[House Report 106-730]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]





106th Congress         HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES         Report
2d Session                                              106-730

____________________________________________________________________





 
 EXPRESSING THE SENSE OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THAT THE RECENT 
 NUCLEAR WEAPONS SECURITY FAILURES AT LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY 
 DEMONSTRATE THAT SECURITY POLICY AND SECURITY PROCEDURES WITHIN THE 
 NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION REMAIN INADEQUATE, THAT THE 
 INDIVIDUALS RESPONSIBLE FOR SUCH POLICY AND PROCEDURES MUST BE HELD 
 ACCOUNTABLE FOR THEIR PERFORMANCE, AND THAT IMMEDIATE ACTION MUST BE 
                TAKEN TO CORRECT SECURITY DEFICIENCIES

                               ----------                              

                              R E P O R T

                                 OF THE

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                                   ON

                              H. Res. 534


                                     


                                     

   July 12, 2000.--Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be 
                                printed



                   HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                       One Hundred Sixth Congress

               FLOYD D. SPENCE, South Carolina, Chairman
BOB STUMP, Arizona                   IKE SKELTON, Missouri
DUNCAN HUNTER, California            NORMAN SISISKY, Virginia
JOHN R. KASICH, Ohio                 JOHN M. SPRATT, Jr., South 
HERBERT H. BATEMAN, Virginia             Carolina
JAMES V. HANSEN, Utah                SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas
CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania            OWEN PICKETT, Virginia
JOEL HEFLEY, Colorado                LANE EVANS, Illinois
JIM SAXTON, New Jersey               GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi
STEVE BUYER, Indiana                 NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii
TILLIE K. FOWLER, Florida            MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York             ROBERT A. UNDERWOOD, Guam
JAMES TALENT, Missouri               PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island
TERRY EVERETT, Alabama               ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland         SILVESTRE REYES, Texas
HOWARD ``BUCK'' McKEON, California   TOM ALLEN, Maine
J.C. WATTS, Jr., Oklahoma            VIC SNYDER, Arkansas
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas                JIM TURNER, Texas
JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana          ADAM SMITH, Washington
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia             LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
VAN HILLEARY, Tennessee              JAMES H. MALONEY, Connecticut
JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida             MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
WALTER B. JONES, Jr., North          CIRO D. RODRIGUEZ, Texas
    Carolina                         CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina       ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California
JIM RYUN, Kansas                     ROBERT BRADY, Pennsylvania
BOB RILEY, Alabama                   ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey
JIM GIBBONS, Nevada                  BARON P. HILL, Indiana
MARY BONO, California                MIKE THOMPSON, California
JOSEPH PITTS, Pennsylvania           JOHN B. LARSON, Connecticut
ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina
STEVEN KUYKENDALL, California
DONALD SHERWOOD, Pennsylvania

                    Robert S. Rangel, Staff Director


                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

Purpose and Background...........................................     1
Legislative History..............................................     3
Committee Position...............................................     3
Oversight Findings...............................................     3
Record Vote......................................................     3
106th Congress                                                   Report
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 2d Session                                                     106-730

======================================================================




 EXPRESSING THE SENSE OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THAT THE RECENT 
  NUCLEAR WEAPONS SECURITY FAILURES AT LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY 
  DEMONSTRATE THAT SECURITY POLICY AND SECURITY PROCEDURES WITHIN THE 
 NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION REMAIN INADEQUATE, THAT THE 
  INDIVIDUALS RESPONSIBLE FOR SUCH POLICY AND PROCEDURES MUST BE HELD 
 ACCOUNTABLE FOR THEIR PERFORMANCE, AND THAT IMMEDIATE ACTION MUST BE 
                 TAKEN TO CORRECT SECURITY DEFICIENCIES

                                _______
                                

   July 12, 2000.--Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be 
                                printed

                                _______
                                

    Mr. Spence, from the Committee on Armed Services, submitted the 
                               following

                              R E P O R T

                       [To accompany H. Res. 534]

      [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

  The Committee on Armed Services, to whom was referred the 
resolution (H. Res. 534) expressing the sense of the House of 
Representatives that the recent nuclear weapons security 
failures at Los Alamos National Laboratory demonstrate that 
security policy and security procedures within the National 
Nuclear Security Administration remain inadequate, that the 
individuals responsible for such policy and procedures must be 
held accountable for their performance, and that immediate 
action must be taken to correct security deficiencies, having 
considered the same, report favorably thereon without amendment 
and recommend that the resolution do pass.

