[Senate Report 106-4]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
Calendar No. 16
106th Congress Report
SENATE
1st Session 106-4
_______________________________________________________________________
NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE ACT OF 1999
_______
February 12, 1999.--Ordered to be printed
_______________________________________________________________________
Mr. Warner, from the Committee on Armed Services, submitted the
following
R E P O R T
together with
MINORITY VIEWS
[To accompany S. 257]
The Committee on Armed Services, to which was referred the
bill (S. 257) having considered the same, reports favorably
thereon and recommends that the bill do pass.
PURPOSE OF THE BILL
S. 257 would establish that it is the policy of the United
States to deploy as soon as is technologically possible an
effective National Missile Defense (NMD) system capable of
defending the territory of the United States against limited
ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, or
deliberate).
S. 257 does not mandate specific architectural elements of
the NMD system, specific deployment dates, or changes to any
arms control agreements. It allows the Defense Department
complete flexibility in designing the NMD system. S. 257, by
itself, would have no budgetary impact.
SCOPE OF THE COMMITTEE REVIEW
The Committee is reporting S. 257 to the Senate for the
following reasons:
Value of National Missile Defense
A commitment to the deployment of an NMD system will have
two crucial impacts on the security of the United States.
First, it will signal to nations that aspire to possess
ballistic missiles with which to coerce or attack the United
States that pursuit of such capabilities is a waste of both
time and resources. In this sense, commitment to an NMD system
would have a deterrent effect on proliferation. Second, if some
aspiring states are not deterred, a commitment to deploy an NMD
system will ensure that American citizens and their property
are protected from limited ballistic missile attack.
Need for a National Missile Defense
Current administration policy on NMD--embodied in the so-
called ``3+3'' ``Deployment Readiness'' program--was originally
based on the premise that the United States did not face a
sufficient ballistic missile threat to justify commitment to
the deployment of an NMD system, and that the United States
would be able to clearly discern the emergence of such a threat
in sufficient time to deploy a defense. The Committee has
repeatedly expressed concern regarding this policy, and has
advocated making an immediate commitment to the earliest
possible deployment of an NMD system, within the limits of
technology and affordability. In this regard, the Committee
strongly supported S. 1873 during the 105th Congress,
legislation that contained the same policy as set forth in S.
257.
The Committee's concern regarding the ``3+3'' policy is
based in part on the fact that a threat of ballistic missile
attack on the United States already exists. Although unlikely,
the threat of unauthorized or accidental launches from Russia
or China is real, and may be heightened as the armed forces of
former Soviet Union undergo their transition to a post-Cold War
posture.
But there is also an imminent threat that stems from the
growing, widely acknowledged proliferation problem. The
President has in recent years declared the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems to be a
national emergency. The seriousness of this problem has been
articulated on numerous occasions by other senior
administration officials and by Congress.
Evidence of this growing threat abounds. The range of
ballistic missiles possessed by proliferant states has been
steadily increasing, sometimes in sudden leaps. North Korea,
for example, first purchased 300 kilometer (short-range) Scud-B
missiles in the 1980s, then developed the 500 kilometer Scud-C,
is now deploying the 1000 kilometer No-Dong, and is developing
a new class of ballistic missiles known as the Taepo-Dong One
and Two. On October 31, 1998, North Korea tested the Taepo-Dong
One missile on a flight trajectory that passed over Japan and
demonstrated the capability to deliver a small payload to an
intercontinental range. Although the Intelligence Community had
observed and reported on preparations for this test, it was
completely surprised by the sophistication of the Taepo-Dong
One missile, especially its use of a solid fuel motor as a
third stage. North Korea is also developing a longer-range
version known as the Taepo-Dong Two, which will clearly be an
intercontinental ballistic missile capable of attacking much of
the United States and which could be operational in a few short
years.
Iran has also made dramatic and sudden progress in its
Shahab-3 and Shahab-4 medium range ballistic missiles, and
Pakistan recently tested a missile with a range of 1500
kilometers.
