaine for the Minnesota distribution
network and refused to cooperate with law enforcement. Gray's
sentence was almost identical to Vignali's.
Tony Speank: Tony Speank was convicted of conspiring
to manufacture and distribute between 1.5 and 5 kilos of
cocaine and cocaine base. The government recommended a sentence
of 210-262 months, but Judge Doty sentenced Speank to 58
months. Judge Doty granted a downward departure because of the
``substantial and valuable'' assistance Speank provided law
enforcement.
Todd Hopson: Todd Hopson was convicted of conspiring
to distribute cocaine; using facilities in interstate commerce
to promote a drug enterprise; possession with intent to
distribute and distribution of more than 5 kilos of cocaine;
and use of telephone for promotion of drug enterprise. The
government recommended 235-293 months in jail. Judge Doty
sentenced Hopson to 235 months imprisonment. Judge Doty found
that the low end of the range adequately reflected the nature
and circumstances of Hopson's offense and his past criminal
conduct.
As shown above, in those cases where Judge Doty exercised
leniency in sentencing codefendants who were at least as
culpable as was Vignali, Judge Doty specifically found that
each of those codefendants provided ``substantial and
valuable'' assistance to law enforcement. By contrast, Carlos
Vignali and Todd Hopson, both of whom were charged with
conspiring to distribute substantial amounts of cocaine and
various other federal narcotics offenses, chose not to
cooperate. Furthermore, they failed to express the least
remorse about or assume responsibility for their roles in the
distribution ring. As such, there could have been no reasonable
expectation of leniency from the sentencing judge. Accordingly,
the White House's position that Vignali's sentence was overly
harsh or disproportionate as compared with his codefendants is
wholly without merit. Having thoroughly considered the
available evidence, Judge Doty sentenced Vignali under the
applicable standards set forth under the law.
``Vignali's sentence was an unfair and overly harsh result
of mandatory minimum sentencing laws.'' Although the rationale
for President Clinton's commutation of Carlos Vignali's
sentence remains unclear, the former president has said he
believes mandatory sentences ``in many cases are too long for
nonviolent offenders.'' \349\ Documents and statements obtained
by the Committee indicate that the White House considered
Vignali's petition together with a number of other drug cases
in which the defendant had been ``oversentenced.'' \350\
Associate White House Counsel Meredith Cabe, who was
responsible for clemency matters for the White House Counsel's
Office, recalled that others in that group were Lau Ching Chin,
Derek Curry, Peter Ninemire, and Loretta DeAnn Kaufman.\351\
Cabe's appreciation that Vignali's petition was considered as a
``mandatory minimum'' case is borne out by a chart of potential
pardons and commutations maintained by Associate White House
Counsel Eric Angel, who worked with Cabe on clemency
matters.\352\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\349\ Bob von Sternberg and Pam Louwagie, Judge Who Sentenced
Dealer in Minnesota Questions Clemency; Clinton Commuted Cocaine
Supplier Carlos Vignali's Sentence, Star Trib. (Minneapolis, MN) Feb.
15, 2001.
\350\ Interview with Meredith Cabe, former Associate Counsel to
President, the White House (Mar. 16, 2001).
\351\ Id
\352\ See, e.g., NARA Document Production (chart of ``Disparate
Sentencing Commutation Cases'') (Exhibit 39).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. District Judge David Doty, who sentenced Vignali, has
long been a critic of mandatory federal sentencing guidelines
for drug offenses.\353\ In Judge Doty's view, ``most drug
sentences are exceedingly long and onerous.'' \354\ But, in
Vignali's case, Judge Doty felt that ``Carlos deserved what he
got.'' \355\ In explaining the sentence he imposed on Vignali,
Judge Doty stated, ``I based the sentence on his criminal
history score--he didn't have much. And I kicked it up because
of the amount of drugs involved.'' \356\ According to Doty, the
sentence he imposed was slightly more than the midpoint of the
guideline range.\357\ Doty observed, ``I hit him in the middle,
not in the low end. And I didn't max him out.'' \358\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\353\ Bob von Sternberg and Pam Louwagie, Judge Who Sentenced
Dealer in Minnesota Questions Clemency; Clinton Commuted Cocaine
Supplier Carlos Vignali's Sentence, Star Trib. (Minneapolis, MN) Feb.
15, 2001.
\354\ Id.
\355\ Id.
\356\ Id.
\357\ Id.
\358\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
D. The Aftermath of the Vignali Commutation
1. The Response from Hugh Rodham
The Vignali commutation proved to be almost as
controversial as the Marc Rich and Pincus Green pardons. News
of Hugh Rodham's involvement in the Vignali matter first
surfaced around February 21, 2001. Former President Clinton
issued a statement indicating that he and former First Lady
Hillary Rodham Clinton were unaware that Hugh Rodham had been
paid for his work on the Vignali and Braswell matters:
``Neither Hillary nor I had any knowledge of such payments . .
. We are deeply disturbed by these reports and have insisted
that Hugh return any monies received.'' \359\ Hillary Clinton
added, ``I was very disturbed to learn that my brother, Hugh
Rodham, received fees in connection with two clemency
applications[.] Hugh did not speak with me about these
applications.'' \360\ Rodham responded to the statement from
the former President and Senator Clinton with a statement from
his own attorney, Nancy Luque:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\359\ James V. Grimaldi and Peter Slevin, Hillary Clinton's Brother
Was Paid for Role in 2 Pardons, Wash. Post (Feb. 22, 2001) at A1.
\360\ Id.
My client, Hugh Rodham, today acceded to his family's
request that he return legal fees earned in connection
with pardon requests. My client did not advise
President or Senator Clinton of his involvement in
these requests. He believes they were unaware until
this week of his work on his client's behalf. Hugh
Rodham has done absolutely nothing wrong. He has
returned these fees solely because his family asked
that he do so. Their request, presumably made because
of the appearance of impropriety, is one he cannot
ignore. There was, however, no impropriety in these
matters.\361\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\361\ Statement by Nancy Luque, Counsel for Hugh Rodham, Reed Smith
(Feb. 21, 2001).
Luque's initial statement suggested that Rodham returned all of
the fees he was paid for obtaining the Braswell pardon and the
Vignali commutation. She soon backtracked, and conceded to the
press that he had returned only $300,000 of the fees.\362\ The
press still reported that Rodham had agreed to refund all
$434,000 he was paid by Braswell and Vignali.\363\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\362\ David Johnston, Hollywood Friend Had Clinton's Ear for 2 Late
Pardons, N.Y. Times, (Feb. 24, 2001) at A8.
\363\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, the Committee's review of Rodham's bank records
shows that as of June 2001 Rodham had returned only $280,000 of
the $434,000 he was paid for his work on the Vignali and
Braswell matters. On February 21, 2001, Rodham wrote checks for
$230,000 and $50,000 to the Coale, Cooley, Leitz, McInerny law
firm.\364\ It appears that the funds were then forwarded by the
Coale, Cooley firm to Reed Smith, Nancy Luque's law firm. Then,
on February 23, 2001, Reed Smith issued a check for $230,000 to
Glenn Braswell \365\ and a check for $50,000 to Morvis Corvis
Corporation, one of Horacio Vignali's companies.\366\ When
Luque forwarded the $50,000 to Vignali, she stated that ``a
check for the balance will be forwarded directly.'' \367\
Communications between Committee staff and Rodham's attorney
have confirmed that Rodham has not to date returned any
additional amounts and has no plans to return the remaining
$154,000 to Vignali.\368\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\364\ First Union Document Production (Check numbers 1321 and 1322
from Rodham & Fine, P.A. IOTA [sic] to Coale, Cooley Liets, McInerny &
Broadus, for $230,000.00 and $50,000, respectively) (Feb. 28, 2001))
(Exhibit 41) (in globo). John P. Coale, a name partner in Coale Cooley,
is a well-known personal injury lawyer with strong ties to the Clinton
Administration.
\365\ Reed Smith Document Production (Check from Reed Smith to
Glenn Braswell for $230,000 (Feb. 23, 2001)) (Exhibit 42).
\366\ Reed Smith Document Production (Check from Reed Smith to
Morvis Corvis Corporation for $50,000 (Feb. 23, 2001)) (Exhibit 43).
\367\ Letter from Nancy Luque, Partner, Reed Smith, to Carlos
Vignali, Morris [sic] Corvis Corp. (Feb. 21, 2001) (Exhibit 44).
\368\ In her discussions with Committee staff, Luque indicated that
she advised against refunding any of the money and that Rodham did so
against her advice. It is also interesting to note that Roger Clinton
believes that Hugh Rodham should not have been forced to return the
money:
GAnyway, Huey [Rodham] has been sort of hung out to dry,
and I want to make that clear. He is a great man. I love
him. He didn't do anything wrong. But he was just tired of
the crap. And tired of the hounding, and he did what he
thought it was going to take to get rid of it. You know
what? He is a lawyer, he was entitled to do what he wanted
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
to do.
Larry King Live, CNN, June 21, 2001.
Roger Clinton has an interesting point insofar as Hugh Rodham was asked
to return $434,000 he earned lobbying for executive clemency when Roger
was not asked to return any of the money he earned in connection with
the Gambino matter and Jack Quinn was not asked to return fees he
earned in connection with the Marc Rich matter.
Therefore, it appears that Rodham misled the public when he
suggested he returned all of the fees when he, in fact, ignored
the request from former President Clinton and Senator Clinton
that he do so. The lack of any further demands from former
President Clinton and Senator Clinton that Rodham return the
fees suggests that their initial demand was motivated by media
pressure, rather than a genuine sentiment that Hugh Rodham
should return the funds.
2. The Florida Bar's ``Investigation'' of Hugh Rodham
Shortly after news of Rodham's role in the Vignali and
Braswell grants of clemency came to light, a complaint was
filed against Rodham with the Florida Bar Association. The
Florida Bar rules, like those of most other states, prohibit
excessive fees and the receipt of contingent fees in criminal
cases. Rule 4-1.5(a)(1) states that ``[a]n attorney shall not
enter into an agreement for, charge, or collect an illegal,
prohibited or clearly excessive fee.'' \369\ Rule 4-
1.5(f)(3)(B) states that a ``lawyer shall not enter into an
agreement for, charge, or collect . . . a contingent fee for
representing a defendant in a criminal case.'' \370\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\369\ Rule 4-1.5(a)(1), Rules Regulating the Florida Bar.
\370\ Rule 4-1.5(f)(3)(B), Rules Regulating the Florida Bar.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The facts of the Rodham case not being in dispute, it seems
that the one issue examined by the Florida Bar was whether
Rodham's work constituted ``representing a defendant in a
criminal case.'' Indeed, there is mixed opinion regarding how
Rodham's work on the pardons should be characterized. Jack
Quinn took the position that his lobbying for Marc Rich's
pardon did constitute representation in a criminal case and
that is why he met the exemption in Executive Order 12834,
which otherwise would have prohibited him from lobbying his
former colleagues in the White House Counsel's Office. If
Quinn's reasoning were to prevail in the Rodham case, it seems
clear that Rodham would have violated the Florida Bar Rules
against receiving contingent fees in a criminal case. On the
other hand, Federal District Court Judge Denny Chin rejected
the claims of Jack Quinn and the other Marc Rich lawyers that
their work lobbying for the pardons of Rich and Pincus Green
were protected by the attorney-client privilege and attorney
work product protection. Judge Chin ruled that their work
lobbying for a pardon could not be considered legal work
entitled to the attorney-client privilege or work product
protection.\371\ If Judge Chin's ruling were to be followed by
the Florida Bar, it is less likely that Rodham could be
sanctioned for violating the Florida Bar rules. However, it is
still possible that he could be punished for charging an
excessive fee in relation to the amount of work he performed on
the pardons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\371\ In re Grand Jury Subpoenas (No. M11-189 (DC)) (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
9, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rather than conducting a serious inquiry into the facts or
the law, it appears that the Florida Bar has declined to look
into the Rodham matter at all. On July 16, 2001, the Florida
Bar grievance committee voted unanimously to close the Rodham
case. In its letter closing the case, the Florida Bar described
its investigation and reasons for closing the case. It appears
that the investigation consisted solely of reading press
accounts of Rodham's involvement in lobbying for pardons and
requesting a written response to the allegations from Rodham's
counsel.
The Florida Bar considered first whether Rodham's fees were
improper and ruled that they were not for two main reasons.
First, it determined that the clemency process was not a
judicial proceeding. Contingent fees are prohibited in criminal
cases, largely because the ``right to competent counsel should
not be tied to the compensation paid to the attorney.'' \372\
However, the Florida Bar concluded that ``clemency is different
from other post-conviction avenues of appeal. It cannot be said
that, based on existing rules and ethics opinions, accepting a
contingency fee for assistance in a clemency proceeding is
improper per se.'' \373\ Second, it determined that Rodham's
fees could not be characterized as ``excessive,'' despite the
fact that he was paid $434,000 for minimal work. The Bar
Committee concluded that ``it would be highly unusual for The
Florida Bar to become involved in a determination of
reasonableness of attorney's fees in the absence of a complaint
of an interested party, one who actually suffered harm
directly. We may consider doing so when a compelling public
interest arises . . . [We] did not find a compelling public
interest in the matters involved.'' \374\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\372\ Letter from Barry W. Rigby, Chief Branch Disciplinary
Counsel, The Florida Bar, to J. Christian Adams, Counsel, Adams Law
Firm (July 16, 2001) (Exhibit 45).
\373\ Id.
\374\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, the Florida Bar considered whether Rodham engaged
in dishonest conduct in his efforts to obtain the Vignali and
Braswell grants of clemency. The Florida Bar concluded:
There has been no evidence presented or made available
to The Florida Bar: 1) that Mr. Rodham violated rules
or procedures relating to the pardons in question; 2)
that monies were intended as improper payment to
persons involved in the pardon process; or 3) that
there was any other deceit or dishonesty on his
part.\375\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\375\ Id.
The Bar then noted that it had attempted to obtain information
about Rodham from the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern
District of New York but was declined.\376\ At no time did the
Florida Bar approach this Committee seeking information about
Rodham, which would have been shared readily with the Bar.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\376\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As this report has made clear, Hugh Rodham engaged in
dishonest conduct on a number of occasions with respect to his
work on the Vignali commutation. Rodham passed on misleading
information to the White House, he made misleading arguments to
White House staff about Vignali's case for clemency, and he
told outright lies to White House staff, for example, that the
attorney who prosecuted Vignali supported his commutation. The
Florida Bar should review this report and take appropriate
action against Rodham.
3. The Message Sent by the Vignali Commutation
The Vignali commutation will have two practical
consequences. First, Carlos Vignali has been released from
prison approximately nine years ahead of schedule. There is no
evidence that Vignali is reformed or that he has in any way
changed his life since being convicted. He has never admitted
his guilt, he has never cooperated with law enforcement, and he
has never admitted that he did anything wrong.
However, the Vignali commutation has a significance beyond
the early release from prison of an unrepentant cocaine dealer.
With his commutation, President Clinton sent a message that
there is a double standard of justice between the rich and the
poor. Twenty-eight other people were convicted along with
Vignali for participating in the cocaine distribution ring.
Carlos Vignali was the only person in that distribution ring to
receive executive clemency. Yet, other participants in the
conspiracy received stiffer prison sentences, despite the fact
that they served more minor roles in the conspiracy than
Vignali. For example, Todd Hopson was sentenced to over 19
years in prison and is still in prison today. While Hopson was
clearly guilty, police have stated that his sentence was
excessive.\377\ After Vignali received his commutation, Hopson
observed, ``I didn't pay anybody, I didn't have anybody walk my
application up to the White House and put it in front of the
President. I didn't have those connections.'' \378\ Even Todd
Hopson, a convicted cocaine dealer, can understand the message
sent by President Clinton: if you can afford to hire the right
person--especially a relative of the President--you can get out
of prison, even if you are clearly guilty of a serious crime.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\377\ Fox Special Report with Brit Hume (Feb. 27, 2001).
\378\ Richard A. Serrano and Stephen Braun, Working the American
System, L.A. Times, Apr. 29, 2001, at L.A. Times Mag. 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Vignali commutation also sent a message to the nation's
law enforcement officers. Many law enforcement officers risk
their lives on a daily basis to stem the flow of illegal drugs
into our neighborhoods. Indeed, Carlos Vignali and his 28 co-
conspirators were apprehended only after a painstaking
investigation that included wiretaps and undercover
surveillance. When one of the ringleaders of a cocaine
distribution ring receives executive clemency solely because he
hired the president's brother-in-law to represent him, it mocks
the efforts of law enforcement and indicates a dangerously lax
attitude towards fighting the war on drugs. Tony Adams, the
Minneapolis narcotics detective who played a key role in
apprehending Vignali and who has risked his life in the line of
duty,\379\ understood the significance of President Clinton's
actions. Adams observed that ``it's like, basically, you've
just been told that this kid, he's untouchable.'' \380\ Adams
stated that the Vignali commutation ``more or less tells us
that America's system has been bought if you have money.''
\381\ The bitterness of Adams, and presumably a number of other
law enforcement officers, is clear in Adams' statement that
``politicians always get in front of this camera and say
``We're trying to take dope off the streets. We're trying to
put dope dealers in jail.'' Well, you just let one out, a big
one.'' \382\ Adams suggested that ``the politicians in L.A. or
Washington, D.C., should finish the nine years that he has left
on his time, and I'm standing right by that.'' \383\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\379\ The danger of Adams' work is underscored by the fact that on
April 20, 2001, he was shot at by a suspect. Adams was unharmed. David
Chanen, Man Fires at Officer, But Nobody is Hurt, Star Trib., Apr. 20,
2001, at 9B.
\380\ Richard A. Serrano and Stephen Braun, Working the American
System, L.A. Times, Apr. 29, 2001, at L.A. Times Mag. 10.
\381\ Fox Special Report with Brit Hume (Feb. 27, 2001).
\382\ ABC World News Now (Feb. 23, 2001). See also Duncan DeVille
Document Production (Letter from Duncan DeVille, Assistant U.S.
Attorney for the Central District of California, Department of Justice,
to Alejandro Mayorkas, U.S. Attorney for the Central District of
California, Department of Justice (Mar. 2, 2001)) (Exhibit 46) (citing
Mayorkas' assistance in the Vignali matter as the basis for
resignation).
\383\ Fox Special Report with Brit Hume (Feb. 23, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
II. THE PARDON OF A. GLENN BRASWELL
Another of the recipients of President Clinton's misplaced
mercy on his final days in the White House was Almon Glenn
Braswell. Braswell was convicted in 1983 of mail fraud,
perjury, and tax evasion in connection with selling herbal
remedies purporting to encourage hair growth, remove cellulite,
and increase breast size.\384\ More alarmingly, Braswell was
under investigation by the Food and Drug Administration, the
Federal Trade Commission, the Internal Revenue Service, and
several state attorneys general when his pardon was
granted.\385\ In addition, as the President was granting
Braswell a pardon, federal investigators in Los Angeles were
examining a massive tax evasion and money-laundering scheme
allegedly conducted by Braswell.\386\ How such an unmeritorious
application received President Clinton's attention may be
explained by a $230,000 payment from Braswell to Hugh Rodham,
the President's brother-in-law. \387\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\384\ Douglas Pasternak, Another Dubious Pardon, U.S. News & World
Rep., Feb. 12, 2001, at 26.
\385\ Id.
\386\ Peter Slevin, Another Pardon Stirs Controversy; Herbal
Marketer Faces U.S. Tax Evasion Probe, Wash. Post, Feb. 6, 2001, at A3.
\387\ See Letter from Nancy Luque, Partner, Reed Smith, to the
Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Feb. 28, 2001)
(within Appendix I).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A. Braswell's History of Misconduct
In the decades prior to Hugh Rodham's involvement, Braswell
created a dietary supplement empire by intentionally misleading
consumers with false claims of health benefits.\388\ These
fabricated claims led to Braswell's conviction in 1983 on
perjury, tax evasion, and mail fraud charges.\389\ According to
his pardon petition, Braswell was convicted of tax evasion for
creating a system in which he would intentionally overpay for
corporate services and, in return, receive cash payments that
were not reported as income to the IRS.\390\ With respect to
the mail fraud conviction, Braswell devised a scheme to defraud
consumers by placing false and misleading advertisements in
magazines throughout the United States.\391\ These
advertisements depicted phony ``before and after'' photographs
purportedly revealing how Braswell's products promoted hair
growth and breast enlargement.\392\ Mr. Braswell was sentenced
to three years' imprisonment and five years' probation for
these crimes,\393\ but he received parole after serving only
seven months in prison.\394\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\388\ Kurt Eichenwald and Michael Moss, Pardon for Subject of
Inquiry Worries Prosecutors, N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 2001, at A1.
\389\ NARA Document Production (Almon Glenn Braswell's Petition for
Pardon (Jan. 12, 2001)) (Exhibit 47).
\390\ Id.
\391\ Id. The House Select Committee on Aging held a hearing in
1984 examining the fraudulent claims of dietary supplement marketers
such as Braswell. ``In Quackery: A $10 Billion Scandal,'' Hearings
Before the House Select Committee on Aging, Subcommittee on Health and
Long-term Care, 98th Cong. (May 31, 1984). Regarding Braswell's
companies in particular, a Postal Service official testified, ``one
hundred and thirty-eight false representation complaints were filed
against 50 different medical-cosmetic products marketed by Braswell,
Inc.'' Id. at 137. The cases were concluded through 32 false
representation orders and 15 consent agreements.
\392\ Id. at 138.
\393\ Richard A. Serrano, Man's Pardon for ``83 Crime Can't Aid Him
in L.A. Probe, L.A. Times, Feb. 7, 2001, at A4.
\394\ Douglas Pasternak, Another Dubious Pardon, U.S. News & World
Rep., Feb. 12, 2001, at 26.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Braswell's conviction was just the beginning of his legal
troubles. Braswell pled no contest to grand theft after being
arrested for burglary at the home of a former employee.\395\ He
was sentenced to two years' probation to run concurrently with
his federal sentence.\396\ Additionally, the Federal Trade
Commission brought charges against Braswell in 1983. The FTC
contended that his companies lacked adequate scientific
evidence supporting the claims of their hair-loss products and
that the companies declined to pay refunds promised to
customers.\397\ Braswell's companies settled FTC charges by
paying $610,000 in civil penalties, and the FTC permanently
barred them from making performance claims for any product
without reliable scientific evidence.\398\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\395\ ``Swindlers, Hucksters and Snake Oil Salesman: Hype and Hope
Marketing Anti-Aging Products to Seniors,'' Hearing Before the Senate
Special Committee on Aging, 107th Cong. 27 (prepared statement of E.
Vernon F. Glenn, Attorney, Law Offices of E. Vernon F. Glenn). Glenn
represented several clients in a defamation lawsuit against Braswell.
\396\ Id.
\397\ Federal Trade Commission Press Release, Braswell Prohibited
Permanently from Advertising Baldness ``Cures'' Without FDA Approval of
Product, Under Federal Trade Commission Consent Judgment, Sept. 16,
1983.
\398\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For over a decade, the herbal remedy dealer managed to
evade the attention of federal regulators. In 1995, the Food
and Drug Administration issued an import alert on products
manufactured by Gero Vita International, Braswell's principal
mail-order marketer of natural medicines.\399\ The FDA
determined that Gero Vita was promoting certain products as
``drugs'' that could cure various ailments without first
receiving FDA approval.\400\ The alert enabled FDA to seize
Gero Vita products imported into the United States. It was in
effect at the time President Clinton pardoned Braswell on
January 20, 2001, and it was still in effect as of January
2002.\401\ Also in 1995, the National Advertising Division of
the Council of Better Business Bureaus concluded that Gero Vita
could not substantiate claims for one of its products claiming
to be an ``Anti-Aging Pill.'' \402\ The company advertisement
declared that the pill ``improves memory . . . Sex Drive! And
reduces chance of Heart Attack by 83%!'' \403\ The Better
Business Bureau warned consumers that these proclamations were
``exaggerated and overstated'' and ``misleading.'' \404\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\399\ Michael Isikoff, The Bush Clan's Donor Problem, Newsweek,
Sept. 29, 2000, at 2000 WL 33208288.
\400\ Id.
\401\ See Food and Drug Administration Import Alert #66-41,
Unapproved New Drugs Promoted in the U.S., Sept. 28, 2000.
\402\ Michael Isikoff, The Bush Clan's Donor Problem, Newsweek,
Sept. 29, 2000, at 2000 WL 33208288.
\403\ Id. (quoting Gero Vita Advertisement)
\404\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Three sports celebrities were also victims of Glenn
Braswell's fraudulent practices. Race-car driver Richard Petty,
Hall of Fame quarterback Len Dawson, and baseball Hall of Famer
Stan Musial filed suit against Braswell in 1997 for falsely
portraying these celebrities as endorsing a Braswell product
that purportedly treats prostate cancer.\405\ In peddling
Prostata, Braswell inappropriately and inaccurately warned that
the sports figures ``waited too long and are suffering'' from
prostate problems.\406\ He then mailed brochures featuring the
celebrities' photographs with their bogus endorsement to over
17 million addresses.\407\ As a result, subsequent sales of
Prostata associated with those brochures totaled over $5
million.\408\ The lawsuit accused Braswell of defamation,
invasion of privacy, unfair trade practices, and intentionally
inflicting emotional distress.\409\ In his two-hour deposition,
Braswell invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination 196 times.\410\ According to the sports stars'
attorney, the lawsuit was eventually settled out of court for
``significant money.'' \411\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\405\ Joan McKinney, New ``Snake-Oil'' Industry Roasted, Baton
Rouge Advoc., Sept. 11, 2001, at 1A.
\406\ Lucy Morgan, Bush Brothers Pop Up in Potion Peddler's
Magazine, St. Petersburg Times, Sept. 29, 2000, at A1.
\407\ ``Swindlers, Hucksters and Snake Oil Salesman: Hype and Hope
Marketing Anti-Aging Products to Seniors,'' Hearing Before the Senate
Special Committee on Aging, 107th Cong. 26 (prepared statement of E.
Vernon F. Glenn, Attorney, Law Offices of E. Vernon F. Glenn).
\408\ Id.
\409\ Lucy Morgan, Bush Brothers Pop Up in Potion Peddler's
Magazine, St. Petersburg Times, Sept. 29, 2000, at A1.
\410\ Isabel Vincent, The Canadian Connection to Clinton Pardon,
Nat'l Post, Mar. 3, 2001, at B1.
\411\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Undeterred by the settlement, the FDA's import alert, and
the Better Business Bureau's consumer warning, Gero Vita
continued to publish deceiving advertisements. In 1998, the
editors of Consumer Reports wrote, ``We see a lot of misleading
marketing, but what spews out of Gero Vita Industries rivals
the worst.'' \412\ Continuing its censure, Consumer Reports
described Gero Vita's unsolicited booklet mailings as
``masquerading as science. The booklets cite actual studies,
but twist the findings to support the company's own
unsubstantiated claims.'' \413\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\412\ Consumer Reports, quoted in Peter Slevin, Another Pardon
Stirs Controversy; Herbal Marketer Faces U.S. Tax Evasion Probe, Wash.
Post, Feb. 6, 2001, at A3.
\413\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite drawing the attention of law enforcement agencies,
various federal regulators, consumer advocate groups, and
plaintiffs' attorneys, Braswell has continued to use misleading
advertising to promote his products. Since the Prostata
lawsuit, Braswell has been sued twice more for misrepresenting
the results of medical research.\414\ Arthritis specialist Dr.
