[Senate Report 106-83]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                       Calendar No. 161
106th Congress                                                   Report
 1st Session                                                     106-83


                    Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act


                              R E P O R T

                                 OF THE



                                 S. 305


                 June 21, 1999.--Ordered to be printed


69-010                     WASHINGTON : 1999


                       one hundred sixth congress

                             first session

                     JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Chairman

TED STEVENS, Alaska                  ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina
CONRAD BURNS, Montana                DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
SLADE GORTON, Washington             JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West 
TRENT LOTT, Mississippi              Virginia
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas          JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
OLYMPIA SNOWE, Maine                 JOHN B. BREAUX, Louisiana
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri              RICHARD H. BRYAN, Nevada
BILL FRIST, Tennessee                BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota
SPENCER ABRAHAM, Michigan            RON WYDEN, Oregon
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas                MAX CLELAND, Georgia

                       Mark Buse, Staff Director

                  Martha P. Allbright, General Counsel

     Ivan A. Schlager, Democratic Chief Counsel and Staff Director

               Kevin D. Kayes, Democratic General Counsel

                                                       Calendar No. 161
106th Congress                                                   Report
 1st Session                                                     106-83


                     Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act


                 June 21, 1999.--Ordered to be printed


       Mr. McCain, from the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
                Transportation, submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                         [To accompany S. 305]

    The Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, to 
which was referred the bill (S. 305) ``A Bill to reform unfair 
and anticompetitive practices in the professional boxing 
industry'', having considered the same, reports favorably 
thereon with amendments and recommends that the bill (as 
amended) do pass.

                          Purpose of the Bill

  The purpose of S. 305, as reported, is to protect 
professional boxers from coercive and exploitative business 
practices, reduce interstate restraints of trade, assist state 
boxing officials to provide proper oversight of the sport, and 
increase honest competition and the integrity of the industry.

                          Background and Needs

  The Committee believes that a modest series of targeted 
public interest reforms of the professional boxing industry can 
have a very positive impact on the industry. The sport has no 
league, governing body, or private sector association of 
industry leaders to establish fair business practices and 
discipline improper and arbitrary conduct. There has long been 
serious public concern about the continuing scandals and 
litigation which occur in professional boxing due to the lack 
of responsible self-regulation on a national basis. The 
Committee concurs with most credible members of the boxing 
industry that problems stemming from the activities of major 
promoters and sanctioning organizations cannot be adequately 
addressed on a state-by-state basis. The Committee emphasizes 
the vulnerability and lack of leverage most professional boxers 
have with respect to various arbitrary business practices of 
these entities in the sport. This legislation complements the 
Professional Boxing Safety Act, the federal law enacted in 1996 
which established a series of vital health, safety, and ethical 
standards in the professional boxing industry.

                          Legislative History

  The Committee held two full Committee hearings in 1998 on the 
professional boxing industry. On March 24, 1998, a hearing was 
held on business practices in the professional boxing industry. 
Frederic G. Levin, attorney and negotiator for Roy Jones, Jr., 
light heavyweight champion, testified that long term 
promotional contracts and options hurt the boxer and the sport, 
and that ratings organizations do not have credible ratings 
procedures. Mr. Levin recommended that all options and 
promotional rights gained from a boxer seeking to compete in a 
particular fight be prohibited. Jones submitted written 
testimony recommending that promotional contracts should be 
limited and that boxers and state commissions be advised of how 
the revenues of a boxing event were distributed. Jones 
recommended that ``options'' should be made illegal. Mr. James 
J. Binns, Counsel to the World Boxing Association, testified 
that the current ratings system does not function improperly, 
and having several different champions in each weight division 
increases opportunities for boxers. Promoter Cedric Kushner 
testified that long term promotional contracts are necessary 
for promoters to recoup their investment in a boxer. Mr. Greg 
Sirb, Executive Director of the Pennsylvania State Athletic 
Commission and president of the Association of Boxing 
Commissions (ABC), testified that the proliferation of 
sanctioning organizations is undermining the title of 
``champion.'' Attorney Patrick C. English, who has represented 
promoters and boxers in the sport, testified that sanctioning 
organizations have inconsistent procedures, and stated that 
state regulations do not adequately regulate promoter 
contracts. Mr. English recommended that option clauses be 
prohibited in certain contractual situations and that promoters 
should be barred from requiring that a boxer hire a specific 
manager. He also stated that certain rules of sanctioning 
organizations could be antitrust violations.
  On July 23, 1998, the Committee held a hearing on the 
Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act, then numbered as S. 2238, as 
introduced by Chairman McCain and Senator Bryan. Mr. Shelly 
Finkel, a manager of several world champions, submitted 
testimony stating that the bill would help end the exploitation 
of boxers. Boxer Mike Tyson submitted a statement alleging that 
he had over $65 million taken from him in less than 24 months, 
and that his promoter took 30% of all his purse earnings. Tyson 
stated that S. 2238 would be a valuable protection for 
generations of fighters to come. Commissioner Larry Hazzard of 
New Jersey testified that S. 2238 would help the New Jersey 
State Board of Athletic Control protect boxers from coercive 
and unfair business practices. Dr. James Nave and Marc Ratner 
of the Nevada State Athletic Commission testified that it is 
difficult for state commissions to individually monitor 
promoter-boxer contracts, and that a federal mechanism should 
be put in place to prevent hidden agreements. The Nevada 
officials testified that expenses charged to the boxer by the 
promoter shouldbe reported, and that option clauses controlling 
a boxer for his entire career should be outlawed. Dr. Nave and Mr. 
Ratner also testified that sanctioning organizations should comply with 
public disclosure regulations on the federal level. Trainer Eddie Futch 
testified that S. 2238 is a necessary and positive reform for 
professional boxing. Mr. Walter Stone, Counsel to the International 
Boxing Federation, testified that S. 2238 was flawed because it did not 
address the role of television and cable networks in the boxing 
industry. This viewpoint also was expressed by Dr. Nave and Marc 
Ratner. They noted in their July 23, 1998 testimony before the 
Committee that cable and pay-per-view organizations also are actively 
involved in matchmaking, which also has resulted in the public and 
boxers being denied great matches. They concluded that to address the 
problems facing professional fighters comprehensively, any legislation 
advanced by Congress should also convey cable and pay-per-view 
networks. Mr. Jose Sulaiman, president of the World Boxing Council, 
pledged the WBC's full support for the legislation in his testimony. 
Mr. Sulaiman's prepared statement said that the bill's requirement to 
provide notice to boxers on why their ratings had been changed would be 
  On October 1, 1998, the Committee met in open executive 
session to consider S. 2238 and by voice vote ordered the bill 
reported with an amendment in the nature of a substitute. S. 
2238 was passed by the full Senate by unanimous consent on 
October 8, 1998.
  The Ali Act was reintroduced, as passed by the Senate, by 
Senators McCain and Bryan, with Senator Dorgan as cosponsor, as 
S. 305 in the 106th Congress on January 25, 1999.
  A full Commerce Committee hearing was held on issues of 
reform in the professional boxing industry on April 22, 1999. 
Former heavyweight champion Muhammad Ali appeared and had his 
statement read by an associate. Ali stated that professional 
boxing had become a travesty and that something must be done to 
stop the manipulation of boxers. Ali stated that he had 
experienced dishonest practices of many promoters and that 
there is no credibility in the ratings of boxers. Senator Reid 
of Nevada testified that S. 305 is a good start to protect 
boxers from unprincipled individuals, but was troubled that the 
bill contains criminal penalties for contractual violations. 
Sen. Reid also testified that the bill should include 
provisions on broadcasters, and recommended that S. 305's 
contract reforms to protect boxers be replaced with a 
requirement that boxers have competent representation. New York 
State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, head of the State 
Attorneys General Task Force on Boxing, strongly endorsed S. 
305, stating that it would curb anti-competitive and fraudulent 
business practices in professional boxing. Attorney General 
Spitzer advocated that an independent organization to rank 
boxers be developed, and recommended the use of a new Consensus 
Scoring system in professional bouts to maximize competitive 
results. Attorney General Spitzer also testified that state 
commissions should exercise exclusive control over the 
appointment of all referees and judges. Greg Sirb, President of 
the Association of Boxing Commissions, testified that state 
commissions should never delegate their authority for 
regulating boxing events to business interests in the sport. 
Sirb stated that S. 305 will significantly help state 
regulators in their oversight of a complicated sport. Promoter 
Dan Goossen of America Presents testified that the poor public 
perception of professional boxing warrants reforms measures to 
restore public confidence. Goossen called for the formation of 
a school, funded by promoters, to properly train boxing 
referees and judges. Former boxing referee and Nevada county 
judge Mills Lane testified that sanctioning organizations have 
gained too much influence, and that their involvement in boxing 
should be reduced. Judge Lane criticized the practice of 
promoters forcing boxers to give options in return for getting 
a title fight. Boxing writer Wallace Matthews of the New York 
Post testified that promoters and sanctioning organization 
heads improperly benefit from the unregulated nature of the 
professional boxing industry. Matthews criticized the ability 
of inexperienced, politically appointed state commissions to 
regulate the sport. He recommended that a federal boxing 
overseer be appointed, and that promoters should be prohibited 
from paying the expenses of ringside judges. International 
Boxing Federation Counsel Walter Stone testified that 
controversies about scoring fights could be reduced by 
prohibiting rounds being scored as even. Mr. Stone said ratings 
organizations are sometimes inaccurately criticized, and noted 
that the IBF allows its boxers to fight the champions of other 
organizations after they have twice defended their IBF title.
  S. 305 was favorably reported out of the Commerce Committee 
by voice vote, with a McCain-Bryan amendment, at the Executive 
Session held on May 5, 1999. Senator Abraham asked to be listed 
as a co-sponsor of S. 305 at the markup.

