[House Report 106-772]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



106th Congress                                                   Report
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 2d Session                                                     106-772

======================================================================



 
                    TRUTH IN REGULATING ACT OF 2000

                                _______
                                

 July 20, 2000.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

    Mr. Burton of Indiana, from the Committee on Government Reform, 
                        submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                     MINORITY AND ADDITIONAL VIEWS

                        [To accompany H.R. 4744]

      [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

    The Committee on Government Reform, to whom was referred 
the bill (H.R. 4744) to require the General Accounting Office 
to report to Congress on economically significant rules of 
Federal agencies, and for other purposes, having considered the 
same, report favorably thereon without amendment and recommend 
that the bill do pass.

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page
  I. Purpose..........................................................2
 II. Need for Legislation.............................................3
III. Committee Action.................................................7
 IV. Section-by-Section Analysis......................................8
  V. Oversight Findings..............................................10
 VI. Budget Analysis and Projections.................................10
VII. Congressional Budget Office Estimate............................10
VIII.Constitutional Authority Statement..............................11

 IX. Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as reported...........11
  X. Committee Recommendations.......................................12
 XI. Congressional Accountability Act; Public Law 104-1..............12
XII. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act; Public Law 104-4, Section 425.....12
XIII.Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) Sec. 5(b)........12

Minority Views...................................................    13
Additional Views.................................................    19

                               I. Purpose

    The purposes of the bipartisan ``Truth in Regulating Act of 
2000'' are to increase the transparency of important regulatory 
decisions; promote effective Congressional oversight to ensure 
that agency rules fulfill statutory requirements in an 
efficient, effective, and fair manner; and increase the 
accountability of Congress and the agencies to the people they 
serve. The bill establishes a Congressional Office of 
Regulatory Analysis (CORA) function within the General 
Accounting Office (GAO). This regulatory analysis capability is 
intended to enhance Congressional responsibility for regulatory 
decisions developed under the laws Congress enacts. The most 
basic reason for the bill is Constitutional: just as Congress 
needs a Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to check and balance 
the Executive Branch in the budget process, so it needs an 
analytic capability to check and balance the Executive Branch 
in the regulatory process.

                                SUMMARY

    In brief, the Truth in Regulating Act of 2000 is intended 
to do the following:
    Requires that GAO conduct independent evaluations of 
economically significant rules and report its findings to the 
Congressional Committees of jurisdiction which requested GAO's 
help.
    Section 3 defines ``economically significant rule'' as a 
rule having a $100 million or more effect on the economy or a 
significant impact on small businesses, and ``independent 
evaluation'' as a substantive evaluation of the agency's and 
the public's data, methodology and assumptions and any 
additional evaluation that GAO determines to be necessary.
    Section 4(a)(1) provides that a Chairman or Ranking Member 
of a Committee of jurisdiction of either House of Congress may 
request GAO to review an economically significant rule after it 
is published by an Executive Branch agency.
    Section 4(a)(2) requires that GAO submit a report to the 
Committee of jurisdiction in both Houses of Congress not later 
than 180 days after requested or, in the case of proposed or 
interim rules, by not later than the end of the public comment 
period. GAO's report shall include its independent evaluation 
of the rule.
    Section 4(a)(3) requires that GAO's independent evaluation 
include: an evaluation of the potential quantifiable and 
nonquantifiable benefits of the rule and the persons likely to 
receive the benefits; an evaluation of the quantifiable and 
nonquantifiable costs of the rule and the persons likely to 
bear the costs; an evaluation of any alternative approaches 
that could achieve the same goal in a more cost-effective 
manner or that could provide greater net benefits; an 
evaluation of the regulatory impact analysis (RIA), federalism 
assessment, or other analysis or assessment prepared by the 
agency; and, a summary of the results of GAO's evaluation, 
including an identification of any changes made by the agency 
from the proposed rule to the final rule.
    Section 4(a)(4) establishes procedures for prioritizing 
Committee requests. Priorities for GAO reports will be 
determined by the Majority and Minority Leaders of the Senate 
and the Speaker and the Minority Leader of the House, with the 
highest priority to requests regarding proposed and interim 
rules.