The proliferation of technology, expertise and hardware
with which to build a long-range ballistic missile is
accelerating rapidly, spurred by advances in information
technology and growing demand for space launch vehicles. This
conclusion was strongly reinforced by the Commission to assess
the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, chaired by
former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. As the Commission
reported: ``The threat to the U.S. posed by these emerging
capabilities is broader, more mature and evolving more rapidly
than has been reported in estimates and reports by the
Intelligence Community.''
Continuing technological surprise
According to the Rumsfeld Commission report: ``The warning
times the U.S. can expect of new, threatening ballistic missile
deployments are being reduced. Under some plausible scenarios
the U.S. might well have little or no warning before
operational deployment.''
The Intelligence Community has been repeatedly surprised by
advances in ballistic missile technology achieved by less
developed countries, calling into question its ability to
anticipate precisely when the United States will be threatened
by long-range ballistic missiles. In 1997, the Director of
Central Intelligence (DCI) testified that Iran could have a
medium-range missile by 2007. One year later the DCI told the
Senate, ``since I testified, Iran's success in getting
technology and materials from Russian companies, combined with
recent indigenous Iranian advances, means that it could have a
medium-range missile much sooner than I assessed last year.'' A
Department of State official testified in September, 1997 that
Iran could develop this missile in ``maybe one to one-and-a-
half years, and it may be shorter than that,'' meaning as much
as nine years sooner than had been predicted only a year
earlier by the DCI.
Variables like the amount of outside assistance provided to
rogue nations--factors which can significantly speed the
acquisition of ballistic missiles--cannot be predicted
reliably. On April 6, 1998, for example, Pakistan launched a
ballistic missile capable of reaching a range of 1500
kilometers. In November 1998, the Defense Department published
``Proliferation: Threat and Response,'' its analysis of the
world's weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems. That
publication contained no mention of any effort by Pakistan to
develop such a capability, crediting Pakistan with, at best, a
300 km. short-range ballistic missile. Yet less than six months
later, Pakistan successfully launched a missile with five times
the range of its previous most capable weapon. Pakistan claims
its achievements were indigenous, the government of India
charges China with providing assistance, and United States
government officials suggest North Korea may have provided the
technology for the Ghauri missile. Whatever the source of
technological aid, one thing is clear: the United States was
once again surprised by the ballistic missile achievements of
another state.
There are numerous other examples of our intelligence
community's uneven record in anticipating ballistic missile
developments in other countries. This does not suggest
incompetence or a lack of diligence on the part of the
Intelligence Community, which is staffed by competent and
dedicated people. It underscores, however, that evidence of
technological developments is often difficult to obtain, and
that even when such evidence is available, it is oftentimes
difficult to discern just what it means until after the fact.
Indeed, the DCI told the Senate in 1997 that ``gaps and
uncertainties preclude a good projection of exactly when `rest
of the world' countries will deploy ICBMs.''
Given this track record, the Committee believes the
security of American lives and property cannot be based on a
hope that the United States will see the next major advance in
ballistic missiles long before it is available to coerce or
harm our nation.
Recent developments reinforce the need to move beyond ``3+3''
As specified above, North Korea's flight test of the Taepo-
Dong One missile demonstrates the ability of rogue states to
develop ballistic missiles capable of threatening the United
States. Such a system could be operational years before the
United States could field an NMD system. As the Rumsfeld
Commission made clear in its report, such threats could
materialize with little if any warning and there are several
rogue countries pursuing such capabilities.
To its credit, the Administration has now acknowledged the
existence of this threat and has taken significant steps to
address it. In particular, the Committee commends Secretary of
Defense William Cohen for his decision to increase funding for
NMD by $6.6 billion over the Future Years Defense Program.
These developments, however, fundamentally change the rationale
supporting the ``3+3'' policy. This policy has been based on a
perceived need to gather more information on the ballistic
missile threat, NMD program affordability, and technology
maturity, before making a deployment decision. The
Administration has now indicated that the threat is all but
here. It has also budgeted the funds needed to implement a
deployment decision, implicitly confirming that the program is
affordable. The Administration's only remaining decision
criterion for which additional information is needed relates to
technology development. Since S. 257 makes clear that a
deployment would only proceed once the technology is ready, the
Committee sees no apparent reason to further delay a deployment
decision.