                      Summary of Major Provisions

  As reported, S. 305 would require boxer-promoter contracts to 
contain specific terms regarding number of bouts and duration; 
would limit certain promotional rights gained from a boxer to 
one year; would prohibit conflicts of interest between managers 
and promoters; and would prohibit promoters from requiring 
boxers to hire an individual as their manager. The bill would 
require sanctioning organizations to establish objective 
ratings criteria; to create a written appeals process; to 
notify boxers of the reason for their rating having changed; 
and to disclose their bylaws publicly. S. 305 would require 
promoters to file complete contracts with state athletic 
commissions, and notify the commissions of all charges and 
costs they impose on a boxer, and all payments made to 
sanctioning organizations. It would also amend the federal 
boxing safety law to require state commissions to honor 
suspensions pertaining to boxer misconduct that are imposed by 
other state commissions.

                            Estimated Costs

  In accordance with paragraph 11(a) of rule XXVI of the 
Standing Rules of the Senate and section 403 of the 
Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the Committee provides the 
following cost estimate, prepared by the Congressional Budget 

                                     U.S. Congress,
                               Congressional Budget Office,
                                      Washington, DC, May 17, 1999.
Hon. John McCain,
Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. 
        Senate, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has 
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for S. 305, the Muhammad 
Ali Boxing Reform Act.
    If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be 
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contacts are Mark Hadley 
(for federal costs), Theresa Gullo (for the state and local 
impact), and Keith Mattrick (for the private-sector impact).
                                          Barry B. Anderson
                                    (For Dan L. Crippen, Director).

               congressional budget office cost estimate

S. 305--Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act

    Summary: S. 305 aims to protect professional boxers from 
unfair business practices of managers and promoters. The bill 
would stipulate that certain provisions be included in 
contracts between boxers, managers, and promoters; prohibit 
managers and promoters from having shared financial interests; 
and require the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to provide 
information about organizations that sanction professional 
boxing matches. S. 305 would allow the FTC to charge the 
sanctioning organizations fees to offset the costs of providing 
such information. The bill also would make violations of 
certain provisions of the Professional Boxing Safety Act of 
1996 federal crimes. Finally, under the bill, boxers' 
identification cards would be valid for four years rather than 
two, as under current law.
    Based on information from the FTC, CBO estimates that 
enacting S. 305 would have no significant impact on the federal 
budget. Implementing the bill would require far less than 
$500,000 a year in additional discretionary spending during the 
2000-2004 period. That cost would be at least partially offset 
by fees, resulting in little or no net impact. S. 305 would 
affect direct spending and receipts, so pay-as-you-go 
procedures would apply, but CBO estimates that those effects 
would also be less than $500,000 a year.
    The bill contains an intergovernmental mandate as defined 
in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA); however, CBO 
estimates that the costs of complying with this mandate would 
not be significant and would not exceed the threshold 
established in the act ($50 million in 1996, adjusted annually 
for inflation).
    S. 305 would impose several private-sector mandates on the 
boxing industry, mainly on promoters and on organizations that 
sanction professional boxers. In general, the new mandates on 
promoters relate to the protection of boxers from exploitation. 
The bill also would impose procedural requirements on 
sanctioning organizations. In total, CBOestimates that the 
private-sector mandates identified in this bill would not exceed the 
statutory threshold established in UMRA ($100 million in 1996, adjusted 
annually for inflation) in any of the next five years.
    Estimated Cost to the Federal Government: Based on 
information from the FTC, CBO estimates that enacting S. 305 
would require new spending subject to appropriation of far less 
than $500,000 a year during the 2000-2004 period, and that such 
amounts would be at least partially offset by collections of 
fees. The costs of this legislation fall within budget function 
370 (commerce and housing credit).
    Enacting S. 305 could increase government receipts from the 
collection of criminal fines, but CBO estimates that any such 
increase would be less than $500,000 annually. Criminal fines 
are deposited in the Crime Victims Fund and are spent in the 
following year. Thus, any change in direct spending from the 
fund would also amount to less than $500,000 annually.
    Pay-as-you-go considerations: The Balanced Budget and 
Emergency Deficit Control Act sets up pay-as-you-go procedures 
for legislation affecting direct spending or receipts. CBO 
estimates that any increases in governmental receipts and 
direct spending would each total less than $500,000 a year.
    Estimated impact on State, local, and tribal governments: 
The bill contains an intergovernmental mandate as defined in 
UMRA, but CBO estimates that complying with the mandate would 
not result in significant additional costs to states. State 
boxing commissions would be required to establish procedures to 
ensure that no boxer is permitted to box while under suspension 
in any state due to unsportsmanlike conduct. Current law 
already requires state boxing commissions to have procedures in 
place to prevent boxers suspended for other reasons from boxing 
in their states. Therefore, CBO estimates that the additional 
costs to states to comply with this new requirement would not 
be significant. Enactment of the bill would impose no other 
costs on state, local, or tribal governments.
    Estimated impact on the private sector: S. 305 would impose 
several private-sector mandates on the boxing industry, mainly 
on promoters and organizations that sanction professional 
boxers. The most significant provision in the bill affecting 
promoters is a one-year limit on promotion contracts that the 
boxer is required to sign in order to participate in a match 
against another boxer under contract to that promoter. Based on 
information from industry sources, CBO believes that this 
provision could impose significant costs, but only on a few 
    This bill would also impose mandates on sanctioning 
organizations. According to representatives from such 
organizations, the costliest of those mandates would be the 
requirement to notify boxers and the Association of Boxing 
Commissions of any rating change of a boxer within or moving 
into the top ten rated boxers. Based on information from the 
major U.S. sanctioning organization, CBO estimates that the 
cost of notification would be less than $30,000 annually for 
each sanctioning organization.
    S. 305 would also impose mandates with minimal costs on 
managers, licensees, matchmakers, and judges. CBO estimates 
that the total direct costs of mandates in this bill would be 
far less than the private-sector threshold ($100 million in 
1996, adjusted annually for inflation).
    Estimate prepared by: Federal Costs: Mark Hadley. Impact on 
State, Local, and Tribal Governments: Theresa Gullo. Impact on 
the Private Sector: Keith Mattrick.
    Estimate approved by: Robert A. Sunshine, Deputy Assistant 
Director for Budget Analysis.