                        II. Need for Legislation

    Article I, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution vests all 
legislative powers in the U.S. Congress. While Congress may not 
delegate its legislative functions, it routinely authorizes 
Executive Branch agencies to issue rules that implement laws 
passed by Congress. Congress has become increasingly concerned 
about its responsibility to oversee agency rulemaking, 
especially due to the extensive costs, benefits and impacts of 
Federal rules.
    Over the past five years, Congress has changed the 
direction of the Federal Government from the endless burden of 
more taxes and spending to the new fiscal discipline of balance 
and accountability. America's freedom and innovation have 
resulted in a quality and productivity revolution and an 
American economy that is the unparalleled envy of the world. 
American business has brought incredible improvements to our 
quality of life, health care, and education. Through the new 
emphasis on flexibility and innovation, State and local 
governments have led the way to safer, cleaner, and better 
places to live. Congress should take responsibility for the 
impact of Federal regulatory programs on our economy and 
innovation. In addition to taxes, the Federal Government 
imposes tremendous costs and restrictions on innovation on the 
private sector, State and local governments, and the public 
through ever increasing Federal regulations. Congress should 
strive for quality, efficiency, and accountability in Federal 
regulations.
    The burden of Federal regulations on the American public 
continues to grow. Professor Thomas D. Hopkins, Interim Dean, 
College of Business at the Rochester Institute of Technology, 
projected total off-budget regulatory costs for 1999 to be $758 
billion.1 Families spend more on regulation than on 
medical expenses, food, transportation, recreation, clothing, 
and savings. In an annual report on the Federal regulatory 
state, Clyde Wayne Crews, Director of Competition and 
Regulation Policy at the Competitive Enterprise Institute, 
reported that the $758 billion in regulatory costs rival the 
$829 billion total of individual income taxes collected. Mr. 
Crews also stated that ``Corporate taxes, at $189 billion [in 
1998], are greatly outdistanced by regulatory costs. Even 
pretax corporate profits, $718 billion in 1998, are outstripped 
by regulatory costs.'' 2
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Thomas D. Hopkins article published in the December 1998 
journal Policy Sciences.
    \2\ P. 7, Clyde Wayne Crews, Jr., ``Ten Thousand Commandments: An 
Annual Policymaker's Snapshot of the Federal Regulatory State,'' 2000 
Edition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In 1999 alone, the Federal Register published 71,161 pages, 
the highest number of pages since 1980, the last year of the 
Carter presidency, which amounts to a 4 percent increase over 
the 1998 level. This level is also a 43 percent increase in 
number of pages in 10 years. In 1999, of the 4,538 new rules in 
various stages, as shown in the Unified Agenda of Federal 
Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions, 963 are expected to have a 
significant economic impact on small businesses, which is a 35 
percent increase in five years--from 711 to 963. The number of 
economically significant rules expected increased 17 percent 
from 1998 to 1999--from 117 to 137.
    In recent years, various statutes (such as the Unfunded 
Mandates Reform Act of 1995 and the Small Business Regulatory 
Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996) and executive orders (such as 
President Reagan's 1981 Executive Order 12291, ``Federal 
Regulation,'' and President Clinton's 1993 Executive Order 
12866, ``Regulatory Planning and Review'') have mandated that 
Executive Branch agencies conduct extensive regulatory 
analyses, especially for economically significant rules having 
a $100 million or more effect on the economy or a significant 
impact on small businesses. Unfortunately, Congress does not 
have the analytical capability to independently and fairly 
evaluate these analyses.
    Congress currently has two opportunities to review agency 
regulatory actions. Under the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA), Congress can comment on agency proposed and interim 
rules during the public comment period. Under the Congressional 
Review Act (CRA), Congress can disapprove an agency final rule 
after it is promulgated but before it is effective. 
Unfortunately, Congress has been unable to fully carry out its 
responsibility under the CRA because it has neither all of the 
information it needs to carefully evaluate agency regulatory 
proposals nor sufficient staff for this function. Therefore, 
since the March 1996 enactment of the CRA, there has been no 
completed Congressional resolutions of disapproval.
    To assume oversight responsibility for Federal regulations, 
Congress needs to be armed with an independent evaluation of 
more than just the agency's regulatory documents, including 
agency-identified alternatives and the agency's costs and 
benefits data. What is needed additionally is an analysis of 
legislative history to see if there is a non-delegation 
problem, such as in the Food and Drug Administration's proposed 
rule to regulate tobacco products, which was struck down by the 
Supreme Court in FDA v. Brown & Williamson, or backdoor 
legislating, such as in the Department of Labor's Birth and 
Adoption Unemployment Compensation (``Baby UI'') rule, which 
provides paid family leave to small business employees, even 
though Congress in the Family and Medical Leave Act said no to 
paid family leave and any coverage of small businesses. Also, 
Congress needs an identification of nonregulatory and lower-
cost alternatives neglected by the agency, such as in the 
Department of Labor's proposed rule for an ergonomics standard, 
and an identification and analysis of other sources of costs, 
benefits and impacts data, such as in the Environmental 
Protection Agency's rule on Particulate Matter and Ozone and 
Labor's Baby UI rule.
    During the 105th Congress, on June 3, 1998, after a March 
11, 1998 hearing of the Subcommittee on National Economic 
Growth, Natural Resources, and Regulatory Affairs, the 
Committee favorably reported H.R. 1704, the ``Congressional 
Office of Regulatory Analysis Creation Act'' (Rept. 105-441, 
Part 2). This bill, introduced by Small Business Subcommittee 
Chairwoman Sue Kelly on May 22, 1997, called for the 
establishment of a new Legislative Branch Congressional Office 
of Regulatory Analysis (CORA) agency to, among several duties, 
analyze all major rules and report to Congress on potential 
costs, benefits, and alternative approaches that could achieve 
the same regulatory goals at lower costs. This agency was 
intended to aid Congress in analyzing Federal regulations. The 
Committee Report stated, ``Congress needs the expertise that 
CORA would provide to carry out its duty under the CRA. 
Currently, Congress does not have the information it needs to 
carefully evaluate regulations. The only analyses it has to 
rely on are those provided by the agencies which promulgate the 
rules. There is no official, third-party analysis of new 
regulations'' (p. 5).
    In January and February 2000, Government Reform 
Subcommittee Chairman David McIntosh and Small Business 
Subcommittee Chairwoman Kelly introduced bills (H.R. 3521 and 
H.R. 3669, respectively) which established a CORA function 
within GAO, which is an existing Legislative Branch agency. 
These bills and H.R. 4744 respond to the main objection of the 
earlier bill in the 105th Congress by establishing a CORA 
function in an existing Legislative Branch agency instead of 
creating a new agency. GAO is the logical location within the 
Legislative Branch since it already has some responsibilities 
under the CRA. On May 10, 2000, the Senate passed S. 1198, the 
``Truth in Regulating Act of 2000,'' by unanimous consent. It 
also places the CORA function within GAO.
    During the 106th Congress, the Committee did not hold a 
hearing specifically on H.R. 4744 but the Subcommittee on 
National Economic Growth, Natural Resources, and Regulatory 
Affairs did hold a June 14, 2000 hearing, entitled ``Does 
Congress Delegate Too Much Power to Agencies and What Should be 
Done About It?''. At the hearing, Senator Sam Brownback and 
Representative J.D. Hayworth testified that Congress needs to 
assume more responsibility for regulations. Dr. Wendy Lee 
Gramm, Director, Regulatory Studies Program, Mercatus Center, 
George Mason University and former Administrator of the Office 
of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB), Alan Raul, Partner, Sidley & 
Austin and former OMB General Counsel, and David Schoenbrod, 
Professor of Law, New York Law School and Adjunct Scholar, Cato 
Institute, all echoed their belief that Congress needs to 
assume more responsibility for regulations, especially for 
regulatory proposals without an explicit delegation of 
regulatory authority from Congress.
    Witnesses stressed the need for analytical assistance so 
that Congress could especially provide timely comment on 
proposed rules that: (a) take into account Congressional 
legislative intent; (b) examine other, less costly regulatory 
and nonregulatory alternative approaches besides those in an 
agency proposal; and (c) identify additional, non-agency 
sources of data on benefits, costs, and impacts of an agency's 
proposal.
    Dr. Gramm testified that, ``there's clearly a need for more 
and better analysis that is independent of the agency writing 
the regulation * * * In my view, Congress cannot carry out its 
responsibilities effectively without such analysis.'' She 
continued by recommending, ``a shadow OIRA, and that is to 
perform independent, high-quality analysis of agency 
regulations at the proposal stage * * * whether or not the 
agency has considered the different alternatives, what might be 
other alternatives * * * I would suggest that all this analysis 
be done at the proposal stage so that this information can be 
put into the rulemaking record.''
    On June 26, 2000, Chairwoman Kelly and Chairman McIntosh 
introduced H.R. 4744, the ``Truth in Regulating Act of 2000,'' 
which includes several needed improvements to the Senate-passed 
S. 1198. H.R. 4744 and S. 1198 share nearly identical purposes 
and very similar provisions. However, H.R. 4744 includes some 
needed improvements, such as: (a) providing for timely 
Congressional comment on agency proposed rules during the 
public comment period, while there is still an opportunity to 
influence the cost, scope and content of the rule; (b) 
requiring GAO to review not only the agency's data but also the 
public's data to assure a more complete, unbiased and balanced 
evaluation; (c) including not only rules having a $100 million 
or more effect on the economy but also rules with a significant 
impact on small businesses; (d) clarifying that GAO's 
evaluation of alternative approaches should include 
alternatives that achieve the same goal in a more cost-
effective manner or that could provide greater net benefits; 
and, (e) changing procedures so that the bipartisan leadership 
of Congress instead of GAO determines the priority for GAO's 
independent evaluations, with highest priority to proposed and 
interim rules. Comments filed by Congress after the end of the 
public comment period can be ignored by an agency, as the 
Department of Labor did after its December 1999 proposed Baby 
UI rule, which was finalized in June 2000, i.e., in a little 
over 180 days.
    Lastly, S. 1198 includes a pilot project approach to test 
the effectiveness of a CORA function in GAO; in contrast, H.R. 
4744 includes a sunset provision approach, which is a more 
usual legislative approach for a new organizational function. 
In fact, the Committee was unable to find any examples in law 
of a pilot approach for an organization; instead, pilot 
projects have been used by Congress to demonstrate new and 
experimental service delivery approaches, e.g., for welfare 
reform or Medicaid.
    As a consequence, at its June 29, 2000 markup, after 
extensive debate, the Committee rejected an amendment to 
substitute the text of H.R. 4763, which is identical to the 
Senate-passed version of S. 1198, i.e., without the needed 
improvements in H.R. 4744. During the debate, Subcommittee 
Chairman McIntosh clarified that H.R. 4744 does not require or 
expect GAO to conduct any new RIAs. Instead, GAO will evaluate 
the agency's RIA and review the public's cost-benefit and other 
impact analyses.
    Instructed by GAO's independent evaluations, Congress will 
be better equipped to review final agency rules under the CRA. 
More importantly, Congress will be better equipped to comment 
knowledgeably on proposed rules during the public comment 
period.
    The Committee has received letters of support for H.R. 4744 
from: the bipartisan National Conference of State Legislatures 
(NCSL); the bipartisan National League of Cities (NLC), which 
represents 18,000 municipalities; Alliance USA, a national 
coalition of more than 1,000 business organizations and 
individual companies; Americans for Tax Reform; the Business 
Roundtable; the Chamber of Commerce of the USA, which 
represents over three million members; the General Motors 
Corporation; the National Association of Manufacturers, which 
has 14,000 member companies; National Small Business United, 
which has 65,000 members; the Schatz Bearing Corporation; the 
Small Business Survival Committee, which has 60,000 members; 
and, the Westchester County Chamber of Commerce.
    An example of a comment submitted is from NCSL President 
Paul Mannweiler: ``The independent evaluations to be carried 
out by the U.S. General Accounting Office would ensure a more 
efficient, effective and fair development of agency 
regulations. For state and local government officials, it would 
provide another important marker for ensuring that appropriate 
federalism assessments are made on proposed rules.'' NLC 
President Bob Knight commented that, ``Requiring the GAO to 
consider public data as well as agency data will ensure that a 
truly objective evaluation results from the GAO analysis.'' 
Chairman Karen Kerrigan of the Small Business Survival 
Committee commented that, ``Allowing a Committee Chairman or 
Ranking Member to turn to * * * (GAO) for an independent 
evaluation of a proposed major rule's costs and benefits; 
reviewing the accuracy of various impact analyses; and 
determining alternative approaches to achieve the same goal in 
a more cost-effective manner will allow Congress and the public 
to more proficiently comment on a proposed rule.'' Lastly, 
Bruce Josten, Chamber of the United States Executive Vice 
President Government Affairs, commented that: ``Armed with GAO 
reports, Congressional committees--and by extension the 
public--will be better equipped to review and respond to 
regulatory proposals.''
    The ``Truth in Regulating Act of 2000'' is a basic step 
toward a smarter partnership in regulatory programs. The best 
government is a government accountable to the people. For 
America to have an accountable regulatory system, the people's 
elected representatives must participate in, and take 
responsibility for, the rules promulgated under the laws 
Congress passes. H.R. 4744 is a meaningful step towards 
Congress's meeting its regulatory oversight responsibility.

                         III. Committee Action

    The bipartisan ``Truth in Regulating Act of 2000'' (H.R. 
4744) was introduced on June 26, 2000, by Small Business 
Subcommittee on Regulatory Reform and Paperwork Reduction 
Chairwoman Sue Kelly and Government Reform Subcommittee on 
National Economic Growth, Natural Resources, and Regulatory 
Affairs Chairman David McIntosh.
    After introduction, the bill was referred to the Committee 
on Government Reform. On June 29, 2000, the Government Reform 
Committee held a mark up of the bill. The Committee, by 
recorded vote did not accept an amendment offered by 
Subcommittee Ranking Member Dennis Kucinich and full Committee 
Ranking Member Henry Waxman to substitute the text of S. 1198, 
which was introduced as H.R. 4763 on June 27, 2000 by Rep. Gary 
Condit. By voice vote, the Committee then approved reporting 
H.R. 4744 without amendment to the full House.

                         Vote of the Committee

    There was one recorded vote on the Kucinich-Waxman 
amendment during the Committee's consideration of H.R. 4744, as 
follows.
    Rollcall--An amendment offered by Mr. Kucinich to 
substitute the text of H.R. 4763 for the text of H.R. 4744. 
Defeated 15-18.
        YEAS                          NAYS
Mr. Waxman                          Mr. Burton
Mr. Lantos                          Mr. Shays
Mr. Owens                           Ms. Ros-Lehtinen
Mr. Kanjorski                       Mr. McHugh
Mrs. Maloney                        Mr. Horn
Ms. Norton                          Mr. Mica
Mr. Fattah                          Mr. Davis (VA)
Mr. Cummings                        Mr. McIntosh
Mr. Kucinich                        Mr. Souder
Mr. Davis (IL)                      Mr. LaTourette
Mr. Tierney                         Mr. Barr
Mr. Turner                          Mr. Hutchinson
Mr. Allen                           Mr. Terry
Mr. Ford                            Mrs. Biggert
Ms. Schakowsky                      Mr. Walden
                                    Mr. Ose
                                    Mr. Ryan
                                    Mr. Vitter

                    IV. Section-by-Section Analysis


Section 1. Short title

Section 2. Findings and purposes

    Congress finds that many Federal rules have improved the 
quality of life of Americans. Congress has responsibility to 
ensure that the laws are properly implemented by the Executive 
Branch. In order for Congress to ensure that the laws are 
implemented in an efficient, effective and fair manner, 
Congress needs accurate and reliable information on which to 
base decisions. The bill is intended to increase the 
transparency of important regulatory decisions, promote 
effective Congressional oversight of agency rules, and increase 
the accountability of Congress.

Section 3. Definitions

    Section 3 includes definitions for ``agency,'' 
``economically significant rule,'' and ``independent 
evaluation.'' The term ``economically significant rule'' means 
a rule having a $100 million or more effect on the economy or a 
significant impact on small businesses. ``Independent 
evaluation'' means a substantive evaluation of the agency's and 
the public's data, methodology and assumptions and any 
additional evaluation that the Comptroller General of GAO 
determines to be necessary, including strengths or weaknesses 
in those data, methodology, and assumptions and any 
implications for the rulemaking.
    Rules having a significant impact on small businesses are 
specifically included in the definition of ``economically 
significant rule'' because small businesses are the backbone of 
America and deserve special analysis for regulatory burdens. 
Small businesses are less able to shoulder heavy regulatory 
burdens. To ensure a more complete, unbiased and balanced 
analysis by GAO, ``independent evaluation'' is defined to 
include not only the agency's but also the public's data. 
Merely evaluating the agency's data will not provide Congress 
with sufficient information in which to formulate appropriate 
comments on an agency proposed rule or a Congressional 
resolution of disapproval for an agency final rule. This 
Section does not require GAO to conduct any new RIAs.

Section 4. Report on rules

    Section 4(a)(1) provides that a Chairman or Ranking Member 
of a Committee of jurisdiction of either House of Congress may 
request GAO to review an economically significant rule after it 
is published by an Executive Branch agency.
    Section 4(a)(2) requires that GAO submit a report to the 
Committee of jurisdiction in both Houses of Congress not later 
than 180 days after requested or, in the case of proposed or 
interim rules, by not later than the end of the public comment 
period. The provision for shortened review time for proposed or 
interim rules is to ensure that comment by Congress is 
submitted during the public comment period, while there is 
still an opportunity to influence the cost, scope and content 
of the rule. The APA requires that all members of the public, 
including Congress, be given an equal opportunity to comment. 
In fact, under the APA, late Congressional comments cannot be 
considered by the agency unless all other late public comments 
are equally considered. Under the APA, agencies are required to 
consider timely Congressional and public comment filed during 
the public comment period and to respond to them in the 
preamble of the final rules. Therefore, GAO needs to complete 
its review during the same period afforded all other members of 
the public. GAO's report shall include its independent 
evaluation of the rule.
    Section 4(a)(3) requires that GAO's independent evaluation 
include: an evaluation of the potential quantifiable and 
nonquantifiable benefits of the rule and the persons likely to 
receive the benefits; an evaluation of the quantifiable and 
nonquantifiable costs of the rule and the persons likely to 
bear the costs; an evaluation of any alternative approaches 
that could achieve the same goal in a more cost-effective 
manner or that could provide greater net benefits; an 
evaluation of the RIA, federalism assessment, or other analysis 
or assessment prepared by the agency; and, a summary of the 
results of GAO's evaluation, including an identification of any 
changes made by the agency from the proposed rule to the final 
rule. Requiring GAO to evaluate additional alternative 
approaches besides those identified in the rule is essential 
because the American people deserve the most cost-effective 
approach or one that provides the greatest net benefits.
    Section 4(a)(4) establishes procedures for prioritizing 
Committee requests. Priorities for GAO reports will be 
determined by the Majority and Minority Leaders of the Senate 
and the Speaker and the Minority Leader of the House, with the 
highest priority to requests regarding proposed and interim 
rules, while there is still an opportunity to influence the 
cost, scope and content of the rule. This approach provides 
that the bipartisan leadership of Congress determines the 
priorities for GAO's independent evaluations instead of GAO.

Section 5. Authorization of appropriations

    Section 5 authorizes $5,200,000 for each year from Fiscal 
Year 2001 to 2003. This is the same annual level of funding as 
received by OMB's OIRA.

Section 6. Effective data; sunset provision

    Section 6 establishes an effective date 180 days after 
enactment, with a three-year sunset provision. A 180-day 
delayed effective date provides sufficient time for GAO to hire 
appropriate analytical staff to conduct the independent 
evaluations, which differ substantially from GAO's usual audit 
reports.

                         V. Oversight Findings

    Pursuant to rule XIII, clauses 3(c)(1), of the Rules of the 
House of Representatives, the results and findings for these 
oversight activities are incorporated in the recommendations 
found in this bill and in this report.

                  VI. Budget Analysis and Projections

    H.R. 4744 provides for a new authorization for GAO. 
Consequently, the provisions of section 308(a)(1) of the 
Congressional Budget Act of 1974 are applicable.

             VII. Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate

                                     U.S. Congress,
                               Congressional Budget Office,
                                     Washington, DC, July 10, 2000.
Hon. Dan Burton,
Chairman, Committee on Government Reform,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has 
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 4774, the Truth in 
Regulating Act of 2000.
    If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be 
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is John R. 
Righter.
            Sincerely,
                                          Barry B. Anderson
                                    (For Dan L. Crippen, Director).
    Enclosure.

H.R. 4744--Truth in Regulating Act of 2000

    Summary: H.R. 4774 would require the General Accounting 
Office (GAO), at the request of a Chairman or Ranking Minority 
Member of an authorizing committee with appropriate 
jurisdiction, to independently evaluate and report on certain 
regulatory rules issued by federal agencies. The rules subject 
to review would be those that could have an annual effect on 
the U.S. economy of at least $100 million or that could 
adversely affect the economy, environment, public health and 
safety, or state, local, or tribal governments. Each GAO report 
would include an evaluation of the potential costs and benefits 
of implementing a particular rule, alternative approaches for 
achieving the rule's goal at a lower cost, and an evaluation of 
the regulatory impact analysis or other assessment performed by 
the agency issuing the rule. To carry out these functions, the 
bill would authorize the appropriation of $5.2 million for each 
fiscal years 2001 through 2003. The bill would not take effect 
until 180 days after enactment, and would not apply to rules 
issued more than three years after that date.
    Subject to appropriation of the authorized amounts, CBO 
estimates that implementing the bill would cost $14 million 
over the 2001-2005 period. Enacting H.R. 4774 would not affect 
direct spending or receipts; therefore, pay-as-you-go 
procedures would not apply. H.R. 4774 contains no 
intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in the 
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) and would not affect the 
budgets of state, local, or tribal governments.
    Estimated cost to the Federal Government: The estimated 
budgetary impact of H.R. 4774 is shown in the following table. 
This estimate assumes that the authorized amounts will be 
appropriated for each year from 2001 through 2003. The outlays 
estimated for 2001 are lower because the bill would not take 
effect until 180 days after enactment. The costs of this 
legislation fall within budget function 800 (general 
government).

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                     By fiscal year, in millions of dollars--
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
                                                                   2000    2001    2002    2003    2004    2005
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                        SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION

GAO Spending Under Current Law:
    Estimated Authorization Level \1\...........................     379     397     412     427     442     458
    Estimated Outlays...........................................     379     394     409     421     436     452
Proposed Changes:
    Authorization Level.........................................       0       5       5       5       0       0
    Estimated Outlays...........................................       0       3       5       5       1       0
GAO Spending Under H.R. 4774:
    Estimated Authorization Level...............................     379     402     417     432     442     458
    Estimated Outlays...........................................     379     397     414     426     437     452
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The 2000 level is the amount appropriated for that year. The levels shown for 2001 through 2005 are baseline
  projections, reflecting annual adjustments for anticipated inflation. Without such adjustments, the level
  would stay constant at $379 million.

    Pay-as-you-go considerations: None.
    Intergovernmental and private-sector impact: H.R. 4774 
contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as 
defined in UMRA and would not affect the budgets of state, 
local, or tribal governments.
    Estimate prepared by: Federal costs: John R. Righter. 
Impact on the State, local, and tribal governments: Susan Sieg 
Tompkins. Impact on the private sector: Sarah Sitarek.
    Estimate approved by: Peter H. Fontaine, Deputy Assistant 
Director for Budget Analysis.

                VIII. Constitutional Authority Statement

    Clauses 14 and 18 of Article I, section 8 of the 
Constitution grants the Congress the power to enact this law.

       IX. Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported

    H.R. 4744 does not make any changes in existing law.

                      X. Committee Recommendations

    On June 29, 2000, a quorum being present, the Committee on 
Government Reform ordered the bill favorably reported by voice 
vote.

         XI. Congressional Accountability Act; Public Law 104-1

    The Committee finds that the legislation does not relate to 
the terms and conditions of employment or access to public 
services or accommodations within the meaning of section 
102(B)(3) of the Congressional Accountability Act (P.L. 104-1).

    XII. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act; Public Law 104-4, Section 425

    The Committee finds that the legislation does not impose 
any Federal Mandates within the meaning of section 423 of the 
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (P.L. 104-4).

   XIII. Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) Section 5(b)

    The Committee finds that the legislation does not establish 
or authorize the establishment of an advisory committee within 
the definition of 5 U.S.C. App., section 5(b).

                             MINORITY VIEWS

    H.R. 4744 is an ill-conceived bill. It did not receive the 
benefit of a hearing or Subcommittee markup. Instead, it was 
rushed through the Committee in a flawed form.
    H.R. 4744 calls on the Government Accounting Office (GAO) 
to review the cost-benefit analyses conducted by federal 
agencies as part of federal rulemaking. The Senate recently 
considered this issue and developed a workable, bipartisan 
approach to GAO involvement. The Senate bill, S. 1288, passed 
by unanimous consent in the Senate. It was recently introduced 
by Rep. Gary Condit in the House as H.R. 4763.
    We can support the Condit-Senate approach. In fact, the 
Kucinich-Waxman substitute that was defeated on a party line 
vote during the full committee markup was identical to it.
    Unfortunately, H.R. 4744 does not take this bipartisan 
approach. Instead, it would impose costly obligations on the 
GAO and would bog down the rulemaking process. That is why it 
is opposed by environmental groups such as the National 
Environmental Trust; labor organizations such as the AFL-CIO 
and the United Auto Workers; health groups such as the American 
Public Health Association; and consumer organizations such as 
Public Citizen. A letter urging opposition to H.R. 4744 from 
the Citizens for Sensible Safeguards--a broad based coalition 
of more than 200 public interest groups--is included as 
Attachment 1.
    Moreover, GAO--the entity charged with carrying out the 
responsibilities in the bill--has expressed concern that H.R. 
4744 requires too much analysis, in too short of a time period, 
without a promise of additional funding. Furthermore, GAO 
expressed concern that the requirement for independent analyses 
expands its responsibilities beyond its traditional role as an 
auditor. These concerns stand in stark contrast to GAO's 
support of the Kucinich-Waxman substitute. The GAO letter is 
included as Attachment 2.
    The most important difference between the H.R. 4744 and the 
Kucinich-Waxman substitute is that H.R. 4744 would require GAO 
to conduct a host of new independent analyses, many of which 
are not currently performed by the agencies. The substitute 
would only require GAO to evaluate agency analyses.
    During the markup, one of the authors of H.R. 4744--Rep. 
David McIntosh--stated that he did not intend to require GAO to 
conduct its own independent analyses. Unfortunately, the 
language of the bill is inconsistent with this stated 
intention.
    As Rep. Jim Turner pointed out during the markup, H.R. 4744 
requires ``an independent evaluation,'' which shall include 
``an evaluation of the potential benefits'' and ``potential 
costs'' of the rule. Furthermore, H.R. 4744 requires GAO to 
conduct a number of analyses that are not currently conducted 
by the agencies. For instance, it requires cost/benefit, small 
business impact, and federalism analyses of some minor rules 
and of major rules promulgated by independent agencies. Because 
current law does not require that these analyses be performed 
by the agencies, GAO would have no choice but to conduct its 
own independent analyses under H.R. 4744.
    We are also concerned that H.R. 4744 focuses more on the 
costs of regulations than on the benefits. In theory, the 
weighing of costs and benefits may appear appealing. But in 
practice, many of the most important regulatory benefits cannot 
be quantified. Thus, an undue emphasis on cost-benefit figures 
can skew the analysis. This problem is exacerbated by the 
requirement that GAO analyze the cost-effectiveness of 
alternatives to the regulation, which emphasizes the cost side 
of the equation.
    This Committee has passed a number of regulatory reform 
measures which were voted out of Committee largely on a party 
line vote. None of these measures has been passed by the 
Senate. However, in this case, the Committee had an opportunity 
to take a different approach and pass a bipartisan bill that 
had received unanimous support in the Senate. We are 
disappointed that the Committee chose not to take this route 
when it rejected the Kucinich-Waxman substitute amendment.

                                   Henry A. Waxman.
                                   Tom Lantos.
                                   Major R. Owens.
                                   Edolphus Towns.
                                   Paul E. Kanjorski.
                                   Patsy T. Mink.
                                   Bernard Sanders.
                                   Carolyn B. Maloney.
                                   Eleanor H. Norton.
                                   Chaka Fattah.
                                   Elijah E. Cummings.
                                   Dennis J. Kucinich.
                                   Rod R. Blagojevich.
                                   Danny K. Davis.
                                   John F. Tierney.
                                   Tom Allen.
                                   Harold E. Ford, Jr.
                                   Jan Schakowsky.

                              Attachment 1

                          Citizens for Sensible Safeguards,
                                     Washington, DC, June 28, 2000.
    Dear Representative: On behalf of Citizens for Sensible 
Safeguards, a broad-based coalition of more than 200 public 
interest organizations, we are writing to express our strong 
opposition to H.R. 4744, which seeks to establish an office 
within GAO to conduct cost-benefit analysis of agency rules.
    This legislation is vastly different from the Senate 
version (S. 1198), which recently passed by unanimous consent. 
In reaching this bipartisan compromise, our coalition worked 
closely with the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee to make 
sure that (1) GAO is capable of conducting the work assigned to 
it; (2) that an extra-rulemaking process is not created; and 
(3) that cost considerations are not elevated above the benefit 
side of the equation.
    H.R. 4744 violates all of these principles. Specifically:
     It requires that GAO conduct its own cost-benefit 
analysis. Cost-benefit analyses are extremely time-consuming, 
require significant expertise, and are done within the context 
of each rulemaking. Yet H.R. 4744 requires that GAO finish its 
analysis within 180 days for final rules, and 60 days--or the 
end of the public comment period, whichever is later--for 
proposed or interim final rules. This is clearly unworkable, 
especially considering that the bill authorizes only $5.2 
million to fund the office. The Senate bill, by contrast, only 
asks GAO to conduct ``an evaluation of the agency's analysis'' 
to examine ``underlying assessments and assumptions'' (and 
allows 180 days for analysis of proposed rules, as it does for 
final rules). This is more realistic and fits much more 
naturally with GAO's skill, which is in auditing agency 
activity, not in developing regulation.
     It requires GAO to assess regulatory alternatives 
using new criteria--not required of the agencies--that slant 
analysis to the cost side of the equation. H.R. 4744 requires 
GAO to conduct an analysis ``of any alternative regulatory 
approaches that could achieve the same goal in a more cost-
effective manner or that could provide greater net benefits * * 
*'' Currently, agencies are not required to develop rules on 
the basis of a cost-effectiveness test, and in many cases, they 
are statutorily prohibited from doing so because of the 
seriousness of the health, safety, or environmental risks 
involved. Such a test inevitably leads to less protective 
standards. GAO should not be charged with evaluating rules on 
the basis of a standard that Congress has found, in many cases, 
to be inappropriate. This provision was removed from the Senate 
version for that reason.
     It puts GAO in the position of weighing outside 
analysis. Not only would GAO have to review the agency's work, 
it would also have to review the ``public's data, methodology, 
and assumptions used in developing the economically significant 
rule''--presumably information from the public comment period, 
although the bill does not specify. This would put GAO in the 
position of weighing outside analysis (including self-serving 
analysis generated by affected industry)--in search of a ``more 
cost effective'' approach--that the agency has already reviewed 
and rejected. GAO would simply not have the time or the 
expertise to do its own credible, independent assessment of the 
``public's data.''
    Some of the language in this bill is somewhat ambiguous. 
The proponents may claim that it does not actually require GAO 
to conduct cost-benefit analysis. But if that's the case, then 
why not go with language from the Senate version that is 
decidedly unambiguous? Clearly, the sponsors of H.R. 4744 have 
something more in mind.
    In particular, we are concerned that H.R. 4744 creates an 
extra-rulemaking process at GAO--which could serve as the basis 
for rejecting agency rules--that includes none of the checks 
and balances of an executive branch rulemaking (e.g., notice 
and comment, judicial review, etc.). This is especially 
significant since the immense scope of the work, coupled with 
the limited time-frame, is likely to produce sloppy work. Add 
in the bill's overemphasis on costs, and GAO's reports would 
provide a distorted regulatory picture that could bias Congress 
against important health, safety, and environmental 
protections.
    Accordingly, we strongly urge you to oppose H.R. 4744. If 
you have any questions on this bill or would like to meet with 
coalition members, please contact Reece Rushing.
            Sincerely,
                    AFL-CIO; AFSCME; American Public Health 
                            Association; Consumers Union; National 
                            Environmental Trust; OMB Watch; Public 
                            Citizen; UAW; United Steelworkers of 
                            America; U.S. PIRG.

                              Attachment 2

                    U.S. General Accounting Office,
                             Office of the General Counsel,
                                     Washington, DC, June 29, 2000.
Hon. Henry A. Waxman,
Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Government Reform, House of 
        Representatives.
Hon. Dennis Kucinich,
Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on National Economic Growth, 
        Natural Resources, and Regulatory Affairs, Committee on 
        Government Reform, House of Representatives.
    As you requested, this letter provides our views regarding 
the role proposed for GAO by H.R. 4744, the ``Truth in 
Regulating Act of 2000,'' We have met with majority and 
minority staff on several occasions regarding the GAO-related 
provisions of the Senate bill (S. 1198) that was passed by the 
Senate on May 9, 2000, as well as the previously introduced 
House bills on this issue (H.R. 3521 and H.R. 3669).
    We are not taking a position on whether Congress needs the 
type of regulatory analysis and reporting contemplated by the 
bill. However, in testimony earlier this month, we noted both 
the House and Senate legislation on this issue and said that we 
stood ready to assist Congress in carrying outs its oversight 
responsibility.\1\ We also said that our ability to carry out 
that role depended on how any legislation that is ultimately 
enacted addresses such issues as (1) the scope of the analysis 
contemplated, (2) the amount of time within which we must 
perform our reviews, (3) the number of requests that we 
receive, and (4) the resources that we are given to accomplish 
the tasks involved.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Regulatory Reform: Procedural and Analytical Requirements in 
Federal Rulemaking (GAO/T-GGD/OGC-00-157, June 8, 2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    H.R. 4744 contains provisions that could affect each of 
these issues. With respect to the scope of our analysis, the 
bill states that our reports should include an evaluation of 
the potential benefits and costs of the rules, as well as an 
evaluation of any alternative approaches that could achieve the 
same goal in a more cost-effective manner or that could provide 
greater net benefits. This language could be interpreted to 
require us to prepare our own cost-benefit analysis for the 
rules--a complex and resource intensive task that sometimes 
takes agencies months or years to complete. It is also a role 
that is very different than our traditional responsibility of 
evaluating agencies' analyses. To eliminate any ambiguity on 
this issue, the language in the bill could be clarified to 
specify that GAO's role would be to review the agencies' 
evaluations of costs, benefits, and alternative approaches.
    With regard to the amount of time permitted for our 
reviews, H.R. 4744 states that, for proposed or interim final 
rules, our reports should be submitted to Congress within 60 
calendar days of the request or by the end of the rulemaking 
comment period, whichever is later. While the bill provides us 
with 180 days to review other types of rules, it states that 
the procedures delineating priorities of requests should give 
the highest priority to proposed and interim final rules. 
Therefore, most of our reviews pursuant to H.R. 4744 could have 
to be completed within 60 days. We believe that we will often 
need more than 60 days to develop our reports given the size 
and complexity of many of the economic analyses that we could 
be expected to review. Also, on several occasions we have 
provided our views on proposed rules after the official comment 
period had ended, sometimes to great effect.\2\ Therefore, we 
believe that providing 180 days for the review of all rules 
would permit GAO to perform meaningful and timely analyses.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ See, for example, Dietary Supplements: Uncertainties in 
Analyses Underlying FDA's Proposed Rule on Ephedrine Alkaloids (GAO/
HEHS/GGD-99-90, July 2, 1999). In response to our concerns, FDA 
partially withdrew this 1997 proposed rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The potential universe of rules that could be the subject 
of a congressional request under H.R. 4744 could also be 
substantial. The bill initially defines ``economically 
significant'' rules subject to a possible review request to 
include any proposed or final rule that would, among other 
things, have a $100 million impact on the economy. We estimate 
that about 100 rules are published each year that meet this 
standard. The bill also includes in the definition of 
``economically significant'' rules any proposed or final rule 
that has a significant effect on small entities under the 
Regulatory Flexibility Act. It is unclear how many rules this 
provision could add to the number of potentially reviewable 
rules, but it could be several hundred.
    Finally, H.R. 4744 states that $5.2 million is authorized 
to be appropriated to GAO in each fiscal year, but does not 
make our review responsibility contingent upon our receiving an 
additional appropriation. Therefore, we could be required to 
assume a significant additional workload with no additional 
funds during a period of time when the demand for GAO 
assistance throughout the Congress has never been greater. As 
we said in a report last year, an independent analysis of 
regulatory costs and benefits will be most useful to 
policymakers if the organization charged with this 
responsibility has sufficient resources to do a proper job.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ Regulatory Accounting: Analysis of OMB's Reports on the Costs 
and Benefits of Federal Regulation (GAO/GGD-99-59, Apr. 20, 1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    We would be happy to discuss these and other issues with 
you or your staff in greater detail, and to work with the 
Committee as it considers issues related to GAO in this 
important legislation. As noted earlier, we worked extensively 
with both majority and minority staff in the Senate on the 
related GAO provisions in S. 1198. As a result of those 
discussions, we believe that the Senate bill provides a 
reasonable accommodation to our concerns.
    Because of our previous discussions regarding this issue 
with congressional staff, we are sending copies of this letter 
to Representative Dan Burton, Chairman, Committee on Government 
Reform; Representative David McIntosh, Chairman, Subcommittee 
on National Economic Growth, Natural Resources, and Regulatory 
Affairs, Committee on Government Reform; Representative Sue 
Kelly, Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Regulatory Reform and 
Paperwork Reduction, Committee on Small Business; 
Representative Constance A. Morella; Senator Fred Thompson and 
Senator Joseph I. Lieberman, Chairman and Ranking Minority 
Member, respectively, of the Committee on Governmental Affairs; 
Senator Christopher Bond; Senator Richard C. Shelby; and 
Senator Carl Levin.

                                             Lynn H. Gibson
                           (For Robert P. Murphy, General Counsel).

                            ADDITIONAL VIEWS

    The Minority Views section of this report erroneously 
states that H.R. 4744 ``would require GAO to conduct a host of 
new independent analyses.'' During the Committee debate, I 
clarified that H.R. 4744 does not require or expect GAO to 
conduct any new RIAs, cost-benefit analyses, or other impact 
analyses. The Minority Views section also erroneously states 
that the bill ``requires cost/benefit, small business impact, 
and federalism analyses * * * Because current law does not 
require that these analyses be performed by the agencies, GAO 
would have no choice but to conduct its own independent 
analyses.'' The bill merely requires GAO to analyze already-
prepared agency analyses, not to prepare any missing cost/
benefit, small business impact, federalism analysis, or any 
other missing analysis.
    Attachment 1, an unsigned letter from ten organizations on 
Citizens for Sensible Safeguards letterhead, misunderstands 
several aspects of the bill. First, it also erroneously states 
that the bill ``requires that GAO conduct its own cost-benefit 
analysis.'' Second, the letter states that the GAO analysis 
will be slanted to the cost side of the equation ``in search of 
a `more cost effective' approach.'' Instead, the bill calls for 
an analysis of alternatives that could achieve the goal in a 
more cost-effective manner or that could provide greater net 
benefits. Alternatives that achieve the same goal achieve the 
same benefit; alternatives that provide greater net benefits 
are more beneficial. Third, the letter states that the bill 
``creates an extra-rulemaking process at GAO * * * that 
includes none of the checks and balances of an executive branch 
rulemaking (e.g., notice and comment, judicial review, etc.).'' 
This is a misunderstanding of the bill and the agency 
rulemaking process. The bill merely calls for GAO's analytic 
help so that Congressional Committees can effectively 
participate in the agency's rulemaking process at the proposed 
rule stage and can effectively consider actions under the CRA 
at the final rule stage. The agency continues to be the 
ultimate decisionmaker after notice and consideration of 
comments from Congressional Committees and other public 
commentors, and agency actions continue to be subject to 
judicial review.
    Attachment 2 is a pre-Committee markup letter from GAO. The 
Committee debate addressed GAO's concerns: (a) H.R. 4744 does 
not require or expect GAO to conduct any new RIAs, cost-benefit 
analyses, or other impact analyses; (b) under the APA's 
fairness provisions, GAO cannot be given more time than other 
members of the public to comment on agency regulatory 
proposals; (c) the inclusion of rules, within the scope of 
GAO's new evaluation function, that significantly impact small 
businesses is desirable because small businesses, which are the 
backbone of America, deserve a special analysis for new agency 
regulatory burdens on them; and (d) authorization bills do not 
include guaranteed appropriation amounts. In fact, GAO was 
unable to provide the Committee with any example of an enacted 
authorization bill with such a guarantee.

                                                    David McIntosh.
    The text of H.R. 4744 follows:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

  This Act may be cited as the ``Truth in Regulating Act of 
2000''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND PURPOSES.

  (a) Findings.--Congress finds that--
          (1) many Federal regulations have improved the 
        quality of life of the American public, however, 
        uncontrolled increases in regulatory costs and lost 
        opportunities for better regulation should not be 
        continued;
          (2) the legislative branch has a responsibility to 
        ensure that laws passed by Congress are properly 
        implemented by the executive branch; and
          (3) in order for the legislative branch to fulfill 
        its responsibilities to ensure that laws passed by 
        Congress are implemented in an efficient, effective, 
        and fair manner, the Congress requires accurate and 
        reliable information on which to base decisions.
  (b) Purposes.--The purposes of this Act are to--
          (1) increase the transparency of important regulatory 
        decisions;
          (2) promote effective congressional oversight to 
        ensure that agency rules fulfill statutory requirements 
        in an efficient, effective, and fair manner; and
          (3) increase the accountability of Congress and the 
        agencies to the people they serve.

SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

  In this Act, the term--
          (1) ``agency'' has the meaning given such term under 
        section 551(1) of title 5, United States Code;
          (2) ``economically significant rule'' means any 
        proposed or final rule, including an interim or direct 
        final rule, that may have an annual effect on the 
        economy of $100,000,000 or more or adversely affect in 
        a material way the economy, a sector of the economy, 
        productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, 
        public health or safety, or State, local, or tribal 
        governments or communities, or for which an agency has 
        prepared an initial or final regulatory flexibility 
        analysis pursuant to section 603 or 604 of title 5, 
        United States Code; and
          (3) ``independent evaluation'' means a substantive 
        evaluation of the agency's and the public's data, 
        methodology, and assumptions used in developing the 
        economically significant rule, and any additional 
        evaluation that the Comptroller General determines to 
        be necessary, including--
                  (A) an explanation of how any strengths or 
                weaknesses in those data, methodology, and 
                assumptions support or detract from conclusions 
                reached by the agency; and
                  (B) the implications, if any, of those 
                strengths or weaknesses for the rulemaking.

SEC. 4. REPORT ON RULES.

  (a) In General.--
          (1) Request for review.--When an agency publishes an 
        economically significant rule, a chairman or ranking 
        member of a committee of jurisdiction of either House 
        of Congress may request the Comptroller General of the 
        United States to review the rule.
          (2) Report.--The Comptroller General shall submit a 
        report on each economically significant rule selected 
        under paragraph (4) to the committees of jurisdiction 
        in each House of Congress not later than 180 calendar 
        days after a committee request is received, or in the 
        case of a request for review of a notice of proposed 
        rulemaking or an interim final rulemaking, by not later 
        than the end of the 60-calendar-day period beginning on 
        the date the committee request is received, or the end 
        of the period for submission of comment regarding the 
        rulemaking, whichever is later. The report shall 
        include an independent evaluation of the economically 
        significant rule by the Comptroller General.
          (3) Independent evaluation.--The independent 
        evaluation of the economically significant rule by the 
        Comptroller General under paragraph (2) shall include--
                  (A) an evaluation of the potential benefits 
                of the rule, including any beneficial effects 
                that cannot be quantified in monetary terms and 
                the identification of the persons or entities 
                likely to receive the benefits;
                  (B) an evaluation of the potential costs of 
                the rule, including any adverse effects that 
                cannot be quantified in monetary terms and the 
                identification of the persons or entities 
                likely to bear the costs;
                  (C) an evaluation of any alternative 
                approaches that could achieve the same goal in 
                a more cost-effective manner or that could 
                provide greater net benefits, and, if 
                applicable, a brief explanation of any 
                statutory reasons why such alternatives could 
                not be adopted;
                  (D) an evaluation of the regulatory impact 
                analysis, federalism assessment, or other 
                analysis or assessment prepared by the agency 
                or required for the economically significant 
                rule; and
                  (E) a summary of the results of the 
                evaluation of the Comptroller General and the 
                implications of those results, including an 
                evaluation of any changes from the proposed 
                rule made by the agency in the final rule.
          (4) Procedures for priorities of requests.--In 
        consultation with the Majority and Minority Leaders of 
        the Senate and the Speaker and Minority Leader of the 
        House of Representatives, the Comptroller General shall 
        develop procedures for determining the priority and 
        number of those requests for review under paragraph (1) 
        that will be reported under paragraph (2). The 
        procedures shall give the highest priority to requests 
        regarding a notice of proposed rulemaking, and to 
        requests regarding an interim final rulemaking.
  (b) Authority of Comptroller General.--Each agency shall 
promptly cooperate with the Comptroller General in carrying out 
this Act. Nothing in this Act is intended to expand or limit 
the authority of the General Accounting Office.

SEC. 5. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

  There are authorized to be appropriated to the General 
Accounting Office to carry out this Act $5,200,000 for each of 
fiscal years 2001 through 2003.

SEC. 6. EFFECTIVE DATE; SUNSET PROVISION.

  (a) Effective Date.--This Act shall take effect 180 days 
after the date of enactment of this Act.
  (b) Sunset Provision.--This Act shall not apply with respect 
to rules published on or after the date that is 3 years after 
the effective date of this Act.

                                
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