The Administration has acknowledged that it must amend or
withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972
prior to deployment of an NMD system. Some have asserted that a
deployment decision should be delayed while negotiations are
undertaken to achieve such Treaty changes. The Committee does
not find this argument persuasive. Although the Committee
believes that the United States must engage Russia with caution
and respect, it does not believe that postponing an NMD
deployment decision will facilitate such talks. Indeed, the
Committee believes that once a firm commitment to NMD
deployment has been announced only then will Russia seriously
engage in negotiations to modify the ABM Treaty. The United
States must make it clear that its decision to deploy an NMD
system is based on threats not envisioned at the time the ABM
Treaty was negotiated, and that such a decision in no way
threatens Russian security. The United States, however, must
make it equally clear that it will proceed with deployment of
an NMD system, whether or not Russia agrees to modify the ABM
Treaty. The only way to clearly send such a signal is by a
clear change in United States policy. The Committee believes
that S. 257 is the best vehicle for accomplishing this change.
Summary
The Committee believes the need for deployment of NMD is
clear. The threat exists and continues to grow. The United
States has been frequently surprised at the pace and character
of its progress. The ability of the United States to clearly
discern those threats well in advance of their arrival is
limited. Confidence in our ability to respond rapidly to these
threats must be tempered by realistic assessments of the
technical challenges and the ability of the technical community
to deal with them. S. 257, which clearly indicates a commitment
to deploy NMD, will ensure the United States is prepared to
meet that threat.
committee action
In accordance with the Legislative Reorganization Act of
1946, as amended by the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970,
there is set forth below the committee vote to report the
National Missile Defense Act of 1997 (S. 1873).
In favor: Senators Warner, Thurmond, McCain, Smith, Inhofe,
Santorum, Snowe, Roberts, Allard, Hutchinson, Sessions, and
Lieberman.
Opposed: Senators Levin, Kennedy, Bingaman, Byrd, Robb,
Cleland, and Reed.
Voting present: Senator Landrieu.
Vote: 12-7, with 1 voting ``present''.
congressional budget office cost estimate
On February 2, 1999, the Congressional Budget Office issued
a cost estimate for S. 257. According to this estimate ``the
bill, by itself, would have no budgetary impact.'' The cover
letter and complete cost estimate from the Congressional Budget
Office are shown below.
U.S. Congress,
Congressional Budget Office,
Washington, DC, February 2, 1999.
Hon. Thad Cochran,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Senator: At the request of your staff, the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has prepared the enclosed
cost estimate for S. 257, the National Missile Defense Act of
1999.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Raymond Hall.
Sincerely,
James L. Blum,
Acting Director.
Enclosure.
S. 257--National Missile Defense Act of 1999
S. 257 would state that it is U.S. policy to deploy as soon
as technologically possible an effective national missile
defense system capable of defending the territory of the United
States against limited ballistic missile attack (whether
accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate).
CBO estimates that the bill, by itself, would have no
budgetary impact. Because it would not affect direct spending
or receipts, pay-as-you-go procedures would not apply. Any
budgetary impact would stem from separate implementing
legislation or from annual authorization and appropriation
bills. How the costs of implementing the policy enunciated in
S. 257 would compare with costs likely to be incurred under
current law would depend on the systems and time frame required
by subsequent legislation.
Secton 4 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act excludes from
the application of that act any legislative provisions that are
necessary for national security. That exclusion might apply to
the provisions of this bill. In any case, the bill contains no
intergovernmental or private-sector mandates.
The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Raymond Hall.
This estimate was approved by Robert A. Sunshine, Deputy
Assistant Director for Budget Analysis.
regulatory impact
Paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the
Senate requires that a report on the regulatory impact of a
bill be included in the report on the bill. The committee finds
that there is no regulatory impact in the cost of S. 257.
changes in existing law
S. 257 does not include any changes in existing law.
MINORITY VIEWS
We share the Administration's commitment to providing the
American people with effective protection against the emerging
long-range missile threat from rogue states. That is why we
support the Defense Department's NMD Deployment Readiness
Program to develop a limited NMD system to protect the United
States against such a developing threat.