Joel Kremer filed suit against two Braswell companies for
creating the appearance in an advertisement that Dr. Kremer's
research supported the effectiveness of a Braswell arthritis
product.\415\ According to the lawsuit, the advertisement also
falsely portrayed Dr. Kremer as endorsing an anti-arthritis
elixir,\416\ an allegation similar to the one Braswell settled
in the Prostata lawsuit. In a similar lawsuit, Braswell
allegedly misused another doctor's research once again for an
anti-arthritis product.\417\ This lawsuit asserts that Gero
Vita distorted Dr. John Prudden's research to support the claim
that the Gero Vita product supposedly rebuilt joints and
stopped arthritis.\418\ These suits were still pending as of
September 2001.\419\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\414\ ``Swindlers, Hucksters and Snake Oil Salesman: Hype and Hope
Marketing Anti-Aging Products to Seniors,'' Hearing Before the Senate
Special Committee on Aging, 107th Cong. 28-29 (prepared statement of E.
Vernon F. Glenn, Attorney, Law Offices of E. Vernon F. Glenn).
\415\ Kim Martineau, Doctor Sues Firms Over Claims in Ad, Times
Union (Albany, NY) Sept. 2, 2000, at B4.
\416\ Id.
\417\ ``Swindlers, Hucksters and Snake Oil Salesman: Hype and Hope
Marketing Anti-Aging Products to Seniors,'' Hearing Before the Senate
Special Committee on Aging, 107th Cong. 28-29 (prepared statement of E.
Vernon F. Glenn, Attorney, Law Offices of E. Vernon F. Glenn).
\418\ Id.
\419\ Id. at 29.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Braswell was under criminal investigation by federal
prosecutors in Los Angeles for tax evasion when President
Clinton pardoned him in January 2001.\420\ The federal inquiry
focused on whether Braswell transferred millions of dollars
offshore through a shell company to evade IRS detection.\421\
Federal investigators described Braswell's actions as ``a
massive tax evasion and money-laundering scheme.'' \422\ Court
documents also allege that Braswell and his employees attempted
to conceal documents from the government.\423\ These
allegations are based on documents and company computers seized
from Braswell's principal holding company, G.B. Data Systems,
after IRS agents raided the office in 1999.\424\ Should any
charges be brought based on these allegations, federal
prosecutors anticipate that Braswell will argue that his pardon
included the pending tax evasion investigation.\425\ Moreover,
if Braswell were convicted on tax evasion charges, the pardon
could lessen his sentence by neutralizing past felonies.\426\
In either scenario, the legal consequences of the pardon could
potentially reward Braswell with unjustified leniency.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\420\ Peter Slevin, Another Pardon Stirs Controversy; Herbal
Marketer Faces U.S. Tax Evasion Probe, Wash. Post, Feb. 6, 2001, at A3.
\421\ Id.
\422\ Id.
\423\ Michael Isikoff, The Bush Clan's Donor Problem, Newsweek,
Sept. 29, 2000, at 2000 WL 33208288.
\424\ Id.
\425\ Michael Moss, Officials Say Investigation Will Go On Despite
Pardon, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 2001, at A24. A former White House
spokesman said that the President did not intend for the pardon to
cover anything other than the felonies Braswell committed in 1983.
Richard A. Serrano, Man's Pardon for ``83 Crime Can't Aid Him in L.A.
Probe, L.A. Times, Feb. 7, 2001, at A4. The Justice Department also
concluded that the U.S. Attorney's Office in Los Angeles could continue
its investigation of Braswell's potential felonies involving his
offshore corporations and accounts.
\426\ Michael Moss, Officials Say Investigation Will Go on Despite
Pardon, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 2001, at A24.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. Consideration of the Braswell Pardon by the Clinton White House
The active criminal investigation into Braswell might have
disqualified him if normal pardon procedures were
followed.\427\ Yet, Braswell's petition bypassed the
traditional route through the Justice Department and went
directly to the White House.\428\ Legal experts agree that had
the FBI conducted the background investigation instead of the
White House, Braswell's application would have been rejected
quickly.\429\ A former pardon attorney at the Justice
Department during the Carter Administration said, ``If it had
gone through normal channels, it never would have gotten
through. Nobody ever gets a pardon when they are under active
investigation for other offenses--ever.'' \430\ Margaret
Colgate Love, the Justice Department's pardon attorney from
1990 to 1997,\431\ concurred that evidence of an ongoing
investigation should stop a president from issuing a pardon
because the ``law-abidingness'' of the individual is a critical
threshold in determining whether a petitioner is
deserving.\432\ Love described the final Clinton pardons as
``an accident waiting to happen.'' \433\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\427\ Kurt Eichenwald and Michael Moss, Pardon for Subject of
Inquiry Worries Prosecutors, N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 2001, at A1.
\428\ Id.
\429\ Id.
\430\ Tim Nickens, Pardon of Man Under Investigation Questioned,
St. Petersburg Times, Feb. 8, 2001, at 6B.
\431\ Leon Bruneau, Clinton Aides Testify Before Congress on Pardon
Controversy, Agence France-Presse, Mar. 1, 2001, at 2001 WL 2352895.
\432\ Peter Slevin, Clinton Termed Unaware of Braswell Probe;
Spokesman Says Pardon Covered Only '83 Case, Not Possible New Charges,
Wash. Post, Feb. 7, 2001, at A20.
\433\ Leon Bruneau, Clinton Aides Testify Before Congress on Pardon
Controversy, Agence France-Presse, Mar. 1, 2001, at 2001 WL 2352895.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
How such an undeserving petitioner received the President's
ultimate grant of forgiveness can be explained by Braswell's
powerful and high-priced connections. Braswell was represented
in his pardon bid by Kendall Coffey, a former U.S. Attorney
appointed by President Clinton \434\ and an attorney for former
Vice President Al Gore during the Florida vote recount.\435\
However, it is unclear whether Coffey called on his own
influence with the Clinton Administration to obtain the
Braswell pardon. Rather, it appears that Coffey's main
contribution to the pardon effort was to hire Hugh Rodham.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\434\ Coffey's tenure as U.S. Attorney ended under an ethical
cloud. After losing a major drug trafficking trial in February 1996,
Coffey visited the Lipstik Adult Entertainment Club, charged a $900
magnum of Dom Perignon champagne to his American Express card, and
retired to the club's private champagne room with one of the dancers.
David Adams, Top Lawman Quits After Topless Bar Tale, St. Petersburg
Times, May 18, 1996, at 1A. Reports indicate that, after the dancer
rebuffed Coffey's advances towards her, Coffey grabbed the dancer,
pulled her towards him, and bit her left upper arm. The bite broke the
dancer's skin and drew blood, according to the dancer's husband. After
meeting with then-Attorney General Janet Reno about the incident,
Coffey resigned as U.S. Attorney. Federal Attorney Resigns, Tampa
Tribune, May 18, 1996, at 1.
\435\ Tim Nickens, Pardon of Man Under Investigation Questioned,
St. Petersburg Times, Feb. 8, 2001, at 6B.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On January 12, 2001, Coffey sent a note to Rodham
requesting his assistance. The note suggested that Rodham could
earn a very large sum of money for his work.\436\ In his note
regarding Braswell, Coffey wrote:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\436\ Kendall Coffey Document Production 0003 (Memorandum from
Kendall Coffey, Attorney, to Hugh Rodham, Attorney (Jan. 12, 2001))
(Exhibit 48). Along with this note, Coffey attached a copy of
Braswell's pardon petition.
The client proposes $20,000 for a best efforts
submission and an $80,000 success payment. Both numbers
are negotiable, especially the latter. The initial
payment can be wired Tuesday a.m. if the representation
is accepted.\437\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\437\ Id.
Rodham accepted the representation but not before negotiating a
fee of $230,000 for his work if successful.\438\ On January 17,
2001, two days before the pardon was issued, Coffey sent Rodham
a fax at the White House.\439\ The fax included a three-page
letter written by Coffey to the President expounding on the
merits of the Braswell case.\440\ With Braswell's crime-ridden
background in mind, in addition to the current investigation
for tax fraud, excerpts from Coffey's letter would be laughable
if not for the gravity of the situation. In the letter, Coffey
describes Braswell as a ``visionary'' with an ``exemplary
record of business accomplishments'' who is ``truly deserving
of the extraordinary measure of mercy embodied in a
Presidential pardon.'' \441\ Coffey also opined that
``[g]ranting a pardon to bring justice and healing to a man's
life would further the extraordinary legacies that have defined
your Presidency.'' \442\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\438\ See Letter from Nancy Luque, Partner, Reed Smith, to the
Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Feb. 28, 2001)
(within Appendix I). News reports indicated that Rodham received
$200,000 for his work on Braswell's pardon, but, according to Rodham's
attorney, Braswell made one payment of $30,000 and then transferred
$200,000 by wire to Rodham's law firm. Based on this information and
Coffey's note to Rodham, the $30,000 payment likely was for a ``best
efforts submission'' by Rodham that he would receive regardless of
outcome. The $200,000 wire transfer likely was received as a ``success
payment.''
\439\ Kendall Coffey Document Production 0004-07 (Fax from Kendall
Coffey, Attorney, Kendall Coffey, P.A., to Hugh Rodham (Jan. 17, 2001))
(Exhibit 49).
\440\ See id.
\441\ Id.
\442\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At this point, Coffey's work pushing the Braswell pardon
was finished,\443\ and Braswell's fate was placed in Rodham's
hands. In the final days of the Clinton Administration, Rodham
contacted Meredith Cabe of the White House Counsel's Office at
least twice.\444\ He forwarded Coffey's letter of support for
Braswell to Cabe, and he made a follow-up inquiry.\445\
According to Rodham's attorney, these two actions were the
extent of Rodham's role in the Braswell pardon, a role for
which he received $230,000.\446\ Despite the huge reward for
success, his close relationship with the President, and his
living in the White House, Rodham claims he never discussed
either Braswell or Vignali with President Clinton or Hillary
Clinton.\447\ However, the small circle of aides advising the
former President admit that Clinton and Rodham may have had
private discussions to which staffers were not privy.\448\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\443\ Kendall Coffey Document Production 0001-02 (Record of
Professional Services Rendered Regarding Braswell Clemency Application
(Feb. 4, 2001)) (Exhibit 50).
\444\ Letter from Nancy Luque, Partner, Reed Smith, to the
Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Feb. 28, 2001)
(within Appendix I).
\445\ Id.
\446\ Id.
\447\ Id.
\448\ Christopher Marquis and Michael Moss, A Clinton In-law
Received $400,000 in 2 Pardon Cases, N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 2001, at A1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Among the staffers assisting the President with the pardon
petitions were members of the White House Counsel's Office.
Meredith Cabe recalls discussing the Braswell pardon with
Rodham.\449\ In fact, another associate counsel at the White
House, Eric Angel, was also aware that Rodham was involved with
the Braswell case.\450\ When asked how he knew of Rodham's
advocacy, Angel responded, ``I think his name was on an
envelope or Meredith mentioned it.'' \451\ Based on the pardon
petition and the White House's cursory investigation, Angel did
not oppose the Braswell pardon and remembers no other staff
member opposing the Rodham-backed pardon either.\452\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\449\ Interview with Meredith Cabe, former Associate Counsel to the
President, the White House (Mar. 16, 2001).
\450\ Interview with Eric Angel, former Associate Counsel to the
President, the White House (Mar. 28, 2001).
\451\ Id.
\452\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One of the President's closest advisors, White House
Counsel Beth Nolan, was also aware that Rodham was advocating
Braswell's petition.\453\ Ms. Nolan knew that Mr. Rodham
circumvented the Justice Department and filed the Braswell
petition directly with the White House.\454\ In fact, Nolan
brought the Braswell pardon to Cabe's attention.\455\ Ms. Nolan
personally handed the Braswell file to Cabe and Angel.\456\
Nolan then requested that Cabe inspect the petition because
Nolan believed it was the type of case in which the President
was interested.\457\ Finally, both Cabe and Nolan recall
discussing the Braswell petition in a meeting with the
President.\458\ Despite Rodham's oddly intense interest in an
obscure herbal remedy dealer from South Florida, Nolan claims
that she was unaware Rodham was receiving a fee for his
advocacy.\459\ Cabe explained that the President had a
``general articulation'' of types of cases he wanted to
consider.\460\ She recalled that President Clinton believed
that felons convicted a long time ago, but who now abided by
the law, deserved to have their civil rights restored.\461\
Based on general agreement among White House staff, Braswell
fell into this category and deserved clemency.\462\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\453\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 413
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Beth Nolan, former Counsel to the
President, the White House).
\454\ Id. at 382.
\455\ Interview with Meredith Cabe, former Associate Counsel to the
President, the White House (Mar. 16, 2001).
\456\ Interview with Eric Angel, former Associate Counsel to the
President, the White House (Mar. 28, 2001).
\457\ Interview with Meredith Cabe, former Associate Counsel to the
President, the White House (Mar. 16, 2001).
\458\ Id. ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 413
(Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Beth Nolan, former Counsel to the
President, the White House).
\459\ Id.
\460\ Interview with Meredith Cabe, former Associate Counsel to the
President, the White House (Mar. 16, 2001).
\461\ Id.
\462\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In a carefully worded statement, President Clinton issued a
similar claim.\463\ The former President said he had no
knowledge that Rodham received a contingency fee for his work
on the Braswell application and insisted that Rodham return any
monies received.\464\ The President's careful use of the phrase
``contingency fee'' leaves open the possibility that he was
aware Braswell was paying Rodham, but not the details of their
arrangement. Rodham's attorney Nancy Luque mailed a $230,000
check to Braswell on February 23, 2001,\465\ after Rodham's
conduct was widely reported and criticized in the press.\466\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\463\ Jerry Seper, Hillary's Brother Returns Cash for Pardon Work,
Wash. Times, Feb. 22, 2001, at A1.
\464\ Id.
\465\ Letter from Nancy Luque, Partner, Reed Smith, to Glenn
Braswell (Feb. 23, 2001) (Exhibit 42).
\466\ Reports detailing Rodham's receipt of over $200,000 from
Braswell appeared on the front page of The New York Times, Washington
Post, Washington Times, Wall Street Journal, Los Angeles Times, and USA
Today.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the face of widespread criticism from Republicans and
Democrats alike, Luque somehow maintained that ``Hugh Rodham
has done absolutely nothing wrong.'' \467\ Most disagreed with
Luque's viewpoint. President Clinton declared that he and
Hillary were ``deeply disturbed'' by news reports of Rodham's
actions.\468\ In a separate statement, Hillary Clinton stated
her belief that ``the payments should be returned
immediately.'' \469\ Other critics more forcefully condemned
Rodham. Terry McAuliffe, Chairman of the Democratic National
Committee, declared, ``What he did was absolutely wrong.''
\470\ The DNC Chairman called on Rodham to ``fully account for
his actions.'' \471\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\467\ Christopher Marquis and Michael Moss, A Clinton In-law
Received $400,000 in 2 Pardon Cases, N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 2001, at A1.
\468\ Jerry Seper, Hillary's Brother Returns Cash for Pardon Work,
Wash. Times, Feb. 22, 2001, at A1.
\469\ Id.
\470\ Christopher Marquis and Michael Moss, A Clinton In-law
Received $400,000 in 2 Pardon Cases, N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 2001, at A1.
\471\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As for Braswell, he has been unable to steer clear of
allegations of misconduct. In addition to the federal tax
evasion inquiry ongoing in Los Angeles, Braswell was subpoenaed
to testify before a Senate Committee investigating health scams
in September 2001.\472\ At the hearing, the former chief
executive officer of a Braswell company testified that its
products are ``laden with lies and deception'' \473\ and that
Braswell continues to ``prey on the elderly and infirmed.''
\474\ Due in part to advertisements containing ``outright false
statements,'' Braswell's companies generate annual revenues of
approximately $200 million.\475\ The companies are organized to
create the appearance of foreign ownership in ghost locations
so any individual or agency seeking to locate the company will
be delayed.\476\ In response to these weighty allegations,
Braswell invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination and refused to answer questions posed by the
Committee.\477\ Braswell similarly refused a request for an
interview by Committee staff.\478\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\472\ William M. Welch, Senate Probes ``Anti-Aging'' Claims, USA
Today, Sept. 10, 2001, at A7.
\473\ ``Swindlers, Hucksters and Snake Oil Salesman: Hype and Hope
Marketing Anti-Aging Products to Seniors,'' Hearing Before the Senate
Special Committee on Aging, 107th Cong. 8 (testimony of Mike O'Neal,
former Chief Executive Officer, GB Data Systems)
\474\ Id. at 11.
\475\ See id. at 8-9.
\476\ Id. at 9.
\477\ Dennis Camire, President of Dietary Supplement Firm Takes
Fifth in Senate Questioning, Gannett News Service, Sept. 11, 2001, at
2001 WL 5112568.
\478\ Letter from James C. Wilson, Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt.
Reform, to Henry F. Schuelke, III, Partner, Janis, Schuelke and
Wechsler (February 26, 2002) (within Appendix I).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
III. HUGH RODHAM'S EFFORTS TO OBTAIN CLEMENCY FOR THE LUMS
A. Background on Gene and Nora Lum
Gene and Nora Lum were prominent Democratic contributors
and fundraisers who gave more than $90,000 to the Democratic
Party and raised at least $250,000 more.\479\ The Lums were
especially close to former DNC Chair and Commerce Secretary Ron
Brown. In 1992, at the request of Ron Brown, the Lums
established the Asian Pacific Advisory Council to organize the
Asian-Pacific American community and raise funds for the
Democratic National Committee. In 1993, the Lums purchased an
oil and gas company in Oklahoma and named it Dynamic Energy
Resources. They hired Secretary Brown's son, Michael, to work
at Dynamic Energy Resources. Although he did little work for
the Lums, he was given $500,000 in company stock and a country
club membership worth $60,000.\480\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\479\ Jerry Seper, Brown Son Gets Probation and Fine; Illegal
Donations Made in '94 Races, Wash. Times, Nov. 22, 1997, at A2; John
Solomon, Couple to Plead Guilty to Illegal $50,000 Donation, Associated
Press Political Service, May 22, 1997, at 1997 WL 2527905.
\480\ Jerry Seper, Couple Jailed for Gifts to Democrats, Wash.
Times, Sept. 10, 1997, at A10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Many of the Lums' political contributions were illegal, and
in 1997 the Lums pleaded guilty to making $50,000 in illegal
conduit contributions to the DNC and the campaigns of Senator
Edward Kennedy and Stuart Price. Their daughter, Trisha Lum,
and Michael Brown also pled guilty to misdemeanor charges of
making conduit contributions. As part of their plea agreement,
Gene and Nora Lum were sentenced to 5 months in home detention
and 5 months in a halfway house and were ordered to pay a
$30,000 fine.\481\ In August 1998, Gene Lum also pleaded guilty
to tax fraud for filing tax returns claiming more than $7.1
million in false deductions.\482\ In June 1999, Gene Lum was
sentenced to two years in prison.\483\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\481\ Press Release 01-182, Thai Businesswomen Sentenced On
Campaign Financing Charges, Department of Justice, Apr. 20, 2001. In
particular, the Lums pleaded to using Dynamic Resources to funnel
$50,000 in illegal contributions to the 1994 re-election campaign of
Senator Edward Kennedy and to Stuart Price's unsuccessful congressional
campaign in Oklahoma. James Rowley, The Justice Department Opposes
Giving Convicted . . ., Associated Press Political Service, Oct. 15,
1997, at 1997 WL 2555487; Federal Document Clearing House, Department
of Justice, ``New Jersey Attorney Sentenced in Campaign Finance Case,''
Oct. 12, 2000 (summarizing Campaign Task Force prosecutions). The Lums
admitted making the donations through ``straw donors,'' including their
daughter, Trisha, and Michael Brown. James Rowley, ``The Justice
Department Opposes Giving Convicted . . .,'' Associated Press Political
Service, Oct. 15, 1997, at 1997 WL 2555487. The Lums also admitted to
having given Brown thousands of dollars in shareholder and consulting
fees, which were given to friends to forward to Kennedy's re-election
campaign. Id.
\482\ Id.
\483\ Press Release 01-182, Thai Businesswomen Sentenced On
Campaign Financing Charges,'' Department of Justice, Apr. 20, 2001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. Hugh Rodham Approaches the White House About the Possibility of a
Pardon for the Lums
The Committee has attempted to interview Gene Lum, Nora
Lum, and their daughter Nicole Lum. All three have refused to
cooperate with the Committee's investigation. Hugh Rodham also
refused to cooperate with the Committee's request for an
interview. Therefore, it is difficult to obtain a full
understanding of the Lums' efforts to obtain executive
clemency. However, sufficient evidence exists to conclude that
the Lums did attempt to obtain executive clemency and that Hugh
Rodham lobbied the White House as part of that effort. It is
not clear why Rodham lobbied on behalf of the Lums or why their
request was rejected.
It appears that the Lums had a relationship with Hugh
Rodham predating their efforts to obtain executive clemency.
The Lums' daughter Nicole described Hugh Rodham was a
``business associate and a friend.'' \484\ This relationship is
supported by the fact that, on January 26, 2001, Hugh Rodham
paid Nicole Lum $20,420.\485\ However, Nicole Lum refused to
elaborate on the nature of the relationship between Hugh Rodham
and her family or the purpose of the payment made by Rodham.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\484\ Notes of Conversation Between Pablo E. Carrillo, Counsel,
Comm. on Govt. Reform, and Nicole Lum (Aug. 28, 2001).
\485\ See First Union Document Production (Check number 1314 from
Rodham & Fine, P.A. IOTA Account to ``Ms. Nikki Lum'' for $20,420 (Jan.
26, 2001)) (Exhibit 51).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In late 2000, the Lums apparently began their efforts to
obtain executive clemency. In December 2000, Nora Lum called
Joel Wohlgemuth, the attorney who represented her husband in
his tax case, and asked him to compile a variety of documents
related to their criminal cases and send them to Hugh Rodham at
the White House.\486\ Wohlgemuth then compiled a packet of
documents relating to both the tax case against Gene Lum and
the campaign fundraising case against Gene and Nora Lum.\487\
Wohlgemuth sent the documents to Rodham at the White House in
late December 2000.\488\ In early January 2001, Rodham called
Wohlgemuth and said that the Justice Department did not have
the documents Wohlgemuth had sent to the White House and asked
him to resend them directly to Meredith Cabe, the associate
White House Counsel responsible for vetting clemency
applications, and one other person whose name Wohlgemuth could
not recall.\489\ Wohlgemuth also asked the Lums' criminal
attorneys in their campaign finance-related case to forward the
Lums' presentence report directly to Cabe.\490\ On January 18,
2001, Cabe received the Lums' presentence report from Caplin &
Drysdale.\491\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\486\ Telephone Interview with Joel Wohlgemuth, Partner, Norman,
Wohlgemuth, Chandler & Dowell (Jan. 17, 2002).
\487\ Id.
\488\ Id. The Federal Express package addressed to Hugh Rodham at
the White House that contained the documents was reportedly dated
December 28, 2000, at 11:11 a.m. The Lawyer's Column, Lobbyist? Who's a
Lobbyist? When It Comes to Clemency, They Are Most Likely Advocates,
Wash. Post, Mar. 5, 2001, at E8. Because Rodham needed the documents
immediately at that point, Wohlgemuth sent the documents directly to
him through the Usher's Office so that it would not be subject to, and
therefore delayed by, onerous security measures that might have had the
package rerouted through an offsite location for screening. Telephone
Interview with Joel Wohlgemuth, Partner, Norman, Wohlgemuth, Chandler &
Dowell (Jan. 17, 2002).
\489\ Id.
\490\ Telephone Interview with Cono Namorato and Scott Michel,
Partners, Caplin & Drysdale (Jan. 17, 2002). This was the extent of
Namorato and Michel's involvement in the Lums' clemency matter. Id. At
no time did they speak to Hugh Rodham about that, or any other, matter.
Id.
\491\ Id.; NARA Document Production (Cover Letter and Presentence
Investigation Report from Scott Michel, Partner, Caplin & Drysdale, to
Meredith Cabe, former Associate Counsel to the President, the White
House (July 16, 1997)) (Exhibit 52).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In January 2001, Hugh Rodham telephoned Meredith Cabe and
spoke to her about the prospects of obtaining pardons for Gene
and Nora Lum.\492\ Cabe found the case Rodham presented in
support of the Lums unimpressive, so she ``just heard him
out.'' \493\ Cabe relayed the substance of her discussion with
Rodham about the Lums to Beth Nolan and Bruce Lindsey. Cabe
also recalls that later, shortly before the end of the Clinton
Administration, she again raised the issue of the Lum pardons
with Nolan and Lindsey, and they made it clear to Cabe that the
Lums were not going to receive pardons. While Cabe did not know
why the Lum pardons were not seriously considered, one
anonymous White House source told the press that ``senior White
House aides had spread the word that clemencies would not be
available for those who had been convicted in the past of
campaign finance irregularities involving the Democratic
Party.'' \494\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\492\ Interview with Meredith Cabe, former Associate Counsel to the
President, the White House (Mar. 16, 2001); James V. Grimaldi & Lois
Romano, Two Others Rodham Helped Didn't Win Pardons; Clinton Relative
Called White House on Behalf of Former Fundraisers, Wash. Post, Feb.
26, 2001, at A1. According to one unnamed source, during that
conversation, ``[Rodham] was expressing some interest in the prospects
of the Lums [sic] getting a pardon. He wanted to know where it stood,
what the likelihood of a pardon might be.'' Stephen Braun and Richard
Serrano, More Clemency Lobbying by Rodham Alleged; Commutations; Former
President Clinton's Brother-In-Law Called a White House Lawyer About a
Pardon For a Couple Convicted of Illegal Campaign Contributions, L.A.
Times, Feb. 26, 2001, at A1.
\493\ Interview with Meredith Cabe, former Associate Counsel to the
President, the White House (Mar. 16, 2001).
\494\ Stephen Braun and Richard Serrano, More Clemency Lobbying by
Rodham Alleged; Commutations; Former President Clinton's Brother-In-Law
Called a White House Lawyer About a Pardon For a Couple Convicted of
Illegal Campaign Contributions, L.A. Times, Feb. 26, 2001, at A1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hugh Rodham has refused to participate in an interview with
Committee staff regarding his pardon efforts. However, Rodham's
attorney has publicly stated that Rodham ``did not represent
the Lums. He was asked to represent them. He declined.'' \495\
Luque also publicly noted that Rodham ``did not represent [the
Lums] in any way, shape or form in connection with any pardon
request'' and that Rodham ``did not advocate on [the Lums']
behalf.'' Luque's statement is in direct conflict with Meredith
Cabe's clear recollection that Hugh Rodham called her about the
Lum pardons and lobbied her on behalf of the Lums. Ultimately,
Luque modified her earlier public statement when she noted that
Rodham in fact played ``a negligible role'' in pursuing
executive clemency for the Lums.\496\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\495\ Stephen Braun and Richard Serrano, More Clemency Lobbying by
Rodham Alleged; Commutations; Former President Clinton's Brother-In-Law
Called a White House Lawyer About a Pardon For a Couple Convicted of
Illegal Campaign Contributions, L.A. Times, Feb. 26, 2001, at A1.
\496\ David Johnston and Don Van Natta, Jr., White House Logs Said
To Show Pre-pardon Visits, N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 2001, at A20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It remains unclear what, if any, amount of money was paid
by Rodham to the Lums. Also unclear is whether there was any
arrangement for a success fee in the event that Rodham was
successful. The refusal of Rodham and the Lums to cooperate
with the Committee only heightens the suspicion that some sort
of financial arrangement, similar to Rodham's payment
arrangement with Horacio Vignali and Glenn Braswell, existed in
this case.