                      Regulatory Impact Statement

  In accordance with paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the 
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee provides the 
following evaluation of the regulatory impact of the 
legislation, as reported:

                       number of persons covered

  Several thousand boxers in the U.S. would benefit from the 
contract and other business practice reforms contained in S. 
305. Numerous promoters in the U.S. would be affected by the 
contract and related reforms established by S. 305. The numbers 
of officials and employees of sanctioning organizations who 
would be affected by S. 305 is likely under thirty.

                            economic impact

  The expected economic impact of S. 305 is minimal. The 
reforms proposed by the legislation should increase competition 
in the industry, due to a reduction in anti-competitive 
restraints of trade. There would be increased free market 
bidding by promoters seeking to sign boxers, which will benefit 
boxers, as will a more consistent and legitimate ratings 
system. The Committee believes the reforms contained in S. 305 
will help encourage an increase in the prominent bouts that are 
major draws for fans, and thus will increase revenues and 
public interest in the sport.


  S. 305 will require sanctioning officials to make public 
rosters of their officials who vote on the ratings of boxers. 
Promoters are required to file complete versions of their 
contracts with boxers, due to the problem of boxers being 
exploited by hidden agreements. State boxing commissions are 
required by the bill to protect the confidentiality of these 


  The amount of paperwork required to meet the public interest 
disclosure requirements is small. On an annual basis, 
sanctioning organizations engaged in interstate commerce are 
required by the bill to submit their bylaws and related 
information to the Federal Trade Commission, or place this 
information on a Internet website. Sanctioning organizations 
will be required to provide notice when changing the rating of 
certain boxers, which can be done on a single sheet of paper. 
Most sanctioning organizations already have extensive 
adjudicatory appeals procedures in place, so the written 
appeals procedure required by S. 305 is minor. The requirements 
on major promoters to protect boxers from exploitative 
practices can largely be complied with in several sheets of 
paper, as well. The Committee has exempted promoters of boxing 
events of fewer than 10 rounds from certain disclosure 
requirements to alleviate administrative burdens on promoters 
of ``club'' boxing shows.

                      Section-by-Section Analysis

Section 1. Short title

  Section 1 designates the short title of the bill as the 
``Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act.''

Section 2. Findings

  Section 2 provides a series of findings which describe the 
problems that exist with respect to arbitrary and anti-
competitive business conduct in the professional boxing 
industry on an interstate basis.

Section 3. Purposes

  Section 3 lists the purposes of the bill, which are to 
protect professional boxers against certain exploitative and 
unethical business practices; assist State boxing officials in 
their oversight of the boxing industry; and increase 
competition within the boxing industry.

