[Senate Report 106-3]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]





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106th Congress                                                   Report
  1st Session                    SENATE                           106-3

_______________________________________________________________________



                         COMMITTEE ACTIVITIES


                               __________

 
        SPECIAL REPORT of the SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE         
                          UNITED STATES SENATE                         



                  JANUARY 7, 1997 TO OCTOBER 21, 1998





                February 3, 1999.--Ordered to be printed

                               --------

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE                    
69-010                     WASHINGTON : 1999





                    SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

                  RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama, Chairman

               J. ROBERT KERREY, Nebraska, Vice Chairman

JOHN H. CHAFEE, Rhode Island         JOHN GLENN, Ohio
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana            RICHARD H. BRYAN, Nevada
MIKE DeWINE, Ohio                    BOB GRAHAM, Florida
JON KYL, Arizona                     JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma            MAX BAUCUS, Montana
ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah                 CHARLES S. ROBB, Virginia
PAT ROBERTS, Kansas                  FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado               CARL LEVIN, Michigan
DAN COATS, Indiana

                  Trent Lott, Mississippi, Ex Officio
              Thomas A. Daschle, South Dakota, Ex Officio

                                 ------                                

                   Taylor W. Lawrence, Staff Director
             Christopher C. Straub, Minority Staff Director
                    Kathleen P. McGhee, Chief Clerk




                         LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

                              ----------                              

                                       U.S. Senate,
                          Select Committee on Intelligence,
                                      Washington, DC, January 1999.
    Dear Mr. President: As Chairman and Vice Chairman of the 
Select Committee on Intelligence, we submit to the Senate the 
Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence regarding 
its activities during the 105th Congress from January 1997 to 
October 1998. The Committee is charged by the Senate with the 
responsibility of carrying out oversight of the intelligence 
activities of the United States. While the majority of its work 
is necessarily conducted in secrecy, the Committee believes 
that as much information as possible about intelligence 
activities should be made available to the public. This 
unclassified, public report to the Senate is intended to 
contribute to that objective.
            Sincerely,
                                   Richard C. Shelby,
                                           Chairman.
                                   J. Robert Kerrey,
                                           Vice Chairman.



                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page
 I. Introduction.................................................     1
II. Legislation..................................................     3
        A. Intelligence Budget...................................     3
        B. Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 1998............     4
        C. Disclosure to Congress Act of 1998....................     6
        D. Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 1999............     7
        E. Ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention.......    11
III.Oversight Activities.........................................    12

        A. Hearings..............................................    12
             1. National Security Threats to the U.S.............    12
             2. Zona Rosa........................................    13
             3. Disclosures Act..................................    15
             4. Mexico and Counter-Narcotics.....................    16
             5. The Biological and Chemical Weapons Threat.......    16
             6. Covert Action Quarterly Reviews..................    18
             7. China............................................    18
             8. Russia...........................................    18
             9. Iraq.............................................    19
            10. Intelligence Sharing with UNSCOM.................    20
            11. Khobar Towers....................................    20
            12. Roger E. Tamraz..................................    20
        B. Investigations........................................    21
            1. China Investigation, Part 1.......................    21
            2. China Investigation, Part 2.......................    23
        C. Community Issues......................................    24
             1. Indian Nuclear Tests and the Jeremiah Panel......    24
             2. The Ballistic Missile Threat and the Rumsfeld 
                Commission.......................................    25
             3. Proliferation Threats............................    26
             4. Arms Control.....................................    26
             5. Embassy Bombings in Africa and the U.S. Response.    26
             6. Intelligence Implications of NATO Expansion......    27
             7. Assistant Directors of Central Intelligence......    28
             8. Oversight of Intelligence Community Inspectors 
                General..........................................    28
             9. Release of JFK Documents.........................    29
            10. Security Automation..............................    30
            11. PolicyNet Update.................................    30
            12. SSCI Web Page....................................    31
        D. Audits................................................    32
            1. Major Systems Acquisition Program of the NRO......    32
            2. Intelligence Community Use of Cover to Protect 
                Operations.......................................    33
            3. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.............    33
        E. Technical Advisory Group (TAG) Reports................    33
            1. The Future of SIGINT..............................    33
            2. The Future of HUMINT..............................    34
IV. Confirmations................................................    35
        A. George J. Tenet.......................................    35
        B. John A. Gordon........................................    35
        C. Joan A. Dempsey.......................................    36
        D. Robert M. McNamara, Jr................................    36
        E. L. Britt Snider.......................................    37
        F. Background Investigation Review.......................    37
 V. Appendix.....................................................    38
        A. Summary of Committee's Activities.....................    38
            1. Number of Meetings................................    38
            2. Bills and Resolutions Originated by the Committee.    38
            3. Bills Referred to the Committee...................    38
            4. Publications......................................    38




106th Congress                                                   Report
  1st Session                    SENATE                           106-3

=======================================================================



                          COMMITTEE ACTIVITIES

                                _______
                                

                February 3, 1999.--Ordered to be printed

                                _______


 Mr. Shelby, from the Select Committee on Intelligence, submitted the 
                               following

                             SPECIAL REPORT

                            I. Introduction

    The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence was established 
in 1976 by Senate Resolution 400 in order to strengthen 
Congressional oversight of the programs and activities of U.S. 
intelligence agencies. Throughout its history, the Committee 
has attempted to carry out its oversight responsibilities in a 
bipartisan manner. During the 105th Congress, the Committee 
continued this bipartisan tradition in crafting important 
intelligence reform legislation, conducting major inquiries 
into Intelligence Community issues, and by providing funding 
for and oversight of a wide array of U.S. intelligence 
activities.
    As part of its oversight responsibilities, the Committee 
performs an annual review of the intelligence budget and 
prepares legislation authorizing appropriations for the various 
civilian and military agencies and departments comprising the 
Intelligence Community. These entities include the Central 
Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, National 
Security Agency, National Imagery and Mapping Agency, National 
Reconnaissance Office, as well as the intelligence related 
components of the U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, U.S. Air Force, U.S. 
Marine Corps, Department of State, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, Department of the Treasury, and Department of 
Energy. The Committee also conducts periodic audits, 
investigations, and inspections of intelligence activities and 
programs with the goal of assuring that the appropriate 
departments and agencies of the United States provide informed 
and timely intelligence necessary for the executive and 
legislative branches to make sound decisions affecting the 
national security interests of the nation, and that U.S. 
military commanders have dominant awareness of any potential 
battle environment. More importantly, the Committee's oversight 
seeks to ensure that intelligence activities and programs 
conform with the Constitution and laws of the United States of 
America and serve U.S. security interests.
    As the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, 
and the accompanying loss of this overriding intelligence 
focus, the agencies and departments of the U.S. Intelligence 
Community have redirected their efforts to the national 
security issues now confronting the United States or which may 
develop in the coming years. The emergence and growth of 
transnational threats such as terrorism, narcotics trafficking, 
international criminal organizations, and the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction present the nation and the 
Intelligence Community with challenges requiring different 
doctrine, policy, and programs. As new challenges and threats 
confront the country, there is an increasing need for the 
oversight provided by the Committee to ensure that our leaders 
have the intelligence necessary to make informed national 
security decisions.
    The Committee took a number of important steps to improve 
the country's ability to collect, analyze, and produce 
intelligence about America's adversaries. The Committee 
achieved strong consensus that timely intelligence is essential 
for sound policy and military success. Legislation reported by 
the Committee stressed the intelligence targets that threaten 
America today and tomorrow, setting guideposts toward future 
technologies for collecting and processing intelligence. Funds 
were authorized above the President's budget request because 
the Committee believes there are areas where additional 
resources are needed in this post-Cold War period of 
uncertainty. While the mission of U.S. intelligence gathering 
organizations has not changed, the areas on which they must 
focus have become more diverse and challenging. For that 
reason, the Committee concentrated additional resources in the 
five areas of counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism, counter-
proliferation, counter-intelligence, and effective covert 
action.
    The Committee also focused on a series of critical 
challenges facing the Intelligence Community, including faulty 
analysis that led to a failure to forecast India's nuclear 
tests, an aging U.S. signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection 
system, the requirement for more effective tools for countering 
terrorists and weapons of mass destruction, and the Clandestine 
Service's eroding technical competence.
    The Intelligence Authorization Acts for Fiscal Years 1998 
and 1999 took a number of important steps to address these 
problems. The Committee recommended significant increases in 
funding for high-priority projects aimed atbetter positioning 
the Intelligence Community for the threats of the 20th Century, while 
at the same time reducing funds for programs and activities that were 
poorly justified or redundant. The net result was a modest increase to 
the overall budget request for intelligence for both fiscal years 1998 
and 1999.
    Also adopted were a number of legislative provisions, such 
as new legislation that establishes a clear process for 
Intelligence Community employees to pass information about 
wrongdoing, including classified information, to the 
intelligence oversight committees, and legislation that updated 
and strengthened the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.
    In addition, the Committee focused budget authorization 
legislation on key areas such as:
          bolstering advanced research and development across 
        the Intelligence Community, particularly the 
        modernization of NSA and CIA;
          strengthening efforts in counter-proliferation, 
        counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, counter-
        intelligence, and effective covert action;
          expanding the collection and exploitation of 
        measurements and signatures intelligence, with a 
        specific focus on missile intelligence;
          developing reconnaissance systems based on new small 
        satellite technologies that provide flexible, 
        affordable collection from space with radars to detect 
        moving targets in all-weather conditions;
          boosting education, recruiting, and technical 
        training for Intelligence Community personnel;
          streamlining dissemination of intelligence products; 
        and
          providing new tools for information operations.
    During the 105th Congress, the Committee conducted 95 
hearings and on-the-record briefings. Of these, forty-seven 
were oversight hearings, fifteen were legislative hearings, and 
fifteen were nomination hearings. There were sixteen Committee 
business or legislative mark-up meetings. The Committee also 
held two on-the-record briefings.

                            II. Legislation

                         A. Intelligence budget

    The Committee conducted annual reviews of the fiscal year 
1998 and fiscal year 1999 budget requests for the DCI's 
National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP), and the 
Department of Defense's Joint Military Intelligence Program 
(JMIP) and Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities 
(TIARA). These reviews included receiving testimony from senior 
Intelligence Community officials and evaluating detailed budget 
justification documents and numerous Intelligence Community 
responses to specific questions raised by the Committee. As a 
result of these reviews, the Committee made recommendations, 
approved by the Senate, that resulted in the authorization of 
funds above the President's request for fiscal year 1998. In 
fiscal year 1999, the Committee recommended significant 
increases in funding for high-priority projects aimed at better 
positioning the Intelligence Community for the threats of the 
21st Century, due to the uncertainty of this post-Cold War 
period, while at the same time reducing funds for programs and 
activities that were poorly justified or redundant. Areas of 
emphasis in both bills included bolstering advanced research 
and development across the Community, to facilitate, among 
other things, the modernization of NSA and CIA; strengthening 
efforts in counter-proliferation, counter-terrorism, counter-
narcotics, counter-intelligence, and effective covert action; 
expanding the collection and exploitation of measurements and 
signatures intelligence, especially ballistic missile 
intelligence; developing reconnaissance systems based on new 
small satellite technologies that provide flexible, affordable 
collection from space with radars to detect moving targets in 
all-weather conditions; boosting education, recruiting, and 
technical training for Intelligence Community personnel; 
enhancing analytical capabilities; streamlining dissemination 
of intelligence products; and providing new tools for 
information operations.