We cannot, however, support S. 257, the ``National Missile
Defense Act of 1999,'' as it has been reported to the Senate by
the Armed Services Committee. We agree with the President's
senior national security advisors that this legislation would
needlessly make a National Missile Defense (NMD) deployment
decision now, before the Defense Department wants to, needs to,
or is prepared to make such a decision. This legislation would
not advance by one day the development of an NMD system
suitable for deployment, but could result in an increased
threat to the United States from the proliferation of nuclear
weapons.
S. 257 states:
It is the policy of the United States to deploy as
soon as is technologically possible an effective
National Missile Defense system capable of defending
the territory of the United States against limited
ballistic missile attack (whether accidental,
unauthorized, or deliberate).
This language makes a commitment now to deploy a National
Missile Defense (NMD) system without taking into account
crucial factors identified by Defense Secretary Cohen when he
testified to the Armed Services Committee on February 3, 1999.
Secretary Cohen testified that the Administration will make a
decision in June 2000 on whether to deploy a limited NMD system
after taking into account: the threat we face from ballistic
missiles; the operational effectiveness of the NMD system; the
affordability of the system; and the impact of deployment on
nuclear arms reductions and arms control treaties. S. 257
ignores these factors and reduces the issue to one of what is
``technologically possible''.
Enactment of S. 257 would undermine the current effort of
the Administration to reach a negotiated agreement on any
changes to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty that may be
necessary to accommodate deployment of a limited NMD system. We
cannot and will not give Russia or any other nation a veto over
our NMD requirements or programs. But making a decision to
deploy an NMD system before we attempt to negotiate changes to
the ABM Treaty--and before DOD says the nation can responsibly
make such a decision--could reduce Russia's willingness to work
with us on reducing nuclear weapons under the START process,
lead Russia to retain thousands of nuclear warheads it would
otherwise eliminate, and dramatically increase the threat of
nuclear proliferation.
administration opposition
In a letter dated February 3, 1999 (the full text of which
is included below), Mr. Samuel Berger, the President's National
Security Advisor, indicated that ``if S. 257 were presented to
the President in its current form, his senior national security
advisors would recommend that the bill be vetoed.''
Mr. Berger explained the basis for their position in his
letter:
The Administration strongly opposes S. 257 because it
suggests that our decision on deploying this system
should be based solely on a determination that the
system is ``technologically possible.'' This
unacceptably narrow definition would ignore other
critical factors that the Administration believes must
be addressed when it considers the deployment question
in 2000, including those that must be evaluated by the
President as Commander-in-Chief.
We intend to base the deployment decision on an
assessment of the technology (based on an initial
series of rigorous flight-tests) and the proposed
system's operational effectiveness. In addition, the
President and his senior advisors will need to confirm
whether the rogue state ballistic missile threat to the
United States has developed as quickly as we now
expect, as well as the cost to deploy.
Berger went on to say:
A decision regarding NMD deployment must also be
addressed within the context of the ABM Treaty and our
objectives for achieving future reductions in strategic
offensive arms through START II and III. The ABM Treaty
remains a cornerstone of strategic stability, and
Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agree that it is of
fundamental significance to achieving the elimination
of thousands of strategic nuclear arms under these
treaties.
It is important to understand that S. 257 will not
accelerate the development of a limited NMD system suitable for
deployment by one day. Senior Defense Department officials have
stated repeatedly that DOD is already proceeding with the
development of the NMD system as fast as is technically
possible. Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre testified to
the Armed Services Committee on October 2, 1998 that the NMD
program ``is as close as we can get in the Department of
Defense to a Manhattan Project. We are pushing this very
fast''. General Joseph Ralston, the Vice Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, testified at the same hearing that ``I know of
no other program in the Department of Defense that has had as
many constraints removed in terms of oversight and reviews just
so that we can develop and deploy it as quickly as possible.''