Section 4. Protecting boxers from exploitation

  Section 4 amends the existing federal boxing law, the 
Professional Boxing Safety Act, by adding a new section 15 
aimed at protecting boxers from exploitation.
  New section 15 seeks to curb several of the most restrictive, 
onerous, and anti-competitive contracting practices which 
promoters have imposed on professional boxers. It requires all 
contracts between a boxer and a promoter to include mutual 
obligations between the parties, and specify a number of bouts 
for the boxer, and the duration in time of the contract. 
Requiring a mutuality of obligation attempts to prevent 
promoters from securing promotional rights or portions of a 
boxer's purse, without providing any compensation or 
consideration to the boxer. Specifying a minimum number of 
bouts for the boxer protects a boxer from having the boxer's 
career stalled or damaged by a promoter who refuses to provide 
the agreed-to number of bouts. Requiring the promoter to 
stipulate the specific period of time for the contract's length 
is an important protection for boxers. Promoters in the 
industry have utilized contracts with vague or unspecified 
terms regarding how long the contract will be in effect, 
thereby permitting the promoter to control a boxer for 
virtually the boxer's entire productive career.
  Historically, promoters in the industry have required an 
exclusive long term promotional contract with a boxing 
challenger as a condition precedent to permitting a bout 
against another boxer that the promoter has under contract. The 
Committee believes, and hearing witnesses and industry members 
strongly concur, that this tactic is the key contracting 
practice that has been used by promoters to gain undue control 
over boxers and championship titles, to the clear detriment of 
the sport. Promoters have used this practice to extract 
``exclusive promotional options'' from boxers who already have 
a promoter, and who would not otherwise enter into a contract 
with a new promoter. The athletes would be better served, as 
would open competition in the sport, if boxers were free to 
contract with those promoters they personally choose, rather 
than being coerced to contract with a promoter who is in the 
position of barring a lucrative bout.
  This practice also has enabled a single promoter to gain 
control over a majority of championship bouts in a weight 
division becauseit results in one promoter having control over 
both the champion and the challenger. No matter which boxer wins a 
title bout, the promoter remains in control over who may compete for 
that title, since he has both contestants under exclusive contract. If 
a boxer who seeks to challenge a champion (or a more established boxer) 
refuses to provide long term contractual rights to the promoter, the 
boxer will be denied the right to compete in the bout. This practice 
frustrates the years of determined training and arduous competition 
that boxers endure, for they will be denied the opportunities that 
their successes in the ring have earned. No boxer will ever be able to 
compete for the title in that division unless they sign away future 
promotional rights to that promoter. The promoter thus has gained total 
control over an entire segment of a major professional sports industry. 
This contracting practice allows a promoter to achieve a monopoly on a 
substantial portion of championship-level competition in that 
particular weight division.
  This practice of coercing options from boxers is also 
utilized by promoters and sanctioning organizations against 
``mandatory challengers''--those boxers who are rated by a 
sanctioning organization as the top contender in a weight 
division. The top-rated contender is supposed to be assured of 
having a bout against the champion of that division, within a 
specific period of time. Despite the fact that top-rated 
challengers have clearly earned the right to compete for a 
title, sanctioning organizations have abetted restrictive 
contracting practices by allowing promoters of championship 
bouts to require options from them. As one hearing witness 
noted, this is akin to forcing a professional tennis player or 
golfer to sign an exclusive, long term contract with the 
promoter of whatever event they were seeking to win. The 
athlete would then only be able to compete when the promoter 
approved, against only those opponents who also were forced to 
agree to terms with that promoter. In self-governed and well 
organized sports industries such as tennis and golf, such a 
business practice would be strongly challenged as an 
unreasonable restraint of trade. In professional boxing, it is 
business as usual.
  The Committee believes that sensible, pro-competitive 
limitations on these onerous practices by promoters are 
warranted. New section 15 would put a time limit of one year on 
all promotional rights that a promoter secures from a boxer (or 
another promoter) as a prerequisite to the boxer participating 
in a particular bout. This situation will generally involve a 
boxer being selected as an opponent/challenger by a promoter 
for a boxer who they already have under contract. The most 
common example of this is when a boxer seeks to compete against 
a famous champion. Currently, the champion's promoter may 
require this challenger to give the promoter exclusive 
promotional rights on their career for an extended term of 
years or fights. If the boxer refuses he will be rejected from 
the bout. The Committee believes that no boxer should be forced 
to contract for long term control of the boxer's career against 
the boxer's will. In situations where a boxer is a mandatory 
challenger, the bill would prohibit promoters from securing 
promotional options from the boxer (or the boxer's promoter). 
The Committee feels that the contracting requirements and 
limitations contained in new section 15 will protect the 
freedom to contract of boxers, increase competition in the 
sport to the benefit of fans, and reduce improper interstate 
restraints of trade.
  It is important to note that the duration of basic boxer-
promoter contracts is not limited by the bill. The Committee 
does not seek to limit contracts reached as a result of 
legitimate arms length bargaining between an unattached boxer 
and promoter. The one-year limitation applies only to those 
situations where a promoter secures promotional rights from a 
boxer (or another promoter), as a condition for that boxer to 
compete in a particular bout. The one-year limitation is not 
intended to apply to a contract where a promoter and boxer 
consensually enter into a long term contract, with the first 
bout for the boxer being specifically named, and in which the 
opponent is not under contract to the promoter. The Committee 
notes that after the one year limitation expires, the boxer is 
free to then contract with whatever promoter the boxer chooses, 
including the promoter in question. However, the one year 
limitation will at least provide the boxer with the ability to 
seek the highest bidder for his or her services after one year, 
or give them the freedom to simply choose the promoter the 
boxer determines will best further the interest of the boxer's 
  The Committee also notes that many States have boxing 
regulations which wholly proscribe any exclusive contractual 
arrangement between a promoter and a boxer, and declare them to 
be unenforceable under state law. These include some of the 
most prominent boxing states in the U.S. However, these 
contractual protections for boxers are rarely, if ever, 
enforced. This is at least partially due to the fact that if 
one State begins to impose more stringent regulations on 
promoters, promoters will simply take the boxing event and the 
accompanying substantial commercial activity and tax revenues 
it generates to a less regulated jurisdiction. The Committee 
feels that this amplifies the need for limited federal reforms 
to curb coercive and restrictive business abuses in the boxing 
  This section also prohibits a promoter from forcing a boxer 
to hire an individual, such as a relative or business 
associate, as the boxer's manager or similar capacity. 
Testimony presented to the Committee described the practice 
wherein a boxer is forced to hire a relative of a promoter as 
the boxer's manager, which results in the boxer then having to 
surrender a third of all earnings in the ring to an individual 
associated with the promoter. It is wrong for promoters to 
force boxers into a position where the person handling their 
negotiations with a promoter is a relative or business 
associate of the promoter. Coupled with the aforementioned 
practice of forcing boxers into long term business 
relationships under the threat of being denied competitive 
opportunities, skimming off a third of their earnings via an 
unwanted manager or other appointed employees is an especially 
egregious practice. Boxers should not be forced into hiring 
unwanted management personnel.
  The final protection for boxers established in this section 
is the prohibition of conflicts of interests between promoters 
and managers. Most boxers have limited educational backgrounds 
and, as the top promoters in the sport readily concede, are no 
match for experienced promoters during contractual discussions. 
While the role of managers has been diminished in the sport 
over the last decade,it remains essential that managers, if a 
boxer does hire a manager, that the manager serve and protect the 
interests of the boxer. They should not be serving the financial 
interests of the promoter, while simultaneously taking a 33% earnings 
cut from the boxer for biased representation as manager. It is not 
plausible for a boxer to receive proper representation and counsel from 
a manager if the manager is also on the payroll of a promoter. This is 
an obvious conflict of interest which works to the detriment of the 
boxer and the advantage of the promoter. The Committee received 
testimony about instances wherein boxers had suffered significant 
career and economic injury due to their manager's clear conflicting 
interests. A manager must be a determined advocate for the boxer's 
interests and not be influenced by financial inducements from a 
promoter. This provision tracks a similar regulation of many State 
boxing commissions.