     B. S. 858 Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998

    On June 4, 1997, the Committee reported out S. 858, the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998. In 
addition to providing the annual authorization for 
appropriations for intelligence activities, the bill, inter 
alia:
          Directed the President to inform all executive branch 
        employees that disclosing classified information to an 
        appropriate oversight committee or to their 
        Congressional representative is not prohibited by any 
        law, executiveorder, regulation, or policy, provided, 
that the employee reasonably believed that the classified information 
evidenced a violation of any law, a false statement to Congress on an 
issue of material fact, gross mismanagement, or wasted of funds, an 
abuse of authority, or a substantial danger to public health or safety.
          Designated the Secretary of State as the responsible 
        official for providing information on violent crimes 
        against U.S. citizens abroad to victims and their 
        families. Expressed sense of Congress that it is in the 
        national interest of the United States to provide 
        information regarding the murder or kidnaping of United 
        States persons abroad to the families of the victims.
          Addressed the Committee's concern that intelligence 
        reporting and analysis lacks standards for foreign 
        names and places.
          Authorized the President to delay imposing sanctions 
        against countries engaged in weapons proliferation in 
        order to protect intelligence sources and methods.
          Provided clear legislative authority for the Central 
        Intelligence Agency to enter into multi-year leases of 
        not more than 15 years duration for the purpose of 
        ensuring cost-efficient acquisition of Agency 
        facilities.
          Amended the CIA Act of 1949, 50 U.S.C. Sec. 403q(e) 
        to provide the CIA Inspector General (IG) with 
        authority to subpoena records and other documentary 
        information necessary in the performance of functions 
        assigned to the IG.
    The Senate passed S. 858 on a vote of ninety-eight to one.
    As noted above, S. 858, contained a provision (Sec. 306) 
that directed the President to inform all Executive Branch 
employees that disclosing certain classified information to an 
appropriate oversight committee to their Congressional 
representative was not prohibited by any law, executive order, 
or regulation or otherwise contrary to public policy. This 
provision was intended to protect employees from adverse 
actions based on what was heretofore considered an unauthorized 
disclosure to Congress.
    The Committee intended disclosure to an appropriate 
oversight committee to mean disclosure to a Member or cleared 
staff of the Committee with jurisdiction over the agency 
involved in the wrongdoing. Members or committee staff who 
received such information from an employee were presumed to 
have received it in their capacity as members or staff of the 
appropriate oversight committee. The Committee believed that 
his presumption was necessary because Members and staff are 
responsible for ensuring that the information is protected in 
accordance with Committee rules and brought to the attention of 
the leadership of the Committee. The President, by informing 
Executive Branch employees as directed in section 306, would 
have authorized disclosure to the appropriate oversight 
committee or members, thereby recognizing that these Committees 
and members have a ``need to know'' the information as required 
by current Executive Branch restrictions on disclosure of 
classified information.
    Shortly after the Senate passed S. 858, the Administration 
issued a Statement of Administration Policy (SAP) stating that 
section 306 was unconstitutional, and that if it remained in 
the bill in that form, senior advisors would recommend that the 
President veto the bill.
    In conference, members of the House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) and the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) agreed not to include section 
306 as passed by the Senate. The Senate offered to amend 
section 306, thereby significantly narrowing the scope of the 
provision to cover only employees of agencies within the 
Intelligence Community (the Senate-passed version covered all 
executive employees). The Senate amendment further narrowed the 
provision by allowing provision by allowing disclosure only to 
committees with primary jurisdiction over the agencies involved 
(the original language also allowed disclosure to a Member of 
Congress who represented the employee).
    The Chairman and Ranking Member of the House Committee 
expressed concern over the possible constitutional implications 
of such language. They were also mindful of the 
Administration's veto threat as expressed in the Statement of 
Administration Policy. The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in deference to their 
House colleagues' concerns agreed to amend the provision to 
express a sense of the Congress that Members of Congress have 
equal standing with officials of the Executive Branch to 
receive classified information so that Congress may carry out 
its oversight responsibilities.
    The managers' decision not to include section 306 of the 
Senate bill in the conference report, however, was not intended 
to be interpreted as agreement with the Administration's 
position on whether it is constitutional for Congress to 
legislate on this subject matter. The managers' actions were 
also not to be interpreted as expressing agreement with the 
opinion of the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel, 
which explicitly stated that only the President may determine 
when Executive Branch employees may disclose classified 
information to Members of Congress. The managers asserted in 
their Conference Report that members of Congressional 
committees have a need to know information, classified or 
otherwise, that directly relates to their responsibilities to 
conduct vigorous and comprehensive oversight of the activities 
of the executive departments and agencies within their 
committees' jurisdiction. The President may not assert an 
unimpeded authority to determine otherwise.
    While the managers recognized the Chief Executive's 
constitutional authority to protect sensitive national security 
information, they did not agree with the Administration that 
the authority is exclusive. Members of both committees agreed 
as well that whatever the scope of the President's authority, 
it may not be asserted against Congress to withhold evidence of 
misconduct or wrongdoing and thereby impede Congress in 
exercising its constitutional legislative and oversight 
authority. Therefore, the managers committed to hold hearings 
on this issue and develop appropriate legislative solutions in 
the second session of the 105th Congress. [See Section III.C. 
for a discussion of oversight hearings held on this matter.]

             C. S. 1668 disclosure to Congress Act of 1998

    On February 23, 1998, the Committee reported out S. 1668, a 
stand alone version of Section 306 of S. 858, based on public 
hearings on February 4 and 11, 1998 to examine the 
constitutional implications of legislation such as section 306. 
The Committee heard from constitutional scholars and legal 
experts on both sides of the issue. Mr. Randolph D. Moss, 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General from the Department of 
Justice Office of Legal Counsel, testified in support of the 
Administration's position that section 306 and any similar 
language represents an unconstitutional infringement on the 
President's authority as Commander in Chief and Chief 
Executive.
    The Committee also heard Professor Peter Raven-Hansen, Glen 
Earl Weston Research Professor of Law from the George 
Washington University Law School and Dr. Louis Fisher, Senior 
Specialist (Separation of Powers) from the Congressional 
Research Service testify that the President's authority in this 
area is not exclusive. Hence, these experts believed that 
Congress already has authority to regulate the collection, 
retention, and dissemination of national security information. 
[See Section III.A.3 for a more extensive discussion of these 
hearings.]
    The Committee found the latter argument to be persuasive 
and determined that the Administration's intransigence on this 
issue compelled the Committee to act.
    Following the public hearing on February 11th, the 
Committee met to markup a modified version of section 306. One 
amendment was offered by a member of the Committee and was 
adopted unanimously.
    The federal ``Whistle Blower Protection Act'' does not 
cover employees of the agencies within the Intelligence 
Community. [See 5 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 2301 et seq.] The ``whistle 
blower'' statute also expressly proscribes the disclosure of 
information that is specifically required by Executive Order to 
be kept secret in the interest of national defense or the 
conduct of foreign affairs. Therefore, employees within the 
Intelligence Community are not protected from adverse personnel 
action if they choose to disclose such information, 
irrespective of its classification, to Congress. In fact, an 
employee who discloses classified information to Congress 
without prior approval is specifically subject to sanctions 
which may include reprimand, termination of security clearance, 
suspension without pay, or removal. See Exec. Order No. 12, 
958, 60 Fed. Reg. 19825 (1995). Some types of unauthorized 
disclosures are also subject to criminal sanctions. See 18 
U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 641, 793, 794, 798, 952 (1996); 50 U.S.C. 
Sec. 783(b) (1996).
    In accordance with Executive Order No. 12, 958, classified 
information must remain under the control of the originating 
agency and may not be disseminated without proper 
authorization. Consequently, an Executive Branch employee may 
not disclose classified information to Congress without prior 
approval. In fact, employees are advised that the agency will 
provide ``access as is necessary for Congress to perform its 
legislative functions . . . . ''. ``Information Security 
Oversight Office, General Services Administration, Classified 
Information Non-disclosure Agreement (SF-312) Briefing 
Booklet,'' at 66. In other words, the executive agency will 
decide what Members of Congress may ``need to know'' to perform 
their constitutional oversight functions. The President, in 
effect, asserts that he has exclusive or plenary authority to 
oversee the regulation of national security information.
    On June 4, 1997 the Committee on Intelligence reported the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998, which 
included a provision that specifically addressed this issue. 
See S. 858, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. Sec. 306 (1997). On June 9, 
1997 the U.S. Senate passed the bill by a vote of ninety-eight 
to one.

     d. s. 2052 intelligence authorization act for fiscal year 1999

    The Committee reported S. 2052, the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, on May 7, 1998. In 
addition to providing the annual authorization for 
appropriations for intelligence activities, the bill inter 
alia:
          Extended for one additional year the President's 
        authority to delay the imposition of proliferation-
        related sanctions when necessary to protect an 
        intelligence source or method or an ongoing criminal 
        investigation;
          Extended for two additional years the Secretary of 
        Defense's authority to engage in commercial activities 
        and security for intelligence collection activities;
          Authorized the Director of Central Intelligence to 
        designate personnel to carry firearms to protect 
        current and former Agency personnel and their immediate 
        families;
          Modified the National Security Education Program to 
        include counter-proliferation studies;
          Authorized the Attorney General or a designated 
        attorney for the government to apply for court orders 
        authorizing the installation and use of a pen register 
        or trap and trace device for investigations to gather 
        foreign intelligence information or information 
        concerning international terrorism;
          Authorized the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
        Investigation or a designee to apply for court orders 
        to require common carriers, public accommodation 
        facilities, or vehicle rental facilities to release 
        certain records in their possession relating to a 
        foreign intelligence or international terrorism 
        investigation; and
          Directed that employees within the Intelligence 
        Community were made aware that they may, without prior 
        authorization, disclose certain information to 
        Congress, including classified information, that they 
        reasonably believe is specific and direct evidence of a 
        violation of law, rule, or regulation, a false 
        statement to Congress on an issue of material fact, 
        gross mismanagement or a gross waste of funds, a 
        flagrant abuse of authority, or a substantial and 
        specific danger to public health or safety.
    The full Senate passed the bill on October 8, 1998.
    Section 305 was included in the bill because the United 
States faces a qualitatively new long-term challenge to its 
national security interests with the proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems. The 
Committee espouses the view that the country should utilize 
education as an essential non-proliferation tool in support of 
the training of counter-proliferation specialists equipped to 
address this threat.
    At the present time, however, explicit program authority is 
not available to train American students adequately to confront 
the proliferation challenge. Particularly noticeable by its 
absence is government support for graduate training in the 
counter-proliferation area which includes WMD technologies and 
capabilities, missile and other delivery system technologies 
and capabilities, existing and required domestic response 
capabilities, motivations and techniques of state and 
subnational proliferations, and a careful assessment of 
existing counter-proliferation regimes.
    The National Security Education Act (NSEA) was enacted in 
1991 ``to provide the necessary resources, accountability, and 
flexibility to meet the national security education needs of 
the United States, especially as such needs change over time''. 
As drafted in 1991 the NSEA emphasized language and area 
studies. Since then, the national security needs of the country 
have in fact changed. In an effort to generate limited but 
sustained Federal support for counter-proliferation activities 
and studies, Section 305 amended the National Security 
Education Act of 1991 to (1) specify counter-proliferation 
studies as a priority area for Federal support, and (2) to 
require that the National Security Education Board established 
by the Act include the Secretary of Energy. The Committee has 
as a goal the allocation of not less than one-third of the 
amounts specified under the Act for the awarding of fellowships 
to graduate students and grants to institutions of higher 
learning in the field of counter-proliferation training and 
studies.
    In addressing the threats posed by the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction, the Committee has not only been 
supportive of the funding requests of the Intelligence 
Community in combating this threat but has also pointed the way 
toward enhanced efforts by the community in newer, 
nontraditional areas. Committee support for funding of counter-
proliferation education and training through an amended 
National Security Education Act is not only consistent with 
these efforts but can ultimately contribute to their success.
    As mentioned above, the bill contained a provision 
(Sec. 501) encouraging the disclosure of certain information to 
Congress. The provision would have allowed disclosure of such 
information to any Member or staff member of a committee of 
Congress having primary oversight responsibility for the 
department, agency, or element of the Federal Government to 
which such information relates, and reflected a modified 
version of this provision proposed in the previous year's 
conference.
    At Conference, the managers agreed instead to adopt a 
modified version of H.R. 3829, the ``Intelligence Community 
Whistle Blower Protection Act of 1998.'' This title established 
an additional process to accommodate the disclosure of 
classified information of interest to Congress. However, the 
managers agreed that H.R. 3829 was not the exclusive process by 
which an Intelligence Community employee may make a report to 
Congress. The managers agreed that the modified language 
furthered the goal of, and built on, the Senate language 
contained in S. 1668 and S. 2052, which were adopted by the 
Senate on three occasions. The managers also highlighted the 
fact that Senate action on this issue was central to the 
development of this provision and incorporated by reference the 
Senate reports on S. 1668 and S. 2052 (S. Rep. Nos. 105-165 and 
105-185, respectively) to provide legislative history and the 
need for Congressional action on this issue. [The cited Senate 
reports on this issue examines the significant constitutional 
implications of this legislation.] The managers agreed that an 
Intelligence Community employee should not be subject to 
reprisals or threat of reprisals for making a report to 
appropriate Members or staff of the intelligence committees 
about wrongdoing within the Intelligence Community.
    As also mentioned above, S. 2052 included important new 
authorities for the Federal Bureau of Investigation:
    Section 601 amended the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. Sec. 1802, et seq. (FISA), to authorize 
pen registers and trap and trace devices in foreign 
intelligence and international terrorism investigations being 
conducted by the FBI under guidelines approved by the Attorney 
General. In particular, it authorized FISA judges to issue a 
pen register or a trap and trace order upon a certification 
that the information sought is relevant to such an ongoing 
investigation.
    The amendment allows the use of pen registers and trap and 
trace devices in foreign intelligence and international 
terrorism investigations. Although such devices can be utilized 
at present, current procedures do not reflect changes in the 
law since FISA was enacted. Before the use of such a device 
today, the complete FISA predicate for actual interception of 
the oral or verbal contents on the communication itself must be 
satisfied. That predicate is designed to satisfy strict 
constitutional requirements or the conduct of a ``search'' 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. However, and 
subsequent to passage of FISA in 1978, the Supreme Court held 
in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), that accessing 
numbers dialed to contact another communications facility is 
not a Fourth Amendment ``search.'' Thus, current procedures 
impose a standard that is more rigorous than the constitution 
requires. Section 501 establishes a predicate for the use of 
pen registers or trap and trace devices that is consistent with 
the opinion and is analogous to the statutory standard for the 
use of these devices in criminal investigations. This authority 
is necessary in order to permit, as is the case in criminal 
investigations, the use of this very valuable investigative 
tool at the critical early stages of foreign intelligence and 
international terrorism investigations.
    Unlike the criminal standard, however, this section 
requires substantially more than mere ``relevance'' to an 
ongoing investigation, as required in 18 U.S.C. 
Sec. 3122(B)(2). In addition to relevancy, the government must 
also demonstrate that the telephone line involved has been, or 
is about to be, used in communication with an international 
terrorist or a person engaged in clandestine intelligence 
activities that may involve a violation of law.
    Each application must also be approved by the Attorney 
General or a designated attorney for the Government, with 
certification by the Federal Bureau of Investigation that the 
underlying investigation is being conducted under guidelines 
approved by the Attorney General. It is the Committee's 
understanding that the ``designated attorney'' for the 
Government will be the Counsel for Intelligence Policy at the 
Department of Justice. Further delegation of this authority 
should occur only after the Committee is briefed on the 
compelling need for it.
    Applications must be submitted to the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court established by FISA; however, the section 
also allows the designation of Federal magistrates to hear 
applications for and grant orders approving the installation 
and use of pen registers or trap and trace devices.
    Section 602 also amended the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA) by giving the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, in conducting foreign intelligence and 
international terrorism investigations, authority to apply for 
court orders to obtain records of common carriers, hotels, 
communications providers, and storage facilities.
    Under existing criminal law, grand jury subpoenas may be 
issued, and the Attorney General has delegated authority to 
certain Federal agencies in narcotics investigations to issue 
administrative subpoenas. No analogue to these authorities 
exist in foreign intelligence and international terrorism 
investigations. When the FBI seeks common carrier records 
relating to the clandestine activities of an agent of a foreign 
power or an international terrorist, compliance is voluntary; 
unfortunately some entities have chosen not to cooperate. This 
section requires that any or all of the four entities (common 
carrier, hotel, communications provider, and/or storage 
facility) comply with a court order based on the certification 
by the FBI that the records are sought for foreign intelligence 
purposes, and that there are specific and particular facts that 
substantiate belief that the person to whom the records pertain 
is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.
    Sections 601 and 602 also include provisions for continuing 
Congressional oversight. The Committee felt strongly that these 
provisions are necessary to insure that these new authorities 
are carefully executed.
    Section 604 amended section 2518 of title 18, United States 
Code, to allow federal judges to issue an order on the 
conversations of a specific person, rather than on the 
conversations that occur on a specific telephone.
    Under pre-existing law, judges issued wiretap orders 
authorizing law enforcement officials to place a wiretap on 
specific telephone numbers. Terrorists and spies knew this and 
often were able to avoid wiretaps by using pay telephones on 
the street at random, or by using stolen or cloned cell 
telephones. As law enforcement officials could not know the 
numbers of these telephones in advance, they were unable to 
obtain wiretap orders on these numbers from a judge in time to 
intercept the conversation, and the criminal was able to evade 
interception of his communication.
    Section 604 addressed this problem by authorizing judges to 
issue an order authorizing the interception of all 
communications made by a particular person, regardless of what 
telephone he may use. The provision does not change the 
existing law that requires law enforcement officials to 
demonstrate that there is probable cause to believe that the 
suspect has committed, or may commit, a crime. With this 
amendment, law enforcement officials will be required to 
demonstrate that there is probable cause to believe that the 
actions of the suspect could have the effect of thwarting a 
wiretap on a specific telephone were the court to order the 
more typical method of wiretap, which targets a specific 
telephone number.
    Sections 601 through 604 of S. 2052 were fully coordinated 
with the Judiciary Committee and accepted in total by the 
Conference on October 5, 1998.
    The President signed the legislation [H.R. 3694] as Public 
Law 105-272 on October 21, 1998.