As DOD has made clear on numerous occasions, adding more money
will not accelerate the program.
On January 20, Defense Secretary Cohen announced four
decisions on the NMD program, while emphasizing that ``No
deployment decision has been made at this time. That will be
made in June of 2000.'' The four items are as follows:
(1) For the first time, the Administration is
budgeting the funds ($6.6 billion) in the Future Years
Defense Program for possible deployment of a limited
NMD system. This funding will permit deployment if the
decision is made to deploy. Without this funding, no
deployment would be possible. This would bring the
total NMD funding for 1999-2005 to $10.5 billion.
(2) Secretary Cohen affirmed that the Administration
expects that the threat of ballistic missiles from
rogue nations will continue to grow and will pose a
threat to the U.S. territory in the near future.
(3) Secretary Cohen announced that the Administration
will seek possible changes to the ABM Treaty with
Russia in the event that deployment would require
modification. He also noted that if we cannot agree on
changes to the Treaty, the United States could exercise
its right to withdraw from the Treaty if necessary.
(4) The earliest anticipated deployment date for the
NMD system was delayed from FY 2003 to FY 2005 because
of continuing concerns about the technology of the
system and because certain critical tests will not
occur until FY 2003.
Secretary Cohen's announcement clearly demonstrates the
Administration's commitment to continue moving forward with a
limited NMD program. The additional funding would permit
deployment if a decision is made to deploy. The threat is
clearly developing more quickly than was believed even one year
ago. At the same time, the Administration policy--unlike S.
257--provides the flexibility to consider the full range of
relevant factors and to pursue planned negotiations on possible
ABM Treaty modifications before making a deployment decision.
Technology and operational effectiveness
Even with Secretary Cohen's announcement that the earliest
anticipated deployment date is now 2005, the NMD program
remains high risk. Numerous technical challenges remain, and
the integration of all the component parts into a system that
can demonstrate its capability is years away. The first
integrated system test using a production interceptor and kill
vehicle is not scheduled to take place until 2003. Prior to
that time tests will rely on surrogate components for some of
the most critical pieces of hardware.
S. 257 would make the deployment commitment now, prior to
any demonstration of the capability of the system, and prior to
any ability to evaluate whether it is operationally effective
and able to meet its system requirements. As the Defense
Department and Joint Chiefs of Staff have pointed out, if we
were to commit to deploying an NMD system ``as soon as
technologically possible'', we might be committing ourselves to
building a system that is not as effective as we would need or
desire to counter the evolving threat.
In 1997, General John Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, testified to the Committee that the earliest
possible system would not provide optimum capability: ``The NMD
Deployment Readiness Program optimizes the potential for an
effective National Missile Defense system. If the decision is
made to deploy an NMD system in the near term, then the system
fielded would provide a very limited capability. If deploying a
system in the near term can be avoided, DOD can continue to
enhance the technology base and the commensurate capability of
the NMD program system.''
By committing to deploy now, before the system has been
fully tested and before its operational capability has been
demonstrated, S. 257 would run the risk of committing to a
system that is either inadequate or, worse yet, ineffective.
The normal DOD acquisition process for major weapon systems
requires a rigorous review of numerous technical, performance
and cost considerations at each major decision point in the
development or acquisition process. DOD Regulation 5000.2-R
establishes the mandatory procedures for major defense
acquisition programs: ``Threat projections, system performance,
unit production cost estimates, life cycle costs, cost
performance tradeoffs, acquisition strategy, affordability
constraints, and risk management shall be major considerations
at each milestone decision point.'' S. 257 would mandate a
deployment decision while ignoring all of these critical
acquisition requirements.
Deputy Defense Secretary Hamre and Vice Chairman of the JCS
General Ralston have testified that the Defense Department has
already put the NMD program on a very fast track. General
Shelton has testified that the program has been compressed from
a normal 16-year process by more than half. This speed led an
independent review team, chaired by former Air Force Chief of
Staff General Welch, to criticize a ``rush to failure'', citing
the need for more testing and more time to evaluate and
incorporate test results. Secretary Cohen's announcement that
the deployment date is expected no sooner than 2005 is designed
to reduce the risk of failure. In mandating deployment ``as
soon as technologically possible'', S. 257 could undermine the
Department's efforts to ensure that the NMD system is
operationally effective and cost-effective.