Section 5. Sanctioning organization integrity reforms

  This section amends the Professional Boxing Safety Act by 
adding a new section 16 pertaining to sanctioning 
  The rating of a boxer has a substantial effect on a boxer's 
career trajectory. Yet the ratings system of professional 
boxers is disreputable and illegitimate. Boxers pay substantial 
amounts to ratings organizations, yet cannot rely on any 
credible or objective process to assure that their performances 
in the ring will be honestly rated. The ratings system in 
professional boxing today is universally criticized as 
arbitrary and manipulative by boxers, managers, state 
officials, and sports journalists. Boxing rankings have more to 
do with financial interests of sanctioning officials and 
promoters than with the skills and achievements of boxers. A 
representative practice is the fact that sanctioning 
organizations refuse to rate the ``champions'' of their 
competitor organizations. This can lead to the dubious 
situation wherein a boxer may be universally considered to be 
the best in the world by his fellow boxers, industry members, 
fans, and the media, at the same time the boxer is not rated in 
the top 20 of many of the organizations who profess skill in 
rating fighters. Boxers may be able to move into the top ten of 
a ratings organization more quickly by signing with an 
influential promoter, as opposed to working their way there 
with victories in the ring. The world of sport contains no 
ratings system of athletes or sports teams that has as little 
credibility, consistency, and athlete/fan confidence as 
professional boxing's.
  Sanctioning organization officials may receive lucrative 
fees, tickets, airfare, and hotel stays for sanctioning an 
event. As long as ``their champion'' continues to win and draw 
ticket buying fans at the gate and on cable television, they 
have a reliable revenue producer. If they objectively rated all 
boxers according to their true skills, however, the champions 
in each weight division would often change due to vigorous 
competition. While this would be good for fans and those boxers 
striving for a chance to compete for a title, it would not be 
in the financial interest of the ratings organizations. They 
might lose exclusive control over a champion and thus lose 
their sanctioning fees or be forced to reduce them. Sanctioning 
organizations would likely see their revenues dwindle as 
championships in each weight division are unified. The fans of 
professional boxing would benefit from a legitimate ratings 
system by getting to see competitive bouts between the best 
skilled boxers, and the sport's integrity would soar as true 
``champions'' emerged systematically in all weight divisions. 
Again, these worthwhile objectives are not in the financial 
interest of the sanctioning organizations.
  Most importantly for the Committee's considerations, the 
manipulation of the ratings system has significant detrimental 
effects on the career paths of boxers. Unlike other major 
sports industries in the U.S., professional boxers do not have 
an assurance that continued success in their competitions will 
guarantee them a chance to vie for a championship. They must 
instead often submit to contractual agreements with promoters 
and sanctioning officials that rob them of short or long term 
control of their careers, in return for a favorable rating 
position. Boxers or promoters may be required to pay additional 
sums to ratings organizations to settle ratings disputes. The 
Committee has received extensive testimony and information 
about the arbitrary and irregular activities of sanctioning 
organizations in the industry. One notable example discussed in 
the April 22, 1999 hearing was the fact that a particular 
number-one ranked contender had not defeated an opponent with a 
winning record in almost four years. For the talented boxers in 
the U.S. who often rise from circumstances of severe poverty, 
the disreputable ratings system in professional boxing deprives 
them of a fair opportunity to succeed according to their 
  New section 16 would require sanctioning organizations that 
are engaged in interstate commerce in the U.S. to establish 
objective and consistent written criteria for their ratings of 
boxers. This new section requires these organizations to 
develop criteria for rating boxers that can be evaluated and 
monitored by members of the industry. Sanctioning organizations 
would be required to establish an appeals process to afford 
boxers a chance to contest the ratings, in writing, to the 
sanctioning organization. The written response of the 
organization would be sent to the boxer, the state boxing 
commission of the boxer's domiciliary, and the President of the 
Association of Boxing Commissions (ABC). The ABC is the 
voluntary national association of state athletic boxing 
commissioners in the U.S. They develop policies to improve 
health, safety, honest competition, and ethical conduct in the 
boxing industry. State boxing commissioners serve a unique role 
in the sport by their regulation of boxing events on behalf of 
the public interest. Members of the ABC are prohibited by 
federal law from having any ties to the business side of the 
boxing industry.
  New section 16 requires sanctioning organizations to notify 
boxers of their reasons for changing their ratings, and 
publicly release their explanation. Since the often arbitrary 
ratings system has a large impact on the career of a boxer, the 
Committee believes this is an important measure to have these 
organizations fairly explain why they have changed the boxer's 
rating. The requirement only applies to those boxers who are 
rated in an organization's top 10. The explanation must be 
mailed to the boxer and the ABC, and posted on the 
organization's Internet site, if they have one. It is hoped 
that public disclosure of their ratings determinations will 
encourage these organizations to make more credible ratings 
  Sanctioning organizations conduct interstate business in the 
U.S. with virtually no standards or ethical guidelines by 
industry members, few state guidelines, and no federal 
oversight. The Committee believes that increased public 
disclosure is an essential part of reform of the professional 
boxing industry. New section 16 establishes an annual public 
disclosure mechanism for sanctioning bodies to disclose basic 
aspects of their operations. Each sanctioning organization is 
required to provide their bylaws, voting membership, and 
appeals procedures on an annual basis to the Federal Trade 
Commission. If the organization has an Internet website, this 
information can be provided on the website.
  New section 16 also seeks to prohibit conflicts of interest 
between sanctioning organization officials and promoters. As 
noted above, the rating of boxers should be made according to 
their performance in the ring, not according to financial 
inducements from a promoter or other interested parties. 
Allegations of payments being made to gain a favorable rating 
for a boxer have frequently occurred for over a decade, and are 
the subject of an ongoing federal grand jury investigation. 
This section would prohibit payments or other forms of 
compensation from promoters and others to sanctioning 
organizations, other than the customary fee and expenses the 
organization is due to receive for sanctioning the boxing 

Section 6. Public interest disclosures to State Boxing Commissions

  This section amends the Professional Boxing Safety Act by 
adding a new section 17.
  This section is designed to provide enhanced information to 
State boxing commissions about the fees that sanctioning 
organizations impose on boxers and promoters, and other revenue 
sources of these organizations. A sanctioning organization must 
advise the State commission of all revenues and benefits it 
receives pertaining to a boxing event. Sanctioning 
organizations must also disclose to a state commission if they 
have received a payment for refraining from exercising its 
authority or withholding its sanction of a professional boxing 
match. Increased disclosure of key information is also required 
of promoters. The Committee received testimony about how 
promoters may significantly reduce what they pay to a boxer 
(below what is reported to the relevant commission) by claiming 
a portion of the boxer's purse, and assessing excessive 
expenses and charges. Currently, promoters can improperly take 
portions of a boxer's purse without knowledge of the 
supervising state athletic commission. This is done by the 
signing of the boxer to a series of hidden contracts, which can 
result in reduction of the boxer's earnings below that 
permissible under State law. For example, Nevada regulations 
require that a boxer receive at least two-thirds of the purse 
the promoter reports to the State Athletic Commission. However, 
the Commission's only information about how much a boxer is to 
receive is generally a one-page form contract which promoters 
file for each event. Commissions have no information or 
documentation to determine if the promoter is subsequently (and 
illegally) taking back significant portions of the boxer's 
purse. Therefore, the bill requires a promoter to provide the 
supervising state commission with copies of any contracts with 
a boxer, and to verify that there are no other agreements. The 
bill requires state commissions to protect the confidentiality 
of contracts that promoters provide to them.
  The promoter is required by this section to provide a 
statement to the commission detailing all costs and expenses 
the promoter will impose on the boxer, and what portions of the 
boxer's purse the promoter may be taking. Promoters are also 
required to report what payments and benefits they provide to 
sanctioning organizations for each boxing event. Furthermore, 
promoters are required to disclose whether they, before the 
boxing event occurs, have reduced the original purse amount 
they promised to the boxer. The Committee is aware that 
promoters have engaged in the practice of contracting or 
pledging to pay a boxer a certain purse amount for a bout, but 
then subsequently pressuring the boxer to accept a lower purse 
shortly before the boxing event takes place. Knowing the power 
that promoters have over their careers, few boxers would 
legally challenge this coercive maneuver. This disclosure 
requirement will alert state commissioners to this potentially 
abusive practice. If requested, the promoter must also provide 
the above financial disclosures to a State Attorney General's 
Office. Additionally, boxing judges for bouts of ten rounds or 
more are required by the bill to disclose to commissions all 
payments and expenses they will receive from promoters or 
ratings organizations pertaining to their participation in an 
event. The Committee notes the inherent appearance of bias that 
exists due to the fact that judges are paid by promoters, and 
often selected by a particular ratings organization. As 
described above, promoters and sanctioning bodies often have a 
strong direct financial interest in one particular boxer 
winning the bout. Testimony by one of the industry's most 
respected referees described how judges are subject to subtle 
pressures to favor a boxer who is affiliated with the promoter 
or sanctioning body who has selected them. This leads to 
allegations of corruption or collusion whenever a boxing event 
is widely considered to be misjudged.