        E. Ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)

    In order to assist the full Senate in its consideration of 
whether to grant its advice and consent to ratification of the 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, 
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their 
Destruction (CWC), the Committee commenced in 1994 a thorough 
review of the ability of the U.S. Intelligence Community to 
monitor compliance by states party to the CWC.
    In particular, the Committee examined issues surrounding 
the monitoring effectiveness of the U.S. Government's 
unilateral capabilities and of the CWC's onsite inspection 
regime; the interpretation and implementation of the CWC, 
including its three annexes; the counterintelligence and 
security implications of the CWC; and the implications of the 
CWC for private companies, in light of the obligations imposed 
on such companies to provide data declarations and to host 
onsite inspections.
    On September 30, 1994, after extensive hearings and review, 
the Committee published classified and unclassified reports 
entitled ``U.S. Capability to Monitor Compliance with the 
Chemical Weapons Convention.'' The report noted theIntelligence 
Community's determination that the CWC will provide another tool in the 
U.S. Government's inventory for monitoring and limiting the spread of 
chemical weapons worldwide. However, the Committee further noted that 
``[i]n general, the Intelligence Community has poor confidence in its 
ability to detect prohibited activities [i.e. production or acquisition 
of chemical weapons agents or precursors].'' The Committee ``largely 
accept[ed] the Intelligence Community's pessimistic assessment of U.S. 
capability to detect and identify a sophisticated and determined 
violation of the Convention, especially on a small scale.''
    The Committee's public report to the Senate (S. Rep. No. 
103-390) was approved by a vote of sixteen members in favor and 
none opposed. The Committee's Report was provided to the Senate 
in anticipation of immediate action on the CWC. However, no 
Senate action was taken with regard to the CWC until the first 
session of the 105th Congress.
    In the interim, a number of Members of the Committee 
continued to raise concerns about the verifiability of the 
treaty, and the Committee staff reviewed developments to 
determine whether any changes or updating of the Committee's 
1994 report were in order. They determined that its original 
findings and recommendations with respect to the ability of 
U.S. intelligence to monitor compliance by states party to the 
CWC remained substantially valid. Prior to ratification, then-
Acting CIA Director Tenet and other administration officials 
reconfirmed the Intelligence Community's earlier judgments.
    In order to address these concerns, the Committee Report to 
the Senate contained fourteen recommendations. In 
recommendations 1, 6 and 7, the Committee proposed that certain 
conditions and declarations be incorporated in the resolution 
of ratification and the CWC implementing legislation. 
Recommendations 2, 3 and 10 were put forward as the basis for 
additional declarations in the resolution of ratification. The 
great majority of the recommendations were incorporated in the 
resolution of ratification reported favorably by the Committee 
on Foreign Relations to the full Senate.
    Prior to final disposition of the Convention and the 
resolution of ratification by the full Senate in the Spring of 
1997, the Senate held a rate closed session of the body in the 
old Senate Chamber to discuss the shortcomings in the 
Intelligence Community's monitoring capabilities that had been 
identified by the Intelligence Community and the SSCI report. 
Following debate in both open and closed sessions of the body 
and after having disposed of five major amendments to the 
proposed resolution of ratification, the Senate agreed on April 
24, 1997, by a vote of 74 to 26, to provide its advice and 
consent to ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

                       III. Oversight Activities

                              a. hearings

1. National security threats to the United States

    For several years, the Committee has begun each new session 
of the Congress with an open hearing reviewing the Intelligence 
Community's assessment of the current and projected national 
security threats to the United States. The Intelligence 
Community's assessment of the national security threat to the 
U.S. plays a critical role in defining our country's foreign 
policy--and forms the foundation for our military planning. It 
is therefore essential that the Intelligence Community provide 
our nation's policymakers with the most accurate and timely 
assessment of these threats as possible. The hearings on the 
national security threats--which cover a wide range of issues--
are held in open session not only to inform the Committee, but 
to enlighten the American public about the threats facing their 
country.
    On February 5, 1997, the SSCI held an open hearing on the 
current and projected national security threats to the U.S. 
Testifying before the Committee were Acting Director of Central 
Intelligence George J. Tenet, Lt. General Patrick M. Hughes, 
USA, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and Toby 
Gati, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and 
Research (INR). On January 28, 1998, the SSCI held a similar 
hearing, and testifying before the Committee were Director of 
Central Intelligence (DCI) George J. Tenet, Lt. General Patrick 
M. Hughes, USA, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency 
(DIA), and Phyllis E. Oakley, Assistant Secretary of State for 
Intelligence and Research (INR). For the first time, the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, represented by Deputy Director 
Robert Bryant, participated in the threat hearing to address 
counterintelligence, terrorist and information warfare threats 
to our national security. On October 8, 1998, Committee Members 
met in closed session to receive a classified update briefing 
on threats to U.S. interests from Intelligence Community 
representatives.
    The transcript of the Committee's February 5, 1997 hearing, 
``Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United 
States, [S. Hrg. 105-201] andthe Committee's January 28, 1998 
hearing, ``Current and Projected National Security Threats to the 
United States'' [S. Hrg. 105-587], which includes the responses to a 
large number of questions-for-the-record (QFRs) covering a broad 
spectrum of national security issues, were printed and made available 
to the public.

2. Zona Rosa

    In June 1985, at a sidewalk cafe in the Zona Rosa district 
of San Salvador, four U.S. Marine embassy guards, two American 
citizens, and six other people were brutally murdered by 
members of a Marxist guerrilla group. During the 105th 
Congress, the Committee continued its Zona Rosa inquiry that 
began in mid-1995 after the television show ``60 Minutes'' 
claimed that the mastermind behind the murder of Americans went 
unpunished and was living in the United States. Mrs. Betty 
Malone's 12-year search for the truth about her son's death 
brought the issue to the attention of the Committee.
    The Committee was appalled to learn that Pedro Antonio 
Andrade, the alleged planner of the Zona Rosa attack, was 
paroled for three years into the United States--by the United 
States Government and with CIA funding--in June 1990. Andrade 
was paroled even after the U.S. Government--or at least some 
parts of the U.S. Government--had concluded that, though there 
was not enough evidence to successfully prosecute him in the 
United States, Andrade was probably responsible for the Zona 
Rosa murders.
    In early 1996, the Committee asked the President of the 
United States to conduct an investigation of the Zona Rosa 
affair, the actions of U.S. Government agencies with respect to 
the political and military response to the massacre, the 
subsequent investigations and prosecutions, and the 
relationship of U.S. Government agencies with the participants 
and alleged participants in the massacre. In the Fall of 1997, 
the Inspectors General of the CIA, State Department, Defense 
Department, and Justice Department issued reports on the matter 
that provided the basic factual information which the Committee 
used in its deliberations during the 105th Congress.
    As a direct result of the actions of the Committee, Andrade 
was arrested in September 1996 in the United States, where he 
had lived, undisturbed, for six years. And although Andrade 
applied for political asylum in the United States, asylum was 
denied in March of 1997 based largely on the evidence brought 
to light by the Committee. The U.S. Federal judge's decision 
was based on a preponderance of evidence indicating that 
Andrade was involved in the Zona Rosa killings. Andrade's 
appeal was also denied and he was returned to El Salvador in 
September 1997.
    The Committee held hearings in mid-1997 to consider the 
views of families and friends of the victims regarding their 
dealings with the U.S. Government. The Committee was dismayed 
to learn that at no time during the events, despite several 
requests for information, did the United States Government 
contact the families to provide further details of their sons' 
deaths, or the pursuit of their killers, or of Andrade's parole 
into the United States. In addition, the Committee heard the 
views of U.S. Government officials with respect to the entry of 
Pedro Andrade into the United States. The Committee hearings 
reviewed the information available to the decision-makers at 
the time, and the conditions under which they had to make their 
decisions, to establish the facts, determine appropriate 
accountability, and develop procedures to ensure that the 
mistakes of the past 12 years would not be repeated.
    During its hearings, Committee Members examined the balance 
between intelligence gathering and law enforcement concerns--an 
issue that continues to pose problems in counterterrorism, 
counternarcotics, and other operations today. The Committee 
explored questions such as why Pedro Andrade was admitted to 
the United States, despite all the evidence linking him to the 
killings of six Americans. Did the decision-makers have before 
them all of the information available at that time within the 
U.S. Government, and if not, why not? Why was information not 
shared between agencies? Witnesses included family members of 
the slain Marines: Mrs. Betty Malone from Northport, Alabama; 
Mrs. Brenda Whitt, Mrs. Beth Hildebrandt, and Mr. Patrick 
Kwiatkowski from Wisconsin; and Mr. John Weber from Cincinnati, 
Ohio. U.S. Government witnesses included: Mr. Richard 
Chidester, the Embassy Legal Officer from March 1989 to June 
1991; ``Bob'' (last name not revealed for security reasons), 
the CIA Chief of Station in El Salvador from June 1989 to June 
1991; Mr. Ron Ward, an FBI agent who, in July and August 1989, 
participated in the interrogation of Andrade after his arrest 
in El Salvador; Ambassador William Walker, Ambassador to El 
Salvador from August 1988 to March 1992, who approved the 
parole request; Mr. Richard Cinquegrana, CIA Deputy Inspector 
General for Investigations; Mr. Floyd Justice, Director of 
Support Programs for the Department of State Inspector General; 
and Mr. Glenn Fine, Special Investigative Counsel with the 
Justice Department's Inspector General.
    Following the hearings, the Committee produced legislation 
designed to ensure that the U.S. Government would provide 
information on violent crimes against U.S. citizens abroad to 
victims and their families. Section 307 of the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for 1998 (S. 858) designated the Secretary of 
State as the responsible individual for providing information 
on violent crimes against U.S. citizens abroad to victims and 
their families. This section included a sense of Congress that 
it would be in the national interest of the U.S. to provide 
information regarding the killing or other serious mistreatment 
of U.S. citizens abroad to the victims of such crimes, or the 
families of victims of such crimes if they are United States 
citizens.