ABM Treaty Issues
The United States and Russia agree that the ABM Treaty is
indispensable for further reductions in nuclear weapons. At the
Helsinki Summit on March 21, 1997, Presidents Clinton and
Yeltsin issued a joint statement on the ABM Treaty, which began
as follows:
President Clinton and President Yeltsin, expressing
their commitment to strengthening strategic stability
and international security, emphasizing the importance
of further reductions in strategic offensive arms, and
recognizing the fundamental significance of the Anti-
Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty for these objectives as
well as the necessity for effective theater missile
defense (TMD) systems, consider it their common task to
preserve the ABM Treaty, prevent circumvention of it,
and enhance its viability.
Defense Secretary Cohen has made it clear that both
pursuing a limited NMD program and maintaining the ABM Treaty,
are in our national interest and can be accomplished. During
his press conference on January 20, 1999, Secretary Cohen
stated his view on the ABM Treaty:
I believe it's in our interest to maintain that. I
think we need to modify it to allow for an NMD program
that I've outlined, but the ABM Treaty, I think, is
important to maintain the limitations on offensive
missiles. To the extent that there is no ABM Treaty,
then certainly Russia or other countries would feel
free to develop as many offensive weapons as they
wanted, which would set in motion a comparable dynamic
to offset that with more missiles here.
Mr. Berger's letter of February 3, 1999, amplifies the
Administration's views about the importance of maintaining the
ABM Treaty and nuclear arms reductions as a factor in the NMD
deployment decision:
S. 257 suggests that neither the ABM Treaty nor our
objectives for START II and START III are factors in an
NMD deployment decision. This would clearly be
interpreted by Russia as evidence that we are not
interested in working towards a cooperative solution,
one that is in both our nations' security interests. I
cannot think of a worse way to begin a negotiation on
the ABM Treaty, nor one that would put at greater risk
the hard-won bipartisan gains of START. Our goal would
be to achieve success in negotiations on the ABM Treaty
while also securing the strategic arms reductions
available through START. That means we need to
recognize and address the interrelationship between
these two tracks.
The Armed Services Committee has previously recognized the
importance of a cooperative approach on missile defense and the
ABM Treaty. Last year the Committee included a provision in the
Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1999
that encouraged the U.S. to work in a cooperative manner with
Russia on issues of missile defense. The Conference Report
Statement of Managers on this bill stated:
The conferees believe that a cooperative approach to
ballistic missile defense could lead to a mutually
agreeable evolution of the ABM Treaty, i.e., either
modification or replacement by a newer understanding or
agreement, that would clear the way for the United
States and Russia to deploy national missile defenses
each believes necessary for its security. If
implemented in a cooperative manner, the conferees do
not believe that such steps would undermine the
original intent of the ABM Treaty, which was to
maintain strategic stability and permit significant
nuclear arms reductions.
S. 257 is inconsistent with this understanding of the
importance of a cooperative approach towards the ABM Treaty to
maintaining strategic stability and permitting large reductions
in nuclear weapons. If enacted, S. 257 would make it much more
difficult for the Administration to maintain the continuing
benefits of the ABM Treaty and the cooperative approach to
nuclear arms reductions under the START process.
By making the deployment decision now, S. 257 would
preclude the Administration from negotiating possible changes
to the ABM Treaty before making an NMD deployment decision in
June of 2000. This is one of the key reasons that the
President's senior national security advisors are strongly
opposed to S. 257 and would recommend a veto of it.
conclusion
S. 257 would needlessly make a premature NMD deployment
decision and jeopardize our ongoing effort to work
cooperatively with Russia on possible changes to the ABM
Treaty, an effort the President and his senior national
security advisors believe is critically important. S. 257 would
not accelerate the NMD system by a single day, but could
increase the proliferation risk from thousands of nuclear
weapons that would otherwise be eliminated through the START
process. In other words, S. 257 would provide no tangible
benefit to the NMD program, but it could reduce our security.