Section 7. Enforcement

  The enforcement of the Professional Boxing Safety Act of 1996 
includes criminal and civil sanctions. A person knowingly 
violating the Act is subject to up to one year in prison, or 
substantial fines. Section 7 of S. 305 provides for the 
stiffest fine when the provisions of new section 15, 16, or 17, 
relating to exploitation of a boxer, are violated. It is 
important that monetary penalties are a sufficient deterrent to 
promoters who may be engaged in exploitation and coercive 
practices. In an industry where a single championship bout 
between prominent boxers can achieve revenues easily exceeding 
$60 million in the U.S. alone, fines for illegal practices 
under the Act must be commensurate. Therefore, the Act provides 
that fines can exceed $100,000 for any boxing events that 
exceed $2 million in revenues. The Committee recognizes and 
supports the fact that State commissions are the primary 
regulators and enforcement entities in the professional boxing 
industry. Section 7 of the reported bill therefore authorizes 
State Attorneys General to bring injunctive, criminal, and 
civil actions on behalf of their residents. Boxers who 
themselves suffer economic injury from violations of the Act 
are also authorized by section 7 to bring civil actions.

Section 8. Professional Boxing Safety Act amendments

  This section contains additional amendments to the 
Professional Boxing Safety Act. It requires State commissions 
in the U.S. to honor the suspensions of boxers for 
unsportsmanlike conduct that were ordered by other state 
commissions. This will prevent boxers from engaging in serious 
misconduct in one state, and then avoiding any suspension 
period by simply traveling to another state to compete. The 
amendment also requires license revocations to be treated 
similarly as suspensions for the purposes of the federal law. 
S. 305 would also extend the period for state commissions to 
renew boxer identification cards from every two years to every 
four years. This will lessen the administrative burden that 
commissions face from renewing these identification cards. This 
change has been recommended by state boxing commissioners from 
across the U.S.

                        Changes in Existing Law

  In compliance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the Standing 
Rules of the Senate, changes in existing law made by the bill, 
as reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be 
omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new material is printed 
in italic, existing law in which no change is proposed is shown 
in roman):

                 Professional Boxing Safety Act of 1996


                            [15 U.S.C. 6301]

  For purposes of this Act:
          (1) Boxer.--The term ``boxer'' means an individual 
        who fights in a professional boxing match.
          (2) Boxing commission.--(A) The term ``boxing 
        commission'' means an entity authorized under State law 
        to regulate professional boxing matches.
          (3) Boxer registry.--The term ``boxer registry'' 
        means any entity certified by the Association of Boxing 
        Commissions for the purposes of maintaining records and 
        identification of boxers.
          (4) Licensee.--The term ``licensee'' means an 
        individual who serves as a trainer, second, or cut man 
        for a boxer.
          (5) Manager.--The term ``manager'' means a person who 
        receives compensation for service as an agent or 
        representative of a boxer.
          (6) Matchmaker.--The term ``matchmaker'' means a 
        person that proposes, selects, and arranges the boxers 
        to participate in a professional boxing match.
          (7) Physician.--The term ``physician'' means a doctor 
        of medicine legally authorized to practice medicine by 
        the State in which the physician performs such function 
        or action.
          (8) Professional boxing match.--The term 
        ``professional boxing match'' means a boxing contest 
        held in the United States between individuals for 
        financial compensation. Such term does not include a 
        boxing contest that is regulated by an amateur sports 
          (9) Promoter.--The term ``promoter'' means the person 
        primarily responsible for organizing, promoting, and 
        producing a professional boxing match.
          (10) State.--The term ``State'' means each of the 50 
        States, Puerto Rico, the District of Columbia, and any 
        territory or possession of the United States.
          (11) Sanctioning organization.--The term 
        ``sanctioning organization'' means an organization that 
        ranks boxers or sanctions professional boxing matches 
        in the United States--
                  (A) between boxers who are residents of 
                different States; or
                  (B) that are advertised, otherwise promoted, 
                or broadcast (including closed circuit 
                television) in interstate commerce.
          (12) Suspension.--The term ``suspension'' includes 
        within its meaning the revocation of a boxing license.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


  (a) Requirements.--Each boxer shall register with--
          (1) the boxing commission of the State in which such 
        boxer resides; or
          (2) in the case of a boxer who is a resident of a 
        foreign country, or a State in which there is no boxing 
        commission, the boxing commission of any State that has 
        such a commission.
  (b) Identification Card.--
          (1) Issuance.--A boxing commission shall issue to 
        each professional boxer who registers in accordance 
        with subsection (a), an identification card that 
        contains each of the following:
                  (A) A recent photograph of the boxer.
                  (B) The social security number of the boxer 
                (or, in the case of a foreign boxer, any 
                similar citizen identification number or 
                professional boxer number from the country of 
                residence of the boxer).
                  (C) A personal identification number assigned 
                to the boxer by a boxing registry.
          (2) Renewal.--Each professional boxer shall renew his 
        or her identification card at least once every [2 
        years.] 4 years.
          (3) Presentation.--Each professional boxer shall 
        present his or her identification card to the 
        appropriate boxing commission not later than the time 
        of the weigh-in for a professional boxing match.


                            [15 U.S.C. 6306]

  (a) Procedures.--Each boxing commission shall establish each 
of the following procedures:
          (1) Procedures to evaluate the professional records 
        and physician's certification of each boxer 
        participating in a professional boxing match in the 
        State, and to deny authorization for a boxer to fight 
        where appropriate.
          (2) Procedures to ensure that, except as provided in 
        subsection (b), no boxer is permitted to box while 
        under suspension from any boxing commission due to--
                  (A) a recent knockout or series of 
                consecutive losses;
                  (B) an injury, requirement for a medical 
                procedure, or physician denial certification;
                  (C) failure of a drug test; [or]
                  (D) the use of false aliases, or falsifying, 
                or attempting to falsify, official 
                identification cards or [documents.] documents; 
                  (E) unsportsmanlike conduct or other 
                inappropriate behavior inconsistent with 
                generally accepted methods of competition in a 
                professional boxing match.
          (3) Procedures to review a suspension where appealed 
        by a boxer, including an opportunity for a boxer to 
        present contradictory evidence.
          (4) Procedures to revoke a suspension where a boxer--
                   (A) was suspended under subparagraph (A) or 
                (B) of paragraph (2) of this subsection, and 
                has furnished further proof of a sufficiently 
                improved medical or physical condition; or
                   (B) furnishes proof under subparagraph (C) 
                or (D) of paragraph (2) that a suspension was 
                not, or is no longer, merited by the facts.
  (b) Suspension in Another State.--A boxing commission may 
allow a boxer who is under suspension in any State to 
participate in a professional boxing match--
          (1) for any reason other than those listed in 
        subsection (a) if such commission notifies in writing 
        and consults with the designated official of the 
        suspending State's boxing commission prior to the grant 
        of approval for such individual to participate in that 
        professional boxing match; or
          (2) if the boxer appeals to the Association of Boxing 
        Commissions, and the Association of Boxing Commissions 
        determines that the suspension of such boxer was 
        without sufficient grounds, for an improper purpose, or 
        not related to the health and safety of the boxer or 
        the purposes of this Act.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                            [15 U.S.C. 6308]

  [No member] (a) Regulatory Personnel._No member or employee 
of a boxing commission, no person who administers or enforces 
State boxing laws, and no member of the Association of Boxing 
Commissions may belong to, contract with, or receive any 
compensation from, any person who sanctions, arranges, or 
promotes professional boxing matches or who otherwise has a 
financial interest in an active boxer currently registered with 
a boxer registry. For purposes of this section, the term 
``compensation'' does not include funds held in escrow for 
payment to another person in connection with a professional 
boxing match. The prohibition set forth in this section shall 
not apply to any contract entered into, or any reasonable 
compensation received, by a boxing commission to supervise a 
professional boxing match in another State as described in 
section 4.
  (b) Firewall Between Promoters and Managers.--
          (1) In general.--It is unlawful for--
                  (A) a boxer's promoter (or a promoter who is 
                required to be licensed under State law) to 
                have a direct or indirect financial interest in 
                that boxer's licensed manager or management 
                company; or
                  (B) a licensed manager or management company 
                (or a manager or management company that, under 
                State law, is required to be licensed)--
                          (i) to have a direct or indirect 
                        financial interest in the promotion of 
                        a boxer; or
                          (ii) to be employed by or receive 
                        compensation or other benefits from a 
                except for amounts received as consideration 
                under the manager's contract with the boxer.
          (2) Exception for self-promotion and management.--
        Paragraph (1) does not prohibit a boxer from acting as 
        his own promoter or manager.
  (c) Sanctioning Organizations.--
          (1) Prohibition on receipts.--Except as provided in 
        paragraph (2), no officer or employee of a sanctioning 
        organization may receive any compensation, gift, or 
        benefit directly or indirectly from a promoter, boxer, 
        or manager.
          (2) Exceptions.--Paragraph (1) does not apply to--
                  (A) the receipt of payment by a promoter, 
                boxer, or manager of a sanctioning 
                organization's published fee for sanctioning a 
                professional boxing match or reasonable 
                expenses in connection therewith if the payment 
                is reported to the responsible boxing 
                commission under section 17; or
                  (B) the receipt of a gift or benefit of de 
                minimis value.


                            [15 U.S.C. 6309]

  (a) Injunctions.--Whenever the Attorney General of the United 
States has reasonable cause to believe that a person is engaged 
in a violation of this Act, the Attorney General may bring a 
civil action in the appropriate district court of the United 
States requesting such relief, including a permanent or 
temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order, 
against the person, as the Attorney General determines to be 
necessary to restrain the person from continuing to engage in, 
sanction, promote, or otherwise participate in a professional 
boxing match in violation of this Act.
  (b) Criminal Penalties.--
          (1) Managers, promoters, matchmakers, and 
        licensees.--Any manager, promoter, matchmaker, and 
        licensee who knowingly violates, or coerces or causes 
        any other person to violate, any provision of this 
        [Act] Act, other than section 9(b), 15, 16, or 17, 
        shall, upon conviction, be imprisoned for not more than 
        1 year or fined not more than $20,000, or both.
          (2) Violation of anti-exploitation, sanctioning 
        organization, or disclosure provisions.--Any person who 
        knowingly violates any provision of section 9(b), 15, 
        16, or 17 of this Act shall, upon conviction, be 
        imprisoned for not more than 1 year or fined not more 
                  (A) $100,000; and
                  (B) if the violations occur in connection 
                with a professional boxing match the gross 
                revenues for which exceed $2,000,000, such 
                additional amount as the court finds 
        or both.
          [(2)] (3) Conflict of interest.--Any member or 
        employee of a boxing commission, any person who 
        administers or enforces State boxing laws, and any 
        member of the Association of Boxing Commissions who 
        knowingly violates section 9 of this Act shall, upon 
        conviction, be imprisoned for not more than 1 year or 
        fined not more than $20,000, or both.
          [(3)] (4) Boxers.--Any boxer who knowingly violates 
        any provision of this Act shall, upon conviction, be 
        fined not more than $1,000.
  (c) Actions by States.--Whenever the chief law enforcement 
officer of any State has reason to believe that a person or 
organization is engaging in practices which violate any 
requirement of this Act, the State, as parens patriae, may 
bring a civil action on behalf of its residents in an 
appropriate district court of the United States--
          (1) to enjoin the holding of any professional boxing 
        match which the practice involves;
          (2) to enforce compliance with this Act;
          (3) to obtain the fines provided under subsection (b) 
        or appropriate restitution; or
          (4) to obtain such other relief as the court may deem 
  (d) Private Right of Action.--Any boxer who suffers economic 
injury as a result of a violation of any provision of this Act 
may bring an action in the appropriate Federal or State court 
and recover the damages suffered, court costs, and reasonable 
attorneys fees and expenses.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


  (a) Contract Requirements.--
          (1) In general.--Any contract between a boxer and a 
        promoter or manager shall--
                  (A) include mutual obligations between the 
                  (B) specify a minimum number of professional 
                boxing matches per year for the boxer; and
                  (C) set forth a specific period of time 
                during which the contract will be in effect, 
                including any provision for extension of that 
                period due to the boxer's temporary inability 
                to compete because of an injury or other cause.
          (2) 1-year limit on coercive promotional rights.--
                  (A) The period of time for which promotional 
                rights to promote a boxer may be granted under 
                a contract between the boxer and a promoter, or 
                between promoters with respect to a boxer, may 
                not be greater than 12 months in length if the 
                boxer is required to grant such rights, or a 
                boxer's promoter is required to grant such 
                rights with respect to a boxer, as a condition 
                precedent to the boxer's participation in a 
                professional boxing match against another boxer 
                who is under contract to the promoter.
                  (B) A promoter exercising promotional rights 
                with respect to such boxer during the 12-month 
                period beginning on the day after the last day 
                of the promotional right period described in 
                subparagraph (A) may not secure exclusive 
                promotional rights from the boxer's opponents 
                as a condition of participating in a 
                professional boxing match against the boxer, 
                and any contract to the contrary--
                          (i) shall be considered to be in 
                        restraint of trade and contrary to 
                        public policy; and
                          (ii) unenforceable.
                  (C) Nothing in this paragraph shall be 
                construed as pre-empting any State law 
                concerning interference with contracts.
          (3) Promotional rights under mandatory bout 
        contracts.--Neither a promoter nor a sanctioning 
        organization may require a boxer, in a contract arising 
        from a professional boxing match that is a mandatory 
        bout under the rules of the sanctioning organization, 
        to grant promotional rights to any promoter for a 
        future professional boxing match.
  (b) Employment As Condition of Promoting, Etc.--No person who 
is a licensee, manager, matchmaker, or promoter may require a 
boxer to employ, retain, or provide compensation to any 
individual or business enterprise (whether operating in 
corporate form or not) recommended or designated by that person 
as a condition of--
          (1) such person's working with the boxer as a 
        licensee, manager, matchmaker, or promoter;
          (2) such person's arranging for the boxer to 
        participate in a professional boxing match; or
          (3) such boxer's participation in a professional 
        boxing match.
  (c) Enforcement.--
          (1) Promotion agreement.--A provision in a contract 
        between a promoter and a boxer, or between promoters 
        with respect to a boxer, that violates subsection (a) 
        is contrary to public policy and unenforceable at law.
          (2) Employment agreement.--In any action brought 
        against a boxer to recover money (whether as damages or 
        as money owed) for acting as a licensee, manager, 
        matchmaker, or promoter for the boxer, the court, 
        arbitrator, or administrative body before which the 
        action is brought may deny recovery in whole or in part 
        under the contract as contrary to public policyif the 
employment, retention, or compensation that is the subject of the 
action was obtained in violation of subsection (b).