IV. FAILURE OF KEY PARTIES TO COOPERATE IN THE HUGH RODHAM
INVESTIGATION
A. Hugh Rodham
Hugh Rodham was a central figure in both the Vignali and
Braswell matters. However, he extended only partial cooperation
to the Committee. On February 21, 2001, Chairman Burton sent
Hugh Rodham a letter posing a number of questions regarding his
work lobbying for pardons and commutations for various
individuals.\497\ This letter also requested Rodham to produce
records to the Committee regarding his lobbying efforts. On
February 28, 2001, Nancy Luque, counsel for Rodham, provided
brief answers on behalf of Rodham.\498\ On March 7, 2001, Luque
provided to the Committee records regarding Rodham's efforts to
obtain a pardon for Glenn Braswell.\499\ However, Luque did not
provide any records regarding Rodham's efforts to obtain a
commutation for Vignali, claiming they were all protected by
the attorney-client privilege. Shortly thereafter, Chairman
Burton requested that Rodham participate in an interview with
Committee staff.\500\ Rodham refused to participate in an
interview but continued to offer to respond to written
questions. Therefore, the Committee did send Rodham two letters
asking questions regarding his role in the Vignali matter.\501\
Rodham did provide extremely brief responses to these
questions. However, he refused to provide to the Committee any
documents relating to his work on the Vignali matter. Rodham's
refusal to provide records relating to the Vignali matter was
not justified by the attorney-client privilege, and it appears
that Rodham's invocation of the privilege was overbroad and
made to hinder the Committee's investigation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\497\ Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on
Govt. Reform, to Hugh Rodham (Feb. 21, 2001) (within Appendix I).
\498\ Letter from Nancy Luque, Partner, Reed Smith, to the
Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Feb. 28, 2001)
(within Appendix I).
\499\ Letter from Nancy Luque, Partner, Reed Smith, to the
Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Mar. 7, 2001)
(within Appendix I).
\500\ Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on
Govt. Reform, to Nancy Luque, Partner, Reed Smith (Mar. 13, 2001)
(within Appendix I).
\501\ Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on
Govt. Reform, to Hugh Rodham c/o Nancy Luque, Partner, Reed Smith (July
30, 2001) (within Appendix I); Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton,
Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to Hugh Rodham c/o Nancy Luque,
Partner, Reed Smith (Sept. 21, 2001) (within Appendix I).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. Horacio and Carlos Vignali
On March 9, 2001, Chairman Burton sent a letter to Edward
Rucker, counsel for Horacio and Carlos Vignali, posing a number
of questions regarding the effort to win a commutation for
Carlos Vignali.\502\ On March 15, 2001, Rucker responded,
stating that, in light of the criminal investigation into the
Vignali matter, it would be ``inadvisable'' to respond to the
questions or produce documents to the Committee.\503\ On March
21, 2001, Chairman Burton issued subpoenas to the Vignali's,
requiring them to produce records to the Committee regarding
the effort to obtain a commutation.\504\ On March 22, 2001,
Rucker sent a letter to the Committee stating that his clients
invoked their Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination
and, therefore, would not respond to the subpoena.\505\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\502\ Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on
Govt. Reform, to Edward A. Rucker, Esquire (Mar. 9, 2001) (within
Appendix I).
\503\ Letter from Edward A. Rucker, Esquire, to the Honorable Dan
Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Mar. 15, 2001) (within
Appendix I).
\504\ Subpoena of Comm. on Govt. Reform to Horacio C. Vignali c/o
Edward A. Rucker, Esquire (Mar. 21, 2001) (within Appendix II);
Subpoena of Comm. on Govt. Reform to Carlos A. Vignali c/o Edward A.
Rucker, Esquire (Mar. 21, 2001) (within Appendix II).
\505\ Letter from Edward A. Rucker, Esquire, to the Honorable Dan
Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Mar. 22, 2001) (within
Appendix I). See also Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman,
Comm. on Govt. Reform, to Edward A. Rucker, Esquire (Apr. 4, 2001)
(within Appendix I); Letter from Edward A. Rucker, Esquire, to the
Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Apr. 6, 2001)
(within Appendix I).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
C. James Casso
During the Committee's investigation of the Vignali matter,
James Casso emerged as a significant figure in the effort to
win a commutation for Carlos Vignali. Beginning in July 2001,
Committee staff began efforts to interview Mr. Casso. Mr. Casso
spoke with staff but initially declined to answer any questions
about his involvement in the Vignali matter. Casso explained
that he wanted to see if other individuals involved in the
investigation were cooperating before he decided whether to
cooperate. In late July, Casso informed Committee staff that he
would not answer questions in an interview but would like to
receive questions in writing from the Committee. Accordingly,
on July 25, 2001, Chairman Burton posed a number of written
questions to Casso.\506\ However, Casso failed to respond to
this letter, necessitating a number of telephone calls from
Committee staff. Eventually, Casso hired a lawyer and refused
to cooperate with the Committee. On August 27, 2001, Mark
Overland, Casso's attorney, wrote to the Chairman and stated
that Casso was ``unable to provide'' the requested
information.\507\ Overland later explained that Casso could not
provide the information because he had an attorney-client
relationship with the Vignalis that prohibited him from
discussing his work for the Vignalis. This representation was
in direct conflict with earlier assurances given by Casso to
Committee staff, namely that he never represented the Vignalis.
It appears that Casso, like Hugh Rodham, invoked the attorney-
client privilege in an overbroad and unjustified manner to
avoid answering questions about his involvement in the Vignali
matter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\506\ Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on
Govt. Reform, to James M. Casso, Partner, Alvarez-Glasman & Colvin
(July 25, 2001) (within Appendix I).
\507\ Letter from Mark E. Overland, Partner, Shapiro, Borenstein &
Dupont, to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform
(Aug. 27, 2001) (within Appendix I).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
D. Glenn Braswell
The Committee contacted Glenn Braswell's attorney, Henry F.
Schuelke, and requested that Braswell participate in an
interview on February 26, 2002. Through his attorney, Braswell
declined to be interviewed \508\ and provided no documentation
regarding his relationship with Kendall Coffey and Hugh Rodham.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\508\ Letter from James C. Wilson, Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt.
Reform, to Henry F. Schuelke, III, Partner, Janis, Schuelke & Wechsler
(February 26, 2002) (within Appendix I) (confirmation letter).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
E. Kendall Coffey
Kendall Coffey represented Glenn Braswell in his efforts to
obtain clemency. On February 16, 2001, the Committee requested
all records relating to Coffey's work on the Braswell pardon.
Coffey's attorney provided records relevant to the Committee's
request. These records raised a number of questions, and the
Committee requested an interview with Coffey to resolve several
issues regarding his role in the Braswell matter in an April
10, 2001, letter. After not receiving a response from Coffey or
his attorney, the Committee again requested that Coffey
participate in an interview in a letter dated June 12,
2001.\509\ On July 27, 2001, Coffey's attorney finally
responded to the Committee by claiming that Coffey was ``unable
to participate in an interview'' due to attorney-client
privilege.\510\ Without Coffey's full cooperation, the
Committee has been unable to resolve questions about the
relationship between Braswell, Coffey, and Rodham.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\509\ Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on
Govt. Reform Committee, to Jon A. Sale, Partner, Sale & Kuehne (June
12, 2001) (within Appendix I).
\510\ Letter from Jon A. Sale, Partner, Sale & Kuehne, to the
Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform Committee (July
27, 2001) (within Appendix I).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
F. Gene and Nora Lum
The Lums likewise refused to cooperate with the Committee's
investigation. On September 26, 2001, the Committee had Gene
and Nora Lum served with a subpoena duces tecum.\511\ For
almost two months, both avoided repeated requests by the
Committee for compliance with its subpoena. After numerous
delays, the Lums finally replied to the Committee's subpoena by
claiming that they had no responsive documents.\512\ On
February 12, 2002, Gene Lum declined to be interviewed by
Committee staff unless he was granted immunity from
prosecution.\513\ Nora Lum likewise declined to cooperate with
the Committee's investigation.\514\
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\511\ Subpoena Duces Tecum from the Comm. on Govt. Reform to Gene
K.H. Lum (Sept. 24, 2002) (within Appendix II); Subpoena Duces Tecum
from the Comm. on Govt. Reform to Nora Lum (Sept. 24, 2002) (within
Appendix II).
\512\ Letter from Gene K.H. Lum to Pablo E. Carrillo, Counsel,
Comm. on Govt. Reform (Nov. 14, 2001) (within Appendix I). Despite
indications of Rodham's involvement in seeking executive clemency for
the Lums and suggestions of some sort of ``business relationship''
between the Lums and Rodham, the Lums claimed that they did not have
any records whatsoever relating to Rodham. Id.
\513\ Letter from Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt.
Reform, to Gene K.H. Lum (Feb. 20, 2002) (within Appendix I)
(memorializing request for prosecutorial immunity).
\514\ Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on
Govt. Reform, to Nora Lum (Feb. 20, 2001) (within Appendix I).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
G. Nicole Lum
On August 28, 2001, Committee staff briefly spoke to Nicole
Lum. During that conversation, Nicole Lum described Hugh Rodham
as ``a friend'' and ``a business associate.'' Committee staff
then attempted to probe into Nicole Lum's (and her family's)
relationship with Rodham and Rodham's efforts to obtain a
presidential pardon for Gene and Nora Lum. Nicole Lum indicated
that she was unwilling to submit to an interview without her
attorney present. However, Nicole Lum ultimately declined to
retain an attorney for purposes of the Committee's
investigation. On February 12, 2002, February 15, 2002, and
February 20, 2002, Committee staff attempted to interview
Nicole Lum.\515\ Nicole Lum has not responded to the
Committee's repeated requests.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\515\ Letter from Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt.
Reform, to Nicole M. Lum (Feb. 20, 2002) (within Appendix I)
(requesting interview and noting telephone calls made on February 12,
2002, and February 15, 2002).
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[Exhibits referred to follow:]
CHAPTER FOUR
TONY RODHAM'S ROLE IN LOBBYING FOR GRANTS OF EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY
FINDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE
Tony Rodham's Role in the Case of Edgar and Vonna Jo Gregory
Tony Rodham lobbied President Clinton to grant
pardons to Edgar and Vonna Jo Gregory while he was receiving
substantial sums of money from the Gregorys. Rodham received
$244,769 in salary from the Gregorys over two and a half years
and also received another $79,000 in loans from the Gregorys.
The Gregorys claim that they paid Rodham this large sum of
money for various consulting services that Rodham provided to
the Gregorys. However, the Gregorys do not have any
documentation reflecting work performed for them by Rodham.
Given the fact that the Gregorys do not have any
documentary evidence reflecting the $244,769 of work performed
for them by Rodham, substantial questions are raised as to what
Rodham actually did for the Gregorys that was so valuable. The
most valuable thing that Rodham did for the Gregorys was to
obtain presidential pardons. Therefore, there is a substantial
question as to whether the Gregorys paid Rodham for his efforts
to obtain presidential pardons for them.
If Rodham was paid to obtain presidential pardons
for the Gregorys, it creates the strong appearance of
impropriety. The prospect of financial benefit for Rodham would
taint Rodham's actions in lobbying for the pardon. Also, if
President Clinton knew about Rodham's financial arrangement, it
would taint his actions in granting the pardons.
Compounding the appearance of impropriety in the
Gregorys case is the fact that the pardons were opposed by the
Justice Department, the prosecutors responsible for the case,
and the Gregorys' sentencing judge. Apparently, the only people
in the Clinton Administration who felt that the Gregorys
deserved pardons were President Clinton and Deputy White House
Counsel Bruce Lindsey, both of whom knew of Tony Rodham's
involvement in the matter.
Tony Rodham's Role in the Case of Fernando Fuentes Coba
Tony Rodham offered to help Vivian Mannerud obtain a
pardon for her father, Fernando Fuentes Coba, in exchange for
$50,000. When Rodham learned in late 2000 that Mannerud was
seeking a pardon for her elderly father, he met with Mannerud
and told her that he could help obtain the pardon if she paid
him a $50,000 consulting fee. Rodham told Mannerud that he had
successfully obtained pardons before and showed her the
Gregorys' pardon petition to support his claim.
Rodham attempted to convince Mannerud to hire him by
making a number of false representations to her. Rodham told
Mannerud that he was close personal friends with the Pardon
Attorney, Roger Adams. Rodham also told Mannerud that he would
use the $50,000 to hire a law firm to handle her case, and that
Roger Adams' wife worked at the law firm, which would help her
case be treated favorably. All of these representations were
completely false and were apparently made to mislead Mannerud
as to the purpose of the payment to Rodham.
Mannerud rejected Rodham's offer. Mannerud was
concerned that Rodham could not guarantee that he could obtain
a pardon in exchange for the $50,000. She was also concerned
about becoming embroiled in a scandal. Therefore, she rejected
Rodham's offer.
After Mannerud rejected Rodham's offer, an associate
of Rodham came back to Mannerud with another offer. According
to Mannerud, a month after she rejected Tony Rodham's proposal,
Marilyn Parker, a mutual friend of Rodham's and Mannerud's who
attended the initial meeting between them, came back to
Mannerud and told her that Rodham now wanted only $30,000 to
help her obtain a pardon for her father. Mannerud was still
concerned about the nature of Rodham's proposal and rejected
it.
The actions taken by Rodham and Parker may have been
illegal. It appears that Rodham, and maybe Parker, tried to
defraud Mannerud. While this effort was unsuccessful, it may
have constituted criminal conduct. The Committee recommends
that the Justice Department investigate these allegations.
INTRODUCTION
Like his brother, Hugh Rodham, and his brother-in-law,
Roger Clinton, Tony Rodham tried to sell his access to the
White House. The Committee has investigated at least two
instances in which Tony Rodham was involved in discussions
regarding lobbying the White House for presidential pardons. In
one case, dealing with Edgar and Vonna Jo Gregory, Tony Rodham
was successful and obtained pardons on March 15, 2000. Rodham's
efforts on behalf of the Gregorys are troubling given several
facts: (1) the Gregorys do not appear to be suitable candidates
for presidential pardons; (2) Tony Rodham used his access to
the President to lobby for the pardons; and (3) Tony Rodham had
an extremely lucrative financial relationship with the Gregorys
in which he apparently did very little work other than lobby
for the presidential pardons.
In the other case, it appears that Tony Rodham attempted to
convince Vivian Mannerud, a prominent Democratic donor who was
seeking a pardon for her father, that she should hire him to
help obtain the pardon. In the course of attempting to convince
Mannerud to hire him, it appears that Rodham seriously misled
Mannerud about his influence with the Justice Department.
Rodham was seeking as much as $50,000 for his work on this
matter. While Mannerud did not accept Rodham's offer, Rodham's
efforts to obtain money from Mannerud might have been criminal.
Although the investigation of Tony Rodham's involvement in
clemency proceedings produced important new evidence, the
investigation was hampered by Tony Rodham's refusal to
cooperate fully with the Committee. Though Rodham produced
documents in response to a Committee subpoena, he refused to be
interviewed by Committee staff. Rodham's refusal to answer
questions regarding his involvement in the Gregory and Fuentes
matters limited the ability of the Committee to reach
definitive conclusions about certain aspects of those cases.
Given Rodham's position that he did nothing improper, it is
unclear why he did not want to answer questions from the
Committee regarding his actions.
I. EDGAR AND VONNA JO GREGORY
A. Background
Edgar Allen Gregory, Jr., and his wife, Vonna Jo, live
outside Nashville and own United Shows of America, a carnival
company which puts on the Florida State Fair and more than 30
other carnivals a year.\1\ The Gregorys have felony convictions
dating from 1986 relating to their ownership of several banks
in the 1970s. From November 1975 to April 1977, the Gregorys
owned controlling interests in five Alabama banks.\2\ The
Gregorys' banking practices came under fire from regulators,
who accused the Gregorys of making unsound loans to other
companies they owned and to various associates.\3\ Alabama's
banking superintendent closed one of the Gregorys' banks in
March 1978.\4\ In a separate matter in January 1978, regulators
seized another of the Gregorys' banks, the First Bank of Macon
County in Notasulga, Alabama, citing ``unsafe and unsound
banking practices.'' \5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Kevin Sack, Pardoned Couple Say Access Has Served Them Well,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 2001, at A9. A news report aired by ``Dateline
NBC'' several years ago alleged that ``games of skill and chance'' were
rigged in United Shows fairways. At that time, Edgar Gregory said he
thought such games were legal but would investigate the allegations.
See Gregory Document Production 00004-08 (``Florida State Fair's
Midway--United Shows of America, Inc.: Showmanship, Entertainment,
Food, Family, Fun, Memories,'' 1998 Fla. State Fair Mag.) (Exhibit 1).
\2\ See Kirk Loggins, Local Man Denies Paying Tony Rodham to Seek
Pardons, The Tennessean, Mar. 2, 2001, at 1A.
\3\ Id.
\4\ Id.
\5\ Id.
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In 1982, the Gregorys were indicted on charges that they
stole $800,000 in connection with their banking activities in
the 1970s, sending the bank into bankruptcy.\6\ Subsequently,
they were convicted of conspiring to misapply bank funds,
making false statements to banks, misapplication of bank funds,
and wire fraud.\7\ At that time, Edgar Gregory was sentenced to
two years imprisonment and his wife to three years
probation.\8\ The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
the conviction in part but also vacated in part.\9\ In 1986,
the case was concluded when the Gregorys pleaded guilty to
conspiracy and misapplication of bank funds.\10\ On October 1,
1986, Edgar Gregory and his wife were sentenced to 5 years and
3 years probation respectively.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Id.; Marc Lacey and Don Van Natta, Jr., Second Clinton In-Law
Says He Helped to Obtain Pardon, N.Y. Times, Mar. 1, 2001, at A1.
\7\ Tony Rodham Document Production 000029 (Petition for Pardon
After Completion of Sentence for Vonna Jo Gregory, Nov. 10, 1998)
(Exhibit 2); Gregory Document Production (Petition for Pardon After
Completion of Sentence for Edgar Allen Gregory, Jr., Nov. 10, 1998)
(Exhibit 3). See also Florida Officials Investigating Couples State
Fair Contract Extension, Associated Press State and Local Wire, Mar. 8,
2001.
\8\ Id.
\9\ U.S. v. Gregory, 730 F.2d 692, 706 (11th Cir. 1984). See also
Florida Officials Investigating Couples State Fair Contract Extension,
AP State and Local Wire, Mar. 8, 2001.
\10\ Kirk Loggins, Local Man Denies Paying Tony Rodham to Seek
Pardons, The Tennessean, Mar. 2, 2001, at 1A.
\11\ Tony Rodham Document Production 000029 (Petition for Pardon
After Completion of Sentence for Vonna Jo Gregory, Nov. 10. 1998)
(Exhibit 2); Gregory Document Production (Petition for Pardon After
Completion of Sentence for Edgar Allen Gregory, Jr., Nov. 10, 1998)
(Exhibit 3). See also Kirk Loggins, Local Man Denies Paying Tony Rodham
to Seek Pardons, The Tennessean, Mar. 2, 2001, at 1A.
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B. Tony Rodham's Relationship with the Gregorys
The Gregorys had a relationship with President Clinton
predating their relationship with Tony Rodham. The Gregorys
made substantial contributions to Bill Clinton when he was
running for President in 1992 and continued their contributions
throughout President Clinton's two terms in office.\12\ By
making large and frequent contributions to President Clinton's
campaign, the Gregorys were able to meet with President Clinton
a number of times. In total, the Gregorys met with President
Clinton at least ten times while he was in office.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ According to the Center on Responsive Politics, United Shows,
the Gregorys' company, has ranked among the top 6 entertainment
industry companies contributing to federal candidates and committees in
the last three two-year campaign cycles. According to campaign finance
disclosure records, United Shows contributed $50,000 to the DCCC in
2000, $25,000 to the DNC in 1998, and $10,000 to the Democratic
Senatorial Campaign Committee in 1998. According to financial
disclosure records, the Gregorys also contributed a total of $4,500 to
Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton in 1999 and 2000, $11,000 to the New
York Senate 2000 Committee, $1,000 to President Clinton in 1995, $4,000
to Vice President Gore, $8,000 to the Tennessee Democratic Party, and
$5,000 to the Democratic National Committee in 1992. During 1999 and
2000, the Gregorys, their children, and their company and its employees
reportedly contributed a total of $294,000. Although the Gregorys
contributed to Republican political interests during that period,
eighty-nine percent of the Gregorys' contributions in that interim
reportedly went to Democrats.
\13\ Telephone Interview with Edgar and Vonna Jo Gregory (Apr. 2,
2001). See also Gregory Document Production (Invitation to birthday
party for Hillary Rodham Clinton, Oct. 27, 1997) (Exhibit 4); Gregory
Document Production (Facsimile driving instructions from Daniela
Castro-Quijada, Tony Rodham & Associates, to Edgar and Vonna Jo Gregory
to birthday party for Hillary Rodham Clinton (Oct. 24, 1997)) (Exhibit
5). The Gregorys declined that invitation. See Letter from Deborah L.
McGee, Secretary to Howard Vine, Greenberg Traurig, to David Kass,
Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (June 7, 2001) (within
Appendix I).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Gregorys first met Tony Rodham while President Clinton
was campaigning for his second term.\14\ They met Rodham at a
small private fundraiser in Washington, D.C.\15\ Rodham
apparently used such fundraisers as a venue to solicit business
opportunities for his consulting firm \16\ and develop a
network of associates from which he could generate cash not
only for political purposes but also for his personal use. At
the fundraiser, Rodham introduced himself to the Gregorys as he
was making the rounds in the room.\17\ The Gregorys cannot
recall how many times or in what contexts they subsequently met
Rodham.\18\ But, in the period that followed, a substantial
business relationship between the Gregorys and Rodham
developed. Around August 1997, Rodham approached the Gregorys
and asked them to hire him as a consultant for their carnival
and music businesses.\19\ Rodham told the Gregorys that he
could be helpful to them in securing contracts or other
opportunities for their businesses.\20\ Rodham also suggested
that he had contacts in the real estate and music
businesses.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Telephone Interview with Edgar and Vonna Jo Gregory (Apr. 2,
2001).
\15\ Id.
\16\ In a televised interview, Rodham described himself as a
``general consultant'' and someone ``who solves problems for people.''
Interview by Larry King, CNN, with Tony Rodham (Mar. 3, 2001) (``I just
bring different peoples together. I help them negotiate deals.'').
\17\ Telephone Interview with Edgar and Vonna Jo Gregory (Apr. 2,
2001). See Kevin Sack, Pardoned Couple Say Access Has Served Them Well,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 2001, at A9.
\18\ Telephone Interview with Edgar and Vonna Jo Gregory (Apr. 2,
2001).
\19\ Id.
\20\ Id. This paragraph was added by the Gregorys to the draft
Rodham originally submitted to them.
\21\ Id.; Gregory Document Production (Consulting Services
Agreement between Tony Rodham & Associates and Anthony D. Rodham and
United Shows of America, et al. (June 6, 1998)) (Exhibit 6).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In August 1997, Rodham provided the Gregorys with a
proposed consulting services agreement.\22\ Under Rodham's
proposal, he would be retained to provide ``general consulting
services'' to United Shows of America.\23\ Rodham proposed that
he be paid a retainer of $200,000 in addition to $2,500 per
month for his labors.\24\ The Gregorys substantially revised
Rodham's proposed agreement before signing it in June 1998. The
main change made by the Gregorys was eliminating the $200,000
retainer. With their changes, Rodham received $2,500 per month
from the Gregorys as well as a $25,000 ``signing bonus.'' \25\
In addition, the Gregorys agreed to pay at their discretion
additional bonuses to Rodham for specific services provided by
Rodham.\26\ Rodham also received health benefits and the use of
a 1995 Chevrolet Suburban.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ Tony Rodham Document Production (Draft of Consulting Services
Agreement between Tony Rodham & Associates and United Shows of America
(Aug. 1, 1997)) (Exhibit 7).
\23\ Id.
\24\ Id.
\25\ Gregory Document Production (Consulting Services Agreement
between Tony Rodham & Associates and Anthony D. Rodham and United Shows
of America, et al. (June 6, 1998)) (Exhibit 6).
\26\ Id.
\27\ Id. See also Letter from Deborah L. McGee, Secretary to Howard
Vine, Greenberg Traurig, to David Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on
Govt. Reform (June 7, 2001); Gregory Document Production (Certificate
of Vehicle Registration Renewal, Dec. 5, 2000) (Exhibit 8); Gregory
Document Production (Vehicle inspection report, Dec. 5, 2000) (Exhibit
9); Gregory Document Production (Insurance Enrollment Form submitted by
Tony Rodham for life and health insurance to be provided by United
Shows of America, Mar. 29, 1999) (Exhibit 10).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Over the course of his relationship with the Gregorys and
United Shows, Tony Rodham received a substantial sum of money.
Rodham received a total of $62,985 in 1998,\28\ $85,806.27 in
1999,\29\ $93,978.66 in 2000,\30\ and at least $2,000 in
2001.\31\ In addition to the $244,769 he received in salary
from the Gregorys, Rodham also received a substantial sum in
personal loans. Rodham apparently had significant expenses
resulting from his divorce, and, therefore, he asked the
Gregorys to loan him money for expenses ranging from lawyer's
fees to school tuition for his son. The Gregorys started
loaning Rodham money in early 2000.\32\ In total, the Gregorys
made more than ten separate loans to Rodham, all of which were
consolidated into one promissory note for $72,000 payable in
December 2001 at eight percent interest.\33\ According to the
Gregorys, Rodham said that ``he was working on a deal and
expected a large payment before the note [was] due.'' \34\ In
2001, the Gregorys loaned Rodham an additional $7,000.\35\
Despite that the loan was due in December 2001, there is no
evidence that Rodham has repaid this loan, and the Gregorys'
attorney informed Committee staff that he believes that Rodham
has not repaid the loan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ Gregory Document Production (1998 IRS 1099 for Tony Rodham by
United Shows of America) (Exhibit 11).
\29\ Gregory Document Production (1999 IRS 1099 for Tony Rodham by
United Shows of America) (Exhibit 12).
\30\ Gregory Document Production (2000 IRS 1099 for Tony Rodham by
United Shows of America) (Exhibit 13).
\31\ Telephone Interview with Edgar and Vonna Jo Gregory (Apr. 2,
2001).
\32\ Id.
\33\ Tony Rodham Document Production 000003-04 (Promissory Note
from Tony Rodham to United Shows of America (Dec. 12, 2000)) (Exhibit
14).
\34\ Telephone Interview with Edgar and Vonna Jo Gregory (Apr. 2,
2001).
\35\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
From 1998 to 2001, Tony Rodham received a total of $323,769
in salary and loans from the Gregorys. A central question is
whether he was paid by the Gregorys to help obtain their pardon
or whether Rodham was paid for legitimate business services.
The Gregorys have referred to several efforts Rodham made
to obtain business for them and their company, United Shows.
For example, Edgar Gregory indicated that Rodham had contacts
with officials in the United Arab Emirates as part of an
unsuccessful effort to bring an ``American-style'' carnival to
Dubai.\36\ With the input of his sister, First Lady Hillary
Rodham Clinton, Rodham did help the Gregorys obtain a contract
to put on an ``old style'' carnival at the White House in 1998
and 2000.\37\ Rodham also obtained information from the State
Department for the Gregorys about doing business overseas and
reportedly did some unspecified ``public relations'' for the
Gregorys.\38\ In an interesting twist, the Gregorys also
indicated that Rodham's work for them also included bringing
them investment possibilities.\39\ The Gregorys said that
Rodham asked them to invest in an overseas telecommunications
project and a $118 million hazelnut scheme conceived by Tony
and Hugh Rodham.\40\ In essence, the Gregorys make the claim
that they paid Rodham to ask them to invest in other schemes in
which he was involved. There is no evidence that Tony Rodham's
investment advice was in such demand that the Gregorys had to
pay to be solicited by Rodham.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ Letter from Edgar and Vonna Jo Gregory to the Honorable Dan
Burton, Chairman, and David Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt.
Reform (June 12, 2001) (within Appendix I). See also Telephone
Interview with Edgar and Vonna Jo Gregory (Apr. 2, 2001); Kevin Sack,
Pardoned Couple Say Access Has Served Them Well, N.Y. Times, Mar. 10,
2001, at A9.
\37\ Telephone Interview with Edgar and Vonna Jo Gregory (Apr. 2,
2001). According to the Gregorys, Tony Rodham told them that Hillary
Rodham Clinton asked him to contact them about having an ``old-time''
carnival at the White House. Id.
\38\ Id.
\39\ Kevin Sack, Pardoned Couple Say Access Has Served Them Well,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 2001, at A9.
\40\ Letter from Edgar and Vonna Jo Gregory to the Honorable Dan
Burton, Chairman, and David Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt.
Reform (June 12, 2001) (within Appendix I). See also Telephone
Interview with Edgar and Vonna Jo Gregory (Apr. 2, 2001); Kevin Sack,
Pardoned Couple Say Access Has Served Them Well, N.Y. Times, Mar. 10,
2001, at A9. The latter deal involved growing and exporting hazelnuts
from the former Soviet Republic of Georgia. Letter from Edgar and Vonna
Jo Gregory to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, and David Kass,
Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (June 12, 2001) (within
Appendix I). See also Telephone Interview with Edgar and Vonna Jo
Gregory (Apr. 2, 2001); Kevin Sack, Pardoned Couple Say Access Has
Served Them Well, N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 2001, at A9; John F. Harris,
Hazelnut Flap Is Building; White House Disavows Clinton In-Law's
Foreign Dealings, Wash. Post, Jan. 1, 2000, at A6; Viveca Novak and Jay
Branegan, Are Hillary's Brothers Driving Off Course--Hugh and Tony
Rodham Are Bill Clinton's In-laws, a Connection That's Brought Them
Pain and Gain, Time, Nov. 1, 1999, at 46. In that deal, the Rodhams
entered into a partnership with the political rival of President Eduard
A. Shevardnadze whose government, then only tenuously in power, enjoyed
the support of the Clinton Administration. See Sack, supra (and other
cited authority). After the State Department complained that the deal
was causing diplomatic tension, the deal was abandoned. Id. Rodham's
other international business ventures were equally unimpressive. For
example, in 1998, Rodham and Stephen Graham, a business partner, met
with Prime Minister Hun Sen of Cambodia in that country in search of
new business opportunities. Lisa Getter, Family Ties Put Rodham
Brothers In Spotlight, L.A. Times, Mar. 4, 2001, at A1; Robin McDowell,
Brother of U.S. First Lady Meets Cambodia Strongman on Business Trip,
Associated Press, July 14, 1998. As with Rodham's initiative in the
Republic of Georgia, the State Department, which had difficulty with
Cambodia's human rights record, expressed concern about Rodham's
dealings in that country. See Getter, supra (and other cited
authority). Rodham was equally oblivious to the policy implications of
his ``business trips'' when he went to Taiwan and met with Taiwanese
Vice President Annette Lu. See Getter, supra; Deborah Kuo, ROC Vice
President Meets US First Lady's Brothers, Central News Agency (Taipei),
June 23, 2000. Taiwanese government officials who attended the meeting
``considered [the meeting] very hush-hush.'' See Getter, supra.
According to one such official, ``Nobody wanted to talk about [the
meeting] because [Rodham's] brother-in-law was the president--because
if China knew about the trip, they might raise issues.'' Id. Not
surprisingly, as was the case with Rodham's other attempts to develop
international business opportunities, no deal emerged from Rodham's
trip to Taiwan. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Critically, the Gregorys did not provide the Committee with
a single document reflecting work performed for them by Tony
Rodham. Given the fact that the Gregorys were subpoenaed to
provide the Committee with ``[a]ll records reflecting work
performed for you or your company by Tony Rodham,'' such
records should have been produced to the Committee if they
existed. Therefore, it is safe to conclude that the Gregorys do
not have a single document reflecting substantive work
performed for them by Tony Rodham despite the fact that they
paid him $244,769 in salaries and loaned him another $79,000.
Such a lack of documentation supports the conclusion that Tony
Rodham performed little or no substantive valuable work for the
Gregorys apart from the failed effort to stage a carnival in
Dubai and the effort to stage carnivals at the White House. The
Gregorys attempted to explain the lack of documentation in a
letter to Chairman Burton:
[We] certainly do not deny he has either sent or
brought to us a great deal of information over the
years, of which a lot of Tony's ideas were over the
telephone and not in writing, that he thought we may be
interested in investing in, as a management partner,
and/or that he thought we might be interested in taking
a financial position in.\41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\41\ Letter from Edgar and Vonna Jo Gregory to the Honorable Dan
Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (June 12, 2001) (within
Appendix I).
However, since the Gregorys did not produce to the Committee
any documentation of the work performed for them by Rodham, it
is possible that the large sum of money paid to Tony Rodham by
the Gregorys was compensation for Rodham's efforts to obtain
pardons for the Gregorys.
C. Tony Rodham's Efforts to Help the Gregorys Obtain Pardons
In 1998, the Gregorys became interested in seeking
presidential pardons, primarily because their convictions
undermined their ability to obtain carnival contracts.\42\ In
cases where bid applications specifically requested criminal
history, the Gregorys were sometimes barred from bidding for
contract business.\43\ In some cases, according to the
Gregorys, their competitors sent fair officials information
regarding their criminal history.\44\ One of the largest
problems faced by the Gregorys during this time period related
to their role as the primary contractor for the Florida State
Fair. The Gregorys took over as primary contractor for the Fair
in 1998 and soon found that their criminal convictions were
posing a problem for Florida state officials.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\ Telephone Interview with Edgar and Vonna Jo Gregory (Apr. 2,
2001).
\43\ Telephone Interview with Edgar and Vonna Jo Gregory (Apr. 2,
2001); Marc Lacey and Don Van Natta, Jr., Second Clinton In-Law Says He
Helped to Obtain Pardon, N.Y. Times, Mar. 1, 2001, at A1; Kevin Sack,
Pardoned Couple Say Access Has Served Them Well, N.Y. Times, Mar. 10,
2001, at A9; Kirk Loggins, Local Man Denies Paying Tony Rodham to Seek
Pardons, The Tennessean, Mar. 2, 2001, at 1A.
\44\ Telephone Interview with Edgar and Vonna Jo Gregory (Apr. 2,
2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Faced with the possible loss of significant business
relating to state fairs, the Gregorys decided to file for
pardons. They consulted with their son, David Gregory, a
lawyer, as well as Greenberg Traurig, a prominent Florida law
firm.\45\ The Gregorys prepared the relevant paperwork and
filed their pardon petition with the Justice Department on
November 14, 1998.\46\ It appears that, on that same day, the
Gregorys also sent copies of their pardon petitions directly to
the White House and requested that President Clinton ``[p]lease
personally review the application and exhibits enclosed
herein.'' \47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\45\ Id.
\46\ Id. See also Gregory Document Production 000144 (Letter from
Vonna Jo Gregory to Roger Adams, Pardon Attorney, Department of Justice
(Nov. 16, 1998)) (Exhibit 15); Marc Lacey and Don Van Natta, Jr.,
Second Clinton In-Law Says He Helped to Obtain Pardon, N.Y. Times, Mar.
1, 2001, at A1.
\47\ Tony Rodham Document Production 000028 (Letter from Vonna Jo
Gregory to President William J. Clinton (Nov. 14, 1998)) (Exhibit 16).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After the pardon petition was filed, the Gregorys and their
Greenberg Traurig lawyers remained in contact with the Justice
Department. Mark Schnapp, one of the Gregorys' lawyers at
Greenberg Traurig, met with Pardon Attorney Roger Adams and
Helen Bollwerk, another staff attorney in the Pardon Attorney's
office, to discuss the petition.\48\ Specifically, Schnapp
informed them that the Gregorys' convictions were adversely
impacting their business in relation to the Florida State
Fair.\49\ He also told them that the Gregorys needed the
pardons by February 2000 if they were to help with the
contracting process in Florida.\50\ Justice Department staff
asked the Gregorys or their representatives on several
occasions for additional information with respect to the pardon
petitions. Throughout their contacts with the Justice
Department, the Gregorys and their attorneys believed that the
Justice Department was ``understanding,'' and they never
developed a sense that the Department viewed their petition
negatively.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\48\ Telephone Interview with Edgar and Vonna Jo Gregory (Apr. 2,
2001).
\49\ Id. See also Gregory Document Production (Letter from Bob
Crawford, Commissioner, Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer
Services to Roger Adams, Pardon Attorney, Department of Justice (Jan.
28, 2000)) (Exhibit 17) (urging Pardon Attorney to consider Gregorys'
clemency application expeditiously because of impending contract
negotiations regarding Florida State Fair).
\50\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nevertheless, by late 1999 the Gregorys had not received
their pardons, and they were growing impatient. The Gregorys
approached Tony Rodham for his assistance with the pardon at a
party in late 1999 or early 2000.\51\ At this point, Rodham had
been on the Gregorys' payroll for a year and a half. Edgar
Gregory described his request to Tony Rodham as follows:
``Tony, we've applied for a pardon, and if you can help us in
any way, we'd really appreciate it.'' \52\ Gregory recalls that
Rodham initially replied, ``I don't really get involved in
that'' and suggested that pardons were handled at the Justice
Department.\53\ According to Edgar Gregory, Rodham gave them
the impression that he could not help much with their pardon
petition but that ``if he could do anything, he would.'' \54\
Edgar Gregory stated that he saw Tony Rodham occasionally
between late 1999 and March 2000 when he and Vonna Jo Gregory
received their pardons. Edgar Gregory occasionally raised the
pardon effort with Rodham, even once telling him that the
Justice Department was ``putting them through the wringer''
with respect to their pardon applications.\55\ But Rodham said
little to encourage them and did not tell them that he had
raised the pardons with his brother-in-law or sister.\56\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\52\ Telephone Interview with Edgar and Vonna Jo Gregory (Apr. 2,
2001). See also Marc Lacey and Don Van Natta, Jr., Second Clinton In-
Law Says He Helped to Obtain Pardon, N.Y. Times, Mar. 1, 2001, at A1.
Vonna Jo Gregory believes that Rodham first became aware of their
convictions in connection with their bid for the Florida State Fair,
but it was in December 1999 that the Gregorys expressed to Rodham
disappointment about not having been pardoned and asked him for help.
Id.
\51\ Id. See also Marc Lacey and Don Van Natta, Jr., Second Clinton
In-Law Says He Helped to Obtain Pardon, N.Y. Times, Mar. 1, 2001, at
A1.
\53\ Marc Lacey and Don Van Natta, Jr., Second Clinton In-Law Says
He Helped to Obtain Pardon, N.Y. Times, Mar. 1, 2001, at A1.
\54\ Telephone Interview with Edgar and Vonna Jo Gregory (Apr. 2,
2001).
\55\ Id.
\56\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In their interview with Committee staff, the Gregorys and
their attorneys attempted to minimize the role of Tony Rodham
in obtaining the pardons. They discounted the importance of
Rodham's role in obtaining pardons. They claimed that the
Justice Department had the predominant role in processing the
Gregorys' petition, and since Tony Rodham did not have any
influence at the Justice Department, Rodham was not
``necessary'' to the process.\57\ However, common sense and the
evidence in this case suggest that the Gregorys' basic story--
that they believed that Rodham was not important to the pardon
process--is not true. Rather, Tony Rodham had a significant
role in obtaining the pardons, and the Gregorys attached some
importance to Rodham's efforts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\57\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
First, the suggestion by the Gregorys and their lawyers
that Rodham's participation was not significant because he did
not have influence at the Justice Department is absurd.
Obviously, when seeking Presidential pardons, it is far more
important to have influence and access to the President of the
United States than the Pardon Attorney or any other Justice
Department staffer. Tony Rodham had this access and used it to
lobby for the Gregorys' pardons.
Second, Edgar Gregory did more than merely mention his
pardon effort to Tony Rodham in an off-hand manner. Gregory
provided Rodham with a copy of his pardon petition as well.
When Committee staff initially asked Gregory why he provided
Rodham with a copy of the petition, he was initially unable to
provide an explanation. Then, he suggested that he gave Rodham
a copy of the petition just so that Rodham would not be
``blindsided'' by the fact that they had applied for a
pardon.\58\ Gregory vehemently denied that he had given Rodham
a copy of the petition so that Rodham could hand-carry it to
the White House or otherwise influence the pardon process.\59\
If Gregory did provide Rodham with a copy of the pardon
petition so that he could hand-carry it to the President or so
that Rodham could make a more impressive pitch to the
President, it would undermine the Gregorys' claim that they did
not place any significance on Rodham's efforts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\58\ Id.
\59\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite the Gregorys' protestations, it appears that Rodham
did have a significant role in the pardon process. Rodham would
not agree to an interview with Committee staff regarding his
role in the Gregory pardons. Nevertheless, he did describe some
of his activities to the press. According to these reports,
Rodham asked President Clinton to pardon the Gregorys.\60\
Specifically, he stated, ``I didn't push. I told the President
about Ed Gregory and that he had applied for a pardon. He's
what the pardon process is all about.'' \61\ Rodham has
recalled publicly that he told President Clinton that the
Gregorys' pardon petition had been filed through the Justice
Department and argued to the President that pardons for the
couple ``made good sense.'' \62\ He told the President that
``[Edgar Gregory] is repentant for what he did'' and ``[the
offenses for which the Gregorys were convicted were] white-
collar crime[s] involving banking irregularities. He's paid his
taxes. He's run a respectful business for 40 years. He's a good
guy.'' \63\ It also appears that Rodham claimed that the
Gregorys were deeply involved in charitable activities in
Tennessee and throughout the country.\64\ Rodham also called
Deputy White House Counsel Bruce Lindsey about the Gregory
pardons. Lindsey stated that Rodham's call to him was ``mostly
concerned about the fact that the application had been pending
over in the Justice Department[,] and [he] asked me whether I
could try to move it along.'' \65\ Either at that point or
subsequently, Lindsey became aware that Rodham had spoken to
the President.\66\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\60\ Marc Lacey and Don Van Natta, Jr., Second Clinton In-Law Says
He Helped to Obtain Pardon, N.Y. Times, Mar. 1, 2001, at A1.
\61\ Id.
\62\ Id.
\63\ Id.
\64\ See Interview by Larry King, CNN, with Tony Rodham (Mar. 3,
2001).
\65\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 254
(Mar. 1, 2001).
\66\ Id. Howard Vine, one of the Greenberg Traurig attorneys
representing the Gregorys, also called Deputy White House Counsel Bruce
Lindsey and White House Counsel Beth Nolan. Vine describes those calls
as ``largely procedural.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
D. Deliberations by the Administration
According to press reports, the Justice Department opposed
the Gregory pardons because the Gregorys did not ``accept the
criminality of their actions.'' \67\ The United States Attorney
who prosecuted the case as well as the judge responsible for
sentencing the Gregorys also opposed the pardons.\68\ According
to federal prosecutors, the Gregorys' activities as owners of
several small Alabama banks were blatantly fraudulent; such
activities included arranging unsecured loans to themselves,
their friends, and other companies they owned.\69\ Ginny S.
Grande, the assistant U.S. Attorney who prosecuted the
Gregorys, noted, ``[The Gregorys] drained the banks that they
were majority shareholders in and just ran them into the ground
for this interconnecting web of companies they owned. They ran
those banks with an iron fist.'' \70\ The question then is why
were these recommendations ignored.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\69\ Kevin Sack, Pardoned Couple Say Access Has Served Them Well,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 2001, at A9.
\67\ Marc Lacey and Don Van Natta, Jr., Second Clinton In-Law Says
He Helped to Obtain Pardon, N.Y. Times, Mar. 1, 2001, at A1. See also
Interview with Meredith Cabe, Associate Counsel to the President, the
White House (Mar. 16, 2001). However, due to the Bush Administration's
refusal to produce to the Committee records relating to the
consideration of pardon petitions by the Justice Department and Clinton
White House, the Committee has not obtained any records from the
Justice Department regarding the consideration of the Gregory pardon.
Therefore, the Committee does not know the specific reasons the Justice
Department opposed the Gregorys' petition.
\68\ Id.
\70\ Id. Federal prosecutors have noted that the Gregorys also used
the Wilcox County Bank in Camden, Alabama, to buy goods from their
other companies. For example, that bank ordered 10,000 job application
forms from a company owned by the Gregorys for another bank with 20
employees in a town of 2,000 people.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There is evidence indicating that the President, not White
House staff, was the driving force behind the Gregory pardons.
Associate White House Counsel Meredith Cabe, the primary White
House lawyer responsible for processing clemency petitions,
recalls that Bruce Lindsey and Beth Nolan told her that someone
had raised the Gregory case with the President because the
President had been asking them about the case.\71\ Former
Clinton aides have publicly conceded that President Clinton
expressed a strong desire to Justice Department officials to
have the Gregorys pardoned.\72\ In speaking to Deputy White
House Counsel, Bruce Lindsey, President Clinton ``indicated . .
. that he understood that the Gregorys were unable to do
business in certain states, and that competitors of the
Gregorys were raising their conviction some 17, 18 years ago as
a basis as to why various states shouldn't do business with
them.'' \73\ According to Lindsey, President Clinton ``thought
that was not fair.'' \74\ In testimony before the Committee,
Lindsey elaborated as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\71\ Interview with Meredith Cabe, Associate Counsel to the
President, the White House (Mar. 16, 2001).
\72\ Marc Lacey and Don Van Natta, Jr., Second Clinton In-Law Says
He Helped to Obtain Pardon, N.Y. Times, Mar. 1, 2001, at A1.
\73\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 255
(Mar. 1, 2001).
\74\ Id.
The President's belief on pardons is that if a person
makes a mistake, does something illegal, wrong, if they
have paid the price for that, if they have gone to jail
or they go on probation and then they live a good life
from that point on forward, that they should not be
denied the restoration of their rights because of that.
He certainly would believe that a person 17 years
afterwards shouldn't have a conviction be used to keep
them from making a living. And, therefore, believed
that if, in fact, they had lived a good life, if they
had not been in additional trouble from that point[.]
\75\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\75\ Id.
Because Lindsey believed that the Gregorys ``were being
financially hurt because of a conviction 17, 18 years ago and
that they had done nothing subsequent to be in trouble with the
law, that they were deserving of a pardon,'' he recommended
that President Clinton consider the petition.\76\ Meredith Cabe
did not find the merits of the Gregorys' petition particularly
compelling.\77\ For her part, White House Counsel Beth Nolan
does not recall her position on the Gregory case. Cabe recalls
that Nolan was not opposed to the pardons and recommended that
the President review the case.\78\ On March 15, 2000, President
Clinton pardoned the Gregorys of their convictions.\79\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\76\ Id.; Interview with Meredith Cabe, Associate Counsel to the
President, the White House (Mar. 16, 2001). To the extent that the
Gregorys believed that a presidential pardon would require that they no
longer disclose their convictions when applying for state carnival
contracts, it appears that they were wrong. According to Pardon
Attorney Roger Adams, a pardon ``does not erase or expunge the record
of conviction and does not indicate innocence.'' Letter from Roger
Adams, Pardon Attorney, Department of Justice, to Mark Schnapp, Counsel
to Edgar and Vonna Jo Gregory, Greenberg Traurig (Mar. 15, 2000)
(Exhibit 18). As Adams indicated to the Gregorys, ``On any application
or other document which requires the information, a pardon recipient
should disclose the fact of his or her conviction.'' Id.
\77\ See Interview with Meredith Cabe, Associate Counsel to the
President, the White House (Mar. 16, 2001).
\78\ Id.
\79\ See Gregory Document Production (Letter from Roger Adams,
Pardon Attorney, Department of Justice, to Mark P. Schnapp, Counsel to
Edgar and Vonna Jo Gregory, Greenberg Traurig (Mar. 15, 2001)) (Exhibit
18) (describing President Clinton's grant of clemency); Gregory
Document Production (Warrant of Executive Grant of Clemency for Vonna
Jo Gregory, Mar. 15, 2000, and Acknowledgement Form, Mar. 17, 2000)
(Exhibit 19); Gregory Document Production (Warrant of Executive Grant
of Clemency for Edgar Allen Gregory, Mar. 15, 2000, and Acknowledgement
Form, Mar. 17, 2000) (Exhibit 20). See also Gregory Document Production
(Letter from Edgar Allen and Vonna Jo Gregory to President William J.
Clinton (Mar. 16, 2000)) (Exhibit 21) (thanking President for grant of
clemency).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
E. Conclusion
There are several troubling facts regarding Tony Rodham's
lobbying efforts on behalf of the Gregorys:
Tony Rodham was provided with $323,769 by the
Gregorys for work for which there is little documentary
evidence.
Rodham lobbied his brother-in-law, President
Clinton, and Deputy White House Counsel Bruce Lindsey in
support of the Gregorys' pardons.
President Clinton granted the Gregorys' pardons
despite the fact that the Justice Department, relevant
prosecutors, and the sentencing judge all objected to the
pardon. The Gregorys' only qualification for the pardons was
that they had a lucrative business which was being adversely
impacted by their criminal record and that they had hired the
President's brother-in-law.
A full understanding of these facts has been further
complicated by the refusal of Tony Rodham to cooperate with the
Committee and the refusal of the Bush Administration to provide
the Committee with all records relating to the consideration of
the Gregory pardons.
The Committee is able to conclude that Rodham was paid a
significant amount of money by the Gregorys and apparently did
little for them other than lobby for their pardons. However,
there is not sufficient evidence to conclude definitively that
the Gregorys hired Rodham for the express purpose of using him
to lobby for Presidential pardons. However, the time period
during which the Gregorys were seeking presidential pardons and
during which they were paying Rodham overlapped substantially;
therefore, it is probable that Rodham was paid for his efforts
to obtain pardons for the Gregorys. This conclusion is also
bolstered by Tony Rodham's subsequent attempted to use his
success in the Gregorys' case to obtain payments to help others
obtain pardons, described below.
It is clear that Rodham had a significant role in obtaining
pardons for the Gregorys. Reportedly, those individuals who
were familiar with the Gregory case--the Pardon Attorney,
federal prosecutors and the sentencing judge--did not believe
that they should be pardoned. However, those people who were
lobbied by Tony Rodham--President Clinton and Bruce Lindsey--
did believe that they should be pardoned. As in the case of
many other questionable grants of clemency issued by President
Clinton, the impetus for the Gregory pardons came from the
President himself. It appears that the President was interested
in the Gregory pardons solely because of his contacts with Tony
Rodham. It is fair to conclude that, but for Tony Rodham's
lobbying efforts, the Gregory pardons would not have been
granted.
One of the factors supporting the conclusion that Rodham
was indispensable to the Gregorys' pardon effort is the
Gregorys' unsuitability for presidential pardons. The Gregorys
committed a serious crime, defrauding banks they owned out of
substantial funds for their personal benefit. Tony Rodham
himself was unable to provide much of a justification for the
Gregory pardons:
Tony Rodham. The Gregorys are the kind of people that
the pardon system is made for.
Larry King. Because?
Tony Rodham. They are people--well, they're tax-paying
citizens. They've been involved in different charitable
organizations. They do a tremendous amount of help in
their community in Nashville and throughout the rest of
the country. Florida, where they do the Florida State
Fair every year, they do a tremendous amount of money
every year. They do a tremendous amount of money that
has gone into the Florida state government's
coffers.\80\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\80\ Interview by Larry King, CNN, with Tony Rodham (Mar. 3, 2001).
It appears that the primary motivation for the pardons was the
fact that the Gregorys were finding that their criminal
histories were an impediment to receiving state contracts. Of
course, such difficulties are the natural and fair result of
criminal convictions, not by themselves a justification for
pardons.
However, there are also unanswered questions about the
Gregory case. The most significant question is whether the
President or First Lady knew of the financial relationship
between Tony Rodham and the Gregorys when Rodham was lobbying
the President for the pardons. In his testimony before the
Committee, Deputy White House Counsel Bruce Lindsey stated that
this financial relationship ``was unknown to me until I read it
in paper [this] morning [of the hearing].'' \81\ Lindsey
testified that he did not know if the President knew of
Rodham's financial relationship with the Gregorys.\82\ In a
statement to the press, Hillary Clinton stated that ``[t]hese
are people he has known for some time . . . he has a personal
relationship with them. He was not paid. I think there's a
distinction between someone whom you've known for a number of
years . . . and taking money on behalf of people he didn't know
and had no personal relationship with.'' \83\ At the time
Senator Clinton made her statement about the Gregory case, it
had already been publicly disclosed that Tony Rodham was
working as a paid consultant. Therefore, her statement that
Tony Rodham ``was not paid'' is not accurate. However, her
statement does not make it clear whether she knew of Tony
Rodham's lucrative financial relationship with the Gregorys at
the time he was lobbying the White House for their pardons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\81\ ``The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc
Rich,'' Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 256
(Mar. 1, 2001).
\82\ Id.
\83\ Hillary Clinton Defends Brother Tony, Associated Press State
and Local Wire, Mar. 1, 2001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
If the President or First Lady did know that Tony Rodham
was receiving substantial sums of money from the Gregorys at
the time he was lobbying the White House for their pardons, it
would cast substantial doubt on the motivations of the
President for issuing the pardons. It would appear that the
President was not motivated by any genuine belief in the merits
of the Gregorys' case, particularly given the fact that such
merits did not exist. Rather, it would appear that he was
motivated by the desire to help his brother-in-law cash in.
Such a case would be a quintessential conflict of interest.
However, given the failure of the President to address the
details of his decisionmaking in the Gregorys case and other
controversial grants of clemency, the public will likely never
know his true motivations.
II. FERNANDO FUENTES COBA
In the course of its investigation, the Committee
discovered that Tony Rodham attempted to become involved in
lobbying for a presidential pardon for another individual,
Fernando Fuentes Coba. In this case, Rodham solicited a large
payment from Fuentes' daughter, Vivian Mannerud, in return for
the promise to lobby for Fuentes' pardon. It appears that
Rodham and an associate of Rodham's made misleading statements
to Mannerud in an attempt to get her to pay Rodham to work on
the case. The Fuentes case combines the unsavory aspects of
Rodham's work on the Gregory matter--a blatant attempt by
Rodham to sell his influence--with a potentially illegal
attempt to defraud Vivian Mannerud.
A. Background on Fernando Fuentes Coba
In the late 1970s, Fernando Fuentes Coba started an airline
charter business called American Airways Charters, Inc.
(``AAC''). AAC took advantage of changes in U.S. law permitting
charter flights to Cuba and, over the next several years, built
a successful business based on flights between the U.S. and
Cuba.\84\ After the Mariel boatlift, Fuentes, AAC, and a number
of other companies and individuals were investigated for having
violated U.S. law in connection with having facilitated the
Mariel Boatlift. In 1982, Fuentes, seven other individuals, and
four corporations were indicted for what U.S. customs officials
described as a ``big, gigantic conspiracy by the Cuban
Government to obtain U.S. currency'' in connection with the
Mariel Boatlift.\85\ In late 1982, Fuentes was convicted of
conspiring to trade with the enemy and violating the Cuban
Assets Control Act in connection with the shipment of goods to
Cuba.\86\ Fuentes was sentenced to a term of one-year
imprisonment and a $10,000 fine.\87\ After having his appeals
rejected, in 1985, Fuentes was ordered to report to prison.\88\
Rather than report, Fuentes fled to Mexico where he remained a
fugitive until his death.\89\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\84\ Tony Rodham Document Production 000020 (Attachment B to Pardon
Application of Fernando Fuentes Coba) (Exhibit 24).
\85\ 8 People, 4 Companies indicted in Cuba Sealift, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 26, 1982, at A14.
\86\ Tony Rodham Document Production 000017 (Attachment A to Pardon
Application of Fernando Fuentes Coba) (Exhibit 23).
\87\ Id.
\88\ Id.
\89\ Telephone Interview with Vivian Mannerud (Aug. 28, 2001).
Fuentes was sentenced to a term of one year in prison but, according to
Mannerud, was ``fearful for his life'' because ``there were drug
dealers there'' and he ``would have been lumped in as a communist.''
According to Mannerud, Fuentes ``decided not to go'' to jail for that
reason. See also Mark Hosenball, Periscope, Newsweek, Mar. 11, 2002
(noting Fuentes' death).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While a fugitive, Fuentes apparently became very ill,
suffering from heart disease, stroke, two aortic aneurysms,
emphysema, and diabetes.\90\ In 2000, Fuentes apparently
decided that he wanted to return to the U.S. to receive medical
treatment and be close to his family without serving his prison
sentence.\91\ Helping Fuentes achieve this goal was his
daughter, Vivian Mannerud. Mannerud, a prominent Democratic
contributor who has raised or contributed hundreds of thousands
of dollars, is also involved in the charter airline business
and has arranged a number of high-profile flights between the
U.S. and Cuba.\92\ Mannerud was herself embroiled in
controversy when she solicited convicted cocaine dealer Jorge
Cabrera to contribute to the DNC and arranged for Cabrera to be
photographed with President Clinton. Mannerud also had $22,000
in contributions returned by the Senate campaign of Hillary
Clinton when the press reported on Mannerud's role in the
Cabrera matter.\93\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\90\ Tony Rodham Document Production 000021 (Attachment C to Pardon
Application of Fernando Fuentes Coba) (Exhibit 25).
\91\ Telephone Interview with Vivian Mannerud (Aug. 28, 2001).
\92\ For example, Mannerud was instrumental in arranging for Elian
Gonzalez's Cuban grandparents to visit the United States. See Carol
Rosenberg, Longtime Air Charter Operator Set to Retire, Miami Herald,
Nov. 6, 2000, at 1B. She also provided the charter for U.S. celebrities
to attend the 1999 game between the Baltimore Orioles and the Cuban
national team.
\93\ See Carol Rosenberg, Donor Gets Angry at Democrats, Miami
Herald, Apr. 21, 2000, at 1B. When her money was returned by the
Clinton campaign, Mannerud stated, ``I think . . . they have to stop
calling me for money, begging me for money, haunting me for money'' and
recommended that the Democratic Party return to her the ``several
hundred thousand dollars'' she had given in the preceding years. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mannerud initially attempted to resolve her father's case
by contacting the U.S. Attorney's office.\94\ Mannerud
attempted to negotiate her father's return to the United
States, claiming he could stay in a hospital in lieu of
incarceration.\95\ When Mannerud concluded that the U.S.
Attorney's Office could not give her any guarantees, she and
her attorney, Lonnie Anne Pera, prepared a pardon petition on
her father's behalf.\96\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\94\ Telephone Interview with Vivian Mannerud (Aug. 28, 2001).
\95\ Id.
\96\ Id. Mannerud did so through the assistance of her attorney in
Washington, Lonnie Pera, an aviation attorney. See Tony Rodham Document
Production 000005 (Fernando Fuentes Coba Pardon Petition) (Exhibit 22).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. The Pardon Attorney Refuses to Process Fuentes' Clemency Petition
Around late October 2000, Mannerud sent her father's pardon
petition to the Office of the Pardon Attorney at the Department
of Justice.\97\ In the petition, Fuentes did not indicate any
remorse for his crimes. Rather, he maintained his innocence and
claimed selective prosecution and ineffective assistance of
counsel.\98\ Fuentes also did not express regret for having
fled the United States after his conviction. Rather, he claimed
that he fled the country because he ``feared that anti-Castro
groups would seriously injure, maim, or kill me in prison.''
\99\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\97\ Id. In an interview with Committee staff, Mannerud could not
recall exactly when she sent the petition to the Pardon Attorney's
Office. She believed that she probably did so about a month before the
date on a White House document which states that Fuentes ``just
applied'' for a pardon. That document is dated November 27, 2000.
Mannerud's recollection that she sent the petition late in 2000 accords
with her memory that, whenever she submitted the petition, someone told
her that it was ``kind of late'' to apply because there was not enough
time for the FBI to conduct its background check.
\98\ Tony Rodham Document Production 000025 (Attachment C to Pardon
Application of Fernando Fuentes Coba) (Exhibit 25).
\99\ Tony Rodham Document Production 000023 (Attachment C to Pardon
Application of Fernando Fuentes Coba) (Exhibit 25).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On November 7, 2000, Pardon Attorney Roger Adams sent a
letter to Mannerud's attorney stating that the Justice
Department would not process Fuentes' petition because he was a
fugitive.\100\ Adams explained that:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\100\ Telephone Interview with Vivian Mannerud (Aug. 28, 2001).
Mr. Coba is ineligible to apply for a presidential
pardon. Pursuant to 28 C.F.R. Sec. 1.2 . . . ``[n]o
petition for pardon should be filed until the
expiration of a waiting period of at least five years
after the date of the release of the petitioner from
confinement . . . .'' Because Mr. Coba has served none
of his prison sentence, he fails to meet this most
basic eligibility requirement for pardon consideration.
Moreover, the Department of Justice has consistently
declined to accept pardon petitions from individuals,
such as Mr. Coba, who are fugitives, since the pardon
process assumes the Government's ability to implement
either of the President's possible decisions regarding
a petition--that is, a denial of clemency as well as a
grant of clemency. Put another way, it is not
reasonable to allow a person to ask that the President
grant him a pardon which, if granted, would have the
effect of eliminating the term of imprisonment to which
he has been sentenced, while at the same time
insulating himself from having to serve the sentence if
the pardon is denied.\101\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\101\ Vivian Mannerud Document Production (Letter from Roger Adams,
Pardon Attorney, Department of Justice, to Lonnie Anne Pera, Counsel to
Vivian Mannerud, Zuckert Scoutt & Rasenberger (Nov. 7, 2000)) (Exhibit
28).
The Justice Department's application of the foregoing
policy, whereby it does not even consider pardon petitions from
fugitives, stands in marked contrast to how the policy was
applied in the Marc Rich and Pincus Green case. Clearly, the
policy expressed by Roger Adams in the Fuentes case should have
applied equally in the Marc Rich case. In the Rich case, of
course, the White House considered and granted the Rich and
Green pardons contrary to Justice Department policy. Moreover,
the Deputy Attorney General, Eric Holder, expressed his support
for the pardons despite the express contrary policy of his own
Department. The fact that Fuentes' petition was summarily
rejected confirms that Jack Quinn was right in thinking that he
needed to circumvent the Justice Department in order to obtain
pardons for Marc Rich and Pincus Green. Fuentes' summary
rejection by the Justice Department also leads one to speculate
that Fernando Fuentes Coba and Vivian Mannerud might have been
more successful if they had hired Tony Rodham to lobby for the
pardon.
Despite the fact that the Justice Department declined to
process her father's pardon petition, Mannerud gave the pardon
petition to ``a lot of people--anyone who could help make sure
that the application wasn't just put on a pile.'' \102\ Among
the people to whom Mannerud gave copies of the petition was Joe
Perez, a friend of Mannerud's in California, who, according to
Mannerud, owns J. Perez & Associates, a travel services
company.\103\ Mannerud believed that Perez knew ``one of the
Clinton brothers--probably Roger Clinton, because he is in
California too.'' \104\ Ultimately, Mannerud understood that
Perez was going to speak to ``his contact'' about her father's
pardon petition.\105\ But, in hindsight, Mannerud does not know
whether Perez did so.\106\ Mannerud also gave a copy of the
petition to a friend named Joe Velazquez who, according to
Mannerud, ran a Hispanic outreach program and had worked at the
Clinton White House.\107\ Mannerud does not know what, if
anything, Velazquez did in support of her father's
petition.\108\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\102\ Telephone Interview with Vivian Mannerud (Aug. 28, 2001).
\103\ Id.
\104\ Id. In connection with its investigation of Roger Clinton,
the Committee learned that Clinton was in business with Perez and a
number of other individuals in Los Angeles who were in the business of
arranging travel to Cuba.
\105\ Id.
\106\ Id.
\107\ Id.
\108\ Id. But see NARA Document Production (Draft of document
entitled ``Pending Clemency Matters'' by Meredith Cabe, Associate
Counsel to the President, the White House (Dec. 10, 2000)) (Exhibit 29)
This document, which was retrieved from the work file of Deputy White
House Counsel Bruce Lindsey, indicates that ``Velazquez spoke to POTUS
re: case.'' Id. at 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
C. Tony Rodham's Attempt to Become Involved in the Fuentes Clemency
Effort
Tony Rodham became involved in the Fuentes matter in
November 2000.\109\ Mannerud was introduced to Rodham at the
Mayflower Hotel by their mutual friend, Marilyn J. Parker.\110\
Parker, like Mannerud, was a prominent Democratic contributor.
Parker also was involved in business with Tony Rodham. Rodham
invested in a Florida company called Environmental Energy
Fuels, which has developed a reportedly environmentally-
sensitive gasoline additive.\111\ Well before the meeting at
the Mayflower Hotel, Parker had offered Rodham, and Rodham
accepted, an opportunity to obtain shares in that company.\112\
In August 2001, Parker pleaded guilty to five felonies in
connection with $145,000 she paid in bribes to Miami airport
officials in return for $1.5 million in no-bid work at the
airport.\113\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\109\ Telephone Interview with Vivian Mannerud (Aug. 28, 2001).
\110\ Id.
\111\ Lisa Getter, Family Ties Put Rodham Brothers In Spotlight,
L.A. Times, Mar. 4, 2001, at A1.
\112\ Id.
\113\ Joseph Tanfani, Case Could Bring More Prosecutions, Miami
Herald, Aug. 4, 2001, at 20A.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to Parker, Mannerud initially spoke to her about
her father's pardon matter during a trip in New York.\114\
During that trip, which, according to Parker, occurred around
September 2000, Mannerud talked about her father's age and
deteriorating physical condition as well as his desire to
return to the United States.\115\ Parker offered to write a
letter in support of his petition.\116\ According to Parker,
the gist of her letter was simply that she knew that Fuentes
was aged and in ill health.\117\ Parker had no opinion as to
why Mannerud thought that, given her limited knowledge about
the matter, her support would have been meaningful.\118\ Parker
initially characterized her role as being limited to drafting
the letter.\119\ However, she later conceded that she had also
arranged and participated in a meeting between Tony Rodham and
Vivian Mannerud.\120\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\114\ Telephone Interview with Marilyn J. Parker (Dec. 18, 2001).
\115\ Id.
\116\ Id
\117\ Id.
\118\ Id.
\119\ Id.
\120\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After discussing the pardon effort with Mannerud in New
York, Parker decided that Tony Rodham might be able to assist
Mannerud.\121\ Therefore, she called Rodham, and he suggested
that Parker and Mannerud meet him for a drink that afternoon in
the Mayflower Hotel.\122\ At the hotel, Rodham and Mannerud
talked about her father's pardon petition.\123\ According to
Parker, the meeting lasted no more than an hour.\124\ Mannerud
and Rodham discussed why she was seeking a pardon for her
father and what avenues Mannerud had pursued to date.\125\
Rodham then told Mannerud that he could help her obtain the
pardon for her father.\126\ Rodham told Mannerud that he had
previously helped two individuals obtain pardons and even
brought a copy of their clemency petition with him to the
meeting.\127\ Rodham then told Mannerud that he would help her
if she paid him.\128\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\121\ Id.
\122\ Id.
\123\ Id.
\124\ Id.
\125\ Telephone Interview with Vivian Mannerud (Aug. 28, 2001).
\126\ Id.
\127\ Id. Neither Parker nor Mannerud was able to specifically
recall the names of the individuals mentioned by Rodham, although
Mannerud did remember that they were ``carnival people.'' This
reference strongly suggests that Rodham mentioned the Gregorys' case to
Mannerud. The petition that Rodham showed to Mannerud was so thick that
Mannerud ultimately redrafted her father's petition.
\128\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mannerud asked Rodham what exactly he would do to help get
the pardon.\129\ Rodham explained that ``it costs money,''
specifically $50,000, which would be paid to Rodham and then
``go to an attorney'' to work on the matter.\130\ When Mannerud
pressed Rodham for more details of how exactly he would help
get the pardon, Rodham explained that he knew the Pardon
Attorney, Roger Adams.\131\ He stated that Adams was from
Arkansas and that he had ``known Adams forever.'' \132\ Rodham
then told Mannerud that ``after the Administration, we're all
out of jobs.'' \133\ Mannerud understood that Rodham was
referring to himself and Adams.\134\ Rodham then told Mannerud
he would hire a law firm to prepare her father's pardon
petition and Roger Adams' wife was associated with this law
firm.\135\ When Mannerud asked if he could guarantee that her
father would be pardoned, Rodham demurred.\136\ Mannerud then
told Rodham that she had had ``her share of scandals'' and
wanted no part of Rodham's proposal.\137\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\129\ Id.
\130\ Id.
\131\ Id.
\132\ Id.
\133\ Id.
\134\ Id.
\135\ Id.
\136\ Id.
\137\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mannerud's account of the Mayflower meeting with Rodham is
corroborated in large part by Marilyn Parker. Parker does not
recall a number of details of the meeting and attributes her
poor memory to the fact that Rodham and Mannerud did most of
the talking at the meeting.\138\ However, she confirms that
Rodham explored with Mannerud ``whether there was any way they
could work together'' on the pardon matter.\139\ She also
confirms that Rodham mentioned his previous work on a pardon
matter.\140\ Parker also confirms that Rodham mentioned he knew
a person handling the pardons, a law firm that worked with DOJ
on pardons, and that a wife of a Justice Department official
worked at the law firm.\141\ Parker also believes that it was
possible that Rodham ``expressed his desire to be paid'' for
his work on the Fuentes matter but could not recall whether
Rodham specifically sought $50,000.\142\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\138\ Telephone Interview with Marilyn J. Parker (Dec. 18, 2001).
\139\ Id.
\140\ Id.
\141\ Id.
\142\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to Mannerud, in December 2000, about a month
after the first meeting, Marilyn Parker called her about the
possibility of Rodham helping her with the effort to obtain a
pardon for Fuentes.\143\ Parker told Mannerud that Rodham had
lowered his asking price and wanted only $30,000.\144\ Mannerud
asked once again if there were any guarantees, to which Parker
responded that there were not.\145\ Parker asked Mannerud to
consider the offer, emphasizing her father's poor health.\146\
Ultimately, Mannerud told Parker in strong terms that she did
not want to be involved in such an arrangement with
Rodham.\147\ After that discussion, Mannerud had no further
discussions about the clemency matter with either Parker or
Rodham.\148\ Mannerud continued her efforts to obtain a pardon
for her father but was unsuccessful.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\143\ Telephone Interview with Vivian Mannerud (Aug. 28, 2001).
\144\ Id.
\145\ Id.
\146\ Id.
\147\ Id.
\148\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Parker denies Mannerud's account of this subsequent
telephone call. According to Parker, Rodham simply asked her
whether she had spoken to Mannerud ``about her father.'' \149\
As for a subsequent conversation with Mannerud, Parker
remembered only having asked Mannerud how the pardon effort was
going and that Mannerud became upset.\150\ Parker flatly denied
having approached Mannerud on Rodham's behalf with a reduced
offer of $30,000 for services relating to Fuentes' pardon
proceedings.\151\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\149\ Id.
\150\ Id.
\151\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
D. Tony Rodham's Representations to Mannerud Were Fraudulent
Tony Rodham's activities in the Fuentes case go beyond an
attempt by Rodham to sell his political access for $50,000.
Rather, Rodham's actions were a potentially criminal attempt to
defraud Vivian Mannerud of $50,000 by making serious
misrepresentations to her about the actions he would take to
help her. Almost all of the statements made by Rodham to
Mannerud in the course of his efforts to be hired by Mannerud
were false. Tony Rodham does not know Roger Adams or his
wife.\152\ In fact, Adams has never met Tony or Hugh Rodham.
Adams is not from Arkansas and has been to Arkansas only once
in his life, in the 1970s.\153\ Adams' wife does not work for a
law firm at all, let alone one that handles pardon
matters.\154\ In fact, Adams' wife is not even an
attorney.\155\ When Committee staff informed Mannerud that
Rodham in fact had no relationship with Adams, she stated that
she was ``shocked'' because Rodham left no doubt that he was
close with Adams and that he intended to use that relationship
to obtain the pardon for Fuentes.\156\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\152\ Telephone Interview with Roger Adams (Sept. 4, 2001).
\153\ Id.
\154\ Id.
\155\ Id.
\156\ Telephone Interview with Vivian Mannerud (Aug. 28, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There are several questions about Tony Rodham's actions in
this case. First, what is Rodham's response to Mannerud's
charges? Second, what was Rodham's motivation for making these
false representations to Mannerud? Third, were the actions
taken by Rodham and Marilyn Parker criminal?
Due to Rodham's refusal to participate in an interview, the
Committee has not been able to determine Rodham's response to
these charges. However, in the absence of Rodham's cooperation,
it still appears that there is substantial corroboration for
Mannerud's account. First, Marilyn Parker recalls a number of
key details from the first meeting at the Mayflower Hotel.
Second, Tony Rodham had in his possession a copy of Fernando
Fuentes Coba's pardon petition. Third, Mannerud has provided
the Committee with a detailed and credible account.
It is difficult to divine Tony Rodham's motivation for
making these false representations to Vivian Mannerud. It is
possible that Rodham was concerned about the appearance of
impropriety if he asked for $50,000 to lobby his sister or
brother-in-law for a pardon, especially considering the fact
that he was not an attorney. To address this concern, Rodham
may have concocted a cover story that he needed the $50,000 to
hire a law firm which was close to Roger Adams when in reality
no such firm existed and Rodham was going to keep the $50,000
for himself.
The final, and most important, question is whether the
actions taken by Tony Rodham or Marilyn Parker were criminal.
It is certainly possible that Rodham and Parker engaged in a
conspiracy to defraud Mannerud. Clearly, Mannerud ended up
rejecting the overtures from Rodham and Parker and was never
defrauded of any funds. However, the actions by Rodham and
Parker may have amounted to a criminal conspiracy.\157\ The
Committee does not have sufficient evidence at this point to
conclude that criminal conduct took place but strongly
recommends that the Department of Justice examine this case and
obtain sworn testimony from all of the relevant actors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\157\ Based on the information currently available to the
Committee, it appears that Tony Rodham and Marilyn J. Parker might be
criminally liable for conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 371 or 18 U.S.C.
Sec. 1343 (wire fraud). Liability as to Rodham and Parker under those
statutes turns on the extent to which Rodham and Parker devised or
intended to devise a scheme to defraud Mannerud and whether the
telephone call by Parker to Mannerud was made interstate and in
furtherance of the underlying scheme. If Parker did not conspire with
Rodham to defraud Mannerud, it appears that liability as to Parker
turns on whether she knowingly and willingly participated in Rodham's
fraud scheme. See, e.g., U.S. v. Maxwell, 920 F.2d 1028 (C.A.D.C.
1990).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
[Exhibits referred to follow:]
CHAPTER FIVE
THE GRANT OF CLEMENCY TO DRUG MONEY LAUNDERER HARVEY WEINIG
FINDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE
Weinig was properly imprisoned for conspiring to launder
millions of dollars in drug money and concealing and furthering
an extortion-by-kidnapping scheme.
Weinig, a former Manhattan attorney, conspired to
launder about $19 million dollars in drug proceeds through a
Swiss bank for the Cali cartel. Members of the money laundering
organization, of which Weinig was a part, boasted that they
successfully laundered more than $70 million for the cartel. In
addition to conducting banking transactions for the
organization, Weinig consulted with co-conspirators in
furtherance of the organization's activities and stored the
drug proceeds in his New York City apartment.
Weinig and other co-conspirators at his law firm
stole from the Cali cartel about $2.5 million they were
supposed to have laundered. This theft exposed Weinig's family
to a risk of being harmed by those drug dealers. In the course
of investigating the organization's money laundering
activities, authorities intervened when they learned that the
drug dealers sent a hit man to kill one of Weinig's co-
conspirators.
Weinig learned that one of his co-conspirators
kidnapped an individual as part of a scheme to extort money
from the victim's family. Rather than report the kidnapping,
Weinig made his office available as a meeting place where the
ransom could be delivered and directed his associates at the
firm to execute transfer agreements.
Weinig's lawyer, a prominent Washington attorney with close
connections to the Clinton Administration, lobbied the White
House in support of Weinig's clemency petition.
Weinig's wife, Alice Morey, retained Reid
Weingarten, who was close to the Clinton White House, to lobby
for the commutation. In April 2000, Weingarten filed a clemency
petition on Weinig's behalf with the Justice Department and the
White House. Knowing that the Justice Department would advise
the President to reject the Weinig commutation petition,
Weingarten lobbied the White House directly, approaching White
House Counsel Beth Nolan, Deputy White House Counsel Bruce
Lindsey, and Chief of Staff John Podesta.
Weingarten chose not to familiarize himself with the
facts of Weinig's underlying conviction. Accordingly, he was
unable to convey to those he lobbied a full, accurate, factual
basis of the merits of Weinig's petition.
Two former Clinton Administration officials, David Dreyer and
Harold Ickes, lobbied the White House on Weinig's behalf.
Alice Morey enlisted the assistance of her cousin,
former White House Deputy Communications Director David Dreyer.
Dreyer repeatedly raised the Weinig commutation with John
Podesta. Ultimately, Podesta recommended that the President
grant the Weinig commutation. Dreyer has invoked his Fifth
Amendment rights rather than cooperate with the Committee's
investigation.
Morey also obtained support for Weinig's commutation
from former Deputy Chief of Staff Harold Ickes, whose children
attended the same school as did her sons. Ickes discussed the
Weinig case with President Clinton twice and recommended the
commutation of Weinig's sentence.
The Justice Department repeatedly and adamantly recommended
against the commutation of Weinig's sentence.
On several occasions, U.S. Attorney Mary Jo White,
whose office convicted Weinig, objected to any reduction of
Weinig's sentence. Ultimately, in a report to President
Clinton, the Pardon Attorney and Deputy Attorney General Eric
Holder voiced their strong opposition to a commutation of
Weinig's sentence.
Pardon Attorney Roger Adams submitted a report to
the President advising against the Weinig commutation. Adams
pointed out that Weinig ``was a well-respected lawyer who used
his professional skills to assist in laundering millions of
dollars that he knew constituted the proceeds of a huge
narcotics trafficking enterprise. He was involved in this
activity for an extended period of time, and he admits that he
engaged in it purely out of greed.'' Adams also informed the
President that Weinig ``aided and abetted the extortion of
money from an individual he knew had been kidnapped at the
direction of a co-defendant in order to coerce the production
of a ransom.''
After an apparently cursory review, the White House set aside
the Justice Department's negative recommendation and granted
Weinig clemency.
Support for Weinig's petition from John Podesta and
Beth Nolan appears to have been critical. The Associate White
House counsels responsible for clemency matters did not support
the petition. However, setting aside the negative
recommendations of not only the Justice Department but also
staff at the White House Counsel's Office, Nolan and Lindsey,
who were lobbied by Weingarten, recommended Weinig's clemency
to President Clinton. John Podesta, who was lobbied by
Weingarten and Dreyer, also recommended to the President that
Weinig's sentence be commuted.
The White House was unjustified in commuting Weinig's sentence.
None of the arguments made by Weinig entitle him to
executive clemency. In his petition, Weinig stated three main
reasons why his sentence should have been commuted: (1) his
sentence was disproportionate and excessive; (2) his
contributions to society justified his early release from
prison; and (3) one of his children was suffering emotional
difficulties as a result of his imprisonment and needed him to
return home. The first reason is simply not true. Weinig's
sentence was comparable to those received by other co-
conspirators who were directly responsible for laundering large
amounts of drug money and declined to cooperate with
authorities. Weinig's sentence was also comparable to those
received by co-defendants who participated in the extortion-by-
kidnapping scheme, which Weinig concealed and facilitated. The
other two reasons fail to distinguish Weinig from the vast
number of other similarly situated felons, who were properly
sentenced but whose families have suffered because of their
imprisonment.
President Clinton's commutation of Weinig's sentence has sent
out the wrong message about the United States' commitment to
fighting drug trafficking.
President Clinton's decision conveyed an appearance
of granting special consideration to wealthy, politically well-
connected criminals and their relatives. Pardon Attorney Roger
Adams foresaw the message sent by the Weinig commutation,
warning President Clinton that ``[t]o commute [Weinig's] prison
term to the five years he proposes would denigrate the
seriousness of his criminal misconduct, undermine the
government's legitimate interest in encouraging prompt guilty
pleas and truthful cooperation from criminal defendants, and
could give the appearance of granting special consideration to
economically advantaged, white-collar offenders.''
The Weinig commutation undermines the nation's
efforts to fight the illegal drug trade. Complaints are
frequently made that U.S. drug laws punish low-level drug
criminals too severely yet do not punish high-level drug
distributors enough. When a large-scale drug money launderer
like Harvey Weinig receives executive clemency after serving
five years of an eleven-year sentence, it sends the message
that the U.S. is not serious about prosecuting the high-level
criminals who make the drug trade possible.
The Weinig commutation has eroded the United States'
moral authority to press other countries to fight the drug
trade within their own borders. The Weinig commutation could
harm the efforts of the U.S. government to extradite drug
traffickers and money launderers from Latin America. Newspapers
in Latin American countries have accused the U.S. of hypocrisy
in the Weinig case. For example, in Colombia's leading daily,
former Colombian attorney general Gustavo De Greiff, in an op-
ed entitled ``The Morality of the Strongest,'' labeled
President Clinton's clemency decision ``monstrous.''
I. BACKGROUND
Harvey Weinig was among the 36 prisoners whose sentences
were commuted on President Clinton's last day in office.
Weinig, a former Manhattan attorney, was centrally involved in
conspiring to launder about $19 million in drug proceeds
through a Swiss bank for the Cali cocaine cartel.\1\ Weinig
also actively participated in a kidnapping and extortion
plot.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ See U.S. Probation Office (S.D.N.Y.) Document Production (Pre-
sentence Investigation Report, U.S. v. Weinig (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1996))
at 14 (Exhibit 1); NARA Document Production (Letter from Mark P.
Goodman, Assistant U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of
Justice, to John R. Wing, Member, Weil, Gotshal & Manges (Sept. 20,
1995)) (Exhibit 2).
\2\ See U.S. Probation Office (S.D.N.Y.) Document Production (Pre-
sentence Investigation Report, U.S. v. Weinig (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1996))
at 29 (Exhibit 1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The efforts that led to Weinig's conviction began in
February 1994 when the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
Drug Enforcement Administration, and the New York City Police
Department jointly investigated a large international money
laundering organization.\3\ Ultimately, the organization was
found to have laundered tens of millions of dollars in
narcotics proceeds generated in the U.S., Puerto Rico, and
other locations.\4\ In connection with that investigation, law
enforcement authorities seized almost $5 million in drug
proceeds from members of the organization.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Id. at 17.
\4\ Id. at 22.
\5\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A. Weinig and His Co-Conspirators
As members of the money laundering organization, Weinig and
his law partner, Robert Hirsch, used their firm, Hirsch Weinig,
to launder drug proceeds for the benefit of their clients,
including members of the Cali cocaine cartel in Colombia.\6\
After Weinig and Hirsch formed their partnership in October
1993, they helped a German resident named Tohmes Peter retrieve
large sums of money that had been seized by law enforcement due
to a suspicion that the money was related to drug sales.\7\ To
assist in the effort, Weinig recruited Richard Spence, a client
and former New York City fireman who became a leader of the
money laundering organization.\8\ Weinig and Hirsch
incorporated Transglobal Import Export Trading Co., Inc., so
that Spence could open a corporate bank account through which
he could operate his end of the money laundering scheme.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ See id. at 19 (describing co-defendants Miguel Omar Garrabito
Botero, Amparo Hurtado Valencia, Juliana (last name unknown), and
Carlos Lopez as associated with Cali cocaine cartel).
\7\ NARA Document Production (Report to the President on Proposed
Denial of Executive Clemency for Harvey Weinig) at 2 (Exhibit 3).
\8\ See id.
\9\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Weinig, Hirsch, and Spence divided responsibilities in the
money laundering operation. Weinig conducted banking
transactions for the organization and consulted with co-
conspirators Hirsch and Richard Spence about the organization's
activities.\10\ Weinig also stored the proceeds from the money
laundering operation in his New York City apartment.\11\ Hirsch
coordinated laundering activities with Spence in New York,
Tohmes Peter and Juan Guillermo Ocampo in Germany, and Leon
Shulum Weinmann and his wife, Rachel, in Switzerland.\12\ As
part of the money laundering conspiracy, the Weinmanns received
money transfers in Switzerland and remitted them to bank
accounts designated by their principals.\13\ Spence was
responsible for organizing pickups of the drug money,
depositing the money into bank accounts without raising
suspicion, and wire-transferring the money to various other
accounts with the intent of concealing its nature and
source.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ U.S. Probation Office (S.D.N.Y.) Document Production (Pre-
sentence Investigation Report, U.S. v. Weinig (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1996))
at 18 (Exhibit 1).
\11\ Id.
\12\ Id. at 19. Ocampo was previously convicted in New York of
selling narcotics, for which he was sentenced to 5 years to life
imprisonment and released on parole in or about May 1987. Id. In
September 1994, Ocampo was re-arrested in Colombia. Id.
\13\ Id.
\14\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other co-conspirators included Michael Kalanz, a police
officer at the 48th Precinct in the Bronx, who counted, stored
(sometimes in his locker at the Precinct), and transported
hundreds of thousands of dollars in drug proceeds; Charles
Bruno, a New York City fireman who acted as a courier;
Alexander Schwartz, a rabbi who picked up drug proceeds
throughout the U.S. and returned them to New York City;
Latchezar Christov, reportedly a Bulgarian diplomat who
received drug proceeds in California and shipped them via
overnight courier to New York City; and Gary Salerno, an
enforcer of the money laundering organization who intimidated
and collected money from various individuals.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Id. at 19-21. See also Joseph B. Treaster, U.S. Says It
Uncovered a $100 Million Drug-Money Laundry, N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1994,
at B1; John J. Goldman, ``White-Collar'' Money Laundry Is Smashed
Crime: Lawyers, Rabbis, a Police Officer and an L.A. Diplomat are Among
23 Charged. Ring Handled Tens of Millions of Dollars in Drug Proceeds,
Officials Say, L.A. Times, Dec. 1, 1994, at A7. On July 21, 1994,
Salerno was arrested by NYPD for extortion involving physical injury
and attempted grand larceny; and, on November 16, 1994, he was arrested
for conspiracy to traffick in firearms, a federal offense. U.S.
Probation Office (S.D.N.Y.) Document Production (Pre-sentence
Investigation Report, U.S. v. Weinig (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1996)) at 20
(Exhibit 1). A contemporaneous search of Salerno's residence uncovered
a ``hitman's kit'' containing a garrotte (a device used to strangle and
sever the vocal chords of the intended victim), three pairs of
handcuffs, a handgun, two rifles, ammunition, a law enforcement badge
bearing the name of another, and a bugging device. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. The Money Laundering Operation
The money laundering conspiracy typically operated as
follows. A narcotics trafficker or his representative (for
example, Juan Guillermo Ocampo) would contact a member of the
money laundering network (for example, Spence and later Hirsch)
to pick up a parcel of cash on the street or in a hotel in a
particular city.\16\ The cash in those parcels was generated
from street sales of cocaine and totaled anywhere from tens of
thousands to hundreds of thousands of dollars.\17\ A member of
the network, sometimes a courier, would then retrieve the
parcel at the given location and deliver it to a leader in the
network (for example, Spence) who would count and deposit the
money into bank accounts controlled by Weinig, Hirsch, or
Spence.\18\ From such accounts, Weinig, Hirsch, or Spence would
then transfer the money by wire or other means to the Weinmanns
in Switzerland or elsewhere.\19\ Through a foreign money
exchange, the drug proceeds would then be auctioned to
``brokers'' who typically bid about 85 cents on the dollar for
$10 million to $20 million bundles.\20\ The brokers would then
generally have to return 85 percent of the cash to the
Weinmanns within a fixed period.\21\ With the proceeds safely
laundered, the Weinmanns would send the cash to bank accounts
designated by their principals in Colombia.\22\ Members of the
organization would ultimately be compensated for their services
by receiving about 7 percent of the amount laundered, which
between 1993 and 1994 equaled between $70 million and $100
million.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Telephone Interview with Mark Levin, former Special Agent,
Drug Enforcement Administration (Mar. 22, 2001). During the federal
investigation of Weinig's money laundering activities, Levin was with
the New York field division of the DEA and was the primary case agent
in the investigation. See also U.S. Probation Office (S.D.N.Y.)
Document Production (Pre-sentence Investigation Report, U.S. v. Weinig
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1996)) at 22 (Exhibit 1). After Peter and Ocampo
began contacting Hirsch directly in the U.S., Hirsch contacted Spence,
who would arrange for the cash to be picked up and retrieved back to
him in New York. Id. Hirsch's increased involvement in the conspiracy
was corroborated by his attendance at meetings in Switzerland with,
among others, Weinmann and Peter from January 31, 1994, through
February 1, 1994. Id. At that meeting, during which the network's
laundering activities were discussed, the Weinmanns reportedly stated
that they, with Peter's assistance, laundered about $72 million. Id.
\17\ Telephone Interview with Mark Levin, former Special Agent,
Drug Enforcement Administration (Mar. 22, 2001); U.S. Probation Office
(S.D.N.Y.) Document Production (Pre-sentence Investigation Report, U.S.
v. Weinig (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1996)) at 22 (Exhibit 1).
\18\ See Telephone Interview with Mark Levin, former Special Agent,
Drug Enforcement Administration (Mar. 22, 2001). See also U.S.
Probation Office (S.D.N.Y.) Document Production (Pre-sentence
Investigation Report, U.S. v. Weinig (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1996)) at 22-23
(Exhibit 1).
\19\ Telephone Interview with Mark Levin, former Special Agent,
Drug Enforcement Administration (Mar. 22, 2001); U.S. Probation Office
(S.D.N.Y.) Document Production (Pre-sentence Investigation Report, U.S.
v. Weinig (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1996)) at 22-23 (Exhibit 1). Joseph B.
Treaster, U.S. Says It Uncovered a $100 Million Drug-Money Laundry,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1994, at B1.
\20\ Telephone Interview with Mark Levin, former Special Agent,
Drug Enforcement Administration (Mar. 22, 2001); Timothy O'Brien,
Embarrassment of Riches: Cartels Use U.S. Lawyers to Launder Drug
Fortunes, Asian Wall St. J., May 30, 1995, at A1.
\21\ Telephone Interview with Mark Levin, former Special Agent,
Drug Enforcement Administration (Mar. 22, 2001); Timothy O'Brien,
Embarrassment of Riches: Cartels Use U.S. Lawyers to Launder Drug
Fortunes, Asian Wall St. J., May 30, 1995, at A1.
\22\ Telephone Interview with Mark Levin, former Special Agent,
Drug Enforcement Administration (Mar. 22, 2001); U.S. Probation Office
(S.D.N.Y.) Document Production (Pre-sentence Investigation Report, U.S.
v. Weinig (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1996)) at 23 (Exhibit 1). See also Joseph
B. Treaster, U.S. Says It Uncovered a $100 Million Drug-Money Laundry,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1994, at B1.
\23\ Telephone Interview with Mark Levin, former Special Agent,
Drug Enforcement Administration (Mar. 22, 2001); U.S. Probation Office
(S.D.N.Y.) Document Production (Pre-sentence Investigation Report, U.S.
v. Weinig (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1996)) at 22-23 (Exhibit 1). When the co-
conspirators of the money laundering ring discussed their activities
over the phone, they often used coded language to conceal the actual
nature of their conversations. For example, they referred to money as
``paper'' and units of $1 million as ``containers.'' Id. at 18. See
also Timothy O'Brien, Embarrassment of Riches: Cartels Use U.S. Lawyers
to Launder Drug Fortunes, Asian Wall St. J., May 30, 1995, at A1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
C. Weinig and His Co-Conspirators Run Afoul of the Colombian Cocaine
Cartel
The organization lost money throughout 1993 and 1994, when
law enforcement arrested some of its couriers in San Juan,
Puerto Rico, and Houston, Texas, and seized drug proceeds they
carried.\24\ In response to those seizures, Weinig, Hirsch, and
Spence filed fraudulent claims of ownership with the DEA,
typically asserting that the money seized from their couriers
represented the proceeds of payment ``for a sale of precious
stones [by Spence] . . . acquired and sold overseas.'' \25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ U.S. Probation Office (S.D.N.Y.) Document Production (Pre-
sentence Investigation Report, U.S. v. Weinig (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1996))
at 23 (Exhibit 1).
\25\ Id. at 25. On November 4, 1993, the Hirsch Weinig law firm
filed a complaint in federal court alleging that a hotel allowed
someone to take a suitcase containing $260,000, which was left by Rabbi
Alexander Schwartz, one of their couriers. Id. at 24-25. The firm
subsequently filed, on February 14, 1994, a claim of ownership with the
DEA for entitlement to those proceeds. Id. at 25. The law firm also
filed three false claims on July 13, 1994, for $1,053,200 (with respect
to a seizure from another courier, Charles Bruno), $1,010, and
$802,893. The law firm filed another false claim on March 24, 1994, for
$676,392 (with respect to proceeds seized from Gary Salerno). Id. at
25-26. Weinig contended that, despite being aware of the filing of
those documents, he was not personally involved in their preparation or
filing. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The organization also lost money when some of its members,
including Weinig, Hirsch, and Spence, stole from Colombian drug
dealers about $2.5 million they were supposed to have
laundered.\26\ To conceal their theft from the Colombians,
Weinig, Hirsch, and Spence drafted a bogus indictment and
notice of seizure to induce their principals in Colombia into
believing that their money was seized by law enforcement when
Spence was ``arrested.'' \27\ In October 1994, law enforcement
intercepted Weinig's explanation to Hirsch of his theft from
the organization:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ Joseph B. Treaster, U.S. Says It Uncovered a $100 Million
Drug-Money Laundry, N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1994, at B1.
\27\ Id. at 23-24. Weinig asserts that the indictment was created
by Hirsch alone. Id. at 24. A member of the organization who was
conducting activities from Germany reportedly lost so much money that
he began speculating in commodities to recoup the losses but then lost
even larger sums on poorly placed market gambles. Timothy O'Brien,
Embarrassment of Riches: Cartels Use U.S. Lawyers to Launder Drug
Fortunes, Asian Wall St. J., May 30, 1995, at A1.
Weinig. And all of the sudden, someone says to me, I
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
can put a million in cash in your . . .
Hirsch. Oh, God. I'm sick.
Weinig. In your, in your attic. I do a quick analysis,
and understand that if everything else goes wrong in
the world for the rest of my life, a million in cash
takes care of everything I'll ever need.
Hirsch. That's true.
Weinig. And so I said, I'm dealing with people, and I
remember this was, this was my approach. We're dealing
with people who are total a**holes, who are out of
control, who are scumbag, lying, cheats. And I am gonna
be in this for the long haul? F**k 'em! F**k 'em! I'm
taking a million dollars and let's, let's see you get
it from me. That was my approach.
Hirsch. But remember the other . . .
Weinig. A million f**king dollars.
Hirsch. A million dollars, but where, you know . . .
Weinig. This is not . . .
Hirsch. How much you would have had today?
Weinig. This is not, this is dealing with normal
Americans. This is dealing with guys I wouldn't take a
telephone call from.\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ See U.S. District Court (S.D.N.Y.) Document Production (Letter
from Lev L. Dassin, Assistant U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., and Mark
P. Goodman, Special Assistant U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y.,
Department of Justice, to the Honorable Kevin Thomas Duffy, U.S.
District Court Judge (Mar. 21, 1996)) at 3-4 (Exhibit 4) (transcription
of conversation between Harvey Weinig and Robert Hirsch recorded in
October 1994).
As the foregoing indicates, Weinig believed that because his
clients were unsavory he was justified in stealing their drug
proceeds. To account for the millions in drug proceeds they
stole from their Colombian principals, Weinig, Hirsch, and
Spence planned to divide it among themselves and allow Spence
to disappear, letting their principals believe that Spence was
arrested and imprisoned.\29\ Plainly, Weinig's decision to
steal from the Colombian drug traffickers exposed him, his co-
conspirators, all of their families, and various innocent
bystanders to a considerable risk of harm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The theft of the drug money by Weinig, Hirsch, and Spence
ultimately led to the unraveling of the money laundering
conspiracy and to Weinig's imprisonment. In late 1994, leaders
in the Cali cartel apparently decided that Hirsch had stolen
money from them and sent two individuals, Miguel Omar Garrabito
Botero and Amparo Hurtado Valencia, to ``convince'' him to
return the money.\30\ Hirsch indicated that he would attempt to
get the money together.\31\ Unknown to Hirsch and the
Colombians, law enforcement was monitoring these discussions
and approached Hirsch to obtain his cooperation.\32\ Law
enforcement also informed Hirsch that the Colombians had
decided to kill him and had, in fact, dispatched a hitman to
New York.\33\ Once provided with this information, Hirsch began
cooperating with the investigation of the money laundering
network.\34\ Over the next several months, the money laundering
network had meetings to address the actual and the fictitious
seizures.\35\ With Hirsch's cooperation, many of those meetings
were observed or recorded by law enforcement.\36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ U.S. Probation Office (S.D.N.Y.) Document Production (Pre-
sentence Investigation Report, U.S. v. Weinig (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1996))
at 24 (Exhibit 1). Botero and Valencia similarly threatened Tohmes
Peter and Juan Ocampo, both of whom conducted money laundering
activities for the organization from Mulheim, Germany. Id. Ocampo's
brother was apparently kidnapped in Colombia. Id. There is no doubt
that Weinig was aware of the risk of harm his theft from the cartel
created. On September 30, 1994, Hirsch told Weinig that Botero was the
principal ``of everyone'' in Colombia and explained to him the
financial difficulties that arose from the debt owed to Botero. Id. at
27. Weinig acknowledged the problem and said, ``[L]isten, let's not
talk about this on the phone.'' Id. In response to Hirsch's request for
the telephone number for his private line at the office, Weinig noted
that he did not think that his private line was any more secure than
the line on which they were speaking. Id. Hirsch also told Weinig that,
in a previous conversation with Botero, Botero implied that Ocampo
might be dead. Weinig replied, ``[L]et's not talk about it.'' Id. See
Joseph B. Treaster, U.S. Says It Uncovered a $100 Million Drug-Money
Laundry, N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1994, at B1
\31\ U.S. Probation Office (S.D.N.Y.) Document Production (Pre-
sentence Investigation Report, U.S. v. Weinig (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1996))
at 27 (Exhibit 1) (describing that Hirsch, Weinig, and Spence pooled
together some of the money they had stolen and sent it to their clients
in Colombia).
\32\ Telephone Interview with Mark Levin, former Special Agent,
Drug Enforcement Administration (Mar. 22, 2001); Timothy O'Brien,
Embarrassment of Riches: Cartels Use U.S. Lawyers to Launder Drug
Fortunes, Asian Wall St. J., May 30, 1995, at A1.
\33\ Id.
\34\ Telephone Interview with Lev L. Dassin, former Assistant U.S.
Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice (Nov. 26, 2001).
\35\ Telephone Interview with Mark Levin, former Special Agent,
Drug Enforcement Administration (Mar. 22, 2001); U.S. Probation Office
(S.D.N.Y.) Document Production (Pre-sentence Investigation Report, U.S.
v. Weinig (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1996)) at 23 (Exhibit 1).
\36\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As money owed to the cartel became more of a problem,
Weinig decided to extend his criminal activities beyond money
laundering. On November 15, 1994, Spence told Weinig that he
had kidnapped an individual named James Clooney, who had
swindled him out of $237,000 by tricking him into investing in
an insolvent company.\37\ Although Clooney had assets that
would have enabled Spence to recover part of his loss, Clooney
would not return Spence's money.\38\ While Weinig was abroad
between November 9 and 13, 1994, Spence had Clooney kidnapped
to ``compel him to return the money that he had wrongfully
taken.'' \39\ On November 15, 1994, Weinig told Hirsch that
Spence ``seized a person.'' \40\ After Hirsch joked with him
that Spence ``learned it from the Colombians,'' Weinig
continued, ``[Clooney] will be released as soon as his family
produces money[.]'' \41\ Hirsch responded, ``Wait a minute.
Hold it, hold it. Dick Spence is holding someone hostage and
you're sitting here? . . . He's holding a person and you really
don't see any problem with that?'' \42\ Hirsch observed that
Clooney might notify the authorities, but Weinig replied,
``Well, he's not in a position to call the police at this
point, right?'' \43\ Weinig rationalized Clooney's abduction by
noting, ``You know [Spence is] kidnapping someone who owes him
money here.'' \44\ He continued, ``It's not drug money, it's
money. He's lost some good money.'' \45\ Weinig apparently felt
that his role as a lawyer might conflict with his participation
in a kidnapping. He therefore attempted to justify his
involvement to Hirsch:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\ NARA Document Production (Report to the President on Proposed
Denial of Executive Clemency for Harvey Weinig) at 3-5 (Exhibit 3);
U.S. Probation Office (S.D.N.Y.) Document Production (Pre-sentence
Investigation Report, U.S. v. Weinig (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1996)) at 29
(Exhibit 1); U.S. District Court (S.D.N.Y.) Document Production (Letter
from Lev L. Dassin, Assistant U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., and Mark
P. Goodman, Special Assistant U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y.,
Department of Justice, to the Honorable Kevin Thomas Duffy, U.S.
District Court Judge (Mar. 21, 1996)) at 6 (Exhibit 4).
\38\ NARA Document Production (Report to the President on Proposed
Denial of Executive Clemency for Harvey Weinig) at 3-5 (Exhibit 3);
U.S. Probation Office (S.D.N.Y.) Document Production (Pre-sentence
Investigation Report, U.S. v. Weinig (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1996)) at 29
(Exhibit 1); U.S. District Court (S.D.N.Y.) Document Production (Letter
from Lev L. Dassin, Assistant U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., and Mark
P. Goodman, Special Assistant U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y.,
Department of Justice, to the Honorable Kevin Thomas Duffy, U.S.
District Court Judge (Mar. 21, 1996)) at 6 (Exhibit 4).
\39\ Lev Dassin Document Production at 11 (Letter from John R.
Wing, Member, Weil, Gotshal & Manges, to Mary Jo White, U.S. Attorney
for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice (Feb. 28, 1997)) (Exhibit 5).
See also U.S. District Court (S.D.N.Y.) Document Production (Letter
from Lev L. Dassin, Assistant U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y.,
Department of Justice, to the Honorable Kevin Thomas Duffy, U.S.
District Court Judge (Mar. 19, 1996)) (Exhibit 6) (transcript of
conversation between Harvey Weinig and Robert Hirsch recorded on
November 15, 1994).
\40\ Id.
\41\ Id.
\42\ Id. at 5-6.
\43\ Id. at 6.
\44\ Id.
\45\ Id. at 25.
We didn't do it. I don't know anything about it. If he
tells me a crime is going to be committed, then I have
an obligation, I have to disclose it or go to the
authorities. . . . But he didn't do that. He just
talked to me a few times about ``I couldn't just sit
around and wait so I had some goons go talk to the guy
and they're gonna make sure the money comes this
week.'' \46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\46\ NARA Document Production (Report to the President on Proposed
Denial of Executive Clemency for Harvey Weinig) at 4 (Exhibit 3).
Clooney was released the following day on the condition that he
surrender his artwork and a home mortgage to settle his debt to
Spence.\47\ Weinig offered his office as a meeting place where
Clooney could convey the ransom and instructed two of his
associates to execute transfer agreements when Clooney and his
girlfriend arrived at the office.\48\ However, he left before
they arrived.\49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\47\ U.S. District Court (S.D.N.Y.) Document Production (Letter
from Lev L. Dassin, Assistant U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., and Mark
P. Goodman, Special Assistant U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y.,
Department of Justice, to the Honorable Kevin Thomas Duffy, U.S.
District Court Judge (Mar. 21, 1996)) at 7-8 (Exhibit 4).
\48\ Id. at 8. Specifically, Weinig instructed two attorneys at the
firm to receive the ransom from Clooney. Id.
\49\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
D. Weinig's Prosecution and Sentencing
Robert Hirsch was arrested in September 1994 and, with
Spence, subsequently cooperated with authorities in their
investigation of the remaining members of the money laundering
organization.\50\ On November 30, 1994, Weinig and the
remaining members of the organization, including Tohmes Peter,
were arrested.\51\ Weinig was subsequently released on
bail.\52\ Weinig was indicted on December 22, 1994, and April
20, 1995, with several co-defendants in the Southern District
of New York for conspiring to launder drug proceeds, 15 counts
of money laundering, two counts of interstate transportation of
stolen money, wire fraud, three counts of making false
statements to federal authorities, and criminal forfeiture.\53\
On September 21, 1995, Weinig was charged under a separate
indictment with interfering with commerce by extortion arising
from his participation in Spence's abduction of Clooney.\54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\50\ Telephone Interview with Lev L. Dassin, former Assistant U.S.
Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice (Nov. 26, 2001); U.S.
District Court (S.D.N.Y.) Document Production (Letter from Lev L.
Dassin, Assistant U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., and Mark P. Goodman,
Special Assistant U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of
Justice, to the Honorable Kevin Thomas Duffy, U.S. District Court Judge
(Mar. 21, 1996)) at 2 (Exhibit 4). See Telephone Interview with Mark
Levin, former Special Agent, Drug Enforcement Administration (Mar. 22,
2001).
\51\ U.S. Probation Office (S.D.N.Y.) Document Production (Pre-
sentence Investigation Report, U.S. v. Weinig (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1996))
at 29 (Exhibit 1). See also NARA Document Production (Criminal
Complaint, U.S. v. Weinig (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 1994)) (Exhibit 7); NARA
Document Production (Affidavit of Special Agent Jeffrey Drubner, In Re
Application for Arrest and Search Warrant (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 1994))
(Exhibit 8). The best recollection of those involved in Weinig's arrest
is that he was taken into custody at his home, without incident, and
outside the view of his children. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with
Lev Dassin, former Assistant U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department
of Justice (Nov. 26, 2001).
\52\ U.S. Probation Office (S.D.N.Y.) Document Production (Pre-
sentence Investigation Report, U.S. v. Weinig (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1996))
at 29 (Exhibit 1).
\53\ U.S. District Court (S.D.N.Y.) Document Production
(Indictment, U.S. v. Weinig (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 1994)) (Exhibit 9); U.S.
District Court (S.D.N.Y.) Document Production (Indictment, U.S. v.
Weinig (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 1995)) (Exhibit 10); U.S. Probation Office
(S.D.N.Y.) Document Production (Pre-sentence Investigation Report, U.S.
v. Weinig (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1996)) at 4 (Exhibit 1).
\54\ U.S. District Court (S.D.N.Y.) Document Production
(Indictment, U.S. v. Weinig, S2 95 CR-167 (KTD) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21,
1995)); U.S. Probation Office (S.D.N.Y.) Document Production (Pre-
sentence Investigation Report, U.S. v. Weinig (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1996))
at 13 (Exhibit 1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Shortly before Weinig was to go to trial on money
laundering charges, he pleaded guilty to conspiring to launder
drug money for the Cali cocaine cartel and to owning or
controlling property that was involved in and traceable to the
money laundering conspiracy.\55\ Weinig's plea to those charges
resulted in his forfeiture of various personal and business
assets, including his summer home, proceeds traceable to his
money laundering activities, and personal and business bank
accounts.\56\ Weinig also pleaded guilty to knowingly
concealing from law enforcement authorities Spence's abduction
of Clooney for the purpose of extorting the payment of
ransom.\57\ Because he waited until the eve of trial to plead
guilty and did not cooperate with law enforcement, Weinig did
not receive any credit for cooperation in the plea
agreement.\58\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\55\ Id. at 14. See also NARA Document Production (Letter from Mark
P. Goodman, Assistant U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of
Justice, to John R. Wing, Member, Weil, Gotshal & Manges (Sept. 20,
1995)) (Exhibit 2) (plea agreement).
\56\ Id. at 16-17.
\57\ Id. at 14. Under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 4 (2000) of the federal
criminal code, this offense is referred to as ``misprision of a
felony.''
\58\ Telephone Interview with Lev L. Dassin, former Assistant U.S.
Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., U.S. Department of Justice (Nov. 26, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The documents relating to Weinig's plea show that he failed
not only to cooperate with law enforcement but also to accept
responsibility for his actions. In his allocution before Judge
Kevin T. Duffy, Weinig stated that he originally believed
representations made by Hirsch that Tohmes Peter was involved
in the ``worldwide distribution of parallel market or greige
market goods, including electronic equipment, computer
equipment, health and beauty aids, and other commodities[,]''
not money laundering.\59\ But, Weinig conceded that ``[f]rom
the very start . . . [he] had misgivings about the highly
unconventional nature of the activity in which [Peter] was
engaged'' and ``[a]s time went on, [he] deliberately ignored
obvious indications that these monies were, in fact, the
proceeds of illicit drug transactions, and eventually [he] was
fully aware of this fact.'' \60\ Weinig admitted that he
ignored the following indicators: DEA statements that the
proceeds at issue were drug-related; the ``highly
unconventional locations, . . . [h]otel rooms, street corners
and empty cars in parking lots where the money was
transferred''; that ``[his law] office never saw documents that
would ordinarily underlie a commercial transaction''; and that
he received ``what [he] perceived to be an unreasonably large
amount of money in relation to the business being conducted.''
\61\ However, Weinig argued that, with respect to the money
laundering operation, he was less involved than were Hirsch and
Spence in the operation's day-to-day operations.\62\ Regarding
his role in the kidnapping scheme, Weinig maintained that he
was not told about the extortion-by-kidnapping scheme until
after Clooney was abducted.\63\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\59\ NARA Document Production (Report to the President on Proposed
Denial of Executive Clemency for Harvey Weinig) at 6 (Exhibit 3)
(quoting transcript of allocution).
\60\ Id.
\61\ Id. at 6 n.14.
\62\ U.S. District Court (S.D.N.Y.) Document Production (Letter
from Lev L. Dassin, Assistant U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., and Mark
P. Goodman, Special Assistant U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., for Mary
Jo White, U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice, to the
Honorable Kevin Thomas Duffy, U.S. District Court Judge (Mar. 21,
1996)) at 1 (Exhibit 4).
\63\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In reply to Weinig's claims, the Government argued that
Weinig was in fact centrally involved in the money laundering
organization with Hirsch and Spence from its inception and
played an important role in the kidnapping.\64\ In support of
its position, the Government cited private statements and
proffers made by Hirsch and Spence, both of whom cooperated
with the Government from the date of their arrest.\65\ In
particular, the Government noted that both Hirsch and Spence
had consistently stated that Weinig was generally aware of the
organization's day-to-day activities and had spoken to them
about those activities frequently.\66\ The Government also
cited various wiretapped conversations, which clearly and
consistently inculpated Weinig.\67\ The Government also argued
that the level of Hirsch's and Spence's involvement in the
organization was irrelevant to Weinig's sentencing.\68\
According to the Government, Weinig's conduct was ``extremely
serious and reprehensible'' and was motivated by ``unmitigated,
unrelenting greed and arrogance.'' \69\ With regard to Weinig's
role in the extortion scheme, the Government argued that, for
sentencing purposes, Weinig's activities should be considered
independent of those of the other criminals involved and
characterized his conduct, particularly inasmuch as Weinig was
a lawyer, as ``chilling.'' \70\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\64\ Id. at 1-9.
\65\ Telephone Interview with Lev L. Dassin, former Assistant U.S.
Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice (Nov. 26, 2001); U.S.
District Court (S.D.N.Y.) Document Production (Letter from Lev L.
Dassin, Assistant U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., and Mark P. Goodman,
Special Assistant U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of
Justice, to the Honorable Kevin Thomas Duffy, U.S. District Court Judge
(Mar. 21, 1996)) at 2 (Exhibit 4).
\66\ Id. at 3.
\67\ Id.
\68\ Id.
\69\ Id. at 6.
\70\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Duffy agreed. On March 22, 1996, he sentenced Weinig
to the maximum sentence under federal guidelines--11 years and
three months.\71\ Before he did so, John Wing, Weinig's
attorney, asked for leniency:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\71\ U.S. District Court (S.D.N.Y.) Document Production (Transcript
of Sentencing Hearing, U.S. v. Weinig, et al. (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 1996))
at 14 (Exhibit 11).
Your Honor, when my kids were young, I was familiar
with that Sesame Street character Big Bird and a song
he used to sing about how everybody makes mistakes, big
people, small people, as a matter of fact, law people.
It's probably a different version of the doctrine of
original sin, but Harvey Weinig made some business
mistakes[.] \72\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\72\ Id. at 2-3.
Wing continued by noting that his client ``did not sit down and
make a conscious, knowing decision to initiate and enter into a
business of laundering drug proceeds.'' \73\ Rather, according
to Wing, Weinig was misled by his law partner, Robert Hirsch,
``a man he liked, respected, trusted, someone he thought was
smart,'' into believing that they were handling ``gray market''
forfeiture cases unrelated to narcotics trafficking.\74\
However, Wing conceded that after Weinig learned about the true
nature of the business, ``[he] stayed in. [He] made money. He
liked having the security.'' \75\ Wing then discussed Weinig's
role in the extortion by kidnapping scheme, which he
characterized as ``also somewhat bizarre.'' \76\ Wing conceded
that, with full knowledge of the abduction scheme, Weinig
``basically let it happen. He didn't stop it.'' \77\ In an
attempt to offset the seriousness of Weinig's criminal conduct,
Wing mentioned Weinig's character, the harm his behavior
visited on his family, and the legal assistance Weinig
occasionally made available to various friends without
charge.\78\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\73\ Id. at 5.
\74\ Id.
\75\ Id. at 7.
\76\ Id.
\77\ Id. at 9.
\78\ Id. at 9-11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Speaking for himself at sentencing, Weinig conveyed to
Judge Duffy, among other things, that ``today marks yet another
milestone in the nightmare from which I am unable to awake.''
\79\ But Judge Duffy observed the following with regard to
Weinig's involvement in the kidnapping scheme:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\79\ Id. at 11.
You know, you talk about a nightmare. Nightmares come
from the unconscious, the subconscious. What you are
facing is something that you were conscious or you got
yourself into. . . . The suggestion has been made that
you are a very altruistic person, that you are a great
guy . . . . I don't know . . . . What would you have
done, Mr. Weinig, if your son Jacob had been kidnapped
and some lawyer knew about it . . . and didn't do
anything? . . . I insisted on getting the tape and
listening to your conversation with Hirsch when you
talk about it, very flip, matter of fact. You couldn't
care less, but if it had been your son, you would have
cared more. . . . You apparently were able to divide
yourself in two, outside the office and inside. Even
when Clooney came in, your attorney says you let it
happen. Sure you let it happen, because you went, and
you stuck two young associates with the job of cleaning
it up.\80\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\80\ Id. at 12-14.
With regard to Weinig's involvement in the money laundering
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
operation, Judge Duffy noted the following:
The suggestion is made that you are not smart or
sophisticated. I can't believe that. You thought that
the money laundering was coming in gray market goods.
But even you admit that you knew where it was coming
from, at least at the end.
What are we talking about? Well the figures vary, from
72 million dollars, that the Swiss bankers claimed to
have laundered, to nineteen, which I understand you are
accused of. Nineteen million dollars in drugs is a lot
of money. That much drugs is a lot of pain. If [your
sons] Samuel or Jacob were the ones who were using the
drugs, you would be singing a different story, an
entirely different song.\81\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\81\ Id. at 14.
Judge Duffy thereupon noted that ``if [this case] had been
in the old days, I would have given [Weinig] the statutory
maximum.'' \82\ On March 22, 1996, Judge Duffy sentenced Weinig
to 135 months (11 years and three months) plus three years
supervised release and a $100 special assessment.\83\ Even with
credit for good behavior, Harvey Weinig would not get out of
prison until 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\82\ Id.
\83\ U.S. District Court (S.D.N.Y.) Document Production (Judgment
and Commitment Order, U.S. v. Weinig, et al. (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 1996))
(Exhibit 12). See 11-Year Sentence for Lawyers in Drug Case, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 23, 1996, at A25.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After his conviction in federal court, Weinig filed for
resignation from the New York Bar with the Appellate Division
of the State of New York. That court accepted Weinig's
resignation, observing that ``[its] review of the record in
this matter reveals that respondent engaged in a course of
conduct that can only be described as shocking and
reprehensible for anyone, let alone a member of the bar.'' \84\
The court also emphasized that if Weinig had not voluntarily
resigned from the bar, a ``serious crimes'' hearing would have
commenced with disbarment being ``the only appropriate
sanction.'' \85\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\84\ In re Weinig, 642 N.Y.S.2d 654, 656 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996).
\85\ Id. See also Disciplinary Proceedings; Appellate Division;
First Department, N.Y. Law J., May 20, 1996, at 5; Today's News Update,
N.Y. Law J., May 20, 1996, at 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
II. WEINIG'S EFFORTS TO OBTAIN EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY
Soon after Weinig was imprisoned, John Wing, Weinig's
criminal defense counsel, wrote a 34-page letter to the U.S.
Attorney for the Southern District of New York, Mary Jo White,
in which he sought a reduction in his sentence, citing the
difference between Weinig's sentence and those of his co-
conspirators.\86\ The U.S. Attorney rejected Wing's
request.\87\ After that effort, Weinig focused his efforts on
obtaining executive clemency.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\86\ See generally Lev Dassin Document Production (Letter from John
R. Wing, Member, Weil, Gotshal & Manges, to Mary Jo White, U.S.
Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice (Feb. 28, 1997))
(Exhibit 5); Benjamin Weiser, A Felon's Well-Connected Path to
Clemency, N.Y. Times, Apr. 14, 2001, at A1.
\87\ Telephone Interview with Lev L. Dassin, former Assistant U.S.
Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice (Nov. 26, 2001);
Benjamin Weiser, A Felon's Well-Connected Path to Clemency, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 14, 2001, at A1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A. Weinig Hires Reid Weingarten to Lobby for Clemency
After Weinig was sent to prison, his wife, City University
of New York law professor Alice Morey, explored ways of getting
Weinig out of prison. Perhaps Morey's most important move was
to hire Reid Weingarten, a prominent Washington attorney with
close connections to the Clinton White House. Weingarten had
represented a number of key figures in Clinton-era scandals,
including Yah Lin ``Charlie'' Trie, Ron Brown, Mike Espy, and
Pauline Kanchanalak. In representing these individuals,
Weingarten had frequent contact with senior Clinton White House
officials and their attorneys. Weingarten was also well-
connected in the Justice Department, having served as a trial
attorney in the Public Integrity Section.
A friend told Weingarten about the Weinig case in 1998 and
asked him to meet with Weinig's wife.\88\ Weingarten met with
Morey, who was at her ``wits end'' because of Weinig's
imprisonment and the harm his imprisonment had caused to her
children.\89\ Weingarten ultimately took the case because ``the
general sentiment was that the sentence was `grossly
disproportionate.' '' \90\ Accordingly, Weingarten prepared a
clemency petition packet on Weinig's behalf and attached
letters submitted while Weinig was awaiting sentencing and
written in support of the clemency petition itself.\91\ In the
petition, Weinig set forth his offenses as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\88\ Interview with Reid Weingarten, Partner, Steptoe & Johnson
(Mar. 23, 2001).
\89\ Id.
\90\ Id.
\91\ Id. See also NARA Document Production (Petition for
Commutation of Sentence, Apr. 6, 2000) (Exhibit 13) (letters attached
to petition not attached).
As to the first count, I assisted various individuals
in laundering money, after realizing that the funds
were proceeds of illegal drug sales. As to the second
count, I became aware, after the fact, that a client of
mine had detained an individual who had defrauded my
client and owed my client money. I subsequently
instructed associates in my law firm to prepare
documentation that gave my client a security interest
in some of the individual's assets. I did not report to
the authorities that my client had previously detained
the individual.\92\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\92\ Id.
Weinig also observed that ``[a]s to my client's abduction of an
individual, I did not learn of the kidnapping until after the
individual had been released.'' \93\ As bases for the
commutation of his sentence, Weinig argued that: (1) his
sentence was grossly disproportionate to the sentences given to
more culpable co-defendants and to money laundering sentences
nationwide; (2) he had made and will continue to make
contributions to society; and (3) his family and, in
particular, his youngest son needed him to return home.\94\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\93\ Id. (attachment).
\94\ NARA Document Production (Harvey Weinig's Memorandum in
Support of His Petition for Commutation of Sentence, Apr. 6, 2000) at 6
(Exhibit 14) (originally attached to petition).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Weingarten filed a copy of the petition with the Pardon
Attorney's Office at the Justice Department on April 3,
2000,\95\ and with the White House Counsel's Office on April 7,
2000.\96\ Weingarten knew that the support of the prosecuting
U.S. Attorney's Office was critical because he had previously
represented two clients in clemency proceedings (and prevailed
in one of them).\97\ Accordingly, he spoke with Deputy U.S.
Attorney Shirah Neiman and Assistant U.S. Attorney Alan Kaufman
in the Southern District of New York.\98\ Weingarten knew that
the prosecutors office had to be on board or the application
was not going anywhere.\99\ In Weingarten's ``spirited''
conversation with Neiman and Kaufman, the prosecutors indicated
that they would not recommend commutation of Weinig's
sentence.\100\ Therefore, sometime in the fall of 2000,
Weingarten turned to Pardon Attorney Roger Adams.\101\ Rather
than persuade Adams to support commutation of Weinig's
sentence, which he was confident he would not do, Weingarten
intended only to have Adams ``soften'' his recommendation
against granting Weinig clemency.\102\ Weingarten failed, as is
apparent from the Justice Department's report to President
Clinton regarding Weinig's clemency petition, which is
discussed below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\95\ NARA Document Production (Letter from Reid Weingarten,
Partner, Steptoe & Johnson, to Roger Adams, Pardon Attorney, Department
of Justice (Apr. 3, 2000)) (Exhibit 15); Interview with Reid
Weingarten, Partner, Steptoe & Johnson (Mar. 23, 2001).
\96\ NARA Document Production (Letter from Reid Weingarten,
Partner, Steptoe & Johnson, to Beth Nolan, Counsel to the President,
the White House (Apr. 7, 2000)) (Exhibit 16); Interview with Reid
Weingarten, Partner, Steptoe & Johnson (Mar. 23, 2001). See also NARA
Document Production (Letter from Reid Weingarten, Partner, Steptoe &
Johnson, to Roger Adams, Pardon Attorney, Department of Justice (Apr.
3, 2000)) (Exhibit 17) (indicating, in note by Podesta to Nolan, ``I
need to discuss this one with you. Can you give me a call[?]''); NARA
Document Production (Letter from Beth Nolan, Counsel to the President,
the White House, to Reid Weingarten, Partner, Steptoe & Johnson (May
25, 2000)) (Exhibit 18) (drafts of letter attached).
\97\ Interview with Reid Weingarten, Partner, Steptoe & Johnson
(Mar. 23, 2001).
\98\ Id.
\99\ Id.
\100\ Id.
\101\ Id.
\102\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Weingarten then turned his attention to the White House.
When Weingarten's practice occasionally required trips to the
White House, he typically met with White House Counsel Beth
Nolan, Deputy White House Counsel Bruce Lindsey, or Chief of
Staff John Podesta.\103\ Though Weingarten has no specific
recollection of meetings he had with any of them regarding the
Weinig matter, he is confident that he brought the matter up
with them.\104\ Weingarten implored those staff members to
review the Weinig clemency petition, telling them ``please read
it, it sings.'' \105\ He also communicated that Weinig was a
``small fry in terms of culpability'' and that the Weinig
family believed that their youngest son's life was in jeopardy
if Harvey Weinig was not released from prison.\106\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\103\ Id.
\104\ Id.
\105\ Id.
\106\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, it appears that Weingarten was not well situated
to lobby the White House on the Weinig case because he was
ignorant of many basic details of the Weinig case. For example,
when discussing the Weinig case with Committee staff,
Weingarten attempted to characterize Weinig as a low-level
white collar criminal.\107\ However, he readily admitted that
he ``never, ever, ever got into the facts of the case because I
felt that I didn't need to.'' \108\ Regarding the kidnapping-
related charge, Weingarten said, ``That could hardly be called
a kidnapping. If it was, it was the mildest kidnapping ever.
First of all, the facts are in dispute. And, the alleged victim
was fed steaks and whores.'' \109\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\107\ Id.
\108\ Id.
\109\ Id. Weinig's trial attorney, John R. Wing, also argued this
point in a letter to U.S. Attorney Mary Jo White after Weinig's
sentencing. In that letter, Wing argued that Weinig's belief that
Clooney was not in danger was shared by law enforcement and that, in
fact, ``[i]t was later learned that Clooney was provided with steaks
and prostitutes during his `detention.' '' Lev Dassin Document
Production (Letter from John R. Wing, Member, Weil, Gotshal & Manges,
to Mary Jo White, U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice
(Feb. 28, 1997)) (Exhibit 5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Every aspect of Weingarten's response is troubling. First,
Weingarten was apparently trusted and respected by White House
staff. It is difficult to imagine how, in lobbying the
Administration, Weingarten could have accurately conveyed a
factual basis for his belief in the merits of Weinig's clemency
petition when he ``never, ever, ever'' felt the need to ``[get]
into the facts'' of Weinig's underlying conviction. Second,
contrary to Weingarten's assertion, the facts most relevant to
Weinig's active involvement in the extortion-by-kidnapping
scheme were not in dispute. In fact, Weinig admitted most of
them in court. Those facts established that Weinig was aware of
the scheme to kidnap Clooney and facilitated Clooney's
extortion through that scheme. Finally, Weingarten's contention
that Clooney's kidnapping was the ``the mildest . . . ever''
because his kidnappers provided him with ``steaks and whores''
fails to reflect the true facts of the crime. As Lev Dassin,
the assistant U.S. Attorney who prosecuted the case indicated
to Committee staff, ``[H]aving your abductors have sex with
prostitutes while you're cowering by the bed on the floor can,
in no way, be construed as pleasant.'' \110\ Weingarten failed
to appreciate the actual dynamics of Clooney's abduction. The
kidnappers, rather than Clooney, apparently partook of the
steaks and prostitutes at issue.\111\ This distinction appears
to have been lost on Weingarten. Nonetheless, assuming only for
the sake of argument that Weingarten's representation that
Clooney was treated favorably while abducted is accurate, there
is an obvious problem with Weingarten's citing it here. It is
simply bizarre for a lawyer, particularly one with Weingarten's
background, to suggest that the offense is mitigated by
supplying a kidnapping victim with ``steaks and whores.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\110\ Telephone Interview with Lev L. Dassin, former Assistant U.S.
Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice (Nov. 26, 2001).
\111\ There are additional elements of the crime of which
Weingarten was apparently unaware when he spoke with Committee staff.
First, as Clooney was being abducted, he was plainly fearful for his
life. He cried. See Appellate Brief, U.S. v. Messina, Docket No. 96-
1789 (2d Cir. 1997) at 9 (citing to record). When Spence told co-
conspirator Richard Messina on the telephone that Clooney cried while
being abducted, Messina responded that he wished he could have been
there to have seen Clooney cry. Id. Also, at various times during
Clooney's ordeal, a co-conspirator brandished a butterfly knife. Id.
Additionally, Clooney noticed that two other co-conspirators had a gun.
Id. Finally, Clooney's kidnappers told him several times that he would
be harmed if he tried to escape. Id. Had Weingarten bothered to ``get
into the facts,'' one hopes that he would have refrained from
characterizing Clooney's abduction as ``the mildest ever.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. Weinig's Wife Seeks Support for His Clemency Petition
While Weingarten was meeting with the White House about the
Weinig matter, Alice Morey called several public officials and
prominent rabbis regarding her husband.\112\ Morey sought these
individuals' help in obtaining a commutation of Weinig's prison
sentence. Morey's statements to these individuals can be
inferred from her February 24, 2000, letter to the Pardon
Attorney. In that letter, Morey characterized Weinig's role in
the conspiracy as ``exceedingly limited.'' \113\ She also
asserted that ``if [Weinig] has to serve the full remainder of
his sentence . . . our family will not be able to survive.''
\114\ Morey further observed that ``[w]ith the exception of
[Weinig], all of the twenty or so co-defendants in this case
received relatively light sentences and most have been out of
jail for some time.'' \115\ She continued, ``[I]t is cruelly
inequitable that Hirsch and the other major players received
sentences so far lighter than that which [Weinig] received,
despite [Weinig's] less significant role.'' \116\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\112\ Interview with Reid Weingarten, Partner, Steptoe & Johnson
(Mar. 23, 2001).
\113\ NARA Document Production (Letter from Alice Morey to Roger
Adams, Pardon Attorney, Department of Justice (Feb. 24, 2000)) (Exhibit
19).
\114\ Id.
\115\ Id.
\116\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Morey's letter to the Pardon Attorney contained many of the
same arguments made in Weinig's clemency petition. However,
Morey's letter also contained arguments not asserted by others.
For example, Morey attempted to distance Weinig from the
conspiracy by noting that Tohmes Peter was Hirsch's client, not
Weinig's.\117\ However, she conceded that Weinig acted on
behalf of Peter ``in a few instances when Hirsch was not
available [and] accepted the cash payments that [Peter] made to
the firm[.]'' \118\ Nonetheless, Morey maintained that
``[i]nterestingly enough, prior to Hirsch's arrest and
subsequent cooperation, the government had little or no
evidence that [Weinig] was connected in any way other than as
Hirsch's law partner.'' \119\ Morey also argued that the
Government had essentially entrapped Weinig, claiming that
``once Hirsch began cooperating with the federal government, he
began involving Harvey in his dealings with Peter Tohmes.''
\120\ Morey further argued that the original indictment
``barely mentions'' Weinig, ``perhaps because he had little to
do with the illegal activities.'' \121\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\117\ Id.
\118\ Id.
\119\ Id.
\120\ Id.
\121\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Morey's position as to Weinig's activities is totally
misleading. Weinig's extensive involvement in the money
laundering conspiracy was supported by statements of co-
conspirators and corroborated by Weinig's own admissions
captured by a wiretap. Contrary to Morey's representation that
Weinig's involvement was barely mentioned in the indictment,
counts one, five, eleven through seventeen, nineteen, twenty-
six through twenty-nine, and thirty through thirty-eight of the
April 20, 1995, indictment clearly indicate Weinig's deep
involvement in the money laundering conspiracy well beyond his
mere partnership in the law firm. Indeed, Morey's
characterization of Weinig's business transactions as having
been conducted ``in a few instances'' is charitable and, to the
extent that it ignores the $19 million Weinig admitted to
having laundered for members of the Colombian cartel and
Weinig's role in the extortion-by-kidnapping scheme,
irrelevant.
Regarding Weinig's guilty plea and sentencing, Morey
asserted that Weinig pleaded ``[f]or a host of reasons, mostly
emotional and financial.'' \122\ Morey also suggested that
``[a]lthough [Weinig's] lawyer had been hopeful that the court
would depart downward in sentencing, Judge Duffy sentenced
[Weinig] to the top of the guidelines without articulating his
reasons.'' \123\ Morey's assertion of why Weinig pleaded guilty
seems to confirm that Weinig never fully accepted
responsibility for his actions--one of the requirements for
receiving a commutation. Indeed, there was never a legitimate
expectation of downward departure at sentencing. Weinig
provided no meaningful assistance to authorities until
immediately before trial, and, as described below, the
information he ultimately provided was useless.\124\
Accordingly, Weinig's plea agreement did not contemplate a
downward adjustment for substantial assistance to
authorities.\125\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\122\ Id.
\123\ Id.
\124\ Telephone Interview with Lev L. Dassin, former Assistant U.S.
Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice (Nov. 26, 2001).
\125\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
C. Weinig's Wife Obtains Support From Individuals With Ties to the
Administration
Alice Morey obtained the assistance of a number of
individuals to press her husband's clemency case with the White
House. A key individual who helped Morey was her cousin, David
Dreyer, who served as a deputy communications director with the
Clinton White House and senior advisor to Clinton
Administration Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin. Dreyer used his
White House contacts to lobby White House Chief of Staff John
Podesta.\126\ When asked about Dreyer's role in lobbying for
the commutation, Weingarten confirmed that Dreyer ``bugged''
Podesta about the Weinig matter but does not know how many
times Dreyer contacted the White House.\127\ Weingarten noted
that, because Dreyer was a ``noodge,'' it might have been as
many as 20 times.\128\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\126\ Interview with Reid Weingarten, Partner, Steptoe & Johnson
(Mar. 23, 2001).
\127\ Id.
\128\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dreyer has publicly noted his fondness for his cousin Alice
and that he occasionally saw Weinig at various family
functions.\129\ He also observed that his friendship with
Podesta, with whom he occasionally jogged in Rock Creek Park,
remained strong even after he left the White House.\130\
According to Dreyer, sometime in July 2000 during a visit to
Podesta's office, he gave Podesta the cover memorandum from
Weinig's clemency petition and ``asked him to take a look at it
and explained to him the relationship, and why this
mattered[.]'' \131\ Dreyer confirmed that Podesta made no
promises but was ``certainly willing to look into it as an act
of friendship[.]'' \132\ Dreyer asked Podesta about the matter
again during the Fall of 2000 as they were jogging.\133\
Podesta responded by telling Dreyer not to expect any action
for several months.\134\ According to Weingarten, Podesta felt
that the Weinig clemency matter was a ``good story'' and that a
decision could be made ``on the merits.'' \135\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\129\ Benjamin Weiser, A Felon's Well-Connected Path to Clemency,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 14, 2001, at A1.
\130\ Id.
\131\ Id.
\132\ Id.
\133\ Id.
\134\ Id.
\135\ Interview with Reid Weingarten, Partner, Steptoe & Johnson
(Mar. 23, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Some insight as to what Dreyer specifically told Podesta,
and possibly others in the Administration, about the Weinig
matter can be gleaned from a letter that Dreyer submitted to
the Pardon Attorney's Office in support of Weinig's
petition.\136\ Dreyer noted in the letter that ``[n]o
conceivable societal interest is being served by forcing Harvey
[Weinig] to remain in prison for the entire length of his
maximum sentence.'' \137\ Dreyer cited as bases for clemency:
(1) the ``disproportion'' between Weinig's sentence and those
of co-defendants ``all more deeply involved [in the money
laundering conspiracy and misprision] than he''; (2) the fact
that ``Harvey's wife and sons are bearing the brunt of his
punishment with enormous force''; and (3) the fact that Weinig
was ``a good and decent father'' and ``a contributing member of
the community.'' \138\ Apparently content with only a
superficial appreciation of the facts, Dreyer noted that the
apparent disproportion between Weinig's sentence and those of
his co-defendants ``[o]n its face . . . is not fair.'' \139\ As
described above, these arguments are based on an incomplete
understanding of the underlying case. Perhaps more importantly,
characterizing Weinig as a ``contributing member of society''
does not help those unfamiliar with the facts of the case
understand that his most significant ``contribution'' was to
assist the Cali cartel in flooding the United States with
cocaine.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\136\ Dreyer's letter refers to ``papers filed with your office
[seeking] a clemency . . . for Harvey Weinig,'' yet the petition was
actually filed with the Justice Department (and the White House
Counsel's Office) months later in April 2000.
\137\ NARA Document Production (Letter from David Dreyer,
Principal, TSD, Inc., to Roger Adams, Pardon Attorney, Department of
Justice (Feb. 28, 2000)) (Exhibit 20).
\138\ Id.
\139\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In light of the specious arguments Dreyer set forth in his
letter to the Pardon Attorney and also likely communicated to
senior Administration officials, Chairman Burton asked Dreyer
to participate in an interview with Committee staff and
subpoenaed documents from Dreyer.\140\ Dreyer declined the
Committee's invitation and asserted his Fifth Amendment rights
against self-incrimination rather than produce records.
Dreyer's role in lobbying senior Clinton Administration
officials for the Weinig commutation was obviously critical.
Therefore, it is disappointing that Dreyer would not cooperate
with the Committee's investigation. Moreover, it is troubling
that Dreyer believed that something about his involvement in
the Weinig matter might be incriminating. Nevertheless, the
Committee must take his representation at face value and
conclude that Dreyer at least believes that he might have
incurred criminal liability during the course of his
activities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\140\ Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on
Govt. Reform, to David Dreyer, Principal, TSD, Inc. (Mar. 16, 2001)
(within Appendix I) (invitation letter); Subpoena from Comm. on Govt.
Reform to David Dreyer, Principal, TSD, Inc. (Apr. 4, 2001) (within
Appendix II).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Weinig's wife, Alice Morey, also directly lobbied Harold
Ickes, the President's former Deputy Chief of Staff, whose
children attended her sons' school.\141\ Ickes and Podesta have
publicly stated that, like Dreyer, they were persuaded to
support Weinig's petition by the merits of the argument that
Weinig's sentence was disproportionate to other sentences
imposed in the case.\142\ Ickes, in particular, said, ``I think
what really drove it home to me was the disparity in the
sentences.'' \143\ They have also stated that they believed
that Weinig's sons were suffering considerably from their
father's incarceration.\144\ That appears to be the position
that Ickes conveyed to President Clinton when the President
approached him about the Weinig petition.\145\ Ickes recalled,
``[The President] asked me about it a couple of times. I don't
think he was aware of all the nuances, so I told him my view of
it. It was the sentencing issue. I said, `Look, this guy was
sentenced. He pled guilty. And nobody is claiming that he's a
saint.' '' \146\ However, it is not entirely clear why the
sentencing disparity--not whether Weinig's crimes merited the
sentence Judge Duffy imposed--was the primary focus. It appears
in hindsight that the disparity argument was manufactured to
compensate for the fact that there were actually no
intellectually defensible grounds for the argument that
Weinig's sentence should be commuted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\141\ Interview with Reid Weingarten, Partner, Steptoe & Johnson
(Mar. 23, 2001).
\142\ Benjamin Weiser, A Felon's Well-Connected Path to Clemency,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 14, 2001, at A1.
\143\ Id.
\144\ Id.
\145\ Id.
\146\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reid Weingarten also enlisted Alma Brown, the widow of
former Commerce Secretary Ron Brown, in the clemency campaign.
Weingarten had represented Ron Brown in various investigations
prior to his death and remained friendly with Alma Brown.
Knowing that Alma Brown remained close to the White House,
Weingarten asked her to write a letter ``putting in a good
word'' for Weinig.\147\ Brown initially resisted but eventually
did so.\148\ Weingarten believes that Brown also might have
spoken to President Clinton about the Weinig matter.\149\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\147\ Interview with Reid Weingarten, Partner, Steptoe & Johnson
(Mar. 23, 2001).
\148\ Id.
\149\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
III. THE WHITE HOUSE'S REVIEW OF WEINIG'S COMMUTATION REQUEST
A. The Justice Department's Input in the Weinig Clemency Matter
The Justice Department repeatedly, clearly, and adamantly
recommended against any reduction of Weinig's sentence, not
only at and after sentencing but also during the clemency
proceedings. Some time after sentencing, Weinig's defense
counsel sent a 34-page letter to U.S. Attorney Mary Jo White
seeking a reduction of Weinig's sentence. In response, White
rejected the request out of hand. Also, when Weinig sought a
commutation of his sentence from the White House, the Justice
Department, through Pardon Attorney Roger Adams, voiced its
opposition.
1. The U.S. Attorney Strongly Objected to Commuting
Weinig's Sentence
U.S. Attorney Mary Jo White expressed her opinion on the
Weinig commutation in her official comments to the Pardon
Attorney. White's position was then communicated by the Pardon
Attorney to President Clinton. White disputed Weinig's
description of his role in the money laundering
conspiracy.\150\ Citing Weinig's admissions at the sentencing
hearing and in the recorded conversations with Hirsch, White
argued that ``the evidence amply demonstrates both Weinig's
knowledge of and enthusiasm to participate in this scheme.''
\151\ White also argued that Weinig ``misstates his role in the
extortion scheme,'' and she challenged his argument that ``he
should be exonerated on [the misprision] count because his
ethical duties as a lawyer prevented him from disclosing
confidential information.'' \152\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\150\ NARA Document Production (Report to the President on Proposed
Denial of Executive Clemency for Harvey Weinig) at 11 (Exhibit 3).
\151\ Id.
\152\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
White explained that ``the extortion charge . . . stemmed
not from Weinig's failure to interfere with the kidnapping, but
rather from his affirmative efforts to conceal and further his
client's extortion of Clooney.'' \153\ White also noted that
``the tapes of Weinig's conversations with Hirsch regarding the
kidnapping provide perhaps the greatest example of Weinig's
shocking lack of morality or care for the rule of law.'' \154\
White described Weinig's ``suggestion that New York [S]tate's
ethics rules either compelled, or at least justified, his
conduct'' as ``perverse.'' \155\ In particular, she noted that,
although Spence was Weinig's client, he plainly did not inform
Weinig of the kidnapping because he was seeking legal
advice.\156\ White maintained that, to the contrary, Spence
sought Weinig's assistance in obtaining ransom from Clooney.
She observed that ``[n]othing in the ethics rules governing
attorney conduct in New York State (or any other state for that
matter) sanctions one's affirmative participation in a crime,
let alone the collection of ransom from a kidnap victim, which
is exactly what Weinig directed his law firm's associates to
do.'' \157\ White also noted that the Appellate Division of the
State of New York, which accepted Weinig's resignation from the
bar, took grave exception to his interpretation of the state's
ethics rules.\158\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\153\ Id. at 11.
\154\ Id. at 12.
\155\ Id.
\156\ Id.
\157\ Id.
\158\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
White also challenged Weinig's claim of entitlement to
commutation because he received a longer sentence than did his
co-conspirators.\159\ White noted that several co-conspirators,
including Gary Salerno and Tohmes Peter, received significant,
comparable jail sentences for their crimes.\160\ White observed
that Weinig was not similar to other co-conspirators in that he
was a successful attorney and, therefore, had no reason to
engage in illegal activity other than ``sheer greed.'' \161\
White further noted that, contrary to co-conspirators Hirsch
and Spence, Weinig repeatedly declined to cooperate with the
Government and admit his guilt until immediately before
trial.\162\ White explained that any disparity existing between
Weinig's sentence and those of his money laundering co-
conspirators is explained by Weinig's active participation in
the kidnapping scheme.\163\ Finally, White argued that Weinig's
family situation did not justify commutation of his
sentence.\164\ White apparently notified Judge Duffy, the judge
who sentenced Weinig, of Weinig's ongoing effort to obtain
presidential clemency. Judge Duffy did not comment on the
petition ``other than to point out that Mr. Weinig was
sentenced within the Guidelines'' range and that the
Commutation Application contains no facts not known to the
prosecution and the sentencing court at the time of
conviction.'' \165\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\159\ Id. at 12.
\160\ Id.
\161\ Id.
\162\ Id.
\163\ Id.
\164\ Id. at 13.
\165\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. The Pardon Attorney Objected to Commuting Weinig's
Sentence
Roger Adams, the Pardon Attorney, also opposed the Weinig
commutation. In his report to the President, Adams pointed out
that the length of Weinig's sentence was directly attributable
to the following aggravating factors: the extremely large
amount of money Weinig helped to launder, Weinig's actual
knowledge that the money he laundered was narcotics trafficking
proceeds, and Weinig's use of his special skills as an attorney
to ensure that the offense would succeed.\166\ The report
further stated that, but for those aggravating factors,
Weinig's sentence would have been much lower.\167\ The report
also noted that Weinig's argument that his sentence was too
severe under the sentencing guidelines was meritless because
his offense (of assisting in the laundering of millions of
dollars that he knew were the proceeds of drug sales) falls
comfortably within the category of drug-related financial
crimes that Congress sought to punish severely through the
money laundering statute and its sentencing guidelines.\168\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\166\ Id.
\167\ Id.
\168\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The report refuted Weinig's claim that he learned of
Spence's kidnapping of Clooney only after Clooney was released.
Weinig's claim is flatly disproved by his contemporaneously
recorded telephone conversations with Robert Hirsch. Given that
Weinig's claim indicates his unwillingness to accept full
responsibility for his role in the extortion scheme, according
to the report, Judge Duffy was fully entitled under the
sentencing guidelines to consider this fact when determining
Weinig's proper sentence.\169\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\169\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regarding Weinig's argument that his sentence was unfair in
comparison to his co-conspirators, the report notes that,
inasmuch as Weinig plainly sought to downplay his involvement
in the extortion scheme, he also sought to significantly
minimize his role in the money laundering conspiracy, calling
himself ``a belated and minor participant.'' \170\ The report
correctly notes that this characterization is contrary to the
evidence. Although the report concedes that Weinig was less
frequently involved in the day-to-day operations of the money
laundering scheme, it notes that Weinig participated in the
planning and oversight of the operation, wired money when
needed, assisted in recovering seized funds, and participated
fully in the profits of the enterprise.\171\ The report also
noted that, unlike his co-conspirators, Weinig rejected
repeated requests from the government for assistance and did
not enter into a plea agreement until the eve of trial--nearly
10 months after his arrest and long after his co-conspirators
pled guilty.\172\ Accordingly, the report observes that:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\170\ Id. at 14.
\171\ Id.
\172\ Id. See NARA Document Production (Letter from Mark P.
Goodman, Assistant U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., for Mary Jo White,
U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice, to John R. Wing,
Member, Weil, Gotshal & Manges (Sept. 20, 1995)) (Exhibit 2) (plea
agreement).
[Weinig] thus has no one but himself to blame for the
fact that, unlike his co-defendants, he was not the
beneficiary of a government motion for a downward
departure at sentencing, since his own choices
precluded him from providing the kind of assistance
that would have warranted such a request.\173\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\173\ See NARA Document Production (Report to the President on
Proposed Denial of Executive Clemency for Harvey Weinig) at 14 (Exhibit
3).
Critically, the report notes that, under those circumstances,
commuting Weinig's sentence as he proposed would
``significantly undermine'' the government's ``legitimate and
important policy interests in encouraging early and complete
cooperation by criminal defendants.'' \174\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\174\ Id. at 14-15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, the report maintains that Weinig's remaining
arguments for clemency, those relating to a history of and
potential for continued community service as well as those
relating to family hardship, simply fail to distinguish Weinig
from other convicted felons. The report helpfully notes that
many felons have enjoyed fewer advantages than has Weinig, have
served longer portions of their lengthy sentences, and have had
their clemency requests denied by President Clinton. Given the
foregoing and the vehement opposition of the prosecuting U.S.
Attorney, the report recommended denial of Weinig's petition.
The Committee finds the Justice Department's positions, as
articulated by both U.S. Attorney Mary Jo White and Main
Justice, powerfully persuasive. Their positions reflect a
reasoned, thoughtful deliberation of the merits of Weinig's
clemency application against criteria traditionally considered
when vetting clemency petitions. They also reflect a thorough
understanding of Weinig's underlying conviction and the extant
record. To accept Weinig's argument requires a willingness to
overlook the facts of the underlying conviction and the record.
Such willful blindness gives rise to the inference that the
ultimate decision to commute Weinig's sentence was motivated by
a factor other than the merits of Weinig's petition.
B. The White House's Deliberations
By late 2000, Weinig's clemency matter was brought before
President Clinton for consideration. Despite the Justice
Department's opposition to the commutation and the lack of any
strong arguments in favor of the commutation, key White House
staff supported the commutation. The Weinig commutation, like
many of President Clinton's other final clemency grants, is
remarkable for the lack of analysis that the case received at
the White House. The White House seems to have ignored the
strong recommendations of the Pardon Attorney and the Justice
Department prosecutors and granted the commutation after only
cursory consideration.
Support from John Podesta and Beth Nolan appears to have
been critical to the decision to grant the Weinig commutation.
Podesta had been lobbied by his former staffer, David Dreyer,
and Nolan had been lobbied by Reid Weingarten. Eric Angel, an
Associate White House Counsel who was working on clemency
matters, recalls that Podesta ``asserted himself'' in favor of
Weinig at a meeting with the President regarding the Weinig
matter.\175\ White House Counsel Beth Nolan also supported the
Weinig commutation.\176\ The lower-level staff in the Counsel's
Office, Meredith Cabe and Angel, were not as supportive. Angel
claims that he was strongly opposed to the commutation because
of the seriousness of Weinig's crimes.\177\ Cabe put her
opposition in more gentle terms, stating simply that she was
``not a big fan'' of the Weinig case.\178\ According to Cabe,
Podesta and Nolan supported the Weinig commutation for two main
reasons. First, they believed that Weinig's sentence was
disproportionately long, apparently accepting the argument that
Weinig was treated unfairly because his co-conspirators
received lighter sentences than he did.\179\ Second, one of
Weinig's children was suffering from severe emotional distress
as a result of his father's incarceration.\180\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\175\ Interview with Eric Angel, former Associate Counsel to the
President, the White House (Mar. 28, 2001).
\176\ Interview with Meredith Cabe, former Associate Counsel to the
President, the White House (Mar. 16, 2001).
\177\ Interview with Eric Angel, former Associate Counsel to the
President, the White House (Mar. 28, 2001).
\178\ Interview with Meredith Cabe, former Associate Counsel to the
President, the White House (Mar. 16, 2001).
\179\ Id.
\180\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
By late December 2000, the White House Counsel's Office was
prepared to recommend that Weinig's sentence be commuted. In a
December 17, 2000, draft memorandum to the President, Beth
Nolan, Bruce Lindsey, and Meredith Cabe recommended clemency
but noted opposition by the office of the prosecuting U.S.
Attorney.\181\ A December 20, 2000, draft memorandum noted
opposition by Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder and
recommended that Weinig's sentence be commuted to 108 months
``[s]ince [Weinig] agreed in guilty plea range should be 108-
135 months[.]'' \182\ As the ``rationale'' for the
recommendation, Nolan, Lindsey, and Cabe observed that ``[m]ore
culpable co-defendants, including the law partner who directed
the kidnapping, received shorter sentences and have been
released.'' \183\ No mention is made of the substantial
assistance provided by the ``more culpable defendants'' to
investigating authorities or that a similarly situated
defendant (who actively participated in the extortion by
kidnapping scheme) received a sentence comparable to Weinig's.
Presumably, both of these facts, as well as a correction to the
misstatement that Weinig's ``law partner . . . directed the
kidnapping,'' were made in the final draft of the memorandum or
orally when advising the President. It is also unclear when or
why the decision was made to commute Weinig's sentence from 108
months to time served. But, drafts of ``Pending Clemency
Matters'' noted that ``Rep. By Reid Weingarten; through JDP;
Harold Ickes.'' \184\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\181\ NARA Document Production (Draft Memorandum to the President
by Beth Nolan, Bruce Lindsey, and Meredith Cabe (Dec. 17, 2000))
(Exhibit 21).
\182\ NARA Document Production (Draft Memorandum to the President
by Beth Nolan, Bruce Lindsey, and Meredith Cabe (Dec. 20, 2000))
(Exhibit 22).
\183\ Interview with Meredith Cabe, former Associate Counsel to the
President, the White House (Mar. 16, 2001).
\184\ NARA Document Production (Draft Memorandum from Beth Nolan,
Bruce Lindsey, and Meredith Cabe to President William J. Clinton
entitled ``Pending Clemency Matters'') (Exhibit 23) (entry for Weinig
only).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The only indication of the President's reasoning in the
Weinig matter comes from a copy of the summary of Weinig's
argument for a commutation. On a note attached to that
document, President Clinton wrote, ``M. Cabe--This looks
meritorious[.] Advise[.]--BC.'' \185\ At the top of the
memorandum itself, President Clinton wrote, ``Reduce to time
served.'' \186\ On January 20, 2001, President Clinton commuted
Harvey Weinig's 11-year prison term to time served, which
reduced Weinig's sentence by 66 months.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\185\ NARA Document Production (Summary of Harvey Weinig's Petition
for Commutation) (Exhibit 24) (note attached).
\186\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
C. The White House Had No Justification for the Weinig Commutation
Weinig articulated three main reasons why he was entitled
to presidential clemency: (1) that his sentence was
disproportionate and excessive; (2) that his contributions to
society justified his early release from prison; and (3) that
one of his sons was suffering severe emotional difficulties as
a result of his imprisonment. The first reason simply was not
true. The other two did not justify any reduction in his
sentence, much less his release from prison.
Weinig's main argument in favor of the commutation was that
his sentence was disproportionate and excessive. In support of
his claim, Weinig pointed to his main two co-defendants,
Richard Spence and Robert Hirsch, both of whom received lighter
sentences than he did and who arguably were more involved in
money laundering activities. However, Weinig's sentence was
stiffer than those received by Spence and Hirsch because they,
unlike Weinig, cooperated with law enforcement.\187\ Judge
Duffy adjusted their sentences downward because they provided
substantial assistance to investigative authorities.\188\ Co-
conspirators truly ``equally culpable,'' including Tohmes Peter
and Gary Salerno, received sentences comparable to Weinig's
135-month imprisonment term.\189\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\187\ Weinig has argued on occasion that he attempted to cooperate
with the government but was rebuffed. A close examination of Weinig's
claims shows them to be hollow. Between the time when Weinig entered
his guilty plea and his sentencing hearing, Weinig apparently attempted
to cooperate with the Government. See Interview with Reid Weingarten,
Partner, Steptoe & Johnson (Mar. 23, 2001); NARA Document Production
(Report to the President on Proposed Denial of Executive Clemency for
Harvey Weinig) at 6-7 (Exhibit 3). Specifically, he submitted himself
for debriefing regarding the money laundering operation in November
1995. At that time, he told authorities that Robert Hirsch had violated
his own cooperation agreement with the government by resuming his money
laundering activities. Id. But this fact was already well known to the
federal government. Months earlier, in May 1995, and well before his
guilty plea, the government already knew about Hirsch's activities and
moved for revocation of Hirsch's bail. Id. at 7; see Telephone
Interview with Lev L. Dassin, former Assistant U.S. Attorney for the
S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice (Nov. 26, 2001). Ultimately, the
federal government did reach an agreement with Hirsch whereby Hirsch
agreed to plead guilty to money laundering, bank fraud, and making
false statements to federal law enforcement authorities and to
cooperate with law enforcement. See NARA Document Production (Report to
the President on Proposed Denial of Executive Clemency for Harvey
Weinig) at 7 (Exhibit 3). Under this agreement, Hirsch received a
sentence of three years imprisonment under the federal sentencing
guidelines. The prosecutors made this deal with Hirsch primarily
because they needed his cooperation to prosecute Weinig. See Telephone
Interview with Lev L. Dassin, former Assistant U.S. Attorney for the
S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice (Nov. 26, 2001). As the U.S. Attorney
informed the Pardon Attorney, ``The predominant reason the Government
resigned Hirsch as a cooperator was to assist in prosecuting [Weinig's]
trial. If [Weinig] had admitted his guilt earlier, Hirsch would not
have been resigned as a cooperating witness.'' NARA Document Production
(Report to the President on Proposed Denial of Executive Clemency for
Harvey Weinig) at 7 (Exhibit 3).
\188\ Telephone Interview with Lev L. Dassin, former Assistant U.S.
Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice (Nov. 26, 2001).
\189\ Peter received 97 months in prison, and Salerno received 108
months in prison. Leon and Rachel Weinmann were indicted for, among
other things, money laundering and, under separate indictment, causing
a $20,000 fully endorsed third-party check to be sent from New York
City to Switzerland without filing a particular customs report. On May
19, 1995, they pleaded guilty to only the customs violation. U.S.
Probation Office (S.D.N.Y.) Document Production (Pre-sentence
Investigation Report, U.S. v. Weinig (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1996)) at 12
(Exhibit 1). But, prior to their sentencing, it was stipulated that (1)
the Weinmanns were charged with money laundering in Switzerland; (2)
the case against the Weinmanns represented the second largest money
laundering prosecution in Swiss history; and (3) the Weinmanns should
be extradited as soon as possible to Switzerland for prosecution there.
Id. at 13. Accordingly, the Weinmanns waived the preparation of a
presentence report; the Government declined to take a position
regarding the Weinmann's sentencing; and, for the crime to which they
pled guilty, the Weinmanns were sentenced by Judge Kevin T. Duffy to 1
year unsupervised probation, a $1,000 fine each, and a $50 special
assessment. Id. The Weinmanns were then escorted to a flight to
Switzerland for prosecution. Id. See Swiss Couple to Be Extradited from
United States, Official Says, Associated press Worldstream, May 16,
1995. However, Marc Ziegler, who was then the District Attorney for the
Canton of Zurich, noted substantial difficulty with his prosecution of
the Weinmanns. The prosecution was intended as a test case of
Switzerland's money laundering law, which was introduced in 1990.
Apparently, the case against the Weinmanns in Switzerland arose out of
the same facts that gave rise to the Weinmann's indictment for money
laundering in the U.S. Nonetheless, as described below, many of
Weinnman's co-conspirators entered into plea agreements, which
precluded evidence that could have been used against the Weinmanns in
their prosecution in Switzerland. Ziegler attributes his difficulties
in prosecuting the Weinmanns to that factor, ambiguities in the Swiss
money laundering statute, and the differences between Swiss and
American evidentiary law. The current status of the Swiss case against
the Weinmanns is unknown. Richard Messina, one of Weinig's co-
conspirators in the scheme to extort James Clooney by kidnapping, was
sentenced to 151 months incarceration and three years supervised
release--a sentence comparable to Weinig's sentence. Judge Duffy
sentenced both Weinig and Messina to the upper end of a recommended
sentencing range of 121 to 151 months imprisonment. Judge Duffy's
rationale for Messina's sentence was very similar to his rationale for
sentencing Weinig, an attorney, to 135 months. He found, among other
things, that Messina knowingly played a role in the extortion of
Clooney and engaged in serious criminal conduct after having been
disbarred. See Telephone Interview with Lev Dassin, former Assistant
U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice (Nov. 26, 2001);
Appellate Brief, U.S. v. Messina, Docket No. 96-1789 (2d Cir. 1997) at
20 (citing to record for judge's reasons).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Indeed, in many criminal cases involving multiple co-
defendants, the Government obtains cooperation from some
defendants to help develop its case against others. Generally,
and understandably, there arrives a point in the investigation
in which the Government becomes unwilling to make available any
more deals with other co-defendants. In such cases, those co-
defendants choose to take their chances with the judge and the
jury rather than cooperate with the Government. Until the eve
of trial, this was Weinig's decision.\190\ Accordingly,
Weinig's citing the resulting ``disproportion'' between reduced
sentences given to co-defendants who substantially assisted the
Government and the sentences of those who decide not to is
flawed because it renders his case indistinguishable from all
similar cases where cooperation agreements were used to obtain
evidence. In other words, Weinig cannot argue that the methods
by which law enforcement gathered evidence to convict him is
inherently unfair without requiring that all those cases where
convictions were obtained by those same means also be reversed.
Such a position is obviously untenable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\190\ Telephone Interview with Lev L. Dassin, former Assistant U.S.
Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice (Nov. 26, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The second main argument used by Weinig as a justification
for his commutation is that his humanitarian actions justified
his early release from prison. The basic thrust of this
argument was that, apart from his activities laundering money
for the Cali cartel and participating in a kidnapping scheme,
Weinig was actually a very nice person. There are several
obvious flaws with this argument. First, it should not have
been relevant to the President's analysis. Second, there is
little evidence that Weinig was a humanitarian in any
significant sense. Rather, the letters of support for Weinig in
his clemency petition basically show that Weinig, like most
people, had friends who liked him. While he may have been nice
to his children and friends, it is difficult to ignore that he
was laundering millions of dollars in drug money for the Cali
cartel. The fact that Harvey Weinig consciously decided to
assist and profit from the Cali cartel's efforts to distribute
massive amounts of cocaine in the United States should have
been both the starting and finishing point in determining his
suitability for Presidential clemency. Doubtless, many families
around the United States could provide tragic stories
supporting the theory that a money launderer for one of the
most powerful Colombian drug cartels is not the kind of person
that should be described as humanitarian.
The final argument used by Weinig to support his clemency
effort was that one of his children was suffering emotional
difficulties as a result of his imprisonment. It appears that
this argument, more than any other, had a great impact upon the
President's decision to grant the commutation. John Podesta
obliquely referred to this in one of his public comments about
the Weinig case: ``I think that people were aware of what he
had done, but that ultimately, I think that based on the length
of time he had served and based on a humanitarian plea, while a
difficult case, it seemed like the right decision.'' \191\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\191\ Benjamin Weiser, A Felon's Well-Connected Path to Clemency,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 14, 2001, at A1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, the ``humanitarian plea'' made by Weinig did not
justify the commutation of his sentence. Thousands of criminals
have families adversely impacted by the stigma of criminal
conviction or the fact of incarceration. Yet, this fact should
serve as a deterrent to crime, not as a reason to let criminals
out of prison long before their sentences are completed. One of
the letters in support of Harvey Weinig noted, ``Harvey's love
for his children has always been a dominant factor in his life,
shaping his ideas of how he wants to spend his time, his money
and his life.'' \192\ If this were true, Harvey Weinig would
have decided not to join a conspiracy to launder millions of
dollars of drug money for, or tried to steal millions of
dollars from, the Cali cartel. Weinig knew that his money
laundering activity was illegal and that it, as well as his
attempted theft of the cartel's drug money, exposed his family
to considerable danger. He also knew that, if he was caught by
authorities laundering drug money or the cartel stealing its
money, he would go to prison or be harmed by the Colombian drug
traffickers themselves. However, because of what U.S. Attorney
Mary Jo White described as ``sheer greed,'' Weinig participated
in substantial criminal conduct that ended up harming his
family immeasurably. Given that it was Harvey Weinig who harmed
his family, it is unclear why that same harm should then be
used to justify freeing Weinig from prison. Weinig's plea is
reminiscent of the man who kills his parents and then asks for
leniency because he is an orphan. Weinig's ``humanitarian
plea'' also ignores entirely his role in bringing into the
United States large volumes of drugs that harmed innumerable
families.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\192\ NARA Document Production (Letter from Cynthia A. Hayes to the
Honorable Kevin Thomas Duffy, U.S. District Court Judge (Dec. 18,
1995)) (Exhibit 25).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Moreover, as Weinig's situation was no different from that
of thousands of other inmates, it is hard to see why President
Clinton chose to grant clemency to Weinig, rather than one of
the other thousands of inmates whose families were suffering
because of their incarceration. In short, the only answer is
that President Clinton chose Weinig because he was the person
who had the access, through his wife's cousin, David Dreyer,
and his lawyer, Reid Weingarten, to make his case to the
President and the White House staff.
D. Aftermath of the Weinig Commutation
President Clinton's grant of clemency to Harvey Weinig has
trivialized the seriousness of Weinig's criminal misconduct.
Having interviewed law enforcement personnel, it is also clear
that the clemency decision has eroded morale among law
enforcement personnel who put their lives on the line and work
tirelessly to enforce the drug laws on a federal, state, and
local level. As a policy matter, the grant of clemency has also
undermined the government's legitimate interest in encouraging
prompt guilty pleas and truthful cooperation from criminal
defendants.
Domestically, President Clinton's action conveyed an
appearance of granting special consideration to wealthy,
politically well-connected criminals and their relatives.
Pardon Attorney Roger Adams foresaw the message sent by the
Weinig commutation, warning President Clinton that:
To commute [Weinig's] prison term to the five years he
proposes would denigrate the seriousness of his
criminal misconduct, undermine the government's
legitimate interest in encouraging prompt guilty pleas
and truthful cooperation from criminal defendants, and
could give the appearance of granting special
consideration to economically advantaged, white-collar
offenders.\193\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\193\ NARA Document Production (Report to the President on Proposed
Denial of Executive Clemency for Harvey Weinig) at 15 (Exhibit 3).
It is difficult to disagree with Adams' conclusion. Clearly,
many prison inmates have families that have been adversely
impacted by their criminal activity. Yet, of all those people,
Harvey Weinig received a commutation of sentence. Weinig's
commutation did not come as a result of having committed some
minor crime--he was a money launderer for the Cali cartel.
Rather, Weinig received a commutation because he was wealthy
and privileged, could hire a lawyer like Reid Weingarten, and
had relatives and friends who knew the President.
On an international level, President Clinton's commutation
decision has unfortunately sent the message to the world that
the United States' commitment to eradicating narcotics
trafficking is, to some extent, disingenuous. Former Colombian
National Police Chief Rosso Serrano noted that President
Clinton ``sent the wrong message to the anti-drug struggle,
because it negates the suffering of all the families of those
who died to fight trafficking.'' \194\ According to Serrano,
``[The Weinig clemency decision is] very frustrating. [The drug
traffickers] must be laughing at us. It's a terrible precedent
for those of us who have openly fought this scourge.'' \195\ In
an op-ed entitled ``The Morality of the Strongest'' in El
Tiempo, Colombia's leading daily, Gustavo De Greiff, a former
Colombian attorney general, labeled President Clinton's
clemency decision ``monstrous.'' \196\ Likewise, former
Colombian president Ernesto Samper, who saw his country
decertified and facing sanctions for his apparent lack of
cooperation with the United States, described the clemency as
``repugnant.'' \197\ He rhetorically asked, ``What would have
happened if, with just a few days left in my presidency, I had
set free several drug traffickers arrested in Bogota, and if
those same people were found to be helping people in my
government?'' \198\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\194\ Former Colombian Drug Agent Blasts Clinton's Pardon of
Trafficker, Agence France Presse, Mar. 4, 2001.
\195\ Colombian General Hits Clinton Commutation, Wash. Times, Mar.
6, 2001, at A13.
\196\ Russell Crandall, The Americas: In the War on Drugs,
Colombians Die, Americans Are Pardoned, Wall St. J., Apr. 20, 2001, at
A15.
\197\ Id.
\198\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Indeed, President Clinton's eleventh-hour commutation of
Weinig's sentence prompted government officials and the media
in Colombia to accuse the U.S. government of hypocrisy. During
the mid-1990s, the Clinton administration openly condemned the
Colombian government's ``surrender policy'' toward the Cali
cartel. Pursuant to the ``surrender policy,'' the Colombian
government allowed reduced prison sentences for drug kingpins
who agreed to surrender. And, currently, an important element
of the U.S. anti-drug approach is the $1.3 billion U.S.
commitment to Plan Colombia--President Andres Pastrana's
program to recover control of the country from guerilla
factions brutally dominating the Colombian countryside in
furtherance of their cocaine production enterprises. But, there
can be no doubt that, to the extent that eradicating narcotics
trafficking is indeed important to the United States, such a
commitment should be reflected in the activities of those
charged with the public trust at the highest levels of elected
office.
[Exhibits referred to follow:]