3. Disclosures Act

    The Committee held public hearings on February 4 and 11, 
1998 to examine the constitutional implications of legislation 
such as Section 306--Encouragement of disclosures of certain 
information to Congress of the Intelligence Authorization Act 
for FY 1998, S. 858. [See Section II.B. for a discussion of 
this legislation.] The Committee heard from constitutional 
scholars and legal experts on both sides of the issue. Mr. 
Randolph D. Moss, Deputy Assistant Attorney General from the 
Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel, testified in 
support of the Administration's position that section 306 and 
any similar language represents an unconstitutional 
infringement on the President's authority as Commander-in-Chief 
and Chief Executive. Mr. Moss asserted the following:
    (a) The President, as Commander-in-Chief, Chief Executive, 
and sole organ of the Nation in its external relations has 
ultimate and unimpeded authority over the collection, 
retention, and dissemination of intelligence and other national 
security information.
    (b) Any Congressional enactment that may be interpreted to 
divest the president of his ultimate control over national 
security information is an unconstitutional usurpation of the 
exclusive authority of the Executive.
    (c) The Senate's language vests lower-ranking personnel in 
the Executive Branch with a ``right'' to furnish such 
information to a Member of Congress without prior official 
authorization from the President or his delegee. Therefore, 
section 306 and any similar provision is unconstitutional.
    The Committee also received testimony that the President's 
authority in this area is not exclusive from Professor Peter 
Raven-Hansen, Glen Earl Weston Research Professor of Law from 
the George Washington University Law School, and Dr. Louis 
Fisher, Senior Specialist (Separation of Powers) from the 
Congressional Research Service. These experts believed that 
Congress already has the authority to regulate the collection, 
retention, and dissemination of national security information. 
Professor Raven-Hansen and Dr. Fisher asserted the following:
    (a) A claim of exclusive authority must be substantiated by 
an explicit textual grant of such authority by the 
Constitution.
    (b) There is no express constitutional language regarding 
the regulation of national security information as it pertains 
to the President.
    (c) The President's authority to regulate national security 
information is an implied authority flowing from his 
responsibilities as Commander-in-Chief and Chief Executive.
    (d) As the regulation of national security information is 
implicit in the command authority of the President, it is 
equally implicit in the broad array of national security and 
foreign affairs authorities vested in the Congress by the 
Constitution. In fact, Congress has legislated extensively over 
a long period of time to require the President to provide 
information to Congress.
    (e) Congress may legislate in the area because the 
Executive and Legislative Branches share constitutional 
authority to regulate national security information.
    (f) The Supreme Court has never decided a case that 
specifically addressed this issue.
    (g) The provision is constitutional because it does not 
prevent the President from accomplishing his constitutionally 
assigned functions, and because any intrusion upon his 
authority is justified by an overriding need to promote 
objectives within the Constitutional authority of Congress.
    The Committee found the last argument to be persuasive and 
determined that the Administration's intransigence on this 
issue compelled the Committee to act.
    Following the public hearing on February 11th, the 
Committee met to mark-up a modified version of section 306. One 
amendment was offered by a member of the Committee and was 
adopted unanimously. The bill was favorably reported from the 
Committee on February 23, 1998. The Senate considered the bill 
(S. 1668) on March 9, 1998 and passed it on a roll call vote of 
93 to one. [See Section II.C.] This bill, as passed by the 
Senate was also contained in Title V of S. 2052 which was 
approved by the Committee on May 7, 1998 and ordered to be 
favorably reported. [See Section II.D. for a discussion of the 
final disposition of this legislation.]

4. Mexico and counter-narcotics

    The Committee held a closed, classified hearing on Feb. 26, 
1998 in conjunction with the Administration's release of the 
1998 U.S. International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, in 
which the President certified Mexico and certain other 
countries as being fully cooperative with the United States, or 
having taken adequate steps on its own, to achieve full 
compliance with the goals and objectives of the 1988 United 
Nations Convention Against Illicit Narcotics Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances. The Committee called witnesses from 
not only the Intelligence Community, but also from the 
diplomatic and federal law enforcement communities. These 
witnesses, in a closed setting, were able to provide 
information to Members, that would not otherwise have been 
available, describing in detail the facts leading to the 
President's decision to certify Mexico. This information 
included the most recent narcotics trafficking trends and 
patterns via Mexico into the United States. The significant 
problems associated with the resultant illicit financial flows 
were also described, showing the rapidly growing role of drug 
monies on the Mexican economy and institutions. This 
information allowed Members of the Senate to more accurately 
analyze the Administration's decision in considering a measure 
that would have decertified Mexico as being fully cooperative 
and/or adequate in its counter-narcotics efforts.

5. The biological and chemical weapons threat

    In the wake of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the 
1995 Aum Shinrikyo attack in the Tokyo subway, and most 
recently, the 1998 arrests in Las Vegas of persons suspected of 
possessing deadly anthrax agent, the Committee has been 
concerned by the proliferation of biological and chemical 
weapons, and the growing prospect of terrorist attack against 
the United States using biological or chemical agents.
    In March and April 1998, the Committee held a series of 
joint hearings with the Judiciary Subcommittee on Technology, 
Terrorism and Government Information to receive both 
unclassified and classified testimony on the biological and 
chemical threats to the United States and on the United States 
Government's strategy and capabilities to prevent or respond to 
such an attack. Witnesses included the Attorney General, the 
Director of the FBI, senior Intelligence Community officials, 
medical experts from the U.S. Army and the Centers for Disease 
Control, and expert private witnesses. In addition, Committee 
staff met with and debriefed a defector who until 1992 served 
as a senior scientist in the Soviet/Russian offensive 
biological weapons program.
    The Committee has initiated or supported a number of 
programs to enhance the Intelligence Community's capabilities 
to monitor this threat, including new legislative authorities 
in the Intelligence Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 1999 to 
collect certain kinds of critical preliminary information of 
relevance to FBI investigations into international terrorism, 
and to provide policymakers with the information and tools 
needed to support U.S. counter-proliferation and counter-
terrorism policies. The Classified Annex to the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 describes in detail the 
Committee's efforts in this regard.
    The threat of biological or chemical attack poses 
extraordinary and, in some cases, unique challenges, ranging 
from the difficulty of detecting the production of such agents 
and providing timely warning of a potential attack, to the 
consequences of a biological event, which could under certain 
circumstances be more lethal than a nuclear explosion. Of 
particular concern, from the Committee's viewpoint, are the 
ready availability and dual use nature of the materials and 
equipment used to prepare biological and chemical agents; the 
relative ease with which a small group of terrorists could 
produce such substances (compared, for example, with nuclear 
weapons); the possibility of genetic engineering to defeat 
countermeasures and increase the virulence and infectivity of 
biological agents; the threats posed by the Iraqi and Iranian 
biological weapons programs; and concerns over Russia's 
remaining offensive biological warfare program, which according 
to published reports could include biological warheads on 
ICBMs, as well as the potential for transfer of scientific 
expertise, or actual biological agents, from the Russian 
program to rogue states or terrorist groups.
    Many of the challenges cited above are intrinsic to the 
nature of biological and chemical weapons, or otherwise largely 
beyond the capacity of the U.S. Government to influence. The 
Committee is disturbed, however, by public reports of 
widespread problems and deficiencies in the U.S. Government's 
counter-terrorism strategy and capabilities, including 
intelligence programs and activities under the Committee's 
jurisdiction.

6. Covert action quarterly reviews

    Covert action funding continued to comprise only a small 
proportion of the intelligence budget throughout the 105th 
Congress. Nevertheless, the Committee continued to conduct 
rigorous oversight of covert action programs, helping to ensure 
that such programs serve an agreed foreign policy objective and 
are conducted in accordance with American laws and values.

7. China

    On September 18, 1997, the Committee undertook a series of 
periodic hearings on major regional intelligence issues with 
open and closed sessions on ``Chinese Political Developments, 
Threats to U.S. National Security, and Intelligence 
Challenges.'' In the open hearing, the Committee heard from a 
panel of distinguished experts on Chinese foreign policy and 
military strategy in the wake of the Cold War and the resulting 
threats to U.S. interests, Chinese military pursuit of the 
``Revolution in Military Affairs,'' Chinese proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction and related technologies (as well 
as advanced conventional weapons), and current and future 
political and economic developments in China.
    Witnesses for the open hearing were noted democracy 
activist Harry Wu, a research fellow at the Hoover Institute; 
Ambassador James R. Lilley, former U.S. envoy to Beijing and 
Director of Asian Studies at the American Enterprise Institute; 
Peter W. Rodman, a former senior NSC and State Department 
official who is currently Director of National Security 
Programs at the Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom; Dr. Michael 
Pillsbury, an associate fellow at the National Defense 
University and senior fellow at the Atlantic Council; and 
Professor Gary Milhollin, director of the Wisconsin Project on 
Nuclear Arms Control.
    In an afternoon closed session, the Committee heard 
detailed classified testimony from CIA, FBI, and DIA witnesses 
on intelligence collection issues, Chinese denial and deception 
operations, and Chinese intelligence activities directed at the 
United States, as well as classified Intelligence Community 
perspectives on Chinese foreign policy and military strategy, 
Chinese proliferation behavior, and Chinese political and 
economic developments.
    The Committee continues to closely monitor developments in 
China, in particular intelligence collection and analysis on 
Chinese military programs, activities, capabilities, and 
intentions, and on Chinese weapons proliferation activities.

8. Russia

    The precipitous deterioration in the political, economic 
and military fabric of the Russian state made that country's 
future an issue of utmost concern to the Committee in 1998. In 
addition to holding a number of closed briefings focusing on 
the fast-paced developments within Russia, the Committee held a 
hearing on September 16th during which the full panoply of 
national security and intelligence issues associated with these 
changes were thoroughly examined. Of chief concern to the 
Committee is Russia's export of nuclear and missile technology, 
particularly technology transfers to Iran. Related to this 
proliferation activity is the issue of nuclear security and 
surety within the Russian Federation and the vulnerability of 
the increasingly desperate military-industrial workforce to the 
influences of organized crime and the lure of employment with 
foreign states interested in obtaining weapons of mass 
destruction. The Committee also examined possible Russian 
nuclear test activities and the implication for monitoring a 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; the future size and force 
structure of Russia's strategic nuclear triad vis-a-vis the 
limitations of START II and the prospective START III; the 
sharp decline in military readiness and force modernization 
funding; the efficacy of U.S. and allied intelligence 
collection against Russia and subsequent intelligence 
assessments; the causes of the Russian economic crisis; and the 
state of democratic reforms during times of social and economic 
tumult. Given the growing uncertainty within Russia, the 
Committee believes that intelligence collection and analysis 
regarding Russia will require considerable oversight in the 
upcoming year.

9. Iraq

    At a time when Iraq remained the most vexing foreign policy 
issue facing the United States, the Committee continued its 
extensive oversight of intelligence collection and analysis in 
support of U.S. policy toward that country. Iraq figured 
prominently in the Committee's global threat hearings, and 
Committee members and staff received numerous closed briefings 
throughout the 105th Congress, including extensive briefings on 
the intelligence on Iraq missile, chemical, biological and 
nuclear programs, and on the prospects for Saddam Hussein's 
regime. In particular, a February 1998 briefing by the Director 
for Intelligence (J-2) for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Major 
General James C. King, highlighted issues associated with 
intelligence on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction sites needed 
tosupport effective U.S. military action--a problem that still 
has not been resolved. The Committee is monitoring the intelligence 
support prior to and in the wake of Operation Desert Fox.
    Reflecting broad bipartisan concern with the conduct of 
U.S. policy toward Iraq since the end of the 1991 Gulf War, the 
Committee, including Chairman Shelby and Vice Chairman Kerrey, 
played a role in Senate consideration of the Iraq Liberation 
Act of 1998 (or ``ILA''), which was signed into law by the 
President on October 31, 1998 (Public Law 105-338). The Iraq 
Liberation Act, inter alia, declared that it should be the 
policy of the United States to remove the regime headed by 
Saddam Hussein and promote the emergence of a democratic Iraq. 
To that end, the legislation authorized the drawdown of U.S. 
military stocks to provide military assistance to designated 
Iraqi democratic resistance groups. Consistent with the ILA, 
the Administration has modified its Iraq policy and stated that 
it seeks the replacement of the Saddam Hussein regime. The 
Administration has also announced its intention to designate 
seven Iraqi democratic resistance groups for U.S. assistance. 
The Committee will closely monitor the continued implementation 
of the ILA, in particular the drawdown of U.S. military stocks 
to provide aid to the designated groups.

10. Intelligence sharing with the United Nations Special Commission on 
        Iraq (UNSCOM)

    Following the successful conclusion of Operation Desert 
Storm, the United Nations Security Council established the 
United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) in order to 
implement relevant Security Council resolutions regarding the 
elimination of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. After having 
served for several years as one of UNSCOM's principal 
inspectors, Scott Ritter resigned in August 1998. Mr. Ritter 
subsequently testified before various Congressional committees 
regarding his concerns about evolving U.S. policy toward Iraq. 
Mr. Ritter, in other fora, also expressed concerns about 
certain aspects of intelligence sharing between U.S. 
intelligence agencies and UNSCOM. In addition, various press 
reports in October described some of the inner workings of 
UNSCOM, including information-sharing arrangements with certain 
foreign governments. In 1998, the Committee staff initiated a 
review of intelligence sharing between U.S. intelligence 
agencies and UNSCOM officials. That review is continuing.

11. Khobar Towers

    The Committee continues to monitor the investigation of the 
June 25, 1996 terrorist bombing of the U.S. military housing 
facility at Khobar Towers, Saudi Arabia, which killed 19 
military service personnel, and at least one Saudi civilian, 
wounded more than 200 Americans, and injured hundreds of other 
civilians. At the time, the Khobar Towers complex was home for 
the airmen of the U.S. Air Force's 4404th Fighter Wing 
(Provisional), under the operational command of U.S. Central 
Command, who were participating in the United Nations effort to 
enforce the ``no-fly'' zone in southern Iraq. The Committee 
held hearings focusing on the investigation of and follow up to 
the Khobar Towers bombing, including possible state 
sponsorship, on terrorism generally, and on intelligence 
support to law enforcement.

12. Roger E. Tamraz

    During the consideration of the nomination of Anthony Lake 
to be the Director of Central Intelligence, the Committee 
became aware of Roger E. Tamraz and his involvement with the 
White House and the Central Intelligence Agency. Mr. Tamraz, a 
Lebanese native turned U.S. citizen, was, at the time, 
attempting to negotiate an agreement to construct a 
multibillion-dollar oil pipeline from the Caspian Sea to 
Turkey. On June 2, 1995, Mr. Tamraz met with NSC officials in 
an attempt to secure the administration's endorsement, or at 
least assurances that the Clinton administration wouldn't 
oppose his plan. He received neither. In fact, NSC staff 
recommended to senior White House officials that Mr. Tamraz be 
granted no further meetings or access to the White House.
    Notwithstanding NSC staff warnings, Mr. Tamraz attended 
four additional White House events with President Clinton 
following pleas by Democratic National Committee Chairman 
Donald Fowler to White House officials to ignore NSC staff 
recommendations regarding Mr. Tamraz. Mr. Tamraz and his 
company Tamoil, Inc. contributed at least $177,000 to the 
national and state Democratic parties in 1995 and 1996.
    Of particular interest to the Committee, however, was Mr. 
Fowler's contact with CIA personnel in pursuit of a favorable 
report on Tamraz, which was subsequently provided to NSC staff 
in hopes of winning NSC support for Tamraz. Apparently, Tamraz 
told Mr. Fowler that he had cooperated with the CIA in the past 
and that the CIA would vouch for him. The Committee was 
extremely concerned that apolitical official could reach into a 
highly secret federal government agency and extract information to help 
a generous contributor. The Committee was also concerned that the CIA 
was distributing information to the NSC on an American citizen.
    On March 13, 1997, then-Acting Director of Central 
Intelligence George J. Tenet directed an Inspector General 
investigation into what appeared to be improper contacts 
between Democratic National Committee and CIA officials and 
contacts with Roger E. Tamraz. The CIA IG conducted what the 
Committee considers to be a thorough investigation. The 
Committee has endorsed its conclusions and recommendations. On 
April 2, 1998, the chairman and Vice Chairman asked the DCI to 
advise the Committee of the actions he had taken or planned to 
take to address the IG's recommendations.
    On December 16, 1998, the Executive Director of the CIA 
responded to the Chairman's and Vice Chairman's request. The 
Executive Director stated that, in early 1998, the DCI 
established a Special Accountability Board to review the 
actions and performance of the agency personnel identified in 
the IG report and to make recommendations regarding individual 
employees. The DCI reviewed the Board's report and concurred 
with their conclusions and recommendations. The Committee 
continues to examine the DCI's actions in accordance with the 
Board's review and the IG's report. The Committee will respond 
to the DCI upon completion of that review.

                           b. investigations

1. China investigation, part 1

    On June 2, 1998, the Committee unanimously approved Terms 
of Reference for two investigations into the impacts to U.S. 
national security stemming from the transfer of advanced U.S. 
satellite and related technology to the People's Republic of 
China, and reports of a covert Chinese Government program to 
influence the political process in the United States during the 
1996 election cycle.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ The investigation into Chinese efforts to influence the U.S. 
political process is described in the next China sub-section of this 
report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    With respect to satellite technology, the Committee voted 
to determine the facts and recommend policies and possible 
changes to law regarding the following questions:
          1. To what extent, from 1988 to the present, have 
        U.S. export control policies regarding the launch of 
        U.S. manufactured communications satellites on Chinese 
        launch vehicles affected U.S. national security?
                  a. Which specific Chinese launches of U.S. 
                manufactured satellites, if any, facilitated 
                the transmittal of technical knowledge to the 
                Chinese launch industry?
                  b. Did such information enable China to 
                develop more effective ballistic missiles? If 
                so, what were the resulting Chinese 
                improvements?
                  c. Was national security information 
                available prior to export policy decisions that 
                indicated that the exports could pose a threat 
                to U.S. national security?
                  d. If so, what steps were taken to 
                disseminate such information to appropriate 
                Executive Branch officials and Congressional 
                oversight Committees?
                  e. Are sufficient intelligence resources 
                dedicated to obtaining information on Chinese 
                ballistic missile developments, including the 
                potential impact of U.S. technology exports?
                  f. What are the gaps in the Intelligence 
                Community's ability to obtain such information?
                  g. What is the history of U.S. Government 
                security procedures for protecting national 
                security when U.S. manufactured satellites are 
                launched from China and are current procedures 
                adequate?
                  h. Were these procedures following during 
                each Chinese launch of a U.S. satellite?
                  i. What are the national security advantages 
                and disadvantages of launching U.S. 
                manufactured satellites on Chinese launch 
                vehicles?
    In the course of its investigation, the Committee held 10 
hearings, and heard from expert witnesses from the CIA, the 
Defense Department's Defense Technology Security Administration 
(DTSA), the Department of State, the National Air Intelligence 
Center (NAIC), the National Security Agency, and the General 
Accounting Office. Committee staff also conducted numerous 
interviews, and reviewed tens of thousands of documents 
provided by Executive Branch agencies and U.S. satellite 
manufacturers.
    The investigation of the transfer of satellite and related 
technology was prompted by press reports of a Justice 
Department criminal probe into whether Loral Space and 
Communications Ltd. and Hughes Electronics Corp. violated 
export control laws by providing to the Chinese their analysis 
of the cause of the failed launch of a Loral-built Intelsat 
satellite on a Chinese Long March rocket in February 1996. 
There was also reports that the White House had approved a 
waiver of Tiananmen Square sanctions for a subsequent Loral 
satellite launch despite Justice Department concerns of the 
possible effect of such approval on its ongoing criminal 
investigation.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ The Justice Department investigation continues today. The 
Committee's investigation is focused on the national security impact of 
technology transfer; it is not intended to duplicate the Justice 
Department's criminal investigation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Following the Loral-Hughes revelations, press reports have 
identified additional events of serious concern, including 
Hughes' transfer to China of a failure analysis of the 1995 
launch of the Hughes Apstar 2 satellite, and the absence of 
U.S. Government monitors at Chinese launches of three Hughes 
satellites in 1995-1996. Press reports also raised concerns 
that China may have developed technology applicable to Multiple 
Independently Retargetable Vehicles (MIRVs) through its 
development, to U.S. specifications, of a multiple-satellite 
``Smart Dispenser'' to place Motorola ``Iridium'' 
communications satellites in orbit.
    The export of commercial satellites for launch in China was 
first approved by the Reagan Administration in 1988, in the 
wake of the Challenger disaster, and the first launch took 
place in 1990. A number of launches took place during the Bush 
administration and during the Clinton administration.
    The Chinese rockets used as space launch vehicles to place 
satellites in orbit are virtually identical to Chinese 
ballistic missiles used to deliver nuclear warheads and other 
military payloads. There have been longstanding concerns that 
by helping the Chinese launch U.S. satellites, U.S. companies 
might--either advertently or inadvertently--provide sensitive 
know-how, information, or technology that would improve China's 
space launch systems, and that any resulting improvements could 
be transferred to Chinese military missile's systems.
    Reflecting the above concerns, export control laws were 
developed to manage the risk of technology transfer, and 
commercial satellite exports are subject to extensive security 
and monitoring requirements. These procedures do not eliminate 
the risk of some transfer of information and are not always 
followed. Moreover, concerns have been raised that changes in 
export controls, including shifting jurisdiction over such 
exports from the Department of State to the Department of 
Commerce, have resulted in increased risk of technology 
transfer. Jurisdiction over commercial satellites lacking 
certain ``militarily significant'' characteristics was first 
transferred from the State Department to the Commerce 
Department in 1992; jurisdiction over the remaining satellites 
was transferred to Commerce in 1996. Following hearings by the 
SSCI and other committees, the fiscal year 1999 Defense 
Authorization Act returned all such satellites to State 
Department jurisdiction.
    The Committee's investigations are continuing, and are 
expected to be completed in February 1999.

2. China investigation, part 2

    On June 2, 1998 the Committee authorized an investigation 
into the allegations that the People's Republic of China (PRC) 
Government had covertly influenced the 1996 U.S. election 
cycle. The investigation was in part prompted by press reports 
of PRC influence in the 1996 election cycle and in part by 
earlier closed hearings held by the Committee into whether and 
how information about these activities had been collected and 
reported in the executive branch. Specifically, the Committee 
adopted the following language as its ``Terms of Reference'' 
for the investigation:

          Is there intelligence information that substantiates 
        the allegation that the Chinese Government undertook a 
        covert program to influence the political process in 
        the United States through political donations, and 
        other means, during the 1996 election cycle?
          a. When was any such information obtained, and what 
        steps were taken to disseminate it to appropriate 
        Executive Branch officials and Congressional oversight 
        Committees?
          b. Does information exist that indicates the Chinese 
        covert effort is continuing today?
          c. Does a covert effort to influence the U.S. 
        political process represent a threat to U.S. national 
        security?
          d. In what ways does a covert effort to influence the 
        U.S. political process differ from other types of 
        international influences on elections?
          e. Are sufficient intelligence resources dedicated to 
        obtaining information on Chinese, or other foreign, 
        covert influences on the U.S. political process?
          f. What are the gaps in the Intelligence Community's 
        ability to obtain such information?

    As of the date of this report, the investigation is 
continuing. The Committee has held formal hearings and taken 
the testimony of key witnesses from the CIA, FBI and other 
intelligence agencies. In addition, Committee staff have 
interviewed witnesses and read hundreds of documents that are 
relevant to the investigation.

                          c. community issues

1. Indian nuclear tests and the Jeremiah Panel

    On May 11 and 13, 1998, the Intelligence Community was 
taken by surprise when India conducted a number of nuclear 
tests. In response to concerns expressed by the Chairman and 
Vice Chairman, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) 
reported in testimony before the SSCI on May 14, 1998 that he 
had asked Retired Admiral David Jeremiah to examine the quality 
and quantity of intelligence reporting and analysis on the 
Indian nuclear tests. Admiral Jeremiah sought to evaluate the 
Intelligence Community's performance, to examine the decisions 
the Intelligence Community made, and to suggest whether and how 
improvements should be implemented.
    On June 2, 1998, the Committee held a closed hearing to 
review the findings of the Jeremiah Panel, which identified 
numerous analytical and collection failures, and DCI Tenet's 
response to those findings. At the request of the Committee, 
the DCI provided an unclassified summary of the recommendations 
of the Jeremiah Report on June 22, 1998. The recommendations 
fall under the following categories: Analytic Assumptions and 
Tradecraft; Collection Management and Tasking; Manning and 
Training; and, Organizing and Integrating the Intelligence 
Community.
    Subsequent to the Jeremiah Report's recommendations, the 
DCI complied with the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1997 
and filled the positions of Assistant Director of Central 
Intelligence (ADCI) for both Collection, and Analysis and 
Production. The DCI appointed John Gannon, Chairman of the 
National Intelligence Council, as the ADCI for Analysis and 
Production, and Charlie Allen, Chairman of the National 
Intelligence Collection Board, as the ADCI for Collection. The 
DCI further directed specific steps to be taken to address the 
other recommendations of the Jeremiah Panel. The Committee 
believes that these positions will have a significant impact on 
the overall organization and effectiveness of the Intelligence 
Community and its ability to redress several of the serious 
shortfalls and weaknesses in the Intelligence Community 
consistent with the recommendations made by the Jeremiah Panel. 
The Committee looks forward to Presidential appointment and 
Senate confirmation of these ADCI positions in full compliance 
with the provisions of the law.

2. The ballistic missile threat and the Rumsfeld Commission

    On July 29, 1998, the Committee met to hear the testimony 
of the Rumsfeld Commission chaired by former Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld. The bipartisan Rumsfeld Commission was 
established by Congress in the wake of a controversial National 
Intelligence Estimate on Ballistic Missile Threats that was 
completed in November 1995. That estimate concluded ``that in 
the next 15 years, no country other than the declared major 
nuclear powers will develop a ballistic missile that could 
threaten the contiguous 48 states or Canada.''
    Subsequently, that estimate was criticized by many 
observers. For example, the General Accounting Office concluded 
that the estimate overstated the certainty of its conclusions, 
contained analytical shortcomings, and did not explicitly 
identify its critical assumptions. In addition, a panel headed 
by former DCI Robert Gates reported that the estimate, although 
not politicized, was politically naive and that its failure to 
include Alaska and Hawaii was foolish from every possible 
perspective.
    A new estimate in the form of an annual report to Congress 
on foreign missile developments likewise addresses the emerging 
missile threat. The Committee received that report in March 
1998. However, while this estimate was viewed as an improvement 
over NIE-95-19, the conclusions contained in that report and 
the Rumsfeld Commission's current assessment differ.
    The Rumsfeld Commission, in addition to its review of ``the 
potential of existing and emerging powers to pose a ballistic 
missile threat to the United States and to arm ballistic 
missiles with weapons of mass destruction'', reviewed U.S. 
collection and analysis capabilities to assess the ability of 
the Intelligence Community to warn of the ballistic missile 
threat.
    The Commission unanimously concluded that first, the threat 
to the U.S. posed by emerging capabilities is broader, more 
mature and evolving more rapidly than has been reported in 
estimates and reports by the Intelligence Community and 
secondly, that the Intelligence Community's ability to provide 
timely and accurate estimates of ballistic missile threats to 
the U.S. is eroding and that this erosion has roots both within 
and outside the intelligence process itself.
    The Committee supports the report's central conclusion that 
the ability of U.S. intelligence to provide timely warning of 
missile threats is eroding and believes that the Commission's 
exhaustive report represents a valuable input to the on-going 
debate on the threat posed by ballistic missiles to U.S. 
national security interests and the proper structure and 
direction of the U.S. Intelligence Community for the 21st 
Century. The Committee has sought to direct the Community's 
efforts in ways that may enable it to minimize the type of 
proliferation surprise that may come more frequently in the 
future if the Community is unable to assess the threats facing 
the United States in the coming decade.

3. Proliferation threats

    The proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical 
weapons and their means of delivery remains a central threat to 
U.S. national security. The Committee undertook a significant 
effort to better understand the scope and direction of 
proliferation trends, to enhance dialogue with the Intelligence 
Community on proliferation topics, to assess and strengthen the 
Intelligence Community's ability to monitor and respond to 
proliferation threats, and to inform the rest of the Senate on 
key proliferation topics.
    The Committee held hearings on a number of proliferation 
topics in addition to the world threats hearings, which also 
addressed proliferation concerns. These included hearings on 
the Indian nuclear tests and the North Korean launch of the 
Taepo Dong I, a launch vehicle that displayed some of the 
capabilities of an intercontinental range ballistic missile. 
The Committee received numerous briefings and reviewed numerous 
Intelligence Community products addressing proliferation from 
both the supply and demand sites of the proliferation equation, 
and established a regular monthly series of briefings on 
proliferation topics in addition to frequent special briefings 
on topics of concern. These briefings have provided a valuable 
channel for regular communication with the Intelligence 
Community on topics of concern, and because appropriately 
cleared staff from other committees are regularly invited, have 
also offered an opportunity to increase the overall level of 
awareness of proliferation topics.

4. Arms control

    In May 1997, the Senate approved the ratification of the 
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). As part of Senate 
consideration, Chairman Shelby and Vice Chairman Kerrey managed 
a historic closed debate of the Senate on verification and 
compliance aspects of the CWC treaty. The Senate relied on 
findings contained in SSCI classified and unclassified reports 
which were prepared in the 103rd Congress.
    The Committee also held staff briefings on possible Russian 
nuclear test activities, and the implications for monitoring a 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
    On other arms control issues, during the 105th Congress, 
the Chairman and Vice Chairman joined together in a letter to 
the Secretary of State to highlight the importance they attach 
to the verifiability and monitoring of arms control agreements. 
They urged the Secretary of State to ensure that the 
verifiability and compliance reports be completed by a Senate 
confirmed individual. The Committee will follow with interest 
the merger of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency into 
the State Department to ensure that the Committee's concerns 
are addressed.
    The Committee also sought to increase its oversight into 
the implementation of existing arms control agreements, 
including the START and INF Treaties.

5. Embassy bombings in Africa and the U.S. response

    On August 7, terrorists bombed the U.S. Embassies in 
Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. On August 20, 
retaliatory and preemptive missile strikes were launched 
against training bases in Afghanistan used by groups affiliated 
with radical extremist and terrorist financier Usama Bin Ladin, 
identified by U.S. and foreign intelligence services as 
responsible for the bombings. A pharmaceutical company in 
Sudan, identified by U.S. intelligence as a chemical weapons 
facility in which Bin Ladin is reported to have a financial 
interests, was also struck. President Clinton also signed an 
executive order freezing assets owned by BinLadin, specific 
associates, and their self-proclaimed Islamic Army Organization, and 
prohibiting U.S. individuals and firms from doing business with them.
    In addition to numerous staff briefings, on September 2, 
1998, the Committee held a closed hearing to review the 
intelligence aspects of the U.S. Embassy bombings in Africa and 
the U.S. response. The Committee is continuing its review of 
the Intelligence Community's performance, including 
intelligence warnings of the terrorist bombings, and the 
intelligence supporting the U.S. military response.

6. Intelligence implications of NATO enlargement

    In 1998, the full Senate considered modifications to the 
North Atlantic Treaty in order to accommodate the membership of 
Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. A resolution of 
ratification to accompany the new Protocols of that treaty was 
reported out of the Committee on Foreign Relations on March 3, 
1998.
    At the direction of the Chairman and Vice Chairman, the 
staff of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence prepared a 
report in clssified and unclassified form to support the 
ratification process by providing the Committee on Foreign 
Relations and the full Senate its assessment of the 
intelligence and counterintelligence implications of the 
admission of these former Warsaw Pact adversaries into the NATO 
intelligence structure.
    In preparation for the Senate vote on advice and consent to 
ratification of a modified North Atlantic Treaty, committee 
staff held numerous briefings with U.S. and NATO intelligence 
officials and reviewed documents prepared by the intelligence 
Community on the intelligence and counterintelligence 
implications of NATO enlargement. Finally, the Committee 
required the Executive Branch to provide a formal report on the 
intelligence and counterintelligence ramifications of NATO 
expansion. Committee staff also met with members of the 
Alliance's Interagency Working Group on NATO Enlargement to 
discuss integration efforts in the intelligence field. Finally, 
Committee members and staff traveled to the national capitals 
of the three aspiring members and a more detailed knowledge of 
how the civilian and military services of those countries 
operate, and whether adequate procedures were in place for the 
sharing of sensitive information with current NATO members.
    The Committee identified certain counterintelligence risks 
arising from the admission of the new members, but concluded 
that the intelligence relationships with Poland, Hungary, and 
the Czech Republic will be, on balance, a net plus for U.S. and 
NATO interests.
    Consistent with and as a consequence of its findings, the 
Committee proposed a condition to the resolution of 
ratification of the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty. The 
purpose of the condition was to chart the progress that the 
three aspiring members were making in adopting NATO practices 
and regulations as standard operating procedures in their own 
intelligence services as well as to encourage all NATO members 
to enhance their measures for protecting intelligence sources 
and methods. To that end, the condition required the President 
or the Director of Central Intelligence to provide the 
appropriate committees of Congress with various reports on 
these efforts, two before and one after formal accession of 
these countries to the Alliance. That proposed condition was 
accepted unanimously by the full Senate.

7. Assistant Directors of Central Intelligence

    The Committee continued its efforts to develp more 
effective management of Intelligence Community. During the 
second session of the 105th Congress, the Director of Central 
Intelligence appointed an interim Assistanct Director of 
Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production. During the 
short period in which the two positions have been filled, the 
Committee has found both appointments to have fulfilled a much-
needed function in assisting the DCI in the management of the 
Intelligence Community. There are now clear lines of 
responsibility for intelligence collection and for intelligence 
production providing expertise and insights for both the 
Committee and to the Intelligence Community. Just prior to 
adjournment of the 105th Congress, the President submitted to 
the Senate his nomination for the Assistant Director of Central 
Intelligence for Administration. The Senate adjourned before 
the Committee could conduct hearings and provide a 
recommendation to the Senate on this latter nomination. The 
Committee looks forward to Presidential appointment and Senate 
confirmation of all ADCI's in full compliance with the law.

8. Oversight of Intelligence Community Inspectors General

    During the 105th Congress, the Committee continued to 
closely monitor the activities of the Inspectors General (IGs) 
of the Intelligence Community. This oversight included: review 
of over a hundred IG products, to include audit 
reports,inspection reports, reports of investigation, and semi-annual 
reports of IG activities; numerous visits to IG offices for updates on 
plans and procedures; and attendance at several IG conferences and NSA 
IG Day. In addition to a variety of hearings focused on issues reviewed 
by the Intelligence Community IGs, the Committee arranged a number of 
briefings with community program and IG personnel in order to follow up 
on the status of IG recommendations. Examples include NRO financial 
practices, employee grievances, lease and sale of real property, 
contracting procedures, employee recruitment and security processing, 
and effective use of resources on new technology.
    During the 105th Congress, the Committee also continued its 
efforts to monitor the operations of the Intelligence Community 
Offices of Inspector General. The most significant product in 
this area was a formal review of the operations of CIA's Office 
of Inspector General. The objective of the SSCI's review was to 
gain further details on the operations of the three IG staffs 
(Audit, Inspection, and Investigation). Particular emphasis was 
placed on the Investigations Staff because it had changed the 
most since the IG was statutorily authorized in 1990. The 
review focused on both the policies and procedures of the IG 
office as a whole and those of the individual staffs.
    The review found that CIA IG had taken many steps toward 
improvement in the years since Congress made it statutory. 
Examples noted included: better training for inspectors and 
investigators; improved follow up on IG recommendations; 
strengthened quality controls; additional staff to meet an 
increased work load; and creation of an IG Counsel team.
    These changes resulted in CIA IG reports being widely 
viewed as quality products that address the issues at hand with 
the proper amount of analysis, criticism, and independence. In 
addition, the office has increased the level of trust and 
respect from within the Agency, the oversight committees, and 
the Intelligence Community. During the review, several areas 
were noted where improvements could be made to further increase 
the effectiveness and stature of the office. These included 
better definition of the auditable/inspectable universe, and 
formalizing a number of IG policies. These matters have already 
been addressed by CIA IG.
    Another significant Committee accomplishment during the 
105th Congress was the confirmation of the second statutory 
Inspector General at the Central Intelligence Agency on July 
14, 1998. Also during this Congress, the Committee included 
language within the 1998 Authorization Act that provided CIA IG 
with subpoena powers held by all other statutory IGs.
    Finally, the 1998 Intelligence Authorization Act included 
language that doubled the size of the NRO IG in order to allow 
that office to more effectively oversee NRO programs and 
activities. The Committee also closely monitored the progress 
of the joint CIA and DOD IG review of the NRO IG office. While 
the review has remained in the draft stage for some time, the 
NRO has already acted on the majority of the review's findings, 
and a new NRO IG has been named. DOD IG is currently conducting 
a similar evaluation of DIA IG, and the results of that review 
will be assessed by the Committee's Audit Team.

9. Release of JFK documents

    Public Law 102-526, the ``President John F. Kennedy 
Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992,'' mandated the 
disclosure of records relevant to the assassination of 
President John F. Kennedy.
    In the spring of 1993, the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence inventoried the original records of the Church 
Committee (some 450 boxes) and identified 175 archived boxes of 
material as having possible relevance to the assassination. A 
page by page review by Committee staff was conducted and 
resulted in the identification of over 34,000 pages of relevant 
material.
    Coincident with the document identification and cataloging 
process, agencies with equities in these documents were invited 
by the Committee to conduct a security review of the 34,000 
pages. Most of the documents were declassified and are 
available to the public through the National Archives and 
Records Administration (NARA). The Committee transmitted all 
declassified and redacted documents directly to the NARA. In 
addition, twelve volumes of classified documents were 
transmitted to the President's Review Board on November 25, 
1997, for final disposition.
    Moreover, in 1997 the Review Board wrote to the Committee 
and identified additional missing testimony directly relevant 
to the Church Committee's investigation of the assassination of 
President John F. Kennedy, as well as testimony regarding 
alleged CIA assassination plots against foreign leaders. The 
Committee staff forwarded the specific transcripts that had 
been identified by the Review Board and the NARA throughout 
1997-98. The Committee staff furtheridentified and produced 
scores of microfilmed copies of the requested transcripts. This 
testimony was processed and placed into the JFK Collection.
    To ensure that the Committee was in total compliance with 
the JFK Act, the entire collection of Church Committee records 
were made available to the Review Board staff to verify that 
the Church Committee files did not contain any additional 
documents relative to their inquiry. On August 5, 1998, the 
Review Board staff completed their review of the Church 
Committee's files. The Review Board determined that there were 
no additional records relating to the assassination of 
President John F. Kennedy and that the Review Board was 
satisfied that the Committee had completed its obligation under 
the Act. In conclusion, the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence turned over more than 60,000 records relating to 
the assassination of President John F. Kennedy that are now 
available to the public through the National Archives and 
Records Administration.

10. Security automation

    The Committee replaced its expensive, decade-old local area 
network (LAN) and is creating a fully automated LAN to provide 
Members and appropriately cleared Committee staff access to the 
Nation's most sensitive intelligence information. Because 
multi-level security is an unrealized goal in the field of 
automation, the Committee has taken unusual and creative steps 
to provide unprecedented access to information while at the 
same time compartmenting information based on an absolute 
``need-to-know.'' Both the Senate Rules Committee and the 
Senate Computer Center have been especially helpful in ensuring 
the Committee's unique and extremely sensitive requirements are 
being fully met. The project should be completed early in the 
106th Congress.

11. PolicyNet update

    In the Fiscal Year 1995 Intelligence Authorization Act, 
funds were set aside for the establishment of a secure computer 
network, referred to as PolicyNet, with CIA designated as the 
executive agent, to connect the Intelligence Community with the 
Legislative Branch to provide timely notification and access to 
intelligence products generated by the Executive Branch.
    Since its inception, the Committee staff have worked 
closely with representatives of the Intelligence Community to 
enhance and fine tune the capabilities of this computer network 
and to provide the Legislative Branch with ``on-line'' access 
to Intelligence Community products.
    PolicyNet is the CIA's Automated Information System that 
provides classified intelligence products, maps, charts, video, 
imagery, etc. to the Congress and selected Executive Branch 
agencies involved with intelligence collection, analysis, and 
dissemination. In addition, the network's secure video 
conferencing feature provides the DCI, as well as other senior 
intelligence officials, with the ability to communicate ``face-
to-face'' with members of the Intelligence Committee on 
extremely sensitive issues of national importance. This feature 
also provides for timely briefings of sensitive late breaking 
events in areas of importance.
    PolicyNet provides the Intelligence Committee members and 
staff with a vehicle that greatly assists the Committee's 
oversight responsibilities by providing timely intelligence in 
``near real-time'' rather than requiring them to wade through 
thousands of pages of paper documents. The secure video 
conferencing benefits the Congressional oversight committees, 
as well as the Intelligence Community, by providing a 
capability to brief both the House and Senate on sensitive 
intelligence matters rather than briefing each Committee 
separately.
    The Committee has greatly benefitted from the resources 
that the Intelligence Community has made available on PolicyNet 
through direct ``on-line'' access. The most precious resource 
of any organization is information and the ability to retrieve 
it quickly. PolicyNet's around the clock accessibility is key 
to providing members and staff with timely notification and 
access to intelligence products.
    Moreover, the funds authorized also provided connectivity 
to the Office of Senate Security for non-Committee members and 
their appropriately cleared staff to have greater access to 
intelligence related material on a variety of issues.

12. SSCI web page [www.senate.gov/committee/intelligence.html]

    The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) web site 
[www.senate.gov/committee/intelligence.html] was established in 
1998 in response to increased constituent and Intelligence 
Community demand for information regarding scheduled Committee 
hearings, press releases, Committee publications, and 
legislation.
    The SSCI web site serves as a means to publicize 
information derived from unclassified proceedings, pursuant to 
the restrictions of S. Res. 400 and Committee rules for 
dissemination of certain categories of information. The site 
also serves as a means by which our current leadership and 
membership is displayed.
    Visitors to the SSCI web site will find an array of images, 
graphics, and animation, as well as an outline as follows: The 
Home Page; Committee Members Page; Jurisdiction Page; 
Legislation Page; Hearings Page; Press Releases Page; 
Publications Page; Intelligence Laws Page; and the Other Links 
Page.
    The Home Page.--Displays welcome information, the address 
and telephone number for the Committee, photos of current 
Committee Chairman and Vice Chairman, with links to their 
perspective U.S. Senate personal office web site.
    Committee Members Page.--Displays a list of current 
Committee members, including the Committee Chairman and Vice 
Chairman, as well as the Ex-Officio members, Senator Trent Lott 
(R--Mississippi), and Senator Thomas A. Daschle (D--South 
Dakota). There is a link to the U.S. Senate personal office web 
site of each respective member listed.
    Jurisdiction Page.--This page contains S. Res. 400 and the 
Rules of Procedure by which the Committee Members and staff 
must comply.
    Legislation Page.--All Committee-sponsored legislation is 
posted here, including the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 1999.
    Hearings Page.--Lists all open hearings of the SSCI, 
beginning in the 105th Congress through the current date, 
posted individually and listed in reverse chronological order. 
Upon clicking a posted hearing link, the visitor goes to a 
separate web page that list the names of the witnesses in 
attendance at the respective hearing. If the witness(s) 
provides a statement, it will be posted. Transcripts for the 
respective hearings will be available either as an attachment 
or via a link to another source.
    Press Releases Page.--All SSCI press releases commencing in 
the 105th Congress through to the current date, posted in 
reverse chronological order.
    Publications Page.--All SSCI publications commencing in the 
105th Congress through to the current date, posted in reverse 
chronological order.
    Intelligence Laws Page.--This page lists all of the 
intelligence-related laws, statutes, and executive orders that 
are under the jurisdiction of the SSCI or that are of interest 
to the Intelligence Committee.
    Other Links Page.--This page provides a link to other web 
sites external to the SSCI web site, that pertain to 
intelligence-related matters.

                               d. audits

    The Committee's Audit Staff was created in 1988 to provide 
``a credible independent arm for Committee review of covert 
action programs and other specific Intelligence Community 
functions and issues.'' During the 105th Congress the Audit 
Team consisted of three full-time auditors, with support 
provided by other staff on an as needed basis. The team led or 
provided significant support to the Committee's review of a 
number of administrative and operational issues relating to the 
agencies of the Intelligence Community. In addition, the Audit 
Staff completed four in-depth reviews of specific intelligence 
programs or issues. These reviews included the following:

1. Major Systems Acquisition Program of the National Reconnaissance 
        Office (NRO)

    The audit team conducted a thorough review of the NRO's 
financial management, contract administration, and program 
oversight practices for a major satellite system. The final 
report noted both strengths and weaknesses in the financial 
management of the program and contained recommendations to 
improve the NRO's acquisition management practices.

2. The Intelligence Community's use of cover to protect operations

    Cover became a significant concern in February 1995, when 
the Committee received notification from the Central 
Intelligence Agency that the French Interior Minister had 
delivered a demarche to the U.S. Ambassador to France regarding 
U.S. intelligence activities in France. The audit was conducted 
to determine whether cover problems, such as those which 
occurred in Paris, were unique or represented a systemic 
weakness within the Intelligence Community. The audit uncovered 
a number of significant issues, and the report included short 
term recommendations to correct immediate problems, as well as 
long-term solutions. Long-term solutions require more 
operational planning, and investment in researchand development 
of new intelligence collection methods to be successfully deployed in 
the technically challenging environment of the future.

3. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)

    1998 marked the 20th anniversary of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). FISA established 
comprehensive legal standards and procedures for the use of 
electronic surveillance to collect foreign intelligence and 
counterintelligence within the United States. In 1994, FISA was 
expanded to include physical search authority. The objective of 
the SSCI staff audit was to follow up on preliminary work 
initiated during the 104th Congress by conducting the 
Committee's first comprehensive review of the FISA process 
since 1984. The audit covered each of the categories of FISA 
collection identified in the Act, but focused most closely on 
policies for approving, implementing, and managing FISA 
operations. In addition, the procedures of the Department of 
Justice's Office of Intelligence Policy Review and the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court were considered. The audit 
found that FISA legal review and approval procedures are 
appropriately rigorous, effective, and consistent with the law. 
The report makes recommendations to enhance certain FISA 
procedures, ensure the continued utility of FISA authorities, 
and standardize Committee oversight.
    In addition to these efforts, the Audit Team initiated a 
review of CIA's contracting procedures and participated in the 
Committee's China investigation by conducting a review of the 
Intelligence Community's collection and analysis capabilities 
against this target.

               e. technical advisory group (tag) reports

1. The future of signals intelligence (SIGINT)

    The Committee appointed a panel of experts knowledgeable in 
a wide range of technologies to advise the Committee on 
challenging and compelling technical issues that face the 
Intelligence Community. This group, the Technical Advisory 
Group (TAG), was formed into two Panels--one to focus on Human 
Intelligence (HUMINT) issues and challenges, and the second to 
address Signals Intelligence (SIGINT).
    The Committee asked the SIGINT Panel to provide an 
assessment of the ``Future of SIGINT'', looking toward the 21st 
Century where global communications networks will dominate. The 
Panel began by reviewing a ``cryptologic architecture'' which 
was the product of a Community-wide effort to create a 
framework for the future, and was led by NSA. From this 
document the Panel identified a number of issues to research in 
greater depth. Based on their research, the SIGINT Panel made 
many recommendations, both evolutionary and revolutionary, to 
the Committee. Some of the Panel's key findings:
         NSA's core mission is an essential national 
        capability, and must be dramatically rejuvenated. NSA 
        must move aggressively in a number of areas (e.g., 
        modernization) to preserve their key role in the 
        Intelligence Community.
         Declining budgets and obsolete equipment are impeding 
        NSA's ability to maintain their technical edge.
         Advanced research and development must receive greater 
        emphasis and more funding. The Panel suggested that 
        significant investment should be made in basic research 
        projects--high risk but potentially extraordinary 
        payoff.
         NSA must revitalize and modernize recruiting and 
        hiring techniques.
         NSA's general organizational structure is not 
        maximized to meet today's challenges. More 
        administrative and support tasks should be contracted, 
        as well as many information services. The TAG suggested 
        distributing budget and authority to those with the 
        problems being worked, and developing more effective 
        metrics.
    NSA has initiated several actions in response to the 
recommendations of the TAG. Many of these actions require a 
significant infusion of funds, some of which were provided by 
Congress in fiscal year 1999. Many of the projects, 
particularly the Information Technology modernization efforts, 
will require sustained effort before the goals can be 
accomplished. The Committee will continue to closely monitor 
NSA's efforts to modernize.

2. The future of human intelligence (HUMINT)

    In 1997, as part of its efforts to gain a better 
understanding of the technology issues facing the Intelligence 
Community, the Committee also established a Technical Advisory 
Group (TAG) to examine human intelligence (HUMINT) gathering 
capabilities and plans of the CIA's Directorate of Operations 
(DO). Comprised of prominent scientists and former high-ranking 
intelligence community officials with extensive expertise in 
technical matters, the TAGexamined how the Directorate of 
Operations could effectively leverage the explosion in information 
technologies.
    The HUMINT TAG made several observations and 
recommendations. Among them:
          Clandestine operations are an absolutely essential 
        element of national security and will play an 
        increasingly important role in a complex future world 
        posing significant new threats to our national 
        security;
          A HUMINT vision and plan must recognize and place 
        proper emphasis on the threats as well as the 
        opportunities brought about by the accelerating pace of 
        technological innovation in a world dominated by 
        information technology;
          Of paramount concern are threats from both national 
        and transnational groups populated by a diverse 
        collection of cultures and armed with high technology; 
        and
          Future U.S. clandestine operations can yield the 
        required quantity and quality of foreign intelligence 
        only with a well-constructed vision of the future and 
        an executable, affordable plan for meeting these future 
        challenges.
    In response to the TAG's recommendations, the CIA made key 
changes in an effort to more effectively take advantage of 
opportunities provided by technological innovation. As in the 
case of NSA, the committee will closely monitor the DO's 
efforts to make better use of technological innovations.

                           IV. Confirmations

                           a. george j. tenet

    On December 15, 1996, John M. Deutch resigned as Director 
of Central Intelligence (DCI). Twenty-four days later the 
President of the United States nominated William Anthony 
Kirsopp Lake to replace Dr. Deutch. The Committee held public 
hearings on March 11-13, 1997 to consider Mr. Lake's 
nomination. Before the Committee had an opportunity to vote on 
Mr. Lake's nomination, however the President withdrew Mr. 
Lake's nomination and in the alternative nominated George J. 
Tenet.
    On May 6, 1997, the Committee held a public hearing on Mr. 
Tenet's nomination. Mr Tenet had served as Deputy Director of 
Central Intelligence for approximately one year at the time of 
his nomination to be DCI. He had previously served as Special 
Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Intelligence 
Programs at the National Security Council. He also served on 
President Clinton's national security transition team following 
almost four years as Staff Director for the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence. Mr. Tenet holds a BSFS from the 
School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and an MIA 
from the School of International Affairs at Columbia 
University.
    On July 10, 1997, the Committee favorably reported Mr. 
Tenet's nomination to the Senate by a vote of 19-0. The Senate 
approved his nomination in executive session on July 10, 1997.

               b. lieutenant general john a. gordon, usaf

    On October 1, 1997, the Committee held a public hearing on 
the nomination of Lieutenant General John A. Gordon, USAF to be 
the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. General Gordon was 
serving as Associate Director of Central Intelligence for 
Military Support at the time of his nomination. General Gordon 
previously served as Special Assistant to the Air Force Chief 
of Staff for Long Range Planning and also served as the 
Director of Operations for the Air Force Space Command after 
having worked on the National Security Council staff 
specializing in defense and arms control, including the START 
II negotiations. General Gordon holds a BS with honors in 
physics from the University of Missouri, an MS from the Naval 
Postgraduate School, and an MA in business administration from 
the Highlands University.
    On October 8, 1997, the Committee favorably reported Lt. 
General Gordon's nomination to the Senate by a vote of 19-0. 
The Senate approved his nomination in executive session on 
October 27, 1997.

                           c. joan a. dempsey

    On May 21, 1998, the Committee held a public hearing on the 
nomination of Joan A. Dempsey to be the first Deputy Director 
of Central Intelligence for Community management (DDCI/CM). The 
DDCI/CM position was created by the Intelligence Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 1997 as a part of the Committee'songoing 
Intelligence Community reform efforts. The DDCI/CM is intended to be 
the principal manager of the various components of the Intelligence 
Community.
    Ms. Dempsey was serving as Chief of Staff for the Director 
of Central Intelligence at the time of her nomination. Ms. 
Dempsey previously served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Intelligence and Security and Acting Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and 
Intelligence. She also served as the Director of the National 
Military Intelligence Production Center, Director of the 
Military Intelligence Staff, and the Deputy Director of the 
General Defense Intelligence Program Staff. Ms. Dempsey holds a 
BA from Southern Arkansas University and an MPA from the 
University of Arkansas.
    On May 22, 1998, the Committee favorably reported Ms. 
Dempsey's nomination to the Senate by a vote of 19-0. The 
Senate approved her nomination in executive session on that 
same day.

                      D. Robert M. Mc Namara, Jr.

    The Committee attempted to create a confirmable General 
Counsel position in the Fiscal Year 1994 and 1995 Intelligence 
Authorization Bills, but was unable to reach agreement in 
conference with the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
of the House of Representatives. In 1996, however, a consensus 
was reached and on October 11, 1996, the President signed into 
law the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 
(P.L. 104-293). Section 813 of that Act established the 
statutory position of General Counsel for the Central 
Intellengence Agency. Until the enactment of P.L. 104-293, all 
elements of the Intelligence Community, save for the CIA, were 
within departments served by a statutory General Counsel 
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The 
Committee firmly believed and still believes that the 
confirmation process enhances accountability to Congress while 
raising the prestige of the individual occupying the position.
    On October 31, 1997, the President nominated Robert M. 
McNamara, Jr. to be the first General Counsel of the Central 
Intelligence Agency confirmed by the Senate. Mr. McNamara was 
serving as Assistant General Counsel for Enforcement at the 
U.S. Department of the Treasury at the time of his nomination. 
Mr. McNamara previously served as General Counsel of the Peace 
Crops, Assistant Director of Enforcement at the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission, Assistant Majority Counsel of the 
U.S. Senate Watergate Committee, and as an Assistant United 
States Attorney. Mr. McNamara holds a BA from Mount Carmel 
College, an AB from John Caroll University, and a JD from 
Georgetown University.
    On November 7, 1997, the Committee favorably reported by 
Mr. McNamara's nomination to the Senate by a vote of 19-0. The 
Senate approved his nomination in executive session on November 
8, 1997.

                           E. L. Britt Snider

    On July 8, 1998, the Committee held a public hearing on the 
nomination of L. Britt Snider to be Inspector General of the 
Central Intelligence Agency. Mr. Snider was serving as Special 
Counsel to the Director of Central Intelligence at the time of 
his nomination. He previously served as Staff Director for the 
Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the Intelligence 
Community, General Counsel for the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence, Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 
Policy (Counterintelligence and Security), Counsel of the 
Select Committee on Intelligence (the Church Committee), and 
Counsel to the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, Committee 
on the Judiciary of the U.S. Senate. Mr. Snider holds a BA from 
Davidson College and a JD from the University of Virginia 
School of Law.
    On July 14, 1998, the Committee favorably reported Mr. 
Snider's nomination to the Senate by a vote of 19-0. The Senate 
approveed his nomination in executive session on July 30, 1998.

          f. new standard for background investigation review

    In accordance with Rule 5.6 of the Committee's Rules of 
Procedure, a nomination may not be reported to the Senate 
unless the nominee has filed a background statement with the 
Committee. Nowhere in the rules of procedure, however, is the 
term ``background statement'' defined. During the consideration 
of Mr. Anthony Lake to be the Director of Central Intelligence, 
the nature and extent of background information that should be 
made available to the Committee and the Senate became an issue.
    At a business meeting of the Committee on April 23, 1997 to 
discuss the matter, the following resolution was adopted:

          Be it resolved, That no confirmation hearing in 
        connection with the nomination of the Director of 
        Central Intelligence referred to this Committee, shall 
        be held sooner than seven days after the nominee's 
        financial disclosure statement is filed with the 
        Committee and the background investigation is made 
        available for review by the Chairman and Vice-Chairman. 
        At the request of members only of the Committee, the 
        Chairman or Vice Chairman shall authorize them to 
        review the background investigation file. The 
        background investigation file shall contain materials 
        that are equivalent to those routinely made available 
        to the Senate Judiciary Committee in connection with 
        judicial nominations, i.e., the full Federal Bureau of 
        Investigation field office investigative reports 
        (including Form 302s and investigative inserts) and a 
        letterhead memorandum reflecting the results of indices 
        checks and other inquiries.

    There was debate on whether the resolution should also be 
extended to other nominees. After some discussion, the 
Committee agreed that the Chairman and Vice Chairman could 
extend this standard to any nominee at their discretion.

                              V. Appendix

                  a. summary of committee's activities

1. Number of meetings

    During the 105th Congress, the Committee held a total of 95 
hearings or on-the-record briefings. Of these, forty-seven were 
oversight hearings, fifteen were legislative hearings, and 
fifteen were nomination hearings. There were sixteen Committee 
business or legislative mark-up meetings. Also, the Committee 
held two on-the-record briefings.

2. Bills and resolutions originated by the committee

    S. Res. 30--An original resolution authorizing expenditures 
by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.
    S. 858--An original bill to authorize appropriations for 
fiscal year 1998 for intelligence and intelligence-related 
activities of the United States Government, the Community 
Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency 
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes.
    S. 1668--An original bill to encourage the disclosure to 
Congress of certain classified and related information.
    S. 2052--An original bill to authorize appropriations for 
fiscal year 1999 for intelligence and intelligence-related 
activities of the United States Government, the Community 
Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Retirement and 
Disability System, and for other purposes.

3. Bills referred to the committee

    S. 1751--A bill to extend the deadline for submission of a 
report by the Commission to Assess the Organization of the 
Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction.

4. Committee publications

    Senate Report 105-1--Special Report--Committee Activities 
January 4, 1995-October 3, 1996.
    Senate Report 105-24--SSCI Report to accompany FY 98 
Intelligence Authorization Bill (June 9, 1997).
    Senate Hearing 105-201--Hearing before the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence--Current and Projected National 
Security Threats to the United States (February 5, 1997).
    Senate Hearing 105-234--Nomination of Lieutenant General 
John Gordon, USAF, to be Deputy Director of Central 
Intelligence (October 1, 1997).
    Senate Hearing 105-276--Hearing before the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence--People's Republic of China 
(September 18, 1997).
    Senate Hearing 105-290--Hearing before the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence--1985 Zona Rosa Terrorist Attack in 
San Salvador, El Salvador (May 20, July 30, 1997).
    Senate Hearing 105-314--Nomination of George J. Tenet to be 
Director of Central Intelligence (May 6, 1997).
    Senate Hearing 105-424--Hearing on Nomination of Anthony 
Lake to be Director Central Intelligence (March 11, 12, 13, 
1997).
    Senate Report 105-165--Report to accompany S. 1668--The 
Disclosure to Congress Act of 1998 (February 23, 1998).
    Senate Report 105-185--Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence report to accompany the FY 1999 Intelligence 
Authorization Bill (S. 2052) filed May 7, 1998.
    Senate Hearing 105-587--Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence hearing on Current and Projected National Security 
Threats to the United States (January 28, 1998).
    Senate Hearing 105-729--Disclosure of Classified 
Information to Congress (February 4, 11, 1998).

                                
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