  (a) Objective Criteria.--A sanctioning organization that 
sanctions professional boxing matches on an interstate basis 
shall establish objective and consistent written criteria for 
the ratings of professional boxers.
  (b) Appeals Process.--A sanctioning organization shall 
establish and publish an appeals procedure that affords a boxer 
rated by that organization a reasonable opportunity, without 
the payment of any fee, to submit information to contest its 
rating of the boxer. Under the procedure, the sanctioning 
organization shall, within 14 days after receiving a request 
from a boxer questioning that organization's rating of the 
          (1) provide to the boxer a written explanation of the 
        organization's criteria, its rating of the boxer, and 
        the rationale or basis for its rating (including a 
        response to any specific questions submitted by the 
        boxer); and
          (2) submit a copy of its explanation to the President 
        of the Association of Boxing Commissions of the United 
        States and to the boxing commission of the boxer's 
        domiciliary State.
  (c) Notification of Change in Rating.--If a sanctioning 
organization changes its rating of a boxer who is included, 
before the change, in the top 10 boxers rated by that 
organization, or who, as a result of the change is included in 
the top 10 boxers rated by that organization, then, within 14 
days after changing the boxer's rating, the organization 
          (1) mail notice of the change and a written 
        explanation of the reasons for its change in that 
        boxer's rating to the boxer at the boxer's last known 
          (2) post a copy, within the 14-day period, of the 
        notice and the explanation on its Internet website or 
        homepage, if any, for a period of not less than 30 
        days; and
          (3) mail a copy of the notice and the explanation to 
        the President of the Association of Boxing Commissions.
  (d) Public Disclosure.--
          (1) FTC filing.--Not later than January 31st of each 
        year, a sanctioning organization shall submit to the 
        Federal Trade Commission--
                  (A) a complete description of the 
                organization's ratings criteria, policies, and 
                general sanctioning fee schedule;
                  (B) the bylaws of the organization;
                  (C) the appeals procedure of the 
                organization; and
                  (D) a list and business address of the 
                organization's officials who vote on the 
                ratings of boxers.
          (2) Format; updates.--A sanctioning organization 
                  (A) provide the information required under 
                paragraph (1) in writing, and, for any document 
                greater than 2 pages in length, also in 
                electronic form; and
                  (B) promptly notify the Federal Trade 
                Commission of any material change in the 
                information submitted.
          (3) FTC to make information available to public.--The 
        Federal Trade Commission shall make information 
        received under this subsection available to the public. 
        The Commission may assess sanctioning organizations a 
        fee to offset the costs it incurs in processing the 
        information and making it available to the public.
          (4) Internet alternative.--In lieu of submitting the 
        information required by paragraph (1) to the Federal 
        Trade Commission, a sanctioning organization may 
        provide the information to the public by maintaining a 
        website on the Internet that--
                  (A) is readily accessible by the general 
                public using generally available search engines 
                and does not require a password or payment of a 
                fee for full access to all the information;
                  (B) contains all the information required to 
                be submitted to the Federal Trade Commission by 
                paragraph (1) in a easy to search and use 
                format; and
                  (C) is updated whenever there is a material 
                change in the information.


  (a) Sanctioning Organizations.--Before sanctioning or 
authorizing a professional boxing match in a State, a 
sanctioning organization shall provide to the boxing commission 
of, or responsible for regulating matches in, that State a 
written statement of--
          (1) all charges, fees, and costs the organization 
        will assess any boxer participating in that match;
          (2) all payments, benefits, complimentary benefits, 
        and fees the organization will receive for its 
        affiliation with the event, from the promoter, host of 
        the event, and all other sources; and
          (3) such additional information as the commission may 
A sanctioning organization that receives compensation from any 
source to refrain from exercising its authority or jurisdiction 
over, or withholding its sanction of, a professional boxing 
match in any State shall provide the information required by 
paragraphs (2) and (3) to the boxing commission of that State.
  (b) Promoters.--Before a professional boxing match organized, 
promoted, or produced by a promoter is held in a State, the 
promoter shall provide to the boxing commission of, or 
responsible for regulating matches in, that State--
          (1) a copy of any agreement in writing to which the 
        promoter is a party with any boxer participating in the 
          (2) a statement in writing made under penalty of 
        perjury that there are no other agreements, written or 
        oral, between the promoter and the boxer with respect 
        to that match; and
          (3) a statement in writing of--
                  (A) all fees, charges, and expenses that will 
                be assessed by or through the promoter on the 
                boxer pertaining to the event, including any 
                portion of the boxer's purse that the promoter 
                will receive, and training expenses;
                  (B) all payments, gift, or benefits the 
                promoter is providing to any sanctioning 
                organization affiliated with the event; and
                  (C) any reduction in the amount or percentage 
                of a boxer's purse after--
                          (i) a previous agreement concerning 
                        the amount or percentage of that purse 
                        has been reached between the promoter 
                        and the boxer; or
                          (ii) a purse bid held for the event.
  (c) Judges.--Before participating in a professional boxing 
match as a judge in any State, an individual shall provide to 
the boxing commission of, or responsible for regulating matches 
in, that State a statement in writing of all payments, 
including reimbursement for expenses, and any other benefits 
that individual will receive from any source for judging that 
  (d) Information To Be Available to State Attorney General.--A 
promoter shall make information received under this section 
available to the chief law enforcement officer of the State in 
which the match is to be held upon request.
  (e) Exception.--The requirements of this section do not apply 
in connection with a professional boxing match scheduled to 
last less than 10 rounds.
  (f) Confidentiality of Agreements.--Neither a boxing 
commission nor an Attorney General may disclose to the public 
any matter furnished by a promoter under subsection (b)(1) or 
subsection (d) except to the extent required in public legal, 
administrative, or judicial proceedings brought against that 
promoter under State law.


                         [15 U.S.C. 6301 note]

  The provisions of this Act shall take effect on January 1, 
1997, except as follows:
          (1) Section 9 shall not apply to an otherwise 
        authorized boxing commission in the Commonwealth of 
        Virginia until July 1, 1998.
          (2) Sections 5 through 9 shall take effect on July 1,