We are all concerned with the need to protect Americans
from the threat of ballistic missiles from rogue nations, as we
are with the need to protect Americans from other threats. The
Defense Department is already proceeding as fast as possible
with the development of a limited National Missile Defense
system. The Administration is working in a cooperative manner
to negotiate possible changes to the ABM Treaty that could
preserve the benefits of that treaty, including the verified
reduction of thousands of Russian nuclear weapons. Secretary
Cohen's plan is the right one and we should stick with it.
Carl Levin.
Ted Kennedy.
Jeff Bingaman.
Robert C. Byrd.
Chuck Robb.
Max Cleland.
Jack Reed.
The White House,
Washington, February 3, 1999.
Hon. Carl Levin,
Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Levin: I understand the Senate Armed Services
Committee will consider tomorrow S. 257--The National Missile
Defense Act of 1999.
I want to underscore that the Administration shares with
Congress a commitment to ensuring the American people are
provided effective protection against the emerging long-range
missile threat from rogue states. That is why we have since
1996 diligently pursued a deployment readiness program to
develop a limited National Missile Defense (NMD) system
designed to protect against such threats. We have now budgeted
$10.5 billion between FY 1999-2005 for this program, including
the funds that would be necessary during this period to deploy
a limited NMD system.
Secretary Cohen has recently made clear that the
Administration will address the deployment decision in June
2000. The Administration strongly opposes S. 257 because it
suggests that our decision on deploying this system should be
based solely on a determination that the system is
``technologically possible.'' This unacceptably narrow
definition would ignore other critical factors that the
Administration believes must be addressed when it considers the
deployment question in 2000, including those that must be
evaluated by the President as Commander-in-Chief.
We intend to base the deployment decision on an assessment
of the technology (based on an initial series of rigorous
flight-tests) and the proposed system's operational
effectiveness. In addition, the President and his senior
advisors will need to confirm whether the rogue state ballistic
missile threat to the United States has developed as quickly as
we now expect, as well as the cost to deploy.
A decision regarding NMD deployment must also be addressed
within the context of the ABM Treaty and our objectives for
achieving future reductions in strategic offensive arms through
START II and III. The ABM Treaty remains a cornerstone of
strategic stability, and Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agree
that it is of fundamental significance to achieving the
elimination of thousands of strategic nuclear arms under these
treaties.
The Administration has made clear to Russia that deployment
of a limited NMD that required amendments to the ABM Treaty
would not be incompatible with the underlying purpose of the
ABM Treaty, i.e., to maintain strategic stability and enable
further reductions in strategic nuclear arms. The ABM Treaty
has been amended before, and we see no reason why we should not
be able to modify it again to permit deployment of an NMD
effective against rogue nation missile threats.
We could not and would not give Russia or any other nation
a veto over our NMD requirements. It is important to recognize
that our sovereign rights are fully protected by the supreme
national interests clause that is an integral part of this
Treaty. But neither should we issue ultimatums. We are prepared
to negotiate any necessary amendments in good faith.
S. 257 suggests that neither the ABM Treaty nor our
objectives for START II and START III are factors in an NMD
deployment decision. this would clearly be interpreted by
Russia as evidence that we are not interested in working
towards a cooperative solution, one that is in both our
nations' security interests. I cannot think of a worse way to
begin a negotiation on the ABM Treaty, nor one that would put
at greater risk the hard-won bipartisan gains of START. Our
goal would be to achieve success in negotiations on the ABM
Treaty while also securing the strategic arms reductions
available through START. That means we need to recognize and
address the interrelationship between these two tracks.
The Administration hopes the Senate will work to modify S.
257 to reflect the priority that we believe must be attached to
the ABM and START objectives I have outlined above. But if S.
257 were presented to the President in its current form, his
senior national security advisors would recommend that the bill
be vetoed.
Sincerely,
Samuel R. Berger,
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs.