[Senate Report 106-225]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



                                                       Calendar No. 424
106th Congress                                                   Report
                                 SENATE
 1st Session                                                    106-225
_______________________________________________________________________



                   CONGRESSIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY FOR


                  REGULATORY INFORMATION ACT OF 1999

                               __________

                              R E P O R T

                                 of the

                   COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                              to accompany

                                S. 1198

  TO AMEND CHAPTER 8 OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, TO PROVIDE FOR A 
     REPORT BY THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE TO CONGRESS ON AGENCY 
               REGULATORY ACTIONS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES




                December 7, 1999.--Ordered to be printed
 Filed, under authority of the order of the Senate of November 19, 1999

                               __________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
9-010                     WASHINGTON : 1999

                   COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

                   FRED THOMPSON, Tennessee, Chairman
WILLIAM V. ROTH, Jr., Delaware       JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
TED STEVENS, Alaska                  CARL LEVIN, Michigan
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine              DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
GEORGE VOINOVICH, Ohio               RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico         ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi            MAX CLELAND, Georgia
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania          JOHN EDWARDS, North Carolina
JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire
             Hannah S. Sistare, Staff Director and Counsel
                      Paul R. Noe, Senior Counsel
      Joyce A. Rechtschaffen, Minority Staff Director and Counsel
                  Lawrence B. Novey, Minority Counsel
                   Susan E. Propper, Minority Counsel
                 Darla D. Cassell, Administrative Clerk
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page
  I. Purpose and Summary..............................................1
 II. Background and Need for Legislation..............................2
III. Legislative History and Committee Consideration..................4
 IV. Administration Views.............................................6
  V. Section-by-Section Analysis......................................7
 VI. Regulatory Impact Statement......................................8
VII. CBO Cost Estimate................................................8
VIII.Changes in Existing Law..........................................9

                                                       Calendar No. 424
106th Congress                                                   Report
                                 SENATE
 1st Session                                                    106-225

======================================================================



 
  CONGRESSIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY FOR REGULATORY INFORMATION ACT OF 1999

                                _______
                                

                December 7, 1999.--Ordered to be printed

 Filed, under authority of the order of the Senate of November 19, 1999

                                _______
                                

Mr. Thompson, from the Committee on Governmental Affairs, submitted the 
                               following

                              R E P O R T

                         [To accompany S. 1198]

    S. 1198, the Congressional Accountability for Regulatory 
Information Act of 1999, is a bill introduced by Senator 
Richard Shelby. The Committee on Governmental Affairs, having 
considered S. 1198 on November 3, 1999, reports the bill 
favorably with a substitute amendment and an amendment to the 
title and recommends by voice vote with no nays that the bill 
do pass as amended (including an amendment to the short title 
to read as follows: the ``Truth in Regulating Act of 1999'').

                         I. purpose and summary

    S. 1198, the ``Truth in Regulating Act,'' \1\ is a 
bipartisan effort to promote effective Congressional oversight 
of important regulatory decisions. Under the ``Truth in 
Regulating Act,'' a committee of either House of Congress may 
request the Comptroller General to review any proposed or final 
economically significant rule and to submit a report which 
includes an evaluation of the agency's regulatory analyses. The 
legislation also would increase the transparency of important 
regulatory decisions and increase the accountability of 
Congress and the agencies to the people they serve. Upon 
introduction of the ``Truth in Regulating Act,'' Senator 
Thompson stated:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ For purposes of this report, the Committee shall refer to the 
official short title of S. 1198 as the ``Truth in Regulating Act of 
1999,'' which was adopted by the Committee at markup in the substitute 
amendment to S. 1198.

          The foundation of the ``Truth in Regulating Act'' is 
        the right of Congress and the people we serve to know 
        about important regulatory decisions. Through the 
        General Accounting Office, which serves as Congress' 
        eyes and ears, this legislation will help us get access 
        to the important information that federal agencies use 
        to make regulatory decisions. * * * This will make the 
        regulatory process more transparent, more accountable, 
        and more democratic. \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\145 Cong. Rec. S7268 (daily ed. June 18, 1999).

    In brief, S. 1198 establishes a 3-year pilot project which 
allows a committee of either House of Congress to request that 
the Comptroller General conduct an independent evaluation of 
the agency analyses for any proposed or final economically 
significant rule. The Comptroller General should submit a 
report detailing the results of the independent evaluation. The 
report should include the following elements: an evaluation of 
the agency's analysis of the potential benefits of the rule, 
including those benefits that cannot be quantified in monetary 
terms and the identification of the persons or entities likely 
to receive the benefits; an evaluation of the agency's analysis 
of the potential costs of the rule, including any adverse 
effects that cannot be quantified in monetary terms and the 
identification of the persons or entities likely to bear the 
costs; an evaluation of the agency's analysis of alternative 
approaches, regulatory impact analysis, federalism assessment, 
or other analysis or assessment prepared by the agency or 
required for the economically significant rule; and a summary 
of the results of the evaluation of the Comptroller General and 
the implications of those results. The independent evaluation 
must be a substantive evaluation of the agency's data, 
methodology, and assumptions used in developing the rule, 
including an explanation of how any strengths or weaknesses in 
those data, methodology, and assumptions support or detract 
from conclusions reached by the agency.

                II. background and need for legislation

    The Constitution places all legislative powers with the 
Congress. \3\ While Congress may not delegate its essential 
legislative functions, \4\ it routinely transfers authority to 
implement laws and issue regulations to the President and 
Executive Branch agencies. Consistent with Congress' broad 
delegations to the Executive Branch, numerous Supreme Court 
decisions have inferred a broad and encompassing power in the 
Congress to engage in oversight to enable it to carry out its 
legislative function. \5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ U.S. Const. art. I, 1 (``All legislative Powers herein granted 
shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist 
of a Senate and a House of Representatives.''); see also U.S. Const. 
art. I, 8 (enumerating powers of Congress).
    \4\ Panama Refining v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430 (1935); Schechter 
Poultry v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 542 (1935).
    \5\ See generally, Congressional Research Service, ``Investigative 
Oversight: An Introduction to the Law, Practice and Procedure of 
Congressional Inquiry'' 2 (Apr. 7, 1995); see also, Congressional 
Research Service, ``Congressional Oversight Manual'' 5 (Feb. 1995).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Congress has become increasingly concerned about its 
obligation to oversee the administrative process. This is not 
without reason. By any measure, federal agencies are engaged in 
an enormous volume of regulatory activity. In a 1997 report to 
Congress, OMB reported that there are over 130,000 pages of 
federal regulations, ``with about 60 federal agencies issuing 
regulations at a rate of about 4,000 per year. * * * Federal 
regulations now affect virtually all individuals, businesses, 
State, local and tribal governments, and other organizations in 
virtually every aspect of their lives or operations.'' \6\ In 
recent reports, GAO noted that the November 1998 edition of the 
Unified Agenda of Federal Regulations contained 4,560 entries 
describing planned or ongoing federal regulatory actions, \7\ 
and that federal agencies issued more than 11,000 final rules 
between April 1996 and December 1998. \8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ Office of Management and Budget, Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs, ``Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of 
Federal Regulations'' (Sept. 30, 1997).
    \7\ U.S. General Accounting Office, ``Regulatory Flexibility Act: 
Agencies' Interpretations of Review Requirements Vary,'' GAO/GGD-99-55, 
at 19, April 2, 1999.
    \8\ Statement for the Record of L. Nye Stevens, Director, Federal 
Management and Workforce Issues, General Government Division, GAO, 
before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, ``Federalism: 
Implementation of Executive Order 12612 in the Rulemaking Process,'' 
GAO/T-GGD-99-93, May 5, 1999.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Over the years, Congress and the White House have required 
a variety of regulatory analyses to provide more openness, 
thoughtfulness, and accountability to the regulatory process. 
When performed well, regulatory analysis can help reduce 
unnecessary burdens and increase the benefits of regulation. As 
OMB has stated:

        [R]egulations (like other instruments of government 
        policy) have enormous potential for both good and harm. 
        Well-chosen and carefully crafted regulations can 
        protect consumers from dangerous products and ensure 
        they have information to make informed choices. Such 
        regulations can limit pollution, increase worker 
        safety, discourage unfair business practices, and 
        contribute in many other ways to a safer, healthier, 
        more productive, and more equitable society. Excessive 
        or poorly designed regulations, by contrast, can cause 
        confusion and delay, give rise to unreasonable 
        compliance costs in the form of capital investments, 
        labor and on-going paperwork, retard innovation, reduce 
        productivity, and accidentally distort private 
        incentives.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ Office of Management and Budget, Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs, ``Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of 
Federal Regulations'' (Sept. 30, 1997), at 10.

    In recent years, various statutes and executive orders have 
mandated that Federal agencies conduct extensive and complex 
regulatory analyses for important rules, especially 
economically significant rules. In some circumstances, agencies 
also conduct such analyses on their own initiative, without a 
specific mandate. Regulatory analyses may cover a host of 
concerns, including, for example, a cost-benefit analysis 
assessing the costs and benefits associated with a rule, a risk 
assessment analyzing the risks that would be reduced or avoided 
by a rule, and more targeted analyses of how a rule may, for 
example, reduce or avoid harm to sensitive populations (such as 
children) or inequitable impacts of environmental pollution 
within the population, or how the rule may affect States or 
local governments or small businesses. These various regulatory 
analyses may be important to understanding the need for a rule, 
whether it fulfills its goals, and what the costs and any other 
unintended consequences may be, and, depending on the 
circumstances, they can affect the agency's ultimate regulatory 
decision.
    When conducting oversight of agencies' regulatory 
activities or when attempting to exercise regulatory review 
authority under the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement 
Fairness Act,\10\ many in Congress would find it helpful to 
have the benefit of specialized expertise and manpower to 
evaluate these regulatory analyses. Many regulatory analyses 
are extensive, highly complex, and technical, and may be at the 
forefront of economic, technological, and scientific theory. 
Others may involve in-depth analyses of circumstances involving 
particular industries, specific regions or populations of the 
country, or specialized concerns such as those involving 
impacts on States and local governments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ 5 U.S.C. Sec. 801 et seq.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This bill establishes a framework under which Congress can 
seek assistance from the General Accounting Office to evaluate 
regulatory analyses for economically significant regulations 
and to advise Congress about the implications of any strengths 
or weaknesses that GAO finds in the agencies' work. The results 
of GAO's evaluation not only will inform and assist Congress in 
fulfilling its oversight obligations and inform and assist the 
agencies and the President in executing the law, but they also 
will enable the public to gain greater understanding of the 
analytic underpinnings of agency decisions.
    In short, the ``Truth in Regulating Act'' will provide 
Congress and the public with more information about important 
regulatory decisions, information which the public has a right 
to know. It will help Congress oversee whether the agency is 
appropriately implementing the law. It will provide an 
opportunity for a thorough look at important regulatory 
proposals by a credible reviewer of government, the General 
Accounting Office.

          iii. legislative history and committee consideration

A. Background

    Congress' engagement on legislation to strengthen its 
ability to conduct regulatory oversight began when 
Representative Sue Kelly introduced the Congressional Office of 
Regulatory Analysis Act (``CORA''), H.R. 1704, in the House on 
May 22, 1997, and Senator Richard Shelby introduced the 
companion bill in the Senate, S. 1675, on February 25, 1998. 
CORA would have established a professional office within the 
legislative branch to evaluate the effects of all new major 
regulations. Non-major rules would have been evaluated at the 
request of committees or individual Members of Congress. In 
addition to providing information on costs and benefits, 
analyses under CORA also would have explored possible 
alternative approaches to achieving the same goals as the 
proposed legislation at a lower cost. Finally, the office would 
have issued an annual report on the total cost of Federal 
regulations to the United States economy.
    Based on discussions about S. 1675 and the Governmental 
Affairs Committee's consideration of the issue, Chairman 
Thompson and Senator Shelby took a revised approach to 
Congressional regulatory oversight legislation. In June 1999, 
Senator Shelby introduced S. 1198 as the ``Congressional 
Accountability for Regulatory Information Act of 1999.'' The 
bill was referred to the Governmental Affairs Committee. 
Chairman Fred Thompson introduced S. 1244, the ``Truth in 
Regulating Act,'' with a bipartisan group of cosponsors, 
including Senators Blanche Lincoln, George Voinovich, Bob 
Kerrey, and John Breaux. S. 1244 was likewise referred to the 
Committee. Both bills were written to achieve the same goals. 
Both were intended to strengthen Congress' ability to conduct 
oversight on economically significant regulations. Both also 
established procedures by which committees could request GAO to 
review and report on the economic, scientific, and policy 
analysis underlying economically significant regulations. The 
supporters of the legislation reported by the Committee include 
all those who supported the preceding bills--Senators Thompson, 
Shelby, Lincoln, Lott, Kerrey, Voinovich, Bond, Breaux, 
Stevens, Landrieu, Inhofe, Robb, Bennett, Roth, and Hagel.
    Before the Committee's August markup, which included S. 
1244 on its agenda, Senator Lieberman, the Ranking Democrat on 
the Committee, expressed several concerns about the bill. His 
concerns were reflected in four proposed amendments to S. 1244. 
In response to these concerns, Senators Thompson and Lieberman 
collaborated to develop a modified draft of S. 1244 to offer as 
an amendment in the nature of a substitute to S. 1198 at the 
Committee's November markup. S. 1198, with the Thompson-
Lieberman amendment in the nature of a substitute, passed the 
Committee by voice vote, with no nays.
    The changes reflected in the substitute amendment ensure 
the following:
         (1) GAO may examine the regulation when it is 
        published in proposed form. S. 1244, as introduced, had 
        also provided for GAO to examine a rule during its 
        development prior to publication.
         (2) GAO will not be required to do a new regulatory 
        analysis, but instead will do a substantive evaluation 
        of the agency's analysis. GAO will then report to 
        Congress on the strengths or weaknesses of the agency's 
        analysis and what the implications of those strengths 
        or weaknesses are for the rulemaking. S. 1198 and S. 
        1244, as introduced, mandated that GAO's evaluation 
        include an analysis of alternative approaches that 
        would be more cost-effective or provide greater net 
        benefits. The bill no longer contains this language. 
        The bill would not create another layer of rulemaking 
        and would not require GAO to go outside of its 
        traditional role as evaluator by, for example, 
        conducting its own regulatory analysis or making its 
        own determination of what the regulatory conclusion 
        should be.
         (3) GAO will not have its authority either expanded or 
        limited by the bill.
         (4) Requests must be made by committees with 
        legislative or oversight jurisdiction.
These changes reflected in the substitute amendment address and 
resolve the concerns of Senator Lieberman while maintaining the 
original purposes of increasing regulatory transparency, 
promoting effective congressional oversight, and increasing 
government accountability sought by Senator Thompson in the 
original drafting of the ``Truth in Regulating Act.''

B. Committee hearings

    On April 22, 1999, the Governmental Affairs Committee held 
a hearing on Congressional Office of Regulatory Analysis 
legislation. At the hearing, witnesses discussed S. 1675, the 
Congressional Office of Regulatory Analysis Act from the 105th 
Congress, which was Senator Shelby's predecessor to S. 1198. 
Testifying at this hearing were: Mr. Don Arbuckle, Acting 
Administrator, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, 
Office of Management and Budget; The Honorable Steven Saland, 
State Senator, New York; Mr. Arthur J. Dyer, President, Metal 
Products Company, on behalf of the National Association of 
Manufacturers; Dr. Robert Litan, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for 
Regulatory Studies; Dr. Murray Weidenbaum, Chairman, Center for 
the Study of American Business, Washington University; 
Professor Sidney Shapiro, School of Policy and Environmental 
Affairs, Indiana University; Dr. Gary Bass, Executive Director, 
OMB Watch.

C. Committee action and amendments

    On November 3, 1999, the Committee on Governmental Affairs 
marked up and reported S. 1198 by voice vote with no nays. 
Members present were Senators Collins, Cochran, Lieberman, 
Levin, Akaka, Durbin, Cleland, Edwards and Thompson. The only 
amendment offered was the Thompson-Lieberman substitute 
amendment, and it was adopted by voice vote with no nays.
    At the markup, Senator Levin expressed concern over whether 
a Committee request for the review of a rule should be allowed 
to be made before the proposed rule is published. He also noted 
that the term ``Committee'' in the bill may not be sufficiently 
explicit, leaving open the question whether a Chairman or 
Ranking Member could make the request on behalf of the 
Committee without formal Committee approval. Chairman Thompson 
and Senator Lieberman agreed to work with Senator Levin on 
these issues before Senate consideration of the bill.

                        IV. administration views

    At the Committee's April 22 hearing, Donald R. Arbuckle, 
the Acting Administrator of OMB's Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs, testified on behalf of the Administration. 
Mr. Arbuckle stated: As is the tradition, the administration 
defers to Congress on matters of internal organization of the 
Legislative Branch. However, we believe that it is important to 
clarify that we believe that no Congressional office should be 
involved in the Executive Branch's development of new 
regulations prior to their formal publication.'' 11 
This issue was addressed in the Thompson-Lieberman substitute 
to S. 1198 offered at markup.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ Testimony of Donald R. Arbuckle, Acting Administrator, Office 
of Information and Regulatory Affairs, OMB, before the Senate Committee 
on Governmental Affairs, S. Hrg. 106-180 (Apr. 22, 1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                     V. Section-by-section analysis

Section 1. Short title

    The name of S. 1198 is the ``Truth in Regulating Act of 
1999.''

Section 2. Purposes

    Section 2 lays out three purposes of the legislation, as 
follows: First, to increase the transparency of important 
regulatory decisions; Second, to promote effective 
congressional oversight to ensure that agency rules are 
efficient, effective and fair; Third, to increase the 
accountability of Congress and agencies to the people they 
serve.

Section 3. Definitions

    Section 3 defines several key terms in the bill. The term 
``agency'' has the same meaning given such term under section 
551(1) of title 5, United States Code.
    The term ``economically significant rule'' means any 
proposed or final rule, including an interim or direct final 
rule, that may cost $100,000,000 or more or adversely affect in 
a material way the economy, a sector of the economy, 
productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public health 
or safety, or State, local, or tribal governments or 
communities.
    The term ``independent evaluation'' means a substantive 
evaluation of the agency's data, methodology and assumptions 
used in developing the economically significant rule, including 
an explanation of how any strengths or weaknesses in the data, 
methodology, and assumptions support or detract from 
conclusions reached by the agency, and the implications, if 
any, of those strengths or weaknesses for the rulemaking.

Section 4. Pilot project for report on rules

    Under the 3-year pilot project established by this 
legislation, a committee of either House of Congress may 
request the Comptroller General to review an economically 
significant rule. The requesting committee must have either 
legislative or oversight jurisdiction over the rule. Because 
the Governmental Affairs Committee has government-wide 
oversight jurisdiction over agency rulemaking, it has broad 
request authority. The Comptroller General may review the rule 
when it is published in proposed or final form by the agency. 
The Comptroller General shall conduct an independent evaluation 
of the agency's regulatory analyses for the rule and submit to 
the requesting committee a report detailing the results of the 
evaluation no later than 180 calendar days after the request is 
received.
    The Comptroller General's independent evaluation of the 
rule shall include the following: an evaluation of the agency's 
analyses of the potential benefits of the rule, potential costs 
of the rule, and alternative regulatory approaches; an 
evaluation of any regulatory impact analysis, federalism 
assessment, or other analysis or assessment prepared by the 
agency or required for the rule; and a summary of the results 
of the evaluation and the implications of those results for the 
rulemaking. The Comptroller General has discretion to develop 
the procedures for determining the priority of committee \12\ 
requests for which a report shall be submitted as required by 
Section 4. The legislation is not intended to alter the 
Comptroller's current policies regarding the treatment of 
requests by Committee Chairs and Ranking Minority Members. For 
example, GAO's existing policy assigns equal status to requests 
from Ranking Minority Members and requests from Committee 
Chairs.\13\ Nothing in this legislation is intended to either 
expand or limit the authority of the Comptroller General with 
regard to powers to access agency information or otherwise.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ At markup, Senator Levin raised the question about the meaning 
of the term ``committee,'' and Chairman Thompson and Senator Lieberman 
agreed to work with him on the issue before consideration of the 
legislation by the Senate.
    \13\ General Accounting Office, ``General Policies/Procedures and 
Communications Manual,'' page 1.1.2 (March 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Section 5. Authorization of Appropriations

    There are authorized to be appropriated to the General 
Accounting Office to carry out this legislation $5,200,000 for 
each of fiscal years 2000 through 2002.

Section 6. Effective date and duration of pilot project

    This Act will take effect 90 days after enactment. Before 
the conclusion of the 3-year period from the effective date of 
this Act, the Comptroller General shall submit to Congress a 
report reviewing the effectiveness of the pilot project and 
recommending whether Congress should permanently authorize the 
project. The pilot project under this Act shall continue for a 
period of 3 years, if in each fiscal year, or portion thereof 
included in that period, a specific annual appropriation not 
less than $5,200,000 or the pro-rated equivalent thereof shall 
have been made for that pilot project.

                    vi. regulatory impact statement

    Pursuant to paragraph 11(b), rule XXVI of the Standing 
Rules of the Senate, the Committee, after due consideration, 
concludes that S. 1198 will not have a significant regulatory 
impact.

                         vii. cbo cost estimate

                                     U.S. Congress,
                               Congressional Budget Office,
                                 Washington, DC, November 17, 1999.
Hon. Fred Thompson,
Chairman, Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, Washington, 
        DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has 
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for S. 1198, the Truth in 
Regulating Act of 1999.
    If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be 
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Mary 
Maginniss.
            Sincerely,
                                        Steven M. Lieberman
                                    (For Dan L. Crippen, Director).
    Enclosure.

S. 1198--Truth in Regulating Act of 1999

    Summary: S. 1198 would establish a three-year pilot project 
for the General Accounting Office (GAO) to review, at the 
request of the committee of jurisdiction, proposed or final 
agency rules that are economically significant. It would 
authorize the appropriation of $5.2 million in each year over 
the 2000-2002 period for GAO to prepare these independent 
evaluations. Assuming appropriation of the amounts authorized, 
CBO estimates that implementing S. 1198 would cost $15.6 
million over the 2000-2003 period. The bill would not affect 
direct spending or receipts; therefore, pay-as-you-go 
procedures would not apply. S. 1198 contains no 
intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in he 
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) and would not affect the 
budgets of state, local, or tribal governments.
    Estimated cost to the Federal Government: For the purposes 
of this estimate, CBO assumes that the amounts authorized to be 
appropriated for each year will be provided near the beginning 
of each fiscal year. Estimated spending is based on historical 
rates of expenditures for GAO. The estimated cost of the bill 
is shown in the following table. The costs of this legislation 
fall within budget function 800 (general government).

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                     By fiscal year, in millions of dollars--
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
                                                                   2000    2001    2002    2003    2004    2005
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Changes in spending subject to appropriation:
    Authorization Level.........................................       5       5       5       0       0       0
    Estimated Outlays...........................................       2       5       6       3       0       0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Pay-as-you-go considerations: None.
    Intergovernmental and private-sector impact: S. 1198 
contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as 
defined in UMRA and would not affect the budgets of state, 
local, or tribal governments.
    Estimate prepared by: Maginniss.
    Estimate approved by: Peter H. Fontaine, Deputy Assistant 
Director for Budget Analysis.

                     VIII. changes in existing law

    S. 1198 does not make any changes to existing law.

                                  
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