                         purpose and background

    The purpose of H. Res. 534 is to express the sense of the 
House of Representatives that the security policies and 
procedures within the National Nuclear Security Administration 
(NNSA) remain inadequate, that the individuals responsible for 
these policies and procedures must be held accountable for 
their performance, and that immediate action must be taken to 
correct security deficiencies affecting the safeguarding of 
classified nuclear weapons information.
    In response to a long history of security and management 
problems, Congress established the National Nuclear Security 
Administration by title 32 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (Public Law 106-65). 
That Act established the NNSA as a semi-autonomous 
administration within the Department of Energy (DOE) with 
responsibility for the management of the Nation's nuclear 
security programs. The NNSA was formally established on March 
1, 2000. In advance of the confirmation by the Senate of an 
Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, 
the Secretary of Energy opted to fulfill the additional 
functions and duties of the NNSA Administrator. The Secretary 
also appointed the Director of the Office of Security and 
Emergency Operations of the Department of Energy, who is 
charged with the responsibility to establish security policy 
for DOE generally, to serve simultaneously as the Chief of 
Defense Nuclear Security of the National Nuclear Security 
Administration, who is charged with responsibility for 
executing security policy for the NNSA specifically.
    The committee notes that over the course of the past year, 
the management of the Department of Energy has repeatedly 
asserted that security throughout the Department and the 
national laboratory system had been greatly improved. In May 
1999, the Secretary of Energy stated that the ``safeguards of 
national secrets have been dramatically strengthened and 
improved.'' On March 2, 2000, the Secretary told the committee 
in a public hearing that ``we've reached a point where we have 
very strong security procedures,'' and ``[t]here's no longer a 
culture of lax security. That has ended.''
    With regard to security at Los Alamos National Laboratory, 
the committee notes that the Office of Independent Oversight 
and Performance Assurance of the Department of Energy reviewed 
security practices at that laboratory in September 1999. That 
review awarded the laboratory an overall rating of 
``satisfactory,'' the highest rating possible, and commended 
the laboratory's security operations as ``first class.''
    In light of the repeated assurances by the management of 
the Department of Energy and the Department's assessment of the 
security procedures at Los Alamos National Laboratory for the 
safeguarding of classified nuclear weapons information, the 
committee was deeply troubled to learn on June 9, 2000, that 
two computer hard drives containing a large quantity of 
classified nuclear weapons information were missing from the 
vault in which they were stored at a secure facility at the 
laboratory.
    In response to that breach of security, the committee held 
an open hearing and a classified briefing on June 14, 2000, and 
June 22, 2000, respectively, to assess the policies and 
procedures for the protection of classified nuclear weapons 
information within the national laboratory system. The 
committee notes with concern that no inventory of secret 
restricted data was maintained at Los Alamos National 
Laboratory; that the Department of Energy was unaware of how 
many NNSA personnel have uncontrolled access to classified 
nuclear weapons material in the vaults at Los Alamos National 
Laboratory and that no logs were maintained to account for 
access to such information; and that routine security 
procedures to change combinations to, or access lists for, the 
vaults were not updated as required by established DOE security 
procedures.
    The committee notes again the June 1999 conclusion of the 
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board that DOE 
suffers from a culture of low regard for security and the 
conclusion of the Special Oversight Panel on Department of 
Energy Reorganization of the Committee on Armed Services in 
February 2000 that the implementation plan prepared by the 
Department to establish the NNSA was inadequate.
    The committee believes that the protection of nuclear 
weapons information is a critical responsibility for all those 
with access to that information, and that the compromise of the 
data on the hard drives, if confirmed, would constitute a clear 
and present danger to the United States and its allies.

                          legislative history

    H. Res. 534 was introduced on June 27, 2000 and referred to 
the Committee on Armed Services.
    On June 28, 2000, the Committee on Armed Services held a 
markup session to consider H. Res. 534. The committee adopted 
the resolution by a voice vote. The resolution was reported 
favorably by a voice vote.

                           committee position

    On June 28, 2000, the Committee on Armed Services, a quorum 
being present, approved H. Res. 534 by a voice vote.

                           oversight findings

    With respect to clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, this legislation results from 
hearings and other oversight activities conducted by the 
committee pursuant to clause 2(b)(1) of rule X.
    With respect to clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives and section 308(a)(1) of the 
Congressional Budget Act of 1974, this legislation does not 
include any new spending or credit authority, nor does it 
provide for any increase or decrease in tax revenues or 
expenditures.
    With respect to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, the committee has not received a 
report from the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight 
pertaining to the subject matter of H. Res. 534.

                              record vote

    In accordance with clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, the committee notes that no roll 
call votes were taken with respect to H. Res. 534.
    The committee ordered H. Res. 534 reported to the House 
with a favorable recommendation by a voice vote, a quorum being 
present.

                                
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